

THE DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this essay is to develop a framework for the comparative study of the process of political integration among states in regional international systems. An empirical theory of political integration should provide explanations of the process in terms of: 1. the evidence that it has occurred; 2. the conditions favorable to its progress; and 3. the dynamics of change. That current theories generally lack such complete explanatory power is a consequence of: 1. the lack of a model which combines sufficient complexity with the necessary manageability; 2. the lack of extensive comparative study in areas other than Western Europe; and 3. the lack of consistency in the use of terms and concepts.

In this essay, political integration is conceptualized as a multidimensional process, akin to national political development, whereby a regional or "partial" international system is transformed to resemble a single political system. In these terms, political integration is a problem both of peaceful international relations and of the optimum form of political organization. In the introductory chapter these problems are discussed and the definition of political integration is elaborated and related to theories of international relations and national political development.

Most important, however, is the notion of political integration as a multidimensional process, occurring in: 1. the ways in which states interact in making decisions; 2. the performance of basic functional tasks; 3. patterns of communication; and 4. political attitudes, in the regional international system. The four main chapters of this essay discuss these dimensions in turn.

The process of political integration occurs partly as change in the structures and processes through which decisions emerge from the interaction of states in the system. This, then, is the first dimension. The second is concerned with political integration as it involves changes in the performance of economic, military and social-cultural functions in the regional system. In the third dimension we are concerned with how changes in the flows of communication and in the structures and practices enhancing such flows, are related to the process of integration. Finally, the process of political integration is viewed as occurring in part as a change in the patterns of political attitudes in the regional system. The first three dimensions are all represented by major theoretical works on political integration; the presence of social-psychological

assumptions in each of these, however, points to the additional need for studies of attitude change in the integrative process.

A dimension, then, is primarily an analytical category. A full explanation of the process of political integration should consider the evidence of, the conditions for, and the dynamics of, integration in each of these dimensions. The essential argument of this essay, therefore, is that political integration cannot be conceived of as taking place, unless certain processes of change are occurring in the interactions among states, the performance of functions, the flows of communications, and the patterns of political attitudes, in the regional international system.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: PROBLEMS AND CONCEPTS IN THE THEORY OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Explanation and the State of Theory in Political Integration

The study of political integration in regional international systems has a distinguished pedigree in the history of political thought. Two problems with which political scientists have traditionally been concerned -- the elimination or control of international violence, and the creation of the best possible form of political unit for the satisfaction of basic human needs -- both these problems are the stimulus and the core of current studies of international political integration.

Scholars have rarely concealed the normative and prescriptive bases of their interest in political integration.¹ Moreover, there are many bodies of theory, of which functionalism is a good example, whose power to explain the process of integration is not necessarily lessened by the occurrence of many normative and prescriptive propositions alongside the descriptive and analytical.

An empirical theory of political integration, indeed, may often be viewed as a means of demonstrating the moral necessity or the historical inevitability of integration in a certain region. Or it may be viewed as a source of policy advice for those engaged in the planning and strategy of a particular integrative process. As a normative force, however, integration theory has generally been somewhat less than effective; as a prescriptive influence it has often been somewhat more than pretentious. But whatever their normative and prescriptive background and purposes, empirical theories of political integration can and must ultimately be assessed in terms of their capacity to explain the integrative process.

As an empirical phenomenon, political integration occurs in diverse and complex instances. The sort of theory which can have general explanatory value for such a phenomenon is therefore not likely to be derived from the application of simplistic models to one or two of these instances. Before discussing these problems of models and comparative study, we should explore the sort of explanation that is to be expected and desired of theories of political integration. In general, at least

at this stage in political science, what constitutes a satisfactory explanation is relative to the situation and to the intellectual orientation of the observer.

Where situations are more manipulable, concepts clearer, and the criteria of relevance and predictive power more established and consistent than in the study of political integration, to insist on predictive capacity and mathematical rigor in explanations is not unreasonable. But for an area of study which is at present still seeking these preconditions, different approaches and criteria of explanation are necessary. Explanations of the integrative process have in fact ranged from the mathematical to the metaphysical, varying in focus from the movement of trade across borders to the somewhat less quantifiable movement of the World Historical Spirit. The first step in giving some order to this intellectual imbroglio, therefore, is to suggest what needs should be satisfied by any explanation of the integrative process.

Firstly, an explanation of political integration should provide a means for assessing the extent to which integration has occurred. What, in short, is the evidence of an integrated system? Perhaps it is misleading to talk at all in terms of an end point for the process.

The present field of analysis, after all, is occupied largely by a number of processes of which future expectations are unclear. Under these conditions, then, explanations will focus on the variables associated with "more" and "less" integrated systems.²

Secondly, an explanation of political integration should provide the means of recognizing and evaluating the conditions favorable to the process. Again, the search at this stage will be for correlations between certain conditions and the higher or lower probability that the process of integration will be advanced. Even granted the imprecision implied here, and the uncertain scientific status of integration theory, at least the search for such variables can be couched in casual rather than teleological terms. As Rapoport notes, in all scientific investigation, "teleological explanations tend to disappear when manipulative causes are discovered".³

Thirdly, an explanation should provide some insight into the interaction of the various conditions which constitutes the dynamics of the process. To assess only the evidence of and the conditions for political integration is to look only at the static aspects. But how do international systems actually move from a lower to a

higher level of integration? What are the mechanisms of change? How does the process become self-sustaining?

In terms of these three basic needs, current theory in the field of political integration lacks general explanatory power for the process as it is occurring in many regions of the globe. This lack derives essentially from the inadequacy of many models, for the broad comparative study of integration.

Problems arise initially in the formation of models because theorists are not all interested in political integration for the same reason. They therefore differ on their points of emphasis in studying the process, and on what they consider to be the mark of an integrated community. He who is concerned with the maintenance of international peace will settle for a form of community which differs greatly from that required by the theorist concerned with optimizing economic distribution in a region. The difficulty here is that models become too specialized and limited. The influential association of integration theory with the desire to lessen the possibility of violent internecine conflict in Europe will often remove the applicability of such generalizations to regional systems like Latin America, where with one or two exceptions the

international system has not been marked by violent conflict among its members. On the other hand, the predominant goals of integration are often seen as related more to the optimal political form for a region -- the efficient and humanitarian development and distribution of the economic resources of the region; the strengthening of its diplomatic and military position in world politics; the satisfaction of a common desire for unity which has arisen from perceptions of shared cultural, economic, social and ideological traditions and interests.

If some problems are associated with the sources of the theorist's interest, more serious difficulties relate to the very operation by which a model is created. No matter what the level of precision, the isolation of variables relating to the level and the causes of integration necessarily involves some prior ordering and simplification of reality in the scholar's mind. Initially the application of an analogy or some other such ordering device will suggest hypotheses; these will be tested, and the models refined and filled out; theory develops as generalizations are continually drawn from this model, applied and tested. But models initially always describe a phenomenon "as if it were so". Accordingly one of the major dilemmas faced by any social scientist in developing

a framework in which to carry out his investigations, is how much comprehensiveness and accuracy in mapping reality he will sacrifice for manageability and accuracy in predictiveness.⁴

The development of integration theory calls as well for comparative analysis. Thus as well as a framework which combines a reasonable degree of comprehensiveness with a reasonable degree of manageability, it is necessary to have a framework which can be applied to a large number of cases. At present comparative analysis of political integration is hindered by the steady multiplication of inconsistently used terms and concepts, by the concern of different theorists with different and usually limited aspects of the total process, and by the propensity to concentrate on the Western European experience. The one systematic attempt, by Etzioni,⁵ to develop a paradigm and to apply it to several attempts at regional integration, despite the value both of the framework and of the collection of studies of integration, is not entirely successful. The "paradigm" is only partially applied in the book; and the evidence, in the second half of the book, of the framework so carefully worked out in the first half, is not exactly striking. But comparison of this kind is vital, and a well-

conceived model provides categories which take us past the initial problem of seeing if things are comparable before comparing them.

With all of these problems, then, how are we to conceptualize the process of political integration? The rest of this chapter will be devoted to this question.

Conceptualizing Political Integration

When a term like "integration" is the common property of many social sciences one can usually expect general imprecision of meaning rather than widespread consensus on usage. Around the general notion of integration as the coming together of components into a whole, there floats a nebula of specialized and often unclear meanings peculiar to economics, psychology, sociology, or political science. The conceptual link between the integrated economy, the integrated personality, the integrated small group and the integrated political system is, to say the least, tenuous.

Even within political science, conceptions of integration show little tendency to be consistent. To some theorists, political integration concerns changes in the way decisions are made; to others it concerns economic

co-operation and not much more; to others it concerns a preoccupation of one nation with another in terms of communication; to others it concerns primarily a shift in the loyalties of individuals. Scholars who have emphasized one of these features are of course generally aware of the others. But studies have rarely comprehended the full range of variables related to the integrative process; more often they have been based on partial or fragmented definitions. Studies of the integrative process, moreover, have focused on many different levels of political organization -- urban, metropolitan, national, regional, universal -- and on many different types of organization, ranging from the monofunctional to political systems encompassing the great part of men's activities and loyalties.

This essay is concerned with a particular type of political integration. Although where it is helpful comparisons will be made with other types, the major concern here is with political integration among a limited number of sovereign states on a regional basis. In such a setting, then, we can conceptualize political integration as a multidimensional process, akin to national political development, whereby a regional or "partial" international system is transformed to resemble a single political system.

The notion of multidimensionality is of course in direct response to the narrowness of focus which characterizes much of the theorizing about political integration. For purposes of comparative analysis it is necessary to move to a more comprehensive, if also more complicated model. As it is viewed here, therefore, political integration involves change in four inter-related aspects of any regional international system, each of which must be investigated for a full understanding of the process. The four dimensions are therefore basically analytical categories which, it is hoped, will lead to more sophisticated explanations. The level of, and the conditions for, political integration can be examined in the following four dimensions: 1. the structures and processes in the context of which states interact to make decisions bearing on the regional international system; 2. the performance of economic, military and social-cultural functions in the regional system; 3. the patterns of communication of information, goods and services, and population; and 4. the attitudes of elites and non-elites to each other and to forms of political organization in the regional international system.

In the regional international system it is, initially at least, the individual and collective decisions of the representative of states which further or retard integration

among them. But these decisions will be affected by the patterns and structures of bargaining where elites interact to make such decisions, by the nature of the functional relationships among states, by the patterns of communication among elites and trade among states, and by the attitudes of different peoples to each other. Each of the four dimensions, moreover, is closely related to every other. In the decision-making setting, functional problems are the usual issues, communications are necessary for information and enactment, and psychological variables bear on the definition of the situation by decision-makers. The performance of functions in the system relies on transportation and communications media, and its success affects attitudes to political institutions. Communications, finally, play a crucial role in the formation of popular attitudes to the performance of the political system. The close interplay between these four dimensions should become even more apparent as the discussion progresses. Nevertheless in most cases integration will be at different levels of advancement in terms of each dimension, and in different systems it is unlikely that the process begins, develops and terminates in the same pattern.

Indeed the general problem of recognizing the beginning and termination of the integrative process can prove somewhat awkward. For the former the best solution lies simply in casting suspicious glances at the empirical world. The beginning state of integration is the sort of regional international system typified by Western Europe, the Nordic Association, Central America, the countries of LAFTA, the several African blocs, the Arab League, and other such groups of states where there is some evidence of co-ordination or of interest in coming together.

But how are we to stipulate the termination state of a process we have never seen terminated? One suggestion, which undoubtedly follows from the conceptual affinity between international integration and national political development, would be to view the logical end-point as a sort of nation-state writ large, with the internal divisions marked by former sovereign states for all practical purposes obliterated. But the necessity for criteria by which to assess the level of integration and for models through which to analyze the process need not drive us to postulate such a goal. Even in "national" settings, after all, integration and disintegration are continuing processes.

In any system at any time, therefore, the level of integration is a relative rather than an absolute thing.

If national political development does not provide a model of the end-state of international integration, it nevertheless bears important resemblances to the process in other ways. Discussing the general problem of nation-building, Friedrich notes some of these similarities.⁶ Many of the characteristics of a nation which Friedrich describes -- independence, cohesiveness, effective political organization, consent and support for government, legitimacy -- can also be seen as the types of goals, on a regional basis, toward which integration is directed.

In a very real sense, then, the regional international system is a developing political system. Some of the ideas of political development theory may therefore be of direct relevance to political integration theory. Of particular interest here is the argument that to become a modern nation-state a society must deal with six crises peculiar to all processes of political development.⁷ The identity crisis involves the tearing of citizens' allegiances and identifications between the traditional and the new political forms. The legitimacy crisis involves the reaching

of agreement as to the proper nature of governmental responsibility and authority. The penetration crisis concerns making government policies effective in the state by the establishment of rapport on all levels between people and government. The participation crisis concerns the expansion of popular, group and party influence in decision-making. The integration crisis concerns the extent to which the whole polity is organized as a system of coherent interacting relationships. The distribution crisis, finally, involves the use of government power to allocate values in the society.

It is not hard to see, in such terms, correspondences between the process of change from a traditional to a modern political system, and the process of change from a classical interstate to a more integrated form of regional system. Some of the crises, such as the participation crisis, concern primarily the decision-making dimension; others, like the distribution crisis, involve the functional dimension; the penetration crisis is clearly a problem in communications; and the identity crisis most directly involves the psychological dimension of political integration. These different crises, and the various forms they may take in the context of political integration, will reappear as themes in the chapters which follow.

The complexity of the process and the developmental crises do not constitute the only affinities between political development and political integration. Theorists in both fields are investigating many of the same problems, whether these are related to ends -- internal peace and order, social and economic justice, the relation of self-sufficiency and military dependence -- or to means -- the relation of economic and political development and integration, the role of bureaucracy and law, problems of mass mobilization and participation, and the role of economic power, military capability, and political culture in the process.⁸ Moreover, in such developing areas as Nigeria, the Congo, India and Pakistan, it almost appears as if the various sub-national regions are behaving much like national states involved with varying degrees of discomfort and intransigence, in an international integrative process of doubtful prospects.

As we have conceptualized it, the process of political integration involves the transformation of a regional international system to resemble a single political system. The notion of "system" is not used here as it is in the strictly "systemic" analysis of international relations.

Typologies of international systems, both real and hypothetical, are of little relevance to regional political integration, except as certain initial patterns of relationships among states are more conducive than others to regional integration.⁹ In any case our concern is with concrete regional systems, for which empirical referents exist in history. Moreover, although the international system certainly has important effects on the behavior of states, the "norms" of the system are only effective to the extent that they are internalized by the actors.¹⁰ Therefore in this discussion political change is viewed as a consequence of the behavior of actors representing individual, group, national and cross-national interests, rather than of any teleological needs of the system.

It is sufficient, then, for the purposes of this essay, to characterize the regional international system basically as a geographical conception in which we isolate several patterns of relationships, several types of units, and different structures and functions in order to explain political integration among its member-states. The most important patterns of relationships are the demands and support for the actions of decision-makers, the policy outputs, and the patterns of communication in the region.¹¹

The units are groups, parties and other organizations. The constituent states themselves act both as units of the system in this sense, and as foci of demands and support whose policy outputs may themselves constitute demands on the regional system.¹² The structures of the system are simply the institutions through which functions are carried out. Functions are simply the tasks deriving, not from the "needs" of the system, but from the interplay of demands and support in its units. To say that systems have functional requirements, then, is only to say metaphorically that its members have basic human economic, military, social and cultural needs, and that when such needs are expressed in the system certain characteristic functions are performed by certain structures. In summary, then, the notion of "system" is employed rather modestly here, and provides not so much an explanation of the changing relationships among states in any region, but a loose framework under which to collect a number of important concepts.

The whole general approach developed in this chapter, is oriented toward the comparative study of regional political integration and toward the growth of a particular type of theory which offers explanations of such processes on as broad a scale as possible. The systems framework, the

suggested affinities with national political development theory, and above all the conception of political development theory, and above all the conception of political integration as a complex, multidimensional process, are important steps in the direction of such a body of theory. The next four chapters will explore the dimensions of political integration. Many of the themes introduced above will recur throughout. In the main, however, the task will be to suggest some evidence of, and conditions for, integration in terms of each dimension, to investigate the dynamics of integration in each case, and to relate the four dimensions to each other and to this whole complex process of political change in regional international systems.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 1

¹See, for example, the prefaces to E. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, Stanford Univ. Press, 1964; and to A. Etzioni, Political Unification, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.

²On this general point, see P. Jacob and H. Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines of Analysis", in P. Jacob and J.V. Toscano (eds.), The Integration of Political Communities, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1964, pp. 9-10.

³A. Rapoport, Operational Philosophy, New York, Wiley, 1965, p.70.

⁴This common social scientific dilemma is expressed well in S. Hoffmann, The State of War, New York, Praeger, 1965, p.273. For a general discussion of problems in the use of models, see A. Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, San Francisco, Chandler, 1964, pp.275-88.

⁵Etzioni, op. cit.

⁶C.J. Friedrich, "Nation-Building", in K.W. Deutsch and J.W. Foltz (eds.), Nation-Building, New York, Atherton, 1963, p.32.

⁷For a discussion of these six crises, see L. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, Boston, Little Brown, 1966, chapt. 3, esp. pp.63-66.

⁸Examples from the burgeoning literature on political development that are of relevance to integration theory are J. LaPalombara (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political Development, Princeton Univ. Press, 1963; L. Pye and S. Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton Univ. Press, 1965; and L. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1962.

⁹See the notion of integration as it relates to international systems in M. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, New York, Wiley, 1957, esp. chaps. 2 and 5.

¹⁰Haas, op. cit., pp. 55-56. The whole of Chapter Three is an excellent critical discussion of systems theory in international relations.

¹¹These relationships are similar to those outlined in G. Almond and J.S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton Univ. Press, 1960; and in D. Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1965.

¹²See, on this subject, Haas, op. cit., p. 63.

CHAPTER TWO

THE FIRST DIMENSION: STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES OF DECISION- MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Introduction

However shopworn and barren the debate among political scientists may be over the "essence" of politics, it does, in a number of its manifold forms of resolution, give us an important initial perspective on problems of political integration. Generally the locus of the political has been traced either in the institutions of government, in the notion of decision, or in the conflict of power and interests.¹ All too often, however, theories of political integration have passed over the involvement of such "political" aspects in the process they purport to explain. The comments of two astute critics of integration theory are of interest in this connection. Claude observes that supranationality "has contrived no genuine escape from sovereign states," that it "may be a step toward federal unity, but it is a step taken by governments, which retain the capacity to decide whether to take further steps forward, to stand still, or to retreat."² Hoffmann points out that the

process of political integration is set in motion by political decisions, and that it is therefore neither self-generating nor automatic.³

To reassert such an emphasis on governments, on decisions and on conflict in theorizing about political integration is not, however, to ignore the involvement of a wide variety of actors and interests in making the decisions which affect political integration. Indeed, depending on the internal political and economic development of the regional international system, and on the extent of its integration, nongovernmental, cross-national and "supranational" interests can play a major role in decision-making. We are concerned, then, with all such actors and interests as they combine to affect the process of integration in a region.

Decisions are as much the product of collective bargaining as of board meetings, of negotiations as of cabinet deliberations, of conflict-resolution as of policy-making. Whether a government acts unilaterally, whether governments co-ordinate policies fully in some field, or whether an exhausting process of bargaining takes place, then, we can say that decisions are being

made for the regional international system. This chapter will explore and develop the theme that the state of integration in such a system is recognizable in the structures and processes of decisions as viewed in the above terms, and that certain aspects of these structures and processes serve to enhance the integrative process.

Here, as in Lindberg's study of the EEC, "It is not policy content, but the method and the context of decision-making that is of greatest interest".⁴ In short, we shall try, as far as it is possible, to abstract the structure and the processes of decision-making from its content. In later chapters, when we discuss economic, military, social and cultural functions, and the communications and psychological aspects of integration theory, we shall also touch on features relevant to decisions -- the basic needs from which demands arise, how decision-makers, other elites and non-elites communicate, and how psychological elements affect those involved in decision-making. When we discuss the structures and processes of decision-making, then, we are telling only one important part of the story.

According to Lindberg, the essence of a political community is "the existence of a legitimate system for the resolution of conflict, for the making of authoritative decisions for the group as a whole."⁵ Political integration, then, is foremost a "process whereby nations forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs".⁶ In accepting this as an important but incomplete conceptualization of the total integrative process, we shall suggest that in terms of decision-making the fundamental contrast between the more and the less integrated regional international system is that, in the former, actors, policies, structures and processes tend to be oriented primarily toward the region as a whole, while in the latter, primary reference is consistently to the nation-state. We are therefore concerned with the conditions that produce change from the latter condition in the direction of the former, and how this change can be recognized as having occurred.

What sort of framework might be used to examine this process? The comprehensive literature on decision-making provides suggestions as to how we might sketch out the territory to be investigated. Just as decision-making

models range from the purely rational "economic man", through Simon's addition of environmental and psychological constraints, to very complex notions of the policy-making process,⁷ so also conflict models range from mathematically simple two-person zero-sum game theory, through more complicated purely competitive models, to Schelling's complex schemes of interdependent, mixed motive games.⁸ In all these models, decision or conflict, simple or complex, there are common elements in terms of which we can analyze the process of decision-making in political integration.

Specifically, it is important first to see how information is gathered as to alternative courses of action and their consequences if followed, and how these consequences are evaluated in terms of likelihood and preferences. Then we must examine how conflicts over the factual and value premises of decisions are resolved and how the outcomes affect the integrative process. To describe this process as it relates to integration we need a framework which focuses, first, on the types of actors involved (representatives of states, interest groups and parties whether national or cross-national, the supranational bureaucracy); secondly, on the nature

of the interests and issues involved (sources, whether the interests coincide, converge or conflict, the nature of support); thirdly, on the structures of the environment in which the interaction of these elements takes place (nature of socio-economic systems, types of organizations, extent of formalized relations among states); fourthly, on the mode of resolution of conflict (minimum common denominator, splitting the difference, upgrading common interest); and finally, on the nature of the outcomes (how they relate in content to the views of each actor, whether they are accepted by all, how they are enforced, and how they affect crucial areas of interest). In this general framework, then, we shall examine variables relating to the level of integration and to the conditions for integration.

Evidence of Integration

1. The actors involved in decision-making for the regional system can be a good indication of its level of integration. First of all, the more the interests of the region as a whole are represented by actors in important decisional roles, the more likely it is that the regional system has already attained a high level of integration. At present, even in the EEC, the number of

actors in such roles is not great, and there remains some ambiguity, for example, as to whether Commissioner Mansholt represents foremost the EEC Commission, an agriculture interest, or the Dutch. In less integrated systems there are fewer ambiguities only because fewer such roles exist; in more integrated systems we would expect these roles to be predominant in most decisions.

Another indicator of integration with respect to the actors might be the extent of involvement of regionally-oriented politicians, bureaucrats, experts and interest-group leaders compared to the involvement of their nationally-oriented counterparts. Lindberg, for example, has suggested that a rough index can be derived by multiplying the number of annual meetings of a suitable international decision-making body by the number of officials of each of the above types involved before proposals emerge and during the decision-process itself.⁹

Other aspects relating to the actors include the importance of the interest they represent to the decision at hand, their bases of support, their commitment to a particular outcome at all costs, and their access both to information and to capabilities for action. In short, the more that decisions taken to integrate the regional international system are viewed as legitimate and necessary arenas

for the involvement of powerful and influential national and group interests, the more likely it is that the system has already attained a substantial level of integration.

2. The nature of the interests and issues involved in any decision related to the integration of the system is an extremely important indication of the level of integration. First, we might ask if in a given situation there is any kind of a regional interest directly and explicitly involved. Thus it is probably good evidence in favor of integration in the EEC that the Community interest is quite explicitly represented by the Commission in most bargaining sessions. On the other hand the fact that France is increasingly calling this role into question demonstrates the fragility of such inferences. Regional interests are often less openly represented. The tacit acceptance by the Six, at least until recently, of the ultimate necessity of political integration, is one example of the internalization of such interests in the states themselves. Again, Tanganyika represented a form of Pan-African interest when, apparently quite out of proportion to any national interest, she supported East African federation in the ill-fated 1963 negotiations.¹⁰

In international decision-making affecting integration, the primary sources of demands and support are the states, and beyond them and often around them, the various interest groups and parties. Certainly there is no reason why integration should witness any greater convergence or agreement among such interests than before. What we would expect, however, is agreement on certain rules of the game and on the extent to which disagreements should be allowed to go, as well as a certain consensus that regional decision-making bodies are the proper arena for such disputes.

3. Turning to the structure of the environment, we can search for evidence of integration in several areas. One of these is the extent of interpenetration of national and regional bureaucracies. We would expect that a more integrated system would have a large bureaucracy which draws fairly freely on the civil services of its member-states, and that in such a system there would be many high-ranking bureaucrats either seconded to this bureaucracy or, having served in it, influential in their own state's policy process.

Indeed, the development of executive, legislative, bureaucratic and judicial bodies for the regional system

and their influence vis a vis national institutions can be a strong indication of integration. It would be a good indication that individual states are not able to meet all the economic, military and social demands made on them, and have found it necessary to re-focus many of these on the organs of the larger system. Successful political integration, like national political development, seems closely tied to the growth of a universalistic and functionally specific bureaucracy.¹¹ In addition, the closer the regional system is to having a generally-elected assembly and an executive body which represents primarily the general interest, the more it can be said to be integrated. Here, however, we are touching on the nerve-ends of national sovereignty, for implied in the development of such institutions is a shift from unanimity to majority rule among states. From the evidence in Western Europe, where the acceptance of the programmed increase in majoritarianism has been anything but smooth, from the African experience, where the planned majoritarianism of the OAU seems even more distant, and indeed from all such examples of the integrative process, we must at present draw the conclusion that either our criteria are too demanding or the level of integration is in no case very high in this respect.

A final consideration here is the effective system-wide development of interest groups and political parties which focus expectations on, seek access to, and raise issues for, the regional institutions. The existence of the latter is of course essential. The existence of cross-national industrial organizations, youth groups and trade unions in the system, is no substantial evidence of integration, when, as in Africa, their demands and support can only be effectively expressed and directed through national governments.

4. Both Haas and Lindberg suggest that a high level of integration can be inferred if conflicts in the system are resolved predominantly by "upgrading the common interest", that is, redefining the conflict "so as to work out a solution at a higher level, which almost invariably implies the expansion of the mandate or task of an international or national governmental agency".¹² Decisions of this kind, as Haas points out, are a significant modification of the usual diplomatic forms of resolution like the "minimum common denominator" settlements of classical interstate bargaining, or the "splitting the difference" technique of mediation or arbitration.

The resolution of conflict in the highly integrated regional system, then, gives a major role to actors representing the interests of the system as a whole. As states become more interdependent and grow to tacitly accept regional goals, they are more likely to turn over difficult problems to such a third-party and to rely on initiatives from it.

5. As a consequence of the above conditions, we would expect that the more integrated the regional system, the more the outcomes of its decision-making processes will reflect the positions of the regional institutions. This most certainly is the case in the EEC, where the Commission's proposals were in strong evidence in the outcomes of negotiations both on the agricultural policy and on the common external tariff.¹³

Another indication of the level of integration will be in the extent to which outcomes are enforceable by the institutions of the regional system upon dissident member-states. The acceptance by states of such a situation would imply solid commitment on their part to the system's goals and the establishment of legitimacy on the part of the supranational institutions. Finally, the outcomes of decision-making in an integrated system

will be more than rhetoric; they will tend to contain specific objectives and commitments, and will usually be directed to meeting basic functional needs and furthering the program of integration rather than to reaffirming long-term goals and bolstering morale.

In conclusion, then, the integrated regional international system, at least in terms of the structures and processes of decision-making, is likely to be characterized by a large number of system-oriented rather than nationally oriented actors, by an increasing tendency to define issues in terms of system interests, and by a growth in system-wide governmental institutions and interest groups with particular influence in the resolution of interstate conflicts relating to integration, and by resolution of conflicts through upgrading the common interest.

Conditions for Integration

Having suggested some ways of inferring the level of integration in a regional international system from the structures and processes of decision-making among its members, we must now examine the extent to which these structures and processes can act as conditions favorable to integration. As is evident in many studies of the

integrative process, such a distinction between the conditions for and the manifestations of political integration cannot always be sharply drawn.¹⁴ Although this can be conceptually awkward, it seems true to say that many variables which appear at first to be manifestations of a high level of integration also feed back into the process as conditions for its further development.¹⁵

1. Several conditions for political integration relate to the types of actors involved. One of the most important of these is what might be called "elite complementarity". A high level of compatibility in the basic values, outlooks, socio-economic and cultural backgrounds of those most closely concerned with the making of foreign policy in the various states of the system, would seem to favor integration. To a great extent, the current fragmentation of the Pan-African movement shows the effect of common elite experiences with different colonial powers in different parts of the continent. Particularly in regions where the elements of political stability and minimal national integration are lacking, the composition of elite complementarity can change radically. The recent replacement of Nkrumah by a military regime in Ghana is a dramatic example of the effect of

internal politics on the elites involved in the integrative process.

Another condition conducive to integration is the effective presence in interstate negotiations of actors who can "present the dossier" for the regional system as a whole. The EEC Commission, as Lindberg points out, has three principal resources: a monopoly on Community policy initiatives, a monopoly on expertise, and the capacity to act as a catalyst through mediation.¹⁶ These resources have been obtained both through the provisions of the Treaty of Rome and through the willingness of the states to look to third-party initiatives rather than abandon hope of agreement on particular issues. Nothing like the Commission's autonomous role has developed yet in other systems. It could be argued that at least until recently the Soviet Union played a somewhat similar role in Comecon, although the methods may have differed. Also, external actors, such as the United States with respect to Latin America and Britain with respect to numerous post-colonial federation efforts, seem to have performed similar functions to those of the Commission in the promotion of the "community interest".¹⁷

What, finally, of the role of creative statesmanship? Political scientists have a natural suspicion of the "man on

horseback" theory of political change. But surely one need not ascribe such equestrian leanings to "Europeans" like Monnet, Schuman and Hallstein, to acknowledge the effects of their ability to bridge crucial gaps in negotiations by proposing new package deals or compromises, or to develop practical schemes for the development of integration. In other settings, however, such as Africa, where the ideological element has greater weight than the utilitarian, the "hero", or the charismatic leader, if he can demonstrate that he is African first and nationalist second, could play the sort of role in Pan-African movements that he undoubtedly played in nationalist movements.¹⁸

2. Turning now to the interest and issues involved, we come to the question of what types of relationships between national policies generally produce integration. In most international systems, clearly identity of interests is rare. It is a major theme in the work of Haas and Lindberg, however, that convergence, and not identity of interests, is the basis for international political integration.¹⁹ States, then, support integration for different reasons.

Such convergence, moreover, may not always be immediate, and here the actual decision-making situation can have an effect on actors' objectives. According to Snyder "certain objective properties of a situation will be partially responsible for the reactions and orientations of

the decision-makers" and "the assignment of properties to a situation by the decision-makers is indicative of clues to the rules which may have governed their particular responses".²⁰ One such property, as North, Koch and Zinnes have suggested, is the very fact that by being in a decisional situation, no matter how conflict-laden it may be, actors are in contact and communication and hence under some integrative influence.²¹ A second such property more closely related to the issues is the pressure to act. In the EEC, for example, the requirements of a common position for the approaching GATT negotiations hastened the conclusion of bargaining over the common external tariff. Other properties of decisional situations that are relevant to the creation and exploitation of converging interests, are the extent to which particular issues are crucial to particular nations (i.e., agriculture to the Netherlands) and how the problem is viewed in terms of its major functional characteristic (moral, political, economic, social, military).²²

The convergence of national interests, then, is a crucial condition for the progress of political integration, but it is a condition which can be rendered more effective, if not in fact often brought into being, by certain properties of the decision-making situation.

3. In the structure of the environment we can identify several conditions which should favor integration. Quite apart from the important question of functional interdependence, which will be discussed in the next chapter, the existence of a tradition of at least some common decision-making between the states can be of aid to further integration. Very often, as with Canada, the United States and the International Joint Commission or NORAD, these traditions and the institutions representing them may indicate the existence of what Deutsch calls a "pluralistic security community",²³ which may lead to a greater degree of integration. Functionalists, however, often overplay this condition; a thirty-year old customs union and extensive co-operation in the East African Common Services Organization were not sufficient conditions for political federation of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika in 1963.²⁴

Another condition of this type is the existence of a "traite cadre". This is a treaty, of which the Treaty of Rome is a prototype, which binds states to agree within specified time-limits on specific policies leading to the general shared objective of integration. As pointed out earlier, the fact that states are hereby

"condamnes a reussir",²⁵ has led, at least in the European experience, to reliance on a Community bureaucracy and executive which can take real initiatives in furthering integration.

There are several problems relating to the economic and social environment of decision-making which we must touch on here and return to in more detail later. Decisions are not made in a vacuum, and it would appear that integration in terms of decision-making is more likely to flourish in an atmosphere of economic, social and military interdependence. We can only get around the notion, based on the European experience, that a high level of economic and social development in the region is necessary for such interdependence, and hence for integration, if we interpret "interdependence" so broadly as to include the common need, for example, in Latin American countries, of economic development.²⁶

A similar problem is raised with respect to pluralism. Haas argues that in the integrating system the structures and processes produced by interstate bargaining on a regional level rapidly become centres to which political parties and groups with cross-national interests seek access.²⁷ This in turn increases future demands and support for integration. There are, however, several

problems in applying this model outside Western Europe. First, as Hoffmann points out, group theory is really relevant to international relations only once nations are engaged in community-building.²⁸ Hence in any regional system where the states continue to interact without relinquishing national sovereignty in specific functional areas, the Haas approach is not useful. Secondly, in non-Western areas parties tend to espouse "world-views" rather than pragmatic goals, and groups tend to be non-associative and functionally diffuse.²⁹ Thus pluralism, as Haas discusses it, would seem to be an important condition for political integration only if certain other conditions, akin to those found in Europe, are present as well. We may find that what groups do exist in less pluralistic societies have different effects on integration.

4. The ways in which conflicts are resolved in interstate decision-making can act as conditions for integration. "Upgrading the common interest", because it is most conducive to "spillover" from one functional sector to others, is clearly the mode of accommodation most likely to enhance integration. Settlements of this type at least partially satisfy every party's expectations. Those who come out second best in negotiations are restrained

from opting out or wrecking the proceedings, not by any altruism, but by the expectation that in the long run there is more to be gained than lost through co-operation with the other states.

The existence of such an outlook on the part of states is a necessary condition for the development of majoritarian decision-making among them. In the OAU this condition does not seem to be present: tough decisions are generally either shelved by the Council of Ministers or handed on for diplomatic discussion by the Heads of State; and lobbies and groups in the OAU are tempted to wreck negotiations rather than abandon their claims.³⁰

Accommodation by "upgrading the common interest" and, to some extent, by "splitting the difference" can have important effects on integration to the extent that it results in the growth of institutions which act for the common interest in future negotiations. Indeed, North, Koch and Zinnes argue that one of the major effects of conflict on integration is the emergence of a new organization, the development of which will be dependent on "key variables" similar to many of those we have discussed in this section.³¹

5. The nature of decisional outcomes can also effect the progress of political integration. In this connection the timing of reallocation is of particular

importance. If a decisional outcome calls for too much sacrifice by a particular state before its commitment to the integrating system has completely jelled, disintegration may follow, as it did in the British West Indies and in the Egypt-Syria union.³²

Outcomes also aid integration if they serve to perpetuate perceptions that progress is being made in integration. As Lindberg notes, EEC decision-makers were desperate for a resolution of the agricultural deadlock; "Something had to be done if the Community were to avoid the politically and psychologically damaging twin failures of being unable to complete the acceleration, and of having to admit that the goals of the first stage remained unachieved..."³³

The outcomes also aid integration to the extent that central institutions are charged with their execution and enforcement. If the tasks are specific in nature, the institutions' role may be purely technical; if the tasks are open to some interpretation, the institutions may find room to take initiatives and increase their mandate. Finally, we must consider the amount of controversy and importance attached to a given decision. Povolny notes the propensity, not peculiar to African statesmen, for agreement to be strongest on the decisions that are the

least productive for integration.³⁴ Clearly progress in integration can only come about to the extent that decisions are sooner or later forthcoming in the issues that divide states as well as on those that unite them.

Conclusion: The Dynamics of the Process

The main argument of this chapter has been that it is possible to draw conclusions about the level of integration in an international system from the structures and processes of inter-state decision-making. Moreover, these structures and processes will themselves act as conditions favoring integration. To conclude the discussion of the decision-making dimension it would be useful to try and sketch out a view of the actual dynamics of the integrative process as it concerns decision-making.

The starting point we can draw from Hoffmann's analysis of the complex international relationships in the Atlantic Community. In any potentially integrated international system such as this there are at least four types of interaction among states all at the same time: first, despite bonds that may exist, the states can act towards one another as sovereign entities; secondly, there may be one state in the system which, in some areas of common interests, is almost completely dominant; thirdly, within the system there may be subgroupings of states which act together in certain policy areas; finally, there are

the relationships where the states interact as members of a possible political community.³⁵

In the first three cases the international system can be said to resemble a primitive political system, where formal, effective system-wide government is absent, members use violence, threats and self-help to achieve objectives, law is derived from custom or from explicit, particular bargaining relations, and political units within the system are functionally diffuse.³⁶ Political integration involves the expansion of the fourth type of relationship into policy areas where the previous three at present are predominant. In the decision-making dimension, then, political integration involves the development of a legitimate supranational government with real powers in policy areas traditionally under the purview of national states. Political integration, like national political development, has many other aspects as well, but in both cases the growth of policy-making, administrative and legal structures and processes for the system as a whole is of first priority.

The end of the process need not be conceptualized as complete centralization and the obliteration of the other three types of relationships, and indeed of the states themselves. Indeed this is unlikely and unnecessary. Integration is undertaken by states because they cannot

alone meet all the demands made on them; it should therefore develop only so far as is necessary for those demands to be met. Within the framework of a federal union, then, states may still, within limited spheres, interact in ways not characteristic of political communities.

At any stage in the process of political integration in the decision-making dimension, demands are exerting pressure on states, states are seeking new capabilities to meet them while resisting encroachments on sovereignty, and the various types of interactions are coexisting uneasily in the international system. We thus have the elements both of a crisis of legitimacy and of a crisis of penetration.³⁷ The continued progress of integration depends on whether agreement can be reached on the proper extent to which supra-national decision-making structures and processes should make inroads into areas of national policy-making, and on whether the supra-national institutions can make their policies felt and meet demands in all parts of the system. The overcoming of these two crises will to some extent be a consequence of the types of actors involved in decision-making, the nature of the interests and issues, the structure of the environment, the mode of resolution and the nature of the outcomes of specific conflicts. In addition, however, other variables related to the economic, military, social and cultural functions of the system, to

communications patterns in the system, and to the attitudes of its members, will also have important effects in these developmental crises. These will be discussed in the chapters which follow.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 2

¹Examples of approaches that do not explicitly relate the notion of politics with the institutions of government are D.H. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1950; J.D.B. Miller, The Nature of Politics, Penguin Books, 1962; and the political-sociological tradition represented by S.M. Lipset, Political Man, New York, Doubleday, 1960; and A. Etzioni, A. Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1961.

²I. Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, 3rd edition, revised, New York, Random House, 1964, p. 103.

³S. Hoffmann, "Discord in Community: the North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System", International Organization, 17:3, 1963, p. 529.

⁴L. Lindberg, "The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration", Stanford Univ. Press, 1963, p. 278.

⁵Ibid., p. vii.

⁶Ibid., p. 6.

⁷See, in particular, A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, Harper, 1957; the articles on decision-making by Lasswell, Lindblom, Simon and Hilsman in N. Polsby et al (eds.), Politics and Social Life, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1963; and R. Snyder et al (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision-Making, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1963.

⁸T. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1963.

⁹Lindberg, op cit., p. 58.

¹⁰J. Nye, Pan Africanism and East African Integration, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1965, pp. 204-7.

¹¹The best discussion of the relationship of bureaucracy to political development is in J. La Palombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development, Princeton Univ. Press, 1963, particularly the chapter by S.N. Eisenstadt.

¹²See E. Haas, "International Integration: the European and the Universal Process", in International Political Communities, New York, Doubleday, 1966, p. 96; also L. Lindberg, "Decision-Making and Integration in the European Community", in ibid., pp. 199-232.

¹³Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, pp. 208-218, and p. 262.

¹⁴See, for example, criticisms of Deutsch's approach in Haas, "Persistent Themes in Atlantic and European Unity", World Politics, 10:4, 1958, p. 627.

¹⁵This "feedback" may also be negative. O. Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1929, shows how, through a process of organic change, conditions for and manifestations of integration eventually began to work as disintegrating factors.

¹⁶Lindberg, "Decision-Making and Integration", in International Political Communities, pp. 207-8.

¹⁷See Etzioni's discussion of the role of "external elites", in Political Unification, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965, pp. 44-50.

¹⁸See E. Wallerstein, Africa: the Politics of Independence, New York, Vintage, 1961, esp. chapters 5 and 6, for a useful discussion of the role of "heroes" and of ideology in the new Africa.

¹⁹The best statement of Haas' outlook is in the first section of *Beyond the Nation-State*, Stanford Univ. Press, 1964. See, for example, p. 35.

²⁰Snyder et al, op cit., pp. 81-2.

²¹R. North, H. Koch and D. Zinnes, "The Integrative Functions of Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 4:3, 1960, p. 359.

²²For a general discussion on how situations are defined by decision-makers, see Snyder et al, op cit., pp. 80-86.

²³K. Deutsch et al, "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area", in International Political Communities, pp. 2-3.

²⁴Nye, op cit., chapters 4 and 5, esp. pp. 130-49.

²⁵This interesting example of Gallic irony is quoted in Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, p. 270.

²⁶For a useful discussion of the effects of interdependence in Eastern Europe on increased multilateralism, see D. Cattell, "Multilateral Co-operation and Integration in Eastern Europe", Western Political Quarterly, 13:1, 1960, pp. 64-67.

²⁷Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, and Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, both develop this thesis extensively.

²⁸Hoffmann, op cit., pp. 527-8.

²⁹For general discussions relating group theory to non-Western political processes, see J. La Palombara, "The Utility and Limits of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations", in Polsby et al (eds.), op cit.;

G. Almond and J.S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton Univ. Press, 1960; and L. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process", in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1961.

³⁰N. McKeon, "The African States and the OAU", International Affairs, 42:3, 1966, pp. 406-7.

³¹North, Koch and Zinnes, op cit., pp. 359-64.

³²Etzioni, Political Unification, chapters 4 and 5.

³³Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, p. 251.

³⁴M. Povolny, "Africa in Search of Unity: Model and Reality", Background, 9:4, 1966, p. 315.

³⁵Hoffmann, op cit., pp. 532-37.

³⁶R. Masters, "World Politics as a Primitive Political System", World Politics, 16:4, 1964, p. 592. For other useful comparisons of foreign and domestic politics, see S. Hoffman, The State of War, New York, Praeger, 1965, chapters 3 and 4, esp. pp. 91-2.

³⁷L. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, Boston, Little, Brown, 1966, pp. 63-66.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SECOND DIMENSION: PERFORMANCE OF BASIC FUNCTIONAL TASKS

Introduction

A political system is characterized not only by the way decisions are made and conflicts resolved within it, but also by what those decisions are about -- in short, by the nature of the functions it performs, their inter-relationships, and its effectiveness in carrying them out. These functions are the tasks performed by structures in the system, and are products of the interaction of individual and group interests, which produces demands on and support for, the political system.

These demands can be said to arise from the economic, military, social and cultural needs of individuals and groups. In our recent experience it has been the nation-state which has proved the most effective political form for the satisfaction of these needs; as Katz suggests, its basic overall functions have been: 1. the maintenance of internal integration, 2. the maximization of a favorable input-output ratio, and 3. survival and protection against enemies.¹ Functional theories of international

political integration are concerned with how the assumption of such functions by structures "beyond the nation-state" -- whether this arises from voluntary international co-operation or from the overwhelming pressure of basic demands -- can lead to political integration among nation-states. Political integration, then, like national political development, can be considered not only in terms of decision-making, but also in terms of the basic functions with which those decisions are concerned.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to enter into a long critical discussion of functionalist theories of political integration. It is important to note, however, that such theories take at least two forms. The first of these, which we might characterize as "traditional" functionalism, is based on the belief that it is possible to integrate states by emphasizing international co-operation in "non-political" spheres of common interest and thereby "weaving an ever spreading web of international institutional relations" on the basis of these interests, until "practical co-operation becomes coterminous with the totality of interstate relations".² This theory, of which David Mitrany has been a major exponent,³ obviously contains prescriptive as well as empirical elements, and indeed, it

has been engaged in a continuing battle with federalist theories of rapid political integration, for the minds of statesmen.

A second form might be called "pluralistic" functionalism. This approach, as developed particularly by Haas, is based on the observation that "certain kinds of organizational tasks most intimately related to group and national aspirations can be expected to result in integration even though the actors responsible for this development may not deliberately work toward such an end". Integration, then, results from an "institutionalized pattern of interest politics, played out within existing international organizations".⁴ In seeking to explain the process of political integration the pluralistic functionalist explicitly rejects the traditional functionalist's reliance on the non-controversial, in favor of a focus on converging objectives in a milieu where there is pressure toward shared decisions.

In investigating how changes in the ways that basic functions are performed can bring about political integration or indicate the extent to which it has progressed, we shall have to keep both the above theories at hand. Although in the face of Haas' sophisticated formulation traditional functionalism appears both restrictive and

naively optimistic, it may prove of some explanatory value in integrating systems which do not feature all the elements necessary for the flourishing of interest politics on a cross-national scale. Moreover, because the focus of this essay is strictly on limited, regional international systems, a further qualification must be added to both approaches. Mitrany is not interested in regionalism,⁵ and Haas formulates his pluralistic functionalism for application to the global system in which the ILO operates. For us, however, the economic, military, social and cultural differences between systems could be important considerations. Again, we must be concerned with the effects on systems of their relations with external states and with other regional systems.

Of the functions to be discussed in this chapter, the economic are probably the most fundamental and the most likely to generate controversy. For this reason pluralistic rather than traditional functionalist approaches are likely to be at home here, and studies are likely to emphasize decision-making and developed economies. As Haas and Schmitter acknowledge, however, in recent history the preceding of political union by close economic ties has not been strongly evident.⁶ Haas adds warnings, of particular interest to those concerned with comparative

study, about applying generalizations from European-based economic theories of political integration, to underdeveloped areas which do not reproduce the physical conditions, ideologies, class structure, group relations or political institutions or traditions of Europe.⁷ In discussing the relation of economic and political integration, then, we must be especially mindful of possible European biases.

Economists generally refer to the integration of two or more national economies as having three aspects:⁸ first, the free movement of trade and factors of production (i.e., changes in the allocation of resources); secondly, economic development and the accumulation of capital and the capacity for "economies of scale" (i.e., the effect of integration on markets, competition, technology and entrepreneurship); and thirdly, the co-ordination of economic policies (i.e., harmonization of social, fiscal, monetary and external policies). Although many of the variables in terms of which we can assess the level of and conditions for integration are likely to be quantifiable, we cannot be sure of some important causal relationships, most notably that of the level of economic development and the extent of interdependence, to the progress of integration.

Because, for one thing, it rarely involves the same piecemeal abrogation of sovereignty we have seen in the European experience of economic integration, military integration has different effects on interstate relationships. The concept of military integration includes both alliances among states against external powers and co-operation among states for the peaceful settlement of disputes in their regional system. Examples of the former are of course NATO, SEATO and the Warsaw Pact; examples of the latter are the OAS and the OAU. Military integration is generally marked by formalized alliances or treaties, often calling for common headquarters and command structures; declared common objectives (in the case of alliances often a common enemy) and commitments; pooling and specialization in personnel, technology and weapons; and the co-ordination of strategy and often even foreign policy.

For a number of reasons it is harder to link military and political integration in the same way that pluralistic functional theory has linked economic and political integration. First, military integration in the form of an alliance may only mean that the members are somewhat more likely to go to war with someone else than with each other. It is unlikely that in such a case

co-operation would involve any extensive shifts of sovereignty. Secondly, while decisions arising from military integration may often be controversial, they usually have less impact than purely economic decisions on interest groups, and these groups have less access to policy-making processes on the international level. We might consider, then, that an important effect of military on political integration, quite apart from that of the co-ordinated decisions, would lie in the perception of solidarity for the purpose of security. Such perceptions could lead to greater ideological justifications and psychological backing for economic co-operation and political union.

The third category of functions is rather more heterogeneous, and involves what we shall call social-cultural integration. It concerns the relations of states with respect to social matters such as health, human rights, education and social security, and with respect to scholarly, artistic, and sporting exchanges, scientific and technological co-operation, and programmes designed for the purpose, however vague, of emphasizing or regenerating a "common culture" among participating states. Examples of international organizations that approach the problem of integration in this way would be the East African

Common Services Organization, and the Council of Europe.⁹

The assumption behind such programmes is clearly that the sharing of basically technical and non-divisive problems, and mutual exposure to cultural experiences, will lead to constant increases in the spheres of co-operation and to the "learning" of psychological attitudes that will decrease the likelihood of serious international conflict. This, then, is foremost the territory of the traditional functionalist. Problems which can be settled by computation or judgement rather than by compromise, are likely to further integration, not so much by involving groups in international decision-making but by increasing popular perceptions of common interests. It may well be that in certain types of integrating international systems this thesis has more explanatory value than it has in the European setting.

These three sets of functions -- economic, military, and social-cultural -- are obviously closely interrelated in many respects. Social-cultural integration, for example, is affected by economic and military integration. Labour mobility in the EEC has produced a need for Europe-wide solutions to the social problems of migration, and Article Two of the North Atlantic Treaty has produced hesitant efforts at promoting the cultural unity of the Atlantic

Community. Economic integration is influenced by military and social-cultural integration. The need to develop "infrastructure" for NATO affects transportation and the deployment of resources in national economies; and in Africa patterns of economic co-operation have tended to replicate patterns of common colonial experience. Military integration, finally, is affected by economic and social-cultural integration. Evidence of success in the Schuman Plan had a great deal of influence on the idea, however abortive, for a European Defence Community; and African awareness of a common heritage of experience with Europeans is manifested in the pledges of military co-operation to be found in the Casablanca Charter and similar declarations.¹⁰

In the discussion that follows, the three categories of functions will be maintained as we suggest variables in terms of which the level of and the conditions for integration in the functional dimension can be assessed.

Evidence of Integration

With respect to economic functions there are a number of objective criteria by which we can assess the level of integration. The first aspect of integration, the free/movement of trade and factors of production, can

be examined in terms of national economic policies. Tariff levels and quotas, restrictions on the movement of labor across borders, and ceilings on foreign capital investment can therefore indicate how far economic integration has proceeded. In addition, it is important to look at the effects of such policies, that is, to measure the actual flows of trade and factors of production among states in the system.¹¹ Figures on trade by states with other states in the system as a percentage of total trade, on population mobility and foreign investment, especially if such figures are compared over a period of time, can provide useful evidence of the level of economic integration.

The free flow of trade and factors of production may occur in some economic sectors and not in others. The number and nature of sectors in which it does occur is therefore an important indication of integration. If coal and steel production is integrated in an industrialized system, we can infer a high level of economic integration. If in any system primary and secondary industry, and farming, are all marked by few barriers to factor and trade flow, the scope rather than the nature of the sectors is the important indication that a high level of integration exists.

The second aspect of economic integration, the level of economic development, raises some difficult questions.

In this section we are concerned, not with the effect of economic development on economic integration, but with the former as a symptom of the latter. Later we shall discuss the relationship of political integration and economic development as well. Suffice it to say here that both the EEC and LAFTA indicate not only that economic integration is viewed as a means toward political integration, but also that political integration can only be marked by economic prosperity. It does, indeed, seem reasonable to suggest that where political integration exists in all its dimensions, the system economy will be marked by a high level of incomes, high percentages of incomes directed toward investment, healthy competitive markets and stable prices, technological innovation, differentiation of industries, and other aspects of economies that have passed "takeoff" and entered the "drive to maturity".¹²

With respect to the third aspect of economic integration, the co-ordination of economic policies, there are again several objective criteria available for assessing the extent to which states harmonize fiscal, social, monetary and external policies. Are tax structures revised so as to be roughly similar? What about labor legislation? What arrangements are made for currency convertability and the handling of payments problems? To what degree has a

common external tariff been achieved? And to what extent do states co-operate in the location of new industry in the system?¹³ Naturally inferences about the level of integration are not always easily drawn from shifts in states' policies in these areas, but to ignore them would be to remain unaware of important evidence.

Turning to military functions we find fewer clear and quantifiable indices. The existence of treaties, institutions and other formal aspects of alliances is only of limited value as evidence of integration. More useful evidence would be the actual direction and extent of war preparations by states in the system.¹⁴ Certainly the diplomatic manoeuvring prior to and even during both World Wars would suggest that states often shift remarkably quickly to closer relations with non-allies than with formal allies. For organizations directed at regional pacific settlement, the number of times disputes are settled within the system rather than taken to the UN, and how successful the organization has been in this respect can tell us a good deal about the level of military integration.

The percentages of personnel, weapons and strategic materials that are committed to the alliance or to regional peacekeeping, must be examined in several ways. As a percentage of total American capabilities, Washington's commitment to the OAS is small; as a percentage of the OAS capability it is rather larger. Clearly, however, the more of their military capabilities that states have tied up in common operations, the more we are justified in referring to them as militarily integrated. The same holds true for the freedom of exchange of personnel, scientific data and military secrets, and for the contribution of territory for bases. Finally, the existence of a common foreign policy in terms of specific goals and attitudes can often be an indication of military integration. The Arab League policy towards Israel reflects not only rhetoric and emotion, but also a substantial degree of military co-ordination. Again, the development of formalized African blocs at the UN parallels concerted military objectives against the vestiges of colonialism on the continent.

With respect to the social-cultural functions, finally, we can look first for formal evidence of co-operation. The structures and programmes that have multiplied under the auspices of the Council of Europe, such as the Commission and Court of Human Rights, the Council

for Cultural Co-operation, the European Social Charter, and all the products of manifold European conferences on everything from education, insurance and criminology to refugees and the doping of athletes -- all these may appear trivial in the face of the dramatic achievements and crises of the EEC. Again, the fact that in the Nordic Council countries social security is portable and cultural exchanges are numerous, and yet no common market exists, is often held to indicate a low level of "real" integration.¹⁵ If, however, instead of comparing social-cultural integration with economic integration, we compare these structures and programmes to what exists outside the system and to what existed at an earlier date, then surely they can be viewed as important symptoms of a closer community in their own right.

In systems which are less developed economically, moreover, drives to put into effect common social and cultural policies may often be based on the desire to imitate immediately many practices of economically advanced welfare states. In such circumstances it is plausible that social-cultural co-operation, to the extent that it means increased popular awareness of the system as a whole, may be an extremely important aspect of political integration.

Where economic development and social pluralism are lacking, then, social-cultural co-operation may assume quite a different role, and be a more important indicator of integration than it is in more developed systems.

Conditions for Integration

The classic condition for economic integration lies in the implications of national economic growth for conditions in the international system. As nationally-based industries grow, the need for investment capital, labor, cheap raw materials and markets often outstrips national capacities. The fact that national industries in developed economies have this propensity to look beyond national boundaries, then, is a condition, at the least, for a highly interdependent international economic system, and at the most, for economic integration. But, as mentioned earlier, in less developed regions economic integration is viewed as a condition for economic development. In a sense, then, the need for development is acting in such cases as a sort of "functional equivalent" for development itself.

Given this basic condition, a number of other important variables come into play. One is the role of what Deutsch refers to as "core areas". These large political

units are more advanced politically, administratively, and economically than other units in the system.¹⁶ Very often, as with the Habsburg lands, or the original Swiss cantons of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden, or the industrial heartland of the EEC, these areas are also geographically central. In this connection also, territorial contiguity and the sharing of convenient transport routes such as the Rhine, can be important conditions for integration. Other conditions bearing on transportation are not related to geography, and have to do with technological developments and with discriminatory transport charges.¹⁷

As suggested previously, an important set of variables concerns interdependence. Whether or not it is a consequence of economic development, a high level of intraregional trade indicates such interdependence, and can be considered an important condition for economic integration. In the Europe of the Six, intraregional trade amounts to 40% of total trade, in former British East Africa, 20%,¹⁸ in Latin America, 10%, and in Central America, 6%.¹⁹ In less developed areas the sharing of problems -- the vulnerability of world prices for the primary products they export; the need to develop economies of scale, and the lack of capital -- apparently constitutes a more important form of interdependence than does trade.

Is economic integration advanced more by complementarity or by similarity of national economies? As Etzioni points out, the answer is not at all clear.²⁰ Heterogeneity with respect to types of products (competitive or complementary), scale (size of GNP) and level of prosperity (per capita income) is a difficult factor to isolate. In terms of products, the traditional idea of comparative advantage (French iron ore for German coal) competes against evidence of homogeneity in Europe and Latin America. Great discrepancies in GNP, which exist in almost every system, with the possible exception of Central America, are often compensated by a smaller country's possession of a unique or crucial natural resource. Finally, with respect to per capita income, Etzioni reaches somewhat ambivalent conclusions concerning the effects of differences within systems. His evidence for the negative aspect, however, is hardly decisive, and he might better have chosen to place more emphasis on his earlier observation that when income levels are measured against all existing states more unifications encompass states that fall in the same general category of wealth.²¹

There are obviously many other factors that could possibly act as conditions for economic integration. In developed systems, the number and type of sectors in which

the process is initiated will be important, and it is usually assumed that successful integration must commence in basic industries so that "spillover" can be maximized. Another condition might be how the region stands in relation to world trade patterns. The fact that Latin America had wobbled to the periphery of world trade, and that its traditional export markets were being threatened by EEC tariffs and preferences, was certainly a stimulus to attempts at economic integration.²² Finally, many regions may possess unique conditions favorable to integration. Gordon reiterates the point made earlier in this section, that less developed economies are still concerned with public investment in infrastructure and in the development of markets, both of which can lead to a high degree of regional co-operation and integration of a definitely "political" nature.²³ Haas and Schmitter, as well, note the potentially important role of unbalanced growth, of the class of tecnicos and of the indigenous problem-solving style in Latin America.²⁴

Military integration, like economic integration, has its "classic" condition. This, of course, is the existence of a common enemy. When we talk in terms of alliances the argument is plausible. We need only consider

the Soviet Union and NATO, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Israel and the Arab League, colonialism and the Casablanca Charter. Indeed, the "common enemy" thesis can explain broader forms of integration as well.

Shulman notes that Western European integration, because it posed both an economic and a military threat to Eastern Europe, produced integration there "by induction".²⁵

History provides further examples. Schemes and movements for European unity have been remarkable for their emphasis on resistance to various common external enemies, notably the Byzantine Empire and the Turks.²⁶ Many of the above examples, however, are also notable in that integration lasted only as long as the threat. Indeed Deutsch comes to just such a conclusion in his North Atlantic study.²⁷

The question of the common enemy aside, there are other conditions conducive to military integration, whether this be for defence or for regional peacekeeping. Geographical proximity has always been important, although technology renders it less so today. It remains an important condition where the maintenance of the political community depends on the use of coercive power to keep intransigent units in the fold. Etzioni suggests that, past a certain point, the use of coercive power to maintain a community will have an increasingly negative effect.²⁸

Similarly divisive effects may arise if military burdens, either for peacekeeping or for the defence of the community, are placed excessively on one unit.

Is it a crucial condition for strong military integration that economic problems be tied to the military problems? Haas suggests that in terms of decision-making styles NATO is purely a classical diplomatic relationship, except where defence problems are related to economic questions of the distribution of defence burdens and their relation to welfare commitments.²⁹ Haas' emphasis on the primacy of economic relations is convincing; yet there are equally important conditions for military integration where, as in Eastern Europe, one country holds predominant coercive power, or where, as in the Arab League, there are certain predominant hostilities, directed toward an outside state, which have psychological effects within the alliance.

Among the conditions for social-cultural integration there are several which are both important and obvious, and need little discussion. These include ease of communications among states, and the sharing of technical and social problems. Somewhat less obvious, but equally weighty, is the compatibility of major values held by elites

in the system. Not only must there be a minimal consensus on what constitute the important questions of welfare, administration and social justice; as well there must be an ethos that these problems can be solved by rational planning and co-operation. The effects of elite differences in backgrounds and social philosophies are particularly evident in integration movements in the developing areas.³⁰

The study of political integration has inherited, quite naturally, a lot of theoretical notions from studies of nationalism. Among these is the idea that the sharing of cultural symbols, ethnic origins, a language, a religion and a sense of identity plays a fundamental role in the integration of political communities.³¹ Many of these factors will work on political integration through the medium of social-cultural co-operation. The role of ideology in international political integration has scarcely been examined; Nye's study of East Africa demonstrates fairly conclusively that the mythical and emotional aspects of PanAfricanism played an important part in several key decisions about integration.³² The implication certainly is that in less developed regional systems shared ideology will be a greater condition for social and cultural co-operation; and because in such systems the pluralism and complex decision-making processes of more developed regions is lacking,

social-cultural co-operation will loom larger in the total integrative process. Whether or not this assumption will be borne out, it is too early to say. In the meantime we can at least agree with Etzioni that "shared culture is not a prerequisite for unification but a requirement that has to be fulfilled before the process can be advanced".³³

Conclusion: The Dynamics of the Process

In its functional dimension, political integration arises from the increasing difficulty of meeting economic, military and social-cultural needs on the level of the nation-state. Either through the straight co-operation of sovereign states, or through compromises of this sovereignty brought about through interaction in a pluralistic decision-making context, the performance of many of these functions becomes the province of the regional international system of which these states are each part. In so far as such changes take place, we can say that the characteristics of the international system are changing and that it is becoming more integrated.

As suggested earlier in this chapter, there are two major clusters of variables relating to this process of integration. The first has to do with the nature of the

functions involved. Pluralistic functional theory relies, in its explanations of the dynamics of integration, on the concept of "spillover" from one functional sector to another. For example, the effects of free trade in certain commodities are soon felt in the transportation sector, as increased flows cause pressures to rationalize regulations and methods for moving the goods between countries. The obvious question then becomes: which functional sectors have the most potential for spillover? As Etzioni notes, claims have been made for the cultural sector (Deutsch), the military sector (Kissinger) and the economic sector (Haas).³⁴ Etzioni's most useful insight here, however, is that it is important to consider as well the internal structure of societies participating in the process, and the extent of sector interrelation.

This leads us to the second cluster of variables, those relating to the differences between types of regional international systems. Etzioni's view is that the "service" sectors have the least spillover potential, programmes to which "human values" are attached, slightly more, tariff agreements and military agreements still more, and economic union or common markets, the most.³⁵ But this, like the pluralistic functionalist thesis, would seem to be a pattern based almost entirely on the Western European experience.

It is not unreasonable to assume that in less developed areas a more important part will be played by the relations of the system with the rest of the world (i.e., trade position, defence, and cultural identity), that the service sectors will assume more important role in the integrative process, and that spillover as a mechanism may be less in evidence.

Certain conclusions, then, can be drawn with respect to the explanatory power of the two schools of functionalist theory. We start from the assumption that political systems that are economically developed and socially complex will be more likely to produce diversified patterns of demands and support for the performance of functions, than are less developed systems. In less developed systems there are more likely to be certain salient common interests, such as the elimination of disease, the replacement of great power intervention as a means of settling local conflicts, the development of viable economic systems, and the gaining of a greater voice in the UN. Thus the scope of what are treated as "technical" rather than "political" problems will probably be greater than in systems where innovation of services rather than redistribution of wealth is the major concern. Moreover there should be a greater play for similar and not merely converging interests. Finally, as Haas himself points out, the assumption that loyalties are a product

of satisfaction with governmental performance of functions, and that they will therefore shift to functionally significant and successful international agencies, may not hold up "to the extent that the integrative process is influenced by nations with ascriptive status patterns, traditional or charismatic leadership".³⁶ In such cases perhaps loyalties are more likely to be shifted by "irrational" appeals such as are involved in the myth of common culture, and the threat of outside intervention.

While, then, we can agree with Haas' criticisms of traditional functional theory and accept his refined version of the "separability propositions",³⁷ his own pluralistic version has its limitations outside the European context.³⁸ Particularly for the purposes of comparative analysis it would be useful to retain elements of both the traditional and the pluralistic functional explanations of political integration.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 3

¹D. Katz, "Nationalism and Strategies of International Conflict Resolution", in H. Kelman (ed.), International Behavior, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965, pp. 358-59.

²E. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, Stanford Univ. Press, 1964, p. 6.

³See Esp. D. Mitrany, A Working Peace System (4th edition), New York, National Peace Council, 1946; and "The Functional Approach to World Organization", International Affairs, 24:3, 1948; also, "The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional?", Journal of Common Market Studies, 4:2, 1965.

⁴Haas, op cit., p. 35; see also E. Haas and P. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections About Unity in Latin America", in International Political Communities, New York, Doubleday, 1966, p. 262.

⁵See Mitrany's discussion of the "fallacy of regionalism", in "The Prospect of Federalism", Journal of Common Market Studies, 4:2, 1965.

⁶Haas and Schmitter, op cit., pp. 260-61.

⁷E. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, Stanford Univ. Press, 1958, p. xv.

⁸See B. Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration, Homewood, Ill., Irwin, 1962; and P. Streeten, Economic Integration, Leyden, Sythoff, 1964.

⁹For chronicles of the functional activities of the Council of Europe, see the Council's bi-monthly publications, Council of Europe News, and Forward in Europe, issued by the Directorate of Information, Strasbourg.

¹⁰See R. Lawson (ed.), International Regional Organizations: Constitutional Foundations, New York, Praeger, 1962, pp. 303-12.

¹¹J. Brebner, in his North Atlantic Triangle, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1945, makes the observation that in Canadian-American commercial relations "the whole apparatus of tariffs, quotas and preferential duties ... is less important than the flood of goods which has flowed over them". (p. 239).

¹²W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965, esp. chapters 4 and 5.

¹³See J. Nye, "East African Economic Integration", in International Political Communities, pp. 424-27. Nye notes the special importance, for underdeveloped areas, of the question of the location of new industry.

¹⁴K. Deutsch, "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area", in International Political Communities, pp. 12-16.

¹⁵Note Etzioni's disappointment with the Nordic Council, in his Political Unification, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965, chapter 6; also, P. Dolan, "The Nordic Council", Western Political Quarterly, 12:2, 1959.

¹⁶Deutsch, op cit., p. 19.

¹⁷Concerning the effect of the latter in Latin America, see M. Wionczek, "The Latin American Free Trade Association", in International Political Communities, p. 329.

¹⁸Nye, op cit., p. 407.

¹⁹W. Sedwitz, "A Common Market for Latin America?", Current History, 43:251, 1962, pp. 5 and 8.

²⁰Etzioni, op cit., pp. 20-22.

²¹Etzioni, loc cit.

²²Sedwitz, op cit., pp. 1-3.

²³L. Gordon, "Economic Regionalism Reconsidered", in International Political Communities, pp. 250-53.

²⁴Haas and Schmitter, op cit., pp. 286-94.

²⁵M. Shulman, "The Communist States and Western Integration", International Organization, 17:3, 1963, pp. 659-60.

²⁶A useful short discussion of these themes in conceptions of European unity can be found in G. Barraclough, European Unity in Thought and Action, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1963, esp. pp. 15-16, 41, 53.

²⁷Deutsch, op cit., p. 25.

²⁸Etzioni, op cit., pp. 72-73.

²⁹E. Haas, "International Integration: the European and the Universal Process", in International Political Communities, p. 103. For an excellent discussion of the relation between military and economic problems, see L. Gordon, "Economic Aspects of Coalition Diplomacy -- the NATO Experience", International Organization, 10:4, 1956.

³⁰See E. Wallerstein, Africa: the Politics of Independence, New York, Vintage, 1961, chapter 4, for an analysis of the effects of colonialism on these patterns.

³¹For these ideas Deutsch, in particular, has drawn on earlier studies of national development.

³²J. Nye, Pan-Africanism and East African Integration, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1965, esp. part 3. See also R. Emerson, "Pan-Africanism", in International Political Communities, pp. 437-56. An interesting discussion of one of the important elements of Pan-African ideology can be found in A. Irele, "Negritude: Literature and Ideology", Journal of Modern African Studies, 3:4, 1965.

³³Etzioni, op cit., p. 36.

³⁴Ibid., p. 55.

³⁵A. Etzioni, "The Dialectics of Supranational Unification", in International Political Communities, p.140.

³⁶Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p. 50. See also E. Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism", International Organization, 12:4, 1958, pp. 456-57.

³⁷Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, pp. 21-22, 47-50.

³⁸See also a general criticism of Haas' approach to problems of integration, in J. Rosenau, "Transforming the International System: Small Increments along a Vast Periphery", World Politics, 18:3, 1966. Rosenau notes that Haas has a tendency to see causation in "too giant terms", and fails to consider the smaller effects of international organizations on the international system. (p. 544).

CHAPTER FOUR

THE THIRD DIMENSION: PATTERNS OF COMMUNICATION

Introduction

That a political community is characterized by the flow of information, goods and services, and population within it, is one of the early insights of integration theory. Transposing ideas from studies of national community formation, Deutsch in particular has suggested that urban, regional and international integration as well could be explained in terms of communications theory.¹ Patterns of communication, then, can be considered both as evidence of, and as conditions for, political integration among nation-states.

As Toscano points out, the assumptions behind the emphasis on communications flows are that: the higher the transaction flows between two groups, the more salient is the one group to the other; the higher the level of mutually indulging transactions, the higher the level of positive salience; and the higher the positive salience, the higher the probability of co-operation and integration between the two groups.² The psychological premises of this reasoning will be explored in the next chapter. The

more immediate interests is the possibility of drawing inferences about the level and the likelihood of integration from the objective evidence of communications flows.

The crucial variable in communications theory, whether it is implicit (as in Toscam's reasoning) or explicit (as in Russett's study of Britain and America)³, is "responsiveness". The existence of a political community is indicated in part by the level of responsiveness of members to each other. Moreover, since from the cybernetics point of view government is a problem more of communication than of power,⁴ the level of development of a political community is indicated by the responsiveness of the government to demands. Translated into terms of this essay, then, political integration in a regional international system is in part a function of the responsiveness of the member states to each other, and of the responsiveness of the evolving system-wide organizations to demands arising from the system as a whole.

How is responsiveness to be estimated? Russett refers to integration as "the process of building capabilities for responsiveness relative to the loads put on the capabilities".⁵ The simple formula, $\text{responsiveness} = \frac{\text{capabilities}}{\text{demands}}$ then, encompasses all the variables which communications theory

usually considers. The only problem here is that, besides the "objective" capabilities, which include the facilities for attention and communication (formal and informal institutions; frequency of use of physical channels of communication), the numerator of this formula also subsumes "subjective" variables relating to "mutual identification" (mutual sympathy and loyalties, "we-feeling", trust, consideration, the will to treat others' requests with indulgence).⁶ But while communications theorists emphasize these subjective aspects, and refer to integration as "the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population",⁷ their reliance on the quantifiable gives them by and large only "secondary" objective criteria by which to estimate the existence of these social-psychological traits.

In this chapter rather less hope will be placed on the questionable facility of making such an inferential leap. Whether or not they can be directly related to attitudes, communications flows do nevertheless indicate certain behavioral regularities. Thus, in order to know the level or the likelihood of political integration we can look at the flow-patterns of information, goods and services, and

population, without being required to worry about the attitudes or potential attitude changes these may imply. Indeed, the question of attitudes is much larger than the explanatory capacities of communications theory alone, and must be discussed on its own in the chapter which follows.

Communications theory, then, can never be the whole of integration theory. Patterns of communication alone do not determine how decisions will be made in integrating systems; nor do they necessarily reflect how economic, military and social-cultural functions are performed in the system. A quantitative increase in responsiveness need not imply a qualitative change in decision-making styles, in functional demands, or in attitudes.⁸ Nevertheless, to ignore the capabilities and loads relating to responsiveness would be as unenlightening as to overplay their importance. How people characteristically communicate is a crucial element in the formation or change of political communities. Communication is social behavior, and the growth of a system of such behavior is an essential aspect of any form of political development. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that more and more correlations can be made between the findings of communications theory and those of other types of integration theory, so that some idea can be gained of the relative weight and usefulness of its indices.

Having, it is hoped, eliminated some major pretensions (and perhaps fostered others), we might now return to the problem of measurement. Quantifiability is at once the major advantage and the chief problem in the communications dimension of political integration theory. It is an advantage because it implies the existence in the researcher's mind of a simple, easily manipulated, predictive mathematical model of integration. As long as the extent of abstraction and the number of variables omitted in the ordering of a complex reality, is specified and clear, such models can be useful both for heuristic and explanatory purposes.⁹ If, however, the communications theorist succumbs to what Bull calls the characteristic "fetish for measurement",¹⁰ and ignores what may be important in favor of what is undoubtedly quantifiable, then any advantages to be gained from the operations which models make possible will be lost in the increasingly obscure and tenuous relationship between the model and the reality of integration.

Bearing in mind these advantages and limitations, we can examine some of the ways of estimating responsiveness as evidence of and as a condition for political integration. It may be possible to measure the loads -- that is, the

denominator of the formula -- in terms of the weight, direction and number of demands made by states on each other and by the system on the system-wide organizations. But the notion of loads is complicated by the fact that not only demands but also the rather less manageable "situations needing attention" are part of the limitations on responsiveness.¹¹ Therefore, to estimate responsiveness, or the likelihood that demands will be both heard and met with indulgence rather than deprivation, it would probably be better to focus primarily on capabilities.

The capabilities can be considered both as the flow of information, population, and goods and services, and as the existence of facilities for such communication. The existence of the latter can be determined largely by straight observation of institutions and practices. With respect to the former, we are aided by a number of formulae. First, there is the "null model", which compares actual and expected volumes of communication between units and thus provides an index of cohesion. The expected volume is based on world patterns estimated without consideration of any special relationships between states, so that the amount by which the actual flow exceeds the expected can be taken as evidence of integration. In its simplest form the "null model" emerges as a "transaction index" $(\frac{\text{actual} - \text{expected}}{\text{expected}})$,

or as an index of "relative acceptance" ($\frac{\text{actual}}{\text{expected}}$).¹²

A second set of formulae concerns simply the volume of communications. The ratios of input to output or of domestic to foreign communications for individual units,¹³ as well as the "preoccupation ratio" of the number of communications from a particular unit to another, to the total number of communications¹⁴ -- all these formulae are based on the assumption that the more two units are integrated the more they will communicate among themselves rather than within themselves or with other units outside the system. Finally, the Newtonian-looking formula $\frac{P_1 P_2}{D^2}$

incorporates the effects of distance and the size of populations into the consideration of communications flows between states.¹⁵ These various ratios serve as useful illustrations of the sort of relationships that can be investigated as evidence of and conditions for integration in the communications dimension.

Evidence of Integration

In general a regional international system is likely to be integrated to a substantial degree if, both among its member-states and in its system-wide organizations, there exist, first, structures and practices which facilitate

responsiveness, and secondly, great communication of information, population and goods and services, which both indicates and helps to ensure that such responsiveness exists. In this section we shall look first at the relations of states to each other and then at the relationship of organizations and system.

1. In the relations of the states in a system to one another there are a number of structures and practices which, if present, would indicate a strong tendency to responsiveness. First, such a practice among foreign policy elites is mutual consultation over the foreign policy decisions of one state when these are likely to have serious implications for the others. Whether formal structures exist for this purpose (the International Joint Commission for Canada and the United States is an example), or whether there is merely a propensity to "get together" on questions (as among the African blocs in the UN), the habit of mutual consultation and exchange of information is an important indicator of integration. The frequency of disruptive incidents, such as the Suez crisis in Anglo-American relations, can be a dramatic, if not always sufficiently sensitive, measure of this type of responsiveness.

Secondly, structures and practices which assist the flow of information among socio-economic and political elites

are also evidence of responsiveness. Cross-national industrial groupings, labour unions and political parties are examples of such structures. Where such structures do exist, as in Western Europe, co-ordination of economic and social policies is facilitated; where they exist to a less degree, co-ordination is less evident. In Latin America, there is a danger that the drastic tariff reductions in LAFTA, desired by some states, may kill some nationally important fledgling industries in others.

Thirdly, the frequency of opportunities for communication among these elites as well as among non-elites is to a great extent dependent on the degree of official resistance to such contacts. Restrictions on travel or cultural exchanges with other countries in the system (such as Costa Rica's refusal to take part in the elimination of visa requirements in intra-Central America travel)¹⁶ are therefore as much evidence of a lack of responsiveness as they are of the lack of conditions for it.

A final structural characteristic of responsiveness is the existence of facilities for the flow of mass communications between states. Shared radio and television networks or arrangements for program exchanges, and the free flow of publications among states constitute evidence for a state of mutual responsiveness.

What can we tell about the level of integration from the actual flows of communications? On the basis of the formulae discussed earlier, we should expect, first, that the actual exchange of mail, telegrams, hours of mass media consumption, and other forms of information, the actual trade and investment figures, and the actual movement of tourists and immigrants, be significantly higher in the system than the "null model" projects them to be. Secondly, in a highly integrated system it is probable that the ratios, for states, of foreign to domestic mail, trade and population flow will be higher than in less integrated systems. Furthermore, the preoccupation ratio should show that the great percentage of these external communications is with other states in the regional system. The fact, then, that trade within the EEC is double that within the three countries of the forty-year-old East African Common Market,¹⁷ no matter how different the background conditions, is a useful indication of the comparative levels of integration in the two systems.

2. When we turn to examine the evidence of integration in the responsiveness of system-wide organizations to demands in the system, the problem takes on a somewhat different complexion. Whereas before the problem was one in the relations between defineable units, now it is one of relations

within a single unit. In fact, the affinity between international political integration and national political development becomes once more apparent. While, too, flows of communication are usually less quantifiable in this case, there are several important qualitative indicators of responsiveness available.

An important indicator of responsiveness is the freedom which the system-wide organizations have to take policy initiatives. The obvious example in this connection is the Commission of the EEC which, by virtue of the Treaty and as a consequence of the critical decision-making context, has come to act as a seventh party to negotiations, presenting both problems and proposals from the Community point of view.¹⁸ Such initiatives are usually on the sufferance of member-states. The OAU machinery, for example, was unable to act on the Moroccan-Algerian border crisis until the United States persuaded Morocco to abide by the Bamako agreements (made among Heads of State), which urged an "African" settlement in order to keep the great powers out of the affair.¹⁹

Another important indicator of responsiveness lies in the structures and practices through which demands are presented to the organizations. In the EEC, as pointed out earlier, this function is increasingly being performed by system-wide interest groups and political parties. In

Eastern Europe for many years after the war, the Soviet Union was one party in practically all bilateral agreements; the result was a sort of "wheel" structure, with most communications passing along the spokes to the Soviet Union at the hub, and very few around the rim. The system, particularly in its many costly duplications in production, soon proved inefficient, and in recent years a greater multilateralism has become the pattern in Comecon.²⁰

Another indicator of responsiveness is the extent to which the system-wide organizations penetrate to and involve all levels of society in the system. The functional organizations for the furthering of political union in the British Caribbean proved incapable of associating the West Indians themselves with their work, and thus soon became viewed as "just another level of officialdom".²¹ In the less developed areas the "hero", the mass party and the ideology of unification may provide vehicles by means of which system-wide organizations can have an impact on all social strata. In this connection the mass media, as well as levels of literacy, assume enormous importance.

The impact of system-wide organizations on the allocation of goods and services throughout the system is perhaps an obvious manifestation of the level of integration. If the organizations and policies of the EEC, or of LAFTA did not

exist, how different would be the patterns of trade and investment among their members? Measurement, of course, can only be based on projection of figures from the pre-organization period; there is the additional complication that in different systems different levels of trade-interdependence may have existed prior to the organizations. Thus the results are useful only for comparison of the levels of integration at different times, and not for inter-system comparison.

Finally, it is useful to look at the extent to which the political and administrative elites of member-states involve themselves in the operations of the system's organizations. In Europe the level of such involvement is much higher than in less developed areas, where the shortage of skills and education usually means retention of most political and administrative talent by the nation-states.

Conditions for Integration

It is a curious feature of communications theories of international integration that it requires very little rewording to turn discussions of the evidence of integration into discussions of the conditions for integration, as an examination of the previous section will show. Haas rightly considers this difficulty in distinguishing cause and effect

and in differentiating between conditions prior to integration from conditions during the process, to be a major drawback of the communications approach.²² And yet there is truth in Russett's observation that this process of mutual reinforcement, where evidence of integration "feeds back" in the form of further favorable conditions, is an integral part of the integrative process.²³ In this section, therefore, the conditions for integration will be discussed, first, as background conditions favorable to the establishment of structures and practices for communication and to the maximization of communications flows, and secondly, as secondary or "feedback" conditions, many of which have already been discussed as evidence of responsiveness.

1. There is no denying the effects of geography as a background condition. Both symbolically and in terms of the logistics of communication the proximity of, and the physical barriers between, states, influence greatly the extent of their interaction. Geographical regionalism is a characteristic of all the major international integrating systems. Technological developments, of course, can often radically change the very conception of "region". Before the airplane and telecommunications it would have been difficult to talk of a North Atlantic or a Saharan "community".²⁴ To some extent, then, despite the tendency for the symbols of maps to overshadow the realities of communications technology,

the latter can also be said to affect greatly the geographical factor of distance. The same is true also for physical barriers, although particularly in Latin America and Africa trade and social mobility are still greatly impeded.

Homogeneity, whether cultural, ideological, religious, political or economic, is another important background factor. In Centra America, one of the regions where this seems least likely, Padelford notes the very real divisive effects of cultural and racial differences.²⁵ The different cultural, social, political and economic legacies of colonialism in African also hinder communications, as is witnessed by the rather random relationship between roads and railways in one country and its neighbour.²⁶ Homogeneity is important mainly because communications can only flow where they are received, and the will to receive is very largely a function of the selection of what is compatible with established major values.

Shared functional interests can also act as a background condition for communications. These interests bring governmental and socio-economic elites together, however uncomfortably, across national boundaries for the exchanges of information presumed to be of benefit to both. From these interests, too, develop the exchanges of goods and services and often of population among states. Finally, shared

functional interests can stimulate interest in the mass media, and, thereby, a greater flow of information in the system. A related variable again here is the capacity for communications, which to a great extent is dependent on the level of economic and social development.

Another background condition is the relative capability of the states to exert influence in the system. As in the case of Eastern Europe referred to earlier, the dominance of one state in the system in terms of capabilities for action means that communications may be directed mainly in its direction. The result may be a lack of responsiveness to the needs of the rest of the system. Western European complaints about the American role in the Atlantic community can also at times be traced to this source.

2. Having discussed some of the important background conditions which favor communications within a regional international system, we must now return to the secondary conditions. These are the conditions for integration which can also serve as evidence that a substantial degree of integration has already occurred. Since most of them have been described in some detail in the previous section the discussion which follows will be brief.

With respect to the relations between states in the system, mutual consultation on policy decisions that may have common effects, and the existence of structures and practices

for the exchange of information among all types of elites, can both lead to integration through the formation of habits of interaction and the fostering of favorable mutual expectations of behavior. Disruptions of this relationship, however, may occur either if one state decides to act unilaterally without consultation, or if one state feels that it should have been consulted but was not.

Heavy flows of communications measured in comparison to the null model and by the preoccupation ratio are also basic conditions of this type. Presumably it is because these figures show that other conditions exist, that they are considered to be of such importance. Thus travel, scholarly exchanges and consumption patterns for mass media are said to demonstrate at least some compatibility of values; trade and investment patterns, again, are evidence of functional interdependence; and the flow of population shows the absence of mutual fears and governmental restrictions. This is certainly true. But the development of communications patterns is also an important condition for integration because it provides the rudiments of a social system in the rarified atmosphere of diplomatic relations.

With respect to the responsiveness of system-wide organizations, the capacity of these organizations to take policy initiatives is a crucial secondary condition. Naturally, wherever full-time regional bodies like the EEC

Commission, the LAFTA Executive Committee or even the Secretariat of the Council of Europe exist, they have, if only by virtue of their day-to-day contact with system-wide problems, a persuasive position in the communications within the system. Where, as in the Treaties of Rome and Montevideo, states are gradually to forego veto-rights in certain policy areas as integration moves ahead, the central organs are likely to acquire greater room for manoeuvre. In many cases, however, the tremendous increase in demands which takes place at the same time, could act against increased responsiveness and thus feed back negatively into the process of integration.

The ways in which demands are represented in these organizations is a second important condition. The Western European experience suggests that a close replication of national interest-group politics provides the greatest stimulus for integration. Demands, however, may also be communicated by national representatives in system-wide bodies which give states votes either according to size and strength or according to the principle of sovereign equality. The likelihood of progress in integration is greater the more that states feel such institutions serve them successfully and the less they feel it necessary to use threatening actions and the mass media to indirectly present or "signal" demands on the system organizations.

This leads directly to the problem of penetration to all levels of society. It is a premise of communications theory and traditional functionalism alike that an important condition of integration is an awareness in all sectors of society in the system of the system itself as a point of reference and of the system-wide organizations as significant and beneficent bodies. In this respect organizations that deal with services and with social-cultural functions may penetrate more effectively to populations, at least in the short run, than do organizations that deal with fundamental matters of trade or defence. Much depends on the role of ideology and of the mass media.

A fourth condition for responsiveness relates to the effects of the organizations in allocating values. The perception that the venture of integration has been successful in increasing flows of information, goods and services and population within the system may lead to the granting of greater capacities for responsiveness to the central institutions. The important element in this perception, however, is whether extensive reallocation early in the process has the effect of alienating some states and interest groups from the system-wide interest. Such was the case, for example, in the attempt to federate the British West Indies.²⁷

Finally, the extent to which national elites are involved in the system's organizations is a condition for both formal and informal communication between the interests of the system and the interests of states and cross-national

parties and groups. The more that such involvement occurs, then, the more likely the system-wide organizations will be responsive to system-wide demands.

Conclusion: The Dynamics of the Process

For a regional international system to be integrated, then, it is necessary that its member states be responsive to each other and that its central organizations be responsive to demands arising from the system as a whole. This responsiveness is both indicated and brought into being by structures and practices that facilitate communication within the system and by the actual flows of information, population, and goods and services in the system. But aside from the conception of the "self-reinforcing" process, this description says very little about the actual dynamics of political integration in the communications dimension.

Shared values and transactions, as Hoffmann points out, rarely prevent wars. They limit and influence the behavior of states, but do not necessarily determine it.²⁸ Certainly, then, the assumption prevalent in the more naive wings of communications theory, that increased communications

among states (or, more usually, among "peoples") automatically leads to the sort of mutual understanding which makes possible the elimination or at least peaceful resolution of conflict -- this assumption is not very useful in the analysis of the effects of communication on integration. Studies of international contacts and of the effects of images in perception of other nations by no means lead to the conclusion that increased communication has its primary effect on integration through dramatic attitude change.²⁹

The sociological rather than the psychological effects of communication are more likely to be important in integration. States which make demands on other states, or interests which make demands on the system-wide institutions may in fact "learn" from the responsiveness of the state or institution to make further demands in other functional sectors, and thus aid the process of spillover, but as Toscano argues, this is not always the case.³⁰ The heavy and sustained flow of communications, however, does imply the existence of some of the habits, institutions and accumulations of experience which make up a social system. Communications, then, may be less important in relation to attitudes than they are to the establishment of certain behavioral regularities. Through communications states in

an integrating international system are less likely to be converted to mutual amity than they are to be mutually predictable and socially limited in their behavior in conflicts that do arise.

This sociological view of the role of communications in political integration extends not only to the relations between states but also to the relations between "functional subsectors" in the international system. Using the Parsonian model, Deutsch has suggested that integration also involves increasing functional interchange along all sides and both diagonals of the square which represents the social system.³¹ In the integrating international system goal-attainment may be a function both of system-wide organizations and of bargaining between states; adaptive mechanisms may be only partly directed toward the system as a whole; and pattern-maintenance and integrative subsystems, that is, familial and cultural systems, may be oriented primarily to particular nation-states. But to the extent that there is increasing functional interchange between these four subsystems, we can say that in terms of the international system, political integration is occurring.

That there are also psychological elements in the notion of responsiveness, and indeed in every conception of

political integration, is quite clear. This question will be discussed in the next chapter. But the conclusion here is equally important -- that increasing communications are closely bound up with the development of an international social system. With its emphasis on the measurable, then, the communications model, within the limits of the observable, provides useful explanations of an important dimension of political integration.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 4

¹See Deutsch's studies of national community-formation, esp. Nationalism and Social Communication, New York, Wiley, 1953, and Nation-Building (ed., with W.J. Foltz), New York, Atherton, 1963. For use of the communications model for the study of urban integration, see articles in P.E. Jacob & J.V. Toscano (eds.), The Integration of Political Communities, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1964; and R.L. Meier, A. Communications Theory of Urban Growth, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1962.

²J.V. Toscano, "Transaction Flow Analysis in Metropolitan Areas: Some Preliminary Explanations", in Jacob & Toscano, op cit., p. 101.

³B. Russett, Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1963.

⁴For a fascinating development of this model see K.W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1963. See also A. Etzioni, Political Unification, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965, pp. 43-44, for a discussion of the relation between "power" and "communications" in the integrative process.

⁵Russett, op cit., p. 39

⁶Ibid., p. 27

⁷K.W. Deutsch, "Political Community in the North Atlantic Area", in International Political Communities, New York, Doubleday, 1966, p. 2.

⁸The difference between a "pluralistic" and an "amalgamated" security community, for example, is defined not by the level of responsiveness but by the method of co-ordination; see ibid., pp. 2-4.

⁹For useful discussions of the nature and purposes of models, see Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, esp. pp. 7-9, and A. Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, San Francisco, Chandler, 1964, chapter 7.

¹⁰H. Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach", World Politics, 18:3, 1966, pp. 372-75.

¹¹Russett, op cit., p. 30.

¹²For a full explanation of the "null model", see K.W. Deutsch, "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in International and Comparative Politics", in J.N. Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1961. See also Toscano, op cit., p. 101, and Russett, op cit., p. 35.

¹³K.W. Deutsch, "Shifts in the Balance of Communications Flows: A Problem of Measurement in International Relations", in N. Polsby et al (eds.), Politics and Social Life, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1963, pp. 728-31, and K.W. Deutsch, "Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion", in Jacob and Toscano, op cit., pp. 79-80.

¹⁴Toscano, op cit., p. 101.

¹⁵Deutsch, "Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion", in ibid., pp. 77-83. As an indication of problems in weight and significance of variables, see the remarkable formula suggested for measuring the "moral integration" of a community, in ibid., pp. 86-87.

¹⁶J.L. Busey, "Central American Union: The Latest Attempt", Western Political Quarterly, 14:1, 1961, pp. 60-63.

¹⁷J.S. Nye, Pan-Africanism and East African Integration, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1965, pp. 138-49. See also L. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, Stanford Univ. Press, 1963, pp. 50-51.

¹⁸Lindberg, op cit., p. 54.

¹⁹P.B. Wild, "The OAU and the Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict", International Organization, 20:1, 1966, pp. 26-28.

²⁰D. Cattell, "Multilateral Co-operation and Integration in Eastern Europe", Western Political Quarterly, 13:1, 1960, pp. 64-67.

²¹J. Procter, "The Functional Approach to Political Union: Lessons From the Effort to Federate the British Caribbean Territories", International Organization, 10:1 1956, p. 45.

²²E. Haas, "Persistent Themes in Atlantic and European Unity", World Politics, 10:4, 1958, p. 627.

²³Russett, op cit., p. 33.

²⁴Concerning the effects of technology on the "Saharan community", see W. Zartman, "The Sahara-Bridge or Barrier", in International Conciliation, no. 541, 1963, pp. 10-17.

²⁵N. Padelford, "Co-operation in the Central American Region", International Organization, 11:1, 1957, p. 50.

²⁶See E. Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence, New York, Vintage, 1961, pp. 37-38.

²⁷Etzioni, op cit., pp. 172-78.

²⁸Hoffmann, op cit., p. 526.

²⁹See for example, the articles by Pool and Alger in H.C. Kelman (ed.), International Behavior, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965.

³⁰Toscano, op cit., pp. 115-17.

³¹K.W. Deutsch, "Integration and the Social System: Implications of Functional Analysis", in Jacob & Toscano, op cit., p. 191.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE FOURTH DIMENSION: POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Introduction

The dimension of political integration which is concerned with the relationship of the individual to the political system must at this stage in the development of integration theory be discussed in a somewhat speculative vein. Unlike the dimensions discussed in the previous three chapters, the "psychological" dimension has never been extensively portrayed in any major theoretical work on political integration. It should, however, be clear from many of the arguments in these chapters that there are implicit or explicit social-psychological assumptions in decision-making, functional and communications theories of integration. In addition, in political science and especially in international relations, the investigation of social-psychological variables relating to political behavior is growing rapidly in sophistication and scope.¹ The current state of theory in political integration, then, as well as the new developments in social-psychological approaches, would seem to call for investigation of the integrative process in terms of changes in political cognition, affect and participation. Studies of national political development

have often emphasized these aspects and the need for cultural-ideological consensus in new states.² Similar problems are involved in the transition from a traditional international system of nation-states to an integrated system.

Normative-prescriptive and methodological interests aside, Kelman suggests that social-psychological approaches contribute to the study of international relations in several ways.³ First, in studying the international behavior of individuals, the social psychologist focuses on attitudes toward international affairs, national and international loyalties, images and stereotypes of other nations, and the effects of cross-national contacts. Secondly, in studying international politics and foreign policy (the behavior of nations and decision-makers), he focuses on public opinion and its role in the foreign policy process, individual actors in foreign policy decisions, and the processes of interaction in conflict situations. The concern of the discussion which follows here is with attitudes in general, and therefore all of Kelman's categories are in some way relevant. Some, particularly the last-mentioned, have been touched upon already from different perspectives. It is only here, however, that we move exclusively to a "first image" analysis of the relation

of the individual political actor to the process of political integration.⁴

For theorists who emphasize decision-making, an essential part of the integrative process is the shift of actors' expectations and political activities to a new centre.⁵ Actors rarely take part in international decision-making or bargaining with identical goals in mind. Given the likelihood of converging or opposed goals, then, decision-making theory points to the effects of developing institutions and practices: the necessity for states to work out agreements can lead to the commitment of important individuals and groups to the progress of integration. Institutions, procedures, problems, and pressure, then, combine to redefine actors' perceptions of their interests and the means to attain them. Here is said to lie the source of consensus.

Functional theorists also accept many of the above explanations based on the effects of interaction. Traditional functionalist theory, however, adds other embellishments. First, creative association and co-operation in problem-solving and the satisfaction of basic needs is presumed to constitute a learning situation where actors can take a non-national and non-political attitude to each other. Haas has shown the antecedents of this assumption in group therapy

theory.⁶ Secondly, traditional functionalist theory assumes that loyalties depend on the continued fulfillment of basic functional needs. From this it follows that multiple loyalties are possible, that loyalties can be redirected and lessons in functional co-operation transferred from one sector to another, and that the growth of a political community depends primarily on its success in functional undertakings.

In his formulation of "pluralist" functionalism, however, Haas modifies this simple stimulus-response model and points out that "When actors realize that their interests would best be achieved by adopting new approaches, and if these approaches involve commitment to larger organizations, then and only then does 'learning' contribute to integration."⁷ Moreover, loyalties may indeed follow the satisfaction of basic needs, but these satisfactions may not always be rational and instrumental. In non-Western systems in particular "the affective or expressive aspect of politics tends to override the problem-solving or public-policy aspect of politics".⁸ Edelman has suggested that this phenomenon is hardly confined to the less-developed areas of the world.⁹

The essential psychological argument of communications theories of integration is not so much that the structures and processes of bargaining and decision-making, or the satisfaction of needs, leads to attitude change; generally it is that communication leads to and indicates some sort of growth in awareness among people that they are part of the same political community. This growth of community feeling comes by way of increased mutual responsiveness. Political integration is "a state of mind or disposition to be cohesive, to act together, to be committed to mutual programmes".¹⁰ It thus involves preoccupation with other people in the community, a sense of common destiny, and expectations of peaceful change in the system. According to Teune these attributes are in a very real sense "learned". Integration means that a stimulus is responded to in similar ways by people, and that "collectivities of people respond to each other as relevant stimuli".¹¹

There are, then, important psychological elements in most theories of political integration. Nearly always a shift of loyalties or expectations is taken to be a crucial stage in the process. It is therefore all the more surprising that so little attention has been paid to the nature, role and modes of change of the attitudes themselves, in such theories. It need not be assumed that popular attitudes are

the key to integration and that to bring about changes in the international system one need only go beyond governments and change the views of the common man. But even if popular attitudes rarely play the role assigned to them by romantic liberalism, they do nevertheless provide limits on government action in the international system. Attitudes, moreover, are not found only "beyond governments", and we might do well to distinguish between popular attitudes and the attitudes of decision-makers and foreign policy elites.¹² Different conditions are likely to bring about changes in each, and each will have a different impact on the integrative process.

In short, it is necessary but not sufficient by itself for the progress of integration that a sort of system-wide "political culture" be developed. To measure the extent this has progressed and the conditions which should aid it we must look at how, both verbally and in terms of participation, elites and non-elites express their attitudes to their nation and to the larger international system.

Evidence of Integration

What should constitute evidence that the attitudes of elites and non-elites have changed substantially in the direction of more positive orientation toward the international political system? Where is such evidence to be found, and how is it to be interpreted?

1. In the investigation of elite attitudes several areas can probably be excluded by definition. For example, it is probably not very useful to look at the extent of knowledge about leaders, offices or outputs, at attentiveness and exposure to issues, or at other such sets of indices which are important with respect to non-elites but which can be assumed to read highly for elites. But both for elites and non-elites certain attitudinal characteristics can be taken as evidence of integration according to their homogeneity and distribution in the system and the intensity with which they are expressed.

The cognitive aspect of attitudes concerns how elites see issues (especially whether war is perceived as a likely outcome of a given inter-state conflict), how they see themselves and other elites (as members of a single community or as divided by nation or class), and how stereotyped their views are of other national groups inside and outside the system. Much of the cognitive aspect is therefore related to decision makers' "definition of the situation". The source of the great part of such information about elites will be speeches and statements, as well as the so-called "elite newspapers" like the Times of London, Le Monde, and the New York Times, where techniques of content analysis can

be applied. Dominant images and characterizations of other states, suggested alternatives, and the tension-content of words may provide clues as to how elites look upon the international system. Useful hypotheses about the integrated system in this connection would be: (a.) that serious conflict is seen as a far greater likelihood between the regional system and some other political system than between two members of the regional system; (b.) that more attention will be paid to system-wide issues and that these will tend to be discussed as the common domestic problems of a single community; and (c.) that there will be a marked difference in levels and complexity of awareness of other states. For states in the system, awareness will be more intense and complex, while for states outside, stereotypes should play a greater role in cognition.

With respect to the affective component of attitudes, some means must be devised for the difficult task of analyzing the direction of loyalties, expectations and feelings of obligation. How can one compare the levels of local, national and system affect in elites? One possible method would be to ask the sort of questions asked by Almond and Verba, and to compare the orientation of elites to their nation and to the regional system.¹³ We would expect that the more the system is integrated, the greater would be the pride expressed in

the institutions, legislation, position in international affairs, economic system, and cultural characteristics of the regional system. In addition, such an investigation, repeated over the years, could provide a useful indication of the direction of shifts of loyalty and of support for integration.

Affective aspects of attitudes might also be examined in looking at what Almond and Verba refer to as "output affect".¹⁴ What are the expectations among elites that the members of each state in the system will receive equitable treatment in the allocation of resources by system-wide organizations? If in rational economic terms the allocation does not seem fair, is there a sufficient reserve of "system affect" among the adversely treated elites to keep them from breaking away? For the first question, again the Civic Culture approach is useful; for the second, we might examine one or two cases of apparently uneven reallocation (such as the case of Germany and Holland in the EEC agricultural crisis), analyze the bases of elite disagreement, and try and determine the extent to which commitment to procedures and long term goals was effective in overcoming their resistance.

There is little that can be added here with respect to the participation of elites and how it relates to their

attitudes. Interaction in decision-making and bargaining, the interpenetration of national and system bureaucracies, informal contacts and communications, and the extent of participation in cross-national, as against national, parties and groups -- all these can be taken at least as impressionistic indicators of favorable attitudes for integration.

2. Many of the same questions and categories also apply to non-elites. As with elites, we can take opinion polls as to attitudes toward different issues and toward other nations. The same hypotheses should apply.

The Almond and Verba survey, however, is of particular relevance to the study of non-elite attitudes. It would be useful, for example, to see how aware people are of leaders and offices, of the details of issues, and of their importance in everyday life.¹⁵ While it should not be expected that where integration has progressed far this awareness should necessarily be greater for the regional system than for the states, an increase over time would provide useful evidence, as would a comparison of levels of awareness between systems. In the latter case, a problem arises. A high citizen awareness of the EEC's activities in Western Europe may be as much a consequence of the existence of favorable "conditions for democracy" as of the level of integration. Therefore care

must be taken in drawing comparisons with areas such as Latin America, that some consideration be made of the differences in political cultures.

Turning to the affective component, again many of the tests of elite attitudes -- questions relating to pride in institutions and other aspects of the integrating system, questions relating to output affect -- will apply. In addition, it would be of interest to see whether, as might be expected, the top areas of a scale ranking other states in order of feelings of affinity would contain, consistently throughout the system, states which are members of the system. This would provide a simple and useful measure of the distribution of attitudes among states in the system. Polls might also be taken to ascertain the extent of popular support for the idea of integration itself.¹⁶

The relationship between participation and attitudes is not entirely clear in the context of political integration. As mentioned previously, travel, exchanges and other interactions among citizens of different states do not unambiguously demonstrate the presence of attitudes favorable to integration. A better indicator might be expressed attitudes to parties and groups on the national and system level, and an increasing level of participation in such organizations on the system

level. Again the factor of the "civic culture" must be considered in comparisons between integrating systems.

The difficulties are obvious in any attempt to assess the psychological evidence for political integration. We are not yet sure what we should be looking for or where to seek it. But some hypotheses can be made. In addition, the sort of survey carried out by Almond and Verba can be adapted to an analysis of the distribution, homogeneity and intensity of attitudes in an integrating system. When the results of such a survey are compared over time, they should indicate whether any shift of attitudes is occurring toward a regional rather than a national orientation. When they are compared between integrating systems they can, if certain other factors are "held constant", reveal something about the relative progress of integration in the regions.

Conditions for Integration

What are some of the conditions which favor the development of patterns of attitudes characteristic of politically integrated systems? Again, in the absence of any really systematic studies in this area, we are forced to be somewhat speculative. Nevertheless, we can identify some background conditions and some previous patterns of attitudes which are likely to aid integration.

A useful place to start is with the process of socialization. Similarities within a system in the ways in which roles are learned and the legitimacy of governmental activities established should aid the development of a common political culture. The Council of Europe has recognized the importance of education in this respect, and has undertaken programmes to standardize curricula and minimize the effects of national biases, particularly in history texts. A system of "European" universities has been initiated for similar purposes; in Africa cross-national student associations and a few institutions such as Makerere College in Uganda are apparently acting in such a capacity already, and aiding the emergence of an elite with a regional rather than a national outlook.¹⁷ Effects should also be expected from the form and content of family and job relationships as well as education. Without descending to the discredited psychological ploy of drawing implications from variations in toilet-training, we can suggest that similar patterns of authority in the family and in occupational decisions are likely to produce the compatible attitudes necessary for integration.

This suggests a second category of conditions, perhaps best referred to as the "elements of system-consciousness".

While these factors too have often been overplayed, it would be a mistake to ignore the effect of perceived traditions, ethnic solidarity, religious affinity, and the various cognitive and affective symbols that peoples feel differentiate them from others. Whether or not it is true, observes Barraclough, "it has often been maintained that the notion 'Europe' represents not simply a geographical division, but a cultural or ideological or political unity, marking off the inhabitants of this area from other areas".¹⁸ A critical debate within the Pan-African movement concerns whether the shores of the continent or the ideological boundaries and the religious boundaries of Islam are the meaningful limits of African unity. Themes of common nationhood have persisted in a divided Central America, and have been employed as well in Latin America as a whole as an argument against the concept of Pan-Americanism.¹⁹ Cultural memories and ideological affinities, then, serve often to mark out the cognitive boundaries of the integrating system.

The last chapter has dealt with the role of communications in political integration. Here it should further be noted that certain types of communication have a greater persuasive effect than others. Social psychologists have pointed, for example, to the effectiveness of the group context on attitude change.²⁰ We might, therefore, expect that

the more inter-state relations involve the establishment of personal, structured group contacts (for instance, the less turnover there is in key personnel), and the more these groups meet with problem-solving success, the more likely it is that attitudes within the group will come to favor further goals associated with integration. The persuasive effect of the mass media, on the other hand, probably will not differ whether emphasis is laid on the mystical "idea of unity" or on the lesser concrete successes of the integrating system. What is of more importance is the fact that the media themselves are instruments which can shrink the perceived distance between peoples.

It might also be suggested that the more attentive and informed the general public is with respect to leaders, political offices and issues, the more likely it is that attitudes can be changed in favor of the integrative process. The implication here -- that countries possessing some of the so-called basic conditions for democracy are more easily brought together than others -- appears alarmingly naive. But the intention is not so much to restate Woodrow Wilson's idea of the inherent peacefulness of democracies, as to point out that pluralistic societies on the Western model seem to afford more opportunities for the cultivation of attitudes

favoring integration, by means of group involvement in decisions and in functional co-operation, as well as through the mass media. Whether in other systems the low rate of turnover in important government positions or government monopolies on information can also favor integration, is not as clear.

Another condition, of which Haas implies the importance,²¹ is that interaction between states provides situations where some states and their representatives may be constrained to act, for a period of time, contrary to their attitudes. They may be bound by a long-term treaty or by some future expectation of redress or gain. However it comes about, such a situation creates a condition of cognitive dissonance, wherein, according to the theory, attitudes will tend to be brought into line with the enforced behavior. This and other theories of attitude change will be discussed shortly.

In discussing the importance of "system-consciousness", conditions relating to the actual patterns of attitudes held were touched upon. Other conditions of this type need mentioning as well. The first of these is the perception of a common threat. With respect to the attitudes, the key to this is not so much the common nature of the threat, as the growing belief in the inadequacy of the smaller political unit to provide security. Similarly, perceptions of functional needs which

grow particularly as peoples come into contact with others "better off" than themselves, may lead to dissatisfaction with the smaller unit as the provider of those functions. Such dissatisfaction with units and their outputs may create a psychological readiness on the part of individuals to undergo deprivations in other areas so that larger political units might be created.

Another condition leading to psychological support for integration would therefore be the capacity of the interacting units, once the integrative process has commenced, to allocate certain rewards in the system. Concrete results such as lower prices for automobiles, or less tangible successes such as a prestigious diplomatic move at the UN, or even favorable events which are merely perceived as resulting from integration, can have an important effect on the way in which the integrating system is viewed in relation to its member-states.

The sense of identity of individuals with nation-states we would expect to diminish, although as Muret and others have pointed out with regard to Switzerland,²² the placing of the integrating system first in loyalties may not be important as a condition. It would appear to depend on the type of loyalty concerned. Loyalty based on the capacity to protect and to allocate resources, should shift to the

larger system, while loyalty based on birthplace, family ties and local traditions may mean that affective ties remain stronger with the smaller unit.²³

A final psychological condition to consider concerns attitudes to political change. Because teleology, theology, and theories of chance have been remarkably infertile sources for explanations of political change, the assumption is painfully gaining ground that political integration is brought about by men and their leaders who react to changes in the environment. Political integration is more likely to occur in a system pervaded by the ethos that political structures and practices can be altered to meet new conditions. Hence, no matter what other psychological conditions they may be more susceptible to, traditional, non-pragmatic and less developed societies may from this point of view be at a distant disadvantage in working toward integration.

Such, then, are some of the conditions which seem to favor political integration in the "psychological" dimension. Undoubtedly there are more, and the pervasiveness of psychological assumptions in theories of integration would suggest that these must not long resist investigation.

Conclusions: The Dynamics of the Process

The previous two sections of this chapter have suggested that it is possible to recognize many of the

conditions which can produce attitudes favorable to political integration, and to find evidence that such changes in attitudes have occurred. But what are the actual dynamics of the process of attitude change that is part of political integration? Social psychological theory has developed three related models of attitude change which may go some distance in explaining this dimension of the process.

The first of these, the "congruity" model, quantifies the strength of attitudes toward objects and arranges them on a linear positive-negative scale. Between any two of these objects on the scale there can be associative bonds (denoting approval or solidarity) or dissociative bonds (denoting incompatibility). In general, "equilibrium in the congruity model encompasses all associative bonds between equally polarized objects (same numerical value) of like sign and all dissociative bonds between equally polarized objects of unlike sign".²⁴ Attitude change is brought about when in any case these conditions do not apply and it is necessary to restore equilibrium by a shift of objects on the scale or by a change in the bond between them.

The second model, the "balance" model, postulates positive (associative and affective), null, or negative (dissociative) relationships between objects, persons, traits

or other cognitive elements. Equilibrium exists as long as "elements of identical sign are linked by positive relations or by null relations..., and so long as elements of opposite sign are linked by negative relations or by null relations".²⁵ What is in balance for this model may not be in congruity for the previous model. Moreover, in this case the process of change is not automatically triggered by the discovery of an imbalance. There are three possible outcomes: 1. the person may not recognize the imbalance and create the need for change; 2. signs of, or relationships between, the imbalanced elements can be changed. This constitutes a change of attitudes; or 3. elements may be redefined or differentiated.²⁶

The third model, referred to as the "theory of cognitive dissonance", is similar in many respects to the other two, but has some interesting characteristics for integration theory. Two cognitive elements are said to be dissonant if one implies the negation of the other, and consonant if the reverse is true.²⁷ More important, however, is the fact that experiments have shown that where a person is forced to take action dissonant with his attitudes, the tendency is to bring the latter into line with the action. Furthermore, the lesser the inducement to take the action and the greater the hardship or unpleasantness

associated with its successful completion, the greater the change in attitudes is likely to be.²⁸

There is no room here to delve into the criticisms of these three cognitive models of attitude change, except to note that the field is new and little-explored as yet. It is, however, possible to suggest some ways in which the models could be related to the shift of loyalties and expectations that we have argued is an essential part of the integrative process.

The congruity model is the simplest and most manageable for predictive purposes. Suppose for example that a certain citizen of country X is highly nationalistic, that is, he places the symbols of X's national sovereignty high on the positive side of his linear scale of values. If, subsequently, he is made aware through social interaction or communications media that his country, acting alone, has not the military and economic capability to act without close co-operation with a traditional rival, a state of incongruity is in the process of forming. An associative bond is being created in the citizen's mind between highly valued national well-being and negatively valued military or economic integration. The incongruity can be resolved by a rejection of the bond, by the devaluation of national well-being, or by increased support of integration. The congruity model, given

the numerical strength of the attitudes and the outside influences, theoretically can predict the direction of attitude change and the degree of support for integration.

Like most predictive models, however, the congruity model avoids some important chunks of reality. The balance model, on the other hand, brings many of these into play. The importance to this model of attention to, and awareness of, imbalance as a prerequisite to change helps greatly in explaining the impact of communications on integration. A basic premise of communications theory is that forms of communication and direct contact between peoples can often increase their awareness of the incongruities of being at odds politically, socially, economically or militarily. Traditional functionalism makes similar assumptions. As a result, it is assumed, attitudes will tend to change to favor closer association. While the balance theory is of this general form, it makes no such rationalistic or deterministic assumptions. People still have the alternatives of: 1. devaluing integration (they may only learn, through mutual contact, that their unfavorable stereotypes were "correct"); or 2. redefining the elements (that is, choosing to see integration, for example, not as the taking of common and binding decisions but as not-too-frequent consultation between

Heads of State over "matters of common concern").

As has been noted already, the theory of cognitive dissonance is relevant where commitment to procedures and to long-range goals can serve to enforce compliance with dissonant behavior. Such a situation would appear to exist to some degree in Western Europe, but the explanatory potential of the theory does not at present seem great. It is clearly of best application to decision-making elites. But even in the well-documented EEC process, it would be hard to ascertain, first, to what extent the attitudes of an individual changed, and secondly, what the significance of this change was for his country's policy. Moreover, attitude change in such circumstances is unlikely to be dramatic. In this dimension as in the others, integration usually proceeds by small increments.

It would appear, at any rate, that if "learning" models are at all applicable to political integration, they will hardly be the simple stimulus-response types envisioned in many theories of international co-operation. Loyalty does not follow need-satisfaction alone; political decision-makers are not as researchable or as predictable as white rats. Yet the shift in attitudes is crucial for integration. In the formation of international political communities as in

the building of nations, crises of identity, participation and allocation have very real psychological aspects. And the decision-making, functional and communications theories of political integration will never be satisfactory so long as their psychological premises remain mute.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 5

¹See, for example, G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton Univ. Press, 1963; H. Kelman (ed.), International Behavior, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winson, 1965; and the articles on content analysis by D. Zinnes, R. North, and H. Koch, and on psychometric methods by F. Klingberg, in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1961, pp. 469-91.

²See esp. L. Pye and S. Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton Univ. Press, 1965.

³H. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations: Definition of Scope", in Kelman, op cit., pp. 10-17. For an interesting general discussion, see O. Klineberg, The Human Dimension in International Relations, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964.

⁴K. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1959, discusses some general problems of social-psychological analysis in international relations. See chapters 2 & 3.

⁵L. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, Stanford Univ. Press, 1963, pp. 5-6.

⁶E. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, Stanford Univ. Press, 1964, pp. 20-21. This assumption is implicit in J.J. Schokking and N. Anderson, "Observations on the European Integration Process", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 4:4, 1960. See their definitions of integration on pp. 386 and 389.

⁷Haas, op cit., p. 48.

⁸L. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process", in Rosenau, op cit., p. 297.

⁹M. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, Urbana, Univ. of Illinois Press, 1964. See esp. the introductory chapter.

¹⁰P. Jacob and H. Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines of Analysis", in P. Jacob and J.V. Toscano (eds.), The Integration of Political Communities, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1964, p. 10.

¹¹H. Teune, "The Learning of Integrative Habits", in ibid., pp. 259-60.

¹²The notion of elites provides a common analytical distinction both for social psychologists and for foreign policy students. See H. Hyman, Political Socialization, New York, The Free Press, 1959, pp. 7-22; K. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", in Rosenau, op cit., p. 392; and G. Almond, "The Elites and Foreign Policy", in ibid., pp. 269-70.

¹³Almond and Verba, op cit., p. 102.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 106-09.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 80-96.

¹⁶For examples of such polls, see R. Aron, "Old Nations, New Europe", in S. Graubard (ed.), A New Europe?, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1964, pp. 41-42; and J. Nye, Pan-Africanism and East African Integration, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1965, pp. 26-27.

¹⁷On Makerere College, see Nye, op cit., pp. 81-82.

¹⁸G. Barraclough, European Unity in Thought and Action, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1963, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹See, for example, the general argument in J. Castaneda, "Pan-Africanism and Regionalism" a Mexican View", International Organization, 10:3, 1956.

²⁰A.R. Cohen, Attitude Change and Social Influence, New York, Basic Books, 1964, provides a useful review of the literature in this area.

²¹Haas, op cit., p. 112.

²²See C. Muret, "The Swiss Pattern for a Federated Europe", in International Political Communities, New York, Doubleday, 1966, pp. 149-74.

²³On the general question of divided loyalties, there is a valuable monograph which was not available to this writer. See H. Guetzkow, Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization, Princeton, Centre for Research on World Political Institutions, Princeton Univ. Press, 1955.

²⁴R. Brown, Social Psychology, New York, The Free Press, 1965, pp. 558-59.

²⁵Ibid., p. 276.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 578-79. See also R. Abelson, "Modes of Resolution of Belief Dilemmas", in Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3:3, 1959.

²⁷Brown, op cit., p. 584.

²⁸Brown, op cit., p. 585.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this essay criticism and conceptualization have gone hand in hand. While throughout the discussion there appear specific and explicit criticisms of current theorizing on political integration, the actual development of a framework for comparative study constitutes the most fundamental comment on the current state of integration theory. Since, then, the concept of political integration developed here is a direct response to the suggested inadequacies of other models for comparative study, it would be useful in concluding to note some of the themes which recur in both in criticism and in conceptualization.

The major theme is, of course, that of the multi-dimensional and complex nature of the integrative process and the demands this makes on the building of models. At present, theories of integration derived from models which focus primarily on decision-making, on the performance of basic functional tasks, or on patterns of communication, tend to play down factors which do not fit their respective partial characterizations of the process. Very often, too, these theories are based on empirical study in quite different integrative processes, where different major conditions

usually exist. The result of both these tendencies has been a fragmented body of narrowly-based theories of the integrative process and a lack of consensus on terminology and basic definitions. The response to this problem, therefore, has been to conceptualize integration as a process occurring in four inter-related but analytically distinct dimensions: 1. the structures and processes of decision-making; 2. the performance of basic functional tasks; 3. the patterns of communication; and 4. political attitudes. Certainly these four dimensions overlap in many places. Certainly, too, there may be other ways to order the study of this phenomenon. The main point, however, is that by recognizing complexity and broadening the framework accordingly, we are enabled to relate a number of partial theories in a more complete explanation of the integrative process.

A number of other themes complement this major one. One of these is the criticism, especially strong in the discussion of functional theory, which attacks the tendency of integration theorists to accept the Western European experience as a prototype for regional integration in all parts of the world. The tacit acceptance of the Western European model is in fact a direct hindrance to fruitful comparative study, as well as a restriction on the search for unique variables in the non-European processes. The

development of a model which is concerned with more than the patterns of decision-making and functional integration typical of pluralistic societies, is therefore an important step for the comparative study of political integration.

Another criticism which recurs in the discussion of integration theory and is of particular relevance to communications theories, is that many characterizations of the integrative process border on the deterministic and the impersonal. There is a tendency to assume that if certain "background conditions" or certain abstract patterns of relationships exist, then integration is automatic. Little mention is made of the actors, specific issues and conflicts that may speed or retard a given integrative process. In the discussion of the "decision-making" dimension there are some important reactions to this tendency.

Related to the issue of determinism and impersonality is the notion that integration in an international system is a product of the functional needs of the system itself. But neither traditional nor pluralistic functionalism, as viewed in this essay, need make such an assumption. Both of these theories emphasize that in one way or another, integration is the result of the economic, military, social and cultural needs of individuals and collectivities within the regional international system. The way in which these needs affect the

integrative process varies according to the type of region; in no case, however, does any teleological explanation in terms of "systemic need" appear convincing.

Another theme of this essay has been the unfortunate relationship of measurement and communications theories of integration. First, it has been suggested here that the sociological rather than the psychological effects of communications are the important factor in integration. Moreover, communications theories have tended to assume far more weight than they merit in the explanation of integration, because communications flows are one of the few easily quantified aspects of international relations. This essay is thus a reappraisal both of communications theories and of measurement. The former take an important but diminished role in the broader pattern of explanation; the latter becomes a question at present of sacrificing precision in order to remove distortions.

The lack of investigation into the psychological variables relating to the integrative process is particularly damaging to the prospects of a fuller explanation. Almost every theory of integration involves some important assumption about the nature of attitude change. The chapter on political attitudes in this essay is in a far more speculative vein than the others, but it does point to the urgency of studies based on this level of analysis.

The affinity between regional political integration and national political development, which constitutes an important theme of this essay, has two implications. First, integration theory, like development theory, needs to escape the attributing of a single direction to the process of change. When the process is viewed in terms of a number of dimensions, it becomes easier to see that there is, strictly speaking, no termination state, but only a constant shifting of the level of integration along a continuum. Secondly, integration theory, like development theory, must concern itself with a number of levels of analysis. The framework developed here allows for analysis in terms of the regional system as a whole, the constituent states, and the individuals they comprise.

Another theme of this essay has been that it is not yet safe to assume that models and generalizations applicable to urban or national integration are necessarily wholly applicable to international integration. It is necessary to make tentative comparisons. It is equally necessary to focus on one particular type of integration, such as regional, and to amass a wealth of case studies in this type. When comparative analysis has been developed to some degree within each type it should be more apparent than at present whether or not broader comparisons can be made and a more general theory of political integration derived.

In discussing each of the above themes which have recurred throughout the essay, we have had in mind a certain desirable pattern of explanation for the process of political integration. In graphic terms this pattern is the table of twelve categories derived by considering, in each of the four dimensions, the evidence of, the conditions for, and the dynamics of, the process. But when this schema is applied, the result is a collection of statements of varying precision which characterize the integrative process in a specific regional international system at a specific point in time. It is then necessary to go further, and to see if all integrative processes go through similar stages over time. Eventually one might hope for a typology of integrative processes in terms of these stages. Naturally there are real difficulties in such a search. Is there one pattern of integration for developed regions and another for underdeveloped regions? Does the pattern depend on the patterns of national power in the regions? Are there in fact so many such independent variables in each region that each integrative process is virtually sui generis? Again, there are no easy answers; such problems can only be tested if the task of comparative study is actually begun.

The research tools and theoretical notions of political science and, specifically, international relations, as the previous chapters have shown, have wide scope for application in the study of regional integration. The integrative process in Western Europe, in particular, has demonstrated that regional integration can provide a laboratory situation for the detailed study, through a battery of techniques, of the process of political change. Political integration, then, can be a major source of theory for political science and international relations.

The major problems on which the study of political integration is based -- the control of international violence and the development of the optimal political unit -- will not be solved by the evolution of sophisticated theories of regional political integration alone. Regional integration, however well it comes to be understood and brought about, will not remove war. Regions may fight among themselves on a scale far greater than mere nations. Nor will it necessarily provide the ultimate in forms of political organization. Indeed the optimal development of resources and the satisfaction of psychological needs may be frustrated more by regional than by national borders. But there are no real solutions to political problems anyway, but only resolutions, where outcomes are the best under the circumstances.

Regional political integration is an attempt to resolve major problems in the particularly harsh circumstances of international politics. The study of the process of regional political integration and the development of theory on the broadest possible comparative base, requires a framework whose comprehensiveness matches the complexity of such problems.

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