BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION WITH REGARD TO GERMANY
1890 to 1914.

by

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CHAPTER ONE

"Public opinion is no more than this,
What people think that other people think."
Alfred Austin, Prince Lucifer, Act VI, Sc.2

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE PRESS

One of the vagaries of our English language is that we may use terms which at once convey to our readers our complete idea and yet while connoting all so hedge our thought with an aura of generality that no tangible impression is made. The term "public opinion" may be considered to be a classic example of such specific vagueness. James Bryce once described public opinion as,

"...a congeries of all sorts of discrepant notions, beliefs, fancies, prejudices, aspirations. It is confused, incoherent, amorphous, varying from day to day and week to week."

We need not be too nonplussed by Lord Bryce's definition, however, for Professor Carroll has defined it simply as "the composite reactions of the general public." This is an interesting definition more for what it suggests than for what it explains. A detailed study of the words "composite reactions" yields at least two opinions or attitudes in regard to a specific event or happening which interests the citizen in his larger groupings. There is both a minority

1 James Bryce, American Commonwealth, Quoted by George Gallup and Saul Forbes Rae, The Pulse of Democracy, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1940, 16.

and a majority opinion. The former is the common decision shared by only a few of the citizens; the latter is the decision, for the most part, agreed upon by the larger number. Generally speaking, we use the term public opinion to mean the majority opinion but it must be realized that within this opinion there may often be individual divergences, common agreement only being expressed on the problem in toto. It is, therefore, in the sense of a majority opinion, that the term public opinion will be used in this essay due appreciation being given to the fact that majority opinion is generally the more vocal and therefore more evident.

If this be public opinion several questions at once present themselves; how is it aroused, and how does it seek expression? To answer the first query three basic conditions must be fulfilled. There must first be some event sufficiently interesting, either inherently or causally, to actuate the attention of the citizen. Second, the attention of the citizen must be secured, or, in other words, he must be made aware of the situation. Third, there must be a definite reaction on the part of the citizen, for public opinion rarely emerges without seeking an expression either to act or to resist.

The agencies which today seek to discover, to influence, or to canalize public opinion are both numerous and varied. The purpose of this essay is to examine public opinion as given in the British periodical press during the period of 1890 to 1914 on a series of events arising out of Anglo-German relations. This period was characterized by notable
developments in the popular press which had throughout the past two centuries become increasingly prominent as a sounding board for various sections of public opinion.

The Education Act which had been passed in 1870 provided for compulsory education for all between the ages of five and thirteen years. The result of such compulsory education was that in time the reading public of England was vastly enlarged. The existing press of the time did not, however, cater to this new reading public and so it was that a new type of press sprang up in England. This was the press created by Harmsworth, Pearson, and their copiers. The Evening News, The Daily Mirror, and Answers are some of the names connected with this newer type of journalism which specialized in sensational articles and pictures. This press had great popularity with the masses because as Norman Angell describes it

"Harmsworth knew that 'public affairs' were, for the millions, not a matter of politics and affairs of State; public affairs were to women, for instance, the fashions, 'Society', what people wear; to men sport, the 'human element' in police cases - personalities in politics. The study of the inattentions and the trivialities became with Northcliffe a profound science."¹³

It would seem, therefore, that the so-called popular press expressed only indirectly a public opinion of significance on foreign policy.


It must be admitted, however, that writers on the press are divided on the question of whether or not the press can mold public opinion or whether it merely reflects such opinion. The question is vital if we agree with Norman Angell that, "we are ruled ultimately, of course, by public opinion." Professor Carroll, who has made a study of public opinion in France, states that,

"The newspaper press was by all odds the most effective instrument for influencing public opinion and the most important medium for its expression."\(^5\)

Another writer of note, William Dibelius, feels that of the thousands of ways and means of forming public opinion the

"Most potent, however, is the influence of the Press"\(^6\)

Disraeli, too, was convinced of the power of the press. He said, that,

"Public opinion has a more direct, a more comprehensive, a more efficient organ for its utterance, than a body of men sectionally chosen. The printing-press is a political element unknown to classic or feudal times. It absorbs in a great degree the duties of the sovereign, the priest, the parliament, it controls, it educates, it discusses."\(^7\)

An authoritative essay on "Public Opinion" by Wilhelm Bauer in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences has this to say of the press and public opinion:

\(^5\) Carroll, op cit., 8


\(^7\) Quoted by L. M. Salmon, The Newspaper and Authority, New York, Oxford University Press, 1923, 384.
"The popularization of the press, particularly in England and France, accompanied by the rapid spread of elementary education, gave to the newspapers a far greater hold on public opinion than they had enjoyed in the days when they had perforce divided honors with the cheap pamphlet."

The chief counter-argument centers on the thesis that the press merely follows public opinion rather than leads it. That is, the press tends to give the people what they want when they want it. As Norman Angell expresses it,

"... if a public has been captured by a given folly or passion.... the paper which hopes to win or retain large circulations must so shape its selection and presentation of news as to appear to confirm the prepossession of the moment."

In this situation the success of the press depends on interpreting accurately what the public thinks and feels and then giving expression to its findings. Regarding this theory Sir Wemyss Reid was of the opinion that,

"Men read The Times, not so much to learn what may be the opinions of its Editors upon any particular question as to discover what, according to his judgment, is the prevailing opinion of the public upon that question."

The root of this argument lies in a sound economic approach that, if a newspaper is to be financially successful, it must print material favourable to its reading audience. A man feels heartened when he reads in the newspaper opinions which coincide with his own. He rarely likes to read that


9 Norman Angell, op. cit., 138-139.

his opinions are ill-founded and foolish. The editor, being well aware of this basic factor, strives therefore to so present his material that it will appeal as much as possible to an already formed public opinion rather than attempting to reshape it.

In some cases where this opinion is not yet formed the press may wield great weight in determining what it will be. This is more generally true in regard to long term matters such as foreign policies where an already preconceived public opinion is lacking. Here the press can mold an opinion by carefully selecting news to conform to the pre-arranged pattern decided upon by the private opinion of the editor or owners.

Such is the case for the two arguments and as yet there is too little definitive research to render conclusive evidence for either point of view. However, from the point of view of this essay the vital and interesting fact which emerges is not in the dissimilarity of the arguments but rather in the common conclusion which they indicate. Regardless of whether the press makes public opinion or merely follows it, its pages, at all times, reflect either what the public is thinking or what the public is going to think. And from thoughts opinions grow, for are not opinions merely confirmed thoughts? So, either as the pedagogue or as the demagogue the press does reflect public opinion.
There are several aspects to a popular study of international events. The field is relatively unexplored and there are several lines along which an approach could be made. For example the type of issue which was treated in a sensational manner by the popular press might be examined, or again, the type of issue treated in a calmer and more reflected manner. This essay will attempt a preliminary exploratory survey dealing with the study of certain issues as they were handled in the calmer fashion of the weekly, monthly, and quarterly reviews of various political opinions where discussion may conceivably be expected to be on a different plane from that of the popular press.
CHAPTER TWO

"The pressure of public opinion is like the pressure of the atmosphere: you can't see it - but, all the same, it is sixteen pounds to the square inch."

INFLUENTIAL PUBLIC OPINION 1890-1914

1890 to 1914 is a crucial period in the development of British public opinion in regard to politics because of the increased interest taken in politics by the working class. Before 1832 the House of Commons was predominantly in the hands of the landed classes. In the year of the first Reform Act there were 489 landowners in Parliament. J. A. Thomas, who has made an analysis of the "economic and functional" character of the House of Commons, concludes that the feeling which pervaded the House up to 1832 was that,

"the object of a law governing the franchise should be to ensure that property should have its due and proper weight and influence in the counsels of the nation."

However, the Reform Act of 1832 was passed which admitted the merchant, the manufacturer, and the industrialist to a share in political power. In 1867 the town worker was admitted and, in 1884, the agricultural and rural classes, too, gained entrance. The passage of these latter two bills is a delightful example of point and counterpoint. The landowning classes of 1867 were willing to see the admittance of the town workers to Parliament because they would provide a


counter balance to the political influence of the employers and shopkeepers. On the other hand, these business interests were agreeable to the admittance of the agricultural classes as offsetting the political influence of the landowning classes.

With this extension of the franchise a change took place in the character of the existing political parties. Formerly the Whigs, or as they became known, the Liberals, had stood for the side of Commerce, Industry, and Finance, while the Tories, or Conservatives, stood for the Landed groups. The beginning of the twentieth century, however, revealed a two-party system with no clear-cut differences between the economic interests of each party. Thus it was that the Liberal-Conservative parties represented both industry and land. There was, nevertheless, a vast group of voters who were finding that the old parties did not voice fully enough their political, social, and economic hopes, and consequently a new voice in English politics was introduced.

As early as 1893 an Independent Labour Party was formed but, while the name was ambitious, it could not be considered a real party. In 1900 the real labour political group started, and by 1916 became important enough to assume the name, Labour Party. By 1914 out of the 670 members of the House of Commons only 37 were Laborites. This meant that only 5½% of the main political organ of the entire British Isles was voicing in

3 J. A. Thomas, op. cit., 10-11
4 See ibid., 159-160.
particular fashion the political opinion of the working class.

The labour group had also found that the press of the day did not adequately express their opinions and so in answer to this felt need the Daily Citizen began publication in October, 1912.\footnote{5}

The power of Government was therefore, definitely in the hands of the Liberals and the Conservatives and from an analysis of the composition of Parliament for the year 1900, as a representative year, the elected members were largely landholders, lawyers, men of finance, men of letters, and academic people.\footnote{6} We may say then, that Parliament up to 1914 was definitely upper and middle class in character, and it was their political opinion which, in the main, predominated.\footnote{7}

Perhaps James Mill’s explanation may show how this situation was possible:

\footnote{5} There had been various local papers representing the labour point of view prior to 1912 but their influence had been localized and their importance limited. Most of them had had a very brief span of life. According to Dr. K. Lamb the labour papers prior to 1890 had been predominantly Trade Union while those after that date were more and more in the control of the socialist press.

\footnote{6} J. A. Thomas, \textit{op cit.}, made an analysis on the basis of members’ interests. His conclusions, which he sets forth in an explanatory note to the text were, that, "Individuals returned to sit as members in the House of Commons were almost invariably men of property." (No page given as note is in forward of the book.)

\footnote{7} Regarding this point Mr. Noel Buxton (now Lord Noel-Buxton) had this to say: "The upper class, which has long lost its administrative domination over home government, retains it in foreign affairs." Quoted by T. P. Conwell-Evans, \textit{Foreign Policy From A Back Bench 1904-1918}, London, Humphrey Milford, 1932, 78.
"The opinions of that class of the people, who are below the middle rank, are formed, and their minds are directed by that intelligent, that virtuous rank, who come the most immediately in contact with them. There can be no doubt that the middle rank, which gives to science, to art and to legislation itself, their most distinguished ornaments, the chief source of all that has exalted and refined human nature, is that portion of the community of which, if the basis of representation were ever so far extended, the opinion would ultimately decide of the people beneath them, a vast majority would be sure to be guided by their advice and example."

We have seen the introduction of a political organization which was independent of this upper and middle class group, but by 1914 it had not gained sufficient momentum or control to determine public opinion. Its own press had just recently begun publication and the press of Harmsworth and Pearson which circulated widely among the working class was largely of the sensational and entertaining type, presumably, because this was commercially more successful among this reader group.

It would seem, therefore, that the public opinion, which was vocal and influential, and which could be implemented in the political sphere, was middle and upper class. It might, of course, actually represent at given times and on given questions the opinion of other classes of society, as well as its own. The press read by this class falls into two large classifications, the newspapers and the periodicals. Of the newspapers the Times was probably the most prominent, holding a position of greater importance than mere circulation figures would indicate.

Periodicals devoted to political and literary questions had held a high place throughout the 19th century. Published

8 Quoted by J. A. Thomas, op. cit., 54-55.
weekly or monthly they provided a perspective for the news. Their more solid and substantial format carried an air of reliability and trustworthiness which rendered them truly formidable as an important factor in influencing public opinion. It is interesting to note the significance which the Germans attached to this periodical press. Paul Metternich, the German ambassador to England, writing to his superior, Von Bülow, once commented,

"The Englishman, even the educated Englishman, is apt to think that his monthly reviews exert no political influence because they are only read by the few. I am not of that opinion. The impulse that influences the masses proceeds from the few, and even scientific thoughts, if they are deep and stirring, and contain a new truth, will form the minds of a new generation." 9

The same sentiment has also been expressed, though in different terms, by the English writer, L. M. Salmon. She compared the influence exerted by the periodical press,

"Like the perfume of a fragrant flower or the unsavory odor of a rendering plant its source can be located, while its nature defies analysis and the extent of the area through which it permeates remains absolutely unknown." 10

Some of the more important of these periodicals were The Nation, The Spectator, The Contemporary Review, The Fortnightly Review, and The National Review. The latter was very definitely anti-German and its editor, Leo Maxse, wielded a vitriolic pen which did not tire of repetition on the theme


of German enmity of Britain. It was this magazine which Metternich describes as "the crudest of the agitators" (against Germany) and one of the most widely circulated periodicals among the British elite.\textsuperscript{11}

The words of Confucius that "one picture is worth ten thousand words" may well be the motto of Punch, a periodical which can be regarded as peculiarly an English institution. Portraying current events in brilliant cartoons which have been reprinted throughout the world, Punch has done much to crystallize the public opinion of its readers. Edgar Stern-Rubarth, a former German journalist, was of the opinion that,

"The somewhat moderated satire of the London Punch has many a time helped by its cartoons to further political causes......"\textsuperscript{12}

The source material used in this essay has been limited to files of certain influential periodicals. The National Review, the Nineteenth Century and After, the Quarterly Review, the Round Table, the Nation, the Economist, the Spectator, the New Statesman, and Punch, have been referred to.\textsuperscript{13} It was also possible to some extent to check and supplement conclusions drawn from these sources by some secondary study of newspaper sources and also by

\textsuperscript{11} Metternich to Bulow, May 8, 1906; G.P., XXI, 427-31.
Quoted by Oron James Hale, \textit{op. cit.}, 294.


\textsuperscript{13} See \textit{APPENDIX I} for brief biographical notes on the chief newspapers and reviews quoted in this thesis.
Parliamentary discussions as recorded in Hansard. In addition books published during the period 1890 to 1914 dealing with Anglo-German relations have been used. Representative of this group are Sidney Whitman's *Imperial Germany*, W. H. Dawson's *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, and J. A. Cramb's, *Germany and England*. Material published since this period relevant to the topic was also examined.

Some of the more important events in Anglo-German relations will now be examined, first from the point of view of traditional diplomatic history, and then from the point of view of the British public.
CHAPTER THREE

"In the past the main reason for the fluctuations in British influence has lain in our geographical position. We are of Europe, but yet not in it."

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1890-1914

The conventional study of British diplomatic history presents the reader with a somewhat confusing kaleidoscopic picture of foreign affairs carried out in every part of the world. In order, therefore, better to understand British public opinion with regard to Germany, a brief résumé of Anglo-German relations as seen in their European setting will prove useful.

The year 1890 witnessed the rounding out of vast colonial empires and the rivalries that such empires engendered. British, French, Belgian and Dutch holdings were already extensive while those of Germans were rather insignificant. Germany under Bismarck had started late in the race for colonial possessions. Bismarck had not been very interested in the acquisition of territory abroad but rather had centered his efforts on the unification of Germany and the consolidation of Germany's position as a European Power. To this end he had created the most powerful army in Europe. The new Kaiser, Wilhelm II, on the other hand, desired to make Germany a world Power with a colonial empire and a navy to

1 Maurice Bruce, British Foreign Policy, 11-12.
2 See APPENDIX II for a tabular account of the important events in foreign affairs and their relation to British political parties and German chancellors.
protect it. Here was definitely a difference in point of view. The Kaiser felt that it was the difference of age and of youth and that ever since his assumption of power in 1888 he had been,

"......forced to deal constantly with old deserving men, who live more in the past than in the present, and cannot grow in the future." 3

Consequently when the opportunity presented itself in 1890 on the matter of a difference in domestic policy the Kaiser accepted Bismarck's resignation.

The alignment of World Powers at this moment was interesting. The Triple Alliance consisting of Germany, Austria and Italy had been formed by Bismarck and in addition, in order to preclude the possibility of a war on two fronts, he had made a Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. In this way he felt that Germany was adequately protected from any possible policy of revanche by France. France was thus isolated and Britain also at the same time was voluntarily following a similar policy. There was little possibility though of an alliance between these two nations for in addition to being traditional enemies colonial rivalry in Siam, Egypt, and Africa kept them apart. The Kaiser and Bismarck's successor, Caprivi, however, were unwilling to maintain Bismarck's complicated system of alliances and therefore allowed the Russian Reinsurance Treaty to lapse. This offered to France opportunity to end her position of isolation and consequently in August, 1891 she and Russia came together for mutual aid.

and protection in the Dual Alliance. This left England in a position of isolation which in the face of two continental alliances was dangerous to her colonial empire. England, therefore, began to look for friends.

The logical place to seek was Germany. The English and the German royal families were connected by family ties. The two nations had fought together at Waterloo, and their racial origins were similar. A beginning at a friendly relationship was begun in June 1889 when Wilhelm was made an admiral of the British fleet and again in July 1890 with the Heligoland - Zanzibar Treaty.

The Dual Alliance and the Triple Alliance created an uneasy balance of power on the continent. The colonial interests of each group placed England's empire in a position of cross fire and in order to extricate herself from her dubious "splendid isolation" England, through her Foreign Secretary,

4 The Dual Alliance was primarily a joint defensive agreement in case of attack by members of the Triple Alliance. Terms of the document given in G. B. Mahhart, Alliance and Entente 1871-1914, New York, F. S. Crofts & Co., 1932, 28-30.

5 The main terms of the treaty gave Germany the island of Heligoland in exchange for her resignation of the protectorate over Zanzibar. For full details of the agreement see E. T. S. Dugdale (translator), German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914, London, Methuen & Co., 1929, II, 25-52.

6 Curiously enough this term which is generally attributed to Lord Salisbury was first coined by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons on February 5, 1896, when discussing England's isolation, "...I think splendidly isolated, because this isolation of England comes from her superiority." On February 26, 1896, Lord Goschen in a speech at Lewes referred to "...our splendid isolation, as one of our Colonial friends was good enough to call it." Lord Salisbury also in a speech in 1896 referred to the term incidently - The Oxford English Dictionary.
Lord Rosebery, in 1895 approached Germany with the suggestion that the time may have arrived for a quadruple alliance. England at this time was undergoing a crisis with France in regard to their relations in Siam and because of her apparent surrender to France she lost prestige in Europe and as a result Germany, dubious of the practical value of the British alliance, declined. 7

In the following year Anglo-German relations were worse because of differences in colonial matters, particularly in regard to the Samoan islands, while Britain and France were at logger-heads over Egypt. The situation was in no wise improved in 1895 under the new Unionist government of Salisbury. Britain was experiencing difficulties in South Africa and the abortive Jameson Raid in 1896 and the Kaiser's ill-timed Kruger telegram aroused British feeling so that for the time being all idea of a rapprochement with Germany was dropped. In March of 1898, however, Arthur Balfour, Chancellor of the Exchequer, acting for Prime Minister Salisbury, proposed anew an Anglo-German understanding. The proposal was further reiterated within a few days by Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, who had previously made advances to the United States and Japan without results. Germany, nevertheless, did not feel the need for a British alliance at the time and turned down the offer. Britain's relations with Russia on the Far East were strained and the Fashoda incident raised a crisis with France. Germany, however,

7 E. M. Carroll, Germany and The Great Powers 1866-1914, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1938, 323, gives fuller detail on this particular point.
counted too much on the permanence of these hostilities. The passage of the German Naval Laws of 1898 and 1900 brought into being a German navy and its creation while not actually bringing about further ill-feeling at the time was to store up future tension.

On January 22, 1901, Queen Victoria died and the prompt arrival of Kaiser Wilhelm at the bedside of his grandmother did much to raise his popularity in England. It also proved an opportune moment for raising the question once again of an Anglo-German entente. England was in the midst of the South African war and Germany thought that she was therefore in a position to dictate the terms. England, on the other hand, was not willing to assume the specific obligations of an alliance and in spite of the efforts of Eckardstein, the German ambassador to England, the proposals fell through, especially as Germany refused to discuss any other basis for an agreement other than a general alliance.

Baron Eckardstein was instrumental, nevertheless, in suggesting to the Japanese ambassador, Count Hayashi, in March 1901, an alliance between Great Britain, Germany and Japan. As a result Count Hayashi made proposals to Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary. These proposals were welcome, especially in the light of Russian pressure in the Far East. The outcome was the Anglo-Japanese Agreement which was

8 Carroll, op. cit., 461.

9 See Eckardstein, Ten Years At The Court of St. James, London, Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1921, 184-221 for a full account of his efforts and the reasons why the agreement was not reached. He is very critical of Germany's attitude.
signed on January 30, 1902, but Lord Lansdowne was unwilling to include Germany in its terms of participation. Great Britain had finally broken away from her position of isolation.

With the growing strength of the German navy and the undoubted power of the German army it became more and more possible that the Triple Alliance might soon be in a position to dominate the Dual Alliance. While there was a balance of power between the two, England could afford to remain aloof from continental entanglements, but once there was even the possibility of a union England's position on the periphery of Europe became exceedingly uncertain. Faced with dangerous possibilities England sought to define her position. She had made offers to Germany on at least four occasions and had been refused, or had been unable to come to terms each time. On the other hand Anglo-French relations were none too good, but France had aspirations in Morocco and, through a common agreement not to hinder each other's actions in their respective spheres of influence, England and France were able to come together in April, 1904, through the Entente Cordiale.

Germany at first showed a friendly attitude toward the Entente Cordiale. She had commercial interests in Morocco but these had been readily recognized by France and assured protection. However, the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 which conveniently disposed of France's ally, plus the fact that Germany was supposedly afraid that France was going to take over Morocco as she had taken Tunis, caused a change of heart in Berlin, and the result was the Kaiser's provocative visit
to Tangier. The result was the summoning of the Algeciras Conference to settle the matter of interests in Morocco. The significance of the Conference actually lies in the fact that the bonds of the Entente Cordiale were strengthened and that England then definitely decided to cast her weight on the side of France in maintaining the balance of power.

Of significance, too, is the fact that the downfall of the Balfour Unionist Government in 1905, and the accession to power of the Liberals under Campbell-Bannerman made no difference in British foreign policy. Regarding foreign policy Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman said,

"I wish emphatically to reaffirm my adhesion to the policy of the Entente Cordiale."

Indeed, under the new government the bond with France was further strengthened by the military conversations which were initiated in 1906 and which continued through 1908, 1909, and 1911. They culminated in the Grey-Cambon letters of 1912 by which,

"If either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common.

"If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staff would at once be taken into consideration and the Government would then decide what effects should be given to them."12

10 In his Memoirs the Kaiser claims that this visit was forced on him by Chancellor Bulow. Kaiser, op. cit., 107-108.


12 Quoted by Conwell-Evans; Foreign Policy From A Back Bench 1904-1908, London, Oxford University Press, 1932, 49.
The English public, nevertheless, was not made cognizant of the closeness of the Anglo-French tie or how the military agreements practically imposed on Britain the necessity to back France with force of arms if need be.

Anglo-Russian relations presented a very similar picture to those of Anglo-French relations before 1904. In the latter case Egypt had proven the stumbling block while in the former Afghanistan, Persia, and Tibet served as constant sources of suspicion. England looked on these countries as outposts of India and regarded Russian penetration, especially financial, as a threat to her position in India. The Conference of Algericas, however, provided an opportunity for cooperation on behalf of their common friend, France. British participation in an international loan to Russia in 1906 further eased the tension and smoothed the way in August, 1907, for an Anglo-Russian treaty. As a result the Triple Entente came into being, and Britain had definitely thrown in her lot with the Dual Alliance.

This did not preclude friendship with Germany. In the autumn of 1907 the Kaiser paid a friendly visit to Windsor and on October 28, 1908, there appeared an anonymous interview with the Kaiser in The Daily Telegraph, the dominant theme of which was friendship for Britain. However, the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria in 1908 and German support for Austria in the face of Russian protestations showed clearly that for Britain a middle course of friendliness for all combined with Entente relations with France and Russia was to be a difficult, if not an impossible,
position. Germany regarded the situation in somewhat the same light as the words of the new Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, would suggest,

"In the year 1909 the situation was based on the fact that England had firmly taken its stand on the side of France and Russia in pursuit of its traditional policy of opposing whatever Continental Power for the time being was the strongest; and that Germany held fast to its naval programme, had given a definite direction to its Eastern policy, and had moreover to guard against a French antagonism that had in no wise been mitigated by its policy in later years. And if Germany saw a formidable aggravation of all the aggressive tendencies of Franco-Russian policy in England's pronounced friendship with the Dual Alliance, England on its side had grown to see a menace in the strengthening of the German Fleet and a violation of its ancient rights in our Eastern policy. Words had already passed on both sides. The atmosphere was chilly and clouded with distrust."\(^{13}\)

This feeling was emphasized in 1911 when Germany once again interfered in Moroccan affairs. A state of anarchy had broken out in Morocco and France had undertaken military measures to restore order. Germany, fearing that France would use this as a pretext for annexing Morocco outright, sent a gunboat, the Panther, and later a cruiser to Agadir, presumably to protect German nationals. This was a violation of the terms of the Algeciras Conference which, however, the Germans termed to be without validity. The situation was critical and England, desiring to inform Germany that she would stand by France, did so through the medium of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech at the Mansion House. Lloyd George was well known for his pacifism and his speech, therefore, was that much more effective. The result was that

\(^{13}\) Quoted by Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923, i, 37.
German demands became reasonable and eventually a settlement was reached. Sir Edward Grey in reviewing the crisis declared that,

"There is another foreign policy which would be simply disastrous - that we should give it to be understood that in no circumstances, however wantonly a friend of ours was attacked, would we give any assistance. That would be an attempt to revert to a policy of splendid isolation. It would deprive us of the possibility of having a friend in Europe and it would result in the other nations of Europe, either by choice or necessity, being brought into the orbit of a single diplomacy from which we should be excluded."

In other words Britain was definitely standing by her rapprochement with France and thereby hoped to prevent the domination of Europe by the Triple Alliance.

The growth of the German navy was looked upon with some apprehension by Britain whose main line of defence was her navy, and whose policy it was to have a fleet twice as powerful as the next strongest navy. After Agadir the British Government felt that Anglo-German relations might be improved if an understanding could be reached regarding naval strength. A new Germany Navy Law was in preparation and an attempt was made, therefore, to try to obviate the necessity of maintaining the naval race. A suggestion was made to Germany by Sir Ernest Cassell and later by Lord Haldane early in 1912 that Britain would not impede German colonial expansion if an agreement could be reached in naval matters. But, whereas the talks had been initiated with the greatest friendliness on both sides, each side was suspicious of the intentions of the other and negotiations fell through.

14 Ward and Gooch, op. cit., III, 453.
As a result the disposition of the British Fleet was concentrated in home waters. British battleships were recalled from China waters and also from the Mediterranean. This redisposition of the British Fleet coinciding as it did with changes in the disposition of the French Fleet had important effects. In the words of the First Lord of the Admiralty,

"Under the growing pressure of German armaments Britain transferred her whole Battle Fleet to the North Sea, and France moved all her heavy ships into the Mediterranean and the sense of mutual reliance grew swiftly between both navies. The only 'trump card' which Germany secured by this policy was the driving of Britain and France closer together. From the moment that the Fleets of France and Britain were disposed in this new way our common naval interests became very important. And the moral claims which France could make upon Great Britain if attacked by Germany, whatever we had stipulated to the contrary were enormously extended. Indeed my anxiety was aroused to try to prevent this necessary recall of ships from tying us up too tightly with France and depriving us of that liberty of choice on which our power to stop a war might well depend."15

This naval redisposition together with the naval conversations between the British and French Admiralties similar to the discussions of the General Staffs and the Grey-Cambon letters meant that in 1912 the Entente Cordiale had become in spirit, if not in the letter, practically an alliance. And when we consider how France was the ally of Russia it will be seen that the future actions of Great Britain would undoubtedly be affected by the fortunes of both these nations.

In 1912 the Second Balkan War broke out. Russia and

Austria were both vitally interested and, therefore, indirectly so were France and Germany, and to a lesser extent Great Britain. Luckily Anglo-German relations were particularly friendly during 1912 and 1913 and as a result cool heads and conferences were able to settle a matter which might well have caused a world conflict. The refusal of Britain and France to assist Russia in exerting pressure on Germany had much to do with bringing about the peaceful settlement but Russo-German relations, however, were not by any means friendly.

In June of 1914 British naval forces made simultaneous visits to Kronstadt and Kiel and there was general fraternizing among the crews. According to the First Lord of the Admiralty "naval rivalry had at the moment ceased to be a cause of friction."\(^{16}\) It was against this peaceful background, therefore, that the fatal shots rang out on June 28 which took the lives of Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, and his wife, and the pernicious system of alliances went into effect.

The Austro-Slav political situation was extremely complicated. The Austro-Hungarian empire was an exceedingly heterogeneous one, composed of many nationalities among which Austria held the key position of dominance only through an uneasy balance of power which she maintained by taking advantage of the various national rivalries. Of the Balkan countries to the south none had stronger national aspirations.

\(^{16}\) Winston Churchill, op. cit., I. 189.
than Serbia. Austria had taken great efforts to curb these expressions. In 1908 she had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, territory which Serbia felt she had a claim to on the basis of the nationality of the inhabitants. Again, in the Balkan War of 1912-1913 Austria had prohibited Serbia from obtaining a direct economic outlet to the Adriatic. The motive behind Austria’s actions was simple. She feared that a strong Slav nationalism developed around the Serbian nucleus would cause uprisings among the many Slav nationals within her own empire and might, therefore, cause her downfall.

Russia and the Balkans were bound together by ties of nationality. Russia regarded herself as the "Big Slav Brother" but so far had played a very poor rôle. In 1908 the dealings of her Foreign Minister, Isvolsky, in trying to obtain the passageway of the Dardanelles with the aid of Austria had checkmated her in any attempt to secure Bosnia or Herzegovina for Serbia. Then in the war of 1912-1913 she was confronted by the combined efforts of Austria and her knight "in shining armour," Germany, and, in face of such combined strength had had to back down.

The assassination of the Austrian heir and his wife provided Austria with an opportunity of wiping out once and for all the Balkan menace. Russia was likewise determined that for once she would not desert her Slav brothers, but would maintain her prestige in the Near East. Germany was pledged to aid Austria and France was pledged to aid Russia. In vain did Britain and Italy propose conferences. The war which had been baulked through conferences in 1912 and 1913
was to be fought, and through the operation of alliances it was to involve all Europe. Britain could stay out of a war that involved only Russia but her entente in honor bound her to aid France. In the last analysis her critical position was clarified by the German violation of Belgian neutrality, but there could really have been little doubt as to her obligation to aid France. The obvious confusing factor in this series of events is that the system of alliances gave the whole matter an air of definitiveness which in actuality it did not possess.

The pattern of British foreign policy is revealed, therefore, as one of isolation as long as the Dual Alliance and the Triple Alliance constituted a Balance of Power. True, England made advances to enter into agreements with Germany before the creation of a powerful German navy upset the balance, but her advances were rejected. Nevertheless, once there was a possibility that Germany could possibly dictate European policy Britain, for the security of her own position, threw in her lot first with Japan, then with France, and finally with Russia. At first there was nothing more than an entente cordiale, but, as Germany continued to mishandle situations such as the Panther incident, the first Balkan war, and the Agadir incident, and, at the same time continued to increase her navy, England developed her entente more and more deeply until it morally became an alliance. When, therefore, war came, Britain found that through her foreign policy, which in large measure had been the result of circumstance, she no longer possessed the full measure of
freedom of action which she had declared to have. Luckily
the invasion of Belgium gave her both a diplomatic excuse
for entering the war and also created sufficient public
opinion to make a declaration of war popular so that she was
thus able to fulfill the moral obligation which had been
created.

It is obvious from this narrative of events that
alliances served the very useful purpose of providing mutual
support in the absence of any agency for collective security.
They also helped to maintain a precarious balance of power in
a world in which the rapid developments in iron and steel
technology were being applied to armaments as well as to
commerce. Then too, the great economic progress had created
the necessity of looking for future markets and thus pro-
duced obvious complications in every chapter of incidents
by apparent clashes of economic interests. Indeed Harold
Nicholson, whose father was connected with the British
Foreign Office during this period, has described the British
conception of policy as mercantile,

"We conduct our diplomacy, not as heroic warriors,
but as rather timid shopkeepers. Except in rare
moments of aberrations......we are not out for
spectacular diplomatic victories or sensational
trials of strength. What we are after is a profit-
able deal. And we know from long business exper-
ience that no deal is profitable which imposes
conditions which are incapable of execution, or
leaves our customers devoid of all powers of
purchase."17

17 Harold Nicholson, The Meaning of Prestige, Cambridge,
University Press, 1937, 22.
The significance of the economic factor was certainly not lost on either Germany, Russia, or France, and powerful armies and navies were felt necessary to protect their economic interests as well as to uphold their national prestige. In their turn such armaments produced distrust and hate. An incident, therefore, was all that was necessary to produce a world conflagration. The interesting question which arises is what the people who were caught up in such a maelstrom of events thought of them. Let us then view the European spectacle from 1890 to 1914 from the point of view of the public.
CHAPTER FOUR

"Public Opinion in England, which is gradually gaining a hearing through the Press, has so much to say, even on foreign affairs, that British official policy is largely dependent on this irregular factor. In the same measure that the House of Commons has lost in influence and standing, Public Opinion has gained in political power. Thus an incalculable element has forced its way into English foreign policy which other nations have to reckon with."1

EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION IN REGARD TO GERMANY 1890-1914

The most important story to come from the continent in nearly five years was the news of Bismarck's resignation, on March 18, 1890, as German Chancellor. The uncertainty with which Britain regarded the future of German policy was summed up by Punch's well-known two-page cartoon, "Dropping The Pilot". Undoubtedly, however, Bismarck's fall was also accompanied by a feeling that relations with Germany would be smoother. An article in the National Review entitled "The Real Cause of Prince Bismarck's Retirement" was of the opinion that,

"England has no reason to dread or regret the change, so far as relations of this country with the German Empire are involved in it. Prince Bismarck was a somewhat exacting friend, often, personally inaccessible, and sometimes employing methods of negotiation peculiar to himself, not wholly agreeable to the other party to the bargain. There is every reason to believe that the Emperor will be loyal and straightforward in all his dealings."2

1 Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung, Quoted by the National Review, June, 1904, 43, 530.
This quotation appeared in a German newspaper just after the signing of the Anglo-French agreement. It seems indicative that many Germans were of the opinion that anti-German sentiments which appeared in several organs of the British press were significant factors in guiding British foreign policy.

2 National Review, May 1890, 15, 294.
Anglo-German relations were indeed very good in 1890. Prior to the Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty between the two nations the Emperor had visited England. This visit brought forth the warm commendation that,

"though ostensibly his visit was only to the Queen, everybody perceived that it has given fresh force and solidity to the excellent understanding already existing between Germany and Great Britain." 3

Actually the exchange of Heligoland for possessions in Africa met with a varied response in Britain. One opinion was that it was "an island of not the slightest real value to our Empire." 4 The same opinion was expressed by the Times of June 18 which used the terms "natural and necessary allies" and spoke of the agreement as "one of the main guarantees of the peace of the world." 5 The Conservative Standard and Morning Post likewise upheld the treaty but the Liberal press was not so sympathetic. The Daily Chronicle spoke of "England's humiliation". 6 The Conservative Pall Mall Gazette followed the general line of the Liberal press and spoke in terms as strong as "Salisbury's surrender to Germany is shameful to the last degree". 7 On the whole, however, the general consensus of British public opinion was

3 National Review, September 1890, 16, 129. Quotations from this source unless titled are the comments made by the editor, Leo Maxse, in his monthly article entitled "Episodes of the Month."

4 National Review, July 1890, 15, 846.


6 Ibid., 297

7 Ibid., 296-297.
quite in favor of the exchange and was pleased at the cordiality of Anglo-German relations.

The British public were not aware in 1891 of the full terms of the Franco-Russian alliance and consequently very little appeared in the papers or reviews. There was every indication, however, that a counter alliance to the Triple Alliance had been set up. An article on French politics in the *Contemporary Review* by G. Monod stated that Russia and France,

"....have at the same time demonstrated to all Europe that a change has taken place in the equilibrium of political forces, and that the period of the absolute hegemony of Germany is ended."

In 1895 the death of Alexander III of Russia brought the royal families of both Russia and England together and the suggestion of an Anglo-Russian *entente* was made. This suggestion met with a certain amount of public approval.

"An *entente* with Russia, is certainly desirable, and it would assure the peace of Europe for another generation. Yet we would join in no *entente* that was ill-disposed toward Germany."

This statement is indicative of a very "middle of the road" attitude; and this is probably an accurate summation of British opinion at the time. There was a feeling prevalent that the policy of isolation should be discontinued, but on the part of the public there was likewise no strong feeling.


9 *Contemporary Review*, December 1891, LX, 917.

10 *National Review*, January 1895, 24, 586.
as to the direction in which Britain should ally herself.

On June 10, 1895, the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance were made public. At this time Anglo-French relations were definitely strained over Egypt and since Russia was now seen to be definitely allied with France the chance of an ally for Britain was simplified. The National Review immediately suggested that,

"...it is expedient England should join the Triple Alliance......We would rather remain aloof from alliance but we cannot blind ourselves to the gathering animosity of the French, nor to the dangerous position we occupy since Russia has placed herself under an obligation to them, and may be called on to render service for service."11

Seen in this light the alliance was being suggested to the public in a manner which would no doubt prove acceptable to them, namely that they could ensure their position, especially in Egypt. An article in the October issue of the National Review clarifies this point. It says,

"Why should not England take her share in guaranteeing, one may say in doubly guaranteeing, the peace by forming a Quadruple Alliance? It is certain there would be no dangerous disturbance of the Egyptian Question if England were allied with Germany, Austria, and Italy."12

The Kruger Telegram of 1896, however, silenced all expressions of a desire for an Anglo-German accord. British public opinion was thoroughly aroused by the Kaiser's telegram to

12 National Review, October 1895, 26, 150.
President Kruger. The Times foreign correspondent in Berlin, wrote that the occasion had been made for the purpose of subjecting "England to the well-deserved humiliation of a bitterly severe lesson." The Times described the Kruger telegram as "distinctly unfriendly to this country."

The Morning Post declared,

"It was hard to speak of the Telegram with coolness. The English nation would never forget it and would always think of it in the future when deciding on its foreign policy."

The Saturday Review wrote,

"Even if it be true that the Drill-Sergeant Autocrat would be supported in his remonstrance by the Governments of France and Russia, we still say that their interference is impertinent and not to be tolerated. Lord Salisbury should not tell Germany and her allies to mind their own business."

The feeling of the entire British press is probably as well summarized by the Economist as any other source. Its summation was that,

"Rarely, perhaps never since Napoleon was sent to St. Helena, has the indignation of the British public been so profoundly excited as by the telegram of the German Emperor to the Boer President. The telegram of the German Emperor was regarded as a deliberate affront to the British Nation. There never

13 The text of the telegram was, "I express to you my sincere congratulations that you and your people, without appealing to the help of friendly powers, have succeeded, by your own energetic action against the armed bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the peace, in restoring peace and in maintaining the independence of the country against attacks from without." Quoted in W. L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1935, I, 237.


15 Quoted by Langer, op. cit., I, 240.

16 Quoted by Langer, op. cit., I, 241.

17 Quoted by Langer, op. cit., I, 241.
was a more gratuitous or wilful affront to a first-class State.”

Since Germany did nothing more tangible to aid the Boers other than the sending of the telegram the outburst of British anger may well appear to be out of all proportion to the event which caused it. Certainly, though, it was a blow to British prestige and did carry every appearance of a rebuke to the English action. There is also the possibility that this outburst had as its real basis an altogether different cause than the mere sending of the telegram. There is evidence for such a suggestion in the predominance of articles on Anglo-German commercial rivalry in the British press of the time. Punch was particularly concerned with Germany's success and expressed the feeling exceptionally well in a cartoon entitled, "Napping", to which the following rhyme was appended,

"There was an old Lady (England) as I've heard tell
She went to market her goods for to sell
She went to market on a market day
And she fell asleep on the world's highway
By came a pedlar - German - and stout,
And he cut her petticoats all round about." 19

Then too in July, 1896, Lord Rosebery made a speech in which he declared that,

"Year after year our Consuls and our various officials of the Board of Trade have called the attention of the community to the fact that we are no longer, as we once were, undisputed mistress of the world of commerce, but that we are threatened by one very formidable rival - Germany..." 20

18 Economist, January 11, 1896, 34.
19 Punch, September 5, 1896, v.iii, 115.
20 Quoted by National Review, April 1897, 29, 169-188.
Such sentiments were further popularized by the printing of a pamphlet written by E. E. Williams entitled, *Made In Germany*, and the support given to his campaign by the *Saturday Review*, *Daily Mail*, and *Chronicle*. This all gives credence to the supposition that the outburst over the Kruger Telegram lay not so much in the actual telegram itself but in the resentment at German trade rivalry and that such resentment found an outlet in its expressions over the telegram.  

The British Government took no official action on the Kruger Telegram and outwardly the anger of the British public over the affair soon passed. This was to be expected for the public had no definite trend in foreign policy. Indeed, immediately relations had become strained with Germany they were interested in the possibility,

"that French statesmen may seize the opportunity of endeavoring to attach her (England) to France."  

This was in spite of the fact that there was no evident basis of agreement on which the two could come to terms. Even *Punch* took up the idea of an Anglo-French rapprochement. In a cartoon entitled "Rapprochement" it showed John Bull and Madame France sitting together on a bench,

"John Bull (aside)'She's rather an attractive woman.'
Madame La République (aside) 'Tiens! Après tout, il n'est pas si mal!'"

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21 A rather amusing sidelight to the whole question of "Made In Germany" came during the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria. Like many other newspapers the *Times* issued a colored portrait of the Queen to its readers. Imagine the surprise of many who desired to have it framed to find printed on it the fatal words, "Made in Germany"!  

Nothing came of these Anglo-French feelers and public interest in the proposal very soon declined. The next matter to arouse British interest in Germany was the proposed German Naval Bill which was introduced into the Reichstag in 1898. The public reaction in Britain could very well be summed up as,

"We cannot afford to allow the German Emperor to hold the balance of sea power in Europe in the early years of the twentieth century." 24

Yet, on the other hand, the public was not unduly alarmed. The press, in general was moderate in tone 25 but it was suspicious of Germany's intention, and so to commercial rivalry we might add naval rivalry as a means of keeping alive a cautious attitude in regard to Germany. Parliament also showed the same attitude of calmness combined with watchfulness. Lord Charles Beresford asked in Parliament if our naval estimates were adequate and he was assured by the First Lord that a careful watch was being kept on foreign construction.26

By 1899, however, we do find some crystallization of opinion among certain sections of the public that any future rapprochement with Germany was an impossibility. In great measure this feeling was due to the despatches of Chirol to


25 Times, Daily Telegraph, Standard, Daily News, were all moderate. The Morning Post saw in the German navy a threat to Britain. For fuller detail see Carroll, op. cit., 390.

the Times. Similar expressions were to be found in the National Review which was gradually becoming anti-German and we find expressions of opinion such as,

"The sooner we realize that any attempt at a rapprochement with Germany must be laid aside as our interests in every quarter of the globe are vitally opposed, that a national dislike has arisen on both sides..."  

Besides this negative attitude in regard to Germany the National Review also put forward a very strong positive stand for closer friendship with Russia. This is interesting as it runs counter to the attitude of members of the Government. Lord Salisbury in a speech on November 9, 1899, described our relations with the German people as all that could be desired. The same tenor was sounded by Joseph Chamberlain in a speech at Leicester on November 30, 1899, in which he said,

"...I think any far-seeing English statesman must have long desired.....that we should not remain permanently isolated on the Continent of Europe; and I think that the moment that aspiration was formed it must have appeared evident to everybody that the natural alliance is between ourselves and the great German Empire."  

We have seen that such, however, was not the feeling of certain sections of the public. Nevertheless, at the root of all such suggestions there was the feeling that Britain would have to end her policy of isolation. Actually there

27 Valentine Chirol (1852-1929). Was foreign correspondent for the Times in Germany from 1892 to 1897. After 1897 he was in charge of the foreign department of the paper and in this position he was well able to influence public opinion. For fuller detail see D.N.B. 1922-1930, 182-185.

28 National Review, November 1899, 34, 326.

29 Quoted by the National Review, January, 1900, 34, 655.
does not seem to have been any strong opinion in favour of an alliance with Germany. Editorially the Times scarcely mentioned the suggested rapprochement. The Saturday Review was definitely opposed, and the National Review declared that,

"...As understandings with that Power so swiftly turn into misunderstandings, which breed further ill-will, the fewer such arrangements the better." Mr. Balfour was well aware of the opposition to such an alliance for he stated that public opinion would have to be improved in both countries before it would be feasible.

Yet the German Navy Bill of June 1900 which provided for a fleet of 38 battleships within 20 years did not unduly arouse the British. This may be because the Bill provided for a powerful navy only on a long term basis. As one magazine declared,

"As far as this country is concerned, we can afford to watch the growth of the German navy with sympathetic interest. It does not follow that because it has shot up in height so suddenly that the same rate of growth will be always maintained."

The death of Queen Victoria in January 1901 and the German Emperor's rapid trip to England undoubtedly raised his popularity in Britain, as Punch's cartoon entitled "Appreciation" certainly indicated. As we know, the Government took advantage of this opportunity to discuss an

30 See Langer, op. cit., II, 499.
31 National Review, January, 1900, 54, 654.
33 National Review, July, 1900, 35, 715.
34 Punch, January, 1901, 119, 99.
Anglo-German entente, but since negotiations broke down the public was not made aware of the attempt. However, by this time the Boer War, as well as the Boxer Rebellion, were under way, and the public mind was more vitally interested in these topics than whether or not an entente was possible between England and Germany.

Nothing spectacular occurred in the field of foreign relations until January 30, 1902, when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed. This treaty was made known to the public on February 11 and the reaction to it was most interesting.

The Economist took a very reserved point of view on the actual benefits of the alliance but did stress that

"...we are not blind to the great increase of prestige which the Treaty brings us, not only in Pekin, where the Japanese strengthen their influence week by week, but on the Continent of Europe. It was an unwholesome, because false, idea which had spread there, that Great Britain was hopelessly fettered by the South African war, and could no longer attempt anything great even in self-defence, and the Alliance dissipates that idea." 35

The National Review was much more outspoken. Its comment was

"It would be more accurate to say, and this is one of the chief attractions from the British point of view, that the Alliance with Japan signifies our emancipation from the German yoke which we have borne so meekly for many years." 36

Both these accounts, as representative of what was written, stress the fact that Britain had taken a decisive step at a

time when she would normally not have been expected to, and had thereby proven that she was capable of action. As a result, Britain's prestige both at home and abroad was increased.

It was about this time that an increasing number of articles began to appear in the British press which expressed the feeling that the growing German navy was a distinct menace. The appearance of these articles coincided with a feeling of almost super-sensitiveness among the British regarding the opinion of other nations on the South African war. German opinion during the war had been largely pro-Boer and the German press had probably been the worst in its comments. As these comments were reprinted in the British press it was Germany consequently, which received the brunt of English ill-feeling, and the focal point for the British attack was the German navy. In May, 1902, a book entitled _The German Empire Of Today_ appeared. Its author writing under the pseudonym of Veritas emphasized the importance of the German navy and pointed out that at the end of sixteen years Germany would possess thirty-eight battleships, fourteen large and thirty-eight small cruisers. The _Morning Post_ had a series of articles on the German menace, and the _National Review_ declared its intention of continuing to shout,

"...month by month until there is some indication that the Admiralty has been roused from the Teutophile torpor."

37 See _Economist_, January 31, 1903, 186-187, for an article on this very point.  
38 _National Review_, May, 1902, 39, 357.
The Nineteenth Century And After took a most serious interpretation of Germany's policy and in article "Great Britain And Germany" by J. L. Bashford said,

"For many months - nay, for the last few years - the belief that Germany's Kaiser and Chancellor have been, and are still, playing a hostile game against Great Britain, and are cynically laying an elaborate plot for the ultimate ruin of our country's power, has been gaining ground in all spheres of British Society, and not amongst the masses of unthinking people alone, who, perhaps, take their cue from the unreliable lucubrations of sensational journalism. The cultured classes of the United Kingdom also have become impregnated with similar views, and many person from among the intellectual portion of the King's subjects speak of Germany as England's bitterest and most dangerous foe. In very exalted circles, too, we find persons who think they are justified in believing that Germany wants to rule the North Sea; to wrest the whole shipping trade out of our hands; to invade England; and to annihilate the world-power of Great Britain." 39

This is probably an extreme view but it is indicative of the feeling towards Germany which was felt by many. It was felt that a re-orientation of British foreign policy was necessary. The Anglo-Japanese agreement had shown that Britain was not going to permit further Russian advance in the Pacific and consequently the line of rapprochement did not point in that direction. Instead, the press began to popularize better relations with France.

In May, 1903, King Edward visited Paris and by his tactful speeches did much to bring about friendly relations. The change in feeling was quite evident and brought forward the comment in the Economist that,

39 The Nineteenth Century And After, December, 1904, 56, 873.
"The genuine quality of the improvement in Anglo-French relations is agreeably illustrated by the attitude of public opinion in this country in regard to the approaching expedition from Algeria for the chastisement of troublesome tribes across the Moroccan frontier."\textsuperscript{40}

The final result was that by the end of 1903 there was "a united English press championing an Anglo-French understanding."\textsuperscript{41}

If the public required any further publicity as to the advantages of an Anglo-French entente it was furnished by the invasion scare which swept the English press early in 1904. The Westminster Gazette had an article on "The Invasion of Germany - Is It Practicable? The Plans of German Strategists." Then a popular book appeared by Mr. Erskine Childers entitled, \textit{The Riddle Of The Sands, A Record Of Secret Service Recently Achieved.}\textsuperscript{42} Commenting on this book and its author the National Review said,

"...there can be no doubt but that he has rendered a real public service in attempting to arouse the British Sluggard while there is yet time."\textsuperscript{43}

Thus, it was no surprise that on April 8, 1904, the Anglo-French Agreement was signed. Public feeling was generally in favor of the entente. Earl Spencer speaking in the House of Lords said that,

"It is not often that an Opposition can give unstinted congratulation on any action it (the Government) may take. I rejoice to think there are exceptions to this rule, and the present is an occasion.

\textsuperscript{40} Economist, June 6, 1903, 999.

\textsuperscript{41} Hale, \textit{op. cit.}, 265.

\textsuperscript{42} There are no reviews available of this book but its popularity is evident from the fact that by 1913 it was in the 10th impression and 2nd edition. It was likewise in the Nelson library series.

\textsuperscript{43} National Review, February, 1904, 42, 840.
"when we may offer congratulation.......It is a matter of the utmost importance to us to have friendly relations with France. It is the best pledge of peace for this country."\textsuperscript{44}

The Marquess of Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, in acknowledging the congratulation replied that,

"...throughout the long months during which these negotiations have been continued, we had the absolute certainty that we had behind us the general public feeling of this country, and that the public feeling would be grievously disappointed if we had had to bring these negotiations to a close without finding a friendly and satisfactory solution to these international questions."\textsuperscript{45}

The press likewise was, in general, very much pleased with the treaty. The Conservative \textit{Morning Post} was an exception and was of the opinion that France had had much the better of the bargain.\textsuperscript{46} The \textit{Economist} however felt that,

"we shall not have much difficulty in giving it (the treaty) a warm welcome."\textsuperscript{47}

The \textit{National Review} was actually effusive in its praise and spoke of few events in our time causing such "genuine satisfaction."\textsuperscript{48} It also took the occasion to point out again that Britain was now entirely emancipated from the "German yoke."

The actual dislike which certain sections of the British press felt for Germany was again plainly shown by the Tangier incident of March 31, 1905. The \textit{Daily Chronicle} published an article entitled "The Kaiser's Gambit" in which it attempted to show how the Moroccan visit fitted into the scheme of \textit{Weltpolitik}. There was also expressed the opinion that Germany

\textsuperscript{44} Parliamentary Debates, 19 April, 1904, V.133, 485-486.
\textsuperscript{45} Parliamentary Debates, 19 April, 1904, V.133, 487.
\textsuperscript{46} See Carroll, \textit{op. cit.}, 496.
\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Economist}, April 18, 1904, 642.
\textsuperscript{48} \textit{National Review}, May, 1904, 43, 349.
was trying to "drive a wedge into the Anglo-French understanding." 49 Actually what did occur was a tightening of the friendly relationship or, as the Economist described it, "an exhibition of the genuine and intimate character of the understanding." 50

The "visit" of the Kaiser was definitely a failure and in his Mémoirs he admits, himself, that he did not interest the right people.

"... it met," he says, "with a certain amount of friendly participation by Italian and Southern French anarchists, rogues, and adventurers." 51

What he did accomplish was to bring about for Britain and France the burial of the hatchet under German auspices. 52

The conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war by the Treaty of Portsmouth brought forth in the British papers the advocacy of an Anglo-Russian entente. The Outlook, Spectator, and the Westminster Gazette were among the leaders of this proposal. However, the time was not yet propitious for such an alignment and instead in August, 1905, a new agreement was made with Russia's erstwhile enemy, Japan. This agreement was enthusiastically greeted by the press which, however, did not cease to point out that in time Britain would be able to come to terms with Russia. The Times correspondent on Russia

49 National Review, June 1905, 45, 569.

50 Economist, April 1, 1905, 516.

51 Kaiser Wilhelm, op. cit., 108

52 National Review, September 1905, 46, 7.
wrote that,
"time, patience, and cordial goodwill on the part of Russia and Great Britain will overcome apprehensions, and thereby pave the way to an understanding between the two countries regarding their respective interests in Asia."\(^{53}\)

The Algeciras Conference provided both Britain and Russia with an opportunity of acting together and thereby laid the basis for the entente suggested by the press.

In June, 1907, Germany invited British editors to visit Germany. The purpose of this visit was ostensibly a goodwill tour and the result which the Germans hoped to obtain was a more cordial attitude on the part of the British press towards Germany. However, many important papers and reviews felt so strongly against Germany that they would have nothing to do with the attempted rapprochement. Included in this list were the *Times*, *Morning Post*, *Daily Mail*, *Evening News*, *Globe*, *Spectator*, *Observer*, *Nineteenth Century And After*, the *Fortnightly Review*, and the *National Review*.\(^{54}\) Punch also had a satirical note on the visit to the effect that,

"The Kaiser has invited the British journalists on their visit to Berlin to witness the spring parades of the Potsdam garrison. If the Kaiser imagines that British journalists are easily overawed he is mistaken."\(^{55}\)

This is, therefore, indicative of the sentiments which a powerful section of the British press felt towards Germany.

In August of the same year the agreement between Britain and Russia, which the press had been so anxious to bring about, was achieved. Press comments on the treaty show how

\(^{53}\) Quoted by *National Review*, November, 1905, 48, 379.

\(^{54}\) This list given in the *National Review*, June 1907, 49, 519-520.

\(^{55}\) *Punch*, May 15, 1907, V132, 349.
"The overwhelming majority of the British people throughout the Empire are delighted that the prolonged Anglo-Russian negotiations have culminated in an Agreement."55

The comment of the Economist was evidence of the unanimity of the press support, for it spoke of the "small band of enthusiasts who have been urging with such stubborn and insistent eloquence in a section of the Press that the British Government should have no dealings with the Russian Government."57

Anglo-French relations were particularly cordial in 1908. Early in the year the French President visited England and his visit was the occasion for expression as to the popularity of the Entente Cordiale. Then M. Clemenceau added another graceful gesture to the feeling of amity by his presence at the funeral of the late Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. However, certain sections of the press felt that the two nations were, "...continually tempting Providence by postponing those military and naval conventions which are the necessary complement of the entente cordiale."58

From this comment, therefore, there is evidence that the public were unaware of the military conversations which had already taken place.

The year 1908 again witnessed a revival of the fear of German armaments. In February an Imperial Maritime League was founded by Harold F. Wyatt and L. Graham H. Horton-

55 National Review, August 31, 1907, 50, 165.
57 Economist, September 28, 1907, 1618-1619.
58 National Review, June, 1908, 51, 504.
Smith. The purpose of this League was to arouse the nation to the menace which Germany presented to the British navy. The Westminster Gazette was extremely interested in the growth of the German navy and in June published comparative tables to show that within four years England would only have eleven Dreadnought type ships to Germany's thirteen. The Observer carried the proposal that Britain required a naval law such as Germany had in order to meet the crisis. The theme was an extremely popular one and some of the articles went into great detail. The Quarterly Review in July had an item on the "German Peril" in which it pointed out that

"...the Kaiser's subjects, now numbering over sixty-two million of people, increase by nearly a million souls a year...a far more formidable increment than is now annually added to the population of any other two Western countries...."

A Socialist paper, the Clarion, also raised the old fear of a German invasion of England and the Westminster Gazette and National Review followed in the same theme. There was also a growing feeling that Britain required an army as well as a navy in order to have adequate protection. Balfour, the former Prime Minister, in a speech of November 19, 1908,

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60 Quarterly Review, July 1908, 209, 265.
said that the navy must be implemented by an adequate home force. Lord Milner was of the same opinion, and Lord Robert's motion in Parliament for attention to the provision of an adequate army was carried 74 to 32. The Times gave full support to the demand for a home army and in an article entitled "The Duty of England" voiced a demand for national training and the creation of a nation in arms. The Spectator followed with a series of articles, the motto of which was, prepare, prepare, and again prepare.

On November 5, 1909, the Socialist paper, Clarion, commented on the growing gravity of the German danger. The editor, Robert Blatchford, in a series of editorial articles said

"Those who deny the danger of an Anglo-German war declare that the British people have no desire for war, that the German people have no desire for war, and that we who insist upon the presence of the war danger are really helping to make war possible.

"I admit the two arguments and deny the third....I am more than ever convinced that there is a real and growing danger of war." These articles were republished in the Daily Mail and also came out in penny pamphlet form so that they must have had a fairly wide circulation.

Yet, while Britain was alarmed at the growing military and naval strength of Germany, the British public were not overly aroused by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The stock market did show, nevertheless, a definite reaction.

61 Times, March 21, 1909.
62 Quoted by National Review, December, 1909, 54, 528.
The Economist noted that,

"Prices meanwhile were giving way in all directions. Consols taking part in the decline, and Kaffirs falling like the leaves in an autumn gale." 63

However, within a week the stock market had recovered from the momentary panic. The annexation had been the action primarily of Austria, though she had been supported by Germany, and consequently the British did not view the move with alarm.

Such was not the case, though, of the Agadir incident of July, 1911. In this instance the British press was fully alive to the possible danger from Germany and many were the comments which were made. There was a definite feeling that the British Ministers,

"... have for once done their duty, as their vigorous attitude went far to preserve the peace of Europe." 64

Concerning the Mansion House Speech it was felt by many that,

"... the Chancellor of the Exchequer made some atonement for past indiscretions by a speech at the Mansion House as irreproachable in terms as it was unmistakable in tone, which, backed as it was by the determination of the Cabinet, saved the peace of Europe, which does not depend, as illusionists pretend to imagine, upon honeyed words or aversion to war, but upon the amount of belligerent power behind peaceful intentions. The speaker merely declared that we were neither a quantité négligeable nor a faithless friend." 65

On the other hand, there were some who, while not disagreeing with what Lloyd George had said, felt that he was not the person to say it, but, that it should have been said by the

63 Economist, October 10, 1908, 659.
64 National Review, November 1911, 58, 329.
Spectator, July 29, 1911, 107, 165 expressed the same sentiment.
Prime Minister, or by Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary.

It has been charged by one magazine that the general public of Britain was in a "semi-comatose condition." But when we remember that 1911 was a year of stirring events in domestic affairs we can understand why foreign affairs did not loom as large in the public mind as might be expected. After all there is such a thing as a surfeit of excitement. At any rate, there was no respite on the part of the magazines in issuing constant warnings to be alert. The Spectator especially urged that Britain keep her navy strong and supreme. In an article on "The Navy Debate" it claimed,

"We are engaged in competing with Germany for the command of the sea, and it is absolutely vital that we should win in that competition and induce our rivals to give up the game as not worth the candle. Now, in our opinion, the best way and cheapest way to do this is to make it quite clear to Germany that whatever happens we shall outbuild her and so outstay her in the race." 67

In the opinion of some Britshers there was too much definite anti-German feeling prevalent in their country. The Spectator had several letters to the editor claiming that Germany had a side to the argument and that she should be permitted to expand. 68

66 National Review, January 1912, 58, 693.
See also Spectator, December 2, 1911, 107, 948.

67 Spectator, May 18, 1911, 106, 389.

68 Spectator, February 12, 1910, 105, 258.
March, 19, 1910, 105, 462.
October 21, 1911, 107, 639.
December 30, 1911, 107, 1150.
November 16, 1912, 109, 806.
January 4, 1913, 110, 15.

These issues, in particular, have letters on this very point.
Suggestions were made to the effect that Germany should have, for the purpose of development, Brazil, the Amazon Valley, and one writer even suggested giving her half of Australia. On the whole, however, the British public seemed to be quite complacent at the attitude of intolerance which a great number of the press took in regard to Germany.

The Round Table in its very first volume made the statement that,

"The central fact in the international situation today is the antagonism between England and Germany....and it is the topic which dominates all others in the columns of the world's press which are devoted to the discussion of foreign affairs. Anglo-German rivalry does not exist solely in the minds of panic-mongers and Chauvinists..... It is an all-pervading reality." 69

Naturally such feelings were not improved by the publication of Bernhardi's Germany And The Next War. This book received wide publicity in England. Charles Sarolea in writing The Anglo-German Problem, 70 considered it important enough to devote an entire chapter to it. The major magazines carried reviews of it and they all stressed the fact that according to Bernhardi, Germany considered war 'as an instrument of policy.' 71

The Balkan War of 1912-1913 did not receive much attention in the periodical press. Again, as in 1908, Austria was

69 The Round Table, 1910-1911, vol. 1, 7.

70 Charles Sarolea, The Anglo-German Problem, London, Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1912, 156-181. (Note this book also appeared in a cheap paper-covered edition selling at a shilling.)

71 Reviews were carried by National Review, December 1912, 60, 543; Athenaeum, October 19, 1912, 2, 447; Spectator, November 30, 1912, 109, 902. The reviews of this book carried in the Book Review Digest are all definitely unfavorable. See Book Review Digest, New York, H. W. Wilson Co., 1913.
the chief figure and Germany played a role which kept her rather much in the background. Actually there appeared to be evidence of a friendlier feeling in regard to Germany. The Nation discussing the Balkan war and peace felt that,

"Now that peace is practically secured, let us all remember our debt, first, to Sir Edward Grey, and then to the Kaiser. Not for the first or second time has the latter given a casting vote against war."72

It also went on to say that the Times and Morning Post were cautious but were writing with good feeling and welcomed the change in Anglo-German relations.73 The only comment of the Spectator was that,

"Freedom with watchfulness has produced the present fortunate situation of mutual self-respect."74

Certainly the situation was not at all to the liking of the National Review, which viewed Germany with constant suspicion, and the general feeling of quiescence prompted the editor, Leo Maxse, to write,

"Apparently the British Press, which has lost nearly all its spunk of late years, is afraid to call attention to these disagreeable facts, (i.e. Germany accelerating her preparations for war). They are too alarming. They would spoil the "trade boom."75

Nevertheless, these friendly relations between Britain and Germany were maintained throughout the first half of 1914. As late as June 20, the New Statesman could write

"For the first time since the turn of the century our relations with Germany, we are told, are those of 'complete confidence'."76

72 Nation, January 25, 1913, 12, 693.
73 Nation, February 15, 1913, 12, 802.
74 Spectator, February 15, 1913, 110, 257.
75 National Review, February, 1913, 60, 880.
76 The New Statesman, June 20, 1914, 3, 327.
The British public were far too engrossed in such vital domestic matters as the question of Home Rule for Ireland with its possibility of civil war, and the Marconi scandal, to have much time for a serious consideration of continental affairs. Certainly the press did not "play up" the European situation. The Nation commenting on the murder of the Archduke and his wife in "Events of the Week" placed it in the sixth paragraph, showing how unimportant they felt the matter to be. Then too, in a leading article on "The Blow At Austria," there was not the slightest suggestion that Britain might be affected. Indeed, the Nation made no serious appraisal of the situation until August 1. Certainly, therefore, its comment in the August 8 issue that,

"The war broke so rapidly upon public opinion, which at first refused to believe that we could be concerned in a quarrel over Servia, that little attempt to organize for peace could well be made." \(^77\)

was indeed most apt.

A careful study of the Spectator, the National Review, and the New Statesman reveal identical trends. The issue of the Spectator which covered the events of the week of the assassination reported that

"The field of foreign affairs in this week barren of important events." \(^78\)

Proof that domestic affairs were more important than foreign events is given in the comment.

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\(^77\) Nation, August 8, 1914, 15, 691.

\(^78\) Spectator, July 11, 1914, 113, 41.

The Spectator was a weekly publication and there was therefore very little likelihood that the "copy" was completed much ahead of the publication date.
"The nation's deep anxieties concerning home politics have to a very great extent obscured for them the European prospect." 9

The first date on which the gravity of the European situation was fully appreciated by the periodical press was August 1. The press, however, made no attempt to formulate public opinion for it seemed to be equally confused by the rapidity with which the situation had so deteriorated that war was practically unavoidable. The Spectator suggested that,

"If the worst comes to the worst we shall stand loyally by our friends and our virtual engagements - a policy dictated alike by honour and by self-interest." 80

The New Statesman was not so definite,

"If the British Government allows itself to be dragged into the conflict at the heels of France and Russia, it may conceivably be adopting the only course, which, under the circumstances, is open to it; but it is no use to pretend that it will have any sort of national mandate behind it." 81

Actually both the press and the people seemed to be looking to the Government for leadership and were in no position to indicate which line of action they preferred. A most interesting article indicative of this feeling appeared in the Spectator under the title, "Public Distraction and Concentration." In part it said,

"It has been remarked that what holds a man's mind in the height of a national crisis is still the plaguy problem of choosing his next pair of trousers..."

"The character of public feeling is not an unimportant thing; it is not a mere "curiosity" for onlookers. A

79 Spectator, July 25, 1914, 113, 121.
80 Spectator, August 1, 1914, 113, 154.
81 New Statesman, August 1, 1914, 3, 513-514.
"Government who mean to govern are bound to study it and lay their plans so as to catch the readiest response to their policy. The Government have now a rather bewildered and crisis-distracted nation to guide, not yet fully awake to the meaning of all that is happening. The Government cannot at the moment ask for inspiration or advice from the people. They must themselves define the situation; they must themselves create a policy and themselves guide the people. The opportunity belongs to them and to nobody else. If they are plainly honest and patriotic they will find a country exceptionally ready to support them in doing what is right."  

The invasion of Belgium, as we know, solved the difficulty for the Government. Britain declared war on August 4, and the New Statesman was able to declare,

"But it is not possible, on the facts as they are known to us, for any man not blinded by his prepossessions to deny that Britain has never gone to war with cleaner hands."  

Such, therefore, was the manner in which the British press handled the major events of foreign affairs between the years 1890 and 1914. And inasmuch as public opinion is reflected by the press it is evident that the public were very keenly interested in Britain's position in relation to the continent and that in the period concerned they did not uphold the traditional policy of isolation. In fact they displayed great eagerness to have Britain ally herself with some continental Power. Their choice of a partner fluctuated constantly during 1890 to 1901 between Germany, Russia, and France. They had no decided preference but rather were

82 Spectator, August 1, 1914, 113, 161.

83 New Statesman, August 8, 1914, 3, 545.
guided in their proposals by the particular relationships existing at the moment. Thus in turn, they wooed the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance. True, after 1899, the general feeling which was expressed was, that there was no possible opportunity of an alliance with Germany. Yet, on the other hand, neither was there a definite conviction that the members of the Dual Alliance offered a counter attraction. On one point, however, the public seemed to be generally agreed - end isolation. Therefore, they acclaimed the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1902 as the first step. The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 was the second step and, with the exception of some of the Liberals, the entente was welcomed with enthusiasm. The treaty with Russia in 1907, likewise, was received in much the same spirit. Yet, while Britain was ostensibly in the camp of the Dual Alliance, and had entered there not only with general public approval but at the insistence of many influential sections of the public, there was a feeling that such a connection must not prevent free and friendly relations with Germany. This ideal position of being friendly with all major Powers was practically achieved in 1914 when the powder-keg of Europe began to blow up.

The situation was so complicated that it was difficult for the public to see why a quarrel between Austria and Serbia should involve them. Then again, many wished to believe that they had freedom to make their own decisions. And while their agreements with France and Russia had been welcome, yet they felt they did not irrevocably bind them to
go to war. On the other hand, at the back of many minds there was the feeling that honor bound them to aid their friends in their difficulties. These, at least, are the trends of public thought which are evident in the press accounts. Actually, however, the public were so engrossed in domestic matters that a serious appraisal of foreign affairs was momentarily impossible. When the crisis came the Government could not give adequate leadership immediately because of the compromised relations with France. The press could not give a lead because it knew of no solution acceptable to its public. The crux of the difficulty of both Government and press was how to find some evident and tangible reason to bear our and render justifiable their support, even with arms, of France and Russia against Germany and Austria. The invasion of Belgium solved that difficulty and provided a solution to the whole situation.
CHAPTER FIVE

"Private publicity, whether news, interpretative comment, or straight exhortation, could not be entirely ignored by those who shaped policies. For the foreign secretary and his staff the domestic and foreign press was a primary source of information."

PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY

An evaluation of the inter-relations of public opinion, as expressed through the medium of the periodical press, and British foreign policy is a difficult task. Government departments, on the one hand, are reticent to admit that they can be swayed by the press while, on the other hand, the press is ever too ready to lay claim to its power to influence. Undoubtedly, however, a relationship did exist between the two. In the first instance a study of the press reveals that with very few exceptions most papers and periodicals had strong political alignments (See Appendix I). Yet there is also very little evidence that party papers were obliged to follow slavishly in support of the policies of their party. The Manchester Guardian is a case in point. Liberal to the core, it nevertheless, from 1906 on, campaigned for better relations with Germany and withdrawal from continental commitments. Another Liberal paper, the Nation, bitterly criticized the foreign policy of Grey as being too anti-German.

Most papers and reviews seem also to have had very definite opinions on foreign affairs but their attitude was quite independent and expressive largely of the point of view

of the editors and their reading public. Leo Maxse, editor of the National Review, and St. Loë Strachey, editor of the Spectator, were both suspicious of Germany and welcomed the alignment with France and Russia. Lord Northcliffe, on becoming owner of the Times in 1908 declared that he would not interfere in the policy of the paper as long as it continued to warn the people of Britain of the German menace.

The independence of the British press was further possible inasmuch as there was no Government Press Bureau, such as existed in Germany. The Foreign Office had no regular means of giving out news and Sir Edward Grey was thus able to report in Parliament that,

"There is no regular organization in connection with the Foreign Office for inspiring any Press agency or newspaper in order to put forward either officially or semi-officially, the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to foreign affairs."

Although there was no official connection between the press and the Foreign Office there were many unofficial associations through personal friendships. Henry Spenser Wilkinson, for example, who was the chief writer on foreign affairs for the Morning Post from 1895 to 1909 was married to a sister of Sir Eyre Crowe, one of the advisers to the Foreign Office. C. P. Scott, editor-proprietor of the Manchester Guardian, had close relations with Campbell-Bannerman. Likewise, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, who had held the office of the British secretary in Berlin and later in St. Petersburg, corresponded with Leo Maxse, St. Loë Strachey,

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and Valentine Chirol.

Besides such unofficial connections there was also some cooperation on the part of the press in forwarding certain governmental policies. Hale puts this very aptly when he says that,

"Considerations of high national policy frequently influenced the work of the correspondents. A good example of this is afforded by the contrasting tone of British reporting from Paris and Berlin between 1904 and 1914."\(^5\)

In this particular regard the amount of cooperation given depended largely on the favour shown to the particular policy by the press concerned.

The Foreign Office was keenly aware of the press and paid close attention to the opinions which it expressed. It is known that in particular the Times, Morning Post, Westminster Gazette, and the Manchester Guardian, were carefully read by the foreign secretary and his staff.\(^4\) A point of interest to note is that these were not the papers with the largest circulations but were those which were read by the "politically effective" sections of the population.\(^5\) Actually the government could hardly ignore the press. In the first instance in its role as the mouthpiece or interpreter of public opinion it commanded some attention. Secondly, it could always print reports which would result in the raising of questions in parliament.

\(^3\) Hale, op. cit. 36. This statement is also borne out by Conwell-Evans, op. cit., 41. See also an article on this very point in New Statesman, May 30, 1914, entitled "Germany And The British Press."

\(^4\) Hale, op. cit., 39.

\(^5\) ibid., 39. Circulation figures for the various newspapers and reviews have been almost impossible to obtain from available sources. Statements, such as those made above, are on the authority of secondary sources consulted.
The press, too, often tried directly to change a given government policy. The National Review definitely stated in 1901 that it was engaged in trying, so far as outsiders can exercise influence in such matters, to convince our Government of the wisdom of establishing our foreign policy on wider lines than it has lately heard.\(^6\)

One of the effective ways in which to gain public attention and interest was by the constant reiteration of an argument. In regard to Anglo-German relations certain anti-German members of the press constantly repeated two arguments in order to forestall closer cooperation. Foremost among these was the German naval menace, probably one of the most potent arguments for a Britisher. The Round Table took the attitude that, "'Our man on the omnibus' has never failed as yet to respond to an agitation on behalf of the Fleet."\(^7\)

The second argument most commonly used, and one which was capable of arousing immediate interest, was the growing commercial rivalry between the two nations. It must be admitted that both these arguments brought forward expressions of opinion that were uncritical and at times entirely unreasonable.

Yet while the government was apparently aware of the opinions expressed by the press certain sections at least, were quite capable of taking action completely independently of public opinion as voiced through the press. This was par-

\(^6\) National Review, December, 1901, 38, 479.

\(^7\) Round Table, December, 1912, 3, 680.
particularly true in regard to the extension of the Anglo-French entente through military and naval conversations to the practical extent of an alliance. Indeed this was done without even the full knowledge of parliament. Conwell-Evans in his preface to *Foreign Policy From A Back Bench* expressed the opinion that,

"The reader will probably be impressed with the small part which the House of Commons was allowed to play in the formulation of foreign policy and with the little control which democratic England could exercise over her destiny."\(^8\)

This was naturally so inasmuch as international negotiations have always been largely secret and since no formal effective machinery for public control has ever been developed. As a result there has of necessity been a lingering autocratic control of foreign policy. Even a measure of public direction of policy is beset with difficulties as is seen in the divergences between expressions of agreement of influential journalists and the alignment of policy.

With regard to the study of certain matters of international importance it is most significant that even the representative press of the more educated classes showed little evident desire to analyze the questions at issue. This is especially true of two particularly important problems, the commercial and naval aspects of Anglo-German relations. In the periodicals checked there was no really considered and sane analysis of the possibilities of danger from German competition. There was also evident a certain emotionalism,

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\(^8\) Conwell-Evans, *op. cit.*, XI.
and at times even hysteria, with regard to the naval threat. True, there was some discussion on an academic plane but it seems to have had little effect on the sections studied. The people who were friendly to Germany seem to have had as little reason to be so as the people who disliked Germany. In general the study seems suggestive of the general air of unreality with which people tend to regard politics. The prevalent tendency was to follow along traditional lines. The result of such an attitude was that the final crisis took the public completely by surprise.
APPENDIX I

Bibliographical notes on the most important of the British press used or referred to in the thesis.

1. THE INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS

THE TIMES

This is probably the most outstanding of all British newspapers. It was first published in January 1, 1785, as the Daily Universal Register and became the Times on January 1, 1788. The editor during the period 1890-1914 was George Earle Buckle who is also well-known as the collaborator in the life of Disraeli. In 1908 the Times was purchased by Lord Northcliffe but though there was a change in ownership the policy of the paper to maintain an independent attitude on political questions remained unchanged. The importance of the Times in matters of foreign affairs rests chiefly on the excellence of its reporters, such as Valentine Chirol, George Saunders, Wickham Steed, and Walter Harris, to mention but a few whose articles were so important from 1890 to 1914.

THE DAILY MAIL

This newspaper was started by the Harmsworths in 1896 as a halfpenny daily. Its circulation has always been extremely large being, on the average, about one million copies.¹

¹ This figure is quoted by the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th Edition, vol. 16, New York, 1937. Article on "Newspapers" by Sir Robert Donald, 334-360.
Both these independent newspapers took a rather unfriendly attitude to Germany and viewed with suspicion her actions in the field of foreign policy.

2. THE LIBERAL NEWSPAPERS

THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN

This influential paper was first printed on July 2, 1855. Throughout its long history it has been chiefly associated with the interests of the Liberal Party. The editor during the period 1890 to 1914 was C. P. Scott, whose general policy was one of disapproval of the anti-German campaign conducted in the press.

THE DAILY CHRONICLE

A morning newspaper which first started as a weekly in 1855 as The Clerkenwell News and General Advertiser. In 1904 it increased its popularity and reading public by reducing its price to a half-penny. During the long Liberal regime of 1906 to 1915 the Chronicle was regarded as the chief supporter of the Left Wing of the Government. In general it was not unfriendly to Germany but did on occasion have articles which voiced suspicion of Germany's policy. Editors from 1890 to 1914 were,

Alfred Ewen Fletcher, 1889-1894
H. W. Massingham, 1894-1899
W. J. Fisher, 1899-1903
(No available information on editors to 1914)

THE WESTMINSTER GAZETTE

Started in January 31, 1893, and incorporated with the Daily News in 1928. Only two editors guided the policy of this paper during the period 1890 to 1914, they were
Spender definitely disapproved of the anti-German campaign, but yet the Gazette carried articles on the danger of the growing German navy and the fear of invasion. The paper was read by editors and politicians and its influence was out of all proportion to its circulation which was only around 50,000.

THE DAILY NEWS

This is the oldest Liberal newspaper in London. It was first published on January 2, 1846. In 1868 it became a penny paper and in 1904 a further reduction in price was made to bring it to a half-penny. In 1930 it was incorporated with the Daily Chronicle. Available information gives only two editors for the first half of the period studied. They are,

Sir John R. Robinson, 1886-1895
E. T. Cook, 1895-1901

Up to the last minute in 1914 this paper was opposed to going to war with Germany.

3. THE CONSERVATIVE NEWSPAPERS

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH

First published on June 29, 1855, it was the first daily newspaper to be sold at a penny (1856). It came to be the special organ of the middle classes and before the coming of the half-penny press it could claim the largest circulation in the world. In politics it was Liberal up to 1878 when it opposed Gladstone's foreign policy and
during the Irish Home Rule split in 1866 it changed its affiliation. Of the Conservative press it was the least anti-German.

J. M. Le Sage, editor, 1890-1914.

THE MORNING POST

This oldest Conservative paper started publication on November 2, 1772. In regard to Germany the Post appears to have followed very closely the attitude of the Times. It supported strongly the Triple Entente and criticized Germany's world policy. There is very little information regarding this paper. Its editors from 1890 to 1914 were,

Alexander Leys Moore, 1890-1894
Algernon Locker, 1895-1897
J. N. Dunn, 1897-1905
Fabian Ware and
Henry S. Wilkinson, 1905-1910
H. A. Gwynne, 1910-

THE PALL-MALL GAZETTE

An evening publication which started on February 1865. Unlike the majority of the Conservative papers the Gazette does not seem to have been too anti-German in policy although it did not agree with Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty. The foreign policy of the paper was strongly imperialistic, and it supported the navy and national conscription as well as Grey's policy of ententes. Its editors from 1890 to 1914 were,

E. T. Cook, 1889-1892
Kinloch Cooke, 1892-1893
H. C. Cust, 1893-1896
Sir Douglas Straight, 1896-1909
F. J. Higginbottom, 1909-1912
J. L. Garvin, 1912-
THE STANDARD

A morning and evening edition paper which started on June 29, 1857. It belonged to the Pearson Press which, generally speaking, was not unfriendly to Germany. Its editors from 1890 to 1904 were,

W. H. Mudford, 1874-1900
G. B. Curtis, 1900-1904

4. THE MAGAZINES

THE NATIONAL REVIEW

This magazine was first printed in 1883. It is a monthly review of 150-180 pages which from 1894 has been edited by Leo. J. Maxse. One of the features of this magazine is a 20-30 page section devoted to "The Episodes of The Month". It was Unionist in politics and after 1899 markedly anti-German in policy.

THE SPECTATOR

This weekly review was first printed in July, 1828. Up to 1925 it had had only four editor-proprietors and consequently it was able to follow a consistent editorial policy. The editor from 1897 to 1925 was the famous John St. Loe Strachey. Strachey felt it was his duty to warn Great Britain of the inevitability of the European war which he foresaw. The Spectator was the principal medium whereby he issued such warnings and it therefore had a strongly anti-German bias. It was undoubtedly a very influential magazine and it has been said that up to the war it was almost without a serious rival in circulation among the London weeklies.2

THE NATION

Probably the most important of the weekly magazines devoted to the interests of the Liberal party. It had a useful "Diary of The Week" which discussed current events. The editorial policy was definitely opposed to the anti-German tendencies prevalent in the British press. Its editor from 1907 to 1923 was Mr. H. W. Massingham.

THE NEW STATESMAN

This weekly journal expressing a moderate Socialist viewpoint was first published in April, 1913. It set forth as its policy, to be,

"....'bound by no ties of party class or creed' - yet having, withal, a definite ideal, 'to apply to social problems something of the detachment of the scientific spirit.'"

Its attitude to Germany was moderate and even friendly. Clifford Dyce Sharp was the editor from 1913 to 1930.

PUNCH

First published in 1841 this famous English humorist magazine has enjoyed consistent popularity. Its cartoons are world famous for their pictorial summations of events. While it would not be accurate to say that Punch had any set policy in regard to Germany it did on occasion carry cartoons which precluded its distribution in Germany. In particular it did stress the growing commercial activity of Germany which threatened to offer serious competition to Britain. Two of its most famous caricaturists are Mr. J. Bernard Partridge and Sir John Tenniel.

3 Quoted by Walter Graham, English Literary Periodicals, New York, Nelson & Sons, 1930, 339.
A weekly journal devoted primarily to financial interests but containing also comments and articles on world events. In general its opinion on foreign affairs was both moderate and restrained. It first began publication on September 12, 1843.
### APPENDIX II

**KEY TO THE RELATION BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES AND FOREIGN POLICY 1890-1914**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>POLITICAL PARTY</th>
<th>FOREIGN SECRETARY</th>
<th>GERMAN CHANCELLOR</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANT EVENT</th>
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<td>1886-1892</td>
<td>UNIONIST GOVERNMENT</td>
<td>SALISBURY</td>
<td>CAPRIVI</td>
<td>JULY-1890 - Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty</td>
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<td>SALISBURY-PRIME MINISTER</td>
<td>SALISBURY</td>
<td>MARCH 1890 - OCTOBER 1894</td>
<td>AUGUST-1894-Franco-Russian Alliance</td>
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<td>1892-1894</td>
<td>LIBERAL GOVERNMENT</td>
<td>ROSEBERY</td>
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<td>1893 - Lord Rosebery approaches Germany with a view to an Anglo-German agreement.</td>
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<td>GLADSTONE-PRIME MINISTER</td>
<td>ROSEBERY</td>
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<td>1894-1895</td>
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<td>1895-1902</td>
<td>UNIONIST GOVERNMENT</td>
<td>KIMBERLEY</td>
<td>HOBENLOHE</td>
<td>1898 - Two proposals made to Germany for an Anglo-German Agreement by Balfour and Chamberlain</td>
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<td>SALISBURY-PRIME MINISTER</td>
<td>KIMBERLEY</td>
<td>OCTOBER-1894- OCTOBER-1900</td>
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<td>PERIOD</td>
<td>POLITICAL PARTY IN POWER IN GREAT BRITAIN</td>
<td>FOREIGN SECRETARY</td>
<td>GERMAN CHANCELLOR</td>
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| 1895-1902 |                                          |                   |                  | JULY-SEPTEMBER 1898 - Fashoda Incident  
NOVEMBER 1898 - First German Naval Law  
OCTOBER 1899 - Outbreak of the South African War  
JANUARY 1900 - German Naval Law  
MARCH 1900 - Outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion  
JANUARY 1901 - Death of Queen Victoria  
JANUARY 1901 - Anglo-German Agreement proposed  
JANUARY 1902 - Anglo-Japanese Agreement  
JUNE 1902 - End of the Boer War |
| 1902-1905 | UNIONIST GOVERNMENT | BULOW OCTOBER 1900- JULY 1909 |                  | APRIL 1904 - Anglo-French Agreement  
MARCH 1905 - Tangier Incident  
NOVEMBER 1905 - Supplementary German Naval Law |
| 1905-1908 | LIBERAL GOVERNMENT | BALFOUR-PRIME MINISTER LANSDOWNE | CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN PRIME MINISTER GREY | JANUARY 1906 - Algeciras Conference  
AUGUST 1907 - Anglo-Russian Agreement  
OCTOBER 1908 - Bosnia-Herzegovina annexed  
OCTOBER 1908 - Daily Telegraph Interview |
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<td>1908 - 1915</td>
<td>LIBERAL GOVERNMENT</td>
<td>ASQUITH - PRIME MINISTER</td>
<td>GREY</td>
<td>BETHMANN-HOLLWEG</td>
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   Library lacks volume 53 (1906) and also the volumes from 1912-1918 inclusive.

2. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates,
   3rd, 4th, and 5th Series referred to on specific events.

3. The Nation, - October 5, 1912, volume 12 to August 8, 1914, volume 15 - inclusive
   Volume 12 is the first volume in the Library.

4. The National Review - March, 1890, volume 15 to September, 1914, volume 64 - inclusive

5. The New Statesman - April, 1914, volume 3 to August, 8, 1914.
   Volume 3 is the first volume in the Library.

6. Punch - March, 1890, volume 98 to October, 1914, volume 147 - inclusive

7. The Round Table - 1910, volume 1 to September, 1914, volume 4 - inclusive.

8. The Spectator - June 18, 1910, volume 105 to August 8, 1914, volume 113 - inclusive.
   Volume 105 is the first volume in the Library.

II. DOCUMENTS

II. DOCUMENTS (Continued)

1. (Continued)
   Useful for German point of view in regard to Anglo-German agreements. Used particularly for the Heligoland-Zanzibar Agreement.

   Excerpts from documents bringing into being the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.

SECONDARY SOURCES

I. BOOKS

   Chapter VI on the Press was very good, especially on the rise of the popular newspaper.

   A most useful book for the definitions which it gives. Chapters I and XXI particularly good.

   Gives short biographical notes on all the famous British newspapers and magazines. Useful for its information on dates of publication and editors.

4. Bruce, Maurice, British Foreign Policy, London, Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1939.
   A useful survey of foreign policy from 1485-1938.

A scholarly study of German reactions to the relations of Germany with other World Powers. Gives, incidentally, some British reactions to Anglo-German relations.


Used chiefly for its first chapter which discusses public opinion.


Particularly useful on account of the author's experience as First Lord of the Admiralty.


Takes the point of view that Parliament was not sufficiently informed of the closeness of the Anglo-French bond.


Stresses the fact that outside events which are immeasurable for the most part, can influence opinion months or even years later.
A compilation of a series of lectures given in 1913 in which the author traces the origin and development of German jealousies of Britain.

A general history of the social, political, and cultural background of Germany.

A review, by the German ambassador to Great Britain, of foreign policy. Very critical of attitude.

A general survey of British newspapers and periodicals.

Used to determine the importance of German at Oxford. It appears to have been considered one of the important modern languages and was taught throughout the period of the war.

An analytical account of public opinion with reference to the part played in its formation by the press.

A general survey book which does not give very much information on the periodicals used in this thesis.


A good, general history of the period.


A study of the part played by the press in shaping the events of 1904 to 1906.


The thesis of this book is that British foreign policy was determined not so much by the fear of Germany as by the desire to retain the goodwill and understanding of France.


Hammann was head of the Press Division of the German Foreign Office from 1899 to 1917. His opinion as to the failure of Germany is that it was due primarily to peculiarities in the Kaiser's psychology which did not permit him to steer a consistent course.
1. BOOKS (Continued)

   
   A general book on propaganda with specific reference to the United States and to the propaganda of World War I.

   
   Useful as the documents have an accompanying historical narrative.

   
   German ambassador in London who felt that he had to support a policy, the heresy of which he recognized.

   
   A useful history of the period which quotes extensively from primary sources.

   
   The thesis of this book is that good propaganda must keep well ahead of political events and mould public opinion without appearing to do so.

I. BOOKS (Continued)

26. (Continued)

Suggests that the analyst of public opinion must recognize the relationship between the scene of the action, the human picture of that scene, and the human response to that picture working itself out upon the scene of action.


A brief but acute analysis of the British and their customs by a foreigner who found them hard to understand until he studied the men, institutions and background, and realized that there was an underlying relationship between the three.


Points out that the Daily Citizen was established to present the point of view of labour. Emphasizes the significance of the press in forming public opinion.


A short, illustrated pamphlet on the Times. Devoted chiefly to the editors, famous correspondents, and growth of the paper to 1875.
   A very favourable survey of Grey's policies.

   A history of the middle years of the reign of Emperor Wilhelm II.

   A study of the Kaiser from a friendly German point of view.

   An interesting account of the different meanings of prestige in various countries. Brings out clearly the relation between foreign policy and national prestige.

   Anti-German inasmuch as author takes point of view that Germany planned to maim France and Russia in order to secure her position of influence in the Balkans and Turkish Empire.
I. BOOKS (Continued)


Points out that authority, which often takes the form of public opinion, is one factor which may curb the power of the press to mould public opinion.


Takes the point of view that the newspaper represents only minor groups at the best and cannot therefore be held responsible for expressing public opinion.


An excellent preface. Interpretative rather than factual and useful for background material.


The author expresses the point of view that Germany provided a stimulus to a lethargic Britain. Chapters V, IX, and X were very useful.


Expresses the opinion that the conflict between England and Germany is the old conflict between Liberalism and despotism, between industrialism and militarism, between progress and reaction, and between the masses and the classes.
I. BOOKS (Continued)

A centenary account of the editors and policy of the Spectator.

A most useful book which explains the composition of the House of Commons according to the business interests of its members.

A detailed history of British foreign policy.

A brief chronological account of biographical events.

An interesting sidelight, from the Kaiser's point of view, on European politics. He set himself up as a constitutional monarch and claims that the Kruger Telegram and his Panther visit only received his assent because of pressure from his ministers.

I. BOOKS (Continued)

45. (Continued)

The written account of lectures given at the Harris Foundation by outstanding newspapermen. Valuable for the number of definitions of the term "public opinion".


An excellent treatment of the naval problem from 1898 to 1914. A useful preface.

47. Whitman, Sidney, Imperial Germany, London, William Heinemann, 1891.

A very favourable survey of Germany but useful only as background material for this thesis.

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   O. W. Riegel "Propaganda and the Press."

3. The Quarterly Review - April, 1896, 163: 545-569.
   "Our Relations with Germany."

   "The German Peril."

5. - October, 1908, 209: 576-598.
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