THE STRUCTURE OF FUR TRADE RELATIONS

by

ADRIAN TANNER

B.A., University of British Columbia, 1964

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
M.A.

in the Department
of
ANTHROPOLOGY

We accept this thesis as conforming to the
required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

December, 1965
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver 8, Canada

Date December 7, 1965
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Table of Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theoretical Premises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wildlife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Native Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>PARTNERSHIP TRADE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade in Native Commodities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Early Trade in European Goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>TRADING CHIEFS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>MONOPOLY TRADE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>MARKET TRADE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to make the following acknowledgements. My work in the Yukon was supported by the Northern Co-ordination and Research Center, Ottawa, and aided considerably by Mr. Jim Lotz, Co-ordinator of the Yukon Research Project. I received guidance in the thesis by Professors C.S. Belshaw and W.E. Willmott.

Others who have taught me anthropology at U.B.C. include Professors H.B. Hawthorn, R.W. Dunning, and Dr. M.G. Whisson.
Map II

YUKON ETHNOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION

Source: Adapted from a map by C. McClellan, published in Slobodin, 1962, p. 6f.
ABSTRACT

The history of trade among Indian groups of the Canadian Yukon has included changes in the quantity and type of goods involved and, more importantly, changes in the social relations between the people who conducted this trade. These relations were between distinct native groups at first, and later directly between Indians and White traders. In this study historical data on the changes in trade is organized into convenient stages by identifying types of trade institutions. Four such stages are described and analyzed with reference to the major conditioning factors for trade in the area and at the time. These stages are (1) Inter-tribal trade, when exchanges were conducted between partners of different native groups; (2) Trading chief trade, in which an Indian group leader handled relations with White traders; (3) Monopoly trade, in which a quasi-debt relationship handled trade between traders and individual trappers; and (4) Market trade, in which trade is handled through separate fur market and retail market institutions. Institutions are treated in this study as having a set of several purposes related to the complementary aims of participants. Changes between one stage and the next are seen as a regrouping of these purposes into new sets, which become the focus of new institutions. This view of institutional change arises from an analysis of the
changes in trade relations in the Yukon, and is compared with a somewhat similar analysis of social change developed by Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser.

W. E. Willmott,
Supervisor.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Theoretical Premises

Historically, the fur industry of Canada has been one of the few organizational forms which has linked various Indian groups to the rest of the country. This economic integration has resulted from the organization of Indians as fur producers, and a system of exchanges between these producing groups and a number of traders or middlemen. It remains useful, however, to distinguish the Indian sector of this economic system from the 'fur trade', as the term is commonly used. The fur trade refers to a market-oriented mercantile business, including the collection, transportation, commodity marketing, manufacture and retail distribution of fur. The section of the fur industry conducted by Indian trappers, on the other hand, deals with the organization of trapping, and of the exchanges which take place through middlemen up to the point when fur reaches the trader.

This distinction is basically a disciplinary one. Economists and historians have done a large amount of work on the fur trade in Canada, but have treated the organization and methods of Indian fur production and trade mainly as peripheral factors which help explain the policies or practices of the traders. Because of the viewpoint of most of these studies,
analysis tends to end at the limits of the market-oriented business establishments, that is, at the trading posts.

Anthropologists, particularly those studying changes within Indian groups, have dealt more thoroughly with the organization of production and trade by Indians. A number of studies have investigated how changes in Indian culture or social organization have been causally related, at least in part, to trade with other cultures (e.g. Balikci, 1964; Lewis, 1942; McClellan, 1950; Murphy and Steward, 1956; Service, 1962). One of the most general of these is the attempt of Murphy and Steward (1956) to show that trade involving fur brought about the loss of band autonomy and the disappearance of all social groups larger than the nuclear family, in unstratified Indian bands. Like most studies of acculturation Murphy and Steward's paper focuses attention on a cultural unit. The trader and the rest of the fur trade are outside this unit, and are seen as external causal factors. This treatment of the fur trade as an external causal factor is common in many anthropological studies on the subject.

It is not the burden of this thesis to criticize those studies in which the fur trade and Indian economics are separated, with each being seen as a factor influencing the change or continuity of the other. Attention, however, will be focused on a third system which may be conceptually introduced between these two sectors. Malinowski has pointed out that culture contact over a period of time results in the creation of a set of new institutions, involving individuals from both
cultures, which cannot be understood either as a diffusion from one of them, or a mixture of elements from both (Malinowski, 1945, p. 65.). It is cross-cultural institutions such as these which have handled the exchange of fur for imported goods between Canadian Indian groups and traders. Other examples of new institutions which have developed between Indians and Whites include religion and administration. While the summation of all cross-cultural institutions does not constitute a society or a culture, the writer holds that they can be fruitfully studied in the same way as institutions within a society.

The present study concerns the trade institutions of the Northern Athapaskans of the Upper Yukon River drainage. At any point in the post-contact history of this area fur has been exchanged for imported goods by some institutionalized method, either between Indian groups, or directly with White traders.

Because this trade is cross-cultural, its methods must be examined from two points of view. The trade institution is conceptualized by the fur-producing group in terms of its aims, values and world view. However, it also is seen separately by a second culture as conforming to a second set of aims, values and conceptions of the world. In this thesis the trade institution is often presented outside both its cultural contexts. This technique is one of abstraction, and must be clearly recognized as such.
The present study will tend to concentrate on trade as a separate institution. The writer believes the study of cross-cultural institutions, as opposed to those of 'contact institutions' which appear firmly based in one of the interacting cultures, to be a useful and neglected approach. An adequate consideration of both interacting cultures will not be possible, because of the serious lack of ethnographic data about the groups under study. This shortage was pointed out in 1950 by McClellan (1950, passim), and since then little additional material has become available, except on the Kutchin.

If the cross-cultural trade institution of the Yukon is viewed from a historical perspective, it will be noticed that substantial changes have taken place in the methods of trading. A useful way to organize this material is to identify stages within the period of change. If these stages are to be seen as structural types they must be identified by criteria which are in conformity both with the definition of institution and with an understanding as to what constitutes structural change. Firth states that structural change involves change in the basic relations between the members of the society. This is contrasted with the less radical organizational change (Firth, 1951, p. 84.). Beattie has criticized Firth's distinction between organizational and structural change as being one of degree, rather than of kind, and for this reason to some extent arbitrary (Beattie, 1964, p. 247.).

Can the idea of structural change be more rigidly defined if its application is limited to institutions? An
institution will be taken to mean a standardized pattern of co-
activity which is rule-governed, sanctioned and thus predictable. The constituent behaviour is recognized by the participants as being meaningfully related to a particular set of aims. Such a behaviour pattern may be more or less institutionalized, to the extent to which individual variations of the pattern are permitted. Using this definition of institution, one kind of structural change can be pointed out, and fairly rigidly defined, by reference to the purpose of the institution. This kind of change occurs when the set of aims of an institution becomes divided into two or more new sets, each with its own new behaviour pattern. Similarly, structural change takes place when an institution is dropped from society because at least part of its purpose no longer fits in with the values of that society.

While the foregoing method of a diachronic comparison of institutions within a society can determine whether or not structural change of this particular type has taken place, the determination of the precise point of change must still be arbitrary.

On the subject of social change, Parsons and Smelser have produced a useful theory of 'structural differentiation', by which certain cases of structural change can be analysed (Parsons and Smelser, 1956, pp. 254ff.). According to this theory, an organization in society, which can be represented as a system in equilibrium, can be influenced by factors outside its system. These may take the form of new opportunities
for achieving the purpose of the organization, or dissatisfactions due to the inability to attain goals. The resultant tensions bring about new ideas for action, and finally two new systems of action become institutionalized. The new organizations "differ from each other in structure and in function for the system, but ... together are in certain respects 'functionally equivalent' to the earlier less differentiated unit." (ibid., pp. 255-256.).

Structural differentiation, when applied to the institution, is a process of specialization essentially similar to the type previously mentioned, in which the purposes of a single institution become separated into a number of sets of aims, each with its own more or less institutionalized behavioural pattern. For this reason Parsons and Smelser's theory will be used as a framework of ideas, when the diachronic variations in the trading institutions of Yukon Indian bands are considered.¹

The material to be used in the account of trade institutions which is to follow contains many gaps, particularly

¹ With reference to social change, Jarvie has contrasted explanations from 'situational logic' with structural-functional explanations, and has severely criticised the latter (Jarvie, 1964, p. 159.). Some structural explanations, such as those put forward in this thesis, include an account of the re-ordering of the set of aims served by the institution in question. This re-ordering of aims can be seen as the breaking down of the logical or pragmatic links which Nadel has pointed out join the aims of an institution (Nadel, 1951, p. 107.). From the point of view of participants in the institution this kind of re-ordering, or differentiation, of aims might well be included in the situational logic. Structural and situational logic explanations may not be irreconcilable.
with respect to the tribes of the central part of the Yukon. The data from the proto-contact period is also generally very thin. The work of trained ethnographers in the area - Osgood, McClellan, Slobodin and Balıkci - has been conducted within the last thirty five years, so that their data on the early period has been mainly oral history. Much of the earlier material is from traders, and explorers of various kinds. The material is most detailed with respect to White-Indian interactions, of which trade was particularly important. However, to give anywhere near a full account of early trade is not possible, and the facts which do come out are often open to various interpretations.

Surprisingly, there has been less contemporary ethnographic work done in the central and southern Yukon since the Gold Rush than there have been among the few northern groups, this despite (or because of) the fact that widespread White settlement has taken place only in the central and southern parts. McClellan's published results of her work in the southern Yukon were mainly concerned with history. In the summer of 1964 the author visited most settlements of the central and southern Yukon, while collecting material for a report on the trapping, hunting and fishing industries of the Territory (Tanner, 1965.). However, not enough time was spent in any location to permit intensive ethnographic field work, outside the subjects of trade, and economic organization. As was pointed out earlier, this shortage of ethnographic material on native groups of the Yukon is not the disadvantage to the
present study that it might be. The institutions of trade have been the direct concern of both the students of the fur trade and the traders themselves. Many of the latter have published accounts of their activities, and present-day traders in the Yukon are only too willing to explain the trade institution. This admittedly gives a one-sided picture, and the rest must be filled in as well as possible from a careful review of what data is available on the trading behaviour of trappers.

Geography

The Yukon can refer to a river, a region or a political Territory of Canada. The distinction between the latter two is a historical one. Prior to the Alaska purchase in 1867 the region can be considered to have included the drainage area of the Yukon River and its tributaries above Fort Yukon. After this date the boundary with Alaska became important. The growth of Territorial government since 1898 has added to the integration of the area, particularly with respect to trade. However, the area north of the Ogilvie Mountains remains somewhat isolated from the rest of the region, and freight must be transported via the Alaska section of the Yukon and Porcupine Rivers. The administration of Indians in the northern section has only recently changed from the Aklavic agency, in the Mackenzie delta, to the Whitehorse agency. From the point of view of the history of trade, there were two regions; the north (Kutchin) was supplied from the Mackenzie, and the south (Inland Tlingit) from the Pacific. Since the building of the
White Pass Railway in the south, the northern part has become, in effect, a trading hinterland of the rest of the Territory.

Geographically, what has been referred to as the Yukon region consists of high plateau land of the Western Cordillera sandwiched between the Coast Mountains and the Mackenzie Mountains. It can be sub-divided into (1) the Porcupine Plain, separated from the Arctic littoral by the Richardson Mountains; (2) the Yukon Plateau, consisting of the Stewart, White and Pelly River drainages, and separated from the Porcupine Plain by the Ogilvie Mountains; (3) the Lake District, containing a string of lakes at the foot of the Coast Mountains, named Kluane, Aishihik, Kusawa, Laberge, Bennett, Tagish, Atlin and Teslin. Most of these lakes feed the Yukon River system, while Aishihik and Atlin drain through the Coast mountains in the Pacific (See Map I, p. iv.).

The climate is distinctly continental—cold, dry winters and warm, dry summers. For long periods in the winter the weather is calm, with sub-zero temperatures, which are ended by the passage of a frontal system, either from Alaska, or less often from the Pacific. In mid-winter there is little or, North of the Ogilvie Mountains, no daylight. Breakup is around the beginning of May, and the July average temperature is usually around 60 degrees farenheit. Precipitation varies from 10 to 16 inches a year, with no wet season; about half is in the form of snow. There is a region of heavier precipitation close to the Coast Mountains. Generally speaking, temperatures are cooler with an increase in altitude or latitude,
but in very cold, calm weather the coldest air collects in low-lying pockets. For this reason the record minimum temperature of -81.0 degrees was recorded not in the north, but at Snag in the southwest. Such very cold weather prevents all travel, human or animal.

The vegetation pattern is affected both by climate and topography. South of the Ogilvie Mountains trees of limited growth cover all but the land over 4,000 to 5,000 feet (Rowe, 1959, p. 30.). The Porcupine Plain has only stunted trees, and is located between the tundra of the Ogilvie Mountains to the south, and a similar tundra of the Richardson Mountains to the north.

Wildlife

The wildlife of the Yukon (Rand, 1945) is of major importance to the economy of the Indian population. Moose are found at the lower elevations as far north as the Porcupine River, and caribou inhabit the hills. The only large herds of Stone caribou are found in the Porcupine and Peel River headwaters, and west of Dawson. In the southern Yukon the Osborn caribou are not migratory, and live in small herds of about fifteen animals. Important fur bearing animals include the beaver, muskrat, mink, marten and squirrel. The beaver was important as a source of food before the fur trade, and in fact was not traded in the southern Yukon until the late nineteenth century, because its weight made it a difficult fur to transport. Very few beaver are found as far north as the
Porcupine River. Mink, beaver and muskrat live close to water, the latter being particularly plentiful at Crow Flats, near the Yunta Kutchin village of Old Crow. Marten inhabit the wooded uplands.

Fish are of two major types; lake fish and salmon. Lakes are found in most parts of the Territory containing many edible species, the most important of which are whitefish and lake trout. The salmon of the Yukon River are of two varieties, the King salmon which averages fifteen pounds, and the Dog salmon which average six pounds. The first salmon reach the Upper Yukon early in July, and fishing continues until September. Yukon River salmon are caught as far upstream as Marsh Lake, near Whitehorse, Teslin Lake, Ross River, Mayo, on the Stewart River, and Old Crow, on the Porcupine River. Sockeye salmon reach the southern Yukon directly from the Pacific, and are caught by Champagne (Southern Tutchone) Indians at Klukshu.

This wildlife pattern affected the social organization of native groups in the Yukon. Those bands which exploited the large herds of caribou (Kutchin and Han) and the Salmon (Kutchin, Han, Western Tutchone and the Champagne band of the Southern Tutchone) had production groups larger than the nuclear family, and capital equipment, like caribou surrounds and fish traps. Other groups, dependant on moose or non-migratory caribou required less organized production groups.
Native Groups

Because of the small amount of ethnographic field work which has been conducted in the Yukon, there has been considerable variation in accounts of the location and identity of tribal groups. The most accurate pre-contact ethnographic map of the area is by McClellan (1950), and is reproduced on page v. However, the distinction between the Tutchone and Southern Tutchone is tentative, and based largely on linguistic considerations (ibid., p. 32).

The distribution of the Kutchin was studied by Osgood (1934), which added considerably to the earlier information of Ross, Hardisty and Jones (1866). Osgood identified eight Kutchin groups, which he called tribes, each inhabiting a major river valley. In the present work the term tribe will be reserved for the language groups of the Northern Athapaskans, such as Kutchin, and, following Slobodin (1962, p. 66.), the term band will refer to major tribal sub-divisions.

The sub-division into tribes and bands of those Indians in the areas labeled Han and Tutchone is rather tentative, because of the lack of linguistic and early ethnographic research. The first explorer in the Tutchone area, Campbell, referred to the Indians he met on the Pelly River as "Knife" Indians, and those around Fort Selkirk as "Wood" Indians (Campbell, 1883, p. 439.). Schwatka, who descended the Yukon River in 1883, referred to the Fort Selkirk people as "Ayans", and described their territory as lying along the Yukon River between what is now Minto and the mouth of the Steward River,
and up the Pelly River as far as the lakes (Schwatka, 1885, p. 227.).

In 1913 the trader Field identified two groups of Indians within the area considered as Tutchone. Below Ross River, in the Pelly River valley and tributaries, were the Little Salmon Indians. The Ross and Upper Pelly River valleys were inhabited by Pelly Indians, a group of former "Center" (Kaska) Indians from the Liard River, who had moved northwest after the former inhabitants of the Upper Pelly River had been massacred by Mountain Indians in 1886 (Field, 1957, p. 49.). The Pelly Indians made annual trading trips to posts on the Liard River until the Ross River post was opened around 1900. It should be noted that this survey of information on early Tutchone groups contains a gap with respect to the inhabitants of the Stewart and Macmillan Rivers, of which there must have been a considerable number.

The groups of the southern Yukon² - the Southern Tutchone, Tagish, Atlin and Teslin - have been termed the 'Inland Tlingit' by McClellan, because of the aspects of Tlingit culture, such as clans, crests and, in some cases, language, which they share. The Teslin were originally a Tlingit group from the Taku valley who moved inland early in the nineteenth century, possibly absorbing an earlier Athapaskan resident group. However, the economy of these groups is Athapaskan in orientation.

---

² The Kaska of the southeast Yukon have not been included in this study.
The simplest division of the native peoples of the Yukon would be between (1) the Kutchin, (2) the Central bands, and (3) the Inland Tlingit. The territory of these three groups corresponds to the three geographic divisions already outlined, that is, the Porcupine Plain, the Yukon Plateau and the Lake District. There are no sharp divisions between these geographic areas, but rather intermediate zones or mountain areas. In a similar way, it is doubtful whether there was any idea among the groups of sharp territorial boundaries between them. This is a misleading suggestion of the ethnographic map, and it is more likely that there were regions of what Slobodin calls "neutral ground" (1962, p. 23.) between the areas where most of the group lived and hunted.

Each of the following four chapters are on one of the four structural types of trade, which are seen by the writer as significant stages in the development of trade. The focus of the examination of each type will be the roles through which exchanges are made. In the first case these are inter-tribal trading partners; in the second, the trading Chief; in the third, the particular trader and several individual trappers, linked by a system of delayed exchange; finally, there is a role system of competing fur buyers, retail suppliers and individual trappers, linked by money. This final stage awaits full institutionalization in most localities.
The foregoing stages are not presented as a necessary sequence, and did not occur at the same time with all Yukon groups. For instance, there is no evidence that the 'Inland Tlingit' ever had trading chiefs, and almost nothing is known of Tutchone trade until they were dealing directly with the traders, under the conditions of the third stage.

After a consideration of the four trade institutions, the process of institutional change as it applies to this data will be discussed.
CHAPTER II
PARTNERSHIP TRADE

Trade in Native Commodities

Trade between groups of people, unlike gift-giving, is to a large extent dependent on differences in the resources available to each group, together with the many other factors which affect their productive capabilities. In the Yukon, such differences are associated with the sharp environmental contrast between the high inland plateau and the sea coast, both of the Arctic Ocean and of the Pacific. A second, less sharp, contrast in human habitats exists between the lowland alongside rivers and lakes, and the more rugged higher land. Pre-contact trade in native commodities was largely a reflection of these resource differentials. For instance, the pre-contact Kutchin-Eskimo trade involved uniquely inland products and uniquely coastal ones. Similarly, the mainland Tlingit trade with several Northern Athapaskan groups consisted mainly in sea products for land products. The Tlingit traded sea-weed, seal oil and Chilkat blankets for inland furs.

The present study is concerned with the trade of Indian groups in the historic period, that is, within the past hundred and sixty years or so. Inter-tribal trade which took place before the introduction of European goods cannot be considered alongside more recent trade, because of
the general lack of pre-historic data. However, it will be useful to be aware if and where such trade\(^1\) did exist, based on available evidence, as the characteristics of this trade could have shaped to some extent the trade pattern which later emerged to handle the exchange and distribution of European goods and fur.

Some writers assert that inter-tribal trade prior to the appearance of European goods was along roughly the same routes as later trade, except that less quantity was involved. Slobodin notes that the Kutcha Kutchin had a tradition of large trading parties with high ranking leaders. These parties traveled south to trade with Indians on or near the Pacific coast. Furs and skins were exchanged for dentalium shells, copper work and, "later", European goods (Slobodin, 1960, p. 91.). Similarly, Stefansson notes that the Eskimo in the vicinity of Barter Island traded with Indians from south of the mountains towards the Yukon River (Kutchin) for wolf, wolverine and, "later", commercial furs (Stefansson, 1914, p. 10.). Pre-historic trade is also presumed to have taken place between the Eastern Kutchin and Mackenzie Eskimo (Slobodin, 1960, p. 92.), between the Natsit Kutchin and the Eskimo (Murray, 1910, p. 11.), and, in northern British

---

1 This is distinct from pre-contact trade. European goods, from both Russia and the traders in the Pacific, reached all parts of the Yukon long before the first White men entered this region.
Evidence of trade in native commodities observed some time after White contact can, in many cases, indicate a trade pattern which must have existed in pre-historic times. For instance, in North Alaska two groups of Eskimo, the inland nunamiut and the coastal taremiut met annually to exchange furs and caribou skins for seal oil and seal and walrus skins (Spencer, 1959, pp. 201-205.). This trade was vital to the existence of these people in this environment, and thus must have preceded the arrival of European goods. The trade route along the Yukon River, by which furs "taken high up on the Youkon" passed through the hands of at least six tribal units to be exchanged for skin clothing, oil and bone from the Eskimo of Bering Straits, was in operation as late as 1867 (Whymper, 1869, pp. 168-169.). This was fifty years after Russian trade entered from the west, and twenty years after the establishment of Fort Yukon by the Hudson's Bay Company. Whymper also observed a lively trade in dentalium shells, which were highly valued by all Indians along the Yukon River, as well as by the Tanana. This trade was at the time conducted by both the Russian American Company and the H.B.C., but it must have been handled previously by inter-tribal trade from the coast. McClellan, who has collected evidence of pre-historic trade in the southern Yukon from historical and archeological sources, as well as from local mythology (McClellan, 1950, pp. 156-165.), observes that, while seaweed and Chilkat blankets were not necessary for the existence of
the Northern Athapaskans, they were still bartered for with the Tlingits (ibid., p. 7.). Cadzow points out that the Kutcha Kutchin, who inhabit the Yukon Flats, had no caribou in their territory, and thus traded with their neighbors for the skins (Cadzow, 1925, p. 174.). Presumably they traded dried salmon and moose hides, commodities of theirs not shared by Indians living in higher lands.

Further afield, the Tanania of south Alaska were divided into bands which traded between themselves. Those bands at the mouth of Cook Inlet traded with those at the head. The Tanania also had war-trade relations with the Eskimo to the west (Osgood, 1933, p. 702.). One of the first White traders to visit the Carrier of Central British Columbia observed that the natives wore oyster shell and copper nose ornaments, as well as those made of dentalium shells. The dentalia were acquired from coastal people via a middleman group, and were "a kind of circulating medium, like the money of civilized countries" (Harmon, 1957, p. 244.).

There is little evidence of trade taking place, either before or after the appearance of European goods, between the tribes of the upper Yukon River drainage and those of the Mackenzie River. The lack of traditional trade seems to have adversely affected the development of trade in European goods and furs, after the traders reached the Mackenzie in 1789. For the following fifty years a program of development along the Mackenzie was conducted by the traders, with posts being opened, first by the North West Company, and later by the
Hudson's Bay Company. Only when Fort McPherson, at the edge of Kutchin territory, was opened in 1840 did Yukon furs begin to be traded to the men who had travelled "from Canada by land." Not only were the Mackenzie Mountains something of a barrier, but the prices at the Mackenzie posts could not compete with those of goods obtained via middlemen from traders on the Pacific coast. In fact, some trade took place in the opposite direction (McClellan, ibid., p. 148, and footnote 210.). There was also a tradition of hostilities across the mountains. As late as 1886 a raiding party of Mountain Indians is reported to have wiped out almost an entire band of Pelly River (Tutchone) Indians (Field, 1957, pp. 48-49.).

When European goods first arrived among Indian groups their distribution sometimes ignored traditional trade routes. The case of the coexistence of separate trade facilities for native commodities and European goods along the Yukon River, which has already been noted, is an example of this. More often, however, in periods of monopoly by a particular trading company, the native trade facilities were utilized to distribute European goods, as this helped to avoid the cost and the danger of the establishment of many isolated posts. In the area under study, inter-tribal trade carried European goods from the Mackenzie River across the divide and down the Porcupine River to the Indians along the Yukon River. In 1848, however, competition from Russian traders in Alaska was felt, so that the Hudson's Bay Company moved west to establish
Fort Yukon. Murray notes that this was opposed by the Vanta Kutchin, since it took away their lucrative position as fur trade middlemen (Murray, 1910, pp. 27, 28, 32, 47.). In the southern Yukon, inter-tribal trade handled the exchange of European goods for inland fur for almost a hundred years before competition between free traders and prospectors on the Pacific coast led to expeditions inland, and the eventual breakdown of the middleman trade.²

There is little indication given, in the cases of inter-tribal trade in native products to which reference has been made, of the extent of these exchanges. Meetings between Eskimo trade partners in north Alaska took place annually. Trading parties of Tlingits visited inland Indians annually also, although before the European fur trade trips may have been less frequent. Where inter-tribal institutions existed, such as partnerships, potlatches, or kinship structures, it is likely that trade was conducted on a regular basis.

Potlatch and sib organizations connected the various Kutchin bands. The sibs and crests now common to both the Tlingit and Athapaskans of the southern Yukon were adopted by the inland people after trade became intensified by the introduction of

² Lewis has noted a similar distinction between monopoly and competition in the fur trade with the Blackfoot, where competition "took the trade to the tipi door" (Lewis, 1942, p. 42.). He traces the effect of competition in breaking down the indigenous leadership and status system, which had, in monopoly times, been given added importance by the fur trade.
European goods. However, the same moiety system was shared by both groups prior to this time. Regular trade is more significant, socially, than trade on a casual basis for which there is little institutionalized pattern. As Beattie puts it, "Sociologically, the important thing is that by habitually exchanging goods and services with one another individuals constantly put themselves, as it were, in the hands of others." (1964, p. 201.).

Early Trade in European Goods

Pre-contact inter-tribal trade in the Upper Yukon was conducted largely through the Trading Party. European goods made up an increasingly large part of this trade for some time before actual contact between Indians and traders was established. The two major literary sources on trading parties in the Yukon are McClellan (1950), and Slobodin (1962). McClellan deals with the trading parties of those Tlingits who controlled passes through the Coast Mountains. These groups traded with the Tagish, Teslin and Southern Tutchone groups of the Southern Yukon, who in turn formed trading parties to carry the trade to the Tutchone groups further inland. Slobodin writes specifically about Eastern Kutchin-Tutchone trade (Slobodin, 1962, p. 15.), as well as trade between the Kutchin and the Mackenzie Eskimo (Ibid., p. 18.). His data on trading parties appears to refer also to inter-band trade among the Kutchin.
Peel River Kutchin trading parties were a "relatively large" collection of families (ibid., p. 73.), or occasionally the total band assembly of 50 to 70 families (ibid., p. 60.). The party moved into the territory of a neighboring group and attempted to establish friendly relations. This required care, since the visitors might be taken for raiders. Trade was conducted between trade 'friends' or partners, men who were members of the same sib. The leader of a trading party was also the leader of the ceremony, the feasting, dancing and singing, which was a part of these inter-band exchanges.

The funeral potlatch is the major inter-band ceremony mentioned by Slobodin. Before European contact the potlatch was an institution mainly of the Western Kutchin, while the Peel River people, if they were present, tended to be unsophisticated onlookers (ibid., p. 33-34.). Although sib affiliation was ideally the basis of the organization of the potlatch, Slobodin states that band affiliation took precedence among the Kutchin (ibid., p. 34.). This being the case, it is possible that potlatch distributions were very much like trade, in that valued goods passed between geographically distant groups. Osgood, in his description of the Kutchin potlatch, states that gifts were chosen with regard to the needs of the recipients, and could be exchanged at the time of presentation with something of equal value (Osgood, 1936, p. 127.). Natsit Kutchin were given wolverine skins, which they required to trade subsequently with the Eskimo (loc.cit.). Further evidence that the Kutchin potlatch was in some sense a
ceremonialized trade institution comes from Osgood's statements that one half the value of all potlatch gifts received had to be returned to the potlatch-giver at some convenient time (ibid., pp. 127, 139.).

Kutchin-Eskimo trade was not conducted through potlatches or sib-based partnerships. Osgood notes a special Kutchin term referring to a special friend in another tribe, most commonly used in reference to Eskimos. The relationship involved mutual aid and respect, and almost certainly trade, although this is not specifically mentioned by Osgood (1936, p. 132.).

Little has been written on the role of the leaders of pre-contact trading parties. They were organizers of the ceremonial, and they directed the trade activity (Slobodin, 1962, p. 59.). This position was adapted later to that of the Trading Chief, the man who mediated in the initial trade relations between his group and the White traders.

In the southern Yukon, proto-contact trade was dominated by the coastal Tlingit groups. It is not known if this domination obtained in Tlingit-Athapaskan trade relations prior to the appearance of European goods. Ecological and cultural conditions suggest that the Tlingits had been far wealthier than the inland Indians for some time before their acquisition of European goods. Also, the Tlingits had a monopoly of the sea-coast items of native trade, whereas they were not dependent on the Athapaskans for supplies of inland furs. Some of the same species of fur were also trapped by
the Tlingits within their own territory (Garfield, 1945, p. 628.). It is probable, therefore, that the Tlingits controlled the trade relations with inland groups before their monopoly of European goods added to this power.

The advantages of guns, woolen blankets and cloth over native equivalents were immediately obvious to the inland Indians. Certain factors suggest that the trade was actively promoted by Tlingits, and encouraged by White traders. (1) The wealth obtained from the fur trade was utilized by the Tlingits to a large extent, within the traditional status system to increase the prestige of groups and individuals, by means of the potlatch and other ceremonials. Profit from the trade with inland bands provided an opportunity for ambitious men to gain prestige and position. McClellan refers to the role of generosity in Tlingit ceremonial for social mobility (1954, pp. 93-94.), as well as to the practice of sib chiefs sending their nephews to foreign tribes to learn the language and the methods of trading. This was done partially for economic usefulness, and also to "... dazzle [potlatch] guest sibs as well." (ibid., p. 95.). (2) By the middle of the nineteenth century inland furs were being actively sought by White traders on the Pacific, in particular the Hudson's Bay Company. Prior to about 1840 there was open competition for trade in Alaskan waters between the Russians, British, Americans and others, but after that date the Hudson's Bay Company had a virtual monopoly on trade with the Tlingit coast through the lease it obtained from the Russians of the main-
land section of the Alaska Panhandle. As long as there was competition on the Pacific for the fur trade of the inland Athapaskan peoples, this trade was also sought by overland traders from Canada. First to arrive was the North West Company, and later, after amalgamation in 1821, the Hudson's Bay Company. After the coastal monopoly was established, some posts in Tahltan and Kaska territory were closed, since this trade reached Hudson's Bay Company traders in any case, via the Tlingit middlemen. In the cases of Fort Frances and Fort Selkirk, the posts were abandoned due to the attacks of hostile Tlingits. The promotion of the inland trade by the Pacific traders was also due to the serious drop in fur seal catches by the middle of the nineteenth century.

The Tlingits prevented the inland Indians from visiting the coast partially in order to maintain their territorial integrity, and also to protect their position as middlemen. Direct trade between Whites and inland Indians was easy to prevent since the Tlingits controlled all passes through the coast mountains.

The Tlingit trading parties which crossed these passes were predominantly male. They arrived in spring and sometimes stayed for a few months. The Southern Tutchone remember them as being large - a "hundred people" (McClellan, 1950, p. 126.). Each man carried a pack of a hundred pounds or more, with the exception of the headmen. Their trade goods were carried by four or five packers, who may have been nephews, or slaves. These headmen were the senior men of sibs, or of
lineages within the sib (de Laguna, 1952, p. 4.). Each trading party had a head trader (McClellan, loc.cit.), although it is not made clear how this position was defined. He probably ranked high in the Tlingit class system, in which case he might have been the headman of the highest ranking lineage. The rights to use a trade route were held by the dominant sib of the qwan, or district, so that the leader was probably the ranking chief in his locality. Other participants in the trading party were from the same localized sib (de Laguna, 1952, p. 3.).

Trading took place at several established locations, all well within Athapaskan territory, and often at Athapaskan villages. The head trader of the Tlingit trading party stayed in the house of the local chief. After trading at one location, some Tlingits would continue to other trading places further inland. Some stayed all the following winter and trapped with their Athapaskan partners.

All trade was conducted through trade partners. An inland Indian had one partner, and loyalty prevented him from disposing of any of his fur before this man arrived (ibid., p. 139.). The evidence indicates that the Tlingits had several partners, since each brought between one and five hundred pounds of trade goods with him. Not all the partners were at one location, however. During the actual trading procedure the Tlingits laid out their goods on the ground around them for display, and the partner chose what he wanted and what he
could buy with his fur (ibid., p. 139.). The choice was at
times limited by Tlingit insistence that certain trade goods
in strong demand should be exchanged for particular kinds of
fur; for instance, silver fox might be demanded for guns
(McClellan, op.cit., pp. 138-139.). Trade was by direct
barter, but apparently little haggling was involved. Standard
rates of exchange, in terms of particular skins, often marten,
are mentioned (McClellan, op.cit., p. 138.).

It is difficult to get a clear picture of the structure
of partnerships from the literature, and particularly how, if
at all, it relates to those features of Tlingit social
organization which were taken up by the inland Indians as a
result of trade interaction. In McClellan's view these
cultural borrowings, such as sibs, lineages and crests,
resulted from inter-tribal marriages. The marriages them­
­selves were due to the personal contacts which were made and
developed in the course of trade. The richer, more dazzling
Tlingit culture increased the status of the visitors in
Athapaskan eyes (ibid., p. 220.), and thus it was the Tlingit
social system that was used as a model for the inland culture,
as it developed. The development itself was facilitated by
the new wealth of the southern Yukon Athapaskans, gained from

---

3 c.f. procedure of North Alaskan Eskimo trading partner­
ships, where one partner estimates the other's requirements
and makes a suitable presentation. There is no bargaining
(Spencer, 1959, p. 169.).
their acquisition of European goods, and their middleman activities with the Tutchone and Han Indians further inland.

This argument of McClellan's accounting for the adoption of Tlingit social institutions is cited here only because it concerns the structure of partnerships. However, it turns on the point that marriages took place between Tlingits and Athapaskans; or more importantly, that Tlingit women married Athapaskan men, since women are structurally more relevant in the matrilineal Tlingit kinship system. Such marriages were both more numerous than the other kind (ibid., p. 61.), and more important and enduring, since the practice of Tlingit men marrying inland women was associated with other temporary liaisons, such as the stealing or borrowing of women, which took place during the trading expeditions. Those men who did marry inland did not take their wives back with them, and thus they rarely saw them (ibid., p. 202.).

Relations between the Tlingit and southern Yukon Athapaskans was almost entirely concerned with trade. There was mainly a suppressed hostility rather than violence. The Tlingit considered the Athapaskans as inferiors. A Tlingit told a nineteenth century missionary, "They are only wild. They are not men..." (quoted in McClellan, 1950, p. 199.). A Tlingit would start a fight, however, if he found that his Athapaskan partner had traded with anyone else before he arrived (ibid., p. 129.). This indicates that an important purpose of the partnership was the control of trade by the Tlingit. Partnerships of this kind eliminated competition
between Tlingit traders. The accumulation of wealth was an important aspect of the competitive nature of Tlingit social life. Thus it was necessary to eliminate such competition between traders in order to maintain control over prices, and a general dominance over relations with the Athapaskans.

Outside the sphere of trade, Tlingit-Athapaskan relations were concerned with ceremonial, and hospitality. The first of these was handled on a group level, with a feast of welcome, inter-tribal games and ceremonies. The inland partner might provide accommodation for his Tlingit trader, and in some cases the two of them trapped together inland all the following winter. Tlingits who stayed inland during the winter were as helpless as children in the harsh environment, according to Athapaskans (ibid., p. 98.).

Because of the wide economic and cultural differential between the Athapaskans and the Tlingit, it cannot be assumed that both saw the partnership in the same light. The Tlingit view of society was bounded by considerations of status and kinship. These two factors were related, and they dominated all relations with other Tlingit. Cross-cousin marriage served to interconnect the various local matrilineages. The society was stratified both within and between these lineages by the potlatch institution. Outside this social system were slaves and foreigners. These people were without membership in the sibs, and thus completely without status. However, on the broadest level of social organization, the moiety (or phratry, since the southern Tlingit recognized three) organization extended to include foreigners.
The Athapaskans, as foreigners without any wealth, were treated with derision. However, in order to exploit them it was necessary for the Tlingit to have social relations with them. They could not, moreover, treat them as slaves, since the Tlingit had no wish to remain inland all winter to oversee the production of fur.

There was considerable variation in the amount of furs traded by different Athapaskan groups. In addition there was variation in trapping production between individuals. Some men traded extensively in their own right with other tribes further inland. McClellan has demonstrated that there were only three inland groups which had marriage ties with coastal Tlingits; the Champagne band of the Southern Tutchone, the Tagish and the Teslin (ibid., pp. 138, 144, 153ff). The Champagne band was located at the head of the Chilkat Pass, and owned most of the houses in Neskatachin, the village where the initial trading of the Chilkats was conducted each year. The Tagish were at the head of the Chilkoot Pass, and the Teslin at the head of the Taku Pass. (See Map I, page iv)

It was these three bands which formed annual expeditions to trade for fur with Tutchone bands, mainly those along the Pelly River. In other words there is a correlation between the Athapaskan bands which conducted middleman trade and those bands which had marriage links with the coast. McClellan explains this with the hypothesis that these marriages were "connections resulting from trade" (ibid., p. 94. my emphasis).
However, regular annual trade was also conducted between the Tlingit and the other Southern Tutchone bands, but McClellan points out that marriages did not result from these connections (ibid., p. 53.). Some further explanation of the cross-cultural marriage pattern is required, particularly in view of the sharp contradiction any marriage with an Athapaskan would have caused; a contradiction, that is, between the Tlingit view of inland people as outside their status system, and the importance attached by the Tlingit to the affinal lineage (Eggan, 1955, p. 539.).

The answer seems to lie in the commercial interests of the Tlingit with regard to the middleman traders from the three inland groups. Some of these men were rich enough to employ several packers; a Tagish middleman would use his nephews (McClellan, 1950, p. 144.). This means that these men would trade enough fur for several hundred pounds of trade goods each spring, and would thus make a desireable partner for any ambitious Tlingit. Marriages were probably arranged to secure the trade of these men in a more binding, and for the Athapaskan more rewarding, way than partnerships.

Tlingit relations with affines were close and binding, while relations with Athapaskans were distant, hostile and of unequal status. These two attitudes were brought into conflict by marriages between the two groups, and this role conflict was still evident at the time of McClellan's field work in 1948 and 1949.
Those members of the Champagne band who could trace
kinship connections with Tlingit living in the coastal village
of Klukwan were proud of this link. It was stated that they
could use this link to get hospitality whenever they visited
the coast. However, at Klukwan McClellan found that none of
the Tlingit would think of admitting the relationship. There
remained a strong contempt for inland people. This was at
least sixty years after trade and intermarriage between the
coast and the inland had ended.

Conclusions

The Kutchin-Eskimo trading partnerships have to be
seen in the context of general Kutchin-Eskimo relations. These
were often hostile\(^4\) and involved lengthy blood feuds (Slobodin,
1960, passim.). Revenge, rather than plunder, was the main
motive of raiding parties. Trading partnership continued
throughout a period of conflict (ibid., p. 86.). The institu-
tion provided a means for trade to continue despite hostilities.
The taboo on killing a partner in war is significant in this
respect (Osgood, 1936, p. 132.).

Relations between Kutchin bands were conducted through
several institutions. The sib organizations united sections of
each band, and thus cut across the territorial organization.
They provided the traveller with the assurance of aid in

---

\(^4\) For the recorded clashes of Mackenzie Eskimo with the
distant bands (Balikci, 1963, p. 24.). The funeral potlatch, which appears to have been organized partly on territorial and partly on sib principles, provided occasions when distant bands could gather together, and also functioned as an exchange institution. Trade between bands was also conducted at such meetings through the chiefs, and through gift exchanges between leading men (Slobodin, 1962, p. 69.). From Slobodin's evidence of the Tatlit Kutchin, it appears that band intermarriage was common. In the 1890's there were several kinship links with all other Kutchin bands (ibid., p. 67.). It is probable that during the period when inter-band trade was important, such kinship links through marriage were also common. It appears that the trading partnerships between Kutchin bands were strictly instrumental trading arrangements, and not the more diffuse mutual protection agreements such as held between the Kutchin and the Eskimo.

Partnerships were of greatest importance in handling trade in a predictable manner between tribes that were continually hostile to each other. This is illustrated in the Kutchin-Eskimo partnerships. To the south, Kutchin relations with the Tutchone tended to be hostile, but there was little contact between the two groups, owing to the Ogilvie Mountains and the Han tribe. Relations between the Han and the Tutchone of the Fort Selkirk area were unfriendly when the first White man contacted them (Campbell, 1883, p. 439.).

McClellan finds little evidence that partnerships existed between Tutchone bands, or that feuds between them were
at all frequent (McClellan, 1950, p. 214.). In the early part of this century an ethnographically-minded trader at Ross River noted that the Pelly River Tutchone had partnerships with the Mountain Indians. The institution involved gift exchanges and mutual aid, and its purpose was to control hostilities (Field, 1957, pp. 58-59.). Trading is not mentioned. With or without trade, partnerships appear to be important between hostile groups.

The cultural differential between the Southern Yukon Athapaskan and the coastal Tlingit is about as wide as that between the Kutchin and the Eskimo, if such a concept as culture can be used comparatively. Relations between the groups were unfriendly, but not openly hostile. This was due partially to the superior power and status position of the Tlingit, and partially to the mountain barrier between them. The annual encounters were mainly for the purpose of trade. Organization was a feature of the Tlingit trading parties, which were made up of members of a lineage under a head trader, and which claimed exclusive rights to the trade route. The organization of exchanges was the specific purpose of the partnerships, and they were not peace-making institutions. For the Tlingits the partnerships also provided some hospitality and support in a foreign community. For the Athapaskans it appears probable that a man could achieve prestige, and possibly marriage and sib relations with the coast through his partner. These links formed a basis for the development of the 'Inland Tlingit' status system.
The material from the Yukon on partnership trade is very sketchy, so that very little in the way of solid conclusions can be drawn on the partnership institution. It was most highly institutionalized where otherwise hostile relations existed between the groups, and where the trade itself was of particular importance to both groups. It was also most highly sanctioned in those cases where it was the exclusive form of trade. For instance, Tlingit-Athapaskan partnerships were sanctioned mainly by the use of force by the Tlingits. Kutchin taboo on killing Eskimo partners suggests that to some extent supernatural sanctions operated to control behaviour in the context of this trade.
In the last chapter it was shown that much inter-tribal trade was carried on at meetings between trading parties. Trading parties were also a feature of the initial direct dealings with White traders. Parties of Indians would periodically visit the trading posts, or in the case of the more distant nomadic bands, trade goods were sent out with a clerk, known as a 'tripper', and trade would take place at the Indian camp. In both cases all trade was conducted through a group representative. These trading chiefs were responsible for stimulating trapping activity, collecting the fur, bargaining with the traders, and distributing the trade goods. They were appointed and rewarded by the trader, and served to bridge the gap – cultural, social, economic, and geographic – between the trader and his customers. As such, the role of a trading chief was transitional and, among the Vunta Kutchin at least, disappeared when direct dealing between traders and individual trappers began after 1894 (Balikci, 1963, p. 50.).

A description of post-contact (1899) Peel River Kutchin trading party is to be found in unexpected detail in a popular account of the attempt of a gold prospector, George Mitchell, to reach the Klondike (Graham, 1935, pp. 103-104, 286-292.). Although this took place after the commencement of individual trade at Fort McPherson, it is probably typical of some of the
earliest post-contact trading parties. On the journey to Fort McPherson the party made the last stop at a cache, where caribou skin clothing was changed for cast-off European garments. Mitchell thought that this non-descript dress was intended to give an air of penitence and poverty, and he offers his own interpretation of this (ibid., p. 90.). It appears likely that such dress was ceremonial, and symbolic of the entry into a White-dominated context, particularly since they also "... all wore splendid coloured sashes", "best smoke-bags with tassels hanging out", small beaded velvet caps and their handsomest beaded moccasins (ibid., p. 286.). As the canoes approached the fort they formed a single line, the chief's boat at the head. Guns sounded at the fort, and the Union Jack and Hudson's Bay Company flag were hoisted. The Indians approached in complete silence to mark the solemnity of the occasion. The Hudson's Bay Company factor waited at the doorway of the trading-room to shake hands "very formally with the leading Indians" (ibid., p. 288.).

Elaborate trading ceremonies were part of all early trade contacts between Whites and Indians. They were used by the traders to reward their loyal trading chiefs. The trader presenting a chief with gifts of food (and at times liquor) to be redistributed among his party in a feast. This served as

1 Possibly these were native copies of the Assumption sashes, three of which had been presented by the Hudson's Bay Company to Peel River trading chiefs as marks of office (Slobodin, 1962, p. 72.).
an encouragement to distant Indians to make the annual journey to the post, and stimulated the trading chief in his efforts to make up large trading parties. This reliance by the traders on presents and ceremonies to get distant Indians to visit the posts was part of the policy of monopoly trade. Rich points out that Samuel Hearne and some of his contemporaries used arguments against attempting to have distant Indians visit the trading posts, because of the long journeys involved, the small amount of trade which each Indian conducted, and the expense of feeding the Indians while they were at the posts (Rich, 1959, pp. 47, 57.). Instead, "... a class of trading middlemen" were encouraged from the tribes closest to the post, who "... would get a certain social standing", as well as a profit from their endeavors (ibid., p. 57.). However, by 1869 the Hudson's Bay Company had lost its official monopoly, and in the Upper Yukon, trade was in danger of being lost at first to Russian, and later to American traders from Alaska. For this reason direct trade with as many Indian groups as possible was encouraged. The gaining of the loyalty of chiefs was an initial step in this direction. The role of trading chief among the Kutchin was different from any traditional leadership roles, since the post was created by the traders. Trading chiefs came into existence at the same time as traditional chiefs disappeared (Balikci, 1963, p. 49.). However, native social structure had some influence on the appointments. Slobodin states that they were chosen from among high-ranking Kutchin (Slobodin, 1962, p. 72.), while all Vunta
Kutchin trading chiefs were from the same sib (Balikci, loc. cit.). This was in contrast to the Tlingit situation, where the traditional leadership was able to maintain control of the trade with outlying groups, mainly by their traditional ownership of the trade routes, and control of transportation facilities such as slaves and kinsmen, who were employed as packers.\(^2\) While monopoly trade increased the power of traditional Tlingit leadership, among the Kutchin it created a new class of leaders, who drew their status, and ultimately their authority, from outside Kutchin society.

By dealing with a group of Indians entirely through their trading chief, the trader was able to gain his business aims, in the way of fur and a market for manufactured goods, while disturbing as little as possible the Indian way of life.\(^3\) The policy of laissez-faire could sum up the Hudson's Bay Company's attitude to Indian social life, beyond the development of trapping enterprise and a consumer market. In the southern Yukon, however, direct trade was initiated by a number of small traders, and prospectors, who traded only as a sideline. These men saw no advantage in operating through Indian leaders, or preserving the status quo, and individual

---

\(^2\) This emphasis of traditional leadership also took place among the Blackfoot under monopoly trade. In this case the leaders controlled transport by means of their horses as well as their men (Lewis, 1942, p. 42.).

\(^3\) For a discussion of the role of the trader as a conservative force in culture contact situations, see Adams, 1963, pp. 298-307.
trade, including that of a wife trading her own fur separately from her husband, began soon after trading stores were established (McGlellan, 1950, p. 148.). The use of trading chiefs was the effect of the policy of a large, highly organized trading company, rather than a practice which developed of necessity out of the existing Indian social structure.

Trading chiefs did become part of Indian social life. While the fur trade entrepreneurs used them as something between foremen and middlemen, to the Indians the trading chiefs were political intermediaries with the White men. Initial direct dealings with the traders were over political matters; the control of hostilities, the right to establish a post, the right to trade. These dealings, like trade itself, had to be conducted by a group leader. When the institution had become established, the trading chief acted as a trade broker. He complained about inferior goods and haggled with the trader over the tariff which determined the exchange rate of furs for goods.

... the Company's trader and the chief agreed upon a scale of prices from which the amount due to each Indian followed automatically when the skins had been counted and graded. But the process was not really quite automatic as an Indian could always put forward some plea for special treatment, supposing, for example, that he had been handicapped by illness or accident, or had had to support a widow or had lost his traps or furs. Or again

4 For one Northern Athapaskan tribe, the Carrier of Central British Columbia, initial relations with the traders had supernatural overtones, for the Indians took the White men to be gods (Harmon, 1957, p. 252.).
he might have taken some particularly valuable skins, for which the trader could allow him a special rate. (Graham, 1935, pp. 289-290.).

It was the trading chief who presented these special pleas. The above account from Fort McPherson took place after trading had begun to be conducted by individual debt account, rather than via the trading chief, and illustrates even at this late date the importance of the trading chief as an intermediary. The granting of such pleas was not merely benevolence; in cases of genuine need the trapper would be unable to bring in much fur the following year without assistance. To the Indian trapper, the trading chief was a person who had political influence, both over his own people and over the trader (Balikci, 1963, p. 50.).

As an organizer of production, the trading chief was only effective as long as trapping was conducted by a large party of all the trappers for whom he traded. The trapping party of the Tatlit Kutchin consisted of from four to eight families, and was only used when trapping highland fur, such as marten (Slobodin, 1962, p. 73.), since this type of group trapping could be augmented with caribou hunting. Balikci has traced the results of the introduction of the rifle on Vunta Kutchin hunting organization. There was a "gradual restriction in size of the main collaborative units." (Balikci, 1963, p. 152.).

5 For the same author's account of a similar reduction in the size of productive groups among Arviligjuarmiut Eskimo, for similar reasons, see Balikci, 1964, passim, esp. pp. 104-105.).
took hold, the trapping group became smaller, and the trading chief was ineffective in his task of stimulating production.
CHAPTER IV
MONOPOLY TRADE

The adoption of the individual debt system of trade came about in part as a result of an expansion by traders into the Yukon. The use of middlemen, whether entire groups, like the Tlingit traders or the Vunta Kutchin, or trading chiefs, had three major disadvantages, compared with direct trade. First, there was a maximum volume of trade which could be carried by the limited transportation facilities of the middlemen. Second, the threat of competition influenced trading companies to protect their monopoly at its source, by setting up outposts within the territory of isolated bands. Third, the method of debt trading, which gave the trader the greatest control over his customers, demanded that there was a personal relationship between the trader and every trapper who received credit.

In Kutchin territory the Hudson's Bay Company expanded west to Fort Yukon in 1848, where by 1867 trade was being conducted individually with Indians from all the nearby Kutchin bands, including the Vunta Kutchin, and also, the Tanana, Han and Tutcheone (Dall, 1898, p. 109.). There was a large population within travelling distance, and occasionally five hundred Indians were camped there at one time, all waiting to trade (Whymper, 1869, p. 177.). Gift-giving by the trader was no
longer directed through the chief but was on a strictly individual and equal basis. Each Indian got a plug of tobacco, a pipe and a daily ration of moose meat (loc. cit.). Apparently this egalitarianism was to prevent jealousies between bands. The debt system of trade was in use at Fort Yukon at this time.

Competitive trade appeared among the Eastern Kutchin about the turn of the century, first from the whalers of Herschel Island, and later from several private traders.¹ However, the debt system survived, and at present there are more or less monopoly conditions at the Vunta Kutchin village of Old Crow.

The expansion of trading posts into Tutcheone territory from Northern British Columbia was conducted for the Hudson's Bay Company by Robert Campbell who had established Fort Frances, Pelly Banks, and Fort Selkirk by 1848. However, the sparse population, a difficult supply route and Tlingit hostilities resulted in the abandonment of all these posts by 1852. After the Alaska purchase, several traders, equipped by the Alaska Commercial Company, moved into the central Yukon from Alaska, and by 1891 a post was opened near the site of Fort Selkirk. After the Klondike gold rush this expansion continued along the Yukon River and up the tributaries by both major trading companies in the area, the Northern Commercial Company and

¹ For a more detailed history of trade in the area, see Balikci, 1963, p. 35.
Taylor and Drury Ltd., as well as by several private trapper-traders. In the southern Yukon posts were opened on the supply routes through the coast mountains, most of them by private traders.

The expansion of trade facilities enabled almost all Indians to make the annual journey to the post. In the northern Yukon, where trade with the Hudson's Bay Company was initially through trading chiefs, individual trade began primarily in order to get goods on credit. Credit was given first to the trading chiefs, and later to some of the other more prosperous Indians. The main criteria for an Indian to get credit were that he be well known at the post, and could be trusted to trade there every year. Thus a personal relationship with the trader was a necessary part of obtaining credit. Every trapper was obliged to make the annual journey to the post in order to get credit.

The obtaining of credit marked an important change in the economic life of a trapper. It indicated a long-term commitment to trapping as the major winter productive activity, and to dealing with a single trader, in order to exchange the results of this activity for some valued end.

A trapper needed credit for two basic reasons. First, he needed it to stabilize his economic relations with the trader. The introduction of fur trading added further risks in the form of price fluctuations of both fur and supplies to an already unstable economy based on the capture of wild animals (Knight, 1965, p. 36.). Credit absorbed some of these
risks, since it could be drawn upon in face of short-term needs and paid back as conditions improved. Also the practice of 'writing off' unpaid debts was followed in some cases of genuine misfortune by the Hudson's Bay Company. The trading company's purpose was to enable a trapper with impossible debts to equip himself for further trapping, since it was from fur that much of the profit was made.

A second motive for seeking credit was in order to capitalize a coming winter's trapping venture. As trapping techniques became modernized larger amounts of supplies were needed at the beginning of each season. Also, trapping tended to replace food-getting activities, like hunting and fishing, at least to some extent. The trapping outfit had to include supplies of food, as well as tea and tobacco, which became necessities.

Not only trappers found credit useful. Traders were able to use it for a number of purposes. It was used to promote spending, in much the same way as retail credit operates in modern Canadian society. This also had the effect of stimulating trapping, in order to pay for these purchases.

Before individual trade was the common practice, the promotion of sales and trapping was conducted through the trading chief. Credit established personal relations between the trader and his trappers, and gave the trader the advantage of having the trappers under an obligation to him. Through this relationship he was able to directly influence their economic life by personal intervention, and discourage activities which conflicted
with trapping, such as winter hunting and fishing.

Credit was also used by traders to control the sort of goods which were purchased. Generally speaking, since one of the purposes of credit was to stimulate trapping, only those supplies which the trader considered necessary to a trapping expedition were issued on credit. The Hudson's Bay Company trader Murray notes that soon after the founding of Fort Yukon he issued credit to a few Indians, but would only allow them to take ammunition (Murray, 1910, p. 57.). This practice can be taken as implying a disapproval of native spending. Travellers of the period have remarked on the Kutchin, Han and Tanana love of beads and dentalia. Whymper mentions that after the few hardware needs of those Indians trading into Fort Yukon had been satisfied, the richest of them accumulated immense piles of beads (Whymper, 1869, pp. 177-178.), and that dentalia ornaments, some worth several hundred marten skins, were worn by many Indians. These dentalia were sold by both the Hudson's Bay Company and the Russian American Trading Company, and had previously been obtained by these Indians through inter-tribal trade from the coast (ibid., pp. 173, 178.). In 1851 the Hudson's Bay Company trader Campbell found that the Indians around Fort Selkirk demanded dentalia from him for their furs (McClellan, 1950, p. 182.). Schwatka, in 1883, also noted the limited market for hardware items along the Yukon River. He indicates that below the junction with the Pelly all the Indians wanted to trade only for tea or tobacco (Schatwaka, 1885, pp. 226-227, 247.).
By allowing only certain goods to be purchased on credit a trader was able to do more than just influence the buying habits of Indians along what he thought to be more prudent lines. He was also able to stress the importance of trapping as an activity, by allowing only those supplies needed for a trapping expedition on credit. In this way he ultimately could increase the fur harvest of his district, on which most of his profit could be made. This resulted in a tendency to eliminate luxuries, particularly those used in ceremony, or for display. One of the central purposes of the potlatch in Kutchin society was the distribution of the dead man's high status property, such as his dentalium shells (Osgood, 1936, p. 137.). The ownership of dentalium shells, and later beads, was the main criterion of membership in the highest Kutchin social class (Balikci, 1963, p. 26.). Beads were the required medium for the payment of blood vengeance among the Kutchin (Osgood, 1936, p. 124.). There were other factors in the breakdown of Kutchin sib organization, potlatching and social classes, but the gradual elimination of ceremonial valuables was a major one.

Traders could also control purchases by refusing to trade a particular item which was in strong demand for anything but a particular species of fur (McClellan, 1950, p. 140.). In this way the trader was able to influence the trapper's productive activities, by directing his efforts towards trapping particular furbearers. The fact that this method was used in addition to price inducements suggests that trappers
were reluctant to trap certain species, whatever the price, either because of taboos, such as those held by the Tutcheone of the Pelly and Little Salmon Rivers against killing mink or otter (Field, 1957, p. 52), or because of unfamiliarity with successful methods of trapping the particular species.

Individual trade employing credit was normally used only when a trader had a monopoly in a district, or had agreements with other traders that none of them would deal with Indians who had refused to repay the credit of another trader. Competition did appear along the Yukon River, from Fort Yukon downstream, after 1867, between the Alaska Commercial Company and the Northern Trading Company. However, this was a special, temporary sort of competition, the practice of which was designed to establish the monopoly of one or the other contestants. Each company actively attempted to put the other out of business, by fair means or foul. In this situation credit was used to capture the loyalty of particular Indians without regard for the 'normal' rules of credit allowance. The competitors tried to undermine this loyalty. Fur prices rose, prices of goods fell to less than wholesale, and credit became available in large quantities 2 (Schwatka, 1885, p. 268.). When the Alaska Commercial Company had succeeded in reestablishing its monopoly it was faced with the difficult

2 Godsell describes a similar case of cutthroat competition in the fur trade, on the Mackenzie River around 1920 (Godsell, 1943, chap. 17, and chap. 25.).
task of reinstating 'normal' prices and credit policy and honest dealings. Schwatka describes the dishonest tactics used by Indians at Fort Yukon in 1883 to get the better of the trader (Schantka, 1885, pp. 284-285).

Genuine competition in the fur trade reached the Upper Yukon drainage with the Klondike gold rush of 1896-98. Many of the prospectors were also part-time trappers and traders. Trade stores established to supply the miners were also open to fur trade with Indian and White trappers, although prices in the Dawson area became prohibitive. In the southern Yukon a railroad was built between the Pacific coast and Whitehorse, and along the Yukon River between there and Dawson there were established several settlements, both woodstops for the river steamers, and roadhouses for the winter stage line. In areas away from the goldfields and the Yukon River travel was more difficult, and traders managed to maintain a monopoly in their districts. One means of beating out competition was to artificially boost the buying price of fur, and also set the prices of retail merchandise so that a profit was made on the whole transaction. This practice was used by Taylor and Drury, Ltd., a local company founded during the Gold Rush, which at one time maintained about twenty trading posts in the Yukon Territory. Those trappers who sold fur to this company were paid only in goods, or in coin-like trading tokens, marked in multiples and fractions of a dollar, and useable only at that company's stores. One writer noted these tokens being carried by Kaska Indians of Frances Lake,
in the early 1920's. The tokens were obtained at the Taylor and Drury outpost at Pelly Banks, where the Indians made a yearly trading trip (Hunter, 1924, p. 66.). Trading tokens were also used by the Hudson's Bay Company, by Dalton's Post in the southern Yukon, established in 1894, and at Haines, Alaska, where the post was opened in 1880 (McClellan, 1950, pp. 129, 198.).

A second method used by some traders to maintain their trade monopolies with particular groups of trappers was by means of the account which each man had with the store. At most times this account provided a record of the debt owed by the trapper (called his 'jawbone' in the central and southern Yukon). A good trader could estimate a trapper's earning potential, and allow credit up to this. If the trapper was able to pay off this debt before the end of a trapping season, the surplus value was normally spent as soon as the fur was traded. However, at times, particularly when fur prices were rising rapidly, a trader's supplies might run short. In such a case he might credit this value to the trapper's account, to be paid in goods some time in the future when they arrived. Cash, where it did appear, was not used as an all-purpose money, but restricted to activities like gambling.

---

3 Honigmann points out that these Indians had originally left the Lower Post area to trap around Frances Lake in order to trade at the newly established post at Ross River (about 1900), and had been drawn by the low price of goods (Honigmann, 1949, p. 23.).
Each trapper had his own account with the trader. Even in cases where married women trapped alongside their husbands they usually traded the fur themselves, and had separate accounts. Accounts were not only used to record credit sales. All fur traded by a trapper was recorded, as were all trade goods which a trapper bought. In this way a statistical evaluation over a number of seasons of an Indian's trading record could be made. Moreover, this evaluation could be passed on to succeeding managers who traded at the same post. Thus, while trading, and particularly credit, depended on a personal relationship between the trapper and the trader, the relationship was of a narrow and instrumental kind. It also depended on impersonal factors, such as past records of trading, factors which were outside the trapper's power to manipulate for his own favour.

It was by means of his accounts that the trader was able to categorize trading into the three activities of buying fur, selling supplies, and providing credit, in the customary manner of a market exchange system. For the trapper, however, without such accounts, there were not three activities of trading, but one. Trade goods were advanced by the trader up to a customary limit, and were later returned by fur. It was a system of direct barter.

The rate at which furs were bartered for supplies was subject to adjustment, in response to world market prices. With a large, complex organization like the Hudson's Bay Company it was possible to maintain a degree of isolation
between the exchange rate at a post and unstable 'outside' prices. Smaller trading companies sold at regional 'commission houses', or public auctions, and did not have the resources to protect the stability of the barter system from outside changes. Most fur trading in the Yukon since the Gold Rush has been done by medium and small size companies. There has thus been little protection for the trapper from the several price drops of this century. Some haggling over prices took place at Hudson's Bay Company Post at Fort McPherson around 1899 (Graham, op.cit.), but this was probably the effect of competition from whalers at Herschel Island. In general the trader dictated the terms of trade, and it was up to the trapper continuously to revise his ideas of what constituted reciprocity.

The connection between fur and supplies was a logical one. It was not possible to obtain supplies without fur, or to utilize fur without obtaining supplies from one trader. Thus, even though obtaining supplies was often done at a different time than bringing in fur, the two activities were necessary parts of a single institution of exchange.

Credit and savings were also built in parts of monopoly trade. Credit was no more than the delay which was permitted between the obtaining of supplies and the reciprocal return of furs. Saving was not a regular part of monopoly trade, but at times, particularly when fur prices were rising, supplies at a post became exhausted before all furs were traded. Trading tokens were given for this surplus fur to
be exchanged for supplies at some later time. It was necessary that fur was traded during the same season it was caught, since it could not be stored by Indians during the summer.

As a means of organizing trapping, monopoly trade worked in a similar manner to another system of pre-industrial organization of production, called the Putting Out system, or Trader Capitalism.\(^4\) This institution was used in the English woolen industry before factories were introduced. It included an entrepreneur, who organized the production of numerous individual cottage spinners, weavers etc. The entrepreneur provided much of the capital. Raw materials were consigned to the worker, who returned the material after his particular process was completed. On paper the materials were 'sold' to the worker, and products were 'bought' by the entrepreneur, but there was no market, and the only money that changed hands was the worker's commission.

It is clear that monopoly trade is a barter system, in which the notions of buying and selling have only a limited application. The idea of credit or debt also requires qualification in this context. Ward has stated that credit is only a polite way of saying debt (Ward, 1960, p. 152.). The politeness results from the fact that credit implies a trust in the debtor's ability and intention to repay, while

\(^4\) For a definition of ' Putting Out', see Casselman, 1949, pp. 382-383.
debt implies an obligation to repay (see entries under 'credit' and 'debt', Webster's New Collegiate dictionary, sixth edition). Under the conditions of monopoly trade, however, there can only be trust expressed in a trapper's ability. Trust in his intention would be irrelevant, since fur must be taken to the one trader, and the relationship with the trader must be maintained in order to obtain necessities. The trapper is under an obligation to make the return, not in the contractual sense, but in the practical sense of needing a further advance from the trader the following year. The motive for the return of 'debt' is tightly bound up with the motive for trade itself. There is no moral obligation, since the debt is not legitimized in Indian society. As an alternative to using the terms 'debt' or 'credit', the term 'jawbone', which is universally used in central and southern Yukon, might be employed.

'Jawbone' is that part of the barter on which repayment is delayed. As was noted above, it is an expression by the trader of a trapper's ability to repay, and thus of his ability as a trapper. Trappers and traders think of each other to a large extent in terms of 'jawbone'. That is, a trader speaks about trappers in a number of graded categories. "Good rustlers" are the men who can get maximum credit. Below this there are various orders of disapproval, according to how industrious or honest the trapper is. Trappers are more secretive about the amount of 'jawbone' they are allowed. One Indian at Ross River quoted me a figure which turned out to be
in excess of his total earnings from fur for either of the two previous years. Balikci states that at Old Crow close kin from the same household often do not know the extent of each other's debt (Balikci, 1963, p. 99.). The reason for this secrecy and exaggeration is that jawbone is a measure of status. Not only is it an expression of a trapper's ability on the trapline, but it is also considered as wealth which a man has in reserve. This status is recognized by the trader, and by other Indians, since trading is an activity which brings prestige (Balikci, 1963, p. 103.).

In summary, the quasi-debt relationship of monopoly trade gave the trader more power than the trapper. With conditions in his favour he usually resisted any factors which tended to disrupt the system.
CHAPTER V
MARKET TRADE

The breakdown of the system of monopoly trade is not completed in the Yukon. The 'credit system' still operates at the Vunta Kutchin village of Old Crow, where a trapper can get up to a thousand dollars' worth of supplies on credit, if he has a good record. At Ross River, which like Old Crow was isolated in winter prior to 1964, the conditions existed for monopoly trade, but the credit supply, as well as the earning from fur, have been very low (Tanner, 1965, p. 23.).

At the other fur trading communities in the Yukon there is some chance for competition between traders. Only Dawson, Pelly Crossing, Haines Junction and Teslin have no more than one trader each, but all these places are on all-weather roads, so that they are not completely cut off from other traders. Whitehorse is the location most emancipated from the monopoly system. Credit is not available to any of the trappers without legal security. Trapping is still practiced in the area by at least ten Indians, some making over $500 a year from fur.

The rapid increase in the number of traders in the Yukon, which followed the discovery of gold and the consequent influx of settlers, brought direct trade for the first time to many Tutchone and southern Yukon Athapaskans. It was only at
first in the mining area that competition existed. Indians from as far away as Fort McPherson journeyed to the Yukon River settlements to trade fur. Although prices of supplies were very high for the first year or so at Dawson, the setting up of a transportation system, consisting of a railway through the coastal mountains from the Pacific, and steamboats down the Yukon River, reduced costs after 1900. It was via this route that goods were carried into Kutchin territory by private traders, forcing the Hudson's Bay Company to abandon its posts west of the Mackenzie. This process was hastened by competition from the whaler-traders who were stationed at Herschel Island during this period. Since the route to the Pacific was not controlled by a single trading company, competition grew along the Yukon River. The Hudson's Bay Company took part in this trade during the 1930's and '40's, with posts at Fort Selkirk and Stewart River. These were abandoned when river transportation began to close down in the 1950's. The major trading companies in the territory since the Gold Rush have been Taylor and Drury Ltd. and the Northern Commercial Company. Many of the posts operated by these companies have been abandoned, and others have been taken over by private traders. In 1962 the Hudson's Bay Company again entered the Yukon, building a large store at Whitehorse, which competes actively for fur with Taylor and Drury.

Many of the White trappers who entered the Yukon in this century also traded with isolated Indian groups. By the 1920's some measure of control was introduced by a Yukon
Territorial Ordinance prohibiting unlicenced traders, and traders who operated without a place of business, such as a trading post. The annual licence fee for non-resident traders by 1927 was $150, as against $25 for residents. It must be remembered that law and order had been well established by the R.C.M.P. during the Gold Rush, so that the kind of lawless cutthroat competition in the fur trade which had earlier taken place in Alaska, and which took place in other parts of Canada during the boom in fur prices after 1919, did not take place in the Yukon to the same extent.

Monopoly trade was broken down in some cases by the trend of Indians to live in permanent settlements, some of which had more than one trader. These settlements were located with reference to the transportation routes; first the railway and the Yukon River, and after 1944, the Alaska Highway and the road from Whitehorse to Mayo and Dawson. For the Tutchone Indians east of the Yukon River, as well as the Teslin, this involved a migration roughly to the southwest. Most of the groups in this area think of their traditional trapping grounds as in the northeast, and the pattern of trapline registrations reflects this orientation. A similar process of consolidation into permanent settlements took place among the Kutchin. There was a large contingent of Kutchin at Moosehide, a large Indian village near Dawson, early in the century (Slobodin, 1963, passim.). At present the three main population centers are Fort McPherson, N.W.T., Old Crow, Y.T., and at Fort Yukon and a few nearby villages, in Alaska.
The introduction of a choice between traders was only one form of competition. Another was the introduction of alternative markets for fur, quite apart from the local traders. These included traders at other settlements. Transportation enabled a trapper to leave his district with his fur, or to send the fur by commercial carrier. At present Whitehorse is a trade center for outlying trappers. Trappers from as far as eighty miles away regularly make trading trips, some in old vehicles, some "catching a ride" (hitch-hiking), and some by bus. One man may make the trip for a number of trappers. For instance, in December 1963, after little more than a month of trapping, one man from Teslin traded over $1,000 worth of fur with a Whitehorse buyer.

Other markets apart from the local trader were the commission houses and public fur auctions of southern Canada. Innis has pointed out that White trappers tend to sell to these markets in favour of the local private traders and small trading companies, which themselves sell their fur on the same markets and under the same terms (Innis, 1927, p. 136.). Recent data from the Yukon confirms this (Tanner, 1965, pp. 35, 37.). Indians learned of the higher prices at these outside markets, and perhaps have an exaggerated opinion of the advantage to be gained. Indians have been unable to make substantial use of this market, however. At first the services were needed of some White man who did not mind offending the local trader, by sending the Indians' fur for them. More recently the problem has been for the trapper to find the capital to send
the fur, pay the Territorial export tax, and maintain himself and his family until the money was returned. A public fur auction will decide the minimum price it should get for a batch of fur, and will hold the fur until this price is bid. This may take months. At various times agencies have advanced the Indian part value for his fur, and marketed it for him, paying him the balance when it was received. In recent years this has been done by both a bank and a grocery store in Dawson, and in a limited way, by the Indian Affairs Branch.

At the same time as a competitive fur economy was developing, an alternative economy was being built up, based on mining. Indians thus were able to leave trapping entirely. Slobodin gives a good idea of the sort of jobs which those Indians who did leave trapping could get around Dawson from 1900 to 1915: commercial salmon fishermen, packers, woodcutters, deck-hands, stevedores, and scow pilots (Slobodin, 1962, p. 32.). This list was later expanded to include guiding for hunters, cutting mine timbers, mining (underground work at the coalmine at Carmacks) and road construction and maintenance. Most labouring jobs have since been eliminated, and those that remain, together with guiding, are most often on a casual basis. The Indian population is, by inclination, a large potential casual labour force for the 'developing' industries - mining, transportation, and tourism. Most of their time, however, is spent in the 'traditional' occupations -
trapping, and subsistence hunting and fishing.¹

The various forms of competition with which fur traders were faced destroyed the logical relationship between fur and trade goods. It became possible to 'trade' fur to a distant buyer and not have to take goods in return. It also became possible to obtain supplies without using fur. This was facilitated by the introduction of money, and of the separate concepts of buying and selling. 'Jawbone' had to be dropped in favour of a third concept of credit. Credit now has to be given on trust or under obligation.

In a sense, monopoly conditions still apply to credit. If a trapper refuses to repay it, his reputation gets around to other local traders, who will also cut him off. Credit is still based on a personal relationship and is therefore strictly local. Thus the trapper can get credit nowhere until he pays up. However, it is still possible for a person to avoid paying a debt, at least for a very long time, and indefinitely, if wage employment can be obtained. The trader keeps credit down to an amount he can afford to write off as a bad debt. In most cases this is between $25 and $50.

¹ Elsewhere I have argued that there is a conflict between the wildlife-based and the casual wage economies, due to the fact that the former requires commitment to an annual cycle of activities, and longer term commitment of capital and trapping rights. The current orientation of trappers to casual labour ('development'), while attempting to continue as trappers ('traditional'), makes success in either difficult to achieve (Tanner, 1965, p. 73.).
As a result, trapping is conducted in short forays into the bush, usually lasting no more than a few weeks. Much time is spent travelling back and forth, and there is thus a premium on nearby traplines. Some traplines more than sixty miles or so from a settlement are only visited during the spring beaver or muskrat season. Normally, a trapper's wife and family remain in the settlement during the trapping expedition. Because of the low limit on credit, and the fact that local stores do not often sell expensive capital items, purchasing in the local store is largely restricted to groceries and dry goods. The larger items, such as expensive rifles, toboggans, boats, outboard motors or motor vehicles must be purchased by getting a job and saving the money over a period of months or years.

The organization of trade in the Yukon is now dominated by modern Western market-oriented institutions. The exchange of fur for supplies, particularly as conducted by Indian trappers, has been adapted to fit crudely into a more competitive economic system. Fur is still seen, by both Whites and Indians, as part of the 'traditional' economy. Principles which are taken for granted in 'modern' occupations often do not apply to the 'traditional' context. For instance, a trapper is never sued for non-payment of a debt. The separation of buying fur and selling supplies is forbidden by Territorial regulations since each trader is required to have a store in which he conducts his business. Independent financial services are not available in most trapping communities. The trader often
receives all the government cheques for his customers—welfare, family allowance, pensions, etc.. He may be the bus, freight and Post Office agent, so that all fur sent to markets outside the Territory must go through him.²

The 'traditional'—'modern' dichotomy even applies to the enforcement of the game laws. Yukon Indians have no treaty, apart from some Kutchin trading into Fort McPherson, and the only special provision in the Yukon Game ordinance for 'natives' are for those 'living north of the Arctic Circle.' Many game department personnel and game wardens are of the opinion that Indians, as much as Whites, are obligated to keep the game laws. However, trappers are only warned about infractions, never prosecuted. Officials state that this is in order to conform with a ruling concerning Indians made by a judge recently in the Northwest Territories. However, a White trapper who follows the 'traditional' economy—subsistence hunting and fishing, and trading his furs locally—would not be prosecuted either. For instance, there is a notorious White trapper married to an Indian who openly claims that he shoots one moose a month, and always a female if he can get one. The local game warden is even sympathetic to this man's subsistence needs, and says he will only arrest him if he has to.

² For details of how a trader in a modern Navaho community uses his ancillary roles in order to saturate the credit market and eliminate competition, see Adams, 1963, pp. 188-195.
One often hears the distinction made between the 'traditional' and 'modern' sectors of the economy by people in the Yukon in terms of the White-Indian dichotomy. Whites, Métis, and even Indians are considered more or less 'Indian!' to the extent to which they take part in the hunting-trapping-fishing economy. This does not reflect the reality of the social organization of the different groups which take part in these activities. However, it does indicate how closely the White conception of the Indian is guided by the conception of the 'traditional' economy. This image, as expressed particularly by traders, is that the Indian is a child with respect to economic planning, spending money, and financial obligations. The trader sees himself as the benevolent manager of the market aspect of the 'traditional' economy.

Despite the image of the 'traditional' economy which many Whites hold, trade between Indian trappers and fur traders today is a different institution from the monopoly fur trade. The difference has resulted from the emergence of buying and selling as separate activities. This has been made possible by the introduction of money. Many Whites in the Yukon argue in favour of keeping money out of the hands of Indians. A Game Department Official told me he opposed the introduction of wolf bounties partially for this reason. Opposition has been expressed to the policy of giving cheques, rather than rations, for Indians drawing public assistance. The ordinance preventing anyone from trading without a store, while originally intended to protect the Indian from unscrupulous fur buyers, is defended now by reference to the danger of
allowing Indians to get cash for all their fur. However, cash plays an important part in trading today. Most Indian trappers in the central and southern Yukon no longer exchange furs directly for trade goods. Important purchases may be made at the time that fur is traded, but cash is used for most day to day expenses. Cash is used exclusively in fur-buying in Whitehorse and Teslin, and in these places at least, buying is impersonal and a separate institution from that of selling supplies.

The little credit which is available, however, is not institutionalized, and is not legitimized by the Indian society. Many Indians have delinquent credit accounts with their local traders, and they go outside the community to trade their fur in order to avoid settling their accounts. Others conceal extra income from the trader. At Ross River the trader complained that ragged, starving children would be brought to the store by some Indians who owed money, in order to soften the trader's resolve not to extend any further credit. Almost every trader with whom I spoke had some story about an Indian obtaining credit under false pretenses, or shamelessly refusing to repay debt even when it was obvious he had the means to do so. Speck, in Labrador, and Godsell, in the Mackenzie district, note similar behaviour by Indian trappers, which they explain as originating in response to dishonest or cutthroat trading practices of Whites (Speck, 1933, pp. 590-594, Godsell, 1943, pp. 299-301.). In the Yukon, however, the practice is not directed to traders alone. An airline at
Teslin began flying trappers to their lines in the winter of 1963, on condition that the fare would be repaid from the fur that was brought in. In July, 1964, three quarters of the trappers who flew with the airline that season still owed an average of $42 each, and the airline owner claimed that he knew that many could afford to repay him. Big game hunting outfitters, who hire Indians as guides, complain that they will make agreements with Indians to work for them, starting at a particular date, and attempt to secure the agreement by paying the guides' licence fees and giving them an advance on their wages. Later they may find an Indian has made similar arrangements with other outfitters, or that he just does not turn up. Most other 'contact agents' report similar trickery, although not always concerned with credit. Credit must be seen in the wider context of White-Indian relations.

Earlier it was pointed out that the basic security for credit was the refusal to extend further credit until an account was paid up. However, accounts do not stay delinquent indefinitely if they go unpaid. They are either written off, or forgotten when one trader replaces another. This can be shown by the fact that no traders have unpaid accounts reaching back more than a year or so, and that most Indians have credit accounts for at least some amount. The credit relationship is a battle of wits which the trader cannot possibly win. He will try public cajoling to get payment, but this can never be effective in lowering the trapper's prestige in his own society. If, when the trapper brings fur to trade, the trader insists
that full payment of debt is made, the trapper may simply take his furs outside the community, in most cases to Whitehorse. Whitehorse is a particular threat to outlying traders since the trapper will also take the opportunity to get supplies there, at stores and supermarkets with prices 20% to 40% below those at smaller centers. If, on the other hand, the trader waits until the trapper needs more credit to tell him that he is 'cut off' until the old debt is paid, he in effect cuts the trapper off from the opportunity of earning any more money by going trapping. Even a small trapping expedition requires capital. A compromise must be reached, and the trader writes off part of the debt to keep the Indian trapping and trading within that community. Many traders stated that they lose a substantial sum each year from bad debts, although I did not have the opportunity to examine their accounts.

The Indian trapper offers a peculiar kind of ambivalence to questions of income and credit. On the one hand he presents himself as an enterprising trapper, despite the efforts of a mean trader, official restrictions, and the ill will of White people in general. On the other hand, he will make fun of the aquisitive characteristics of White people. "Why work? I get three meals a day, and that's all that matters." However, the Carmacks man who made the above statement wants a car. Those Indians who take casual jobs often do so because they have specific large purchases in mind; this was also found by Balikci at Old Crow (Balikci, 1963, p. 103.). One of the loudest objections from Indians to the practice of building
Indian houses some distance from a White settlement is that they are unable to have electricity installed.

A recent study made in a Saskatchewan community reveals a similar ambivalence in Indian values (Braroe, 1965.). While an Indian may lead White people to believe that he values the 'traditional' (non-White) way of life, Braroe found that his behaviour in many ways demonstrates that he in fact regards the Whites as a positive reference group. In this case the ambivalence is resolved by the Indian's presentation of himself to other Indians as an artful and successful exploiter of White people: (ibid., p. 173.). In the Yukon, the Indian attitude to credit has the appearance of such exploitation. In the same article, Braroe discusses why the White people continually permit themselves to be "conned" by the Indians. His explanation is that the Whites' treatment of Indians is in conflict with their own ideas about humanity. In order to minimize this conflict, Whites avoid contact with Indians, or accept the trickery as evidence that Indians are, in fact, irresponsible children from whom one must expect such behaviour (ibid., p. 172.). Braroe suggests that White acceptance of their "conning" practices allows the Indians to adjust psychologically to their failure to achieve White cultural values (ibid., p. 176.).

The situation in the Yukon of White traders continually losing money to delinquent debtors seems to be similar to Braroe's case of Indians continually "conning" Whites. However, I, believe that the earlier analysis indicates that traders
permit this activity to continue for economic reasons. That is, the process of losing money each year in bad debts is an integral part of the exchange relationship between trapper and trader. It is the price the trader pays to keep his clientele, and to keep them trapping.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

From the four previous chapters have emerged descriptions of four cross-cultural exchange institutions. The significant distinctions between them can now be brought into focus through an examination of the structure of each.

The first institution which was examined involves members of two geographically, economically, and to some degree culturally separate groups. Exchanges between these groups are conducted through several pairs of partners. The partnership is a durable non-kinship association.\(^1\) Periodic meetings of partners take place, in some cases by means of organized trading parties, and articles are bartered without haggling. Inter-group relations at these meetings of trading parties express hostility and rivalry, through ritual performances such as games, dancing and singing.\(^2\) Partnership relations, on the other hand, express solidarity, and include such non-trade activities as hospitality (which in the Southern Tutchone-

\(^1\) The degree of durability of partnerships, and way by which new partnerships are formed can only be guessed. Also in the area of speculation is the suggestion that partners would be of an equivalent social status. Some support to this suggestion is given by the argument that since a rich man would tend to trade more he would require a rich partner.

\(^2\) Slobodin notes the ambivalence in the meaning expressed by the dances and songs at Kutchin interband and intertribal events. "... dances and songs ... honoured the visitors and at the same time expressed a threatening or defiant tone." (Slobodin, 1962, p. 69.).
Tlingit case includes commensality (McClellan, 1950, p. 127.), mutual protection, and gift exchange.

The characteristic aims of partnership trade must be understood in the light of the conditions under which it takes place. The two groups tend to be hostile, non-intermarrying, nomadic and separated by natural barriers to travel. These factors present two qualifying conditions for trade. (1) A man from group A who wishes to trade must know that there is someone in group B with the desire and the means to trade with him, and who can be contacted within a reasonable period of time. (2) He must be assured that he will not be killed or robbed while in foreign territory. These two points can be expressed by stating that there is a problem of trading security. The durable nature of partnerships permits the planning of trade, and partnership loyalty ensures that trade goods are set aside for these planned meetings.

Mutual protection of partners, as well as the practice of using trading parties, are measures which met the security problem. The over-all purpose of partnership trade can be summarized as the organization and protection of trade.

The trading chief institution involves exchanges between two distinct cultures. The two cultures involved are that of an Athapaskan band (all the material considered here refers to Kutchin bands) and that of the Euro-American traders. Exchanges are made between representatives of the two groups, the trading chief and the resident trader. The trading chief gathers in the fur and distributes imported
goods which are obtained from the trader. He promotes trapping among his group on behalf of the trader, and is in charge of trading party ceremonies at which gifts provided by the trader are distributed. As leader of a trapping and trading group the trading chief organizes the annual trading party, haggles with the trader over rates of exchange, and tries to get special concessions. Relations between trappers and the trader in the context of institutionalized trade are conducted as if all trappers were the same. Through the trading chief they act as a group, and are treated by the trader as a group.

The trading chief institution, like the trading partnership, maintains durable relations between people. In the case of the trading partnership this is to counteract the effects of various kinds of separation between the trading groups. In the case of Indian-White relations, these are at first concerned mainly with trade. Factors which make trade uncertain are systematically eliminated by the traders. Posts are located on convenient travel routes, and are always open for business. One of the first aims of traders is to eliminate fighting between native groups. A binding relationship with a trapping group through its trading chief is formed not merely to make trade possible, but to actively expand trade and cut out any possible competition. The trading chief, in his role as representative of the trader with respect to these business aims, receives his power and the symbols of his authority from the trader. However, in order to be able to organize and promote the production of fur his position as
a leader must be legitimized to some extent by the trapping group. This legitimization comes from the fact that he is also a representative for the interests of the group. Interests, like bargaining and organizing the trading party, which are pragmatically related to the interests of the trader.

In the case of monopoly trade, the trader has an individual relationship with each trapper. Furs are bartered for supplies without haggling. Trapping supplies are advanced at the beginning of the season, and a complete return is expected before the end of the season. This 'debt' relationship emphasizes the distinction between trappers, in terms of their productive capacities. The 'debt' relationship is manipulated to promote increased trapping production on the individual, instead of on the group level. Where several bands or tribal groups trade at a single post, debt trading is associated with a de-emphasis of groups and group leadership.

Groups of trappers may continue to exist, however. Among the Tatlit Kutchin Slobodin identified five kinds of groups which have continued to function after fifty years of individual debt trade (Slobodin, 1962, pp. 73-74.). Production groups remained for such purposes as caribou hunting and fishing. Groups of cross-cultural significance include residential groups, and 'bands', as defined by the Indian Affairs Branch. These are administrative units, and their leaders, which are rewarded by the Indian Affairs Branch, are intermediaries in much the same way that trading chiefs were.
One task formerly handled by the trading chief which is now done by the trader is the promotion of fur production. This is conducted on an individual basis by means of the 'jawbone' account, which is also the means by which exchanges are made. This method of linking production to a debt-like obligation makes the trader in effect the organizer of production, a position he inherits from the former trading chief. In a sense the trader becomes a political leader.

Productive activities in the monopoly trade situation are seen as two distinct spheres of interest. Fur production is an individual enterprise, conducted to obtain imported trade goods, and largely controlled by the trader, through his use of 'credit'. Subsistence production is without the same cross-cultural implications, and is considered 'traditional'. This distinction can be seen in Slobodin's account of a Kutchin hunting and trapping expedition in 1947. No trapping was done on a Sunday, but hunting was continued, since, "Moose do not have a Lord's Day" (Slobodin, 1962, p. 51.). Fur and game were subject to two separate principles of distribution. Fur caught by the party was distributed according to who set the trap, while game was distributed "among the heads of families on the basis of family size" (ibid., p. 52.).

The fourth cross-cultural trade institution is described as market trade, a term which indicates that to some extent competition between different traders exists. This competition, and the introduction of money, have split the role of the trader into that of a fur buyer and a retail supplier.
Where credit is no longer given by traders, such as those in Whitehorse, this separation of roles is quite apparent, although they may continue to be held by the same individual. In other locations where some retail goods are given on credit the role of retailer is confused with that of fur buyer, since credit is given partly in the expectation of a return of fur.

A second form of competition, although it is not seen by trappers or traders as such, is from wage work. The obtaining of such work is the goal of most trappers, and is encouraged by the traders to the extent that, outside Whitehorse, a man with steady wage work can get credit up to a limit of his monthly salary. Wage work, however, is scarce.

Market trade is characterized by a separation of the institutions of fur buying from those of retail supply. This separation occurs in a large center like Whitehorse, where the relationship between fur buyers or retailers and their customers is impersonal, and many customers are not local residents. The separation occurs elsewhere when customers are wage earners. For this reason one cannot plot the geographic distribution of market trade, since it depends to some extent on the customers. For instance, at Carmacks, where some Indians are employed in a coal mine, some trade is based on fur, and the trader's role as fur buyer influences his role as retailer and credit supplier. Market trade factors like money and competition are less important for the trapper than for the wage earner, who uses cash, or liberal amounts of credit. In some cases outside Whitehorse trappers do business with
separate fur buyers and retailers. These include trappers who send fur to buyers or auctions outside the Territory. Teslin trappers sell to a local fur buyer who pays cash and is not connected with the local store. In this case credit is handled by the storekeeper. To determine how much debt he will allow he uses his knowledge of his customers as credit risks, rather than their past performance on the trapline.

Diagram 1, on page 79, illustrates the main structural changes in cross-cultural trade institutions of the Yukon. Each of the boxes represents an institution, and each contains an outline of its general purposes. Social change in this situation involves a regrouping of the purposes of the institutions. Other sorts of changes are involved, of course. As Belshaw has stated, with reference to multi-stage economic change in New Guinea, "At each point of change a new culture is formed, with new quantities and kinds of consumption and production." (Belshaw, 1960, p. 95.). However, in the present analysis, attention is focused on changes in the kinds of institutional aims, and the relations between them.

Diagram 1 shows that the trading chieftainship took over some functions of two earlier institutions, trade partnership and traditional leadership (in its various forms). Traditional leaders of the Kutchin included band chiefs, sib leaders, war leaders, economic leaders (owners of caribou surrounds), shamans and local residence group
DIAGRAM 1. 

STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION OF TRADE

**Historical Stage**

1. Inter-tribal Trade
   - **PARTNERSHIP**
     - Organization of Exchange
   - **LEADERSHIP**
     - Organization of Production
     - Organization of Group Relations

2. Trading chief Trade
   - **TRADING CHIEFTAINSHIP**
     - Exchange: Fur and Supplies
     - Organization of Production

3. Monopoly Trade
   - **INDIVIDUAL 'JAWBONE' ACCOUNT**
     - Supply: Exchange: Fur and Supplies
     - Organization of Production
   - **BAND LEADERSHIP**
     - Organization of Group Relations

4. Market Trade
   - **RETAIL MARKET**
     - Supply: Exchange: Supplies
     - Credit and Money
   - **FUR MARKET**
     - Exchange: Fur and Money
   - **GAME LAWS**
     - Organization of Production
   - **ELECTED LEADERSHIP**
     - Organization of Group Relations
leaders. These forms of leadership and their purposes have been lumped together in the diagram for the sake of simplicity.

Leadership in the inter-tribal trade stage organized the production of both food and furs. Among the Kutchin, rich men who owned caribou surrounds directed the rest of the hunting group. Some men, as well as women and boys, ran behind the herd; a second group guided them into the surround entrance; and a third group ambushed the animals in the corral. The surround owner supervised the sharing of the meat. The band chief was the other individual who had most to do with the organization of production. He made decisions and gave advice in matters of hunting and trapping (Balikci, 1953, p. 26.)

Although salmon fishing using a fish trap was a complicated productive venture by a large group, according to Balikci there was no fish-camp leader (ibid., p. 18.). Little data is available on the productive groups of the 'Inland Tlingit'. There is some evidence for the existence of large hunting groups. The large herd of Stone caribou located west of Dawson migrated regularly each winter as far south as Klukshu and Aishihik in Southern Tutchone territory in the nineteenth century, although this is no longer the case (McClellan, 1950, p. 13.). This same herd was also hunted by the Tagish Indians. In these cases large group production under leaders was probably important. However, as trade with the Tlingit became important, so did the fur production by small groups. The ecology of the region, particularly with respect to moose and Osborne caribou, which tend to be widely distributed and
are not herding or migratory animals, suggests that small group extended families were the major productive unit in winter. Certainly the leading male traded all the fur produced by his family group (ibid., p. 147.). In summer, fishing was a major group productive activity, but only the Champagne band of the Southern Tutchone had sites where traps were used. To sum up, it appears that, as far as the organization of production goes, leadership was of some importance during the inter-tribal trade period, particularly in the case of the Kutchin.

External relations were a second important purpose of leadership. Among the Kutchin the important leaders in this respect were the sib leaders who organized potlatches and were also war leaders. There is an apparent suggestion by Balikci that these two roles were separately institutionalized (Balikci, 1963, p. 48.). In friendly meetings with strangers the band chief was principal host and gave the first meal to all newcomers (Osgood, 1936, p. 108.). Among the Inland Tlingit there were apparently strong band chiefs, who led war parties in inter-band raids; one had the authority, for instance, to forbid band members to act as guides to an early party of White explorers (McClellan, 1950, p. 28.).

After the adoption of trading chiefs by the Kutchin most of the general purposes of trading partnerships and leadership which remained were absorbed by the trading chief-tainship. Some inter-tribal partnership trade may have continued, an instance being the case cited on page 18 of such
trade along the Yukon River some time after direct contact by traders. It is probable that leadership of productive groups other than trappers remained in the hands of separate leaders, although trapping must have been coordinated with, or ancillary to, the other main winter activity, caribou hunting. In the field of group relations with outsiders, the White trader became the dominant influence, and to a large extent eliminated hostility between bands trading into one post. Hostility between bands did, however, increase in this period, in cases where one group had an actual or potential middleman monopoly. Two such cases are the Vunta Kutchin prior to the founding of Fort Yukon, and the mutual raiding between the Tatlit Kutchin and the Mackenzie Eskimo, after the founding of Fort McPherson. In such cases where hostility was caused by trade, the trading chief would be directly concerned with the organization of war.

In rare cases war between bands was directly fostered by traders. Murray, the first trader at Fort Yukon, notes in his journal that it was his policy to encourage enmity between the local Kutcha Kutchin and tribes further down the Yukon River, in order to prevent fur from the Fort Yukon area reaching Russian traders, via inter-tribal trade (Murray, 1910, p. 97.). He could only have encouraged this hostility at that time by influencing his trading chiefs. This again emphasizes the point that trading chiefs became important as organizers of external relations of their groups.

We have seen that in addition to activities directly connected with trade, such as the collection of fur, bargain-
ing over rates of exchange, and the distribution of trade goods, the trading chief institution also handled other tasks, which can be loosely termed the organization of production, and the organization of group relations. Trade and also production, were conducted by groups; the trading chief was the group manager. When the individual 'jawbone' account was introduced, however, trade could no longer be a group activity. It was conducted between individual trappers and the monopoly trader.

At the same time as individual trade began, technical innovations in productive activities were being introduced. By the time trappers were receiving individual 'debt', there were enough guns, steel traps, dog-pulled toboggans, and fish nets in the area – all of which had been introduced by the traders – to bring about a considerable reduction in the size of production groups. There was also, in several Kutchin localities, the introduction of annual muskrat trapping. This did not become important until 1917 when the price of muskrats began to rise for the first time. Muskrat trapping is preeminently a small group occupation, and cannot be conducted as an adjunct to large group hunting or fishing. Kutchin territory has three excellent muskrat areas: part of the Mackenzie delta, the Crow Flats in Vunta Kutchin territory, and the Yukon Flats, around Fort Yukon, so that every Kutchin group was within travelling distance of one of these areas. Trapping and caribou hunting in large groups continued in some areas, but, as I have shown earlier in this chapter, trapping in the context of such groups was mainly controlled by the individual. Even in extra-
familial trapping groups like trapping partnerships, individual ownership of traps assured a system of individual production in most respects. In other words, trapping partnerships and trapping parties might pool resources in order to travel together, but the crucial productive activities were individually handled. This is significant because of the introduction of the repayment of individual 'credit' as a motivation for economic activity. An individual Indian was no longer motivated and controlled in his fur-productive activities by matters of group participation or the sanctioning influence of a group leader, but solely by his own co-resident family group (the unit of consumption), and, through the 'jawbone' relationship, by the trader. The trader was a continual influence to increase fur production.

Thus the individual 'jawbone' relationship became the institution which handled both the organization of trade and the organization of most forms of production (certainly all production which was included in this trade), and handled them without going through any leaders of groups larger than the co-resident family group. It also handled the newly-introduced purpose of supplying credit. However, the organization of external group relations required that leadership be maintained. Among the Vunta Kutchin, according to Balikci, there was no formal leader for over twenty years after the band's trading chiefs died out. (Balikci, 1963, p. 50.). Among the Tatlit Kutchin after the introduction of individual trade, band chiefs of a traditional type remained, and continued in a roughly
genealogical succession until 1949 (Slobodin, 1962, p. 71.). Trading chiefs continued as organizers of the annual trading parties and as spokesmen for their group members in seeking trading concessions. When administration by an Indian Affairs agent was introduced in 1921 the two trading chiefs in office were automatically considered "tribal councillors" (ibid., p. 72.). Among the Inland Tlingit chieftainship was associated with sib leadership. To the present day sib rivalry is organized mainly on the basis of territoriality. Thus in the context of the new external administration, 'traditional' leaders were absorbed into a system of leaders of government-defined bands, and began to act as administrative intermediaries for those bands. A few scattered references may be found to 'traditional' chiefs among the Tutchone during the monopoly trade period, but generally speaking band leadership, even where formal elections are held, does not have significant authority among present day Tutchone bands.

The separate institutionalization of trade and leadership which the diagram shows as occurring in the Monopoly Trade period can be seen as the separation between the external economic interests and external political interests of trapping groups. This separation took place because trade became an individual activity, while political interests, of their nature, had to remain on the group level. The dashed arrows in Diagram I joining institutions of the inter-tribal trade stage with institutions of the monopoly trade stage represents the Inland Tlingit case, in which the trading chief stage did not occur.
The final point of change in the cross-cultural economic institutions of the Yukon was when the individual 'debt' trade broke down into the three separate institutions of the retail market, which also handles credit, the fur market, and the Game Laws, which now organizes production. The point has been made that individual credit was used by the trader to attempt to increase fur production. Competition brought about a lowering of the amount of credit available and a general lessening of the influence of the local trader over the economic lives of trappers. Attempts to increase the fur harvest are now matters of Territorial and Federal government action. The Territorial Game Laws are administered by the Department of Game who have Game Wardens throughout the Yukon. The organization of game production is not the only purpose of the Game Laws, but is the one which has been taken over from the traders. Conservation was the first task of this legislation and measures included the licencing of trappers, a record of annual wildlife kill, bag limits, seasons, and closures. In 1950 group and individual trapping areas began to be licensed, and with current low harvests of fur, the policy of the Game Department is to encourage individual trappers to increase their trapping effort. Production of fur is also encouraged by the Indian Affairs Branch, most recently through the appointment of economic development officers.

The foregoing account of changes in the organization of trade has referred to structural changes. In this social
change model the units of structure were cross-cultural institutions. As institutions, they are considered to have undergone change when there has been some basic rearrangement in the sets of purposes. The question of institutional purposes will be considered in more detail in the following paragraph. The change model contains four parts, equivalent to historical stages, each of which represents a system in stable equilibrium. The system is not sharply delimited from other social interaction, and in fact it contains roles in two cultural units. It is more useful to think of each stage not as a self-contained social system, but a context of general interaction to which several institutions are more or less relevant.

The view of social change which has been presented here is similar in many ways to that contained in Parsons and Smelser's theory of Structural Differentiation. However, where Parsons and Smelser speak of a division of a unit of social structure into two new functional units, I have instead spoken of the regrouping of social purposes and the creation of new social institutions around these new sets of purposes. My avoidance of the notion of function is simply because the

3 No assumption is made that such a reorganization of purposes is the only criterion for institutional change. The example given by E.R. Leach of a political system composed of equalitarian lineage segments which is replaced by a ranked hierarchy of a feudal type (Leach, 1954, p. 5.) is another kind of structural change. Change in the value system is a third kind.
analysis offered here is of a fairly low order of abstraction. The structural-functional analysis of society by such theorists as Parsons, which is implicit in the structural differentiation theory, is designed for theories of wide generality. While I hope to show that the principles of social change analysis used in this thesis can have a wider applicability, they are basically dealing with structural categories which are recognized by the people involved. The notion of purpose, however, does not refer to the motivations or goals of any individual acting within these structural categories. To give a simple example, one of the goals implicit in the role of trader is to obtain fur; for a trapper, one of his goals is to obtain supplies. The institutional purpose, however, is not fur or supplies, but exchange or trade. The purpose of an institution, as I use the term, is not a species of individual or group motivation, but a generalization of the constituent complementary sets of motivations of participants. Yet this notion of purpose is still far from the level of abstraction involved in the notion of function, where the latter refers to the significance which an institution has for the maintenance of stability and the integration of a larger social system (Parsons, 1951, pp. 21-22, Radcliffe-Brown, 1952, p. 180.).

The results of this study lead in two directions: the one concerned with matters of ethnohistory, culture change and the development of trade; the other concerned with the
implications an analytic method such as was used in this study might have for anthropological theory.

Some of the interpretations of the data which were raised along the way might be phrased as hypotheses, other as open questions. More data is required before the status of Tlingit-Athapaskan marriages can be understood, but I believe that evidence has been shown that these marriages may have been methods of creating trading obligations more binding than the trading partnership. Another important question which was raised is concerned with the role of 'debt' in the breakdown of Indian groups larger than the co-residential group. Most arguments explaining the disappearance of these groups rely on such factors as changes in technology which permitted smaller production groups, changes in animal ecology, or changes in the numbers and distribution of population due to wars and disease. In the Yukon the 'debt' relationship with the trader shifted the whole motivation for fur production away from the group, since fur production became a matter of the return of an advance for each individual. The argument that rifles, steel traps, etc. reduced the size of trapping groups also applies here, but the 'debt' factor has been overlooked by most anthropologists.

The argument in this thesis has sought to explain continuities and changes in patterns of trade relations. This inquiry has been carried on at two levels. At one level of analysis an examination was made of the causal or limiting factors affecting trade relations. At the structural level,
a set of institutions were considered, in which roles are held by members of two cultural groups. The 'holistic' method of considering trade institutions as parts of a 'society' of functionally inter-dependent structural units was forgotten, in order to concentrate on the context of cultural interaction. The technological, ecological and demographic factors of the first level of analysis only enter the structural level as a set of initial conditions. In an entirely different example of structural change analysis they are summed up as 'new opportunities to achieve aims and/or dissatisfactions with the way aims are achieved' (Parsons and Smelser, 1956, p. 270.). Aims, by this analysis, are not thought of as subject to sudden change when an institution becomes unworkable. Parsons and Smelser's model specifically assumes that the value system remains constant (Parsons and Smelser, 1956, p. 256.). The second level of explanations of changes which the model represents indicates that, when understandable circumstances arise which cause the unworkability of one system (dissatisfactions and alternative opportunities), interested individuals and groups will 'bargain' and compromise in setting up new institutions to handle aims and tasks which have been in some sense a continuous factor throughout the period of change.

While the schedule of aims (the value system) and the relative bargaining positions (the political system) are considered steady factors at each point of change, they themselves are involved in change. Questions of new choices between several individual and group aims, and the introduction
of new sources of political power, are part of the conditions under which the reformed system of institutions emerges. Thus institutional change may very well be accompanied by changes in the value system or the political structure. Consider the implications which the introduction of 'debt' had to the political status of the trading chief, not only in the context of trader-Indian relations, but also within his own society. Or consider the new opportunities for action and the new schedule of values which can arise when competition is introduced to a situation of monopoly trade.

Thus this study suggests that there is a need for other interpretations of the historical data which do not emphasize the continuity of values and the regrouping of general purposes into new institutional contexts, but analyze the changes in value patterns, as reflected by changing behavioural orientations. Similarly, work is needed on the emergence of new power structures. Unfortunately, I do not believe the available historical data from the Yukon to be capable of such handling, but these sort of studies would seem to follow from this description of trade institutions.

The cross-cultural nature of the institutions in this study has been stressed at various points. This factor is most significant in the earliest stages of trade development. In White-Indian relations, for instance, in earliest times most interaction was channeled through the few cross-cultural institutions. Interests of one cultural group with the other
were few and specific. Communication between them was limited. Today the study of Indians as societies, or as one or a number of cultural entities, is becoming unrealistic. With this in mind it seems that historical studies should more often 'see ahead' to the contemporary position of Indians as ethnic minorities within a larger societies. Historical studies which take Indian groups as their focus of study, and treat non-Indians as outside causal factors, tend to paint themselves into a corner by treating as a self-contained system of social relations a group whose primary raison d'etre comes from outside.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Lewis, Oscar, 1942. *The Effects of White Contact upon Blackfoot Culture, with Special Reference to the Role of the Fur Trade*. American Ethnological Society Memoir No. 6.


