The Mercenaries of Ancient Carthage

by

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The Mercenaries of Ancient Carthage.

Introduction.

It has become an historical commonplace that one of the main reasons for the downfall of Carthage was her dependence upon foreign mercenaries. Owing to their own stupidity or laziness or cowardice or love of mercantile pursuits, we are told, the Carthaginians preferred to buy the services of foreign soldiers, rather than fight for their country themselves. This reproach is an old one. Livy, who tells us of Roman soldiers' refusing to accept their pay lest they might be called mercenaries 1, is fond of repeating the Roman taunts that the Carthaginians had their fighting done for them by a host of turbulent barbarians 2. Long before Livy, Polybius had pointed out the dangers implicit in the use of mercenary forces 3, and had contrasted the hirelings of Carthage with the sturdy native soldiery of Rome 4. Such a contrast is emphasised by subsequent historians. Thus we find Montesquieu simplifying the whole matter in the words: "Les Carthaginois se servaient de troupes étrangères, et les Romains employaient les leurs" 5. A more modern writer continues

1. Livy xxiv. 18.
2. E.g. Livy xxiii. 5; xxvi. 40; xxviii. 12.
3. Polybius §. 67.4.
4. Ibid., vi. 52.3.
5. Montesquieu, Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence, ch. iv.
the tradition thus:

"It was, however, the one fatal weakness of the Carthaginian State for military purposes that the bulk of their vast armies consisted not of their own citizens, nor even of attached and obedient subjects, but of foreign mercenaries" 1.

Is it not an over-simplification of the problem to make the employment of mercenaries the reason for the collapse of the Carthaginian power? It is true that on numerous occasions the mercenaries failed their Punic paymistress; yet when we consider the defeats that these same soldiers were able to inflict on the Romans whom the historians hold up for our admiration, are we really justified in despising the rulers of Carthage and deeming that they leant on what was obviously a broken reed? May the failure of the mercenary system be not rather a symptom of some flaw in Carthaginian statecraft, and not the actual flaw itself? Was there some special indication of rottenness in a State that hired foreign swordsmen, and did such a thing arouse widespread contemporary disapproval? Would it have been a clear gain if Punic blood, and only Punic blood, had been poured forth in Carthage’s defence? And was the custom of hiring alien soldiers uniform throughout the history of Carthage? These random questions call for more than a hasty answer.

The fall of Carthage from her high place has a particular interest for the people of the British Empire, who have

1. R. Bosworth Smith, Carthage and the Carthaginians, p. 37.
been given by more than one foreign observer the name of "the modern Carthaginians". It can scarcely be taken as a flattering epithet, for though it may connote enterprise in commerce and daring in exploration, it implies a nation lacking in original culture, in military prowess, and in governing ability --- a nation despised by the strong and hated by the weak. The unfriendly foreigner sees a parallel between Carthage's rise to commercial prosperity and the rise of the British Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ¹, and points out how much of the success in both cases was due to the trader rather than to the soldier. Both nations, our unkind foreign critic would add, trusted in their navy, and when war was brought home to the individual Carthaginian and to the individual Englishman, no longer protected by their fleets, both Carthage and Britain ceased to dominate.

The parallel, which admittedly takes a good deal for granted, is not a pleasing one to the British mind. And yet the resemblances between ancient Carthage and modern Britain --- for some resemblances there are, even if offset by differences far greater --- should make it easier for those of British race to see the Carthaginian a little less out of focus, a little less distorted by the twisted Roman mirror wherein for ever he is reflected as an infamous figure. After all, it was not an Englishman but a German who wrote the words: "The Romans are terrible liars when they blame an enemy" ².

Admittedly it is well-nigh impossible to see the Car-
thaginian as he really was. If he ever wrote his own history, the records have disappeared. We have only the histories written by the Roman victor or by the Greek whom the Roman had conquered. Even the scanty archaeological remains of Carthage have been excavated and presented to the modern world mainly by the inheritors of the Roman spirit. The Carthaginian, unable to set forth his own defence as his Jewish kinsman has done, has been condemned, and his judges have passed the heaviest sentence of all upon him --- that all evidence in his favour should be destroyed to preclude an appeal.

This thesis is not an attempt to rehabilitate the Punic name. It merely aims to trace the Carthaginian use of mercenaries within the limits that history affords and to establish some relation between it and the downfall of the African State. But first it was necessary to confess that after Rome's final victory the evidence for anything at all in Carthaginian history was obscured if not utterly destroyed.

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Chapter I.

Mercenaries Ancient and Modern.

What is a mercenary?

The first answer that most people would give to this question is: "A soldier who serves for hire". But this would equate the mercenary with any professional soldier, so that only the unpaid soldier could escape an appellation which has never been felt to be flattering. We are closer when we define a mercenary as a man who fights solely as the result of a monetary contract and not because his services fulfil a duty or a principle. But how about the man who joins the regular army of his own country --- is he a mercenary? No, most people would reply; a mercenary is a soldier who serves a foreign master for hire, especially a foreign master who has no power to exact such service from him and therefore has to purchase it. Thus in the Persian Empire of old, the Great King often bought the services of the wild mountaineers whose fastnesses he could not conquer; and in modern times, the Gurkhas have served in the British armies in India on a somewhat similar basis. Levies from a subjugated or dependent nation cannot be considered real mercenaries. This is an important distinction, though, as we shall see later, it is often impossible to establish it in a discussion of the Carthaginian armies, because of inadequate or conflicting historical data. The word "mercenary" implies a certain freedom of choice on the part of the person who sells
the mercenary's services. This person is normally but by no means necessarily the mercenary himself; we must remember that soldiers have been rented or sold by their own rulers — a practice, for instance, that made infamous the names of certain German princes of the eighteenth century.

It is generally thought that the nations employing mercenaries are necessarily unwarlike, that men who hire fighters cannot or dare not fight themselves. Ancient Egypt serves as an example: at no time have the natives of that country been distinguished as warriors. But there have been other reasons for the employment of mercenaries. Sometimes they have safeguarded despots and oligarchies against a popular uprising, especially when the foreign hireling has known that defeat for his paymaster means destruction for himself. So we find the tyrants of ancient Greece usually depending on mercenaries for their power.

Again, even a warlike people may employ mercenaries; in which case we find, more often than not, that the latter fall into two classes that differ from each other and also from the inhabitants of the country. In the first place, we may find a backward country renting the services of a military expert from some State more familiar with advanced military technique. Xanthippus the Spartan may serve here for an ancient example; in our own day we have seen European officers on the payroll of China and Abyssinia. This type, which we may call the

1. For mention of Egyptians employing Greek mercenaries in the sixth century B.C., see M.N. Tod's Greek Historical Inscriptions, pp. 6-7.
2. See for example Polybius xi. 13; xiii. 6.
"Quality" mercenary, is often hired when a backward State expects or experiences conflict with a State whose soldiers are superior to its own. The second type is what we may call the "Quantity" mercenary, who is hired because his life is cheaper than the life of a soldier of the employing nation, or because he is better able to endure some local climatic condition: the Gurkhas from the semi-independent Himalayan States are perhaps the closest modern parallel, though as they receive their military training from British officers and conform in large degree to the British pattern, they are by no means a real equivalent of the ancient mercenary, who as a rule brought with him his own weapons and his own methods of fighting.

It is difficult, however, to find true modern parallels, because the actual mercenary soldier has become comparatively rare in our modern world. The foreign soldier who serves nowadays with the forces of a less militarised country than his own, is often not so much a real mercenary as a technical adviser or observer sent abroad to further the interests of his own State, either by widening a "sphere of influence" or by acquiring useful knowledge both technical and political. Perhaps if we yield for a moment to cynicism, we may declare the true modern mercenary to be the international manufacturer of arms and munitions.

Be that as it may, comparatively few people nowadays sell their services as soldiers of fortune; and there are many reasons why this is so. First, exile as a punishment is so much rarer than in ancient times that there no longer
is a great host of landless men ready to sell their services. The criminal who takes refuge in a foreign land is not usually welcomed as a potential fighting man, nor, for that matter, is the political refugee. Secondly, most countries have enlistment legislation intended to prevent their own citizens from taking service abroad and aliens from entering the national defence force. Moreover, if an alien is permitted to enlist (as in the French Foreign Legion), he is rarely on a mercenary footing once he has taken the oath of allegiance: the contract between him and his employer is not a commercial one at all. He has become to all intents and purposes a soldier of the employing Power; and, like the native-born, is subjected to a discipline that allows no haggling over pay. A third point is that a modern soldier's pay in war or peace is a very slight remuneration. It is true that the ancient mercenary was often badly paid also and that his meagre salary was often several months in arrears, but he usually was able to make a bit extra by plunder, whereas modern armies are prohibited by stringent Articles of War from taking, concealing, or selling captured property.

But though the mercenary's calling may have fallen on evil days, in the ancient world he was a very important figure. Nor was Carthage the only nation or the first nation to hire mercenaries: they were in use long before the Battle of Himera, fighting for the kings of Babylon, Persia, and Egypt, as well as for many a lesser monarch ¹. Greek cities

¹. For a general account of early mercenaries, see Daremberg-Saglio, Dict. des antiq. grec. et rom., s.v. "Mercenarii".
employed them after the Persian invasions: Athens, for instance, hired some ruffianly Thracian peltasts in 414 B.C. Philip of Macedon used them, and so did the Greek cities that he crushed. Mercenaries were in the armies of Alexander the Great, and came to play a leading part in those of his successors. I cannot here do more than speak in the most general terms: it is enough to say that Carthage, in employing mercenaries, was merely following an ancient precedent.

What type of men became mercenaries? As far as the Greeks are concerned—and we know far more about Greeks than about barbarians—we can say that there were three classes of men, classes not always distinct: the adventurous, the poor, and the refugee. There were often men of education among them: Xenophon, for instance. Sometimes even the wandering Sophist was willing to put his theoretical knowledge at the disposal of an alien master; a famous example of this is that philosopher who tried to give a Staff College lecture in the presence of Hannibal the Great. There may have been a number of runaway slaves among Greek mercenaries, especially men who had been enslaved by enemies or pirates, but on the whole mercenaries, Greek and barbarian alike, must have been free men, though poor. We may well doubt the assertion of a

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1. Thucydides vii.27.2.
2. See for instance the following books: E.R. Bevan, The House of Seleucus; P. Jouguet, Macedonian Imperialism; W. W. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilisation; also the first seven chapters of Griffith, op. cit.
3. Cicero, De oratore, ii. 18.
4. An excellent summary of ancient military theory is Col. O.L. Spaulding's Pen and Sword in Greece and Rome.
modern writer that slaves were the first mercenaries, serving in the beginning "under their owners, as impedimenta of the army"\(^1\), and later assuming the dignity of combatants, for it was not the custom of the ancient world to train slaves as soldiers, even with the intention of renting them out for profit. They were of course sometimes found convenient for certain police duties, like those performed by Scythians in ancient Athens.

It is not always easy, in the light of extant historical data, to divide mercenaries into the categories of Greek and barbarian. We do know that the companions of Xenophon were Greeks, and that Xanthippus, the most famous individual mercenary in the history of Carthage, was a Lacedaemonian, but the historians were rarely so generous with their information. In Hellenistic warfare the barbarian mercenary played a very great part; and in Carthaginian warfare, an almost exclusive part. We must not be misled by ethnic names in the former case\(^2\). Terms like "Macedonian"\(^3\), "Cretan", "Tarentine", and the like by the time of the First Punic War usually indicated a type of soldier rather than a purely racial contingent. There is a somewhat similar modern parallel in the French Zouaves, whose name was originally that of an Arab tribe, but here we find an

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important difference: the modern Zouaves are really white Frenchmen, whereas the Macedonians and other ancient military forces with Greek names came in process of time to be largely composed of barbarians.

It was quite natural that the Carthaginians should turn to the barbarian rather than to the Greek when they wanted a scanty mercenary soldier. However, may be the early history of Carthage, we know for a fact that her expansionist tendencies were toward the West, so that there was little likelihood of her having to face the trained Greek hoplite in battle. Her first mercenaries were in all probability the "Sepoys" of a trading company, a native police intended merely to guard a trading-post against marauders who were poorly armed and worse organised. Like the inhabitants of the parent country of Phoenicia, the Carthaginians preferred trading to fighting, and for the first few centuries after the foundation of their city they seem to have made a very sparing use of military force.

Before we discuss the wars into which Carthage was eventually drawn, it will be as well to examine briefly the Punic State as a whole, in an attempt to relate the mercenary system to the city that employed it.

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Chapter II.

Some Characteristics of the Carthaginian State.

The ultimate collapse of Carthage has caused historians to emphasise the latent rottenness of the Punic character: its cruelty, its degraded religious superstition, its political corruption, its unashamed commercialism, its disregard for culture, its barbaric love of luxury and splendour. And yet a study of ancient historians --- not in the least to be accused of pro-Carthaginian feeling --- makes it clear that there was originally something in the Punic State that won the admiration even of the critical Greek and of the hostile Roman. Cicero, who lived at a time when fear of Carthage could no longer warp Roman judgement, admitted that only wisdom and statesmanship could have enabled that city to flourish for six centuries; and long before Cicero, Aristotle, who rarely bothered to study barbarian systems of government, showed that his rather scanty knowledge of the Carthaginian constitution impressed him, on the whole, favourably. Instead of grovelling before a monarch in the usual Oriental way, the Carthaginians had a balanced constitution of the type that we "are apt to consider the peculiar property of the Indo-Germanic races," with

1. Cicero, De republica, i. Frag. 3: "nec tantum Karthago habuisset opum sescentos fere annos sine consiliis et disciplina".
2. Aristotle, Politics, ii., esp. ch. 11.
authority shared among kings, senate and assembly.

Even though this political development did not free the Carthaginians from a religion as licentious as it was cruel, it would be difficult to show that the Carthaginian State was ever under real theocratic domination, or that superstition played much part in impeding commerce, war, or government. Human sacrifice is admittedly a dreadful thing, but neither Greece nor Rome can show an entirely clear record in this respect -- still less that Germanic paganism in which some people find the origins of free political institutions. It would be difficult to establish a connexion between the Carthaginian religion of human sacrifice and the callous unconcern with which the Republic squandered the lives of its mercenaries. If the life of the stranger was cheap at Carthage, that city was no different from many another city of the ancient world.

In Carthage, as in all other ancient cities, the life of the citizen was infinitely more precious than that of any alien could possibly be, no matter what services the alien might have rendered to the State. To save a Carthaginian's life by substituting a hired alien for him on the battlefield was by no means such a foolish practice as it has been made to appear. The failure to glorify the military profession had at least one advantage: it tended to prevent a successful general from overthrowing the political balance of the State and becoming a dictator. At the same time, the Carthaginians gave their generals a longer tenure of office than that enjoyed by the Roman consul; they were permitted to learn their profession
but not to turn it to political advantage. If Punic generals before the time of Hamilcar Barca were often defeated, we should rather blame the men who chose them, than see in the whole nation a race of incompetent, cowardly hucksters.

When all is said and done, the Carthaginian system did work well for a very long time. As Freeman has well observed, such a dominion as that which Carthage exercised could never have been won by the arms of her own citizens. "It shows the wonderful wisdom of her rulers from age to age that she could for so many generations continue to wield so dangerous a weapon, and could live through that frightful revolt of her own mercenaries" — a far more terrible peril than the nearest modern parallel that Freeman can find, the Indian Mutiny of 1857. And this political wisdom was shown also by the remarkable way in which all the Phoenician colonies in the Western Mediterranean, some of them older than Carthage herself, acknowledged her as their head and lived at peace with one another while the Greeks, both at home and in Magna Graecia, allowed their rivalries to be their ruin.

1. E. A. Freeman, History of Sicily, 1. 292.
2. Ihne, History of Rome, ii. 10 (Engl. trans., London, 1871). Cf. also Freeman, op. cit., iv. 418: "When we see how little love there was between Carthage and her neighbours even of her own race . . . ., we wonder the more at the widespread power which rested on so small a basis of physical strength at home". For a different opinion, see Grote's History of Greece, viii. 375 ff. Diodorus Siculus, however makes it clear that many 4th-century Sicilians and Sicanians preferred a Carthaginian master to Dionysius of Syracuse (xiv. 41, 55, 58, 76, 77).
Nor was such harmony due to an essential poltroonery in the Punic soul. Ihne's remarks are worth quotation at some length:

"— how could a people have been wanting in warlike spirit who braved the storms and rocks of every sea, who established themselves on every coast, and subdued the wildest and boldest races? If the Carthaginians formed their armies out of hired foreign troops and not out of citizens, the cause is not to be found in their want of courage or deficient patriotism. The men, and even the women, of Carthage were ever ready to sacrifice their lives for the defence of their homes; but for their foreign wars they counted the blood of citizens too dear. A mercenary army cost the state less than an army of citizens, who were much too valuable as artisans or merchants, as officials or overseers, to serve as common soldiers. .... Love of the military service as a profession and occupation of life is never found in the mass of an advanced people where the value of labour ranks high. We must not on this account reproach such a nation with cowardice. The English are surpassed by no people of Europe in bravery; and yet in England, except the officers, none but the lowest classes adopt a soldier's life, because it is the worst paid. Of course in times of national enthusiasm or danger it is different".

The Carthaginians in the earliest times appear to have attached comparatively little importance to mere prestige. They were willing to recognise in a nominal way the supremacy of the Great King; and until about 450 B.C. they may even have paid ground-rent to the Libyans for the land on which their city stood. Even Ihne, who doubts whether such payment was made, declares that if it had been so, it still would not prove that the Carthaginians were deficient in

1. Ihne, op. cit., ii. 8-9.
political capacity; the British, he points out, acknowledged the Great Mogul as the nominal sovereign of India until 1827.

The smallness of the actual Carthaginian army was partly due to the political system of the state. The ruling oligarchy was not willing that there should be a large city mob of poor but free citizens who might realise their own strength and take over the government. Accordingly, in Carthage's early history, the poorer citizens were sent out to distant colonies, where they not only maintained Carthaginian power but were made incapable of dictating to the oligarchy. No doubt, the less the proletariat had of military training the more secure the oligarchy felt.

The essentially mercantile nature of the Carthaginians must have been another main reason why there was no universal military service, such as prevailed at Rome. In general, the wealth of the small trader must have fluctuated within much wider limits than those which bounded the worldly prosperity of the small farmer. In those days of uncharted seas, the Punic trader, much of whose business was with barbarous tribes, was a far more difficult person to assess for taxation, and hence for military service, than the peasant of

1. Ihne, op.cit., ii. 8-9.
2. Aristotle, op.cit., vi. 3.5.
3. Philip Smith, Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, s.v. "Carthage", p. 544a, declares that it is wrong to think of Carthage as a purely commercial state, and that its prosperity rested on an agricultural basis. It is surely nearer the truth to say that agriculture was one of several factors making up Carthage's main interest. The Roman did not exploit his land for trading purposes; the Carthaginian did -- or, if he was wealthy, looked on farming as a hobby.
Athens or Rome: one year he might be able to afford a costly panoply, but the next might see him impoverished, and the rulers of Carthage did not like military power given to the poor --- even though they might be poor only temporarily. Again, military training is not compatible with commercial voyages to distant, ill-defined localities. If the Punic trader limited his patriotic activities to murdering foreigners found trafficking in the western seas, a custom mentioned by the geographer Eratosthenes ¹, he probably felt that he was giving his city ample service.

The Home Army of Carthage appears to have been very much a corps d'élite, in which the wealthy were encouraged to serve. Aristotle, though he does not vouch for its truth, has passed down to us an assertion that at Carthage a man was allowed to wear as many rings as he had served campaigns ². If this is anything but a pictur-esque invention, it would seem to imply a popular tendency to shun military service --- at least, in Aristotle's time, which is not very early in the history of Carthage. Things were probably different in the earliest times, when the Carthaginian army seems to have been a genuine citizen-force, adequate for the defence of the city. But

². Aristotle, op.cit., vii.2.6 (1324b.12-15):

ἐν ἐνίοις γὰρ νόμοι τινες εἰσὶν παραξύνοντες πρὸς τὴν ἄρετὴν ταύτην, καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασί τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμου λαμβάνειν δόσας ἰν στρατεύσονται στρατεύσας.
after about the middle of the sixth century B.C. a prominent man named Mago appears to have changed the system 1, so that the only Carthaginians serving in the field --- except in a national crisis --- were either officers or else the picked corps above mentioned, composed of wealthy citizens and with the magnificent equipment described by the recorders of the Battle of the Crimisus 2.

A much greater element in the Punic armies consisted of troops levied from subject-peoples. At first these came mostly from the cities round about Carthage, which, with the exception of Utica, had to contribute a definite amount of money and of military force 3. Mommsen considered that such Libyphoenicians stood in very much the same relation to Carthage as that of the Latins toward Rome 4. Beyond the cities were the Libyans, who were partly at least of European stock, and by no means entirely uncivilised 5. As the influence and power of Carthage increased, the more subject-peoples contributed to her armies, --- the Numidians, the Sardinians, the Spaniards. There is regarding this whole matter a lamentable paucity of definite detail, but we can safely say that the contributions made by the subject-peoples must have varied greatly, from place to place and from time to time, in both quality and quantity. Those

1. Justin xix.1 ; Diodorus xiv.75.2.
2. Diod. xvi. 79-80 ; Plutarch, Timoleon xxvii.
3. Polybius vii.9 ; Diod. xiii.79, xx.10, 55 ; Justin xxii. 7.3.
5. Arthur Evans in Freeman's History of Sicily, iv. 422.
living near Carthage were encouraged, in the interest of the Carthaginians themselves, to substitute a monetary payment for military quotas; with this money the Republic hired mercenaries further afield. Those subject-peoples remote from Carthage were able, in times of the city's weakness or distress, either to refuse the contribution of troops altogether or else to perform their military service for Carthage only for special payment—in other words as mercenaries. It is quite possible that troops summoned originally as levies had to be kept in the field as mercenaries, if circumstances arose in which they were able to assert their claim for pay. It is therefore a very difficult matter to separate levies from mercenaries. This is especially true of the Africans and Spaniards who served in the Second Punic War.

We do know, however, that Carthage in times of need enrolled actual mercenaries as such—men from lands so far outside her admitted sphere of influence that their service could not in any way be looked upon as the fulfilment of a duty. In a comparatively few cases these were Greeks, usually hired for service against an enemy of superior military organisation like the Sicilian Greek or the Roman; but in general Carthage, even against such an adversary, preferred to use great hordes of cheaply-hired barbarians. The use of such men not only economised Carthaginian blood; it also obviated the payment of ransom if a Punic army were taken prisoner. In such cases the captives, apart from citizens,

1. Mommsen, op.cit., ii.158.
2. Ibid. Griffith, op.cit., p. 231.
could be left to their fate, and the money that would otherwise have been spent on ransoms, could with far greater profit be employed in hiring more mercenaries. The barbarian who took service in the Punic armies had thus a great incentive to assure victory for his masters — provided that a tempting offer from the enemy did not overcome his fears or arouse his cupidity.

One very serious feature of the Carthaginian system was the lack of homogeneity among the various racial groups that made up the mercenary force. There was little attempt before the time of Hannibal the Great to establish any training or equipment among the motley hordes of barbarians. Each group brought its peculiar tribal weapons and employed its hereditary battle-formation, for instance the wedge-shaped column of the Celtiberians, and in general relied either on surprise-attack or mass-effect. We do not even know whether there was a common lingua franca for the giving of orders, such as we find in the armies of British India today; the testimony of Polybius is somewhat inconsistent. Orders were probably

1. But see Appendix I. Griffith (p.293) points out that if mercenaries did not receive the bulk of their pay till the end of a campaign, every casualty was a clear financial gain for the State that employed them. We know little or nothing of heirs and assigns, and there seems to have been no attempt to organise a Mercenaries' Guild like that found in Ptolemaic Egypt (see Tarn's Hellen. Civilisation, p.175).
2. Livy xl. 40. See also Niebuhr, op. cit., ii. 20.
3. Cf. Polybius 1.67.3-11 with 1.80.6.
given by the general in the first instance to the Carthaginian commander of each racial group, who either knew the barbarian language himself or else had an interpreter attached to the contingent. The Carthaginians do not appear to have been proficient linguists ¹ or to have encouraged the study of foreign tongues among their own people ², so that it is not surprising that they considered it undesirable for one racial group to be able to dispense with a Carthaginian interpreter in conversing with another racial group. This is a point worth dwelling on: the real weakness of the mercenary system was not Carthage's mere dependence upon a hired soldiery, but her inability and her lack of desire to assimilate her mercenaries to herself and thereby to one another. Whatever the faults of Rome, that city had the great gift of imparting her spirit to those she conquered and finally to those who conquered her. This gift Carthage did not possess. The ordinary Carthaginian officer, it has been said, reckoned his mercenaries much as a modern soldier might reckon cannon-shot ³ --- though at least cannon-shot possess the merit of uniformity! Such treatment could produce only one result.

If the mercenaries again and again displayed the bad faith characteristic of barbarians, they could scarcely be

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¹ Even then, they were probably superior to the Romans. Hannibal seems to have been a good linguist. No doubt the success of the Barcine family was largely due to their knowledge of the language of the Iberian tribes.
² Justin, xx.5, says that in 396 B.C. the Punic Senate forbade the study of Greek, to prevent a repetition of some treasonable dealings with Dionysius: "ne quis postea Carthaginensis aut litteris Graecis aut sermoni studeret; ne aut loquì cum hoste aut scribere sine interprete posset".
³ Mommsen, op.cit., ii. 158.
blamed. This same motley collection could respond well enough to the personal appeal of a good leader; in fact, it has been well said that when the Punic mercenary did fight bravely it was not for Carthage but for a Hamilcar or a Hannibal 1. The latter's promise of Carthaginian citizenship to the strangers who served him well 2 is almost the only testimony in all the history of Carthage that shows a generous appreciation of the outsider. And we do not know whether Hannibal would have kept the promise, or whether, when he made it, he had the slightest conviction that he ever would be able to keep it as Gelon of Syracuse kept his 3. Had the rulers of Carthage displayed as much statesmanship as cunning in their dealings with the mercenary, had they kept before his eyes the gift --- costly, but for the deserving, obtainable --- of citizenship, the mercenary system might have worked far better than it did. Rome at her best saw a potential Roman in the men she fought; Carthage had no idea of making Carthaginians of the men she hired.

One great reason for the failure of Punic statesmanship in this respect was the apparent absence of long campaigns in early Carthaginian history. War was a commercial speculation, to be carried through to a successful conclusion as soon as possible; and the quickest method was to hire hordes of barbarians who meant nothing to the city. They seem to have been hired just for the campaign, for whenever the Carthaginians began an invasion of Sicily, it was necessary to enrol mercen-

1. Freeman, "Carthage", in Historical Essays, 4th. ser., p. 8.
2. Livy xxi. 45.
3. Diod. xi. 72.
aries for that special purpose 1. The shortness of the period of service prevented the formation of a tie between the mercenaries and their general, much more that of any bond between the mercenaries and the citizens of Carthage.

When the campaign was over, the surviving mercenaries got their money if they were lucky --- that is to say, if Carthage admitted her ability to pay and did not allege any excuses like those which helped to provoke the Truceless War2. We may be sure that the Carthaginian merchants made every effort to see that as much of that money as possible was spent in the city; like the Athenian Iphicrates, they considered it best to have a mercenary soldier given to self-indulgence and therefore soon likely to have to offer his services again 3. And if the mercenaries were not lucky, the rulers of Carthage cheated them out of their pay, sometimes depriving them, by force or fraud, of life itself. The Carthaginian masters who had been capable of betraying the mercenaries in the course of a war 4, were even more treacherous and cruel, if we may believe our historians, when the external enemy was no longer a menace. Diodorus Siculus, for instance, has a ghastly story of six thousand malcontents treacherously abandoned to die of hunger on the desert Isle

2. Polybius, i. 67.1.
3. Plutarch, Galba, opening sentence.
4. Diod. xlv.75; xxiii.8.3; Frontinus, Strategemata iii. 16.2; Zonaras viii. 10, 16.
of Bones. Sharp practice, it is true, and even murder stain
the name of more than one ancient employer of mercenaries, but when all allowance has been made for prejudice and exaggera-
their

"On the one side, instead of patriotism, faith-
fulness, and devotion, we find among the sol-
diers a spirit of rapacity, hardly restrained
by military discipline; on the other we ob-
served cold calculation and heartlessness, which
saw in a soldier no kinsman, citizen, or bro-
ther, but an instrument of war purchasable for
a certain sum, and worthy of no considerations
but those which called for the preservation of
valuable property." 3.

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1. Diod. v. 11.
2. Diod. xiv. 72 (Dionysius of Syracuse deliberately sacri-
fices a thousand disorderly mercenaries in battle); Polybius v. 78.112 (Gauls abandoned by Attalus I of
Pergamum). These are typical instances.
3. Ihne, op. cit., ii. 59-60.
Chapter III.

The Wars with the Sicilian Greeks.

The first real appearance of a Carthaginian mercenary army on a large scale in history belongs to the year 480 B.C., the year of the great invasion of Sicily. There must have been warfare between the Carthaginians and the Sicilian Greeks before this time, but the records are obscure. At the same time that Greece proper was being attacked by the Persians under King Xerxes, another barbarian Power in the West was attempting to check the spread of Hellenic civilization. Carthage resolved to crush Gelon of Syracuse, and spent three years assembling a huge mercenary force; it consisted of barbarians, collected from the shores of the whole Western Mediterranean. Diodorus Siculus gives its number as 300,000, but like all such figures it must be taken with suspicion. There were Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, and Ligurians; there were also some Italians, who were perhaps Volscians. The Punic commander was Hamilcar, the second son of that Mago who has already been mentioned.

Disaster first came upon the army while it was still at sea: its numerous war-chariots and an unstated number of horses were lost in a storm. Perhaps with this mounted

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1. See Freeman, Hist. Sic., ii. 98-99, also App. VIII in same book.
2. Diod. xi. 1.
3. Diod. xi. 20; Herodotus vii. 165.
4. See Freeman's comments, op. cit., ii. 172. For a different view, that Diodorus was mistaken in including Gallic and Italian mercenaries, see A Commentary on Herodotus, by W. W. How and J. Wells, notes on Herod. vii. 165.
5. Diod. xi. 20.
force the Carthaginians might have broken the hostile ranks, as at a later date they did with their elephants. However, this we do know: it was a terrible defeat that the Carthaginians suffered at Himera. Half of their army was slaughtered. The accounts of the battle are confused, and the only Punic mercenaries singled out for special mention are the Spanish swordsmen, who appear to have been formidable even amid defeat. Brave or cowardly, few of the mercenaries escaped the alternatives of death or slavery. Vast numbers were distributed, like tamed animals, among the victorious towns of Sicily.

The result of this defeat was that the Carthaginians retired to a few strongholds in the West of the Island, to watch in sullen hopefulness for some turn of events that would make it possible for them to avenge the Battle of Himera. Such a situation arose in 410 B.C., when the city of Egesta asked them for aid against her neighbour Selinus. A Carthaginian army was sent under the command of Hannibal, the grandson of the Hamilcar who had been defeated and killed at Himera. Selinus was overthrown with terrible butchery, and Himera also.

The historian mentions more than one contingent of mercenaries in this expedition. First, 5,000 Africans were sent to aid Egesta against Selinus, and with them went

1. Diod. xi.21-24.
2. Ibid., 25.
3. Ibid., 43.
800 Campanians; the latter were mercenaries who had reached Sicily too late to help the Athenians at the siege of Syracuse 1. Carthage bought horses for them. They were the first of Hannibal's men to make their way into Selinus, but were driven out with great loss 2; a more successful attack was made by mercenaries from Iberia 3. When Himera had fallen, Hannibal sent the Campanians home; they went away complaining that though they had done more than any other contingent in the army, their services had not been properly valued by the Carthaginians 4. Nor were Campanians and Iberians the only mercenaries. There were also Greeks, who served a barbarian paymaster against their fellow-Greeks 5. In addition, the Punic army included large numbers of African levies and Carthaginian citizens, and also numerous mercenaries from the Balearic Islands 6. The whole army was a great conglomerate mass, victorious through sheer

1. Diod. xiii.44. 2. Ibid., 55. 3. Ibid., 56. 4. Ibid., 62. Other Campanians were hired later, 80.
5. Freeman, op.cit., 11.455. He adds, "Mercenary service was indeed fast becoming rife in parts of Greece far beyond the Arkadian land where it had long been traditional."
6. Diod. xiii. 80. So important was the hiring of mercenaries that the Carthaginians entrusted it to some of their chief men:

ἔπεμψαν τινὰς τῶν ἐν ἀξιόματι παρὰ τοὺς Καρθηνοῦς ὄντων μετὰ πολλῶν χρημάτων, τοὺς μὲν εἰς Ἰβηρίαν, τοὺς δὲ εἰς τὰς Βαλλαρίδας νῆσους, παρακαλεούσινος ξενολογεῖν ὡς πλείστους.
weight of numbers. Victory and vengeance were sweet to the Carthaginians, and aroused in them the hope of conquering all Sicily.

In 406 B.C. another huge Carthaginian army was despatched to Sicily and laid siege to Agrigentum. This city was aware of the danger and had made some preparations to meet it: it had engaged a Spartan commander named Dexippus with 1,500 mercenaries, and also the 800 Campanian mercenaries who had previously been in the Carthaginian service. In the course of the siege the Agrigentines were greatly assisted by forces from other cities; these, it is true, were unable to raise the siege or to break into the Carthaginian camp, but the Greek cavalry cut off supplies, causing great distress among the besiegers. Many of the latter died of hunger, and finally there was a general mutiny, led by the Campanians in the Punic service. The soldiers crowded about the tent of Himilco, who shared the chief command with Hannibal. They shouted for their rations; if they did not get them they would transfer their services to the enemy. The general managed to buy them off for a few days by giving to them as pledges the costly drinking-cups belonging to the Carthaginians in the camp.

"We thus get a glimpse of the wide distinction that was made in all Punic warfare between the

1. Diod. xiii.88.
2. These forces defeated the Spanish and Italian troops in the Punic army, but because of the excessive caution of the Greek general Daphnaeus, the victory was not followed up.
men of the ruling city and the multitudes whom they pressed and hired into their service. The native Carthaginians had brought the luxuries of the city into the camp; the plate of their tables was accepted as a valuable pledge even by half-starved men with arms in their hands."

Fortunately for Himilco, a large supply of provisions coming to Agrigentum from Syracuse was captured by the Carthaginian triremes; it was now the besieged who began to suffer from hunger. The Campanian mercenaries who had gone over to the Agrigentines, now perhaps influenced by a Punic bribe as well as by famine, rejoined their former employers, and Dexippus the Spartan, though he did not actually transfer his services to the enemy, was generally thought to have accepted for himself as large a bribe as all the Campanians together had received. In return he persuaded the Italiots who were assisting the besieged to go away. The result was that the people of Agrigentum---at least, all who could---fled in the night from the city that they could no longer defend; it says but little for Punic vigilance and mercenary discipline that they were able to escape thus. In the morning Himilco entered with his host. An orgy of butchery and rapine was the reward for eight months' besieging. No doubt many a barbarian mercenary became possessed, in an hour's time, of far more wealth than the Carthaginian paymaster would have handed out to him for the service of several years.

1. Freeman, op. cit., iii. 531.

If we may believe Appian (viii. 2.12), the Carthaginians of two centuries later were still as fond of luxury in their camps, even when fighting the frugal, hardy horsemen of Masinissa.

2. Diod. xiii. 88.
Himilco and his army wintered at Agrigentum; then, in the spring of 405 B.C., he proceeded to subjugate the rest of the southern coast of the island. More plunder, says the historian, enriched his army. He then laid siege to the city of Gela.

The story of the siege reminds us of in many ways of that of Agrigentum. Again a relieving force attempts to save the besieged; again there is failure; again the suspicion of a secret bargain between the Punic invader and the Greek commander. Not all of Carthage's hirelings were to be found in her own armies.

Dionysius of Syracuse had become tyrant of his city by harping on the menace of a Carthaginian attack. He marched out to the relief of Gela with a great army consisting of Syracusans, Greeks from Italy, Siceliot allies, and his own mercenaries. But when fighting began near the besieged city, his conduct of operations gave rise to suspicion. He allowed his Italiot allies to suffer terrible losses at the hands of the enemy's Iberian and Campanian mercenaries, and the Siceliot fared little better. On the other hand, not a single man of the tyrant's own mercenaries was killed. In the night the city was abandoned, just as Agrigentum had been. Carthage owed the victory less to the soldiers whom she had hired than to the opponent whom she had bought.

After the treaty of peace, a treaty that confirmed Dionysius's position as tyrant of Syracuse and also the Punic dominion over the greater part of Sicily, Himilco prepared to

1. Diod. xiii. 108.
leave for home. First, however, he struck a special coinage with which to pay his mercenaries, most of whom, according to the Carthaginian custom, were probably dismissed wherever they happened to be at the end of the campaign and not taken back to Carthage.

"He struck coins of two patterns, patterns well suited for the currency of a Phoenician power bearing rule in Sicily. The artistic type followed the finest models of the Greek coinage of the island. The bridleless horse of Syracuse, the half-horse of conquered Gela, were both copied. But the palm-tree on the reverse was a badge of the Phoenician master, and letters graven in the Phoenician tongue showed yet more plainly at whose bidding the moneyer plied his skill."

Such relics as these bring home to us the extreme scantiness of the records of Carthage's dealings with her mercenaries. There is nothing, for instance, in Carthaginian history that parallels the recorded military accounting of Egypt under the Ptolemy and Pergamum under Eumenes I.

Whether on this occasion the mercenaries were satisfied with the pay and the plunder that the campaign had brought, we do not know. One person at any rate did not look upon the peace-arrangements as satisfactory, and that was Dionysius.

1. There is an illustration of one specimen of the Punic moneta castrensis in Duruy, op.cit., i.622. This does not appear to be the coinage struck by Himilco, which is better represented by the illustrations in A.J. Church's Carthage, pp.115-116.

2. Carthage, of course, evacuated her mercenaries at her own expense if a victorious enemy insisted on it, as Rome did at the end of the First Punic War.


himself. He had bargained with Carthage only in order to consolidate his power; when he had obtained it, he took upon himself the role of champion of Sicily against the Carthaginian intruder. He hired mercenaries on a scale that was Carthaginian rather than Greek, but did not make his enemies' mistake of sacrificing quality to quantity. Skillful planning marked all his preparations, and though he hired mercenaries from the barbarian peoples of the Western Mediterranean and equipped them with their national weapons, he also took into his service many a Greek soldier, especially men familiar with the more complicated weapons used in siege-warfare. In the hands of a man like Dionysius, himself no mean soldier ¹, a mercenary force was much more formidable than when employed by flaccid Punic merchant-princes. He is said to have marched against the Carthaginian territories of Sicily with no fewer than 80,000 infantry and over 3,000 horsemen ².

With this force he laid siege to the island-city of Motya, which included in its garrison some Greek mercenaries ³. It was a city of rich men and lofty houses, defended with the desperate courage that characterises the Semitic peoples when there is no hope of truce or escape. The swordsmen of Dionysius completed what his catapults had begun. Motya fell, and its fall was followed by plunder and massacre. The Greeks who had survived their Punic comrades were treated by Dionysius with unusual severity. In ancient times mercenaries, especially Greek mercenaries, were often incorporated into

¹. Diodorus (xiv.42) credits him with the invention of the
². Diod.xiv.47.
³. Ibid., xiv. 53. (catapult.
the army of the victor, but on this occasion a worse fate awaited them, namely, death by crucifixion.

The following year, 397 B.C., Himilco, the chief magistrate of Carthage, began preparations to recover the island. The Sicilian historian again tells of huge numbers of fighting men levied or hired from the tributaries and allies of Carthage. The host managed to land in Sicily and to create a great fortress at Lilybaeum. It took Messana and destroyed it. Its naval victory off Catane forced Dionysius to retire to Syracuse. He had left a number of Campanians at Aetna, after taking some of their comrades with him as hostages. When Himilco came in pursuit, he tried to induce the Campanians to join him, but they refused, however strongly tempted. It is probable that their refusal was not dictated entirely by loyalty to their comrades and that the hostages in the hands of Dionysius also included their women and children --- often the best guarantee of the fidelity of mercenaries.

Himilco laid siege to Syracuse, but his huge host was smitten by pestilence, which facilitated a sortie by Dionysius. Like the Carthaginians themselves, he had had trouble with mercenaries: his men, knowing how dependent he was upon them in a city that hated its tyrant, had been mutinous and turbulent. Accordingly he made use of them in a feint attack along with his cavalry; as soon as the enemy was engaged, the mercenaries were deserted and left to be cut to pieces by the enemy, about 1,000 being thus disposed of.

1. Diod. xiv. 61. 2. Ibid., 72.
The operation was part of a wider scheme that gave Dionysius victory on both land and sea in the vicinity of Syracuse.

Then followed a corresponding piece of treachery on the part of the Carthaginian commander. Himilco had with him a huge sum of money, three hundred talents; he offered this to Dionysius that the Carthaginian army might be permitted a safe return to Africa. The tyrant would not give so much for the money, however: all that Himilco could get for his three hundred talents was permission to sail away by stealth in the night with the actual Punic element of his army, leaving to the mercies of Dionysius the allies and mercenaries. This deserted host was put to the sword or enslaved, except the Sicel allies of Carthage who managed to escape in time ¹, and some Iberian mercenaries who refused to lay down their arms but agreed to use them in the service of Dionysius.

Carthage’s difficulties were now aggravated by a great revolt in Africa, a struggle which, in Freeman’s words, may serve as a foreshadowing of the great Mercenary War of a century and a half later ². The rebels included both slaves and freemen, both subject-allies and mercenaries. Furious at the hideous betrayal committed by Himilco, they seized Tunis and threatened Carthage itself. But in spite of their numbers,

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¹ Diod. xiv. 75. Perhaps Himilco, knowing that Carthage might need their aid at some future occasion, took care to see that they received a timely warning.
² Freeman, op. cit., iv. 145.
which Diodorus gives as 200,000, they were, like other insurgents in Carthaginian history, lacking in unity and leadership, and the revolt came to nothing.

When this danger had passed, Carthage again sought to regain her lost possessions in Sicily. She had been placed in a disadvantageous position by the disaster at Syracuse, so that now a small area in Western Sicily was all she held, but warfare between Dionysius and the Sicels appeared to offer a good opportunity for revenge. The general commanding Punic forces in Sicily, Mago by name, took the side of the Sicels. In doing so, he apparently acted upon his own responsibility, not instigated or reinforced by Carthage. Dionysius defeated him, and the defeat, instead of leading to any disavowal or punishment by the rulers of Carthage, caused them to take up the struggle in earnest. Another army was collected and sent to Sicily; it is said to have numbered 80,000 men and to have included "barbarians from Italy" as well as African and Sardinian forces. Mago was its leader. However, his diplomatic and his military efforts were alike unsuccessful. A Sicel army joined the forces of Dionysius against the invader, so that Mago, forced to make peace, sailed back to Carthage utterly thwarted.

The next Punic war was begun by Dionysius himself in 383. We are told very little about it, but Diodorus informs us that Carthage prepared for a great struggle. Citizens and mercenaries, the latter in vast numbers, were despatched

1. Diod. xiv. 77. 2. Ibid., 95.
to Sicily. Thousands of men were also sent to the African mainland, where Dionysius had been extending his dominion. There were various encounters between the two armies, but only two battles of major importance have been recorded. In one of these, fought near a place called Cabala, Dionysius butchered more than 10,000 of the barbarians and captured 5,000; Mago, who again commanded the Punic host, died fighting bravely. The demoralised Carthaginians were forced to take refuge on a fortified hill, where they suffered from lack of water. When they spoke of making peace, Dionysius declared that Carthage must withdraw from the Sicilian cities and pay an indemnity to cover his war-expenses. The Carthaginians sought to gain time by asserting that they could not make such terms without the consent of the authorities at home. A truce was granted them, during which time they made great preparations for a fresh offensive, drilling and training their troops. The Carthaginian general was a young commander but a gallant one, the son of the dead Mago. A second battle was fought at a place called Cronion; it was a bloody defeat for the Sicilian army. Dionysius barely escaped with his life; he left his brother Leptines dead on the field, along with 14,000 other men. The Carthaginians passed along the word that no quarter was to be given.

After such a defeat, Dionysius had to accept the terms

1. Diod. xv. 95:

προορώμενοι δ’ἐμφρόνως τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ πολέμου, τῶν τε πολιτῶν τοῦς εὐθέτους κατέλεγον στρατιώτας, καὶ ἄρματων προχειρισάμενοι πόλεως, ξενικὰς δυνάμεις μεγάλας ἐμίσθοῦντο.
that Carthage imposed: payment of a thousand talents and the acceptance of the Halycus River as the boundary between his lands and those of Carthage.

About this time the Punic army in Italy had to be recalled to Africa because of a plague that raged so fiercely at Carthage as to make an end of the city's empire seem possible. The Libyans took advantage of her weakness to rise against her, and so did the Sardinians. In both cases she managed to put down the revolt. Whether she was saved by her own citizens or by loyal mercenaries we have no means of telling.

Plague and insurrection had weakened her to such an extent that Dionysius thought he could this time wage a successful war upon her. In 368 B.C. he set forth against the Carthaginians of Sicily with 30,000 foot and 3,000 horse, as well as with 300 triremes. The enemy, however, acted with vigour and inflicted a severe defeat on his naval force. He died in the course of an ensuing armistice, and peace was made by his son Dion.

For some years there was no warfare between Carthage and the Sicilian Greeks, as the latter were fighting among themselves. With the advent of the Sicilian patriot the struggle between Greek and Carthaginian was resumed. The Carthaginians aided the tyrant Hicetas in 344 and 343 B.C.; in the latter year the Punic commander Mago came to Syracuse to help Hicetas with a force of 60,000 men against Timoleon².

². Plutarch, Timoleon, xvii.
but grew suspicious of his Greek ally and sailed away to Carthage, there to find an inglorious death as the result of his cowardice.

It is interesting to notice what part was played by Greek mercenaries in deciding the fate of Syracuse on this occasion. Mago and Hicetas were holding most of the city, and the army of Timoleon was encamped by the Anapus River. There happened to be good eel-fishing at the marshy mouth of the river, and this sport appealed to the mercenaries on both sides; during a cessation of hostilities these soldiers, who appear to have asked themselves the question of Kipling's Tommy as to the use of hating those whom one is paid to kill, joined freely in the common sport, being all Greeks together. One of the Greek mercenaries of Timoleon reminded the men on the other side that all true Hellenes should stand together against the barbarian, and expressed his conviction that little good would come to the island by the invasion of a horde collected from the Pillars of Hercules and beyond. We do not know whether the Greeks who were thus admonished were in Hicetas's service or whether they were hirelings of Carthage. The former is more probable, for it is hard to believe that men in the Carthaginian host, aware of Punic punishment for disloyalty, would have dared to express such sentiments. In any case, when this matter

1. Plutarch, Timoleon, xxii.
2. Ibid., xx.
3. Griffith, op.cit., thinks that these Greeks were with Hicetas, not with Mago, but enumerates previous instances of Greeks actually serving as mercenaries of Carthage.
reached the ears of Mago, he began to feel unsafe with such associates. No doubt the incident made Carthage thereafter inclined to suspect Greeks in general, especially if they might be called upon to fight others of the Hellenic name.

Timoleon was thus able to dispose of Hicetas, who submitted to him and handed over his mercenaries. The victor knew that Carthage was getting ready to renew the struggle for the mastery of the island.

"Timoleon, like Dionysius, thought it well to strike first, the more so as he was in great straits for money to pay his mercenaries. He sent two of his Corinthian officers on a raid into the Carthaginian territory (B.C.343-342). There they won over several towns to the Greek side, and brought back great spoil, which was useful both for paying the soldiers and for making ready for the greater campaign that was coming." 1

The above incident, though narrated of men serving against Carthage, must have had many a parallel in the record of her own mercenaries. The Punic commanders, if money failed to arrive from home for their troops, must often have been forced to undertake a raid, perhaps even to join battle, in defiance of diplomacy and strategy alike. If Timoleon, a Greek general commanding Greeks against barbarians, thus had to anticipate his soldiers' demands, we can be quite sure that the mercenaries of Carthage, whether Greek or barbarian, were quite as importunate when unpaid as Timoleon's men --- more so in fact, as being much more likely to desert to the enemy if not at once satisfied.

1. Freeman, op.cit., iv.316. His authorities are Diodorus xvi. xvi. 73, and Plutarch, Timoleon, xxiv.
The response of the Carthaginians to Timoleon's raid was to despatch a large force to Sicily under the command of one Hanno. The precise number is not recorded, but it was undoubtedly a great one implying the hiring of thousands of mercenaries. Little is known about this expedition, except that it laid siege to Entella, which was occupied by the Campanians who had assisted Dionysius the Elder.

The failure of this army to conquer Sicily impelled the Carthaginian Senate to organise a still greater expeditionary force, which sailed from Africa in 339, with leaders named Hasdrubal and Hamilcar. It consisted of a thousand transport-ships and a large naval escort; the troops, including those already in Sicily, numbered 70,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. Not all these soldiers were mercenaries or subject-allies; a large number of Carthaginian citizens were serving also, men of high birth and great wealth many of them. These wealthier soldiers formed a corps d'élite known as the Sacred Band; it was splendidly armed and equipped.

As the Punic army began to march from the west of the island toward Syracuse, Timoleon assembled what force he could and marched against the invaders. Much of his own force consisted of mercenaries. They had been unpaid for a considerable time, and now that they were to be led against what they considered hopeless odds, they mutinied. By promises and

1. Diodorus, xvi. 67, speaks of 50,000 infantry; Plutarch, Timoleon, xxv., of an army of 70,000.
2. Diod. xvi. 67.
3. Ibid., 77; Plutarch, op.cit., xxv.
entreaties Timoleon persuaded most of them to stay with him, but a thousand of them returned to Syracuse 1.

The battle which ensued is famous as the great Battle of the Crimisus, fought not far from Entella. A violent storm beating in the faces of the invaders gave the victory to Timoleon, vast numbers of Carthaginian soldiers being slain. It is worthy of note how well the Sacred Band fought, dying where it stood. Its members were weighted down with their heavy panoplies and were not able to withstand the more agile Greeks. But even the Greek Plutarch admits that it was not through any lack of courage that the men of Carthage were defeated and slain 2. The Sacred Band, in number 2,500, took the first shock of the battle. If it had followed the frequent Carthaginian practice of allowing the enemy to blunt their swords and exhaust their strength in a preliminary slaughter of barbarian mercenaries, perhaps the issue of the contest would have been different. On this occasion, as on many others, Carthaginian bravery was as notable as it was unavailing.

Timoleon was unable to follow up his victory, and so the Carthaginians were not driven from the island; in fact, they kept giving help to Timoleon's Sicilian enemies, and they were even able to enrol Greek mercenaries in their own forces 3. But before long they had to make peace, peace which was to last for over twenty years.

1. Diod. xvi. 79.
3. Ibid., xxx.
Syracuse had a tyrant named Agathocles, who had been aided in his rise to power by Carthage; she had gone so far as to place at his disposal 5,000 of her own mercenaries. Once possessed of power, he turned upon her and her Greek allies, the latter including the city of Agrigentum. In 311 B.C. Carthage sent out yet another great expedition. Under the command of Hamilcar the son of Gisco there was a total force of 40,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, including men recruited in Sicily.

"From Africa were sent 2000 Carthaginians and 10,000 Libyans, and recruiting officers brought in from the northern Mediterranean 1000 Etruscan mercenaries and 1000 slingers from the Balearic islands; Hamilcar himself recruited mercenaries in Sicily (presumably Greeks) and received contingents from his Greek allies in the island."

Two things, as Freeman has pointed out, are worthy of note in this Punic army: the large number of Carthaginian citizens, who were evidently not stricken with terror by the memory of the Criminus, and also the large number of Balearic slingers, who were to play a large part in subsequent campaigns.

The army of Agathocles met the Carthaginians at the Battle of Himera in 310 B.C. At first Agathocles had the advantage, as his men were able to ambush parties of Libyans who had left their camp to plunder, and to drive them back.

1. Justin xxii. 2. 2. Diod. xix. 106; Justin xxii.
5. This is sometimes called the Battle of Ecnomus.
6. Diod. xix. 108.
with great slaughter. The Greek army attacked the camp itself and might have taken it, but the thousand Balearic slingers hurled upon the assailants a shower of stones, weighing about a pound apiece and thrown by men who had been practising from early childhood. The Greeks were beaten off and put to flight, pursued murderously by the Carthaginian horsemen. As a result of this victory and of his own diplomacy, Hamilcar won over many of the Greek cities. He then marched on Syracuse.

Agathocles, however, adopted the surprising strategy of carrying the war into Africa. From near Cape Bon he marched through the rich country estates of the Carthaginian grandees, and was joined by many of Carthage's own subjects. Between Tunis and Carthage he won a great victory over the Punic army, which was commanded by two generals named Hanno and Bomilcar. It is characteristic of the oblique-mindedness of Carthage that these two generals should have been chosen for the express reason that they were personal enemies and therefore likely to emulate each other. The army of Agathocles was as motley a force as that of his opponents, for it consisted of 3,500 Syracusans, 3,000 Samnite, Etruscan, and Gallic mercenaries, 1,000 chosen hoplites, and other troops to the total number of 13,500. Once again the Sacred Band bore the brunt of the fighting; once again rash bravery brought disaster. Hanno, who commanded this chosen contingent, exposed himself and was killed. Bomilcar on the other wing treacherously retreated, and left the Sacred Band to its fate. The Carthaginian mer-

1. Strabo iii. 5. 1. 2. Diod. xx. 8.
scenaries took to flight, and after a long resistance the Sacred Band followed them.

The Carthaginians ordered Hamilcar at Syracuse to send some of his troops back to Africa, where a dangerously large number of the subject-allies were going over to the Greek invader. Hamilcar made an unsuccessful attack on Syracuse, but was defeated and killed, and the Greek element of his army withdrew, to wage a separate warfare against the rule of Agathocles.

The tyrant had his own difficulties in Africa. His mercenaries revolted, partly because their pay was in arrears and partly because they disliked his son Archagathus. The Carthaginians heard of the mutiny and tried to win the mercenaries over to their own service with offers of high pay, but Agathocles managed to win them back to their allegiance, except two hundred who did desert to Carthage.

A little later Bomilcar made an attempt to seize political control of his city by means of an army largely consisting of mercenaries, and paid with his life for his failure.

In 307 B.C. the tide of events in Africa turned against Agathocles, who was defeated in an attack on the Carthaginian camp before Tunis. Some African mercenaries who had entered

1. Diod. xx.30. 2. Ibid., 33.
3. Ibid., 43, 44. Justin xxii.7. Griffith, op. cit., p. 211, suggests that these were probably Greeks, "since there had apparently been no recruiting campaigns in Spain or elsewhere".
his service deserted to the enemy by night. He abandoned his demoralised men and sailed back to Sicily. The soldiers killed his sons and made peace with the Carthaginians, who allowed all who wished to take service with them. Whether Carthage was impelled by respect for their fighting power, or whether she was afraid of further revolt among her own people, we do not know; but she seems to have kept faith with the men whom Agathocles deserted.

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1. Diod.xx. 69.
Chapter IV.

The First Punic War.

Between the time of Agathocles and the First Punic War we find little mention of Carthaginian mercenaries. Details of Carthage's wars with Pyrrhus are scanty, and the two authors on whom we are largely dependent, Justin and Zonaras, are late and often palpably inaccurate. Justin, it is true, shows Pyrrhus being hard pressed by the Carthaginian fleet, which insufficient knowledge prevents us from classing as a mercenary force. Zonaras tells us that in 278 B.C. the growing power of Pyrrhus frightened Carthage into getting additional mercenaries from Italy; perhaps these were recruited by permission of Rome, then Carthage's ally.

Mercenaries, as is well known, were primarily responsible for the first great conflict between Rome and Carthage. They were a gang of ruffians who called themselves "Mamertines" or "sons of Mars". They had been in the service of Agathocles; when he died in 289 B.C., they were disbanded, and instead of returning to their native Campania they treacherously seized the town of Messana. Besieged by Hiero of Syracuse,

1. Justin xviii.2. See also Plutarch, Pyrrhus, xxiv.
2. Lenschau, in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. "Karthago", col.2240, says that the sailors and probably the marines were principally drawn from the population of the capital.
3. Zonaras viii.5.
4. Griffith, op.cit., p. 212 n., thinks this unlikely. He names it as a suggestion made by Gsell.
* See Appendix II.
they appealed to Rome, and Carthage took the opposite side. Hiero soon transferred his services to the Romans, but the war went on between the two great opponents. Hiero's defection was a serious loss to Carthage; she had probably been relying chiefly upon the forces of Syracuse to defend Sicily: "at all events it is not until Hieron has changed sides that we hear of any extraordinary effort at Carthage with a view to reinforcing the permanent army of defence which presumably occupied the Carthaginian province." There was then the usual Punic recruiting-effort. Foreign mercenaries were gathered in great hordes — Ligurians, Celts, and still more, Iberians, and all sent to Sicily, where Agrigentum was chosen as the Punic base of operations.

This was in 263 B.C. The following year the Romans began the siege of Agrigentum; after five months of siege the Suffete Hannibal, who commanded the garrison, being threatened with famine, sent to Carthage for help. A new army with a number of elephants was sent out under the commander Hanno, and began to operate from Heraclea. In a preliminary engagement a feigned retreat by the excellent light cavalry of the Numidians inflicted considerable loss on the Romans, but failed to raise the siege. Many of the defenders of Agrigentum deserted to the Romans because of hunger, so that Hanno decided on a decisive battle before things went too far.

1. Polybius 1. 10-11.
3. Polybius 1. 17.
The contest lasted a long time, but eventually the Romans put to flight the Carthaginian mercenaries, who were in the front line, and threw them back upon the elephants and the other supporting forces; the result was a rout for the Carthaginian army. When night fell, however, Hannibal took advantage of the Romans' elation and fatigue and made his way out of his desperate situation, breaking out of Agrigentum about midnight with his mercenaries. All that now remained of Carthaginian Sicily was a few strongholds on the western coasts of the island.

Much of the struggle in Sicily from this point consisted of naval warfare, in which mercenaries are seldom mentioned. Zonaras, however, tells a story which seems to belong to the first years of the war. The Punic commander Hamilcar, he says, was afraid that his Gallic mercenaries, discontented at not being paid in full, might go over to the Romans; to get rid of them he sent them out to plunder a city which he told them would be surrendered to them, at the same time sending to the Romans pretended deserters who were to give the enemy advance notice that the Gauls were coming. The latter fell into an ambush and all perished, but not until many Romans had been killed also.

In 256 B.C. the Romans decided to invade Africa. The

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1. Polybius i. 19.
2. Zonaras viii. 10. Frontinus, Strat. iii. 16. 4, attributes this piece of treachery to "Hanno, Carthagisium imperator in Sicilia".
road to Carthage was opened to them by their naval victory off Cape Ecnomus. They landed in the enemy's country and might have decided the war then and there if they had marched on Carthage at once instead of stopping to plunder in a manner more characteristic of the mercenaries whom they affected to despise. Their mastery of the sea was not absolute, and in the intervening time the Carthaginians were able to bring back from Sicily 500 horse and 5,000 foot.

In a battle near the town of Adys, victory went to the Romans, owing to the nature of the ground. The strength of the Carthaginians lay in their cavalry and elephants, and such schnelle Truppen required level ground to operate effectively. Here they threw away their advantages by fighting upon a hill. Deprived of the assistance of the mounted troops, their mercenaries nevertheless fought very gallantly, compelling the Roman front line to retire, but they were finally defeated.

Polybius expressly states that the Carthaginian reverses, on both sea and land, were not due to any lack of courage among the soldiers but rather to incompetent commanders. The

1. One thing is of special interest in Polybius's account of this naval battle (1.27.1): the Carthaginian commanders, in the customary harangue before the battle, are represented as reminding their men that if they were defeated they would have to fight for their own country and their own homes: ἔτηροντες δὲ περὶ τῆς οἰκετείας πατρίδος κινδυνεύοντι μετὰ τῶν ἄναγκαιν.

This looks as though the men in the fleet were not mercenaries but Carthaginians. Cf. Lenschau's statement on page 42, note 2, in this thesis.

3. Ibid., 31.
situation was desperate, as the Numidians rose against Carthage and inflicted even more damage than the Romans did. The war might have ended there with a Roman peace if Regulus, the Roman commander, had laid down less intolerable terms. Carthage resolved to keep on fighting, and soon had better fortune.

About this time there returned to the Punic capital one of the recruiting-officers who had been sent to Greece. He was accompanied by a considerable number of soldiers, among them a very able commander named Xanthippus, a Lacedaemonian. This soldier of the Spartan school did not hesitate to say to friends that the Punic defeats had been due to bad generalship. When the Carthaginian government heard of his strictures, it invited him to make suggestions, and the generals were so much impressed by his views that they voluntarily entrusted the command to him. Their confidence was shared by the populace of Carthage, and when he had displayed his skill and his experience to the soldiers in the evolutions of the parade-ground, they too were filled with enthusiasm and demanded to be led against the Romans. In a few days Carthage took the field once more, with 12,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and nearly a hundred elephants.

1. Appian, viii.1.3, says that the Carthaginians had already realised the defects of their generalship and had asked the Lacedaemonians for a commander, and that Xanthippus was the man whom the Lacedaemonians selected. Frontinus, Strat. ii.3.10, credits Xanthippus with originality in his use of light-armed troops— which looks as though Sparta had learnt the hard lesson that Iphicrates had taught.

2. Polybius i.32.6; Zonaras viii.13.
The ensuing battle was a victory for Carthage, largely due to the skilfully-handled cavalry and elephants and to the level ground that Xanthippus had chosen for the battlefield. The Carthaginian phalanx, kept intact till fairly late in the battle, is given credit by Polybius for administering the finishing blow to the tired Roman legionaries. On this occasion the mercenaries appear to have been of little service. We are told that the Romans held them in contempt and put them to flight, killing about 800 of them. In fact, about 2,000 of the Romans owed their lives to this, as their pursuit of the mercenaries carried them out of the main battle.

His victory accomplished, Xanthippus departed for home, to disappear entirely from history. It is strange that Carthage was willing to dispense with his services before the war had been won; perhaps the sanguine African temperament saw in one victory sufficient augury for a successful termination of the war. Polybius declares that Xanthippus did wisely in leaving before he could fall a victim to jealousy and slander, which are always more deadly when they assail a stranger. Zonaras mentions two different versions of a story that the Carthaginians vainly plotted against his life when he was on his way home. Mommsen and Ihne both reject this tale as a fiction; R.B. Smith says, more cautiously, "The story is doubtless a malicious invention, but it could hardly have been fathered upon a people whose gratitude for favours received

1. Polybius i.34.6.
2. Ibid., 9.
5. Ihne, op.cit., ii. 71.
was either deep or lasting" 1.

Land operations in Sicily during the next two or three years included no pitched battles of importance, so greatly had the Romans learned to fear the Carthaginian elephants. This panic lasted until Hasdrubal rashly employed these animals too close to the walls of Panormus, with the result that the Romans were able to capture them and lost much of their terror 2. The men whom the Carthaginians employed to drive their elephants are spoken of as "Indians"; whether this name be correctly applied or not, it is almost certain that they were mercenaries.

A little after this event at Panormus, the Romans laid siege to Lilybaeum, where Himilco's garrison included 10,000 mercenaries 3. Some of these were Greeks, but we do not know how many; it is likely that the proportion was a high one, because the operations of counter-building and counter-mining which they carried on extensively were beyond the capacity of the mere barbarian 4. Certain officers 5 of the

2. Polybius i. 40.
3. Ibid., 42. 11.
4. It is noteworthy that the idea of setting the Roman siege-works on fire during a gale originated with some of the Greek mercenaries (Polybius i. 48. 3). We must not forget, of course, that the Carthaginians themselves were fully conversant with siege-operations; see Tarn, Hellen. Mil. & Nav. Devel., pp. 102-103.
5. The word that Polybius uses is the rather ambiguous ἱππεύοντων, but as they are contrasted with ἰππο-ταταγμένους, it is clear that they were officers rather than ringleaders.
mercenaries went over to the Romans, but their treacherous example was not followed by their comrades, owing to an Achaean named Alexon, who used his influence with them and also informed Himilco of the plot. The Punic commander called together the officers who had not deserted and implored them to remain loyal. His lavish promises assured their fidelity; in their turn they used entreaty and promise of reward to keep their own men from becoming disaffected. Some of the mercenaries were Celts; they had served under a Carthaginian officer named Hannibal, who was now the means of keeping them loyal. Among the other mercenaries Alexon himself enjoyed considerable prestige; this may mean that the non-Celtic mercenaries were largely Greeks.

Another contingent of troops came from Carthage by sea to Lilybaeum, numbering 10,000. They sailed past the Roman fleet, to which they were ready to offer battle at sea: Polybius says that they were on the decks and prepared for action—a statement which seems more applicable to Greeks or Phoenicians than to seasick Gauls and Libyans. What this force did once, was done many times by a skilful blockade-runner named Hannibal "surnamed the Rhodian". Smith speaks of this man as "a Rhodian mercenary"; the Loeb editor, as one of the leading citizens of Carthage. The name Hannibal certainly fits in better with the latter idea, and the phrase ἄντρο τῶν ἐνδόξων Ἀννίβας ἐπικαλοῦμαι Ὀδωρος scarcely sounds as though he were a mercenary at all.

1. Griffith, op. cit., p. 216. 2. Polybius, 1.44.3. 4. Smith, op. cit., p. 121. 3. Polybius, 1.46.4.
Mercenaries are mentioned more than once as serving at sea in the last naval battles of the war. In 249 B.C. the Punic commander Adherbal took them aboard his ships as marines; to oppose them Publius Claudius Pulcher put on his ships the pick of his army --- men who readily volunteered as the voyage was to be a short one, with what seemed a sure chance of acquiring booty. This scarcely justifies the Roman historians in their scorn of the professed mercenary. Neither did the issue of this battle, which was fought off Drepanum, though Polybius attributes the Carthaginian success to the superior build of the Punic fleet and the better training of the Punic rowers. In the year 241 Hanno's defeat off the Aegatian Islands was due to the failure of his plan to exchange, before offering battle, the raw levies who were serving as marines, for qualified mercenaries, "the best infantry men of the levies".

Returning to operations on land, we may mention the part played by mercenaries in a sortie from Lilybaeum in 249 B.C. Himilco, who commanded the Carthaginian garrison, seeing the Roman camp in commotion because of a Carthaginian raid from the sea, sent out his mercenaries to attack, but no reason is given why they were selected for the purpose.

1. Polybius 1.49.10; 51.3.  2. Ibid., 51.4.
3. Ibid., 60.3; 60.8. Griffith, op.cit., p. 216, thinks that these superior marines were probably the Greeks.
4. Polybius, XXXIII 53.5.
whether as more likely to be effective or as more easily dis­
pensed with in case of disaster. It was mainly on mercenary
soldiers, at any rate, that the great Hamilcar Barca had to de­
pend in his guerilla warfare during the last years of the great
struggle; and when we consider the depleted state of the Car­
thaginian treasury at this time, we can only marvel that this
man kept up the fight so long. In my opinion, Tenney Frank
fails to do justice either to him or to his men when he blames
him for not carrying a bold offensive into Eastern Sicily.1
Hamilcar's claim upon his soldiers was that of a paymaster on
his employees; if the paymaster has no money, can he be
blamed, or the employees either, if the contractual relation­
ship comes to an end?

It is true that some of Hamilcar's men gave trouble,
especially when their pay fell into arrears. The fact that
the Gauls were the worst offenders 2 would appear to show that
Carthage could no longer afford mercenaries of better quality;
Gauls were notoriously unstable and turbulent, and frequently
embarrassed the Hellenistic masters that employed them in
hordes.3 Hamilcar was compelled to treat his Gallic mal­
contents more sternly than some of his predecessors had done,
for the latter were still able to bestow or at any rate to
promise; and his sternness sometimes took the form of cruelty

2. Polybius ii.7; Zonaras viii.10, 16.
3. P. Jouguet, Macedonian Imperialism, pp.186,188; H.A.Ormerod,
   Piracy in the Ancient World, p. 126; Tarn, Hellenistic
   Civilisation, p. 56; Griffith, op. cit., especially
and treachery 1. But it was not Hamilcar, nor was it his mercenaries, who lost the war for Carthage. Griffith well says:

"---the evidence relating to the long weary struggle, scanty as it is, does suggest that the mercenaries of Carthage, besides being numerous, were also both efficient and loyal" 2.

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1. Zonaras viii. 16; Frontinus, Strat. iii. 16.2
Chapter V.

The Truceless War.

Immediately after the First Punic War there followed an episode which, as recorded by Polybius, tells us more about the mercenaries of Carthage than we can learn from any other source: the great Revolt of the Mercenaries, or, as it was often called in antiquity, the Truceless War. In this chapter of Punic history, the mercenaries themselves are the main characters and not mere pawns in a game. It is almost the only place where individual mercenaries are described in any detail, and where we see them dealing direct with the city that employed them, not with a general or a committee of officers in a distant theatre of hostilities. It is a terrible tale of perfidy and rapacity, of turbulence, slaughter, and fierce revenges. There seems little reason to doubt the general accuracy of the story as Polybius tells it, but we must bear in mind that his great admiration for the Romans tends to bring out all that is to the discredit of Rome's great enemy. The mere fact that Carthage employed the mercenary system causes him to perceive in that system evils which a less partial observer might deem not necessarily a part of it. To do him justice, however, we must admit that much of the trouble he himself realised to have arisen from lack of foresight on the part of the Carthaginian authorities...
and from their failure to take obvious precautions\(^1\). He implies that Carthage, by a judicious mixture of justice and firmness and discretion, could have made of the mercenary system something better, or, let us say, less faulty than it was. Perhaps he intended to warn his Roman friends who might have to handle mercenaries themselves \(^2\).

At the end of the First Punic War the rulers of Carthage were faced with a great demobilisation-problem. The difficulty was not that which confronts a modern government at the end of a long war, when several million conscripted men must be taken back into civilian pursuits without disorganising the economic system or causing a political upheaval. Carthage had not to deal with her own citizens; she had to get rid of a horde of aliens who were no longer wanted but who had claims upon her for services in a lost war. According to the peace-treaty, Carthage was bound to evacuate Sicily and all the islands lying between Sicily and the Italian mainland \(^3\), nor were the Romans likely to be indulgent as regards the time-limit for such a surrender. The humbled African city had to bring her defeated troops into her own territory before she could demobilise them. We do not know whether she asked for permission to pay them off in Sicily and to leave them to their fate; it is very unlikely that the Romans would have welcomed the presence of thousands of troublesome barbarians in their newly-acquired territory. At any rate, it was out of the question for Carthage to think of paying her

\(^1\) Polybius i.65.7.  \(^2\) See Griffith, pp.234-235, for early Roman use of mercenaries.
soldiers off in Sicily. Apart from the danger of losing the money at sea, there was the risk of its falling into the hands of the Romans, who had already added a thousand talents to the war-indemnity. There was no other way. The mercenaries had to be brought back to Africa. And where was the defeated city to find the money to pay them off?

The history of mercenary warfare is full of disasters caused by the employer's failure to make good his promises: nations, no less than individuals, have reason to dread le quart-d'heure de Rabelais. Throughout antiquity the rule was --- in practice if not in principle --- that the payment of a mercenary force enrolled for a crisis was contingent upon the employer's victory. Before success was achieved, the soldiers could consider themselves lucky if they received enough ration-money\(^1\)--- apart from pay proper --- for each day's food. The employing State, hazarding everything upon success in the field, was in a position somewhat like that of the modern man who borrows or steals money with which to speculate. Failure activated the State's own tools to increase the calamity. And it was in this unhappy situation that the rulers of Carthage now found themselves.

As soon as the peace-treaty had been made, Hamilcar Barca had resigned his Sicilian command\(^2\). Perhaps he foresaw the trouble that was coming and desired to evade the responsibi-

2. All the details in this account of the Truceless War are taken from the First Book of Polybius, unless some other source is expressly mentioned.
lity', for indeed he had already endured enough for the Republic; it is more likely, though, that he felt such a resignation necessary because of the likelihood that the suspicious Romans would see in his remaining in Sicily a pretext for further steps against Carthage. He was succeeded in the command at Lilybaeum by an officer named Gisco, whom Polybius commends for his sagacity. Anticipating the probable difficulty, Gisco sent his soldiers back to Carthage in detachments, his idea being that the home authorities should pay each detachment off and send it away to its own country before the next draft arrived. This sensible arrangement was upset by two things: first, Carthage was short of ready money; secondly, the authorities cherished the delusion that the mercenaries could be persuaded to forgo some of the pay that was in arrears. Men who had suffered defeat, they thought, would scarcely dare to be importunate on the very soil of Carthage. More and more troops kept arriving. The government, annoyed by their licentiousness, induced them to quit the city in a body and move to a nearby town. It gave each man a gold coin for pressing expenses; the sight of the gold only whetted the appetite of the soldiers for more. To deprive them of an excuse for returning to Carthage, the authorities made them

1. Appian (v.2.3; vi.1.4) says that Hamilcar, while commanding in Sicily, made lavish promises to his Celtic mercenaries and Libyan allies, and that the failure to make these promises good after Hamilcar's return to Africa was the cause of the Mercenaries' War. Appian, however, is plainly prejudiced against Hamilcar.
take with them their wives, children, and baggage. This action greatly offended the malcontents but gave them the satisfaction of knowing that Carthage no longer held any sureties for their good behaviour.

The men who had endured hardships for so long were now no longer restrained by thoughts of either discipline or danger; in their demoralising environment they soon fell victims to numerous agitators. The favourite topic for discussion was of course the amount that Carthage owed them. If there was to be any change, they declared, it would surely be in their favour. Had not all manner of lavish promises been made to them by their generals whenever in the late war things were at a crisis?

Their hopes were dashed when Hanno, who then held the chief command in Africa, addressed them. Carthage, he said, could not meet their demands in full. Would they not, in view of her heavy taxation and general distress, agree to moderate their claims? The immediate reply was a series of indignation-meetings throughout the camp. Men of the same linguistic or racial group gathered to discuss their wrongs, and these meetings soon coalesced with those of other groups. It had been a Carthaginian practice to keep the mercenary contingents as heterogeneous as possible to prevent concerted mutiny, and to discourage the use of a common language in the camp. The result of this policy was that now amid the rioting it was impossible for the voice of reason and moderation to make itself heard. Either through misunder-
standing or through malice the officers failed to transmit correctly to the men under them the demands or entreaties that Hanno made. The troops were for the most part men of excitable races: Iberians, Celts, Ligurians, Balearians, with no small number of Greek half-breeds who were mostly deserters and slaves; but the largest racial group consisted of the passionate violent Libyans --- men who were probably subject-allies rather than mercenaries but in the present crisis insisted on assuming the latter character. In all, the mercenaries numbered over 20,000.

In their subsequent dealings with this wild rabble, the Carthaginians showed as much weakness as folly --- a policy dictated by their realisation that their citizen-force was quite incompetent to control the mutineers. Accordingly, all that could be done was to make extravagant promises and to let the mercenaries have abundant supplies at any price they chose to pay. The soldiers then demanded reimbursement for the horses which they had lost in the war. When this was conceded to be a reasonable request, the mercenaries demanded

1. Polybius here (i.76.10-11) shows that subordinate officers in the mercenary forces were not Carthaginians. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, iv.1, p.354, and Duruy, op.cit., i.452, speak of only the principal officers of a Punic army as being Carthaginians, and this view is probably correct: the essentially tribal methods of warfare followed by these mercenary forces must have required a large number of subaltern officers to be of the same racial group as the men they commanded. On the other hand, Polybius here may use the words ῥῦν ἡγεμόνυ and τοὺς πολλοὺς, respectively, to indicate not officers and men, but spokesmen and those for whom they spoke.

2. See Griffith, op.cit., pp. 219-220, for a discussion of this point.
that the arrears of their ration-money should be calculated on
the basis of the maximum price at which grain had stood during
the war, and they made similar exorbitant claims. They did
however agree to submit disputed points to one of the generals
under whom they had fought in Sicily --- not to Hamilcar Barca,
whom they had come to dislike for his unconciliatory attitude,
but to Gisco, who had been considerate of them in the matter of
transportation from Sicily. Gisco came to Tunis with money
for the soldiers, travelling by sea with the idea, no doubt,
that it would be impossible to transport money by land through
a disaffected and turbulent district. He first held confer­
ences with the mercenaries' officers (or leaders, τοὺς ἰγε-
μόνας) and then with the soldiers themselves, dealing with
the different racial groups separately. He rebuked them for
their conduct and begged them to be better disposed for the
future toward their old paymasters; perhaps he had in mind
their eventual re-engagement in another war against Rome. He
proceeded to pay off their arrears, tribe by tribe. We are
given no information about the order of payment except that
the Libyans appear to have consider themselves as the last on
the roll of creditors. They may have had a suspicion that
Carthage would end by refusing to recognise any Libyan as a
mercenary at all.

Just when a satisfactory solution appeared to have been
reached for the other soldiers, the Libyans began to give
trouble. They had been incited by a couple of agitators, one

1. Polybius i. 69. 1.
a runaway slave of the Romans, by name Spendius, a Campanian full of the turbulence of his race, the other a Libyan named Matho. Both were afraid of the probable course of events: Spendius because he anticipated a return to his Roman masters and death by crucifixion, Matho because he feared Carthaginian punishment for the agitator's part that he had just been playing. Matho managed to convince the Libyans as a whole that they would suffer Punic vengeance as soon as the other mercenaries were no longer at hand to aid them 1, and rioting became worse and worse.

The picture of the mercenaries' camp given by Polybius is very different from the orderly scenes depicted in the pages of Xenophon — at least, the Ten Thousand, in spite of the missiles and the taunts they threw at their leaders, were orderly in comparison! Xenophon shows men who could listen to reason — in other words, not barbarians. On the other hand, all the lawlessness in the barbarian nature was brought out by the Carthaginian military system, which had discouraged all organisation among the mercenaries. There appear to have been no mercenaries' guilds, such as existed in the Egypt of the Ptolemies 2, -- organisations which in spite of their occasional turbulence strove at any rate to clarify the relationship between the soldiers and their employer. In the armies of the Hellenistic kings, there was one great stabilising-force,

1. According to Appian, v.2.3, the Carthaginians had already angered the Africans by crucifying 3,000 of them for deserting to the Romans.
2. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilisation, p. 175.
namely a common language which Greeks and barbarians alike understood. No such influence helped to restore order in that stormy barbarian camp near Carthage. The only phrase, says Polybius, that all the diverse racial groups understood was the cry, "Stone him!", with which the troublemakers silenced either officers 1 or privates who came forward to address the multitude.

In this tumult Gisco is shown by Polybius as acting in an admirable manner. The general, thinking only of the danger in which Carthage stood and not of his own peril, kept on trying to conciliate one deputation after another, as well as addressing the various racial groups. Finally he lost his temper, and the Libyans answered his sarcasm by arresting him and his Carthaginian staff. Such violence shown to a man who had virtually come in the character of an ambassador and therefore, according to the custom of the ancient world, inviolable, meant open war with the Republic.

Immediately the rebels sent envoys to ask the Libyans for aid against the common oppressor. The response was gratifying. Most of the Libyan towns agreed to contribute troops and supplies. It was not a forced co-operation; so intense was the general hatred of Carthage that the Libyan women are said to have offered their trinkets to the war-fund. Utica

1. Because of its antithesis to τῶν ἱσιωτῶν, τῶν ἡγεμόνων must mean officers here rather than ringleaders. The passage is Polybius 1.69.11.
2. Polybius 1.70.2-3. W.R. Paton, the Loeb editor, assumes that the delegations consisted of officers of the mercenaries. The Greek phrase τοὺς προεστῶν σωμάτων would indicate ringleaders rather than officers duly appointed; see Liddell and Scott, s.v. προεστήμα.
and Hippocrates, which refused to join the rebels, were besieged.

The situation was a desperate one for Carthage, which was exhausted of naval and military resources and could hope for no external assistance. Her policy of grinding down the subject-peoples, especially the Libyans, had produced a terrible reaction. Polybius implies that some Carthaginian governors had ruled with mildness and humanity ¹, though they were the exception rather than the rule. But at this moment the Libyan insurgents, men and women alike, could think of Carthage only as the oppressor, the city that called a man a good governor if his harsh rule brought in ample tribute. The mutineers were given money by the Libyans with far greater readiness than Carthage had ever shown in paying wages duly earned. Matho was joined by about 70,000 Libyans ².

The Carthaginians showed more courage now than during the negotiations. They armed the citizens of military age with the scanty supply of weapons at their disposal; they organise and to began to/drill the citizens' cavalry force ³; they got ready the remnants of their navy; and, with characteristic conservatism, they set about hiring more mercenaries. For a

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1. Polybius i. 72.3.
2. Zonaras, Φ111. 17, says that the slave-population of Carthage, τὸ δούλευον τὸ ἐν τῷ πόλει, joined the rebels. This is apparently borne out by Appian, v.2.3.
3. Apparently there was no need to arm the cavalry, which consisted of wealthy citizens permanently in possession of equipment.
commander they chose a certain Hanno, who though a rapacious provincial governor was deemed to have handled in a satisfactory manner previous trouble in Libya. His talents, however— if we may use the modern military argot— lay in the "Q" branch, not in the "G"; he was an organiser but not a tactician. The situation called for generalship, whereas Hanno added to inexperience a lack of caution and of energy, as well as an effeminate craving for luxury. His previous military renown had been gained in fighting Nomads and Libyans who never tried to rally after a defeat.

The result was what might have been foreseen. Though he took the field with a hundred elephants and a great train of equipment, the seasoned veterans who had fought in Sicily under Barca managed to retrieve an initial defeat and to foil his attempt to raise the siege of Utica. Hanno's siege-train was captured and many of his men killed; two great advantages that might have given the loyalists victory, namely elephants and catapults, had been thrown away.

1. According to Diodorus, xxiv. (Vol. IX., p. 344 in the Wesseliving edition), Hanno appears to have gained a reputation for mild diplomacy rather than for generalship.
2. Polybius i. 74.8 : εἰς τὴν πόλιν (Utica) ἐγένετο περὶ τῆς στρατείας ὁμοίως ἔτοιμος.
3. The rebels appear to have had no elephants at all. These animals, very effective against untrained men and horses, were largely responsible for the mercenaries' defeat in this war. See Tarn, Hell. Milit. & Nav. Devel., pp. 92-98.
4. The mercenaries appear to have had little skill in the handling of catapults or other siege-engines— a circumstance which perhaps shows that only Carthaginians were allowed to acquire the requisite training. The sieges which the mercenaries conducted must have been mere blockades, relying for success (see foot of next page for the rest of this note.)
The Carthaginians replaced the incompetent Hanno with Hamilcar Barca. He was given seventy elephants and about 10,000 men — a small force in Punic history. In addition to citizen-forces of cavalry and infantry, there were the newly-collected mercenaries and also deserters from the rebels. After crossing the supposedly impassable Macaras River by a night-march skilfully planned and executed, he gave battle to two rebel armies, one of strength equal to his own and another more than half as strong again. He used his heavy-armed infantry, which probably consisted of citizens, as a lure to induce the Libyans and rebel mercenaries to break their ranks, and then threw his cavalry and elephants upon the undisciplined enemy, who were defeated with heavy loss. This raised the siege of Utica. Some of the towns that had been hostile to Carthage were induced by him to return to their allegiance; others he took by force — perhaps not so great an exploit, as their fortifications must have been of a makeshift sort. He was joined by a young Numidian chief named Naravas with about 2,000 followers, and with this reinforcement he won another victory over a force consisting of Numidians, Libyans, Gauls, and contingents from every racial group in the camp of the mercenaries. The victory was largely due to the Numidian horsemen of Naravas and to the Carthaginian elephants. Hamilcar incorporated into his own army all of the 4,000 prisoners

(Note continued from last page) on treason or famine among the besieged. Moreover, to collect and organise siege-material called for a higher degree of discipline than the mutineers would have accepted.

1. The African vassal-towns were not permitted to possess city-walls. See Mommsen, op.cit., II. 140.
who were willing to serve him; the rest he allowed to go free, with threats of punishment if they were ever caught fighting against Carthage again.

Meanwhile the bad example of revolt was followed by the mercenaries who garrisoned Sardinia. They massacred the Carthaginian commander Bostar and others of his countrymen, and when Hanno was sent over with another force to restore order, the new arrivals joined the insurgents. Hanno and all the other Carthaginians in Sardinia they tortured and murdered. They became masters of all the towns in the island, but quarreled with the natives, who drove them out of Sardinia to Italy.

episode

This Sardinian/in turn had a bearing upon the mercenary revolt in Africa. Matho, Spendius, and a Gallic leader of the name of Autaritus, hearing of the lenient terms granted by Hannibal, did what many a desperate ringleader has done—they strove to involve those under them in a crime precluding any hope of pardon. They pretended that news had come from their fellow-mutineers in Sardinia, informing them that the Punic clemency was but an attempt to get them all into the power of Hamilcar. Autaritus spoke with Gallic eloquence to the mercenaries, advising them to put to death every Carthaginian prisoner, including the general Gisco. The terrible Gaul had been a long time in the Punic service, and was well known; he also had a knowledge of the Phoenician language,

1. For a general survey of Carthaginian rule in Sardinia, see E.S. Bouchier, *Sardinia in Ancient Times*, ch. iii.
which was fairly familiar to the mercenaries. His hearers, fierce though they were, were not all entirely depraved. From every group speakers arose to remind their comrades of Gisco’s previous kindness to them. If they must kill, they declared, they need not at any rate inflict torture. In the tumult the advocates of mercy were not understood, especially as they did not possess the linguistic talents of Autaritus but had to speak each man in his own tongue. At last it was realised that they were asking for a milder sentence. A fierce voice from the audience shouted "μαλλη", and in an instant a shower of stones brought death to the speakers. Gisco and his miserable companions were made to die in torment. It was now apparent that the brutalised mercenaries intended to fight to the death. The struggle had earned its ghastly name, "the Truceless War". Reprisals followed on the Carthaginian side: captive rebels were either put to the sword or thrown to the war-elephants to be trampled to death.

These victories, however, which Hamilcar had won, did not immediately achieve his purpose. He had asked Hanno to unite the latter’s army with his own; he soon had reason to regret this, for violent quarrels broke out between the two generals, quarrels of which the enemy did not fail to take advantage. The Carthaginians, realising the dangers of a divided command, decreed that one general should be withdrawn; they left the actual choice of commander-in-chief to the troops themselves. It is not clear whether voting

1. Polybius 1. 82. 5, 12.
was limited to members of the citizen-force or whether the mercenaries also were permitted to decide the question. The latter seems more probable when we remember that among the Carthaginians military command did not confer political power; a general had little chance of becoming a despot so long as the treasury of the Republic controlled the soldiers' pay. In this case Carthage did not defer to her soldiers, but rather called upon them as experts empowered to make a specific decision. The Greek words used to describe the military voters imply no distinction between citizens and mercenaries.

While these matters were being settled, a new peril had arisen. Hippacritae and Utica, two cities noted for their traditional loyalty to Carthage, now went over to the rebels. They slaughtered about 500 Carthaginian troops together with the commander of the force, which had been sent to aid their defence against the mercenaries; nor would they even allow their bodies to receive burial. So much were Matho and Spendiatus encouraged by this accession of strength that they laid siege to Carthage itself. Their operations were impeded by Hamilcar, who, assisted by a lieutenant named Hannibal and by the Numidian Naravas, intercepted so far as possible the supplies of the besiegers.

The Carthaginians were also aided by the refusal of external nations to assist the rebels. There might indeed have been trouble with Rome, for Italian traders had been bringing supplies to the enemy; 500 of them had been caught

1. αἱ δυνάμεις, τὸ στρατόπεδον.
at sea by the Carthaginian cruisers. When Rome demanded their release, Carthage was wise enough to grant it. This pleased the Romans, who were rarely well-disposed toward anything that looked like a servile revolt: in return they permitted their merchants to trade with Carthage but not with the rebels, and they also refused to accept the surrender to themselves of Sardinia or Utica.

Short of supplies, Matho and Spendius had to give up the siege of Carthage. Collecting a force of selected mercenaries and Libyans, altogether about 50,000, they began to manoeuvre about in the open in the hope of bringing Hamilcar to battle in a favourable spot. Because of Hamilcar's elephants and Naravas's cavalry, they avoided level ground, and sought to occupy positions in the hills and in defiles where the enemy would be likely to pass. Polybius bears witness to the courage and energy of the mercenaries but declares that they showed little tactical skill. It is, of course, possible that the failure of their leaders was due not so much to inexperience or incapacity in the art of command as to lack of discipline --- a difficulty very often confronting men who have to command an army that has mutinied. A general who is himself a mutineer usually has a hard time getting obedience, for the men whom he commands are apt to look upon him as their creature whom they have the right to replace at will.

Little by little Hamilcar's superior generalship, aided by the circumstance that time was on his side, wore the rebels down. He kept ambushing them and cutting off their supplies,
and then managed to hem in and annihilate a rebel army of over 40,000 men under Autaritus and Spendius. It was a hideous episode: cannibalism among the famished rebels, before they surrendered, was followed by treachery on Hamilcar's part in negotiating with them, and the end was ghastly slaughter.

Whatever moral judgement we may pass on the Carthaginian commander, his severity had the desired effect. Most of the Libyans came over to him, so that Hamilcar and Hannibal were able to besiege Matho in Tunis. As a foretaste of what the besieged might expect, the Carthaginians crucified Spendius and other prisoners in sight of the rebels still in arms. Maddened by the spectacle, Matho made a sortie against the over-confident Hannibal, whom he put to death on the very cross where Spendius had died; many other Carthaginians fell fighting or died of torture, and much booty fell into the hands of the rebels. Once more Hamilcar, who did not learn of this sortie till it was too late to avert disaster, had suffered because of a colleague's incompetency. He raised the siege of Tunis.

By such an admission of failure, he placed himself in a position where he could not refuse the advice of the Senate that he and Hanno should end their long disagreement. The united Carthaginian armies in a general battle encountered the rebels, who were equally ready to decide the issue. It was a Carthaginian victory. Matho was captured, along with the remnant that was not lucky enough to be slain on the field.
The only opposition now remaining was that offered by the insurgent cities of Hippacritae and Utica; desperate though they were, they surrendered after a short siege, perhaps being assured of merciful treatment because of previous loyalty. The Truceless War was over, having lasted for three years and four months. The leaders of the revolt had perished; the cities and tribes that had joined them were punished with heavy fines.

It was a dearly-bought victory for Carthage. When she began to prepare a punitive expedition against the mercenaries who had revolted in Sardinia, Rome professed to see in such preparations a menace to herself. To avoid further warfare, Carthage had to surrender the island and also to pay the Romans an additional indemnity of 1,200 talents. The whole transaction reflects little credit on Rome.

We must remember that the Truceless War was more than a soldiers' mutiny. It did begin with the revolt of more than 20,000 mercenaries, but much larger forces than that fought on the rebel side, mostly Libyan and Numidian subjects. Had Carthage possessed the loyalty of the African peoples, the mercenary system would not have been such a dangerous thing; as things were, her exploitation of her immediate neighbours had created a great mass of smouldering hatred, which the mutiny in the camp ignited. The blame for the whole trouble rests not with the Punic military leaders but with those grandees at Carthage who brought into their Senate the narrow outlook of

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1. Polybius i. 88; iii. 28; Appian vi. 1. 4.
the counting-house. If ever there was in ancient history an example of the "business men's government"—that panacea still so strongly recommended for all a nation's ills—, it was the Senate of Carthage. Times had changed from the days when the Punic Empire had been a mere chain of trading-posts, but statesmanship had not kept pace with financial ability. The situation called for at least one of two things: a host of loyal subjects and a trustworthy army. In both respects there had been almost complete failure.

Was the lesson of the revolt lost on Carthage? We know so little of the city's internal politics between 238 and the Second Punic War, which began twenty years later, that it is hard to say. The actual rulers probably learnt nothing; the Barcine family evidently learnt a great deal. As we shall see, the mercenary system was not abandoned as a result of the revolt, but became of secondary importance in the Carthaginian army—-or more strictly speaking, in the armies of Hamilcar and his family. Before the Truceless War ended, virtually every Carthaginian citizen of military age must have been called upon for duty; if this proved to be but an emergency-measure not perpetuated after victory was won, we must remember that Carthage was not entirely a free agent. Had she, with the lesson of the Mercenaries' War still fresh in her mind, set about to create a large citizen-force, the jealous Romans would very likely have declared such a step part of a revanche-policy.

That danger was no doubt realised by the citizens of
Carthage. The consciousness that it was through their own exertions that the city had been saved led them to demand, not a great rearmament-programme, but rather, as Ihne has pointed out, a greater share in the government. This democratic movement was headed by Hamilcar Barca, who saw that he would need political support at Carthage if he should try to create in a distant dominion a new type of army for the Republic.

1. Ihne, op.cit., ii. 144.
Chapter VI.

Between the First and the Second Punic Wars.

The treaty that ended the First Punic War left Carthage in a crippled condition, as indeed the Romans intended that it should do. It was clear that as soon as they themselves had recovered from the long exhausting war, they would do their utmost to complete her ruin; fortunately for her, they were kept busy establishing their rule in Sicily, and later in Sardinia, as well as fighting with huge Gallic hordes. The Carthaginians none the less knew that Rome was still too powerful to offend, and many years elapsed before they could openly begin preparations for vengeance.

Their system of employing mercenaries had been struck a severe blow by the treaty-clause that prohibited them from hiring any mercenaries in Italy or in any territory allied with Rome. Although Carthage was given special permission at the time of the Truceless Year to raise a mercenary force that included Italians, it was plain that Rome would do all in her power to prevent her defeated rival from hiring the Campanians who, in spite of their insubordination and treachery, had done Carthage so much service in the past. Moreover, the clause

1. Polybius 11.22. 9-11.
2. Polybius is our most trustworthy historian for this period. He makes it clear that there was a widespread desire among the Carthaginians for vengeance (iii. 8, 10, 13).
3. Appian v.2.2; Zonaras viii. 17.
4. Appian v.2.3; viii.1.5; Zonaras viii.17.
made it clear that any increase of Rome's dominion would mean a diminution of the field in which Carthage could hope to hire mercenaries in the future. In any case, the great Mercenary Revolt had brought home to the Carthaginian mind the dangers inherent in the use of hired foreigners.

The changes in Carthaginian political and military organisation were largely due to Hamilcar Barca, who, as head of the "war party", was given a position as permanent commander-in-chief. In this original appointment there was little to arouse Roman suspicion, for beside the smouldering embers of the great revolt, Carthage had to deal with insurrections among her Numidian subjects, whom as yet Rome had had no opportunity of organising against her. So far as the citizens of Carthage were concerned, Hamilcar appears to have had comparatively little hope that he could collect enough military force for a war of revenge; he no doubt felt that the ordinary Carthaginian, however great his hatred of Rome, could not be counted on as a fighting man --- not that Carthaginians were cowardly but because the creation of a large citizen-army would defeat its own ends by disrupting the economic system. Again, he must have realised how necessary it was to make all

1. Appian vi.1.5. See Mommsen, op.cit., ii.235, for a discussion of Hamilcar's policy.
2. According to Dio Cassius (xii.48), when Hamilcar had been in Spain for six or seven years, the Romans became suspicious of his activities, but he satisfied them that his campaigns against the Spanish tribes were dictated by his desire to pay off the war-indemnity imposed by the Romans, and that there was no other way of raising the money; the Roman envoys fell victims to the common vice of their people --- cupidity.
military preparations far away from the capital and from the spies, who would report them to Rome. The army that was to avenge Carthage's humiliation was to be composed of men personally devoted to him and to his family. So great a distrust of Carthaginian politicians was in his mind, that after he had done his utmost to modify the control exercised by the oligarchy, he made it his aim to keep his army as independent as possible of the home government and to refrain from asking the Senate for financial support. It is likely that he spent a great amount of his personal wealth before his venture in Spain brought in much of a return.

From the scanty data that we possess concerning the great Punic soldier-statesman, we gather that in the creation of his new armies he was guided by the following principles:

(a) His power was to be based primarily on land-forces. There were several reasons for this. Hamilcar had greater talents as a soldier than as a seaman, and from bitter experience he hesitated to trust in an uncertain element. Carthage, moreover, was less of a maritime power than she had been; to rebuild her war-fleet on a great scale would have been to invite premature hostilities with Rome. Accordingly he appears to have retained only so much of a naval force as was needed

1. R. Bosworth Smith, op. cit., p. 152: "he was the head of a minority only, and finding that it was impossible to bring the majority over to his way of thinking, or to reform them by pressure from without, he determined to accept, or it may be, to demand, a post in which he could serve his country more effectually."
to cover the transport of troops from Africa to Spain. In
addition, he realised that because of its very mobility and of
its being largely composed of Carthaginians, a naval force
could never be absolutely under his personal control and in-
fluence.

(b) While retaining the cavalry and elephants that had
so often made Punic armies formidable, he proceeded to create
an infantry force, because the guerilla warfare that he had
waged from Ercole and Eryx had taught him the need for men who
could meet the Roman legionaries on equal terms, men who
were more agile and more able to endure fatigue than the old
Sacred Band had ever been. This meant the end of the tradi-
tional Carthaginian policy of hiring hordes of barbarians at
the beginning of a campaign. The Greek hoplite, who alone
might be hired as a ready-trained mercenary able to confront
the Roman foot-soldier, was out of the question because he
would have to be recruited in a region too likely to come under
Roman influence, and would then have to be sent to a depot at
Carthage before he could join Hamilcar's army in Spain; more-
over, it is doubtful whether many Greek soldiers would have
given the Carthaginian service preference over the more attrac-
tive army-life of Pergamum, Antioch, or Alexandria. Nor could

2. Smith, op.cit., p. 131; Mommsen, op.cit., ii.192. Smith
   (p.134) points out that Hamilcar's own veterans of the
   Sicilian campaign must almost all have perished in the
   Truceless War.
Hamilcar safely use Carthage as a depot: mercenaries coming there would come under the eyes of his own political adversaries and also of Roman spies; even if they were permitted to join the Army of Spain, their stay in Carthage would in one way or another have been a bad prelude to satisfactory service in the new dominion.

(c) It is well known that it took a long time to train the heavy-armed infantryman of the ancient world. A force of soldiers clad in heavy armour could be really effective only after many months of drilling had made of them a single disciplined body, terrible in its precision, skill, and endurance 1. Hamilcar therefore had to replace the haphazard mercenary with the levied soldier, African or Spaniard, who, though Carthage may have been but a name to him, was at least attached to his general and to his comrades. Such a man was not free to take his services elsewhere at a moment's notice when pique or cupidity called him; nor, under proper leadership, would he desire to do so.

(d) Payment of his troops, whether in money or in booty, was a personal matter of the general's; the money did not come from Carthage, but was raised in the newly-acquired lands where loot also was to be obtained as a prize of victory 2.

2. Appian vi. 1. 5.
Indeed Hamilcar had to send money back to the Punic treasury and to his own faction in the capital, to retain his position as colonial governor.

(e) His freedom from Carthaginian interference was assured by the mingled feelings that prevailed at Carthage—a desire to be revenged on Rome, and a fear of being compromised in any act that Rome might consider a cause for war.

(f) When Hamilcar had an adequate force of African and Spanish regulars, he could supplement them with other troops raised as mercenaries from the tribes of Numidia and Gaul, and from the parts of Spain not under Carthaginian domination.

Such were the principles that guided Hamilcar and his successors in the Spanish command. In less than a score of years Carthage transformed her relation with Spain—the southern and eastern parts of Spain, at any rate—from a commercial connexion into an imperial dominion, incorporating into her new colonial forces the Spanish tribes, some by fighting, but more by diplomacy. One cannot but wonder what Mediterranean history would have been if Carthage had had more men like the strong but tactful Hamilcar Barca.

He died in battle in 229 or 228 B.C., and his son-in-law Hasdrubal, who succeeded him, was assassinated in 221.

1. Even during the Second Punic War there was a widespread view at Carthage that military activities should be self-supporting. See Hanno’s speech in Livy xxiii.12.
3. Polybius ii.1.8; Appian vi.1.5. (also Diod.xxv. ech.2 -- Polybius ii.36.1; Appian vi.2.8. (p. 358 of Vol.IX. of the Wesseling edition, for (Hamilcar’s enrolment of captured Spanish tribesmen.
Hamilcar's son, Hannibal the Great, now assumed command of the Carthaginian forces in Spain, being nominated commander-in-chief by a vote of the soldiers themselves with subsequent confirmation by the Senate of Carthage. Mommsen asserts that the appointment was made by "the Carthaginian officers of the Spanish army," but does not state his authority for this limitation; Ihne discusses the point in greater detail, saying that it could not have been an illegal usurpation of authority or a breach of discipline on the part of the soldiers, because of the Carthaginians' subsequent approval of the appointment. According to Ihne, the voting must have been confined to Carthaginian citizens serving in the army, and the whole proceeding must have been rather like the election of a Roman consul by the comitia centuriata. However, from what we know of Hannibal, a child of the camp if ever there was one, we may well believe that the voting was much more general and included the whole regular force at least. Ihne himself says:

"That the Carthaginians intentionally left to their armies a voice in the election of generals is clear from a proceeding in the war with the mercenaries, when the army is allowed to decide whether Hamilcar or Hanno is to command it. -- See Polybius, i. 82".

1. Appian vi.2.8; Polybius ii.36.3; Zonaras xiii.211; Livy xxi. 3.
3. But perhaps Ihne is influenced by Livy's use of the Roman terms. Ihne is really referring to the similar election of Hasdrubal by the soldiers after Hamilcar's death, but the point at issue is the same. Cf. Diod. xxv. ecl. 2 (p. 357 of Vol. IV. of the Wesseling edition).
4. That the commons of Carthage had a voice in such matters seems borne out by Polybius's remark that the multitude was supreme at Carthage (vi. 51).
Hannibal's position at the beginning of the Second Punic War was, indeed an anomalous one, and there has been great disagreement among both ancient and modern authors as to whether the great struggle was due to the Barcine family's hatred of Rome, or whether the government approved of the preparations which it must have known to be proceeding in Spain. In other words, was Hannibal an irresponsible mercenary-captain, or was he the recognised leader of the levied troops of the Carthaginian empire? The general view of modern writers appears to be that the government of Carthage, at the time of Hannibal's assumption of command, knew of his plans and approved them, whatever its attitude may have been toward his predecessors. Nevertheless, the student of the Second Punic War must always feel that it was from Carthaginian Spain, not from Carthage herself, that the great blow was launched at the Roman State.

Hannibal spent the years 221 and 220 in subduing some of the Spanish tribes south of the Ebro. In these operations, as well as after the fall of Saguntum in 219, he undoubtedly made the hope of booty a great incentive and also took care to discharge faithfully any arrears in his soldiers' pay, but these actions do not justify our describing his

1. Mommsen, op.cit., ii. 246, asserts that Hannibal began the war on his own responsibility. For the opposite view see Ihne, op.cit., ii. 149-151, 162, 217, 426, 453, and also B. L. Hallward, ch. ii. of Vol. VIII. of the Camb. Anc. Hist., "Hannibal's Invasion of Italy", p. 31.
2. Polybius iii. 17. 7, 10-11; Livy xxi. 5.
original force, the army that invaded Italy, as an army of mercenaries. After all, few armies of ancient times were unmoved by the hope of pay and of plunder. And even the anti-Carthagenian Livy lays very little emphasis on pay and plunder as maintaining the loyalty of Hannibal's men. They seem to have been personally devoted to him, and to have regarded themselves as something higher than paid servants of a foreign master. Hannibal's camp was their fatherland. Perhaps, like some of the long-service professional troops of the successors of Alexander, they hoped to be rewarded at the end of their campaigning with a piece of farm-land somewhere in the domains of their victorious leader; if Livy is to be believed, another inducement held out by Hannibal was the gift of Carthaginian citizenship. This promise, however, was not made till the great contest with Rome had begun. If any of the above circumstances made Hannibal's soldiers mercenaries, then the same reproach applies to the soldiers of Marius and of Sulla, of Pompey, of Antony, of Caesar, and of Octavian.

1. Ihne, op. cit., II. 152, has an excellent summary of Carthaginian preparations for the Second Punic War: "The Iberian tribes, subjected by force of arms or conciliated by peaceful negotiations and readily submitting to Carthaginian authority, furnished for the army an abundant supply of volunteers or compulsory recruits (Livy xxi. 11,21) in place of the inconstant Gallic mercenaries, of whom the Carthaginian army was mainly composed in the first war. The Libyan subjects were reduced to obedience, and furnished excellent soldiers. The Numidians, more closely united with Carthage than ever before..., supplied a light cavalry that could not be matched by the Romans."


3. Livy xxi. 45.
Chapter VII.

The Second Punic War.

The Second Punic War is so vast and complex a struggle, with such uncertainty as to numbers, dates, and localities, that it seems to me advisable to state my general view of the mercenary problem before going into detail. In brief, the matter may be summed up thus: the army with which Hannibal marched across the Rhone after the taking of Saguntum, consisted not of mercenaries but of long-service professional soldiers over whom Carthage claimed territorial dominion. Unlike most of the great expeditions of Carthage in the past, Hannibal's Italian campaign was not preceded by the activity of recruiting-officers in admittedly foreign countries --- at least, there seems to be no record of such activity. The soldiers came in the main from the African and Spanish provinces of Carthage. If there were any mercenaries in this original army of Hannibal's, they were either light-armed troops from Liguria and the Balearic Islands 1, or else specialists like the so-called Indians who drove the Punic elephants 2. As the expedition moved into Gaul, it took

1. The first Ligurians mentioned in this war were used as garrison troops in Spain, left behind with Hasdrubal (Livy xx1.22; Polybius iii. 33.16). A detachment of Balearian slingers was sent to Africa, according to Polybius ---kept in Spain, Livy says. We have no evidence showing that the Balearic Islands were under the domain of Carthage (Griffith, op.cit., p.228).

2. Polybius iii.46; Appian vii. 7. 41. We do not know for certain whether elephant-drivers in general were called Indians. See Liddell and Scott, s.v. Ἰνδίς.
local volunteers into the service of Carthage, both Gauls and Ligurians. To replace casualties during the long campaign, Hannibal and his brothers obtained reinforcements not in the main from Africa, but from Gaul and Spain, and also from the Bruttians and Lucanians who joined Hannibal as allies against Rome. The progress of the war brought about a weakening of Carthaginian authority in Spain, so that the soldiers who were recruited there for Hannibal joined as mercenaries rather than as levied subjects. On the whole we may say that Hannibal raised and employed mercenaries as circumstances dictated, but that his main military strength was due to long-service troops from the Punic dominions in Africa and Spain, or else to allies like the Numidians, who through many years of service under Hannibal came to regard him, and not their far-away princes and chieftains, as their lord and master. We must also remember that the anti-Carthaginian bias of Polybius and Livy has accentuated the mercenary element in their descriptions of the armies that confronted the citizen-militia of Rome.

1. The warlike tribes of the Spanish interior, including the Celtiberians, were never conquered by the Barcids, so that if they took service with the Carthaginians it must have been as mercenaries. See Griffith, p.226, and Niebuhr, ii.79, 209.

2. Griffith, op.cit., p.227. See also Ihne, op.cit., ii.152: "The Libyans and Numidians .... served rather the generals than the commonwealth of Carthage."

3. The most conspicuous example is Polybius vi.52, but other examples are very numerous, especially in Livy, e.g. xxii. 43 ; xxiii. 5 ; 28 ; xxiv. 18 ; xxvi. 43.
And now we return to Hannibal's army as it opens the campaign. Too much has been made of the way in which Africa was garrisoned with Spanish troops and Spain with Africans ¹, as though Hannibal did not trust his men; had this been so, he would scarcely have sent potential rebels to localities where his own political opponents at Carthage could foment trouble amongst them. His Africans were probably sent to Spain merely because they were better soldiers ² and would soon be needed, and the sending of Spanish levies to African posts is no doubt to be regarded as similar to the way in which the British War Office at the beginning of the War of 1914 replaced regular troops in India with Territorials.

Until Hannibal had crossed the Alps he received little real aid from the Gauls, who did not join him in any number till the Battle of the Ticinus ³, when a large contingent deserted the Romans, with whom they were serving as auxiliaries. It is not easy to say whether at this stage the Gauls with Hannibal's army regarded themselves as mercenaries of Carthage or as free allies making common cause against Rome ⁴.

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¹. Livy xxxi. 21; Polybius iii. 33.
². Cf. what Frontinus says of the Africans as compared with the Spaniards, minus viribus firmi, sed animi constantiores (Strat. ii.3.1).
³. Livy xxxi. 48; Polybius iii. 66-68. Polybius (iii.56) says that after the passage of the Alps Hannibal's army numbered 12,000 African foot and 8,000 Iberian, with not more than 6,000 cavalry.
⁴. Livy, who of course must be read with caution, declares that Hannibal had no Gallic auxiliaries but such as were hired (xxiii. 28).
They gave good service at the Battle of the Trebia, where Hannibal is said to have incorporated them in his battle-line; so did the slingers.

Losses among the Gauls were heavy, as Hannibal seems to have used them to spare his own men. He looked upon them as fickle plunderers who could not be trusted, and as poor military material when it came to enduring hardships. His callousness toward their lives during the passage of the Etruria recalls the old Punic attitude toward the wholesale slaughter of the barbarian hireling. The fact that most of the Carthaginian dead after the Battle of the Trasimene Lake were Gauls is probably due as much to Hannibal's deliberate sacrifice of them as to their own lack of defensive armour and of discipline. Other things, besides his tactical use of them, show that he regarded them as cheap mercenary troops. First, he made it his policy, according to Appian, to make them the special recipients of booty—not as a reward for distinguished service but rather as a guarantee against defection; he knew that his regular troops did not need to be

1. Polybius iii. 72.8. Livy (xxi. 56) represents the Gauls as being used as supporting troops for the Africans.
2. Polybius, loc. cit.; Livy xxii. 15.
3. Livy is fond of dwelling on this failing of the Gauls. In the year 194 B.C., when fighting the Romans, they gave way in a battle, he says, because of heat and fatigue and thirst (xxxiv. 48). Cf. Dio Cassius xiv. 6b.
4. Polybius iii. 79; Livy xxii. 2.
5. Polybius iii. 85.5.
6. Appian vii. 2.
bought thus. Secondly, in spite of the deficiencies of the Gallic fighting-equipment, he did not include them with his Africans when he re-armed the latter with captured Roman arms and armour 1, though there was certainly enough of such armament to go round. This is quite the old Punic tradition of allowing mercenaries to fight and be killed in their own way 2.

Just before the Battle of Cannae, according to Livy 3, Hannibal's motley army began to grumble because its pay was in arrears, and it was reported that the mercenaries, the Spaniards especially, had been planning to desert to the enemy. In view of Polybius's statement that Hannibal managed to keep his men from sedition toward him or among themselves 4, this proposed desertion seems unlikely. In fact the Carthaginian discipline at this time, on Livy's own showing, compares favourably with the Roman.

1. Polybius iii. 87, 114; Livy xxii. 46. It is true that Hannibal did not re-arm the Spaniards either, but they do not seem to have needed it. Their lighter armament (Livy xxii. 18) was easier to replace.

We are scarcely justified in assuming with Ihne, op. cit., ii. 216, and Duruy, op. cit., i. 598, that the Roman armament was superior to that previously used by the African veterans, or with Niebuhr, op. cit., ii. 103, that the Africans had to undergo a long course of instruction in the use of Roman weapons. As Mahaffy (in Duruy, loc. cit.) it was Hannibal's only way of replacing lost and broken weapons.

Cf. the Boers' use of captured British rifles in the Second South African War.

2. A. J. Evans in Freeman, op. cit., iv. 61 n., and M. Cary, op. cit., p. 217, point out that this was characteristic of mercenary armies in general in the fourth, third, and second centuries B.C.

3. Livy xxii. 43.

4. Polybius xi. 19, and cf. Livy's tribute to Hannibal, xxviii. 12. Appian (vii. 17) merely says that just before Cannae Hannibal was afraid lest through shortage of pay and provisions his mercenaries might desert him.
So far as the Battle of Cannae is concerned, the mercenary troops were of secondary importance in contributing to the Carthaginian victory. The Celts or Gauls did good work in the preliminary encounter of cavalry, it is true, and the Celtic infantry died bravely beneath the rush of the Roman legionaries; moreover, upwards of two-thirds of the slain on the Carthaginian side were Celts. The truth is that the Celtic contingent, however gallant, was used by the Punic commander as live bait, and the great proportion of Celtic casualties should not obscure the fact that Cannae was largely a cavalry battle won by the Numidian horsemen ably supported by the African infantry. When Duruy asserted that the Gallic nation was the instrument of all Hannibal’s victories, he was a victim of racial patriotism.

There is one Roman version of the battle which deserves mention here if not credence. According to Appian, 500 Celtiberians pretended to desert to the Romans in the course of the fight. Disarmed and taken to the rear, they turned on the Romans at a critical moment with concealed or captured weapons, and by this treacherous attack helped to win the day for Hannibal. It is just possible that such a thing may have happened, and certainly no Carthaginian general would have

1. Polybius iii. 115; Livy xxii. 47.
2. Polybius iii. 117. The proportion is given as about 4,000 Celts out of an approximate total of 5,700.
3. Duruy, op. cit., i. 611. But cf. Mahaffy ad loc. On the whole the Celts or Gauls appear to have been much inferior to the Ligurians; see Livy xxvii. 48; xxviii. 5.
weighed the lives of 500 mercenaries against the advantage that such a piece of treachery would confer. However, Livy says that such a deed was committed by 500 Numidians, and Frontinus, by 600; Zonaras mentions it, but states neither the number nor the race of the perpetrators; and Polybius does not mention the incident at all.

Even before the Battle of Cannae, Spain as a recruiting-ground for mercenaries was not wholly Carthaginian. Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio had managed to sail past the Pyrenees and to raise several fine auxiliary cohorts from tribes friendly to Rome, most likely in the rugged districts of Northern Spain outside the Carthaginian domains. The Romans realised the fighting qualities of the Spanish peoples well enough to make repeated efforts to interfere with Carthaginian reinforcements from the Peninsula. They also sent envoys to the Ligurians before the Battle of Cannae, expostulating because of the aid that these people had given to Hannibal. It is, however, not easy to consider all Ligurians in the Punic army at this time as mercenaries, since Livy tells us that this nation aided the Carthaginians with their substance as well as with auxiliaries.

The Romans made no fine distinctions between one sort of foe and another. About this time they sent a legion to Cisalpine Gaul as a punitive expedition to harass the homeland of the Gauls already serving with Hannibal, but it was ambushed and utterly destroyed.

1. Livy xxii. 48; Frontinus, Strat. ii. 5. 27; Zonaras ix. 1.
2. Livy xxii. 60; Polybius iii. 99.
3. Livy xxii. 33.
4. Polybius iii. 106. 6.
5. Polybius iii. 118. 6; Livy xxiii. 24.
Cannae marks a turning-point in one respect, namely that after this battle Hannibal, who marched southward, was cut off from further supplies of Gallic mercenaries. He was probably not much depressed by the thought, for he had hopes of winning aid from the civilised Greek and Italians in the South. So little did he strive to add mercenaries to his army that he dismissed 600 Cretans whom he had captured at the Trasimene Lake among the Roman auxiliaries; they were part of a force of archers and slingers that had been sent by Hiero of Syracuse to aid the Romans against the Balearic and Moorish light-armed troops in the Carthaginian army. Hannibal's action was probably due to his hope that better troops would soon come to him from Carthage, along with a supply of money. He did receive a modest reinforcement of this kind after his brother Mago had reported on the Italian triumphs to the Punic Senate, that body decreed that 4,000 Numidians should be sent to Hannibal, with 400 elephants and many talents of silver; arrangements were also made to hire in Spain 20,000 foot and 4,000 to reinforce the Punic armies in both Spain and Italy. If Livy is correct in this assertion, the Carthaginians were again falling back on mercenaries; and yet it is possible that he is really confusing, wholly or in part, an ordinary levy with a recruitment of hired troops.

One thing is fairly certain: after Cannae Hannibal, so long as he remained in Italy, acquired few mercenaries. The Italians and Greeks of Southern Italy who joined his forces fought as allies, not as mercenaries, till his return to Carthage. As is well known, they were disappointingly few for the most part Bruttians and Lucanians. But mercenaries did serve in large numbers with other Carthaginian leaders, especially Hannibal's brothers Hasdrubal and Mago, who are mentioned as enlisting fighting men in Africa, Spain, Gaul, Liguria, and the Balearic Islands as the long war dragged on; from the frequent references to money it would seem that the newly-raised troops were for the most part mercenaries. Some of them were of poor quality, even slaves and malefactors being taken on at least one occasion.

However the Romans might despise such adversaries, it scarcely befitted them to adopt a superior tone. Pay of some

1. Livy (xxii.61) gives a list of the peoples of Italy who joined Hannibal. According to J.S. Reid (vide infra), this list is far from accurate.
3. Some typical instances of Carthaginian recruiting:
   Africa: Livy xxvii.5; xxviii.23; xxix.4; Appian viii.2.9.
   Spain: Livy xxiii.49; xxvii.20; xxviii.1,13; xxx.7; Appian vi.5.
   Gaul and Liguria: Livy xxvii.44; xxviii.46; xxix.5; Appian vi.7.37; viii.2.7-9.
   Balearic Islands: Livy xxvii.20; xxviii.37; Zon.8x.10.
4. Appian viii.4.24; Zonaras ix. 12 (slaves and deserters serve in the army against Scipio in Africa).
kind or another was an important matter in the eyes even of Roman soldiers, those same men who so abominated the very name of mercenary, and it is clear that it was not merely money in lieu of rations. In the later Roman levies could be found many a black sheep --- slave or convicted felon, and in both Spain and Africa Rome did not disdain to assemble its own mercenaries, sometimes giving them the less offensive name of auxiliaries or allies. On more than one occasion Spanish hirelings fought or refused to fight, as Romans and Carthaginians bought their activity or their quiescence, and the capture of Carthaginian money by the Romans produced an immediate result on the Iberian battlefields.

As one reads the account of the Carthaginian attempts to buy the services of fickle barbarians in Spain and to transport them by a dangerous land-route into Italy that they might join Hannibal's army, one cannot help wondering whether the great Carthaginian ever approved of such a policy. It seems very unlikely. His repeated but unavailing petitions to the Carthaginian Senate for money show that he would rather have spent the money himself in hiring mercenaries of better quality. Carthage, however, had its

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1. Livy xxiii. 20; xxiv. 10.
2. Livy xxiii. 21.
3. Livy xxiv. 11, 16; Appian vii.5.27; Zonaras ix.2.
4. Livy declares that the Romans considered manumitted slaves likely to make better soldiers than ransomed captives could be (xxii.57).
5. Livy xxiv.49; xxvi.43; Zonaras ix.17.
7. Appian (vii.8.54) says that after the defeat of the Metaurus Carthage tried to send Hannibal reinforcements, but was thwarted by Roman sea-power.
eyes on Spain, and wished to assure its hold on that region, whatever happened to Hannibal; it also frittered away much useless effort in trying to regain Sardinia¹, whence it had obtained many mercenaries in former wars, and Sicily, though the fate of the latter depended on the fortunes of the war in Italy.

In spite of the difficulties of getting provisions and money, Hannibal managed to maintain excellent discipline among his men², and seldom did an impulse to plunder cause his veterans to ruin his plans through disobedience. The worst mutiny in the Punic expedition, the defection of the half-caste Carthaginian cavalry leader Mutines³, does not appear to have been due to Hannibal's administrative shortcomings, but to the jealousy and incompetency of Hanno⁴; and the point at issue was prestige rather than plunder. Mere mercenaries could not have been trusted, as Hannibal's men undoubtedly were, in a rich country where the enemy's superior numbers made fighting so much less attractive than plundering. Scipio's men in Spain in 206 B.C., who may have been Latin and Italian allies⁵, acted much worse when their pay was in arrears⁶. If the discipline that Hannibal maintained had been matched by that prevailing among the Gauls of Hasdrubal⁷.

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1. Livy xxiii. 40-41. 2. Livy xxiv. 20. 3. Livy xxv. 40; xxvi. 40; Polybius ix. 22. 4. Zonaras (ix. 7) asserts that Mutines had been sent to Sicily because Hannibal had become jealous of his exploits, but even Zonaras does not make Hannibal the real cause of the defection of Mutines; it was Hanno, who deprived him of his command. 5. T. Arnold, The Second Punic War, p. 231. 6. Livy xxviii. 24. 7. Livy xxvii. 48; Polybius xi. 11.
and Mago 1, the end of the war might have been very different. So far is Duruy’s assertion from being true, that Hannibal owed his victories to his Gauls 2, that it would be far closer to the mark to say that their insubordination, their drunkenness, and their inability to endure fatigue and hardship lost the war for Carthage.

The victories of Scipio the Younger in Spain deprived Hannibal of the hope of getting mercenaries from that region in adequate numbers, and when the young Consul won further victories in Africa itself, victories largely due to the allies under Masinissa whom Rome would have called mercenaries if they had been on the opposite side, Hannibal was recalled to Carthage. The Romans afterwards circulated a legend that he punished with death or slavery all the Italian soldiers who refused to accompany him 3. The imputed motive was that he did not wish them to become an accession to the enemy’s forces, and it is indeed likely that there was a slaughter of horses and other animals; this is mentioned by Diodorus and Appian in addition to the alleged butchery of soldiers. But it is very unlikely that Hannibal, however embittered by the sense of failure, could have been such a fool as the legend makes him out to be 4. Whether these men were mercenaries or

1. Livy xxx. 18. 2. Vide supra, p. 87.
4. Mommsen, op. cit., ii.358, swallows the story, as might be expected from a member of a nation which believes in the efficacy of Schrecklichkeit. Smith, op. cit., p. 305, rejects it.
Italian allies whose more obedient comrades saved their lives by becoming mercenaries 1, he must have realised that Carthage would need more soldiers for her last struggle and that it would be sheer insanity to get, throughout the Mediterranean world, a reputation that would deter mercenaries from entering her service. If there is any foundation for the story of the massacre, it may be that Roman intrigues aimed at a treacherous attack during Hannibal's embarkation, a time when his force would be very vulnerable, and that a number of executions were deemed necessary to prevent such an occurrence. Diodorus, who does not like Hannibal, tells of another instance of his cruelty 2: after the return to Africa he is said to have punished with death 4,000 horsemen who, after deserting Syphax for Masinissa, abandoned the latter and came over to him, but such a story proves nothing at all.

We know that mercenaries played a prominent part in the Carthage defensive prior to the Battle of Zama and in the battle itself. Early in 203 B.C. there arrived in Africa a contingent of 4,000 Celtiberians 3, who took part in the Battle of the Great Plains. They were doomed to destruction,

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1. Griffith, who does not even mention the alleged atrocity, says (p.231) that Hannibal's Italian allies, to the number of many thousands, as well as some Greeks, remained with Hannibal "as pure professional soldiers". These Greeks must have come from Magna Gracia, not Greece proper, but see Zonaras, ix.2 (Vol.II., p.148 in the Loeb edition of Dio Cassius), where the Romans seek mercenaries in Greece.
3. Livy xxx. 7; Polybius xiv. 8.
for the Carthaginians on their right and the Numidians on their left gave way; the Celtiberians, thus exposed, who had no hope of pardon at Scipio's hands, died fighting where they stood.

Another mercenary detachment in the Carthaginian army at this time was a body of heavy-armed infantry, "Macedonians" under a commander named Sopater; they numbered 4,000 and had been sent by Philip of Macedon, who was probably their paymaster, for he sent a considerable amount of money with them. There is some doubt, however, as to whether such a Macedonian force was present at Zama; the Romans at any rate made the alleged expedition an excuse for proceedings against Philip.

Appian says that at the time of the Battle of Zama Mago was in Liguria, raising more mercenaries, but this is impossible. Mago had been in Liguria, but according to Livy, who seems more trustworthy here, he had died before the battle on his way home from Sardinia.

The engagement at Zama appears to have been forced on Hannibal, who would have preferred to wait until he had been reinforced by more mercenaries and subject-allies; from the

1. Livy xxx. 26, 33; Frontinus, Strat., i. 5, 16.
2. M. Cary, op. cit., p. 189 n., points out that Polybius makes no mention of a Macedonian contingent in his account of the Battle of Zama. Neither, for that matter, does Appian.
3. Livy xxx. 42.
4. Appian viii. 8. 49; 9, 59.
5. Livy xxviii. 46.
7. Appian viii. 7. 39-40; Livy xxx. 29.
latter he most desired aid in the form of Numidian cavalry to oppose to the horsemen of Masinissa. Some of the Numidians did arrive 3, but not enough to give the Carthaginians a superiority in mounted troops, nor were eighty elephants, hastily collected 2, able to accomplish anything against Scipio's order of battle.

This was really the last fight in which Carthage is known to have used mercenaries. They were a motley lot, like the diverse hordes sent to Sicily in previous campaigns — Ligurians, Gauls, Balearians, Moors, and Numidians from the independent West African kingdoms. According to Livy, there were the old difficulties in regard to language 3: most of the officers had to use interpreters, and even the effect of the battle-cry was impaired by the variety and the dissonance of the many languages.

Light-armed mercenaries to the number of about 12,000, were placed in front of the Carthaginian army. Both Livy and Polybius declare that they fought gallantly but were not supported by the Africans and Carthaginians, who with the Macedonians formed the second line; a third line consisted of Italian troops, mostly Bruttians. Livy says of these that they had followed Hannibal from compulsion rather than choice and that he felt doubtful of them 4, but Polybius tells us

1. Polybius xv. 3.
3. Livy xxx. 33-34. See also Polybius xv. 12.9.
4. Livy xxx. 33, 35.
that they were the most efficient and the steadiest of his troops ¹, and Appian adds that they could best be counted on to acquit themselves manfully, as they had the most to lose if defeated ². It is likely that these Italian soldiers were professionals who in the course of the long campaign in Italy had largely replaced the veterans who had crossed the Alps with Hannibal; in other words, they were well-trained mercenaries, whereas the forward screen of light-armed troops were probably little better than raw recruits. "The more one looks at it the more probable it seems that the third line was not the strongest merely but very much the strongest of the three." ³ Such is the comment of Griffith, who attributes Hannibal's defeat to the weakness of the cavalry that protected his wings, and this opinion is supported by Polybius's vindication of the great commander's tactical dispositions ⁴.

So the Second Punic War ended. If anyone is inclined to blame mercenary troops for the Carthaginian collapse, two things should first be carefully considered ⁵. The first is the Roman peace-treaty that absolutely prohibited Carthage

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1. Polybius xv. 15.3.
2. Appian viii.7. 40.
4. Polybius, loc.cit.
5. It is true that the unsatisfactory behaviour of the Gauls in the armies of Hasdrubal and of Mago had much to do with the failure of Hannibal in Italy, but my point is that they were unsatisfactory not because they were mercenaries but because they were Gauls. The same vices of inconstancy, indolence, turbulence, cupidity, and drunkenness appear in the campaigns where the Gauls are fighting, not for a foreign master, but for their own homes and freedom.
from hiring any more mercenary soldiers. Rome may have despised the mercenary soldier, but she feared him nevertheless. It is true that Polybius does not mention this clause of the treaty at all, and that Appian makes it apply to Celts and Ligurians only. On the other hand, the jealous Republic that handed Carthage over, disarmed, to the attacks of Masinissa is not likely to have permitted her to retain the power of purchasing foreign aid.

The second argument against undervaluing the Carthaginian mercenary is the growing tendency of Rome during and after the war to use mercenaries herself. We may recall the Cretans sent by Hiero of Syracuse, men whom Rome did not refuse to employ and whom Hannibal captured and allowed to go free; the Cenomanni and other tribes of Cisalpine Gaul who served on the Roman side at the beginning of the war, the Punic deserters of various races, the Spaniards and Celtiberians whom Rome bought by the thousand, and the Numidian loothunters of Masinissa. Of such auxiliaries Thue has well said:

"All these troops were animated, not by patriotism or a sense of duty, but by the hope of gain; and if we are justified

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1. Dio Cassius xvii. 57. 82.
2. Appian viii. 8. 54. But in viii. 6. 32, Scipio, even before Hannibal has landed in Africa, is represented as making the prohibition absolute. Cf. viii. 9. 59.
3. Livy xxii. 26, 55.
4. E.g. Livy xxvii. 46; xxv. 47; xxvii. 8.
5. E.g. Livy xxiv. 49; xxv. 32.
6. Appian viii. 2. 12.
in assuming that the Roman, Latin, and Sabellian soldiers were originally inspired by higher motives, still they could not fail to be affected by the character of their mercenary comrades" 1.

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1. Ihne, op.cit., ii. 469. The same writer (ii. 411) points out that the Romans took into their service as mercenaries the whole Aetolian nation.
Chapter VIII.

The Third Punic War. Conclusion.

Whether the treaty of 201 B.C. did or did not expressly forbid Carthage to hire mercenaries, other things were calculated to produce such a result: the huge indemnity, the cession of territory, the surrender of ships and of elephants, and the jealous surveillance exercised by Masinissa. The defeated African Republic appears to have refrained, at least for many years, from giving Rome any pretext for renewed hostilities. Hannibal himself strove for peace, whatever hopes he may secretly have cherished of ultimate revenge. For anti-Roman insurrections among some of the barbarous peoples who had served as Punic mercenaries in the past --- like the operations conducted by Hamilcar, a former officer of Hannibal's, among the Gauls and Ligurians, or the activities of the 10,000 Celtiberian mercenaries in the service of the Turditi in B.C. 195, Carthage cannot be held responsible. There is a possibility, however, that as Masinissa's aggressions became more and more intolerable, the Carthaginians may secretly have begun arrangements for the hiring of mercen-

1. Polybius xv. 18, 19; Appian viii. 9, 55.
2. Livy xxxi. 10; Dio Cassius xviii. 58. 5; Zonaras ix. 15-16.
3. Livy xxxiv. 17; Zonaras ix. 17.
aries for their defence. There are a few vague references to auxiliaries and allies collected or hoped for. Mommsen declares, as usual without giving his sources, that about 154 B. C. the patriotic party in Carthage "formed out of the free Numidians a numerous army under Arcobarzanes, the grandson of Syphax". Niebuhr goes so far as to say of the Carthaginians of this period:

"Their previous misfortunes had not made them more warlike; they did not do what Machiavelli wished to be done for his native city, and had not yet come to the conviction that they must rely upon their own valour, and at the same time lighten the burdens of their subjects. The evils of their military system had not been removed, and their armies still consisted of mercenaries." 

On the other hand Appian, who does not usually minimise any Roman achievement, expressly declares that after Scipio Nasica and Cornelius Hispanus had imposed upon the Carthaginians the brutal terms that drove them to make their last desperate stand: "They had neither mercenary nor friend nor ally, nor opportunity to obtain them", and his words just previous to this passage imply that the soldiers lost in the unsuccessful war with Masinissa were Carthaginians.

1. Notice the references to the Carthaginian captain of auxiliaries (if ὁ βοηθόρχος means this) in Appian viii. 10. 68, 70; 11. 74. Allies of Carthage are alluded to in Polybius xxxvii. 9, and Zonaras ix. 26, 27, 29.
This is a virtual repetition of viii. 11. 76.
5. οὐκ ἄνδρας οὖν ἱκανούς ἱκανούς ἀπομαχεσθαί πέντε μαυριδῶν ἔναυχος διετίθεσθαί.
Notice however such a name as that of Hamilcar the Samnite (viii. 10. 70). He was apparently not a mercenary.
Summing up, we may say that, though the Carthaginians did arm the slaves of the city for the last defence ¹, there is no satisfactory evidence for the statement that mercenaries aided the unfortunate Republic in her last struggle.

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In concluding this study of the mercenary system of Carthage, I shall recapitulate the main points as follows:

(a) The Carthaginians, though not a military people, were not cowards, and when well-trained and well-led, could be formidable antagonists.

(b) Their use of mercenary troops was prompted by a desire to economise the lives of their own people and to prevent interference with their ordinary pursuits.

(c) In general, their mercenaries were hired rather with a view to cheapness than to quality; barbarians, especially those from the Western Mediterranean, were preferred to Greeks.

(d) Carthage's troubles with her mercenaries were mainly due to:

i. The wild treacherous nature of the barbarian.

ii. The failure of Carthaginian statesmen and generals to treat them with wisdom and justice.

iii. The short period of service, which was inadequate as a course in civilisation.

iv. The absence of any system enabling a mercenary to win Carthaginian citizenship.

(e) The mercenaries cared little for Carthage but were capable of loyalty to an individual commander who knew how to

¹ Appian (viii. 13. 93) says that before the general arming of the citizens, freedom was proclaimed to the slaves.
handle them with firmness and justice and to gain their respect as a general.

(f) Carthage used mercenaries in large numbers in the period between the Battle of Himera in 480 B.C. and the death of Agathocles in 289 B.C., and in smaller numbers, though still to a considerable extent, in the First Punic War. In the Second Punic War, mercenaries were employed but did not take a leading part in the fighting till the latter part of the contest. They were not used in the Third Punic War.

(g) Many of the troops in the service of Carthage, spoken of by Greek and Roman writers as mercenaries, were rather subject-levies. They might, however, in the course of a campaign, when Carthage's direct control over them was weakened, or under the influence of a general's strong personality, tend to throw off the character of subject-levies and assume that of mercenaries.

(h) On the whole, the purely mercenary element in the Punic army has been exaggerated by both ancient and modern historians.

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Appendix I.
The Ransoming of Carthaginian Mercenaries.

Ihne (op. cit., ii. 99 n.) goes too far when he says that it is probable that the Carthaginians never ransomed their mercenaries. Livy, xxi. 41, declares that the Carthaginians had to ransom Hamilcar Barca's garrison at Eryx for 18 denarii a head. These men were nearly all mercenaries. Zonaras, viii. 16, mentions payment being made by Carthage as ransom for prisoners taken by the Romans toward the end of the First Punic War, but does not specify whether mercenaries were included. He says that the two sides exchanged their captives man for man and that as the Carthaginians had lost more men taken prisoner than the Romans, they had to make up the difference with money-payments. It is hard to see how they could avoid ransoming mercenaries on this occasion, since the Romans would scarcely have allowed any discrimination that would have left them with valueless captives on their hands.

Dio Cassius, xiv. 15, mentions an exchange of prisoners on a somewhat similar basis in the Second Punic War. Here Hannibal may have been willing to ransom mercenaries because of the difficulty of getting fresh troops from Carthage, as well as to get rid of Roman prisoners who were an encumbrance. See also Livy xxii. 23.

1. Zonaras also tells us (viii. 17) that at the end of the First Punic War the Carthaginians were compelled to ransom their men who had deserted or had been captured; this again would seem to include mercenaries, since the Romans wanted as much ransom-money as possible.
Appendix II.

Carthage and the Alliance against Pyrrhus.

Polybius, iii.25, gives details of the treaty made in 279 B.C. by the Carthaginians and the Romans against King Pyrrhus of Epirus. One clause of this treaty says that in case of either of the contracting parties' requiring assistance, the Carthaginians are to provide the necessary ships, but that each party shall provide the pay for its own men. This does not of necessity mean that Carthage was using mercenaries, as the word for pay, τά ὅψωνία, means rather money granted in lieu of rations. See Griffith, op. cit., ὅψωνία, in his index on p. 325.
Appendix III.

"Latro" Equivalent to Mercenary.

There is an interesting note in Julius Brix's edition of Plautus's Trinummus (line 599), which I quote here as illustrative of the Roman contempt for mercenaries:


Cf. also Festus, quoted by W. Y. Tyrrell, verse 74 of the latter's edition of the Miles Gloriosus:

"latrones" : qui conducti militabant."
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