PROSCRIPTIVE FEATURES OF UNILATERAL CROSS-COUSIN MARRIAGE

by

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This essay offers an analysis of the phenomena of normative matrilateral and patrilateral cross-cousin marriage. The review of prior literature is confined to studies which appear to be significantly opposed in approach to my own; the "exchange theories" of Levi-Strauss, Leach and Needham. Therefore, the review is conducted in the context of a discussion of some epistemological questions important to contemporary social anthropology.

The major points of departure between the exchange theories and my own views center upon the question as to what we are to take as our analytic units: de facto corporate units or ideologically explicit social divisions. Whereas I opt for the former, explanatory propositions employ a concept of whole "groups" as their subject element only in an elliptical sense; "group" means a set of human actors. This view implies that, where human actors are our subject-element, it is not merely reasonable but is desirable to predicate phenomena of a motivational nature to them. Thus, both conscious decision-making and unconscious dispositions, admittedly in some sense "psychological", are valid forms of sociological analysis. Indeed, to my way of thinking they are the most powerful conceptions that we can presently form.

In the last analysis I regard the predications of the exchange theories to be of precisely this order. My complaint is that this mode of predication is inconsistent with the confinement of our analytic
subject-element to idealogical social divisions: whole-descent-groups. That approach, I argue, severely delimits our explanatory powers, especially in a context of structural change. These arguments are illustrated in an analysis of Purum data.

My own models are based upon a series of concepts having to do with processes of role identification between personnel of adjacent generations. These processes, though not verbalized, find formal expression in the distribution of Ego's sexual cum marital privileges and taboos. This encompasses Ego's relations with many personnel, thereby extending the implications of the models' theoretical premises considerably beyond the cousin relationships taken as the initial problem. This extension in the scope of deductions permits the formulation of empirically testable hypotheses of value in the verification of the theoretical premises.

The concepts and methods developed are illustrated and tested I think successfully against Murngin data.
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INTRODUCTION

Institutionalized cross-cousin marriage in its various forms has for some time been a focus of theoretical controversy. Currently at the forefront among contributors to the subject are Rodney Needham, Edmund Leach, and Claude Levi-Strauss. The theories advanced by these scholars are fundamentally alike. For ease of future reference, therefore, I shall frequently cite them under the single label group-exchange theory (or simply exchange theory). Where important differences exist among them, they will be noted. Needham has probably been, at least in recent years, the most energetic advocate of this theory.

The exchange theorists have been criticized by various writers on aspects of their analysis. However, although there have been a number of interesting suggestions offered by their critics, none, with the exception of Homans and Schneider, have offered a well developed counter-proposal.

The dialogue between the exchange theorists and their critics has had two aspects. There has been mutual criticism of substantive issues; i.e., of theoretical and empirical issues concerned specifically with the phenomena of cross-cousin marriage. Charles Ackerman, for example, has attempted to show that certain entailments of Needham's model of Purum social structure are not borne out in statistical analysis of actual Purum marriages. Needham has pointed out certain flaws in the logic of the Homans and Schneider model.
In addition, adherents to both sides of the dialogue have regarded their respective views as incorporating a fundamental opposition in the epistemology of sociological analysis. The exchange theorists on the one hand argue that the psychological approach of Homans and Schneider is unsuited to the analysis of institutionalized behaviour; dimensions of individual personality have no bearing on group norms. Homans and Schneider argue that the exchange model requires the assumption of a foresightful social designer.

The primary aim of this essay is to offer another analysis of the unilateral forms of cross-cousin marriage. As such the emphasis is upon substantive issues. However, Chapter Two provides a discussion of what I regard as the main requirements of theories of social norms. Most of the epistemological issues in the chapter are illustrated from literature on theories of cross-cousin marriage. Thus, together with Chapters One and Three, Chapter Two contains an examination of some of the more salient aspects of the exchange theory.

Chapters one and three in particular examine some of the implications of Needham's distinction between prescriptive and merely preferential marriage rules. Prescriptive rules as he views them are essentially a means of regulating the status relations between entire social groupings. This interpretation requires that the social system provide mechanisms for equating the membership of such groupings with the appropriate kin-term categories.
In Chapter Three certain empirical implications of the exchange interpretation are examined against Das's data on the Purum. This analysis causes me to doubt the adequacy of Needham's approach. The examination reveals certain inconsistencies between Das's findings and Needham's model. Briefly stated, these inconsistencies derive from the idea that Ego places other persons in various kin-term categories on the basis of their membership in particular explicitly recognized whole descent groups.

In Chapter Four, Purum data are re-interpreted from the point of view that the social groupings relevant to Ego's allocations of kin-terms are narrower than the named Purum descent groups. To be sure, the structure of the social groupings which compose a society is a decisive factor in Ego's allocations of kin-terms to the people surrounding him. Further, the structure of the relevant groupings is regarded as changeable from time to time as well as cross-culturally variable. Hypothetically this approach may be taken to a point at which Ego's allocations of kin-terms are based upon his location in an orientation group reduced to scarcely more persons than his own parents. In such a situation, the matrilateral cross-cousin marriage rule can scarcely be regarded as a charter to status relations among ideological descent groups. In brief, the relations of whole descent groups and the matrilateral cross-cousin marriage rule are treated as contingent to one another.

These considerations represent a two-fold departure from Needham's approach. The orientation to analysis in terms of struc-
urally relevant social groupings which need not correspond to
the culturally normative groupings introduces de facto elements
into models of societies having a matrilateral cross-cousin mar-
riage rule. This results in a model of mixed composition (utili-
zizing both statistical and ideological norms) as distinguished from
Needham's more purely mechanical model (ideological elements only).
The characteristics and relative merits of mechanical vs. statis-
tical vs. mixed models are discussed in the first section of the
cssay.

Furthermore, the view that understanding the marriage
rule may be achieved even while treating the normative group struc-
ture of the society as a contingent variable would appear to lead
our quest for an explanation of the marriage rule in the direction
of what the exchange theorists might term psychological reduction-
ism. If we do not explain the marriage rule in terms of the be-
haviour of or interests of groups taken as a whole, what entities
are to serve as our analytic units? This issue is also discussed
in the first section. Suffice to say, for the present, that to
eliminate whole groups as analytic units is not, as the exchange
theorists appear to believe, tantamount to isolating persons, as
analytic units, from an envrironment of social relations with
other persons. The analysis of social relations among persons does
not reduce to a theory of personality.

It is by no means my aim to discredit the brilliant
contributions of the exchange theorists. Rather, I hope merely
to show in the first section of the essay that on some important points there is sufficient doubt that the new approach to the problem of unilateral cross-cousin marriage offered in section two is not a wasted effort.

In Chapters Seven and Nine respectively models are proposed for matrilateral and patrilateral cross-cousin marriage systems. The models are based upon a few rather simple principles. These principles, formulated in Chapter Five, are concerned with dimensions of social interaction which surround the regulation of heterosexual behaviour. Marriage rules per se are treated as a manifestation of the same factors which ex hypothesi structure sexual behaviour.

The regulation of sexual behaviour, in turn, is viewed as deriving from a prepotent disposition among the peoples with whom the analysis is concerned to reproduce themselves as social beings in persons of the generation which succeeds them. This tendency is referred to as a process of identification or role-continuity. In sum, then, the basic propositions of the theory concern a process of inter-generational role continuity, particularly as the process is manifest in the regulation of heterosexual behaviour.

I must emphasize at the outset that my own concern is with a somewhat different range of social phenomena from those for which the exchange theory is designed. Needham confines his analysis to so-called prescriptive systems. This essay, on the
other hand, is an attempt to understand important features of preferential rules as well as of prescriptive ones.

In the exchange analysis of systems of prescriptive matrilateral cross-cousin marriage the characteristic sexual and marital prohibitions are treated as complementary to the prescriptive aspect of the rule: a prescription to one social category directly implies marital prohibition of the remaining ones. A merely preferential rule, however, cannot be handled with the same relative simplicity. A normative marriage preference for a given social category scarcely provides an immediate understanding of the strict prohibition of other specific categories. In this expanded universe of discourse the marital prohibitions become events which require a more particular understanding.

Thus, the primary focus in this essay is upon the prescriptive regulations which comprise a definitive aspect of any system of unilateral cross-cousin marriage. My efforts in handling the positive features of the systems -- prescriptions and preferences -- are less satisfactory. This limitation becomes apparent in Chapter Eight which offers an analysis of Murngin kinship based upon the abstract model provided in Chapter Seven. The continuity concepts are able to render an explanation of the specific distribution of Ego's sexual privileges and taboos among the numerous female kin-term categories which surround him. They do not account, however for the restriction of his marital rights to only a single one (the matrilateral cross-cousin) among the several terminological
categories of women with whom a Murngin man is in fact allowed to conduct sexual relations.

Chapter Six is somewhat incidental to the mainstream of the essay. However, it provides another illustration of the possibilities offered by a psychological approach in the analysis of norm systems. Rules of exogamy are viewed as a mechanism for limiting the development of strains in the relations of men who must guard a close mutual trust.

Throughout the text I have used a consistent kin-status notation system. The abbreviations are as follows: father = Fa, mother = Mo, brother = Bro, sister = Si, son = Son, daughter = Da, wife = Wi, husband = Hu, elder = a prefixed e, younger = a prefixed y. Where a different notation system has been used within a quotation, I have taken the liberty of altering it to this one, in such cases, squared brackets indicate the alteration.

Native kin-terms have all letters capitalized, except where they occur within quotations and are otherwise distinguished there.
CHAPTER 1

Cross-Cousin Marriage: Prescriptive vs. Preferential

Anyone familiar with the works of Levi-Strauss, Needham and Leach is well aware of the virtually axiomatic position in their theory of some conception of a corporately acting social group. In connection with the problems of institutionalized marriage rules this posture is clearly illustrated in the following statements:

First Levi-Strauss,

The preferred marriage /matrilateral c.c. marriage among the Kachin results, not so much from a prescribed and precise degree of relationship, but from a general relationship between all the men of a lineage . . . and /another lineage in respect of all of its daughters and sisters.3

and Needham,

These alliances through prescribed marriage are established between corporate groups, specifically lineal descent groups, not merely between individuals, and not between individuals standing in any particular genealogical relationship.4

or, again,

The relationships of affinity are not merely ties between individuals or families. Descent groups, whether localized or dispersed, are also related as groups by ties of prescriptive alliance.5

and finally Leach,

There are two kinds of marriage. The first results from the whims of two persons acting as private individuals; the second is a systematically organized affair which forms a part of a series of contractual obligations between two social groups.6

Leach considers the second type of marriage to apply to societies practicing matrilateral cross-cousin marriage.
In their developments of the foregoing statements these writers reveal one or two important divergences. They do not concern us at present. On the other hand, each clearly posits the existence of some form of social grouping which acts somehow corporately in the marriages of its individual members. The analysis of social institutions in terms of some conception of a corporately acting social unit is a defining characteristic of structural anthropology. As such the concept figures vitally in the exchange theories of prescriptive marriage systems.

For the most part, however, the studies with which I am familiar make no effort to provide an empirical justification of their idea of the group. They are concerned rather with elaboration of the various effects or implications of this, that or the other form of marriage upon the relationships of the given social groupings. The pursuit of these implications introduces further concepts, notably the ideas of reciprocity, status and solidarity.

However, I consider that the quasi-axicmatic position of social groups in the exchange theories is itself a giant step. I shall devote much of this section to examining its methodology in addition to some consideration of the further concepts named above.

An important exception to the lack of empirical consideration of the group in a society with a prescriptive marriage rule appears in Needham's analysis of Das' data on the Purum tribe.
of Manipur. Needham employs Das' data in an effort to show that, among the Purum, most individual marriage choices do in fact add up to movements of women, as between whole descent groups, which parallel the mode of movement (exchange) held to be implied by a rule of prescriptive matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. His effort has stimulated a spate of controversy centered upon the empirical features of this question.

Figure 1, taken from Needham, represents the "formal features of prescribed matrilateral cross-cousin marriage." It presents diagramatically what Needham views as the structural implications of a prescriptive (as opposed to preferential) matrilateral cross-cousin marriage rule.

\[\text{Figure 1}\]

The meaning of this diagram, to Needham, is contained in the following statements:

The central fact in a matrilateral system is that lines are related by the same kind of relation from instance to instance and from generation to generation. Viewed as a system for the communication, transfer, or "exchange" of women, all the transactions are made in the same
"direction". Three lines satisfy the structural requirements of such a system, and the model entails that the movement of women is cyclic. Line A gives women to B, B gives to C, and C in turn gives to A, thus closing the cycle.12

The "lines" referred to are also termed "structural groups": Ego's structural group, the group of "wife-givers" and the group of "wife-takers". He continues:

In reality, each of these structural groups may comprise a number of corporate unilineal groups as defined by the particular society: these are descent groups. A descent group of any order may comprise a number of dispersed local groups.13

A central implication of these statements appears to be that, as between whole descent groups, here depicted as lines or as components of lines, women move in one and only one direction. A corollary to this is the structural prohibition of sister exchange ("sister" being understood in the classificatory sense). Even Needham's most ardent opponents seem agreed on this point. For example, Charles Ackerman states:

When there is a significant tendency to avoid the direct exchange of women among the descent groups, the bride-giving and bride-taking relationships are ordered by a matrilateral connubium.14

The avoidance of sister exchange between alliance groups in actual Purum marriages has been treated as a crucial "test case" of Needham's model. To be sure, Needham himself and some of his supporters appear ambivalent about this issue. It will be taken up later.

To accept avoidance of sister-exchange between alliance groups as an implication of a prescriptive rule of matrilateral
cross-cousin marriage (hereafter the word "cross-cousin" will be abbreviated to "c.c.") is, of course, to accept whatever premises support Needham's model. If only to fully understand Needham's concepts I shall now attempt to make explicit some of these premises. For purposes of this explication I shall employ a dialectical approach; i.e., together with presenting some of Needham's own statements of his premises, I shall offer what seem to me logically reasonable alternatives (or dialectical opposites). The question of the empirical reasonableness of these opposed views, and of their reconciliation, will be taken up later.

In a most excellent review of Needham's monograph "Structure and Sentiment", Floyd Lounsbury (A.A., 64, pp. 1302-1310) has considered at length some of the semantic difficulties in Needham's use of the word prescriptive. Lounsbury's criticisms need not be repeated here. I shall be satisfied to spell out to the best of my own understanding what Needham means by the notion of a prescriptive rule of matrilateral c.c. marriage. To begin with Needham's own words:

The term "prescriptive", on the other hand, as opposed to "preferential"/ has quite different connotations. In this case the emphasis is on the very lack of choice: the category or type of person to be married is precisely determined, and this marriage is obligatory. Among the Batak of Sumatra, for instance, marriage is prescribed with a woman exclusively of the category boru ni tulang, of which one of the genealogical specifications is "mother's brother's daughter". Contrarily, a woman of the category boru ni namboru, of which one of the specifications is "father's sister's daughter", may absolutely not be married. This situation is characterized by an utter lack of categorical choice.
Needham has repeatedly insisted that a prescriptive system is to be understood as a system of social classification. Our task, as he views it is the "comprehension of the life of a society in terms of the classification employed by the people themselves, and an analysis in terms of relations of the widest generality."

Thus, in a system of prescriptive matrilateral c.c. marriage every male Ego divides the women of his generation into (at least) three exclusive categories; sisters, mother's brother's daughters, and father's sister's daughters. These categories correspond to the three structural groups mentioned earlier (vide supra, p. 11). Prototypically, each of these categories of women is set apart by a distinct term of address and/or reference. This is not always precisely the case, however, and differentiation among the three categories is sometimes accomplished only through the additional support, to the terminology, of further reference to descent group (or section) membership.

Among the Purum, for example, we find a terminological equation between ySi and MoBroDa (KA-NAU-NU). This, however,—as Needham views it—presents no classificatory problem to the Purum since (a) ySi (=KA-NAU-NU) is also referred to as a KA-SARR-NU which "appears to be in fact the common Kuki-Chin term (sar, far) for sister in general (cf. Shafer 1952: 267-8, s.v. "Schwester")". A MoBroDa, who is referred to as KA-NAU-NU, would not carry the additional label of KA-SARR-NU. (b) Also, "we have in this case both ySi and MoBroDa denoted by nau, [abbreviation of KA-NAU-NU]"
but there still need be no practical difficulty, for the former is a member of Ego's own descent group and is thus prohibited, while the latter is not." (c) Finally, "there is still the fact that the eSi is known as u whereas the HoBroDa is not (Needham 1962 a: 78)."

Thus, a maritally proscribed KA-NAU-NU is distinguished from a maritally prescribed KA-NAU-NU by the fact that the former has a sister, older than Ego, whom Ego terms KA-U whereas the latter has a sister, older than Ego, whom he terms KA-NAU-NU. In passing, we should note that "A man addresses a woman of his sisters' husbands' group of sibs as Katunu (if elder) or by name if younger". I presume that this statement provides the basis for Needham's inclusion of the FaSiDa under the term KATUNU (Needham, 1962, p. 76, Table 4 and 1964, p. 1378).

Thus, there is no single term in the Purum lexicon of kin-terms which may be directly translated maritally prescribed woman. Using Needham's information, one would characterize a woman of the prescriptive category as any woman whom Ego terms KA-NAU-NU, as long as she is "not of Ego's own descent group", and/or as long as she is not included under the more general term KA-SARR-NU, and/or as long as she has no sister, older than Ego, whom he terms KA-U.

It has already been stated that a prescriptive marriage system is primarily a system of social relational classification which is "employed by the people themselves" (vide supra, p.13). Such a prescription may be expressed in the system of kinship
terminology. This need not be the case, however, as in situations where marriage prescriptions take the form of prescription to either specified descent groups or to named marriage sections. In these cases the structural group to which a man's choice is prescribed is not designated by kin-terms as such, but by the appropriate descent group or sectional name (kin terms for women will cross-cut the prescribed structural group).

Where the marriage prescription is expressed in the system of terminology, the kin terms must provide for a demarcation, in the mind of the cultural participant, of at least three classes of women (in the case of matrilateral c.c. marriage systems; only two classes of women are required in systems of bilateral c.c. marriage, i.e., sisters vs. bilateral cross-cousins) of Ego's generation. The distinction of these categories, as they appear in the terminology, may be achieved either through single terms, each sufficient by itself to denote an exclusive social category or (as in Needham's argument above regarding Purum terminology) through an interaction of terms.

Finally, Ego must be morally restricted to selecting a marriage partner from one and only one of these terminological categories. A merely preferential system is the same in all respects save that Ego is not rigidly confined by morality to only one of the categories, but merely prefers to choose his bride from it.
Perhaps these remarks will become clearer if we look at some of Needham's characterizations of particular cases:

Karadjeri: Not prescriptive in the sense required. They have a four section system, and although marriage with the genealogical father's sister's daughter is forbidden they marry categorically a bilateral cross cousin.\(^{19}\)

-or, again,

Wik-Munken (Archer River group): Not prescriptive in the sense required. A straightforward two section system with exogamous moieties, plus differentiation of senior and junior affines. The genealogical \(FaSiDa\) is forbidden, but marriage is categorically with a bilateral cross-cousin.\(^{20}\)

According to Needham then, the Karadjeri and Wik-Munken are not prescriptive "in the sense required". I take him to mean by this that such systems are indeed prescriptive ones, but not the kind of prescriptive system he is concerned with. Karadjeri and Wik-Munken prescriptions are to named sections; i.e., a given man is morally restricted to choosing a wife from a single named section (and morally proscribed from choosing one from the one or three remaining sections). Thus, while these are prescriptive systems they are not unilateral (in these cases matrilateral) cross-cousin marriage prescriptions. This is simply because the kin terminology in both cases puts women of Ego's generation in only two terminological categories, rather than in three categories. In these cases, the two categories are identified as sisters, who are proscribed, and bilateral cross-cousins who are not proscribed. The genealogical FaSiDa and MoBroDa both fall within the same single kin-term category. Thus where it is observed that among the Karadjeri
"marriage is allowed with own mother's brother's daughter but not with father's sister's daughter", one must assume that the FaSiDa here referred to is confined to the literal genealogical FaSiDa. In terms of Needham's stipulated meaning of the word, this does not make a prescriptive system of matrilateral c.c. marriage since the proscription against FaSiDa does not mean the proscription of an entire exclusive category of women, which merely includes the genealogical FaSiDa, and prescription to a distinct terminological category which includes the genealogical own MoBroDa.

In passing it should be observed that it is unclear whether the Karadjeri should be counted as sectionally prescriptive, terminologically prescriptive (to the bilateral cross-cousin category), or both. It is possible in a four-section system that the terminological category of bilateral cross-cousin may not denote uniquely the category of women to which Ego is confined in his marriage; i.e., bilateral cross-cousins may be distributed in more sections than the single one to which Ego is prescribed. Prescription to a named section may not, then, be tantamount to a terminological prescription. It is not at all clear to me what obtains among the Karadjeri in this respect. Indeed, it is not even clear that they have a four-section marriage system. The Lanes count six.

A general summation of our discussion of the concepts prescriptive/preferential contains three major points:

(1) A prescriptive system is an ideology of social classification. Exclusive categories of people are in some way named by the culture participants.
We may, for present purposes, recognize three varieties of prescription. These differ in the conceptual mechanisms which provide the basis for creating the various exclusive and named categories of people. The three types are:

(a) prescription to named marriage sections.

We should remark, in passing, that when dealing with implicit section systems we will have, from this viewpoint, descended from the realm of cultural ideology per se to modeling a mixture of ideological and de facto marriage patterns. Where it is demonstrated that the ideological elements of such a combined model represent factual marriage behaviour as well, the model as a whole must be regarded as a representation of actual marriage practices.

(b) prescription to women of named descent groups.

(c) prescription to the women of a single kin-term category; for example, prescriptive matrilateral, patrilateral or bilateral cross-cousin marriage.

Combinations of the above three forms of prescription may coincide in a particular social system. The major point of Needham's Purum analysis concerns the coincidence of prescriptions of (b)/(c) variety. His theory attempts to explain a rule of prescriptive matrilateral cross-cousin marriage (a type (c) prescription) in terms of type (b) prescriptions.

We must bear in mind that the prescriptions and proscriptions both carry moral injunctions. It is morally correct to marry
a woman of one category and morally wrong to marry a woman of another. It is not really clear whether preferential systems differ from prescriptive ones in this regard—other than as an issue of degree. The difference seems to center about the idea that no serious moral offence is committed by marrying into a non-preferred category. Rather, "it is simply thought a good thing that a man should marry, if conveniently possible, a woman in a certain position." The "position" may be stipulated through genealogical description, a terminological category, reference to a descent group, etc. Let us accept, then, that Needham's distinguishing criterion centers, above all, in the absence of a strict moral proscription, in preferential systems, against marriage into a category whose counterpart in a prescriptive system is morally forbidden.

Like Needham's, the views which I present later in this essay are an attempt to explain rules of matrilateral c.c. marriage. An important difference, however, appears in our respective stipulations concerning the situations which we accept as cases of these rules. For my part, I include situations, some of which Needham might class as preferential, in which there is a significant tendency shown to frown upon marriage with a FaSiDa (and/or women of her distinctive terminological category) even if they are willing to reluctantly tolerate it. At least I am inclined to include such cases as possible examples of my argument. In addition, I might include societies, such as the Karadjeri and Wik-Munken, which
apparently proscribe the genealogical FaSiDa, but not the term
category to which she belongs (which includes the genealogical
MoBroDa). We are alike, though, in that I also am concerned with
social systems that would qualify clearly as systems of prescrip-
tive matrilateral c.c. marriage.

I have taken some pains to present as clearly as I am
able Needham's use of the concepts prescriptive/preferential. The
distinction is a central one to his arguments:

Prescriptive rules have certain structural entailments,
and societies with such rules can be classified accord-
ing to the particular entailments of the different pre-
scriptions.²⁴

whereas,

Marriage preferences, on the other hand, have no struc-
tural entailments in the total social system comparable to
those of a prescriptive system, and are not systema-
tically integrated with the marriage prohibitions.²⁵
CHAPTER 2

Explanation in Structural Analysis

The crucial feature of prescriptive marriage rules in general is that they "entail enduring affinal ties between groups", and of prescriptive matrilateral c.c. marriage rules in particular, that "the ties are formed by the unilateral transference of women from group to group. . ." This concept, which has already been introduced (vide supra, pp. 10-11), will require closer analysis. Especial difficulty, it seems to me, derives from the connotation of the word group. Needham's meaning is somewhat clarified in a statement made in reply to criticisms put forward by Livingstone (F.B. Livingstone, 1959). He states:

A social system is an abstraction relating (in this context) to lineal descent groups which are also an abstraction. There is no place in abstraction for substantive "specific groups". It would be an odd and profitless notion of social system to so identify it with substantive reality that every change (segmentation, even births or deaths of individuals) would be said to constitute a "breakdown".

This statement echoes the form vs. matter, mind vs. body, and persistence vs. change dilemmas which troubled the thought of ancient Greece. Our purpose is to avoid such dilemmas in 20th Century science. I hope to show how this might be accomplished with the problem in hand.

I am prepared to accept the notion of groups as an abstraction. However, the abstract groupings dealt with in a particular situation must, in the context of Needham's ideas, be ones
that are nevertheless real at least as a part of the ideology of
the culture participants themselves. The groups must be perceived,
named or not, by the culture participants. If they are not par-
ticularly named the anthropologist must be prepared to provide
evidence that the group is treated as an exclusive societal divi-
sion through some designation occurring in the actions or conver-
sations of the culture participants; e.g., designations such as
the people who live--(place indicated) or the people who -- (ac-
tivity stereotype), etc.

The substantive content of such ideological divisions
will doubtless undergo continuous flux--population and composi-
tional change, localization, politico-economic unity and struc-
ture, etc. Indeed, particular groupings may appear and disappear
in substantive fact, their numbers may increase or decrease through
time, and this may all be clearly recognized by the people them-
selves. However, as long as the ideological criteria which defined
the nature of the earlier societal subdivisions (such as a rule of
patrilineal descent) continue to apply, in the minds of the people,
to currently recognized social subdivisions, then the compositional
elements of the social system remain ideologically unaltered. Fur-
ther, as long as the relations among these elements (albeit speci-
fically new ones) remain normatively the same, then the entire ide-
ological social system remains unchanged.

I do not wish to imply that the system is perceived as
such by the culture participants. The ideological system is a
mode of relating some (as many as possible) of the reliably identified normative elements of a culture in some logical manner. Most often, the culture participant himself, when asked "why" with respect to a particular norm will (if he is inclined to answer at all) provide explanation directly in terms of some further norm proper to his own culture. Let us take an example from a situation in which there appears a norm of preferential matrilateral c.c. marriage. Hsiao-Tung Fei, in his book "Peasant Life in China" observes:

In the village, two kinds of "cross-cousin" marriage can be distinguished. A girl married to the son of her father's sister is called saonseodiu, meaning a girl going up the hill. "Up the hill" signifies the prosperity of the family. A girl married to the son of mother's brother is called wesienodi, meaning a girl going back to the native place. This is interpreted as a sign of ruin of the family. As the terms show, the people prefer the up-hill type and dislike the "reverting" type.

Let us see what is the real difference between these two types. . . .

Fei's Chinese peasants explain their avoidance of FaSiDa marriage by quite direct reference to other of their culture norms; in this case having to do with the support of "family prosperity". Anthropologists are seldom satisfied with a culture participant's explanation of his own norms (sometimes referred to as "conscious paradigms"). Fei, for example, goes on to explain the "real difference...". Hugo Nutini explains this dissatisfaction as follows:

Conscious paradigms are not models at all, if we take for granted that a model must be an explanatory construct....conscious models are not explanatory, that is, they do not entail causality.
The minimal form of "causality" manifest in the anthropologist's explanatory models is logical connectedness among its constituent propositions. Confronted with a cultural norm taken as a problem (such as normative marriage rules), the anthropologist attempts to provide a series of propositions from which he is able, in effect, to deduce the proposition which states the problem norm. The problem element is then taken as explained by the logical interaction of premises whence it is derived. Where the problem element of the model is an ideological norm the completed deduction is often referred to as a mechanical model. Where the problem element is, empirically, a statistical norm the construct is often called a statistical model. This essay, then, is concerned with so-called mechanical models.

There are two further questions concerning the anthropologist's explanatory models:

(1) What is the epistemological nature of the propositions that compose a completed model?

(2) How can we select among equally (logically) valid models of the same social phenomenon? How, that is, do we verify models?

Let us consider the first question. There seem to be three basic types of elements distributed among the premise propositions:

(1) Explicit, and therefore "conscious" ideological norms. In mechanical models this includes the problem norm itself.
(2) So-called statistical norms.

(3) Theoretical postulates of the Anthropologist.

One major objection which may be directed against this view involves my inclusion of statistical norms as legitimate elements in a so-called mechanical model. Witness Nutini:

The reader must not interpret this to mean that we can only construct mechanical models out of or based on actual behaviour. This is not what I am saying, for all models, be they mechanical or statistical, can be constructed out of any set of empirical data as long as they explain the facts in question. What I am maintaining is that mechanical models constructed out of ideal behaviour, and statistical models based on actual behaviour are best; they are the "most explanatory" models that we can build in dealing with social phenomena. . . . mechanical and statistical models, as explanatory constructs, must always be regarded vis-a-vis their proper epistemological referents, if they are to explain a given set of social facts in the best possible manner. 32

In sum, Nutini seems to be arguing (very ambivalently) that the best mechanical model is one in which all directly empirical elements are ideological norms whereas the opposite is the case in statistical models (based on statistical norms). I see no reason to endorse this viewpoint. It is a case-in-point of the kind of mind/body dichotomy I referred to earlier.

Ideological norms belong to the world of mind. The world of mind cannot, it seems, be best explained by events of the distinct world of body, (i.e., statistical norms). The realm of human thought, perception, and emotion is self-contained (except as it is causal in body action) and wholly discontinuous with the more rudely corporeal conditions of life. For my part, I view
this epistemology as highly restrictive and more theological than scientific. Man's psychic world, and in particular his normative definitions of the world in which he lives and dies, cannot be comprehended without reference to the de facto behaviour in which he engages, often (if not usually) unawares. In brief, the "best" models are always "mixed" models in that they say more about MAN. Added to this is the unquestionably greater range of theory-building materials afforded by the mixed model approach.

In this respect, I might add, Nutini appears to misunderstand what Levi-Strauss and Needham actually do in their substantive work. The very explanatory postulates of their theories refer to phenomena which are explicitly not conscious norms but either unperceived (by the culture participant) patterns of de facto behaviour and/or (at least) attitude sets which, as such, are unperceived by the participant himself.

These considerations lead me to conclude, further, that a psycho-biological view of Man enters all Anthropological theory, admittedly often unexpressed, whether or not the theorist is prepared to admit it.

The epistemological and empirical nature of what I have termed theoretical postulates is an exceedingly subtle matter. Ultimately, it is these postulates which are the explanatory elements in all of our models; they are what we ordinarily call statements of theory. Such propositions, as they apply to particular explanatory models, have a number of important characteristics:
(1) They are more abstract than the statements of the directly empirical norms which are logically connected through them in the model. This follows from my claim that explanatory models are basically deductive constructs. The concluding propositions are logically subtended by the explanatory, theoretical, propositions. Let me illustrate again from Fei's material. Fei attempts to explain the "real difference" between the two types of cross-cousin. I have provided diagrams beneath to enable the reader to more easily follow Fei's remarks. (Figs. 2 and 3) He states:

In the first case [matrilateral c.c. marriage] the girl [a bride] will be the daughter-in-law of her father's sister, who is from the father's Chia [a patrilocal extended family] and still stands in an intimate relation to her father; while in the second case [patrilateral c.c. marriage], the girl will be the daughter-in-law of her mother's brother's wife, who has suffered from her own mother-in-law who is the girl's mother's mother. An intimate relation of a mother towards her married daughter is usually jealously resented by her son's wife. When the girl comes under her control, she will take her as a target for revenge.33

![Diagram](image-url)
Fig. 2 shows mother/daughter pairs by loops of broken lines. #1 resents the intimacy between #2 and #3, and expresses this by making her daughter-in-law, #4, who is daughter of #3, suffer. She is able to do so in virtue of the normative authority vested in the mother-in-law.

![Fig. 2](image)

**Figure 3**

MATRILATERAL

Fig. 3 However much #1 may resent the intimacy of #2 and #3, she cannot effectively avenge herself because her own daughter-in-law, #5, is not the daughter of #3 as in Fig. 2.

Although this argument, as it stands, has difficulties, it is not my present purpose to offer a thorough critical analysis. For purposes of illustrating the abstractness of theoretical postulates it will be sufficient to examine a single segment of the argument:

(a) A woman resents the "intimacy" shared between her mother-in-law and the daughter of her mother-in-law. I take this to be based on some direct observation by Fei of de facto behaviour, or, possibly, interview statements.

(b) The woman desires "revenge" against them but, in view of her status with respect to them (normative authority of mother-in-
law over daughter-in-law), is unable to act directly and openly against them. I assume this statement would be supported similarly to (a).

(c) Patrilateral c.c. marriage results in the woman's own daughter-in-law being the daughter of the woman's mother-in-law's daughter.

(d) Matrilateral c.c. marriage does not have this effect.

(e) If the woman's own daughter-in-law is the daughter of her own mother-in-law's daughter, the woman will "take her as a target for revenge"; not so or less so otherwise.

(f) Conclusion: A woman will make her daughter-in-law suffer more where the patrilateral form of marriage is practiced than where the matrilateral form is practiced.

In the series of premises the proposition which is most uncertain as to its empirical source is (e). I suspect that it could not be, as such, traced to informants' statements or even from Fei's observations and interpretations of actual patrilateral c.c. marriage situations. Indeed, for Fei to have observed a situation with the entire structural gestalt required by this statement, actual patrilateral marriages would have had to occur through several generations in a family line. Fei's statements make such an event very unlikely. What, then, is the source of the statement?

Statement (e) appears to almost follow from (a)-(b); but not quite. They need a logical cement -- a statement of more general cast than any of (a), (b) or (e). Let me suggest, for example, a fourth proposition to be interpolated between (a)-(b) and (e):
to a third person a mother and her daughter are socially equivalent in the sense that one may serve as a surrogate of the other in the eyes of the third party.

This statement anticipates the views I have developed in the second section of this essay. The present formulation of the postulate is certainly inadequate but will serve my immediate purpose of illustrating the nature of theoretical postulates.

Thus, in a situation of repeated marriage to the literal patrilateral cross-cousin, a woman will be far more tyrannical in her treatment of her daughter-in-law than otherwise because, under these circumstances, the daughter-in-law is, in the woman's eyes, a sort of social surrogate to persons whom she resents (the woman's mother-in-law and the daughter of the latter) and this is so specifically because she is the daughter of one of these women.

It is easy to see from this illustration that our theoretical postulate is a proposition of more general cast than the statement of the social phenomena which they purport to explain. Here, for example, our postulate stipulates neither the particular formal status relationship (e.g. Kin-relation) between our third party and either of a mother/daughter pair, nor the qualitative nature of relationship of the outsider toward the pair. Our norm patterns, on the other hand, specify both.

(2) A second feature of theoretical postulates concerns the nature of their subject elements and of what functions are appropriately predicated to these. Are we concerned, as the subject elements of
our theoretical statements, with "people", or "groups", or "institutions", or with something else altogether? Do these "act", or "function", or have "effects", have "attitudes"?

A first and perhaps facile answer to these questions is just that a subject element may be any of a large range of concepts. Which is employed on a given occasion will depend upon the nature of the problem at hand. Also, the predicate element is, in a common-sense way, a function of the subject element of the statement. The language of Anthropological theory is not yet so specialized that we can meaningfully refer to the attitude of an institution, unless we are shown that this can be understood in some elliptical sense.

We can say more than this. Homans and Schneider observe that all institutional theories have "at one time or another, been called functional theories, but the word function has been used in several different senses." They recognize three "chief senses" of the word. These are:

(a) "Malinowskian Functionalism";

An institution is what it is because it results from the drives, or meets the immediate needs, of individuals or sub-groups within a society....interests may be other than economic.

(b) "Quasi-Mathematical functionalism";

An institution is what it is because it meshes with other institutions within a society.

(c) "Final Cause" functionalism;

An institution is what it is because it is in some sense good for a society as a whole.
In sum, Homans and Schneider find three types of theoretical postulates differing from each other above all in what kind of predication each ascribes to its subject element. Since there are certainly many more than three kinds of specific predication to be found in theoretical statements, I take them to mean that all such belong to one of these three classes in some ultimate sense beyond the scope of our immediate inquiry.

Taken as a totality, the theories of Lévi-Strauss and Needham contain a mixture of all three of these types of functionalism. Let us look first at their "quasi-mathematical" aspect.

I have already observed that a central feature of Needham's Purum analysis appears to involve the coincidence or, to use Homans and Schneider's term, "meshing" of the rule of prescriptive matrilateral c.c. marriage and the alleged normative prescription to women of specified, named, whole descent groups (vide supra, p.18). We have yet to examine this proposal in detail but, for the time being, we shall accept it at face value.

More specifically, the exchange theorists have argued that the ordering of one way giving and taking of brides between whole descent groups is a "structural implication" or, as Needham puts it, a "structural entailment", of the prescriptive matrilateral marriage rule. As I have already pointed out (vide supra, pp. 21-22) the ordering of descent group relations is to be understood above all in a normative sense. In this argument our subject element
(the marriage rule) is linked to the object element (descent group relations) by what is held to be a purely logical connection. The marriage rule explains the group relations as premises explain their conclusion. In this context nothing of the order of drive or purpose is predicated to the marriage rule.

This argument presents two difficulties. First, is it truly the case that the prescriptive marriage rule does "entail" the kinds of whole descent group relations that it is purported to entail? I shall show later that it does not under any but certain highly specific conditions. I shall further examine Purum data in light of this argument. The second difficulty, of importance in our present context, is that the exchange theorists are distinctly concerned with providing an explanation of the marriage rule. Thus, a quasi-mathematical functionalist explanation of the prescriptive matrilateral c.c. marriage rule would demonstrate that it could be derived deductively from the definition of another socially co-existing institutionalized norm; not vice versa. There are points at which Leach and Needham appear to be suggesting just this; i.e., that institutionalized whole group relations (of one-way bride movement) imply the rule of marriage. Leach cannot take this position firmly, however, because the Kachin of Burma on whom his analysis is based simply have no explicit norm of whole-group one-way bride movement. In the case of Needham's Purum this issue is a moot point (to be examined later) although I suspect, in the final analysis, that Needham's difficulty is one and the same as Leach's.
In view of this difficulty, the exchange theorist lacks a quasi-mathematical explanation of the marriage rule, and although a meshing of the marriage rule and group relations are a part of the theory, this is not the part which contains the explanatory punch. For this, they must shift to predication of a different kind.

The shift is somewhat obscured by a corresponding shift in the definition of the problem. In Needham's words, the problem now becomes "roughly this: Given that a society practices this form of marriage [ unilateral c.c. marriage ], why is it contracted with one side rather than the other." As it stands, this question is remarkably ambiguous. However, I shall take it to mean what it appears to mean; viz., why is matrilateral c.c. marriage (whether understood as prescriptive or merely preferential) considerably more frequent than patrilateral c.c. marriage?

In his contrast between the two forms of unilateral c.c. marriage, Lévi-Strauss provides what I consider to be the beginning of a good answer to this question. At present I am more concerned with his form of explanation than with its detail. Accordingly, I shall reproduce the argument only in broadest outline. The reader will be assisted in following this discussion by the diagram beneath representing a model of a patrilateral cross-cousin marriage system (from Needham, 1961, p. 15).
Homans and Schneider make the following summary remark about patrilateral systems:

father's sister's daughter marriage, just like mother's brother's daughter marriage, requires at least three lineages; any one lineage is linked by marriage to two others in the ring, and the ring can be lengthened indefinitely. On all these counts it meets Levi-Strauss's requirements for generalized exchange /matrilateral system/. The only difference is that the men of B lineage, defined either patrilineally or matrilineally, give women alternately to the As and to the Cs instead of always getting them from one and giving them to the other.  

This statement may be represented simply by the following diagram.

![Diagram](image-url)

**Figure 4**

**PATRILATERAL SYSTEM**

The diagrams given also illustrate an important corollary to Homans and Schneider's observations. Any single descent group,
such as "C", exchanges women, in both directions with two others (schematically), but it is as dependent on the working of the "entire system" as a single group in the matrilateral system. In order to continue the alternating give-take with "C", "D" must persist in alternating give-take with "E", "E" with "F", and so on. In this sense the "organic solidarity" of interdependence appears to be at least as intricate as in the matrilateral system. Homans and Schneider say that "We might even go on to argue that father's sister's daughter marriage makes for greater organic solidarity...." If I thought that the concept of organic solidarity had any use whatever in this problem (which I do not) I would be obliged to agree with Homans and Schneider.

In view of these observations, what can Lévi-Strauss possibly mean by his following statement?

Instead of constituting a global system, as do both bilateral and matrilateral cross-cousin marriage each in its own sphere, marriage with father's sister's daughter is not capable of attaining any other form than a multitude of little closed systems, juxtaposed to one another, without ever realizing a global structure.

To understand Lévi-Strauss's metaphor we must return to an earlier discussion. We have said that a prescriptive rule of matrilateral c.c. marriage, by definition, groups all women of marriageable age into three exclusive terminological categories. In addition, any ego will, ex hypothesi, regard all such women who are of a single descent group as belonging collectively and exclusively to one or another of these three categories. Thus, from the viewpoint of any Ego, any woman of marriageable age can be judged marriageable
or proscribed automatically and simply in virtue of her descent group membership alone. Her kin-status is determined by her descent group status. No system could be more truly "global".

Contrast this with the situation generated by a prescriptive rule of patrilateral c.c. marriage. Once again let us confront Ego with three terminological categories of women corresponding to Si, FaSiDa and MoBroDa. If Ego is a man of descent group "C" (Fig. 5), into which of these terminological categories does he place a given woman of descent group "D"? The women of "D" do not belong, collectively and exclusively, to any one of the three categories; a given woman could belong to any one of the term-categories or at least to either of the FaSiDa or MoBroDa categories. But, it may be argued, surely Ego (say he is located in the middle row of Figure 5) calls women of "D" by the term for FaSiDa since the arrow between C and D moves in the direction of "C"? This is true as long as the system includes an explicit means of separating the generations; such as explicit generational moieties or explicitly named sections which divide each descent group in half on the basis of alternating generations. These structures are shown in the following diagrams:

![Diagram](image-url)
With either of the above qualifications a patrilateral system can manifest a structure involving prescriptive "circulating connubium" between two sets of sections (which do not themselves intermarry but are connected by descent) or, alternately, circulating connubium among the moiety divisions of whole descent groups (Fig. 6). In either case, furthermore, Ego can readily identify the terminological category of any woman by simple reference to her section or to her descent group and generational moiety. For example, in the hypothetical situation shown in Figure 7, the terms might be distributed roughly as follows (Ego in section 1):

- women of section 1 = sisters
- women of section 3 = mothers' brothers' daughters
- women of section 5 = fathers' sisters' daughters
- women of section 2 = fathers' sisters and daughters (note: FaSi = mo-in-law)
- women of section 4 = sons' wives (= sister's daughters) and mothers.
- women of section 6 = daughters' husbands' sisters and fathers' sisters' husbands' sisters.
Since Lévi-Strauss does not consider this possibility let us ask what Ego would confront without any explicit ordering of generations? The situation would surely be very ambiguous.

Once again, if Ego belongs to descent group "C" (say the middle row in Fig. 5), how does he determine the kin category of a given woman of descent group "D"? She is not categorically one or the other type of cross-cousin simply in virtue of her descent group membership vis-à-vis his own. At its simplest all that can be said of the women of "D", collectively, is that in the eyes of the men of "C" some are their individual MoBroDa's while others are their individual FaSiDa's. In the absence of clear-cut generational divisions Ego has very little to guide a decision concerning a particular given woman. Nor is relative age a satisfactory criterion since it does not always faithfully reflect the relative generational positions of Ego and the woman in question.

Assuming that Ego is bent upon obeying the FaSiDa prescription what devices remain to him for determining the given woman's kin category? What about their precise genealogical connexion? Beyond his first genealogical cousins Ego will run into very great difficulties. Harrison C. Whyte has argued, for example, that fully eight of the sixteen genealogically distinct second cousins "are genuinely new kinds of kin in the classificatory kin system." Of the remaining eight, four are identified as classificatory sisters, two as MoBroDa's and two as FaSiDa's.

The upshot of all this is that, in a patrilateral system without explicit ordering of generations, Ego is confined to identi-
fying his undisputed cousins of the various types to a narrow range of genealogical specifications. Matrilateral cross-cousins, for example, would include the literal MoBroDa, MoFaBroSoDa, MoMoSiSoDa; patrilateral cross-cousins would include the literal FaSiDa, FaFaBroDaDa, FaMoSiDaDa. Beyond this, we must move to the genealogical third cousin level, and here we may anticipate that an even smaller proportion could be identified as to kin-category than in the case of the second cousins. The remaining second and third cousins cannot be identified through the unaided logic of classificatory kinship alone. The reason for this is clearly, in the last analysis, that a person's terminological category is characteristically determined, for Ego, as a function of that person's descent group (and, sometimes, generational position) and Ego's personal genealogical connexion with the descent group. Sometimes Ego's personal genealogical connexion with the descent group is, as it were, predetermined by the normative marital relations of his whole-descent group to the other one in question. This need not be the case, however. This discussion will be made clearer at a later point.

In sum, Ego can locate unambiguously only a small range of FaSiDa's, MoBroDa's, and Si's, but remains confronted with a relatively large pool of women none of whom can be clearly identified as to kin-category without the aid of an explicit generational principle. Thus, if Ego obeys the patrilateral prescription he is confined to selecting a bride from a small pool of women who are genealogically traceable through his personal family history. A strict patrilateral prescription means, in other words, that the
repetitious affinal alliances obtain between narrow family lines and not, as is more clearly possible in a matrilateral system, between larger groupings. This, I take it, is what Lévi-Strauss is driving at where he refers to "a multitude of little closed systems juxtaposed to one another, without ever realizing a global structure."

A matrilateral system, by contrast, does not require an explicit generational principle to create such a "global" structure. By simple reference to descent group alone Ego can identify the kin-category of a given woman; at least, that is, in the hypothetical exchange theory model.

But what has all of this to do with the different frequencies of the two forms of cousin marriage? The answer is that Lévi-Strauss predicts in an *ex post facto* way that the patrilateral rule has a lower survival probability than the matrilateral one. Once again I have had to take interpretive liberties with Lévi-Strauss's statements.

He appears at this juncture to want to move in two directions at once. On the one hand, he has pointed us in the general direction of an important contrast between the two cousin marriage systems. As I will argue more fully at a later point, there appear to be good reasons to expect that the patrilateral rule has lower survival probability than the matrilateral one. These reasons all relate to statements concerning people. It has already been suggested, for example, that Ego (any male culture participant) is confined to a relatively small pool of women from which to
choose a wife. One can easily envision situations arising, in the course of human events, as they are played out in a patrilateral system, in which Ego is hard pressed to break his prescription and select a bride from the undefined pool. The situation would simply be one in which Ego confronted a severe scarcity of women who are clearly FaSiDa's. Should this occur regularly and become widely accepted, the system can no longer be labelled a prescriptive one but must be termed a merely preferential one. The problem is considerably more complex than this, however, and I must leave it until further analysis prepares us to take it up again. My present argument concerns the fact that Lévi-Strauss has, however impressionistically, pointed us in the direction of important distinctions between the two rules. The distinction devolves about propositions concerning human beings to whom we predicate certain general behavioural dispositions (e.g. the disposition to mate and reproduce). I intend to locate some of these which are relevant to our present problem and to then show in greater detail that such dispositions are more likely to be frustrated in a patrilateral than in a matrilateral system.

It seems possible then to construct an argument which explains the differential frequency of the two cousin marriage forms on the grounds that the patrilateral form must generate regular frustration of certain important behavioural dispositions where the matrilateral form does not. Such explanatory postulates contain people as their subject elements and predicate to them what I
have termed behavioural dispositions. Such propositions would fall more nearly within the sphere of Malinowskian functionalism than within the other types.

At this juncture Lévi-Strauss's argument undergoes a subtle shift in ground. To this point he has hinted that there might be good reason why few cultures have a patrilateral (prescriptive) cross-cousin marriage norm. But how does this explain why certain other cultures do have a matrilateral cross-cousin marriage norm? The argument virtually posits an artificial situation of choice; the matrilateral form is chosen over the patrilateral. In effect, if people are in any sense the subject-element of the explanatory postulates implied in this argument, what is predicated to them is the action of rational choice; choice, that is, which is based upon foreknowledge. This is precisely what Homans and Schneider had in mind when they remarked that "Lévi-Strauss's efficient cause is human intelligence." This aspect of Lévi-Strauss's explanatory efforts is surely an example of final cause functionalism.

In my view, the kinds of propositions which have the greatest and most ultimate explanatory power in the problems dealt with by social anthropologists, are propositions which have people as their subject-element (whether all people, Purum people, males, etc.) and which predicate to people various dispositions (sets?) for acting toward and reacting to other people (also further specified) in corresponding ways. Mauss's concept of "total prestation", of great importance in the exchange theories of prescriptive marriage,
is an outstanding example of this type of theoretical proposition.

Witness Mauss:

Total prestation not only carries with it the obligation to repay gifts received, but it implies two others equally important: the obligation to give presents and the obligation to receive them. 44

"Obligations" are examples of behavioural dispositions predicated to people acting individually or in groups.

(3) The verification of explanatory postulates: I shall return anon to a further exploration of the epistemological nature of dispositional postulates. For the moment let us return to an earlier perspective.

Anthropological models are an attempt to explain explicit norms (statistical or ideological). The deductive sequence which yields the problem norm (i.e., the model) requires, as I have argued, certain generalizing postulates taken as axiomatic in the model itself. As scientists, however, we are inclined to attempt to verify our axioms. Speaking for myself, I regard particular models as ultimately of less importance to our discipline than the general postulates upon which they rest. How, then, do we support the postulates?

I have stated that the postulates are general propositions and operate axiomatically within particular models. By this I mean that they logically subtend propositions derived from them. Let me illustrate this point from Leach. In the concluding section of his essay, "The Structural Implications of Matrilateral Cross-Cousin Marriage", he states that
In every relationship between individuals and between groups, items in the above list are exchanged. It is in the nature of most such 'exchanges' that, as regards the tangible items a, b, c, d, e there is always an imbalance on one side or the other. The exchange account is balanced by the intangible items f and g.45

The list referred to in the citation is as follows:

I. Tangibles
   (a) women and men
   (b) labour of men or women
   (c) consumer goods and money
   (d) capital goods
   (e) ritual objects of no intrinsic value.

II. Intangibles
   (f) rights of a territorial and political nature
   (g) relative status or prestige.46

These statements, operating as premises lead to the following conclusions:

With Kachin type marriage the relationship between wife giving and wife receiving groups is asymmetrical; hence differentiation of status one way or the other is more likely than not. Such differentiation can be avoided if a small number of neighboring local groups marry in a circle, or if there is a system of balancing rights and obligations — as with the Murngin; but any such system of balances will be unstable.47

At the risk of becoming tiresomely repetitious I shall try to restate the general flow of Leach's argument:

(a) If tangible gifts are not repaid by other tangibles they must be repaid by intangibles. This is clearly a corollary to Mauss's notion of total prestation.

(b) A rule of matrilateral c.c. marriage implies one-way bride giving between groups, (in Leach's view specifically "local descent groups").
(c) Therefore, in a Kachin type system there is an implicit im-
balance in the exchange between groups of at least one speci-
fic tangible; i.e., women.

(d) The debt incurred as per (c) above is balanced by an intan-
gible; i.e., status differential as between bride giving and
bride taking groups.

(e) Therefore, Leach predicts, there will be a status differen-
tial between bride giving/bride taking groups in a society
having a rule of matrilateral c.c. marriage.

My present point is that the concluding proposition, (e),
is logically subtended by the major premise, (a), which is itself
subtended by Mauss's definition of total prestation (**vide supra**, p.44 ). The relation between the movement of women and of deference
shown between groups is a particular case-in-point of the general
kinds of behavioural dispositions postulated by Mauss.

What does this model achieve? First we should note
that it does not, as it stands, provide an explanation of the mar-
riage rule itself. To accomplish that end with the propositions
given above it is necessary to reverse their order.

Given (empirically) a norm (statistical and/or ideolo-
gical) of status differential among the descent groups which com-
pose a society, one would argue, roughly, that a one-way movement
of women between any two groups (in which one renders deference to
the other) is one means at least of balancing the debt incurred by
the disequilibrium of status. Further, one would have to reverse proposition (b) to show that the one-way movement of women implies a rule of prescriptive matrilateral c.c. marriage. Again, Mauss's principle of total prestation and Leach's corollary, proposition (a), operate as major premises.

I am unclear which of these alternate models was actually intended by Leach. To expedite the present discussion I shall concern myself with only the first of them.

This model predicts of societies with a rule of matrilateral c.c. marriage that the constituent local descent groups exchange women as brides, if they intermarry at all, in one and only one direction. Secondly it predicts that, as between all intermarrying pairs of local descent groups, there will be found a status differential (i.e., there is deference shown by the members of one group to the members of the other) Finally, the direction of deference will be homogeneous among all such pairs moving either from bride givers to bride takers (Leach cites the Chinese peasants) or consistently in the direction opposite to that in which brides move (e.g. Kachin). The direction of the flow of deference is consistently either the same or opposite to the flow of women; not random among the intermarrying groups of the society in question.

These proposals constitute exemplifications of the general human inclination -- ex hypothesi -- to balance giftgiving interaction: Leach remarks:
In any such system of reciprocities one must assume that, overall, both parties -- the junior group and the senior group alike -- are satisfied with their bargain, and therefore that the exchange account 'balances'. But we cannot predict from first principles how the balance will be achieved because we cannot know how the different categories of 'prestation' will be evaluated in any particular society.\textsuperscript{49}

A model of this kind can be used in only one of two ways at a time. It can be used, on the one hand, as an explanation of a particular situation. In this case, it would provide explanation of an empirically observed pattern of intergroup status relationships of the kind described above. Even in this respect it would not be employed as a complete explanation because no model is. All good models beg further questions. In the present case, for example, explanation of status relations is given \textit{in terms of} the principles of prestation, applied to the particular situation of one-way bride give and take. Thus, the unidirectionality of bride movement (and, hence, of the matrilateral marriage rule) remains, itself, a begged question. The problem arising from this use of the model is, however, that it requires axiomatic acceptance of the general theoretical postulates upon which the model is based.

Thus, the second, and methodologically prior use of such models is their treatment as devices for providing support of the general postulates. Such a procedure has always been philosophically problematical but scientifically indispensable. In most, if not all, scientific models the "if...then" relationship between
the general postulate and the hypothesis cannot be directly reversed; i.e., the relation of a particular conclusion to the general premises whence it is derived is inductive when moving from particular to general. Thus, for example, it must always be admitted as possible that, in situations found to faithfully reproduce the predictions of Leach's model, some general behaviour disposition other than those contained in Leach's model can generate the same predictions. No verification procedure can ever assign to a theoretical postulate more than a measure of probability.

These two uses of models cannot be applied simultaneously without circular argument. To maintain that the Kachin status structure (taken as an empirically given norm — ideological and/or statistical) is a result of a disposition to reciprocity in interaction, we must support the claim that the Kachin in fact have such a disposition. What is more, we must support this claim through empirical observations other than those which we use the postulate to explain. Thus, to complete a particular explanatory model we must introduce data other than that which is itself explained by the model. This feature of explanatory models is itself sufficient to account for both of the traditional "cross-cultural" and "whole-cultural" analytic frameworks.

The expression "whole-culture" analysis means that, where we employ a model to explain a given norm in a given society, we also predict, deductively, other behaviour patterns on the basis of our dispositional postulates. Thus, for example, we might pre-
dict that, among the Kachin, interactions in many social contexts other than those specifically of marriage and affinal alliance display specific kinds of patterns which are implied by the concept of reciprocity. The difficulty in this particular situation resides in the near impossibility of stipulating a situation which cannot be argued to manifest the dispositions of reciprocity. Be that as it may the point illustrates the idea of "whole-culturalism" as a methodological procedure.

Beginning with an explanatory model of one cultural phenomenon we deductively generate models for phenomena of other kinds. Thus, where we are concerned initially with a marriage rule, we are led to deduce many other forms of behaviour as likely in the same social situation (i.e., involving the same set of actors) "if the postulates of our initial model are true". We could be led to predictions about behaviour in political, economic, ceremonial, mythological, any number of other frames-of-reference. The particular frames of reference selected will be anticipated by the nature of the particular postulate. A given postulate may specify behavioural dispositions of interactions between certain categories of people, say, for example, persons of opposite sex and alternate generation. Persons of these categories may interact extensively in some contexts (e.g. ceremonially, relating of folk-wisdom, etc.) but very little in others (e.g. co-operative work, sexual intercourse). However impressionistic it may be general ethnography is a completely indispensable guide to such a procedure. We can only afford to
snub general ethnography when we already have it -- thanks to the labour of our predecessors.

In sum, the reliability (i.e. believability) of a particular explanation of a phenomenon is measured by the support given to its theoretical postulates through the substantiation of other models based upon the same postulates. The measure of substantiation of all such models (including the one centered about our initial problem norm), singly and collectively, is a measure of the reliability of our theoretical postulates in the society with which we are concerned.

An important corollary to this argument is that whole-cultural orientation (the word whole must not be taken over-literally) is methodologically prior to cross-cultural analysis. There is no a priori reason to conclude that the theoretical postulates which believably explain a given norm (e.g., prescriptive matrilateral c.c. marriage) in one society also explain a like-appearing norm in another society. For a model to be acceptable in the second society its postulates must work in the same way that they work, whole-culturally, in the first. I am in whole-hearted agreement with Needham's remark that "you cannot compare what you do not first understand ...".

On the other hand, the reliability of our theoretical postulates relating to phenomena in one society is increased as cross-cultural evidence accrues. The disturbing feature of this methodo-
logical point, and it is one which I personally endorse for the most part, is that there is no "logical" reason for it. It is based on an ontological faith; if people do the same thing as one another, they do it for the same reasons. This axiom can be carried to the tyrannical point where we will deny that a case-in-point is really the same thing; it cannot be, so it might be argued, because it has required a different explanation.

The diagrams below are provided to aid my present argument.

**Social System Type-I.**

![Diagram](image)

- "x" = summary statement of the problem norm.
- "a,b,c, etc." and "1,2,3, etc." = summary statements of norms other than "x".
- "A" and "B" - theoretical postulates (statements of behavioural dispositions).
- "\[\ldots\]" = a deductive sequence linking "A" and "x"; the sequence will include other norms not shown and perhaps other postulates (e.g. Leach's models).
- "\[\ldots\]" = "inductive" inference. (vide supra, p. 49)

**Social System Type-II.**

![Diagram](image)

Each of these diagrams symbolizes an attempt to provide a reliable explanation of problem norm "x" in each of two types of society in which it occurs. The social systems differ, obviously, in that "x" coincides with a distinct set of other norms in each
case. The diagrams are to be understood as purely hypothetical situations since I am here concerned only with the logic of cross-cultural analysis.

The surrounding features of each of these social systems (i.e., the other norms which coincide with "x") support, in each case, different theoretical postulates. Remember, it is given that both "A" and "B" can operate as major premises in deductive models for problem norm "x". Now, given, further, that we have a relatively large number of cases of Type-I, but only a small number of Type-II, must we conclude that "B" is not a reliable explanation of the cases we have of Type-II because it is not reliably supported in cases of Type-I, or vice versa? To be sure, we would be inclined to reject that either of the two theoretical postulates provides the basis of a reliable general (i.e., cross-cultural) theory of norm "x". But this does not mean that they are not each the most reliable theories for their particular social systems. Nor, on the other hand, does this mean that we must surrender the attempt to formulate a more general theory.

The paradox in this situation is, however, that the larger the number of cases of Type-I we are able to demonstrate, the more we are ready to believe that "A" is a reliable explanation of norm "x" in a single given case of Type-I. This sense of reliability derives from the satisfaction of our (i.e., anthropologists') expectation that people are alike, and we tend, therefore, to be satisfied only with explanations which suggests that they
are alike. As I have stated, I share this general expectation if only because it is the keenest Occam's razor that we possess.

On the other hand, we must never conclude that there can be no persons (or peoples) whose social behaviour does not support the same theoretical postulates as those applied to others with whom they share a given problem norm. In summary, while the scholarly orientations and methodology of Anthropology are cross-cultural in part, they are intra-cultural or relativistic first. This is a procedural imperative.

(4) There are one or two further methodological points to be made. These will become more apparent following a statement, albeit only a sparse outline, of what I mean by the concept of behavioural disposition. I shall also attempt to show why I believe that such postulates provide the most forceful basis for institutional theory.

In the first place, institutions or norms whether statistical and/or ideological are manifest (observable) forms of human behaviour; that is, human individuals and/or collections of human individuals are our subject matter. Any theory which purports to explain the observed behaviour of a set of human individuals must predicate something to the human individuals who compose the set.

It has been observed that few "conscious models" satisfy the anthropologist. (vide supra, p.23). In some respects Lévi-Strauss's comments on this issue are unclear to me. He remarks, for example, that they "are usually known as "norms"." As I
have used the concept, a model is explanatory and, as such, to refer to norms as models of any kind is confusing since, as Lévi-Strauss remarks further, norms are "very poor" models "since they are not intended to explain the phenomena but to perpetuate them". Since I agree with this observation, I would, to avoid confusion, simply refrain from identifying the concepts of norms and conscious models. To my way of thinking norms (ideological) may comprise the elements of conscious models where one norm is explained, by the culture participants, in terms of another. The process of linking explains the norms, where the norms are the elements requiring explanation. Fei's report of the Chinese peasants' explanation of their marriage system is an example of what I mean by a conscious model; it is a genuine attempt at explanation albeit, from our viewpoint, an unsatisfactory attempt.

The reason for this confusion seems clear enough. The context from which I drew the above citations infers that what is explained by models are de facto social events (what Lévi-Strauss terms simply "the phenomena") rather than the ideological norms which perpetuate them. In brief, this posits two states of mind for the social actor; his awareness that he and others of his culture usually do (or always do) something in fact and his conviction that the former is something which he ought to do. Lévi-Strauss then argues that the "ought" is not a satisfactory attempt, by the culture participant, to explain what he observes that he does. "I do it because I ought to do it" does not satisfy the anthropologist as an explanation.
Of this there is no doubt. However, the important point is that there exist better attempts to explain provided by informants; again refer to the case of the Chinese peasants. In other words, I do not conclude that conscious models are unsatisfactory because they are norms. Rather, the explanations provided by informants as to why they do something they are aware they do, and why they feel they ought to do this are characteristically unsatisfactory because the logical links provided are unsatisfactory in terms of our expectations. (See, yet again, the case of the Chinese peasants). This has nothing whatever to do with the intelligence of our informants. This will become clear shortly.

The elements of conscious models are always, by definition, themselves conscious; i.e., they are ideological norms. Given, that, from the anthropologist's viewpoint, such a model is unsatisfactory, it is always because it is either entirely logically invalid or because it tends to validity but has missing links. In either case, the anthropologist, attempting to explain the same problem element, must order the various constituent norms in a logical sequence and complete the sequence by propositions of his own invention. Such propositions, as I have already argued, are more abstract than the statement of the norms which they cement. As such, they are the most explanatory propositions in the sequence. But, to the extent that these statements are of the anthropologist's own making and not of the culture participants', they do not exist on the level of consciousness in the actor. This should scarcely
surprise anyone since, in a general way, whatever exists as ex-

plicitly normative and therefore conscious is defined as a problem

by the anthropologist. Now, since most conscious models are logi-
cally incomplete, -- at best -- the anthropologist must invent
propositions to complete them. Sometimes, on the other hand, there
are no conscious models whatever. In this situation the anthropol-
ogist must himself do all of the combining of various norms (stat-
istical and/or ideological) into a deductive sequence which gen-
erates the problem norm. Here, again, almost invariably, the
anthropologist will have to invent major premises to complete
his sequence. Even, in an extremely unusual situation, where the
anthropologist should locate a set of statements, reliably sum-
marizing norms of a culture, and find himself able to order these
into an air-tight deductive sequence he will then ask "why" of
the most major premise of the sequence. Again, to try to answer
this he must invent further propositions.

In all such situations the most explanatory statements
which the anthropologist achieves are his own inventions. Invar-
ially, therefore, the propositions of most forceful explanatory
power which we as anthropologists seek are propositions which do
not represent explicit verbalized norms, In brief our most power-
ful theoretical postulates impute something to actors which does
not exist on the level of their verbal consciousness. (There may
be other kinds of consciousness such as an eidetic consciousness.)

The concept of behavioural dispositions will readily
accommodate the predication, to social actors, of characteristics
of which they have no verbal consciousness. This can include a wide range of psycho-biological concepts such as attitudes, aptitudes, drives, etc. All such can be meaningfully referred to at the level of the unconscious.
CHAPTER 3

The Exchange Model of Purum Society: Salient Issues

At this point I wish to return to more direct consideration of prescriptive matrilateral c.c. marriage. Further theoretical and methodological issues will arise out of this discussion.

Earlier, I introduced the distinction between mechanical and statistical models. I took Hugo Nutini's formulation as the basis of that discussion. Lévi-Strauss's definition of the distinctions seems to be very much more complex. At the same time, I believe that both would agree that Rodney Needham's analysis of Purum social structure is a clear case of a mechanical model. Following his definition of the distinction, Lévi-Strauss remarks that:

The laws of primitive marriage provide the best illustration of this difference. In primitive societies these laws can be expressed in models calling for actual grouping of the individuals according to kin or clan; these are mechanical models.  

This statement precisely summarizes Needham's model of Purum society. More fully, his model argues that:

1. For any Ego, prescription to the kin-category (remember, it may be characterized by an interaction of terms) which Needham translates MoBroDa is tantamount to marrying a woman of any of a strictly limited and somehow pre-established set of descent groups. This set of descent groups will include the one(s) to which his own literal Mother's brother's (s') daughter(s) belong. At the same time, the set is not exhausted by those groups containing his literal MoBroDas.
2. For any ego, proscription of women of the kin-category FaSiDa is tantamount to the proscription of marriage to any woman who is a member of any one of a further set of pre-established descent groups. This set will include, but not be exhausted by the descent group(s) to which ego's literal FaSiDas belong.

3. For any ego there is a further kin-category, sisters, which includes the women of his own descent group and generation, and may be exhausted by these. Equally, it may include women of other descent groups viewed as related in "origin" to ego's own.

4. What is true, above, of Ego is also true of all of the men of Ego's own descent group.

5. Thus, where all men and women of descent group x class all men and women of descent groups a, b, and c as matrilateral cross-cousins, all of the latter class all of the former as patrilateral cross-cousins. Therefore, men of x may marry women of a, b, or c, but men of the latter may not marry women of the former. As between whole-descent-groups there is only one-way movement of women in marriage. This is also referred to as the proscription of sister exchange.

The first three points of this model are almost definitive of the concept of prescriptive. The definition accords with many societies which proscribe marriage with the literal FaSiDa but do not proscribe it with the MoBroDa. As Needham argues at length (see "Structure and Sentiment", Chapter Three), it by no
means accords with all such societies. If we confine our analysis to truly prescriptive systems we have to deal more fully with the last two propositions as well as with certain features of the first three.

The last proposition is a summary statement of the exchange model of prescriptive matrilateral c.c. marriage. The fourth proposition is a necessary logical step in the analysis. It seems to me to contain the key element of the theory and yet is not explicitly dealt with in the expositions of any of the exchange theorists.

Before we consider these specific questions let us consider the model as a whole. It seems, given Lévi-Strauss's last statement, to qualify as a mechanical model. A mechanical model is "A model the elements of which are on the same scale as the phenomena". A cryptic definition to be sure; nor do Lévi-Strauss's elaborations make its meaning very much clearer. It is often the case with outstanding thinkers that the initial formulations of their concepts serve merely to funnel our attention in a general direction.

It is clear that the key to the meaning of this definition resides in the word "scale". The "phenomena" referred to are the empirical givens taken as the analytic problem. In Needham's analysis of the Purum systems the problem phenomenon is the rule of matrilateral c.c. marriage. The elements of his model are
whole-descent-groups. The elements of the model and the phanome-
non are in this situation alike in that both are components of
Purum explicit ideology. At first glance this similarity does
not appear to amount to a likeness of scale which suggests equiva-
ience of size or measure. However, ideological norms are categor-
ical propositions; they impute modes of behaviour to all members
of a named (though often not explicitly stated) category. Thus,
for example, we are dealing with a rule which asserts something of
all Purum men; namely that they must marry women only of the exclu-
sive category MoBroDas.

If a model is truly mechanical, the subject element of
its propositions must (at least) exhaust the membership of the
category which comprises the subject-element of the problem norm.
The expression to at least exhaust raises difficulties in the dis-
tinction between the two kinds of model. The point is that the
model's subject-element must, at least, just exhaust the subject-
element of the problem norm. Perhaps it may be more inclusive,
but it may not be less inclusive and yet be a mechanical model.

Thus, the Purum marriage rule demands explanation in
terms of something which can be predicated to all Purum men and
from which the marriage rule can be logically derived. To my
mind this admits of two broad possibilities in the Purum situation:
(a) The model may be treated as a purely statistical norm. This
would require the direct observation of a mode of behaviour of
Purum men which, while not actually expressed as such in explicit
Purum ideology, nevertheless exists as a behavioural fact which is, furthermore, a possible logical premise to the marriage rule per se. The difficulty is, however, that the frequency of this de facto event must at least just exhaust the frequency with which the ideological norm is itself expressed.

Before I continue further I must point out that this approach simply cannot be satisfactorily tested in the Purum case, because we have no idea in fact of the frequency with which the marriage rule itself is endorsed by Purum men. We tend to assume that because the statement of an ideology -- i.e., a single informant's statement -- is categorical (refers to all members of the subject category) all possible informants would accept it as their own ideology. This is clearly not necessarily true. In the Purum situation, however, we do not have any alternative but to accept this approach at the present time.

Bearing in mind this assumption, let us inquire whether Needham's model can be treated in this way. The required condition is as follows: If it is found that the marriages of all Purum men are such that all of the men of any given Purum descent group in fact marry into one of an exclusive set of descent groups (which does not exhaust all Purum descent groups), and if the men of the latter do not ever marry women of the former, and if the women of the marriageable descent groups are referred to by a term (or interaction of terms) which is distinguished from the term applied to all women of all other descent groups, and if this term includes
the actual MoBroDas of each of the Purum men, then we may conclude that all Purum men marry only women they term MoBroDas. But, it might be argued, this model does not explain why the Purum say they ought to marry a MoBroDa; it explains, rather, only that the women they do marry are termed MoBroDa. This dispute derives from what I referred to earlier as the mind/body problem of Social Anthropology. For my part I am prepared to believe that ideologies may be understood in terms of unperceived de facto behavioural tendencies even where these are not perceived by the actor in an explicit way. It appears that Lévi-Strauss also holds this position, perhaps in a more extreme form. He states that “When the structure of a certain type of phenomena does not lie at a great depth, it is more likely that some kind of model, standing as a screen to hide it, will exist in the collective consciousness.” I think this means that expressed norms are often screens for unexpressed norms (de facto behaviour or dispositions) which describe the underlying structure. This argues not only that explicit norms may express ones which are not explicit, they may actually screen them.

While I have argued, in the abstract, that this type of a model is possible, I have now to argue that it cannot apply to the Purum situation. The reason for this is simply that the Purum evidence fails to support it.

There are two kinds of Purum descent groups. First, there are five exogamous patrilineal clans, which Das termed "sibs".
Four of these clans are further subdivided into named lineages. In all, there are twelve such lineages. Most of the lineages and all of the clans are dispersed among the four Purum villages.

Since the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that one-way bride movement does not occur in any statistically significant frequency as between clans, Needham, and subsequently a number of other scholars, have attempted to ascertain whether circulating connubium applies to the lineage level of Purum society. This debate appears to have achieved a consensus that there is a statistically significant tendency among Purum lineages to avoid the direct exchange of women (2-way) between any intermarrying pair.

If this conclusion is accurate it is indeed an interesting and very important feature of Purum society. However, it is not useful in the kind of model under present discussion. The most that it can mean is that a greater than chance proportion of Purum men marry women of an exclusive set of other Purum lineages; there is a less than chance tendency for the men of the latter to marry women of the former; and, finally, given that the exclusive set of lineages into which men of a given lineage tend to marry, contain the only women whom all of the men of the lineage term MoBroDa, there is a greater than chance frequency of marriage with a MoBroDa. But, is a greater than chance frequency of one mode of behaviour sufficient to explain the 100% frequency of some other mode of behaviour (the ideological norm)?
At first glance, such an explanatory effort would appear to be very faulty. How, one might ask, can we explain what 100% of a population do in terms of something which only 40% of that population do? But if we recall that the 100% refers here to an ideology while the 40% refers to a statistical norm, we might envision avoiding this dilemma by postulating that it is possible that the ideology supported by 40% because of something that they do can be spread, as an ideology, to the remaining population in spite of the fact that the latter do not themselves do what inspired the ideology. Much additional evidence would be required to support such a position. An example of such a model would be one in which the overall tendency to one-way marriage derived from the relationships particularly of lineage nobility, this tendency being expressed by the actual marriage rule which was then, in turn, adopted as a universal ideology. Suggestions of this kind have been made before.

In summation, since there is a considerable disparity in scale between the model (when treated as a statistical norm) and the phenomenon (marriage rule), and since no evidence is provided to account for the disparity in terms of some additional feature of the structure (e.g., interaction of nobility and commoners), we must reject Needham's model as being based upon a statistical observation concerning inter-lineage marriage relationships.

But there are other ways of treating Needham's model and, in fairness to Needham, I should point out that he does not appear
himself to favour the above approach. He is rather puzzling on this point since he has taken great pains to measure the actual frequency of direct exchange between lineages. At the same time we may recall Needham's remark, cited earlier that "A social system is an abstraction relating (in this context) to lineal descent groups which are also an abstraction. There is no place in abstraction for substantive "specific groups"." This seems to mean that what is predicated to the groups is not to be taken literally. The statistical features of whole group behaviour are somehow not of great relevance in his models.

This suggests a second interpretation of Needham's Purum model.

(b) The model may be regarded as being premised upon propositions which themselves constitute explicit ideological norms. This would mean that the one-way movement of women between whole descent groups exists as an ideological norm whether or not it is actually obeyed. In this case, the norm of matrilateral marriage would be viewed as a function of the norms of descent group relations. Here, the subject element of the model would be equivalent in scale to the subject-element of the problem norm. An ideology prescribing one-way marriage between all members of any pair of Purum descent groups, would mean that all descent groups just exhausts the membership of the category all Purum. In this case we can readily argue from the former to the latter.
The Purum did indeed have what appears to be such an ideology. It is contained in the following statement from Das:

The Purum sib was not only an exogamous unit but it was something more. Purum boys and girls could marry only in one or more selected sibs. Such unions between the different sibs were fixed by traditional customs. Besides this there was another custom by which the boys and girls of any one of these sibs might not marry into the same sib; that is, they had to find spouses from two different sibs, the boys from one and the girls from another. Thus brothers and sisters could not marry into the same sib.

This citation refers to "traditional" marriage alliances between "sibs" taken as-a-whole. Furthermore, the tradition would result in only one-way movement of women between intermarrying sibs. To deduce the marriage rule itself from these normative sib prescriptions requires only that the system of terminology accord with them. That is, if we are able to show that (a) there is unanimity among the men of a sib as to what women they call MoBroDa and that (b) these women are the same as those who belong to the maritally prescribed other sibs--there being unanimity among the men of a sib in this prescription as well--then we will have shown that the sib prescriptions are tantamount to the terminological, MoBrcDa, prescription.

Das's data do not allow us to conclusively verify either of these statements. In fact, as I have pointed out, he acknowledges that "the sib is no longer the most important exogamous unit" and that it has been "supplanted by the subsibs". He proceeds, however, to reconstruct the traditional "marital relations between
different sibs" on the basis of terms used by the members of a given sib in addressing the members of other sibs. This argument appears in the discussion and appended tables (III to IX inclusive) on pages 123-132 of Das's book.

In general, Das's argument is a valuable one. Yet on certain points I remain skeptical. I shall be satisfied to merely illustrate the reasons for this skepticism. Das first provides a list of definitions of Purum kin-terms (terms of address) which, he says, "are always used in relation to sibs and never in relation to subsibs". These appear in table IV, pp. 125-6; the table is entitled "Terms of Address Used by Men and Women in Respect of Persons Belonging to Their Own As Well As to Other Sibs, When No Direct Relationship Exists." In all, he defines twelve term relationships according to whether speaker is male or female, whether the person addressed is male or female, and for each of these four combinations, whether the person addressed is of the speaker's own sib, mother's sib, or of a third category of sibs. I shall cite two examples of such definitions from Das:

A man addresses a woman of his sisters' husbands' group of sibs as Katuna (if elder) or by name if younger.

Thus, if a man addresses a woman as KATUNA, she should belong to a sib from which he may not take a wife since he must not, ideally, marry into a sib from which his sister takes a husband.

A woman addresses a man of her mother's group of sibs as Apu (if elder) or by name if younger.

Clearly, a woman should not be allowed to marry an APU since her brother takes a wife from APU's sib(s).
Tables V-VIII show the terms applied among the members of all Purum sibs. Thus, for example, table V lists "Terms of Address used by boys of one sib to the girls of its own and other sibs". The remaining tables have the other combinations of sex of speaker and sex of addressee. Combining these tables, Das "deduces" the "traditional" marital relations among the various sibs. Tables III and IX summarize his reconstruction.

Das is well aware that combining tables V-VIII presents several apparent contradictions. He observes that "we find two or three cases where correction was necessary. This correction has been attempted with the help of the internal evidences of the table itself as well as materials collected in 1932."

At first glance his corrections seem reasonable, but a second look will suggest certain questions and a somewhat different interpretation of the meaning of the sib traditions. I shall illustrate the contradictions of his tables with the terms of address employed by persons of KHEYANG and MARRIM sibs vis-à-vis each other:

1. A KHEYANG man addresses a MARRIM girl as KATUNA. This should mean that he may not marry her. Conversely it suggests that KHEYANG girls may marry men of MARRIM sib.

2. A KHEYANG girl addresses a MARRIM man as APU. The definition of APU given above suggests that a KHEYANG girl does not marry a MARRIM man. Conversely, it suggests that a KHEYANG man may marry a MARRIM woman.
(3) The terms used by MARRIM speakers are more consistent. MARRIM boys and girls seem agreed that women move from MARRIM to KHEYANG.

(4) The women of the two sibs appear in agreement that, when addressing each other, their terms suggest movement of women, from KHEYANG to MARRIM (Table VIII).

(5) However, the men of the two sibs disagree, since both term their opposites APU which when male addresses male suggests that the sib of the addressee is "of his mother's or wife's group of sibs" (Table VII).

In sum, the marital relations between KHEYANG and MARRIM, as deduced from the terms of address, would appear to be in great confusion. The same applies, to a lesser extent, in the marital relations of KHEYANG-PARPA and of PARPA-MAKAN.

The point I wish to make is not simply that the tables present inconsistencies and should therefore be somehow corrected (as Das has tried to do), but that such inconsistencies are to be expected without any real contradiction to the ideology of sib prescription itself.

Perhaps this will become clearer if we ask who were the informants from whom the information of tables V-VIII was collected? Does the information that "the boys" of KHEYANG address "the girls" of MARRIM as KATUNU derive from only one or from several KHEYANG boys? Indeed, was the informant, or were they, of KHEYANG sib at
all? If there was more than one KHEYANG male informant and more
than one KHEYANG female informant it is strange indeed that the
boys should all agree that a MARRIM female is KATUNU while the
girls should all agree, in contradiction to the boys, that a MARRIM
male is an APU. Indeed why should even one informant of each sex
disagree?

This picture strongly suggests that tables V-VIII were
compiled on the basis of information drawn from a relatively small
number of informants in each of the sibs, if there were informants
from all five sibs. We do not even know that informants from a
given sib were always of both sexes. How do we know, in other
words, that if we drew terminology from a substantial cross-section
of all five sibs, and included informants of both sexes in all cases,
we wouldn't find that the inconsistencies would abound? It is my
present contention that Das's tables are not drawn from such a wide
sweep of Purum informants and, further, that the measure of consis-
tency which it does achieve is a result of the small number of
informants. Of course, Das himself is the only person who can
tell us whether this is correct. Until such information is avail-
able I shall assume my hypotheses correct in order to suggest a
somewhat different interpretation of the Purum ideologies.
CHAPTER 4

An Alternative View of Purum Society

The following hypothetical situation will illustrate an alternative interpretation of Das' data.

Two men, Ego 1 and Ego 2, are both members of the KHEYANG Sib, but Ego 1 is of the KHULEN village branch of the JULHUNG lineage while Ego 2 is of the TAMPAK village branch of the AIHUNG lineage. Who knows, the two may never have met? If asked, Ego 1 would claim that he addresses women of MARRIM and perhaps one or two of the other sibs by the terms "U (if elder) or as Kanaunu if younger." It so happens that Ego 1's own mother is a MARRIM. He reports that he will someday marry a KANAUNU. Ego 1's sister, on the other hand, reports that she addresses the men of these same lineages as APU and the women "as U (if elder) or by name if younger." She wouldn't dream of marrying an APU.

We now speak to Ego 2. He reports that he addresses the women of MARRIM by the term KUTUNU and would not consider taking such a woman as his bride. His mother is a MAKAN and he addresses women of MAKAN as KANAUNU, or U if elder. As it happens Ego 1 and Ego 2 both term MAKAN women as KANAUNU even while they apply opposing terms to MARRIM women. Ego 2's sister is consistent with her brother; she would marry a MARRIM man, but not a MAKAN.

The upshot of such a situation is that two informants of the same sib would provide lists of sibs into which they may and
and may not marry, both would supply terms of address consistent with their sib prescriptions, and, further, if each was asked how it was determined which sibs he may and which he may not take a bride from, each might well answer that the determination was established by tradition. Furthermore, neither would be mistaken unless he claimed that what applies to him also applied to all men of his sib. It is by no means clear that this is in fact what Das's informants said or meant. They have apparently claimed, each, that I (or we) am (are) prescribed to marriage with women of one or more of a strictly limited set of other sibs. It is not clear to me that the hypothetical 'we' would apply to all

Figure 9

Fig. 9. Large arrows indicate direction of movement of women between sibs.
other men of his sib. I suspect that the nearest one could come to translating the meaning of whatever Das was told would be best expressed as "we" means "my fathers, my brothers, and I." Under some circumstances this might be conceived as including all of the men of a man's sib. Under other circumstances it may mean a group considerably smaller than a sib; perhaps the Purum subsib (lineage), or, what is even more probable a grouping smaller than either of the named units and one which is socially more close-knit or corporate. It is considerations such as these, I suspect, which led Leach to argue that the alliance groups are "local descent groups" of three generations maximum depth. His major point is that groups which successfully impose marriage prescriptions upon their members, for whatever reason, political alliances or otherwise, must be sufficiently corporate not only to be able to sustain (and sanction) the prescriptions, but to be able to successfully communicate them to the members. Indeed, it is difficult to base a theory upon the assumption of political or status interests of groups if the groups haven't sufficient political unity -- or solidarity -- to have a political or status interest.

Certainly the Purum sib does not appear to be such a group. The subsib, while more solidary, may not always be the grouping whose members, at a given time, share the same sib prescriptions. With respect to sibs at least, the following statement from Das bears out these suggestions:

The members of a subsib regard themselves to be related by blood and this relation is more intimate than that
which subsists between members of different subsibs of the same sib. The subsib is either an expanded family or an embryonic sib. Perhaps it is more the latter.\textsuperscript{63}

This also tends to support one of the implications of my hypothetical case. In a sense Ego 2's sister is Ego 1's sister. Her marriage to a MARRIM man would appear, then, to break the norm that a sister does not marry into the same sib as her own brother. Again, a category such as sisters is -- like any ideology -- fundamentally ambiguous. It means only what the culture participants intend, not what the anthropologist would like it to mean. Indeed, a single term can be used in quite contradictory senses by a single actor, especially when he uses it in reference to different persons.

This ambiguity in the meaning is, I think, especially true of kin-terms both in the sense that the people the term includes and the behaviour such a term implies are subject to a great deal of change through time and variation at a given time.

This does not mean that there are no regularities in the use of kin-terms. Rather, it means that these regularities are of a more general nature than can be ascribed to the non-corporate or only semi-corporate groupings which may constitute an informant's expressed view of his own social structure. I submit only that while it is certainly possible that such groupings may regulate the distribution of kin-terms employed by their members and, hence, regulate their marriages, it is only a special circumstance when they do so. This circumstance requires a measure of corporateness which we do not see in the Purum sibs.
If my suggestions are correct, there is no Purum ideology which prescribes uniformity to all members of a sib. As a result, there can be no ideology which amounts to one-way bride exchange between whole sibs. In turn, no mechanical model, premised upon an ideology of one-way movement of women between ideological Purum groupings, can be made to explain the rule of prescriptive matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. Equally, there is nothing which even appears to be an ideology of alliances relating to the Purum subsibs.

Let me pause to summarize the foregoing analysis:

(a) Each Purum man is prescribed to one or more sibs and is proscribed against marriage with any woman from the remaining sibs.

(b) Each Purum man classes all of the women of his prescribed sib(s) as terminologically uniform (MoBroDas) and as terminologically different from all of the women of the remaining sib(s).

(c) Each Purum man, therefore, is prescribed to marrying a woman whom he terms MoBroDa.

(d) It is not the case, however, either in fact or in what is unequivocally known of Purum ideology, that all men of a given Purum sib are prescribed to the same combination of other sibs and proscribed from the same remainder.

(e) Thus we do not find one-way movement of women between entire sibs either as a Purum ideology or as a de facto event (see Fig. 9).

(f) We do find a statistical tendency toward one-way movement of women as between Purum lineages. We do not, however, find a corresponding norm (ideological).
The question remains, however, as to how a given Ego's sib prescriptions are determined. At this point, the want of sufficient specific data, especially of the kind which traces genealogies through a span of some generations, makes it difficult to provide more than a general answer to this question. In the first place, Ego is automatically proscribed from marrying his literal FaSiDa, and is permitted to marry the literal MoBroDa. As we have seen, the Purum tend, apparently, to apply a given kin-term throughout an entire sib. Thus, Ego would treat all women of his own mother's patri-sib as terminological MoBroDas, while he would address all women of his actual Father's actual sister's own daughters' sib as terminological FaSiDas. Which of the remaining sibs would be placed in which of these categories would depend entirely upon what other people Ego is inclined and/or enjoined (by his socially most near relatives) to regard as fathers of social importance to him. Other MoBroDas will belong to the sibs of other mothers and these are the wives of other important fathers. Likewise, other FaSiDas would belong to the sib(s) of the actual daughters of the actual sisters of Ego's other socially important fathers. It is clear, then, that all decisions pertaining to Ego's sib prescriptions and proscriptions are contingent upon what men of his first ascending generation he regards as important fathers.

It is very easy to imagine that a very large number of variables would affect this arrangement. Under some circumstances, the group of important fathers may include no more than the literal
brothers of Ego's actual father. In a situation where a set of actual brothers are socially close for whatever reasons -- political, economic, even sentimental -- a set of male patrilateral parallel cousins will share the identical combination of sib prescriptions. One can also imagine different circumstances under which the corporate group expands for economic, political, military or some such circumstances, to include a larger set of men whose sons are enjoined to treat one another as close brothers and the men of their senior generation as close fathers.

The Purum subsib may be the Purums' own ideological approximation of those solidary social units whose members tend, as a function of this solidarity, to share the same sib prescriptions and proscriptions. Yet, the de facto corporate groupings may, under various influences, expand and contract around this ideal level even to the point where, through time, the groups which share uniform marriage rules vis-à-vis other groups may be of a very different nature than had once obtained. It could even come to pass that a new group concept might be introduced into the ideology.

It should be noted, in passing, that the size of the solidary grouping could be considerably influenced by any phenomenon which should reduce the number of maritally available women. That is, reduction of women available for marriage might cause a person to manifestly ignore a relationship -- a classificatory FaSi -- which would preclude a marriage that ego desires. Whether or not this would be regarded as a breach of the FaSiDa proscription
would be essentially a political issue. He would be, in effect, not acknowledging the social importance of certain classificatory relationships in his marriage choice. By doing so he would, from his viewpoint and that of his supporters, be correctly obeying the marriage rules respecting kin-category as well as sibs. It is conceivable that such decisions could themselves become the source of a group fission. On the other hand it could even be employed as an intentional device for precipitating or symbolizing such a fission.

As a whole, this is a somewhat different model of Purum society than Needham's. I take as empirically given that each Purum man has a set of sib prescriptions and proscriptions. I also take as empirically given that each Purum man locates classificatory relationships of the various kinds according to his classification of sibs. It follows from this that since MoBroDas are women of ego's prescribed sibs, he is prescribed to marry with a MoBroDa. This is clearly a mechanical model since both the premises and conclusion are Purum ideological norms whose subject-elements are all Purum men. That is, the scale of the "phenomenon" is the same as the scale of the elements of the model.

This model departs from Needham's in several respects. The prescriptions of Purum individuals to a combination of sibs is not a simple function of his membership in a given sib. I submit that there is no explicit and clear ideology defining the group of men who must behave uniformly in their marriage decisions vis-
à-vis other sibs. To argue the contrary is to claim that the application of a given kin-term to a number of people means -- in the eyes of the Purum -- that all these people must be treated exactly alike. Not only is such a conclusion false in terms of the actual behaviour of the Purum, there is no reason to believe that the Purum believe this in their ideology. The most that can be said is that, as ideologies, classificatory kin-terms are only very broad and essentially ambiguous frameworks for relationships. It is quite possible that, to the Purum, the word father (KA-PA) in its classificatory usage is almost as ambiguous as our word "cousin". In some situations there is a clear recognition among culture participants of sharply different degrees of social nearness among the various persons to whom Ego nevertheless applies a single term. A pointed example of this obtains among the Murngin. Lloyd Warner writes:

A definite distinction is made between actual father and Father's brothers, blood sons and brothers' sons; between father's own brothers and clan brothers of the father. Clan solidarity sharply divides fathers within and outside of the clan. There may or may not be differences in the emotional attitude of a father and son from a nearby clan and a father and son from a more distant clan. The usual behaviour between a father and son generally does not hold between a distant son and father; frequently because of the opportunities of competition for women among distant groups, there are actual animosity and warfare.64

A general consequence of my approach is that the Purum maintains a norm of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage without any corresponding ideology which can be readily translated to a philosophy of alliances of a quasi-political nature aligned to one-way movement of brides between whole-groups.
The measure of deviance from the cross-cousin marriage rule is estimated, by Needham and his supporters, by the degree of failure to avoid direct exchange between Purum lineages. This assumes that the Purum themselves define their cousin categories in terms of lineage membership. This is manifestly untrue since they define their cousins in terms of SIBS. It also assumes that all members of given lineages define their various cousins in the same way. While this is nearer the mark than the first assumption we would no doubt find that the whole groups which behave uniformly in marriage choices are even smaller than lineages. Here, Leach's concept of the local descent group could prove useful. In sum, a matrilateral cross-cousin is, to Ego, a person that Ego and perhaps a small set of his near relatives define as such. She is not the person the anthropologist would like her to be.

The upshot of this is that the measure of deviance from the cousin marriage rule is not reflected by failure to avoid whole-group direct exchange between either sibs or lineages. Altogether it would be very much lower (the deviance) than Needham, et al, are obliged to conclude that it is.

The above modifications of the exchange theory model of matrilateral connubium clearly rob it of its explanatory punch. We are left now only with the marriage rule (cross-cousin) itself and the view that the basis for determining which people belong to what cousin category can be far more individualized than is allowed for in the exchange theory. Let me now remind you of a remark from Needham with which I introduced this section (vide supra, p. 8).
The relationships of affinity are not merely ties between individuals and families. Descent groups, whether localized or dispersed, are also related as groups by ties of prescriptive alliance.

I have argued, to the contrary, that among the Purum and perhaps more so among other cultures having a matrilateral cross-cousin marriage rule the size and nature of the group which influences Ego's marriage choices (i.e., the membership of his own cousin categories) can vary greatly from place to place — among the Purum -- as well as from time to time. In addition, the bride-giving group may vary not only in a similar manner, but may be different from the size and nature of the bride-taking group at a given time and place. Thus, the members of a Purum lineage may behave uniformly as a bride-taking group vis-à-vis a combination of Purum sibs.

Finally, we can conceive of a model of matrilateral connubium in which the uniformly acting bride-taking groups are, indeed, regularly no larger than small family lines composed of three or even two generations of male siblings and their sons.

My conclusion, based upon the argument of this entire section, is that a theory of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage must be concerned with two related but definitively different issues:

(1) Firstly, and most important, why is it that a given culture has a norm whereby every man is permitted to marry his own mother's own brother's own daughters while, at the same time, he
is proscribed from marrying his own father's own sisters' own daughters?

(2) Secondly, what other people, if any, are identified by a man as his classificatory MoBroDas and FaSiDas, and what are the general structural principles of this identification in a given culture?

It will be clear from these questions that my problem defines matrilateral cross-cousin marriage in such a way as to include not only the classically prescriptive situations of Needham which is confined to situations where classificatory cousins are located in terms of whole-descent-group membership, but also hypothetical preferential systems in which the only members of either cousin category are either first or at most second genealogical cousins and where one category is only avoided as very undesirable.

In the following section I shall propose some answers to both of these questions and, in addition, apply the general principles to a hypothetical model of patrilateral cross-cousin marriage rules as well.

Before I leave this section, a final word concerning the nature of explanation in structural Anthropology. I have tried to make clear, through this section, the kinds of models which I regard as most explanatory in our discipline. These are models whose major premises are propositions which predicate behavioural dispositions to human actors. Any such predication is taken to
apply equally to what people actually do as to what they merely say they ought to do. Thus, de facto behaviour patterns and ideologies alike fall under the aegis of this kind of explanation.

In every social situation known to Anthropology there are norms of ideology confronted with only a less than perfect measure of obedience to the corresponding norms. As I have tried to show in the Purum material, however, we must understand what kinds of de facto behaviour these ideological norms imply before we begin to estimate degrees of conformity/deviance. To achieve this end effectively we must make greater efforts to do as Boas had recommended many years ago, i.e., "see the culture from the inside."

Pursuant to this, explanation of social situations in which de facto behaviour deviates, in whatever measure, from a corresponding explicit cultural ideology requires a twofold explanation. Firstly we must explain the most frequent behaviour. In the easiest situation, it conforms to a corresponding ideology. We are oriented to discover and describe both life circumstances (environmental) and human dispositions which combine to generate these model forms of de facto and ideological behaviour. We are then oriented to treating deviant cases as instances which, like all the rest, are also subject to the same dispositions which explain the mode except that they are subject to additional and different life circumstances which provoke additional dispositions that negate the former ones. This is somewhat like saying that all physical objects are equally subject to the force of gravitation,
but that some have a greater disposition to oppose it owing to the shape and size of their surface in the face of air currents.

In the case of human beings, the opposition of dispositions in a single actor is known as ambivalence. If the reader has not been convinced of the phenomenon of ambivalence through simple introspection perhaps he will be prepared to accept it for pragmatic reasons; no explanatory hypothesis has been able to explain more in the sciences of human behaviour.

Where we argue that one set of actors behaves in a given way as a result of certain kinds of dispositions, and that deviant cases are deviant because of opposed dispositions, we do not conclude that either set is entirely free of the opposed disposition. To the contrary we will predict that certain aspects of the deviant actors' behaviour do indeed accord with dispositions which they do not predominantly manifest. Likewise, we would be generally oriented to predict that various kinds of changes in their life circumstances would provoke an even wider range of behaviours that accord with the disposition they do not at present predominantly manifest. Both of the above views, that humans manifest contradictory aspects in their behaviour and that different circumstances will evoke opposed responses seem to me statements which, when tested, demonstrate the phenomenon of ambivalence.
CHAPTER 5

Basic Concepts: Continuity and Trusteeship

The present section outlines the central features of a theory concerning the sexual relations between a man and his various cousins in societies having one of several cross-cousin marriage norms. Each type of cousin is treated as a distinct relative so that we are dealing with four dyads: MoBroDa/FaSiSo, FaSiDa/MoBroSo, FaBroDa/FaBroSo, MoSiDa/MoSiSo. Each distinctive system of normative cousin relations with which I shall deal is characterized by a distinctive combination of sexual proscriptions and non-proscriptions among the four dyads. I propose to suggest theories of each of the following systems of unilateral cross-cousin marriage.

(1) Matrilateral cross-cousin marriage: in the following argument this means, (a) the proscription of sexual relations and marriage between a man and (at least) his literal FaSiDa, FaBroDa, and MoSiDa, and (b) non-proscription of sexual relations and marriage between a man and his literal (at least) MoBroDa.

(2) Patrilateral cross-cousin marriage: this means (a) proscription of sexual relations and marriage with each of a man's literal (at least) MoBroDa, MoSiDa, and FaBroDa, and (b) non-proscription of a man's literal (at least) FaSiDa.

In general, it is my most basic contention that these various cousin marriage rules are first and foremost regulations of sexual behaviour. The marriage rules that I am concerned with
are ones which contain, as an explicit aspect, features which can be termed rules of incest. The marriage rules are treated as secondary to the rules regarding sexual behaviour explicitly. In other words, where a man is proscribed to marriage with his FaSiDa, it is for the same reason that he is not allowed to have sexual relations with her. This, in turn, is regarded as a prohibition of the kind usually termed a rule of incest; breach of the rule is typically regarded as a somehow contaminating act. We are aware that different kinds of incest are variously repulsive to culture participants — perhaps a mother-son union is frequently felt to be the most horrific. Likewise, varying degrees and kinds of sanction may be imposed in different cultures and on different occasions in a given culture.

It is my second contention that various systems of cousin sexual relations are manifestations of a combination of several variables. These are of two general kinds:

(1) Intra-familial incest taboos: these are not really variables since they are manifestly the same from system to system within our universe of discourse.

(2) A set of what I shall term principles of sex-role identification. These are propositions which predicate general kinds of behavioural dispositions to specified actors in interaction with others of specified status vis-à-vis those actors. I use the expression behavioural dispositions rather than simply roles because many features of the behaviour imputed to the actors do not themselves represent conscious norms of the actors themselves as is,
in my opinion, typically the case in usage of the word rule. While many of the acts which the actor manifests may indeed be conscious norms, that they reveal an identification process is not always a clearly conscious norm, i.e., the process of identification itself is a key disposition which is not a clearly elicitable conscious norm.

These principles, as I shall show, vary in their particular combinations from system to system.

In the following discussion I shall tend to move from general orientation-remarks to more specific definitions. I shall proceed immediately to a discussion of the principles of sex-role identification.

I distinguish two varieties of these principles. First, there are principles of sex-role continuity or, for brevity, principles of continuity. Second, I shall refer to principles of the equivalence of same-sexed siblings or, for brevity, principles of equivalence.

Exposition of the principles of continuity will sound at times like a quasi-genetic theory. It must not be interpreted in this sense since I am concerned with a process of the adoption, by persons of one generation, of specific roles (relating to sexual behaviour) revealed in the behaviour of persons of the generation immediately senior. Clearly, a process of role-repetition from generation to generation need not be given a biological rationale (although I personally suspect that this often occurs.)
In the present context I wish only to propose that, perhaps universally, there is a tendency for persons of an adult status to treat some persons of their junior generation as an extension of their own self-image. Whatever else such a process might mean, it is surely man's principle response to the prospect of his personal death. Conversely, children are moulded, as far forth as is socially and personally expedient, "after the image" of some one or more individual adults who take it upon themselves to protect, and train, and nurture a child. I freely admit that the "expediency" is variable from person to person as from culture to culture. This does not in the least obviate that it is a powerful impulse in most persons of all societies. Even in social situations which feature a high measure of individual mobility (status and spatial) this tendency is clearly recognizable in the "conservative" elements of the society.

One further dichotomy; I am concerned with two principles of continuity: these are the sex-role continuity of father and son and the sex-role continuity of mother and daughter. Let me expand a little on the concept of sex-role continuity.

By sex-role continuity I mean that a child will tend to assume the sexual orientations of some one or more adults. Most especially, the child is obliged to take upon itself some or all of the sexual taboos proper to that adult. The meaning of "proper to" will be clarified later. Likewise, there may be a tendency for the child to assume certain of the adult's sexual privileges,
at least in the sense in which the child is allowed to find a
sexual partner in the same category of women as is permitted the
adult. There are certain obvious limits to this last generalization.
The adult's permitted category will include women inaccessible to the child by reason of age difference, and vice versa.
In addition, the adult's category will include his or her own
spouse who is expressly and specifically proscribed to the child.

There is a second aspect to this principle. A dyad
which is continuous in the above sense is also continuous in terms
of sexual accessibility or non-accessibility from the viewpoint
of a given third party. Where the dyad involves a parent and
child, this feature of continuity is always broken by the spouse
of the parent. From this aspect, the continuous dyad is treated
as a single kind of sexual object in the eyes of most others. In
the first definition the two of the dyad are treated as sexual
actors. For our purposes, the two aspects are mirror images.

It will be apparent that where a sex-role continuity can
be shown to exist between persons or reciprocal status (e.g. Father/
Son) we will anticipate continuity in roles of other kinds as
well as in sexual behaviour; e.g., in work, religious and ceremonial,
leadership, and other roles. Our immediate concern however is to
explore continuity specifically in the realm of sexual behaviour.

Principle of Father/Son Sex-Role Continuity:

This describes circumstances in which a man is treated
as the sexual equivalent to his own father with the obvious excep-
tion of their mother and wife respectively. By the same token, Ego assumes the sexual proscriptions proper to his father, and perhaps sexual privileges as well. Certain of these shared proscriptions would be established independently, as it were, of the process of continuity; notably Ego's proscription to his own literal sister. Others, it shall be argued are a function of the Father/Son identification process.

As I have indicated the process of sex-role sharing is one aspect only of a more generalized identification process. The postulates relating specifically to sex-role sharing will be seen to be premises in our cousin-marriage systems models. The phenomena of role-sharing in a more generalized sense will be considered corroborative evidence of sex-role continuity in particular. That is, we do not ascribe a continuity in sexual roles between persons unless there is evidence of identification in other aspects of their lives. This will be illustrated later.

**Principle of Mother/Daughter Continuity**

This situation parallels Fa/So continuity except that the role sharing applies between a woman and her daughter.

If, in a given society, it can be supported that such an identification process is at all operative, it may be found that the process obtains more between Fa/So than between Mo/Da, or perhaps not at all between Mo/Da. Conversely, the Mo/Da principle may obtain in the absence of a parallel Fa/So continuity. What is the basis for regulation of the sexual life of the child of opposite
sex of a line of continuity where such continuity does not apply, as such, to persons of the child's sex? For example, how is a girl's sexual life regulated in a society characterized by Fa/So continuity but not by Mo/Da continuity? I shall refer to such situations as ones in which one line of sex-role continuity predominates over the other line. The lines are identified as either male-continuous or female-continuous according to whether the continuity principle applies to the Fa/So or Mo/Da dyads respectively.

As a first formulation of an answer to the question posed above I suggest that persons of the sex opposite to the predominating line are treated by culture participants as belonging to that line, being linked with it at, at least, one point and perhaps more. A word of caution must be injected here. The word predominating does not necessarily imply either political or status prominence of the sex of the predominating line. It means only, as I have said, that the process of sex-role continuity applies to one sex, e.g. Mo/Da, conspicuously more than to the opposite sex.

Thus, where one line is conspicuously predominant, members of the opposite sex are viewed as belonging for purposes of sexual disposition to some one, or perhaps more, persons of a line of continuity. Here, I expressly avoid the concept of Jural Authority. Through the Needham vs. Homans and Schneider debate, this concept has come to imply more than I am prepared to affix to the notion of belonging for purposes of sexual disposition. Radcliffe-Brown's concept of *jus in personam* strikes nearer the
mark. At the same time, it has important features of his *jus in rem*.

This means that where Fa/So continuity predominates (Mo/Da continuity does not obtain), a man treats his own daughter's sexual disposition, vis-à-vis other people, as his own right and duty; as a sexual object. She is his *for disposition*. This applies not merely to her marriage but to her pre-marital sexual life as well. A man assumes the right to regulate the issues of with whom his daughter may or may not have sexual relations. It means that a man may impose sanctions upon his daughter as well as upon her lover for a sexual union of which he disapproves. This sexual trusteeship continues at least until the time of his daughter's marriage. At this time the rights are at least partly transferred to the girl's formal husband, and he as a rule confines sexual access to the girl to himself. The father may be expected to continue his trusteeship in a limited sense beyond marriage. This is well illustrated in the following statement concerning the Murngin:

> If a daughter runs away from her husband (the father's Waku), the father with the aid of his sons brings the runaway back to his Waku [SiSo]. She receives a beating from him and is advised to remain faithful to her husband. Quarreling daughters who are the wives of one man are instructed by their father to live in peace, for he considers the welfare of his Waku of the greatest importance.

And in extreme cases of infidelity:

> If a wife continues to be unfaithful she might be killed by her due [FaSiSo = Hu or Brother of Husband] and members of her own family.
Principle of the Sexual Equivalence of Sisters.

Sisters, at least girls who are daughters of a single sire, become equated as sexual objects, and in a sense as actors, as a function of having one and the same sexual trustee — their mutual father. His attitude regarding the proper disposition of one, in terms of the status of what he will consider an acceptable sexual partner for her, will apply likewise to the others. Likewise, they are viewed as equivalent sexual objects by third parties in the sense that a man may deny sexual access to his daughter's categorically to that third party.

This principle of sister equivalence does not pretend to countenance no contradiction. The sexual access of a man to his own wife does not imply his automatic access to her sisters. At the same time it does help to account for such phenomena as the sororate and sororal polygyny. Also, it does mean that the strict sexual proscription to a woman implies the same to her sisters. It will also help us to understand sexual taboo of the matrilateral parallel cousin.

The Sharing of Trusteeship

In such systems as these, having predominance of the male-continuous line and father/daughter trusteeship, we anticipate that, as one aspect of the more generalized Fa/So role-continuity, a man will share his own father's role of trustee vis-à-vis their sister-daughter (respectively). This is not implied by the defi-
nition of Fa/So sex-role continuity but is predicated as a tendency corresponding to the anticipated generalized identification process. It is also interesting to speculate that, where such a role-sharing occurs, it goes far to explain the brother-sister incest taboo. That is, given the father-daughter incest taboo, and given father/son sex-role continuity, the brother-sister sexual taboo is accounted for as the son's adoption of a proscription proper to his father.

In addition, I propose that the role of sexual trustee is, with the important exception of the Husband role, incompatible with sexual union between the trustee and his trust. This will be taken up again at a later point. However, given this, and the sharing by a man of his father's trustee role over their sister/daughter, we have supplied an additional reason for a brother/sister incest taboo.

Just as an example of shared trusteeship, recall the citation above concerning the runaway wives. Such a girl, among the Murngin, is retrieved and punished by the father "with the aid of his sons." This statement clearly implies primacy of the paternal trusteeship, but just as clearly specifies that his sons must participate in the role.
Female Ego and her Father's Sister

In a situation in which, as well as sharing his father's own sexual orientations, a man also shares his father's trustee roles (remember that the former must not be taken to necessarily imply the latter condition), we are led to anticipate a tendency to the sexual equating of a woman and her FaSi. A man in this case will assume a trustee role vis-à-vis both his own sister and his own daughter (rather than only over his daughter). Thus, a girl and her FaSi are identified as belonging for purposes of sexual disposition to a single given man at least in the sense that one of the men to whom each is a sexual trust is the same person. In such a situation we anticipate the tendency for a woman to be sexually oriented in the same directions as her father's sister; that is to behave as sexually continuous with the FaSi as actor and as object. This means that we anticipate she will adopt at least the sexual proscriptions proper to her father's sisters.

Any circumstance which attenuates the sharing by a man of his father's trusteeship roles will attenuate this FaSi/BroDa sex-role continuity.

Before I move on, let me remind you that we have been dealing expressly with a situation showing predominance of male-continuous lines. We may also refer, here, to a sexual equivalence of brothers. This is directly implied by their mutual continuity from the same sire. However, what about a situation in which there
is predominance of a female-continuous line? Remember, we do not imply political or status dominance of women; only that Mo/Da sex-role continuity obtains where Fa/So continuity is submerged.

Predominance of a female-continuous line

This situation would parallel the one of male-continuity in the obverse sense:

(1) A woman is sexually continuous with her mother, sharing the mother's sexual taboos and perhaps her general sexual privileges.

(2) Brothers are sexually equated under the common trusteeship of their mother. They, as it were, derive from the same womb. For obvious reasons, they cannot, like their sisters, be equivalent sexually as continuations or duplications of the maternal womb.

(3) The measure of transmission of the trusteeship role over boys from their mother to their sister is a contingency upon which depends the measure of sex-role continuity that obtains between a man and his mother's brother.

We expect that one factor will complicate this situation in a greater measure than the case of male-continuous lines. Most often, jural authority over young men is exercised by the mother's brother even more conspicuously than by his sister, if not more so than his mother. Yet, I contend that this jural authority derives from the boy's mother. The MoBro is what Radcliffe-Brown terms a "male mother".
In these cases the mother and to some degree the sister have trusteeship in the sexual disposition of a young man. This, together with the more generalized features of jural authority (authority in training in male skills etc.) are in part delegated to the nearest male of the boys 1st ascending generation over whom the mother has a measure of influence. This is the woman's own brother and the boy's maternal uncle. This does not mean that a woman has generalized jural authority over her brother. She does have at least a shared sexual trusteeship in him.

Perhaps some illustration of our general notions will be helpful at this point. Throughout the remainder of this essay I shall continue to exploit Murngin data, from Warner, for much of my illustration.

In the first place, the Murngin appear themselves to have a fairly explicit attitude of generalized Fa/So role continuity.

Warner observes that

the death of a son is a great social loss to the father, since there is no one to take his place.  

Likewise the position of the father as sexual trustee over both his sons and daughters seems clear in the following remarks:

As soon as a boy is circumcised and old enough to understand and remember what is told him, his galle [MoBroDa] is pointed out. At a similar age a galle mielk [MoBroDa] has her due diramo [FaSiSo] shown to her. This is done by the male parent of both children.

and,

Usually an older male due and male galle have an understanding that their sons and daughters shall marry.
This last remark means that as between a man and his MoBroSo, who may be brothers-in-law (Murngin have a rule of matrilateral c.c. marriage), there is an agreement the son of the former shall marry the daughter of the latter. This would of course be a matrilateral c.c. marriage. My major point in these citations is that it is the fathers who make the arrangements and who form the agreements -- at least formally.

These comments may also help to point up that there is some difference between sexual trusteeship and jural authority. Homans and Schneider have expressed uncertainty concerning whether the locus of jural authority rest, among the Murngin; with the father, the MoBro or the MoMoBro. They include the Murngin as one of two exceptions (Yir-Yiromt are the other) to their expectation that patrilineal descent will mean patripotestality. Yet they do not feel it to be a "full exception" (p. 42). On all of this, Needham is in agreement.

Thus, even in a situation, such as among the Murngin, where the disposition of generalized jural authority is unclear, it is quite possible that the formal locus of specific sexual trusteeship is perfectly unambiguous. There can be little doubt that the Murngin sexual trustee is Ego's father.

The discussion to this point allows us to posit four major combinations of the general dispositions so far considered:
(1) Fa/So sex-role continuity; paternal sexual trusteeship which is not considerably shared by the girl's brother; equivalence (sexual) of brothers and of sisters, but not of the BroDa/FaSi dyad.

(2) The same as the above except that there is a strong tendency for a man to assume his father's trusteeship role vis-à-vis the sister of the man. This would result, ex hypothesi, in a greater tendency to a sex-role continuity between a girl and her FaSi.

(3) Mo/Da sex-role continuity; maternal sexual trusteeship over sons which is not significantly shared by the boy's sisters; sexual equivalence of brothers and sisters, but a weak tendency to continuity in the SiSo/MoBro dyad.

(4) The same as (3) except that there is a strong tendency for a girl's assumption of the trusteeship role over her brother. This would result in a greater tendency to a sex-role continuity between a man and his MoBro.
CHAPTER 6

Exogamy and Descent

In the following I shall attempt to apply some of the principles already introduced to rules of exogamy imposed upon the membership of groups recruited on the basis of a rule of unilineal descent.

A concept of an exogamous patrilineal descent group has the following features:

(1) A patrilineal descent group is a set of men who recognize a common ancestor who is linked to each member through a temporally receding line of males. This line may be viewed as composed of dyads of fathers and sons.

(2) The women of these groups are the daughters of each of these men (and, of course, their sisters). Collectively, the women will be viewed as sexual wards of the men; each of her father.

(3) The rule of exogamy is viewed as the proscription among the men of a descent group to their mutual sexual wards -- i.e., their daughters.

This last characteristic in particular needs further clarification. In the first place, it does not imply that among all men of a descent group or even between all members of adjoining generations there is a more generalized sex-role continuity with sharing, by each, of all of the sexual taboos proper to every other. Clearly this would extend the sexual proscriptions of each
person vastly beyond the membership of his own descent group which is my immediate concern. Thus, the proscription characteristic of an exogamous descent group is particularly that to the sexual wards of all the men composing the group.

The kinds of sexual proscriptions which derive from Fa/So sex-role continuity are considerably more extensive, where they occur, than the abstention from sexual relationships (of a man and his son) with their respective wards. As I have already noted this proscription (to trusts) applies doubly in a father/son dyad in which the son also assumes a trusteeship posture vis-à-vis his sister. However, the concept of Fa/So continuity in sexual orientation implies a wider range of sexual regulation than obtains as a function of mutual abstention from sexual wards. The latter is characteristic throughout the membership of the descent group. The more generalized sharing of taboos implied in Fa/So sex-role continuity will seldom extend throughout the membership of an entire descent group. This category implies Ego's proscription to women whose sexual taboos are proper to his father. This category of women can extend considerably beyond those women who are the father's own sexual wards. This will be exemplified later. However, I should point out that such exhaustive sex-role continuity among all members of a descent group is a requirement of the exchange theory models of matrilateral connubium. Only under this condition will all men of a descent group behave identically in their marital relations with other whole descent groups, and only then can the entire group exchange models be applied.
The foregoing remarks are a way of viewing exogamous social groupings. Behind them is a theoretical viewpoint concerning the basic structural features of enduring associational groups. In particular, it is my own argument that the phenomenon of sexual trusteeship is fairly much a social universal. In addition, it is my view that there is a widespread and forceful disposition among persons who compose a corporate grouping with a substantial measure of endurance to refrain from sexual relations and marriage with their respective sexual wards.

The key words here are corporate and enduring. To put it in simple words, I would argue that any condition which will cause a size reduction or size expansion of a group whose members undertake any close corporate interactions will tend to create a corresponding change in the size of the exogamous grouping. Such corporate interactions may center upon any of a variety of circumstances most notably economic and/or politico-military. Thus, for example, there seems little doubt that, among the Purum, the sib was at one time a strictly exogamous social unit but that it had undergone change in this respect. Das observes of a number of cases of sib endogamy that

in spite of their non-observance of the exogamous rule in connection with the sib they were neither excommunicated nor punished in any other way for this social offence. They continued to remain members of Purum society and lived in a Purum village taking part in all socio-religious rites and ceremonies performed by the village community for the welfare of its constituent members. In short this was not regarded as an offence at all. But this does not seem to have been the case at the time when Shakespeare wrote on this
tribe. According to him "Among the Anal, Purum and Lamang marriages must be made within the clan but not within the family." Shakespeare's 'clan' refers to our 'tribe' and his 'family' is identical with our 'sib'. Even nowadays whenever a Purum is asked whether a man can marry within his sagei /sib/ he at once denies it and this is the general feeling of the community. But the instances under reference show that the intensity of this feeling has diminished to a very appreciable extent and the sib is no longer the most important exogamous social unit. The idea of incest which generally accompanies the sib-concept has now been transferred in Purum society from the sib to the subsib.73

What I am suggesting is that, had we the information, we would be able to demonstrate a parallel reduction in the measure of sib corporateness. This might well be reflected in if not caused by reduction of economic and political cooperation of sib members and perhaps by a growing measure of sib dispersion consequential to the apparent territorial expansion which the Purum were undertaking.

Conversely, this viewpoint argues that any circumstance which inspires sexual union and marriage among the members of an ideally exogamous unit will tend to have a divisive effect upon the unit. Thus, even should a named unit continue, a while, to be so named and recognized, the corporate and cooperative interactions of its membership will be substantially reduced, or what may amount to the same thing, the size of the groups whose members do cooperate closely will be reduced to sets of people smaller than those which compose the ideal exogamous unit. Any condition which, for example, reduces the availability of women over the entire population might result in fragmentation of the earlier exogamous corporate units into smaller corporate groupings.
Since all of this is bare-faced speculation I had just as well carry the argument to its extreme. Why should one anticipate what amounts to the incompatibility of enduring corporate-ness and a persistent endogamous pattern among the group members? Anthropologists have long been inclined to view marriage and sexual relations of man and woman as events which have profound effects upon the social relations of man with man. Specifically, the occurrence of sexual relations between a man and woman always demands that there be some social adjustments made between a girl's sex — cum marriage — partner and other men associated with her; most especially the men whom I have designated a girl's sexual trustee.

I suggest that whenever two men have claims on the loyalty of a given woman, they are in a condition of potential vulnerability vis-à-vis one another. Perhaps even the most casual sexual encounters carry this implication, but it is certainly an aspect of prolonged male-female intimacy that each of the partners may expose themselves considerably to the other. This tendency may be as readily precipitated in circumstances of sexual intimacy as under any social encounters general to human relations. This is sheer speculation and is, possibly, very ethnocentric in its source. If something of this nature is so, however, it may prove very useful in understanding social phenomena of many kinds.

Where a woman owes loyalty to her sexual trustee as well as to her sex partner, the sex partner could, in a sense,
place himself in a condition of vulnerability before the girl's trustee. She can become the bearer of information of perhaps the most intimate kinds about her sex partner. If, in cultures besides our own, men are prone to punctuating sexual intimacy -- and the sense of conquest that often accompanies it -- with a general verbal "beating of the chest", women are placed in a position of great potential power. Such information could often be of a damaging nature should it become known to other men -- such as the girl's sexual trustees. This is reminiscent of many male-female encounters recorded both in mythology as in reliable history. Our own Western histories are replete with cases of treacherous women who employ their feminine wiles toward the destruction of their lovers; Lucrezia Borgia, Katherine the Great are, purportably, classic examples. More recently, the comical events surrounding the "Profumo Scandal" and the "Munsinger case" are an excellent example of the common assumption that a man is seldom so vulnerable before other men as when he shares a sexual intimacy with a woman whose loyalty may be in doubt.

A man who is the trustee of a girl is also vulnerable where, even though sexual intimacy is taboo between them, the intimacy of the trustee/ward relation may arm the girl with information which is potentially damaging to the trustee. Thus, a woman may be in a position to transmit intimate and otherwise guarded information between her trustee and sex-partner in either direction. This places each in a position of some vulnerability vis-à-vis the other.
To my mind, the widely recognized state of tension found so often in affinal relationships in many societies may well derive in some measure from this implicit interpretation placed, by men, upon their intimate relations with women. A factor of this nature might well become manifest in institutionalized exogamy where the exogamic group comprises an association of males who, for whatever reason, are oriented to a high degree of cooperative interaction. Conversely, regular breach of the exogamic disposition would result in a condition of tension among the men of a group. At least it might induce sufficient uncertainty to compromise an enduring close cooperativeness among them.

I do not wish to imply that cooperativeness cannot be propitiated among affines; only, rather, that it is cooperation from a distance such as is described by the attitude of reciprocity. Affines will exchange produce but are less able to co-produce.

I frankly admit that at this point I am unable to draw sharp lines between the affinal and kin cooperativeness. I only say that there is a difference in their degree and that this may be in part engendered automatically as it were by their reduced ability to control information about themselves. This implies, paradoxically, that a condition of high cooperativeness requires a measure of personal secretiveness among its participants. Perhaps this is what is meant by our own folk wisdom that "familiarity breeds contempt."
Perhaps I should make one point clearer. The information to which the girl has access need not be of a specifically sexual nature. Often, a girl is not only not allowed to have sexual intimacy with her trustee, they must not even speak of sexual matters in one another's presence. On the other hand, the girl, has, as a rule, been raised in the camp of her trustee. Many peoples appear to guard important information from their women by means such as outlawing their membership in secret societies. At the same time she may be able to learn, simply through propinquity, the important skills and even military stratagems of her trustee. In her relation with her sex-partner, the act of intercourse alone may evoke revelations from the man, not to mention the information she might gain simply through living in the camp of her mate.

The other side of this coin is that, where a sexual trustee approves a given man as sex-partner to his ward, he implies some measure of trust in the man. Indeed, such trust is very commonly symbolized through so-called "marriages of state"; these frequently punctuate the formal termination of hostility.

The foregoing discussion is not an attempt to explain rules of descent as such. Rather I am primarily concerned with the phenomenon of exogamy which is so often superimposed upon groups constituted through a rule of unilineal descent. There are, of course, some well-known examples of societies which practice a rule of unilineal descent without ever creating on its basis any enduring
(or stable) corporate groupings. In such situations there simply are no groups to be exogamous. The Arab Bedouin provide an interesting example.

The Bedouin practice a rule of patrilineal descent to be sure; yet, as Murphy and Kasdan have described them,

In this system, it is almost impossible to isolate a solidary ingroup, and groupings are continually being activated or redefined through struggles that may even pit members of the nuclear family against each other. Such fluidity is congruent with the extreme weakness of internally exercised authority in agnatic sections, whatever the level of segmentation in question.74

They illustrate this analysis with the Arab proverb: Myself against my brother; my brother and I against my cousin; my cousin, my brother and I against the outsider.

In view of the transitory nature of corporate groupings, it is difficult to refer to the Bedouin preference for marriage with the patrilateral parallel cousin as an example of endogamy. The marriage preference does mean, however, that the patrilineal segment composed of two brothers and their children is indeed endogamous. It is most telling that such endogamy should occur in a social structure characterized clearly by potential hostility at nearly any point -- including between literal brothers who squabble interminably over inheritance. I shall emphasize this point with one further remark from Murphy and Kasdan:

Thus, in a system where every male sibling is a potential point of segmentation, and therefore a significant political role player, even the interests of brothers or of sons and fathers are not necessarily convergent... Cohesive relations between and within sections do not have an enduring, continuing quality, but are situational and opportunistic.76
The authors of this fascinating article carry their argument a step further:

It is, then, our hypothesis that the peculiar nature of agnatic sections among the Arabs is closely related to the practice of parallel cousin marriage. It might also be hypothesized that lack of internal solidarity and homogeneity in Arab kin groups is promoted by the combining of affinal and consanguineal ties.

In other words, they too seem to argue that there is some source of incompatibility between the creation of enduring corporate groupings and a practice of endogamous marriage. Their explanation of this emphasizes factors which I have not, however. They accept Homans and Schneider's general postulate that people will marry away from jural authority, and, since corporate groups reveal such an authority structure, people marry out of their corporate groups. Thus, since the Arab Bedouin have only a very weak tendency to corporateness, and a weak jural authority structure, there is no jural authority, within even narrow agnatic segments, to marry away from.

My own view is somewhat different. Affinal relationships are inherently tense for the reasons given whereas corporate relations are inherently closer—more cooperative. Nothing is directly implied here concerning the affectional or sentimental dimension of these relationships. It is even possible, to my way of thinking, to feel great affection for a person whom one may have reason to fear (such as one's affine) while, at the same time, one may feel keenly irritable towards a person in whom he is ready to place a great deal of trust (one's consanguineal kin). At the same time we expect sentiment to generally parallel measures of corporate closeness.
In terms of the concept of trusteeship, then, while the Bedouin undoubtedly reveal dispositions to a relationship of sexual trusteeship between a man and his daughter, and while a man's sons very probably assume a measure of this role as well, there is manifestly no sexual avoidance of the mutual wards of the men who are agnatic kin. A man, as I have already noted, is strictly proscribed from having sexual relations with a girl who is his own ward. Thus, brother/sister as well as father/daughter, mother/son sexual taboos are strictly maintained. However, the trusteeship role does not appear to extend beyond these members of the immediate nuclear family. In addition, there is no father/son sex-role continuity as such. A boy does not assume the taboos proper to his father. Thus, the only group within which a rule of exogamy consistently is enforced among the Bedouin is the nuclear family.

Conditions of desert life are such that near association among men is always tenuous and conducted against a backdrop of perpetual competition. These circumstances counter the formation of enduring corporate groups. The relationships among consanguin- eally near agnatic kin are a tissue of mutual distrust to begin with. Thus, not only is there no orientation to avoiding the establishment of affinal tension among agnatic kin through endogamous marriage, but such marriages are themselves expressive of a pre-existing disposition of only very hesitant mutual trust. Indeed, such marriages, in my view, also have the effect of propagating
the tension among agnatic kin and of rendering the formation of enduring corporate groups an impossibility short of prolonged and intensive confrontation with mutual enemies -- outsiders.

In sum, then, a rule of unilineal descent may exist independently of the formation of enduring corporate social groups and without a rule of exogamy that extends beyond the members of the nuclear family. The persistence of intra-familial incest taboos would indicate, in terms of my argument, that a sharing of trusteeship roles and a respecting of their mutual sexual wards between a man and his sons is a part of the general disposition of father/son identification which will scarcely yield under even the most competitive of social circumstances. The converse to this would be that circumstances under which breaches of the incest taboos do occur might be ones involving a substantial breach in the identification of father and son.

Let me summarize some of the major points in this discussion of systems which tend to create agnatic clusters:

(1) A father is the principal individual having the social role of sexual trustee over his daughter.

(2) The relationship of trustee to ward is incompatible with the sexual union of its members.

(3) A man's own sons always share (ideologically) their father's role of trustee over their sister. This adoption of father's trusteeship role may or may not be extended further to include partaking of the father's trusteeship over the father's sister. Trusteeship
sharing may be expected where the closeness of the male association is strong. Thus, a man may or may not share a trusteeship proper to his own brother (i.e., over BroDa). In general as social closeness is intensified among the men who recognize agnatic ties, so is the measure of trusteeship sharing.

(4) There is a firm disposition among corporately near men to avoid sexual relations among their respective wards even where they do not assume trusteeship positions vis-à-vis these women. Thus, a man may assume no responsibility in the sexual disposition of FaSi, but will usually refrain from intimacy with her since she is a ward of his father.

Thus, the limits of the effectively corporate unit tend to approach the limits of the exogamous unit; i.e., the unit whose members abstain from sexual relations among their respective female wards. We may expect the limits of the assumption of an effective trusteeship role to fall short of the bounds of exogamy. Major decisions concerning the sexual disposition of a girl will still reside primarily with her own father although he may occasionally have to call upon the other men of his group to support his decisions in some crisis circumstance such as the retrieving of a daughter who has eloped or been stolen by a man of whom he disapproves. Such a situation could threaten hostilities in which he might require military backing.

Before I move to a brief consideration of matrilineal groupings I would like to add one final admission of uncertainty.
It concerns the vague word corporate. Clearly we are dealing with a very ill-defined notion. What we have been concerned to relate the notion to has been its relationship to the phenomenon of exogamy. If, as I have argued, corporateness of a stable kind requires exogamy, it was because in-marriage would create a kind of relationship among men which tends to be incompatible in its qualitative character with the character of relationships in a solidary or corporate group. The distinctive quality of such kin-relationships resides in the mutual expectancy that, vis-à-vis the rest of the world, a man can ultimately trust in the support and protection of the other members of his group. There are probably no other kinds of relationship which as successfully inculcate this attitude.

It is more difficult to maintain such an attitude among men who avail themselves of the favors of women who are their respective wards. Apart from the possibility of jealousy (even of a sexual nature) on the part of the trustee, the factor of control of highly personal information may part way account for this. It is probable that all human beings guard items of information which concern themselves against exposure to even the most trusted of their fellows. There is no reason to believe that men of simple tribal social systems are any less vulnerable in their own view than are men of our own social system. Perhaps all close associations require that we accept what is somewhat illusory of others and foster, in their minds, illusions about ourselves.

In terms of the concepts I have provided exogamic groupings based upon a rule of matrilineal descent will have the following characteristics:
(1) Maternal trusteeship: boys are the sexual wards of their mothers. Such a role may be shared in varying degrees by the boy's sister; most probably an older sister. This means that the sexual disposition of a boy is held to be primarily the concern of his mother, even though her brother will assist in supporting and sanctioning her decisions.

(2) Thus, a matrilineal descent group is a set of women who recognize a common ancestor (or ancestress) who is linked to each member through a temporarily receding line of women. This line may be viewed as composed of dyads of mothers and their daughters. In this case, it is the women who fundamentally compose the group, whereas the men who are members of it are viewed as the sexual wards of particular women of the group. As I have noted, the trusteeship role is primarily that of the mother, but may extend outward from her to include other women of the group -- conceivably all.

(3) As a result of postulates (1) and (2) the rule of exogamy is here viewed as at least resulting from the prescription of sexual relations between any women of the group and the particular sexual ward of any of the other women of the group. Where the trusteeship role is widely shared among these women, the exogamic rule also obtains by reason of the firm disposition against sexual relations with one's own sexual ward.

Thus, sons are primarily the property of their mothers until their marriage. Needham observes of the matrilineal BELU,
for example, that the children "belong" to the wife and "It is the wife and her brother who together possess jural authority over the children, as they possess rights over land, house, hereditary property, and all other things of value". As a rule, the training of a young man in his male roles is undertaken by a male. In these cases, the job is undertaken by the nearest male kin of the boy's mother, the mother's brother. Yet the rights of sexual disposition over a son are, ex hypothesi, ultimately those of the mother in consultation with her brother.

It seems that the tendency of most societies to relegate major decision making into the hands of men will result in a lesser tendency for a boy's sister to assume the mother's trustee role than in the parallel patrilineal situation where a boy assumes father's trusteeship over sister. Thus, we anticipate that we shall seldom find that a woman is a major sexual trustee over her own brother. This will minimize any tendency to sexual continuity between a man and his own mother's brother. That is, to the extent that they are discretely the sexual property of their own respective mother's and not of a trustee which they mutually share, the process of their identification may be somewhat intercepted. In general, I believe there is always a tendency to male dominance in decision making. This tendency results in reduction of the degree in which men belong to a line of women which includes women of their own generation. As a result, the men of matrilineal descent groups tend to be sexually identified through the process of shared
trusteeship less than do women of patrilineal groups. Thus we anticipate a greater tendency toward sex-role continuity of a girl and her FaSi in patrilineal systems than of a boy and his MoBro in matrilineal ones. This absence of sex-role continuity between a boy and his MoBro does not imply any absence of avuncular jural authority which, as here understood, is an authority delegated from the mother.

We are now prepared to move onto the subject of models of our various cousin marriage systems. In these models the following intra-familial incest taboos are assumed:

(1) Mother/Son.

(2) Father/Daughter.

(3) Brother/Sister.
CHAPTER 7
Matrilateral Cross-Cousin Marriage

These systems may be understood in terms of the existence of dispositions toward both of father/son and mother/daughter sex-role continuity operating together in a single context.

As a function of the former, a man assumes the sexual taboos proper to his father. At the same time, a girl assumes the sexual taboos proper to her mother.

The primary role of trusteeship over children (sons and daughters) may belong to either the mother or the father although it is most often in the hands of the latter. Where the father is sexual trustee over his children, his son adopts a supportive part in this function vis-à-vis his sister. In such a system, then, a girl is the sexual ward of her father, subject to his decisions in her sexual career, while she is at the same time sexually continuous with her mother, sharing most notably the taboos proper to the mother. Clearly, the father's decisions are his to the extent that they do not violate the dispositions of Mo/Da continuity.

These remarks summarize the basic features of a system of matrilateral c.c. marriage with paternal trusteeship. In the following I shall offer an analysis of the sexual dispositions of Ego vis-à-vis each of his four types of cousin:

(1) The Father's Sister's Daughter.

According to the principle of Mo/Da continuity, a woman and her mother are sexually equated by all men except the woman's
father (her mother's husband). If mother is not allowed to have sexual relations with a given man on the ground that it would be incestuous, then neither may her daughter. Thus, whereas a man is proscribed from sexual relations with his own sister, so is he proscribed from the daughter of his sister. From his viewpoint, his sister and her daughter are identified -- continuous -- as sexual objects. Conversely, a woman assumes the proscriptions proper to her own mother. Thus, she takes upon herself the taboo to sexual relations with her MoBro. From this perspective, a woman and her daughter are viewed as sexual actors.

But, according to the principle of Fa/So sex-role continuity, a boy assumes the incest taboos proper to his father. Thus, he also is proscribed to sexual relations with the daughter of father's sister. Conversely, a woman identifies her brother and her brother's son as sexual objects; she is thus proscribed to both. Thus, her daughter, assuming the incest taboos proper to her mother is likewise proscribed to her MoBroSo.

(2) The Father's Brother's Daughter.

A man and his own brother share mutual taboos. This includes both taboos proper to themselves (e.g. against mother and sister) and those which they adopt from their mutual sire. In addition, they are proscribed from sexual relations with the sexual wards of one another -- their daughters. From the viewpoint of each of these girls, as to all other people, a man and his brother are sexually equivalent. The son of each of these brothers adopts the taboo to the daughter of the other.
(3) **The Mother's Sister's Daughter.**

According to the principle of Mo/Da sex-role continuity sisters are equivalent as actors and objects. Thus, the Mo/So incest taboo applies equally between Ego and MoSi and, therefore, between Ego and MoSiDa.

(4) **The Mother's Brother's Daughter.**

There are only two situations in which I can envision this combination of identity principles resulting in the proscription of sexual relations with the MoBroDa. These are:

(a) **sex-role continuity of FaSi/BroDa.**

Such a situation means that a girl assumes the sexual proscriptions of her FaSi including that to FaSiSo, and conversely where a girl is sexually equated with her FaSi by men. The principle of Mo/Da continuity does not achieve such an identification since a woman and her BroDa are of different lines of women. The circumstance under which there may be a disposition toward this identification is one in which these women are equated through being the common sexual property of a common major trustee. This identification, then, could develop where a man's sister is treated equally as his own sexual ward as is his own daughter. This would mean that the girl's FaSiSo is proscribed to her as he is to his own mother (the girl's FaSi).

In my view this kind of continuity is of a much less direct nature than Mo/Da continuity. A mother and her daughter are more readily sexually identified as though they were the same kind of sexual and maternal principle.
The union of two women under common trusteeship need not develop into this kind of sexual identification. The political interests of the trustee are a more explicit concern in the situation. The union of two women under his dispositional aegis need not mean their complete sexual identification with the consequent sharing of taboos. It is more probable that their identification is of the kind proposed by the exchange theorists: they are viewed as the women belonging, for purposes of sexual disposition, to a line of men, the line consisting at least of a man and his sons. It is this sharing of trusteeship among the members of a line of men which equates the women. To an outsider, including the son of one of these women, others of the women are viewed as collectively, potential wives to the men of his line which includes his father and brothers. The size of such bride/giving and bride-taking lines is highly variable as was noted earlier.

(b) sex-role continuity of MoBro/SiSo.

This analysis parallels the one above except that the continuity would develop in a situation of strong maternal trusteeship. The identification of a man and his MoBro as sexually continuous may occur where they are clearly the common wards of a solidary Mo/Da shared trusteeship. Again, however, it is more probable that this identification will involve regarding a man and his SiSo, common trusts of a single female line, as equivalent as potential spouses. A girl may be proscribed to particular ones of these men by intra-familial incest taboos; e.g. the woman is
specifically taboo to her own father as the spouse of another woman of her line (her mother's), but has access potentially to other men belonging to the same line of women as does her father. This would include her FaSiSo.

In general, then, I would argue that it is only seldom the case that the sexual-continuity will develop in full-blown form. A man, therefore, does not view his own mother and mother's brother's daughter as sexually equivalent as sister and mother are. Rather, Mo and MoBroDa are distinctive sexual principles who are, nevertheless, identified as equally available to ego's line as the wards of a bride-giving line.

The Generalization of Shared Taboos.

In its first formulation, I defined Father-Son sex-role continuity as the assumption, by a boy, of the sexual taboos proper to his own father. This was presented, for expediency's sake, in an unqualified manner. Yet, in the first section of this essay I have argued at some length that a science of human beings must accept as its most effective explanatory postulates the predication to human beings of behavioural dispositions. These must be understood only as tendencies which never operate in an unqualified manner. In keeping with this approach, I shall now expand somewhat, and qualify somewhat, our notion of Fa/So continuity as it obtains in systems of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. I shall be concerned first with such systems in societies also characterized by predominant paternal trusteeship.
The qualified minimal definition of Fa/So sex-role continuity is that a boy assumes at least two of the sexual proscriptions proper to his own father. These are:

1. proscription to all women who are his father's own sexual wards.

2. proscription to the sexually continuous line of women initiated in Father's mother. This line includes FaMo, FaSi, FaSiDa, FaSiDaDa, etc.

In the following diagram, I have indicated a number of Mo/Da lines, each being the 'mother's line' of a member of a line of men. Each of the Mo/Da lines is distinguished by an encircled numeral. The men of a receding Fa/So line are designated by Capital A and each man distinguished by a subscript numeral.

Figure 10
Continuous lines of women.
The "mathematical" implications of the notion of Fa/So sex-role continuity are that Ego-A5- is proscribed not only to the women of line 3, above, but since Ego's father - (A4) - is proscribed to his father's (A3's) mother's line, i.e., line 2, Ego should be proscribed to this line (line 2) as well since it is one of the proscriptions proper to his father. Thus, by extending the logic of Fa/So continuity, Ego's proscriptions would "pile up" through time, since the same can be argued of line 1 etc. Thus, we would ask, is Ego invariably proscribed to women who are his genealogical FaFaSiDaDa, or again, his FaFaFaSiDaDaDa?

For purposes of definition, then, I shall qualify what I mean by "proper to" to indicate those women to whom a man is sexually proscribed independently of the continuity process which calls for his sharing the taboos of others. Thus, again, two kinds of proscription are proper to every Ego: (1) sexual proscription to his own mother and her line, which includes one's sister. (In figure 10, A5's proscription to the women designated by 4). (2) Sexual proscription to one's own sexual ward, i.e., one's daughter -- and her line (DaDa, etc.). (In figure 10, A5's proscription to women designated by 5, with the exception of his own wife).

Thus, minimally, a man has two general sets of proscriptions:

(1) Those proper to himself; mother's line and daughter's line.

(2) Those proper to his father and adopted by himself; sister's line and father's mother's line (line 3 in figure 10, and again line 4).
Collectively, these are lines 5, 4, and 3 of figure 10. When combined with the phenomenon of classificatory termin­ology, any tendency to inherit proscriptions to further lines of women (such as 2 and 1) could raise difficulties. There is a tendency -- and I must emphasize the word tendency -- to apply to the classificatory sisters of a proscribed woman, the same pro­scription. The sisters of such a woman may be the women of her descent group or of some section of her descent group. Since the women of a line are, where there is a rule of patrilineal descent, of different descent groups from those immediately above and be­neath them in generation, it can be seen that Ego could come to confront so many proscriptions as to have no women available to him­self. Thus, I have suggested that Ego is proscribed not only to FaSiDa but to FaSiDaDa. The latter is of a different descent group from the former. Is Ego proscribed to all of the sisters (many of whom could easily be of Ego's own age) of FaSiDaDa? A problem of this kind would of course multiply greatly as Ego in­cluded lines 2 and 1 as well.

At this moment I shall not attempt to be more specific on this issue except to argue that there are several general ways that this problem may be managed. The first answer is that very distant sisters of a directly proscribed woman may simply not be treated as her classificatory sister. The second is that there may be a tendency to minimize the accumulation of lines. This will be a function of the difficulty of maintaining a clear historic
record of lines which originated in the marriage of Ego's male ancestors in distant past generations. The third point offers an additional perspective on the more positive features of a prescriptive system. The matter is far too complex for the present analysis, but a simple illustration may serve to put the general idea across.

The following diagram, figure 11, illustrates the idea that a tendency to limit the number of descent groups from which the persons of one sex of a given descent group may take a spouse will have the effect of holding down the development of further descent group proscriptions.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 11

Fig. 11. Ego is darkened triangle.

In figure 11, the broken lines encircle the women of a Mo/Da continuum. Line 1. is the line initiated by Ego's FaMo, line 2. is initiated with his own mother, and line 3. with his daughters. Locate Ego's FaSi. There might be several literal FaSi's, not to
mention other close classificatory ones -- e.g., the actual sisters of father's first patrilateral parallel cousins. If each of these women is allowed to marry arbitrarily into any descent group she chooses other, of course, than her own, then Ego -- so long as he is under any pressure to recognize all these women as FaSis (which means to recognize their brothers as fathers) -- will be obliged to recognize FaSiDas in as many descent groups as those into which the classificatory and several literal FaSis have married. Given, further, that he generalizes the label FaSiDa to the descent group sisters of these girls, it could easily come to pass that Ego will have no women whatever whom he is allowed to marry without breaking the proscription against the FaSiDa category.

The same general difficulty will arise if I am correct in saying that, in these systems, Ego will be proscribed to sister's daughter. If Ego has actual and/or close classificatory sisters who are allowed to marry arbitrarily into any descent groups they choose, Ego may in theory come to be proscribed to marry further women who are descent group sisters of his sister's daughters. Where Ego, then, is a young man with a substantial number of older father's sisters and sisters all of whom have married into different descent groups, Ego could be confronted with a situation where every woman he meets is a taboo woman.

Paradoxically, any tendency for a line of men to limit the descent groups into which they allow their daughters to marry will hold down the range of descent groups from which they and
their sons are sexually and therefore maritally proscribed. According to this analysis Ego is not allowed to marry women of FaSiHu descent group (FaSiDa proscribed) or of sister's husbands descent group (note that the Purum explicitly prohibit this; vide supra, p.68 ) because each contains a girl of a specifically proscribed continuum. If the range of descent groups into which sister and father's sister (at least socially close and important ones) are allowed to marry is limited, then the men of the line will not find themselves without spouses.

I submit, further, that the factors which determine the descent groups into which Ego and his sisters may or may not marry will be many. In general they will relate a socially near group of men to other socially close units (local descent groups?). Factors such as spatial proximity, economic and political interaction will certainly loom large. We may anticipate then that corporate clusters will usually favour marriage in one direction with other corporate clusters and will define each such cluster as bride-giving or bride-taking vis-à-vis itself by defining the entire descent group to which it belongs as one or the other. Other corporate clusters which belong to the same descent group as the first-mentioned one may have quite different definitions of these other descent groups.

Societies like the Purum appear to have explicitly built-in mechanisms which help to avoid such difficulty. Their "whole-descent group" -- SIB -- regulations will limit the likeli-
hood that future generations find themselves without potential sex-partners and wives.

I do not argue that such regulations reflect a conscious awareness of the aforementioned structural difficulties on the part of the culture participants themselves. Indeed, I should be surprised if such a difficulty did not periodically arise. Where it does, I would anticipate that it could become the source of a quasi-fission of the relationships in an otherwise close social unit. Thus, Ego might simply ignore the marriages of certain sisters and father's sisters, in order to avoid defining too many girls as maritally and sexually proscribed. Such a situation could even lead to heated dispute and the beginning of group fission.

Such a picture makes it by no means unthinkable that the culture participants in such systems are fully aware that these difficulties will arise unless strictures are placed (in terms of descent groups) upon the marriages of their daughters and sisters. It will be obvious that such strictures can have uniformity and successful implementation only within a group having sufficient corporateness to achieve communication and agreement among its members. The scale of such a group is clearly subject to a vast number of variables. In sum, awareness of such a mechanism is by no means out of the question, and if we have never been told of it perhaps it is because we have never (to the best of my knowledge) asked.
Finally, I shall explicate a little more clearly an issue which has already been raised. An exogamous descent group is one in which the men are proscribed to the sexual wards of one another. This represents the generalization of disposition which appears in all individual Fa/So dyads. The further tendency of a boy to assume the proscription, proper to father, of the line of father's mother will tend not to generalize as far; i.e., to fewer of his classificatory fathers. I have already argued that this tendency will vary according to the amount of social closeness between Ego and his various fathers. This, in turn, is a variable subject to many conditions, political, economic, etc. -- even personality factors. (See the citation from Warner given above, pp. 65-6).

The following diagram attempts to summarize my argument. It shows the minimal sexual proscriptions of Ego in a situation of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage based upon our principles of continuity and trusteeship.

\[ \text{Figure 12} \]
Legend: (1) Ego is the darkened triangle.
(2) Capital letters indicate a line of Fa/So continuity.
(3) Small letters designate that a woman is the sexual ward of some man (or men) bearing the same letter capitalized. Such women are taboo sexually to all men bearing the same capital letter either as the particular ward of the man or as a function of exogamy.
(4) Encircled numbers indicate a line of Mo/Da continuity.
(5) Non-encircled numbers designate men proscribed to a line of women who bear the same number encircled. This applies to Ego's proscription to his own mother and her line; i.e., based upon the given Mo/So incest taboo and principle of Mo/Da continuity.
(6) Bracketed numbers indicate proscription to the line of father's mother.

An important consequence of the postulated limitation of any tendency to generalize Fa/So continuity throughout the membership of a named exogamous descent group, such as the Purum sib or even lineage, is that we may expect to find classificatory sister-exchange, i.e., two-way movement of women between "whole descent groups", a not uncommon occurrence. Furthermore, such marriages need by no means be regarded as breaches of either the kin-term regulations or of the descent group regulations proper to the people involved. It is equally possible that some persons of a descent group may regard the marriage of others as wrong because the latter have ignored the regulations proper to the former, and have, as a result, ignored them. The occurrence of such a reaction and measures which might be taken as a result must be regarded as an open question. The following diagram, Figure 13, illustrates this point:
In this illustration, Ego 1 is proscribed to FaMo line of women which includes girl #1 and, for Ego, her classificatory sisters (girls of her descent group). The diagram describes a situation in which Ego 1 marries a girl of the very descent group to which the proscribed actual FaSiDa of Ego 2 belongs. Ego 1, ex hypothesi, does not recognize the actual father of Ego 2 as a significant father to himself and therefore does not assume the proscription to that person's mother's line (which includes girl #2 and her descent group sisters). The upshot of this is two-way bride exchange between "whole descent groups". Ego 1 has married a woman
of the same descent group as the one to which Ego 2's FaSiHu belongs. Yet, as far as Ego 1 is concerned, he has not married incorrectly.

In general, then, beyond women traced through close kinsmen the kin status of a given woman is an ambiguous issue. I have already pointed out that purely on the logic of classificatory relationships it is impossible to determine the terminological status of fully half of the sixteen second cousins (see Harrison Whyte, pp. 42-47). I shall pause briefly to illustrate this point.

On page 110 of "Structure and Sentiment", Needham remarks that "in a matrilateral system . . . the MBD is herself equivalent to MMBDD." I cannot take this to mean less than that a genealogical MoMoBroDaDa is treated as of the same terminological category as a genealogical MoBroDa. How can we be satisfied of this? It is certainly true in any circumstance in which the matrilateral c.c. marriage rule is modelled as involving invariable marriage with the literal MoBroDa (see fig. 1, p. 10). However, as I have argued throughout this essay, such a model fails abysmally to represent what the marriage rule means to the culture participants, not to mention what they actually do. What, then, can the arithmetic of classificatory terminology determine concerning a genealogical MoMoBroDaDa?

![Figure 14](image-url)
Classificatory logic leads to certain conclusions concerning coincidence of genealogical relationships and terminological ones. We expect, for example, that, in figure 14, Ego will apply the term for his own MoBroDa to his genealogical MoMoSiSoDa (girl #1). To Ego's mother the father of #1 is a matrilateral parallel cousin. Thus, Ego's mother will refer to him as brother. To Ego he is a mother's brother and, #1, therefore, is a MoBroDa.

But can we construct an equivalent argument for the MoMoBroDaDa (#2)? The mother of #2, is a MoBroDa to Ego's mother. What does Ego's mother term the daughter of MoBroDa? What does Ego term the daughter of his mother's MoBroDa? I can discover nothing in the logic of classificatory terminology to answer the question.

The only remaining phenomenon which can assist Ego in his decision is the descent group membership of #2. But this, I have already argued, can be variable from one Ego to another within a whole descent group. In general, the variation of descent group regulation diminishes with an increase in the social closeness (which, incidentally, will generally parallel genealogical closeness) of a subset of men who are members of a larger set of men -- the whole descent group.

Matrilateral Cross-Cousin Marriage With Maternal Trusteeship.

A matrilateral c.c. marriage rule can also be envisioned in a situation of predominant maternal trusteeship. This is in keeping with the fact that the rule sometimes occurs in a society with
matrilineal descent; we expect the trusteeship to correlate with the direction of descent much as Homans and Schneider have argued that the locus of general jural authority correlates with descent rule. The following diagram illustrates the system from the viewpoint of female Ego:

Figure 15

1) **Female Ego** is the darkened circle.

2) **Capital letters** attach to women only and identify lines of Mo/Da sex-role continuity. Thus, in any given Mo/Da dyad of such a line, the daughter assumes the sexual proscriptions proper to her own mother. The proscriptions proper to a person include the particular sexual ward (son) of each, and the line of their own father. Thus female Ego is proscribed to her own son's line, her father's line, and the line of her mother's father. The lines to which a given female Ego is proscribed are indicated by the _____
3) **Non-Encircled numerals** which attach to the women only. These numerals appear in the order of son's line, father's line and mother's father's line. The lines of men to which these numerals refer are indicated by the corresponding:

4) **Encircled numbers** which attach to each man. That is, they indicate Fa/So sex-role continuity. Where a woman is proscribed to one member of a line she is proscribed to all. This is the case for all women except a wife who is proscribed to a son and his line exclusive of her own husband. Thus, the first in the sequence of non-encircled numbers attached to a woman indicates proscription to her son and his line, but while it corresponds to the encircled number of her own husband, it does not mean that she is proscribed to him as well -- obviously.

Thus female Ego is proscribed to lines 4 (son's), 1 (father's) and 2 (mother's father's) and has the sequence of numbers 412 attached to the right of her capital letter, A. It will be noted that female Ego's FaBroSo belongs to line 1 while her MoBroSo belongs to line 2. Both are, therefore, sexually taboo to her. The latter one is, of course, proscription of the FaSiDa from male Ego's viewpoint.

5) **Small letters** indicate men who are the sexual wards (sons) of the individual women of a Mo/Da line who bear the corresponding capital letter. A woman of a given line must abstain from sexual relations with any man who is the sexual ward of another woman of her line. Thus, sexual relations are taboo
between women designated by a given capital letter and men
bearing the corresponding small letter. This, it will be
observed, includes the MoSiSo of female Ego.

6) **Blank Brackets** indicate letters or numerals not identified in
this diagram.

   It will be seen that female Ego's FaSiSo is of his father's
line, which is not one of the lines to which female Ego is proscribed;
i.e., not her father's or mother's father's line.
CHAPTER 8

Murngin Kinship: An Illustration

I stated, much earlier, in Section I, that a verification procedure involves the making of predictions, from the explanatory postulates, which concern phenomena specifically not ones which the postulates are designed to explain. It seems to me that the model given above, of matrilateral c.c. marriage, makes a number of predictions quite distinctive from its explanation of the first cousin regulations themselves.

To illustrate this procedure, I have selected Warner's study of the Murngin, a tribe of Australian aboriginals, since it is relatively complete in its description of sexual taboos. My major concern will be to show that the Murngin social system reveals a strong tendency to proscribe, sexually and maritally, women whose proscription is predicted by my model. These will include women other than Ego's own FaSiDa, FaBroDa, MoSiDa, and the classificatory descent group -- sisters of each of these women.

Needham describes the Murngin as,

Not prescriptive in the sense required, but a very difficult case. There is indeed a categorical distinction between MBD and FZD, and the latter may not be married. But they also have an eight section system (though in certain respects, as Warner shows, it resembles a four-section system), and marriage is thus necessarily with a genealogically bilateral cross-cousin.79

I am puzzled as to the meaning of "genealogical bilateral cross-cousin".

The "categorical distinction between MBD and FZD" and the proscript-
tion against marriage with the latter more than satisfies what my own universe of discourse will include as a case of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. I require, strictly speaking, only one further stipulation: the FaSiDa marriage proscription must be paralleled by a sexual taboo.

Warner does not specify such a taboo. However, he provides some discussion of "extra-legal sexual relations." He makes the following observations:

A man ordinarily would choose a galle /MoBroDa/ for such affairs, and a woman a due /FaSiSo/; but they do occur between momo and kaminyer, little arndi and waku, gawel and waku, and one case has been reported of momelker and dumungur. This last is very rare and has a strong taboo against it. All relationships except the above are completely taboo, and no one would any more think of such an extra-legal union than a normal man in our society would consider a liaison with his own mother.

The taboo against "all relationships except the above" will clearly include taboo against sexual relations of a man and his female DUÉ ("DUE MIELK"), FaSiDa -- as of a woman and her male GALLE ("GALLE DIRAMO") -- MoBroSo.

Having established the existence of a sexual taboo to FaSiDa (as well as a marital proscription) and the non-proscription of MoBroDa, we may proceed to examine the remaining sexual regulations. Figure 16 will assist the reader in the following discussion.

It will be noted that most of the sexual taboos to which Murngin men are subject involve women of their own exogamous moiety. The Murngin moieties are named DUA and YIRITJA. On page 113 of his
book (1964) Warner provides a table showing the distribution of kin-
terms according to moiety and subsection membership where a man
is in a given moiety. The relationships listed in the foregoing
quotation all obtain between men and women of opposite moiety from
each other. "Extra-legal" sexual relations take place only between
persons of opposite moiety. Thus, it might be argued, sexual taboos
against "all relationships except the above" are simply a function
of belonging to Ego's exogamous moiety.

However this might be, it is interesting that Ego is
not allowed to have "extra-legal" sexual relations with any women
of the opposite moiety. Nor, on the other hand, is he limited,
in these, to a GALLE MIELK (MoBroDa). The most conspicuous case
of an opposite-moiety yet sexually taboo woman is of course DUE
MIELK herself (i.e., FaSiDa). But there are several other rela-
tionships of interest to us.

In the first place, it is clear from Warner's statement
that even though there has been a liaison between a man and his MOM-
ELKER -- clearly a classificatory one -- the liaison was regarded
as wrong; normatively taboo. It will be seen in figure 16, that
MOMELKER has the genealogical statuses of MoMoMoBroDa and MoMoMo-
BroSoSo.

By elimination, we can also locate others besides MOMELKER
and DUE. Thus, for example, Warner does not include on his list
of "extra-legal" sexual relations the liaison of a man with his female
DUMUNGUR. This would be listed as a NATJIWALKER-DUMUNGUR liaison.

Nor does he list any liaisons of NATI (MoFa) and KAMINYER (DaDa).

But immediately following the above quotation Warner adds a qualifying remark:

much indignation usually is caused by a gawel-waku liaison /MoBro/SiDa/ if discovered, though several were observed. This sentiment would not be that of the injured wife or husband alone, but of the tribe generally. Men having such a relationship with waku or momelker would be called dogs and considered evil-doers even by their own people, who might be defending them at the time from the attacks of the girl's husband and relatives. The woman would almost certainly receive a severe beating and occasionally be killed.81

One final qualifying remark of importance:

All the above affairs would be with distant relatives and not the actual ones.82

In sum, then, we may include the following categories (terminological) of women of the opposite moiety from Ego as sexually taboo to him at least in terms of Murngin sentiment; DUÉ, WAKU, KAMINYER, DUMUNGUR, MOMELKER, and one more not yet mentioned, ARNDI (Mo, Mo-Mo). These categories are located in figure 16, where the attached subscript #2 indicates that they are women who are sexually taboo to Ego. The subscript #1 attaches to these women of opposite moiety whose affairs with Ego are not pictured specifically as incestuously taboo even where they are "extra-legal". No numerals are attached to the women of Ego's own moiety since they are all sexually proscribed to him. People of Ego's own moiety are indicated as the darkened figures while those of the opposite moiety are not darkened.
Figure 16
Figure 16 also shows the distribution of personnel according to section membership (capital letters). The Murngin have eight named subsections. A child belongs to the specific subsection of its father or of its mother. Yet its subsection membership is determined by its mother. A Murngin woman is prescribed in marriage to either of two subsections (as is each man). Thus, for example, a woman of subsection \(A_1\) must marry a man of either of subsections \(B_1\) or \(B_2\). Whichever the subsection of her husband, however, her children will be of subsection \(C_1\). The following diagram (from Warner, 1964, p. 109) shows the marriage and descent relations among the eight subsections.

![Diagram of Murngin Subsections](image)

**Figure 17**

Murngin Subsections

This diagram shows that the subsections are arranged into pairs designated by the same capital letter, but distinguished by numerical subscript. However, the subsections as such do not regulate Murngin marriages. Thus, a man of either of the A subsections may marry a woman of either of the B subsections, and their children will be of one of the D subsections (depending upon the B subsection of their mother).
Thus, for purposes of marriage regulation, Murngin society is dichotomized only twice, i.e., into sections. The first dichotomy is produced by the patrimoieties. Each moiety contains four subsections. These four are gathered into two subsection pairs in the sense that the marriage regulations of all members of a subsection pair are identical. Each member of the subsection pair $A_1 - A_2$ may marry into either of the subsections $B_1 - B_2$, which together form a subsection pair — section — of the opposite moiety. The children of such a marriage will be of the section $D_1 - D_2$ which is the other section of their father's moiety. Thus, Warner's diagram (Fig. 17) may be simplified to represent marriage regulation as follows (Fig. 18):

![Diagram](image)

Figure 18

Murngin Sections; these are represented by the capital letters.

In passing, we might observe that diagrams 17 and 18 may contain the source of Needham's decision that the Murngin marry a "genealogical bilateral cross-cousin". It will be noticed in Fig. 18 that, as between sections, women are exchanged in two directions (e.g. $A=B$).

This point is illustrated in the following diagram (figure 19):
In this diagram each moiety is represented as a circle. The division of each moiety into two sections is represented by the half-circles above and beneath the horizontal diameter. Each moiety is further divided into two clans by the vertical diameter. The clans are indicated by the encircled numbers \(1\) - \(4\). Thus, clan \(1\) is the left hand semicircle of moiety 1, and is divided into B and C sections by the horizontal radius. In all, there are four clans, which is the minimal required for such a structure since there must be an even number of clans, more than two to avoid direct exchange between them. Solid arrows represent the direction of bride movement between clan-section and clan-section.
The diagram shows several noteworthy consequences:

(1) two-way movement of women between moieties — obviously.
(2) two-way movement of women between sections of moieties.
(3) one-way movement of women among clans forming a completed circle; \(1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 4 \rightarrow 1\).

Thus, one-way movement of women between "whole-descent groups" — on the clan level is structurally possible in Murngin society. But this does not allay the fact that marriage could, according to the logic of classificatory terminology, still be with the classificatory (note; NOT genealogical à la Needham) bilateral cross-cousin. Figure 20 shows this consequence:

Here, Ego is the darkened triangle. Solid lines represent direct consanguineal relationships, and broken lines represent classificatory, or better, potential classificatory relationships. Ego is shown to marry, in this hypothetical situation, a woman of
the same clan as his own mother; i.e., a MoBroDa. However, she is
the actual daughter of a woman of clan 3 which belongs to the same
moiety, and perhaps the same phratry (which "group together cer­
tain clans within one moiety" ). The mother of this woman could
be regarded as a classificatory FaSi and thus Ego's wife as a
classificatory FaSiDa as well as a classificatory MoBroDa.

But the Murngin do not marry anyone they term FaSiDa.
Thus, the possible patrilateral relationship of Ego and his wife
(and surely many potential wives) is simply disregarded.

Having said this, I must add that while a model of mat­
rilateral connubium is not inconsistent with what we know of Murn­
gin social structure,there is on the other hand, no reason to be­
lieve that marriages actually or even ideologically operate in
this way. At the same time, there is no question that the Murngin
prescribe marriage to the category MoBroDa, and proscribe the
category FaSiDa. Further, the two will not be allowed, in their
view, to overlap in a single person.

Let us now pick up once more Ego's sexual regulations
vis-à-vis the various female personnel who surround him. Figure 16
indicates the section membership of these personnel by the bracketed
capital letters. In this diagram, Ego is a member of section A
and is therefore prescribed to marriage with women of section B.
The distribution of the numbers 1 and 2 among the women of opposite
moiety from Ego indicate that some of them are accessible for "extra-
legal" sexual relations while others are taboo. Some of those who are taboo are of the very section to which Ego is maritally prescribed. These include DUE', KAMINYER, DUMUNGUR, MOMEKER. At the same time he has sexual and marital access to GALLE, also of section B. Conversely, he is allowed sexual access to some (LITTLE ARNDI) but not others (WAKU) of section C, to which he is maritally proscribed.

In general, these regulations force the conclusion that, as such, sectional membership does not regulate sexual relations even where it does regulate marriage. I do think, however, that my earlier model of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage with paternal trusteeship does help considerably to shed light upon these features of Murngin society.

A basic feature of the model was that women are viewed as collected into Mo/Da lines, and Ego tends to be proscribed to all of the women of a line where he is proscribed to one of them; he treats them as sexually continuous. Thus, for example, Ego's Mo, MoMo, Si, SiDa and SiDaDa compose such a line. In diagram 16, these are the women termed respectively, ARNDI, MARI, YEPPA, WAKU, and KUTARA who compose just such a line, and are all sexually taboo to Ego. The taboos to ARNDI (mother) and YEPPA (sister) are given as intra-familial incest taboos, but what of the remainder? MARI (MoMo) and KUTARA (SiDaDa) are of Ego's own moiety. This leaves WAKU who is not of Ego's moiety. The fact that she is of the section - C - to which Ego is not maritally prescribed seems
to have no direct bearing on sexual access since Ego does have "extra-legal" affairs with LITTLE ARNDI who is also of C section. Yet, where liaisons with WAKU are concerned the Murngin, as described by Warner, view it as "a normal man in our society would consider a liaison with his own mother."

In addition, our model called for the adoption, by Ego, of his father's proscription to the line of women initiated in the mother of the latter. This line is composed of MOMO (FaMo), MOKUL BAPA (FaSi), DUE (FaSiDa), GURRONG (FaSiDaDa), and DUMUNGUR (FaSiDaDaDa). Here, MOKUL BAPA and GURRONG are of Ego's moiety, but DUE and DUMUNGUR are of opposite moiety and the prescribed section -- B. Yet he is sexually, and maritally, taboo to both.

In MOMO we encounter what appears to be our single exception to the notion of a continuous Mo/Da line. Warner observes that MOMO:

is frequently a sweetheart of his. This is of course not his father's mother, or any of her sisters of clan members, but a woman who stands in this tribal relation to him.84

The first point to note, an obvious one, is that the "sweetheart" relationship involves a very distant MOMO. Our principles, throughout, have stressed that the continuity concepts develop, for Ego, around close relationships from whence they may radiate outward to other persons classed, on the basis of descent group and sectional membership with the persons closely related. The radiation effect can be expected to weaken with social and genealogical distance.
The exception of MOMO raises one further interesting possibility. It will be noticed that the vertical line of female personnel to whom men of Ego's male line are married present a striking contrast to all other vertical lines. All except ARNDI are sexually accessible to Ego. Warner observes that "a waku often has an affair with a distant arndi. This is considered wrong, but it occurs". It is difficult to estimate the strength of such a taboo from such a remark. If my following speculation has any credence, I should not be surprised to discover considerable ambivalence concerning affairs with a distant ARNDI.

Much earlier I introduced the thought that a possible aspect of Fa/So sex-role continuity might involve the sharing of sexual privileges as well as proscriptions. The difficulty in describing such a phenomenon derives from the fact that the immediate and direct sexual privileges of a boy's father are strictly proscribed to Ego. Thus, Ego's mother and, as a rule, any of father's wives will be absolutely taboo to Ego. This, of course, is in keeping with our earlier argument that women may operate as a wedge in the relations between men which demand trust and loyalty. Thus, among the Murngin, Warner observes:

Except under rare circumstances there would be no possible chance of a son's marrying a possible mate for father, just as the opposite would not be allowed. Any woman whom Ego's father would regard as a "possible mate" to himself would be termed GALLE by the father and ARNDI by Ego. Thus, while Ego does not marry an ARNDI, he does periodically have an
affair with a distant one. While Warner does tell us that this is "considered wrong" there is a lack of emphasis in the statement that allows me to wonder just how serious such a transgression is taken to be. Again, I would be inclined to predict an ambivalent reaction from Ego's father at worst.

The cases of Ego's sexual privileges with MOMO and LITTLE ARNDI are clearer. Again, these invoke distant relatives. My present hypothesis, then, is that Ego is virtually expressing the continuity of his male line in his affairs with women of the same terminological category as the women with whom FaFa, Fa, himself, and his own son have the greatest sexual privileges. Or, to put it another way, the continuity is expressed in the low degree of negative sanction to such liaisons.

A category of sexually accessible women is determined (or defined) somewhat differently from a category of sexually taboo women. Proscription tends to spread in two ways:

(1) Sexual proscription tends to spread, mainly downward but sometimes generationally upward along a Mo/Da continuum from its point of origin in a specifically proscribed woman (e.g. own mother, own sister, SiDa, SiDaDa, etc; FaBroWi (point of origin), FaBroDa, FaBroDaDa, etc.). As this will introduce multiple generations, it may, as it does with the Murngin, introduce people (women) of several terminological categories.

(2) Sexual proscriptions tend to radiate outward from each of the women in a particular proscribed Mo/Da line. Thus, the
classificatory sisters of each of these women may be incorporated into the proscription. This may involve all of the descent group sisters of the separate women in such a line. In this kind of proscription radiation, each of the women in the line becomes a separate point of origin for the proscription of her sisters. Where this involves a variety of terms, a variety of terminological categories are introduced. Radiation of this kind tends to weaken as social (and genealogical?) distance increases away from its point of origin.

Sexual privileges (as opposed to marital prescriptions) tend to be located in the very terminological categories to which belong the women in whom proscribed lines originate ("originate" in the sense of proposition 1, above). Thus, they will be, from Ego's view, the very distant descent group sisters -- probably not even of the same clan but of a distantly related clan -- of the women with whom the men of Ego's male line (including FaFa, Fa,Ego himself, and his son) have sexual and marital privileges. These women also span a series of generations and as such may involve a number of term categories. The relations among distance, strength of disposition and point of origin are in this case the reverse of proposition 2. That is, sexual privileges weaken as the personnel of the category approach the point of origin. Among the Murngin, at least, sexual privileges vis-à-vis such a terminological category disappear entirely at the boundary of the actual clan of the point of origin of the category. Thus, for example, Ego could never have a sexual relationship with a woman termed MOMO who is also of his own FaMo clan.
To return to Murngin regulations as such I might add two points for completeness. KAMINYER (figure 16) is a sexually taboo category though she is of the prescribed section. She is of Ego's daughter's (GATU MIELK) line.

The case of MOMELKER, Ego's MoMoBroDa (figure 16) is also very interesting. Warner's remarks seem to contain the same type of viewpoint as the postulate of Mo/Da continuity:

The momelker relationships is built out of the mokul rumera /mother-in-law/ behaviour. . . . She /momelker/ is the mother of mokul rumera, the mates say; and just as one avoids a mother of one's wife, so one avoids her mother.87

Thus, the same general avoidance relationship which applies to one's mother-in-law is applied to MOMELKER because "She is the mother of mokul rumera". This amounts to an explicit statement of an attitude of Mo/Da continuity except, as I had anticipated earlier, the identification has other forms than merely sexual ones.

While we are on the subject of more generalized role-identification it is interesting, though hardly surprising, that mother's sisters and mother's mother are regarded as the most appropriate maternal surrogates.

When a mother goes away with the father for a trip to distant kins people, the older children are left with the mother's sisters, the mother's mother, or the mother's brother.88

It is important to appreciate that this phenomenon cannot be accounted for simply in terms of the interest of a clan in these children since MARI MIELK (MoMo) is neither of Ego's own or of
his mother's clan. MARI MIELK is very akin to Ego's own mother in many respects. She is quite singled out in her relationship to Ego by the following statement:

Mari mielk also occupies a position of considerable importance. She looks out for kutara /daughter's child/ when he is small. Instances of a man's having a greater affection for his mari mielk than for his own arndi were recorded several times. Mari mielk corrects the children when they are mischievous or bad mannered. Chastisement is hardly ever practiced, /nor does Arndi/ but ridicule is effectively used. 89

Several further observations should also convince the reader that Fa/So role-identification in a more general sense is of great importance in Murngin life. Consider, for example, the following:

A man prefers a son, however, because of his value in the constant tribal feuds, not only through his own assistance and the aid he brings to his relations (as, of course, the daughter does through her marriage), but also because almost the entire ceremonial life of father's clan is centered around males. A son inherits the right to perform certain dances through his father and never through his mother. By a son's initiation into the various ceremonies the father's social participation is further increased as it would not be if the child were a daughter. 90

Father is of primary importance in other ceremonial events in his son's life.

When a boy is circumcised (at from six to nine years of age), it is the father who decides the type of initiation ceremony. The other older men of the tribe confer with him as to time, place, and other arrangements. 91

Also,

The father is one of those who teach his son how to hunt, fight, and conduct himself in the best possible way in the practical affairs of life. If the father is a cere-
monial leader he instructs his son in the routine of songs, dances, and words that make up the great ceremonies. 92

One final point before we leave our analysis of Murungin kinship. I have expressed skepticism throughout that ideological prescriptions of one-way bride exchange among whole descent groups are the best way to understand the rule of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. I argued this point at some length in connexion with Purum social structure. My skepticism is more fully supported in the case of the Murungin. Warner states:

Theoretically an individual can marry into any one of the clans in the opposite moiety. 93

Thus, it would appear that even where a model calling for whole-descent group -- clan -- prescriptions is consistent with the other features of Murungin social structure (vide supra, pp. 145-147), such is simply NOT THE CASE.

The remainder of this essay will offer a series of further models based upon our principles of trusteeship and continuity. No effort will be made, however, to illustrate these as I have just done for matrilateral cross-cousin marriage with paternal trusteeship.
CHAPTER 9

Patrilateral Cross-Cousin Marriage

Analysis in terms of the general postulates would predict all around attenuation of the continuity principles as they relate specifically to the sharing by Fa and So and by Mo and Da of sexual taboos. It would predict that these situations are dominated by an over-riding principle of maternal trusteeship. Thus, a woman is the major sexual trustee of her son. Her own daughter may share in such a role to some extent, but, in view of the tendency for boys to be generally trained under the aegis of other men, much of the authority over a young man, including a role in his sexual disposition, is delegated from the mother to the mother's brother. Metaphorically speaking, a woman and her own daughter may be viewed as a single kind of "womb", alike in the sense that they produce like offspring. A boy and his MoBro derive, as it were, from the same "womb". Thus, a boy is sexually identified most with his mother's brother and is, like him, a sexual ward of the same Mo/Da dyad. Thus, male Ego shares the sexual proscriptions of his MoBro.

There is, at the same time, an attenuated recognition of Fa/So identification. They are alike as sexual objects but less so as sexual actors. Thus, ego is proscribed in the eyes of any woman to whom father is proscribed, but is equated with MoBro as a sexual actor as well as object. These principles of Fa/So vs. MoBro/SiSo continuity are, in all probability, somewhat psychologically competitive.
From female Ego's viewpoint, sexual prohibitions proper to her include those to her own son and his line (identification as objects) and to her father and his line. Thus, a woman's taboo to her own brother has a double source in the point of view of this analysis; he tends to be identified as an object with his Father, and he is the sexual ward of the girl's mother. The women of a line abstain from sexual relations with their mutual wards (sons).

In spite of the tendency for women of a line to be equated as sexual objects, especially in the sense that they are alike as life-giving wombs, there is no tendency for a girl to share the proscriptions proper to her mother.

Thus, in sum we have an attenuation of Fa/So sex-role continuity and of the corresponding Mo/Da principle. In both cases, the principles tend to be confined to equivalence as sexual objects without the sharing of taboos proper to one another. The Mo/Da identification as sexual objects assumes the particular aspect of equivalence of life-giving principles. This results in the sex-role continuity of a boy and his MoBro. A man is directly proscribed to the lines initiated in his own mother and his own daughter.

The following diagram demonstrates the consequences of these dispositions:
1) **Female Ego** is the darkened circle.

2) **Capital letters** attach to women only. They indicate lines of Mo/Da sexual identification. These women are equivalent in the double sense that sexual taboo to one means the same vis-à-vis the rest (from male Ego's viewpoint), and in the sense that they produce sexually equivalent -- continuous -- male children who are their respective sexual wards. These men have an attached

3) **Small letter** which corresponds to the capital letter of their mothers and women of their mothers' line. Such men are sexually taboo to all women bearing the same capitalized letter. A boy is sexually continuous with, i.e., shares the sexual taboos proper to his MoBro (who of course has the same small letter). On these grounds, female Ego is proscribed sexually to MoSiSo who bears a small letter a.

In this diagram, small letters attach also to women. Here they indicate a female Ego's proscription to her father and to
all men who are taboo to her by virtue of being of the same womb as father. That is, men who are the co-wards of a line of Mo/Da identification. These men, of course, bear the same small letter as father and as female Ego. This letter is first in the sequence characterizing a man, but second in the sequence characterizing a woman. On these grounds female Ego is prohibited from having sexual intercourse with her FaSiSo who is of the same line of women as her own father. Female Ego and FaSiSo, therefore, both bear the small letter b.

4) Encircled Numerals indicate the very attentuated Fa/So continuity whereby they are merely identified as sexual objects by females (except, of course, the wife of father; i.e., mother of Ego).

5) Non-encircled Numerals attaching to women indicates a woman's prohibition against a given Fa/So line whose members bear the same number encircled. This line is initiated in her incest proscription of her own father. It will be seen that female Ego is taboo to FaBroSo on this account.

6) Female Ego, finally, shares no numbers or letters with her Mo-BroSo.

The subject of patrilateral c.c. marriage was raised much earlier in this essay (pp. 34 et seq). At that time, it was observed that this marriage rule is cross-culturally far less common than the matrilateral form. One of the factors in this pheno-
menon could well be that situations of pronounced maternal trusteeship are relatively rare, especially where it is sufficiently pronounced so that, along with the sexual equivalence of Mo/Da as maternal principles, it causes a sex-role continuity of Ego and MoBro to the point of its competing with a Fa/So sex role continuity. Where such a situation does arise, I would anticipate that the rule of descent will parallel the direction of trusteeship, i.e., matrilineal descent. The cases collected by Homans and Schneider do, indeed, prove to be mostly ones of matrilineal descent.

Furthermore, I suggest that the latent tendency to Fa/So sex-role continuity would at the first opportunity become vitalized to the point where such systems would change to ones in which all near cousins are proscribed (Fa/So sex-role continuity superimposed upon the above situation would cause proscription of FaSiDa as well). I am not afraid to admit that, in this argument, I am assuming that there is something more "natural" about Fa/So continuity than MoBro/SiSo continuity.
CONCLUSIONS

Only the major themes of the essay will be reviewed here. Section I considers Needham's view that unilateral c.c. marriage could only be adequately analysed in terms of the relationships among explicit whole descent groups. My concern was to show that, to the contrary, it will not offend common sense to discover the causes of norm systems in dispositional orientations of the collection of human individuals who compose a society. The theory developed in Section II is essentially of this order.

Some of the main issues were:
(1) Needham's use of the concept of marital prescription (as opposed to preference) denotes an ideological social system in which kin-terms are distributed among the persons surrounding Ego in strict accordance with the explicit descent groupings to which these persons belong vis-à-vis Ego's own descent group. This is a necessary structural condition of idealized one-way bride exchange between descent groups. The resulting system of unilateral connubium is then explained in terms of the laws of reciprocity, the relative statuses of the various groups being one of the key balancing elements in the exchange system.

Needham's distinction implies that prescriptive and preferential rules of marriage are, in some ultimate sense, quite different phenomena demanding different explanations. This of course begs the question. When and if a theory is brought forth
which, unlike Needham's, is able to accommodate both types of rule they will no longer be regarded as inherently different phenomena. Homans and Schneider attempted such a theory. It is one thing to criticize the specific contents of their argument and quite another to pre-emptively assert as Needham has done that a theory such as theirs is in error even before it is begun. As far as I am concerned, other things being equal, the greater cross-cultural scope of such a theory is sufficient to make it a more valuable one.

The model proposed in this essay is an attempt to accommodate both types of rule; its potential cross-cultural range is therefore substantially wider than that of the exchange model.

(2) The internal logic of the exchange model was examined. In chapter 3 I proposed that an explanatory model is simply a sequence of propositions arranged deductively so as to terminate in a summary statement of the problem norm. As Needham has himself written the exchange model does not appear to provide an explanation of the phenomenon of matrilateral c.c. marriage. His argument suggests rather that given a prescriptive rule of matrilateral c.c. marriage, a one-way bride movement between descent groups is logically implied. The converse of this argument does not follow as directly (see Salisbury, 1956).

Thus, since Needham does not wish to argue that the marriage rule per se is to be understood as a teleological mechanism for perpetuating a system of unilateral connubium, I have concluded
that his argument employs the marriage rule in the position of a premise rather than as its conclusion. If this is correct, Needham's is not a theory of matrilateral c.c. marriage.

However, I have pointed out that a somewhat different interpretation of the Needham model is possible. Given an expressed ideology which amounts to in perpetuum descent group unilateral connubium, a male Ego will find only matrilateral cross-cousins in the proscribed descent groups and only patrilateral ones in the prohibited groups. But do we find expressed ideologies of unilateral connubium?

(3) Certain Purum norms suggest a system of inter-sib unilateral connubium. At the same time, specific data concerning the idealized basis of terminological identification of members of various descent groups (sibs) by the members of other ones appear to contradict the model of inter-sib unilateral connubium. I have suggested that these contradictions disappear if we understand the sib-regulations to apply to the members of de facto socially close groupings -- smaller in scale certainly than the idealized groupings, sibs or lineages. From this point of view each Purum Ego belongs to a reference set of socially important kin through whom links to the various sibs are traced and the membership of each terminologically identified. This reference group is smaller (among the Purum) than are the groups (sibs) with which it exchanges women. The exchange model, to the contrary, requires that the relevant groupings be structurally equivalent (in size range, composition and especially as ideological units).
Thus, the interpretation of Purum data offered in this essay precludes Needham's mechanical model. I am not satisfied that the data allow us to accept even an implicit ideology of unilateral connubium among normative whole descent groups. At the same time, a tendency toward \textit{de facto} one-way bride movement among sub-lineage reference groups must exist. The location of such reference groups must proceed without the aid of the Purum ideal descent group categories. Here, Leach's concept of local descent groups may prove helpful.

More generally, however, the nature of the important reference groups must be treated as a cross-cultural variable as well as subject to flux through time within a culture. This approach injects a distinctly statistical element into our model building. It argues that we have not fully comprehended the normative structure of a society until we understand how the norms may be accommodated to a wide range of \textit{de facto}, and changeable, social conditions. Purely mechanical models on the other hand cannot accommodate themselves to conditions of social change since they are confined to handling explicit ideologies.

Ideologies are by their nature ambiguous. As such they can endure effectively in the face of \textit{de facto} social change. Thus, for example, in the face of significant alteration in the composition (and functions) of the corporate structural units of a society, a man may well employ new criteria in the distribution of kin term categories. Yet the rules of marriage, such as a
matrilateral c.c. prescription, can endure, nor need they become a mere vestige.

Precisely this consideration allows us now to avoid explaining away, as deviant cases, the many actual Purum marriages which fail to conform to Needham's model. They are indeed deviations from Needham's ideal, but there is no evidence that the Purum themselves feel the same way.

(4) The matrilateral c.c. marriage rule is therefore treated as analytically independent of the idealized whole descent group structuring of the societies involved. In seeking to explain the marriage rule our unit became human individuals embedded within a set of basic role-relations with other people of great direct significance in their lives. The primacy of Ego's relations with his actual father, mother, siblings, and (to a lesser extent) his grandparents is purported to be universal to the societies being studied. Given this assumption, my purpose has been to delineate certain cross-cultural regularities characteristic of this set of role relations. The explicit unilateral c.c. marriage rules are then deduced from the regularities, which I termed principles. These are concerned with a process of role-continuity obtaining between specific personnel of adjacent generations. The major focus of this process concerns the expression of personal social identity through the particular allocation of one's sexual privileges and prohibitions.
(5) To be sure, this approach may invite an accusation of psychological reductionism. My analysis is not at all concerned with the dimensions of personality theory but the accusation would be correct in the sense that I am basically interested in the formulation of theoretical propositions which employ human beings as their subject element and which predicate to them generalized behavioural dispositions. I regard Marcel Mauss's concept of reciprocity as just such a theory. In other words, the exchange theories, being profoundly dependent upon the concept of reciprocity, are as much psychological as my own.

It was observed that a dispositional analysis is not tantamount to role analysis since the latter is composed by and large of explicit cultural norms. Explicit norms are the anthropologist's problems, not his explanations. Explanation involves the activity, on the anthropologist's part, of creative invention. He invents statements which his informants themselves do not make. In this sense, most explanatory models are unconscious models.

(6) These views have certain methodological implications. Particular explanatory models are a sequence of propositions which move deductively from their theoretical dispositional statements to the problem norm being considered. Yet, in my view, the primary object of the social sciences is to discover and lend support to the theoretical statements themselves. The verification process has two logical phases.
Firstly, the problem norm occurs in particular spatially and temporally localized situations. A theory of such a norm must be believable in the context in which the norm appears. Thus, we attempt to show that features of the expressed culture other than the problem norm of our initial model can likewise be deduced from our theoretical statements. This verification process is itself sufficient to generate the holistic orientation which has dominated Anthropology. It also justifies, for me, the necessity of impressionistic ethnography as a stage prior to the development of a sharply defined problem approach.

Secondly, the cross-cultural duplication of such intra-cultural verification strengthens our confidence that our theory has credence in each particular instance of its use. Finally, it encourages us to seek out new kinds of situations in which such dispositions may be manifest.
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