

THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION OF CYPRUS

1925-60

by

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## ABSTRACT

Cyprus, a small island in the eastern Mediterranean which, since the beginning of recorded history, had always been dominated by a foreign power, obtained its independence in August, 1960. At that time it ceased to be a part of the British Empire and became a member of the Commonwealth. Great Britain, the last power to control the island, obtained it in 1878, as a base from which to check Russian expansion into the Near East. From 1878 until 1914 the island was held on a temporary basis from Turkey. After that date, when the two powers became involved as enemies at war, Britain annexed the island. In 1925, Cyprus became a Crown Colony.

During the period of British administration many changes in all aspects of Cypriot life occurred. Economic and social progress until after the Second War was slow but continuous. The greatest changes were to be found in the areas of public works and communications, water development, agriculture and the elimination of rural indebtedness, forestry, trade and commerce, education, health, and government administration and finance. From 1946 until 1959, Cyprus, like other British colonies, benefited from the Colonial Development Programmes and other plans, during which time large sums of money were expended to accelerate the island's economic and social advancement. By 1959 the standards of economic and social life in Cyprus were comparable to, if not better than, any in that area of the world.

A most important force which operated throughout the whole period was Enosis, the desire of the Greek Cypriots to join with Greece. Requests and manifestations for Enosis occurred continually during the British administration. The leaders were the ecclesiasts of the Orthodox Church who assumed social and political, as well as religious authority and leadership. The first violent manifestation against British rule occurred in 1931. No further outbreaks occurred until 1956, from which time violence continued incessantly until the final truce. During the last four years of the period the organization known as EOKA, organized and directed by Archbishop Makarios and Colonel Grivas, conducted a campaign of resistance and terrorism against all aspects of British rule, in an attempt to obtain Enosis. The result was four years of communal strife and civil chaos.

The Turkish inhabitants, who formed almost twenty percent of the island's population, opposed every attempt on the part of the Greeks to achieve Enosis. The Turkish Cypriot policy hardened into one of adamant resistance, stating that Britain must either maintain the status quo or return the island to Turkey.

Cyprus was governed under a Constitution promulgated in 1882, which was withdrawn in 1931 due to the outbreak of violence, and then replaced by the autocratic rule of the Governor and his Council. The Constitution was resented by many because of its very limited nature. The lack of any real political responsibility for the Cypriots was another reason for their dissatisfaction with the British regime. From 1946 until 1959 constitutional offers and counter offers were put forth by the British and the Cypriots in an attempt to arrive at a solution. None of these offers was able to provide a compromise solution which would be satisfactory to the British, Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks. The British emphasized the strategic necessity of maintaining Cyprus; the Greeks and Greek Cypriots the desire for self-determination, as expressed constantly through the United Nations; and the Turks the necessity either to maintain the status quo, or to partition the island.

It seems evident that only the prospect of continued violence and stalemate led all the powers concerned to come together at the end of 1958 and the beginning of 1959 and work out a compromise solution which became the basis of the Constitution. In viewing the many conflicting factors involved, it seems that the only possible type of agreement was one based on compromise.

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## CHAPTER 1

### BRITISH CYPRUS BEFORE 1925

Since the British occupation, Cyprus has displayed many of the elements which have played such a vital role in twentieth century history. The problems of racial and religious conflict, imperialism, nationalism, and revolution have been an integral part of Cypriot development, just as they are an integral part of the development of many larger and more important states.

Foreign domination, and often oppression, has always been a characteristic of Cypriot history. Egypt, Persia, Assyria, Rome, Byzantium, Genoa, Venice, Turkey, and Britain have each in turn ruled this eastern Mediterranean island. British control, which began in 1878, was the result of many factors. The development of Russian influence in the Near and Middle East, the

opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the protection of the route to India, and a post from which to supervise the reform of the Ottoman Empire, made a British place d'armes in the eastern Mediterranean seem necessary.

By 1878 a post closer to the Near East than Malta seemed essential because of the need for a coaling and refitting station, and to guard the route to India if the Ottoman Empire were threatened with dismemberment.

Colonel Robert Home, who was sent to the Near East in November 1876 to locate a suitable area for a place d'armes, considered Cyprus to have many advantages.

He considered it to be a suitable region in size, material resources, and population, for an experiment in reformed government, as a place easily defended by a small garrison, and as a base to defend the approaches to Mesopotamia and the Suez.<sup>1</sup>

The official view, as expressed by Bourke, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was that Famagusta could become one of the finest harbours in the world.<sup>2</sup>

Lord Beaconsfield was satisfied that the island was "the key to Western Asia".<sup>3</sup> By the end of 1877 all the elements of the policy which accompanied the acquisition of Cyprus had been introduced into British political thought: the

desire for a commanding position in the eastern Mediterranean with a naval base to guard the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal; the reform of Turkey; and the realization of the important position of Asia Minor in relation to the route to India.

The Russian campaign against the Ottoman Empire, launched in April, 1877, was soon successful and by January 1878 the Russian army had advanced to the gates of Constantinople. The war was brought to an end by the Treaty of San Stefano, which was signed on March 3, 1878. It set up the state of Greater Bulgaria, and gave Russia the Turkish possessions of Kars, Ardahan and Batoum, thus making the Black Sea virtually a Russian Lake. After this treaty, the necessity for British action in establishing a Near Eastern policy became imperative. Some time between April 18 and May 10, 1878, as the result of political, military, naval, and commercial considerations, Cyprus was chosen by the British Cabinet as the desirable place d'armes. In a letter of May 15, 1878, A. H. Layard, the British ambassador in Constantinople, gave Lord Salisbury his views on what should be the British programme. He proposed the Balkans as a frontier for Turkey in Europe;

an alliance between Turkey and Greece; and an administration under European supervision which would ensure just and equal government to all the populations under Turkish rule in Europe. He also advocated an alliance with Turkey which would enable her to defend her Asiatic possessions against Russia on condition that Britain be allowed some direct control over their administration, without in any way touching the absolute sovereignty of the Sultan. Finally, he recommended the acquisition of a port in the Levant which would give England a direct material interest in the maintenance of the Turkish dominion in Asia, and would enable her to exercise the necessary influence and control over the reform of Turkish rule.<sup>4</sup> But a substantial portion of public opinion in Britain was aptly expressed in a speech to the House of Commons by Mr. Fawcett, who criticized the Government's policy. He declared that "the whole history of the Ottoman Empire since it had been admitted into the European Concert by the Treaty of Paris in 1856, showed that the Porte was powerless to guarantee the execution of reforms in its provinces by Turkish officials, who accepted them with reluctance and neglected them with impunity".<sup>5</sup>

On May 25, Layard proposed the Cyprus Convention to the Sultan. His plan included most of his earlier recommendations to Lord Salisbury. After a great deal of vacillation on the part of the Sultan, and continuous pressure applied by the British ambassador, the Convention was secretly concluded on June 4, 1878.<sup>6</sup> One article of the Convention provided that if Russia retained Batoum, Ardahan, or Kars, or if at any future time any attempt were made by Russia to take possession of any further Asiatic possessions of the Sultan, Britain would join the Sultan in defending this territory. In return, the Sultan promised to introduce at a future date reforms into the government for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories. In order to enable Britain to make the necessary provisions for the execution of her engagements, the Sultan further consented to assign the island of Cyprus, to be occupied and administered by Britain.<sup>7</sup> In Britain and Europe this was considered to be a great coup on the part of the British Government.

On July 1, 1878, an Annex<sup>8</sup> to the preceding Convention was agreed upon and signed by Layard, the British Ambassador, and Safvet Pasha, the Turkish Minister for

Foreign Affairs. It clarified several details of the alliance relating to Britain's occupation and administration of Cyprus. A Moslem religious tribunal, named by the Pious Foundation in Turkey, would continue to exist on the island, and would superintend, in conjunction with a delegate appointed by the British authorities, the administration of the property, funds, and lands belonging to the mosques, cemeteries, Moslem schools, and other religious establishments in Cyprus. Britain would pay to the Porte the excess of revenue over expenditure on the island, to be calculated upon the average of the previous five years, excluding the produce of the State and Crown lands let or sold during that period. The Porte might freely sell and lease lands and other property in Cyprus belonging to the Ottoman Crown and State. The British Government, through competent authorities, might purchase compulsorily, at a fair price, land required for public improvements or other public purposes. And finally, if Russia restored to Turkey Kars and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the previous war, Cyprus would be evacuated by Britain, and the Convention would come to an end.

Cyprus was occupied in the early part of July, 1878,

without any serious incidents and with no resistance. The Turks accepted the change without any disaffection and the Greeks welcomed the British. Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived on July 22, and swore himself in as High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief. He was to exercise all the authority and functions previously exercised in Cyprus by the Turkish officials. In a proclamation he assured the people of the Queen's wishes for the prosperity of the island, and development of commerce and agriculture, and the promotion of liberty, justice and security. There was no mention of a constitution.<sup>9</sup>

However the occupation of Cyprus on July 12, and the signing of the Treaty of Berlin on the next day, was the beginning of increased anxiety and responsibility for Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury. They had to face vexatious problems involved in the application of the policy, including disgruntled supporters and critical opposition at home, irritation among the friendly powers, and a bad humoured Russia. On July 18, in the House of Lords, Beaconsfield, in defending his coup declared:

We do not, my Lords, wish to enter into any unnecessary responsibility; but there is one responsibility from which we certainly shrink; we shrink from the responsibility of handing to our successors a diminished or weakened Empire . . . In taking Cyprus the movement is not Mediterranean;

it is Indian. We have taken a step there which we think necessary for the maintenance of our Empire and for its preservation in peace. If that be our first consideration the next is the development of the country.<sup>10</sup>

Beaconsfield here was defending the acquisition of Cyprus on broad and far-reaching imperialistic grounds, considering it a necessary link in holding the Empire together. This view was not shared by everyone in Britain. John Morley, commenting on the parliamentary debates in the Fortnightly Review, declared Cyprus to be:

An island, two hundred miles long, ravaged by famine, a nest of malaria, with a fatal fever of which it enjoys a monopoly, without harbours, and possessed of a growing population of lepers, (and) . . . held by Englishmen an adequate consideration for an obligation to spend scores or hundreds of millions in defending an Empire which either cannot or will not defend itself.<sup>11</sup>

This attitude fails to consider the contemporary argument whether Britain was to be one of many small European powers or a great imperial power. It does not take into account the importance of connecting links between Great Britain and her Eastern Empire, particularly at a time when imperialism was being revived, when the tendency was toward large territorial states, and when other nations were occupying vast portions of the world, in the hope of carving out rival Empires. Consolidation or power rather than decentral-

ization was the policy of the time. Lord Salisbury displayed a more realistic attitude when he declared in 1879:

Men are much more readily persuaded by acts than by words, and therefore we occupied the Island of Cyprus to show our intention of maintaining our hold on those parts . . . . When the interest of Europe was centered in the conflicts that were being waged in Italy, England occupied Malta; and now that there is a chance that the interest of Europe will be centered in Asia Minor or in Egypt, England has occupied Cyprus.<sup>12</sup>

The years 1878 to 1880 were a transition period in Cyprus when the basis of British policy was established. During this time Cyprus was under the Foreign Office, but in 1880 it was transferred to the Colonial Office, and was neglected. It was occupied for strategic purposes, as a place d'armes, rather than as a mere coaling station, but it failed in this respect. According to a leading authority on Cypriot history, this failure was partly the result of Gladstone's colonial policy, which made him reluctant to take any steps to develop the economic and strategic potentialities of the new acquisition.<sup>13</sup> In addition, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 provided a good base in the Levant; and the uncertainty of tenure on which Cyprus was held discouraged private and government enterprise from showing

much interest in territory not legally British.

When the British occupied Cyprus in 1878 they found the island to be in an impoverished condition. The majority of the inhabitants were destitute. A contemporary declared the "case is a dead one; we could not have taken in hand an unhealthier limb of the sick man . . . ." <sup>14</sup> There were no roads, the harbours were silted up, the peasants were apathetic, trade and commerce were undeveloped, and a general state of paralysis existed. By 1880 it was apparent that Britain had abandoned all idea of Cyprus as a fortress commanding the eastern Mediterranean, and the island was governed with relative neglect.

Unlike most crown colonies, Cyprus enjoyed limited participation in its government throughout a great part of the British occupation. In September, 1878, a Legislative Council was set up consisting of the High Commissioner and not less than four or more than eight other members, one-half official and one-half nonofficial. Provision was also made for the establishment of an Executive Council. The Cypriots, however, in a memorial addressed to Wolseley, asked for a Representative Assembly. The British Government decided that modifi-

cation of the Constitution was desirable, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a despatch to the High Commissioner, on March 10, 1882, laid down the lines of the Constitution, and the functions of the new Legislative Council. The Council was to consist of eighteen members, twelve elected and six official, presided over by the High Commissioner. The principle of communal representation was established for the elected members, with nine members always being Christian and three always being Moslem. These members were elected by all males over twenty-one who paid taxes. Ultimate power to legislate, nevertheless, was reserved to the Crown.

Charges on revenue were reserved in respect to the amount of the Tribute, an annual payment made to the Turkish Government based on the excess revenue of the island; the salaries of the six official members; and the salaries of the judges and the expenses of the courts. Since Cyprus was not part of the Queen's possessions but was administered by Her Majesty under a treaty with the Sultan, which was terminable, it was claimed to be impossible for the Queen to surrender any of the governmental control, as this authority was not

hers to surrender. This legal technicality limited considerably the degree of power to which a Legislative Assembly might aspire. Britain used this technicality as an excuse for keeping the Legislature in a subordinate position.

The British more and more regarded this Legislative Council as a board of advisers where views could be expressed, but not necessarily acted upon. On the other hand the Greeks thought of it as their parliament. This difference of opinion proved to be irreconcilable. The Turks, previously the rulers, were at first displeased with their representation of three while the Greeks had nine members. But it soon became apparent that the six official members and the three Turks could, with the casting vote of the High Commissioner, thwart any attempt on the part of the Greek members to forward legislation. This Legislative Council was to prove itself to be the cause of racial and religious antipathy and division rather than an instrument to bring the people of the island together in harmonious cooperation. A contemporary writer declared, " . . . the true function of a Legislative Assembly of this sort, which possesses little real power, is to make itself as disagreeable as possible

to those in authority over it".<sup>15</sup> The Greek members complained and petitioned constantly for more privileges. In 1889 a Greek deputation asked for two native members to be on the Executive Council. By 1894 it was decided that the Executive Council should have an advisory body composed of Cypriots, and this system was established by an Order-in-Council in 1897 which empowered the High Commissioner to name three inhabitants of the island as additional members to be summoned when he wished their advice.

The elected members of the Assembly presented an ambitious plan for the revision of the Legislative Council to Winston Churchill, when he visited the island in 1907 as Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Greek members asked for the Legislative Council to consist exclusively of elected members, in proportion to population. Churchill said that he saw no way in which the existing system could be changed, and added that he could not see that the wishes of the representatives of the people had suffered from insufficiency of expression or failure to shape or control legislation. When the members complained that they had no power to initiate expenditure, Churchill pointed out that such

powers did not belong to private members in the House of Commons in Britain, but as in all parliaments, belonged to the Executive.<sup>16</sup> In 1911 even more extravagant demands were made for the revision of the Legislative Council. There was a demand that elected members have sole control of finance, that official members have no part in legislation, that all administrative and judicial positions be filled by Cypriots, and that there be proportional representation of Greeks and Turks. These demands were dismissed by the Colonial Secretary, Sir Hamilton Goold-Adams, on January 10, 1912.<sup>17</sup> Later that year a deputation asked for an increase in the number of the Greek members and the exclusion of the official members from voting. The British refused on the grounds that there would not be enough safeguards to protect the rights of the Turkish minority. The British Government did offer to increase both the Greek representation and the official representation by two in 1914. But the Greeks, realizing that this would give them no advantage, refused the offer.

With the outbreak of war in 1914, Britain and Turkey were on opposite sides, and the former annexed Cyprus at that time. No constitutional change occurred

in the island's government, and the Greek members continued to press for wider political powers. However in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 between Britain and France, Britain agreed not to open negotiations with any power for the concession or alienation of Cyprus without previous consent of the French Government. This complicated the issue even further, having the effect of making any change dependent upon yet another factor. In 1920 the Greek members resigned in a body from the Legislative Council, and in 1921 and 1922 the National Assembly, a group formed to achieve wider Cypriot rights, boycotted the elections as a form of protest.

The annexation was officially recognized by the Turkish Republic in 1923 in article twenty of the Treaty of Lausanne, whereby Turkey renounced all claims or rights to Cyprus.<sup>18</sup> In 1925 when Cyprus became a Crown Colony, the Legislative Council was exactly the same as that set up in 1882. No changes had occurred as a result of the continuous pressure of the Greeks. The idea of a Legislative Assembly with no real power had proved itself to be quite unsatisfactory, particularly when it appeared clear that there were no plans for political advancement by an evolutionary process. By 1925 it was obvious that

the Legislative Council could not be made to work. Instead the system had done more harm than good, breeding political dissatisfaction and racial and religious antipathy. Any spirit of harmony and cooperation was entirely lacking in the Cypriot Government during the entire period.

Closely linked with the political dissatisfaction was the economic impoverishment which was partly the result of the exaction of the Tribute. It was stated in the Cyprus Convention that the Porte would suffer no financial loss when Cyprus was transferred to Britain, and a sum calculated on the revenue for the five years previous to 1878 was arrived at. In 1882 the sum of £92,800, was agreed upon as the annual payment to the Porte. A total of £87,800 was the fixed payment for occupation, and an additional £5,000 was added to this amount under an agreement of February 3, 1879, whereby the Sultan gave up all property and revenue rights reserved to the Ottoman Crown and Government. This payment was not intended to go on indefinitely, but covered amortization. It has been calculated that the Tribute was equivalent to an impost of almost ten shillings a head on every man woman and child in Cyprus.<sup>19</sup>

This annual exaction was called the Tribute till the Annexation in 1914, after which time it was termed the Turkish Debt Charge.

Turkey never received any of this Tribute, as it was applied to the payment of a debt owing to the British Treasury by Turkey since the Crimean War. The British and French Governments had guaranteed the interest on this loan, on which the Porte ceased payment in 1877. It was pertinently asked in Cyprus why the island should be forced to make this contribution in view of the object to which it was devoted. The difference between the amount of the Tribute and the interest on the Turkish loan came to a little over £11,000. This sum was indignantly refused by Turkey, and the British Government put it into a sinking fund.

Agitation against the Tribute by the Greek Cypriots was continuous and the same arguments were repeated at every stage. Cyprus had never paid tribute to Turkey; Turkey had merely taken the surplus of revenue. In 1892 the Legislative Council unanimously passed a resolution declaring that the whole Tribute should be paid by the British Exchequer so that there might be a surplus to be spent on public works, education, and the relief of

taxation. Winston Churchill, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a memorandum written after his visit to Cyprus in 1907, declared:

We have no right whatever, except by force majeure, to take a penny of the Cyprus tribute to relieve us from our just obligations, however unfortunately contracted. There is scarcely any spectacle more detestable than the oppression of a small community by a great power for the purpose of pecuniary profit; and that is in fact, the spectacle which our own financial treatment of Cyprus at this moment indisputably presents. It is in my opinion quite unworthy of Great Britain and altogether out of accordance with the whole principle of our colonial policy in every other part of the world.<sup>20</sup>

After 1907 a fixed Grant-in-Aid of £50,000 annually was made to Cyprus, and this meant that the island was now paying only £42,800 in tribute. In 1912 the Greek members demanded the abolition of this sum, but their request was ignored, and the Tribute was exacted until 1927. Little wonder that a Cypriot historian should declare that for forty-eight years "the Cypriot taxpayer was paying for what was purely imperial responsibility".<sup>21</sup> When Britain took over Cyprus her task, as stated in the programme advocated by Layard, was to give enlightened and beneficial government, and to raise the people from their destitution.<sup>22</sup> In taking over the responsibility of Cyprus Britain should also have taken over the responsibility of the Tribute. Britain's policy is even more

to be condemned when it is realized that none of the money went to the Porte, but to Britain and France. The Tribute was certainly one of the causes for the long period of stagnation on the island from 1880 to 1907, and continuing to a lesser degree even after this date.

The new administration at first did little to alleviate or lighten the taxpayer's load. The reform of the taxation system was slow and difficult. The taxes levied by the Turks—tithes on farm produce, property and trade tax, sheep and goat tax, customs dues, excise tax on tobacco and alcohol, salt monopoly, fee for military exemption, and miscellaneous taxes—were retained. The British reformed, modernized, and made more equitable the existing tax structure. Tax farming was abolished and permanent tax collectors were employed. Instead of using different collectors for the several kinds of tax, as the Turks had done, they were all collected by the one collector. The only new tax instituted was the locust tax, in 1881, and it was continued long after it had served its purpose. The result was that although taxation remained heavy, the method used in collecting the taxes was efficient, and a much larger amount of money was available for improvements, than there had been under the previous administration.

Although slow, there was a certain amount of progress on the island. In March, 1879 a high court of justice was established, consisting of the High Commissioner, a judicial commissioner, two deputy commissioners, and three judges. The court used English law, and it functioned pending the organization of the whole judicial system of the island. It was invested with full powers in all civil and criminal cases, and excluded only cases concerning Moslem Sacred Law.

In the field of education a considerable change can be noted between 1878 and 1925. Under the Turks, a minimum amount was spent by the Government on the Moslem schools, and nothing on the Greek. In 1878 there were about 7,000 pupils attending one hundred and forty schools: seventy-six Christian and sixty-four Moslem. Josiah Spencer, an Anglican clergyman who was placed in charge of education in 1880, established a school system where the authority was left in the hands of the villagers, but where modern methods of management and instruction were established. Two separate educational systems, Christian and Moslem, were retained. A teacher training college was set up at this time. By 1881 £3,672 was being spent annually on education. In 1913 there were 33,000 pupils, and 586 schools, with an educational bill

of £24,000, and these figures had jumped to 47,430 pupils and 820 schools at a cost of £90,560 by 1924.<sup>23</sup>

Lord Salisbury had had great plans for the development of Cyprus during the two years it was under the control of the Foreign Office, but unfortunately for the island it was transferred to the Colonial Office in 1880, and little was done. It rejected any plans for a harbour, or for the development of roads, and it was not until after the fixed Grant-in-Aid was established in 1907 that progress began. In 1878, Garnet Wolseley expressed an optimistic view:

However, suffice it to say that Cyprus is going to be a great success; I shall have a surplus this year, after what I have spent on roads, and paying the Turks in full for the surplus revenue they are entitled to under the annexe to the convention of the 4th June last. Next year I hope to embark upon some important public works. Laugh at anyone who tells you Cyprus is not going to be a complete success.<sup>24</sup>

Unfortunately these views did not mark the beginning of an era of progress in Cyprus. Eventually in 1899 Cyprus received a loan of £254,000 for improvements. In 1900 it was established that each villager work six days a year on the roads. A railroad was begun in 1903 and by 1905 it ran from Nicosia to Famagusta, operating for years at a loss. The roads had increased from twenty-

six miles in 1878 to over eight hundred miles of main roads by 1924, most of which were constructed after 1908.

Agriculture was in a pathetic state at the time of the occupation, and it remained so for some time, as no direct aid was given in the early years. After 1900 the Government encouraged agriculture, and in 1903 a Board of Agriculture was formed. Improvements in farming methods, and in equipment, such as a light iron plough, were introduced. In 1907 the High Commissioner, Sir Charles King-Harman, established banks for loans. Tobacco and carobs became the main export crops, and Egypt was Cyprus's best customer. The forests by 1878 were completely desiccated, and there were attempts throughout the period for reforestation. In 1913 measures were taken to limit the number of goats since these animals were so harmful to forest growth.

The population of the island from the time of the occupation to the time when it became a Crown Colony rose from 185,000 to 326,000. In 1924 public health was good, particularly when contrasted with all the neighbouring countries in the Levant and the Near East. Cyprus was entirely free from the plague, typhus, and other virulent diseases, and vigorous anti-malaria

campaigns were conducted. There were two government-maintained hospitals at Nicosia and Limassol and four government-aided hospitals at other towns, sixteen rural dispensaries, and eight branch dispensaries, a lunatic asylum, and a leper farm.<sup>25</sup>

Little of the island's progress was made during the early years of the occupation. In fact during the first thirty years hardly any economic advancement whatever was to be found. A writer in 1888 noted that in the field of agriculture, viniculture, reforestation, road building, the construction of a harbour, and other public works, very little had been done for the island. He noted progress in the field of law and justice, the police force, sanitation and medicine, and the destruction of the locusts. He felt that in overall effect, however, British rule had done little for Cyprus.<sup>26</sup> In 1915 another writer noted advancement in justice, prisons, and to a certain extent public works, but he concluded that the Tribute had taken the capital which was necessary for agriculture, forestation, roads, harbours, waterworks, and other improvements.<sup>27</sup> This writer does not present an accurate impression of the development under the British occupation because he does not show improvement in comparison with

the position of the island in 1878. Actually development in agriculture and public works was quite considerable by 1915.

By 1925, the improvements made, although late in beginning, were far-reaching. In the field of justice, there was a good judiciary, liberal laws, good police, and improvements in prisons. Trade had been increased many times. Educational progress had been great. With the extensive building of roads, a railroad, and the establishment of a postal service, communications had been greatly improved. Agricultural progress—in the form of irrigation works, a certain amount of reforestation, destruction of locusts and blights, new agricultural methods and machinery, loan funds and an agricultural bank—was carried forth. Progress in the field of medicine and sanitation was important. But the fact that most of this development was slow in taking place, and that the Tribute had been exacted for so long, tended to make the Cypriot antagonistic and dissatisfied.

On the political side one of the most important factors in the history of Cyprus during this period was the development of Enosis, the desire for union with

Greece. As a national aspiration, it antedated British occupation, appearing with the creation of the modern Greek state, but it became a direct political issue only with the coming of the British rule, when its potential realization became at least possible. The leaders of the movement had always been the high dignitaries of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus who, under Ottoman occupation, became the natural leaders of their people. The movement was given impetus with the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1863. The Greek Cypriots were delighted with the British occupation of 1878 for they looked on it as the first step in their cession to Greece.

Archbishop Sophronios included in his welcome, the statement: "We accept the change of government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece with which it is naturally connected".<sup>28</sup>

The Greek Cypriots thought of themselves as Greeks. Their schools were allowed to follow the Greek curriculum and use Greek textbooks. Cyprus was shown on Greek Cypriot maps as part of unredeemed Greece. Portraits of the Greek monarchs and statesmen and Greek heroes decorated the walls. The glories of Greek history rather

than the achievements of the British nation were made familiar to the pupils, and they were taught that Greece was the mother country. The Greek flag was always used. No attempt was made on the part of the British to discourage the movement. Demonstrations in favour of union were never interfered with and freedom of speech and the press were very extensive before the outbreaks of 1931.

One of the characteristics of Enosis was the persistence of the movement. There was constant repetition of the same cry. In 1880 and 1897, during the Greek wars with Turkey, the Greek Cypriots aided the Greeks, and went as volunteers in the Greek army. In 1881 they exploited a baseless rumour that Cyprus had been offered to Greece with telegrams to Gladstone. The Queen's Jubilee of 1887 was boycotted by the Cypriots; instead they asked for union with Greece. In the spring of 1895 there was an outburst of feeling for Enosis, at which time a Memorial was sent to Britain containing the request. The news that Crete was under a Greek High Commissioner by the end of 1898 caused much emotion in Cyprus, and in 1899 there was another outburst for Enosis. When in 1902 Joseph Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons that cession

of Cyprus to Greece would not meet with approval of the people who, he claimed, preferred to live under a rich power than a poor one, a veritable deluge of protests was brought forth from every corner of the island. On the accession of Edward VII, the Greek Cypriots telegraphed their best wishes to the king, and the message included their desire for union with mother Greece. In 1907 Churchill admitted the Greekness of the Cypriots, but also spoke of the island as part of the Ottoman Empire. In December, 1911, the Greek members of the Legislature asked for union with Greece, and when their requests were curtly refused, they resigned in a body in April 1912. During the Greek war against Turkey during October 1912, hundreds of Cypriots went to the aid of Greece.

When on the November 5, 1914, Cyprus was annexed by Great Britain, the Greek Cypriots again protested and asked for the island to be handed at once to Greece. On October 16, 1916, Sir Edward Grey instructed Sir Francis Elliot, the British minister in Athens, to offer Cyprus to Greece if she would come into the war on the allied side. Premier Zaimis of Greece refused the offer, as he was adamant in his neutrality. To the Greek

Cypriots this was tantamount to Britain's recognition to their claims. The Cypriots expected union with Greece after the war. In 1919 the Greek premier, Venizelos, received promises from Britain that when the Balkan question was finally settled, Cyprus would become part of Greece.<sup>29</sup> This offer was another admission of the claims of the Greek Cypriots. At the time of the offer, the Turkish Cypriot population opposed all proposed changes in the island's status. A memorial from the Moslem members of the Legislative Council was sent to London protesting against the Greek Cypriot agitation and praying for the continuance of British rule.

Memorials and protests from the Moslems in London as well as Cyprus, continued through the spring and summer of 1919. Their opposition to the transfer of the island to Greece was continual. The uneasiness among the Moslems at this time led to the formation of a party advocating the return of the island to Turkey.

The centenary of Greek Independence was celebrated in 1921, and it brought renewed outbursts in favour of Enosis in Cyprus. In this year an organization known as the National Assembly was organized with the object of bringing about Enosis. By December 1921 the National

Assembly had made plans for the political organization of Cyprus, with the purpose being to pursue the liberation of the island based on non cooperation with the government. This boycott existed till 1923.

Throughout the first fifty years of British occupation, the movement for Enosis continually grew. Concurrent with this was the development of a spirit of resistance among the Turkish Cypriots. The High Commissioner, King-Harman, stated in 1907 that the protests and agitation for union were rarely heard outside the principal towns. Whether this opinion is entirely correct is uncertain, but the general desire among Greek-speaking Cypriots for union was quite widespread by the time the island became a crown colony in 1925. The movement was a justifiable one in that it attempted to expel a foreign dominating power, and to exercise the right of self-determination. This movement did not consider the Turkish minority, which certainly complicated the situation.

In summary, during the period from 1878 to 1925 the British policy was established, and the Cypriot attitude to it became clear. Although there was social and economic progress during these early years, it was

slow in beginning, and it failed to satisfy the expectations of the people. The system of government also proved to be unsatisfactory, as it gave the people little opportunity to control their affairs, and left them dissatisfied. The system also tended to emphasize the division between the Greeks and the Turks. The Turkish Cypriot reaction to Enosis developed into a policy of unyielding resistance. The Turks, as might be expected, opposed every attempt made on the part of the Greeks to achieve this aim, and they always enunciated the desirability of maintaining the status quo. This minority group which formed one-fifth of the population believed that the only way it could maintain its rights was by opposing any change in the island's status, with the exception of the island's return to Turkey. Another difficulty was the fact that the exaction of the Tribute through all these years naturally embittered the people against the British rule. All of these factors tended to increase the Greek Cypriot desire for Enosis, and the movement grew steadily throughout the period. Britain remained adamant on this issue, and refused the Greek Cypriot demands on every occasion. The Greek Cypriots expected that Britain would concede the request for

Enosis, and hand the island over to Greece after the First World War, since by this time Cyprus was no longer part of the Ottoman Empire. The rights of the Moslem minority, they claimed, could be protected by entrenched clauses placed in the transfer. This was not done, and Britain retained the island against the opposition of the Greek Cypriots for another thirty-five years. It was apparent even at this time that a solution to the Cyprus problem would not be a simple matter, and that a solution satisfactory to all was almost an impossibility. Because of the sizeable Turkish minority, the policy of self-determination was fraught with danger, as it would almost certainly result in the island's becoming part of Greece. On the other hand the return of the island to Turkey was also out of the question. These factors certainly influenced the fact that Britain, instead of allowing the island to decide its own fate after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, converted Cyprus into a Crown Colony and retained it for another thirty-five years.

### FOOTNOTES

1. Dwight E. Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1934, pp. 77-9.
2. 244 H. C. Deb. 4s, Mar. 24, 1879, col. 1535.
3. Lord Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria, May 5, 1878, Letter quoted by W. F. Monypenny and G. E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, London, John Murray, 1920, vol. VI, p. 291.
4. A. H. Layard to Lord Salisbury, May 15, 1878. Letter quoted by Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention, pp. 193-4.
5. 242 H. C. Deb. 4S, Aug. 8, 1878, col. 1557.
6. For the text of the Cyprus Convention see Appendix A.
7. See Appendix A, Art. I, Par. 3.
8. See Appendix A: Annex.
9. Sir George Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol. IV, The Ottoman Province, The British Colony, 1571-1948, ed. Sir Harry Luke, Cambridge, At the University Press, 1952, p. 297.
10. 241 H. C. Deb. 4S, July 18, 1878, coll. 1772-3.
11. Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention, p. 118. Cited from The Fortnightly Review, vol. 24, Sept. 1878, pp. 311-2.
12. "Lord Salisbury at Manchester", The Times, Oct. 18, 1879, quoted by Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention, p. 124.
13. Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol. IV, p. 274.
14. Reginald S. Poole, "Cyprus, Its Present and Future", Contemporary Review, vol. 33, 1878, p. 139.

## CHAPTER 2

### POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT TO 1954

The conversion of Cyprus to a Crown Colony in 1925 made very little difference to the constitutional and political position of the island. In fact the government became even more restricted than the political system which had been established soon after British occupation began in 1878. The period of crown colony status coincided with the progressive elimination of constitutional rule, and the establishment of authoritarian rule. Even the conditions on which Great Britain had originally occupied Cyprus had ceased to exist, but this made little difference to the British attitude toward her newest Crown Colony. In 1924 the British Prime Minister had stated that, "His Majesty's

Government are not contemplating any change in the political status of Cyprus".<sup>1</sup> This official statement foreshadowed the policy which was established for a period of almost thirty-five years.

Letters Patent giving Cyprus the status and name of a colony were passed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom on March 10, 1925. The government and administration at this time remained very similar to the system established in the previous British period. The office of Governor of the Colony was substituted for that of High Commissioner. He could appoint all necessary officers in the island in practice, but many of the high ranking officers were nominated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and only formally appointed by the Governor. The Executive Council was the most important governing body. It consisted of four high officials nominated by the Governor to serve in an ex-officio capacity. These were the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Treasurer, and the Chief Commandant of Police. The Governor was also empowered to appoint three additional members to the Council, and to summon them to meetings on any occasion on which he thought it desirable to obtain their advice. The Executive

Council was important since it discussed policy, but it was only an advisory body with no responsibility to the Legislative Council. The Governor alone decided.

The Legislative Council, similar to its predecessor, had no real power. Its constitution, which was created in 1882, was recited in an Order of the King-in-Council of February 6, 1925. It consisted of the Governor, and fifteen elected and nine official members. The official members were appointed in London. The Colonial Secretary, Attorney-General, and Treasurer were ex-officio members. Of the elected members, twelve were elected by the Christian voters and three by the Mohammedan voters. Every male person who was a British subject or had resided in the colony for not less than five years and had reached the age of twenty-one, and paid any class of taxes known as Verghi, varying from £10 to £20 a year, was entitled to vote. Any male person who had reached the age of twenty-five and was a British subject was eligible to sit as a member of the Legislative Council. Although the Legislative Council had been enlarged, it was enlarged on the principle that the official British members, plus the Turkish members exactly equalled the number of Greek members. Under this arrangement the

official British members along with the Turkish members, and the casting vote of the Governor, could always out-vote the Greek Cypriots, and control legislation. Therefore, even while the Greek representation was now proportionally greater than the Turkish, in actuality there were no advantages resulting. The idea that more of the Cypriots would benefit from participation in government affairs really made very little difference.

For administrative purposes, the island was divided into six districts, a system begun by the Turks. These districts were Nicosia, Larnaca, Limassol, Famagusta, Paphos, and Kyrenia. Each was administered by a district commissioner, who was the head of all executive departments in his district. Most of the districts, both Greek and Turkish, were divided into sub-districts, or Nahiehs, and were administered by Mudirs. The Mudirs, at this time, were principally employed as sheriffs' officers, and their duty in this capacity had become so heavy that it overweighed their primary function of native assistant to the commissioner.

Last in this pyramid-like system, and under the commissioners and Mudirs, were the Mukhtars, or village headman. Their powers and duties were of a local nature.

They were elected in every alternate year, and were assisted by four Azas, or village elders, elected at the same time.

The principal departments of the government other than those already mentioned, were the Agricultural, Audit, Customs, Education, Forest, Land Registration and Survey, Legal, Medical, Police and Prisons, Postal, Public Works and Irrigation, and Railway departments. A commissioner was in charge of each of these departments.

The reaction of the Greek members to the new Constitution was expressed in a resolution moved in the Legislative Council shortly after the establishment of the colony, by the Metropolitan of Kition. He expressed disappointment that greater political rights had not been granted.<sup>2</sup> The Legislative Council, it was soon realized, had no more power than before. In spite of its representative character, it was not permitted to make any laws to alter its Constitution. In fact, to the Greek Cypriots, it was an exasperating and humiliating nuisance, where all their legitimate demands were unceremoniously buried and forgotten. It was constitutionalism in practice degenerated into despotism.<sup>3</sup>

This judgment is much too harsh. Although the colonial government was authoritarian and not what the Greek Cypriot politicians desired, it was not despotic. Frequent were the instances of the Legislative Council being overridden by Orders-in-Council and otherwise. In 1927 when the budget was rejected by a vote of the Legislative Council, it was nevertheless put into execution in its entirety by the King's Order-in-Council. In the same year taxes were increased by £40,000 without the advice or consent of the Legislative Council. The revised Penal Code, though published in the Cyprus Gazette as a Bill, in order to be introduced later into the Legislative Council as expressly stated in the preamble to the Bill, was actually imposed by an Order of the King-in-Council, without its being laid before the Legislative Council and the advice of the members obtained. In a later session of the Legislative Council a Pensions Bill as proposed by the Governor was rejected, but the same measure was sanctioned from England as law by means of a Royal Order-in-Council. The Greek Cypriots continually resented their inferior status and again in 1927 a resolution was moved in Council expressing the hope that the King might be advised that

the Constitution should be amended so that the elected representatives of the people should have a responsible and effective share in the administration. The resolution was proposed for insertion in the reply to the Governor's speech but was rejected by a vote of twelve to eleven.<sup>4</sup> These events show that the only way of meeting the intransigence of the Greek members was to take what the latter considered to be an arbitrary action.

When the Labour Party came to power in Britain in June 1929, the Greek members of the Legislative Council made an appeal to the new Government in the form of a memorial to Lord Passfield, the Secretary of State for the Colonies.<sup>5</sup> The grievances they put forth were many, and for the most part legitimate. Following the usual request for Enosis, the Memorial listed many complaints. There was no Legislative Assembly, but merely a Legislative Council which was very much limited in power. The Legislative Council could introduce no vote, resolution, or law for the appropriation of part of the public revenues, or propose a bill imposing a tax, without having previously obtained the consent of the Governor. The Council had no control over the appropriations made during the

voting of the budget, and also it enjoyed no substantive participation in the preparation of the budget, nor was it entitled to exercise any control over the estimates. Also the power reserved to the Governor or the King to exercise the prerogative of disallowance, and the King's right to legislate for the colony by an Order-in-Council, were irksome. The Greek Cypriots complained that the administration was in the hands of the Governor and the English officials, who were his Executive Councilors. The Governor, being responsible and answerable to the Home Government in London only, had no responsibility to the tax-paying people of Cyprus. That is to say, the Executive Council was only an advisory body to the Governor, the Governor not being bound by its advice. The Governor was not bound to nominate members of the Executive Council from among the native elements, and the three Additional Members were not always taken from the Legislative Council. The Additional Members could even be excluded from the Council. The Memorial went on to state that the Executive Council was a constitutional monstrosity, holding a place in the government, yet complete in itself and entirely independent of the representatives of the people in the

Legislative Council.<sup>6</sup>

The Memorial demanded that representatives of the people in the Legislative Council should have unlimited power in all local matters. The Council should consist only of elected members, with the two elements of the population being represented in proportion to their numbers. In the Executive Council the majority should be persons elected by the Legislative Council, and only three British-born officials—the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General, and the Treasurer—should participate in it. The only power the Governor should have would be the right of disallowing legislation in the case of an emergency. Also the decision of the Executive Council should be binding on the Governor. The King-in-Council should not legislate for the island except in extraordinary cases provided for in the Constitution. The Memorial also stated that the slow economic advance was the result of the ever heavier taxation. The high taxation, it was claimed, was due to high public salaries, supernumary personnel and exorbitant emoluments.<sup>7</sup>

In his reply, Lord Passfield first stated that on the subject of the cession of Cyprus to Greece His Majesty's Government was unable to accede. "This

subject is closed and cannot profitably be further discussed", he declared.<sup>8</sup> In connection with the request for responsible government, he felt that the time had not yet come when it would be to the general advantage of the people of Cyprus to grant it. The popularly controlled institutions already established had not attained that reasonable measure of efficiency which should be looked for before any extension of the principle could be approved. He went on to add that had Cyprus possessed a Legislature controlled by officials, its progress would have been even more rapid. He pointed out that the divorce of power from executive responsibility is rarely conducive to efficient administration, however much unofficial control over the Legislature might be valued from other standpoints. The Memorial would only distract attention from more practical matters on which the progress of the colony depended. He concluded with the statement that there was much to be said for the view that what Cyprus needed at that time was fewer occasions for political discussions and more occasions for constructive work.<sup>9</sup>

Relations between the Greek Cypriots and the British Government deteriorated considerably as a result of the

way the Greek Cypriot case was dealt with. It was apparent that no changes were going to be made, and there was little hope of advancing toward responsible government. This was most irksome for the Cypriots. They found the British attitude insulting as well as degrading. From the British standpoint, the Government realized that if they were to allow the process of constitutional evolution to occur, it would eventually result in the loss of the colony. Britain was not ready at that time to lose her island in the eastern Mediterranean. A Cypriot historian declared that "it was, perhaps, the fear that constitutional advance would have strengthened the Enosist movement that compelled the Colonial Secretary to reject outright the proposals put before him." By doing so, the administration barred the way to all constitutional advance. No other road was left open to the Greek representatives except that of irreconcilable opposition, direct, action, or in the last analysis, revolution.<sup>10</sup>

The eruption finally took place in 1931. Up to this date the Greek Cypriot National leaders had employed pacific and constitutional methods of protest. In October, 1931, they resorted to violence. According

to Toynbee, economic and social progress made in Cyprus though manifestly creditable in itself was nothing exceptional or extraordinary.<sup>11</sup> The economic depression readily bred political discontent, and nowhere more quickly than in Cyprus, where the conflict between Greek Cypriot nationalism and British imperialism was a standing cause of political unrest. In the opinion of Sir Ronald Storrs, the Governor, the movement for more rights had continued to make headway in the towns. Fresh generations of youth sedulously indoctrinated with the Greek Cypriot desire for Enosis had been launched on all the professions by the secondary schools which were not government controlled. Outside the government service and the realm of government influence and activity, every branch of public life in the Orthodox community was in some way allied to the cause of union.<sup>12</sup> It was against this background of poverty and economic distress, of constitutional impotence, and the frustration of Greek Cypriot aspirations that this revolution must be seen. According to one historian, up to 1925 the British administration, though neglectful, was nevertheless tolerant, but after 1925 it became authoritarian. He went on to state that Storrs tried to limit the

Constitution even more, and hoped to turn the island into a "loyal dependency of Britain".<sup>13</sup> Although much of what they claimed was correct, it is evident that both Toynbee and Alastos were attempting to vindicate the uprising in October, 1931. Both authors tended to overemphasize the Greek Cypriot case, and both attempted to fit the revolt into a background which justified the Greek Cypriot action.

These unsatisfied aspirations and unappeased grievances were the motive forces of the Enosis movement in Cyprus, and the antecedent to the disturbances. But the two main events which actually precipitated these disturbances were the passage of the Elementary Education Law of 1929, and a conflict of wills between the elected Greek representatives on the Legislative Council and the British authorities over the Cyprus Budget of 1931. The main purpose of the Elementary Education Law was to transfer the control and discipline of the Cypriot school teachers to the British authorities from the Greek and Turkish bodies which had previously controlled these. The Bill was passed because the schools had been used for political propaganda. It was passed in the Legislative Council with three Greeks voting for it, and it became law. Three Greek members voted for it because there

had been widespread criticism of the previous system on the island. These members—an advocate, a merchant, and a farmer—did not stand at the election of 1930. According to Toynbee, the estrangement over the Elementary Education Law of 1929 prepared the way for the open breach over the Budget of 1931.<sup>14</sup> In the Budget of 1931 the Government decided to make up the deficit in the Cyprus Budget from the colony's surplus balances and reserve fund. This was done with the casting vote of the Governor against the twelve Greek members. It was also announced at the same time that the Governor had appointed a committee to go into the finances of the colony in order to see whether a saving could not be made. The recommendations of the committee were to change the customs duties from ad valorem to specific duties, which would realize a slight increase; to increase the duty on gasoline; and to increase the wharfage dues. This Bill was presented to the Legislative Council on April 28, 1931, and was rejected, the twelve Greek members, and one Turk voting against the nine officials and two other Turks. Compromise proposals for balancing the Budget were then introduced by the British authorities. Most of the proposals followed lines approved

by the nonofficial members, but an increase in taxation was imposed in the three above-mentioned areas by an Order-in-Council made from London on August 11, 1931, and published in Cyprus on September 9. The new taxation was not burdensome and in conjunction with new economies in administration, it duly balanced the Cyprus budget for 1931. But this increase in taxation had been imposed on the Cypriot taxpayers against the vote of the Legislative Council, by resorting to the short cut of an Order-in-Council passed in London. The increase in revenue was only about £20,000, yet the British officials had only to consult their own constitutional history to be reminded that a small tax was capable of producing a large upheaval, if an important constitutional principle were involved. Toynbee declared that to "anyone familiar with English history, it would hardly be a matter of surprise that the overriding of the vote of the Cyprus Legislative Council on the 9th September, 1931 should have been followed by the widespread Cypriot disturbances of the following month". Although the British Colonial Empire taken as a whole was politically quiescent and contented at this time, there were few British colonies where the British connection was anathema as it was in

Cyprus, where there was struggle between nationalism and imperialism.<sup>15</sup>

Like many Greek risings against Ottoman rule, the occurrence in October 1931 was headed by a prelate of the Orthodox Church. The movement apparently arose out of deliberations begun on September 12, 1931 among the leaders of the Cypriot Greek National Organization. This was a body of Greek Cypriots formed in 1922 to achieve union with Greece and to influence the Legislative Council. It planned to organize demonstrations against two official acts. One was a statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the British Parliament on July 8, 1931 to the effect that the accumulated surplus from payments made from the Cyprus revenue as tribute to Turkey under the Convention of 1878 had been disposed of for the sinking fund of the Turkish Loan guaranteed by the British in 1855. The other was the Order-in-Council imposing increased taxation, published in Cyprus on September 9, 1931.<sup>16</sup> The Greek Members of the Legislative Council met in secret at the village of Saitta to decide their course of action. At this meeting it was formally resolved, though the

resolution was not made public, that subject to the approval of the Cypriot Greek National Organization, a manifesto should be addressed to the Cypriots. By way of protest, the organization intended to initiate a policy of civil disobedience, and to call upon the Cypriots to refuse to pay taxes, and to boycott British goods. In his report to London, Storrs claimed that the National Organization had used a policy of memorials to the authorities expressing the desire for union, delegations to England, local demonstrations with flags and processions, anti-British invective from the press and platforms, and non-cooperation and obstruction in the Legislative Council.

Since these peaceful tactics had come to nothing, the extremists in the movement were now turning to deeds rather than words to achieve their object.<sup>17</sup> Invective against British rule became more and more bitter and direct. On October 3, the National Organization and the Greek members of the Legislative Council considered a draft proposal, the tactics being that the manifesto should be read at the opening meeting of the Legislative Council and that the Greek members should then resign. The meetings continued through October 10,

11, and 17, but no decision could be reached. On October 17, when the members met, the Bishop of Kitium read them an inflammatory manifesto,<sup>18</sup> and on the next day on his own initiative published it and then resigned from the Legislative Council. This unexpected action provoked protests from eight of the Greek members of the Legislative Council. On the same day there was an announcement of the formation of a new and radical organization called the Cyprus National Radicalist Union. Its intentions were to precipitate the crisis and exploit it. The Bishop of Kitium made a violent speech at Limassol on October 21, and on the same day the other Greek members of the Legislative Council decided to resign. A public meeting was summoned at Nicosia by the National Union later in the day. A crowd gathered and, shouting for union with Greece and singing the Greek national anthem, they marched upon and burned Government House. The revolution flared up quickly over the whole island, resulting in six persons being killed, nearly three dozen wounded, ten banished for life, and over two thousand imprisoned. On the Government side, there were no casualties. The British Government dispatched troops and warships to Cyprus,

and by the end of the month the disturbances had virtually ceased.

Suppression of the rising was followed by punitive measures, and on November 12 Letters Patent abolished the Constitution.<sup>19</sup> This meant that all elective bodies, the Legislative Council, and the municipal councils, were abolished. Clubs and other organizations were suspended, meetings of more than five people were prohibited except by permission, and press and film censorship was imposed. The Governor ruled with an Executive Council of four official and two nonofficial members, one of the latter Turkish and one Greek-speaking. This Council advised the Governor on new legislation and on the exercise of powers granted to him under the existing laws.<sup>20</sup> It became extremely unpopular for any Greeks to serve on this body and they were immediately branded as enemies of the people. In fact one member, A. Triantophyllides, for his participation, was assassinated in January, 1934.<sup>21</sup> On December 1, 1931, three new laws were promulgated under Letters Patent. They prohibited the unauthorized flying or exhibiting of flags, restricted the ringing of Church and other bells to prevent the recurrence of their use as tocsins, and vested in the

Governor the power to appoint village authorities. These laws were published in the Cyprus Gazette. On December 21, the Reparations Impost Law was passed declaring that destroyed property should be repaired and replaced at the cost of the responsible towns and villages.<sup>22</sup>

The opinion held by the British authorities at the time of the outbreak in October of 1931 was that while the priests, the advocates, the school teachers, and the urban population in the larger towns were, with few exceptions, in favour of union with Greece, and while the Cypriot press was controlled by Unionists; there was still a majority, including the merchants, the farmers, and the peasants in general who were either politically apathetic or else were in favour of British rule.<sup>23</sup> Whether this British opinion expressed an accurate picture of the situation is difficult to ascertain. It is certain that by 1931 there was a large group which was very dissatisfied with the British administration, as the events of that year were to prove. On the other hand the fact that Cyprus remained so quiescent politically throughout the 'thirties and 'forties does much to justify British opinion.

In Greece, the disturbances in Cyprus produced a sharp conflict between the popular impulse to express pro-Cypriot and anti-British sentiments, and the Government's policy laid down by Premier Venizelos, of preserving a scrupulously correct attitude in regard to a matter which was juridically a foreign affair. On October 23, 1931, Venizelos enunciated his policy in this statement to the press:

As I have declared many times there is no Cypriot question between the Greek Government and the British Government. That question is between the British Government and the people of Cyprus. Up till now the Cypriots have carried on their campaign by means of memorials, addresses, meetings and protests, that is to say by means which the liberal minded British consider absolutely lawful. To-day, unfortunately, excesses have taken place, such as attacks on soldiers and police and the burning of Government House at Nicosia. Faced by excesses of that kind, British tolerance comes to an end and a strict application of the law begins.

I can only express my profound regret for these excesses. The promoters of the movement did not wish for this but they ought to have known that if they pushed things too far the moment would come when they would be no longer masters of the situation.

If the Greek press would listen to me, I should advise it to condemn these excesses, from which no good can come. No sensible man can imagine that excesses of this kind will force Great Britain to satisfy the national aspirations of the Greeks of Cyprus.<sup>24</sup>

A practical application of the Greek policy was to recall

from Cyprus the Greek Consul, who was sympathetic toward the Greek Cypriot cause.

When reviewing the outbreak of 1931, it is difficult to decide the extent to which either of the groups should be censored for its actions. It must have seemed to the Greek Cypriots that after over fifty years of attempting to change a stereotyped form of government that the only solution was direct action. As government rule became more authoritarian, and as representative institutions were ignored, it was little wonder that rebellion resulted. In revoking the Constitution the British seemed to forget that they were dealing with a politically minded group of people. It also was unfair that the whole island should be punished for the actions of a few. On the other hand Britain was faced with the problem that if she wished to maintain the island, which at that time seemed extremely necessary, it would have been impossible to grant to the Cypriots the political rights they desired. Morally, this does not justify the British position. Another fact the British had to consider was that one-fifth of the population was Turkish, and their rights had to be considered. The best solution might have been for Britain to have

allowed almost total internal self government, incorporating clauses which would have attempted to safeguard the rights of the Turks, and to have maintained the established status of the island within the British Empire. The Greek Cypriot actions during the period from 1925 until 1931 seems to show a desire for Enosis, rather than for increased self government.

The period is one of continuous Greek Cypriot agitation, culminating in the riots of October 1931. This date marks the end of Cypriot participation in its government.

Politically Cyprus now remained under the same regime until she obtained her independence. During the 1930s a number of laws were enacted which became known as the Illiberal Laws.<sup>25</sup> Political control was drawn more into the hands of the authorities. In 1932 the police organization was reformed in a law to make better provisions for the appointment of rural constables, and to regulate their powers and duties. In 1933 another Elementary Education Law was passed and the English language was made compulsory in the elementary schools, and teacher training colleges were founded. In 1934 the Governor assumed the power to appoint municipal councils, and also the power to revoke any such appoint-

ment. During 1935 the press laws became more rigid. The Secondary Education Law passed in 1935 brought the secondary schools and their teachers more directly under the control of the Director of Education, who was an Englishman. In 1937, the Government launched an assault on another stronghold of Greek sentiment: the Church. First, the Governor, Sir Herbert R. Palmer, dealt with the control of finances of the churches and monasteries in the Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus Law, laying down that no person could be elected an Archbishop of the Autocephalous Church of Cyprus who had been deported from the island, or convicted of sedition or any other offense punishable with imprisonment for more than two years, or was not a native of the colony. A complementary law then went on to provide that no one could be Archbishop unless approved by the Governor. This interference by an alien authority in the affairs of a Church which had been self-governing as its name indicates, and had fought for its independence for almost as long as the Christian era, turned the Church of Cyprus irrevocably against British rule, and enabled priests to maintain with greater fervor than before that British rule was an instrument of the devil. The

arrogance of Palmer's laws provoked the resentment even of those Cypriots who were normally little endeared toward their Church.<sup>26</sup> The result was that the embittered Church refused to elect an Archbishop to the throne which had fallen vacant, and asserted for eleven years, until the edict was modified, that a Christian Church could not function freely and according to its own Christian laws under British rule. The Illiberal Laws of the 1930s hardened the Cypriot attitude toward British rule, and formed one of the basic causes of the violence of the 1950s.

On the other hand some attempt was made during this period to mitigate authoritarianism. In 1933 an Advisory Council was established, composed of four official and ten nonofficial members appointed by the Governor. It had no legislative powers, but was consulted by the Governor on legislative and other measures. Trade unions were legalized in 1936, and hours of work were reduced and wages raised as a result. Concern was shown in the House of Commons as to the state of affairs in Cyprus throughout the 'thirties. When asked whether the strict regime was still necessary, Mr. Ormsby-Gore,

the Secretary of State for the Colonies, replied on March 24, 1937:

No alteration in the constitution of the Central Government is under consideration. It seems clear that, having regard to local conditions, the sound line of advance lies in first and foremost encouraging the Islanders in the management of their local affairs in the districts. It is, therefore, the definite policy of the Government to enlarge the sphere of the local authorities: and the powers of the municipalities and village authorities are accordingly being extended . . . . It would be undesirable to alter the present constitution of the Central Government of Cyprus.<sup>27</sup>

Parliamentary interest did not end however, and in 1939 after being asked about restoring the constitution and ending censorship, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Malcolm Macdonald, declared that the plan for the people of Cyprus was to associate them with the management of their local affairs through the District and Municipal Councils, and that the policy of the Cyprus Government was gradually to develop this association and to extend the powers of the Councils. He felt that the time had not yet come for any change in the constitution of the Central Government.<sup>28</sup>

In 1937 a Committee for Cyprus Autonomy was formed in London, and in 1939 it presented to the Colonial Office a document embodying the fundamental constitutional

demands of two hundred persons and organizations in Cyprus. The British attitude to the demands was expressed by the British Colonial Secretary, Macdonald, in answering critical questions put to him in the House of Commons, on July 5, 1939. He stated that there had recently been a certain amount of discussion in Cyprus regarding constitutional reform. The principal means by which the agitation had been conducted was by the collecting of petitions, all of which were not collected in a proper manner. He was satisfied that the great majority of the people of Cyprus were not discontented under the present administration. The policy of the administration was to work in the direction of more representative government, but this process could not be hurried, and in Mr. Macdonald's view it must proceed first through a gradual increase of responsibility in local government, before being extended to the central machinery.<sup>29</sup>

In 1941 a new phase in Cypriot politics began. On October 5, a Representative Assembly, composed of merchants, representatives of the rural communities and organizations, professional men, and others, met in Nicosia with the sanction of the authorities. The

result was the formation of the Progressive Party of the Working People, AKEL. This signalized the emergence of trade unionism as a recognized political force. According to Hill, the freedom of action and speech allowed to the unions was without precedent in the history of any colony of the British or any other Empire.<sup>30</sup> During the municipal elections, which were restored in March, 1943, AKEL was successful in Famagusta and Limassol. During the years 1943-44, AKEL supported a number of strikes and refused to cooperate in various ways with the authorities, as a protest against the lack of popularly-elected bodies on the island.<sup>31</sup> The Nationalist Party, a Right-wing middle class party, supported by the Orthodox Church, in the meantime was actively urging Enosis.

On August 2, 1944, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Colonel Stanley, made a statement in the House of Commons which held hope for the future of Cyprus. He stated that the present policy of the Cyprus Government was to establish representative institutions in the sphere of local administration before extending them to the central machinery of government. A beginning had been made in 1943 with

the restoration of elected municipal councils, and at the time of the declaration, proposals were under consideration for establishing a similar system of local administration through elected councils in rural areas. He hoped that if these councils proved to be a success, it would be possible to contemplate the constitution of a legislative council with unofficial elected representation.<sup>32</sup>

When in 1945 the Labour Party came into power in Great Britain there was hope of the establishment of a more liberal regime on the island. On October 10, Mr. George Hall, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced that he was hopeful that the policy of elected municipal councils would be so successful as to make it possible to contemplate the institution of a Legislative Council with unofficial elected representatives at an early date.<sup>33</sup> A year later, Mr. Creech-Jones, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced that the Government proposed to seek opportunities to establish a more liberal and progressive regime in the internal affairs of the island. Sir Charles Woolley, the Governor, was to be asked to call a Consultative Assembly drawn from representative elements of the

island, for the purpose of framing a constitution, and to re-establish a central legislature. He added that it was hoped to bring the people into full consultation with the Government in the execution of their local affairs.<sup>34</sup>

When the new Governor, Lord Winster, arrived in Cyprus in March 1947, he too promised a more liberal and progressive regime.<sup>35</sup> Shortly after his arrival he made arrangements for the election of a new Archbishop. Bishop Leontios, after first refusing, was finally elected but he died a few days later. Before his death he publicly opposed the Governor's Proclamation inviting nominations for a Constituent Assembly to make recommendations on the form of the constitution to be established. This was because his sole political aim was union with Greece, rather than constitutional advancement within the British Empire. A new Archbishop, Makarios II, was elected in October, and he opposed the British plan for a Constituent Assembly. The result was that when the Constituent Assembly met in November it had, because of Church boycott, only eighteen members attending, instead of forty. Of those present, eight were Left-wing Greeks,

six were Turks, two were non-party Greeks, and one was a Maronite. The status of Cyprus within the British Commonwealth was not to be subject to discussion by the Legislature, but apart from that no subject was excluded. The Assembly demanded a constitution similar to that of Malta or Ceylon, with a legislature of elected members and a restriction of the Governor's powers in all areas.<sup>36</sup>

It was not until the following May that the British Government made known its proposals for the new Constitution. During the six-month interval there had been many strikes, preparations were begun for the arrival of troops from Palestine, and the construction of an air base equipped with radar was begun. Coinciding with these events was the British surrender of the Palestine mandate in May 1948. This meant that Cyprus was the only remaining British base in the Eastern Mediterranean and its value as such became much greater. It is evident that from this time on Cyprus assumed much greater strategic value in the eyes of the British, hence the likelihood of Britain's allowing any change in the island's status was much less. By the time the details of the new Constitution were actually announced

the atmosphere had not in any way improved. The new Legislature was to be composed of twenty-six members: four officials and twenty-two members elected by universal male suffrage, eighteen by the Greek Cypriots and four by the Turks. The new Council could not introduce Bills affecting finance, defence, external affairs, minority rights, or the Constitution, without the consent of the Governor. Also the Council might not discuss the status of Cyprus within the British Commonwealth. The Governor was to be assisted by an Executive Council on which there could be three Greek and one Turkish elected members. There were proposals for the appointment of Cypriots as Under-Secretaries in certain departments of the Government. A considerable number of points were left open for discussion by the Assembly.<sup>37</sup> This offer, subject to limitations imposed by imperial considerations, showed a generous advance on all previous concessions.<sup>38</sup> The Greek Cypriot representatives for the first time would be able to command a decisive majority over the official representatives, even when the latter were supported by the Turkish members. But the limitations imposed, and the powers reserved for the Governor, were sufficient

to wreck the chance of acceptance by the majority of the politicians of Cyprus. At a meeting of the Constituent Assembly held on May 21, the British proposals for the Constitution were opposed by the Greek representatives who then withdrew from the Assembly which was finally dissolved on August 12. The Governor on the occasion of the dissolution of the Assembly, told its members that the British constitutional proposals could be taken up again if at any time responsible and fully representative political leaders came forward to ask that these or other proposals might be re-examined and implemented.<sup>39</sup> A Cypriot historian referred to the 1948 Constitution as a belated offer, rejected as unacceptable. He claimed that no effort was ever made by the Colonial Office to sound public opinion in the island or to investigate the demands of the people. No Cypriot organization was ever asked or encouraged to put responsibly their demands before the Secretary of State to be examined or discussed, and even when people or associations did do so on their own initiative, they met only with formal acknowledgment or curt refusal.<sup>40</sup> This statement tends perhaps to exaggerate the case somewhat, because the 1948 offer

would have been a considerable advance over any previous system, and it would have given the Cypriots considerable governmental control, at least in theory. But the Cypriots knew they would still be far from being the masters of their own affairs. The facts of the case were that what the Cypriots wanted, the British were unwilling to offer, and no compromise solution could be worked out.

The campaign for self-government was continued with even greater vigour during the months after the offer, and found its expression in some powerful demonstrations held in many parts of the island under the slogan 'Self-Government-Union'. By January, 1949 the AKEL Party withdrew from the campaign for self-government and they too initiated a programme for Enosis. The self-government campaign collapsed.<sup>41</sup> When the municipal elections were held in May, 1949, AKEL kept their control of Limassol, Famagusta, and Larnaca, but the Right-wing Enosists won the capital, Nicosia, and eleven of the fifteen municipalities, polling sixty percent of the vote. Lord Winster, the Governor, asked to be released from his office solely on the grounds that efforts to secure acceptance of

the Constitution had proved unavailing, and that the primary purpose for which he had undertaken the appointment no longer existed.<sup>42</sup>

During the last few months of 1949 the Orthodox Church prepared for the holding of a plebiscite on Enosis. The vote, which consisted of signing an open petition, took place on January 15, 1950, at which time almost ninety-six percent of all the Greek Cypriots were said to have signed in favour of Enosis.<sup>43</sup> This was used by the Greek Cypriot leaders as a clear indication of the political desires of the people. On February 4, Archbishop Makarios II communicated the results of the plebiscite to the Governor, Sir Andrew Wright. The British Government still regarded the issue of union as closed. The plebiscite was really indicative of nothing because intimidation was used to force the Greek Cypriots to vote for it. What the result showed was that the leaders and advocates of Enosis were able to force all the Greek Cypriots to endorse the cause, whether it was their desire or not. The plebiscite was used for propaganda purposes by the Greek Cypriot leaders throughout the period of crisis.

The next major political development occurred in 1954 when the British Government made another attempt to establish a constitution. In February, Lord Winster declared that if the British were going to impose a constitution as had been suggested, it would again meet with boycott and obstruction from the Church. The only solution was that the Cypriots themselves must have a share in the drafting of any constitution.<sup>44</sup> On July 28, Mr. Hopkinson, Minister of State for the Colonial Office, announced that the time had come to take a fresh initiative in the development of self-governing institutions in Cyprus. However nothing less than continued British sovereignty of the island could enable the United Kingdom to carry out its strategic obligations in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East.<sup>45</sup> The proposals for the new Constitution provided for a Legislature containing both official and nominated members together forming a majority, and elected members. Provision was made for the appointment to the Executive Council of some unofficial members of the Legislature to take charge of the departments. The Government also declared once again that no change in the sovereignty of Cyprus could be

contemplated.<sup>46</sup> The presenting of such a Constitution was certainly a most inadvisable move, since it represented a retrogressive step in contrast with the Constitution offered in 1948. It aimed at denying the people ultimate independence. In reply to criticism, Mr. Hopkinson proposed a Constitution which, he hoped, would work and added that there were certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, could never expect to be fully independent.<sup>47</sup> The statement had explosive effects. It repudiated the concept that colonial peoples should be guided toward self-government until they reached the stage where they could decide for themselves their future relationship with the Commonwealth. From this point affairs in Cyprus worsened very rapidly and the tactics used in the following five years differed considerably from those of the previous thirty. It seems evident that the British policy in 1954, although perhaps more realistic, was certainly not wise. The announcement that ultimate Cypriot independence was not to be granted was a mistake.

From a political and constitutional standpoint the history of Cyprus from 1925 to 1954 indicates a

period when liberalism declined and authoritarianism flourished. This part of Cyprus's period as a Crown Colony laid the basis for the violence and terrorism which followed. The Constitution established in 1925 did not satisfy the political aspirations of the Greek Cypriots, and it laid the basis for the rebellion of 1931. Rather than realizing that it was a lack of liberal qualities in government which had caused this rebellion, the British established an even more repressive and totalitarian regime. The result was that when a more liberal constitution was offered in 1948, the Cypriots were not, by that time, prepared to accept it. The constitutional offer of 1954 was an insult to the Cypriots and was refused without hesitation.

The effect of this political struggle on the Turkish population was that it hardened them to any change which might jeopardize their minority rights. It seemed evident to them that any increase in Greek Cypriot control would most certainly be to their disadvantage. The situation between the Greeks and the Turks gradually became worse until by 1954 it had become extremely tense. The Turkish Cypriots main-

tained their policy that Cyprus should not be subject to any change in status, unless it was the return of the island to Turkey.

The fundamental problem which developed during this thirty year period was the conflict between the national desires of the politically minded Greek Cypriots for self-determination; and the imperialism of Great Britain, attempting to maintain control of a strategically-located island. The third factor, the opposition of the Turkish minority to the Greek Cypriot aim, complicated the situation even further. The relations among the groups continually became more strained until by 1954 it seemed impossible that any compromise solution satisfactory to all three could be worked out. The result was that the Cyprus dilemma was brought by Greece before the United Nations, at which time it became an international problem. After that there followed four years of embittered strife and violence.

### FOOTNOTES

1. 172 H. C. Deb. 5s, Apr. 14, 1924, col. 909.
2. Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol. IV, p. 428.
3. Alastos, Cyprus in history, p. 325.
4. Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol. IV, pp. 429-30.
5. Great Britain, Parliament, Cyprus, Memorial from the Greek Elected Members of the Legislative Council together with the Reply returned by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Parliamentary Papers, 1929-30, vol. XXIII, (Cmd. 3477)
6. Cmd. 3477, p. 7.
7. Cmd. 3477, pp. 1-8.
8. Cmd. 3477, p. 16.
9. Cmd. 3477, pp. 17-18.
10. Alastos, Cyprus in history, pp. 330-1.
11. Toynbee, Arnold J., "Cyprus, the British Empire and Greece", Survey of International Affairs, 1931, Oxford, University Press, London, 1932, p. 367.
12. Great Britain, Parliament, Disturbances in Cyprus in October, 1931, Parliamentary Papers, 1931-32, vol. VI, (Cmd. 4045), p. 5.
13. Alastos, Cyprus in history, pp. 347-9.
14. Toynbee, "Cyprus," International Affairs 1931, p. 376.  
Toynbee is possibly misinterpreting the motives of the Greek Cypriots. What was really a struggle for Enosis, he portrays in terms of a constitutional struggle similar to what occurred in Great Britain.
15. Ibid., p. 381.

16. Cmd. 4045, p. 2.
17. Cmd. 4045, p. 4.
18. Cmd. 4045, pp. 33-4.
19. Cmd. 4045, p. 30.
20. Royal Institute of International Affairs,  
Information Dept., Cyprus, the dispute and  
the settlement, Oxford University Press,  
London, 1959, p. 5.
21. 285 H. C. Deb. 5s, Feb. 7, 1934, col. 1117.
22. Cmd. 4045, p. 31.
23. Toynbee, "Cyprus," International Affairs, 1931,  
p. 364.
24. Ibid., pp. 388-9.
25. Arnold Percy, Cyprus Challenge, a colonial island  
and its Aspirations: reminiscences of a  
former editor of the Cyprus Post, London,  
The Hogarth Press, 1956, pp. 109-11.  
Titles and dates of the laws are cited.
26. Ibid., p. 118.
27. 321 H. C. Deb. 5s, Mar. 24, 1937, col. 2882.
28. 343 H. C. Deb. 5s, Feb. 8, 1939, col. 933-5.
29. 349 H. C. Deb. 5s, July 5, 1939, col. 1283-5.
30. Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol. IV, p. 435.
31. R. I. I. A., Cyprus dispute and settlement, p. 6.
32. 402 H. C. Deb. 5s, Aug. 2, 1944, col. 1388-9.
33. 414 H. C. Deb. 5s, Oct. 10, 1945, col. 218.
34. 427 H. C. Deb. 5s, Oct. 23, 1946, col. 396.

35. The Times, Apr. 7, 1947, p. 3c.
36. R. I. I. A., Cyprus dispute and settlement, p. 9.
37. The Times, May 12, 1948, p. 3d; Manchester Guardian,  
May 20, 1948, p. 7c.
38. Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol. IV, p. 439.
39. The Times, May 22, 1948, p. 3g; Aug. 13, 1948, p. 4d.
40. Alastos, Cyprus in history, pp. 358-9.
41. Ibid., p. 377-8.
42. R. I. I. A., Cyprus dispute and settlement, p. 50.
43. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
44. The Times, Feb. 24, 1954, 3a-b.
45. Ibid., July 29, 1954, 3e-g.
46. 531 H. C. Deb. 5s, July 28, 1954, col. 504.
47. 531 H. C. Deb. 5s, July 28, 1954, col. 507.

### CHAPTER 3

#### ENOSIS TO 1954

At the time of the British occupation, and for some years after, relief at the substitution of British rule for Turkish was uppermost in the minds of the Cypriot Greeks. However this was accompanied by the gradual development of the long cherished desire for Enosis, union with Greece, a movement which gradually assumed importance in Cyprus. The feelings of the great majority of the Greek Cypriots for Hellas "were based primarily on a cultural, social, sentimental, emotional urge of kinship born of a common language, a common faith and, above all, of common customs and a common way of life. . ."<sup>1</sup>

Question was raised by the British and Turks throughout the period of British occupation as to the

Greekness of the Cypriots, and the legitimacy of their demand for Enosis, but to develop this argument is really to evade the problem. The fact that the Cypriots may not have been descended from the same racial stock, or not have ever formed part of Greece does not invalidate their desires. Sir Ronald Storrs pointed out:

The Greekness of Cypriots is . . . indisputable. Nationalism is more, is other, is greater than pigmentations or cephalic indices. A man is of the race of which he passionately feels himself to be. No sensible person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek, just as much as the French Canadian is French-speaking, French-thinking, French-feeling and French".<sup>2</sup>

The fact that they should not form part of Greece for ethnic or racial reasons was completely unthought of by the Greek Cypriots.

The years after the First World War saw the awakening of Enosis as a Cypriot national movement, a movement which declared itself with increasing energy. The leaders of this movement claimed to represent the opinions and sentiments of four-fifths of the population of Cyprus, who were Greek Orthodox Christians in religion and Greeks in nationality. The main role of leadership was taken by the hierarchy of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of the island, which, in a community

bred in the Ottoman social tradition, was recognized as the leader in temporal affairs as well as in spiritual. "The Eastern monastery is not only the asylum of the recluse and the ascetic, it is also the nursery and forcing-ground of those eager and enterprising spirits who seek positions of power in the larger world of politics and national affairs."<sup>3</sup> The fact that the ecclesiastical leaders were able to exert such a great influence on the religious minded Greek Cypriots meant that they could promote the cause for union with Greece much more effectively than could most temporal leaders.

The desire for union with Greece was not for any material benefits it would bring, for indeed it was quite likely that the Cypriots would have been worse off. But generally speaking the majority of the Greek Cypriot population would have preferred to be ruled by Greece, rather than prosper under a foreign power. A quotation by a Greek Cypriot historian as to whether a Greek administration would have proved better than the British reveals the attitude taken by the Greek Cypriot leaders.

Whether better or not it would have been undoubtedly preferable, as the people would have participated

in the running of their affairs both locally and through their elected representatives in the Greek Parliament.<sup>4</sup>

This statement does not really portray the situation as it actually existed, because the Cypriots did have local institutions under the British government.

The strength of the agitation, at least up to the disturbances of 1931, was partly the result of the extreme tolerance of the British administration. The schools, both Greek and Turkish, were allowed to follow their own curriculum and to teach what they wanted. The Greek Cypriots were told that they were a part of unredeemed Greece, and through the glories of Greek history they were taught allegiance to that land, rather than to the British Empire. The Cypriots were allowed to display the Greek flag for processions or any other occasion. Freedom of speech and of the press was in fact very extensive, even though the nationalists did not always show moderation in their criticism. They were allowed to discuss local political and administrative questions. No attempt was ever made to stop the movement in the way of curtailing demonstrations in favour of union. All these features of the British administration form a singular contrast to

what was found in the Italian administration of the Dodecanese.<sup>5</sup>

For these reasons the Greek Cypriots kept unswervingly to their demand for incorporation into Greece. The period from 1925 to the time when the Cyprus question came before the United Nations in 1954 saw the constant and continual demand for Enosis. The frequent repetition of the same cry, although tedious, proved the persistence of the movement and gave some impression of what the administration had to face. Hardly a year had passed since the occupation without the Hellenic idea finding expression in some form or another.

Throughout this period of Greek Cypriot agitation the Turkish minority remained opposed to the Enosist movement, for equally strong nationalistic reasons. They constantly attempted to frustrate the Greek Cypriot desires by siding with the British in the affairs of government, and by opposing all Greek memorials and petitions with similar ones of their own. They watched the steady development of the Enosis movement with a growing alarm, and for this reason they surrendered their minority rights to the official British control,

in exchange for protection from the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots never objected to their minority representation being used by the British as a tool to thwart the Greek Cypriots. The Turks could see no reason why the island should be allowed to become part of Greece. In fact they declared that if any changes were to be made in the island's status, it should be the return of Cyprus to Turkey to which it had originally belonged. They maintained that the proximity of the island to the Turkish mainland further justified such a retrocession. Since the island had been taken from Turkey by Britain as a trust, the rights of the original owners could not be sacrificed entirely, even though the island had become a crown colony, completely independent of any connection with Turkey. Since the Turkish Cypriots realized that there was little likelihood of the island being returned to Turkey, they emphasized the maintenance of the status quo. They constantly put forth the question as to why the Greeks should be given rights which would undoubtedly affect the Turkish Cypriots adversely. But they didn't offer any positive compromise policy at that time.

In viewing the situation, it is very difficult

to form an accurate impression of the political climate in Cyprus during this period. For one thing, much, if not most, of the opinion expressed was quite prejudiced. Hill illustrates this point by quoting a commissioner in Cyprus, who in 1938, very rightly pointed out that pictures of grave discontent and of general satisfaction were both equally false.<sup>6</sup> The English were told what they wanted to hear and the visiting journalists got the copy they wanted. Likewise the priests and other Greek Cypriot leaders told the people what would best advance their cause.

Throughout the entire period of British occupation, the Greek inhabitants of the island pressed for the realization of Enosis. One of the characteristics of the movement was the continually repeated requests and demands made to the British government, in the hope of achieving this aim. The Greek Cypriots took advantage of every opportunity which presented itself to press for union with Greece. There are numerous examples which can be cited by way of illustration.

For example, on the occasion of the official statement declaring Cyprus a Crown Colony, May 1, 1925, Archbishop Cyril presented a solemn protest:

We express in the name of the clergy and people their very deep grief and lay an emphatic protest against the renewed ignoring, by this political action, of the indefeasible historic national rights of the Hellenic people of the Island to their national restoration, which it was expecting soon to receive from the liberal English nation, and we declare that the burning and unalterable desire of the Hellenic people of the Island was, is and always will be its union with its mother Hellas.

L. S. Amery, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in his acknowledgement of the request, informed the Archbishop that the question of Union of Cyprus with Greece had been finally closed and could not be reopened. At the same time the Moslem, Armenian, Latin, and Maronite communities also protested against cession to Greece. These groups all sent memorials to London opposing the Greek Cypriot requests.

The fiftieth year of British occupation was 1928, and although it was not wise, the government decided that some official notice should be taken of it. The reply to the Governor's invitation to celebrate the Jubilee was a circular, issued by the bishops, the Greek members of the Legislative Council, and the mayors, protesting against the Occupation and recommending the people to boycott the celebrations. In over six hundred churches on the island on March 26, the liturgy was sung

for the salvation of the nation and the fulfilment of the Cypriot aspiration. There were noisy demonstrations for union all over the island. The Greek Cypriot politicians refused to attend the Birthday Review of the troops and the police at the annual Garden Party on June 4. On the same day, the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Cession, the bishops, the Greek members of the Council, and the mayors in the National Assembly, resolved to address the Secretary of State regretting that liberty had not been granted to the island. On August 1, Amery informed Parliament that no negotiations for any change in the future government of Cyprus was intended. "H. M. Government will continue to govern the Island in the general interests of the inhabitants as a whole."<sup>8</sup>

The expectation of a more sympathetic attitude on the part of the Labour Government prompted delivery to the British Secretary of State on July 20, 1929, of a Memorial from the Greek members of the Legislative Council. They asked, on behalf of the Greek inhabitants of the island, that Great Britain consent to satisfy a legitimate and just desire by sanctioning their political union with Greece, to which they were

bound by sacred ties of religion, language, long historical tradition, and national conscience. Cyprus was, without the knowledge of its people, subjected to British administration by virtue of the Treaty of 1878. The argument by which the above claim was opposed—the existence in the island of a small Turkish minority, the remnant of the conquering invaders of three hundred years before—was untenable. The island's political annexation to Greece would involve no danger whatever for the Turkish minority, whose rights might be safeguarded by special convention. The Memorial concluded by stating that it seemed to be a matter of little concern to Britain that the Greek inhabitants of Cyprus, who belonged to an historical race with a great tradition and who were on a standard of civilization with the rest of the Hellenic world, should be still administered in the same autocratic way that prevailed fifty years before. To this, Lord Passfield, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, replied:

My answer on this point can only be the same as that which successive Secretaries of State have in the past returned to similar demands, namely, that His Majesty's Government are unable to accede to it. This subject, in their view, is definitely closed and cannot profitably be further discussed.<sup>9</sup>

The Moslems of Cyprus quickly retaliated, and in

September the Turkish members of the Legislative Council sent a Memorial on behalf of the Turkish community protesting against the terms of the Greek Memorial.

In February, 1930, The Times correspondent said that Lord Passfield's reply to the deputation had had a sobering effect. Union, he declared was not wanted at all by Turkish Cypriots or the rural Greek Cypriot population, and only half-heartedly by the townspeople. In April a Greek Cypriot mukhtar said that eighty percent of the villages desired to remain British and would vote against union if they were free to do so.<sup>10</sup>

On July 2, 1930 a Resolution was presented to the Governor. The Resolution had previously been presented to the village commissioners who were asked to endorse the Enosis cause. Of the four hundred and ninety-six villages where it was presented, in sixty-six all, and in fifty-two some, of the commissioners refused to endorse it. The result of this was that in November, 1930, representatives of the National Organization and the Greek members of the Legislative Council decided that all Greek members of the district councils should be advised not to reappoint any mukhtars or azas who

had refused to sign. The Village Authorities Law of 1931, put an end to these coercive measures on the part of the Greek Cypriot leaders. The response to the Resolution and the action on the part of the Greek Cypriot leaders did tend to suggest however that Enosis was imposed from the top, rather than being entirely a spontaneous movement developing from the masses.

During the elections of October 15, 1930, the intransigents who proclaimed union with Greece as the sole remedy to their troubles, were triumphantly successful. However the Under-Secretary for the Colonies, Drummond Sheils, said that no British Government could get the support of Parliament or the British people for any proposal for the cession of Cyprus to another power. In November and December the Archbishop continued to ask for Enosis. The Address in Reply to the Governor's speech at the opening of the Legislative Council in 1931, confined itself to a reaffirmation of the will of the Hellenic people, comprising four-fifths of the population, for union with Greece.

By 1931 the abstract and a priori desire for union with Greece had been sharpened by a conflict over the

control of education in Cyprus, and also by an important practical difference of opinion and policy between the British authorities and the Greek members of the Legislative Council over the public finances, which in Cyprus, as in many other countries were feeling the strain of the world-wide economic depression. The demand for union with Greece was one, even if it was not the chief of the motives for the disturbances of 1931.

Like many Greek risings at various times and places against Ottoman rule, the Greek rising in Cyprus against British rule, in October 1931, was headed by a prelate of the Orthodox Church. At this time it was the Bishop of Kitium. On October 17, in his Manifesto, he proclaimed that the only salvation, from all points of view, for the Greek Cypriots, was by uniting with Greece. The foreign ruler, to whose illegal laws the Cypriots owed no obedience, must be made to leave the country.<sup>11</sup> On October 20, he made a rousing and inflammatory speech at Limassol, at which time he declared:

. . . In the name of God and people I declare the union with mother Greece and the disobedience and insubordination towards the illegal laws of the immoral, vile and reproachful regime which is called "English regime", and which rules Cyprus

without any human right, without our consent  
 . . . . there is no doubt that English reign will  
 fall one day because it is dishonest and immoral  
 . . . . The time has come to show to the foreign  
 rulers that we must live free under the Hellenic  
 flag. Down with the vile and reproachful regime.  
 Long live Union.<sup>12</sup>

Next on October 18, the Cyprus National Radicalist Union was formed, which had as its aim, "the fanatical pursuit of the union of Cyprus with the Greek political whole". It also believed that the annexation of Cyprus to Greece not only would satisfy an inalienable human right but was the only means of creating suitable conditions for the real spiritual and material progress of the inhabitants of the island.<sup>13</sup> Simultaneously, the National Radicalist groups began to appear in the villages in close association with the National Youth Clubs, or else as independent bodies.

The degree to which the outbreak represented the feelings of all the Greek Cypriots is difficult to ascertain. The British thought that the Greek Cypriot national movement, while general and genuine among the urban minority, was neither spontaneous nor deep-rooted among the peasantry. The Resolution circulated to the village authorities in 1929 for their signature certainly indicated that the dissatisfaction with British rule

was not universal among the Greek Cypriots at that time. It was only after pressure had been applied by the ecclesiastical authorities and the National Organization that the attitude to the British administration became totally antagonistic. Among the Turkish minority there was a further hardening of feeling toward the Greek Cypriots and the Enosis movement.

The attitude of the Greek Government toward the whole affair was correct, and Venizelos did his best to moderate the position of the Greek Cypriots. The Greek Government could not interfere in a question which was an affair between Britain and Cyprus. There was much sympathy for the Cypriots among the Greeks. However even though Premier Venizelos maintained a correct attitude, he still felt that, as in the case of the Ionian Islands and Crete, Cyprus would eventually form part of Greece. He stated in the Chamber on November 18, 1931 that:

If Great Britain likes to regard the question as a closed question, it cannot but be closed. Yet, after addressing myself to the Cypriot people and speaking to them in rather a hard and painful manner, I thought I was equally justified in adding that the question of the realization of the Cypriot demands is not a closed question in my estimation.<sup>14</sup>

The unrest on the island subsided surprisingly.

rapidly. The centenary of the declaration of Greek independence on March 25, 1932, passed very quietly in Cyprus. There was not a single incident. On December 21, 1932, Sir <sup>Philip</sup> Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated that the situation in Cyprus was generally satisfactory.<sup>15</sup> The open agitation for Enosis gradually died down.

Throughout the remainder of the 1930s there was very little agitation for Enosis on the island. This was probably due in great part to the fact that many of the Greek Cypriot leaders had been deported to England. In fact a counter movement began to emerge, demanding autonomy for Cyprus in the British Empire. The plan comprehended self-government within the framework of the British Empire, implying that all questions affecting local administration should be left in the hands of a democratically-elected government, while questions of foreign policy and defense should be reserved for the Imperial Government. Also economic readjustment, including a settlement of the Tribute question, was to be left in Imperial hands. This movement developed, possibly as a result of the change in Greek Cypriot leadership.

Unfortunately for the Cypriots the reaction of the British during this period was not only always a blunt refusal to any change in the island's status, but also took the form of retaliatory repressive legislation, the Illiberal Laws. Enosis clashed with British imperial policy, and the result of this clash was that since the Cypriots did not prove too troublesome to the British authorities, the movement did not have to be given a great deal of consideration.

The war created many new problems which affected the Cypriots considerably. The new conditions resulted, to a certain extent, in a sense of responsibility, as the people were stimulated by the allied cause. The fact that by 1941 an estimated thirty thousand Cypriot troops, inspired by the Italian and German campaigns against Greece in 1940 and 1941, played a part in the war activities,<sup>15</sup> in spite of the opposition to recruiting offered by the trade unions, did not mean that the agitation for Enosis ceased. With the emergence of trade unionism as a recognized political force in 1941, there was a recrudescence of Enosist activity. Throughout the war years, the three main political parties—AKEL, the Progressive Party of the Working People; KEK,

the Cyprus National Party; and PEK, the Cyprus Rural Union—each worked for a programme of greater political rights and for union with Greece. Despite the political and ideological differences among them, all the Greek political parties and associations on the island were united in the common aim of union with Greece. During the municipal elections of 1943, many candidates successfully advanced their campaigns by advocating the cause of Enosis.

In spite of British defeats, most Cypriots favoured the allies. This was due, in great part, to the military aid Britain sent to Greece when she was invaded by Italy in 1940 and by Germany in 1941. A common belief was that Britain would cede Cyprus to Greece after the war. This was partly the result of Churchill's message to the Greek Prime Minister, on the anniversary of the Italian attack on Greece, on November 15, 1941, at which time he declared: "Their [the Greek people's] martyrdom will be avenged by the Pan-Hellenic Army of liberation. The unity of all her sons and daughters behind their king and Government in the cause of their Fatherland will bring its own reward."<sup>17</sup> The Greek Prime Minister stated: "I visualize Great Greece as including North

Epirus, the Dodecanese, Macedonia, Cyprus . . . ."18

The result was that the Governor was authorized to state that there had been no negotiations between the British and Greek Governments regarding the post-war status of Cyprus, and the question of transferring the island to Greece was not under consideration.

When in August 1944, Sir Cosmo Parkinson, acting on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, visited Cyprus, the three principal organizations, AKEL, KEK, and PEK, were persuaded by the ecclesiastical authorities to present to him a joint memorial, asking for union. As might be expected there was a demand that the fate of Cyprus should be one of the questions to be settled after the war.

The Turkish Cypriot attitude toward Enosis remained adamant. They continued to protest against any proposal for self-government or union with Greece. They did not believe that Britain would leave the island. However if she did, they maintained that Cyprus should go back to Turkey, its previous suzerain and nearest neighbour, who was in a better position than any other state to defend it. Although they did not necessarily approve of the British administration—for they were subject

to the same illiberal laws as the Greeks—they could see no other alternative at that time.

After the war, in August 1946, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a statement in the House of Commons, proposed a plan for the reform of the government of the island. However, any plan for improving conditions in Cyprus was liable to weaken the desire of the Greek population for Enosis. According to one historian,<sup>19</sup> this was a severe threat to the cause of union and it was inevitable therefore that the Ethnarchic Council should notify the British Government that it rejected categorically and with indignation any solution of the Cyprus question which did not grant union with Greece.<sup>20</sup> In December 1946, a delegation from the Ethnarchic Council, headed by the acting Archbishop Leontios, visited London to inform the Government that the proposed constitution could not meet with the approval of the people whose only demand was for Enosis. The Colonial Secretary refused the demand, but urged the committee to accept the constitutional offer. At the same time the Turkish minority also sent a delegation to London to oppose union with Greece and to accept the offer. Once more Enosist hopes in a Labour Government

were dashed, as Mr. Creech-Jones had stated definitely that no change in the status of the island was contemplated.<sup>21</sup>

Another delegation was received by the Colonial Secretary in February 1947, at which time the usual requests were presented. The familiar arguments were the Greek nature of the island and its people in religion, language, tradition, and national consciousness. Since nothing but union would suffice, constitutional reforms and economic schemes recently announced were rejected. However the rights of the Turkish minority would be safeguarded, and also arrangements would be made with the Greek Government, so that British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean would not be impaired.<sup>22</sup> Again the reply was that no change in the status of the island was contemplated by the British Government, which had invited the cooperation of the people of Cyprus in a more liberal constitution and in a programme of social and economic welfare.<sup>23</sup> During the remainder of 1947, and in 1948 and 1949, a similar line of conduct was followed. The Greek Cypriot leaders continued to request Enosis and the British authorities continued to state that there was to be no change in the status of the island.

In 1948, during the agitation over the constitutional proposals, King Paul of Greece expressed his opinion to C. L. Sulzberger, an American journalist:

Greece certainly desires and will continue to desire the union of Cyprus to the rest of Greece. It is difficult to understand why this has not yet been effected.

The argument that this might interfere with British security positions is not valid. Were Cyprus to be given to Greece as the vast majority of its population desires, this would in no way interfere with any military or other bases Britain has established there.

Furthermore, if it could be arranged under the United Nations, Greece would be prepared to offer further base facilities to Britain or the United States in Crete or elsewhere . . . .<sup>24</sup>

This seemed to be a repetition of the national feeling already expressed in the Greek Parliament. The Prime Minister, Mr. Sophoulis, declared that the Greek Government bearing in mind the delicate circumstances, felt that to keep rousing public opinion on the Cyprus question would not promote the issue, but on the contrary, might actually damage the country's international position.

Toward the end of the year 1949, the Orthodox Church prepared for the holding of a plebiscite on Enosis. In December, Archbishop Markarios II issued an Encyclical calling on the people to take part in the plebiscite. At the same time he sent a letter to the Governor

informing him of the decision, and asked the Government to conduct the plebiscite under its own authority, freely and impartially. The Governor refused the offer, knowing that the result would probably be the same, whoever conducted it. The plebiscite was held during the week from January 15 to 22, 1950. All Greek Cypriots over the age of eighteen had the opportunity to append their signature to a document in favour of union with Greece. In other words this was an open vote, not a secret ballot. Of the 224,747 Greek Cypriots eligible to vote, 215,108 or ninety-six percent endorsed the Enosist movement. On February 8, the Archbishop communicated the results to the Governor, Sir Andrew Wright, who simply declared the question of union as closed.

Attempts were made among the officials of the British government to minimize the importance of the plebiscite. In February 1954, Lord Winster, speaking in the House of Lords declared:

I know perfectly well that the Archbishop has carried out propaganda in the island and that following the best Russian example . . . the result has been a hundred per cent. vote in favour of Enosis. I never expected anything else. To my mind the plebiscite ran absolutely according to form.<sup>25</sup>

Although this is a harsh indictment, it seems evident

that coercive measures were used. Also the fact that no secrecy of opinion was tolerated probably had a very great bearing on the result. According to one commentator when the Church held its plebiscite on Enosis in 1950, "the people were threatened with spiritual sanctions—that is, with exclusion from the sacraments—if they did not vote as they were told, an irresistible form of blackmail when applied to a God-fearing people . . . . The pulpits of Cyprus have become platforms for the preaching of Enosis rather than the Gospel."<sup>26</sup>

However the plebiscite provided a useful foundation upon which the Greek Cypriot leaders could rest their claim for Enosis. Actually it did not demonstrate conclusively, the road the Greek Cypriots wished to follow. But it had the effect of uniting the Orthodox community into a single, tightly-knit group. After the plebiscite a new urgency was given to the demand for union, and a systematic campaign for its achievement was inaugurated by the Ethnarchic Council under the auspices of Makarios III, who was elected to the archiepiscopal throne on October 18, 1950. Makarios now emerged as the dominant personality of the island.

The year 1951 was a year of internal consolidation

and increased national manifestations among the Greek Cypriots. The Ethnarchy orientated its policy in two directions: towards the United States and towards the Greek Government. The attitude of the Greek Government changed at this time as it was receiving assistance from the United States and was no longer dependent on Great Britain. On February 11, Prime Minister Venizelos officially advocated Enosis in the Chamber of Deputies. In November the Greek delegate to the United Nations raised the question of Cyprus.

From October 1952 to March 1953, Makarios visited the United States, Great Britain, France and Greece, where at press conferences and meetings with many leading personalities, including delegates to the United Nations General Assembly, he raised the demand for union. The Greek Government, constantly appealed to by the Cypriots, made overtures to Britain only to be rebuffed. About these moves, Anthony Eden said later that, "certain informal approaches have been made and there have been statements by Greek official spokesmen indicating that the Greek Government would like to hold bilateral discussion." He added it was made clear that his Government could not agree to discuss the status of Cyprus.<sup>27</sup>

Again in April 1953, Makarios made the request for Enosis. He asked the Governor to offer self-determination by giving effect to the 1950 plebiscite, at which time eighty percent of the total population, he claimed, showed their desire to incorporate with Greece. Concurrently with this request, the Turks strongly opposed the union. Sir Andrew Wright replied to Makarios that, "as has been repeatedly made clear, Her Majesty's Government do not contemplate any change in the sovereignty of Cyprus and regard as closed the question you seek to raise".<sup>28</sup> In February, 1954, The Times expressed what seemed to be the opinion of the British government.

So long as the only subject for debate is the ultimate status of Cyprus there can be no agreement and so no progress. But whatever the political destinies of Cyprus may be it is clear that its people will need much more training in the arts of government if they are going to play an effective part.<sup>29</sup>

In March, 1954, the Greek Government stated that it was prepared to cede to Britain as many military bases as might be needed on Cyprus, the Greek mainland, and Crete, when the island was handed over to them. Again, Eden announced that the British Government would not discuss Cyprus with Greece. Thwarted and irritated, Greek opinion was epitomized by the Ethnos, which declared:

"The die is cast. The clash is between morality and imperialism."<sup>30</sup> In May, Makarios emphasized that only the end of British rule would satisfy the demands of Cypriot nationalism.

The situation was precipitated into a crisis on July 28, 1954, when Mr. Hopkinson, the Minister of State for the Colonies, announced proposals for a new constitution, and at the same time stated that owing to its particular circumstances in the Commonwealth, Cyprus could never expect to be fully independent. The issue aroused intense feeling on the island, and it was heightened by the warning given by the Attorney-General of Cyprus on August 2, that the existing sedition law was to be enforced. Any advocacy, spoken or written, in favour of Enosis, or change of the sovereignty of the island would constitute sedition and would be punishable by imprisonment of up to five years and in the case of newspapers, of suspension for up to three years. The Ethnarchy sent immediate protests to London and to Greece, a twenty-four hour general strike was declared, the newspapers instituted a one-week strike, and Archbishop Makarios openly defied the ban when he spoke advocating Enosis, at Trooditissa Monastery, on August

15. No action was taken and the law was left in abeyance.

The attitude of the Greek Cypriots was clearly indicated in their reaction to the British treatment. With self-determination barred in perpetuity, a section of the Cypriot nationalists began to embrace violence as a way out of the impasse. The feeling was nearly explosive and very similar to that of October 1931. There was a difference. By 1954 the people were much better organized, and willing to fight for what they considered their rights.

The Cypriot Turk at this time was anxious for the continuance of British rule, but still felt strongly that, if there were to be a change in the island's national status, it could only be made in favour of Turkey. The people and Government of Turkey shared this view with determined conviction. The revival of militant Enosis after 1950 had the effect of making the Cypriot Turk more Turkish-minded than they had been for centuries. Following the example of the Greeks, Cypriot Turks took to hoisting the red and white flag of the Turkish Republic on the minarets of their mosques. Loyal British subjects though they were, they felt at

this time for the efficient Ankara Republic something they were never able to feel for the decaying Empire of Abdul Hamid II.<sup>31</sup>

The Greek attitude at last became definite. In fact the Cypriot question was projected on to the international stage with the submission of a Greek resolution to the United Nations asking that the principle of self-determination should be applied. On September 23, 1954, the Greek representative, Mr. Alexis Kyrrou, placed before the steering committee of the General Assembly the following resolution:

Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus.<sup>32</sup>

Mr. Kyrrou said that the Cyprus position had become unsatisfactory from both the ethical and legal standpoints. As a consequence a situation had developed between the United Kingdom and Greece which it was incumbent upon the United Kingdom to adjust, and dangers had arisen which it behooved the United Nations to prevent. He went on to state that the Greek Government had for years tried to bring about bilateral talks to find a solution but the British Government had refused. He was asking only for Cyprus to have the right of self-

determination. Mr. Kyrou mentioned in the course of the debate, as arguments in support of the resolution, the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1863, the British offer of Cyprus to Greece in 1916, the fact that eighty percent of the population was Greek and desired to be a part of Greece, and the results of the plebiscite of 1950 which proved their desires for Enosis.<sup>33</sup>

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd presented the British case to the steering committee. He pointed out that geographically Cyprus was not a part of Greece, as it was ten times farther from Greece than Turkey. It had never, except for a brief period in the fourth century before Christ, belonged to Greece. He declared that the Cypriots had no legal right to self-determination. He asked what good would self-determination do the Cypriots as they had fared well under British rule. What right had a Government to acquire territory from another, by simply applying to the United Nations? Finally he pointed out the particularly important fact that political, social and military stability in the Middle East might be gravely endangered by the consequences of inscribing the item.<sup>34</sup>

On September 24, the General Steering Committee decided by a vote of nine to three with three abstentions to recommend the Cypriot Resolution to the General Assembly Agenda. On September 29, at a plenary session of the Assembly, the Cyprus question was put on the agenda of the Assembly by a vote of thirty to nineteen with eleven abstentions. The item was assigned to the First Political and Security Committee, which met on December 14. The official British opinion on the Greek proposal was that it did not obtain an absolute majority with the General Steering Committee. The size of the vote against inscription and the number of abstentions demonstrated that there was a substantial body of opinion in the Assembly which either opposed discussion of the Cyprus item or doubted the wisdom and appropriateness of the decision. There was no doubt that the danger of bringing territorial claims of this nature before the United Nations received wide recognition among the delegates.<sup>35</sup>

When the item was brought before the First Political and Security Committee on December 14, it led to considerable discussion over procedure. New Zealand introduced a draft resolution calling on the Assembly to decide not

to consider further the Cyprus question. The committee decided by twenty-eight votes to fifteen with sixteen abstentions that this draft Resolution should have priority in the proceedings over the Greek proposal. On December 15, the operative text of the General Assembly's Resolution, as amended by the delegations from El Salvador and Columbia, was presented as follows:

The General Assembly,  
Considering that, for the time being it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus.  
Decides not to consider further the item entitled "Application, under the auspices of the United Nations of the principle of equal rights of self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus."<sup>36</sup>

The Committee recommendation received an endorsement in the General Assembly by a vote of fifty to none, with eight abstentions. Mr. Kyrou explained that Greece voted for it because of the phrase, "for the time being", and the fact that the Resolution did not close the Cypriot issue. Mr. Nutting, the British representative, regarded the vote as representing "a great and important victory for common sense".<sup>37</sup> He also declared that Great Britain had accepted the Resolution, but that the vote did not imply acceptance of the Assembly's competence in the matter in the future.

British official opinion is further exemplified in the words of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the Minister of State, who said that in the British view, Greece was " . . . in effect asking the United Nations to interfere in the domestic affairs of a foreign power in order to effect a territorial change favourable to herself".<sup>38</sup> Mr. Nutting at a later date declared:

. . . Enosis does not mean self-government. It means in fact the opposite; agitation for enosis can only hamper and delay ordinary progress towards self-government of the Greek as well as the Turkish-speaking inhabitants of Cyprus.<sup>39</sup>

In fact, the importance of Cyprus as a strategic necessity was not concealed from the United Nations Committees. In October, Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, said:

I repeat that these arrangements contemplate no change in the sovereignty of Cyprus. In the present troubled state of the world we cannot foresee a time when a relinquishment of our sovereignty of Cyprus would be compatible with our responsibilities for security in the Middle East.<sup>40</sup>

Neither the Greek Cypriot supporter of Enosis nor the Greek Government were prepared to admit that Britain's defense obligations required that she retain sovereignty over the island. In sponsoring the Greek Cypriot demand for self-determination, neither the Greeks nor the Cypriots

entertained the idea of a withdrawal of British forces from the island, but pointed out that they would be retained under more amicable conditions if Cyprus were granted self-determination.

Among the Greek Cypriots the result of the Resolution was deep disappointment. The new factor of resistance appeared in Cypriot politics. The terrorism which followed was to a great extent the product of prolonged political frustration.

The Enosist movement, which was very closely connected to the political and constitutional development of the period, paralleled that development very closely. It was thwarted political hope which drove the Greek Cypriots to an uncompromising policy of Enosis. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots, as was to be expected, resisted every attempt on the part of the Orthodox community to achieve its aim. They saw maintenance of the status quo as their only hope, and they looked to British Colonial status as a system which safeguarded their rights.

It was obvious that as the Enosist movement advanced, the relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots should become continually worse, and the chance of an amicable settlement less likely. It must not be forgotten

that the British, as well as having to deal with the fanatical Enosist movement, also had to face a hard core of Turkish resistance. Even so, it seems evident that this Cypriot dilemma was not particularly well handled during this thirty-year period. If the British Government had allowed a more liberal administration, and greater Cypriot participation in government activity, the Enosist movement might not have reached the proportions it did. When Britain was willing to grant independence to such countries as Burma, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, it seems difficult to understand why such a very definite attitude of refusal should be adopted in the case of Cyprus. Yet the basic problem was complex. Britain, as a result of strategic necessity and the seeming impossibility of working out a satisfactory compromise solution, was not willing to surrender any control of the island until she was absolutely forced to do so. It took four years of terrorism and civil strife before the compromise policy of Commonwealth status could be worked out.

### FOOTNOTES

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22. The Times, Feb. 28, 1947, p. 3d.
23. Ibid., Feb. 8, 1947, p. 4e.
24. The New York Times, July 28, 1948, p. 14c.
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27. 525 H. C. Deb. 5s, Mar. 15, 1954, col. 8.
28. The Times, Apr. 29, 1953, p. 5b.
29. Ibid., Feb. 25, 1954, p. 7d-e.
30. Ibid., Feb. 18, 1954, 6f.
31. "Enosis," Round Table, p. 139. Abdul Hamid II was Grand Vezir of Cyprus from 1876-78.
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## CHAPTER 4

### THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE FINAL SETTLEMENT, 1954-60

The final years of British administration of Cyprus form a tragic picture of terrorism, repression, and struggle to find a solution to the many formidable problems with which the colony was faced. From December 1954—when for the first time the question of the self-determination of the people of Cyprus came before the United Nations General Assembly and suffered defeat—there was a hardening of the resistance movement to British policy. A Dutch writer declared at that time that after the United Nations decision of 1954, the "repressive violence of the colonial ruler was answered with rebellious, offensive violence of the guerilla-fighter, the maquis, or as it is known in colonial

terminology, 'the cowardly terrorist'."<sup>1</sup> The development of violence and terrorism was largely due to two people, Archbishop Makarios and Colonel Grivas. Their efforts led to the organization calling itself the Revolutionary Organization for Cypriot Struggle, EOKA, which was formed at this time.

George Grivas, a retired Greek army officer, came to Cyprus near the end of October, 1954 to begin the organization of the resistance movement. Grivas was born in Cyprus in 1898, and had moved to Greece after the First World War. During the Second World War, he commanded a Greek army division in the Albanian campaign during the war between Italy and Greece in 1940-41, and was the leader of a secret organization during the German occupation of Greece. In 1945 he headed an extreme nationalist movement against the communists. In this political venture he was unsuccessful, and he remained unknown until his arrival in Cyprus in 1954. The actual EOKA bombings, sabotage, and other terrorist activities did not begin until the end of March, 1955. At this time grenade explosions in Nicosia and other Cyprus towns began, and were directed against the Government, the police and the British military

organization. The campaign flowered into one of intimidation, murder, violence and terrorism, and continued intermittently from this date until the final truce in December 1958. It is clear from the secret documents known as the Grivas Diaries, that Makarios was in fact the real leader of the national liberation struggle.<sup>2</sup> When the British Government announced the capture of the EOKA documents on August 27, 1956, it was found that the Diaries contained numerous references to Makarios, indicating that he had personally taken part in the foundation and initial operational planning of EOKA, that his approval had been sought for the date of the commencement of operations, and that he had provided funds which were used for procuring arms for the terrorists. The authenticity of these documents has never been conclusively proved. Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, was satisfied as to their authenticity. The Greek Government alleged that they had been forged. There seemed no valid reason for the British Government to forge such documents, as they would bring little advantage. Makarios's part in the organization was important. A biographer states that from the beginning, Makarios showed by his public

utterances, and even more significantly by his silences, that he was wholly behind EOKA.<sup>3</sup> This is shown by his admission on July 25, 1959, that he had had a secret meeting with Grivas in August 1955,<sup>4</sup> ten months after the latter arrived in Cyprus.

As far as the organization was concerned it is difficult to establish the exact size of EOKA. In March 1959, between two and three hundred men took part in a victory procession which marched through Nicosia. This was really no indication of the size. Other estimates place the number as low as sixty or seventy men.<sup>5</sup> This information does not necessarily give an accurate picture either.

After beginning in March 1955, the terrorist activities continued throughout the summer and accelerated before the holding of the London Tripartite Conference on Cyprus, which was held at the end of August and early September of that year. To cope with this problem Field-Marshal Sir John Harding was made Governor in the summer of 1955. On July 15, 1955, an emergency law was passed giving the Governor power to detain any person who he was satisfied had belonged to, or was a member of, any organization which had been responsible for acts

of violence directed at the overthrow of the Government. On August 2, the Greek Cypriots protested against this law with a general strike and riots. At this time, anti-British and pro-Enosist broadcasts began to be directed toward Cyprus by Athens radio. Another emergency law was promulgated on August 4, banning firearms to all under the age of twenty-one, and also stating that all firearms must be licensed.

By September 1955, a Turkish Cypriot resistance movement had developed, chiefly as a reaction to the Greek Cypriot terrorist activities. Volkan, a Turkish secret organization, was formed, and it threatened reprisals against EOKA.

During the winter of 1955-56, concurrent with the Harding-Makarios talks which attempted to arrive at an agreement, there was increased terrorist activity on the part of the outlawed EOKA. Governor Harding proclaimed a state of emergency, with the death penalty for anyone caught with firearms, bombs, grenades, or any type of explosive. Continued anti-British broadcasts from Athens radio influenced the Cypriots. Even education was disturbed at this time, and many elementary and secondary schools had to be closed. On November 27,

1955, an emergency law pronouncing the death penalty for anyone found in possession of arms of any type was promulgated. Sabotage was to be punished by life imprisonment. Even the unlawful wearing of a military uniform was punishable by life imprisonment. Harbouring or aiding the terrorists was punishable with a sentence of up to seven years imprisonment. At his time collective punishment for communities engaged in unlawful activities was given legal sanction. In fact the situation had deteriorated to the extent that by the end of November, 1955, there were ten thousand troops in Cyprus on a war footing. In his New Year's message, Harding warned the people that EOKA was doomed, and that the British forces were slowly closing in around it. The British were meeting violence and terrorism with repression, but not too successfully.

By this time it was well known that Makarios was deeply involved in the terrorist organization, and on March 9, 1956, he and three others were arrested and deported to the Seychelles, under Regulation VII of the Emergency Powers Regulations. The Government explained its action on the grounds that Makarios was implicated in EOKA activity, and that he had broken

off discussions. The official statement given at this time was that the Archbishop had chosen to reject the offer of a new and constructive approach to the island's political problems and had continued to seek to gain his ends by force. With that approach he had finally removed any compunction which the Governor might have felt against dealing with him not as a responsible political leader, and still less as the head of a Christian Church, but in the character which he himself had chosen to prefer: the leadership of a political campaign which relied on the use of ruthless violence and terrorism.<sup>6</sup> Although this statement might have presented certain truths, it ignored the fact that the political leadership had for centuries been executed by the high dignitaries of the Orthodox Church in all regions previously controlled by the Ottomans. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Fisher, expressed shock that one of the heads of the oldest of Churches in the world should be exiled. He also stated that it was shocking that the Archbishop should take the lead in a political matter and involve himself in the passionate partialities which political incitement always involves. He continued by stating that the British

Government must recognize that despite his activities, he remained the head of an independent Church. The Archbishop revealed that on a previous occasion Makarios had said to him: "I am sincerely afraid that an official condemnation of events by myself would not find at the present stage the necessary response, but would involve the risk of exposing me rather unprofitably."<sup>7</sup> At the same time, the Archbishop of Canterbury made three proposals for Cyprus: that a constitution should be drawn up along the lines of correspondence between the Governor and Archbishop; that the Greek, Turkish, and British Governments should issue an appeal to end terrorism; and that Makarios's exile should end when public order was restored and negotiations with him resumed.

Among the members of the Labour opposition the deportation of Makarios was strongly opposed. The opposition leader, Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, stated to the press on March 9, that the Archbishop's deportation seemed to him "an act of folly which will only make the insurgents more determined in their fight for self-determination and therefore encourage terrorist outrages against our own troops."<sup>8</sup> Also to the press, Mr. Clement

Davies, the Liberal leader, described the deportation as "an act of madness", adding that "nothing is more likely to stir up animosity and feeling of intense anger among the people of the island".<sup>9</sup>

In the House of Commons, on March 14, Mr. Aneurin Bevan moved a motion condemning British action in connection with Cyprus. He stated, "We are doing the name of Great Britain great damage in almost every part of the world".<sup>10</sup> In reply, Sir Anthony Eden declared:

We do not withdraw. Our immediate purpose must be to defeat terrorism so that the individual citizens in Cyprus—and there are plenty who want a quiet life—can enjoy personal security, and to go on trying to resolve the conflicting interests in this intractable problem. We must safeguard the strategic needs of our country and our allies. Neither NATO obligations, nor the Tripartite Declaration, nor the Bagdad Pact, can be effectively carried out unless we have the sure and unfettered use of Cyprus. But there is more in it even than this. The Government must be concerned to protect the vital interests of its citizens. The welfare, and, indeed the lives of our people depend on Cyprus as a protective guard and staging base to take care of those interests, above all oil. That is no [sic] imperialism. It should be the plain duty of any Government, and we intend to discharge it.<sup>11</sup>

Mr. Francis Noel-Baker, for the opposition, implored the Colonial Secretary for the sake of the good name of Britain, and for the hope of peace in the Middle

East, and for the sake of the lives of the British servicemen and the Cypriots, to take up negotiations where they were left off in Nicosia a few weeks before.<sup>12</sup> Mr. Lennox-Boyd concluded the discussion for the government by stating that the Archbishop was not prepared to surrender a powerful weapon in his armoury lest he might fail to get everything he wanted in the political field and find it difficult to begin a campaign of terrorism again.<sup>13</sup>

The Greek reaction to the deportation was violent anti-British riots in Athens and elsewhere. On March 15 the Greek Government expressed the hope that negotiations could be continued when Makarios was allowed to return to the island. Resistance continued well into the summer. On June 3 the Greek Government lodged an urgent petition with the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe alleging that Britain had violated human rights in Cyprus. The Petition was ruled admissible and was considered by a special sub-committee before the next meeting of the Human Rights Commission in the following September. Zenon Rossides, a member of the Ethnarchy Council of Cyprus, declared:

After the banishment of the Archbishop and his

co-exiles which was equivalent to a sentence without a trial, the most ruthless repression began in Cyprus: executions, floggings, tortures during interrogations, detentions without trial, concentration camps, curfews, collective punishments and other measures entailing not only great suffering but also economic ruin for the Cypriots and the whole island.<sup>14</sup>

Although this statement did not present an accurate evaluation of the situation, it at least shows that by their actions the British were leaving themselves open to every type of criticism. Turkish public opinion and the Turkish press regarded the British action as fully justifiable in the light of events. There was no official statement on the part of the Turkish Government. The result in Cyprus to the deportation was that terrorist activities continued with even greater violence. There were increasing attacks against Turkish policemen and retaliatory attacks against Greek shops by the Turks. In fact conditions worsened to the extent that the British authorities decided to separate the Greek and Turkish areas of Nicosia with a barbed wire barrier. Mr. Griffith, a Labour M. P., accused the Government of creating hostility between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. He also pointed out that the deterioration in Anglo-Greek relations had weakened the position of NATO in a vital area of the world.<sup>15</sup>

At a press conference on March 18, Harding stressed that his policy for the future was to end terrorism, to promote prosperity, and to re-examine with impartiality all problems. He believed that political leadership would emerge only after the fear of terrorism and the organization of EOKA ceased to exist. He reiterated Britain's need for Cyprus. He was convinced that the only term the Archbishop would accept was the handing over to him of virtual control of the island. He stated that in the long run the Western world would benefit from the fact that at this critical stage the British Government did not take the easy and superficially popular course in Cyprus. He also commented on the role of the Greek Government:

It has been a very sad thing that the Cyprus situation has been the cause of a serious worsening of Anglo-Greek relations. The Greeks are old friends. In my opinion the failure of the Greek Government to control the violent and inflammatory broadcasts to Cyprus and its refusal to use its influence to end violence, have been major factors in the blowing up of this problem to its present dimensions. This brings no advantage to the people of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Britain, or the free world.<sup>16</sup>

This statement did not result in any improvement in the conditions on the island. The great majority of the terrorists had not yet begun to vent their

exasperation against the British. In an article published at this time, it was declared that EOKA was at least as much a movement of Greek against Greek as Greek against Briton. Indeed the resentment toward the British of the average Greek Cypriot was not the dominant factor in the Enosis movement, it was his fear of the EOKA terrorists. The article continued by describing the nature of EOKA. It stated that the organization was a fascist type minority group, a gang of bomb tossers rather than a home guard. Secondly it declared that although the entire membership of EOKA was Greek Cypriot, its top leaders were mainland Greeks. Thirdly it clarified that EOKA did not enjoy the active support of the population. Although many Cypriots sympathized with the objects of EOKA, the basic reason for the lack of cooperation with the Government seemed to be the result of intimidation.<sup>17</sup> Because of the British policy of concentrating exclusively on military repression, the Cypriots had the impression that the British had abandoned the search for a political solution. They were tempted to conclude that EOKA alone possessed the key that would unlock the door to self-determination.

By the middle of August 1956, the EOKA leaders asked for the suspension of violence. They stated that during a period of truce a solution could be worked out. Nevertheless the organization kept its arms ready. On August 22 the Government offered terms to EOKA. If the terrorists surrendered they might either go to Greece, never to return, or remain in Cyprus in detention till the end of the emergency. The truce lasted until August 28, at which time EOKA rejected that rather limited and uncompromising offer. Harding's opinion was that the truce was only a breathing space for the terrorists to manufacture more bombs, refurbish weapons, and recruit more men. The reason that led Colonel Grivas to issue his declaration cannot be accurately known. Conceivably he might have felt that violence had paid considerable dividends in budging the British from their refusal to acknowledge the Cypriot right of self-determination and that for the time being other methods might be more appropriate. It is also likely that Harding was right and the cease fire might well have been designed to make the best of a bad situation, to gain a respite for men hard pressed by British troops, and at the same time to put to the

test the British Government's sincerity in saying that terrorism was the great obstacle to a settlement. Before the end of August the truce had ceased. The terrorist activities were resumed when the truce was called off by EOKA, and terrorism reached a new peak in November 1956. On December 18, Harding announced that the emergency regulations would be considerably relaxed in the hope that Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposal, a recommendation prepared in the summer and fall of 1956, would mark the beginning of a new and happier chapter for Cyprus and its peoples. For the first three months of 1957 terrorism was somewhat less noticeable than in the previous months.

On March 14, 1957, EOKA offered to suspend terrorist activities, in response to the spirit of the recent United Nations resolution expressing a desire to see the peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of its Charter. They claimed they were ready to suspend terrorism as soon as the Ethnarch was set free. The British said that they later discovered from documents that at that time EOKA's morale was broken, and its organization disrupted. The British authorities stated that from the terrorists' point of view the truce

was a shrewd move designed to stop the Government's offensive against them. Several months later EOKA was ready to resume violence, having made good use of the truce interval to recoup its strength.<sup>18</sup> The Cyprus Government never regarded the truce as a genuine offer to end violence. But the British did slacken the anti-terrorist drive and relaxed the security measures. There was always hope that this might lead to some improvement in the political atmosphere.

On March 28, Mr. Lennox-Boyd informed the House of Commons that the British Government had agreed to release Makarios from detention in the Seychelles and to allow him to go anywhere he chose except Cyprus. In addition the Governor was prepared to offer a safe conduct out of the island to Colonel Grivas and any other foreign nationals who were members of EOKA, in order to promote a rapid return to peaceful conditions. Upon his release Makarios declared that he was prepared to have talks with the British Government only when he was allowed to return to Cyprus, and when the state of emergency was lifted.

The release of the Ethnarch was greeted with jubilation by the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots

were dismayed, and protested against the Archbishop's release. To prevent communal clashes, Harding imposed a dusk to dawn curfew for a few days after the announcement. In Greece Mr. Karamanlis issued a statement describing the release as a decisive step toward the solution of the Cyprus problem. In Turkey there was surprise and apprehension at the Archbishop's release.<sup>19</sup>

No terrorist activity took place between March 14 and the middle of July. On August 9, 1957, Harding revoked nearly half the Emergency Regulations. They were further relaxed on September 11. However, during the period of truce, EOKA increased activities against those it called traitors. It enforced strikes and organized memorial services for its members who had been killed by Security Forces. From August on, continued violence against left wing clubs and organizations including trade unions occurred. Persons holding office in local government were also the victims of attack. After September 1957 there was increasing counter-terrorism on the part of the Turkish community. In view of the Turkish Cypriots' insistence that the Cypriot question could only be solved by taksin, partition, in contrast to the Greek Cypriots' demand for Enosis,

tension between the two communities increased still further. The formation of a Turkish resistance organization in Cyprus, known as TMT, which had replaced the former Volkan Organization, had been announced in leaflets distributed throughout the island in November 1957.

In December, 1957, Sir Hugh Foot replaced Harding as Governor of Cyprus. Foot's liberal background and upbringing, his wide experience of service in the Mediterranean and Levant, including Palestine during the troubled years, his experience of constitution-making in the West Indies, his real sense of mission in the successful development of colonial self-rule all fitted him for the task. Above all, his task was to break down the barriers of mistrust and suspicion that the emergency had raised. He at once appealed for a new start, and he expressed his conviction that the overwhelming majority of the people would wish to accept the offer of friendship, understanding, and cooperation which he extended. From December 4 to 30, he visited all parts of the island. In the early part of 1958 there was a lull, but in March 1958 EOKA broke its truce, which in reality amounted to a passive resistance

campaign with a new and concentrated campaign of indiscriminate sabotage directed against service installations and government property and equipment. Official sources claimed that water pumps, agricultural and forestry stations, road-building machinery, irrigation projects and other public property were damaged or destroyed to an estimated value of £100,000 during the year.

From the middle of June till the end of August the Graeco-Turkish conflict in the island worsened. The month of July was marked by communal violence on an unprecedented scale, and cost the lives of almost a hundred Greek and Turkish Cypriot civilians. This was a record figure for any of the forty months of the Cypriot emergency. On July 31, Prime Minister Macmillan appealed for a cessation of violence, which resulted in another EOKA truce declared on August 4. By September the truce was broken and intensification of terrorism continued into September and October.

From October 1958 three large-scale anti-terrorist operations were carried out with notable success. They resulted in the death or capture of a number of Grivas's supporters, as well as a large haul of arms and

ammunition. Much of the success was due to Major-General Darling, under whose direction there was a marked change in the method and morale of the security forces. The actual tactics used were not greatly altered, but they were performed with much more efficiency and determination.

As a result of political agreement and hope for the future, EOKA declared a final truce on December 23. The British authorities responded by lifting curfews, releasing an increasing number of detainees, and removing various restrictions. However military operations against EOKA were continued.

Uncertainty over EOKA's attitude towards the London Agreements on Cyprus, the final solution, played a major part in moderating the Cypriots' enthusiasm for the settlement. In early March, 1959, over a fortnight after the agreements were signed, Grivas broke his silence, impressed no doubt by the Cypriots' reluctance to forgo the chance of peace and stability. He said that he was obliged to stop the struggle and he exhorted the Cypriots to close their ranks and unite round the Ethnarch, the symbol of unity and power. He added that although this was not the solution to

which they had aspired, he preferred to accept it, and to retire from politics either in Cyprus or in Greece, since the alternative seemed to be a national division in which they would lose everything. With frank reluctance Grivas had thus done the right thing.<sup>20</sup>

Sir Hugh Foot and the British authorities for their part did much to bring the island back to normal. Detainees and political prisoners were released. A calculated risk was taken when the Cyprus police were disarmed. The way was being cleared for the British and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to lay the foundations for the island's independence. By the middle of March the emergency was virtually at an end. EOKA had been practically disbanded, most of its army surrendered, and Grivas had left the island without disturbance. After the agreement Grivas declared that he was resolved not to mix in politics or public life either in Cyprus or in Greece, but would watch with deep emotion from afar the progress of his "tortured bleeding country".<sup>21</sup> Whatever Grivas's policies might have been during the four years of the emergency, at least he realized when the crisis was over that he was no longer of any assistance to Cyprus. As for the role of Grivas in

Cypriot history, opinion was varied; as the following two statements illustrate. On March 10, 1959, John Hall, a Conservative M. P. said of him:

. . . he should be remembered as a hired assassin who was very successful in carrying out many cowardly and brutal murders, but completely failed to achieve his object [that of Enosis or union of Cyprus with Greece].<sup>22</sup>

On the same day Makarios declared:

Colonel Grivas remains the central figure of this period. His military genius, his fighting spirit, his deep sense and national faith are perhaps unique in our national history. His virtues, which he has so fully demonstrated on the battle field, he is reaffirming to-day in the field of peace with his proclamation through which he calls the Cypriot people to unity and love so that they can build the bright edifice of young democracy.<sup>23</sup>

Whatever the opinion was on this man it is clear that his role in the Cypriot problem was decisive. He did much to bring about the change in the island's status. On April 1, the leaders of EOKA created a political organization known as EDMA, or the United Democratic Reconstruction Front. What was once a terrorist organization became a political group for reconstruction.

During the four years of civil strife and terrorism over five hundred were killed and well over a thousand wounded. These were from the armed services, the police, and civilians. Many died and were wounded during inter-

communal riots, which occurred chiefly during 1958. Whether the terrorism can be justified is a moot point. It seems that it was necessary before an agreement acceptable to the Cypriots could be reached. It is highly unlikely that Cyprus would have become an independent Republic when it did, if there had not been an era of violence. From examining the constitutional offers made before 1955, the above statement can be substantiated. Cyprus, like other colonies, had to rebel violently before it could obtain its freedom.

Attempts were made on the part of Greece to bring about a solution to the Cyprus problem through the United Nations. During the years from 1954 until 1959 the Cyprus case came before the United Nations General Assembly five times.<sup>24</sup> The appearance of the Cyprus problem in the United Nations General Assembly for five consecutive years certainly brought the issue onto the international stage. The main arguments were presented by Greece and Britain. Greece claimed that the people of Cyprus were entitled to the right of self-determination, the right to decide their own future. Britain declared that Greece as a foreign power did not have the right

to try and change the status of a country through an international tribunal; to acquire territory in this way could not be justified. Britain always maintained that self-determination for Cyprus would only result in chaos. The only solution was the development of self-government. Turkey, the third power involved, always agreed with the British opinion, and desired to maintain the status quo in accordance with previous treaties. Eventually Turkey declared that if self-determination were to be applied, it should be applied to both communities. However even though it may be concluded that while Britain and Turkey presented a very justifiable case, the proposal put forth by Greece was valid, and in line with the trend of the times. Although there were many factors complicating the issue, the case in its essence was that the majority of the Cypriot people were held by a dominating power against their wishes. Although United Nations had no success in the case of Cyprus, its action still might have had some influence on the final decision, and on the time of its occurrence.

Constitutional issues were constantly being considered during this period. The Tripartite Conference

of London was held to consider a constitutional agreement in the summer of 1955. In the winter of 1955-56, Makarios and Harding had discussions to try and arrive at a conclusion. The Radcliffe Constitutional Proposal was offered at the end of 1956. Macmillan's Partnership Plan was presented to the Cypriots in the summer of 1958, and Makarios's Proposals for independence were considered in the autumn. Finally an agreement satisfactory to all was arrived at during the Zurich and London talks, taking place at the beginning of 1959.

The first attempt to settle the Cyprus problem, made after the United Nations recommendation of December 1954, was the London Tripartite Conference. It was summoned by Sir Anthony Eden, on June 29, 1955, and included Britain, Greece and Turkey. In his memoirs, Eden stated that he was convinced that the Cyprus problem would only be resolved between the three Governments, British, Greek and Turkish. The best hope of reconciling the problem was by diplomacy and confidential talks. On the other hand he regarded Britain's alliance with Turkey as the first consideration in that part of the world.<sup>25</sup> Mr. Macmillan was to be the chairman. On July 16 Makarios, in Athens,

said he opposed the Greek acceptance, and would have preferred an immediate appeal to the United Nations. He felt that the Greek Government should have accepted the invitation only after Britain had given an undertaking to grant self-determination to Cyprus. On August 24, Mr. Menderes said that he would not accept a status of Cyprus incompatible with the interests of Turkey. On August 26 Dr. Kutchuk, the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, opposed Enosis.<sup>26</sup>

The Conference opened on August 29 and was suspended on September 7, pending further consideration by the Greek and Turkish Governments of the British proposals for granting self-government to Cyprus. Each government spokesman made an official statement after the conference.<sup>27</sup> Mr. Macmillan representing Britain said that Cyprus, under Britain, was a vital hinge of NATO and the Middle East defense system. Britain had a responsibility to European and Middle Eastern powers, and to discharge these responsibilities she needed not just a base, but the whole island and its facilities. He continued by declaring that the Government's first duty was to maintain law and order, and to endeavour to promote self-government. Britain would abandon

neither her interests nor her responsibilities for those for whom she was a trustee; but nevertheless she would not be inflexible.

Mr. Stephanopoulos, representing Greece, recognized the need for Britain's presence in Cyprus for defense purposes. He argued that the military and defense value of a British base in Cyprus would be enhanced were the ill feeling among the Cypriot population to be changed into a spirit of spontaneous and unqualified cooperation. This could be achieved only by granting self-government. Greece denied the right of any third power, including herself, to determine the fate of Cyprus. Greece repudiated all acts of violence on Cyprus.

Turkey's representative, Mr. Zorlu, in respect to the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, looked on Cyprus as purely a British problem. If any change in the status of the island were to be brought about, it should be in favour of Turkey, who needed it for strategic reasons. The principle of self-determination could not prevail over historical, geographical, strategic, and security requirements. He maintained that before self-government Cyprus needed a period of peace and quiet.

All three countries recognized their need to maintain

friendship, the important position of Cyprus to maintain Mediterranean and Middle East security, and the welfare of the Cypriots. The two problems to be settled which would determine the future of Cyprus were the introduction of a new constitution leading to internal self-government by the people, under the proper safeguards; and the future international status of Cyprus.

The British proposal, published on September 6, offered a new and liberal constitution leading to the fullest measure of internal self-government compatible with the strategic requirements of the existing international situation. The Constitution provided for an Assembly with an elected majority, a proportionate number of seats being reserved for the Turkish community. All departments of the Cyprus Government were to be subjected to the control of the Assembly, with the exception of foreign affairs, defense and public security, which would be reserved to the Governor. Safeguards were to be provided for the Turkish community, and a proportion of ministerial portfolios reserved to them. Cypriot chief ministers to head the new administration were to be chosen by the Assembly, with the approval of the Governor. It was planned that when the new constitution

came into effect that the tripartite conference would be reconvened with Cypriots present.

In answer to questions from the Turkish Foreign Minister, the British Foreign Secretary stated that the British Government did not intend to continue the present system indefinitely. Concerning self-determination Macmillan said that Britain did not accept that principle as one to be applied universally. He stated that exceptions must be made in view of geographical, traditional, historical, strategical, and other considerations.

Mr. Stephanopoulos said on his return to Athens that the Cypriots had the right to determine their own future in conformity with the United Nations Charter. He favoured the right of self-determination after a reasonable period of self-government. He claimed that the Cypriots were being treated differently from other members of the Commonwealth and Empire.

The discussions came to an inconclusive end. Indeed it was worse than inconclusive, as the effect had been to seriously worsen relations between Greece and Turkey while Britain's own position in Cyprus was not in the least improved. The Times stated that the delegates seemed to think that the British Government had then

worked themselves into a formidable position in which instead of being the villain of the piece, they had become the arbitrator between conflicting Greek and Turkish claims.<sup>28</sup> Although the British proposal seemed to be an advance on anything offered before, and would have given the island full self-government in all spheres except foreign affairs, security, and defense, other factors ruined its chance of success. Unfortunately Mr. Macmillan effectively damned these liberal proposals in Cypriot eyes by coupling them with the categorical statement that he could see no prospect of self-determination for Cyprus in the foreseeable future. Also he failed to offset this by making any constructive suggestions calculated to appeal to the Greek Government and induce it to cooperate in making a success of Cypriot self-government. Turkey aggressively opposed the idea of Cypriot self-determination, and thus evoked a new Graeco-Turkish tension, which made a solution more difficult. The three power conference worsened conditions on the island, and relations among the powers concerned. It seems reasonable to conclude that there could be no moral justification for sovereignty when exercised against the will of the governed, and there

could be little practical value in military establishments which were surrounded by a hostile population.

Following the failure of the London Conference, Britain entered into direct negotiations with Archbishop Makarios.<sup>29</sup> Makarios submitted to Sir John Harding a new plan in which he had abandoned the demand for a fixed time limit regarding the application to Cyprus of the right of self-determination. Instead he asked that the British Government recognize the principle of self-determination and leave for later negotiations with the elected representatives of the Cypriot people, the question of when and how it could be applied to the island. Under the proposal, the Cypriots would then cooperate in framing a constitution and putting it into operation. The British Government rejected the offer. But Makarios had made a considerable concession. He had offered to cooperate in the introduction of self-government if Britain would acknowledge the principle of self-determination at some future date. It was unlikely that he could go any farther, even if he wanted to without losing ground to the Communists and to the more extreme nationalists. The British Government had it seemed, convinced itself that for reasons

of prestige and strategy it must retain sovereignty over the island indefinitely, and it must also reckon with the apparently adamant hostility of the Turks to Greek sovereignty over Cyprus.<sup>30</sup> The Archbishop disclosed on December 7, that he had rejected a proposal by the Cyprus Government which, although recognizing the right of self-government for Cypriots, made its application dependent on certain prerequisites, and this substantially unattainable. He reiterated that the Greek Cypriots were determined not to accept any solution which did not secure in a positive manner the application of self-determination for the island.

On December 30, the Archbishop said that the solution of the Cyprus problem was simply a matter of time. He added that since the people of Cyprus had taken the irrevocable decision to regain their freedom, and as the British Government had recognized the existence of a problem calling for a fair and honourable solution, he personally considered that the problem was solved.<sup>31</sup>

Harding and Makarios met several times in January, 1956, and discussed the political and constitutional future of Cyprus. On January 26 Mr. Lennox-Boyd said

in the House of Commons that the Government and Harding were in complete agreement on the next step to be taken in Cyprus.<sup>32</sup> On the next day Harding presented new proposals for a constitution. The Governor's talks with Makarios had not been concerned with the details of constitutional developments in Cyprus but with the finding of a general basis for cooperation in its development.

Towards the end of February Mr. Lennox-Boyd visited Cyprus and talked with Harding, Makarios and Kutchuk, but no compromise could be reached. On February 2 Makarios set out certain principles of discussion. All legislative, executive and judicial powers with the exception of defense and external political relations of the island, which should be in the hands of the Governor, should originate from the people through their institutions. The Governor should be only the constitutional head of state. Finally proportional representation should be introduced. On February 14, Harding replied offering a counter basis for discussion. The Cypriots were to assume control of all but defense, foreign relations, and public security. An Assembly was to be instituted with an elected majority, a

Cypriot Premier, and Turkish membership on the Council. Built-in safeguards were to protect the individual. On February 25, Makarios gave his criticism. He claimed that it was not made clear that all powers except those excluded would emanate from the people, or that the Legislative Assembly would be proportionate to the population. Also there was no assurance of the formality of the Governor's approval of the Prime Minister. The Government's plans for a constitutional settlement of the Cyprus question which had been carried on for five months in the form of discussions and exchanges of correspondence with Makarios finally broke down. This was partly due to the fact that Makarios had insisted that terrorists found in possession of arms and explosives should be included in the amnesty which had been offered by the British Government; that Harding should not retain powers for the preservation of public security for as long as he thought necessary; and that the composition of the elected majority in the Cyprus Legislative Assembly should be defined to the Archbishop's satisfaction in advance of the recommendations of the Constitutional Commissioner which the Government had proposed to appoint. The British Government attributed

the failure of the negotiations to the above-mentioned points. However the Archbishop felt that he could not accept the British proposals as long as such fundamental issues as the democratic fabric of the constitution itself were not clearly defined in advance. On March 5 Makarios stated:

. . . . the Cypriots were called upon to accept a regime under which it would be doubtful whether they would control their own Assembly, and on a basis in which a colonial ruling Power would be able to interfere indefinitely in everything under the pretext of public security.<sup>33</sup>

At this point it was felt that any basis for discussion had broken down, and on March 9 Makarios was arrested and then deported.

The next attempt on the part of the British for a solution was the formation of the Cyprus Conciliation Committee on April 16, 1956, which was composed of members from both Houses of Parliament, plus several prominent people outside Parliament. The Committee felt that conciliation in Cyprus was possible and essential. It urged that a parliamentary commission should visit the island to seek ways and means of re-opening negotiations. It should be invited to make recommendations on the progressive repeal of the emergency laws and the terms and timing of an amnesty,

following the restoration of order. Negotiations should be assumed on a basis of immediate self-determination on the assurances of foreign affairs and defense in the hands of the Governor, internal security to the Governor for a limited period of time, and an elected Greek Cypriot majority with safeguards for the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and others. Lastly it stated that the Archbishop should be returned.

On the basis of this memorandum, Sir Anthony Eden stated on June 12 in the House of Commons that the Government had decided to ask Lord Radcliffe to undertake the duties of Constitutional Commissioner for Cyprus. Eden stated that as the principle of self-determination had been recognized, the problem was to devise a solution that would provide for the protection of the interests in Cyprus of Britain and Turkey.<sup>34</sup>

In a message to the people of Cyprus on July 12, Harding asked the Cypriots to cooperate with the drafting of a liberal constitution, making possible the chance of self-government, to which the people could look forward with purpose and hope. From July 14 until August 2, Radcliffe lived in Cyprus studying the situation and drawing up recommendations for the

Constitution.

Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced the terms of reference for the Radcliffe proposal on September 14 in the House of Commons. The primary aim was to make recommendations as to the form of a new constitution, to be consistent with the following requirements. During the period of the Constitution, Cyprus was to remain under British sovereignty. Cyprus was to continue as a base. All matters relating to external affairs, defense and internal security were to be retained in the hands of the Governor. Other than this the Constitution was to give a wide measure of self-government with protection for minorities.<sup>35</sup> Lord Radcliffe stated at that time:

There are two main problems involved in the framing of the constitutional form. The first is how to express the relationship between the control of external affairs, defense and internal security, which are reserved from the local Legislature, and the control of the other matters which fall within the scope of that Legislature. The other is how to impose such restrictions on the local Legislature as to secure effective protection—protection 'with teeth'—for the minorities of the island.<sup>36</sup>

It was clear that the system proposed was one of diarchy, with the power shared between the Governor and the Legislature. The Governor was to have full

law making and executive power for his reserved field, and the Legislature was to be master of its field. Two separate public funds, one for the Governor with his offices and one for the proposed popularly controlled General Assembly, were to be established. The Governor was to retain responsibility for defense, external affairs, and internal security, and all other matters were to be under the Chief Minister and Cabinet, drawn from the Assembly. Her Majesty would be entitled at any time by an Order-in-Council to declare a state of emergency under which the Constitution would be suspended. The Governor could reserve only those bills designed to alter the Constitution, bills affecting the royal prerogative, and bills affecting trustee status of Cyprus Government stock. The Governor was to act in two capacities: as the constitutional head of the Government, and as the autocratic delegate of the British Government. In the proposed Legislative Assembly, six of the thirty-six members were to be nominated. Also a unicameral Legislature was suggested as a bicameral one was thought unnecessary. Communal separation remained a general factor of the report as there were to be separate communal roles. However it

would be a unitary state rather than a federation. Several proposals were made to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. Communal electorates for the Legislative Assembly were to be on a basis of twenty-four Greek and six Turkish members. Consent of two-thirds of the Turkish membership was necessary before the existing laws affecting the Turkish Community could be altered. There would be an office of Turkish Cypriot Affairs under a Minister appointed by the Governor and he would have an ex officio seat on the Cabinet. The rights of the Turks were to be guaranteed and protected by the Supreme Court. To ensure impartiality of the Judiciary, the Chief Justice was to be appointed from outside Cyprus and the judges on the Supreme Court were to be always balanced between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. A Tribunal of Guarantees was to be set up to prevent discrimination and before which complaints could be reviewed.

On December 19, 1956, Mr. Lennox-Boyd announced that the Government accepted Radcliffe's guarantees for the Turkish community. He declared that it was the Government's intention that this Constitution should be instituted. After it had been found to be working

satisfactorily, and when the international and strategic situation permitted, the Government would be willing to consider the application of self-determination.<sup>37</sup> One writer stated that "these proposals are delightful enough for Arcadia itself, but it is questionable whether they are sufficiently realistic for Cyprus".<sup>38</sup> Another conclusion was that although Radcliffe had done a splendid piece of work it was too narrow. It was for the British Government to enlarge it, and this it had been unable or unwilling to do. Since it was not what the discontented were looking for it was unlikely to suffice.<sup>39</sup> The proposals were presented to Makarios, and the Greek and Turkish Governments, following that date. The Greek Government announced that in its view neither Lord Radcliffe's Report, nor Mr. Lennox-Boyd's statement to the House of Commons, offered a basis which was compatible with the post-war spirit and high grade of civilization of the Cypriots. It did not create the prerequisites for self-determination. The idea of eventual partition complicated the issue even further. It was finally declared that the Constitution was illiberal and undemocratic because of the powers reserved to the Governor. The Turkish Prime Minister

declared after a preliminary study of the Constitution, and in the light of Mr. Lennox-Boyd's statement in the House of Commons, that the Turkish Government regarded the Report as a reasonable basis for discussion. In the Turkish National Assembly a few days later however Mr. Menderes declared that his Government was in favour of the partition of Cyprus. In fact he asserted only partition or maintenance of the status quo were acceptable to Turkey, which could not accept the proposals of the Radcliffe Report, providing for a unitary state.<sup>40</sup>

The Radcliffe Constitution, prepared and published without the consent and against the wishes of the Cypriot people, met with absolutely no success. It was opposed By Cypriots, Greeks and Turks. It simply increased the problem by magnifying the issue of partition. The trouble with a situation like that was that there was some validity and much logic to support the conflicting arguments of all contestants. This is what makes international problems so seldom susceptible to easy answers.<sup>41</sup>

In March, 1957 Makarios was released from the Seychelles. After his release the Archbishop proposed to the British Government that he should be allowed to

return to Cyprus, and he requested bilateral negotiations on the island's future. The British replied that bilateral discussions were impossible as other and wider interests had a right to be consulted. The British Government stated it would consider any proposal for self-government put forth in conformity with the Radcliffe Report.

Mr. Menderes, on the other hand, declared that partition of the island was the maximum and final sacrifice that Turkey could make on the Cyprus issue. Mr. Profumo, the Under-Secretary for the Colonial Office regarded partition as not an ideal solution but as a possibility which must be taken into consideration.<sup>42</sup> The concept of partition was really quite infeasible for Cyprus from every point of view. The island was too small, and the Greek and Turkish populations were too much dispersed over the whole island. Cyprus was one political, social, and economic unit. It was unfortunate that this concept became involved in the issue, complicating the situation even more.

The next major constitutional proposal was made on June 19, 1958, when Mr. Macmillan announced the British Seven Year Partnership Plan for Cyprus. The

main points of the proposal were announced in the House of Commons, on June 19, 1958. The international status of Cyprus would remain unchanged for a period of seven years; that is, British sovereignty would continue during that period. A system of representative government and internal autonomy was to be worked out by establishing separate Houses of Representatives for the Greek and Turkish communities, and each of these Houses would have complete autonomy in communal affairs. Authority for the internal administration, other than communal and internal security, was to be undertaken by a Governor's Council, which would include representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments, plus four Greek Cypriot and two Turkish Cypriot ministers drawn from the Houses of Representatives. Responsibility for external affairs, defense, and internal security would be reserved to the Governor acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots would possess Greek and Turkish nationality respectively; in other words all Cypriots would have dual nationality. At the end of the seven year period Britain would be prepared to share the sovereignty of the island

with her Greek and Turkish allies, subject to retention of bases and facilities needed for the discharge of Britain's international obligation. Macmillan stated that the plan had four main purposes. To serve the best interests of all the people of the island, to achieve a permanent settlement acceptable to the two communities and to the Greek and Turkish Governments, was a first necessity. Also to safeguard the British bases and installations on the island, and to strengthen peace and security and cooperation between the United Kingdom and her allies in a vital area was important. He states that Cyprus should enjoy the advantages of association not only with the United Kingdom and therefore with the British Commonwealth, but also with Greece and Turkey.

The reactions of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to the plan were instantaneous. Mr. Zorlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister stated that his Government would continue to maintain its conviction and decision that the best solution to the Cyprus question was partition. He did feel that the principles of partnership and partition might be fused into a perfect plan. Many Turkish Cypriots feared that a British withdrawal from the

island in the foreseeable future would result in civil war in Cyprus and a rupture between Greece and Turkey with disastrous effects on NATO.<sup>43</sup>

Mr. Karamanlis, representing Greece, and Makarios, representing the Greek Cypriots, both rejected the plan, because it limited the freedom of the people of Cyprus to determine their own fate. They would neither accept the British proposals for Cyprus, nor enter into tripartite negotiations as suggested by Macmillan; a plan which imposed a triple condominium on Cyprus was unacceptable and would lead to antagonism and strife. Makarios emphasized that the Cyprus question was one which concerned the British Government on the one side, and the people of Cyprus on the other. The acknowledgement of partition was opposed. A small island with a population of half a million could not have two Houses of Representatives of conflicting interests, a Council whose decisions could be vetoed by its chairman; and three countries—Greece, Britain, and Turkey—interfering in the affairs of the island through their representatives, two of which, the Greek and Turk, had the right to appeal to an impartial court against the Governor. There was even a possibility that another

body for cooperation and joint action might confuse the issue even further.<sup>44</sup>

The Times declared about this plan:

. . . Many details of the plan are left to be worked out in conjunction with Greece and Turkey. Like all fancy constitutions it may be hard to work. It involves what is virtually a system of non-territorial partition. The presence of the Greek and Turkish representatives in the Governor's council could make for serious difficulties. Without the good will, it would be virtually unworkable and there are the obvious and serious difficulties of applying the communal system to a population which is not geographically separated.<sup>45</sup>

Opinion expressed in the House of Commons was varied.<sup>46</sup> Mr. Lennox-Boyd described the proposal as a chance, perhaps the last chance, to heal a wound which was weakening and impoverishing the free world. The main criticism of Mr. Callaghan, a Labour M. P., was that the plan emphasized the separation, rather than the unity, of the two communities in Cyprus. He stated that self-government when it came must come with the consent of the people of the island. Mr. Aneurin Bevan stressed that every dependency in the Commonwealth had the right to look forward to full self-government, carrying with it the right of self-determination. Macmillan pointed out that both the Greeks and the Turks, as well as Britain had a funda-

mental interest in the future of the island. He concluded by stating about the plan that the Government had no special pride of authorship which would make it stick obstinately to this or that detail of the plan. The purpose was to reach an agreement and bring peace to the island.

Following a visit by Mr. Macmillan to Athens and Ankara, several important modifications were made in the plan, and were announced in London on August 15. Representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments would not sit on the Governor's Council, as originally proposed, but would merely have direct access to the Governor. The proposal for dual nationality was to be dropped in view of the complexities of international law. The setting up of two Houses of Representatives would not preclude the eventual creating of some form of representative institution serving the interests of the island as a whole. Pending the elections of the two Houses of Representatives, the Governor would be authorized to set up separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot municipal councils, where local circumstances made this desirable.

On the very next day Makarios uncompromisingly

rejected the revised plan, adding that its implementation would involve grave consequences. He declared that the Greek people of Cyprus could never accept a plan which disregarded their basic democratic rights and denied them both freedom and peace.<sup>47</sup> His statement was followed by that of Mr. Karamanlis, the Greek Prime Minister, who, on August 19, declared that his Government was unable to cooperate in the application of the revised British plan and did not intend to appoint a representative to cooperate with the Governor of Cyprus. Also all moves toward partition, which would disrupt the unity of the population could not be tolerated. On September 7 Mr. Karamanlis announced his decision to use all political and diplomatic means to prevent the application of the new British plan for Cyprus. He asserted that the British plan, by associating Turkey with the Government of the island, was a flagrant violation of the Lausanne Treaty.

On August 25, the Turkish Government notified Britain of its acceptance of the revised plan. Mr. Zorlus said that although Turkey had not abandoned her demand for partition of Cyprus, she regarded the modified plan as reconcilable with her thesis. She would

support the plan so as to prove Turkey's good will in the face of the positive efforts made by Great Britain. It was announced on September 30 that the Turkish Government had appointed its Consul-General at Nicosia as its representative in Cyprus, acting in an advisory capacity to the Governor in accordance with the revised British plan.

On September 27, Makarios presented a proposal of his own as a solution to the problem. He stated that after a period of self-government, Cyprus should become an independent state, united neither to Greece nor to Turkey. This was an abandonment of the plan for Enosis. The probable explanation for this sudden change of view was his realization that a compromise was the only possible solution. It may well be that he also preferred his position as leader of an independent Cyprus. He also declared that the independent status of Cyprus should not be changed either by union with Greece or partition, or in any other way, unless such a change were approved by the United Nations. The Archbishop added that membership in the British Commonwealth would not be incompatible with the status that he proposed.

The Greek Government approved Makarios's proposal, but the British Government did not. On September 30, Mr. Macmillan said that the Archbishop's proposal fell outside the scope of the immediate problem of setting up interim arrangements for restoring order and developing representative institutions, but of course it could remain open for consideration along with any other proposal for a final settlement.<sup>48</sup> Hugh Gaitskell and Aneurin Bevan expressed deep regret with the Government's response to the Archbishop's offer. This offer presented by Makarios was certainly a positive step forward in arriving at the final compromise. The comment on the situation expressed in a British newspaper was that now that the "Greek leaders have offered to abandon Enosis, there is no reason at all why Britain should not equally conclusively rule out partition. If that were done, the situation would become negotiable overnight. . . ."<sup>49</sup>

After the United Nations decision in December 1958, the three countries finally decided to come together to discuss a possible compromise solution. This commenced when Averoff, Zorlu, and Selwyn Lloyd met at Paris to review the situation in the light of the recent debate.

At this time Britain stated that she would be willing to consider the transfer of the sovereignty of the island.

On February 5, 1959, hope for a settlement of the Cyprus question rose when the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey arrived at Zurich to begin a series of meetings. On February 11, the Zurich Conference reached a compromise solution in which the cause for the unity and welfare of Cyprus emerged victorious. The decision was announced in a joint communique which was issued on that date by Mr. Karamanlis, Mr. Menderes, Mr. Averoff and Mr. Zorlu. No details of the Zurich agreements were released at that time as the proposals had first to be submitted to the British Government. Discussion, at London was begun immediately between Mr. Averoff, Mr. Zorlu, and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. Sir Hugh Foot, Archbishop Makarios, and Dr. Kutchuk were invited to take part and came to London. Also delegations from Greece, Turkey and Cyprus attended the conference. Discussions continued informally among the various groups from February 11 until the 17, and on February 17 the London Conference opened.

In a preliminary statement, Selwyn Lloyd outlined

the basic principles which the British Government insisted be incorporated into the Agreement. The strategic needs of the British Government should be met in a manner which could not be later challenged. There should be a reconciliation between the Greek and Turkish communities and revival of friendship between Greece and Turkey. And lastly the Cypriots should be given an opportunity to develop their institutions.

On February 18 the conference reached its conclusion, and all but Makarios agreed to the solution. On February 19, after much vacillation, Makarios announced his approval, and the long standing Cyprus dispute ended dramatically when Macmillan, Karamanlis, Makarios and Kutchuk went to the London clinic, where Menderes was recovering from the effects of an air crash. The documents were initialled by the three Prime Ministers. In the evening of February 19, Macmillan interrupted a foreign debate to make a statement to the House of Commons. He declared:

I hope—indeed I trust—that all members on all sides of the House will welcome this agreement. I believe that we have closed a chapter of bitterness and strife in the history of Cyprus and that we are now embarking, with our Greek and Turkish allies and the people of Cyprus themselves, on a new approach where partnership and co-operation

take the place of strife and dissention. . . . I regard this agreement as a victory for reason and co-operation. No party to it has suffered a defeat. It is a victory for all, and by removing a source of bitterness and division it will enable us and our allies and the people of Cyprus to concentrate on working together for peace and freedom.<sup>50</sup>

Several documents annexed to the Memorandum signed on February 19, formed the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.<sup>51</sup> These consist of: a Declaration stating that Cyprus would become an independent Republic, and detailing the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus; a Treaty of Guarantee whereby Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey undertook to recognize and maintain the independence, territorial integrity, and security of Cyprus; a Treaty of Alliance between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus whereby the three countries undertook to cooperate for their common defense and to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic; a Declaration by the British Government accepting the Zurich agreements as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus, and stating that Britain would relinquish sovereignty over the island to the Republic with the exception of two areas to be retained

for British military bases, and also for unrestricted use of communications and public works; a Declaration by the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers and Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk, accepting the above documents as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus; and finally a statement on agreed measures to be taken to bring the new arrangements in Cyprus into force.

The basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus was finally worked out to the satisfaction of all. There was to be a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president each elected for five years. The president and vice-president were given executive powers and a council of ten, seven Greek and three Turkish, which could be chosen from outside the House of Representatives. The decisions of the Council were to be taken by an absolute majority, but could be vetoed by the president or vice-president. The legislative powers were vested in the House of Representatives, elected for five years, and which was to be seventy percent Greek and thirty percent Turkish. Authority in all matters but those expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers went to the House of Represent-

atives. Laws and decisions were adopted by a simple majority, but modification of the electoral law or law affecting the municipalities required a majority in both parts of the House of Representatives. The President and Vice-President might veto any law or decision on foreign affairs, except the participation in international pacts and organizations in which Greece and Turkey both participated.

Each community was to have a Communal Chamber composed of a number of representatives which should have a right to impose taxes and levies on members of their community to provide for their needs, and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their supervision: all religious, educational, cultural and teaching questions; also in institutions which were communal in nature, such as charitable foundations, bodies and associations, producers and consumers, cooperatives and credit establishments created for the purpose of promoting the welfare of either one of the communities. The civil service, generally speaking, was to be seventy percent Greek and thirty percent Turkish. Compulsory military service could be instituted only with the assent of both the president and vice-president. The heads of

the armed forces, gendarmerie, and police were to be appointed by both the heads of state. The High Court of Justice should have two Greek Cypriot judges, one Turkish judge and one neutral. The President was to be a neutral and have two votes. It was to be the highest organ of the Judicature. In criminal cases the judges were to belong to the same community as the accused.

A Treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and Constitution of the new State was to be concluded between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Great Britain. An important clause was the fact that partition or joining of Cyprus to any other state was absolutely excluded.

To bring the Constitution and Treaties into full effect as quickly as practicable there was established a Joint Commission and a Transitional Committee in Cyprus, and a Joint Committee in London. Also the Governor was to begin the work of organizing the new State as soon as possible.

At the conclusion of the Conference statements were made by Macmillan, Karamanlis, Zorlu, Makarios, and Kutchuk.<sup>52</sup> Mr. Macmillan reviewed the Cypriot

problem and praised the constitution stating that it was one which recognized the Hellenic character of the majority of the Cypriot people. But it protected the national character of the Turkish Cypriot community. It was one which preserved to the United Kingdom the defense facilities which were essential not only for Britain's own narrow national reasons but for the greater allied cause of which Britain was a member.

Mr. Karamanlis expressed his pleasure with the agreement stating it was the best solution because it left to the island's majority the right to act, enabling it to develop in the most appropriate manner all aspects of its life, while it secured to the minority a splendid opportunity for maintaining its character and institutions, as well as for enjoying its share of common authority and responsibility.

Mr. Zorlu speaking for Mr. Menderes expressed Turkey's approval of the Agreement. He stated that provided it was observed by all, the solution which safeguarded the legitimate interests of all concerned would open an era of peace, friendship and sincere co-operation. He thanked the leaders of the two Cypriot communities for their cooperation.

Makarios declared that it was a great day in that positiveness of unity and cooperation prevailed over the negativeness of division and strife. He thanked the Governments for working for the solution and hoped that the two communities could work together and develop the welfare of the island to their common benefit.

Dr. Kutchuk stated that whatever was sacrificed was worth it, because he felt that the Turks had gained the full cooperation and friendship of the Greek community.

Although work on the new Government was begun at once in the hope of completing everything before one year had passed, the progress was slow as during the summer months there was a prolonged controversy between General Grivas and Archbishop Makarios, arising out of a number of allegations by Grivas in connection with the London and Zurich Agreements. In October of 1959, however, a reconciliation between the two was effected and a statement declaring the full identity of views as to the future of Cyprus was agreed to. By December 13, sufficient progress had been made, that it was possible to hold elections. Makarios was

elected President, and Kutchuk Vice-President.

Although according to the Agreement, Cyprus was scheduled to become an independent Republic by February 19, 1960 at the latest, it was not until July of that year that the British and Cypriot Governments could reach a final agreement on all outstanding matters, notably in the areas of the bases remaining under British sovereignty, a matter which had been the subject of prolonged negotiations between the two Governments for many months. Finally, following agreement, and after the passing of the necessary legislation by the British Parliament, Cyprus, on August 16, 1960, became an independent Republic, and was admitted to membership in the United Nations shortly thereafter. Immediate post-independence developments included the holding of elections, the formation of a new Government, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with a number of countries. On March 14, 1961, Cyprus became a member of the Commonwealth.

The basic characteristics of the Settlement were first that it was a compromise, but one which seemed to measure up to the requirements of all involved. Essentially it was a very complex document, composed of

twenty-seven articles, which were permanent components. Another characteristic was that any means of altering the basic articles of the Constitution was a very difficult process. In fact legislation would have to be composed for such a purpose. Also very important was the need for a balance between the two communities, which had been met either by laying down certain proportions between the Greeks and Turks, or by stipulating that certain posts should be allotted on defined principles. In practically all domains the Constitution provided the Turks with rather more than their fair share of representation; and communities other than Greek or Turkish were accorded no special treatment at all. According to one commentator,<sup>53</sup> the working of this mechanism would depend greatly on cooperation and goodwill between the two principle communities, and especially between the President and Vice-President. Here lies the familiar dilemma of such elaborate contracts.

During the five year period from 1955 to 1960, Cyprus moved from a strife torn island to an independent Republic and member of the Commonwealth. The three basic factors—internal conflict, attempts for a solution

through the United Nations, and the constitutional offers and counter offers—were all very much intertwined. The degree to which one factor influenced another is difficult to ascertain accurately, but it is certain that the continual terrorist activities and the constant appearance of the Cyprus question before the United Nations influenced the decision. All the groups involved probably compromised because of the otherwise formidable prospects of continued violence and disruption. This is probably partly the explanation of why the Greek Cypriots were willing to accept so much less than Enosis, why the British were willing to allow the island to achieve its independence, and why the Turkish, a change in the status quo. It was unfortunate that there were minority right problems, and that the island was considered a strategic necessity. Both these factors certainly complicated every decision and made the only possible solution one of compromise. The period then can be viewed as one where conflict and the continued attempts to arrive at a solution led only to a compromise, and a compromise which relied to a very great extent on goodwill and understanding. If these characteristics give way, it would be virtually

impossible for the island's Government to function.

It is clear then that only a very precarious and none too stable compact had to become the only possible settlement for Cyprus.

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## CHAPTER 5

### ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 1925-59

Although political developments appear to be the most prominent part of Cypriot history during the period from 1925 until 1959, the economic and social progress during this time formed a basic part of the island's development. Even though the Greek Cypriots were discontented with the British administration, it could not be denied that remarkable improvement in the economic and social condition of the island had been brought about. The pattern which developed—Britain attempting to keep the Cypriots in what might be termed political subjection, and yet developing the country economically and socially—does not present an inconsistency in policy. Throughout the period, the British Government

utilized the resources available to raise the standards of existence on the island; but at the same time was not willing to allow the administration to undergo any changes which would eventually lead to independence for Cyprus. Although Britain's position in Cyprus does not always appear in a most favourable light, the economic and social advances point to one aspect of the administration which does much to exonerate British rule.

By the year 1925, when Cyprus was given crown colony status, there had been a very noticeable improvement in the economic and social conditions on the island. When Ottoman rule ended in 1878, the country was in a state of desolate ruin and decay. The struggling agricultural community was poverty stricken and insecure. Lethargy, thriftlessness and improvidence had become ingrained in the character of the peasantry who had learned, if nothing else, the fruitlessness of effort. The stately and wealthy kingdom of the Lusignans had long before succumbed to the deleterious influence of corrupt Ottoman control. Such was the condition in 1878.

The task that confronted the British Government

which succeeded the Turkish Administration was difficult and many sided. All aspects of Cypriot economic and social life were in dire need of improvement. "It was necessary to secure the preservation of law and order and the proper administration of justice, to stimulate agriculture and revive commerce, to provide for the health and education of the inhabitants, and above all to restore that spirit of security and confidence without which enterprise and prosperity are impossible."<sup>1</sup>

The results of British endeavours were clearly evident by 1925.<sup>2</sup> The population of the island had very nearly doubled; the revenue had increased almost five times. Imports and exports had attained a value approximately six times as great as that which they were in the first year of the occupation; agricultural production had trebled; and the fact that a family required ten times the income that it required in 1878 was also evidence that the standard had been raised. Public works formed the corner stone of progress. Means of communication were created. A thousand miles of roads had replaced irregular tracks. A railway had been built; all the principal towns were connected by telegraph, and some by telephone. A

postal service had been established. The harbour of Famagusta had been enlarged and the ports of Larnaca and Limassol were improved. Through such activity the essential bases of commerce were laid.

From many standpoints, the first need of the island was water. Large sums were spent upon the construction of reservoirs and channels for irrigation, upon the improvement of existing sources and upon the discovery of fresh supplies, and also upon sub-artesian borings, which increased the quantities of water available for irrigation. The country's forests, not only for their valuable timber, but also for water and land conservation, were protected, and reforestation was carried out. In the field of agriculture, demonstration and instruction in farming methods were promoted. In order to relieve the peasants of their burdens, an agricultural bank and cooperative societies assisted the farmer. Mining activities were continued, and formed a basic part of the island's wealth.

Crime had decreased, as the lives and property of the inhabitants were protected by an adequate military police force. Justice was exercised by a body of trained lawyers, and the courts were regarded with

confidence and respect by all classes of the community.

Education was greatly improved. The schools were increased from very few to a system educating forty-eight thousand children at an annual cost of around £84,000. Illiteracy was diminished to a very great extent. The health and welfare of the inhabitants had improved considerably. Absolute neglect in this area had been replaced by a system comprising doctors, health officers, hospitals, sanitary measures and disease prevention programmes.

Thus in the first fifty years of occupation, Cyprus had been brought from a state of stagnant decay into the orbit of western civilization. From the conditions observed during the first few years of colonial status, the achievements in the economic and social field were quite apparent. It was clear, however, that not all the development had been judicious. The railway and many of the irrigation reservoirs had failed to justify themselves. The money extracted from the Turkish Tribute could have been used much more profitably. All of the improvements seen in comparison with the deplorable state of the country in 1878 appear somewhat out of perspective. Actually Cyprus was far

from being in completely satisfactory condition from the economic and social standpoint. Rural indebtedness was perhaps the greatest single problem to contend with. Poverty and debt plagued almost the entire rural population. Public health was still not adequate. Disease, particularly malaria, was prevalent everywhere. There was also complaint that after fifty years of British occupation there still was not a decent harbour in Cyprus. While official British opinion pointed to the many advances made, others held a more deprecatory attitude. One Cypriot historian felt about British rule that it amounted in effect to a policy of contracting out of the obligation to develop the country, and gradually hardened into a policy of neglect leading to economic depression which lasted for sixty years.<sup>3</sup> This point of view, however, cannot be justified. It ignores the very obvious advances which had been made.

There was no consistent programme of development throughout the period from 1925 to 1959. During the first twenty years the rate of development was slow. It continued in much the same manner as that of the previous period from 1878 to 1925. The last fifteen

years of British rule saw very rapid and far-reaching changes from the economic and social standpoints.

A beginning was made in 1940 to establish better conditions in Cyprus, through the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. The Act of 1940 opened a new era in British Colonial policy. It was no longer considered necessary that every colony should be economically and financially self-sufficient. Britain at that time directed the use of her revenues for the assistance of the colonies without expecting repayment or profit. Measures could be undertaken which did not yield an immediate result. However by March, 1944 only ten and a half percent of the money available had been spent, owing principally to the war. Even so Cyprus benefited in the four years, 1940-43, to the amount of £1,071,000 of which more than half was from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. The programme included a grant to develop irrigation schemes, for malaria control, for rural health units, and for water supply to the villages. From 1941 to the end of March 1946, the amount expended on public health, water supplies, agriculture, irrigation, and forestry, from free grants under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act totalled £600,000.<sup>4</sup>

In October, 1946, Mr. Creech-Jones, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced a Ten-Year Programme of Development for the island.<sup>5</sup> The expected total for the entire expenditure came to over £9,000,000. The allocations were as follows: £2,880,000 for agriculture, forestry, irrigation, and communications; £2,790,000 for health, education, and town and village improvement; £280,000 for miscellaneous expenditure; and £3,350,000 for an island-wide electric development scheme. The sources for which the schemes were to be financed were the Colonial Development and Welfare Funds, loan funds to be raised locally, and sums to be set aside from future revenues. Meanwhile schemes involving about £4,000,000 were given priority as the first instalment of the Ten-Year Programme. Mr. Creech-Jones announced in the Commons that a programme for development in irrigation, forestry development, agricultural improvement schemes, anti-malaria, and rural health measures, and improved hospitals, educational development and teacher training, and village improvement schemes had been given priority.<sup>6</sup> The actual expenditure from the 1946-55 Ten-Year Development Programme amounted to something over £6,000,000. About

this scheme, Lord Winster, an ex-Governor, declared in the House of Lords in February, 1954:

I feel I can fairly say that it is a work in which all of us here at home can take great pride as one of Britain's great achievements in Colonial administration.<sup>7</sup>

A five year programme, which was a still more ambitious development scheme, was announced in 1956. The total expenditure was to be £38,000,000. Governor Harding announced the details of this comprehensive economic and social development programme in November, 1955. The main features of the plan were divided into eight categories. The development of rural areas, with emphasis on irrigation and water supply was a primary task. Agricultural research and the expansion of forestry, to enable the island to rely to a much greater extent on its own timber resources than hitherto, was planned. There was to be expansion of electrical supply and inland telecommunications. Port development was planned, and in this connection Sir John Harding said there was "no reason why a first-rate modern port should not help make Cyprus the busiest and most prosperous island in the Mediterranean."<sup>8</sup> A first class network of trunk roads capable of carrying all types of modern vehicles was necessary. Improvements at Nicosia air-

port were on the agenda. The improvement of school buildings, the establishment of technical high schools, and more scholarships for secondary education was part of the programme. The provision of funds to provide small dwelling houses on hire purchase terms was to be made available. In addition measures for social insurance were announced shortly after. Harding emphasized that the British Government was determined both to restore law and order and to develop the island's economy so as to ensure a substantial rise in the standard of living. No progress or betterment of economic and social conditions could be made without the restoration of public security and confidence, and in this connection immediate measures would be taken to build up an adequate police force, which had hitherto been lacking.

Thus it can be seen that the economic and social level attained at the time the island acquired its independence was chiefly due to the efforts of the last years of British administration, particularly from 1946 on. Even though there was civil strife and terrorism on the island from 1955 to 1959, there was still a considerable amount of progress. For the five year scheme beginning in 1956 the allocation for the pro-

posed expenditure was as follows: economic services, including agriculture, forests, water, and rural development, £6,350,000; basic services composed of electricity and telephones, ports and airport, and trunk road improvements, £26,100,000; and social services, schools, scholarships, town water supplies, hospitals, technical education, and rent purchase houses, £5,100,000. These Colonial Development and Welfare Programmes inaugurated in the last few years of the British administration meant that Cyprus was able to achieve a considerably improved standard of economic and social life. The programmes made possible much greater progress than would have been possible if the island had been either independent, or a part of Greece.

By the time Cyprus achieved independence in 1960 much advance had been achieved in the economic and social field. The population had increased from 326,000 in 1925 to 561,000 by the end of 1959, with a total working population of around 329,000. Of this number about forty-two percent were engaged in agriculture, which was still the chief occupation. Other fields of employment were manufacturing and mining. There was by

that date a fully organized Labour Department, taking care of the needs of the workers. Trade unions had been legalized in 1941 and by 1959 there were one hundred and fifty trade unions and branches registered. They were divided into several right and left wing groups, and into separate Greek Cypriot, and Turkish Cypriot organizations.

As far as the Cyprus Government income was concerned, the main sources were customs duties, excise duty and stamp duty, income tax, and estate duties. British grants-in-aid also helped to balance the budget. In August, 1955 a new currency was introduced with the object of facilitating transactions and bringing Cyprus into line with neighbouring countries. Exchange regulations were eased during 1955. Income tax, which had been introduced in 1941, formed a basic part of the Government's economy. Even so, by the time of independence, Cyprus's financial position was not particularly good. In July 1960, Mr. Iain Macleod, the Secretary of State for the Colonies declared:

The budget is balanced only with difficulty. Independence naturally brings with it additional expense, and the island's economic development can go ahead only with external aid. Cyprus is achieving independence without any financial resources and, indeed, without any working balance.<sup>9</sup>

The amount of trade had increased greatly over the thirty-five year period. In 1925 imports amounted to £1,500,000, and exports to £1,000,000, whereas in 1959 the figures were £41,000,000 and £19,000,000. Overseas trade had tripled in the last five years as a colony, and was over ten times greater than the pre-war level.

The results of the development programmes were to be seen primarily in the field of production. Agriculture, forestry, manufacture, fisheries, and mining all benefited greatly from the development expenditure.<sup>10</sup>

Agriculture was always given first consideration, as Cyprus was basically an agricultural country. Under the Government's administration, constant and continual advancement had been made in the increase of production. All aspects of agricultural life were considered, and the result was that during the fifteen to twenty years previous to independence, the Government had inaugurated a successful programme for agricultural improvement. By 1959 the result of the administration's long term plan for improvement was clearly evident, and the lot of the agriculturalist had improved considerably.

Closely allied to agricultural development was the

founding of the cooperative societies. In 1934 agricultural indebtedness amounted to two million pounds, or almost seven pounds per head. Although the cooperative societies dated from 1916, they were little more than lending and collecting agencies, and were completely reorganized in 1935. After this time they became the mainstay of rural economy. By 1959 credit was within the reach of every farmer, and local savings banks had been established. By 1959 there were over eight hundred cooperative societies with a total membership of around one hundred and sixty thousand. There were over three hundred cooperative stores with an annual turnover of about £3,500,000. The Greek and Turkish cooperative societies tended to grow up separately. These organizations had remarkable success in reducing the rural cost of living, and improving the lot of the agriculturalist.

An important aspect of Cypriot development was the programme of reforestation. By 1959 the forests covered six hundred and seventy square miles, or nineteen per cent of the land area of Cyprus. A forestry college had been established in 1950, and scientific methods of reforestation were encouraged constantly. According

to one authority, Cyprus was expected to be virtually self-sufficient in timber within a period of forty years.<sup>11</sup> This says much for the reforestation programme on the denuded island which Britain took over in 1878.

Manufacturing was not one of the main areas of production in Cyprus. The industries were limited to the processing of food. Mining continued to be one of the major industries on the island, and was of great economic importance. The tonnage of mineral products exported in 1959 had increased almost ten fold over the 1925 figure. The total value of all minerals exported for 1959 was £9,460,000, compared with under £200,000 for 1925.

Great improvement was to be seen in the field of communications and public works. Roads had improved from around eight hundred miles in 1925 to over one thousand miles of asphalted road and three thousand miles of good subsidiary road, by 1959. There was also a network of good forest roads. Also many bridges had been built. Motoring conditions were good over most of the island for the entire year. By 1959, there were around 42,000 licensed motor vehicles on the island, or

one vehicle for every nineteen people.

Telephone and telegraph services were greatly extended. The Cyprus Inland Telecommunications Authority had been administering the island's telephone and inland telegraph system since 1957, and had expanded the services by introducing modern technical equipment. Submarine cables connected Cyprus with Britain, and with the Middle East.

The basis for communication and commerce had been very greatly improved with the airport and better harbours. The Nicosia international airport was one of the best equipped aerodromes in terms of runways and navigational aids in the Middle East. It was used jointly by civil aircraft and the Royal Air Force. There were daily flights to and from Cyprus. The airport did much to compensate for the not so satisfactory harbour facilities. A good port had always been lacking in Cyprus, but by 1959 much had been done to alleviate this problem. The Famagusta harbour was very much improved, and harbour facilities at Limassol, Larnaca and Paphos had also been developed. This was a great boon to commerce, as in 1959 thirty-four shipping lines regularly visited Cypriot ports.

One of the main problems which had always confronted Cyprus was the great shortage of water. In 1939 the Department of Water Development was established. Its programme covered research, irrigation, and domestic supplies. So great was the need for water that in the seven years previous to independence, the expenditure on water development had reached the sum of £5,500,000. By 1959 the main towns had adequate water for most of the year, and of the six hundred and twenty-seven villages, the number with piped water supply was five hundred and twenty-five, or almost eighty-four percent. Irrigation development had been carried out under a number of methods, and the rate of progress in irrigation between 1946 and 1959 resulted in an increase of fifty-five percent in irrigated land. In every part of Cyprus the quest for water was a continual task, and will continue to be for a considerable time.

Another achievement for the development of Cypriot economy was the island wide electrical scheme. The production of electrical power was begun on a large scale in 1946 with the Ten Year Development Programme. By 1956 there had been an expenditure of £6,000,000 for an electricity grid, and by 1958, a total of

£10,000,000 had been spent. The electrical scheme was carried out in three stages, and the third and final extension to the steam electric supply was completed in 1959. In 1952 the Electricity Authority of Cyprus was established as an independent corporation to generate, supply and encourage the use of electricity for the development of the island's resources, especially for agriculture and industrial purposes. By the end of 1959 most of the island was supplied with electrical power.

The social services received a large share of the development funds. Education, public health and social welfare, and community planning were all much more highly organized in 1959 than they were in 1925.<sup>12</sup>

According to the 1911 census only one Cypriot in four could read and write, whereas by 1959 illiteracy was rare, even in the remotest villages. By the time British rule ended there were well over eighty thousand elementary pupils, and twenty-six thousand secondary, compared with a total of forty-eight thousand pupils in 1925. During the last few years of the period there had been a great improvement in education techniques. From 1955 to 1958 the education system was seriously

affected by strikes and demonstrations, as a result of the island-wide disturbances. Elementary education was free, with about seventy percent of the cost paid by the Government and the remainder by the communities. Post secondary education was limited to two government training colleges for elementary teachers, and the forestry college at Prodromos, which offered a two year course of sub professional training. There were good facilities for industrial and technical education at technical institutes. Facilities for agricultural training were also available. The school year, 1958, saw the disappearance of the Education Department in Cyprus, as at that time the Government gave communal autonomy. Three independent offices—office of Greek Cypriot education, office of Turkish Cypriot education, and office of joint educational services—were established. The reorganization of education in preparation for the establishment of the Republic had been smoothly carried out without any interruption in the functioning of the schools.

Public health and social welfare underwent remarkable change in the years after the Second World War. Cyprus was, by 1959, a healthy island, free of quaran-

tinable diseases such as cholera, plague, typhus, and yellow fever. The greatest achievement was the eradication of malaria. In the pre-war years malaria affected thousands annually, whereas by 1959 there wasn't a single case. Other diseases showed a sharp decline in the last years as a colony, as immunization and vaccination became common. Also achievements were made in lowering infant mortality. There were government hospitals in every main town, staffed with qualified people. Travelling medical and dental clinics were well established. Treatment was available free or at a reduced rate for patients who could not afford the normal fees. Lord Winster declared in 1955:

So good is this service that not one of 620 villages of the island is more than an hour's travel from skilled medical and surgical help.<sup>13</sup>

Cyprus, it was claimed, had at that time, one of the lowest crude death rates in the world.<sup>14</sup>

A welfare department was set up in 1951. Its functions included disease protection work and public assistance. A rigid programme of training was set up for the social workers. A social insurance scheme, under which the Government, employers, and employees each contributed in equal shares, was drawn up in 1953,

and came into force in 1957. By 1959 over one hundred and fifty thousand people were insured. Further improvements were also made in accident prevention precautions.

A community development scheme was begun in 1951. Industrial zoning, street widening, house lease construction, improved sewage disposal, and general village and town improvement formed part of the scheme. House to house water extension was an important advance. However a difficulty in carrying through this work was the lack of properly qualified community planners.

When surveying the period, the rapid advances made during the last few years are very apparent. Throughout the eighty years of British rule, economic and social progress for at least sixty-five of these years did not meet the expectations of the Cypriots. The reason for the rather slow rate of progress was due, in great part, to the fact that there simply had not been sufficient finances available to develop the island any more rapidly. Also, in the early years, the Turkish Tribute took much needed money from the island. Throughout the 'thirties the world-wide depression seriously affected the Cypriot economy. In

the year 1938, Mr. deRothschild declared about living conditions, in the House of Commons:

After all, we have seen in Cyprus conditions similar to those in the West Indies—bad housing conditions, lack of ventilation, bad sanitation and appalling overcrowding, whole families living in one room which often serves also as a stable or byre. It is a depressing picture of social conditions.<sup>15</sup>

From 1946 until the time the island became a Republic, progress was much more rapid. Through the various financial schemes made available, there was more social and economic advancement than in all the previous years. In 1952 The Times declared:

Moving around this peaceful progressive island and comparing the conditions here with those elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean, including Greece herself, or even more examining the colonial budget, the visitor is naturally astonished that anyone in Cyprus could want a change that would surely bring retrogression . . . In an unpretentious way the British Crown Colony of Cyprus may perhaps be considered a paragon among Mediterranean islands. It is well administered, prosperous and orderly.<sup>16</sup>

The internal crisis in the latter part of the 1950s affected progress somewhat. In this connection, Mr. Lennox-Boyd declared in April, 1958:

. . . it seems to me pretty fruitless to spend money on village development if the projects are then to be destroyed by E.O.K.A. action.<sup>17</sup>

Actually the crisis did not affect the economic and

social development as much as might have been expected, and the development programmes were carried on regardless of the violence. The fact that much of the money which was expended on military activities would otherwise have been spent on development, did retard progress somewhat.

By the time Cyprus achieved republican status in 1960, the island had undergone a remarkable change, economically and socially, as compared with what it had been in 1878, or even in 1925. By the time of independence, the Government revenue equalled expenditure,<sup>18</sup> the standard of living was greatly improved, and wages were comparable with other states in that area. Foreign trade was quite good, and production was better than it had ever been. Public health and welfare compared favourably with other countries, and was better than that of most Mediterranean regions. In the field of education, illiteracy had successfully been ended. Health insurance and other schemes were in operation to look after the needs of the people in that respect. An indication of the island's progress was the great achievements which had taken place in the fields of communications and public works. Roads, and all other

forms of communication, water supply, electricity development, harbour improvement, and the construction of a modern airport all pointed to advancement.

Apart from the fact that it is almost impossible for any state not to achieve at least some degree of progress in the present technological age, development in Cyprus, since the Second World War compared well with development in other areas. Even though one of the chief reasons for Britain's retaining the colony was self-interest, and even though the political desires of the Greek Cypriots were to a large degree, legitimate; it is still obvious that from the economic and social standpoint, the Cypriots benefited very greatly from the British administration.

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## CHAPTER 6

During the eighty-one years that Great Britain governed Cyprus, a phenomenally large number of changes occurred in all aspects of Cypriot life. The expressed reason for the acquisition of the island, as declared in the Cyprus Convention of 1878, was to use it as a base to protect the Ottoman Empire and as a check against Russian expansion to Constantinople. It was intended to be the key to western Asia, and became another link in the system of strategic possessions protecting Britain's empire and sea routes. The fact that Cyprus proved to be of little strategic value, at least until the advent of air facilities, meant that the island was soon transferred from its prominent position in the Foreign Office to the oblivion

of the Colonial Office.

If comparisons are of any value, it can be easily discerned that the British administration of Cyprus was certainly much superior to that of the corrupt Ottoman regime. When Britain acquired the island it was in a state of desolate ruin and decay. The servile agricultural population was struggling with poverty and insecurity. In fact it was obvious that all aspects of Cypriot economic and social life were in great need of improvement. It was unfortunate for the island that progress was very slow during the first thirty years of the British administration. The annual extraction of the Tribute, plus the fact that there was simply very little money available for colonial development, meant that the long period of poverty and stagnation was continued long after the change of sovereignty. A fixed grant-in-aid to the island in 1907, which greatly decreased the annual Tribute, marked the beginning of somewhat greater prosperity, and more definite economic and social advancement.

By 1925 the results of British control indicated that a considerable degree of progress had been made. The population had almost doubled, and the revenue had

increased many times. Trade and commerce grew from almost nothing into a fairly flourishing endeavour. There was marked improvement in agricultural production and methods, and an active programme of reforestation had been carried out. Progress in the field of public works and communications was considerable. A thousand miles of good roads, a railway, a telegraph and telephone system, and an improved harbour at Famagusta all pointed toward the progressiveness of the regime. The island's first and greatest need was water, and a large amount had been expended to develop this necessity. Considerable advancement had occurred in the administration, of the island, in law and justice, and in the fields of finance and tax collection. The chaotic and wasteful system used by the Turks had been replaced by order and economy. In the field of the social services, the system of education and the welfare of the inhabitants had improved considerably.

Although this first fifty years of British rule indicated much advancement; conditions in the island were still far from being completely satisfactory. Poverty and indebtedness still plagued the rural population. Disease, particularly malaria, was very

prevalent. And although a little-used railway had been constructed, Cyprus was still in great need of a good harbour.

During the first twenty years following crown colony status, economic and social progress continued in much the same manner as it had in the previous twenty years. The pattern was a slow but steady programme of development. From 1946 until the time of independence a dynamic and expanding programme for the economic and social welfare of the island was instituted. A plan inaugurated in 1940 with the passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, opened a new era in British colonial policy, making it unnecessary that a colony should be able to repay loans. There was not much actual application of the plan until after the war however. In 1946 a Ten Year Programme, involving the expenditure of about £9,000,000 and another plan in 1956 for five years with an estimated expenditure of about £38,000,000 were carried through. The programmes were financed by the Colonial Development Fund, loan funds raised locally, and on the London market, and from sums set aside from the future revenue. The chief object for both the programmes was for develop-

ment in irrigation and water supply, agricultural improvement and research, forestry development, health and welfare, particularly an anti-malaria campaign, improvement in education, the development of an island-wide electricity scheme, and great improvement in the development of roads, telecommunications, the harbours, and the airport.

In surveying the economic and social advances brought about during the eighty-one year period, the degree of change appears very great. In all aspects a standard of living comparable with any in the Mediterranean or Middle East areas replaced the wretched existence prevalent in 1878. Credit to the island's administering power can be overemphasized; nevertheless it must be concluded that the British administration of Cyprus, particularly in its last few years, effected an admirable programme of economic and social progress on the island.

A problem which confronted the British throughout the entire period of their occupation was the desire on the part of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece. Until the last year of British rule, the official attitude always was that the status

of the island could not be changed. The British reaction was always an adamant refusal of the Greek Cypriot desire. Until 1914 the British could legitimately state that the island did not belong to Britain, and therefore could not undergo any change of sovereignty. The presence of the Turkish minority which was almost one-fifth of the population complicated the problem. The British administration always stressed this factor as one of the reasons for not allowing the Greek Cypriots self-determination or Enosis. On this issue the Turkish minority was never silent, but always protested against every attempt on the part of the Greek Cypriots to change the status quo. The first violent outbreak for Enosis during the British administration occurred in 1931. Failure resulted because the Greek Cypriots were neither prepared nor organized to undertake a lengthy struggle.

An interesting fact is that the leadership was, and always had been, in the hands of the Ecclesiasts of the Orthodox Church. This resulted from the fact that the population had never been allowed to have any effective leadership other than religious. In all ex-Ottoman territories the high dignitaries of the Church

had always assumed political and social as well as religious control. The outbreak in 1931 was instigated by the Church, and the result was that several Ecclesiasts were banished.

The Enosist agitators attempted no further violent outbreaks again until the 1950s. A plebiscite in 1950 for Enosis, which was signed by almost the entire Greek population, stimulated agitation. Feelings of frustration developed because of the refusal on the part of the Government to consider even self-governing institutions within the Commonwealth. From 1955 until 1959 a continuous and ruthless programme of resistance and terrorism organized and directed by the EOKA organization tried to obtain Enosis for the Cypriots. Tension on the island reached the point where almost any solution to the problem would have been impossible. The Turkish community reacted violently against the Greek, standing firmly for maintaining the status quo, and eventually enunciating a plan for taksin, or partition.

The Enosis movement assumed the most prominent part of the political history of the period. As for the administration, Britain had established a Constitution in 1882 which remained in force until 1931. This

Constitution provided for a Legislative Council which was composed of both appointed and elected members.

The official members plus the Turkish elected members were always able to outvote the Greek elected members, and the results were twofold: there was much resentment toward the authorities, and there was communal dissension. The basic problem seems to lie in the fact that the British unfortunately regarded the Council as merely an advisory board, whereas the Greeks thought of it as their parliament. The two concepts were irreconcilable, and the Constitution was doomed from the beginning.

When the island became a colony in 1925, the Legislative Council was enlarged, but no changes were made in the principles of its operation. Throughout this period until 1931, much Cypriot control had been extended to the level of local government. The system had its basis in the previous regime of the Turks.

Following the outburst against the administration in 1931, the Constitution was suspended, and the Governor with his advisors ruled autocratically, until the island was given its independence in 1960. Even the municipal elections were cancelled and local government came under the control of the central administration.

No attempts were made to restore some form of self-governing institutions until after the Second World War. The Labour Government announced in 1946 that it hoped to establish a more liberal and progressive regime. From this time until the final agreement, proposals and counter proposals for a solution for the problem were enunciated by all concerned, particularly the British Government and the Greek Cypriots.

From 1945 on, the Greek Cypriots were no longer satisfied with a constitution functioning under British control; they now wanted nothing less than union with Greece. The British attitude was that this was impossible because Cyprus was required for strategic purposes; and also the interests of the Turkish minority must be protected. The Turkish Cypriots likewise resisted any attempts for self-determination on the part of the Greeks, being adamant in their determination to maintain the status quo. Eventually they proposed partition. These three highly different concepts became so bitterly involved that it seemed as though it would be impossible to arrive at any solution satisfactory to all concerned.

The Greek Government became an active party in the

events when from 1954 on, it proposed to the United Nations that the people of Cyprus be given the right of self-determination. The United Nations General Assembly, never, during the five times that the Cyprus question came up, made a definite proposal regarding the island's future. Although from the Greek standpoint the attempts were not successful, they at least brought the Cyprus question before the world on the international stage of the United Nations.

Throughout the latter years of the struggle, the pattern of development followed previous situations in that the lead was taken by the Orthodox Church. Archbishop Makarios was the leader of the Greek Cypriots in all respects. He had condoned and assisted the terrorist organization conducted by Colonel Grivas. He was the official spokesman who criticized and rejected all proposals made for the governing of the island by the British, and it was he who put forth the Greek Cypriot suggestions for a solution. The exile of the Archbishop removed the Greek Cypriot leadership, and therefore any chance of arriving at a reciprocal agreement at that time. In fact conditions on the island worsened during his exile.

Resistance, violence, and terrorism were the most obvious characteristics of the years from 1955 until 1959. The EOKA organization aimed for Enosis, and to achieve this end, directed its campaign against all aspects of British rule; against Turks, usually the police; and against fellow Greeks, the so called traitors. The result was repressive measures by the Government. The British even organized a full scale armed force to fight the organization. Much bitterness and resentment developed among the Turkish community, and inter-racial violence resulted. Feelings between the two groups hardened to the extent that it seemed almost impossible that a compromise solution could be worked out. It was only after the final truce that all concerned were able to sit around the conference table and search for a solution.

The final agreement—~~independence~~ with many conditions attached—was not what any of the groups concerned desired as a final answer to the years of conflict. Britain had maintained that she required the island for strategic purposes, and only a limited form of self-government was possible for the Cypriots. Britain also advanced the argument of protecting

minority rights. The Greeks and the Greek Cypriots declared that they would accept nothing less than self-determination which meant Enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece. The Turks and Turkish Cypriots held a negative attitude by desiring to maintain the status quo, which was an obviously unsatisfactory state of affairs. As conditions worsened, they asked for taksin, the partition of the island, a solution which would have been virtually impossible for Cyprus. Obviously the Cyprus situation presented a most complex problem, very difficult to solve. All of the claims presented by the interested groups had some justification. It seems that the most justifiable case was undoubtedly presented by the Greek Cypriots, who were the majority of the population, and were held autocratically against their wishes for a great number of years. It seems evident that the island was basically Greek, and should have been allowed union with its mother country, providing the rights of the Moslem minority were protected by entrenched clauses placed in the transfer. Unfortunately by the 1950s civil and communal strife reached such proportions that such a solution to the problem would have been virtually impossible.

The final agreement was a very intricate and complex compromise relying on the good will of both the Greek and the Turk. It might offer to the island a final answer to its problems. After such a long period of conflict it was admirable that the British, Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots were able to come together and work out a solution to the controversy, satisfactory to all. On this basis of amity and goodwill the Republic of Cyprus has perhaps found a satisfactory answer to the years of conflict and searching with a compromise which augurs well for the future.

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The British Government documents formed a very important part of the sources for the essay. The Command Papers recorded political developments, often in a detailed manner, and also supplied the British Government's official opinion. Official statements on policy were frequently announced in the House of Commons, and through replies to questions, the Government's policy was given. Also, a cross section of British opinion was expressed by the Members from all the political parties. The Colonial Office Reports for Cyprus were used for the years from 1924 until 1959, and although the record was not complete, there were sufficient available to prove very useful. A detailed account of the economic and social conditions and advances was indicated in the Reports.

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Royal Greek Embassy Information Service, Makarios III, Archbishop and Ethnarch of Cyprus, Washington, 1958.

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Proceedings of the United Nations General Assembly, 1954-59.

### Newspapers and Weekly Journals

The Economist.

The Manchester Guardian.

The New Statesman and Nation.

The New York Times.

The Times.

Of the newspapers used, The Times proved to be of the greatest value. The Times presented a detailed picture of the political, constitutional, economic, and social developments on the island, particularly for the period following the Second World War. The articles and reports seemed to show all three sides of the problem—the British, the Greek, and the Turkish—in an unbiased manner. This newspaper was one of the most important sources for the essay.

### SECONDARY WORKS

#### Books and Reference Works

Alastos, Doros, Cyprus Guerrilla, Grivas, Makarios and the British, London, Heinemann, 1960.

Since Cyprus became an international problem in the 1950s, many works have been written on the developments on the island. Alastos, a Greek Cypriot historian, attempted to justify the Greek Cypriot case. This work was found to be overly sympathetic to the Greek Cypriots and vindictive in its attitude to the British administration.

Alastos, Doros, Cyprus in History, a survey of 5,000 years, London, Zeno Publishers, 1955.

Alastos's Cyprus in History, was very useful as a source for the essay. Although the Greek Cypriot cause was portrayed in a most favourable light, much information was given. The work was particularly valuable as an indication of the opinions and attitudes of the Greek Cypriot leaders. Economic and social developments were ignored.

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This work by Byford-Jones formed a great contrast with that of Alastos. Byford-Jones emphasized the British case, and treated Archbishop Makarios, Colonel Grivas and the entire Enosis movement in a most unsympathetic manner. The work reflected the attitude of the British officials to the Cyprus problem during the period of crisis.

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A History of Cyprus by Hill proved to be the most valuable of all the secondary sources used. This volume gave a very complete picture of the British administration of Cyprus from the time of the occupation until 1948. The information seemed to be presented in an unbiased manner, and the work portrayed all sides of the problems which developed. The social and economic developments on the island were not stressed however. An excellent bibliography and great number of documents proved very useful.

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Huizinga, J. H., A Dutchman Looks at Cyprus, London, Greek Information Office, 1956.

This work printed by the Greek Information Office attempts to vindicate the Greek Cypriot position and cause. The background history to the crisis of the 'fifty's was not written in an unbiased manner. The purpose of the work was to justify the Enosis cause.

Knaplund, Paul, The British Empire 1815-1939, London, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941.

Laqueur, Walter Z., The Middle East in Transition, London, Routledge and Kegan Publications, 1958.

Lawrence, Lee E., The British Administration of Cyprus, 1878-1914, University of Wisconsin, 1936.

Lawrence's thesis, covering the period of Cypriot history from 1878 until 1914, gave a detailed account of the developments during that time. There seemed to be no definite conclusion concerning the period, however.

Lee, Dwight E., Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1934.

This work by Lee proved itself to be of great assistance in organizing the introductory chapter. The work gave a very detailed background to the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878, and also the details of the policy were fully explored.

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Mayes, Stanley, Cyprus and Makarios, Putnam, London, 1960.

Like many of the works written during or after the crisis, Mayes's work tended to show a biased attitude. Mayes attempted to justify the British administration and to do this, Makarios is not portrayed in a sympathetic manner. In fact Mayes presented both Makarios and Grivas as villains, who created much trouble.

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The Royal Institute of International Affairs aims to present information with no judgments or opinions expressed on the issues involved. In this work the Institute seems to have succeeded. The constitutional and political developments, from the time of the occupation, until the time of the final agreement are traced, and the development of the Enosis movement is also shown. The details leading up to the final agreement are extensively dealt with. The work was of great value.

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The Illustrated London News, 1954-59.

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United Nations Review, 1954-60.

## APPENDIX A

### THE CYPRUS CONVENTION

1. CONVENTION OF DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND TURKEY, WITH RESPECT TO THE ASIATIC PROVINCES OF TURKEY. SIGNED AT CONSTANTINOPLE, 4TH JUNE 1878.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, being mutually animated with the sincere desire of extending and strengthening the relations of friendship happily existing between their two Empires, have resolved upon the conclusion of a Convention of Defensive Alliance with the object of securing for the future the territories in Asia of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

Their Majesties have accordingly chosen and named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, the Right Honourable Austen Henry Layard, Her Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Sublime Porte;

And His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, His Excellency Safvet Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Imperial Majesty;

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in due and good form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

ART. 1. If Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as fixed by the Definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms.

In return, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary Reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the government, and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories.

And in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England.

ART. II The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged, within the space of one month, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Constantinople, the fourth day of June, in the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight.

(L. S.) A. H. Layard  
(L. S.) Safvet

## II. ANNEX TO THE PRECEDING CONVENTION. SIGNED AT CONSTANTINOPLE, 1ST JULY 1878.

The Right Honourable Sir A. H. Layard, G. C. B., and his Highness Safvet Pasha, now the Grand Vizier of His Majesty the Sultan, have agreed to the following Annex to the Convention signed by them as Plenipotentiaries of their respective Governments on the 4th June 1878:

It is understood between the two High Contracting Parties that England agrees to the following conditions relating to her occupation and administration of the Island of Cyprus:

I. That a Mussulman religious Tribunal (Mehkeme-i Sheri) shall continue to exist in the island, which will take exclusive cognizance of religious matters, and of no others, concerning the Mussulman population of the island.

II. That a Mussulman resident in the island shall be named by the Board of Pious Foundations in Turkey (Evkaf) to superintend, in conjunction with a Delegate to be appointed by the British Authorities, the administration of the property, funds, and lands belonging to the mosques, cemeteries, Mussulman schools, and other religious establishments existing in Cyprus.

III. That England will pay to the Porte whatever is the present excess of revenue over expenditure in the island; this excess to be calculated upon and determined by the average of the last five years, stated to be 22,936 purses, to be duly verified hereafter, and to the exclusion of the produce of State and Crown lands let or sold during that period.

IV. That the Sublime Porte may freely sell and lease lands and other property in Cyprus belonging to the Ottoman Crown and State (Arazi Mirie ve Emlak-i Humayun) the produce of which does not form part of the revenue of the island referred to in Article III.

V. That the English Government, through their competent authorities, may purchase compulsorily, at a fair price, land required for public improvements, or for other purposes, and land which is not cultivated.

VI. That if Russia restores to Turkey Kars and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war, the Island of Cyprus will be evacuated by England, and the Convention of the 4th of June, 1878, will be at an end.

Done at Constantinople, the 1st day of July, 1878.

A. H. LAYARD  
SAFVET