THE WESTERN CANADIAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1900 - 1930

by

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ABSTRACT

"There is good reason for the belief that local self-government is the cornerstone of democracy." One might employ this statement to describe the value of having autonomous provincial or state governments operating within a federal system. These governments are usually very sensitive to the opinion of the electorate. Thus in Canada one often finds Territorial or provincial premiers not only taking action in matters within their actual or intended jurisdiction, like education and the control over local commerce. In particular after 1900, they have also spoken frequently upon certain wider national questions.

Constitution-makers attempt federalism to give the people of distinctive geographical regions a sense of pride in the operation of their political institutions. This attitude is conducive to the growth of national unity. Having already achieved improvements in constitutional status, the provincial or state governments will be all the more willing to adopt a cooperative approach in their relationships with the national authorities. The following discussion indicates why the provincial governments in certain federal states deriving from the British Empire have often practiced, during the twentieth century, conciliatory and sometimes even overly cautious ideas of constitutional status.

Heterogenous states possessing a unitary constitution normally find it easier to implement sudden changes of policy than do the national governments of federations. On the other hand, in unitary states slight attention is often given to the views characterizing a remote or thinly settled region. In federal states, it is possible for political parties to defend distinctive ideas of the regional and the national interest upon two levels of government. As a result, the inhabitants of remote districts in federal states generally acquire a more rewarding experience in politics. Likewise, they are likely
to obtain more satisfactory economic services than would groups outside the policymaking elite in a unitary state.

Workable local and regional governments are able to provide some services directly. Further, they frequently can mobilize public opinion within their territory upon any political or economic issue whatever. As will be shown in this study, their shortcomings sometimes result precisely from failure to concentrate upon the most promising and best defined objectives.

Besides setting up certain regional governments, a federal constitution normally provides for a theoretically impartial tribunal to resolve or arbitrate conflicting interpretations of law. Not only are jurisdictional disputes expected to decrease in number as the regional political units use the opportunities available within the constitutional framework for constructive initiative, but the very presence of somewhat detached adjudicators has made the relevant issues more intellectual in nature. The remaining legal cases will often be highly significant. To buttress their position, the participants will often put up carefully made up arguments. The discussion will tend to concern matters of principle. Sometimes, the divergent ideological premises will appear clearly and immediately. One might well apply this statement to the litigation between the governments of Ontario and Canada during the nineteenth century.

During a historical period when the court has explained to the satisfaction of representative political figures the existing legal status quo, the regional governments will have to make the further important choice as to whether they should insist upon additional functions and revenues to be gained from the national authorities. This situation prevailed in Canada during the period from 1900 to 1930. The Western Territorial and provincial political
movements then shared with other regional governments in Canada fundamental agreement upon the ideas of self-government. The regional Governments in Western Canada were all interested in making certain fairly modest jurisdictional and subsidy gains. Still, one finds several distinct responses being made to the serious constitutional problems then baffling Parliament.

In the Canadian Confederation, provincial governments have been entities "largely independent, in the constitutional sense, from the Dominion government." The regional governments have generally been successful in maintaining rights given by the British North America Act of 1867 and subsequent amendments. Even the Legislative Council of the Northwest Territories took far-reaching action to protect its favorite legislative plans, as in language matters, even at a time when Parliamentary approval was essential. The Northwest Territories made a steady advance to the legal status enjoyed by the governments of Manitoba. Meanwhile, the Cabinets of Manitoba and British Columbia kept sponsoring certain legislative measures opposed by the federal Government. Notable were the provincial railway charter acts and regulations pertaining to Crown lands. After 1890, the federal Government allowed the great majority of disputed provincial acts to stand. The Western administrators undoubtedly enjoyed legislative sovereignty in substantial degree.

Politically, the federal parties have exerted only restricted influence with even friendly Territorial and provincial Cabinets. Legally and in everyday conduct of business, the latter made public policy mostly on their own initiative. Hence the nature of the constitutional proposals submitted by the Western regional Governments to Parliament, and the nature of direct challenges to federal policy in their legislative programs, often indicate reliably the ideology held by representative regional leaders. This study will define ideology so as to clarify the different approaches taken, between
1900 and 1930, to the federal system. This writer takes ideology to mean not merely the belief in traditionally held personal liberties. It is not restricted to new concepts of economic organization. Any precise concepts of political figures concerning the division of powers must be included. Thus one might speak of a decentralist ideology.

Indeed, one rarely finds the Western Canadian political figures expressing theoretical arguments. It is, therefore, often necessary to infer beliefs from specific policies or proposals. For instance, by analyzing the demands made by the Roblin Government (1900-1915) in Manitoba upon Parliament, one may deduce the strong belief held by numerous Conservatives from the Western Provinces in the necessity of modifying the constitutional restrictions resulting from the British North America Act of 1871 and small federal subsidies.

The similarities of belief characterizing the representative Canadian regional politicians during the period in question are significant, and will receive considerable attention in this study. Still one finds certain variations both in the jurisdictional positions taken by provincial parties and in typical attitudes shown in matters undisputably under the authority of Parliament. This study will suggest that certain ideological differences were actually the most important factor determining the nature of emphasis and the degree of urgency given either fundamental set of issues. The reader will find all these concepts carefully defined in the introductory chapter. So are the non-ideological factors behind the regional attitudes.

The regional viewpoints to be studied will be termed autonomist, qualified cooperative, and partisan nationalist. For reasons given later, this writer will classify all the Territorial and provincial governments in Western Canada prior to 1905 as autonomist. Such also were the Conservative
Governments in Manitoba and British Columbia between 1905 and 1914. The Liberal Governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan during the latter period will be considered partisan nationalist. They remained of this type until at least 1918. The label qualified cooperative is applicable to all the Western provincial Governments holding office from 1918 to 1930. No conclusive statements will be made to the ideology held by Members of Parliament from Western Canada. It will only be suggested that the great majority of them, after 1900, have shown political attitudes similar to those of the provincial partisan nationalists.

A different study is required if one is to account in detail for the ideologies held by the regional governments in Western Canada. In the following pages, their viewpoints will be mainly employed to explain specific actions taken to change the existing division of functions in the Canadian federal system. Other factors, which also influenced Territorial and provincial governments in the choice of policies include electoral motives, the influence of federal parties, and the degree of financial hardship felt in the respective region. Since numerous writers have already analyzed the financial issues at stake in Canadian inter-governmental relations, the political aspects listed above must now obtain the greatest degree of attention.
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INTRODUCTION

THE CHANGING ATTITUDES OF THE TERRITORIAL AND THE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIONS IN THE CANADIAN WEST TOWARDS THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1900 UNTIL 1930

Several difficult problems presently inherent in the federal system of Canada give rise to more serious contentions in this Dominion than exist in the other federal states originating as British Colonies. The most keenly disputed and differently interpreted characteristics of Canadian federalism comprise the nature of the legal guarantees available for the non-English cultural traditions, the unconditional subsidies which the Parliament of the Dominion assigns to the individual provinces, and the far-reaching recent evolution of cooperatively financed and sometimes jointly planned governmental services, in particular the Dominion-provincial projects. These matters are now of great concern to the Canadian political parties and their leaders, although obtaining insufficient attention from the public at large. To cast new light upon them, further reliable studies into the origins and the present functioning of the governmental institutions in Canada are needed.

One might study the leading concepts behind Canadian federalism from the contemporary or the historical viewpoint. In this thesis, the second method is followed. The writer will generally restrict himself to the period from 1900 to 1930. The usual procedure will be to analyze, in chronological order, vital problems arousing the keen concern of political leaders on both national and provincial levels. Parliament was usually to make the final decision in these policy questions.

One may properly call the majority of the issues selected as "problems in federalism". This writer will consider as "problems in federalism" all significant clashes of specific policies or proposals, provided the protagonists have been essentially interested in advocating an ideology favorable or opposed to political centralization within the nation. Other issues have been created for reasons of tactics or sentiment exclusively.
It is necessary to explain presently what is meant by ideology. One may define it genetically or according to the standard usage of the term. Each individual must apply certain philosophical ideas of justice, social order or peace to specific public issues. He is then selecting or evolving an ideology. In this process, he combines both abstract principles and inferences from personal experience. In turn, the ideology produced in this manner leads to specific value judgements. A critic cannot, in many cases, fairly judge the latter without referring to the agent's ideology.

Social scientists have offered several carefully reasoned out definitions of ideology. For instance, the latest acceptable definition is given by Julius Gould and William L. Kolb. They call it "a pattern of beliefs and concepts (both factual and normative) which purport to explain complex social phenomena with a view to directing and simplifying socio-political choices facing individuals and groups. Such systems may be the rules which govern or are built into e.g. moral behaviour, the work of a church or a political or legal structure. They may also be thoughts or theories on such topics, or assessments of social situations or statements about social structure. They may also be belief systems which buttress such assessments or statements."²

Incidentally, Gould's and Kolb's view differs considerably from the definition formerly proposed by Henry P. Fairchild and other writers. Fairchild had restricted himself to studying, "the ideals, beliefs and modes of thinking characteristic of a group, such as a nation, class, caste, profession, religious sect, political party, etc. These ideologies are conditioned and determined by the geographical and climatic situation, political activities, and cultural environment of their respective groups. They are not mutually exclusive."³

Likewise, Gould's and Kolb's view is somewhat at variance with the reference made by Michael Oakshott to political ideology.⁴

In this study, none of the technical definitions employed in the social sciences are necessary. Instead, this writer will use the generalized meaning that has satisfied the professional philosophers. Franz Boaz calls ideology "any general set of ideas."⁵ This meaning is amplified by
Definition 3-a and b as given in Webster's Third New International Dictionary.

3-a A systematic scheme or co-ordinated body of ideas or concepts, especially about human life or culture.

3-b A manner or the content of thinking characteristics of an individual, group or culture.

3-c The integrated assertions, theories that constitute a socio-political program (a national ideology), but altered with altering circumstances.

Along with defining ideology, the majority of writers have also committed themselves to a theory of individual differences. Historians have generally taken the view that an individual’s ideology may largely be original in content. For instance, Carl Becker has emphasized the uniqueness of certain individual’s beliefs. Thus, they have been cautious in generalizing about the similarities apparent in different leaders’ views on politics, morality or economics, even when causal relationships definitely exist.

For both theoretical and practical reasons, this writer prefers to analyze specific ideological positions in the chronological order, starting in each case with the relevant individual heads of governments. Theoretically, it is considered feasible to analyze distinctly the political religious, economic, ethical, and aesthetic components of an individual's outlook. It is daring to assume that such an analytical study might reliably be done in reference to any large group living in the past. Further, this writer believes that well-informed citizens have sometimes given as much attention to the constitutional and the leadership aspects of the government as to the economic benefits expected from it. One must analyze, in a general historical survey, all the above factors. Only by studying individual politicians can one obtain sufficient evidence to support definite conclusions upon all the aspects of this study.

It is always more difficult to generalize concerning the political
beliefs of groups than to trace prevailing attitudes towards economic issues. In the first instance, many variations of viewpoint will appear within any single party or occupational group. Particularly in the Canadian West during the period prior to 1930, a great variety of ideas concerning governmental policies may easily be seen. To consider only one fairly consistent set as a "regional" ideology would probably be unjustified. At most, one may speak of broadly defined public reactions to the positions taken by regional leaders.

Cabinets and parties will often appear to hold a certain ideology. This method of generalizing is used for reasons of convenience. In fact, the Cabinets are seldom ideologically homogeneous.

The one suggestion of Fairchild applicable to this study is that an individual's ideology should be studied under several headings. Nevertheless, these headings need not be the names of groups to which he belongs. Rather, one might also consider crucial the nature of the motives behind an individual's public conduct.

An individual who gives much thought to the needs of organized society in general shows strong political motives. In Canada, such motives have been prized. These become a political ideology, if consistent. Any individual gives some attention to the relationship between the government and the governed, but relatively few possess a consistent body of ideas on that topic. Many will more readily form a non-political institutional ideology. It will refer to an institution other than the government or a political party. Still others may emphasize an occupational ideology, with slight regard for the diversity of groups in society. In general, a person assigning much weight to his political ideas is most readily distinguished by the ability to perceive the need for a great variety of social goals, although he may choose either an autocratic or a liberal approach.
In politics, the principal problem is how to categorize and evaluate a multiplicity of human needs to be served. Governments must establish priorities for social problems. They must perform this task in conjunction with beliefs prevailing in their civilization during a certain period. The subsequent problem is using the power of organized society to achieve the gains considered the most important. Further, it is most helpful to establish a sense of common interest among some, if not all, the segments of the population affected.

All governments must initially classify their activities. They set up commercial, formal educational, symbolic, and military objectives. What alternative methods exist for determining the priorities? This can be done either by analyzing immediate challenges or by considering more theoretically the fundamental categories of human needs. Thus, one must notice distinct psychological, cultural, and economic effects of public policy. The people feel the excitement of participating in the making of policy, or merely await material benefits.

The decision as to whether or not to extend greatly the power of the Executive branch over the legislature in a unitary state depends closely upon analysis of human requirements. So does the degree of centralization attempted in a federal system. Decentralization sometimes promotes psychological and cultural gains at the expense of some delay in the stimulation of economic growth. The constitution-makers invariably infer other institutional arrangements from their attitudes to centralization of power. Finally, a third way to evaluate the functions of governments would be to isolate the extent of special group bias apparent (partisan, sectional or occupational).

We are dealing with a political question whenever the end of organized society and/or the well-being of governments become the decisive criterion for the answers given. An issue may also be considered political if
partisan organizations play an influential part in disposing of it. Their platform refers largely to government. An additional factor is the interplay of personalities. It usually accompanies the other two defining characteristics.

There will frequently be important medical, juridicial or economic aspects to a public issue, but insofar as the above two characteristics also exist, an observer has the right to call it political too.

Examples might be regional railway construction, irrigation, and the provision of scientific information on soils. The Western Governments also contributed towards the reductions enacted between 1905 to 1914 in the tariff. A writer might consider genetically the role of government in the above cases. Even so, then he is free to concentrate upon the primarily economic issues.

In speaking of the human interests to which governments must attend, this writer will consider the desire for participation in the process of governing to be one on par with the purely economic needs. The reasons for this theoretical approach will later be explained. It is granted that the electors as well as their leaders shall act upon an intertwined combination of motives. For that very reason, this study will suggest that the ideology of any political movement cannot simply be determined by its attitude to private enterprise or labor organizations. It also includes the provision for the electorate of a relatively remote or geographically marginal area to take some responsibility for the conduct of public business.

In other words, it will be argued that conflicts over the centralization or the decentralization of power in any state are significant per se. Particularly in geographically heterogeneous nations, creative thinkers will always be suggesting ways of satisfying what they consider the national interest along with some distinctive regional desires. Often, the very existence of the political system in which they live depends upon the availability of alternative
solutions to this problem.

All political parties are likely to agree upon one premise only; that the popularly recognized regional interests cannot be altogether ignored. There are usually great differences of view as to the maximum permissible measure of economic concessions and differences and the extent of self-government or local influences in the federal legislative body that are openly extended.

"Problems of federalism", as defined in this study, are not easily identified. The argument must refer to the relationship between the two principal levels of government, the key constitutional provisions defining the division of power, and those actual legislative policies which are given high priority as methods of achieving greater national unification or more extensive regional self-government. Some of the issues invariably present in geographically heterogeneous states are the workability of regional self-government in the respective country, the extent to which the central authorities should regulate the economy, the disposition of jurisdictional challenges by a court and the organization of national parties.

In substance, these ideas set forth must either be theoretical speculations or proposals relating to immediate policy questions. The discussion of what constitutes a constitutional amendment, as in the works of W.S. Livingston and Paul Gerin-Lajoie illustrates the first type of issue. The question as to whether the Canadian Federal Government should exercise its powers of disallowance and reservation is of the second set. So is the tariff policy of Canada.

The protagonists in debates concerning the "problems of federalism" might include not only practising politicians, but also commentators or intellectual critics. Certainly, one cannot merely take account of government officials or Members of Parliament. Still, it must be noted that the independent writer possesses slight influence over the working of the government machinery. This fact has been particularly true of the Canadian federal state.
The theoretical "problems of federalism" might well arise in unitary states. One needs only to mention the debate concerning "imperial federation" in Great Britain during the years from 1900 to 1920. The various currently made proposals intended to restore the union of the British West Indies are somewhat more realistic projects still remote from approval by the governing parties upon the individual islands. Further, the specific issues which involve the two levels of government in Canada or Australia might well arise in a different form in any geographically heterogeneous state. The extent of economic controls or the rights of ethnic minorities would centre upon the decisions of national Government only. In democratic states, the legislative body would possess the supreme power.

In federal states, existing interregional conflicts are likely to produce fewer explosive nationwide issues than is true in numerous unitary states. Many writers have observed that workable federal institutions, like those of Canada, help to moderate continuing interregional conflicts of interest. Thus in Canada, although serious differences do exist among the leadership of the different Governments and parties, one is impressed by the substantial pride taken in the up-to-date achievements of at least the provincial governments. This sense of political gain, widely shared by the electors, has reinforced the traditional belief in the desirability of compromise. Canadian political figures have always possessed much legal freedom for the expression of their views. Even so, they were normally careful to remain within the limits of the consensus governing the electorate. It is true that an additional significant factor obscuring the importance of regional movements in many of the larger states has been the growing impact of foreign policy questions. This phenomenon complements, but hardly underrates the role of the constitutional structure within the country in question.

In federal states, all the practical political issues might be debated at the two levels of government and party leadership, or merely at one.
In Canada, both the federal and the provincial politicians have tended to discuss freely the major national problems. Up to 1900, provincial figures had indeed seldom championed matters beyond their intended jurisdiction. However, they have done so frequently during this century. Which set of issues a writer chooses to emphasize depends upon his or her purpose.

This study gives the spotlight to the shifting policies which the Territorial and the provincial administrations in the Canadian West selected to deal with problems which likewise required certain important decisions from the federal Government during the period from 1900 to 1930. Only extensive comparisons of the relevant provincial attitudes and courses of action permit one to suggest plausible explanations of the regional response made by the people in Western Canada to the federal system imposed upon them. The provincial governments whose policies will be taken up in detail include those of British Columbia, Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan, while the sole Territorial unit to be studied is the Northwest Territories prior to 1905.

To meet the object of this study, it is essential to take up for detailed analysis the entire relationship between the national and the provincial or Territorial political leadership. The writer will find it also necessary to refer to questions which are not, strictly speaking, "problems of federalism." Certain issues quite irrelevant to the distribution or even exercise of legislative powers in a federal state sometimes call forth vigorous comments from politicians at either level. For instance, the death of Queen Victoria in 1902 and the accession of Edward VI provoked expressions of sorrow from both the federal and the provincial politicians. In British Columbia, the party leaders sometimes reacted more quickly to significant events in London than to those occurring in Ottawa's Parliament Buildings. The wording of the relevant declarations in the individual provinces reflects the degree of their sensitivity to national issues. These data will be correlated with election
In general, all political leaders in the Canadian West occasionally commented upon Canada's role in the world, notably its ties with Great Britain. Also, such measures of Parliament as won regional approval, like the Reciprocity Agreement in the Prairie provinces, or (particularly in British Columbia) proposals for lowering the freight charges on transcontinental railway shipments also provoked provincial leaders to take clearly perceptible positions. After analyzing their statements, one is best able to outline their attitudes towards the Canadian Confederation.

Before proceeding with the detailed analysis of any specific viewpoint, it is essential to understand clearly what is meant by "regional," "region," "regionalist," and "nationalist." To start, a distinctive region which forms part of a heterogenous state will be defined as one in which public opinion has established a clearly identifiable consensus upon the leading cultural and political issues debated during the period under consideration, and where the public responds much more readily to certain specific ideas than elsewhere. What regions one sets up in studying the history of any nation depends primarily upon the scholar's interests. Several distinctive sets of regions might be drawn from the political, the economic, the linguistic, or any other viewpoint. This study will refer only to political regions, i.e. those in which the electorate is more likely to react decisively for or against the most urgent proposals for changes in the national policies than would happen elsewhere at the same time.

The element of regional predictability is naturally based upon the repeatedly demonstrated tendency of regional leaders and electors to endorse a certain political party throughout the years during which the platform and the ideology of that national or provincial organization remained fairly constant. In federal states, it is naturally most convenient to delimit
the political regions so defined along the existing provincial or state
boundaries, except that one may usually enclose several of these local ad-
ministrative units in a set.

Distinctive political regions exist in unitary as well as in federal
states. In unitary systems, maps showing the national election returns over
certain periods of time are the only reliable indicator of the relevant
differences. The other, more intricate and stimulating, but unfortunately
less definitive methods of studying regional political characteristics range
from the detailed biographical or textual survey of individual political
leaders and their utterances, the survey of electoral platforms or newspaper
policies, to the comparison of sample "grassroots" sentiments. In using any
or all of these procedures, one must clarify the leading features of the
relevant political parties.

In nations organized with only one legislature, the genuine or alleged
nationwide parties comprise more or less uneasily all the principal regional
spokesmen (except for the declared secessionists). In the case of the federal
states, one is, besides, able to set up a second list of political regions, viz.
those clearly distinguished by perceptible similarities in provincial or state
voting trends. Each of the regions established on this basis would comprise
one or several political territorial units.

In this study, the results of the provincial elections will be considered
significant insofar as they demonstrate public response to the different
policies which the respective administrations practised in their relations
with the federal Government. For Canada, it is suggested, the conduct and
the outcome of the provincial elections provides the most reliable evidence in
reference to regional political beliefs. Provincial parties generally stood
closer to grassroots sentiments than did the federal parties. For that reason,
this writer will chiefly draw upon this source to support his conclusions
that both the electors and the Cabinets in the Western region of Canada have shown numerous commonly shared attitudes, including a striking chronologically progressive tendency to improve their standing with the Governments of the Dominion.

In this study, the term "region" will normally be used to denote one of the four principal geographical politico-economic parts of Canada: the Maritimes, Ontario, Quebec, and the Western provinces. A word of explanation will perhaps meet the reader's doubt as to whether British Columbia should enter the latter category. Most geographers, it is true, consider that the Pacific province possesses various distinctive features. These are the crucial factors to be considered while discussing the natural landscape of the country, its natural resources, or even the predominant economic activities. As regards the make-up of population, its dependance upon exports, and the dominant political ideology, there are broad similarities between British Columbia and Manitoba or Alberta. The political habits of the post--1918 Liberal Government in Victoria resembled even those of Saskatchewan.

One might summarize as follows the meaningful distinctions of viewpoint. Separatists will be fundamentally unable or unwilling to see any national interest apart from the full sovereignty of their regional political unit. If they accept the legal rules governing the existing governmental structure, they will follow tactical considerations only. All the other political groups might be classified as nationalists or regionalists according to the following definitions.

A regionalist party holds, as a matter of principle, that the national government must patiently seek to satisfy various special population groups, particularly those which have been promised certain rights in the past and are geographically distinguishable. Regionalists consider the achievement of
interregional compromises to be as significant as any other conceivable domestic national objective. Hence even at a time when the federal government of Canada held an opposing view, the spokesmen for the distinctive interests of Quebec and the West strongly insisted that the people there should enjoy adequate political and legal protection. In making the numerous demands that will later be analyzed, they were entirely undeterred by arguments that delays might occur in the settlement of Canada as a whole, or that the industries of Ontario might be severely hurt by their proposals.

Fundamentally, regionalists believe that the people in a certain section of a nation should enjoy the right to set up their idea of regional and national needs at either level before compromises if any with the national authorities are worked out. Regional autonomists identify the idea of regional interest essentially with the provincial or state administrations; other regionalists emphasize their pressure group role in the federal Parliament. Regionalists are generally more urgently concerned with meeting local problems than with relating their preferred solutions to a national view, although frequently both concerns are shown. In this respect, they differ most evidently from the nationalist.

Any national or regional party must necessarily make some provision for supplying distinctive regional demands. Thus even the Laurier administration, a nationalist Government, sponsored repeatedly emergency grain and fodder relief for the Northwest Territories (a purely regional policy). Still, the Laurier administration took this service up primarily because it was essential for encouraging immigration. The members of Parliament, like Senator Buchanan, who had warmly urged that measure, were chiefly concerned (in all probability) with getting a remedy to a severe local drought disaster. They probably gave distinctly secondary attention to the question of how the federal relief service was intended to promote the National Policy as a whole.
Regionalist views may or may not differ markedly from those expressed by either the national Government or those political leaders appealing for their electoral support largely to another section. Frequently, views of this type will be restricted to one region. For instance, the demands for the transfer of federally-owned Crown lands in the Prairie provinces and for the return of the Railway Lands in British Columbia were significant political questions only in the two respective subdivisions of Western Canada before 1914. Severe conflicts between the federal and the provincial administrations, and among the national parties arose over these issues. On the other hand, upon the topic of the federal immigration policy, the Borden administrations definitely approached the viewpoint of the British Columbia political figures by 1912. A more reliable characteristic of a regionalist belief than its opposition to the current federal policy appears when we analyze its internal logic. The regionalists form their concepts from the fabric of local problems before they stop to argue that their proposals are also vital for the national welfare (if they do so). The latter claim, if it appears, is a justification, not an inspiration. This emphasis upon the regional necessities, with the resulting complications involved in defending the suggested remedies from a national viewpoint, is clearly apparent in George Bramley-Moore’s arguments on behalf of the typical Western Canadian stand upon the tariff and the natural resources issues.\(^2\)

By contrast, one immediately finds a nationalist ideology whenever a political movement or party advocated a significant policy logically derived from its leaders' view of the national interest. The nationalist attitude is most readily perceived when the particular policy is intended to make the central Government more powerful politically or economically than it had previously been. In any heterogeneous state like Canada, such a course of action, strikingly exemplified by the Canadian tariff and railway legislation,
between 1870 and 1911, often calls forth strong opposition from those parties whose leaders hold such ideas of the national and the regional interests as are unlikely to win much acceptance from the national authorities. Thus one might term the federal Conservatives under Sir John A. Macdonald's or Sir Charles A. Tupper's leadership a clearly nationalistic party. Likewise, those organizations emphasizing the necessity for interregional compromise and intergovernmental harmony within their nation might be included in the same category. This description characterizes the federal Liberal between 1900 and 1911, when it continued an already established National Policy and was generally satisfied with the status quo in the powers enjoyed by the federal Government.

It might be concluded that the one common mark describing all the nationalist parties is their ability to relate concrete ideas of regionally acceptable remedies with an overall policy intended to benefit the entire nation, whether or not a strong central Government is considered necessary for that purpose. It appears that the majority of the federal Members might have held, along with their Leaders, such a position. No conclusive answer will be attempted upon that topic. The principal difficulty in analyzing their attitudes lies in determining the element of consistency in voting records, and also the extent to which the conduct of federal politicians results from their beliefs.

As a matter of fact, the Governments of the Dominion were generally able to obtain fairly easily the support of the Western Members and the Senators, if the latter belonged to the governing party. Remarkably cooperative, loyal, sometimes even excessively submissive attitudes were generally shown by the Western Members of Parliament towards their party leaders, particularly before 1917. For the considerable majority of the Members representing the Western ridings during the years from 1900 until
1917, their party formed the Government. By electing such representatives sometimes against the will of the provincial administrations, the electors frequently demonstrated their desire that the regional Members should be on the side of the National Government. It is striking that no open revolt against an incumbent Government occurred within its party during the entire period from 1880 until 1930,25 with the sole exception of the Liberal Unionists in 1917.

Historians sometimes emphasize that the British idea of party discipline was consistently practiced by the Canadian parties only until the coming of World War I. It is true that the Members of Parliament from the Western region were fully identified with the idea of the national and the regional interests represented by their party leadership only during the years from circa 1880 until 1917.26 Afterwards they, in particular the Liberal and the Progressive Members, commenced expressing their own legislative philosophies independently, and sometimes even more belligerently than previously. Still, the actual behaviour of the individual federal politicians illustrated the traditional preference of the Western Members for being on the side of the Government. This regional characteristic of the Western Canadian representation appeared most clearly in the movement for the Union Government. Among the most fervent and constant supporters of the Coalition idea then, and of the actual Unionist Cabinet afterwards, were Members from the Western provinces.

Even after 1918, despite numerous frustrations, the great majority of the federal Members and Senators from the Canadian West were persistently determined to enjoy the good will of the incumbent Dominion Governments. Some of these Western representatives still felt strong partisan loyalties for the governing National Conservative or Liberal parties, while others were primarily motivated by the new "political reform" idea that the different parts of the
government structure must cooperate with one another regardless of ideological differences among the office-holders, because they were to express the actual strength of the numerous economic interest groups coexisting in society. For either philosophical motive (and for many immediate motives), the Parliamentary representation from the Canadian West was normally ready to make substantial compromises with the Government. Thus several Progressives, like T.A. Crerar, actually chose to rejoin the federal Liberals during the period from 1921 to 1926, while even the most radical United Farmers of Alberta Members were frequently cooperating with the W. L. Mackenzie King Government. The desire to have an actual voice in the making of policy, keeping within bounds the growing readiness of Western political figures to differ with their National leaders upon some specific regional objectives, found its best expression in the unwillingness of the Progressives to become the official Opposition in the House of Commons, and was given its best theoretical defense in Henry Wise Wood's vision of Parliament as the expression of cooperating occupational groups.  

There were more numerous alternative policies tried out by the Western Territorial and provincial administrations in their dealings with the federal Governments during the period from 1900 until 1930. The Governments then holding office in the Northwest Territories, in the provinces derived thereof, and in British Columbia or Manitoba experienced a considerable shift in their respective attitudes and policies. One can best summarize that change in four chronologically consecutive periods, each (except the transitional second) dominated by a fairly distinctive, regionally accepted ideology.

In the first period, ranging from 1870 until 1905, strongly regionalist or autonomist ideas characterized all the administrations in the Northwest Territories, Manitoba and British Columbia. Most politicians in Western Canada then assigned a genuine priority to the task of defending or extending
the functions of the regional administrations. For that reason, these units themselves preferred to associate with the federal Opposition rather than with the Dominion Government. The Western provincial leaders apparently thought it was easier to make the non-governing party the vehicle of their own views.

During the second period, (from 1905 until 1914), all the provincial administrations in the Canadian West were moving in the direction of improved relations with the governing federal party. Still, there was a considerable contrast between the Liberal administrations installed in the new provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan, and the more traditionally-minded Conservative Cabinets in the older Western provinces. The Conservative McBride (1903-1915) and Bowser (1915-16) Governments in British Columbia, and their Manitoba counterpart headed by Rodmond Roblin (1900-1915) essentially retained their autonomist ideology throughout their existence. Even upon the election of the federal Conservatives to power in 1911, they showed little hesitation to differ with the national policies, and in 1914 they suspended their provincial claims upon the Parliament of the Dominion only because that action was dictated by wartime conditions. By contrast, the Liberal Cabinets of Alberta and Saskatchewan, immediately upon taking office in 1905, sharply revised as a matter of principle the policy which their immediate predecessor, the F. G. Haultain Government, had been implementing upon the theories established by the nineteenth century Canadian provincial administrations.

The Scott (1905-1916) and the Rutherford (1905-1910) administrations in Saskatchewan and Alberta respectively adopted an unprecedentedly submissive policy which demonstrated their full loyalty to the Laurier Government. They had successfully carried into effect and made popularly acceptable the Autonomy Acts of 1905. That new provincial Liberal ideology, which will be called "partisan nationalist" in this study, remained official in Alberta and Saskatchewan until the beginning of World War I.
During the period from 1914 to 1918, all the provincial administrations in Canada faithfully observed their emergency agreement made with the federal Government to practice harmonious constitutional and political relations. They also explicitly voiced nationalist convictions more frequently than the Saskatchewan or the Alberta Governments had done before 1911. It is, however, difficult to determine whether any genuine ideological motives, or merely pressures from the electorate then prompted their line of conduct.

By 1921, there arose a somewhat different set of provincial Governments. The typical principle was to form policy independently of any federal party. The new Governments also revived some of the specific demands which had been previously made by the autonomists. They held the national interest superior to all but one set of regional institutional ends, the object of achieving sole jurisdiction over the Crown lands. All the Liberal and the United Farmers' Cabinets in the Western region, including Premier Norris of Manitoba only in 1922, broke new ground in their thinking. For want of a better term, theirs might be called the "qualified cooperative" viewpoint. Their views will be later analyzed in detail.

The crux of the change apparent in the regional ideologies typical of the period from 1905 until 1920 is the growing tendency of political parties at either level to place more and more significance upon the ideas emphasized by the federal parties and less upon the distinctive ambitions of their administrations to administer certain disputed functions upon their own responsibility. Prior to 1905, the most significant, repeatedly expressed desire characterizing the Canadian West was for strengthening the provincial institutions. Essentially, the most representative political figures in that region then believed that the provincial governments were the more trustworthy agents of regional interest than the federal Parliament. After 1905 in Alberta and Saskatchewan, sometime between 1910 and 1922 in Manitoba, and
since 1921 in British Columbia, the governing provincial parties concluded that the Governments of the Dominion were more competent than they were to provide effective economic remedies to the hardships frustrating the public. In other words, the regional leaders representing the Western electors at both levels of the government came to see that the regional interests of their section could best be served, not by acquiring altogether new functions and revenues for the provincial level, but by securing change in such policies of the federal Government as were exclusively or primarily under the latter's jurisdiction according to the British North America Act of 1867. The provincial authorities also commenced to press for conditional grants along with showing primary interest in reforming existing federal policies. After 1925, only the British Columbia government again assigned the highest priority to their institutional legal objectives.

What sort of evidence will be offered to support this hypothesis concerning ideological change? The most comprehensive evidence appears to be the valuation placed by the representative political leaders in the Western provinces (i.e. provincial governments, the Councils of the Northwest Territories prior to 1905, and the leading Members of Parliament from that region) upon specific political issues.

It will be shown that governments holding the autonomist viewpoint controlled the Northwest Territories until 1905 and Manitoba until 1921. Their counterparts governed British Columbia continuously except for the period from 1914 to 1928. In general, after 1911 the Western autonomists found it more difficult than the Governments of Ontario and Quebec to remain in office.

The autonomist Governments of Manitoba looked forward to winning favourable decisions from the federal government in matters of natural resources, disputed boundary questions, and the chartering of companies.
In the Northwest Territories, the supporters of Premier Frederick G. Haultain desired full equality of status with the Central or Eastern provinces. The British Columbia groups were usually preoccupied with the Better Terms Question, the immigration controversies, and (after 1921) the projected transfer to Railway lands. Frequently arguing on grounds of principle, these regionalists, whatever their affiliation in federal politics, believed that considerable gains in constitutional matters were essential. As will be shown later, they won occasional successes in their dealings with the Federal Government.

Until the representative leaders in the Canadian West turned definitely from the "autonomist" to the "nationalist" or the "qualified cooperative" viewpoint, they generally held that federal policy decisions not intended to give the provincial governments new administrative functions were of secondary importance. Such were the regional tariff and freight rate objectives. The tariff became the crucial issue to Western Provincial leaders only after 1905 in Alberta and Saskatchewan, and sometime between 1910 and 1914 in Manitoba. Parallel with that issue, the federal control of grain marketing, as represented by the "Manitoba" Act (a federal statute) enacted in 1905, also became important. In the Prairie provinces, the growing attention paid by political parties to these issues resulted partly from the publicity campaigns of the Grain Growers Associations, and partly from the strategy and policies sponsored by the Laurier Government. Neither factor seriously influenced British Columbia, and hence the successful politicians in that province continued to emphasize the claims of their provincial administrations until at least 1920, when the freight rates problem loomed the largest.

Needless to say, it was the federal politicians who were the first to become engrossed with the issues having little relevance to provincial claims for new responsibilities and revenues. The federal Liberal Members were the
first to experience this shift of values during the years of the Laurier administrations; the Conservatives, upon the victory of Sir Robert L. Borden in 1911. As soon as the provincial administrations felt that they could not count upon the support of their federal allies in their campaigns for larger subsidies or greater functions, they more or less gradually turned to other political issues for their principal political appeal. The latter were either questions deriving from their past legislative performance, federal policies beyond their actual or intended responsibility, or (after 1921) new issues referring to the conditional grants.

Only the political figures from British Columbia became once more primarily concerned after 1925, with subsidy questions or Dominion-provincial jurisdictional conflicts. The most significant issues concerned the Railway Lands and the ownership of the Great Eastern Railway. It will later be pointed out that these changes of political emphasis resulted not merely from the preferences of influential federal politicians. The readiness of all the parties to adopt any policy innovations arose from their interpretation of shifting public mood.

It might be added that it is much easier to trace the shifting views of provincial administrations in the political history of Alberta and Saskatchewan than it is to do likewise for the older Western provinces. The Liberal Prairie administrations made themselves conspicuous by revising the beliefs and the policies previously held by the F. G. Haultain Government. There is considerably more difficulty in identifying the comparable shift in the policies of the Conservative or the Liberal administrations in British Columbia or Manitoba, because these Governments modified their values and their strategy more gradually.

This interpretation of provincial policies as reflecting ideological distinctions will naturally be challenged. Critics might well hold to the
view that the Territorial and the provincial administrations in the Canadian West were demonstrating essentially similar ideas of the regional interest, but were merely employing a different methodology. This writer cannot accept that view.

It is, of course, true that the regional administrations in Western Canada show certain similarities of belief. All their views were clearly moderate in nature. The respective Governments preferred to find a middle ground between the extremes of submissive or secessionist attitudes in their relations with the federal Government. In particular, they were careful to compromise when there was no other promising alternative in any specific instance.

Further, there was basic agreement among the regional Western Canadian leaders as to the existing rights of the provincial administrations under Canada's federal system. Indeed all the administrations were generally willing to accept the delimitation of functions which the courts had established. There were substantially few significant legal cases then because the courts had clarified, as early as the nineteenth century, the rules governing the division of powers among the Canadian governments. The provincial administrations in the Canadian West saw no opportunity to challenge effectively the legality of the policies upon which the various Governments of the Dominion had embarked, nor were there numerous legal conflicts among the individual provincial administrations.

Likewise, Canadian politicians in the Western region approximated one another's viewpoint in respect to their ultimate ideals of provincial autonomy. The fundamental intention motivating all the provincial parties in the Western region was to secure and make financially possible certain more or less limited extensions of the provincial jurisdiction, without unduly restricting the functions of the federal Governments. In general, all the respective
Territorial and provincial administrations desired to enjoy the fullness of the powers which the courts had assigned to the Ontario and the Quebec legislatures. Each provincial government in Canada, building upon the precedents established in relation to the oldest and the most powerful provinces, formulated its own idea of "legislative sovereignty," i.e. its idea as to what the provincial level could do. To secure genuine provincial status, regional leaders thought it was necessary to be equal in status with the central provinces, to be fiscally responsible, and to retain political sensitivity to the electorate.

All the Western Canadian administrations were particularly careful to follow the legal example of the other provinces in any matters which were likely to call forth serious differences of viewpoint between them and the Dominion Parliament. The most persuasive precedents were found for questioning those statutory disabilities which the Western provinces faced, but which did not apply to Ontario or Quebec. One finds in this category numerous of the Western demands for new administrative responsibilities: those for the transfer of the public domain, the assurance of control over mortgage conditions set for farmers receiving drought relief from the Department of the Interior, for taxation powers over the Canadian Pacific Railway, for the authority to charter competing lines, and for exclusive power over education. It was likewise easy for the Western administrations to attack at least one federal policy in the area of jurisdiction intended to remain with Parliament. This was the regulation of freight rates by the Board of Railway Commissioners. It was naturally much more difficult for the Western provincial governments to present uniform arguments in respect to those national policies which resulted in regional hardship, but made no special restriction upon the powers of the Western provincial governments and no explicit discrimination against their region (e.g. the tariff). Still, even in matters of the latter type, the
Western provincial governments derived at least some of their arguments from the relevant submissions formerly made by the Maritime or the Central provinces to the federal parliament.

Since they drew upon identical historical sources to bolster their position in the leading Dominion-Provincial disputes of significance during the period from 1900 until 1930, provincial leaders of all parties in Western Canada frequently agreed as to what regional gains were desirable in peacetime. It seems, for instance, that even the Liberal "nationalists"/or the World War I provincial administrations privately agreed that they should at some future time assume control over the Dominion-held public domain. Agreement among provincial leaders often extended to those few constitutionally debatable positions for which no clear precedent existed. For instance, prior to 1914, all the Western provincial governments believed that actual need rather than the traditional formula should determine the amount of federal subsidies. In the absence of such policy, they felt justified to insist upon extending their licensing powers to those types of companies which the Dominion Governments insisted on chartering themselves. Some highly divisive issues, like the question of public ownership of utilities, existed in provincial politics, but it is striking that the great majority of the heterodox proposals were unlikely to produce Dominion-provincial conflicts because they implied no challenge to the National policy.

Although the Territorial and the provincial administrations were all holding essentially identical concepts of self-government, the "nationalist," the "regionalist," and the "qualified cooperative" ideologies do contrast with one another in several respects. Fundamentally, their authors assigned different degrees of urgency and significance to the traditional provincial demands for new subsidies and additional responsibilities, like their request for the transfer of natural resources, as compared to those political
objectives, which were to give the provinces no new jurisdiction. There are at least two convincing indicators of the priorities which the Western regional leaders assigned to their objectives: their selection of issues which were to be emphasized, and their preparedness or reluctance to accept financial compensation for actual desired functions. Further, the three sets of administrations employed widely divergent methodologies in their relations with the federal Government.

It is suggested that the differences among the three sets of regional administrations distinguished above are sufficient to denote individual ideological characteristics. Even if two governments know their rights, show some interest in securing changes of the National Policy, and hold closely resembling views as to an ultimately acceptable line of demarcation between the federal and the provincial levels, they still differ in ideology if one considers the standing jurisdictional disputes to be of essential, and the other of only secondary significance. The same might be said of the governments, if one makes urgent and timely requests, and the other is willing to accept long delays without protest, or even to suspend formally certain objectives for an indefinite period of time. To be specific, if the autono­mist Western Canadian provincial administration gives much weight to its natural resources and subsidy claims, and calls for the immediate satisfaction of its demands, it takes an ideological position which is distinct from that of the post-1918 governments which clearly saw other Dominion-provincial matters to be more profitable and urgent, although they intended to gain no new responsibilities by acting in this manner.

Differences in methodology among the Territorial and the provincial administrations in question underline, but hardly deny, the presence of ideological diversity. There are indeed different meanings which the term "methodology" might carry in this context. It might mean that the several
sets of governments were each employing a different technique in pressing their requests upon the federal Parliament. This is quite true. Still, the "methodology" might also be used in a different light, as will presently be pointed out.

In this thesis, the methodological problem in Dominion-provincial relations will be restricted to the formulation of specific legislative objectives within each fundamental type of issues, the choice between beligerent and restrained political tactics, and the attitude taken in respect to intergovernmental consultations. Each of the three sets of provincial governments identified above took an individual course of action in conjunction with its ideology and in respect to its political and financial strength. The ideological and the methodological aspects of provincial policies have normally been in very close relation one to another, but it is possible to analyze them distinctly for better comprehension.

For instance, the following describes how the provincial autonomists in the Canadian West sought to put into effect their ideology. Prior to 1912, the administrations of Manitoba and British Columbia frequently challenged the Governments of the Dominion by making their jurisdictional and financial claims (and occasionally their provocative legislative policies) the leading political issues in federal as well as in provincial elections. The Conservative administrations which held office in those provinces, up to the beginning of World War I, vigorously and often very effectively campaigned on behalf of the federal Opposition party under Sir Robert L. Borden. They had also nearly demolished the provincial Liberal Party by charging the latter with subservience to the Laurier Government. By employing these normally effective partisan tactics, the Conservatives intended to impress the federal Liberals with the futility of stimulating intraprovincial Opposition towards them, and also with the desirability of
reaching early agreements in respect to the currently significant provincial proposals and measures. 37

The autonomist administrations extensively bargained with the federal Government, both unilaterally and in conjunction with other provincial leaders. However, the first-named Governments dealt mainly with demands referring directly to their administrative responsibilities. They very rarely consulted the Dominion ministers in other matters, such as the legal standing of their legislative plans or proposals.

The autonomist methodology brought certain gains from the federal Parliament. But neither the financial benefits nor the increased considerations won by the autonomists were sufficient to ensure their neutrality in federal politics, except for the Governments of the Northwest Territories. 38 The latter shared the respective ideology with Conservatives (and some Liberals) of Manitoba and British Columbia. Yet the Territorial Premier was in no position to practice the Conservatives' tactics in federal elections because his Government lacked comparably strong political organization.

The "partisan nationalist," as well as the "qualified cooperative" administrations in the Canadian West, likewise continued to participate energetically in Dominion elections on behalf of their favorite party. With the sole exception of Premier John Bracken and his Manitoba Government (1922-1940), 39 none of the provincial Cabinets was ever nonpartisan or neutral in federal politics. Still, not only did the reasons for their participation differ widely, their actual tactics were hardly identical.

The differences among the provincial methodologies are best seen in reference to the nature of political criticisms employed and the contacts which their authors instituted with the federal level of government. In the course of their election campaigns during the years from 1896 to 1917, both the autonomists and the Liberal nationalists were unsparing in attacking their
political opponents. They freely selected their issues from the topics in which they were primarily interested. The Liberal Alberta and Saskatchewan Governments then differed from Manitoba's in being much longer on the side of the governing federal party, and hence they staked their life upon the popularity of the Laurier national policies. Like the Liberals, the "qualified cooperative" governments desired to enjoy the good will of the Dominion, but felt it necessary, for political reasons, to demonstrate their independence by their utterances. Thus, they were frequently critics of the national policies, whether or not they were associated with the party in power at Ottawa. Nevertheless, upon partisan occasions they rarely referred to the matters then under negotiation.

Unlike the autonomists, both the post-1918 governments and the previously governing Liberal nationalists were highly interested in developing friendly and frequent consultations with the federal Cabinet upon diverse matters, including partisan strategy. The Liberals had strongly favored the establishment of Dominion-provincial contacts outside the formal conferences. So long as the Laurier Government was in office, they enjoyed constant access to the Prime Minister personally. The "qualified cooperative" governments were likewise highly interested in discussing with the federal authorities numerous problems. Hence they called for repeated meetings with either the Prime Minister or specialists in Ottawa. Numerous federal-provincial and interprovincial conferences were held from 1919 to 1930. It might be added that since all of the Western Governments were then little interested in partisan cooperation with the federal Government, those associated with the governing party preferred to join in conversations attended by several administrations of different party affiliation. Thus, there were practiced less cordial exchanges of opinion between the Western Canadian provincial
leadership and the federal Government during the period from 1920 to 1930 than had prevailed between the Prairie Liberals and the Laurier Cabinet during the years from 1905 until 1911. One finds during the later period certainly less respect shown by one level of government for the other.

These factors doubtless contributed to the delays occurring in the settlement of the natural resources issue, despite the willingness of the federal Government to arrange the transfer after 1911. In general, the autonomists' bargaining methods and the Liberals' maintenance of partisan close ties with their federal party prior to 1914 were more effective in obtaining concessions from the Dominion than the open, prolonged, semi-partisan negotiating characteristic of the postwar decade. To repeat, this study will employ the term methodology only in the sense of intergovernmental consultations, the choice of specific legislation, and the treatment of political issues. This definition excludes the decision of a Territorial or provincial Government to emphasize its objectives in one or the other of the following: those intended to extend the direct administrative responsibilities of the respective province, or to increase its revenues, and such as were undisputably intended to remain under the jurisdiction of the federal Government. (not subsidy questions). It is always important to observe the distinction between questions of detail and those of priority or evaluation.

It might be pointed out that some writers do employ the term methodology much more comprehensively. They suggest that every problem pertaining to the choice of political objectives on part of governments, as for instance the very decision as to whether a provincial Government should ask the Dominion Parliament for the transfer of the public domain or for new subsidies, is a question of methodology. In this view, ideological conflicts are only those relating to very broadly conceived national and regional economic interests. Such are the settlement and the cultivation of empty regions, the
encouragement of agriculture or industrial diversification, and the distribution of adequate funds for accepted social purposes. Ideology so defined would exclude the political problem as to what powers should be given to each level of government in a federal state. Assignments of responsibilities to a person or an agency would always be called a choice of technique. So would be all the revenue distribution issues.

Writers who classify the problem of dividing power among the different governments or their branches as methodological questions are generally economic determinists. They underrate the intrinsic significance of political issues because they want to interpret all conflicts of power as reflections of economic interests.

What attitude to the question of ideology is taken in this study has received attention elsewhere. The definition suggested carries more strength historically and from the present perspective than the economic determinist's. One should reflect as faithfully as possible the viewpoint of the Western Canadian political leaders who frequently termed many of their specific intentions and claims to be questions of principle. The natural resources and the Better Terms Question are clear examples of such issues, as one might gather by reading the most authoritative arguments concerning these problems. Not only historically, but also judging the provincial attitudes from our present scale of values, it appears that the distribution of power among several different governments is for active politicians as significant a problem as the promotion of economic activities. A final reason why this interpretation is taken is the writer's interest in the intrinsic values of regional self-government.

Certain specific methodological positions which seem inseparable from the ideology of the "autonomist" or the "qualified cooperative" Governments will be treated as defining characteristics. The single legislative objective
which best represents at least the earlier view, and invariably accompanies that of the post-1918 Governments, is the provincial request for the transfer of natural resources to their jurisdiction. In connection with the dispute of this type pertaining to the Prairie provinces, the historical tradition cited by Premier Haultain and Professor Chester A. Martin will be examined in some detail. Likewise, one should give similar emphasis to certain of the unconditional subsidy questions, because the provision of adequate revenues, freely to be appropriated, is certainly a sine qua non of responsible self-government. Besides, provincial demands for new subsidies often centred upon the injustice of the current programs. It is significant that no provincial administration ever gave up its subsidy objectives simply because other revenue sources were available.

What factors explain why the provincial administrations in the Canadian West repeatedly changed their ideological positions and their methodological courses of action during the period from 1900 to 1930? It is possible to suggest several different hypotheses from the economic or the political viewpoint. Either type of theory might concentrate upon the national or the regional problems.

Writers proceeding from the economic viewpoint have been attempting to interpret some or all of the following three sets of phenomena. Sometimes the effort was made to give the reason for the ideological viewpoint of the provincial governments upon the nature of self-government, i.e. their decision to attach substantial or slight significance to the prospect of assuming new responsibilities. Further analysis of this theoretical approach would require a discussion beyond the scope of this thesis, and will not be attempted. A writer might also try to interpret the methodology followed by a provincial party in its relations with the federal level solely as a method of obtaining financial benefits. This theory will be demonstrated
to be false, although it is very common, since its authors fail to distinguish it from the third, plausible type of explanation. The only type of economic explanation which will be accepted in this thesis pertains to the choice of specific objectives within one of the two fundamental categories (matters to be placed under provincial jurisdiction and those intended to remain under the federal Parliament). The political considerations being equal, the provincial administrations have naturally preferred issues promising a realistic increase of revenue. Thus historians such as W. L. Morton and commentators like J. Castell Hopkins have repeatedly pointed out that these Western administrations which undertook to formulate certain far-reaching legislative objectives on the provincial level, to place ambitious requests upon the Governments of the Dominion for additions to their jurisdiction (e.g. the natural resources issue), or to introduce legislation likely to be challenged or disallowed, frequently made their choice with the view to meeting a serious financial crisis. Particularly during the period from 1900 to 1918, the majority of the Western administrations did, in fact experiment with numerous enterprising policies intended to satisfy the desires of settlers who wanted to enjoy modern facilities in a frontier environment. To obtain funds for the various new services required, the administrations of Manitoba and British Columbia were indeed the most likely to take steps objectionable to the federal authorities. They enjoyed smaller per capita subsidies than did the Northwest Territories or (between 1905 and 1911) the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan. The older provinces were then facing similar shortages of taxable capital as did the other units, but they were required to appropriate considerably large sums for social and educational purposes because of their somewhat complex society. Thus they were all the more ready to continue voicing such "autonomist" objectives as were likely to bring considerable increases in their subsidies.
Economic factors are helpful in clarifying the turning point in the provincial methods of dealing with the federal Parliament. Still, they must in every case be supplemented by political analysis. For making this generalization, there is much evidence originating with all the three types of Western Canadian governments.

This study will mainly present the political factors, which have been neglected by numerous other writers. These considerations will include ideological characteristics, electoral-strategic plans, partisan influences, and the personal psychological make-up of the party leaders. While in any thesis discussing Canada's political history, some of the aforementioned characteristics must be known concerning the governing national party, the emphasis in this study will be upon provincial governments.

The personal characteristics and ingenuity of provincial party leaders as well as influences from the federal party figures and organizations have been of great significance in the Western region of Canada. Hence all the four types of political factors might well be profitably studied. In fact, this study will principally refer to the ideological and electoral aspects of the Territorial and provincial administrations in question, chiefly because this writer has been able to collect worthwhile information upon these barely explored topics. Information upon the third set of factors, the partisan pressures exerted upon the provincial administration by either the federal party leaders in Ottawa, or by the outstanding or most powerful Members of Parliament from the respective province is frequently inaccessible.

The beliefs of the leading political movements appearing in Canada during the period from 1900 until 1930 must be considered fundamental in this context. This writer will attempt to show that additional forces or considerations, apart from personal convictions, have influenced the provincial administrations in the Western provinces to take up the positions which have been outlined above.
In the case of the Liberal administrations in Saskatchewan and Alberta, their behaviour resulted very substantially from their identification with the federal Liberal party. The latter's leading figures, notably Sir Wilfred Laurier and Frank Oliver, had given these provincial Cabinets frequent advice upon numerous theoretical and practical problems. The conformity of the federal Prairie Liberals was, naturally, heightened not only by the favorable financial terms provided by the Autonomy Acts of 1905, but also by their keen awareness of public preferences. The electors in the new provinces, at least until 1917, expected greater tariff reductions and more of the direct services provided by the federal Government than did the majorities elsewhere in the Canadian West. The first were particularly well disposed to the national policies sponsored during the years from 1900 to 1911.

As for the autonomists, they consistently required a considerably greater degree of independence from their federal party than did the Liberals. Their principal aim being the building of powerful provincial institutions, they were very strongly motivated by immediate partisan-electoral considerations. They desired their party to overshadow in political strength all the other allied and competing parties. After 1918 the Western Governments in question found the "qualified cooperative" policy easy to pursue, because they had given up any serious intention to affect the outcome of federal elections.

As will be pointed out later, a study of intraprovincial political currents is particularly useful in explaining their typical postwar provincial "retrenchment" policy.

Indeed the efforts made by the various analysts to understand, from the financial viewpoint, the conduct of those Governments described as "qualified cooperative" must be considered the weakest link in their accounts. It is
most difficult to explain, by studying exclusively economic aspects, why those Governments should have practiced, during the third decade of this century, an ideology which visualized an essentially modest role for the provincial level, and a methodology which was bound to delay the settlement of the one outstanding conflicting issue, the natural resources issue. Why did those Governments while assuming the role of lobbyists with the federal Government, make no new demands for bigger unconditional grants until Premier Bracken's plea in 1927? One must look to other than financial explanations to answer these questions.

In fact, all the Western Canadian Territorial and provincial administrations were heavily guided by their analysis of voter preferences. Up to 1920, they employed very successfully their knowledge of public opinion to enhance their own prestige and security. What is the relationship between the ideological and the partisan motives of the Governments or their immediate successors?

Normally, a political leader forms his beliefs before deciding whether it is most appropriate for him to specialize upon the provincial or the federal levels, and what party he should work with. It is striking that the heads of the Governments in the Western region generally experienced slight conflict between their personal and their partisan motives. The reason is doubtless the fact that until 1918 there was much correspondence between the sentiments of the public and their own.

The evidence for the close understanding existing, at least until 1921, between particularly the provincial Governments in question and the electoral majority is the impressive continuity in the ideological positions taken by all the party leaders. The Western Canadian Governments were clearly able to employ such electoral strategies as did not seriously compromise their principles. This situation always prevails when public moods change slowly.
However, at certain rare intervals during the period from 1900 to 1930, the views of the electorate in Western Canada did change so quickly that their Governments lost contact with the voter. Then it was urgently necessary for the concerned Governments to choose between logical consistency and their own partisan interests. The earliest such occasion appeared in the Northwest Territories in approximately 1905.\(^3\) In that year, the Haultain Government preferred to face political disintegration rather than fall short of the Premier's far-going autonomist principles. It is apparent that in refusing to accept the Autonomy Acts, Haultain badly misjudged the extent of the rising support enjoyed by the federal Liberals in the Territories.

Again between 1917 and 1922, much uncertainty as to the changing outlook of the Western electorate appeared throughout the Canadian West, particularly in British Columbia and Manitoba. At that time, there was a new interest in and demand for the reforming of certain federal policies. The actions of the Coalition in Ottawa had exerted a profound effect upon the Western provinces, which reacted with considerable unanimity. However, there was a slight consensus as to what role the provincial level or government should play in Canada. This was a situation in which all the provincial Cabinets might well have seized the initiative by educating the public to share a consistent ideology of federalism. They might have acted strongly for or against the widespread desire felt since 1914 for the subordination of provincial to national interests. Instead, unlike Haultain in 1905, the Norris, the Oliver, and the Stewart (1917-21) Governments displayed excessive hesitation, before at least the two first-named Premiers emerged, by 1922, with their eclectic, makeshift program.

It is suggested that the key reason for the inability of these Governments to retain the confidence of the voters lay in their reputation for inconsistency, which they showed immediately upon the conclusion of World War I.
Their experience, as will be pointed out later, contains a significant lesson for all the provincial leaders in Canada.

Why did the provincial administrations in Western Canada over the entire period from 1917 to 1930 find it highly difficult to predict the response of the voter?

During the years roughly from 1900 to 1925, several highly important changes had occurred in the regional attitudes of Western Canada towards the federal system. It is suggested that the electors were the first to modify substantially the traditional concepts of the regional and the national interests. Let us now briefly outline the main trend.

At the turn of the century the public in the entire region placed a high value upon the functions of their own Territorial or provincial administrations. Therefore, they accepted the judgment of their most influential leaders as to what policy proposals they should support in either set of elections. In particular, they believed that they must rally to certain key demands for revisions in the National Policy. The interest shown by the federal Conservatives in the proposals made by the regional Conservatives and the Non-partisan premiers during the period from 1900 until 1911 reinforced the tendency of the electors to trust them. So did the "tradition of grievance" which the people of Manitoba and British Columbia had carried away from their experiences with federal policies during the nineteenth century.

Since the opening years of the twentieth century in the Prairie provinces, and since the Reciprocity Campaign in British Columbia, the federal political parties commenced to enjoy the prestige which the "autonomist" leaders alone had previously possessed. Their ascendency was paralleled by a sharply increased public interest in inter-party competition upon the federal level, and in those policy questions which were beyond the actual or
the intended jurisdiction of the provincial administrations. Issues of this type, notably the tariff, were initially stressed by the Liberals during the early years of the Laurier regime, but gradually Conservatives paid ever more attention to criticizing the latter Government for its respective actions in areas other than "provincial rights." The result was the drawing away of public interest from the proposals originating with provincial premiers.48

The majority of historical writers agree that in the Reciprocity Campaign of 1911 more attention was paid to the tariff and the debated grain elevator legislation than to the proposals of provincial premiers for the transfer of federally held lands or subsidy raises.49 Rising public interest for or against numerous Laurier policies was an important reason for increased participation in federal elections. During the years from 1896 until 1911, the vote cast in provincial elections generally exceeded that recorded in the subsequent federal voting. The greatest distinction between the two sets of totals appears in British Columbia.50 For the period from 1911 until 1925 (inclusive) public participation in federal elections was everywhere higher than that in provincial ones, except that in Alberta more voted in the provincial election of 1921 than in that year's federal contest probably due to the greater urgency felt for the United Farmers' political reform ideas upon the provincial scene.51

How do we know that the increased vote cast in federal elections resulted in large measure from the new interest in questions other than the provincial claims intended to give the provincial governments new extensions of jurisdiction? We can infer this fact from the study of the first thirty years of this century. At the time when considerable attention was paid, at least by the Conservatives, to the subsidy, the boundary, and the natural resources questions in the period from 1900 until 1911, the totals recorded in federal elections approximated those for the provincial ones. Since
similar issues, like the question of the Reciprocal Trade agreement, were debated in both sets of elections, we must assume that the totals essentially represent public response to the control exerted over them by "autonomist" leaders (in the Northwest Territories this was true until 1905). The sharpest change in voting trends occurs during the period when the federal parties debated issues other than provincial claims. The new habit of the electors to vote essentially upon those questions in federal elections was an established fact in Alberta and Saskatchewan by 1911, in Manitoba by 1917, while in British Columbia it was only temporarily in existence and was reversed by 1928.

The fundamental modification of viewpoint which the electorate in the Western provinces manifested during the period under consideration appears in the results of the provincial and the federal elections within their territory, in the political issues which the parties were debating in connection with these elections, in the official submissions made by the provincial administrations to the corresponding federal Governments, and in the extent of interest shown by the leading Western periodicals to various public issues. The analysis of election campaigns, to be comprised in the subsequent chapters (particularly that of provincial campaigns) will best clarify how the electorate in the Canadian West modified their viewpoint in respect to those issues upon which their provincial administrations as well as the federal Government had assumed a significant position. Only such a comprehensive study will clearly indicate the shifting response made by the Westerner to problems concerning the division of powers between the two levels of government.

The changes of regional attitudes to be analyzed will be taken up in reference to three carefully delimited sets of political issues. For the period from 1900 until 1930, these are, fundamentally, either the constitutional issues comprising serious arguments concerning the legal rights of any government or proposals for changes in "fundamental" laws, and exclusively
federal questions, having no direct reference to the administrative functions of the provinces. Finally, there is also the typically twentieth century category of issues pertaining to "cooperative federalism" or the conditional grants made by the federal Government to the provinces.

Constitutional questions will occupy the spotlight in Part I of the thesis. These will be considered to include jurisdictional and federal subsidy questions. The jurisdictional issues comprise all significant arguments over the existing legal rights of the federal or the provincial administrations in Canada, as well as the proposals for the transfer of authority. Either type of jurisdictional contention might originate with the Attorney General of a government or with an individual. As for federal unconditional subsidies, only some of the proposals for revisions in the current arrangements are required to be enacted by the British Parliament according to the formal process of constitutional amendment. Still, since the entire system of unconditional subsidies has been a fundamental prerequisite for Confederation, any issues referring to that topic will be grouped with jurisdictional questions.

Jurisdictional issues might further be subdivided. One might set up four groups. The first naturally includes the legal cases which the judicial Committee of the Privy Council or Canada's Supreme Court had heard at some time. For the period from 1900 until 1930, the most significant legal cases concerned the rights of provincial legislatures to enact laws interfering with the operations of liquor importers. Further, it is necessary to study the somewhat more numerous and highly controversial instances of executive nullification, i.e. the uses of the reservation and the disallowance powers by which the Governments of the Dominion voided at will provincial legislation. Finally, there are formal constitutional amendments and special Dominion-provincial agreements.

Very significant are the additions to Canada's "fundamental law."
One might thus term the British North America Acts of 1871, 1908 and 1930. Prior to 1930, the British Parliament enacted all the laws in this category at the request of Canadian Governments.

Before 1930, constitutional amendments required the consent of the provincial governments. Still, the federal government sometimes reached agreements with all or some of the provinces before preparing relevant resolutions for the British authorities. This was true of the 1908 and 1930 British North America Acts.

Provincial constitutive acts are a special sub-group of constitutional amendments which the federal Parliament can enact, but not amend without the action of the British Parliament. The consent of respective territorial governments is not necessary. Such are the Autonomy Acts of 1905.

Secondly, one finds the various pseudo-constitutional agreements made between the federal and provincial Governments, like boundary demarcations. The consent of all the concerned regional governments is required in the latter case.

The other fundamental category of political issues, significant during the period from 1900 until 1930, are those policy decisions which might be called "exclusively federal" in nature. These include federal legislation acting directly upon the people of Canada, with hardly any significant legal challenge being made. All sections of the federal parliament will be classified under this heading, unless responsible critics raised either in the courts or politically the charge of unconstitutionality. The legislative powers of the federal level essentially comprise Sections 91, 93, 94 and 95 of the original British North America Act, with the later amendments added to those provisions. In its permitted field, the federal Parliament exercises either exclusive authority, as over the tariff, interprovincial commerce and banking, or superior powers (in agriculture and immigration).
Constitutional amendments to which the affected provinces object on political grounds, like the British North America Act of 1871 which validated the retention of Prairie Crown lands by the federal Governments, also placed certain areas of legislation exclusively under its control. Hence questions relating to the administration of these topics will be considered exclusively federal in nature, like the setting of homestead prices, unless the argument concerns proposed transfers of the respective power to the provinces. It might incidentally be added that the provincial administrations in the Canadian West have frequently publicized their proposals in reference to exclusively federal functions, in particular since 1900, with the intention of pleasing the electorate by acting as defenders of regional economic interests, but the same have rarely questioned the legal right of the Governor-General-in-Council or of the federal Parliament to resolve the debate.

Finally, since 1918, there have arisen ever more frequent questions referring to "cooperative federalism." Commencing with emergency grants-in-aid, the recent policy of the federal Government to participate jointly with the provincial governments in areas of health, education, and welfare has become permanently established and extensively practised. For instance, James A. Corry pinpoints the fundamental change from the "classical federalism" characterizing the period prior to 1914 to the rise of intergovernmental association in three selected federal states (Canada, Australia and the United States), since the conclusion of World War I. After defining the earlier version of federalism, he goes on to describe its transformation.

"From an examination of these three constitutions comes the definition of federalism that we have found meaningful: general and regional governments of co-ordinate authority, each independent of the other in its appropriate sphere, ruling over the same persons and the same territory under the benign surveillance of a court. This is classical federalism in the Anglo-American..."
mode. Classical federalism saw the national and the state governments in the system as independent entities, each going its own way in the enjoyment of its powers under the check of a watchful electorate, with a minimum of either association or collusion. Classical federalism worked with considerable success until the First World War. (Since that time) the co-ordinate governments no longer work in isolation one from another, but are increasingly engaged in cooperative ventures in which each relies heavily on the other. Indeed a self-centred provincial autonomy is no longer possible. 58

What is meant by "cooperative ventures" in Professor Corry's statement? The meaning given that term will determine our dating of the leading twentieth century transformation in the Canadian political history the coming of extensive consultations initiated by provincial administrations in their relations with the federal Governments, and their subsequent joint provision of specific services by the two levels. It is clear from the context that Corry is referring to the latter type of cooperation, while disregarding those earlier Dominion-provincial Conferences which produced no federal financial contributions to provincial services. 59 Hence he needs to study only the period after 1914. Although the political and the economic strains impeding the smooth operation of "classical federalism" have been accumulating since the very earliest years of this century, Dominion-provincial projects became common only during the third decade.

In any federal state, the significant political leaders must meet several prerequisites before the rise of "cooperative federalism" can take place. First it is necessary for regional leaders to place high value upon achieving reasonably good standing with the federal Government. Relations between the national and the regional levels of Government must be based upon mutual confidence and respect. For this purpose, it is essential that the concerned administrations then demonstrate more willingness to compromise
their different ideas of the national or the regional interest than the Canadian government at either level had been prepared to do before 1914.

The most significant effect of the political changes occurring during the period from 1900 to 1930 lay undoubtedly in the producing of political conditions favorable to the extension of "cooperative federalism", so important since the Great Depression. Anyone interested in furthering improved public services must give this phenomenon essentially favorable attention. After 1920, as a result of the conditional grants appropriated by the federal Parliament, provincial governments were offering many services at a level which they had been unable to attain previously (to a substantial extent, because of their inability to secure the transfer of the disputed natural resources).

Politically, one must also laud the cultivation of increasingly frequent reciprocal contacts maintained by the provincial with the federal governments, though with the qualifications introduced earlier. Certainly, it is true that the regional Cabinets in Canada became better qualified to foretell the reaction of their counterparts in Ottawa to their legislative ideas. Hence they were able to plan with greater assurance of acceptability their own policies. In turn, they became less increasingly inclined to challenge the existing national policies, whether by their legislation or proposals for constitutional amendments. In particular, the three provincial governments in the Prairie region came to differ strikingly from the continuously "autonomist" parties of Ontario and Quebec.

On the other hand, it is fair to add that the electorate in the Western Canadian provinces also suffered certain significant disadvantages from the emphasis placed after 1918 by their provincial administrations in their public statements upon matters beyond the intended jurisdiction of the provinces. In the first instance, by neglecting to throw their full
strength behind their standing demands for the transfer of the Crown lands to their jurisdiction, for certain desired taxing powers and for new unconditional subsidies, the Western Canadian provincial administrations were forced to get along with highly limited gains from the federal Parliament. In this respect, they also made slight use of their greatest opportunity to publicize their ideas of provincial autonomy. As a result, when serious conflicts between the two levels of government later occurred, the electors were frequently unprepared to understand the issue at stake. It is doubtful whether the attitudes making cooperative federalism feasible would have been greatly impeded if the provincial leaders had spoken more resolutely to support their institutional interests, in particular at the time of federal election campaigns.

It must also be pointed out that during the years from 1925 to 1940, when the question of the constitutional amending process was being carefully considered and debated, the Western Governments failed either to support any of the views expressed by the Premiers of the Eastern Canadian provinces or to put forth their own proposals upon this vital problem still facing Canada. Undoubtedly for fear of prejudicing the federal Cabinets, they decided to make no significant contribution towards working out a settlement of this national problem. Thus they indirectly helped to multiply the present uncertainties regarding the status of the provincial "safeguarded" powers.

Because they remained largely passive in respect to the general constitutional problems of Canada, and because they were willing to defend an ambitious vision of provincial administrative function, the provincial governments in the Canadian West commenced to modify their tactics. After 1918, their new ideas and methods were of limited assistance in restoring prestige with the electorate. The federal party leaders soon perceived this fact. To some extent, the political weakness of the Western Canadian Governments
inevitably resulted from the contemporary changes in public attitudes. That effect was, certainly, deepened by the tendency of the regional politicians to look for the easiest remedy to their growing insecurity in office.
PART I: The Western Canadian Regional Governments and Constitutional Issues
As this writer has already pointed out in the preceding chapter, the regional administrations in a federal state are constantly facing several difficult choices. Among the most important problems to be resolved by a regional unit are its jurisdictional limits and special privileges. The Territorial and provincial governments have normally been free to work out their vision of autonomy. Their jurisdictional and financial concepts have resembled those of older Canadian regions. During the period from 1900 to 1930, the Western Canadian provincial governments had shown a steadily growing, but fundamentally qualified willingness to compromise differences with the federal government.

Once the regional administration feels in a position to challenge the premises of the incumbent national government as regards constitutional matters, the alternatives are to claim new administrative functions or defend the status quo. Until 1905 in the Northwest Territories, and approximately 1915 elsewhere, one finds unmistakably the earlier, ambitious, belligerent policy of pressing for the maximum feasible enlargement of the jurisdictional lines. Subsequently, the Governments of all Western provinces remained indeed autonomous, but sought few additional functions (like transfer of federally-owned natural resources). In the period between 1905 and 1911, the Liberal governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan had been able to formulate a highly conciliatory policy.

This writer will first attempt to study the leading shift in approaches taken by Manitoba and British Columbia governments to constitutional questions. It is necessary to analyze carefully the entire relationships between the respective provincial governments and the federal ministries throughout the period from 1900 to 1930, against the background of the rather static policy in the younger Prairie provinces. The most significant events in the Dominion-provincial contacts at that time were still several long-standing
conflicts over the federal subsidies and the jurisdiction claimed by the provinces, in particular over the public domain and several disputed areas of legislation. These issues have already been grouped into four categories in the introductory chapter.

Tracing the modifications in the provincial policy on these questions, one can best classify the varieties of outlook according to the given definitions of the "nationalist partisan," the "provincial autonomist," and the "regionalist pseudo-nonpartisan" trends of thought. Thus the revision of the Manitoba and the British Columbia policies from the "provincial autonomist" to the "regionalist pseudo-nonpartisan" position is most clearly seen in the references which the respective provincial governments made to cases of reservation and disallowance. It becomes less perceptible in the formal provincial claims. The trend appears largely in the changing moods by which the Western administrations pushed their proposals for new intergovernmental agreements. One can barely make use of the judicial proceedings.

Except for the court cases, this comparison of the different types of conflicts will govern the sequence of the subsequent three chapters. The occasionally significant decisions of the judicial tribunals have strongly influenced the actions of all the governments in Canada. Therefore, it is logical to consider the legal verdicts first. Subsequently, the use of the federal veto powers and the provincial demands for federal statutes providing improvements in their status will be taken up in that order.

The reasons for the shifts in provincial policies have already been pointed out. It is important to add that this study will take up in some detail only the political factors behind the attitudes and the policies of the Western Canadian Territorial and provincial administrations. It is strongly suggested that this survey of their views on the federal system
will fully support the premise that their primary intention, aside from propagating their peculiar ideological convictions, was indeed their constant desire to ensure their control over the electorate.
CHAPTER I

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Legal cases concerning the delimitation of powers between the Dominion and the provinces were the easiest to resolve. The special procedure provided for judicial review in Canada effectively minimized arguments over the constitutional status quo. Therefore, only in the experience of British Columbia governments with litigation, one may clearly perceive a significant change of attitude towards federalism. During the period from 1900 to 1915, confident of favorable public response, British Columbia governments originated, before the courts, several fairly important challenges to business companies or federal policy. The Insurance Case of 1912 shows a typical regional attitude towards jurisdictional conflicts. During the subsequent fifteen years the British Columbia governments opposed, by litigation, no significant federal policy actually in effect. Likewise, they attacked no powerful private interests, except the liquor importers. After 1930, the federal Government again experienced more numerous legal challenges, but mainly from the governments of Quebec, Ontario and Alberta.

Litigants challenging the constitutional validity of legislation were either Attorneys-General of the Dominion or a province or private persons. Individuals possessed the right to question all legislative acts, whether originating with the provinces or the Dominion. The Attorney-General of Canada would normally question the validity of a provincial legislative act. Provincial Attorneys-General were able to act against federal laws. Ever since 1875, Canada has had its own Supreme Court, which could exercise initial jurisdiction in constitutional matters. This Court, consisting of nine lifetime appointees, was an autonomous institution, removed from the control of either the electorate or the Dominion Cabinet. Those who mistrusted the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, or who wanted to appeal its ruling could turn, until 1949, to another constitutional court, which possessed the final jurisdiction in matters of this type. During the first
seventy-five years of its existence, Canada's Supreme Court was obliged to defer to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Great Britain, a court which acted as Canada's highest Court of Appeals. Thus a party to a jurisdictional dispute was able to take his arguments to a court that was entirely removed from the political influence of Canadian parties. This procedure lessened the frequency of jurisdictional disputes over the meaning of Canada's constitution in more than one way: it not only encouraged a belief in the finality of court judgments, but it also made politicians hesitate to submit disputes to a court in which they possessed no influence.

It must be remembered that the most important decisions given by the Judicial Committee in reference to the division of functions between Canadian governments affected the thinking of Canadian politicians ever since the closing decade of the 19th century. The formative judicial interpretations given in Canada's earliest period were of indirect importance in nearly every stand taken upon a jurisdictional problem by a provincial administration in later years. In general, the most significant decisions referring to the meaning of the British North America Act and its amendments were given in the years from 1884 to 1907, and from 1935 to 1940, but those of the early period were the more influential upon subsequent legal thought. In six key decisions dating from 1883 to 1907, the Judicial Committee had expounded upon the rules governing Canada's federal system (essentially embodied in Sections 91-95 of the British North America Act). These decisions were a key factor in minimizing litigation concerning governmental functions for the next thirty-odd years.

Most historians consider that these early judicial decisions, generally speaking, extended the functions of the provinces beyond the limits intended by the Fathers of Confederation. It must be emphasized that the Judicial Committee intended to safeguard what every jurist considered the fundamental powers of the Dominion Government, while assuring to the provincial
administrations a large number of functions then considered of lesser importance. In general, the high court interpreted broad power of the Dominion to legislate for the "peace, order, and good government of Canada" as being restricted to the enumerated powers listed in Section 91, functions that were originally thought to illustrate rather than comprise this general provision. The Judicial Committee declared that only in times of emergency was the Dominion competent to invoke the general power.

Soon after making this generalization, the court made it known that the enumerated powers themselves were securely reserved for the Dominion, that is, the provincial governments could not legislate on these topics. While the early decisions forced the Dominion to transfer to the provinces such special revenue-providing functions as the regulation of conditions in the mines (except on Dominion-held Crown lands) and the provision of liquor licenses on grounds that these had been assigned to the provinces under Section 92, the federal government still retained the exclusive control over many matters, e.g. banking, navigable rivers, and the regulation of inter-provincial railways. The court even asserted that functions closely related or "ancillary" to the above matters under Dominion authority, for example, the right to determine minimal working standards on railway construction, be reserved for the Parliament of Canada. These decisions protecting vital prerogatives of the Dominion place in proper perspective the verdicts that assured the provinces of full control over the responsibilities falling under Section 92.

The Judicial Committee met with an impressively acquiescent public response in Canada. Their decisions were accepted without much controversy, at least prior to 1935. The reasons for this reaction include traditional legalism or respect for the law in public attitudes, the content of the decisions themselves, and the stature of the British court.
The outcome of the Judicial Committee's decisions was to satisfy some of the principal provincial objectives without seriously endangering the National Policy. Both the Dominion and the provinces were sufficiently appeased to avoid major legal conflicts. The provinces, for instance, retained control over important sources of revenue. They were able to obtain fees from timber and liquor licenses, tolls, bridge licenses, and the chartering of companies operating within their territory. Towards the turn of the century, the Western provinces also extended their direct taxation, including rising income, corporation, and succession taxes. As a result, provincial administrations were able not only to budget for surpluses, but also to offer fairly extensive public services, such as the rural telephone networks constructed by the Prairie provinces after 1905, and welfare measures like the impressive British Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act of 1916. These services kept the general public reasonably contented during the "Homestead Period", except during the worst moments of depression. Hence civil and professional organizations such as farmers' associations and at least some labour unions, refrained from making demands for a relocation of functions until after 1930. The moderate attitude shown by most occupational organizations throughout the period from 1900 to 1930 (though continued in the face of frequent rank-and-file protest after 1920) made it less urgent for the provincial administrations to secure new sources of revenue than might have been expected in a period of settlement.

Meanwhile, another fairly significant factor behind the rarity of jurisdictional conflict was the nature of Dominion politics. The Dominion governments in office from 1900 to 1930 were generally even more faithful upholders of the status quo in jurisdictional functions than were the provinces. This was notably true of the Laurier administration, and that of Borden prior to 1914. The conservatism of these administrations appeared
in their attitude to the National Policy, to subsidy requests by the provinces, to proposals of legislation in matters bordering upon or within provincial responsibilities, and to taxation.

As to the National Policy, its legal basis was so securely defined that those Dominion policies which embodied restrictions upon the Western provinces after 1900 were legally unimpeachable. The clear-cut wording of Section 95 in the British North America Act provided for the superior status of Dominion legislation in the jointly held jurisdiction over agriculture and immigration, while the enumerated clauses in Section 91 spelled out the "regulation of trade and commerce" and "banking" as Dominion functions. Further the Rupertsland Act of 1869 and the Manitoba Act of 1870 gave the federal Parliament an unmistakable authority to conduct the National Policy in all respects.

The Rupertsland Act of 1869, enacted as soon as Canada's purchase of Hudson's Bay Company territories had been negotiated, gave the Dominion an absolute power to establish the governmental structure of the huge area then acquired. It was made lawful for the Parliament of Canada from the date aforesaid to make, ordain, and establish within the territory so admitted, all such laws, constitutions, and ordinances, and to constitute such courts and offices as may be necessary for the peace, order, and good government. So as to forestall any doubt as to the power of Canada to practice such impressive, unlimited powers in the new territories, the British North America Act of 1871 made this alleged right of the Dominion to set up the administrations of the Prairie provinces under any terms whatsoever a part of the constitution. It specifically validated the Manitoba Act of 1870, as well as declared Canada's right to provide for the administration of the Northwest Territories.

The Manitoba Act was the first constitutive act to provide for special
restrictions upon the educational policies of a Western province, while ensuring Dominion control of natural resources in Manitoba, as well as a peculiarly unfavorable boundary provision for that province. Similar restrictions over educational policy and Crown lands appeared in the Northwest Territories Act of 1875. These became a perennial grievance in the Territories, as well as in Manitoba. The Saskatchewan and the Alberta Autonomy Acts of 1905 later applied the clause providing for Dominion ownership of Crown lands, along with a modified version of the original educational restriction, to the youngest provinces. It should be noted that the British North America Act of 1871 gave the Dominion power to determine the subsidy rates to the Prairie provinces at will.

The Prairie provinces could not hope to secure, by appealing to the Judicial Committee, any concessions in respect to schools (after 1900) and the natural resources, or an increase in their subsidies. Their grievances could have been removed only with the cooperation of the federal Parliament. To obtain satisfaction, the administrations of Manitoba, Alberta and Saskatchewan were forced to seek the necessary amendments to the constitution or other agreements enacted by Parliament. British Columbia was in a nearly identical position vis-à-vis the Dominion. The primary grievances there were also largely irrelevant to judicial review of existing law, though some of these were of a different nature and origin from the problems affecting the Prairie provinces.

While the National Policy with its principal restrictions upon the Western provinces remained intact until at least 1930, the administration of the Dominion did pay increased attention to the task of removing certain grounds for jurisdictional disputes after 1890. Notably the federal Cabinets were careful to discourage lawsuits. The principal method which the Federal Government employed to accomplish this end, relating to all
provinces, was to plan its legislative program so as to remain securely within the area of jurisdiction reserved for the Dominion by the Courts. The Laurier and the Borden Governments took every possible precaution to refrain from trenching upon the functions reserved for the provinces. Even in a joint area of responsibility like wheat marketing control, these governments instituted new services (like regulations on elevator facilities or the provision of public terminal elevators) only under great pressure, mostly from Western Members of Parliament. Likewise, extreme caution characterized every Dominion action relating to health, welfare, and labor legislation. Only very circumscribed regulations in respect to the conduct of public works for the Dominion along with the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907 had been enacted by 1918, when a Workmen's Compensation Act for Employees performing Dominion contracts was finally passed.

The attention paid by the Dominion ministers to the division of powers prescribed for Canada's federal system pleased in particular the administrations of Ontario and Quebec, since the Quebec administration possessed its own, often unique laws on these matters under its jurisdiction, and that of Ontario had been, since the days of Oliver Mowat, a firm protagonist of provincial rights. By contrast, the Western provincial administrations were generally not interested in protesting against new federal services even in matters coming within provincial jurisdiction, as in drought relief or employment services, or Dominion ownership of terminal elevators, so long as these services were supplementary to, and in agreement with their own policies in these matters. In fact, sometimes the Western provinces were prodding the Dominion to extend new economic services in joint areas of responsibility, as did the premiers of Alberta and Saskatchewan in respect to drought relief and Wheat Board legislation. The autonomist administrations of British Columbia in that region between 1898 and 1915 were the sole ones
to challenge several significant statutes of the federal Parliament.

The one federal policy indisputably attractive to all the provincial administrations was the system of taxation practiced by the Dominion prior to 1914. The Laurier and the Borden governments alike derived their revenues primarily from the tariff. Indeed, all the Western premiers, regardless of party affiliation, occasionally criticized the high rates generally imposed by the Canadian tariff, and the Liberal premiers of Saskatchewan and Alberta sometimes posed as free traders and warm protagonists of the Reciprocity Agreement of 1911. Basically, they liked to see the federal administration depend upon customs duties for its revenues, while their provinces were free to tap the revenue to be derived from direct taxation. Before 1930, none of the Western provincial party leaders ever made a forthright proposal that the Parliament of Canada should turn its attention to the possibilities of the income tax, as it did in modest measure during World War I. The reason for their frequent unwillingness to state what they considered the ideal type of national taxation has been precisely their awareness that the impressive extension of provincial economic services, such as occurred in the Western provinces from 1900 to 1920, would have been unfeasible if Parliament had enacted a substantial direct tax in the prewar period.

Records of legal cases indicate that significant litigation respecting the jurisdictional functions of the provinces was unusual in Canada during the period from 1900 to 1930. An investigation of Bora Laskin's *Canadian Constitutional Law* reveals that judicial review of legislation enacted by the Western provinces has never been of comparable importance to that arising from legislation by the other provinces, nor have the Western provinces challenged Dominion legislation as frequently as did the other provinces. This is notably true of the thirty years preceding the rise of the Social Credit movement in Alberta. For instance, in the years from 1900 to 1930,
Alberta entertained only four important legal actions against the Dominion governments, and Manitoba participated in only two such lawsuits in addition to one reference case. The administrations of British Columbia were the only ones to meet with a somewhat greater measure of legal conflict. They lost seven proceedings and won one in the thirty years preceding 1930.

The most important legal cases pertaining to the statutes of British Columbia resulted from efforts made by the legislature of that province to prescribe licenses for corporations claiming to operate under Dominion jurisdiction. This licensing policy was a standing temptation for the Western provinces. Always it meant the inflow of license fees in addition to taxes from the wealthiest firms. Manitoba had employed this policy at the turn of the century. After two incorporation statutes had been disallowed, the Manitoba legislature desisted from licensing acts of this type. The British Columbia legislature did occasionally revert to a similar policy in the period from 1900 to 1930. The most notable efforts to apply this policy concerned insurance companies, liquor wholesalers and importers, construction companies operating in disputed coastal areas, and the control of fisheries.

The primary reason for these controversial licensing acts enacted by the legislature of British Columbia was financial; it is no coincidence that they were enacted at times when severe budgetary shortages developed. Yet it is also possible to trace political motives behind this and other legal cases. For instance, the McBride administration adopted the policy that was challenged in the Insurance Case of 1912 on the eve of a provincial election. In that election, the Cabinet was attacked by dissident Conservatives led by Sir Charles Tupper, as well as by Liberals for allegedly wasteful land grants made to monopolistic companies such as the Canadian Pacific. Since insurance companies were then among the principal targets of anti-monopolists, too, it is clear that the attempt to regulate them more strictly than has
previously been done was intended to win some converts for the Conservative party. It brought the Cabinet support not only from reformers, but also from those voters who were concerned about the outside origin of the insurance companies. The Insurance Case was valuable evidence that the Conservatives were free from monopolistic control; this claim helped to bring them an impressive majority in the popular vote in 1912.

The experience of the Oliver administration (1918-1927) with judicial proceedings resembled their predecessors' in number and legal outcome. The difference after 1918 was the appearance of only three significant cases before the Great Depression, as compared with five or six during the earlier twenty years. At least one of the later disputes does show no partisan motives on part of the provincial Liberal Government.

From 1918 to 1930, no more than one court case resulted from a challenge to a Western provincial statute. The scarcity of litigation over the action of Governments and legislative bodies, particularly other than the federal, proves that great care had been taken to draft valid bills. The new characteristic of British Columbia governments during the incumbency of the Liberals was their greater reluctance to challenge Parliamentary acts.

Presumably, the provincial Governments deduced from their "qualified cooperative" ideology as well as from electoral and other partisan considerations their cautious course followed in respect to litigation. It is clear that since 1914, the only issues which the British Columbia Governments considered of somewhat comparable importance to their favorite tariff and federal railway policy reforms lay in the area of subsidies. The projected return of the Railway Lands to provincial jurisdiction indeed received no less attention than any other issues. But the problems involved in strictly legal arguments, as well as all the instances of reservation and disallowance, occupied a distinctly minor role in the general picture of intergovernmental relationships.
The principal cases pertaining to British Columbia in the postwar decade were a provincial challenge to the Dominion Board of Commerce Act and a reference regarding the validity of labor standards prescribed for aliens by the legislature of British Columbia. Like the McBride Conservatives, the Oliver Liberals were primarily influenced by financial considerations in taking the actions that led to lawsuits in a majority of cases, including the Board of Commerce cases. Oliver wanted to protect their revenues from general taxation and from the licensing of firms active in intraprovincial trade. Like the McBride Conservatives, he met with mixed success. The Oliver administration obtained the invalidation of the Board of Commerce Act, but it failed to persuade the Judicial Committee of its alleged power to restrict the privileges of aliens.

In the Aliens Employment Rights Reference, it is apparent that the Oliver Government was hopeful of obtaining favorable legal judgment upon the principle behind one of its few controversial bills challenging policy. There seems to have been little doubt in the Premier's mind that the action was well within the British North America Act, Section 92, Clause 10, assigning "Local Works and Undertakings" within the jurisdiction of the province. The intention was to regulate, or rather restrict the opportunities available for persons of Oriental background in activities supported by public funds, so as to make the number of immigrants from the respective nations decline. Originally, the British Columbia Liberals had apparently expected that even the federal Government might leave their policy intact. The last time it had used the power of disallowance upon the identical topic was in 1903.

The provincial administration was badly disappointed when they were notified by the Meighen Cabinet that the act could not be allowed to stand. The diplomatic line of conduct practised by the British Columbia Liberals brought limited fruit. Their only success was to have disallowance withheld.
until the court presented its opinion.

A partisan motive is clearly present behind the initiative of the Oliver Government in the case of the Aliens Employment Act. How did the electorate of British Columbia react to their strategy? Would they extensively support the readiness of the provincial leaders to exercise what they, certainly no single-minded autonomists, considered a legally acceptable and necessary prerogative within their regulatory powers? The available evidence indicates that the electorate displayed minimal interest in this and the related immigration problem, at least between 1914 and 1927. Few letters from the readers dealing with these topics appeared in the representative Vancouver newspapers during 1922-24. In the provincial election of 1924, the party leaders refrained from referring to the legal case that had been decided during the two preceding years. The leaders, Oliver included, apparently believed that these questions were less relevant to the interests of the electors than were the freight rate issue or political reform. That the British Columbians were possibly returning then to their traditional interest "provincial rights" questions, contrary to the judgment of their Liberal Government, might be surmised from the fact that the Oliver administration itself was barely re-elected in 1924.

The history of the Prairie provinces lacks enough instances of similar judicial review to reveal reliably a trend in public reactions to the positions taken by their provincial administrations to legal conflict, at least for the period preceding 1935. The governments of these provinces were prepared to protect their functions and revenues in the courts if this seemed required, though only prior to the First World War did these administrations make occasional efforts to exploit the jurisdictional issues at stake for political reasons. Thus in 1902, for instance, the Roblin administration obtained a favorable decision from the Judicial Committee. The court recognized
the power of the province to regulate the sale of liquor by retailers and to prescribe rules for licensing such retailers. This decision was publicized by the Manitoba Conservatives as a constitutional gain for the province, since it could now proceed to enact any statute licensing retailers who sold liquor or to forbid their trade (though the Conservatives had no intention of enforcing the Prohibition Act of 1901 after it had already been reviewed by the court). 32

During the period from 1905 to 1911, the Liberal governments in Alberta and Saskatchewan exercised the most care to reach a genuine understanding with the Attorneys-General of Canada regarding the legislation which they were planning to introduce. 33 Indeed, no serious instance of litigation was then brought against these provinces, nor did their governments ever challenge a vital act of Parliament until after the defeat of the federal Liberals. Before the close of World War I (according to Bora Laskin), one case illustrating an important legal principle concerned the Sifton Cabinet, 34 while none other legal dispute is listed with either province.

In 1924, a case of comparable importance to the Manitoba Reference of 1902 did finally affect the province of Alberta, where it produced a remarkably different reaction. This dispute arose when the Alberta Prohibition Act of 1914, with an amendment governing the import of liquor into the province, was challenged in the courts. 35 Apparently, the Stewart administration gave little thought to the constitutionality of this measure or to the desirability of modifying the statute so as to make it legally more acceptable. The reason for this attitude was doubtless the conviction that his party had little to lose from the invalidation of this statute. We can infer this explanation of Stewart's inaction from his failure to discuss this act in provincial politics. He must have considered it less troublesome to place the problem in the hands of the Dominion than to have the province enforce
prohibition. In taking this position, he was conforming to the desire of the public. When the Judicial Committee had stricken the act down, few saw this decision as a loss to provincial autonomy. The Stewart Cabinet was ready to transfer the responsibility for controlling liquor imports to the Dominion. In fact, they even sponsored a plebiscite intended to impress upon the Meighen administration the necessity of taking action in respect to the wholesale distributors and importers of liquor. This policy reflects the attitude of increasing segments of the electorate, who felt that so long as their objectives were reasonably satisfied, it was unimportant which level of Government attended to their needs.

It must be said that an historian can obtain only scanty evidence from the Judicial proceedings concerning the Western provincial administrations of Canada to illustrate the views of their governments in respect to jurisdictional or financial problems. One might hastily infer from the slight number of legal cases that the respective administrations were, (throughout the entire period from 1908 until 1930), particularly anxious to prevent any contentions with the Governments of the Dominion from arising. This generalization would indicate a measure of truth if we take it to mean that the provincial administrations generally steered clear of inter-governmental conflicts which they thought were not conducive to their political and economic needs. Even for the administrations of Manitoba and British Columbia prior to 1914, court cases intended to strengthen their lawmaking powers or to challenge the acts of Canada's Parliament were sometimes highly unattractive. The provincial administrations were very well aware that legal judgments were generally unpredictable, and that it was generally inexpedient to outspokenly attack unfavorable rulings from the courts. The public highly respected the courts. Provincial leaders also rarely discovered any opportunity to question the constitutionality of any federal statute.
The latter were normally very carefully drafted. Besides, the electors have generally welcomed extensions of the jurisdictional area which Canada's Parliament enjoyed.

Still, this writer's survey of selected judicial cases defining the rights of Canadian Governments does fit the general chronological tendency which runs through representative public attitudes of constitutional problems from as early as 1900 to 1930. Further, it is very helpful to start any analysis of intergovernmental contentions in Canada with the legal challenges because high courts have often given in their verdicts certain general principles which influenced the course of Dominion-provincial disputes in matters of different nature, let alone other court cases. For instance, by assuring to the provincial legislatures the right to regulate river traffic, to collect tolls, and to license liquor retail distributors, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council made it financially unnecessary for the provincial administrations, at least in the period from 1900 to 1914, to require additional sources of revenue so badly as to venture often into the area of chartering interprovincial companies. The decisions of the Manitoba Conservative administrations to sponsor two legislative measures with that intent appear to reflect principally the political motive of their authors. It must be observed that the Governments of the Dominion were continually protecting their function of controlling interprovincial commerce, including the incorporation of the nationally operating firms, by the use of nullification against the offending provincial legislation. In brief, the willingness of the courts to let the Canadian provincial administrations tap other fairly lucrative revenue sources, as mentioned above, made it easier for the latter to formulate only those licensing statutes that were acceptable to the federal Governments.

Again after 1914, when the court interfered with the efforts of the Western provincial administrations to tax the transcontinental railway
companies and to license the wholesale importers of liquor from outside the province, it forced these administrations to keep looking for new sources of funds. As a result, besides extending their intake from the permissible methods of direct taxation, the provincial administrations in the Canadian West continued to press for the settlement of their provincial claims to the ownership of the natural resources within their boundaries, and to the grant of sizeable compensation for the alienated portion of the federally-held Crown lands, even though all provincial party leaders then showed little genuine interest in the political possibility of exploiting those issues.

To summarize, the legal problems arising in the distribution of governmental powers between the two main levels of the Canadian political structure are significant as direct, although limited evidence for the generalizations respecting the evolution of jurisdictional questions. Likewise, the decisions of the courts served as contributing factors to the response which the respective provincial administrations undertook in their stand upon other significant questions.
CHAPTER 2

THE USE OF RESERVATION AND DISALLOWANCE

The disputes over provincial legislation and its nullification, as well as over provincial claims to the revision of their financial and legal status in the Confederation, illustrate more clearly than the judicial cases the substantial changes in the attitudes of the Western Canadian administrations in the period from 1900 to 1930. Those Governments interested in expanding their legislative functions were more willing to face the threat of reservation or disallowance than to be involved in judicial review. It was considerably easier for the regional political leaders in Canada to press the ministries of the Dominion for certain benefits dependant upon action on the federal level than to challenge the verdicts originating with the Judicial Committee. On the other hand, the refusal of provincial administration to extend their legislative goals into matters that might be considered to be under the jurisdiction of the Dominion, or contrary to the policies of the incumbent federal Governments is immediately revealed in the increasing infrequency of disallowance and reservation along with lessening attention given to provincial claims for new responsibilities and revenue. Indeed, one might suggest that for the years from 1900 to 1930, there is no more sensitive index to changes in the jurisdictional objectives or provincial administrations than the frequency with which their legislation met with disallowance. There is certainly no other type of jurisdictional conflict giving a sharper contrast among their ideologies than the debates over provincial legislative challenges.

It must be admitted, of course, that the use of disallowance and reservation also reflects the changing viewpoint of the federal Government. The most notable revision of policy had been carried out by the John A. Macdonald administration during the years from 1880 and 1891.1 Prior to 1890, the Dominion Cabinets disallowed freely the acts of the provincial
legislatures whenever these were considered repugnant to the federal interest or laws, unconstitutional, or simply unjust. Arbitrary action against provincial laws was then often taken, even if the federal Parliament had already deprived the respective province of certain customary functions by constitutional amendment. ²

After 1891, provincial laws of doubtful constitutionality were generally challenged in the courts instead of being voided by federal action. The federal government frequently allowed those statutes questioned on grounds of justice to stand. Rarely, when an important national interest was violated, the federal government referred to the above-named reasons for disallowance. It also defined the concept of national interest more narrowly. In 1891, Parliament cancelled the monopoly clause pertaining to the Canadian Pacific Railway, possibly the most controversial federal policy of the nineteenth century.³

On the other hand the rule that provincial statutes must not infringe upon either matters of imperial concern (the rights of Japanese after 1901), or inter-provincially operating companies, has always played a central part in federal policy. The difference in the principles held by the federal Government doubtless contributed to the change in the occurrences of disallowance and reservation. During the first period from 1867 to 1890, sixty-four provincial acts in Canada were disallowed, as compared with thirty between 1891 and 1916, six from 1915 to 1936, and eleven since that date.⁴ The Lieutenant-Governor employed the power of reservation fifty-seven times before 1895, fourteen more until 1913 inclusive, and only six times hence.⁵

How much significance should one attach to the detectible changes in federal policies as compared to those describing provincial leaders' views? For the period from 1867 to 1905, innovations upon the federal level are the most significant. Subsequently, the attitude of the federal level towards the provincial legislation has then remained fairly constant until
the present. Clearly, the federal Governments were normally willing to leave it intact. Conservatives no less than Liberal Cabinets gave careful thought to those provincial and Territorial statutes which they considered objectionable. The federal Governments disallowed only those acts which they considered highly injurious to the entire nation. This action was taken only when the leaders of the governing party thought there would not be much protest outside the one affected province. The best evidence for this generalization is the fact that the entire legislative output of the Northwest Territories was accepted despite the presence of several highly controversial statutes. When the powers of disallowance and reservation were employed, the respective federal Cabinets were generally quite prepared to desist as soon as the respective provincial government or legislators removed the offending clause.

Since the early years of this century, it is quite clear that provocative provincial policies were chiefly responsible for the occurrence of reservation and disallowance. Before analyzing any further the reasons for such action by provincial administrations, let us now briefly see how many statutes were, in fact, nullified, and how we might best classify the resulting conflicts. For these purposes, it is most helpful to study the relevant events in four historical periods. The following tables best set forth the material which we are dealing with; the chronological groups set up for each of the two types of federal action against provincial statutes roughly parallel each other.
Outline Pertaining to the Use of Disallowance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Western Canadian Regional Units Involved</th>
<th>Frequency of Federal Action</th>
<th>Range of Topics</th>
<th>Total Number of Instances for Canada</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. 1870-1890</td>
<td>British Columbia, Manitoba</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Diverse</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. 1895-1909</td>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Very few, even in</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. 1910-1923</td>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Same number as Cases</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. 1867-1894 British Columbia 6 Diverse 57
Alberta -
Manitoba 27
B. 1897-1907 British Columbia 3 One 6
C. 1915-1920 British Columbia 3 Two 6
D. 1937-1920 Alberta 3 Few 3

G. V. LaForrest, in his short but excellent study, groups the instances of disallowance into five periods according to detectible shifts of federal policy. His purpose is to study the principles behind the use of disallowance. In this chapter, the significant occasions at which the federal Government employed its powers of reservation and disallowance will be examined for their value as indicators of the provincial attitudes towards the federal system.

Let us now glance at the behaviour of the regional governments in the Canadian West, in their role as originators of Territorial or provincial
legislation. How might we best classify these administrations? If we simply consider the degree of their willingness to sponsor legislation contrary to the principles of the federal Government, they might be classified into the following categories. The most apparent are the aggressive, militant, regional administrations which originated, in numerous areas under their jurisdiction, various measures questioned by the federal Government. These Cabinets kept re-introducing the majority of their controversial measures despite the use of disallowance. Such were most of the nineteenth century Manitoba and British Columbia Governments, notably that headed by Norquay in the first-named province.

About 1900 there appeared, in the Canadian West, essentially more moderate governments which only occasionally challenged the National Policy through their legislative measures, but refused to yield upon the disputed matters. One might clearly consider in this light the Roblin, the Hugh J. Macdonald, and the Haultain Governments in the Prairie Region. Separately should be listed those of their counterparts which attacked one or two concepts held by the federal Government, primarily because Parliament had refused to embody their preferred remedy in the laws of Canada (Cf. the position taken by the McBride Government in British Columbia regarding the immigration controversy). 9

Finally, since 1905, there were in Western Canada other administrations which were involved in no serious conflict with the federal Government over their legislation, because they were making a conscious and consistent effort to make it acceptable. One might term these Governments the conformist or the legalist group. In this category were the early Liberal Governments of Saskatchewan and Alberta, as well as the post-1914 Cabinets in the entire region.

This analysis of the regional attitudes towards the risk of disallowance
and reservation roughly follows the chronological order. So does the
different, previously attempted classification of the ideologies held by the
Western Canadian Territorial and provincial governments during the period from
1900 to 1930. Sequentially, the Governments first formed certain conclusions
regarding the federal system. It is superfluous to outline again the latter
frame of reference. There is a clear relationship between the two sets. It
appears at several levels.

The most significant relationship between the ideological and the disallowance groups is their common purpose. Both are intended to help us study the
changing attitudes shown at different times by the Territorial and provincial administrations in the Canadian West. Their constitutional ideas ultimately
explain the conflict over legislation (at least for the period from 1900 to
1930). The latter which is only an aspect of methodology employed by the
respective Government.

It is important to understand the distinction between ideological and
methodological questions. One might place in the first category, for instance,
the basic decision of a regional administration as to priorities. In general,
it would primarily seek new functions or revenues from the federal Parliament,
or lobby for changes in those policies which are expected to remain under the
latter's jurisdiction, and concern services provided directly by the federal
Government to the individual citizen. A nationalist government will not only
emphasize the second alternative, but will frequently choose only such legis-
lative goals as are considered suitable by the leadership of its federal party,
insofar as the latter's view is understood. By contrast, an autonomist Govern-
ment will be pressuring its federal party to accept its demands, derived from
its idea of regional good. It is a matter of expediency whether or not region-
al leaders will select such policies as will be objectionable to the federal
Government. The choice of specific steps, like the chartering or extra-
provincial companies, is the manner in which provincial policymakers may
proceed. While indeed an autonomist Government is more likely to face the use of disallowance or reservation than any other, there might be few jurisdictional conflicts. Strategic partisan and economic considerations will determine whether the federal Government intervenes against provincial acts.

What significant information can be obtained from a study of disallowances and reservations? To start, the analysis will be useful only if we restrict our attention to some instances of provocative regional legislation which represents a deliberate choice by a government, of the risk involved. In general, conflicts of this type occur either when the tensions between the provincial and the federal Governments are very high, and calculated challenges are made by the first to the second. Provocative laws are also sponsored when there is a lack of information in a certain Cabinet as to the likely consequences of a provincial bill. Finally, a certain regional Government may consciously invite the disallowance of a certain bill which it wishes to have removed from provincial statute.

Since the instances of disallowance and reservation are usually episodic, one cannot conclusively establish the reasons for them without knowing the political and financial characteristics of the Governments involved. Only when it is known that a deliberate motive has characterized the action of a provincial government, and when we rule out the possibility of a technical remedy as mentioned in the third case mentioned above, is there a definite advantage for the student of Canadian regionalism to study the incident.

Essentially, the conscious Territorial or provincial decision to implement a provocative statute does show precisely and immediately the intention of the respective Government to acquire, by unilateral action, a new responsibility within the disputed area of jurisdiction. In particular, a minute change in the typical official provincial attitude to such a problem is perceptible.
Instances of such initiative may be studied for different reasons. For instance, numerous painstaking studies have been done to determine whether the respective provincial Governments could or could not predict the use of disallowance. Likewise, one might consider certain provincial policies to be valuable evidence for the viewpoint shown by regional leaders upon economic matters.

In this study, the object is to show that political factors were normally of considerable, and sometimes of decisive, importance behind the Territorial and provincial formulation of policy in respect to the division of functions in Canada's federal system. It is admittedly easiest to study the electoral-strategic considerations, and such will receive much attention in this thesis. These are particularly evident behind the instances of legislation which challenged the federal Governments. One finds it considerably more difficult to study the ultimate role of ideological concepts, to discuss their relevance to the cases of disallowance and reservation. An effort will be made to pinpoint some relevant information in this respect as an introduction to further analysis in the following chapters. Relations between allied federal and the provincial parties will be examined only pertaining to the Liberal Governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan between 1905 and 1911.

Changes in the moods of the electors have often brought about abruptly a severe conflict centred upon the nature of a regional statute which the federal Government could not accept. Forces producing disallowance had been either occasional outbursts of popular bitterness directed at the National Policy, or the cool calculation of the respective provincial Governments. What reasons did the latter have for originating conflict of this type?

At least for the period from 1900 to 1930, the presence or the absence of disallowance seems to be a reliable test of the political power enjoyed by Territorial or provincial Governments in Western Canada. At times, the
latter found it unrealistic to expect significant gains from the federal Parliament by using the method of negotiation and subsequent bilateral or multilateral agreement. Often, they lacked the necessary strength to persuade the federal parties that they must be heard. Thus a relatively weak administration is the one most likely to become entangled in conflict over the acceptability or the validity of its legislation. By sponsoring highly controversial measures with much public appeal, it may seek to obtain de facto certain revenue-producing sources and other functions bolstering its prestige. In other cases, the respective Governments will only intend to mobilize the electorate around its leadership. Naturally, the "practical" political considerations appear most clearly in the conduct of those Governments which had much experience with jurisdictional conflict. These are notably the administrations of Manitoba and British Columbia before 1914, and those of the Northwest Territories between 1890 and 1904. It will later be proven conclusively that the Hugh J. Macdonald, Roblin, McBride and Haultain Governments were all autonomists, according to the definition set up in the introduction.

The study of disallowance and reservation may be employed to confirm an already established outline of ideological characteristic provided that there is also other evidence available to support it. Theoretical analysis undoubtedly enables us to see a predominant pattern of policy as it existed in the minds of the respective regional Ministers throughout their terms of office. It sometimes explains why they took certain contrary actions to their immediate electoral interests, although admittedly this rarely happened in the Western provinces.

In respect to the ideological differences between the Western Governments, we cannot expect to obtain entirely conclusive evidence in this chapter to prove their existence. Whether the instances of disallowance are
ever sufficient to identify a provincial government as holding a distinctive theoretical premise as to the federal system is uncertain. Indeed, it might be argued that the extreme frequency with which the nineteenth century British Columbia and Manitoba Governments drafted their legislative challenges shows that they were autonomists. Even this argument is probably unacceptable. With regard to the Roblin and the McBride Conservatives, the modest number of the relevant incidents is insufficient for this purpose. Thus, in brief, nullified legislation cannot be considered the defining characteristic of an autonomist Government, nor is it a necessary one.

Granting that a study of the disallowance and reservation applying to the Western provinces of Canada does not alone permit us to classify the regional ideologies, there is some relevant indirect and verbal evidence to be gained. The legislative sessions following the occurrence of conflict, as well as the subsequent federal and provincial elections, provided the forum for the airing of various political discussions. By studying the respective debates over a period of years, it is possible to find Premier Roblin, for instance, promoting distinctly autonomist views. By contrast, the arguments employed by the Attorney-General or Prime Minister of Canada comprise the best expression of the nationalist position. Those provincial Cabinets who supported the above either by explicit arguments, or their silence might well be classified in the same category.

It might be added that provincial Premiers were often leading political campaigns across provincial boundaries, especially in federal elections. At such times, it is certainly possible to detect significant differences towards the use of disallowance. In fact, political debates do bring out clashing ideological premises in connection with Dominion-provincial disputes of all types, but it is necessary to correlate the latter in order to establish the frame of reference which is presented in this study.
In this chapter, the assumption is made that the McBride and the Roblin Governments were autonomists throughout their terms of office. Their Liberal successors were to work out a new ideology, no sooner than 1921. Hence any changes of policy evident before the latter date must be considered tactical in nature.

It is clear that the Conservative administrations of Manitoba and British Columbia passed through three distinct stages in their attitudes to the threat of disallowance during the period from 1900 to 1914. Until 1910 (1919 in British Columbia), these governments still occasionally showed an impressive willingness to draft bills challenging the federal legislature contrary to the policy of the federal Government, although they were indeed cautious enough to avoid an extended conflict of this type. Such an approach also characterized the Executive Councils of the Northwest. The Territorial Governments had always followed this approach, but for the older provincial units in the Canadian West, it already represented a partial retreat from their predecessors’ less compromising methodology.

From 1910 through 1911, the Roblin government attempted to establish somewhat smoother relations with the Laurier Cabinet than had previously prevailed. At that time, they were careful to draft only such legislation as skirted wide the risk of disallowance. For a different reason, the McBride Government also sponsored no provocative measures since as early as 1909. The factors behind this sudden change in the choice of electoral issues will later be examined. It certainly did not inhibit the respective Governments from taking a very active and effective part in the election of 1911.

With the victory of the federal Conservatives led by Robert Borden in 1911, both the British Columbia and Manitoba Governments commenced to support the new Executive in Ottawa. As their permanent concession to better Dominion-provincial relations, both eschewed the policy of sponsoring
provocative laws. In fitting their conduct to the continuing principles behind the use of disallowance, the provincial Conservatives were now closely following the line previously instituted by the Liberal administrations of Alberta and Saskatchewan.

The politically important examples of this disallowed legislation from 1890 to 1910 were the incorporation statutes of Manitoba and the immigration acts of British Columbia. The respective autonomist Governments acted under the strong, and in many cases decisive influence of electoral considerations prompting such serious challenges. A comparison of the two sets of issues reveals that those political parties least inhibited in criticising the Dominion government, and not necessarily the incumbent administrations, reaped the greatest advantage. In general, the use of disallowance often severely injured the provincial party associated with the incumbent Dominion administration. In the face of persistent attacks from those opposing the governing federal party, the latter's supporters often found it difficult to prove that they were just as firmly devoted to "provincial rights".

During the period from 1896 to 1911, provincial Conservatives in Manitoba and British Columbia effectively persuaded their electorates that they were the only provincial party that could resist inducements by Dominion officials to abandon legislative goals that the latter considered objectionable. The Conservatives had the disallowed measures repeatedly re-enacted, sometimes apparently in the expectation that the federal government might ultimately yield. In fact, the Conservative administrations kept reviving disallowed legislation only at times when the relevant policies were politically expedient.

The incorporation acts sponsored by the Greenway administration in Manitoba in 1895 and 1897 were an important factor behind the rise of the Manitoba Conservatives to power in 1899. The Act of 1895 provided that all
corporations which had obtained their charters outside Manitoba, even such companies as were incorporated by the Parliament of Canada, were to obtain new charters from the Registrar of Manitoba upon the payment of a fee. Since this act was so formulated as to empower the Manitoba administration to force even the Dominion corporations like the Hudson's Bay Company and the Canadian Pacific Railway to take new charters, the Greenway administration must have foreseen the immediate threat of disallowance. Indeed, the leading motive behind this statute sponsored by the Manitoba Liberals, as one might surmise from the timing, was partisan. On the eve of an expected provincial election, the Greenway Liberals intended to embarrass their Conservative opponents.

Although normally there prevailed bipartisan opposition to disallowance in Manitoba, the Conservatives had found it difficult to explain freely their viewpoint upon the use of disallowance by the Tupper administration in 1895, since many of them were preparing to support their party in the impending federal election.

During the provincial election of 1895, Premier Thomas Greenway derived considerable advantage from criticising the federal government. The Liberal Cabinet of Manitoba considered arbitrary the use of disallowance, along with the widely debated Remedial Bill, offering federal protection to Roman Catholic schools. Upon the two above issues, coupled with dissatisfaction over federal subsidies, the Liberals mobilized all the most determined defenders of regional autonomy.

Greenway's attitude and tactics denote the autonomist ideology. His arguments convinced the electorate. In 1895, the Liberals received an overwhelming majority in the popular vote.

In Manitoba, the use of disallowance was frequently of sufficient importance to the electorate to influence the outcome of provincial elections.
It tended to be overshadowed by other issues, like the tariff, in Dominion elections. Encouraged by the response given by the provincial electorate to their platform in 1895, the Greenway Liberals attempted to introduce their conflicts with the Dominion over the Remedial Bill and the use of disallowance into the 1896 campaign. The outcome of the voting in Manitoba shows that these issues were less effective than the Conservative tariff and railway policies stressed by Prime Minister Tupper. Although Laurier was victorious in the Dominion election, Conservatives won five of the six House of Commons seats in Manitoba. To politicians, this result must have been conclusive evidence that instances of disallowance could be effectively exploited in provincial, but not in federal elections in that province. That conclusion was indeed true.

That political parties have learned this lesson appears in the policies adopted by the Laurier administrations, as well as in those practised by the Manitoba Conservatives. The federal Liberals must have felt that since the use of disallowance exerted slight influence upon the outcome of Dominion elections (an impression reinforced by their victories in British Columbia in 1900 and 1904), the Dominion could afford to employ disallowance whenever it seemed legally desirable. For instance, when the Greenway administration revived their Incorporation Act in 1897, apparently in the expectation that it would be allowed to stand by the generally sympathetic Laurier administration, it was disallowed once more. The Dominion also voided the Manitoba Land Sales Act of 1900. As expected, these actions produced slight effect upon the Dominion election of 1900.

The shortcoming of these Laurier policies was the relative unconcern that the federal Liberals were manifesting for provincial politics in Western Canada, at least up to 1905. The Manitoba Conservatives effectively attacked Greenway's restrained attitude to the Dominion in the instance of disallowance,
as well as in relation to the natural resources question. In 1899, Hugh J. Macdonald, the new Conservative Leader in Manitoba, made these criticisms the key factor behind the decisive victory won by his party in the provincial election of that year, an event that ended fifteen years of Liberal rule in Manitoba. In 1901, his successor Rodmond Roblin further solidified the Conservative hold on the electors by condemning the use of disallowance by the Laurier administration. He cited a typical autonomist defense for the respective statutes: they were important means of assuring the fiscal responsibility of the province. As he pointed out, the first intention of his Government had been to find a \textit{local} source of revenue (as distinguished from new subsidies).

Why were the Conservative administrations of Manitoba and British Columbia, in the period from 1900 to 1912, formulating their legislative measures more carefully than their immediate predecessors had done? Since approximately 1890, the government in any Canadian province was receiving new demands from the electorate. For that reason, all provincial administrations proceeded to place emphasis upon the unprecedented issues resulting from the current public needs. To produce legally safe legislation, it was often necessary to be on good terms with the administration of the Dominion. For instance, there was one special legislative problem which influenced the Roblin administration to look for improved relations with the Laurier government in the years between 1909 and 1911. The Manitoba Conservative administrations needed legal advice from the law officers of the Dominion in respect to the drafting of legislation instituting the public elevator system.\footnote{22}

The most significant reason explaining why the Roblin administration in the period from 1900 to 1909 introduced only non-provocative legislation was the following. At the times cited above, the Manitoba Government believed that there was more profit to be derived from concentrating upon
their own formal provincial proposals for revision in the national statutes governing the division of powers between the two major levels of government, the territorial boundaries, and those specifying unconditional subsidies.

The preferred issues in this category became the ownership of the public domain, the Boundary Question, and the federal subsidy rates in Manitoba, while in British Columbia the parallel issues were the Better Terms claim and the McBride's Railway Land Purchase offer of 1911. In giving priority to their interests of this type, the Roblin Government followed clearly perceptible partisan motives. So did the McBride Government, who adopted a similar strategy about the time of the Reciprocity Election. Few references were made to the use of disallowance in either province.

With a view to ensuring their control over both federal and provincial elections in Manitoba, the Roblin Government was, ever since at least 1904, effectively appealing to the electorate for their support in his struggle for new Dominion-provincial agreements. That Government considered the new emphasis to be the most effective manner of counteracting the rising interest of the public in such policies of the federal Government as were beyond its actual or the intended jurisdiction of the province. In all the Western units except British Columbia, the exclusively federal issues attracted keen attention as early as 1900, the most important being the tariff and the supervision of the grain trade. Stimulated by the informative Winnipeg Free Press and The Grain Growers Guide, the enthusiasm with which the electors followed the debates over these issues was a serious challenge to the autonomists.

In brief, there is a continuity in the ideological principles held by the Governments of Manitoba from Norquay's to Norris' in respect to "provincial rights", but the several Cabinets show many variations in their choice of primary specific objectives within that set. Thus all the
administrations of that province, until at least 1915, were theoretically prepared to implement and defend provincial statutes contrary to the National Policy, if they could find precedents for their initiative in the ruling of the Court, in the laws of the original Canadian provinces or the British North American colonies of the pre-Confederation period. However, controversial measures found objectionable by the federal Government were commonly put into effect only if they were highly popular. Some were also expected to aid considerably the provincial Treasury during a financial crisis.

The revenues of Manitoba barely sufficed to produce surpluses since 1900. Unexpected financial circumstances conducive to the introduction of provocative provincial legislation arose repeatedly, for instance between 1912 and 1915. Despite this situation, the Roblin Government drafted its measures strictly within the lines drawn by the federal Government after 1910. The Manitoba Government found the electors undisposed to support its cause in conflicts over the use of disallowance, and further it wanted to avoid giving excessive difficulty to the Borden Cabinet.

Guided by essentially similar electoral reasons before 1920, and additionally by its new nationalist premises afterwards, the Norris government also invited the use of disallowance in no single instance after 1915. The factors ultimately explaining his policies will later be examined. At this time, it might be added that the electoral motives shown by the Norris Government in its policy of minimizing the Dominion-provincial conflicts were remarkably similar to those behind Roblin's policy from 1910 to 1915. The Manitoba Liberals then feared that the use of disallowance might doubtless damage, but would hardly help the prestige of the provincial Government.

British Columbia

In British Columbia, it was only during World War I, over a decade later than in the Prairie provinces, that the electors became steadily
concerned with national policies other than those referring to the rights of their own provincial administrations. In the period from 1900 until 1914, the great majority of the voters in the Pacific province were firmly attached to the Better Terms idea urged by their administrations, as they were to be at the conclusion of the War. Under such circumstances, it was natural for the McBride Government to practice less restrained autonomist tactics than those typical of Roblin's party. Already enjoying widespread recognition, the McBride administration was further able to reap substantial political benefits from the nullification of provincial laws, and from the Premier's subsequent criticism of the Laurier administration. Indeed, the British Columbia Conservatives succeeded much more readily than the Roblin administration in helping sympathetic candidates for Parliament to win federal elections upon the resulting political issues.

The deliberate manner in which the legislature of British Columbia kept challenging the Dominion as to the nature of selection standards for immigrants provides a useful basis for evaluating the effects of the subsequent change in provincial policy upon Dominion-provincial relations. The largest number of the statutes enacted by the legislature of British Columbia to restrict the entry and employment rights of Chinese and Japanese laborers were passed in the years from 1897 to 1904. Possibly the most controversial ones appeared in 1907 and 1908. Nearly all these statutes were disallowed or reserved by the Dominion.

The figures summing up the occasions upon which the Governments of the Dominion nullified British Columbia statutes show clearly the trend away from the frequent use of disallowance prior to 1910 to its rather sudden disappearance in 1921. These instances are best classified into three periods. During the years from 1870 to 1897, numerous statutes enacted by the legislature of British Columbia on different topics were disallowed or reserved.
From 1897 to 1914, all but two of the acts meeting with that fate were intended to restrict immigration. Between 1918 and 1921, nearly all the statutes of that province were acceptable to the Dominion, except for those relating to Crown Lands or immigration.

It is highly significant that the diminishing use of disallowance or reservation pertaining to the legislation of British Columbia in the years after 1908 essentially resulted from a change in the method employed by the administrations of that province to accomplish their immigration objectives. It is true that the concessions made by the Dominion to the demands of the McBride administration in 1907-08, like the agreement reached by Rudolphe Lemieux with Japan, or the 1908 increase in the headtax paid by Chinese immigrants, were doubtless influential factors behind the decision of the Conservative administration not to sponsor immigration statutes contrary to the National Policy. Nevertheless, the change of policy made by the provincial administrations became the immediate cause for the cessation of disallowance after 1908 and in 1921.

Until 1908, while the bipartisan efforts made by the Members of Parliament to obtain the desired legislation from the Dominion Parliament were unsuccessful, the McBride administration was often prepared to act on its own initiative to obtain its objective. For instance, in 1907-08 it decided to curb the then quickly growing influx of Asian laborers on the grounds that the latter were refusing to accept the white Canadians' customs, and unfairly competed with white workers for employment. These immigrants were admitted by the Dominion administration into Canada because they intended to seek jobs in the construction of nationally important projects, like the Victoria dry-dock and the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway. The Dominion encouraged the Japanese and the Chinese immigrants to come precisely because a majority of them were expected to remain construction workers. Hence the Dominion
employed disallowance so long as the legislature of British Columbia kept enacting the restrictory statutes. Once the legislature desisted from its course, disallowance ceased. While the Dominion policy in respect to British Columbia statutes remained immutable, the provincial policy did change considerably after jurisdictional conflict had reached its peak in 1907 and 1908.

The political factors behind the change of policy demonstrated by the British Columbia governments are quite apparent. In calling for immigration restrictions, the political parties in that province intended to obtain votes by catering to the demands made by the most vocal groups in the electorate. The McBride administration formed a flexible strategy to obtain the support of influential organization. Since the victory in 1903, the provincial Conservatives enjoyed the collaboration of different businessmen's and lawyers' associations. Before 1906, several labor unions also backed McBride. After being formed in 1900, the Navy League was another source of strength for the Conservatives. Finally, since 1907 the latter also obtained the approval of the less reputable Chinese Exclusion League. McBride was able to resist the challenges of the Liberals largely because he enjoyed extensive organized support.

Up to 1907, the McBride administration was slow to publicise its stand on the immigration issue because it was engaged in intricate negotiations with the Laurier Cabinet concerning proposed increases in Dominion subsidies. When the Dominion made its offer of a "final and unalterable" financial settlement, the Conservatives were faced with a difficult choice between acceptance and rejection of that offer. When they decided to attack that offer, there was an element of doubt as to whether the provincial electorate would support their stand. Indeed, soon afterwards the Conservatives found much support for their criticisms of the "final and unalterable" clause in the British North America Act of 1907 that resulted from the Interprovincial Conference, since that clause appeared to forestall any likelihood of further modifications in the subsidies.
On the other hand, the Laurier administration did agree to make a substantial raise in the subsidy paid to British Columbia. When Premier McBride left the conference in protest against what he considered the insufficiency of the determined sum, the Opposition led by M. A. Macdonald was prepared to criticise his conduct. In fact, the Victoria Liberal Association, without approving all aspects of the 1906 agreement, called on McBride personally to participate in a full scale debate on the subsidy question. It is open to doubt whether Finance Minister G. Tatlow's self-confidence was entirely genuine when he stated in 1907 that "it was quite apparent that the supporters of the opposition felt Premier McBride's actions in maintaining a firm stand for British Columbia rights was quite destructive of their (Conservative) political chances".

In the subsequent provincial election held in February, 1907, the McBride administration found it insufficient to base its appeal to the electorate entirely on the issue of Dominion subsidies. This seems to be the reason why they chose to introduce the immigration issue into the provincial election campaign of 1907. Since there had been no instance of jurisdictional conflict pertaining to that problem for two years, the Conservatives were simply restricted to attacking Dominion policies. In this connection, McBride criticised the hiring of Asian immigrants by the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company, as well as the subsidy provisions embodied in the British North America Act of 1907. The Grand Trunk Railway was accused of conspiring with the Laurier administration and the provincial British Columbia Liberals to ensure the unrestricted entry of Japanese laborers into Canada. Two days prior to the British Columbia general election, the editors of The Province, a Conservative organ, saw fit to print a sensational front-page article in which it was declared that the British Columbia Liberals had made a secret agreement with the managers of the Grand Trunk Pacific to the effect that the latter would be permitted to bring 50,000 additional Japanese workmen into Canada in case of
a Liberal victory.\textsuperscript{33}

The Liberals were vulnerable to charges of conniving with the Grand Trunk Pacific, since they defended the policies followed by that company in cooperation with the Laurier administration, although in principle the Liberals were calling for restricting the number of Oriental immigrants. In this case, they were handicapped by the impossibility of replying to the Conservative charges at length, because the latter were made on the eve of the election. It seems that McBride's ability to combine his criticisms of the Dominion immigration policies with his publicised stand for subsidy increases was of decisive help to the Conservatives, who in that year's provincial election obtained the largest majority in the popular vote that they had ever obtained.

Premier McBride would have probably preferred to discuss exclusively the federal subsidy problem. "Torn between his desire to conform in every way with Imperial policy and at the same time protect the special interests of his province,"\textsuperscript{34} he finally, in 1907, took the responsibility for renewing the policy of restricting the number of immigrants from Asia. It seems that he was prepared to revive the immigration policy contained in previously disallowed statutes with a view to strengthening his control over the electorate. He had apparently decided that the political utility of sponsoring such legislation exceeded the risk of antagonizing those imperialists who supported the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902.\textsuperscript{35}

While we may consider his stand on the Asian immigration problem morally unattractive, his political objective of gaining solid support from the electorate was a prerequisite for an administration emphasizing autonomy from the Dominion. In this sense, McBride's immigration policy is clearly an indirect evidence for his ideology.

After the impressive Conservative victory achieved in February, 1907, the British Columbia administration determined to challenge the Dominion either to let conflicting British Columbia statutes stand, or else to modify
the federal immigration policy. In either case, the Liberals would be put on the defensive. With this object in view, the McBride administration made its new legislative move in March, 1907, when they sponsored their first immigration statute since 1904. That bill, sponsored by Attorney-General Bowser and termed British Columbia's Natal Act, forbade "the immigration into British Columbia of any person who, when asked to do so by the officer appointed under this act, shall fail himself to write out and sign, in the English language or in any language of Europe, this application...as well as reading in English, or any language of Europe, any test..."36

The introduction of this bill clearly displays the willingness of the McBride administration to face the risk of disallowance, since statutes intended to accomplish the identical objective of restricting non-European immigration had been voided as recently as 1904. There was no indication that the policy of the Dominion had changed. Indeed, the formulation of the Bowser Act left the Dominion no choice but to disallow it. It is evident that the federal Liberals were offered the choice between belligerence and surrender. If they decided to couple the disallowance of the statute with an uncompromising defense of the existing immigration policy, they would have been denounced as acting contrary to the spirit of Confederation. By refusing to compromise with the provincial Conservatives, they would be charged with aggravating the currently serious social tensions in British Columbia.

On the other hand, the Conservatives might well have persuasively interpreted any immediate concessions by the Dominion as deriving from their intervention. The intended outcome of the provincial policy was to make it impossible for the Dominion officials to influence the course of provincial politics in British Columbia, if the latter intended to do so by supporting local Liberals. Likewise, McBride's control over the electorate was to help federal Conservatives, whom he was strenuously supporting, to capture the
remaining House of Commons seats in British Columbia.

The Laurier administration was apparently fully aware of the political dangers that their federal party was likely to encounter in British Columbia, if a severe jurisdictional dispute over immigration developed with the now solidly entrenched McBride administration. One must infer this from the subsequent actions of the federal Liberals. Even though the preceding instances of disallowance exercised little effect in the Dominion elections of 1900 and 1904, they were facing a changed political situation by 1908. There was an incumbent provincial Cabinet with a considerably greater prestige in the province than their immediate predecessors had enjoyed, while the electorate itself was becoming increasingly inflamed, both by Conservative politicians and especially by the leaders of the Chinese Exclusion League, until a major riot protesting Dominion immigration policies took place in June, 1908. Under these circumstances, a policy of either belligerence or of weakness might have been politically fatal.

Hence the Laurier Cabinet resolved to sidestep the alternatives foreseen by the Conservatives and to develop their own policy of watchful waiting. The principal objective behind that approach was the suspension of provocative policies, like disallowance, that might have deepened the hostility felt by the majority of the British Columbia electors towards the Dominion. The method selected entailed either the use of reservation in place of disallowance or delay in dealing with objectionable provincial legislation. In accordance with that policy, the Laurier administration reserved the Bowser bill for later action by the Governor-General in Council.37 After the statute was reserved on November 27, 1907, the legislature of British Columbia promptly repassed it in January of the subsequent year. On this occasion, the Dominion attempted to avert conflict through jurisdictional procrastination. For that reason, the disallowance of the act was delayed until November 29, 1908,
two months after the Dominion election.  

Insofar as this policy of the Dominion administration prevented a severe jurisdictional conflict prior to the election, it doubtless averted a Liberal debacle in British Columbia, in 1908. The federal Liberals were unable to avert the loss of three ridings and a considerable reduction in the popular vote received in that province. The Conservatives convinced the majority in the electorate that they offered better alternatives in both the subsidy and the immigration policies.

To the extent that the jurisdictional aspect of the immigration issue was debated by the federal Conservatives, who gave more emphasis in British Columbia to their criticism of Laurier's immigration policy of the Dominion election of 1908, their campaign of that year is certainly the most striking instance of a successful partisan attack upon an incumbent Dominion administration for its use of reservation and disallowance. In 1907-1908, as in 1904, the McBride administration planned its legislative policies so as to provide the maximum support for the federal Conservatives headed by Robert L. Borden, and represented most outspokenly in British Columbia by John Barnard, the Member of Parliament for Vancouver South in the previous Dominion Parliament. In the years immediately preceding the Dominion elections of 1904 and 1908, Premier McBride timed the introducing of the immigration statutes that were objectionable to the Dominion so as to make his policies, and their potential nullification current news at election time. As a result of his initiative, his rhetorical ability, and the provincial party organization, the federal Conservatives were expected to gain and did win a majority in the popular vote and the available House of Commons seats in British Columbia.  

What were the Conservative policies on the subsidy and the immigration issues in 1908? Robert Borden had given only statements of principle on
both the Immigration issue and the "Better Terms" question. In his Halifax
speech of August 20, 1907, a declaration of principles and promises that
served as the Conservative platform for the 1908 campaign, he mentioned
neither issue by name. The only item that could have vaguely referred to
the regional demands raised in British Columbia was a pledge to avoid using
disallowance in matters that were within constitutional powers of the pro-
vince. There was promised an "unimpaired maintenance of all powers of self-
government which have been conferred upon the provinces of Canada under the
constitution." Apparently, he intended to let the Judicial Committee rule on
the validity of the Bowser Act, but did not spell out what action the Dominion
would take if the court ruled it ultra vires. During his tour of the West,
on September 24, 1907, Borden commented briefly upon the controversy re-
specting Dominion subsidies. He promised "a close inquiry into British
Columbia's financial conditions and the question of Better Terms, whenever
the Conservative party got into power". The subsequent night in Victoria,
he touched upon the immigration issue by stating that "British Columbia must
remain a British and Canadian province."

During the 1908 campaign, Borden allowed Bowser to present his strong
autonomist views on these issues. The Conservative National Leader's own
silence provoked John Barnard, a Conservative candidate in Vancouver, who had
presided over Borden's rally there during the previous year, to wire a week
prior to the election in order to obtain his views on the immigration issue.
Borden apparently replied so evasively that Barnard or another Conservative
party official felt it necessary to add color to the wording of his reply
wire. All that they could get from Robert Borden was a statement that he
stood for "the protection of white labor", but he refused to commit himself
as to any specific policy that he would seek to implement.

It is clear that the key man behind the Conservative success in British
Columbia in 1908 was not Borden, but Premier McBride. "The chief Conservative factor was the part taken by the Premier in the contest and the chief issue in the election there were the gains in Chinese and Japanese immigration."44 It seems likely that McBride was being driven into relentless activity by fear that Borden's generalizations might not be specific enough to sway the electorate, although the provincial Conservatives were supporting their party's candidates for the House of Commons.

The Premier did everything conceivable to ensure a victory for the Conservatives through his own impact and prestige. Of course, the jurisdictional aspect of the immigration issue, manifested in the threat of disallowance that hung over the Bowser Act, gave him a warrant to become a spokesman for those segments of the electorate who were dissatisfied with the Dominion policy. At least up to the June riot of 1908, he was primarily concerned with this aspect of the immigration issue. Afterwards, as the election day approached, he increasingly proceeded to deal with the existing Dominion policies irrespective of their relation to provincial laws. This procedure was contrary to the usual emphasis given by the Conservatives to provincial claims. Arguments that were intended to secure certain additional responsibilities from the Dominion—and were formulated at will by the provincial Cabinets. In this instance, McBride must have found it very difficult to influence the outcome of a Dominion election in his province merely by defending the right of its legislature to enact immigration statutes that contradicted the policy of the federal administration. Hence he subjected the federal Immigration Act itself to scathing criticism and called for such changes in it as the most influential organizations desired. This aspect of the immigration issue was forcefully presented in his pre-election appeal, when he tore the Laurier government into a shapeless wreck of confusion and mismanagement" on this and other federal issues.45
It seems likely that Premier McBride was genuinely anxious over the jurisdictional issue at stake in the British Columbia immigration problem. He probably preferred, as a matter of principle, that his own, rather than the federal Government, should provide the remedy. Granting the above, one of his leading motives behind his successful intervention in the 1908 election was apparently his desire to strengthen his grasp upon the loyalties of the British Columbia electorate. He intended to put his administration into a strong bargaining position with the Dominion Cabinet, whatever party won the federal election. He was acting on the generally accepted premise that his administration would gain in the support of the electorate only if he identified it with the most urgent regional demands.

Like the other "autonomist" administrations, the McBride Conservatives essentially attempted to respond to these demands within the sphere of provincial jurisdiction, if this was feasible. If the solution lay within the powers of the Dominion Parliament, as defined by the Judicial Committee, or if it was in a joint area of responsibility in which the provincial policy was facing a threat of disallowance, then the provincial government might be forced to call upon the Dominion to provide the solution desired by large segments in the electorate. These considerations explain, in brief, the reason why Premier McBride cared enough to play the decisive role in the 1908 federal election, when he helped the federal Conservatives to gain five out of the seven House of Commons seats available in British Columbia, and a majority in the popular vote, revealing that Conservative support had risen 38.8% in 1904 to 59% in 1908. 46

The legislative and political performance of the McBride Government during the years from 1907 and 1908 illustrates the key role of political, particularly electoral considerations in determining the readiness of the British Columbia Conservatives to sponsor the immigration statutes which had
called forth the use of disallowance and reservation. Some of the Premier's supporters were always yearning to revive that issue. Even after the compromise agreement between British Columbia and the Laurier Government, numerous Parliamentary candidates did improve their partisan position in the federal election of 1911 by the continued references to conflicts over immigration.

It is indeed true that the disallowed statutes were not re-enacted after 1908. At first, to pacify public feelings after the continuing racial unrest in British Columbia, it must have seemed expedient for the Cabinet to sidestep direct challenges. In this matter, they were not guided by immediate partisan interests.

In publicising their demands for new subsidy and Railway lands pseudo-constitutional agreements, they did attempt to impress the public with their ambitious concept of provincial autonomy. McBride made frequent references to his current negotiations with the federal Government, while occasionally stating criticisms of the latter's position. Undoubtedly, he also found such action useful to emphasize his independence from Borden's leadership.

It appears that the electors in British Columbia were for the first time heavily preoccupied with issues other than jurisdictional conflicts and the purely intraprovincial questions during the Reciprocity Election of 1911. The Parliamentary candidates everywhere in Canada discussed then most frequently the tariff. The wider issue of unity in the British Empire was then likewise of great significance.

Meanwhile McBride continued working to stimulate public interest in the provincial administrative and legislative goals. He apparently succeeded in having the voters give his provincial policy at least the degree of attention which the national public business received. To summarize, it might be argued that McBride sponsored only such legislation as was clearly acceptable to the federal Government after 1911 not primarily because a Conservative was
the Prime Minister, but because the British Columbia Cabinet had already found a better basis upon which to request public support. The outcome of the provincial elections held in 1913 proved the new methodology successful. The Government had won 38 seats out of the total forty, despite the coming of an economic recession.

As their counterparts elsewhere in the Canadian West, the British Columbia Governments experienced a considerable shift from the autonomist to the qualified cooperative viewpoint sometime during the years from 1916 to 1922. It is interesting to see that the Liberal Cabinets which followed McBride, the Brewster (1916-18) and the Oliver (1919-27) Cabinets included many men who had been partisan nationalists during the pre-World War years. Unlike the Norris Government in Manitoba, they showed immediately upon taking office their devotion to Wilfred Laurier's leadership, which they identified with their cause of freer international trade and the furthering of immigration. Before 1920, Premier Oliver clearly considered matters beyond the jurisdiction of his Government as more significant than the legal status of the province. Thus, he based his usual cooperation with W. L. Mackenzie King upon their mutually shared low tariff principles, not upon any idea of "provincial rights". The British Columbia Government took no action which would have made it urgent for the federal Government to deal with the standing issues of the latter type. During the third decade of this country, the leaders of that provincial party were considerably more nationalistic than the United Farmers Governments in the Prairie Region. This is not always seen because the first sometimes employed a traditional methodology in order to prevent the hostile reaction of an electorate slowly returning to its customary preoccupation with provincial institutional interests. The primary concern of the British Columbia Liberal Governments was to formulate the vast majority of their legislative measures, including all the most significant
ones, within the limits assigned by the courts and by the federal government to the provinces.\textsuperscript{53} Certainly, the Brewster and the Oliver Cabinets believed that it was possible for them to establish a reputable record, while observing the above jurisdictional limitations. They were ready to concede that some sacrifices were required if they implemented this principle. While holding it, they could never meet as many requests made by the public, as the autonomists had earlier attempted to do. Nor were the post-1917 Governments expecting to create a sufficiently strong political organization to control the outcome of federal elections. The principal argument behind the respective policy stated that provincial leaders must enjoy the confidence of the federal Government, which looked favorably upon those who practiced smooth intergovernmental relations.

The actual reason for the self-restraint which the British Columbia Liberal Governments showed throughout their terms of office was their conviction that only Parliament was capable of providing the most effective remedies to the needs of Canada.\textsuperscript{54} The National Party Leaders were thought more competent to define the National Policy than the provincial premiers. The latter could only share through consultations in the making of federal legislative measures. To strengthen their role in this respect, the Governments of the Pacific province of British Columbia had slight use for provocative provincial statutes.

On the other hand, the Liberal Governments saw the necessity for extending some carefully selected functions, even at the risk of disallowance and reservation. In the latter cases, the motive was probably the desire to seize the possibility that the federal Government might not act.\textsuperscript{55} Before sponsoring the venturesome statutes, the British Columbia Cabinets assured themselves that the statute was popular within their province, and \textit{intra vires} of the provincial legislature. As in judicial disputes, the matters were also not to be such as to cause bitter conflict. The resulting
assertions of regional interest and pride are fairly modest, but sufficient to show the ideological difference between their authors and the early Governments of Saskatchewan and Alberta, which were more submissive to the leadership of the federal Government whenever a partisan tie prevailed.

Between 1916 and 1927, the legislature of British Columbia enacted two statutes presumably known to be objectionable to the federal Government. One of these, the Vancouver Island Settlers Act, was re-enacted twice after being disallowed and reserved. That was the earlier legislative challenge, and the only one not yet discussed in this study.

The initial conflict over the Vancouver Island Settlers Act came as an entire surprise to the public. In 1917, the Brewster Government sponsored it to provide for the sale of certain lands which had been reserved for future use or disposal by the Esquimalt-Nanaimo Railway. The Government felt justified to take this action because that company was operating under a provincial charter, even though it had been brought into being by an agreement reached by Premier Smith with Sir John A. Macdonald in 1884. In fact, it was readily admitted that the act in question was legally valid.

The object of the Vancouver Island Settlers Act was to encourage the speedy development of unused land. The Brewster Government intended to obtain substantial revenues from selling or licensing the homesteads or timber leases respectively. His Government was fighting a severe financial crisis in the final two years of World War I. Besides, Brewster was probably pursuing certain political motives. Protesting against the unwarranted invasion of federal authorities, he publicised the Liberals' willingness to defend certain important provincial interests. In this incident, he could do so without creating a serious jurisdictional conflict. It is likely that the Liberal Cabinet had no intention of reviving the statute in question, since they were supporting the Coalition until the Premier's unexpected death.
Whether any urgent partisan considerations made Premier John Oliver revive the measure in 1919 and 1920 cannot be answered conclusively. It is clear that the new Premier was facing an extremely difficult political situation. One may reasonably assume that he intended to rally some autonomists around his banner, since even a slight change in public attitudes could determine whether the Liberals would win the subsequent provincial election. They considered a majority Government essential for the province. To obtain the necessary number of seats in the Assembly, they required more support on Vancouver Island, where the Conservatives were powerful.

The provincial election did produce a minority Government in British Columbia. The indifference then shown by the electorate for Premier Oliver's readiness to challenge the federal Government was most likely of some importance behind his later move to sponsor non-conflicting legislation. As has already been pointed out, the lesson which the Liberals had derived from the enactment of the Aliens Employment Rights Act in 1921, and its disallowance must have been similar to the above. Silence upon these topics characterized their subsequent strategy.

The Liberals had sometimes found autonomist arguments helpful in making the new emphasis upon the exclusively federal issues palatable to the public. In making the repeated demand for the lowering of the freight rates, for instance, the provincial Government referred to the Terms of the Union.

How the Oliver Government proceeded to rank its provincial institutional ends has already been pointed out. This writer will later consider in some detail the Railway Lands Problem. At this time, it is necessary to analyze the attitude of the British Columbia Liberals to the possibility of legislating in that jurisdictional area which the federal Government was, or had formerly been reserving for itself. The answer to be sought must be more complex than that concerning the policies of the Norris Government.
As in other provinces, ideological factors ultimately determined provincial attitudes to the use of disallowance and reservation. Electoral considerations were one of the immediate motives explaining why the British Columbia Governments drafted or refrained from provocative legislation, and in the first case, what areas of jurisdiction were selected. Tactics of this type testify not merely to the effect made by a certain party to sway the voter in an approaching election. The leaders of regional parties in Canada have normally attempted the conscious education of the electors in certain attitudes towards the federal system. One can apply this statement to all the Territorial and provincial governments in Western Canada before 1914 and to numerous ones holding office afterwards.

The Northwest Territories

While the Conservative administrations governing Manitoba and British Columbia prior to World War I had been gradually turning away from their early highly belligerent to their subsequently cautious behaviour in the planning of provincial legislation, there is a truly sharp turning point in the constitutional history of the Northwest Territories. Acting in March, 1905, Parliament formed the new provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta. On July 25th, Amadee E. Forget was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the first-named new province, and Charles A. Bulyea, of the second. During the first week of September, these Liberal politicians called upon Walter Scott and John A. Rutherford respectively to form the new Executive Councils. Even before elections were held later in the fall, the two Governments chose to reverse the policy which Territorial predecessors had followed.

The Governments of the Northwest Territories were operating in very difficult circumstances. Not only were they extremely dependant upon the subsidies received from the federal Treasury, there being little taxable capital in their area.\(^{62}\) Their Legislative and Executive Councils were highly restricted in their legal powers.\(^{63}\) Before the first could enact any significant Ordinance, the Cabinet had to receive the advance approval of Parliament.
As the final step in the legislative process, the Governor-General in Council possessed the sole right to ratify or refuse the product. Hence the Territorial Governments were constantly forced to employ much ingenuity in both meeting the public need and in persuading the federal ministries to accept their legislation.

Faced with severe legal restrictions, the leading Governments of the Northwest Territories had been remarkably self-assertive in pressing their wishes upon the authorities in Ottawa. Thus in 1892, the Legislative Council, having obtained the necessary permission from the Thompson Government, made English the sole official language within their boundaries. This Ordinance was written upon the model of a similar Manitoba statute passed in 1889, and was enacted with great unanimity, even though there was as yet no responsible Cabinet in the Northwest to sponsor the new principle. 64

Later, the Haultain Government proceeded to draft and to get accepted by the Laurier Cabinet certain daring legislative measures, like the Educational Ordinance of 1901. 65 The first Premier of the Northwest Territories was successful in this respect, because he commanded the loyalty of a large majority of the electorate.

In fact, Haultain's control over the electorate in the Territories was greater than that exercised by the contemporary Conservative premiers in British Columbia and Manitoba, since there were no party lines in territorial elections in the Northwest Territories and Haultain faced a very weak Opposition in the Northwest Legislative Council.66 To maintain his control over the Northwest electorate, Haultain would have most probably introduced and obtained the enactment of numerous statutes objectionable to the Laurier administration, if the Northwest Council had possessed the legal powers of a provincial legislature. As it was, constitutional restrictions upon the Council legal powers were the principal reason why despite Haultain's critical attitude to Laurier's manner of prosecuting the National Policy, no statutes which the federal Government actually refused to ratify had been enacted.
Alberta and Saskatchewan

After 1905, there was a different reason why none of the statutes drafted by the new Liberal administrations of Alberta and Saskatchewan experienced reservation, while only a few were disallowed. While organizing the new provincial institutions, these Liberal administrations set their sights upon the distinctive principles of strictly avoiding any jurisdictional contentions with the approving Dominion Government. They were generally consistent and successful in introducing only legislation that was immune from the danger of nullification. This course was pursued during and after Laurier's tenure of the Prime Minister's office.

Why did the Liberal administrations of Alberta and Saskatchewan demonstrate this determination to prepare their legislative policies so as to prevent the possibility of reservation and disallowance being used against their provincial legislation? One might attempt to answer that question from a political or financial viewpoint.

To understand their policy of avoiding the introduction of bills that led to reservation or disallowance, it is essential to note their acquiescent attitude to prevailing expectations in the electorate. In nearly every line of provincial policy, the Liberal administrations of Alberta and Saskatchewan demonstrated a high degree of sensitivity to the requirements of influential segments in the electorate. This attitude is shown by their cooperation with the Laurier administration in the inauguration of provincial governments in their provinces.

In 1905, the Rutherford administration in Alberta and that of Walter Scott in Saskatchewan accepted the type of provincial status, with its prerogatives and its limitations, that the Laurier administration extended to the people of the southern section of the Northwest Territories through the Autonomy Acts of 1905. The Liberal Premiers of the new Prairie administration
lauded these constitutive acts, while working with the Liberal Dominion Cabinet in their enactment by the Canadian Parliament, and in their implementation, i.e. the creation of new provincial institutions in Edmonton and Regina.

Territorial Liberals had possessed slight voice in the drafting of the provincial constitutive acts. It was Prime Minister Laurier himself, with several of his closest advisors in the Dominion Cabinet, who determined the jurisdictional restrictions applied to the new provincial governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan, as well as special financial benefits apparently intended to compensate them for their legal and geographical disadvantages. These governments received a good financial endowment in the form of satisfactory subsidies from the Dominion, but they also obtained fewer responsibilities than the F. G. Haultain administration of the old Northwest Territories had requested for the projected administration of a large single province. Notably the Laurier administration decided to include a smaller area than Haultain had proposed into the area to be given self-government, and to divide that area into two provinces. Besides restricting the provinces geographically, the Dominion retained its ownership of Crown lands, which was to be administered as previously by the federal Department of the Interior. In withholding the Crown lands from the new administrations of Alberta and Saskatchewan, the Laurier Cabinet had followed the precedent set by the John A. Macdonald administration in reference to Manitoba in 1870.

Why did the Rutherford and the Scott administrations outspokenly associate themselves with the Autonomy Acts, despite the disappointing provisions in reference to Crown lands, the size of the new provinces, and the division of the Northwest? Historians have sometimes found it difficult to explain why the Liberal Cabinets became advocates of the 1905 settlement, and why the electors of their provinces gave them secure majorities in the subsequent provincial elections. C. C. Linguard suggests that like other politically
conscious citizens in that period, the members of the provincial Liberal ministries possessed a keen sense of party loyalty and primarily for that reason acquiesced in the verdicts given by the Laurier administration. In his view, the mass of the electors followed their leadership because they were satisfied with the financial arrangements made by the Laurier administration for the new provincial governments. Professor H. B. Neatby suggests that the latter acquiesced in the terms of the Autonomy Acts primarily because the Liberal ministries themselves were satisfied with the financial subsidies which they had been assigned.

A correlation of election statistics and issues with their behaviour strongly indicates that the Liberal premiers and leading ministers also entertained other considerations before deciding to cooperate with the Laurier administration in 1905. Their satisfaction with the financial provisions extended to them by the Dominion, and their loyalty to Laurier's leadership were doubtless reinforced by their awareness that the electorate in their provinces, which strongly supported the federal Liberals in Dominion elections and were keenly interested in matters like the tariff and the regulation of the grain trade, were most unlikely to support them in jurisdictional conflicts with the Dominion.

To start, Premier Scott, Rutherford, and A. L. Sifton must have realized throughout their incumbancy that they lacked the personal prestige enjoyed by the Conservatives Roblin in Manitoba and McBride in British Columbia. Further, as the failure of Haultain's Provincial Rights Party to win the 1905 election in Saskatchewan demonstrates, the electorates in Alberta and Saskatchewan were prepared to refuse the leadership of even a strong and brilliant personality like Haultain, if he failed to share their faith in the economic policies and doctrines of the Laurier administration. Premiers Rutherford and Scott were undoubtedly deterred from opposing their federal
party by their knowledge of the latter's grasp upon the electoral majorities in their province.

Concern for the likely reaction of the electorate explains in even greater measure the post-1905 attitude of the Liberal administrations in Alberta and Saskatchewan to jurisdictional conflicts generally, and to the possible use of reservation and disallowance by the Dominion Cabinet in particular. In the years from 1905 to 1911, they strictly shunned all types of jurisdictional conflict, most probably because they felt it impossible to obtain the support of an electoral majority over an issue directed against the federal Liberals. This is a major reason, it is suggested, why the Prairie administration drafted their legislation so carefully that the Laurier administration disallowed, after 1905, only three Saskatchewan incorporation statutes, enacted purely for financial reasons and not employed as campaign issues in the subsequent provincial election. The Dominion disallowed no Alberta statute until 1924.

From 1918 to 1930, the Governments of Saskatchewan and Alberta continued to present at protracted negotiations or even sometimes in partisan platforms and press interviews, their arguments for the transfer of the federally-held Crown lands.

The subsequent administrations of Alberta and Saskatchewan generally consulted the federal Department of Justice before introducing constitutionally doubtful legislation, except for the Aberhart Social Credit administration of Alberta, (1935-1943). Apparently, these governments believed that the majorities in the provincial electorates were not interested in giving them sufficient support in either provincial or Dominion elections to put them in a strong position with the Dominion Cabinet, if it were decided to emphasize provincial financial or jurisdictional claims upon the Dominion, or questions resulting from the use of reservation or disallowance, over other political issues in the respective election campaigns.
In brief, the attitude revealed by the administrations of Alberta and Saskatchewan to the possibility of jurisdictional conflict with the incumbent Dominion Government generally throughout this century demonstrates a significant political tendency which guided them in the making of their legislative policies. The governments of the two aforementioned Prairie provinces have consistently revealed a willingness to accept the views of the most influential farm organizations in their provinces. The latter were normally either not interested in, or opposed to proposals and political methods which were likely to deepen the existing jurisdictional and financial conflict between the provincial administrations and the Dominion Cabinet. These organizations were also strongly opposed to legislative proposals that were expected to cause new jurisdictional contentions, as by challenging the federal government to modify its principles regarding the use of reservations and disallowance.

Theoretical as well as practical considerations impelled these organizations to intervene repeatedly with their provincial administrations to ensure the legal impeccability of the provincial legislation that they were advocating, even when these administrations were hardly interested in drafting legislation contrary to the interests of the Dominion. The ultimate reason of the farm organization Executives for taking that stand was their ideal of cooperation. The leaders of the farm organizations generally interpreted this principle to mean, in reference to the federal system of Canada, that they favored an early end to jurisdictional conflicts between the Dominion and the provincial governments, along with the provision of a restricted number of jointly financed services by both levels. Only experienced writers, like William Irvine, suggested that the provincial administrations should work with the Dominion Cabinet as closely and as harmoniously as the local branches of a professional organization cooperated with their national
The majority of farm leaders were reluctant to propose numerous Dominion-provincial services, probably because they feared that activities of this sort might extend the influence of the governing Dominion party in provincial politics.

Farm organization officials opposed, for certain other reasons, those provincial policies likely to call forth the use of reservation or disallowance. Those officials intended to have the federal government accept their proposals of some joint services in areas like rural credits or scientific assistance. Essentially, they desired their provincial administrations to act as regional spokesmen with the federal Parliament in diverse matters under the latter's jurisdiction, especially in the two areas of joint responsibility in which is possessed the superior decisive voice. The best evidence for this observation appears in the conduct of those who had been active in the Grain Grower Associations or the United Farmers of Alberta before becoming provincial leaders. Consider, for example, Dunning's campaign of 1922-23 for the restoration of the compulsory federal Wheat Board, the typical readiness of the Western Governments to accept conditional grants from Parliament in matters like farm credits, and the suggestions made by Premiers Greenfield and Bracken for restricting immigration into Canada.

The farm organizations in the Western Canadian provinces likewise intervened with their Governments in the purpose of helping to draft legislation which would be acceptable to the federal Cabinet. Thus during 1910-1911, a committee appointed by the Canadian Council of Agriculture, the national coordinating body, formed by its member groups in 1909, made a careful investigation of the legal aspects in the proposals presented by the Executives of these organizations for provincial or cooperatively-owned inland elevators. As a result, the Executives of the United Farmers of
Alberta, and of the Grain Growers of Saskatchewan and Manitoba, were able to advise forcefully their respective provincial administrations as to the manner of making the resulting statute acceptable to the Laurier administration, and refused to accept the initially offered explanations of their premiers that the proposals were illegal. The Executive of the Grain Growers of Manitoba, in particular, demonstrated a very firm and vigorous attitude in dealing with the reluctant Roblin administration in this matter.  

In 1922, when jurisdictional lines in several areas like taxation and the regulation of wheat marketing became uncertain, and when the financial difficulties of the Norris administration in Manitoba made likely the latter's sponsoring of revenue statutes that would have been objectionable to the Mackenzie King Government, the delegates attending that year's annual convention of the United Grain Growers of Manitoba in Winnipeg, showed again serious concern over the possibility of provincial legislative policies calling forth the use of reservation and disallowance. Hence they wrote into their platform a resolution calling for "a conference of Municipal, Provincial, and Federal authorities to consider (the division of powers) in such fields as taxation, income, interprovincial corporations, and railways". With the objective of pleasing these highly influential farm organizations, the Liberal administrations of Alberta and Saskatchewan since 1905, and both the Conservative and Liberal governments of Manitoba since 1910, were careful to sponsor only such legislation as carried no risk of disallowance.  

One must admit that all the Western Canadian Territorial and provincial administrations possessed ideological foundations for their attitude to the possibility of jurisdictional contentions with the federal Government. At least the autonomist leaders had formed their preparedness to challenge certain constitutional national policies before taking office. The sole Governments which considerably changed priorities as to political issues was
the Norris Cabinet in Manitoba, which was heavily affected by the integrating impact of Canada's experience in World War I.

On the other hand, it seems warranted to consider the concrete positions which the regional leaders exemplified their ideology as their adaption to public sentiment. This explains the tendency of many administrations in the Canadian West to draft only such legislative measures as the Governments of the Dominion would allow to stand, even if simultaneously these provincial governments still engaged in disputes over the natural resources and the federal subsidy question. It is suggested that this political factor behind their decision to embrace or to desist from legislative policies calling forth the use of reservation or disallowance was more significant than the parallel financial motives. In the last analysis, all the Western administrations were displaying a high degree of responsiveness to the articulate elements in their electorate.

Considering all the similarities characterizing the various provincial administrations in the Canadian West, one is struck by the considerable contrast between the results which the decision to prevent disallowance produced in the period prior to 1914, and those accruing later. In the earlier years, the promulgation of nationalist beliefs by the Alberta and the Saskatchewan governments generally brought political rewards. The Scott and the Rutherford Governments strengthened their influence with the electors by remaining faithful to this approach as long as they were in office. Their influence reflects the considerable popularity of the Laurier Government in their provinces, and even more significantly, their sound judgment of the wishes of the public. The Prairie Liberals were able to initiate popular policies despite their circumspection.

In the case of the post-1918 Liberal administrations in Manitoba and British Columbia, the governing provincial parties had little to show for
their similar efforts to respect the division of powers as interpreted by
the Governments of the Dominion.

There are many explanations as to why these administrations failed to
secure results comparable to those won earlier by the Prairie Liberals.
Essentially to blame was the incorrigible tendency of the Western Canadian
administrations after 1920 to offer insipid economic policies. During the
third decade of this century the provincial leaders in that region, with
the noteworthy exception of Premiers W. M. Martin and H. A. Dunning in
Saskatchewan, popularized a fairly modest vision of provincial self-govern-
ment. In taking that position, the respective Western administrations then
disregarded the historical lesson that the best manner in which a regional
Government can preserve or even extend its control over the electorate is to
take up popular and imaginative policies, despite the inevitable danger of
reservation and disallowance being occasionally applied. 82

In view of the critical attitudes which the electors in the Western
region then generally held in respect to the Governments of the Dominion,
their provincial administrations made a remarkable, and somewhat excessive
political sacrifices by restricting themselves to nonconflicting legislation.
As will be pointed out in the following chapter, they took that action
primarily because they thought it might be unpopular to press in a belliger-
ent partisan manner their actual provincial claim to the ownership of
federally held natural resources or the Railway Lands in British Columbia
and to make demands for increased subsidies. In fact, as it was to be
demonstrated shortly at the time of the Great Depression, any substantial
expansion of provincial functions certainly depended upon larger revenues
than were available from the existing sources. 83
CHAPTER 3

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS OF THE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS

During the period from 1900 to 1930, the Canadian Territorial and provincial administrations considered their demands for various revisions in the constitutional status quo to be the most meaningful type of jurisdictional conflict. Unconditional subsidy questions and conflicts over the Crown lands had been continually debated in the Western units since their entry into the Confederation until the opening years of the Great Depression. Since all the administrations in that region had to deal with these matters on numerous occasions, their respective records are the most comprehensive sources of reference for a student of political history.

The requests of the Western regional Governments for constitutional and pseudo-constitutional changes show most convincingly the nature of their ideology. All the principles which the respective Governments held in common are evident in this context. The most notable one is their tendency to look for precedents in the records of the Eastern and Central provinces, before taking controversial action.¹

The positions taken by the regional Governments in the Canadian West upon the natural resources, the boundary, and the subsidy questions illustrate perhaps most convincingly the differences among the three distinct viewpoints previously summarized. The partisan nationalist Governments differed from the others in being prepared to compromise or even discontinue for long periods of time their predecessors' objectives. They considered that the national interest, as represented by a friendly federal Government in peacetime and any in wartime, must be the starting point for any concept of provincial functions. While they have never said that the will of their national party was always to be paramount, they did insist that it might well impose certain disabilities upon provincial Governments.² Concretely, the Liberal administrations.
in Alberta and Saskatchewan publicly left unquestioned the federal ownership of the Crown lands, for which they were being financially recompensed on a per capita basis until 1911. They also made very modest demands for raises in other unconditional subsidies.  

The Governments holding the "qualified cooperative" viewpoint followed the example of the pre-World I Liberals in numerous respects. The principal distinguishing characteristic of the first was their insistence upon the settlement of the natural resources question along with the determination of the compensation to be paid by the federal Governments for the lands already sold. This proposal was justified by an elaborate historical argument originally made by Frederick G. Haultain.  

The post-World War I Governments carried on the leading jurisdictional demands which the autonomists had made before 1914. The latter had also raised numerous others, in line with their emphasis upon strengthening the powers of the provincial level. In their relations with the federal Government, they had given more attention to the resulting problems than to any other matters.  

The relevant problems may be included into either one of two formal categories. Some of the provincial proposals required constitutional amendments, while others called for special agreements between the Dominion and one or all the provinces. The latter were generally restricted to bilateral negotiations between the respective provincial administration and the federal Cabinet over matters like distinctive subsidies or boundary revision. Questions of this type could have been settled simply by an act of the Parliament of Canada. The constitutional amendments, creating modifications in Canada's "fundamental law", irrespective of whether one or more of the provinces were concerned, required final action by the Parliament of Great Britain acting at the request of the Canadian Cabinet on Parliament.
The chief examples of provincial claims that required the action of Dominion Governments exclusively included Manitoba's objective of securing equality with Saskatchewan and Alberta in compensation paid for Crown lands (requested by the resolution of the Manitoba legislature on January 18, 1908 and determined in 1912). There were also claims made by Manitoba to a boundary revision (revived by the February 27, 1901 resolution of the Manitoba legislature and settled in 1911), and the interest of the administration of British Columbia in various Crown lands held by the Dominion on the basis of an agreement made in 1876. Each of these demands reflected the objective of a specific province to achieve a particular source of revenue. Likewise, the issues relating to proposals for constitutional amendments occasionally concerned exclusively an individual province. For instance, certain provisions in its constitutive act might have been at stake, e.g. the clauses governing education or the appropriation of the per capita unconditional subsidies in categories originally stipulated by the British North America Act of 1867. More frequently, the disputed laws referred to all or several of the provinces. The leading instance of a proposal for constitutional amendment referring to all the provinces was the demand for an increase in per capita subsidies made by all the attending provincial premiers at the Interprovincial Conferences of 1902 and 1906.

The natural resources issues pertaining to the Prairie provinces and the Railway Lands Question in British Columbia respectively are the best examples of significant jurisdictional questions raised by the Western provinces of Canada over a considerable period of time. In the Prairie region, the issue was constitutional, since the provincial administrations of Manitoba, Alberta and Saskatchewan desired to have their constitutive acts amended so as to remove Crown lands, with full control over mineral deposits, from the
Dominion had owned them from the very beginning of their status as parts of Canada. The provincial Prairie leaders argued, strictly speaking, for a transfer rather than a return of the disputed Crown lands to their jurisdiction, along with payments covering the already sold lands. This issue had the longest history in Manitoba, where the provincial administration kept uninterruptedly demanding a transfer of the Crown lands from 1876 to 1914, and from 1918 until the settlement of the issue was reached.

The other Western provincial administrations were raising similar claims to Crown lands under Dominion ownership in that period, though less continuously than those of Manitoba. For instance, the Haultain administration (1896-1904) had also requested the Dominion Cabinet to have the Dominion-held Crown lands transferred to the jurisdiction of the new province that was to be formed there, and to remit to its future administration the funds received for lands that had already been alienated. In several lucid submissions, made in 1900 and 1901, Premier F. G. Haultain insisted that these concessions be extended simultaneously with the granting of provincial status to what he expected would become a single province. At the turn of the century, it was expected that the new province or provinces would follow the example set by Manitoba administrations in pressing for the transfer of natural resources and the remittance of compensation for lands already sold. Nevertheless, the subsequent Liberal administrations of Alberta and Saskatchewan chose to revive only intermittently that claim from 1911 to 1914, and after the Interprovincial Conference of 1918.

Since the administrations of Manitoba dealt more persistently with the natural resources question than those of any other province, the student of that question will usefully concentrate upon the records of that province for his material. He will find an impressive continuity demonstrated by provincial administrations which struggled for the ownership of Crown lands.
from 1870 to 1930. In the experience of these administrations with the natural resources questions, one also perceives clearly, and more palpably than in the case of the other Western provinces, the fundamental change which occurred in the attitudes of electors to jurisdictional claims in the years from 1914 to 1925. Then their natural resources objective remained a significant financial consideration, but no longer an urgent political issue.

It is necessary to explain briefly the legal aspect of the controversies concerning the Dominion-held Crown lands before the political significance of the resulting issues becomes understandable. The origins of the natural resources question in the three Prairie provinces and the Railway Lands problem in British Columbia lie in the earliest acts defining the legal status of the original political entities in the Canadian West. By several important legislative measures enacted between 1869 and 1871, the John A. Macdonald administration had ensured that the federal Government would exclusively own all the Crown lands in Manitoba and the Northwest Territories, even before the two regional Governments of these areas had been formed. Thus, the Prairie natural resources question was a recurring source of conflict between the federal Governments and the Territorial or Provincial parties for over sixty years, until the dispute over the Crown lands was resolved by approximately 1930, chiefly by the British North America Act of that year.

It was also the first Conservative Government of the Dominion which had taken control of very extensive land holdings in British Columbia. In this case, the acquisition of the Railway Belt and the Peace River Block by the federal Parliament occurred with the consent of the already established Governments in British Columbia. The takeover resulted in exchange for commitments made by the Macdonald Cabinet to have two important railway lines and a dry-dock constructed in British Columbia. The respective agreements
were set down in the original Terms of the Union, which obliged the federal Government to arrange for the extension of a transcontinental railway line to the Pacific Coast, and the subsequent Act of 1885, providing for the Esquimalt-Nanaimo Railway and the dry-dock in Victoria.

There were undoubtedly significant legal differences between the claims raised by the provincial administrations in the Prairies to the federally-owned natural resources within their boundaries and the action which the Governments of British Columbia were to take in respect to the Railway lands. The Prairie administrations possessed the considerably stronger case from the juridical viewpoint. They could easily question the justice of the exceptional federal ownership over the Crown lands in their Provinces. By taking over the lands, the Government of Canada had assumed the power which the British Government had relinquished to the individual North American colonies in 1841. The federal policy in Canada as to the natural resources in the Prairies had no parallel in Australia, the only other federal state in the British Empire. Indeed, every self-governing unit in the Empire possessed control of its own public lands. In Canada, the federal Government had insisted upon the ownership of natural resources exclusively in the Prairie region. There was no warrant for its action in the British North America Act of 1867. On the contrary, there is a clear and explicit indication in that Act that the provinces would possess at least some Crown lands. Section 92, Clause 6, clearly stated that the provincial legislatures would hold the right to legislate concerning "Public Lands Belonging to the Provinces, and the Wood and Timber Thereupon". While this clause failed to assure full ownership over all the Crown lands with the provinces, there was no corresponding rule permitting the federal Government to establish its monopoly in this field.

To ensure the legality of its natural resources policy, the previously asserted right of the federal Parliament to decide unilaterally upon
the intended arbitrary apportionment of Parliamentary representation, Sir John A. Macdonald sponsored the British North America Act of 1871. This was the leading constitutional amendment passed by the British Parliament between 1867 and 1908. Even though after 1871 there remained little actual doubt as to the power of the federal Government to deprive any regional area of control over the Crown lands before its provincial institutions were formed, many critics were firmly convinced that the exceptional nature of the law pertaining to the Prairie provinces made it at odds with the spirit of Confederation. Indeed, the Borden Government admitted that arguments raised in 1913 by all the three Prairie administrations collectively were valid in principle. The Governments of the Dominion since that date delayed arranging for the transfer of the disputed Crown lands to provincial jurisdiction not because they particularly needed to retain their ownership, but rather because they thought it impossible to satisfy the additional compensation claim which the provincial administrations in the Maritime region insisted must accompany the settlement of the natural resources issue. The Maritime provincial administrations insisted, since 1911, that in case their counterparts in Manitoba, Alberta and Saskatchewan were to receive any compensation for the Crown lands which the Department of the Interior had already sold to settlers, they must also receive special subsidies to satisfy their various grievances. Legally, the Governments of the Dominion would probably have required the consent of only the three administrations in the Prairies to transfer the lands themselves, but the federal Governments believed that important changes in either federal subsidies or in the provision of compensation were to be approved unanimously by provincial administrations.

By contrast with the self-assurance demonstrated in the natural resources controversy by the three provincial Prairie administrations, British Columbia hesisted until 1918 to demand the return of
Railway lands. The McBride administration intended to purchase the federally-held lands in the Pacific provinces since 1911. The British Columbia Conservatives presented their proposal simply upon the grounds that the provincial authorities were better able to provide for the settlement of the respective Crown lands than was the federal Government. When the Oliver Government became sufficiently bold to insist upon the free recovery of the lands, that Liberal administration stated that the projected provincial takeover was to be the compensation for the mountain differential in the freight rates, fixed by the federal Board of Railway Commissioners. The Governments of the Dominion kept rejecting the arguments of the British Columbia administrations until 1928, when the W. L. MacKenzie King administration had yielded, for reasons of political expedience, to the demands made separately by Premier MacLean and the Conservative Opposition Leader, Simon F. Tolmie, that jurisdiction over Railway Lands be returned to the province.

Regardless of whether their legal arguments were strong or weak, all the provincial administrations in the Canadian West found it extremely difficult to obtain the ownership of the Dominion-held Crown lands within their boundaries. Complex political and financial factors explain the stubbornness shown by the John A. Macdonald and the Laurier Governments in resisting the provincial proposals for the transfer of the natural resources prior to 1911. Financial deficits were probably the decisive determining factor behind the continuing inaction of the federal administrations after 1918.

Until 1911, the principal reason why the administrations of the Dominion were determined to preserve their control over the Crown lands in the Western provinces was the typical "nationalist" belief that federal ownership was essential for the settlement of the available areas, with the provision of modern transport and communications. This feeling was eloquently stated by Frank Oliver in the assertion that "It is in the development of these
(Western Canadian) territories that the prosperity of the whole Dominion depends... The lands belong to Canada."¹⁸ In the case of the Prairie lands, the immediate consideration was the actual distribution of the homesteads.¹⁹ The conviction shared by all the federal Governments until 1911 in the necessity of continuing direct control over the resources was strengthened by numerous specific financial and political advantages derived from this policy. As regards the Railway Lands, the federal Government let the Canadian Pacific Railway dispose of the resources because it intended to keep that leading railway company in Canada financially stable in this manner. Indirectly, it also wished to encourage that company to push the settlement of its lands under the influence of commercial stimulus. The Canadian Pacific Railway administered the Railway Lands under the supervision of the federal Government.²⁰ While the Railway Lands policy deprived the federal Government of income from their sale, it enabled the Governments of the Dominion, after 1885, to make direct expenditures upon objectives other than the support of the Canadian Pacific Railway.

For the period from 1918 until 1930, the financial deficits of the Meighen and the King administrations indicate most clearly why the status quo was maintained in their Crown lands policy.²¹ It seems that these administrations actually felt unable to pay the compensation required by the Maritime provinces, along with the payment that was likely to accrue to the provincial administrations in the Prairie region.²² In the case of the Railway Lands in British Columbia, the federal administrations must have also wished to give the Canadian Pacific Railway the opportunity to retain its surpluses in the light of heavier operating expenses and more competition.

In fact, the crucial reason why the provincial administrations in the Canadian West failed to obtain control over the disputed Crown lands was their lack of sufficient political influence to produce the desired action
If any of the governing national parties had found it politically inevitable to accept the provincial proposals, they would have taken that action even if they were required to keep the direct taxation at the wartime level for several years after 1918.

Financial as well as political considerations explain why the administrations of the Western provinces repeatedly raised their claims to the Dominion-held Crown lands and to compensation for the lands that the Department of the Interior had already sold to settlers. At all times, financial motives were doubtless of considerable importance in determining the substance of these provincial claims and the manner in which the Western provincial administration promoted them. In particular, in the years prior to 1900, the administrations of Manitoba and the Northwest were essentially interested in the financial aspect of their claims to the Dominion-held Crown lands and to compensation for already alienated lands. For that very reason in particular, all the Western provincial administrations including British Columbia revived or (in the case of British Columbia) presented their claims to Crown lands after 1918. While granting that the financial motives were of substantial weight in influencing the Conservative administrations of Manitoba, the Conservative party of Alberta, and Frederick G. Haultain's Provincial Rights Party in Saskatchewan to emphasize these claims over all other political issues arising in their provinces during the period from 1900 to 1914, it is suggested that these "autonomists" were equally concerned with important political (ideological and partisan) considerations.

While always present in the mind of provincial Cabinets to some extent, partisan considerations are especially apparent in their attitudes to provincial claims during the decade and a half preceding World War I. This period was one of intense partisanship in the Western provinces. It was also then that the Western Canadian Governments made a clear-cut choice between
full cooperation with the federal Government and the energetic defense of provincial autonomy.

As will later be pointed out, political reasons were likewise the principal consideration dictating all the provincial administrations in the Canadian West to revise their attitude towards the federal Governments after 1918. The content of the resulting provincial policies in respect to their constitutional proposals presented before the Parliament of the Dominion had already been broadly indicated. It remains to pinpoint the shortcomings of the typical tendency then shown by the four Western provincial administrations to restrict their claims upon the federal Government to one single issue and to push their interest in that claim in an excessively cautious, indecisive manner. The defects of the post-World War I provincial policies in questions also involving the federal level appear clearly when they are compared with the far reaching course of action followed by the Governments of the Northwest Territories, of Manitoba, and British Columbia prior to 1914.

There are several sets of facts showing that in the earlier twenty years preceding World War I the autonomist Western Territorial and provincial administrations attached more weight to their provincial claims than any of their successors were to do later. The evidence appears in the theoretical justification which these Governments presented to back up their claims, in their conduct during election campaigns, and in their readiness to pursue more than one possibility of expanding their functions. The impatience of the pre-1915 regional administrations to improve their legal status has produced remarkable theoretical arguments. That characteristic is best expressed in the view which the Prairie administrations then developed to buttress their claim to the federally held Crown lands. Certainly the very ablest formulations of the provincial demands were those given by Premier Frederick G. Haultain of the Northwest Territories in a speech delivered in June, 1900, and by
Professor Chester A. Martin of the University of Manitoba in a volume entitled *The Natural Resources Question*, a treatise written by arrangement with the Norris Government. The two sources provide much information concerning the political ideology of their authors and sponsors. There is substantial agreement in the conclusion offered.

The speech which Premier Haultain delivered before the Northwest Territories Council in 1900 is remarkable not only for its intellectual keeness, but also for the far-reaching theoretical justification of his claim. The principal ideas that he presented as premises to the natural resources claims of his administration include the ideas of local freedom from financial responsibility for Canada's purchase of Rupertsland and the analogy between the Empire and Canada as imperial entities (rather than nation-states). These allow or should allow to their self-governing provinces control over all Crown lands in their territory. Haultain is also responsible for an eloquent plea affirming that the Western provinces are entitled to "equality of status" with the original provinces of Canada in subsidies as well as in the control of their natural wealth. To bolster his arguments, he concluded his speech with an ingenuous, but somewhat unconvincing argument stating that Canada's purchase of Rupertsland from the Hudson's Bay Company gave the Dominion legislative but not proprietary powers over the Crown lands in the Northwest Territories. This idea might easily have been applied to Manitoba, too.

Clearly, Haultain meant that the Dominion Parliament had received, in 1869, the power to enact laws referring to the Crown lands in the territories to be acquired, although the Cabinet of the United Kingdom still retained ownership over these resources. Putting forth that theory, Haultain requested the British Parliament to enact an amendment to the British North America Act of 1867 providing for full provincial ownership over natural resources, and he also asked Canada to surrender its right to legislate regarding these lands
simultaneously with the passage of the proposed Autonomy Acts for the Northwest Territories.

Although Professor Martin refrained from citing Haultain's distinction between the proprietary and the legislative powers of the Crown, and although he apparently accepted the view that the Dominion lawfully exercised its ownership of the Crown lands in Manitoba, he emphasized the idea stated by Haultain that the Dominion should formulate its policies in respect to the provinces by analogy to those which Great Britain had been practising in North America prior to 1867. The policies practiced by Great Britain in relation to the British North American colonies coupled the granting of Responsible Government with the extension of ownership over Crown lands to the provincial administrations. "The principles underlying this claim (wrote Martin) are much older than the province of Manitoba or the Dominion of Canada. The public domain had always been, and still remains in title vested in the Crown, and as one was indivisible throughout the Empire (cf. Lord Hilden, A.P.C.), but two functions with regard to it, viz. the administration of the same, and b. the beneficial interest therein, were long in dispute until both were unreservedly conceded to self-governing provinces upon their undertaking the rights and duties of a responsible government." In brief, just as the British Parliament had handed the Crown lands of the united province of Canada and of the Maritime colonies to their administrations by 1851, Canada should do likewise.

The reasons why Martin considered that control over natural resources is the **sine qua non** of a responsible administration are his premises as to the nature of Responsible Government. In his view, a provincial administration must largely ensure its own financial solvency in order to conduct its policies autonomously, with a view to accomplishing this end, and also for reasons of prestige, its legislature must exercise full
legislative sovereignty over all objects and persons within the territory of the province (except for those matters reserved for the Dominion by the British North America Act of 1867). According to Martin, a province must command substantial powers of autonomy, if its administration is to enjoy the respect of the electorate. A provincial administration must therefore control the manner in which the wealth of the province is being handed out or leased, and it must also satisfy the expectations of the public for public services.\textsuperscript{27} In order to perform its functions, it has to enjoy financial solvency. As the Fathers of Confederation had seen, provincial ownership of natural resources was a substantial revenue source for the province. For these reasons, Martin argued that it was imperative for the Western provinces to secure the Crown lands (along with payment for alienated lands), if they were to enjoy financial solvency and exercise the functions originally intended for all provincial administrations.

A survey of Manitoba history reveals that the administrations of that province gave continuous attention to their natural resources claim from the beginning of their provincial identity to the settlement of the question in 1939. Throughout the intervening years, the leading political figures in Manitoba gave more prominence to the natural resources question than to any other constitutional or other jurisdictional problem, except possibly for the years from 1881 to 1896. At that early time, the disallowance of railway legislation, and after 1887, the educational crisis had been receiving a comparable degree of attention.

As early as 1876, the first premier of a responsible administration, John Norquay, mapped his policies on the premise that the acquisition of the Crown lands was the most important demand that his Cabinet made upon the Dominion.\textsuperscript{28} For that reason, he made unyielding efforts to obtain an amendment to Section 30, of the Manitoba Act, providing that "all ungranted lands
or wastelands in the province shall be, from the date of the said transfer, vested in the Crown, and administered by Canada for the purposes of the Dominion." Until at least 1911, the federal Governments advised any concerned province to desist from making demands for a return or transfer of jurisdiction over natural resources.

Their 19th century administrations conditioned the Manitoba electorate to give support to parties emphasizing the natural resources objective of the province. Early leaders, such as Norquay, considered Section 30 more objectionable than the limitation placed upon provincial powers in educational matters. Prior to 1887, little was said concerning the education provision in Section 2, while the provincial Cabinet placed much emphasis upon their natural resources claim. This viewpoint appears in their submissions to the Dominion in connection with the negotiations leading to the Manitoba Claims Settlement Act of 1885. Likewise, the great concern shown by the Norquay administration for their claim to the Crown lands is apparent in the stand taken by Norquay himself at the Interprovincial Conference of 1887. At that time, he successfully put forth his proposal that the resolutions of the conference should embody that objective, as well as his demand that disallowance be abolished. He also persuaded the participants at the Interprovincial Conference that a statement supporting the right of the provinces to grant railway charters in contravention of the monopoly enjoyed by the Canadian Pacific Railway be inserted into the resolutions.

By 1888, the Manitoba Schools Question did temporarily remove the spotlight from the natural resources question. From that year until 1896, the educational clause of the Manitoba Act aroused much controversy, because the opponents of the Educational Act of 1887, sponsored by the Greenway Liberals, seized upon that clause to frustrate the object of Greenway's policy. Because the Laurier-Greenway Agreement concluded the Manitoba Schools Question
In 1897, the Conservative party demanded that provincial claims made upon the Dominion, particularly the objective of acquiring Crown lands, be once more considered the fundamental objective of the provincial administration.

To summarize, both the Manitoba Schools Question and the natural resources issue in its early stages provided the psychological foundations for the policies later followed by the Macdonald (1899-1900) and less than the Roblin (1900-1915) administrations. These controversies, along with the frequent use of disallowance prior to 1895, created "a tradition of grievance", which the second Conservative administration exploited in appealing to the electorate for support in its conflicts with the Dominion.

To what extent did the provincial parties of Manitoba differ, between 1900 and 1930, on the issues pertaining to the demands made by the Conservative Governments upon Parliament for new administrative functions? Both parties were autonomists in their ideology until probably 1921, including Premier John Norris. Further, the Liberals supported in substance all the financial, boundary, and natural resources issues which the Conservative administrations had introduced.

The reason for the consensus among the two provincial parties was present in the attitudes of the electorate. In Manitoba, as in any portion of the Canadian West, the electorate insisted that their Government must ambitiously evolve its legislative policies. The electors, creating new communities, were impatient for adequate economic services, as in matters of railways and public schools. Hence the widespread support for the principle that the provincial parties should set policies independently of the federal Government. Many were to scorn any partisan organizational restraints upon the manner in which legislation was made.

The difference between the provincial Conservatives and Liberals extended precisely to the nature of political methodology which the provincial
Government was to use in its dealings with the federal parties. At first, during the years from 1896 to approximately 1905, there was substantial agreement among party leaders even in this respect. Premier Greenway's success in obtaining Laurier's pledge ruling out federal interference with provincial public schools was considered fair for the province. All the political leaders still agreed that compromise between the two levels should be attempted whenever possible. On the other hand, few were holding the formerly popular view that regional provincial leaders should not actively collaborate or participate in federal politics. Norquay was the last Premier to have been neutral.\(^{35}\) The great majority of practicing politicians came to believe, during the subsequent Liberal administration, that regional Governments should possess the ability to influence the selection of federal Members. The remaining arguments concerned the wisdom of associating with specific federal Governments, and the nature of the collaboration. As to the first question, the Laurier Government was still popular with the majority of Manitobans during the period in question.\(^{36}\) Supporting it could only help, but not hurt, the Greenway Government. As to the method in which the provincial leaders were to act in federal elections, the principal prerequisite for honourable dealings was considered the absence of secrecy. The Liberal Manitoba Government was not charged with violating that principle.\(^{37}\)

The provincial Conservatives vehemently criticised the Laurier Government for its then inflexible stand upon numerous constitutional questions, although not before the provincial election of 1899. That year, the Manitoba Opposition, then led by Hugh J. Macdonald, finally defeated Greenway Liberals largely upon the promise of extending provincial functions with surplus financing.\(^{38}\) The resulting difficulty of accomplishing such contradictory intentions created a serious danger for the Conservative Government and made its members look for the most promising remedies.
The financial factor behind the attitude of the Conservative Government in Manitoba towards the Laurier Cabinet is easily established. The provincial Treasury remained, for several years, at the brink of deficit, while the Roblin administration was inaugurating an extensive economic program. Still, the intention of the Manitoba Conservatives to finance that ambitious policy does not fully explain the emphasis which they placed upon constitutional issues. Their financial position was hardly desperate. Their political situation was serious.

Believing firmly in the "autonomist" principles, the Conservatives looked for ways of retaining the support of a badly divided and politically highly volatile electorate. There was no important reason why the public should refuse the provincial Liberals an early return to power. To prevent this possibility from occurring, it was essential to formulate very attractive specific regional objectives at both the legislative provincial level and in relationships with federal Governments.

Further, in Canadian provincial politics, only an impressive personality can assure his administration repeated re-election. Due to an unexpected difference of opinion in the Cabinet, the best-known leader of the Conservatives resigned in 1900. With a view to unite the electorate around his own leadership, removing denominational conflicts from the attention of the public, and encouraging public interest in provincial institutions, Premier Roblin commenced his long crusade for the constitutional interests of Manitoba.

The Manitoba Conservatives were greatly encouraged by the sympathetic attitude of Robert L. Borden, who became the new National leader of the federal Conservative party in 1900. As long as his predecessor, Sir Charles Tupper, remained the head of the party, it must have seemed extremely doubtful whether their Dominion party would accept the natural resources objective of the Manitoba Conservatives, since Sir Charles was a warmer advocate of the
National Policy than Wilfrid Laurier. In fact, Sir Charles' viewpoint must have made a settlement to the natural resources issue so remote that Hugh J. Macdonald hesitated to give much attention to that problem during the 1889 election. As soon as Borden took over the federal leadership of the Conservative party, and expressed his approval of Manitoba's claim to the Crown lands, during a tour of the Canadian West in 1902, the Roblin administration no longer hesitated to devote much emphasis to the issue. Borden's support increased the likelihood of a favorable conclusion of the issue in the admittedly remote possibility of a Conservative victory in a Dominion election. Perhaps even more importantly, it gave the Roblin administration an opportunity to put effective pressure upon the Laurier administration by threatening the defeat of the Liberal Members of the House of Commons for Manitoba.

The major reason for the ability of the Conservative administrations of Manitoba to retain and even to strengthen their grasp on the electorate in 1900-1911, even in Dominion elections, was their success in combining their ultimate natural resources objective with other claims that brought immediate results. For instance, in 1899-1902, they skillfully championed their natural resources claim at two levels, by submitting to the Dominion distinct proposals for a final settlement and for a partial immediate transfer.

As a long-range political objective, they requested the transfer of all the Crown lands under the ownership of the Dominion within their provincial territory, with a full power to sell the available lands for settlers and to give minerals leases. (Before 1905, they rarely referred to a payment for the lands that had already been sold). The Conservatives in both Manitoba and in the other Prairie provinces repeatedly advocated the transfer of the Crown lands in general terms in all the provincial elections in Manitoba. In this manner, they were educating the electorate of their province in the
importance of that objective, and developed even more extensive support for it than had previously existed.

Prior to the agreement reached in 1903, the Conservative administrations pressed, in formal submissions to the Laurier Cabinet, for the immediate acquisition of those Crown lands that had been set aside as School Lands. The Conservatives were then asking for one and three-fourths of a section in every township, with a reimbursement comprising the revenue which the Department of the Interior had received from the sale of the already alienated lands and was owing to the administration of Manitoba on the basis of a previous agreement. There are clear financial and political reasons for the decision made by the Macdonald and the Roblin governments to concentrate upon the objective of acquiring the School Lands. Essentially, the Dominion was more likely to consent to a partial transfer than to a general settlement, especially when the process of settling the Prairie region and British Columbia was nearing its peak. Hence, the Conservative administrations of Manitoba considered that their claim to the School Lands might bring an earlier result than their general natural resources objective. Either their acquisition of the School Lands or an increase in the Dominion subsidy would bring immediate financial relief. The provincial administration was doubtless expecting to charge higher prices for the sale of homesteads than did the Department of the Interior in Ottawa. Gains of this sort would strengthen the political position of the Roblin administration by making possible expanded provincial services and simply by impressing the electorate with the effectiveness of Conservative policy.

In the resulting negotiations, the Roblin administration received an increased subsidy in lieu of School Lands. Even before this settlement was reached, the Roblin administration raised other claims intended to provide further revenues. Expectations grew that the Conservatives might be able to secure a settlement of the natural resources issue, too. The principal
additional demands raised by that administration were Manitoba's revived claim to a boundary revision, initially proposed in 1901, and a request for increased per capita subsidies, revised at the 1906 Federal-Provincial Conference. In pressing these demands, the Roblin administration did obtain some fairly early success: the subsidy increases gained in 1907 and 1912,\(^4\) the acquisition of the Northland at the latter date.\(^5\)

The political use which the Conservative administrations of Manitoba made of these "provincial rights" objectives since 1900 was very extensive and effective. They employed political contests as opportunities to educate the electorate in the significance of provincial autonomy. This motive is particularly apparent in the political campaigns preceding provincial elections. On those occasions, the boundary and the natural resources questions were frequently discussed.

In his efforts to establish a firm control over the electorate, the Roblin Government consciously aggravated the tactical differences between themselves and the provincial Liberals. The most serious of these arose between 1908 and 1911. The Manitoba Liberals had advocated the acceptance of Laurier's generous boundary offer, made in 1908. Nevertheless, the Conservative Cabinet tied the result of the respective negotiations to the satisfaction of their financial demand to the equality of treatment with Saskatchewan and Alberta, to be retroactive from the year of the settlement to 1905.\(^6\) Also debated was the problem of the affiliation which a provincial administration enjoyed with a Dominion party. The Conservatives claimed that the Liberals were associated with the Dominion party which offered the least hope for a settlement of provincial claims, and that they were impeded by their association from conducting a vigorous drive for that objective.\(^7\) Meanwhile the Liberals stressed the practicality of being associated with a governing Dominion party.\(^8\)

Generally, after 1899, the Conservatives appeared to possess a more convincing argument, since the Greenway administration had attained few results from their association with the Laurier Cabinet in 1896-1899. As a result, the Liberals in Manitoba tended to shy away from discussing provincial claims in provincial politics. The Conservatives pursued them all the more belligerently. Why did the Conservatives introduce so persistently these issues into provincial campaigns? The most plausible explanations are that they wanted either to capitalize on the popularity of achievements of their federal organization or that they aimed to impress that party with their ability to control the electorate over issues that pertained to the policies of the Dominion. The latter consideration was clearly the leading motive behind the political tactics of the Conservatives, since they had much difficulty in influencing their own federal party in the matter of provincial claims, and since they had few achievements to boast of prior to the settlement of 1912. As a result, to achieve any results at all, they felt it necessary to demonstrate all the more convincingly their role as molders of public opinion.

The Conservative administrations of Manitoba performed impressively. They used jurisdictional objectives more effectively than the Liberals, because they were more resolute in their criticisms of the policies practiced by the Laurier administration. In the natural resources question, for instance, both parties took a bipartisan stand behind the traditional objective set up by Norquay. The provincial demand for the transfer of natural resources appeared in every Conservative and Liberal platform in provincial elections, until the settlement of the issue was reached in approximately 1930. Nevertheless, the Roblin Government was thought to be more determined to obtain results than the Liberal Opposition, since the Conservatives had succeeded, immediately upon accepting office, in reaching a close understanding with their National Leader.
In respect to the other claims, i.e. the boundary revision and the subsidy questions, the Conservatives were either the originators of the provincial demand, or else took a more ambitious view of provincial interests than did the Liberals. To illustrate, when on April 5, 1899, the future Liberal Minister of Education Cameron moved, and ex-Premier Greenway seconded a motion instructing the provincial administration to demand a lump sum of $300,000 from the Dominion to settle a controversy over payments in lieu of School Lands, the Conservatives had this motion amended, calling for control over the entire School Lands. On the other hand, the Roblin administration originated the proposals for boundary revision and per capita increases in Dominion subsidies. By spotlighting their role as advocates of these objectives, the Conservatives obtained an increasing percentage of the total vote cast in the provincial elections of 1903, 1906, and 1909.

The Conservatives were notably concerned to emphasize the natural resources and the boundary issues in the 1906 election. In that campaign, partisan motives played clearly the crucial role behind their decision to give prominence to provincial claims. They successfully employed their stand on these questions to defeat the most powerful challenge that they had faced from the Liberals since their return to power in 1899. This threat arose from the attack that the Liberal Leader Brown made upon Roblin's educational policy. Although Brown's step was likely to help Liberals at the expense of encouraging bitter exchanges of opinion along denominational lines, Roblin outwitted Brown. He made an emotional appeal to the electors, while emphasizing the campaign for a boundary revision. In the 1906 general election, as in no other, "the boundary issue even masked the growing problem of educational administration and the assimilation of alien immigrants and their children." In 1906 at least, the Roblin Conservatives voiced their jurisdiction objectives primarily for political reasons.
The Conservative administration also did its best to persuade their Dominion party to adopt these objectives, although their viewpoints never coincided. In the natural resources question, Premier Roblin came close to obtaining the cooperation of the National Leader of the Conservative Party. It was since 1901, Robert Borden. While he made no commitments as to the boundary question until at least 1908, Borden made a promise as early as 1901 to press for a fair solution of the natural resources question. Writing later of events occurring in 1902, he stated: "Throughout the Western Tour, I emphasized the need of a policy of adequate protection for Canadian industries and did not in the least depart from any ... (proposal) that had been renounced in Eastern Canada. The subject to which I gave the greatest prominence in the Prairie provinces was provincial autonomy and the control of public domain. I urged that the people of the Territories should have the same right of self-government in respect of their domestic affairs as that enjoyed in the other provinces. On many occasions there was marked enthusiasm."

Robert Borden changed his view of the natural resources question several times. While Leader of the Opposition, he kept repeating his early promise with various important qualifications. Until at least the 1907-08 campaign, he was apparently prepared to risk an unqualified statement of policy. In 1904, for instance, when an Opposition speaker impressed Borden with the possibility that provincial control of the Crown Lands might lead to high land charges and consequently impede the settlement of the West, the Conservative Leader suggested that only the even-numbered sections of Crown lands, or only a half of all the available resources, be transferred to the Western provinces. In a debate following Laurier's introduction of the Saskatchewan and the Alberta Autonomy Acts, Borden had frankly agreed with the Prime Minister that some restrictions upon provincial control of the Crown lands were essential, if these lands were transferred (as Borden then
"If there were any danger of land-grabbing, it could be obviated by a clause in the bill relating to free homesteads and the price of the lands." It is clear that Borden then meant that the provincial administrations be forced to charge only nominal fees, which would leave the flow of settlers unimpaired, regardless of whether the provinces or the Dominion controlled the Prairie Crown lands.

By 1907, the Conservative National Leader was determined to avert another defeat, even if he were required to pledge a transfer of the natural resources without specifying restrictions upon provincial powers. Thus in his Halifax speech of August 20th, an address serving as the Conservative platform for the subsequent Dominion election, Borden promised "the restoration of public lands to Alberta and Saskatchewan upon fair terms". He admitted "the absolute right of the new provinces to obtain control of their lands and the richness and value of the assets involved". The administrations of Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan "should be placed upon a footing of equality with other provinces of Canada", Borden was prepared to state without reservations.

Upon becoming Prime Minister, Borden proceeded to implement the latter pledge exclusively in relation to subsidy increases asked by the Western provinces. In 1912, his Cabinet sponsored a bill raising the per capita subsidies of all the Western provinces. Simultaneously, the Borden Cabinet met Manitoba's claim to increased per capita subsidies and payments in lieu of Crown lands to the level enjoyed by Alberta and Saskatchewan, these increases being made retroactive to 1905. The total of the subsidies received by Manitoba was raised from $833,438.86 in 1912 to $1,343,345.39 in 1913. Likewise, the Borden administration granted Manitoba the boundary revision desired by Premier Roblin. Simultaneously, Borden thought it
preferable to defer a decision upon the natural resources controversy.

Prime Minister Borden remained, in principle, favorable to the idea of having the Prairie provinces acquire at least a portion of the public domain. Thus he implied, during the Inter Dominion-provincial Conference of 1912, that the desired transfer was feasible. "Though the subject was not debated, the Western premiers waited upon Mr. Borden and presented upon his Government the desirability of handing the natural resources of the West to the provincial governments. The Dominion Premier asked that their case should be prepared and presented in writing." To the Western politicians, the transfer of the federally held lands in the Western provinces must have appeared close.

Since immigration rates declined sharply after 1911, the federal Government no longer required the majority of the available homestead sections for settlement purposes. Land suitable for successful farming had already been mostly occupied. After 1911, the transfer of the Crown lands was delayed by a fear arising in the Maritime region that any further transfers of power benefitting the Western provinces might make less likely desirable subsidy increases for their own provinces. Since the turn of the century, party leaders in the Maritime region saw the reason for this threat lying in the greatly expanded representation enjoyed by the Western provinces in Parliament. It was thought likely that even if no serious financial shortage developed in the federal Treasury, the majority in the caucus of the governing party might either be unwilling to spend larger funds for such regional conveniences as the Intercolonial Railway or (in the case of Conservatives) might proceed to raise an equivalent through objectionable increases in tariff. The Maritime premiers apparently decided that further jurisdictional or subsidy grants made by Parliament to the Western provinces might encourage the successful members to seek additional power in the governing party.
The leaders of the Maritime region also proceeded to ensure for themselves larger subsidies, while they still possessed substantial influence with the major federal parties. Already in 1911, the government of New Brunswick asked that the Federal Subsidy Act be amended. It was suggested that the province would prefer to have the federal Government "amount made payable under either of the two plans" worked out to ensure the construction of certain railway lines. New Brunswick acted impatiently even before the Conference of 1912 took place. Subsequently, all the Maritime provinces acted jointly in the matter of subsidies. For instance, on January 29 (1913) a Maritime delegation waits upon the Dominion premier and through the Hon. J. A. Mathieson and W. C. H. Grimmer presents the claim of these provinces for compensation in respect to large extensions of territory accorded various other provinces in recent years.

It appears from Prime Minister Borden's letter addressed to the three Prairie premiers, it was sometime during the winter of 1913-14 that the Maritime governments in the Maritime region finally reached a common decision to publicise their stand upon the natural resources issue.

"Coming to the letter of December 22nd, 1913, from the three Prairie Premiers I had expressed my desire that the subject should be discussed at the Provincial Conference during the previous autumn. The reason why it was not then discussed was the well-known opposition of the Maritime Provinces to any such proposal, except upon compensation to other provinces. Under the circumstances, I declared my inability to regard the proposal of the Prairie Premiers as reasonable or as setting forth any such terms as I had asked them to place before me at my conference with them. Further, I had transmitted to each of the Maritime Premiers a copy of the letter from the three Prairie Premiers and had asked for their impressions. In each case the reply was distinctly opposed to the claim set forth in the Prairie Premiers' letter. Finally I stated that the views put forward by the Prairie Premiers and those put forward by the Maritime Premiers ought to be considered and dealt with at one and the same time.

Concluding, I said:

'We are desirous of dealing with this question in a reasonable way, but it did not seem to me that the proposal put forward to us in December last by the three Prime Ministers of the prairie provinces..."
'was one that they really expected us to entertain. I assumed that they put it forward more especially as a basis for further negotiation. At all events, at the moment I have only this to say, that up to the present time those negotiations have had no further results.'"

From the earliest years of Manitoba as a province up to and including the Reciprocity Election of 1911, there is a clear relationship between the changes in Conservative policy regarding the natural resources question and the votes cast in federal elections. In 1872, Manitoba's leaders, like Girard, hoped to obtain significant gains by cooperating with the Macdonald Government and its representative, the first Lieutenant-Governor Archibald. Consequently, five out of the six Members of Parliament elected in 1872 joined the Conservative caucus upon arriving in Ottawa. In 1874 and 1882, the Manitoba voters elected a divided representation, in large measure because neither federal party was prepared to satisfy key provincial demands, including the one for the transfer of natural resources.

In the subsequent two elections, regional conflicts over the status of Roman Catholic schools were more important than any other issue in producing Conservative majorities. That issue was allayed, at least in federal politics, by the Laurier-Greenway Agreement of 1897. Immediately, the controversy over Crown lands entered into the foreground.

In 1900, the Conservative National Leader, Sir Charles Tupper, refused to support the natural resources objective put forth by the Roblin Government. Tupper's viewpoint upon that issue seems to explain substantially why the Liberals received 53.7% of the popular vote in Manitoba in that year's federal election, and secured as many as seven out of ten available seats in the House of Commons. In 1904, even though Borden hedged with important reservations his promise to arrange for the transfer of the Crown
lands to Manitoba, his generally sympathetic attitude was instrumental in aiding the Conservatives to extend their support. That year, they gained 45.9% of the popular vote and seven out of ten seats, despite the popularity of the new transcontinental railways promoted by the Laurier Government. It is likely that the Conservative vote would have been larger if Borden had taken a more determined stand for Manitoba's natural resources objective.

In the 1908 federal election, Borden's apparently unreserved support for provincial interests brought decisive results in Manitoba. On that occasion, the Conservatives frankly spotlighted their partisan view upon the natural resources question. J. Cassels Hopkins emphasized that they persisted in criticising "the administration of Western lands... (as) the central theme of their speeches" throughout the Prairie provinces. Hence they were able to counter effectively the Liberal leaders, who ensured that "in Manitoba the chief issue was Sir Clifford Sifton" (then a supporter of the Laurier administration).
By placing emphasis upon the natural resources objective of the Roblin administration, and by cooperating closely with the provincial Roblin-Rogers party association, the Conservative candidates for the House of Commons won 55.3% of the popular vote, with eight out of the ten seats available in Manitoba. This was the high water mark of the gains won by the Dominion Conservatives in Manitoba before 1930. In the Reciprocity election of 1911, they dropped one seat, and their popular vote slipped slightly to 51.8%.

Because of the coming of World War I, the Liberals possessed no opportunity to highlight Borden's inability to arrange for the settlement of the natural resources question when the subsequent Dominion election was called in 1917. The Unionist election followed by three years of agreement reached by the Borden administration with the provincial Cabinets, who pledged to suspend their jurisdictional claims to new responsibilities and revenues.

Nevertheless, we can ascertain the intentions of the Norris administration in respect to natural resources issue by analyzing the methods employed by his party in the provincial general election of 1914, which preceded that agreement. In the 1914 political campaign Norris, then a Leader of the Opposition, concentrated his criticisms of the Roblin administration precisely upon their failure to obtain a settlement of the provincial natural resources objective from the Borden Cabinet. His conduct in that year's campaign indicates that he intended to follow the political methodology employed by the Conservatives during the administration of Wilfrid Laurier, i.e. that he intended to attack their relationship with the Borden administration.

A perceptible change in Premier Norris' ideology appears during 1921 and 1922. In the former year's federal election, he collaborated with
T. A. Crerar, even though the latter showed slight interest in provincial jurisdictional interests, and members of the Manitoba Government themselves made few references to such topics. While that behaviour might be considered a question of methodology, the persistent unwillingness of Norris to discuss widely the obstacles arising to the settlement of the natural resources issue suggest a deeper motive.

The positive evidence that Norris experienced a revision of values appears in his suddenly enhanced interest in matters beyond the intended competence of provincial administrations. He culminated this evolution by running in a famous though unsuccessful campaign against Richard Rogers for a Winnipeg Parliamentary seat in 1925, although he would have found it easier to get a seat in the provincial assembly. In 1927, he accepted an appointment to the Board of Railway Commissioners in Ottawa. The behaviour of the former Liberal premier after 1922 strongly supports a hypothesis that he has been moving towards the nationalist viewpoint since the conclusion of World War I. Further studies of his record are required before one can say that partisan expediency played a prominent role in his decision. There is much evidence to suggest, of course, that his analysis of the political trends affirmed his belief that it was unrealistic for an important Manitoba party to continue the prewar emphasis upon the constitutional rights of the province.

Norris' methodology since 1917 was typical of the other Western Canadian administrations of the period. In 1918, when the pledge made by the provincial Governments in 1914 to suspend their claims had lapsed, Premier Norris presented Manitoba's traditional natural resources demand to the Unionist Cabinet for the first time. In conjunction with other Western premiers, he worked hard to achieve a satisfactory settlement of the problem at the Inter-provincial Conference of 1918, at the Federal-Provincial
meetings held that very same year and again in 1921,\textsuperscript{79} and during the special briefing session which the provincial leaders had with Arthur Meighen, the new Prime Minister, during 1920.\textsuperscript{80} Nelson suggested that the Liberal premier considered the particular provincial interest intrinsically important \textit{per se}. Nelson's conclusion would place Norris in the \textit{qualified cooperative} category. There is little corroboration for this suggestion in the records. Instead, one finds in the Manitoba submissions exclusive references to the compensation desired for the sold lands. There is no reference to Professor Martin's autonomist theoretical arguments. Whether the Manitoba Government shared Martin's view is still to be established from their private papers.

After 1921, the Norris administration continued to treat the natural resources issue as a suitable topic exclusively for nonpartisan negotiations. The Liberal and the Bracken Governments underrated the partisan or the educational values of the issue. The leading provincial political figures, except for the Conservatives, gave that question hardly any attention in either the federal elections of 1921 and 1925,\textsuperscript{82} or in the provincial contests held in 1920, 1922, and 1927.\textsuperscript{83} Little effort was made to enlist "grassroots" support for the several distinct provincial proposals submitted to the King Government.

Partly as a result of the detached viewpoint shown by Manitoba premiers in the natural resources issue during political campaigns, the National Party Leaders resisted the temptation that they must have felt to introduce the relevant provincial ideas in federal politics. Apparently, the federal parties, as a rule, neglected to give even cursory attention to the Crown lands problem during their own political campaigns between 1918 and 1930. Possibly, the sole exception to this tendency were statements made by United Farmers of Alberta candidates in 1925 to promote the provincial demands made by the Brownlee administration.
Clearly, the natural resources issue lost much of its political significance in all the Prairie provinces by 1920. The fact that the provincial premiers preferred to push their views in the context of the Dominion-provincial conferences hardly indicates *ipso facto* that they considered their natural resources claims unimportant. The question must be, was it promising to champion provincial claims without appealing for the elector's backing? After the failure of the 1921 Conference, it must have been clear to the provincial leaders that sole negotiating would produce no early action. Their determination to continue their cautious course of action at least implies that they were reconciled to the prospect of long delay.

What are the factors ultimately explaining the readiness of the provincial administrations in the Prairie region to put into use a strategy which led to no immediate gains being won from the federal Government?

There is little doubt that the ideas of cooperation and nonpartisanship emphasized by various elements among organized farmers and political reformers affected the determination of the Western provincial administrations to underplay the political aspects of their claims to the transfer of Dominion-held Crown lands and to increases in their federal subsidies. These ideological influences possibly exerted a considerable effect upon the conduct of the individual leaders of the Western provinces in years from 1918 to 1930. Unfortunately, since none of the individual premiers in Western Canada in that period was particularly adept at expressing his ideological convictions, it is difficult to provide the evidence illustrating that the ideals of the political reform movement determined their judgment as to the manner of accomplishing individual objectives, like the acquisition of the Crown lands. For that reason, the ideological factors will be analyzed exclusively in reference to the priorities which the electorate in the Canadian West and
their Governments gave to the two principal types of political issues. This writer will consider electoral considerations to be the immediate factors behind provincial tactics.

What are the financial motives leading provincial administrations to seek nonpartisan methods of obtaining the transfer of natural resources to their jurisdiction? It may be suggested that one of these factors was the awareness of the provincial administrations that the extent of the Crown lands had dwindled by 1914, and that since the remaining lands were hardly choice ones, their acquisition would contribute a distinctly limited source of revenue. This is true. After 1914, the Department of the Interior administered at a deficit the remaining Crown lands under the jurisdiction of the Dominion administration. Only very substantial annual increases in the numbers of farmers immigrating to Canada might have made it possible for either the Dominion or the provincial Treasuries to make a profit from the sale of the Crown lands at stake. Still, the Western provincial administrations did expect an increased revenue from the licensing of the timber reserves and the mineral deposits upon the Crown lands, and from the leasing of sites to firms interested in instituting hydro-electric developments in the public domain. These administrations found the possibility of hydro-electric developments highly attractive only after 1925, but the benefits to be gained from licensing prospecting and mining firms intending to open or expand their operations in the Canadian Shield sections of Saskatchewan and Manitoba, and in various locations in British Columbia, were a very real expectation shared by the respective provincial governments, immediately after 1918. Moreover, until at least 1926, when plans of hydro-electric developments began multiplying, the Western administrations found that even more realistic than their expectations pertaining to Crown lands themselves was the prospect of obtaining satisfactory financial compensation for lands that had
already been sold by the Department of the Interior to settlers.

The latter reason is probably the most convincing explanation why the premiers of the Western provinces persisted in struggling, at Dominion-Provincial Conferences, to obtain the satisfaction of their natural resources claims, even though they gained slight political advantage by taking that stand. Until 1924, all the Western premiers decisively refused to accept the transfer of the Crown lands without being given the compensation which they claimed for already alienated lands. Thus at the Dominion-Provincial Conference of 1921, Premiers Norris and Oliver forcefully demanded that the Meighen Cabinet arrange the final solution to their natural resources claims in toto, including their compensation objectives, even though the premiers of the Maritime provinces were most strongly opposed precisely to that aspect of their demands. Granted, Prime Minister Meighen refused to discuss the claim of British Columbia to the Peace River Block and the Railway Belt, he might well have been able to propose, to the satisfaction of all participants at the Conference, a formula for the transfer of Dominion-held Crown lands to the Prairie provinces, if Norris, Greenfield, and Martin had avoided insisting upon compensation for lands that the Department of the Interior had already sold to settlers.

The compensation aspect to the natural resources question was to remain the most baffling source of disputes until the final settlement was secured. Likewise, at their special meeting with Prime Minister Mackenzie King in November, 1922, the premiers of the Prairie provinces, by declaring their wishes for higher compensation than the King administration was prepared to offer, ruled out the immediate termination of the dispute. When in 1924 the Greenfield administration in Alberta offered to waive its compensation terms while accepting the federally-held Crown lands in its territory, Premiers Bracken and Dunning reacted sharply against
Premier Greenfield's decision to take that stand. The positions taken by the premiers of the Prairie provinces in their relations with the Meighen and the King Governments clearly indicate that they considered, from a financial viewpoint, that they had a considerable stake in securing the settlement of their claims to the Dominion-held natural resources.

If that premise is true, why did the provincial administrations in the Prairies make little partisan use of their claims to the transfer of the disputed natural resources? Why did the premiers of the Prairie provinces give hardly any attention, in the subsequent provincial or Dominion election campaigns, to the alternative solutions that Prime Minister King had proposed in respect to their provincial claims in 1922?

In respect to those provincial administrations that were Liberal, one might suggest that their premiers were eager to prevent open contentions with their federal party Leaders for reason of partisan loyalties. In fact, the Liberal administrations of Manitoba and British Columbia only occasionally demonstrated this concern. There is indeed a possibility that Premier Norris had refrained, for instance, from raising the claim of his administration to Dominion-held Crown lands during the general election in Manitoba in 1920 for fear of splitting the Members of Parliament who then represented Manitoba. At that time, the majority of the latter (though already with the exception of T. A. Crerar and several of his closest associates) were still either supporting or actually serving in the Union Cabinet. Norris wished to save these Members from embarrassment over the question of Manitoba's provincial claims, which neither Borden nor Meighen were much interested in satisfying. He, along with other ministers in the Manitoba administration, were possibly also intending to cooperate with the federal Liberal party under Mackenzie King, who was still to formulate a definite proposal for settling the provincial claims to natural resources. Whether or not Premier Norris and the
leading members of his Cabinet expected sympathy to their provincial claims from Mackenzie King, they were still sufficiently persuaded in the rightness of King's tariff reform objective to support him and the federal Liberal party until at least the summer of 1921.

Since the autumn of 1921 until his defeat, the following year Premier Norris was much less interested in maintaining good relations with his federal party. During the Dominion election of 1921, he was giving support to T. A. Crerar and the National Progressives, primarily because he became convinced in the superiority of their tariff policy to that of King's. Likewise in the 1922 provincial election in his province, Norris found it prudent to manifest his independence from the federal administration of W. L. Mackenzie King. Hence factors other than deference to the wishes of the federal Liberals explain Norris' restrain in debating the natural resources question. Likewise, the sole intention to help their federal party was hardly sufficient to sway the Stewart administration in Alberta or the Dunning Government in Saskatchewan. Although more closely allied with the King Liberals than Norris, these administrations were in no mood to adhere blindly to the preferences of their federal leadership.

It had already been suggested that the most convincing explanation for the decision of the post-1918 administrations in the entire Western Canada has been the continuing tendency of the four Cabinets there to exploit shifts in public opinion. The general nature of the fundamental changes in the attitudes of the Western electors have already been indicated, and will be taken up in detail later in this thesis. At this time, it is only necessary to make one fairly significant reservation that casts light upon the differentiation in the political habits of British Columbia from those in the Prairie provinces.

At times of international crisis, the electors in British Columbia
have been as much preoccupied with the economic, the external, and the military policies of the federal Government as have been the citizens of the Prairie region. All have manifested a similar increased interest in Dominion politics at those occasions. The significant distinction in the political trends of these areas appears in the subsequent peacetime periods since 1918. While the electors of the Prairie provinces tended to retain much of their interest in federal policies and elections in the years following an international emergency such as World War I, those of British Columbia preferred to return once more to their pre-war emphasis placed upon provincial policies and jurisdictional objectives.

Discussion of provincial claims make it particularly relevant to outline the peculiar "provincialism" manifested by the electorate of British Columbia in peacetime. In the years between 1918 and 1930, this feature has been the prerequisite for the contrast in the methods by which the Oliver and the Tolmie administrations of British Columbia pursued their objectives for increased responsibilities and revenues.

As will be indicated in the subsequent chapter, the current of public opinion emphasizing the issues pertaining solely to the Dominion Parliament affected the electorate of British Columbia as profoundly as it did those of the Prairie provinces during the years from 1914 to 1925. Many more citizens of that province voted in the Dominion elections of 1917, 1921, and 1925 than in the immediately following provincial elections, although the current growth in population would have shown the opposite results even if an equal interest in both sets of political contests prevailed. In the Dominion elections of 1917 and 1921, insofar as a student of the period might see the predominant concerns of the period, reflected in periodical literature, the voters participating in the Dominion election of 1917 and 1927 gave far more attention to the new economic activities of the Dominion
administration than they did to the traditional provincial jurisdictional requests upon the Dominion.

Faced with this trend, the Oliver administration made little effort to promote its constitutional objectives in either Dominion or provincial elections. For instance, in the provincial elections of 1920 and 1924, the Liberal Cabinet made few references to their currently made Better Terms proposal. They, as well as the opposition parties, generally stuck to local issues in the campaigns preceding these elections, except that Premier Oliver introduced the freight rate question into the provincial election campaign of 1926.

By 1928, the leading figures in the Conservative Party in British Columbia decided that the time was ripe to appeal to the electors of that province as traditional champions of "provincial rights". Having rejected the diplomatic manner in which the MacLean administration, succeeding that of Oliver in 1927, had proceeded to negotiate with the Mackenzie King Cabinet in Ottawa, the Conservatives openly promised to achieve a settlement of the outstanding jurisdictional issues from the Dominion Parliament by political pressure. Like Premier McBride, they coupled their proposals with a free criticism of the incumbent federal Government for partisan purpose. The provincial electorate responded to their approach by giving the Conservatives, led by Premier-elect Simon F. Tolmie, a substantial majority of the popular vote and a comfortable majority in the provincial legislature.

The total of participants in the general election of 1928 in British Columbia exceeded the number of votes cast in the subsequent Dominion election. Clearly, the electors of that province were once more demonstrating their normal preoccupation with provincial issues and jurisdictional claims. This is precisely why Tolmie's strategy was effective in that election. A provincial party can effectively employ its jurisdictional objectives in election campaigns only if there is a high degree of interest, at least equal to that manifested in other policies expected or received from the Dominion.
Such circumstances prevailed exclusively in British Columbia in the period from 1918 to 1930, probably for reason of its geographical remoteness from the principal population centres of Canada and the seat of the Dominion administration.
PART II: The Role of the Western Canadian Provincial Governments in Matters Beyond their Actual or Intended Jurisdiction.
CHAPTER 4

THE WESTERN LIBERAL PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS
DURING THE PERIOD FROM 1900 TO 1918

All the Territorial and the provincial administrations in the Canadian West have occasionally voiced their views upon matters beyond their actual or intended responsibility. Thus, Premier Rodmond Roblin repeatedly advocated the acceptance of Sir Joseph Chamberlain's imperial customs union idea by Canada. Some regional autonomists in Canada might have considered that issue to be ultimately as significant as the acquisition of new administrative functions by their own Governments, but they did not emphasize the first set of issues over the other, at least in peacetime. This conclusion may be deduced from their public statements.

Genetically, it seems that the political figures holding the autonomist viewpoint evolved their interest in the vast majority of public issues from the aspect of the regional interest. Thus, Premier Richard McBride's qualified approval of the National Policy very clearly depends upon his judgment as to which aspects of it are of assistance to British Columbia.¹ Many of the Western leaders in this tradition had been either natives of their region, or had formed their personal philosophy while residing there.² None of the four premiers who had been classified into this category lived in the West less than twenty years before assuming office. All were fully identified with the habits and the problems of the nineteenth century settlers.

It is the distinguishing feature of the political leaders sharing the partisan nationalist ideology that they assigned the greatest weight to the exclusively federal policy objectives, like the construction of transcontinental railways and the lowering of tariffs. From their point of view, therefore, the National Policy as practiced by the Laurier Government was a better instrument for the progress of Canada than the autonomists believed, because improvements were being made precisely in those aspects in which they were
most interested. The Laurier Government was better prepared to reduce the tariff, or to modify the economic services received directly by the citizen, like the extension of drought relief, than to change the legal limitations imposed upon the functions of the Western provincial Governments. Successful in finding new European markets for Canadian goods, the federal Liberals offered more promise of meeting the characteristic dependence of the Western provinces upon overseas commerce.

It has already been pointed out that the Western Canadian electors maintained a wide consensus upon the nature of the regional constitutional aspirations. Aside from the tariff question, one finds numerous differences of view as to what Parliament should do in respect to the exclusively federal matters. For instance, nearly all believed that the federal Government should arrange for the construction of one or two transcontinental railways competing with the existing Canadian Pacific Company, but disagreed widely upon the number or the ownership of the additional lines to be built, whether national or provincial. After 1914, many also believed that Parliament should provide for loans to individuals, although the alternatives of direct federal service versus joint financing with the provincial authorities stimulated a warm debate.

In taking a stand upon any political issue, the provincial leaders found it necessary to consider the significant question as to whether it was more urgent to press for the regional interest by emphasizing the exclusively federal, or the constitutional questions. Few chose to argue theoretically whether it was ever morally right for Parliament to deprive provincial Governments of certain functions usual for their level, or arbitrarily to restrict them by the use of disallowance. The main arguments centred upon the question as to whether it was, in fact, necessary for the federal Government to resist provincial demands for the extension of their jurisdictional
spheres. A debater's conclusion upon this topic depended upon what broad results he expected from the National Policy (and what related services, like the control of health). For any policy, financial aspects were equally to be considered. In addition, men associated with the governing federal party also considered urgent the question of how it might best retain its prestige. All regional leaders were also motivated to retain the confidence of their electorate.

The factors that determined the sides taken by political figures upon the argument concerning the acceptance of the view held by the federal Government might be briefly summarized as follows. These comprised the nature of risk which they were ready to take and their consciousness of it, the presence or the absence of trust in the ability of the federal Government to interpret rightly the situation faced by Canada (and by the governing political party), also the organizational partisan relationships.

In Part 1, it was suggested that the autonomists were men who had refused to accept the risks involved in a long delay characterizing the satisfaction of their constitutional demands. Essentially, they asked for a speedy settlement of the disputes because they feared that the electorate might lose interest in the point of view if the negotiations languished. It might be surmised that they, and their allies in the federal Parliament, were willing to face less complete achievements in certain national policies, like the construction of competing transcontinental railways, than the incumbent federal Government expected. The latter projects might have been at least temporarily endangered by fiscal considerations or the political instability of the federal Government, if many provincial demands were met.

As to the tariff issue, of course, many of the Conservatives were naturally less concerned with lowering it than were the Liberals. Some of the first, like McBride, did in fact believe that a protectional policy would
best stimulate national development, while increasing the revenues of the federal Government. In taking this position, they were willing to risk that the Canadian exporters would not suffer from such a policy and that imports might still be reasonably heavy. It was also clear that high tariffs would produce less immediate encouragement to the settlement of the Western provinces than would direct federal expenditures. For all these reasons, it is concluded that men combining a high tariff approach with the autonomist approach placed less value upon the direct role of Parliament in supporting the National Policy than the federal Liberals after 1896. The non-ideological motives of the autonomists have already been analyzed, and require no further attention.

The partisan nationalists believed in placing the federal government in a safer political position than the high tariff autonomists cared to see it. The first expected it to satisfy immediately numerous social groups. The latter looked almost exclusively to the long-term benefits expected from the National Policy. After 1900, there was a narrow and fluctuating margin between the supporters of the two viewpoints in Manitoba, while the nationalists obtained growing majorities in Saskatchewan and Alberta.

Immigrants, for instance, found it easier to see the benefits provided by the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907 than those conceivably originating with a protectionist policy. It was no accident that the Liberals at the federal level were usually more willing to take the advice of labor and farm organizations than were the Conservatives. The first were better prepared to increase expenditure. In Alberta and Saskatchewan, one must add, the non-Liberals approximated that view by 1908. As has been stated, partisan differences extended there to few of the exclusively federal issues, centering everywhere upon their preferred specific constitutional objectives. The critics of the Laurier government in the newest provinces differed also in defending the rights of the Canadian Pacific Railway,
favoring higher tariff rates upon imports other than farm tools, and offering to pay from the federal Treasury for the enlargement of the British Navy.

The leading Liberals in Western Canada, whether active at the federal or the provincial level, were men who realized that a diversified program of economic services was essential for satisfying the public. Further, they were unwilling to accept the risks involved in yielding to Territorial and provincial demands in matters like the transfer of natural resources in the Prairie region. They were as yet unprepared to have the federal Treasury depend upon direct taxation to a great extent, at least in peacetime.

The great majority of the Liberals were also more inclined to trust the analysis of the national situation made by the Laurier Government, than did the Conservatives. The first were apt to exaggerate the differences between the two official methods of implementing the National Policy. They were motivated to do so by feelings of partisan loyalty and by their knowledge of public preferences in their provinces. Often, they were taking the professions of the federal Liberals at face value. Thus they tended to assign excessive credit to Wilfrid Laurier for ushering in the era of development characterizing the period between 1896 and 1911. Afterwards, they kept identifying the rejection of the Reciprocity Agreement by the Conservatives in 1911 as the reason for the collapse of the land boom.

The partisan nationalists were men who, whether or not they had considered political issues primarily from the viewpoint of the national interest early in their careers, or even privately later, learned to voice them in such a manner while collaborating with their federal party. Some merely repeated their National leader's phrases, while others were indubitably sincere. For instance, Premier Alfred L. Sifton of Alberta proved his emphasis upon the general welfare by joining the Unionist Cabinet in 1917, and most importantly, remaining in it after 1918, although he would have enjoyed more political
security as Premier of Alberta. Besides, a considerable minority among the Western Liberal leaders had held low-trade ideas before arriving in their province. Such were Premiers Rutherford, Martin, Norris, Brewster, and Oliver. The first two of the above, along with the great majority of the leading Cabinet Ministers in Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Manitoba were recent newcomers before accepting their first important public office. These represented the greatest turnover in population occurring during the period from 1896 to 1914, and undoubtedly speeding up the changes in regional attitudes.

After 1918, the Western provincial Governments holding the cooperative qualified view substantially retained the beliefs which the majority of the Liberals had held during the preceding period. They would also advocate widely their certain preferred remedies relating to the national trade and railway policies, at least whenever it was politically expedient to voice such sentiments. Since they did not enjoy the organizational support of any federal party, they felt it essential to adapt their policies more closely to electoral considerations than their predecessors had done. Although most of the respective Liberal or Farmer leaders had already been born in Western Canada, they were heavily influenced by the integrating impact of the period between 1911 and 1918.

It is indeed very difficult to obtain any theoretical expressions of view given by the non-autonomist provincial leaders in the Canadian West. In most cases, one must surmise their ideology from the manner in which they responded to the issues which they held the most vital. So will be defined these legislative and administrative functions at either the federal or the provincial level which were the most seriously and extensively debated during at least more than a year.

The evidence showing that the Governments as well as the electors in
the Western provinces deepened, during the period from 1900 to 1930, their interest in such policies made at the federal level as concerned problems different from jurisdictional conflicts appears in various sources. One of the leading guides illustrating that trend is the content of editorial pages in the periodicals. These have been left largely unexplored in preparations for this study. Helpful are also the submissions laid by the provincial governments before the Governor-General-in-Council. Some will be mentioned below. Further, one may refer to the political documents ranging from the formal platforms of the parties to the speeches of their leaders. These will be given the primary attention, because they faithfully reflect the changes in the voter's interests along with the reactions of the leading public figures. In particular, the records on provincial politics must be studied, for the reason already given.

The authors of the speeches and the manifestos which will be considered in this part have usually formulated their legislative objectives in the intention of influencing the outcome of elections. To analyze the effectiveness of their statements, we must study the voters' response in elections. Just as the conduct of political campaigns demonstrates the efforts of the parties, either to educate the electors or to conform to the latter's demands, so the results per se indicate the nature of the voters' interests.

As has been noted in the introductory chapter, the voting totals for the period from 1900 to 1930 are a useful starting point in the analysis of evidence gathered to illustrate the deepening involvement of the public with the policies of the Dominion. In all the Western provinces, there was a comparatively larger participation of electors in provincial than in Dominion elections prior to the Reciprocity campaign of 1911. In other words, either more electors voted in provincial than in the immediately following Dominion, or else the edge apparent in the Dominion elections was of slight significance
in view of the quick rate of population growth prevailing in the intervening period. The latter development is notably true of the Prairie provinces. The election statistics for British Columbia reveal a similar trend no earlier than 1917, and indicate a clear-cut regression to the previous emphasis upon provincial policy questions by 1925. By contrast, the basic tendency of the electors in the Prairie provinces to emphasize the policies of the Dominion over those of their own provincial administrations prevailed until the present time, with only occasional deviations being manifest in Alberta.

The voting statistics per se are only imprecise indications of changes in the voters' priorities. To establish conclusively that there was indeed, as James A. Corry writes, "nationalizing of sentiment" or "a widespread acquiescence in, if not active support for, the enlarged role of the national government", it is necessary to study the issues in elections at the two levels of our federal system. Since the jurisdictional objectives of provincial administrations were frequently injected into Dominion campaigns, and since provincial parties sometimes formulated in their provincial elections certain requests upon the Dominion for action beyond the intended jurisdiction of their province, the voting statistics are an unreliable clue to the actual interests of the voters. The voters' response to political platforms must be supplemented with an analysis of issues, generally comprised in partisan platforms, if the nature of the electors interests is to be accurately gauged.

The interaction between the federal parties and the desires of electors in Western Canada was limited, so far as the setting of party objectives was concerned. This is particularly true of the Conservatives and the Liberals, who made relatively few concessions to the grassroots demands of the Western electors while forming the federal Government. Their Leaders' relative unresponsiveness led to the rise of minor parties, like the National
Progressive Party organized by seceders from the Union Coalition along with the Executive of the Canadian Council of Agriculture in Winnipeg in August, 1920. While the Progressives differed from the other parties in assiduously publicising the demands of their constituency associations, the very fact that there they elected no Member of Parliament from British Columbia meant that the electors of that Westernmost province were unable to make their voices heard effectively through the new Dominion party.

Insofar as concessions to the objectives of the Western electors were made, Dominion administrations extended them more frequently in the period from 1900 to 1914 than in the subsequent decade. In the earlier period, these concessions referred to both the jurisdictional objectives of provincial administrations and to matters intended to remain under the jurisdiction of the Dominion. To mention the federal legislation in the second category, the Laurier administration sponsored by the Canada Grain Act of 1905, instituting a new wheat marketing program, as well as the Reciprocity Agreement of 1911. Many instances of changes in the principles pertaining to the rights of the provincial governments have already been given, the most vital probably being the subsidy raises included in the British North America Act of 1908.

One may infer from the gains exacted from the federal Government by the Western Premiers and Members of Parliament that the public of that region was vitally interested, prior to 1914, in both the economic services provided them directly by the federal Government and the constitutional desires of their Territorial or provincial Cabinets. It is clear, for instance, that throughout the Prairie provinces there was strong support for the Conservative position upon the natural resources question, as shown in Roblin's submissions to the federal Parliament, although it was only in Manitoba that the electoral majority from 1903 to 1915 (except possibly in 1911) considered the requested transfer to be of crucial importance. In British Columbia, the majority of
electors likewise backed the financial and the immigration objectives of their administration. It is also easy to infer from the conduct and the results of the Dominion elections in that period that the electors in Manitoba and British Columbia were demonstrating more consistently their commitment to the jurisdictional objectives of their administrations than were the electors in the younger Prairie provinces.

While one may confidently draw certain inferences from the analysis of Dominion elections in Western Canada prior to 1914, it is much more difficult to interpret satisfactorily the priorities given by the Dominion parties to political issues after 1917. In the federal political campaigns from 1911 to 1930, the federal parties in their platforms discussed at length the matters acknowledged to be within the permanent functions of the Dominion, with the exception of rural credits in Alberta. Those questions requiring action by the federal Government upon the constitutional matters, like the natural resources question, received very cursory attention from the writers. None specified how the Maritime provinces might be persuaded to confirm the Western proposal. Needless to say, no program even referred to the requests for financial subsidies asked on grounds of expediency, like those originating with the British Columbia Government between 1918 and 1921. Then the Oliver Government prepared its consolidated demand centred upon the Railway Lands.

It is striking that for all their brevity, the writers of the party platforms had more regard for the provincial constitutional proposals than the individual National Party Leaders. The latter debated exclusively the other aspects of the National Policy. To see the striking change in their conduct, we need to compare an earlier election, like that of 1908, with those between 1917 and 1930 inclusively. In tracing the campaign speeches of Meighen, King, and Crerar, in the 1921 campaign, we find that grain
marketing, tariffs, veterans aid, and railway nationalization were the issues given a reasonably thorough discussion. In 1925, the tariff, along with the future of the Canadian National Railways and the related policies, fitted the more conservative mood of that year.

Did the Dominion parties place emphasis upon questions of general national interest over the traditional jurisdictional objectives of the Western provinces because that approach suited their candidates in other sections of Canada, or because the electors in the Canadian West and their administrations themselves were less interested than previously in debating issues of that type? To answer that question conclusively, one has to use other sources than the documents pertaining to the Dominion parties and elections.

In general, the data to be derived from the federal elections are less significant than the developments in provincial politics for the historian of Canadian federalism, if he is primarily interested in the attitudes characterizing the Western provinces of Canada in the period from 1900 to 1930. The political platforms chosen by the federal parties were written with a view to pleasing the entire nation, to satisfy various regions without displeasing any. As Mallory states, "The old national parties (Conservatives and Liberals) had tried to unite elements from both races and all regions around a particular interpretation of the national interest," while in essence the progressive movement was a search for a new set of national aims. Although many in the Dominion, Labor, and the Progressive parties, important in Western Canada after 1917, had "started from the assumption that group interests in the community were contradictory", their leaders were generally as eager as those of other parties to prove that they desired no class domination or regional favoritism. For instance, Henry Wise Wood, expressed a typical promise of farmers' movements when he said: "I believe in economic class
organization up to the highest point of efficiency. I am absolutely opposed to class domination or class legislation. T. A. Crerar and Meighen, the two Manitobans who were national party Leaders in the 1921 federal election, were especially careful to deny regional bias. Thus, Meighen rarely alluded to his Brockville promise of having Parliament provide a national wheat marketing agency to which farmers would sell voluntarily. Crerar made it clear that he was opposed to "absolute free trade". Although, as Underhill points out, those of Crerar's supporters in the House of Commons who had been Liberal Members had left their former party because they wanted "to be free from an eastern majority" in the caucus. Once they formed their national party, they attempted to develop a Canada-wide appeal. Thus, the issues that they stressed in 1921 or 1925 were considerably modified versions of typical Manitoban or Western attitudes. It might be an interesting project to survey the views of individual party candidates to see how they differed from the national Leaders', but this is a topic for a separate study.

There is further an unsurmountable factor that prevents us from comparing, for the federal elections, the emphasis given to purely federal issues with the attention paid to provincial claims that were intended to enhance provincial responsibilities. This is the fact that the provinces suspended their claims in 1914 for the duration of the war, and that, although these were renewed in 1918, the three leading parties assumed a similar position.

Thus, all the Leaders could state with a clear conscience that they believed the Western provinces were entitled to their claims, provided the Maritime provinces would agree or some arrangements would be made to satisfy them. Under these circumstances, although everyone after 1918 occasionally voiced the hope that the Western provinces would get their lands, it is hardly enlightening to place the pious expressions of the parties on this topic on par with their positions on issues that were truly controversial.
By studying the federal campaigns, one is unable to tell how important the provincial claims were to the electorate in Western provinces by comparison to matters acknowledged to be within the permanent jurisdiction of the Dominion. One might infer that if public demand for the settlement of these provincial objectives had been highly vocal, the Dominion parties would have been forced to offer more solutions more satisfactory to the provincial administrations than had been offered in the years from 1918 to 1927.

Insofar as one finds any revealing evidence in the conduct of Dominion elections to illustrate the lessening of public interest in jurisdictional questions and the deepening concern shown by the Western electors for Dominion issues since 1911, surely, the most meaningful indication is the utterances of provincial ministers in connection with federal politics. An analysis of their role from 1900 to 1914 is highly illuminating, since in that period they undeniably exerted a considerable influence with the federal electorates in their provinces. In those years, each Western provincial administration was closely associated with a Dominion party (one of the two major parties), and had taken a forceful part on behalf of that party in federal elections, provided that the leadership of the latter was genuinely interested in the jurisdictional aspirations of the provincial Cabinet. After the 1911 election, provincial Cabinets rarely emphasized their jurisdictional objectives over other issues debated in Dominion elections. Sometimes they gave exclusive attention to matters beyond their intended jurisdiction, as in the following instance. Premier Norris supported the National Progressives in 1922 largely on their promise of lowering the tariff. Premiers Martin and Dunning of Saskatchewan apparently believed that a Liberal Dominion administration would be more likely to revive the Wheat Board than a Conservative one.

While one might, therefore, gain some indication of prevailing local
currents by analyzing the role of provincial Premiers and other Cabinet Ministers in the course of Dominion elections, it seems doubtful whether the resulting findings would merit a detailed analysis. Commencing with the Union election of 1917, the role of provincial administrations in Dominion politics became so distinctly restricted that no historian cared to investigate it. For all these reasons, ranging from the lessening weight of provincial premiers in Dominion elections to the limited consideration shown by the major parties to the special interests of the Canadian West, particularly in the years from 1912 to 1926, any effort to pinpoint changing currents of regional political expectations on part of the regional electorate in question by primary reference to Dominion elections will likely fail to yield conclusive evidence.

The most promising source of evidence supporting the view that the electors in the Western Provinces were demonstrating an increasing concern for the policies of the Dominion (other than concessions to the jurisdictional objectives of provincial administrations) in the years from 1911 to 1925 lies in the realm of provincial politics. It is the increasing readiness of the provincial administrations to act as regional spokesmen with the Dominion in matters beyond their actual or intended responsibilities that best reveals the increased preoccupation of electors with the policies of the Dominion. By 1922, all the provincial parties in the Western provinces manifested a more or less resolute determination to obtain political advantage by voicing the impatient requests made by the professional and political reform associations in the Canadian West for changes in the policies of the Dominion. These were either economic policy questions like the trade policy (e.g. the Reciprocity Agreement of 1911) or proposals for modifying the organisation of the Dominion government (the idea of Union Government, 1914-1918) and the procedures of political parties ("delegate democracy" after 1918).
Until 1915, the administrations of Manitoba gave much more attention to the natural resources issue and to their other jurisdictional and subsidy claims than to policy decisions of direct concern to exclusively the federal government. It is true that later the Manitoba governments came to imitate closely the priorities and the strategy of the other Prairie administrations. By contrast, the administrations of British Columbia rarely spotlighted their views upon questions beyond their actual or intended legislative responsibility before at least 1921. Hence, it is unnecessary to give that province any extensive detailed analysis in this chapter. This writer will make further comments concerning the Oliver Government in the conclusion to Chapter 5.

While provincial Premiers sometimes advocated these objectives in the context of Dominion elections, they primarily intended to influence the outcome of provincial contests. Thus, the Liberal administrations of Saskatchewan and Alberta were the earliest Western Canadian Governments notable for practicing the role of lobbyists with the Dominion Cabinets in the intention of securing tariff reductions, as well as additional economic services. When the provincial leaders did lobby with the federal governments in questions that were beyond their direct concern, their interventions were most effective in cases when there was some logical relation between their actual functions and the particular national policy. Thus in 1908, Premier Walter Scott, who was considered to be in close touch with the powers at Ottawa, released a statement announcing his receipt of a federal loan. In it, he tied his railway policies to the willingness of the Laurier administration to support it. "Before consenting to promise aid (mostly bond guarantees) by the province, we decided to present these cases at Ottawa and we have had success in procuring aid from Parliament sufficient to ensure construction in a number of cases," Premier Scott stated. Subsequent to this declaration of dependence, which was at least directly connected with his actual
responsibilities, Scott also released a letter in which he urged Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier to sponsor more railway construction independently of provincial policies. "Unless the Parliament of Canada is prepared to follow up its settlement policy with a systematic, well-planned, aggressive railway policy that will be put into effect promptly," wrote Scott. "There is the very gravest danger not only of continual unrest among our new settlers, but of an actual exodus from them as well."

Significantly, the communications released by Premier Scott became an issue of great importance in the Saskatchewan general election of 1908. Scott was stressing the railway policies of his administration because he had few other arguments or achievements to match the appeal of Frederick G. Haultain's "home rule" objectives. These carried emotional and economic persuasiveness to a sizeable block of voters (though a minority), and were backed by Haultain's immense prestige. Scott must have also feared the lingering effects of the Northwest School Question, which had been a potential issue in 1908. It might well have been kindled again by rising controversy over schools in Manitoba. Hence he must have decided that an additional ace was needed beside his railway policies. His ingenious intervention with the federal government, apart from its economic timeliness, was an effort to avert impending political threats. Scott was resisting the effective campaign of the Provincial Rights Party and the currently revived agitation over Manitoba's denominational dispute. His influence with the Laurier government was Scott's aureole, for which he desired credit from the voters.

It is also evident, and must have been perceptible then, that Scott's call for an extension of the railway policies of the Dominion was partially a substitute for a Manitoba-type provincial demand for increased subsidies or natural resources. If Saskatchewan had possessed its Crown lands, then
the provincial administration would possibly have been able to sponsor more railway construction on its own initiative, although this would have hardly lessened the extreme dependence of Saskatchewan wheat producers on transcontinental traffic under the jurisdiction of the Dominion. Scott's appeal to the Dominion for additional railway facilities was also as effective a partisan issue in Saskatchewan as Roblin's campaign for the natural resources transfer or the requested boundary revision was in Manitoba. As will be shown later, the intervention of the Saskatchewan administration with the Dominion is politically explicable by the close ties of the provincial Liberals with their federal party, and by the prestige of the Laurier Cabinet in that province. It is economically explained by the financial difficulties facing the new provincial administration in the absence of local control over Crown lands, as well as by the necessity of having the local lines closely correlated with the transcontinental ones.

Essentially, all the Western provincial administrations faced the problem of persuading private companies, like the Canadian Pacific or the Canadian Northern, to build lines that were frequently unprofitable, provided only that they connected scattered pockets of settlement with the interprovincial railway networks. To accomplish that objective, the Saskatchewan legislature, like those of the other Western provinces, kept enacting bond guarantees, until these threatened to exceed the available assets. Demonstrating more caution than the Cabinets of the other Western provinces, the Scott administration hesitated to risk a deficit. Since they were less secure both financially and politically than those of either Alberta or British Columbia, they preferred to request that the Dominion supplant their policies rather than risk serious financial shortages or commence a struggle with the Dominion for a new source of revenues.
Premier Scott's interventions with the Dominion stimulated the rise of a provincial tradition of lobbying with the Dominion Parliament even in matters other than the jurisdictional objectives of the provincial administrations. Scott's actions impressed upon the political figures of that province the habit of making frequent demands for federal economic services. The leading motive of the Saskatchewan Cabinets in raising these demands was often the desire to lighten the financial burden of their government, a consideration that was also an important factor behind their decision to raise the natural resources claim in 1912. The provincial partisan nationalist ministry must have discovered that calling for changes in federal policies, such as tariff or railway measures, was often more desirable than raising the claim to public lands. The first course of action was likely to produce some benefits for Prairie settlers without entailing any additional administrative responsibilities for the province.

In Alberta, provincial party leaders introduced federal policy proposals into provincial politics somewhat later than in Saskatchewan. Premier Rutherford apparently intended to avoid altogether topics of that sort in the Alberta legislature or during election campaigns. His policy was feasible because his province did not require federal loans for its railway construction policies or for any other purpose in the years between 1905 and 1912. Then Premiers Rutherford and Sifton relied heavily on London companies for loans. Thus, in Alberta the Dominion policy of financing railways became a provincial issue only in 1913. Then Sifton started urging the federal government to support the Canadian Northern Railway, which Alberta was also backing by its bond issues.

This very readiness of provincial parties in the younger provinces to employ federal issues to their advantage appeared in the conduct of the Scott Government and in that of many Alberta Liberals (though not in Premier
Sifton's speeches) in connection with the Reciprocal Trade Agreement made by the Laurier government with the United States in 1911. That Agreement itself largely resulted from the demands voiced persistently by Western Members of Parliament, notably by Liberals William E. Martin from Regina and W. A. Buchanan from Lethbridge, for a reciprocity treaty, at least since the sessions of the special Tariff Commission sitting in 1907. The appeal of that proposal to the electorate of all the Prairie provinces was made manifest in the conduct and the scope of the farmers march to Ottawa. It was sponsored by the Interprovincial Council of Agriculture in cooperation with many organizations, including the Grain Growers Associations of Manitoba and Saskatchewan. At that time, or even up to 1912, provincial governments were showing slight interest in the movement for reciprocity in trade with the United States. The goal was set by farmers' organizations and advocated by federal Liberal members from the Prairie region in the House of Commons. The reason for the cool attitude shown by the Alberta and Saskatchewan Liberal governments towards this struggle must be their independence from farmers' organizations at that time, their uncertainty as to the attitude of the Laurier Cabinet up to 1911, and the widespread belief in keeping federal policies out of provincial politics.

Unless the researcher considers the changes that have occurred in the relations between the Prairie Liberal governments on one hand, and the farmers' organizations or the federal Cabinet government on the other, he will find it inexplicable why the tariff issue became of great importance in provincial politics, and especially in Saskatchewan, in the years 1912 and 1913, not in 1910 or 1911. In the latter years, the legislatures of both Saskatchewan and Alberta passed unanimously or near-unanimously resolutions which supported the Reciprocity Agreement. There was then little debate concerning these pronouncements, and slight controversy, at the
federal electoral campaigns.

A year later in Saskatchewan, the Scott government claimed that they deserved re-election because of their vigorous stand behind the cause of the reciprocal agreement, while disregarding the fact that members of the Provincial Rights Party had also voted for the unanimously accepted resolution. Hence "the Elections of 1912 were, from the Liberal viewpoint, based largely upon the prosperity and progress which had attended the Scott government in its administration of affairs, and upon the claim that when these things were lacking, the fault was due to the Dominion Government's refusal to grant reciprocity."

Even after 1911, Saskatchewan Governments chose to remain within the movement for ratification of the Reciprocal Agreement. They were genuinely anxious to see improvements in different aspects of the Canadian national life. Notably, Premiers Scott and Martin, in agreement with several dedicated leaders of the Grain Growers Association, agitated for the encouragement of quicker economic growth in Canada that was prevailing between 1911 and 1916. Being fearful of the potential assistance which Prime Minister Borden might extend through favorable legislation and patronage to Opposition groups in Saskatchewan, the Liberals saw that electors were informed of official provincial viewpoint. Indeed a detailed analysis of the policies adopted by the Scott government between 1912 and 1914 does show that they, like the Sifton administration in Alberta, were then more determined than ever to extend the basis of their public support. After they had been deprived of their former privileged position with the federal government, the provincial leaders could satisfy the electorate only by their own ingenious policies. The resulting Liberal approach included both the offer of new provincial services, like up-to-date agricultural colleges, and ever greater readiness to intervene with the federal government.

The key aspect of the new political methodology employed by the Alberta and the Saskatchewan Cabinets since 1911 was their growing readiness to collaborate with the farmers' organizations. Not only intraprovincially,
but also as an intermediary with the federal government, Premier Scott was increasingly acting at the advice of the Grain Growers Association in his province. Like A. L. Sifton in Alberta, he was also courting the support of urban groups by extending new welfare and mining inspection acts, Scott was searching for effective issues. The Liberals found that unlike other remedies, their promise of fighting for "freer trade" appealed to all the segments of their Prairie society. Hence the Saskatchewan Government assumed their self-appointed task of lobbying for such a federal policy.

Since 1908, the Scott Government had been engrossed with the problem of surviving a political crisis. They had received several warnings. In 1909, the Liberals had barely been re-elected, their total percentage of votes contrasting sharply with the landslide won by the Alberta party a year earlier. In January, 1909, the loss of a riding formerly held by a Scott supporter to an Independent Farmer candidate marked the low water mark of the Saskatchewan Premier's popularity.

Several distinct threats had coincided to threaten the Liberal's continuation in office. The latter faced the lingering uncertainties of the Grain Growers as to whether definite strong commitments be given the Government. The mutual confidence that was to characterize their later relationship as yet lacked in 1912. Likewise dangerous was the powerful leadership given by Frederick G. Haultain to the Provincial Rights Party and the increasing practicality of the natural resources transfer that he had always advocated. The federal government was no longer uncompromising: the Territorial ex-Premier might stand a better chance of persuading Borden to act quickly. The financial circumstances of the Saskatchewan Treasury required its replenishment. The Liberals, largely for that reason, had revived the issue in 1911, immediately upon the formation of the Conservative Cabinet in Ottawa. They, undoubtedly, found it difficult to convince the public of their sincere belief in the suggested solution.

In the election of 1912, a new factor working to Haultain's advantage
was the likelihood that the federal government would assume the management of at least some terminal elevators in Canada. The promise was apparently coming true in the Canada Grain Bill, which the Borden Government was sponsoring in 1912, and which was under debate in the summer of 1912, when the Saskatchewan election took place. Haultain had been vigorously stressing the desirability of the latter policy in conjunction with his demand for the provincial ownership of inland elevators, and now he had the satisfaction of seeing his views move somewhat closer to realization. The attention that he was giving to the elevator issue must have given Haultain increased prestige with many settlers. There must have been a real opportunity for Haultain’s party to obtain the credit for the federal legislation that was being prepared, whether or not Haultain had openly said that he was influential with the federal government. (In fact, Haultain continued urging his views on elevator policy without implying that he possessed much weight with the federal Cabinet.) At least the federal aspects of Haultain’s proposals were extremely popular with the leaders and the members of the Saskatchewan Grain Growers Association. It seems likely, therefore, that his stand for the federal ownership of terminal elevators, along with the apparent responsiveness of the Borden Government, might have given the Provincial Rights Party a decisive number of new voters from among those settlers who were unmoved by Haultain’s provincial "home rule" ideas, or were beginning to be moved by his courage apparent in his readiness to renew his demand for a transfer of natural resources to the province, even at a time when Borden’s Conservative Cabinet was in office. All these factors, seeming to make Haultain’s cause invincible, might well have been sufficient to alarm the Scott administration in 1912. Political anxiety was doubtless a leading reason why the Liberal party of Saskatchewan then openly disregarded the principle that federal policy questions should be kept out of provincial politics, a rule that was generally observed in Western
Canada during the nineteenth century.

It is suggested that the Saskatchewan Liberals' stand on the reciprocity issue was one of two principal factors in their ability to hold a fairly narrow, though assuring majority of the popular vote in the 1912 election, which produced a comfortable margin for the Liberals in the legislature. (The other cause for their success was the Cooperative Elevator Act of 1911.) One finds much convincing evidence for this conclusion. An impressive indication is the fact that the comeback in Scott's fortunes paralleled the course of the reciprocity controversy in Canada. This relationship has already been examined. The importance of the reciprocity issue in Saskatchewan's election may also be analogy from J. C. Hopkins' observation that the same problem affected the Alberta voting in 1913.

An additional fact confirming the popular enthusiasm shown in the Prairies for the Reciprocity Agreement, is the absence of any critical remarks from F. G. Haultain or his party concerning Laurier's trade agreement or the use that the provincial government was making of it. Haultain's own references to the desirability of federal ownership in the terminal elevator field indicate that he was also prepared to assume the role of a regional spokesman with the federal government and to practice the strategy followed by his opponent, though his approach was to prove less effective. The growing irrelevance of Haultain's case for the provincial management of inland elevators, after the apparent failure of the Manitoba experiment in provincial public ownership, as well as the undoubted disappointment of many grain growers with the actual content of Borden's Grain Bill, restricted the effectiveness of Haultain's strategy, though his stand must have been popular per se.

The apparent conviction of the Scott Government that their references
to the Reciprocity Agreement gave them a partisan advantage over the opposition is seen in their decision to revive that issue in the post-election session of the Saskatchewan legislature. In 1913, "a keen and angry debate was precipitated when J. D. Stewart moved to consider the formerly adopted resolution on behalf of the Reciprocity Agreement as the official pronouncement of the Assembly upon a matter of paramount importance to the people of Saskatchewan and proposing to censure the opposition members of the Assembly who voted for the (original) resolution and then opposed reciprocity or its (Liberal) candidates in the elections (federal and provincial)."  

In the subsequent debate, the provincial legislators marshalled all the usual historical and partisan arguments on trade policy, normally reserved for a national Parliament in the course of their deliberations. "Home rule for Ireland, Cobden and the Corn Laws, the Cement merger, Free Trade and Tariff in many forms were discussed." At the request of the Premier, a motion was finally made to omit the censure clause of the original resolution, but to leave merely the section providing that this House reaffirm its adherence to the policy embodied in the aforesaid agreement between Canada and the United States. This decisive amendment was passed by a vote of 27 to 12, with the Provincial Rights Party unreconciled by Scott's move.  

While the desire of the Liberals to place Haultain's supporters in a position where they would appear to be hostile to the trade agreement is easily explained by partisan considerations, there were also economic motives behind the decision of the Saskatchewan government to press for reciprocity. They were determined that the Borden government either confirm the original agreement, or else provide substantial reductions in the Tariff with the Supply Bill for 1914. If the Scott Cabinet possessed only political motives, they would have felt no urgency to revive the issue in 1913, immediately following a successful election. Doubtless, the collapse of the land boom
in 1912-13 must have been a vital and possibly the most important factor in their decision to bring up the issue as soon as a year following a provincial election. Freer trade was the standard prescription given by Prairie Liberals for curing an economic recession. The Saskatchewan Government also experienced a special financial dilemma. Like other provincial governments, they were urged by many organizations, such as the Trades and Labor Congress, to extend their relief appropriations, while the Grain Growers were insisting that the Farm Mortgage Act of 1913 be made immediately operative. At that very time, the usual surpluses shown by the Scott administration had nearly disappeared, and deficit financing was begun in 1914. During the period from 1912 to 1915, the Scott government could either make substantial raises in both expenditures and taxation, extend expenditures modestly with deficit financing, or resist pressures for appropriations. The second choice was taken. Slight increases in welfare payments were made, while the Farm Mortgage Corporation Act was kept inoperative for three years.

Saskatchewan sponsored fewer extensive economic services than did Manitoba. The government made little effort to raise the levels of direct taxation, and an experimental tax on unused land gave little revenue. Either the Liberal ministers were convinced that the high rate of federal tariff taxation, coupled with the removal of some British capital, made much heavier provincial taxes impossible, or else by stressing that external trade was the fundamental remedy for the recession, they might have hoped to direct public attention to what they considered a more promising source of relief. As a matter of fact, a farmers' credit service was begun only in 1916, while federal solutions to the farmers' hardships were kept in the foregound of public attention.

In the Alberta provincial election of 1913, the Reciprocity Agreement produced less controversy than in Saskatchewan during the preceding year.
In the course of the Liberal campaign preceding the election of 1913, Premier A. L. Sifton faced a very arduous challenge. The prospects of the Opposition had been improving for several years. The Conservatives had become more deeply concerned with the new federal grain policies than with provincial legislation. They urged support for the public ownership of terminal elevators to supplement the existing system of cooperative inland facilities. As soon as Sifton became the champion of provincial autonomy, R. B. Bennett, then the Conservative provincial Leader appeared to be the more aggressive lobbyist with the federal Government. His strategy became ominous when Sir Thomas White, the Dominion Finance Minister, made some of Bennett's views his own. The prospects of the opposition were brightened further when the Board of Grain Commissioners, in their annual report for 1913, recommended an experimental network of federally-owned terminal elevators. Simultaneously, Sifton must have seemed out of touch with many of his own supporters who wanted their party to remain primarily associated with the causes of the Reciprocal Agreement and the public terminal elevators. That segment of the party included those members looking for leadership to Honourable Frank Oliver.

Despite Sifton's unwillingness to discuss the Reciprocity Question in 1913, there is much evidence to show that his party was already so closely identified with the causes of the federal Liberals that the "Oliver Liberals" and a majority of the organized farmers saw no sufficient reason to undertake a revolt or leave for Bennett's party. Sifton's farm and railway policies commenced in 1911 were possibly the major reason for his victory. His ability to please those who, like Bramley-Moore, were critical of either federal party was of considerable value. Yet there is also evidence that with many voters the memories of the Autonomy Acts and the Reciprocity Agreement of 1911 were decisive. Whatever Bennett might now
promise, these voters had already associated the federal Liberals with tariff reform and helpful regulation of the interprovincial grain trade. They continued to treat the Sifton Government as a branch of the national Liberal movement. This may be inferred from the attitudes shown by the United Farmers, from the response given Premier Scott when he participated in the Liberal campaign, and from the fear that officials of the Department of the Interior were working for the Bennett Conservatives in order to promote the interest of a national high-tariff government. ④9

The United Farmers showed much preoccupation with the Reciprocity Question at their annual 1913 convention. At their annual convention held in January, 1913, the United Farmers called for lowered tariffs, since they expected that policy to cut the inflated living costs, aggravated by the economic recession then commencing. In their platforms, federal and provincial objectives appeared intermingled in a single document, and it is reasonable to infer that many of their members considered much of its content applicable to either provincial or federal politics. ⑤0 (It is noteworthy that the Manitoba Grain Growers' Association was generally careful to provide separate platforms for their provincial and federal objectives.) Further, it may be surmised that many of the U.F.A. officials, such as the new president, J. Bower, who spoke for Sifton's Government, ⑤1 were motivated to support the Sifton administration because that Government was more likely to support the objective of easing external commerce restrictions than were the Conservatives.

The trade issue remained in the spotlight because the federal parties and Premier Scott of Saskatchewan proceeded to take part in the Alberta campaign. The public tended to see a close connection between the federal party officials and the trade issue in the aftermath of the great reciprocity campaign. As J. C. Hopkins sums up the two aspects of the evidence,
"Reciprocity was not often mentioned in the press, but there is no doubt that it had helped many Liberals in the rural regions who feared that Conservative success would be interpreted as a blow to the "freer trade" policy, the Hon. R. Rogers was said to be working within the Province through Dominion officials, etc. for the Conservative cause, as the Saskatchewan government was alleged to be going for the Liberals."  
Incidentally, the decision of the Scott Government to revive the trade issue in their legislature in 1913 might have been partly motivated by their intention to help Alberta Liberals. The move was timed to coincide with the climax of the Alberta campaign.  
Sifton's vigorous denunciation of R. B. Bennett's references to the Canada Grain Act and the elevator policies inaugurated by the Borden Government, indicates that the Alberta Government was genuinely alarmed by the plans of the Opposition to gain new converts by associating themselves with a federal policy objective. The Conservative stand was doubtless of substantial significance in helping Bennett's party to achieve a virtual tie with Sifton's Liberals in the popular vote (although Conservative criticisms of the Waterways scandal which they exposed in 1910 were likewise of considerable importance.) If the Liberals had not been considered the champions of reciprocity, or if Sifton had not made his determined effort to appease the farmer in his two busy years in office, Bennett's strategy might have been sufficient to make him the third premier of Alberta. His tactics, as well as the attitudes of the farmers cited by J. Castell Hopkins, indicate that large segments of the Alberta electorate were ready to give priority to federal policy objectives, even in provincial politics.  
By 1915, the Alberta electorate was, therefore, prepared to countenance the political tactics that the Saskatchewan Government was already practicing in greater measure. These methods comprised the assumption of the role of
regional spokesmen in matters beyond provincial jurisdiction by provincial Governments or opposition parties. Consequently, resulting stress was placed on federal policy objectives in provincial elections. Chronologically, one might summarize, as follows, the experiences characterizing the Rutherford and the Scott Governments in Alberta before World War I.

In the years from 1905 to 1910, the Rutherford Government had formed the beginning of a tradition that the provincial administration should only be concerned with matters within its jurisdiction and that only local questions should be raised in provincial elections. In setting this policy, Rutherford doubtlessly intended to bind the old Northwesterners, who believed in nonpartisanship at the provincial level, to his administration. His objective was doubtless the formation of a wide provincial coalition that would give the incumbent government a safe majority, larger than the somewhat narrow margins that generally prevail in federal elections. This policy was only possible if the government enjoyed substantial prestige with the electorate on provincial issues. Premier Sifton attempted to practice such a policy without the necessary standing in his province. His own nomination as premier had occurred at a time when his provincial party was divided, and the federal one close to national defeat. While preserving the unity of his party by placating the autonomists, and helped by the fact that he could press the natural resources claim of Alberta on a Conservative Dominion Cabinet, Sifton soon found that his provincial policies and the natural resources question were insufficient to help him extend his majority in the province. After 1912, an Alberta government was no longer able to enjoy a safe majority by merely appealing to the voter on its own record, because exposures of corruption had made a sizeable portion of the electorate suspicious of the Liberals, and because the majority of the electorate was becoming more keenly interested in purely federal policy objectives than in
provincial policies or claims, and expected their provincial government to share that interest.  

After 1913, both the Alberta and the Saskatchewan provincial administrations were increasingly becoming spokesmen in matters that were legally within Dominion jurisdiction. For instance, both premiers were vocal in demanding that Canada supply relief for destitute farmers in connection with the drought in 1914, or for the institution of federally-managed rural banks. The stand taken by the Alberta and Saskatchewan Governments on these issues brought them increased prestige and helped them to survive the disruption of the federal Liberal party in 1917 with little immediate damage.

However, the provincial governments repeated their demand for federally-owned rural branch banks frequently enough to make this stand a meaningful ace in the 1917 provincial elections. Premier Sifton had commenced asking for such national banking facilities as early as 1915. He then stated that a solution "is coming, but will only come after a big effort on the part of the people and not until we have a Finance Minister, irrespective of politics, who has sand enough to fight the Banks". Sifton differed from the Alberta Conservatives in calling for this reform in the financial system, whereas the drought relief and the terminal elevator question had been largely bipartisan. Thus, he could use his stand and the reaction of the Conservatives as an argument for pointing out the fruitlessness of nonpartisanship on the provincial level as urged by the nonpartisan Movement in 1917. That very year Premier William E. Martin of Saskatchewan followed Sifton's example in making a demand for federal rural banks a leading plank in his own party's electoral platform, though it was an exclusively federal issue.
Manitoba, 1912 - 1917

In Manitoba, provincial parties held more consistently than those of Alberta or Saskatchewan the principle of educating the electors to expect genuine economic remedies from policies within the actual or intended jurisdiction of the provincial legislature. Hence, the administrations of that province, whether Conservative or Liberal, were reluctant to act as lobbyists with the Dominion Cabinet in matters other than their own jurisdictional objectives, at least prior to 1914. One sees this attitude in the persistent determination of the Roblin and the Norris Governments to emphasize local legislative and jurisdictional questions in provincial elections, and also in their formal submissions to the Dominion Cabinet. Until 1914, the great majority of the submissions, approved by the Manitoba legislature, dealt with the jurisdictional objectives, like subsidy questions. Only few referred to other policies of the Dominion, like the tariff.

It is characteristic of Manitoba Governments that the first encounter of Premier Norris, while in office, with a policy question affecting the federal level occurred not in the economic, but in the political realm. During the critical period between the provincial elections of 1914 and 1915, he desperately required an effective issue that would dim Sir Rodmond Roblin's remaining persuasiveness. While deeply concerned over the provincial demand for the transfer of the natural resources, the Liberal leaders found it difficult to clarify why they expected to be more successful than the incumbent Government in dealing with Prime Minister Borden or the Maritime provinces.

It was finally in the spring of 1915 that Premier Norris picked the right cause. "The new Premier spoke at Norwood on June 30th and said little about the late Government, or even about his own, but urged a Coalition in Ottawa." He was careful to add no comment. This stand must have made the
Manitoba Liberals appear ambitious to play an influential role in national politics, while emphasizing their freedom from Wilfrid Laurier's leadership.

Norris was careful to add no further comments as to what tariff changes or other economic policies, the prospective Union Government should introduce. The Manitoba Liberals formed a strongly autonomist Government. Why? Political considerations made any clearcut stand on decisive national issues dangerous for a party aiming to please the entire electorate by defending regional autonomy. Winnipeg and farm interests differed considerably on some aspects of the National Policy (trade, subsidizing of immigration). Further, whether influenced by Reform Associations or the Western Nineteenth Century tradition of nonpartisanship, the Manitobans strongly suspected those provincial politicians identified too closely with a cause which their federal party was assisting in an area unrelated to constitutional conflicts. As it was, Norris, the imaginative head of the Government, offended no important group in or outside the province, while pleasing the average citizen who expected the professional politicians throughout the country to cease their usual partisan struggle in wartime.

There are several ways of explaining in more detail Premier Norris' call for a national Coalition Government. Several partisan factors cast light upon his motivation. Premier Norris evidently attempted to achieve the good will of some individual Conservative members, whose party still possessed the majority in the assembly at the time when he was called to office. He took a move that was calculated to win their sympathies without entailing on the Liberals any obligation to take a member from the other major party into their own Cabinet. In 1915, the Government refused to take the logical step of forming a provincial coalition, because they apparently intended to lead a partisan campaign election in Manitoba within several months. Urging a national Union Government might make the administration
appear non-partisan in spirit, without their paying the price for an actual coalition: a sharing of decisions with the future Opposition.

Norris might also have expected that a national Union Government might be more willing than a party Cabinet to sponsor the transfer of natural resources to his province, since then his provincial party might possess more influence with a bi-partisan administration than one formed exclusively Conservative. The Manitoba Government must have been apprehensive that their poor relationships with either federal party would delay a solution to the conflict indefinitely, so long as party Government prevailed in Ottawa. The Manitoba Liberals could expect little sympathy from the incumbent all-Conservative Cabinet of Borden, with Robert Rogers as the Minister of the Interior. If Roblin, Rogers' closest collaborator, had failed to secure a better arrangement with Canada than that given in 1912, would Norris be more successful? Robert Rogers was the pillar of the Conservative organization in Manitoba (and allegedly in the other Prairie provinces.) Meighen, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration also showed little sympathy to Norris' administration. On the other hand, Norris was on poor terms with Wilfrid Laurier, then still a leader of the federal Liberals. The Manitoba leader had criticised the national Liberal party repeatedly on the issue of educational policy, ever since he had blasted the Coldwell amendments which the Roblin Government had enacted in understanding with the Laurier Government. Norris was to remain a severe critic of the federal Liberals until his retirement as premier in 1922. In these circumstances, he must have hoped that a Union Government might include some Western Liberals, such as T. A. Crerar, who would be closer to his own viewpoint than either Laurier or Rogers.

In addition to his interprovincial political motives, or to his intense desire to secure the federally managed natural resources in Manitoba for his province, Norris was also committed, apparently in all sincerity, to the moral reform movement that was particularly significant in Manitoba during the
period from 1914 to 1925, and in British Columbia from 1916 to 1919. In
Manitoba, the political objectives of this movement appeared first in the
program of the Political Reform League, started under the leadership of R. L.
Richardson as early as 1900. The ideas introduced by that organization
became of great significance when they were adopted by the Manitoba Grain
Growers Association in July, 1914. The primary political goal of both
the Political Reform League and the Grain Growers Association was the
widening of the role given the general electorate at the expense of political
parties. For this reason, numerous proposals were suggested, including
techniques for democratising nomination meetings at both federal and pro-
vincial levels, coercive powers for the electorate (recall) to be exercised
between elections, and even more far-reaching suggestions for letting the voter
share in the making of policy (initiative, referendum). The proposal of civil
service reform was intended to place all public jobs on the basis of merit
rather than political loyalties.

The Political Reform Association and the farmers organizations pro-
posed their favorite reforms for both provincial and federal governments.
While the Manitoba Grain Growers Association applied them to provincial
politics in 1914, the Canadian Council of Agriculture made them federal issues
through its Farmers Platform of 1914.

It is significant that until 1917 organized farmers suggested the
remaking of political practices rather than the structure of the existing
parties. No representative farmers' groups suggested the idea of "delegate
democracy," or full constituency control over the conduct of the members of
legislative bodies. This fact gave cooperating provincial parties, such as
Norris' party a tremendous advantage. The Norris administration could in-
corporate these ideas into their platform without losing the partisan support
of a reasonably disciplined provincial party. The Manitoba Liberals were
able to claim to be the advocates of the new movement of moral regeneration,
since the aims of the most prominent reform leaders stopped short of
delegate democracy or the creation of a new party, which the Nonpartisan
movement was to demand in Alberta after 1915\(^2\) and in Saskatchewan in
1917.\(^2\)

For provincial parties, there was one major difficulty inherent in
the ideas of political reform as interpreted by the Manitoba Grain Growers
Association. Before 1917, the institutional ties between the corresponding
provincial and federal parties were very close. Hence it was difficult for
a provincial party to implement significant changes in its own practices
without hurting the organization, or prestige of the associated national
politicians. What consistent reformer could avoid commenting in respect to
the methods employed in federal politics?

Premier Scott's Liberals in Saskatchewan and C. H. Brewster's party in
British Columbia, refrained from making a crusade for the new political
reform proposals, in large measure because they feared discrediting the
activities of the federal Liberal party. These leaders made some legis­

dative concessions to the movement, like the Saskatchewan Referendum Act of
1913.\(^3\) Generally, those provincial leaders associated with major federal
parties were less than enthusiastic advocates of these changes. The local
organizers of a federal party were unable to accept the reform ideas. Their
national leadership firmly held to the principle that all policy decisions
of any importance must be determined solely by the caucus. For that reason,
the federal Conservatives and Liberals were generally far less willing even
to experiment with the political reform ideas than were provincial parties.

The Manitoba Liberals were the only provincial party in Western
Canada who determined, prior to the summer of 1917, that they would rather
be the spokesmen for the reform movement than remain faithful to their
federal wing. As an advertisement of this position, which deepened an
already existing disharmony between the federal and the Manitoba Liberals, Norris' call for a Union Government was convincing evidence.

Norris' initiative served him well with the voters of his province in the elections of 1915 and 1920. Interestingly, it failed to make him an important kingmaker in the negotiations leading up to the formation of the Union Government in 1917. In those talks Clifford Sifton and Robert Borden were the prominent figures. Next in importance were premier A. L. Sifton of Alberta and C. H. Brewster of British Columbia. Sifton attended several important consultations with Borden, his brother and T. A. Crerar,74 (then a leading federal Liberal from Manitoba, and supported by Norris, though he was sufficiently concerned about the natural resources claim raised by his province to avoid mentioning it in his reply to the Crown Speech in 1922).75 Also Brewster, while maintaining friendly relations with Laurier, participated in the early negotiations for the Union Government, and although some of his Cabinet ministers were cool to the prospect, he was spoken of as the likely prospect for a Cabinet position.76 One may conclude that Norris was a prophet only in his Manitoba homeland. For the Borden administration, he was a maverick whose idea happened to be useful.77

Did the Governments of British Columbia remain, during the years from 1903 to 1918, entirely silent upon the matters beyond their actual or intended competence? No, the McBride, the Bowser, and the Brewster Governments occasionally proceeded to discuss matters of that type. Like the Governments of Premier Norris in Manitoba, they reduced the relevant instances to one or two problems, but they went further by refusing to be conspicuous in a crusade which did not already have the backing of other influential leaders or organizations.

The remaining occasions for intervention by the provincial Government were selected most carefully to fit ideological requirements. In this
respect, the Conservatives under McBride's leadership were united, and persistently in close touch with the preferences of the public in their province. Hence they were better prepared than the Liberals or the Socialists to voice their views upon any aspect of the Dominion-provincial relationship.

Aside from concentrating upon constitutional issues, the McBride Conservatives effectively exploited all the suitable occasions for presenting their views upon the nature of current Imperial problems. The British Columbia Conservatives, like most citizens of their province, were in favor of close collaboration between the Dominion and the United Kingdom along the lines urged by the Imperial Federation Movement. Acting from their premise, they were highly critical of the policies assumed by the Laurier Government, particularly between 1908 and the latter's defeat.

What aspects of intra-imperial relationships did the British Columbia Government consider most significant? Premier McBride frequently performed the usual rites of welcoming the representatives of British institutions or the visiting ships of the Royal Navy. Yet he was not content with these routine procedures. It is true that he never urged a central Parliament. On the other hand, unlike the majority of other regional leaders, he asked for joint control with Great Britain over several broad aspects of Canadian national life. While continuous consultations were held sufficient for numerous activities, single coordinating authorities were proposed for commerce and defence.

The subsequent actions of the British Columbia Government showed more regard for sentiment than for legal considerations. Thus McBride publicised his sympathy for a compromise settlement of the dispute in the case of the Irish Home Rule Controversy. Already a subscriber to a moderate Irish newspaper, he supported, as by a speech made on October 18, 1910, certain
proposals for the establishment of a federal system in Great Britain. He appeared on a public platform with T. P. O'Connor, who originated that idea. Meanwhile, McBride was corresponding with several Conservative Members of the British House of Commons, apparently to publicise his Imperialist beliefs. McBride's strategy succeeded in making him trusted by the British Government, whatever party controlled it.

The earliest occasion upon which the McBride Government took sides in a vital matter pertaining to the British Empire concerned a topic upon which the Canadian Parliament possessed only superior, not exclusive jurisdiction. As did the Saskatchewan Government in the matter of railway subsidies, the British Columbia Conservatives found a convincing constitutional basis for encouraging selective immigration. Thus the Speech from the Throne, delivered on March 7th, mentioned "negotiations which promised a desirable class from the United Kingdom". Indeed, there were to follow a substantial result from this policy, (as Appendix D shows).

Premier McBride did most to build his reputation of being an Imperialist by his vigorous role in the widespread debate regarding the Laurier and the Borden naval policies. All the leading public figures in the United Kingdom as well as Canada made themselves heard. Of all the Dominion Cabinets, the British Columbia Government probably expressed the most challenging views.

Premier McBride spelled out his proposals for organizing the Imperial Navy in his speeches of April 1st, 1909, and March 19, 1910. His first utterance was an effort to bring Laurier's early moves, as expressed in the Parliamentary resolutions of 1909 with the requirements of the United Kingdom. As reported by J. C. Hopkins in the Canadian Annual Review, he approved of the intention shown by the federal Government to establish a Canadian unit, but also desired the Dominion "to go further and to illustrate the spirit of
Canada by an immediate and unconditional gift. The authorities should show Britain during the next fifteen years how much help this virile and prosperous people could give". The ways in which the British Columbia Governments proceeded to obtain the desired response from Ottawa included active collaboration with Phillips-Woolley, the organizer of the Navy League branches in that province. This is another item showing that the first maintained a steady interest in the matter until their electoral defeat in 1916.

Why did the McBride and the Bowser Governments emphasize Imperial topics? They genuinely believed in the necessity of encouraging closer political and cultural relations between the Dominions on one hand, and Great Britain on the other. Further, it was thought beneficial to provincial interests if a London-Ottawa-Victoria triangle existed as regards the legal division of powers in Canadian federalism. In particular, the British Columbia Conservatives desired to achieve the favorable response of the British Cabinet and Parliament, if not that of the Judicial Committee, to any constitutional appeals or proposals which they might have made, inclusive of such unusual interventions as took place in 1908.

There was also the motive of ensuring the defence of the Pacific coast. The British Columbia Government paid much attention to the Navy Question, precisely because the province was greatly exposed to attack from the sea. Its lack of defensive installations appeared strikingly in 1914. This factor led to the spectacular shipbuilding program instituted by the McBride Government.

The latter made important contributions to the Canadian Navy, which cooperated closely with the British Admiralty. However, the British Columbia Government also chose to take a fairly consistent course of action in Imperial matters because public sentiment favored the decisions taken.
British naval policy proposals possessed the further merit of being more conclusive than any of the national policies taken in Canada before 1914. While it was helped to secure large majorities, the provincial Government needed to share little of its resulting prestige with any federal party.

By comparison with defence policy, Premier McBride paid rather limited attention to the tariff. During the Reciprocity Campaign of 1911, a strong effort was made to support Borden's position. At other times, protectionist proposals seemed dangerous, since they might have seriously divided the electorate.

During the First World War, the Liberal Government of British Columbia considered it expedient to voice its viewpoint upon only two matters which were to be decided by the federal Parliament. One was the principle behind the formation of the Union Government, the other, the proposed policy of conscription. Upon these questions, British Columbia followed a nationalist viewpoint.

The most meaningful comments made by the British Columbia Liberals upon this topic were those of Premier Brewster. Having opened the Western Convention which the federal Liberal party held in Winnipeg on August 7 to 10, 1917, he introduced Premier Norris, who was to act as temporary chairman.

At first, both helped their federal party to remain united by recalling certain of the most important economic policies which had formerly been introduced by the Laurier Government. A notable example, was, of course, the idealized low-tariff principle symbolized by the Reciprocal Trade Agreement.

J. Castell Hopkins reports that during the opening day of the Convention, the other leading figures in the Liberal Party, including Clifford Sifton, conformed to the conciliatory mood. Apparently, they accepted Sir Wilfrid Laurier's leadership for the time being. There were few hints of a threatening revolt.
Later in the proceedings, differences of view clearly appeared, precisely in respect to the potential Coalition and the nature of the national military policy. Thus, Premier Brewster stated in a press interview that the "Liberal party's War Resolution means conscription if necessary." His endorsement of Laurier was based upon the assumption that the latter would confirm the platform "in its entirety."

One might well wonder why Premier Brewster neither sought, nor was offered a federal appointment. Why did he then concentrate almost entirely upon the interprovincial business in his public utterances? In fact, during the year of 1918 he made only one single recorded reference to Borden's bill concerning conscription, while appearing at a public rally in Vancouver. The Prime Minister was in the audience.

The most plausible reason for Brewster's restrain upon in commenting on the exclusively federal issues lies primarily in his awareness that the top figures in his party, even at the provincial level, disagreed in their approach to the tariff and the economic regulatory policies embraced by the Union Cabinet between 1917 and 1920. In fact, some openly questioned then whether the Coalition should have been formed despite Laurier's explicit disapproval, indicated already at the Liberal Convention held in Winnipeg during the spring of 1917. The most influential Westerners associated with this position, since 1918, were Frank Oliver and Walter Scott from the Prairie region, and in British Columbia. As to the leading economic issues, the British Columbia Government was indeed undisputably united, at least until 1920, but their rapport with the electorate was limited. In federal politics, the public in the Pacific province paid more attention to the high-tariff, strongly imperialist Conservatives than to the Liberals. For those reasons, it is suggested that Premier Brewster found it expedient to remain in the provincial Government during 1917 and 1918.
CHAPTER 5

THE AFTERMATH OF THE UNION GOVERNMENT

The relationship of the provincial Canadian Governments to the national Union Cabinet headed by Robert L. Borden after October, 1917, was undoubtedly the most thoroughly debated issue in the entire Western region until at least 1921. Provincial leaders then expressed divided views upon many of the federal economic issues, like the question of the compulsory marketing of wheat by the federal Government. Simultaneously, they were defending their support of, and later their neutrality towards the Coalition Government. As one might have expected, the resulting heated arguments removed jurisdictional conflicts of the traditional type from the attention of the public.

It should be emphasized that after 1918 the Western provincial Governments in the Prairies considered their demand for the transfer of the federally-held natural resources to be of equal importance with the tariff and the freight rate issues. The same was true of the attitude taken by the Oliver Government in respect to the Railway Lands question in British Columbia after 1921. For essentially partisan reasons, however, only the provincial stand upon the non-constitutional questions was sufficiently explained and advertised to the electors.

The story of the Saskatchewan Governments between 1915 and 1925 will first be analyzed in detail, because it shows in an unmistakably clear manner the priorities assigned by the Western Governments after 1914 to political issues. As this writer will point out in detail further, the largely single crop province probably experienced more keenly than any other in Canada the economic and political tensions resulting from the policies embraced by the Union Government at different times. The decisive factor which permitted the Martin and the Dunning Governments to win a total of three elections in
consecutive order after 1914 comprised the continuing understanding which these Cabinets enjoyed with the electorate. 2

Several effective policies allowed the Saskatchewan Liberals to profit from the currently expressed preferences and needs of the Prairie public. The leading figures in the government were shrewdly drawn from the ranks of the organized farmers, to work with politicians experienced in Parliamentary methods. Undoubtedly, the Government practiced marked self-respect in its relationships with the federal institutions, even though it was believed that regional leaders must frequently cooperate with the governing party in Ottawa. Dunning's friendly contacts with his National Leader did not prevent him from speaking with remarkable clarity in respect to the demands made upon the federal Liberals.

Meanwhile, the Liberal Government found it all the more easier to maintain its ascendancy in Saskatchewan because the majority in the electorate continued to place a heavy weight upon the desired tariff reductions and other causes traditionally associated with the Laurier Government. It is striking that the inability of Dunning's successor to win the election of 1929 resulted from the financial weakness of the provincial administration and from revived conflict over governmental policies in respect to separate schools, not from protest against his alliance with the federal party. 3 It might be argued that the predicament of the Gardiner Government might have been lightened by an earlier agreement in respect to the natural resources question. However, the premier-to-be Anderson showed little interest in debating the methodology which his opponents employed in dealing with the federal Government. 4

On October 17, 1916, William Martin received the call to premiership of Saskatchewan after eleven years of the Scott administration. Martin had been a faithful supporter of the Liberal party both federally and provincially, while enjoying the confidence of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. 5 He seemed to have been

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especially interested in, and thought most important the exclusively federal issues like the tariff and the provision of drought relief to the new provinces. This may be concluded from the speeches he made while holding his first important office, the Regina seat in the House of Commons. In that capacity he, incidentally, never challenged the Autonomy Acts of 1905.

The Martin Government was prepared to cooperate with the federal Government, provided the latter implemented acceptable changes in the matters beyond the intended provincial competence. Thus in a statement issued in October, 1916, the New Premier stressed five purely provincial issues, upon which he could not enter into conflict with the Borden Government. These included the improvement of agriculture by provincial action, the extension of the farm mortgage corporation, School Act changes, and the subsidizing of new railway construction. It is clear that Martin was acting cautiously in respect to the federal parties because he was unprepared to commit himself to the question of Coalition. Many in the West also appreciated certain measures which the federal Government then took to increase wheat production and prices.

Even so, Martin was careful to add his support for "the continuation of the struggle for reciprocity in natural products" and for a general revision of the tariff downwards. There was, simultaneously in his document, no more than a brief mention that the province expected to be granted "provincial control of the natural resources and public domain" at the conclusion of World War I. Thus the Liberal Saskatchewan Government, even by the wording of its policy proposals, remained true to the ideological tradition of its predecessors. Shortly afterwards, the Martin government made a decision to champion a new federal policy proposal, the establishment of new rural Dominion banks. This proposal initially appeared in a platform adopted by the Saskatchewan Liberal party convention held in Moose Jaw on March 28-29, 1917.
At the Moose Jaw convention, the Saskatchewan Liberals drafted two distinct documents respecting provincial and federal policy. The official provincial party platform for the coming election consisted entirely of local business. The Martin Government promised improvements in education, mother's pensions, veterans aid, public health, and the extension of the telephone system, while concern was also shown for certain specialized agricultural industries, like the dairy companies.\textsuperscript{12}

The Liberal convention of 1912 also approved an additional document entitled "A Saskatchewan Bill of Rights". This document reveals the increasing concern felt by the Saskatchewan Liberal party in respect to national policies. This statement demanded two significant legislative changes and four constitutional amendments. The legislative aims expressed were substantial tariff reductions and the establishment of nationwide agricultural banks. In the area of formal Dominion-provincial relations, the Liberal convention was calling for a transfer of natural resources and school lands for the province, the assurance for the province of all legal powers concerning the control of liquor, and the abolition of the tax exemption enjoyed by the Canadian Pacific Railway. In view of the attention given to the traditional provincial jurisdictional claims, this document seems rather conservative. It is, nevertheless, significant that the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights was presented by Charles Dunning, the provincial Treasurer who was a tireless leader of the Saskatchewan Grain Growers Association. The latter were busy persuading the Martin Government to take up such proposals for new federal economic policies as were initially suggested in their own conventions.\textsuperscript{13}

From this date onwards, Premier Martin was steadily devoting more and more attention in his statements to various policy proposals pertaining to the Borden and Meighen Governments. For instance, in 1912, "he was insistent... throughout the year upon the necessity of tariff changes along free trade lines."\textsuperscript{14}
In June of that year, he presided at a provincial Liberal party convention which was meeting to participate in the proceedings leading to the choice of a new national Leader upon the death of Laurier in 1918. In connection with these events, the Saskatchewan Government elucidated certain altogether new ideas. Not only changes in commercial policy, but also emergency legislation to supply "food and fuel" to all sections of Canada were now expected.

Aside from the direct demands of the Grain Growers, there were two broader reasons for Premier Martin's increasing preoccupation with various federal economic policies, especially the tariff and the new services proposed or actually implemented during 1917-1921. One of these was undoubtedly the fact of considerable suffering resulting from the increasing living costs apparent since the beginning of World War I. In 1919, the public felt for the first time the full impact of the process, when a 50% fall in the price of wheat, and a severe drought attacked the Western farmers.

As Nellie McClung writes, "none of us who lived through it will ever forget the tired rebellious faces of the bewildered farm boys who drifted from place to place, not wanted anywhere.... We know now that there could have been great projects of housing, road building, reforestation... the making of parks, and the conservation of water supply which could have taken up the slack of our manpower. It could have enriched and beautified our country, but to all our entreaties that this should be undertaken, we were met with the cry, "We haven't the money!" Provincial Governments anywhere in Canada were able to make very limited expenditures for relief, since they were suffering unprecedented deficits between 1918 and 1925. Financial considerations doubtless prompted the leading public figures in the Western provinces to call upon the federal Government to hasten a postwar economic recovery."
Another factor behind the increasing engrossment of these provincial governments was their political weakness. For instance, the Martin government in Saskatchewan, eager to survive the partial disintegration of the Union Cabinet, was faced with the grave difficulties resulting from its originally divided stand on the question of the Union government and from the subsequent widespread disappointment of the voters with both major federal parties.

In 1917, Martin had given general verbal support to the new coalition Cabinet formed by R.L. Borden, who united the Unionist Liberals and the Conservatives under his leadership. J.A. Calder, the Saskatchewan Minister of Railways, became Borden's new Minister of Immigration and Colonization. Even at that time, there was a considerable division in the Saskatchewan Government as to the wisdom of Calder's entry into the Union government. In 1918, W.L. Motherwell, a provincial minister, strongly urged him to resign. Motherwell then failed to have his view made official, and returned to private life until 1921.

R.L. Borden considered that the Saskatchewan Liberals were extremely partisan in their attitudes. A likely explanation for their critical attitude towards the Coalition was their great dissatisfaction with the unwillingness of the Conservative government to reopen commercial negotiations with the United States. The Saskatchewan legislature had requested this action in 1912.

Criticisms of Calder's association with and Martin's formal approval of the Union government mounted in the years from 1918 to 1921, when the Canadian Council of Agriculture was organizing a new federal Progressive Party. Since 1907, the Grain Growers Association of Saskatchewan were considering the formation of a new provincial party on the pattern of the United Farmers of Alberta. It was doubtless to forestall this sudden threat
that Martin so readily became a spokesman for new federal legislation. In 1921, prior to the provincial elections of that year, Martin even declared that he considered the conduct of wheat marketing and the Dominion freight policy the most important issues in Saskatchewan. In respect to wheat marketing, his Cabinet sponsored a study of the possibility of compulsory marketing under provincial auspices. The commissioners appointed for this purpose, James Stewart, a former chairman of the Canadian Wheat Board, and F. W. Riddell, General Manager of the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company, considered that "the best form of a centralized wheat marketing agency would be a national organization". Hence Premier Martin acquired an additional basis for his call on the Dominion to provide one. As to the related issue of the railway freight rates, which had been sharply raised by the Board of Railway Commissioners during 1916 and 1917, Martin demanded an immediate reduction. He was ready "to continue the fight now waged for lower freight rates, believing (sic) that the present unbearable charges constitute one of the heaviest burdens on our people." Throughout the period from 1911 to 1923, Premier William F. Martin repeatedly referred to his comparative independence from the federal Liberal party. Martin certainly intended to prove that he was able to champion effectively the regionally desired federal policy proposals, regardless of the position taken by the national Liberal leadership. Simultaneously, the Saskatchewan Government gave little explicit encouragement to organizations opposing the federal Liberals. In line with this principle, the Saskatchewan Liberals commenced no crusade for the reform of political practices.

In taking this complex position, the most important provincial Liberal policy makers, probably thought it impossible as yet to practice "the desire of the government that the public business of Saskatchewan should be dealt with on its own merits and not confused or affected by the issues which
The Government was re-elected in 1921 (Cf. Appendix A), precisely because it had been able to act as the spokesman of the organized farmers concerning both provincial and national issues.

To what extent was the evolution noted above in the political practices of Saskatchewan parties typical of the Western provinces of Canada? In general, there are significant differences of degree in the interest shown by the four provincial governments in Dominion questions. These were either the economic policies beyond provincial jurisdiction, the special provincial claims that involved a decision by Canada, or the political question of the relationship between a provincial government and a federal party. It seems that the element of financial and political security enjoyed by a provincial administration was probably decisive in producing a distinctive political tradition in each province, a tradition which either encouraged provincial parties to take a stand upon federal policies or else impeded them from stressing issues of this sort. All provincial governments were, at one time or another, concerned with federal policies, as we have seen in Roblin's case. Yet not all have frequently assumed the role of regional spokesman with the government of Canada, not all have used the resulting issues in provincial elections. The latter readiness arose only when a definite tradition encouraging a provincial administration to become preoccupied with matters beyond its jurisdiction became established in a province. In the older provinces of British Columbia and Manitoba, political habits usually impeded the provincial administrations from interfering with the exclusively federal issues. Thus, federal questions rarely became issues there in provincial elections. In the new Prairie provinces, the beliefs of provincial leaders stimulated the discussion of various federal policy proposals. For reason of expediency, the Rutherford or the Sifton government sometimes hesitated to make known their views upon national policies, as upon the
terminal elevator question. Only in Saskatchewan did all the circumstances ease the way for those party leaders who, like Scott and Martin, frequently took a stand upon national or imperial policy questions and claimed the political rewards.

An analysis of individual provinces shows that the regional political traditions were connected with the degree of enthusiasm demonstrated by a provincial electorate for the special claims made by their province on Canada, or for the stand taken by their provincial government in jurisdictional disputes with the federal Governments. From 1914 to 1925 in particular, it was admittedly difficult for any Territorial or provincial government to create a continuing interest in its constitutional objectives. Even in Manitoba, the electorate commenced to pay much more attention to the tariff debates and the other direct services expected from Parliament.

It is clear that Western Canadian provincial administrations generally, and even a strong Territorial leader like Frederick G. Haultain, have always been able to give the respective electorates a certain measure of guidance. The role of the Manitoba and the British Columbia Governments in indoctrinating the public has been variable, yet nearly always of considerable importance. Except during the period from 1914 to 1924, provincial administrations have effectively promoted the autonomist or the qualified cooperative viewpoint. Solid constitutional gains, if not merely the promise to achieve them, have normally provided security of tenure to the successful administration.

By comparison, the governing parties of Saskatchewan and Alberta have usually exercised less control over the voter. Indeed, this is not true of the period from 1935 to 1958. At that time, the continuing experience or memory of the Great Depression created the rare opportunity for a nationally minor party to control the outcome of elections at both levels of the government. During the earlier years taken up in this study, provincial leaders in the most recently formed Prairie provinces generally conformed to the prevailing public opinion, instead of changing it. Until 1930, the fundamental reason for this situation lay in the quicker rate of democratic changes occurring there.
One may find much evidence showing that the majority of voters in the two new Prairie provinces were greatly interested, since the period from 1905 to 1911, in numerous exclusively federal political issues. This trend is clearly perceptible in the political history of that province. One finds it shared, notably, by the leaders of the organized Prairie farmers (Grain Growers Association in Saskatchewan, Farmers Union of Canada, United Farmers of Alberta). In both provinces there was increasing dependance on the decisions of the federal Parliament, as for the arrangements governing the Board of Grain Supervisors during 1917-1919, and the Wheat Board in 1919-1920. This public attitude undoubtedly hampered these political parties who desired to emphasize the natural resource ownership question or the subsidies. The Conservatives and the Provincial Parties were kept from coming into office, at least until Premier Anderson had the Conservatives adopt a new platform in 1928. That leading political tradition of Saskatchewan, the habit of provincial premiers of becoming lobbyists with the government of Canada, was doubtless an important reason why many leaders of the Saskatchewan Grain Growers, such as J. A. Maharg and C. A. Dunning himself, cooperated with the incumbent Liberal administration, after the Martin Cabinet agreed to redefine the meaning of provincial autonomy. The farmers were less concerned with the constitutional meaning of "autonomy" than with the independence of the governing provincial party from its federal wing. For this reason, it is suggested that while the willingness of the Saskatchewan Liberals to become tireless spokesmen for the general interests of the Prairie region brought for them the good will of the organized farmers, it inhibited them from concentrating on the achievement of constitutional "equality of status" among provincial governments in Canada.

It may be argued, of course, that the alliance between the Liberal Governments and the Grain Growers in Saskatchewan made for expanded local
economic services. In turn, their cost was certainly an incentive for the province to continue its negotiations with the Meighen Cabinet for the transfer of natural resources to provincial jurisdiction. This fact was widely known. Nevertheless, this writer finds that attracting the greatest attention from the voter were the tariff, the regulation of grain marketing, and the nonpartisan handling of local needs by Parliament.

There are several factors behind the nature of voters' interests in the Prairie region. To start, the press gave better publicity to the exclusively federal issues than to any others, perhaps under the influence of the provincial Governments themselves. So did the Liberal and the Farmers' party platforms. Further, the Grain Growers, while mentioning the natural resources problem, never gave any arguments other than financial to support the provincial interest at stake. At their conventions, sharp debates as to the desirable political reforms on the provincial level often obscured other legitimate topics for concern, even though some members undoubtedly possessed the autonomist outlook. Heavily influenced by certain United States figures like Robert M. LaFollette and Woodrow Wilson, the majority often assigned great significance to proposed techniques, designed to bring the government in Canada closer to the people.

A detailed study of official correspondence would be required before a historian could definitely state just what objectives the leading figures in the Martin or the Dunning Governments considered privately, after 1918, to be most significant. It seems that in their public utterances they gave approximately equal weight to all the currently made requests upon the federal Parliament. Because they kept the natural resources question out of partisan debate, the electors were left to form their own conclusions as to the nature of the regional interest. Few saw the logic of the "qualified cooperative" viewpoint. The electors kept dividing between autonomists and nationalists.
To summarize, the Saskatchewan Liberal Government, from 1917 to 1928, stood for the protection of the regional interests both by urging changes in numerous exclusively federal matters and by continuing to present upon Parliament certain standing constitutional requests. Even after reviving certain standing provincial constitutional jurisdictional demands, the provincial Government avoided presenting any relevant ideological arguments. It seems that the Liberals feared offending the Grain Growers Association as well as the federal Government by making far-reaching statements on provincial rights. The result of the Liberal policy was to deepen the informed citizen’s interest in certain national policies without legally strengthening the position of the provincial legislature before the Great Depression commenced.

ALBERTA

In both Alberta and Saskatchewan, as in similar "new" areas in other federal nations, the high concern of the electors with the direct services provided by governments often helps politicians who are willing to make considerable compromises in constitutional matters. Patient negotiations of regional spokesmen with the national authorities produce modest accretions of self-government, while sectional popular movements arise over other issues. In Alberta after 1918, the cause of political reform provided the most apparent reason for the dissatisfaction of the electors with the Unionist and the Conservative administrations in Ottawa.

In Alberta, while the majority of the population probably developed similar expectations to those typical of Saskatchewan, the Sifton and the Stewart Governments observed a somewhat different principle in respect to the policies of the federal Government. Indeed, the respective provincial Governments sometimes acted in economic matters beyond the jurisdiction of
their legislatures. Thus, Premier A. L. Sifton urged the formation of rural branch banks by the federal Government, asked for drought relief, and even implemented a constitutionally questionable liquor policy. On the other hand, the Alberta Liberals differed from the Saskatchewan Governments in generally making slight use of these questions to their advantage in provincial political campaigns. The reason for this habit was doubtless the greater economic and political security enjoyed by the Alberta Liberal governments, at least until 1920. Thus, Premier A. L. Stewart was following in the footsteps of his predecessors when he showed a reluctance to debate Dominion issues, whether economic policy proposals or criticisms of the federal Liberals, in the 1920-21 Alberta campaign. Instead, he chose to stress issues that were provincial at least in their immediate implications. He emphasized the creation of an Alberta Department of Labor, continued enforcement of the Alberta prohibition laws, and a promise to support Northern railways (the Great Waterways Line and the Edmonton, Dunvegan, and British Columbia Railway). The Liberals also took up the question of class organization in politics. The latter issue was being made more than a theoretical problem by proposals made by some United Farmers of Alberta leaders, mostly the Non-partisans of 1917, that their organization support a distinct slate of candidates in 1921.

It is significant that all these questions were indirectly connected with Dominion policies and issues. For instance, through the amendments that the Sifton Government had added to the Alberta Prohibition Act of 1914, that province crossed into a federal jurisdictional field. In pressing its litigation with the Gold Seal Company, Alberta was hardly clarifying the line between federal and provincial responsibilities. The Stewart Government even sponsored a referendum in 1921. It called upon Canada to forbid the import of liquor into the province (approved by a vote of 63,012 to 44,321).
The success of the Alberta prohibition experiment depended on the willingness or the ability of the federal government to stop the entry of liquor from outside the province. That matter was within the power of "regulating trade and commerce", given to Parliament. That policy was indeed introduced by the federal Prohibition Act of 1919, but was shortly thereafter made ineffective. The provincial support for the Edmonton, Dunvegan, and British Columbia Railway and the Alberta Great Waterways Line also depended partially on payments being made by Canada for the nationalized Canadian Northern Lines and by its coverage of the interest due on the bonds of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway (originally guaranteed by Alberta, but a federal responsibility upon the settlement determined by the Taft Commission).35

One reason why Alberta was unable to operate the Waterways Line and handed it over to the Canadian Pacific Railway was the slowness of the Dominion in making its payment on the interest of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway.

Even the question of economic interest groups sponsoring their own candidates in politics was a federal as well as a provincial issue. It was initially raised by the Canadian Council of Agriculture in relation to federal politics in November, 1920. The doctrine of "delegate democracy" (full constituency control over the conduct of legislators) had also appeared in the Farmers Platform of 1918, a document published in relation to Dominion issues.36 All these instances illustrate the close connection between federal and provincial issues in Alberta, and the difficulty faced by a provincial administration intending to appeal to the voter chiefly on its own record.

It is hardly surprising that the leaders of the United Farmers of Alberta were generally unhelpful, even if interested in clarifying the division of powers between provincial and federal governments. They were interested in moral reform and new services for farmers, not in the
constitutional aspects of public policy. This appears in the custom of the United Farmers' conventions to draft only a single annual platform. In it, local and national objectives were indiscriminately mixed. For instance, in the platform adopted in January, 1921, at least three of six key planks referred apparently to matters under the jurisdiction of the federal government. The convention favored a general world-wide reduction of armaments and an acceptance of the World Court, demanded the nationalization of banking and credit services, and expressed "appreciation" for the Wheat Board of 1919 without making a specific appeal for its renewal. Caution upon the latter topic probably prevailed because Henry Wise Wood, the U.F.A. president, was urging a year's study before a definite commitment was made. At the same time, the platform took a definite stand on only two matters of relevance to the provincial government. Opposition was expressed to higher licence fees being set by the Hail Farm Insurance Commission and "the right of provincial members to vote against a Public bill without defeating the government" was urged. At least one plank referred to both levels of government. The Hare system of proportional representation was advocated for both federal and provincial elections.

A study of the United Farmers of Alberta conventions indicates a convincing reason as to why all these planks were inserted into a single platform. Apparently, the membership was far from agreed as to whether new economic policy proposals, like those pertaining to public arrangements for wheat marketing or farm credit, should be made purely federal objectives. In 1921, many observers felt that compulsory marketing under federal auspices was unconstitutional, at least without enabling legislation by the provinces. This viewpoint was confirmed by the jurists who, while studying the problem for the Parliamentary Wheat Commission, investigated proposals for reviving the Wheat Board in 1922. Whether the U.F.A. Executive might have as early
as January, 1921, supposed that some provincial action in wheat marketing might be necessary is debatable. Many conflicting proposals were raised by members. Some proposed a voluntary wheat pool that would have required only a provincial charter.

More urgent to Albertans than wheat marketing was their demand for farm credit. The evidence is clearcut that many influential leaders in the United Farmers organization, such a Rev. Rice Shephard and George Bevington, desired to see either provincial-federal cooperation, or at least immediate provincial experimentation with a credits scheme in the absence of such cooperation. Henry Wise Wood, the president of the United Farmers, was barely successful in having the majority turn down requests for a provincial farm credit program in several consecutive years. Thus, the United Farmers' movement was able to agree on the desirability of certain broad economic and moral objectives, but was far from unanimity as to what level of government was intended to carry out these aims. As Macpherson points out, the fundamental issue was whether the province would carry out the demand of the farmers for credit out of the provincial revenues or whether some nationwide redistribution of wealth was to be attempted through direct federal service. Any effort to resolve that question for more than a year or so would have split the United Farmers organization.

Since only two or three planks of the platform adopted by the 1921 convention referred to provincial action, the United Farmers' Executive, in charge of all political activities since the disbanding of the Farmers Political Association in 1919, issued a special Proclamation on July 1, 1921. This document presented an analysis of reasons as to why the farmers were to enter that year's provincial election under the auspices of their organization. The U.F.A. Executive claimed that "the present unsettled conditions in Canada politically are due in large measure to dissatisfaction
with the party system... Present-day political institutions have failed to develop a sufficiently close connection between the representative and the elector and...the people desire a greater measure of self-government."  

This proclamation stressed political rather than economic provincial aims, as may be seen from the summary which is included in the Appendix. The declaration of principles issued by the U.F.A. Executive was coupled with a special statement made by Henry Wise Wood, who claimed that he "believed in class organization, but not in class legislation or class domination". Wood pledged that the farmer-endorsed candidates, if elected, would "legislate for the good of the community as a whole".  

The nature of this election platform shows that the United Farmers of Alberta were making rather modest demands on their provincial government in 1921. Insofar as they made specific promises in economic policy, the U.F.A. Executive pledged only relatively minor improvements of provincial services, as in hospital services and Hail Insurance. The Executive gave merely a general conventional promise to obtain improvements in the broad areas listed under Section F. In brief, the farmers leaders were fervently impressed with the conviction that even more important than these improvements was the introduction of a new moral climate in politics. It was expected to result from religious inspiration, from popular control of government, and from the cooperative effort of their membership. They were agreed that their essential policies must be the strict enforcement of prohibition, impartiality in hiring public servants and awarding contract jobs, and fiscal solvency. By contrast, on the questions of economic services they showed a rather noncommittal, pragmatic attitude. Wood, for example, was sympathetic to the aims of the moderate craft unions who desired better minimal wage and maximum hour acts, with an increase in relief appropriations. The U.F.A. made no blanket assurances that any improvements in these respects
would be forthcoming. The Executive took the stand that they would not bind the prospective farmers administration to any specific economic policies.

The one far-reaching aspect of the U.F.A. platform was the belief held by that organization that ultimately the same principles of moral and political reform must permeate both provincial and federal policies. This principle was the leading issue in both sets of elections in Alberta from 1921 to 1935. There seems little doubt that on this issue the U.F.A. Executive possessed the warm approval of the rank-and-file members. On the other hand, it may be questioned to what extent the noncommittal attitude of the Executive with reference to economic policies reflected the attitudes of these supporters, who had made the success of the movement possible in 1921. The leaders were stressing the principles of moral reform and fair management, while the farmers, hit by the recession, must have expected that their new government would be more sensitive to their needs than the Stewart administration had been. Doubtless, they were expecting more substantial extensions of farm services, such as provincial financing of more agricultural schools and the irrigation projects, that the U.F.A. statements indicated. At least a strong minority expected the inauguration of rural credits. One may also assume that at least a portion of the electorate would have liked the provincial government to assume a more aggressive attitude towards the federal Government, on the pattern followed by the Saskatchewan administrations. A great deal of investigation has been done already to show the divisions among farmers in respect to provincial services such as farm credit legislation, but insufficient attention has been paid to their views as to how the provincial government should act towards the Dominion. More research is required before one could generalize conclusively whether the grassroots members of the United Farmers of Alberta desired their provincial government to assume more
frequently the role of regional spokesmen in matters beyond the jurisdiction of the province than either the outgoing Stewart government had done or the incoming Greenfield administration was to do.

There is every indication that Herbert Greenfield, who was selected in 1921 as Premier by the successful United Farmers members of the Alberta legislature, probably intended to give exclusive attention to intraprovincial administrative questions. In this respect, he was forced by circumstances to modify his attitude. Although he was much less concerned than Premier Dunning of Saskatchewan with the campaign for the restoration of the Wheat Board, which most Progressive federal Members of Parliament from Alberta supported in 1922, he was forced to take an active part in the discussions pertaining to the federal Wheat Board Act of 1922. In Alberta, he made the legislature pass an enabling bill as was required by Parliament. The legislature of Saskatchewan had also enacted it, before the failure of Manitoba to act stopped the proceedings.

Generally speaking, one is led to conclude that the farmers of Alberta were showing less interest in national services, like wheat marketing, than did the Grain Growers in Saskatchewan. Likewise, there was a greater feeling of distrust felt for the Dominion in Alberta than in Saskatchewan or Manitoba. When S. D. Clark writes that "the West sought to be left alone, it wished to withdraw from those alliances which placed it in a subordinate position," he is describing the mood of many Albertans in particular (Cf. Declaration of grievances with a hint of secessionist sentiment passed at the U.F.A. convention in January, 1924). These feelings are evident in a comparison of the resolutions offered in the conventions of the United Farmers of Alberta with those considered by the Grain Growers conventions in Saskatchewan. With his secessionist views, E. A. Partridge was rather exceptional among farm leaders in Canada. In Saskatchewan, socialists like George Williams
of the Farmers' Union of Saskatchewan generally desired a stronger federal government. So did Technocrats and Fascists like Dr. Johnstone of Vidora. On the other hand, secessionists repeatedly submitted resolutions in the conventions of the United Farmers of Alberta. Faced with these popular feelings of independence and sometimes of hostility to the federal government, the Greenfield and the Brownlee administrations wisely preferred to let the annual conventions clear the way for causes that entailed an increase in federal powers. These Alberta governments must have also felt that they were necessarily less influential with the major federal parties than the Saskatchewan Cabinets because of their continued obligation to support the Progressives (United Farmers of Alberta after 1925) in federal elections. Under these circumstances, Greenfield and Brownlee must have considered it more prudent to cultivate the good will of the farmers' organization than to become dangerously identified with a federal government.

There was one significant exception in which the Alberta administrations did work hard to influence federal policy. They strenuously supported the proposal of a national credit policy which the United Farmers' conventions and the U.F.A. members from that province had originated. An Alberta cause par excellence, the offer of a national farm loan policy was first made by Liberals in 1919.

The United Farmers movement had been keenly interested in the possibility of obtaining a Dominion lending service at least since 1920. The 1920 convention urged "nationalization of banking facilities and federal credits," and so did the 1929 convention. At the 1923 convention, a determined minority led the movement for a federal credits service against Wood's wishes. In that year, the Greenfield government joined the campaign for the participation of Canada in a federal-provincial cooperative policy. The provincial ministers were doubtless motivated by a desire to avoid the necessity for a unilateral provincial credits program and also by an intention to repair
the loss of prestige that they might have suffered in the collapse of the Wheat Board movement.

As the Greenfield Cabinet reported still in 1923, they "viewed with approval the investigation being held by the Dominion into the matter of intermediate and long-term loans" and had intimated their readiness to cooperate in working out reforms in this field. Likewise in 1926, after the federal Parliament had already passed its experimental Credits Act, R. G. Reid, the Treasurer of Alberta in Brownlee's Cabinet and future premier, stated that "the best scheme of rural credits at present was one which would combine the Dominion and provincial governments and the borrowers."\(^{55}\) Neither the unilateral federal measure nor this statement prevented the 1926 convention from finally passing a request for provincial participation, along with a demand for a national Central Bank. Ultimately, it was the return of substantial rural prosperity by 1927 that rather than the meagre federal program made it possible for the Brownlee government to ignore the instructions of the convention with impunity. Demand for rural credit was less urgent, when farmers were able to pay the $8.00 per day for occasional help that even transient laborers were charging in Calgary in 1928.\(^{56}\)

In the federal election of 1925 in Alberta and in the provincial election of the subsequent year, the federal credits policy was of considerable importance. The United Farmers of Alberta used the concessions that they won from the King administration as an argument that even an independent group of small numbers could be influential in drafting Dominion legislation. In 1926, the Brownlee government was also receiving approval for urging Canada to expand its credit policy and to limit immigration. These examples show the ease with which federal issues were introduced into the provincial elections in Alberta, even though individual Alberta premiers
often showed reluctance in appealing to the electorate on these issues. One might suggest that the reformist organization principles of the governing Alberta parties, starting with the Sifton administration, sometimes encouraged provincial governments to avoid raising federal economic issues in order to prevent the public from associating them with a federal party. Further, the usual political security enjoyed by Alberta governments made it normally rather unnecessary for them to champion national policy proposals in order to remain in office. Thus, the Stewart administration followed A. L. Sifton's principle that a provincial administration must appeal to the electorate on its own administrative and legislative record.

Nevertheless, the United Farmers movement introduced many joint causes into Alberta's federal and provincial elections. Their attitude towards the issues of prohibition, delegate democracy, credits policy, tariffs, and immigration inevitably changed earlier official policy regarding the federal government. While showing more interest in political reform, the United Farmers kept Alberta fairly close to the priorities of the contemporary Saskatchewan governments. In brief, the Farmers administration of Alberta was busy with so many other objectives that they were simply unable to concentrate on the amendment of their constitutional status. Thus, efforts to achieve the natural resources transfer never became the raison d'être of their organization. On the other hand, it is true that the Alberta United Farmers administrations were freer to devote more attention to that objective than the Saskatchewan Liberals. The first were able to refer to the annual United Farmers of Alberta conventions the task of promoting certain other federal policy objectives. Thus, the Alberta public never lost sight of their provincial leaders' constitutional objectives, even though other issues were made more prominent by the Farmers' convention.
A brief comparison of the statements made concerning rural credits in the United Farmers of Alberta platform in 1924 and those appearing in the documents issued by the Manitoba Grain Growers Association that very year illustrate the distinction in the political practices of Manitoba and Alberta. The Alberta document contains many objectives addressed to both levels of government. It does not define whether rural credits enter under provincial or federal responsibility. From other sources, we are able to learn that the convention intended to have the Dominion accept this responsibility, but this seems to have been purely a matter of expediency. The Manitoba Grain Growers issued two separate documents, one dealing with provincial and the other with national objectives. In the first document, there is a discussion for federal credits policy; in the other, a reference to Manitoba Farm Loans program. This is typical of the policy which all the significant Manitoba organizations generally followed. They frequently observed a clear demarcation of governmental responsibilities.

In Manitoba, therefore, a conscious effort to confuse federal and provincial political issues invariably produced a protest, like the one appearing in the letter cited below. The leadership of the Conservative and the Liberal parties, like the most influential members of the Grain Growers Convention, upheld the Manitoba tradition of separating provincial from federal questions in elections held during the entire period from 1896 to 1925. This tradition was indeed severely strained under the pull of several Dominion issues in the provincial election of 1922. A substantial section of the electorate, whether in the farmers' movement or in the Socialist and Labor parties, then voted for a cause greater than the provincial sphere of action. Since that year to the present, the habit of sticking to provincial issues in Manitoba elections has been apparently held less firmly than
during the preceding decades, but the persistence of the tradition was
demonstrated repeatedly, as in the election of 1927, when there were re-
markably few references made to federal political or economic policies.

Premier Norris discussed only entirely provincial issues in the
Manitoba election of 1920. He ran for re-election on the basis of his
Cabinet's record and the promises made in the above platform. The
Conservatives opposed the Liberal Government on these grounds.

The powerful, but still provincially nonpolitical Grain Growers
Association of Manitoba refrained from entering this contest, although they
were already supporting federal Progressives. They shared with the
political parties the tradition of sticking to provincial issues in
Manitoba elections. One finds this habit in the discussions taking place
during the Grain Growers Convention of 1920, in their platform.

The clearest evidence as to the attitudes of the rank-and-file Manitoba
farmers is their very refusal to enter the elections of 1920 as an inde-
pendent party. That year, the Grain Growers issued a platform entirely
referring to federal issues, except for a plank urging strict provincial
enforcement of prohibition. (In that year, no separate provincial platform
was issued.) Upon adopting that platform, the convention approved political
activity in federal elections. "There was a lengthy discussion upon a
resolution, moved by B. Edie, citing the great importance of federal issues
and the need of concentration upon them... and mentioned the absence of a
Provincial Farmers platform with that conclusion: 'Therefore be it resolved
that the question of taking provincial action be left entirely to the
initiative of each local constituency'." The decision made by the Grain Growers convention to defer the
organization of a new provincial party doubtless increased the element of
security in the planning of the Liberal strategists. Their self-confidence
is shown in their reliance on provincial issues and also in their apparent change of attitude towards the federal Liberal party. Norris had attended the 1919 national convention of that party and made a noteworthy speech which seemed to signify a rapprochement between the Manitoba government and the National Leader-elect, Mackenzie King. The provincial election of 1920 must have been a rude awakening for Norris and his party strategists. The Liberals obtained only 26 seats to 12 Farmers, 13 Conservatives, 4 Labor, and 3 Independents.

The outcome of the 1920 election made the Norris Government partially modify its attitude towards both Dominion issues and parties. The Manitoba administration was now readier to associate itself with various federal economic policy proposals, such as the revision of freight rates and tariffs, the marketing of wheat. Numerous memorials on these topics appeared, and were approved by the Manitoba legislature in the years 1921-22. In this respect, the 1922 session of the legislature in Manitoba resembled the 1913 session of the Saskatchewan legislature.

After 1918, the federal Liberals were able to encourage Premier Norris' collaboration by making promises of substantial tariff reductions and other regionally popular policy proposals. In 1921, Norris must have hoped that the federal Liberals might champion the legislation desired by the Manitoba electorate. He had been a prominent figure at the 1919 Liberal convention. Yet when it became apparent that the federal party under Mackenzie King was unprepared to accept the viewpoint expressed in the Manitoba submissions, Premier T. C. Norris decided to support T. A. Crerar and the federal Progressives in the federal election of 1921. He retained that negative attitude towards the King Liberals in 1922, even though many of his colleagues were ready to change theirs. As in the other provinces, there was a direct relationship between the insecurity of the Manitoba Government
and the willingness of the Premier to speak out on federal issues, even to the extent of opposing his federal party.

In the election campaign of 1922, the Norris government succumbed to the temptation of making repeated intrusions into the area of federal policy and politics. On the eve of the election, the provincial Liberal platform endorsed "the adoption of a vigorous federal and Provincial Immigration policy" and made "eulogizing" comments in respect to the national King Government. In his own campaign, T. C. Norris followed the precedent that the platform had set in referring to federal policy questions. He went even beyond the official platform of his party to ask for a vote of confidence on the basis of efforts to change federal economic policies. For instance, "the Premier claimed that the chief credit for the successful outcome (of his fight for the reductions in freight rates) was due to the Manitoba government". He also stressed the need for lower tariffs.

In 1922, Premier Norris likewise widely discussed the question of his relationship with the federal Liberals. On this topic only, he differed with the view expressed in the Liberal party's platform. Norris kept declaring his policy of "no alignment with Ottawa" because he wanted to remain consistent in his independent campaign for greater tariff and freight rate reductions than the King administration was then ready to sponsor. One of Norris' motives for taking this nonconformist position on the two economic questions of the utmost significance to the Manitoba electorate was his intention of containing the political reform movement, then championed by the farmers. Generally, while it is true that Norris also gave much attention to local questions, like the desirability of a majority government in Manitoba and the values of the legislation sponsored by his Government, he had moved far, by 1921, towards a nationalist viewpoint. In 1922, he was deeply involved with many federal economic and political questions.
The United Farmers of Manitoba and the labor parties opposing the Norris administration reveal many gradations of viewpoint as to the extent to which they were prepared to debate Dominion issues in a provincial election. The Socialists, for instance, discussed economic questions with little regard being given to constitutional aspects. In regard to constitutional limitations, A. E. Smith's comment was typical of their viewpoint: "As for British institutions, he claims that they were elastic and can and should be adapted to the changing conditions of the time."

The Dominion Labor and United Farmer parties were more precise in stating objectives within the jurisdiction of the province. The Dominion Labor Party, headed by J. F. Dixon, apparently restricted its choice of objectives to provincial labor and welfare legislation, so far as proposals which this party made in the provincial election of 1920 were concerned. Along with the Dominion Labor Party, the Executive of the United Farmers of Manitoba took every care to ensure that their newly launched organization in provincial politics would possess a detailed program applicable to Manitoba conditions.

As in the previous years, the 1922 regular annual program of the Manitoba Grain Growers Association had highlighted federal rather than provincial issues. Only a secondary mention was made of such provincial objectives as "economy in public works" and "prohibition of horseracing". For that reason, when the decision to sponsor a distinctive party ticket in the forthcoming Manitoba election was made, the Executive drew up, as in Alberta, a strictly provincial platform. That document was broader in its content than the Proclamation issued by the Executive of the United Farmers of Alberta two years earlier. The Manitoba Grain Growers platform discussed political reforms along with legislative policies, and aptly brought up the urgency of "clarifying Dominion and provincial responsibilities" in respect
to the Canadian economy. Unlike the Alberta organization, the Manitoba
United Farmers made a contribution to that clarification by commencing the
publication of distinct provincial and federal platforms from 1922 on.

The reference to the division of power made in the 1922 Manitoba
Grain Growers document called for a Dominion-provincial conference to
consider such fields as taxation, income, interstate commerce, corporation,
and railways". This statement is significant in several respects. It
reveals an intelligent desire to have the current overlapping services and
revenue collection fields transformed into a more efficient distribution of
functions. For instance, the Manitoba Farmers were ready to have the pro­
vinces transfer certain powers of direct taxation to the Dominion in return
for a consolidated national railways policy or the acquisition of natural
resources. Their viewpoint shows the acceptance of federal leadership in
certain areas of the economy, if this were to everyone's advantage. One
also finds the corollary readiness to have the national services financed by
a tax proportional to the payee's income, even though direct taxation was
considered a provincial responsibility. The Farmers considered a transfer
of direct taxation yields to Canada preferable to the high freight charges
that were used to pay the cost of consolidating the Canadian National
Railways. Simultaneously, the document proposed that the provinces be
allowed to remain solvent by being given control of public lands.

The platform adopted by the Manitoba Grain Growers convention held in
1922 expresses firm belief in the necessity of preserving the federal system
in Canada. In fact, there was a wide consensus upon that topic in the
Western provinces. The expectations placed by the Canadian electors upon
their governments were somewhat greater than those typical of the United
States during the "Era of Normalcy". The farmers did show a genuine concern
over the quickly worsening financial position of the provincial administrations
in the West. This situation resulted in their inability to appease the increasingly powerful organized farm or labor groups, although some new experiments were being made, like the system of interprovincial consultations.

In Manitoba, the leaders in the United Farmers movement, like Charles Burnell, understood the seriousness of the situation, and saw the urgency for new social services. Nevertheless, only traditional remedies of constitutional status obstacles, like the transfer of natural resources and unconditional subsidies, were being advised. Apparently, the Executive of the United Farmers, as in Alberta, decided that some suggested services must be shelved (like expensive irrigation projects), since it was even more undesirable to risk radical taxing laws threatening business firms or national interest. Any serious legal disputes whether private interests or the federal Government were thought to be worse possibilities than deficit financing or economical policies.

The Farmers showed an essential similar attitude towards the federal Government. There were moderately expressed demands that the King administration should display more leadership either in introducing new expenditures for welfare, or in special areas like the consolidation of national railways. Nevertheless, many influential figures, like the Premier-to-be Bracken, hesitated to propose specific undertakings concerning constitutional law. In general, very few politicians or occupational group leaders felt competent to judge reliably the limitations circumscribing the federal level.

A key factor determining the presence of new ideas coupled with self-restraint and legal uncertainty was the rise of new leaders from the organized growing economic interest blocks. Already known by 1917 were Ralph Smith, sometime president of the American Federation of Labor and Member of Parliament for Nanaimo, Premier Thomas A. Drury of Ontario, Agnes MacPhail,
Mary McClung, and T. A. Crerar. Becoming influential after the formation of the Unionist Government were Charles Burnell, a leading member of the United Farmers of Manitoba, William Irvine, a founder of the Dominion Labor Party and subsequent Member for Calgary South, Henry Wise Wood, and J. F. Dixon. These public figures had little knowledge of the theoretical basis or the legal principles behind the federal system. They wished improvements in the Canadian society, but their personal experiences with the existing institutions were sufficiently productive to prevent them from embracing extremist viewpoints. For all these reasons, they proposed immediate changes in numerous specific economic policies, without often considering what modifications in the British North America Act of 1867 or what Dominion-provincial understandings were prerequisite.

A general study of Western Canada's leaders in the period between 1917 and 1930 is yet to be written. Such a study would certainly reveal that the leaders of the Farmers movement in Manitoba shared the uncertainties of their counterparts in Alberta and Saskatchewan as to the jurisdictional lines between the provinces and the Dominion government. The Manitoba Farmers differed from the Alberta and Saskatchewan leaders in desiring intensely a clarification of these lines. The very demand made by the Executive of the Manitoba Grain Growers for a Dominion-provincial constitutional conference is a witness to their determination to uphold their provincial tradition of restricting the Manitoba government to its rightful administrative and legislative functions. Instead of calling for Dominion-provincial cooperation, as did the Alberta government in the matter of credits, the Manitoba farm leadership preferred a compartmentalizing of functions and revenue sources. This was to be made satisfying through agreements between Canada and the provincial and the provincial governments.

This stand involved a scrupulous observance of jurisdictional lines in
the selection of electoral issues. Indeed, the Executive of the United Farmers of Manitoba made every effort to dispel suspicions to the effect that the Farmers were building only "a second front" for their federal party (Progressives). For instance, Charles Burnell, in his most significant speech of the 1922 campaign, explained that his organization was guided entirely by an intention to meet the needs of Manitoba, when it chose to enter provincial politics. According to Burnell, the Farmers' leading motive was their objective of healing the social divisions and conflicts that the traditional parties had aggravated in the province (ethnic and religious conflicts resulting from disputes over educational policy, and social divisions deepened by the Winnipeg Strike). "The whole aim of the United Farmers of Manitoba is to get the different nationalities together in order that the best type of Canadian citizen might be formed..." The vote in the Mountain riding that included St. Boniface with its sizeable French-speaking minority indicated that this appeal of Farmers met a favorable reception. Joining town and country behind a single provincial program was another aim. The victory of the Progressive candidate in Winnipeg, R. W. Craig, was a striking confirmation of urban-rural proximity in Manitoba. An additional objective of the Farmers party was the achievement of financial solvency by the provincial government: "The organized farmers felt that they were compelled to take political action to protect some of the legislation enacted" (from mismanagement and financial collapse).

Burnell's speech, with its apparently sincere analysis, shows that some influential farmers (at least in the Executive) possessed meaningful motives for entering the election of 1922, regardless of the effect this step would exert in federal policies. The tone of his speech, analyzed above, clearly indicates that Burnell was speaking for the leadership of the Farmers movement in Manitoba. He was addressing a meeting of Shoal Lake
farmers on July 5th. Why he found it necessary to recapitulate the reasons for the entrance of the farmers organization into provincial politics in front of an audience who had been represented at the Grain Growers' annual convention, where that decision was taken, and who must have approved it at a meeting of their local, raises some unanswered questions. The effort to persuade is evident in Burnell's speech. One may assume that some members of the Association had other motives in addition to those voiced by the Executive for supporting a provincial party. Still others must have hesitated to oppose the popular Norris. Judging by the large participation of Manitoba voters in the federal election of 1921, substantially exceeding the turnout in the provincial voting of either 1921 or 1922, a reader is entitled to suggest that many farmers were either deprecating provincial elections or else thought of a prospective success as the basis for future federal victories. Possibly, Burnell was deliberately dissociating the leadership of the Farmers party from this position in order to attract conservatively-minded rural voters, who were displeased with the educational reforms or the heavy expenditures sponsored by the Norris administration. According to W. L. Morton, this block of voters did provide much of the Farmers' support.

There is evidence that certain members of the Grain Growers Association were interested in provincial politics only to provide a future source of strength for the Progressive party. A Farmers' government might well give moral and organizational support to the House of Commons delegation led by Robert Forke in 1922. For instance, a generalization to this effect appears in the following letter, written by a mistrustful critic named M. A. C. Markle and appearing in the July 1st issue of the *Manitoba Free Press*: "There is an important phase of the provincial campaign being waged by the United Farmers of Manitoba, which it seems is being kept as far as possible in the
background...(The platform adopted by the United Farmers of Manitoba on June 30th) was formed from the four winds of heaven. There is very little serious criticism of the Norris Government..." (The same could be said of the United Farmers of Alberta pronouncements in respect to the Stewart administration in 1920-21).

According to Markle, "the farmers grievances (read: economic grievances) are entirely in the federal field. What they really want is to make the provincial government 'a second line of defence': to get control of the provincial government in order to use it for federal purposes." The writer cites a conversation with a Farmers leader who inadvertently gave some evidence for this assertion. Apparently, certain influential members of the Farmers party were affected by the same tendency to stress federal policy objectives as were the Socialists and the Liberals in the 1922 election, while the United Farmers of Manitoba Executive was resisting that trend. Similar reasoning must have occurred to some Alberta U.F.A. members in 1921, but it failed to produce as vocal a protest as in Manitoba, since the Alberta electorate was less inhibited to hearing Dominion issues treated in a provincial campaign.

Like their predecessors, the United Farmers of Manitoba administration skillfully combined new and old elements of political practice. Insofar as they followed the principle, historically respected in Manitoba, that provincial administrations should attempt to meet local demands for economic remedies primarily from their own resources and within their jurisdictional area, they retained it in reference to provincial elections. For instance, in the provincial election of 1927, the Bracken Government maintained the principle that an administration must stick to provincial policy questions in a Manitoba election. In his most important speech of the 1927 campaign, Premier Bracken stressed that his primary aim was the "well-balanced
development of every industry in the province.™ He looked forward to a settlement of the natural resources dispute with Canada which would allow a transfer of these resources to the provinces. Such a settlement would provide the Manitoba government with funds for many services, including the promotion of electric power developments. In eulogizing Bracken, W. J. Major, a Cabinet minister, also limited his arguments to the intraprovincial achievements and plans of the Farmers administration. The latter "had rescued Manitoba from the slough of financial despondency and raised it to prosperity." These statements of Government leaders indicate that the tradition of Manitoba administrations to appeal to the electorate primarily on the basis of provincial policy objectives coupled with special constitutional claims on the Dominion was still vital enough to be observed by the governing party, whenever it enjoyed a certain degree of political and financial security.

The utterances made by the Liberal and other party Leaders in 1927 reveal that they were sharing the official principle on the choice of political objectives. Doubtless, each of these parties possessed special motives for taking that stand. The provincial Conservatives intended to attack the Dominion Cabinet for delaying final decisions on the transfer of Crown lands to Manitoba, the Liberals, to stress their independence from their federal party, and Bracken, to lay the foundations for a subsequent coalition with the Liberals in Manitoba. The total effect of the decision made by all these parties to shun requests for changes in the policies of the Dominion (other than those pertaining to the natural resources and the subsidy questions then outstanding) during the 1927 election was to convey the impression that all the provincial parties in Manitoba were the protagonists of an economically enterprising provincial administration, independent from Dominion parties.
Simultaneously, Bracken and his ministers shared the current belief, widespread in the Western provinces, that the policies of the Dominion deserved the primary attention from the electorate. Bracken himself admitted holding that belief, when he declared to the writer John Nelson: "We can never cure our economic ills at Winnipeg. If these are to be remedied by politics, it must be in Ottawa." It is understandable that the Bracken administration, holding that view, refrained from widely expanding the economic responsibilities of the provincial departments, at least until the need for and the possibility of helping the development of hydro-electric power gave the province a new area for activity in the closing years of the third decade of the century.

BRITISH COLUMBIA

The ideological background of the British Columbia Liberal Government has already been examined. Likewise, attention has been paid to the other, specific partisan considerations which had led the Brewster and the Oliver Governments to emphasize the jurisdictional or the purely provincial political issues during the period from 1918-1924. One must except the federal election of 1921 from this generalization, since the tariff and the Imperial Conference of 1921 were almost the sole topics then debated in British Columbia.

At this time, it is proper to study the factors which made the Oliver Government speak frankly upon the exclusively federal issues during the provincial election campaign of 1924. This strategy certainly helped the Liberals in the latter instance. However, the party under Oliver was too weak to re-educate the electorate in their point of view, and failed to interest them once the strains resulting from the First World War ceased to dominate public thinking. To find the reasons for the weaknesses of the Oliver government, it is necessary to examine the leading political events
in British Columbia since 1917.

Already in 1918, Premier John Oliver departed from the previous policy of his province in taking a stand upon at least one issue entirely within the federal jurisdictional field. Along with Norris, he urged a substantial cut in the freight rates, then fixed at a very high level by the Board of Railway Commissioners. As if to justify his intervention in this federal policy, Oliver issued an elaborate factual and theoretical defense of the demand for lower freight rates. The proposals for giving relief to the Canadian West had become a bipartisan issue in the Prairie provinces and in British Columbia. The factual basis for Oliver's initiative was the real discrimination that British Columbia as well as importers into that province were experiencing at this time. They were often required to pay charges double those charged in the Central provinces for equal distances. The differential rates had been intended to cover differences in construction costs, but their principal effect was the burdening of areas that were the least able to pay heavy transport costs.

Premier Oliver's theoretical argument was to the effect that the differential rates contradicted the "spirit of the Terms of the Union", reached between Canada and British Columbia at the time of Canada's entry into the Confederation of 1871. The Terms of the Union had provided that fair railway rates would be set by Canada to prevail upon the transcontinental railway to be built. In general, Oliver's stand was popular in British Columbia, because it was intended to help not only those who were enjoying direct railway facilities, but all consumers. All were facing increasing living costs owing to excessive freight rates. Throughout a long political career until 1924, Oliver apparently had much regard for the provincial tradition that enjoined provincial governments to avoid purely federal issues. This principle had been observed in the British Columbia
elections since 1908. Hence Oliver chose not to concentrate, in the provincial election of 1920, upon the freight rates problem. The latter tactic seemed tempting at a time of considerable political uncertainty.

Many parallels can be drawn between the attitudes shown by Oliver and Norris in the provincial elections held in their provinces in 1920. The Manitoba Liberal party platform consisted entirely of provincial legislative and administrative objectives. In the course of the campaign, Premier Norris had kept close to the views expressed in this platform, except that he proceeded to amplify his views on the necessity of a strong majority government. Although at the Interprovincial Conference of 1918 he had struggled vigorously, along with Oliver, for the transfer of natural resources to the Western provinces, in the 1920 election he rarely referred even to this traditional objective of his province. Doubtless, the reason for Norris' attitude was his awareness that a solution to the natural resources controversy, or even to his fight for lower freight rates, was remote. In this campaign, Norris revealed no knowledge that a new Interprovincial Conference was to be held in November of 1920, at which he was to renew his drive for a transfer of natural resources and a cut in freight rate charges. Meanwhile, he was touching neither issue in provincial politics.

The British Columbia premier, in choosing the principal issues for the 1920 elections, had followed a course similar to Norris. The British Columbia Liberals employed the traditional practice of giving maximum attention to local legislative and administrative issues. Although Oliver had been as forceful as Norris in demanding the transfer of the Peace River Block and the Railway Belt to his province in 1918, and although he insisted on a substantial revision of the railway rates to prevent discriminatory charges against the shippers in his province, he, too, made few references to these claims on the Dominion in the campaign of 1920. Apparently, the
British Columbia Liberals were convinced that they could repeat their stunning 1916 victory by observing the traditional principle of sticking to provincial economic issues in a provincial election.

What were the leading issues in the British Columbia election of 1920? The election was called after a lively legislative session that produced several innovations in welfare and labor management, and extended the financial commitments previously made. In 1920, British Columbia had inaugurated one of the earliest Mothers' Allowances Acts in Canada. By expanding its veterans' aid program through the amendment of the Soldier Assistance Act, the province was leading the other sections of Western Canada in the amount of aid given to veterans. In 1921, the Oliver Government had confirmed, too, its earlier decision of continued public operation and extension of the Great Eastern Railway, then being built from Vancouver to Prince George and only partly finished. Having failed to find an owner for this bankrupt line, the Oliver Government continued the construction job under public auspices. The Liberals apparently considered that public demand for increased provincial responsibilities in social and economic matters would make the voters justify their commitments, although the latter had entailed a deficit of over $4,000,000. The nature of their platform, stressing the positive aspects of these programs, indicates that the Liberals were somewhat less concerned by the Conservatives' criticisms of their expenditures (and of the arrangement by the Government of an insurance policy for the Great Eastern with Finance Minister Pattullo's firm) than by the rising labor and socialist movements in the province. A platform of the type adopted in 1924 was the surest way of attaching at least some of these economic rebels to the respectable Liberal banner.

Many elements of a deepening financial and political crisis apparent in the years 1921-23 explain why Premier Oliver found it necessary to apply at
selectively, while the subsequent campaign proceeded, the example set by the Prairie premiers in their frequent references to the \textit{exclusively federal} policy objectives. The financial difficulties of the province are the easier to evaluate. The deficits reached their climax in 1923. The financial crises made it impossible for the Oliver Government to commence any new attractive social or economic policy until 1927. The factors aggravating the political insecurity of the Oliver Government in these years have not generally received adequate attention from historians. It is easy to see that the necessity to run a minority government, with only 25 members out of the total 47, and with 40.3\% of the popular vote would stimulate the Liberals to look for a new method of winning a secure majority. Another factor, the rise of the Provincial Reform League under General McRae's leadership, has received careful treatment. At least three other challenges, however, must have imperiled Oliver's political position in the three years between the elections of 1920 and 1923. The sweeping victory of the Conservatives in the federal election of 1921 in British Columbia was the first serious warning to Premier Oliver. The approaching end of an alliance between Liberals and organized labor, as was made apparent in Mrs. Ralph Smith's resignation from the Oliver Cabinet in 1921, was strangely followed by the hostility of the investor interests. The latter fact resulted from Oliver's intervention in the Molly Varden mine case. All these threats appear to have placed Oliver in the unenviable position of a man standing in a boat which was filling with water.

To re-establish majority government, Oliver was determined to break, if necessary, with the British Columbia tradition of disassociating the provincial government from issues that are entirely within the jurisdiction of the federal government. The Liberals picked once more the drive for freight rate reductions. Returning from a conference in Ottawa in May, 1924,
Oliver was quoted by the Vancouver Sun as stating that "the greatest problem involved (in the coming election) is the transportation rates. It is for the electors to decide between a government which started the fight (for reduced railway freight rates) and has secured big results already, and the other parties."\footnote{98}

As the voting results for the 1924 provincial general election indicate, Premier Oliver did achieve his objective. Although the popular vote received by the Liberals dropped to 31.2\%, they did obtain a majority of the legislative seats in the assembly.\footnote{99}

It is clear that the Oliver administration intended to exploit, and did so successfully, the current interest shown by the electors in a policy proposal pertaining entirely to the Dominion Parliament. That intervention of the provincial Cabinet is \textit{per se} insufficient evidence that the electors of that province were, like those of the Prairie provinces, responding to the current trend of Canadian nationalism. Indeed, Oliver's choice of an objective that was essentially intended to remove an existing burden imposed by the Dominion in the national interest, and his presentation of that objective in the traditional language employed by British Columbia administrations in dealing with the "Better Terms" question,\footnote{100} indicates doubt in the ability of electors to pass upon new \textit{exclusively federal} policy issues.

To derive any more reliable conclusions as to emphasis which the British Columbia Governments gave to specific issues during the period from 1900 to 1930, it is essential to study the conduct of both provincial and federal election campaigns. On occasions of either type, British Columbia Governments were taking advantage of the current public opinion trend then characteristic of Western Canada. They were giving more attention to policy proposals beyond their own actual or intended jurisdiction.
Although upon the conclusion of World War I, fewer electors in British Columbia than in the Prairie provinces retained their interest in the policies of the Dominion, many were still keenly interested in obtaining improvements in federal services like the Veterans Re-settlement program of the Dominion administration. Numerous political figures were suggesting that the Dominion expand its nationalized network of railways, culminating in the creation of the Canadian National Railways in 1923. For instance, there were suggestions (backed by the Oliver Cabinet since 1925) that the Dominion should assume the ownership and control over the Great Eastern Railway, then provincially owned. All these requests for improved federal services, in addition to the widespread controversy over the high tariff policies warmly espoused by the Conservatives after 1918 (against the wishes of the Oliver Liberals), resulted from the growth of Canadian nationalism. The subsequent political history of that province has already been traced until 1920. It might be added that the typical absorption of the public there with the institutional interests of their provincial Governments, was to be once more arrested in 1940.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To summarize, the greatest change characterizing the political practices in the Canadian West from 1900 to 1930 was the increased readiness of Territorial and provincial leaders to act as spokesmen with the federal Government in the issues defined as exclusively federal. Whenever the respective regional Government adapted that role and gave it considerable weight in provincial politics, they testified to the preoccupation of the electors with matters to be decided by the national or the imperial authorities. Changes in the public mood can be conclusively deduced from a study of provincial party attitudes to all the fundamental types of political
problems.

The data presented in this study permit the writer to pinpoint three distinct provincial ideologies. Undoubtedly the autonomist, the partisan nationalist and the qualified cooperative Governments show certain characteristics in common. All the major Western Canadian political parties have fairly well interpreted the constitutional status quo. On the other hand, one also finds them making varying valuations of specific political objections. Comparing the importance given upon the public platform to the natural resources issue with the treatment of the tariff shows most reliably the nature of the regional policy.

It is helpful to study the regional ideologies not only to satisfy our interest in the history of political thought, but also to find the ultimate explanation as to the choice of method followed in Western Canada. The changing trends of public opinion produced both predominant ideological and methodological alternatives. Hence there is much correspondence between the two aspects of provincial policy.

A few examples suffice to show the relationship. It was natural for an autonomist Government to insist upon making its decisions separately from the federal party with which it was associated. How else could a Territorial or a provincial Cabinet decide to give more emphasis to certain key demands upon the federal Parliament than the National Leader of any party would allow? It was sometimes necessary for a regional Government of this type to bargain with the federal party of any designation. On the other hand, a nationalist Premier was well advised to maintain constant contacts with his important ministers in Ottawa. He intended to secure influence in the making of policies like the tariff, which were rarely discussed at formal Dominion-Provincial Conference.
The policies embraced by the Western Canadian Territorial and provincial administrations exerted substantial effect upon the lasting change, occurring between 1900 and 1930, in Canada's federal system. Some of the key events weakened politically the provincial level vis-à-vis the federal. There were the delays arising in respect to the natural resources questions, repeated conflicts over railway bond obligations in respect to Canadian National lines, and temporary revocation of certain conditional subsidies started during World War I.

In cases of political failure, it very seldom happened that a provincial electorate was unprepared to support the ideology of their leaders. One such instance is ex-Premier Haultain's inability to rally many voters to the support of the Provincial Rights party in Saskatchewan after 1905. It happened somewhat more often that other partisan considerations dictate a policy which the public perceives to be inconsistent with the precedents formerly established by their Territorial or Provincial Governments. The decisive factor which permitted the Martin and the Dunning Governments to win a total of three elections in consecutive order was their consistent attitude to the federal Government. Their policy was in line with the traditions, and the economic interests of Saskatchewan.

There are several sets of factors which helped to weaken the Western Canadian provincial Governments during the period from 1918 to 1930. The contemporary changes in public opinion undoubtedly comprised the most significant phenomenon. To a large extent, that situation was beyond the control of the regional leaders.

At least two aspects of voluntarily selected provincial policies were also responsible for the decline in the prestige of their authors. The very flexibility in the relationships between the Western Governments and
the federal parties produced, in at least some cases, marked inconsistency between the professions of the respective Liberal leaders and their actual policies. At such times, perceptive observers must have seen that electoral considerations dictated the decisions taken.

Always present, the non-ideological partisan motives cannot be considered decisive behind provincial policies, unless the choice of methodology by a Government contradicts its then or at least formerly expressed professions. The best example of a method chosen at will by a provincial Cabinet is provided by legislative measures which challenge the federal Government to modify one of its leading principles regarding the use of disallowance. Even a nationalist Cabinet might take this action in cases in which no clearcut federal policy to the contrary exists. Only if it would frequently act in a provocative manner would that party risk the charge of destroying the good will of the governing federal party. On the other hand, an autonomist Government suddenly deciding to follow the rules set in Ottawa might be accused of taking orders from outsiders. This is no doubt why Premier Roblin so vigorously kept voicing the natural resources demand even after the Borden victory in 1911.

The Norris Government failed to show similar caution after 1918. The electorate was unable to reconcile the tactics of the Manitoba Liberals with their pre-1914 ideology, and no new one has been explained. The charge of inconsistency proved fatal to that Government in the election of 1922. The Stewart Government in Alberta also found it expedient to follow an excessively flexible strategy of doubtful wisdom in its dealings with the Mackenzie King Government, though at least its members had never been autonomists. The experience of the post-1918 Governments supports the view that the regional leaders in the Canadian West were expected to demonstrate a large measure of consistency in their relationships with the federal level.
The other source of the ineffectiveness shown by all the Western Governments in their dealings with the federal authorities during the difficult decade between 1917 and 1927 lay in their decision to follow somewhat uncritically the constitutional policies of the federal Government. Why, in addition to the natural resources issue, were there no other provincial demands for new responsibilities or revenues presented to Parliament? It seems unwarranted to blame the "qualified cooperative" viewpoint for the insufficiency of the provincial methodology. In fact, it was the preoccupation of the respective Governments with their immediate electoral interest which impeded provincial parties from giving the kind of leadership which would have achieved more ultimate economic and political advantages to the Western region than had characterized the years in question.
FOOTNOTES

A. THE ABSTRACT


3. Possibly the most striking example of a currently serious conflict arising in a unitary state results from the nearly equal division between the Flemish and the Walloon groups in contemporary Belgium. Sometimes, the leaders of a small, but nationally distinctive people oppose the highly centralized government of a country, as in the Basque ethnic region of Spain. A unitary constitution is slight protection against disputes along cultural or racial lines.

4. A personal deduction from general reading.


B. The Introductory Chapter


10. For instance, certain individuals might be excessively engrossed with the theory behind problems of operating a manufacturing corporation or a recreational institution.


17 Cf. Footnote No. 4, Abstract.


19 As evidence for this statement, one may cite the longevity enjoyed by numerous provincial Governments in Canada. Cf. Introductory Chapter, pp. 35-9. Likewise, compare the heavy vote frequently polled by provincial parties as reported in Appendix A.

20 The term Western Canada will be employed in the identical sense as in Blishen, R.R., Neagele, Kurt, et al., *op. cit.* p. 29; cf. Chapter 1, pp. 50, 62-65, Chapter 5, pp. 190-227.


22 Donald G. Creighton, *The Young Politician*, Chapter 4, pp. 60-99, Chapter 6, pp. 125-46, Chapter 8, pp. 174-207; The Old Chieftain, Chapter 9, pp. 190-210, Chapter 10, pp. 215-22, Chapter 14, pp. 482-520.


25 Those Unionists who had broken off from the Coalition between 1918 and 1921 had mostly been Liberals before 1917. Thus one cannot consider them as having been of the party led by Prime Minister Borden. Besides, it was the Progressives who always protected most strongly against the leading Conservatives' favourite concepts of the postwar economic policies; cf. W. C. Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada*, University of Toronto Press, 1950, pp. 178-83.


Canada, Statutes, A Consolidation of the British North America Acts 1867-1952, Ottawa, 1958; for the exclusive powers of the Federal Government, see Section 91, pp. 24-28; powers in which the Provincial Governments also share are listed in Clauses 92 and 93, pp. 30-31. Cf. Chapters 2 and 3, also Chapter 4, pp. 158-162.

Cf. Chapter 4, pp. 166-182.


This is an inference based upon the conduct of all the Territorial and provincial administrations in Canada since 1864. To find the self-restraint shown by the Western provincial leaders at a time of bitter conflict with the Dominion, see Creighton, John A. Macdonald, The Old Chieftain, pp. 410-511, likewise, M. A. Ormsby, op. cit., p. 362; for the later weakness of the separatists, see CAR, 1924, pp. 399-400.

Cf. Chapter I, in particular pp. 50-55.


37. To compare the results achieved by the different Western Canadian administrations from Parliament, see Commission on Dominion-provincial relations, *Report*, pp. 60-62, 112-119; vol. 1; Eggleston, W. and Kraft, C. *Dominion-Provincial Subsidies and Grants*, Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, *Studies*, vol. 2; cf. R. MacGregor Dawson, *Democratic Government in Canada*, University of Toronto Press, 1957, Chapter 4, pp. 31-36.


43. Linguard, *op. cit.* pp. 161-64.


45. Appendix A, to be correlated with specific election campaigns, e.g. Chapter 4, pp. 159-64.


51 Appendix E, Chapter 5, pp. 115-18.


53 Cf. Chapter 2; also The Story of Alberta, King's Printers, Edmonton, 1938.

54 Gerin-Lajoie, Paul, Constitutional Amendment in Canada, pp. 30-42.

55 Chester A. Martin, The Dominion Lands Policy, Chapter 4, pp. 277-98.


58 Ibid., pp. 26-7.


60 H. Blair Neatby, op. cit., pp. 230-5.

61 Canada, Dominion-Provincial Conferences, pp. 110-160.
C. Chapter I


4 Canada, The Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book 1, 1867-1939, Canada 1940; Cf. Table of Contents, Chapter 2, Pp. 54-59.

5 Bora Laskin, op. cit; Cf. The Table of Contents.

6 Ibid., pp. 64-5, 89-93.


8 For farmer organizations, see CAR 1902, pp. 430-33, 440-1; CAR 1906, pp. 32, 422-423; CAR 1912, p. 664; CAR 1913, p. 753; CAR 1914, p. 664; Cf. H. S. Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation in Western Canada, (check the index for the organization desired); for situation in British Columbia, see M. A. Ormsby, op. cit. pp. 411, 420; also CAR 1920, pp. 829-31; for labor unions refer to CAR 1902, pp. 328-338, 482, 492, CAR 1908, pp. 109-115, CAR 1912, p. 658, CAR 1914, p. 572.

9 Cf. Introductory Chapter, Footnote No. 29 and pp. 18-19, 23.

10 Canada, Statutes, cf. supra.

11 Canada, Statutes, 1869, Chapter 3, pp. 18-20.

12 Canada, Statutes, 1870, Chapter 30, pp. 20-27.

13 Canada, Statutes, 1869, p. 19.


15 Canada, Statutes, 1900, pp. 52-53.

17. Canada, Statutes, 1918.


20. Supra.


22. Bora Laskin, op. cit. Table of Contents (liquor tax case).

23. Cf. 221-223.


29. Supra.


31. The Vancouver Sun, June 30th, 1924.

32. CAR 1901, pp. 470-481.

33. CAR 1901, pp. 478-481.
34. Dominion Law Reports (hereafter termed DLR) 22, p. 501.

35. DLR 62, p. 21.

36. CAR 1921, p. 802.
D. Chapter II

1 G. V. LaForest, Disallowance and Reservation of Provincial Legislation, to trace the leading change in federal policy, see Chapter 4, pp. 28-35, ("Responsibility for the Exercise of the Powers"), Chapter 5, pp. 28-35, ("Disallowance - First Period, 1867-1881"), and Chapter 7, pp. 53-61, ("Disallowance - Second Period, 1881-96"), for the use of reservation only, see Chapter 6, pp. 44-52.

2 For the principal constitutional amendments enacted during the nineteenth century, see Paul Gerin-Lajoie, Constitutional Amendment in Canada, Chapter 3, pp.

3 Donald J. Creighton, Dominion of the North, p. 373.


5 Ibid, pp. 100-114.

6 Ibid, Chapter 8, pp.62-; (Third Period 1896-1911) Chapter 9; (Fourth Period, 1911-1924), pp. 69-74.


8 G. V. LaForest, op.cit. Contents, Chapter 2.


11 Cf. Chapter 2, p. 104; W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party of Canad...

18 Supra. Also see the Parliamentary Companion for 1898.

19 G.V. LaForest, op.cit. 94; cf. CAR 1902, pp. 466-69.

20 G.V. LaForest, op.cit. 95.


22 H. S. Patton, Grain Growers Cooperation in Western Canada, p. 110.


24 Premier McBride's initial request for the sale of the Railway Lands to the province was made in an official memorandum to the Federal government. The document is now available in manuscript form at the Provincial Archives at Victoria, B.C. It is in a folder entitled "Reference Claims of British Columbia to Better Terms."

25 Appendix B, for Manitoba.


27 Dwyer, Melva, op.cit. pp. 80-85.

28 CAR, 1907, pp. 384-85.


30 The Province, November 1, 1906.

31 Supra.


33 The Province, February 1, 1907.

34 M. A. Ormsby, op.cit. p. 349; CAR, 1907, pp. 391-3.

36 CAR 1907, pp. 612-14.

37 G.V. LaForest, *op.cit.* p. 26


39 Howard A. Scarrow, *op.cit.*; cf. also Appendix A.

40 CAR 1907, pp. 459-63.

41 CAR 1907, p. 464.

42 *Supra.*

43 CAR, 1908, p.

44 CAR 1908, pp. 217-18.

45 *The Province,* January 1, 1908.

46 Appendix A, for British Columbia.


49 CAR 1911, pp. 50-130, 432; Cf. Introduction, pp. 35-38 (in particular p. 36).

50 Appendix A.

51 John Morton, *op.cit.* pp. 109-110; CAR 1921, p. 208. The statement concerning Premier Oliver's "nationalist" beliefs must be qualified by adding that he was frequently involved in prolonged disagreements with the King Government over specific issues, like the federal freight rate policy or the question of the Great Eastern Railway. Cf. M. A. Ormsby, *op.cit.* p. 416. Dr. H. Blair Neatby suggested that Liberals favorable to the federal party preferred Robert MacLean to Oliver by 1926.

52 Cf. Appendix A; Chapter 5, pp. 224-229.
This is an inference from the rare occurrence of disputes over the validity of provincial legislation, or its conformity to federal policy. Cf. G. V. LaForest, pp. 98, 108-9.

This conclusion has been inferred from the material indicated above (Footnotes 50 and 52), as well as from the Liberals' preoccupation with the freight rate question, cf. Chapter 4, p. 162, Chapter 5, p. 197, 214, 225-4.


Cf. Appendix B on British Columbia.

Cf. CAR 1918, pp. 650-60.

Cf. Chapter 5, pp. 218-29.

Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1921, "British Columbia Government!".

Cf. Chapter 1, pp.

Cf. Introductory Chapter, pp. 18, 30-31, Part 1 preface, Chapter 1, pp. 47, 59.

Canada Commons Debates, 1905, pp. 7180, 8331-8342, cf. also p. 2405.


Canada Commons Debates, 1905; Cf. criticisms express by R.L. Borden, pp. 5302-5335. The action was defended by J. P. Turiff, pp. 3591-6.


Dr. H. Blair Neatby has made this comment orally in the course of the 1962-63 academic year.
71 D. H. Bocking, op. cit. pp. 100-130.

72 Cf. the remaining section of Chapter 2 and the entire Chapter 5.

73 The ideals of cooperation common among the organized farmers have been eloquently voiced by E. A. Partridge, T. A. Crerar and others. For a clear expression of Crerar's aspirations, see brief article concerning him in A. Bridle (Domirilo, pseud.) The Masques of Ottawa, Toronto, Macmillan Press, 1921. To appreciate Partridge's outlook, read the Opening Chapter on his War on Poverty, Winnipeg, Wallingford Press, 1925. Some labor groups in Canada shared the farmers' insistence that the federal and the provincial Governments provide correlated or jointly financed services, chiefly in the area of welfare. For an expression of this view, see Grace, MacInnis, A Man to Remember: The Life of J. S. Woodsworth. Read especially Chapter 4.


76 Infra, numbers 76 and 77; also check Dominion-Provincial Conferences, pp. 54-60.


78 Donald G. Creighton, Dominion of the North, pp. 480, 465-7, Chapter 5, pp. 191, 203-5.


80 CAR 1922, pp. 763-5.

81 Cf. Appendix A; likewise Chapter 4, pp. 160-1, 165-184.

82 Compare the instances of disallowance summarized in Chapter 2, pp. 168-70 with the provincial election returns given in Appendix A, also see J. A. Jackson The Disallowance of Manitoba Legislation in the 1880's, M.A. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1945, cf. pp. 100-130.

E. Chapter III


3. Canada, Dominion-Provincial Conferences, pp. 61-3, 48-49.


5. Cf. Introductory Chapter, pp. 11-12; Cf. Chapter 3, pp. 119-23; Footnotes No. 23-26 infra; cf. A. Bramley-Moore, Canada and Her Colonies, read especially the concluding chapter.


7. Dominion-Provincial Conferences, pp. 36-9.

8. Ibid., pp. 40-49; cf. Introductory Chapter, pp. 16-17, 29.


15. Introduction, pp. 10-13, 15-17, Chapter 2, pp. 80-87, 94-97, 97-100.

16. British Columbia, Memorandum in Respect to the Railway Belt and the Peace River Block. In manuscript form, this document may be inspected at the Provincial Archives in Victoria, B.C., cited by James Morton, op. cit.

18 Canada Commons Debates, 1905, pp. 3153-6.

19 Ibid., cf. Footnote No. 67, p. 101, Chapter 2, read also pp. 102-5.


21 Estimates submitted annually by the Department of Finance to Parliament, Canada, Sessional Papers.

22 Cf. CAR 1918, pp. 426-8, 604-5, 670; CAR 1920; D.G. Creighton, Dominion of the North, pp. 463-5; Cf. Chapter 1, p. 64.

23 Hon. Frederick G. Haultain, speech given in the Legislative Assembly on May 2, 1900, Regina, Queen's Printer.


25 Ibid., Chapters 2, 3, & 4, pp. 18-52.

26 Ibid., Chapter 1, pp. 9-.

27 Ibid., pp. 15-16.

28 Dominion-Provincial Conferences, pp. 16-25.

29 Chester A. Martin, Dominion Lands Policy, pp. 472-4.


31 Dominion-Provincial Conferences, pp. 14-25, 32, for Norquay's proposals see Page 16.

32 Cf. Introductory Chapter, p. 23.

33 Cf. Chapter 1, pp. 61-66.

34 Cf. Introductory Chapter, pp. 30-33.


37. Ibid., pp. 380-90.


41. Manitoba, The Legislative Assembly Journal, 1900, pp. 136-37, (Refers to a resolution memorializing the Federal Government to grant the province full control on the School Lands).

42. CAR 1916, p. 630.

43. The Manitoba Free Press, Editorial, November 11, 1911.

44. CAR 1906, pp. 572-6; CAR 1908, pp. 510-20.

45. Ibid., pp. 464-8; CAR 1906, pp. 335-6.


48. CAR 1908, p. 574.


50. Ibid., p. 315.


52. Cf. Chapter 2, pp. 87-89.

53. Canada Commons Debates, 1905, pp. 5502-03.

54. CAR 905, pp. 75-79.

55. Supra.
For the perennial concern shown by the Maritime provincial governments in federal subsidies, see CAR 1902, pp. 37-40; CAR 1912, p. 472; Henry Borden, ed. *op.cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 653-4.


CAR 1911, p. 530.

CAR 1913, p. 706.

Henry Borden, ed., *op.cit.*, vol. 1, p. 439, the quotation which follows is taken from pp. 438 and 439.


Appendix A.

CAR , p. 215.

Ibid., p. 110.

Canada Commons Debates, 1905.

Appendix A for Manitoba; cf. Howard A. Scarrow, *op.cit.*, tables on Dominion elections.


CAR 1921, pp. 741-3.

Cf. The Manitoba Free Press, September 1st to November 10th, 1925.


78 Dominion-Provincial Conferences, pp. 90-100; CAR 1921, pp. 837-40, 849, 740.


82-83 These conclusions have been reached primarily on the basis of information given by J. Castell Hopkins in The Canadian Annual Review for the respective years. For the periodicals consulted, see the Bibliography; cf. James Morton, The Honest John Oliver, The Life History of the Honourable John Oliver, London, J.M. Dent and Co., 1933, is also very helpful on the British Columbia political history.

84 Cf. Introduction, p. 16, Chapter 2, pp. 104-106, Chapter 1, footnote 8, Chapter 2, footnote 4, 73 and 74.


86 CAR 1927, pp. 25-30.

87 Ormsby, M.A., op.cit., p. 417.

88 CAR 1924, pp. 385, 425.

89 Ibid., pp. 445-7.

90 Cf. Chapter 5, pp. 190-234.

91 Introduction, pp. 11-14.
Cf. Chapter 3, pp. 169-74, footnote 81 and 82 supra.

Cf. Appendix A.
F. Chapter IV

1 Cf. Introductory Chapter, pp. 9-11, 16-18, 25-26, 34, 35.

2 M. Stewart Wallace, The Dictionary of Canadian Biography, University of Toronto Press, 1926, find the relevant entries, like those on N.F. Davin or Sir Richard McBride.

3 CAR 1914, pp. 580-3; cf. R.B. Bennett, in reply to the Speech from the Throne, Canada Commons Debate, 1911, vol. 1.

4 For Premier Haultain's emphasis upon federal or Territorial policies referring to transportation, see CAR 1901, pp. 487-9; the pre-1939 concern of the Canadian Westerners that railway facilities should urgently be improved appears strikingly in the debate concerning Laurier's National Transcontinental-Grand Trunk Railway, read Canada Commons Debates, 1903, pp. 9148-58, 8855-65, 11096; the drought relief policies of the Dominion also occasionally produced heated argument, cf. Canada, Parliament Journals, 1915, also see the Commons Debates for that year, vol. 1, pp. 15-18.

5 Canada, Statutes, Chapter 4, "Act to aid in the Prevention and Settlement of Strikes and Lockouts in Mines and Industries connected with Public Utilities," pp. 235-.

6 R. MacG. Dawson, op.cit., see Index for Hon. Ralph Smith and A. Mulock Verville.

7 H. S. Patton, op.cit., pp. 1-60.

8 J. Harvey Perry, Taxation in Canada, University of Toronto Press, 1951, pp. 1-30.


10 Cf. Introduction, pp. 31-35.


12 Concerning the 1921 federal election campaign, see: For Meighen, CAR 1921, pp. 446-53; for W.L.M. King, ibid., pp. 476-9, 209 (Liberals) 448-52; for T.A. Crerar, ibid., pp. 468-474.
To investigate the 1925 election campaign, check:
for Charles A. Dunning, The Manitoba Free Press, October 5, 1925;
for W.L.M. King, The Manitoba Free Press, October 9, 1925; for
A. Meighen, The Manitoba Free Press, October 9, 1925; for C. Sifton's
brilliant October 3rd speech, cf. Ibid., October 29, 1925.

J. R. Mallory, Social Credit and Federal Power, University of

Ibid., pp. 25-28.

CAR 1921, pp. 808-8.

Ibid., pp. 430-30.

T. A. Crerar, reported in The Manitoba Free Press, June 1st,
1920.

Frank H. Underhill, "The party system in Canada," Canadian
Political Science Association, Papers and Proceedings of the Fourth
Annual Meeting, Toronto, 1924, vol. 4, pp. 201-212; regarding the debate
concerning the Speech from the Throne given in 1921, see cf. Chapter 3,
p. 108, footnote No. 64.; cf. likewise William Irving, The Cooperative

CAR 1921, p. 7421; Cf. Introduction, pp. 334-5, 44.

W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, Appendix A.

Cf. Ibid., Appendix 2.

CAR 1908, p. 490.

Ibid., pp. 490-1.

Supra, pp. 491-2.

For Sen. Buchanan's view upon the tariff read C. F. Steele,
Prairie Editor.

Walter Chapman, The Farmers' March to Ottawa.

CAR 1912, p. 566.
29  CAR 1911, pp. 595-598.

30  CAR 1912, pp. 562-3.

31  CAR 1906, p. 454; CAR 1910, pp. 565-570; Saskatchewan, Statutes, 1913, chapter 6, pp. 259-267; cf. chapter 2, pp. 105-110, footnote 70 supra.

32  Cf. Appendix A, regarding the Saskatchewan general election of 1909.

33  Ibid, concerning the Alberta general election of 1908; cf. The Story of Alberta for information on the historical background.

34  CAR 1914, pp. 580-583; Rev. William Irvine, Farmers in Politics, pp. 10-25; Harald S. Patton, op. cit. pp. 139-144.


36  Cf. chapter 4, pp. 168-172.

37  CAR 1912, pp. 562-564.

38  Harald S. Patton, op. cit., pp. 130-140.

39  CAR 1913, pp. 541.

40  Ibid, p. 542.

41  Appendix B for Saskatchewan, 2. Report for 1925-1926.

42  CAR 1913, pp. 635-638; CAR 1913, pp. 580-604.

43  Cf. chapter 3, pp. 135-140.

44  Supra.

45  Lewis G. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

46  Sir Thomas White delivered the relevant speech in the House of Commons on December 28, 1912. It is cited by Harald S. Patton, op. cit., pp. 145-147.

49  The Board of Grain Commissioners, Report, 1912-1913. It is analyzed supra.

49. CAR 1913, p. 640.

50. Ibid, pp. 557-559.


52. Supra.


55. Cf. chapter 2, pp. 101-103.


57. CAR 1914, pp. 154-157.

58. CAR 1914, pp. 578-581.

59. CAR 1917, pp. 763-765.

60. CAR 1919, p. 789; CAR 1920, pp. 811-813; CAR 1921, pp. 861-862, 869.

61. CAR 1914, pp. 569-574.


64. Cf. chapter 3, pp. 138-139.

65. CAR 1917, pp. 569-574.

67. CAR 1902, pp. 67-68.

68. CAR 1914, pp. 634-636.

69. CAR 1914, pp. 581-583.

70. W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, Appendix A.


72. W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, chapter 3, pp. 75-.


75. Cf. chapter 3, p. 126, footnote 31.


77. Although Premier T.G. Norris had been one of the first politicians in Canada to propose the creation of the Union Government during World War I, there is no evidence that Prime Minister Borden ever considered him for a Cabinet appointment. Further research is necessary to determine the reason for Borden's rather indifferent attitude towards the Manitoba Premier. It is interesting to observe that both men prized non-partisan conduct during the years from 1915 to 1920.


79. CAR 1907, p. 361; CAR 1913, pp. 130, 171-174.

80. CAR 1910, p. 65.

81. Cf. chapter 4, pp. 186-188.

82. Ormsby, M.A., op. cit., op. cit.
83. Cf. chapter 4, pp. 186-188.

84. CAR 1909, pp. 92-96.

85. CAR 1910, pp. 100-103.

86. Cf. chapter 2, pp. 85-87.

87. CAR 1910, pp. 65. CAR 1915, pp. 130, 171-172.

88. CAR 1911, pp. 248-251.

89. CAR 1917, pp. 569-574.

90. Ibid, pp. 575-579.

91. CAR 1917, p. 575.

92. CAR 1916, p. 782.

93. CAR 1917, p. 576.
Chapter 5

1. S.M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1950, chapter 2, pp. 21-37; D.F. Putnam, Canadian Regions, University of Toronto Press, 19 , e.g. page 364 (gives statistics in respect to the changing ratio between farm and urban population in the Canadian provinces; J.F.C. Wright, Saskatchewan: The History of a Province, McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1955, pp. 173-176.


5. CAR 1916, p. 720.


9. Supra.


12. CAR 1917, pp. 763-5.


15. Ibid, pp. 749-751.


19. CAR 1919, p. 772.


25. CAR 1925, p. 810.

26. CAR 1921, pp. 798-801.

27. Saskatchewan, Sessional Papers, 1918-1923; cf. chapter 5, p. 227-230, footnote no. 3 supra.

28. CAR 1921, p. 809.

29. Cf. chapter 4, p. 149.

30. Cf. chapter 5, p. 190, footnote no. 3 supra.


32. CAR 1920, pp. 790-795, 841-850.
33. Cf. chapter 2, pp. 50-52, 58, 60-63.

34. CAR 1920, pp. 180-183.


37. CAR 1920, pp. 806-810; CAR 1921, pp. 824-9; William K. Rolph, op. cit. pp. 96 (bottom) to 99.

38. The Manitoba Free Press, July 12th, 1922.


41. CAR 1923.


44. Supra.


48. CAR 1924, pp. 820-25.


52. Cf. chapter 5, pp. 198-203, footnotes 32 and 38 supra.

53. CAR 1923, pp. 426-429, 426-429, 824-825.


57. CAR 1923, p. 742; cf. Appendix E, pp.

58. CAR 1924-1925, pp. 426-429.

59. CAR 1920, p. 749.


61. CAR 1922, p. 772.


63. *Manitoba, Sessional Papers, 1918-1921.*

64. CAR 1921, pp. 741-743.

65. *Supra.*


69. H.A. Logan and J. Ware, *op. cit.*.
78. *Supra.*

71. CAR 1922, pp. 762-764.


76. Cf. Appendix A for information regarding general elections in Manitoba after 1914.


79. *Supra,* and July 5th.

80. CAR 1927-1928, pp. 140-143.


83. Cf. chapter 3, pp. 140-145.

84. CAR 1920, pp. 811-816.


86. *British Columbia Statutes,* 1920, chapter 61, pp. 319-321; and 1921, chapter 43 (amendment), p. 419.

87.
88. CAR 1921, p. 741.


90. CAR 1921, pp. 860-861.

91. Cf. Chapter 5, the preceding page, footnote 88 supra.


93. Ibid. p. 414.

94. CAR 1914, p. 814.

95. Cf. footnote 93 supra; re-read preceding page.

96. CAR 1920, pp. 814-815.


100. Cf. the typewritten statement contained in a folder entitled "British Columbia's Claims to Better Terms." Available at the Provincial Archives in Victoria, B.C. Contains documents since approximately 1900.

101. For British Columbia veterans aid measures, see; British Columbia, Statutes, 1917, chapter 34, and 1919, chapter 41, pp. 251-255. The principal federal programs of this type were enacted in 1917 and 1919, too. Cf. Canada, Statutes, 1917, chapter 21, pp. 123-128, and 1919, chapter 71, pp. 627-661.

102. L. Fournier, op. cit. See the index.


104. CAR 1921, pp. 446-457.

105. Cf. Introductory chapter.
I. Printed Sources

A. Government Publications

Alberta. Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta. Edmonton, Queen's Printer, 1905-1921.


Canada. British North America Act and Amendments. (together with other acts and orders-in-council relating to the constitution of Canada and of its provinces). Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1943.
A series of individual constitutional acts. Includes the full text of resolutions adopted at Quebec and London Conferences held in 1864 and 1866 respectively.


Canada. Dominion-Provincial Conferences. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1940.
Extremely helpful reports.

Canada. A Map showing the area of provincial districts of the Northwest Territories. Sessional Papers, 1905, number 97.


Canada, Department of Justice. Memorandum of the Office of Lieutenant-Governor of a Province, its constitutional character and functions. (With Appendices). Ottawa, Department of Justice, 1938.

Canada, Department of Labor. Report on the Royal Commission on Industrial Disputes in the Province of British Columbia. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1903.
Contains the viewpoint of W.L. Mackenzie King on Dominion responsibility in labor developments.


A very valuable reference source.
Gives explanations of provincial claims to boundary and financial revisions.

Manitoba. Statutes. 1900-1917.


B. General Works

1. Contemporary


Gives a logical argument for functional government, but pays little attention to the constitutional framework of a state.

Contains an imaginative discussion of what the farmers movement could have accomplished.

Partridge, E.A. (Partridge of Sintaluta!). A War on Poverty. The one war that can end war. Winnipeg, Wallingford Press, 1925.
An original little-known volume of proposals reforming the society and the political organization of Western Canada. Humanitarian in nature.

An autobiography. Makes brief but interesting allusions to the social conditions of 1914 and 1920-21.

This is a distinctly anachronistic interpretation of Canadian Regionalisms. Nevertheless, Nelson's book contains useful details on economics and politics in Canada during the period from 1918 to 1925.

Firsthand, but cursory account of Grain Growers Association.

Has numerous perceptive glimpses on the policies of the Canadian political parties before 1914. Makes for worthwhile scanning. The great majority of sections pertain to the federal government and Eastern Canada.

2. Later


Gives interesting insights into selected aspects of economic developments in Canada prior to 1930, e.g. into the growth of the mineral extracting industries in Western Canada in the years from 1890 to 1914. Too brief in respect to the post-1914 period, as in its treatment of Wheat Pools.


An extremely useful reference source in respect to Dominion-provincial judicial conflicts.


Contains an excellent bibliography.


A reliable comparative description of political structures in the British Commonwealth prior to 1935.


A good summary of the "Canadian Tax Structure".


Latest source on constitutional developments in the Commonwealth nations.


A thorough and detailed general history of British Columbia. Basic reference source upon the history of that province.


J. F. Wright has given a readable general history of Saskatchewan. It is very cursory in respect to biographical data, facts concerning provincial party leaders, and technical details upon Dominion-provincial relations.
3. Periodicals

Sees one of the main sources of Conservative party in British immigrants, explains reasons for Dr. S.F. Tolmie's failure, follows an upsurge of Conservative strength during Patullo's term.

Attempts to show the reasons for British Columbians' lagging interest in federal elections, notes relative equality of strength between 3 parties, expects Conservatives to go down. Says, "this geographical complex reduces interest in federal elections far below that which is taken in provincial affairs." Cf. Page 168. Considers distance, size, and small population to be reasons for this characteristic.

Explains the importance of the union between the Equity Society and the Farmers Association in 1909.

The only official summary of Dominion election results in which these are classified by province, ridings and parties. Very reliable. Compare with Appendices A and B.


Explains the steps leading to the British Columbia Act of 1871.

Explains the reasons for Borden's choice of his ministers, including Senator James Lougheed as Minister Without Portfolio and M. Burrell as Minister of Agriculture.

Was at the above times edited by John S. Dafoe. Expressed interesting viewpoints on the editorial page.

Traces the acquisition of Rupert's Land, Northwest Territories, and British Columbia by Canada. Explains the distinction between "chartered" and "licensed" territories of Hudson's Bay Company. Discusses the
importance of the Northwest Rebellion and the Manitoba Act as the basis for subsequent policy. Stresses the importance of the Select Committee's 1857 Report as the legal basis for uniting of British Columbia Mainland and Vancouver Island, still showing significant regional differences.

"Oliver, Frank: A Portrait." Alberta Historical Review. 7:5. (Autumn, 1959). This is a photo of the Liberal Minister.


Sandwell, B. K. "Political Development Around the Turn of the Century." Canadian Historical Association. Report, number 45, pp. 44-57. Describes the intellectual atmosphere in the early part of the century, including the entry of Canadian national feeling into the West, while a separate Quebec nationalism was developing in the East. Also stresses the willingness of many to have public provincial ownership of utilities in the absence of extensive regulation of the economy by the federal Government.


Waddell, W.S. "Frank Oliver and the Bulletin". Alberta Historical Review, Spring 1957. Gives the depiction of Oliver's character while listing the main events of his career both provincial and federal. Does not bring out his importance in the choice of Sifton as premier.

Webster, J.C. "Canadian Cultural Development". Canadian Historical Association, Report, for 1927, pp. 74-81. Summarizes the intellectual development in the Dominion up to circa 1920. A critical analysis, and a good reference.

Wallace, Stewart F. "Psychology of Western Canada". Addresses given before the Canadian Club of Toronto, Vol. 34, p.356. (Session 1936-7). Toronto, Warwick Bros. and Rutler, 1937. Concludes that the presence of insecurity is the source of widespread distrust of national parties. Suggests economic remedies such as short-term loans. Stimulating.

C. Special Studies

1. Compendia


Laskin, Bora. Canadian Constitutional Law. 2nd Edition. University of Toronto Press, 1960. A brilliant critical analysis of all significant legal cases pertaining to Canada. May be considered a summary, presented with exhaustive explanations. The sole weakness is the absence of references to federal policies regarding reservation and disallowance.


2. Monographs


Fowke, Vernon C. Canadian Agricultural Policy. University of Toronto Press, 1947. Starts with the early nineteenth century. Attempts to trace the continuity in the policies of Colonial British North America and post-Confederation Canada, as in efforts to obtain entry into overseas markets. A broad, yet reliable study.


Gerin-Lajoie, Paul. Constitutional Amendment in Canada. University of Toronto Press, 1950. A clearly written, scholarly study of changes occurring in Canada's constitutional law. Gives several striking, original definitions, as of "fundamental law". Very stimulating to read. Also, remarkably detailed for a broad topical study.

Irving, John. The Social Credit Movement in Alberta. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1959. (Ed. S. D. Clark. Social Credit in Alberta, Its Background and Development.) A well-documented study that evokes Aberhart's dramatic 1934-5 campaign. Presents a theory concerning Aberhart's "charismatic" leadership. The lives of other leading Albertans are briefly sketched. Unfortunately, there is little information on the personal relationships between Aberhart and Members of Parliament from the province. Must be supplemented by J. R. Mallory's Social Credit and Federal Power and by The Case for Alberta (Vide both) for further information on legal topics.


Sharp, Paul F. The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada; A survey showing American Parallels. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1948. A smoothly written analysis. It is a reliable reference source on political reform ideas. On the other hand, it lacks detail upon economics or law.

Stout, Hiram M. British Government. New York Associations, 1953. A very comprehensive reference source upon the political practices in Great Britain. Their evolution clarifies many changes in Canada’s governmental system. A good example is the idea of an elected assembly’s powers.


Smith, W. G. A Study of Canadian Immigration. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1920. This work is of some value in showing contemporary attitudes to immigration, but it is generally obsolete.
3. Articles in Anthologies

Gives a keen comparison of methods which the Governments of the Canadian provinces, and state administrations in the United States developed to promote consultation among one another. Draws upon rarely listed sources of information. Analyzes certain Dominion-provincial conferences in Canada.

Compares the voting behaviour during elections in the Western provinces, with those of other Canadian regions in Dominion elections. Gives a problematical explanation of Liberal success in Alberta and Saskatchewan after 1905. Cf. page 54.

An apologetic answer to critics of Canada's constitution. Generally convincing and well written. Concludes that to satisfy regional protest movements, Canadian Governments have introduced various "moderating schemes (which) have worked to harmonize provinces and federations" (pp. 192-3).

The most stimulating recent analysis of the federal system in Canada. The latest up-to-date commentary upon the rise of "Cooperative Federalism" in Canada after 1918.

Suggests that "the possibility of including a delegation clause is also under consideration." Cf. p. 90. Also check the other conclusions in this article.


Russell, Peter H. "The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Constitution since 1949", Ed. Paul Fox, Politics: Canada, pp. 64-80.  
"For those centralists who pressed for a restatement of the Dominion General Power, Lord Simon's judgment in the Canadian Temperance Federation Case of 1946 has provided a new ray of hope. There, Lord Simon had gone a long way towards undermining the authority of the emergency doctrine". Cf. p. 68. Other cases were the reference re Validity of Wartime Leasehold Regulations (1950), and Johannesson vs. St. Paul, pp. 66-67.
The Executive Committee of the Liberal-Conservative Summer School. Canadian Problems, as seen by Twenty Outstanding Men of Canada. Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1933. A collection of papers read at the first annual Liberal-Conservative Summer School, held at Newmarket, Ontario.

3. Biographies


Borden, Henry, ed. Sir Robert Borden: His Memoirs. University of Toronto Press, 1938. Contains useful information upon Sir Robert Borden's changing attitudes to the natural resources claims of the Western Provinces. Gives a valuable account of Borden's negotiations with Western Liberals regarding the formation of the Union Government in 1917, though one finds only rare references to his relations with the provincial premiers or Conservative party leaders in Western Canada at other times. Interesting.


MacInnis, Grace. James S. Woodsworth A Man to Remember. Toronto, Macmillan Co. of Canada, 1953. An attractive interpretation of Woodworth's career. Gives an interesting description of the events leading to the Dominion Old Age Pensions Act of 1927. On the other hand, this biography is sufficiently documented to be an historical work.

MacLean, Andrew D. *R. B. Bennett, Prime Minister of Canada.* Toronto Excelsior Publishing Co., 1934. A journalistic account of Prime Minister Bennett's personality and his impact upon contemporaries. Restrained in attitude. Gives insufficient analysis of the changing legislative policies.


Steele, C.F. *Prairie Editor* (W. A. Buchanan). University of Toronto Press, 1961. Contains an interesting letter upon the tariff, as viewed by James G. Gardiner writing to rancher George Ross.


5. Pamphlets


Canada, Department of Interior. *The last best land*. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1906.

Canada, Department of Interior. *Winter Wheat is a Success in Canada*. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1906.


Haultain, Sir Frederick W. G. *Constitutional and Financial Questions, affecting the Northwest Territories*. Speech given in the Legislative Assembly on May 2, 1900. Regina, Queen's Printer, 100. Intellectual.

Woodsworth, James, S. *Reconstruction from the viewpoint of labor*. Winnipeg, Hacla Press, 1919.

D. Reference Sources

1. Encyclopedic Works

The Encyclopedia Canadiana.

2. Bibliographies


Peel, Bruce Bladen. *A Bibliography of the Prairie Provinces to 1953*. University of Toronto Press, 1956. Very helpful. Relevant to this study. In particular, there are numerous entries for pamphlets.


D. Reference Sources

3. Dictionaries

a. General


b. Specialized, by Subject


4. Bibliographic Aids


II Manuscript Sources

Theses


Bocking, D. H. Premier Walter Scott, A study of His Rise to Political Power. M.A. Thesis, Saskatchewan, 1959. A well written analysis of Scott's ideas and methods. Gives helpful detail on his relations with the Laurier Government. Notes his primary concern with objectives beyond the actual or intended jurisdiction of provincial administration, e.g. his interest in securing tariff reductions or competing transcontinental railways. His views upon these matters determined his attitudes to the federal Liberals.


A general survey of the federal Liberal party. Gives information on the low-tariff ideology and the other legislative objectives of the federal Liberals, or at least their leaders in the period from 1900 to 1930. Enlightening upon the clashes of viewpoint defended by Eastern, Prairie, and Western Liberals.

Occasionally enlightening, upon Premier McBride's political and legislative objectives, but has too little information on legislation or economics of British Columbia.

Gives one of the leading reasons for the development of the "tradition of grievance" in early Manitoba. Rightly stresses the important effects of the use of reservation and disallowance by the Dominion Cabinets in that period upon the thinking of Manitoba's provincial political leaders.

Unavailable.

Traces enlighteningly the career of a Prairie Senator who was an ally of the Laurier and the King administrations.

Includes some valuable details, in respect to Oliver's attitude to the Macdonald and the Laurier governments and to the federal party system in Canada. Is informative regarding the legislative policies of the administrations of the Northwest Territories and the work of the Legislative Council in that political unit.

Unavailable.
E. **Addendum**

Several Monographs which have not been previously listed provide useful information and interesting ideas.


APPENDIX A

ELECTIONS IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES OF CANADA
POPULAR VOTE
1900 - 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVES</th>
<th>LIBERALS</th>
<th>IND.</th>
<th>LABOR</th>
<th>U.F.M.</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>19,906</td>
<td>16,629</td>
<td>3,063</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 accl.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>32,067</td>
<td>29,426</td>
<td>939</td>
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<td></td>
<td>62,432</td>
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<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>34,056</td>
<td>21,890</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>55,946</td>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>44,434</td>
<td>71,102</td>
<td>5,870</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 accl.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>68,434</td>
<td>62,728</td>
<td>654</td>
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<td>131,816</td>
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<td>1920</td>
<td>24,210</td>
<td>51,659</td>
<td>15,163</td>
<td>29,869</td>
<td>22,739</td>
<td>743,640</td>
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<td>1924</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVES</th>
<th>LIBERALS</th>
<th>IND.</th>
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</tr>
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<td>21,700</td>
<td>22,413</td>
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<td>34,890</td>
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<td>1911</td>
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<td>40,456</td>
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<td>78,183</td>
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<td>46,486</td>
<td>29,525</td>
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<td>1915</td>
<td>70,264</td>
<td>34,538</td>
<td>168,996</td>
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<td>1920</td>
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<td>172,722</td>
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<td>1921</td>
<td>46,486</td>
<td>29,525</td>
<td>18,335</td>
<td>83,350</td>
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<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>70,264</td>
<td>34,538</td>
<td>168,996</td>
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Note: Provincial Election returns have been calculated from the information given in the Canadian Parliamentary Guide. It is believed that in many of the above instances these returns have been totalled for the first time. The federal totals are derived from the Canadian Annual Review.
### Saskatchewan Provincial Elections

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Rights</th>
<th>Non-Part.</th>
<th>Labor</th>
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<td>309</td>
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<td>619</td>
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<td>26,927</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>59,974</td>
<td>49,104</td>
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<td>1912</td>
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<td>49,841</td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>87,583</td>
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<td>88,965</td>
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<td>1917</td>
<td>65,762</td>
<td>101,419</td>
<td>7,475</td>
<td>7,277</td>
<td>1,474</td>
<td>183,407</td>
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<td>1921</td>
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<td>67,299</td>
<td>2,238</td>
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<td>(Gov't)</td>
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<td>YEAR</td>
<td>CONSERVATIVES</td>
<td>LIBERALS</td>
<td>IND.</td>
<td>LABOR</td>
<td>U.F.M.</td>
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<td>1909</td>
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<td>31,195</td>
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<td>1930</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
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<td>360</td>
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<th>Social</th>
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<td>153,538</td>
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- **Ind.**, **Liberal**, and **Labour** columns represent party affiliations. **Total** column sums up the votes for each year.
- **1920**: Federal Lbr. (mod. leg. 567, Labor 2,443)
- **1922**: People's 424, Fusion 10,372, Funct'1 Groups 276
2. Report for 1906:

<table>
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<th>Expenditures</th>
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<td>Education Dept. $303,728.38</td>
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<td>Federal school grant 76,212.36</td>
<td>Agriculture and Immigration Depts. 205,461.38</td>
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<td>License fees, fines 314,005.83</td>
<td>Treasury Dept. 266,699.96</td>
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<td>Provincial lands 69,512.59</td>
<td>Public Works Dept. 365,340.00</td>
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<td>Succession duties 71,310.15</td>
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<td>Corporation tax 74,416.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railway tax 84,370.48</td>
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<td>Total $2,630,225.27</td>
<td>Total $2,543,289.26</td>
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3. Report for 1914

<table>
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<td>Education Dept. $724,560.</td>
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<td>$1,592,675.</td>
<td>Telephones and telegraphs 1,392,390.</td>
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<td>Fines, license fees</td>
<td>Public works 721,156.</td>
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<td>561,693.</td>
<td>Agriculture 423,684.</td>
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<td>Aid to Municipalities 459,998.</td>
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<td>218,406.</td>
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<td>Succession duties</td>
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<td>283,480.</td>
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<td>Corporation tax</td>
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<td>158,481.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway tax</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203,461.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephones and telegraph</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,814,071.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto licenses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,000.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> $5,512,163.</td>
<td><strong>Total</strong> $5,638,658.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Surplus</strong> $18,776.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Report for 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenues</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominion subsidy</td>
<td>Agriculture Dept. $937,922.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposal of Provincial lands</td>
<td>Public Works Dept. 2,108,194.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Succession duties</td>
<td>Widows' Pensions 5,028.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation tax</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mothers' allowance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>License fees, tax fines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$10,063,139.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Assets $2,001,090.14)</td>
<td>(Liabilities 6,468,378.56)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Revenues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominion subsidies</td>
<td>$1,500,213.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion school grant</td>
<td>318,899.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto license fees</td>
<td>1,013,412.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income tax</td>
<td>532,732.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation tax</td>
<td>547,400.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unoccupied land tax</td>
<td>18,866.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline tax</td>
<td>669,780.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Dept.</td>
<td>1,979,058.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Including succession tax)</td>
<td>732,897.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney-General's Dept. (fees, fines)</td>
<td>2,424,383.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Debt charges</td>
<td>$4,117,585.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public works</td>
<td>476,275.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Welfare</td>
<td>2,248,893.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Including Old-age pensions)</td>
<td>300,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural credits</td>
<td>30,940.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other agricultural program</td>
<td>300,693.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2,322,857.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: $12,344,492.54
1. Report for 1911

Total public debt - $429,572.79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenues</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>Debt charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ 303,523.00</td>
<td>$ 429,572.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Dominion</td>
<td>Public works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,551,160.42</td>
<td>612,384.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees, Attorney-General's Dept.</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32,524.00</td>
<td>508,410.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway and telephone</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>379,957.68</td>
<td>342,962.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Succession duty</td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33,859.24</td>
<td>101,275.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation tax</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62,627.87</td>
<td>270,934.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>Courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>$3,359,866.27</strong></td>
<td><strong>590,763.28</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**$3,244,336.58**
### Saskatchewan Accounts 1925 - 26

#### 2. Report for 1925 - 26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$87,891,484.79</td>
<td>$87,891,484.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Revenues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominion subsidies</td>
<td>$1,850,755.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trunks</td>
<td>$984,904.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney General's Department</td>
<td>$1,235,243.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including Succession duties</td>
<td>$332,607.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquor permits</td>
<td>$32,022.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>5,144,346.23</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Including liquor permits)</td>
<td><strong>1,499,825.12</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest on telephones</td>
<td>$1,230,611.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province security</td>
<td>$2,694,100.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including corporation tax</td>
<td>$487,525.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$13,317,398.37</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>$3,796,881.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>$391,089.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public works Department</td>
<td>$421,206.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts, Attorney General's Dept.</td>
<td>$1,016,746.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$13,177,747.02</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: $13,177,747.02
### III BRITISH COLUMBIA

#### 1. Report for the year ending June 30, 1904.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenues</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominion subsidies</td>
<td>Debt charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$307,075.66</td>
<td>$522,067.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial land sales</td>
<td>Public works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168,276.89</td>
<td>1,028,650.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber licenses</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>289,366.93</td>
<td>415,358.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income tax</td>
<td>Hospitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72,102.39</td>
<td>123,875.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Succession duty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29,625.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>$2,638,260.68</strong></td>
<td><strong>$3,031,237.47</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2. Report for the year ending March 31, 1914.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenues</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominion subsidies</td>
<td>Debt charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$823,135.06</td>
<td>$330,587.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial land sales</td>
<td>Hospitals and charity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,279,351.93</td>
<td>430,784.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber leases and licenses</td>
<td>Justice Dept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,444,179.06</td>
<td>747,112.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Dominion grant</td>
<td>Public works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(derived from the tax paid by Chinese immigrants upon entering Canada)</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,279,351.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income tax</td>
<td>348,452.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company tax</td>
<td>96,420.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Succession tax</td>
<td>249,275.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>$10,478,258.74</strong></td>
<td><strong>$15,762,912.48</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Report for the year ending December 30, 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenues</th>
<th></th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominion subsidies</td>
<td>$723,135</td>
<td>Debt charge</td>
<td>$529,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber leases and royalties</td>
<td>2,558,724</td>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>430,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial land sales</td>
<td>1,391,478</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1,141,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Succession duty</td>
<td>249,275</td>
<td>Public works</td>
<td>3,064,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income tax</td>
<td>348,452</td>
<td>Roads and highways</td>
<td>5,322,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10,479,258</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$15,762,912</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Assets)</strong></td>
<td><strong>$18,617,046.</strong></td>
<td><strong>(Liabilities)</strong></td>
<td><strong>$25,845,029.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net Provincial Debt. $20,748,146.
APPENDIX C

WHEAT PRICES

The following chart is S. S. Gampell's Table I, showing "Farm Price of Wheat in Canada, and Return to the Grower. Index Numbers."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Official Farm Price of Wheat as a % of 1913</th>
<th>Official Yield Per Acre of Wheat in the Prairie Provinces As of 1913</th>
<th>Price per Acre Received by The Grower A % of 1913 Intake</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Period of War-time Prosperity:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1914</th>
<th>146</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>106</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>195.5</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>301.5</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1919 was the year of functioning of the Canada Wheat Board which was practically a compulsory Pool.

Period of World Deflation; Discontent in Canada; and clamour for renewed compulsory Pool:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1920</th>
<th>242</th>
<th>67</th>
<th>162</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inauguration of the Canadian Wheat Pool in Three Provinces, coinciding with recovery in European purchasing power:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1924</th>
<th>182</th>
<th>54</th>
<th>98 (under estimate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commencement of period of difficulty:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1929</th>
<th>173 (nominal price)</th>
<th>55</th>
<th>95 (over estimate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929 (price as paid to date to Pool members)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>65 (preliminary)</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1930 data show merely the initial payment made to Saskatchewan Pool Members.
S. S. Gampell's Note:

"Both the farm price figures and the yield figures on which this table is based are official returns of the Canadian Government. Nevertheless, they are subject to grave error in some years, and must only be regarded as showing a general view of the position. For 1924 and 1929 they are not even that, the price figure for 1924 being much too low, while that for 1929 is much too high, at least as regards Pool farmers."

The above table, with the explanatory headings and the above note, is taken from S. S. Gampell's Canada and her Wheat Pool, the Fifth of a Series of Lectures on the Economics of the Grain Trade, given at the City of London College, London, England, on October 22nd, 1930. Published by the Grain Trade News, Winnipeg, page 12. The references made in the thesis to this table are limited to the years from 1916 to 1922.
# APPENDIX D

## ORIGIN OF POPULATION IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Native Born</th>
<th>Foreign Born</th>
<th>In British Isles</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Native Born</td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign Born</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Born of Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td>Born of Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>50,648</td>
<td>57,365</td>
<td>44,489</td>
<td>23,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>36,701</td>
<td>20,150</td>
<td>41,322</td>
<td>17,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>27,437</td>
<td>20,530</td>
<td>18,832</td>
<td>10,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>99,806</td>
<td>81,053</td>
<td>40,201</td>
<td>33,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>59,589</td>
<td>40,023</td>
<td>46,110</td>
<td>30,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>50,438</td>
<td>58,709</td>
<td>48,981</td>
<td>17,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>170,819</td>
<td>94,009</td>
<td>95,688</td>
<td>95,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>84,490</td>
<td>84,832</td>
<td>105,097</td>
<td>118,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>73,813</td>
<td>88,424</td>
<td>142,711</td>
<td>69,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>101,854</td>
<td>146,897</td>
<td>162,610</td>
<td>81,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>291,462</td>
<td>96,284</td>
<td>109,258</td>
<td>113,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>157,043</td>
<td>107,003</td>
<td>99,784</td>
<td>160,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>194,525</td>
<td>110,565</td>
<td>173,972</td>
<td>99,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>287,652</td>
<td>160,181</td>
<td>199,322</td>
<td>100,293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX D:


5. The figures under the heading "born in the British Isles" include, for the years 1891 and 1901, only those born in England and Scotland. Persons born in Ireland or in other British possessions do appear in the data for the more recent years.
APPENDIX E

The United Farmers of Alberta Executive issued a significant declaration of principles on July 1, 1921. The following summary highlights the principal proposals made in that document, which emphasizes political reform objectives while giving slight attention to the traditional concerns of the Western autonomists.

As reported by J. Castell Hopkins,¹ The United Farmers of Alberta demands:

A. Proportional representation, with preferential ballot in single-member constituencies,

B. Initiative, referendum, and recall,

C. A law forcing the provincial Government to announce elections 30 days ahead of the event,

D. Permanence of Government (The same Cabinet is to remain in office during the entire term of five years unless they ask explicitly for a vote of confidence and are defeated, or unless any important Bills of Supply are rejected.

E. Economy and efficiency in all the branches of the provincial Government, the abolition of patronage.

F. Improvements in highways, more support for education.

G. Better public health services, with the stringent enforcement of a total liquor sales prohibition policy.

H. A somewhat confusing plank which urges, in reference to Dominion-provincial relations, "the immediate handing over of the natural resources by the Dominion (to the provinces) and the encouragement of cooperative efforts in marketing and handling the products of the farm."

¹Hopkins, J. Castell. CAR 1921, Page 571-5.