AN EVALUATION OF THE AIMS OF EDUCATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA
IN TERMS OF THE EMOTIVE THEORY OF ETHICS

BY

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Date June 20, 1963
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AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT
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M. A.

IN THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

THE OBJECT OF THIS STUDY IS TO EVALUATE THE AIMS OF EDUCATION IN A
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IN TERMS OF AN ETHICAL THEORY WHICH IS COMPATIBLE
WITH THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY WHICH INSPIRES THAT SOCIETY. EVIDENCE IS GIVEN TO
SHOW THAT BRITISH COLUMBIA IS A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IN THE SENSE THAT
IT IS COMPOSED OF A NUMBER OF SOCIAL GROUPS WHICH HOLD DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF
VALUES, AND BECAUSE IT EXHIBITS A PRIMARY CONCEPT OF WIDESPREAD CONCERN FOR
THE VALUE OF INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP FREEDOM IN ANY ISSUES WHICH DO NOT
DIRECTLY INVOLVE THE SAFETY OF THE STATE.

FURTHER EVIDENCE IS GIVEN TO SHOW THAT SUCH A SOCIETY OPERATES ON THE
PRACTICAL BASIS THAT VALUES ARE RELATIVE RATHER THAN ABSOLUTE. THE STUDY
THUS PROPOSES A PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM KNOWN AS THE EMOTIVE THEORY OF ETHICS
AS THE BEST MEANS OF JUSTIFYING SUCH RELATIVITY AND OF SUPPLYING A METHOD OF
REACHING AGREEMENT WHEN DISPUTES BETWEEN DIFFERENT VALUE SYSTEMS ARISE.

FINALLY IT IS SHOWN THAT OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF THE AIMS OF THE
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OF BRITISH COLUMBIA ARE VAGUE AND LACKING IN LOGICAL
COHERENCE, MAINLY BECAUSE THEY ARE BASED UPON A THEORETICAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF ABSOLUTE VALUES WHICH IS IMPRACTICAL AMONG THE MULTITUDE OF GROUPS WHICH COMPRISE THE SOCIETY. THEREFORE, SINCE THERE IS A LACK OF AGREEMENT UPON THE ENDS AND MEANS OF MORAL EDUCATION, RECENT OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS HAVE TENDED TO AVOID SPECIFIC MENTION OF MORAL EDUCATION AND REPLACE IT BY INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION AS THE PRIME AIM OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM.

The study concludes with the suggestion that, in a society where values are to all practical purposes relative to individuals and groups, formal training in the nature of morals is essential to national survival. It further suggests that such training might best follow the direction given by the emotive theory of ethics, since this theory provides the most satisfactory explanation of relative values. Suggestions are also made concerning the means of including formal moral training in the present curriculum without undue disruption.
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INTRODUCTION

This study arose as the result of an attempt to establish a relationship between the type of society which existed in British Columbia at the time of writing, and the philosophical basis of the aims of the educational system set up to serve that society. It will be shown that the present aims of education do not correspond to the social ethos prevalent in British Columbia, and that this lack of correspondence may be corrected by the adoption of a suitable ethical theory as the basis for the aims of education.

In developing this thesis, it will be necessary to describe the nature of the society involved and to suggest the ethical theory most compatible with the basic ideals of that society. In order that the reader may have some philosophical terms of reference at the beginning, the first chapter involves a brief description of the origin and the fundamental concepts of the emotive theory of ethics. No attempt will be made to justify the epistemological basis of the theory, since this has already been accomplished by scholars in the philosophical school of logical empiricism. The reader will be asked to accept the premise that the emotive theory is a reasonable hypothesis which offers one explanation of the nature of values.

The second chapter will provide the connection between the emotive theory and the type of society which exists in British Columbia. The name chosen in this paper for that type of culture is that of a multi-group liberal democracy. The reader will be asked to accept the value of such a society for the sake of the present argument. It will be shown that, if
SUCH A SOCIETY IS WORTHWHILE, IT CAN BEST BE DEFENDED, JUSTIFIED AND PRESERVED IF ITS MORALITY IS BASED UPON THE EMOTIVE THEORY.

THE THIRD CHAPTER WILL DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GRADUAL GROWTH OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA HAS NOT BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY COMMENSURATE CHANGES IN THE AIDS OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM. IT WILL BE SHOWN THAT:

A. THE PRESENT STATEMENT OF AIDS OF EDUCATION LACKS CLARITY AND COHERENCE, SINCE IT IS NOT THE PRODUCT OF CONSISTENT AND LOGICAL CONSIDERATION.

IF THERE IS ANY DEFINITE PHILOSOPHICAL BIAS, IT SEEMS TO BE IN THE DIRECTION OF ETHICAL ABSOLUTISM.

B. SUCH A BASIS IS PARTICULARLY UNSUITABLE TO A MULTI-GROUP DEMOCRACY WHICH OPERATES BOTH PRACTICALLY AND THEORETICALLY UPON THE BASIS THAT VALUES ARE RELATIVE.

C. A SURVIVAL OF THE PREVIOUS TENDENCY TO REGARD VALUES AS ABSOLUTE HAS LED TO A DECLINE IN THE TRADITIONAL EMPHASIS UPON CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT IN EDUCATION, BECAUSE THE INCREASING NUMBER OF ETHICALLY DIVERGENT GROUPS IN THE SOCIETY HAS LED TO AN INCREASING LACK OF AGREEMENT UPON THE ENDS AND MEANS OF THAT TYPE OF EDUCATION.

THE FOURTH CHAPTER WILL INVOLVE REASONING CONCERNING THE NECESSITY OF MORAL EDUCATION IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, AND WILL SUGGEST METHODS BY WHICH SUCH EDUCATION MAY BE CARRIED OUT IN A CULTURE COMPOSED OF A VARIETY OF GROUPS AND VALUE SYSTEMS.
CHAPTER I

THE EMOTIVE THEORY OF VALUE

The emotive theory of ethics has been derived from the epistemological doctrines of a philosophical movement known by the various names of positivism, logical positivism, scientific empiricism, analytical philosophy, and logical empiricism. Since recent trends seem to favour the latter term, it will be used throughout this paper. Logical empiricism is said to have originated with a group founded by Mortitz Schlick (1882-1936) and termed the Vienna Circle. It followed the empiricist tradition originating with Hobbes and growing with the works of Hume, Berkeley, Russell and Wittgenstein to the point where, in the early years of this century, logical empiricism became the philosophy of the scientific revolution. The modern exponents include A.J. Ayer and H. Feigl. The main contention of this school is that cognitively meaningful statements, i.e. those which can be termed either true or false, must fall into one of two categories; (A) analytical, or (B) empirical.

A. Analytical statements, such as those of logic and mathematics, may be said to be true or false because they are tautological rules of language. Thus '2+2=4' may be said to be a true proposition because '2+2' is simply another way of saying '4' (by definition). In other words, 'analytical statements are true because they embody nothing but rules to which any language must conform if it is to
DESCRIBE THE FACTS WITHOUT CONTRADICTION.\textsuperscript{1}

B. **Empirical statements are those derived from observations of a sensory nature; for example, "Gold is malleable." If a statement is to qualify for this category, it must be capable of verification by means of sense-experience, and can claim only varying degrees of probability rather than absolute truth.**

Empirical statements can be tested by the famous principle of verification, stated by Feigl as follows:

A sentence is meaningful in the sense of conveying information (true or false) regarding matters of fact, if and only if, it is in principle capable of at least partial and/or indirect confirmation (or disconfirmation) by means of some data of observation.\textsuperscript{2}

Strictly speaking, the logical empiricist will grant cognitive meaning only to those statements which can be verified by sense experience at any time in the future. The statement that gold is malleable contains terms whose meaning is familiar; the connection between these terms may be tested by anyone who has a hammer and a piece of gold. On the other hand, if I say that I had a headache yesterday, I cannot verify my statement since I cannot indicate a course of action which an observer might follow to verify it in terms of his own personal sense experience.\textsuperscript{3} Practically, this type of verification is unattainable in many scientific and historical

\textsuperscript{1}Herbert Feigl, "Aims of Education in Our Age of Science; Reflections of a Logical Empiricist," *Modern Philosophy of Education*, 54 y.b., N.S.S.E., Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1954, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.

HYPOTHESES AND THUS THE PROBABILITY THAT THEY ARE TRUE DIMINISHES ACCORDINGLY. THIS EXPLAINS THE MULTITUDE OF QUALIFYING PHRASES IN FEIGL'S CRITERION OF MEANINGFULNESS. IT IS WISE TO NOTE THAT LOGICAL EMPIRICISTS ARE PRONE TO USE A LARGE NUMBER OF TERMS TO DESIGNATE THOSE STATEMENTS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING GENUINE ASSERTION, COGNITIVE STATEMENT, VERIFIABLE SYNTHETIC PROPOSITION, FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL STATEMENT, AND MOST SIMPLY, BELIEF. WHEN BELIEF, FOR INSTANCE, IS USED BY EMPIRICISTS IN THIS WAY, IT IS EQUATED WITH DEWEY'S SENSE OF A WARRANTED BELIEF WHICH CAN BE VERIFIED, RATHER THAN IN THE SENSE OF BELIEF IN A MATTER OF FAITH OR SUPERSTITION.

GIVEN THESE TWO CATEGORIES OF STATEMENTS, ANALYTICAL AND EMPIRICAL, AS BEING THE ONLY KINDS WHICH CAN BE SAID TO BE TRUE OR FALSE, WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE ETHICAL STATEMENTS? THE PROPOSITION THAT "EUTHANASIA IS WRONG" IS NOT AN ANALYTICAL ONE SINCE IT EXPRESSES NEITHER A TAUTOLOGY NOR A LINGUISTIC RULE. NOR, ACCORDING TO THE EMPIRICIST, IS THERE ANY WAY OF VERIFYING SUCH A STATEMENT BY MEANS OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE.

THE TWO MAIN TRADITIONAL SCHOOLS OF ETHICS WOULD AGREE THAT THE ABOVE VALUE JUDGMENT CONCERNING EUTHANASIA IS NOT ANALYTIC. THE INTUITIONISTIC ABSOLUTISTS WOULD CLAIM THAT EVEN THOUGH IT CANNOT BE EMPIRICALLY VERIFIED, ONE CAN HAVE AN INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE THAT A VALUE JUDGMENT IS EITHER TRUE OR FALSE. THE EMPIRICIST WOULD REPLY THAT INTUITIVE JUDGMENTS ARE NOTORIOUS FOR THEIR LACK OF UNIVERSAL APPEAL AND THAT IF TWO PEOPLE POSSESS OPPOSING INTUITIONS REGARDING EUTHANASIA THERE IS NO MEANS OF DECIDING WHICH INTUITION IS TRUE.

THE SECOND TRADITIONAL SCHOOL OF ETHICS, DESIGNATED BY G.E. MOORE

Such arbitrary definitions of the nature of good are termed by Moore to be commissions of the 'naturalistic fallacy.' He claims that if you define good as pleasure, you are not giving a statement of fact but simply reciting a tautology; in effect all you are saying is that pleasure is pleasure. Empiricists agree with Moore that the term good is indefinable and that any attempt to equate good with pleasure or interest or happiness lacks the possibility of empirical verification.

To recapitulate, there is agreement between naturalists and empiricists that statements which cannot be empirically verified are neither true nor false but are factually meaningless. On the other hand, intuitionists and empiricists agree that ethical statements cannot be verified by empirical means. Empiricists disagree with both schools in claiming that ethical

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4 Mary Warnock, Ethics Since 1900, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1900, pp. 20–21
STATEMENTS ARE COGNITIVELY MEANINGLESS.

Such disagreement has made necessary the development of a new ethical theory. The first advocates of the emotive theory are considered to be C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards. In a book entitled The Meaning of Meaning published in 1923, they agree with Moore that the term 'good' is indefinable, but where Moore suggests that this is because good is a term which possesses a unique indefinable quality, they claim that in ethical usage the term is cognitively meaningless. They state that "good has no symbolic function, but is used mainly as a collection of homonyms with no common characteristic." Thus when we say 'a good baby,' 'a good bed,' or 'a good god,' the adjective has a different meaning in each case; a meaning which is not factual but emotive, given to expression or evocation of feeling.

The theory that ethical statements are emotive gained many adherents, one of the most effective of whom was A.J. Ayer. A brief passage from his book, Language Truth and Logic, expresses clearly and concisely a rather dogmatic form of the emotive theory. Ethical statements, he claims, are as unverifiable as a cry of pain. The word 'damn' and the statement 'X is good' are alike lacking in factual content; they purely and simply express feeling.

The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content . . . If I say to someone 'you acted wrongly in stealing that money' I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said 'you stole that money.' In adding that this action is wrong, I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it.

This statement of moral disapproval cannot be termed true or false, since it

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CANNOT BE EMPIRICALLY VERIFIED THAT THIEVERY IS WRONG. IN AYER'S VIEW, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF TWO PEOPLE CONTRADICTING EACH OTHER ON A QUESTION OF MORALS, SINCE MORAL VIEW IS FOUNDED UPON FEELING, AND FEELINGS ARE THE RESULT OF INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCES.⁷

Although Ayer suggests in later works that moral statements might sometimes contain more than a simple expression of feeling, his two major assumptions are as follows:

a. Ethical expressions are not empirically verifiable.

b. Ethical terms are purely emotive.

Later emotivists qualified these rather dogmatic statements. C.L. Stevenson also claims that ethical statements are not genuine assertions, where a genuine assertion is defined as one which is empirically verifiable and in which the essential constituents are capable of genuine definition. Where Ayer claims that ethical statements are purely emotive, Stevenson adopts the more reasonable view that only the essential part, the ethical part, is emotive.⁸ He proposes that a statement such as 'X is good' can, in most cases, be analysed into two or more different parts. 'X is good' equals:

A. I approve of X (a verifiable statement of interest) and

B. Something else which is actually indefinable because of its emotive content, but which approaches "so do thou" or "you should do it too."

"I approve of X" coincides with Ayer's point that ethical statements

⁷Warnock, op. cit., pp. 82–83.

⁸Avrum Stroll, The Emotive Theory of Ethics, p. 50.
are descriptive of feelings. Stevenson agrees that this gives information by being an expression of feeling. However, the second indefinable part is evocative; that is, intended to evoke the same feelings in the hearer and to direct his actions. And it is this second portion, be it urging, pleading, suggesting or commanding, which is the essential ethical portion making the statement a value judgment. If it is removed, only the first verifiable statement remains, devoid of ethical content. 

To summarize Stevenson's description of the emotive theory of ethics, an ethical statement may be said to consist of two portions: first a factual statement of interest which is nonessential (in the ethical sense), and secondly an emotional imperative which cannot be said to be true or false but which is essential to the ethical sense of the statement. Stevenson gives an example by means of the statement of a munitions maker that "war is good". When the statement is analysed, it appears that he has said (a) I approve of war, thereby expressing interest, and (b) you should approve of it also. If the interest of the hearer is not the same as expressed in the first portion, then an argument will develop. Stevenson then points out how an analysis of ethical statements into descriptive emotive components may foster agreement.

First, he claims, values are ultimately sanctioned by attitudes which the individual has acquired through heredity and environment. Thus if two individuals disagree concerning a value judgment, the disagreement may arise

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9 ibid., p. 50.  
10 ibid., p. 49.  
Either over factual beliefs regarding the consequences, or over actual interests.\(^{12}\) Now the empirical method is relevant to ethical problems because our knowledge of the world is a determining factor in our self-interest. Thus the argument between the munitions maker and the pacifist may be resolved by an empirical investigation of the consequences of war. If the pacifist can give sufficient evidence that any future war is likely to cause the extermination of mankind, the munitions maker may agree that future wars are not in his interests and may change his statement to "war is bad." But if the empirical evidence does not convince the munitions maker that total war will mean his demise, if he is willing to gamble for the high stakes he will win by manufacture of munitions, then the disagreement cannot be resolved empirically but remains a question of divergent interest. One cannot claim that the original statement is false (as an absolutist or naturalist would wish), since its ethical content removes it from the realm of truth and falsity.

When empirical means have been exhausted in an ethical disagreement, and only a conflict of interest remains, Stevenson suggests that agreement may be attained by persuasion.\(^ {13}\) An appeal to the emotions may resolve the difficulty by changing interests. Other means of reaching agreement, not mentioned by Stevenson, are the use of force, or a tolerant decision by both parties to allow each other to act according to his own interest, provided that the consequences are not disastrous for either; the latter is the spirit


\(^{13}\) C.L. Stevenson, "Ethical Judgments and Avoidability," *Mind*, 1938, p. 348.
OF COMPROMISE DEVELOPED FROM A REALIZATION THAT AN ETHICAL JUDGMENT IS NEITHER TRUE NOR FALSE BUT ONLY RELATIVE TO THE INTERESTS AND ATTITUDES OF THE POSSESSOR.

HERBERT FEIGL IS ONE OF THE MORE RECENT EXPONENTS OF THE EMOTIVE THEORY, IN CONSEQUENCE OF HIS SUPPORT OF LOGICAL EMPIRICISM. HIS CRITERION OF MEANINGFULNESS HAS ALREADY BEEN QUOTED. HE STATES THAT VALUE JUDGMENTS ARE NOT FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL, BUT IMPLICITLY EXPRESS EMOTIONS, ATTITUDES AND INTERESTS. HOWEVER, IN CONTRAST TO THE EARLY EMOTIVISTS WHO WERE PRONE TO CLASS ALL VALUE JUDGMENTS, WHETHER THOSE OF TASTE IN FOOD, AESTHETIC APPRECIATION, OR MORALS, IN THE SAME CATEGORY, FEIGL POINTS OUT THAT MORALS ARE CRUCIAL IN THAT THEY CONSTITUTE JUDGMENTS NOT OF THINGS BUT OF OUR FELLOW MEN.  

THUS, WHILE MORAL JUDGMENTS CANNOT BE SAID TO BE TRUE OR FALSE, WE DO HAVE A CERTAIN CORE OF ETHICS WHICH SEEM COMMON TO ALL MEN AT ALL TIMES SINCE THEY ARISE NATURALLY OUT OF THE HUMAN SITUATION. "GENTLENESS TO CHILDREN IS A GOOD THING" IS NOT A COGNITIVELY MEANINGFUL STATEMENT, BUT IT IS A STATEMENT WITH WHICH MOST PEOPLE WILL AGREE, SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THEIR HEREDITY. A PERSON WHO DOES NOT AGREE IS NOT FLOUTING AN ABSOLUTE TRUTH, BUT THE INTERESTS OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF HIS FELLOWS.

FURTHERMORE, BEYOND THIS BASIC CORE, THERE FLOURISH SYSTEMS OF VALUES WHICH ARE CONSISTENT WITHIN THEMSELVES BUT WHICH DO NOT COINCIDE WITH OTHER SYSTEMS. SINCE NO ONE VALUE SYSTEM CAN BE SAID TO BE THE TRUE ONE, RELATIVITY IN ETHICS IS ADVISABLE. TO QUOTE FEIGL:

LOGICAL EMPIRICIST MORAL PHILOSOPHY (THE EMOTIVE THEORY) MAY BE REGARDED AS RELATIVISTIC IN THAT IT RECOGNIZES MORAL VALUES OR FOR THAT

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14 FEIGL, OP. CIT., P. 326.
MATTER, VALUES OF ANY KIND) AS DEPENDENT ON HUMAN NEEDS AND INTERESTS. A 'CATEGORICAL' IMPERATIVE, I.E., AN UNCONDITIONAL MORAL COMMAND, APPEARS TO BE INEFFECTIVE IN THAT WITHOUT APPEAL TO HUMAN INTERESTS IT WOULD NEVER COME TO BE ADOPTED; AND IT APPEARS ARBITRARY IN THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF A MORAL CODE CAN BE JUSTIFIED ONLY WITH REFERENCE TO THE GOALS OF THE GROUP TO WHICH THE CODE IS TO APPLY. BUT IN VIEW OF THE BASIC AND PRACTICALLY PERMANENT ASPECTS OF THE HUMAN SITUATION THIS 'RELATIVISM' IS NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH A MORAL ANARCHISM, SKEPTICISM, OR NIHILISM. A CERTAIN FRAME OF MORAL PRINCIPLES REFLECTS IN ITS STABILITY THE CONSTANCY OF THE HUMAN-SOCIAL SITUATION. IT IS PRIMARILY WITHIN THAT FRAME THAT WE FIND MORAL DISAGREEMENTS — OFTEN POIGNANT, PAINFUL, EVEN TRAGIC — WHICH CANNOT BE SETTLED BY APPEAL TO LOGIC OR EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. VALUE ATTACHMENTS MAY BE SO INCOMPATIBLE WITH ONE ANOTHER THAT THE ONLY TECHNIQUES AVAILABLE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF DISAGREEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE NONCOGNITIVE.

FROM THIS QUOTE CAN BE SEEN THE GROWTH WHICH HAS OCCURRED FROM THE EARLIER SOMEWHAT DOGMATIC STATEMENTS OF THE EMOTIVISTS. THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY PRESENTS THE MAIN TENETS OF THE EMOTIVE THEORY:

a. Statements which are cognitively meaningful must be either (A) ANALYTIC (TAUTOLOGICAL) OR (B) SYNTHETIC (CAPABLE OF EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION).

b. Ethical statements contain not only expressions of interest or attitude on the part of the speaker, which are empirically verifiable, but also an essential constituent which is not empirically verifiable and without which the statement is not ethical.

c. The essential constituents of ethical statements are emotive in nature; they do not convey information but are intended to evoke emotions or actions in the hearer which are agreeable to the interest of the speaker.

d. Since the interests of individuals vary as the result of

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\[ \text{15}^\text{ibid.}, \text{p. 330}\.]
HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT, THE ETHICAL VALUES WHICH ARE A RESULT OF THOSE INTERESTS WILL VARY. AND SINCE ETHICAL VALUES CONTAIN ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS WHICH RENDER THEM COGNITIVELY MEANINGLESS AND THUS NEITHER TRUE NOR FALSE, VALUES OR SYSTEMS OF VALUES MUST BE TERMED RELATIVE TO INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS; I.E. THAT NO SINGLE STATEMENT OF VALUE OR SYSTEM OF VALUES CAN BE DESCRIBED AS RIGHT FOR ALL MANKIND.

E. IN THE CASE OF A DISAGREEMENT OVER A VALUE JUDGMENT, EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION MAY PREDICT THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE JUDGMENT ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE PRODUCTIVE OF THE INTEREST OF ONE OF THE DISPUTANTS, OR PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT MAY ALTER THE INTEREST ITSELF. IF NEITHER COURSE IS SUCCESSFUL IN RESOLVING THE ARGUMENT, THEN THE ONLY POSSIBILITIES REMAINING ARE THE ACQUIESCENCE OF ONE PARTY, OR COMPROMISE WHICH ALLOWS EITHER PARTY TO PURSUE ITS INTEREST WITHOUT INTERFERENCE WITH THE OTHER.
CHAPTER II

A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE EMOTIVE THEORY OF ETHICS WITHIN A MULTI-GROUP, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

The main tenets of the emotive theory of ethics have been outlined. Before using them as a measure of the validity of the aims and purposes of education in British Columbia, the theory itself must be shown to be compatible with the aims of the type of society involved, best described as a 'multi-group democracy' or a 'liberal democracy.'

The discussion will involve:

A. A description of what is meant by the term democracy, touching upon the basic disagreement in ethics which exists between Marxist democracy and liberal democracy.

B. A description of what is involved in the term liberal democracy, with emphasis upon those concepts which are of particular concern in ethical matters. Two important concepts are that individuals or groups within a society have a right to a measure of freedom from government constraint, and that major decisions taken by the government are the province of the majority of citizens.

1. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Since the aim of this description of democracy is to demonstrate the use of the emotive theory as a logical basis for a system of ethics, characteristics of democracy other than ethical will be ignored. Similarly a very brief statement only concerning the historical origins of the two
CONCEPTS WILL BE PROVIDED. ALSO, SOME TECHNICAL TERMS MUST BE DEFINED BEFORE THE MAIN ARGUMENT IS DEVELOPED.

AN ETHICAL THEORY IS ONLY INDIRECTLY PRACTICAL; IT IS SIMPLY A HYPOTHESIS WHICH ENDEAVOURS TO EXPLAIN HOW MEN FORM VALUE JUDGMENTS. SUCH DERIVED KNOWLEDGE IS OF INTEREST TO ANY TYPE OF SOCIETY WHICH CONCERNS ITSELF WITH THE NATURE OF THINGS. HOWEVER, IF, BY CHANCE, A SOCIETY ARISES WHICH HOLDS ETHICAL VIEWS COMPATIBLE WITH A PARTICULAR THEORY, THEN THAT SOCIETY WOULD DO WELL TO EMBRACE THE LOGICAL COROLLARY FOR ITS ETHICS AND ENSURE, BY EDUCATIONAL MEANS OR OTHERWISE, THAT SUCH KNOWLEDGE HAS A WIDE CIRCULATION AMONG ITS MEMBERS. MANY PEOPLE BELIEVE THERE IS A HIGH PROBABILITY THAT VALUES ARE RELATIVE RATHER THAN ABSOLUTE RULES OF CONDUCT WHICH ALL SHOULD OBEY. THIS CONVICTION MAY RESULT FROM THE FACT THAT THEY LIVE IN A SOCIETY WHICH SEEMS TO REGARD THEM SO. IF VALUES ARE NOT RELATIVE, THEN A SOCIETY WHICH WORKS ON THAT BASIS WILL HAVE BRIEF EXISTENCE. IF VALUES ARE RELATIVE, THE SOCIETY WHICH FUNCTIONS ON THAT BASIS IS MORE LIKELY TO SURVIVE AND FUNCTION WELL IF ITS MEMBERS ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ETHICAL THEORY WHICH SUPPORTS RELATIVITY. HENCE, A PRACTICAL APPLICATION FOR AN ETHICAL THEORY IS PERMISSIBLE.

IN THIS PAPER, THE TERM 'SOCIETY' WILL BE CONFINED TO THE CULTURAL UNIT OF THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED.

THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING TERMS IS A CRUCIAL ONE IN ANY DISCUSSION OF SUCH HIGHLY EMOTIONAL WORDS AS ARE ENCOUNTERED IN POLITICS. DEMOCRACY IS A WORD WITH STRONG EMOTIVE UNDERTONES. IN A SYMPOSIUM CONDUCTED BY U.N.E.S.C.O. CONCERNING WORLD OPINION OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF DEMOCRACY, THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE EDITOR INCLUDED THE REALIZATION THAT FOR ALL
GROUPS, DEMOCRACY IS A WORD OF TREMENDOUS EMOTIONAL APPEAL; IN SOME CASES, A SACRED WORD.¹ MAURICE CRANSTON, IN A BOOK ENTITLED FREEDOM, A NEW ANALYSIS, USES THE TERM ‘HURRAH WORD’ TO DESCRIBE THOSE WORDS WHICH SHARE A BASIC DESCRIPTIVE MEANING WITH A POWERFUL EMOTIONAL APPEAL. THUS, IF WE SAY THAT WE LIVE IN A DEMOCRACY, WE ARE ALSO INCLUDING A CHEER FOR THAT FORM OF GOVERNMENT. THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY INVOLVES A PLETHORA OF WORDS WITH HIGH EMOTIONAL CONTENT, INCLUDING FREEDOM, LIBERTY, MORALITY, TYRANNY, AND LICENCE. THE LATTER TWO HAVE A PERJORATIVE EMOTIONAL CONTENT AND MAY BE TERMED ‘BOO-WORDS.’²

TO COMPLICATE MATTERS FURTHER, SOME WORDS MAY HAVE A DIFFERENT EMOTIONAL CONTENT DEPENDING UPON WHO IS USING THEM. DEMOCRACY WAS A PERJORATIVE WORD IN THE THIRD REICH; IT RETAINED THE DESCRIPTIVE IMPORT GIVEN IT BY WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, BUT WAS USED AS A TERM OF CONTEMPT. ‘LIBERAL’ POLICIES ARE REGARDED WITH FAVOUR IN CANADA AND ENGLAND, BUT HAVE ACQUIRED A DISTASTEFUL CONNOTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, WHERE THEY ARE ASSOCIATED WITH A WEAKMINDED SUSCEPTIBILITY TO COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA.³ IT FOLLOWS THAT AN OBJECTIVE CONSIDERATION FOR ANY OF THESE TERMS MUST TAKE CAREFUL COGNIZANCE OF BOTH THE EMOTIONAL AND DESCRIPTIVE CONTENT. THE INTENT OF THIS PAPER IS TO MAKE A STUDY OF DEMOCRACY AND RELATED TERMS AS THEY ARE USED IN ORDINARY SPEECH: ‘ORDINARY’ IN THIS SENSE MEANING USE AS IS COMMON AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE GIVEN SOME THOUGHT TO THE DESCRIPTIVE MEANING

¹R. McKeon (ed.), DEMOCRACY IN A WORLD OF TENSIONS, UNESCO SYMPOSIUM, 1951.
²MAURICE CRANSTON, FREEDOM, A NEW ANALYSIS, P. 16.
³IBID., P. 108.
OF THE WORDS INVOLVED. 4

Such definitions made on the basis of the way in which informed persons
use words can, of course, be empirically tested and therefore can be considered
either true or false. The contrary is the case in regard to stipulative
definitions such as follow the phrase—"true democracy is the . . ." In
this sense, 'true' is itself used as a hurrah word and, rather than giving a
report of what people ordinarily mean by the word in question, the speaker
is using an emotional ploy to elicit acceptance of his own private definition
of the word. Such stipulative definitions, devoid of emotional content, are
frequently necessary in scientific writing, especially where the ordinary usage
is vague. Since this paper is an attempt to prove the relationship between
an ethical theory and the concept of democracy as held by a particular group
of people, such stipulative definitions are undesirable. 5

Democracy, stripped of its emotional content, will be found to have a
number of descriptive meanings. One can discover such categories as pure
democracy, tribal democracy, liberal democracy, bourgeois democracy, Marxist
proletarian democracy, Jeffersonian democracy, and the guided democracy of
Indonesia. In truth, since democracy is a hurrah word, it is used to
embellish a wide variety of totally dissimilar political organizations.
Huey Long is reported to have said that when fascism finally came to America
it would assume the title 'democracy.' 6 While the Nazis retained the

5 Cranston, op. cit., p. 35.
DESCRIPTIVE MEANING BUT CHANGED THE EMOTIONAL CONTENT FROM HURRAH TO BOO, THE MARXISTS HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF THE CONVERSE; I.E. RETAINING THE FAVOURABLE EMOTIONAL CONTENT BUT ALTERING THE DESCRIPTIVE PORTION TO SUIT THEIR OWN VIEW OF AN IDEAL SOCIETY. In other words, they have exploited the emotive content of the word, a trick which leads to confusion when discussions such as the UNESCO symposium strive to reach agreement on the 'real' meaning of a vague term. If the Marxists are intentionally guilty of such a linguistic coup, they are certainly not alone, since it seems that the original meaning of the term is simply that of government by the people. Such government has an emotional appeal to the majority of people and any ramifications to this simple definition could be accused of trading on that appeal. Rather than hurl emotional accusations and blunt statements regarding the 'true' meaning of democracy, it is more enlightening to define categories. Thus the following discussion deals with two opposing forms of democratic theory, Marxism (communist, socialist, proletarian) and liberal (capitalist, bourgeois, representative). The comparison is made both for purposes of demonstrating the care required in the use of terms bearing a high degree of emotional content, and of showing that the ethical basis of a political theory has a powerful effect upon practice.

II. MARXIST DEMOCRACY

Democracy in the Greek city states meant simply rule by the people, rather than by a dictator, an aristocracy, an oligarchy, or a foreign

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7Cranston, op. cit., p. 110.

POWER. WHETHER RULE BY THE PEOPLE MEANT ALL THE PEOPLE OR A SIMPLE MAJORITY IS NOT CLEAR. PROBABLY THE MARXISTS ARE CORRECT WHEN THEY ASSOCIATE SUCH EARLY DEMOCRACY WITH WHAT THEY TERM BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY, WHEREIN LEADERS OF A CERTAIN CLASS MAKE DECISIONS BY COUNTING HEADS AFTER A DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM BY THE WHOLE CLASS. IN SUCH A CASE, DECISIONS ARE MADE ON A BASIS OF SIMPLE MAJORITY, ALTHOUGH ALL MEMBERS OF THE CLASS ARE ABLE TO TAKE PART IN THE PRECEDING DEBATE. To THE MARXIST, THIS IS A PRIMITIVE FORM OF GOVERNMENT, NECESSARY WHERE A CONFUSION OF AIMS AND A MULTITUDE OF CLASSES EXISTS, AND WHERE NO EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE CONCERNING THE 'CORRECT' DECISION.

FOR A MARXIST DEFINITION, WHICH WOULD APPLY TO A MORE ADVANCED STAGE OF COMMUNIST SOCIETY, CHARLES BETTELHEIM SAYS:

THE CHARACTERISTIC OF A DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY IS IN ITS AFFIRMATION OF THE SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF LIBERTY AND EQUALITY, THE PARTICIPATION OF THE WHOLE POPULATION (OR A LARGE PART OF IT) IN IMPORTANT SOCIAL DECISIONS, FREE ACCESS OF ALL MEMBERS OF SOCIETY (OR A LARGE PROPORTION OF THEM) OF THE MEANS NECESSARY TO THEIR FULL PHYSICAL AND INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT.⁹

AT FACE VALUE, SUCH A DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY WOULD PROBABLY BE AS ACCEPTABLE TO A LIBERAL AS A MARXIST. ARGUMENT ARISES OVER THE MEANING OF THE FIRST TWO PHRASES; I.E. THE TERMS FREEDOM, EQUALITY, AND THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PEOPLE IN IMPORTANT SOCIAL DECISIONS. ACCORDING TO BETTELHEIM, LIBERTY IN BOURGEOIS (LIBERAL) TERMINOLOGY, MEANS FREEDOM FROM RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS BY THE SOCIETY AS A WHOLE. He IDENTIFIES SUCH FREEDOM WITH UNRESTRICTED LAISSEZ-FAIRE, WHICH WOULD ALLOW UNSCRUPULOUS MEMBERS OR CLASSES TO VICTIMIZE THEIR FELLOWS. HOWEVER, IN A PROLETARIAN

⁹R. McKEON, OP. CIT. P. 3.
SOCIETY, LIBERTY REFERS TO FREEDOM FROM OPPRESSION, SUCH AS WORKERS AND PEASANTS ARE SAID TO SUFFER IN A CAPITALIST STATE.

IN REGARD TO EQUALITY, BETTELHEIM CLAIMS THAT BOURGEOIS CÉMOGRATS REFER TO EQUALITY UNDER THE LAW AND IN TERMS OF VOTING POWER, WHICH HE OPINES HAS LITTLE VALUE WITHOUT EQUALITY OF PROPERTY, BASED UPON THE INHERENT EQUALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL.¹⁰

IN REGARD TO THE CONDITION THAT THE WHOLE POPULATION PARTICIPATE IN MAJOR SOCIAL DECISIONS, INTERPRETATION DIFFERS ONCE MORE, BUT IN THIS DISAGREEMENT, THE GULF BETWEEN ETHICAL TRADITION BECOMES CLEAR. IN A FULLY EVOLVED PROLETARIAN DEMOCRACY, THE WHOLE OF THE POPULATION CONSISTS OF TWO CLASSES ONLY, THE WORKERS AND THE PEASANTS, WHOSE DESIRES AND ÁIMS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE IDENTICAL. THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS BY NO MEANS A SEPARATE CLASS, BUT SIMPLY THE VANGUARD OF THE MASSES.¹¹ THUS PARTICIPATION IN MAJOR DECISIONS IS INTERPRETED TO MEAN FOLLOWING THE LEAD OF THE PARTY, WHICH HAS ASCERTAINED AND INTERPRETED CORRECTLY THE ULTIMATE ÁIMS AND DESIRES OF THE MASSES. BETTELHEIM STATES THAT "THE TOLERATION OF DISSIDENT OPINIONS CAN BY NO MEANS BE SAID TO CONSTITUTE THE ESSENCE OF DEMOCRACY, BUT ONE OF ITS SECONDARY ASPECTS AND ONE WHICH CAN DEVELOP ONLY UNDER SPECIAL CONDITIONS."¹² IN THOSE STAGES OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT WHICH PRECEDE PURE COMMUNISM THERE ARE BOUND TO BE DISSIDENT OPINIONS FROM REMNANTS OF THE PREDATORY CLASSES WHICH ARE DYING OUT. WHEN THEY ARE EXTINGUISHED, ONLY ONE CLASS WILL REMAIN, ALL

¹⁰IBID., P. 13.
¹¹BISHOP AND HENDEL, OP. CIT., P. 350.
¹²IBID., P. 13.
MEMBERS OF WHICH WILL HAVE IDENTICAL AIDS; DISSENTIENT OPINIONS WILL NOT
ARISE SO THERE NEED BE NO QUESTION OF TOLERATION.

As for discovering what these basic aims are, the party vanguard will
establish them on a basis of empirical investigation. Thus we have here an
ethical system based upon a conviction that values are absolute in nature
and, since they are susceptible to empirical verification, either true or
false. Such an ethical position is obviously incompatible with the emotive
theory, which claims that values vary in relation to interests, that no
single set of values is correct for all mankind and that value judgments
cannot be proven true or false by empirical investigation.

There is nothing illogical about the Marxist line of argument
provided one is prepared to accept the premise that values are absolute and
open to empirical investigation; indeed, the administrative difficulties in
governing a one-group society with common values should be far simpler than
in one where values are considered to be relative in regard to a multitude
of groups. It is the inherent contradiction between permission of minority
values and the requirement of unity productive of stable government which
has plagued the evolution of the society called the liberal democracy,
composed of a number of groups in a single state.

III. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Under this heading it is necessary not only to define liberal
democracy in terms of the basic concepts involved but to link these concepts
to a relative theory of ethics.

The reasons for selecting the adjective 'liberal' to identify that
type of democracy acceptable to members of the society concerned, are
similar to those given by A.M. Lower in his book This Most Famous Stream. He claims that the roots of Canadian democracy lie primarily in the British tradition of liberal thought as developed in the philosophical works of Locke, Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. Their concern for the individual may in turn be traced to the Reformation and the resultant schism of the church into a multitude of sects, all claiming to know the truth. Since no single party was able to prevail in the religious wars, men acquired a habit of tolerance and compromise less destructive than warfare. The view gradually arose that each man might be permitted responsibility for his own salvation, a concept which is the essence of English liberalism and the root of an inadvertent practical acceptance of the philosophical principle that values are relative. The validity of the preceding statement will be demonstrated by a consideration of the most frequent interpretation of two pillars of modern liberal democracy, the concept of individual freedom and the contradictory concept of majority rule.

A. Individual Freedom

An excellent analysis of the meaning of freedom in ordinary language appears in Freedom — A New Analysis by Maurice Cranston. Ordinarily, when we say we are free of something, we mean that we are without something which we prefer to be without; a feeling of constraint, a debt, an illness, or a vexing responsibility. In ancient political parlance, freedom meant being without domination by foreigners. To the Marxist, as previously mentioned, freedom in the political sense means being without the oppressive predation

\[13\] A.M. Lower, This Most Famous Stream, p. 23.

\[14\] Cranston, op. cit. p. 5.
OF A SPECIAL CLASS IN A MULTI-GROUP SOCIETY. HOWEVER, TO THE ENGLISH
LIBERAL, SUCCESSOR TO THE ENGLISH NON-CONFORMIST LONGING FOR TOLERATION FOR
HIS MODE OF WORSHIP, FREEDOM MEANT AN ABSENCE OF CONSTRAINT OF THE INDIVIDUAL
OR MINOR GROUP BY THE STATE.\(^\text{15}\)

Such regard for the right of an individual to govern his own affairs
is the cornerstone of liberal democracy. JOHN STUART MILL EXPRESSED THE
PRINCIPLE SUCCINCTLY IN HIS FAMOUS STATEMENT:

\[
\text{If all mankind minus one were of one opinion and only one person were}
\text{of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing}
\text{that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in}
\text{silencing mankind.}\(^\text{16}\)
\]

This statement reads very much like a law of physics or a theorem in
mathematics; an effort is required to perceive that it is a value judgment,
lacking the possibility of empirical verification. MILL ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY
IT ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT IS USEFUL; HE OFFERS CONVINCING REASONS WHY SUCH A
RULE WILL LEAD TO PROGRESS AND THEREFORE HAPPINESS. MARXISTS, ON THE OTHER
HAND, OFFER EQUALLY CONVINCING REASONS WHY THEIR REFUSAL TO CONDONE DIS-
SENTIENT OPINIONS WILL FOSTER PROGRESS. FURTHERMORE, THE IMPLICATION THAT
PROGRESS AND HAPPINESS ARE GOOD THINGS IS AN ETHICAL JUDGMENT, AND THEREFORE
NOT OPEN TO EMPIRICAL JUSTIFICATION EITHER, ACCORDING TO THE EMOTIVE THEORY.

IN NEITHER CASE ARE THE REASONS GIVEN THE PRIME ONES MOTIVATING THE
ORIGINAL PREMISES. IN MILL'S CASE, HIS DEFENSE OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM ARISES
FROM INTERESTS ORIGINATING IN THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HIS ENVIRONMENT.
However, the fact that the statement is a value judgment is no reflection on

\(^\text{15}\)\text{IBID., P. 69.}

its importance. It is the cornerstone of a value system, the salient concept upon which men in liberal democracies have built the ethical rules by which they live. Furthermore, though the statement cannot be empirically justified, it is logically compatible with the ethical theory discussed in the first chapter of this paper. Since the emotive theory is a logical justification of relativity of values, then individual freedom should not be curtailed on the basis that certain views or actions are 'wrong' or 'incorrect.'

Mill's statement expresses a conviction common in liberal democratic literature. Maurice Cranston says that:

The English liberal has demanded freedom for the individual from the constraints of the state because he had regarded the individual person as an ethical end, and the state as an instrument, of value only in so far as it could serve the interest of the individual person.\(^{17}\)

A.M. Lower claims that "we never submerge individuals in the progress of grouping because they are the raison d'être."\(^{18}\) Furthermore, concern for the individual is an almost unanimous feature of the list of works included in the bibliography appended to the end of this paper and representative of informed thought on the subject of various forms of democracy. Finally, there are frequent references to the necessity of developing the individual in the Canadian Citizenship and Adult Education Bulletin called The Democratic Way,\(^{19}\) and in the literature providing the official statement of aims and purposes of education in British Columbia. These publications are listed simply to show that empirical evidence exists to support the

\(^{17}\)Cranston, *op. cit.*, p. 72. \(^{18}\)Lower, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

\(^{19}\)The Democratic Way, Canadian Citizenship Council.
Contention that individual freedom is an essential component of liberal democratic thought.

Is ideal freedom for individuals and groups practical in a cohesive state? Quotations from Mill and more modern authors on the practical implications of individual and group freedom in society indicate that it is, with limitations.

Mill first qualifies individual freedom by noting that there must be limits. "The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self protection." Thus there is justification for interference with the freedom of others. With this qualification, to be enlarged later, he proceeds to discuss the suggested areas of freedom.

1. Freedom of thought: This freedom includes that of speech, writing, and publication and Mill suggests reasons why no restrictions should be placed on those actions. First, he states that some dissentient opinions may be 'true' and if extinguished are a loss to society. He remarks that this is especially true since "The initiation of all wise and noble things comes and must come from the individual." Secondly, even if an official opinion is true; public discussion of the contrary opinion will ensure that the people reconsider the rational justification for their belief, rather than holding it on blind faith. Thirdly, he claims that most beliefs are a blend of truth and falsity, and that discussion will assist in clearing away the false portion. All these reasons justify freedom of speech on the

grounds that it will lead towards truthful opinions. Mill was not an ethical relativist. The point is that, while his grounds for defending the position of individual freedom are not consistent with the emotive theory of values, his position itself is. Proponents of the emotive theory justify free speech on the grounds that values are relative to individuals and groups. Thus free discussion may lead to common agreement by persuasion, but whether it does or not, there are no logical grounds for eliminating free thought on the basis that one opinion is 'true' and all others 'false.'

In spite of a previous plea for complete freedom of speech, Mill later qualified this in cases where incitement to violence might lead to an infringement on the rights of others; for example, the case of an agitator haranguing the unemployed in a park is permissible, while the same harangue given to a crowd of anarchists outside the home of a rich merchant, whose life and property are thereby endangered, is not. He made no mention of the kind of difficulty experienced presently in the United States, where it is claimed that free speech aimed at the curtailment of freedom of speech is a violation of the constitution. Two such occasions were the decisions of the supreme court in regard to the convictions of Schenk et al of contravenation of the Espionage Act by distributing literature against conscription, and the conviction of Dennis et al of violation of the Smith Act by urging the violent overthrow of the state. In both cases it was felt that the international situation justified curtailment of certain utterances. In the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The question in every

23 Ibid.
CASE IS WHETHER THE WORDS USED ARE USED IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, AND ARE OF SUCH NATURE, AS TO CREATE A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER THAT THEY WILL BRING ABOUT THE SUBSTANTIVE EVILS THAT CONGRESS HAS A RIGHT TO PREVENT." Holmes made a clear distinction between freedom of speech in times of war and peace, thus leaving such freedom open to legal interpretation of the degree of menace to the state.

This means, in effect, that freedom of speech largely depends not on an ironclad, unchangeable rule, but upon the self-restraint and tolerance of the people. This is the case in Canada and Britain where the authorities are prone to use the Riot Act where free speech endangers life and property, and the laws of libel where false character representations can be proven to have caused mental or social distress. It is left to a judge to decide whether a breach of the rights of others has occurred. However, the real guarantees of "Freedom for the thought we hate," (to quote Holmes) (USS vs Schwimmer) lie in the tradition of tolerance and the mood of the people at the time of a suspected infringement. This tolerance is rooted in an historical climate favourable to the acceptance of the idea that opinions are relative to, or the business of, the person who holds them.

2. Freedom of Action: Where Mill made a case for almost complete freedom of expression, he regarded action as dependent upon consequences. "No one pretends that action should be as free as opinions," but they should

24 Bishop and Hendel, op. cit., p. 76.
25 Cranston, op. cit., p. 69.
26 Bishop and Hendel, op. cit., p. 84.
BE PERMITTED IF NO HARM IS OCCASIONED TO OTHERS, OR IF THEY DO NOT CAUSE THE
ABROGATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES PREVIOUSLY ASSUMED. THERE IS A VAST FIELD OF
ARGUMENT HERE, SINCE SOME WOULD INSIST THAT EVEN SUICIDE IS A LAPSE OF A
RESPONSIBILITY WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL OWES THE SOCIETY WHICH BRED HIM. MILL
WOULD AGREE, WHERE WIVES AND CHILDREN SUFFER, BUT WITH RESERVATIONS. In
DOUBTFUL CASES, HE WOULD MAKE THE DECISION IN FAVOUR OF THE COURSE MOST
CONDUCTIVE TO GENERAL HAPPINESS, A DIFFICULT QUANTITY TO ASCERTAIN EVEN WITH
THE AID OF A 'HAPPINESS CALCULUS.'

THE EMOTIVIST, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD MAKE NO PROMULGATION ON THE
BASIS OF GENERAL HAPPINESS; HE WOULD SIMPLY APPLY THE THREE STEPS IN ATTAINING
AGREEMENT UPON AN ETHICAL PROBLEM CONCERNING FREEDOM OF ACTION, TO WHIT,
EMPirical INVESTIGATION OF CONSEQUENCES, PERSuASION, AND COMPROMISE. IF
DISAGREEMENT REMAINED, AND AGREEMENT WERE CONSIDERED NECESSARY TO ORGANIZED
SOCIETY, THEN THE TWO ALTERNATIVES, NEITHER OF WHICH CAN BE SAID TO BE
ETHICALLY SUPERIOR, REMAIN: — CAPITULATION BY THE MINORITY OR CIVIL WAR AND
SECESSION. MORE WILL BE SAID LATER CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE
EMOTIVE THEORY TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS. THE PROBLEM AT HAND IS THE DEMONSTRATION
THAT FREEDOM OF ACTION IS A FACTOR OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, AND THE ASSOCIATION
OF THIS FREEDOM WITH THE CONCEPT OF RELATIVITY IN ETHICS.

IN CLOSING, AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE CITIZENS OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGARD
THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF ACTION MAY BE OF VALUE. THE FREEDOM OF THE
DOUKHOBORS TO REMOVE THEIR CLOTHES IN PUBLIC IS CURTAILED BECAUSE THIS ACTION
OFFENDS THE EYE AND IS SAID TO CONTRIBUTE TO IMMORALITY. IN OTHER WORDS,

27MILL, OR. CIT., 43 PP.
THEY CONTRAVENE SOCIAL TABOOS REGARDING NUDITY. THEIR FREEDOM TO DEMOLISH SCHOOLS AND BRIDGES IS ALSO CURTAILED, BECAUSE THIS TYPE OF ACTION DIMINISHES SAFETY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, THEIR FREEDOM TO BURN DOWN THEIR OWN HOMES IS NOT CURTAILED BECAUSE THIS ACTION IS SAID TO HURT NO ONE BUT THEMSELVES. TRUE, THERE ARE MUTTERINGS THAT THE ARSONISTS HAVE REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PROPERLY CARING FOR THEIR FAMILIES AND THAT THEY ARE A DRAIN ON PUBLIC WELFARE FUNDS TO WHICH THEY HAVE NOT CONTRIBUTED. YET IN DEFERENCE TO THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM OF ACTION, NO LEGAL MACHINERY IS BROUGHT TO BEAR WHEN THEY BURN THEIR HOMES. THIS PERMISSIVENESS IS TYPICAL OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND RESULTS FROM THE IDEA THAT VALUE JUDGMENTS ARE RELATIVE TO THE GROUPS CONCERNED AS LONG AS OTHER GROUPS OF INDIVIDUALS ARE NOT PHYSICALLY AFFECTED.

3. **Freedom of Association**: Mill defends the right of the individual to associate in groups which are not under the control of the state. This freedom is normal in liberal democratic societies. For example, *The Democratic Way* states that freedom of choice in joining associations makes for progress—a justification which Mill made in the case of free speech. Once again, it is not certain that this justification is valid or necessary. The same bulletin states that associations in a totalitarian society are all under the control of the state. Certainly Marxists would claim that such a situation is compatible with progress. Surely the proper justification of freedom of association is not that it contributes to progress, but that it permits individual freedom, an ethical end in itself accepted by those who

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SUPPORT LIBERAL DEMOCRACY.

That such societies do allow association, even by the groups which are purported to advocate and conspire towards overthrow of the state by violence, is demonstrated by the fact that the Communist Party of Canada meets and functions legally. That the right of association is used widely can be demonstrated by a glance at the list of organizations incorporated under the Societies Act of British Columbia. The basic aims of each society, as laid down therein, are myriad and frequently in conflict with one another. The fact that they all meet and function in the same society is evidence that relativity of values is accepted, if grudgingly, by the mass of the populace.

To summarize the discussion on freedom, evidence has been presented to show that freedom of thought, action and association is a dominant feature of liberal democratic government. This freedom probably resulted, historically, from the existence, in one society, of a variety of groups who reluctantly decided that compromise and non-interference in matters of ethical disagreement were preferable to civil war. This spirit of compromise in ethics is more compatible with relative than with absolute theories of ethics. Since the emotive theory of ethics provides a logical defense of ethical relativity, it is compatible with and serviceable to the liberal democratic concept of freedom.

B. GOVERNMENT BY MAJORITY DECISION

A second dominant feature of liberal democracy is the concept of

29 Societies Act of British Columbia.
government by the majority of the people. If interpreted as meaning that the minority of the people would have to submit to majority decisions on any issue, there is obviously a flat contradiction between this concept and the idea of individual and group freedom. A tremendous amount of effort has been expended by political theorists in solving this contradiction. This chapter will describe some of these efforts, and conclude with a brief statement of how the emotive theory of ethics can be used to alleviate the contradiction and provide a logical basis for liberal democracy.

A canvas of democratic thought produces fairly close agreement on the right of the people to rule themselves; indeed, most are very careful to state that this does not mean rule by simple majority. To quote Cranston:

... the biggest mistake made in this connection is to assume that 'rule of the people' means 'rule of the majority.' The expression 'the people' does not mean some people or most people but the people as a whole, and this necessarily includes the minority as well as the majority. Hence if the minority has no share in ruling, a system cannot be properly considered a democratic one. 30

There may be some confusion among the masses on this score, but there certainly seems to be unanimity among scholars that majority government can very easily become 'tyranny' (a boo-word defined by James Madison as the deprivation of natural rights, Federalist #47, p. 54 Basic Issues). 31 Most modern authorities on democratic government are especially concerned with the preservation of the rights of minorities. The results of the UNESCO symposium indicate that a definite majority of correspondents found one-party

30 Maurice Cranston, "What is Democracy?" The Listener, Aug. 27, 1959, p. 311.

31 Bishop and Hendel, op. cit., p. 54.
SYSTEMS INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRACY. Marxists were in the minority, of course, while Westerners very definitely favoured the tolerance of minority opinion and action. Common sentiment may be coalesced into a statement quoted from The Democratic Way:

Party government in our democratic communities succeeds because of two unwritten rules. One is that the minority give in to the majority after the votes have been counted. The other is that the majority in office won't abuse its power and won't try to suppress the minority or deprive it of its right to criticize.

Thus by common agreement (among those who give active consideration to the subject) the definition of liberal democracy involves not only a concept of rule by majority but, paradoxically, a commitment to preserve the existence and the freedom of minority groups. Some opinions on how this contradiction is to be ameliorated follow.

Efforts to preserve the rights of minorities may be found in written constitutional guarantees as exhibited in the Constitution of the United States. Of the original authors of this document, James Madison is conspicuous in his concern that external checks and balances are needed to restrain any individual or group (and especially that group comprising the majority) from tyranny over their fellows. Thus the American constitution is a written and permanent set of rules which limit the power of the largest faction. To quote Walter Lippman, "Democracy is virtually limitation of power, including the power of the majority."

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32McKeon, op. cit., p. 500.
33The Democratic Way, op. cit., III, 12.
34Bishop and Hendel, op. cit., 51 pp. 35Ibid., p. 70.
On the other hand, the rights of British minorities are said to be protected, not by written constitution, but by the self-restraint and tolerance of a population which once experienced the horrors of religious and political persecution without a clearcut victory on any side. \(^{36}\)

In Canada, according to A.M. Lower, the tolerance of minority rights arose partly as the result of the British tradition and partly because the nation itself, as it grew, was composed of a loose federation of geographically isolated pockets of population. The necessity which induced each faction to run its own affairs in various fields produced an atmosphere of tolerance in the nation as a whole. It was difficult either to develop or to maintain a set of absolute values in a country as widespread and patchy as Canada. \(^{37}\)

Thus growth of various means of protecting minority rights is a common feature of liberal democracy. On the debit side, strong groups within a state weaken the unity of the whole, according to C.N. Parkinson. \(^{38}\) Madison suggests that because majorities are likely to be unstable and transitory in a large and pluralistic society, they are likely to be politically ineffective; herein lies the basic protection against their exploitation of minorities. \(^{39}\) A.C. Ewing states that when a law passes by a small

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\(^{36}\) Cranston, op. cit., p. 69.


\(^{38}\) C.N. Parkinson, The Evolution of Political Thought, p. 243.

\(^{39}\) Bishop and Hendel, op. cit., 47 pp.
MAJORITY, ODDS ARE THAT IT WILL BE MITIGATED SOMEWHAT IN PASSING.\textsuperscript{40} THESE STATEMENTS POINT OUT THE OBVIOUS WEAKNESS OF A GOVERNMENT COMPOSED OF A MULTITUDE OF GROUPS. BY CONTRAST, THE MARXIST FORM OF DEMOCRACY DOES NOT SUFFER FROM THAT DEFECT. WHERE THERE IS ONE GROUP, ONE VALUE SYSTEM, AND ONE BODY RESPONSIBLE FOR DECIDING THE DETAILS OF THAT SYSTEM, NATIONAL UNITY IS LIKELY TO BE FIRM AND STABLE.

THE PROBLEM IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IS TO DECIDE WHICH ISSUES ARE SUFFICIENTLY CRITICAL IN NATIONAL TERMS TO WARRANT A MAJORITY RULING WHICH WILL REGULATE ALL. WHAT JUSTIFICATION HAS THE MAJORITY FOR ITS SELECTION OF SUCH ISSUES AS EUTHANASIA, CONSCRIPTION OR THE CHOICE OF MAJOR WEAPONS OF WAR AS THOSE WHICH DEMAND THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE MINORITY? WILL HOLME'S RULE REGARDING "THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER" TO THE STATE EVER BE MORE THAN A CLICHÉ, USED BY EITHER SIDE TO JUSTIFY ITS STAND?

ONE FINAL QUESTION. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE IS SAID TO INDICATE THAT NO MATTER WHAT SAFEGUARDS ARE INSTITUTED TO PROTECT MINORITY RIGHTS, THE MAJORITY WILL EVENTUALLY SUCCUMB TO DEMAGOGUES WHO WILL INSIST UPON EQUALITY IN ALL THINGS FOR ALL PEOPLE. IN HIS BOOK \textit{THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL THOUGHT}, C.N. PARKINSON CLAIMS THAT A DEMOCRACY WHICH PERMITS POLITICAL EQUALITY AMONG ITS MEMBERS WILL MOVE INEVITABLY ALONG THE ROAD TO SOCIALISM. IN OTHER WORDS, POLITICAL EQUALITY WILL EVENTUALLY BRING ECONOMIC EQUALITY. HE NOTES THAT MOST LIBERAL THINKERS HAVE GRADUALLY SHIFTED FROM MILL'S EARLY POSITION OF UNBRIDLED LAISSEZ-FAIRE TO A MODIFIED FORM OF THE WELFARE STATE.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{40}A.C. EWING, \textit{THE INDIVIDUAL, THE STATE AND WORLD GOVERNMENT}, p. 117.

\textsuperscript{41}PARKINSON, \textit{OP.CIT.}, p. 188.
IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT SUCH A TREND TO PURE SOCIALISM IS INEVITABLE OR THAT A SOCIALIST SOCIETY IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE EXISTENCE OF GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS. IN ANY CASE, THE PROBLEM OF BUILDING BOTH A STRONG STATE AND A SET OF RULES FOR PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP FREEDOMS REMAINS THE CHIEF HURDLE OF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRAT.

IV. POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF THE EMOTIVE THEORY

THIS CHAPTER HAS INVOLVED AN ATTEMPT TO PROVE THAT:

A. VALUES IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY ARE REGARDED BY THE CITIZENS AS RELATIVE TO THE INTERESTS OF THE INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS WHO HOLD THEM.

B. THE LOGICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES IS CONTAINED IN THE EMOTIVE THEORY OF ETHICS.

C. A CRUCIAL PROBLEM IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IS THAT OF DECIDING WHICH ISSUES ARE SO IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF THE SAFETY OF THE STATE, TO REQUIRE THE ACQUIESCENCE OF ALL TO A DECISION BY THE MAJORITY.

D. THE EMOTIVE THEORY WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE IN DECIDING WHICH ISSUES ARE CRUCIAL TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE STATE, AND HOW AGREEMENT MAY BEST BE ATTAINED IN THOSE ISSUES.

THOSE CONCLUSIONS SUGGEST APPLICATIONS OF THE EMOTIVE THEORY OF ETHICS IN PROBLEMS WHICH ARISE IN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES.

FIRST OF ALL, THE THEORY PROVIDES A REJECTION OF THE CONTENTION THAT THERE ARE ABSOLUTE VALUES. THEREFORE, IF VALUES ARE RELATIVE TO THE INTEREST OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS, THERE IS NO LOGICAL OR EMPIRICAL REASON FOR CURTAILING INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP FREEDOM ON THE GROUNDS THAT ONE SET OF VALUES IS INTRINSICALLY BETTER THAN ANOTHER. THE THEORY DOES NOT PROVE THAT THE CURTAILMENT OF FREEDOM IS 'WRONG'; SUCH, OF COURSE, IS A VALUE JUDGMENT AND
not open to empirical proof either way. The theory does suggest that there can be no logical justification for the curtailment of freedom on the grounds that one particular way of acting or speaking is 'right.' Therefore, a society which chooses to make the value judgment that individual and group freedom is 'good' can rest assured that such a judgment is neither contrary to fact nor logically unsound.

On the other hand, any citizen of Western democracy who attempts to defend freedom on the empirical grounds that it favours progress, as did John Stuart Mill, will be faced with two problems. First, he will have to contend with the arguments of the Marxist that empirical evidence from ancient Greece and contemporary society shows that freedom does not favour desirable progress. Secondly, he will have to prove that the type of progress which does result from individual freedom is desirable. Neither question can be answered on an empirical basis, since emotional bias is involved. Therefore, it would be sounder to base the justification of individual freedom, not upon empirical evidence, but upon the logical basis that values are relative.

The second problem facing liberal democracies is that of deciding which issues are sufficiently crucial to demand the acquiescence of dissentient groups. Here, the emotive theory is not much help, but can only suggest that those issues involving national survival and the infringement on the liberties of others are crucial enough to require curtailment of freedom on practical (not logical) grounds. Herbert Fiedl's common core of values which result from 'some of the most pervasive aspects of the human
situation,\textsuperscript{42} include such virtues as honesty and kindness. Once again, there is no logical reason why one should be honest in his dealing with others; there is only the practical reason that honesty is the best and safest policy in the long run.

Where those who propose the emotive theory can be of assistance however, is in showing how to proceed with a problem once the limits of national survival and freedom of others have been agreed upon. Thus, they would suggest empirical study of such a question as abortion, to find out whether the foregoing limits are involved. If they are not, then obviously the question of abortion is a matter of individual choice. If they are, then further empirical study should be conducted to find out whether there actually is a conflict of interests. It may develop that the consequences of the course of action suggested by one set of value judgments is not compatible with the interests of those who propose it. In the case of the problem of what to do with juvenile delinquents, it is quite possible that the interests of contending parties are identical, and that the question is not one of aims but of means.

In the case of abortion, however, it is doubtful if a study of consequences will show that aims are identical. Here is a case where different value systems result from different interests. If agreement is absolutely necessary for national welfare, then those who hold the emotive theory suggest that either a compromise be reached, in which each party surrenders a portion of its freedom in order to reach compromise, or that

\textsuperscript{42}H. Feigl, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 329.
Persuasion be employed in order to get one party to alter its interests. At this stage, there is no question about empirical proof or logical reasoning; two parties hold opposite opinions by reason of their interests and since both opinions are value judgments, neither can be proven incorrect. If persuasion is unsuccessful in getting one party to alter its interests, if compromise is impossible, the only practical means of preserving social unity is by the acquiescence of the minority to the will of the majority. Coercion or secession are also possible, but stable liberal democracies have usually rejected these alternatives.

Such are the solutions to democratic problems which are suggested by an emotive analysis of values and an acceptance of the relativity of values. While the emotivist's method of dealing with disagreements is followed, after a fashion, in liberal democracies, the logical justification of individual freedom is largely unknown. Indeed, relativity of values is probably not consciously accepted by the majority of citizens, although practically they seem to accept it. The next chapter involves a study of the ethical aims contained in official statements concerning education in a liberal democracy. The relevance of the previous sentence will then be made clear. Furthermore, the value of including a rational treatment of ethical matters in the educational system will be discussed at length.
CHAPTER III

AN EVALUATION OF THE AIMS OF EDUCATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

The emotive theory of ethics specifies that value judgments are relative to the individuals and groups who hold them, and suggests a manner of arriving at agreement in ethical arguments of a crucial nature. A liberal democracy is also based, consciously or unconsciously, on the concept that values are relative, mainly because of its value judgment that individual freedom, within limits, is a good thing. A second basis of liberal democracy is the idea that some ethical questions are so crucial that they demand the acquiescence of all the people.

Education may be defined as a means by which a society perpetuates itself or promotes its own progress. Therefore, the philosophy which directs the educational system of a liberal democracy should:

A. Be based upon the concept that values are relative and the value judgment that individual freedom is good.

B. Aim at the development in students of a sense of relativity of values and a reasoned method of reaching agreement in ethical questions.

Are these the bases and the aims of education in British Columbia? This chapter proposes to show that they are not, since the philosophy of education in British Columbia is so vague that it gives little direction other than toward a certain expediency governed by a fluctuating national mood. This chapter will also submit reasons for this vagueness and suggest means by which aims may be fashioned more in accord with the basic concepts.
OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND OF THE EMOTIVE THEORY OF ETHICS. WHILE A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION WILL BE EVIDENT IN THE WHOLE OF AN EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM, THE EMOTIVE THEORY IS SPECIFICALLY RELEVANT TO THE PHASE DEALING IN MORALS OR CHARACTER BUILDING. THEREFORE THE FOLLOWING SURVEY AND DISCUSSION IS MAINLY CONFINED TO THAT PHASE OF THE AIMS AND PURPOSES OF EDUCATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA.

I. GROWTH OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

First, a brief description of the origin and growth of the British Columbian society is necessary. Settlement of the original colony of Vancouver Island, founded on the fur trade, began in 1849. In 1858 the discovery of gold upon the mainland prompted the formation of a second colony, British Columbia, and Governor James Douglas was placed in charge of both. In 1866 the two were united, with the capital at Victoria. In 1871, when the colony joined the Canadian federation, the population stood at about 10,000 whites, 4,000 Chinese, and about 35,000 Indians.¹ The white population declined somewhat following the end of the gold rush, but subsequent growth was steady and continuous until the beginning of the second world war. Then a combination of an increased birth-rate and greatly increased immigration from the rest of Canada and from Europe caused a phenomenal rate of increase. The most recent census was taken in 1961 and showed that the population increased by 71% between the years of 1941 and 1956, while in the decade preceding the census the increase was almost 40%.

At least half of this increase is due to migration.²

In terms of ethnic groupings, this migration has produced important change. Early government was carried out by the solidly British colony in Victoria, although the influx of Americans and Chinese during the gold rush produced a somewhat more cosmopolitan atmosphere on the mainland. However, the 1911 census disclosed that 81% of the population had been born in the British Isles. Then followed an irregular decline in the proportion of Britishers, to 63% in 1921, 33% in 1951 and 10% in 1961. Citizens of British origin (such as offspring of original settlers and migrants from other parts of Canada and the United Kingdom) accounted for 59% of the population in 1961.³ The remainder included such a diverse mixture of European and Oriental ethnic groups as to make British Columbia one of the most cosmopolitan societies of the world.

In terms of religious affiliation, the proportions have not altered radically since the turn of the century. However, the largest group, the United Church of Canada, can claim the recognition of approximately 30% of the populace, while Anglicans claim 23%, Roman Catholics 17% and Lutherans 6%. The remaining 24% are spread over a multitude of small but thriving denominations of every religious hue.⁴ The fact that such a mixture of groups can coexist amicably in the same culture indicates that an acceptance of relativity of values is a practical necessity.

³Ibid., pp. 3-4.
⁴1961 Census of Canada, 92-546, 1-2-6 Table 42, 1&2.
The statistics quoted above indicate that the population of today in British Columbia is the result of rapid growth and is composed of a multitude of groups. The massive influx since the war cannot have failed to have an effect upon the type of society involved, especially since it included so many people of other than British origin. British Columbia may be said to be a polyarchy in the best liberal democratic tradition. Political views are fragmented to the extent that the ruling party enjoyed the support of a mere 38% of the population in the last election. Private schools have never been able to derive support from public funds because they command the sympathy of such small minorities and because public schools are, probably the only way in which a comprehensive school system can be made to satisfy the desires of the myriad groups. Finally, the variety of attitudes toward proper moral behaviour, resulting from the increase in diversity of the population, has led to an increase in the disagreement about the nature of education for character which in turn has led to the virtual elimination of that subject from public school curriculum. The history, reasons and remedies for this retreat from character education form the topics of the remainder of this paper.

II. ORIGINS OF THE EDUCATIONAL AIMS

James Douglas, the second governor of the colony, was a deeply religious man, as were most of his hard-headed compatriots in the Hudson's Bay Company of the 19th century. In governmental matters he was certainly authoritarian. Thus in letters written between the years 1850-53 to Alexander Barclay, governor of the Hudson's Bay Company, he requested that a school be formed in the colony with the primary purpose of moral and religious
TRAINING. He claimed that the youth of the settlers were growing up in "utter neglect of all their duties to God and Society." Douglas did not specify the religion nor the morals to be taught, but one must assume he favoured those befitting loyal British subjects. Consequently, the first school established in 1856 was placed in the charge of Rev. Edward Criddle, of Anglican persuasion.

Douglas retired in 1863, and in 1865 the first Common School Act was passed for the colony of Vancouver Island, which set up a board of education, a system of free schools and a sum of ten thousand dollars for their support. Article thirteen of this act provided the only philosophical direction to the school system, and this was in direct contrast to Douglas’ accent on religion:

Non-sectarian books inculcating the highest morality shall be selected for the use of such schools, and all books of a religious character, teaching denominational dogmas shall be strictly excluded therefrom.

The accent on secularism may be attributed to the use of public funds, collected from all denominations, to finance the schools. There is in this article the British determination to tolerate varied religious persuasions, coupled with the American concept of free public education. Thus the taxpayers should not be required to finance religious education with

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6 Ibid.

7 The word 'inculcate' is an important one in B.C. educational philosophy, since it is still used in the school act of today. According to the Oxford Dictionary, it means 'to urge, impress, (fact, habit or idea) persistently (upon or in a person, mind)' p. 605.

8 MacLaurin, op. cit., p. 44.
which they are not in accord. The point was made more strongly in article fourteen which stipulated that clergymen were not even to be allowed into the schools. 9

Article thirteen seems vague in reference to morality but definite in requiring that religion be excluded. It is interesting to note that it still exists in the School Act of 1958, virtually unchanged. The attitude toward religion has ameliorated slightly; the Lord's Prayer and Bible readings are now required in all classes, but the non-sectarian nature of the schools is strongly asserted. The statements concerning moral education are just as vague and unsubstantiated. However, one is inclined to think that there was a good deal more accord concerning the meaning of the term 'morals' among the British gentlemen of that era than exists among the myriad groups in British Columbia today.

When the colonies were united in 1866, Governor Frederick Seymour from the mainland encountered the newly created island school board and their zeal for free education. He did not like it, being of the opinion that responsible citizens would consider beneath their dignity the proposal that the public purse be burdened with the education of their offspring. The correspondence between the board and the governor make entertaining reading, especially in regard to the latter's refusal to release the ten thousand dollars which the unfortunate school board had already spent. However, his conception of the aim of education was more modern than his views on its finance, since he was completely against religion in the schools:

9 Ibid.
The government has not undertaken to prove to the Jew that the Messiah hasindeed arrived, to rob the Roman Catholic of her belief in the merciful intercession of the blessed virgin, to give special support to the Church of England, to mitigate the acidi-ty of the Calvinist doctrines of some Protestant believers, or to determine authoritatively the number of sacraments. 10

In a later letter of a more conciliatory tone on the question of school finance, Governor Seymour added the remark that 'children do not go to school to learn religion, but the ways of getting on in the world.' 11

These quotes indicate an acceptance of relativity in religious matters on the part of the governor; the school board of that day seems to have had little interest in the philosophical aspects of education, their interests being mainly financial. That emphasis persisted until the Putman-Weir Report of 1924.

In the next formal piece of educational legislation, the Public School Act of 1872, one article only refers to morality or the purpose of education. It has a familiar ring:

All public schools must be conducted on strictly secular and non-sectarian lines. The highest morality is to be inculcated but no religious dogma or creed may be taught. The Lord's Prayer may be used in opening or closing the school. 12

In 1875 a set of Rules and Regulations were added to the School Act, two of which have a bearing upon moral education. Rule eleven requires that teachers:

Pay the strictest attention to the morals and the general conduct of the pupils; to omit no opportunity of inculcating the principles of truth and honesty, the duties of respect to superiors, and obedience to all

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10 Ibid., p. 67. 11 Ibid., p. 75.
PERSONS PLACED IN AUTHORITY OVER THEM.\textsuperscript{13}

Rule Thirteen requires that they:

\textit{Cultivate kindly and affectionate feelings among pupils; to discountenance quarrelling, cruelty to animals, and every approach to vice.}\textsuperscript{14}

These two adjurations sound odd today. The first one requires a continual indoctrination of the social virtues, especially those such as obedience, which will produce docile citizens. The idea that respect to superiors must be inculcated has been to a large extent discarded today and there is less tendency to demand obedience to authorities than to demand their obedience to majority or minority wishes. One receives the impression that the author of this rule was imbued with a sense of the absolute in values and the necessity of authoritarianism. The second rule, on the other hand, demands the cultivation of moral behaviour of the most mundane kind and suggests that 'vice' is a matter upon which society is in complete agreement.

The same set of rules recommended (rather than stipulated) the daily reading of the Lord's Prayer "to secure divine blessing and to impress upon students their religious duties and their entire dependence upon their maker."\textsuperscript{15} Thus British Columbia at this time was apparently a religiously oriented society where values were absolute and the authority for them lay in the Bible.

The rule concerning the Lord's Prayer later caused concern, since

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Report of Public Schools, B.C. Dept. of Education, 1875–76, p. 59.}
\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid., p. 59.}
\textsuperscript{15}\textit{MacLaurin, op. cit., p. 60.}
Regulation #141 of the 1879 Public Schools Act specified that "exercises of a religious character in opening and closing schools were strictly prohibited,"\(^{16}\) while the rules were changed once more to permit (but not require) the use of the Lord's Prayer.\(^{17}\) The clergy were barred from the schools, except as visitors, in 1876 and this rule seems to have remained to the present day.

In the annual report of 1886–87, the statement was made that morals can be taught without dogma and further that "it is now a recognized fact that moral truths can be taught even in the absence of sectarian form and without referring to any dogma or creed."\(^ {18}\) However, the same report claimed that the necessity of moral education was recognized by every country which has adopted a public school system.\(^ {19}\) The implication seems to have been that public funds were not to be used to finance education in one religion, in a society where many exist. The nature of the morals to be taught and the methods of teaching them are not stipulated. It is hardly to be expected, however, that in such a homogeneous British Christian society, the reader of the day would differ greatly from the author of the document over the constituents of moral excellence.

IV. THE PUTMAN AND WEIR REPORT

School legislation from 1881 onwards was almost exclusively concerned with matters of administration and finance, and by 1924 had produced a highly

\(^{16}\) MacLaurin, *op. cit.*, 60 pp.  
\(^{17}\) ibid.  
\(^{19}\) ibid.
LOCAL FORM OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION WITH THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
SHOULDERING THIRTY-EIGHT PER CENT OF THE COSTS.  
HOWEVER, THE CONSTANTLY RISING COSTS OF EDUCATION AND A CONCERN ABOUT THE DIRECTION IN WHICH PUBLIC EDUCATION SHOULD BE HEADING, PROMPTED THE GOVERNMENT OF 1923 TO REQUEST TWO LEARNED EDUCATIONALISTS, J.H. PUTMAN AND G.M. WEIR, TO MAKE A THOROUGH SURVEY OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OF THE PROVINCE IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, INCLUDING HEARINGS OF PUBLIC OPINION, AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO FUTURE CHANGES. WHILE IT SEEMS THAT EDUCATIONAL FINANCE WAS ONCE AGAIN THE PRIME CONCERN OF THE SURVEY, THE COMMISSIONERS SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME AND EFFORT IN ASCERTAINING PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING THE AIMS OF EDUCATION, AND IN MAKING THEIR OWN VIEWS ON THAT MATTER CLEAR.

THE SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED AT A TIME WHEN TWO MAJOR QUESTIONS CONFRONTED THE GOVERNMENT. THE FIRST WAS THE MATTER OF FREE HIGH SCHOOLS, AND IN KEEPING WITH WHAT THE COMMISSIONERS TERMED THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, THEY RECOMMENDED THAT SCHOOL BOARDS BE NOT ALLOWED TO CHARGE FEES EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF NON-RESIDENTS.  

THE SECOND WAS THE BATTLE BETWEEN PROGRESSIVISTS AND TRADITIONALISTS WHICH WAS THEN RAGING AT ITS HEIGHT, AND THE COMMISSIONERS RECOMMENDED A HAPPY MEDIUM. WHILE THESE TWO ISSUES MAY BE CONSIDERED TO BE MATTERS INVOLVING PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, THEY BEAR LITTLE RELATION TO THE EMOTIVE THEORY AND TO CHARACTER EDUCATION AND FURTHERMORE HAVE BEEN GENERALLY SETTLED TODAY IN THE WAYS RECOMMENDED BY PUTMAN AND WEIR.

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21 Ibid., p. 70.  
22 Ibid., pp. 24-29.
More cogent to the scope of this paper are the remarks by the Survey concerning the aims of education; here the Commissioners made the definite and unequivocal statement that the moral and patriotic ends of instruction were fundamental.

The development of a united and intelligent Canadian citizenship actuated by the highest British ideals of justice, tolerance, and fair play should be accepted without question as the fundamental aim of the provincial school system. Such an aim has stood the test of time and its application in the daily lives of the British people has enhanced the good name of the British Empire. The moral and patriotic aim is undoubtedly more important, if less measurable, than the other objectives of instruction discussed in this and the following section of the present chapter.23

One must certainly agree that these aims are difficult to measure. Justice, tolerance, and fair play are hurrah words, with different emotional content for each individual. However, the concept of the British ideal of Edwardian times does give the reader a mental picture of an honourable gentleman, tolerant within carefully prescribed boundaries and loyal to the motherland. Such a society was highly religious and could hardly be regarded as one in which values were considered relative.

Further on the Commissioners support:

... the development of the intellect for the service of others as well as self, the enriching and refining of the emotions, the purifying of the sentiments, the appreciation of one's duties to one's fellow men and the body politic,—these aims of education are neither ephemeral nor ornamental.24

The concern for the development of the intellect has a familiar ring today, with the aim of benefiting both self and society. However, the refining of emotion and the purification of sentiments; these are emotional

23 Ibid., p. 38. 24 Ibid.
TERMS MEANING ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN. THE COMMISSIONERS CONTENDED THAT, WHILE THERE IS 'UNANIMITY WITH REGARD TO THE VALUE OF THE MORAL ENDS TO BE ATTAINED,' THERE IS A WIDE DIVERSITY OVER MEANS. Assuredly all will concur with the value of words packed with such emotional appeal, but unfortunately each person uses such words differently. Thus the survey notes that some wish the 'medium of instruction to be the inculcation of these ends by the personality and daily example of the teacher and others by direct biblical instruction of an optional character.' The very fact that there is a wide diversity of opinion on the means of teaching concepts of 'justice, tolerance and fair play,' towards refinement of the emotions and purification of the sentiments, should indicate that while all consulted liked the sound of these words, investigation of how they used them would probably have shown a wide divergence in the ends of moral education as well.

The commissioners refer to the 'Christian virtues' which they claim are honesty, courtesy, sympathy, co-operativeness, generosity, unselfishness etc. They go on to say:

... most individuals have sufficient ability to exercise the Christian virtues, which presupposes the ordinary ability to think. The great defect of modern society ... is not so much the inability to think, as a lack of those fundamentals of character that will enable people consistently to 'think straight.' The inculcation of such purposes is admittedly one of the chief aims of modern education and greatly transcends in importance the periodic passing of written examination.

It will be noted that the virtues mentioned are social virtues and further, that mere thought alone is considered insufficient to produce them.

25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., p. 45.
SINCE SOME THOUGHT IS 'CROOKED.' THUS INDOCTRINATION AND HABIT FORMING ARE THE PROVINCE OF THE SCHOOL IN THOSE CHARACTER FUNDAMENTALS WHICH DO NOT COME NATURALLY. THE REMARK CONCERNING STRAIGHT THINKING SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT IN ACCORD WITH THE ETHICS OF THE ENGLISH GENTLEMAN, THERE ARE ABSOLUTE VALUES WHICH ALL MEN WILL ACCEPT IF ONLY THEIR THINKING IS CORRECT. IF THEIR THINKING ON ETHICAL MATTERS IS DEFECTIVE OR IMMATURE, AND IN THE CASE OF STUDENTS SUCH DEFICIENCY IS INEVITABLE, THEN INOCULATION OF THE TRUE FUNDAMENTALS OF GOOD CHARACTER IS NECESSARY.

IN THE INQUIRY INTO THE QUESTION OF BIBLICAL INSTRUCTION IN THE SCHOOLS THEY FOUND COMMON AGREEMENT AGAINST SECTARIAN OR DENOMINATIONAL INSTRUCTION, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME REASONABLE UNANIMITY OF OPINION THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL TENETS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF, IF SUCH CAN BE AGREED UPON BY THE CHURCHES, SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL PROGRAMME AND TAUGHT BY PERSONS, GENERALLY OTHER THAN CLASSROOM TEACHERS, TRUSTED TO RISE ABOVE SECTARIAN BIAS. Finally, the commissioners were 'believers in the doctrine that religious faith and conviction constitute the supreme motive power and the greatest incentive in guiding the impulses and desires of youth along worthy lines.'

IN THEIR RECOMMENDATION AGAINST BIBLICAL INSTRUCTION IN THE SCHOOL THE COMMISSIONERS DO REFER TO THE CHARACTERISTIC OF BRITISH RULE THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE MINORITY, ESPECIALLY WHERE EMOTIONS AND CONVictions ARE CONCERNED. THEY DID NOT HOLD THIS CONSIDERATION BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED VALUES ARE RELATIVE TO EMOTIONS, HOWEVER, BUT BECAUSE THEY

28 Ibid., p. 53. 29 Ibid., p. 70.
doubted that the citizens of British Columbia have yet attained that stage of social enlightenment and toleration which will enable them to sink all petty difference and unite in a great campaign of moral emancipation. The differences in the value judgments must then be the result of confused thinking rather than divergent interests. No doubt they would have accepted the utilitarian doctrine of goodness, and defended freedom of speech by Mill's contention that such freedom was the only way in which 'true moral judgments could be discovered'.

They proceed to a consideration of individual rights, defined as the enjoyment of 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness within reasonable limitations'. The inevitable democratic contradiction is resolved by placing the emphasis on social cohesion rather than individual freedom; 'the freedom to do, to become, when duly subordinated to social obligation, has become the birthright of every Britisher'. The freedom of the individual is considered both an ethical end in itself and an aid to progress in the liberal democratic tradition.

To sum up, the Putman and Weir report selected moral and patriotic education as the fundamental aim of the schools, and defined the desired results as the type of character observed in the British Christian gentleman. They were aware of a profound divergence in opinion regarding the means of attaining that ideal and because of this recommended against any specific moral training of a religious character in the schools, thereby leaving the job, by default, to the example and personality of the teacher.

\[30\textit{ibid.}, \textit{p. 55.} \quad 31\textit{ibid.}, \textit{p. 57.} \quad 32\textit{ibid.}, \textit{p. 58.}\]
It may be that they were wrong in assuming any more than a superficial emotional unanimity of opinion regarding the aims of moral education, but it is probable that in British Columbia of that day, when emotional ties with the Empire were still powerful, a unifying war had just been won, and the population was still predominately of British origin, there was far more unanimity of moral opinion than exists today. Finally they regarded freedom of the individual as an ethical end and as a means of progress, and considered character education to be a function of the school as well as home and church. They did not regard morals as relative but considered that, in the public arena of their day, insufficient agreement of the means of attaining absolute moral behaviour meant that formal teaching of desirable morals was premature. They did however state that moral attitudes must be inculcated and instilled into an immature student, since the ability to think was by no means certain to produce moral behaviour. Hence, they were moral intuitionists, who intuitively regarded individual freedom as good.

IV. THE 1935 STATEMENT OF THE AIMS OF EDUCATION

The publication of the Putman and Weir survey was followed by substantial administrative and curricular changes. The curriculum itself was a practical means of directing education and had been distributed in printed form since 1919. However, it contained no introductory statement of aims and no guidance in teaching specific courses until 1935, when a curriculum revision committee was given the task of formulating a set of aims and purposes for education in British Columbia. This committee, under the chairmanship of C.B. Wood, prepared the most complete and thoughtful statement of the philosophy of education ever to be adopted by the province.
A general aim for all education was followed by a detailed set of aims which were laid down for elementary, junior high and senior high schools. The detailed aims are too long to be quoted in the text of this paper but will be found in the appendix; the reader will find them thoughtful, progressive, and permissive. Finally, there was included in the curriculum a directive upon a subject known as character education with detailed instructions upon the way the teacher was to handle this subject. The text which accompanied the aims and the directives upon character education was clearly a result of extensive reading in the field of progressive education since it included many of the catch-words of the progressivists such as 'problem-solving,' 'education as life' and 'experience.' There was also a thoughtful expression of the ideals already noted in the concept of a liberal democratic society (Chapter 3).

The statement of general aims is worth quoting:

It is the function of the school, through carefully selected experiences, to stimulate, modify, and direct the growth of each pupil physically, mentally, morally and socially, so that the continual enrichment of the individual's life and an improved society may result. 33

The salient feature is that the school is not to dictate, instill, indoctrinate, but to provide experiences which will enrich the life of the individual and promote, through the individual, the progress of society. It is notable that nowhere in the whole text does the word 'inculcate' occur, nor is it in sympathy with the emphasis upon critical thinking as a means of solving moral problems. (See footnote, page 40, on meaning of inculcate.)

33 Programmes of Studies, Senior High Schools of B.C., Bulletin #1, 1937, p. 11.
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE TERMS 'INDIVIDUAL' AND 'SOCIETY' IS CHARACTERISTIC IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. HOWEVER, EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM IS STRESSED, NOT AS A MEANS OF SPURRING PROGRESS BUT AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING SELF-REALIZATION IN THE INDIVIDUAL.\textsuperscript{34} The aims require that the student be educated in those lines which will enable him to find enjoyment in his leisure time in aesthetic and athletic pursuits and which will enable him to find rewarding employment in the vocation for which his ability most suits him.\textsuperscript{35} This accent was missing in Putman and Weir and will be conspicuous in its absence from the 1962 statement of aims; yet the desire to produce self-realization in the individual is the result of a value judgment distinctive to the liberal democratic society. The word which keynotes such self-realization in the general statement may be said to be 'stimulate,' since the provision of meaningful experience is mainly aimed at stimulation of mental and emotional growth.

However, the committee stressed that the educator must strive to reach an 'individual-social balance,' since 'individual development which is opposed to the social good is undesirable.'\textsuperscript{36} But here, as in other statements of the socializing process of education, social behaviour is allied to, and identified with, moral education. Actions which are anti-social are immoral, and moral behaviour is identified with behaviour which takes the welfare of others into consideration. Thus individuality must be curbed in various situations, not because society demands it, but because the welfare of other individuals is at stake. The alliance of social and moral education

\textsuperscript{34}ibid. \qquad \textsuperscript{35}ibid. \qquad \textsuperscript{36}ibid., p. 14.
THUS INDIRECTLY FAVOURS INDIVIDUALISM.

FROM MORAL EDUCATION THE COMMITTEE DERIVED EDUCATION FOR CHARACTER. SINCE THEY INCLUDE THE MORAL FEATURES OF EDUCATION IN THEIR SECTION ON 'INDIVIDUAL EDUCATION,' IT IS ASSUMED THAT EDUCATION FOR CHARACTER MEANT, TO THEM, THAT OF BOTH THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE CITIZEN. AT ALL EVENTS, THEY AGREE WITH PUTMAN AND WEIR THAT THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF EDUCATION IS CHARACTER. HOWEVER THEY DISAGREE WITH THE LATTER IN THE MEANS OF ATTAINING 'CHARACTER.'

HERE IS THEIR STATEMENT:

EVERY ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE, EVERY JUDGMENT, AND EVERY EFFORTinski p. 428.;italics mine) TO THE FORMATION OF HIGH IDEALS AND TO NOBLE CONDUCT, BY PROVIDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR RIGHT THINKING, RIGHT ACTION, AND THE SATISFACTION THAT RESULTS THEREFROM. THESE MEASURES SHOULD SUPERSEDE THE NEGATIVE METHOD OF RIGID AND EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENT. 37

IN CONTRAST TO THE ACCENT UPON RIGOROUS INCULCATION OF PROPER HABITS REQUIRED BY PUTMAN AND WEIR, THE FRAMERS OF THIS STATEMENT OF AIDS PROPOSE THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALS THROUGH CRITICAL THINKING. THEY STATE THAT 'MERE HABITUATION CAN NEVER RESULT IN GENUINE CHARACTER,' 38 AND THAT 'LEARNING MAY BE THOUGHT OF TOO MUCH IN TERMS OF ACQUIRING READY-MADE RESPONSES THROUGH MECHANICAL THINKING.' 39 THEY PROPOSE THE DEVELOPMENT IN STUDENTS OF 'CRITICAL THINKING, OF OPENMINDEDNESS AND FREEDOM FROM PREJUDICE, UNIMPEDED BY UNREGULATED EMOTIONS' 40 OR, IN A PHRASE, THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD OF ATTACKING PROBLEMS.

THE AREA OF THE CURRICULUM DEVOTED TO CHARACTER EDUCATION GIVES FURTHER DIRECTION ON THE WAY STUDENTS ARE TO BE ENCOURAGED TO ATTACK MORAL DILEMMAS. FIRST, THERE IS NO SET SCHEDULE FOR MORAL EDUCATION SINCE IT IS TO

\[37\text{Ibid.} \quad 38\text{Ibid., p. 428.} \quad 39\text{Ibid., p. 15.} \quad 40\text{Ibid., p. 11.}\]
PERVADE ALL SUBJECTS, AND IS TO BE 'THE FIRST CONSIDERATION OF EVERY TEACHER.' Not only is the character of the teacher important, but he must make regular and planned efforts to develop in students a 'knowledge of what is right; awareness of moral principles and as far as possible, reasons for them.' The submission of examples and group discussions are to be the main means. The teacher is never to tell the students what to think, he is only to provide them with the facts and allow them to do the thinking themselves.

Pupils should be encouraged to think independently, to examine all sides of the question, to seek adequate rational grounds for their opinions, and to organize their thinking in terms of broad moral principles. Such faith in the ability of students to reach the right moral opinion by means of critical thinking could mean that the framers either considered that ethical judgments were relative to each individual, or that correct ethical rules could be derived by the exercise of reason and empirical investigation of consequences. The latter viewpoint is a feature of the naturalist view of ethics and this, rather than the relativist, was the one held by the committee. "Students are to be brought to an understanding of the fact (italics not in the original) that good acts are those which result in the greatest satisfaction to the greatest number of people over the longest period of time." This, of course, is not a fact but a value judgment, common to the utilitarians and devoid of the possibility of logical proof. If a student were to ask for proof that the greatest happiness is good, the teacher would be unable to supply it and therefore,

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41 Ibid., p. 428.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid., p. 430.
WOULD HAVE TO ASK HIM TO ACCEPT IT BY INTUITION, IN DIRECT CONTRAST TO THE
IDEAL OF CRITICAL THINKING WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE FOSTERED; OR THE TEACHER
WOULD HAVE TO ASK HIM TO ACCEPT IT AS VALUE JUDGMENT HELD BY THE MAJORITY IN
HIS SOCIETY, MAKING A TACIT ADMISSION THAT VALUES ARE DECIDED BY MAJORITY
VOTE.

ONE WONDERS, INDEED, HOW OFTEN THE TEACHER WAS COMPELLED TO TERMINATE
THE KIND OF DISCUSSION ON MORALS SUGGESTED IN THE CURRICULUM, BY STATING
 THAT ONE PARTICULAR COURSE IS THE RIGHT ONE BECAUSE EITHER HE, OR THE WELL
INFORMED, OR THE MAJORITY, SAY IT IS. HOWEVER, ABSOLUTE VALUES HAVE LOST THE
PREVIOUS RELIGIOUS ASPECT. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IS NOT MENTIONED ANYWHERE
IN THE STATEMENT.

TO SUM UP THE TENOR OF THE STATEMENT OF AIMS OF EDUCATION IN BRITISH
COLUMBIA FORMULATED IN 1935 FOR INCLUSION IN AND GUIDANCE IN INTERPRETING
THE PROGRAMME OF STUDIES;

A. IN KEEPING WITH PREVIOUS STATEMENTS, THIS STATEMENT REGARDS THE
FORMATION OF CHARACTER AS THE FOREMOST AIM OF EDUCATION.

B. IN CONTRAST TO PREVIOUS STATEMENTS, THIS STATEMENT ACCENTS THE
EDUCATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL WITH THE AIM OF PROMOTING HIS SELF-REALI-ZA-
TION, AND SEEMS TO SUGGEST THAT THE ATTENDANT AIM OF SOCIAL EDUCATION
FINDS ITS PURPOSE IN THE SELF-REALIZATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AS WELL.

C. IN CONTRAST TO PREVIOUS DIRECTION, THE STATEMENT REQUIRES THAT
MORAL EDUCATION PRODUCE HABITS AND IDEALS WHICH ARE THE RESULT OF
INDEPENDENT THOUGHT ON THE PART OF EACH STUDENT, RATHER THAN INCULCATION
OF THE MORAL VIEWS OF SOCIETY BY THE TEACHER. IN PLACE OF INDOCTRINA-
TION, THE STATEMENT PROPOSES CRITICAL THINKING ALONG THE LINES OF THE
SCIENTIFIC METHOD.

D. While the 1935 statement of aims suggests independent critical thought is suitable in moral problems, it was expected that reason would produce agreement upon the 'correct' moral course in the end. Thus the statement reflects a utilitarian and therefore absolutist view of ethics.

V. THE OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF AIMS OF EDUCATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1955

The statement of aims formulated in 1935 reflected the utilitarian philosophy and progressive attitude to education prevalent at that time. As has been shown, they were lengthy and all-inclusive, stressed critical thought as a means of arriving at individual self-realization, and were justified by a fairly complete discussion of the reasons behind them. They sufficed until 1954, when a general public uneasiness was noted concerning the permissiveness and breadth of the new education. Since a Provincial Curriculum Advisory Board, composed of teachers and principals, had been previously created to advise the Department in curriculum change, the Department considered it meet that this board make a re-assessment of the basic aims of the curriculum in the light of observed changes. A new statement of aims was drawn up by a committee of the board, amended by the whole board, accepted as the authorized official statement of aims of education in British Columbia, and first published in the 1954-55 Annual Report of the Department of Education. It remains, at this writing, the official version, although a revision is in progress. The full text takes up only one page, (in contrast to the seven pages devoted to aims by its
The brevity of the new statement is its most striking feature. It is devoid of any philosophical or logical justification, being simply a series of promulgations which have frequently been accused of vagueness, incoherence, and ambiguity. Taken alone, the tone seems to differ substantially from that noted in the 1935 statement, although exposition by its originators does seem to ameliorate the dissimilarity. Briefly, the statement seems to direct a return to the less permissive education with more emphasis on 'inculcation' of morality. The leading sentence reads thus:

The people of this Province have established schools for the primary purposes of developing the character of our young people, training them to be good citizens, and teaching them the fundamental skills of learning necessary to further education and adult life.  

There are three purposes here, but the last concerning the attainment of skills may be left without comment since it is purely practical. The first two definitely require elucidation, since they could be construed as identical: 'character' development usually means the development of 'good' moral character, and the latter in turn usually means that possessed by a good citizen attuned to the attitudes held worthy in his society. Nothing in this statement suggests that by character, the committee inferred a sense of individual self-realization. They mention that 'a good school programme develops children in two ways -- as individual persons and as citizens.'

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However, they define the individual as 'one who has confidence in himself because of what he is and what he knows.' This statement is vague indeed; well-founded self-confidence is surely not a sufficient definition of the self-realization mentioned in the previous statement of aims. It does not suggest, as did the former statement, that the child be assisted in developing an integrated personality, the fullest limit of his ability, and the critical independence of thought desirable in a member of a democratic society.

However, this is the only mention of the individual. The remainder of the statement concerns the attainment of skills and the development of special attitudes. Nor is there any mention of developing the latter by means of independent thought. The key words 'instill' and 'require' have returned. Students are to be directed toward the proper attitudes which will make them docile, obedient and industrious citizens. In place of independent appraisal of moral questions by means of the medium of class discussion, the teacher is 'to guide pupils in the development of such qualities of character and citizenship as good personal habits, willingness to work with others, honesty, obedience, and self-control.' These are hardly the qualities one associates with free and independent thought. Self-discipline is to be taught, not by having the students think about the benefits to them and to society of such behaviour, but by 'requiring acceptable standards of performance and behaviour in all phases of the school programme.'

46 Iibid.  
47 Iibid.  
48 Iibid.
The attitude towards aesthetics and manual training has also become more social. Where the old statement concerned itself with 'encouraging an interest in art, music, literature, nature and play for the enrichment and enjoyment of life,' the new statement wishes pupils to 'become familiar with that which is great and valuable in history, science, and the arts, for no stated reason. The accent is now placed upon teaching the 'glories of the past' instead of aiming at personal enjoyment of leisure time. Pupils are now to learn manual skills 'as a means of helping them become practical and useful citizens.'

In an article in the Journal of Education in 1960, Professor P. Remnant contrasted the new statement with the old in these terms:

Where the former places its emphasis on growth, self-realization and the disciplined self-expression of the individual child, and on the development of an emotionally mature, imaginative, and critical adult, in whom we may have a better hope of society, the latter envisages a person tamed into the negative virtues of obedience and conformity, and fitted out with the standard manual and intellectual skills, ready to slip quietly into what is appropriately called the 'occupational life.'

Thus the negative ideal of a docile citizen is to replace the positive ideal of the individual trained to think for himself and reach his own decisions.

To be sure, the idea that the latter will produce a better society is a value judgment, but it is one which fits the liberal democratic ethic far better than does the society in which citizens are taught obedience and

49 Programme of Studies (1937), op. cit., p. 17.
ACCEPTABLE STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE AND BEHAVIOUR.

It should be noted that such rigorous examination of the aims themselves does the members of the committee little justice. Where they had the opportunity to expand upon the contents, the vagueness is to some extent dispelled and the debt owing the 1935 statement appears. In a speech upon the occasion of the first public unveiling of the statement, Mr. F. P. Levirs, chief inspector of schools, explained the reasons why a revision was made and the intent of some of the objectives. For instance, unlike the 1935 statement, this set of rules made no distinction between the aims and purposes of elementary and of secondary schools. Thus on the matter of obedience, Mr. Levirs stressed that 'obedience to external authority becomes less necessary as pupils learn the advantages to be gained from good order and gradually assume self-control and self-direction of which sound discipline consists.'

One would never divine from the bald statement of aims that, as students progress towards graduation, indoctrination in habits is less desirable than the reasoned approach, although this was carefully explained in the former statement and clearly intended by Mr. Levirs. Again he provides the missing reason why the student should be made familiar with aesthetic and historical matters; the purpose is individual enrichment as it was in the old statement.

However, while the committee was obviously composed of able men who thought clearly and had valued philosophical reasons for so thinking, their

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54 Ibid.
INADEQUATE PRODUCT IS ALL THAT GREET THE CASUAL OBSERVER TODAY. THAT
PRODUCT IS VAGUE AND BRIEF AND VIRTUALLY IGNORES THE CONCEPT OF INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM AND THE IDEAL OF INDEPENDENT CRITICAL JUDGMENT IN QUESTIONS OF MORAL
HABITS, ATTITUDES AND IDEALS. THE REASONS FOR THE CHANGE OF EMPHASIS AND
THE LACK OF CLARITY ARE FAIRLY CLEAR.

MR. LEVIRS STATED THAT A CHANGING SOCIETY REQUIRES CHANGING AIMS AND
THAT WHILE THE ORIGINAL STATEMENT WAS EXCELLENT IT HAD LED TO A NEGLECT OF
THE OLD VIRTUES AND THE ASSUMPTION OF TOO LARGE AN EDUCATIONAL RESPONSIBI-
LITY.\(^{55}\) IT SEEMS MORE LIKELY THAT THE ORIGINAL STATEMENT WAS MODERATELY
PROGRESSIVE, AT A TIME WHEN THE EXTREMES OF PROGRESSIVISM HAD BECOME PUBLICLY
NOTORIOUS. IT HAD EMPHASIZED THE ROLE OF THE SCHOOL IN ALL PHASES OF
EDUCATION AND HAD LED TO A CERTAIN SUPERFLUITY OF COURSES NOT IN KEEPING
WITH THE IDEA THAT THE SCHOOL WAS THE MEDIUM FOR A SOLELY INTELLECTUAL
EDUCATION. THE POPULAR REVULSION AGAINST THE PROGRESSIVE IDEAL OF TEACHING
'THE WHOLE CHILD' CAN BE DISCERNED IN THE FACT THAT THE 1955 STATEMENT,
BRIEF AS IT IS, CONTAINS IN THREE SEPARATE PLACES THE ADJURATION THAT THE
SCHOOL IS NOT THE ONLY INSTITUTION INVOLVED IN EDUCATION AND THAT IT MUST
CO-OPERATE WITH THE HOME AND THE CHURCH TO THAT END. MR. LEVIRS STATED IN
HIS SPEECH THAT 'THE SCHOOL IS NOT THE SOLE AGENCY OF THE COMMUNITY
CONCERNED WITH THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN; THEREFORE NEITHER SHOULD IT
ARROGATE TO ITSELF THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER AGENCIES, NOR
SHOULD IT CARRY OUT ITS OWN PROGRAMME IN ISOLATION.'\(^{56}\) FURTHERMORE, HE
STATES, (ALTHOUGH THE 1955 AIMS DO NOT) THAT THE ONE EDUCATIONAL ELEMENT

\(^{55}\) Ibid., pp. 5-7. \(^{56}\) Ibid., p. 7.
PARTICULAR TO THE SCHOOLS IS INTELLECTUAL TRAINING, AN IMPLICATION THAT THIS AIM IS TO BE REGARDED AS ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION. Moral character is to be mainly the province of the home and church and only enters the school as a by-product, a derivative of sound discipline and the excellent example set by the teacher.

Thus the 1955 statement of aims adds little to the philosophy of education in British Columbia except an inclination towards authoritarianism in moral education; any account on teaching the critical appraisal of morals has vanished and the previous concern of Putman and Weir for the production, by example, of a particular type of character, that of the British gentleman, has likewise disappeared. It would seem apparent that in the polyarchal society that British Columbia had become in this decade, common agreement on morals was non-existent, and formal teaching of character in any sense was out of the question in the public schools. Therefore, the new statement of aims was made as abstruse and platitudinous as possible, while at the same time a recognition was made of public revulsion with the excesses of progressive education.

VI. PROGRAMME OF STUDIES AND THE SCHOOL ACT

Before discussing the approach to the question of character education taken by the latest Royal Commission on the education, two minor sources of philosophical import remain.

The Programmes of Study, the origins of which have been explained, 

57 Ibid., p. 9.
were revised in 1935 to include the philosophy and aims of education discussed hitherto, and also a complete resume of the aims of each subject. This practice has been continued to the present day and the programmes of study in various courses provide a flexible but informative guide to daily teaching.

In most cases the aims of each course are mundane and refer more demanding reader to the general aims already discussed. In a few cases however, the comments which precede a course are of great interest, since their implications go beyond the general statements. Such was the case, for instance, with the 1935 section on character education. Here, for the first time, an attempt was made to describe to teachers the aims and methods of educating for desirable character. Previously, as today, character education had been highly extolled in ambiguous terms but quietly omitted from the curriculum except as a matter of assimilation of habits and examples of teachers and heroes.

In keeping with the general statement of aims, the 1935 section on character education specified that 'the ultimate goal of all education is character' and that it was the 'first considerate' of every teacher. The directions given in regard to character education proposed in 1935 have already been discussed, as have the suspected difficulties. No evidence is available as to how such teaching was actually carried out, and one is inclined to wonder how the teaching profession handled the subject, if at all. At any rate, the section on character study was not reprinted after

58 Programme of Studies (1937), op. cit., p. 428.
THE 1941 REVISION, BUT WAS SUCCEEDED BY COURSES LABELLED 'EFFECTIVE LIVING' AND 'HEALTH GUIDANCE.' THESE WERE DEVOID OF MORAL IMPORT, AND ONLY CONCERNED CHARACTER EDUCATION IN SUCH THEMES AS TEMPERANCE, CLEANLINESS AND GOOD STUDY HABITS. THUS CHARACTER EDUCATION, ON A FORMAL SCIENTIFIC BASIS, HAD A VERY SHORT LIFE.

OTHER PROGRAMMES OF STUDIES OF IMPORTANCE TO THIS PAPER COVER ENGLISH, SCIENCE AND SOCIAL STUDIES AND THEY ARE CHIEFLY OF INTEREST BECAUSE THEY SUFFERED LESS FROM REVISION THAN DID THE GENERAL AIMS OF EDUCATION. IN PARTICULAR, THEY RETAIN TODAY AN EMPHASIS UPON THE INDIVIDUAL AND UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD OF CRITICAL THOUGHT DERIVED FROM 1935 BUT LACKING IN THE PRESENT AIMS OF EDUCATION. THE ENGLISH PROGRAMME OF STUDIES AIMS AT 'INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT LEADING TO EFFECTIVE PERSONAL LIVING AS WELL AS SOCIAL AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING.'\(^5^9\) THE SCIENCE PROGRAMME IN 1935 STRESSES THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE RATHER THAN THE ACQUIRING OF FACT OR SKILLS, AN EMPHASIS LOST IN THE 1956 REVISION. IT ALSO STRESSED THAT GENERALIZATIONS ARE TO BE FORMED BY THE STUDENTS RATHER THAN PRESENTED AS READY MADE LAWS. HOWEVER, THE 1955 VERSION DOES STRESS THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES OF TOLERANCE OF NEW CONCEPTS, WILLINGNESS TO withhold JUDGMENT TILL ALL THE FACTS ARE IN, AND AWARENESS OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FACTS AND SUPERSTITION.\(^6^0\)

IT IS THE SOCIAL STUDIES PROGRAMME WHICH MAKES THE MOST APPARENT CONTRAST WITH THE 1955 AIMS. FOR INSTANCE, 'SOCIAL STUDIES INSTRUCTION WILL

\(^{5^9}\) ENGLISH (PROGRAMME OF STUDIES) PROVINCE OF B.C., DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF CURRICULUM, 1956, P. 7.

\(^{6^0}\) THE SCIENCES (PROGRAMME OF STUDIES), PROVINCE OF B.C., DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF CURRICULUM, 1956, P. 7.
HAVE FAILED IN ONE OF ITS PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES IF STUDENTS PURSUE IT IN A PASSIVE, CREDULOUS, UNTHINKING SUBSERVIENCE TO ALL THAT IS WRITTEN AND HEARD TO-DAY ABOUT SOCIETY AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS.\(^{61}\) HERE IS AN ACCENT ON CRITICAL THOUGHT WHICH IS A FAR CRY FROM THE 'INSTILLING OF DESIRABLE ATTITUDES, HABITS AND IDEALS.' A LIST OF THE SUGGESTED ATTITUDES WHICH THE 1951 PROGRAMME CONSIDERS SHOULD BE THE OBJECTIVE OF SOCIAL STUDIES ARE INCLUDED IN THE APPENDIX. IT WILL BE NOTED THAT THEY ACCENTUATE TOLERANCE, REASONED PATRIOTISM, AND THE RIGHT TO INDIVIDUALITY, AS WELL AS THE NEED TO PRODUCE RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS. INDEED, ONE OF THE MOST CONCRETE STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE AIM OF PRODUCING INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE USEFULLY THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT OCCURS IN A PARAGRAPH LABELLED 'PROPAGANDA:'

While the pupils should be led to the understanding and appreciation of the democratic principles upon which our constitution and our national life are based, the teacher of the Social Studies should bear in mind that to take advantage of his position to propagandize his own views—political, economic, religious, or other—or the views of any party or group to which he may belong or with which he may sympathize, violates the objectives of the Social Studies and of education in general, and is inconsistent with the ethics of the teaching profession. It is the function of the teacher to provide the pupil with material to think about, with a method of thinking, and with situations and problems which challenge him to think. It is not the function of the teacher to tell him what he is to think.\(^{62}\)

This statement is virtually unchanged from the 1935 statement. It contains a concept fundamental to liberal democracy, to the scientific attitude, and to the acceptance of the theory that morals are relative to individuals and groups. It is the antithesis of 'inculcation' and 'instillation.' Surprisingly enough, it occurs not only in the modern Social Studies (Programme of Studies) Province of B.C. Dept. of Ed., Division of Curriculum, 1956, p. 7.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., p. 28.
Studies programme but also in that bulletin which presents the authorized official aims of education for British Columbia, although at the end, and in no way connected with the aims of education.

Such are the scraps of direction concerning character education in the present programmes of study. The Public Schools Act of British Columbia presents one final directive concerning moral education which has caused a great deal of soul-searching and discussion over the years. Article 167 reads:

All public schools shall be opened by the reading, without explanation or comment, of a passage of Scripture to be selected from the readings prescribed or approved by the Council of Public Instruction. The reading of the passage of Scripture shall be followed by the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer, but otherwise the schools shall be conducted on strictly secular and non-sectarian principles. The highest morality shall be inculcated, but no religious dogma or creed shall be taught.63

The article has existed, with minor changes, since the first school act of 1872. The word ‘inculcate’ has never been omitted. It represents a concession to the religious majority within the society, a concession so limited as to be little more than a meaningless formality. It originated at a time when the moral basis of the society was felt to originate in religious faith but where a variety of religious faiths made agreement on any further inclusion of religion in the curriculum impractical. No doubt such is the case today. Few teachers claim that the morning Scripture reading has any moral value, but whenever the question of its retention, expansion or abolition arises, the majority can only agree that no change be made. The irreligious regard it as harmless and the religious regard it as

63Public Schools Act of British Columbia, 1960, Article #167.
BETTER THAN NOTHING. ANY MOVE TO INCREASE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION FOUNDERS ON THE COMPLETE LACK OF AGREEMENT ON THE MEANS OF MORAL EDUCATION, NOTED BY PUTMAN AND WEIR, CIRCUMVENTED BY THE ATTEMPT AT A RATIONAL CHARACTER EDUCATION IN 1935, AND IGNORED COMPLETELY IN 1955.

VII. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON EDUCATION, 1960

The decade between 1950 and 1960 was, in British Columbia, one of the rapid expansion and startling change. The remarkable demonstration of the scientific prowess by Soviet Russia and the apparent loss of technical and moral leadership by the West caused a trauma which prompted frantic endeavours to find the reasons behind such loss. Education was chosen as one of the fields where the West was losing ground, and a multitude of opinions, informed, unqualified, constructive and destructive, were advanced to explain the scientific lag. The obvious victim of such criticism was the concept of progressive education, since the doctrine of teaching the whole child is mainly practical only in an affluent society. Thus when a society finds it is not as dominant as it once was, there is a tendency to discard the form of education which displaced the traditional schooling of the 'good old days' and revert to that which is associated, at a distance, with the successes of the past.

One sign of such a reassessment in British Columbia was the revision of aims of education in 1955 which, it has been noted, showed a good deal less confidence and sense of direction than its predecessor. Concern grew with each triumph of the Soviets and in 1958 the Government of British Columbia appointed a Royal Commission to report 'in the light of world
CONDITIONS, ON THE ADEQUACY OF THE BASIC EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE
BRITISH COLUMBIA EDUCATIONS SYSTEM; THE CURRICULUM AND COURSES OF STUDY;
THE TEXTBOOKS AND SCHOOL LIBRARY FACILITIES; THE SCHOOL AND DEPARTMENTAL
PROCEDURES AND REPORTING TO PARENTS; THE STANDARDS OF PUPIL ACHIEVEMENT AND
DISCIPLINE; PUPIL AND PARENT RESPONSIBILITY.\(^{64}\)

The commissioners, headed by S.N. F. Chant, were to consider all
aspects of education with the exception of finance. They were careful to
deny that the commission had been appointed because of a widespread
discontent with the existing system, but stated that the time seemed
opportune for an independent review because of 'a prevalent opinion that
Canadian education was not yielding results that were equal to those being
obtained in some other countries.'\(^{65}\) The concern was not confined to
BRITISH COLUMBIA, since almost every other province in CANADA has conducted
a similar investigation in recent years.

The commission felt that one of its prime duties was to produce a
channel by means of which the general public might make its educational views
known to its government, and to this end invited written and spoken expres-
sions of public opinion which it termed 'briefs.' Three hundred and six such
briefs were received, ranging from lengthy recommendations on all aspects of
education by professional organizations to terse submissions by individuals.
The commission attempted the difficult task of reconciling the multitude of
divergent views concerning the various aspects of education; if anyone

\(^{64}\) Report of the Royal Commission on Education, Province of B.C.,

\(^{65}\) Ibid., p. 2.
doubts that British Columbia is a multi-group society where individuals use fully their right of free speech, he need only investigate these briefs.

The briefs studied in preparing this paper were considered representative of both large provincial organizations and of individuals and private groups. Discussion of the aims and philosophy of education was not widespread, and the general consensus seemed to be that while the official aims would do, the schools had drifted away from their prime function of intellectual development. For the purposes of this paper there is little of value in listing a series of quotations from various briefs which, as the commission says, "invariably took the form of a statement of educational aims and objectives rather than that of any speculative theories of education." It is the philosophical speculation upon which the statement of aims are founded which are relevant here, and a reasoned and coherent assessment of that foundation is available only in the report of the commission itself.

The commission first quotes the 1955 statement of aims and then points out that while there was general unanimity over the basic aims of education, disagreement arises when means are discussed. However, where Putman and Weir were content to consider the public in agreement over basic aims, the Chant Commission was fully alive to the likelihood that the agreement existed in terms of words rather than definitions of words. They state that "although a statement of broad aims may be fully accepted, it may lead to vastly different outcomes in its actual application," and offer as an example the superficial agreement over the aim of teaching pupils to

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66 Ibid., p. 11. 67 Ibid.
'THINK.' Unless actual ways of thinking are delineated the term means very little.  

Thus the commissioners criticized the 1955 statement as being too general, all-inclusive and indefinite, capable of interpretation in all ways by all men. They claimed that such vagueness had led to a number of pressure groups using the aims to justify the inclusion in the curriculum of such quantities of dubious courses as to cause an overloading of the curriculum and a neglect of the 'traditional' activities. Their main concern therefore, was to re-define the aims of education so as to provide a single aim, definite enough to be of use in directing a course of action. With such singleness of purpose, the curriculum might then be checked in order to justify those courses which contribute to the central aim, and to discard those which do not.  

Here again, was the reaction against the progressive doctrine of teaching the whole child. To proponents of that doctrine, the term 'overloaded curriculum' is meaningless, since the traditional aims of which the commissioners speak are only a part of the total educational picture. However, the commission, in assessing the climate of public opinion, found that it was generally felt that schools had assumed the responsibilities of home and church and neglected their prime responsibility of intellectual development, so necessary to scientific progress. They felt that teaching the 'whole child' was the responsibility of the whole community and that schools should return to the traditional aim of developing the intellect. Thus were all previous extensive delineations of the aims of  

68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid., p. 12.  
70 Ibid., p. 15.
education in British Columbia had stated that the principal function of the
school was the education for character, the Chant Commission recommends
that the primary or general aim of the educational system of British
Columbia should be that of promoting the intellectual development of the
pupils, and that this should be the major emphasis throughout the whole
school programme." 71

Here we have a significant change of emphasis from character to
intellect. The change limits and clarifies the job of the public school,
since a well-developed intellect is slightly easier to define than a well
developed character, and certainly somewhat easier to measure.

The commission justifies its choice of intellectual development as
the main aim of education of British Columbia on three counts: first, because
such education is essential for survival in a world where scientific prowess
brings dominance; second, because the intellect is, they claim, the tradi-
tional concern of the school; third because such development is the area best
suited to the formal methods of study used in schools. 72

These three reasons require close scrutiny. While the commissioners
do not specifically refer to national survival as being dependent upon
development of the intellect, it seems obvious that their concern for the
latter has, in common with much of the western world, been excited by interna-
tional events. The public in British Columbia had been aroused by reports
that the progressive education of the latter decades had starved the intellect
in favour of the whole child, while countries such as Russia avoid pampering

71 ibid., p. 17. 72 ibid., pp. 18-19.
The child and concentrate on the brain. That the intellectual challenge in Canadian schools is less vigorous than that in some European institutions is more or less taken for granted by educators. However, it might be suggested that whatever deficiencies exist in the intellectual attainment of the youth of British Columbia, they are not the result of an overloaded curriculum, but rather of a desire to provide perfect equality of education for all youth. This principle of equality demands a curriculum which is a challenge to the average, rather than the bright child; thus the achievements of the average suffice for the intelligent child. Therefore, if national survival demands stress on intellectual development, it might conceivably be more efficient to educate for an intellectual elite as in the case in Britain, France, Germany and Russia. In such systems, the more able students receive the intellectual challenge which is said to assist national survival. There is no need to devote the whole of the school system to the primary aim of developing the intellect.

The commissioners claim to have studied the educational systems of other countries and state that such systems will not do for British Columbia. However, in their recommendations concerning the re-organization of the school system, they propose a set of ability streams which bears a good deal of resemblance to the European system. But in none of these systems is intellectual development the primary aim. Communist theory, the Russian method of building character, is the cornerstone of the educational system of that nation. The British Grammar School and the French College Moderne both stress character building equally with intellectual development.73

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V. Mallinson, Comparative Education, pp. 85-86.
Thus, while the commission may have some cause to claim that the British Columbia curriculum is overloaded to the detriment of academic subjects, their recommendation that intellectual development become the primary aim would produce a rather unique school system.

The second reason for the recommendation, that intellectual development is the traditional aim, is contrary to fact. As has been noted in prior statements of aims, character development is the traditional purpose of education in British Columbia. The commission's recommendation is actually contrary to tradition.

Finally, the commission opined that other institutions, notably church and home, were better suited for the development of character than the school. This is consistent with the 1955 statement of aims and with public opinion of the day, both of which were disturbed by the way in which schools had usurped what was considered the main responsibility of other institutions. The 1955 statement was explicit that the school should buttress home and church but must not attempt to usurp their responsibility. This position is also consistent with the apparent conviction of the commission that values are absolute. Thus if all agree on moral problems, then it is small consequence who teaches them as long as they are taught.

However, if values in a multi-group democratic society are relative, then there is some danger in apportioning major responsibility for their education to a remarkably diverse group of institutions, all of which are under the impression that their own values are absolute and correct. This seems to be the case in British Columbia; there is an unconscious or overt feeling among the population that values are absolute, in defiance of the
BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE SOCIETY INVOLVED.

In the conclusions of this paper, an attempt will be made to point out the dangers of leaving character development to institutions other than school. At this point, it will suffice to record that the final reason the commissioners give for making intellectual development the prime aim of the schools, in defiance of tradition, is that character development is the particular responsibility of home and church.

This paper suggests a further reason why the school is regarded by the public and the commission as subordinate to home and church in character development; that is, the heterogeneity of the society. Where no unanimity exists regarding the ends and means of moral education, that type of education cannot be made a formal object of public school instruction, even though various groups insist that the school must teach fundamental morals. While grandiose statements are made concerning the need for moral training in the values by which men have consistently lived, neither the briefs to the commission nor the commission itself can afford to be specific about what those values actually are.

In the definition of intellectual development which the commission provides, there is room for moral development. It states that 'the development of the intellect demands the acquisition of skills, the understanding of human knowledge, the appreciation of human values and principles, and the ability to think effectively.' The latter two are the crucial ones in this discussion. Neither is defined further. Effective methods of thought

\[\text{\footnotesize 74 \textit{Report of the Royal Commission, op. cit.}, p. 18.}\]
ARE SIMPLY SAID TO BE VASTLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE CAVEMAN.\textsuperscript{75} IN A LATER SECTION ENTITLED 'LEARNING TO THINK' THE COMMISSIONERS REVIEW SOME STATEMENTS ON THE SUBJECT FROM VARIOUS BRIEFS. THEY STRESS THE NEED FOR INFORMATION, AND THE ABILITY TO MANIPULATE WORDS AND NUMBERS, BEFORE THINKING CAN PROCEED.\textsuperscript{76} BUT THEY SAY NOTHING ABOUT THE ACTUAL CRITERIA OF EFFECTIVE THINKING ITSELF, OTHER THAN A VAGUE REFERENCE TO THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD.\textsuperscript{77} ONE CAN ONLY ASSUME, SINCE THEY MADE NO ADVERSE COMMENTS, THAT THEY ARE IN ACCORD WITH THE ESSENTIALS OF THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE AND WITH THE NOTE ON PROPAGANDA ALREADY QUOTED FROM THE SOCIAL STUDIES PROGRAMME OF STUDIES.

ON THE SUBJECT OF THE 'APPRECIATION OF HUMAN PRINCIPLES AND VALUES,' THEY ARE NO MORE SPECIFIC. HOWEVER, THEY REJECT ANY INCREASE IN RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION BECAUSE OF A LACK OF GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF COMMON RELIGIOUS BELIEF NOTED IN INTELLECTUAL SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE.\textsuperscript{78} WHILE THEY PREFER TO LEAVE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MORAL EDUCATION TO THE CHURCH AS ITS TRADITIONAL CONCERN, THEY CLAIM THAT THE SCHOOL HAS SOME RESPONSIBILITY 'PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE ITS MAJOR AIM OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT IMPLIES AN UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTANCE OF THOSE PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT WHICH MAN HAS FOUND OVER THE AGES TO BE ESSENTIAL FOR HUMANE LIVING.'\textsuperscript{79}

THE LATTER STATEMENT IMPLIES THAT THE COMMISSIONERS REGARD THESE PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT AS ABSOLUTE, IF ONLY BECAUSE OF THE PREVALENT HUMAN SITUATION, NO MATTER HOW LITTLE UNANIMITY THEY FOUND AMONG THE GENERAL

\textsuperscript{75}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 19. \textsuperscript{76}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 362. \textsuperscript{77}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 354.
\textsuperscript{78}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 20. \textsuperscript{79}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 21.
PUBLIC ON THIS SCORE. HOWEVER, THEY FAIL TO LIST THESE ABSOLUTE VALUES AND
PREFER TO LEAVE THEM TO ACCRUE AS A 'BY-PRODUCT OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT'
AND OF THE EXAMPLE OF THE TEACHERS AND LEADERS OF THE COMMUNITY. THUS THEY
STATE THAT 'IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS THE (MORAL) PROBLEMS ARE MORE CIRCUM-
SCRIBED THAN IN SUCH FIELDS AS PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, OR LAW, IN THAT THE
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MORAL CONDUCT ARE ACCEPTED, AND THE MATTER BECOMES ONE
OF ENCOURAGING THEIR PRACTICE IN THE YOUNG, RATHER THAN ONE OF DISCUSSING
THEIR NATURE AND SANCTIONS.'\textsuperscript{80} THE RIGHT MORAL COURSE CAN BE ASCERTAINED
AS A MATTER OF FACT, AND HENCE NEED NOT BE JUSTIFIED BUT SIMPLY INCULCATED.

HERE THE COMMISSIONERS HAVE REVERTED TO THE POSITION OF PUTMAN AND
WEIR, IN DIRECT CONTRAST TO THE 1935 STATEMENT OF AIMS. HOWEVER, THE
CHAPTER FROM WHICH THIS IS TAKEN, 'MORAL PRINCIPLES AND CHARACTER EDUCATION,'
IS CONFUSING IN THAT IT INCLUDES DIRECT BUT UNACKNOWLEDGED QUOTES FROM THE
AFOREMENTIONED STATEMENT OF AIMS. IN IT THE COMMISSIONERS SEEMED TO USE
THESE QUOTES TO JUSTIFY THE CRITICAL APPROACH TO MORAL EDUCATION, BUT
TERMINATE BY RECOMMENDING INCULCATION AND ASSIMILATION BY EXAMPLE RATHER
THAN UNDERSTANDING. THUS THEY RECOMMEND MORAL DEVELOPMENT BY MEANS OF A
'PRECEPT, BY EXAMPLE, BY SETTING HIGH STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND OF ACHIEVE-
MENT, BY EMPHASIS ON GOOD HABITS AND RIGHT ATTITUDES, BY INSTILLING RESPECT
FOR PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND FOR HIGH IDEALS.'\textsuperscript{81} THESE METHODS SEEM MORE IN
ACCORD WITH MORAL EDUCATION IN THE ELEMENTARY GRADES THAN WITH SECONDARY
SCHOOL STUDENTS WHO ARE TO BE EDUCATED WITH THE PRIMARY AIM OF DEVELOPING
THE INTELLECT BY MEANS OF EFFECTIVE THINKING.

\textsuperscript{80}ibid., p. 408. \textsuperscript{81}ibid., p. 409.
SUMMARY

IN CONTRAST TO PREVIOUS STATEMENTS ON THE AIMS OF EDUCATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA, THE CHANT COMMISSION SELECTED INTELLECTUAL RATHER THAN CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT AS THE MAIN AIM OF EDUCATION. ENVIRONMENTAL REASONS FOR THIS CHANGE OF EMPHASIS WERE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION HAD PROMPTED A CONCERN FOR THE INTELLECTUAL COMPETENCE OF CANADIAN YOUTH AND THAT PUBLIC OPINION FELT THAT THE SCHOOLS WERE ASSUMING MORE THAN THEIR SHARE OF THE EDUCATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMUNITY. THE STATED REASONS OF THE CHANT COMMISSION FOR THE CHANGE IN EMPHASIS WERE THAT INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT WAS CRUCIAL FOR NATIONAL SURVIVAL AND THAT THE SCHOOL, AS AN INSTITUTION, WAS MOST PROPERLY SUITED TO THIS AIM RATHER THAN TO LESS DEFINITE PURPOSES WHICH PERMIT PRESSURE GROUPS TO OVERLOAD THE CURRICULUM, AND WHICH AT ANY RATE ARE MORE PROPERLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HOME AND THE CHURCH.

THE MORE PROBABLE REASONS BEHIND THE SWITCH TO INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT AS THE MAJOR AIM OF EDUCATION ARE:

A. IN A SOCIETY SUCH AS BRITISH COLUMBIA, WHERE THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY DISCOURAGES THE PRACTICE OF PRODUCING AN INTELLECTUAL ELITE, AN UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN FOR INTELLECTUAL COMPETENCE MAY FORCE THE WHOLE SCHOOL SYSTEM TO CONCENTRATE ON THAT AIM, TO THE NEGLECT OF THE TRADITIONAL AIM OF CHARACTER BUILDING,

B. IN A HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETY SUCH AS BRITISH COLUMBIA, THE RELUCTANCE TO ATTEMPT ANY SPECIFIC OR EXTENSIVE FORMS OF CHARACTER EDUCATION MAY RESULT FROM THE LACK OF UNANIMITY REGARDING THE ENDS
and the means of such education. Therefore, those called upon to delineate aims fall back on more easily defined objectives, such as the development of the intellect.

The Chant Commission did, however, feel that the schools had some responsibility towards moral education. They avoided the delineation of a moral philosophy, but, left the impression that they considered moral values as absolute. Furthermore, while they made some reference to the use of critical individual appraisal of moral problems, they very definitely gave the impression that they favoured instilling and inculcating moral habits, attitudes and ideals by means of good examples and unquestioning obedience.

VIII. REVISED STATEMENT OF AIMS

At the time of the writing of this report, the Department of Education is in the process of developing a new statement of aims which is in keeping with the recommendations of the Chant Commission. To this end, it has produced a draft statement which is included in the appendix of this paper, and caused it to be circulated among those organizations and individuals whose briefs to the Royal Commission indicated an interest in the subject. In the covering letter, the Department states that it 'is concerned in obtaining a final statement which has the general support of the people of this province who pay for the public schools.'

The draft statement is in accordance with the commission's recommendations both in its brevity and in its adoption of the general aim of intel-

LECTUAL DEVELOPMENT SO AS TO PROVIDE A DIRECTION TO COURSES OF ACTION. THE
PROLOGUE IS RELATIVELY UNCHANGED, EXCEPT THAT WHERE ONCE CHARACTER, CITIZEN-
SHIP AND FUNDAMENTAL SKILLS WERE SELECTED AS BASIC AIMS, NOW ONLY CITIZENSHIP
AND INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT REMAIN. SINCE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE 1955
AIMS, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT ORDINARY USAGE TENDS TO EQUATE GOOD CHARACTER
WITH CITIZENSHIP, THE ELIMINATION OF THE FORMER MAY BE A CLARIFICATION OF
THE ACTUAL INTENT OF THE DEPARTMENT. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT, WHERE
ONCE GOOD CITIZENSHIP WAS EXTOLLED, THE DRAFT STATEMENT REQUIRES 'GOOD AND
USEFUL CITIZENSHIP' AND EMPHASIZES THE WHOLE STATEMENT BY UNDERLINING IT.
THE REASON FOR THE INCLUSION OF 'USEFUL' IS NOT CLEAR.

WHERE A SUMMARY OF TWELVE AIMS FOLLOWED THE 1955 EDITION, THE NEW
VERSION RETAINS FIVE. NUMBERS ONE AND FIVE ARE CONCERNED WITH PROVIDING
ALL STUDENTS TO THE LIMITS OF THEIR ABILITY WITH SKILL, KNOWLEDGE AND
UNDERSTANDING. NUMBER FOUR REQUIRES ALL STUDENTS TO MAKE THEIR BEST EFFORT
IN REACHING THE PROPER LEVEL OF ABILITY. THREE RELATES ALL SCHOOL
ACTIVITIES, AESTHETIC, CULTURAL AND PHYSICAL, TO THE MAJOR AIM OF INTELLEC-
TUAL DEVELOPMENT, PRESUMABLY PROVIDING GUIDANCE FOR CURRICULUM REVISION
COMMITTEES IN ELIMINATING ANY PRACTICES FROM THE CURRICULUM WHICH MERELY
CONTRIBUTE TO PLEASURE, ENJOYMENT OR PHYSICAL WELL BEING. NUMBER TWO IS THE
MOST CRYPTIC; 'TO PROMOTE MORAL DEVELOPMENT.' THERE IS, OF COURSE, NO
PHILOSOPHICAL EVALUATION OR EXPLANATION OF WHY OR HOW THESE AIMS WERE
DEVELOPED. IT MUST BE ADMITTED THAT THEY FOLLOW THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
ROYAL COMMISSION VERY WELL IN MAKING INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT THE PRIMARY
PURPOSE OF EDUCATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA. THEY DO, HOWEVER, GIVE LITTLE
GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THIS CENTRAL PURPOSE. ONE WONDERS
HOW BRIEF THE NEXT STATEMENT OF AIMS WILL BE, SAY IN 1980.

IX. SUMMARY

A SUMMARY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIMS AND PURPOSES OF EDUCATION IN

BRITISH COLUMBIA FOLLOWS.

A. THERE HAS BEEN GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT MORAL VALUES ARE ABSOLUTE
   IN NATURE, ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASING AMOUNT OF DISAGREEMENT
   CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THESE VALUES.

B. SINCE VALUES WERE CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE, THERE HAS BEEN GENERAL
   AGREEMENT THROUGHOUT THAT MORAL EDUCATION IS BEST ACHIEVED BY INculca-
   TION, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A BRIEF PERIOD IN THE THIRTIES WHEN THE
   PROGRESSIVISTS ADVOCATED THE METHOD OF INDEPENDENT CRITICAL ANALYSIS.

C. IN THOSE YEARS WHEN THERE WAS SOME HOMOGENEITY IN THE POPULATION
   AND WHEN RELIGION WAS A DOMINANT FORCE, THERE WAS A GENERAL AGREEMENT
   THAT THE MAJOR AIM OF EDUCATION WAS CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT.

D. AS HETEROGENEITY IN THE POPULACE INCREASED, THE AMOUNT OF AGREE-
   MENT OVER THE MEANS OF CHARACTER EDUCATION DECREASED, WITH THE RESULT
   THAT TODAY THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTELLECT HAS REPLACED THAT OF THE
   CHARACTER AS THE MAJOR AIM.

E. TODAY, MORAL EDUCATION IS REGARDED AS A NECESSARY BY-PRODUCT OF
   EDUCATION FOR INTELLECT. REFERENCES TO IT ARE VAGUE AND CURSORY AND
   CONTINUALLY REFER TO THE BELIEF THAT IT IS PRIMARILY THE CONCERN OF
   INSTITUTIONS OTHER THAN THE SCHOOLS.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Three tasks have been attempted so far in this paper:

A. An explanation of the emotive theory of value and the practical application of that theory to problems of an ethical nature.

B. An explanation of the nature of a liberal democratic society as exemplified by British Columbia. It was maintained that such a society was based upon the twin concepts of individual freedom and majority rule, and that these concepts could best be justified and defended by means of the emotive theory of value.

C. An explanation of the evolution of aims and purposes of education in British Columbia. Investigation showed that, while such aims had become increasingly vague in recent years, official statements on the subject retain the absolutist character more in keeping with the homogeneous authoritarian society of the past than the heterogeneous liberal-democratic society of today.

The concluding chapter of this paper will involve an attempt to show that, in a liberal democracy, character education is not only possible but essential, and to suggest ways in which it may be accomplished.

1. Character Education as the Main Aim

The Chant Commission has done worthy service in defining the terms 'purpose' and 'aim,' when they claim that 'aim' means a 'purpose which directs a course of action.' Thus 'purpose' is a broad term meaning
'GOAL' OR 'RAISON D'ETRE' OR 'FUNDAMENTAL JUSTIFICATION' WHILE 'AIM' IS A
SUBCLASS OF PURPOSE WHICH SPECIFICALLY POINTS OUT VARIOUS MEANS BY WHICH
THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE CAN BE ACHIEVED.

Now it has been stated that the purpose of education is to assist in
the perpetuation of the desirable aspects of a culture and to assist
progress towards a better society (the latter point applies especially in a
liberal democratic society where progress is an element in the ethos).\(^2\)
Certainly the most desirable aspects of liberal democracies are the twin
concepts of individual freedom and majority rule; their choice by the society
is the result of a value judgment, but this makes them no less valuable.

As has already been shown, these two concepts can best be justified
and defended by means of a relative theory of values. If aims point out
course of action towards the attainment of purpose, then a major aim of
education should be to produce citizens who know how their society functions
and who are aware of the means by which it may be held together and permitted
to change, without excess disruption. Thus education should endeavour to
produce citizens who are fully aware of the relativity of values implicit in
liberal democracy and who are cognizant of the methods of resolving or
avoiding ethical disputes between subgroups in the society.

Moral education should be, therefore, the cornerstone of education in
a liberal democracy. This conclusion has been reached by reasoning, but it

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\(^1\)Report of the Royal Commission on Education, Province of British

\(^2\)This definition is the result of readings from J. Brameld, R. Living-
stone, K. Burke and Herbert Feigl among others. No doubt none of these
would concur completely with it.
WILL BE SUPPORTED BY THE MAJORITY OF EDUCATORS AND PUBLIC FIGURES, NOT TO MENTION THE PUBLIC. THE PROBLEM REMAINS AS TO WHETHER MORAL EDUCATION IS FEASIBLE WITHIN THE FORMAL EDUCATIONAL FRAMEWORK. UNTIL THE 1950'S OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC OPINION SEEMED TO AGREE THAT CHARACTER EDUCATION WAS THE PRIME AIM OF THE SCHOOL SYSTEM. THEN SUGGESTIONS THAT SCHOOLS WERE SHIRKING THEIR INTELLECTUAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND A COMPLETE LACK OF AGREEMENT UPON THE MEANS OF CHARACTER EDUCATION, PROMPTED THE OFFICIAL VIEW THAT CHARACTER EDUCATION WAS MORE PROPERLY THE PROVINCE OF HOME AND CHURCH AND THAT THE SCHOOL SHOULD MEDELLE AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE.

SUCH REMOVAL OF CHARACTER EDUCATION FROM THE FORMAL INSTITUTION IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD SCENE. FEW RUSSIAN, CHINESE, BRITISH OR GERMAN EDUCATORS WOULD AGREE THAT THE SCHOOL SHOULD GIVE PRIME IMPORTANCE TO INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVOUR AND LEAVE MORAL DEVELOPMENT TO OTHER INSTITUTIONS. YET THE PROBLEM IS MORE CRUCIAL IN A MULTI-GROUP DEMOCRACY THAN IN ANY OTHER FORM OF SOCIETY. IF THE UNDERLYING BASIS FOR THE MORALS TAUGHT BY THE HOME OR THE CHURCH IS THAT VALUES ARE ABSOLUTE, SUCH EDUCATION WILL MERELY INCREASE THE INABILITY OF GROUPS TO WORK TOGETHER AND RESOLVE DIFFERENCES AMIABLY. THERE IS EVIDENT IN BRITISH COLUMBIA TODAY THE EMOTIONAL FEELING THAT, WHILE IT IS ALL VERY WELL TO BE TOLERANT OF THE EXOTIC VALUE SYSTEMS OF OTHER GROUPS, BASIC TRUTH IN VALUES IS THE PECULIAR PROPERTY OF THE GROUP TO WHICH ONE BELONGS. SUCH AN EMOTIONAL FEELING DEMONSTRATES A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE THEORY OF VALUES INVOLVED IN THE EXISTENT SOCIETY. FURTHERMORE, SUCH EMOTIONAL FEELINGS ARE TO BE EXPECTED WHERE MORAL EDUCATION IS LEFT TO VARIED INSTITUTIONS WHICH REGARD VALUES AS ABSOLUTE AND WHERE THE RATIONAL BASIS FOR MORALITY CANNOT BE ADEQUATELY COVERED.
As has been said, the aim of education should be to assist preservation and progression of the twin aspects of liberal democratic culture. These twin aspects, individual freedom and majority rule are difficult to reconcile. However, if the society is to persist as a stable grouping, they must be reconciled. As was demonstrated in chapter three, the reconciliation can best be achieved by a practical knowledge of the emotive theory of values. Such knowledge requires an objective approach to the subject of morals which is not common to the home or the church. It also requires that an extensive study of the nature of the society involved, the way in which values are acquired, and the means by which disagreements may be resolved. Such careful investigation seems more properly the realm of formal study than of the more emotional influence of church and home.

Nor can such moral education be accomplished by means of the inculcation or imitation suggested by official documents. Inculcation will certainly suffice where there is an absolute set of values to be inculcated. Here the authoritarian society is especially fortunate; if there is only one set of values and these can be ascertained either by empirical means or by intuition, then there is no need for a rational individual approach by each student. But where values are relative to individuals, groups, and situations, and each judgment must be made in the light of probable consequences to oneself and others, then inculcation of basic rules will not do. The individual must be trained to think for himself and be aware of the influence of emotion upon his decision.

Nor can moral education be left to osmotic absorption—the type of morality which one is presumed to derive by imitation of his betters.
Frequently the value of noble conduct by teacher or hero is espoused as a sufficient means of eliciting equivalent behaviour in the student. Certainly there may be some transference here, but there is little evidence that such a method is effective in the crowded schools of today. Nor does such a method ensure a rational approach to a problem, unless the teacher constantly discusses with his charges his mental workings in approaching a moral problem.

Thus inculcation and imitation may be said to be unacceptable means of moral education in the society concerned. R.S. Guttenen has pointed out the distinction between reflexive and reflective judgments. Inculcation produces an individual who reacts to a situation by reflex. If situations differ, then the individual will be stymied or will make a response not in keeping with the changed situation. Only the individual who is trained to reflect in a critical manner upon each situation will be effective in a society as varied as our own. He points out that 'it is an article of faith that morals cannot be taught' and that this article arose with Dewey. The latter insisted that environment was much more efficacious than direct teaching, in any sphere. However, as Guttenen points out, 'both malig and benign influences surround the child and are absorbed.' Surely then, it is wiser to make the child aware of the probable ways in which he makes a judgment and to assist him in investigating the consequences of a decision.

The reflective approach to moral problems will not be attained by

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4Ibid.
EITHER INCULCATION OR OSMOSIS. AS PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED, OFFICIAL PROMULGA-
TIONS REGARDING MORAL EDUCATION WERE VERY PROPERLY IN FAVOUR OF INCULCATION
WHILE THERE SEEMED TO BE SOME AGREEMENT UPON THE ABSOLUTE NATURE OF MORALS.
WHEN SUCH AGREEMENT DISAPPEARED, OFFICIALS WERE COMPELLED TO FALL BACK ON
THE STOP-GAP OF MORAL EDUCATION BY IMITATION, AND TO REMOVE THE SUBJECT FROM
THE CURRICULUM. AS HAS BEEN STATED, NEITHER HOME NOR CHURCH SEEM TO POSSESS
THE OBJECTIVITY TO ENABLE THEM TO PROVIDE THE MORAL TRAINING SUITABLE TO A
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY; NOR, FOR THAT MATTER, DO THESE INSTITUTIONS APPEAR TO
HAVE THE ABILITY TO REACH THE MAJOR BODY OF YOUTH IN THIS ERA.

II. THE POSSIBILITY OF CHARACTER EDUCATION IN THE SCHOOLS

The Chant Commission was of the opinion that moral education was a
minor responsibility of the school. It has been suggested that the reasons
they gave to support this conclusion are in variance with the facts; the
more probable reason is that they were unable to discover an absolute system
of values to suit the many groups in society. They shared with the majority
of the population an unconscious rejection of the concept of relativity of
values; in spite of the fact that this rejection defies the whole ethos of
the society they support. People do not fundamentally believe that values
are relative, except in practical matters of minor importance. While it may
be desirable that schools lead their charges towards a moral view which is
consistent with the basic concepts of their society, is it possible?

The framers of the 1935 Statement of Aims and Purposes made an effort
which ended in failure. To be sure, they espoused the doctrine that the
greatest good was equated with the happiness of the greatest number and that
Empirical means were suitable for finding that good. This doctrine tends to infringe upon the concept of individual freedom and must have been exceedingly difficult to defend in a classroom of individualists. However, the approach was notable for the rejection of inoculation and the espousal of reasoned critical thinking as a means of moral education. Such an approach favours not only the teaching of relativity of morals but the intellectual development desired today.

As has been noted, the Chant Commission's discussion of critical thinking is a curious mixture of ambiguities. There seems to be an undercurrent of disapproval with the ideas involved in the 1935 statement concerning character education, but nothing specific. It is difficult to know how they would have reacted to the suggestion that education in moral relativity might solve the problem of formal teaching of morals in a multi-group society. It may be that they reflected a public distaste for the use of reason in teaching morality which was also the cause of the short life of the 1935 character development programme.

However, there is another possible reason why the course in development of character withered away and that lies in the nature of the teaching profession. Teachers are a conservative body; they must be, since undue innovation on their part comes immediately to the notice of a critical and conservative public. Moral education is a touchy subject. While there are some teachers who are prepared to embark on fresh seas without a textbook and without special training, the majority are far too cautious. No text existed for the course outlined in 1935. The procedure, the methods and the type and scope of assignments were vague. Without some concrete references and some
SPECIAL ASSISTANCE, THE FIELD OF CHARACTER EDUCATION IS LIKELY TO DEGENERATE INTO A SPARE PERIOD WHERE STUDENTS MAKE A PRETENCE OF WORKING AT THE COURSE IN WHICH THE TEACHER LACKS INTEREST. WHILE ONE TEACHER HERE AND THERE MIGHT BECOME EMOTIONALLY DEDICATED TO RAISING THE MORALS OF STUDENTS, THE MAJORITY WOULD CYNICALLY REGARD THE COURSE AS REDUNDANT.\(^5\)

One can hardly blame them. Teaching a course regarded with suspicion by the public, without a text or solid curriculum, and without the stringent examination to provide incentive to students, is not an agreeable chore for the average teacher today, let alone in 1935. Today the guidance course suffers from the same defects. It does no good at all for officials to insist that the course is of prime importance, and that it should only be taught by 'qualified' teachers. Such teachers are rarely available, since a complete course requires them to be experts in counselling, social behaviour, the effects of drug addiction and, if morality is to be included, the wide and involved field of philosophy.

The opinion expressed in this paper suggests that character development as a special course is not feasible at the present time because of a lack of trained personnel and material; that moral theory is by nature sufficiently involved and complicated that it is best suited for inclusion in the three academic subjects where application is simple. The final section

\(^5\)This suggestion has been supported by evidence obtained in conversations between the author and a number of teachers who were involved in character education during the years immediately following the 1935 directive. While they were in agreement that moral education was important, they also suggested that the reflexive or imitative approach was the most suitable and that the 1935 directive was not effective in changing the methods of the majority of teachers of the time.
III. INCLUSION OF CHARACTER EDUCATION IN THE CURRICULUM

As has been stated, the effort at providing formal education in character attempted after 1935 failed because:

A. The effort was premature in regard to the attitude of the public and the teaching body,

B. No formal course was outlined and no text provided.

Whether or not the public attitude has changed since 1935 is questionable; briefs to the Chant Commission reflected considerable anxiety concerning moral education, but little or no firm direction. It may be that the idea of relativity of values is still so alien to the subconscious beliefs of the majority, that character education is safer left to the welfare of groups and institutions upon whom the responsibility now rests; the very diversity of opinions will tend to create a distrust in absolutism in the minds of students. However, since rudimentary traces of the theory proposed already exist in the courses prescribed for certain academic subjects, the following suggestions make use of these beginnings to develop a gradual movement in the direction of character education.

Inclusion of the teaching of moral theory in the academic subjects has numerous advantages. In the first place, the understanding of such theory requires skill in the art of critical thinking, a recognized aspect of the science curriculum. In the second place, the theory of morality advocated is dependent upon and essential to the proper teaching of social studies; students must have knowledge of the society in which they live, and
MUST BE FAMILIAR WITH THE MOST EFFICIENT WAYS OF RESOLVING VALUE
DISAGREEMENTS IN SUCH A SOCIETY. FINALLY, SUCH MORAL EDUCATION WOULD BE
STERILE WITHOUT A WIDE RANGE OF EXPERIENCES INVOLVING VALUE JUDGMENTS, AND
THIS IS MORE PROPERLY THE SPHERE OF EDUCATION IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. SO
TOO DOES PRACTICE IN DEVISING A RATIONAL BASIS FOR INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP
VALUE JUDGMENTS.

If instruction on relativity of values can be included in such
academic subjects, the problem of special texts and properly trained
teachers would to some extent be alleviated. Material of use to such
pursuits could be included in new texts produced on the subject concerned,
and such inclusion would be the best way of ensuring that the area is
covered. No matter how much obloquy is poured on the teachers who 'teach by
the text' the fact remains that most teachers use texts as guides, and avoid,
for reasons of ease or politics, areas which do not have the sanction of a
text book reference. In the ultimate development of the type of character
education proposed, there might be some justification in arranging a course
with a special textbook, for the benefit of all students in their final year
of school. At present, such a course is neither advisable nor practical;
some groundwork must be laid in the earlier grades and more general
acceptance of character education must be apparent in public opinion.

A. The Field of Science

As has been noted, the scientific attitude and skill in critical
thinking are essential for an understanding of moral relativity. A student
should have some knowledge of the ways in which men arrive at knowledge,
whether by intuition, logic or experience. He should be aware of the
RELATIVIST POSITION THAT THERE ARE ONLY TWO TYPES OF TRUTH AND THAT VALUE JUDGMENTS ARE NOT INCLUDED. THUS NO VALUE JUDGMENT MAY BE TERMED TRUE BUT ONLY DESIRABLE. HE SHOULD BE TRAINED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN AN ASSERTATION AND QUESTIONS, COMMANDS, EJACULATIONS AND VALUE JUDGMENTS. FINALLY HE SHOULD BE AWARE THAT EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO CONSEQUENCES MAY GO A LONG WAY TOWARDS PRODUCING AGREEMENT OF INTEREST.

THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE IS ONE WHICH IS FAIRLY FAMILIAR TO READERS; IT INVOLVES A RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT ANY STATEMENT AS UNALTERABLY TRUE, A REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ANY PROPOSITION NOT FOUNDED UPON FACTS, AND A WILLINGNESS TO ALTER ONE'S CONVICTIONS IN THE FACE OF NEW EVIDENCE. EACH SCIENTIFIC TREATISE DEFINES THIS ATTITUDE IN A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT WAY BUT THERE IS BASIC SIMILARITY. THE TERM 'CRITICAL THINKING' IS ONE WHICH IS VERY POPULAR TODAY, ALTHOUGH DEFINITIONS ARE RARE. IT IS IN THE NATURE OF A HURRAH WORD. PROBABLY THE SIMPLEST DEFINITION IS THAT OF MAX BLACK WHO STATES THAT CRITICISM AMOUNTS TO THE TESTING OF BELIEFS. THUS CRITICISM IMPLIES A VALUE JUDGMENT TO BE MADE EVENTUALLY, BUT ONE BASED UPON FACTUAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES. ANOTHER WAY OF DEFINING CRITICAL THOUGHT MIGHT BE THE TYPE OF THOUGHT THAT INVOLVES A REASONED APPRAISAL OF BOTH THE CAUSES LEADING TO A PARTICULAR JUDGMENT AND THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF ACTING UPON IT. THUS WHEN THE CHART COMMISSION EXTOLLS CRITICAL THINKING, IT PRESUMABLY RECOMMENDS THAT STUDENTS BE TRAINED TO WITHHOLD JUDGMENT UNTIL AS MANY FACTS AS POSSIBLE ARE IN. THEREFORE THERE IS LITTLE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE AND THE ART OF CRITICAL THINKING.

MAX BLACK, CRITICAL THINKING, P. 265.
Science texts in the junior high level in British Columbia are the only ones which provide any direction in the scientific attitude and they do it in a cursory way. The first chapter in the text is devoted to a description of attitudes with the time-honoured references to Galileo and his sceptics. The remainder of the text dwells on facts and theories with little reminder that ways of thinking are involved. Newer texts on the market are much more satisfactory on this score, since they continually tend to request students to consider why statements are made, why theories are accepted or rejected and how to go about developing theories of their own. There is still a need for some explanation of what a fact actually is and how it differs from a theory. But the trend is in the right direction and unless teachers of other subjects are prepared, they may find some difficulty with students who refuse to accept propositions without a critical appraisal.

b. The Field of Social Studies

A knowledge of the nature of liberal democratic society is essential to an understanding of the moral values involved. If future citizens are to assist in the perpetuation and progression of such a society, they must be aware of how it works. They should know that individual freedom and majority rule are desirable because they represent value judgments common to most of the inhabitants. These judgments can be defended as good because they have desirable consequences, not because they are intrinsically 'right,' or exceptionally efficient. They should know that these two concepts are contradictory and difficult to reconcile; but that the most successful means of reconciliation is a practical application of the emotive theory of values. They should
BECOME ADEPT AT DISCERNING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF A VALUE JUDGMENT. THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN PRACTICE IN DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THOSE JUDGMENTS WHICH ARE THE STRICT CONCERN OF THE PERSON OR GROUPS WHO MAKE THEM AND THOSE WHICH INVOLVE CONSEQUENCES OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE SOCIETY AS A WHOLE. THEY SHOULD BE AWARE THAT AGREEMENT UPON APPARENTLY ANTAGONISTIC JUDGMENTS MAY BE PROCURED BY AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION WHICH SHOWS THE CONSEQUENCES ARE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. AND FINALLY, THEY SHOULD BE COGNIZANT OF THE THREE ALTERNATIVES IN THE EVENT OF FINAL DISAGREEMENT ON THE DESIRABILITY OF CONSEQUENCES: (A) FORCE, (B) PERSUASION, (C) A PERMISSIVE PURSUIT OF SEPARATE WAYS.

AT PRESENT, HISTORY TEXTS SEEM TO BE LONG ON FACT AND SHORT ON DISCUSSION OF SUCH FUNDAMENTAL TERMS AS FREEDOM, MAJORITY RULE AND VALUES. THE SECTIONS ON DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION, IN PARTICULAR, SEEM TO REGARD BOTH OF THESE INSTITUTIONS AS BEYOND REPROACH, AND TREAT THEM IN A CHAUVINISTIC AND SUBJECTIVE WAY. NOW POLITICS AND RELIGION ARE ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT TO TREAT IN AN OBJECTIVE FASHION SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY ARE HIGHLY EMOTIONAL TERMS. IN A HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETY, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THEY BE RECOGNIZED AS HIGHLY EMOTIONAL AND THAT EFFORTS BE MADE TO APPROACH THEM OBJECTIVELY. IF THEY ARE IGNORED BY THE SCHOOLS, THE JOB IS LEFT TO FACTIONS, ALL CLAIMING INFALLIBILITY. THUS THE PARTISANS OF EACH FACTION DEVELOP AN EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT TO THEIR OWN BRAND OF POLITICS OR RELIGION WHICH DEFIES OBJECTIVITY. SUCH A SITUATION CAN ONLY ERODE THE PRECARIOUS COHESION OF A MULTI-GROUP SOCIETY.

OBJECTIVE MORAL EDUCATION DEMANDS A NEW DIRECTION IN SOCIAL STUDIES CURRICULUM. GEOGRAPHY, WITH ITS ACCENT ON FOREIGN WAYS, IS EXCELLENT
preparation. But a history which seems to vindicate our society as the only right one is not enough. Some kind of sociology, which explains how people make value judgments and how they reach agreement, is essential for the proper understanding of how a liberal democratic society is to endure and progress.

c. The Field of English

Critical thinking is also a matter of communication. The citizen of a liberal democracy should be adept at presenting his own point of view and of appraising the factual and emotive content of that of others. Both the study of elementary logic and the common errors of reasoning are fundamental to reaching valid conclusions. Max Black states that 'one can improve one's skill in reaching conclusions justified by experience by means of rules of logic independent of wishes or desires.' There is a tendency today to include the study of logic in the area of mathematics; left in this connection it tends to be devoid of significance in the daily life of the student. It is in the study of written or spoken proposals, editorials, speeches, magazine articles, great orations, plays, novels, essays, that students will find logical or illogical statements, attitudes, and points of view. There is no need to enter into the depths of symbolic logic; there is a wealth of syllogisms, 'argumenta ad hominem', and non sequiturs in any issue of a popular magazine. Of course, the teacher of English does endeavour to find out whether the hero of a story is 'right' or 'wrong', 'rational' or 'irrational.' But if there are ground rules for establishing a logical

\[\text{Ibid., p. 5.}\]
ARGUMENT IT HARDLY SEEMS WISE TO IGNORE THEM OR LEAVE THEM TO A SUBJECT DEVOID OF MORALITY. THUS IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE ENGLISH CURRICULUM INCLUDE AN ELEMENTARY STUDY OF THE BASIC RULES OF LOGIC AND SOME PRACTICE IN DISCERNING THE COMMON ERRORS OF REASONING.

THE SECOND RECOMMENDATION IN REGARD TO ENGLISH INVOLVES A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS. AT PRESENT, THE ENGLISH CURRICULUM AND THE TEACHERS WHO TEACH IT ARE TO A LARGE EXTENT OBEDIENT TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHANT REPORT; THEY AVOID MATTERS OF MORALITY AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. NO DOUBT THERE IS A CAUTIOUS WISDOM IN THIS PRACTICE SINCE A SLIP OF THE TONGUE SHOWING SUPPORT FOR A CERTAIN POSITION CAN VERY WELL EARN A TEACHER A REBUKE FROM A PARENT AND ADMONISHMENT FROM HIS PRINCIPAL. THE DANGER CANNOT BE AVOIDED NO MATTER HOW OBJECTIVELY A TEACHER APPROACHES A MORAL ISSUE; INDEED SIMPLE OBJECTIVITY IS OFTEN SUSPECT. WHILE SUCH AVOIDANCE OF MORALITY MAY BE SAFE, IT CAN HARDLY SUFFICE IN THE SOCIETY INVOLVED. THEREFORE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE ENGLISH CURRICULUM INCLUDE SELECTIONS THAT ENTAIL A BASIC MORAL DILEMMA AND THAT TEACHERS PROMOTE TO THE FULLEST EXTENT AN OBJECTIVE DISCUSSION OF SUCH ISSUES. FINALLY, AT THE END OF EACH DISCUSSION, SOME EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO PRESS HOME THE IDEA THAT CONSEQUENCES MATTER, AND THAT MORALITY IS RELATIVE TO INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS.

D. TEACHER TRAINING

THE FINAL AND PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT SUGGESTION REGARDING THE INTRODUCTION OF MORAL RELATIVITY INTO THE CURRICULUM INVOLVES THE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION. AS HAS BEEN NOTED, CURRICULAR INNOVATIONS STAND OR FALL UPON THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CLASSROOM TEACHER. PART OF THAT ACCEPTANCE INVOLVES HAVING MATERIAL WITH WHICH TO WORK, AND THAT POINT HAS BEEN COVERED. IT
remains that the teacher be aware and enthusiastic about the aims involved. This demands for the student teacher the same kind of preparation given the citizen; information about his society and skill in critical thinking.

The College of Education at present provides a course in educational philosophy called 'A Survey of Educational Thought' (Ed 400), in which students are prompted to develop a personal philosophy of education. The course covers the range of educational thought over the ages and provides excellent stimulation for those who had previously never considered the aims and purposes of education. However, not all teachers need take it. Furthermore, it covers a vast expanse of educational philosophy and dwells generally upon each area. What is required is a more specific approach to the aims of education in a liberal democratic society. The teacher of any age group should have a clear idea of the ideals of the society which he serves. He should have made some study of the nature of morality, and in particular, of the view of morals most applicable to his culture. He should have studied the steps in the development of the official aims and purposes of education in his culture, and should be aware of what the public wants and of what the public needs. Finally, he should be cognizant of the philosophical aspects of assertions, value judgments and the art of critical thinking. Such a teacher would be the product of a course which treats morals openly, objectively and at length.

IV. CONCLUSION

It will be apparent from this brief sketch that the methods proposed deal with the provision of information and guidance in special ways of thinking, rather than with character education in the usual sense.
SENSE IMPLIES INCULCATION OF AN ABSOLUTE SET OF VALUES COMMON TO THE SOCIETY INVOLVED. SUCH SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THE SENSE INVOLVED IN PUBLIC REACTION TO THE CHANT COMMISSION, THE COMMISSIONERS THEMSELVES, AND THE RECENT OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF AIMS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. THE THESIS PRESENTED HERE, THAT CHARACTER EDUCATION IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY SHOULD BE BASED ON A RELATIVIST APPROACH TO MORALS AND SHOULD BE MADE THE SPECIAL AND PRIME RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SCHOOLS, IS THUS AT VARIANCE WITH POPULAR AND OFFICIAL OPINION AND POLICY.

There may be disagreement with this thesis on the grounds that values are not relative but absolute. In that case, argument remains on the philosophical level, divorced from the practical reality. There may be disagreement on the grounds that morals in a liberal democracy are really absolute. In that case argument involves the nature of such a society and the practical way in which people act in it. Such argument can be resolved by empirical observation of how people think and act. There may be disagreement on the grounds that a liberal democracy is not the best type of society to perpetuate. In this case, argument revolves around a value judgment made by the majority of the population and in practice, the majority rules. Finally, there may be disagreement on the grounds that the population refuses to accept the fact that values are relative. On a practical level, this is not the case. In terms of the system of education desired by that population, one of the salient points of democratic ethos is the idea of progress. Therefore progress towards a more realistic attitude to morality should be both the hope and the aim of the educational system itself.
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CHAPTER IV


APPENDIX I

GENERAL AIM OF EDUCATION

It is the function of the school, through carefully selected experiences, to stimulate, modify, and direct the growth of each pupil physically, mentally, morally, and socially, so that the continual enrichment of the individual’s life and an improved society may result.

A. The Aims of Education for the Elementary Schools.

To accomplish the above purposes, the Elementary School should provide experiences necessary to meet the common needs of all children; that is:

1. To develop an appreciation of the value of physical and mental fitness and to build correct health habits.
2. To develop the child as an individual through instruction, training, and experience based upon his needs, interest, and abilities.
3. To stimulate and develop desirable self-expression.
4. To bring children to a progressive understanding of the problems, practices, and institutions of social life; and of their responsibility for social and civic welfare and progress through acceptance of pupil contributions.
5. To develop to as high a degree as possible, skill in the fundamental processes in all school subjects and in life situations.
6. To encourage interests in art, music, literature, nature, and play for the enrichment and enjoyment of life.
7. To develop and practise desirable habits, attitudes, and appreciations of right behaviour which will enable the child to live more effectively and to co-operate in home and community life.
8. To develop the habit of critical thinking and effective study.
9. To foster the desire for continuous education both in and out of school.


1. Aims of the Junior High School, or Grades VII., VIII., IX.

It is believed that the general aim of education may be realized best on the Junior High School level by directing and stimulating individual growth in the following ways:

1. To improve further (according to individual capacities) the habits and skills in the fundamental process through the use of materials and activities which in content and method are of vital importance to pupils at the beginning of adolescence.
2. To continue to develop the understandings, attitudes, and habits which are of importance in the realization of emotional, mental, and physical health of the individual and of the community.
3. To furnish for all pupils opportunities to explore some of the possibilities of the general fields of knowledge, in sciences and mathe-
MATHS, IN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE, IN COMMERCIAL, FINE, AND INDUSTRIAL ARTS; AND SO REVEAL TO PUPILS SOME OF THE POSSIBILITIES IN THE MAJOR FIELDS OF LEARNING AND THEIR OWN DOMINANT INTERESTS, CAPACITIES, AND LIMITATIONS FOR THEM.

4. To give all pupils a body of information about educational opportunities and occupations; then to help them to make wise choices in their future vocational activities or in the continuance of their education in the higher schools.

5. To develop habits, understandings, attitudes, and ideals in the class-room, library, club organizations, assembly-hall, lunch-room, and on the playground, which are essential to social living in the school, in the home, and in the community.

6. To develop tolerant and critical understanding and behaviour in relation to society and its problems through pupil participation, pupil co-operation, and pupil contributions.

7. To provide for active and vicarious experiences calculated to stimulate lasting appreciations of beauty and of leisure-time, interests in literature, music, art, nature, and science, philosophical reflection, practical arts, and human associations in order to satisfy the individual's desire for enjoyment; also, to develop in children, according to the degree of native ability, a reasonable skill in creating beautiful and useful things.

8. To develop in boys and girls through all fields of subject-matter and through every class-room situation an understanding appreciation of right and wrong, and a desire to attain a high standard of personal conduct.

9. To cultivate habits of critical and independent thinking, evaluation of propaganda, and to strengthen further the ability to study.

II. AIMS OF THE SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL.

1. To continue to refine and improve the numerous skills required by society in the fundamental processes, especially in the cursory and study types of reading for various purposes, and in oral, written, and graphic expression by constant practice in all departments of instruction.

2. To develop the ability to solve problems; to do critical, reflective thinking; to summarize and formulate generalizations from concrete situations; to apply these generalizations to other fields, and to develop effective and economical study-habits.

3. To establish the understandings, habits, and ideals which are of importance in the realization of mental and physical health for the individual and for the community.

4. To provide varied and numerous experiences which will give the pupil the necessary understanding of himself and of vocations in order that he may be helped to choose intelligently, to plan his application for, to enter upon and to make progress in his chosen occupation.

5. To develop interests in and habits of employing leisure-time for worthy enjoyment in order to promote personal growth and human betterment; to develop high standards of appreciation and enjoyment of the best in music, art, literature, drama, nature, architecture, and other arts.

6. To train pupils in the skilful and economic management of house-
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HOLD AFFAIRS, TO GIVE THEM A KNOWLEDGE OF SUITABLE, PRACTICAL, AND AESTHETIC STANDARDS OF LIVING TO THE END THAT THE CO-OPERATION IN THE HOME OF ALL ITS MEMBERS MAY BE SECURED.

7. To PROVIDE EXPERIENCES WHICH WILL MAKE FOR TOLERANT UNDERSTANDING OF MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEMS, AND OF THE INTERESTS, POSSESSIONS, PRIVILEGES, AND DUTIES WHICH ONE CITIZEN SHARES WITH ANOTHER IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.

8. To DEVELOP HIGH AND JUST STANDARDS OF MORAL VALUE AND TO DEVELOP RIGHT HABITS OF ACTION THROUGH HIGH IDEALS OF SPORTSMANSHIP, THE IDEAL OF SERVICE, THE FAITHFUL PERFORMANCE OF DUTY, AND THE INSISTENCE ON PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT.
AIMS OF EDUCATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

The people of this Province, have established schools for the primary purposes of developing the character of our young people, training them to be good citizens, and teaching them the fundamental skills of learning necessary for further education and adult life.

The school, however, is not the only agency responsible for the education of children. Worthy influences of the home, the church, and the community must also be considered, since these are a vital part of the child's development. The school must add to and strengthen the influence of these agencies, but it should not attempt to take their place. The home, the church, the community, and the school should work together to provide strong and worthy guidance for our children.

The education given in the school, unlike other forms of education, can be readily planned and directed. For this reason, it is possible for the school to bring together all those educational forces that will contribute to the best development of the child. The school should support influences that are good and oppose those which are harmful. Above all it should do its own special task so well that it earns the confidence and respect of the people of the province.

A good school programme develops children in two ways -- as individual persons and as citizens. Since this development begins long before the child comes to school, the programme must build upon a foundation already well defined. It should be so planned that it helps the child to become an individual who has confidence in himself because of what he is and what he knows. At the same time it should guide him into becoming a person who is respected and trusted by his fellow man. A school programme which neglects the child in either of these respects fails to fulfil its responsibilities.

In order that these general aims may be achieved, certain objectives must be established for those areas of learning in which the school is best qualified to serve. If these defined objectives are attained to a desirable degree, the school can make its special contribution to the complete education of every child. They may be summarized as follows:

To ensure that all pupils master the fundamental skills of learning to the limit of their abilities.

To help all pupils to develop healthy minds and bodies.

To help pupils become familiar with that which is great and valuable in history, science and the arts.

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To guide pupils in the development of such qualities of character and citizenship as good personal habits, willingness to work with others, honesty, obedience, and self-control.

To co-operate with parents in guiding the growth and development of their children.

To teach each pupil to do his best work by maintaining high standards of performance in all phases of the school programme.

To instil in all pupils respect for high standards of work and an appreciation for the efforts of others.

To develop in all pupils an understanding of the responsibilities and privileges of life in a democracy.

To encourage self-discipline in pupils by requiring acceptable standards of performance and behaviour in all phases of the school programme.

To teach pupils some common manual skills as a means of helping them to become practical and useful citizens.

To give pupils some guidance in the choice of a career and some opportunity to begin preparation for occupational life.

To seek out and develop pupils' special talents and potentialities and to assist them in developing their strengths and overcoming or adjusting to handicaps or weaknesses.
APPENDIX 3

DRAFT STATEMENT OF
THE AIMS OF THE BRITISH COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM

The people of this Province have established schools for the primary purpose of promoting the intellectual development of our young people and, at the same time, encouraging the highest development of all other attributes necessary for a life of good and useful citizenship.

The school is only one of the agencies responsible for the education of children. Influences of the home, the church, and the community must also be considered, since these have a vital effect on the child's development. The school must add to and strengthen the desirable influences of these agencies, but it should not attempt to take their place. The home, the church, the community, and the school should work together to provide strong and worthy guidance for our children.

The education given in the school, unlike other forms of education, can be planned and directed. For this reason, it is possible for the school to bring together all those educational forces that will contribute to the best development of the child. The school should support influences that are beneficial and oppose those which are harmful. Above all it should do its own special task so well that it earns the confidence and respect of the people of the Province.

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In order that these general aims may be achieved, certain objectives must be established for those areas of learning in which the school is best qualified to serve. If these defined objectives are attained to a desirable degree, the school can make its special contribution to the complete education of every child. They may be summarized as follows:

1. To ensure that fundamental skills, knowledge and understandings are acquired by all pupils to the extent of their ability.

1Letter circulated among interested parties by Dept. of Education in 1962.
2. To promote moral development;

3. To give emphasis to the school activities that have the most direct bearing upon the intellectual development of the pupils, recognizing that aesthetic, cultural and physical activities support and add to this intellectual development;

4. To establish and maintain educational standards that will require the best effort on the part of the pupils;

5. To provide educational facilities for all pupils such that their varied abilities may be developed to the highest level.
APPENDIX 4

PROPAGANDA

Teachers of the Social Studies are frequently confronted in the classroom with the problem of controversial issues. Often such issues cannot be ignored. It is one of the functions of the school, and of the study of Social Studies in particular, to develop powers of good judgment and critical thinking. Unfortunately, it is all too easy to influence classes, perhaps unwittingly, to one's own way of thinking. Even attempts to be "fair" or to avoid giving a personal opinion can sometimes create the wrong impression. It is necessary to be constantly on the alert to avoid appearing to propagate personal views on controversial questions. The teacher must maintain the highest measure of impartiality on all such questions.

At the same time, it might be noted that the development of patriotism and of loyalty toward our country, appreciation of democracy, and respect for law and order is most desirable and does not constitute real propaganda of the type which should be avoided. The following statement clearly expresses the position the Social Studies teacher should take in the matter:

"While the pupils should be led to the understanding and appreciation of the democratic principles upon which our constitution and our national life are based, the teacher of the Social Studies should bear in mind that to take advantage of his position to propagandize his own views—political, economic, religious, or other—or the views of any party or group to which he may belong or with which he may sympathize, violates the objectives of the Social Studies and of education in general, and is inconsistent with the ethics of the teaching profession. It is the function of the teacher to provide the pupil with material to think about, with a method of thinking, and with situations and problems which challenge him to think. It is not the function of the teacher to tell him what he is to think."

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