INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN THE COMMERCIAL FISHERIES OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

by

PERCY HENRY GLADSTONE
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ABSTRACT

The commercial fisheries of British Columbia, operating along the province's 750-mile winding coastline and out into the North Pacific, are extremely diverse. Each of the many different species of fish requires its own technique of catching and method of processing and marketing. Processors are concentrated into a few firms, handling all products. Fishermen are a specialized, but nonetheless competing, labour force, divided by a variety of gears used and wage payments received, and further split historically into various language and racial groups, often isolated in close-knit communities.

Characteristic of the industry is its uncertainty of operation and income. Lack of control of the supply of fish has been further accentuated by variations in conservation measures designed to perpetuate the fisheries. These rigid government controls have, in part, determined the nature of the fierce competition and rapid technological changes which have occurred when fishermen and companies have attempted to increase their share of the fish. Another uncertainty has been fluctuating market demand, especially in those export markets which take the bulk of the catch.

Focus of the tensions produced has been disputes between fishermen and companies over the price of raw fish. Fish prices were the cause of the first strikes and attempts at unionism in the years 1893 to 1914. In this period, while the companies organized a tight employers' organization, antagonism between fishermen, especially whites and Indians on the one hand,

and Japanese on the other hand, often defeated their aims. Unions that did survive were restricted to a single area, type of gear or language group. In the second phase of unionism, much stress was laid on legislative action to restrict fishing licences, especially to Japanese fishermen.

Rapid changes in technology have dominated the last two decades. Mergers and consolidations have concentrated processing into a few multi-phase plants. The fishing fleet has become highly mobile, adaptable to many fisheries and increasingly owned by individual fishermen, though often with company financing. Local isolation has broken down, competition between groups has increased, and fishermen face an increasing need for co-operation to cut insecurity and risk. Out of the struggles against depression conditions in the 1930's, scattered fishermen's unions were welded into a coast-wide organization. Joined with more recently stabilized unions of shoreworkers, it forms one industry-wide union, enrolling the bulk of the labour force. The other attempted solution to these problems has been producers' co-operatives which have had a limited success in enlisting independent fishermen from some fisheries and areas.

The industry today is highly organized with collective agreements in all processing operations and practically all fisheries. One major union negotiates with a single employers association, with independent vessel owners and co-operatives playing a subsidiary role. Basic insecurities

which produced past industrial disputes have not been eliminated, and the prospect is for continued conflict, coupled with displacement of fishermen and shoreworkers from the industry as productivity and capital costs rise.

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Department of Economics and Political Science

The University of British Columbia,
Vancouver 8, Canada.

Date October 1, 1959.

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In 1949 the University of British Columbia made a research grant to the Department of Economics for a study of labour relations in the fishing industry of British Columbia. Out of this study the author, in collaboration with Dr. Stuart Jamieson of the Department of Economics, wrote two articles on unionism in the industry. They were published in The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, February, 1950, and May, 1950. This thesis is a continuation and enlargement of these two articles.

In 1950 the author received a further financial grant from the Department of Anthropology, University of British Columbia, for the purpose of studying the role of the native Indians in the commercial fisheries of British Columbia. The results of this study, "The Indians in the Commercial Fishing Industry of British Columbia", was also published in The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. This article has been included as Appendix A of this thesis. A summary of the data in the article is contained in Chapter V.

A number of the quotations in the study should not be regarded as factual and accurate statements. Rather, they are used to indicate the attitudes of the parties involved in the disputes. The thesis is not as well balanced as would be desired. Some topics have been written up at considerable length because factual data about them were available in detail. Other topics have been treated somewhat inadequately because

source material was fragmentary or lacking.

All opinions expressed in this thesis are those of the author and are based on research and personal experience.

INTRODUCTION

The commercial fishing industry of British Columbia is characterized by the uncertainty of income and the insecurity of capital investment. A consequence of this inherent insecurity has been a long history of bitter labour-management disputes.

The primary purpose of this thesis is to trace the history and development of trade unionism and labour disputes involving commercial fishermen. It is the writer's belief that the reader should have some knowledge of the factors and problems which may create labour-management tensions. To give this background several chapters are devoted to indicate the reasons for the insecurity and how they affect labour relations.

Two major problems arise in dealing with the subject of labour relations in the industry. The first problem is the wide diversities found within the industry. Each species of fish requires its own peculiar techniques of catching, processing and marketing. The seasonal nature and the degree of governmental controls vary for the different types of fishing. Technological developments are highly developed in some phases of the industry, while others are primarily manual labour. Finally, the degree of employer-employee relationship varies from that of an unhampered buyer-seller basis to a close relationship involving contracts. A consequence of the diversities is the difficulty and even impossibility of generalized statements applicable to all aspects of the industry.

The second factor is that the inherent problems affect both management and labour alike, though the effects vary in degree. The

uncertainties and insecurities apply to both parties. In discussing the disputes only the bare facts are given with only a minimum of discussion regarding the causes.

The species of commercial fish with some pertinent characteristics are discussed in Chapter I. The value of each fishery, which in turn determines the price paid to the fishermen, is discussed from the standpoint of consumer demand, the supply of fish for a given season, and the natural supply of fish. The seasonal nature of the different species and the localities of the main fishing areas are also mentioned.

In Chapter I the main techniques of fishing and processing are discussed, with the main emphasis on technological developments and their effects on the industry. The developments in fishing techniques have increased to a degree where rigid controls must be instituted by the Department of Fisheries to ensure the perpetuity of fish populations. The developments in processing have made possible volume production with substantially reduced unit costs. The highly competitive nature of the industry compels the development and acceptance of new ideas and methods. Failure to do so would result in failure or, at the best, marginal operation.

Without some forms of controls there probably would not be a fishing industry. Chapter II deals with the purpose and necessity of government controls. The primary purpose of these regulations is the conservation of the fisheries. The regulations do have the effect of creating uncertainties through shortened seasons, closures, quotas, etc.

Consumer market demands for fish and fish products are constantly changing as indicated in Chapter III. The conditions are reflected back

to fishermen in changing prices. Since fish prices have been the cause of a majority of disputes in the industry, then it becomes obvious that market conditions are of utmost importance in maintaining stable labour relations. It should be noted that fishermen have no difficulty in disposing of their catch. Problems arise when companies try to market their products at prices which will give a reasonable profit. Market conditions are of importance to this study for their effect on the prices paid to fishermen. Since conditions do change the examples of market conditions can only be for a given year.

The main point made in Chapter V about labour relations between the companies and other employer groups and fishermen is that, though they are subjected to the same problems as fishermen, companies have presented a unified body through their Association which has always bargained with fishermen, whether organized or unorganized. The economics of the industry, plus rapid technological changes have resulted in mergers and consolidations. The result of this is that today there are a relatively few companies producing homogeneous products. The second employers group, the Fishing Vessel Owners Association, stands between companies and fishermen, at times co-operating with companies against the unions, and at other times with unions against the companies.

Labour as shown in Chapter V, is divided into two groups--the wage earner and the fisherman. Reasons for unionism among the first group are similar to those in other industries, but the case of the fishermen is rather complex. Actually, the fisherman is self-employed and on a

buyer-seller basis with the companies. However, he has identified himself with labour by organizing and using the traditional weapons of labour unions. Historically the fishermen have been a militant group operating under militant leadership.

A feature of the industry is the division into ethnic groups, with each specializing in a particular branch of the industry. The roles of the Indians, Japanese and Chinese are given in Appendices A, B and C. Chapter V gives a resume of the roles of these three groups. In addition the role of the white fishermen in the development of unions is discussed. The "whites" themselves are composed of Swedes, Norwegians, Finns, Danes, Yugoslavs, Greeks, Italians, Scottish, etc.

The discussion of wages and other payments in Chapter V is necessarily generalized due to the variations. For a detailed study the reader is referred to the current union agreements. Generally, payments to shore workers are monthly, hourly, or contract, depending on the type and classification of work. It should be noted that standardized wage rates and classifications of work are relatively recent in the industry. Prior to World War II all calmon cannery labour, except the skilled white workers, worked under a Chinese contractor.

The fishermen are paid on poundage or tonnage basis. Tendermen receive wages, commission, or are on a lay basis. The share divisions for crew members are also given.

Chapter VI deals with the actual history of the disputes and the development of trade unionism among fishermen. The history is divided into three phases. The first phase, 1893 to 1930, was marked by the

development of unions in local areas. These had two aims. First, there was bargaining for fish prices, and secondly, the protection of native Indian and white fishermen against the increasing competition of the Japanese fishermen.

The second phase began during the economic depression of the 1930's. This was particularly severe in the fishing industry and was marked by a series of severe disputes and strikes. Leadership of the fishermen was taken by the Unity League. The fishermen were first organized on an occupational basis. Then, through a series of well-planned moves, these groups were united until, in 1945, the present-day United Fishermen and Allied Workers emerged as the bargaining representative of the majority of the fishermen and shoreworkers, and covering practically every phase of the industry.

The final phase may be dated 1945 to the present day. The discussion here is limited to the degree of organization among fishermen and shoreworkers.

Not all fishermen are organized into unions. Many of the independents, i.e. those fishermen who are not under financial or contractual agreements with the companies, have organized marketing co-operatives. Chapter VII traces the development of these organizations on the coast. The development of these co-operatives parallelled the development of the Unions in the 1930's.

Two current problems are omitted from this study. The first is the problem of license limitations. The purpose is to issue fishing licenses to bonafide fishermen only and refuse them to part-time or "holiday fishermen". The question of interfering with the rights of

man enters into this problem. The second problem omitted is the question of fish versus power dams. The fishing industry is of the opinion that this problem can be solved to the satisfaction of both parties. The development of one sector of our economy may have an adverse effect on another sector.

The prospect of "peace" in the industry is not bright, particularly during an economic recession. The factors contributing to insecurity will always be present.

PART I

BASIC FACTORS IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

CHAPTER I

THE B. C. FISHERIES: MAJOR SPECIES AND TECHNIQUES

Topography of British Columbia. British Columbia's coastline is about 750 miles in length. When it is traced out along its innumerable islands, inlets and rivers, it measures some 13000 miles of navigable waters. It is in these latter waters that commercial fish is found in abundance. Certain areas yield certain species in greater quantities at various periods of the fishing season. These periods provide the main concentration and intensity of fishing.

The coastal waters of British Columbia produce a wide variety of fish. In marketed value the province produces the major share of Canada's fisheries. This chapter is concerned with the physical characteristics of the commercial species rather than with the biological or scientific aspects. It is the physical characteristics which determine consumer demand and thus the economic importance of the fish.[1]

Major and Minor Fisheries. The commercial fisheries are divided into major or minor fisheries depending on the marketed value which indicates its economic importance in the industry.

In British Columbia the major fisheries are: the salmon group --sockeye, spring, chum, pinks and coho; halibut; herring; and bottom fish such as cod and sole.

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1 See W.P. Clemens and G.U. Wilby, Fishes of the Pacific Coast of Canada, Bulletin 68, Fisheries Research Board of Canada, Ottawa, 1946, for more complete details.

Characteristics of the Species.

The Salmon Group. The five species of salmon and their products are the are the most important in terms of landed and marketed value.

The salmon are anadromous in that they return from the ocean to spawn in fresh water lakes and streams. The migrations to the spawning grounds occur at definite periods of the year with the different salmon species migrating at different times. The sockeye appear first, followed by pinks and chums. It is during this brief migration period that they are fished commercially. The spring and coho have a longer and steadier migration period.

All species of salmon cease to feed when they come in contact with the fresh waters of the river mouths and at this stage the storage of food by the salmon is at the highest point. For this reason the salmon caught at river mouths are particularly suited for canning purposes.

Each species of salmon has a known life cycle, with some species showing a definite cycle of scarcity and abundance. From this knowledge of the life cycle, it is possible by a study of the spawning conditions to estimate the scarcity or abundance of the next cycle.

The Sockeye Salmon. The sockeye is the most important in terms of value of the five salmon species. The entire catch is canned. The life cycle of the sockeye is from four to five years, with most fish being four years old.

The sockeye appears around July and by the end of August begins to deteriorate rapidly for canning purposes.

Commercial sockeye fisheries are concentrated chiefly in and around the waters of the Nass, Skeena, Nimkish, Rivers Inlet, Smiths Inlet and the Fraser River. This last area has a cycle of abundance every four years. It appears first at Rivers Inlet area, then the Nass and Skeena, followed by the Fraser River. These periods may run concurrently and certainly will overlap.

Chum Salmon. The chum salmon, sometimes called keta or dog salmon, is the last salmon to appear during the season. The species travels in schools and its life cycle is generally four years. Chum salmon is marketed in canned, fresh, frozen and filleted forms.

Chum fishing ranges along the coast with the main concentration in the Queen Charlotte Islands, Johnstone Straits, the lower East Coast of Vancouver Island and Barkley Sound.

Chum salmon is graded into the silver-bright dog appearing early in the season, and the later dark variety. There is a corresponding price differential between the two grades with the former commanding the higher demand.

Chum salmon were in relatively low demand prior to World War I. However, wartime and post-war periods brought a sharp increase in prices, due in part to demand in the United States. Prior to World War II a large quantity of chum was used in dry salting for the Oriental trade.

Pink Salmon. The pink salmon, or humpback, is the most abundant of the salmon species. This is part of the reason for its consistently low price in comparison to the other salmon species. The entire catch

of pink salmon is canned. Like the chum, pink salmon travel in "schools".

Pink salmon fisheries range along the entire B.C. coast. Some main areas are the Nass, Skeena, Queen Charlottes, Bella Bella, Johnstone Straits, Barclay Sound and Nitinat, the last two being on the west coast of Vancouver Island.

In the pink salmon fisheries there is a two year cycle of abundance. In the southern half of B.C. the cycle of abundance occurs in the odd years with the main concentration in the Johnstone Straits area. In the northern portion of the province it occurs in the even years. In the Queen Charlotte Islands pinks appear only in even years.

Coho Salmon. The coho salmon ranges along the whole coast, both offshore and inshore. The coho matures at the end of three years, sometimes four. There is no cycle of scarcity or abundance. Coho salmon are caught commercially by trolling, gillnetting or seining. In trolling the major areas are the Hecate Straits and the West Coast of Vancouver Island. The coho is marketed as canned, fresh, frozen, or fillets. The troll-caught salmon is used mostly for the fresh fish trade. In the Gulf of Georgia, the young, or immature coho, is known commercially as the blue back.

Spring Salmon. The spring salmon is the most important salmon in the fresh fish trade with practically the entire catch being sold this way. It is fished commercially along the whole of the B.C. Coast with some concentration in the Prince Rupert-Queen Charlotte area, and along the West Coast of Vancouver Island. Fishing is mainly by trolling with a lesser amount caught by gillnetting. The spring matures in three to eight years, generally in four to five. There is no cycle of scarcity or abundance.

The spring salmon is bought from the fishermen in three weight categories: mild cure, with weights 16 pounds and over; medium, 12 to 16 pounds; and small, 6 to 12 pounds. There is a price differential for the three grades, with the mild cure having the highest demand.

Herring Fisheries. Herring fisheries rank next to the salmon group in marketed value. The herring appear in schools with concentrations in definite areas along the coast. These are the Lower and Upper East Coast of Vancouver Island, Barclay Sound to Esperanza Inlet on the West Coast of the Island, central B.C. area, Ogden Channel in the vicinity of Prince Rupert and the Southeast coast of the Queen Charlottes.

The coast is divided into areas and each area has a quota of herring to be fished. The quota is set by the Federal Department of Fisheries and may be altered depending on conservation and spawning conditions.

The main products are herring meal, used as high protein animal feed, and herring oil. The oil content of herring decreases with the season as the spring spawning approaches. A small portion is used for canning and frozen bait. Dry salting of herring, like the dry salting of chum, was the basis of a major industry prior to World War II.

Halibut Fisheries. The halibut fisheries rank third in marketed value of B.C. fisheries. The history of this fisheries shows a steady northward trend until today the main fisheries extends from the Hecate Straits to the Bering Seas.

The halibut fisheries is supervised by the International Halibut Commission whose members are composed of representatives from Canada and the United States. The coast of British Columbia as well as Alaska is divided into three main areas with some sub-divisions, with two areas providing the bulk of the catch. Each area and sub-area has an opening date and a quota of halibut to be taken during a season.[2]

Halibut is sold by the fishermen in three weight divisions: large, over 68 pounds; medium, 11 to 68 pounds; and chicken, 6 to 11 pounds. Of the three, the medium enjoys the highest demand and thus the highest price. The price differentials for the three weight divisions could alter with changing ideas of marketing.

Soles. The nomenclature of the flat fish comprised of soles and flounders has created some difficulties. The present terms are agreed to by representatives of the Biological Board and the fishing industry in order to ensure orderly marketing names and for statistical purposes.[2a] The lemon sole is the most important, while of lesser importance are the brill and butter sole. All soles are marketed in filleted form.

The "Cods". As in the case of the soles, "cod" is a misnomer for this group of fishes. The grey cod is the only true cod, and in fact is commonly called the true cod. Ling cod and the red cod are rockfishes. Also of this group is the black cod, or sable fish. All cods, except black cod which is smoked, are marketed in filleted form. During World

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2 See Map 2.

2a Clemens and Wilby, op. cit., p. 310.

War II there was a strong increase in demand for cod livers for pharmaceutical purposes. An equally rapid decline in demand came in the post-war period with the introduction of synthetic products.

Tuna. The production of Tuna, or albacore, is uncertain, and to offset fluctuating Canadian production, tuna is imported from Japan.

Some Main Changes in Techniques of Fishing. The fishing industry of B.C. is constantly undergoing tremendous technological changes. Many and varied developments have occurred in fishing techniques, in the transportation of fish and in canning and other processing techniques.

Fishing is a highly competitive industry and this competitive element, coupled with increasingly short seasons and wider areas of fishing, requires maximum effort within a limited time. Thus a firm or individual is compelled to adopt these technological changes in order to remain in a competitive position. Failure to do so would result in economic failure or at the best, a marginal operation. One consequence of the technological changes is that existing capital investments become obsolete and make necessary new and invariably greater investments.

Technology In Fishing Methods. There are several areas of technological developments that are common to all methods of fishing. The development of communications and electronics is a case. With a radiophone the fishermen are able to keep in contact and have immediate knowledge of the more productive fishing grounds. The depth recorder is a navigational aid as well as a means for locating herring and fishing banks. The direction finder is also a navigational aid which enables

the fishermen to "home" to productive areas and, in the absence of landmarks, to remain in specific areas by means of "fixes".

In discussing any new development in fishing it should be remembered, however, that the fundamental principles and methods have not changed. Rather the changes have been mechanical with increased efficiency at greatly reduced physical labour.

Methods of Commercial Fishing.

Basis of Fishing Methods. The various species of commercial fish have known habits and characteristics which determine the methods of fishing. Salmon and herring travel along known paths at specific periods of the year on their annual migrations to the spawning areas. Herring, pink and chum salmon "school up" at, or near, the water surface. Cohoes, springs and sockeye travel at various depths. The flat, bottom feeding fishes--halibut and soles, remain relatively stationary at known localities. All species of fish listed as cods are also bottom feeders. Some species feed on smaller fish as herring and lance, other species feed on crustaceans. Salmon cease to feed on coming in contact with the fresh water of river mouths.

On the basis of the knowledge of these habits and characteristics the commercial fishing can be divided into four basic methods: entanglement, using gillnets; encirclement, with the purse seine and beam trawl; hook and line, as in long lining for bottom fish and in salmon and tuna trolling; entrapment in fish traps. Each species is fished mainly by one only of these methods but there is some overlapping, particularly in the salmon fishery. Table 1 shows the proportion of salmon taken by each method for the year 1951.

TABLE I

SALMON CATCH BY SPECIES AND BY GEAR, 1951

	Gillnet		Seine		Trollers		Traps		Total	
	Mill Lbs.	Percent	Mill Lbs.	Percent	Mill Lbs.	Percent	Mill Lbs.	Percent	Mill Lbs.	Percent
Chums	27.22	43.0	35.92	56.8	.14	.2	.02	- *	63.30	100.0
Pinks	15.67	26.0	42.72	71.0	1.08	1.8	.71	1.2	60.18	100.0
Coho	8.71	24.8	6.74	19.2	19.51	55.5	.18	.5	35.14	100.0
Sockeye	26.00	87.2	3.49	11.7	.05	.2	.28	.9	29.82	100.0
Red Spring	2.08	21.2	.33	3.4	7.15	72.8	.26	2.6	9.82	100.0
White Spring	1.46	51.8	.11	3.9	1.19	42.2	.06	2.1	2.82	100.0
Steelhead	.37	90.3	.03	7.3	- **	-	.01	2.4	.41	100.0
Jack Spring	.15	53.6	.07	25.0	.06	21.4	-	-	.28	100.0
TOTAL	81.66	40.5	89.41	44.3	29.18	14.5	1.52	.7	201.77	100.0

* Less than .005 percent
** Less than 5000 lbs.

Source: British Columbia Catch Statistics - By Area and Type of Gear, Department of Fisheries of Canada - Pacific Area, 1951.

The Salmon Gillnet. Gillnet fishing is the oldest and most widely used method of commercial fishing. The net is essentially a webbing of dyed linen or nylon usually measuring 200 fathoms in length and 60 meshes in depth. (The webbing is hung from a "cork line" which floats on the water's surface. The bottom of the webbing is weighted with a "lead line" to give the net a vertical position.)

The gillnet is set across the known or assumed path of the travelling fish. The fish come in contact with the net and become entangled. Should the fish see the webbing the tendency will be to avoid it. For this reason the gillnet is most effective in the muddy waters found at the mouth of a river. Gillnet fishing is generally identified with sockeye fishing, but the method is used for all species of salmon.[3] The present day gillnet boat is owned and operated by an individual fishermen.

Variations of the Salmon Gillnet. The sunken net used to take dogfish has a heavy lead line. Glass buoyancy balls give the net the vertical position. A second variation is herring gillnetting. This is centred in the waters off Point Grey and the herring are sold on the fresh fish market of Vancouver.

Technological Changes in Gillnetting. The original gillnet boat was a skiff, a small boat or a canoe. It was manned by a crew of two, one man to handle the oars and the other the net. Later, a rather

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3 See Table I, p. 15.

specialized 26-foot boat, commonly known as the Columbia River boat, came into existence. This was still, as a rule, a two-man boat but with a sail for greater mobility.

Mobility was not a serious consideration until the 1920's. Fishing was of a local nature in the vicinity of the many canneries. The fishing boats were merely towed to the grounds located near the home cannery. With the beginning of centralized canning operations and the increased fishing areas came a need to cover the increased distances. In addition, competition among the fishermen was increasing. These factors created a need for power but an order-in-council prohibited the use of power boats for gillnetting in fishing Area 2.[4]

Main opposition to powered gillnetters came from the canners. They had considerable investment in the Columbia River boats and to convert to power would require an additional $800.00 a boat. Besides, most boats were unsuitable for conversion to power.[5]

The advisability of the use of power gillnets in Area 2 was studied by a Commission on the fisheries.[6] Finally, permission for the use of powered gillnet boats in Area 2 was given in 1923, but only to Indians and whites. The Japanese were given permission in 1930. Gillnetting became a one man operation and the old type boat was obsolete. The original power boats were up to 30 feet in length. Engines ranged from four to seven H.P. It was not until World War II and the post-war period that the modern high-powered gillnet boat came into existence.

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4 Details for Dist. 1 are not known. See Map 1b.

5 Vancouver Province, July 12, 1917, p. 14.

6 Ibid., July 9, 1917, p. 14.

A second major development was the power reel or drum for nets in the late 1920's. The gillnet until then had been played out and hauled in by hand. Use of the power-operated drum to set and haul nets results in a fast and efficient operation with a minimum of physical labour. In the post World War II period another change saw the introduction of the nylon gillnet. The increased efficiency of this net practically eliminated the linen net.

Today the modern gillnetter is around 38 feet, using gasoline or diesel engines with up to 200 H.P. and requiring a capital investment up to $20,000.00. These boats can be adapted to gillnetting, halibut fishing or trolling. The majority of the boats are fitted with the latest mechanical and electronic aids.

Purse Seining. The purse seine embodies the principle of encirclement and is used mainly for the "schooling" species of fish--pinks, chums and herring.

It is essentially a webbing of tarred cotton (now nylon) with a lead line and a cork line, measuring 175 to 225 fathoms in length. Brass rings are hung at regular intervals along the lead line by means of "bridles". A "purse seine" is then passed through the rings.

In making a "set", the seine boat makes a complete circle around the fish. The two ends of the purse line are hauled in, or "pursed in", by means of a power winch. On completion of the pursing, the rings are hauled on board the seiner. The net is then hauled on the seine table, forming a bag or packet, containing the fish. From this bag the fish are "brailed" on the seiner. The herring purse seine operation is the same. Heavier equipment is used and power is used for hauling or

"fleeting" in the seine which measures 250 fathoms in length and up to 35 "strips".

Salmon purse seine boats vary in length from 40 to 72 feet and carry crews of four to eight men. For herring seining the larger boats are used, averaging 72 feet and carrying a crew of nine men.

Development in Salmon and Herring Purse Seining. The two fishing methods use the same boats so any new developments will apply to both. Actually, large scale herring fisheries appeared after the larger seine boat was an established unit. One difference in the two fisheries is the use of depth recorders to locate the schools of herring.

Originally salmon purse seining was done by two large skiffs. One carried the net, the other the winch for the purse line. They were propelled by oars and a crew of around 16 men was required. The gas engine seiner appeared in the early 1900's. The boats averaged around 35 to 40 feet with a crew of about seven or eight. As in the case of gillnetting, the seiners increased in size to cope with wider fishing areas. The gas engine has been replaced by the more economical diesel engine.

No radical change appeared in purse seining until after World War II when the drum salmon seiner appeared. Its seine is reeled in by power in a method similar to that found in gillnetting. The conventional table salmon seiner requires five or six men who haul in the seine by hand. In fact this is a double process. The seine is hauled in during the pursing operation. It is then returned to the water and rehauled, piled a and made ready for the next set. The drum seiner, on the other hand, can be operated by four men at a greater speed and with less physical labour than the conventional table seiner.

The use of the drum seiner resulted in the first opposition to seiners by the fishermen's union. Owners of drum seiners felt they were entitled to an increased boat share because of the smaller crew. The UFAWU opposed this, using as one argument that if the boat share was increased, every seine boat would install a drum. This could conceivably eliminate nearly half the seine fishermen.

A second development has been the Puretic block, which hauls in the seine by power and eliminates the need of manually hauling or "fleeting" the seine. The block has reduced the physical demands on the crew and could be used to reduce the number of crew men.

Hook and Line. The two main applications of hook and line fishing are to salmon and tuna trolling, and long line fishing for halibut and black cod. Table I[7] shows the proportion of salmon taken by this method. Trolling for spring salmon, coho and blue back is based on the habit of these species of feeding on lance, herring and other small travelling fish. To simulate this feed, trolling "spoons" of bright metal and plastic or wooden "plugs" are used as lures. The salmon are caught by the barbed hooks attached to the lures. The lures are set at varying depths determined by trial and error. The fish are "dressed"; that is, cleaned by the fishermen.

Trolling boats run from 25 to 50 feet in length with an average of 36 feet. Larger boats, 40 feet and over, pack ice and deliver to the processing plant. These boats usually carry two men. All trolling boats are owner-operated. Tuna trolling differs from salmon trolling in the use of feather lures and greater trolling speeds. In addition,

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7 See p. 15.

it is an off-shore operation and requires a crew of at least two men. A major technological change has been the development of power-driven gurdies for hauling trolling lines, a task formerly done by hand.

Entrapment. Salmon traps are the most efficient method of fishing from the standpoint of costs and the control of conservation. The method is now of minor importance in British Columbia, but is important in Alaskan waters and until 1934 was important in the waters adjacent to the State of Washington. In British Columbia salmon traps are used by one company at Sooke on southern Vancouver Island under a privilege granted by the crown in 1903. The use of traps on the Alaska-B.C. border was recommended in 1929 by a Royal Commission, but was not approved by the Federal Government.[8]

As the name suggests, a salmon trap is a means of entrapping fish travelling along a known path. A "lead" guides the fish into a wire net trap having a series of compartments. The fish are brailed from the last compartment or "spiller". Traps as well as the trap sites are company owned. Crews are hired primarily for maintenance and caretaking. The proportion of salmon taken by the traps is given in Table I.[9]

Salmon traps have been a cause of intense controversy between Canadian and American authorities. Fraser River salmon on their annual migrations pass through American waters before entering the river. For many years, traps were allowed in American waters but not in Canadian. As a result, Americans were catching a good portion of

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8 Pacific Fisherman, (May 1929), p. 14; (July 1929), p. 30.

9 See p. 15.

salmon destined for Canadian spawning grounds.[10]

Beam Trawling. Beam trawling is used for bottom fish such as sole, ling cod, true cod, red cod and dog fish. The beam trawl is a conical bag of heavy cotton (now nylon) webbing, held open by means of two "wing" boards. It is towed along the sea bottom and literally scoops up the fish. For this reason it is the least selective method of fishing.

Beam trawlers measure from 40 feet to the same size as the larger seiner and carry two to five crewmen. A number of halibut boats and seiners enter this fisheries during their off seasons. Large-scale beam trawling first appeared during World War II, then decreased in intensity. The technological branch of the Department of Fisheries has done considerable experimental work aimed at improving the beam trawl, particularly trying to adapt it to the herring fisheries.

The Halibut Fisheries.

The development of the halibut fisheries shows a pattern of adjustment and adaptation of methods and techniques of fishing to rapid depletion and to the move to fishing areas more distant from the fishermen's home port. In turn the changes in methods and techniques have brought a change in ownership of boats and equipment and in the methods of payment to the fishermen. In addition, the whole labour relations structure was to be affected by these changes.[11]

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10 See below, Chapter 2.

11 See Below, Chapter 9.

Methods of Halibut Fishing. In long lining for halibut or black cod, the line with baited hooks is laid on the bottom of the sea. A unit of gear, or "skate", consists of a main line of tarred manila, with shorter lines or "gangings" attached at regular intervals. Barbed hooks are attached to the gangings. The skate is set through a "chute", then anchored at each end and marked by buoys. The lines are hauled in by a power winch, or "gurdy".

The halibut fleet consists of the specialized halibut boat plus seiners and a "mosquito fleet", mostly of trollers and gillnetters. Crews vary from two men on the smaller boats to 15 on the larger boats, depending on the size of the boat and the amount of gear handled.

The hook and line method is also used in a minor way, for hand lining or "jigging" for ling cod. They are kept in "live wells" for delivery to the buyer.

Early Fisheries. The halibut fisheries began in the 1880's with operations confined to the Gulf of Georgia and markets in Victoria, Vancouver and New Westminster, although some exports were made to San Francisco. The industry received an important stimulus about 1890 with the introduction by the C.P.R. of refrigerated railway cars. This opened huge markets in Eastern Canada and United States, greatly expanding the industry.

Early halibut fishing was carried on in small boats which proved inadequate for the rapidly expanding industry. The halibut steamer was introduced. It was a mother ship for fishing dories which delivered to the steamer. Halibut sailing schooners were used to a lesser extent, mainly by Americans, operating from San Francisco. The fisheries was

restricted by their limited range, and by the end of the century, they were no longer used. The steam halibut boats had more range but heavy initial investment and high operating costs made them increasingly uneconomical as the fishing area enlarged.

A typical halibut steamer at the turn of the century, described as the "finest fishing vessel in the world" using "modern methods", had 12 dories, each with two men. Every dory fished with four skates, each with 500 to 600 hooks.[12] Another halibut steamer of this period, operating out of Tacoma, Washington, carried 30 men, including 18 fishermen for its nine dories.[13]

All boats and equipment were owned by the fishing companies. The men were paid so much a fish, regardless of size. In 1900 the arrangement made by the companies was a payment of 25 cents a halibut with the companies supplying board, frozen herring for bait, dories, and lines. A typical landing was 276 halibut, or $33.00 a fisherman.[14] Halibut in that year was retailing for four to five cents a pound in Vancouver.[15] 25 cents a halibut was the prevailing price until 1902 or 1903 when it rose to one cent a pound.

Until 1914 practically all halibut fisheries were conducted by company-owned steam vessels and dories. With depletion of the fishing banks and need to travel to more distant grounds, the steamer became

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12 Vancouver Province, August 20, 1900, p. 7; June 3, 1901, p. 5.

13 Vancouver World, October 28, 1898, p. 5.

14 Province, August 20, 1900, p. 7.

15 Ibid., September 20, 1900, p. 2.

uneconomical and was replaced by the privately-owned halibut schooner.[16]

At this point, the gasoline engine was introduced. It brought changes to the whole industry which were most evident at first in halibut fishing, mainly because of the time factor. The gasoline-powered schooner could cover a wider area of operation. While the first specialized halibut boats were company-owned or company-financed, the trend was soon towards private ownership. The first gasoline-powered halibut boat arrived in Prince Rupert in the winter of 1913.

The introduction of the diesel engine, like the gasoline engine, was to have the greatest impact on the halibut industry. The diesel, operating at far less expense, could compete with the steamers in the more storm-swept banks of Alaska now known as Area 3. The first diesel-powered halibut boat appeared in Seattle, in 1916.[17] Canadian owners followed suit and the last halibut steamer was used in 1918.

The specialized halibut boats were strong and seaworthy, with a deep draft, high bow and stern, a fairly low deck with high bulwarks and hatch combing. They measured up to 100 feet and carried crews of up to 15 men. In 1914, with the appearance of the independent halibut boat came the halibut "line hauler system" (presumably the gurdy) and the halibut chute.[18]

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16 Nicholl, J.W., "Pacific Halibut Control", Pacific Fisherman, (August, 1929), pp. 16-17.

17 Prince Rupert Daily News, April 29, 1916, p. 3.

18 Pacific Fisherman, (August 1929), p. 16.

Depletion of the halibut fisheries continued and increasingly stringent measures were necessary for conservation purposes. The halibut season has become shorter and shorter until at present the quota for Area 2 can be caught in less than a month.[18a] Thus the need for the specialized halibut boat for halibut fishing alone decreased. Today though many are still in use, the construction trend is toward combination boats, suitable for halibut, salmon, herring and beam trawling.

Techniques and Labour Relations in Halibut Fisheries. The trend towards the privately-owned halibut boat had an important impact in labour relations. The trend was related to the fact that the companies were unwilling to risk capital investments in boats in the face of rapid depletion. The privately owned boats were free to sell to the highest bidder with the proceeds divided on a "lay" basis, that is, 20 percent of the gross to the boat and the net proceeds divided equally among the crew. Furthermore, with the change in status whereby the crews were self-employed in the true sense of the word, the incidence of labour management disputes was minimized.[19]

The Transportation of Fish.

The method of transportation of fish from the fishing areas to the processing plants varies and has caused some conflict between labour and management. Size of vessel varies considerably from the small local collector to the coastwise packer. Manual labour entailed also differs. For instance, in packing troll-caught salmon, each fish must

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19 See below, Chapter 9.

18a. But see Table IV, p. 57.

be iced. In general, hours of work are long but the type of labour needed varies as does the number of crew.

The modern packer, with its large carrying capacity and its long range is able to travel the entire coast line. Thus it has been an important factor in centralizing canning and processing operations at Prince Rupert, Namu and in the Vancouver-New Westminster district. With radio telephones, packers can be directed to more productive fishing grounds. Contact with the home plant means arrival times are known and the processing crews can be ready.

Larger packers have not only been a factor in centralized operations but have considerably reduced competition and eliminated the need for smaller packers. The latter are now mostly used for collecting from gillnetters and transferring fish to larger packers. A further step in efficiency might be attained by rival companies packing for each other, particularly in long runs to less productive areas. This would ensure capacity loads and thus a minimum unit-production cost.

An important development in fish transportation has been brine refrigeration, developed by the technological branch of the Fisheries Department. This system ensures top quality fish, yet eliminates the physical labour of icing fish. The process is still new and as yet has not had wide acceptance, possibly because of relatively high initial cost.

Effects of Techniques in Fishing on Labour Relations.

A fishing vessel is designed primarily for a particular type of fishing, and each fisherman is usually a specialist in one method.

However, rising costs of boats, equipment and general operations, as well as increasing competition at a time when fishing periods are being continually restricted, have meant a decline in value of catch per boat. Therefore, for a number of years, the trend has been to adapt equipment and gear for a variety of major fishing operations. An added incentive to diversified operations has been the rise in prices of all varieties of fish.

Examples of diversified operations are numerous. The gillnet boat is used for trolling and halibut fishing. The seine boat is used for salmon, herring, halibut, beam trawling and packing of fish. The specialized halibut boat, confronted with a short season, has been used for beam trawling, salmon and tuna trolling, herring and salmon packing.

In the earlier days of fishing the fishermen followed one method of fishing, remained in a relatively restricted area and had little contact with fishermen from other areas. The trend towards consolidation and centralization of processing operations, plus the wider areas of fishing operations, meant closer contacts. This was a factor in union organization. At this stage, however, the fishermen were still relatively specialized and any group action was on occupational lines--that is, each group, whether gillnetters, seiners or trollers, took up its own special problems.

But with diversification and overlapping of occupations, the fishermen came into contact with several types of fishing and so had common interests--a prerequisite for group action on a coastwise basis.

The movement of the fleet from one productive ground to another led to increasing competition. At the same time it resulted in some

antagonism by local fishermen against the "intruding" fishermen.

Competition in fishing operations compels a search for new ideas and innovations. The original users of new ideas maintain an advantage until they become widely adopted and the search is renewed for further improvements. The end result is increased productivity, increased investments and decreased physical labour.

The present-day fishing fleet has reached such a degree of efficiency as to become a matter of prime concern to the fisheries authorities. To cope with this high degree of efficiency, increasingly stronger conservation measures must be instituted to ensure perpetuity of fish populations. Resultant shorter fishing seasons, quotas and other regulations mean that fishermen and companies must realize returns on their labour and investment during a briefer period. This tends to promote tension and conflict in labour-management relations.

Main Techniques in Processing Fish.

Processed fish products are marketed in competition with several other protein food products. So they must be sold at competitive prices. In the early stages of salmon canning, the operators realized that one way to reduce production costs was by use of mechanical devices. As early as 1878, it was reported that "many ingenious devices, with labour saving devices of diverse kinds, are eagerly adopted as necessity suggests. It is of course only by an organized system of action and the minute subdivision of labour that the operation of the industry, from the cutting up of the tin plates, the shaping, the soldering up to the final labelling of the cans, after the insertion and cooking of the contents,

can be profitably or successfully carried on".[20]

There is a paradox in present-day processing of fish. The canning and reduction sections are highly mechanized but in fresh fish sections, where raw fish prices and production costs are high, manual labour still predominates.

Techniques of Salmon Canning.

Salmon canning follows this pattern. The salmon is unloaded from the boats by conveyor into separate bins, according to species or areas of origination. The salmon then pass through an "Iron Chink" where heads, tails, fins and viscera are removed. The salmon then pass through tanks where they get a final cleaning and inspection. This last is a manual operation. From the tanks they pass to a set of circular "gang" knives where the fish are cut into correct lengths for the filling machines, or to the hand fillers. (In some plants, handfilling is still done, especially for 1/4 lb. cans.) Alternatively, they may pass to a combined cutting and filling machine. From the filling machine, the cans pass through an automatic weighing machine where all underweight cans are rejected. At this point, salt is added mechanically. The cans then pass through a double seamer where lids are added and the cans partially closed. The next stage is the vacuum machine where the air is exhausted, the cans sealed and made ready for cooking in retorts. The cans are cooled, washed in lye tanks and then passed to the labelling machines. They are then ready for the consumer market. As can be seen, the modern salmon

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20 Report of Commissioner of Fisheries, Department of Marine and Fisheries, 1878, p. 297.

cannery is a highly mechanized operation, but it still requires a fluctuating and seasonal labour force.

Major Technological Changes in Salmon Canning.[21] The fishing industry showed advanced thinking about mechanization at a very early period. At the 1898 New Westminster Agricultural Fair it was reported that "the visitor will be able to note the evolution in the science of salmon canning. They will see a machine that caps and solders the tin in one motion, also which cuts up the fish, inserts it in the cans and sends it along to the capping machine. There is also a mechanical idea which proposes to do away with both nets and fishermen, which when perfected is expected to secure the fish as he runs without the aid of the antiquated mesh nets, divide the shoals into departments of exact uniform size, split the fish into required slices, cut them to the one hundredth part of an ounce in weight and land them in one pound tins ready for capping. This invention which is not yet patented, but which, all the same, bids fair to revolutionize the Pacific canning trade, will at the same time settle the Chinese labour and fishermens' strikes. This invention will also do away with trap nets without the aid of the international commission".[22]

By 1907 reports were that never before in the history of the canneries was there such a great rush to install new machinery. The usual operation now was sending the fish to the cannery by conveyors, then to the "Iron Chink" and cutters where the fish was cut into proper

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21 The dates given for these changes are those applicable to Alaskan and American canneries. Canadian changes would presumably be about the same. [?]

22 The Vancouver World, August 9, 1898, p. 1. [?]

size for canning. The cans were hand filled, then placed on belts where the lids were hand soldered. From here they passed through a steam box. The lids were then sealed, and the cans were ready for the retorts.[25a]

In the intervening 50 years the technological developments have increased the speed of salmon canning by 400 percent.[23] The original canneries were sheds where all stages of salmon canning and processing, except the actual cooking, were manual operations.

First requirement in canning was the cans, each of which had to be individually shaped and soldered by hand, before the automatic soldering machines were introduced. At one stage, a hole was left on the top of cans to exhaust the air. It was then covered and soldered by hand. Finally, each can was tested for leakage.

In the 1890's an attempt at can manufacture was made.[24] But the manufactured can, or "sanitary can", did not appear in salmon canning until 1905 and then was not widely used until 1912 with the introduction of the "double seamer", a device for sealing lids.[25] Soldering of lids became obsolete. By then canneries were obtaining their supplies from can manufacturers.

The next stage of can manufacture was the introduction of the collapsed can, resulting in space and freight savings to upcoast plants.

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23 Pacific Fisherman, August 1952, p. 66. The reader is referred to this issue for a history of technological developments in the industry.

24 This was the Automatic Can Co., believed to have been a subsidiary of Bell-Irving interests, and sold to the American Can Co. in 1897.

25 Ibid., August, 1952, p. 6 and February 1929, pp. 8-9.

25a Vancouver Province, July 9, 1907, p. 10. [?]

The plants merely reshaped or reformed the collapsed cans.[26] Their success in Alaska was immediate, and within a few years the can making phase of the Alaska cannery had disappeared in favour of the reformed can. Other reports have "collapsed cans were pioneered in 1924, but it was not until 1925 and 1926 that this development and its economies swept throughout the Alaska industry."[27]

Salmon cans, both empty and full, were first shipped in wooden boxes manually made from pre-cut lumber. In 1918 the fibre box was introduced and gradually replaced the wooden box.[28] Today an operator merely empties a large paper carton, or bag of cans into a machine which automatically uprights and feeds the cans into the filling machine.

The "Iron Chink". Until 1904 heads, tails, fins and viscera were removed by Chinese labourers. In that year the "Iron Chink" was invented. The first machines handled 60 fish per minute and replaced 56 Chinese labourers.[29] Today the machine can handle 120 fish per minute with one operator and three or four assistants.

Filling Machine. The mechanical filling machines began to replace the hand fillers in the early 1900's. This machine was gradually improved until 1928 when the high speed filler appeared.[30] The modern

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26 The year of the introduction of the collapsed can is uncertain. One report states "it was in 1918 that the American Can Co. first offered collapsed cans to the salmon industry...." Pacific Fisherman, Aug. 1952, p. 30.

27 Pacific Fisherman, August 1952, pp. 30, 41.

28 Ibid., p. 30.

29 Ibid., p. 67. Also Marine Life, June 1909, p. 8.

30 Ibid., p. 43.

filling machine will take dressed fish and can at rates up to 240 cans a minute compared to an average production of 270 1/4 pound cans an hour filled by hand.[31] Only 1/4 pound cans are hand filled today.

The Vacuum Machine. The vacuum machine was first introduced in 1913 but was not successful, and it was not until 1926 that it became widely used.[32] This machine replaced the cumbersome steam box through which cans were passed back and forth for 7 or 8 minutes to exhaust the air from the cans. The modern vacuum machines combine the function of exhausting and sealing the cans at the same rate of speed as the filling machines.[32]

By 1928, with the use of the vacuum machine and the high speed filling machine, the speed of a salmon canning line had increased by 300 percent.[34] The compact one-line cannery common on Campbell Avenue docks in Vancouver was now possible.

Another development common to all phases of processing is the use of towmotors. This has eliminated hand trucks and piling of cans by hand.

Labelling and Boxing. The modern labelling machine labels the cans, boxes them and then glues the boxes, ready for the market. It replaced the machine which lacquered the cans which were put by hand into wooden boxes.

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31 Author's estimates.

32 Pacific Fisherman, August 1952, p. 43.

33 The exact functions of the double seamers and steam boxes as given here may not be accurately described because of lack of research material giving exact details, and the author's lack of personal knowledge. Some of the statements are reconstructions based on a few known facts. The same applies to the techniques of hand soldering of cans.

34 Ibid., p. 43

Main Techniques in Fish Reduction.

Main steps in fish reduction, whether of salmon offal, herring or other fish, are as follows. The fish is unloaded into bins from which it passes through a pre-cooking stage to presses. Here the liquids, that is the fish oils, are pressed from the pre-cooked fish. The solids are then passed through rotary driers to be cooked and dried. Finally the meal is ground and sacked ready for the market as fish meal.

The liquids from the press are pumped into tanks and heated to around 180 degrees F. The oil "breaks" to the top and is run off. The remaining liquids, or "stickwater", are passed through agitator tanks at 210 degrees F. and then to separators for further extraction of oils. The stickwater from the separators is stored in tanks where acid is added to obtain the correct pH factor. The liquid is then run through a second series of separators, and then passed through "baskets" where a further extraction of oil is obtained by centrifugal action of the baskets. The stickwater is finally passed to an "evaporation" plant where the remaining solids are recovered to obtain "solubles". Theoretically, and in actual practice, nothing is lost in the reduction operation.

Technological Development. The basic processes of fish reduction were known when herring production was permitted in the early 1930's. By the end of the 1930's the separator had been added and the evaporator was added in the 1940's.

Techniques in Fresh Fish Processing.

For years fresh fish was sold in fresh and frozen state without the aids of consumer appeals like packages. With the rise of supermarkets and the competition of other packaged frozen foods, the fish industry was compelled to change some of its methods of processing. The result has been the development of many types of packaged fish products, in addition to the sale of whole fresh and frozen fish. But the main processes in preparing fresh fish have remained unchanged.

Salmon is dressed, washed, glazed and stored in cold storage. Dressed springs, chums and coho are marketed whole in fresh or frozen state. A small amount is filletted and packaged, while large springs are mild cured.

The cods and bottom fish are filletted--bones and skin are removed--and packaged. An increasing amount is being used for recently developed products, such as fish sticks and pre-cooked frozen fish and chips. The demand for packaged fish opened up a big market for these lower priced species. Large-scale beam trawling to meet this need began in the early 1940's.

Dressed halibut is glazed and frozen. About the same quantity is filletted and flitched for halibut steaks. Packaging halibut has cut the premium price that medium halibut used to have over large.

Technological Developments in Fresh Fish Processing. Fresh fish processing is primarily a manual operation and very little of the operation can be mechanized. In filletting, the wrapping is done mechanically, and, at present, mechanical skinning machines and filletting

machines are being introduced, but as yet the capital costs are high. A major technological development that made packaged food possible was the introduction of quick freezing in 1930.[35] In this system, packages are frozen between plates under continuous pressure.

Technological Developments in Fish Processing and Labour Relations.

Great technological changes in fish processing, particularly in salmon canning, were a vital factor in the series of mergers, consolidations and centralization of operations begun in the 1920's. With the speed of salmon canning increased by 300 percent, and a highly mobile fishing and packing fleet, a lesser number of salmon canneries was required. This trend created some unemployment, particularly among the native Indians.

In past periods, the natives had migrated to the canneries in family units. The fishermen were hired by the native contractor acting as the agent for the canners. One consideration in the hiring was the available labour in the fisherman's family for hand filling and fish washing. However, in these many canning units, the work was highly seasonal, the season relatively short, and the supply of fish unpredictable. Therefore work was intermittent and income limited.

Against this must be balanced some of the advantages to labour of the technological developments. Centralized plants are integrated units comprising salmon cannery, reduction plant, cold storage and fresh fish operations. The trend for the employees, especially male employees, is a longer period of employment.

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35 Pacific Fisherman, August 1952, p. 45

Today the period of employment is practically year round with halibut, salmon and herring operations following one another. In addition there is maintenance work in the slack seasons. Also skills needed to make the many packaged and specialty products increase the trend toward a permanent labour force.

Technological developments have definitely created an increased labour force in certain areas. Fresh fish filletting and developments in reduction plants have enlarged these operations. Advancing technology has widened the scope of these operations, building a permanent labour force with increased incomes. The growing permanent labour force, in contrast to the earlier transient workers, requires more job security and this has been a factor in union organizing.

Effects of Technology on Labour Relations--A Summary.

The British Columbia fishing industry has undergone immense and rapid technological changes in catching, transporting and processing. These rapid changes, if adopted by only one company, would obviously mean an economic advantage for the user. Thus the very forces of competition compel the wide adoption of any new technological development. In consequence the technological changes have been adopted in sudden surges, because failure to adopt new techniques can mean economic failure.

The rapid rate and extent of technological changes, the pattern of sudden spurts, are all conducive to tension and conflict. Large fish packers equipped with radiophone and high speed canneries have been a factor in the centralized processing operations that have replaced the many canneries that once dotted the coast near the fishing grounds.

A few large diesel packers replaced many smaller salmon collectors. A few canneries now replacedthe many. In this way much capital investment in plants and boats became obsolete. The workers who worked in plants near their homes became unemployed and had to travel to distant plants, or find alternative employment.

In a similar way the gas engine replaced the oar-propelled boat, larger engines replaced the early smaller engines, and finally the economical diesel engine replaced the larger gas engine. In each case, the pattern remains the same--existing capital investment becomes obsolete only to be replaced by a greater investment.

Technological developments have increased efficiency and reduced physical labour per unit of output. At the same time, they have caused organized conflict among fishermen and, to a minor extent, in processing. The introduction of any new development in fishing or processing is of benefit to labour and proprietor alike, but it tends to create conflict over the question of sharing the benefits, or the costs, of the new development.

The introduction of the power "drum", in place of the hand-operated "table", in purse seining during the 1950's is one example of conflict resulting from improved technology. The drum seiner is considered to be highly efficient and certainly labour saving. Smaller boats and smaller crews can be used. If he uses a drum, the boat owner bears the total cost of the drum and the cost of any alterations. Since the smaller crew could increase their earnings through increased efficiency, the boat owners felt they were entitled to a greater share of the catch than the crew. The attempt to increase their share from the existing 7/11

of the catch was unsuccessful. One argument was that fishermen would be displaced. Another difficulty was that a larger boat share might induce many smaller boats to convert to purse seiners.

The above conflict may have been forestalled by the introduction of the Puretic block for reeling in purse seines. This too is efficient and labour saving, yet because of organized opposition the crew, particularly in herring seining, has not been reduced.

In processing there has been very little opposition to technological development. The disputes that have resulted are generally over the classification of the type of work created.

These illustrations show that new developments will and do create tensions that result in organized conflict and organized action.

Diversity of Methods. The methods of commercial fishing vary considerably. Each method requires its own peculiar type of boat and fishing equipment. There are wide variations in the requirements for capital investment in boats and gear, in crew complements, in the division of share earnings and in actual individual earnings. In addition, some ethnic groups with common interests have tended to specialize in certain types of fishing.

An outstanding feature in commercial fishing is the high degree of competition, not only between method, but within each. In salmon fishing, the gillnetter and purse seiner are competing for sockeye, pinks and chums. The gillnetter and salmon purse seiner compete with the specialized halibut boat in halibut fishing.

This competition has resulted in some antagonism and was a contributing factor in group action taken by the different gears. As will

be shown below, gillnetters and salmon purse seiners, though engaged in the same fisheries, organized into separate groups. Lack of co-ordinated action by these differing groups, meant that each group might arrive at a separate agreement with management--an agreement that might be against the interests of the other group.

Mutual understanding or, in other cases, enforced regulations have lessened competition in certain areas. For instance, specified fishing areas are open for gillnetters and closed to purse seiners, or vice versa. Again, different times are imposed when each type of fishing is allowed, e.g. gillnetting at night and purse seining during the day.

CHAPTER II

GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF THE FISHING INDUSTRY

The degree of governmental control and regulation of the B.C. fisheries is unmatched in any other privately owned or privately operated industry. There are several reasons for this. The supplies of fish are limited by natural forces and are still beyond the control of man. There is intense competition for this limited supply by fishermen and processors. Technological changes increase the catch of fish per man or per man hour. The end result of these factors is a continual problem of depletion. Hence more numerous and stringent regulations must be introduced to conserve the supplies of fish.

Types of Governmental Regulations.

The purpose of governmental regulation of the fishing industry is to sustain or increase present yields and to ensure the perpetuation of the fish populations. The main method of control of the fisheries is through conservation measures. Without strict conservation, there can be no fisheries.

In salmon fisheries the method of conservation is by closed seasons. For some time the closure was for 48 hours a week. Lately, with increased fishing pressures, the closed season has been increasing, and conversely, the fishing periods decreasing. In addition, conservation measures will close fishing areas for specified periods or for whole seasons, or even years. The B.C. coast is sub-divided into fishing areas.[1] Many of these are "allotted" a certain number of gillnetters or seiners. As

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1 See Maps 1A and 1B.

the number of boats increases so does the length of the weekly fishing closures. Again, certain fishing areas are available only to seiners, others to gillnetters. Alternately, seiners may be permitted to fish only during specified hours during the day, and gillnetters during the night. Further, regulations control the size of mesh in gillnets to provide for selective fishing. The lengths of seines and gillnets are limited and vary for different fishing areas. Finally, river mouths are marked and no fishing is permitted beyond these markers. In recent years the markers have been moved farther out towards the river mouths. On the Skeena, for example, fishing is now in open waters.

In addition to regulations for conservation there have been other measures such as limitation of licences to Japanese fishermen and company control of fishing licences.

The effect of government regulations on technological development has been varied. In some cases increased efficiency of fishing has been controlled by specifying the length of nets and the size of mesh in the nets. In some cases regulations have limited technological developments. The most effective method of fishing is by fish traps. Location of these at strategic points along the coast yield maximum catches, yet allow a controlled escapement for optimum spawning conditions. However, the adverse effect on the ancillary industries and on employment is obvious, particularly in coastal communities where fishing is the main source of income. To take another example, until 1917, governmental regulations delayed technological changes in gillnetters in District 2 by prohibiting the use of powered gillnet boats in District 2. The use of such boats could increase mobility from one area to another. If power

was permitted it was feared by the canners that the boat-rating system[1a] which limited boats in the district would be upset.[2]

A Dominion Fisheries Commission was established in 1917 to study and report on the problems of restrictions of fishing licences and number of boats in District 2. It was empowered to decide what numbers of boats should be allowed and whether certain companies should be given a quota of boats, as in the past. In their statement before the Commission, the canners maintained that the number of cannery licences should depend upon the supply of fish, motor boats ought not to be permitted since the majority of boats in use were not adapted for power and would have to be scrapped, there would be an increased investment of $800.00 a boat for engines.[3] An additional argument against power boats was made by the fishermen who feared that the engine noise would drive away the salmon.

In 1922 another Commission on fisheries included on its agenda the question of whether powered boats should be permitted for salmon drift nets.[4] The report of the Commission was favourable and in 1923 powered gillnet boats were allowed to operate in all the fishing areas of B.C.[5] Excluded were the Japanese who did not receive this right until 1930.

1a See below, p. 58 et seq.

2 Vancouver Province, July 10, 1917, p. 1.

3 Ibid., July 12, 1917, p. 14.

4 Ibid., July 11, 1922, p. 17.

5 Report of the Fisheries Branch of the Department of Marine and Fisheries, 1923-24, p. 53.

Another aspect of governmental regulations is that they have often set up a chain reaction. Regulations have encouraged technological developments to the point where these regulations must be further intensified and increased to curb the greater output made possible by greater technological efficiency. The shorter the fishing season is, the greater the degree of competition. The increased competition results in developing ways and means of increasing efficiency. Thus a highly mobile and efficient fishing fleet is encountering more and more government regulations.

As stated earlier, government conservation to be effective must be uncompromising. However, this has not discouraged organizations from attempts to influence government policies. The UFAWU has continuously attempted to reopen closed areas and lengthen fishing seasons. The canners in the past made similar attempts to influence policy but have in recent years refrained. In a similar way attempts have been made to persuade government policy to limit the number of fishing licences issued. In this way the fisheries would not be overcrowded by "holiday fishermen", since only bonafide fishermen would be issued licences.[6]

Another organized attempt to influence policy has sought alteration of the opening of the halibut fisheries in such a way as to restrict it to the full-time halibut fishermen and eliminate the salmon seiners and gillnetters. This would be done by postponing the opening day to a date approximating the salmon season. An alternative plan was to

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6 The particular case of government policy which denied Japanese the right to fish is discussed later.

to split the season into two parts. All these controversies chiefly affect halibut Area 2.[6a]

Few, if any, of these pressure groups have been successful. However, a group of fishermen were successful in getting protection in a specified fishing area between the New Westminster Bridge and Mission. In or about 1905, settlers in this area were permitted to fish in any part of the Fraser River. Residents below the bridge were not permitted to fish above the bridge. Ostensibly the purpose was to encourage settling of the area, but in actual fact the purpose was to prohibit the entry of Japanese fishermen. Obviously that purpose of the order no longer exists.

In 1954 the Federal government proposed to repeal this order but backed down in face of the protests of the union. One reason for the protest was that the fishermen concerned had been a privileged group, had failed to keep pace with technological developments and had boats which were therefore unsuitable for outside competition.

Effects of Regulations on Labour Relations. As can be seen, the effect of governmental regulations from year to year is to create further tensions through shortened seasons, closures, control of gear and areas to be fished, and to increase insecurity in an industry which historically has been uncertain.

The regulations limiting fishing time put pressure on both labour and management. To realize maximum returns on their labour and investment, fishermen demand increased prices for salmon, while management offers a minimum. These conflicts frequently lead to strikes. But the regulations also put pressure on both parties to reach an agreement

6a See Map 2.

before the opening date for salmon fishing. When the season is short neither party can afford to lose time. Regulations have the effect of creating conflict between different groups of fishermen as in the example mentioned for the halibut fisheries. In addition, the short halibut season compels halibut fishermen to enter other fisheries in the same way that salmon fishermen enter halibut fisheries. Fishermen who enter more than one fisheries are interested in the whole fisheries picture. This is a factor in producing one coastwise organization like the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union. The Deep Sea Fishermen's Union, devoted solely to halibut fisheries, has, on the other hand, declined in strength.[7]

Governmental Regulations on Salmon. The main conservation method is closure. Attempts at artificial propagation in hatcheries have had a long history, first being suggested in 1875. Hatcheries were closed as failures in 1936.[8] They, however, in no way affected labour relations in the industry.

International Sockeye Commission. The protection of the sockeye run on the Fraser River presents a special problem because the sockeye in their annual migration to the spawning areas of the Fraser River pass through American waters. Until 1934, salmon traps were permitted in the waters off the State of Washington, but not in Canadian waters with the

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7 The roles of the D.S.F.U. is elaborated below. See Chapter 6.

8 Report of Commissioner of Fisheries, Department of Marine and Fisheries, 1875, p. 219, and subsequent reports.

exception of the Sooke area of Southern Vancouver Island. Thus the American canners enjoyed a competitive advantage in catching salmon destined for Canadian waters. The controversy over the equitable catch of sockeye raged for years and did not officially end until 1937 when a joint United States-Canada International Sockeye Commission was formed to protect and rehabilitate the Fraser River sockeye through scientific study.[9]

Main advantages of salmon traps over gillnet fishing determined the nature of the controversy between Canadians and Americans over their use. Basically, trap caught fish were lower in cost.[10] Traps were placed at strategic places along the salmon migration routes and thus were able to catch more salmon. They operated 24 hours daily for the full seven days a week, while salmon gillnetting was restricted by a weekly closure period. Trap-caught salmon could be held for several days in the trap. The trap served as a reservoir allowing the canning plants to operate at capacity, or at least on a planned schedule. In gillnet fisheries the plants operated as salmon were landed at the plant, with the landings fluctuating from day to day.

Salmon traps, used extensively in the waters off the State of Washington since 1892, caught the salmon as they travelled toward the Fraser River, particularly at Point Roberts. The American canners, through the use of these traps, were in a more favourable position in the initial cost of the raw fish, and consequently their production

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9 "Rebuilding the Sockeye Runs of the Fraser River", Pacific Fisherman, August 1943, pp. 33-40.

10 For traps to operate successfully, they need a monoply position and rigid control of offshore fishing. Otherwise the maximum catch would be caught before the fish reached the traps.

costs of canning were lower than those of the Canadian canners. The latter protested against this inequality, arguing that the Americans were entrapping salmon destined for Canadian rivers. The use of salmon traps in Canadian waters was legalized in 1894, presumably to offset the American operations, but were never used extensively except in Southern Vancouver Island.[11]

The B.C. Fisheries authorities attributed the low seasonal catch on the Fraser River to "what might be expected from the damaging of Puget Sound by the slaughter pens along the natural course of the salmon to the natural spawning grounds in the streams of B.C. What at present is an object lesson is the fact that the traps are full of salmon and the nets in the river are practically empty. The trap licences allowed by the American authorities are simply deleting the river of valuable fish, and if the traps are permitted to continue their exterminating operations, it is only a matter of a few seasons until the Fraser repeats the experience of the Columbia River. They are 'killing the goose that laid the golden egg'. What will the Fraser be without salmon?"[12]

By 1899, there were 19 American salmon canneries operating in the Puget Sound area, using 159 salmon traps, 365 gillnets, 330 set nets, 125 drag seines and 72 purse seines. All these were in daily use. Compared to this, the Canadian canners were operating 3,405 gillnet boats in the Fraser River area, subject to a weekly closure system.[13] The year 1899 was reported to have been a record year for capital investment and value

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11 Dominion and B.C. Fisheries Commission, Reports and Recommendations, 1905-1907, p. 33.

12 The Vancouver World, August 5, 1898, p. 1.

13 Dept. of Marine and Fisheries, Annual Report, 1903, p. 2.

of output in Puget Sound. Capital invested and capital employed increased 110 percent, employment showed the same increase, while earnings of employees rose by 300 percent. Value of output of the plants increased by a like amount.[14]

The Canadian objections to the Puget Sound salmon traps continued until 1934 when the traps were declared illegal in the State of Washington. The only traps now allowed are those within the boundaries of Indian reservations since these have had little or no effect on the salmon migrations along the approaches to the Fraser River.

TABLE II

FISHING GEAR OPERATED -- FRASER RIVER AND PUGET SOUND, 1911-1917[15]

	Fraser River		Puget Sound		
Year	Gillnets	Traps	Gillnets	Drag Seines	Purse Seines
1911	1,443	300	459	---	137
1913	2,560	311	170	---	252
1914	2,656	---	---	---	---
1915	2,614	268	509	---	137
1917	2,606	274	394	112	411

In discussing salmon traps on the Fraser it would be well to point out that Canadian protests were also directed at salmon traps used in Alaska. It was charged that the low salmon pack on the Nass River in 1907 was a direct result of the Alaska traps intercepting the Nass

14 Report of the Fisheries Commissioner for the State of Washington, cited in Canada, Dept. of Marine & Fisheries, Annual Report, 1903, p. 3.

15 Canada, Dept. of Marine & Fisheries, Annual Report, 1915, p. 16, and Annual Report, 1917, p. 9.

salmon run.[16] Similarly, 1919, it was stated that the 14 traps located between Cape Fox and Tongas in Southeastern Alaska were affecting the Nass run.[17]

A fisheries commission studying the effects of Alaska traps on the Canadian catch did recommend the use of traps by Canadians on the B.C.-Alaska boundary. This recommendation, though made in 1922, was not carried out.

To return to the Fraser River sockeye, there was evidence, as is known today, that overfishing prevented sufficient escapement to the spawning grounds to perpetuate the sockeye population. But the industry still hoped to remedy this by artificial propagation in hatcheries. Meanwhile, Canada and the United States still sought agreement on joint control of the sockeye fisheries. In 1908, Britain, acting for Canada, and the United States did sign a treaty covering the Fraser River sockeye situation but the United States Senate refused to ratify it.[18]

In 1913, the well-known Hell's Gate slide blocked migration of salmon to the spawning grounds. The result was a pack of less than 600,000 cases of sockeye in 1917 compared to 2,401,488 for the previous cycle year of 1913. This drop lent weight to the belief that the key to sustained yields is a suffient escapement of salmon to the spawning areas.

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16 Canada, Dept. of Marine & Fisheries, Annual Report, 1917, p. 10.

17 Ibid., 1919, p. 11.

18 Pacific Fisherman, August 1943, p. 34.

Continued decline in the Fraser River sockeye production led Canada in 1918 to re-open negotiations with United States. An international committee was established to study the fisheries. It recommended "regulation of the fisheries in respect to the times, seasons and methods of sockeye fishing, and the conduct of investigations into the life history of the salmon, hatchery methods, spawning ground conditions and other related matters by an international fisheries commission to consist of four persons, two to be named by each of the high contracting parties."[19]

A Canadian commission appointed as a result found the reasons for the drop in production to be over fishing by the Americans, too many B.C. gillnetters, improper fishing in the River itself, Indian fishing upstream, long-distance administration from Ottawa, the Hell's Gate blockade, and political influence.[20]

The 1918 recommendations were agreed to by Canadian authorities but again the United States Senate failed to ratify the treaty. In 1929 and again in 1930 the Canadians signed treaties covering Fraser River sockeye, but each time they were rejected by United States. Progress towards treaty was accelerated in 1934 when salmon traps were declared illegal in the waters off the State of Washington, with the exception of those in waters off Indian reservations.

Also putting pressure on the U.S. was the fact that in 1936, for the first time, the Canadian catch of sockeye exceeded that of the United States.[21] Finally, in 1937, a treaty establishing an Inter-

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19 Pacific Fisherman, August 1943, p. 34.

20 Ibid., August 1952, p. 27.

21 Ibid., August 1943, p. 34.

national Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission was ratified with a provision that the United States and Canada would share the sockeye catch equally.[22]

The controlling authority, therefore, on the most important salmon river is the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission. Regulations of this Commission have caused conflict, as noted above. However, the remarkable rehabilitation of the sockeye salmon and the economic benefit of all who are engaged in this fisheries offset any arguments against its control.

A similar treaty covering the pink salmon fisheries of the Fraser River has been signed. Some delays in negotiations were encountered but the issue was soon settled when the Canadians began to use larger seiners off the waters of Juan de Fuca. These boats, 72 to 84 feet, were bought in the United States for the express purpose of outfishing the Americans. When the Americans lost the edge they formerly had in catches of pink salmon, it was to their advantage to sign the treaty.

Conservation and Rehabilitation of the Halibut Fisheries. Following 1915, due to increased intensity of fishing, the exploitation of new fishing grounds and the increased area of fishing, annual production of halibut showed a decline. The need for conservation measures became apparent. American and Canadian fishermen in the industry were competing with each other in extra-territorial waters. Any conservation measures had to be undertaken jointly by American and Canadian authorities. Control has been brought about amicably in contrast to the long wrangle over the Fraser River sockeye.

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22 The division of the catch for the 1935-51 period is shown in Table III.

TABLE III

CANADIAN AND AMERICAN SOCKEYE CATCHES, 1935-1951[22a]

Year	Fraser River Percent U.S.	Fraser River Percent Canada
1935	47	53
1936	25	75
1937	38	62
1938	42	58
1939	44.5	55.5
1940	37.5	62.5
1941	39.3	60.7
1942	37.2	62.8
1943	37.42	62.58
1944	29.77	70.23
1945	39.9	60.1
1946	43.9	56.1
1947	16.6	83.4
1948	59.7	40.3
1949	49.95	50.02
1950	57.7	42.3
1951	46.78	53.22

22a British Columbia, Department of Fisheries, Report, 1951, p. 9.

In 1913 to 1915 the Provincial Department of Fisheries undertook the investigation of the decline of halibut fisheries. The results of this investigation laid the foundation of future investigations and co-operation between Canada and U.S.A.[23] Negotiations between the two countries proceeded and, by 1917, it was reported that the U.S.A. had agreed to a three months closed season but that Canada had not taken a definite stand.[24]

In 1923 the terms of a halibut treaty were agreed upon, with the object of a joint and uniform regulation of the fisheries. The treaty, ratified October 21, 1924, established the International Halibut Commission with two representatives from U.S.A. and two from Canada.[25] The treaty controlled the fishermen of Canada, Alaska and the continental U.S.A. The primary function of the Commission was to conduct investigations into the decline of the halibut fisheries and to recommend means of preserving and rehabilitating it. The first step was to enforce a closed season of three months.

Further regulations were required and a new treaty signed in 1930, and revised in 1937, stands to the present day. This prescribed, among other things, a closed season from November 30th till April 30th, control of incidently-caught halibut in areas closed to halibut fishing, the control of types and size of gear (dories were prohibited), collection of statistics to show trends, and closing of certain areas for spawning purposes.

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23 Report of Commissioner of Fisheries, December 31, 1924, pp. 55-59.

24 Vancouver Province, July 6, 1917, p. 14.

25 Ibid., December 31, 1924, p. 16.

Most additions in the present treaty were divisions into areas of the fishing banks along the whole Pacific Coast.[25a] Special regulations apply to each area in accordance with the degree of depletion, the growth rate and age factors of the halibut populations. For commercial purposes Areas 2 and 3 are the most important. Each area has a quota of halibut to be taken, set by the Commission in accordance with the condition and abundance of the halibut. The quota must be consistent with the best conservation knowledge.

The Commission sets the opening date of the halibut season and the quota for each area. When the quota is filled, the Commission sets a closing date. During the season, individual boats work to obtain a maximum share of the quota.

In 1951, a modified split season went into effect when two sub-areas were created by the International Halibut Commission. These sub-areas are closed during the regular halibut season but are opened for a ten day period after the closure of Areas 2 and 3. No quotas are set for these sub-areas.

The quota system, as stated earlier, did arouse conflict. In fact, the fishermen felt it might be impossible to operate for such shortened fishing periods. Despite the early fears, the Canadian share of the quota has been steadily increasing regardless of the decreasing fishing periods.[26] Another factor is that the majority of the regular halibut boats continue fishing in Area 3 after Area 2 has closed while other boats rig out for other fisheries. Conflict has thus been reduced as the fishermen grow accustomed to the short fishing season.

25a See Map 2.
26 See Table IV

TABLE IV

NORTH PACIFIC HALIBUT SEASONS AND PERCENTAGE DIVISIONS OF CATCH, 1933 - 1958

	AREA 2					AREA 3					ALL AREAS		
				Percentage of Catch					Percentage of Catch		Percentage of Catch		
Year	Opened	Closed	Fishing Days	Can.	Amer.	Opened	Closed	Fishing Days	Can.	Amer.	Can.	Amer.	Year
1933	Feb. 1	Aug. 25	206	33.9	66.1	Feb. 1	Oct. 26	268	2.7	97.3	17.7	82.3	1933
1934	Mar. 1	Aug. 19	172	40.2	59.8	Mar. 1	Oct. 27	241	3.0	97.0	20.5	79.5	1934
1935[i]	Mar. 1	Sept. 6	159	40.8	59.2	Mar. 1	Dec. 26	270	5.3	94.7	21.3	78.7	1935
1936	Mar. 16	Aug. 10	148	38.8	61.2	Mar. 16	Nov. 3	233	7.0	93.0	21.7	78.3	1936
1937	Mar. 16	July 28	135	42.6	57.4	Mar. 16	Oct. 19	218	7.5	92.5	23.8	76.2	1937
1938	Apr. 1	July 29	120	41.3	58.7	Apr. 1	Oct. 29	212	10.4	89.6	24.7	75.3	1938
1939	Apr. 1	July 29	120	44.8	55.2	Apr. 1	Oct. 28	211	10.0	90.0	26.5	73.5	1939
1940	Apr. 1	July 13	104	43.5	56.5	Apr. 1	Sept.26	179	5.9	94.1	23.8	76.2	1940
1941	Apr. 1	June 30	91	44.2	55.8	Apr. 1	Sept.14	167	8.4	91.6	24.7	75.3	1941
1942	Apr. 16	June 29	75	39.0	61.0	Apr. 16	Sept.25	163	7.7	92.3	22.2	77.8	1942
1943	Apr. 16	June 20	66	44.5	55.5	Apr. 16	Sept. 8	146	5.8	94.2	24.1	75.9	1943
1944[ii]	Apr. 16	July 9	51	42.7	57.3	Apr. 16	Nov. 30	194	8.2	91.8	25.0	75.0	1944
1945	May 1	June 15	46	47.0	53.0	May 1	Sept.24	147	12.2	87.8	28.0	72.0	1945
1946	May 1	June 11	42	50.7	49.3	May 1	Aug. 19	111	13.0	87.0	30.7	69.3	1946
1947[iii]	May 1	June 8	39	62.3	37.7	May 1	Aug. 17	109	25.3	74.6	43.7	56.3	1947
1948	May 1	June 1	32	51.7	48.3	May 1	July 11	72	18.0	82.0	33.6	66.4	1948
1949	May 1	June 3	34	51.4	48.6	May 1	July 12	73	17.9	82.1	33.7	66.3	1949
1950	May 1	June 1	32	52.7	47.3	May 1	July 5	66	15.6	84.4	32.8	67.2	1950
1951	May 1	May 28	28[iv]	53.9	46.1	May 1	June 25	56	19.6	80.4	38.0	62.0	1951
1952	May 14	June 8	26[iv]	56.1	43.9	May 14	July 12	58	24.2	75.8	39.6	60.4	1952
1953	May 17	June 9	24[iv]	55.8	44.2	May 17	July 7	52	28.0	72.0	42.9	57.1	1953
1954	May 16	June 5	21[iv]	47.6	52.4	May 16	July 12	58	29.9	70.1	38.9	61.1	1954
1955	May 12	June 4	24[iv]	45.5	54.5	May 12	Aug. 4	84	30.8	69.2	37.6	62.4	1955
1956	May 20	June 26	38[iv]	42.6	57.4	May 20	Aug. 23	97	33.5	66.5	38.1	61.9	1956
1957	May 1	June 17	48	46.3	53.7	May 1	Sept.22	144	34.7	65.3	40.3	59.7	1957
1958	May 4	July 2	59	49.6	50.4	May 4	Aug. 31	119	40.6	59.4	44.8	55.2	1958

Note: All dates given are for the legal season. Fishing times given are actual periods of fishing, with allowance made in certain years for delays in fishing due to strikes and disputes. Closure generally at midnight of dates given.

i. Fleet tied-up voluntarily until April 1.

ii. Fleet tied-up until May 20 in protest against OPA ceiling prices.

iii. Seattle fleet largely tied-up until July 1, due to crew share dispute.

iv. Does not include special post-season open fishing periods in sub-areas.

Source: Pacific Fisherman Year Book, 1958, pp. 110,213.

Governmental Regulations in Herring Fisheries. Strict governmental regulations for conservation purposes are also applied to herring fisheries. The coast is divided into districts each with its own tonnage quota of herring. Before the quota system came into effect, length of the fishing season was determined only by opening and closing dates set by the Fisheries Department.

More boats entering this fishery means that competition is sharper and fixed quotas mean a decrease in the average share per boat. The average share per fisherman is therefore dropping--a situation likely to produce conflict.

A solution, from the standpoint of the fishermen's earnings, is to eliminate the use of herring packers and tow-off boats and have the seiners pack their own herring to the plants. Instead of price per ton being divided among crews of seiners, packers and tow-off boats, it would be split only among seine crews, who would increase their earnings at the expense of packer and tow-off boat crews.

Governmental Regulations Restricting the Japanese Fishermen. In the period after World War I, the Federal Government instituted laws and regulations aimed at curbing the number of Japanese fishermen in British Columbia.[26b]

Issuance of Fishing Licences to Canners and the Boat Rating System. From the start of salmon canning until the period of the early 1900's, the Fisheries Department issued a share of the gillnet licences to the various salmon canners who, in turn, allotted them to individual gillnetters

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26b See Appendix B.

chosen by the canners.[27] The result was that during this period, the canners enjoyed a relatively high degree of control over the fishermen. Fishermen charged that the canners were obtaining or building sheds and calling them canneries in order to increase their share of these licences. Typical of protests was a resolution passed in 1900 by the newly-formed Fishermen's Union. In it, the case against the system then used is summed up. It asked that the ten licences allowed to the canners by the fisheries regulations should be abolished, charging the canners used the privilege allowed by the government to the disadvantage of the fishermen. One of the fishing regulations provided that a fisherman applying for a licence had to declare that he owned and operated his own boat and net. The Union protest declared that two-thirds of the fishermen receiving licences did not own either boat or net, but had them supplied by the canner. They alleged that the canners allowed such a fisherman to paint out the canner's mark and replace it with his own name and registered number. When applying for a licence, the fisherman then declared the boat and net to be his own. The union fishermen denounced this practice as a direct violation of the fishing laws by the canners themselves to serve their own ends.

Their protest went on to say: "By law, the canners are allowed ten licences, and each cannery has from 50 to 100 boats. These boats are rented to anyone whom the canners think proper, on the condition that they pay back to them the fish caught. It will be seen by these means how their boats can be worked to the disadvantage of the bonafide fisherman who has little invested in his boat and net. Therefore, the fishermen ask that the regulations mentioned above be strictly carried

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27 Available data on this subject is incomplete.

out and that it be made unlawful for a cannery man or any other person to supply either boats or nets to fishermen for the purpose of evading the law."[28]

Another example of government regulation by means of limiting licences existed in District 2. Until 1905, the salmon canneries in this District operated under an agreement which set the number of boats employed by each cannery. With the establishment of more canneries, this agreement was ended and replaced by a boat-rating system, sometimes known as the Williams-Babcock Boat Rating Commission. This system, instituted by the Dominion and Provincial Governments, fixed the number of boats for District 2 and then allotted them to the various canneries in the District. It was alleged that the system limited the number of canneries by virtue of limiting the number of boats. The result was the canners enjoyed a high degree of monopolistic power. Many of the fishermen regarded themselves as employees, whereas in reality, they were self-employed. While they should have been independent operators, they were forced to rely on the canners for their licence to fish.

In 1912, a movement to induce fishermen to immigrate to B.C. was started by the Federal fisheries authorities, the salmon canners, fishermen and other interested parties. To ensure success for this venture, the practice of issuing a share of the gillnet licences to canners, along with the boat-rating system, would have to be replaced by the issuing of licences directly to independent fishermen. Accordingly

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28 "News of Organized Labour", Vancouver Province, September 10, 1900, p. 5.

this type of licence began to be issued in 1912, but the total of gillnet licences was still divided between the independent fishermen and the canneries. The boat-rating system was meanwhile being outdated by the increasing number of fishermen and the mobility and efficiency which could be gained by using power gillnet boats.[29]

The canners also made efforts to increase the proportion of white fishermen on the coast. In a brief to the provincial government they outlined their method. Key proposal was "that in 1913 the canners undertake to employ not less than 20 percent of white fishermen applying before March 1, and that the Department be empowered to allow such applicants pro rata to the canners in District 2, this proportion to be increased year by year."[30]

As for the settlement of the B.C. coast with independent fishermen, the B.C. Commissioner of Fisheries permitted himself to indulge in a little rose-coloured rhetoric. He maintained that "at the present state in the growth of the West, with the present sentiment so strongly in favour of cementing bonds which hold together the Empire, we have felt it imminently desirable to foster that great coastline one of white fishermen of the stock of which won for Britain the supremacy of the seas and have placed her in the forefront of the nations. . . to dot this coastline with villages of prosperous white fishing folk, available as raw material for the Empire navies, is the ambition of us Westerners."[31]

As a positive step towards the encouragement of settling of these immigrant fishermen, a number of fishing licences were to be reserved for independent white fishermen for the 1913 season. They were divided among the coastal areas as follows:

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29 Vancouver Province, June 25, 1917, p. 2. See above, p. 17. Power was permitted in 1923.

30 Ibid., November 1, 1912, p. 7.

31 Ibid., November 16, 1912, p. 7.

Nass River.....	40	Kimsquit.....	8
Skeena River	170	Manitou	8
Rivers Inlet	175	Namu	5
Bella Coola	14	Smith's Inlet ...	5

[32]

As would be expected, the greatest dissatisfaction and the loudest protests against the method of issuing gillnet licences and the boat-rating system were expressed in the relatively undeveloped area of northern B.C. A public meeting at Prince Rupert sought ways to "destroy the outrageous monopoly now existing under government protection, and that British subjects be given their just rights and privileges in connection with the salmon industry in Northern British Columbia."[33]

From the same source came the statement that "the establishment of independent canneries will mean that the fishermen will receive a much better price for their fish. One authority stated the other day that it would mean that the fishermen would get ten cents more per fish than they are able to get now. It is no secret that, at the present time, the cannerymen can quite nicely afford to pay this extra ten cents, and then some, and still have a handsome profit left."[34]

A resolution that the boat-rating system be abolished was placed before Parliament in Ottawa. This move was strongly supported in Prince Rupert, where it was maintained that "the breaking of the salmon fishing and canning monopoly is the most important question in British Columbia, the people of Prince Rupert, and the North generally . . . the business of canning is in the hands of a few, who control the salmon fisheries of the northern waters in such a way that the white fisherman has no chance to

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32 Vancouver Province, November 16, 1912, p. 7.

33 Prince Rupert Daily News, April 1, 1916, p. 1.

34 "Editorial", Ibid., May 26, 1916, p. 2.

make a living by fishing for salmon. The system of the cannery boat-rating places the whole matter entirely in the hands of the cannerymen, as it keeps them entirely independent of the independent fishermen. Doing away with the cannery boat-rating system is the first step towards the freedom of the fishermen."[35]

In assessing the protests from Prince Rupert it should be realized that until World War II, the economy of the city depended primarily upon the fishing industry. It would be to the advantage of the city to have an increased number of salmon canneries with a corresponding increase in the number of fishermen and wage earners, even without a proportionate increase in the total salmon pack. But unless the pack did increase, the average earnings of the fishermen and wage earners would drop and, in actual fact, the trend was towards a decrease in the number of canneries.

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35 Prince Rupert Daily News, May 26, 1916, p. 2.

CHAPTER III

MARKETING

Marketing Problems. A major difficulty facing the fishing industry lies in its marketing problems. The consumer market determines the price the processor receives for the products, which ultimately determines what prices the fishermen receive. Prices have been the focal point of labour-management disputes and thus the market conditions have a strong bearing on the stability, or lack of it, in the industry.

Disputes in the industry, with minor exceptions, are a reflection of consumer market demands and prices. When the demand for fish products is strong, the industry is stable and generally free from labour-management disputes. When the market demand decreases, repercussions are felt throughout the industry and labour-management disputes, with the possibility of strike action, are almost unavoidable.

In part the difficulty lies in the nature of the industry itself. It has a problem of balancing supply and demand. In the first place, the supply of fish is unpredictable. In the salmon fisheries the catch fluctuates from year to year, because of cycles of relative abundance for sockeye and pinks. As yet there is no certain pre-season knowledge of the salmon pack despite scientific predictions or comparisons of previous cycle years.

The supply fluctuates less in halibut and herring fisheries, since the quantity of the catch is set by quota and some stability is achieved by the amounts of fish available being known in advance. In beam trawling

on the other hand, the supply is generally geared to the demand.

A second problem of supply is the effect on the unit costs of production, that is, the greater the supply, to a certain point at least, the less the unit costs, and vice versa. In fact, it appears that one of the causes of overfishing is this attempt to lower the unit cost of production.

The salmon fisheries face the possibility of over-supply or under-supply. In 1955-57, a short supply of fish was met by importing canned sockeye from Japan to meet Canadian domestic commitments, a plan that resulted in labour-management conflict. The problem of over-supply results in increased selling costs and increased storage costs. In addition, a carry-over in the salmon pack could have adverse effects on prices for the following year. This is also true of unsold stocks of other fish products, particularly halibut. In general, an over-supply in any one species and its product will tend to lower the prices of all other species. Conversely an under-supply will tend to increase prices.[1] On the other side, demand varies from year to year. This results in an uncertain market and changes in prices, which are reflected back to the fishermen themselves in terms of raw fish prices. Here is a prolific source of tension and dispute.

In the highly seasonal fishing industry, the supply of fish is obtained during a short period. On the other hand, demand is on an annual basis. Prices then will be on the basis of future or anticipated demands.

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1 Pacific Fisherman Yearbook, 1952, p. 14.

In some cases increased demand will not necessarily increase the price of fish. The recent high demand for packaged products, pre-cooked and other specialty food products is a case in point. The extra costs of production and distribution have absorbed the higher returns. Increased incomes of processor and fishermen have been, in this instance, a result of increased production. Another type of difficulty in the marketing of fish products is that caused by tariffs, monetary policies, political atmosphere, and general economic conditions existing in actual or potential importing countries.

Market Changes. Market conditions are constantly changing so the following can only indicate the nature of the problem.

Canada is a large producer of various fish products, but her per capita consumption of fish is small, leaving a large exportable surplus each year. This surplus must find an outlet on world markets in direct competition with other basic food products. But many countries such as Japan with a relatively high per capita consumption of fish also catch their own needs. Markets then will be in countries where demand for fish exceeds the supply or where there is a demand for special Canadian products, such as salmon.

Domestic Markets. Canada, in comparison with most other countries, has a relatively low per capita fish consumption as can be seen in Table V. One reason is that fish products are marketed in competition with the more popular basic protein foods such as beef, pork, mutton and poultry. Table VI shows the disadvantageous position of fish compared to competitive food products. The Fisheries Association of B.C. states that

the more desirable sockeye and coho compete with meat, poultry, canned tuna and processed meats, while pinks and chums compete with such food products as macaroni, pork and beans, and cheese.[2]

TABLE V

PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF FISH - 1951[3]

Japan	83.3 lbs.	Germany	19.8 lbs.
Iceland	65.3 "	Holland	17.9 "
Norway	46.7 "	France	14.8 "
Denmark	35.9 "	Canada	13.7 "
United Kingdom	29.9 "	Italy	12.6 "
Belgium	21.6 "	U.S.A.	11.1 "
Portugal	20.5 "	China	6.0 "

TABLE VI[4]

CANADIAN PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF MEAT AND FISH[5]

Meats		Fish	
Pork	62.2 lbs.	Fresh and frozen	6.82 lbs.
Beef	44.8 "	Canned Fish	4.67 "
Canned Meats	7.2 "	Cured Fish	2.20 "
Veal	6.7 "		
Offals	5.4 "		
Mutton and Lamb	1.9 "		
Total	128.2 lbs.		13.69 lbs.

2 Facts on Fish, Fisheries Association of B.C., March 19, 1953, Vol.2, No. 6

3 Ibid., April 23, 1953, Vol. 2, No. 8. 4 Ibid., April 23, 1953, Vol.2,No.

5 Figures for meat consumption, 1952; for fish consumption, 1951.

In the domestic markets the provinces with the higher per capita consumption are also the major producers. Newfoundland, though not shown in Table VII, would undoubtedly rank with Nova Scotia and British Columbia. Thus B.C.'s major domestic markets are the Prairie Provinces, Ontario and Quebec.

TABLE VII

PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF FISH BY PROVINCES[6] - 1951

Nova Scotia	16.68 lbs.	Ontario	8.26 lbs.
British Columbia	13.22 "	Pr. Edward Is.	7.45 "
Quebec	9.68 "	Alberta	7.12 "
New Brunswick	9.56 "	Saskatchewan	4.26 "
Manitoba	9.40 "		

The per capita consumption of fish is gradually increasing as shown in Table VIII. This increase can be attributed to the increase in population, particularly of immigrants from countries with a relatively high per capita fish consumption; the higher level of incomes with a resulting change in the standards of living; the substitution of fish for the higher priced competing food products because of the post-war high cost of living; the intensive sales promotion and advertising campaign of the B.C. Canners Association and the Federal Department of Fisheries.

6 Facts on Fish, Fisheries Association of B.C., April 23, 1953, Vol. 2, No. 8. This Table shows only relative differences between provinces and is not comparable to either Table VI or Table VIII.

TABLE VIII

INCREASE IN PER CAPITA FISH CONSUMPTION[7]

	Fresh & Frozen	Canned	Cured	Total
1947 -	5.78 lbs.	4.48 lbs.	2.00 lbs.	- 12.26 lbs.
1948 -	5.95 "	4.69 "	2.19 "	- 12.83 "
1949 -	6.16 "	4.51 "	2.20 "	- 12.87 "
1950 -	6.70 "	4.58 "	2.25 "	- 13.53 "
1951 -	6.82 "	4.67 "	2.20 "	- 13.69 "

Increasing freight rates pose a serious problem to the industry. Each increase adds to the total costs of production which are eventually reflected in the prices paid for raw fish. The freight rate increases shown in Table IX have resulted in an increase of 31 cents to 71 cents per carton of 48 halves of salmon and 57 1/2 cents to $1.33 per carton of 48 one-pound talls.

TABLE IX

RAIL FREIGHT RATE INCREASES[8]

Sept. 15,	1948 --	$0.96	per	100#	to	$1.33	per	100#	----	38%	increase
Oct. 1,	1949 --	1.33	"	"	"	1.40	"	"	----	5%	"
Nov. 7,	1951 --	1.40	"	"	"	1.57	"	"	----	12%	"
Mar. 1,	1952 --	1.57	"	"	"	1.64	"	"	----	4 1/2%	"
April 1,	1952 --	1.64	"	"	"	1.90	"	"	----	16%	"
Jan. 1,	1953 --	1.90	"	"	"	2.07	"	"	----	9%	"
Mar. 16,	1953 --	2.07	"	"	"	2.21	"	"	----	6%	"

7 Facts on Fish, Fisheries Association of B.C., April 23, 1953, Vol.2, No. 8.

8 Ibid., April 9, 1953, Vol. 2, No. 7. Rates given are from B.C. to points in Ontario and Quebec, in dollars and cents per 100 pounds.

Loss of many traditional foreign markets for canned salmon has left the industry more heavily dependent on the Canadian domestic market and the United States market. The purchasing power of Canadians increased during World War II, but the domestic market for canned salmon was neglected because of the needs of the armed forces and war relief. When the British dollar crisis created a need to expand the domestic market, the industry was confronted with the problem of educating a new generation about the virtues of canned salmon, and re-educating pre-war users to buy at inflated post-war prices. Individual fishing companies had always maintained their own sales promotion and advertising programmes in the domestic markets. In 1948, when Britain failed to purchase any canned salmon, these sales programmes were increased.

The competitive oligopolistic structure of the industry made it more equitable for the industry as a whole to undertake this sales promotion. This was undertaken in 1949 when 30 fish companies, under the Associated Salmon Canners of B.C., instituted a national no-brand advertising campaign at a cost to the industry of $250,000 to $300,000 per year. The Federal Department of Fisheries, through its Inspection and Consumer Service, assisted in the campaign through Home Economics Services. That this campaign has had considerable success is indicated in Table X.

In the sales promotion of canned salmon, diminishing returns on the advertising investment can be expected. As the consumer market approaches the saturation point, sales returns on any further investment for advertising may be expected to be negligible. The only alternative

then is to cut sales prices. This the canning companies did as shown in Table XI.

TABLE X

CONSUMPTION OF CANNED SALMON -- CANADA[9]

Pre-War	1948-49	1949-50	1950-51	1951-52	1952-53
550,000 cs.	172,846	905,226	883,183	814,184	900,000 (est.)

TABLE XI

DECREASE IN CANNED SALMON WHOLESALE PRICES[10]

	1951	1953	% Decrease
Sockeye	$38.00 per case	$33.00 per case	..... 15%
Coho	29.00 " "	22.00 " "	..... 24%
Pinks	19.00 " "	15.00 " "	..... 21%
Chums	16.50 " "	13.00 " "	..... 21%

In attempting to predict developments in the domestic market, it must be remembered that per capita consumption of fish products is relatively low in comparison to competing meat products. Now, assuming

9 Facts on Fish, March 19, 1953, Vol. 2, No. 6. 48-lb. case.

10 The Fisherman, May 19, 1953, p. 1.

that the sales promotion and advertising campaign of the Associated Canners, plus the educational efforts of the Department of Fisheries can achieve the desired effect of increasing the consumption of fish, then market price to the consumer becomes a major factor. At some critical point on the price range of a food product, substitution by other competing food products occurs. Because consumers seem to prefer meat, it may be assumed that the critical price per pound at which a competing product will be substituted occurs earlier in the case of fish than that of two competing meat products. In general, demand for fish products should increase if the price of competing meat products increases in relation to fish prices. Correspondingly, consumer demand for fish products will decrease if meat prices decrease in relation to fish prices. The ability of fish products to compete with other food products will determine the supply of, and the demand for, fish products, which will in turn determine the prices paid for raw fish.

Fishery production in B.C. is certain to be in excess of domestic requirements for some years to come. In the case of canned salmon, it would appear that annual Canadian consumption will be around 900,000 cases in the immediate future. Assuming that annual canned production averages 1,500,000 cases, an export market must be found for the excess. Similarly, a market must be found for surplus production in other fisheries.

Foreign Markets. Until recently, Canada has depended on world markets for the sale of the major portion of her fisheries production. Selling was not a serious problem since demand was high. However, the price of fish on foreign markets was determined by supply and demand in the

importing countries. Thus economic conditions in the importing countries eventually determined the prices paid for fish products. This has been particularly true for canned and fresh salmon and for halibut.

The degree of the dependence of canned salmon on foreign markets and the degree of competition was noted as early as 1897 in a statement saying that "of late years, canned salmon has become the staple meat diet of the working millions of the large manufacturing centres of Europe and America, with but little competition, even including the vast output of the Armour factories. Very recently, however, immense exports of cheap meats, preserved and frozen, from the Australian colonies, assisted by low transportation rates and rapid facilities given by the mammoth steamship companies, has had the powerful, though temporary influence in the pulse of the general demand, and it may be confidently expected that before long canned salmon, and especially the superior brand of the B.C. waters, will find its normal level on the world's market."[11]

Present problems of the marketing of B.C. canned salmon and problems which will undoubtedly arise in the future may be dated from the period of World War II. Prior to 1939, foreign markets, chiefly Commonwealth, absorbed 65 percent of the B.C. canned salmon production, leaving 35 percent to be marketed on the Canadian domestic market. During the war and the immediate post-war, the major portion of the canned salmon production was used by the armed forces and for the relief feeding

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11 Vancouver World, October 15, 1897, p. 8.

in distressed areas. From 1941 to 1946 inclusive, 80 percent of the annual salmon pack, totalling 7,600,000 cases, was used for these purposes. Of the remaining pack, 19 percent was allocated to the domestic market at ceiling prices, leaving only 1 percent for export.[12] The problems of the foreign market were further aggravated in the post-war period by the dollar crises. The U.K., finding her dollar balances at a low level, was forced to reduce her imports from the dollar areas. Canned salmon imports were drastically curtailed, and in 1948 she was unable to purchase any.

At present there are no assured markets for canned salmon. The dollar crisis still exists and virtually no salmon is exported to former strong Commonwealth markets, such as South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. The largest buyer, the U.K., is able to provide basic food needs for her people with such staples as meats, pork, mutton, poultry. Her existing dollar balances are used for the imports of these basic food requirements and for raw materials and capital equipment, especially for defence purposes. Other goods of non-staple category are purchased if dollar balances exceed those required for necessary purchases. Canned salmon falls in this latter category.

Future exports of canned salmon will depend upon world political and economic conditions. The immediate future will depend upon the dollar reserves and the tariff policies of the importing countries. The available markets in Belgium, West India and South Africa take pinks and chums, but no sockeye or coho. Chief other market is the United States. At present, Canadian exports to this market are canned salmon, with the

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12 Facts on Fish, March 19, 1953, Vol. 2, No. 6.

exception of sockeye. Halibut, springs, chums and coho are exported frozen, with heads off, as are bottom fish like sole and cod. All are also shipped, filletted and packaged in cartons. Edible oil and fish meal products are marketed in the U.S.

The United States has been the largest importer of Canadian fish other than canned salmon. This market, however, presents some uncertainties. The United States is herself a large producer of fish. Many of her species of fish and fish products are identical to those produced in Canada. Imports of fishery products into the United States are faced with the possibilities of quotas, increases in tariffs and monetary exchange problems, particularly the premium on the Canadian dollar, which has the effect of raising the price of Canadian imports to American consumers. Higher tariffs and stricter quotas on imports of Canadian fish products are distinct possibilities under the present Republican government with its traditional protectionist policies.

The trade agreements and laws of the United States contain escape clauses which can be invoked if it can be shown that imports are detrimental to any sector of the American economy. Certain sections of the American fish industry feel that they are being threatened by the increasing imports. A 1953 meeting of the Pacific Fisheries Conference passed three resolutions of interest to the B.C. fishing industry: Saying that duties on imports of fishery products have declined, and their volume greatly increased, to the serious injury of the domestic industry, the Conference sought a continuance of improvement of the Trade Agreement Act through escape clauses, peril-point and quota provisions, establishment of fair tariffs and flexible import quotas, consumer education as to the

value of a competitive domestic industry with a just share of the American market.[13]

The American fishing industry is fully aware that the only sizeable export market for the B.C. fishing industry is in the United States. If Canadian imports can be shown to depress prices, escape clauses in trade agreements could be invoked for the benefit of the American fishing industry. Recently, when there was a shortage of pinks, Canadian pink salmon was placed on the American market to fill the gap. From sections of the U.S. industry there were mutterings about dumping and invocation of the anti-dumping clauses of the American law.[14] In this situation, a U.S. Senator promised assistance to Pacific Northwest and Alaska fishermen in an effort to halt declining fish prices. At a meeting of the fishermen where this problem was discussed, a delegate said, "On fillets, we import 51 percent from Canada. We don't think Canada needs our dollars. They're not as much in debt as we are, and their dollar is worth more than ours."[15]

Another attempt to invoke the escape clause against fish imports was rejected by the U.S. Tariff Commission on the grounds that "fillets are not being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry." Thus no change in tariff was recommended to alter the present tariff

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13 Pacific Fisherman, May 1953, p. 12.

14 Ibid., October 1953, p. 61.

15 Vancouver Province, April 1, 1953, p. 26. (For charges that depressed fish prices in Eastern United States are due to the imports of Canadian fish, see Wall Street Journal, Pacific Coast Edition, Vol. 48, No. 91, May 12, 1953, p. 1.)

which provides for a levy, 1-7/8 cents a pound on an annual quota of 15 million pounds, or 15 percent of the average U.S. consumption for three years, whichever is the greater. Imports in excess of this quota, which is determined annually, pay a duty of 2-1/2 cents per pound.[16]

Following the Torquay Conference on Trade Agreements, the United States reduced the duty on Canadian canned salmon from 25 percent to 15 percent. This gain was offset when the Canadian dollar was freed and became worth more in relation to the American dollar. Thus the advantage formerly enjoyed by the Canadian exporter in being paid in American funds was reversed. Table XII illustrates the position of a Canadian exporter who faces payment of duty and the adverse exchange on the Canadian dollar. In the illustration, the assumed selling price of a case of 48 No. 1 Tall Pinks is $19.00 f.o.b. Seattle, and the rate of exchange is 4 percent. The actual amount received by the Canadian exporter under the assumed figures is only $14.32.

Two further problems remain in selling to the United States. Any fish purchases made by the United States government must be of fish produced and processed in the United States. Therefore purchases for the U.S. armed services might release a portion of the U.S. domestic market to Canada. However, all Canadian fish exports must meet standards set by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the Canadian exporter must incur the return freight and handling costs of all rejected fish.

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16 Pacific Fisherman, October 1952, p. 61.

TABLE XII

PRICES CANNED SALMON SHIPMENT[17]

VANCOUVER - SEATTLE

GROSS SELLING PRICE, U.S. FUNDS	$19.00
LESS: Selling deductions -	
(a) 1-1/2% Cash discount	.285
(b) 1/10 of 1%	.019
(c) 5% Commission	.94
U.S. Funds, Seattle, Duty Paid	17.76
LESS:	
Duty @ 15% of Canadian Selling Price	2.25
Handling charges, Seattle	.17
Labels and labelling	.22
U.S. Funds, Seattle	15.12
LESS:	
Freight, Vancouver - Seattle	.20
Discount on U.S. Funds, 4%	.60
NET Canadian Funds, unlabelled, f.o.b. Vancouver	$14.32

17 Pacific Fisherman, December, 1952, p. 54. From figures supplied by Canadian exporter.

Halibut Markets.[18] Under normal conditions, halibut has always a relatively good consumer demand. Early local markets of Vancouver, New Westminster, and Victoria, were supplemented by large markets in Eastern Canada and U.S.A. with shipments using the C.P.R. and the G.T.P. During the halibut season, carloads are still shipped daily to Boston and New York and, to a lesser extent to Chicago and other distributing centres. Prior to World War II shipments were also made to the United Kingdom.

At present the only export market for B.C.'s fresh and frozen fishery products is in U.S.A., and halibut, in terms of volume, is the most important product in this category. Of the annual halibut quota of between 56 and 58 million pounds, 48 to 50 million pounds are marketed in the U.S.A. Though Canadian fishermen produced 33 percent of the total quota in a typical year, only 50 percent of their catch was marketed in Canada.[19] Canadian share of the total quota has been showing a slight increase,[20] so the importance of the U.S.A. market for B.C. halibut cannot be over-emphasized.

In recent years, Pacific Coast halibut has been receiving competition from Atlantic halibut caught along the coasts of Eastern Canada and Western Greenland. In 1950 the Atlantic halibut marketed in U.S.A. was in excess of 10 million pounds. An additional half million pounds was landed there from Norway and Denmark.[21] The overall effort of the eastern competition will be to make the buyers of Pacific Coast halibut more cautious.

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18 Partly based on Report of Fifth B.C. Natural Resources Conference, pp. 223-227.

19 Ibid., pp. 226-227.

20 See above, Table IV, p. 57.

21 Pacific Fisherman, Yearbook, 1951, p. 251.

Mention has already been made of the introduction of refrigerated cars by the C.P.R., which opened up vast markets in eastern Canada and the U.S.A. As a consequence, the movement of the industry northward developed Prince Rupert as a fishing centre until it has become the major halibut port in the world. It owes this position not only to its relatively close proximity to the halibut grounds, but also to the railroad. Grand Trunk Pacific Railway was completed in 1913 and already in 1914 "in one month alone 27 carloads of frozen halibut" were shipped.[22] By 1915 the growth of Prince Rupert as a halibut centre was hailed as the "most gratifying feature of our fishery for the year 1915." This growth was aided by extension of bonding and buying privileges to American halibut boats,[23] as well as shipments by the G.T.P.[24] The railroads, therefore, have been a major factor in the development of the industry.

To give added encouragement to the fishing industry, the Dominion Government had passed in 1909, an Order-in-Council granting a rebate of express rates on Canadian-caught fish shipped by Canadian companies from Vancouver to any point in Alberta, Saskatchewan or Manitoba.[25] The completion of the G.T.P. reduced the price of fish in Saskatchewan by one-third.[26]

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22 Report of Commissioner of Fisheries, December 31, 1914, p. 8.

23 Labour Gazette, April 1915, p. 1136.

24 Report of Commissioner of Fisheries, December 31, 1915, p. 8.

25 Labour Gazette, June 1909, p. 1282.

26 Ibid., February 1916, p. 342.

Another problem in the marketing of halibut is the method of selling the raw fish. The load of halibut is placed on an "exchange" and sold to the company with the highest bid. This sets the price at fish camps and to boats selling directly to the halibut buyers. During the short fishing season heavy landings tend to depress prices from day to day. These depressed prices create conflict between fishermen and companies which the former have attempted to eliminate in three ways. First, the load may be sold through the Fishermen's Co-operative. Secondly, the fishermen have voluntarily remained in port for specified periods to spread the supply.[27] The third is a demand for a minimum price for halibut. This has not been achieved, partly because it requires the support of American fishermen who are restricted by anti-trust laws in any negotiations to establish a minimum price.

Other Fisheries. As a rule, the lesser fisheries do not present marketing problems as supply and demand are in close balance. However, an increasing amount of cod is exported to the United States in the form of fillets and frozen blocks and thus subject to trade legislation mentioned above. In the fillet trade with the United States, Canada's competitors have increased their exports at a greater rate than has Canada. Recent reports indicate that these countries are able to market at prices below the prices of Canadian products.

The marketing problems in these fisheries have not resulted in any serious labour-management conflict. An attempt to organize beam trawlers to demand minimum prices met with failure. The majority of the independent trawlers claimed membership in co-operatives.

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27 See below, Chapter 6, p. 193.

CHAPTER IV

FISHING COMPANIES

Corporate Problems

Definition of Companies. The fish companies represent the ownership, individually or collectively, of the processing establishments, processing machinery and other production equipment required in the industry, as well as fishing and packing boats and other facilities. The primary or direct functions of the companies are the production, processing, and the distribution or marketing of the various fish products.[1]

A company may own and operate a cannery, a cold storage plant, a fish filletting plant, a reduction plant, a herring or salmon saltery, or a combination of these. An establishment may be a single unit engaged in a single process, or it might be a unit engaged in more than one, or all the processes. Company ownership ranges from that of a single unit to more than one integrated unit, from production of one product to that of all marketable products.

Operational Changes. Technological developments and marketing problems discussed in earlier chapters have had a profound effect on the fishing companies. In the early phase of the industry, dozens of

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1 Some processing equipment cannot be purchased and must be rented. For the value of the capital equipment in the industry prior to World War II see W.A. Carrothers, The British Columbia Fisheries, Chap IV, pp. 26-36.

canneries along the coast engaged in an intense competition. This fierce rivalry squeezed out the marginal firms. Technological changes in processing, transportation, and fishing methods also worked to reduce greatly the number of canneries, and today only a fish camp marks the site of many a former cannery. In recent decades, a trend to enlarge operations has been an added factor in the merger, consolidation and centralization of modern-day operations into integrated plants, where the various operations act as hedges to give an overall profit, or minimize losses to the company.

Technological changes in processing have resulted in one more efficient processing plant replacing a number of plants. Smaller and more isolated plants have been closed down or dismantled. Likewise, the technological improvements in fish transportation have meant that a packer can transport raw fish greater distances without spoilage.

The modern integrated and centrally located plant is planned basically for the maximum use of labour and capital. The main "departments" are salmon canning, reduction plant, fresh fish department and cold storage. These large units require increased initial financial investment not only for machinery but for larger storage facilities as well. However, lower unit costs could be achieved only by larger volume of output.

The large integrated plant runs practically throughout the year. Salmon canning operations run from July to November. The reduction plant operates in conjunction with salmon canning and for herring from October to March, though some summer herring is processed. The cold

storage and fresh fish departments operate on a year round basis. The fresh fish department operates chiefly for halibut, spring salmon, coho, and chums during their seasons. The fillet department operates throughout the year for bottom fish and those mentioned above. In addition, many plants process specialty products such as fish sticks, fish paste, smoked salmon and smoked black cod.

Consolidation of many scattered canneries into integrated plants has reduced total labour requirements. However, transferring labour between departments enables labour to get longer periods of employment. The labour force becomes relatively permanent, develops skill and enjoys security compared to transient seasonal workers in early years of the industry. Labour, in order to enjoy the security and protection of the job, also develops a strong incentive to organize.

These developments have reduced vulnerability of the fish canning and processing companies and so tended to strengthen their bargaining position against the fishermen and shoreworkers. As the companies have become larger and more centralized in ownership and operation, they have become less competitive in dealing with the union, and have co-operated in selling through the advertising by the Fisheries Association. But they have, on the other hand, become more and more cut-throat in getting fish. Competition in this direction has produced an excess of boats, gear, fishermen and buyers.

Consolidations have made unionism on a broader scale more vital to the fishermen to protect their bargaining position with the companies. Industry-wide unionism consequently became necessary for effective functioning.

One function of the companies is marketing fish products. These markets are uncertain, with price changes which are reflected in raw fish prices. The growing number of products and a shorter season in salmon, the most valuable fishery, are increasing this problem. Prices offered to fishermen will be based on estimation of the possible supply of fish during a short salmon season and anticipated demand for the coming year. Consequently, these offers tend to set a low or minimum price. The fishermen, also faced with uncertainties, demand a maximum share. This conduces to periodic conflict.

In passing, it should be noted that the B.C. fishing industry has not depended on the federal government for aid in marketing, or by price supports. Prices of B.C. fish products are determined by supply and demand, rather than artificially through government subsidy or other floor price.

Problem of Fish Supply. The companies, like the fishermen, are confronted with the uncertain supply of fish. They are subject to the same governmental regulations protecting the fisheries. Like the fishermen, they have no assurance of a return on their investment.

A supply of fish was a particularly serious problem in the early phases of the industry when independent canneries were scattered along the coast. Each unit depended on the fish supply in its immediate area. In the last few years, this problem has become less acute. Scientific predictions based on the study of salmon life cycles enable a fairly accurate estimate of salmon runs. In herring and halibut fisheries, quotas enable pre-season preparations. Centralized operations,

using a highly mobile fishing fleet, can rely on a large fishing area. However, uncertainty still exists. As late as 1952, elaborate pre-season preparations for an expected large sockeye run on the Fraser River were not justified by actual size of the run.

Another example of the risks to capital investments and earnings from the vagaries of the fish supply concerns the pilchard fisheries. At one time this was a major fishery of B.C., with operations centred on the West Coast of Vancouver Island. In 1926 there were 15 pilchard reduction plants operating, all built within a period of 18 months.[2] After World War II, this fishery declined rapidly with the disappearance of the pilchards, and by 1947 it had ended. Though the loss was lessened by transferring boats and plants to the herring fisheries, the last reduction plant on the west coast of Vancouver Island was closed at the end of 1953.

In addition to fixed and contractual costs of ownership, companies make pre-season investments for plant improvement, for maintenance and for fishing equipment to insure uninterrupted operation. Months of planning and preparation are required to bring labour, machinery and supplies to processing plants. Thus companies have made considerable investments before they have processed a single saleable product. On the other hand, the entire year's income is often derived from a few weeks of actual fishing.

When fishermen are well organized, their bargaining position is strong and they are able to inflict heavy losses on the companies. A

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2 Pacific Fisherman, August 1952, p. 43.

strike or other interruption in output during the season means a loss not only of current income but of the entire year's investment.

Company Structure. Economic structure of companies within the fishing industry has characteristics which are of importance in labour-management relations. In the industry there are a relatively few firms producing homogeneous and substitutable products. The number of firms has fluctuated, with activity reaching a peak in the late 1920's, and sharply declining in the 1930's. Dollar value of annual output of the salmon canning industry declined by almost two-thirds from the peak of the late 1920's to the bottom of the depression. Canneries in operation shrank from 76 valued at $16,350,000 to 44 valued at $7,400,000.[3]

The oligopolistic structure whereby a few firms produce homogeneous products necessitates price leadership since the sales curve of any one firm will depend upon the sales actions of other firms in the industry. No change in sales policy in regard to sales prices may be attempted by any one firm without some knowledge or idea of the policy which the competing firms might undertake. A very pronounced sales price increase by one firm may result in decrease in sales unless all competing firms increase their sales prices correspondingly. Conversely, any price decrease by any one firm must be followed by equal decreases by the other firms or they will face loss in sales and revenues. Since fish products are homogeneous for each species any concerted effort by any one firm to increase its sales of a particular product may indeed, over a short period, increase its sales, but in doing this, it will

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3 W. A. Carrothers, The British Columbia Fisheries, pp.23-27.

also increase the sales of competing firms for that particular product. The one firm will therefore reach a point of diminishing returns on investment in sales promotion because competing firms, in the long run, will derive equal benefit from any promotion investment. This, in part, explains the no-label canned salmon advertising campaign on the Canadian domestic market conducted and financed by the industry as a whole through the Fisheries Association of B.C.

Firms engaged in the same phase of the industry have identical processing systems and produce identical products. Oligopolistic competition in the distribution of the same homogeneous and substitutable varieties of fish products leads to equal selling prices for the same products or at least negligible differences. However, this is modified by attempts at product differentiation as each individual firm attempts to create consumer market preference for its own products through brand labels and advertising.

Costs of production of the various firms differ, so that any excessive price raising in buying raw fish or price cutting in selling the finished product would be disastrous to marginal firms.[4] The oligopolistic structure of the industry has, in recent years, tended to permit maintaining a price in both buying and selling that allows all firms to operate and thus avoid cut-throat competition.

This structure encourages close co-operation of the companies to achieve stability in other respects than pricing. As early as the 1890's

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4 A price war of canned salmon occurred in the United States in 1903. In four months one of the firms engaged in the war was bankrupt. In 1905 its assets, which included 13 canneries, were sold for $205,000. Pacific Fisherman Yearbook, August 1952, pp. 5, 15.

the canning firms organized, with one of the primary aims being to control the prices offered fishermen by individual canners. When fishermen began to organize, this group became the spokesmen for the canners in labour matters.[5] So, throughout the history of the disputes in the industry, a close well-knit employers' organization has faced fishermen and wage earners, whether organized or unorganized.

Inter-Company Competition. Inter-company competition, which extends from production to processing and distribution, is nevertheless, an important factor in labour relations. Inter-company competition for the limited supply of fish during a short season sets prices paid to fishermen at or near that determined by supply and demand, as, for example, in the salmon and halibut fisheries. Competition can sometimes raise the prices of salmon above the minimum prices determined by labour-management negotiations. On the other hand inter-company competition can be costly and, at times, appears unjustified or unnecessary.

Companies, like fishermen, face seasonal uncertainties about the supply of raw fish. The fact that no individual can claim proprietary right to a share of the fish also applies to them. Company operations may be curtailed or interrupted by government conservation policies. Abilities of fishermen and fishing equipment vary. During any season the companies must therefore make every effort to obtain a maximum share of the fish to get more economical production. If they can increase their supplies of raw material, they can cut their unit costs of operation and get a maximum return on capital investment.[6] Hence, it will be seen that

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5 The development of the organization is discussed later.

6 Because of an excessive number of canneries and excess plant capacity, most plants are operating on decreasing costs.

competition for fish tends to raise prices paid to fishermen.

During production the efficiency of fishing boats and equipment can, to a large extent, be controlled and it can be assumed that most company-owned equipment is, or should be, modern and competitive with rival boats. Equipment for fishing requires a heavy capital investment and returns can be made only by heavy production. The decisive factor in production is therefore the human element. So the companies attempt to hire, or make contracts with, the most efficient and consistently successful fishermen. The present trend is for the companies to finance a fisherman in obtaining his own fishing boat and equipment. A fisherman with the responsibility of ownership is considered most dependable by the company for production and maintenance of equipment.

Company packers service only company fishing boats. For maximum efficiency a packer should carry capacity loads but this is not always possible because of an uncertain supply. It is a common sight to see packers with partial loads, when with inter-company co-operation one packer could carry the lot. This means added costs but any reduction in boats and crews can spark labour-management conflict.

A factor in possible differences in fish prices paid to the fishermen is in services and facilities provided for the fishermen on the fishing grounds. A company may incur extra costs by providing fish camps with stores, net repair facilities, and so forth. Another company may have no facilities but would be willing to pass the savings in whole or in part to the fishermen through higher fish prices. Generally, a fisherman is under contract to fish for one company but will deliver to a buyer who not only pays a slightly higher price, but pays in cash.

In actual fishing and in fish transportation, production costs vary between companies. In processing plants, however, methods of operation and equipment required are practically identical. Machinery and methods are the same, each plant has the same labour and capital requirements. Moreover, much machinery used in salmon canning is rented from and serviced by the American Can Company. The end result is that the unit costs of production for any one process are nearly identical for all rival companies. In processing, therefore, efficiency of the labour force and supervisory staff is a major factor.

Inter-company competition in salmon canneries reached a peak just after World War I, with a decline in numbers beginning in the early 1930's. The following excerpts show the nature of the competition. It should be noted that this was the era of the salmon hatcheries before scientific study of fisheries biology became the basis of salmon conservation. The excerpts also show the length of the season, the supply of fish available for each cannery and relation of catches to pre-season investments.[7]

Though conservation during the period up to 1936 relied on fish hatcheries, a significant statement in 1917 pointed out--"the salmon industry does not depend upon the amount of money invested in canneries, gear and boats. It depends upon the number of salmon which escape and successfully spawn."[8]

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7 The Provincial Government controls the number of plant licences. The Federal Government is concerned with salmon, and other commercial fish only until the fish are caught by the fishermen.

8 Fisheries Report, 1917, p. 117.

In 1916, with the annual salmon pack showing a continuous decline, overfishing made the need for stringent conservation measures more and more apparent. A statement at the time charged that, "too many canneries --lots of them ill-advised--was given as the reason for the over-heavy drain on the fishing resources; and this over-building was ascribed as due to the entirely erroneous idea generally prevalent that it is a bonanza business, and that all one needs to get rich quick is to build a salmon cannery."[9]

During the time when monopoly charges were being made against the canners, there was already in fact, evidence of over-competition and over-expansion in the industry. One report by federal authorities argued that, during the 1916 season, it would have been possible for the 14 canneries on the Skeena, the seven around Rivers Inlet, and the four on the Nass River, using 868, 700 and 265 gillnets respectively, to pack the season's catch of salmon in less than nine days of 12 hours each.[10]

The provincial Department of Fisheries also feared the possible deletion of the fisheries through over-competition and over-equipment. Furthermore, the department held the canners solely responsible for any depletion. It made proposals for curtailment and limitations, with the proviso "that excess profits, if any, shall go to the public, and that exploitation, as a fact and as a motive, shall be eliminated from the industry."[11]

The B.C. Fisheries Department proposed that: since the canneries

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9 Pacific Fisherman, August 1952, p. 27

10 Fisheries Report, 1917, p. 17 and 1922-23, p. 55.

11 Report of Fisheries Commission, 1917, p. 17.

were licensed by the province and operated on a year to year basis, the provincial government should be under no obligation to renew any licence. There should be no increase in the number of cannery licences for five years. No motor boats should be allowed and if they were allowed the total number of boats should be reduced. There should be no increase in the number of fishing boats. Fishing licences should be issued only to qualified fishermen.[12]

In 1919, the Federal Minister of Naval Services under whose department Fisheries came, expressed his fear of depletion as a result of over-competition. He suggested elimination of "all useless competition, over-equipment, and waste, to the end that the people may be able to obtain at a fair price one of the natural food products of the province . . . . Instead of licensing existing and new companies and individuals, to take over and handle our salmon fisheries, the Government should take them over and handle them."[13] The B.C. Fisheries Commissioner was stated to be in favour of this move.[14] Over-competition, therefore, added to a decreasing supply of fish did contribute to bankruptcies and to amalgamations.

Early Period of the Companies.[15] Early fisheries were salmon fisheries since cold storage did not appear until the industry was

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12 Fisheries Report, 1917, pp. 17-18.

13 Report of the Fisheries Commission, 1919, p. 15.

14 Ibid., p. 70

15 The author is attempting to trace the history of the canneries, the mergers and amalgamations leading to the present day consolidated operations. Reports uncovered so far show variations in the number of early salmon canneries. The following is information found regarding the early phase.

fairly well established. The reduction plant as known today appeared at a still later date.

The salmon canning industry may be dated from 1867 when the first cannery was built on the Fraser River,[16] with the industry centred on the sockeye salmon. Early canneries were small units requiring a relatively low initial capital investment. In 1880, the nine canneries in B.C. were valued at $10,000 each, a total investment of $104,000 including fishing equipment.[17] By 1893, the 44 canneries were valued at $880,000.[18]

In general, the technique of salmon canning known prior to 1900 did not encourage much use of capital. Power-driven machinery had not been introduced and practically all processing was by hand. The workers were paid by the hour or by piece rate. Until 1893, fishermen were also paid daily wages. Then they were paid so much a fish.

The number of canneries increased tremendously as shown in Table XIII. In a speculative infant industry, depending mainly on foreign markets for its product, company failures were many and frequent. "The shores of Alaska, British Columbia, Washington and Oregon soon were strewn with the wreckage of concerns that rushed into the little-understood operations of fishing, packing and marketing of canned salmon."[19]

In addition to failures resulting from lack of knowledge of the industry, other bankruptcies were caused by the economic depression of

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16 The original date varies somewhat. See Table XIII.

17 Fisheries Statement for the Year 1880, Supplement No. 2 to the Eleventh Annual Report of the Minister of Marine and Fisheries for the Year 1880, p. 268.

18 Canada, Department of Marine and Fisheries, Annual Report, 1894 - Fisheries Statistics, p. 290.

19 Gregory & Barnes, North Pacific Fisheries, p. 91.

the 1890's which cut canned salmon prices on world markets. Many canneries were owned and operated by individuals or small companies whose financial reserves were unable to withstand losses from lower prices. Distress selling by marginal or bankrupt firms further depressed market prices. In many cases, stronger firms were able to purchase the output of sub-marginal firms but this too had its limits.

TABLE XIII

BRITISH COLUMBIA SALMON CANNERIES[20]

1873[21]	---	2	1880	---	9	1887	---	20	1894	---	32
1874	---		1881	---	12	1888	---	21	1895	---	36
1875	---		1882	---	18	1889	---	28	1896	---	47
1876	---	3	1883	---	24	1890	---	32	1897	---	54
1877	---	4	1884	---	17	1891	---	26	1898	---	51
1878	---	10	1885	---	9	1892	---	27	1899	---	59
1879	---	9	1886	---	17	1893	---	37	1900	---	64

The situation was a product of too rapid expansion, spurred by opening of new markets in eastern Canada and the United States by way of the newly-completed C.P.R., and by the further development of European markets. Rapid expansion of plants had placed increasing

20 W.A. Carrothers, British Columbia Fisheries, p. 11; Report of B.C. Commissioner of Fisheries Reports and Recommendations 1905-07, p. 19; Report of Minister of Marine & Fisheries, 1922-23, p. 54.

21 These canneries were in the nature of experiments.

quantities of canned salmon in new and relatively undeveloped markets. Many cannery operators relied on agents or brokers who advanced credit in the form of nets, tin plate and other equipment and supplies. Many operators were at the mercy of brokers who were in a position to close them out. B.C. canneries operating gillnet boats were at a disadvantage compared to American canners in Puget Sound, who operated salmon traps. The latter were able to get fish at a lower price and thus can salmon at lower unit costs.[22]

By 1892 only four companies operating on the Fraser River had sufficient capital to survive.[23] One company absorbed eight competing salmon canneries situated at various points along the coast, marking the first amalgamation. Despite these failures, new firms continued to enter the field.

Technological changes in canning, fishing and in transporting of fish in the early 1900's revolutionized the industry, and made possible integrated plants. Mergers did not prevent new canning plants from being built. By 1920, 64 of 132 salmon canneries built in B.C. had been sold, dismantled or destroyed.[24] A comparison of the number of canneries and the number of gillnets operated by canneries for the years 1912 to 1922 is given in Table XIV.

In the early 1900's salmon fisheries other than sockeye began to be developed. By 1902 coho and some pinks were being canned. It is

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22 See section on Salmon Traps, Chap. 1, p. 21.

23 Carrothers, British Columbia Fisheries, p. vii.

24 Gregory and Barnes, North Pacific Fisheries, p. 92.

TABLE XIV

NUMBER OF CANNERIES AND GILLNETS 1912-1922[25]

Year	Fraser River	Skeena River	River's Inlet	Nass River	Smith's Inlet
1912:	15 -- 1430	12 -- 850	7 -- 700	3 -- 265	1 --
1913:	35 -- 2560	13 -- 850	7 -- 700	3 -- 265	1 --
1914:	20 -- 2656	13 -- 850	7 -- 700	4 -- 265	Not Available
1915:	22 -- 2616	13 -- 962	7 -- 700	4 -- 265	1 --
1916:	21 -- 2240	14 -- 868	7 -- 700	4 -- 265	1 --
1917:	29 -- 2626	15 -- 788 *	8 -- 700	4 -- 265	2 --
1918:	18 -- 1582	15 -- 889 *	9 -- 700	6 -- 265	2 -- 115
1919:	14 -- 1337	14 -- 1153	9 -- 769	5 -- 300	2 -- 147
1920:	11 -- 1288	15 -- 954	9 -- 871	5 -- 342	1 -- 173
1921:	13 -- 1437	13 -- 1109	9 -- 1000	5 -- 338	1 -- 215
1922:	10 -- 1296	15 -- 1091	9 -- 1012	5 -- 304	1 -- 179

* Approx.

25 Report of Fisheries Branch of the Department of Marine and Fisheries, 1922-23, p. 55.

certain that by 1910 both chums and pinks were canned.[26] Prior to this chums were used by the Japanese in saltery operations. Increasing demand for chums for canning reduced these operations. In 1911, only five salteries operated, compared to 19 in 1910.

In 1901, a cold storage was built on the Skeena followed in 1912 by one in Prince Rupert. In 1910, the first cold storage solely for fishery purposes was built in Vancouver. These plants provided impetus to salmon trolling and the halibut fisheries.

Building of reduction plants for salmon offal, pilchards and herring reached a peak in 1926 when there were 15 pilchard reduction plants on Vancouver Island, all built within 18 months.[27] Today, centres for processing are Prince Rupert and the mouth of the Skeena area, the central B.C. area around Namu, and the Steveston-Vancouver area. Between Namu and Prince Rupert, there is also one important combined cannery and cold storage operation.

Early Halibut Companies. Early halibut fisheries were dominated to such an extent by one American company, the New England Fishing Company, that by 1907 the Vancouver Board of Trade stated that the company was "undoubtedly monopolistic".[28] It had well established markets in eastern United States and the added advantage of shipping under bond by C.P.R. halibut landed in Canada to eastern U.S. markets.

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26 These estimates are based on the Report of the Commissioner of Fisheries for British Columbia, 1911, p. 5.

27 Pacific Fisherman, August 1952, p. 43.

28 Vancouver World, June 5, 1907, p. 4.

This was possible under an Order-in-Council of 1898 allowing foreign corporations to land fish from American ships and ship it under bond to the U.S.A. In addition, U.S. vessels could buy supplies in any B.C. port.[29]

Canadians competing with the American company, on the other hand, faced an American duty on halibut, and the handicap of an undeveloped Canadian market. The Vancouver Board of Trade, on behalf of the Canadian firms, petitioned Ottawa to suspend special privileges for New England Fish. The Board argued the fisheries yielding in the previous year, "more gold than B.C. coal and gold together, must be preserved for Canadians and the great harvest of our seas reaped in bottoms flying the Union Jack."[30] The New England Fishing Company did become a Canadian firm in 1907 and established a branch in Prince Rupert in 1912.

While the protests were being made, a second major firm was being established at Prince Rupert. First reports said that the firm was to ship "untinned halibut and salmon" to England.[31] Other companies followed to keep pace with the industry.

Employer Organizations and Trade Associations.

Fisheries Association. In the oligopolistic structure of the fishing industry where a few firms produce homogeneous products, an organization early developed to govern the actions of member companies.

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29 Labour Gazette, August 1909, p. 243.

30 Vancouver World, June 3, 1907, p. 11.

31 Vancouver World, May 29, 1907, p. 1.

In 1892, Fishing companies formed a Canners Association with headquarters in Victoria.[32] In 1902 the Fraser River Canners Association opened headquarters in New Westminster. As communications improved, the Association became increasingly active along the British Columbia coast. The original purpose of the organization was for mutual protection and for dealing with the Government on fisheries problems. With expansion of the industry, scope of the organization increased. Thus, in 1908, the Fraser River Canners Association became the B.C. Fisheries Association. This organization operated until 1923 when the fishing operators became a branch of the Canadian Manufacturers Association.

Fishermens' unions in the 1930's became stronger and united on a coastwise basis with their chief demands being fish prices offered to gillnetters and purse seiners. In 1937 the companies mainly affected formed the "Salmon Canners Operating Committee" to negotiate salmon prices with fishermen.

During World War II and after, the Operators' Committee also faced problems relating to fresh and frozen fish products, herring meal and oil, in addition to canned salmon. Fisheries companies felt a need for more comprehensive coverage to management problems. Consequently, in 1951, the Committee became the Fisheries Association of B.C.

In 1952 the Association represented 14 companies or 90 percent of management. It deals with matters affecting management and the industry as a whole. It has special sub-committees to deal with labour agreements, fish prices, marketing problems and fish versus power disputes.

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32 All information regarding the company association is based on The Canadian Fisheries Annual, 1952, National Business Publications, Gardenvale, Quebec., p. 47.

Since 1892, the fishing companies have been organized into formal and closely knit organizations. During this period they have presented a strong front in dealing with demands by fishermen. The latter, on the other hand, have been, for much of the time unorganized, heterogeneous groups separated by race, geography and occupational ties. Since 1945 however, labour-management negotiations have been between the Association and the United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union, representing both shoreworkers and fishermen.

The Fishing Vessel Owners' Association of British Columbia. A number of larger fishing vessels are privately owned by individual fishermen. The trend has been towards private ownership rather than company ownership. The vessel owners occupy a position between the companies and fishermen, co-operating or opposing both groups as differing circumstances arise. Because the vessel owners are classed as employers or "owners", they are not eligible for membership in the UFAWU. To protect their interests in the industry, vessel owners established the Fishing Vessel Owners' Association of British Columbia on June 3, 1935, and incorporated it on March 25, 1938. It has two separate organizations in B.C. with headquarters at Vancouver and Prince Rupert.[33]

Membership in the Association is restricted to "owners and part owners owning one-third or more of such fishing vessels and fish carriers operating out of the port of Vancouver or elsewhere along the coast of British Columbia as shall require a crew of three or more in addition to

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33 The data here is based on the Vancouver organization .

the skipper on any fishery in which the vessel may participate. No owners interested in canneries, cold storage or fertilizing plants, salteries or other fish plants shall be eligible for membership."[34]

Contracts with Companies and Union. Income of the vessel is based either on shares, charter, or a commission on fish carried. Any changes in rates or in division of earnings will affect earnings of the boat owner. Therefore, the constitution states that specific objects of the organization are the problems of "settlement between crews and vessel", and "charters and commissions on fish carried from place to place".

There have been numerous disputes between the vessel owners and fishermen over the division of shares. The boat shares are 20 percent of the gross catch in halibut fishing, two and one-half out of a total of eleven shares in salmon purse seining, and 40 percent in beam trawling. Fishermen attempt to increase their share while the owner at best attempts to maintain the status quo.

Another source of dispute is in work done on boats and fishing gear other than during the actual fishing season. In the past, it was common practice for boat crews to work on pre-season preparation and post-season stowage of gear. Fishermen now demand and receive pay for the whole or part of such work. Vessel owners negotiate charter rates with the companies. When packing fish, the crews are on wages and thus there are neither pre-season or post-season wage problems. However, charters for herring and salmon seining, where the crews are on shares, could lead to share disputes.

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34 By-law No. 1 (a) Fishing Vessel Owners' Association.

The commission, or packing charge, is the earnings of a vessel transporting fish from a camp to a plant. This system is confined to a few operations, mostly on the Fraser River, and applies mainly to halibut and troll-caught salmon. The commission is the difference between the price paid at the camp and that paid at the processing plant.

Vessel owners whose boats are on shares co-operate closely with the UFAWU in price demands for fish.

Technological Changes and the FVOA. So far as vessel owners are involved in disputes over technological change, the conflict is not over improvements as such, but over the costs of the innovations. These changes mean more efficiency and less physical labour, and usually are intended to increase earnings for boats and fishermen. The problem is whether the fishermen should share the costs or whether the added equipment should be considered as a part of normal boat equipment with total cost borne by the boat owner. A second source of dispute is the possible cuts in crews because of technological improvements. This has already occurred in drum seining and the UFAWU took a strong stand against any cut in crew.

CHAPTER V

LABOUR IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY

The fishing industry as described in the previous chapters, is extremely diversified, requiring a correspondingly diversified labour force. The various species of fish require special techniques of catching and hence specialized occupational groups such as gillnetters, seiners and trollers are created. The fisherman sells his fish and is technically self-employed, yet belongs to one of the strongest unions in B.C. This chapter will study some of the factors underlying unionism among the fishermen.[1]

Fishermen seem to live and work on the periphery of modern society, because fishing operations by their very nature are carried on in areas far removed from the main centres of population. Moreover, the economic and legal status of fishermen is ambiguous, particularly in legislation governing such matters as workmen's compensation, unemployment insurance, and conciliation or arbitration of industrial disputes.[2] Technically speaking, most fishermen are not "employees". Along with farmers, they are generally classed as "self-employed" or "independent proprietors", in that the majority of them individually or collectively own or manage the capital with which they work, and derive their incomes from selling

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1 The following, with slight modification, is based on a study by Stuart Jamieson and Percy Gladstone, "Unionism in the Fishing Industry of British Columbia", The Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science, Vol. XVI, No. 1, February 1950.

2 Beginning in 1957 fishermen receive unemployment insurance.

their produce for a profit, rather than working for a wage.

Some modification would seem to be required in the usual theoretical approach to industrial relations if the ambiguous role of the independent proprietor is to be explained adequately. The term "labour" (as used in "labour problems", "Labour organization", etc.) has come to mean almost exclusively that class of urban industrial workers who are propertyless (in the sense that only a minor part of their incomes are derived from ownership of or control over physical means of production); and work in groups, under the supervision of owners or managers, rather than as separate individuals. Labour unrest and conflict with management, the organization of trade unions and the establishment of collective bargaining are generally interpreted as phenomena arising out of labour's propertyless status and insecure, dependent relationship to employers, in an environment of rapid technological change and large-scale operations.

This interpretation overlooks the fact that independent proprietors in several important industries have also experienced unrest and organized conflict with management. Apparently ownership of capital and individualistic, competitive relationships in production have not prevented such "workers" from forming into unions and using the traditional weapons of the strike and the picket-line, sometimes with violent overtones. An example is the 1946 strike of dairy farmers in Alberta under the leadership of the United Farmers. Individual ownership and operation of means of production in such cases seem to have encouraged rather than inhibited collective action along trade union lines.[3]

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3 The more typical form of organization among farmers has been, of course, the co-operative. Trade union organizations and tactics have played a secondary role.

Fishermen on the Pacific Coast have followed a more consistent pattern than have farmers. The majority identify themselves more closely in interest and policy with wage-earners than with farmers, business men or other "independent proprietors". They were among the first occupational groups in this region to organize and strike for collective bargaining demands. The more important of their organizations have been active affiliates of the major labour congresses. And, despite the propertied status of their members, fishermen's unions for several decades have been predominantly "leftist" in leadership and ideology.

In such matters as the amount and location of fish resources, techniques of production and problems of conservation--all of which have strongly influenced the growth of unionism--the fishing industry of B.C. is inseparable from that of the adjoining Pacific Coast states and the territory of Alaska. American fishermen's unions, moreover, have had considerable influence on the course of unionism in British Columbia. Certain unique problems of topography, markets, and racial or ethnic divisions in the population of British Columbia have also influenced and affected unionism and collective bargaining in the commercial fisheries of this province. It provides a graphic illustration of the manner in which individual and group attitudes and policies are moulded by the techniques used in an occupation, and by the varied physical and social setting in which it is carried on.

Different species of fish, with different techniques and problems of catching, processing and marketing lead to a variety of relationships between fishermen and employees, on one hand, and buyers, markets and employers, on the other. The result is a wide variety of methods of payment of labour.

Importance of Fish Prices.

Companies and fishermen are, as we have seen, closely dependent upon the level of fish prices as well as volume of output or catch for their income.

Prevailing prices for a species of fish or fish product are determined by the consumer market whose variations affect income of either or both parties. However, companies and fishermen view price variations in different ways. Companies, selling on the consumer market, regard price variations as consumer market reactions. Fishermen, selling to the companies, hold the companies primarily responsible for these variations. This disagreement over prices is at the root of practically all labour-management disputes in the industry.

In pre-season negotiations for fish prices, two things add to the uncertainties. First, prices are offered in terms of future or anticipated market demand, and second, fishermen receive payment for their fish before the companies sell the products upon which their profit depends. The tendency then is for the companies to negotiate in terms of profit and hedge against any possible adverse trends in the market.

Determination of Fish Prices.

Prices for the various species are set in several different ways. A minimum seasonal price is negotiated for some species between labour and management. Other prices are determined by supply and demand on the consumer market. Still others are set by a producer's co-operative's payments to its fishermen-members, which is, of course, a variation of setting prices by flexible supply and demand.

Minimum Price Agreement.

Seasonal minimum prices are negotiated by the UFAWU and the Fisheries Association to cover gillnet and seine-caught sockeye, pinks, chums, cohos and springs. In addition, the agreement covers troll-caught blueback in the Gulf of Georgia. A separate price agreement is negotiated for herring fisheries. Historically, practically all the disputes in the fishing industry and the resultant development of unions have resulted from disagreements on the seasonal price of salmon.

Minimum prices are floor prices but there are factors which will raise these prices above the minimum. Competition between companies can increase prices to the fishermen. This is particularly true in periods of scarcity accompanied by stricter conservation measures. These increased prices could compensate for the shortened fishing season imposed by the conservation authorities. On the other hand, prices remain at the minimum during periods of abundant supplies.

Minimum prices are applied to fish that are canned, with the exception of blueback. Once the fish is canned, it is no longer a perishable product. However, under minimum price agreements, any unforeseen drop in the future market prices has to be absorbed by the companies while any rise is to their benefit.

Prices Determined by Flexible Demand and Supply.

Fisheries with prices determined by flexible supply and demand include all species other than gillnet and seine-caught salmon, herring and Gulf of Georgia blueback. Halibut, troll-caught salmon, bottom fish (that is, all beam trawl fish) and other products of the lesser fisheries

are highly perishable and are sold directly to the consumer in fresh or frozen form. Prices for them fluctuate more than for canned salmon, therefore, the prices paid fishermen conform more closely to current fluctuations in the market.

A slightly different situation exists in the halibut fisheries. With the shortened fishing season, the tendency is for the market to be "flooded" during the height of the season. Thus the prices will be influenced not only by the consumer market condition but also by the daily supply of halibut at the ports. It is to meet this situation that "lay-up" periods between trips have been agreed to by fishermen.

Prices Paid by Co-operatives.

Prices paid by the co-operatives are basically set by supply and demand. Co-ops have concentrated on the fresh and frozen fish business, though they have lately expanded into salmon canning and into herring. Under the co-operative system, fishermen receive a down payment on actual deliveries. Fish is marketed and the fishermen then receive the final market price less costs of selling.

Co-operatives began as marketing agents for salmon trollers, selling each load of salmon to the highest bidder. Later, fish was sold through marketing agents. As a final step, processing establishments were built.[4] Today co-operatives market their own products in competition with private companies. Since the members are fishing for themselves, there are no price negotiations.

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4 The development of the co-operatives is dealt with in Chapter 7.

It is interesting to note that one private company operating at Bull Harbour at the north end of Vancouver Island practices the same principles as the early co-operatives. Each load of troll-caught salmon and halibut is sold in Vancouver and the fishermen receive the current Vancouver price, less the packing costs. The Kyuquot Trollers' Co-operative at the height of its activity met with no success in this area against the private operator.

Camp Price Differentials. Where deliveries are made to camps rather than to a processing plant, price at the camp is the price at the plant, less cost of transportation.

Share Payments to Fishermen.

The present day gillnetter is owner-operated and the fisherman's income is on the basis of his season's catch of the various species of salmon. He is responsible for all the fixed and operating costs. Company owned gillnetters may be used at a fixed rate for the season. There is no legal or union provision on regarding the share of an assistant gillnetter should one be required. Where applicable, the division of shares is through individual bargaining with the captain.

Salmon Purse Seining. Division of earnings in salmon purse seining is regulated by a signed contract between fishermen, Vessel Owners' Association and companies. By this contract, gross value of the season's catch of salmon is divided into eleven shares, regardless of size of the crew. The boat receives two and one-half shares, the net one and one-half shares and the remaining seven shares are divided equally among the crewmen. The seine captain receives a bonus, or a portion of the boat and net share.

Halibut. Division of earnings is determined by a contract between the Deep Sea Fishermen's Union of Prince Rupert, the UFAWU and the Vessel Owners' Association. From the gross value of the catch, 20 percent is deducted as the boat share. From the remaining 80 percent, costs of fuel, provisions, ice and bait are deducted. Net gross is then divided equally among the fishermen.

Salmon Trolling. The salmon trollers are generally owner-operated and the fishermen's income is based on his catch. There are no agreements covering the share basis where the boat owner has one or more assistants, and any division is based on the crew's bargaining with the captain.

Tuna. Gross income is divided into two parts: Where the tuna boats are salmon trollers and where there is no agreement, the division of shares is similar to those in salmon trolling. Since 1948, halibut boats engaged in tuna fishing and manned by halibut fishermen, have had an agreement between the UFAWU and the Vessel Owners setting the division at 25 percent for the boat and the balance to the crew.

Herring Purse Seiner. Present practice is for the fishing fleet of one company to pool their total catch of herring. Gross value of the catch is then divided among the fishermen. Companies provide the boats and equipment. The crews of the tenders, tow-off boats and scow boats are also included in the share of the pool. Individual crew shares on the latter boats are slightly less, and range from a full fisherman's share for the captain to lesser amounts for the rest of the crew.

Beam Trawling. There is no contract for the division of income in beam trawling. Generally, the shares are 40 percent for the boat and 60 percent for the crew in a 3-man crew. For larger crews the boat shares decrease, with the crew shares increasing proportionately.

Lesser Fisheries. For lesser fisheries such as black cod, ling cod, herring, gillnetting, oolichan fisheries, there are no definite patterns. If the fish is caught incidental to a major fishery, this major fishery will determine the division.

Wage Payments in the Fishing Industry.

Wage payments in the fishing industry, unlike fish prices, are not directly determined by the consumer market, but tend to conform to the general wage level to comparable jobs in other industries. Unlike the disputes over fish prices, wage rates and methods of payment generally have not been a major source of conflict in the fishing industry in past years. Reasons for this can be seen from a review of wage payments to 1947 since that date.

Wage Payments Till 1947. Canneries in the early years of the industry were scattered along the coast and processing operations were highly seasonal. Wage earners during this time might be divided into three categories. The first group consisted of a nucleus of skilled white workers employed on machinery and on salmon packers and collectors. They were hired by management and paid monthly or by the season.

The second group were the Chinese, Japanese and Indians. They worked under the Chinese contractor who had a contract with one or more canneries for a fixed sum per case and hired all cannery help, except

skilled labour. All Chinese labour was hired by the contractor. Japanese women, specializing in hand filling salmon cans, went to the plants with their husbands, who worked under the Japanese fishing contractor. Native Indians were hired by the village cannery agent or as a family unit. As the salmon canning operations became more centralized and the number of canneries decreased, the Japanese and Indians went to the plants as family groups, though Chinese labour was still hired by the contractor. A third group of unskilled or migratory workers worked at the peak of the salmon run. They were mainly additional members of families of cannery workers.

Only the skilled white workers had direct contact with the cannery management about their work or rates of pay. The other groups worked directly under the Chinese boss and were paid at the end of the season.

Wage Payments Since World War 2. With the complete unionization of shoreworkers in the UFAWU in 1945 and signing of an industry-wide agreement in 1947, wage payments underwent a drastic change. Conditions of work and rates of pay were established for all workers, and hiring and payment by Chinese contractors was abolished. Payment is now at regular intervals, governed by Provincial labour legislation.

Similar or duplicate agreements are made between Native Brotherhood of British Columbia and the Fisheries Association. Probably the only difference between agreements signed with the UFAWU and the Native Brotherhood is that the latter does not have written seniority clauses, nor a guaranteed wage clause for out-of-town plants. The contention is that the native women are not hired for work at plants, but go as a family unit and are provided with work when work is available.

Full scale unionization of the shoreworkers and industry-wide labour agreements appeared at an extremely opportune time for the wage earners. Labour shortage and the inflation of World War II and after resulted in increased wages and favourable clauses in the agreements. The Fisheries Association, on the other hand, while at a disadvantage in bargaining during this time, also benefitted from inflationary trends by passing increased costs on to the consumer.

Disputes over wages may be expected during an economic recession. While a strong union like the UFAWU is instrumental in increasing wages, it can also resist wage cuts during a recession. With increased labour costs the companies have an incentive to cut unit production costs through increased mechanization.

The war pariod witnessed a considerable change in the make-up of the labour force. A general shortage of labour was made more critical for the industry by the removal of experienced Japanese workers. One result was an influx of white workers, particularly in plants near centres of population.

The uncertain supply of fish creates a situation where workers are hired when fish arrives at the plant. The result is rather uncertain periods of employment. During periods of labour shortage, plants hired whoever was available in the immediate vicinity, many of whom could be classed as marginal employables. In consequence, there developed a relatively permanent labour force with higher wages, and the advantages and protection of a union contract. The permanent labour force in some plants, therefore, tends to be in the older age group.

Types of Wage Payments.

There is a wide diversity in types of wage payment and to attempt to give particulars and conditions governing gradations in payments would merely be duplicating the current wage agreements. However, a general synopsis indicates types:

Transportation of Fish. A separate tendermen's agreement covers the pay for the various crew members, wages and crew complement being governed by boat tonnage.

Salmon Canning. It is covered by a separate cannery agreement. Payment in a cannery may be a monthly or hourly wage, or piece work rates for hand fillers. Generally, machine men are on monthly pay. Labelling, boxing and other warehouse work is covered by the same agreement.

Fresh Fish and Cold Storage is covered by a separate agreement and all wages are hourly rates.

Netmen are covered by a separate agreement. Payment is on hourly, monthly or piece rate.

Reduction Plants also have a separate agreement. Majority of payments are by the month, a few by the hour, while unloaders are on contract at so much a ton.

Power Plant Engineers are covered by a separate agreement. All are on a monthly wage.

Labour Costs and Wage Levels.

The proportion of labour cost to final costs of the various products is known only to individual companies. In general, hourly rates are less in canneries where there is a high degree of technological development, than rates in the fresh fish and cold storage where it is practically all manual labour.

Generally speaking, wages paid by a particular industry will be determined by its ability to pay. Fishing companies, as stated earlier, are in an oligopolistic market structure with price leadership but in a highly competitive consumer goods market. Studies have shown that the lowest wage gains are in industries where product competition is high.[5] In the fishing industry this competion is twofold: Competition among firms processing and marketing similar products, and competition of fish products with other food products. Any success in passing increased costs of production to the consumer would depend on consumer resistance, elasticity of demand and the substitution effect.

Ethnic Composition of the Labour Force.

B.C. fishermen are widely differentiated by race and language. Until 1941 there were three main groups--whites, Japanese and native Indians, in that order of numerical importance. Japanese have been almost entirely absent from the fishing industry of the province since their expulsion from the Pacific Coast in 1942. A large proportion of

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5 Arthur M. Ross and William Goldner, Forces Affecting the Interindustry Wage Structure, Reprint No. 22, Institute of Industrial Relations, 201 California Hall, University of California, 1950, pp. 278 to 281.

the whites are of first or second-generation immigrant stock, representing many different language groups. Native Indians likewise come from a number of tribes speaking different tongues.

Fishermen in each racial and language group have tended to specialize in certain branches of fishing. Yugoslavs predominate in purse-seining, for instance, and Norwegians in halibut fishing. Finns tend to concentrate in gill-netting and, to a lesser extent, trolling, as did the Japanese. Indians likewise tend to concentrate in gillnetting, though they also comprise about one-third of the fishermen engaged in purse-seining.[6] Other minorities represented in substantial numbers in various branches of the fishing industry are Swedes, Italians and Greeks. Fishermen of Anglo-Canadian background appear to be in the minority.

These diverse racial and language groups, tend, furthermore, to live in separate ethnic communities. This is true of those who live in cities as well as those who live in smaller coastal settlements during the off-season. In the important lower Fraser River district, for instance, are to be found concentrations of Finns at Woodwards' Slough and Sunbury, Yugoslavs at Ladner, and Greeks on Deas Island. Further up the Coast are similar communities such as Malcolm Island, predominantly Finnish in population, and Bella Coola, predominantly Norwegian. Indian fishermen and their families likewise live in numerous reservations and tribal villages scattered along the coastline of the province. To an increasing extent they, as well as many white fishermen, are tending to

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6 Annual Report, Department of Fisheries, Ottawa, 1947-48.

live the year round in communities that have grown up near canneries and other processing plants. Here, too, they are inclined to settle in more-or-less segregated groups.

Role of the Minority Groups.[7] A special feature of the fishing industry as compared to other industries in British Columbia is the special role played by the native Indian, Japanese and Chinese. Because of the unusually important role played by these minority groups, they merit special treatment in this study. Furthermore, more published data is available about them because of the special attention paid to them, as, for instance, in the agitation about the Japanese fishermen and the reduction of licences.

Native Indians. Native Indians on the B.C. coast are widely differentiated by language, customs and geography. In addition, the present-day villages are amalgamations of former scattered villages. Areas of common language and interests are roughly as follows. The Nass today comprises four villages. The Tsimpsheans live from Port Simpson to Hartley Bay along the coast and up the Skeena River to the Hazelton-Kispiox area. These two groups fish the Nass and Skeena areas. The Haida of the Queen Charlottes fish the Skeena as well as in home waters. The Kwakiutls from Kitimat to Comox generally fish the central area of B.C. From Comox to the Fraser River, is fished by natives of those areas. As the fishing became established, the native tendency was to fish near their own villages, therefore, there was little contact between groups.

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7 A more detailed analysis of their role, their organizational activities and other aspects are contained in the Appendices.

It is noteworthy that the fishing industry is the one major industry to which the natives have readily adjusted and kept pace competitively. As early as 1880 the Commissioner of Fisheries for B.C. reported, "I am glad to state that the services of the rising generation of our native population, along the coast, and of the younger adults, are of great value in the development of the fishing interests. The expertness of these people as water men, and their aptitude under instruction, qualify them peculiarly for the business of the fisheries. I do not question that the Indian Department, in all practical ways, sanction measures to develop and improve this invaluable source of labour, upon which the successful prosecution of our fisheries, and indeed of other large provincial industries, at present in no small degree depends. Nor is it under this utilitarian consideration alone that this subject will be regarded; for it is by the prudent encouragement of their industrial tendencies, conjoined with other teachings, that the benificient intentions of the Government towards its national proteges will be best and most efficiently promoted."[8]

The first major role of the Indians in labour disputes was during the 1900 and 1901 strikes on the Fraser River. It should be noted that the natives felt that fishing was their aboriginal right and they were prepared to fight for this right. This fear of displacement was a direct result of the influx of Japanese fishermen and it was against this influx that the Indians united with the whites. The number of

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8 Fisheries Statements, 1880, Supplement No. 2 to the 11th Annual Report of the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, 1880.

fishing licences issued to the Indians in comparison to the whites and Japanese is given in Table XV. The natives were at the height of their militant period during these years and then subsided.

TABLE XV

NET LICENCES ISSUED 1898 - 1905[9]

Year	White	Japanese	Indian	Total
1898	2032	782	850	3664
1899	1905	919	621	3445
1900	1771	1655	347	3767
1901	1306	1804	423	3533
1902	1184	924	377	2485
1903	1285	1499	366	3120
1904	1218	776	230	2224
1905	1398	1042	337	2777

Other Totals Given:[10]

1901	-	3832
1902	-	2685
1903	-	3101
1904	-	2224
1905	-	2770

The method of hiring Indian labour was for the companies to appoint an agent or "contractor" in each village. He thus became the "boss", hiring the necessary help and being paid so much per "head". Women and plant workers at the actual plant were hired and paid by the Chinese Contractor. The number of native Indians employed in the salmon canneries for the years 1898 to 1905 is given in Table XVI, while native licences for 1922 to 1933 are given in Table XVII.

9 Report and Recommendation 1905-07, p. 23.

10 Report of Fisheries Branch of Dept. of Marine & Fisheries, 1922-23, p.55.

TABLE XVI

SALMON CANNERY EMPLOYEES 1898 - 1905 [11]

Year	Canneries Fraser	Canneries B.C.	White	Chinese	Indian	Total	Salmon Prod.
1898	35	51	390	2340	936	3666	484,161
1899	41	59	440	2640	1056	4136	732,437
1900	48	64	440	2640	1056	4136	585,413
1901	49	73	520	3120	1248	4888	1,236,156
1902	42	66	450	2700	1080	4230	625,982
1903	35	59	440	2640	1056	4136	473,674
1904	23	51	320	1920	768	3008	465,894
1905	38	67	490	2940	1176	4606	1,167,460

TABLE XVII

FISHING LICENCES ISSUED 1922 - 1933 [12]

Year	Japanese	Whites	Indians	Total
1922	2933	3115	1545	7593
1923	2627	3717	2571	8515
1924	2525	3678	2750	8953
1925	2190	4785	3146	10121
1926	2106	6010	3095	11211
1927	1990	8305	3697	13892
1928	2261	8084	3321	13666
1929	2344	7884	3632	13860
1930	2196	7824	3505	13525
1931	2147	6407	2800	11356
1932	1998	6288	2615	10901
1933	2110	7076	3060	12246

11 Report of Fisheries Commission, 1905, pp. 15-16; Report and Recommendations 1905-07, p. 23; Report of Fisheries Branch of Marine and Fisheries, 1922-23, p. 54.

12 Compiled from Dominion Fisheries Reports, 1922-1933.

The Native Brotherhood, the organization of B.C. Indians, has never been a strong bargaining unit for several reasons. It has attempted to bargain in labour negotiations as well as be responsible for the advancement of the welfare of the Indians. The latter field was the responsibility of the Department of Indian Affairs. In bargaining, the Brotherhood has been handicapped by the lack of data about the market condition of the industry on which to base price demands. Even with it, the Brotherhood could not negotiate fish prices without the support of the UFAWU since the latter also represent the shoreworkers. Probably the greatest handicap in labour relations is that all the key officials of the Brotherhood are employees of the companies. Only the business agent is a paid employee of the organization. He, in turn, is handicapped in that he alone conducts bargaining and all other business of the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood headquarters in Vancouver thus attempts to handle all business on behalf of all B.C. Indians. The result of these handicaps is that the Brotherhood follows the UFAWU in labour matters. Agreements signed by the Brotherhood are almost complete duplicates of those signed by the UFAWU.

The Japanese. The Japanese have been in the fisheries of B.C. since around 1885 and have proved successful despite racial discrimination, agitation against them by labour unions, and various other organizations and, finally, legislative attempts to squeeze them out by licence restrictions.

The original immigrants were farmers and labourers, escaping difficult conditions in Japan. Others followed, including some reportedly

imported for fishing. Soon Steveston became the centre of the Japanese population. Other later centres were Port Essington, Powell Street in Vancouver and Ucuelet on the west coast of Vancouver Island.

These settlers were handicapped by language barriers, lacked finances, worked under a Japanese "boss" and had very little chance of alternative employment. Thus they were unable to withstand strike pressures as was evidenced in the Fraser River strikes of 1900 and 1901.

The Japanese were successful in other fields of the industry, again despite opposition. Early on, they were active in herring and salmon salteries and remained the dominant group in this till World War II. The same legislation that restricted fishing licences, also placed restrictions on the salteries. The number of seiners were reduced and Japanese labour restricted. The number of Japanese workers in the salteries were to be gradually replaced by whites and Indians. Their situation altered radically when, in 1942, the Japanese were moved inland from the Pacific Coast for security reasons. Their boats, fishing equipment and gear were sold to whites and Indians. They re-entered fishing in 1948. By then, the UFAWU was the dominant bargaining unit and the Japanese fishermen, as well as plant workers, became members of that union. It is obvious that the Japanese were never in a position as a group to bargain strongly. At first, they were handicapped by language and financial difficulties. As they increased in strength, so did the organized opposition to them.

The Chinese. The Chinese were brought to Canada as a source of cheap labour and it was for this purpose that they were recruited for salmon canneries. They were employed mainly in canning processes and

seldom, if ever, entered other departments. Table XVI indicates their numbers during 1898-1905. Chinese labour was recruited by the Chinese contractors who supplied their keep and payment at the end of the salmon season. The Chinese labourer has always been considered docile and honest, accepting poor rates of pay and plant living conditions without complaint. With technological developments and consolidation, their numbers have decreased gradually. The Chinese still worked under contractors until 1945 when this system was abolished. Since then they have been in the UFAWU. They now receive the same rates of pay and conditions of work as any other worker.

Chinese were the key manual labour force in canning operations and were in a vulnerable position in shore labour disputes. Yet there is no recorded evidence of them having key men in any disputes, or even of having joined disputes.

The "White" Group. As noted earlier, fishermen were differentiated by race and language with each group living in separate communities. In addition each group specialized in certain branches of fishing. It was the whites who took the lead in practically all the major disputes and who were mainly instrumental in organizing fishermen's and shoreworker's unions.

No particular ethnic group can be picked out as more active than any other group. It might be noted that the Slavs and Finns were active in unions in the salmon fisheries. The Norwegians, on the other hand, confined their activities to producers' co-operatives. This may be due to types of fishing rather than racial traits. The Norwegians specialize in halibut, but the Deep Sea Fishermen's Union, which was organized in halibut, was created by Americans and the membership during the period of halibut disputes was predominantly Newfoundlanders.

PART II

ORGANIZATION AND CONFLICT

CHAPTER VI

UNIONISM AND STRIKES

Unionism among the fishermen of British Columbia has experienced an intense and diversified organizational growth, accompanied by frequent and at times violent industrial disputes. As may be seen from Appendix D, Tables XXXII & XXXIII, there have been at least 30 different fishermen's organizations formed at one time or another since 1893, and members of these, as well as numerous non-union fishermen, have engaged in more than 40 strikes. The fishing industry of British Columbia today is highly organized, and industrial relations are relatively stable and harmonious. The majority of fishermen now belong to one union that has collective bargaining jurisdiction over all major branches of the industry. Most of the non-union fishermen (as well as a considerable number of union members) belong to processing and marketing co-operatives.

Yet it would be difficult to imagine an occupational group less amenable to unionism. Strictly speaking, most fishermen in British Columbia are not employees or "workers" in the usual sense of the term. They are proprietors who own and operate their own capital, that is, their boats and gear.[1] Their occupation is by nature highly migratory,

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1 Fishermen in some branches of the industry, as in purse-seining and halibut fishing, are employed as members of crews by fishing companies and vessel owners. Even in this case, however, they are not "employees" in the full sense of the term, as they are paid on a "lay" or share basis. That is to say, the crew members share the proceeds of the boat's fish catch with the boat owner and skippers. It is for this reason that many

individualistic, and competitive, as it is carried on in many scattered operations along thousands of miles of rugged coastline. Their employment and income are very insecure by reason of the characteristically extreme seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in the supply, demand and prices of fish.

The fishermen of British Columbia, moreover, are very heterogeneous in composition, and divided along lines that have tended to breed individual and group antagonisms. There are among them wide inequalities in income and wealth. They comprise a number of specialized but nonetheless competing occupational groups, as there is a wide variety in types and species of fish caught for commercial purposes, and each requires special fishing gear and techniques. The fishermen are further divided into a number of distinct and at times mutually antagonistic racial and language groups. All of these divisions have tended to accentuate the basically competitive relationships among fishermen and would be expected therefore, to render unionism and collective bargaining that much more difficult to achieve.

On the other hand a number of these apparent obstacles to unionism have in fact facilitated its growth and provided much of its motivating force in the fishing industry of British Columbia. Extreme fluctuations in output, price, and income, while disruptive to established organizations, have at the same time provoked periodic unrest and militant collective action among fishermen. Practically all of the strikes listed in Table XXXIII[2] first arose from disputes between fishermen

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fishing crew members are disqualified from many of the benefits provided by labour legislation.

2 See Appendix D.

and company operators over the question of fish prices. Again, the ownership and operation of boats and gear by the fishermen themselves may perhaps be conducive to an individualistic and conservative way of life. On the other hand, they give the fishermen a bigger and more permanent "stake" in their occupation than most wage-earners in other industries enjoy, and hence a stronger incentive to unionize in order to achieve greater stability in price and income. As unorganized, separate individuals most fishermen are in an extremely weak bargaining position because of distance from the market, difficulties of transportation, and perishability of their produce. When organized, however, their bargaining power is strong because a strike or other shutdown during the fishing season may mean a loss to the company of an entire year's income and investment.

Even the various group divisions and conflicts among fishermen have played an important motivating role in the growth of unionism. The scattered location of fishermen, relatively isolated, but often in tightly-knit communities, their tendency to specialize in different branches of the industry, and their pronounced differences in race, language, and national background, in the past have facilitated the organization of small local or sectional trade unions and co-operatives. Hence the multiplicity of organizations shown in Table XXXII,[3] variously held together by ties of local loyalty, occupational interest, and racial or ethnic sentiment.

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3 See Appendix D.

As a matter of fact, while prices were the immediate cause of most strikes in the fishing industry, competition among the major racial groups provided the first important stimulus to unionize. Specifically, from the 1890's to the 1920's the strongest and most persistent force impelling the fishermen of British Columbia to organize into unions appears to have been the growing competition of Japanese with whites and native Indians. Indeed, the intense and deep-rooted antagonism to the Japanese in B.C. that culminated in the expulsion of this minority from the coastal areas of the province in 1942, first took root among fishermen. This issue came to the forefront in the most violent disputes in the history of the fishing industry. More than any other single factor during the early period of organization, competition created a common hostility to the Japanese that transcended the various other racial, language, and occupational divisions among white and Indian fishermen and drew them together into the same unions. Japanese fishermen, in turn, were driven to organize their own unions in self-defence. But anti-Japanese sentiment, while providing added momentum to the growth of unionism in its earlier stages, continually split the ranks of organized fishermen in British Columbia and seriously weakened their bargaining power in relation to canning and fishing companies. Chiefly on this account the majority of strikes met with rather indifferent success until the 1920's. Japanese competition, while remaining a potent source of friction among fishermen, ceased to be a major issue governing union policy after the 1920's, as the federal government arbitrarily reduced the number from this minority licenced to fish.

A major force affecting organization in the British Columbia fishing industry in recent decades has been that of technological change. Among other effects, it has tended to modify the various group divisions and conflicts among the fishermen, and has facilitated their organization on a broader base. Boats powered by gas engines and diesel engines, in place of the traditional oar and sail, have increased mobility of fishermen, broken down much of their local isolation, and brought them into closer communication with one another. Among employers, similar improvements in transportation and communication, as well as in plant layout and mechanization, have encouraged a trend toward larger-scale ownership and operation. A growing list of formerly independent firms have been bought up by or merged with large holding companies and combines. Canning and processing plants have been consolidated into larger units and become more centralized in location. The various fishermen's unions and co-operative organizations have consequently been impelled to sink their differences and merge into larger, province-wide associations in order to protect their bargaining position with employers.

Origins and Early Disputes 1893 - 1914.

Unionism first took root among British Columbia fishermen in the lower mainland district where the Fraser River empties into the Gulf of Georgia. Here the largest, most violent and spectacular disputes in the history of the fishing industry occurred about the turn of the present century. This district was the main centre of the salmon canning industry of the province prior to World War I, as the Fraser River was the most important spawning ground for sockeye and coho on the Pacific Coast.

Practically all fishing at that time was carried on close to shore in company-owned gillnetting boats, propelled by oar and sail. Each boat carried two men, one to "set" the net and haul in the catch, the other to row and steer. As the main fishing season on the Fraser lasted less than two months, the majority of fishermen and cannery workers had to depend on other employments during the rest of the year. Most of them lived in the cities of Vancouver and New Westminster and smaller communities in the lower Fraser Valley. They were essentially an urban occupational group, engaged in other industrial pursuits besides fishing, and were strongly influenced by the rapidly growing urban labour movement of that period.

The fishing and canning companies located in the Fraser River were a well-organized group. Together they accounted for more than one-half of the annual salmon output of the province prior to World War I. Early in the 1890's they formed the Fraser River Canners' Association, primarily to promote orderly marketing and to achieve some degree of unified control over the output and price of British Columbia salmon. This body functioned also as a tightly-knit employers' association in dealing with fishermen.

A major motive impelling the Fraser River fishermen to unionize was not so much to achieve wage or price increases as such, as to protect themselves against growing competition from outside sources. Large numbers of American fishermen were coming to the Fraser to carry on their trade, as major fishing grounds in the United States like the Sacramento and Columbia Rivers, were facing serious depletion.

There were widespread complaints among local residents during the 1890's about Americans obtaining fishing licences in the Fraser by fraud and misrepresentation regarding their citizenship.[4] Growing numbers of Indians were also migrating annually from communities as far north as Port Simpson, near Prince Rupert, for fishing and cannery work on the Fraser. But by far the most serious competition came from Japanese immigrants, who began concentrating in the lower Fraser River district during the early 1890's.

Strike of 1893. Beginning of a severe depression and mass unemployment in 1893 accentuated competition in the fishing industry and sharpened group antagonisms, particularly towards Orientals. There was a rising chorus of complaints from Fraser River fishermen against "indiscriminate and illegal" granting of fishing licences to Chinese and Japanese, "thereby starving out the white man".[5] Support was enlisted from the local Trades and Labour Council in a campaign to have the federal Department of Fisheries reduce the number of licences granted to Orientals.

Out of this situation, the Fraser River Fishermens' Protective Association was organized in New Westminster in 1893. This was the first important union among fishermen in B.C. and by July of 1893

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4 Vancouver World, July 24, 1893, p. 2.

5 Ibid., June 7, 1893, p. 8.

claimed a membership of 1600.[6] It led the first recorded strike of fishermen in a dispute over daily wage.[7] The men demanded $3.00 a day while the canners offered $2.25 to $2.50, an increase of 25 cents a day more than 1892 wages. The resulting unsuccessful strike led by the Fishermens' Union began on July 14, and was of short duration.[8]

This first strike showed the same pattern of organized conflict that was to become familiar in a number of subsequent disputes in the Fraser River fishing areas. Foremost was the violent opposition to the influx of Japanese fishermen.

The role to be played by native Indian fishermen, as well as native women cannery workers, in strikes to the end of World War I was first apparent in this 1893 strike. During the early period, unlike the heterogeneous disorganized white groups, the Indians were cohesive, unified groups under the leadership of their chiefs, organized in their indigenous tribal bands. They regarded fishing as their inherent and aboriginal right and reacted violently to any encroachment on it. Their hostility, directed largely against the Japanese, led them to align themselves solidly with the white fishermen and was the major reason for the role of the Indians in unionism.

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6 At various times this union was also referred to as the Fishermens' Union, the Fraser River Fishermens' Benevolent Association, the Fraser River Fishermens' Association.

7 Fishermen in 1885 averaged wages of $30.00 a month. Fisheries Report, 1885, p. 277.

8 Vancouver World, July 15, 1893, p. 2.

In the strike of 1893 the Indians "fully understood the grievances of the white fishermen and being in sympathy therewith, had joined the union."[9] Their solidarity was shown when they refused to fish until after the white fishermen capitulated to the canners. They further showed their ability to withstand pressures, particularly from the Indian agents. Indians claimed that they had been "intimidated by the Indian Agent, expressed their contempt for him and their determination to have nothing further to do with him. They thought he should look after the interests of them and not the interests of the canners."[10]

Another feature of the 1893 strike was the inability of the canners to convince the fishermen that their problems were mutual and that prices were dependent on consumer supply and demand. The infant companies were financially weak, operating on future demands. The direct dependence of the fishermen on the companies for fish prices made them distrust the companies deeply. Attitude of the union was that "the men who make their living by fishing in the Fraser were being deprived of their share of God's fish by rich men."[11] The canners were accused of monopolizing the fishing licences in B.C. and discriminating against the white fishermen. The only success of the canners in dealing with the fishermen resulted from antagonism between racial groups which enabled the canners to deal with each group separately.

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9 Vancouver World, July 24, 1893, p. 2.

10 Ibid., p. 2.

11 Ibid., p. 1.

The militant methods which have characterized fishing disputes also were used in 1893. The strike was short but violent, with the union being accused of using "questionable methods and intimidation in preventing the Indians from fishing, while other pernicious methods were adopted to prevent the cannery men obtaining assistance."[12] The violence led the Fraser River Canners' Association to offer a $50.00 reward leading to the arrest and conviction of any person "found unlawfully cutting or damaging nets or boats, or other property, interfering with or intimidating fishermen or other employees, inciting any person or persons to do anything unlawful or in any way hindering or attempting to hinder them from properly performing their duties, using violence or threats of violence to any person or persons in pursuance of any combination or conspiracy to raise wages."[13]

Attempted Strike - 1897. The years 1894 to 1899 were relatively quiet but with a mounting antagonism among the white and Indian fishermen toward the Japanese. Anyone, including Japanese and Americans, could obtain a fishing licence simply by stating that he was a British subject. By 1896 it was stated that "the alarming preponderance of the Japanese elements in the fishing population of the river just now is being freely discussed among the B.C. fishermen with some rather ugly commentaries."[14]

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12 Vancouver World, July 14, 1893, p. 4; July 15, 1893, p. 2.

13 Ibid., July 15, 1893, p. 2.

14 Ibid., July 17, 1896, p. 4.

In 1897 an abortive strike bore no results. The dispute arose when Japanese, Indian and white fishermen, who appeared to be working harmoniously together, demanded 15 cents a sockeye with a written contract, while the canners offered 8 cents. The dispute ended abruptly with an unprecedented run of sockeye and an order to permit U.S. trap-caught sockeye to enter duty-free into B.C.[15]

During 1897 the prevailing price for net-caught sockeye was 10 cents each, while trap-caught sockeye were 3 cents to 6 cents each. The latter, for some reason, were considered inferior for canning purposes.[16] Market price of salmon was "depressed" at an average $3.50 a case, yet new canneries were being built on the Fraser.[17]

The larger run of 1897 resulted in a limit of 250 fish to each contract boat though this was not enforced since the canneries were able to handle the total catch. 75 fish was considered a large load for one boat of that period.[18]

In contrast to the previous year, the 1898 sockeye run was a failure. Sockeye prices rose from 15 cents to 20 cents but in the end neither the canners or fishermen showed profits.[19] During the same period coho prices were 20 cents each.[20]

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15 Vancouver World, July 13, 1897, p. 23.

16 Ibid., July 16, p. 1; July 27, 1897, p. 1.

17 Ibid., November 26, 1897, p. 1.

18 Ibid., July 27, 1897, p. 1; August 10, 1897, p. 1. The latter paper stated that much of the fish was shipped frozen via CPR to Eastern Canada and USA.

19 Ibid., August 16, 1898, p. 8; August 23, 1898, p. 1.

20 Ibid., September 20, 1898, p. 4.

Disputes to 1900 - Skeena and Nass Area and Rivers Inlet.[21] These few disputes appear to have been spontaneous and confined in many cases to a single cannery. The majority of the fishermen were native Indians with Japanese the next largest group. Some had fished previously on the Fraser. Disputes were probably the action of one racial group. There were no organized labour groups among the fishermen. Wages for net men at the time were $45.00 per month with board, or $60.00 per month without board. Net women received $1.00 per day. By 1898 the net men's wages had increased to $70.00 a month with board. Fishing skiffs were renting for $1.00 a week. Cunningham's journal mentions several disputes without giving any details. A June 19, 1894 entry states that the fishermen "were still on strike" and that the strike ended June 20. The May 18, 1896 entry mentions another strike, presumably over the price of spring salmon. On July 14, 1897, Indian fishermen at one cannery went on strike for an advance of 1 cent in the price of sockeye.

On June 20, 1899, a dispute was reported in a Vancouver paper involving the Nass, Skeena and Rivers' Inlet, with 2500 fishermen demanding 10 cents a sockeye. The canners offered 6 cents, perhaps

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21 Unless otherwise stated the material for this section is based on the records, or diary, of the late R. G. Cunningham, pioneer business man and cannery operator at Port Essington during this time. The town was the centre of commercial activity for the area at the turn of the century. The records were obtained through the kindness of Earl Anfield, then Indian Superintendent at Prince Rupert.

8 cents, though later reports denied this offer. By June 30 the salmon canneries were in operation.[22] Cunningham reported a strike on the Skeena River beginning on July 3, 1899 for a demand of 8 cents per sockeye. The dispute ended July 8 at a price of 7 cents.[23]

Fraser River Strike of 1900. Displacement of whites and Indians continued at an accelerated pace during 1898 to 1901. The boom resulting from the gold rush in Alaska and the Yukon drew many fishermen into other industries. Canners, complaining of labour shortage, replaced them with Japanese. By 1901, the Japanese held 958 out of a total of 4,722 fishing licences as compared to 452 held by them in 1896. In addition, 1,090 licences were issued to the canneries which used them mainly to employ Japanese fishermen. With two men to a boat and licence, the Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration estimated that over 4,000 Japanese were engaged in the fishing industry, mainly in the Fraser River district.[24]

Rising tension in the fishing industry broke out in violence in 1900. White fishermen feared that the Fraser River Canners' Association was planning to "flood the River with cheap Japanese labour." With the help of professional union organizers from other trades, the B.C. Fishermen's Union was organized on December 12, 1899, with one local in New Westminster directly chartered by the American Federation of

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22 Vancouver World, June 20, 1899, p. 3; June 27,1899,p. 6; June 30, 1899, p. 8.

23 This may be a reference to the dispute mentioned above in the Vancouver press.

24 Report, 1902, p. 390.

Labour and one in Vancouver by the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada.[25] By 1900 the union had a membership of 600 whites[26] plus an unknown number of Indians. The union also had militant and experienced leaders from the Columbia River area.[27]

The Japanese Benevolent Society at Steveston had a membership of about 1,800.[28] Because of the handicaps of language difficulties, racial discrimination, lack of job opportunities in other industries and their position as new immigrants, the Japanese were in a weaker bargaining position. Their position in the industry became rather intolerable with these handicaps and the fact they were numerically outnumbered by the white and Indian fishermen.

The Fishermens' Union and the Japanese Society were reported to be working in harmony at the beginning of the season and both parties demanded 25 cents a sockeye. The Japanese were said to be "enthusiastic about their union" and to have pledged that "they would not go back on their pledge if they received proper treatment from the hands of the whites."[29] However, the actual demand for 25 cents was made by the Fishermen's Union while the Japanese were prepared to accept 20 cents.[30]

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25 B.C. Federationist, December 27, 1912, p. 5.

26 Vancouver Province, July 2, 1900, p. 8.

27 The Columbia River Fishermen's Union was organized in 1888. In 1896 it led a prolonged and successful strike.

28 Vancouver Province, July 2, 1900, p. 8.

29 Ibid., p. 8.

30 Ibid., July 2, 1900, p. 8; July 6, 1900, p. 9.

The canners remained firm in their offer of 20 cents. The Fraser River Canners' Association maintained that "considering the price ruling in England at the present time, the offer of 20 cents was an exceptionally fair one to the fishermen and it leaves the canners but a small margin of profit. As a matter of fact--it would pay us better to close down our work altogether than to pay the price demanded by the Fishermen's Union. Practically the only outlet we have to look to is the British market. Canada only takes in the neighbourhood of 50,000 cases. As we have to compete in that market with the fish put out by the Alaska Packers' Association, and furthermore, as the market is very limited, it is impossible to obtain a higher figure than that now ruling in England."[31]

The fear of the white fishermen was that the Japanese would accept the canners' terms and start fishing. A demonstration was staged at Steveston with a parade of strikers consisting of Canadian, Portuguese, Spaniards, Swedes, Danes, Indians, a few Japanese and nearly every other nationality. The purpose was to warn the Japanese that "the time had come for the white and Indian fishermen to take action to prevent the Japanese from working for the canners at any price other than that set by the Union."[32]

The Fraser River Canners' Association charged that the strikers were not bona fide fishermen but that a majority were Americans who

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31 Vancouver Province, July 7, 1900, p. 1.

32 Ibid., July 10, 1900, p. 8.

were "in the pay of the canners across the line . . . desirous of keeping down the production of the Fraser River canneries, as it is of a better quality than theirs and commands the best market price in Europe."[33]

To prevent violence and property damage the canners offered a reward of $100.00 leading to arrest and conviction of anyone damaging nets, boats and other property or for any acts of intimidation. Credit or advance of food supplies to the fishermen was cancelled.

Then the canners requested police protection. 40 special constables arrived at Steveston. The police chief was given the authority to swear in as many more men as he deemed necessary. The police were to patrol the Fraser River and protect an estimated 45 percent of the fishermen willing to accept the offer of 20 cents.[34]

The fishermen remained firm with the union reporting that the Japanese "were solid with the whites and that the strikers are sure of success in the long run."[35] In actual fact the Japanese showed more strength than the whites. The few incidents of reported strike breaking were among the white fishermen.

Fishing was permitted to raise funds for the strikers. Since the Fishermen's Union had the support of all unions in Vancouver the latter were urged to have their members buy fish for a month.

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33 Vancouver Province, July 13, 1900, p. 4.

34 Two strikers were arrested for intimidation but were acquitted on the grounds that the acts were committed beyond the three mile limit in the Gulf of Georgia and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.

35 Vancouver Province, July 13, 1900, p. 4.

Salmon fishing was the chief, if not the sole, means of livelihood of the early Japanese immigrants. The prospects of alternative employment were not great. The fear then was the hardship of the coming winter if the fishing season was lost. The Japanese were forced into a vulnerable position in the dispute. The first symptom of the wavering of the Japanese strikers was their expressed dissatisfaction with the 500 to 700 fish allowed them for food purposes. In addition, they appeared willing to accept an offer if it was increased to 22 to 22-1/2 cents a sockeye.[36] A few boats did begin fishing but were stopped by 150 white fishermen.[37]

On July 15, the fishermen staged a demonstration with 1,000 strikers parading to the Court House in Vancouver. By that date it was stated that the "cardinal principles for which the fishermen were struggling for was recognition of the union."[38]

On July 16, some Japanese began fishing on the canners' terms despite the fact the Japanese union had re-affirmed their support of the Fishermen's Union. Persistent reports that "practically every Japanese has either a rifle, a shot gun, or a revolver, and all are determined to resist should any interference with them by the white fishermen be attempted, over wages or anything else", were denied by the Fishermen's Union.[39]

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36 Vancouver Province, July 17, 1900, p. 4.

37 Ibid., July 20, 1900, p. 2.

38 Ibid., July 16, 1900, p. 3.

39 Ibid., July 6, 1900, p. 9.

Finally a meeting of the fishermen and the FRCA took place on July 20 with the Dominion Commissioner of Labour for B.C. in attendance. The canners offered a maximum of 20 cents a fish, this price to be reduced to 15 cents in case of a heavy run of fish. No more fish than could be canned would be purchased from the fishermen. The variation between the 15 cents and 20 cents was to be governed by the quantity of fish and the state of the market.[40]

The Fishermen's Union in reply asked for a fixed price of 25 cents a sockeye for the whole season. They asked one month's notice be given either party before changing the agreement. If a limit was to be placed on the number of fish which could be delivered to the canneries, then the same number should be taken from private boats as from cannery-owned boats. All those engaged in the strike were, if they rented cannery boats, to have their boats returned with no hard feelings.[41]

On July 22, the fishermen voted on the new fish price offers. The results were 497 for 25 cents; 15 for 22-1/2cents--a vote that meant 25 cents or no fishing. The canners then offered 20 cents a fish till August 25, with a maximum of 600 fish a week and 15 cents a fish caught above this amount.[42] The same evening, July 22, 4,000 Japanese staged a parade to "show strength and unity", as well as to "show the whites just what they are capable of doing in case of a scrap."[43]

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40 Vancouver Province, July 19, 1900, p. 3.

41 Ibid., July 20, 1900, p. 1

42 Ibid., July 22, 1900, pp. 1 and 3.

43 Ibid., July 21, 1900, p. 3.

The strike reached a sudden climax when martial law was enforced at Steveston as a protection against the rising threats of violence. The militia, 160 men from the 6th Regiment of the DCOR's, arrived and created a situation whereby, according to the Province, "Canadian authority had to provide sufficient force to protect an alien force of fishermen defending, by recourse to arms, their inalienable right to work."[44] Each militiaman was supplied with ten rounds of ball cartridge and 20 in reserve. The "understanding with the soldiers was distinctly that in the event of action being demanded of them, they were to shoot--and shoot to kill."[45] The opposing sides at this point were 4,000 Japanese plus 200 militiamen and 100 armed police against 700 white fishermen and a few Indians.

On July 24, 2,000 Japanese went fishing under police protection. Many white fishermen followed. The Indians alone stood firm as a group. The native Indian women refused to work in the canneries while the remnants of the Fishermen's Union attempted to prevent Chinese from working in the plants.

The position of the striking fishermen appeared hopeless but "without the faintest hope that they will get their 25 cents per fish, that they would ever get recognition for their union, the Fraser River fishermen kept fighting on."[46] Finally, on July 30, the strike ended.

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44 Vancouver Province, July 24, 1900, p. 1.

45 Ibid., p. 1.

46 Ibid., July 27, 1900, p. 1.

The prevailing sockeye price by then was 19 cents each.[47]

During the course of the strike the Boards of Trade at Vancouver and New Westminster offered to mediate the strike but the canners refused all their offers. The newspapers ran editorials suggesting arbitration and conciliation. The provincial Legislature even suggested a compulsory arbitration law.[48]

The intervention of the militia ended on rather a humiliating note. They were subjected to the jeers of the fishermen and the wrath of public opinion. At one stage, some 300 striking fishermen, whites and Indians, marched by them. The local magistrate of Richmond municipality was asked to read the Riot Act to prevent such assemblies but he refused. The role of the militia was discussed by the provincial Legislature which heard charges that their presence was "a disgrace to the district, which fishermen and people felt keenly. One act of intimidation would not warrant it and generally speaking the strikers had remained within their rights and within the law." The net result, it was said, was to "give the river to the Japanese."[49] The final and ironical blow came when the municipality of Richmond disputed the bill of $2,000. for the 175 men and 15 officers on the ground that the

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47 Vancouver Province, July 30, 1900, p. 3; July 31, 1900, p. 1.

48 Ibid., July 21, 1900, p. 6; July 22, p. 1 and 3; July 26, 1900, p. 8; August 4, 1900, p. 8.

49 Ibid., July 26, 1900, p. 1.

Provincial Government had invited the militia.[50] Thus, the militia "having performed a most unpleasant duty will have to wait for their paltry pay."[51]

Fraser River Strike - 1901. By 1901 the Fishermen's Union had expanded to include the following Locals: No. 1 at New Westminster, No. 2 at Vancouver, No. 3 at Canoe Pass, No. 4 at Eburne, and No. 5 at Port Simpson. By July 31, 1902, additional locals were chartered at Cowichan and Bristol Bay.[52] In January 1901 a Grand Lodge of B.C. Fishermen, with headquarters at Vancouver was organized to co-ordinate the activities of the local unions.[53]

The Vancouver local of the Fishermen's Union was organized with the help of the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council following the Fraser River strike of 1900.[54] Native Indian fishermen became active members despite the early opposition of the local Indian Agent. During this period the Japanese fishermen formed their own union, the Japanese

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50 Actually the militia had been called out under the procedure permitted by the Militia Act of the day by a requisition signed by three Richmond Justices of the Peace, one a cannery owner, the second a cannery foreman, and the third a Steveston storekeeper. See Peter Guy Silverman, A History of the Militia and Defences of British Columbia, 1871-1914. Unpublished M.A. thesis, The Library of the University of British Columbia, 1956.

51 Vancouver Province, Sept. 26, 1900, p. 1.

52 Labour Gazette, June 1903, p. 1016.

53 Ibid., February 1902, p. 488.

54 "News of Organized Labour", Vancouver Province, August 27, 1900, p. 8. This conflicts with the April, 1900 date given in the B.C. Federationist.

Fishermens' Benevolent Society, under the patronage of the Japanese Consul.[55] Full co-operation between the white and Japanese organizations was said to be assured.

The aim of the Grand Lodge was to extend the organization on an industry-wide basis on the Pacific Coast "from the Skeena in the North to the Columbia in the South." The headquarters of the Grand Lodge was to settle all disputes between the canners and fishermen. In addition, it was to regulate fish prices paid to the fishermen. All locals were to be affiliated with the Dominion Trades Congress and the American Federation of Labour. These two bodies were to issue charters to the local unions. In general, it was stated that "heretofore there have been a number of unions on the coast, but they have been only local affairs without stability and have fallen without accomplishing any good. With the tremendous force of unionism at the back of the new organization, there is no doubt of its ultimate success in ameliorating the present conditions of the fishermen."[56]

The 1901 strike on the Fraser was to duplicate the 1900 strike in violence and, like the earlier strike, was to develop into an open struggle between white and Indian fishermen on one hand and the Japanese on the other. Involved were 8,000 fishermen, made up of 5,000

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55 Daily Province, August 4, 1901, p. 1.

56 "News of Organized Labour", Vancouver Province, August 27, 1900, p. 8.

whites and Indians and 3,000 Japanese.[57]

The canners expected a heavy run of sockeye. Their competitors in Puget Sound now had 300 fish traps and were expected to pack one million cases. Furthermore, there was a wide difference between the prices of Alaska and B.C. salmon on the London market and the canners insisted B.C. prices must be revised.[58]

The canners and the Fishermen's Union began negotiations on May 20. The Japanese did not take an active part. It was the "desire of the fishermen to come to some agreement with the canners whereby all expected trouble on the Fraser may be avoided this year, and on their part the canners signified their intention of meeting the fishermen at least half way in any agreement looking to an amiable adjustment of causes of differences alleged to exist between the two bodies."[59]

The canners offered 12 cents a sockeye, which the Grand Lodge officials were willing to accept. However, the union vote showed all Indians and 60 percent of the whites still insisted on a demand of 15 cents a sockeye. The canners made a new offer of 12 cents a sockeye from July 1 to July 27 and 10 cents thereafter, but only 20 percent of the fishermen were in favour. The canners then offered 12-1/2 cents till August 3, but the fishermen countered with a demand of 12-1/2 cents for the season. In addition, the union asked for no

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57 Labour Gazette, August 1901, p. 125.

58 Vancouver Province, June 18, 1901, p. 1.

59 Ibid., May 13, 1901, p. 3.

discrimination against union fishermen and a restriction on the supply of trap fish, but was agreeable to a limit of 300 fish a boat. Neither party could accept the other's terms and negotiations were ended.

The canners then began negotiations with individual fishermen offering 12-1/2 cents to July 27 and 10 cents thereafter, with a limit of 200 fish a boat a day. A stipulation was that individual agreements must be signed by July 5 or there would be a further drop. Japanese and many white fishermen were reported to be signing.

On June 25, the dispute took an unexpected turn when 40 of an expected 400 to 500 Japanese fishermen arrived from Seattle to fish on the Fraser River. By the end of the season, a total of 250 had arrived. The Japanese then held 900 of the 1,408 fishing licences issued.[60] As non-residents of Canada, the Japanese from Seattle could not obtain fishing licences. This regulation was by-passed by using them as "boat-pullers", or assistants, on gillnetters, so they did not require licences.

On July 4, the fishermen's representatives and canners resumed their meetings. New negotiations for sockeye prices were based on a sliding scale of salmon pack. The proposed prices were to be 15 cents for a pack up to 400,000 cases; 12-1/2 cents up to 500,000; 11 cents up to 600,000; 9 cents up to 700,000, and so on. The fishermen refused to accept this scale, stating "we would fish for 11 cents for the season, supposing the canners would give us the

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60 Vancouver Province, June 25, 1901, p. 1.

preference, not employing Japanese except after we have been equipped with boats and nets, and if the canners would take all the fish the union men can bring in."[61] The dispute was now "not for the price" but "whether we are going to get our rights or not."[62]

Despite reports that the Japanese were armed and were going fishing, there was actually no fishing. However, by July 15, persistent reports that they were to start fishing brought action from the union. Patrol boats were put on to the river to prevent fishing. However, the Japanese had their own patrol to protect their fishermen. Violence was reported with both parties being armed. Police protection was negligible, though several fishermen were arrested. However, violence was of such proportions that a cannery offered a reward of $500. for information about two of their Japanese fishermen who had been "missing since Monday the 8th instant and that their boats had been found adrift in English Bay without the nets and with sail unfurled. And whereas there is reason to believe they have been murdered off Point Grey. The above reward will be paid to any person or persons giving such information as will lead to the arrest and conviction of one guilty party or parties."[63]

A favourite tactic of the Fishermen's Union was to pick up Japanese fishermen, cast their boats adrift, then leave them marooned at a previously chosen island. The idea was to leave them marooned

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61 Vancouver Province, July 10, 1901, p. 1.

62 Ibid., July 12, 1901, p. 1.

63 Ibid., July 18, 1901, p. 3.

for the season where they would be fed "every few days, maintained comfortably, though closely guarded."[64] When the authorities discovered the first hideout, the union chose a second and more remote island.[65] The authorities were unable to discover this second island. By July 12, the union had marooned 36 Japanese.

On July 14, the canners made a new offer of 12-1/2 cents to July 27 and 10 cents thereafter, unless the pack fell below 50,000 cases, when the price would remain 12-1/2 cents. This offer was refused by the union. At this time 1,500 boats were available for fishermen, with white fishermen to be given the preference.

During the course of the strike the Dominion Commissioner of Labour was active in attempting a compromise. However, the dispute ended on July 19 through the effort of a group of Vancouver businessmen who had been quietly working to bring the union and canners together. The final settlement was 12-1/2 cents for one quarter of the season's pack and 10 cents for the remainder. The report of a "unanimous vote of the Grand Lodge" was given as 61 to 25.[66]

When fishing resumed, the fishermen harvested an unprecedented run of sockeye with the boats averaging 300 to 500 fish a day. The salmon traps in Puget Sound were reported to be releasing one-half of

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64 Vancouver Province, July 11, 1901, p. 1.

65 The first island was Bowen Island.

66 Vancouver Province, July 19, 1901, p. 1.

their catches. By August 3, the price of Fraser River sockeye had decreased to 10-5/8 cents each and by August 8 each boat was limited to 200 fish per day. The report on August 29 was "fishing about over and canneries begin to worry about sales."[67]

Post-1901 Period. A period of relatively stable relations between fishermen and cannery operators was maintained on the Fraser River for several years following the 1901 strike. Unusually small salmon runs, coupled with reduced competition for employment in the industry, enabled fishermen to receive higher prices for their catch. There was a decline in the numbers of Japanese employed on the Fraser, due to their emigration to other fishing centres of the province. Immigration of Japanese to B.C. was also at a virtual standstill during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. However, following 1905, it was resumed.

In 1902, there were unsuccessful negotiations towards affiliation of the Fishermen's Union with the Fishermen's Protective Union of the Pacific Coast and Alaska organized in 1902 by American fishermen, which had set as one of its aims "the uniting in one great common brotherhood of all the fishermen seeking a livelihood in the waters of the Pacific Coast and Alaska."[68] With an increasing influx of

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67 The aftermath of this unprecedented run of sockeye is described under Fishing Companies, Chapter IV.

68 The Fisheries of California, published by the International Fishermen and Allied Workers of America, CIO, San Francisco, California, January, 1947, p. 18.

Japanese fishermen after 1905, the strength of the Fishermen's Union declined. On June 22, 1907, the union staged its last strike over a reduction in the price of spring salmon from 5 cents to 4 cents. Only 78 fishermen were affected by this unsuccessful strike.[69] Other reports stated that 125 fishermen responded.[70] The Union ceased to function shortly after.

During this period, salmon prices fluctuated widely. In 1903, the average price of sockeye was 16-1/2 cents each. In 1904 the price was a flat 20 cents. In 1905, the Fraser River Canners Association, the Fishermen's Union and the Japanese Benevolent Society agreed to a price of 12-1/2 cents a sockeye for July, and 10 cents for the balance of the season. In the first week of August the price was 15 cents to 20 cents, but later dropped to 10 cents and 8 cents. By 1906 the prices reached 20 cents to 25 cents. During the same year, red springs were 8 cents and white springs were 4 cents each. In 1909, the price dropped sharply to 12-1/2 cents during July and 10 cents during August.

Skeena River Strike - 1904. The conflicts on the Fraser had repercussions in other major fishing districts on the coast. The Indians were predominant among the fishermen and cannery workers in the northern districts prior to World War I. Only a small number of

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69 Labour Gazette, July 1907, p. 106; Vancouver World, June 24, 1907, p. 7.

70 Vancouver Province, June 27, 1907, p. 7.

Japanese and whites fished in these districts at that time, owing to the long distances from major population centres, the high transportation costs, and, in comparison to the Fraser, the low prices the fishermen received.

The most serious dispute occurred in 1904, involving 800 native fishermen, supported in the plants by 200 native women. "A salmon fishing season in British Columbia without a strike would not be the real thing, and as apparently all is to be peace and quietness on the Fraser River this year, it is not a surprise that trouble has broken out on the Skeena. It is the poor Indian who has stirred up the row this year."[71]

The fishermen demanded 10 cents a sockeye and 25 cents for red springs against the canners' offer of 7 cents and 25 cents. The Japanese were willing to accept the offer but were outnumbered by the Indians. The fishermen at the Nass River were also out. On July 6, the canners increased the offer to 8-1/2 cents but the Indians refused. The strike ended with a reported 300 fishermen going to the Fraser.[72]

In June 1907, Skeena River Japanese fishermen, now organized, won a price increase of 25 cents to 35 cents. The species of fish is not mentioned but it was presumably spring salmon.[73]

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71 Vancouver Province, June 13, 1904, p. 1.

72 Labour Gazette, August 1904, p. 189. Vancouver Province, June 13, 1904, p. 1; June 23, 1904, p. 1; July 2, 1904, p. 1; July 6, 1904, p. 1; July 8, 1904, p. 1.

73 Vancouver World, June 3, 1907, p. 8.

Views of Industry Problems, 1907. Before a Commission appointed in 1907 to study the fishing industry of B.C. the cannery operators stated what they considered to be their major problems. The first was competition from American canners who got their salmon at lower prices from salmon traps. The second was seasonal fluctuations in the sockeye runs. Third was an increasing scarcity of Chinese and Indian labour. The supply of Indian labour was uncertain and variable. The Chinese were seeking steadier work in lumbering, agriculture and railroad construction. The head tax on Chinese immigrants had been increased in 1904 from $100. to $500., thus cutting immigration. The Canners Association had previously presented a brief to have it reduced to $100. Fish prices were said to be rising because of the development of freezing, salting and mild curing.

On the other hand, complaints were directed against the canners over the use of Japanese fishermen. In its brief to the Commission the New Westminster City Council stated "that the canners are exploiting the salmon fisheries of the country by the aid of oriental labour, and that a determined effort has been made to discriminate against white fishermen in favour of the Japanese."[74]

Dispute of 1913. By 1913, the Japanese were numerically the largest group fishing on the Fraser River. They held 1,088 of the

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74 Source of data on Commission, British Columbia Fisheries Commission, Reports and Recommendations, 1905-07, pp. 16-18.

fishing licences issued on the river that year, as compared to 832 for whites and 430 for the Indians.[75] The respective roles of these three racial groups had become almost the exact reverse of the situation in 1900 and 1901. The Japanese had become the dominant and aggressive group with "a complete organization in Steveston with a Union Hall and office", while the white fishermen "being of all nationalities--besides English-speaking", lacked organization.[76]

On August 1, 1913, the price of sockeye was reduced from 25 cents to 15 cents. The Japanese, claiming that their agreement called for 25 cents through July and August, went on strike. The white fishermen were willing to compromise at 20 cents on the understanding that the canners would take 200 fish a day from each boat, but the organized Japanese kept them in port. There were reports of guns being used to intimidate strikebreakers, of nets being cut and fish destroyed.[77] The reported violence, intimidation and property damage on the part of the Japanese were reminiscent of the tactics used by the whites and Indians against the Japanese in 1900 and 1901. The strike came to an end on August 7 when the Japanese, without informing other fishermen, returned to fishing. The price agreed on was 15 cents a sockeye with a limit of 200. Affected were 2,500 fishermen at the mouth of the Fraser. The fishermen operating above the New Westminster Bridge were not affected.

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75 Daily Province, August 4, 1913, p. 4.

76 Ibid., p. 4.

77 Ibid., August 5, 1913, p. 20.

During this 1913 dispute the Industrial Workers of the World made unsuccessful attempts at organizing the white fishermen.

World War I and the Post-War Period.

During World War I and the post-war period, there was a marked decrease in the number of fishing strikes. During this time, organizational activity shifted from direct action to legislative action. Specifically, efforts were directed towards reducing Japanese competition by limiting the number of licences issued to them.

Union activity remained at a low ebb among fishermen during World War I. The only organizations that maintained themselves during the period were the Deep Sea Fishermen's Union of Prince Rupert[78] and the Japanese Benevolent Society of Steveston. The temporary lapse of organizations among fishermen may be explained by developments in the industry. High prices coupled with labour shortage during the war years temporarily enabled those engaged in the industry to enjoy unprecedented earnings. Technological changes, particularly power engines to fishing boats and the expansion of large scale fishing techniques, speeded up production. The long-continued stagnation of fishing and canning on the Fraser River following the 1913 Hell's Gate slide, led to a large-scale migration to other fishing districts of the coast.

During World War I, the number of Japanese increased until they dominated the industry. Many white and Indian fishermen were drawn into

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78 See below, p. 188, et seq.

the armed forces or other industries. The peak of Japanese domination was in 1919 when they received 3,267 fishing licences, or nearly one-half of licences issued for the year.[79] Japanese competition was being felt not only in gillnetting but in other branches, such as purse-seining and halibut fishing.[80]

Fraser River Fishermen's Protective Association. The first organization formed for the purpose of getting legislative action against the Japanese was the Fraser River Fishermen's Protective Association organized at New Westminster in 1914.

The fisheries regulations were such that only bonafide residents of the area above the New Westminster Bridge could fish that part of the Fraser River. Reports that the canners were encouraging the Japanese to live in float houses above the Bridge to take advantage of this regulation led to a meeting of fishermen under the auspices of the New Westminster Board of Trade. These two resolutions were passed. One stated "that this meeting of representative fishermen from the Fraser River east of the New Westminster Bridge is strongly of the opinion that legislation or other protection should be afforded to the white and Indian resident population on both banks of the river." The second asked "that the Government's aid hereby requested to protect the white and Indian resident population from the alien fishermen by

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79 C.H. Young and H.R.Y. Reid, The Japanese Canadian, p. 43

80 B.C. Federationist, Sept. 29, 1916, p. 1; June 26, 1917, p. 1.

such regulations as will prevent the Japanese from invading the drifts in the district which we represent."[81]

This first meeting sent the resolutions to Ottawa. At a subsequent meeting steps were taken to organize the Fraser River Fishermen's Protective Association with an initial membership of 30 men. The FRFPA was to be a permanent organization for the "purpose of eliminating the Japanese from the Fraser River and show strength to the Government."[82] The organization was completed a week later with a membership of 300. Initiation fees were 50 cents. Membership was open to all who "believe in driving the Orientals out of the industrial life of the province."[83]

The first act of the FRFPA was to pass these resolutions. "As we consider that the Asiatics of the Fraser River are a deadly menace to this district because they are steadily driving the white and Indian fishermen off the river and sapping the financial life of the Fraser Valley to the extent of approximately $1 million a year, which is diverted from local channels of trade and sent to an alien land, where it is lost to this section forever, that unless this steady insidious invasion of the Asiatic is checked quickly, one of the greatest commercial assets of our province will pass entirely into the hands of aliens by nature, if not by name, and all the benefit of our fishing

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81 B.C. Federationist, April 24, 1914, p. 2.

82 Ibid., May 1, 1914, p. 2.

83 Ibid., May 8, 1914, p. 2.

industry will go to enrich the coffers of a nation across the sea; now, therefore, the FRFPA, representative of white and Indian fishermen on the Fraser River from the Gulf of Georgia to Mission City Bridge, do hereby resolve, that in order to preserve the fishing industry of the Fraser River for the white and Indian fishermen the Dominion and Provincial Governments are petitioned to enact legislation as follows: That no licences be issued to Asiatics to fish along the river above the New Westminster Bridge; that in 1915 and henceforth the number of fishing licences to be issued to Fraser River fishermen be restricted to a total to be agreed upon by interested canneries and this association; and that in 1915 and henceforth licences shall be issued to the white and Indian fishermen on the Fraser River for one month prior to the issuance to any other party whatsoever."[84]

The FRFPA remained relatively inactive until the 1920's, partly because World War I broke out shortly after the formation of the Association, and partly because of the serious decline in the Fraser River fisheries following the slide at Hell's Gate in 1913.

The Fish Packers Union - Prince Rupert (Seal Cove). In 1916, the first union concerned primarily with shoreworkers was organized as Fish Packers' Union No. 5240 with headquarters at Prince Rupert. It had jurisdiction over the cold storage workers of the Seal Cove area. Affiliation of this organization is rather difficult to ascertain. It appears to have been directly chartered in 1916 by the American

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84 B.C. Federationist, May 23, 1914, p. 2.

Federation of Labour. It operated under the One Big Union banner from 1918 until 1934 when it received a charter from the Trades and Labour Congress. The management of the plant exerted considerable influence over the union. The FPU attempted a sliding scale of wages based upon the cost of living index as supplied by the Dominion Department of Labour. However, the cost of living in Prince Rupert was considerably higher than that shown by the Department of Labour and the system was unsuccessful.

The FPU maintained its identity until the fall of 1945 when it amalgamated with the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union. Previous to this, it had refused to join the Fishermen and Cannery Workers' Industrial Union.[85] The reason given for the refusal was that the FPU had built up a sum of money and refused to turn it over to another union. A second shoreworkers union emerged in Prince Rupert, though the dates and other particulars are unknown. This was the Fish Packers' Association chartered by the All-Canadian Congress of Labour. This Association was absorbed by the FCWIU and later by the UFAWU.

Prince Rupert shoreworkers were, therefore, represented by the FPU in the seal Cove area and the FPA in the Cow Bay area. Each carried out negotiations in their separate territories. The barrier to a union between the two was that the FPU members, though paid lower wages, enjoyed a relatively long and steady employment, whereas, the FPA had higher wages but short, uncertain seasonal work.

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85 See below, p. 172, et seq.

United Fishermen of British Columbia. In 1917 the Finnish fishermen of Rivers Inlet area refused a canners offer of 22-1/2 cents a sockeye demanding 25 cents. This offer had already been accepted by the Skeena River gillnetters.[86] During this 1917 strike, a meeting of independent and unattached Rivers Inlet gillnetters organized the United Fishermen of British Columbia, with headquarters at Sointula and consisting mainly of Finnish fishermen of Skeena River and Rivers Inlet. The actual date of organization was June 22, 1917.

The aims of the union at the time of inception were stated to be protection of the fishermen from the exploitation of the cannery owners, securing better prices for their catch, protesting against the restrictions which inconvenience the fishermen, and, in general, bettering conditions under which the fishermen were operating. Some attempts were made "to throw cold water on the plan by referring to the history of the attempted organizing among the Fraser River fishermen, but this has been more than met by the showing made by the Columbia River fishermen who won out by sticking to their organization."[87]

Revival of Union Activity After World War I. Increased competition from the Japanese fishermen revived agitation against them by white and Indian fishermen who were, at the same time, facing competition from an influx of the returned soldiers who were being

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86 Vancouver Province, July 14, 1917, p. 14.

87 B.C. Federationist, February 12, 1917, p. 7.

encouraged to enter the industry. An added difficulty was the post-war depression and falling fish prices. Out of this situation, unionism was revived during the early 1920's, following much the pattern of the pre-war period.

In northern B.C., the Queen Charlotte Salmon Trollers' Association was organized. Though a loose organization, it did achieve some success in raising salmon prices. The QCSTA patterned itself after the IWW in being a militant organization using strike and boycott tactics. The association at its height had a membership of 250.

As fishermen in more and more fishing settlements were joining the QCSTA, it became necessary to have a larger organization with a more centralized headquarters. The QCSTA was therefore re-organized in 1920 as the Northern B.C. Salmon Fishermen's Association, with headquarters at Prince Rupert. Locals were at Jap Inlet, Port Simpson, Port Essington and in three Queen Charlotte Island settlements. The union was active until the 1930's when the trollers joined the co-operatives and the gillnetters joined the FCWIU and later the Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union.[88]

In southern B.C., the Fraser River Fishermen's Protective Association was re-organized in 1919 into the B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association with headquarters in New Westminster. Like its predecessor, the B.C. FPA was strongly anti-Oriental in policy, and relied on legislative policies rather than direct action to reduce or eliminate the competition of the Japanese fishermen. It was the

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88 See below, p. 183, et seq.

B.C. FPA who spearheaded action by fishermen against the Japanese.[89] The B.C. FPA was at first concerned primarily with the Fraser River and in particular with the area above the New Westminster Bridge. In the early 1920's, however, it began to organize the fishermen at other points on the coast. When it reached the Rivers Inlet area, it came into conflict with the British Columbia Fishermen's Union.

By this time, the BCFU had locals at Lund and Hunter Island, but had otherwise been relatively inactive. The union was a local affair centred at Sointula, and the majority of gillnetters were still unorganized. The result was the BCFU could not bargain for fish prices. A more serious factor in curbing activities of the union was the licence restrictions initiated by the Provincial Department of Fisheries to enable the war veterans to enter the industry. The local fishermen feared discrimination for union activities. It was stated that, for the 1918 season, 24 union members failed to receive fishing licences.[90]

With the appearance of the BCFPA in Rivers Inlet, the BCFU was spurred into action. A jurisdictional dispute between the two was of such proportions as to be the cause of strike failure of the 1923 Rivers Inlet strike.

Basically, the BCFPA was a conservative or "reformist" union depending on legislative measures rather than direct action, to achieve some of its aims. The majority of northern fishermen opposed

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89 See Appendix B, The Japanese in the Fishing Industry.

90 Field notes and interviews.

the ideas of the BCFPA. Out of this opposition, the B.C. Fishermen's Association, composed of gillnetters, trollers and seiners, was organized in 1925. On December 23, 1925, the BCFU disbanded and joined the BCFA.

Both the BCFA and BCFPA were active until the 1930's. Actually the BCFA concentrated on the Rivers Inlet area while the BCFPA was dominant in the south. One report says that on June 20, 1929, the BCFA disbanded and joined the BCFPA. This is probably partially true. By the 1930's two other organizations were emerging, the United Fishermen's Federal Union and the fishermen's section of the Workers' Unity League. The BCFA was absorbed by the second organization.

On the west coast of Vancouver Island, the Port Alberni Fishermen's Association was organized. In 1925 this association was reorganized into the West Coast Trollers' Association. This organization did not function as a union but was concerned with conservation of the salmon fisheries, and also had a particular concern over heavy herring fishing. It later became the Kyuquot Trollers' Co-operative Association.[91]

Disputes During the 1920's. In 1920, what was probably the first agreement made between a shoreworkers and allied workers union and a fishing company was signed. This was a settlement of a dispute between the cold storage workers at Seal Cove, Prince Rupert, organized in the Fish Packers Union and the Cold Storage Company. It was made under the Industrial Disputes and Investigation Act (IDIA) of 1907.

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91 For further detail, see Chapter VII, Fishermen's Co-operatives.

The award was made April 6, 1920, retroactive to February 24, 1920, and was to be in effect for 12 months. The dispute over wages can be followed at a glance from the Table below:

TABLE XVIII

SHOREWORKERS' ARBITRATION AWARD, 1920

Current Wages	FPU Demands	IDIA Award
60¢ per hr. per 8 hr. day	75¢	67-1/2¢
70¢ per hr. overtime	85¢	80¢
75¢ Sundays and Holidays	90¢	85¢

Note: In addition there was to be a bonus of $1.00 per week to cold storage and sharp freeze workers.[92]

In 1921 this agreement was revised with arbitration under the IDIA, and with award being made on August 9, effective from August 1, 1921. Table XIX shows the issues in that dispute.

92 Labour Gazette, May 1920, p. 522; Prince Rupert Daily News, April 14, 1920, p. 2.

TABLE XIX

SHOREWORKERS' ARBITRATION AWARD, 1921

Prevailing Wages	FPU Demands	Company Offer	IDIA Award
67-1/2¢ per hr. per 8 hr. day	67-1/2¢	60¢	67-1/2¢
80¢ per hr. overtime	1.01	70¢	72-1/2¢
85¢ Sundays and Holidays	1.35	74¢	77-1/2¢

Additional points of the 1921 settlement were:

(1) A bonus of $1.00 a week for frozen fish workers.

(2) Agreement to be in force from July 10, 1921 to July 10, 1922, with semi-annual adjustments based on the family budget of the Canadian Labour Gazette with the first revision on January 10, 1922.

(3) Automatic revision of company boarding house rates with the rise and fall in wages.[93]

Two other disputes in the 1920's may be mentioned. In June 1924, 573 Japanese fishermen, under the Japanese Fishermen's Association at Port Essington, staged an unsuccessful eight-day strike against a reduction in the price of sockeye.[94] On August 6, 1929, 100 out of 120

93 Labour Gazette, September 1921, p. 1114.

94 British Columbia Department of Labour Annual Report, 1924, Victoria, B.C., p. 640.

pilchard fishermen at Nootka Sound, Vancouver Island, staged a successful strike for an increase in wages.[95]

Rivers Inlet was the scene of not one but several disputes. The series had begun in 1912, when native Indian fishermen in the Nimpkish district, near Alert Bay, staged a strike for 12-1/2 cents for sockeye, the price then being paid in the Rivers Inlet area instead of the 10 cents they were getting. The strike failed when white fishermen refused to tie up.[96]

In 1918, one company in Rivers Inlet paid 40 cents each for coho while a second buyer paid 20 cents. The fishermen refused to fish unless the second buyer also paid 40 cents. The result was the first buyer left the grounds. This was considered a "foolish strike" since the fishermen could sell to the first buyer for 40 cents. However, the second buyer was a cannery and the fishermen were probably obligated to sell there.[97]

On June 20, 1922, some 950 Rivers Inlet fishermen consisting of an estimated 478 whites, 346 Indians and 126 Japanese, organized in the UF of B.C. and the BCFPA, went on strike for a 50 percent

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95 Labour Gazette, September 1929, p. 985. The wording of this report makes it impossible to state whether "pilchard fishermen or shoreworkers in the pilchard reduction plant were affected."

96 Field notes and interviews.

97 Field notes and interviews.

increase in the price of sockeye. The canners' offer was 30 to 45 cents each. A strike vote among the Indian fishermen showed a result of 193 to 109 in favour of a strike. On July 9 this minority group of Indian fishermen, under the protection of three Provincial police resumed fishing, and thus ended the strike. This is the first recorded case of a group of native Indian fishermen being strikebreakers.

No location is given for two disputes reported by the Provincial Department of Labour in 1925. The first dispute occurred in May and involved 650 fishermen for six days over a cut in the price of spring salmon.[98] The second dispute, in September, involved 1,000 men over a decrease in the price of salmon.[99]

In 1927, 1,000 Fraser River fishermen led by the BCFPA refused to fish September 21 and 22, because sockeye prices were cut from 75 cents to 40 cents, and pink salmon prices from 8 cents to 4 cents. The settlement was 50 cents for sockeye and 8 cents for pinks.[100]

In 1928, the FRFPA staged a strike involving 1,500 fishing boats to enforce an increase in the price of sockeye from 65 cents to 75 cents each. The dispute began on August 20 and ended August 23.[101] Settlement

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98 This dispute would have involved salmon trollers and/or gillnetters.

99 Report, Provincial Department of Labour, 1925, p. 639 and 640.

100 Labour Gazette, 1927, p. 1046.

101 Labour Gazette, Sept. 1928, p. 986; Vancouver Province, August 20, 1928, p. 3; August 21, 1928, p. 18; August 22, 1928, p. 25.

at 70 cents was made till September when a select Committee was to make further adjustments. Similar adjustments were made for other varieties of salmon, the canners offering 9 cents a pound for red and 3 cents a pound for white spring.

The Depressed Thirties and World War II.

Unionism among fishermen and allied workers widened its scope and attained a new militancy during the depression and slow recovery of the 1930's. The fishing industry was among the hardest hit in the province. Incomes and standards of living of fishermen fell drastically. During the very time when sharp reductions were occurring in market demand and prices for fish, as well as in the number of canning and processing plants in operation, the number of fishing boats and their productive capacity was on the increase. As against the 1,296 fishing vessels of all kinds in operation in 1928 there were 1,532 in 1932. Sail boats decreased by 1,089 but the more efficient power boats increased by 1,690 during the same period.[102] A large proportion of fishermen had incurred large debts to canneries and finance companies to equip newer, more modern power boats and they were burdened with high fixed costs in face of falling fish prices and increased competition.

Unrest and conflict among fishermen and workers in canning or processing plants reached unprecedented proportions during the

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102 Carrothers, The British Columbia Fisheries, p. 27.

desperate 1930's. Strikes affected virtually every important fishing area and every major branch of the industry.[103] Important disputes and strikes occurred annually.

There was a correspondingly intense organizational activity among fishermen, with organizations appearing in scattered sections of the coast among various occupational, racial and language groups. These challenged the leadership of established unions like the DSFU and BCFPA. Increasing consolidation among canning companies was paralleled by the consolidation of various scattered local unions in the same type of fishing. These were drawn into province-wide unions of the craft type, chartered by the American Federation of Labour and the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada. These were finally federated into the present-day province-wide United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union.

The key role in organizing and unifying the fishermen was played by a militant, Communist-led group, who in the 1920's had comprised the opposition to the BCFPA. In this and other unions, they used the principle of "boring from within". Following the Sixth World Congress of the Third International held in Moscow in 1928, this policy was changed to a world-wide campaign to unionize the more exploited and poorly paid workers into revolutionary unions directed against the capitalistic system. For this purpose the Communist Party in the U.S.A. and Canada formed new revolutionary labour federations known as the Trade Union Unity League in U.S.A. and the Workers' Unity

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103 See Appendix D, Table XXXIII.

League in Canada. These made concerted efforts to organize workers who hitherto had been ignored or only partially organized by the craft-conscious AFL and its Canadian counterpart, the TLC. In B.C., the WUL achieved its greatest success in the primary industries of logging, lumbering, mining and fishing.

Rising unrest and militancy of organized fishermen first became apparent in 1931. A number of large strikes occurred which aggravated factional conflict within the ranks of the main unions.

On June 1, 1931, the weak Northern B.C. Salmon Fishermen's Association led some 300 salmon trollers, comprising 90 percent of the Prince Rupert trolling fleet, in a strike demanding a 25 percent increase to 8 cents and 9 cents a pound for troll-caught salmon. The American trollers of Alaska were also affected by the tie-up. On June 23, the fishermen applied for arbitration under the Fisheries Act. In the meantime, fishing was resumed. The Arbitration Board awarded some increase for cohos and a rebate of 2 cents a gallon for gasoline used for commercial fishing purposes.[104]

During the same period, a dispute among halibut fishermen resulted in the Deep Sea Fishermen's Union of Prince Rupert breaking away from its affiliation with the International Seafarer's Union local in Seattle and obtaining a charter from the TLC as a separate union. As a combined effort, halibut and salmon fishermen passed a resolution asking for a government subsidy of 2 cents

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104 Labour Gazette, July 1931, p. 761; Vancouver Province, June 10, 1931, p. 24, June 24, 1931, p. 2.

a pound.[105]

At Barklay Sound, on the west coast of Vancouver Island, some 500 salmon seiners and gillnetters belonging to the BCFPA staged a strike beginning on September 24, 1931. The fishermen demanded an increase from 5 cents to 10 cents each for dog (or chum) salmon. The dispute was settled on October 2, through the intervention of the Provincial Government, with the price set at 6 cents a fish and the cancellation of the provincial licence of $50. on seine nets, provided the fishermen resumed fishing by October 5.[106]

The Fishermen's Industrial Union. Dissatisfaction arising from the disputes in Prince Rupert and Barkley Sound brought to a climax the internecine conflict within the BCFPA between the incumbent leadership and the strong leftist faction. In 1931, the Provincial Executive of the BCFPA in New Westminster expelled the militant Vancouver Local, by far the largest and most important in the organization. This expelled group came under the control of the Communist-led Workers' Unity League and formed the Fishermen's Industrial Union.

The FIU of Canada, "organized and chartered by the WUL of Canada has automatically become an affiliate, and must at all times subscribe to and support the strategy and tactics of revolutionary class struggle as outlined in the program of the WUL, which is the Canadian section of the Red International of Labour Unions," said its

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105 Vancouver Province, June 13, 1931, p. 19. A consequence of the halibut and salmon disputes was a strong factor in the development of the fishermen's co-operatives.

106 Labour Gazette, October 1931, p. 1072.

constitution.[107]

The aim of the FIU was to organize all workers in the fishing industry into one industrial union in Canada. The method of organization was to be through industrial leagues, centralized through delegate and district councils to a National Executive Committee set up by the WUL. The Union pledged itself "to promote and lead in the daily economic struggles of the workers employed in the fishing industry for higher living standards and social conditions, repudiating arbitration and class collaboration in all price, wage, or working disputes, relying entirely upon the militant activity of the organized fishermen and workers employed in the industry, and the mass support of the revolutionary working class as the final arbitrator between Capital and Labour."

Other aims were "to actively engage in the struggle for social insurance, adequate old age pensions, compensation for disability, sickness, maternity, and so forth, and to give every assistance to the organizing of unemployed workers in the fight for adequate relief measures and for non-contributory state unemployment insurance;" and "to work in the spirit of working class consciousness and International Proletarian Solidarity with all sections of working class struggling against the imposition of Capitalistic Exploitation, in this and other countries, and constitute an integral part of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement in the final struggle for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of a Revolutionary Workers' Government."

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107 This and other data about the FIU is from the Constitution and By-laws of the FIU.

Membership in the FIU was open to all workers employed in the fishing industry, irrespective of age, race, color or sex, whether engaged in actual fishing, carrying or packing, in canning, curing or salting, in all fish fertilizer or reduction plants. Initiation fees were 50 cents and monthly dues 25 cents with no waiver for unemployed members. Members more than three months in arrears were not in good standing and were to be struck off the books. Of the monthly dues, 50 percent was sent to the District Council which in turn sent 5 cents a member a month to the National Executive Council of the WUL.[108]

In 1933, the FIU changed its name to the Fishermen and Cannery Workers' Industrial Union (FCWIU). At that time, it had eight locals from Vancouver to Prince Rupert. Included in the union were the Japanese Workers' Protection Association, the Chinese Workers' Protection Association, and Indians from North Vancouver. Membership totalled around 1,500. The "united front" tactic was developed with stress on unity between Indian, Japanese, White and Chinese workers.[109]

During the period 1931-1935 the FIU, and later the FCWIU, displaced the BCFPA as the leading organization of B.C. fishermen. The FIU was active in strikes at Skeena, Nass and Rivers Inlet during

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108 During this same period a counterpart of the FIU was established in the U.S.A.--the Fishermen and Cannery Workers' Industrial Union, Affiliated with the Trade Union Unity League.

109 Report of the 2nd Annual Convention of the FCWIU, December 10 and 11, 1933.

1932. In Rivers Inlet the FIU captured control of the strike from the BCFPA.

The United Fishermen of B.C. In the meantime a new organization, the United Fishermen of B.C.[110] was organized by anti-Communist elements among the fishermen. Left-wing spokesmen alleged that prominent canning and fishing establishments helped organize it as an opposition to the FCWIU. In June 1933, the Rivers Inlet fishermen were warned that "if an organizer from the UF. of B.C. visits your locals you will know that he has been sent by the B.C. Packers, New England and Bell-Irving for the purpose of disrupting and breaking up the FCWIU."[111]

The UF of B.C. received a charter from the TLC in 1932 and became known as the United Fishermens' Federal Union (UFFU), Local 44, with headquarters in Vancouver. Its jurisdiction was restricted to herring and pilchard seining so as to avoid dualism with the BCFPA.

Strike Struggles 1932 - 1934. Salmon fishermen in the Northern B.C. Salmon Fishermen's Association, the FIU, and the UF of B.C. were involved in 1932 in a major dispute on the Nass, Skeena and Rivers and Smith's Inlets. The BCFPA was also involved but only in Rivers Inlet. On June 20, the canners began negotiating with the UF of B.C., which was the only organization they recognized. The fishermen demanded 40 cents a sockeye, while the canners offered 27-1/2 cents.

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110 Labour Gazette, July 1932, p. 766; August 1932, p. 855.

111 Field notes and interviews.

In the Nass and Skeena areas, some 1,800 fishermen were involved. On July 6, the Indians were reported to be fishing under police protection in the Nass area for 27-1/2 cents. There were some reports of net cutting and acts of intimidation by the white and Japanese fishermen.

By July 8, the Japanese on the Nass had followed the Indians back to fishing. On July 10 the fishermen of the Skeena area, decided that, in view of the resumption of fishing at the Nass and Rivers Inlet areas, the remaining strikers, under the NBCSFA, would resume fishing.[112]

In Rivers Inlet and Smith's Inlet 1,400 fishermen, led by the FIU and the BCFPA, were on strike from July 10 until July 17.[113] Several Japanese and white fishermen were arrested for allegedly intimidating strikebreakers and cutting net.[114]

The strike of 1932 officially ended on July 20 with the ending of negotiations between the UF of B.C. and the canners. The final settlement was 30 cents per sockeye, plus a 20 percent reduction in the price of nets. The fishermen who resumed fishing on July 11 for the 27-1/2 cents originally offered by the canners were granted greater

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112 Prince Rupert Daily News, July 4, 1932, p. 1; July 5, 1932, p. 2; July 6, 1932, p. 1; July 8, 1932, p. 1; July 11, 1932, p. 1; July 12, 1932, p. 1. Labour Gazette, July 1932, p. 766.

113 Labour Gazette, August 1932, p. 858.

114 Vancouver Province, July 1, 1932, p. 2; July 9, 1932, p. 1; July 15, 1932, p. 2.

concessions as to fishing gear, gasoline, and so forth.[115]

The final settlement created general dissatisfaction and led to increased strength for the militant FIU. The dissatisfaction was of such proportion that, in the Rivers Inlet area, the BCFPA was ousted by FIU. Thereafter the BCFPA did not exert any influence over fishermen north of the Fraser River.

Also during 1932, the independent Barkley Sound Fishermen's Union was organized on the west coast of Vancouver Island. No charter was applied for and it was later absorbed by the Pacific Coast Purse Seiners Union.

By the spring of 1933, the FIU was in a sufficiently strong position to call out 50 salmon trollers on the west coast of Vancouver Island. Three firms were affected as well as the whole membership of the Kyuquot Trollers' Co-operative Association. The strike was in sympathy with striking American fishermen of Oregon and Washington, led by the Fishermen and Cannery Workers' Industrial Union of the Trade Union Unity League, the American counterpart of the FIU-WUL. Fish caught in this section of B.C. were marketed in the U.S.A. in competition with the American catch. The strike began on May 16 and ended June 16, with no gain obtained.[116] Prices for mild cure spring salmon dropped to from 5 to 6 cents a pound but increased to 10 cents

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115 Labour Gazette, August 1932, p. 855.

116 Ibid., June 1933, p. 590. Field notes and interviews.

a pound at the end of the season.[117]

On May 15, 1934, the FCIWU, as the FIU was now known, led a strike of 50 gillnetters on the west coast of Vancouver Island against an offer of 7 cents a pound for sockeye. The second offer of 7 cents a pound, with a minimum of 35 cents a fish was made to meet the fishermen's contention that the fish did not average five pounds. This offer was refused by the FCWIU but on May 22 fishing was resumed at this rate.[118]

In this same year a clash between white and Japanese troll salmon fishermen was reported in the Bull Harbour area on the northern end of Vancouver Island. This was the first attempt by Japanese trollers to enter this territory. On June 29, an organized group of white fishermen drove them away. As a result of this clash two white fishermen were arrested for "flourishing guns."[119]

Fishermen's Joint Committee. The organizational strategy of the Communist Party was meanwhile undergoing a change. The Third International began to abandon its separatist revolutionary policy by the mid-1930's. It adopted a new program which sought to merge its subsidiary organizations with liberal, reformist or radical movements, and if possible, control these latter, in a "united front". In the U.S.A. and Canada, respectively, the Trade Union Unity League and the Workers' Unity League were dissolved in 1935. Their affiliated unions

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117 KTCA records.

118 Labour Gazette, June 1934, p. 503.

119 Vancouver Province, June 30, 1934, p. 1.

either dissolved or sought affiliation with the AFL or the Canadian TLC.

Therefore in 1935, the FCWIU-WUL abandoned its policy of open opposition to other fishermen's unions and took the initiative in seeking a co-ordinated policy in all branches of the fishing industry. A Fishermen's Joint Committee was established, representing five organizations of fishermen--the FCWIU, the BCFPA, the UFFU, the Native Brotherhood of B.C. and the Amalgamated Association of Fishermen (Japanese).[120]

The first strike conducted by the Fishermen's Joint Committee was among Gulf of Georgia blueback trollers. Though the Committee presumably led the strike, there still appeared to be some lack of co-operation among the three Unions involved, the FCWIU, BCFPA and the Japanese Fishermen's Association. Also involved were cannery workers who, partly through sympathy with the fishermen and partly to secure wage increases, refused to work.[121]

The strike began when a reported 500 trollers tied up on May 15 asking 15 cents a fish. The canners were not anxious to buy, owing to the small size of the fish. On May 29, the BCFPA and the JFA were expected to reach a mutual settlement. By June 15 a reported 70 percent of the fishermen had returned for a price of 5 cents a pound round and 6 cents a pound dressed. On June 29 the FCWIU reported a settlement of

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120 The American counterpart was the Federated Fishermen's Council of the Pacific Coast.

121 Labour Gazette, June 1935, p. 515; Vancouver Province, May 29, 1935, p. 20.

5-1/2 cents a pound round, and 6-1/2 cents a pound dressed. In addition some wage increases were granted by one cannery.[122]

On the west coast of Vancouver Island, pilchard seiners under the UFFU delayed the July 1 opening for a ten-day period, demanding an increase in the price of pilchards. A settlement with an increase of 35 cents a ton was made through conciliation services of the Provincial Department of Labour.[123] Another strike of two days duration started on September 9 of that same year in Bute Inlet in dispute over chum salmon prices. Some increases were reported but no further particulars were given.[124]

By the end of 1935, the FCWIU had disbanded and its four affiliates at Vancouver, Prince Rupert, Sointula and Port Alberni were dissolved.[125] The members then organized into local unions based on occupation--namely, salmon purse seining, gillnetting and trolling. These separate organizations were to continue to function through the Fishermen's Joint Committee.

The latter body and its affiliated unions were involved during 1936 in one of the longest and costliest strikes ever to occur in

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122 Labour Gazette, June 1935, p. 515; July 1935, p. 609. Vancouver Province, May 17, 1935, p. 22; May 18, 1935, p. 1; May 21, 1935, p. 23; May 29, 1935, p. 20; June 8, 1935, p. 34; June 15, 1935, p. 1; June 21, 1935, p. 20; June 29, 1935, p. 28.

123 Labour Gazette, August 1935, p. 724. Vancouver Province, July 5, 1935, p. 20.

124 Labour Gazette, October 1935, p. 967.

125 Labour Organization in Canada, Report of the Dominion Department of Labour, Ottawa, 1935, p. 203.

northern fishing waters. Some 1,400 fishermen in Rivers Inlet, including both gillnetters and seiners, struck July 5 for an increase in the minimum price of 40 cents to 50 cents a sockeye. Eight canneries were affected. A price agreement had not yet been reached when the canners set a scale of 50 cents. At Alert Bay fishermen tied up from July 5 until July 10. At Smith's Inlet, despite a majority vote of 120 in favour of continuing fishing for the 40 cent price, 300 fishermen were tied up by July 13. In addition there were seven or eight boats on strike at Butedale. A strike committee made an unsuccessful trip to the Skeena area to influence the Skeena and Nass fishermen, who were receiving 45 cents a sockeye. Thus approximately 2,500 fishermen were involved. By July 19, the eight salmon canneries in the area had closed, affecting 1,000 shoreworkers and other employees.

At the meetings held July 14 and 15, the fishermen lowered their demand to 45 cents. The canners offered to submit the dispute to the Provincial Department of Labour. While the dispute was being arbitrated under the Fisheries Act, the fishermen would resume fishing with the understanding that the price would be 40 cents, regardless of the finding of the arbitration board and the canners would bind themselves to any findings made by the board. However, the fishermen refused to arbitrate and demanded the original 50 cents as the minimum price.

By July 14, 15 seine boats from one cannery had resumed fishing. In addition, all Indian seine boats in the Butedale area were fishing. With the opening of the southern fishing areas, many of the striking fishermen left the Rivers Inlet area, leaving only a

few to "guard" the strikebound area. On July 22 and 23, 76 boats from Namu and Fitzhugh Sound and 30 from Rivers Inlet resumed fishing under police protection for the original canners' offer of 40 cents. The whole fishing season in the Rivers Inlet district was lost, and only a few fishermen received the advantage of a week's fishing.[126]

Native Indian Unions. An important aftermath of this strike was a revival of "race-conscious" organization among the native Indian fishermen. Feeling that they had been misled or "sold out" by the white fishermen, a group of native Indian fishermen at Alert Bay late in 1936 formed the Pacific Coast Native Fishermen's Association. Primary aim of the new organization was to protect the interests of all Indians engaged in fishing. The PCNFA later merged with and has provided the main strength in the economic aims of the Native Brotherhood.[127]

The other major dispute of 1936 occurred in the Fraser River. On May 26, 1936, some 70 gillnet fishermen in the newly organized Upper Fraser Fishermen's Union, staged a strike for red spring salmon prices equal to those on the Lower Fraser. They were getting 6 cents

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126 Labour Gazette, August 1936, pp. 692, 694. Vancouver Province, July 6, 1936, pp. 18, 20; July 10, 1936, p. 25; July 13, 1936, p. 16; July 14, 1936, p. 18; July 15, 1936, p. 1; July 16, 1936, p. 20; July 22, 1936, p. 1; July 24, 1936, p. 25. Prince Rupert Daily News, July 6, 1936, p. 1; July 14, 1936, p. 1; July 20, 1936, pp. 1,2; July 21, 1936, p. 1.

127 See Appendix A, particularly for more details of the origins of the Pacific Coast Native Fishermen's Association.

a pound against 7 cents a pound in the lower Fraser with the differential due to the packing charges. On June 1, some 270 fishermen on the lower Fraser, members of the BCFPA, quit fishing in sympathy. Red spring were sold on the fresh market and adequate supplies were being obtained from other sources. Therefore, the Fraser River dispute was lost ending without any price changes.[128]

Salmon Purse Seiners' Union and Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union. Organizational activity reached a new peak in 1937 and various jurisdictional problems arose. The independent organizations of salmon purse seiners, gillnetters and trollers which were formed following the dissolution of the FCWIU now proceeded to join affiliates of the American Federation of Labor, following the footsteps of their counterparts in the U.S.A. The Salmon Purse Seiners' Union and the Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union (comprising gillnetters and trollers) were organized and chartered by the International Seamen's Union, AFL. A number of unattached trollers were organized separately into the B.C. Trollers' Association which dissolved in 1938 and joined the PCFU. Prior to 1937, the Yugoslavs had organized their own purse seiners' union and this formed the core of the SPSU.

The new organizations were soon involved in disputes. They led 450 purse seiners and gillnetters in the Johnstone Straits area, who struck September 17, 1938 because canners cut the price of chum salmon from 12 to 8 cents. The dispute ended October 3 with the canners

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128 Labour Gazette, June 1936, pp. 483, 579. Vancouver Province, June 1, 1936, pp. 1, 8. This report states there were 800 boats in the upper Fraser and 500 fishermen in the lower area.

signing with the PCFU and the SPSU for 10 cents a fish. The settlement affected 1,300 fishermen though only 450 had actually stopped fishing. Of these, about one-third had gone back by the end of September.[129]

Herring gillnetters, belonging to the PCFU, and fishing for the Vancouver market struck from November 4 to 23, 1938. The 45 gillnetters won union recognition and a minimum price agreement. The agreement provided a guaranteed minimum price of 2 cents a pound for gillnet caught herring used for kippering. Each wholesale fish dealer agreed to take a specified amount of fish daily for five days a week unless a 24-hour notice was given the fishermen. Any amount over the specified amount used for freezing, was to be 1-1/2 cents a pound. Minimum prices did not cover herring for local fresh market. Preference was to be given to gillnet-caught herring over seined herring.[130]

The United Fishermen's Federal Union, which had been granted jurisdiction over herring and pilchard seining by the TLC, led a strike for increased prices of some 50 herring seiners at Prince Rupert. This dispute, which involved only one establishment, lasted from January 10 to 22, 1938. Final settlement gave strikers $1.10 a ton, against their demand of $1.20.[131]

The SPSU and the PCFU, as newly chartered affiliates of the American Federation of Labor, came into conflict with the Canadian TLC over the issue of "dual unionism". In this conflict, the TLC in 1937

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129 Labour Gazette, October, 1938, p. 1086; November, 1938, p. 1218.

130 Ibid., January, 1939, p. 33.

131 Ibid., February, 1938, p. 138.

extended the jurisdiction of the UFFU Local 44, whose members were mainly pilchard and herring seiners, to cover all branches of the fishing industry. The BCFPA and the Upper Fraser Fishermen's Association were merged into a new organization under the UFFU and chartered by the TLC as the B.C. Fishermen's Union, Local 14, though it continued to be known under the older name as the BCFPA. This new union was given jurisdiction over gillnetting and trolling.[132] The cannery operators refused to recognize the SPSU and the PCFU and continued to bargain exclusively with the Locals 14 and 44 of the TLC.

Hostility of whites and Japanese continued to divide the ranks of organized fishermen. The Amalgamated Association of Fishermen of British Columbia, comprised entirely of Japanese, was finally accorded official recognition as a bonafide trade union when it received a charter from the TLC in 1935.[133] This did not, however, appreciably reduce the opposition from other AFL and TLC affiliates. The BCFPA continued to press for a revival of the policy followed by the Dominion Department of Fisheries during 1922-29, of arbitrarily reducing each year the number of fishing licences granted to the Japanese.[134]

An intricate series of organizational manoeuvres was undertaken

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132 The Fisherman, May 3, 1937; September 9, 1937.

133 Canada, Department of Labour, Annual Report on Labour Organization in Canada for 1936, Ottawa, 1937, p. 203.

134 Vancouver Sun, February 28, 1938, p. 2.

during the latter 1930's and the early 1940's under the leadership of the left-wing unionists, to settle the numerous jurisdictional conflicts among fishermen's unions and bring them together into one industry-wide federation under the TLC. The UFFU, because of its broadened jurisdiction, was made the focal point of organization. The first step was taken late in 1938 when the SPSU severed its relationship with the International Seamen's Union, AFL, and received a direct charter from the TLC as Local 141.[135] Members of this organization then joined the UFFU in sufficient numbers to achieve a voting majority in the latter. Dual membership was allowed in this case because most salmon purse seiners seined for herring and pilchards in other seasons of the year. Finally, in early 1940, by a substantial voting majority in each union, a merger of the SPSU with the UFFU was accomplished.[136]

The Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union meanwhile had been expanding rapidly, till by the end of 1939 it had local councils in 26 main fishing communities along the coast.[137] It had virtually eliminated the BCFPA, the membership of which by that time had declined to 300, practically all of whom were in the Fraser River district. Efforts of the PCFU to affiliate with the TLC were unsuccessful because the BCFPA still claimed jurisdiction over gillnetters and trollers. Efforts to bring about a merger of the two organizations were defeated by adverse

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135 Labour Organization in Canada, 1938, p. 232.

136 The Fisherman, April 23, 1940, p. 1

137 Labour Organization in Canada, 1937, p. 237; 1938, p. 232; 1939, p. 227.

membership votes in the BCFPA.[138] Finally in December, 1941, the executive of the PCFU proposed to disband the organization and join the UFFU.[139] This proposal was subsequently adopted by a majority in the PCFU which, by that time had lost a large part of its membership of gillnetters and trollers to the rapidly growing fishermen's co-operatives.

In 1940, UFFU Local 44, which now included the SPSU, delayed opening of the pink salmon season from July 1 until July 10, pending completion of negotiations. Involved were 1,500 salmon seine fishermen on the whole coast and some Fraser River gillnet fishermen. Canners proposed the price reductions because of wartime uncertainty of markets in Great Britain plus a large carryover of fish from 1939. Cannery owners offered 5 cents and 5-1/2 cents a pink salmon while the union demanded 6 cents and 6-1/2 cents. Final compromise was 5-1/2 cents and 6 cents.

Relations between operators and organized fishermen remained relatively stable and harmonious during the remainder of World War II and no important disputes occurred. To a greater extent, even than in World War I, the increased demand for food, coupled with labour shortages as large numbers of fishermen and allied workers were drawn into the Armed Forces and other industries, brought increased earnings to those remaining in the industry. Above all, the mass evacuation of Japanese from the coast of British Columbia in 1942, and their complete removal from the industry, increased greatly the per capita income and bargaining power of the whites and Indians.

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138 The Fisherman, May 9, 1939

139 The Fisherman, December 23, 1941.

Organizers of the UFFU focused their energies on broadening the base of trade unionism in the fishing industry and further consolidating union ranks. They were aided by favourable wartime legislation. Unionization of shoreworkers was established on a stable basis for the first time with the formation of The Fish Cannery and Reduction Plant Workers' Union (FCRPWU), which in 1941 received a direct charter from the TLC as Local 86. This became an industry-wide shoreworkers union.

Finally, virtually industry-wide organization was achieved with the establishment of the United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union. This new organization, chartered by the TLC in March, 1945, resulted from the merger of the UFFU, the BCFPA and the FCRPWU, and left the DSFU the only remaining bonafide union of fishermen in British Columbia. The Native Brotherhood of B.C., while not a union in the full sense of the term, continues to function as the main organization of Indian fishermen, and co-operates with the UFAWU in negotiating with operators. By agreement, the UFAWU does not compete with the Native Brotherhood for membership among native Indian fishermen. A number of the latter, however, belong to both organizations.

Labour Relations in the Halibut Industry. Halibut prices from at least 1896 till about 1903 were 25 cents each, regardless of size. Till 1912 the price was one cent a pound. Halibut fishermen's unions developed from the disputes over these prices.[140] American halibut fishermen, operating out of Seattle, Washington, organized in 1909 the Pacific Halibut Fishermen's Union. It received a charter

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140 Field notes.

as an affiliate of the International Seamen's Union of America, AFL. On November 1, 1912 it changed its name to the Deep Sea Fishermen's Union of the Pacific, setting up headquarters at Seattle, Washington, but still retaining its affiliation with the ISU.

During this same period, the halibut fishermen in Vancouver were also attempting to organize. In 1909 a Vancouver branch of the Pacific Halibut Fishermen's Union was established.[141] It did not, however, get a separate charter as it was a branch of the Seattle local. Shortly after its organization, the Vancouver branch staged an unsuccessful strike in an attempt to enforce a closed shop in a certain fishing company. The dispute involved 71 out of 72 fishermen.[142]

In 1912-13, the Halibut Fishermen's Union became involved in an industry-wide dispute over prices and union recognition. The strike involving 150 fishermen began on November 18, 1912 with a demand for an increase of 1/2 cent per pound. By April, 1913, a price increase of 1/4 cent a pound was gained but the strike continued for union recognition. By the end of March this point was won and the strike ended.[143] The price of 1-1/4 cents a pound may have been the share of each fisherman as reports stated each man received $1.25 for each 1,000 pounds.[144]

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141 The union became the DSFU but was more commonly known by the earlier name.

142 Labour Gazette, July 1909, p. 125.

143 Ibid., February 1913, p. 894; April 1913, p. 1138; May 1913, p.1299 B.C. Federationist, February 14, 1913, p. 1; February 21, 1913, p. 1; February 28, 1913, p. 1; March 7, 1913, p. 1.

144 Statement of original captain of first powered halibut boat from Prince Rupert.

With the advent of owner-operated power halibut vessels, changes were made in the method of payment. In one case, it was reported that a Prince Rupert company was buying halibut at market prices and selling ice at $3.00 a ton and frozen bait at $25.00 a ton.[145] In 1918, a halibut exchange was established in Seattle.

In other cases a fixed price was the rule. In an agreement in effect from January 1, 1919 to December 31, 1919 between the Deep Sea Fishermen's Union of the Pacific, the Fishing Vessel Owners' Association and the Halibut Steamers Company, were 3 cents a pound for halibut, 2 cents a pound for black cod, and 1-1/4 cents a pound for other varieties.[146]

In 1921, the DSFU of the Pacific and "certain companies in Prince Rupert and South Vancouver" signed an agreement effective from May 15, 1921 till December 31, 1921 and thereafter unless cancelled by a 30-day notice. It provided that only DSFU members were to be employed if obtainable, but companies were not to be compelled to engage men who for good reason were objectionable. Prices a pound of marketable fish caught by lines and delivered during 1921 were set at 2-3/4 cents for halibut, 1-3/4 cents for black cod, and 1 cent for other varieties. A bonus could be paid without violating the agreement. Fishermen were not to cause delay to the vessels. They were required to load ice and bait but not fuel or stores. If

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145 Report of Commissioner of Fisheries, December 31, 1915.

146 Labour Gazette, September 1919, p. 720.

they were careful, they could not be charged for gear lost. For fish lost after having been iced and stored in the vessels, fishermen were to receive one-half the rate. Weighing rules provided that fishermen were to be represented at the scales by one of their members. Not less than 400 pound drafts were to be weighed. On weighing, 14 percent was to be deducted for fish weighed with heads on. When heads were off, 2-1/2 percent was to be deducted. When long lines were used, the mates were not to share with the fishermen. Fishermen were to receive checks when vessels stayed in port for at least 24 hours. If the companies needed fish for shipment, fishermen were to unload them, irrespective of the hour. Fishermen had to rig all gear without charge. When deckhands were not obtainable, fishermen had to do the necessary deckhands' work but received deckhands' pay.[147]

The economic depression of the 1930's proved to be especially difficult for the halibut fishermen. In 1931, average prices in Prince Rupert were 6 cents a pound for No. 1 Grade and 3 cents for No. 2.[148] In 1932 the year quotas were first applied, Seattle prices dropped to 4 cents and 2 cents a pound with imported Japanese frozen halibut undersellling the Americans by 2 cents.[149] Halibut boats delivering in Prince Rupert were barely able to meet expenses of their trips. Prince Rupert fishermen attempted co-operative selling but failed when the Seattle company with whom a contract had been made suspended pur-

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147 Labour Gazette, August 1921, p. 1043.

148 Vancouver Province, June 8, 1931, p. 2.

149 Pacific Fisherman, August 1952, p. 53.

chases. Finally organized attempts were made to reduce the catch of halibut in order to raise the prices.

The first attempt at cutting the catch in 1931 resulted from a conference of Prince Rupert fishermen, boat owners, fish buyers and the city council. At this meeting, fishermen decided to remain in port for a period of 10 days between fishing trips. Alaska halibut fishermen agreed but Seattle fishermen refused. A resolution asked the federal government for a subsidy of 2 cents a pound. By June 16, Canadian boats were observing the lay-up period.[150]

The Seattle fleet continued to refuse to a 10-day tie-up. Canadian boat owners then requested the Canadian Government to take "measures which would temporarily bar the port to American fishermen," if the latter refused to remain in port for a four-day period between fishing trips.[151] In one incident an American boat had her lines cut and was ordered to leave port by Canadian fishermen.[152]

The DSFU of Prince Rupert was, however, still a branch of the DSFU of Seattle. The Rupert branch had found it increasingly difficult to work effectively owing to its distance from the Seattle headquarters. Seattle fishermen's refusal to co-operate with the Canadian fishermen in the voluntary tie-up resulted in the Prince Rupert fishermen breaking away to become the independent Deep Sea Fishermen's Federal

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150 Vancouver Province, June 3, 1931, p. 1; June 13, 1931, p. 1; June 16, 1931, p. 1.

151 Ibid., June 16, 1931, p. 20.

152 Ibid., June 18, 1931, p. 1.

Union of British Columbia with headquarters in Prince Rupert. This union received a charter from the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada as Local 80.

In 1935, a tie-up period between halibut trips of varying length came into effect through mutual agreement of the fishermen, vessel owners, fish buyers and the Halibut Commission. The tie-up period for Area 2 was seven days for boats with a crew of three men or less, eight days for four and five-men boats, and nine days if over five men. All Area 3 boats remained for ten days. In addition, quotas were applied to each halibut boat. In Area 2, each boat was allowed 3,100 pounds a man each trip. For Area 3, the quota was 4,000 pounds.[153] The proceeds of any amount over the quotas were given to the Halibut Commission.[154]

The start of fishing for the 1935 season was delayed for two reasons. The fishermen through mutual agreement, remained in port despite the March 1 opening in the hopes that the 1934 catch would be sold and thus improve the market for 1935. The second reason was a minor dispute between the vessel owners and fishermen over the division of sales of halibut livers, which involved 600 halibut fishermen and lasted from April 27 till May 3.[155] Until this period, the fishermen

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153 Pacific Fishermen, 1936 Yearbook.

154 The quota system was suspended during World War II.

155 Labour Gazette, March 1935, p. 228. Voluntary delay in season's opening, May 1935, p. 401.

had divided the proceeds equally. However, when the price increased from 6 cents to 40 cents a pound, the boat owners felt that they were entitled to the same share as for halibut, that is, 20 percent of the gross value. The fishermen conceded and ended the dispute.

As the Prince Rupert Co-op became the marketing and processing agent, the problem of prices was partially solved. Since then, the halibut fishery has been relatively free of labour problems.

CHAPTER VII

FISHERMEN'S CO-OPERATIVES

In certain branches of B.C. Fisheries, fishermen have organized not only in unions, but in co-operatives and marketing associations which distribute fish in fresh, frozen or packaged form. These types of fish products experience wide fluctuations in price as contrasted to the relatively stable prices of canned salmon. It is, therefore, much more difficult to negotiate seasonal minimum prices as is done in the canned salmon. Another problem in setting prices is that the co-operative marketing associations require a minimum initial capital investment.

In some cases these co-operative associations are supplementary to, and in other cases substitutes for, trade unions. This chapter will present brief histories of fishermen's co-operative associations on this coast.

Halibut fishermen and salmon trollers, as we have seen, have not been successful in organizing unions. Most men in these two fisheries are classed as "independent fishermen", in that the majority have no connection, financial or otherwise, with the companies. They are free to sell their fish wherever they receive the highest price.[1]

The co-operative associations developed out of the early salmon trollers unions. As the co-operatives built processing plants, the

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1 The DSFU is more of a welfare organization than a bargaining unit.

scope of operations was increased to include halibut, bottom fish, herring, seine and gillnet salmon. Today all members of co-operatives are obligated to fish for their association, except in the halibut fisheries. Many members deliver only when the prices on the halibut exchange are not satisfactory to them. The co-operatives have not only been an economic advantage to their members but they have also provided a personal sense of belonging to an organization of their own.

Development of the Co-operatives.

The Kyuquot Trollers' Co-operative Association (KTCA). Prior to the 1930's, the West Coast Trollers' Association on the west coast of Vancouver Island was the representative of salmon trollers in the area. Several private buyers also operated and salmon price fluctuations were considered by the fishermen to be a normal thing. However, a price cut during the 1929 season was considered unjustified by fishermen. The result was a strike of two months duration in which the WCTA did the negotiating with the companies. During this tie-up, fishermen sought alternate ways of disposing of their fish rather than selling directly to private buyers. The fishermen's producers co-operatives, already successful in Nova Scotia, were adopted as the answer.

Therefore, during 1929 and 1930, the WCTA operated as a co-operative with the primary function of marketing troll-caught salmon. The marketing method during this period was to sell each load of salmon to "any private company offering the highest prices for the load."[2] Actually, the WCTA had no legal rights

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2 Field notes and interviews.

in the buying or marketing of fish. To meet this situation, the name of the organization was officially changed on March 30, 1931 to the Kyuquot Trollers' Co-operative Association with headquarters at Kyuquot, B.C.[3]

Despite adverse economic conditions in the 1930's the KTCA afforded satisfactory returns to its members. For the 1932 salmon season they reported "better prices than any other body of fishermen in B.C."[4] This was despite a price decrease from 12 cents to 5 cents a pound during May. For the 1934 season, the Association reported the "highest prices on the Pacific Coast."[5] During the same year, they received "eighty percent of the white fishermen's troll fish" and "occupied the dominant position in controlling prices."[6] During the 1930's they acquired a fleet of three salmon packers. Membership grew, as shown in Table XX , from 165 in 1931 to 765 in 1948.

B.C. Ling Cod Fishermen's Association. In ling cod fisheries, wells on boats or shore tanks are used to keep the fish alive and they are dressed only upon arrival of the fish packer. This assures delivery of the product to the fresh fish market within 18 to 48 hours of processing.

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3 Minutes of Meetings of KTCA.

4 Minutes of Annual Meeting of KTCA.

5 Minutes of Meetings of KTCA.

6 Minutes of Meetings of KTCA.

TABLE XX

KYUQUOT TROLLERS' CO-OPERATIVE ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP, 1931-48[7]

Year		Membership	Year		Membership
1931	-	165	1938	-	288
1932	-	158 or 178	1939	-	240 or 291
1933	-	186, 201 or 229	1940	-	315 or 320
1935	-	208 or 284	1941	-	351
1936	-	240	1948	-	765
1937	-	292			

Japanese fishermen dominated this fisheries when they were licenced for, and restricted to, one type of fishing. In an effort to increase ling cod prices the fishermen organized the East Coast (of Vancouver Island) Ling Cod Fishermen's Association. In the early phase of the organization, prices were maintained at artificial levels by restricting the members to 200 pounds of cod a week.

In 1935, the name of the organization was changed to the Consolidated Cod Fishermen's Association. It covered an increased fishing area as compared to the first association, whose operations were mainly in the Cape Mudge area. The membership at that point was 102 Japanese and 83 white fishermen. In 1938 the Association became a co-operative under the name of the B.C. Cod Fishermen's Co-operative Association. Headquarters were in Vancouver and this co-operative's

7 Compiled from Minutes of Annual Meetings of KTCA.

function was marketing of fresh living cod.

During World War II the Japanese members of the Co-operative were removed from the Pacific Coast. In August 1944, at an extraordinary meeting of the Co-operative, Japanese members were expelled. Following this, the membership continued to decrease and the Ling Cod Co-operative ceased to function. The remaining members either sold privately or through other co-operatives, mainly the United Fishermen's Co-operative Association in Vancouver. During the peak demands of World War II and the immediate post-war period, the bulk of ling cod deliveries came from beam trawlers.

The United Fishermen's Co-operative Association. In 1940, the United Fishermen's Federal Union organized a separate body to purchase and operate the buildings at 138 East Cordova Street in Vancouver, the present headquarters of the UFAWU. Thus the United Fishermen's Co-operative Society emerged as a subsidiary of the UFFU.

In 1941 the Society contracted with a private firm for processing and marketing fish liver products. Under the terms of the contract, the Society had an option to purchase the private firm. This was exercised and by April 1, 1944 the Co-operative was actively engaged in processing and marketing fish liver products. In the same year a cold storage plant was added to the liver plant. The Society then extended operations to include processing and marketing of fresh fish. In addition, it made an agreement with a Fraser River cannery for canning salmon delivered by the Co-operative members.

Membership, at one time or another, has included salmon trollers, beam trawlers, gillnetters, salmon purse seiners, halibut and ling cod fishermen. Fishing operations extended from the Fraser River to the Queen Charlotte Islands, though the main operations were concentrated along the lower coast.

For the liver operations the co-operative management reported that "in general the prices paid through the co-operative processing and sales of these materials (i.e. vitamin products) have brought our membership a much greater return than at any time obtained from private enterprise."[8] The liver processing section was discontinued with the post World War II slump in the demand for liver.

Prince Rupert Fishermen's Co-operative Association. The Northern British Columbia Salmon Fishermen's Union had organized selling pools in the late 1920's and early 1930's for the sale of troll-caught salmon. No details regarding the selling pools are known but presumably the method was bargaining with the various buyers by the Northern B.C. Salmon Fishermen's Union.[9] The relative success of these salmon-selling pools led to the formation of co-operatives.

In 1931, the halibut fishermen of Prince Rupert attempted co-operative marketing through arrangements with a Seattle buyer. This venture was pronounced a failure as early as April when the Seattle buyer found it impossible to buy or handle the extremely

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8 Annual Reports of the Association.

9 See above, p. 162.

heavy landings of halibut in Seattle.[10] Insufficient preparation and study made of co-operative marketing principles contributed to this failure. The general conclusion was that the "time was not ripe for a change in the present system of marketing."[11]

But this setback did not alter a feeling of many fishermen that the "Co-operative system would have to come as the ultimate salvation of the fishermen."[12] In 1932 the Prince Rupert Fishermen's Co-operative Association was organized expressly "to handle and sell fish collectively to any market if found practicable . . . ."[13] Since its formation the PRFCA has been the dominant buyer and processor of troll-caught salmon and of halibut in the northern fishing area. Other species of fish are also handled. Since 1939, under a contract with a private cannery, the Co-operative has been engaged in the canning of all species of salmon. The PRFCA has operated in the northern fishing waters, primarily in the vicinity of Prince Rupert. Membership includes salmon trollers, halibut fishermen, beam trawlers, gillnetters and salmon purse seiners. Physical assets in 1950 included a modern cold storage with fresh fish processing departments, fish liver plant, fish camps and four modern fish packers.

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10 The day of the heavy landings is famous as the "Black Monday" of the Seattle Halibut Exchange.

11 Prince Rupert Daily News, May 2, 1931, p. 2.

12 A fisherman quoted by the Prince Rupert Daily News, May 14, 1931, p. 1.

13 Field notes.

North Island Trollers' Co-operative Association. The North Island Trollers' Co-operative Association was the second outgrowth of the salmon-selling pool policies of the NBCSFU. It was incorporated on August 13, 1935 and patterned on the PRFCA, but confined primarily to the fishing area off the northern end of the Queen Charlotte Islands.

The PRFCA and the NITCA co-operated in their operations but the Prince Rupert Co-op lacked facilities to handle the fish produced by both organizations. As a result, the NITCA had to maintain the earlier salmon-selling policies and served merely as a buying agent for private fish companies with each load of salmon sold to the highest bidder.

Amalgamation of the PRFCA and NITCA. Amalgamation of the PRFCA and the NITCA, operating as they did in close proximity and with similar purposes, was inevitable. The immediate reason for amalgamation was a drop in coho prices in the Prince Rupert area to the level of those paid in the outlying Queen Charlottes. Previously, there had been a differential of 1 cent to 2 cents a pound. The PRFCA placed their coho salmon in a privately-operated cold storage in anticipation of higher prices. The same private company was buying salmon from the NITCA. The NITCA and the PRFCA were, in this situation, actually opposing each other and losing the benefits of co-operative marketing.

In 1935, the PRFCA went on record favouring co-operation with other co-operatives in fish marketing. At a special meeting in March

1937, the PRFCA considered and actually endorsed amalgamation with the NITCA. But it was October, 1938 before a committee was established to consider the feasibility of amalgamation. Finally, on February 10, 1939, the two organizations merged under the name of the PRFCA.

The B.C. Fishermen's Co-operative Association. The B.C. Fishermen's Co-operative Association with headquarters at Sointula was organized in 1929 under the auspices of the B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association.[14] Its primary interest was the canning of fish and its members hoped ultimately to be able to operate co-operative canneries at Sointula, Fraser River, Barkley Sound, Rivers Inlet and Johnstone Straits.[15]

During its early years, the BCFCA had the salmon delivered by the co-op membership canned under contract by a private firm. The 800 members had a three-year contract to deliver to this firm.[16] The arrangement proved successful and the organization made plans to build and operate their own canneries. The Co-op planned to build a cannery in Rivers Inlet but the Provincial Government refused to grant a licence on grounds there were already sufficient plants in the area. In 1932, the organization took an option to purchase plants at Port Alberni and Burrard Inlet. Payments were to be made from operating profits.

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14 Pacific Fisherman, March 1929, p. 32.

15 Ibid., March 1929, p. 32.

16 Ibid., May 1930, p. 19.

However, the co-operative had encountered difficulties in its first year of operation, difficulties which led finally to bankruptcy. Devaluation of the British pound resulted in a loss of $2.00 a case on 24,000 cases of salmon. Then a salmon broker went into bankruptcy causing a $6,000. loss to the members. Halibut marketing which the co-op entered in 1930, also lost money when the co-op shipped halibut to the eastern markets in such quantities that market prices dropped considerably. These marketing difficulties and the dissension within the organization that they caused, brought an end to the BCFCA. Since that time the co-op, as a producers co-operative, has existed in name only, confining itself to operating a retail store at Sointula.

Fishermen's Co-operative Federation. The Fishermen's Co-operative Federation was organized in November 1944 as a central sales and marketing agency for the KTCA, PRFCA, Sointula Co-op (BCFCA), UFCA and the Massett Co-op.[17] The Federation has been successful in establishing well developed sales organization in the domestic and foreign markets for co-operative produced fish and fish products.

Amalgamation of the Co-operatives. The KTCA, UFCA and the PRFCA were the major and successful producers' co-operatives. By the end of World War II, these organizations were actively engaged in the production, processing and distribution of fish and fish products. They were dominant in the fresh salmon, halibut and other fresh

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17 The last mentioned co-op has not been discussed since it is a shell fish operation.

market fisheries, and participated to a lesser extent in the canning industry. Their volume of production was such that they could supply all demands at lower unit costs than private firms.

In 1949 the co-operatives began to feel the economic effects of the drop in domestic and foreign consumer markets. The KTCA and the UFCA in particular were confronted with a production decline in the higher-priced species of fish, and although production of some lower-priced species increased, it was insufficient to offset the overall decline. Added to the economic problem were managerial and plant inefficiencies, particularly in the UFCA.

A series of amalgamations to increase operating efficiencies was started in 1950. It centralized operations in the same ways the private companies had done beginning in the 1890's. Members of the UFCA voted 97 percent in favour of amalgamating all co-operatives in order to "strengthen the co-operatives for the depression times ahead", at the same time asserting that it would be "another big step in the progressive movement of fishermen on the B.C. Coast."[18] In 1950 the KTCA and the UFCA merged to form the Fishermen's Co-operative Association with headquarters in Vancouver, but the PRFCA refused to join the merger. This merger merely delayed the end of these two co-operatives. By the end of 1952 the FCA had ceased to function and the processing plants of both the KTCA and the UFCA remained idle during the 1953 season.

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18 The Fisherman, March 7, 1950, p. 4.

Faced with this situation, the Board of Directors of the FCA voted to work closely with the PRFCA and depend on satisfactory financial arrangements being provided by that organization. This move was made in preference to liquidating the FCA, or accepting financial aid from outside sources.[19] The membership of the KTCA and the UFCA was to continue to operate under the management of the PRFCA.

Causes of Co-operative Failure.

Causes of the failure of the co-operative were summed up by the Board of Directors of the FCA. The facilities, they said, for serving the membership had developed beyond what was required for production by members. Cuts in markets and market prices led to lower gross margin on many species. A full understanding of the position of the organization had not been developed among the locals.[20]

Labour and the Co-operatives.

For reasons that are obvious, there is no labour unrest among the members of the co-operatives. The fishermen are owner-members and have a personal interest in the operations of their organizations and have the feeling that they "belong to the industry." In contrast to this, the interest in the economics of the industry by non-members who depend upon the companies, in the majority of the cases, ends with

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19 Pacific Fisherman, April 1953, p. 67.

20 Ibid., p. 67.

the companies. Co-operators argue that their organizations offer a greater degree of independence and self-reliance to the fishermen.

While the co-operatives have labour agreements with the UFAWU covering plant shares, workers and tendermen, there are no minimum fish price agreements. The co-operative acts as marketing agent and the members are assured of maximum prices consistent with market conditions. It is possible, therefore, for co-operative members to continue fishing even though the UFAWU and the Fisheries Association fail to negotiate minimum prices for a particular fishery.

As stated previously, the co-operatives provide a factual or indicative interpretation of the current market situation and operating costs which the UFAWU uses to its advantage in their negotiations with the companies.

By the end of World War II, they seemed well established and dominated the fresh and frozen fish trade. The growth of the co-operatives was accomplished with relatively low capital investment. However, the recession of 1949, albeit a mild one, resulted in the failure of both the Kyuquot Trollers' Co-operative Association and the Fishermen's Co-operative Association of Vancouver. These failures indicate that co-operatives had not completely solved the very real problems of marketing of fish products. It is conceivable that in the event of an economic recession the membership of the co-operatives could increase, assuming that the PRFCA, largest surviving co-operative,

is willing and able to expand its scope of operations. In any event, the co-operatives appear to be the best answer as yet to the basic problems of fish prices and resultant labour disputes.

CHAPTER VIII

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY SINCE WORLD WAR II

Since 1945, the United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union has been the dominant labour organization among the fishermen and processing workers in all branches of the fishing industry except in halibut. In halibut, the UFAWU shares jurisdiction with the Deep Sea Fishermen's Union, centred in Prince Rupert. One other organization, the Native Brotherhood, usually negotiates agreements jointly with the UFAWU.

Most collective bargaining agreements in the fishing industry are province-wide. Because of the wide diversity of conditions in which fishing is carried on, the unions negotiate separate agreements with employers in the various distinct branches of the industry.

The main employer groups are the Fisheries Association of B.C. and Fishing Vessel Owners Associations of Vancouver and Prince Rupert respectively. There was also, for a time, a separate Vessel Owners Association of the Native Brotherhood. On some issues, for example, fish prices, the Vessel Owners Association and the fishermen's unions are aligned against the main fishing companies, and on other issues, as in seine shares, the vessel owners and the companies are aligned against the unions.

Status and Degree of Organization (1948)[1]

United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union.

The UFAWU is the dominant union in the industry, enrolls the overwhelming number of unionized fishermen and shoreworkers, and takes the initiative in bargaining. But the degree of unionization among fishermen and shoreworkers still varies in the different branches of the industry.

Salmon Purse Seiners. The salmon purse seine fleet can be considered to be 100 percent organized. In 1948, the UFAWU established a system of union clearance before the vessels leave for the season's operation. This assures that men entering the fishery and the industry for the first time are enrolled in the union.

Salmon Gillnetters. It has been difficult to estimate the degree of organization in gillnetting due to the large and unknown number of casual fishermen. The licence figures are padded by "holiday fishermen" who take a commercial licence for a vacation period and by part-time fishermen who fish the occasional evening while engaged in regular work during the day. It has been estimated that between 500 and 1,000 new fishermen enter gillnetting each year with a similar number leaving. According to the experience of the UFAWU the degree of organization varies with the fishing experience of the fishermen.

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1 Based on Contracts and Organization in the Fishing Industry of B.C., brief submitted by the UFAWU to the Dominion Department of Labour (Ottawa, 1948). In 1956 compulsory check-off came into effect.

In 1948 the estimates were:

Over three years fishing experience	--	80 %
Two to three years fishing experience	--	50 %
One years fishing experience	--	10 %
Holiday and part-time fishermen	--	0 %

Salmon Trollers. , The license figures for trollers are also padded by holiday and weekend "sports" fishermen.[2] In 1948 about 400 to 500 trollers belonged to the UFAWU, a figure amounting to about 10 percent of the licences issued to white troll fishermen, with practically the entire membership being among the Gulf of Georgia blueback fishermen. However, there are a few members among the regular salmon trollers.

Halibut Fisheries. The entire halibut fleet is organized with Vancouver fishermen belonging to the UFAWU. The majority of the gillnetters and salmon seiners likewise belong to the UFAWU. Actually, the shifting of men during the year from halibut to gillnetting, salmon seining, herring seining, salmon and herring packing, results in the majority of halibut fishermen belonging to the UFAWU.

Herring Fisheries. The herring fishermen on purse seiners are 100 percent organized in the UFAWU. Practically all these fishermen are also salmon seiners, halibut fishermen and crew men on salmon packers. Herring gillnetters, a small group fishing for the local fresh fish market, are not organized.

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2 There is no closed season for trolling.

Cod and Soles Fisheries. These bottom fish are caught by two fleets. The regular halibut fleet, incidental to its main catch, takes most of the black cod and a proportion of the ling cod. This fleet is, as mentioned above, 100 percent organized in the UFAWU and DSFU. The Beam Trawl draggers take all the soles, grey cod, most of the red and rock cod, and a share of the ling cod. If they are engaged in year-round dragging, they are unorganized. Many boats and crew members, however, engage in other fisheries or pack fish, in which cases they are under the UFAWU.

Dogfish Livers. The majority in this fishery fish for the co-operatives and are unorganized. Livers are sold on test with prices varying according to vitamin content.

Tuna Fisheries. Tuna fishermen are either regular salmon trollers who belong to co-operatives and are not organized into unions, or halibut fishermen.

Packers. Labour turnover in the packer fleet makes estimates difficult. Many are employed only during the salmon season. It is estimated that 95 percent of the total employees on the larger packers belong to the UFAWU. In the smaller boat collectors, having a two-man crew, the second member is often a boy. 70 percent of these crews are UFAWU members.

Shoreworkers. The degree of organization of the shoreworkers is not known but is probably high among regular employees and negligible among casual or seasonal workers.

The Native Brotherhood.

The Native Brotherhood and the UFAWU bargain jointly with the Fisheries Association but the role of the Brotherhood is sudsidiary to that of the UFAWU.

The degree of organization among the native Indian fishermen is difficult to ascertain. The headquarters of the organization has no record of membership. Generally, the member ship is loose, often relying on the principle that once a member "joins" the Brotherhood, he remains a member for all time, regardless of whether or not annual dues are paid. According to the constitution and by-laws of the organization, membership is open to all native Indians of British Columbia. However, majority of the membership are from the coastal area where fishing is the main, and sometimes the only, source of income. Membership has varied during the history of the organization and the trend appears to be a steady decrease in membership. Fishermen either become unattached, or what is more probable, join the UFAWU. In many cases the native fishermen belong to both the UFAWU and the Brotherhood.

The majority of Indians in salmon gillnetting, salmon purse seining and salmon packing belong to the Brotherhood, while a lesser number belong to the UFAWU. Practically all those in the herring fisheries belong to the Brotherhood. Similarly all salmon trollers are Brotherhood members. A few belong to co-operatives.

Indian membership in the shoreworkers section cannot be tabulated with any certainty. In the Vancouver-Steveston and Prince Rupert

areas the trend is toward the UFAWU, while in the Namu or central area the membership is in the Brotherhood.

The Deep Sea Fishermen's Union (DSFU).

Membership figures of the DSFU are not known, but membership is probably confined to the older regular halibut fishermen of Prince Rupert. The DSFU is made up of white fishermen.

The Co-operatives.

The actual membership in the co-operatives is not known. The majority of regular salmon trollers and halibut fishermen are members. The latter group are not obligated to deliver all their catch to the co-operatives but are at liberty to sell on the halibut exchange. The co-operative membership also includes salmon gillnetters, salmon and herring seiners and beam trawlers. Limitations in the size of these groups would appear to be related to the size of the plant at Prince Rupert.

Agreements in the Industry.

There are eight different agreements negotiated in the fishing industry by the UFAWU and the Native Brotherhood. Some of these agreements are joint and some are separate. The DSFU negotiates a separate agreement with the Fishing Vessel Owners Association of Prince Rupert.

The agreements are as follows:[3]

Minimum Price Agreements for Salmon. The first agreement sets a minimum price for each species of salmon caught by gillnetters and purse seiners. This minimum of floor price in effect sets the price to be paid regardless of the method of fishing, with the exception of salmon traps. It covers all species of round salmon and dressed coho sold to the companies, and is negotiated with the Fisheries Association jointly by the UFAWU and the Native Brotherhood. However, the two unions sign separate but practically identical agreements on behalf of their organizations.

The second agreement concerns the minimum prices to be paid to the blueback trollers in the Gulf of Georgia. The prices are for dressed fish delivered to the companies and it is negotiated by the UFAWU and the Fisheries Association.

Minimum Prices. Here it might be well to amplify the term "minimum price". The minimum price agreed to by the UFAWU and the companies is not a fixed price for the particular species of salmon covered, but rather, a guaranteed floor price. During a fishing season, it frequently happens that prices above the stipulated minimum will be paid for one or more species of salmon depending on the fishing area, market conditions, and degree of competitive buying. Some companies may have lower initial operating costs while others have the added costs of fish camps and other facilities for the fishermen. The former then are in a position to pay a slightly higher price,

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3 The comments on the agreements are based on Contracts and Organization in the Fishing Industry of B.C., a brief submitted to the Dominion Department of Labour, Ottawa, 1948.

usually at the peak of the salmon season.

Such price increases will be first for gillnetters. Fishermen who are under a financial obligation to a fishing company for boats and/or fishing equipment may feel compelled to sell to that company, or may have signed an undertaking to do so, or traditional practice or personal inclination may induce them to sell to that company. However, many gillnetters are no longer under such obligations and many do sell to outside buyers if the price offered is high enough. The price above the stipulated minimum, if justified by market conditions, thus becomes the general salmon price for all gillnetters.

The new and higher price may also apply through union action to prices paid to purse seiners. Generally, however, salmon seiners feel the effect of competition at a later stage. Many seine boats are owned, chartered or financed by fishing companies and are under an obligation to sell to the owning companies at the agreed minimum price. Any payment above the guaranteed minimum is done voluntarily by the companies.

The UFAWU brief puts the position this way--"the minimum price contract in one sense covers all salmon fishermen in that it provides a floor price for all. Such minimum prices are not guaranteed to those categories not specifically covered but in a practical sense this difference has little meaning."[4]

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4 Union brief, 1948.

Share Basis and Working Conditions Agreement. This agreement covers all salmon seiners and establishes the divisions of the season's proceeds as between vessel, net and crew. In attition it establishes working conditions. The present established share basis on a salmon seiner is 2-1/2 out of 11 shares of the gross proceeds for the boat, 1-1/2 out of 11 of the gross for the net, and 7 out of 11 of the net proceeds for the crew, regardless of the number of crew men. It is negotiated jointly by the UFAWU and the Native Brotherhood with the Fisheries Association and Fishing Vessel Owners Association, but the two unions sign separate though identical agreements as in the minimum price agreements for salmon.

Weight Averaging Agreement. This agreement covering all seine boats, lays down the procedure governing payment for pinks and chums by weights. These two species delivered on the grounds to a packer are counted but not weighed.

Average weights are obtained by sample weighing at specified cannery weighing stations in each area. The sein boats are then paid for their fish on the basis of these average weights. Pinks and chums, on the other hand, sold by gillnetters, are paid according to recorded weights for individual fishermen. This agreement is negotiated jointly by the UFAWU and the Brotherhood and the Fisheries Association. Again the two unions sign separate but identical agreements.

Salmon Tendermen's Agreement. This agreement covers all salmon and halibut packers and salmon collectors other than those operating on a commission basis. The union contracts govern wages and working conditions such as days of rest, vacations and supplemental pay.

Collecting and packing of salmon are done by several types of boats. "Tenders" work on a wage basis. They include boats collecting undressed salmon from seiners on the fishing grounds and packing to canneries and boats collecting dressed coho and springs from fish camps and packing to cold storage and/or canneries. "Collectors" buy or collect salmon from the gillnetters for delivery to camps or canneries. They may be buying or collecting fish on a commission or poundage basis, or working for wages. In the halibut fisheries, the packers transport the fish from camps to processing plants.

The tendermen's agreement is negotiated jointly by the UFAWU and the Brotherhood with the Fisheries Association. Again the two unions sign separate but identical contracts. The UFAWU agreement also covers tendermen employed by the co-operatives.

Fish-Trap Workers Agreement. It covers wages and working conditions for employees of the salmon traps at Sooke, Vancouver Island. No minimum salmon price agreement is involved and tendermen employed at the traps are covered by tendermen's agreement.

Herring Fisheries Agreement. A union agreement, negotiated and signed by the UFAWU, covers both herring fishermen and packer crews. The price agreed is on a tonnage basis with the companies

supplying the packers, seiners, and fishing gear in addition to the set price.

All packer crews and tendermen are paid on a "lay" basis determined according to earnings of the fishermen--there are no wage rates. On this basis, the captain of a tender receives the same share as individual fishermen of that company. Packer and tender crews' shares are lower than fishermen's shares by amounts ranging from 3 cents a ton for the engineer to 7 cents a ton for the cook.

The agreements for herring fishing provide that all boats fishing for a company pool their production, each boat being paid on the average production of the company. This facilitates efficient production and prevents boats fishing for a single company from going only to the area where the highest catches are anticipated.

Halibut Fisheries Agreement. The UFAWU has a contract with the Vancouver Fishing Vessel Owners Association, governing the share basis of trip proceeds and other working conditions on independently-owned halibut boats. A similar agreement is signed with Vancouver fishing companies for company-owned boats. The DSFU of Prince Rupert has a similar agreement with the FVOA of that port. These parallel agreements cover all regular halibut boats.

The agreements provide for a 20 percent of the gross receipts as the boat and gear share. There are no price agreements in the halibut fisheries. Sales are made at daily auctions at Prince Rupert and Vancouver which also have the effect of setting prices at Namu, Butedale and Klemtu. A large portion of the halibut from the indepen-

dently owned boats is sold through the co-operative. The agreements do specify that halibut caught by Company-owned boats must be sold on the exchange.

Smaller boats, usually salmon trollers and gillnetters with two men each, are not covered by any agreements. As a rule, they follow the set pattern of 20 percent of the gross proceeds as the boat and gear shares. Native Indian halibut fishermen are Native Brotherhood and/or UFAWU members. No Indians belong to the DSFU.

Shoreworkers Agreement. There are five union agreements in the shoreworker section covering wages, working hours, working conditions, holiday pay, welfare benefits, etc. These separate agreements cover cannery workers, fresh fish and cold storage workers, reduction plant workers, net workers, and steam plant and refrigeration engineers.

They are all negotiated by the UFAWU and the Fisheries Association. For the cannery and fresh fish workers, the Native Brotherhood signs a separate but similar agreement covering native Indian workers.

Fisheries Without Contracts. Some fisheries have no contracts with the companies, either because the unions have failed to organize a particular type of fisheries, like beam trawling, or because it is a small operation like herring gillnetting and is considered relatively minor, or because it is incidental to a larger fishery, as are ling and black cod.

Tuna fisheries have no single pattern of share division. Where two-man salmon trollers fish tuna, shares are usually divided by verbal understanding, with wide variations in percentage. According to the UFAWU, tuna fishermen follow the standard troller share agreement for a two-man boat. One-third goes to the boat and one-third to each man, after all expenses, except food, have been deducted from gross receipts. This practice probably applies most often where the second man is an experienced fisherman. A new entry to the industry would likely get less, but generally the share division can be influenced by the assistant's ability to bargain. When unionized halibut fishermen fish tuna, the share basis, set by arbitration, is 25 percent to the boat and the rest to the crewmen.

Conclusion. The fishing industry, while one of the most highly competitive among workers and operators, is also one of the most highly organized. Collective bargaining between fishermen's unions and employer associations, representing canning or processing companies and fishing vessel owners, now determine fish prices and other points of issue in virtually every major branch of the industry. The UFAWU, DSFU and the Native Brotherhood directly or indirectly have jurisdiction over practically every fisherman and allied worker in the industry. Individually or in combination, these three negotiate province-wide master agreements for their membership.

In certain branches of fishing where union organizations have not been feasible, co-operatives have been organized. Where applicable the UFAWU signs union contracts with these co-operatives. No minimum

price contracts are signed since the co-operatives must pay at least the minimum prices in order to justify their operation. In some cases, co-operative processing and marketing associations are supplementary to, and in other cases substitutes for, trade unions.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Despite its limited size, the fishing industry of British Columbia is extremely complex in terms of capital investment, annual income and employment. A large number of variable forces are continually and rapidly acting to change the structure and operations of the industry. They render difficult any accurate and comprehensive analysis of present and future trends.

Of the outstanding characteristics of the industry, the most important is its extreme diversity. Many different types of fish are caught, processed and marketed, but by far the most important are the five species of salmon. These various types and species of fish require correspondingly different specialized types of boats, equipment and techniques for catching, processing and marketing. These, in turn, require high degrees of occupational specialization among fishermen and other workers in the industry. The labour force is further differentiated by numerous language and racial groups,--whites, both Canadian and foreign born, native Indians and Asians.

Another salient feature of the industry is, and has been, its extreme uncertainty of operations and insecurity of income and livelihoods for owners or employers, middlemen and workers alike.

Supply of Fish. Supply of fish is extremely variable due to unpredictable "natural" forces, coupled with government conservation measures. These two work to produce an unevenness in "runs" of fish from year to year and from week to week within the season. Weather conditions are another variable and result in loss of valuable time during the fishing season. They may also affect conservation measures, as where dry weather shortens the salmon season.

Conservation measures also increase insecurity, because they depend upon the size of "runs" and "escapement". Length of the fishing season and the number of days a week when fishing is permitted are both rigidly controlled. In addition, specific fishing areas may be closed during the season. Finally regulations govern types of equipment and fishing techniques.

Another cause of uncertainty, and one that is increasingly serious, is the presence of alternative sources of a supply of fish which can compete with local products, particularly imports from Japan and, to a lesser degree, from Western Europe and the Maritimes. Heavy imports of canned salmon from Japan could seriously reduce the bargaining power of B.C. salmon fishermen.

Demand and Markets. Effective demand in various markets is uncertain from year to year. The domestic market is limited by a low per capita consumption. Fish not being a staple in Canadian diet means the market will vary considerably with the business cycle. Another variable in the domestic market is fluctuations in the price

of meat. Since fish is to some degree a substitute for meat, demand for and prices of fish products are affected. Prices of fresh salmon seem to fluctuate considerably in response to changes in beef prices, while the price of halibut has a similar relationship to pork.

In the important United States market, the Canadian seller is confronted by such variables as possible restrictions of imports from Canada, the competition from the United States domestic producers, especially in Alaska, and the competition from Japanese canned salmon imported into the United States.

In the overseas market, additional problems arise. Tariffs, quotas and currency controls, particularly affect the British market, most important single importer of Canadian canned salmon. Canadian fish products must also compete with cheaper fish products and Canada must compete with other countries, particularly Japan.

Price. The unpredictable and frequently wide variations in supply and demand bring corresponding uncertainties in price. Fresh and frozen fish are the most responsive to changes in demand and supply, prices varying from day to day. On the other hand, canned salmon has a greater price stability because supply can be more easily adjusted to changes in demand. Surpluses can be stored and carried over to a later period when demand may be more favourable. This will depend, however, on rational co-operation and good faith among producers and sellers. But risks and costs are involved in planning for future or anticipated markets.

Uncertainties of price, and losses from unforeseen changes in price, are major sources of conflict in the industry, as has been shown. An overwhelming majority of strikes have arisen from disputes between fishermen and fishing or canning companies about fish prices.

Technological Change. Another cause contributing to uncertainty, risk and insecurity, has been the diverse and rapid rate of technological change. The list of developments is impressive and means that the fishermen has had to adapt to these advances or become at the best a marginal operator. Oar-propelled and hand-operated boats have been replaced by gas and diesel engined craft with power-driven machinery. The radio telephone has increased mobility while radar has reduced navigational risks. Nylon gillnet and seines have greatly increased efficiency. Technological change has compelled cannery operators to centralize scattered operations in one processing plant, while modern refrigeration techniques in the fresh and frozen fish have resulted in increased scope of operations.

In contrast to other industries, however, strict control has been exercised by the Federal Government over the applications and use of technological changes to ensure proper conservation. In the past, controls perpetuated small-scale operations. Today, and in the future, technological changes will mean large-scale operations to cut costs and meet competition in foreign markets.

Degree of Competition. Another characteristic of the industry in the past, but to a lesser extent today, has been extreme competition. Supplies of fish from year to year are limited by natural forces and conservation. Each boat and fisherman competes with every other boat

for this limited supply. The tendency has been towards excessive numbers of boats and fishermen and a continued over-investment in the industry, a tendency accentuated by rapid technological changes.

While most strikes in the industry have arisen out of disputes over fish prices, the most violent conflicts developed among fishermen themselves. Noteworthy was the hostility of whites and Indians to the Japanese because of competition from what the other groups considered to be excessive numbers of Japanese.

There has also been extreme competition in the processing end. In the past, continual over-investment produced excessive numbers of canneries and other processing establishments, which competed not only in the sale of products but also in buying from fishermen.

Some aspects of competition have been sharply reduced in recent years. A conscious effort has cut risks and uncertainties. The fishermen in most branches of the industry are now organized either into co-operatives or into unions. The canning and fishing companies have likewise organized to control or reduce competition. Employers associations deal with the unions, while co-operative marketing associations organize many independent fishermen.

Reasons for Organization. Reasons for the remarkable extent of organization in the industry, considering its extreme diversity, particularly in labour force, coupled with its excessive competition and uncertainty, are two-fold. First, a need for planning and co-operative action among fishermen and companies alike to attempt

to cut uncertainty and risk in a situation where both groups, despite limited resources, yearly face steadily larger investments because of technological development. Secondly, technological changes themselves, while they tend to sharpen and accentuate competition in some respects, at the same time facilitate organization among all groups. Consolidations and mergers among companies produced large-scale centralized operations and cut competition among canning and processing companies by rapidly reducing their number. This gave rise to a correspondingly strong incentive among fishermen to organize to protect their bargaining position against the larger and more centralized companies. Improved transportation and communications have broken down local isolation among fishermen enabling better co-ordination of their activities along the whole coast, but producing more intense competition among different groups within their ranks--between drum seiners and table seiners, between large gillnetters and purse seiners, and between gillnetters and halibut boats.

Future Trends. Future trends are difficult to predict in view of the many variables within the industry. There will be a continued growth in size and scale of operations. Canning, processing and marketing operations may be still further centralized through mergers or inter-company co-operation, particularly in canning and fish transportation. There is a trend to fewer but bigger boats, particularly in purse seiners and gillnetters. Off-shore fisheries will increase in size and importance. Conservation measures in the

face of this trend may eliminate inshore commercial fishing, particularly around the mouth of the main salmon producing rivers.

To prevent B.C. fish from being priced out of both domestic and foreign markets, fishing and processing operations will need to increase in scale, improve in efficiency and cut costs. Large-scale mechanized and centralized plants and bigger and fewer boats will likely mean decreased employment opportunities. Shorter fishing seasons, if the number of fishing units remains the same, will mean a net displacement of labour. Likewise, longer seasons can only be maintained by cuts in the number employed in fishing and processing. Already displacement of Indians from the industry is occurring.

Disputes and Strikes. Disputes have been frequent, prolonged and costly in recent years. There is little to indicate that relationships will be any more stable in the foreseeable future. Both sides are well organized over the entire industry in B.C.

Fishermen and unions, as the trends have indicated, are faced with shorter seasons, excessive numbers of people in the industry, low annual income and displacement of workers. Increasingly larger investments are required for boats and gear. Rising wage levels in B.C., with sizeable gains by unions in other seasonal industries like lumbering and construction continue to produce a pressure for higher prices, or at the very least, resistance to price cut proposals.

Companies are faced with uncertainty and increasing competition in foreign markets. The pressure to cut costs will mean increased resistance to union demands with the possibility of getting alternative supplies from Japan, as a bargaining lever for the companies.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

NATIVE INDIANS AND THE FISHING INDUSTRY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA[1]

Introduction. Contemporary industry and society have brought major changes to the economic and social life of the Indians of British Columbia. Most tribal cultures were built upon a simple small-scale base. The tribal band was typically small and closely knit with personal relationships; the individual's status and role were clearly defined, and his activities regulated by tradition. Hunting, fishing, and gathering supplied a livelihood. Equipment and techniques were generally simple and static. Most of the output was for the local community's own use: only a small fraction was bartered for the products of other groups.

The new economic system and the way of life associated with it is almost the direct antithesis of the tribal system outlined above. Today the Indian is involved in a large-scale and increasingly complex system of production and distribution, characterized by dynamic, rapidly

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1 A reprint from The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. XIX, no. 1, Feb., 1953.

Some of the ideas expressed in this article are necessarily repetitious of those to be found in the two articles by Stuart Jamieson and Percy Gladstone, "Unionism in the Fishing Industry of British Columbia", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Feb., 1950, 1-11; May, 1950, 146-71.

Grateful acknowledgement is made of a grant from the Canadian Social Science Research Council facilitating this study.

changing techniques, a steadily increasing use of automatic power-driven machinery, and a growing production for national or international markets rather than for local use. As worker or producer he has, with few exceptions, lost his direct ownership of, or control over, his means of production. Relationships, defined increasingly by the market rather than by custom, have become more impersonal.

Comparatively few Indians have managed to derive full advantage from the new way of life. Tribal cultures have been disorganized or destroyed, and with them has gone the whole structure of role and status that made life meaningful for individuals. Indians have faced formidable difficulties in acquiring the economic incentives of the white man's culture, and the equipment and techniques with which to meet them. The result has been, in all too many cases, deterioration of morale, apathy, and economic dependency. Indians have become a marginal labour group in many areas: living on reservations, depending upon the government for a large part of their subsistence, and employed only casually in unskilled or menial jobs of a type that other workers avoid.

Here and there one may find occupations in which native Indians have managed to carry over the skills and aptitudes of their tribal culture and acquire new techniques to a degree that enables them to compete successfully with the whites. Where this process has occurred, Indians are in a position to acquire a new sense of identity and of "racial pride." Characteristically, they form new organizations that cut across lines of tribe or tongue, organizations that are designed to strengthen their bargaining power and improve their economic and social status through mutual aid.

One of the most striking examples of this sequence has been, and is, occurring among Indians along the coast of British Columbia whose livelihood is based primarily on the fishing industry. Here, to a degree rarely found in other occupations or regions on the North American continent, native Indians have been able to adapt the special experiences and skills of their traditional cultures to the new requirements of a dynamic, technologically advanced industry.

The fishing industry of British Columbia furnishes at best a lucrative but highly insecure livelihood. Success in the occupation requires a unique combination not only of skill, experience, and fortitude but also of good luck. Demand, supply, and price vary widely from year to year. The supplies of fish are highly seasonal and uncertain. There are variable weather conditions to contend with. A major part of the output ordinarily is exported to foreign markets, where it must compete with the output of other countries. Finally, the industry is characterized by intense competition and rapidly changing techniques which require a steadily larger investment in boats and gear on the part of the fisherman.

Despite these formidable difficulties, native Indians in growing numbers have more than held their own in the fishing industry of British Columbia. Today, perhaps as many as 10,000[1] of them derive their livelihood from fishing and allied occupations, and they have become a vital and necessary part of the labour force in that industry. Their ability to compete on an even basis with the whites is beginning to

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1 Estimate of the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia.

instil in them a new pride. They are rapidly losing their recent apathy, and becoming an organized and articulate element that may acquire a considerable economic and political bargaining power in this province.

Tribal Fishing Economy. The coast of British Columbia is blessed with a great wealth and variety of fish. Prior to the coming of the white man this plentiful food supported a relatively large native Indian population that maintained a rich diversity of culture. In the almost self-sufficient village economies, barter played a secondary role. Fresh, dried, and smoked fish provided staple articles of diet (as well as of barter) supplemented by other products of the sea, such as clams, seaweed (dulse), and herring-eggs. The dense forests crowding the shoreline of most areas along the coast provided meat, furs, hides, berries and herbs, timbers, and fibres for boats and gear.

By far the most important fish to the tribal Indian economy, and also to the present-day economy of British Columbia, were the five species of salmon: spring, sockeye, cohoe, pink or "humpback", and chum or "dog" salmon. The wealthiest and most populous tribes on the northern Pacific coast were those located in areas adjacent to the main rivers and streams in which salmon came to spawn.

Commercial Relations with the Whites. The barter trade in fish carried on with interior groups by numerous coastal tribes facilitated the adjustment of Indians to the development of the fishing industry by the whites during the early nineteenth century. The forts and trading-posts of the Hudson's Bay Company furnished a limited market for fish as well as for furs. From 1835 to 1858 the Company developed an export

market in smoked and cured salmon in the Hawaiian Islands and Asia. As compared with total production, however, this was a comparatively small-scale operation confined to an area along the Fraser River where the Hudson's Bay Company claimed a monopoly of fishing rights. The fishing activities of the Indians on behalf of the Company were incidental to production for their own use. The supply of fish was sufficiently plentiful so that production for the market did not interfere with the Indians' claim of inherent and aboriginal rights designed to guard the food supply. Competition with the whites was limited, and no disputes or conflicts were recorded.

Later Commercial Fishing. A new problem faced the Indians during the 1860's when the fish-canning industry became established in British Columbia. Practically overnight the Indians had to adjust themselves to drastic economic and cultural changes. In the face of their own changed needs, fishing became a specialized and complex means of economic survival instead of merely one way of obtaining food. Indians had to face growing competition from fishermen who were more experienced in the commercial pursuit: Europeans from various maritime nations, the Americans from the Columbia and Sacramento rivers, and later, the Japanese. They had to cope with rapid technological changes in the industry. They were confronted with a maze of conservation laws and regulations that were difficult to understand, let alone obey. Whereas once they had fished with spears and weirs of their own making, Indians now had to make heavy capital investment for fishing equipment to keep up with their white and Asiatic competitors. Indian women working

in the canneries had to deal with similar problems: competition with whites and Asiatics, and the resultant racial animosity and discrimination; constant adaptation to new technological changes; and, in a few cases, displacement by organized workers having closed-shop or seniority agreements with employers.

In their own tribal cultures the Indians were accustomed to a community life directed by heads of family and clan, who were responsible for welfare and for enforcement of the laws. This structure of authority broke down when the economic foundation of the tribal economy was transformed. The hereditary leader was replaced in some of his functions by a new agent, the cannery contractor. Possession of the right to hire and fire Indian fishermen and cannery workers, gave him a measure of control over the economic destinies of his fellow tribesmen.

As a rule, the settlements of the coastal tribes had been located within easy reach of fishing streams or halibut banks. Their limited migratory habits were connected with those of food gathering. In normal years their staple foods had been easily obtained. With the coming of commercial fishing the Indians found it necessary to make mass migrations to the major fishing and canning centres in the Nass, Skeena, Fraser, and Rivers Inlet areas. In travelling the 1300 miles of navigable waters along the coast of British Columbia, they came into contact with Indians and whites of different languages and customs. They broadened their outlook and improved their techniques at the expense of their own settled tribal and community life.

The relationships of native Indians with the Dominion and provincial governments were also changed by the rapid transformation

occurring in the fishing industry. The need for conservation measures brought a steadily increasing degree of government regulation of the industry. Early in the history of commercial fishing restrictions were placed on the Indians' right to obtain fish for food, which they looked upon as a natural right. The General Fishery Regulations of July 18, 1889 restricted their methods of catching salmon, but a Royal Commission appointed two years later recognized the need to continue fishing for food indefinitely. The result was that special provisions guaranteeing their privileges of fishing were included in the Order in Council of 1894. This set a precedent for most subsequent fishing regulations.[3] By 1918 the Indians of the upper Fraser River, suffering from a decrease in fish due to depletion, actually suggested that the Dominion Government purchase their fishing rights.[4] By 1920 the Indians were prohibited from fishing in Hell's Gate and above the Mission Bridge, two formerly important points on the Fraser River.[5] Today they require a permit for obtaining salmon for food in any river; in the fiscal year 1951-2, 1,848 permits were issued.

The problems of adjustment in commercial fishing have been especially acute among those inland tribes who were primarily trappers, for whom fishing was a secondary and minor occupation. Owing to the loss of their trap-lines through depletion and logging operations, many of them turned to fishing for their main source of income. These Indians, coming from comparatively isolated inland areas, became the marginal

3 A.H. Ainsworth, "Conservation in the British Columbia Salmon Industry", unpublished B.A. thesis, April, 1946, University of British Columbia, p. 18.
4 Report of Fisheries Commission for British Columbia, Dec. 31, 1918, 12.
5 Report of Fisheries Commission for British Columbia, Dec. 31, 1920, 13.

fishermen on the coast. Their problems may be gauged by their own oft-repeated statement, "We will soon be the D.P.'s of the fishing industry." They are acutely conscious of their position but are unable to cope with their problems. Because of racial discrimination, lack of training, and inability to break family and community ties, they find it difficult to enter other occupations. It was this group that raised the loudest protest against the return of the Japanese fishermen following World War II.

Indians and Types of Fishing.[6] The Indians have participated in all the specialized branches of fishing. A special method is required for each species of fish: gill-netting for salmon returning to the spawning grounds, purse-seining for fish which "school up", trolling for off-shore fish, beam-trawling and long-lining for bottom fish. Each method in turn requires a special type of boat and equipment, and it may be competing against another method used in taking the same kind of fish: for example, gill-netting against purse-seining for salmon, the "mosquito" halibut fleet against the larger specialized halibut boats. This competition creates occupational antagonism, which is sometimes transferred to racial antagonisms.

The fishing industry tends to be divided into specializations according to ethnic groups. Thus the Jugoslav and Austrian fishermen have a tendency to specialize in purse-seining, the Norwegians in halibut fishing, the Japanese in gill-netting and trolling. The Chinese and Indians have been the main workers in the processing plants, though in recent times Indians are being displaced by machinery as well as by an

6 See also Jamieson and Gladstone, "Unionism in the Fishing Industry of British Columbia", 5-6. and Chapter I, p. 14, et seq.

increasing number of white workers.

In the case of the Indians there also exists what might be termed geographic specialization. The great majority are permanently settled on reservations scattered along the coast of British Columbia. Generally they have gone to the nearest cannery during the fishing season and engaged in the type of fishing suited to the local species. In modern times, faced with depletion of the salmon, but aided by high-powered boats with radio-telephone, the British Columbia fishing fleet has become highly mobile. The Indian fishermen, in common with others, cover increasingly large areas in search of fish. Yet basically the type of fishing followed by the Indians is still related to factors of their local environment. Accordingly, around the great salmon areas of the Nass, Skeena, Fraser, and Rivers Inlet, gill-netting and purse-seining predominate. Along the west coast of Vancouver Island and around the Queen Charlotte Islands, trolling and purse-seining are the main methods.

Gill-netting was the original method of commercial salmon fishing and remains the method most used by the Indians. Some eleven hundred[7] gill-

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7 The statistics on licences issued were furnished by the Federal Department of Fisheries, 1110 West Georgia Street, Vancouver, B.C. The number of licences issued is no indication of the ratio of fish caught. It would be interesting to find out what proportion of the total catch of fish was caught by Indian fishermen but at the present time investigation of this question is not possible.

TABLE XXI - Fishery Licences, Fiscal Year 1951-2

Variety of Licence	Indians	Total
Salmon trap-net		5
Salmon drag-seine	9	9
Salmon purse-seine	52	501
Salmon gill-net	1122	5429
Salmon trolling	596	5129

netting licences were issued to them in 1950 compared to 922 for salmon purse-seining and 596 for salmon-trolling.

Salmon-trolling furnishes a good example of geographic restriction. This type of fishing is a later development than gill-netting and purse-seining. Originally gill-net boats were easily adapted for trolling and the latter actually was an off-season occupation for gill-netters. Nowadays many localities specialize in trolling and do not take part in gill-netting. Salmon-trolling in the areas mentioned earlier had the added advantage that the Indians were able to operate from their native villages.

Variety of Licence	Indians	Total
Asst. salmon gill-net	42	206
Capt. salmon purse-seine	164	387
Asst. Salmon purse-seine	758	2412
Cod	145	684
Crayfish	7	258
Crab	46	181
Small dragger	8	94
Smelt		42
Miscellaneous	8	218
Herring purse-seine	2	74
Capt. herring purse-seine	6	47
Asst. herring purse-seine	41	387
Pilchard purse-seine		
Capt. pilchard purse-seine		
Asst. pilchard purse-seine		
Herring gill-net		28
Herring pound	2	17
Herring trawl		12
Capt. herring trawl		
Asst. herring trawl		7
Capt. halibut or black cod	263	928
Capt. halibut for bait		6
Capt. tuna	1	96
Asst. tuna		33
Abalone	20	24
Whaling		5
Angling permits		414
	3292	17,633

Indian permits (for domestic food) 1848

In the case of halibut fishing a difficulty has arisen from overfishing and serious depletion. The history of this type of fishing differs from that of the other branches. Originally it was carried on by two-men dories operating from a steam trawler which served as the mother ship, a method patterned on cod fishing in Newfoundland and eastern Canada. Depletion soon became a serious problem. New halibut banks had to be found and each succeeding year the halibut boats were forced to go farther from the home ports. What was once a yearly operation of indiscriminate fishing was altered by international regulation to seasonal operations limited by a quota system. Depleted and scattered halibut banks called either for privately owned smaller boats or for schooners ranging up to 80 feet in length. The capital required for these specialized boats and gear was beyond the reach of most Indians, with the result that they remained of minor importance in the halibut fishing.

There is a current trend for the Indians to obtain larger seine boats. It is becoming necessary to operate larger fishing boats in a number of types of fishing: for seining, beam-trawling, and halibut fishing. For this reason the number of Indian halibut fishermen has increased each year. Then again, a large number of Indians in the small gill-netter and trolling boats form a substantial part of the modern halibut "mosquito fleet". This is a major occupation for them before the opening of the gill-netting season. In 1950, 263 halibut fishing licences[8] were issued to Indians. Beam-trawling is another development which is the result of owning larger boats. Indian participation in this type of fishing

8 Only the captain of the boat and not the fishermen require a licence.

is centred at Massett in the Queen Charlotte Islands, where there are twelve large boats capable of this operation.

Large-scale herring seining is a development arising out of World War II. Part of the impetus has been the total disappearance of pilchards from the coast of British Columbia since 1942. Herring fishing requires larger, modern boats, fully equipped with the latest sonic developments. The necessary capital investment is tremendous, ranging to $125,000, and, until recently, all equipment was owned by the companies. Several Indians were engaged in fishing pilchards but have not begun to fish extensively for herring. Indian fishermen from Bella Bella and Alert Bay are the sole representatives in this phase of the industry. The Indian feels that he is being discriminated against in company employment in this type of fishing, and at present is attempting to enlarge his small share in the catch.

Participation in Fishing Labour Disputes.[9] The commercial fishing industry has been characterized by annual labour disputes, some of them violent. The militancy of the fishermen has culminated in their being led by the militant United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union. The role of the Indians themselves has changed from extreme militancy at the turn of the century to a conservative unionism at the present day. They now participate in fishing disputes but as a group refuse to become incorporated into white fishing unions or associations, preferring to maintain their identity through their own bargaining unit, the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia.

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9 Indians participated in all disputes listed and described in Gladstone and Jamieson, "Unionism in the Fishing Industry of British Columbia," 146-71. The present article is confined to reports of actual participation of Indians in the strikes. See also Chapter VI.

In commercial fishing each fisherman with his equipment is an independent unit competing with others. Every year increasing numbers of modern and independent units vie for the supply of fish available during the limited seasons. The income of the fisherman is made uncertain by the variability of fish "runs", and earnings may be further decreased by severe conservation measures which further shorten the season if the run of fish fails to materialize. As the capital expenditure for boats and equipment increases, a larger gross income is required for upkeep; and it becomes imperative for each individual fisherman to enlarge the scope of his operations. Whereas in former times the boats and equipment had been largely owned by the fishing companies, the modern trend is toward individual ownership of boats. This shifts the risks of ownership to the individual fishermen, but at the same time alters the employer-employee relationship which formerly existed between the cannery operators and fishermen. The industry is affected by world economic conditions and the fisherman is faced with price fluctuations as the demand for and the supply of fish products fluctuate. In addition to contending with these economic factors he is constantly struggling with the elements. He must be a mechanic as well as a mariner with a high degree of familiarity with local geography.

At first glance it might appear that the antagonism resulting from the competition and hazards of the industry would result in the formation of heterogeneous competing groups. Yet these very difficulties and problems help create a strong group sentiment and a feeling of the need for mutual aid, a condition necessary for the formation of strong

labour unions. This group sentiment has been strong enough to transcend occupational antagonism, language and racial differences, as well as geographic isolation. Many Indian fishermen feel a kinship with their fellow white fishermen to a degree only slightly less than with other Indian fishermen. The result is that the Indians actively co-operate with white fishing unions, though they join them only as a last resort. Prior to the mid-1930's, all labour unionism in British Columbia fishing was composed of a series of local units in isolated areas often working at cross purposes. Since isolation has been overcome by increased communication, the local units have been merged into one coastwise union. The Indians, however, still live in comparatively isolated reservations along the coast. They move to the canneries during the fishing season and then return home, thus losing contact with labour problems.

The fact that the Indian fishermen are in sympathy with labour unions and take an active part in fishing disputes, yet remain outside the white fishing unions, is a result of a combination of causes. Aside from isolation, a distrust of white unions has resulted from discrimination and from their abandonment of the Indians in several early fishing strikes. Moreover, the Indians of British Columbia are in a transitional stage in their social and economic conditions. There is a strong link with the past, yet there is an inevitable drift towards participation as full citizens. The opposing pressures are shown in the strong desire of the Indians to maintain their identity in an inclusive Indian organization. Thus the Native Brotherhood is a separate bargaining agency which works in close co-operation with the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union.

Their desire to remain as an Indian group may be due in part to racial discrimination on the part of U.F.A.W.U. members, in part to unfamiliarity with the factors underlying labour bargaining. In part also, the cause is the fear of being absorbed by the militant U.F.A.W.U., where they would be a minority group; the Native Brotherhood is and will remain an exclusively Indian group. Finally, each Indian desires the responsibility of conducting his own affairs.

The Indian fishermen are subject to the same fishing laws and regulations as the white, yet legally the Indians are minors, wards of the federal government, and the local Indian Agent is responsible for the general welfare of the Indians in his district. It would be expected that, with the power vested in the local Indian Agent, he would advise the Indians in their labour problems. Attempts by an Indian Agent were made early in the history of the fishing industry to dissuade Indians from joining unions. However, in 1900 the Honourable Mr. Sifton, then Minister of the Interior, overruled the Agent, stating that the "Indians could do as they wished in this matter."[10] With only one exception this has remained the policy of the Indian Department.

The Indians have played an active role in fishing disputes from the beginning of the fishing industry. Then militancy arose from antagonism to the influx of Japanese fishermen. Furthermore, the Indians were at that time faced with the loss of their "aboriginal and inherent rights" in fishing. Even today bitter antagonism is directed against the Japanese fishermen, and there still arises a feeling of resentment against the white fish-

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10 Vancouver Daily Province, July 16, 1900, 3.

ermen who "invade" local fishing areas.

Historical Review of Labour Disputes Mainly Involving Indians.[11] In 1893 the Indians, as members of the Fraser River Fishermen's Benevolent Association, staged a strike for an increase of daily wage from $2.50 to $3. At that time the fishermen were paid a daily wage regardless of their actual catch. To offset attempts made by the Canners Association to use other Indians and Japanese as strike breakers, the Union resorted to intimidation of the Indians "and to this end is practicing questionable methods."[12] The canners' reply was an offer of $50. reward for the arrest and conviction of any person found "interfering with or intimidating fishermen or other employees, inciting any person or persons to do anything unlawful."[13] During this period appeals were made to the Superintendent of Indian Affairs to induce the Indians to return to fishing, but to no avail. Apparently the Indians were determined to continue their stand since at a subsequent meeting three Indian Chiefs, Capilano George, Cranberry Jack, and Charles Meshell, spoke and the "tale they told showed clearly they fully understood the grievance of the white fishermen and being in sympathy therewith, had joined the union. They narrated how they had been intimidated by the Indian Agent and expressed their contempt for him and their determination to have nothing further to do with him. They thought he should look after their interests and not the interests of the canners. They spoke of the poor wages, of their having to travel around the four cities in order to make a living."[14] The white fishermen

11 See fuller list of disputes in Jamieson and Gladstone, "Unionism in the Fishing Industry of British Columbia," 148-52. Also Table XXXIII, pp.304-10.
12 Vancouver Daily Province, July 14, 1893, 4. This and subsequent quotations are given not so much for their factual accuracy as for the indication they give of the attitudes and expressions of the parties involved in the disputes.
13 Vancouver Daily Province, July 15, 1893, 2.
14 Vancouver Daily World, July 24, 1893, 2.

subsequently broke the strike, and the Indians were abandoned; but they did win the praise of the Union leaders who stated that no Indians had "volunteered to assist the canners until some white men had led the way."[15]

Following 1893, the fishing industry was adversely affected by the world economic depression. Labour activity in lower British Columbia was quiet. In the northern area around the Skeena River several strikes are recorded[16] but no details are available. Strikes were staged in 1894, 1896, and 1897. The first two were disputes over the price of fish, the last appears to have been over cannery wages. These seem to have been local disputes directed against individual operators and were of short duration.

During the 1890's a more serious problem for the Indians arose out of the influx of Japanese fishermen. Gold discoveries in the Slocan area and the Yukon caused an exodus of white fishermen. To meet the labour shortages in the industry, Japanese were brought in. By 1896, approximately one-quarter of the 6000 British Columbia fishermen were Japanese. By 1898, the Japanese competition had become a serious issue with the Indians. In 1899, when they felt that they had a bargaining advantage on the Fraser owing to the shortage of white labour, the Indians went on strike for increased fish prices. The attempt was unsuccessful because it failed to win the support of the Japanese.

During the violent Fraser River strikes of 1900 and 1901 the

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15 Vancouver Daily World, July 24, 1893, p. 2.
16 From the diary of R. Cunningham, pioneer cannery operator of Port Essington, B.C., which was the centre of early Skeena River fishing.

Indian showed a militant attitude not since apparent. In the 1900 strike the Indians, with the Fraser River Fishermen's Union, made a determined stand against the Japanese fishermen, the Cannery Operators' Association, the militia, the Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles, and the Superintendent of the Indian Department. It was during this period that the Honourable Mr. Sifton issued the statement previously mentioned. The strike ended when the Japanese, who had previously guaranteed to co-operate with white and Indian fishermen, went fishing under the protection of the militia. The Indians who had long regarded fishing as their heritage were then to watch while the "Canadian authorities had to provide sufficient force to prevent an alien force of fishermen defend, by recourse to arms, their inalienable right to work." [17] The bitterness of the Indians increased when the canners showed no concern over the return of the Indian fishermen.

During the Fraser River strike of 1900, the village of Port Simpson, near the mouth of the Skeena River, took a particularly active part. In the village was a local of the British Columbia Fishermen's Union, organized in 1899. The Port Simpson brass band led the parade of mass demonstrators during the strike, provided music for meetings, and later travelled to Nanaimo to give concerts for the purpose of gaining support and raising funds.

Plans were made early by white fishermen for the 1901 fishing season, based on the experience gained from the 1900 strike. A Grand Lodge of British Columbia Fishermen was organized to co-ordinate locals

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17 Vancouver Daily Province, July 24, 1900, 1.

and to strengthen them. The white fishermen conferred with the Indians "to ascertain the general feeling among the Indians concerning the moral right of the Japanese to fish on the Fraser River."[18] As a result of the conferences the demands for the 1901 season were signed by 33 prominent Indians from Port Simpson to the Fraser River and inland to Harrison Hot Springs. The Indians were unanimous in their demands and were supported by sixty per cent of the white fishermen. The cannery operators were beginning to use Japanese women for cannery labour, and could dispense with some Indians, stating "the Indians were not of special value to the canneries."[19] For their part, the Indians expressed no great desire to return to the canneries as there had been "too much trouble these last few years" to please them.[20]

The 1901 strike ended favourably to the cannery operators, again on account of the organized strike-breaking of the Japanese fishermen, who had been brought into British Columbia in greater numbers. By 1901 the Japanese held 1,958 out of 4,722 licences issued in British Columbia. No doubt they also received most of the 1,090 issued to the canneries, since by estimates of the Department of Fisheries[21] there were over 4,000 Japanese fishermen in the industry. The attitude of the Indians may be gauged by the uncompromising statement of one of them that "any man who would take less than 12½¢ (for a single sockeye) ought to drown the first time he went out in a boat."[22]

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18 Vancouver Daily Province, May 31, 1901, 9.
19 Vancouver Daily Province, June 22, 1901, 1.
20 Vancouver Daily Province, June 20, 1901, 1.
21 Report (Ottawa, 1902), 390.
22 Vancouver Daily Province, June 22, 1901, 1.

The next dispute occurred in the region of the Skeena and Nass Rivers. In 1904 the Indians struck for higher fish prices. During this period Indian and Japanese fishermen were equal in number. The latter offered passive support by refraining from fishing, but anxiously awaited the results of the dispute. No agreement was reached and the net result was that over 300 Indians left the northern area to fish in the Fraser River. The leader of this strike was Nedildahld of Port Essington, who was a "first class agitator being possessed of a good command of language and the faculty of impressing the most optimistic feeling among his followers. In consequence of the influence of Nedildahld, the Indians are unanimous in their refusal to fish." [23]

In 1907 Indian women demanded higher pay in the canneries. Labour during this period was scarce and the Indian women had the advantage of a decrease in the number of Japanese women working in the canneries. Through their strengthened bargaining power the Indians "demanded and received a higher wage." [24]

The ensuing years were comparatively inactive. The Indians were losing their confident militancy owing to past failures in disputes and to repeated abandonment by white and Japanese fishermen. In 1912 the Indian drag-seine fishermen of Nimpkish village on Vancouver Island demanded a high price for sockeye. However, the white fishermen accepted the lower offer of the cannery and resumed fishing, leaving the Indians with no

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23 Vancouver Daily Province, July 13, 1904, 1.
24 Vancouver World, July 19, 1907, 73.

alternative but to return to their fishing operations. By 1913 the Indians were definitely a minority group in the industry, holding 430 fishing licences against 1,088 held by Japanese and 832 held by whites.[25] The Indians and whites were unorganized despite the efforts of the Vancouver branch of the Industrial Workers of the World. On the other hand, the more numerous Japanese fishermen had become an organized group. They led a strike in 1913 while the Indians and white fishermen were ready to accept the operator's offer. The Indian and white fishermen were subjected to violence, intimidation, and property damage by the Japanese strikers.[26]

In 1914 Indians became members of the Fraser River Fishermen's Protective Association organized by the New Westminster Board of Trade on an anti-Japanese platform. Subsequently, during World War I, the Indians took practically no part in labour disputes or activities. Fish prices had increased, the war had created labour shortages, and the Indians were enjoying a fair degree of prosperity. Another cause of this quiet period was the deep sense of patriotism of the Indians generally.

In their participation in the fishing industry, the Indians had come in contact with missionaries, teachers, and businessmen. These contacts all operated to change the cultures. Moreover, the Indians held a place in a highly competitive industry with little chance of turning to other occupations. They no longer possessed the unity and cohesion they had gained at the beginning of the commercial fishing period. Their determination had weakened since the turn of the century. They took a

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25 Vancouver Daily Province, July 27, 1907, 7.
26 Ibid.

less active role in unions but they were still active in disputes. During World War I the Japanese had further consolidated their position in the industry, and by 1919 held 3,267 licences, or approximately half the total issued that year.[27] They had replaced the Indians in practically every branch of the fishing industry. The Indians' position in the industry was further jeopardized by the post-war depression and the influx of ex-servicemen into the industry.

Their weakened position was evidenced by their own disunity in Rivers Inlet during a dispute in 1922. A majority of the Indians had voted for strike action, but the minority group under the protection of the British Columbia police "amid cheers and armed to meet trouble" [28] broke the strike.

In the economic depression of the 1930's the organizing of the fishermen proceeded under the direction of the Workers' Unity League, and from this activity emerged the Fish Cannery Workers Industrial Union, with the purpose of organizing all the fishermen and shore workers in the industry. The only Indian local was at North Vancouver and sent eight representatives to the 1933 convention of the F.C.W.I.U. Their main demand was the abolition of the contract system of hiring Indian fishermen and cannery workers. The F.C.W.I.U. disbanded in 1935 and reorganized into separate locals to cover different branches of the industry.

During this period the Indians were forming their own organization. In 1934 the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia was formed primarily as a fraternal group, with the aim of furthering the general

27 C.H. Young and H.R.Y. Reid, The Japanese Canadians (Toronto, 1938), 43.
28 Vancouver Daily Province, July 15, 1922, 7.

welfare of the British Columbia Indians and of bringing before the proper authorities the plight of the Indians in regard to medical care, educational facilities, and social welfare. Though the Brotherhood was not yet a recognized bargaining agent, it did represent the Indian fishermen on the Fishermen's Joint Committee, which was composed of five fishermen's unions. The primary purpose of the Committee was the co-ordination of negotiations of organized fishermen with cannery operators.

The last of the long and costly strikes occurred in the Rivers Inlet area in 1936, when the entire fishing season was lost. During the last week of the strike a few Indians were left to see that there was no organized strike-breaking. However, Native Brotherhood members as well as white fishermen came from the Northern area and broke the strike. With no earnings for the season many of the Indian cannery workers were returned to their homes by chartered steamer.

One direct outcome of the 1936 strike was the beginning of gill-netting in Johnstone Straits.[29] The Indians were faced with the need to obtain relief after the fishing season was lost on account of strike action. They sought aid from the local Branch of Indian Affairs, posing a moral issue to the Government. As a partial solution, the local Indian Agent, with the co-operation of the cannery operators, persuaded the Indians to gill-net in Johnstone Straits. This operation is an important one today.

A second by-product of the 1936 strike was the first all-Indian

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29 Concerning the pioneering phase of this development there is some dispute. Another version is that the Finns of Sointula accidentally discovered the possibility of gill-netting in the Straits.

union. During this strike the Indians felt that they had been misled and abandoned by the white fishermen, especially when they were left to guard the strike-bound area while the white fishermen went elsewhere to fish. As a result, the Indians of the Kwakiutl Agency, embracing fishing villages from Alert Bay to Cape Mudge, organized the Pacific Coast Native Fishermen's Association. The aims of this organization were:

(1) to further the spirit of co-operation between the Indian fishermen and the fishing industry generally for the mutual benefit of all; (2) to have definite arrangements made and agreed upon between the Indians and the industry before proceeding to the fishing grounds, to avoid difficulties thereafter; (3) to protect the interests of all Indians engaged in the fishing industry; (4) to increase the number of Indian fishermen to a fair proportion of those engaged in the industry; and (5) to safeguard against the use of unfair means of determining fishing boundaries by local interests to the detriment of the industry as a whole.[30] Many Indian members of the P.C.N.F.A. claim that a separate organization was proposed in order to maintain their identity since many Indians had lost faith in white leaders. The P.C.N.F.A. officials did contact the white unions asking them to release all Indian members but their request was refused.

In 1942, by Order in Council, the Indians were made liable for income tax payments. The Indian fishermen were opposed to this order and turned to the Native Brotherhood to voice their protests. It was by reason of their opposition to the income tax payments that the rather

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30 Indian Agency, Alert Bay, B.C.

localized P.C.N.F.A. joined the larger province-wide Native Brotherhood. The P.C.N.F.A. faction, still largely composed of the Kwakiutl members of the Native Brotherhood who were more aggressive and more experienced in fishing matters, soon became the dominant group in the Brotherhood. More and more of the Brotherhood's activities were directed towards fishing problems, and by 1945 the Brotherhood was officially recognized by the British Columbia Department of Labour as the bargaining agent for all British Columbia Indian fishermen.

Though the Native Brotherhood is recognized as a union for bargaining its primary purpose is still the betterment of the general welfare, the health and the education of the British Columbia Indians, and it also deals with legislative problems affecting the Indians. Its strength as a bargaining agent is due to its close co-operation with the U.F.A.W.U., which has jurisdiction over the majority of fishermen and shore workers. The two organizations attempt to settle prices, working conditions, wages, and other matters of mutual interest with the Fishery Council of British Columbia before the fishing season opens, and thus prevent disputes during the actual fishing season. At the end of negotiations separate agreements are signed, the Native Brotherhood signing on behalf of all Indian fishermen and shore workers. The two organizations have an oral understanding that the U.F.A.W.U. will not use undue pressure to enroll Indian members. However, many Indian fishermen and shore workers, especially in the northern region of British Columbia, are voluntarily joining the U.F.A.W.U.

Other Organizations. During the 1930's there was a phenomenal growth of fishermen's co-operatives. These were undertaken by trollers and

halibut fishermen who, as a rule, are independent operators. The co-operatives might be considered to be the counterpart of the unions of the same period, among the fishermen who could not be considered in the employee-employer class. The Indians recognized the growth of co-operatives but did not join. The main problem has been the financing of the season's operations. Loans for this purpose obtained from a fishing company carry an obligation to fish for the company. Another problem was posed by the legal position of the Indians. Financial advances could not be recovered by recourse to law and the early co-operatives could not afford to take financial risks. Furthermore, racial prejudice shown by the co-operatives' members touched the Indians directly, particularly in the north. An underlying reason for this prejudice was the fear that the Indians would vote en masse for candidates of their own people for the directorship of the co-operatives.

However, the trollers of the west coast of Vancouver Island and the Queen Charlotte Islands did form organizations modelled on the co-operatives. The Indians were forced by economic conditions of the 1930's to make a concerted effort to obtain financial aid as groups rather than as individuals. These organizations operated on the principle that the fishermen formed an Association to which the company advanced credit in return for the total catch. The Association then advanced credit to individual fishermen. Because of the increased production for the companies they were able to pay a commission on a poundage basis to the Association, aside from the regular fish prices. This commission constituted the income of the Association. However, the collection of the

advances made to individual fishermen was difficult, with the result that the practice has been abandoned except at Nootka, Vancouver Island, where the operation has been successful under the guidance of the Roman Catholic Church.

Future Outlook. The coast Indians have been identified with the fishing industry from the earliest days, and their adjustment to this industry indicates that they will continue to be a part of it. For many of them it is still difficult to enter other occupations. The industry offers opportunities both in the primary fishing and in the secondary stages of processing, and both are becoming year-round operations. The racial prejudices and language difficulties, which formerly restricted these opportunities, are gradually being overcome. Fishing offers freedom and independence, and self-employed, independent proprietorship. Enjoying these, the Indians acquire a sense of responsibility, and their feeling of security increases.

The trend among the Indians is towards private ownership of boats and gear. This was especially noticeable during World War II when fish prices were comparatively high and the Japanese were removed from the Coast. Many of the Japanese boats were made available for the Indian fishermen; thus there was no decrease in the total fishing gear used. The antagonistic feeling against the Japanese remained and the Indians shared in the pride that the over-all production of fish could be maintained without the Japanese fishermen.

In Massett, Queen Charlotte Islands, one finds one of the largest and finest seine-boat fleets of any community on the coast, valued at $350,000.

The same village boasts a modern boat-building yard, where each year a large seine boat is launched. Farther down large fleets are owned at Bella Bella and Alert Bay (examples picked almost at random). It has been estimated that the Indians in British Columbia own large boats valued at one and one-half million dollars, and to protect their interests the owners have formed a Fishing Vessel Owners' Association to work in close co-operation with the Native Brotherhood.

The old concept of "aboriginal and inherent rights" in fishing is gradually being replaced by the realization that to survive in the industry the fisherman must make an all-out effort to maximize his season's catch. The industry is faced with problems identical with those of the fishermen. The companies must invest increasingly large amounts to prepare for an uncertain supply of fish, with no guarantee of returns. During the season they must make an effort to maintain full production--and the non-producing or even the marginal-producing fisherman is out of place. The Indian fisherman is coming to realize that the interests of the fishermen and canners are interdependent and that both are vulnerable to the uncertainties of the industry, including the possibility of loss through disputes. The trend in the industry to maximize returns from the use of capital and labour is resulting in company mergers, centralized operation in large units, and technical improvements.

A serious problem is posed by the loss of foreign markets. At present the domestic market is being exploited but greater sales would require still lower fish prices to the consumers. The fishermen are faced with increased operating costs along with possibly decreased incomes through lower prices. The resulting feeling of insecurity is causing many

of the Indian fishermen to turn to the U.F.A.W.U. hoping to maintain prices. On the other hand, in the event of a dispute leading to a tie-up, the Indian is more vulnerable than some of the other fishermen. He is faced with the loss of a year's income, and has fewer possibilities of alternative employment.

The present indications are that the Indian fishermen have a feeling of group responsibility and they believe that through their Brotherhood they are capable of conducting their own affairs. This is especially true of the older Indian fishermen. If the Native Brotherhood takes effective action in maintaining this feeling of group responsibility the Indian fishermen may well be the main stabilizing factor in an uncertain industry.

APPENDIX B

THE JAPANESE IN THE BRITISH COLUMBIA FISHING INDUSTRY[1]

The Japanese in British Columbia are an efficient, industrious, and cohesive group. Brought to Canada when there was a high demand for labour during the development of mining, fishing, lumbering and railway construction of the early period of British Columbia's history, they remained to pioneer in several fields of the province's primary industries. Their success has been accomplished despite discrimination and organized opposition to them. In the fishing industry they have withstood opposition by labour groups and legislative restrictions. In no other industry have they met more intense racial antagonism, or been in the midst of more violent strikes and disputes.

Japanese Immigration to Canada. The period of 1884-1900 when lumbering, fishing, mining and railway construction was being developed was accompanied by a corresponding high demand for unskilled labour. In 1884, Japan had completed arrangements with Hawaii to permit Japanese labourers to enter that territory. Many of them then came to Canada via

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1 Several unsuccessful attempts were made in 1950 and 1951 to interview Japanese fishermen; all were reluctant to speak of the past. Much of the details about the Japanese in the fishing industry are based on Chas. H. Young and Helen R.Y. Reid, The Japanese Canadian, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1938, and Reginda Sumida, The Japanese in British Columbia, unpublished M.A. thesis, Library of the University of British Columbia, 1934.

Hawaii to take advantage of the current demand for their labour.[2]

The early Japanese immigrants to British Columbia were encouraged to emigrate by representatives of the infant primary industries and usually arrived under a labour contract. These arrivals were described as follows: "The immigrants brought little with them other than the talents with which nature endowed them and which nurture had sharpened. The average price for steerage on the ocean liners plying between Japan and Canada at the time of their immigration was fifty dollars, the equivalent of one hundred yen in Japan, a very large sum of money in the economy of the occupational groups from which the immigrants were drawn. Immigrants were frequently compelled to borrow from relations and friends, mortgaging their future for months after their arrival in Canada."[3] The period 1884-1900 constituted the first phase of Japanese immigration. In the second phase from 1901-1907, immigration dropped to negligible numbers, then rose sharply by the end of 1907.[4] The decrease in 1901 was due to (1) the opposition to the Japanese immigrants by the white population; (2) the Russo-Japanese War; (3) the cessation of Japanese immigration from Hawaii. Following the end of the Russo-Japanese War, immigration rose sharply, climaxing in 1908 with 7,601 with an estimated 3,779 coming from Hawaii.[5]

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2 A negligible number of Japanese had entered Canada prior to 1884, the date which marks the start of intensive immigration. The Charter Oath of 1808 and the Emperor's Edict of 1871 encouraged Japanese to emigrate to Western countries to acquire new knowledge, but they did not include Japanese labourers.

3 Young & Reid, The Japanese Canadian, p. 19.

4 See Table XXII.

5 Sumida, The Japanese in British Columbia, p. 30.

TABLE XXII

Japanese Immigration to Canada - [6] 1899-1934

1899	1917 - 301
1900	1918 - 459
1901 - 6	1919 - 584
1902 - 0	1920 - 280
1903 - 0	1921 - 145
1904 - 0	1922 - 140
1905 - 345	1923 - 141
1906 - 1922	1924 - 184
1907 - 2042 (9 mo. period)	1925 - 182
1908 - 7601 (6945 males)	1926 - 114 (6 months)
1909 - 312	1927 - 475
1910 - 104	1928 - 478
1911 - 170	1929 - 168
1912 - 322	1930 - 188
1913 - 252	1931 - 70
1914 - 354	1932 - 32
1915 - 191	1933 - 52
1916 - 148	1934 - 44

Source: R. Sumida, The Japanese in British Columbia, pp. 28 & 35

Until 1907 Canada was bound by the terms of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1894 which permitted any number of Japanese nationals to settle in Canada. However, Canada was faced with a peculiar problem in that practically all Japanese immigrants were concentrating in a small area around Vancouver. In addition, anti-Japanese feelings ending in race riots made it necessary to review existing immigration regulations.

The outcome was a meeting of Japanese and Canadian authorities who compromised on the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907. Under this Agreement, the immigration of Japanese labourers was to be restricted to 400

per YV-7 Sum. 34

6 Periods 1899-1908 and 1927-30 give total immigration. Otherwise figures are for males 18 years and over.

per year.[7] However, the quota of 400 immigrants applied to male industrial workers other than farm labourers.

Under the 1907 Agreement, Japan volunteered to restrict emigration to (1) prior residents of Canada, with wives and children; (2) domestics hired by Japanese residents for bona fide personal and domestic servants; (3) contract emigrants whose term of contract, work to be done, and names and standing of employer were satisfactorily specified; (4) agricultural labourers brought in by Japanese land owners, with a limit of ten labourers to one hundred acres owned by Japanese. The Japanese Consuls in Canada were not to issue certificates for contract labour in Canada unless the contracts had the approval of the Canadian Government.[8]

Canada had agreed to the 1913 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Japan agreed to the provisions on the understanding that the Treaty should not be taken to preclude the application of the provisions of the Canada Immigration Act to Japanese in the same way as to the citizens of other countries.[9] Japan insisted that there be no discrimination and that the Canadian immigration laws give the same consideration to Japanese as given to immigrants from other countries. How-

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7 Sumida, p. 34. The large immigration of 1908 was explained by (1) Japan had no control over Japanese emigration from Hawaii; (2) passports were valid for six months after issuance; (3) the Agreement was not binding until 1908.

8 Reid & Young, p. 11 and Sumida, p. 34.

9 H.F. Angus, Canadian Immigration: The Law and Its Administration, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 28 (January 1934) p. 84.

ever, a new Canadian-Japanese agreement was signed in 1928 restricting the total Japanese immigration to Canada to 150 per year. In addition, each immigrant was required to have a Japanese passport approved by the Canadian Minister in Japan. Passports were restricted to (1) domestic servants for Japanese, (2) agricultural labourers for Japanese farmers, and (3) wives and children of immigrants. Through this treaty Canada gained technical control of Japanese immigration through the Canadian Minister in Japan.

The Japanese as Fishermen. It is reported that the first Japanese to arrive in Canada in 1877 became a fisherman. With an Italian partner he fished on the Fraser until 1880. He returned in 1884 and found 7 or 8 Japanese fishermen. He then fished in the United States, returned to Canada and found 5 of his countrymen fishing. He retired from fishing in 1894 to initiate the salt salmon industry in B.C.[10]

The early Japanese fishermen may be divided into (1) experienced fishermen who came to Canada under a labour contract or by a desire to fish, (2) unskilled labourers other than fishermen, who emigrated under a labour contract. Of 574 Canadian Japanese studied in 1934, 92 or 16.02% came from the prefecture of Wakayama where the main occupation is farming and fishing. 40 of these 92 were fishermen and 30 were farmers.[11]

When Japan rescinded her emigration restrictions on labourers in 1884, the number of Japanese fishermen in B.C. increased rapidly.

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10 Sumida, p. 23.
11 Ibid., p. 55.

Steveston at the mouth of the Fraser River where the Japanese first arrived in 1887 soon became the centre of the Japanese population. The original Japanese settler of Steveston returned to Japan to tell of the B.C. fisheries. His success in persuading his countrymen to return to Canada with him may be gauged by the fact that by 1899 the Japanese population of Steveston was 2000.

Perhaps it was a factor in the influx of the Japanese that the president of the Fraser River Canners Association visited Japan. A newspaper reported a "tremendous influx of Japanese during the early summer months, significantly after a visit by the president of the Canners Association to Japan."[12]

The number of Japanese entering the fishing industry during the early phase of immigration was as follows:

1896 - 452
1897 - 787
1898 - 800
1899 - 1955 [13]

By 1901, Japanese fishermen held 1958 of the 4722 licences issued in B.C. In addition, the Japanese fishermen probably received a considerable number of the 1090 fishing licences allotted to the salmon canneries in 1900 and 1901. In the latter year, it is estimated that the Japanese held over 2000 licences. Assuming that each fishing boat had two men, there would be approximately 4000 Japanese fishing.[14] Only the captain on the gillnet boat required a licence. The crewmen were unlicenced.

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12 Vancouver Daily Province, August 4, 1900, p. 8.
13 Sumida, p. 25.
14 Young & Reid, p. 42.

Another source gives the number of licences issued to Japanese as follows:

1898 - 782	1902 - 924
1899 - 919	1903 - 1499
1900 - 1655	1904 - 776
1901 - 1804	1905 - 1042 [15]

In the following years the Japanese maintained an active part in the industry despite continued agitation against them. By the beginning of World War I they were firmly established. During this war Japan was an ally and consequently the B.C. Japanese were regarded as patriotic citizens. By the end of the War (1919) they held 3267 or approximately one-half of all the fishing licences issued to the B.C. fisheries. Increased agitation resulted in a curtailment of licences issued to Japanese, a curtailment that they successfully fought.[16] When Japan entered World War II all B.C. Japanese were evacuated from the Pacific Coast and were not permitted to re-enter fishing until 1947.

The Japanese have specialized in gillnetting. To a lesser extent they were also to be found in trolling, cod fishing and halibut fishing. In general they tended to dominate any branch of the fishing industry where they were unrestricted. Thus to some extent their specialization was determined by restrictive legislation.

Japanese Fishing Organizations. For various reasons the assimilation of the Japanese into Western Canadian society has been retarded. Basically, the cause is a clash of two different cultures with

15 B.C. Fisheries Commissioner, Reports and Recommendations, 1905-1907, p. 23.
16 Details are given later.

the accompanying different physical characteristics, languages, habits of living, customs and material standards. The major cause of opposition to the Japanese was due to the economic competition offered to the white worker. There was the constant fear that the Japanese, because of his lower standard of living would work for less pay and thus deprive the white man of his livelihood. As a consequence, the Japanese labourer has had to face discrimination, attacks from organized labour, and legislation designed to restrict his entry into Canada and into certain industries. On the other hand, he has been welcomed by employers who required a source of cheap labour.

When the Japanese settled in B.C. they tended to concentrate in certain defined areas along the coast. In the fishing industry the main areas of concentration were at Steveston on the Fraser River, Ucluelet on the West Coast of Vancouver Island, Port Essington on the Skeena River and the Powell Street area of Vancouver. The last mentioned area served as the business centre for the Japanese. Wherever they settled the Japanese were a segregated minority group, maintaining their own language and customs.

In each settlement Japanese organizations and societies were formed to serve a dual purpose. Foremost was economic, concerned with their livelihood. Secondly, the societies went beyond their economic basis and served as centres of community life.[17] "The more obvious function of these associations is the protection of the occupational

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17 The dual purpose of the Japanese organizations serving the purposes of a labour union and a community council or a fraternal society is similar to the purposes of the present Native Brotherhood of the native Indians of B.C.

interests of the Japanese. They have worked effectively when provincial authorities have attempted to restrict the area of Japanese competition in the different industries. They formed an association within which practically all the gainfully employed adult Japanese males are organized. They function also in the interests of the general welfare of the Japanese section of the larger community. They may build a hospital for the use of their people, assist Japanese educational associations, give moral and financial support to sport among the second generation, or establish subsidiary organizations for the guidance of the second generation when the latter seem unable to cope with the particularly difficult problems which confront them. Moreover, in times of crisis, these associations speak for the Japanese section of a community as a whole. The assumption of a broader function by the trade organization is almost inevitable because the Japanese are usually only a small section of a predominantly white community and would be without leadership if the trade organization did not provide it." [18]

It is obvious that with the Japanese concentrated in a few centres and their organizations serving dual purposes a few organizations would meet their needs. To serve the gillnetters were two organizations: (1) the Fishermen's Association at Port Essington, and (2) the Fishermen's Benevolent Association at Steveston, with a membership in 1934 of 600 and 413 respectively. [19] In turn, these two organizations were affiliated with the Canadian-Japanese Association of B.C., which was the major

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18 Young & Reid, p. 114.
19 Sumida, P. 158.

Japanese organization and whose aims were stated to be (1) to sustain and improve the moral character of the Japanese first and second generation in Canada, and (2) to establish and spread friendly relations between the Japanese and all other races in Canada, and hence to aid the process of assimilation.[20]

In 1917, six Japanese gillnetters moved from Steveston to Ucluelet. The year marked their entry into salmon trolling.[21] The numbers increased and by 1926 they organized the West Coast Trolling Fishermen's Association (WCTFA) with headquarters at Ucluelet and branches at Bamfield and Tofino. During this same period, the white fishermen on the West Coast of Vancouver Island were making attempts at forming similar organizations, but were meeting with indifferent success.

Two fish-buying stations were to be used, one for the Japanese trollers and one for the Indian and white fishermen. The purpose of the Association was to secure better fish prices. The organization was to have its own manager who was to be responsible for developing markets and negotiating with both Canadian and American buyers. It was felt that with their own manager negotiating on their behalf the fishermen would feel assured that they were receiving the prevailing market price. There would be less necessity of having recourse to strike action in order to secure increased prices for their fish.[22]

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20 Sumida, p. 159.
21 Ibid., p. 228.
22 Labour Gazette, February , 1926, p. 260. Another version and possibly an incorrect one regarding this fishing organization was that it was called the Consolidated Fishermen's Association with headquarters at Ucluelet. It is possible that the name given here was confused with that of the Consolidated Cod Fishermen's Association.

The WCTFA was mainly concerned with the marketing of troll-caught spring salmon and cohoes. The packers collected fish from the various fish camps, then delivered them to Vancouver and Seattle buyers at the prevailing market prices. Packing charges and other costs of production were deducted from gross sales. The balance or net was paid to the fishermen according to the amount of their delivery.

Membership in the Japanese Association was open to all fishermen regardless of racial origin, but only one or two white fishermen were members. From 1932 to 1935 offers were made to cooperate with or merge with the Kyuquot Trollers' Cooperative Association, composed of white fishermen and with an operation extending along the entire coast of the West Coast of Vancouver Island. All these offers were rejected. The details of these proposals are not known. Some possible basis for the rejection would be the nature of the proposals, racial animosity, or both. In March 1932 the Board of Directors of the KTCA decided against taking any action regarding amalgamation with or even admitting Japanese trollers. There was an understanding among the KTCA membership that a Japanese could not become a member. Actually, there never was any sign of friendliness or cooperation between the two Associations. In 1934 the KTCA brought to the attention of the M.P. for Comox-Alberni the activities of a Japanese fish buyer at Bamfield, alleged to be using unfair business practices.

The main centre of the B.C. ling cod fisheries for the smaller ling cod boats is the area around Nanaimo and Cape Mudge. Under the leadership of a native Indian, the Consolidated Cod Fishermen's Association

was formed. The name was later changed to the East Coast Ling Cod Fishermen's Co-operative. It showed considerably less hostility to Japanese than the KTCA and by 1938 had a membership of 215 with an executive of five Japanese and four white fishermen. By World War II the organization was composed almost entirely of Japanese.

The peak of organized agitation against Japanese fishermen followed World War I. By restricting and reducing the number of fishing licences issued to Japanese fishermen, it was hoped to eliminate them from the industry. This threat aimed at their livelihood required joint action by all Japanese in the industry. The action taken was the formation in 1926 of the Amalgamated Association of Japanese Fishermen, merging the Japanese Fishermen's Associations of Steveston and Port Essington. The new Association was chartered by the Trades and Labour Congress as a federal union, but not until 1935.

Neither the West Coast Trolling Fishermen's Association nor the East Coast Ling Cod Fishermen's Co-operative actually joined the Amalgamated Association of Japanese Fishermen. However, curtailment of fishing licences to Japanese applied to all phases of fishing and thus it can be assumed that they gave it support while retaining their separate identities.

By 1942, when all Japanese were removed from the Pacific Coast, the main Japanese fishing organizations in B.C. were the Amalgamated Association of Japanese Fishermen, the East Coast Ling Cod Fishermen's Co-operative, and the West Coast Trolling Fishermen's Association. Today the majority of Japanese fishermen are members of the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union and the pre-war associations never reorganized.

Japanese Owned Fisheries Establishments. The Japanese were instrumental in developing the salt salmon and salt herring industries. The former was started in Vancouver in 1896 and soon salt salmon establishments were scattered along the coast. In many cases where the canners did not want the chum salmon the Japanese were permitted to use a part of the cannery plant for the dry salting. In 1934 there were eleven salmon salteries on the West Coast of Vancouver Island representing a total capital investment of $1,019,000, a gross income of $1,730,000, employing 298 white and 395 Japanese labourers.[23]

Japanese were instrumental also in developing the dry salt herring industry, which started in 1892 at Vancouver. This industry was in the Gulf of Georgia area with centres at Departure Bay, Pender Island and Galiano Island and the Barkley Sound area of Vancouver Island with Green Cove the largest centre.

Prior to World War II the Japanese were dominant in both the salt herring and salt salmon industry. The markets were in the Orient and of necessity the product had to be low priced to meet the demands of the low income Japanese and Chinese buyers. A major portion of the pre-war demand for the chum salmon was for salteries.

Both industries declined after expulsion of the Japanese from the B.C. Coast in 1942. It is doubtful if either industry will be revived to any extent in the near future for the following reasons: (1) The present political unrest in the Far East makes an assured market an impossibility. (2) The price of chum salmon has increased considerably.

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23 Report of the Japanese Consulate, Vancouver, B.C., 1935, cited by R. Sumida, The Japanese in British Columbia, p. 270.

Where the Japanese buyer paid so much per fish in the pre-war period he would now have to pay more than that amount for a pound of the same fish. Similarly the present price of herring prohibits its sale for mass consumption in the Orient. (3) Labour has been unionized and labour costs have risen to the extent where it probably prohibits the operation of both industries in view of the fact that all manual labour and no machinery was employed. (4) Plants required for the dry salting were merely sheds plus plenty of salt. These "sheds" today would require a considerable investment. (5) Assuming that plants were built for the dry salting of salmon or herring there is still the problem of being assured an adequate supply of fish.

Organized Action Against Japanese Fishermen. Organized action has been directed against the Japanese since their arrival in Canada. Agitation has occurred in every branch of industry that the Japanese have entered. For the purpose of describing the Japanese in B.C. fisheries, this agitation will be divided into (1) legislative action, (2) organizations specifically formed for anti-Japanese purposes, (3) opposition from various fishermen's unions, and (4) opposition from fishermen's co-operatives. These divisions are purely arbitrary since labour, organized and unorganized, along with proprietors of small business firms, were the principal instigators of practically all agitation, whether action was taken through legislation or through physical means.

Three factors should be taken into account in dealing with any action directed against the Japanese. The first is that labour unions and co-operatives generally have clauses in their constitutions and by-laws stating that members are to be accepted regardless of race, creed or

colour. Secondly, the Japanese did not have either the Federal or Provincial vote and thus did not enjoy the full rights and benefits of citizenship. Japanese veterans of World War I were exceptions having received their federal vote in 1919 and the British Columbia provincial vote in 1931. Thirdly, the basic fear of the white population was economic competition. White labour feared the possibility of Japanese labour replacing them. This fear was aggravated by the concentration of the Japanese in defined areas.

Legislative Action Against Japanese Fishermen. In 1891 an amendment was introduced in the provincial legislature to increase the Chinese Head Tax from $50.00 to $250.00. This amendment contained a proposal to include Japanese immigrants under this increased head tax. This motion was withdrawn. In 1895 a measure was introduced to prohibit the employment of Japanese and Chinese in public works or on works authorized by private Acts, the purpose being to stem or decrease the influx of Oriental labour. This proposal was disallowed by the Dominion Government.[24]

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24 Angus, "Canadian Immigration", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, (January 1934), p. 72. The Dominion Government has complete powers under the British North America Act to control immigration into Canada. Provincial governments may pass laws relating to immigration provided these laws are not repugnant to laws passed by the Canadian parliament. Furthermore, it is possible for the Dominion Government to control without reference to the Parliament of Canada, provincial legislation: (1) the Governor-General of Canada in Council within one year of the receipt of an authentic copy of an Act of a Provincial Legislature may disallow the Act, in which case the Act is annulled from and after the day on which the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province signifies the disallowance by Speech or Message to the Legislature or by Proclamation; (2) the Lieutenant-Governor of a Province may reserve a bill passed by the Provincial Legislature for the signification of the Governor-General's pleasure, in which case the bill has no force

Positive legislative action to eliminate the Japanese gradually began following the end of World War I. War veterans were being encouraged to re-establish themselves in the fishing industry and to settle along the B.C. Coast.[25] This was to be achieved by curtailing the number of fishing licences issued to the Japanese and increasing the number issued to the white fishermen. In 1919, the Federal Government and the Department of Marine and Fisheries attempted to enforce this. However, no action was taken in 1919 or 1920 due mainly to the scarcity of white and Indian fishermen during the post war economic prosperity. The order was portponed in 1921 because of the scarcity of fish which made a demand that allowed room for all fishermen. By 1922 the postwar economic slump created unemployment and a chance for the authorities to enforce the order.[26]

In 1922 a commission was appointed under the British Columbia Fisheries Department to study and report on the problem of the Japanese in the B.C. Fisheries. On this commission were four M.P.'s from British Columbia and two from the Maritime Provinces. All the four M.P.'s from B.C. represented constituencies in which fishing was an important industry.[27]

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unless and until within one year from the day on which it was presented to the Lieutenant-Governor for assent, the Lieutenant-Governor signifies by Speech or Message to the Provincial Legislature or by Proclamation that it has received the assent of the Governor-General in Council. As stated earlier, Canada was bound by the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1895 which allowed Japanese to enter, travel or reside in any part of Canada and any new legislation would be difficult to enforce.

25 More details of this will be given in a later section of this study.

26 Sumida, p. 229.

27 The B.C. representatives were Messrs. Stork of Skeena, McQuarrie of New Westminster, Neill of Comox-Albemi, and Dickie of Nanaimo.

The Commission held hearings at various centres from Prince Rupert to Vancouver. White and Indian fishermen and organizations were invited to present briefs but no such invitation was extended to individual Japanese or representatives of Japanese organizations.[28]

Following the hearings, the Commission made the following recommendations regarding the curtailment of licences issued to Japanese fishermen: (1) gillnet licences issued in 1924 should be 40% less than the number issued in 1923; (2) salmon trolling licences should not be cut in 1924 but reduced 15% in 1925; (3) in issuing fishing licences to Japanese fishermen preference be given to Japanese war veterans and then to other Japanese fishermen on the basis of length of residence in Canada.[29]

The following table for the years 1922-1924 shows the number of fishing licences issued to white, Indian and Japanese fishermen.

TABLE XXIII - FISHING LICENCES ISSUED 1922-1924

	1922			1923			1924		
Area	White	Indian	Jap.	White	Indian	Jap.	White	Indian	Jap.
1	390	34	872	416	25	523	359	42	523
2	993	950	1068	1185	1037	641	909	937	627
3	87	48	49	54	59	29	97	32	29
Total	1470	1032	1989	1655	1121	1193	1365	1011	1129

Source: Data provided by the Amalgamated Association of Japanese Fishermen as cited by R. Sumida, The Japanese in British Columbia, p. 232.

Results, in 1923, of the reduction of licences issued to the Japanese fishermen were varied in different types of fishing. In gillnetting where Japanese licences were to be reduced by 40%,

28 Sumida, p. 230.
29 Ibid., p. 231.

numbers of white fishermen rose by 9.5% and Indian fishermen by 7.4%. In salmon trolling, the number of Japanese decreased by 25%, white fishermen were down by 6.1% and Indian fishermen increased by 13.9%.[30]

In 1924, the results were as follows: in gillnet fishing, a decrease of 1.18% in the number of white fishermen and an increase of 4.1% in the number of Indian fishermen. In District 1 (See Map 1A) the number of white fishermen increased by 2.8% and Indians by 32.3%. In the Skeena River area, white fishermen increased by 56% and Indians 6.2%. In the River's Inlet and Smith's Inlet areas number of white fishermen dropped 12.7% and Indians went down by 21%.[31]

In 1925, the Japanese held 24% of the gillnet licences issued in the province plus 10.5% of the salmon trolling licences.[32] The reduction was continued in 1925 but was suspended in 1926 due to lack of specific recommendations for the year; strong protests from non-Japanese sources against elimination of the Japanese fishermen.

In 1926, a Select Standing Committee on Marine and Fisheries was appointed to make further recommendations about the Japanese fishermen. This new committee merely reiterated the stand of the previous Commission with the added recommendation that the licences issued to other than white men and Indian be reduced 10% below the number for 1926, and that they be reduced by the same amount in each future year, so that licences would ultimately be entirely confined to whites and Indians.[33] The order covering ling cod and salmon fisheries went into

30 Canada, Department of Marine & Fisheries, Fisheries Branch, Annual Report, 1923-24, p. 52.

31 Fisheries Report, 1924-25. The figures given for the various areas show a shifting. The report stresses that the purpose of the figures were to show overall results.

32 Fisheries Report, 1925-26, p. 53.

33 Canada, House of Commons, Select Standing Committee on Marine & Fisheries, Report, 1926, pp. 33-34, cited by Sumida, p. 239.

effect in 1927. The results in the two fisheries were as follows:

TABLE XXIV

Gill Net Licences Issued To Japanese 1922-1931

1922 -	1,989	1927 -	912
1923 -	1,193	1928 -	912
1924 -	1,179	1929 -	912 [34]
1925 -	1,015	1930 -	912
1926 -	1,014	1931 -	912

TABLE XXV

Ling Cod Licences Issued 1923-1924

District	White	Indian	Japanese	White	Indian	Japanese
	1923			1924		
1	2	-	1	8	-	1
3	64	8	303	92	15	129
Total	66	8	304	100	15	130

Source: Data supplied by the Amalgamated Association of Japanese Fishermen, cited by R. Sumida, The Japanese in British Columbia, pp. 239-240.

The reduction in salmon trolling licences issued to Japanese fishermen with a comparison of licences issued to other fishermen is shown in Table XXIV. In 1924 the West Coast Trolling Fishermen's Association protested to the authorities in Ottawa concerning the reduction but to no avail. In 1926, a further decrease of 15% in Japanese trolling licences was ordered. This last order resulted in a strong protest and in petitions from some white residents of Ucluelet, Tofino and Clayoquot. No reductions were made in 1927.[35]

34 In 1929 and subsequentlyears, licences were issued to Japanese war veterans without discrimination.

35 Sumida, pp. 246-249. The petitions mentioned probably originated from merchants rather than from the white and Indian fishermen. The report of the Kyuquot Trollers' Co-operative Association seems to confirm this.

TABLE XXVI

Salmon Trolling Licences Issued 1922 - 1925

Year	Whites	Indians	Japanese	Totals
1922	743	438	332	1513
1923	698	499	249	1446
1924	776	552	225	1553
1925	919	539	191	1821

Source: Annual reports of Fisheries Branch of Department of Marine and Fisheries.

Similar restrictions were placed on the dry salt herring and salmon operations, a phase of the industry dominated by the Japanese. The 40% reduction ordered by the Commission reduced the number of purse seine operators to 30 in 1925.[36] By 1927 this was reduced to two.[37]

In addition, restrictions were placed on the employment of Japanese labour in the herring salteries. These were ordered to employ 25% white or Indian fishermen and plant workers in 1924, 50% in 1925 and 75% in 1927.[38] In 1926, the number of Indians and whites to be employed was actually increased to 100%.[39]

In the dry salt salmon industry the Japanese were ordered to employ 25% white or Indian labour in 1925, 50% in 1926, 75% in 1927 and finally 100% in 1928.[40] However, in 1925 the white fishermen of the Fraser River area protested to the Minister of Fisheries on the grounds that the quality of the dry salt salmon had deteriorated following the order and there was a possible loss of markets and thus a loss to the

36 Japanese Herring and Saltery Operators, Petition to the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, February 1925, cited by Sumida, p. 241.
37 Report of Department of Fisheries, p. 65.
38 Sumida, p. 242
39 Departmental Order, Herring Operations - Oriental, January 25, 1926, cited by Sumida, p. 244.
40 Sumida, p. 243.

fishermen. The government then partially rescinded the order by allowing the Japanese to work in the saltery plants only. No purse seining for salmon by the Japanese was permitted.

During this period the Amalgamated Association of Japanese Fishermen was formed. Representatives of the organization and the Steveston Benevolent Fishermen's Association went to Ottawa to present the case of the Japanese fishermen. The Federal Minister of Fisheries came to Vancouver to obtain first-hand information. Neither of these attempts produced any concrete results and as a final recourse the Japanese took the matter to court. Thus in 1927 all restrictions on the granting of fishing licences were halted pending the outcome of the court decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada in 1928 rendered a judgment which appeared to be in favour of the Japanese. Basically, it was that "and British subject residing in British Columbia, who is not otherwise legally disqualified, has the right to receive a licence, if he submits the proper application and tenders the prescribed fee." [41] The Dominion Government appealed the judgment but the Supreme Court was upheld by the Privy Council. Thus in this final judgment of May 1929 the matter of restricting Japanese fishing licences appeared to have ended.

Despite the court decision, the Minister of Fisheries still had discretionary power to grant or withhold fishing licences. Any hope that the Japanese had of benefitting from the court decision was seriously hindered by another legislative restriction enacted by the Federal Govern-

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41 Sumida, p. 252.

ment in 1929. This legislation clearly defined the power of the Minister of Fisheries to grant or withhold licences by stating that "the Minister (of Fisheries) may, in his absolute discretion, wherever the exclusive right of fishing does not already exist by law, issue or authorize to be issued, leases and licences for fisheries and or fishing, wheresoever situated or carried on." [42]

The Federal Department of Fisheries in 1931 announced the resumption of the policy of restricting fishing licences issued to Japanese. Beginning with the 1931 season the rate of reduction was to be 10% annually. This order was never enforced.

Japanese-owned processing establishments were in a more enviable position. In 1930 the B.C. Provincial Government received the sole power to grant licences to processing plants. The Provincial legislation regarding granting these licences contained no discriminatory clauses and the Japanese had unrestricted privileges to obtain licences for salmon canneries, salteries and reduction plants. In the same year Japanese gillnetters were allowed to use power boats, a right which had been extended to Indian and white fishermen in 1923.

Results of Restrictions on Japanese Fishermen. The main purpose of the restriction measures was stated thus: "the gradual elimination of the Oriental from the fisheries of the province is primarily for the purpose of providing greater encouragement to white men and Canadian

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42 1929, 19-20, Sec. V, Chap 42, Sec. 2, amending R.S.C. 1927, Chap. 73, Sec. 7. See 1932, 22-23 Geo. V Chap 42, Sec. 7, and Amending Act 1934, 24-25 Geo. V, Chap 6, cited by Sumida, p. 252.

Indians to take up fishing for a living."[43] This elimination was partially achieved. By the end of the restrictions the Japanese were engaged in gillnetting, trolling, cod fishing, greyfishing, and some herring where restrictions had been partly lifted. No licences were issued to them in salmon purse seining, halibut fishing, and pilchard seining.

A serious result of the restrictions on the Japanese was the transference of the economic competition provided by the Japanese from the fisheries to small business establishments, lumbering and agriculture, particularly in small fruit growing. During the imposition of restrictions approximately 1200 Japanese were forced to seek other employment.[44] The average Japanese fisherman up to this period, based on a study of 93 fishermen, had spent 20.18 years in fishing.[45]

The number of Japanese fishermen was decreased and they were no longer a dominant group. The fact that the white and native fishermen could maintain production was demonstrated during the absence of the Japanese fishermen during World War II.

Organizations Formed For Anti-Japanese Purposes. By 1903, the Americans, particularly around the San Francisco area, were actively agitating against the Japanese through the Japanese and Korean Exclusion Leagues. Under the guidance and aid of this organization an Anti-Asiatic League was formed in Vancouver in August 12, 1907, with a membership of 500. On September 12, 1907, this League led an anti-Oriental riot inflicting

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43 Sessional papers #24, 1925, cited by Sumida, p. 232.
44 Sumida, p. 254.
45 Ibid., Table #22, p. 109.

considerable damage to the Chinese section of Vancouver but were repelled from the Japanese section. It was during this demonstration that the rioters burned the effigy of the Lieutenant-Governor of B.C., who was an employer of Oriental labour in the coal mines of Nanaimo.

The White Canadian Association was formed in November 1920 with the object of voicing anti-Oriental propaganda through the press. Included in the executive was a representative of the B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association.[46]

Opposition By Organized Fishermen. Much of the history of the disputes in the fishing industry is concerned with antagonism towards the Japanese. In this industry labour's traditional concern for civil liberties was abandoned. When the fishermen's unions were of a local nature, confined to local geographic areas and concerned with a specific type of fishing, the antagonism towards the Japanese was confined to these specific areas. In the early period up till the end of World War II the white and Indian fishermen were confronted with the dual purpose of bargaining with the canners for fish prices while at the same time protecting themselves from the encroachment of the increasing number of Japanese fishermen.

The original B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association was organized in 1914 under the auspices of the New Westminster Board of Trade for the express purpose of eliminating the Japanese from the Fraser River.[47] All

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46 Young & Reid, p. 124.
47 B.C. Federationist, May 1, 1914, p. 2.

who "believed in driving the Oriental out of the industrial life of the province" were welcomed to the organization.[48] The Board of Trade was concerned with the Japanese practice of remitting a part of their earnings to Japan thus "sapping the financial life of the Fraser Valley to the extent of approximately $1 million a year, which is diverted from the local channels of trade and sent to an alien land, where it is lost to this section forever."[49]

The constitution and by-laws of the BCFPA stated that "only whites and native Indians may be enrolled as members of this organization", but that "if deemed advisable by the executive and endorsed by the members of the organization, active cooperation with the Japanese fishermen in matters pertaining to the welfare of the fishermen as a whole will be included in achieving the objectives of the union.[50]

Opposition By Fishermen's Cooperatives. The Japanese trollers were confined to the Barkley Sound area with headquarters at Ucluelet. The opposition to the Japanese centred around this specific area and along the West Coast of Vancouver Island generally. The general attitude of the white members of the Kyuquot Trollers' Cooperative Association may be summarized by the tacit understanding that existed among them that a Japanese could not become a member of their organization. As stated earlier, any proposals of cooperation or amalgamation of the Japanese WCTFA and the KTCA were refused by the latter body. In 1936, the KTCA formally requested the Department of Fisheries to reduce Japanese trolling licences by 10% annually. The Japanese were confined to the Barkley Sound

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48 B.C. Federationist, May 8, 1914, p. 2.
49 B.C. Federationist, May 22, 1914, p. 2.
50 No. 4 and 5, Constitution and By-Laws, BCFPA.

area and when they asked for help in overcoming area restrictions, they were refused. In 1938 the KTCA passed a motion that when a Japanese holder of a trolling licence died, his licence be cancelled and not be passed on to another Japanese. In 1942 the white trollers expressed opposition to any re-settlement of the Japanese in British Columbia following World War II. They went further by going on record as being in favour of the repatriation of all Japanese including Canadians of Japanese descent.

The End of Anti-Japanese Agitation. All anti-Japanese agitation in the fishing industry ended suddenly in World War II with the removal (allegedly for security reasons) of all Japanese from the Pacific Coast. All Japanese-owned fishing boats and fishing gear were sold by the Custodian of Alien Property. Some shore-based fish plants were also sold but many fell into disuse and allowed to deteriorate. The fishermen hoped that the removal of the Japanese would disperse them permanently across Canada, rather than allow them once again to be concentrated in a few centres in B.C.

Restrictions against the Japanese ended in 1948 and they were free to return to the fishing industry. The fear of the mass return of Japanese fishermen proved groundless. Equally groundless was the fear that only those Japanese unable to adjust themselves to their new surroundings would return to the coast. Many of the Japanese fishermen were not anxious to return to pre-war conditions. Again for those who returned to the industry the post-war financial investment required for fishing had increased considerably over that of the pre-war period. Nevertheless, a number of Japanese have returned to gillnetting and trolling.

The UFAWU and the Japanese Fishermen. Notwithstanding the fact the UFAWU has clauses admitting membership regardless of race, creed or colour, and that the union strictly enforces these clauses, racial antagonism does recur wherever and whenever there is economic competition among fishermen. When the Japanese fishermen returned, racial antagonism soon became evident but was immediately stopped by the UFAWU officials. Today there still remains some bitterness and antagonism toward the Japanese, but the only vocal protest has been voiced by a small section of the Native Brotherhood.

The Japanese fishermen today belong to the UFAWU, though the motion to admit them was passed by a narrow margin. The fact that Japanese were returning to the industry created the fear that they might form their own separate organizations and the obvious way of preventing this was to admit them to the UFAWU. In 1950 an official of the UFAWU was an advisory member of the newly-formed Vancouver chapter of the Japanese Canadian Citizens' Association,[51] and a Japanese is currently a vice-president of the UFAWU.

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51 The Fisherman, March 14, 1950, p. 4.

APPENDIX C

THE CHINESE IN THE B.C. FISHING INDUSTRY

Chinese in the B.C. fishing industry are mainly cannery labourers, performing the more menial work. As a group, they have been rather docile in an industry troubled with strikes and disputes. Like the Japanese, they were persuaded to emigrate to Canada during the early development of British Columbia when there was a demand for unskilled labour. Many entered the fishing industry as common labourers with very few, if any, becoming fishermen or skilled tradesmen.

Chinese Immigration into Canada. First Chinese labourers came to British Columbia from the United States during the Fraser River gold rush of 1858. By 1870, they were coming directly to B.C. from China. In the same year, the Provincial Government proposed a head tax on Chinese immigrants and the exclusion of Chinese from government public works. Between 1881 and 1884, it was estimated that the Canadian Pacific Railway brought 15,000 Chinese labourers into Canada.[1] The head tax of $50.00 first levied in 1885 was increased to $100.00 in 1900,[2] without any serious cut in immigration. By 1891

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1 Charles H. Young and Helen R.Y. Reid, The Japanese Canadian, The University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1938, p. 220.

2 Statutes of Canada 63-64 Victoria. c. 32, cited in ibid., p. 220.

there were 8,910 Chinese in B.C., and in 1901 there were 14,376.[3]

In 1902, a Royal Commission was created to study and report on Chinese and Japanese immigration. One result of its report was the raising, in 1904, of the head tax on Chinese labourers to $500.00. This increase discouraged immigration for a period, but by 1908 the number entering was increasing again as shown in Table XXVII.

TABLE XXVII

MALE CHINESE IMMIGRATION TO CANADA, 1904 - 1912

Year		Total	Year		Total
1904	-	4,847 *	1909	-	1,695
1905	-	77 *	1910	-	1,886
1906	-	3	1911	-	4,859
1907	-	63	1912	-	5,776
1908	-	1,719			

* Figures for 1904 and 1905 are for total Chinese immigrants.

Source: Canada, Department of Interior, Annual Reports, cited by Young and Reid, op. cit., pp. 224, 265.

In 1914, the Federal Government under an Order-in-Council (P.C. 23, January 7, 1914)[4] prohibited immigration of skilled and

3 Young and Reid, p. 220.

4 H.F. Angus, "Canadian Immigration: The Law and Its Administration", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, (January 1934), pp. 72,84.

unskilled artisans and made it mandatory for all Chinese immigrants to come directly to Canada from their native states in China. A further deterrent to immigration was given by transportation difficulties during World War I. A further Order-in-Council (P.C. 1202, January, 1919) barred skilled and unskilled labour from entering British Columbia ports.[5] Table XXVIII gives the Chinese immigration following the 1914 Order-in-Council.

TABLE XXVIII

MALE CHINESE IMMIGRATION TO CANADA - 1913-1922

Year		Total	Year		Total
1913	-	7,029	1918	-	695
1914	-	5,230	1919	-	4,095
1915	-	1,147	1920	-	384
1916	-	42	1921	-	2,001
1917	-	297	1922	-	1,125

Source: Canada, Department of Interior, Annual Reports, cited by Young and Reid, op. cit., p. 265.

The Chinese Immigration Act, came into effect in 1923, and until recently formed the basis of Chinese immigration into Canada.[6] Under

5 H.F. Angus, "A Contribution to International Ill-Will," Dalhousie Review, vol. 13 (April 1933), pp. 23-33.

6 Statute of Canada 13-14, Geo. V, C. 38, cited by Reid and Young, op. cit., p. 227.

this Act, only the following classes of Chinese, irrespective of allegiance or citizenship, were allowed to enter Canada:

(a) Members of the Diplomatic Corps or other government representatives, their suites and servants, and consuls and consular agents;

(b) Children born in Canada of parents of Chinese origin or descent, who have left Canada for educational or other purposes on substantiating their identity to the satisfaction of the Controller at the port or place where they seek to enter on their return;

(c) Merchants as defined by such regulations as the Minister may prescribe; students coming to Canada for the purpose of attending, and while in actual attendance at, any Canadian University or college authorized by statute or charter to confer degrees;

(d) Persons in transit through Canada.

An Order-in-Council of September 16, 1930 prohibited the entry of Chinese. The Chinese immigration to Canada following the 1923 Act is shown in the following table.

TABLE XXIX

CHINESE IMMIGRATION INTO CANADA, 1923-1934*

Year		Total	Year		Total
1923	-	232	1929	-	1
1924	-	59	1930	-	0
1925	-	0	1931	-	0
1926	-	0	1932	-	0
1927	-	0	1933	-	1
1928	-	3	1934	-	2

* Figures for 1923 and 1924 are for male Chinese 18 years and over. Balance of figures are totals. Source: Canada, Department of Immigration and Colonization, Annual Reports, cited by Young & Reid, pp.227.

Chinese as Labourers in the Salmon Canneries. Chinese have been engaged as labourers in the salmon canneries practically since the beginning of the industry. Very few have become active fishermen, although in 1931, 18 Chinese were listed as fishermen, but no particulars regarding the type of fishing are given.[7]

During hearings before the 1902 Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration, a canneryman stated that "no cannery on the coast has ever successfully employed exclusively white labour. The Chinese are steady in their habits, reliable in their work, and reliable to make contracts with. They won't strike while you have a big pile of fish in your dock. They are less trouble and less expense than the whites. They are content with rough accommodation at the canneries. If you employ white people, you have to put up substantial buildings with every modern appliance, only to be occupied six weeks in the year. The cameries draw upon all industries for their Chinese labour. Quite a few domestics come to work."[8]

The same Commission reported that the Chinese "are noted for faithful observance of contracts. They are docile, plodding and obedient to servility, easily obtained through boss contractors, accept accommodation unfit and intolerable to a white man, working in gangs under a Chinese boss who has the contract, and who makes his profits

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7 Census of Canada, 1931, cited by Young and Reid, op. cit., p. 239.

8 Canada, Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration, Report, 1902, p. 145, cited by Young and Reid, op. cit., p. 224.

chiefly in furnishing them supplies at a high price."

"A glance at the conditions under which the white working man and the Chinese compete will show how unfair this competition is. The one is expected to discharge the ordinary duties of citizenship to himself, his family, and his country; rent must be paid, food provided, and the family decently clothed; yet he is put into competition with one who does not assume any of these duties, and who lives under conditions insufferable to a white man. Fifty cents a month or less pays the rent, a few cents a day supplies the food, he has no home, wife or family in this country; he shows no desire to change, he is well content as he is until such time as he can return to China and take his savings with him. Fifty years or more on this continent has made little or no change in him or in his manner of living."

"The fact is established beyond all doubts that under present conditions the white labouring man cannot compete with the Chinese and decently support his family. It is wholly illusory to say that wages are fair for the ordinary working man. He may get work at odd jobs which a Chinese cannot do, but the real avenues for unskilled labour that are afforded by the natural industries of the province are practically closed against him, while the cost of living is very much higher than is the east."[9]

The above quotations could be applied to all industries employing Chinese labour. In the fishing industry, it is true that the

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9 Report, 1902, pp. 276-7, cited by Young and Reid, op. cit., p. 225.

conditions under which they lived, and their transportation to and from the salmon canneries, were of a low standard. Their food consisted chiefly of native dishes. In the salmon canneries it is doubtful if they provided unfair competition to white workers. The Chinese were employed in labour considered unskilled and menial which the white workers had no desire or inclination to do. Chinese labour came under Chinese contractors who signed a contract to supply labour in return for so much a case of salmon during the operating season. From the stipulated amount, the contractor paid his Chinese and Indian labour on hourly or piece rate basis.

Chinese labour was, and still is, employed in canneries in all non-skilled work. Generally in the early period, this included making cans by hand, cleaning of fish in preparation of the canning, unloading of fish and cleaning the cannery after a day's run. Today, their steady plodding habits make them especially suitable for the steady work in various processing stages. In addition, they still carry on with the cleaning work, unloading of fish boats, and other necessary common labour in the canneries. Estimates of the number of Chinese labourers employed in the salmon canneries during the early period are given in Table XXX , while Table XXXI shows the average wages paid to Chinese and white labour in the same period.

TABLE XXX

CHINESE LABOUR IN SALMON CANNERIES, 1879 - 1905

Year		Total	Year		Total
1879	-	1,100	1902	-	2,700
1898	-	2,340	1903	-	2,640
1899	-	2,640	1904	-	1,920
1900	-	2,640	1905	-	2,940
1901	-	3,120			

Source: 1879, Young and Reid, p. 218

1898 - 1905, Dominion and British Columbia Fisheries Commission Reports and Recommendations; 1905-1907, p. 23.

TABLE XXXI

WAGES OF CHINESE AND WHITE LABOUR IN SALMON CANNERIES
1879 - 1900

Year	White Monthly	Chinese * Daily	Chinese Monthly
1879			$25.00 to 35.00
1897	$79.58	$1.48	38.54
1898	77.71	1.51	39.39
1900	77.21 to 80.91	1.54	40.15

* 26 days constitute a month.

Source: Young and Reid, pp. 218, 224.

Organized Opposition to Chinese Labour. There is no documented evidence to show any organized opposition to Chinese labour in the fishing industry. They did not offer the economic competition possible in other primary industries. The Chinese cannery labourer performed the menial work and did not become a skilled or technical worker. While he did receive lower pay, it was not at the expense of white labour, since it was under the extenuating circumstances that no white man would be willing to do the type of work that the Chinese were willing to do. The native Indians and the Japanese were primarily fishermen and it is doubtful if the low wages received by the Chinese contributed to racial antagonism.

A factor in the lack of organized opposition to the Chinese was their status as immigrants. Early Chinese came to Canada without intentions of becoming permanent settlers. Their main idea was to save enough money and then retire to their native land. A portion of their earnings was sent to their homes in preparation for their return. Another factor in the lack of opposition was the high proportion of male Chinese in the total Chinese population. There were approximately five males to one female. Thus public opinion did not fear the possibility of a natural increase sufficient to "overrun the country", which formed some of the charges made against the Japanese. Finally, Chinese immigration was relatively well-controlled through legislation. As shown earlier, each increase in immigration has resulted in legislation.

The Anti-Asiatic League of 1907 was directed against the Chinese,

as well as the Japanese.[10] In the riot of 1907, the Chinese were the heaviest losers when the Chinese section of Vancouver was wrecked.

Chinese Organizations in the Industry. In discussing Chinese organizations in the fishing industry the following factor must be considered--only the Chinese contractor had business relations with the fishing company management. Chinese labour was paid, hired, and worked under the supervision of the contractor. It is conceivable to suppose that grievances, if any, of the contractor regarding the contract price would be directed against the cannery management. Similarly, any grievances regarding the rates of pay, working conditions and other labour problems of the Chinese labourers, would be directed against the contractor. Historically, this has been the case.

In 1904, a Chinese head tax of $500.00 came into effect. The ensuing decrease in the Chinese immigration, plus the report that 1,500 to 2,000 Chinese had left for northwestern and eastern Canada led the Chinese cannery contractors to take advantage of the scarcity of Chinese labour. The contractors had contracted in 1903 for 48 cents per case of salmon. The offer for the 1904 season was 50 cents a case.[11] The contractors' main concern was not so much the contract price, but

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10 For details, see Appendix B.

11 Vancouver Daily Province, April 12, 1904, p. 1.

the fact that they had been hiring labour and basing their contract price on a stipulated number of cases which had in the past been greater than the actual pack.

They therefore refused to sign contracts unless the canners guaranteed them the price of 75 percent of their contracts. The canners would not and some cannery operators actually circumvented the contractors by quietly hiring individual Chinese labourers at a daily wage. However, the scarcity of Chinese labour, as a result of the new head tax, proved too great a drawback to make this method of biring a success.

Outcome of problems facing the contractors was formation of the Chinese Contractors Union.[12] Aim of this union was to have all members work through the organization in dealing with cannery operators. One contractor who failed to do so was fined $500.00 by the union. No further details regarding the activities of this union have been discovered. At the very outset, members were expressing fears that attempts were being made to disrupt the organization.[13]

Meanwhile, the Chinese labourers turned their attention to the contractors. In 1904, the Chinese Cannery Employees' Union was formed.[14] These two Chinese unions appear to be the first organizations in the industry concerned primarily with cannery shore workers. Complaint of

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12 Vancouver Daily Province, April 22, 1904, p. 1.

13. Ibid., p. 1.

14 Ibid., April 25, 1904, p. 1.

the Chinese labourers was that each season they had agreed to work for certain rates of pay, but because the contractors had agreed to low contract prices or because the salmon pack did not materialize, the Chinese contractors had been unable to pay them. To aggravate matters, many contractors left for China after being paid by the cannery operators without paying their labourers. The labourers directed this resolution against the contractors: "Under all contracts not containing a guarantee clause, the advances to employees shall be $200.00 to a skilled worker and $65.00 to an unskilled worker. All advances shall be paid in cash."[15] What constituted the skilled and unskilled categories of labour or the reason for the wide discrepancy in financial advances is not known. No further information has been found regarding this union.

In later years, some Chinese workers joined other unions. A number of Chinese cannery workers were members of the Fish Cannery Workers' Industrial Union. At the convention of December 1933, there were eight Chinese delegates representing the Chinese Workers' Protective Association.[16] Basis of representation at the convention was one delegate for fifty members, or a fraction thereof, and an additional delegate for each additional fifty members, or a fraction thereof.

After the effective organization of the shoreworkers, the

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15 Vancouver Daily Province, April 25, 1904, p. 1.

16 No details of this organization are known.

contract system of employing Chinese workers in the fishing industry was abolished. A Chinese labour organizer was appointed by the United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union to work among them. As a result, a majority now belong to that union. Their rates of pay, overtime rates, categories of work, working conditions and other related matters are determined by union agreement.

At the present time, they still are employed mostly in common labour. Their pay and conditions of work are on a par with other workers. Their period of employment has increased. Living conditions have improved correspondingly and are also equal to those of other workers.

APPENDIX D

TABLE XXXII

ORGANIZATIONS OF FISHERMEN AND ALLIED WORKERS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1893-1949

	Name of Organization	Headquarters	Affiliation	Date Organized	Date Dissolved Merged or Reorganized
1.	Fraser River Fishermen's Benevolent Association (later changed to Fraser River Fishermen's Protective Union)	New Westminster	Independent	1893	1893
2.	Fraser River Fishermen's Union (later merged in 4. below)	New Westminster	Trades and Labor Congress	1899	1907
3.	Fishermen's Benevolent Society (Japanese)	Fraser River, Steveston	Independent (later affiliated with 14. below)	1899	1942
4.	Grand Lodge of B.C. Fishermen's Unions	Vancouver (7 locals)	Trades and Labor Congress	1901	1902
5.	Pacific Halibut Fishermen's Union (later changed to 6. below)	Vancouver and Prince Rupert	International Seamen's Union, AFL	1909	1912
6.	Deep Sea Fishermen's Union	Prince Rupert	ISU (see 5. above) (in 1932, severed ISU affiliation and joined TLC)	1912	to date

TABLE XXXII (Continued)

Name of Organization	Headquarters	Affiliation	Date Organized	Date Dissolved Merged or Reorganized
7. Fraser River Fishermen's Protective Association (see 10. below)	New Westminster	Independent	1914	1919
8. United Fishermen of B.C.	Sointula, Malcolm Island	Independent	1917	1924
9. Fish Packers' Union of B.C.	Prince Rupert	Trades and Labor Congress	1918	1935
10. B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association (merged with 30. in 1945)	New Westminster	Trades and Labor Congress	1919	1945
11. Northern B.C. Salmon Fishermen's Association	Prince Rupert	Independent	1920	1932
12. B.C. Fishermen's Association	Vancouver	Independent (merged with 10. above in 1928)	1924	1928
13. Consolidated Fishermen's Association (later changed to 16. below) *	Ucuelet, V.I.	Independent	1924	--

* Co-operative organization having some trade union functions and characteristics.

TABLE XXXII (Continued)

Name of Organization	Headquarters	Affiliation	Date Organized	Date Dissolved Merged or Reorganized
14. Amalgamated Association of (Japanese) Fishermen of B.C.	Vancouver (4 branches)	Independent (TLC charter in 1935)	1926	1942
15. Barkley Sound Fishermen's Union	Barkley Sound	Independent	1931	1931
16. Kyuquot Trollers Association *	Victoria	--	1931	to date
17. Fishermen's Industrial Union (reorganized as 19. below)	Vancouver	Workers' Unity League	1931	1934
18. United Fishermen's Federal Union No. 44 (merged with 30. below in 1945)	Vancouver	Trades and Labor Congress	1932	1945
19. Fishermen and Cannery Workers' Industrial Union	Vancouver (4 locals)	Workers' Unity League	1934	1935
20. Native Brotherhood of B.C. (Indian)	Vancouver	Independent	1930	to date
21. Upper Fraser Fishermen's Union (later merged with 10. above)	Mission	Trades and Labor Congress	1936	1937

* Co-operative organization having some trade union functions and characteristics.

TABLE XXXII (Continued)

Name of Organization	Headquarters	Affiliation	Date Organized	Date Dissolved Merged or Reorganized
22. Skeena River Fishermen's Association	Prince Rupert	Independent	1936	1937
23. British Columbia Fishermen's Union Local 14	Vancouver	Trades and Labor Congress (UFFU No. 44 above)	1937	1938
24. B.C. Trollers' Association (merged with 27. below in 1938)	Victoria	Independent	1937	1938
25. Consolidated Cod Fishermen's Association *	Vancouver	Independent	1937	1942
26. Pacific Coast Native Fishermen's Association (merged with 20. above)	Alert Bay	Independent	1936	1943
27. Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union (merged with 18. above in 1941)	Vancouver (26 locals)	International Seamen's Union, AFL (TLC charter in 1938)	1937	1941

* Co-operative organization having some trade union functions and characteristics.

TABLE XXXII (Continued)

Name of Organization	Headquarters	Affiliation	Date Organized	Date Dissolved Merged or Reorganized
28. Salmon Purse-Seiners' Union (merged with 18. above in 1940)	Vancouver	ISU of AFL (TLC charter in 1938)	1937	1940
29. United Fish Cannery and Reduction Plant Workers Federal Union No. 89 (merged with 30. below in 1945)	Vancouver	Trades and Labor Congress	1941	1945
30. United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union (merger of 10, 18 and 29.)	Vancouver	Trades and Labor Congress	1945	to date

This Table XXXII lists, in chronological order, those fishermen's unions that developed a formal organization, complete with name, constitution, and elected officers. Many informal local organizations of one kind or another have also developed at different times, and a number of them participated in "spontaneous strikes" indicated in Table XXXIII. These were not included among the above, as reliable information about them was lacking.

APPENDIX D

TABLE XXXIII

STRIKES OF FISHERMEN AND ALLIED WORKERS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1893-1949

Date	Location	Organizations Involved	Type of Fishing	Number Involved	Duration (in days)
1893	Fraser River	Fraser River Fishermen's Protective Union	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	1600	5
1894	Skeena River	Indians (unorganized)	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	unknown	unknown
1896	Skeena and Nass Rivers	Indians (unorganized)	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	unknown	unknown
1897	Skeena and Nass Rivers	Indians (unorganized)	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	unknown	unknown
1897	Fraser River	Whites (unorganized)	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	unknown	unknown
1899	Rivers Inlet	Indians (unorganized)	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	2500	7
1900	Fraser River	B.C. Fishermen's Union	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	8000	23

TABLE XXXIII (Continued)

Date	Location	Organizations Involved	Type of Fishing	Number Involved	Duration (in days)
1901	Fraser River	Grand Lodge of B.C. Fishermen's Unions	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	8000	17
1904	Skeena River	Indians (unorganized)	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	1000	30
1907	Fraser River	B.C. Fishermen's Union	Spring salmon gillnetting	125	7
1909	Vancouver and Northern B.C.	Pacific Halibut Fishermen's Union	Halibut	71	10
1912	Vancouver and Northern B.C.	Pacific Halibut Fishermen's Union	Halibut	1700	120
1913	Fraser River	Fishermen's Benevolent Society (Japanese)	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	2000	2
1917	Skeena River and Rivers Inlet	United Fishermen of B.C.	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	unknown	unknown
1918	Prince Rupert	Fish Packers' Union of B.C.	Packing and processing	1000	10
1922	Rivers Inlet	United Fishermen of B.C., B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	950	39

TABLE XXXIII (Continued)

Date	Location	Organizations Involved	Type of Fishing	Number Involved	Duration (in days)
1924	Skeena River	Japanese Fishermen's Association (local)	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	573	10
(May (1925	Fraser River	B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association, Fishermen's Benevolent Society (Japanese)	Spring salmon gillnetting	650	6
(Sept. (1925	Fraser River	B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association, Fishermen's Benevolent Society (Japanese)	Pink salmon gillnetting	1000	3
1927	Fraser River	B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association, Fishermen's Benevolent Society (Japanese)	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	1000	1
1928	Fraser River	B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association, Fishermen's Benevolent Society (Japanese)	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	1500	4
1929	Nootka Sound, Vancouver Is.	Unorganized	Pilchard seining	100	1
1931	Prince Rupert	Deep Sea Fishermen's Union	Halibut	600	10
	Prince Rupert	Unorganized	Salmon trolling	300	14
	Barkley Sound	B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association	Salmon purse-seining and gillnetting	500	10

TABLE XXXIII (Continued)

Date	Location	Organizations Involved	Type of Fishing	Number Involved	Duration (in days)
1932	Skeena and Nass Rivers	B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association, Fishermen's Industrial Union, United Fishermen of B.C.	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	1800	30
	Rivers Inlet and Smith Inlet	B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association, Fishermen's Industrial Union	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	1400	7
1933	West Coast, Vancouver Is.	Fishermen's Industrial Union	Spring salmon trolling	250	30
1934	West Coast, Vancouver Is.	Fishermen's and Cannery Workers' Industrial Union	Spring salmon trolling	50	7
1935	Vancouver and Prince Rupert	Deep Sea Fishermen's Union	Halibut	600	6
	Gulf of Georgia	Fishermen's Joint Council: F&CWIU, BCFPA, Native Brotherhood (Indian), Amalgamated Association of Fishermen (Japanese), United Fishermen's Federal Union	Blueback salmon trolling	500	10

TABLE XXXIII (Continued)

Date	Location	Organizations Involved	Type of Fishing	Number Involved	Duration (in days)
1935	Bute Inlet	Fishermen's and Cannery Workers' Industrial Union	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	80	2
	West Coast, Vancouver Is.	United Fishermen's Federal Union	Pilchard seining	150	10
1936	Upper Fraser	Upper Fraser Fishermen's Union	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	70	7
	Lower Fraser	B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association	Sockeye salmon gillnetting	270	3
	Rivers Inlet	Fishermen's Joint Council	Sockeye salmon purse-seining and gillnetting	2500	26
1938	Prince Rupert	United Fishermen's Federal Union	Herring seining	50	10
	Alert Bay and Johnstone Straits	United Fishermen's Federal Union, Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union, Salmon Purse-Seiners' Union	Salmon purse-seining and gillnetting	450	7
1939	Vancouver	Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union	Herring gill-netting	45	19

TABLE XXXIII (Continued)

Date	Location	Organizations Involved	Type of Fishing	Number Involved	Duration (in days)
1940	B.C. Coast	Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union, United Fishermen's Federal Union	Salmon purse-seining and gillnetting	8000	10
1946	Vancouver	United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union	Net making	245	35
	Vancouver	United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union	Tuna trolling	60	6
1947	Gulf of Georgia	United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union	Blueback salmon trolling	250	30
1949	B.C. Coast	United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union	Chum salmon purse-seining and gillnetting	4500	6

This tabulation of strikes by fishermen and allied workers in British Columbia is by no means complete. It includes only those for which there was definite recorded information in daily newspapers, in union or employer publications, or in official government reports such as the Annual Report of the Provincial Department of Labour of British Columbia and the Labour Gazette, published by the Dominion Department of Labour at Ottawa.

Strikes by fishermen are in many cases exceedingly difficult even to identify, let alone to measure accurately. In the majority of cases the disputes have arisen over the fish prices

TABLE XXXIII (Continued)

offered by canning or processing companies before the season began. A strike occurred when fishermen refused to begin fishing at those prices. The authors have heard of many cases where numbers of fishermen temporarily refused to fish for a particular company, or for a number of companies in a district, because they felt that the prices or other conditions were inadequate. Technically speaking, these were strikes (or perhaps they should be termed "labour boycotts"). However, where the number involved in such disputes was only a small fraction of all fishermen in the district, and failed to have any significant effect on company operations and on markets, they were not included in the above tabulation. The few such small-scale strikes that were included were those that happened to be reported in local newspapers or government publications.

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DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES

STATISTICAL MAP

SHOWING AREAS OF CATCH FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA WATERS (SOUTHERN HALF)

READ CAREFULLY

1. PIN UP IN WHEELHOUSE.
2. WHEN DELIVERING YOUR CATCH, GIVE TALLY MAN THE MAP NUMBER, OR NUMBERS SHOWING THE AREA IN WHICH YOUR FISH WERE CAUGHT.
3. ACCURATE CATCH REPORTS WILL HELP PRESERVE YOUR FISHERIES.

STATISTICAL AREAS ARE DIVIDED BY RED LINES.
SALMON FISHING WITH NETS OF ANY KIND IS NOT PERMITTED OUTSIDE OF, THAT IS SEAWARD OF THE HEAVY BLACK LINE.



THIRD EDITION: JUNE 1957

DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES STATISTICAL MAP

SHOWING AREAS OF CATCH FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA WATERS (NORTHERN HALF)



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

MAP 2

INTERNATIONAL PACIFIC HALIBUT COMMISSION MAP

SHOWING PACIFIC HALIBUT FISHERY

REGULATORY AREAS, 1959