ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF TRADITIONAL CULTURE AMONG THE HAISLA

by

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Abstract

This thesis explores the interrelationship between the disintegration of traditional culture among the Haisla of Kitamaat, British Columbia, and that group's participation in the industrial economy of the Northwest Coast.

Initially, the ecological dimension of ranking and chieftainship in traditional Haisla society is examined. It is proposed that localized variability of resources was sufficient to create shortages within village groups or sub-groups, which would require the intervention of a regulatory mechanism such as chiefly redistribution. This regulation of resources promoted the establishment of populations consistent with the high average productivity of a region rather than the more variable productivity of individual sites.

High status accrued to those who, because of the greater regularity and reliability of their resource holdings, were able to act as donors more often than less favoured groups or sub-groups.

The disintegration of this system coincided with the natives' participation in the industrial economy of the coast. This participation is examined in terms of: the extent and type of merchantable resources in the region; their accessibility and availability to native producers; the number, type, and location of markets; prevailing prices and potential income; compatibility of various occupations, both with each other and with traditional subsistence activities; and, the socio-political implications for the natives of their participation.
The removal of the chiefs from the apex of the economic system was initiated by the decline in importance of traditional resource sites, as population decline reduced the exploitative pressure on the resource base that the large aboriginal population had exerted.

The Haislas' participation in the industrial economy further undermined aboriginal social organization by establishing a system of resource exploitation that was independent of the traditional political structure and the services of the central figures. Access to resources and wealth became governed by factors outside the chiefs' control, and in fact placed them in the same economic position as anyone else, in that success became due to personal characteristics, such as skill or stamina (or luck) rather than social position.

Two non-economic factors contributory to cultural change, missionization and severe population decline, are examined. The establishment of an evangelical mission among the Haisla promoted change in two ways: the missionaries themselves were often bent on eradicating all forms of native culture that they considered incompatible with their teachings; in addition, by establishing separate mission settlements, they provided a sanctuary in which innovative social forms could be adopted, enabling novel adaptations to prevailing economic or political circumstances to proceed relatively unhampered by conservative pressure or reprisals.

The population decline enforced a receptivity to social innovation even among traditionalist elements, who were obliged to countenance manipulation of the social system in order to
maintain some semblance of continuity in the face of depletion of the social units and disruption of lines of succession. These innovations were elaborated by reformist elements, which contributed further to the dissolution of 'pure' native forms.

The eventual replacement of the traditional matrilineal system by the European bilateral one was preceded by an extended period in which both systems operated simultaneously. This process is considered, focussing on changes in the traditional system of named, ranked statuses and their transmission via the potlatch.
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Figure 1

Haisla Territory
Chapter 1

Introduction

This thesis will examine the relationship between the disintegration of the aboriginal culture of the Haisla of Kitamaat, British Columbia, and three of the more significant and pervasive effects of contact, viz.: 1) Haisla participation in the industrial economy of the coast; 2) population decline, which resulted primarily from epidemic and endemic diseases carried by whites; 3) missionization by an 'ultra-evangelical' form of Christianity that arrived bent on eradicating all aspects of aboriginal culture deemed incompatible with its teachings.

I will focus on two aspects of traditional culture: the matrilineal clan system and the system of named, ranked, statuses that culminated in lineage, clan, and village chiefs.

I will first examine those conditions that contributed to the establishment and maintenance of chieftainship and hereditary ranked statuses among the Haisla, in order to provide a background for consideration of the changes that led to or permitted their decline.

Second will come a detailed examination of the economic history of the Haisla, describing the environmental, technological, and historical conditions that influenced the nature and extent of their participation in the industrial economy. These chapters will deal primarily with commercial fishing and logging.

Third will be a short account of the decline of population

among the Haisla. This will be followed by a description of the character and activities of the mission that was established at Kitamaat.

(Although the processes mentioned here were common to most, if not all, the native groups of the coast, they differed considerably in detail from people to people.) Any examination of the interrelationships of those processes for a particular group must, therefore, take those variations into consideration.

(The natives' entry into the market economy, for example, was conditioned by a host of factors: the occurrence of marketable resources within the various territories; environmental characteristics, such as terrain or climate, that promoted or inhibited the exploitation of those resources with cheap, readily available technology; proximity to or isolation from markets; the presence or absence of a local non-Indian population, which could compete for jobs or access to the resources. The variation of these factors from region to region could be considerable.)

Similarly, no two missions seem to have been quite alike. The combination of church doctrine, the training, approach, or personality of the missionary, the disposition of the native subjects and historical factors (how severely the particular group had suffered from epidemics, for example) all played a part in shaping the particular character of the mission, and the degree and velocity of cultural change. The Kitamaat appear to have hosted one of the sterner, more uncompromising missions, which may have accelerated abandonment of elements of their
traditional culture.

Fifth, as an example of the disintegration of aboriginal culture, I will describe changes that have taken place in the transmission of named, ranked statuses. (Associated with the decline in importance of statuses is the relegation of matriliny to a peripheral role in the everyday affairs of the village.)

Finally, I will attempt to relate the breakdown of traditional social forms to the economic, demographic, and ideological pressures described earlier.

In the first section, the basis of chieftainship and ranking, I will propose that the existence of both is explicable in terms of the irregularity of the occurrence of staple resources, particularly salmon. In part, this hypothesis proceeds from the proposals of Suttles (1960, 1962) and Piddocke (1965) that the coastal resource base was characterized by irregularity and unpredictability, and that failures of salmon runs occasionally led to shortages among the tribes, shortages that were met through redistribution from groups enjoying surpluses. The formulation proposed here differs from those of Suttles and Piddocke in that it considers intra-group redistributions to be ultimately more significant than inter-group ones in the development of characteristic coastal cultural forms, and also proposes that redistribution was one of the causative elements in the occurrence of shortages among local groups (or sub-groups). By creating an interdependence that enables local groups to transcend the limitations set by their individual resource bases, redistribution permitted the establishment of a population size consistent with
the high average productivity of the wider region rather than the more variable productivity of the local area.

Under this formulation, the basis of the chief's economic importance (and thus of his superior status and prestige) is the necessity for a redistributive agent to counter the inevitable shortages that would occur as a result of the local groups' surrender of self-sufficiency.

The second group of chapters, dealing with the economic history of the Haisla, will examine two issues: the factors that governed their participation in the industrial economy of the region, and the patterns of that involvement over the past three-quarters of a century. Those patterns reveal a process that has been underway for some decades.

This process is reflected in the markedly different pictures that we have of Northwest Coast economic life during early and later phases of the development of the industrial economy. On the one hand, we read of the ease with which wealth flowed to the natives during the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth, and of the flamboyance and 'disregard for tomorrow' with which they consumed it. Drucker, for example, claimed that:

...It became possible for anyone to acquire a small fortune in trade blankets, etc. from extra-cultural (i.e., European) sources, by such a relatively simple process as killing a sea otter or two, or putting in a lucrative season on a sealing schooner (1939: 145fn).

We read, too, of the profligacy of native potlatches, at which thousands of blankets and dollars, dozens of canoes and rifles, and uncounted sacks of flour, sugar, and the like were
given away or destroyed. Duff quotes a Southern Kwakiutl's observation that:

When I was young I saw streams of wealth shed in war. But since that time the white men came and stopped up that stream of blood with wealth. Now we fight with our wealth (1964: 59).

Even though this process has been described in considerable detail, by Codere (1950, 1961) in particular, Drucker and Heizer claim that, if anything, it has been underplayed.

An aspect of the transition from aboriginal to a modern economy that Codere manifestly understands but perhaps might have emphasized more strongly is that Southern Kwakiutl life and the potlatch were enriched by the vast stream of, to them, cheap consumer goods acquired through trade channels (1967: 14).

Studies of current coastal economies and societies, however, tend to focus on the poverty and deprivation characteristic of contemporary reserve life, stress how the native ranks at or near the bottom in virtually any measure of economic well-being, and point out that his prospects are generally the worst of anyone's in the province.
The transition between early prosperity and later poverty is so startling that I wondered how the change came about, what circumstances and processes were abroad to bring the native so low so quickly.

The answer, I believe, lies in the character of the development of the major industries of the coast. That development has militated against the natives' full or independent participation in the economy until today he is at best a marginal, almost mendicant member, in large part reliant for his economic survival on companies and governments that occasionally make provision for his participation by enacting measures to ensure that no matter how precarious his position may become, he shall not disappear altogether.

Initially, the slow and erratic settlement of the coast, coupled with the rudimentary technological level of fishing and logging in their early stages, enabled the natives to enter the field with little or no investment and relatively free from competition. At that point, the Indian was the only readily available source of labour for the producers, whose primitive transportation technology obliged them to locate their operations near to the source of the raw materials, far from metropolitan centers, but close to the isolated Indian villages.

The low technological state of the industries, with consequent ease of access and egress, enabled Indians to participate in many or all of the prevailing occupations, and thereby to shield themselves from the vagaries of any one. The system of occupational multiplicity that developed fitted quite well with
the subsistence economy that most natives continued to rely on, and altogether made for a sound adaptive strategy, one that coped rather well with the irregular and unpredictable fortunes of the infant industries.

With the settlement of the coast and the development of harvesting and transport equipment, the native found himself at a disadvantage in a number of ways. The equipment became too expensive for him to acquire readily. In fact, lack of capital or equipment drove many natives out of some occupations entirely, at least as independent producers. Those who attempted to keep up with the equipment race were obliged to specialize in one occupation, reducing their adaptability without measurably increasing their security, for while the industries may have become technologically more sophisticated, they remained subject to the same world market forces and/or unpredictability of supply, and consequently were basically no less erratic. The natives who tried to keep up were flirting with ruin and the loss of their equipment should things go badly, which they frequently did, while those who maintained their adaptability by clinging to the simpler and less expensive technologies were relegated to the more unprofitable margins of the industries, and eventually found themselves regulated out of business as governments attempted to rationalize production in the face of declining stocks of resources. The attempts at rationalization took the form of licence restrictions, royalty charges, and the like, and almost invariably favoured the interests of the large producers at the expense of the small 'inefficient' ones, which included most of
The third group of chapters, dealing with non-economic factors in the disintegration of traditional Haisla culture, focusses on missionization and population decline. I will examine both the deliberate changes fostered by the missionary, and the inadvertent or unforeseen shifts precipitated by his efforts at reform. I suspect that the principal contribution of the missionary to cultural change among the Haisla was the establishment of a separate mission village, wherein innovative forms of behaviour (responses to changes in the economy, perhaps) that might have caused considerable disruption in the traditional village could be tried out with relative impunity. These innovations may have been ostensibly in response to the missionary's urgings, but may also be seen as adaptations to the pressures of the industrial economy in which the natives were quite deeply involved by the time they began to move in numbers to the mission village.

The second non-economic force, depopulation, disrupted lines of succession so thoroughly that survivors were forced to countenance quite drastic manipulations of the social structure in order to try to maintain the integrity of the traditional social units. These manipulations became the precedents that later, less orthodox innovators extended to embrace ever more liberal interpretations of the rules, such that contemporary 'traditional' structures differ in fundamental ways from former ones.

In dealing with the disintegration of matriliny and the attenuation of the traditional system of named, ranked, statuses, I will apply Robert Anderson's (1960) 'reduction of variants'
schema to the process of acculturation. My version of Anderson's formulation views contact as characterized by a rapid increase in the number of variants, or alternative modes of behaviour, and acculturation as a progressive reduction of variants as traditional patterns drop away and introduced forms are retained. This, I believe, accounts for transitional situations like that at Kitamaat, in which elements of both traditional and modern systems operate simultaneously for some time, or in which certain factions adhere to one set of precepts, while another behaves according to an alternative set.

Finally, I will attempt to show that the operative sphere of the aboriginal system is progressively reduced as its substantive underpinning, control over the acquisition and distribution of resources, is assumed by elements of the new system.
Research Methods

The materials for this thesis were gathered in two stages. The first involved some ten months field work in Kitamaat; the second, about six months spent in archives and government records in Vancouver and Victoria.

During the field work period, the focus of the study shifted from a concentration on contemporary social organization and the effects of recent industrial activity on social change to a more historical account of the Haislas' experience in the industrial economy of the coast from about the inception of commercial fishing and logging. There were several reasons for this shift.

It soon became evident that contemporary native sensibilities would not permit me comfortably or successfully to pursue lines of questioning that a study of present day organization would require. Questions pertaining to mutual aid, finances, household economy or even residence patterns were construed as unwarranted prying. (That I tended to agree did not enhance my persistence, needless to say.) I therefore concluded that a more neutral historical study, focussing on economic history, could be more comfortably and profitably pursued.

This second approach placed my primarily in the company of older people, who, unlike the working population of the village, were willing and able to discourse at length about their lives and backgrounds. (The high employment rate at Kitamaat made it difficult to conduct interviews among the younger elements of the village, who were at work during the day, and seldom inclined to be questioned at length during the evenings. A full shift at
Alcan or Eurocan did not leave the workers too disposed to participate in lengthy interviews.) Older informants, however, often seemed pleased to discuss their experiences at considerable length, and a number of rewarding and mutually satisfying relationships developed.

With the selection of a historical problem, the matter of a sample of informants became irrelevant. Rather, the matter became one of discovering individuals who had the singular knowledge that I was after, and who were willing to discuss their life histories. Thus I adopted what might be termed an 'adventitious' sample--I talked to whoever would talk to me. Basically, I worked with seven major informants, ranging in age from the late forties to the late seventies. Of these, I worked with three most intensively, gaining life and work histories of both informants and their families, extending in some cases to the late nineteenth century. I consulted a wider circle of informants about specific issues, when my regular informants were not sure of details, or did not feel qualified to discuss matters that they did not 'own'. (My principal informant, an Eagle, would often refer me to members of other clans if my questions touched on matters that he knew of but did not have authority to discuss.)

I was thus able to develop an outline of the Haislas' economic and social life for about three quarters of a century--the economic avenues open to them and the effects of their economic circumstances on the social life. It remained to place these accounts into a more general historical framework, a matter
I pursued by way of documentary materials.

The genealogies and historical details collected in the field enabled me to peruse the government records and pick out data pertaining to Haislas. Although it would have been preferable to have had this material on hand before entering the field, I could not have gathered it without extensive genealogical and chronological information amassed at Kitamaat. Most of the records are not indexed; information is filed by year and name of person. This demands a considerable degree of familiarity with persons and operations before any benefit can be gained from the immense body of data contained in the files.
Chapter 2

The Haisla

Today, the Haisla\(^1\) live in the village of Kitamaat,\(^2\) located some seven miles from the head of Douglas Channel, near the city of Kitimat.

The Kitamaat Band is formed of two main subdivisions, the Kitamaat and the Kitlope, the latter formerly living at the mouth of the Kitlope River and at Kemano, both located in Gardner Canal. They formally amalgamated with the Kitamaat some two decades ago. Prior to that time, however, most of the band had already migrated to Kitamaat, and virtually all were resident there for at least part of the year.

The Kitamaat themselves are a combination of three precontact divisions, the Nalabila, or dwellers upriver (i.e., the Kitimat River), X'aisla, dwellers farthest downriver, and Gildalidox, or inhabitants of Kildala Arm. Some time before the first white settlement, the three branches began to winter together at the village of the X'aisla, located just upstream from the mouth of the Kitimat River.

Shortly after his arrival in 1893, the missionary, George

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1. Throughout the thesis, whenever I refer to the Haisla, I mean both Kitamaat and Kitlope. If I am not sure that the issue under discussion applies to both, I specify one division or another. Because most of the information extant pertains to the Kitamaat, they are the primary focus of this study.
2. I encountered more than twenty ways to spell Kitamaat. The Haisla themselves prefer Kitamaat, and therefore I use that version whenever I refer to the natives themselves or to their village. Elsewhere I adopted the common map spellings of places, e.g., Kitimat River, Kitimat (city). Variations of spelling in quotations remain unchanged, of course.
Raley, established a rival village on an old settlement site about five miles down channel from the head of the inlet. Converts moved there as they became Christianized. During the first decade of this century virtually all the Kitamaat had undergone at least nominal conversion, and migrated to Kitamaat Mission, as the village came to be called. The natives repaired to the old village site only to catch and process oolichan, or to potlatch out of reach of the missionary and Indian Agent.

Today, all status, On-Reserve Haisla live at Kitamaat. The 1973 census lists a total Haisla population of 883, approximately two-thirds of whom live in the village (Department of Indian and Northern Affairs census).

Traditional Orientation

Kroeber (1939: 29) classified the Haisla as 'Northern Maritime River,' a "variant of the Northern subculture, localized on rivers or inlets rather than the sea." Although the Haisla relied primarily upon the four main rivers of their region, the Kitlope and Kemano for the Kitlope, and the Dala and Kitimat for the Kitamaat, they nevertheless occupied and exploited one of the

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1. The Kitamaats' intimate connection with the river was demonstrated rather neatly after the introduction of outboard motors, and their installation on Haisla canoes. These craft are of the same general design and construction as the classic northern style, although they are slightly narrower in the beam, as befits a canoe used often in a swift flowing stream like the Kitimat. When poling up river, it was the practice to reverse the canoe and to proceed stern-first, for the vertical cutwater of the bow left the craft too susceptible to currents and eddies, while the high, curving stern permitted the steersman to maintain better control. When outboard motors came into use, the canoemen removed the bow in order to fit the motor, rather than the stern, thus sacrificing a measure of seaworthiness in order to retain river-worthiness.
major inlet systems of the Northwest Coast. They controlled at least two hundred miles of (inlet) coastline.

In addition to the four major rivers mentioned, Haisla territory included 31 salmon-bearing streams (cf. Table II, p. 42) scattered along the length of Douglas Channel, Gardner Canal, and the score of bays, arms, and channels of the inlet system. Older informants could recall the locations of some 40 houses or cabins built near resource sites throughout the region, an indication that those sites continued to be important until well into this century (cf. Figure 2, p. 16).

Traditional Social Structure

In terms of classification, the Haisla are something of an anomaly. Although they speak a Wakashan language, and are classed as the northernmost of the Northern Kwakiutl, their social organization resembles that of the Tsimshian, Haida, and Tlingit more than that of their linguistic kin. As Olson noted:

"Alone of all the Kwakiutl-speaking tribes the Haisla and Kitlope have a full-fledged maternal exogamic clan organization which is almost identical with that of their Tsimshian neighbours (1940: 169 )."

The consensus among students of the area seems to be that the forebears of the Haisla adopted that form of social organization as a way of articulating with the Tsimshian. The Haisla themselves have no sense that things were always as they are, and informants themselves speculated that their ancestors had taken on the northern form after migrating to the area.

The origin stories have the core of the Haisla moving from
Figure 2
Salmon Streams and Resource Sites of Haisla Territory

□: cabin adjacent to resource site

Source: Stream Catalogue 1972
Rivers Inlet to Kildala Arm and gradually populating the adjacent inlet system, absorbing other migrant groups who later arrived from the Skeena via the Kitimat valley.

Aboriginally, there were six clans, which, by the time that the first ethnographic reports were written, had coalesced into three groups:

- Beaver
- Blackfish
- Eagle
- Raven
- Salmon
- Crow

This linkage has proceeded quite far. In the case of the Blackfish and Salmon, for example, members are simply referred to as 'fish,' usually without any distinction being made. (Curiously, the Haisla term for the clan combination is based on their word for salmon, miya, rather than for blackfish, even though Olson noted that in potlatches the Blackfish were called before the Salmon, which would indicate that the former were ranked higher than the latter.)

Clans today are evident and active, albeit within a highly restricted sphere, and membership is maintained by adoption if a unit appears in danger of disappearing. Lineage organization, however, appears to have disappeared virtually without trace. Olson reported that he could discern lineages, but commented that they lacked the "clear cut functions of the clans" (1940: 170). Many of the informants that I consulted were not familiar with them at all. Possibly the sole remaining attribute of
lineage organization is the practice of calling the first three or four ranking nobles of a clan 'chief.' Among the Eagles, for example, the clan head, SanaxeD, is naturally called 'Chief SanaxeD,' but subordinate nobles' names are likewise prefaced--Chief Hemasaka, Chief G'psalopUst--which leads me to believe that those titles once denoted lineage heads. The clan chief regards the title holders as his counselors, which strengthens the view somewhat, for lineage heads acted as such in Tsimshian villages like Port Simpson, where lineages remained active until well into this century.

Actually, the people do refer to units such as 'Chief Legex's family,' but I do not believe that that can be taken as evidence of any significant intra-clan distinctions, for the individuals included in the appellation are a small group who are seen to be closely related to the chief. Even after all the "chiefs' families" are totalled there remains a great mass of individuals who once would have belonged to one lineage or another, but who now do not calculate their clan membership by way of their relationship to some sub-chief or lineage head.
Chapter 3

Environment, Traditional Economy, and Social Structure

Because subsequent chapters deal with the decline of the place of nobles and chiefs in Haisla society, it would be appropriate to begin with a discussion of the factors that sustained those positions in aboriginal or early historic times, in order to associate their decline with changes in the natives' environmental or economic circumstances.

Unfortunately, most of the information extant pertaining to the economic aspects of chieftainship or high status relates to the intricacies of the post-contact potlatch. The role of chiefs and nobles in the aboriginal subsistence economy is given comparatively short shrift. Moreover, the earliest ethnographers did not begin their work on the coast until nearly a century after contact (Boas arrived in 1885, for example), by which time such factors as the fur trade and severe depopulation had drastically altered the natives' relationship to their resource bases. Reconstruction of those relationships seldom received much attention.

Thus it is not possible at this date to say with certainty just what was the role of the house, lineage, clan, or village heads in the production and distribution of resources. Nevertheless, some clues do exist, and the area remains a fertile field for speculation.

In this chapter, I will propose that a significant element in the operation of chieftainship among a northern Northwest
Coast people like the Haisla was an economy characterized by an unequal distribution of resources resulting from a resource base that was both highly productive overall, and rather irregular and unpredictable in its constituent parts.

Such characteristics put a premium on co-operation, both within the local community, and between it and neighbouring communities. Such co-operation, in the form of pooling and redistribution, could sustain the statuses of house, clan, and village chieftains. As Sahlins noted, the role of redistributor and the status of chief are combined in the same person.

The tribal economic system is an extended family system, characterized throughout by kinship co-operation and mutual aid. The principal administrative operation in a tribal economy, therefore, is pooling and redistribution of goods by a central agent. Everywhere this central agent occupies a political, chiefly status, and his redistributive activities subsidize the division of labor and tribal enterprise. Prestige is attributed to the chief so long as he manages goods in the general welfare. This prestige not only permits the chief to influence persons, it sanctions his call on goods. Prestige, therefore, operates to overcome an inherent tendency to limit productivity in a system of production for use (as opposed to production for exchange). Prestige is the action of a social system operating to widen the economy at the same time, and by means of increasing the powers of the administrating chief (1960: 410).

Although Sahlins was addressing himself primarily to the inequalities of distribution that arise from a well developed division of labour, his formulation is equally pertinent to inequalities resulting from irregularities of resource production, for both can result in an imbalanced distribution of resources. As Service points out, specialization can apply to differential production of resources resulting from ecological
variability.

Clearly, redistribution is a consequence of specialization and the related needs for its co-ordination and for the allocation of products. There are two distinct and separable kinds of specialization which could lead to redistribution. They frequently co-exist in the same society, but it seems probable that one or the other alone would be sufficient to catalyze the transformation of society. One (probably the more frequent) is the regional, or ecological, specialization of different local residential units... (Service 1964: 145).

Service is referring here to the occupation of distinct ecological zones by the members of a community, and consequent differential production. His point applies equally well to areas like the coast which, while they are nominally part of the same ecological zone, are nevertheless highly variable in productivity from place to place and from year to year. The operative consequence of specialization is that it leaves a considerable quantity of resource or product in the hands of one segment of the society and less or none in other segments. Variable productivity of the resource sites belonging to the various segments has a similar effect. In both cases, redistribution could be a primary mechanism for the equalization of the imbalance.

The chief's role as a redistributor would be most critical, of course, in a situation in which the population exerted some pressure on the resource base, or where the demands of some or all of the society occasionally exceeded the productive capacity of the resource base. At that point, the chief's socio-political connections and his ability to channel goods from units with a surplus to those suffering a shortage would be his main justifi-
cation for being.

Indeed, as Sahlins points out, the very existence of a chief may well provide the impetus for the consistent production of a surplus.

Prestige, therefore, operates to overcome an inherent tendency to limit productivity in a system of production for use (as opposed to production for exchange). Prestige is the action of a social system operating to widen the powers of the administrating chief (Sahlins 1960: 410).

Prestige associated with pooling and redistribution operates simultaneously as an incentive to dispensation on the chief's part and an incentive to production on his kinsmen's part--thus a tribal economy (ibid.: 411).

Stimulated by the chief's drive for prestige, habitual over-production (when the opportunity arose) could create a supply ready for distribution should an appropriate neighbouring group or local segment suffer a shortage. (Among the coastal groups, should no shortage occur, there were well established methods of consumption of any excess that were similarly prestige-enhancing for the hosts--ostentatious distribution and consumption in feasts, for example, or, among the Southern Kwakiutl in historic times, actual destruction of large quantities of food.)

It remains to consider two issues, one ecological, the other cultural: was the coastal environment so variable as to create shortages among the various segments of local communities; and, did high status individuals indeed operate as redistributors of foodstuffs to their tribesmen? I will consider each issue in turn.
Ecological Variability

The crux of the argument, then, (as it applies to the Northwest Coast) concerns the question of irregularity of production of staple resources: did those resources, particularly salmon, vary and/or fluctuate in quantity sufficient to deprive segments of the native population of the minimum they considered necessary, tolerable, or convenient, so as to trigger some compensatory mechanism such as redistribution?

Suttles maintained that that sort of variability was a salient feature of the Northwest Coast environment. He claimed, furthermore, that the orthodox conception of the uniformity of the coastal ecosystem and economy was a simplification that, by neglecting to consider micro-environments and their potential effects on subsistence patterns, overlooked circumstances that may have figured large in the development of economic, demographic, and ultimately of social and political forms.

The environmental setting of native culture was characterized by four significant features: 1) variety of types of food, including sprouts, roots, berries, shellfish, fishes, waterfowl, land and sea mammals; 2) local variation in the occurrence of these differences between fresh and salt water, local differences in temperature and precipitation; 3) seasonal variation, especially in vegetable foods and in anadromous fishes; 4) fluctuation from year to year, in part due to the regular cycles of the different populations of fish, in part to less predictable changes, as in weather (1960: 302).

The last category, fluctuations from year to year, is of particular importance, for it introduces the elements of irregularity and unpredictability, which will in turn lead to consideration of their cultural concomitant, counteracting mechanisms
such as redistribution and redistributive agents.

But the fourth of the environmental features, fluctuations from year to year, must have demanded versatility and adaptability... The rather pronounced differences in resources among communities, plus year-to-year fluctuation in quantities, must have put a premium on intercommunity cooperation (Suttles 1960: 302).

Although his initial speculations concerned the Coast Salish, Suttles soon extended the ideas to encompass groups to the north, albeit in slightly altered form.

...The more northern tribes rely on fewer kinds of plants and animals and get them at fewer places and for shorter times during the year, but in greater concentration, and with consequent greater chance for failure (1962: 103).

The fewer types and greater concentration of resources that I have postulated for both the Wakashan and Northern areas might increase the importance of the "owner" as a redistributor of resources within the local group and a representative of the local group in relation to other groups. This increase in importance of the role of the "owner" may be accompanied by an increased emphasis on differences in status throughout society (ibid.: 138).

The enhanced status of the owner-distributor postulated here is reminiscent of Sahlins's proposal cited earlier.

Everywhere, this central agent [the redistributor of goods] occupies a political, chiefly status... (Sahlins 1960: 410).

It is important to note here that redistribution of goods can take place on a number of levels: between houses, lineages, or clans within a community, between communities or between tribes. I propose to limit my inquiry here to intra-village redistribution, since I am concerned primarily with status relationships among the Haisla, and not between elements of the
Haisla and other north coast groups. I believe that there is enough variability in resource availability within the holdings of the Haisla to justify the operation of an intra-village redistributional network, one that sustained status differentials among the various social units of the local community.

It remains to consider whether the environmental variability described by Suttles was in fact characteristic of the coast, particularly as far as salmon are concerned. Suttles mentions two major causes of fluctuations, "regular cycles of the different populations of fish, and less predictable changes, as in weather" (1960: 302).

Fluctuations in the size of salmon runs result partially from the life cycles of the various species. Some time after they hatch in streams or lakes, the young salmon migrate to the sea, there to spend two to eight years, depending on the species, before returning to their home streams to spawn. A single stream, therefore, can host several distinct populations of the same species, each running during a different year. Pinks have a two year cycle, for example, and representatives of the two populations occupy the stream on alternate years, where they are known as 'odd' and 'even' year pinks. In the Haisla region, coho have a three year cycle, chums a four, sockeye a four or five, and chinooks a five year cycle.

These populations can vary considerably in size. In many pink runs of Haisla territory, for example, either odd or even year populations are strongly dominant in any one stream. In
the modern runs, pink salmon can vary by more than one-thousand
per cent from one year to the next (Stream Catalogue 1972: passim).

Suttles's second major cause of fluctuations, "less predictable changes, as in weather," can take a number of forms, as
this report from a fisheries biologist shows.

Immediate causes of death. Many more or less specific causes of loss can be recognized as contributing to the total mortality experienced in the freshwater phases. These can be listed by periods, as follows:

A. Period preceding burial of eggs.
   (1) Predation on adult unspawned fish.
   (2) Death of adult unspawned fish through other causes, notably as a result of barriers or insufficient water.
   (3) Losses of eggs through retention in the body or failure of fertilization.

B. Period of incubation and alevinage.
   (1) Erosion or scouring, that is, removal of gravel and contained eggs or alevins by flood, with resultant death by mechanical injury, exposure to predation of deposition in unsuitable situations.
   (2) Asphyxiation. Mortality caused by insufficient exchange of gases with the environment, due to unsuitability of the original location or to subsequent deposition of silt, etc., resulting in reduction of the water supply or reduction of the dissolved oxygen content of the water.
   (3) Unfavourable temperature for development.
   (4) Freezing of eggs or alevins by coincidence of prolonged cold weather with exposure of spawning beds to air.
   (5) Reduction of water level, resulting in death by dessication or prevention of the emergence of fry from the gravel.
   (6) "Superimposition" or "overdigging". Mortality of the same type as in (1) but caused by the operations of fish which have occupied spawning sites already containing the developing eggs of earlier-spawning parents.
(7) Killing of eggs of alevins by fungus.
(8) Predation.
(9) Exposure of eggs to salt water in tidal areas.

C. Free-swimming period.
(1) Predation.
(2) Trapping of fry in pools or backwaters.

(Neave 1953: 455-56).

Any of these factors can have a catastrophic effect on the salmon populations. Areas like Kitamaat, which is noted for its harsh climate, can be particularly susceptible to such occurrences. In 1973, for example, a warm spell during the winter resulted in a premature breakup of ice in the Kitimat River. Float ice scoured the salmon spawning beds and destroyed most of the eggs that were buried in the gravel. Fisheries Officers estimated that much of the populations for that year would be wiped out. Succeeding pink runs were 'very weak,' according to one Officer. (The results of other runs are not yet known, because other species' population cycles are longer.) Following that disaster, a serious flood during the fall of 1974 'wiped out everything,' leaving the probability of further failures to come.

These disasters are of two types, local and general. A landslide that blocks a channel or smothers a spawning bed, or a forest fire that overheats the water of a creek, are localized events that affect the populations of a single stream or a few streams. Floods, drastic temperature changes, and the like are apt to be more generalized and to affect salmon populations over a wider area, causing shortages in a number of streams.

According to Suttles (and Piddocke 1965), when taken
together, the cyclical variability of salmon and the random fluctuations due to environmental accidents could well reduce the salmon runs to a point below the demand level for local populations, creating a need for some form of regulatory mechanism.

I should note at this point that I do not propose to examine the complete Suttles-Piddocke argument. They claim that variations in production between communities prompted food-for-wealth exchanges between affinal kin, transfers that could eventually lead to an imbalance of wealth accruing to groups with more regular or bountiful resource bases. This imbalance could then be rectified through the distributions of wealth (or the wealth-for-prestige transactions) of the potlatch. I am concerned instead with the first, or environmental, half of their argument, that a combination of variation and fluctuation in staple resources could lead to shortages. I wish to apply this concept to intra-village redistribution and its effects on the socio-political structure of the community.

The 'ecological' point of view is not without its critics, however, particularly those who view the concept of fluctuation of resources on the coast as greatly overplayed (Drucker and Heizer 1967, Rosman and Rubel, 1971, Adams 1973). These authors contend that, regardless of differences in detail, the central and northern coast is a single biotic region characterized by a 'prodigality of foodstuffs' that permitted the development of a 'fantastic surplus economy.' According to Drucker and Heizer, while shortages may occasionally have occurred, they most often resulted from mismanagement of food stocks, from the gluttony
and over-feasting of a people who were assured of a food supply of some sort no matter what.

Although the debate has become acerbic on occasion (Drucker and Heizer dismissed part of Piddocke's argument as 'absurd,' for example), the antagonists have relied largely on assertions about the nature of the coastal environment that are seldom supported by solid data. Occasionally, the supporting evidence is completely contradictory.¹ This virtual absence of reliable data in the anthropological literature makes it desirable to begin at the beginning, and to submit the important propositions to tests with information from ecological sources such as the Department of Environment, insofar as those data are applicable to historical conditions. Unfortunately, that qualification may be decisive, for, considering the abuse that fish stocks have been subjected to during the past century, from environmental degradation to rapacious overfishing, it is unlikely that contemporary patterns are of any real use in calculating pre-contact or pre-commercial fishing conditions. When I asked a wildlife ecologist whether he considered that contemporary salmon population figures could be used to estimate the probable variability of historical runs, his reply was succinct: "Not a chance. Too

¹ For example, consider the following:

(Dog salmon and humpbacks)...were leaner and kept better than fat species such as spring salmon and coho (Drucker and Heizer 1967: 139).

My Salish informants say that fatter fish last longer and thus sockeye and dog salmon are their favorites. Other species may not last through the winter (Suttles 1968: 63).
much environmental noise." I intend, therefore, to rely primarily on internal evidence of the nature of salmon runs to examine the propositions concerning variability.

To begin, Drucker and Heizer take issue with Suttles's basic premises and instead advance three conditions that, if true, undercut the entire ecological argument.

1) While Suttles stresses the marked year-to-year differences in size of Frazer [sic] River Sockeye runs, it may be doubted that primitive pre-commercial demands were so heavy that the smaller runs produced serious hardship (1969: 139).

2) In any event, the year-to-year fluctuations in salmon were not characteristic of the area other than those [sic] occupied by Coast Salish (ibid.).

3) It is obvious that to have had the economic effect described by Suttles the exchange had to be between distant groups inhabiting different biotic zones, depending on different spawning cycles of salmon, etc. Variable as the Coast Salish habitat may have been, adjacent villages must have suffered the same scarcities and enjoyed the same abundances, so that food gifts to close neighbours could scarcely have had the effect posited (ibid.: 145).

Upon examination, the authors' claims appear flawed, partly because they are qualified---"it may be doubted" that pre-commercial demands exceeded the Fraser's supply, and, "adjacent villages must have suffered the same scarcities" (emphasis added). In other words, the authors do not know for sure.

Their first claim, that the natives' demand level did not exceed the minimum supply level of the Fraser, is not an argument that can justifiably be applied to the coast in general, because of all the salmon streams, the Fraser is undoubtedly the least typical. Its stupendous runs, often consisting of many
millions of fish, contrast sharply with those of the hundreds of smaller streams of the coast that carry runs of a few-hundred to several thousand salmon. These streams are far more characteristic of the coastal resource sites than the major rivers, and patterns of redistribution for the great majority of the coastal villages must take into account the variability of the more typical streams. That the exploiters of the Fraser may not have suffered shortages cannot be taken to mean that the exploiters of the smaller streams were so fortunate.

Moreover, there is some evidence that even the great streams were not immune to occasional failure. Consider this account concerning the Skeena, after the Fraser the principal salmon stream of the British Columbia Coast.

In connection with the Skeena, a fact came to my knowledge which will be interesting to you. In the year 1863, long before there was a cannery on the Skeena, there was a great scarcity, if not a total failure of salmon on that river, and the Indians who depended to a great extent on them for their supply of food for the winter, were reduced to a state of great destitution, and whole tribes had to remove to the Naas, where fortunately there had been an abundant supply of salmon saved, and where a trading post of the Hudson Bay company had been established, and there traded their furs and anything else they might have, and in some cases their children to the Naas Indians, for dried salmon. I have made many enquiries, but did not learn that anything approaching a total failure had occurred since that time on the Skeena (Federal Fisheries Annual Reports 1889: 257).

Drucker and Heizer's second claim, that significant variation in salmon stocks does not extend to the north of Coast Salish territory, would, if true, limit the applicability of Suttles's redistribution formulation to quite a restricted area.
of the coast.

While there were rather less edible vegetal products available to the natives [of the Coast Forest Biotic Area], there is no evidence of the drastic cyclic fluctuations in the fisheries recorded for the "Gulf Islands Biotic Area." Fluctuations in fish populations do occur, but they are random, less frequent, and proportionately smaller than in the pink and sockeye salmon runs in Salish territory (1967: 148).

Unfortunately, the authors do not present any evidence to support this claim, and make only a vague reference to the source of their information. One infers from their statement that "there is no evidence [in the north] of the drastic cyclic fluctuations in the fisheries recorded for the 'Gulf Islands Biotic Area'" that they base their claim on documentary (recorded) materials. Yet there are no objective records of fish runs in the north or south available for the years prior to 1947, and the records of subsequent years, insofar as they are applicable at all, do not indicate that the fluctuations in northern runs are "random, less frequent, and proportionately smaller" than those of the south.

To test their claim with modern fisheries data, I collected escapement statistics from two sample regions (once corresponding roughly to Pentlatch territory, the other to Haisla territory).

1. Estimates were made as early as 1933, but Fisheries personnel do not consider them to be reliable enough to use as statistics. They use data from 1947 on.

2. Fisheries Department Statistical Areas 14 (South) and 6 (North) respectively.
I calculated the co-efficient of relative variation\(^1\) for the various species of each stream in the two areas, then ranked and compared them. The results are given as Table I (p. 34). The figures show that the average variability of runs in northern streams is slightly higher than that of the southern streams.

After my previous remarks concerning the inapplicability of modern escapement data to historical runs, I do not wish to base any argument on them here. Rather, I am attempting to establish some sort of evidentiary basis for Drucker and Heizer's claim, if only to try to refute it. I could find no historical reference to different degrees of variability between northern and southern runs, nor do modern data indicate that such a condition has developed in recent times. One is left wondering where the authors' ideas came from. I can discover no reason to suppose that Suttles's propositions need be restricted to the region of the Coast Salish.

There is, I believe, an inherent tendency to variability in total stream populations of salmon (i.e., that composed of the various species sub-populations) that results from characteristics of the life cycles of the several species. As such, it is independent of the location of the home stream, and operates on populations throughout the coast. Because this tendency also

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\(^1\) This co-efficient (calculated as c.r.v. = \(\frac{\sigma}{\mu} \times 100\)) "expresses the measure of variation as a percentage of its origin[in this case, the mean population size of each stream]" (Mueller et al: 1970: 158). It enables the observer to compare the degree of variation between units of radically different magnitude (runs of small streams and large rivers).
## Table I

**A Comparison of Variability of Salmon Runs of Pentlatch and Haisla Territories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Species</th>
<th>Mean Coefficient of Relative Variation in Streams of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pentlatch Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sockeye</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinook</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coho</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chum</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pink</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean:</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Stream Catalogues 1970, 1972*
bears on Drucker and Heizer's third objection to the ecological argument, I will introduce that objection before proceeding with the discussion of inherent variability.

The authors' third objection, that "adjacent villages must have suffered the same scarcities and enjoyed the same abundance," assumes that within a particular region the salmon runs are somehow synchronized, such that the high and low years coincide. I can find no evidence that during the pre-commercial period such a condition prevailed. Moreover, I believe that certain characteristics of the salmon life cycle make such a coincidence virtually impossible to maintain.

The total salmon population of any stream is composed of up to five different species.¹ Each species component is made up of a number of sub-populations, which occupy the stream during different years. For example, pinks run on a two year cycle. During 1970, the 'even year' sub-population ran in the streams, while during the following year, the 'odd year' component returned to spawn. In 1972, the progeny of the 1970 sub-population ran. Thus, the stream was alternately occupied by 'year 1' and 'year 2' fish.

¹ These are: sockeye (Oncorhynchus nerka), pinks or humps (O. gorbuscha), chums or dogs (O. keta), coho (O. kisutch), and chinook or springs (O. tshawytscha). In addition, a number of streams of the coast carry runs of steelhead trout (Salmo gairdneri). The runs of these fish are minor in the streams of Haisla territory, however, and I have omitted them from the discussion.
The same applies to the other species, with one important difference: the life cycles are of different lengths. Coho run on a 3 year cycle, chums a 4, sockeye a 4 or 5, and chinook a 5.* Because of this variation, different combinations of sub-populations will constitute the total stream population in any given year.

This can be seen clearly in the diagram.

During year 'k', for example, the population is made up of year 1 pinks, year 2 coho, year 3 sockeye, year 3 chums, and year 1 chinook.

There tends to be an overlap in the length of life cycles of all species except pinks, which apparently run on an invariable 2 year cycle. Thus, some chum run on a 3, 4, or 5 year cycle, and chinooks may run between 3 and 8. In Haisla territory, between 80% and 99% of the chums run on a 4 year cycle, and the majority of chinook run at 5 years. For purposes of clarity, I have included only the 4 year sockeye and chums and 5 year chinooks in the diagram. To do so does not damage the argument, but simplifies the diagram considerably. Intra-species cycle variation merely adds to the potential number of combinations.
1 chinook. The following year, the constituent runs are entirely different: year 2 pinks, year 3 coho, year 4 sockeye and chums, and year 2 chinook.

Because some sub-populations of the same species are larger than others (a condition noted by observers long before the start of commercial fishing on the coast), it follows that different combinations will yield variable total runs sizes. This may well account for the occasional very good years, in which the high sub-populations run together, and the very poor years, in which the opposite occurs, all the weak runs coincide. Other combinations may tend toward one or the other extreme depending on the particular combination of strong and weak constituents.

To return for a moment to Drucker and Heizer's second point, that northern runs do not vary to the same extent as southern ones--it is clear that the potential inherent variability of the northern streams cannot but be equal to those of the south. Other factors that promote fluctuations, such as environmental accidents, are more likely to occur in the north, with its harsher climate and higher precipitation levels, than in the south.

To return to the authors' third point, that high and low years occur simultaneously in the streams of a particular region--I believe, that, given the large number of combinations of constituent units, the likelihood of their all running well or poorly at the same time in a variety of streams seems very remote.

It might be argued that widespread and severe environmental accidents can, in effect, overcome this heterogeneity of runs, and affect a number of streams, bringing about simultaneous
failures. Certainly this inference underlies Piddocke's proposals. Once again, however, the varying cycle lengths serve to prevent a concentration of failures, and ensure that the effects of any disaster will be spread over a period of years rather than concentrating in a single year. The 1972 breakup of ice in the Kitimat River mentioned previously will affect the 1974 pink, 1975 coho, 1976 sockeye and chum, and 1977 chinook runs. The effects of a disaster that damages a stream's stock for one year will be diluted by the presence of unaffected stocks in the runs of the succeeding years. This will reduce the likelihood of all runs of a stream failing simultaneously, as the diagram shows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pink</th>
<th>Coho</th>
<th>Sockeye</th>
<th>Chum</th>
<th>Chinook</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This phenomenon will tend to dampen the effects of a catastrophe by staggering the affected runs over a period of years. Assume that a disaster occurs in year 'a' that affects year 1 stocks and results in the virtual elimination of the succeeding year 1 run. The effects of its temporary disappearance (until the stock regenerates) will be mitigated by three or four unaffected runs.

Two other factors influence this pattern, however: the possibility of successive disasters, and the variable speed with which salmon populations can re-establish themselves following a
decline. The premature thaw of 1972 in the Kitimat River, followed by severe flooding two years later, has been mentioned. In addition, it is difficult to predict the speed with which a population can recover from a disaster. To judge by the effects of modern accidents, recovery can sometimes take decades.

On the Skeena, as in other northern British Columbia areas, a marked slump in pink salmon catches occurred in 1932, apparently as a result of exceptional droughts in 1930. In most places, the former level of catch was restored, but in the Skeena area this slump and a somewhat similar depression which occurred in the "odd year" line a few years earlier, have not been followed by subsequent restorations of catch-level. Annual catches which in the 1920's averaged near 2,500,000 fish have averaged scarcely half this quantity since 1930 (Shepard and Stevenson 1956: 144).

A succession of disasters following close upon one another would have a cumulative effect as the resulting failed runs began to overlap. The following diagram illustrates this process, using the 1972 and 1974 Kitimat River accidents as an example.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pink</th>
<th>Coho</th>
<th>Sockeye</th>
<th>Chum</th>
<th>Chinook</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972 accident</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 accident</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>[3]</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1]: failed run, result of 1972 accident.
[3]: failed run, result of 1974 accident.
Thus, in year 'f,' the year 1 chinook stock will be affected by the 1972 thaw, and the year 3 coho by the 1974 flood. In year 'g,' the year 3 sockeye and chums will be affected by the 1974 flood, in addition to which there may be a residual effect of the 1972 thaw on the year 1 pinks and coho, if those stocks are somewhat slow in recovering. The year 1 pinks in year 'g' could conceivably be affected by both the 1972 and 1974 accidents.

For all sub-populations of all streams to fail during the same year, it would require the coincidence of a number of devastating events: a succession of disasters that occur in fairly rapid sequence and/or create long-term decreases in the stocks.

I. One consequence of long-term failures and varying life cycles of the different species may be crucial in the operation of compensatory mechanisms such as redistribution or migration. Because different species are often dominant in some streams and in some areas, the exploiters of those sites naturally tend to be more dependent on them than on other types. Their subsistence economy also becomes subject to the characteristics of the dominant species. A long-term depression in, say, 'odd-year' pinks would involve a failed run every other year for the owners of pink-dominant rivers. A similar prolonged slump in one sub-population of chums, however, would affect groups reliant on them only one-half as often, or every four years. Thus the nature of the dominant species may well have a great deal to do with the stability of the resource base under the control of any particular group, and tends to give the lie to at least one aspect of Drucker and Heizer's claim that the coast exhibited a 'broad uniformity of native economy.'

The fact that the Nootkan staff of life was dog salmon [chums] while the Haida wintered on dried humpbacks [pinks] does not materially alter the picture (1967: 140).

That fact may be far more consequential than we have supposed. I will return to this matter when discussing the cultural consequences of irregularity in the resource base.
Failing such an occurrence, it is highly unlikely that the array of sub-populations that together comprise the total resource base of a community will undergo the widespread and simultaneous failure necessary to leave all its inhabitants short of salmon.

It should be noted, however, that the stabilizing effect of staggered failures has two significant qualifications: one species may be strongly dominant in a stream (accounting for three-quarters or more of the fish), so that a failure in that species could not be ameliorated effectively by normal runs of the others; in addition, most of the streams of Haisla territory contain three runs—coho, pinks, and chums (cf. Table II p. 42), leaving only two runs to make up for the failure of a third, rather than three or four runs. Thus, while absolute failures are unlikely to occur, significant decreases in the total production of local streams as a result of environmental accidents are entirely possible, depending on the make-up of the individual stream's total salmon population.

In sum, I believe that Drucker and Heizer's picture of a uniformly abundant and stable resource base is not compatible with the evidence. The authors have not refuted Suttles's propositions about the fundamental irregularity and unpredictability of staple resources on the coast, which continue to have considerable explanatory potential.

Proceeding from Suttles's proposals of resource base irregularity, I will advance a formulation which relates resource instability to the presence of redistribution and the existence of various levels of chieftain among the Haisla, offices which I
## Table II

**Salmon Runs in Streams of Haisla Territory**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stream</th>
<th>Species Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sockeye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Eagle Cr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Kihess Cr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Bish Cr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Fisherman's Cr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Big Tillhorne R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Crab R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Falls R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Foch R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Giltoyees Cr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Hotsprings Cr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Hugh Cr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Humphrys Cr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Kiltuish R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Kowesas R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Nalbeelah Cr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Paril R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Pike Cr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Riordan Cr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Wathl Cr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Brim R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Dala R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Hirsh Cr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Kemano R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Kildala R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Little Wadeene R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Tsaytis R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Wahoo R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Wadeene R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Evelyn Cr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Kitimat R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Kitlope R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Totals       | 3   | 11  | 30  | .32 | 32  |

Source: Stream Catalogue 1972
perceive as outgrowths of mechanisms adopted to cope with resource fluctuations. In so doing, I will also attempt to demonstrate that the two main viewpoints—one envisaging stability and abundance, the other irregularity and shortages—are not so irreconcilable as they might at first appear. It is possible, I think, to establish a scheme that embraces both, for it is not unreasonable to speak of a high average productivity of an area's resource base while admitting to considerable irregularity in the productivity of its constituent units.

(The formulation is based on these premises: 1) salmon populations were subject to fluctuations of considerable magnitude; 2) these fluctuations could be regular and predictable (e.g., odd and even year pink runs of markedly different size), or random and unpredictable (as when they resulted from environmental accidents); 3) the range of variability was significant, some species or some streams being more prone to fluctuation than others, partly due to the characteristics of the fish populations themselves, partly to the susceptibility of some localities to floods, freezes, and the like; 4) regardless of local (single or adjacent stream) variability of salmon stocks, total production for a region (from all the streams owned by the inhabitants of a village, for example) could remain quite stable from year to year, as the effects of individual fluctuations became cancelled or modified by the weight of the area's aggregate production.)
Cultural Adaptations to Resource Irregularity

Given high variability of salmon populations, small local groups could take three types of action to cope with the irregularity of their staple resource: somehow regulate their demand so as to keep consumption below the level of the poorest runs; operate under a system of residential flexibility such that groups could readily migrate from areas of shortage to areas of plenty, there to engage in the exploitation (as full members of the exploiting group); or, establish a redistributive or exchange relationship with groups whose periods of shortage did not coincide with their own.

Residential flexibility (which means, in effect, moving people to resources rather than resources to people, as in redistribution) seems to have been the norm only among the bilateral Nootka.¹

Demonstration of kinship is the only prerequisite of group affiliation. In order to activate a claim to membership, it is necessary for an individual to reside with a group and to participate in that group's activities for the time of his residence (Rosman and Rubel 1970: 71).

With whatever group a man happened to be living, he identified himself completely. For the time being, he centered all his interests and loyalties in that group, and participated in all its activities. He tended the chief's fish traps, contributed food and property for feasts and potlatches, danced and enjoyed himself at the festivities (Drucker 1951: 279).

Such flexibility does not appear to have obtained among the unilineal groups of the north. Although the Kitamaat clans

extended hospitality and aid to visitors of the same clan, nowhere could I find mention of short-term shifts of population to counter resource variability.

Because the resource fluctuations were often unpredictable and randomly distributed, the most sensible exchange arrangement would seem to be a comprehensive relationship among the owners of a large number of streams, sufficient to absorb the consequences of localized failures. The operation of such an arrangement corresponds, in Sahlins's term, to a 'tribe-wide economy,' with all its potential for the emergence of high status distributor-chiefs.

The practicality of an exchange or redistributive relationship for the peoples exploiting the streams in the Haisla region is clear. The total salmon population of the area was made up of some 108 units, composed of 32 pink runs, 32 chum, 30 coho, 11 chinook and 3 sockeye (cf. Table II, p. 42), a base certainly large and varied enough to absorb a number of disappointing runs without serious strain. What might be a serious shortfall for a local productive unit (the group or family exploiting a single stream, say) becomes only a minor irregularity when seen against the total production of all the runs controlled by the inhabitants of a community. Thus, the operation of a redistributive relationship among the various owners of the stream could create a total resource base relatively free of the vagaries that afflict local resource bases.

Unfortunately, the mechanics and comprehensiveness of this
system are impossible to determine precisely at this date. We do not know, for example, just what was the nature of the house, lineage, clan, or village heads' calls on resources among a group like the Haisla. Therefore, we cannot tell whether the movement of resources within the community was redistribution proper or a series of generalized or balanced reciprocal transactions. That is because, as I noted earlier, the evidence about non-ceremonial economic activities is somewhat fragmentary. Nor is the extent of the authority of high status individuals always clearly described.

It is unfortunate, for example, that such native terms as the Coast Salish siem- and hegus, Nootka tais, Kwakiutl gyigame, and Haisla hemas have all been translated as 'chief,' for that lends a spurious similarity to statuses that were dissimilar in important respects. Whether the heads of the various coastal kinship or residential units were indeed 'chiefs' in the formal sense is problematic. (For a discussion of this problem, see Appendix I, p. 295). ('Chief' in the context of this discussion refers to the highest ranking member of the local kin group or residential unit--thus a lineage chief, clan chief, and village chief.)

The degree of authority of these individuals differed from group to group. It is therefore difficult to generalize about such matters as their call on their group's resources and their role as redistributors. Nevertheless, I will set down the common features of the nobles' and chiefs' place in the subsistence
economy (insofar as we know it) and trust that the Haislas’ system was not significantly different.

It is well established that a clan or village head had call on his kinsmen’s or tribesmen’s products for ceremonial distribution, as in a potlatch. This principle obtained throughout the coast.

[Among the Tsimshian:] Due to the fact that the reputation of the tribe among its neighbours depends largely on the chief and his potlatches, he is assured of his tribesmen’s support and assistance.... While a chief can expect constant and liberal economic support from his tribesmen, he does not contribute to potlatches given by them. He is responsible for their economic welfare, must feed them when necessary and has to lay aside supplies for this purpose. He is also expected to be generous with his tribe and to give feasts to them from time to time....Since his tribe furnishes him with wealth for his potlatches they expect to share in what he receives from others (Garfield 1939: 182).

[Among the Kwakiutl:] The chief was the custodian of the resources of the numaym. As such, it was his duty to perform the necessary rituals concerning the exploitation of these resources at the appropriate season. In this position, he received a portion (sometimes called tribute in the texts) of the fish, seals, goats, etc., caught by the men. His wife similarly received a portion of the berries and roots collected by the women. With this supply the chief could hold potlatches...(Piddocke 1965: 289).

These comments are typical of the descriptions of the prerogatives of chiefs or kin group heads to call on the efforts of their kin to uphold the honour of the group in its own distributions or contributions to larger scale distributions. Whether the various levels of chieftain had regular call on their kinsmen's products for non-ceremonial use is seldom discussed. The principle seems to have differed somewhat from
group to group. According to Barnett, among the Coast Salish the obligation to contribute food even to members of the same house was largely a moral imperative or a matter of self interest rather than an explicit rule.

[Family] units were distinct social and economic entities in the native consciousness. Although they were housed under one roof and were related by blood and common interests, the units were nevertheless potentially autonomous and behaved as such. They did not draw their food from a common stock, nor were the members of a unit obliged to distribute their individual catches among the other units, although sharing was a very common thing and was expected of a good neighbour when he had exceptionally good luck in his hunting or fishing. It was expected even more of the head of the house as the owner of the most productive instruments of exploitation. But this fact did not negate individual ownership of food; that was fully recognized (Barnett 1955: 59).

This atomistic attitude is consistent with the rather loose attitude of the Coast Salish towards ownership of resource sites, as described by Barnett. "...All village members were, for the most part, free to range as they pleased so long as they did not interfere with others. This was particularly true of fishing sites" (ibid.: 252).

Where titular ownership was more explicit, as among the Nootka, where the chief was said to enjoy 'absolute ownership' of important sites (Drucker 1951: 454), a call on goods was easier to exert.

In actual fact, a chief would allow a commoner access to his resource holdings for personal use, in return for part of the catch - a form of tribute that added to the chief's surplus (Ruddell 1973: 260).

To the north, the situation is rather less clear. As
Rosman and Rubel state, the primary property-holding unit among the Southern Kwakiutl was the numaym, rather than the individual.

A final distinction must be made between communally held property and individually owned property. The members of a particular numaym hold title to such economic resource areas as fishing grounds, berrying grounds, hunting grounds, and beach areas (Boas 1921: 1345ff.). Unlike the Nootka, where title to this type of property is held by individual chiefs and may be passed as dowry with a daughter, ownership among the Kwakiutl is held by the entire numaym rather than by the chief alone, and there is no evidence to support alienation of such property out of the numaym (Rosman and Rubel 1971: 134-5).

Even though title is vested in the kin group, the head would appear to have had some call on the regular products of his kinsmen. One of the Boas texts collected by George Hunt sets out the proportions the catch normally due the chief: one-fifth of the salmon (more if both chief and kinsman are 'good-minded'); one-half of the goats; one-third of the bears and sea otters; one-fifth of the berry cakes; and all but one of the seals (Boas 1921: 1333-1340).

The previous three examples, Coast Salish, Nootka, and Southern Kwakiutl, have each operated under somewhat different principles of resource site ownership, from seemingly quite loose among the Salish, to strict individual ownership among the Nootka, to strict kin group control among the Kwakiutl. In each the chief or headman's call on the resources of his kinsmen proceeds from a different basis. The Haisla seem to have embraced all three types. As Olson reported:

The clan as a whole, a family, or a chief often is said to "own" a lake, valley, or favorite berrying place; but actually the right is mainly fictional....
But the hunting and berrying rights are regarded as prerogatives rather than as things of utilitarian or tangible value. The attitude toward them is more like that shown regarding crests or legends—things to be claimed because of a certain prestige value attaching to the claim (1940: 180).

Furthermore, claimed Olson, rights to resources within a particular territory tended to be resource-specific.

Places for hunting bear or mountain goat are also owned, whereas localities for hunting deer are never claimed. Thus Foch Lagoon is open to everyone for berrying, but is "owned" by someone for bear hunting (Olson 1940: 180).

This type of attitude contrasts sharply with the Southern Kwakiutl approach to territoriality, as reported by Boas.

The hunters of the different numayms can not go hunting on the hunting grounds of the hunters of another numaym; for all the hunters own their hunting grounds, and when a hunter sees that another hunter goes to hunt on his hunting ground, then they fight, and generally one or both are killed....

And it is also the same with the grounds for picking viburnum berries of the various numayms, for each numaym owns berry-picking grounds for all kinds of berries....When it is seen that somebody, from another numaym, comes to steal berries from the berry-picking grounds, they fight at once....

The numayms of all the tribes also all own rivers. They do not allow the men of other numayms to come and use their river to catch salmon. When a man disobeys and continues to catch salmon, they fight (1967: 35-6).

The Haislas' attitude towards fishing sites corresponds much more closely to that of their neighbours.

Each family has its own [fish garden] assured to it by ancestral titles from time immemorial. These gardens are...jealously guarded. Poaching on these fish preserves has often wrought serious mischief
among the tribes\textsuperscript{1} and at times has been sufficient cause for bloodshed (Raley 1901: 16-18).

Evidently, there was nothing 'fictional' about the ownership of fishing sites, at least.

Among the Haisla, it seems, the head of a kin group or the village chief could expect to obtain resources in a variety of ways from a number of sources. Since title to or usufruct rights to resource sites was variously vested in individual, house, clan, or village, portions of a catch might accrue to the chief as 'rent' if he owned the site himself (as among the Nootka) or as presentations to him in his position as head of the kin group (as among the Southern Kwakiutl).

**Redistribution**

However (the various levels of chieftain acquired the resources, there is considerable evidence that they were obligated to disperse them unreservedly in order to maintain their standing in the community. The chief was constrained to act in a manner befitting his station, that is, with chiefly generosity. Thus distributions of food by various chiefs was a common feature of coastal social life. As Jewitt reported for the Nootka:

> The king is, however, obliged to support his dignity by making frequent entertainments, and whenever he receives a large supply of provision, he must invite all the men of his tribe to his house to eat it up, otherwise, as Maquina told me, he would not be considered as conducting

\textsuperscript{1} The use of the word 'tribe' in the Haisla context is ambiguous. The Haisla themselves use it synonymously with clan. What Raley meant by it is unclear. de Laguna (1972: 212) notes that the Yakutat Tlingit also translate their term for clan as 'tribe.'
himself like a Tyee, and would be no more thought of than a common man (1973: 113).

As Sahlins remarked, "Prestige is attributed to the chief so long as he manages goods in the general welfare" (1960: 410).

The mechanics of redistribution—how the foodstuffs were delivered into the hands of the chief's kinsmen or tribesmen—is not known completely. The transactions may have been mundane and unremarkable, or rather more ceremonious and formalized.

Subordinates in severalty and on various occasions render stuff to the chief, and often in severalty receive benefits from him. While there is always some massive accumulation and large-scale handout—say during rites of chieftainship—the prevailing flow between chief and people is fragmented into independent and small transactions: a gift to the chief from here, some help given out there. So aside from the special occasion, the chief is continuously turning over petty stocks. This is the ordinary situation in the smaller Pacific island chiefdom...and it may be generally true of pastoralist chiefdoms. On the other hand, chiefs may glory in massive accumulations and more or less massive dispensations, and at times too in large stores on hand congealed by pressure on the commonality (Sahlins 1972: 210).

Similarly, redistributions on the coast could take place on at least three levels: the 'independent and small transaction,' operating more or less within the sphere of generalized reciprocity; feasts; and potlatches, the last corresponding to Sahlins's

I. An interesting account, contemporary to Jewitt, of a Tahitian chief's obligations is couched in almost the same terms.

The case is, that whatever [the chief] receives he immediately distributes among his friends and dependents....And this prodigal behaviour he excuses by saying that, were he not to do so, he should never be a king, nor even remain a chief of any consequence (Duff Missionaries 1799. in Sahlins 1972: 133).
'massive accumulation and more or less massive dispensations.' Although potlatches were the occasion of the most notable and formal distributions, I doubt that they had the same significance for subsistence as the feasts and small transactions, if only because their very scale and importance made them too inflexible an instrument to employ as a regulatory mechanism for the intravillage distribution of foodstuffs. As Goldman noted:

Properties do not circulate [in potlatches] at random intervals. They follow the life cycles of persons and the cycle of the seasons. They are interlocked with birth, with the stages of maturation, with adolescence, with accession to rank, with marriage, with succession to chieftainship, and with death (1975: 125).

Feasts, held frequently and with little advance notice, or the day-to-day operation of the generosity ethic (give to whoever asks or appears in the house as a guest) were rather more flexible mechanisms for redistribution.

During his captivity at Nootka, Jewitt recorded two variations of the feast.

As, whenever they cook, they always calculate to have an abundance for all the guests, a profusion in this respect being considered as the highest luxury, much more is usually set before them than they can eat. That which is left in the king's tray, he sends to his house for his family by one

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1. For the same reason, I find Harris's interpretation of the Suttles formulation rather unconvincing.

Failure of the salmon runs at a particular stream could threaten the survival of certain villages while neighbors on other streams continue to catch their usual quota. Under such circumstances the impoverished villagers would want to attend as many potlatches as they could and carry back as many vital supplies as they could get their hosts to part with ...(1971: 291).
of his slaves, as do the chiefs theirs; while those who eat from the same tray, and who generally belong to the same family, take it home as common stock, or each one receives his portion, which is distributed on the spot (1974: 55).

On another occasion, he reported that canoes from neighbouring villages arrived, bringing various types of foodstuff for trade.

I have known eighteen of the great tubs, in which they keep their provisions, filled with spawn brought in this way. On these occasions a great feast is always made, to which not only the strangers, but the whole village, men, women, and children, are generally invited, and I have seen five of the largest tubs employed at such time, in cooking at the king's house (ibid.: 69).

In the first instance, Jewitt describes what might be termed 'representative redistribution,' in which nobles and chiefs are given food for subsequent distribution to their kinsmen. In the second, a generalized form of distribution is employed; that is, all individuals are invited directly.

In this manner, houses or units with a surplus regularly transfer food to other segments of the village, who both consume it directly and take portions home as general stock.

A comprehensive intra-village redistributitional network will significantly enhance the demographic potential of the group's territory, for it has a sort of synergistic effect: the total population that can be sustained through redistribution is greater than the sum of populations that can subsist independently on the individual resource base of each. As Aberle noted:

Obviously, if the resource base of a set of units fluctuates simultaneously for all of them, exchange will afford no alleviation from shortages. But if units vary in production at different times, it will. In this way a set of units can maintain a population
larger than the limit set by the minimum product of each unit - one approximating the average minimum for a set of units at any given time. Such units may be nuclear families, extended families, localized descent groups, communities, chiefdoms, or states. The size of the network within which the exchange will be advantageous will be a function of at least three factors: the interaction of (a) environmental characteristics and productive technology; (b) environmental characteristics and storage technology; and (c) environmental characteristics and transportation technology. It will also be a function of that number of units among which exchange is possible which comes closest to maximizing the randomness of the variable productivity of each unit in the set at any given time (1973: 3).

Co-operation among the owners of a number of salmon streams would work best when the fluctuations in productivity occur infrequently in any given stream, thus minimizing the likelihood of simultaneous failures. With pooling and redistribution, the commoner, larger runs (which, without such co-operation would remain as a glut) can contribute to a high average level of productivity for the region. Native populations could grow until they became consistent in size with that high productivity.

Paradoxically, then, while redistribution may be used to alleviate local shortages, it can also be instrumental in creating them, by underpinning the population growth that makes them inevitable.

Should the population grow in response to the opportunity brought about by co-operation, then the chief's role as a redistributor becomes more critical, as I noted earlier, for the increased numbers will likely begin to exert pressure on the resource base, and make it inevitable, given the irregularity of its constituent units, that various segments of the enlarged
population will, on occasion, produce less than they need. Having cast their lot with interdependence, local groups would become unable to maintain a demand level below the amount of the poorest runs.

They would be living beyond their local means, relying instead on the credit that their participation in the redistributitional network provides them.

Finally, the presence of a number of chiefs and sub-chiefs (lineage, clan, and village heads) within a community bespeaks the variety of sources of surpluses that go into the redistributions, for each stands at the apex of a productive unit and contributes the product of that unit to the commonweal via his contributions to the heads of the larger units (house head to lineage chief, etc.) or his distributions in feasts and the like. Because each draws on the product of a particular segment of the community's resource sites (such as the 31 salmon streams with their 108 runs), he is dependent on the characteristics of that segment for his ability to participate in the reciprocal network.

The ranking among the chiefs and kin units may, therefore, reflect the reliability of resources under their control, a condition that would dictate the frequency with which they could act as distributors, as opposed to recipients. The high range of variability of the salmon runs could, over time, lead to the owners of streams with low variability and large quantities acting as donors or hosts more frequently than those who controlled more erratic runs.
Conclusion

The formulation proposed here differs from those of Suttles and Piddocke in that it considers shortages of salmon as the natural consequence of the development of a tribe-wide (or village-wide) economy and, as I proposed, its attendant population growth, rather than as extraordinary and shattering failures of the resource base. I view redistribution in this case as a normal, rather adroit means of sustaining a large population in the face of a bountiful, albeit irregular, resource base, rather than as an emergency measure to stave off disaster. I do not believe it necessary to claim, as Piddocke did for the Southern Kwakiutl, that "Without the distribution of food [poorer groups] would often have died of hunger" (1965: 293-4), nor to attempt, as Suttles did, to explain coastal social phenomena in terms of infrequent and extraordinary occurrences.

Perhaps, also, a single, once-a-generation failure of a major fish run or prolonged period of severe weather may explain an otherwise inexplicable practice such as the Northwest Coast search for prestige (1968: 60).

Such once-a-generation disasters cannot meet the type of reservation expressed by Weinberg.

...Temporary and local food shortages could tend to establish an economic 'chief,' that is, the leader of a group not suffering from the current shortage....It would then become advantageous to the entire village to maintain this group as a kind of central storehouse to take care of future shortages in the community....

...The chief could acquire a social power, status, because of his importance to the community.... Once a condition of surplus had been established and the group felt secure again, there would no longer be any need for the chief (1965: 248-9).
Under the circumstances that I have posited, however, the group would never establish a sufficiently stable surplus for them to 'feel secure' enough to eliminate a regulatory mechanism such as a redistributor-chief, because by maintaining a larger overall population than the individual resource bases could sustain without redistribution, it is pushing the environment to its limits. An economy geared to the high average productivity of a resource base whose constituent units are nevertheless characterized by considerable fluctuation will need fairly constant tending and readjustment (in the form of redistribution, say). Such regular call for compensation is a firmer basis for the maintenance of status ranking than is the rather tenuous once-a-generation crisis.

According to the formulation proposed here, the basis of chieftainship and inter-personal and inter-group ranking among a people like the Haisla is: 1) a resource base that is conducive to exclusive, long-term control by specific units (individual, house, clan, etc.) such that that unit's economic fortunes are contingent upon the particular pattern of productivity of its local resource base; 2) a degree of variability in the staple resources such that some segments of the community experience occasional shortages that require some form of compensatory mechanism; 3) a differential in variability of productivity among the holdings of the various units that enables some 'owners' to act as contributors more frequently than others; 4) the operation of an economy in which these contributions are somehow
institutionalized.

The key to this type of system is stability—a stable catalogue of resources and stable patterns of access to those resources such that control over them remains in well established channels, and a stable population size such that demand remains fairly constant and predictable.

The addition of a series of spatial and temporal random fluctuations in the quantity of staple resources puts a premium on regulatory mechanisms such as pooling and redistribution. The randomness of the fluctuations is conditioned by the greater or lesser susceptibility of some areas to the environmental accidents that create fluctuations, or by the characteristics of the resources themselves. Units controlling relatively protected regions or stable species will suffer fewer or less extreme fluctuations than units in the opposite circumstances, and thus are in a position to act as high status donors more frequently than less favoured units.

In the following chapter, I will describe how those conditions of stability were fundamentally altered by the introduction of a series of new resources, access to which was governed by conditions not readily absorbed by the old system, and by a severe decline in population such that the demands on the traditional resource base fell off, reducing the importance of those

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1. The previously mentioned circumstance that pinks will fail every other year in a long term depression while chums will fail every four years is an example of the species' characteristics that could affect a group's susceptibility to shortages.
who had once been able to administer the distribution of resources.
Chapter 4

Commercial Fishing

Since the introduction of a logging and fishing based industrial economy to the northern Northwest Coast, the natives of the region have occupied the interface between subsistence and market economies. On the one hand, many have continued to rely to a considerable degree on their traditional resource base, often producing and distributing the foodstuffs via well established kinship channels. On the other hand, as the white economy reached the more remote native territories such as Kitamaat, the Indians became quite deeply involved in the industrial system, taking on the type of role described by Firth:

...the individual has normally a high degree of anonymity, of impersonality in the economic situation. Even if he is not merely a number on a payroll, it is his function as an energy factor, a provider of capital, or of organizing capacity that is of prime importance. As such it is his specific industrial characteristics, not his total social characteristics, that matter. He is deemed to be replaceable. It is the magnitude and quality of his contribution to the economic process, irrespective of his personal status or position in the society, that defines him. (In primitive communities the individual as an economic factor is personalized, not anonymous. He tends to hold his economic position in virtue of his social position. Hence to displace him economically means a social disturbance (1951: 137).

Under the industrial system, the Indian became an impersonal supplier of trees or salmon to the mills and canneries. At any particular time, an individual might be involved in both types of economy, the extent of his involvement in each depending on a variety of circumstances, which I propose to consider in some detail.
The material in the following section is an overview of the factors that governed the participation of the north coast Indians, particularly the Kitamaat, in the major industries that developed in the region, fishing, logging, and factory work. For a number of reasons that I will go into later, I did not examine the factory work in any great detail. Because the first plant did not locate in the area until a half century after the development of logging and fishing, I thought it more fruitful to concentrate on factors pertaining to participation in the latter industries.

I will describe the circumstances which influenced the ability and desire of the natives to take up either of those occupations. Later, I will discuss some of the effects on native culture of that participation. Initially, however, I will restrict the narrative to a historical overview of the industries and the place of the native in them.

The attractiveness of fishing and logging for a coastal Indian is a function of a number of factors: the quantity of a merchantable resource in existence; its accessibility and availability; the number, type and location of markets; prevailing prices, or potential income to be made; compatibility of the occupation with other activities; the relative condition of alternative occupations; and the ease of access to jobs or to equipment for independent operation. (For my purposes, I define accessibility in a physical sense, as 'capable of being reached via the prevailing technology,' and availability in a legal sense, as 'open for exploitation under the prevailing
rules.

The next section, then, will be devoted to an examination of these features, and their relation to Kitamaat logging and fishing.
Accessibility of Fish

Because salmon are anadromous, that is, they are hatched in fresh water streams or lakes but spend most of their adult lives in the sea before returning to their home rivers to spawn, they are inaccessible to fishermen for all but the comparatively short time that they inhabit the inshore waters of the coast and run in the streams themselves.

Each of the five species has a relatively short, inflexible period during which it can be taken. The periods overlap, with the result that the total 'salmon season' extends from June to October or November, with gaps in between when comparatively few fish are running (cf. Table VI, p. 98).

Salmon may be taken in two places: 'in-river' and 'mid-inlet' or open water. The former location lends itself to aboriginal techniques, using weirs, traps, torches and spears or leisters, and nets stretched across the stream, techniques that were prohibited as early as 1892. Since that time, fishing offshore, from skiffs or larger boats has become the norm, although drag seining, or fishing with a seine net from the shoreline and trapping fish between the net and the beach, was practised occasionally.

With the vigorous prosecution of the regulations prohibiting aboriginal methods of taking fish, the natives have perforce abandoned those techniques and have adopted European methods, gill netting, seining, and trolling, for both subsistence and commercial purposes. I will describe the first two techniques
but omit the last, as it is economically insignificant at Kitamaat.
Gill Netting

Gill nets (or salmon drift nets, as they used to be called) remained for some time the only officially sanctioned means of taking salmon in northern waters. The net, of variable length, depth, and mesh, depending on the fish sought and/or the prevailing regulations, was most often rented by the native fisherman from the cannery for the equivalent of one-third of the catch. Made of linen, it usually lasted about two years. The method of gill netting has not changed substantially since the earliest days of commercial fishing on the coast. The net itself has changed, however, becoming at once more efficient and more expensive. As McKervell describes the situation,

...gill netting has advanced from the days when an Indian...threw a rented linen net over the stern of a cannery owned skiff and waited until it was festooned with fish. If a fisherman wants to compete in the modern race for salmon he must have several nets varying in mesh size and colour depending on the species of salmon...and the water to be fished. The net that would be suitable for the Fitzhugh Sound area, for example, would not fish well in Rivers Inlet because the Inlet water is milky due to silt brought down by the river. A dark web would easily be seen by the fish during daylight, and they would simply dive beneath it or swim around. Furthermore, since the trend is towards a light gauge twine that will be less visible to the salmon, a web may not be used more than two seasons, three at the most. Many fishermen use a number 28 web valued at around $350 for only three weeks during the peak of the run, then they strip it off the cork and lead lines and throw it away (1967: 150).

Even more drastic developments have come in the boats. Initially, the canners constructed hundreds of rowboats, which were supplied to the fishermen with the net. Holding two men at
most, usually a man and a woman or boy, they were suitable only for inshore fishing. That did not matter particularly at first, for the regulations prohibited fishing outside the boundaries of inlets or beyond the mouths of rivers.

Motor boats were not permitted in the fishery north of Cape Caution until 1924. Until that time, virtually all the fishing took place from rowboats within the confines of inlets or rivers adjacent to the canneries. Canners resisted the introduction of engines because they saw no real competitive advantage to be derived from them, and sought to avoid the expense of equipping all their fishermen. If one group of fishermen were to obtain motor boats, they reasoned, the pressure would fall on them to supply all fishermen in their employ, and the expense would not justify the transitory advantage to be gained, for soon all fishermen would obtain them, and be on an even footing again. Besides, they saw the motors as simply conferring increased mobility rather than increased efficiency, and were loath to underwrite the fishermen's convenience when they saw no profit in it for themselves.

By 1924, however, the regulation was relaxed, and engines were permitted. They began to appear with increasing frequency in Rivers Inlet, the major commercial fishing ground of the Haisla. This spelled the end of overall Indian equality in the fishery. As long as the equipment available to the whole fishing force remained substantially the same--row boat and gill net--the native could hold his own, for success came with greater skill
or luck, and was not conferred by superior equipment. With the introduction of engines, however, the process began which saw the Indian fall further and further behind as development crowded upon development, each innovation more costly and harder to obtain, each more necessary to the fisherman who desired to remain competitive.

(In 1924, of the 54 motor boats introduced at Rivers Inlet, 3 belonged to Indians. The following year, the figure rose to 9 out of 110. Figure 3 indicates the rate at which motor boats were adopted at Rivers Inlet. The proportion rose quickly, from 5 per cent in 1924 to 67 per cent in 1939. The technological basis for Indian underdevelopment was established during this period.)
Figure 3

Rowboats and Motor Boats at Rivers Inlet

1924-1940

Source: Federal Fisheries Annual Reports
Seining

(Whereas gill netting is primarily a solitary occupation (two-man, before the advent of motor boats, one oar puller, one net man), seining is characteristically a co-operative venture, requiring the efforts of from 3 to 7 men, depending on the degree of mechanization of net hauling equipment.)

Seiners generally pursue fish, such as herring or chum salmon, that congregate in schools and can thus be surrounded in large numbers. When a school is encountered, the captain releases a skiff, to which is attached one end of the net. He then proceeds at high speed to surround the school, recovers the far end of the net from the skiff man, and cinches the bottom tight, using drawstrings attached for the purpose. The trapped fish can be scooped out of the resulting purse with a small seine net, or brail, attached to a boom, and deposited in the hold.

(On early seine boats, hauling was done by hand, a task requiring the efforts of a 7 man crew. Subsequent developments of power hauling equipment have progressively reduced the size of the crews until today, the modern boats carry as few as 3 men.) In 1953, 7 seiners operated out of Kitamaat, each with a 7 man crew, for a total of 49 seine fishermen. Today, there are 2 boats, with 3 man crews, for a total of 6.

Recent years have also seen the introduction of complex and expensive electronic gear --radar, sonar, sonic fish-finding apparatus--in addition to costly deck machinery. The result is a soaring cost that few natives can meet.) Of the two Kitamaat
seiners, one is worth $175,000, the other some $325,000, (far beyond the range of all but a small minority of 'high-line' fishermen.)

While it is usual for seiners to take larger hauls than gill netters, the proceeds must be shared among a larger number of crewmen, in addition to shares for the boat (or the company, if it supplies the vessel), sometimes a share for the fuel, and so on. Thus, it is not uncommon for seine fishermen to realize less than gill net fishermen.)
Availability of fish

The availability of salmon was governed by regulations defining who was eligible to fish for them, when, where, and by what means. The regulations were designed to permit adequate numbers of fish to escape the nets and reach the spawning beds.

As the numbers of salmon caught increased with greater intensity and efficiency in the industry and the possibility of depletion of the spawning stock loomed up, restrictions became more inclusive—fewer individuals could obtain licences, various technological limitations were imposed, closed areas and times were extended. Manipulation of any of these regulations of access effectively varies the availability of salmon to the fishermen. I will consider each in turn.

Who may fish

Prior to 1892, licences were not needed for individual fishermen, who fished for canneries on an unregulated basis. A number of factors, such as encroachment on the grounds by foreign fishermen and potential depletion of the fish stocks from overfishing prompted the government to issue licencing regulations in that year. Thereafter, individual fishermen could obtain licences, but under certain restrictions; canneries submitted lists of fishermen in their employ to fisheries officers, who then issued permits to the fishermen. Those working under such terms were known as "attached" fishermen, for the conditions of their licence bound them to sell all their fish to their employer. Individuals caught violating this provision stood to lose their
licences.

(Even with those restrictions, it was not difficult initially for natives like the Kitamaat to find work in the fishery. The isolation of the plants (cf. p. 82) left the inhabitants of the coastal villages as the only readily available source of labour. So anxious were the canners to secure Indian help (especially women) that they dispatched steam tugs to villages such as Kitamaat to tow a train of canoes to the canneries, returning them at the end of the season. In this manner, virtually the whole village would embark for Rivers Inlet in mid-June, to return in late August. During the 1890's the missionary at Kitamaat reported that the village became practically deserted during the summer. All able bodied men and women had departed, leaving only those too frail to stand the three day canoe trip.

(Until the numbers of fishermen became excessive, it was an easy matter for a competent native fisherman to sign on with a cannery, most often through a broker who contracted to supply so many workers to the canner in return for a per capita fee. The canneries became an increasingly popular source of income during the late 19th century, a circumstance that gave rise to gross overcrowding of the fishing grounds and alarmed even the canners, who in 1903 sought to protect their futures and regulate the fishery by way of a voluntary boat rating.)

That move marked a departure from the untrammelled competition that had characterized the industry. Hitherto, a feature of the sockeye runs had encouraged a system of ever-expanding
fleets, as the canners scrambled to beat out their rivals on the grounds.

Sockeye schools run in unpredictable surges. One hour or day the fish are scarce; the next, they are everywhere, an irregularity that affected both the strategy of the canners and the employment prospects of the fishermen.

(During the peaks of the run, the cannery had no trouble acquiring enough fish. In fact, quite often the processing capacity of the plant was swamped. The fish will not keep for long during the summer, and as storage facilities were virtually non-existent in the days before cold storage, it was not uncommon to see thousands of prime salmon dumped into the inlet because the plant could not keep up the pace.

During the frequent lulls, however, in order to maintain minimal levels of fish, the canners needed every net out that they could afford. On the principle that the greater the number of nets one had out the greater was the chance of catching the few salmon there were, canners sought to counter the slack periods with sheer numbers of fishermen. While the practice may have been sound enough in theory, each canner tried the same course, with the result that the number of fishermen grew beyond all reason. The same fishermen who supplied the canneries during the slack periods naturally expected to profit from the surges, and brought in all the fish that they could catch. The whole matter was aggravated by the presence of up to ten competing canneries, and in consequence, Rivers Inlet stood in some danger of being fished out.)
Economics provided virtually the only moderating factor: the matter soon became one of the canners' calculating the point at which the extra costs of boat and rig fell below the benefits of an extra net in the water. That number was higher than the fish populations could long endure, however.

It eventually became clear that the unrestricted competition would benefit no one, not the canners, whose cutthroat rivalry was proving expensive, nor the fishermen, whose increasing numbers spelled far lower individual catches, nor the salmon. The canners negotiated a voluntary boat rating in 1903, under which each firm was allotted a quota, to be divided among the canneries under its control. (Some companies operated two or three canneries in the inlet.) These ratings appear as Table III, p.

In addition to the totals, they are interesting chiefly for the light they throw on the activity of the various bands of natives operating in Rivers Inlet at the time, a matter which will be considered later.

Had the rating remained in force for any period, it would undoubtedly have affected the economic life of the Haisla considerably, for the Kitamaat were allowed a quota of only 25 boats, when there were 82 adult men in the village. Those unable to hire on in Rivers Inlet found it necessary to travel to the Skeena or the Fraser canneries, which were already manned by the well established local natives.

The agreement did not last for more than three years, however, after which the net race broke out again, a spiral that continued
until the government imposed a rating of its own, limiting the number of boats to 700. Although more fishermen found work under the government rating than under the canners', the increase put greater pressure on the individual fisherman, as increased numbers of nets reduced the average catch.

In addition to the problems facing individual natives, Indians as a group were meeting increasingly stiff competition from whites and immigrant Japanese. Evidently, it was only the canners' need for Indian women to work as packers in the plants that enabled the men to hang on as well as they did.

In addition to the disabilities resulting from open competition, the natives had to contend with discriminatory legislation, as the government attempted to enhance the position of whites in the industry. This discrimination took the form of the "unattached licence."

Because the coast was so difficult to farm successfully, it soon became clear to the government that if settlers were to succeed in occupying the region, they would need an outside source of income to see them through. That realization did not bode well for the natives, for the measure conceived to help the settlers did so largely at the expense of the Indians:

With the increased settlement of the northern coast, which has proved rapid during the past two years, however, it was felt that exceptional privileges should be granted white fishermen who might be induced to settle in the district....

[Officials] recommended that in each year a certain proportion of the licences in each area be reserved for independent white fishermen. These licences carrying with them the right to dispose of the fish where and to whom the licensee desired,
the proportion of licences so assigned to gradually increase in recurring years (Provincial Fisheries Dept. Annual Reports 1913: I, 7).)

This measure followed closely the efforts of the federal Department of Marine and Fisheries to limit the number of fishing licences in the interests of conservation of the salmon stocks. These independent licences ('unattached' to any cannery) were to be included within the overall limitation, with the result that the number of attached licences (the only type available to non-whites) would have to be reduced accordingly. Moreover, if the number of unattached licences were to increase over the years, in the absence of an expansion of the total fleet, the non-whites would be progressively squeezed from the industry.

Whites took to these licences enthusiastically. In the first year of their operation, some 175 were issued, by the second year, 456, and by the third, 575 (Prov. Fish. Ann. Rpts. 1916: 245).

The issuance of licences soon became something of a farce, however, with considerable abuse of the spirit of the law, as many whites bent the rules to obtain permits.

The man who wanted work, but was not a settler, could file a pre-emption on a pile of rocks at a cost of $2 pre-emption record fee. This led to the creation of a class of "raft-farmer." Your Commissioners saw three or four rafts with little cabins on them, moored to a shore on which it would be difficult to land, and facing pre- emptions on which one could not pitch a tent, much less find soil for even a patch of garden. Having thus qualified as a settler, the man could qualify for an independent licence (Fisheries Commission Report 1917: 33).
Nor were the canners altogether pleased with the type of help that the independent licences obtained for them. Since they wanted as many nets operating for them as possible, managers were obliged to recruit all the independent fishermen that they could, for with the licence limitations then in effect, it came to a choice between the independents' working for them or for a rival. They therefore were obliged to take on anyone who could obtain a licence, one way or another, with decidedly mixed results. One canner complained to the 1917 Fisheries Commission that:

Under the present condition, we are obliged to take men that know absolutely nothing about fishing or about a net. Myself, I do not know how the canneries stand it. I lost $800 worth of net the first clatter out of the box through having two new hands that I was absolutely forced to take on. If I did not have them, some other cannery would have had to have them; men that do not know anything about fishing or about a net, and they lost their nets; entirely through their own fault; entirely through neglect and not knowing their business. There was no occasion to lose them. A complete net, with lines, rigged out, costs us close on to $400., at the present time (Fisheries Commission Evidence 1917: 372).

The framers of the regulation had evidently foreseen that some situation of that sort might develop, and for that reason had specified that the unattached fishermen were to supply their own gear. They did not foresee that the licence limitation would oblige the canners to take on anyone who had somehow acquired a licence, regardless of whether he had equipment or not, simply to make up the required number of fishermen. Thus, non-fishermen, complete outsiders, were able to come in and squeeze natives from their occupations.)
The influx of whites so cut into the number of licences available to Indians that many despaired of finding work and remained at home. A native witness testified before the 1917 Commission:

There is another thing we want to ask. The Indians always get smaller licences every year. We want to find out how many licences we are supposed to be getting. They are always getting less every year, licences for us. We are liable to not fish in some years. There is very few Indians fishing now to-day compared with before.

Q. But do they want to fish?
A. Sure they want to fish, but lots of fellows just stay home; can’t get no licence; because I think we have a right over any people, because we have no other chance (Fisheries Commission Evidence 1917: 274).

Another sore point was the higher price paid to independent fishermen. Traditionally, the canneries had paid one-third more per fish to operators who supplied their own gear. This practice was applied to unattached fishermen, who, theoretically, also brought their own equipment. In practice, virtually no independent fisherman did, but instead arranged to buy nets from the canneries, paying them out of the proceeds of the catch. In a good year, the price differential between dependents and independents was enough to enable the latter to retire a considerable portion of his debt. In poor years, the canneries generally permitted him to turn in the net and take the attached price for his catch, operating as if he had been an attached fisherman all along. Thus, he benefitted in a good year, and in a poor year did no worse than anyone else.

This type of favoritism occasioned considerable resentment from the Indians, who saw it as evidence of gross discrimination.
At every opportunity, they called on the government to remove their disability.

(Had the licence limitations and increasing numbers of independents continued unabated, the Indian would have been virtually eliminated from the coastal fishery. Two events prevented this from occurring. The government restricted the number of Japanese fishermen, thus taking some of the pressure off both whites and Indians, and in addition relaxed the boat ratings, permitting virtually open access to the fishing grounds, a condition that lasted until 1968, with the introduction of the Salmon Licence Limitation Program.)

White fishermen had been complaining for some time about the increasing competition from the Japanese. The Duff Commission of 1922 examined the question of Oriental participation in the industry and recommended a decrease in the number of Japanese that should be eligible for licences. This adjustment took the form of a 40% reduction of Japanese fishermen in Rivers Inlet in 1923. According to the original edict, the number was to be further reduced by 10% per year, a condition that was removed in 1929 after a successful Japanese appeal to the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the fact remained that the makeup of the fishing fleet was artificially determined from about 1913 intermittently to 1948 through a variety of such maneuvers.

Following the elimination of the boat ratings, the size of the fishing fleet shot up, as fig. 3 shows. These boats were primarily gill netters.
(With this increase, however, another restriction on the availability—and thus the catch size—grew in significance. That was the practice of closing certain times of the day, certain days of the week, or certain regions, to fishing. These restrictions were known as closed periods and closed areas.)

(A certain irreducible minimum of salmon must be permitted to escape the fishermen and reach their home streams in order to ensure an adequate spawning stock. A large number of fishermen operating in a region, especially with the increased efficiency that technological developments imparted, meant that the allowable catch quotas were filled more quickly, obliging the Fisheries officers to extend the closed times, reducing the opportunity for individual fishermen to take fish.)

(The squeezing of the periods during which fish are caught and delivered created an artificial form of the 'surge' mentioned previously in connection with the sockeye runs:

...the short open weekly season for salmon fishing tend(s) to bunch fish deliveries into a short period of the year and into weekly peaks. This requires excess handling facilities and services(Sinclair 1960: 97).

This led to an intensification of the boat race:

On their part the companies are competing for the same total quantity of fish which must be caught in a given period of time. It is in their interest if they are to get the largest possible quantity that they have as many fishermen as possible catching for them (Ibid.: 131).

The upshot of this restriction on availability was that, while canners remained willing to hire (and usually supply) Indian fishermen, the increased competition inherent in the
increase in boats reduced average catches significantly.

Markets

The primary market for Kitamaat fishermen was the canneries, first of Rivers Inlet, and after they closed, those of the Skeena, and the individual plants at Butedale, Klemtu, and Namu. In common with the processing plants for logging (sawmills and pulp-mills), canneries initially located near the source of supply of the raw material. This dispersion proceeded from the fact that salmon will not keep for long in the absence of refrigeration. Canners could not locate more than a few miles from the fishing grounds without endangering their supply, hence the location of the plants along isolated inlets, far removed from population centers, but relatively close to Indian reserves.

This decentralization initially worked to the natives' advantage, for it left them as the only readily available labour supply. No matter how unwilling the canneries were to take on Indian help, they nevertheless did so, if only to obtain native women for inside work. Whereas white and Japanese men were willing to travel to the inlets for the season, women were not, which left women's jobs washing fish and filling cans, almost exclusively in native hands.)

Hawthorn et al noted that this situation--hiring Indian men in order to obtain their wives' labour--obtained during recent decades (1954: 111 ). I had assumed that the reasons given for the canners' dissatisfaction with native fishermen--their alleged neglect of equipment, lower productivity, and unreliability--
followed on the adoption of power boats and complex equipment. I was surprised to find that those attitudes prevailed as early as 1902.

The employment of Indian fishermen is necessary in order to secure the assistance of their women in the canneries. Desirability of a particular Indian is measured by the number of women his household will produce for the canneries as fish cleaners and can fillers....

Considerable rivalry was developed during the past season between the cannery managers for Indian labour and a bonus of 30 dollars per boat was paid for season contracts and the existing price of seven cents per fish was raised to eight cents (Prov. Fisheries Annual Reports 1902: G 29).

Moreover, whites were not slow to admit that, were non-Indian female help more available they would not have minded dispensing with Indian fishermen.

In most cases we get the Indians, practically, because we need the help in the cannery; we need their women. This year I am making an experiment with white women....

Q. Now because you, under those conditions, do not need the Indian women that you did before, you have been employing more Japanese [i.e., as fishermen]?

A. Yes.

(Fisheries Commission Evidence 1917: 360.

This canner's experiment evidently was not successful, for native women continued to dominate the inside work of the northern canneries, and their husbands continued to find work fishing. (As long as the canneries remained isolated and operators found it difficult to persuade women to travel north for the season, the natives retained an edge.) Table III indicates that Indians made up some 64% of the fishermen in Rivers Inlet during 1903, for example.
As for the pattern of employment in a region like Rivers Inlet, it is difficult to generalize. The list of canneries and their employees (Table III, p. 85) illustrates why. I was curious whether Indians tended to work for a single cannery or had spread out to work for several. Of the seven bands mentioned in the boat rating system, three worked for one company, three worked for two, and one worked for three. (The Kitamaat worked for a single company.) I would have thought that natives from a particular village preferred to work for one cannery in preference to dispersing and losing contact with each other. In a single plant, the women were able to work together, and the matter of hiring fishermen was simplified. (It was the practice of the time for all dealing to be carried out through a broker, who assembled the fishermen for the canner and acted on their behalf. The operator was thus spared the task of dealing with hundreds of individuals from an alien culture, speaking half a dozen languages. In turn the broker received around ten dollars for each man he recruited, five dollars for each woman (at the 1910 Rivers Inlet rate). Once at the canneries, however, women came under the purview of the Chinese boss, who handled all dealings inside, including both Chinese butchers and Native fillers. Things did not always go smoothly under that system, for the Chinese workers were rather more tractable than the natives, who were more conscious of their rights and more inclined to assert them.) (Fisheries officials around Rivers Inlet were wont to complain that the Indians became 'saucy' when ordered about.)
Table III
Boat Ratings at Rivers Inlet, 1903-04

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B.C. Packer's Association</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingcome Indians</td>
<td>103 boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert Bay</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-weet-kay-no</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Hat</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White fishermen</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>258</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B.C. Canning Co., Ltd.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kitamaat Indians</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-weet-kay-no</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert Bay</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bella Bella</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>114</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anglo-B.C. Packing Co., Ltd.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bella Bella Indians</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nox</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-weet-kay-no</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Hat</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>76</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Totals</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kitamaat</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingcome</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bella Bella</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-weet-kay-no</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Hat</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert Bay</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nox</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>448</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Fisheries Commission 1905: 134-35)
Boss's attempts to feed the usual Chinese rice ration to the native women caused considerable friction, for example.

The Kitamaat were originally hired through a white trader resident in the village, but eventually they revolted and demanded that the canners deal directly with them. The operators responded that they should choose a spokesman from among themselves. An interesting process took place then, for one would assume that the position would be taken by a chief or individual with high status, for the traditional system still counted for a great deal during the early years of the century. Indeed, the chiefs do seem to have been canvassed first, but declined on the grounds that they could neither read nor write, an accomplishment deemed necessary for the job. The position then went to a younger man who had attended the missionary's school. (My informants did not remember his identity, so I was unable to learn what effects the new-found wealth and position had on his life.) The problem remains an intriguing one, for in such a situation an individual could realize twice to three times the income of his fellows, one of the very few instances that I know of in which such a marked and regular differential occurred. Moreover, this income was independent of the vagaries of the season and came to the broker regardless of the size of the catch.

Two developments served to undermine the Indians' security in the canneries. First, a rash of takeovers and amalgamations took place, leaving most of the canneries in the hands of a few large operators. Second, the canners learned to overcome their
transportation problems, enabling them at long last to ship salmon over considerable distances without their spoiling.

The mergers led to the wholesale closure of canneries. While the canning business was the preserve of the fiercely independent wildcat entrepreneur, a large number of plants continued to operate in defiance of rules of efficiency. This independence occasionally led to vast fortunes being made very quickly, but more often spawned an instability in the industry that left many precarious operations ripe for a takeover. The process began quite early. In 1902:

The British Columbia Packers' Association of New Jersey...took over 42 British Columbia canneries with land, buildings, machinery, fixtures, fishing gear, ships, boats, scows and trade marks, also 2 cold storages (Lyons 1969: 737-8).

Almost the first act of the new companies in many cases was to close down the smaller plants. In 1901, 73 canneries operated on the coast. Three years later there were 50. Actually the numbers fluctuated rapidly, for the independent canners were far from beaten at that time. The principle of cannery closure by large firms remained, however.

The second development that harmed the Indians' chances in the industry was the introduction of packers capable of delivering salmon in good condition from hundreds of miles away. Initial attempts were relatively crude, but successful—salmon were packed in crushed ice. Later developments saw the fish kept fresh in refrigerated brine, a mechanism that enabled the collecting boats virtually to range the coast, and freed the operators to locate
Consolidation of plants into few hands had given the motive for closures and centralization of canneries; brine packers gave the opportunity. As long as technological limitations enforced the dispersion of plants, natives could rely on finding work. With those limitations overcome, however, the way was open for owners to concentrate their plants near the metropolitan centres and away from the fishing grounds, and, incidentally, from the native villages.

The shift in the pattern of cannery locations between 1920 and 1970 is shown in fig. 4, p. 89. Clearly, the coast-wide dispersal of plants had given way to a clustering at two metropolitan centres -- around Vancouver, and near Prince Rupert.

Figure 5 shows that the decline in numbers of canneries began in the late 1920's both for the coast as a whole, and for Rivers Inlet. The main effect of this process was to throw hundreds of native women out of work, on the central coast especially, depriving them of an independent income that they had commanded since the 1880's.

The Haisla found other canneries to go to, but in reduced numbers. After the closure of the Rivers Inlet plants, the focus for Haisla fishermen shifted to Butedale, about 130 miles south of the village, and to the Skeena canneries. Around 1959, the Butedale plant collapsed--the roof fell in, and much of the structure fell into the inlet--and was not rebuilt, depriving the Haisla of their main market.
Figure 4

Consolidation of Canneries, 1920-1960

Source: Lyons 1969: 710-715
Figure 5

Number of Canneries Operating, B.C. and Rivers Inlet

1880-1956

1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950

No. of Canneries Operating
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80

Rivers Inlet

British Columbia
That closure also removed the winter herring fishery experiment that promised to provide a lucrative income for those Haisla who could sign on with a seine boat. For a short time during the early 1950's, herring fishermen could make more money during the winter than when they fished for salmon during the summer.

After the closure of the Butedale plant, the Haisla looked to the Skeena canneries for employment and boats. There too, the process of consolidation continued, inexorably reducing the number of plants and workers. As late as 1969, some 6 canneries shut down. Again, the impact fell heaviest on the natives, as Table IV, p. 92 shows. These closures are brought on by the concentration of almost the entire fishing industry into the hands of three giant companies: Nelson Brothers, Canadian Fishing Company, and B.C. Packers. Competition, and its concomitant proliferation of plants has given way to rationalized production based on economies of scale, progressively reducing the number and disposition of plants, boats, and jobs.)
Table IV

Cannery Staff Layoffs, Skeena River, 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Staff Layoffs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Indian</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>951</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hall and Tsong 1970: 4
Compatibility with other Occupations

Although the fishing season is relatively short, lasting somewhat less than ten weeks, it is subject to a rather inflexible phenomenon—the timing of the salmon runs. Although the seasonal nature of the occupation permits natives to carry on other activities for much of the year, if they are to fish, they are totally committed for a particular period. To that extent, fishing is an activity incompatible with other occupations.

Similarly, as long as the natives continued to rely on traditional foodstuffs, their time was committed during the seasons that those foods were available. Oolichan run during April and May, while the Indians' main salmon species run from September to November.

The Haisla would not willingly abandon these foods, for they preferred them, by and large, to those the whites introduced, besides which their availability was not subject to the vagaries of the natives' cash supply. Therefore their subsistence activities were of considerable importance. Kitamaat grease, for example, was not only a staple for the Haisla themselves, but was a major item of inter-tribal trade. It was exchanged for seaweed and herring eggs from groups like the Bella Bella and Skidegate. Springtime was thus doubly committed, for without grease, the Haisla would have lost not only the foodstuff itself, but also the variety of items that it would obtain in trade.
Initially, commercial fishing fitted in quite well with subsistence fishing, for the most saleable species, sockeye, was not so crucial to the Haisla as were chum or pink salmon, which run in far greater numbers in the rivers of the Kitamaat region (cf. Table II, p. 42). Thus, exploitation of the different types could proceed with minimal overlap and conflict.

The canners' concentration on sockeye resulted from the preferences of the buying public, primarily in Britain, which would accept only the rich red flesh characteristic of sockeye and red springs. For twenty years after the inception of canning at Rivers Inlet, sockeye remained the overwhelming favorite and almost the sole commercial species.

Red springs were taken in addition to sockeye. Spring salmon vary in the colour of their flesh; about one-third are the desired red, one-third pink, and one-third white. In the earlier years, fish collectors slashed springs near the head and tail to expose the flesh, discarding white and paying less for pink coloured fish. Other species were not considered worth the bother. A fisherman of the period wrote:

We'd leave at four in the morning, my partner and me. In our big, 25-foot rowing skiff. Four hours hard work out to the net. Pull it, take out the sockeye. Throw away all the coho, chum, pinks and big, big springs (Lyons, 1969: 210).

Because of the emphasis on sockeye, canneries were located in numbers only near the major sockeye streams of the coast: the Fraser River, Rivers Inlet, and the Skeena and Nass Rivers. Individual canneries were dotted the length of the coast, wherever
local circumstances seemed to warrant, but nowhere outside the major sockeye rivers did numbers of plants develop.

This concentration on a single variety of salmon had two advantages for the Haisla. Their favoured species had white flesh and were not initially sought by the canners. For some time, they were left alone to exploit them as they had always done. As far as they were concerned, during the early period of commercial fishing, the subsistence and commercial fisheries occupied different niches.

In addition, because the species run at different times, wage work for the canneries did not interfere overmuch with subsistence activities. Natives could fish for the Rivers Inlet canneries (or elsewhere) during June, July, and August, and return to their home rivers before autumn, to take and process their favoured species for the winter.

(inevitably, however, the industry expanded its operations, as the European public were persuaded to accept white or pink coloured salmon. Although the canning of chums and pinks had begun around 1905, the great increase in processing of these species began with the First World War, when shipments of the cheaper grades were sent to alleviate the war-time food shortage. Some was also destined for the troops, who were glad of any salmon, no matter what the colour.

The pack of the various species canned in area 2 (Rivers Inlet included) indicates the broadening of the industry at that time. (See Table V, p. 96)
Table V
Composition of Rivers Inlet Salmon Pack by Percentage

Of Each Species, 1905-1917

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sockeye</th>
<th>Chinook</th>
<th>Coho</th>
<th>Chum</th>
<th>Pink</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Federal Fisheries Annual Reports
The effect of this expansion on the natives was twofold. First, canners did not close down at the end of the sockeye season as they had done formerly, but attempted to persuade fishermen to remain for the autumn runs of coho, chums and pinks. It was far easier to retain the whites and Japanese than the Indians, who wanted to return home to put up their winter's supply of salmon. This unwillingness to remain further damaged the Indians' already fragile reputation with the operators.

The natives' refusal to stay was a perfectly sound position, if one considers their priorities. Returning home in August, they arrived in time for most of the fish in their rivers, which they would not have done had they remained near the canneries to fish commercially. For a diagrammatic rendering of this situation, see page . By arriving home around the third week of August (the red line in the table), the Haisla were well placed to pursue their subsistence fishing, for 15 of the 19 major runs had yet to peak. Had they remained working for the canneries until the coho runs had peaked in October, they would have been forced to rely on the ends of only 5 runs.

The variability of the salmon and the generally unpredictable character of the commercial fishery obliged the native to maintain his subsistence activity, for he could never tell when a season's work for the canneries would leave him nothing.

Second, the canners began to establish operations around pink, chum, and spring rivers that they had previously ignored, and in some regions interfered with natives' subsistence fishing.
Table VI

The Timing of Salmon Runs in Major Streams of Haisla Territory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stream</th>
<th>Species</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kitimat R.</td>
<td>Sockeye, Pink, Chum, Chinook, Coho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kildala R.</td>
<td>Pink, Chum, Chinook, Coho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dala R.</td>
<td>Chinook, Chum, Coho, Pink</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiltuish R.</td>
<td>Pink, Chum, Coho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemano R.</td>
<td>Pink, Chum, Chinook, Coho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitlope R.</td>
<td>Sockeye, Pink, Chinook, Chum, Coho</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

〇: Peak of Run
〇: Beginning or End of Run

Source: Stream Catalogue 1972
in the process. This encroachment naturally met with resistance. Evidence given by a white cannery employee before the 1917 Fisheries Commission illustrates the situation. The region under discussion lay just beyond Haisla territory.

The Indians. They figure that they have a right to do these things, you know [i.e., fish in their traditional locations]. I had an Indian here... he is fighting our seine, and he went away outside of Estevan Island here on a creek belonging to the B.C. Packers. Their man at Lowe Inlet had notified Mr. Williams about it. So I told this Indian that I understood they had this ground. He got hostile. He said it was illihe. It was his home. I said "Here is Mr. Williams." So he talked away, that he had fished it so many years and to think that now he could not fish there - so Mr. Williams told him that he had better stop it. But it is the same old thing. Of course it is hard lines to think that these Indians cannot go back to where they lived so many years and fish there (Fisheries Commission Evidence 1917: 467).

A similar situation obtained in Gardner Canal, home of the Kitlope, where by 1905 a single company was licensed to operate a number of drag seines. Probably only the severe depopulation of the Kitlope at that time prevented a confrontation. The Kitlope were so reduced in numbers by then, however, that they could subsist without strain on their main rivers.
The income to be realized from fishing is a function of three elements: the number of fish caught, the unit price, and costs. Because each of these factors is highly variable, income can fluctuate markedly from season to season and from fisherman to fisherman.

The catch itself is prone to all manner of influences, some obvious, others quite arcane: the number of salmon in the runs, weather, the ratio of four to five year old fish in the schools, the number of competing nets, length of closed periods, and personal factors such as luck or skill.

The number of fish in the runs varies with the population cycles of salmon and with environmental accidents that may have reduced the quantities of young fish, as has been discussed in Chapter 3.

Bad weather can depress the catch totals significantly, especially in areas like Rivers Inlet, which can suffer rainy or cloudy weather for weeks on end during the fishing season. In such conditions the fish evidently swim deeper than they do on fine days, and thus escape the nets. Fisheries reports attribute a number of very poor catch totals to this condition.

On a number of occasions, the catch at Rivers Inlet was much smaller than average while the spawning beds showed no corresponding decline. This anomaly was eventually traced to a preponderance of four year old fish in the schools, which, being smaller than the five year olds that also make up the run, could
not be trapped by the standard sized mesh. As a Fisheries officer reported:

...Fishermen whom I interviewed during the fishing season time and again deplored their luck in seeing hundreds of salmon pass through the nets (Prov. Fisheries Annual Reports 1926: G 12-13).

Four year olds were observed to outnumber five year olds in seven of the fourteen years between 1912 and 1926 (Ibid.: E 39f). This was an important depressant in catch totals and accounted for a significant part of the variability in the fishery at that time.

The number of competing fishermen affected the catch of the individual in two ways: it reduced the average haul and, less obvious, as I noted earlier, it prompted Fisheries officers to extend closed times, which limited the individual's opportunities for taking fish. More fishermen meant that the weekly quota of fish were caught in a shorter time, enforcing a longer idle period.

Other variations in catch size could be attributed only to chance, as on the occasions when officers noted that one fisherman caught over 100 salmon in a day, while his neighbour operating two hundred yards away took 15.

Against these disabilities, a fisherman could catch around 2,000-3,000 fish per season with gill net and skiff, taking only sockeye. The missionary at Kitamaat reported that the 'high man' for the village took 2,400 sockeye in 1903; the following year the largest catch totalled 2,700.
A half century later, gill netters claimed that they could take up to 40,000 fish in a very good year, using power equipment and accepting all species that they caught. The best seine haul that I heard of totalled 100,000 fish. The proceeds of a seine catch were split several ways, however.

I had hoped to be able to determine the average income of a fisherman for a number of years, albeit in a crude manner, by calculating the average catch, multiplying that figure by the prevailing price, then deducting costs. Unfortunately, one invariably encounters a mass of conflicting evidence in matters of this sort, and it is not easy to know which set to believe. For example, the 1922 Provincial Fisheries Report lists a fish price table for nearly two decades (given here as Table VII, p. 103). That, I thought, was potentially useful information, for with it I could calculate the average catch per boat, and from there determine the mean income. If we compare the pack figures in the report with others given by Lyons 1967 (given as Table VIII, p. 104), however, we find marked discrepancies, making reliable calculation impossible.

Complicating the issue was the trend towards the greater diversity of catch. When sockeye was the sole commercial species, the listed price could refer only to it, leaving no problems of calculation. When other species became commercially acceptable, price differentials appeared (Table IX, p. 105), complicating matters (3 1/2¢ - 50¢ per fish, for example.) In order to determine income, we need to know the makeup of each fisherman's
Table VII

Selected Fisheries Statistics, Three Year Averages

1903-1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Average Pack (in Cases)</th>
<th>Average Price Per Fish (¢)</th>
<th>Average No. of Boats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1903-06</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907-10</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-14</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>12 1/2</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-18</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Provincial Fisheries Annual Reports
Table VIII
Variation in Reported Size of B.C. Fish Packs.
Three Year Averages, 1903-1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Pack Size, Cases of 48, 1 lb. Cans</th>
<th>Difference in Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reported by Fisheries Dept.</td>
<td>Reported by Lyons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903-06</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>92,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907-10</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>97,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-14</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>104,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-18</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>107,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Federal Fisheries Annual Reports
Lyons 1969: 705-715
Table IX

B.C. Salmon Prices, by Species, 1935

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Species</th>
<th>Price (Cents per Fish)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sockeye</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coho &amp; Steelhead</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinks</td>
<td>3 1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chums</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Springs (over 12 lb.)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Springs (under 12 lb.)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pink, White, &amp; Jack Springs</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lyons 1969: 413
catch. Sales slips listing such information were issued for each fisherman, a copy of which went to the Fisheries Department. Unfortunately, they discard them after two years.

Using the scraps of accurate evidence that we do have, such as the Raley 'high man' figures and the price for that period, 7¢ per sockeye, we can arrive at incomes of $168 and $189 for 1903 and 1904 respectively. Those were the high figures; presumably the remainder of the Kitamaat brought home less. It is difficult to go beyond that sort of calculation. For example, one cannot be sure from the size of a pack what a fisherman was likely to make. Clearly, poor runs depressed a fisherman's income. Less obviously, a large run could work to his disadvantage as well:

The earnings of the Indians at the canneries in 1897 were less than in any previous year. The salmon run at the northern canneries was a complete failure, and owing to the unprecedented numbers of salmon running up the Fraser, the prices paid per fish were totally unremunerative and did not meet the general expenses incurred by the fishermen there employed (IAR 1898: 247).

Moreover, trying to correlate observers' comments about the profitability of a season and the size of a pack leads nowhere. Compare the remarks found in the Kitamaat missionary Raley's newsletter with the pack size and the local estimation of the season (Table X, p. 107). It seems that, not only was the pack size quite variable, but the Kitamaat share of it was likewise unpredictable.

1. Indian Affairs Reports.
Table X

Discrepancies Between Perceived Success of Fishing Season and Size of Pack: Missionary's Reports and Pack Records

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Missionary (Raley)</th>
<th>Pack (Rivers Inlet)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Fairly good year</td>
<td>71,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>The season, so far as the Kitamaats were concerned, was a comparative failure; several of them hardly catching sufficient salmon to pay for their supplies at the cannery store</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>A very fair run</td>
<td>69,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>A successful season</td>
<td>94,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Raley (Na-Na-Kwa) 1899-1907
Lyons 1969: 705-715
Haisla fishermen

Because licence records are unobtainable for the years prior to 1966, it is impossible to determine the number of Haisla fishermen over the past eighty years. (It is safe to say, however, that from around the inception of canning at Rivers Inlet (in 1881) and for more than half a century following, virtually every able-bodied Haisla made at least part of his living as a commercial fisherman.) I found only four men who had taken up logging full time rather than following the usual course of fishing during the summer and logging during the off season.

(The overall participation rate declined between 1900 and 1950, however.) The missionary reported around the turn of the century that the village was all but deserted during the summer during the time that the canneries were operating. In 1917, a nurse in the village school noted the same thing, remarking that only two families remained behind. By 1953, however, the Hawthorn Report fieldworkers noted that about half the village travelled to the canneries, while the other half remained at home (223 went, 228 remained) (1953: n.p.).

The number of men fishing at that time totalled 77, of whom 28 operated gill netters, while 49 worked aboard the 7 seiners operated from the village (Ibid.).

Since then, however, the number of fishermen has declined to 26, around one-third of the 1953 total (Fisheries Dept. Licence Records: n.p.). Of that total, around 8 worked on seiners (2 boats, @ 4 men per boat), the rest on gill netters. The Provin-
cial Voters' Lists record a steady decline in the number of those calling themselves fishermen since the Indians were first included on the rolls, in 1949. This decline is coupled with a commensurate rise in the number of labourers, a term that includes those working for Alcan, Eurocan, Kitimat City, or Kitamaat village.

(This decline accompanied the general closure of canneries and fish plants. Fishermen found it more difficult to obtain boats or credit from the remaining companies.) The Hawthorn field workers found the process in evidence in 1953:

said he might try (gill netting) next year. The main difficulty seems to be obtaining boats. Official policy of the company is not to give out boats except to top fishermen. There are too many gillnetters around now, and most of them are no good, said the clerk in the office ...
The attitude of the clerk was that if the fisherman was known to be a good one, the company would see that he got a boat, but if he was just average or less than average he would be out of luck (1953: n.p.).

Fifteen years later, the situation had worsened for northern native fishermen:

The prediction of poor salmon runs in 1969 and a series of company closures and mergers resulted in the closing of a number of canneries in 1968 and 1969. Fishing companies operating in northern British Columbia where the salmon prospects were also poor in 1971 decided to curtail the number of gill net and seiners that they usually rented or chartered. The high percentage of these vessels were [sic] usually fished by Indians. The decision not to fish these vessels was based on the premise that there was no hope, with the anticipated runs that the vessel operators could even pay the costs of normal operations. Had the vessels fished the end result would have been that operators would have owed the company more at the end of the year than at the beginning. Many of the Indians who were not given vessels were unfortunately heavily indebted to the companies from previous years and the companies
had no security against this indebtedness. Once the companies withdrew the opportunity for Indians to continue to fish they in effect also recognized that there was little hope of ever collecting money from this group of fishermen. Many of the gill net vessels withdrawn in 1971 were not returned to the fishery....Most marginal Indian fishermen were thus forced out of the industry because of these changing conditions (Sinclair 197.: 522-23).

A greater proportion of Kitamaat natives has left the fishery than of almost any other coastal band. Figure 6, p. 111, shows the decline over the past quarter century.¹ This reduction has left Kitamaat with one of the smallest proportions of fishermen to workers on the north coast, as Table XI indicates. Of those villages with a smaller proportion of fishermen, only Greenville and Owikeno are located on the coast.² Even a number of villages on the Skeena (marked with an 'S' on the table) a hundred miles or so from the sea have maintained a greater proportion of fishermen in their work force than has Kitamaat.

The reason for this decline may well be found in conditions described by Hawthorn et al. They remark upon the relatively stable rate of participation in the northern fishery by natives

1. The absolute numbers of fishermen in the graph may not be altogether accurate, for two reasons. Because the figures were compiled from the claimed occupation of individuals on the provincial voters' lists, a few fishermen under voting age would not appear. Second, because most of the elections during the period were held during the summer, some fishermen may have been absent from the village when the enumerations were taken. Nevertheless, the trend is quite unmistakeable, and illustrates the point that I am trying to make.

2. Owikeno is exceptional, however, in that the natives there relied on a single cannery for their boats. That cannery closed recently, and the Indians have not yet established an alternative source of equipment.
Figure 6

Occupations at Kitamaat, 1949-1972

Source: Provincial Voters' Lists
### Table XI

Number of Fishermen as a Percentage of the Male Work Force--North Coast Indian Villages

(Three Year Average, 1971-73)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Band</th>
<th>Avg. Male Population 16-60 years of age</th>
<th>Avg. No. of Fishermen</th>
<th>No. as a % of Working Male Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Port Simpson</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bella Bella</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skidegate</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitkatla</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bella Coola</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitasoo</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitwancool</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kincolith</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitsegukla</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masset</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitwanga</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitsumkalum</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glen Vowel</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kispiox</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gitlakdamix</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitamaat</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenville</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owikeno</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazelton</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitselas</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8 s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

s: Skeena village

in the decades preceding the date of their study (1954) (see Table XII, p. 114), but add a cautionary note:

The new competition from the Japanese and from others using newer and more efficient boats and equipment has had significant effects on per capita output and income, which according to a good deal of evidence has been drastic, especially for Indians in some areas. The licence figures may really indicate, not that Indians have held their own in gill net fishing, but that they have held on, in the face of shorter fishing seasons, smaller catches per boat, declining incomes and standards of living, deterioration of equipment, and a rising burden of indebtedness. In other words, many Indians in the north have continued gill net fishing under conditions which have driven a large number of Whites out of the industry entirely (1954: 117).

(The Indians of the isolated villages of the north coast hang on, it seems, because they have nowhere else to go. If they wish to remain in their home villages, it is a choice between marginal fishing or nothing.

The decline in the number of Haisla fishermen has resulted from the presence of alternative occupations in the nearby town of Kitimat. (See next chapter.) The construction of the town presented alternative occupations that have lowered the Kitamaats' tolerance for the conditions described by Hawthorn et al. (Or, if it has not lowered their tolerance, it has removed their need to put up with them.)
Table XII
The Number and Percentage in the Industry of Indians in Some Aspects of the Commercial Salmon Fishery, 1922-1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gill Net</th>
<th>Purse Seine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owned or Rented</td>
<td>Owned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>1369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Federal Fisheries Annual Reports
Chapter 5

Logging

Logging remained second to fishing as a major source of remuneration among the Haisla, although a considerable number of Haisla engaged either in independent production, contract work for sawmills or pulpmills, or wage work for local companies. The period of greatest activity for the Haisla came during the First World War, and lasted until the mid Twenties, when their participation dropped off gradually, until by the early Fifties, fewer than a half-dozen derived any significant income from it.

Particular features of the environment of Haisla territory, particularly the terrain and species composition of the forests, enabled the Haisla to become one of the most successful groups of native loggers on the coast. This initial success was attained in spite of the fact that the forests of the region are both smaller in extent and considerably sparser in high-grade timber species than the territories of many southern groups.

In this chapter, I will consider factors relevant to the Haislas' participation in the industry: merchantable timber in the region, its accessibility and availability, markets, technological influences, and pricing structures.
Merchantable Timber

In traditional Haisla territory (Gardner Canal drainage basin in Forest Service parlance), only fifteen per cent of the land area carries merchantable timber. This figure is very low for coast forests, as Table XIII, p. 117 shows. Furthermore, almost two-thirds of the merchantable timber is found in stands averaging less than ten thousand board feet per acre, a figure usually deemed the lower limit for economical tracts. The more profitable stands, those containing ten thousand feet or more, make up less than six per cent of the forested area; the average for the coast for stands of that quality is thirty-two per cent.

In addition, much of the timber consists of the least sought-after types. Merchantable timber, of course, is that which can be sold. Although there may have been a considerable acreage of timber growing in Haisla territory, much of it was not initially of the right type or quality to find a ready market. For the early period of logging on the coast, timber primarily meant Douglas Fir, a species almost completely absent from the coast north of Knight Inlet.

The almost exclusive demand for Douglas Fir by Lumber manufacturers encouraged most loggers to operate their camps where Douglas Fir predominated, on the land of low elevation around Georgia Strait. Thus a whole forest industry became based upon the exploitation of a single major species, Douglas Fir, a species which, in Canada, had limited areal extent (Haig-Brown 1967: 103).

According to Haig-Brown, in the earlier years of the industry, "Too high a percentage of hemlock and silver fir [balsam] in a stand was enough to make the difference between profit and loss."
Table XIII

Density of Forest Cover in Coastal Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proportion of District:</th>
<th>Above Merchantable Timber Line</th>
<th>No Merchantable Timber</th>
<th>&lt;10,000 fbm/acre</th>
<th>10-30,000 fbm/acre</th>
<th>&gt;30,000 fbm/acre</th>
<th>Total Percentage of Area Carrying Merchantable Timber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S'E'n Vancouver Is.</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renfrew</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quadra-Hardwick</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardy Bay</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barkley</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quatsino</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clayoquot</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnstone Strait</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nootka-Kyuquot</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powell-Texada</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drury-Belize</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loughborough</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jervis</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burrard</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingcome</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith-Rivers</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skeena-Portland</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toba</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burke-Dean</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardner</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knight</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bute</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Whitford and Craig 1918

1. fbm: feet, board measure
Even Western Red Cedar was a liability much of the time" (Ibid.: 61).

That was not an encouraging situation for potential Haisla loggers, for the northern coast forest consists largely of those very species. Figure 7, p. 119 illustrates the situation faced by a Haisla who attempted to stake a tract of marketable timber. Douglas Fir accounted for less than 2% of the timber in the region; that amount was located in one tract in the Kitlope valley, mainly inaccessible to small loggers with limited equipment.

The commonest type of tree, hemlock, was used only for pulp, as were the cheaper grades of cedar and spruce. This limitation had considerable influence on the pattern of logging that developed in the region, for the establishment of a pulp mill was a major project requiring enormous capital investment. This naturally limited the number of mills that were built, and thus the number of markets for peoples like the Haisla, whose forests were mainly composed of pulp quality trees.
Figure 7

Proportions of Timber Species
in Forests of Haisla Territory

Source: Forest Service Annual Reports 1936: L14
Environmental Influences on the Accessibility of Timber

The maps on pages 139 and 141, (figures 8 and 9) show two conditions that promoted the particular pattern of logging that developed in Haisla territory.

The maps indicate quite clearly that almost all of the merchantable timber lies within a short distance of the shoreline or along the adjacent river valleys. As the photograph shows, the terrain in the region is quite mountainous. In fact, most of the timber grows on quite steep slopes that lead directly to the water.

Initially, these patterns aided the Haisla loggers, for they made much of the timber accessible to small scale loggers who used quite rudimentary (and cheap) techniques and equipment. (As I noted in the introduction to this section, I define accessibility in a physical sense, as 'within reach via the prevailing technology'.)

The logger's great problem, of course, once he has felled the tree, is to get it to market. In more level regions than Haisla territory that problem was solved with complex and expensive methods and gear: horse or ox teams and skid roads, railways, or extensive road networks and heavy-duty trucks.

The mountainous terrain and extensive inlet system of the region enabled the Haisla loggers to adopt a far simpler system. They restricted their logging primarily to the sidehills facing the shore and simply slid their logs downhill to the water, or pulled them down the slopes using a winch mounted on a raft near
the shoreline. The opportunity conferred by the simple, readily available gear enabled them to engage in small-scale independent logging to a degree unmatched by any other coastal native people.\(^1\) I will now describe each of these methods.

\(^1\) The independence from complex tree-hauling methods that was conferred by the steep hillsides of Haisla territory enabled the local natives to engage in logging relatively free of the impediments and pitfalls that faced some southern native groups, who occupied level territories unsuitable for handlogging. An Indian Agent for the southern Kwakiutl reported that:

The logging experiment of the Indians of the Wi-wai-ai-kai tribe at Cape Mudge has not been very successful, they getting heavily into debt; so I have forbidden them cutting any more timber till they are able to buy oxen and haul the logs themselves, as they had to get white labour to haul what they did cut, which with provisions supplied them ate up all the profits (IAR 1893: 124).

\(\text{(Local terrain was thus an important factor in the Indians' ability to take up independent, small-scale logging of a type that would not lead to serious debt from inexperienced management or bad luck.)}\)
Handlogging

Handlogging, the dominant method used by the Kitamaat, is the most rudimentary method of felling trees and removing them to tidewater. It requires but two elements: basic felling equipment, and a sidehill steep enough to slide the logs to the water, most often with the aid of one or two jacks. The felling gear itself is uncomplicated, inexpensive, and needs little maintenance: axe, saw, wedges to drive into the cut to prevent the weight of the tree from pressing down and binding the saw, and a springboard to set in a notch in the trunk some feet from the ground to place the faller above the clinging brush and give him a level place from which to work. Altogether, they cost less than ten dollars apiece, at least during the heyday of handlogging, during the first two decades of this century. The "hauling mechanism," the jacks, cost up to $68 apiece.\footnote{1920's prices.} If a logger worked only the shoreline and dropped trees directly into the water, even the jacks were unnecessary.

The procedure went as follows: the logger felled the tree, trimmed it, then removed the bark from the side on which the log was to ride downhill, in order to expose the slippery sap layer. Often, he rounded the leading end, to lessen the chance of splitting, should the log hit an obstruction on the way. To get the log to move, he placed jacks at critical locations—one at the butt end, the other where experience told him would do the most good. Maneuvering the log an inch or so at a time, he eventually
unbalanced it, whereupon it would slide, he hoped, to the water. Although it was a relatively straightforward procedure, it required considerable skill and stamina. An inexperienced logger could jerk and tug on the jacks for hours, and still the log would remain fast where it fell. Small surprise that many men dreamed of the day that they could obtain machinery and escape the handloggers' life. One novelist described the satisfaction felt by a logger who had at last acquired a donkey engine:

Think what this mastery over huge and heavy logs means to a man who has been used to coax them to tiny movements by patience and a puny jack-screw (Grainger 1908: 60).

Even when the log was on its way downhill, the logger's troubles were not over—in fact, they could be just beginning. A tree weighing several tons hurtling down a mountainside carries a terrific momentum, and in a matter of seconds, the object of some hours' work can get itself firmly and inextricably stuck or destroy itself against a rock or tree. It often entails less work to begin afresh on a standing tree than to spend hours trying to free a jammed log.

Should it clear the woods without incident, the log could embed itself in the mud or sand of the sea bottom. Logs stuck in this way can usually be recovered, but at the cost of considerable toil and wasted time. Despite all these problems, however, the technique remained an attractive course for the individual who wished to engage in independent production. The investment was minimal, and the returns could be considerable. In any event, it was the only avenue for the vast majority of individuals
who wanted to log but could never afford the investment of a power operation.

Frustrating as his problems may have been to the logger himself, they appear to have exercised the authorities rather more. Officials in Victoria considered handlogging methods wasteful and damaging to the forest, and from the advent of power logging agitated for the abolition of handloggers' licenses. According to an early catalogue of coastal forests:

The indiscriminate cutting of convenient shore timber without any control results in the injury of many good logging sites; for, as the hand-loggers are not allowed to use steam power, they fail to get to the water a large proportion of the trees they cut down. It is estimated that at least 40 per cent of the trees cut by hand-loggers are wasted in this way....It is extremely doubtful whether the advantages thus gained in forest utilization, or the furnishing of employment to the nomadic, irresponsible citizens who follow this occupation are commensurate with the resultant damage. The discontinuance of this form of license was recommended by the Forestry Commission in 1910, but such licenses are still issued (Whitford and Craig 1918: 94).

Handloggers were much maligned men during this period--I encountered only one man who defended them, a ranger who pointed out that it was often the practice to fell trees and leave the stubborn ones until rainy weather, when the resulting slicker surface would ease the job of getting the logs to slide. Because commissioners and inspectors preferred to tramp the woods in dry weather, it was not surprising that they found numbers of logs lying about the forest. Moreover, to abolish handloggers' licenses completely would hardly have made for more rational exploitation of forests, for in areas like the Kitamaat region,
long stretches of coastline could be logged in no other way. Indeed, in 1920 the District Forester described the region to the Chief Forester thus:

...The general character of the country and timber being favourable to hand logging and hand logging only (Timber Mark Supervision Files 1920: n.p.).

To have abolished handloggers' licenses would not, therefore, have eliminated handlogging practices. Instead, it would have denied entry to small time (gyppo) operators, while leaving employees of the mills and large companies to practise handlogging wherever the local terrain dictated.

As for the "nomadic and irresponsible citizens": a significant proportion of handloggers' licenses went to Indians, who were hardly nomadic, and who could not (or would not, for reasons to be discussed later) invest in the expensive gear necessary to engage in power logging. Between 1910 and 1927 (the years of the ledgers extant in the Forest Service), out of 1223 men who took out handlogging licenses, 308, or 25%, were Indians. (94, or 8% of the B.C. total, were Haisla.)

To have abolished handlogging licenses would have deprived the Indian of his main avenue of entry into the logging industry as an independent operator. (He could, of course, have worked for white logging companies, but that entailed other problems, which I will discuss later.) As the above mentioned ranger pointed out, (in the north the majority of handloggers was likely to be Indian, and in that district, an abolition of handloggers' permits would have worked a particular hardship on them.)
Codere went so far as to claim that the animus against hand-loggers was directed primarily towards Indians:

These favorable conditions held until 1908 when economic circumstances changed, and legislation was passed which would have prevented the Kwakiutl from further profitable activity in hand logging in any case. The provincial government refused to issue any more hand loggers licenses to Indians, and withdrew all timber lands from the market (1950: 39).

I searched all legislation passed during the period, and could find no enactment dealing with Indian handloggers, nor any handloggers, for that matter. The government did refuse to issue handlogging licenses for a period following the closure of timber staking (see p. ), but the action appears to have been an administrative decision of the Department of Lands and Works, rather than legislation. Moreover, the action covered all hand-loggers, not just Indians, and remained in effect for less than a year. The only reference to the matter that I encountered went as follows:

Mr. Brewster asked the Hon. the Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works the following questions:--
1. Has the Government refused to issue licences to cut timber on Crown lands to handloggers?
2. If so, what are the reasons which induced the Government to refuse licences to handloggers?
3. If not, can handloggers still obtain licences to cut timber on Crown Lands?

The Hon. Mr. Fulton replied as follows:--
1. Yes.
2. A reserve having been placed on timber, it was not deemed advisable to issue any more handloggers' licences until some policy could be carefully considered and decided upon.
3. Not at present.

(B.C. Legislative Journals 1908: 28).
If the government's blatant discriminatory attitude towards Indians in the fishing industry is any guide, they would not have hesitated to bar Indians from the woods had they wished. Few were averse to expressing racist sentiments in those days, and, if legislators wanted the Indians out, they would have said so.
Power Logging

Loggers employed a wide variety of power logging techniques and equipment in the Kitamaat region. I will describe only those employed by the Kitamaat themselves.

The type of power hauling used most often by the Haisla was the small gasoline donkey, usually with an A-frame. A donkey engine is simply a stationary winch. In larger operations, especially those that move back some distance from the shoreline, the donkey, clamped to a sled of logs, will pull itself about the woods by reeling in a cable attached to some immovable object, such as a stump. This type of operation requires a considerable amount of clearing and ancillary work, as well as a large, powerful engine of a type usually beyond the financial reach of the native loggers. In the smaller operations characteristic of Haisla shows, the donkey was most often mounted on a raft, and all hauling was done directly to the beach.

The A-frame, as its name suggests, is a shear-like device, constructed of logs, with a pulley attached in the apex. The operator runs lines from the donkey to the log via the A-frame, and hauls it to the shore. Although a series of lines and blocks can improve the mechanical advantage of a relatively low-powered engine, this type of gear is most effective on a slight slope, too level for handlogging, but with a sufficient grade for gravity to do some of the work. The engine serves to give direction and maintain momentum. Under such conditions, a small engine can be

1. A specific logging operation.
quite effective.

The donkey engine opened up stretches of forest that were not steep enough to exploit with handlogging methods. With the relatively light machinery that the Haisla could afford, they were able to operate in level areas and reach about one-thousand feet inshore.

That left a considerable proportion of the merchantable timber beyond their reach, however. Such timber had to be left to the operators who could acquire the larger machinery.

Unlike fishermen, logging operators customarily supplied their own gear. Therefore, for an Indian to commit himself to power logging, he would have needed at least several hundred to a few thousand dollars, which would have supplied him with a small gasoline donkey suitable for logging the fringes of the shoreline. To obtain a machine capable of moving timber from beyond the beach area down to the beach required an outlay far beyond the reach of an individual Indian. Even during the 1920's, a new steam donkey cost around $15,000, a used one at least one-third of that, plus the cost of cables, blocks, and the like.

Indians lacked the access to credit that white loggers enjoyed. Under the Indian Act, their reserves and houses were and are inalienable, leaving them unacceptable as collateral, and the generally negative attitude of creditors towards financing natives left them with virtually no means of acquiring equipment of any great value.

A company of Indians could theoretically have banded together
to purchase a large donkey, but in order to make it pay, they would have had to apply for the better stands of timber, a move that would have brought them into direct competition with the logging companies and the mills, contests which, for reasons that I will explain in the next section, they were almost certain to lose. That, combined with the chronic uncertainty of lumber markets, made large scale logging the kind of affair that the natives appeared unwilling or unable to chance.

As Table XXV, p. 307 shows, of the eleven power logging Timber Sales (to be defined later) taken out by the Haisla, all but one went to the same family, a man and his son-in-law who began with a nine horsepower donkey on a raft, and gradually worked their way up to a 55 horsepower gasoline raft-mounted rig. Actually, even that family hedged its bets, for its members continued to fish both commercially and for subsistence in addition to working their logging claims.

(This sort of limitation did not apply with the same force in the fishing industry. The open access policy of the government precluded the sort of direct competition for exclusive access to the resource that the nature of the forest tenure system made inevitable in the logging industry. Theoretically, once the native had his boat and reached the fishing grounds, he stood as equal a chance of success as the non-Indian. Native problems with obtaining competitive equipment or access to the resource itself were not nearly so acute for fishermen as for loggers.)

How natives gained, or did not gain, rights to cut timber is the subject of the next section.
Availability of Timber

As in the fishing chapter, I define "available" in a legal sense, as: timber stands not alienated in some manner, and open to exploitation under the various laws governing the issuance of licences.

The pool of timber land from which a native logger could take out a claim may be calculated as: the total area of accessible timber minus that already alienated in some way. These alienations took a number of forms: timber leases and licences, pulp leases and licences, Crown grants, handlogging licences, timber sales, and government reserves. The history and intricacies of the terms and conditions of these types of alienation are a study in themselves and will be discussed here only insofar as they affected the Indians' ability to engage in logging or dictated the organization of the activity itself. Because the economic activity of the natives was a response to conditions in the larger economy which were themselves responses to still more distant events and pressures, it will be necessary to range fairly far afield in order to explain some of the difficulties facing native loggers or would-be loggers.

During the last century, logging on the coast of the province was relatively small-scale, compared to activities taking place in the eastern part of the continent. The north coast in particular remained an economic backwater, far removed from Europe and eastern North America, the major lumber markets at that time. As eastern sources of timber became depleted, however, the forests
of the West came into focus as the logical area for expansion. According to Lawrence:

Between 1860 and 1905, lumbermen had swept across Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, slashing down the vast pine forest, until by 1905 all that remained were small fragments of the original stands and hundreds of miles of stumps....By 1910 their holdings were so depleted that the centre of the lumber industry shifted to the west coast (1951: 41).

Having repeated the process to an alarming extent in the western states, the timber barons next looked northward to the forests of British Columbia:

That these untouched stands were the last great tracts of coniferous timber in the world was at last realized by American lumbermen, and they rushed to make their claims. Between 1890 and 1910, and especially between 1905 and 1910, they cruised almost every good available area in the province, and in one way or another bought almost every piece of timber which they thought might eventually prove profitable (Ibid.: 42).

Seldom had means and opportunity come together quite so fortuitously, for at the same time that the speculators and operators were casting about for new forests to conquer, the provincial government was attempting to devise a method of securing greater revenue from hitherto unprofitable timber stands. This account of what followed, although florid, gives some indication of the stampede that followed the government's solution.

At this juncture in the year 1905 the government resolved upon a remarkable measure of policy that challenged and defeated criticism as a master stroke of bold statesmanship. Though the lumbering industry had been progressing gradually with the growth of population in the province its demands for many years to come could obviously be expected to make but slight impression upon the vast forest available.
The hundreds of billions of feet of standing merchantable timber in the forests were remaining in the hands of the government and were unproductive of any revenue. How then could revenue be extracted from the forest? The government threw open all timber lands. Anyone who cared to stake a square mile of forest was encouraged to do so and the exclusive right to cut timber on that area was given to him.

The confidence felt by the investor in this form of tenure is shown strikingly by the history of the years following 1905, for within two years, 15,000 square miles or 9,600,000 acres of timber lands had been taken up in this way by investors and lumbermen, while over 12,000 sales of these valuable licences had been recorded in little over three years (Flumerfelt 1914: 625).

The government halted this gobbling upon realizing that some 160 billion board feet of timber had been alienated, a quantity sufficient for 300 years' cut at the 1907 rate of exploitation (Yerberg 1931: 41). If all holders of cutting rights had attempted to clear their tracts within the twenty-one year term of the licences then in effect, the resulting glut would have ruined the industry. In an attempt to forestall that, the government permitted the renewal of rights for successive twenty-one year periods and removed the performance clause, which had required that a certain amount of timber be cut each year. Those revisions led to a far more permanent, and far less productive, form of alienation than the government had foreseen, for these relaxations worked to the advantage of speculators.

The weakest feature in the act was that it made no provision against any one person acquiring an unlimited number of licences. Another radical change from past procedure was the complete omission of any operating clause. The result of this omission became immediately evident as timber licences promptly became a highly favoured medium of speculation (Yerbergh 1931: 39).

1. 8600 square miles of this total lay in coastal forests.
Speculators sought only to hold timber land, not work it, an inaction that deprived the government of considerable revenue. In an effort to force some action in the woods and thus generate revenue for itself the government established regulations to try to guarantee minimal logging. The speculators then engaged in a game of regulational leapfrog with the authorities, finding ways to circumvent the rules, the government responding with more comprehensive regulations. For example, in an effort to limit the holdings on any one concern to the timber land that it could properly exploit, the government had required the construction of a sawmill with a certain capacity for each tract of timber leased. Officials evidently neglected to specify that the mill be operated. Consequently, "Speculators appear simply to have added the cost of constructing a rough sawmill to the cost of securing timber leases" (Hardwick 1963: 139). The government then responded with a regulation requiring a minimum period of operation of the mill, and so on.

In addition, the government had not permitted the transfer of a stand from the original licencee, a restriction that did not prove popular in some quarters. Both loggers and financial institutions had pressed for the adoption of the transferability clause--the loggers because their holdings would not otherwise be acceptable as collateral, the bankers for obvious reasons. The transferability clause permitted the entry of banks and trust companies into the forests in a big way, as the volatility of the industry at that time drove many loggers under and left banks
holding title to vast tracts of timber land. In the Kitamaat region, for example, the Dominion Trust Company assumed title to 46 square miles of timber land formerly held by the Anglo-Canadian Timber Company (B.C. Forest Service Transfer Ledgers, 1913).

The omission of the performance clause, the allowance of transfers, and the renewal privilege opened the way for certain companies to accumulate and hold indefinitely truly staggering amounts of timber land.

Under these relaxed conditions, banks and trust companies became a major entrant into the timber holding field. They did not figure in the lumbering industry, however, for they had not the slightest interest in working the stands, a circumstance that reduced the natives' economic opportunities by diminishing the number of jobs available for natives who did not control tracts of their own.

Even though the Haisla region did not lie in the Douglas Fir belt, the area of greatest interest for the speculators, it did not escape the staking rush, for the area was seen as good pulpwood territory and was claimed and held for whenever markets should develop.

The effect of all this activity was to deny to Indians vast tracts of the most desirable timber and to leave them to take up the smaller, less productive stands that the stakers had considered not worth their while. Although this process had been under way for some years prior to the staking scramble, the 1905-
Within the last year the Indians are paying more attention to hand logging. In this field of industry there would be a good chance for them were it not that the majority of the government lands in this district are either held under lease by the different sawmill companies or are reserved by the provincial government for pulp purposes (IAR 1903: 292). (Kwawkewlth Agency)

The agent for the Queen Charlotte Islands reported a similar situation, although with a peculiar twist.

A number of Haida have taken out logging licences, and are cutting timber for the mills. It is difficult to obtain for them areas of timber-land. There are hundreds of thousands of acres of timber-land on the islands; but when we applied for a few limits for the Indians, we were met by the statement that the timber limits were too valuable for logging (IAR 1916: 96).

The situation in Haisla territory is shown on overlays (pages 138, 140). Furthermore, there is every reason to suppose that the remaining stands were not of the same quality as those staked, for the speculators hired timber cruisers to assess and claim the tracts for them, and it is unlikely that many good stands were overlooked.

In 1918, a forest inventory listed the following statuses for timber land in the Gardner Canal drainage basin:

- Permanently alienated: 65 square miles
- Timber licences: 380
- Pulp leases: 132
- Total: 577

(Whitford & Craig 1918:)

1. Hereinafter cited as IAR.
Figures 8 and 9

Accessibility and Availability
of Timber in Haisla Territory

The two maps depict sample areas of Kitamaat and Kitlope territory, respectively. The first shows a section of Douglas Channel and Devastation Channel; the second covers the region around the mouth of Gardner Canal.

The colours indicate the following:

- **green:** timber of merchantable quality
- **yellow and yellow-green:** cut over area, not yet restocked
- **blue:** timber of non-merchantable quality
- **white:** no timber

The blocks of black on the overlays indicate the areas that were alienated by timber companies and pulp mills prior to 1910. It can be seen that much of the coastal strip of timber was spoken for, which left most of the remaining timber out of reach of the Indians, with their technological limitations. It is clear from the maps that even the white logging companies found it unfeasible to try to take out the timber located in the river valleys that run into the mountains from the coastline. The remaining unstaked coastal stands were not necessarily of high quality, for, as I remark in the text, they represented those areas that timber cruisers had passed over on their claiming surveys.
Figure 8

Accessibility and Availability of Timber in Haisla Territory: Douglas Channel

Source: Forest Cover Map Series
Figure 9

Accessibility and Availability of Timber

in Haisla Territory: Gardner Canal

Source: Forest Cover Map Series
Figure 10

Areas Sampled for Figures 8 and 9
This was in an area containing 480 square miles of land with over 10,000 board feet of timber per acre, and 715 square miles with up to 10,000 feet. The area listed as alienated under pulp lease had actually been claimed before the staking rush. A British consortium financed the establishment of a pulp mill some 130 miles south of Kitamaat. The government sought to encourage the location of pulp mills on the coast and legislated grants of large tracts of timber land to companies agreeing to construct a mill. The annual rental was set at two cents per acre.

This mill had rather a chequered career, with frequent closures and capitalization crises. When the plant finally closed permanently, in 1924, the company's holdings of 331 square miles lay untouched and untouchable, as far as I could tell, while the Haisla continued to stake claims from the scrubber patches left after the staking rush. In a similar manner, the tracts taken over upon the bankruptcies and foreclosures might as well have been removed from the map, for speculators and bankers had no intention of working them.

The situation was even more extreme than the 577 square miles of alienated land enumerated by Craig and Whitford would indicate, for, as the overlay maps show, much of the unstaked timber was located away from the shoreline, and thus lay out of reach of the small loggers. To a considerable extent, in the period following the rush, the accessible timber tracts were not available, and the available tracts were not accessible.

When in 1907 the government withdrew all timber lands from
the market, it left handlogging licences as the only method by which timber could be staked, a condition that was modified somewhat in 1912 with the establishment of Timber Sale Licences, a mechanism that was to rival, and finally overshadow, handloggers' permits as the Kitamaats' dominant method of acquiring cutting rights. Timber Sales were established in part as a counter to the situation following the 1907 staking closure.

...With remarkable foresight [the Timber Commission of 1910] feared that much of the timber already alienated might become concentrated in the hands of non-operating speculators, or that a combine of operating tenure-holders could restrict market competition. It was thus for the purpose of maintaining market integrity, as well as providing for efficient harvesting, that the Commissioners recommended a procedure for alienating timber that was otherwise under reserve (Pearse 1974: 48-49).

Under the terms of the Forest Act of 1912, Timber Sales were to be administered as follows:

The Act required that an area proposed for sale be surveyed and that its timber be "cruised and classified." Sales were preceded by advertising in the British Columbia Gazette for at least three months, and bids were offered by way of sealed tender, accompanied by a deposit of at least 10 per cent of the bid price. In addition to the appraised upset price fixed by the Forest Service a successful applicant was obliged to pay to the Crown any bonus bid above the upset price, the costs of advertising, cruising and survey, annual rental at the same rate as applied to Timber Licences, and royalty (Ibid.: 50).

(This advertisement, bidding and deposit worked to the natives' disadvantage, for it placed them in direct competition with independent white loggers and with large mills for the remaining unstaked timber. Moreover, with numerous stands given over to Timber Sales, handloggers' licences became more
difficult to acquire. Stands from which Timber Sales would be
made came from the land not staked prior to 1907, which, as I
remarked earlier, meant that that was the timber rejected by
timber cruisers, hardly an encouraging statement about its
quality. It took about fifteen years, however, for Timber Sales
to make serious inroads into handlogging licenses in Haisla
territory.

In practice, the administration of Timber Sales was not so
scrupulous as the Act would indicate. Many were let in regions
in which there was only local interest, and some latitude is
evident in the awarding of the sales. The records indicate that
in numerous instances, only one person expressed interest in the
timber, and it was accordingly awarded with little formality and
no advertisement. Moreover, the rangers appear to have exercised
considerable discretion in the granting of such sales. (This
latitude occasionally added yet another impediment to the native
logging operators.)

Although most of the correspondence for the period prior to
1930 has been destroyed (under an Act of government providing for
the removal of "valueless" documents) some of the scraps that
remain lead one to suspect that the Indians' difficulties may not
have been entirely the result of economic or technological forces.

On the occasions that he applied for the least profitable,
scrubbier stands, the native did not encounter much difficulty,
from either the Forest Service officers or competing white
loggers. The most common notation on Timber Sales applications
from Indians remarked that no one else was interested in the tract, and often recommended a direct sale to the applicant in order to save the cost of advertisement, so remote was the likelihood that anyone else would want the timber.

The rangers' descriptions contained in the applications leave little question why: (most stands were of such little value that only the most marginal operator would have considered them.) (Fuller descriptions of the stands that Indians applied for are contained in Appendix II, pp. ) This description is typical:

Hand logging is the only economical and feasible method of removing the few scattered trees from a precipitous, rocky, and extensive shoreline (Timber Sale No. 12947).

When the more ambitious native loggers attempted to purchase better stands, however, they encountered opposition. Not only did both gyppo outfits and the mills often compete with them for the tract, but the rangers, some of whom appear to have adopted a proprietary attitude towards the stands, offered a form of bureaucratic obstruction. Their comments in applications leave the impression that they considered the Indian logger to be a nuisance whenever he applied for the more lucrative stands. For example, Ed Gray, a Kitamaat, operated handlogging claims (beginning at least by 1910), and in some years took out over a quarter-million board feet, an impressive performance for a handlogger. When he applied for a Timber Sale containing an estimated 940
thousand board feet, however, he lost the competition to a white logger with a steam donkey. The following month, he tried for a stand containing 1200 thousand board feet. The Assistant District Forester noted on the application:

There is a good body of timber in here, and we do not want it alienated by any Indian Reserve applications (TS No. 6710: 1924).

There is no record of the disposition of the application; evidently, he did not get the sale.

Another Haisla applied for a Timber Sale containing 444 thousand board feet, which prompted this letter to Victoria from the local ranger:

The applicant, Fred Woods...has been logging on Pacific Mills TSX 41166 Kildala Arm within this ML application. He now wishes to move across the inlet to this small show and will no doubt operate independently, although output may go to Ocean Falls [i.e. Pacific Mills]. There is some doubt in my mind as to Mr. Woods being accustomed to log in the region, and thus eligible for a sale of his own, to the annoyance, perhaps, of the Pacific Mills. There is no apparent reason why he should not continue to operate as at present. Timber Sale disallowance recommended (TS No. 45465, 1948).

This is a rather strange letter. Far from being unaccustomed to logging in the region, Fred Woods had been doing so since the age of eighteen (he was then fifty), and had taken out four handloggers' licenses and eight Timber Sales, all in the region of Douglas Channel. Pacific Mills outbid him on that tract, and hired a white logger to take out the timber.

1. These estimates came from the mandatory cruise mentioned in the regulations. They could be quite inaccurate—in the Timber Sale estimated at 444 thousand feet mentioned on this page, some 1291 thousand feet were removed.
Earlier, Fred Woods had applied for a Timber Sale containing 1470 thousand board feet, the most ambitious application from a Haisla up to that time. Although the application notes that no one else was interested in the stand, the forester recommended that the sale be advertised. Pacific Mills were sent particulars of the timber without having expressed an interest in the sale, so far as I could tell. I found no other example of such an action. The ranger's attitude is clear from the comment he appended to the application.

Applicant (an Indian) will employ his fellow men, which speaks for itself regarding output to be expected (Timber Sale 31736, 1942).

Woods and crew removed 1457 thousand board feet from this stand.

It is noteworthy that these comments and obstruction arose only when the natives applied for timber stands containing substantial bodies of timber. With only the fragments of evidence remaining in the files, it is difficult to judge the precise origin of the Indians' difficulties. It is my opinion, nevertheless, that the natives' generally low position in the logging industry resulted from more than economic or technological factors, but may have proceeded in part from a conviction of some government officials that the better tracts of timber should not go to Indian loggers.

The ultimate step in this restriction of availability came with the establishment of the Tree Farm Licence. This type of alienation was implemented in 1947, and has led to the establishment of immense holdings by large companies, two of which control
almost all of the timber land in the Douglas Channel-Gardner Canal region. As Pearse explains it, these licences were granted:

...To promote industrial development, with attendant community stability by providing their holders with long-term supplies of timber sufficient to meet the needs of existing or new utilization plants. Since 1907, Timber Sales, for all practical purposes, had been the only means of obtaining new allocations of timber, and it was argued that these did not provide raw material supplies that were secure enough to justify the heavy investments required for pulp mills and other conversion plants.

...(Clearly, these licences were designed to accommodate large, integrated corporations,) although some licences have been issued to small enterprises and to one municipality as well. Many of the licences initially issued to the smaller operators have since been acquired by the larger concern (Pearse 1974: 63).

The interests of the lumber industry, as perceived by the government of the day, took precedence over the interests of the small producers, with the result that very little timber land traditionally exploited by the Haisla is available today, as Fig. 11, p. 150 shows. What little remains has been cut over several times during the course of the past eighty years, and there is some question whether the remaining available tracts will be worth bothering about for some decades to come.
Figure 11
Areas Held Under Tree Farm Licences in Haisla Territory

- Haisla Territory
- TFL Boundaries
  - TFL 25: Issued to Rayonier Corp.
  - TFL 41: Issued to Eurocan Corp.

Source: Tree Farm Licence Map 1976
Markets

The number, type, and location of markets for the log producers varied not only with the establishment or closure of the mills themselves, but with the development of transport technology. Because logs will keep for a considerable period in the water, loggers theoretically could sell to any mill on the coast, subject only to access and considerations of transportation costs. Practically, however, for the greater part of the logging period, the coast has been divided into two regions: that with sheltered access to the Vancouver region, and that without. All producers north of Queen Charlotte Sound must ship their logs through that open stretch of waterway between the sheltered passages of the north coast and the inland waterways of Georgia and Johnstone Straits. As long as booms remained the sole method of transporting logs by water, that open stretch of rough, storm-prone sea acted as quite an effective hindrance to the transportation of logs from northern forests to southern milling centers. Booms, although flexible in construction and convenient for small operators to build, are unstable and break up easily in rough weather.

Tugboats hauling these rafts were often obliged to lay up for considerable periods in sheltered areas, and dash (if their

1. except for a variety of hemlock with an unfortunate tendency to become waterlogged and sink soon after entering the water. Some loggers unsuccessfully sought relief from royalties and deadlines because, they claimed, their stands contained too high a proportion of "sinkers," which would not make it to the mill.
one to two mph average can be called that) across the more open regions during calm weather, periods which are rather less frequent than rough on certain stretches of the coast.

These two factors, distance and risk, produced prohibitive transportation costs for small loggers and obliged them to sell to the local mills or to no one at all.

Recently, self-loading and self-dumping barges have largely eliminated the problem by converting logs into a deck cargo. These craft can be towed long distances at comparatively high speeds with considerable safety, in weather that would almost certainly destroy a boom. This development has altered the processing situation on the coast, to the extent that Vancouver area mills now dominate the entire region.

During the period that the Haisla were most active in logging, however, booms were the sole convenient means of transporting logs by water, and the unprotected water above Queen Charlotte Sound continued to isolate the northern producers.

This limitation placed the northern mills in effective control of logging in their region. Scale and Royalty accounts for Haisla loggers indicate that the overwhelming majority of their booms went to a single dominant mill for almost the whole of the logging period. (Actually, they sold to three plants, each being dominant during a different period.)

During the late 19th century and through to 1917, except for a brief period when the mill at Swanson Bay was open, the sawmill at Georgetown bought almost all the Haisla's timber. This mill,
located north of what is now Prince Rupert, lay some 240 miles from Kitamaat.

With the re-opening of the Swanson Bay mill in 1917, the focus of activity shifted south, not surprisingly, as the mill lay far closer to Haisla territory than did Georgetown. During the period that Swanson Bay operated, more Haislas took up logging than at any other time.

After Swanson Bay finally closed, in 1924, the only ready market lay at Ocean Falls, some 180 miles south of Kitamaat. This mill remained the largest market for the Haisla until the 1950's, when they ceased taking out independent licences.

The type of operation conducted by these mills and the organizational policies of the companies had some bearing on the type of logging that the Haisla were able to carry out. The Georgetown sawmill, for example, would not accept hemlock in any great quantity, for no market existed at that time for lumber of that species. The impact of that policy can be seen in the cut records of the Haisla for 1915, shown as figure 12, p. 154.

Although hemlock comprised over one-third of the timber of the Kitamaat forests, it accounted for less than one-thirtieth of the cut. Having to overlook the most numerous single species forced the loggers into a form of "creaming" operation, taking only the timber that would sell. Given the considerable mobility of handloggers (they did not have to shift masses of equipment--heavy blocks, lines, and donkey engines--in order to range the woods), that was no great drawback immediately. More serious was
Figure 12

Percentages of Various Species Cut by Haisla Loggers in 1915, Compared to Species Distribution in Forests

Source: Scale and Royalty Records and Forest Service Annual Reports
was the depletion of the remaining forest. By taking only the saleable species, the loggers stripped the prime timber from larger tracts than they would have done by taking all the logs from a stand.

When technological and market developments made hemlock an economical tree to cut, loggers were faced with stands from which the finest, most valuable timber had been removed, a circumstance that lowered the value of the tract considerably.

Consequently, many of these cut-over tracts could be exploited only during hard times, when the little they would bring was considered worth the effort, or when the rising price of lumber made otherwise marginal stands economical. In several Timber Sales applications from the Depression and Second World War years, foresters remarked that the tract under consideration was rather poor overall, but that under prevailing conditions the trees would pass for timber (c.f. Appendix II, pp. ). In more stable times, however, loggers did not consider the stands to be economical. Thus the stands of good timber that remained open to independent loggers were further diminished.

This imbalance in the hemlock cut persisted only as long as no pulp mills operated in the vicinity, for hemlock found a ready market in those plants, if not a particularly good price. With the re-opening of Swanson Bay pulp mill in 1917, hemlock began to be cut in more or less the same proportion as it appeared in the woods.
The prices a logger could expect for his timber depended to a great extent on world market conditions. The economy and population of this province could never provide an adequate domestic market, which left the coastal logger particularly susceptible to the vagaries of the world economy.

The British Columbia forest industry...depended on a world market in which it supplied less than three per cent of the total lumber consumed and less than three per cent of the pulp. It could, therefore, exercise no control over the price at which it was sold. These handicaps made the British Columbia industry extremely vulnerable to international economic and political crises...Wars, embargoes, trade agreements, and exchange difficulties in far distant parts made or undid the British Columbia industry from time to time (Lawrence 1957: 194).

In consequence, the history of the lumber industry of this province can be seen as a series of booms and slumps. This is obviously not the place to engage in a lengthy account of factors influencing the world price of lumber or pulp, but it is instructive to consider the variety of extrinsic events that could profoundly affect the coastal, and thus, the native economy. What follows is a brief catalogue of events that sent prices soaring or plummeting.

The settlers who poured onto the "treeless prairies" prior to the First World War supplied the first large, steady market for B.C. lumber, and underpinned much of the expansion of the industry during those years. Came the War, and the settlement virtually dried up, and the market with it.

Two American developments, the completion of the Panama
Canal, and the passage of the Jones Act, benefitted the B.C. industry enormously. For the first time, it became cheaper to ship lumber to the east coast by water than by rail. In addition to the Canadian and European markets the canal opened up, the eastern U.S. became an important customer, for the Jones Act required that cargoes shipped between U.S. ports travel via American ships, and made Seattle lumber appreciably more expensive in New York than lumber exported from Vancouver, since the latter could go by cheaper foreign freighters.

The rebuilding programs following the massive earthquakes in San Francisco, Valparaiso, and Tokyo created sudden, massive markets, and the B.C. industry boomed for short periods as a result. The sales to the Japanese market following the Tokyo earthquake established a steady trade that continued until Japan invaded Manchuria and secured her own supplies of timber.

The entry of the United States into the First World War affected the north coast timber producers especially, for, prior to 1917, the U.S. had supplied much of the airplane spruce for the European aircraft industry. After 1917, that spruce went for the manufacture of American warplanes, and the Europeans looked elsewhere, particularly to the northern B.C. coast. For a time, all independent logging was directed towards the supply of grade-one spruce. Because Kitamaat lies in one of the major spruce belts of the region, the Haisla were quite deeply involved in the trade. For some time, the government issued cutting permits for spruce only, and forbade the logging of other trees from
Crown land. The market was quite lucrative while it lasted, but the demands for only airplane-grade timber had the same effect as the creaming operations mentioned earlier—the most profitable tree in the northern woods was removed wholesale, leaving behind a devalued forest. Very little top grade spruce appears in the cut records for a considerable period after the end of the war.

(The depression of the 1930's hit the lumber industry particularly hard.

Within two years the building trade of the world was paralyzed; the consumption of lumber on the American continent tumbled to the lowest point since 1869; and the production of lumber in North America fell by seventy-five per cent to the lowest point since 1859. Not only was Coast production reduced by approximately sixty per cent, but the price of lumber dropped in the year 1932 to less than half the average of the preceding seventeen years. In the five-year period between 1930 and 1935, many operations, both large and small were forced to discontinue operations, and many others worked on reduced time schedules. Other plants reduced wages from thirty to forty per cent to maintain operations (Lawrence 1957: 136).

These conditions precipitated a considerable decline in the number of Haisla who went logging during the 1930's. This reduction is shown on the histogram on page ___.

(During the Second World War, the occupation of the Baltic countries removed a major competitor, and pulpwood sales, especially to Britain, expanded considerably. The shortage of shipping left deliveries uncertain, a factor that tempered the boom somewhat.

Clearly, the B.C. industry was highly vulnerable to circumstances beyond its control. Although the natives may have
operated a satellite economy to the B.C. economy, that was itself a satellite to metropolis economies in the U.S., Europe, and eastern Canada.

(During the boom periods, the ever optimistic plant owners habitually overinvested, overbuilt, and overbought, with the result that when the good times ended, which they did with startling suddenness occasionally, the lumbermen found themselves holding massive unsaleable inventories. They naturally ceased buying timber from the loggers, who had often stepped up production to take advantage of the boom. They, too, could find themselves without a market, or with plummeting prices with little warning.) The Indian Agent for Kwawkewlth Agency reported one such incident.

Early in the season there was a tremendous demand for logs and many of the people took advantage of it. Later in the year the demand suddenly fell off and prices dropped to such an extent that most of those who were logging stopped work. Those who continued working have had the greatest difficulty in disposing of their logs (IAR 1908: 224).

In addition to the volatility of the coastal industry as a whole, dependence on local mills put the Haisla at a further disadvantage. Because northern loggers could not afford the high insurance and towing charges involved in shipping logs to the south, the local mills remained for them the only feasible market. These plants appear to have acted accordingly. A ranger reported that the northern pulp mills, at Swanson Bay and Ocean Falls, followed this price structure:
Prices Paid by Swanson Bay

- No. 1 & 2 Spruce $9-11
- No. 3 Spruce $7.50
- No. 1 & 2 Fir $9-11
- No. 3 Fir $7.50

From $8 to $15 under Vancouver prices

Prices Paid by Ocean Falls

- No. 1 & 2 Spruce no amount
- No. 3 Spruce listed $9 to $15 under Vancouver prices

(Timber Mark Supervision Files 1920: n.p.)

Prices paid for particular species could sometimes fluctuate independently of outside market forces. One technological innovation adopted by a southern mill enabled Ocean Falls to squeeze northern producers even harder than usual.

During the year a cheap bleaching process for hemlock pulp was developed and the Powell River Company reduced the spruce content of the pulp accordingly. Disposing of spruce pulp became a difficult problem and the logging companies were compelled to sell as much as possible to Pacific Mills, Ltd. Pacific Mills are now in a favourable position to dictate terms to [northern] mainland coast operators (Timber Mark Supervision Files 1935: n.p.).

Table XIV, p.161 represents what I have been able to piece together of the price structures available to Haisla loggers for the period 1915 to 1947. Unfortunately, it is not possible to calculate a logger's income simply by multiplying the amount of timber that he cut by the prevailing price, then deducting royalty, stumpage, and towing charges, for the prices paid to loggers were subject to a maze of arrangements and conditions that varied from company to company and from year to year. The best we can do is

1. Per thousand board feet.
## Table XIV

Log Prices Paid by Various Northern Mills To Haisla Loggers, for Selected Years 1915-1947

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<td>$15.50</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
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<td>15.00</td>
<td>10.25</td>
<td>8.00</td>
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<td>8.00</td>
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Source: Timber Sales Applications and Indian Affairs Commission Evidence.
to make rough calculations of the range of income for loggers of a particular time and place.

With the exception of the 1915 figures, all the prices in the table come from information in Timber Sales applications. (Rangers included the selling price as part of the calculation of stumpage.) It becomes quite confusing to consider that often the same ranger listed widely varying prices for the same types of timber, cut in the same region in the same year for sale to the same mill. Estimates within a dollar or two per thousand are explicable, but variations like that of 1947—from $17 to $45 per thousand for grade-one spruce—make it impossible for me to determine income from the figures included in the applications.

A further complication is the practice of Pacific Mills of paying some or all of the expenses incurred by the loggers. A number of scale and royalty accounts of the post 1925 period carry the notation "all charges to be met by Pacific Mills." Thus, stumpage and royalty, towing and ancillary charges may well be hidden somewhere in this price structure, but in such a manner that digging it out without supplementary information that may no longer exist is impossible.
Production Data

Because government revenue from timber was calculated from a formula involving quantity and species cut, scalers kept records of the size and type of every tree that went to a mill. These accounts, covering 1915 to the present, make it possible to follow the logging activity of any particular individual or group over several decades. Because the associated scaling slips run into the hundreds of thousands and are not indexed, I found it too time consuming to try to account for the activities of Haisla loggers for every year. I therefore selected every fifth year, with a view to discovering the individuals involved, the locations and type of logging, and the general quality of the timber cut.

This material, together with data from handloggers' license ledgers, Timber Sales application files, and the like, permitted me to form some idea of the logging activity of the Haisla over the period they were actively engaged as independent timber cutters.

It soon became apparent that my original aim, to determine individual income from logging, was not possible. Although the quantity of logs cut is easily calculable and the prevailing prices are known for some years, I lack detailed information concerning costs of production, and, more important, patterns of co-operation and sharing among loggers of the early period.

During the handlogging period (late 1800's to ca. 1930), a boom submitted in the name of one individual may actually have
been the work of several. This would naturally inflate any productivity figures and leave an unrealistically high impression of the output of individual loggers during the period. Although handloggers were required under the terms of their license to work alone, such a condition was not enforceable, especially in an isolated region like Douglas Channel, where the boat of any inspector could be seen or heard from miles away. The natives found the $25 handloggers' license fee to be quite onerous, and it is not impossible that a number banded together under one or two licenses to cut timber co-operatively, thus saving a not inconsiderable sum in license charges. To calculate the proceeds from a boom as one man's income may therefore be assuming too much.

In addition, the Timber Sales could legally be logged by any number of individuals, making a calculation of individual income impossible without considerable field data specifying the identities of crews, material which I was most often unable to collect.

Even the profit margins calculated by the rangers at the time can be misleading. For example, with Timber Sales, the stumpage and upset price of the tract were calculated to return the logger a certain profit, variously considered as $1.15 or $1.50 per thousand board feet. (On one occasion, I encountered a figure of 75¢ per thousand, but that was exceptional.)

The total costs for one Kitamaat's Timber Sale were estimated as follows:
Royalty: $1.15 per thousand
Falling & Bucking: 1.25
Hauling: 2.00
Driving: 1.25
Tow to Boom: .25
Booming: .50
Tow to Mill: 2.25
Profit: 1.50

Total: $9.90

(Timber Sales Files, No. 5514, 1923)

Stumpage was then calculated as: mill price minus total costs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>mill price</th>
<th>costs</th>
<th>stumpage</th>
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<td>$2.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hemlock</td>
<td>10.25</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>.35</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Thus the stumpage is a variable tax, calculated to leave the logger a particular margin of profit.

It is tempting to infer that the profit from this example was about $150 ($1.50 profit margin X 100,000 feet bm). I cannot believe, however, that expenses would have reached the level estimated by the ranger. The only fixed charges in the operation were the royalty, stumpage, and tow to mill. All other factors were variable, and in a small operation like that of the example, probably did not approach that of the estimate. For example, the ranger listed costs of felling at $1.25 per thousand. Since the operator would almost certainly do his own felling in an operation of that size, his only expenses would be wear and tear on his axe and saw, hardly a matter of $1.25 for one or two trees.

1. feet, board measure
In the larger camps, with specialists' salaries to meet, costs may have reached that level. In the family affairs that characterized Indian operations, the costs would differ considerably from that set down in the Sale application. The return to the native logger may well have been double that estimated in the Forestry accounts, consisting as it did of the profit margin plus the expenses that were, in effect, paid to himself.
The Number of Haisla Loggers

It is noteworthy that although most Haisla men engaged in handlogging at one time or another, comparatively few did so with any great frequency (officially, at least). Of the Haisla who took out handloggers' permits, nearly three-quarters did so fewer than five times. Each permit lasted for one year. In addition, only three individuals took out more than one Timber Sale. One took out two, another three, and the third, eight (see Table XV, p. 168).

Most of the individuals who took out single licences did so during the 1917-1924 period, the years of operation of the Swanson Bay pulp mill. After the closure of that plant, logging subsided as a general occupation, with a core of loggers remaining, only a few of whom gave up commercial fishing to follow logging exclusively. For the vast majority of the Haisla, however, logging was looked on as a quick, relatively convenient means of acquiring cash over and above their regular earnings from fishing.

Figures 13 and 14, pp. 169-70 show the history of Haisla participation in independent or quasi-independent (contract) production quite clearly. From an initial high participation rate, with nearly 40 men engaged in hand logging (out of a village total of about 50 men aged 21-65), the number dwindled to around five by 1950, and has floated around that figure since. All loggers now working do so for Crown-Zellerbach or MacMillan-Bloedel, who conduct truck logging operations around the Kitimat valley.

This diminution is remarkable when one considers that, as I noted earlier, out of 1223 men who took out handloggers' licences
Table XV

Handloggers' Licences Issued to Haislas, 1913-1927

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Licences Per Man</th>
<th>No. of Haisla Men</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
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Source: Handloggers' Licence Ledgers
Figure 13
Number and Type of Logging Licences
Worked on by Haislas, for Selected Years

No. of Licences

Legend

- Handloggers' Licence
- Pulp Lease (Swanson Bay)
- Timber Sale Licence

Source: Handloggers' Licence Ledgers and Timber Sale Files
Figure 14
Probable Number of Haisla Loggers
For Selected Years, by Type of Licence.

Legend

- Logged under Handloggers' Licences
- Employed by Swanson Bay Mill to Cut Timber on Pulp Lease
- Logged under Timber Sale Licences

Source: Handloggers' Licence and Timber Sale Files
in the province between 1910 and 1927, 96, or 8% were Haislas. During that period, Kitamaat or Kitlope loggers accounted for almost one-third of all independent Indian handloggers on the entire coast.

Cut records show that in 1915, Haisla loggers cut around one-quarter of the cedar taken out of the Prince Rupert Forest District, a region that comprises all the forests from Rivers Inlet to the Alaska border, and includes the lower Skeena and the Queen Charlotte Island; an altogether remarkable performance, considering the population of the two villages. Their preeminence could not last, however, for with the First World War, scores of whites arrived to cut spruce for aircraft, and remained to log after the armistice. The Haisla share of the cut dwindled rapidly to around 4% of the total for the district. (Scale and Royalty Records: n.p.).
Chapter 6

Alcan

Kitamaat remained one of the more isolated of coastal communities until around 1950, when the development of the region that had been predicted for over half a century finally took place. At that time, plans were laid for the establishment of an aluminum smelter and an 'instant city' at the head of Douglas Channel, some seven miles from Kitamaat.

The smelting of aluminum requires enormous quantities of electricity, which was to be supplied by a massive hydro-electric project at Kemano, near the site of the old village of the Kitlope. The most suitable location for the smelter itself was considered to be at the head of Douglas Channel, where the combination of proximity to the power source, good deep water harbour, adjacent level land, and a suitable grade for a railway between the smelter and the nearest rail line made for the best site. The project, involving both a major plant and a town of some ten thousand people, grew almost overnight from the wilderness, and transformed Kitamaat from an isolated fishing village into a virtual suburb.

Regular wage work in the plant was offered to the Kitamaat beginning around 1953. In 1965, the Eurocan Company established a pulp mill near the Alcan plant. Thus, in the past two decades, three major sources of regular, predictable, and fairly high income have appeared: Alcan, Eurocan, and the City & District of Kitimat.
The arrival of these industries, particularly Alcan, accelerated and exaggerated a trend that was well established before the plant located in the region, namely the decline of the natives' position in the logging and fishing industries. Although few coastal Indians participate in either occupation to nearly the extent as formerly, the process is particularly marked at Kitamaat, as I noted in the fishing section.

The change from fishing to smelter work has not been steady or smooth, however. It has been marked by many individuals switching back and forth between the two, at least during the first years of operation of the plant. Many Kitamaat, faced with the prospect of steady but dull work in the Alcan plant, or irregular and unpredictable, though potentially lucrative work in fishing, often chose the latter. The field workers on the Hawthorn project noted:

One big reason for the native's lack of incentive while he works for Alcan is that there he is just a laborer, while when he goes fishing he is either "my own boss" on a gillnetter, an engineer on a seine boat, or even a partner in a fishing enterprise. So far there is more prestige to be found in fishing than there is in laboring. Also common is the belief that this year just might be a good season and he just might make a killing, way more than he would make working for Alcan, especially if he can get a labor job upon his return after fishing season. Fishing offers the men a change, excitement, some prestige, sometimes some money. A man is not losing much if anything as long as he can return to Kitamaat and find a labor job paying $280 per month (Hawthorn Field Notes 1953: n.p.).

Their choice was eased by the knowledge that they could in all likelihood land jobs at the plant upon their return, for
labour shortages have plagued Alcan at Kitimat since the construction of the plant. Initially, I suspect, Alcan planned to tolerate the Indians' coming and going only as long as the labour shortage lasted. They believed that when the actual operations began and the town grew up, then the work force would stabilize and they could pick and choose among prospective workers, weeding out those who were not willing to stay year round. It has not worked out that way. Even now, nearly a quarter of a century after the opening of the plant, the company experiences severe labour and turnover problems. The reasons are twofold: the plant and the town.

The technique of aluminum smelting results in dirty and unpleasant working conditions, a circumstance that limits both the number of men willing to work at the plant, and the tenure of those who do hire on.

The reduction of alumina to aluminum plus oxygen takes place in large electrolytic cells, called 'pots' locally (hence the requirement of cheap and plentiful power). These cells generate an astonishing amount of heat, which becomes so intense along the pot lines that workers can spend only twenty minutes or so at a time in the smelting area itself. The company is sensitive to charges of pollution, and so even in summer the windows are most often kept closed in order to prevent the escape of alumina dust. The result inside is an atmosphere both hotter and dirtier than most men can tolerate for long.

These disagreeable conditions, coupled with shift work and
the absence of any free periods like those found in fishing, make the plant an unattractive place to work for the majority of natives, most of whom try the plant for a while, then quit. They are not alone in this. In fact, as Figure 15, p. 176 shows, Indians tend to remain longer than whites, nearly two-thirds of whom leave during the first year.

In addition to the working conditions, the town of Kitimat itself is a factor in many workers' leaving. Often, whites leave the company not so much to get out of the smelter as to escape the town. The lack of amenities and social opportunities and the forbidding climate do not help. Many of the white employees who leave during the first year are young, single men who live a sort of barracks life and miss the social life of the larger towns, for the single female population is quite small in Kitimat.

The natives, of course, have their families with them, and their social lives are well established. Moreover, they have always lived there and are not unduly oppressed by the high rainfall and long snowbound period as are many whites who move in not expecting the isolation and the bleakness of the town. Many whites who do bring their families come not intending to stay for long. A significant proportion are Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and German immigrants who come to accumulate a stake before moving to the south.
Figure 15
Indian and Non-Indian Tenure at Alcan Smelter

Source: Alcan Employee Records
Chapter 7
White Development and Indian Underdevelopment

We come now to the question expressed earlier—what accounts for the change between the natives' early success and prominence in the industrial economy of the coast and the subsequent decline of their ability to compete and of their overall economic position? I believe that their present inferior place in the economy can be explained in terms of Jorgensen's 'development-underdevelopment' schema, and that their former success can be seen as a corollary to it. As Jorgensen maintains:

Underdevelopment, in my view, has been caused by the development of the white-controlled national economy, and the political, economic, and social conditions of Indians are not improving because the American Indian is, and has been for over one hundred years, fully integrated into the national political economy. Underdevelopment, paradoxically, then, has been caused by the development of the capitalist political economy of the United States (1971: 68-9).

Conversely, the early native success and relative prosperity was caused by the underdevelopment of the white industrial economy. The natives' initial advantages in the economy were eliminated by the technological and political innovations that constituted the development of the coast.

The underdevelopment proceeded from environmental, technological, and historical factors, which I will consider in turn.

Environmental factors

White settlement of the coast could not proceed except in a very few locations, for the environment of the region simply was not (nor is) conducive to agriculture and large scale occupation.
Except for a few favoured locations, mainly on the south coast, the mountainous terrain, poor soil, and dense forest cover effectively discouraged settlement, and left the natives to occupy their territories comparatively unhindered. Moreover, the absence of white settlement restricted the labour pool for those industries that did locate in the region, a factor that figured large in the natives' ability to compete for jobs.

The whites that did come to the region took items in a way not incompatible with the natives' exploitation of their traditional resource base, which revolved around relatively small sites scattered throughout their territory--salmon streams, clam beds, and the like. The items that the whites desired most, timber, furs, and sockeye salmon, could be taken with minimal disruption of native subsistence patterns. Native and white exploiters occupied different niches.

In Haisla territory, the virtual absence of the major commercial fish and timber species, sockeye and Douglas Fir, reduced the attractiveness of the region to whites and delayed the intensive exploitation that southern natives experienced. In addition, the climate and terrain of the region hampered development. The seasonality of fishing and logging discouraged many outsiders from travelling several hundred miles to the north for a relatively short season's work. The short period of the salmon runs, or the likelihood that the forest would be snowed in and made inaccessible to loggers held back massive exploitation for some time.
Technological Factors

The rudimentary state of the early technology worked to the natives' advantage in two ways: lack of adequate transport mechanisms obliged owners to locate fish and log processing plants near the source of supply, and away from the population centers, leaving the natives as virtually the only readily available source of cheap labour. Second, the primitive harvesting equipment, and consequent low cost, enabled natives to acquire both the gear itself and the skills to operate it with little difficulty. Where the gear itself was comparatively expensive (a gill net, for example), the shortage of labour often obliged plant owners to supply the equipment to the natives anyway. (Shortage of labour in this instance could as easily apply to Indian women as to men.)

This ease of access brought on by readily available gear permitted ease of egress and considerable occupational flexibility, for the native was not bound to any occupation by the weight of his investment. In addition, because the outlay required for participation in any particular occupation was minimal, he could acquire the means to engage in several during the course of the year, avoiding the 'eggs in one basket' hazard.

The seasonality of trapping and subsistence and commercial fishing and the relative flexibility of independent logging enabled the natives to engage sequentially in two, three or even more wage earning occupations while continuing to rely for food on traditional foodstuffs.

This, I believe, accounted for much of the natives' initial
success in the industrial economy, for with the flexibility came
a pattern of occupational multiplicity that tended to transform
a series of unpredictable and largely unremunerative occupations
into a viable totality that not only returned a fair amount of
cash for the time, but also ensured that a failure in any one
occupation was buffered by the income from the others. Under­
lying this pattern was the traditional resource base that con­
tinued to support the band no matter what happened in the market
economy.

The development of the industrial economy undermined both
the natives' prosperity and their independence. Development in
the case of the coast took three main forms: occupation of the
region by whites and subsequent competition for jobs, the ela­
boration of technology, and the promulgation of laws for the
regulation of the exploitation of fish and timber.

With the settlement of the coast, an altogether predictable
process took place. Natives who, until then had enjoyed a quite
favourable job situation, found themselves facing increased com­
petition in a number of areas that they had hitherto considered
virtually their own. The process began even before the turn of
the century, as this report from the Indian Superintendent
attests:

It is noticeable that within the past few years
there has been a falling off in the gross earnings
of the natives of B.C., which may be accounted for
by the gradual influx of settlers of every nation­
ality into the province, which increases each year.
They do not now, nor can they expect to in the
future, make as much money as formerly in any line
of business or enterprise where the natives used to
be the only people available for such employment
and pursuits; whitemen and Japanese and others, are at present competing with them in the labour market, and in the occupations of fishing, trapping and hunting, etc. This natural outcome of the settlement of the country is constantly being brought to the attention of the Indians by myself and by the Indian agents; the natives being urged to concentrate their energies more in the cultivation of their reserves, the raising of stock and in such pursuits within themselves as will prove of permanent use to them in the future (IAR 1894: 202).

How the agents could realistically encourage the natives to concentrate on cultivation and stock raising is problematic, considering the reports that they were submitting at about the same time.

These Indians can never depend on agricultural pursuits for a food supply. The principal source of supply must be fishing and hunting....These people are not stock raisers as their lands are mostly unsuitable for stock raising (IAR 1896: 94) (Northwest Coast Agency)

These bands of Indians have about 17,000 acres of land allotted to them, a great part of which is unfit for cultivation (Ibid. 1897: 93) (Kwawkewlth Agency)

The Reserves of this band [Kitamaat] are all situated in Douglas Channel and are the poorest reserves and of smaller dimensions according to the size of the band than any other in the agency. They contain no farming land and no timber of any value (Ibid. 1905: 268) (Bella Coola Agency)

Thus the superintendent encouraged natives to take up farming on land that would not support farms, to compensate for being squeezed from the commercial fishery by whites who needed supplementary incomes because their own farms could not support them (cf. unattached licences, p. 76).

Development of Technology

The development of technology affected the Indians in two
ways: the introduction of refrigerated fish packers and log barges enabled the plant operators to overcome transportation problems that had kept the plants decentralized. They were thus able to consolidate and centralize the plants, closing most of the outlying operations and laying off workers. This process was most marked in the canneries, where all the Rivers Inlet plants were closed in 1956. Not only did these closures deprive Indian women of virtually their only independent source of cash, but the men found it more difficult to obtain equipment once the leverage conferred by their wives' labour had disappeared.

The elaboration of harvesting technology tended to squeeze Indian men out of independent production as well. While the gear remained simple and cheap, almost anyone could engage in fishing and logging. As engines and power hauling equipment for fishing boats replaced skiffs and hand hauling, and as donkey engines took over from handloggers, natives found themselves obliged to invest many thousands of dollars to obtain competitive equipment, a course that most were unable or unwilling to take. For all the increased investment, the occupations remained at the mercy of international market forces as well as unpredictable fluctuations of supply, which added the complication that a bad year or two could well result in the seizure of equipment for non-payment of fees, taxes, or any of a number of charges. (That happened to the single Kitamaat to operate his own donkey.) Thus the mechanization of fishing and logging demanded a greater commitment of capital without imparting an increased measure of security.
The alternative to independent investment was employment with a cannery, mill, or independent white operator, a course with numerous drawbacks. First, those operations were themselves often erratic, and many went under, leaving their employees without work and often without pay. Second, employment in one of those concerns involved a virtually complete commitment to that operation, which deprived the native of the flexibility that had shielded him from the thousand natural shocks that those industries were heir to. A Haisla who logged or fished for the whites found it difficult to take time off to go oolichan processing or salmon fishing as he had been able to do when he worked for himself. Should he do so, he jeopardized his reputation with his employer and found it almost impossible to find work again, for he was indelibly stamped as a 'shiftless, unreliable Indian.'

The legislation and regulations formulated illustrate quite graphically Jorgensen's comment that:

Underdevelopment of rural areas is a product of the development of urban centers of finance, and the latter wield considerable influence in enacting legislation to maintain their growth (1971: 87).

These regulations took the form of restrictions governing who was to gain access to the resources, and where, when, and how they should be taken. Initially, regulations also decreed the amount of resource that an entity should control. In the case of logging, the regulations granted exclusive access to particular tracts of resources, in the form of timber cutting licences. In fishing, the licences granted the right to fish in competition
with other licence holders. Cannery licence quotas ensured that plant operators could acquire for their exclusive use a certain portion of the industry within their region.

Most of the regulations brought out favoured the interests of the larger operators (or even non-operating speculators) over the smaller. Timber licences and leases, for example, were initially granted for 160 acres, a move that placed the annual rental beyond the reach of native loggers, although it was absurdly small for the companies. Moreover, the relaxation of non-transferable 'one licence per operator' clauses effectively played into the hands of speculators and worked against the interests of the small loggers or would-be loggers. When timber sales were instituted in part to rectify the imbalance caused by the timber licence policies, the practice of putting the timber out for bids once again ensured that only the mills and most successful independent operators stood a chance of obtaining the best timber while small operators were left to scramble for the poorer tracts.

Similarly, measures that were designed to promote rationality and discourage non-economic operations in the fishing industry most often favoured the larger, more successful operators and hampered the marginal operations, of which the Indians formed a significant part.

Two other aspects of settlement and development illustrate the source of the declining fortunes of the native. One is the effect of industrialization and its almost inevitable concomitant, pollution, on the traditional resource base; the other
concerns the confiscation of native territories and the restriction of their ability to maintain their resource base in the face of ever tighter regulations and laws.

Development of the coast can have yet another deleterious effect on native life, for the wastes of the industries that locate there can hamper both commercial and subsistence activities. The Indians' initial ability to maintain their subsistence economy intact resulted from a fortuitous division between resources exploited for the industrial economy and those relied on for subsistence. This division was a spatial one too, for the majority of processing plants were located some distance from the village of the Haisla. In the Kitamaat region, at least, niches remained fairly distinct, and whites and Indians were able to avoid ruinous competition for the same resource.

Recently, however, some overlap has occurred, and the Haisla are the losers. With the location of a pulp mill at the head of the inlet, the river that the Kitamaat relied on for food became a dumping ground for industrial effluent.

The Kitamaat River is one of the major oolichan streams of the coast, and the Haisla accordingly placed great emphasis on the grease making industry, rendering a product of particularly high quality, one sought by natives far from Kitamaat. This fishery was used both to supply the Haislas' own needs and to trade for goods not readily available locally. Douglas Channel is poor in edible seaweed, for example, and the Haisla traditionally obtained it from the Bella Bella in exchange for grease. The trade has continued to the present, at the rate of one five gallon can of
grease for an equal volume of seaweed.

The grounds at Kitamaat were only seven miles from the village. Each April, when the sun set behind the 'oolichan canoe,' a canoe-shaped hollow in the line of mountains opposite the village, they moved to the camp, located at the traditional village of the X'aisla, and prepared for the run. Most of the village participated in the move, and customarily spent about a month there. So important an item was the grease that all other activities took second place to rendering it. Even the most successful loggers took a month or so off at grease making time. The old oolichan camp remained a significant resource site until recently, so much so that when Alcan pressured the village to sell the land or move their reserve to a different section of river, they steadfastly refused, declaring that 'Our main livelihood is that village. We will never let it go.' They stayed, and Alcan located some distance away.

Thus it was a considerable shock when the oolichan took on a peculiar taste, a problem that began after the establishment of the pulp mill upriver from the camp. The Haisla claim that the discharge of effluent into the river imparts the disagreeable flavour to the oolichan, making the grease inedible. Fisheries personnel agree that the fish do not taste as they should, but claim that the cause is unknown.

Whatever the cause or whoever the culprit, the fish are now unsuitable for rendering. Those Haisla who wish to obtain grease must now travel to the Kemano River, their secondary oolichan stream, located in former Kitlope territory some 50
miles from Kitamaat.

Those who could have pursued the project while it was carried on near Kitamaat often find it inconvenient or impossible to do so at Kemano. Part of the convenience of the Kitamaat site was its proximity to the village, and later, to Alcan. Workers in the plant could help in the process during their off hours or days off, for the camp lay quite close to the smelter. Also, families could remain together for the month or more that the grease making might take.

With the site far removed from Kitamaat, a number of situations arise. Because the site can only be reached by a reasonably large boat, those who gave up their fishing boats are now reliant on someone else for a ride, putting a premium on access to a boat, or on a relationship with someone who enjoys such access.

Those who find it inconvenient or impossible to go grease making will henceforth be reliant for grease on someone who can travel to Kemano, a circumstance that may lead to the development of intra-village reciprocity structures, or to the reactivation of dormant ones.

Particularly hard hit are the former grease makers whose most abundant asset was time, for grease now sells in the village for $45 per gallon, if people will part with it at all.¹ Those

¹ This spring, the Kemano run failed completely, which the Haisla attribute to blasting taking place upriver. They say that the oolichan, a notoriously skittish fish, entered the estuary, encountered the upheavals from the blast, and retreated in a body back to the sea. Therefore, no new supply of grease could be put up. All grease consumed this year comes from the remainder of last year's supply. The uncertainty of future supplies prompts many who have grease not to sell or trade it but to hoard it, which further decreases the amount available.
with more time than cash could once have supplied their own needs and acquired herring eggs and seaweed, both important foods, from trade with the Skidegate or Bella Bella. Now, faced with the prospect of paying cash for all these items, they must cut down or do without altogether. Because they are the ones who are short of money, they will find it most difficult to replace those items with store-bought foods.
Territorial Encroachment by Whites

The essential inability of the natives to deal with white encroachment onto their territories is quite evident in their requests for additional reserves made before the McKenna-McBride Commission. The type of requests, and the dispositions of them by the authorities, were to consign the natives to marginal operations at the fringe of the industrial economy, for the lands requested and granted were, by and large, quite unsuited to the type of economy that was fast developing on the coast.

Traditional subsistence patterns are much in evidence in the requests. Most often, the Indians asked for small parcels of land adjacent to their salmon streams, ideal sites for fishing in the traditional manner (cf. Table XVI, p. 191). Only one band requested timber grounds, even though most of the villages were engaged in logging by that time, and presumably had experienced some difficulty in securing good logging claims of their own.

Similarly, farming was not a significant factor in the applications. It is noteworthy that among the Kitamaat, fishing sites figured quite large in the requests: 8 out of 11, a total quite different from those of the Owikeno, for example, who saw fit to request but two, and those in association with garden sites. Part of the reason, I believe, was the Kitamaats' isolation from and the Owikenos' proximity to, whites, particularly Fisheries Officials. The Owikeno live at Rivers Inlet, and had had considerable contact with Fisheries personnel, and knew at the time the requests were made that their traditional forms of
Table XVI

Requests for Additional Reserves,
Bella Coola Agency, c. 1913

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Band</th>
<th>No. of Requests</th>
<th>Granted</th>
<th>Denied</th>
<th>Requests for:</th>
<th>Fishing grounds</th>
<th>Hunting grounds</th>
<th>Old village site</th>
<th>Timber lands</th>
<th>Clam &amp; Seaweed beds</th>
<th>Burial grounds</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Farming &amp; Gardens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kitamaat</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitlope</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1(^b)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitasoo</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimsquit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1(^a)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bella Coola</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owikeno</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bella Bella</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartley Bay</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Often, the requests specified multiple use, for example "fishing ground and old village site." Hence the figures in the breakdown may number more than the total of requests.

a. out of 160 acres requested, 40 were granted.
b. out of 200 acres requested, 10 were granted.

(Reserve Commission Report 1916)
fishing could not be pursued. The use of weirs, traps, and the like had been prohibited in the Fisheries Act of 1892, and Fisheries Officers were in the habit of inspecting the streams, ordering the natives out, and destroying their equipment whenever they discovered them fishing with traditional methods. The Kitamaat, living as they did far from the mainstream, were left alone to practice whatever methods they wished for much longer, a condition which, I believe, led to their requesting a pattern of additional reserves that was inappropriate.

Thus the pattern of reserves that developed was obsolete, in some cases even before the reserves were granted, for it fitted the natives to pursue a way of life that was fast being denied them, but did not suit the occupations that might have replaced the traditional activities. Almost all of the Kitkatla-Hartley Bay requests for timber land were denied, many on frivolous grounds, such as that the land under consideration was already alienated under a handlogger's licence, a permit that remained in effect for only one year in any event.

Actually, the development of the coastal fishing industry as we know it was contingent on the prohibition of traditional native catching methods and the removal of their control over the rivers. Although Crutchfield and Pontecorvo refer to salmon as an 'open-access' resource, accessible to everyone equally (1969: 7), that condition could only obtain after the natives had been removed from their traditional control over the fishing streams. For it is the nature of anadromous fish like salmon that they can be completely controlled by manipulation of their spawning
streams. Anyone who can monopolize the streams up which they travel to spawn can take the whole population if he chooses, simply by blocking the channel. The natives were well aware of that, of course, for the system of resource ownership that they followed was predicated on the control of such streams. Salmon were, in their conception, a closed-access resource, the potential property of the owner of the particular section of stream they happened to occupy at any given time.

Before the fishing industry could develop in the freewheeling, competitive way that it did, based on the mid-inlet or offshore taking of fish, native forms of ownership and catching had to be abolished, else the Indians would have controlled the fishery, a situation that the tenor of the times would not countenance. Nor would the fiercely competitive canners readily allow control of a stream to go to a rival. Thus the alternative—using traditional in-stream fishing methods, albeit under white control—never came to pass. The way was opened, therefore, for mid-inlet net fishing to replace native forms of exploitation. The change was initially most serious for the Owikeno, for not only were their old subsistence patterns forcibly altered, but the development of the mid-inlet fishery drew hundreds of outsiders, natives included, to Rivers Inlet for cannery work.

Thus, in order to promote the development of the industry, both the accessibility and availability of the natives' fish were manipulated in such a manner as to favour the companies and white fishermen at the expense of the local Indians.
Chapter 8

Missionization

We come now to two non-economic determinants of cultural change among the Haisla: missionization by an ultra-evangelical form of Christianity, and drastic depopulation. In this chapter, I will consider aspects of missionization that may bear on the Haislas' abandonment of certain forms of traditional culture.

The various churches and missionary societies that appeared on the coast during the last century were among the most pervasive agents of cultural change, and their efforts in that direction were direct and explicit. It is tempting, therefore, to ascribe all manner of changes to missionary influence, simply because the churchmen exhorted the natives to adopt certain forms of behaviour that they did indeed take up. Later in the thesis, I will argue that this ostensible adoption of the missionaries' proposals may have resulted in part from a convergence of interests—economic or demographic pressures may have been abroad that made it logical or convenient for the Indians to behave in ways that were consistent with the teachings of the church. Before taking up that argument, however, I will describe the particular mission at Kitamaat.

The Kitamaats' first recorded contact with Christianity came in 1864, when travelling Catholic priests baptized a number of natives. Nothing further came of it, however, and it was not until 1876 before the first serious efforts at conversion were made, by Wahaksgumalayou, a Kitamaat who had become converted while on a fur trading expedition to Victoria. He returned home
determined to proselytize his fellows. His initial attempts met with considerable hostility from nobles in the village, and culminated in a remarkable form of excommunication. As recounted by a later missionary, the scene was simple, but rather awesome:

One of the head chiefs passed sentence in a characteristic manner; he took in the palm of his hand a piece of dry cedar bark and powdered it to fine dust then blew it away with the remark "Thus shall you, Wahaksgumalayou and your family and you, Ningohs and your friends perish and vanish from the earth. Your names shall not be handed down. You Wahaksgumalayou shall be the last to perish, and shall see all your friends pass before you. This is all I have to say" (Raley 1902: 17-2).

Matters became so tense that Wahaksgumalayou fled to the protection of the Methodist mission at Port Simpson, which at that time was led by Thomas Crosby.

Shortly thereafter, Crosby began to visit Kitamaat periodically, and won a number of converts. (Actually, since conversion at that point involved only the acceptance of baptism, there is some question about the ultimate significance of the venture.) He then persuaded a lay missionary to take up residence in the village. She arrived around 1885, by which time the chiefs' opposition to the mission seems to have abated somewhat, for the woman reported that she was met with courtesy and co-operation from the highest ranking nobles.

George Raley, the first ordained minister, and the individual who was destined to have the greatest impact on the culture of the Haisla, arrived in 1893 and remained for some 13 years. During his tenure, the great majority of the Kitamaat accepted baptism and became nominal Christians, taking up residence about
seven miles down channel from the winter village of the unconverted. In time, as more natives converted, the mission village became the main population center for the Kitamaat, and the former village was abandoned for all but a few activities, such as oolichan fishing during the spring, or potlatching out of reach of the missionary and the Indian Agent.

Whatever the native motivation for conversion to Christianity, an impulse which has never been satisfactorily explained (c.f. Rumley, 1973), the action had more radical implications than could have been anticipated by the Indians. For it was a rare missionary that could tolerate the sight of undiminished native culture. Even matters that had little or nothing to do with the church or the natives' ability to lead Christian lives according to the lights of the church fell under his proscribing eye. The more intolerant missionaries often set out to eradicate not only native elements that were clearly incompatible with the church, but any that in their opinion might set the Indians to pining for their old ways.

[Mumming in Britain] was supposed to be harmless by many, however, by not a few, a useless relic of a barbaric age. And so amongst the Indians there are customs harmless in themselves, yet when associated with a savage life, it is better for their welfare to discard them (Raley 1904: 25-8).

Raley set himself to create a European-style village on the Northwest Coast, shorn of all the more obvious Indian cultural features, such as ranks, clans, ceremonials, and the like. Accordingly, he does not appear to have attempted to reconcile the native and church hierarchical systems even to the extent that,
say, Durieu did at Sechelt, with a system of warders, constables, and other officers drawn from among the nobles and distributed in a manner reflecting the origins of the divisions of the band (cf. Lemert 1954). North coast missions, it seems were to be made of sterner stuff. Raley did institute system of church officers, but, so far as I could determine, they were not necessarily held by persons of high rank. In fact, when Tsasih, the chief of the village, eventually appeared on the roll of church members, he was placed far down the list, and on one occasion was marked as being 'on trial,' a supplicant, surely a most un-chieflike position. At the same time, villagers of undistinguished background were listed prominently, as full members.

Raley never succeeded in effecting as thoroughgoing a renunciation of native ways as some other missionaries of the region, such as Duncan at Metlakatla. Instead, a complex of native forms survived, with greater or lesser vigour, to co-exist with the European forms, in spite of his exhortations. All told, he did have considerable success in altering the face of Haisla culture, and in enlisting the co-operation of the native nobles, however. On one occasion, for example, the Kitlope council received a visit from him. They

...Closed with the firm conviction that pagan customs are wrong and it is their intention to use all means to suppress them (Raley 1901: 16-2).

The practical effects of that type of resolution are rather difficult to determine precisely. One gets the impression that the natives became adept at telling the missionary what he wanted to hear, but doing more or less as they pleased when he was not
present. The proclamations on pages 199 and 200 show the type of document that resulted when the native councils acceded to missionary pressure. The first, the potlatch prohibition at Kitamaat, threatened a fine approximately equal to a season's income at a cannery, certainly a major deterrent, were it to be enforced. It is doubtful that the edict made all that much difference at Kitamaat, however, for the potlatchers merely moved their ceremonies to the old village up the Kitimat River. For several years, Raley complained in his journal that his parishioners were stealing off to engage in potlatching.

The second document was drawn up for the Kispiox, but was witnessed by Raley some years after he had left Kitamaat to take the church at Port Essington, on the Skeena. Nevertheless, the fact that he had a hand in it prompts me to include it, for it is illustrative of the approach taken by the Methodist missionaries to the question of Indian ceremonialism and social organization. It indicates the direction of the missionary's assault on north coastal cultures, and shows clearly the attempt to extinguish the traditional social order. Attempts to rout out the fundamental characteristics of the native system usually followed the elimination of the more flamboyant and overtly 'savage' practices.

Early white witnesses were horrified by the boisterous native ceremonials, especially the dramatic dances and like performances with their cannibalism (probably feigned, though highly realistic), grisly stage decapitations followed by dramatic resurrections, and the like. When Raley began to win converts, he lost no time in convincing the natives that to continue such
KITAMAAT COUNCIL

10th. Nov. 1893

ANY PERSON IN THE VILLAGE OF KITAMAAT WHO GIVES A FEAST OR POTLATCH WILL BE PUNISHED BY A FINE OF ONE-HUNDRED AND FORTY DOLLARS

$140.00

Sam Amos
Chief Councilor

This is a copy of a potlatch prohibition, the original of which is in the Raley papers in the Provincial Archives, Victoria. Sam Amos, the chief councillor, was the brother of Charley Amos, Wahaksgumalayou.
We the undersigned Chiefs of Kispiox B.C. wish it to be known:--

1. That we desire no more Potlach held in our village.

2. That we want no more old fashioned feasts or feasts in memory of the dead, but if feasts are held we desire them to be set with clean tables and as up to date as our means will allow and such harmful and objectionable features as wasteful extravagance, the calling of names of living or dead, the giving of money or other gifts included with ceremonial feasts prohibited.

3. We further desire all dancing to be abolished at our feasts.

4. We desire there shall be no more dressing up in old fashioned costume or the painting of tattooing of the body or face.

5. We further desire that the Halliet or Indian Medicine Doctor shall cease his practice for many reasons, but especially the following: - (a) It is absolutely deceptive. (b) It interferes with the education of the children and general progress of the people. (c) It tends to sensuality and is a cloak for immorality. (d) It interferes with the work of the legally appointed medical Doctor whose instructions are frequently countermanded by the heathen Doctor in a manner detrimental to the patient. (e) Such practice is the enemy of morality and religion. (f) It is the medium of darkest superstition and witchcraft.

We are so aroused at the present time on this question that we ask the aid of the Government and the Church. We feel that some law should be made to protect our village against these enemies to advancement, law, order, social and religious progress and we feel that a severe penalty should be attached to any breach of the law.

Signed, Chief Walter Kail his mark, X
                     Chief Solomon Johnson his mark, X
                     Chief Paul Thlamleha his mark, X
                     Chief Philip Williams his mark, X
                     Chief Robert Williams his mark, X
                     Chief Isaac Sholsh his mark, X
                     Chief John Kunnulaha his mark, X

Dated at Kispiox this 13th day of February, 1914.

Witness to signatures after the matter herein had been read and meaning interpreted,

Signed, G.H. Raley.

I hereby certify that I have faithfully interpreted the words to the Chiefs so that when it was read over they declared they understood it.

(Raley papers: n.p.)
activities could not but harm their chances of salvation.

When Christianity came, my grandmother said that her uncle went down to the beach and burned everything. He had heard that the Lord will not receive you if you still look to your treasures.

That attitude effectively removed many of the converts from full participation in the ceremonial cycle. Nevertheless, many converts remained at least partially within the traditional system, for they continued to stage or attend potlatches. It seems that for some time after the arrival of the missionary, many natives remained unconvinced that potlatching and adherence to traditional social forms were inimical to proper conversion. For the most part, those who converted maintained the positions in the traditional social hierarchy. Even though they may have abandoned some of the dances and theatrical performances, they continued to operate in the status system for some decades. As late as 1918, differences in rank could impede projected marriages (cf. Butcher's account, p. 203, in which the family of a young noblewoman had difficulty finding a husband of suitable rank for her). Butcher also describes a number of situations in which parents forced marriages on their children. The occasional instance of defiance was considered remarkable, and seldom succeeded.

The missionaries for their part inveighed against not only the ceremonials and what was, to their eyes, the shockingly wasteful potlatch distributions, but attempted to eliminate the "calling of names of living or dead, the giving of money or other gifts included with the ceremonial feasts" (cf. p. 200). Had that succeeded, it would have undermined the entire Northwest Coast form of social organization. Most natives were not pre-
pared to abandon everything, however.

Although the churchmen claimed periodically that potlatching was not being carried on with its old ardour, it seems evident that the Kitamaat continued not only to potlatch among themselves, but engaged in the major inter-village potlatches as well. A 1911 report in a Vancouver newspaper describes a potlatch held at Bella Coola, at which "$3875 in money, 700 boxes of biscuits, 1000 sacks of flour and 500 bags of sugar" were distributed (Rushton 1974: 65). The account also noted that "The next Indian potlatch is to be held in Kitimat, where many of the gifts will find their way back to the giver" (Ibid.).

The Kitamaat continued to participate in major inter-village potlatches until the 1930's, at least. Garfield reports a discussion that took place at Kitkatla following the death of a major chief:

Upon Wakas' suggestion it was decided to invite the Gitamat and Hartley Bay people, since, as he said, they honored their debts and also know Dzi'bas better than his Port Simpson brother chiefs (1939: 253).

Two items are worthy of note here. First, the Kitamaat maintained close ceremonial connections (they honoured their debts) with a Tsimshian village--closer, in fact, than a neighbouring Tsimshian village had done. Second, those ties continued in spite of church opposition. Port Simpson, like Kitamaat, was the site of a successful Methodist mission. Garfield remarks that some of the Port Simpson Tsimshian had used their conversion to Christianity as a pretext for refusing to repay their potlatch debts, an action that created considerable ill feeling among their
neighbours. In spite of a similar opportunity to remove themselves from the potlatch system, the Kitamaat continued to engage in it.

Actually, the Kitamaat ceremonials remained underground only as long as a strong, wilful missionary like Raley was present. Later ministers seem to have lacked Raley's forceful presence, and in consequence practices that were proscribed during his tenure began to reappear or be practised more openly. In 1918, Margaret Butcher, a nurse at the local school, described a wedding.

Being of high caste it has been difficult to find her a husband....There was a big council meeting to arrange [the marriage] of the Princess, and had to be chosen as he was the only eligible man of high enough rank....

[In the reception banquet] the Eagles and Beavers, being entertainers did not sit down....Before the close two sleds were drawn into the room loaded with joints of meat. A joint was given to the head of each family. To others were given parcels of soda crackers or boxes or oranges and money was given quietly. $70 was given to the Band and $10 was laid in front of Mr. Allan for the Church. The whole feast and Potlatch cost $1000.

After our return home the people would have a native dance and the next day there was a second feast and dance given by another branch of the same family....There has been a succession of feasts since that day at least one every other day. Our friend Mr. Anderson [a local white settler] has sold five beeves for this feast. After the Stewarts (the Princess' feast) three brothers the Grants gave one and theirs cost $1100 so that now they are very big people.

There have been numerous dances but they are kept very quiet and the white man is not welcome to those (1918: January 1st and 8th).

The Kitamaat missionary's fundamental technique in effecting the abandonment of native cultural elements was the separation of converts from the influence of their unregenerate kinsmen. To
that end, Raley encouraged the converts to take up residence in the mission village. In its later stages, this move also involved the adoption of the European-style frame dwelling, for Raley campaigned strenuously for the abandonment of the traditional communal house, for medical and moral reasons. He feared that the diseases that were so prevalent among Indians at that time were too easily transmitted among people who lived communally. In addition, he was particularly concerned that European standards of propriety could never be inculcated among children brought up in the old houses.

It used to be, that in the old native houses, all the members of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 families lived together in a single room, where all ages and both sexes slept, ate and dwelt together. Fancy what a picture of human life must be formed in the mind of a child who is familiar with vice in all its forms from infancy upward, and who looks on scenes of sin as the normal condition of humanity (Raley 1901: 14-9).

The construction of frame houses evidently proceeded quite rapidly, for by 1903, Raley remarked that:

Ten years ago the village presented altogether a different appearance, then the old fashioned Indian houses predominated, now none are to be seen (1903: 24-1).

This shift in native residence patterns can be seen from population figures of the time. The 1900 Indian Affairs Report notes that the village was made up of 42 frame houses, and had a population of 266, an average of just over 6 per house. The closest age-distribution figures we have are for 1902, which show 87 persons below the age of 20, and 166 above (IAR 1903). If we assume the same number of houses, that would leave about 4 adults
(20 and above) and 2 children per house.

This transition to small households is of some consequence in matters of individual control of property, rights of inheritance, co-operative patterns, post-marital residence, and the like. These will be discussed in succeeding chapters.

A second form of residential shift took place at this time, one that was to have considerable importance in the eventual disintegration of traditional cultural forms. This shift was also initiated by the missionaries, and grew out of their concern that even the converted parents were too close to their heathen past to be reliable models for their children. A boarding school was therefore constructed for village children. Girls remained there from the ages of about 6 or 7 to 17, boys from about 7 to 12. Boys who showed promise then left to attend Coqualeetza residential school at Sardis, near Vancouver, and about 500 miles from Kitamaat. The regimen was quite strict, and proceeded from Raley's motive for removing converts from the long houses.

Therefore if we want the future of the people to be Christian, the children must be removed from such demoralizing surroundings, into homes where they are under the constant influence of Christian teaching (Raley 1901: 14-9).

Children were permitted to stay with their parents only on weekends and holidays, even though their houses were all within a quarter-mile of the school. They were forbidden to speak Haisla, even among themselves, and were punished if caught doing so. The boys did not see home for months, or even years, at a time, Coqualeetza being a thousand mile round trip from the village.

This isolation had far-reaching consequences. Butcher
remarked in 1918 that some of the girls had told her that they
could not understand all the Haisla of their parents and grandpar-
ents. Informants told me that upon their return from Coqualeetza
they had lost almost all of their Haisla and had to re-learn it
in order to communicate with their elders.

In addition, the prolonged separation of children from the
social life of the village prevented, or at least hampered, their
undergoing the intensive and prolonged training for the inheri-
tance of traditional statuses. The considerable stock of what
Suttles calls "private knowledge" and orally imparted informa-
tion that any heir to a title would be expected to know was not
easy to impart only on weekends.¹

A further problem for the elders of the village who tried
to socialize their children into traditional culture was the
attitudes developed by the students who were regularly exorted
to forget the heathen past. It is not surprising that many
children developed casual or even hostile attitudes towards the
maintenance of traditional cultural forms, considering the con-
flicting pressures that they were subjected to.

¹. One of my most knowledgeable informants was a gentleman who
contracted tuberculosis at the age of 8, and was sent home
from the school to die. He recovered, but did not attend
school again, and consequently was exposed to more tradi-
tional Haisla learning than his fellows.
Chapter 9

Depopulation

According to Duff (1964: 39), the century and a half following contact was a demographic catastrophe for the coastal Indians, as most tribes suffered a shattering drop in numbers. The causes of the decline were threefold: intertribal warfare, using European weapons to devastating effect; a succession of plagues which swept the coast, carrying off thousands before subsiding; and a number of slower acting though no less deadly diseases such as tuberculosis and veneral disease, which became endemic among the tribes and ravaged the survivors of the plagues and wars.

The effect of all this on the population of the Haisla is difficult to estimate. Living far up remote inlets as they did, they remained relatively unknown to the white until very late in the nineteenth century. To what extent they suffered from the warfare or the epidemics is therefore not recorded. Not all groups were affected to the same degree, as Table XVII, p. 208 shows.

Some Kitamaat have told me that aboriginally, the Kitlope were somewhat more numerous than they, with around 1200 persons, to Kitamaat's 1000. If that were true, it would indicate that the Kitlope were especially hard hit, for by the 1890's, they had been reduced to fewer than 100, and were declining steadily. During several years, the Indian Agent reported that no births had taken place among them (IAR passim.).

If we accept the Kitamaats' claim of about 2200 for both
Table XVII

Population Decline Among Natives of the Coast, 1835-1885

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>1835</th>
<th>1885</th>
<th>Decline in Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haida</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsimshian</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>4,550</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwakiutl</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,700</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nootka</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bella Coola</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Salish</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>5,525</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Duff 1964: 39
peoples the turn-of-the-century population of around 400 represents a decline of some 82 per cent. Even if we use the more conservative Mooney-Kroeber figure of 1300, the decline is still considerable: 70 per cent.

Some indirect evidence exists of smallpox at Kitamaat. When he lists Haisla names, Olson includes the following explanatory note for one woman's title:

Ma'manakelaxs ("she gathered together the bodies"). About one hundred years ago, after an epidemic of smallpox at Kildala Arm, a woman buried the numerous dead, then came to Kitimat, gave a feast and took the title (1940: 172).

By the time that George Raley arrived, in 1893, the Nalabila, Xa'isla, and Gildalidox had begun to winter together in the village of the Xa'isla, a possible indicator of severe depopulation.

Whatever their losses from the plagues and warfare, the endemic diseases played havoc with the Haisla well into this century. For a number of years before 1920, the Indian agent remarked on the toll of persons at Kitamaat, primarily from tuberculosis, and noted that the village seemed to be the hardest hit of any in the agency. Margaret Butcher, a nurse at the Mission home (1916-1919) gave her relatives a pathetic account of the human side of the mortality statistics, and conveyed the feeling of hopelessness felt at the seemingly inexorable slide to extinction:

I was remarking on the growth of one sturdy boy; the answer was--"Yes, we hope he will win through. Two of his sisters are dead and another will be soon. We must take care of him." (October 4th, 1916)

Sarah, aged 12, the youngest in a family in which 2 girls have succumbed, has just matured, and started a cough, and looks very sick. The lung trouble has to be reckoned with all the time....
Miriam is the eighth to die since I came here seven months ago (n.d.)

Maud last August, Amy last January; Maggie in June--three sisters within 12 months. Norah has just married. Hazel and Sarah are still in the home--which one will die next? Do you wonder that we fuss when a child gets a cough? (n.d.)

One man lost 7 children, another 9--[he] brought the last remaining to the home to try to save him from the same fate (October 1st, 1917).

Another has brought his one precious little son, he has lost nine other children and has only a boy of 22 or so besides (n.d.).

These deaths occurred among children from the ages of about seven to eighteen, which, according to figures drawn from the burial records was the age group with the lowest mortality rate.

The burial records kept by the missionaries indicate that the death rate for infants and young children was phenomenally high, a situation that persisted through the 1940's, at least. The relative mortality rates are given in Tables XVIII-XXI, pp.

Although the rate of infant mortality declined from the first period shown through to the last shown, it continued to be far higher than for other age groups. Between 1897 and 1906, deaths of children under one year of age accounted for one-third of the total. Nearly half the total came from children under six. For the 1930's, the figure had dropped, but was still very high--37%.

The epidemic of Spanish influenza that struck North America late in 1918 hit Kitamaat with particular virulence. Although attempts were made to isolate the village by preventing anyone from disembarking there, some sick Haisla returned home and infec-
ted the rest. In less than eight weeks, ten per cent of the popu-
lation died. Again, the hardest hit were those under six, who
comprised nearly half the victims. The mortality rates are shown
on Table XIX, p. 213. Whereas one-twentieth of those between 6
and 15 died, over one-fifth of those under 6 succumbed. Whereas
no families escaped this decline entirely, some were hit much
harder than others. The father who lost nine of his children,
and the other who lost six, have been mentioned.

The effect of this imbalance was to create a receptivity to
social innovation, as groups were forced to accept more diffuse
categories of kinsmen as heirs in an attempt to maintain the
continuity of names or lines. In a situation to be described
later, one clan was obliged to accept as their chief the son of
former head. All the more direct potential heirs had died during
the influenza epidemic, or lived in distant villages and were
unwilling to move to Kitamaat to take up the position. The popu-
lation decline thus prepared the ground for the dissolution of
strict rules of descent and the acceptance of far more lenient
ones.
Table XVIII

Kitamaat Mortality, 1897-1906

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
<th>Percentage of Deaths</th>
<th>Cohort's Percentage of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-65</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Raley, Na-Na-Kwa Obituaries
Table XIX

Mortality During the 1918 Spanish Influenza Epidemic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
<th>Percentage of Deaths</th>
<th>Cohort's Percentage of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
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</table>

Source: Kitamaat Burial Records
Table XX

Kitamaat Mortality, 1920-1929

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
<th>Percentage of Deaths</th>
<th>Cohort's Percentage of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-15</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>16-20</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>21-65</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
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Source: Kitamaat Burial Records
Table XXI

Kitamaat Mortality, 1930-1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
<th>Percentage of Deaths</th>
<th>Cohort's Percentage of Population</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-15</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
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Source: Kitamaat Burial Records
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>16-20</th>
<th>21-65</th>
<th>65+</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>1910</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>1913</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>1917</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>1934</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Indian Affairs Department Annual Reports
Chapter 10

Social Change: The Adoption of Variants

The process of acculturation among the Haisla can be clarified somewhat by reference to an intriguing formulation by Robert Anderson.

I term it the principle of reduction of variants, defining variants simply as alternative and interchangeable elements. The principle may be phrased formally in this fashion: reduction or increase in the number of variants operative in given situations is a function of the degree of integration of the complex of which they are parts. As integration of a complex proceeds, the number of variants in given situations is reduced. Other things being equal, the degree of integration is indicated positively by the extent to which element bundles reduce their component variants in each case toward unity, and negatively, by the extent to which the variants increase toward infinity (1960: 52).

Although Anderson was not addressing himself to acculturation as such, the notion of variants nevertheless holds some utility for an examination of the process. Contact and subsequent white occupation of the coast presented an array of alternative elements to the natives, and thus provided for the dis-integration of their cultures. The number of variants increased enormously, and the degree of integration diminished to the extent that these alternatives were taken up, voluntarily or involuntarily. During the period of greatest flux, the Haisla had the choice of cleaving to the old ways exclusively, of adopting the new while abandoning the old, or of fashioning any of a number of combinations of traditional and white elements. Evidence suggests that adoption of white cultural forms took place in fits and starts, with some traditional elements proving more tenacious than others.
The Haisla took to being married in church readily enough, for example, but for some decades after conversion to Christianity they generally refused to consider marriage within the clan. Marriage form--traditional or Christian--became variable quite early, while choice of partner became one only gradually.

Contact, then, is characterized by a sudden expansion in the number of variants, and acculturation by a progressive reduction in the number of alternatives as traditional forms of behaviour are abandoned in favour of the new, and the culture becomes integrated along new lines.

Not all aspects of the culture become re-integrated, however. Some, like the matrilineal system of the Haisla, disintegrate, and remain so. The reasons for the Haislas' tolerance of a disintegrated aspect of their culture will be examined in some detail.

The breakdown of matriliny, or as Gough phrased it, "The modern disintegration of matrilineal descent groups," refers to more than matriliny in its strictest sense, as expressed by Aberle.

Matriliny consists simply in assigning individuals to kinship categories by reference to descent traced through females (1961: 656).

Technically, we may say that the matrilineal system has never broken down at Kitamaat, for people are still assigned to categories (clans) on the basis of matrilineal principles, although the population decline enforced a certain amount of flexibility in that regard, as adoptions into clans became a not infrequent device for staving off extinction of a line.
What has broken down is the system by which the majority of statuses and roles are calculated by way of clan affiliation.

Recent literature has accumulated evidence to show that under economic changes brought about by contact with Western industrial nations, matrilineal descent groups gradually disintegrate. In their place, the elementary family eventually emerges as the key kinship group with respect to residence, economic cooperation, legal responsibility, and socialization, with a narrow range of interpersonal kinship relationships spreading outward from it bilaterally and linking it with other elementary families. The interim steps in this process vary in different societies and in different strata of the same society (Gough 1961: 631).

(I would add only that in Kitamaat the interim steps vary between individuals within the same stratum, and even within the same family.)

Although the clans still exist at Kitamaat, their functions are quite severely circumscribed. People continue to potlatch and assume titles, although the economic and political dimensions of social rank have all but disappeared.

Over the years the number of variants associated with traditional statuses has grown until it encompasses all aspects of the system, from 'who may take a title' to 'the proper behaviour and place of the title holder in the community.' The relegation of the clan system to a marginal place in the everyday affairs of the village has reduced integrative pressures, with the result that all manner of innovations in the traditional system are accepted, not without dissension occasionally, but accepted nevertheless. I believe that this toleration of diversity is related to the diminished importance of the clans, for I doubt that the anomalies that appear in the taking of titles would be tolerated were the
holders also to gain significant political or economic advantage.

If, as Anderson maintains, the "...degree of integration is indicated...negatively, by the extent to which the variants increase toward infinity" (1960: 52), then the clan system is certainly dis-integrating, for the number of alternatives relating to titles and traditional statuses continues to grow. These variants are whether:

1. To take a title or let it lapse.
2. To claim a title with or without a potlatch, i.e., a public ceremony and distribution.
3. To follow the traditional avenue of succession or to consider more distant kin or even non-kinsmen.
4. To transfer traditional prerogatives and property with the title, or to transmit them to other persons via different criteria.
Whether to take a name or let it lapse

The decline of population left fewer survivors than titles, and made it inevitable that many names should disappear or not be handed down. Today a number of titles are, and appear destined to remain, vacant. Names stand vacant for a number of reasons. Often, no one is interested in claiming them, or potential successors lack the means to potlatch for them and are unwilling to move until they can accumulate the wherewithal to stage one. Thus there are two kinds of vacant status: those that are abandoned, and those temporarily open pending a potlatch. Even a title vacant for generations can theoretically be revived if a claimant holds a memorial banquet or erects a tombstone for the previous holder, so a name is never really considered to be absolutely defunct. Practically, however, many names are unlikely to be revived.

Olson found a great many titles to be vacant or lapsed by 1935. He identified (or heard about but could not name) 40 titles, 21 of which were 'active.' During a longer stay in the village, I collected 72 names, 48 of which are currently held by someone, leaving one-third of the titles vacant. It seems likely that a far greater number of titles and names, especially the lesser ones, have simply been forgotten. Informants had difficulty remembering names that had been out of circulation for half a century or more, and most had never heard of them.

In recent decades, the practice has grown of 'burying a person with his name.' Although his kinsmen will erect a tombstone, the functional equivalent of a memorial pole (and traditionally
the duty of the successor), no one will claim the title. Sometimes this was the wish of the deceased person himself, who let it be known beforehand that he did not want his name to be passed down. "Things have gone the other way. People need their money for themselves today" was the explanation one nobleman offered for declaring that he wanted his name to end with him. Or, the senior kinsman, generally the individual with the authority to decide on the disposition of the title, will decide not to proceed with plans for the succession. Some are modernists and take the opportunity to end the practice. Occasionally, some have personal reasons—one woman was reported to be so sensitive about an irregularity in a kinsman's assumption of his title that she attempted to have the name lapse, 'out of shame.' She felt that the kinsman's behaviour had so soiled the name that it was forever compromised.

For those titles that remain potentially active, the decision whether to take the name or to let it lapse has become a matter of personal or family preference rather than general prescription. Even those who take on names often discount them in conversation. They commonly aver that such things are today a minor part of the social scene, and count for very little. Time after time, I was told that the traditional status system has little or no currency in the village beyond the sentiments of a few elderly people who cling to the old ways, but whose views are deemed largely irrelevant to the present social situation. To my questions about the operation and importance of the system, I got this type of response:
Today respect for the name is only casual. Only a very light respect to them. (A chief)

(A title) doesn't really amount to anything.
Q. Why do people continue to take them, then?
A. They want to be honoured, or something like that.
Q. Are they?
A. I don't see it myself. (Elderly gentleman)

It's not going to do me any good if I have a chief's name. (Individual who refused a chief's title to which he was heir)

Moreover, the knowledge of the system seems surprisingly thin, even among middle-aged people. For a number of individuals, their perception of the traditional statuses is a generation behind—they can identify who held a title during the 30's or 40's but are unaware of the identity of the current holder, even though the man or woman may have potlatched for the name.

Others are not even sure of their own standing. One man, in his late forties, a fine informant with an otherwise extensive knowledge of Kitamaat history, was telling me of the preparations for the taking of a title, the details of banquet arrangements, and so on. He himself was heir to a major title, he explained with some pride, and intended to potlatch for his uncle's name. When I asked what that name was, he looked sheepish, and said that he could not remember it.

At a banquet honouring a championship sports team, various dignitaries of the band gave speeches, beginning with an address from Tsasih, the hereditary chief of the Beavers, and highest title of the village. The second man to speak was not well known to me, and so I asked my companion and interpreter, a middle-aged
man, why that individual was the second to speak. He replied, "I think he's some sort of chief." On the strength of his name, the interpreter is seated at one end of his clan's table during potlatches, an honoured place open only to nobles. He is, therefore, no stranger to the status system. Nor was he unduly reticent, for he was a willing and able informant.

It is interesting to note that although the band adheres to a traditional order in speeches, much as was done at potlatches, many in the audience have only a vague notion of the precedence that is being manifested.

How much the variations in attitudes and behaviour result from the social ambience and how much from personal or family inclination is difficult to say. Certainly, personality plays a considerable part in the approach of an individual to his responsibilities or opportunities within the traditional system. Consider the different attitudes towards the adoption of the title Hemasaka:

I might as well take the money down to the wharf and throw it overboard. All for nothing. What is a name?

...When my oldest uncle, Tom Amos, died, it wasn't until a couple of years after that we got everything collected, we went through the ceremony. I made a suggestion to the whole of the Eagle tribe, all the chiefs and all the noblemen, I explained to them about my condition: I am not a married man, I have no family, I have no property, so if I bear that hereditary chief of my family, Hemasaka, I cannot respond with the people that have the same category as I have, which I'm supposed to pay a lot of attention to. So I have told all the members of the Eagle tribe, that as for myself, I think it's best that brother Hank [i.e., cousin] take it now, instead of waiting until I am dead and gone. I'd rather myself see brother Henry sit on that chair and I give him all the
advice required so he'll get used to it while I'm gone. So everybody agreed to that, so up until now, brother Henry bears the bigger category than I have.

...I willed Henry everything. I willed him my rattle, my blanket, and my headdress.

The first speaker was the uncle of the second. Ironically, the less traditional attitude was expressed a generation earlier than the more traditional one. Hence my remark earlier that the 'interim steps' mentioned by Gough can vary between individuals within the same stratum or family.

Similar divergences in attitude are not uncommon. The current holder of the title Tsasih took the name only after his elder brother refused it, announcing that he wanted nothing to do with the traditional system.

Although knowledge of individual titles tended to be erratic and spotty, knowledge of clan affiliations seemed to be rather more extensive and stable. Thinking that perhaps there was a functional basis to this maintenance of knowledge, I decided to test the awareness of clan membership. I prepared a list of all the adults of the village, beginning with the names of the oldest members and working down to those of twenty years of age. I then asked certain informants to identify the clan membership of these individuals in order to determine both the breadth and accuracy of their knowledge of such matters. The older and middle-aged informants were able to answer without hesitation and with surprisingly few disagreements. Where the persons under consideration were older, there was little problem of direct identification. When we reached the names of people around thirty years of age, however, my informants
often began to lose track, and one took to deducing out loud: "That's Molly's girl, so she must be a Beaver." The greatest area of uncertainty and disagreement came in the area of adoptions. Informants often would answer with such responses as "I can't remember if his mother made him an Eagle or his father made him a Blackfish."

I questioned one informant about the generally extensive and consistent knowledge of affiliations shown, and speculated that such detailed knowledge had to indicate that the clans were more important to people than they were letting on, else why do they remember them so well? She replied that I'd remember them too if every time I attended a banquet I saw all the members of a particular clan sitting at the same table. Extensive knowledge of clan affiliations may not, therefore, have an important functional dimension, but may well result from vestigial potlatch practices.

I was not able to ascertain the knowledge of clan affiliation at all well among the younger adults, for whenever I approached them I was told that I should talk to so and so, an older person, usually, who knows a lot about the old days. People had a fixed idea of what it is that anthropologists do, or should do, namely gather myths and stories, and consequently were always directing me towards persons with knowledge of that sort. My attempts to convince people that their own concepts of the old days were of interest to me usually met with a courteous, non-committal response, a disclaimer of any real knowledge of that sort of thing, and the suggestion that I really ought to talk to
so and so....

My initial hope, to discover the difference in degrees of knowledge between different age groups, got nowhere, for a number of reasons. First, it is difficult to ask a younger person about such things at all, as I have just noted. The truth, that one is trying to find out how much less he knows than his grandfather, is not a politic reply to his disclaimers. Second, it involves asking the same questions to a series of informants, many in the same families, who compare notes on the researcher and who feel insulted when they discover that he is cross checking and repeating questions that they believe that they have answered satisfactorily. I therefore gave it up as a bad job.
To take a title with or without a potlatch or distribution

Traditionally, it was unthinkable that anyone would attempt to assume a name other than by way of a potlatch, a public ceremonial at which invited witnesses gathered to ratify the transfer of a title from the former holder to the claimant. During the proceedings, the hosts presented important guests with items of wealth as marks of esteem and implicit payment for the service of witnessing the assumption of the status by the claimant. No peaceable transfer of status was legitimate, unless carried out at such an occasion.

On a few occasions beginning some time after the turn of the century (as near as I can calculate), however, some families attempted to claim titles for their members more or less in private. This met with indifferent success, initially. Although the claimants wore the titles, the stigma of an improperly assumed name seemed to continue for years, and could even hamper the efforts of an heir to take the title a generation later.

James Clarkson's parents, for example, called in five or six chiefs to their house, presented them with gifts, and privately invested their son with the title Mamakawah but did not hold a conventional potlatch. A generation later:

Fred Woods thought he'd take the name when his uncle James Clarkson (died). (He) announced a banquet. During preparations, Chris Walker Sr. asked Fred Woods what the name was to be. He told him Mamakawah. Chris Walker said: "You were there when James Clarkson explained that the name was not his. Now you go and put up the banquet. Nobody ever put up a banquet for Mamakawah so put up a big one." Bill Starr seconded what Chris Walker said and so did Eddie Maitland. Mamakawah was a big name. You've got to do something big.
Fred Woods then said he wouldn't stand up for (the name). So Fred Woods took a name from Melissa's mother. Fred looked after her since she became almost crippled. She gave him the name "in payment for what he did for me, a crippled woman. Now I give him the biggest name I've got."^2

Of interest here is the conception that the transfer of the title to James Clarkson was somehow not legitimate, (some Haisla say 'not legal') not having been ratified at a public ceremony. The attendance of the chiefs at his parents' house notwithstanding, Clarkson evidently felt that he had never properly assumed the name, nor did significant elements of the village. Fred Woods was exhorted in effect to take the name not from James Clarkson, but from the preceding Mamakawah, and in so doing to make up for the omission of his uncle, who had left Mamakawah un-memorialized.

Clarkson's parents' attempt at social innovation did not take, it seems, and thus did not help to establish a variant, although the lack of outright denunciation within James Clarkson's lifetime indicates that the move gained at least partial acquiescence, if not approval. The five or six chiefs did attend the private affair, after all. Other attempts of a similar kind met with more direct disapproval. I heard tell of people accosting others in the street to chide them for deviating from approved procedures. One title, for example, was transferred to a young woman by her grandmother "without the people knowing it."

My grandfather went to her and asked her--she said she was too old to get around to the people. (He

1. His wife's mother.
2. Nawilowashemas (Lone Chief), a Blackfish title.
told her) she wasn't supposed to give that name until she died. She didn't have the power to give the name to anybody. Then he turned around and walked away.

Some claims are made in an even more unorthodox manner, and on occasion succeed. One man claimed a title in a way that kept the gossip alive for years, but which apparently has not prevented his functioning in a ceremonial context as the title holder. During a banquet held by someone else, he simply stood up and claimed a high title of the Eagles, making no presentations nor holding a potlatch of his own. My informant was quite contemptuous of the effrontery.

A chief doesn't get up and do something without telling his fellow members in the clan. He didn't tell anybody. He got up and said it. People were really surprised, an experienced man like that. People laugh at him. Call himself a chief. (Potlatching) It's a rich man's game. Not for [______], he hasn't got anything.

The village could have ignored his claim altogether, a not unknown technique for snubbing those who overreached themselves. One man who held a chief's title with a somewhat erratic history attempted to enhance his status by claiming an associated name. He held a banquet in honour of a deceased kinsman, at which time he claimed the title. All seemed to go well. During a subsequent banquet at which he was a guest, however, he was called by his first title only, not the one he had subsequently claimed. This was an implicit, yet pointed, refusal to recognize his attempt at social aggrandizement, even though he had fulfilled the formal proprieties.

The claimant for the title of [______] could have been
similarly snubbed. Yet during the potlatch held in memory of Tsasih, the chief of the village, clan leaders were called on to announce the succession of the new chief. He was one of the three called, a recognition of his succession by the nobles of the Beavers, and kinsmen of the highest title of the village. Presumably they had had the option of ignoring the claim and calling on some other chief or noble, but did not do so. And so, sneered at privately or not, the man is recognized as ________.

It now appears that questionable assumptions of titles (in traditional terms) are accepted more frequently by the village at large, not without grumbling from the traditionally minded, but accepted nevertheless.

I have sponsored four big banquets myself for my dead family members. Henry has done the same thing. These things we have to accomplish to become what we are.

There are others who had their names given to them without them paying a red cent and yet they have the same respect we have. That's how much things are changing today.
To follow traditional avenues of succession, or not

Although the transmission of statuses traditionally followed the matrilineal route common to the northern Northwest Coast peoples, the precise order of succession is difficult to define. The order of succession explained to me differed from that told to Olson and Lopatin.

The order of succession given me is: nephew, lacking nephew to niece, lacking niece to sister. One informant stated that brothers succeed to the title before a nephew, but this is unlikely or at least unusual (Olson 1940: 178).

If the deceased chief has no nephew in the female line, his younger brother succeeds him. The present Chief Morrison succeeded his elder brother, L. Morrison. If there are neither nephews nor brothers, a cousin in the female line may be the successor. Thus Lui [sic] Morrison, a second cousin, was Jesse Morrison's successor (Lopatin 1945: 28-29).

The Haisla order that I was given corresponds more closely to that of the Port Simpson, as noted by Garfield:

Holder of the name to:
1. Own next younger brother (same mother).
2. Own eldest sister's eldest son.
3. Next younger parallel cousin. (Man having same maternal grandmother as holder).
4. Eldest house nephew. (Son of a woman of the same house and generation as the holder.)
5. Eldest man of a related house, in own or another tribe.
6. Adopted man.

(Garfield 1939: 179)

With only one exception, informants told me that brothers came before sister's sons. Whatever the details, however, one salient feature is clear: the name passed down within the clan. Even with drastic population decline and consequent disruption of the lines of succession, the ability of 'outsiders' to take
names does not appear to have been thrown as wide open as is generally thought. Even for a group like the Southern Kwakiutl, whose reputation for scrambling for statuses is unparalleled on the coast, there remained culturally prescribed bounds to a man's ambition, as Drucker's description attests.

The extremes to which these competitions were carried and the attitude that developed in Fort Rupert—that great expenditures were sufficient to validate any sort of a claim—are exemplified by the unique institution which those people created. This was the title of "Eagle." An Eagle was a person who had the special right to receive his gift before the highest-ranking chief was presented with his. At one time there were twelve Eagle titles at Fort Rupert. Investigation has revealed that most of these Eagles were not chiefs at all, but were men of intermediate or even common status who through industry and clever trading amassed great quantities of material wealth. Some of them, in addition, were backed by powerful chiefs who recognized them as potential tools to assist in the downfall of some high-ranking rival. It is interesting to note that the Eagles made no pretences at claiming tradition-hallowed names or crests, but assumed or tried to assume invented names that referred in some way to the privilege that they hoped to acquire—that of precedence in receiving gifts before the real nobles (1955: 138-9).

There is an apparent contradiction here. Drucker begins by stating that: "...great expenditures were sufficient to validate any sort of a claim...", but goes on to demonstrate that even among the Southern Kwakiutl, great wealth could not quite buy legitimacy: the "tradition-hallowed names or crests" remained the preserve of those with a strong genealogical claim to them, and stayed beyond the reach of the well-to-do commoners. New money, it seems, could buy a great deal, but it could not buy a background. The institution of the Eagles was a safety valve designed to permit the structure to remain fundamentally unaltered.
in the face of the commoners' intrusion into the nobles' preserve, access to resources. The more things changed, the more they remained the same.

Olson records a similar basic stability (or rigidity) among a Northern Kwakiutl people, the Owikeno.

Furthermore, there is an elaborate but obscure code regarding the ethics and rights of potlatching. Much of this in turn revolves around concepts of social status, which again rests on intangible but elaborate standards. There are definite limits to which a man may aspire, however great his ambition or his willingness and ability to potlatch. Attempts to go beyond these limits would entail a loss of "face"....The result is that a large number of titles heavy with prestige go begging for want of a candidate who is at once willing, able and worthy of assuming them (1950: 109).

Thus for the first few decades of this century, whatever variants developed in the assumption of statuses, they remained conditioned by a genealogical qualification--the claimant had to be related in some specific way to the holder of the name. The conditions became somewhat looser as more and more categories of individual became eligible. In 1935, Olson observed a certain flexibility in the transmission of titles at Kitamaat:

In some instances, if there is no nephew to inherit, the brother of a deceased chief gives a feast of naming and adoption to bestow on a son of the deceased or on his own son the title of the deceased (1940: 179).

Although these personal names and titles are the property of the clan, individuals may give them away (usually as potlatch gifts). In time, however, the name usually reverts to the original clan. Thus, a Raven chief was given the name Wikwanakulah (Bella Bella name meaning "soaring eagle") by his father, who was of the Eagle clan and who had no sister's son as his heir. At the Raven chief's death the name reverted to the Eagle clan. Usually, a name is given away to a nonclansman only when there is no
eligible or desirable person within the clan or lineage (Ibid.: 178).

In these cases, the move towards greater flexibility was brought on by the population decline, as more and more lines of succession were broken. Olson described one situation that was shaping up:

[SanaxeD] of the Eagle clan has no heirs at Kitimat, though two of his sister's sons live at Hartley Bay (Tsimshian village). He has adopted his own son into his clan as his heir. However, if his nephews return to Kitimat one of them will be recognized as his successor (Ibid.: 179).

The nephews did not claim the title, and it was taken by the son. As I will explain in greater detail in the next section, this type of situation is partially a result of the loss of control of resources by the holders of traditional statuses, and will occur more frequently now that titles have lost their substantive value. As long as names carried with them not only prestige, but access to wealth, it was worth one's while to leave the natal village to take up residence at the home of the uncle. Now that the titles do not confer wealth on their holders, nephews will tend to remain in their home villages, and the titles will either lapse or pass to more distant kin (in matrilineal terms), as in the case of SanaxeD.

The admission as heirs of sons, grandsons, or other non-matrilineal kin, with no real attempt to manipulate their status, beyond adoption into the appropriate clan before conferring a title, signifies a fundamental shift in attitude. In contrast, consider a situation that occurred in the late nineteenth century. A chief (1)(a) had no sister and no sister's son to inherit
his name. His clan council decided to confer the title normally held by the chief's sister upon a woman (2) with no family other than a young son (3). Normally, whoever held that title was the principal sister of the current chief, and the mother of the next. The chief disapproved of the course his council had set for him, and announced that instead, he intended to adopt his own daughter (4) as his 'sister' and confer on her the title proposed for the first woman. His daughter's son (5) would then become his 'sister's son' and thus his heir. Under the prevailing order of succession, however, the title would first pass to the chief's younger brother (6) and eventually to the adopted nephew. Before the transfer could take place, the younger brother died in an accident (some claimed by witchcraft), and for reasons not wholly clear, the chief then permitted the adoption of the first woman as his 'sister' and the subsequent assumption of his title by the woman's son.

This form of adoption was obviously a way of coping with the various demographic anomalies that populations in flux are subject to. It is significant, I believe, that at the time of that incident, before an individual like the daughter's son could be considered eligible for the inheritance, he had to be transformed
into someone of the right category, i.e., a sister's son. In other words, the individual's status was manipulated to conform to the order of succession. Later developments, in which the more distant relatives took titles without any such transformation, indicate that the order of succession was manipulated (loosened) to conform to the individual's status. That appears to be a qualitative shift of some magnitude. The abandonment of the strict adherence to the old order of succession and the admission of people with no attempt to create even a fictive 'correct' relationship is clearly indicative of the disintegration of the traditional system.

All of the variants discussed thus far are what Aberle has termed 'conditioned variants.'

Now, genuine variants must be, to some degree, free variants, not conditioned ones—to borrow terms from linguistics....They would tend toward being free if the individual had to weigh many items of context to make up his mind about appropriateness....We may also speak of free variants where there is no prescription....free variants [exist where] a number of choices are recognized in the culture, but rules for deciding among the choices are insufficiently specific to condition the variants. Others involve free variants because there is no rule, whereas in many other societies familiar to us the rules are highly specific (1963: 3).

The two types of variants, free and conditioned, are both in evidence in the taking of titles, but represent different stages in the dis-integration of the traditional system. Consider two different forms of the order of succession: the order lays down three different categories of heir, A, B, and C (corresponding, say, to brother, nephew, and son). If they were
conditioned variants, the order would be stated as follows:

A comes first.
If no A exists, then B.
If neither A nor B exist, then C.

That, of course, is an entirely different matter from the operation of free variants: 'either A, B, or C is eligible' depending on circumstances. As I remarked earlier, the type of alternatives discussed so far are conditioned variants, in that preferential rules remain in force (if no nephew, then a cousin, etc.). The progressive widening of eligibility appears to have arisen in response to the population decline and consequent disruption of normal lines of succession. When the direct heir did not exist or was not available, the response, it seems, was to embrace the 'next best,' an expedient that would probably not have been necessary during pre-contact times, when the population was more stable and direct heirs more numerous. This step by step relaxation of strict matrilineal principles appears to have occurred elsewhere among the northern tribes. Adams noted it among the Gitksan, for example. It is interesting that the common 'A, then B, then C' progression is expressed.

In certain cases, the children may even succeed to their father's property to the exclusion of the father's distant matrikin if there is no suitable matrisuccessor and if that part of the father's Crest which owns resources in the father's village approves...(1973: 35).

The transition from conditioned to free variants in the taking of titles involves the relaxation of rules governing strict order, and leaves more to individual judgement or idiosyncratic situations--(cf. Aberles's remark "if the individual had to weigh
many items of context to make up his mind about appropriateness\" [1963: 3]). Can the most direct heir afford the title? Is he a lout who will bring disgrace to the name? Would a more distant relative perhaps fulfill the obligations of the status more faithfully? I have heard all those considerations expressed.

An even more general form of variant was described by Garfield for the Port Simpson of the 1930's.

However, it was the man who could first distribute property who acquired the rights for himself, and the other (claimant) had no redress. This sometimes happened in spite of the wishes of the deceased man as described in the taking of Sadzan's name. Although everyone knew Sadzan's choice of a successor, when the elder man distributed property to them in his own name they accepted it and recognized his claim (1939: 218).

Alacrity counted for more than mere bloodline in that instance, although the variant remained a conditioned one, requiring some form of relationship to the predecessor. Nevertheless, by admitting a more amorphous category (they who potlatch first) than the previous more rigid requirement (someone of particular relationship to the previous name holder) it loosened or 'freed' the procedure somewhat.

Truly free variants in the taking of names (either A, B, or C, with no fixed preference), in which the brother, nephew, son, or grandson are considered more or less equally eligible, is not yet generally accepted at Kitamaat, although the requirement for the inheritance of a name described by some informants certainly approaches it. They claim that anyone who 'did something' for the previous holder can conceivably claim his title, regardless of their relationship, or lack of one. I know of no example of
such an assumption, however, beyond the already mentioned gift of a title to Fred Woods from his mother in law, 'in payment for what he did for me, a crippled woman. Now I give him the biggest name I've got.'

To claim that a particular action is not generally accepted, however, begs the question somewhat, for what constitutes 'general acceptance?' Aberle (1963: 2) describes variants as 'culturally permissible alternatives,' which is a rather tricky concept to deal with. Does 'culturally permissible' denote 'behaviour enjoying general sanction,' or 'behaviour that the actor can get away with?' The latter will vary with the individual involved, with his fortitude and ability to weather disapproval, or his independence from possible social and economic reprisal. Individual variation certainly plays a part--what one man may think worth a try another will consider utterly out of the question. Thus the bold and unorthodox innovation tried by the claimant to the title of ______--to stand at another's potlatch and claim a title for himself--has not been emulated by a number of other impecunious claimants who have yet to try to claim the names for which they are eligible. It is not that they do not want the titles; they are simply unwilling to try for them without staging potlatches. One such, for example, wants the name, but "never put any money by for it. Now (he) just keeps to himself." Similarly, the example given previously of the individual who decided to forego a title because, as he said, "...I have no property, so if I bear that hereditary chief of my family, Hemasaka, I cannot respond with the people that have the same category as I have,
which I'm supposed to pay a lot of attention to," contrasts sharply with the attitudes of those who take titles but do not maintain them.

Thus it may well develop that what one class of individuals will consider as an acceptable alternative some other class will not. This leads to the question, how general must an action become before it can be considered a genuine alternative? Does one man's taking his father's title without a potlatch establish a variant? To ask informants about the principles that they perceive is to get a series of contradictory replies, depending on whether they are traditionally minded, or more liberal towards innovations. One informant will describe an action as an alternative that anyone may follow; another will confide that, while certain shameless people do such and such, "the people" do not really accept it. One chief, I was told, adopted a child as his son, and conferred a high ranking name on him. It was no good, one informant explained, for the people do not accept that man as "coming from a chief's family." I asked whether the individual in question was called in the potlatches by the name that his father had conferred on him, and was told that he was. When I attempted to resolve the contradiction, the informant responded with a shrug, so there the matter rested. One suspects that "the people" in that case are the relatively small circle of like-minded individuals with whom he associates.

Thus, there is not 'a' set of variants to which the Kitamaat subscribe, but a series of sets, each adhered to by a particular group. It appears to me inescapable that the process of establish-
ing variants will produce friction in the community, especially in an aspect of culture as deeply embedded in the value structure of some people as the traditional status system. Any innovation or deviation (much the same thing, in traditionalists' eyes), will spawn, if not outright opposition, at least grumbling and ill feeling, that tends to promote the establishment of divisions in the community.

There appear to be three rough divisions at Kitamaat: traditionalists, who value the old ways, and claim to order their lives, as far as is practicable, according to their precepts; modernists, who inveigh against the traditional system, refuse to engage in it, and who often campaign for its abandonment as a relic of a time best forgotten; and a large middle group of 'neutrals,' holding a range of opinions, from passive support to indifference. Many neutrals co-operate with the traditionalists to the extent of contributing to, attending, and even staging potlatches, usually at the prompting of the traditionalists. Others, while they bear no particular animus towards the system, seem to pay it little attention, and seldom participate if they can conveniently avoid it.

My attempts to associate membership in these categories with other attributes, such as age, actual or potential rank in the traditional system, occupation, financial standing, education, and the like, did not lead far.

As one might expect, the large majority of strict traditionalists are elderly persons; on the other hand, a few older people quite openly disparage the system, and make no special effort to
keep names or traditions alive.

While the majority of the young adults with whom I came into contact knew little of, or were indifferent to, details of the traditional system, one occasionally will go to considerable trouble to take a name. One youth of about 20 recently applied his entire earnings from the fishing season to a potlatch, for example. Actual hostility towards the old ways is virtually absent among the young, not surprisingly, for they have not been torn between the two systems as have their parents. Some of the more bitter conflicts over taking or not taking names seem to have taken place about twenty or thirty years ago; hence the more outspoken modernists are among the middle aged, although there are too many exceptions to attempt a generalization.

Traditionalists do tend to cluster in families. The young persons who go to the trouble of taking names appear to be more conversant with many traditional elements than the others--their knowledge of Haisla seems to be superior, for example. Although traditionalists may come from traditionalist families, the converse is not necessarily true--not all who come from traditionalist families turn out to be traditionalists. There are several instances of siblings taking quite different stands towards the matter. One individual who belonged to a high ranking, traditionalist family attempted to persuade the band council to prohibit potlatching (during the 1950's), and later refused to take the chief's name to which he was entitled. His brother then assumed the title.

The degree of flexibility shown in the adherence to tradi-
tional forms is an indicator of the essential irrelevance of the traditional system to the economic and political life of the village. That the number of variants seems to be growing points towards continued dis-integration of the matrilineal system. This dis-integration can continue largely unchecked because the economic and political attributes of the titles have been removed, leaving the statuses shorn of the properties that once gave them other than honorific value. Nearly forty years ago, Garfield noted the same process at Port Simpson.

Natives' names do not carry with them the prestige and privileges they once did, since house and lineage heads no longer have political, social, and economic power over their kin. The importance of lineage possessions, both tangible...and...intangible...has waned. Therefore the urge to preserve the continuity of the lineage has gradually weakened (1939: 229).

The details of the separation of property from titles is the subject of the next section.
Traditionally among the most property-conscious of peoples, the Northwest Coast groups extended concepts of ownership to embrace virtually all aspects of life. Their property may be divided into two types, tangible and intangible. Tangible property included houses, canoes, tools and implements, and ceremonial regalia. Intangible included prerogatives such as rights to social precedence, songs, dances, and stories, and control over resource sites, such as fishing grounds, hunting territories, berry patches, and the like.

Ownership was vested variously in individual, lineage, clan, or village. Those items under individual control normally passed to heirs through matrilineal channels. Control of property under lineage or clan ownership passed to the successors to chief's titles. Thus the matrilineal system provided the avenues for the transmission of all types of property.

The isolation of the matrilineal principle and the partial substitution of the bilateral system lead to the question of the transfer of property—to what extent have the Haisla maintained or attempted to maintain traditional patterns of property ownership and transmission?

As far as personal property is concerned, the Kitamaat have separated the honorific and the substantive aspects such that an individual who inherits a status does not normally inherit the tangible property as well. Thus we find names, songs, and ceremonial prerogatives being transmitted primarily along matrilineal
lines (with the qualifications noted in the preceding section), while houses, canoes, rifles, and the like commonly go to a man's children.

This shift towards children's inheritance of economically significant property seems typical of matrilineal societies caught in the throes of acculturation to Western industrial society. As Gough showed in her comparative study:

Among the Tonga...with the growth of new forms of production and of wealth, there is a tendency for matrilineal groups to break down, especially for purposes of inheritance....Many who are most deeply involved in the new economic processes desire a further change to elementary familial inheritance (1961: 632).

[Fortes] notes specifically that [among the Ashanti], "modern opportunities for accumulating private means and holding fixed property such as cocoa farms and buildings, work in favor of the ties between parents and children"....About one out of four cocoa farms, in fact seems to have passed from father to children (Ibid.: 634).

Eggan notes that, [among the Hopi of Oraibi], a man's personally acquired property, especially sheep, is divided between his children, particularly his sons. Forde noted in 1931 that some men were passing on land of their own to either their sons or daughters...(Ibid.: 636).

[Among the Minangkabau] the father now often pays his children's school fees, may act as their legal guardian, and makes large bequests to his sons, sometimes to the extent of his whole personal property (Ibid.: 639).

The process appears to take place in a number of stages, beginning with the realignment of residential units into elementary family households and the shifting of control of means of production into individual hands. Next comes intra-household economic co-operation, notably between a man and his sons, and
finally, transmission of property to those sons.

The change in housing patterns came quite soon after the arrival of the missionary at Kitamaat, in 1895. Over the next decade, smaller frame dwellings replaced the traditional lineage-owned long house, and the traditional residential units were broken up as converts moved to the mission village. Garfield noted the trend towards father-and-son co-operation and inheritance of such houses at Port Simpson, like Kitamaat a north coast village missionized by the Methodists.

In the early building of frame family dwellings the custom of mutual aid of lineage members continued to a certain extent. Especially was this true of the younger men who assisted the elder ones in the expectation of inheriting the dwelling they assisted in building. Other men were independent and insisted on financing and building their homes as single family dwellings with the right to will their property to their own children. Sons gradually replaced nephews in assisting the older men, since they would be heirs of their fathers and not of their uncles (1939: 280).

Garfield notes that traditionally:

According to a well-known principle of property ownership a son had no rights to anything belonging to his father, however it may have been acquired (Ibid.: 264).

I know of no instance in the modern village of Kitamaat in which matrilineal heirs have received a house. I have heard of instances in which nephews helped in the construction of houses, but as far as I could determine, this was done in the course of mutual aid within the family, and the nephews did not consider that their help conferred any special rights of inheritance. The pattern of co-operation in house construction diverged from traditional channels quite early, for the erection of a frame dwelling
called for novel skills that not everyone had acquired. One sought out a carpenter for aid, rather than just a kinsman. The project then became more of a commercial transaction than an exercise in social relations.

The disposition of other economic benefits that went with titles—access to or control over resource sites—is considerably less clear cut than the shift in the transmission of tangible property. To begin, there is the difficulty in determining just what was the Haisla attitude towards exclusive access to those sites. This difficulty has been discussed in chapter 3, pp.

Whatever the details of Haisla perceptions of ownership of resource sites, it seems clear that they shared the general coastal attitude that such sites were to be considered the property of some social units, be they individual, house, clan, or the like. I suspected initially that those who controlled fishing sites or berry grounds would have attempted to extend their priority to resources that became important following contact, and, for example, would have laid claim to logging rights in their domains. I therefore examined the pattern of logging and trapping claims to see whether they corresponded in any way to traditional ownership patterns, and if so, how rights to them were transmitted. I hoped to apply the concept of increase and reduction of variants to any shifts in the patterns and modes of transmission of these rights.

The government enforced a sort of exclusivity by licensing the right to exploit certain areas for particular resources. The locations of logging claims, traplines, and drag seines are spe-
cified in the licences obtained from various agencies, making it possible to follow the activities of the holders of permits over several years, and occasionally, over generations.

Traplines, for example, are registered to an individual without term, and can be willed or transferred to whomever the holder chooses. Evidence suggests that they were originally apportioned along traditional lines. In a letter to the Fish and Game Branch, three Haisla and one Kitkiata complained that: "________ should never have been registered on this creek, as he does not belong there" (Trapline File 1936: n.p.). The following year, a man wrote on behalf of his son that "Mr. William Henry gave my son this trapline as his grandfather owns this place" (Ibid. 1937: n.p.).

Evidently, then, title (in native terms) did confer a prior claim in the matter of at least one post-contact resource, fur-bearing animals.

As Table XXIII, p. 250 shows, however, by the 1930's, title had begun to pass along bilateral lines. Of 22 transfers between 1934 and 1972, 8 lines went to children (7 sons, 1 daughter), 4

1. The present trapline boundaries are of recent creation. When they were first drawn up, the Indians submitted a drawing of the location of the line to government officials. The drawing showed just that—a line, following the path the trapper took from trap to trap. That would not do, for the government demanded clear cut boundaries between the holdings. So the natives and Fish and Game personnel together drew up blocks, which satisfied Victoria and accounts for the pattern of traplines today. Even though the configurations are new, the locations remained constant, which was all that mattered for my purposes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Philip Williams</td>
<td>Guy &amp; Charlie Williams</td>
<td>sons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Matthew Wilson</td>
<td>Charlie Wilson</td>
<td>son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>William Henry</td>
<td>Roderick Bolton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>James Henry</td>
<td>William Henry</td>
<td>son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Frederick Grant</td>
<td>Donald Grant</td>
<td>son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Herbert McMillan</td>
<td>Mary Shaw McMillan</td>
<td>wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>John Livingstone</td>
<td>Joe Paul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Albert Starr</td>
<td>Allan Starr</td>
<td>son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Allan Starr</td>
<td>Timothy Starr</td>
<td>brother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Timothy Starr</td>
<td>Gordon Robinson</td>
<td>wibroso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>G.E. Moore (white)</td>
<td>Chris Walker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Mary Shaw McMillan</td>
<td>Norman Stewart</td>
<td>husiso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Joseph Gray</td>
<td>Alex Gray</td>
<td>brother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>John Paul</td>
<td>Walter Williams</td>
<td>daso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Dick Williams</td>
<td>Stewart Woods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>G. &amp; C. Williams</td>
<td>Fred &amp; Moses Williams</td>
<td>brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>John Bolton</td>
<td>Albert Walker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Thomas N. Amos</td>
<td>Heber Amos</td>
<td>son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Walter Williams</td>
<td>Crosby Smith</td>
<td>mosiso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Joe Paul</td>
<td>James Robertson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Timothy Starr</td>
<td>Kay &amp; Robin Grant</td>
<td>da &amp; daso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>John Wilson</td>
<td>Geddes Wilson</td>
<td>son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>William P. Nelson</td>
<td>Joe Nelson</td>
<td>brother</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fish and Game Branch
Trapline Files, Terrace
to brothers, 1 to daughter's son, 1 to sister's sons, and 1 to a mother's sister's son. One widow took her husband's trapline, but later transferred it to his sister's son. I believe that she merely held it in trust for him.

The question remains, which of these transfers could be considered to have been determined from matrilineal principles? Those made from men to their children or their children's children do not fit that category, for they involve the transfer of property between individuals of different clans. The remainder, those made to brothers, sister's sons, and matrilateral parallel cousins could conceivably have made along matrilineal lines.

When we examine transfers over two or three generations, however, we find a mixture of types of transfer, as the diagrams on page 252 show. Of the four transfers to brothers, two were preceded by transfers from father to son (numbers 1 and 4, page 252). The transfer between parallel cousins followed a transfer from the mother's father (number 5).

The only transfer made clearly along matrilineal lines, that from mother's brother to sister's son, albeit via the former's widow (number 2), did not take place in the traditional context of a potlatch. The transfer took place informally (in native terms), several years before the assumption of the uncle's name was even contemplated.

I believe that it is safe to say that by the 1930's at least, the transfer of traplines had ceased to be associated with potlatches, and that their transmission along bilateral lines was an accepted variant.
Table XXIV

Sequential Transfers of Traplines

1. Philip Williams → Guy & Charlie Williams → Fred & Moses Williams (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
2. Herbert McMillan → Mary Shaw McMillan → Norman Stewart (1) (2) (3)
3. John Livingstone → Joe Paul → James Robertson (1) (2) (3)
4. Albert Starr → Allan Starr → Timothy Starr → Kay & Robin Grant (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)
5. John Paul → Walter Williams → Crosby Smith (1) (2) (3)

1)  
2)  
3)  
4)  
5)  

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  

2  
3  
4  
5  

The question then is, did the ownership and exclusivity concepts that initially were applied to traplines extend to the use of other resources? Were fishing and logging similarly affected?

Intra-tribal concepts of property do not seem to have applied among Haisla commercial fishermen, because most of their fishing is carried out away from shore, where claims of exclusivity are not easily asserted. Drag seining is the only commercial fishing venture that takes place away from the shore, and some sort of territoriality does appear to have operated, although I found only one passing reference to it. Fieldworkers for the 1954 Hawthorn study recorded that:

To drag seine you need a net, ca. 34 ft. boat and skiff; and crew of 4 men. You fish in a bay or at the mouth of a river. To do this you usually have to "own" the river (informant's grandfather has a trapline on the river they fish in front of) (Hawthorn Report Notes 1953: n.p.)

Unfortunately, the informant for that information no longer lives in the village, and my informants, even those who were commercial fishermen at that time, disclaimed any knowledge of that sort of territoriality. In any event, drag seining never counted for much among the Haisla, almost all of whom fished from gill netters or seiners, so territorial restrictions would have had little impact.

Some inter-tribal feeling does seem to have existed, especially among those who, like the Owikeno, saw their territories flooded with hundreds of 'foreign' fishermen each summer. Informants told me that as late as the 1920's, they were occasionally confronted by hostile Rivers Inlet natives and told to go back
where they came from. Fisheries reports note that feelings ran highest on the Skeena, where native fishermen often took to the grounds with rifles, and deliberately fouled each others' nets, in disputes over precedence. Apparently, those villages that were relocated following missionization suffered the most difficulty, for non-converts took the moves as a sign that the converts had abandoned their territories, and moved into what they considered a vacuum. When the converts attempted to exploit their old grounds, they were met with the argument that they had 'thrown them away' when they shifted villages. Exasperated Fisheries Officers attributed other inter-village territorial disputes to the "deplorable ecclesiastical animosity" fostered by inter-church rivalry. By and large, the Haisla escaped such difficulties, for their territory did not become a major fishing ground on the order of the Skeena or Rivers Inlet, and conversion did not involve relocation.

I believe that the Haislas' foregoing of exclusivity over fishing sites proceeded from two factors. First, the decline in population enabled the people to meet their subsistence needs from fewer streams than before. Second, the Fisheries Department's prohibition of the use of traps, weirs, and in-river commercial fishing deprived traditional locations of their economic value. In neither case was control of sites as crucial to the survival or prosperity of individual or clan as before those changes took place.

It appears that the Kitamaat may have abandoned traditional control over fishing sites somewhat earlier than neighbouring peoples. Garfield notes that at Port Simpson:
There are still some fishing sites and hunting and trapping territories that are used and bring their possessors money. These are jealously guarded and there have been family feuds in recent years over the taking of names which included the privilege of control or exclusive use of such sites (1939: 194).

Garfield does not specify what type of fishing was carried out, however. It may have been drag seining, in which case the native attitude made economic sense. In Haisla territory, most of the drag seine licences, conferring exclusive rights to fish at a particular location, were originally issued to a white-owned company.

Because commercial fishing commonly took the Haisla hundreds of miles from home, questions of aboriginal control of sites becomes less pertinent than for logging, which took place near to or within traditional territories. Moreover, a timber stand is precisely the kind of resource that lends itself to clear, unequivocal, transmissible control. I therefore thought it not unlikely that aboriginal concepts of control would have extended to forest tracts.

Using handloggers' licence ledgers and counterfoil books, I was able to plot the precise locations of about half of the 305 handloggers' claims taken out by the Haisla between 1910 and 1927. The remainder had descriptions such as 'Douglas Channel' or 'Devastation Channel,' far too vague to be of any use. The locations of some are plotted on the maps, figures 16 and 17, pages 256 and 257.

I found only two Haislas who logged predominantly in the areas of their traplines. The claims of the other loggers were
Figure 16

Haisla Handlogging Locations, 1913-1916

Source: Handloggers' Licence Counterfoil Books
Figure 17
Haisla Handlogging Locations, 1917-1919

Source: Handloggers' Licence Counterfoil Books
scattered throughout the whole of Haisla territory and beyond. Aboriginal ownership appears to have counted for much less than economic expediency in that case, for it was to the loggers' advantage to work as close to the mill as possible in order to minimize towing charges which, it will be remembered, were a not inconsiderable part of their expenses.

As I mentioned in the logging section, the Haisla sold to three main mills: the Georgetown mill up to 1917, the Swanson Bay pulpmill from 1917 to 1924, and thereafter to Pacific Mills at Ocean Falls. The pattern of logging claims reflects these shifts. As figures 16 and 17 show, the first two mills seem to have had a gravitational effect on the location of logging claims, as the loggers moved their operations towards the prevailing market. Thus the first map shows a number of claims spilling out of Haisla territory towards the west and northwest, in the direction of Georgetown. With the opening of the Swanson Bay mill, the claims tended to gravitate to the south. After Swanson Bay closed down and Pacific Mills at Ocean Falls became the major market, however, the latter's different purchasing arrangements seem to have promoted a dispersion of operations. Pacific Mills paid all towing charges, removing them as a consideration in the location of a claim.

Of special interest in this process is the fact that Haisla loggers established claims in the territories first of Hartley Bay (Kitkiata) then of Klemtu (Kitasoo). As fig. 16 shows, during the 1913-1916 period, 10 claims were taken out by Haislas in Hartley Bay territory, some within two miles of the village itself.
Between 1917 and 1919, 15 claims were located in Klemtu territory, several by the same men who had logged near Hartley Bay shortly before (figure 17, q.v.).

I heard of no accounts of confrontations, friction, or attempts by Hartley Bay or Klemtu natives to assert their prior claims to the timber stands.
Chapter 11

Interrelationships Between Economic and Non-Economic Factors in Cultural Change

Thus far, we have considered five topics: the basis of chieftainship and ranking in traditional Haisla society; the Haislas' entry into and participation in the industrial economy of the coast; their missionization by an ultra-evangelical form of Christianity; drastic depopulation; and the breakdown of the traditional matrilineal system and its partial replacement by a quasi-western, bilateral, nuclear-family based system. It remains to consider the relationships among them.

The initial blow to chieftainship and ranking resulted from the epidemics that afflicted most coastal peoples following the arrival of the whites. I have speculated that the basis of the chief's superior status was a resource base that was more regular in the aggregate than in its constituent units. Pooling and redistribution permitted the establishment of a population size consistent with the average minimum productivity of the region rather than with the productivity of the more variable local resource bases. The resulting pressure on the regional base generated a regular call for some form of redistribution and thus sustained the central position and superior status of the redistributor-chiefs.

During the nineteenth century, however, the Haisla may have lost up to four-fifths of their people. This reduction in numbers was not accompanied by any diminution in the resource base, which, in the absence of intensive commercial fishing of the predominant
local species of salmon, remained stable. The remnants of the population that survived the ravages of that period could hardly have exerted pressure on the resource base sufficient to have required the intervention of a redistributor. Thus the constant reinforcement of the chiefs' prestige through redistribution, the critical economic function that sustained their claim to prominence, was eliminated.

If the population decline removed the positive pressure for the maintenance of the chiefs' status, the Haislas' entry into the Industrial economy actively undermined it, by establishing a system of resource exploitation that was quite independent of the traditional political system and the services of the central figures. In the Industrial economy, the resources themselves were defined as such by whites, permission to exploit them (in the form of licences) was conferred by whites, and the means to do so, the equipment, was obtained from whites. Thus, the means of production were placed in the hands of individuals who obtained their remuneration as a result of personal attributes -- knowledge, skill, stamina, or luck -- rather than genealogical position or the influence or intervention of the chiefs.

When access to resources became governed not by chiefly sanction, as formerly, but by Government fiat, the loss of sovereignty deprived the chiefs of one of the main attributes of economic

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1. It is possible, in fact, that the salmon populations could have increased following the reduction of native exploitation that followed the population decline. Hewes (1973: 148) described the period between the drop in native exploitation and the onset of commercial fishing as a "resting period" during which salmon stocks may have increased considerably.
power, the ability to control the access of others to resources. Furthermore, they found even their own access limited by the same legal, market, and technological constraints as their tribesmen.

This enforced equality of access placed the chiefs in the same economic jeopardy as any commoner, for with the irregularity endemic to the coastal industries, it was as likely that a chief would suffer a poor year as that a commoner would enjoy a good one. In such a situation, the maintenance of economic differentials was impossible. Consider the sources of irregularity or unpredictability that faced natives attempting to engage in the industrial economy: access to equipment was made difficult by the development of technology; jobs working for white operators could evaporate as the unstable economy drove many concerns out of business; licence restrictions made it difficult for many natives to gain access to the resources themselves; once access was gained, the variability in the occurrence of the resources—fluctuations in fish runs, unforeseen stump or crown rot in trees, population cycles in fur-bearing animals—made returns highly unpredictable. Even with a stock of resources for sale, native producers could be left with unsaleable or grossly undervalued products by world or local price and market fluctuations. The chiefs were as susceptible as anyone else to these disabilities, with the result that the economic advantage over their tribesmen that they had enjoyed in the traditional system disappeared entirely.

This irregularity was accompanied by a decline in the size of the productive unit. Gill netting and handlogging can be
carried out by solitary producers. Seining and power logging do use larger crews (4-7 and 4-5 men, respectively), but they came into operation thirty to forty years after the Haisla began to engage actively in the industrial economy, by which time the principal relations of production were set, and in any event, did not last for very long as a major alternative form of organization before the decline in fishing and logging noted earlier saw them much reduced. Their main effect was to keep the overall economic organization of the village somewhat unsettled, as a form of economic power was conferred on the captains of boats or owners of equipment, who could control the access of a small number of their fellows to jobs. This power, however, did not devolve to chiefs or to the holder of any particular status in the traditional system, but went to individuals for a number of reasons having nothing to do with social position. Captaincy of a seiner, or option to purchase, could be offered to a fisherman after a number of seasons in which his superior knowledge of the grounds, or diligence, or luck brought him big catches, for example.

Thus, not only were the chiefs shunted aside economically, it became extremely difficult for any class of individuals permanently to take their place and become 'chiefs' in their stead, for the technological and organizational innovations that were introduced on the coast sequentially conferred superior access to resources or the ability to control the access of others on all manner of persons. It became difficult indeed for the culture to 'settle down' under such conditions.
...Changes in technology are exogenous; they are external to the culture and cannot be explained by the culture....The system moves in spurts; each change in technology sets in motion a series of changes in the culture until the new culture is again consistent with the new technology....Moreover in the absence of new pushes, the systems eventually settle down to stationary states; the systems are dampened in other words. In fact, all real societies are subject to a sufficient number of exogenous pushes, from diffusion for example, that they rarely reach stationary states (Berliner 1962, in Frankenberg 1967: 82).

The innovations that initiated the 'spurts' have been discussed: handlogging equipment, the donkey engine, motor boats, seines, power drums for gill netters, power hauling equipment for seiners, electronic fish finding apparatus, the aluminum smelter, and so on. Thus we find not only marked variability in success from person to person and from year to year within the same occupation, but fairly long-term shifts in advantage resulting from the adoption of some innovation by a few individuals, an advantage that may last until some new development shifts the advantage elsewhere.

The contrast with traditional Northwest Coast society is marked. There, the connections between social, political, and economic prominence were clear, unequivocal, and explicit. The possession of a title conferred economic advantage by virtue of the property and prerogatives associated with the accompanying status, which in turn could be used to consolidate the political and social value of the status through supervision of the exploitation of the resource sites controlled by the title holder, and by redistribution of the proceeds.

The independent access to resources and remuneration provided
by the industrial economy thus removed the economic foundation of the chiefs' superior status.

The place of the missionary and the church in Haisla cultural change is rather difficult to delineate precisely, for a somewhat paradoxical reason: on the surface, the changes are so clear. The changes in native culture that the missionaries sought to effect were explicitly phrased--they campaigned for: abandonment of the potlatch; repudiation of ranks, clans, exogamy, and the like; destruction of ceremonial regalia; removal of converts to a separate village; adoption of elementary family residential units; isolation of children in a residential school; and suppression of the use of the native language among the children.

Thus, when we find the diminution of the potlatch, the withering of native social forms, establishment of a separate village, and the adoption of small frame houses and so on, it is tempting to ascribe the changes to missionary influence. Whether the missionaries were indeed the primary agents of these changes is, however, problematic.

The adoption of small frame houses is a good example of this 'causal ambiguity.' Raley had long campaigned for the adoption of the small elementary family household, and it was at his urging that the long houses were not only abandoned, but pulled down (Raley 1907: 31-5). Just what prompted the natives to accede to missionary pressure is not clear, however. Although it is true that tribes that accepted missionaries adopted the frame houses fairly rapidly, those that resisted conversion eventually built them of their own accord. The Indian Agent for the Southern
Kwakiutl reported in 1909 that:

The prevailing style of house is a huge shack built with split cedar boards covering a framework of great cedar logs...

...Recently they have built smaller frame houses to sleep in, which are badly ventilated, but the rest of the living is in the big houses. These houses are wanted by them for the gatherings which they hold on every possible occasion (IAR 1909: 246).

After a number of unsuccessful attempts to convert various groups of Southern Kwakiutl, missionaries finally gave up, declaring them to be 'incorrigible.' The adoption, however tentative, of frame houses among a people notoriously unreceptive to the missionaries' blandishments leads one to suspect some underlying reason for the natives' receptivity to a new form of dwelling (and, by implication, a new pattern of residence). The Northwest Coast people were not the most tractable of converts, and it is unlikely that any amount of persuasion or hectoring would have induced them to forego their traditional form of dwelling unless they were quite ready to do so.

When it suited them they retained other aspects of their culture in spite of missionaries' pleas. For example, Raley complained in his journal that:

The natives have made great strides in civilization in the last 10 years, but there are simple laws of heredity...which have not yet entered their heads (1903: 21-2).

Clearly, the Haisla were resisting the imposition of a European kinship model a decade after conversion.

It seems evident that missionization was a process of selective adoption of European-like cultural forms by the natives.
What they did not want, they rejected (or ignored), and what they chose to retain of their own culture, they held in spite of the missionaries' pleas. One is reminded here of Murdock's dictum that:

Traits of social structure appear to be borrowed, in general, only under conditions in which the same traits would be independently elaborated even in the absence of culture contacts (1949: 196).

In the same manner, I believe, European traits were unlikely to have been borrowed in the absence of circumstances that somehow made the appropriate to prevailing circumstances, notably those proceeding from their participation in the industrial economy. To a considerable extent, then, missionization and industrialization were complementary processes on the coast. Gough noted a somewhat similar process among the Nayar.

Spoehr also finds evidence, however, of the direct transmission of a European kinship morality by white settlers, missionaries and government agents....

Such a situation is to be expected in the history of a minority group which has been gradually engulfed by the "contact" group of permanent settlers. A very different situation is evident for the Nayars, among whom European government agents, missionaries and settlers were always a small minority with little prestige beyond that commanded by their superior technology (Gough 1952: 85).

Kinship change among the Nayars is not explicable in terms of the concepts of "culture-contact" or "cultural borrowing," but rather in terms of growth in the social structure as a whole, stimulated by external economic factors. Changes in the Nayar kinship system, correlated with changes in local organization, appear to have taken place in response to changes in the technology and economic organization of the society as a whole. They can therefore only indirectly be attributed to European contact....It appears that the stage of disintegration of the traditional lineage system and the development of the modern bilateral system depends on the degree of absorption of the inhabitants into the modern economy of cash crops, cash wages and urban occupations, and on the consequent degree of social and spatial mobility (Ibid.: 86).
The situation presented by a coastal people like the Haisla is a fascinating mix of the two types of condition, for, while it is true that the Haisla accepted a missionary, and on the surface acceded to his pressure to adopt nuclear family dwellings, marry within the church, abandon arranged marriages, and so on, they were not "engulfed by the 'contact' group of permanent settlers," and took the presence of the missionary much upon sufferance. The Haislas' isolation seems to parallel that of the Nayar, among whom "European government agents, missionaries and settlers were always a small minority...." It was not until the 1950's that the white population of the region outnumbered the Haisla. Until that time, the permanent white population remained at less than two dozen, while the native population never fell below about 400. Moreover, after Raley departed for Port Essington, the presence of a missionary at Kitamaat was rather intermittent. The visits of the Indian Agent were also infrequent, not at all like the unremitting presence of Law and Government that some of the southern groups were subjected to.

Thus, while the natives were indeed brought under considerable pressure to adopt white cultural forms, it was not altogether irresistible in an isolated village like Kitamaat, if only because the pressure emanated from agencies whose impact was weakened by their distance.

The natives' receptivity to at least part of the missionaries' offerings must, therefore, be attributable to factors other than their being 'engulfed' by the contact group. It is here that the 'convergence of interests' that I spoke of in the missionary
chapter becomes relevant. It is not coincidental that the cultural forms being proposed by the missionaries were based on the European system, while the economic system to which the natives were adapting was also based on the European model. The individually-owned or controlled licences, individually-acquired equipment, and other aspects of the industrial economy were quite compatible with the nuclear family-based bilateral system that the missionaries were urging the natives to adopt. To ascribe the native abandonment of long houses, exogamy, ranks, or whatever either as examples of missionary influence or adaptation to prevailing economic circumstances may well overlook the congruence of interests of the two forces. It is not unlikely that many natives who converted to Christianity and abandoned some of the old ways for the new were already being pushed in that direction by the nature of their involvement in the industrial economy.

If that was the case, then the most crucial part played by the missionary was the establishment of the separate mission village, which affected both the velocity and direction of the cultural change. The most significant aspect of the missionaries' presence was not their exhortations, but the physical and emotional sanctuary that the separate village provided for the innovators or dissidents.

New forms of behaviour were liable to be viewed by traditionalists as anything from peculiar to subversive; innovators might simply be shunned, or go in danger of their lives. The first few occasions that someone decided to will his property to
his own son rather than to his sister's son may well have resulted in an outraged nephew, an unco-operative kin group, and scandalized neighbours. Therefore, to engage in forms of behaviour that flew in the face of propriety, morality, or the interests of powerful conservative forces in the community required both considerable fortitude and some immunity from reprisal. The latter was provided by the mission village. It is one thing to contemplate marriage to a fellow clan member from the relative security of the mission; it is entirely another to attempt this 'gross and culpable offense' within range of the wrath of the traditionalists. That is not to say that innovations or adaptations to the industrial economy would not have taken place in the absence of the missionary, but rather that the presence of the village must have accelerated the process considerably. Not only would innovators be free to practice their new forms of behaviour in the village, but there they would encounter numbers of like minded individuals, who would reciprocate. Thus, what would be an aberration in the traditional village could quickly become a norm in the mission.
Conclusions

To recapitulate: in this thesis, I have examined the basis of ranking and chieftainship in aboriginal Haisla society, and the factors attendant upon contact that undermined them, i.e., the natives' entry into the industrial economy of the coast, missionization, and severe population decline.

The basis of chieftainship in Haisla society was, I believe, relative consistency of demand (that grew out of a stable population); and consistent, long-term patterns of ownership or control of resources, such that the economic fortunes and ultimately the social standing, of any particular group became consistent with the productivity of the component of the resource base under its control.

This consistency enabled favoured groups--those with more abundant or less variable resources--to engage in prestige-enhancing redistribution to elements suffering shortages more frequently than less favoured groups, and thus accruing an imbalance of prestige.

Events following contact undermined that basis in a number of ways. Severe depopulation reduced the natives' demand, and thus the pressure, on the resource base, enabling local groups to subsist on the proceeds of a few streams without recourse to regular redistribution. Thus was the chiefs' critical function eliminated, and with it the regular reinforcement of their superior status. That is not to say that their position was
immediately and directly jeopardized; rather, one of the underpinnings was removed, leaving the institution of ranking and chieftainship vulnerable to further assaults.

The shifting pattern of resource exploitation further weakened the chiefs' economic supremacy by placing the primary emphasis upon the individual rather than upon the kin group under the aegis of the chief. Under the new system, the individual owed both his access to the resources and his remuneration to factors other than his place in the aboriginal social network and the favour of his chief. In fact, the chief had lost his place at the apex of the economic system, and had become instead just another supplier of fish, furs, or logs to the whites, and was subject to the same forces as his humblest kinsman.

The natives' participation in the industrial economy was a function of a variety of environmental, historical, and technological factors, which dictated the character and extent of their engagement, and their potential prosperity. The particular features that the Haisla were subject to tended to work in their favour, during the first few decades of the development of the economy, at least. Paradoxically, the relative absence of sought-after resources within their territory was a benefit, for it enabled them to engage in the economy relatively free from overwhelming competition from whites.

In the commercial fishery, the virtual absence of sockeye, the major commercial salmon species, delayed the intrusion of canneries and fishermen to the Haisla region for nearly four decades after the inception of commercial fishing on the coast.
During that time, the Haisla were able to travel to Rivers Inlet or the Skeena to engage in commercial fishing, then return in late August to fish their home rivers for their favourite subsistence species, which, because they ran later in the year, were accessible at a different time than the commercial types. Similarly, oolichan, a source both as a staple food stuff and a major item of inter-tribal trade, runs during the early spring, and thus did not interfere with commercial salmon fishing.

Just as the rivers of the region lack the major commercial salmon species, the area's forests are singularly deficient in stands of Douglas Fir, the principal timber species. This absence was both a boon and a drawback. While it considerably reduced the value of the local timber stands, it also prevented the area from becoming a major target of loggers, stakers, speculators, and bankers to nearly the same degree as areas in the Douglas Fir belt to the south. Although the Haisla faced severe competition from whites, they were not handicapped to the same degree as some southern tribes.

The terrain of the area facilitated the operations of small, independent loggers like the Haisla. The steep hillsides made a great deal of the timber accessible to operators with primitive equipment (sometimes just an axe and saw), who could slide logs to tidewater with little difficulty or expense, again in contrast to some groups to the south who, while their territories were richer in high-grade timber, could not easily exploit much of it, because the ground was too flat to remove the logs without some form of hauling mechanism (such as an ox team or steam donkey)
that was expensive to acquire and maintain.

Although logging was not as seasonal as fishing, there were periods during which it was difficult to work in the woods, usually during mid-winter, when deep snow hampered operations. During this period, displaced loggers could take up trapping, for the furs of animals are naturally at their best during the coldest weather.

These conditions promoted the development of an intricate system of occupational multiplicity, in which almost all of the men of the village engaged sequentially in logging, commercial fishing, trapping, and subsistence fishing (or any combination of these), while the women continued to gather berries, clams, and the like, process salmon and oolichan, and then worked in the canneries as fish washers and can fillers during the salmon season.

This system worked quite well during the early period of the industrial economy, when equipment was simple and relatively easy to obtain and operate, and before competition from whites with expensive equipment and influence in the government became too heavy.

Because, in their early stages, the industries were beset with problems of irregularity of supply, price, and markets, operators could never predict the profitability of any occupation from year to year. Participation in several occupations, but commitment to none, was thus a sound strategy, and shielded the natives from the worst of the vagaries of the primitive industrial economy.
The Indians' ability to maintain their generalized adaptation was undermined by the development of the industrial economy, however. The increase in complexity (and price) of the equipment put it beyond the reach of most natives, who either continued to operate at a technologically simple level and were pushed to the least profitable margins of the industries, or ceased independent production altogether, and/or signed on as employees of local white companies. The last action curtailed their adaptability, for their employers expected an exclusive commitment to the job, with the result that the native was soon faced with an unpalatable alternative: keep his job and give up his subsistence activities, or quit to engage in those pursuits, and thereafter find it next to impossible to find work with a damaged reputation.

In addition, the development of transport equipment such as fish packers and log barges enabled companies to transport the raw materials over great distances, overcoming a problem that had kept the processing plants decentralized, but near Indian villages. Freed from the necessity of locating near the source of raw materials, the companies began to consolidate plants into two main regions of the coast and closed down the dozens of outlying plants that had hitherto serviced the isolated native producers.

Thus, while the underdevelopment of the industrial economy had worked to the natives' advantage, by providing cheap operating gear, local markets, and reducing the influx of competition, development squeezed them from independent participation and also undermined the strategy of occupational multiplicity that they
had employed with some success. The initial (relative) prosperity of the coastal tribes, so unusual in the experience of North American Indians, was gradually replaced by a more typical poverty.

This development was particularly damaging to the position of chiefs, for with the greater intensity of exploitation came greater control by whites, and access to resources, and thus to income, became governed by licences issued by the authorities without regard to social standing. Moreover, the irregularity of all the occupations ensured that greater remuneration did not necessarily accrue regularly to the same individuals. Rather, anyone could experience a good season in one year, and a poor one the next. Good markets, prices, and supplies seldom coincided in industries as varied as logging for sawmills and pulp-mills, commercial fishing, and trapping. It was quite possible to do well in fishing, poorly in logging, and well in trapping, or the reverse. Establishment of consistent economic differentials between individuals became hard to sustain.

With the establishment of licencing arrangements, chiefs and nobles were deprived of the economic basis of their superior status: the ability to control the access of others to resources. Henceforth, the ability to redistribute resources was placed in the hands of whoever had enjoyed a good year fishing, logging or trapping, not in the hands of those who, by virtue of their social standing, had the right to call on the output of their kinsmen.

On the few occasions when individuals could control the access of others to resources—when they owned a donkey or con-
trolled a seiner and thus could hire and fire a crew--this control went to individuals who had established good reputations with fishing companies or had somehow acquired a small working capital with which to purchase equipment. That is, access devolved to them through personal attributes or efforts that owed nothing to traditional social position.

The decline of the chiefs' economic position could not be accompanied by the rise of a new class of economically prominent individuals, for the occupations were generally too erratic to permit the establishment of a permanently prosperous class. Even the owners and captains of seiners could not maintain their advantage indefinitely in the face of the coastal natives' declining place in the commercial fishery, which resulted from the increased competition from whites, and the rapid development of complex and expensive technology.

An important consequence of the chiefs' loss of economic centrality was the separation of economic and socio-political prominence, such that the one was no longer the concomitant of the other. The spectacle of impoverished chiefs and well-to-do commoners was a not uncommon feature of coastal villages. With the removal of substantive attributes, the way became open for their decline, and possession of a title, or lack of one, became economically insignificant.

That, plus the devastating population decline that had removed hundreds of heirs to titles, opened the way for the disintegration of the complex of aboriginal statuses. This disintegration was manifested in the gradual tolerance by the natives
of alternative forms of behaviour with regard to the traditional social system: The practice of allowing some names to lapse, or go unclaimed; permitting some titles to be assumed by a variety of categories of individuals other than the 'correct' heir; recognizing claims that had not been accompanied by a potlatch; failure of matrilineal heirs to lay claim to post-contact resource sites within their holdings; and, the transmission of property to non-matrilineal kin, such as children.

Precedents for these unorthodox forms of behaviour had been established, following the plagues of the nineteenth century, when the decline in numbers had ruptured many lines of succession, and inured the survivors to unusual means taken to maintain the viability of kin groups. Individuals who later manipulated the traditional structures to conform to their preferences were not necessarily initiating the variants, but rather were extending (or, in the opinion of some, over-extending) the latitude established by those who had resorted to variants in an effort to save the overall structure.

The acceptance of some of these innovations as variants (i.e., generally perceived alternative forms of behaviour) was aided by the establishment of the mission village, which created a form of social laboratory, in which unorthodox behaviour could be attempted without the actor having to endure the full wrath of the conservative elements, whose capacity for social control was severely curtailed by the conversion of the majority of villagers. (In fact, the conservatives themselves eventually moved to the mission when it became apparent that they would soon be isolated if...
they did not [cf. Rumley 1973]).

In addition, letting a title lapse, or permitting an unorthodox assumption had little, if any, effect on the administration of the economic and political life of the village. The circumstances already detailed—engagement in a market economy in which the individual became the basis of production of resources, access to which was conferred by an outside agency (government departments) using technology and techniques individually acquired. Under such conditions, the maintenance of the matrilineal unit (and, incidentally, its physical manifestation, the matrilocal household), became largely irrelevant.

Consider the utility of the traditional system, as outlined by Aberle:

The primary function of [matrilineal descent groups] may be the extension of hospitality and protection, the inheritance of property, mutual defense, redistribution of goods, or authoritative regulation (1961: 656-7).

All but the inheritance of property and redistribution of goods have been assumed by outside agencies such as government bureaus and police, or local structures such as service clubs and the band council. The inheritance of property and the redistribution of goods are largely the province of the bilateral network, as I have discussed. That does not leave very much for the matrilineal system to do any more.

The result is the relegation of matriliny to a sort of acculturative limbo. The matrilineal shell remains. People transmit names, adopt members into clans to prevent the extinction of lines, grumble and snipe at those who do not follow the 'correct'
rules, but all the while the economic and political heart of the culture lies elsewhere. The time, effort, and feeling invested in the maintenance of clans and names are, I believe, an instance of a system operating on emotional momentum, divorced from the substantive underpinnings that once sustained it.
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Appendix I

Tribes and Chiefdoms

The most explicit treatment of tribes and chiefdoms as types, or levels of socio-cultural integration, comes from Service (1964) and Sahlins (1963, 1968). While basically similar, their definitions differ in one important respect: Service treats tribes and chiefdoms as dichotomous types, while Sahlins regards chiefdoms as an advanced form of tribe, and sets out all levels from primitive segmentary tribe to highly developed Polynesian 'near-state' along a continuum.

A chiefdom occupies a level of social integration which transcends tribal society in two important respects. First, a chiefdom is usually a denser society than is a tribe, a gain made possible by greater productivity. But second...the society is also more complex and more organized, being particularly distinguished from tribes by the presence of centers which co-ordinate economic, social, and religious activities (Service 1964: 143).

Tribes present a notable range of evolutionary developments...which counterpose at the extremes two radically different types. At the underdeveloped end of the spectrum, barely constituting an advance over hunters, stand tribes socially and politically fragmented and in their economies undiversified and modestly endowed. These are segmentary tribes proper. But in its most developed expression, the chiefdom, tribal culture anticipates statehood in its complexities. Here are regional political regimes organized under powerful chiefs and primitive nobilities, often encompassing diversified as well as productive economies. The segmentary tribe is a permutation of the general model in the direction of extreme decentralization, to the extent that the burden of culture is carried in small, local, autonomous groups while higher levels of organization develop little coherence, poor definition, and minimum function. A chiefdom is a development in the other direction, toward integration of the segmentary system at higher levels. A political superstructure is established, and on that basis a wider and more elaborate organization of economy, ceremony, ideology, and other
aspects of culture.

Between the most advanced chiefdom and the simplest segmentary tribe stand many intermediate arrangements (Sahlins 1968: 20-21).

Service's approach is obviously easier to deal with, for, according to his definitions, cultures generally fall into one type or the other. Sahlins's continuum presents some difficulty, however. Aside from the 'polar permutations' as Sahlins calls them, the intermediate forms present an array of the ambiguous cases that resist easy categorization. The great majority of Northwest Coast groups falls into this latter amorphous area. They are too complex to be called segmentary tribes, yet they lack certain critical features that would place them unequivocally as chiefdoms according to Sahlins's criteria.

This difference in approach between Service and Sahlins is reflected in their categorization of Northwest Coast groups. Service classifies as chiefdoms the groups of "The Northwest Coast of North America, from Northern California to Alaska" (1964: 153). In fact, he includes the coastal groups with the advanced types of the Pacific: "Among a great many chiefdoms, and seemingly all of the well-developed ones such as those of Polynesia and British Columbia..." (Ibid.: 169-70).

Sahlins, however, is not entirely consistent. At one point, he remarks: "Between centricity in a Melanesian big-man economy such as Siuai...and centricity in a Northwest Coast Chiefdom such as the Nootka...there is little to choose" (1972: 209). In the same essay, he refers to "proto-chiefdom British Columbia" (Ibid.: 229). In 1963, Sahlins classified coastal groups thus:
Called conical clan by Kirchhoff, at one time ramage by Firth and status lineage by Goldman, the Polynesian ranked lineage is the same in principle as the...house-groups of Northwest Coast Indians (1963: 287).

Later, he wrote:

The segmentary tribe is the main type in Amazonia, aboriginal California [etc.]. American Indians of the ...Northwest Coast...are advanced in certain respects but fall generally in the same class (1968: 21).

Yet, as Sahlins makes clear, the two types of structure are mutually exclusive.

[Segmentary lineage systems] duplicate many features of conical clan organization. But in comparison with the latter, segmentary lineage systems are politically underdeveloped and are found rather in segmentary tribes than in chiefdoms.... Decentralized and egalitarian, a segmentary lineage system is like a conical clan only in outline; in substance and function it is quite different (1968: 50).

I will examine the question of what some or all the coastal groups ought to be called in order to clarify the terminology used here. To abstract from Service's and Sahlins's discussions, chiefdoms are characterized by the following basic structural features: 1) The presence of a hereditary office of chief, whose incumbent enjoys privileges by virtue of his office rather than by virtue of his personality and political creativity.

A charismatic ephemeral leader of the type found in tribes and bands has the functions and attributes that result from his own capabilities. An "office," on the other hand, is a position in a sociopolitical structure that has ascribed functions and conventionalized attributes no matter who occupies it (Service 1964: 155).

Master of his people and "owner" (in a titular sense) of the land and sea, the chief's call on his people's labour and goods was only the chief's due. Political
mobilization of the household economy did not depend on de novo creation by the leader of personal obligations.

...Compliance was not personally dunned but structurally exacted (Sahlins 1968: 91).

2) The presence of a stratified society, based on the 'conical clan.'

One particular type of chiefdom organization... is so often called to anthropological mind it has come to epitomize the class. This is the Polynesian type, based on the conical clan....

The conical clan is an extensive common descent group, ranked and segmented along genealogical lines and patrilineal in ideological bias. Here is clanship made political. Distinctions are drawn between members of the group according to genealogical distance from the ancestor: the first-born son of first-born sons ranks highest and other people lower in the measure of their descent, down to the last-born son of last-born sons--everyone's commoner. A rule of primogeniture is implied: the oldest son should succeed to his father's authority. A second implication is that any group of descendants from a common ancestor will be divided into a senior branch (main line) and ranked junior branches (cadet lines) ....Now the chiefdom as a whole is constructed on the clan as a ranked descent unit (Sahlins 1968: 24).

3) The presence of a multi-community polity.

Yet the relatively small settlements [of tribal organization] are autonomous and self-governing, a feature which in turn distinguishes tribal from chiefdom plans. The local segments of the latter are integrated into larger polities, as divisions and subdivisions, by virtue of principles of rank and a structure of chieftainships and subchieftainships. The tribal plan is purely segmental, the chiefdom pyramidal (Sahlins 1972: 228).

Perhaps the crux of Malinowski's view lies in his analysis of Trobriand chieftainship in terms of the overriding of strictly local communities. That is to say, Malinowski...saw clearly that an essential element of the concept of tribe was transcendence of the individual community and, pari passu, that tribalism consisted in functions aggregating otherwise discrete villages into an interacting whole (Fried 1975: 39).
[According to Malinowski] what should be distinctive about a tribal type of economy: it should have mechanisms integrating several otherwise discrete communities into one system of production, distribution, consumption, or some combination of these. Unless an intermittent capacity for transcending village autonomy is present, the concept of tribal economy dissolves into nebulosity. It becomes indistinguishable from the vague concepts of simple economy or primitive economy (Fried 1975: 41).

The first qualification for a chiefdom, the presence of offices, is amply fulfilled by coastal society. The intricate association between hereditary statuses and social, political, economic, ceremonial, and religious rights and prerogatives is perhaps the most widely described feature of Northwest Coast culture, and I shall not dwell on it here, other than to note its existence.

The second qualification, the presence of a conical clan system, is also fulfilled. Boas's description of the Kwakiutl system of descent could stand as a paradigm of the type.

The names of the head chiefs go back to those of the mythical ancestors from whom they are supposed to be descended by primogeniture. Those nearest to them in rank are descendants of the younger brothers among the children of the mythical ancestor. The lines are the lower in rank, the younger they are, so that the names of individuals descended from youngest brothers through youngest children are of lowest rank (1966: 52-53).

Similar basic organization is found throughout the British Columbia coast (e.g., Barnett 1955: 247, for the Coast Salish; Drucker 1951: 245, for the Nootka). There are exceptions, however. Rosman and Rubel (1970: 113-4) report that primogeniture did not operate among the Bella Coola. Garfield's evidence for the Tsimshian is rather contradictory. In 1939, she listed the
order of succession as: 1) own next younger brother
   2) eldest sister's eldest son
   3) etc. (1939: 178).

In a later publication, however, she notes that: "...The lack of rigid rules of primogeniture prevented lineage heads, their close kin and heirs from forming as distinct a class as would have been the case had there been strict succession of the eldest" (1951: 28). Succession to eldest sister's eldest son is the matrilineal equivalent of primogeniture, and certainly has the effect of maintaining a conical clan type of arrangement.

The last qualification, the existence of a multi-community polity, does not seem to have obtained on the coast, with the possible exception of the Nootka. Here again, however, the problem of definitions arises. Although Sahlins, and before him Malinowski, talk of the extension of political authority or control over more than one community, the nature of this control can, it seems, be quite tenuous. Fried writes of the "intermittent capacity for transcending village autonomy" (1975: 41). In describing the polity of Moala, Sahlins notes:

Yet as a political unit the chiefdom was decentralized and ineffective. The regional paramount could not effectively control communities other than his own; each village retained a great deal of autonomy (1962: 365).

Furthermore, the loyalty of individuals, kin groups, or villages to a chiefdom could not be guaranteed or enforced. Local alliances have been largely matters of political and economic expediency and it might well become expedient for some person or group to migrate or to defect to another chief (Ibid.: 380).
With the exception of the Nootka, the authority of the village heads of the coast does not appear to have extended beyond the confines of their own villages. The ethnographies of the coast are consistent in describing the winter village as the most extensive political unit.

It has long been recognized, however, that there was something different about the Nootka. This has usually taken the form of the recognition of some super-village form of organization, called by Drucker and others the 'confederacy,' by Driver the 'tribe.' As Driver describes the organization:

Nuclear families were combined into extended families in the large plank house, and the houses were aggregated into villages which appear to have been patridemes. These villages were named and each was led by a headman who inherited his position. Each owned land, houses, and many incorporeal privileges as well. Each village was formally united with several others nearby, and all lived together in a larger, named winter village in which the headmen of the smaller member villages were ranked in order of wealth and prestige. This unit we shall call a tribelet. These tribelets were sometimes still further combined into a third unit which we shall call a tribe. The tribe possessed a still larger town on the ocean, where all the

I. According to Fried, "The word tribelet...seems to have been introduced by Alfred L. Kroeber and used mainly by himself and his students" (1975: 56), of whom Driver was one. Kroeber's definition of tribelet, however, does not apply to the unit among the Nootka that Driver calls by that term:

...What may be called "tribelets:" groups of small size, definitely owning a restricted territory, nameless except for their tract or its best known spot, speaking usually a dialect identical with that of several of their neighbors, but wholly autonomous (Kroeber 1932: 258, in Fried 1975: 57).

When describing the northern matrilineal groups, however, Driver refers to clan villages, then to "...A larger village with a number of avunculcans, and finally to a tribelet comprising a number of villages" (1961: 332).
member tribelets might assemble in the summer for the taking of salt-water fish and sea mammals. Such towns were named, and the headmen or chiefs who assembled there were carefully ranked as in smaller territorial units (1961: 333-4).

The use of different terminology for the same social units can be somewhat disconcerting. Together the two main forms appear thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drucker</th>
<th>Driver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>house</td>
<td>extended families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>band</td>
<td>village (patrideme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tribe</td>
<td>tribelet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confederacy</td>
<td>tribe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ruddell, among others, seeks to explain the confederacy as a way of adapting to two distinct ecological zones in Nootkan territory, the outer coast, with one set of resources, and the sheltered inlets, with a different set. The periodic congregations in the confederacies' villages on the outer coast enabled diverse groups to exploit the complete range of resources available to them (1973: 261). (The Nootka appear to have been unique in one other respect: their largest concentrations of population

1. Interestingly, Sahlins implicitly equates 'confederacy' with 'chiefdom' in Moala.

The regional confederacy of a few villages.
In late aboriginal times there were three such regional chiefdoms...(1962: 365).

Both the Oxford English Dictionary and Webster's 3rd International define a confederacy in terms of an alliance of independent equals united for some purpose, which runs counter to Sahlins's definition of a chiefdom as a series of communities united under a paramount authority.
occurred during the summer. During the winter, the units of the confederacy dispersed to their individual villages.)

The existence of an individual with authority over a number of villages was noted by several observers during the early contact period. In 1792, Moziño wrote:

The vassals receive their sustenance from the hands of the monarch, or from the governor who represents him in the distant villages under his rule (Moziño 1970: 24).

Vancouver's botanist, Archibald Menzies, recorded the visit of two elderly chieftains to Nootka from a village some distance away, and noted that they "seemed to be dependants of Maquinna" (Newcombe 1914: 115). In addition, on a number of occasions, John R. Jewitt described quite distant villages as being under the control of Maquinna (1973: 66, 67, 85).

Taking account of these observers' conditioning (vassals, tribute, etc.), it does seem significant that a number of independent records were made that agree about the extent of the authority that existed among the Nootka. That at least suggests quite strongly that at least one Northwest Coast group had developed a multi-community polity that may have fulfilled Sahlins's criterion.

By and large, however, the people of the coast do not appear to have developed the degree of political control that would have united a diverse set of residential units under a single, regular authority. Coastal society remained characterized by a fragmented series of autonomous units, the winter villages.

This leaves the question of how to categorize the heads of
these units. While they may not have been lords of many villages, they were certainly a far cry from the village headmen of the segmentary tribes, whose powers and honours were all too fleeting. Northwest Coast headmen were men of substance who were born to their places. Furthermore, they appear to have carried out many of the functions of pooling and redistribution that Sahlins categorizes as a chiefly prerogative. Therein lies the weakness of Sahlins's formulation. When cultures fall at neither end of a continuum, it becomes difficult to know what to call them. Sahlins's admits as much when he notes that:

Again the student must realize that these are but polar permutations of the tribal design, that the real world introduces many intermediate versions (1968: 27).
## Appendix II

### Quality of Timber in Timber Sales Let to Haisla Loggers

As Shown by Foresters' Comments on Applications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5507</td>
<td>Handlogging only feasible (Method).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5513</td>
<td>Handlogging only--poor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11409</td>
<td>A very poor chance and only suitable for hand logging. Most of area is very steep and rocky and shoreline exposed. Logs will have to be towed to shelter in Drumlummond Bay as soon as put in water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12391</td>
<td>No person with a steam donkey would consider it worth their while to log this area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12947</td>
<td>Hand logging only economical feasible method of removing the few scattered trees from a precipitous, rocky, and extensive coastline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16747</td>
<td>Scattered spruce and cedar only. Both species are short and limby.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16806</td>
<td>This stand of timber, although small in size, appears to be decadent, not the thrifty timber these small sizes would indicate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17921</td>
<td>Scattered timber along river bank. Ordinary hand logging proposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17922</td>
<td>A few trees of all species scattered along a very steep and rocky mountainside which has already been extensively hand logged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18408</td>
<td>Remaining accessible timber in this area is small, scattered, and suitable for pulp logs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20618</td>
<td>Scattered timber on steep sidehill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21502</td>
<td>Scattered timber on steep sidehill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24112</td>
<td>Southwestern part very steep. Logs will run quite a distance when felled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27957</td>
<td>Good A-frame show. Whole of area can be logged by direct yarding with A-frame. Good yarding as there are no bad gullies or adverse grades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31333</td>
<td>Area can be logged with a machine on A-frame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36796</td>
<td>Front has been hand logged years ago. The remaining timber consists of scattered trees throughout the area, short and limby, but as the market is at the present time, they will pass for sawlogs, mostly for planking. Considerable stump rot in the cedar. Muskeg is remarked in the bottom, outcropping of bedrock on the sidehills. Very poor chance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36801</td>
<td>The stand on the whole is poor, but will help out on the present shortage of logs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37726</td>
<td>Scattered trees along whole shoreline. Hand logging only. Area is very steep, rocky sidehill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40547</td>
<td>Rough and rocky sidehill. Soil shallow in small draws and crevices that supports present growth. Brush disposal: not recommended. Burning would destroy what little humus there now is. Lee &amp; Genbergh are the only other operators in the vicinity who might be interested, and they do not consider it worth their while.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41461</td>
<td>Area has been cut over several times. There are scattered trees along whole shoreline which can now be taken on account of the big market for logs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41510</td>
<td>Scattered trees on steep rocky sidehills, suitable for hand logging only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41794</td>
<td>Scattered trees along shoreline. Hand logging only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41873</td>
<td>Timber is very scattered over whole area. Hand logging only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41882</td>
<td>Scattered trees over whole area. Overmature....suitable for hand logging only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43044</td>
<td>Scattered trees over whole area. All are limby growth and will cut out considerable stump rot. Scattered trees along steep rocky shoreline. Hand logging only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44173</td>
<td>Small A-frame show. Logs will be yarded direct to water.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is a complete list of all Timber Sales issued to Haisla loggers for which comments were included in the applications.
Table XXV

Timber Sales Issued to Haisla Loggers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Handlogging Timber Sales</th>
<th>Quantity of Timber (X.1000 board feet)</th>
<th>Power Logging Timber Sales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joe Gray</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Stewart</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Stewart</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. McMillan</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Stewart</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.S. &amp; Leonard Bolton</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joe Bolton</td>
<td>130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Williams</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Wilson</td>
<td>170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Gray</td>
<td>180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. McMillan</td>
<td>185</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy Starr</td>
<td>190</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Duncan</td>
<td>204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Grant</td>
<td>280</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>230</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>309</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>340</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>355</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Timber Sale Files
Table XXVI

Indian-White Hand Logging Timber Sales Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>White</th>
<th>Indian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>415</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>280</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Timber Sales Files

Figures refer to estimated quantity of timber present in a claim, measured in thousands of board feet.
### Table XXVII

**Indian-White Power Logging Timber Sales Compared**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>309</td>
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<tr>
<td>309</td>
<td>326</td>
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<tr>
<td>340</td>
<td>349</td>
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<tr>
<td>355</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>423</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>565</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>590</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Timber Sales Files*

Figures refer to estimated quantity of timber present in a claim, measured in thousands of board feet.
Table XXVIII

Comparison of Density of Timber in Indian and White Timber Sales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>600</td>
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<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>600</td>
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<td>900</td>
<td>1300</td>
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<td>1300</td>
<td>1600</td>
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<td>1300</td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2100</td>
<td>3500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4600</td>
<td>4800</td>
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<td>4600</td>
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<td>4600</td>
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<td>4600</td>
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<tr>
<td>4600</td>
<td>7500</td>
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<tr>
<td>7900</td>
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<td>9100</td>
<td>9100</td>
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<td>9900</td>
<td>10500</td>
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<tr>
<td>10500</td>
<td>11900</td>
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<td>11900</td>
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<td>12200</td>
<td>12200</td>
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<td>12200</td>
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<td>15900</td>
<td>17500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17500</td>
<td>17500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17500</td>
<td>19900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures refer to board footage per acre, calculated by dividing the estimated board footage (included in Timber Sales applications) by the total acreage of the claim.
Examination of Table XXV will show two situations quite clearly. First, the values of the handlogging Timber Sales do not approach those of the power logging Timber Sales. This is not surprising, considering that many stands that were inaccessible to handloggers could be exploited by donkey operators. Moreover, those with power equipment needed better stands to make the proposition pay, and therefore would not attempt to obtain the poorer tracts of timber that a handlogger might find acceptable.

Second, there is a greater diversity among the handloggers than among the power loggers. Fred Woods was Charles Stewart's son-in-law, and took over the family donkey after the latter's retirement. Therefore, all but one of the native power logging operations were run by one family. Without their donkey, the Haisla would have been relegated almost exclusively to either small scale handlogging, or wage work for white operators.

When the value of Timber Sales issued to Haislas is compared to those issued to whites, we find that handloggers' tracts were roughly equal overall (Table XXVI). In power logging Timber Sales, however, the whites' claims were distinctly better, on average (Table XXVII). The disparity between the value of whites' claims and natives' is quite apparent when we consider the density of timber, measured in board feet per acre (Table XXVIII). The median density of the natives' stands is 800 board feet per acre, an extremely low figure; the whites' median approaches 10,000 board feet, the figure considered the lower limit for profitable stands. Clearly, the natives were operating on timber land that was of virtually no value to anyone else.