THE REIGN OF THE EMPERORS VALERIAN
AND GALLIENUS, A.D. 253-268

by

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This study of the reigns of Valerian and Gallienus, two Roman Emperors of the mid-third century after Christ, was undertaken to reassess their achievements in the light of modern discoveries about the Roman world. The view frequently expressed by historians—that Valerian and, in particular, Gallienus, were to blame for all the misfortunes that occurred in the Empire—has been found incorrect. Gallienus was vigorous and bold in taking action to check the rapid disintegration of the Empire. Although he failed, the reforms that he introduced into the organization of the army and of provincial government lived on after him. His contribution was not so much to discover these changes (largely begun by Septimius Severus) but to carry their development to a definite conclusion. In order to present the history of the period clearly, the study has been divided into two parts, the first dealing with the chronological sequence of events, and the second with administrative policies, or lack of policy, and with social and economic conditions. Many problems still remain unsolved, but the result of this work, it is hoped, has been a version that reasonably accounts for available evidence.
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PART I

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE YEARS A.D. 253-268

The third century after Christ was one of the most unsettled periods in the history of Rome. If the first century could be called the period of development of the Empire, the second the time of consolidation and prosperity, the third must be termed the century of trial and change. War became the usual way of life; the army was in many respects the leading power and held the lives of many emperors in its hands. The danger of military invasion became an all too frequent reality and the years 235-268 were the grimmest in the history of Rome. That Rome recovered is remarkable, but the new stability was gained only by the realization that the world was too great a responsibility for one man to manage. Aurelian did much to restore order and Diocletian finished the process, but not before creating four administrative divisions within the single Roman world.

In economic and social life there were also far-reaching changes. The old nobility, very few in number since the civil wars of Caesar and Octavian, had disappeared completely by the times of the Flavians; the commercial classes that then rose in prestige now suffered under the strain of supporting continuous warfare. In fact, the classes and types of population of the Empire were quite different from those of even the prosperous second century. With the decline of the commercial groups a large part of the population was

1 The number of emperors alone in each century shows this trend: thirteen in the first, ten in the second, but well over thirty in the third.

left unprotected and often unable to support itself—a condition which could lead to violence. It should be remembered also that the army was not necessarily "Roman", that men of any origin and condition filled its ranks and could furthermore rise to positions of leadership and authority. The allegiance of such men was often more to their own ambition than to maintaining the stability of Rome. Another factor to be considered is the great imperial administrative organization. The Roman bureaucracy was well-established and far-reaching, but the new demands made upon the vast area under its control by the emergencies of war exhausted its resourcefulness. It survived nevertheless and became the basis of the new autocracy and state-control of the fourth and fifth centuries. In matters of philosophy and religion as well there had been important influences through the growth of oriental cults and of Christianity. With so many divergent interests calling for attention, it is no wonder that the third century was a time of growing confusion. To see the Roman world in a period of widespread crisis one need only turn to the events of the years 253-268, the reigns of the emperors Valerian and Gallienus.

For this period the sources vary considerably in quality. Unhappily, much of the contemporary material has been lost, especially written histories. The extant literature, much of it Byzantine and consisting of epitomes and chronographies, is admittedly drawn from these earlier sources but often in so uncritical and unsystematic a manner as to cause considerable confusion. A case in point is the discrepancy in the Historia Augusta between the Vita Gallieni and the Vita Claudii over Gothic invasions in Europe in the years 376-378.
The Historia Augusta is not at all free from the interpolation of many letters, speeches and other documents which are for the most part false. The reason for this is partly to maintain a rhetorical style but chiefly, in the case of Gallienus and Claudius, to glorify Claudius at the expense of his predecessor. It is also awkward to use with assurance because it contains much that is mere gossip and scandal. But not all is poor; the epitomes of such men as Aurelius Victor, Zosimus and Zonaras are, despite the length of time after the events, much more reliable. Helpful, too, are the Christian writers Cyprian and Eusebius in giving a picture of the living conditions of the time. But there still remains the difficulty of accepting any of the accounts at face value: second or third-hand information or worse must be checked closely.

The value of archaeological evidence is apparent: one can thereby augment or correct the more subjective literary records. The study of Roman-Persian relations has been served well in recent years by the discoveries in Iran of several inscriptions referring to the time of Valerian and Gallienus. Much work has been done (and remains to be done) in the Danube area; the frontier-history of Rome is extremely difficult to understand without sound archaeological aid. Epigraphical source-material is scanty—probably destroyed

5 A. Alföldi in C. A. H., XII, pp. 721-723.
7 A. T. Olmstead, "The Mid-third Century of the Christian Era," Cl. Ph., XXXVII (1942), pp. 241-262, 398-420. The Persian records are here compared with a little used but valuable source, the thirteenth Sibylline Oracle.
in the turmoil of the third and succeeding centuries. The extant inscrip-
tions give in general the titles or offices held by the emperors and prominent
military commanders or senators.

Fortunately for historical study, ancient coins were more like medallions
than mere pieces of exchange. That is, events of importance to the Empire
and the imperial viewpoint could be brought to the attention of all. This
advertising-value of coins must be carefully considered: in point of fact,
was the official imperial version the truth? Such legends as PAX AETerna,
LIBERTAS, or RESTITVTOR ORBIS do not seem suitable to the conditions in many
parts of the Empire under Valerian and Gallienus. The imperial policy was
probably to encourage the popular belief in a strong and durable Rome (ROMA
AETerna) under the protection of heaven and guided by the emperor (VIRTus
AVGVSTI). The news-value of coins is seen in such legends as VICTORIA GERMANICA
and VICT. PARTICA and in the special votive and ceremonial issues and those
of the legions. Matters of chronology can often be determined by a careful
study of coinage. In many instances the coins provide a continuous link of
evidence where other sources are incomplete or even contradictory. Apart from
the appearance of coins, their composition is of special importance in
economics. During the reigns of Valerian and Gallienus the debasement of
currency reached crucial proportions. The effect on commerce of a world
shaken by wars and invasions is thus all too clear. Numerous coin-hoards
(usually coins of good weight) buried at this time show the insecurity felt
in all parts of the Empire.

It can be seen from this brief account of the evidence that a general
understanding of the history of the mid-third century is readily acquired.
There are, however, many problems of chronology and interpretation of sources
to be overcome before the history is seen in any detail.

The events leading to the accession of Valerian and Gallienus should now
be considered. In 247/248, during the rule of Philip, Rome celebrated her millenary, but not with pleasant prospects. The foreign wars and the local revolts of Philip's conscientious reign were a portent of the great crises to come within the next few years. His successor Decius (249-251) tried diligently by a programme of reconstruction in the provinces (notably military roads in the Balkans)\(^8\) and of re-organization in Rome to check the strain upon the resources of the Empire. He created a new office in Rome, probably largely financial and equivalent to that of a deputy, which was filled by the future emperor, Gaius Publius Licinius Valerianus.\(^9\) Decius further tried to safeguard the authority of the Roman state by enforcing the imperial power on the body of Christian subjects. For this he received the epithet *execrable animal* from one great Christian writer,\(^10\) but he had a very real reason for demanding popular sacrifice to the Emperor—to ensure loyalty to the state.\(^11\) It was a political move and also an effort to bring under the control of law any possible outbreak of feeling against the Christians.\(^12\) On this point the Roman and Christian minds could not see each other's point of view. Decius, however, had little time to develop his plans for he was called from Rome to Moesia and Thrace to meet two invading armies of Goths—and death. While Decius was fighting the Goths a usurper named Valens Licinianus appeared, but

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9 Zonaras, XII, 625B-C.

10 Lactantius, *De Morte Persecutorum*, IV, 1.

11 Eusebius, *H. E.*, VI, 39, and Zonaras, XII, 635C, note as a reason Decius' hatred of Philip for his tolerance toward Christians.

only for a few days and probably in Illyricum. Many commentators prefer Rome as the scene of his revolt but it may well have been a provincial affair since Valerian was presumably close to Rome. A similar revolt in Philippopolis by the governor, Lucius Priscus, caused the city to be taken by the Goths. As a result of this Gothic invasion in 250 or 251 the Lower Danube area was open to continuous raids and invasions.

Decius was succeeded by his governor in Moesia, Trebonianus Gallus, who had been sent by Decius to help in turning back the Goths. The new emperor immediately concluded a treaty with the Goths, allowing them to keep their booty and prisoners, and promised an annual tribute from Rome to ensure future peace. Returning to Rome, Gallus raised Hostilianus, Decius' younger son, to the position of Augustus and made his own son Volusianus a Caesar. Hostilianus, however, died soon of the plague that had just broken out. It should be noted here that this plague, which appeared first in North Africa and quickly spread over the Mediterranean world, not only caused untold damage for some fifteen years to the populations of cities and towns but also seriously diminished

13 Aurelius Victor, Epitome, 29, 5; Triginta Tyranni, 20.
15 Alföldi in C. A. H., XII, pp. 143-145, argues for 250 whereas Salisbury and Mattingly, J. R. S., XIV (1924), pp. 17-18, and Parker, History, p. 161, n. 51, hold to early in 251 on the ground that the evidence makes it clear that other campaigns on the Danube and Rhine occupied Decius for the whole of 250.
16 Zosimus, I, 24, 2; Zonaras, XII, 628A.
18 Zosimus, I, 25, notes that Gallus, acting from fear of revolt, was involved in his death.
the fighting strength of the Roman army. The events that follow will be found to reveal an empire despairing of recovery and almost demoralized through epidemic and invasion. By the end of 251 Gallus and Volusianus were joint Emperors. Their rule lasted barely two years and was spent in Rome—in fact, Gallus seems to have paid little attention to events farther afield. Gallus' successor as governor of Moesia, Aemilius Aemilianus, an obscure figure even to contemporaries, was in action meanwhile against the renewed attacks of the Goths. He achieved notable successes against them and was shortly proclaimed Augustus. He then marched to Italy against Gallus and was accepted by the Roman army, which then disposed of the Emperor. Gallus, however, had not received the help he had expected: Valerian had been sent to Raetia to gather an army in defense of the Emperor but had not arrived. Aemilianus survived only a short time in Rome, probably from May to early August of 253. He in turn was deserted by the army, which welcomed the slow-coming

19 Aur. Vict., de Caes., 30, 2; Eutropius, IX, 5; Zosimus, I, 26, 2; Zonaras, XII, 628B.
20 Pap. Ox., XII, 1554, in Parker, History, p. 342, n. 60.
21 Zosimus, I, 27, 1.
22 Eutropius, IX, 6.
23 Parker, History, pp. 342-343, n. 8, favours May to August on the basis of the coinage of two Dacian years but only one year at Viminacium for Aemilianus; H. Mattingly, "The Reign of Aemilian," J. R. S., XXV (1935), p. 56, prefers a slightly earlier dating. Dessau, I. L. S., 531, dated 22 October 253, has been taken as evidence that the defeat of Aemilianus took place in August since it would have taken some time for a detachment from a legion to be disbanded and sent home.
Valerian as Emperor.

The problem of chronology here is interesting, although the sources agree in general on the order of events from Decius to Valerian. The Goths, placated by Gallus, renewed their offensive in 251/252 and were defeated by Aemilianus in 252. Perhaps even at that time he was looked upon as a ruler. From then on he had his hopes set upon Rome and probably was in Italy early in 253. (The usual account assigns Aemilianus' ascendancy and whole recorded career to 253,25: Valerian's role in these affairs may then date from before the end of 252 in Raetia. It is quite possible that he purposely delayed in assisting Gallus and allowed Aemilianus to hold power only until he was fully prepared to assume control. It has thus been suggested that he reckoned his tribunician power from 252 as a successor to Gallus.26 This view has not been widely accepted since the difficulties with regard to dates on coins would be increased.27

The Roman East at this time was a source of continuing trouble.

24 Mattingly, J. R. S., XXV (1935), p. 57. The Dacian mint was silent in 251/252 but struck for Aemilianus in 252/253. He was recognized on Alexandrian coins in the summer of 252.


27 Alfoldi, "The Reckoning of the Regnal Years and Victories of Valerian and Gallienus," J. R. S., XXX (1940), p. 1, points out that discrepancies in dated evidence are accounted for not only by numerous errors but also by abnormal systems of calculating regnal years (which, as it happens, are consistent within themselves). It will readily be seen how difficult it is to determine a sound chronology of the mid-third century.
9.

The various Gothic peoples and the Persians under the leadership of the Sassanid king Sapor I (241-272) made repeated inroads into Roman territory—probably so frequent and similar as to cause the confusion found in the sources. Decius was well aware of the danger from Iran; coins show that he re-organized Edessa (given up by Philip) as a military centre. Although Gallus did nothing, Aemilianus probably intended to fight the Persians, as one source states. Valerian went to the East immediately after his confirmation in Rome but achieved little success. For some time Roman control over the East had lessened; the full effect was seen in the time of Valerian and Gallienus.

The renewed Persian vigour began to be felt when Sapor gained control of Armenia in 250/251 by driving out the young Tiridates, after having had his father, the Arsacid king Chosroes, murdered. A Syriac source notes that

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28 Failure to distinguish between "Gallus" and "Gallienus" is often given as a reason for the wrong order of events in Byzantine histories (Alföldi, in C. A. H., XII, p. 146, n. 2). It may with as much reason be the case that invasions were similar and continued under both rulers. The following version of the history is drawn largely from Olmstead, Cl. Ph., XXXVII (1942), pp. 241-262, 398-420, and Alföldi, in C. A. H., XII, Chapters V and VI. Differences among these and other accounts are considerable. The present writer has tried to arrive at a reasonable view in the belief that the sources are by no means satisfactory and that subsequent attempts at reconstruction must be thoroughly analysed.

29 Zonaras, XII, 628D.

30 The Artavasdes in Vita Val. 3, 1, may be the satrap or regent who took Tiridates to the Romans for refuge. This view is opposed by W. Ensslin, in C. A. H., XII, p. 132.
an invasion of Syria and Cappadocia then took place in 251/252 and another much neglected and often maligned source notes an invasion of Cappadocia even before the death of Decius. That the Armenian campaign and the move into Cappadocia are part of a general Persian plan of expansion is obvious—first secure the northern approach (Armenia) and then take opportunities as they come. A Gothic incursion into Cappadocia and Pontus is noted next, contemporary with other activity of the Goths in Moesia and Thrace. After this is recorded the main invasion by the Great King, helped by the adventurer from Antioch, Mariades. These events may be explained as follows. Sapor  


32 The degree of opposition to Sapor is uncertain, but that some bitter episodes did occur may be inferred from *Vita Val.*, 4, 1.  

33 Olmstead, *op. cit.*, p. 401, holds to 251; Zosimus, I, 26, 1; 27, 1; 28, 1, places this event in the year 252/253. The year 252 is not unreasonable. Zonaras, XII, 628A-B, notes Persian and Scythian (Gothic) advances under Gallus.  

34 The biography of Mariades (*Trig. Tyr.*, 2) derives from a Persian or Aramaic source (Olmstead, *op. cit.*, p. 242) and should therefore be carefully examined. It is doubtful whether Mariades was ever an Augustus since coins are not known in his name, whereas other minor rulers, such as Uranius Antonius of Emesa, did issue coins. There may be more truth to the tradition that his treachery and execution took place before Valerian arrived in the East, although most commentators place Mariades at the capture of Valerian. The much-debated rock-carvings from Bishapur (near Kazerun) and Naqsh-i-Rustan (near Persepolis) have been interpreted as showing Sapor giving Mariades a favorable position over the captured Valerian. This need not be the case: B. C. MacDermott, "Roman Emperors in the Sassanian Reliefs," *J. R. S.*, XLIV (1954), pp. 76-80, has pointed out that the figures may well be the emperors Gordian, Philip and
himself did not invade Armenia but sent his son Hormizd there. Hormizd appears in the northern part of Syria and Cappadocia, probably encouraged by Mariades, in 251/252 and seems to have returned to Armenia afterwards, for there is a list of cities (again from Cappadocia) that are evidence for a campaign from Armenia by Hormizd parallel to Sapor's main invasion. Closely following the Persian expedition came the Goths. The suggestion that the Persians urged the Goths and later the Borani to invade from the region of the Black Sea is thus strengthened. Sapor did, however, keep Hormizd in the north to guard against too far-reaching attacks by the Goths. While these operations were under way Sapor began his advance into Mesopotamia and Syria. His path was along the Euphrates, one of the first sites besieged being Doura-Europos. This town was not taken (the name is listed separately in the Valerian—Romans who either were defeated in the East or bought peace there. It would be a fitting memorial to Sapor showing his supremacy over the Roman emperors—no need to mention the insignificant Mariades. Any victories by his son would be added to the glory of the Great King. Zonaras, XII, 628A, does not specifically name Sapor.

Alfeldi in C. A. H., XII, pp. 171-172, places the Persian attack on Cappadocia in 260 and has Mariades with Sapor in 258/259.

Olmstead, op. cit., p. 410. Though the expedition may be slightly later it is probably from Armenia.

Zosimus, I, 28, 1, has them take Ephesus and Pessinus. He says little of Persian activity at this time.

Ensslin in C. A. H., XII, p. 134, objects to this on the ground that the difficulties of the Empire were so well known that no invitation was needed.
inscription) and in fact held out till 255/256. Although Sapor was near Palmyra he did not capture the town (it is not on the list). The incident concerning the rejection by Sapor of Odenath's offer of friendship, if true at all, may be dated at this time. Continuing northward the king appeared before Nisibis in 252, though the town held out for a short time, probably until 254. From there the march continued to Antioch, which was in Persian hands early in 253. The move southward against Emesa, which was guarded by Sulpicius Uranius Antoninus, was unsuccessful. Following this setback the Persians returned home by a northerly route, Palmyra being closed to them. Whether the anecdotes concerning the Persians at Edessa and Carrhae (if true) deserves lengthy discussion in the present context.


42 An Arab source, Tabari, has this in the eleventh year of the king (Ensslin, in C. A. H., XII, p. 132).

43 Ensslin, loc. cit.; Warmington, in Parker, History, p. 390.

44 Alföldi, in C. A. H., XII, p. 170, on the ground that coins of Antioch continue uninterrupted from this time to 258/259; Olmstead, op. cit., p. 405; Warmington, in Parker, History, p. 389.

45 Coins of this ruler continue to 253/254 after which date he disappears. A Greek inscription at Qalaat el Haways (near Emesa) dated 252/253 records a defeat of the Persians (Olmstead, op. cit., p. 408).
This whole campaign can be accurately described as a series of raids: the Persians made little effort to occupy the country but contented themselves with plunder.

Since events in the East were so urgent, it is no wonder that Valerian made hasty preparations for war there. At this point it would be helpful to note the members of the Licinian house who were prominent in the following years. Valerian himself was a distinguished senator and soldier who had served the emperors from the time of the Gordians. His wife, Mariniana, has coins for the years 253-257 but she had died before his accession (she is always referred to as Diva on the coins). His son P. Licinius Egnatius Gallienus was made co-Emperor in Rome by the Senate when Valerian reached the city. Gallienus' wife was Cornelia Salonina, whose coins continue until her death shortly after the murder of her husband. Coins of hers inscribed AVG. IN PACE

46 Petrus Patricius, frag. 11, in H. G. M., I, pp. 430-431; Ammianus Marcellinus, XX, 11, 11. Olmstead, op. cit., pp. 408-410, would place them on this invasion though they may as reasonably have taken place after the capture of Valerian. The two expeditions must have been almost identical.

47 Zosimus, I, 27, 2, gives this impression.

48 Vita Gordianorum, 9, 7; Aur. Vict., Epit., 32, 1; de Caes., 32, 2; Zosimus, I, 14, 1. The fulsome praise of Vita Val., 5 and 6 is in many of its details false but other sources correct it.


50 Aur. Vict., Epit., 32, 2; Eutropius, IX, 7; Zosimus, I, 30, 1; Dessau, I. L. S., 531.
need not mean that she was a Christian, but were issued for several years during Gallienus' sole reign and probably afterwards by Claudius in memory of a loyal wife. There are records of two sons of Gallienus, the elder, P. Cor. Lic. Valerianus, and the younger, P. Cor. Lic. Saloninus Valerianus. The elder son was made Caesar by the Emperor Valerian in the first year of his reign and died a few years later (Alexandrian coins continue only for Saloninus). Saloninus, made a Caesar by Gallienus, remained at Agrippina (Cologne) until he was killed by Postumus when the city was taken. The sources to pacify the army of Gallienus angered at his death.

51 Webb, R. I. C., V, 1, pp. 28, 197, n. 2. In so doing, Claudius hoped to pacify the army of Gallienus angered at his death.

52 Dessau, I. L. S., 557, lists both.


54 Vita Gall., 19-21 (Salonini); Aur. Vict., Epit., 33, 1; Zosimus, I, 38, 2. There is some question as to the dates of Postumus' activity. Saloninus is named in an inscription of 259/260 (Dessau, I. L. S., 539) and is the Caesar on entries in the Justinian Code to the end of 259 (IV, 35, 8 is dated 30 December). Only once is he so named in 260 with certainty (IV, 65, 16, of 29 July). This entry, it should be noted, follows several of 259 with the same heading—an error in compilation is possible.
also note a Valerian, brother of Gallienus, and another son of his who were killed by the Senate after his death. Concerning these there is less certainty: the consular lists have (Licinius) Valerianus as consul for the second time in 265, but there is no mention of his first consulship. As for the son, there is a Quintus Julius Gallienus known from only two coins, of doubtful authority, and an (Egnatius?) Marinianus known again from the consular records. Both Quintus and Marinianus probably belong to the Licinian house, but since there are at most only three sons of Gallienus on record their exact relationship is impossible to determine. The literary tradition remains, but other evidence is inconclusive. That the Senate did vent its bitterness toward Gallienus on his family and associates immediately after his death may safely be drawn from the sources. The Licinian house did not survive fifteen years of rule.

55 Vita Val., 7-8; Vita Gall., 12, 14; Zonaras, XII, 635C.

56 A. Degrassi, I Fasti Consolari dell'Impero Romano (Rome, 1952), p. 72. Coins inscribed VALERIANVS P. F. AVG, and showing a younger man have been interpreted by Webb, R. I. C., V, 1, pp. 28-29, as being Gallic issues for the Emperor and not those of a brother.

57 Webb, R. I. C., V, 1, p. 128, dates these coins, both posthumous, to 255. That a third son should live without leaving substantial record when the other two sons (who had both issued coins) were dead is hard to believe. "Quintus" is still a mystery.

Leaving Gallienus as joint Emperor and in charge of the army in Europe, Valerian arrived in the East in the winter of 253/254 and made his way immediately to Antioch.\(^{59}\) The presence of an Augustus in the East was noted in the coins by optimistic legends. Shortly afterwards the Borani launched an attack against Pityus but were turned back by the military commander there, Successianus. Valerian then called him to Antioch, raised him to the rank of praetorian prefect and set about restoring the city. The next year (255) the Borani were successful, capturing Pityus and Trapezus. Then the Goths in 256 sailed to Chalcedon and from there scoured Bithynia. Valerian sent the general Felix to hold Byzantium, setting out himself for Bithynia. He proceeded only as far as Cappadocia, however, where his army was stricken by the plague. This crippling hardship forced him to turn back to Antioch where he remained till just before his death.

Shortly before, Valerian had strengthened Roman defences as a result of the capture of Doura by the Persians. Coins inscribed VICTORIA PART. and RESTITVT. ORIENTIS may refer to Roman successes in keeping the Persians from any noteworthy crossing of the Euphrates at this time.\(^{60}\) It is possible that even now Valerian had encouraged Odenath of Palmyra to support the Romans.\(^{61}\)

\(^{59}\) Zosimus, I, 30-36, gives the chief outline of events in the East under Valerian.

\(^{60}\) Alfoldi, in C. A. H., XII, p. 148, calls these legends a "groundless boast." It should be noted, though, that there is little Persian aggression for several years.

\(^{61}\) Corpus Inscriptionum Syriac. III, 3945 (cited by Olmstead, op. cit., p. 411, n. 132), has Odenath called \textit{vir consularis} by 258.
Coins were also issued from 255 at a new mint, presumably in support of further military re-inforcements. But this hopeful situation was ruined by Valerian's failure to check the Goths: Asia Minor was in a state of panic.

Valerian, it seems, was unable to restore confidence in the Roman army after the Gothic raid. Feelings of hatred and despair were all about him; his reaction was to begin a persecution of the Church (summer, 257).

There is evidence that he was urged to this action by the future usurper Macrianus, but he needed no excuse at this time to direct hostility away from the Roman ruling forces. The higher clergy were required to show allegiance to the state by sacrifices made before a ranking Roman official. Harsher measures, however, were taken the next year; the clergy could be executed.

62 The location of this mint has been the subject of much debate. Alftöldi, in C. A. H., XII, p. 177, and Magie, R. R. A. M. (Princeton, 1950), I, p. 707, have Samosata; Olmstead, op. cit., p. 419, has Emesa. Alftöldi holds the view that Valerian established his military headquarters at Samosata when moving north. Olmstead notes that issues from this mint for Macrianus and Quietus and the legend sol invictus point to Emesa as a better site. That Samosata was a Roman military post is certain (Macrianus senior was there) but whether it was ever the headquarters under Valerian can be doubted (Antioch was still the chief city). At this time Emesa would have been useful in blocking the Euphrates through a Palmyra-Sura link of defence.

63 Zosimus, I, 3, 6, 2, censures Valerian for failing to aid the survivors, though rather too severely, considering the condition of the army.

64 Zonaras, XII, 629C, connects his persecution with the popular discontent.

65 Eusebius, H. E., VII, 10, 4-5. Cyprian, Epistles, 76-82, shows the extent and effect of his measures.
immediately, Christians of importance in the state service lost property and lives, meetings were denied everyone. As could be expected such actions did nothing to rectify the serious situation in the Roman East.

The Emperor's movements shortly before his capture are obscure. He is known to have been in Antioch in May 258 and probably remained there until drawn out to meet the new Persian invasion. This new threat probably began with decisive inroads into Mesopotamia leading to the siege of Carrhae and Edessa. Valerian faced the Persians at Edessa but fell into their hands, along with other officers, including Successianus. Various stories of this tragedy relate that the army was stricken by the plague at Edessa and that Valerian either tried to purchase an armistice and was seized at a conference or surrendered to Sapor in fear of a rebellion amongst his own men. That he survived some years in servile captivity is certain, although probably not for long, considering his advanced age. The shock to the Roman world was intense:

66 Codex Iustinianus, V, 3, 5; IX, 9, 18. The episode of Mariades' treachery leading to the sacking of Antioch by Sapor is often placed just prior to Valerian's capture. As shown above (p. 10, n. 34) this need not have been the case.

67 Eutropius, IX, 8, 2, and Orosius, adversus Paganos, VII, 22, 7, for Mesopotamia; Zonaras, XII, 629D. Zonaras' account of events surrounding the defeat of Valerian (629-630) is the fullest.

68 Kaaba inscription (Greek) 11, 23-6 (cited by Olmstead, op. cit., p. 413, n. 145); Zonaras XII, 630A.

69 Lactantius, de Morte Pers., IV; Aur. Vict., Epit., 32, 5-6; Eutropius, IX, 7; Hieronymi Chronicon, (Helm) p. 220; Vita Val., 1-3; Orosius, adv. Pag., VII, 22, 4; Zosimus, I, 36, 2; Zonaras, XII, 630B. Two entries in the Codex Iustinianus name Valerian after the year 260 (III, 8, 8, of 262 and V, 62, 17, of 265). Aur. Vict., Epit., 33, 3, says that Gallienus was 'fifty years old
Gallienus, however, did not try to salvage Roman dignity by ransoming his father.

The capture of Valerian presents several problems: when it happened and what the immediate circumstances were still admit discussion. The Persian invasion began in 259 and continued into 261 with Syria, Cappadocia, Cilicia and Lycaonia being overrun after the great success at Edessa. When Valerian had been drawn from Antioch, it is quite probable that a Persian force moved behind his advance and besieged the city. Valerian was thus doubly forced to make a stand at Edessa. The main Persian army then broke through the Roman defences near Samosata, and, joining with the victors from Antioch, ran rampant over Cappadocia and Cilicia. The problem of the date of Valerian’s defeat when he died. Valerian, therefore, was probably well over sixty at his death.

70 Hier. Chron., p. 220; Zonaras, XII, 630D. For a list of the victories from the Persian inscriptions see Olmstead, op. cit., pp. 414-418.

71 Zonaras, XII, 631B, notes Antioch taken along with Tarsus and Caesarea. Alföldi, C. A. H., XII, p. 170, n. 1, notes that coins from Antioch are lacking for a time from 259 and cites the capture as the reason. It should be remembered that there were several "Antiochs" in Asia Minor. Olmstead, op. cit., p. 415 remarks that the Antioch taken by the Persians is listed among cities from the coast of Cilicia, thus raising the possibility of only one capture of the capital Antioch. The tradition in the sources is that the capital was taken closely following the defeat of Valerian. It is reasonable, then, to say that the city was taken twice during Valerian’s lifetime. (Alföldi, C. A. H., XII, p. 172, believes it was captured three times.)

72 Warmington, in Parker, History, p. 392, notes that Samosata itself was taken only on the Persians’ return. Macrianus withdrew the garrison from there when he prepared his expedition to Illyricum in 260.
is more difficult to determine. A coin hoard from Hamath (south of Antioch) contains issues from the second Asian mint, but only of Valerian. That they were buried in connection with the taking of Antioch is certain but whether before or after is impossible to say. Papyri show that the successors of Valerian were recognized in Egypt from September of 260. (Entries in the Justinian Code, on the other hand, continue in the names of Valerian and Gallienus right through 260.) To find a more precise date it has been suggested that the election of Dionysius as bishop of Rome in some way depended upon the arrival of news of Valerian's defeat. However, as there is some question about when the election took place, no definite date can be established.

73 Alföldi, Berytus, IV (1935), p. 51 (cited by Olmstead, op. cit., p. 419), dates the hoard to 260, followed by Olmstead. But when the coins were minted need not be 260. This hoard is not necessarily to be taken as evidence that Antioch was taken twice within the space of a single year (as Alföldi interprets it) since the Persian siege and occupation might have lasted some time into 260.

74 Magie, S. H. A., III, p. 18, n. 1. Coins from Alexandria were being prepared from August of 260 still in Valerian's name (Alföldi, in C. A. H., XII, p. 173). This difference points up the indecision in official circles as to whether Valerian retained his power when in captivity and demonstrates as well the divided loyalties of many parts of the East.

75 Alföldi, C. A. H., XII, p. 172. (He mistakenly has Julius for Dionysius.)
from this evidence. Stronger help is the fact that coins of Antioch fail in 259 and it is thus reasonable to place the capture of both the Emperor and his capital in Asia in the latter half of 259. The records of 260 in Valerian's name show that he was still the senior Augustus and that some hope remained that he would yet be returned to the Empire.

Gallienus was now sole ruler of the Roman world. At this point it is fitting to recount his actions in the West and the events in the rest of the Empire up to the beginning of his seniority. The sources record continuous invasions by various peoples and tribes of Europe and what is now Western Russia. The Goths who had been so troublesome in the Danube area under July 259. Liber Pontificalis, ed. l'Abbé L. Duchesne (second edition, Paris, 1955), I, p. CCLXI; 22 July 260, according to E. Caspar, Geschichte des Papsttums (Tübingen, 1930), I, pp. 72, 575-576. This latter date is commonly quoted. The last Roman bishop, Xystus II, died in 258 under the renewed persecution. There was no delay, however, at Antioch (where Valerian was) in the succession of bishops. Since Gallienus in the West had little interest in Christianity and probably would not interfere, the election of the Roman bishop need not be so closely connected with the capture of Valerian as some interpreters would have it.

77 Goths (Scythians), Carpi, Quadi, Sarmatae, Marcomanni, Alamanni and the Franks are seen in Aur. Vict., Epit., 33, 1; de Caes., 33, 3; Eutropius, IX, 7-8; Hier. Chron., pp. 220-221; Orosius, adv. Pag., VII, 22, 7-8; Zosimus, I, 29-31, 37-38; Zonaras, XII, 629C-D, 631C. The following account is based largely on the special work of Alftöldi in Num. Ch., IX (1929), pp. 218-279, and in C. A. H., XII, Chapters V and VI.
Gallus again made inroads into Thrace in 254 and threatened to invade Greece (the walls of Athens and the Isthmus were hastily rebuilt). The Carpi and other free Dacians raided Dacia and Moesia; the Quadi and Sarmatae, were active in Pannonia. Marcomanni were also invading Pannonia (254) and even pushed into North Italy as far as Ravenna. Gallienus, however, felt the greater danger to be on the Rhine frontier and accordingly turned his attention there, leaving the eastern provinces to his generals to control. As it happened, he was occupied for the next five years in wars against the Germanic invaders in that area, spending little time in Rome itself. Two tribes, the Franks and Alamanni, are prominent in these attacks. (The Franks when defeated by Gallienus turned to piracy on the English Channel and the coast of Gaul. They also reached Spain and Mauretania on their extensive travels.) As a counter-move to the repeated raids of the Germans, Gallienus enlisted the aid of some of the barbaric leaders to hold off other chieftains. (Later, after the revolt of Regalian, he settled a band of Marcomanni in Pannonia for the same defensive purpose.) These measures were expedient for the moment.

78 Gallienus used the title DACICVS MAXIMVS in 257 to show victories there.

79 Five victories over the Germans are recorded on the coins between 254 and 259. Numerous coin hoards along the Gallic-German frontier are ample evidence for the chaotic state of Europe under Gallienus.


81 It is also noted that he took the daughter of a Marcomannic chief as his secondary wife (Aur. Vict., Epit., 33, 1; de Caes., 33, 6; Vita Gall., 21, 3.) It is evident that Roman military control was weakening and too thinly spread to cope with serious emergencies.
but Gallienus fully realized that to be successful in these wars he would need to be present constantly and with a much stronger army based in the troubled area. In 257 he made Agrippina (Cologne) his headquarters and conducted the war with renewed vigour. In 258/259 the Alamanni made a serious attack on Gaul and Italy, advancing as far as Rome where they were held off by the senatorial forces. Gallienus quickly crossed the Alps and defeated them at Mediolanum (Milan). Thus far Gallienus had done his best to preserve the Roman Empire.

In Africa as well incursions were made into Roman territory. Throughout the reign of Valerian the Bavares and Quinquegentanei were active until defeated by the governor of Numidia in 260. It should be noted here that the "fringe"

82 The mint at Viminacium (Moesia) was moved to Cologne, probably for military funds (Alföldi, C. A. H., XII, pp. 158, 182). Gallienus' presence in Rome in October 256 (Codex Iust., VI, 42, 15) is likely connected with his proposed move to Cologne. Coins from Cologne and from Lugdunum (Webb, R. I. C., V, 1, p. 39, n. 7; p. 70, nos. 21-23) inscribed CVM EXERCITV SVQ are evidence for his move and for his fully independent military command—as well as for a probable serious disagreement with Valerian on matters of state policy. One cause of the rift might have been Gallienus' strong disapproval of the persecution of the Church as a means of easing the widespread tension and resentment which was a product of the overwhelming invasions throughout the Roman world. Direct military action was the only answer.

83 Zosimus, I, 37, 1-2.

84 Dessau, I. L. S., 1194, 2766, 2767, 3000; Cyprian, Ep., 60.
areas of the Roman frontier in particular received insufficient protection. The "sphere of influence" between Gaul and Germany northward along the Rhine (agri decumates) was overrun and lost to Rome during Gallienus' sole administration. The strip between the Rhine and Danube lines, beyond the Raetian limes, was also lost during this time.\^5 Dacia itself, though badly torn, was probably not officially abandoned until the time of Aurelian; that any extensive degree of Roman control remained under Gallienus may be seriously doubted.\^6 It is no wonder, then, that the provinces of Europe felt neglected. Although Gallienus was fully occupied on the Rhine, Europe was in a dangerous frame of mind.

The despair of the Danube peoples at the Emperor's absence now broke forth

\^5 Alföldi, C. A. H., XII, p. 155, dates and inscription from the Raetian border (C. I. L., III, 5933) to 256/257 and notes that it is the latest from that area. This date rests on a very little evidence, but it is certain that inscriptions do fail there early in Valerian's reign.

\^6 Aur. Vict., de Caes., 33, 3; Eutropius, IX, 8; Orosius, adv. Pag., VII, 22, 7 all place the loss in the reign of Gallienus. C. I. L., III, 1577 and 8010, from Dacia, are both dated 257-260. There is evidence, however, from recent excavations that some military forces were sustained in Dacia under Gallienus (Alföldi, C. A. H., XII, pp. 151, 213-214). The claim that legions were moved by Gallienus from the Transylvanian region of Dacia to Lower Wallachia (Parker, History, pp. 343-344, n. 22) has been denied on the grounds that there was nothing of provincial organization in Wallachia (Alföldi, review of Parker, History, in J. R. S., XXVII (1937), p. 259).
in a series of revolts. First, Ingenuus, a commander in Pannonia, gained
the support of the legions in Moesia and was proclaimed Emperor, probably
making Sirmium his headquarters. Gallienus, leaving his son Saloninus at Cologne
under the charge of the praetorian prefect, Silvanus, set out with Aureolus,
his cavalry commander. Aureolus soundly defeated Ingenuus, who fled to his
death. The remnant of Ingenuus' army, however, elected Regalianus (a Dacian)
to carry on the revolt. He based his rule in Carnuntum, aided by his wife,
Dryantilla (of a senatorial family). Little is known of his rule but it lasted
only a matter of weeks. Both these usurpers were unqualified for anything
more than causing a disturbance, though their defeat was much to Gallienus' credit.
It should be noted here that the armies on the Danube would probably have supported the Emperor fully if he had chosen to stay in that region.
What difference it would have made is hard to say; usurpers would appear anywhere during the absence of the Emperor.

87 Aur. Vict., Epit., 32, 3-4; de Caes., 33, 2; Eutropius, IX, 8-10;
Trig. Tyr., 3, 5-6, 8-10, 12-14; Orosius, adv. Pag., VII, 22, 10-12; Zosimus,
I, 38, 1-2; Zonaras, XII, 631C-633A. The sources agree on the order of the usurpations and are generally consistent in details of the events.

88 Webb, R. I. C., V, 2, pp. 575-577. Coins of Regalian and Dryantilla
from Carnuntum are nearly all re-struck, indicating a short-lived local revolt
but giving no clue as to the date. The difficulty here is that it is hard to
believe that Regalian's revolt followed closely on the defeat of Ingenuus,
especially when a strong Roman army was in the vicinity. The tradition is that
he succeeded Ingenuus and for the present should be retained.

89 Coins number these victories VI and VII following those commemorating
the German campaigns (Alföldi, Num. Ch., IX (1929) p. 255).
One revolt was successful, however, that of M. Cassianius Latinius Postumus in Gaul. Left in charge of the Rhine frontier when Gallienus went to meet Ingenuus, he founded an Empire which lasted well into the reign of Aurelian.\(^{90}\) There is some question about the date of his revolt, as there is about the previous violence in eastern Europe. That Postumus followed Ingenuus is certain, and he was probably contemporary with Regalian.\(^{91}\) Postumus took advantage of the Emperor's absence to besiege and capture Cologne where Saloninus and Silvanus, his guardian, were stationed. References to Saloninus are common in 259 but stop sometime in 260.\(^{92}\) From this evidence it is reasonable

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\(^{90}\) Trig. Tyr., 3, 1 and 9, has him also named governor of Gaul by Valerian.

\(^{91}\) Legionary coins of victories six and seven include the Rhine legions which later went over to Postumus. British detachments were included in the army which fought Ingenuus, but they also later supported Postumus. Alfoldi, Num. Ch., IX (1929), p. 262, n. 62, holds that the absence of British and Spanish forces on coins of 260 has no historical significance. Their actions, however, are surely as valuable as those of the Rhenish forces in determining the date of Postumus' activity. Postumus was recognized on the Rhine after the defeat of Regalian, though his revolt was probably under way at the same time as Regalian's (Parker, History, pp. 168, 343-344, n. 22, 27.).

\(^{92}\) See above, p. 14, n. 54. Alexandrian coins in his name stop with the year 260/261 (Magie, S. H. A., III, p. 57, n. 1). This mint was slow to change from issues for Valerian and may have issued for Saloninus for some time after his death. Egypt, it should be noted, was not urgently concerned with the activity of Valerian and hardly at all with Saloninus. Even the occupation of Alexandria later by Palmyrene forces did not cause an immediate break in relations with Rome (A.C. Johnson, Egypt and the Roman Empire (Ann Arbor, 1951), p. 43).
to place the beginning of Postumus' revolt late in 259. The revolts of Ingenuus and Regalian thus would occur at the same time as the Persian invasion which resulted in the capture of Valerian. When the defeat of Valerian was known in the West, Postumus' usurpation was in the meantime established in Cologne (early in 260). Little more than this can be said with certainty.

The result of Postumus' revolt was the restoration of some order in Gaul, but not before he escaped the attacks of Gallienus. The Emperor, making sure of his defences in the Alpine area, resisted him successfully at first but

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93 Aur. Vict., de Caes., 32, 2, has the revolt of Ingenuus take place when the capture of Valerian was known. A connection between the western revolts and affairs in the East is thus probable. (The Historia Augusta, Trig. Tyr., 9, 1, places the revolt of Ingenuus in 258—too early.) Alfeld, Num. Ch., IX (1929), pp. 260-262 and in C. A. H., XII, pp. 184-185, basing his version on the belief that news of Valerian's defeat arrived in Rome in the summer of 260, has Ingenuus and Regalian in the autumn and Postumus in the latter half of December (260). However it is not known when Rome heard of events in the East, and it may be doubted that such a moment is an important terminus for dating the revolts. It was probably common knowledge that Valerian was fully occupied with the Persians and other invaders long before this. The number of tribunician years on Gallic coins is more significant. Since Tetricus abdicated in 273 it is probable that Postumus counted his rule from the beginning of his revolt in 259 (Webb, R. I. C., V, 2, pp. 326, 329; Parker, History, pp. 168, 344, n. 26).

94 Vindonissa was refortified in 260 (C. I. L., XIII, 5203). That Gallienus was consistent in his efforts to hold northern Italy is shown in the fortifications of the important town of Verona in 265 (C. I. L., V, 3329).
was forced to withdraw by an injury. Aureolus was sent to pursue Postumus but let him escape. (Aureolus may well have been testing Gallienus' dependence upon himself. At any rate, he was not punished for his supposed negligence.) Postumus then set about to consolidate his rule, fortifying the Rhine frontier and keeping it closed to the Germans by several victories. At the height of his power he could count large areas of Spain and Britain as subject to himself. He established Treveri as his capital and built a palace there. He may also have begun a new mint there, but the evidence for this is not secure. It is certain, though, that he did move the mint from Lugdunum to Cologne, probably in 265. Postumus' rule was thoroughly Roman in organization.

95 Vita Gall., 4, 4; Trig. Tyr., 3, 5; Zonaras, XII, 632A-B. His urgent preparations against Postumus are ample reason for not having negotiated the release of Valerian from the Persians. There is also some evidence that Gallienus had no intention of ransoming Valerian and actually did much to erase memory of him (Alfoldi, C. A. H., XII, p. 183). The cost, at any rate, would probably have been large portions of the Empire.

96 C. I. L., XIII, 8882, 8883, 9023, 9092, record the restoration of roads in Gaul. Dessau, I. L. S., 561 (of 260), and coins of several years record continuing military activity on this front.

97 C. I. L., II, 4913, for Spain; C. I. L., VII, 820, 1161, for Britain. His influence spread into north Italy also; coins were struck there for him by Aureolus when the latter revolted in 268 (Webb, R. I. C., V, 2, pp. 327-328). See below p. 35.


99 C. I. L., VI, 1641, is interpreted by Alfoldi, in C. A. H., XII, p. 188, as referring to the time of Postumus, though it is possibly much later.

100 Webb, R. I. C., V, 2, pp. 330-331, who notes that the move was not made from lack of security.
He kept the Roman military system, reckoned his rule by tribunician authority and consuls and may even have had a senate of his own. How ambitious he was for wider power cannot be determined. The progress in legends on his coins from RESTITVOTOR GALLIARUM to REST. ORBIS had at least a value as propaganda, but possibly meant nothing more. Towards the end of his reign he associated Victorinus, his praetorian prefect, with himself in his fourth consulate (266 or 267)—evidence that he expected difficulties. In 268 he put down a revolt by Laelianus in Mogontiacum (Mainz) but was killed by his men for his handling of this rebellion. His immediate successor was Marius, an ironworker, whose recorded rule in Cologne was three days, though he surely was in power longer than that (there are at least nineteen varieties of his coins). Victorinus then held power (268-270) and the last ruler of the Gallic Empire was Tetricus (270-273). In considering the effect of Postumus' revolt it will be seen that the military strength of the Roman Empire was seriously weakened. The frontier areas now suffered by being the battleground not only of invaders but of opposing Roman forces as well. Numerous coin-hoards show that insecurity still prevailed in Gaul in spite of Postumus.

While these revolts were in progress in the West, the Roman commander at Samosata, Macrianus, and Callistus, the praetorian prefect (also called "Ballista"), began to re-organize the army in a campaign to regain power in

101 S. C. on his early coins has also been interpreted as referring to the Roman Senate and showing Postumus' hopes of ruling from Rome (Webb, R. I. C., V, 2, pp. 332-333).

102 Alfeldt, C. A. H., XII, p. 187, feels that the various legends show a developing desire for world rule.

103 Laelianus was probably the governor of Germania Superior (Degrassi, Fasti, p. 72).
Asia from the Persians. Macrianus and Quietus, the sons of the commander, were named Emperors and were accepted in Asia and Egypt. In 260/261 the Romans under Callistus attacked, winning a decisive victory at Corycus in Cappadocia and forcing the Persians to retreat. When the invasion of Sapor had been checked through several more successes, the two Macriani set out for the Balkans in an effort to enlarge their empire. (Quietus and Callistus moved their headquarters to Emesa in Syria.) The Macriani gained the support of some Pannonian legions, supplementing an already substantial army. Before meeting the army of Gallienus they disposed of two pretenders in Macedonia and Thessaly, Valens and Piso. Gallienus then sent Aureolus to check them. He was helped in crushing them by some of the Pannonian troops, who again changed sides, abandoning the Macriani. This victory took place either in Illyricum or on the borders of Thrace, both Macriani being killed. Quietus and Callistus were thus left in Emesa with little military support. By the end of 261 both were dead; Callistus was defeated by Odenath and Quietus was killed by the people of Emesa.

104 Vita Gall., 1-3; Trig. Tyr., 12-14; Zonaras, XII, 632C-633A, for details of their actions.

105 Trig. Tyr., 19, 21. Aur. Vict., Epit., 32, 4, and Ammianus Marcellinus, XXI, 16, 10, mention Valens among the opponents of Gallienus. Piso is probably a general sent by Macrianus to dispose of Valens, but who revolted and was killed by Valens instead. Little is known for certain about either of them. There is a possibility that they were active before 260 (Webb, R. I. C., V, 2, p. 574), but it is difficult to suppose they would survive the much stronger revolts of 260.

106 Coins number this the eighth victory of Gallienus (Alföldi, Num. Ch., IX, (1929), p. 248).
With the defeat of the Macrianus, the situation in the Danube area improved—no further revolts occurred there during the remainder of Gallienus' reign. In Egypt, however, there is evidence that a minor revolt was in progress. Aemilianus, the prefect there, had supported Macrianus and Quietus but on their deaths asserted his independence by stopping shipments of grain to Rome. Gallienus quickly sent one Theodotus there to restore order, afterwards appointing him prefect in place of the rebel. Gallienus had now held power for almost ten years. Accordingly, in the autumn of 262 Gallienus was in Rome to celebrate the beginning of his decennial year; special coins and medallions commemorate the event. For several years afterwards Gallienus' actions are not clearly known. With Postumus secure in Gaul he would need to watch northern Italy closely: he probably paid attention to maintaining the defences of the Empire in general.

107 Alföldi, in C. A. H., XII, p. 147, notes the undisturbed activity of the mint at Siscia from 262 as evidence for some re-organization.


109 From papyri it is known that Aemilianus was prefect in October of 259 and the Theodotus succeeded him by August of 262 (Magie, S. H. A., III, p. 119, n. 1). Magie, loc. cit., gives a different version of the incident, holding that Aemilianus defended central Egypt for Gallienus against the Macrianus. This is also the view of Johnson, Egypt, p. 141.

110 Vita Gall., 7, 2-4, notes that Gallienus went to Byzantium to put down a military disturbance shortly before returning to Rome. C. Starr, The Roman Imperial Navy (Ithaca, New York, 1941), p. 195, believes that Gallienus visited Byzantium before the Heruli invaded. Since the Heruli may well have been active in 262, the coincidence of their activity with Gallienus' decennial celebration is possible (see below, p. 34).

111 Alföldi, C. A. H., XII, pp. 188-189, notes that he rebuilt the imperial
With the defeat of the Macriani a new power came into prominence in Asia. Palmyra, led by Odenath, was now the centre for Roman resistance to the Persians. Odenath, probably for economic reasons, turned to Rome and accepted commands from Valerian and Gallienus to restore Roman control of the East. He outgrew the position of subject prince, however; his rise in prestige under Gallienus is shown in the numerous titles given him. Shortly after putting down the Macriani he began a campaign against the Persians. He advanced into Mesopotamia, regaining Nisibis, and then went as far south as Ctesiphon, capturing rich booty on these expeditions. His reign was not long, however, for he was dead by 267. He was succeeded by Vaballathus (his second son) and Zenobia fleet and ordered the fortifications of coastal cities in Asia Minor to be repaired.

112 Most sources give the following sequence of events but Trig. Tyr., 15, places his defeat of the Macriani after his campaign against Sapor.

113 Vita Gall., 1, 1; 3; 10, 1; 12, 1; Trig. Tyr., 15, 2; Zonaras, XII, 631A, 633B. It is doubtful that he was ever an Augustus as is sometimes mentioned. That his rule was secure is seen from the titles inherited by his son Vaballathus.

114 Probably in 262 (Alföldi, C. A. H., XII, p. 174; Parker, History, p. 174). Olmstead, op. cit., p. 420, holds to 264 basing his argument on a date in the Vita Gall., 10, 1-6. Gallienus received Odenath's successes—an inscription of 263 (Dessau, I. L. S., 8923) calls the Emperor PERSICVS MAXIMVS.

115 Some uncertainty still remains about his death. There is the tradition in many sources that he was killed by his relatives, but it has been suggested that the Romans had a hand in his death. It is possible that the Roman Rufinus noted in connection with his father's death may really be involved with Odenath (Warmington, in Parker, History, p. 393). He died probably at Emesa (Zosimus, I,
(his wife) who maintained Palmyrene power until defeated by Aurelian. By this time two large areas of the Roman world were under independent rulers, Gaul and Syria-Mesopotamia. An interesting parallel between these independent states should be noted. Both were maintained by Roman troops and both rulers claimed to be upholding the good name of Rome. Sources praise both Postumus and Odenath as being more fit to rule than the unfortunate Gallienus. But the Emperor did not recognize either area as separate and there is evidence to show that he planned to retrieve Syria.

While Odenath was ruling Syria the Goths invaded Asia Minor, sailing down the coast as far as Ephesus and Miletus and sending a land army into Bithynia, Phrygia and Cappadocia. There is, however, some question about the date though many historians prefer the account in which he was at Heraclea-Pontica (Cappadocia) defending the Taurus passes against a Gothic invasion (Deæppus, in Syncellus I, pp. 716-717, cited by Parker, History, pp. 175, 345, n. 18). See below, p. 34. Alfoldi, C.A.H., XII, p. 176, has 267 for the date of his death, using an inscription referring to a military governor under Odenath. It should be noted that coins of Vaballathus begin at Alexandria in 266/267 (Magie, S.H.A., III, p. 107, n. 1).

116 Eutropius, IX, 11. This is the general tone of the Historia Augusta, also.

117 Coins from Siscia at this time read ORIENS AVGVSTI. A new mint in the west of Asia was set up probably to supply an army intended to defeat Odenath (Alfoldi, C.A.H., XII, p. 177; Warmington, in Parker, History, p. 393). The account that Gallienus sent a general Heraclianus against Palmyra, though plausible, is not substantiated (Vita Gall., 13).

118 Vita Gall., 11; Syncellus, I, p. 716, in Alfoldi, C.A.H., XII, p. 72.
of this attack. The Historia Augusta places it in 264; Dexippus and Syncellus connect it with the end of Odenath's reign (266/267). But recently inscriptions have been published from Lydia which could well mean that this invasion took place in 262. If this is the case, the strengthening or rebuilding by Gallienus of city-walls on the coast of Asia Minor (as at Miletus in 263) can well be understood. The Emperor himself could well have been in the Aegean area at this time: the account that he became eponymous archon of Athens and was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries would then be probable. Gallienus, however, did not check the Goths at this time.

There is thus still the possibility that similar Gothic raids occurred at least twice during Odenath's reign. Furthermore, since the evidence for each episode is good, it is quite possible that the Goths made frequent raids unchecked into Asia Minor from 262 to 267.

In 267/268 the greatest invading force (Goths and Heruli) ever to attack the Empire made its way by both land and sea to the Danube provinces and Greece.

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119 This is the view held by many recent scholars and is well supported by documents.

120 L. Robert, "Inscriptions grecques de Lydie," Hellenica, VI, (1948), pp. 117-122. The barbarians referred to in the inscription are presumably the Goths since the Persians were out of Asia Minor by 262. The order of events in Odenath's career given by Zosimus (I, 39) would thus be corroborated (he is said to have defended himself against the "Scythians" before attacking Sapor).

121 Alföldi, C. A. H., XII, p. 148, n. 3, for the date of the walls at Miletus.

122 Vita Gall., 11, 3-4.

123 Vita Gall., 13; Eutropius, IX, 11; Zosimus, I, 42-43.
In Greece the devastation was terrible even though the attackers were resisted fiercely by Athenian commanders, including the historian Dexippus. The expedition by sea was not so successful, running into difficulties with ocean currents and being hampered by the imperial fleet. Some of the invaders proceeded into Macedonia and Thrace but were met by Gallienus and defeated. The main force joined battle with the Romans at Naissos and was also defeated, though probably at heavy cost to the Romans. Gallienus and his generals had turned back the full strength of the barbarians; scattered bands still roamed in Thrace but the invading chiefs had either surrendered or had been killed.124 The invasions by the Goths were not over, however, for fresh bands soon came and more ships. It was left to Claudius, the successor to Gallienus, to direct the war to an end in 269, thereby earning for himself the name "Gothicus".

After his victory at Naissos, Gallienus was called back to Italy by news that Aureolus, who had been left in Raetia to hold defences there and to watch Postumus, had revolted (probably with Postumus' approval) and had set himself up in Mediolanum (Milan).125 Leaving the general Marcianus to continue operations against the Goths, Gallienus and his advisory staff set out at once to deal with the usurper. Gallienus defeated Aureolus near Milan but Aureolus 124 Many of the sources place these events in the reign of Claudius.

That the above version is the likely one has been shown by Alföldi, C. A. H., XII, pp. 721-723. Naulobatus, a Herulian chief who surrendered, is said to have been honoured by Gallienus with a consular rank and was possibly used in the Roman army (Alföldi, C. A. H., XII, pp. 149, 162).

125 Trig. Tyr., 11; Aur. Vict., Epit., 3, 4; 33, 2; de Caes., 33, 17-18; Zosimus, I, 40-1; Zonaras, XII, 633D-634D.
escaped into the city. The Emperor laid siege and would have taken the city, but he was assassinated through a plot by his generals (summer 268). Accounts of his death vary but it is probable that the generals Heraclianus, Claudius and Aurelian were responsible.\textsuperscript{126} Aureolus was then crushed by Claudius—the siege continued, it should be noted, evidence that Gallienus' chief staff-officers were involved. Claudius proved himself a capable commander (the sources praise him highly) as did his successor, Aurelian. Under these two emperors the parts of the Empire that were weakened or lost under Valerian and Gallienus were in general consolidated or regained.

The reaction to the death of Gallienus came swiftly and was long-lasting. He was blamed for all the troubles of the Empire—a view recurrent in almost all the histories now used as sources.\textsuperscript{127} His unpopularity with the senatorial class will be seen to be the direct result of his administrative policies. Personal jealousy and ambition coupled with the opportunistic hope of turning misfortune for the Empire into private gain are to be seen in the many revolts that took place under his sole rule. But if some generals thought only of their own advancement, the men in the army were willing to accept the leadership of Gallienus. Claudius was forced to placate the army, angered at the death of Gallienus, by having the former Emperor consecrated.\textsuperscript{128} To the same end he had previously arranged a considerable donative for each man and had

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{126} Zonaras, XII, 634, is the fullest version.
  \item \textsuperscript{127} For the harsh measures taken against his relatives and associates see above pp. 13-14.
  \item \textsuperscript{128} Aur. Vict., \textit{de Caes.}, 33, 27.
\end{itemize}
invented the story that Gallienus had named him as his successor. But any favourable comment on Gallienus was soon forgotten. During the last few years of his reign there was less military action in Europe than there had been for over ten years, but the uneasy peace did not bring relief from the hardships of an economy undermined by the expenses of war. Gallienus was thus destined to be known as an incompetent emperor.

129 Vita Gall., 15, 2; Aur. Vict., de Caes., 33, 28; Epit., 34, 2.
PART II

THE ADMINISTRATION OF VALERIAN AND GALLIENUS

In this half of the thesis an attempt will be made to outline the policies of government followed by Valerian and Gallienus and to evaluate their achievements. It will also be fitting, in conclusion, to determine whether the long-accepted condemnation of these rulers, particularly of Gallienus, is in fact the true estimate of their reigns. Considerably more information is available for the policies of Gallienus than for those of Valerian. The explanation undoubtedly lies in the fact that Valerian spent almost the whole of his short rule engaged in military operations within the province of Syria, whereas Gallienus was active over a wider area for a much longer period and was also more vigorous and venturesome than his father.

Since warfare was the daily life of Valerian and Gallienus, it is only to be expected that most of their reforms were connected in some way with the army. Here, especially, the ability of Gallienus is revealed. To see the nature of his reforms it is necessary first to understand the structure of the army with which he worked. After the reign of Septimus Severus the number of legions was thirty-six, twelve each on the Danube and in the East (Severus had created three new ones here) and nine on the Rhine frontier. The legions were always the backbone of the army, but in the third century increasing importance was attached to the auxilia and numeri. These lesser groups

1 For details of the development of the army under the Severi see in particular the following: S. N. Miller, in C. A. H., XII, Chapter I; Alföldi, in C. A. H., XII, pp. 208-213; Parker, History, pp. 80-88.
had intended to defend the frontiers as local units (especially the numeri) and were therefore recruited largely from the area in which there were stationed. Thus there developed the condition in which these forces became settled in the defence of their own homes. Men from beyond the frontiers who had been accepted previously as foederati (allies of Rome by agreement) were now enlisted in units of the Roman army itself in ever-increasing numbers. In fact, the personnel of the army changed completely during the rule of the Severi. Caracalla, in an edict of 212, made all people of the Empire citizens, thereby recognizing that the Roman world was no longer made up of privileged Italians and provincials of lower status. But the composition of the army was already an indication that men from all parts of the Empire could share in the responsibilities of State. Severus, a provincial favouring the provinces, had brought provincials and foreigners into Italy and had opened the ranks of the favoured but often arrogant Praetorian Guard to all men. It was now possible for anyone, peasant or townsman, to reach the highest military positions.

The army had become "democratic", but was not on that account a better fighting force. Wide differences in tactics and armament were still to be found in the new army. Frontier forces continued their local methods of fighting which had been developed to suit the nature of the terrain. In the East, for example, archers and cavalrymen were the strongest troops, especially the Palmyrene army later developed by Odenath. In the Roman army itself the long sword and lance were now standard equipment, the old weapons being obsolete. Such changes, however, could be exploited to the fullest benefit by competent commanders. A more far-reaching change was the fact that the new army was largely of peasant origin. The problems it created were many and long-lasting.

2 Dio Cassius, LXXVIII, 9, 5.

3 Dio Cassius, LXXV, 2, 4-6. Dio notes the decline of military aptitude in Italian youth and blames Severus for it.
Severus, basing his power on a strong army, was forced to grant important concessions to retain control over his troops. Legionary pay was increased; imperial congiaria (largesses) were more frequent and much more indulgent; marriages in camps were declared legal; conditions of service in general were made more attractive. As could be expected, the distinctions between officer and soldier were quickly disappearing just as the differences between Roman and provincial had disappeared. The army thus grew powerful with imperial support, but it soon overruled its masters, the Severan house, to bring a champion from its own ranks to the throne. Under Maximinus a civil war broke out from which the military class emerged as masters of the State. The army had become almost free from tradition—a self-reliant body capable of destroying or preserving the Empire.

Such was the army as Gallienus found it. With the constant threat of utter ruin to the Empire, he could in no way lessen the expense of maintaining such a force. Instead, he strengthened fortifications and encouraged enlistment from Germanic peoples in particular to help check frontier raids. In several instances he even settled such tribes in troubled areas (see above, pp. 22, 35, n. 124). The relief thereby gained was only temporary; Gallienus realized that to be sure of any military security along a wide area of invasion he would need a highly mobile and versatile army. His measures to attain this aim form one of his most lasting reforms.¹

In re-organizing the form of the army, Gallienus paid particular attention to the cavalry. The Illyrian troops were skilled horsemen and one of the most powerful groups in the whole army. When the Emperor decided to concentrate his personal energies on the less well-defended Rhine, it was necessary to give the Danube-Illyrian forces an important part to play in holding the Empire, both to retain their loyalty and to satisfy their willingness to fight for their homes.\(^5\) Using these troops as the central core, Gallienus created a highly mobile cavalry force independent of the legions. This force, commanded by Aureolus, came into being shortly before the revolt of Ingenuus, in which it played an important part.\(^6\) At the same time, the Emperor increased the cavalry attached to the legions. At first the legionary cavalry was closely connected with the infantry, but during the reign of Aurelian and increasingly thereafter, it was often used in detachments without infantry. There thus developed a gradual separation between infantry and cavalry which

\(^5\) The army on the Danube had supported Severus and Decius and later was to raise Claudius, Aurelian and Probus to power. Gallienus, foreseeing trouble on the Rhine, was forced to take the chance of Illyrian disloyalty. The later revolts on the Danube were the realization of his fears.

\(^6\) Zosimus, I, 40, 1, and Zonaras, XII, 631C, have Aureolus connected with this force from its inception. It is probable that the cavalry was stationed at Milan after the invasion by the Alamanni in 258/259, but not before. See above p. 22. Alfeldi, C. A. H., XII, p. 182, believes that it was formed in 257 and was always based in Milan. Gallienus' plans for reform seem to date from 257 but it may well have been the case that the cavalry did not receive a thorough test in action until the revolt of Ingenuus. That this mounted force was extremely useful is seen in the amount of authority given its commander.
reached its final stage in the time of Constantine. Two other changes of note should be mentioned here. Early in his reign, Gallienus formed a corps known as protectores divini lateris, open at first only to high-ranking staff officers but later to all centurions. This corps, in attendance on the Emperor and the praetorian prefects, became a training-school towards further promotion—a necessity, since many officers now lacked education. There is also the probability that the reduced size of a legion seen under Diocletian (by A.D. 290) began to be felt in Gallienus' time. New cohorts under Gallienus had five centuries rather than the usual six, with the number of centurions in a legion now fifty instead of sixty. The result of these changes in form was an army intended to meet all emergencies, but having a tendency towards specialization.

7 The change in meaning of certain military terms shows this development. The term promoti came to be applied to the increased legionary cavalry when used separately. The special cavalry force of Gallienus was known at first simply as equites (Dessau, I. L. S., 569, of A.D. 269) in contrast to the vexillationes, or infantry detachments from legions. But by the reign of Diocletian the term vexillatio had changed completely to mean now the cavalry force (including the promoti). To refer to the infantry force only, legio began to be used (Codex Iust., X, 55, 3; VII, 64, 9). There is evidence from papyri that detachments from legions were not fully independent until after 302; Constantine later in using detachments as independent units gave recognition to the fact that, through the hazards of war, detachments had often been unable to return to their parent legions.

8 Centurions were admitted by 261 (Dessau, I. L. S., 1332). Gallienus also decreed that sons of centurions should be of the equestrian order at birth.

9 Parker, Cl. Q., XXVI (1932), pp. 146-147, for the best explanation.
To coincide with these developments, Gallienus thoroughly revised the system of military commands. The traditional military administration had been in the hands of men of the senatorial order. In fact, the period spent as a legatus was always part of the senatorial's training for service in the government, whether military or civil. But over the years it happened that the senatorial order became less suited to military positions, being for the most part men whose chief interests were in business. Their places in legion commands were taken by men from the equestrian order; a new class of professional commanders was being created to handle the changing personnel of the army and to meet the stringent demands of crucial warfare. This extensive use of equestrians by Gallienus in government service was in no way a novelty; Augustus had administered Egypt through the equestrian order, Commodus had made use of equestrians and, more recently, Septimius Severus had placed equestrians in command of his new Parthian legions. The new commander of a legion was called a praefectus legionis agens vice(s) legati; Gallienus softened the effect of his measures by pretending that these prefects were merely serving in place of a senatorial official.  

This reform was complete for there is no record of a legatus legionis after the reign of Gallienus. In the provinces, the chief military commanders were also equestrians, often called praepositi; this title continued in use for some time until dux became the common term for a military commander in the time of Diocletian. Thus as a result of Gallienus' reforms, the positions of importance in the army—cavalry commander, commander of a provincial army, prefect of a legion and leader of legionary detachment—all were held by men of the equestrian order.

10 Dessau, I. L. S., 545; C. I. L., III, 3424, 3426, 3469, 4289.

11 Aur. Vict., de Caes., 33, 34, is definite on this point, although the reason he gives for Gallienus' actions (fear for his throne) is incorrect.
The rise in importance of the equestrian class inevitably meant a change in the relationship between this class and the senatorial order. In making military commands the exclusive privilege of equestrians, Gallienus had separated the military from the civil administration, leaving the latter largely in the hands of senatorials. The effects of this principle are seen to full advantage in the system of provincial government which Gallienus developed. It had been the custom that the governor of a province was supreme in all departments, but now an equestrian was in command of the army and not subject to the governor in any military matter. Not all provinces, however, were governed by senatorials. Egypt and Mesopotamia had regularly been ruled by equestrians and Septimius Severus had made temporary use of equestrians regularly in many imperial provinces (Cilicia, Cappadocia, Galatia, Arabia, Numidia and Dalmatia). There was no abrupt change, it should be noted; Bithynia-Pontus did not have an equestrian governor until 279, and in Britain, Hispania Tarraconensis, Moesia Inferior and Syria Coele there was no change till the time of Diocletian. In senatorial provinces the separation was slower, since little military strength was there anyway. That the separation of duties and loss of several governorships caused much bitterness on the part of many senators toward Gallienus is certain. But the Emperor took action not from prejudice or hatred (he was himself a senatorial), but rather to ensure responsible

12 In addition to the bibliography in notes 1 and 4, the following references are particularly useful at this point: Parker, History, pp. 73-76; Ensslin, in C. A. H., XII, Chapter II; Magie, R. R. A. M., I, p. 711; II, p. 1571, n. 35. L. Homo, "L’Empereur Gallien et la Crise de l’Empire Romain au IIIe Siècle," Revue Historique, CXIII (1913), especially pp. 257-260; Homo, Roman Political Institutions, trans. by M. R. Dobie (London, 1929), pp. 251-265.

13 The term for a governor of a senatorial province was praeses (common in the fourth century). This same title was used whether the governor was
management of the Empire in a period of crisis.

Some further points of interest in connection with the change in function of these two classes call for discussion here. It was Septimius Severus who undertook the reform of the civil administration, as well as of the army, by admitting equestrians into senatorial positions. The comites Augusti (senatorials) were now chosen from the equestrian order, as were high-ranking treasury officials, such as the director of Severus' new personal property, the res privata. The prefect of the Praetorian Guard (an equestrian) took on wide judicial and administrative duties, including control over the annona or food supply, but was less concerned with military affairs. In fact, some of the most capable prefects, Papinian, Paul and Ulpian, were lawyers. The Senate at this time held little power; as the concilium principis it had in theory the power to refuse decrees of the emperor, but in practice Severus disregarded it and ruled to suit himself. It should be remembered, also, that the composition of the Senate was altered by the Severi. At most, half of the senators were Italian, some were from the western provinces, and about a third were from the East. In some instances, probably for the sake of expedience, equestrians were admitted to the senatorial class by the process of adlectio in order to hold senatorial commands. Under Severus Alexander, however, conditions changed; a reaction to the policies of Septimius took place, but more in spirit than in effect. Although the supreme civil post in the Empire, that of praetorian prefect, could now be held by a senatorial, little more was accomplished to return any power to the Senate. The short-lived senatorial or equestrian. C. I. L., II, 4102, 4103; III, 3418, from the time of Diocletian, note that a praeses sometimes kept the term legatus to show that he was of senatorial rank, though he did not have military power.

14 Warmington, in Parker, History, pp. 385-386.
15 Homo, Institutions, p. 261.
senatorially biased rule of the Gordians was ineffective: warfare cut it short.\textsuperscript{16} It was left to Gallienus to recognize openly that the equestrian order had become the administrative class. A thoroughly militarized administration, both in the city of Rome and in the civil service, was the result.\textsuperscript{17}

Since Gallienus was pre-occupied with military affairs, he showed less ingenuity in dealing with the growing economic crisis.\textsuperscript{18} The system of government begun by the Severi was in itself an ever-increasing drain on the finances of the Empire, not to mention the frequent wars which followed closely on the death of Severus Alexander. In an effort to increase his financial reserve, Septimius Severus had re-organized the treasuries. The aerarium became the municipal treasury of Rome, and the fiscus contained the revenue from imperial and senatorial provinces and most of the patrocinium. The new res privata was formed from the many estates confiscated by Severus and from the reserves of cities punished for opposition to his rule. Caracalla also was aware of financial need; his edict of citizenship meant that all men in the Empire were liable to equally heavy taxation (foreigners had previously not paid the same taxes as citizens). Taxes however, were not shared equally by rich and poor. Severus and Caracalla granted many exemptions to the army and poorer classes.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{16} There is evidence that the Senate regained some of its former rights (electoral, judicial, military and administrative) during the reigns of Tacitus and Probus (275-282). For a discussion of this view, see Homo, \textit{Institutions}, pp. 253-255. The reforms of Gallienus, however, were more durable than this compromise and continued to be expanded.

\textsuperscript{17} Early in his sole reign Gallienus introduced his reforms into the urban government at Rome; the first equestrian consul on record was \textit{consul ordinarius} for the year 261 (Degrassi, \textit{Fasti}, p. 71.)

\textsuperscript{18} The following version is drawn chiefly from Rostovtzeff, \textit{S. E. H.}, I, Chapters IX to XI; F. Oertel, in \textit{C. A. H.}, Chapter VII; Magie, \textit{R. R. A. M.}. 
The result was an increase in taxation for the commercial and senatorial classes. Various methods were employed to collect revenues, the chief one being through the many branches of the civil service. Community and social organizations of all kinds were also used for this purpose, since it was an expedient way of keeping records in order. For the upper classes, a common method of exacting funds was through the custom of "liturgies"—compulsory state service. The duties involved became more demanding and the expense unbearable. It was the system of liturgies as much as anything that brought frequent ruin to members of the richer classes. Some attempts to ease the situation were made by the Gordians, who had been brought to power in a revolt of nobles in North Africa against high taxation, and by Philip, but abuses of taxation policies were frequent nonetheless. Valerian and Gallienus enacted legislation which gave some relief to communities but apparently little, if any, to citizens in responsible positions.\(^\text{19}\) Such measures were quite insufficient to rectify the critical condition of the Empire's finances.

A clear picture of economic difficulties is given by the progressive debasement of coinage. More money was needed than the reserves of gold and silver would allow since the existing mines were fast becoming exhausted, but no new ones were found. Fiduciary coinage was begun, especially in silver issues, but this money was not based on a standard purity. The state reckoned the new coins at the same value as previous full-weight issues, but they were not accepted as such and their purchasing value dropped. Furthermore, gold and silver coins of better weight soon disappeared from circulation, being hoarded

\(^{19}\) No new taxes without imperial consent (\textit{Codex Iust.}, IV, 62, 3); the interests of a community were not to suffer through favouritism to a debtor (II, 4, 12); an official's private estate was liable for his debts of office (X, 32, 1).
wherever possible (this process is today known as "Gresham's Law"). Many coins were also carried outside the Empire in trade with Germany, South Russia and even India, again leaving a smaller supply of good coins in use. It should be noted, too, that the distribution of coinage was considerably less equable than in the prosperous time of the Antonines. These trends began to be felt in the reign of Septimius Severus with the start of a general inflation. To help close the widening gap between gold coins, which were relatively stable, and silver, Caracalla introduced a coin roughly equivalent to two denarii. This coin, the so-called *antoninianus*, became a standard unit of commerce, the reason being that prices were increasing. Here can be seen the higher prices and lower purchasing-power combination familiar to students of inflation. By the time of Valerian and Gallienus the situation was urgent, but the Empire was too unsettled to allow much change. As it happened, the silver coinage was further debased to an unheard of extent; in 256/257 the *antoninianus* was at best only 5% pure. The *aureus* by this time had also fallen, being struck at ninety to the pound. There is evidence that Gallienus restored the *aureus* to a better weight during his sole reign, but the silver coins were still little more than coated bronze.²⁰ Some degree of adjustment to the tariff between the *aureus* and *antoninianus* was effected by Aurelian, but financial conditions remained serious.²¹

²⁰ Bronze coins (the smaller denominations) issued under authority of the Senate had become practically worthless and were discontinued at this time. Some senatorial bronzes were struck by Claudius, but more to flatter the Roman government than to recognize senatorial power. In the reign of Gallienus local mints throughout the Empire also ceased to function, except for a few in Asia.

²¹ There is still disagreement over the exact value of the *antoninianus* and on whether any substantial reform to the system of coinage took place from the time of Nero to that of Diocletian. For a discussion of these questions see Webb, *R. I. C.*, V, 1, p. 6; Magie, *R. R. A. M.*, I, pp. 713, 719.
Some other aspects of the financial problem should now be considered. Corresponding to the general rise in prices, the wages of labourers and the lower classes also rose, but not enough to ensure them any better standards of living than before. Army pay continued to rise and often provided an adequate livelihood, especially with additional donatives and bonuses. Those who suffered the most were men on a salary or fixed-fee basis—the professional class—and those whose income was based on investments. Because of unstable conditions, in many parts of the Empire the rates of interest fell far below the maximum of 12%. For the same reason endowments and donations declined sharply; many of the bequests specified a definite value by the weight of coins, not the face-value. Speculation on the rate of exchange, however, was widespread: fortunes were made and lost with equal ease. Although capital investment was curtailed, the commercial class found one pathway to relative security, the acquisition of land. A propertied estate continued to give dividends since the prices paid for its produce and the rents to the owner were as flexible as the inflationary process itself. It is difficult to say how many such estates there were, but by the time of Valerian and Gallienus there was a definite trend toward this type of investment.

The question of landed estates introduces the larger problem of the conditions in industry in general. Normal production and trade were unknown for so many years in the third century that only a complete change of economic principles developed under Diocletian and Constantine could bring any relief. Agriculture was perhaps the first industry to suffer and certainly suffered the most. As wars swept over the Empire the land was abandoned, irrigation and drainage were neglected, and disease spread. The emperors took great care to encourage and enforce production of food; the frontier settlements of foreigners were perhaps farming groups as much as defensive units. Cities
were required by law to pay taxes on unused lands in the hope of keeping them under cultivation. As could be expected, communities and private citizens alike tried desperately to avoid the burdens of these laws, but with no success. Although rural life was disrupted, cities were often no more prosperous since in large measure they depended upon the continuation of land-industries. In other industries the problem was not abandonment but rather an increase in the quantity of goods of poor quality. Skilled craftsmen were numerous, but the force of free and only partly-trained workers was enormous. Since the purchasing-power of this class was small, the consumption of industrially produced wares was low. As a result, the demand for low-priced articles of poor quality increased. In spite of the imperial legislation relative to all phases of industry, conditions became no easier.

It should be noticed, however, that the decline was by no means uniform throughout the Empire. Although the prosperity and importance of Italy was dwindling, the provinces assumed a greater share of responsibility for economic life. In the West, Gaul remained free from serious damage until the Germanic raids of 254-259, but thereafter continued to produce foodstuffs which were always in demand. In Spain conditions were more serious: the many confiscations of estates by Severus there had been particularly injurious. Prosperity in Roman Africa was checked when the overthrow of the Gordians meant the disruption of capital and productive power. Numidia and Mauretania in particular suffered from frequent Moorish raids, but there were still many large imperial and private estates over the whole region which flourished.

22 The decline of city life in Spain is noted sadly by Orosius, VII, 22, 8.
23 For conditions in Africa see R. M. Haywood, in E. S. A. R., IV, 1 (Baltimore, 1938), pp. 115-119.
Of all the western provinces, Britain suffered least. Being an island and removed from the European conflict, Britain continued its largely self-contained economy in peace.

In the East, however, conditions were much more severe. Asia Minor and Syria and Cilicia in particular probably received the worst damage of all areas. From the time of Septimius Severus to the reign of Gallienus, Asia was forced to bear heavy expenses for war as well as the destruction involved in being used as a battleground. A few larger cities, such as Pergamum, Nicaea and Cyzicus, continued to be productive, but in many regions village life and small local systems of rule were all the economy could sustain. In several parts of Asia local rulers came into prominence who were all but independent of Rome. They held power probably through popular fear of even further hardships after Roman military prestige had been badly shaken by the capture of Valerian. Strong local authority also served as a necessary protection against the raids and disturbances to trade caused by numerous robbers and pirates. In Asia as in the West, many citizens found it more profitable to flee from a life of responsibility and turn to piracy—a sad comment on the despondency of the Empire. The province of Egypt, on the other hand, fared much better since its chief product, grain, was always in demand. In the time of Gallienus the food supply in the Empire as a whole, however, was poor in spite of substantial production by Egypt. As could be expected, inflation took hold on Egypt during the reign of Valerian and Gallienus, but not because of failings in the Egyptian budget. The probable reason for the great volume of inflated coinage from Alexandria is the loss of revenues from Asia and western

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25 Particularly helpful here is Johnson, Egypt, pp. 30-34, 140-141.
Europe. As far as the war-torn provinces of Europe were concerned, surprisingly, all was not lost. Greede and Macedonia, for example, were not much affected by the monetary crisis and even after the invasions of 267/268 were still vital.

From this brief survey of the economic conditions of the third century from the Severi to Gallienus, it is evident that the Roman Empire was in a state of shock. To rectify the total upheaval of the usual way of life was too immense a struggle for Gallienus in spite of his many military successes. At this point it will be helpful to indicate the chief social and economic trends of the times. Of basic importance was the change in structure of the various classes of society. The cultured aristocracy was diminishing and the leading part it once played was taken over largely by the recently dominant military class. Military success ensured a man of a position of importance in civil administration as well. A once substantial middle class, the commercial element, now faced imminent ruin since the monetary system it was so closely connected with was itself upset. The lowest class (still the vast labouring force) was unaltered. The deterioration of the commercial class led to widespread changes, especially in industry. A tendency towards decentralization was marked; manufacturing was carried on by small groups, even the household, to provide for the needs of the many separate communities that arose when city living became unbearable. In agriculture this trend gave further emphasis to the system of tenant-farming, with large land-holdings in the hands of a few men.  

26 This process was aggravated by Claudius, who issued huge quantities of debased coins from Alexandria.


28 Rostovtzeff, S. E. H., I, pp. 494-501, believes it was the conflict of class-interests within the Empire as much as barbarian invasion which caused the breakdown of order.
The farmers' descendants, in many instances, stayed on the land where more security could be found.\footnote{29} One result of this change was a reversion to a more primitive economy in which production was less intense and of crops indigenous to the land. In many parts of the Empire barter was the common form of exchange—not necessarily a sign of further collapse but perhaps rather an attempt to attain stability in values and prices. With the division of industry and the separation or isolation of parts of the Empire by invasion, a deep-seated reason for the lack of unity in the Empire was revealed.\footnote{30}

There was such a diversity of peoples, each with local, "national" customs, languages and religions, that any "Roman" sentiment could easily be forgotten in favour of their immediate safety. Many of the revolts in the reign of Gallienus were due to local resentment at measures intended for a wider area of benefit. Thus the tendency towards sepæatism was a logical development of the period of crisis. Equally logical, however, from the imperial point of view, were the efforts by the government to enforce obedience to state policies. The demands made upon the citizen by the State were increasingly severe. But the aim of all imperial reforms was to ensure an unchanging process of administration, a common feature of ancient civilizations. Unfortunately, the method chosen (State-control and compulsion in the exploitation of many resources and in the operation of industries) did little to create any willingness on the part of the citizens to share this aim. Two dominant trends are thus exposed, the drive towards uniformity through the imperial

\footnote{29} This feudalistic system was widespread in Asia where many small rulers flourished.

\footnote{30} For details see C. E. Van Sickle, "Particularism in the Roman Empire During the Military Monarchy," \textit{A.J.P.}, LI, (1930), pp. 343-357.
bureaucracy and the opposite urge, to live independent of Roman authority with its responsibilities.

The actions of Valerian and Gallienus on a totally different subject, the matter of religion, are also worthy of note since their policies regarding Christianity bore very important results.\(^{31}\) The Christian and pagan philosophies were completely incompatible: the Christian belief in the freedom of the spirit and individual personality was viewed with suspicion by those who held to the conservative imperial cult. Failure to conform with the prevailing religious customs, such as sacrificing to the Emperor, could be considered an act of disloyalty. This misunderstanding lay behind the several persecutions endured by the Church. There seems to have been no official policy in dealing with Christians; provincial governors rather than the emperors were responsible for persecutions in many parts of the Empire. The Church had become strong by the third century, but in the time of crisis there was a corresponding upsurge of emphasis upon the imperial cult. Septimius Severus renewed the connection between political organization and the religious idea of imperial power. Succeeding emperors were often depicted as being under the guidance of divinities (for Gallienus, Sol invictus and Sarapis were his comites) and therefore were to be thought of as earthly counter-parts to divine beings.\(^{32}\) Eastern cults were dominant for a short time during the reigns of Elagabalus and Severus Alexander, but a reaction soon began. Decius, whose support was based on non-Christian Illyrian troops, was eager to restore Roman prestige and was thus hostile towards any foreign influence. Valerian

\(^{31}\) For a good account of the relationship between the Church and the State see A. D. Nock, in C. A. H., XII, Chapter XII, and H. Lietzmann, Chapter XV.

next authorized a determined persecution (Gallus probably had planned to continue Decius' measures, but did not live long enough to cause much harm.) Both Valerian and Decius received the support of the Roman Senate, which, though weak, nonetheless held to the established beliefs. For nearly ten years from the accession of Decius the Church suffered treatment that was often vicious. One important result of the harsh repression of the clergy in particular was the open hostility between the Church and the Roman governmental authorities, whereas previously the conflict had not been as bitter. For the Church itself, there was also the matter of re-stating believers who had submitted to the Roman demands—the question of the lapsi. This problem remained in dispute for many years.

Toward the end of Valerian's reign prospects improved for the Church, and shortly after the tragedy in Asia, Gallienus reversed his father's policy. In two edicts he restored the use of church buildings and cemeteries and proclaimed the Church free from further interferences. Although Christianity was not yet a religio licita, the right of the Church to hold property as a corporate body was confirmed. The result of Gallienus' concessions was a period of peace in which the Church organization was developed and in which the doctrines and ceremonies revised by Cyprian became catholic. In answer

33 Zonaras, XII, 628A, records a vigorous persecution under Gallus. For the measures taken by Decius and Valerian see above, pp. 5, 17. Valerian's persecution was particularly effective in Africa where the prefect Aemilianus was in charge (Eusebius, H. E., VII, 11, 1-26).

34 Eusebius, H. E., VII, 13. That Gallienus had disagreed with his father's actions for some time is apparent from the tone of the rescript.

35 The question of the primacy of the Church at Rome was also raised; Cyprian of any one bishop, and other African churchmen were vigorous in opposing increases in the authority. However, Aurelian acted in favour of the Roman Church in permitting it to
to the question why Gallienus chose this action, several reasons are probable. The Emperor certainly saw that no benefit was to be gained by creating further tension amongst a people long since tired of any kind of conflict. It is possible that Gallienus was hopeful of regaining power in the East and was tolerant to Christians since large numbers of them were there. Gallienus' own philosophical views may also have been a cause. There is evidence that he favoured neo-Platonism as advocated by Plotinus, and that he made friends of leading exponents of this school. By encouraging the growth of neo-Platonism he possibly envisaged that the teachings of Plotinus would subvert much of the influence of Christianity. Each of the reasons has something to recommend it.

The important feature of his tolerance, however, is the chance it gave the Church to expand and eventually become the powerful instrument of State-religion in Constantine's Empire.

To conclude this study of the mid-third century, it is fitting to comment on the nature of the rule of Valerian and Gallienus and on their personalities. Valerian, it is known, was an experienced administrator before becoming Emperor. His abilities would undoubtedly have been appreciated in a time of security and order, but the military emergencies that harrassed him were too much for him to manage. His rule began amid hopes for success, but his incapacity for decisive military action in Syria caused much bitterness. In the sources determine who should succeed Paul of Samosata (Eusebius, H. E., VII, 30, 19).

he is both hero and villain, depending upon the bias of the writer, senatorial or Christian. An estimate closer to the truth is that he was growing too old to be responsible for leadership.  

Gallienus, on the other hand, was more successful. Most of the Latin sources note his reign with abuse; he was cruel, degenerate and selfish, as well as responsible for the break-up of the Empire. But the view of Greek writers is better balanced; he was noble-minded, energetic and wished to be well thought of, but he could not control opposition to his sole rule. That this latter version, is, in the main, quite reliable can be: seen from a review of his achievements. His reforms in the army and in the government of provinces were not hasty, ill-conceived schemes to escape from a difficult situation, but rather a programme calculated to establish maximum efficiency and stability in departments vital to the survival of the Empire. Gallienus was himself successful on the field and was for much of his reign absent from his capitals, Rome and Cologne, on campaigns. In spite of his efforts, however, the Roman world was divided by the secession of Gaul and Syria to form independent states. In matters of economics he could not supply a solution; it is probably for this reason and because he continued a policy which led to a basic change in the social class-structure that Gallienus received the condemnation of historians. Nor is it surprising that the accepted view of his administration, until very recently, was one of blame and

37 Zosimus, I, 36, 2, draws attention to his "softness and slackness of life"--a probable interpretation of this statement is that the rugged conditions of warfare in Asia had taken the toll of his strength and energy.

38 Zonaras, XII, 634C.

39 Where he gained the necessary experience in war is not known. In fact, nothing is known about him until he appears as Emperor.
On the surface, the conclusion that Gallienus was irresponsible seems to be valid, but a thorough examination of his policies shows that this opinion is misleading: Gallienus tried his utmost to preserve the Empire as he thought best.

There is another side to the personality of Gallienus which had not been mentioned thus far, and that is his natural interest and ability in literary and artistic pursuits. He is said to have been famous for his literary accomplishments, and a few lines from an *epithalamium* of his are still extant. As an educated man, he encouraged men of letters to visit his court and took a keen interest in helping to revise artistic standards, particularly in sculpture. In many ways Gallienus was probably more "Hellenic" in outlook than "Roman"; his artistic aim seemed to be a return to the classical style of the Antonine period, leaving behind the primitivism of his own day. There is also some evidence that he found inspiration in the ideas of Augustus and that he even used him as a model. Although evidence is limited, enough exists to justify the acceptance of belief in Gallienus' artistic nature at least. This feature of his personality probably won him little popularity and may well have alienated many influential men who felt that there was no time for

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40 The work of Léon Homo (especially *Revue Historique*, CXIII (1913), pp. 1-22, 225-267) was one of the first important attempts to re-examine the evidence for Gallienus. Recently, Alföldi has continued this approach with success.

41 *Vita Gall.*, 11, 6-9. The author's comment on this aspect of Gallienus' nature deserves note: "This is all very well, but the requirements of a good poet are not those of an Emperor."


43 Alföldi, *Num. Ch.*, IX (1929), pp. 270-279, notes that the 'new golden
literature in government under conditions of utmost crisis. But it is pleasant to know that Gallienus was not completely overwhelmed by the pressures of state business. In an age when so much of daily life was filled with horror, the Emperor Gallienus stands out as an interesting and attractive person.
### APPENDIX

#### CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE: A.D. 253-268

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EVENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>254</td>
<td>Borani beaten back from Pityus. Persian invasion ends. Goths in Thrace; Marcomanni and Quadi in Pannonia. From 254 to 259, Gallienus, in command of the West, was faced with invasions by various Germanic peoples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>255</td>
<td>Borani capture Pityus and Trapezus. Valerian reinforces military establishments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
<td>Goths ravage Bithynia; Valerian, going to meet them, advances only as far as Cappadocia (plague in army). Economic crisis: debasement of coinage at its worst.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>257</td>
<td>Valerian begins persecution of the Church. Gallienus makes Cologne his headquarters against the Germans. From this time, Gallienus asserts his full independence, probably through disagreement with his father on matters of policy. Gallienus plans reforms in military organization and in provincial government which are carried out in general by 261.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258</td>
<td>Persecution of the Church renewed with vigour. Gallienus' son, Valerianus, dies sometime between 255 and 258. Alamanni invade Gaul and Italy 258-259. Decline of Roman control in Dacia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>259</td>
<td>Sapor again invades Asia 259-261. Revolt of Ingenuus in Pannonia; Regalianus continues the revolt. At the same time Postumus successfully revolts, taking Cologne and putting Gallienus' younger son, Saloninus, to death (late winter). Meanwhile, in Asia, Valerian was captured by Sapor and Antioch was taken (late in the year).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>Sole reign of Gallienus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEAR</td>
<td>EVENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>Postumus escapes the attacks of Gallienus and establishes his Gallic Empire. The Persians sweep over Cilicia and Cappadocia. Gallienus officially ends persecution. Invasions by Bavares (for several years) into Roman Africa checked. Roman military strength in Asia re-organized by Macrianus and Callistus. Macrianus and Quietus, sons of the commander Macrianus, accepted as Emperors in Asia and Egypt (by September). Romans force the Persians to retreat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>The two Macriani invade Europe, are defeated on the Thracian border. Quietus and Callistus overthrown in Emesa by Odenath. Conditions in Danube improve. Rise of Palmyra under Odenath; Odenath, honoured by the Romans from at least 258, campaigns against the Persians with success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262</td>
<td>Gallienus in Rome to celebrate the decennial year of his reign (autumn). Goths raid Asia Minor from 262 to 267; Bithynia, Phrygia and Cappadocia suffer most.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262-266</td>
<td>Conditions in Europe relatively peaceful. Little improvement, however, in economic life. Death of Odenath in 266/267; Zenobia rules in Palmyra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267</td>
<td>Goths and Heruli invade Danube provinces and Greece: the greatest invading force ever to attack the Empire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268</td>
<td>Gallienus defeats the main attack of the Goths at Naissos. Aureolus revolts in Milan; Gallienus murdered by his generals while attacking Aureolus (summer). Deaths of Laelianus, Postumus and Marius in Gaul; succession of Victorinus. Claudius and Aurelian continue the war against the Goths 268-269.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claudius acclaimed Emperor (summer).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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