ON THE IDEOLOGY OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM

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ABSTRACT

On the Ideology of Democratic Socialism

-- An attempt to determine the nature of difficulties of contemporary democratic socialism and to seek clue to their solution through an ideological approach.

Democratic Socialism is said to be the theory of establishing socialism by democratic means, i.e. through gradual changes brought about by the operation of democratic governmental agencies, and hence it has been put in contrast with Communism, i.e. socialism through revolution and dictatorship. Yet, while Communism has been gaining grounds in some important parts of the world today, democratic socialism has lost not only popular support, but also its own self-confidence. It has come, so to speak, to an over-all impasse.

The purpose of this thesis is to grasp the nature of this impasse and then to help contribute to its solution through relevant measures. The thesis therefore consists of three parts. Part I deals with the nature of present socialist troubles. It is argued that the root of its troubles lies in that 1) democratic socialists have underrated the importance of political ideology, and 2) the ideology of democratic socialism itself has shortcomings.

Part II deals with the ideology of British Socialism in order to have a good understanding of the democratic social-
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The two Fabian Essays are treated here to reveal various shortcomings of British Socialism. It may be said that this part of the thesis consists, in general, of a brief criticism of Fabianism.

In Part III we try to come to the core of the ideological defects of democratic socialism. Gradualism, when applied to the Asiatic situation, can be no match against Communism and democratic socialism is impelled to find a way toward new characteristics of its own. It is argued in this Part that the traditional socialist assumptions are no longer adequate to meet the present political situation of the world. In conclusion it is suggested that the problem of freedom, rather than of equality, should be the central issue for democratic socialism.

In general the thesis treats democratic socialism in close connection with Communism and this is due to our conviction that Communism seems to be the real enemy of the democratic socialist movement.

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PART I—
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

It has been said that contemporary democratic socialism has come to an impasse, or has lost its "sense of direction." Wherein lies the chief cause of its troubles? This thesis tries to help find an answer to this question.

There may be various causes for this socialist impasse. The purpose of this paper is to argue that its chief cause is to be found in the ideological shortcomings of democratic socialism. Despite the various political and historical conditions that have contributed to its loss of "sense of direction," the main defects of democratic socialism seem to lie in its own ideology. What kind of ideological shortcomings does it contain and how should they be overcome?

First of all, we have to grasp the nature of the troubles of democratic socialism in the world today. Since its troubles seem to be determined by its political and ideological position with respect to other major political forces, it will be necessary to consider its relations with the two other chief political forces, modern liberal democracy and communism, and then we must try to understand the position of democratic socialism in the contemporary world. By modern liberal democracy, we mean those ideals of representative government

1. R.H.S. Crossman "Towards a philosophy of Socialism."
that accompanied laissez-faire economic individualism. It 
was the democracy of laissez-faire. By communism, we mean 
here, those ideologies as represented by the communist parties, 
especially that of the Russian communist party, as expressed 
in its various official and semi-official publications.

The ideological position of democratic socialism 
today must be evaluated in connection with these two great 
political ideologies of the modern age. In view of the un-
successful status of present democratic socialism, however, 
we have to consider the nature and various aspects of its 
present trouble that seem to have sprung from its ideological 
defects.

The ideological defects, however, cannot be clearly 
understood without some detailed study of democratic social-
ism. We shall discuss British socialism, therefore, as the 
representative of democratic socialism in order to grasp the 
chief characteristics of democratic socialist ideology. We 
have to analyze British socialism and try to see its ideo-
logical shortcomings. Though the "New Fabian Essays" is an 
expression of conscious effort to overcome the ideological 
defects of the British Socialism, the over-all conclusion will 
be that it is yet far from its proposed goal. Some of the 
analyses of the New Fabian Essayists seem to be inadequate 
and incorrect. Their basis of thinking seems to be too narrow 
and their outlook too limited. They have not done away with
so-called political "empiricism", i.e. the attitude of
democratic socialists ignoring the need for fundamental
principles of their theory, and relying on the short-sighted
political "trial-and-error-ism."

It may be not proper, however, to criticize through
British socialism, democratic socialism in general, without
paying attention to general and essential characteristics of
democratic socialism. Hence, gradualism is also discussed in
terms of its origin and content.

In order to show more clearly the nature of ideologi­
cal defects of democratic socialism, and to help prepare
the way to a new definition of democratic socialism, it seems
to be best to discuss democratic socialism as applied to the
Asiatic situation. Its weakness lies, not only in gradualism,
but also in the basic assumptions that are common to all types
of socialism. The central weakness of democratic socialism is
more clearly revealed here, in that it is still confused about
its own ideals, and hence, still fails to distinguish itself
clearly from communism except in gradualism, which somehow,
is only a matter of tactical difference. It is here that
the need for a redefinition of democratic socialism is un­
mistakably felt, and we must make an attempt to suggest a few
outlines for its redefinition. It will be said that the
central point of the democratic socialist ideal is not so
much "about equality" as "about freedom". And only in this
question of freedom may be found the true foundation of democratic socialism that can gain victory in the struggle for human freedoms.

This thesis, therefore, will consist of four main chapters; the Position of Democratic Socialism in the Contemporary World; the Ideology of British Socialism; Democratic Socialism and Asia; and lastly some suggestions for redefinition of democratic socialism.
THE POSITION OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM
IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

In order to consider the position of democratic socialism in the contemporary world, we are here going to discuss, (1) the chief limitations of the ideas of early modern democracy, (2) the characteristics of contemporary communism, (3) the ideological position of democratic socialism in relation to modern liberal democracy and communism.

a. Modern Democracy

The evaluations of modern democracy differ according to one's standard of judgment. A man who knows the feudal system and its shortcomings cannot but help admire the whole development of modern democracy. But a man who seeks and envisages a better life for human beings cannot fail to see its limitations and defects.

In Ancient Greece, democracy developed from political expediency. It was thought to be the most convenient way of ruling city states, which had small areas and populations. It was, so to speak, "a purely pragmatic phenomenon, arising under special conditions, and regarded as the most convenient way of managing the affairs of people bound together by community of interests and for the achievement of specific end."  

2. C.L. Becker, Modern Democracy, New Haven; Yale University Press, 1941, p. 17
Plato could not see any merit in democracy. To him what was important in a government was whether or not it had a "science of government," i.e., the "royal science." Only a scientific government could be a true government, whether it was a government of the few or of the many, or whether it was accepted voluntarily or involuntarily. Thus, our ancient democracy was not identified with "scientific government," but was rather an offspring of mere political expediency, and lacked its own theoretical foundations.

With the dawn of the modern age, democracy was given a dress of conscious justification. This took the form of showing that it possessed scientific foundations. If ancient democracy came into being by way of expediency and convenience, modern democracy came into being along with a conscious quest for theoretical justification, without which many modern political movements would have lost their meaning.

"Natural law" and "natural rights" together with

4. Plato, op.cit. p.19
5. Both were derived from the concept of the individual as a rational animal. Grotius defined the natural law as "a dictate of right reason" and said that "the very nature of man is the mother of the law of nature." "Life, liberty, and estate" which Locke enumerated as natural rights were equally derived from the prevailing concept of the individual--the free form, self preserving, rational being--, and were held to be as indefeasible as the natural laws were intrinsic and ultimate. See Sabine, "A History of Political Theory." New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1953, pp. 423-424, pp. 526-528.
the "contract theory", gave democracy something more than "minimum assumptions," and made it possible for democracy to claim that it alone deserved the name of "good and true" government.

This new phase in the development of democracy was made possible by the belief in the new ego—the ultimate individual. The individual was a free, reason-controlled being, endowed with intrinsic natural rights. Man was thought to be "born free," endowed with certain "inalienable rights," and with the ability to know what is in his best interests. In theory, when this concept of the individual was applied to government, it meant that the best government was that which ruled the least, (since it hampered the individual least.) If we could not run the government by direct participation because of the size of present-day state and population, then justification could be made for the notion of "contract" and "representation." In case of conflict of interests or disagreement among individuals, the rule of the majority, agreed upon and accepted in advance, would resolve the difficulties that occur. Thus modern democracy, in principle at least, seemed to have accomplished the task of providing a theoretical foundation for itself. If the theory of modern democracy had

8. Declaration of Independence. 1776.
advanced one pace beyond ancient democracy in the sense that it had laid a theoretical basis which was more than mere political expediency, it was nevertheless so one-sided and abstract that it was soon attacked at its very foundations.

It was one-sided because it failed to foresee the important role played by economics in society. The laissez-faire system was elaborated and defended but its political and social implications were not seriously considered. It was not properly considered in terms of historical context. The discovery that individuals are endowed with reason and natural rights was not linked with the discovery of the steam engine. Thus the newly discovered individual was an abstract individual, found nowhere else but in the field of assumption. To a reader who knows the later emphasis on history, it seems strange to find that there is little sense of history in the social contract theories of either Rousseau or Locke and little reference to man's economic life.

The newly created social and economic conditions, the division and regimentation of labour, the wage system, and the plight of mass population, could not receive appropriate attention in this basic theory of democracy.

b. Communism

10. The term "Marxism" is used in this chapter to mean the same as Communism.
The word "Communism" is ambiguous. For the purpose of our inquiry we mean by the term communism the doctrine represented by the ideology of the Russian Communist Party.

Lenin once pointed out three main theoretical sources of Marxism. They were (1) German philosophy, (2) English political economy, and (3) French socialism. Therefore, the unique feature of Marx's doctrine consists in the fact that he attempted to unify historical, economic, and social theories into a single all-embracing philosophical doctrine. He could integrate, with the help of Engels, into a coherent world-outlook called dialectical and historical materialism, the very three elements which were hitherto dealt with separately or left out by the exponents of modern liberal democracy.

When theories of history, society and economies were integrated under the principle of materialism, a new concept of humanity and a new concept of society and state were shaped and applied.


13. Even Mill's "On Liberty" failed to give appropriate consideration to the social and economic aspects of individual liberty. His economic theory is said to have gone a little further than the classical economists, but even so, failed to bring about a clear logical conclusion of its own. (See G.H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory: New York, Holt & Co., 1953, pp. 712-713.)
A chief characteristic of Marx's doctrine lies in his analysis of the masses and classes in accordance with the concept of dialectical development.

The concept of collective humanity and the concept of historical development of society were for the first time seriously considered by him. It is interesting to note that when Hegel tried to give to individual life a reasonable social and historical position, he introduced the concept of "Cunning of Reason." The individual might think himself as an independent and free person, but he was in fact no more than a puppet cunningly controlled and handled by the "Reason" (or World Spirit) which would see to it that every individual would act in accordance with its plan of world history. But Marx did not require the "Cunning of Reason." He simply adopted a new concept of the individual and explained him in terms of his social being. "In its reality it (the human essence) is the ensemble of the social relations."

The new aspect of human life, i.e., its social aspect, was given exclusive attention. If a man's life has

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two fundamental aspects, the social and the individual, as 16 Alexander Gray said, it was Marx (and Engels) who consciously tried to cancel out the latter, to explain it away by the former. The fundamental ingredient of man's social life was said to be, after all, his economic life.

"Just as Darwin discovered the law of evolution in organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of evolution in human history; he discovered the simple fact,...that mankind must first of all eat and drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, religion, art, etc..." 17 Thus the rational man was replaced by the collective economic man. The most individual aspects of man's life, such as religion and the arts, were either regarded secondary or were subordinated to the interest of classes or demands of the party line. As Marxism, through Lenin and again through Stalin, underwent a course of theoretical reshaping, this tendency was carried to extremes. From the theory of class struggle to the theory of the revolution and dictatorship and from here to Stalinism which was the theory of the maintenance of dictatorship through collectivization and purges, through the strict "one party line" doctrine, through the increase of state power by the building up of heavy industry, Marxism became

ever more totalitarian.

A political theory reveals its potentiality when it shows its power of mobilizing and organizing masses of people, of rallying them consciously around one center, supplying them with the necessary morale and energy for the revolutionary movement. Eighteenth century liberal doctrine played this role. But it did not play it for long. Though it is hard to decide how much of the weakness of modern democracy was caused by and was due to the deficiency of its theory and how much was due to the inevitable disparity between theory and practice, doubtless, to the 18th. century liberals and revolutionaries, the phrase "all men are created equal" must have had a great deal of meaning. It is not appropriate to dispose of the phrase, "Men are born free..." simply because it does not mean anything to us today. We will be led to an intellectual position which under-rates the power and significance of political ideals if we think they are "unprofitable" and "worthless." It may be true that some political philosophers, like Rousseau, Locke, Hegel and Marx might "have formulated questions of a type to which no empirically testable answers could be given" and therefore that such questions are "nonsensical" or "beyond the range of empirical confirmation."

19. The current denunciation of Stalinism by Stalin's successors may be a significant phenomenon. Yet, its full implication will probably not become clear until the passage of many more years from now.


21. Ibid. pp.74 & 95.
But such "empirical testability" seems to have little to do with the potentiality of a political ideology. No one can deny the important roles played by the "theory of inalienable rights" and Kant's "end-in-itself" theory of man in the history of modern democracy, though it may be another question to decide the exact extent of their influence. Can we deny the statement that "Marx's own influence on modern history is the most spectacular example of the power of ideas and ideals?" 22

Thus, a political ideal has some meaning in it when it lives in the minds of intellectuals and ordinary men; drives them toward something which they have not yet got; makes them aspire towards a reform or revolution, stirs them up to a general dissatisfaction with the existing political system.

Although for a political ideology, this may not be the test of truth, nevertheless, it reveals to us its significance and potentiality. However, the doctrine of early modern democracy sufficiently contributed to the process of shaping modern institutions. But it was not long before the doctrine lost most of its meaningfulness. To the people with democratic governments it had little more to offer, and to non-democratic people it emerged as an instrument of a new exploitation and oppression. It no longer appeared as a dynamic social force.

Communism was born out of the same aspirations as modern liberal movements. Its ultimate goal was the kingdom of freedom, "in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all!" In place of the abstract individual, the rational and free born man, communism put social, collective, economic man; instead of inalienable rights and natural law, it brought out the concept of evolution and history; instead of appealing to abstract humanity, it called for a working class of the world.

Communism spoke not only in terms of a nation, but of every nation and all societies. It made the plain fact known that inequality existed not only within a society, but also among societies.

Thus, when the modern democratic movement virtually ceased to be a revolutionary force, whereas there were still many places in the world where such a force was still required, communism took over to play its function and carried out the overthrow of the old regime. It is interesting to note that the Russian revolution was achieved finally by the Bolsheviks, but not necessarily under the Bolshevik banner. The Bolsheviks had to support the popular coalition government, and Pravda

(then edited by J. Stalin) announced that the fundamental problem is to establish "a democratic republic."

One of the major achievements of communism today is that it is capable of leading and achieving a revolution. The inability to do this is one of the chief deficiencies of the doctrine of democracy. It knows pretty well how to run an established democracy, but tells us little about how to establish it. Communism on the other hand was conceived as a theory of revolution, and set forth elaborate tactics and strategy for it. Of course there cannot be an intrinsic value in revolution itself, and even Rousseau could not fail to see the danger and risk involved in a revolution. To him the attitude of caution with regard to any revolution was "a maxim of politics," but there seem to be many areas in the world today where revolution may still be necessary. Except for a few countries, the majority of the world's population have a long way to go before they can see any working political system of the sort envisaged by early modern liberal thinkers.

Thus, Stalin could still say before the representatives of his communist party: "...formerly the bourgeoisie could afford to play the liberal, to uphold the bourgeois-

24. Muller, op.cit.,pp. 296-297
democratic liberties, and thus gain popularity with the people. Now not a trace remains of this liberalism. The so-called "liberty of the individual" no longer exists—the rights of the individual are now extended only to those who possess capital, while all other citizens are regarded as human raw material, fit only to be exploited. The principle of equal rights for men and nations has been trampled in the mud; it has been replaced by the principle of full rights for the exploiting minority and no rights for the exploited majority. The banner of bourgeois-democratic liberties has been thrown overboard. I think that it is you, the representatives of the communist and democratic parties, who will have to raise this banner and carry it forward, if you want to gather around you the majority of the people. There is nobody else to raise it."

These words may not mean much today to the people of England, Canada or the United States, but they can have a tremendous meaning to the people of various colonies and semi-colonies. Now it is the communists who want to play at being liberals, and even nationalists.

c. Democratic Socialism

The term "democratic socialism" is no more precise than "democracy" or "communism." However, as we tried to

include, under "communism" the general ideology of the present communist party of the USSR, i.e., The Marxist-Leninist tradition, so we may include here the ideology of the democratic socialist parties in the world today. But this does not bring us any closer to its definition chiefly because of the fact that there are so many democratic socialist parties with different ideologies.

However, we can roughly divide most of these ideologies into two categories: the continental ideology and the British ideology.

From the very beginning of the continental socialist movement, there emerged two basically different tendencies with regard to both the theory and practice of socialism, which later came to be known as communism and democratic socialism (evolutionary socialism).

In the matter of practical activities, the split was revealed in various questions of party policy or organization. The history of the communist party of the USSR is, internally, a striking example of a history of the struggle between these two tendencies.

With regard to theory this split was revealed notably by Edward Bernstein's "Revisionism." Thus the continental

ideology of democratic socialism sprang, both in theory and practice, out of the original Marxism.

In contrast, the British democratic socialism has, in its origin, comparatively little connection with the doctrine of Karl Marx. Fabianism and the ideology of the British Labour party nevertheless have something in common with continental revisionism, and this common quality in the two ideologies is of great importance.

They both reject: (1) revolution and subsequent dictatorship of proletariat as the necessary means of establishing socialism, (2) materialism as the sole philosophical basis of socialism, (3) the unqualified concept of class struggle. They both believe in: (1) evolutionary and gradual progress of society, (2) the spirit of liberalism and individuality, (3) defence and nourishment of political institution of modern democracy.

In the care of these common features lies one fundamental principle—the principle of individual freedom, sustained by "a liberal conscience."

The historical significance of democratic socialism is that it consciously tried to inherit early modern liberalism in both theory and practice. Bernstein was aware of this

30. Ibid., p. 407
point; as Gray says:

"Democracy is not merely a condition of socialism; it is exalted until it comes something more than the means—it is indeed the very substance of socialism... It is part of Bernstein's confession of faith that socialism is the legitimate heir of liberalism, not only in chronological sequence, but also in its spiritual qualities. There is, he says, no truly liberal thought that does not also have its place among the ideas of socialism; the task of socialism is indeed that of organizing liberalism."31

Therefore, if communism was an outright reaction against the defects of modern democracy, democratic socialism was a conscious effort to inherit its ideals. Hence, democratic socialism claims that "socialists strive to build a new society in freedom and by democratic means. Without freedom there can be no Socialism. Socialism can be achieved only through democracy. Democracy can be fully realized only through Socialism."32 It denounces both capitalism and communism. "...Socialism was born in Europe as a movement of protest against the diseases inherent in capitalist society."33

There are ceaseless attacks from the Communist side upon democratic socialism, which charges it with not having established socialism anywhere in the world or not having made any serious efforts to do so, even when Social-Democratic


32. Aims and Tasks of Democratic Socialism, Declaration of the Socialist International (Section: Political Democracy) adopted in Frankfort on 3 July 1951.

33. Ibid., Preamble, - p.1
parties have led governments in many countries both before and after World War II. Nevertheless, the Declaration of the Socialist International of 1951 could say "Socialism has become a major force in world affairs. It has passed from propaganda into practice."

Democratic socialism is, as we have already observed, a movement of democracy and has today become a major political force. It does not play at liberalism, as the communists do, but is itself liberal and wants to be the true heir of the modern liberalist movement. And yet democratic socialism has not been too successful in its lofty efforts and struggles for the goal of socialism. It has been particularly unsuccessful in the colonial or semi-colonial areas where communism has been gaining ground.

What are the reasons for the failures of contemporary democratic socialism? There seem to be several chief reasons.

(1) Democratic Socialism can be meaningful and can have significance in the advanced democratic countries of Western Europe (or North America), even without clear, systematic doctrine of socialist philosophy. Thus this casual attitude toward principle and theory is reflected in the Declaration in such phrases as:


"Socialism is an international movement which does not demand a rigid uniformity of approach. Whether Socialists build their faith on Marxist or other methods of analysing society, whether they are inspired by religious or humanitarian principles, they all strive for the same goal—a system of social justice, better living, freedom and world peace."36

Surely Socialism must be more than "a system of social justice, better living, freedom and world peace." These words do not mean much to the people of, for example, Korea, unless they are interpreted in the context of a coherent and overall doctrine, as well as a concrete policy.

People will not move for any sweet and beautiful phrases unless they are, first, reasonable and convincing to them, and, second, concrete and practical. An appealing, practical program and policy, founded on and supported by some convincing principles, is what is required in order to set the people into motion.

It is, of course, extremely dangerous for any democracy to be too restricted and to tie itself to any transcendent creed or ideology. But some theory must be respected if we want to defend democracy, and the theory must be more than an expression of such words as individual freedom, peace, equality, etc. In England even this amount of theory may be


dispensed with since the people there are in no need of it. When they are living a free life, the word freedom would have not much provocation except in such times when they become aware of any threat to their free life. In such a country the already petrified phrase "all men are created equal" may not sound as meaningful as in Hanoi, Indo-China.

Thus, underrating the role of a doctrine, failing to see the real significance of an ideology, while expecting those people in the underdeveloped areas to come to accept democratic socialism, the socialists wanted to win an easy victory. They thought that their political empiricism would also be a sufficient guiding principle. In recent years, the failure of empirical politics was more deeply felt among the leading democratic socialists.

"...a failure of the sense of direction which alone can unify and sustain a great political party. The Labour Party was unsure where it was going... How can the Labour Party regain its sense of direction? My contention, in this essay, is that it cannot be done so long as politicians are content to rely on their "hunch" and empirical experiences. The Labour Party has lost its way

38. The word "empiricism" used here is different from philosophical empiricism. The term is borrowed from Mr. Crossman's article "Towards a Philosophy of Socialism" (New Fabian Essays, p. 2). It may be interpreted as a political empiricism, i.e. a general attitude of politicians to rely more on their "hunch and empirical experience," and less on principles. It also can imply an attitude to underrate the importance of ideological principles, in their political movement.
not only because it lacks a map of the new country it is crossing, but because it thinks maps unnecessary for experienced travellers."\(^{39}\)

If this is the true case with the leadership of the British Labour Party, which represents a leading democratic socialist movement, how can we expect to see self-confidence among democratic socialists in other countries?

(2) This lack of adequate agreement concerning principles of Democratic Socialism, except the empty concept of a gradualism which will be dealt with later, contributes to the further widening of the gap between left and right wings within the Democratic Socialist Party. It is one thing to accept as natural or even as inevitable, some internal wings and factions in a democratic political party. But it is another question to have right and left wings that might split away from each other so widely as to destroy it as a political party. When there are no agreed principles in regard to the matter of fundamental policies, the Democratic Socialist Party will become so divided internally that it will cease to exist as a major political force.

(3) Another effect of the absence of agreed principles is the possibility of the party losing its

characteristics and identity in the highly flexible and opportunistic political arena of modern representative governments. This can be more true when a democratic socialist party is in official opposition. If there were nothing in the party to distinguish it from the party in power, and an election campaign had to be conducted on the basis of virtually an identical platform, its political future could be hardly bright.

It can be said that the recent British election is another lesson of this sort for the Democratic Socialist movement.

(4) It is questionable whether the general public could ever be induced, by means of "permeation," or other "democratic means" of enlightenment to accept and support a fully socialist program under normal political conditions. It may be not possible to go beyond the "welfare program" or some half-hearted "reform policies" without any social impact that would give enough momentum to the general public to throw the socialist party out of power. It may be true that only some drastic social commotions, such as a great depression or war, or a serious deterioration of society, could induce the general public to accept any full scale socialist program.

The democratic socialist's "piece-meal" approach has not yet been proven capable of establishing socialism.
This is one of the central tasks yet to be solved by Democratic Socialists.

(5) In addition to these, there is the inability of democratic socialism and of its party to lead a revolution in the areas where revolution is inevitable or required. If a revolution is led, under whatever banner (nationalist, democratic, socialist, or communist,) it is more than apparent that the subsequent regime will be in the hands of the Communist Party. It is of utmost importance for a party, aiming at capture of power, to regain and exercise leadership in a revolution over all other political and social forces. To do this, the Democratic Socialist Party must be able to mobilize not only the masses, but also the intellectuals. It will be impossible for any political force to perform this function without (1) a convincing political philosophy, and (2) a revolutionary organization with appropriate tactics. Unfortunately, the Democratic Socialist Party lacks both conditions. It should be clearly understood by democratic socialists that the character of the regime born out of a revolution is determined by the character of the leading force of that revolution. Nowhere is leadership so vital as in a revolution.

(6) The cold war between communism and democracy has further weakened the position of democratic socialism. It has left little space for political empiricism. Where
there is no basic established doctrine, only two courses of action are open to democratic socialists. Either they tend to join the communists or they tend to go over to the capitalist movement. Unless democratic socialists exercise a leadership in this cold war, sooner or later they will be torn into two parts.

It is however encouraging to notice a sign of conscious struggle by leaders of British socialism towards more principles and less details.

"The Fabian Society is, or should be, British Socialism's thinking machine. I wish it would think, for the time being, more about first principles, and less about detailed plans, which can be got right only when the ends are clear."\(^{40}\)

"What is wrong with the Labour Party today is a shortage, not of leaders, but of ideas," cried the *New Statesman and Nation*.

It seems to be appropriate, at this stage, to turn to British Socialism in the hope that, by examining it, we will come to the core of democratic socialism, and to the understanding of its problems and tasks in the contemporary world.

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\(^{41}\) op.cit. p. 678.
PART II

CHAPTER III

IDEOLOGY OF BRITISH SOCIALISM (FABIANISM)

In this chapter we are to discuss British socialism, particularly Fabianism, as a representative ideology of democratic socialism. At first, we consider briefly the historical background of English socialism, then try to analyze the chief characteristics of Fabianism. The New Fabian Essays may be said to represent the most recent expression of Fabianism as a result of the Fabina's conscious struggle for the formulation of democratic socialism.

a. Historical Background

Before we proceed to a consideration of Fabianism, it seems to be advisable to look a little further back in the tradition of English socialism, out of which Fabianism itself grew. We can point out about four important varieties of pre-Fabian socialism in England.

First, there was Utopian socialism as represented by Robert Owen. Although it was later criticized by many modern socialists, particularly by Marx and Engels, this Utopian socialism exposed various defects of the existing bourgeois society and grasped fairly clearly the socialist order of society.

Second, there was a sort of Agrarian socialism as
represented by Thomas Spence and William Ogilvie. Both of these men conceived a kind of socialism primarily in terms of land. "God gave the land to the people." "God gave the earth in common to all men."

Third, there was the Ricardian socialism as conceived by a number of socialists before 1850, such as Charles Hall, William Thompson, John Gray, etc.

They prepared the way for Marx by formulating their theory of exploitation and surplus value on the basis of Ricardo's Law of Rent.

Finally, we may mention the "Christian Socialists", to whom Sidney Webb refers in his book Socialism in England. The Christian socialists denounced the current bourgeois ideals and advocated socialist order of society. They spoke loudly, together with the "Young England" of Carlyle, around the middle of the nineteenth century. Despite some later criticism against them, these early English socialists made a unique and historical contribution to the future of socialism in England. They were all highly critical of the existing social order and eloquently exposed the social defects in it.

42. Gray, The Socialist Tradition, pp.258-9
43. Gray, op.cit., p. 262.
They had, generally speaking, another common feature, namely, their common spirit and zeal towards the envisaged Utopia. They postulated their ideal society and pictured it in contrast to the current one. Later, in Marx and Engels, this quality was discarded for the sake of giving a scientific tinge to socialism, and consequently, but for the help of the labour value theory and surplus value theory, Marxism would have had nothing to inspire people towards social justice.

These earlier forms of socialism faded away before nineteenth century liberalism and, but for John Stuart Mill, the revival of British socialism in the late 1880's might have been delayed. The influence of Mill's "Political Economy" gradually prepared the public mind for Socialist proposals. Mill was, in this sense, a bridge between Liberalism and Socialism. In his "On Liberty" he was a superb liberalist, but at the same time in his Political Economy, especially on the subject of the "unearned increment" of land values, he was for socialism. Then the "Progress and Poverty" of Henry George came out which gave a strong push to the then arising socialist movement.

As a result of this general revival of socialism, there appeared a number of organizations, such as the Democratic Federation (1881), the Fabian Society (1884), the

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45. Webb, op.cit., p.19
46. Loc.cit...
47. Ibid., p.21
Independent Labour Party (1893). Out of these movements and organizations, supported by the growing trade union movement, was born the British Labour Party, which is the political expression of century-old British socialism.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt any detailed account of the exact interrelationship between these organizations or of their respective influence upon the present ideology of British socialism. Whatever their influence might have been, Fabianism has become today the representative ideology of British socialism.

b. Chief Characteristics of Fabianism

Apart from the difficult question of deciding the extent to which an ideology is determined by the class status of an individual or group of individuals who entertain it, it is still useful to see the class background of the Fabian Society before we proceed further.

It has been admitted both by Fabians and non-Fabians that the Fabian Society is a movement of middle-class intellectuals. Though it is needless to mention the founders and original members of the Society, the general atmosphere of the middle-class still prevails even today, when the educational and social progress of modern society has considerably

48. The T.U.C. has exercised a great deal of influence upon the British socialism. Perhaps, it has shaped, to a great extent, the character of the Labour Party, but theoretical expression of British socialism as represented today by the Labour Party seems to be found in Fabianism rather than trade unionism.
diminished the distinction between lower and middle classes. As recently as 1942, the representative of a Divisional Labour Party announced his willingness to welcome a local Fabian Society to his division, with these words: "I think it would be a good thing to have a snob section in our Party."

The body of middle-class intellectuals has shown its peculiar character, which may not be wholly independent of its class background.

(1) It exists only to "advise," to "persuade the English people" and their politicians.

(2) Though it has produced no genius of great originality, it has shown a remarkable example of eclecticism.

Fabian socialism was a body of theory, the parts of which were borrowed from so many non-Fabian writers. Thus, according to Margaret Cole, the earlier Fabians took much of their history, with little or no acknowledgement, from Marx; their economics from Jevons and Ricardo; and their political philosophy from Bentham and John Stuart Mill, adding a dash of Henry George.

(3) It has had a high degree of adaptability and flexibility without losing any tenacity to its general pledge.

50. Ibid., p.6.
51. Fabian Tract, No. 70, p.1
(4) Its empiricism remains unchanged. Still today "the need to be practical" is cherished. The Fabians' major interests have revolved around the matter of practical policy and tactics. They retain the common quality of the English people—the dislike of dogma. As Margaret Cole put it, they show little concern about the remote future and "they have aimed at getting their facts unchallengable, at putting forward proposals which are (a) capable of being adopted within a reasonable space of time, and (b) defensible against rational opposition. If Utopian fundamentally, neither the Essayists nor their successors were concerned to make immediate suggestions for Utopia."

With these Fabian qualities in mind, we can give a brief consideration to some of the unique characteristics of what is called "Fabian socialism." Apart from the numerous tracts and journals, research pamphlets and individual writings, there are two very important documents which may best serve to represent Fabian socialism as such. These are the "Fabian Essays" (1889) and the "New Fabian Essays" (1952). Between the two Essays there is an interval of sixty-three years and it is not uninteresting to compare them with each other.

The most important thing to be said about the original Fabian Essays is that (1) they laid down the foundations of the


Welfare State and it was finally realized by the labour government of 1945-51, (2) they represented the first theoretical program for an evolutionary socialism distinct from Marxism and Utopian Socialism. The main points of this evolutionary socialism which were contained in the Essays and had a lasting influence may be enumerated as follows:

(1) Constitutionalism: Besides the simple statement expressed in the Fabian Tract No. 70, under the title of "Fabian Constitutionalism," the Essayists believed in the British Constitution and had a strong faith in a working democracy. Without this faith in the existing constitutional democracy, evolutionary socialism would have lost one of its basic grounds of argument, which they were quite right to hold on to.

(2) Equally important was their optimistic view, particularly that of Mr. Webb, on the activities of the state. To them socialism meant only state socialism, and in this respect "Fabianism becomes to a large extent synonymous with a demand for an indefinite extension of State activity."

(3) It must be pointed out that, though Fabianism is in general alien to abstract doctrine, the earlier Fabians nevertheless tried to support their "gentlemen's socialism" with some half-borrowed, half-conceived abstract economics.

54. Gray, op. cit., p. 395
It was the Ricardian Law of Rent that gave them a clue to the witty but ill-conceived analogy called the "Rent of Ability". Mr. Shaw tried to supply a theoretical foundation for his equalitarian socialism by this strange conception of rents of ability. According to him, a rent of ability was "the excess of its produce over that of ordinary stupidity".

This concept seemed to be able to explain the existing social and economic inequality without the Marxian concept of class exploitation. Inequality was not due to the exploitation of the ruling class, but due to the unequal ability of individuals. This theory apparently must have fitted the Fabian mood--i.e., it enabled the Fabians to dispose with the concept of class struggle and unilateral exploitation of the workers. It did not require them to condemn the State as the oppressive organ of the ruling class for exploitation. Thus backing up their socialist conviction by such concepts as "Law of Rent" and "rent of ability", the early Fabians worked out the practical programs and proposals which, when carried out later, brought about the present Welfare State.

(4) Beneath all the above characteristics, lies the faith of Fabians in gradualism. Constitutionalism, state socialism, rents of ability that sidesteps the notion of class struggle, all went hand in hand under the great faith of gradualism, which was consciously stated by Mr. Webb in

55. *Fabian Essays in Socialism*, ed. by Bernard Shaw, London, the Fabian Society, 1931, p.9
the Fabian Essays.

Before we begin to consider the New Fabian Essays, it may be appropriate to look at some of the deficiencies of early Fabianism.

(1) As Mr. Atlee said, the reader of Fabian Essays today "is struck by the almost complete absence of any reference to foreign affairs." It cannot but surprise anyone who knows Victorian England that those Essayists completely failed to see the significance of international affairs. Their interest was confined to that of the English people. In this sense, they were sort of national egotists, whatever their practical reasons might be.

(2) Together with the above deficiency there was a lack of vision in the Essays. Too empirical and practical, they spoke only in terms of today and tomorrow, here and us, "the English." Their words lacked such a far-reaching quality of sound as "workers of the world unite!" They failed to speak in terms of humanity. Above all, "they did not give a blue print for an ideal society." For this reason, Fabianism played no significant role beyond the boundary of England. It failed to give any moral or theoretical support to the continental democratic socialism that has failed to do away

58. Loc.cit.
with Marxism.

(3) The most important thing, however, was their failure to establish a firm theoretical ground for the gradualism which has been the core of Fabianism. As Mr. Gray points out, they had a strange faith in the inevitability of automatic evolution that was supposed to go on with or without any conscious effort or recognition. This view they might, as Margaret Cole pointed out, have borrowed from Marx, but they combined this inevitable process toward socialism with the principle of gradualism and their optimistic view of State activity. Thus, the conclusion became that the state would inevitably keep on expanding its sphere of activities, which would finally, and perhaps without realizing it, bring us into the realm of socialism. Few doubted about congeniality between a socialist society and state activity. Can state activity, when expanded infinitely, produce a socialist society? Even though we may assume that the state acts for, and only for, the common interest of all, it may be still doubtful whether we shall have anything like an ideal society which we cherish by the name of "socialist society."

Two crucial questions are involved here. (1) Whether or not it is possible to expand state activity infinitely. (2) Whether or not this expansion can bring about a socialist society.

We turn, at this stage, to the New Fabian Essays. The task of these Essays is, as Mr. Attlee puts it, to answer the question, "Where do we go from here?" This question expresses two important Fabian traditions. The word "we" does not assume "we" as the people of the world, and the primary concern and the interest of the Essayists are confined to that of the English people. Secondly, they regard the accomplished Welfare State as a stepping stone toward a socialist state, and as gradualists, they are entitled to this attitude.

After the accomplishment of those proposals and programmes formulated by the original Fabians under the Welfare State of the last Labour Government, there came to British Socialism a period of overall impasse, loss of momentum and sense of direction. As we have observed in the foregoing chapter, there can be various reasons for this impasse. But the most important of all factors must be found in the inadequate theory of socialism itself. There was nothing more in the original Fabian Essays which could guide the Labour movement beyond the Capitalist Welfare State. Socialists are at a loss for guiding principles.

The New Fabian Essays which appeared in 1952 under the editorship of R.H.S. Crossman are a direct result of the conscious struggle on the part of British Socialists in their

60. New Fabian Essays, Preface by C.R. Attlee.
quest for reappraisal of socialism under new historical conditions.

To summarise the main points of the eight essays, they can be said to consist of (1) redefinition of socialism, (2) a reappraisal of new historical facts and conditions and (3) proposed measures and policies in the light of socialism as thus redefined and of historical conditions as thus related. A new philosophy of history, however, dominates the essayists's analysis, in sharp contrast to their predecessor's optimistic view of the inevitable evolution of socialism. It is their deep scepticism about the automatic historical progress. At some points this scepticism submerges into a sense of tragedy and martyrdom.

Disillusioned by two consecutive World Wars, which gave birth to communism and fascism, these Fabians could not share the rosy Victorian belief that every step taken by state activity would bring us nearer socialism, that every social change which takes place silently or automatically would represent historical progress. In this mood of sceptical humanism, as Mr. Crossman calls it, they disagree with the early Fabians as well as with Marx; they turn their backs on collectivism and many traditional socialist ideals.

In their effort to re-define socialism, therefore, they seem to be less daring than even the earlier Fabians.

61. See Mr. Crossman's "Towards a Philosophy of Socialism," New Fabian Essays, p.10 and p.15
They shift emphasis from the socialization and nationalization of industry to democratic planning and control of industry, from abolition of private property to redistribution of wealth, from efficiency to equality. They have an even less doctrinaire aspect than their predecessors, though they try to be more than mere political empiricists. There is no such daring analogy as the "rents of ability" in the New Fabian Essays. Consequently, in general, there is nothing that can stir up the sensitive faculty of vision in the people who have lost the driving momentum of socialism and who have been held up in an impasse. They need something more than a fact or its explanation. They need a winged vision in order to proceed beyond the impasse.

Though some of the socialists, on the right wing particularly, were fascinated by their last achievement—the Welfare State—and advocated only consolidation and improvement of this achievement as the next goal of socialism, it is nevertheless to the credit of Fabians that they have not been dazzled by it. In their effort to dispel the feeling of complacency among some conservative socialists, and to create momentum toward further socialist advancement, the Fabians have tried to establish the argument that the Welfare State is not yet a socialist society. Thus it is characterized as the post capitalist society and named as Statism, a pre-socialist society. "I shall assume that socialism still means
a society different in kind, not only from Capitalism, but also from the statism of 1951."

It was, then, the concept of classless society that helped distinguish the socialist society from the post-capitalist Welfare State. Henceforth the following two definitions of socialism were quoted in the New Fabian Essays.

"By Socialism, I mean a form of society in which men and women are not divided into opposing economic classes, but live together under conditions of approximate social and economic equality, using in common the means that lie to their hands of promoting social welfare.

A human fellowship which denies and expels distinctions of class, and a social system in which no one is much richer or poorer than his neighbours as to be unable to mix with them on equal terms."63 (as defined by G.D.H. Cole in 1935).

"The socialist measures this progress of morality by the degree of equality and respect of individual personality expressed in the distribution of power and in the institutions of law and property within a state. This standard indeed is what we mean by the socialist ideal."64

In these definitions the general emphasis, as Mr. Crosland says, is laid on the "classless society", and socialism has come to be "about equality". It was thought that in this concept of equality they could bring about the necessary distinction between the Welfare State and socialism. "Once we accept this definition", says Mr. Crosland, "and the

63. Loc.cit.
64. R.H.S. Crossman, "Towards a Philosophy of Socialism", New Fabian Essays, p.10.
differences between statism and socialism come sharply into focus." Here the features of statism are analyzed and proved to be mere pre-socialism. There is, it is said, too much inequality yet in both wealth and power under statism. So far so good.

But when it comes to interpreting the meaning of "class", Mr. Crosland shifts the emphasis from the actual class division to the mere mental class division.

"But perhaps even more disturbing than this residue of objectively measurable social inequality was the persistence of a deep-seated sense of an unequal society...The purpose of socialism is (therefore) quite simply to eradicate this sense of class, and to create in its place a sense of common interest and equal status." 65

Consequently as the "sense" of class rather than the "objectively measurable" class division, came to be emphasized, so the proposed measures for the socialist society were not so much the real equalization of wealth and power, as education and psychology. Consequently what we are in most need of now would become to be not the factual change of society, but our own mental change. Thus it could be said that the U.S.A. is a more nearly classless society than Britain. The logical conclusion of this view would therefore amount to that the

66. Ibid, p.62 (Crosland)
feudal Korean society, in which few peasants or serfs had a "sense" of class could have been nearer to the classless society!

Through the whole Essays, one cannot but feel a general watering down of the traditional socialist ideals. Various reasons can be attributed to this trend. The last Labour government's experience, the English political system, the temperament of English people, the external factors such as the Cold war and relationships with The United States and above all, the loss of interest of the public towards "more socialism" owing to the effect of the Welfare State, etc.

Gradualism, if interpreted and adopted in the above way, may bring us ever closer to socialism, (the equalitarian society), but it is not likely to do more than that. Proposed measures of various kinds will, of course, diminish class distinction, but they may never be able to uproot its foundations. If we try to purge away the "sense" of class from people's minds, we may be able to do it temporarily, even without much factual change in social structure. But if we succeed in cleaning up the class sense before we clean up the actual class basis of society, the Socialists would never get enough enthusiasm from the people to halt the ever emerging class distinction. Then the socialists would either have to cease to be socialists, or have to resort to extra-legal
means, such as a coup d'etat in order to sweep away the final basis of class society. It was Marx's insight that any proposal which may alleviate social conflicts and troubles will harm the advance of socialism. It may sound illogical, as Bernstein said, that progress depends on the deterioration of social conditions, but it has some undeniable truth. The present loss of momentum and the impasse of Western socialism can also be attributed to the Welfare State. By establishing it, the socialists have almost lost themselves and their cause. The effect of the Welfare State is that "the temper of the people will be more contented and therefore more conservative, and public opinion will take time to acclimatise itself to the prospect of each further radical advance." The actual consequence of this sort of gradualism is that change ceases to be progress, that social changes will become nothing but a cycle of degeneration and reform.

A few more points should be mentioned. Though the Essayists do not share the romantic notion of automatic progress of society, it is interesting to note their belief in the inevitability of the transformation of capitalism. "Thus capitalism, with no hope of abortion, is forced to give birth to a new


"These influences (on the transformation of capitalism)—part external, part self-generated—have proved, in combination, irresistible." Political theorists appear to be reluctant to have any theory without the faith that history is more or less on their side.

The New Fabian Essays contains a separate essay on Equality—perhaps because of the new emphasis on it—and Mr. Jenkins did not forget to mention the relation of the equalitarian society to the political liberty of the individual. As far as the liberty of the individual's social and economic life is concerned, the equalitarian society is the highest form of individual freedom, because the individual becomes really free when and only when he can enjoy and utilize the equal means and conditions of life.

What about political freedom, especially the freedom to form a political party and to oppose the government under socialism? What about the party system under the equalitarian society?

In answer to the first question, if adequately established, the socialist state would not have too much to worry about because the basic cause of political conflicts,

71. Ibid., pp.37-38
i.e., conflicting interests among bodies of people, would have disappeared under socialism, and there would remain differences of another character in the field of politics. The government may be opposed not by a group of conflicting interests, but by a group of different tastes and tempers.

Therefore, it is not contradictory to its principle for socialism to have more than one political party. If it is well ensured that "our new society of near equals is left confronting a state machine in which power, both economic and political, is as widely diffused as possible," then political freedom will have the soundest social foundation that is possible. Thus for example, it could be said by the New Fabian Essayist that in England "the move towards and the attainment of a classless society might well leave largely undisturbed the present party basis."

Lastly it is worth noting that, though so much of the volume of the New Fabian Essays is given to foreign affairs, the essayists still cannot escape the traditional self-centered way of thinking. As practical thinkers, they are chiefly concerned with, and interested in, the political problems of their own country. And this seems to constitute the merit as well as the demerit of their approach to problems of socialism.

73. Jenkins, op.cit., p.89

74. Jenkins, Loc.cit.
They may be modest thinkers in the sense that they are reluctant to assume the role of solving world-wide socialist problems. Nevertheless, this intellectual modesty on the part of Fabians constitutes at the same time a limit of the Fabian ideology. Though they need not, and should not dictate to socialists of other countries, they should at least be aware of their great responsibility as leaders of democratic socialism amidst the bitter ideological struggle with communism. No matter whether they want it or not, they are sought by socialists of other countries for guidance and leadership. But when these socialists of other countries turn to Fabianism for some guiding principles, do they find any positive theoretical guidance? They may be advised not to imitate the British method, but they will not be presented with alternate methods. It may be that the Fabians are too busy with their own country's problems to deal with other countries, but this excuse does not change the socialist situations in the world. Fabians should show more genuine interest also in other countries and peoples than shown in such sentences as: "There is no reason to believe that social justice in the under-developed areas will be built by British or American methods." Otherwise, uncertainty and loss of self-confidence will further spread among those socialists who find themselves in an impelling political and ideologi-

cal struggle with communism.

The deficiency of the above Fabian attitude is revealed also by their incorrect appraisal of contemporary Asian nationalism and its relation to socialism. It seems to be the agreed opinion among Fabians that the real dynamic of the contemporary Asian revolution is the will of, not the masses but the elite—the minority, who does not share their aspiration with the masses.

"The dynamic of social revolution in Asia and Africa is not a mass demand for tractors or for bread, but the will and the social conscience of a small intelligentsia, whose aim (national liberation and modernization) is shared neither by the ruling oligarchy nor by the masses." 76

If this statement is true, how can we explain the fact that the Asian revolution is, like most revolutions elsewhere, being carried out by the masses? Why do the masses join and accomplish a revolution if they do not "share" the aims and aspiration of their elite leaders? Those revolutions in Asia today are not the few "elite's movements," but the people's movements, even if they are and have to be led by the elite. And again when it comes to what the essence of Asian nationalist movements is, the Essayists seem to be still inadequate in their judgment by interpreting the Asian nationalism

76. R.H.S. Crossman, "Towards a Philosophy of Socialism", New Fabian Essays, p.21
solely in terms of 19th and early 20th century ethnic nationalist movements. In fact, what has given rise to those nationalist revolutions is not so much mere aspiration for national independence or any exclusive nationalist sentiment, as it is a demand for social revolution. This is why most of the Asiatic nationalist parties in power, now or in the past, have been strongly "socialistic" in their policies. Indian Congress Party, Indonesian nationalist party, as well as the early Kuomintang under Sun Yat-Sen, all contain to some extent, socialist policies. The reason is plain they all want to achieve a social revolution and the appeal to nationalism is only a necessary means. Nationalism in Asia is not the cause but rather the effect of demand for a social revolution. Yet when Fabians look at those Asian revolutions merely from the standpoint of their own country's interest, Asian revolutions would appear as being not shared by the masses. Asian nationalism would appear to be "the one force strong enough to defeat all comers, whether the imperialism of the past or the totalitarianism of the present."

The two fundamental assumptions of British socialism, from which their socialist thinking proceeds, are the British political institution and the British national interests. The

Fabians are seldom free from the above assumptions in their thinking, consequently, their whole aspect of thinking, proposal, and policy formulations are restricted by the English boundary beyond which they cannot be influential, with the exception of those countries where British tradition and temper have somehow sent down deeper roots.

It is however, interesting to note that only recently there seems to be a growing awareness of the need for internationalism among the leading circles of the British socialists. G.D.H. Cole, the president of the Fabian Society at this time, has written an article in "The New Statesman and Nation" about the future of socialism, in which he proposes a new crusade of socialist internationalism by which he hopes Western socialism will overcome the present impasse and give a new momentum to it. But this internationalism would not do any good unless socialists, particularly the British socialists, based their thinking not on local and national grounds but on a higher and broader ground, i.e. humanity in general. They will find themselves in need of more socialist "doctrine" than the meaningless phrases of the Frankfort Declaration of 1951.

After all, British socialism, and Fabianism in particular, is essentially not a set of doctrines, but "a

79. Aims and Tasks of Democratic Socialism, Declaration of the Socialist International, July 1951, Frankfort. See also p.60 of the New Fabian Essays for Mr. Crossland's opinion about this Declaration.
set of proposed policies and programs, conceived on the basis of certain fundamental political traditions and assumptions, which are peculiar to the English temper and politics, and which "commit no one but their authors and are open to be taken or left, or altered for adoption." In this sense, it may be said that there is no Fabianism as such today, as there is no British socialism, apart from some socialist policies tempered by English traditions and politics.

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Democratic socialism is a form of socialism that attempts to establish a socialist society by way of changes brought about through operation and utilization of modern representative democracy. Democratic socialists have been traditionally distinguished from Communists not only in their disinclination toward a rigid and dogmatic doctrine, but also in their distrust of and refusal to employ revolutionary methods. Hence democratic socialism is sometimes called evolutionary socialism, or gradualism. As we saw in Fabian socialism, it has rejected the doctrine of class struggle and revolutionary dictatorship.

At first gradualism seemed to be more a product of a particular temperament than a conclusion of theoretical investigation. It grew up more through consideration of practical tactics than through a well-conceived system of political philosophy. It is said that the initial differences between gradualists and revolutionary socialists (Communists) were "not primarily in ideas, but in feeling."

The historical split between the Second and Third Internationals is said to represent "not only sharply differing tactics, but the temperaments that go with them." Temperament and ideology are usually intimately related, and this seems to be especially true in the case of gradualism.

Yet there were also particular historical conditions that could justify and support the gradualist approach to socialism. That is, those who were of gradualist temperament could find in the newly developing historical conditions of the late 19th century a basis for the new gradualist principle and tactic of socialism.

What kind of historical conditions were they, then that could justify the gradualist approach to socialism?

When the Communist Manifesto was first published, European democracy was still in its embryonic stage of development. It was full of defects. Only sixteen years earlier, the first major reformation of the English parliamentary system had been achieved, and until then it is said that "conditions did not exist for the emergence of a modern party system...The majority of Members of Parliament, even after 1832, continued to take their orders from the influential individuals or groups controlling their constituencies..." The early

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82. Loc.cit.

modern democratic government was indeed, "but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie."

However, toward the beginning of the 20th century, the development of political democracy, especially of the representative system, and with it, the emergence of the mass party system in Western Europe, neither of which was clearly envisaged by Marx, affected the tactical considerations of some of the traditional socialists. The Fabian Essays in Socialism were first published in 1889, and Bernstein's Evolutionary Socialism appeared in 1899. Both expressed the faith of socialists in the newly developing political democracy as a safe and appropriate means of achieving socialism. This faith was best expressed in the Fabian Tract No. 70.

When the House of Commons is freed from the veto of the House of Lords, and thrown open to candidates from all classes by an effective system of Payment of Representatives and a more rational method of election, the British parliamentary system will be, in the opinion of the Fabian Society, a first-rate practical instrument of democratic government. 84

Furthermore, with the development of parliamentary democracy and the party system, the socialist parties in the Western countries began to gain more and more seats in the parliaments. There was strong hope of winning a majority of

84. Fabian Tract No. 70 (Report on Fabian Policy) p.65
electors to their side. They thus hoped to capture political power through a parliamentary majority. Revolution thus became unnecessary for them. Moreover, to such socialist parties it must therefore have seemed, for example, that to oppose the war efforts of their States in World War I would mean not only the loss of their supporters' votes, but also the end of their own existence. To them, the traditional talk of "revolution" came to mean only a parliamentary, constitutional revolution, implying the defence of the democratic constitution.

Finally with the break-up of the Second and Third Internationals, socialists for the first time came to realize the full significance of their old but hitherto veiled disagreement in temperament and approach.

Moderate and constitutional, so that the voters were not to be frightened, sufficiently nationalistic so that electoral chances might not be prejudiced, the socialists of the Second International began to re-think their socialism, in the light of parliamentary democracy. Under the ever improving political democracy, the socialists could have probably two choices--either adhere to the Marxist theory of revolution and dictatorship, and abandon hope for an early attainment of political power, or adopt a new course of tactics--democratic

constitutionalism—in the hope that it would ensure the achievement of political power through an electoral majority. The democratic socialists chose the second course. The Berne Conference of the Second International adopted in February 1919 a majority resolution "On Democracy and Dictatorship", which states that it "firmly adheres to the principles of Democracy," and that "effective socialist development is only possible under democratic law." It called upon "Socialists throughout the world...to ensure that Socialism and Democracy, which are inseparable, shall triumph everywhere."

Having taken this new course with full consciousness of its significance, the leaders of the democratic socialist movements tried to justify their position against Communism which came to be represented by the Third International and by Russian Marxism. In 1918, K. Kautsky thus wrote The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, and in the next year, Ramsay MacDonald's Parliament and Revolution appeared, defending the principles of political democracy. At about the same time, Lenin wrote The State and Revolution and The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, denouncing the principle of gradualism. Since then, the chief dispute between Commun-

86. R. Palme Dutt, The Two Internationals, London, Allen & Unwin, 1920, pp.54-5. See also Part II, Chapter III, of this paper for the position of the newly revived Second International.
ism and Democratic Socialism has largely revolved about the questions of revolution and the proletarian dictatorship. The arguments for each case presented by many writers ever since are too long to be considered here. However, it is noteworthy that for Communists, proletarian revolution and the subsequent dictatorship are not only inevitable and necessary, but also more effective, more expedient and (in the sense in which a tool is better for certain types of carpentry work) better ways of achieving socialism. Lenin wrote:

"The revolutionary way is the way of quick amputation, which is the least painful to the proletariat, the way of direct removal of the decomposing parts, the way of fewest concessions and least consideration for the monarchy and the disgusting, vile, rotten and contaminating institutions which go with it."87

How the natural necessity of the laws of social development, of the class struggle, of the inevitable revolution and dictatorship could combine so fortunately with political expediency, nobody seems to have explained yet. Might it perhaps be that the "inevitable", or the "necessary", is the "reasonable"? At any rate, this identity of necessity with expediency seems to be also, in a less explicit way, assumed by the democratic socialists.

To democratic socialists, the gradual change of a

capitalist society toward a new type of society seems to be not only "desirable" but also quite as much "inevitable". Thus it is said that "capitalism, with no hope of abortion, is forced to give birth to a new society. It is now quite clear that Capitalism has not the strength to resist the process of metamorphosis into a qualitatively different kind of society." Capitalistic democracy here has become itself a stage to socialism. Thus writers on democratic socialism have started to analyze changes in the modern capitalist system and its state organs in order to justify their theory of "gradual" self-transformation into socialism. Somewhat abridged, the chief features of these changes, as described by C.A.R. Crosland, may be summarized as follows:

1) Decline of the social position of property rights, and the political powers that accompany these rights.
2) Rise of the new managerial class, and transfer of power from owners to managers.
3) Enormous increase and extension of the power of the State.
4) Disappearance of the laissez-faire economy, and the extension of social services.

5) Removal of the deep instability of capitalism, and maintenance of a high level of employment.

6) Continued expansion of productivity and increased production.

7) Variation in class divisions, and the rise of the middle classes.

8) Changes in the ideological atmosphere of society, and a shift of emphasis from "private profit" to "the public good".

The most important aspect of change among those mentioned above, is said to be "the change from laissez-faire to state control." This trend, which the gradualist names "Statism", is said to be the first stage of socialism, and to be now in the process of succeeding capitalism.

In this way, modern democracy and the democratic state, which were branded by Lenin as "the bourgeois dictatorship and suppressive organ of the ruling class", have undergone a series of changes which, to the democratic socialists, seem to offer promise of a peaceful realization of socialist society. Hence, in addition to being an excellent machine that could be utilized to produce, in the manner most acceptable to the liberalist temperament, a socialist society, modern representative democracy is now thought to be itself a

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90. Ibid. p.43

91. Loc.cit.
prelude to socialism.

b. The Double Meaning of Democracy—and Defects and Confusion in Current Democratic Socialist Ideology:

Democracy is thus thought to be helping the gradualists in two ways, i.e. 1) by providing them with the instrument of representative government through which to bring about the necessary changes leading to socialism, and 2) by becoming itself a stage to socialism. We may call, for the sake of convenience, such aspects of modern democracy its instrumentality for gradualism, and we now can say it is this instrumentality that is the foundation of gradualism. On it is gradualism founded and through it is gradualism practicable. Without it gradualism becomes meaningless. Is, then, the importance of democracy for democratic socialism to be found only in its instrumentality for gradualism?

To a true heir of liberalism, democracy should stand for more than a mere instrumentality. It stands, in other words, also for the principle of freedom. The notion of democratic socialism implies democracy and hence socialism has been thought to mean more than a mere economic order of society. In a truly socialist society, not only the means of production would be owned socially, but also all the principles of freedom should prevail. Democracy in this sense is therefore also the ultimate end of democratic socialism.
Thus we can say that to democratic socialists democracy has a double meaning, namely, as an instrument and as an end. This double meaning of democracy for democratic socialism found its expression in the position of the new Second International. Whereas the old Second International asserted simply the inseparability of democracy and socialism, ("Socialism and Democracy are inseparable"), the new Second International expressed a clearer understanding of the above meaning of democracy when it stated:

"Socialism can be achieved _only through_ democracy. Democracy can be fully realized _only through_ Socialism."  

In other words, the first sentence of the above statement expresses the instrumentality of democracy for socialism whereas the second holds democracy as a desirable end to be realized through socialism. Here, democracy is an instrument for socialism and, at the same time, socialism for democracy. Democracy and socialism are each a means for the other and an end through the other. To democratic socialists, true socialism is always socialism under democracy, and, true democracy, democracy under socialism.


93. Declaration of the Second International, as adopted in Frankfort on July 3, 1951. (Section Political Democracy) (Italics not in the original.)
In this way democratic socialism tried somehow to identify Socialism with Democracy, and in this attempt to unite the two ideologies the democratic socialists seem to be motivated chiefly by their consideration for human freedom. In the hearts of gradualists burns the time-honoured torch of love for freedom.

And yet it may be noted that the principle of freedom and gradualism are not the same thing. The two are of course closely related to each other, but they are still not the same thing. The point is, freedom is an end, gradualism merely a means to it. This distinction between gradualism and the principle of freedom in Democratic Socialism is important for both theoretical and practical reasons. The theoretical reason is that the distinction between the fundamental and accessory concepts of democratic socialism will facilitate and may help orient more adequately any attempt to re-define democratic socialism.

Gradualism would become meaningful not as an end in itself, but as a means to preserve or to achieve freedom—closely related to, and practicable through, the instrumentality of modern democracy. Yet one often can get the impression that the concept of freedom in Democratic Socialism is be-clouded by the overemphasis on gradualism. Gradualism must not be left to usurp, even by implication, the role and position of the concept of freedom in Democratic Socialist ideology.
In order to maintain this point it is necessary to clarify the proper meaning and role of gradualism.

We have hitherto observed that at the core of Democratic socialism lie the liberal tradition and liberal temperament, and gradualism was adopted first because of the particular social and political conditions that were developing in Europe during the late nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. It is therefore one of the tactical principles of Democratic Socialists: it may not be applicable under different historical conditions, especially where the instrumentality of democracy is lacking. Yet its underlying cause, i.e. the principle of freedom, can be adopted for Democratic Socialism even if conditions are inimical to the adoption of gradualism.

When they attempted to re-define democratic socialism in the New Fabian Essays, however, the Democratic Socialists, for all their liberalist bequests, seemed to put emphasis on the concept of "equality" rather than on that of "freedom". Thus it was said that socialism is "about equality". The book also contained a separate article on "Equality", which is an indication of the allocation of more emphasis to the concept.

If socialism is "about equality", democratic socialism


95. Ibid. p.69.
or gradualism would mean "gradual equalization" or "gradual nationalization and redistribution of national income". In fact this seems to be more or less what is meant by democratic socialism to many people today. This would be an inadequate representation of democratic socialism, for it leaves out one of the fundamental dynamics of democratic socialism, namely, the spirit of liberalism. Furthermore, without the concept of freedom Democratic Socialism may fail to distinguish itself clearly from Communism, thus paralyzing its effectiveness to challenge the Communist ideology. If socialism were meant to be "about equality" and not "about freedom", and if it is with respect to equality rather than freedom that the Communists today can claim accomplishments, then how can Democratic Socialists claim superiority for their ideology? Complete socialization and "levelling-off" at the cost of freedom are well-known Communist approaches. If there is to be a real difference between Democratic Socialism and Communism, it seems to have to be with respect to the concept of freedom.

It is interesting to note the nature of a difficulty which is presently faced by the Fabians. During the discussion at the Fabian Summer School at Oxford in 1955 the younger Fabians are said to have told R.H. Crossman,

"If you are going to have Socialism and a planned economy, why not make a real job of it?...For heaven's sake, make up your minds. If you are still Socialists, go for it one hundred per cent."  

Mr. A.J.P. Taylor who had been invited there by Mr. Crossman listened to these younger Fabians and is said to have asked them:

"Very well, my friends, answer me one question. If you really believe all that, why don't you join the Communist Party? If you want one hundred percent Socialism, what's wrong with the Soviet Union?"

According to Mr. Crossman, "they could not give much of an answer to Mr. Taylor's question."

These conversations indicate somewhat the nature of the current trouble of democratic socialists. They want freedom, or do not want to lose it, yet they are unable to re-cast the idea of socialization in terms of freedom. They do not seem to have been successful in the attempt to found socialism on the concept of freedom, though they are themselves essentially liberals.

The question of freedom will have to be faced more seriously by the thinkers of democratic socialism today. In this connection, however, it may be an encouraging tendency that several years after the publication of the New Fabian Essays, the Fabian Society published Tract No. 298, which seems to be more oriented in the direction of a re-thinking of socialism in terms of freedom. Such a re-thinking would not

97. Ibid.
be an innovation, alien to the tradition of Democratic Socialism, but rather a restoration or return to its essential character. It is known that "men and women have joined the Labour Party," to quote The Economist, "because they believed that it was fighting the battle for popular emancipation. They looked for freedom through socialism." What the Democratic Socialists should do is to revitalize their early liberalist aspiration and reinterpret it in the light of modern conditions.

c. The Practical Side of the Question of Rethinking Democratic Socialism in Terms of Freedom:

The "practical" importance of the distinction between gradualism and the principle of freedom will become cogent when we consider the tasks to be faced by the democratic socialists in such revolutionary areas as Asia or Africa.

In such areas there may be, as we shall discuss in the following sections, little chance for successful adoption of gradualism. There may be neither an existing democracy to serve as an instrument for gradualism nor sufficient conditions favourable for its emergence. The "instrumentality" of democracy thus may be totally lacking in such areas. The point is, that if there is little possibility for gradualism, should then democratic socialists sit back and watch the

Communists take over such countries. If gradualism alone were to prescribe the actions of democratic socialists, then they would hardly be able to act in a revolutionary situation.

It seems to us, therefore, that only by re-defining democratic socialism on a broader basis than the gradualist principle or on a more fundamental concept than equality, i.e. by founding it on the concept of freedom, can Democratic Socialists hope to accomplish their task.

Moreover, since a revolutionary situation itself constitutes a potential threat to freedom, it is vital that Democratic Socialists make freedom their cardinal concept. The more seriously revolutionary a situation is, the more important will have to be the role of the concept of freedom, if Democratic Socialists want to establish a free society. Where there are few liberal traditions in a country, there seems to be no stronger bulwark for the development of free government than an ideology conceived in freedom.

It has been said that freedom means little to the poverty-stricken peoples in Asia and Africa. It is true, probably, that freedoms of speech, association, or press may mean little when people are suffering from poverty and thus cannot actually utilize these formal guarantees for freedom. To them, the desire for food would naturally come before their desire for the freedoms of speech and association. Yet
this fact must not belittle the importance of freedom for those people.

It was the insight of early socialists to point out that those formal guarantees for freedom were not enough for realization of a free life. The necessary economic needs and basic human desires must be satisfied before man can enjoy the values of freedom. Poverty or low living-standards can in this sense be linked with the problem of freedom. In fact it is a part of the entire problem of freedom. If we regard the problem of poverty in relation with freedom, it can be made meaningful to the peoples of underdeveloped areas. A part of this logic has been used by the Communists to suppress freedom and to justify their doing so when they say: "there can be no freedom until you have the means to enjoy it." In this way they not only succeed in subjugating peoples, but also have managed to put off, or to leave out, the question of freedom. The Democratic Socialists will have to face the question honestly and make it their cardinal issue. Therefore, in this sense, the concept of freedom can serve the purpose of Democratic Socialists in the underdeveloped countries, too.

So far we have argued that 1) the concept of freedom rather than that of equality or gradualism should be made the central concept of Democratic Socialism, 2) the attempt of the New Fabians to redefine Democratic Socialism in terms of
equality seems to be inappropriate, 3) gradualism should be regarded as one of the tactical concepts of Democratic Socialism, and 4) under revolutionary conditions, Democratic Socialists may not only have to turn to principles other than gradualism, but also the concept of freedom will need to play a vital role and therefore should be adequately treated.

With these points, we now turn to consider, in the following sections, the nature of the present difficulty of Democratic Socialism when applied to Asia, generally, and to Korea in particular.

d. Asia and Western Democracy:

The struggle of Western-style democracy against Communism in Asia has not been very successful, and there are many reasons for this.

In regard to the ideology itself, certain difficulties arise. First, one of its early central ideals, the idea of laissez-faire economy, and with it, capitalism in general, is more or less discredited there today, especially in academic circles and among intellectuals. Second, there was and still is the fact that most of the colonial powers in Asia claim to be "Democracies" at home. This means that the colonialism-hating peoples of Asia see in Western-style "democracy" a symbol of Western-style colonial rule and imperialism. And,
it is to be noted that these "democratic" nations are at the same time capitalistic nations. Unfortunately, the picture of Western nations thus constructed by Asians is something like this: "Democracy", Colonialism (imperialism), and Capitalism, the three different heads of one monster.

Another factor, however, perhaps the most important one, is the contemporary Asian social situation, demanding of social revolution or at least drastic reform. It demands social revolution even before there is the possibility of realizing some of the ideals of modern democracy, such as individual freedoms. If the people there are now impelled to take a choice, they would be more inclined to take revolution and even dictatorship than the mere individual freedoms. "Democracy" without social reform would be more meaningless than social reform without "democracy".

Moreover, without a revolutionary program for social reform, "democracy" would sooner or later founder under the pressure of current Asian conditions. If Indian democracy under Nehru and Burmese democracy under U Nu have been relatively successful so far, it must be attributed more to the drastic social reforms the two leaders have aspired to and so far brought about, than to any other factor. Filipino democracy under President Magsaysay seems to be no exception in this respect.
On the other hand, a spectacular example of failure of democracy that was mainly due to the neglect of social reform was, as we know now, the Kuomintang's China. Over the period of a generation, the Chinese Nationalists failed to institute the social and economic reforms so desperately needed, especially the land reform.

Where economic power is concentrated in the hands of a few semi-feudal landlords, even the process of popular election will only throw these power-hungry landlords into office, and enable them to utilize all the powerful machinery of government to preserve their entrenched interests and to further exploit the already down-trodden masses. This is what has happened in Korea for instance, and even a leading public figure like Syngman Rhee may be too impotent to remedy it. It is not one man's fault, it is the fault of the entire society.

Thus only the formal aspects of democracy, such as mere universal suffrage and a system of representative and constitutional government, may be put forward. The supposedly representative government turns out to be the government of the privileged few, who manipulate the entire election, and whose aims are power and money. "Democracy" here may produce, in fact, nothing else but an "executive committee" of the landlords. Corruption of the government becomes inevitable.
Thence, intellectuals become disillusioned, the masses become dissatisfied with Western-style "Democracy". Such has been the general fate of democracy in Asia.

**e. Communist Success in Asia:**

Turning to Asian Communism, we find a totally different situation. There has been a spectacular Communist success in Asia in the last ten years. It is important to grasp clearly and correctly those factors that have contributed to that success, for only through a proper appraisal and understanding of those factors can we hope to find some basis in which future policies and strategy against Communism can be sought.

Earlier, in the second section of Chapter II of this paper, we characterized the Communist Party as primarily a revolutionary party. This essential nature of the Communist Party as a revolutionary organization is the source of its strength, as well as of its weakness.

We can say that, whenever the Communist Party commands strong support and wields great influence, wherever it becomes a major political force, there must exist conditions favourable for revolution. Conversely, if there is little in the way of a revolutionary situation in a society, Communist strength is negligible.
What, then is a revolutionary situation? More specifically, what are those conditions that have underlain Communist success in Asia? We can speak of the possibility of revolution when we find (1) a widespread suppressed hostility of the masses of a population toward a ruling minority, (2) a deep corruption of government, (3) the absence of popular and legal means to change government, (4) presence of organized revolutionaries; and other factors, such as defection of armed forces and intellectuals, foreign intervention, etc. With the exception of the suppressed hostility of the people, all the factors are objective, and can be grasped by an observer without much difficulty. And even the suppressed hostility of the people may be grasped, through such objective factors as poverty and economic inequality. It often seems to be that a ruling government is startled and frightened by the intensity of this suppressed popular hostility, as manifested in some outburst of revolutionary enthusiasm. However, it should not be too hard for the rulers to sense any substantial hostility of the people more indirectly, through various factual symptoms and events.

Leaving aside a detailed treatment of the historical background of the present revolutionary conditions in Asia, so fertile for the spread of the revolutionary force, Communism, we will only try to indicate briefly some of its salient characteristics.
Colonialism--A Case Study:

When Western capitalism, eager and anxious to find new trading markets, came into Asia more than a century ago, the Asiatic nations were still under feudalistic rule. They had no intention of opening their ports or trading with the new visitors from the West.

Japan was the first country to throw off the coat of feudalism in 1868. Korea was still a corrupted, feudal kingdom when Japan took it over completely in 1910, representative now of the new Western order of things. We will try here, for the sake of convenience, to restrict our attention to Korea alone and will show what happened to a feudal society after an advanced modern nation established a colonial rule. Did modern nations with their modern industry and political systems (such as democracy or constitutional monarchy) try to do away with the feudal social structure or try to advance a society? The following statistics will speak for themselves; the case here is Korea.
Trend of increase in tenant farmers (Korea was, as it is still today, primarily an agricultural nation when Japan took over in 1910).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF FARMING FAMILIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-17</td>
<td>555,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-22</td>
<td>529,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-27</td>
<td>529,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-32</td>
<td>497,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-37</td>
<td>547,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-</td>
<td>539,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note the sharp decrease of farmers who owned a part of their land, and rented the rest of it, and who constituted a social bridge between the upper landowners and lower tenants).

Table of big landowners by nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Over 100 square chong</th>
<th>Over 150 square chong</th>
<th>Over 200 square chong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(≈ about 14.5 chong make one mile).

As we can see from the above two tables, as the years passed.


100. Ibid. p.164
the concentration of land in the hands of a few was further intensified under Japanese colonialism. The semi-feudal social structure was not eliminated, but preserved.

Japan would claim that it raised the amount of food production by so many per cent. It was true that Korean peasants were driven to increase food production. But where did the thus produced food go? Who benefited most by the increased production of food? Let us turn to the figures again.

Table of value of crop production and export

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thousand yen</td>
<td>Thousand yen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>241,722</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>13,167</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1,644,004</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>385,958</td>
<td>2,931</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(We must not forget that 80-90% of food export went to Japan.) How about the main crop, the Korean rice? Here are the figures about it.

101. Ibid. p.133
Table of rice production and export.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Amount of rice consumed per person in Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>thousand bushels</td>
<td></td>
<td>thousand bushels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-16</td>
<td>12,303</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.7188 bushel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-21</td>
<td>14,101</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>2,443</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>0.6860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922-26</td>
<td>14,501</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>4,375</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>0.5871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927-31</td>
<td>15,798</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>6,616</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>0.4964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-36</td>
<td>17,002</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>8,735</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>0.4017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>19,410</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>7,201</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.5679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>26,796</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>10,996</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>0.7031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>24,138</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>6,894</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>0.7761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures show that an increase in rice production did not necessarily mean an increased consumption by Korean farmers; instead, except in 1939, the average amount consumed per person in Korea steadily decreased under the Japanese rule.

The Japanese would often talk about the colossal colonial expenditures, in an attempt to show how generously they gave away their money to the Korean people. Actually, all the money spent in Korea by the Japanese Government was squeezed from the already impoverished Koreans, as the following figures will show:

Japanese Governmental Revenue and Expenditure in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL EXPENDITURE (thousand yen)</th>
<th>TOTAL REVENUE (thousand yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>46,172</td>
<td>52,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>56,869</td>
<td>62,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>93,026</td>
<td>125,803</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

102. Ibid. pp.151-2
103. Ibid. pp.83-85
It seems superfluous to go further than this in trying to show the nature of modern colonialism in Korea under the Japanese. The few big industries in Korea were all owned by Japanese. No industry for the production of capital equipment was established. The extremely low living standard of the Korean people, the backwardness in industrial development of Korea in comparison with Japan today, prove how Japanese colonial rule held back the development of Korean society. The sharp increase in rural tenancy, the decline in independent ownership brought further impoverishment of the majority of the Korean people. The effect of Japanese colonialism was thus the preservation and further strengthening of the class division and inequality of the old, semi-feudal social structure.

We are often told how modern colonial powers helped modernize the feudal and backward societies of their colonies. It is true that these societies were backward, and, for that reason, were taken over by relatively more advanced nations. For effective exploitation the ruling nations established 1) a centralized administration, 2) an improved system of production to boost output of raw materials and food, 3) a modern transportation system, and 4) something in the way of public health and education. These "modernizations" were the necessary measures for maximum colonial exploitation.

However, it came to be an effect of modernization
under colonialism that these backward and feudal societies started, gradually or suddenly, to develop and attain consciousness of social and national unity, independently and in spite of the colonial rulers, whose chief goal remained economic exploitation—which goal was generally achieved, to the general impoverishment of the victimized nations.

The combination of the above two effects of colonialism—the impoverishment of society under colonial exploitation and at the same time the awakening of colonial peoples under colonial modernization, is the background of present colonial revolutions.

Although the extent and degree of preservation of the old social structure varied according to circumstances, it may be said in general that elimination of feudal social structure did not go beyond what was expedient for maximum colonial exploitation. To do away with the old social order entirely meant to democratize these societies, and to democratize them meant to overempower them so much, that they threatened the rule of the colonial powers. Thus Asian society did not pass through the stages of such democratic revolutions as represented, in the West, by the French and American revolutions. These general observations apply not only to Korea, of course, but also to such countries as India, Burma, Indo-China, and Indonesia.

104. For interesting description of Western colonialism in Asia, see K.M. Panikkar's Asia and Western Dominance, New York, The John Day Co., 1954. Parts II and III.
This basic character of colonialism as the deterrent of social progress determines the nature of Asian nationalism today. Asian nationalism is not a mere "national self-determination" or "independence" movement. It is a social revolution. If it appears nationalistic, or inspired chiefly by nationalist sentiment, it is so because without elimination of colonialism, which has been the perpetuator and protector of semi-feudalism, social revolution is impossible.

g. The Chances for Democratic Socialism in Asia:

Communism has been successful in Asia because it has met those revolutionary conditions for which it is best prepared. At the same time, the elimination of this revolutionary situation would automatically cut down its influence, and bring about its eventual downfall. One could say that this elimination could be effected either "gradually" or "abruptly". But any revolutionary situation, being "revolutionary", presupposes the difficulty of "gradual" improvement—or it wouldn't be "revolutionary". Hard as it might be, however, to attempt "gradual" change of a society and avoidance of any total disruption is always worthwhile. To avoid revolution as much as possible is, as Rousseau said, an axiom of politics.

Here democratic socialism, or the socialism of gradualism might be adopted in Asia, provided that the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) Presence of a successful parliamentary democracy;
(2) Existence of a government showing improvement in democratic processes;
(3) Presence of a Democratic Socialist Party, that can at least expect a parliamentary majority; or,
(4) A great leader of Democratic Socialism who can command the support of the masses;
(5) Sufficient time for gradual change;
(6) Absence of external interference or aggression; (for example, by a Communist country, or a former colonial power)
(7) Sufficient strength to resist internal revolution.

Unfortunately, the actual situation in some parts of Asia today seems hardly to satisfy these lavish requirements for adoption of gradualism. In most countries, the Western-style parliamentary democracy seems unable to produce any responsible government bent upon drastic social reform. Administrations seem to be getting more and more corrupt. The internal unrest of society growing out of long existent social injustice is becoming more serious. The presence and operation of the Communists leave little time for an eventual improvement by gradualism. All sorts of international interference and invasions seem to stifle freedom of governments to carry out their reform policies. Moreover, most of the governments are
too weak to meet internal unrest without foreign assistance. Lastly, the democratic socialist parties, except in India and Burma, are either too weak to command a majority, or too divided internally to carry out united action. (Japan, for example, had two separate socialist parties, left wing and right wing ones.) The situation might be left to the course of natural development, were there no Communist threat both from within and from without. But time is running against slow and gradual change.

How about our second way of dealing with the Asian revolutionary situation then--the way of abrupt elimination?

As soon as a democratic socialist turns to this, he is faced with direct rivalry with the Communists, the master revolutionaries.

To leave the question of revolution entirely to Communists, however, means to guarantee establishment of a Communist regime after revolution, for whoever leads a revolution will also control the post-revolutionary regime. Therefore, if democratic socialists amid revolutionary conditions want to prevent Communist post-revolutionary dominance, they must be the leaders of revolution. They must retain in their hands "the hegemony of revolution".

Communists are fully taught and aware of the importance of revolutionary leadership.
"The main tactical principle is that the proletariat can and must be the 'leader' of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the 'guiding force' of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia."  

Are the contemporary democratic socialist parties able to lead a revolution? As democratic socialism has come to mean more or less the socialism of gradualism, or socialism through parliamentarism, the question of revolution is entirely neglected. To enquire into this question might appear to go beyond the relevant scope, therefore, of the politics of democratic socialism. But this may be a wrong position, for (1) no genuine political ideology should leave out such a vital political problem as revolution from the scope of its inquiry; (2) the essence of democratic socialism is not the faith in gradualism or parliamentarism, but the faith in liberty. As we have seen in the third section of Chapter II, the core of democratic socialism lies in its assumption that it is the true heir of liberalism. The role of democratic socialism as the new champion of liberalism is exemplified by the replacement of the British Liberal Party by the Labour Party. Gradualism, or parliamentarism, which split the socialist movement in two, grew out not from some abstract doctrine, but from the "liberalist temperament" of socialists, who had joined the socialist ranks primarily to save human

freedom. Democratic socialists should therefore be not "first liberals, second socialists", but "first liberals, second liberals." They are and must be liberals through and through. If they were ever socialists, it was because they believed that only socialism could achieve the liberal ideals. In this meaning of democratic socialism lies the justification for facing the question of revolution. It is not against the cause of democratic socialism to carry out a revolution if only revolutionary means are left to achieve freedom.

h. The Ideological Incompetence of Democratic Socialism:

If democratic socialists, then, must face the question of revolution and be capable of leading a revolutionary battle in order to deprive the Communists of any chance to establish a Communist regime, we must consider their competence for this task.

This question of competence must be considered from three aspects: organizational, tactical, and ideological. The organizational and tactical aspects, however, are not only beyond the scope of this thesis, but also are deducible from the ideological aspect. For this reason, we are here chiefly concerned with only the third, the ideological, aspect.

The picture is hardly an encouraging one. The ideological incompetence of democratic socialists to lead
revolutionary movements may be due to neglect of the leaders to give proper attention to matters of ideology. But this seems more an effect than the cause. The basic cause seems to lie in the ideology itself.

(1) First of all, gradualism should not be considered the *sine qua non* of democratic socialism. It is of course an important characteristic of democratic socialism that it does not exclude, but embraces within itself. Gradualism is and must be only one of its tactical principles.

(2) As we have argued earlier, the concept of freedom should be given adequate role in the structure of democratic socialist ideology.

(3) Democratic socialism seems to have an old dogma that needs re-examining—i.e. that socialist economic order, the State-owned and State-run system, would not only be able to put an end to all social injustices once and for all, but also be able to bring us automatically into the "Kingdom of Freedom".

This has been a traditional socialist assumption to which all the early socialists, Communists and Democratic Socialists alike, subscribed. Even after the break with the Communists, it has been the haunting ghost that has put Democratic Socialists into a state of constant ideological
uncertainty. By temperament, Democratic Socialists cherished democracy and the idea of modern representative government. But if the above general socialist assumption were true, why should Democratic Socialists hesitate to establish the socialist economy, even at the cost of democracy?

Nevertheless, they couldn't become communists, for by nature they were too liberalist to sacrifice freedom to the principle of political expediency. This state of "divided self" of Democratic Socialists finds its expression in the wide split of left and right wings within democratic socialist parties. From the very beginning, they must have felt this divided self and therefore were aware of the subsequent danger. Thus they consciously tried to unify this divided mentality when they asserted that "Socialism and Democracy are inseparable." How and why they are or should be inseparable, they could not explain at the time. It was not a theoretical conclusion arrived at after a long investigation, but rather a demand, a cry of a divided mind. In this divided mind, many Socialists lived a life of tragic ideological wandering, and even the Webbs ended their life in admiration of the Soviet régime.

However, it was made clear recently that the old socialist assumption that a socialist economy is the gateway to the "Kingdom of Freedom" is a dogma. In theory, individual
freedoms may be said not to be compatible with the planned economy under socialism; in practice, Soviet Russia's economic and political development offers an undeniable proof that socialist economy is not a friend, but an enemy of individual freedoms. Nevertheless, it seems this socialist dogma is still entertained by Democratic Socialists.

If they compete with the Communists, burdened with this same dogma, they are doomed to lose the leadership, for they want to go the same road only "gradually", i.e. "more slowly" than the Communists, and to go the same road more slowly means to give up the leading role. This is one reason why democratic socialism should be something other than the "slower, cautious socialism" or the "one-half socialism".

Democratic socialists have two choices. One is to stick to the above socialist dogma, and thus take the same road as the communists, more slowly, in which case there will be no democratic socialist leadership—in fact there will be no democratic socialists as such, except those political opportunists who are used and then denounced and purged in time by Communist leadership. The fate of so many Mensheviks, early Social Democrats who lost their battle to the Communists, illustrates this situation.

The other choice is to find a different and sounder assumption for democratic socialism, and thus take a different, and more correct, road than the Communists, in which case democratic socialists will be leaders of their own movement. To do this would require a new approach toward the definition of democratic socialism, and we are well aware of the difficulty involved.

(4) Democratic socialists should take a clearer stand in regard to the modern democratic representative system of government than those ambiguous statements that Democracy and Socialism are inseparable or that one can be achieved or fully realized "only through" the other. They are too vague to be a guiding principle of democratic socialism in all types of political action.

Is Democracy, i.e. the representative system of modern government, the sine qua non of the democratic socialist ideal? Should socialism be achieved only through democratic means? Would socialism be possible under democracy? If so, what sort of socialism would it be? We must have an answer to these questions, if we are to act, for they are imposed on us by contemporary politics.

It seems to be clear by now that these four ideological defects of contemporary democratic socialism are closely
related to the question of freedom. They seem to stem from the failure of democratic socialists to grasp clearly the meaning of freedom and to found their ideology on it.

The first task in redefining democratic socialism therefore centers around a redefining of the meaning of freedom. Is freedom something that must be sacrificed or ignored for the sake of socialized economy? If not, how should it be understood and how should the concepts of traditional socialist economics and politics be recast in the light of its meaning? Here we face a tremendous task of theoretical research. It may mean a revolution in the ideology of democratic socialism. Yet, it is a challenge the contemporary democratic socialists must face.
CHAPTER V

A NEW APPROACH TOWARD THE MEANING OF FREEDOM

In this concluding chapter, we are going to seek a new understanding of the meaning of freedom—the central problem in the re-thinking of democratic socialism. It is hoped that this attempt, though only a very brief suggestion, and anything but a theoretical system, will provide something for overcoming the present impasse and uncertainty of democratic socialists.

a. A Socialist Dilemma

In the foregoing chapter, we tried to show the nature of the ideological defects of democratic socialism in relation to actual political and social conditions. Here, in order to illuminate the same defects from a different angle, we would like to examine one more definition of democratic socialism, that seems to us clearer than those discussed in Section II of the third chapter:

"Socialism is a belief in a fundamental re-organization in the structure of society, based on the common ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, the political liberty of the individual, and the replacement of motives of profit and competition by those of service and cooperation." 107

There are, at least, two problems involved in this definition, and we will try to point them out in order to show the nature of the present socialist difficulty.

First of all, in this definition of socialism, "individual freedoms" are implicitly limited and reduced to "the political liberty of the individual." It was anything but an early socialist dream to "reduce" individual freedoms. It was the vision of the "Kingdom of Freedom" that inspired so many early socialists' thoughts and actions.

The reason for limiting individual freedoms to political liberty is that the other individual freedoms, especially the freedom to choose and decide quality, quantity, and variety of economic products, are not thought to be compatible with the "common ownership of means of production, distribution and exchange." Whether or not "all forms" of common ownership or only "some forms" of common ownership of economic means are incompatible with the individual's economic freedom, we must admit that without the economic freedom of the individual, his political freedom is insignificant, for it is his economic activity that occupies the greater part of his life. If a man is not free in choosing his job, in controlling production through markets and the price system, or through whatever means, deciding the economic trends of society, where is his free life?
Socialism was born not to reduce, but to extend the freedoms of the individual, and if one sort of "common ownership" of economic means has proven to cost individual freedoms, it must find others that will not. State-ownership or nationalization should not be regarded as the only form of common ownership. The "co-ownership" of an industry by both workers and owners, or by government and workers or by all of them is one of such forms.

Second, if we consider further the nature of the socialist economy under socialism thus defined, we will come to realize the difficulty of even the "political liberty of the individual" in socialism. Common ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, the replacement of the profit motive and competition by motives of service, must imply one or another sort of comprehensive "planned economy". However, it will be difficult to carry out a planning economy when the government, which is the actual planning body, is subject to the constantly shifting popular will.

Planning requires continuity of the planning and executing body, i.e. continuity of government. Yet the political liberty of the individual implies a continuous or periodical change of government by the people. How can the government honestly stick to its economic plan when its life is subject to the constant fluctuation of public opinion?
It is not so easy to unite the national economic planning with the representative system of government that is under the control of the popular will. Socialist economic planning is not a mere sectional or short-range planning. It is an all-inclusive, long-range planning. It requires stability and continuity of government as much as it does a strong government. Mr. Nehru's ambitious Five Year Plan would not have been possible if his exceptional popularity did not more or less guarantee the relatively long stability of his government. What will happen to India's future five year plan when he has died or when an opposition party with a different policy gets in power, is anyone's guess. We cannot but sense, even at this moment, an ultimate difficulty which in this point the Indian Five Year Plan as a type of socialist planning may have to face sooner or later. Trying to make representative democratic government and the political liberty of the individual fit together with the socialistic planned economy may be to try to have one's cake and eat it too.

We may call these two difficulties of socialism the socialist dilemma. Individual freedoms broadly speaking do not go together with socialism as defined above, and even the political liberty of the individual, or the modern democratic system of government—which is thought to be the indispensable element of democratic socialism, can hardly go together with
the planned economy of socialism.

b. Freedom as Man's Power Over His Surroundings:

Then what is freedom? Equality is something not difficult to grasp. But what about freedom? Is it not one of the oldest and most difficult philosophical problems? Would it not be a theoretical blunder to drag the problem of freedom into the philosophy of socialism?

It is not our intention, however, to tackle here the problem of free will. The freedom we have to deal with here is objective freedom--i.e. something objectively meaningful. There are various definitions of freedom, for example: voluntary action, or absence of restraint, etc. These definitions do not stand the test of modern politics. The majority of the German people supported Hitler, and their support was far more a voluntary than a forced action, yet we cannot say Germans were free at the time. Japanese supported their government voluntarily and died willingly for their Emperor, yet we say they were under totalitarianism. The Russian people today may be voluntarily obeying and supporting their Communist regime, yet we are in no way inclined to call them free. Modern science and technical advance have given rulers such effective means of indoctrination that they can not only wipe out the sense of restraint from the mind of people, but
also make them act "voluntarily". Popular support of government no more serves as a landmark to democratic government. Also, the "absence of restraint" cannot represent what we mean by freedom, for then we cannot distinguish freedom from the "habituated restraint" which is the Communist concept of freedom, as presented by Lenin:

"The escape from this popular accounting and control will inevitably become so incredibly difficult...that the necessity of observing the simple fundamental rules of human intercourse will very soon become a habit. And then the door will be open for the transition from the first phase of communist society to its higher phase, and with it to the complete withering away of the state."108

Here Lenin has best expressed the Communist concept of freedom. It is the "habituated necessity". It is the restraint that has become a habit, and a habituated restraint is absence of restraint. In fact the Communists also claim freedom in this sense as much as anarchists. How could we accuse the Communists for their suppression of freedom if our meaning of freedom were to be pretty much the same as theirs?

The "real" meaning of freedom seems to be better sought in "man's power to change his status and his surroundings". A slave is not free because he has no power to change his social status. A people will not be free, if it has no power to change its government short of revolution. Revolution may appear to be a way of changing government, but when

we look at its nature more closely, we cannot say it changes a government, for it does not change, but destroys one government and creates a new one; it is more properly termed a creation of government. A government created by a revolution may be a free one, i.e. subject to popular control, or may be an unfree one as before. A free people must be able to change its government peacefully, and in this peaceful change of government by the people lies the core of modern political freedoms. For this reason the existence of an official opposition within a state can be one of the best tests for a free government.

Man's power to change his surroundings, however, depends on his knowledge; knowledge is power, it has been said. Thus the extent of his freedom may depend on his knowledge which can increase his power to control or change his surroundings. Therefore the more he knows, the more he may become free. In politics this relation of knowledge and freedom is revealed by the importance of means of information for political freedoms. Restriction on news agencies by government may be therefore one of the most serious limitations of political freedom.

In a stricter sense it may be said that knowledge is a means of power, and hence a means of freedom. There thus seem to be at least two important means of freedom, one our
knowledge, and the other the material means, i.e. our economic products in general. Man's power to change his surroundings depends also upon the material means available to effect change. It can be actually exercised only through proper material means, and only when he has the material means can man be said to be actually free being.

Traditionally, therefore, it has been said that to increase knowledge and economic products, and thus to make both of them available to as many as possible, is the basis of all human freedom. In order to make available for everyone all the material means of living the "community" system was envisaged. In order to make the indefinite expansion of production possible, common ownership and planned economy were advocated. The immense expansion of economic production through socialized economy, it was thought, would bring about automatically the "Kingdom of Freedom". Socialism and Communism both started from these assumptions.

c. Freedom in the Means of Freedom:

There was one point, however, that escaped the thinking of traditional socialists. That was the freedom of choosing means of freedom. If the meaning of freedom is man's power or ability to change his surroundings, he must be able, not only to "possess" means of freedom, but also to choose
those means of freedom. If he cannot change or choose the means, how can he change anything? Thus, the freedom of choosing knowledge, of choosing material means becomes the indispensable basis of all freedoms. Freedom of the press should always imply freedom to choose any information. The mere abundance of means of freedom does not guarantee the automatic realization of freedom. Man must be able to choose, to change his means of freedom. In short, he must be free here also, in his means of freedom.

Concerning ourselves, then, not with a philosophical enquiry into the problem of freedom per se, but with those aspects of freedom pertinent to a political ideology, we have so far tried to define freedom as a kind of power, and have tried also to show that in order to realize freedom, not only abundance of means of freedom but also freedom in the means of freedom are necessary. There seem therefore to be two conditions that must be satisfied together for realization of freedom. First will be the continued expansion and amplification, in quantity as well as in variety, of means of freedom, namely economic products, scientific knowledge, and the like. The second will consist in the power by which man can change or choose such means of freedom. His power to control surroundings through various means must be substantiated by his power to control those means as well. A man may be surround-
ed by abundance of goods, yet if he cannot use or choose anything except that which he is told to, he will be no more free than an ignorant man who does not know how to use them. The value of private property in this connection seems to consist in that it guarantees the power of the individual to control or dispose of his possessions, which are actually means of his freedom.

**d. An Application:**

With these two aspects of freedom, we now would like to clarify some of the basic ideological positions of democratic socialism.

Among men's surroundings, those most important for freedom are perhaps the political, economic, and social surroundings. Since freedom is related to the power of individuals over these surroundings, we can say there are at least three categories of freedom: 1) economic, 2) social, and 3) political freedom.

(1) As the most important source of material means of freedom, the economy has two functions for human freedom. It must, on the one hand, continuously expand and amplify economic products, thus making ever more means of freedom available for men. On the other hand these products, the process of their production, the process of their distribution
and consumption, all these means of freedom themselves must be subject to individual control. When the first condition is satisfied in the absence of the second, as in the case of the Soviet Union (in the assumption that Communist claims of more goods and more machines are true) real freedom cannot exist. Conversely when the second condition is met but the first is unsatisfactory, as in the case of some underdeveloped countries today, "true" freedom may hardly prevail either. It will have to be the duty of democratic socialists to see to it that both conditions are satisfied.

(2) Social freedom also is subject to two conditions, namely, it must involve a) maximum civil rights or privileges as the means of social freedom, and b) freedom of individuals in the use of these privileges. Thus the right to education, for example, should imply at least the freedom of the citizen to choose the type of education or school he wishes, if not his freedom to send or not to send his children to school. When civil rights or privileges are made compulsory, as in the case of compulsory "right to work" for example, real freedom may not easily prevail. When the right to work is made compulsory, we are not far from the forced labour camp. Therefore, social freedom must be tested by the guarantee of various social rights and privileges and lack of restriction by the class and other structures of society, as well as by the power
of the individual in the free use of these means of social freedom.

(3) In a similar manner, political freedom consists in a) the means available to citizens to effect their control over their political institutions, and b) their power of free use of these means. The right to vote, the right to opposition and other devices of modern representative government may be said to be the means by which citizens can exercise their power of control over government. These political rights must, in order to be conducive to freedom, be subject to the individual's power in the free use of them, i.e. these rights should not be made compulsory. When, for example, the right to vote is made "compulsory", it may become inimical to freedom. When the right to criticize is made compulsory, as is illustrated by the Communists' so-called "self-criticism", the effect may be akin to Rousseau's idea of "forcing a man to be free". Therefore the mere existence of voting or other political rights, or the mere guarantee of them by a constitution, may not per se prove existence of political freedom. In order to be politically free, a citizen must have power to use them as he desires; in short he must be free also in the use of his political rights.

Such principle of freedom alone, however, may be insufficient if we want to work out some guiding rules of
political action and tactics. It is here that we need some ethical principles.

Lenin once said that Communist ethics consist in the interests of the class struggle.

"We say that our morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of class struggle of the proletariat." 109

From this morality of class interests was derived justification for all kinds of Communist political actions. It was this morality that led Stalin deliberately to starve millions of peasants by artificial famine.

The morality of Democratic Socialism must be more inclusive and broader than the Communist morality of class interests. It must be a humanitarian ethic that is not confined to the interests of one section of the people. And for this reason, Utilitarianism seems to be the most useful morality for the politics of democratic socialism. The details of this matter of Utilitarian ethics for politics of democratic socialism, however, must be treated in a separate theoretical inquiry, and we have to abstain from any further treatment of it here.

Democratic socialism is often described as the third force, but this term "third force" should not be taken as the

109. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Youth Leagues", Marx, Engels, Marxism, pp. 5-36.
"in-between" or "middle of the road". It is not the centre of the two extremes of Communism and Capitalism. Capitalism is more of an economic term, whereas, Communism is an all-inclusive political philosophy and world outlook. If democratic socialism is fundamentally "about freedom", the enemy of freedom is the enemy of democratic socialism, and Communism, rather than Capitalism, is the enemy of our freedoms. Therefore, under the light of this new meaning of democratic socialism, its real enemy will become unmistakably clear.

The future of the democratic socialist struggle against Communism may depend on the elimination and prevention of revolutionary situations in the world. If necessary, i.e. when compelled by circumstances or when there seems to be no alternative, the democratic socialists may have to try to lead and accomplish a revolution. It may be said from experiences that the price of revolution is usually high, yet no price may be too high if it is for freedom. In that case, it will be a revolution dedicated to the cause of freedom and democracy. They will have then deprived the Communists of any exploitable situation and opportunity. It will be, then, that the democratic socialists can force the Communist revolutionary parties into the course of two possible positions, i.e. into a position of political impotence or into eventual self-alteration.

If the revolutionary parties of Communism should
remain dogmatic and be reluctant to give up or adapt their basic philosophy to the changing world where revolutionary situations may hardly exist, it will be probable that their status would become something akin to that of the Anarchists, and their philosophy an object of mere academic interest. The mighty surge of the present Communist force would then be reduced to a point of political impotence.

On the other hand, if they want to remain always "scientific" and hope to "enrich" their doctrine ever "with new experiences", as they propose to do, they will likely have to either create revolutionary situations or change their own revolutionary tactics. It will be dangerous to the world if Communists should try to create revolutionary situations, for war and military conquest would be their eventual means to create such situations. The two World Wars have proven how successful they could be under such a situation.

However, if they instead should decide to change their entire tactic, they might eventually come to change their nature as the party of revolution. It would then remain to be seen how they could retain their fundamental philosophy of dialectical materialism and could manage to preserve their identity as the party of Communism.

The task and the process that lie before the Democratic Socialists may be long and arduous, but they can still have a hopeful fight on their hands.


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