THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA:
SOME ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATION

by

Edwin Robert Black
B.A., University of Western Ontario, 1951

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of
the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the Department

of

Economics and Political Science

We accept this thesis as conforming to the
required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
April, 1960
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives, with the explicit exception and reservation that no part of the material in the thesis known as Appendix I, "The Blue Book", and known as Appendix II, "The Drew Letter", may be reproduced in any manner, in full or in part, without the express permission in writing of the holders of the copyrights for the material. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Economics
and Political Science,
The University of British Columbia,
Vancouver 8, Canada.

April 1960.
ABSTRACT

Relatively few inquiries have been made into the sectionally-derived characteristics of Canadian political parties. The British Columbia Progressive Conservative Party had been exhibiting signs of stress between factions interested in attaining national power and those interested in provincial government objectives.

The inquiry, which relied chiefly upon personal interviews and accounts in periodicals, examined the beginnings of partisanship in B.C. provincial politics. Party groups were organized along provincial lines and, when working toward electing federal representatives, they did so wholly under the provincial leader's control. Until the second world war the national party was a confederation of provincial parties loosely linked across the top.

As an important force in B.C. the Conservatives died during the early thirties. When national leaders attempted reconstruction, they found provincial Conservatives in a coalition government dominated by the Liberal Party. Even after the second world war ended, the provincial leader refused to break with the Liberals and clung to sole control of a moribund provincial association. Attempts to revivify the association failed and personality clashes between the provincial leader and the national leader's personal representative brought into the open a bitter quarrel between the provincial and federal wings. A new federal party
structure institutionalized the division of interests and labour between federal and provincial spheres. Acceptance of the changed structure came with the provincial group's realization of the extent of the damage done by the quarrel.

Two groups promote Conservative interests in B.C., the Federal Council and the B.C. Progressive Conservative Association. The Council is the national association's chief agent in B.C. for federal matters although the association is also recognized. The latter group, which is left free to pursue provincial objectives, nominally claims but does not exercise authority in federal work. The leader of each group is not a member of the other group. The provincial leader enjoys much independence, accepts the division and seeks to heal the rupture. Important power was not vested in the national leader's personal representatives although they performed important services. A survey indicates more co-operation existing at the grass roots level of federal and provincial wings than the leadership quarrels might suggest. Public policy issues have not divided party members, largely because ideology is not too important in the party and because there have been few periods when the party held office simultaneously at Ottawa and Victoria. National Conservative election victories eased financial difficulties for both groups and promoted reconciliation.

Federalism in government and the diversity of Canada's major regions decided the organizational character of the Conservative
party until about the second world war. Extra-parliamentary political associations were slow to develop. The growth of important inter-sectional interests and of feelings of nationhood was accelerated by urbanization, economic depression, war, technological advances and sociological evolution. The political party that used a Confederation framework was becoming obsolete. New forms of organization were needed that recognized the sociological changes and were equipped to handle techniques of influencing voters in the mass. Coalition government made the changes even more necessary in British Columbia and, perhaps, facilitated their realization in some ways. The B.C. Conservative organization appears to be evolving toward a new type of structure that reflects the crumbling of strong sectional feeling. Many problems remain to be examined, especially those involved in the inter-relationships of the various types of elected persons within the federally-organized political party.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

Introduction  page 1
Historical background  5

CHAPTER II

Development of Conflict  35

CHAPTER III

Contemporary organization  64
(i) The Federal Council  64
(ii) The B.C. association  72
(iii) Two Conservative Organizations  76

CHAPTER IV

Inter-Factional Relationships  80
(i) Factionsal Leaders  81
(ii) Membership articulation  95
(iii) Public Policy  105
(iv) Party Finance  109

CHAPTER V

Conclusion  114

APPENDIX

I "The Blue Book"  132
II The Drew Letter  145
III Survey Form, Questionnaire  149
IV Election Returns  150

SOURCES  153
CHAPTER I

Introduction and Historical Background

Federal countries are relatively new on the world stage but the success of several in governing and developing large territories comprising several disparate sections offers fruitful areas of inquiry for the student of government. Only recently have countries like Canada and Australia started to receive close scrutiny, in contradistinction to the much greater interest social scientists have shown in the United States of America. So many similarities are there between Canada and the United States that attempts are sometimes made to transfer the findings of American domestic scholarship to the Canadian scene, a procedure that requires very careful handling in view of the significant differences between the continental cousins.

The political party as it operates in European countries and in the United States has been fairly thoroughly investigated although such inquiry can not be called complete so long as the subject retains its dynamic character. The party's role in defining acceptable areas of public controversy, educating the citizens to these issues and, in two-party countries, offering the voters an alternative government has been discussed in many places. Much less understood is the political party operating in a federal country with a parliamentary government. It is usually taken as axiomatic that major parties in North America
are chiefly organizations seeking power rather than organs of ideology, a more strongly entrenched attribute of parties in many older nations. An hypothesis that the federal political party in the Canadian model performs an additional and vital role in helping to reconcile sectional differences led to the present inquiry.

Federal governments present political parties seeking to encompass major levels of administration with unusual difficulties of organization. Historically there is apt to be physical difficulties of communication. But even when geographic handicaps have been overcome there remains the strategic problem of operating over a sectionally-divided field in which success may be won, not in only one place toward which all resources may be directed, but in two or more directions represented by the national and the provincial governments. Attaining power at one level frequently leads to differences with the holder of power at the other level. Provincial governments may be controlled quite independently of the national party leaders by members of the same political party. This creates a problem in discipline which is compounded by the possibility of some party members achieving independence of the national leader and utilizing it to direct the activities of the same party workers on whom the national leader depends for field work. A Canadian party seeking national power is forced to bridge the sectional interests, offering a compromise of regional claims that may render it almost ideologically neutral in sectional politics.
These considerations suggested an inquiry into the organization of the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Party in which there appeared to be internal strains resulting from a clash of national and sectional interests, both seeking to control it. Directly-applicable materials for research were not easily discovered. Only a few comprehensive studies have been made of Canadian national parties, and even fewer of parties operating within one province.¹ None of these examined very intensively the problem under review here. Only very recently has an authoritative history of British Columbia been written that embraces the first half of this century.² The Conservative organizations lack documents and records; neither of the two party offices possessed complete lists of party standings after elections from 1905 to the present, and neither was there a complete record of the names of party leaders in British Columbia for the same period. These deficiencies had to be made good before the inquiry could proceed very far.

In consequence, chief reliance has necessarily been placed on personal interviews and the files of daily newspapers and popular periodicals, with all the attendant handicaps that such research methods imply. Much of the matter studied is strongly colored by the personal involvement of those interviewed. Impartial assessment of the overall situation is often impossible if one has been a

1. The Canadian Social Science Council series on Alberta is a notable exception. A study of Social Credit in British Columbia is being completed at Wesleyan University by Thomas Sandford.
participant in the main arena or one of the antagonists' supporters although such a person can often furnish valuable information. Impartial assessments might be made by persons who have not been personally involved but they are usually denied the knowledge on which assessments can be made.

In discussing federal politics, political party workers often suggest that intra-party clashes between leaders or factions can be reduced to personality differences and nothing more. Challenging such suggestions requires indication of possible alternative explanations of such difficulties between adherents of the same political party. In seeking such alternatives the question was reached: What are the influences operating on a regional political party that may be traced to the evolution of Canada as a national entity, and in what way are these influences manifested? The search for an answer sometimes led to the impression that a phantom was sought, many persons were of this opinion, but it is believed that some solid substance has been grasped that may contribute in some small measure toward further understanding of Canadian party politics. The deductions that are offered are solely the responsibility of the investigator and none of the many persons who so generously assisted should be attributed with any of the faults herein.
The provincial executive of the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association met at Vernon on July 17, 1954. At that meeting the provincial party leader supported a motion of non-confidence in George Drew, the national leader of the party. For several hours angry debate filled the air, charges were hurled freely and personalities slandered during the progress of what amounted to a civil war within the party. Finally a ballot was taken. The motion was approved 40 to 24. The province's three Conservative members of Parliament jumped to their feet and stalked from the room, followed by 21 supporters, several of them in tears and all of them enraged.

During the days, weeks and months that followed, Conservative party members in the province defiantly ranged themselves into two antagonistic camps. The party's bitter internal strife was exposed for all the voters to see. The divisions were easily discerned. On the one side was Deane Finlayson, the provincial leader, most of the executive members of the B.C. Progressive Conservative Association, and part of the riding associations' executives. On the other side were the members of Parliament, the Young Conservatives, and the other riding association executives and members. The lone Conservative member of the Legislature held himself aloof from the fray, later changing his official designation to that of independent.

Newspaper reports gave the impression that the clash resulted from the personalities of George Drew and Deane Finlayson. The
provincial leader's case was that Mr. Drew was denying him his rights as a provincial leader, and in so doing was behaving dictatorially. Many of those supporting Mr. Drew did so partially on grounds that the provincial executive had acted unconstitutionally and was gravely injuring the party in the process. Chiefly, however, they supported Mr. Drew because they did not wish to relinquish to an unproven provincial leader and his friends the full control of the party's federal organization in B.C., an organization built largely through the work of a few stalwarts like Leon Ladner and the three M.P.s: Howard Green, member for Vancouver-Quadra; E. Davie Fulton, Kamloops; and Maj.-Gen. George Pearkes, member for Esquimalt-Saanich. Those claiming that the problem could have been resolved but for Mr. Drew's personality ignore the determination of Mr. Drew's B.C. supporters who refused to give up control over their organization.

As a jurisdictional dispute, the quarrel had deep roots; some party members traced them to the "Bowserites and the Tupperites", a reflection of one of the earliest divisions in B.C. Conservative ranks - supposedly between members primarily interested in winning power at Ottawa and those primarily concerned with gaining power at Victoria.

Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper was the son of a Conservative prime minister in whose cabinet he had held office in his own right, a man who had won some national stature through service on an international commission, and had retired from national
politics to live in British Columbia at the turn of the century. While out of public office, he continued his interest in Conservative party fortunes. Some persons believed he was assigned to bolster B.C. organization for the election of M.P.s. Some also saw him as the *eminence grise* in British Columbia, but this he was not. He may have wished for the role but he never attained it. There were two reasons, both of them fellow Conservatives. The more eminent was Richard Cartwright McBride, and the other was William John Bowser, called by his many enemies, "Little Caesar". Bowser manipulated the party apparatus in B.C. for the first quarter of this century. The opposition to Bowser's control centred about Tupper, whence arose the appellations of "Bowserites and Tupperites."

The credit- or blame - for the introduction of national party lines into provincial politics goes to McBride. Until 1903 cabinets had been formed on a personal basis regardless of national party affiliations. Ministries often included Liberals, Liberal-Conservatives (as the Conservative party was then designated) and non-partisans.

Because the rise of political parties in Canada and in British Columbia has been described elsewhere only a brief outline for British Columbia will be attempted here.

Pro-Confederation associations which had been active in the province waned after 1871. A few became constituency organizations supporting Sir John A. Macdonald. The importance of the Canadian Pacific Railway project was, however, apparently enough to ensure British Columbia's almost solid support of the Liberal-Conservative party for many years. The Liberals opposed the railway and were in great disfavour with loyal British Columbians. Not until 1889 was a Liberal riding association formed in B.C. During the early nineties, Sir Wilfrid Laurier encouraged the growth of Liberal party feeling in British Columbia and a loose provincial association was formed about 1894. While the Liberal-Conservatives had had numerous campaign organizations, these usually disappeared after elections.

Suggestions were made with increasing frequency during the nineties that Dominion party lines should be introduced into provincial politics. Such suggestions were not well received. The mood that prevailed is suggested by this comment in the Vancouver News-Advertiser on July 19, 1896:

In our provincial affairs we want the most capable and best business men that we can get to accept a seat in the Legislature and whether they hold Conservative or Liberal views in federal affairs should cut no figure in their selection.

When the newly-formed Provincial Liberal Association held a conference in Vancouver in 1897 it was immediately criticized for what was said to be an attempt to introduce party lines in provincial matters. The federal election had been held the
year previously, it was pointed out, and there was no cause for the Liberals to meet provincially. The meeting passed a resolution proposing that party lines be introduced in provincial affairs. The resolution was repudiated the next day. At Victoria the Opposition to the government of Premier J.H. Turner continued to include Liberal-Conservatives and Conservatives working closely together. Turner, seizing the offensive, declared his government was "Conservative from top to bottom" but he failed to secure the support of his Conservative opponents. He next tried to win the support of federal Liberals who opposed party politics in the provincial sphere and called an election in 1898. Turner's government group had maintained a strong organization throughout the province and both Liberal and Conservative associations were determined to keep the Opposition united by refraining from partisan politics during the election. It resulted in Turner securing only 18 of the 58 members as supporters. He was dismissed by the lieutenant-governor and Charles Semlin, the opposition leader, became premier.

The Liberal-Conservatives held their first Vancouver convention in 1896, resolved that party lines would be desirable provincially and encountered widespread newspaper opposition. The outcry was such that they postponed plans to organize provincial constituencies. At a meeting the next year the Liberal-Conservatives seriously considered, but did not actually adopt a motion to withdraw from any activity that might be linked to provincial politics.

4. Vancouver News-Advertiser, Nov. 28, 1897.
In 1899 Semlin's government was defeated over a redistribution bill. Joseph Martin, former attorney-general, formed a new government on the understanding that he would call an immediate election. Discussion had revived within Conservative ranks about the advisability of party lines in B.C. politics, but the move was condemned in the desire to keep opposition united to defeat the government for Martin appears to have been widely disliked. Party groups were most active in Vancouver, however, and when the city Liberal association decided to support the government, the Liberal-Conservatives decided as a body to oppose the government. A few other ridings ignored the provincial leaders wishes and ran party candidates resulting in lists for Government, Opposition, Liberal, Liberal-Conservative, Labour and Independent candidates for the 1900 elections. Martin was defeated. James Dunsmuir became premier.

A few months later, in August, the Liberal-Conservatives assessed the election results. Although some straight Conservatives had been elected, the meeting concluded that what party efforts had been made outside of Vancouver had failed. Exceptionally strong organization had made the difference in Vancouver. Once more a Conservative meeting decided the party should not be involved in provincial affairs, as a similar Liberal group had also decided. For two years the federal organizations evinced little interest in the issue. In April 1902, however, a straight Liberal-Conservative won a provincial seat in a Rossland by-election with the help of the Rossland district association. The
Liberal-Conservatives convened in September in Revelstoke, passed resolutions backing participation in provincial politics, drafted a provincial party constitution and asked M.L.A.s who were Liberal-Conservative in federal affairs to work as a group in the B.C. Legislative Assembly. Richard McBride's rise to eminence has been described by both Dr. M. A. Ormsby and Brian R. D. Smith. The government had been in the hands of E. G. Prior for only a short time before his defeat in the Legislature over the Chimney Creek affair. McBride, the Leader of the Opposition, was summoned by the lieutenant-governor. McBride apparently considered forming another coalition government but was swayed from this course by a number of considerations. Most important seems to have been a caucus of the Liberal-Conservative members of the legislature who reminded him of the Revelstoke convention's resolutions. The new ministry was frankly Conservative in its makeup and McBride determined to go to the country for a vote of confidence.

The Liberal-Conservative association undertook to conduct the government's campaign. Some riding associations protested the imposition of federal lines into provincial politics and refused to co-operate. McBride accordingly set up separate associations in those ridings with the express aim of working in the provincial field. Federal election work was to be left to

5. Ormsby - History - chap. 12 "The People's Dick"
the recalcitrant federal organizations. McBride apparently had the support of the new national Liberal-Conservative leader, Robert Laird Borden. Borden took no part in the campaign, and there is no suggestion he would have taken part even if there had not been aggrieved party feelings on the matter. Several members of Parliament campaigned actively while others refrained. The vagueness of political lines in the legislature makes it difficult to examine the partisan character of any new group of members. The 1905 election gave McBride a slight edge in the House; of the forty-two members, twenty-two were nominal Liberal-Conservatives or Conservative and one had to be elected Speaker. Seventeen called themselves Liberals, two were Socialists and one Labour. The Liberal-Conservative annual meeting of 1904 congratulated the premier for his success in introducing party lines and reorganized itself completely along provincial lines. This basic structure has remained largely the same up to the present. 7

The introduction of party lines into British Columbia politics may be attributed partly to the carry-over of partisan feeling from the federal sphere, partly to the increasing migration to B.C. from eastern provinces of people accustomed to partisan provincial politics, but probably chiefly to the growing inability of the personality governments to cope with the province's changing

7. Superimposition of the Federal Council organization was an addition from without. It is dealt with below.
problems. Had a succession of able premiers appeared at the correct time, it is possible that coalition government would not have fallen into disrepute as an efficient means of administration. Another probable influence came from the revivifying of both national parties, the Liberal through the influence of a brilliant new leader and success, and the Liberal-Conservative because of its crashing defeat and the rise to power of energetic young people free from the taint of "old-guardism". The growth of Canadian nationalism in B.C. also may have helped the province to accept introduction of national party lines.  

Conservatives who sought election to the House of Commons had less organized support than did prospective members of the Legislative Assembly. Although the original basis of the Liberal-Conservatives in B.C. had been federal, the reorganization into a provincially-oriented body had repercussions on federal candidates. With each election they had to patch together, from the provincial constituency associations, an organization that could embrace the work required in the much larger federal riding. Once the election was over, the patchwork fell apart. The result was that members who consistently won re-election federally had to build personal organizations that usually were intimately connected to the provincial association. Federal candidates who

8. Ormsby - History - p.329
9. Much of this information has been gleaned from a series of personal interviews with Leon J. Ladner and D. A. MacGregor, former editorial writer for The Vancouver Province and a keen observer of the political scene for many years.
lacked such personal forces had a much more formidable task. At times the provincial association threw itself into a federal election campaign but its efforts were weakened by its Victoria orientation. This is not to say that powers in the federal party were lacking influence in B.C. party circles. Influence they had, but not organizational control. Members of Parliament, Senators and ex-cabinet ministers such as Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper were large personages, but they did not often work actively in the association to which they nominally belonged. They preferred to concentrate on the personal machinery. It was rare indeed that an individual, once successful in the federal field, could be induced to play an active provincial role.

Accord between McBride and the federal leader, R.L. Borden, seems to have obtained throughout the former's leadership in B.C. During his 1902 western tour Borden had visited the B.C. Liberal-Conservative convention at Revelstoke and observed that McBride was the obvious choice for the party leadership (by virtue of his leading the Opposition). The federal leader's views were, however, passed by and Charles Wilson, a party stalwart, was elected leader at that time. This apparently was an attempt by the party old guard to assert its authority. McBride began building up the Conservative organization with the help of Robert Francis Green and William John Bowser. Bowser later assumed full

responsibility over organization in B.C. In 1906 McBride's leadership was seriously challenged by a combination of Bowser and Wilson, aided by Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper who had been alienated by the Kaien Island dispute. In addition, Green's resignation was demanded over the Kaien Island case which the opposition represented as a railway lands scandal.

McBride's answer was a journey to Ottawa to extract "Better Terms" for British Columbia. Sir Wilfrid Laurier had called a conference of the provinces to consider their financial relations with the federal government. The B.C. premier's case was well-prepared and well-presented. The province claimed that it suffered far more than any others from the protection given to eastern manufacturing interests, that federal public works were built everywhere else, but not in B.C., that government costs were made unusually expensive because of geographical considerations, and that the province contributed far more to federal revenues than it received. Fixed grants were outmoded, he argued, and healthy upward adjustments were required. Laurier apparently was persuaded by some of these suggestions and unwilling to alienate the voters of a province that had, in 1904, elected all Liberals as their seven M.P.s. He offered a grant of $1,000,000 in ten annual instalments. This McBride rejected in great indignation and went to the polls in 1907. He won increased support. 11

11. Authorities vary on the precise composition of the Legislature. The most acceptable results seem to be those giving the Liberal-Conservatives twenty-seven supporters, the Liberals twelve, and the Socialists three.
McBride carried his fight for better terms to Britain, a trip that was generally hailed as a success. He returned in time to begin with some of his cabinet a series of trips throughout British Columbia in which he eulogized Borden and helped to focus the population's anti-Oriental feelings. A bill in the legislature which was thrown out by the Liberals at Ottawa, coupled with close liaison between Borden and McBride, helped to return five Liberal-Conservatives in the 1908 federal election.

Attorney-General Bowser was firmly wedded to McBride and devoted more and more of his talent to organization. Where McBride was charming and diplomatic, Bowser was blunt and often discourteous. If a party supporter needed putting off, it was Bowser that had to tell him no. Over the years of McBride's prime ministry strong feelings grew up within the party. If you won what you wanted McBride's persuasive personality bound you close to the hierarchy and "Little Caesar" made it clear who controlled things. The attorney-general could not turn away a request softly. All that he could not accede to, he considered impertinent requests. The party thus had its "ins" - Bowser's hierarchy and its followers - and its "outs" - those who lost their fight for favours and were antagonized by Bowser.

Railways schemes were revived in British Columbia and McBride decided to make them an election issue in 1909. The party "outs" included Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper, who had railway interests of his own. Tupper denounced McBride's "spendthrift" schemes but he carried little organizational
influence at this time and was apparently regarded by many as an Eastern intruder who did not understand British Columbia's problems. The tide of political favour set full for the Conservatives in 1909. McBride was returned with thirty-seven supporters, the opposition reduced to two Liberals and two Socialists. Even the two Liberals were swept away in 1912 and the Socialists held to two. The year before, 1911, Borden had won all seven British Columbia seats in the Commons during his sweep to national power. One of the seven B.C. M.P.s was a young member who had keenly observed the importance of party organization, H. H. Stevens, who later played a role that contributed to the Conservatives' overthrow.

Borden and McBride were high in each other's regard, and it was probably this more than any other factor that accounts for their harmonious relations while each was in office despite the B.C. premier's potential threat to Borden's leadership. Borden's Memoirs relate several instances between 1909 and 1911 when his national leadership was threatened with the succession of McBride a distinct possibility. Before the election, in 1911, Borden sent this message to McBride:


The national emergency referred to was the Naval Bill debates and the Liberals' Reciprocity proposals. Apparently before McBride was able to refuse Borden's request, the national leader was petitioned by alarmed members of Parliament and remained in his post. When Borden became prime minister he expected McBride to join his cabinet but the British Columbia premier preferred to remain where he was.

McBride left the leadership in 1915 to go to England as British Columbia's agent-general. Bowser became premier and was promptly defeated at the polls. Before the 1916 election the number of seats in the legislature had been raised to forty-seven but of this total Bowser won only nine. Harlan C. Brewster led the Liberal Party into office with thirty-six supporters in the legislature. A Socialist occupied the remaining seat. Bowser had reaped not only the bitter fruit of economic difficulties and of the results of his former chief's often-dilatory policies, but of all the personal enmities he had made in the party for years.


14. Party opinion had been further aggravated when Bowser took over the leadership without calling a convention. Tupper swung his support solidly to the Liberal side and worked actively against Bowser in the election campaign.
A contemporary observer made this assessment of W. J. Bowser:

A man of dominating force of character and marked ability, his cold personality and direct and explicit manner of expression was the very antithesis of that of McBride, and he could not capture the popular support.....

As Opposition leader ... Mr. Bowser only succeeded in further antagonizing powerful sections of the public.15

During Brewster's regime charges were made that railway promoters had contributed to the campaign funds of both parties.

A member of the Liberal party, the sixth member for Vancouver City, embarrassed the government by claiming that the first member, [M. A.] Macdonald, had received a contribution of $25,000 for his personal campaign funds from the Canadian Northern Railway. Still another investigation had to be held. During the hearings, sordid details of contributions to the campaign funds of both parties came to light....16

Brewster was forced to accept the resignation of his Attorney-General. Promoters of the Pacific Great Eastern Railway were involved in a later case in which it was said that Bowser and a Liberal, William Sloan, had taken money for political campaigning.17 While no visible harm was done to the Conservative party organization by these charges, the malcontents gained fresh fuel with which to feed their grievances

17. See: Bruce Ramsey, The P.G.E. Story in process of publication by Mitchell Press, Vancouver, chap.iii. Mr. Ramsey generously permitted the writer the use of his manuscript.
over Bowser's leadership. His opponents, however, were unable to make any headway. Their difficulties were compounded by the focussing of all attention on the federal election campaign of 1917. For the Conservatives, it was a matter of patriotism that Borden be returned in the fullest possible strength. Internal party differences were submerged for the campaign which resulted in the election of all thirteen Conservative candidates. Part of the credit for this achievement belongs to H. H. Stevens, whose ability gained increasing notice in party circles, and to Simon Fraser Tolmie, son of a nineteenth century B. C. public figure who became federal Agriculture Minister in August 1919.

By 1920 Bowser had been out of power four years and his grip on the party apparatus appeared to be loosening. He was challenged by young Conservatives, including many newly-returned from military service, and by many in the large contingent of Conservative members of Parliament. Bowser fought a vigorous campaign against Premier John Oliver, raised the Conservative representation at Victoria\(^\text{18}\) and fought off his critics. Those M.P.s critical of Bowser had complaints based both on differences over organizational tactics and on personal antagonism. Opposition to Bowser began to fade seriously in the face of three developments: his enthusiastic attack on Oliver in the legislature, the 1921 federal election campaign which cut the thirteen Conservative M.P.s to seven, and the rise of the Provincial Party.

\(^{18}\) Conservatives fourteen; Liberals twenty-six; Labour four; Independents three.
This latter represented a protest movement that was in full swing in Ontario and the Canadian West. One essential difference in its British Columbia manifestation is that the movement was not controlled by agricultural elements but by businessmen. The Provincial Party began with a fusion between the United Farmers of British Columbia, dissatisfied veterans, and politically-minded Vancouver businessmen. Foremost among these latter was Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper, together with disillusioned supporters of the Liberal and Conservative camps. It is difficult to say to what extent dissatisfied Conservatives made up the Provincial Party. Tupper's influence may be overemphasized but the number of Conservatives was not inconsiderable. The group's chief complaints were corruption in government, blamed equally on both parties, high taxes, inadequate treatment for soldiers and farmers, and dissatisfaction with the provincially-owned Pacific Great Eastern Railway. Young Conservatives had been angered by the 1922 convention's endorsement of Bowser and many had joined the Provincial Party. The new party published an organ called The Searchlight which made such a series of charges against the old line politicians and against the government that Premier Oliver was forced to appoint a commission of enquiry into the accusations. Maj. - Gen. A. D. McRae, the

Provincial Party's financier and leader, had bandied about a figure of $500,000 supposed to have been paid from provincial funds controlled by the P.G.E. both to Bowser and to Oliver's supporters. Sir Charles Hibbert was counsel for McRae in the inquiry but he was unable to adduce any evidence acceptable to the inquiring commissioner. Bowser flatly refused to testify. Premier Oliver rebutted all questions with such skill that many answers were elicited but no information. Because certain records were burned, the Provincial Party was able to create an impression that great corruption existed but had been cleverly camouflaged.

The Provincial Party campaign motto was "Put Oliver out and don't let Bowser in", a slogan that bore fruit in the elections of June 1924. Not only did Premier Oliver lose his seat, but so did Bowser who had held his seat twenty-one years. To the provincials chagrin, however, McRae also failed to win election to the legislature which was composed of fourteen Conservatives, twenty-three Liberals, three Provincial Party members, three Socialists, one Labour and four Independents. The premier won a byelection to return to the house and continued to rule, as one Conservative put it, "by the grace of God, and the Labour Party and the member for Alberni." The Conservative leader, angered by his defeat and the defection of many whom he felt should have supported him, refused to seek another seat and announced his retirement from politics.

20. The best account is in Ramsey, The P.G.E. Story, Chapter V. 21. Cited in 
He was provisionally succeeded as nominal leader of the party by R. H. Pooley who became Leader of the Opposition.

Although the election had cut Oliver's support and kept Bowser out, it had also administered the coup de grace to the Provincial Party. Its membership faded away. Some, like McRae, stole quietly back to the folds of the Conservative Party. The farmer supporters withdrew to the wings of the U.F.B.C. and eschewed political action for a time. Most prominent among the Conservative members of Parliament at this time were Hon. H. H. Stevens, Dr. S. P. Tolmie and L. J. Ladner, who had first won election to the Commons in 1921. Stevens was closely involved in the battle with King at Ottawa. Tolmie, another former cabinet minister, became national organizer after the party's defeat in 1921. These federal members ensured that B.C. Federal ridings were well-organized but control of the party machinery was held firmly by Bowser. After his "retirement" in 1924 he attempted to control the organization through close friends and it became evident that as long as Bowser was alive he intended keeping his hand as firmly on the party throttle as possible. R. L. Maitland, who became party president, tried to steer a neutral course between the Bowserites and the anti-Bowserites but this satisfied nobody.

22. Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper, for example, retired from political life as a result. He died March 30, 1927.

23. Some agricultural groups supported the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and others the Social Credit movement. See Ormsby - "The United Farmers" - B.C.H.Q. P.75
All it did was to keep the field clear for battle. The federal election of 1925 returned ten Conservative M.P.s from British Columbia. Disaffection with Bowser gathered about the leadership of some of these federal members. The strongest M.P. apart from Stevens and Tolmie, was evidently Ladner. Tolmie was approached several times about assuming the leadership but he rejected every advance. The provincial government was running into increasingly heavy weather over the P.G.E. railway and the economic situation. Mr. Ladner states:

It was absolutely certain that the Conservatives could form the next provincial government, provided they had a strong leader. It was a great chance. Bill Bowser realized this too and he couldn't keep his hands off. The minute he saw there was a lot of support building up for me, he started moving again.

A leadership convention was called for November, 1926 at Kamloops. The intrigue began months before. There was quarrelling over the method of selecting each riding's delegates, and on convention balloting. The dispute was detailed and acrimonious. Every twist and turn was reported in the daily press. Charges were made that federal members had used their weight in particular constituencies to secure the election of delegates pledged either to Ladner or to Bowser, who had decided to enter the contest. Gangs from either camp crowded constituency meetings for the election of


25. From a conversation between Mr. Ladner and the writer, January 1960.

26. See daily issues of _The Vancouver Province_ during September, October, and November 1926.
delegates. Claims of "packing" meetings with non-members were made by both sides. A number of constituency associations sent unpledged delegates. Two ridings sent double sets of delegates, one set pledged to Ladner and one to Bowser. By all counts the delegates were evenly split between the Ladner and the Bowser men.

The battle was not one along federal-provincial lines and this, for purposes of this inquiry, is its most noteworthy feature. R. H. Pooley, the Conservative Leader of the Opposition, had declined to run. Instead, he led a group of twelve or thirteen members of the Legislature in a group to Ladner, urged him to run and pledged their support. Ladner, the member of Parliament had the most important provincially-based support he could have. Bowser, on the other hand, claimed important supporters among those with strong federal connections. Rather than risk the possibility of a defeat, he withdrew from the race just before the Kamloops meeting. He asked his followers to vote instead for Senator J. D. Taylor. Ladner's committee included Gen. McRae and W. C. Shelly, who was later to become provincial Minister of Finance. Among his supporters Taylor counted Bowser, W. G. McQuarrie, and many of the association's officers.

The convention proceedings were dramatic. Eight ballots were taken without anyone being able to gain a simple majority. Ladner was far in the lead. On the seventh ballot he gained 517 votes, only six short of the necessary majority. Taylor was never
able to get more than 218. Two other candidates were Col. Nelson Spencer and C. F. Davie. Neither gained more than twenty votes which were important only insofar as they might have made the difference to Ladner’s possible victory. After the eighth ballot and the prospect of endless deadlock, a dinner adjournment was called. Ladner met his committee. They decided to offer their support to Simon Fraser Tolmie. He declined. Nevertheless Ladner proposed Tolmie’s name 27 from the platform and a roar of approval filled the hall. Tolmie again declined but Pooley and others eventually prevailed upon him to accept an offer made by unanimous approval. Some observers claimed that Bowser sat stubbornly in his seat, refusing to give his approval to Tolmie, but that he was eventually dragged to his feet and held there by friends.

Tolmie was a most-acceptable choice to the national Conservative leader, Arthur Meighen, for whom he had worked as national organizer. Tolmie’s selection had the advantage of quieting internal disputes and of securing the apparently permanent retirement of Bowser. Both Meighen and Tolmie were fighting Liberal governments, 28 and their views on policy were similar in all essential respects. Neither was there any difference in organizational matters. During the twenties, Tolmie had largely

---

27. "...it was Leon Ladner, who if he persisted might have made the leadership himself, who proposed that the party refuse to accept Dr. Tolmie’s latest denial...." - McKelvie - op. cit. p. 30
28. Tolmie did not, as many expected immediately resign his seat at Ottawa to seek a seat in the legislature. Not until two years later when the then-Premier J. D. Maclean called an election did he quit Ottawa to devote his time exclusively to the B.C. scene.
confined his B.C. organizational interest to Vancouver Island while Stevens looked after the mainland. When Tolmie won the 1928 provincial election with a reinvigorated B.C. Conservative Association, he was apparently content to have Stevens take federal matters out of his hands. The province's main differences with the federal government -- "better terms", railway freight rates, and the railway lands -- had been vigorously battled by Oliver and Maclean, and with some success. The Liberals had failed to persuade King that he should buy the P.G.E. but this did not arise as an important issue between the two Conservative administrations that followed. Even the railway lands issue had been largely decided before King's overthrow in 1930. The Liberals had done much to narrow the field of possible differences between Tolmie and R. B. Bennett.

Although R. B. Bennett could claim to be a westerner, his western campaign in 1930 fared worse than had that of Meighen in 1926. The federal Conservative representation from B.C. fell from the twelve elected in 1926 to only seven. The reason for this decreased B.C. support of the Conservatives is not clear. Ladner, who was one of those eliminated from the scene, says the Liberal campaigning was not only much better in 1930 than it had been in 1926, but that it was relatively more effective in B.C. than elsewhere.
Tolmie's incumbency at Victoria marked the beginning of a long period of depression for the Conservative party in B.C. Not for another seventeen years would the province send any greater Conservative representation to Ottawa. Never since have the Conservatives elected many more than one-third the number of supporters Tolmie had in 1928. 29 The depths of economic and social depression into which British Columbia was plunged had wide repercussions. Tolmie's government demonstrated an ineptness and lack of imagination in dealing with the situation that was equalled by few other contemporaneous jurisdictions. Vancouver businessmen, on whom the Conservative party had been greatly dependent, sent a delegation led by H. R. MacMillan which demanded a special commission of inquiry into the whole operation of government. Tolmie acceded to the demand. The report of the George Kidd commission made startling reading, especially for party workers. This group of prominent Conservative businessmen insisted that the province's salvation lay in stringent economy. 30 Suggestions made included reducing the amount of free education, eliminating the appropriation for the University of B.C., cutting the cabinet to six members and the legislature from forty-eight to twenty-eight members. Conservatives had had their faith already greatly weakened by the failure of orthodox remedies for the

29. 1928 returns: Conservatives thirty-five, Liberals twelve, Labour one. Total forty-eight.

30. The province could be run on an annual budget of $6,000,000, instead of the $25,000,000 it was using, the report said.
economic troubles.

This committee's recommendations, apparently representing the most informed thinking in the Conservative party, came as a stunning blow. Shortly after the report was published in August 1952 Tolmie proposed forming a Union government with the Liberals and appealed to his followers for support. Not only were the Liberals adamantly opposed to any coalition but the whole Conservative association seemed to be opposed. The legislative caucus opposed coalition but later approved it rather than oppose the premier. T. D. Pattullo, the Leader of the Opposition, rejected yet another proposal for union government in the spring of 1955. Tolmie, in desperation, dragged out the legal life of the legislature to the very end before calling an election for November 1955. The Conservative association was badly split, as was the cabinet. The association executive decided it would take no part in the campaign and told the constituency associations they were free to support the premier, or to run candidates under any label. To add to the Conservative party's woes its former leader refused to stay retired. Tolmie's calls for union government had so incensed Bowser that he re-entered public life, formed a Non-Partisan movement and began campaigning. His death two weeks before the election removed this group as serious contender although it managed to elect two members. Slight though this accomplishment

51. See Ormsby, History, pp. 446-449.
might seem, it was better than the Conservative showing. Tolmie was personally defeated and only one supporter running under his Unionist label was returned. This was R. H. Pooley, former Attorney-General and once party House leader. Pattullo's triumph was almost as complete as had been Brewster's in 1916 when the Conservatives had last been overthrown. Opposed to the thirty-four Liberals stood Pooley, five Independents, one Labour, and seven members of the newly-formed Co-operative Commonwealth Federation which formed the official opposition. Further humiliation was visited on the Conservatives during the next two years. The lack of discipline resulting from the executive's freeing the riding associations for the 1955 campaign, coupled with the depression and the election results, shattered the provincial Conservative association. After a few post mortem meetings, the executive had difficulties even summoning a quorum of its own members. McRae, who had been Bennett's national organizer in 1950 had received the traditional summons to the Senate. He maintained his heavy financial contributions to the party but played very little part personally in the party work thereafter. The last vestige of Conservative strength in B.C. vanished just before the 1955 federal election campaign when H. H. Stevens bolted the party and formed his own Reconstruction movement.

52. Tolmie retired from active direction of the party, suffered several long illnesses, but re-entered the political scene briefly in 1956 when he won re-election to the House of Commons in a by-election. He died October 15, 1957.
Conservatives in British Columbia were no more strongly oriented in ideology than those elsewhere in Canada but the triple shock to their principles --- the provincial Kidd report, the Price Spreads Inquiry report and R. B. Bennett's radical legislation --- was adequate excuse for deserting the party in those hard days. The Conservatives in 1926 had polled 56 per cent of British Columbia's popular vote. This sagged to 49 per cent in 1930 and plummeted to 25 per cent after Steven's defection.55 Had Stevens not bolted the party, Bennett might have reaped many of the Reconstruction Party's votes and avoided defeat in 1935.54 The party is still likely to have been in hard circumstances in B.C. The survival of the Conservative Party as a vital national force would certainly have made much easier the party's revival within the province. The 1935 election had one slight consolation for the Tories in the introduction to the House of Commons of a very able Conservative member who later played a key role in party organization. This was Howard Green who, from 1935 to the present day (1960) has been an M.P., first for Vancouver South and then in the new Vancouver-Quadra riding.

The provincial association wandered in the wilderness of despair for many years. Its president after 1954, Dr. F. P. Patterson, acted as party leader. On July 1, 1956 he was formally


54. The Liberal vote was only slightly increased in 1935. The Reconstruction and C.C. F. parties together polled one-quarter of the total ballots cast.
elected leader after a rather listless campaign. Tolmie's former minister of public works, Rolf Bruhn, who sat as an Independent, had been nominated for the leadership but declined it. He expressed uncertainty whether political partisanship in the traditional fashion was the best way to conduct government. Patterson won the first ballot with 266 of the 389 votes cast. The runners-up were Herbert Anscomb and R. L. Maitland. Patterson was unable to win election in the Vancouver-Burrard by-election in 1936 but the next year he won Dewdney riding which had been held by two former premiers. Seven other Conservatives sat in the legislature with him but the Liberals' thirty-one members were more than enough to support Pattullo. Dr. Patterson died in February 1938. This time the party turned to Maitland who was able to persuade Bruhn to return to the fold. This kept the Conservative strength at one member more than the C.C.F. and made Maitland Leader of the Opposition succeeding Patterson.

R. B. Bennett meanwhile had left the Conservative party which cast about for a national leader who could bring them electoral success. Dr. R. J. Manion set about trying to repair his party's illnesses. Before much could be accomplished, either by Manion nationally or by Maitland provincially, the Second World War had begun. Dr. Manion asked and apparently expected Mackenzie King to form a coalition government. He was caught in a state of extreme unpreparedness by Kings snap election in 1940. The party
representation in B.C. dropped from five to four of the possible sixteen. The Conservative popular vote had doubled in B.C. but this did not compensate for the loss of a seat.\textsuperscript{55} Manion had told the voters that if elected he would form a national coalition government as Britain had done. Similar suggestions were made in British Columbia soon after the war began but the premier, Pattullo, saw no reason whatever for taking the Conservatives into his cabinet. Some of the Liberal ministers were, however, growing discontented with their stubborn leader.

The provincial election of 1941 chopped the Liberal strength from thirty-one to twenty-one; the Conservatives rose from eight to twelve and the C.C.F. doubled its representation to fourteen. Fernie continued to return Tom Uphill, the single Labour member. With his strength cut below a majority, Pattullo still refused to form a coalition government. Maitland proposed a union cabinet of all parties. The C.C.F. rejected the idea as did Pattullo. Liberal members, however, disagreed with their leader, ousted him, and installed John Hart who formed a joint administration with the Conservatives.\textsuperscript{56} Maitland became Attorney-General and Anscomb Minister of Public Works. The coalition movement arose from a number of causes: the patriotic one which said it was harmful to the war effort to have the country's legislators divided; the Liberal desire to retain power, for they feared defeat

\textsuperscript{55} Williams, \textit{Conservative Party}, table p.165

\textsuperscript{56} The calls for coalition and the overthrow of Pattullo are described in Ormsby, \textit{History}, pp. 466-478.
without coalition and few wished to have another election so soon; and the Conservative hunger for office. The coalition government is generally acknowledged to have been most able during its early years.
CHAPTER II

DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICT

Formation of the coalition government late in 1941 set in motion forces that were to disrupt the Conservative party for many years. An apparently quite reasonable decision to form a coalition government for the duration of the war resulted in a dilemma in which political parties in a unitary country like the United Kingdom are seldom involved on such a scale. The national administration was carried on by party government, one that required extraordinary powers to prosecute the war. This imposed unusual and chafing restrictions on the opposition parties. The government's sudden involvement in much larger expenditures and greater ventures than had ever been contemplated in Canada gave His Majesty's Loyal Opposition an even stricter sense of its duties for it feared the government might well be carried away by its power. The national Conservatives, recently badly-beaten at the polls by the Liberals, found themselves in Ottawa attacking policies that fellow-Conservatives were forced to defend at Victoria by reason of their coalition with the provincial Liberals.

In 1942 the Conservatives convened to choose a new national leader. Most of the British Columbia delegates supported John

---

1. British national parties may occasionally be embarrassed by members who win power in municipalities but the relative degree of power on each side is such that the problem is of smaller consequence than a comparable Canadian situation.
Bracken, but one of them, Howard Green, entered the leadership race at the last moment. Green, however, collapsed on the platform and withdrew from the contest which Bracken won easily. Among the defeated candidates was John Diefenbaker.

Bracken realized his primary need was an efficient organization. Where there was an effective provincial Conservative party, the task was entrusted to the provincial leader. Where the party was weak, as in Quebec, a special organizer was named. British Columbia presented an unusual problem. The provincial association existed and was active but its leaders were all in league with the political enemy. What was worse, they were under steady criticism in the legislature from the C.C.F. This meant the Conservative leaders in B.C. were frequently called upon to defend policies originated or supported by the Liberals in Ottawa. Had a coalition of all parties been formed many issues embarrassing to the party might not have been debated so publicly.

Since H. H. Steven's resignation from the party in 1954, federal organization in B.C. had been in the hands of a committee named by the members of Parliament and by Candidates. This method had not been eminently successful and Bracken apparently decided a strong personal hand was required. He chose Green for the task since he was the leading member from the province. Green accepted the job but his long absences in Ottawa made it difficult for him

2. From interviews with Lt.-Col. C. C. Merritt, V.C., and L. J. Ladner, Q.C.
to do the work he felt necessary. He called on Leon J. Ladner to assist. Maitland apparently found this arrangement distasteful but recognized the difficulty in which the party found itself. Thus Green and then Ladner became the national leader's personal representative in B.C. with full responsibility for organizational matters. Policy was set by the federal leader and made known to the faithful through the leader's personal representative.

Not all Conservatives were happy about the coalition arrangement. Some contended the party would have won the next election except for coalition while others argued that Conservatives were treated unfairly in the distribution of cabinet posts and other government advantages. There is no evidence to support this latter view. Early in 1945 the Vancouver Centre Conservatives had argued that the party should leave the coalition. In defending coalition, The Vancouver Province commented editorially on February 4 that the coalition had provided "very good government -- possibly the best B.C. has ever had." It appears, however, that most of the Conservatives were content to remain in the coalition. Maitland and Anscomb apparently felt that, given a few years in which to utilize advantages derived from participating in government, they would be able to build the party into a strong force which could then strike out on its own against the Liberals. Maintenance of the coalition depended on the two leaders, John Hart and R. L. Maitland, who worked well together. Criticism of the
coalition only began to mount when the leadership changed. For the most part, those concerned with Conservative fortunes nationally kept their embarrassments to themselves, until after the war ended.

When a federal election was anticipated in 1945 Anscomb, who acted for Maitland in organizational matters at this time, approached the national party headquarters. He was directed to Howard Green and told that Green would be in charge of the federal campaign. Anscomb did not take kindly to this suggestion. Maitland, however, accepted the decision and joined in the fight to elect federal Conservatives while some of his fellow cabinet ministers helped in the election of federal Liberal members of Parliament. The B.C. Progressive Conservative Association was the medium through which the Conservative campaign group was set up and financed. There was, however, no disputing Green's authority in the matter. The Conservatives elected five M.P.s, the Liberals and C.C.F. five each and there was one independent.

The coalition government called a provincial election in October 1946. A joint platform was drawn up by the Liberal and Conservative leaders and a joint campaign conducted. Campaign funds were collected by both parties for a common war chest. Candidates were chosen jointly, one Liberal and one Conservative in a riding like Vancouver-Burrard while compromises and "saw-offs" were reached for single-member ridings. Some constituency organizations showed little or no enthusiasm for campaigning for the
election of a coalition candidate of the opposite political party. The Conservative members of Parliament, not surprisingly, took little or no part in the provincial campaign although they had worked for straight Conservative candidates before. The election cut the Conservative strength in the coalition from twelve to eleven. The Liberals added five members to their original twenty-one. The C.C.F. dropped from fourteen to ten. Mr. Uphill again was the forty-eighth member of the legislature.

In 1946 Maitland died. Anscomb, who had become coalition Finance Minister, won the party leadership with a convention victory over W. A. C. Bennett. The vote was 519 - 188. One of the new leader's first demands was that the federal leader "recognize his rights" as leader of the Conservatives in British Columbia. He especially resented Green and Ladner. Although authoritative information is lacking on the subject, Anscomb seems to have been told that so long as the Conservatives were allied to the Liberals in B.C. there could be no possible question of acceding to his demand. This was probably the main but not the only reason. The war had ended and much new blood entered the party's rank and file. The new elements were not so sectionally-oriented as the older elements. In addition Anscomb was unpopular with many in the party and until he had proved himself at the polls, the federal organization had no desire to hitch its B.C. prospects to such an uncertain constellation. "He made a big show but it was like a shooting star that flares up brilliantly -- and then
fizzes out." This was the assessment one party member made during the course of this inquiry.

When Byron I. Johnson succeeded Hart as Liberal leader and premier the coalition's instability increased. Neither Johnson nor Anscomb had created the coalition and both felt they might be able to "go it alone" were it not for the great threat they saw from the C.C.F. party. Only this kept them together. It was, figuratively speaking, a divorce forestalled by shotgun. There was constant bickering. The Conservatives insisted that they were entitled to another senior cabinet post. Anscomb held the finance ministry but the Liberals refused, after Maitland's death, to permit the Conservatives to have the attorney-generalship, which they demanded. After Johnson's advent to power, Conservatives such as Green, Ladner and E. Davie Fulton, the young war veteran M.P. for Kamloops, expressed concern that the provincial Conservatives were falling more and more under the sway of the Liberals. They renewed earlier demands that the coalition be broken up. Still another election was fought by the coalition, however, and the balance of the House remained the same. The 1949 coalition campaign was conducted similarly to that of 1946 although the Conservatives complained they received too little voice in the framing of the "joint" platform. Some claimed the party had become outright supporters of the Liberals. Most prominent of the Conservative objectors were those with primarily national interests.

George Drew, formerly premier of Ontario, had become national leader in the winter of 1948, but did nothing to change the arrangement for federal affairs in British Columbia. In the June federal election of 1949 the federal wing of the party hit the lowest point since 1904. Only three of the eighteen members elected were Conservative. Three were C.C.F., one was Independent and eleven were Liberals. If any proof were needed that the Conservative organization was in bad shape, the two 1949 elections certainly gave ample demonstration.

On October 6, 1950 the Progressive Conservatives convened at Vancouver to assess the year-old election results and the general situation. The convention had the effect of venting publicly the whole array of grievances that had arisen within the party about its internal operation. The key note for the 400 delegates was sounded by Gordon Cameron in an address marking his retirement as B.C. association president. "I now feel that my term of office has been a total loss of time and money," he said. He expressed hope that the next executive could accomplish results where he had been unable to but warned that time was fast running out. "It is obvious that the leader of our party in B.C. must give more attention to the responsibilities of the association, organization and welfare of the members of the party. The convention must unify the party.

4. All seven B.C. members elected in 1904 were Liberals.
The retiring president continued:

Organization in both the federal and provincial fields has been chaotic or nothing more than a dogfight. Neither group has co-operated with the other. Many will say that nothing has been done to build up the party -- but more to destroy it. This disunity can never make up strong.

This association has had no responsibility for organization -- or any responsibility whatever. In the past few years this association has been physically unable to advance the cause of the Progressive Conservative Party in B.C.5

Cameron said he had asked Drew to visit Vancouver for a meeting with Anscomb. The two leaders met in Ottawa instead. Drew wrote Cameron, he said, telling him it was desirable to have one organization to deal with both federal and provincial matters. He told the convention that after Anscomb returned from Ottawa the provincial leader told him that any person appointed to work in the federal field would first have to be approved by himself as provincial leader. "There was no discussion as to whether the provincial appointee must be satisfactory to the federal field." After this negotiations ceased altogether between the federal and the provincial leader. Cameron warned the convention:

Unless a united organization is brought about immediately, it is possible we shall see the formation of a separate Federal Progressive Conservative Association of B.C. carrying with it the Young Progressive Conservative Association -- the future leaders of our party -- and the Women's Association, both founded under federal organization....

5. Cited in The Vancouver Province, October 6, 1950.
Speaking of coalition government:

I do not see how it should have affected our organization any more than our Liberal friends have been impeded in building up theirs. And, incidentally, we are all aware that they have been building.  

The divisions between the provincial and federal groups became an open issue at the convention when Whitworth Stanbury, a Victoria delegate, moved that the agenda include an election for the party leadership. An amendment voiced confidence in Anscomb and a verbal fight began. A young delegate from Trail, Shirley Dougan, told the delegates that Anscomb had obviously packed the meeting when convention delegates were being chosen for her riding. She said the young members would be loyal to their leader "but he won't recognize us." Her remarks summed up the opposition case fairly well:

You can't talk loyalty to the present leader. He disregards the federal organization, he disregards the young people, and apparently disregards the provincial association. We want a man who will co-operate with the organization. We want a man who will carry on his duties as a leader and not as a dictator.  

One of Anscomb's defenders was Allan J. McDonell, M.L.A. for Vancouver Centre who said the finance minister was "the greatest political leader and the greatest administrator in B.C. " Many others stood to denounce youthful exuberance and demand loyalty be rendered to Anscomb. A Victoria alderman, Waldo Skillings, said Anscomb was most able on the public platform but that leadership required more than the ability to speak and to finance a department of government.

6. ibid. 7. The Vancouver Province, October 7, 1950.
The leader for the past four years has come before the executive, has come before us, and said the organization has been making great strides and that is an absolute falsehood.\(^8\)

These remarks by Skillings were echoed by others and rebutted by the leader's followers. After ninety minutes of such exchanges, Anscomb rose to his feet, declared that a vote of confidence would be insufficient because his honesty had been attacked and resigned the leadership. He said he would contest the leadership the next day and, through victory, vindicate his honor. The opportunity had not been unforeseen and a Conservative M.L.A. from the Okanagan, W. A.C. Bennett\(^9\), rallied about himself nearly all the malcontents and the Young Conservatives, and set to work to defeat Anscomb.\(^10\)

The second day of the convention a controversy broke out over a resolution declaring that a single organization for the B.C. party was desirable. Those ranged against the motion included members and former members of the House of Commons with the exception of Maj.-Gen. G. C. Pearkes, V.C., the member for Nanaimo.\(^11\) He argued that one organization was essential to efficient operation and endorsed the resolution backed by Anscomb and his supporters.

---

8. ibid. Skillings was among those who later broke away from the party to support the Social Credit group.


10. A few days before the convention it was claimed that the Liberal senator, J. W. deB. Farris, was the guiding spirit of the Conservative group trying to depose Anscomb. This charge was made by H. C. Pooley, former attorney-general.- *The Vancouver Sun*, September 25, 1950.

Howard Green, the Vancouver-Quadra M.P., charged that Anscomb wanted to control the entire Conservative organization in the province -- "in other words, he wanted to be a dictator." He contended that the aims and interests of the party in provincial and federal fields in B.C. were widely different because of the provincial coalition with the Liberals. The problem of fighting the Liberals in national politics had no relation to the problem of co-operating with them in the provincial field. E. Davie Fulton, the Kamloops M.P., supported Green. The party's third M.P., Pearkes, rejoined that his federal riding of Nanaimo had been quite successfully organized as a single unit and he saw no reason why the principle could not be extended throughout the province.

Fulton told the meeting that Anscomb was not giving a correct interpretation of Drew's attitude in the matter. It was the difference between both activities going forward in partnership within one organization, and Anscomb directing everything himself. Despite these views, the convention passed the resolution giving the effect of a decree that there should be no separate federal organization in the province. The battle to control the association executive followed similar lines. The presidency was a two-way fight between Fulton and Pearkes who was supported by the Anscomb group. Pearkes won. Fulton won the vice-presidency, the only serious upset in the list of Anscomb candidates who carried every other post.

12. A charge later used against Green.
In the leadership campaign the opposition to Anscomb used many of the same criticisms of the leader as had the federal group led by Howard Green. Bennett's campaign was led by A. L. Bewley, David Tupper and Robert W. Bonner. They played an important part in having the convention called but lost some of their strength through the tactics of convention politicking. They argued that Anscomb had turned the party association into a tightly-controlled clique devoted to maintenance of a personal Anscomb machine, one that was content to see many constituency groups controlled by incompetent friends, an organization that was entirely out of touch with Conservative feeling at the riding and polling division level. They said Anscomb's ruthless purging had kept new blood from the executive, that the ruling clique could think in no other terms than clinging to power through association with the Liberals, regardless of the cost to the party in organizational strength and public favor. They demanded a complete break with the past and a "new face" for the Conservative party. Anscomb's supporters used appeals based on experience, loyalty, the advantages of coalition, the perils of trusting to emotional youth and claims that Bennett and his followers were trying to upset a working organization.

Bennett's formal speech attacked Anscomb for his "dictatorial attitude", for failing to organize the party and for permitting the Liberals to dominate the party. He brought up the issue of directorates in wine and brewing industries. Anscomb should have given these up on becoming finance minister but he refused to do so.
Bennett said this failure to give up directorates was irretrievably harming the public's impression of the party. Anscomb appeals for loyalty and co-operation, defended his personal activities and said he planned a big reorganizational campaign. He was returned as leader on a vote of 450 to 167. Anscomb then declared his intention of staying with the coalition until the current legislature had run its course. If the party were to pull out before then, he said, it would be breaking faith with the people who had not voted for party men but for sound government coalition supporters.

Confusion surrounds the events of the next few weeks. From the claims and accusations that mounted on both sides this picture can be discerned: Frank Barker, the federal organizer, was ordered to leave the suite of offices at B.C. association headquarters. He proposed opening a separate office elsewhere; the association wired the national leader opposing any separate federal offices being opened and sought the dismissal of Barker "in the interests of harmony." Separate offices were, however, opened for Barker and the federal group's activities. Newspapers reported that Barker had been blamed for leading the anti-Anscomb forces at the convention. Delegates to that convention are still divided on whether Bennett's supporters were organized by Bewley or Barker but the point is academic.

13. Anscomb's supporters claimed no one had disputed these directorates in the eight years before and said the issue was simply a red herring.
14. 815 West Hastings Street, Vancouver.
15. See the "Blue Book" - p. 11. Appendix I (below)
A convention of Young Conservatives in January, 1951 indicated the extent to which their sympathies lay with the federal group. The traditional invitation to the provincial leader was not extended, and during the proceedings criticism of Anscomb occurred so frequently and vehemently that only Fulton's threat to leave the meeting stopped the attacks. An executive meeting of the association, held the same day, refused -- on technical grounds -- to admit the Young Conservatives official representatives, Bewley and Tupper, who had supported Bennett the previous autumn. The federal leader, Drew, met the provincial association executive in December 1951. Further quarrels resulted later over what assurances Drew had, or had not, given Anscomb concerning jurisdiction. After the meeting Drew announced that he was naming Cecil C. Merritt, V.C., former Vancouver Burrard M.P., as his personal representative in B.C. with the added task of mediating the dispute.

In January, 1952, Premier Byron Johnson dismissed Anscomb as finance minister for what he termed arrogant disregard of constitutional government procedures in releasing to the press details of a federal-provincial financial agreement that had not been communicated to the full cabinet. The coalition had long been in difficulty because of the Johnson-Anscomb antipathy and the occasion gave the premier adequate excuse for breaking it up. Bennett, meanwhile, had become increasingly dissatisfied with Anscomb's rule of the party organization and more and more unhappy
with the performance of the coalition government which he was criticizing openly. He finally quit the Conservative Party in a dramatic speech in the legislature, and with a small group of followers, allied himself with the Social Credit League which eventually elected him as its leader (after the election).17

The Social Crediters emerged from the June 1952 provincial election with nineteen seats, the C.C.F. with eighteen and the Liberals with six seats. Anscomb was defeated personally and the Conservatives reduced to four members.18 The provincial leader was forced to resign at a meeting in October at which Fulton succeeded Pearkes as president.19 Merritt was mentioned for the leadership but the man given the best chance was E. G. Carson, former public works minister. Although not favored by some who said he had permitted Anscomb to dominate him during the coalition cabinet, Carson was popular with nearly all party members. Merritt declined interest in the leadership and Carson died before the November convention. A Vancouver-Point Grey M.L.A., Reg. MacDougall, seemed destined for the leadership when he too died leaving the question wide open. The dispirited convention elected a person

17. See Collins - op. cit. - p. 60
19. Fulton, it will be recalled, had been vice president in 1951.
hitherto almost unknown, Deane D. Finlayson of Nanaimo, who had been an association vice-president and a strong Anscomb supporter. His only opposition came from a last minute entry, A.L. Bewley, former president of the Young Conservatives who had helped spark the 1950 campaign for Bennett against Anscomb. 20

With the change in the provincial leadership there was no apparent change in relations between the federal wing and the provincial association. Throughout 1955 conversations and letters were exchanged in which Finlayson sought to have all Conservative operations in B.C. channelled through the B.C. association and the federal group's separate offices closed. Two elections occurred. Each office maintained its own paid personnel working in their separate spheres. The provincial campaign, which came first, saw the Conservative legislative representation reduced to one member. 21 The federal wing managed only to retain the three seats it had won in 1949, those held by Green, Fulton and Pearkes. In both campaigns, the badly-split party lacked money and volunteer help. The situation had deteriorated from 1952's derelict position. Representatives of both provincial and federal camps worked on each other's campaign: Bewley, who had become Drew's B.C. representative, spoke on behalf of Finlayson and candidates in two or

20. In an interview with the writer Bewley said he felt at the time he did not have a chance against "the Anscomb-Finlayson machine" but he felt there should be a contest of some kind.

21. The sole Conservative Dr. Larry Giovando, later dissociated himself from the party. See below - p. 53.
three other ridings; Finlayson ran (unsuccessfully) as a federal candidate with the federal group's help. There were recriminations later that neither group had aided the other but the facts belie both claims. Certainly neither group gave the help the other wanted but that was probably impossible, physically as well as in terms of morale.

After the elections, provincial association officials wrote to Drew renewing the request for a united headquarters and a single B.C. organization. 22 The national organizer, R. A. Bell, made efforts to resolve the question as did the principals at a meeting after the national annual meeting in March 1954. These efforts came to naught and feelings worsened. The provincial association accused Green of having ordered his organizers, during the provincial campaign, to arrange a compromise with the Social Credit party to the effect that B.C. would be left to Social Credit provincially if Social Credit would not run candidates against the Conservatives federally. 25 In April the provincial association approved a resolution which said, in part:

22. See Blue Book pp.15-16, in Appendix I

23. Federal sympathizers hotly deny the claim. They suggest it arose because many nominal party supporters were willing to vote Conservative federally but intended to support the more dynamic and aggressive Social Credit leader in provincial elections, and that this inclination was widely discussed by such supporters.
It has been brought to the attention of this Executive that it is proposed to divide the Province of British Columbia into three separate areas for the purpose of Federal organization, placing a Federal Member in charge of each area.

This Executive is of the opinion that this move is merely a primary step toward dividing of the Conservative Association of British Columbia and the setting up of a separate Federal Organization, dominated as in the past by Howard Green, without any obligation or responsibility to the Conservative Association of British Columbia. 24

It went on to condemn any attempt to divide the party association and demanded once more that the federal offices be closed. The resolution was sent to Drew who replied with a strong defence of Green. 25 The national leader wrote Finlayson that the provincial leader could not expect to run the party's national organizational affairs in British Columbia and that, as in the past, the federal leader would not attempt to interfere in the party's provincial affairs. 25

The dispute came to a head at a meeting at Vernon on July 17, and culminated in a motion of non-confidence in the federal leader which was passed by a 40-24 vote and resulted in the emotional scene described at the beginning of this inquiry. 26

24. *Blue Book* - pp. 18-19
25. "The Drew Letter" - appendix II
26. p.5
At the meeting Finlayson charged the federal leader with secret dealings, renewed the charges of an attempted "saw-off" with Social Credit, and said the federal party leaders in B.C. were "agents of malice and misery." Finlayson predicted at the meeting that within two years John Diefenbaker, M.P. for Prince Albert, would be the national leader. After the non-confidence resolution was passed, the three B.C. members of Parliament and twenty-one supporters withdrew from the meeting. The only Conservative M.L.A., Dr. Larry Giovando, who was not at the meeting, publicly dissociated himself from the party, changing his designation to independent.

Green and Drew announced that a separate federal Conservative organization would be set up in the province to be responsible for all federal party matters. Thorough reorganization was planned in all federal ridings to ensure their loyalty to the national leader, and to the national association. In the days that followed Diefenbaker issued several statements affirming his loyalty to Drew and disclaiming any designs on the leadership so long as Drew held it. Bitter words were hurled back and forth as first this Conservative and then another held press conferences. The newspapers during the last two weeks of July

27. Whenever the Vernon meeting is mentioned, federal Conservative delegates wax long and eloquently about the domination of the meeting by the Finlayson group which is charged with unparliamentary conduct and virtually gagging supporters of Drew.
reported almost daily incidents evidencing the split. The federal group apparently came off the worse in the public eye. An editorial in The Vancouver Daily Province, headed "Suicide at Vernon", expressed a common view of the matter:

So far as the public knows, the vote at Vernon was based on nothing but the charge that George Drew and his federal party supporters were interfering with the provincial politicians. There was no major issue of policy. It was strictly a domestic row over the kitchen sink.

By resolution George Drew stands condemned, not because he failed in matters of national policy, but because he butted in on Mr. Finlayson, the seatless leader of a seatless party.

Throughout the provincial and federal constituency organizations the fissure ran, creating an ever-widening gulf. The incident was usually a resolution voicing confidence in either Finlayson or in Drew. In many cases those who voted against the resolution withdrew from the organization. Sometimes they appealed to the provincial or federal leader for help in setting up a new group. More often, however, the dissident members simply quit active party work. Premier Bennett claimed large numbers of disaffected Conservatives joined the Social Credit "movement". In August the federal members began reorganizing in earnest. Pearkes supervised the work on Vancouver Island, Fulton that in

the Interior and Green that in the Lower Mainland. By the autumn of 1954 the Federal Council was formally constituted and under its aegis, all work was carried on. 29

Definite recognition of the Federal Council was given by Drew and by the national president, George Hees, M.P. for Toronto-Broadview. Sporadic reconciliation meetings were held but without effect. Organizing went ahead in the federal sphere but the provincial association remained hamstrung and did little. In March 1955 the officers of the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association published what was later termed the "Blue Book" A Factual Documented Statement of the Conservative Party's Position in British Columbia and some of the Reasons for the Motion of No Confidence in the National Leader. 30 This traced the difficulties back to 1942 and Green's appointment by Bracken. It presented a series of statements, letters and parts of letters purporting to show that Green had sought undue power for himself in British Columbia in opposition to the legally-constituted association and that the two successive national leaders had systematically, although not always consistently, supported Green in an attempt to divide the Conservative party. The "Blue Book" reiterated the association's claim to be only legal authority for the promotion of Conservatism in the province and attacked the federal wing for setting up the Federal

29. A. L. Bewley estimated that the new organization represented 90 per cent new work effected after the Vernon meeting.
30. See Appendix I
Council. Many of this document's observations were attacked as untrue or misleading by federal Conservatives. It was argued that sections of letters and conversations were quoted badly out of context. The "Blue Book", if nothing else, does document the extent of the breach.

At a quarterly executive meeting in April, 1955 the B.C. association approved, by a 40-2 vote, a brief that charged the national leadership had agreed to support Social Credit in the provincial field in return for support from Social Crediters in the federal field. Not only did this receive the usual denials from the federal Conservative leaders but it also provoked a statement from Noel J. Murphy, president of the B.C. Social Credit League:

The provincial Conservatives must be so desperate for publicity that they will use us as a vehicle to backbite their own federal party. 51

So often was this claim made by the provincial Conservative leaders that close inquiry was made into it. The "Blue Book" cites two statements by Chilliwack constituency executives who claimed a federal organizer had told them about such an arrangement with Social Credit. The organizer many times denied he had ever made such a suggestion. Had he done so and been exposed in this way, it seems reasonable to assume the expedient course would have been to discharge him immediately. This was not done.

51. The Vancouver Province, August 26, 1955.
When questioned, provincial association members often referred to the reported arrangement but had only hearsay evidence to support the contention. It was always denied by the federal supporters. On logical grounds it is difficult to find the proposition reasonable. Social Credit was regarded by the national Conservative leaders as a highly successful party that threatened to suborn traditional Conservative groups of support. Social Credit had a sizeable number of western members at Ottawa and it would have been most unwise for the Conservatives to agree to an arrangement that would permit a formidable rival party to gain and hold control of two prosperous provinces, to use as a springboard for the national campaign to which Social Credit so often referred. The fixation with which some provincial Conservatives spoke of the reported arrangement is explicable only in view of their oft-desperate circumstances, a desire to vindicate their own stand, and a need to promote a misdemeanour serious enough to convince the national Conservatives that their representatives in B.C. were untrustworthy. The wide circulation given to the "Blue Book" -- it went to newspaper reporters, to radio columnists and to members of other political parties -- suggests the lengths to which the provincial officers were prepared to go for support.

In May 1955 Finlayson attended a national association executive meeting at Ottawa. After four hours of debate at the meeting, a
resolution was endorsed 58-1 that approved formation of the Federal Council and entrusting to it all federal Conservative matters in British Columbia. The only negative vote was cast by Finlayson who withdrew from the meeting after a motion of censure was passed on him. Censure was based on three points: Finlayson's attack on Drew, the provincial association's publication of formerly confidential information (in the "Blue Book") and the B.C. leader's attack on three B.C. members of Parliament. This action had the important public effect of transferring the quarrel from a strictly provincial affair to a national one. The national association, in demanding absolute loyalty of the provincial units, was prepared to go as far as necessary to ensure its control over all federal matters.

In 1956 a provincial election was called. The provincial association could find only twenty-two candidates to contest the fifty-two seats. All twenty-two were beaten. Soon after George Drew resigned the federal leadership because of his increasingly poor health. Both the Federal Council and the B.C. association sent delegates to the national convention. Initially the credentials committee refused to certify the association's delegates. A compromise was reached through the intervention of Leon Ladner, the Federal Council president who had assumed the role of mediator. Ladner backed the leadership candidacy of Fulton. Green plumped for Donald Fleming, M.P. for Toronto-Eglinton. Finlayson supported Diefenbaker who won the convention.
Diefenbaker did not support a B.C. association request to dissolve the Federal Council but decided to contest the expected federal election with the existing arrangements in B.C. In any case it would be no time for a change. The association did not press its claims. On election day British Columbia elected seven Conservative M.P.s, the party's greatest success in a quarter-century. The nation also elected a minority Conservative government with Diefenbaker as its leader. During this election campaign, Finlayson campaigned for federal candidates to a limited extent. His help was not always appreciated but it was forthcoming nonetheless. Federal Council members attribute what success the Conservatives had in British Columbia in 1957 chiefly to the Diefenbaker impression on the general public and to national issues. The Federal Council's organizing is sometimes given about 25 per cent of the credit. The next election -- March 1958 -- was, for the federal Conservatives chiefly a case of success: breeding success. In many B.C. ridings the old animosities were set aside. The associations had gained new vigour in the inter-election period, and almost immeasurably more money and volunteer help was available for the campaign. The voters elected eighteen Conservatives from the twenty-two B.C. ridings. The Liberal and Social Credit representation was eliminated.

Both the 1957 and the 1958 campaign committee in B.C. was organized, apparently on Diefenbaker's orders, by a committee
representing both factions in the B.C. party. The same committee was used for both election campaigns.

The Conservatives had chosen a new national leader and had won nationally. Was the same thing possible provincially? A number of people thought so. In the face of such feeling Finlayson decided to call a leadership convention to try and consolidate his position. Although several persons entered the race initially they withdrew. As the convention approached, Dr. Desmond Kidd entered the lists. Finlayson and Kidd were seen in friendly newspaper poses and some comment was made about a pre-arranged convention. Kidd, however, was very popular with the party's younger members who were enthused with the idea that change might mean progress. Diefenbaker had ordered the members of Parliament to take no part in the contest. All eighteen maintained a discreet distance from the convention. Those most active in campaigning for Kidd included many who had been counted in the federal wing in earlier years. Few of the federal sympathizers were found openly working for Finlayson. The old issue of divided organization did not rise to the fore.

32. Co-chairmen were chosen: Ladner for the Federal Council, and A. C. Desbrisay, financing expert for the provincial association. Ladner named three representatives to the group: John Pearkes, son of the M.P. and secretary of the Federal Council; Mary Southin, of the Federal Council executive, and Fred Field, chairman of the Federal Council finance committee. Three were also named to the committee by Desbrisay: Ian Pyper, Young Conservatives' president; Gowan Guest, association president, and Frank Dorchester, association treasurer.

33. Kidd's campaign on Vancouver Island, for example, was organized by Eric Charman of the Victoria federal riding association.
The provincial leader pointed to a big increase in association activity. In the preceding six months, he said, forty-two effective constituency associations had been put into operation compared to only twelve counted in April 1958. With co-operation from everyone in the party success could well be expected. Kidd's appeal was based on his expert knowledge of the province and the advantages to be anticipated from a fresh approach. Finlayson was sustained in the leadership by a margin of only eleven votes. The count was 350 to 339. Kidd then pledged his immediate co-operation and that of his supporters.

Assessing this convention result is difficult. A knowledge of party history leads to judgement in terms of the past. Observers with lengthy memories saw on each side representatives of the federal-provincial division. But they also saw on both sides a majority of new people in the party, individuals who had not been caught up intimately in the emotion and strife of the days when Drew was national leader. At the provincial convention there also seemed to be more talk of national issues than had been usual at B.C. conventions.

Since Diefenbaker's two victories, the provincial association has found itself with more funds and other resources. Federal members of Parliament have been available to address provincial constituency meetings and a full-time administrative assistant was appointed to the provincial office which had lacked an organizer.

---

34. There are, of course, far more Conservative M.P.s today than there had been in previous years.
It is assumed on all sides that the new impetus and financial support has come from the party's national headquarters. When the British Columbia party convened at Harrison Hot Springs for its annual meeting in October 1959, four members of Parliament took an active part. Two other M.P.s attended the sessions. The provincial leader said the theme of the meeting was "our new-found unity." He put the case frankly\(^\text{35}\) that Diefenbaker was the man responsible for the growth of unity, that the national leader had recognized the position of the provincial leader in a way that the former national leader had refused to do. The meeting saw the introduction of nearly two dozen prospective candidates for the provincial election expected in 1960. A full slate of fifty-two was anticipated. Finlayson said the federal office had promised "everything -- money, organizers, everything" needed to help the party in the provincial election campaign.

It was evident, however, that not all the wounds had been healed. Two of the party's three senior M.P.s were too busy in their duties as cabinet ministers to attend the meeting. The third senior M.P., Fulton of Kamloops, was engaged in a three-day speaking tour of B.C. communities in the same region as the meeting place of the provincial association. Although expected at the two-day meeting, he never put in an appearance. One of the other principals in the federal wing, Leon J. Ladner, did not attend the meeting. The reason he gives is that he did not feel it was his place as president of the Federal Council and he wished to avoid doing anything that might suggest the Federal Council was interfering in provincial matters.

\(^\text{35}\) In an interview with the writer during the meeting.
The annual meeting re-elected Ainsworth as president of the association. A few months later, Finlayson and Ainsworth responded to an invitation from Ladner and attended the Federal Council's quarterly meeting. It was the first time the provincial leader or president had ever been present at a Council meeting. The reason was to co-ordinate co-operation for the provincial election campaign which was anticipated. This development indicated a degree of reconciliation at the executive level greater than had been indicated publicly. Both Ladner and Finlayson say the Council meeting proceeded smoothly with no difficulties. The provincial leader did not anticipate attending Council meetings regularly but only "as the need arises."[57]

36. Details of Finlayson's co-operation speech and the election of provincial officers are in *The Vancouver Province*, October 26, 28, 1959 and in *the Vancouver Sun*, October 26, 1959.

37. Interview with the writer, February, 1960.
CHAPTER III

Contemporary Organization of the Party

Matters of Progressive Conservative party interest in B.C. are handled by two organizations: those relating to the problem of representation in the House of Commons are dealt with almost exclusively by the British Columbia Council of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada; those relating to representation in the Legislative Assembly at Victoria are the concern of the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association. The first group is commonly called the Federal Council, the second the B.C. association. The constitution of the Federal Council is straight-forward in outlining the objects which it does, in fact, pursue, and in describing its de facto jurisdiction. The constitution of the B.C. association is not as helpful in this respect for its description of powers and interests do not correspond precisely to the actual situation.

(i) The Federal Council

The Federal Council grew out of the circumstances of the Vernon meeting of the executive of the B.C. association in July 1954. That meeting passed a resolution expressing lack of confidence in the national leader, whereupon the three Conservative members of Parliament, the national leader's personal representative in B.C., and twenty sympathizers announced their withdrawal
from the association and, subsequently, their intention to create a new organization for federal purposes.

After preliminary organizing by the federal members during the ensuing summer and autumn, The British Columbia Council of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada was organized on December 11, 1954. The constitution says the objects of the group are:

2. To promote and advance the principles, policies and interests of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada and to secure the election of Progressive Conservative candidates to the House of Commons.

3. To aid and advise members of the House of Commons and to assist in the promotion of wise policies and sound legislation.

4. To organize and assist in organizing and carrying on Federal Progressive Conservative Associations and Clubs in each Federal constituency within British Columbia on a membership basis and to co-ordinate their activities.

Full authority in all federal matters is claimed for the Council:

15. The Council shall have and exercise under the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all Federal Progressive Conservative Associations and policies within the Province of British Columbia, and shall have the sole power to appoint executive members from British Columbia of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada.

1. Articles of the Federal Council constitution, mimeographed, on file in the Council's offices in the Vancouver Block.
2. ibid.
The Council thus, indirectly, bases its claim to legitimacy on its recognition by the national association of the party. Without such recognition and the concomitant exclusive powers, the Council would have few or no sanctions at its disposal with which to exercise the claimed jurisdiction. Such recognition by the national association is taken to be concurrent with that of the national leader at whose behest the national association usually operates. 3

The Council membership comprises two general groups: those admitted to membership by reason of national position and representatives of certain groups specifically recognized by the Council. The first group includes members of Parliament, senators, and executive officers of the national Conservative association who live in British Columbia. In the second group are a representative from each federal riding association, three from the Young Progressive Conservative Association of British Columbia, one from the University of B.C. Progressive Conservative Club and three from the Women's Progressive Conservative Association of British Columbia. Organizations mentioned in this second group send representatives:

to the council only if the council specifically accords them recognition which may be withdrawn at any time. This assures the council that factions out of sympathy with the prevailing view of the council need not be tolerated. The council does not specify any procedure for granting or withdrawing recognition to such groups.

In addition to the two general groups, membership is accorded to the chairmen of any committees that may be struck by the Council if those chairmen are not normally Council members. While executive officers of the national association are automatically members of the council if they live in B.C., executive members of the association living in B.C. are not Council members unless specifically elected by the Council. This ensures that the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada will have, if not a modicum of control over the Council, at least full information on the council's activities. The permissive election of national executive members means that the Council, which might be unable to prevent the B.C. association's nomination of members to the national executive, at least does not have to accept those people as Council members unless they also win national executive office.

The Council membership may be increased by such other persons as it may wish to appoint, so long as not more than ten such appointments are made at one time. This clause gives the Council a good deal of flexibility. It could be the means by which the Council would enlist outside Conservatives if relations between

the Federal Council and the B.C. association became unusually amicable, or the need for co-operation unusually pressing. In the same way, persons outside the party could be enlisted. The figure ten is interesting. The total membership of the Council could, theoretically, be as high as eighty, depending on the number of national executive members for B.C. who might be appointed, committee chairmen not otherwise members of the council and assuming no special appointments through the clause under discussion. In practice, the Council rarely musters more than forty members, and ten is a quorum. Federal Council members profess the possibility was not contemplated but the special appointment of ten members at a time could easily render one faction's temporary majority a more permanent one by reinforcement at successive meetings.

The Council elects the usual set of officers at an annual meeting to be held in December or January. Besides the immediate past president, president, vice-president, secretary and treasurer, five executive members are elected by and from the membership of the Council. To this executive are added the Conservative members of the House of Commons who sit for the province and such honourary officers as the Council may elect.

13. The officers shall be a Board of Management with all the powers of the members of the Council but their actions and decisions shall be subject to review by the Council. The officers may meet together for the dispatch of business, adjourn and otherwise regulate their meetings as they think fit.

14. The Council and the officers may create and appoint such committees as they deem fit.

Each member of the Council and each officer holds office until his or her successor is elected or appointed. No constitutional provision is made for the deliberate removal of persons from membership or executive office. Council members suggest they would be free to do so in the ordinary course of business. It would, however, appear that in some cases the constitution would require amendment to terminate the membership of certain persons.

The Federal Council provides the federal riding associations with the only direct link to the national association executive. Although some changes were contemplated in the national organization, when the Federal Council was organized a constituency association had no representation at the annual national meeting if it had not elected a Progressive Conservative member of Parliament. This relationship strengthened the Federal Council's actual and potential control over the federal riding associations.


7. "Amendments to this constitution may be made by a two-thirds majority vote of the members of the Council present at any annual meeting or general meeting or at any special meeting called for that purpose, without any prior notice." Clause 16. Constitution.
The Federal Council is not unique in the national scheme of Progressive Conservative organization, a consideration that has received no acknowledgement either by the system's opponents, or by the popular press in discussing Conservative affairs. In 1959 the national organizer, Allister Grosart, gave the B.C. Federal Council the following outline of national organization in the provinces. Quebec has a federal association which oversees three regional (federal) associations and more than seventy-five riding associations, most of them fairly new. Manitoba was organized on a strong federal riding basis after a coalition provincial government had resulted in the atrophy of many Conservative associations in the provincial constituencies. The separate federal association is to be maintained in Manitoba until the provincial organization is rebuilt satisfactorily and the two fields of work divided under one jurisdiction. A federal council was contemplated for Newfoundland but has not been organized. Grosart emphasized that no problems resulted wherever a strong provincial association existed and that separate federal organization was usually unnecessary. This situation was believed to obtain in Ontario, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. There were provincial but no federal associations in Saskatchewan and Alberta.

The Federal Council in British Columbia employs a paid organizer who works to improve the effectiveness of Conservative groups.

---

8. Initially, Frank Barker, assisted by John Fox; from 1955 to mid-1956, Fred Waterhouse, from mid-1956 to the present; C. J. Holms, a former organizer for the provincial association who was among those breaking away from the association at the Vernon meeting.
seeking the election of candidates to the House of Commons. The Council maintains an office with paid secretarial help which is engaged in liaison work between the national and the riding associations, between the members and ridings, and groups seeking their assistance. It also helps to produce and distribute party literature and works with such federally-organized groups as the Young Conservatives, the university club and the women's group.

The direction of the Federal Council has remained in the same hands from its inception in 1954 to the present. Leon J. Ladner, Q.C., has been president, and John Pearkes its secretary. The national leader's representative, A. L. Bewley, Q.C., was a member of the Council until April 1956 when he retired from political life. Since then Ladner has been the federal leader's personal representative as well as Council president.

As might be expected, the organization of the two federal election campaigns since the Council's initiation has been under its supervision. Election campaigns are directed by special groups: the National Campaign Committee and, in B.C., the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Campaign Committee. This latter group, although under the aegis of the Federal Council and of its special campaign finance committee, represented two Conservative organizations. Co-chairmen of the campaign committee were Ladner, 

9. Son of the member for Esquimalt-Saanich, Maj.-Gen. G. V. Pearkes, V.C.
and A. C. Desbrisay, long known as the provincial association's finance director.  

(ii) The B.C. association

The British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association operates under a constitution adopted at an annual meeting held in Vancouver, October 18, 1952, with certain minor amendments adopted by the annual meeting held at Harrison Hot Springs in October 1959. The association takes as its objects the promotion of interest in Canadian and B.C. politics and government, maintenance of parliamentary principles, the organization and direction of party clubs, associations and societies and of the party's general work in the province, and to secure the election of candidates to the Legislative Assembly and to the House of Commons. The association asserts its jurisdiction over and superiority to, all provincial and federal Conservative riding or constituency organizations whose constitutions have been approved by the association. The B.C. association constitution claims that all Conservative groups within the province are to submit their constitutions and themselves to the association's authority. The association's officers are empowered, subject to the later confirmation or amendment of the annual meeting, to take such steps as they deem necessary to the party's best interests where any disputes or question of the effectiveness of any organization arise. Procedural details for the various groups are specified.

10. Committee members listed in footnote 32.
Membership in the provincial association is extended to the national and provincial Conservative party leaders, privy councillors, senators and members of Parliament and of the Legislative Assembly who support the party, party candidates defeated in the last provincial or federal general elections, to the association's executives and honourary members, to the presidents of federal and provincial riding or constituency associations, and to one representative from each Young Progressive Conservative association recognized by the association. Where members are elected to the provincial association executive, another ordinary membership is granted to the association or group which that executive member represented. Membership is retained so long as qualifying status is held in the subordinate groups, or until successors are appointed or elected.

Provision is made for the expulsion of members who act in a manner "prejudicial to the Progressive Conservative Party". Reasonable notice of intention to expel and a chance to state a defence is granted. A two-thirds vote of those present at a regularly convened meeting of the association is required for expulsion. Provision is made for annual meetings of the membership,

11. Providing, however, that membership passes to any new candidates nominated for the riding for a forthcoming election.

12. Where there is no riding organization, a Conservative member sitting for the riding, or a defeated candidate, or the B.C. association president may appoint a representative member.

13. No expulsions are on record.
for other special meetings at the call of the president or the executive. Proxies are not permitted although temporary substitutes may be appointed by local or riding associations where the regular member is unable to attend. There is no provision for calling a general meeting by petition of the members. A quorum consists of forty members.

The executive is charged with carrying out the objects of the association, conducting its management and discipline. Its members meet quarterly, are eligible for re-election to the executive in the next year regardless of any change in their outside qualifications for membership. If fifteen members of the executive petition for a meeting, the president is to convene such a meeting. If he fails to convene a meeting, it may be held by the petitioners in any case. Twenty members constitute a quorum.

The executive consists of the officers, the immediate past president, the national leader and the provincial leader, all Conservative members of the House of Commons or of the legislature, one man and one woman for each federal riding association and one member for each member of the legislature that a provincial constituency elects, three Young Progressive Conservatives and one member each from the Primrose Club, the B.C. Progressive Conservative Women's Association and the Victoria Women's Progressive Conservative Association, as well as honorary members of the

14. i.e.; three members for a multi-member riding like Vancouver-Point Grey, making a total of fifty-two for the forty-two ridings.
association (who have no voting rights on the executive).

The officers of the association are elected at the annual meeting, convene at the president's call, act as a board of management vested with all the association's powers, are subject to review by the executive and the association, and may be elected from among members in good standing of any B.C. federal or provincial riding association. Five officers constitute a quorum. There is no provision for meetings by petition of the officers. The officers chosen are a president, three vice-presidents, a secretary, a treasurer and six directors. Provision is made for election of the officers so that each of seven geographic regions is represented.

The association vests its supreme authority in the convention which may be summoned by a three-fifths vote at a general meeting of the association or by the association's officers at the request of the provincial leader, or on his death or resignation. All members of the association are convention delegates. Each provincial constituency association elects ten delegates for each M.L.A. that the constituency is entitled to elect. Alternates are elected in like number. The B.C. association constitution prescribes the rules of procedure at such conventions, at which one hundred delegates constitute a quorum.

15. The third vice-president is to be a woman.
Amendments to the constitution may be made without notice by a two-thirds vote at a convention, or, on six weeks notice, at a general or special meeting of the association.

The B.C. association maintains its headquarters in a suite of offices in Vancouver. Paid secretarial help is provided as well as a full-time administrative assistant. There is no full-time provincial organizer as such.

(iii) Two Conservative Organizations

Exclusive jurisdiction over federal matters is claimed by both the British Columbia Council of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada (the Federal Council) and by the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association. Only the Federal Council exercises that jurisdiction. The Conservative members of the House of Commons do all their liaison work, insofar as it is institutionalized, through the Federal Council office and not through the B.C. association headquarters. The Federal Council is recognized as supreme in its field both by the national leader and by the national association's executive.

The most striking thing about the Council's organization is that every important Conservative party group is represented on it except the B.C. provincial association and the provincial leader. At this writing the question of representation of members of the legislature on the Council is academic for there are no Conservative party groups in B.C. which are included in the Federal Council.

17. At 815 Hastings Street West.
supporters in the Assembly. There is, however, no specific provision for such possible representation on the Council. The omission of such important groups within the Conservative party reflects the historical circumstances which led to the organization of the Federal Council. Such circumstances are also reflected in the Federal Council's rigid control of the groups to which it will accord membership representation. There is no question about the Council being an oligarchic structure, that it is and perhaps of necessity. Perusal of annual lists of officers of the B.C. association reveals more apparent changes. However, the offices are held largely by the same group of persons with only occasional additions and eliminations. The B.C. association cannot claim to be much more democratically controlled than is the Federal Council.

One gauge that is sometimes useful in assessing such organizations is the amount of power given minorities to challenge decisions of the majority. This, on executive bodies, usually lies in the right to demand by petition and to receive general meetings to air their grievances. Section 7 of the Federal Council's constitution says the Council shall meet at the call of the president, or in the event of the neglect or refusal of the president to call a meeting, then at the request of five or more members of the Council. While there is no provision for meetings of the officers by petition of a certain number of officers, the requirement of only five members to demand a general meeting would seem adequate safeguard that minority elements can be heard. The
B.C. association is a much larger group and, while executive members can petition for a meeting of the executive, neither dissident officers, nor dissident general members can secure meetings of their bodies on petition. As the officers' and general meetings are the important ones in this group, some such protection would seem necessary if the democratic organization of the group is to have substance. The B.C. association says its supreme authority is the party convention. Overwhelming weight in such a convention is given to provincial constituency associations who receive greatly augmented representation to the relative detriment of other groups such as federal riding associations. In some cases, as will be shown later, many of the same people within one district are active in both provincial and federal work. There remains, however, such a division of interest—if not emotion—that many persons work exclusively to the furtherance of Conservatism in only one of the two spheres. It is difficult to see how a convention, so constituted, can be deemed truly representative of all Progressive Conservatives in the province. It is notable that neither a general meeting of the party, nor even a convention, can be called unless either the officers or the provincial leader give consent. Some critics suggested privately during the annual general meeting in 1959 that the regional representation required on the association executive would be only a facade, and that it might be capable of use by
the leading officers to enhance their own control. This situation could arise if the provincial party organization was notably weak in particular regions, some of which are sparsely settled, or if leaders from particular regions could be brought within the personal control of any seeking to elaborate their own interests within the party hierarchy.

An element of great flexibility has been noted in the Federal Council structure. This could be put to a number of uses; the enhancement of personal or factional control, the possible overthrow of control if a temporary majority could be obtained (because only a small quorum is required), or to assist in the gradual improvement of relations between the two bodies. This latter possibility would likely involve appointment to the Federal Council of individuals whose previous interest has been exclusively provincial in nature and whose sympathies have been wholly engrossed by the B.C. provincial association and its work. How this element of flexibility is used in the Federal Council depends entirely on the intentions of the Council's officers.

...
CHAPTER IV

Inter-Factional Party Relationships

Within a parliamentary political party such as the Progressive Conservatives in British Columbia there may be contact between constituent elements at a number of different levels, the contact points being determined largely by structure, personality and the vagaries of elections. The question of personality looms large in any consideration of the problem, if only because it may appear to be the easiest to examine. And where politics hinges more on personality than on ideology, as in Canada, it is not uncommon to attribute difficulties of contact between groups to the personality of the nominal leaders. Whenever the structure of the Conservative Party in B.C. is discussed, much emphasis is usually placed on the personalities of Howard Green, member of Parliament for Vancouver-Quadra, and of Herbert Ansoomb, one-time provincial leader of the B.C. Conservative party. It is not antagonism or any other relationship between these two persons on which the differentiation is based. That differentiation rests chiefly on a fundamental difference in objective between two groups of people, nominally bearing the same party label. The objective is not simply the advancement of "Conservatism" within the province. This is a minor aim. The major one is winning power, and holding it, in two different and often opposed political spheres.
Determining the best method of achieving an objective is the task of leaders. When the leaders have different objectives, it cannot be surprising if they advocate different methods.

(i) Factional Leaders

The party leader's position is one established and sanctioned by party traditions. It is mentioned in the B.C. association's constitution only with reference to his holding office on the various boards and the summoning of conventions. Nowhere does the constitution specify the leader's rights and obligations. Nor does it mention relationships of right and obligation between association members and the leader. If the B.C. association constitution alone were examined it would appear that the association presidency was by far the more important office instead of being an administrative position. The party leader is usually all-powerful and the association executive is his executive arm. There is some conflict between the conservative idea that the association exists to service the leader's needs, and a democratic notion that the leader is merely the party's representative who can be changed at the whim of the association's members. It may be noted that when there is to be a change in the party leadership this change is not effected by the B.C. provincial association, but by a much wider group summoned by but superior to the association. This is the party convention.
It is really only to the convention that the party leader is answerable and, if his personality permits, a B.C. party leader can usually make himself independent even of the convention. No B.C. Conservative party leader has been forced to resign by action of a convention. Two leaders, Anscomb and Finlayson, gave conventions opportunities to choose another leader, but the conventions confirmed them both.

The Conservatives in British Columbia have not chosen a large number of leaders since party lines were introduced in provincial politics. Richard McBride was the first (1904-1915), followed by William Bowser (1915-1924), Simon Fraser Tolmie (1926-1934), Frank Porter Patterson (1936-1958), Royal Lethington Maitland (1938-1946), Herbert Anscomb (1946-1952) and D. D. Finlayson (1952- ). The leader's power within the party has always depended on how well he has fared with the voters. McBride faced no serious challenges because he held the premiership. Bowser, who had also been premier and McBride's chief aide in party matters, faced no serious challenges until three provincial elections showed the disfavour in which voters held him. Tolmie retired after his government was defeated. Patterson died soon after winning the leadership. The only B.C. Conservative leaders who faced a division

1. R. H. Pooley led the Conservative opposition in the legislature from 1924 to 1928.
2. The post appears to have been vacant from 1924 to 1956. Patterson, the president, was de facto leader.
of ranks along federal-provincial interest lines have been the last three, Maitland, Ansoomb and Finlayson.

McBride held office eight years in British Columbia before the national leader, R. L. Borden won office. McBride began his "Better Terms" fight with the federal government (or rather, renewed B.C.'s struggle) before a sympathetic Conservative government had regained national power. McBride had temporarily resolved the only significant issues between the two governments by 1911. Control of the provincial Conservative association was his because he had built it, with the assistance of Bowser and R. F. Green. Members of Parliament called on and received their help in putting together federal organizations that operated only during the campaign. Borden and McBride were friends and the national leader relied on the B.C. premier to keep him informed on the state of the local political fences. After McBride retired Bowser was able to maintain the relationship, although to a more limited degree because of Borden's increasing pre-occupation with the war effort. The relations of Borden's successor, Arthur Meighen, with Bowser have escaped notice. The succession of Tolmie to the leadership in B.C., and eventually to the premiership reconciled party factions as he brought to the task the knowledge and relationships he had built while a national party organizer. Good relations existed between Bennett and Tolmie, although both men were soon engrossed in economic concerns that
dwarfed or even obliterated the political issues. Party fortunes during the nineteen thirties hit such a low ebb both provincially and federally that no problems between the two interests were evident.

In 1942 two developments conjoined, both connected with attempts to revive party organization. The first development was Maitland's decision to join the Liberals in a coalition government. Apart from other considerations, Maitland thought coalition would help protect the party from the voters long enough to permit strengthening the party's internal structure. The second development was the national party's search for new leadership and new methods that could win power. An often neglected factor that grew steadily more important from 1942 onward is the development of the national party from an extremely loose confederation of provincial parties toward a more organic national structure that could fight a national battle.

A student of Canadian political party organization noted of the situation in 1941-42:

The national headquarters has but little control over the autonomous organizations in the provinces. ... Naturally there are strong reasons for mutual co-operation, but we must not forget that the provincial party organizations are primarily interested in provincial parliamentary elections and only secondarily in the national cause. At times they may actually be diverted by provincial leaders to downright opposition to the national party organization.

This last remark is presumed to stem from the case of the Ontario premier, Mitchell Hepburn, a Liberal who frequently clashed with the national Liberal leader, Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King. The observation might apply with almost equal validity to the later situation of the Conservatives in British Columbia. J. R. Williams, in his study of *The Conservative Party of Canada 1920–1949*, says that in 1942 the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada for the first time began functioning between elections. Other writers have commented on Canada's lack of developed extra-parliamentary party organization. Under Bracken's insistence, the national association became a force through which increasing central control was asserted over the previously completely autonomous provincial associations. This aspect of Canadian party life has received comparatively little attention by students of politics. It would be useful to have traced the probable connection between the growth of a centralized party association and the increase in importance of the national government relative to the provincial governments.

Opinion is divided on the attitude taken by R. L. Maitland toward the designation of Howard Green as the personal representative in B. C. of the national leader, John Bracken. The provincial

4. p. 111 et. seq.

5. See below, Chapter V
association many years later published in its "Blue Book" a statement by a Conservative M.L.A., Allan J. McDonell, who said Maitland had told him he had objected to the arrangement placing federal election preparations wholly in Green's hands. This statement has not been susceptible of substantiation by any other source and has been denied by Maitland's widow. Maitland's attitude toward the matter was considered important; he and Green were believed to be quite friendly and Maitland had a strong personal following in the association, support that was claimed by later provincial leaders.

It now appears that Maitland was persuaded, even if reluctantly, of the necessity of a division of labor while the party was in coalition with the Liberals. Maitland was the first leader to face this problem and his relationship with Green does not appear to have been uncongenial. Attempting to show that Maitland had opposed the arrangement was designed to strengthen the B.C. association's position vis-à-vis the federal stand, following the open clash at Vernon.

Despite the convention challenge from W. A. C. Bennett in 1946, Anscomb succeeded to the leadership almost automatically on Maitland's death by virtue of his obvious ability and experience compared to other M.L.A.s. A number of difficulties threatened

---

6. The Federal Council office has on its files a copy of a letter given by Mrs. Maitland to the federal organizer in 1955 after she had denied the turh of the claim published in the "Blue Book".
his authority. He was participating, and insisted on doing so, in coalition government long after the ostensible reason for its being had ended. Anscomb demanded unswerving loyalty which only a close group of friends would deliver. He became increasingly isolated from changes in rank-and-file feeling in the party. The Anscomb clique that resulted was resented by many newcomers to party ranks as well as by the party faithful who were not among the chosen. As a member of the coalition cabinet Anscomb was not disposed to agree to the necessity of reforms in government, nor was he disposed to attribute the party's weakness federally to an atrophied provincial organization for which he was responsible. If these were conditions flowing in toto from personality attributes, then the party leader's difficulties with the party's federal wing at this time did indeed result from personality incompatibilities.

Tracing these difficulties wholly to matters of personality tends to obscure changes taking place in the political substructure. Anscomb wanted to revert to an organizational structure more appropriate to an earlier period in the Dominion's development, and, in particular, more appropriate to a different provincial political situation. A number of events coincided at this time: coalition in B.C., a division of labor and jurisdiction for the

party's two spheres of activity, a major war and the advent of the "positive state" which catalyzed the country's transition from a confederation of widely different sections into the early stages of a federalized national state. The first circumstance, coalition, brought alterations in the party's structure that would have been necessitated in any case by the transition in national life. Personality differences in British Columbia made acceptance of the alterations a more tempestuous process than it might otherwise have been.

The present party leader took over amid this process. From the former leader he inherited situations and attitudes that moulded his course as much as he moulded them. Finlayson also assumed power during the slide to the nadir of the party's fortunes both in the federal and in the provincial fields. There was little he could have done to prevent such depths being reached. He was a young man, owing his position to the party's "old guard" but aware of the young people's hopes and ambitions. On gaining the leadership, he could have asserted his independence of those who brought him to power and built his support on the young people and a fresh party organization. For a new party leader certain to face a provincial election almost immediately, this course would have been incomparably difficult. Election results suggest he might just as well have taken this course, but an unusual amount of courage would have been required to anticipate and ignore such shattering defeats in hopes of better things in the future.
Finlayson chose instead to build on the situation he inherited. This led to the public debacle at Vernon in 1954 which a more astute or more experienced political leader would undoubtedly have avoided even if the changes that this signified could not have been evaded. Peaceful transition from the prewar structures had been achieved in other provinces, with the work divided between separate hands and offices, but the emotional consequences of such a sharp, public break as Vernon were averted elsewhere. Experiencing the practical difficulties of some years in office brought home to Finlayson the realities of his position. It was obvious that insisting on the provincial leader's "rights" to supervise the federal field would gain him nothing. Achieving an understanding with the federal wing was the only practical course open. This understanding was facilitated by the cooling of passions fired by the Vernon meeting, by the withdrawal from party life of certain persons who insisted on the claims of either faction, and by the change in the party's national leadership. Despite these things, understanding was only achieved on the basis of de facto recognition of the status quo as it related to division of jurisdiction, which was in no wise altered by personality changes.

The designation of a personal representative of the national leader began with John Bracken, was continued by George Drew and not substantially altered by John Diefenbaker. It is surprising, after having read and heard many denunciations of the personal representatives, to find that the representatives themselves attach
such relatively little importance to the post that they are unable to recall definitely who had the task during what years. Howard Green was the first personal representative designated by a national leader. His duties were largely performed, however, by Leon J. Ladner except in time of election campaigning. In December 1951 Lt.-Col. C. C. I. Merritt, V.C., was named by George Drew as his personal emissary in B.C. to whom all federal party matters should be referred. In the late spring of 1955 A. Leslie Bewley assumed the task. Ladner remained intermittently active through these years. When the Federal Council was formalized in December 1954 it chose Ladner as president although Bewley still worked as Drew's representative until April 1956. Drew did not name another representative and neither did Diefenbaker who succeeded Drew in the winter of 1956.

The personal representative's duties have always been vaguely defined and his powers, if any, even more vaguely understood. Critics claimed that Howard Green had been given dictatorial power. There is no suggestion that Merritt ever employed such powers or sought to, and Bewley, while an aggressive personality, seldom presumed to be doing more than carrying out instructions from the national leader. Merritt, Bewley and Ladner have all agreed\(^8\) that the primary function was that of funneling reliable information in both directions. From the time of the coalition government in B.C., the national leaders were never convinced

---

8. In separate interviews with the writer. Unfortunately an interview could not be arranged with Mr. Green.
that enough credence could be placed in situational assessments made by people working closely with the Liberal party, or by an organization long accustomed to co-operating with the Liberals, which the Conservatives were opposing in the national sphere. It would appear that it was primarily to fill this informational gap that personal representatives were named. Formation of the Federal Council did not supersede the personal representative's work initially for it was more concerned with associational work and less with divination of popular feeling. As the Federal Council largely completed its associational work, a structure resulted which could assume the responsibilities of the federal representative. This was facilitated by vesting supervision of the structure in a person who had previously acted as a personal representative.  

In another Canadian political party, the Liberal, the federal cabinet ministers have often been the party's effective leaders in provinces governed by ministries of different political parties. Where control of a province is vested in the same political party empowered nationally, the provincial premier has nearly always dominated the party provincially. Conservative cabinet ministers have not figured large in the party in B.C. The chief reason is that there have been so few of them.  

When Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper came to B.C., he was out of office and had only the influence deriving from personality and

prestige. Putting himself into opposition to a successful Conservative premier cost him whatever important power he might have wielded in the province. Borden's cabinet minister for B.C. was Martin Burrell, a well-respected man and personally popular. He was not, however, greatly interested in the mechanics of the party and was devoted to his duties at Ottawa. He got along well with McBride's organizer, Bowser, and generally left things in his hands although he was always willing to make speeches and do all he could to assist if called upon. Burrell was sworn to the Privy Council in 1911 and left the federal ministry in 1920 to become parliamentary librarian at Ottawa.

Simon Fraser Tolmie and H. H. Stevens entered the federal cabinet in 1919 and 1920 respectively. King's 1921 victory kept them out of office until Tolmie won the provincial party leadership and the B.C. election in 1928, and until Meighen entered Bennett's cabinet in 1930. 

Tolmie was so little concerned about the B.C. party organization that he retained his seat in the Commons for two years between 1926 and 1928. After the Bowser forces had demonstrated their lack of control in 1926, Stevens and Ladner directed organization in B.C. Ladner's personal defeat in 1930, when the party won national victory, cost him most of his influence and left Stevens dominant. In these years the association was effective chiefly in the immediate pre-election periods. With Conservative success in both provincial and federal fields, the party was prosperous enough that there was no quarrel over the division of spoils and power.

10. With the exception that Stevens and Tolmie were members of Meighen's short-lived "shadow" cabinet in 1926.
Tolmie's defeat and Stevens' resignation wrecked the party. Grote Stirling who was sworn to the Privy Council to replace Stevens in 1934 is not considered to have been a strong organization man and did not exercise too much influence. The party was out of power until 1942 when it formed a coalition government with the Liberals dominating. There were no federal Conservative cabinet ministers for almost a quarter of a century. The minority victory of the federal Conservatives in 1957 brought three British Columbia M.P.s into the cabinet, Howard Green, George Pearkes and E. Davie Fulton. Green and Fulton had been especially concerned with asserting the independence of the federal wing of the party in B.C., as has been demonstrated. Their accession to power in 1957 gave them enhanced power but they were forced to employ it from a greater distance than thitherto and were, for practical purposes, removed from the immediate intra-party struggles for long periods of time. In any case, by this time all real challenge to the division of jurisdiction had ceased and the accession of Green, Fulton and Pearkes to the cabinet had the further effect of squelching any likelihood of the challenge being revived. Green's stature as Diefenbaker's senior minister merely confirmed, in British Columbia, the dominant position he had assumed in the province.

In the sixty years encompassed by this study Conservatives have held federal cabinet posts for only eighteen years. During half that time the Conservatives also held power in the provincial government and were free of effective domination by federal ministers.
This leaves three short periods to discuss. During the first, 1916 to 1921, Bowser's personality ensured his control over the party apparatus in which the minister, Burrell, was not overly interested. From 1935 to 1935 there was no organization left over which control could be exercised. By the time federal Conservative cabinet ministers were back on the scene -- 1957 -- the federal wing had asserted its control over its own affairs. Since 1957 the federal cabinet ministers have been preoccupied with national affairs although it is expected they will keep a watchful eye over the election apparatus. The most important party event in British Columbia since the federal elections of 1957 and 1958 was the provincial leadership convention late in 1958. The national leader instructed members of parliament not to participate actively in the contest between Deane Finlayson and Dr. Desmond Kidd. It is widely believed within party circles, however, that Kidd's support derived directly from opposition to Finlayson that was led, outside the convention, by several members of Parliament and that it was probably directed by the federal minister of Justice, E. Davie Fulton. With the confirmation of Finlayson as leader, there has been no suggestion of further attempts by federal cabinet ministers to influence affairs in the provincial sphere. Indeed, there has been evidence of the provincial leader receiving increasing support from elements within the party that were formerly distinguished as

11. The national leader's non-participation order cannot be documented but is so freely discussed in party circles as to leave little doubt that it was issued. Similarly with the role played by Fulton.
as largely federal in sympathy. Members of parliament have begun to assist constituency associations preparing for the next provincial election. None of the three federal ministers is expected to play an active role in the provincial campaign. It is believed this springs from the national leader's desire to keep the two spheres of Conservative politics separated, if for no other reason than to avoid the possibility of an embarrassing charge that the national government was attempting to interfere in an internal matter affecting a sovereign provincial government.

(ii) Membership Articulation

When the sound and fury of the party leader's quarrels die away and the cast of the factional relationships seems to have been set, another aspect of articulation remains to be examined. This concerns the rank-and-file, the nuts and bolts of the party machinery which the leaders strive to control. If the constituency executives and their members should refuse to accept their leader's decision after quarrels such as those described, then the crystallizing of positions means nothing. How has the division between party leaders affected the party membership? It is on this answer that the effectiveness of the party organization will depend.

There is no doubt that the disputes between leaders of the provincial association and the federal council led to ruptured relations throughout the party structure. This was reflected in the three election campaigns of 1952 and 1953. The volunteer staff working in the 1952 provincial election was the smallest since the
campaigns of the middle thirties. People who formerly had labored for the party went to work for the new Social Credit organization which boasted the help and experience of many able Conservatives. The Social Credit victory and the ensuing provincial leadership battle alienated even more Conservative supporters. Case after case was found in the election campaign of 1953 where constituency organizations were unable to perform even the most minimal services for candidates. The same situation obtained during the federal election campaign in 1955 with the qualification that, if anything, even less help was available to the federal workers. Some of them had participated in the provincial campaign a few months earlier. The help that might have been expected reciprocally from the provincial workers was too discouraged by the B.C. election returns to do much more than sit back and wish their federal cousins well. The inter-factional bickering had also alienated many from the federal group.

Some light might be thrown on the question of membership support for each wing during this period by a yearly records system of membership in party offices. Such records do not exist. Current membership records, which were made available, were not especially helpful in this connection. Both the Federal Council and the B.C. association use largely the same mailing lists and rely on the same sources for their membership rolls. This may be some indication that the division of feeling is not as deep as popularly supposed. An aggrieved and vocal constituency executive (who belongs to the B.C. association) might well declare his
opposition to this or that leader's tactics but this does not necessarily mean that he is representing the feeling of all the members of his constituency association. That feeling is difficult to gauge even as it exists today, let alone as it existed at some point in the past.

Both the Federal Council office and the B.C. association office claim the party has a B.C. membership of eight to ten thousand persons who pay annual dues of about one dollar. The only real difference in the two offices' membership records is that the provincial association also has lists of provincial constituency officers while the Federal Council has federal riding officers listed. Throughout this inquiry party officials stressed that the upper level quarrels seemed to have no visible effect on the general party loyalty of many members. These statements were difficult to substantiate but, pending any proof to the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that large numbers of party members continued their interest in both facets of the party's work and probably restricted their participation in the disputes to deploring the divisions.

An attempt was made to assess the contemporary situation. A short questionnaire was sent to the presidents of the provincial constituency associations and, where there were none, to persons performing similar functions. Addresses were supplied by the B.C. association and the letters mailed before there could be any question of suggestions going out from the provincial office.

12. Nearly every case where this occurred, the responsible person turned out to be a member of the corresponding federal riding group.
All forty-two provincial constituencies were canvassed in this way. A corresponding survey of the twenty-two federal ridings was planned but was not carried out because a similar list of names was not made available. The Federal Council office undertook to question its riding associations about joint membership provisions. Answers received by the federal office were inconclusive or, at best, consisted of information that the canvassed person had already replied to a similar questionnaire. The constituency presidents were chosen as being the most representative of the party's workers. If it could be shown that the greater number of these people were actively engaged in promoting Conservative candidates for both federal and provincial elections, then a high degree of unity might be deduced. Questionnaires were returned for twenty-seven of the forty-two constituencies, some with accompanying letters. Only a few respondents failed to reply to all the questions. Information is thus available for 64 percent of the constituencies.

Association presidents were asked to respond yes or no to the question "Are you active in the federal riding association in your area?" All but one replied affirmatively. They were also asked "Do you hold a federal riding executive post?" Fifteen replied yes and eleven no. Some of those replying negatively added that they had recently held a federal riding post. Response to these two questions seems to indicate a fairly high degree of articulation

13. The letter and questionnaire will be found in the appendix.
between officers of the federal and provincial field organizations. While such people might feel an obligation to reply affirmatively to the question about their active participation in federal work, the indication later that more than fifty-five per cent of the provincial association presidents work as federal executives gives weight to the assertions that there is substantial co-operation.

Data showing the degree of participation in provincial party affairs by federal riding presidents would be equally interesting. All such officers are granted membership in the B.C. provincial association but this does not ensure their active support in constituency level work for the provincial association. Some party members have suggested that a feeling of "graduation" exists in a few ridings; apprenticeship is spent in provincial work and then one passes up the ladder to the federal work. Individuals in the party long enough to become federal riding presidents, however, usually profess that both phases of party work benefit from strong provincial organization. It would seem reasonable to assume that federal riding presidents would strive for provincial success in most cases, even if not to quite the same degree in which their federal work is supported by provincial constituency officers.

The survey's third and fourth questions sought to determine the degree of participation in federal affairs by members of the provincial constituency associations. Respondents were asked to

---

14. See above, p. 73.
estimate the percentage of the membership active in federal riding work. Their answers were colored to some extent by the question following which asked whether membership in the provincial constituency association automatically conferred membership in the corresponding federal association. In fifteen of the twenty-seven constituencies represented by replies dual membership of this sort obtains and twelve of the presidents put their membership's activity federally at 90 to 100 per cent. Eight of these twelve constituencies had dual membership arrangements, in which cases it is possible the word "active" was interpreted rather more loosely than had been anticipated. Five constituencies reported participation ranging from 25 down to 5 per cent. Four were in the bracket 25 to 49 per cent and four other constituencies in the 50 to 75 per cent range. Two constituencies reported only that their members were active during federal election campaigns.

Two of the five constituencies reporting the lowest degree of participation in federal affairs (i.e. 5 to 25 per cent) also reported dual membership arrangements. Of the four constituencies in the second group (25 to 49 per cent participation), two had dual memberships. Three of the four constituencies reporting 50 to 75 per cent participation had dual memberships. One must be cautious about drawing too general a conclusion from the figures. They do show, however, reasonable grounds on which party organizers could question whether much is accomplished with a dual membership arrangement, of which the survey shows fifteen cases. Two of the fifteen occur in areas of below 25 per cent joint participation,
another two in areas of below 50 per cent and three in the 50 to 75 per cent range. True, eight dual membership arrangements were supposed to result in 100 per cent participation or close to it, but it is to be wondered how many respondents equated "active participation" with the essentially passive act of holding membership in such circumstances. It seems plausible, however, that the survey offers some support for an opinion held by party workers that about 50 per cent of the provincial constituency members play an active part in the federal field as well, and possibly even more during election campaigns. It may be questioned whether the most optimistic party workers could hope for very much better in a country which offers two different directions in which the politically-interested may travel.

As a second part of the fourth question, respondents were asked to state whether any co-operative membership arrangements, other than automatic duality, existed between the federal and provincial groups and, if so, to describe them. There were four responses to this query. Two described arrangements in which memberships were sold at a local, regional or municipal association level. In one case, but not the other, local membership entitles one automatically to federal and provincial association memberships. In these two cases, the senior associations levy, if they wish, 25 per cent each of the one dollar membership fee. The other two responses indicated attempts were being made to put primary

15. None had been expected from the fifteen dual membership areas.
membership on a local unit base with members automatically becoming members of the provincial and federal riding associations as well. There are a number of variations of this membership form in constituencies that were not represented by responses to the questionnaire. Most of these require all members to enrol on the local level with part of their dues going to the senior bodies; in some cases membership to the senior bodies is available at a reduced rate to those belonging to the local associations. Several constituencies stress the local or poll level membership but also permit direct membership in the provincial or federal constituency association.

Marginal comments made on six replies to the questionnaires indicated that, whatever the formal arrangements, affairs in both spheres were largely organized and run by the same persons. This situation was only suggested in what are essentially rural areas. An urban constituency such as Vancouver-Burrard in which federal and provincial riding boundaries are almost precisely the same may exhibit the same characteristics. With the likelihood of more people being available in urban areas for political work, division of labor is more likely to occur in an urban area than in a rural one, quite apart from all other considerations of the varying interests in the two different spheres of activity, federal and provincial.
The questionnaire asked one subjective question:

Some people think that national and provincial Conservative spheres should be kept strictly separated to achieve greatest efficiency. Others think that all Conservative party members should work for the party in both federal and provincial fields. Would you state your views below (briefly)?

Some respondents contended themselves simply with underscoring the question's second sentence, or by writing short phrases such as "Best to work in both fields." Others elaborated views that Conservatism should be advanced by all party workers, regardless of nominal attachment to this or that wing and regardless of past differences. One person wrote:

Present arrangement of separate provincial and federal has caused a great deal of trouble and hard feeling. Lack of top federal and provincial executive co-operation has cost us thousands of members.

Another said he felt joint efforts were desirable, that in his constituency "all members active in the provincial sphere are also active in the federal, but the reverse does not hold true. Some of our federal members are still Socred provincially." One president from Vancouver Island, in making a case for full cooperation said that insisting on keeping the fields separated was tantamount to putting British Columbia ahead of Canada in one's interests. Another Vancouver Island view was this one:

Provincial officers should shoulder responsibility for party efficiency. Federal officers should expect free co-operation leading up to a federal election -- provincial affairs being set aside for the time being -- in an all-out federal effort. Federal backing in all provincial elections should be relied on.
The president of yet another constituency, one predominantly rural, made these observations:

The need for greater liaison between provincial and federal organizations has been doubly apparent since Anscomb defeated Bennett for party leadership. The rift of that day was widened when Finlayson defeated Bewley at a later convention and was still apparent to many of us when Finlayson won by a small margin over Desmond Kidd.

Most thinking Conservatives that I know realize that the problems of that day were not faced up to in a proper manner with resultant friction between Federal and provincial associations. Finlayson was chucked out at Ottawa when he called for the resignation of Drew. The provincial association had a core of diehards that fostered the rift and the federals were pretty bitter over the provincial attitude. If we are still going to try and decide who was right and who was wrong there cannot be proper liaison. The federal landslide in 56 (sic) practically eliminated provincial arguments so perhaps they were wrong in great part, but until someone on the federal side makes a move to cement Conservative organizations into a unit under a mutual plan, and this plan will have to allow freedom by provincial organizations in provincial fields to function without dictation, there will be little progress made in solidifying the Conservative party in Canada, and those of us who try to please both can only end up displeasing one of them.

I feel the federal side can afford to be generous in this situation and tried in my own riding to get both on one platform without much success. The expected election offers an excellent chance for the federals to get behind the provincial candidates irrespective of the past and resolutions to this effect will go forward from this riding to our annual meeting to be held in February.

What was felt to be surprising about the answers to this question was the extent of the solidarity of feeling. Not one writer suggested any reasonable grounds existed for keeping the two
levels of party work separated. Presidents of all twenty-seven constituencies were unanimous in a wish to see all Conservatives working closely together. Several pointed out that geographic difficulties and the lack of coincidence in federal and provincial riding boundaries made some divisions inevitable but, while this was acknowledged, division was never thought desirable. Two of those replying with similar views indicated that their primary interest was in the federal sphere but this did not alter their views on the matter. This unanimity may be attributed in large measure to widespread feeling that recent party divisions had caused great harm and that therefore the closest co-operation possible is most desirable. It is possible that a similar survey carried out in another case where the party had not been wracked by factional disputes that the tenor of the answers would vary from that evidenced here. Another possible explanation might be that party workers subscribe to a view that problems of government in both national and provincial spheres are not so dissimilar that different party tactics are required. This latter, however, may represent a sophistication in viewpoint above that which may be expected of political workers in the field and that the idea of reaction from past quarrels is the more likely explanation.

(iii) Public Policy

When the inquiry began it was assumed that any differences between federal and provincial groups would be evident in the determination of party viewpoints relating to desirable public policy.
The concern of each group with aspects of governmental life that have potentiality of conflicts between them was expected to result in the promotion of dissimilar viewpoints relating to preferred government action. Grounds for such expectation may be found in the origins of the federal system itself which represent a series of compromises between sectional interests and between those interests and national interests as they come into being. It was, however, in matters of public policy that the least discord was found.

Party workers account for this lack of conflicting policy viewpoints with a glib reply that whatever their internal disputes all party members are united in wishing to advance "Conservatism". There have been many explanations for the existence of the party system but, so far as British Columbia and the Conservatives are concerned, Lord Bryce's suggestion that "Party seems to exist for its own sake" seems to be almost as adequate an explanation as can be deduced. The political philosophy of "Conservatism" as expressed by B.C. party workers has been so difficult to define in consistent terms -- and therefore incapable of analysis -- that one is forced to seek another answer. In British Columbia the Progressive Conservative Party directs its policy more toward the winning of power than toward the promotion of a developed doctrine of government.

The determination of party policy is one of the prerogatives of Conservative leaders. Annual meetings of party associations often debate issues of public concern and report their views in the form of resolutions. While such resolutions usually imply that they would be put into effect by a Conservative government, if elected, they are considered within the party as having little more than an informative nature for the party leader. They may also bear some propaganda value for the voters and serve as an outlet for the feelings of vocal party members. The prestige of the prime minister in parliamentary countries has been such that most right wing parties acknowledge they can do no more than make suggestions to their leaders. This practice obtains in British Columbia not only with resolutions but with election platforms, responsibility for which rests almost entirely on the party leader. The party's only control over its public policy as it is expounded by the leader is to dismiss him from office if it can. This the Conservative party had not done in British Columbia although the Liberals have.

A conflict in the policies of the national and the provincial leader is possible but unlikely if each leader maintains his policy declarations within the governmental sphere which concerns him.

17. The case is, of course, different for left-wing parties such as those in Australia and the United Kingdom.
18. The Liberals were able to dismiss Premier Pattullo who refused to form a coalition ministry.
Discord would be likely if a provincial leader were frequently to insist that the federal government must take certain actions, or the national party leader made pronouncements that might be judged to impinge on provincial rights. While concurrent fields of jurisdiction might also offer possibilities for intra-party differences on party, such differences have not often occurred in the Conservative case. Natural resource development that involved the federal government as well as the provincial could permit clashes of policy within a party — development of hydro-electricity on an international river suggests an example — but the national leader is usually astute enough to formulate policy in conjunction with the provincial leader and so avoids such difficulty. Policy differences between a provincial premier and a federal prime minister have developed even where they adhere to the same political party, but the coincidence of the Conservative party holding office simultaneously in Ottawa and Victoria has been so rare that trouble of this nature has not afflicted the British Columbia Conservatives.

It appears probable that only when the same party holds office nationally and provincially is there much chance of public policy becoming an important divisive factor within the party.

The lack of policy differences in the public sphere was considered to be significant as a suggestion of the slight extent to which policy is important in the Conservative party in Canada. This is usually the case with parties that try to bridge sectional interests. This lack of any policy or ideological conflict may be borne in mind

19. Simultaneous office-holding occurred only twice in the past sixty years, and both during periods of unanticipated strain: immediately before and during the early years of the first world war, and during the early years of the economic depression of the thirties.
when consideration is being given to the country's sectional politics and the party's beginning construction of non-sectional or national organization. Any evolution of the party from an alliance of various sectional interests into one based on different, intra-sectional lines (such as economic classes) might well bring about such changes that would make public policy conflict more likely between national and provincial leaders. Such speculation, however, must find more solid ground than is here available before definitive conclusions could be drawn.

(iv) Party finance

Only a little light can be thrown on the subject of party finance as it relates to the British Columbia Conservatives. Such information as has been gleaned has come from people in the party in a position to know the facts but who felt themselves unable to permit use of their names as a source. Of the party's day-to-day financing, little can be learned and it may safely be asserted that very, very few individuals within the party have any definite idea whence it arises. Speculation by party workers is the same as that by people outside the party: a few large companies are presumed to contribute to all major parties but such contributions amount to very little between elections. In any case, the party's financial needs are relatively slight until a major campaign must be fought.

20. In the concluding chapter of this inquiry.
Chief costs to the provincial party between election is the office rent at the headquarters and the salaries of the two full-time staff members. There is, in addition, such incidental costs as stenographic supplies and mailing, and travelling expenses of the provincial leader who is not paid. Expenses that arise in connection with conventions and annual meetings are met on an ad hoc basis. The Federal Council has roughly similar office expenses, although on a smaller scale, and the financing of the organizer's work. Officers of the Federal Council are not salaried. The provincial association's expenses for maintenance purposes are wholly met by contributions raised by the party in British Columbia. So too with the Federal Council, although a general impression has existed in party circles that the Council's work was at least partially financed by funds sent from Ottawa or Toronto.

Election campaign funds are a different matter. The association has found the funds available to it for fighting elections varied greatly as the political fortunes smiled or scowled upon the party. Money for elections is raised in three ways: by the central finance committee set up by the B.C. association executive, by the efforts of constituency committeemen, and by the candidates themselves, either from their personal funds or their friends. For a major election campaign such as the one planned for the 1960 election, perhaps two-thirds of the total amount raised will come through the efforts of the central finance committee of the association. The total amount spent depends, of course, on the number of constituencies to be contested so figures will be presented on
the basis of money spent per candidates. While costs vary greatly between different urban constituencies and between rural constituencies, an average of about $5,000 was spent per candidate for the 1952 provincial election campaign. The figure fell to $1,000 per candidate for the next year's provincial campaign, chiefly because the party's dismal showing in 1952 made it impossible to raise any more money. Spending per candidate in 1956 amounted to less than $200 each for the twenty-two candidates. The reversal in the party's fortunes in the federal field has brought commensurate gain to the provincial party financiers for total spending for the 1960 campaign is anticipated at about $5,000 for each of fifty-two candidates. It should be emphasized that these are average figures, that they take into account money raised from all sources, and that they cover all forms of expenditures in connection with election campaigning. The amount of money being made available to the B.C. association through federal party channels could not be determined although it was understood it would amount to something more substantial than a token contribution, and that it might also depend on the amount of financial support the association could find by itself. If it found wide enough support to raise funds easily, it was implied, then federal help might be a little more generous than would be the case if the provincial association could not find such evidence of solid backing. 21

21. This despite the obvious fact that, given wide financial support, the provincial association would have less need of aid.
Less information is available on financing federal party campaigns in British Columbia. One of those directly involved in spending of central campaign funds asserted that the major part of the election funds had to be raised within the province, and that there was no truth to the popular assertions that a Conservative campaign was mounted in British Columbia only with the aid of money from Eastern Canada. Examples were given for the 1949 campaign, which was financed in part by the B.C. association campaign committee and in part by the federal leader's liaison officer, and for the 1953 election which was wholly financed through the federal liaison officer. The target for contesting twenty-two ridings was $200,000, but the sum spent was between this and $140,000 which was considered the minimum with which to make a respectable impression on the voters. Contributions from Eastern Canada never amounted to more than $40,000 according to the informant whose figures were not contradicted by others with whom they were discussed. Most of the costs were paid by candidates, riding associations, and by the central campaign fund. No information was available on the 1957 and 1958 campaign costs, which were financed by the joint committee described earlier. The party's national director, Allister Grosart, has been quoted as saying:

The Conservatives in 1957 had spent less than half as much money as they had done in 1955. 1957 was strictly a 'shoe-string election' and 1958 had been a little better, but even so less had been spent than in 1955.22

The individual party member's financial contributions are valued, not for their benefit to the head office, but as evidence of the party worker's interest in the party. The dues money is retained within the ridings or constituencies for work on the local level or the purchase of party literature and distributing it. The ordinary contributions of the party worker never reaches the head offices and thus has not been a factor in the struggles for control that have taken place. If the party workers had made a significant contribution to the work of the leaders' offices, it is possible more tangible evidence of "grass roots" feeling on the divisions would have been evidenced. Those connected with directing the activities of the provincial and federal wings suggest that the divisions were aggravated during the most critical years of strife, 1951 to 1956, by a steadily declining flow of contributions to the party's work. The more successful the party appears to be, the greater the amount of money it can raise for election campaigning. The accession to office of the federal party eased financial difficulties for both groups and helped to contribute somewhat to the reconciliation that is taking place.
CHAPTER V

Conclusion

Promulgation of the British North America Act in 1867 brought together into one polity sections that exhibited marked differences in ethnic origin, religion, social and economic orientation. Geographic distances so increased difficulties of government that of themselves they would have required some form of administrative devolution. For technological reasons alone Sir John A. Macdonald's wish for a close legislative union might have been impossible to achieve. Had the distances been overcome, there would have remained the necessity of constructing some political machine that could have made a legislative union work. The difficulties encountered in putting together even temporary support to bring about a loose federal union suggests the trouble Macdonald would have had in trying to weld interests into that closer unity that legislative union would have required.

A. R. M. Lower and other writers have pointed out that Confederation was largely inspired by the fear posed by a strong United States, continental forces working through mechanical advances, serious economic and political difficulties, and a vague sense of having a common British North American heritage. If the provinces that made up Canada during the eighteen seventies had these things in common, they had as many differences. Each province had boasted of a separate identity that antedated the Confederation, a separate political existence during which the
the colony had ruled itself in some measure, with the exception of the Red River colony. The most striking difference between the provinces was that of language. The French-Canadians, a conquered people, were fiercely proud of their language and determined to preserve it from their bastion in Quebec. The English-speaking residents of the other provinces saw no reason why the French should not be assimilated in terms of language and, for the most part, stubbornly refused to learn French. The religious complexion of the sections differed as well. Quebec not only was the North American cathedral of Roman Catholicism but her bishops fostered an ultramontanism that set their adherents apart from the English-speaking Roman Catholics from Ireland and other parts of the United Kingdom. The Anglicanism of the Maritimes contrasted with that of Ontario which was giving way to the Protestant sects which, generally-speaking, were in the vanguard of the anti-Romish faction of the Orange Lodge.

The social life of the Pacific Coast was a curious mixture of English society transported to a new world existing almost side by side with the western frontier society that marked the American mid-West. Ontario was more representative of Scottish-American social mores with an admixture of industrial revolution classes and a yeoman farming community. The Maritimers were proud of their older society, based largely on fishing, shipbuilding and the timber industry, while the Québécois clung to the sharp divisions that reminded European visitors of feudal times, with the exception of Montreal which was the new nation's financial centre, the heart of
transportation speculation and new commercial ventures, just as Toronto was becoming the nation's first industrial centre. The economic divisions were no less clearly drawn than the social, and probably were easier to discern. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick saw their hinterland directly to the west and south for New England was a most convenient trading centre for their goods and the West Indies made Halifax one of the world's major shipping centres of the day. The fisheries turned Maritimers' eyes seaward, to the markets in Britain and to their rivals in New England. The lumber industry depended heavily on sailing ships and the "day of wind and sail" was fast coming to an end. Maritimers wanted protection for their fisheries and markets for their timber which Upper and Lower Canada had in abundance. For her part, Quebec was nearly self-sufficient economically so long as the St. Lawrence trade remained strong. Ontario, however, cried loudly for protection for her infant industries after the homeland had declared for free trade and made plain her lack of interest in overseas colonies. The prairies existed on a fur trade economy increasingly threatened by the slow growth of settlers agriculture which early found need of export markets. As Ontario's economy was tied to the St. Lawrence system so Manitoba's depended greatly on the southward connection until the Canadian Pacific Railway was built and its effect took several years to make itself felt. The Pacific Coast colony was far from the others and developing an economy based on markets that must be sought to the south and to the far west over vast ocean stretches. Great resources there were but great difficulties were
hindering their development. Timber, coal, fisheries, gold, these the province had in abundance and little in common with other provinces of Canada. Her mountainous terrain posed special problems of government, problems that were the province's ever-recurring complaint at Ottawa. British Columbia's union with Canada was almost wholly negative in that it was largely as a reaction to the threat of American envelopment.

Each section of Canada was different and usually proud of it. This sectionalism dictated the form of government, as many able writers have shown; and, it may be suggested, the form of government combined with the sectionalism dictated the form that successful political parties would take. The retention of important powers by the provinces meant that winning control of their governments offered continued inducement to political parties which had operated within the separate colonies, to continue to seek the favors of provincial voters. Social factors appear to have been influential in the organization of political parties and society remained provincial in character long after Confederation. A coalition of sectional parties enabled Macdonald and George Brown to achieve Confederation; to develop it would require further coalitions. It was Macdonald's great talent as a compromiser that enabled him to put together endless combinations representing the sectional interests and keep the loose assortment of colonies on the track toward eventual nationhood. A national sentiment did not exist that was strong enough for a political party to be built on that foundation alone and, until it came, the
sectional interests were the only foundations on which a successful political party could be built. Thus it was that in the first seventy-five years of Canada’s nationhood, party structures tended to be series of parallel vertical sectors, loosely connected across the top.

One Canadian writer has suggested that, next to forming governments, the most important function of political parties is:

that of adjusting the conflicting claims of religious, racial, occupational and sectional interests in the society so as to secure sufficient support to constitute an effective government.

Canadian governments have been concerned with the economic issue of resources development to an almost unparalleled degree. This has brought into sharp focus the different economic claims of the country’s four chief sections: the Maritimes, Ontario and Quebec, the Prairies and British Columbia. Cultural, racial and religious issues have been of equal importance in the sectional struggles, although they may be assuming somewhat lesser significance in the present day. V. O. Key, speaking of the United States, makes a comment that applies with equal validity to Canadian politics:

A sectional politics commonly involves a sharpening of interests and attitudes by peoples of all sorts in a major geographic region against a similar clustering of interest and attitudes of the people of another region.

It was amid such a conflict of interests that party politics began in British Columbia. For thirty years the sectional interest had dominated the political scene, almost to the total exclusion of national party lines. Provincial governments were formed on the basis of personalities chosen from a fairly homogenous group. But government by personality could not survive the development of the hinterland which destroyed the old colonial milieu and resulted in important differentiation of social and economic interests within the province. Intraprovincial sectionalism that thus came into being necessitated political groups that could bridge the varying interests. The rising of one successful coalition of interests forced the opposition to emulate it. These provincial combinations assumed national party political labels, although not without some difficulties.

To achieve any success provincially a party had to evolve such a compromise that was workable. This was no mean task and it is no wonder that federal party leaders preferred to rely on the existing provincial party structures rather than build a new series of compromises that would in turn become part of a higher interests-bridge if the federal leader was to win office. This situation obtained in Canada as long as sectional interests pre­dominated. Sectional interests were by far the most significant ones, they had antedated Confederation while the national interest resembled an artificial vine nurtured in a faraway hothouse. It

could thrive only as it drew nurture from all sections and contributed to each in turn. But when economic concentration and social particularism begins to weaken, the whole political structure is affected. It seems equally true of Canada as of the United States that "the sectional foundation of parties for half a century have been eroding." The reasons are many and varied: industrialism, urbanization, economic diversification, immigration, technological advance in transport and communications. D. Brogan says the result is that

the spread of interests all over the country nationalizes many interests, unites producers or consumers all over the Union, breaking down not merely state barriers, but the much more important regional barriers. Economic unification of a country is measurable, by statistics which show the increase in inter-provincial flow of goods and produce, by regional economic indicators showing the national connections of branch plants, and by the very spread of one region's clearly identifiable products to other regions. While more difficult to measure, social and cultural unification and admixing is of equal if not greater importance. Some degree of the changes in Canada were suggested by the Report of the Royal Commission on the Arts, Letters and Sciences. The growth of national associations for professional people, and of nationally organized labor unions has had profound effects, as has the increasing mobility of the

4. Key - Politics - p. 251
5. An Introduction to American Politics (Hamilton, London) 1954, p. 93. See also Hugh A. Bone in American Politics and the Party System (continued p. 121)
population resulting in high inter-regional migration. Some of these indicators may be found in population charts whose figures also suggest what is possibly one of the most potent forces in the process of Canada's change from rural sectionalism to growing nationhood, that is, the urbanization of the population. In 1901 three-quarters of the Canadian people lived in rural areas, the remainder in urban centres. Twenty years later the population was evenly divided between rural and urban areas and by 1956 two-thirds lived in the city. Canadian political parties based on loosely-connected sectional groupings found their already difficult task vastly more complicated as the cement of sectionalism slowly began to crumble. Measures associated with two world wars and the economic depression of the nineteen thirties accelerated the breakdown of regionalism. Coupled with this "a new Canadian nationalism is arising which may tend to blunt the edges of the previously sharply-defined economic and religious sectionalism." The problems political party organizations faced in accommodating themselves to changed circumstances were brought into sharper focus

(5) "The old sectionalism is being broken down by the rise of industrialism the immigration of population during the wars, the spread of labor unionism and the increasingly high level of education." p. 19.


7. Canada Year Book 1957/58 (Queen's Printer, Ottawa) chart p. 121.

8. G. L. - "The Pattern of Canadian Politics" - World Today vol. x, April 1954, p. 172. The "edges" have probably been blunted much more than this writer suggests.
as the process of change accelerated and its effects accumulated.

Professor J. R. Mallory of McGill University suggests this useful analysis: A rural democratic structure prevailed before the first world war wherein every township, village or county pushed its natural leaders to the fore in assuming, among other duties, the dominant political role for their area in the party organization. Such circumstances found the provincial party association fairly well adapted to the task at hand. The change to urban living, however, has necessitated mass techniques of political action because there is less and less direct contact between the politically interested or "militant" and the constituents on whose behalf they presumably run the local party organization. Such mass techniques require greater centralization and greater efficiency from the party association.9

While the Conservative Party's national director, Allister Grosart, indicates he agrees with this as a fairly valid picture of the modern problem, the example of the rural democracy need not be too heavily depended upon. The rise of new political groups with which parties must deal through new techniques is, however, most important. If Canada has economic classes they were, until early in this century, geographically determined, whereas now they are more likely to be determined by function which ignores geographic delineations. When sections no longer serve as the chief unifying

element in a growing country, one must turn to these social changes for enlightenment. The social unifying group for the modern politician may well turn out to be a national political association.

A number of observers have commented on the slow growth of extra-parliamentary associations in Canada. Herbert F. Quinn suggests that the reason lies in the leader's need to draft political programs acceptable to a wide variety of sectional interests. He feels that a strong extra-parliamentary group "would undoubtedly attempt to dictate policy and draw up a definite program to which he would be asked to conform." It seems reasonable to suggest that the slow dissolution of strong sectionalism would mitigate a leader's reluctance to assist the growth of such extra-parliamentary groups. Austin Ranney and Willmore Kendall find that national party extra-parliamentary groups have taken a long time to develop in Canada, which lags behind other democratic countries in this respect. They observe that in the United States the federal form of government has emphasized the decentralization of parties because there is little federal law relating to their activities. The American primary system for nominations also strongly influences this decentralizing trend for the primaries make it very difficult for national party leaders to intervene decisively in the determination of local candidates.

11. Democracy and the American Party System (Harcourt Brace), 1956. p. 107. These writers suggest that lack of such development is an indication that full self-government has not yet been attained. More adequate documentation would seem required.
Not only does Canada lack a primary system of nominations, thus permitting the national leader more leeway in influencing local candidatures, but laws regulating national election activity are nationally-enacted in contradistinction to the American case. Canadian party workers may well be influenced by the example of the American system and even affected by the spirit of local party independence which this fosters but lacking the institutional framework to go with that system the way is easier in Canada for some centralization of the party machinery used for national elections.

J. R. Williams finds that it was not until after November, 1941 that the national Conservative association became an active and continuing force. A meeting in that month ordered a survey that showed a decade of only intermittent work on organization and publicity that had caused heavy damage to the party.

Under R. B. Bennett, all local organizations almost disappeared except where it was kept alive by individual members in the House of Commons. 12

Reorganization began late in 1942 by John Bracken after his election as national leader. One of his steps was the appointment of Howard Green to improve the British Columbia situation, in which party leaders were in a coalition government with the Liberals. The basic reason for the coalition was the fear felt by both parties that to risk an election individually would probably mean the victory of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, a reason that points out the sorry state of the party's organization in B.C.

Green evidently felt obliged to build afresh in British Columbia. "Why did not the rebuilding take the form of strengthening the provincial association? A surface reason may be found in the slight embarrassment that the coalition caused the national party at this time (during the war). Later on, violent personality clashes occurred which also helped to obscure the more important reason which rested in the obsolescence of the old alliance of provincial party groups on which leaders like Borden had relied. The traditional machine as represented by the old provincial association's clique was antique and quite incapable of reaching the urban masses. The organization the Conservatives required if they were to regain power had to re-establish contact with the country's changing society, taking cognisance of the new trans-sectional interests on which it would build instead of upon the former vertical provincial parochialisms. Sectional interests are still important in Canadian politics but the "horizontal" or non-sectional interests that denote, as well, a growing feeling of nationalism, demand increasing consideration. Whether the rise of more and more non-sectional interests in the country is correlative to a growth in nationalism forms interesting speculation but is beyond the scope of the present inquiry.

While the new Conservative party is thus reaching more and more to the masses, this is not to say that it can be called a mass party in Maurice Duverger's sense. The party is still governed by cadres or elites and any idea that important decisions are made
frequently or continuously through the articulation of the party branches is little more than fiction.

The locus of power, as recent British scholarship has emphasized and as Duverger concedes, remains in the parliamentary parties as opposed to the external mass parties. The reference is to a British case but it is equally useful here.

In adducing a high degree of centralization for the British parties, Ranney and Kendall suggest that it is linked to the degree of control exercised over local government and regional administration by the national authorities. They feel that such a central party system, if developed in the United States, might well mean "the end of the reality if not of the form of federalism." Before such an issue could be decided some closer correlation must be shown between the detailed form of government organization and the detailed form of party organization. While this inquiry has suggested that Canada's sectional politics during the last century acted in combination with the federal governmental form adopted to determine the nature of the political parties, it has not been shown that the party form determines the form of government. Much further investigation of this subject will be required before the suggestion by Ranney and Kendall above can be accepted with full equanimity.

Recent trends indicate Canada is getting more and more government in absolute terms and that the federal government is gaining increasing power relative to that of the provincial governments. J. A. Corry finds special significance in the attempts of the business elites to gain increasing influence in the federal sphere. Such people being, he believes, the leaders of opinion are likely to tip the federal balance decisively in Ottawa's favor.

... it is hard to see how state governments and national governments can continue to be genuinely co-ordinate authorities. In constitutional law the states may long continue to be co-ordinate, but politically they are likely to sink to a subordinate position.\textsuperscript{15}

Even if the citizens' demands should swing the balance in favor temporarily of the provincial governments because they control the sphere in which services may be most heavily demanded—services such as health, education and highways—the federal government seems certain of eventual dominance by reason of its greater financial resources which would have to be employed to provide any large scale service increases. Political parties may be expected to orient their objectives and organizations along those lines most likely to maximize their chances for wielding decisive power. If they do, and there seems little doubt that they would find sufficient reasons, then the long-term organizational pattern of the Conservative party is likely to be one in which the horizontal or intra-sectional lines are likely to be of the most importance.

It has been suggested that public policy issues have not been important factors in the struggles that rent the Conservative party in B.C. The very nature of sectional politics, however, tends to preclude public policy-making as a major function of the party which tends to concentrate instead on winning elections. Many of the public policy issues with which national politicians might be concerned lie within provincial jurisdictions; the impossibility of controlling all such governments in order to effect such policies makes any question of policy-making in those spheres a useless exercise. Matters within federal government jurisdiction have still enough different sectional colorations that public-policy making in those areas is a ticklish task, one that would be especially risky and of dubious value to a party in opposition, as the Conservatives were for so many years.

The nation's changing political character necessitated change in the Conservative party's character if it hoped to regain office. The Liberal party, posing as the nation's savior from several evils, enjoyed the perquisites of power and could well afford to make whatever alterations of structure that seemed necessary and in a piecemeal fashion. Eventually, however, the Liberal party fell behind the changes and was replaced by the voters. Evolution on a forced scale was imperative for the Conservative party for its very survival depended on getting into harmony with the new pattern of the nation's political heartbeat which was responding to maturation processes of social and economic development.
If an organic, non-sectional party is what is required to win national power in Canada today, that type of party could not come into being until the country was ready for it, until some degree of national feeling had been achieved. Only then could a national organization -- insofar as the Conservative party today is a national body -- be superimposed on the old structure. This is what seems to have been happening to the Conservatives in British Columbia during the past seventeen years although it is doubtful whether many party workers would have considered it in such terms. That this superimposition produced bitter disputes waged in public is probably due to the personalities that were involved after the death of the pre-war leader. But for this clash of personality it is possible that some variation of the provincial structure might have been achieved that would have permitted the federal-provincial differentiation of labor and authority that was attained in any case, one that would have avoided the intra-party battling in public that did the party incalculable harm. Regardless of the outward form of the solution, however, associational change was necessitated. It could have been put off only at the likely chance of the party's total disintegration.

It may be noted that similar differentiation of labour and organization has occurred in other party groupings. The Liberal party in British Columbia for several years maintained completely separate Vancouver offices for federal and provincial work and closed one of them apparently, chiefly because of economic troubles which followed the party's defeat in a national election campaign.
Both the Conservative and Liberal parties in Ontario have divided their spheres of activity while the Liberals in Quebec have used different offices and organizations to carry out work in its different fields. More inquiry into other federal parliamentary parties might provide useful information.

Opposition to an entrenched party hierarchy seems to ally itself with that wing of the party — federal or provincial — which has least control over the organizational apparatus. A party that holds power nationally and not provincially is likely to find its national elements dominating the provincial wing, and *vice versa* should the party hold office provincially but not federally.

Domination of a provincial party apparatus hinges largely on personality where the party holds power in both spheres, or in neither sphere, simultaneously. In British Columbia, a Conservative premier has always tended to dominate the party in such double-power cases. Inquiry into a situation under today's changed circumstances might well lead to different conclusions, especially where there would be the possibility of clashes between powerful cabinet ministers (federal) resident in a province and a premier of the same party.

The whole question of power by any group within a federal party has not been closely studied in a parliamentary context. What are the sanctions a provincial leader uses when he is out of power? How are those sanctions applied and what is their relative effect on the party's federal wing? The same questions arise with
respect to the national party leader's controls over party members primarily interested in winning and keeping control of provincial governments.

Difficult to examine but of some importance to the study of government are the sources of political party funds. Are contributors to parties in situations like the Conservative has encountered able to influence directly the bifurcation of the party machinery? It may be found, for instance, that as the national government comes to exercise, even indirectly, more influence over the disposal of natural resources within a province's boundaries that business contributors might weight the scales in favor of the federal party's wing. Other questions that arise during the course of such a study have included: the effect of internal party division on the voter, the relative prestige of provincial party leaders (in and out of office) and federal cabinet ministers, and the prestige situations involved with members of the legislature and members of the House of Commons in the different circumstances of one group, but not the other, holding control of a government, or of both controlling governments contemporaneously; and the potentiality of public policy clashes when the same party controls both national and provincial governments. That these and still further questions appear after such an inquiry, still unsolved, is perhaps inevitable. In trying thus to strike a match in a small corner of the abyss of ignorance, the investigator can hope only that the darkness may be lightened a little more that others may find the true path.
APPENDIX I

"The Blue Book"

The material following hereafter in this appendix may not be reproduced or copied, in whole or in part, without the written permission of the holders of the copyright, the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association.
A Factual Documented Statement of the Conservative Party's Position in British Columbia and some of the Reasons for the Motion of No Confidence in the National Leader

MARCH, 1955

Published by the Officers of the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association

To understand the difficulties confronting the Conservative Party in the Province of British Columbia—both Provincially and Federally—one must delve into the past.

Since the party first appeared in British Columbia it has operated on the principle that the Conservative Party is indivisible. Since the inception of Party politics in British Columbia the affairs of the Conservative Party, both Federal and Provincial, have been under the authority and direction of the British Columbia Conservative Association. This Association, until the present difficulties arose, worked in close harmony and cooperation with all Federal and Provincial Leaders.

The Constitution of the Conservative party in British Columbia provides, as follows:

“(1) The name of the Association is the “British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association,” hereinafter called “the Association”.

OBJECTS

“(2) (c) to organize and assist in organizing and carrying on Progressive Conservative Clubs, Associations and Societies throughout British Columbia.
(d) to direct general organization work of the Progressive Conservative Party in British Columbia.
(e) to promote and advance the principles, policies and interests of the Progressive Conservative Party and to secure the election of Progressive Conservative candidates to the Dominion House of Commons and Provincial Legislature.”

“(4) (a) Provincial District Associations and Federal Associations shall be organized under the authority of and be subordinate to this Association and in order to be entitled to elect members to this Association and to be recognized by it must have a Constitution approved by this Association.”

From the foregoing it will be clear that the British Columbia Conservative Association provides the means of operating a united party embracing both federal and provincial interests. The fact that Members of the
Legislature and Members of Parliament have served as Presidents and officers of the Association over the years and assisted in drawing up the Constitution of the Association, indicates that the British Columbia Association was accepted as the governing body. Until 1942 the party functioned effectively and harmoniously under this principle.

In that year, Mr. Howard Green, Member of Parliament for Vancouver South, contested the National Leadership of the Conservative Party and was defeated by Mr. John Bracken. Later Mr. Bracken and Mr. Green consummated an arrangement placing Mr. Green in charge of federal affairs in British Columbia. The plan was designed to alter the former method of conducting party affairs; it would split the party in British Columbia and result in the formation of a federal wing under Green's control.

At that time the party in B.C. was in coalition, this being used as an explanation for the contemplated action. Mr. Maitland, then the Provincial Leader in British Columbia, opposed the plan because it was unconstitutional and undemocratic, and because he foresaw it would result in the deplorable situation prevailing today.

In 1945, when a federal election became imminent, and notwithstanding the fact the party was in coalition, Mr. Maitland followed the practice he and previous Provincial Leaders had adopted of getting the party machinery in motion to nominate candidates to contest the election. He sought Mr. Green's assistance, advice and co-operation, but in reply he was advised by Mr. Green that he (Green) would be handling the party's campaign in British Columbia and that there would be a new order of things. Mr. Maitland refused to consider as final this decision enunciated by Mr. Green and insisted on meeting Mr. Bracken. This he subsequently did at which time Mr. Bracken confirmed the private arrangement made with Mr. Green.

Shortly after this election Mr. Maitland died.

A member of the Conservative wing in the Legislature, and a close friend of Mr. Maitland, reporting on this period states that Mr. Maitland was very much opposed to the Bracken-Green arrangement.

MEMBER'S STATEMENT

Having contested on behalf of the Conservative Party two federal elections—one in 1935 and another in 1940, and having represented the party in three provincial elections, and through my association over a long span of years with this organization, I have a very clear knowledge of the manner in which our organization has carried on.

Since 1924, to my knowledge, and previous to that no doubt, the British Columbia Conservative Association was the only body through which nominations of candidates were made and election campaigns carried on, both federally and provincially. There was no discussion at any time as between federal and provincial election machinery or the carrying on of organization between elections and at election time.

Early in the session of the Provincial Legislature in 1946 Mr. Pat Maitland, then Conservative Provincial Leader, sent to me a note by a page, upon which he had written: "When the House rises can you come to my office?" and on reading the note I nodded my assent to Mr. Maitland. When the House rose I immediately went to his office. After discussing briefly some things that had transpired in the House that afternoon, Mr. Maitland said:

"Do you know anything about my trouble with Green" and I answered:

"I only know that you have trouble—I don't know the details". Whereupon Mr. Maitland said:

"When the Federal House rose last year and it was quite apparent that they were going to name an election date I waited until Mr. Green had been home for three weeks, which I thought would give him time to catch up on his local affairs, and I telephoned him and suggested that he and I had better get together and have a talk because it was necessary that we start the organization rolling in the province. Mr. Green proposed a delay saying he was very busy and had some things to catch up with so I undertook to telephone him some time later. In about two weeks I phoned him again and again Mr. Green was reluctant to name a time for our conversation. I phoned him again drawing his attention to the fact the time was rolling by and it was essential we get the British Columbia Conservative Association throughout the province into the campaign, whereupon Mr. Green said: "That will not be necessary because I am going to handle our party's campaign in British Columbia." Mr. Maitland then said: "I do not understand just what you mean and we should get together and discuss this and I succeeded in getting him to make an appointment."

When we got together Mr. Green pointed out to me that Mr. Bracken had directed him to take charge of all of the nominations and the conduct of the campaign in British Columbia and that he proposed to do that and was intent upon naming a committee of Vancouverites with whom he could consult. Mr. Maitland said that he objected to the whole procedure and was unwilling to accept that arrangement as final and that out of the arguments which then ensued came an arrangement for Mr. Green and Mr. Maitland to meet with Mr. Bracken upon his arrival in Vancouver and each one would
Mr. Maitland stated that this meeting was held in Mr. Bracken's room in Hotel Vancouver—each presented his argument and Mr. Bracken, after giving consideration to them made this definite statement—Mr. Maitland, I have decided that Mr. Green is to look after the federal campaign for me in British Columbia.

Mr. Maitland and I discussed the implications of Mr. Green's actions and Mr. Maitland's last words to me were: "I wanted you to know this."

Mr. Maitland died within a week after this interview.

(Signed) "ALLAN J. MCDONELL".

In 1946, following the death of Mr. Maitland, a Leadership convention was held to elect a new Provincial Leader in British Columbia. At this convention Mr. Anscomb defeated W. A. C. Bennett, the other aspirant to the office of Leader of the Conservative Party.

After Mr. Anscomb's election he immediately undertook to implement an intensive integrated program of organization throughout the province, notwithstanding the fact the provincial wing of the party was in coalition. He wrote to Mr. Bracken advising him of his desire to stimulate organization. In reply he was requested to contact Howard Green, Mr. Bracken's "lieutenant" in British Columbia. He, therefore, wrote Green requesting his co-operation in organizing and unifying the party in the province. He invited him to serve on an Advisory Committee responsible to the B.C. Association.

INVITATION TO GREEN

October 27th, 1946

"My dear Howard:

"When at our convention in June last, the members elected me the leader of our party in British Columbia, I realized full well that it carried with it not only a great responsibility but a tremendous work load if we were to succeed as we should do in the political life of the province.

"Since the convention, I have been endeavoring to get a foundation laid on which we could proceed to build the party. It has been a somewhat difficult task, but I think I am now at the stage where a start in actual development can be made.

"With this object in view, I write to ask if you would be prepared to serve on an Advisory Committee, whose function will be to give me the benefit of advice and guidance in all matters of major policy in the party's activities. Others who I am asking to join this special Advisory Committee are listed below. Would you be good enough to let me know at once if you are willing to act, as I would like to arrange the first meeting to take place on Thursday or Friday next, the 31st of October."

Mr. Green replied declining to serve on this committee.

GREEN DECLINES

October 29th, 1946

"Dear Herb:

"I acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 27th. As Mr. Bracken pointed out in his letter to you of August 1st replying to yours of July 23rd, he has placed on me ever since his election as National Leader the responsibility of looking after federal activities in British Columbia. I do not think it would be wise to act also on your Special Advisory Committee, which I take it will assume responsibility for activities within our provincial sphere.

"I would suggest that you give me a call when you come to Vancouver, and that we then arrange for you and Merritt and myself to have a talk about the whole situation. I shall be very glad to co-operate with you to strengthen the party.

"With kindest personal regards."

Mr. Anscomb then wrote again stating the committee was holding its first meeting on October 31st, 1946.

NOTICE OF MEETING

"My dear Howard:

"Very many thanks for your letter of the 29th to hand this A.M. I am sorry that you do not feel that you should act on my Advisory Committee.

"When elected leader of our party in British Columbia, I naturally, as leader, assumed the responsibility for all our activities within that area, and I certainly do not propose to divide it. The object of my suggested Committee as outlined was to give me advice and guidance in the affairs of our party in the province for all purposes. It is my wish and duty to make our party strong, so that no matter what may come or from what quarter, we shall be ready to accept the test.

"I appreciate very much the contents of the last paragraph of your letter, and I know of no better way in which you could assist in that work than as an active associate with our other friends who are gathering together for that purpose. It is hardly necessary for me to say that I shall be very glad to chat with Colonel Merritt and yourself at any time.

"We are holding our first meeting of the Advisory Committee tomorrow, Thursday, 31st of October, at the headquarters.

"Very kindest regards."

"H. ANSCOMB"

On December 20th, Mr. Green replied setting forth his proposals for operating a divided party.

GREEN REPLIES

December 20th, 1946

"Dear Herb:

"Some days ago I had a letter from Bill Jones, with which he enclosed a copy of a letter received from Mr. J. R. 
Yoer Durm, of the Provincial and Federal branches of the Party, setting out a plan for co-operation and organization between the Provincial and Federal branches of the Party. As you will see, it is along the lines proposed to you by Merritt and myself during the discussion in my office on November 20th. "Wishing you the compliments of the season," and so on.

GREEN PROPOSALS

1. Anscomb and Green, as Mr. Bracken's Deputy in B.C., to recognize the sole responsibility of each in his respective sphere, consequently the sole power to make decisions proper to the chief executive of the party in that sphere.

2. Each may appoint his own Advisory Committee or not as he sees fit.

3. Each to have such paid staff as he finds necessary, and under his sole direction.

4. In view of unity of Party organization in many respects, arrangements to be made for closest co-ordination of organizational effort in each sphere and to this end. (a) Anscomb and Green to meet frequently to discuss plans and to arrange views on subjects of Anscomb interest. (This of course being impossible with Green in Ottawa and Anscomb in Victoria). I think that should be generally. (b) Financial men to co-operate on their jobs and to assist each other where possible. (c) Paid organizers to co-operate and assist each other. (d) In some areas, one local man shall work in both spheres. (e) Anscomb and Green shall each appoint two men to a Co-ordinating Committee whose job will be to advise them upon ways and means of co-operation. They shall meet monthly or at call of either Anscomb or Green.

Mr. Anscomb indicated the proposals were not acceptable because they were contrary to the Constitution and impracticable. He believed they would have the effect of perpetuating the division in the party—a state of affairs he wished to end. He wrote to Mr. Green inviting him to reconsider his position. He suggested that Mr. Green take the Chairmanship of the committee and appoint to the committee people of Mr. Green's choice in whatever number he desired, and sufficient to give Mr. Green's group a majority.

ANS.COMB RENEWS INVITATION

"My dear Howard:

Your letter of December 20th arrived just at Christmas time and I have not been able to answer it until now, due to a very busy period indeed when it arrived, and I left right after the New Year for the east and only returned this morning. I had hoped to answer you enroute east, but that was not possible.

"The proposals contained in your enclosure are that there should be two Conservative Parties in British Columbia. I am sure on reflection you will understand that I could not possibly assent to such a condition. In my view, the Conservative Party in British Columbia is one and indivisible, and our success federally, as well as provincially, depends on the maintenance of such a condition. Mr. Bracken was elected as leader of the Conservative Party in Canada at a convention attended by Conservatives throughout Canada, who were interested in Provincial as well as Federal politics, some of the delegates being Provincial Members.

"I was elected as leader of the Conservative Party in British Columbia at a Convention attended by Federal as well as Provincial members. At an Annual Meeting of the British Columbia Conservative Association some years ago, you then being a Federal Member, were elected President of the Association. At the Convention at which I was elected leader, General Pearkes, a Federal Member, was elected Vice-President of the Association. At that Convention, under the constitution, Federal constituencies as well as Provincial constituencies were represented. All the above is provided for in the constitution.

"The Constitution refers to the leader of the Conservative Party for the time being in British Columbia. It does not provide for two. Your proposal for a double organization is contrary to the provisions of the constitution, which indicates the objects of the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association under which the convention was held, especially these are quotations from the constitution.

"1. To promote and develop a general interest in Canadian and British Columbia politics and Government."

"2. To organize and to assist in organizing and carrying on Conservative Clubs, Associations or Societies throughout British Columbia."

"3. To direct general organizational work of the Progressive Conservative Party in British Columbia."

"4. To promote and advance the principles, policies and interests of the Progressive Conservative Party and to secure the election of Progressive Conservative candidates to the Provincial Legislature and the Dominion House of Commons."

"You will note the references to general interest in Canadian and British Columbia politics and government, and general organization work, to secure the election of Progressive Conservative candidates to the Provincial Legislature and the Dominion House of Commons. The proposals that you make would have the effect of dividing the party, which at any period in its history would be bad.

"The effect of such suggestions would, at the same time, double the expense of organization and create possibilities of very definite conflict. You will remember that after you declined to join my Advisory Committee or have anything to do with it, I had a further meeting with you at which Colonel Merritt was present. After an extended discussion, Colonel Merritt suggested he felt you should be joint Chairman with me of the
Committee. I stated that while I did not agree with the suggestion, I would go further than he asked and promptly suggested any of the following, to all of which you declined to agree.

1. That you be Chairman of the Advisory Committee.
2. That you add to the numbers of the existing committee to the point that you have a majority on it with yourself as chairman.
3. That if you desired or thought advisable that we form a sub-committee to deal with Federal problems, with yourself as chairman, on the understanding that the main committee be kept fully advised of the work that the sub-committee was doing.

"I am sure you will agree that to be effective we must go forward as a united party in British Columbia, so that we may deal with every problem as it develops, be it federal or provincial, and to ensure the success of that aim we must all work together as one unit. It is hardly necessary for me to say that I shall be glad to implement the suggestions I outlined to you in your own office, and as recorded above, and all the members of our committee will be glad of your presence and advice in the work we are undertaking.

"With every good wish."

Mr. Green again declined stating that, in his opinion, Anscomb had taken the position that Anscomb should dictate all affairs in the Province. Mr. Anscomb made a further effort to unify the party by inviting to become members of the committee certain persons who were members of Mr. Green’s personal committee.

Concerning this period, and at a party convention in October 1950, General Pearkes vigorously defended Mr. Anscomb’s action in his efforts to unify the party saying: “I do not believe it is practical to organize on a federal basis . . . I personally have had nothing but co-operation from Mr. Anscomb. Never at any time has he attempted to dictate to me . . . I have had the benefit of his advice but never his dictation.”

Because Mr. Green insisted that he have sole control of federal affairs in British Columbia, without reference to the B.C. Association, all efforts to promote unity were thwarted, and friction increased. Confusion prevailed.

In 1948 George Drew succeeded to the National Leadership and once again Mr. Anscomb renewed his efforts to end the growing strife between the party organization and the small but noisy rump group fostered by Mr. Green.

---

Mr. Drew at first failed to appreciate the value and significance of the proposals advanced through Mr. Anscomb. It was not until after the National election in 1949, when the party dropped from 65 to 42 seats, that Mr. Drew appreciated the necessity of a unified organization in British Columbia. He explained he had reconsidered the whole matter and concurred with Mr. Anscomb’s view that there should be one organization. He wrote to Gordon Cameron, the then President of the British Columbia association, to this effect, sending Mr. Anscomb a copy of the correspondence.

DREW AGREES TO ONE ASSOCIATION

January 12th, 1950

“My dear Herb:

“I am enclosing a copy of the letter I have sent to Gordon Cameron for your information, which I wrote to him after our conversation today. I do feel perhaps, because of the pressure of other circumstances, we may not have fully understood each other when we discussed these things on earlier occasions. But I am very glad to know that we now have a clear picture of what we agree would be the most satisfactory type of organization.

“Best regards.”

“Yours sincerely”,

“GEORGE DREW”.

COPY OF PART OF DREW LETTER TO GORDON CAMERON

“My dear Herb:

“Herb Anscomb and I had the opportunity for a very satisfying discussion of our views on organization, and I find that we are in agreement on the desirability of a single organization. . . . “to deal with both federal and provincial matters it would seem that the problem is not one of procedure, but rather of details of how the plan would be worked out.”

At Mr. Anscomb’s request, he stated he would also advise Mr. Green that he agreed with Anscomb there should be “a single organization to deal with both federal and provincial matters in B.C.”

If the National Leader advised Mr. Green of his decision he ignored it because the federal group continued its disruptive activities which later developed into an internal plot to end Mr. Anscomb’s leadership in British Columbia. Members of this federal group carried on an active campaign throughout the province to malign and discredit the Provincial leader. False and trumped-up charges were used. Mr. Anscomb successfully refuted these charges to the satisfaction of the 1950 convention which again confirmed his leadership. Serious damage was inflicted
upon the party. The charges were widely publicized in the press resulting in undermining public confidence in the party and in the Leader of the party in British Columbia.

Following upon this a convention was held at which 620 delegates representing all sections of the province, by an overwhelming majority, passed the following resolutions:

"1. ORGANIZATION:
WHEREAS duplication of work and a certain amount of confusion exists through the fact that there is now a federal organization and a Provincial organization working within the framework of the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association,
AND Whereas, in the interests of efficiency and economy these two organizational branches should be merged into one,
THEREFORE this Convention goes on record as favouring this change and that the Executive of the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association be empowered to take all necessary steps to have it effected."

"2. PAID EMPLOYEES:
WHEREAS the Executive of the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association is the governing body of the Association and as such is responsible for the organization of the party within the province of British Columbia, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that all paid employees of the party be appointed by and responsible to the Executive and report directly to the Executive upon their activities when called upon to do so and to the Executive of the respective District Associations whom they report on."

The general membership believed that inasmuch as these resolutions came from a Convention of the party they surely would be binding upon everyone concerned.

General Pearkes was elected President of the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association by the same Convention which passed the resolutions referred to above in the hope that he might be able to assist in implementing the resolutions.

He wired the National Leader requesting his cooperation to end party strife and advised against maintaining two associations.

PEARKES WIRSES DREW
Vancouver, B.C.
October 28th, 1950.

Hon. George Drew, M.P.
Leader, Progressive Conservative Party,
Ottawa, Ont.

"Convention passed resolution that Provincial and Federal organizations in British Columbia must be merged into one to insure efficiency and economy—stop—officers of association meeting today Vancouver feel essential all activities be centred around association's offices eight fifteen West Hastings St.—stop—Deplore press statement given by of intention to open separate federal offices elsewhere—stop—Accommodation available all Conservative activities in association's offices—stop—Impetuous that separate federal offices be not opened as indicated in press—stop—However, in order to insure harmony and co-operation essential cease to be employed by party—stop—Can assure you that all Federal activities can be maintained through me—stop—Urge your early visit to confer with me and my officers."

"GEORGE R. PEARKES"
President B.C. Conservative Association.

The resolution and wire were ignored.

A separate federal office was opened in which the rump group continued its rebellious and unconstitutional activities, in respect to which General Pearkes, at that time President of the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association, had this to say in a letter to the Association office secretary, dated November 3, 1950.

"I have just received your letter informing me about the "rebel office" having been opened in the Vancouver Block. This I very much regret and if they are forming anything in the nature of a separate Association with a secretary of their own it will do George Drew and the party federally much harm."

And in a letter to the National Leader, November 20th, 1950, while serving as President of the B.C. Association, General Pearkes gave advice to the National Leader and stated the only solution to disharmony lay through the B.C. Association.

PEARKES ADVISES DREW

"Letter from General Pearkes to National Leader is written in part below in reply to letter from him dated November
18th, 1950, addressed to General Pearkes. "... "I have your letter of 18th November, in which you discuss the position of our party's organization in British Columbia. I am pleased to note your comment that "nothing that has happened limits the possibility of devising a plan for effective co-operation between those responsible for national and provincial organization within the framework of the British Columbia Association." That the basis of co-operation be within the framework of the association is precisely the procedure decided upon at the recent convention.

"Earlier in your letter you mention, however, that "new offices (Federal) were obtained and the work is being carried on in exactly the same way as before." Reference is also made to "A local committee which handled national activities for so long." These points are, of course, the crux of the whole matter. The very facts that separate offices are set up when it has been repeatedly stated that facilities are available at the association's headquarters, the work is being carried on in exactly the same way as before and that a committee, outside the sphere of the association, continues to handle national activities, nullifies co-operation, continues the duplication of effort and causes friction.

"If a solution to present difficulties is to be found, I am convinced that it must be within the spirit of the resolution passed at the convention dealing with organization ... "

"G. R. PEARKES".

At the annual meeting on December 1st, 1951, the members again requested the said resolutions of the 1950 convention be acted upon. Mr. Drew was personally present at this meeting. He was again made acquainted in a forceful manner with the problems which, by this time, had become aggravated and seriously threatened the future of the party in British Columbia. He evaded taking any decisive action.

Several prominent Conservatives concerned about the state of affairs sought a private meeting with Drew at which they tried to convince him of the wisdom of cooperating with the B.C. Association by carrying out the spirit and letter of the Convention resolutions. He was warned by these friends his failure so to do would harm him personally, and also the party. Once again he refused to act.

In the Spring of 1952 a Provincial election was announced. In commenting on an event that he thought was harmful to unity, General Pearkes, in a letter to his Vice-President, dated March 27th, 1952, stated: "... it calls attention to the fact that the federal organization is determined to work independently when we are just entering on a provincial campaign. It would certainly have been in the best interests of the party both federally and provincially, not to have called attention again to the rift which a small group of those who are particularly interested in federal affairs, persist in keeping up. . . . I don't want that man (referring to the organizer engaged by the federal rump group) going around my constituency not only openly knocking Mr. Anscomb, but also making disparaging statements about myself."

Mr. Anscomb was defeated in the Provincial election and resigned his leadership of the party.

In the Fall of 1952, E. Davie Fulton was elected President of the Conservative Association of British Columbia and presided over the leadership convention to replace Mr. Anscomb. The election was contested by D. D. Finlayson and L. Bewley, Green's aide. Finlayson was elected and Bewley later became Mr. Drew's personal representative in British Columbia.

The National Leader invited the newly-elected Provincial Leader to Ottawa to discuss with him matters concerning the party.

At a meeting of the Executive of the B.C. Association in April 1953, Finlayson said about his discussions with the National Leader: "I advised the National Leader if the motions passed by the Convention were put into practice we could rebuild the party in British Columbia and restore peace. Mr. Drew was in favour of the one-party organization and referred me to his National Organizer to discuss the details of how this might be done."

"In my discussion with the National Organizer I followed the general theme of the resolutions. He was substantially in agreement. I was encouraged by my talks in Ottawa and feel that we can bring about unification." Mr. Fulton, who has been elected President of the B.C. Association in October of the previous year, at the last moment flew out from Ottawa to chair the said executive meeting.

Mr. Fulton sat next to the Provincial Leader and heard his above report to the Executive. After the meeting had adjourned he informed the Provincial Leader a discussion took place at Ottawa immediately prior to his decision to attend the Executive meeting, at which it was decided to abstain from taking action to implement the two convention resolutions.
The matter, therefore, was for the time being left in suspense.

In June a Provincial Election took place followed by a Federal election in August the same year of 1953. During these campaigns two groups of organizers were in the field—one employed by the B.C. Association and the other employed by the federal wing, which was still operating. There was no liaison between the two.

While the Leader of the Party and the Provincial organizers were encouraging the Constituency presidents to field candidates, the federal organizer(s) were discouraging the running of provincial candidates. An example of this is shown.

During the Provincial Election Campaign of 1953, Mr. John Fox, Federal Organizer, who said he was acting as a special representative for Mr. George Drew, called upon me at my place of business in Chilliwack and invited me to go to dinner with him. This I did. While having dinner, and in the presence of another person, he asked me if we were going to run a candidate in Chilliwack Provincial Constituency in the campaign.

I said we were going to run a candidate.

"Do you think you have a chance of winning?" he asked.

I said, regardless of whether we have or not, I believe we should run a candidate.

Mr. Fox then said he had just come from the New Westminster Constituency and they were not going to run a candidate.

He explained that if we would do the same as New Westminster, and not oppose the Social Credit Provincially, the Social Credit would support us Federally.

"You should consider that part of it," Fox said.

"J. P. ROBERTSON,"
Past President, Chilliwack Provincial Constituency, 1953.

Prior to the Provincial Election Campaign of June 10th, 1953, I received a phone call from a man who identified himself as John Fox, Conservative Federal Organizer for B.C.

After telling me who he was he asked me if my Constituency was going to run a Conservative candidate in the Provincial election coming up.

The Constituency organization had not yet nominated but I said "Yes", it was my intention to see that we did.

Fox then said, "There is no chance of you winning."

"We have decided to support the Social Credit Party Provincially and they are going to support us Federally, so it would be wise of you if you do not run anyone," he said.

(Fox did not say who the "we" referred to but I took it he meant the people in charge of Federal affairs in B.C.)

I "blew up" at his proposal and said, "as President of Chilliwack Provincial Constituency it is my duty to field a candidate."

It then occurred to me I should try to find out who was behind this plot to discourage the running of a Provincial Candidate in our area, so I invited Mr. Fox to come to see me.

My reaction to his scheme was so violent I think I must have scared him off because he never came to see me.

(Signed) DOUG. TAYLOR.
President, Chilliwack Provincial Constituency, 1953.
Past President Fraser Valley Federal Riding Ass'n.

The party fared badly in the Provincial election and while in the Federal election it returned the three sitting members, the total vote dropped from 128,620 in 1949 to 66,426 in 1953.

Following the elections, the Officers of the Association held a meeting on September 21st, 1953, and sent to the National Leader a new set of proposals, in line with the Convention resolutions which they felt, if put into force, would enable the rebuilding of the party.

NEW SET OF PROPOSALS BY B.C. ASSOCIATION

September 21st, 1953

"Dear George:

"On behalf of the Officers of the B.C. Association, I enclose herewith a copy of proposals agreed to by the officers in relation to the establishment of one office in British Columbia to conduct the affairs of the association. These proposals are submitted to you in the hope that they will meet with your assent and approval and that such assent and approval will be committed to the officers of the B.C. Association in time to present to the annual meeting which is being held on Saturday, October 10th next.

"The officers are of the opinion that if these proposals can be instituted there is no reason why the work of the association cannot progress in greater measure than it has done during the past number of years. The majority of the members of the association throughout British Columbia are indeed anxious and longing for one organization of Conservative people because they are of the opinion that it is only by such unity that our cause can be advanced."

"With kindest personal regards."

"Yours sincerely"

"TOM McDONALD."

PROPOSALS FOR OPERATION AND ORGANIZATION

In order that the affairs of this party in British Columbia may be carried on in accordance with its constitution and to assure a maximum of co-operation between the Provincial and Federal Leaders and between all Conservatives in the Province, the following recommendations are placed before — 14 —
the officers of the Association for their consideration. When accepted by the officers as presented or amended, it is the intention they should then be forwarded to Mr. Drew for his consideration—and finally placed before the Annual Meeting for its consideration and approval.

1. The elected Officers of the B.C. Progressive Conservative Association, hereafter referred to as the “Board” shall function as a Board of Management, as outlined in the Constitution, to conduct the affairs of the Conservative Party in British Columbia and shall be responsible to the membership of the Association and the Leaders Provincial and Federal.

2. The Board may make recommendations with respect to policy and the conduct of campaigns but these matters remain the prerogative of the Leaders in their respective spheres.

3. The Board shall hire and fire the staff employed by the association including the Field men but no Field man shall be employed or discharged without first being approved by Provincial and Federal Leaders. In the event that objection is raised to action recommended by the Board the Leader or Leaders shall state objection in writing and they shall have the power to veto. Field men shall be known as Progressive Conservative Party Field men and not designed as Provincial or Federal.

4. All Party activities shall be conducted from one office known as Party Headquarters in British Columbia.

5. Operational expenses shall be shared equally by National Headquarters and Party Headquarters in British Columbia. A budget shall be prepared for submission to both Leaders from year to year setting forth estimated operational expenses.

6. It is not the intention to limit the authority or privilege of the Leaders of this Party but rather to complement them in development of strong and active Constituency and Riding Associations for the purpose of assisting in the selection and election of candidates to the Legislature and to Parliament.

It is desirable to establish the closest liaison between the Party organization and the National Leader and National Headquarters in order that an effective and lasting organization may be built in British Columbia commencing from the date of the 1953 Annual Meeting.

Mr. Drew acknowledged the proposals, without comment, in a letter to the President dated October 1st, 1953.

DREW ACKNOWLEDGES PROPOSALS

October 1st, 1953

"Dear Tom:

"This will acknowledge your letter enclosing proposals discussed at a meeting of Officers of your Association. I am very glad to have this information and will look forward to having further reports of your activities preparatory to your meeting on October 10th.

"With warmest personal good wishes and great appreciation of all that you have done, believe me.

"Sincerely yours,

"GEORGE DREW."

The annual meeting of the party was set for October 10th. The Provincial Leader who had corresponded with the National Leader urging him to support the principles of the one party organization, received a letter dated October 6th, 1953, from the National Leader, which said, in part:

"I expressed my belief some time ago that the National and Provincial organizations should share equally the cost of maintaining the British Columbia Conservative Headquarters. I am most anxious that this be the arrangement and I assure you that it will be carried out so far as the National Organization is concerned."

"I am convinced that we are in entire agreement in principle and that there will be no difficulty about working out any of the details."

The annual meeting was advised by the Provincial Leader that Mr. Drew would co-operate and that a sound basis of organization would materialize. In the absence of any objection to any of the proposals or the presentation of any views by Mr. Drew, the officers of the Association continued their efforts to build a united party.

But in 1954, the federal office was still being maintained by the federal rump group. The National Organizer wired Mr. Drew's personal representative on the 21st of January, 1954, to carry out the National Leader's instructions.

NATIONAL ORGANIZER'S WIRE

1954, Jan. 21. P.M. 12:46

"Ottawa, Ont.

"A. L. Bewley/Bewley, Kidd and Chambers

"736 Granville St., Vancouver, B.C."

"Imperative all outstanding matters relating joint maintenance office for general purposes National and Provincial Organizations be finally settled forthwith—stop—Such settlement must be in full conformity with position stated Drew letter October Sixth to read to annual meeting from which position no departure can be tolerated—stop—All here greatly disturbed by misunderstandings which appear to be occurring and by suggestion that indirect means being adopted to circumvent clear purpose October Sixth letter—stop—Possibility further misunderstandings allegations impeaching integrity good faith Ottawa must be removed immediately—stop—Please send me detailed report soon as possible."

"R. A. BELL."

These instructions were not carried out.
At the Annual Meeting of the Conservative Party in Canada held in Ottawa on March 1954, in a final effort to find some way to unify the party, it was agreed among the delegates from British Columbia that a meeting should be held in Vancouver during the Easter Recess to try to get on a practical basis of organization, so long under discussion. This meeting was held on April 22nd, 1954, and was attended by Major-General Pearkes, Mr. Green, the Provincial Leader, Mr. Drew’s personal representative and other interested parties. It was preceded over by the President of the B.C. Association, Mr. Tom McDonald, Mr. Green and Mr. Drew’s personal representative showed no serious interest in the meeting. Mr. Green would not accept the views expressed in the National Leader’s letter of October 6th, 1953, and withdrew from the meeting. The meeting adjourned without accomplishing anything.

Two days later, on April 24th, at an Executive meeting of the association held in Victoria, a resolution was passed pointing out that the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Association could no longer tolerate the obstruction, interference and division that had been so long endured by the membership of the party, and with such harmful consequences. This resolution was sent to the National Leader.

EXECUTIVE RESOLUTION APRIL 24

“It has been brought to the attention of this Executive that it is proposed to divide the Province of British Columbia into three separate areas for the purpose of Federal organization, placing a Federal Member in charge of each area.

“This Executive is of the opinion that this move is merely a primary step toward dividing of the Conservative Association of British Columbia and the setting up of a separate Federal Organization, dominated as in the past by Howard Green, without any obligation or responsibility to the Conservative Association of British Columbia.

“Therefore be it resolved that the National Leader and National President be advised that the British Columbia Conservative Association absolutely opposes any attempted move of this nature and will not tolerate setting up of any unauthorized organization.

“And further, the B.C. Conservative Association will not tolerate any obstruction, deviation or interference with the association by any Federal Member.

“And further Mr. Howard Green has indicated to the Provincial Leader that he refuses to be bound by commitments of the Federal Leader to the Conservative Association of British Columbia and the Provincial Leader, in particular in reference to the National Leader’s Letter of October 6th, 1953, addressed to the Provincial Leader.

“And further be it resolved that this Executive demands that the Progressive Conservative National Headquarters in the Vancouver Block, Vancouver, B.C., be closed forthwith.”

On June 9th he wrote to the Provincial Leader. Copies of this personal letter to the leader of the party in British Columbia were mimeographed and distributed to the press by Mr. Drew’s personal representative.

The relevant parts in connection with Mr. Drew’s attitude towards the party in British Columbia, which had laboured and suffered so much in its desire to promote the party and also to help him, are as follows:

“The effort now being made to create the impression that there was an understanding that the National organization in British Columbia would be under the control of the Provincial Officers is without foundation of any kind and was never considered. If the handling of National organization, choosing of candidates and details of that kind were under provincial officials in every province we would have a completely Balkanized party.”

In this paragraph the National Leader denies the existence of a Conservative Party in British Columbia. Notwithstanding the fact that he agreed with the previous Leader and the present Leader to place federal affairs in British Columbia within the framework of the association, he reversed his expressed views in this paragraph referred to above. He totally ignores the wishes of a large convention and the resolutions that have been quoted. He denies the right of the membership to direct its own affairs and to criticize actions of any of the Conservative Members of Parliament.

In another paragraph from this letter of June 9th, 1954, he had this to say:

“We shall proceed to carry on the organization of the federal ridings in British Columbia with such assistance and office accommodation as we deem advisable for that purpose.”

The people of British Columbia were told in these two paragraphs the National Leader wished to continue
the abortive and disastrous organizing methods of the recent past. Even after the National Leader had taken this final stand, the Provincial President and Provincial Leader continued in their efforts to find some way of resolving the problem. They met the National President on June 22nd and sought his assistance. He said he could do nothing in view of the National Leader's stand.

After years of frustration, after failing in every means including the changing of leadership in the province and the changing of presidents; after promises of co-operation that were never kept, after dismemberment of the party and what appeared to be a deliberate effort to emasculate the party so it could no longer be a factor in provincial politics, the Executive decided upon drastic action. It moved a motion of no confidence in the National Leader on July 17th.

The National Leader proceeded with his plans to operate a separate federal group, responsible only to him. The appointment of an Executive Council, headed by Mr. Green, was announced and this continues to function until this day. It has no following of any account. Every Federal Riding in British Columbia that has voted upon the matter has refused to join the Council and still, therefore, remains a part of the Conservative Association of British Columbia.

Two months after the non-confidence motion was passed, Mr. Hees, visited the Province of British Columbia in his official capacity as National President and under the aegis of the new Federal Council. He saw first hand the impossible state of affairs then prevailing.

The President of the Party in British Columbia and the Provincial Leader met with Mr. Hees. As a result of this meeting all three agreed to bend their efforts towards restoring harmony. It was felt a joint statement for publication to this effect would brighten an otherwise gloomy picture. Here is the statement:

"Following a meeting between Mr. Deane Finlayson, the Leader of the Conservative Party in British Columbia, Mr. Thomas McDonald, the President of the Conservative Party in British Columbia, and Mr. George Hees, M.P., the National President of the Conservative Association of Canada, the following statement was prepared.

"We are agreed that for the welfare of the Conservative Party it is necessary to restore harmony within our ranks in British Columbia, and our joint efforts will be directed to that end."

Mr. Hees excused himself to make a phone call. On his return a few minutes later he informed the Provincial Leader he was compelled to disassociate himself from the joint statement which he had proposed should be issued. The statement, therefore, was not issued.

The members who have remained loyal to the Conservative Party of British Columbia believe there is a definite need for a means to express Conservative thought and opinion in this province. The only way that this can be done is through the maintenance of a strong, effective and united party organization. There is no question that there is a difference of opinion as to how such organization can be built and maintained. One opinion is, and this is the opinion of the National Leader and the rump group in British Columbia, that you simply need to appoint someone with full power and authority to act, or not act, as he pleases. In such a method as this there is no restraint, guidance or continuity. This is the method that the National Leader has attempted to force upon the membership in British Columbia, so far as the federal aspect is concerned.

The second opinion is the one held by the vast majority of the party members in British Columbia. This envisages a constitution for the orderly conduct of party affairs and provision of the means for continuity of purpose and effort. It permits order, in that provision is made for good management, proper direction and restraint.

Authority exists for only one system. Common sense indicates it is the only one that offers any hope of progress and success, and that is the one advocated by the British Columbia Association, and commended to the National Leader by General Pearkes when he was president of the Association.

Those who persist in ignoring the lessons contained in this Brief and seek for personal or other advantage—either real or imaginary—the continued division of the party, must accept the full responsibility for the final alienation from the party of the remaining loyal Conservatives. Such a result would have a detrimental
and perhaps a disastrous effect on Conservatism throughout Canada. The result of this will be complete destruction of the only body that can rightfully and properly mobilize Conservatism in thought and action.

All of this respectfully submitted by the Officers of the British Columbia Association.


The B.C. Conservative Association.

Secretary.
Mr. Deane D. Finlayson,

Dear Deane:

Your letter of May 27 unfortunately leaves me with no choice but to withdraw without reservation the proposal made to you in my letter of Oct 6, 1955, for the joint maintenance of an office for the general purposes of national and provincial organization. That proposal was based on a perfectly clear understanding between us as to the relationship between national and provincial activities, which you have now rejected.

The extraordinary resolution which accompanied your earlier letter of May 6 was so completely contrary to the assurances of co-operation which your letter contained, that I delayed my reply to that letter until I could make enquiries about what had happened at Victoria where the resolution was passed. I even went so far as to hope that, after further consideration, you might disassociate yourself from the inexcusable attack in that resolution on one of the most distinguished members of the House of Commons, whose long and distinguished public service commands respect in every part of Canada. Instead of expressing any disapproval of the resolution, your letter of May 27 indicates that you have, in fact, been giving it widespread distribution for reasons which are entirely beyond my understanding.

When you suggest that there is a lack of interest in our party in British Columbia, I must recall that, as soon as you were chosen provincial leader, I asked you to come to Ottawa to meet our federal members: establish contact with national headquarters, and discuss the basis on which we could establish the widest possible measure of co-operation. Provision was made for transportation and other expenses, not only in Ottawa but also in Toronto, where I arranged that you meet the Prime Minister of Ontario, some of the members of his cabinet, the president of the Ontario association and the representative of our national organization for the province.

That was for the purpose of letting you see how the national and provincial activities were carried on in complete co-operation.
You found that in Ontario, where our joint activities have met with a substantial measure of success for some years, the direction of national activities is entirely under national headquarters, while the direction of provincial activities is entirely under provincial headquarters. You found that the national and provincial offices, as well as the officials occupying them, worked in complete and effective harmony. You expressed yourself as being greatly impressed and entirely satisfied with that arrangement.

Until recently, there seemed to be no uncertainty about the acceptance of that very satisfactory arrangement in British Columbia. You were well aware that Colonel Cecil Merritt, V.C., and his assistant, Mr. Les. Bewley, represented me and the national organization. You expressed satisfaction with that arrangement.

The attempt to work out a satisfactory plan for the use of one office, to be available for both national and provincial activities, at no time implied the handing over of any measure of its responsibility by the national organization.

The effort now being made to create the impression that there was an understanding that national organization in British Columbia would be under the control of provincial officers, is without foundation of any kind and was never considered. If the handling of national organization, the choice of candidates, and details of that kind were under provincial officials in every province, we would have a completely Balkanized party.

The National Association would be a head with no body. It is neither within my power, nor the power any other national leader to withdraw the responsibility of the National Association over the federal ridings in any part of Canada.

I can only repeat what I explained to you personally. While I was leader of the party in Ontario and premier of that province, I never at any time sought, nor would I have accepted, responsibility for the direction of national activities in any riding in Ontario. Since I came to Ottawa, the situation has been exactly the same. Although Leslie Frost and I have been lifelong friends, were for years very close colleagues in the government of Ontario, and see each other frequently, he has at no time assumed any responsibility for provincial activities. Nevertheless, our co-operation has been close and effective, as you saw when you visited Ottawa and Toronto. I had hoped that was the kind of co-operation we were going to be able to establish in British Columbia.

Now may I refer to the objection raised to the proposal that our three federal members from British Columbia should survey the
province and make recommendations for an effective plan under which the organization of the federal ridings in British Columbia could be carried out. That proposal was discussed in Ottawa. You approved of it. In any event, I should think that every Conservative in British Columbia would welcome the fact that we have three extremely capable members, who have demonstrated their knowledge of successful campaigning by getting elected regularly and are ready to use their experience for the general advantage of our party at this time.

Any suggestion that they are not interested in the party in British Columbia, or that they are out of sympathy with the provincial association, is answered by their record. Howard Green, George Pearkes and David Fulton are all past-presidents of the British Columbia association. What better evidence could there be of their sympathy with and understanding of the activities of that association? Howard Green has been elected in five successive elections, George Pearkes in three, and David Fulton in three. That is a combination of experience of immense value to our party. Moreover, they represent three distinctly different areas, and, therefore, have special qualifications between the three of them to carry out a combined survey of the federal ridings in the province.

I do not know what has produced this new and utterly unreal interpretation of the relationship between national and provincial activities which was expressed in the resolution. As I already pointed out, you indicated your satisfaction with the situation in Ontario. You were equally clear on this point when I saw you at the meeting of the Alberta association in Edmonton in February.

Whatever the reason may be for the changed attitude, I can only express my very strong objection to the unwarranted imputation against the good faith of an outstanding Canadian, whose reputation in every part of the country should be a source of pride to the people of his own province. Howard Green commands the respect of every Member of the House of Commons, as I am sure he also does of the overwhelming majority of the people of British Columbia, who have followed for years his untiring efforts on behalf of his own province, as well as the constituency which has expressed its confidence in him for so many years.

We shall proceed to carry on the organization of the federal ridings in British Columbia with such assistance and office accommodation as we deem advisable for that purpose.

In carrying out our organizing activities, there will be no doubt about our position in regard to the Social Credit Party, any more than there will be in regard to the Liberal Party or the Socialist Party. In your presence, I have made my own position and the position of our party abundantly clear on that subject, at
public meetings and in press interviews on different occasions.

The course I now find it necessary to take indicates no lack of interest in your success, nor does it change in any way the relationship between the national and provincial associations. It simply recognizes the fact that nothing will be gained by further efforts to use one office for national and provincial activities in view of the position you have taken. We must proceed with our own organization. We hope that what we do will help you in building up the provincial organization. I wish you well and most earnestly hope for the successful outcome of your efforts.

Yours sincerely,

George Drew.
APPENDIX III

Survey form and letter used in questionnaire

Dear Sir or Madam:

I am conducting a study of the Progressive Conservative Party of British Columbia under the supervision of the Department of Economics and Political Science at the University of British Columbia.

The inquiry is aimed at throwing further light on the operation of political parties within the Canadian form of government.

Your name has been supplied by the Provincial Leader, Deane Finlayson, and the party staff assistant, Robert Anderson. They have been most helpful in the research thus far. If, within the next few days, you could possibly spare the few moments required, your assistance can also further this project.

There are several questions at the bottom of this letter. If you could mark the appropriate place and return this in the enclosed stamped envelope, I should be most grateful. Any comments you might care to make on the topic would be most welcome. Thank you for your assistance.

Yours truly,

E. R. Black

1. Are you active in the federal riding association in your area? YES NO (please circle one)
2. Do you hold a federal riding executive post? YES NO
3. Please estimate the proportion of your membership active in federal riding work ...%?
4. Are your provincial riding members automatically members of the federal riding association? .... If not, do any co-operative membership arrangements exist between the two groups. Please describe briefly.

5. Some people think that national and provincial Conservative spheres should be kept strictly separated to achieve greatest efficiency. Others think that all Conservative Party members should work for the party in both federal and provincial fields. Would you state your views briefly?
APPENDIX IV

B.C. Election Returns

Reliable figures showing the standings of each political party after elections in British Columbia are not available for the whole period studied, 1903 - 1958. Statistics given in the standard sources are especially unreliable, and often contradictory, for elections held during the first thirty years. This is due in part to the looser-drawn party lines of the period and to the occasional practice of members calling themselves independent for campaign purposes but giving their full support otherwise to one of the leading parties. The later practice by election returning officers to include in the official returns figures showing party voting has introduced more reliability into the records.

The figures presented in the tables following represent the investigator's best efforts at reconciling contradictory and incomplete figures found in these sources:

The Canadian Parliamentary Guide,
The Canadian Almanac,
The Canadian Annual Review,
The Canada Year Book,
The Vancouver daily newspapers, The Province and The Sun.

These abbreviations have been used: Conservative (CON), Liberal (LIB), Socialist (SOC), Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), Independent (IND), Social Credit (S.C.), Labor (LAB), Progressive (PROG), Reconstruction (RECON), and Total (TOT). Liberal and Conservative members are recorded simply as Coalition in B.C. in 1949.
## PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 1905 - 1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CON</th>
<th>LIB</th>
<th>SOC</th>
<th>CCF</th>
<th>IND</th>
<th>S.C.</th>
<th>LAB</th>
<th>TOT</th>
<th>LEADER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>McBride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>McBride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>McBride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>McBride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Bowser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Bowser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Bowser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Tolmie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1**</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Tolmie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Patterson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>12---21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Maitland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>11---26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Maitland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>---39---</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Anscomb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Anscomb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Finlayson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Finlayson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes three Provincial Party
** Tolmie Unionist
## Federal Party Representation for British Columbia 1904 - 1958

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CON</th>
<th>LIB</th>
<th>CCF</th>
<th>PROG</th>
<th>S.C.</th>
<th>IND</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SOURCES

BOOKS

Hugh A. Bone - American Politics and the Party System


G. W. Brown (ed.) - Canada - The United Nations Series
(Univ. Calif.) 1954.

D. W. Brogan - An Introduction to American Politics


H. McD. Cлокie - Canadian Government and Politics
(Longmans, Toronto) 1944

--------------- Canada Year Book 1957/58 (Queen's Printer)

J. A. Corry - Democratic Government and Politics
(Univ. Toronto), Second edit. 1951

Donald Creighton - Dominion of the North, (Macmillan, Toronto) 1957.

R. MacG. Dawson - The Government of Canada (Univ. Toronto)
Third edit. 1957.


J. H. Irving - The Social Credit Movement in Alberta
(Univ. Toronto) 1950.

V. O. Key, Jr. - Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups

A. R. M. Lower et. al. - Evolving Canadian Federalism,


A. R. M. Lower - Colony to Nation (Longmans Green, Toronto) 1946.
Edgar McInnis - Canada: A Political and Social History (Rinehart, New York) Eighth edit. 1958
Robert Michaels - Political Parties (Free Press-Glencoe, Ill.) 1958
James Morton - Honest John Oliver (Toronto) 1935.
Sigmund Neumann, ed. - Modern Political Parties (Univ. Chicago) 1956.
Austin Ranney and Willmore Kendall - Democracy and the American Party System (Harcourt Brace, New York) 1956
E. O. S. Scholefield and F. W. Howay - British Columbia: From the Earliest Time to the Present 1914.
E. O. S. Scholefield and R. E. Gosnell - British Columbia, Sixty Years of Progress 1913.
L. G. Thomas - The Liberal Party in Alberta (Univ. Toronto) 1959.
F. M. Watkins, J. R. Mallory, et. al. - Canadian Politics (Mount Allison Univ., Sackville, N.B.) 1959

MANUSCRIPTS
Bruce Ramsey - The P.C.E. Story In process of publication by Mitchell Press, Vancouver. April 1960

ARTICLES
The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science is referred to throughout as C.J.E.P.S.
H. F. Angus - "Note on the British Columbia Election in June 1952" The Western Political Quarterly, vol. 5 pp358-391
H. F. Angus - "The British Columbia Election of June 1952" C.J.E.P.S. xvi p318
J. Murray Beck - "The Party System in Nova Scotia"
C.J.E.P.S. xx 525

Robert Collins - "The Remarkable Rise of Smiling Cece Bennett"
Macleans lxviii 25

Edith Dobie - "Some Aspects of Party History in British Columbia 1871-1905" Pacific Historical Review i No. 2 235

Edith Dobie - "Party History in British Columbia 1905 - 1933" Pacific Northwest Quarterly xxvii 153

H. S. Ferns - "The New Course in Canadian Politics" Political Quarterly xxix 114

Eugene Forsey - "The British Columbia Election, A Comment"
C.J.E.P.S. xix 518

G. L. - "The Pattern of Canadian Politics" World Today x,172

K. A. MacKirdy - "Federalization of the Australian Cabinet 1903 - 1939" C.J.E.P.S. xxiii 216

K. A. MacKirdy - "Problems of Adjustment in Nation Building" C.J.E.P.S. xx 27

H. N. MacQuarrie - "The Formation of Borden's First Cabinet" C.J.E.P.S. xxiii 90

B. A. McKelvie - "British Columbia's New Premier"
Macleans October 1, 1928 10

S. Muller - "Massive Alternation in Canadian Politics" Foreign Affairs xxix 114

Herbert F. Quinn - "The Role of the Liberal Party in Recent Canadian Politics" Political Science Quarterly lxviii No. 3

M. A. Ormsby - "The United Farmers of British Columbia - An Abortive Third Party Movement" British Columbia Historical Quarterly xvii 53
Escott Reid - "The Rise of the National Party System in Canada"
Proceedings of the Canadian Political Science Association 1952

D. C. Rowat - "Recent Developments in Canadian Federalism"
C.J.E.P.S. xviii 1

W. N. Sage - "Federal Parties and Provincial Political Groups in British Columbia 1871-1905"
British Columbia Historical Quarterly, xii 151

F. R. Scott - "The Special Nature of Canadian Federalism"
C.J.E.P.S. xiii 13

D. V. Smiley - "The Two-Party System and One-Party Dominance in the Liberal-Democratic State"
C.J.E.P.S. xxiv 312

Brian R. D. Smith - "Sir Richard McBride" Conservative Concepts
(University of B.C.) 1959

F. H. Underhill - "The Canadian Party System in Transition"
C.J.E.P.S. ix 500

PERIODICALS

The Vancouver Province (daily newspaper)
The Vancouver Sun (daily newspaper)
The Vancouver News-Advertiser (defunct daily newspaper)
The Canadian Annual Review annual volumes 1905 - 1958

INTERVIEWS

Far too many persons have been of assistance that their help can be adequately acknowledged. Some devoted hours and some only a few minutes to answering the investigator's questions. The following, however, have been especially helpful: