The Political Philosophy of Bertrand Russell

by

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Chapter One.

Russell As A Man And A Writer.
There have been, through the years, only a very few men gifted with the rare ability to absorb and synthesize into their own minds any considerable portion of the known knowledge of their time. Among such gifted men, Aristotle and Aquinas have been two of the most brilliant, but since the latter's time such a feat has become almost impossible due to the vast increase and specialization in human knowledge. But there have been men who have soared close to this ideal. One of the greatest of them in our time is Bertrand Russell, an English aristocrat by birth, a cosmopolite of the world by nature. With a thorough and intensive education behind him, the young Russell set out many years ago to settle certain problems of mathematics which he found puzzling or inconsistent; problems, which he tells us first arose when he discovered at the age of eleven that the basic conclusions of Euclidean geometry depended on axioms which could not be proved, but must be assumed to be true. However, he has found that each old problem settled leads to a new and often more difficult one. It was this discovery which has led him so far from his original field of interest. Mathematics aroused his interest in logic and epistemology. The latter may have caused him to devote some study to metaphysics. Associated with this is his interest in other closely related subjects such as ethics, religion, and social problems. In the natural course of events, just as he contributed new and start-
-ling theories to the science of mathematics, Russell also
cor-ordinated and expanded his views on other subjects unti-
il he had created a logical, coherent philosophy. Despite
the comprehensiveness of this philosophy it cannot really
be called a system in the strict technical sense. Rather,
it is a seeking for a way of life, giving the broadest po-
sible interpretation to that term; a way of life which is
concerned largely with the ethical and social nature of man,
his relationship to himself and to others. Russell has de-
voted much of his time and talent to the study of this su-
bject and has reached a number of definite conclusions about
it. These conclusions, I call his ethical and political phil-
osophy, the latter being only a natural growth out of the
former, and it is this same political philosophy, together
with a consideration of his ability as a political philoso-
pher, which will be the subject of this thesis.

The purpose of the thesis is twofold. I shall
attempt to establish two major points about Russell. My first
aim is to prove that Russell has, since his earliest work,
developed and adhered to a consistent political philosophy,
contrary to the popular belief that he has vacillated back
and forth among many theories and systems. This is not nece-
essarily a consistency of method in studying different ide-
ologies, but it is a consistency in the conclusions he has
reached regarding their value after he has examined them.

The second point I hope to prove is that Russell is
an able political philosopher. To prove this I shall describe the basic principles of his philosophy, dwelling at greater length on the aspects of the subject which he considers the most important and to which he devotes the most space. Among these are the two great ideologies of our day, democracy and communism; the two major economic doctrines of capitalism and state socialism; and the problem of war and international peace which has never been so much in men's minds as it has during the last quarter of a century.

Russell insists that civilization can only endure, if every individual man has as much personal freedom and liberty as is compatible with the interests of men as a whole. The only restrictions which should be imposed are those which are necessary to safeguard this liberty. This theory might almost be called Russell's 'touchstone' and it is to this 'touchstone' that he applies all political theories before evaluating them.

In my opinion, one of the most pertinent evidences of his genius lies in the manner of his approach to the study of these different ideologies. It is fundamentally the painstaking approach of the scientist and his attempt is to uncover the underlying causes of what he is investigating; from these he goes on to its wider ramifications, both in theory and in everyday practice. First, all existing information about the theories is gathered together and observed, then certain hypotheses are reached, and finally,
the ability of these hypotheses to function in a practical situation is considered. It is a method which is cold and analytical, disrespectful of irrelevant material and opinions, interested only in true facts, the logical inferences which may be drawn from them, and in the ultimate truth of these inferences. In a purely formal way, the same approach can be used by any scientifically trained investigator, but Russell brings to it something more, something which is an intrinsic part of his own personality. Part of this something is certainly his vast erudition. Another part is his almost complete freedom from bias or prejudice of any kind, although there are some subjects such as Christianity where this statement does not hold true. A third part is his rare ability to reason a problem through to a logical sound conclusion, irrespective of conventional hindrances or contemporary social mores. These are probably the three main aspects of the Russell touch, though there are others, including his literary ability and his disregard for public opinion. It is in the possession of these attributes that Russell differs from other men. There are few others whose interests are as widespread, and even fewer others who are as well equipped to develop them.

It would be incorrect, however, to suggest that Russell is a paragon of all the virtues, that he is always right, for it is not so. He has a considerable sprinkling of faults along with his better qualities, and both are a
product, not of his detached scientific manner, but of all the aspects of his own personality which have just been discussed.

No attempt will be made to outline all of Russell's good points, both as a writer and a thinker, for that would necessarily be very arbitrary. However, there are some which stand out above the others and therefore must receive special attention. His unusual ability to develop his point almost to infinity is so distinctive as to be a source of fascination to the reader. In "Marriage and Morals", when he wishes to discuss the nature of family life in the present day, he begins with a survey of the family as it existed in early primitive tribes and traces its growth through the matriarchal and patriarchal systems to the institution of today. He is never satisfied with describing one aspect of a subject, but almost always concerns himself with all the elements which go to make up the whole. In the case of the family he reviews it from the point of view of varying religions, races, nationalities, and even economic doctrines. Another striking example of this ability is the comparatively recent book, 'Power', in which the thesis is maintained that the motivating force of mankind is not desire for economic security, nor for religious faith, but the desire for power, which he concludes is the basic yearning of all men. Russell postulated a dozen different kinds of power and proceeded to elaborate each one of them. Whether or not one agrees with the original thesis, it cannot be denied that he has consider-
Russell is primarily interested in discovering the truth. Therefore he has cultivated a relentless, searching manner with regard to research. Nothing is too great, or too insignificant, too private or too public or too sacred, to come under his scrutiny. He has never respected persons or places or institutions in the sense that he has felt them to be beyond criticism. This attitude has frequently caused him personal hardship as in the first world war when he was imprisoned for teaching pacifism. In the same vein, he has developed the knack of cutting through useless verbiage and intellectual jargon in order to get to the core of a matter. He is not interested so much in words as in what they mean. If they convey no meaning, he discards them.

He has the courage to spare nothing in his research and the same courage prevents him from wavering in his convictions once they have been reached. He has never given up a belief for any other reason than that it had been rationally proved to be false, certainly never because it conflicted with the moral or political views of any particular person or group of people.

Five years ago this led to considerable unpleasantness when the College of the City of New York broke their contract with him because of his alleged immoral views. Although at the time there were harsh words said on both sides, it never occurred to Russell to renounce views which he did
hold. Had anyone taken the trouble to read the book in question, they would have discovered that these alleged views were very different from those he actually possessed. As I have said, in the first Great War, he suffered public disgrace rather than give up his views on pacifism. The fact that he later supported the Allies in the second world war is not a reflection on Russell's character. He says that the aims and causes of the two wars were very different and that the second one was truly a fight for the survival of freedom, while the first one was strictly Imperialistic. A few years after the first war, he was laughed at for his attitude towards Internationalism, an attitude which was to come into general prominence a quarter of a century later. We cannot help but respect a man who is willing to sacrifice personal dignity and financial loss rather than yield his ideals to those of the mob.

Russell's literary style is one of his most popular qualities, since it can be appreciated by those who are prejudiced against believing what he has to say, either through personal bias or through the attitude of the general public. This style is easy and informal, not overloaded with intellectual phrases, nor couched in such simple words that it becomes monotonous. It is straightforward, natural, and unaffected, seeming to flow along from one paragraph to the next. Like his thought, it rarely ever suffers from inhibitions. He has the power to create a mood by swaying the emotions and uses it frequently. One of the finest examples is the following,
passage taken from a short section in which he is evaluating Christianity.

"The principles of the Sermon on the Mount are admirable, but their effect upon average human nature was very different from what was intended. Those who followed Christ did not learn to love their enemies or to turn the other cheek. They learned instead to use the Inquisition and the stake, to subject the human intellect to the yoke of an ignorant and intolerant priesthood, to degrade art and extinguish science for a thousand years." *

The following short passage from his book on China shows him in a different mood, a mood in which he is creating an exquisite poetry in prose:

* Practice and Theory of Bolshevism, Page 16.
At the same time, this literary style is often so smooth that it is a dangerous handicap to him as a serious philosophical writer. On occasion he writes so fluidly and with such ease about a subject that the reader is completely convinced until a more cautious examination proves that the point at issue has been neither thoroughly nor accurately discussed. There is a second effect issuing from the same cause. The reader finds what he is saying so plausible that he does not pause to reflect on its meaning, and frequently receives a totally different impression than the intended one. When Northwestern University recently compiled a series of papers dealing with every phase of Russell's work and prepared by some of the most eminent scholars of the day, they were startled when Russell, after reading the essays, reported that over half their authors had not understood what he meant, or else had wrongly interpreted his meaning.

Though it can not fairly be said regarding his more serious works, there can be no question that in his popular books, he is frequently deliberately flippant and sensational. He is a master of the art of prose style and no one knows better how to catch the eye of the average reader than he. Regardless of how uninhibited he himself is, he is aware that other people lead more conventional intellectual lives and that when he throws an unfounded and startling statement into these lives, he is being sensational. Perhaps this is why he does it.
Flippancy is the mark of a person who either does not know how to reason, or cannot be bothered. In either case, it is a very poor quality in a writer who considers what he has to say to be of considerable importance in the intellectual world.

The lucidity of Russell's style is indirectly one of the causes for so much criticism of him as a vacillator. I think it may be fairly said that he often appears to change from one opinion to another, because in each new book he writes with a conviction and sincerity so intense that the unwary believe that the problem of this book is the most important problem of all. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that each thesis or each belief is only a part of the system as a whole. The fact that his books do fit into a coherent pattern is really a tribute to his greatness, as each work is an entity in itself and is not part of an organized and comprehensive plan.

I have said that Russell almost completely lacks any prejudice or bias and I now come to the exception, which is here to be considered as a fault. In his approach to religion, particularly the Christian religion, he is altogether too arbitrary. He has always insisted that Christianity as a religion and a church in practice, has contributed nothing useful or valuable to civilization. He tends to confuse religion as a way of life and religion as a dogmatic theology, though he admits he realizes the distinction between them. He seems to think
that it is all the same thing and that one label will cover all. He is unable to refrain from making slanderous remarks whenever he can and often spoils a good piece of work by casting wholly irrelevant aspersions on the church. Aside from the fact that his entire bias on the subject is unwholesome, there are two main objections to this attitude. The first is that it often appears in the midst of a piece of writing which is respectable in every other way and well worthy of our consideration, causing us to shy away from everything he says. The second objection is that in his failure to admit the great contributions made to civilization by Christianity, he allows prejudice to blind his reason. He never remembers that the church, despite the depths of corruption to which it has sunk at various times, was responsible for keeping alive the basic elements of our modern culture throughout the Dark Ages after the collapse of the Roman Empire.

Much of what he says regarding the church is partially true, but it is almost impossible to sort this out from the great deal which he says that is entirely absurd. In his most recent book which is a history of all western philosophy, his attitude has undergone a slight change. Though he is still out of sympathy with religion in both its forms, advancing years have apparently brought mellowness, and his attacks have not their old bitterness. Actually, he now seems almost indifferent to the subject as if he no longer considered it of any importance. This new position seems far more preferable than his former one.
I have now come to what will appear here as the last, though not the least, of his major faults. This is his discursiveness. Russell poses as an authority on far too many subjects, with the result that some of his work has not the merit possessed by other work. The more popular books on morals are probably the worst offenders. Many of the facts contained within them are authentic and many of the opinions are well considered. But by far the largest number of flippant remarks also appear here. With the straightforward sharpness of the true scientist, Russell cuts through such red tape as conventional ideas and public opinion in order to present his conception of the moral life. Totally disregarded is the fact that morals are not and by their very nature can never be scientific. If progress is to be made in broadening or revising them, it can only be made by proceeding with great caution. A man of Russell's mental stature ought to know this and act accordingly. If he cannot, he should stay away from the moral field altogether.

There can be no objection to a writer who is very discursive, providing he can treat each subject with as much intelligence and fairness as he brings to his own special field. This is what Russell tries to do, but his success is not always apparent.

Before consideration of any particular aspect of his philosophy can be carried on, it is essential that we
realize these shortcomings as well as his virtues, both as a master of prose style, and as a philosopher.
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Chapter Two.

The Modern State.
Political activity, by its very nature is inherently concerned with the relation of man to his fellow men; to the community; and to the social process as a whole. It is bound up with prevailing ethical codes and with the morality of the time and place. The morals of most men are determined by their religion, their economic position, and the opinions of their fellows, whose morality is in turn determined by the same things. Any political system or philosophy which wishes to gain wide support must recognize this and cater to the beliefs and superstitions of the masses. Man appeared first, then society, then political activity. For this reason, politics is inextricably interwoven with the ethical and social life of the group. Yet, it is not a part of this life, as in a crisis human beings will usually serve themselves and their group before they will serve their political beliefs, although there have been and are many exceptions to this rule. It must then be considered as more or less an outgrowth of our social life. As such it naturally follows that the development of ethical or social life is a natural forerunner to the development of political life. If one seeks to understand a certain political development, one can do it better with a thorough knowledge of the ethical environment surrounding it, and out of which it was created. Russell is no exception. He is interested in ethics so that he can better understand man's relation to the whole world process,
the process of political activity.

At the present time the state is the climax of this political activity. In other words, it is the highest level that our social evolutionary process has reached. This process may really still be called primitive, as our civilization is still in its infancy, and we have reason to hope that the process is not near an end. The first stage was that of the family group and the early primitive tribes. Then came the ancient dynasties such as those of Babylon, Syria, and Egypt. These were followed by the city state idea of the Greeks and Romans which in turn gave way to medieval feudalism. With the advance of science, feudalism fell and was replaced by nationalism. Now, we are turning our thoughts towards a new stage in human history, that of internationalism. Whether this is the final stage or not it is impossible to predict. It depends largely on what the science of the future makes possible.

Because of its biological unity, the family is considered the original social unit. From the family, society as we know it, has sprung. The original basis for extension beyond the family was the blood group. Several related families grouped together to form the clan or tribe. Natural developments in transportation with their corresponding increase in immigration caused the decline of the tribal system and the growth of new organizations of society. These were largely based on property and common interests, such as language, religion, race, etc., but were also influenced
by economic conditions, which produced the class or caste system at an early stage. The different elements which enter into the evolution of the social process are so multiple and so various that they form a complete and complicated study in themselves. But all of these elements have been in some part responsible for the development of what we term the modern state. The blood tie is one of the more important factors, particularly in the early life of a state. The development of our own country of Canada has been tremendously influenced by the tie of kinship which prevails among the French Canadians. Even in older, more settled communities its influence cannot be overlooked and one of the reasons the League of Nations failed was because it neglected to take this factor into consideration. Almost equally important is the territorial tie. People who live in a common territory feel themselves bound together to promote its interests and to protect it. Possibly the newest and strongest tie of all is the sentiment of nationalism, which has grown up since the Renaissance. It is a feeling of separation from other peoples with different heritages and a feeling of kinship with those around you who have similar mental and physical characteristics. Over and above both of these, nationalism has come to be identified with the struggle or at least the desire for self-government, when such a desire is held in common by a group of people.

All of these reasons combined with language, race,
religion, and ethical codes have served to create the idea of one state as distinguished from another. The internal development of the state has been a product of the same causes plus the continual struggle of the lower classes for political equality. The class system, created in most cases by economic conditions, has prevailed in almost every state at one time or another. It originated with the establishment of the chief of a tribe or a clan. This gradually turned into the concept of sovereignty which in the majority of instances was strengthened by religious association of the sovereign with divinity. He collected about him either his favorites, his family, or his advisers, who eventually became the nobles and the ruling class. The common people who had originally wanted a king as their representative in dealing with other states now found themselves faced with the problem of a whole governing class possessing all the political power, because they possessed all the economic power and thus controlled the remainder of the people. Eventually the situation reached a point where the king found himself forced to unite with the nobles to keep the commons down, or to unite with the commons to keep the nobles down. It was in this way that state power as we know it emerged. Many modern philosophers like Marx and Oppenheimer insist that state lines are determined exclusively by class, although more liberal men give the credit or blame to some of the other influences which work on the state such as
ethnocentrism, nationalism, etc.,

The difficulty appears to be to draw a distinction between the state and society. Most statesmen conceive of the two as one, or at least, of the state as superior to society. The state accordingly possesses full sovereignty in the sense that it has complete control and life or death power over its subjects. This is a confusion which must be cleared up. R. M. McIver compares this doctrine of state sovereignty with the claims of the divina rightists. Actually the relationship between the two is very different. The state is only an instrument of society. Basically, society is a community, one of the organs of which is the state. Thus the state is only one association among many, though it differs from all others in that everyone within its boundaries must belong to it. The important thing is that it has a duty to its members and when it fails to perform this duty properly, its members have a right to object, even by force if necessary. This view of the state has been lost sight of by most philosophers with the possible exception of the modern liberals, but it has been ever present to Russell who has spent a great deal of time and energy seeking to have some of the shackles the state has placed on society removed. Plato most emphatically did not believe in this doctrine at all. He insisted that the state must have complete power over the individual, but this view does not seem so Fascistic when we remember the political confusion
of Athens in his time. Nor was he communistic in our sense of the word as he still firmly believed in slavery and the class structure like most of his compatriots. His pupil, Aristotle was closer to the modern idea of a democrat. He advocated political pluralism and the rights of the individual, confining the state to a sort of ethical function.

Towards the close of the feudal ages when national states seemed as inevitable as internationalism does today, the Italian writer Machiavelli outlined four ways in which a national state could be attained. The first two were by the use of the prevailing ethics and religion of the people to build up the state, and the third was by telling them how superior they were to their neighboring states and thus building up their egos. The last and most important was by exploiting the power of the state to the maximum and using this power in every possible way to increase the security of the nation. Here we find the beginning of the idea of the state being associated with power. For many years this power rested in the hands of a sovereign, but eventually this divine right was questioned. Prominent among those philosophers who came to the support of the monarchy was the Englishman Thomas Hobbes. By pointing out the natural egoism of mankind and the need for self-preservation, he attempted to justify the position of the ruler. His successor, Locke, the first of the English liberals, was not so interested in the sovereign as he was in the doctrine that the state
itself possessed sovereign powers and could do no wrong. He felt that any political authority should provide law and justice, but that otherwise it should never violate the rights of the individual, which he considered to be of the first importance.

In the same tradition as Locke was James Mill and his son, John Stuart Mill. They were firm believers in the rights of man and in the doctrine of individual freedom and liberty. The only restrictions which could be accepted are those which are essential to the preservation of law and order. As we shall see, Russell, godson of the later Mill, followed closely in their path, although he elaborated his beliefs more specifically.

From all these men and many others and from all the ages of civilization, the ideas and theories which we have incorporated into the modern state have come down to us, with the result that our state is a peculiar institution possessing strange powers and even stranger properties. Not only that, but every state has its own personal peculiarities. I have attempted to find a definition which is universal enough to cover all states and have emerged with that used by R. M. MoIver in his work on the subject. He says that,

"The state is an association, which acting through law as promulgated by a government endowed to this end with
coercive power, maintains within a community territorially demarcated, the universal, external conditions of social order." (1.)

I consider this definition adequate because it is applicable to either dictatorship or democracy with equal impartiality. And as a definition it clearly states what most men will agree is the nature of the state today. Russell would certainly agree with it. It says nothing about the duties or privileges of the state. It merely says that its purpose is to maintain law and order.

I feel that now we have considered the origins of the state, a definition of it, and Russell's keen respect for the rights of the individual, we are prepared to examine his views on all the aspects of the state with which he deals.

He commences his discussion of the state by attacking its tremendous power. He insists that the state, because of its power to wage war, and private property, are the two most potent evils of the modern world, are harmful to life because of the excess use of power, and are hastening the loss of vitality from which the civilized world increasingly suffers. This is a point which he reiterates again and again in different places, feeling that it cannot be emphasized too strongly.

Russell maintains that this tremendous power can really be curbed only in two ways; internally by rebellion and externally by failure in war. It is the fear of these...
two catastrophes which preserves what little balance is maintained. In practice the state can interfere with the life and happiness of its citizens to an enormous extent. It can tax, order, control, demand, and command. In the larger states it appears to be able to control public opinion so that the views of any individual person no longer matter much one way or the other. In the large democracies of the present, Russell says that religious toleration is a farce, while race and color have become political footballs. But the ultimate power of the state so far as any individual is concerned is its assumption of the right to wage war where and when it pleases, ordering men about with no sympathy for their particular abilities and talents. On this subject, Russell becomes rather bitter and vague, perhaps because it is a subject which touched him so personally during the first world war and perhaps because it is a subject on which so much can be said and yet so much still be left unsaid.

The external power of the state if it possesses any is derived from the threat of war and inspired by this weapon. All states pursue external policies which are basically selfish. The ends of this selfishness are either the acquisition of power and prestige, or the opportunity of successfully exploiting weaker countries. In the effort to achieve these ends, nothing is too much for the state to do. People are put to death by the hundreds.
and their territory ravaged and burned. Russell with his characteristic literary eloquence paints some vivid word pictures on the evils of war. Writing about the eve of World War I, he says,

"While the relations between states remained completely unmodernized, their power of injuring each other had been immeasurably increased. Science and industrialism had transformed the art of war, and made it possible to devote to fighting and the production of munitions, a far larger proportion of the population than had been available for destruction in the campaigns of Napoleon..............

......nationalism and fear, in disastrous interaction, continually increased each other....."(2.)

Faced with many such pictures as this, our immediate reaction is to ask why men tolerate the exercise of such naked power. Their acquiescence is due to several different reasons. The most important of these, of course, is the feeling of nationalism which has been elaborated and strengthened since the days of tribal feeling. This feeling provides a basis for the unity of the state, although the strength of the state originated from two quite different sources. These were the fear of anarchy within the nation and the fear of aggression from without. These fears provide an incentive to mankind to unite together into a group. The group may be animated once it is formed by either common friendship, or a consciously determined purpose. The first 2. Freedom and Organization, Page 481-492.
is more common and results in a political nation, while the second becomes a religious creed which usually soars beyond mere boundary lines as it did in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Russell distinguishes between tribal feeling and patriotism as elements in the unity of the state. The latter, he says, is a much more complicated feeling, containing within it more elements of our nature than the former, such as our love for our home and family. In addition to this we have an instinctive love for our compatriots as opposed to foreigners, because we are able to know and understand their way of life.

There is also a very strong religious element in patriotism, which instils in many men a feeling of the nobility of sacrifice in war. This element is usually supported by an educational system which instructs the young in the greatness of their countries past, sometimes to the almost complete subordination of knowledge of any other country's achievements. We have had many examples of this in the last decade, but the most glaring example at the moment is in the United States of America.

In commenting on patriotism, Russell declares it to be one of the truly great evils existent, and that, "We cannot avoid having more love for our own country than for other countries, and there is no reason
why we should wish to avoid it any more than we should wish to love all men and women equally. But any adequate religion will lead us to temper inequality of affection by love of justice, and to universalize our aims by realizing the common needs of man." (3.)

As a religion patriotism is peculiarly undesirable, because of its national limitations. It aims at ends which will benefit only one nation and not all nations. Such an end is in direct opposition to Russell's conception of a good end as stated in his essay on the Elements of Ethics, (8.) For this reason, it is inferior to religious beliefs which concern themselves with saving the souls of men.

Once people become capable of suppressing their own good for that of the larger group, there is no reason why they should stop until the good of the entire human race has been attained. What is needed to make a noble sentiment out of patriotism is the removal of national pride and the refinement of universality.

Patriotism is suffering severe attacks on its integrity with the growing rise of socialism and anti-


4. The first essay in the series entitled Philosophical Essays, and published in 1910.
capitalistic movements generally, as these movements tend to unite the oppressed of many lands irregardless of borders between states. Further, most states, of which Russia is a notable exception, are interested in maintaining the privileged position of the wealthy, thus causing labor to unite, not only with foreigners, but to unite with the hope of changing the status quo and seizing political power for themselves. In Russia the situation is much the same only reversed. There, the privileged position of the proletariat is maintained. What will happen in this case is a difficult question to answer, though the experience in Australia gives cause for a certain amount of pessimism. In that country, labor since it has come into power has excluded foreign labor from entering the land, proving itself to be as intolerant as a capitalistic regime.

Russell strongly emphasizes his belief that the state will at all times work towards promoting efficiency in war. I feel that he has allowed his judgement to be swayed by his bitter hatred of war for this statement hardly stands when considered with regard to the disarmament policies of Britain and the United States during the decade immediately prior to the second world war, and the appeasement policy of England just before the war. Chamberlain may have, directly or indirectly, promoted the
war, but he certainly never promoted the efficiency of his own country for fighting it. The state creates an artificial situation with reference to our duty to mankind. On the one hand we are bound by the law and sincerely try to preserve peace within our national limits. On the other hand we seem bound by no law except that of murderers and looters, and try, just as sincerely, to force foreign states to acknowledge the superiority of ours. Russell insists that until we can persuade mankind of the necessity for a political, economic, and intellectual framework working for a positive expression of good will towards all, the present system will prevail.

This power urge is perhaps the ultimate reason why it is impossible for democratic and fascist states to exist concurrently. The entire metaphysic of the fascist state is external power by any means, while the democratic state is forced by public opinion to refrain from any open show of power in the field of foreign relations. This, of course, is largely in theory only, but it does have to be more careful. Thus we find that conflict between theoretical ideals and practical activities between the two types of states is almost inevitable. This inevitability frequently leads to war.

In the case of the communistic state, the contrast is not so strong, because here the state is more concerned
at first in building up and maintaining its internal power, before it can give much thought to the problem of external prestige. In theory, their foreign policy can hardly be called one of aggression for it is the unique idea of world revolution by any means at all.

Some time ago I pointed out that the state, regardless of what kind it is, is only an instrument of society and as such has been created to be the servant of the individual man. Its function then is to aid in the control and operation of certain activities necessary to the freedom and liberty of the individual. One of its most important functions has been the substitution of law for force in the relations of men with one another. Russell adds that this substitution can only be made truly worthy by exercising law in international relations. This cannot be done unless we perfect a world state. In other words, at the present time, we are bound by the law and feel ourselves to be so in dealing with our own compatriots, but we feel ourselves bound by no law when we are dealing with foreigners.

As a second positive function, the state controls sanitation, fire prevention, police protection, etc. It is impossible to maintain that sanitation should be left up to the individual when what one person does will so obviously affect the general welfare of the entire community. Russell mentions that the interference here with individual liberty is indicative of compulsion, but that this compulsion is a
smaller evil than the spread of disease and infection would be. Prevention of ruin by fire or by knavery of criminals comes under much the same heading. So does compulsory education. A large quantity of ignorant people in a community are a real danger to the rest of the population and the circumstances giving rise to such a situation should be removed as quickly as possible. The state should also assume certain obligation to encourage scientific research and certain responsibility for the care of children. The state is the only organization which can insist on children receiving at least a certain amount of health care and education.

Further, Russell most emphatically believes that the state should possess powers aimed at decreasing economic injustices. He considers, as I have already mentioned, that private property is one of the two great evils of society. Usually it is the state acting through law which creates these monopolies on land and property and, in their turn, it is these monopolies which demand support from the community at large.

If the state has control of all these things, just how much personal liberty has the individual left. The problem is an ancient one. How can personal initiative be combined with organization? The whole field of our political and economic life is becoming dominated by enormous organizations and corporations, while the individual faces
the danger of having his rights swept away by the rising tide. Of these great organizations, the modern democratic state with its increasing number of boards, bureaus, and commissions is rapidly becoming one of the most oppressive. There are several ways in which this oppression may be lifted rather than increased. The state should not attempt to function as a business conducting the affairs of its citizens. Instead, as many as possible of its services should be carried on by private agencies. But, and this is important, it is the duty of the state to exact efficiency from these agencies and to supervise them by seeing that they give the public the best service possible. In so far as is compatible with this efficiency, there is every reason to give as much freedom to the individual as possible in order to prevent the growth of a feeling of impotency. If the work is done by voluntary associations, then it is done by people who are interested in seeing it accomplished and will work towards that end.

These people would thus be united by common interests and desires. It is out of such groups as these, and because of such interests as these, that public opinion is formed. This public opinion is, in the last analysis, the only weapon any group of people have against the tyrannical exercise of the powers of the
state. It is a weapon which almost always succeeds eventually. The length of time required for public feeling to achieve certain ends depends on how strong the feeling is, and how determined those in authority are.

Earlier in this chapter emphasis was laid on the usurption by the state of the right to wage war if and when it pleases without consulting the people. This is why Russell considers the state so detrimental to the welfare of civilization. It is not the state itself which is so objectionable, but its readiness to wage war. He is convinced that as long as nations retain their prerogatives, refusing to yield them to an international power, the catastrophe of aggressive war will remain. How long this can be, or will be, done is a difficult question. New methods in scientific technique have made possible more hideous wars than have ever before been dreamed of. It has become apparent to all that such wars cannot go on indefinitely, and that something must be done to prevent them from recurring in the future. The only solution open at the moment appears to be internationalism. The need for it has become increasingly obvious as the only answer to the problems which confront us.

For these reasons, and because Russell emphasizes the value of internationalism to world peace so strongly, I shall return to it again in a later chapter. Before that, however, something else must be done. I wish to briefly
review Russell's comments on the different types of political philosophies and ideologies advocated in our time which have been put into actual practice, or have come near to this goal. I shall ignore the philosophy of Fascism, for it is at the moment losing its influence so rapidly that in very little time it will have but few adherents. Suffering from the crushing blows it has received in the past few years, it is doubtful if Fascism will again become significant, and even if this does happen it will not be for many years.
Chapter Three.

Democracy.
In the last chapter the main types of the modern state existent in the world today were briefly mentioned. Of these types, Russell considers that democracy is by far the most important and likely to become the most universal. This is quite natural as the basic belief of all Russell's political thinking is his respect for the rights of the individual. Any other system, in his opinion, is oppressive. A full life can only be achieved through freedom. This full life demands adherence to the doctrine of the greatest happiness for the greatest possible number. Such happiness can only be arrived at by toleration on the part of the state. The people must have freedom of thought and speech, even freedom of action is so far as it is compatible with the happiness of other peoples. There must be no discrimination because of race, creed, color, or language. Any other type of state than democracy cannot provide these things, because one or more of them are contrary to the basic principles of that type. Fascism, quite obviously, discriminates strictly among peoples of different races and creeds, and freedom of any kind does not exist. Communism, at least in theory, does not draw discriminatory lines, but it fails to permit freedom of thought, particularly with regard to the economic life of the nation. On the other hand, modern democracy, despite its many faults, attempts to permit all of these freedoms and to eradicate
any discrimination. Of course, a great deal of this is only theoretical. Most of our great democracies of the present day have become extremely bureaucratic since the turn of the century, with an increasing tendency to regulate the lives of their citizens, thus curtailing freedom of action. They have even tampered, by means of propaganda, with freedom of thought. Public opinion, however, is a strange and unwieldy thing, slow to anger, but violent when aroused. In the last analysis, it is the only weapon the people have against the power of the state, but it has proved a most potent one. Neither are modern democracies free of a certain amount of discrimination in practice, though in theory it is largely non-existent. In the United States of America where the majority of federal laws recognize equality of rights between white and black people, the negroes possess very few rights of a political nature and do not appear likely to gain more for some time to come.

I am trying, as I write this chapter, to consider the situation as it existed prior to the war and as it seems likely it will continue to exist in the immediate future. Self defense and the need for unity in war time make it necessary for any state to take over certain rights held by individuals in order to protect the mass of the people. I am not saying whether this is good or bad, because such ethical considerations are irrelevant at
the moment. Russell considers it to be a harmful, but nevertheless necessary action.

The origins of the political theory of democracy are very obscure. Probably it began with certain primitive tribes long before history became recorded. We know that democracy existed in China centuries before the Mongolian hordes of the great Khan swept down on the ancient cities of Peking and Hangchow while at the other end of the world the king of England was industriously attempting to wrest power from the barons and grant a certain amount of freedom to the common people. This ancient Chinese form of democracy may be contrasted with our constitutional monarchy. The land was ruled by hereditary emperors, rather than by elected representatives, but a certain amount of economic liberty was held by the common people. They owned the land they worked, in contrast to the serfs of Europe, who were held in virtual slavery by the great feudal lords. It was not what we would term a democratic state today, but it was probably the first step in that direction.

The originator of modern democratic theory was Aristotle. He insisted that man was a social animal and that he finds his social nature furthered by the society of which he necessarily forms a part. In his opinion the sole function of the state or of any other social group into which man enters is the completing and perfecting of man's personality. The state is only a means for the
self-realization of the individual. This is one of the earliest assertions of the rights of man and of his importance in the world. Centuries later the Christian church gave further impetus to this belief since they believed that man was made in God's image. Again later, St. Thomas Aquinas applied the doctrines of Christianity to the philosophy of Aristotle. The result, Thomism, became the official philosophy of the Roman Catholic church and its most important contribution to the field of political philosophy was a reassertion of Aristotle's individualism. Aquinas states that the social and political whole into which man enters as an integral part exists only for the sake of the individuals who compose it. Man belongs to two realms, nature and grace. As a member of the realm of nature, man respects the authority of the existing government. As a member of the realm of grace, man is provided for by the organization and administration of the Christian church. He further suggested that individuals as members of the realm of nature have many interests and that the unification of these interests is provided for by the supreme authority of the church. In any conflict between the state and the individual, the church is to act as the arbiter. Thus the two realms of nature and grace are not conceived as mutually exclusive or incompatible. They are related to each other as two means to the same end. The purpose of the state is to serve as an
instrument whereby the church may more completely realize the destiny of man. Thus we see that Aquinas believed in democracy only in so far as relations between the individual and the temporal government were concerned. Democracy could not exist where the relations of the individual to the church were involved as the church was the final and supreme authority on all subjects. Since his time, this point has been a source of great conflict between the church and governments. Even today it remains an unsolved problem in several Roman Catholic countries such as Spain and Mexico.

In the twentieth century, we are inclined to reject the latter part of this view as well as the claims of the church to temporal authority. But there are two features of it which have been incorporated into modern democratic theory and which make up an intrinsic part of that theory.

The most significant is the doctrine of individualism. In democratic states, the individual is considered the most important single factor. It is his will as expressed through the will of the majority which determines the policies of the state, and it is this same will which finally rules on the manner in which these policies are carried out. His rights are promoted and safeguarded by the state, at least in theory if not in actual practice.
The second feature of St. Thomas' philosophy which we have absorbed flows out of the first. It is the right of any man to possess private property of his own, a right which is regarded as inalienable by democratic believers. Because of their belief in this right, both the Roman Catholic church and democracy are incompatible with Marxian Communism, even if they were able to agree on the subject of whether or not the state or the individual is superior to the other. The whole question of private property versus collectivism is a troublesome one. Russell insists that private property is one of the two great evils of the modern world. He insists that it is the direct cause of the worst forms of slavery and economic oppression. To him, the solution of the problem is a very important matter and he devotes a great deal of time and space to a discussion of it. For this reason, I shall not consider the matter here, but will reserve it for a later section.

The growth of modern democratic ideas flows directly from the development of the printing press and paper. Science has also helped by attacking the ancient superstitions. With the collapse of feudalism and the spread of the Industrial Revolution people became more transient and gradually transferred their allegiance from their local lord to the king. Thus the nation state arose. The king quickly adopted divine rightism, and soon the people became as opposed to the king as they had been in
favor of him. With the rise of this middle class there came a redistribution of economic power and gradually of political power. Slowly, but clearly, they began to realize that they were not inferiors and had a right to take part in the government.

One of the earliest of democratic thinkers in the English speaking world was John Locke. A very able philosopher, his work has received more practical application than any other man since Aquinas. Influential by his writings in directing the trend of eighteenth century Frenchmen like Voltaire and Rousseau, he was also held in high esteem by Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson who incorporated many of Locke's ideas into the American constitution. In his own country, he remained without honor until the nineteenth century when his practical influence was revived by the new liberals. Locke was also the founder of associational psychology and made the first really elaborate clinical experiments.

His political philosophy is in many ways a refutation of Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes, who preceeded Locke by about a generation, had postulated a state of nature in which men, allowing their natural egoism to control them, ran wild and were constantly at each others throats. Realizing that they must change their way of life if they were to live, men agreed to forego their right to kill
each other, and to mutually surrender their power to a state power. He called this the social contract theory of political obligation. According to it government originates in a contact among people whereby they give up their rights to one central source. This source must secure peace and security. For Hobbes, this central source was a state ruled by sovereignty. The individual gives his rights to the state, except that of self-preservation, in return for security and protection. He justified this sovereign power of the state on the basis of the unity, order, and protection that the state provides for its people. Despite the fact that he was one of the first men who tried to rationally justify the authority of the state, the fact remains that Hobbes was not truly democratic, because he subordinated the freedom of the individual to the power of the state, quite aside from his belief in the vital necessity of an all powerful ruler.

Locke begins his refutation with the question of the nature of the state of nature Hobbes had postulated. He had more insight into the workings of the human mind than his predecessor had, possible because of his interest in psychology. He accepts the view that man emerged from this state by way of a social contract, but argues that in a pre-political state of society, humans would have an appreciation of their obligation to act socially and
and therefore in such a state there would be moral obligations, even though it might not be possible for them to be exercised. He insisted that human beings are fundamentally altruistic and sociable and that these qualities would persist even in a state of nature. They would recognize and respect the rights of others, if only in the hope that their own rights would be respected in turn. He adds that these rights owe their origins to easily ascertainable causes, the major one of which is the natural desire for self-preservation. Though men are thus living in a state of society in which certain primitive laws and civil rights prevail, there are inconveniences which make it highly desirable that some sort of government or political regime should be set up. These inconveniences are threefold. First, there is no established, settled, and known law which is accepted by common consent as the standard of right and wrong and the common measure by which controversy may be regulated. Second, there is no known and impartial judge with authority to determine differences between people according to established laws. Finally, there is often required a power to back up and support the sentence of the judge when it is right and to provide for its execution. He sums the situation up admirably in the following three paragraphs,

37"Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all
the rights and privileges of the law of nature equally
with any other man or number of men in the world, hath
by nature a power not only to preserve his property—that
is his life, liberty, and estate—against the injuries
and attempts of other men, but to judge of and punish
the breaches of that law in others as he is persuaded
the offense deserves, even with death itself, in crimes
where the heinousness of the fact in his opinion deserves
it. But because no political society can be nor subsist
without having in itself the power to preserve the property,
and, in order thereunto, punish the offenses of all those
of that society, there, and there only, is political
society, where every one of the members have quitted this
natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the
community in all cases that exclude him not for appealing
for protection to the law established by it; and thus all
private judgement of every particular member being excluded,
the community comes to be umpire; and by understanding
different rules and men authorized by their community
for their execution, decides all the differences that may
happen between any member of that society concerning any
matter of right, and punishes those offenses which any
member hath committed against the society with such
penalties as the law has established; whereby it is easy
to discern who are and who are not in political society
together. Those who are united into one body, and have a
common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between them and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another, but those who have no such common appeal—I mean on earth—are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is no other, judge for himself and executioner, which is, as I have before shown it, the perfect state of nature.

And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it committed amongst the members of that society, which is the power of making laws, as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members by anyone that is not of it, which is the power of war and peace; and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society as far as it is possible. But though every man entered into civil society, has quitted his power to punish offenses against the law of nature in prosecution of his own private judgement, yet with the judgement of offenses, which he has given up to the legislative in all cases where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to the commonwealth to employ his force for the execution of the judgements of the commonwealth whenever he shall be called to it; which, indeed, are his own judgements, they being made by himself or his representative. And herein we have the original of the executive and legislative
power of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far offenses are to be punished when committed within the commonwealth, and also by occasional judgements founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both of these to employ all the force of all the members when there shall be need.

89. Wherever, therefore, any number of men so unite into one society, as to quit everyone his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there, and there only, is a political, or civil society. And this is done wherever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme government, or else when anyone joins himself to and incorporates with any government already made. For hereby he authorises the society, or, which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the society shall require, to the execution whereof his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth with authority to determine all the controversies and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And wherever there are any number of men
however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature." (1.)

Locke was the earliest exponent of the doctrine which came to be known as Liberalism, and certainly Russell is one of the leading exponents of the same belief today. The tie between the two lies in the writings of James and John Stuart Mill, who in the last century were the main believers in the freedom and liberty of the individual as opposed to the power of the state.

Russell commences his review of democracy by mentioning that there are three conceptions of the democratic state. The first is the laissez-faire type of state in which private enterprise and free initiative are the main theme. Organization is regarded as an evil and each man is expected to sink or swim as best he can. The second is the social service state. Here the state recognizes certain responsibilities to its members. For example the British Reform Bills, particularly the earlier ones, were only a system of mild handouts by the government. Such a state is not progressive as it functions as a charitable institution. The third conception is that of the collectivist state. Marx said the working classes would eventually take over the instruments of production. The essence of collectivism is the raising of the standard of living for everybody, not for just a few. According to Russell none of these doctrines are adequate, as each one leaves a great deal to be desired.

1. Essay on Civil Liberty.
M tanker said that power could not be equalized by democracy while economic power remained concentrated in the hands of a few. Therefore economics must be in the hands of the state and the state must be democratic. Russell criticizes modern Communism for keeping only the first half of this doctrine by concentrating both politics and economics in the state. The result is an oligarchy or one man tyranny as we have seen.

In his views on democracy, Russell's political and economic philosophies overlap each other. The concept of power overshadows all of his writings. He believes that possessiveness is evil because it promotes the power of one man over another. On this basis he condemns, as we shall find in a later chapter, not only nineteenth century competitive capitalism, but also contemporary monopolistic capitalism and state socialism. He concludes that one is as bad as the other. On the purely political side, he concludes that democracy is the only system which allows the greatest amount of freedom to the individual, a freedom which Russell considers almost sacred. Modern democracy in practice, however, has one great fault which he finds it impossible to overlook. This is its laissez-faire attitude to war. He says that democracy is the only political organization in the world today that does not either actively support or actively combat the holding of private
property and the waging of war. Both of these, he adds, are incompatible with the liberty of the individual, because while they exist and are encouraged, he is a slave to them and has no liberty.

Everywhere in Russell this word liberty keeps reappearing. He considers that the Continental and English schools of philosophical *liberalism* liberalism which developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are the direct forerunners of modern democracy, particularly as it has been elaborated in the United States. The English liberals were social hedonists. They believed that all men were born equal and thus had a right to expect equal opportunity. Quite romantic by nature, they tended to stress feeling and the emotions rather than reason, and did this by the use of such catch words as tyrant, slave, etc. They stood for religious toleration, republicanism, freedom of the press and of opinion, and at the same time emphasized the importance of economics in social and political life. Among the earlier liberals, the most important element in their creed was their belief that all nations must be free from foreign domination. Gradually this developed into the principle of *nationality*. A nation came to be defined as a geographic group possessed of a sentiment of solidarity due to common language, custom, interest or descent. This sentiment was held as the only
essential to nationhood. The idea had started in a primitive form when Henry VIII had released the country from the shackles of Rome. It continued under Elizabeth as the country became at the same time more prosperous and more smug. The English, though, reacted to the growth of German and American industrialism with hysterical Imperialism, thus antagonizing the liberal elements within their own country that still believed one nation should not be subjugated to another.

In France the change was more tortuous. It was not until after the revolution of 1848, that it was even safe to express liberal ideas. The years following saw a regular crusade for ideas sweep the country. Out of this crusade grew the constitution of France as a democracy in 1871. The fact that France has not been able to remain true to these ideas has nothing to do with the ideas themselves, but is due to a host of other reasons. The temperament of the people, constant wars, corruption from within, etc., have all done their share to undermine the constructive working out of the original ideas of freedom and liberty which had been so strongly believed in.

Russell states that the two great sources of modern democracy are classical and Protestant. For example, pre-revolutionary France was inspired by the classic example of Herodotus and Tacitus. The history of distinctly Protestant countries is one,
first of revolt against the power of the papacy, and then against the civil power. Protestant statesmen combined democratic principles with their assertion of the rights of the individual, to procure at the same time both a theory of government and a theory of the limits of its power. This is essentially what we now mean by democracy: A government pledged to guarantee the liberty of its people.

The great American democrat was Thomas Jefferson, often called the founder of this theory in the United States. He was strongly influenced by John Locke, Sydney, an opponent of the Stuarts, as well as by many unidentified emigres from Cromwells army. He wrote the Declaration of Independance and later became the first president who honestly tried to establish democracy, believing that man was a rational animal and endowed by nature with an innate sense of justice. He insisted that every man knows by his conscience what it is right to do, and it is only necessary for the happiness of all that each man follow the dictates of his own conscience. If he has liberty he will do this. Laws are made to guide the exceptions along the right path. Unfortunately, Jefferson was not allowed to do exactly as he pleased and was curbed in many of his ideas by a rival party led by Alexander Hamilton. The result was a sort of compromise. Jefferson
succeeded in molding the political character of the constitution, but Hamilton succeeded in seeing that the constitution protected capitalism and private property.

Many of the evils of democracy which were to come into being at a later date were not foreseen by this constitution. The party system was still only in its infancy and the infamous part which it was to play in democratic history did not become apparent for some years. Nor was it evident that as civilization became more and more complex, the difficulty over what government should control and what it should not control would arise. The development of a bureaucratic state could not possibly have been foreseen at that time.

It is not with the principle or the theory of democracy that Russell quarrels, but with the way in which it is carried out in practice. He has not the same faith in an 'innate sense of justice' as Jefferson had and believes that if freedom and liberty are to be preserved, more concrete methods will have to be adopted to do the job.

He says, "Democracy, as a method of government is subject to some limitations which are essential, and to others which are, in principle, avoidable. The essential limitations arise chiefly from two sources; some decisions must be speedy, and others require expert knowledge."
Owing to these essential limitations, many of the most important matter must be entrusted by the electorate to the government. Democracy is successful in so far as the government is obliged to respect public opinion. The moral is that a democracy, since it is compelled to entrust power to elected representatives, cannot feel any security that, in a revolutionary situation, its representatives will continue to represent its wishes. This is not to say that there is a better form of government than democracy. The difficulty of democracy as a form of government is that it demands a readiness for compromise. The beaten party must yield the majority must not press the advantage. This requires practice, respect for the law, and the habit of believing that opinions other than one's own may not be a proof of wickedness. Given these conditions, democracy is capable of being the most stable form of government hitherto devised.

1. Power, Pages 191, 192, 193 and 194.
Chapter Four.

War And Private Property.
I have placed two apparently irrelevant subjects together in the same chapter, because of the inter-relation and the importance which Russell himself assigns to them. In his opinion these are the two great faults of modern democracy in practice, which he points out takes a laissez-faire attitude towards them. He declares that the democratic state at the present time is the only political ideology which does not either actively support or oppose these two evils. In addition, he adds, the state deliberately attempts to influence public opinion regarding war and private property by the use of propaganda, education and religion. To end war, he insists that private land and capital must go, but there are other causes which are more important than these and which are overlooked by most political theorists. War is not caused by governmental ambition, economic forces, or diplomatic tangles, but by human nature. Russell considers that war is another form of institution, comparable to some of our accepted political institutions. He asserts that if men would only awaken to the intense harm done them by war they could eventually succeed in abolishing it, and then he goes on to show how this could be done.

"War is a conflict between two groups, each of which attempts to kill and maim as many as possible of the other group in order to achieve some object which it
desires. The object is generally either power or wealth. It is a pleasure to exercise authority over other men and it is pleasant to live on the produce of other men's labour. The victor in war can enjoy more of these delights than the vanquished. But war, like all other natural activities, is not so much prompted by the end which it has in view as by an impulse to the activity itself. Very often men desire an end, but because their nature demands the actions which will lead to the end. And so it is in this case; the ends to be achieved by war appear in prospect far more important than they will appear when they are realized, because war itself is a fulfilment of one side of our nature. If man's action sprang from desires for what would in fact bring happiness, the purely rational arguments against war would have long ago put an end to it. What makes war difficult to suppress is that it springs from an impulse rather than from a calculation of the advantages to be derived from it."

There is a distinction between force as exerted by the police and force as used in international relations. In the former case, such force is usually ordered by a neutral authority endowed with this power. In the latter case, force is employed by one community against another without any regard to the arbitration of a neutral power. Russell thinks that a certain amount of force exercised by the police in internal disputes is necessary, and that a similar use of force in international relations

1. Principles of Social Reconstruction, Pages 77-78.
is the best hope of permanent peace.

Most countries contain two forces which co-operate to produce war. The first of these is the small group of men who are aware of war at all times. Either they are naturally bellicose and like war for war's sake or they stand to profit in terms of power or wealth by war. The second force is the large number of ordinary people who pay no heed to the prospect of war when there isn't one, and immediately become seized with a sort of war fever when one seems imminent. This fever is an outburst of patriotism by people who are convinced that they have right and justice on their side and that the enemy is envious of the superior achievements of their country or state.

Russell feels that the two main characteristics of nations at war are pride and envy. Pride on the part of the country that has what it wants, and envy on the part of the country that has not. Prior to both World Wars, this was the situation which prevailed in England and Germany. The latter felt that Britain, by her great expansion, had stunted the growth of Germany. Britain, on the other hand, was proud of what she had accomplished and secure in the belief that her particular area of the world would remain the same for ever. Not with envy of Britain's possessions, and infuriated by her acceptance of this arrangement as a natural.
priveledge and her patronage of lesser countries, Germany determined to upset the status quo. The result was catastrophic and, according to Russell, wholly unnecessary. Both countries were forced by their national pride to fight to the bitter end. Peace at any time during the war would have been more desirable and unquestionably more profitable to both countries. "The utmost evil that the enemy could inflict through an unfavorable peace would be a trifle compared to the evil which all nations inflict upon themselves by continuing to fight. What blinds us to this obvious fact is pride, the pride which makes the acknowledgement of defeat intolerable, and clothes itself in the garb of reason by suggesting all sorts of evils which are supposed to result from admitting defeat. But the only evil of defeat is humiliation, and humiliation is subjective; we shall not feel humiliated if we become persuaded that it was a mistake to enter the war, and that it is better to pursue other tasks not dependant on world dominion." (2.)

Most wars are fought in an attempt to upset the status quo. The concept of permanent peace has unfortunately come to be associated with the maintenance of the existing state of things. The very nature of things makes this impossible. Society is continually growing and changing and allowances must be made for these changes. The status

quo must be flexible enough to bend to accommodate these changes. Russell claims that this flexibility can only be guaranteed by an international organization, backed up by force to support its decisions. Such a parliament of nations must have full power to make difficult decisions, to alter the distribution of territory and wealth, and it is only in this way that militarism can be permanently overcome.

So far, I have discussed only how Russell thinks wars originate and how he thinks they might be overcome. Many of his critics assert that these opinions are too idealistic and that he expects too much from human nature. It is said that his ideas could only become effective if man were to bring reason into every field of thought, and rationalism always triumphed over emotionalism. Actually this is not the case. Few people realize better than he that the basic trouble we have to combat is the ennui of the common man. The common man leads a life which is utterly devoid of adventure or risk. He has a regular income from some occupation in which the fear of dismissal or failure is at a minimum. He is insured against death or sickness, and thus is secure as long as he continues to remain in his own narrow rut. Unfortunately, security creates a nemesis of ennui. Life is no longer romantic or interesting, and has become only dull. This same man, however, belongs to a nation, and in a certain sense he shares in the
successes and sufferings of his nation. For years he has been caught in a web of private cautions and regular performance of duties which have come to be abhorrent because of their very regularity. It is with a joyous feeling of release that he will support his nation when it plunges into public madness. It is patriotic to be reckless for the nation whereas it is wicked to be reckless in personal affairs. All vigorous men need some sort of activity, some sort of feeling of having met resistance and overcome it. The problem then is to create an activity which will satiate this primitive urge by some other means than the destruction of civilization. One of the ways by which we are already doing this is in our social and political conflicts. Though many men tend to deprecate these conflicts, Russell feels that they fulfill a very necessary function, as they increase men's interest in public affairs, and at the same time do very little real harm. He also considers that in a democratic community, every voter has a little of the monotony of his life removed by the sense of initiative and responsibility which the casting of his ballot gives to him. Obviously these interests are not enough. If the impulse to wage war existent in all men is to be permanently eliminated, some form of activity much more intense than either of these will have to be devised.
Russell does not venture any suggestion as to what this activity might be. The subject is really one that belongs to the field of ethics and involves a change in our whole manner of existence. What he does say is that it must be supplied if we are to survive at all.

The second real enemy of civilization both in the past and in the present is the concept of private property. He believes that the tremendous influence private property has had on the history of the world is attested to, not only by its social and psychological ramifications in the life of all mankind, but in the inroads it has made into world culture as well. Under existing conditions, the grim necessity of acquiring enough of this world's goods to clothe and feed oneself is one of the starker, but ever present realities.

When the craving for material possessions becomes a religious passion, it ceases to retain any of the aspects of decency or respectability, and frequently causes mental or moral decay. Conversely, this same decay of life promotes a belief in the value of material goods. People who worship money, unless they are abnormal, are interested in it for what it can procure, and they have come to regard happiness as merely the enjoyment of the external pleasure which money can provide. They have ceased to expect happiness as the
reward of their own direct activities, but rather as an indirect reward dependant on the acquisition of wealth. A person who takes a real and vital interest in his work receives his happiness from sources within himself. For him, money does not possess the same meaning. Russell seems to limit this to a select group of artists and lovers, but I think it can be quite safely expanded to include all those who receive real satisfaction from their work, irregardless of what this work is.

We have seen that this worship of money is both a cause and an effect of decay. The next step is to reflect on how our present system might be remodelled in order to increase the general vitality and eliminate decay. There can be no objection to those who strive for a certain amount of economic independance in order that they may have time in the future to pursue a worthy and reasonable desire, for in this case, their aim has a definite finite limit. On the contrary, it is the worshippers that are important. Yet, this worship is opposed to human nature since it prevents growth and expansion and ignores significant elements in mankind which are counter to the amassing of money. Men stint their own personalities, because of this inaccurate concept of success. At the same time, they aid in the promotion of a nervous stress and strain which tires out everybody and generally weakens any co-operative community undertaking. Perhaps, worst of
all, is the fact that men will throw all their strength and energy, mentally, physically, and financially, into enterprises which cannot possibly add anything to the general welfare of their fellowmen and may even deter from that welfare.

Russell discusses in several different places, and at some length, the extent which this worship of money has reached in England and America. He feels that the class of money worshippers now vastly outnumbers those who do not belong to it. Here he seems to be giving away to his usual tendency to exaggerate when referring to America. Russell is frequently a victim of the conventional English attitude towards the United States and he finds it very difficult to overcome this. He makes sweeping statements about Americans as a whole. Such generalizations can not be truly made about any race or nation, especially a nation so ridden with social class consciousness as the United States.

The social and psychological effects of this love for money seem to vary with different nations and races. In America it has resulted in the desire to infinitely increase the amount of one's wealth. Prior to the Civil War, the United States thought its prosperity was due to free competition. But with the improvement in technique, the system became one in which one or two vast corporations controlled
most of the important industries. In the oil race, Standard Oil, piloted by Rockefeller, obtained a complete monopoly in America and began spreading to other parts of the world. Gradually and inevitably, America became an organization ruled by a small group of rich men for their own profit. It was an excellent organization, but its purpose was all wrong. W.H.Vanderbilt says it is impossible to enact legislation which will keep such men down, and Russell agrees with him, within the limits of the capitalistic system. The solution lies, not in a more absolute plutocracy, nor in a return to economic anarchy, but in public ownership and control of the machine which finance has created.

In England the effects of this love for money take the form of a desire to be socially correct. You must have the right number of rooms and servants in your home. In courtship or marriage, aside from the overwhelming restrictions of the social class system, you must also observe an infinite number of traditional conventions. In order that children may be sent to the proper public schools, often inexcusably bad, the parents will deliberately limit the size of their families and make any number of personal sacrifices. The stupendous effort which men and women make, and the amazing quantity of self discipline which they display in this struggle are a credit to them.
It is sad that all this energy should be exerted not for any constructive end, but only to make their own personalities shallow and narrow.

In France there is a slightly different situation. Here, the financial level of society is very static. It is not easy to build up a vast fortune, but the majority of the people belong to the reasonably well to do middle class. As a result many people inherit a small competence. Once having received this, the trend seems to be of the utmost thrift. Instead of spending their money, they try to hand it down to the next generation. All inherited property is divided by law among the family and it has become a social necessity that a French girl be provided with a dot. These things have combined to make the family a vital and powerful institution. This love of safety and security has meant that the family has been limited in size as well as in outlook. The tendency to maintain the status quo produced by this type of society coupled with the decline of the population was directly responsible for the decline of France during the inter-war period.

In Germany the worship of money is associated with the state. The man who builds up a successful business is performing a service to the state. This was not only a policy of the National Socialist party, but it is an attitude which has existed in Germany ever since its unification by the Franco-Prussian war. In some ways they are merely
copying Britain. Germans have long held the belief that the triumphant position of Britain is due to her industrialism and her intense nationalism, and they have tried to create these qualities within their own boundaries.

Russell remarks with sorrow that in their attempt to do this, they appear to have lost that mastery of the fine arts which they had to a much greater extent than the neighbors they are so envious of. He points out that there has hardly been a literary, musical or artistic masterpiece come out of Germany in the last forty years which can compare with their efforts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During the last few years, they have become a race of robots and it is unlikely that enough individuality will be revived among them for some time to come to produce anything really noteworthy.

It is not possible to estimate at present how much the World War just concluded has changed or will change the situation in these countries. In America we may expect the change to be slight, though already labour is asserting itself in a manner it would not have dared to try ten years ago. In England class lines have been broken down somewhat and perhaps they will not be so rigid in the future. France and Germany have both been put under such gigantic physical and emotional strain that interest in wealth and property has disappeared under the stress of
more fundamentally biological needs like food and clothing. In both of these countries the necessity to fight daily for the bare preservation of life will probably develop a similar type of person as was developed by the French Revolution; a callous, brutal person, indifferent to the wants or needs of others.

Russell also takes infinite care to point out that this worship of wealth is far more harmful now than it used to be for several reasons. Industrialism has made work less interesting on the one hand, and massive armies and navies more possible on the other. People are better educated and disciplined, enabling them to hang on to an unworthy purpose in life with more tenacity than formerly. These things have gradually come to be recognized as harmful by various groups of people with the result that new political movements inspired by economic desires have sprung up. These groups are all more or less concerned with judging the industrial system. Russell considers that there are four points of view from which such a judgement may be made. We may ask whether the system secures the maximum amount of production, of justice in distribution, and a tolerable existence for the men who are the producers. Fourthly, we may ask if it secures the greatest possible freedom and encouragement for progress. A capitalistic regime is naturally interested in the first
of these objects. Growing socialistic movements are making the second and third the focal point of their interest. But there is no group or organized system supporting the fourth object. Russell insists that the encouragement of progress is essential to industrialism if it is to survive. Yet both the present system and planned socialistic reforms are insufficient. The former looks at it only from the side of production and the owner capitalist, while the socialists look at it only from the side of the employees.

The present system has given rise to a widespread belief that production is the only factor that matters. No one concerns themselves any more than they have to with what is produced, nor do any but the workers care how much sorrow and suffering go into its production. The tendency is towards sacrifice of everything, life, health, etc., if need be, in order to maintain and increase production. This gluttonous desire has resulted in men forgetting many things that are more significant. Russell believes that after we have produced enough food and clothing for everybody, we would be wiser to cut down on our production so that people would have more leisure time to enjoy the fruits of their labors.

Production, after all, is just like everything else. There is a point beyond which it cannot go. We are
rapidly exhausting not only our minerals and forests, but even the very soil itself, to say nothing of the deterioration of the human element involved. With the tremendous upsurge of production that the war has brought, particularly in North America, future generations face almost certain hardships unless we start vast conservation and preservation schemes in the immediate future.

Russell regards the injustice of our present system of distribution as inevitable no matter how you look at it. Never in the history of man has the right to the produce of his own labour been commonly supported by the law. Though early socialists insisted on this right, it has now become obsolete, as the manufacturing mass-production setup makes such a principle untenable. Further there are physical differences between workers which automatically enable the stronger person to produce more and it seems hardly fair to encourage these in the name of economic justice.

He insists that a great deal of the power which appears to belong to landowners actually belongs to landowners, and refers for example to mines. He further points out that it is a significant example of the patience and inertia of men that they continue to endure the tyranny and exploitation which are practiced on them by those who own the land. The only historical basis
for private property is the feudal one of conquest by
the sword. It is strange that such an unnatural process
should become so consolidated in men's minds as to reach
the height of complexity and stability it has attained
in our civilization. Abolition of the right to possess
land would not solve the problem, since the necessity
of distinguishing between good and bad land would still
remain. For this reason there must be rent on all land,
buts it must be paid to some institution which is organ­
ized to perform public services such as the state. If
any of this money were left over after operating expenses
had been deducted, it could be divided among all the
rent payers. Inheritance would disappear, and rightly
so, Russell feels that the class of people who live on
inherited wealth are generally harmful to all society.
They are afraid both of reform and of thinking clearly
since they know their position is undeniably wrong. Yet,
because they are wealthy and can establish a world of
artificial manners and opinions which seems to be
superior to naturalness, they have collected a large
group of followers, particularly among the middle
classes. Little faith can be placed in the theory that
men would not work as well if they could not will their
property to their dependants and descendants. We have
long since learned that the mass of work is done for bread and butter, while all exceptionally good work is done for the pleasure of doing it. This is indisputable if one examines all of the really excellent work which has been done in any field. In scientific research, there are incidents like the discovery of radium by the Curies; in art, music, literature, and sculpture, examples are too numerous to need mentioning. In architecture we have the magnificent English cathedrals of the middle ages, built by a people who loved their work, because they loved their religion. Apparently the same rule prevails in all fields, if we wish to pursue the matter further.

It would be interesting at this point to discuss the attitudes of various political ideologies towards these problems, but our ends will be much better served if we consider these by themselves, without specific reference to the questions which have been considered in this chapter.

The trouble with the present system is that the interests of consumer, producer, and capitalist are mutually exclusive. Russell points out that co-operation would combine the interests of consumer and capitalist; syndicalism would combine the interests of producer and capitalist, but neither would amalgate the interests of
all three. Therefore, would prevent industrial strife, but either would be preferable to the present system, and perhaps a mixture of both would put an end to many of our present troubles.
Chapter Five.

Communism.
"By far the most important aspect of the Russian Revolution is an attempt to realize Communism. I believe that Communism is necessary to the world, and I believe that the heroism of Russia has fired men's hopes in a way which was essential to the realization of Communism in the future. Regarded as a splendid attempt, without which ultimate success would have been very improbable, Bolshevism deserves the gratitude and admiration of all the progressive part of mankind.

But the method by which Moscow aims at establishing Communism is a pioneer method, rough and dangerous, too heroic to count the cost of the opposition it arouses. I do not believe that by this method a stable or desirable form of Communism can be established. Three issues seems to me possible from the present situation. The first is the ultimate defeat of Bolshevism by the forces of capitalism. The second is the victory of the Bolshevists accompanied by a complete loss of their ideals and a regime of Napoleonic imperialism. The third is a prolonged world war, in which civilization will go under, and all its manifestations (including Communism) will be forgotten."(1.)

These are the words with which Russell commences his report on the political philosophy known as Communism, as it is being put into practice in the Soviet Union. There is in them no attempt to evade the significance

Communism as a new political faith. Russell recognizes its importance and prepares to consider it as such a major ideology ought to be considered. There can be no question that Communism is philosophical. Its theories of dialectical and historical materialism originated with early materialistic philosophers such as Hobbes, and more particularly with Hegel and his new dialectical procedure. As a philosophy it has been elaborated by the work of such men as Feuerbach, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and to a very much lesser extent, Trotsky and Stalin. In our own time, we are perhaps too close to Communism to be able to study it impartially. Yet, if we are to understand it, we must at least attempt to do this.

When we examine the foundations and bases of the theories which are accepted in present day Russia, we find that the movement is definitely one which is religious in its derivation as well as in its organization. Communism contains as many doctrines and dogmas as any of the more orthodox beliefs. It has just as much ritual, and certainly with reference to many things, it demands the expression of emotions which are just as intense if not more so as the sacred passions which Christianity tries to kindle. The nature of its metaphysics includes elements which are decidedly dogmatic and arbitrary.
A few years after the first World War, Russell wrote, "The war has left throughout Europe a mood of disillusionment and despair" (2.)

These then are the things the new religion offers. This is the hope that Communism has extended to a suffering nation. Russell says of this hope, "I cannot share the hopes of the Bolsheviks any more than those of the Egyptian anchorites; I regard both as tragic delusions, destined to bring upon the world centuries of darkness and futile violence" (3.)

After such a positive statement as this, a detailed explanation is needed and Russell hastens to provide it. He begins by pointing out that the fundamental teachings of Christianity are entirely admirable, but that they have rarely ever been put into practice. Instead of turning the other cheek, they learned, "...to use the Inquisition and the stake, to subject the human intellect to the yoke of an ignorant and intolerant priesthood, to degrade art and extinguish science for a thousand years." (4.)

4. Ibid, Page 16.
These horrors were due to the fanaticism with which Christianity was practiced. Russell adds that the teachings of Communism are every bit as admirable, but will no doubt end in a similar way. Fanatics will always sacrifice everything, even human life to further the cause for which they are fighting. Thus, they are liable to sponsor the most horrible cruelties in order to achieve their ends. A few years ago a man of lenient disposition might have felt that the civilized society of the western world had reached a point of development in its evolutionary pattern where such conditions as Russell portrays could not exist. He might have insisted that Communism could never follow the trail blazed by Christianity, because human nature would never again sink so low. Now after six years of international atrocities on a grand scale, such an assertion is not only impossible, but few will even tolerate it as a forecast of the future. We must, therefore, accept human nature, not as it has been, or will be, but as it is. I am not for one moment suggesting that human nature cannot be changed, for this would be contrary to all modern psychology. I am merely pointing out that the change will be very slow and the result cannot be foretold.

In December of 1847, the English Communist League decided that Marx and Engels should draw up a statement of the aims of the League. This statement was published the next year and was called the Communist Manifesto. It has,
in Russell's words, "...bouyancy and swiftness, compression and propagandist force, and is the best thing that Marx ever did." (5.) Except for its call to the workers to unite and its concluding threat of a communist revolution, it is largely a history of the world, showing the grim effects of modern capitalism and the inevitability of a proletarian revolution. In it one finds the tendency to build an all-embracing system and the dialectical approach inherited from Hegel by both Marx and Engels. This is effectively combined with the revolutionary spirit stirred in these men by the troubles of France and the knowledge Engels had of factory conditions in England. (6.) This document had a profound influence on modern political thought and action, as it is still regarded as their creed by many Marxists.

Their fundamental theory is the materialistic conception of history which states that all mass-phenomena are determined by purely economic motives. Russell, in criticizing this view, points out that *philosophical materialism and this doctrine have no logical connection, because materialism in the philosophical sense refers to the theory that all mental occurrences are purely physical in their origin. He draws this out to form a foothold for


by Frederick Engels.
his belief that any attempt to base a political theory on a philosophical doctrine is undesirable. People whose politics are metaphysically dogmatic, come to regard their theories as ultimate and universal and feel that it is their duty to mankind to spread their hopes and fears around. This is what gives rise to religion of any kind, which in its turn usually gives rise to fanaticism. The materialistic conception of history considered as a practical approximation, can, of course, not be totally denied, as there is much in it that is acceptable not only to the demands of modern society, but also to any really rational mind. They insist that modern industrialization has tremendously influenced our social culture and our mental life. In many ways they are right. Our minds have become more emancipated, the world is smaller, we are more dependant on each other, and in a hundred other shapes and forms the manufacturing era has stamped its impress on our life. Russell suggests some specifically important things which have been affected. Among the working class, religion had decayed, while among the wealthy it has revived, thus proving, perhaps, that it is much easier to have faith with a full stomach than without. However the real reason for this deviation is that capitalists find defenses for their position among some of the reactionary doctrines of the church.
As another example there is a new attitude towards women. For several generations philosophers and sociologists like John Stuart Mill and Mary Wollstonecraft had advocated equal rights for women, but it took a world war and the desperate need for more workers to make all the arguments for placing women on an equal basis with men irresistible. More important than this was the new view on sexual morality, which developed as antithetic to the old system which was controlled by the economic dependence of women on their male relatives. Changes in sexual morality are changes which must inevitably affect the whole social process, as they are so inextricably bound up with men's thoughts and feelings. Thus we find that literature, law, and indeed our entire culture undergoes a complete revision simply because of a more intelligent consideration of the position of women.

In the face of such an analysis as this, Marxists are quite right in speaking of a morality imposed on the world by capitalism. But they are hardly accurate when they ignore all the non-economic factors in their interpretation of the politics and beliefs of a people. There are several of these factors which are obviously important and among these is that great psychological force known as nationalism. Economics does, in a large measure, provide a mainspring for political action, but it is not the
'raison d'être' for the formation of nations. People group together within certain boundaries because they have the same common heritage, not only of race and color, but also of culture and language. In addition to, or instead of, one of these causes, they may be united geographically or climatically. Once any nation has survived long enough to acquire tradition and legend, then the people or descendants of those who were at one time a part of that nation are never happy until the old order has been restored. One of the finest illustrations of this point is the general chaos of the Balkan countries, where the pressure of population has so intensified nationality that it has become almost impossible to discover any adequate solution to the problem. If the economic settlement of the situation were acceptable to the people, the whole problem would disappear. A further example can be found in the feeling which exists between northern and southern Ireland.

Communists assume that man will associate with other people in his own class, and though this is partially so, it is not the whole truth. His relations with his fellowmen are largely determined, not by economics, but by some other superior interest which they hold in common such as their religion. Russell insists that, "Religion has been the most decisive factor in determining a man's
herd throughout long periods of history."(7.)

One other element which is really vital has been ignored in the creation of a materialistic theory and that is that the actions of the vast majority of people are due to certain desires which are best called human desires. Ultimately, Communism assumes that every individual who is aware of political activity is moved by a desire to increase his own share of this world's goods, and that in the process he will also further the efforts of all the other people in his class. This theory disregards the fact than many men, rightly or wrongly, are not as interested in money, which probably is hard to envision anyway, as they are in furthering their own pride and self respect. Also they desire power in order that they may be victorious over their rivals and thus satisfy some instinctive feeling of superiority over others. Man is guided not by his economic desires, but by his endeavors to increase his ego and satisfy its demands.

Russell contends that in the Marxian treatment of the life of instinct, there are very decided shades of Procruste's notorious bed. He feels that a political psychology more accurate than theirs can be devised, and he proceeds to outline one which he believes will serve his purpose better.

Russell calls this psychology his own view on 7. Principles of Social Reconstruction, Page 246.
human political and social relationships, and as it contains many of his own personal beliefs, it must be accepted as a minor part of his own doctrine, the major part of which is his concept of the ills of power. This theory is what may be called an interactionist one, for he feels that fundamentally the major issues are a mixture of both material conditions and human passions. The operative process of the system is one in which passions or whims or desires play upon the external properties. Usually these passions are modified by intelligence, but whether or not the intelligence will be positive or negative and what the nature of the passions will be are the two questions which confront us most forcibly in surveying present day politics.

If passions are so decisive, they should be studied and classified, and Russell does this with an excellent thoroughness. The basic desires are for the things which make life bearable; food, water, sex. To these, climatic differences may add shelter and clothing. Founded upon these primitive desires are a series of secondary ones. They include the instinct to hoard and preserve for the future, the love of the good opinion of others, rivalry, and the love of power.

The basic passions are largely biological, while the secondary ones are those that influence political life. Of these four passions, acquisitiveness, vanity, rivalry,
and love of power, only the first is interested in man's relation to the material world, while the others are all concerned with his social relations. This is where the Communists make their mistake as they assume that the governing force is acquisitiveness alone. Russell points out that many men will willingly sacrifice riches for power and glory, which brings us back to the theory of a superior ego first stated by Nietzsche and later taken up by the Nazis. May I make it clear here, though Russell does not, that I do not consider there is anything basically wrong with this tendency if it is not carried to an extreme, as the desire for some sort of superiority appears to be common, not only to all men, but also the progenitor of many outstanding human achievements. It is this tendency which gives energy to men's thoughts and makes them actualize that which is potentially within them. As this energy is basic to life, then the desire from which it springs must also be fundamental. I am not advocating a mass ego-inflation, but, on the contrary, I am merely pointing out how harmful to society a general inferiority complex would be.

The role of intelligence as a modifying agent is usually neglected by political theorists, probably because the intelligence referred to is not political, but scientific and technical. As such it has its most profound effect on material conditions. The Bessemer process created the German iron and steel industry, electricity made tungsten valuable.
The list could go on indefinitely, but the important thing is that this exercise of intelligence has procured a vast change, not only in our economic organization, but in everything we do. For thousands of years, oil was only so much mud in the ground, but in the past century inventions requiring oil have made it one of the most valuable commodities on the world market. People are willing to fight and if need be to kill for its possession. The direction the world will take, whether to advance or to regress depends on how this intelligence is used. It may be used to increase methods of production so as to increase the share of all, or it may be used to release more manpower for the business of killing off rivals. The conflict resolves itself to one between acquisitiveness and rivalry, the question being which one will triumph. The answer depends on how we use new scientific techniques and so leaves the solution of all our social and political problems squarely up to the people who created them. At the same time, though there can be no doubt that scientific technology and economic techniques were the main cause of political change in the nineteenth century, still they were not the whole cause. For example, they cannot account for the division of mankind into various nations.

Russell does not believe that Communism as it has
been practiced in Russia has shown the way to any better solution of the problem than has modern democracy. So far there has been no notable tendency to put an end to war and use new methods to solve international problems. Nor has been any concentrated attempt to understand human nature and deal with it accordingly. Instead, they have sought to pour it into a mold and regiment it as they have their factories and armies.

His great objection to Communism, however, remains the basic one that the liberty of the individual becomes a myth, while his freedom is completely subjugated to the will of the state, which in this case means the will of one political party with one definite philosophy of government and law. He insists that all seeking and striving, all romance and adventure, in short all those things which make life worth the effort, cease to play any role in the life of a Communist state. Man becomes a robot.

The economic theories of Karl Marx, which are also those of the present day Communists are of vast importance in the political affairs of the present day. Unfortunately, Russell never really seriously considers any economic theories, which is one of the greatest faults of his political criticism. The only economic theory which he does consider in any detail at all is that of the Gild Socialists which I will take up in the next chapter, as it rightfully
belongs there. I will also discuss other forms of socialism besides collectivism or state socialism. These forms are important because of the great influence they have had on socialists and socialistics theory, not because of anything we have learned from them in practical experience, as they have never been put into practice.
Chapter Six.

Anarchism, Syndicalism, and Gild Socialism.
In the more recent past since man has become politically conscious, there have been many other governmental theories spring up besides the ones which have already been mentioned. These include Anarchism, Syndicalism, State Socialism and Gild Socialism. None of them have been tried in practice on a large scale, but all have had enough supporters to make their theories and doctrines well known. Russell himself thinks that a form of Gild Socialism is the most adequate theory of government and since he devotes a considerable amount of time and energy to a study of these more or less minor doctrines, I feel that they cannot be passed over lightly in a work of this nature.

Probably the first of these to appear historically was Anarchism, a doctrine which grows out of theoretical accounts of the state of nature, and whose sources lie in the social life of primitive tribes, Anarchism made its strongest bid for public approval in the last century and has many advantages to recommend it. These should not be minimized, despite the fact that new scientific techniques with regard to warfare have made anarchy impossible as a practical political theory.

"Anarchism, as its derivation indicates, is the theory which is opposed to every kind of forcible government. It is opposed to the state as the embodiment of the force employed in the government of the community. Such government as
anarchism can tolerate must be free government, not merely in the sense that it is that of the majority, but in the sense that it is that assented to by all. Anarchists object to such institutions as the police and the criminal law, by means of which the will of one part of the community is forced upon another part. In their view the democratic form of government is not very enormously preferable to other forms so long as minorities are compelled by force or its potentialities to submit to the will of the majorities. Liberty is the supreme good in the Anarchist creed, and liberty is sought by the direct road of abolishing all forcible control over the individual by the community." (I.)

Modern anarchism is properly called Anarchistic Communism as individualistic Anarchism has almost ceased to exist, and as the present doctrine is concerned with the communal ownership of land and capital, thus having a certain kinship with Socialism. Whereas the Socialists believe that the capitalistic tyranny of one man over another can be limited by giving economic power to the state, the Anarchists seek as complete as possible a diminution of the authority of the state and hope eventually for its complete disappearance.

The founder of modern anarchistic theory was Michel Bakunin, a Russian born political philosopher who discarded Hegelianism in favour of his own theories. In adult life he I. Pages 50-51 of Roads to Freedom.
wandered from one country to another but was as always forced to move on. He spent many years in prison, though he finally escaped and spent the remainder of his life expounding his views in Southern Europe where he fought against Mazzini's nationalism and devoted himself to spreading the spirit of anarchist revolt. In 1867, he founded the International Alliance of Socialist Democracy in Switzerland. The programme of this organization which he drew up is the programme actually not only of his own opinions but of all Anarchism since his time. "The Alliance declares itself atheist, desires the definitive and entire abolition of classes, and the political equality and social equalization of individuals of both sexes. It desires that the earth, the instruments of labour, like all other capital, becoming the collective property of society as a whole, shall be no longer able to be utilized except by the workers, that is to say by agriculture and industrial associations. It recognizes that all actually existing political and authoritarian States, reducing themselves more and more to the mere administrative functions of the public services in their respective countries, must disappear in the universal union of free associations, both agricultural and industrial." (2)

This alliance later joined the International Working Men's Association, an organization inspired by Marx and eventually lost its own identity through the merger. 2. Programme of the International Alliance of Social Democracy, 1898.
No significant anarchistic movement has appeared since.

The whole theory of Anarchism was made much more coherent by his successor, Kropotkin, who believed basically the same things, but stated them in a clearer and less impassioned fashion. Much of his work is concerned with the technical questions of production and like most Socialists he believed the standard of living could be greatly improved by a more organized and scientific productive system. He advocated the abolition of the wage system and all compulsion to work. Man, he said, would prefer work to idleness if the work was enjoyable. Our aim should be to see that this is done. Whether or not it is possible is another question, but as it has never been tried there can be no answer.

The past history of the movement is not a pleasant one. It has attracted many high-minded intelligent men who detest authority and love the liberty of the individual. But, it has also attracted many psychoneurotics who see in it only freedom to commit criminal and immoral acts. The outrages perpetrated by this unwelcome fringe have made the word itself synonomous with terror and violence to the general public, a fact which has almost irreparably injured the Anarchist's cause. Russell points out that we must separate the gold from the dross in our estimate of the value of the theory, and that we should not confuse the harm done by un-
balanced enthusiasts with the saner views of the real leaders. He concludes that Anarchism is unlikely to ever again attain any real prominence, but he also feels that it has many very sane ideas.

The main differences between Anarchists and Socialists lie in the conception of the role of government. In their conception of the organization of society, they are also closely related as they both believe that the instruments of production should be owned by the producers. The latter believe in the democratic principal of majority rule, whereas the former insist that majority rule may be just as prejudiced as autocracy and that government should require the unanimous consent of all the people. The element of truth in this assertion is undeniable. However, the revolt of Anarchism against purely political government has remained weak and was replaced, prior to the first world war by Syndicalism and the movements which grew out of it. It is these movements which popularized the change from purely political government to a government by the wage earners.

The origins of Syndicalism are complicated and no longer significant to us, due to the almost complete disappearance in the last quarter century of organizations supporting the theory. Before the first world war, however, the theory did achieve a certain amount of prominence, particularly in France, and it was instrumental in the creation of several Socialist
and Labourite political parties which have grown stronger in the world of today.

The essential doctrine of Syndicalism is the class war theory, and their aim was to conduct this war by industrial rather than by political methods. The chief methods which they advocated were the strike, the boycott, and sabotage. Many ordinary Socialists have questioned the morality of such methods, but the first of these, at any rate, has become increasingly common in modern industrial disputes.

Russell suggests that the aims of the Syndicalists are somewhat more vague than their methods. In a way they are too metaphysical and represent their party as a one of constant change. But though their aims may be vague, there is nothing vague about the negative side of their beliefs. They are opposed to States and to State Socialism and desire to have every industry self-governing. As they are internationalists and believe that all working men everywhere have the same common interests, they are opposed to war between states, which they insist are not fought for interests that concern the workers. The great influence of Syndicalism was on the early trade unions, which they considered capable of governing the country. This influence is still visible to a marked degree in modern trade unions, particularly in the United States. It is for this reason only that Syndicalism retains any importance as a theory, because as a movement, it no
longer exists.

The following quotation from a leading British newspaper clarifies the differences between these three types of Socialism.

"All Syndicalism, Collectivism, Anarchism, aims at abolishing the present economic status and existing private ownership of most things; but while Collectivism would substitute ownership by everybody and ownership by nobody, Syndicalism aims at ownership by organization of Labour. It is thus a purely Trade Union reading of the economic doctrine and the class war preached by Socialism. It vehemently repudiates parliametry action on which collectivism relies; and it is, in this respect, much more closely allied to Anarchism, from which, indeed, it differs in practice only in being more limited in range of action(3)"

Syndicalism takes account of men only as producers in contradistinction to State Socialism which considers them only as consumers. Another organized Labour group, the Gild Socialists believe the problem can only be settled by reconciling the two points of view, and that you cannot reconcile two points of view by denying them. Nevertheless, though they attempt to adjust these differences, they derive their force and many of their ideas from Syndicalism. Their basic endeavour is to secure the better payment of 3. London Times August 24, 1911.
work by making it more interesting and more democratic.

Russell says, "Gild Socialism aims at autonomy in industry, with consequent curtailment, but not abolition of the power of the State. The system which they advocate is, I believe, the best hitherto proposed, and the one most likely to secure liberty without the constant appeals to violence which are to be feared under a purely Anarchist regime."

In industry each factory is to be free to control its own methods of production by means of elected managers. The different factories in a given industry are to be federated into a National Guild which will deal with marketing and the general interests of the industry as a whole. The State would own the means of production as trustee for the community, the Guilds would manage them also as trustee for the community, and would pay the State a single tax or rent. Any Guild that chose to set its own interests above those of the Community would be violating its trust, and would have to bow to the judgment of a tribunal equally representing the whole body of producers and the whole body of consumers. This Joint Committee would be the ultimate sovereign body, the ultimate appeal court of industry. It would fix not only Guild taxation, but also standard prices, and both taxation and prices would be periodically readjusted by it. Each Guild would be entirely free to apportion what it receives among its members as it chooses, its members being all those which work in the industry which it covers. The distribution of this collective
Guild income among its members seems to be a matter for each Guild to decide for itself. Whether the Guilds would sooner or later adopt the principle of equal payment for every member is open to discussion.

The Guild Socialists have never made themselves clear on this matter, preferring to believe that it will solve itself when the need arises. There are many factors which must be taken into consideration with regard to equality of wages and they infer that such a system as they advocate would create new problems which we cannot settle in advance as we do not know them. The only thing to do is to wait and see, and to deal with the whole problem of wage equality when it arises.

Russell continues, "Guild Socialists regard the State as consisting of the community in their capacity as consumers, while the Guilds will represent them in their capacity as producers; thus Parliament and the Guild Congress will be two co-equal powers representing producers and consumers respectively. Above both will be the Joint Committee of Parliament and the Guild Congress, for deciding matters involving the interests of both groups." (Page 95 Roads to P)

This, then is the essence of Anarchism, Syndicalism, and Guild Socialism. Whether or not we think that any of these schemes are practicable, we cannot deny that they have done much to inspire the workers of today in all democratic countries. They have given birth and life to many modern trade unions and labour organizations, which in their turn are making themselves felt very loudly in present day affairs.
Russell adds that they have also succeeded in two other ways, though neither of them were deliberately intentioned. First, they reemphasized the desire for liberty which had become somewhat obscured in the course of the development of parliamentary socialism. Second, they have reminded mankind that what the world needs is not a little repairing and mending of old troubles, but a sweeping away of all the old oppressions and a complete reconstruction of society based on the new ideas in political life and the new changes in scientific technology. Russell insists that this merit is so great as to make these movements important for all time in the history of socialism, even though they have almost passed entirely out of sight as definite movements.
Chapter Seven.

Power and Internationalism.
"I do not think any reasonable person can doubt that the evils of power in the present system are vastly greater than is necessary". (1.)

Then concept of power and of its significance in the world overshadows all of Russell's work. It occupies the same place in his political philosophy as religion does in Christianity and economics in Communism. For this reason it may seem rather odd to find it discussed in the last chapter of this thesis. My reasons for this, however, seem quite logical to me. Power in all its forms, says Russell, can only be curtailed and controlled by Internationalism. Therefore, in any consideration of how the evils of power can be overcome, we must be prepared at the same time to consider how Internationalism may be attained and whether or not it would be a desirable state of society. But Russell's views on Internationalism can only be properly understood when placed in perspective with his views on all other important political ideologies. Their place comes at the end, for he believes that the entire political history of civilization has been the construction of new social forms upon outmoded ones, until the process reaches its natural and inevitable culmination in an international world state.

Russell's most comprehensive work on this subject

has appeared relatively recently, but his ideas on the subject date back to some of his earliest writings. In 1903, he wrote the short essay, A Free Man's Worship, in which he said, "If power is bad, as it seems to be, let us reject it from our hearts. In that lies man's true freedom: All hope of a better world through science is lost while greed and power remain". (2.)

The main thesis of his later book 'Power' which came out in 1938, is that the laws of social dynamics are only capable of being stated in terms of various forms of power. In order to discover these laws we must first classify the forms of power and then review the ways in which individuals and organizations have been able to gain control of it. Power, he defines as the production of intended effects.

He commences by stating that humans are goaded on in their actions by their imaginations, co-incident with which is their desire for power and glory. This power is the basic motivating force and history can only be interpreted by realizing this. In addition, power has many forms and it must be thought of in terms of all its forms, rather than in terms of specifically isolated forms such as the economic, religious, or military.

These forms of power are fivefold in his analysis. The first is power over matter, then power over the individ-
ual, while the last three are what he calls traditional, naked, and revolutionary power.

The growing amount of power over matter made possible by rapidly expanding scientific knowledge is one of the chief causes of change in the modern world. "The control and direction into useful channels of this knowledge is one of the more imperative questions with which the nations of today are confronted. In 'Icarus', Russell suggests that, "Science might perform miracles in the interests of peace, but is more likely to act in the interests of war", a fact which has become all too apparent in the years since he wrote this sentence.

Power over the individual is obtained in a multitude of varying ways. These include brute force, blackmail, bribes and inducements, propaganda, and the use of secret police. People, Russell declares, automatically divide into two groups, the leaders and the followers. Leaders frequently use fear to gain power, as in a crisis, people will submit themselves to the will of others due to fear. Russell has always emphasized the role of fear, and its importance cannot be denied, though I feel that in our present world it has undergone a slight change of meaning. The basic fear of today is one of lack of security, rather than one of the use of force.

Traditional power is more the power of habit than
of anything else. It has many aspects. Wealthy men insist on their hereditary powers because they have always had them. For the same reason the majority of the people acquiesce in allowing them to keep their power. The church's power is also largely traditional and often is based on ignorant superstition as well as habit and the fear of hell.

The starkest form of power is what he calls naked power, usually accompanied by military force. It develops within a country in two ways. First, when two opposing factions come into conflict with each other and, secondly, when traditional beliefs decay and are not replaced by new ones. Fortunately the periods of naked power are brief and usually disappear either by conquest or the rise of a new religion, or by the establishment of a traditional dictatorship. Marx said that all economic power is naked power. Russell points out that Communism stands for economic power, and that if the people living under this order are content, then economic power is traditional. It only becomes naked when existing customs are upset.

The last of the five forms of power is revolutionary power. This is distinguished from naked power by the fact that it is a group, not an individual who seeks power in order to institute the doctrines of their particular creed. It often results when the traditional system has
dissolved into skepticism and power is needed to preserve the social order. It can, however, be as disastrous to the individual as naked power.

There are other types of power which cannot be strictly included in these five forms. Of these, economic power is very important, but Russell takes pains to point out that it is only one element in the science of power. While it is derived from law and public opinion, it can in turn influence both by corruption and propaganda. It may also lead to military power or vice versa. The modern tendency has been to combine all these three types of power in the state.

Public opinion, however, cannot be considered ultimately powerful, because it can be generated or changed by either of the two types of power. Persuasion can convert a small minority. This minority in turn forces only certain propaganda on the majority. The latter accepts the propaganda and public opinion has been formed. The question of how much liberty of opinion the government should allow the people, if it wishes to continue in power, still remains. If the government is revolutionary, individual freedom will probably bring further revolution. The idea here is that what has worked once will work again. If the government is traditional, individual freedom is likely to act as a safety valve
as it has proved to be in Great Britain.

Russell also points out that creeds are frequently sources of power. They are essential to social cohesion, but can only be strong if they are felt by a majority of the population. He concludes by pointing out that in a war of creeds, the ultimate victory will go to neither, but to those who shrug their shoulders and consider the issues of both sides unimportant. Power is limited by boredom, weariness, and the love of ease. He suggests that these are the only restrictions which appear to be placed on the growth of power, but that, as they are traits common to all men, they are powerful restrictions.

Power has always depended on a high degree of organization, and since the modern state has become such a closely integrated system, its power has been greatly increased. Political parties have become tighter and more rigid. This has been particularly the case in Fascist and Communist countries. Here, the development has not been that of a political party, but of a secret society formed due to the suppression of liberty by an autocratic government. In their turn, these parties have become powerful enough to suppress any elements opposed to their doctrines. Fascism has kept big business under control by the fear of Communism. These means are not open to democracies, who are pledged to guarantee the liberties of all. As soon as
they break this pledge, they cease to be true democracies
in our sense of the word.

Russell says that as economic cartels grow larger,
the state absorbs them. If this is so, the end ought to be
a world state. Actually it seems to depend on the size
of the cartel. If it is large enough to be a danger and
a nuisance, it may be absorbed, but if it is very large
and international, it is too big for the state to fight.
Competitive capitalism in his opinion is little better
than the huge cartels of today. He speaks of it as merely
a nineteenth century device to avoid the dangers of
arbitrary power. Neither the one, nor the other, nor
Communism offer any satisfactory solution to the problems
of our time. A new, broader, and more universal system
must be worked out.

The ethics of power and the relationship of
power to moral codes is the next topic to briefly claim
his attention. The moral code of a group is never wholly
an expression of power as there have always been ethical
principles that are not related to power. In a way, the
instinct for power is really synonymous with desire, for it
is a way to satisfy this desire. But power, by means of
propaganda, does determine moral codes to a certain
extent. Russell refers to the type of morality thus created
as positive morality. It is analogous to law which is
formed from it, and it is usually held by the majority. Contrary to this is personal morality which is that of the individual's own conscience, which cannot be controlled by the group or creed in power, except in so far as the individual is the product of his own education and environment.

In Russell's opinion, too, there are certain ethical consideration which make a world federation desirable. In the lives of all people there are many evils which hinder them in the pursuit of a full and useful life. These may be roughly divided into three classes. First are the physical ills. These include all pain and suffering with its frequent climax in death, together with the simple struggle to make the soil produce. Next come the evils of character, which include such things as ignorance and violent passions. Finally come those evils which depend upon the power of one individual or group over another and which are in any way responsible for interference with free development. These are the evils of power. In the world of the future these evils must be eliminated. Russell says that this can be done in three ways. Science will overcome the physical evils, and education in its widest possible form may do away with some evils of character. But the evils of power can only be eradicated by the reform of all political
and social life to such an extent as to reduce to the lowest possible minimum, interference with the life and activity of man.

I now come to the last and perhaps most difficult section of this thesis: Russell's discussion of how power is to be tamed and used for the benefit instead of the detriment of mankind, and how our social organization must be reformed in order to remove the evils of power from our lives. It is the last section, because it sums up all of Russell's hopes for the future of civilization. It is difficult for two reasons. First, and foremost, is the fact that Russell's suggestions for curing the world's ailments, though they are always similar and consistent in their essence, are nevertheless extremely widely scattered throughout all his works and are very difficult to co-ordinate. Secondly, there is little in his views that is concrete and could be put into immediate practice. He is basically, of course, a philosopher, and as such is concerned with looking on at the world and suggesting improvements along broad, general lines, rather than in isolated details. For these reasons, I shall not attempt here to outline specific suggestions which he makes, but rather I shall attempt to indicate the general tenor of the ideas which he advocates, and of the beliefs of which he is convinced.
Of these latter, the most fundamental is that the modern state is harmful to society and to its welfare. He insists that no other organization can arouse loyalty so completely and so intensely as the state can. It has every means at its disposal to do so. He is also convinced that the chief activity of the modern state is preparation for what he terms 'international homicide'. Whether or not this conviction seems more passionate than accurate, the fact remains that the history of the world for the past seventy years must lend it a certain amount of truth. War is the most drastic form of control over individual lives. Such things as compulsory conscription and the death penalty for intelligence with the enemy, to name only a few, make war the most bitter enemy of that freedom and liberty of the individual, the pursuit of which is, for Russell, the only really worthy aim in life.

The only solution to the problem of nationalism and war is internationalism or a world federation of all nations. At a moment when the term has become a byword in all political affairs, Russell's emphasis on internationalism seems rather redundant. But the term has only entered the consciousness of most people in very recent months, whereas Russell has been a firm advocate of the theory for over thirty years. In a sense, he deserves much credit as one of the pioneers of the theory.
Such an international state would have to be
democratic. While democracy does not insure good govern-
ment, it does prevent certain evils such as oligarchy or
dictatorship. The threat of bureaucracy is ever present,
but would have to be dealt with by constitutional means,
rather than creating a new system to deal with it, which
in turn would have other, possibly greater defects of its
own.

The one important problem still left unsolved in
a democracy is that rule by a majority may mean persec-
tution of a minority, or a part of the minority. This has
been proved to be frequently the case, particularly in
race-conscious America. The only adequate solution seems
to rest in the education of the masses and in constitu-
tional protection of the minority as well as the majority.
Minority propaganda should be allowed, except in a straight
case of incitement to break the law by violence or to
seize power by force. In such an instance, the pledge of
the democracy to the people to maintain order is more
important than the guarantee of freedom of thought and
action. If one must be sacrificed, then it is the latter
which must go.

Another necessity, if democracy is to be remodelled
and used as a world system, is the reform of the entire
legal organization. To begin with, both in the interests
of individual liberties and of minorities, the law should
be as tolerant as is compatible with technical efficiency and the maintenance of order. Further, even in democracy, individuals must be protected against the tyrannies of the police and the courtroom. Russell suggest that a practical arrangement would be to divide the system into two branches, one to find proofs of guilt, and one to find proofs of innocence.

It is such a democratic state as this on an international plane that Russell envisions. But he is willing to start on a smaller scale with a federation of nations to which all of the countries of the world would be compelled to belong. This federation would be supported by an international police force, and would have complete control over all production of instruments of warfare.

These, then, are the political conditions necessary for the creation of such a state. But what of the economic conditions? Russell is not an economist, but he ventures to describe, rather too cursorily, the economic organization which he considers would be practicable. Actually, in economics, he is a Gâld Socialist and his views on the subject rarely range far from those of the supporters of this movement. The methods and means of production should be owned and controlled, as well as merely used, by the workers themselves. Each industry or vocation would elect representatives to a sort of
grand council which would be used as an advisory body to parliament. Some Gild Socialists even suggest that this council should be the parliament itself, with precisely the same power as members hold when elected in the present way.

There two things which strike me most forcibly about such a system, although Russell does not mention them at all. First, inevitably the parliament would be influenced almost completely by one industry or one small clique of industries. In a country like Canada, representatives of agriculture would be able to control every parliamentary session to the possible harm of other industries. The group in power would be much more stationary, and therefore more reactionary, than under our present party system, which has already more than enough faults.

Second, such a governmental body, particularly in the form of a vocational council advising a political parliament, would be extremely clumsy. In order to make it workable, various committees would be set up. The natural result would be the very thing which must be avoided at all costs in any true democracy, bureaucracy.

This is the international state Russell postulated. Present day statesmen have added greatly to the theory as a whole, but they cannot detract from Russell's importance
as a pioneer in the field. In a sense he went beyond them, for their minds are still clogged with the concept of nationalism. In Russell's opinion, and in mine, the only hope civilization has, lies in an international federation free from the besetting greed of nationalist policies, and working for the common good of all races, all colors, and all creeds.
Conclusion.
In a recent book published by Northwestern University (1.), a number of essays commenting on the entire range of Russell's philosophical writings have been collected. They have been written for the most part by men who are not philosophers themselves, but are, rather, philosophical commentators. Russell was then invited to reply to their criticisms, and has done so in his usual brilliant manner, though his replies are somewhat more cryptic than usual. I have not, in the course of this thesis, paid much attention to this book, because I do not feel that as a whole, it is a very valuable estimation of Russell. While some of the essays are sound and scholarly, others seem hurried and written without a very wide acquaintance with the books about which they are written.

His replies are excellent, however, for two reasons. First, because they contain a recent restatement of his views, many of which were first stated years ago, showing how little his ideas have changed. Secondly, because he corrects the misconceptions and misunderstandings in the minds of these men, thus making himself clear once and for all. For these reasons, I have elected to close my theses by summarizing those replies which are concerned with this work.

With regard to E. C. Lindeman's essay on his Social and Concise Philosophy, he says, "I note with pleasure that he sees no necessary connection between my views on social questions and my views on logic and epistemology. I have always maintained that there is no logical connection, pointing to the example of Hume with whom I agree so largely in abstract matters and disagree so totally in politics. There is, I think, a psychological connection, but that, I think, is a different matter."

He also appreciates Lindeman's analysis of his doctrine of the ethical neutrality of science. Russell says that science is a tool which is needed for any deliberate social change, but whether the social change is for better or for worse depends upon its purposes, which science alone cannot determine. Science is ethically neutral. A railway helps me whether I am going to visit an invalid, or murder one. Science creates possibilities both good and bad, but it is not science which decides how they will be utilized.

Russell's philosophy is criticized by Lindeman as abstract and theoretical. Russell insists that he has been a practical reformer in his own country and that his philosophy is very definitely one of action. Here, there is certainly something to be said for both sides. In a sense, he has been a reformer, particularly in
education, but only in a limited way. His real work has been advocating reform by means of the written word, and not by practical action.

The essay on Russell's religious views is a rather unique summary of those views. He believes that there are three main aspects to religion. One, a man's own personal beliefs insofar as they have to do with the nature of the world and the conduct of life. Two, theology, and finally, institutionalized religion. He states that philosophy is, or ought to be, concerned only with the theological aspect of religion. I cannot agree as I feel that it should and does concern itself as well with religion as a way of life or as a personal belief. Russell never really distinguishes between religion as a personal or public theological system, and religion as a way of life, a distinction which is becoming increasingly necessary in our modern world.

I have avoided any detailed reference to McGill's essay on Russell's political and economic philosophy, because McGill, a Marxist, shows himself not only prejudiced against Russell, but also to have missed the point of much that Russell has said. In his reply to this essay, Russell does not take it very seriously and wonders where McGill got his ideas. McGill assumes that Russell says war is the inevitable result of a
natural impulse to aggressiveness, whereas what Russell actually said is that people whose lives have been thwarted in some way have this impulse, not all people.

He accuses Russell of not being dynamite, but when Russell calls for a dynamic psychology as in 'Social Reconstruction' and 'Power', he advises him to remember that human nature is unchangeable, a statement which Russell dismisses as unworthy of an answer.

Again, he deliberately confuses Russell's use of the terms instinct and impulse. Russell is not using it in the scientific, psychological sense of animal behavior, but in its looser and more popular meaning. This may be a mistake, but a clever man would recognize it as such and pay no further attention.

Finally, he asserts that Russell cannot forgive the Marxists their rationalism. Russell replies that they have none, but are in the grip of a strong, theological dogma and that faith in dialectical materialism is impossible for anyone who believes in scientific methods.

Russell's reply to the essay on his educational theories is precisely my own reaction to it. He says simply and briefly, that not only has Bode hopelessly misinterpreted him, but that he obviously has not read his most important book on the subject, 'On Education'.

I have tried to the best of my ability to do
two things in this thesis. First, I have attempted to prove that Russell's political philosophy has been coherent and consecutive, the natural elaboration of certain fundamental ideas and beliefs. Second, I have attempted to provide a complete, though all too brief, outline of this political philosophy, showing how one thing led to another until they all wound up as a part of his intense belief in, and intense desire for, internationalism.

I can only hope that I have succeeded in achieving both these ends.


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