

THE ATTITUDES AND POLICIES
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
TOWARDS CANADA'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES:
1870 - 1930

by

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ABSTRACT

In the year 1967 the Northwest Territories extend from the 60th parallel of north latitude to the North Pole, and from the eastern boundary of the Yukon Territory to the eastern shores of Ellesmere Island, to within sight of the Danish colony of Greenland. Since 1912 the perimeters of the Territories have remained unchanged. This thesis is an attempt to ascertain the origins of the Northwest Territories as they are presently constituted. It enquires into the reasons for which and the manner by which the Dominion of Canada acquired such a vast extent of arctic and sub-arctic land. It attempts to explain the origin of Canadian concepts and practices of territorial government and how they were applied, or not applied, to the northern extremities of the country.

One of the principal expectations of the Confederation of 1867 was the expansion of the new Dominion over the whole of the interior of British North America. Canada consciously aspired to become a transcontinental state; she became the second largest arctic state on the globe unwittingly. From the moment of her national birth Canada intended to extend herself to the Pacific Ocean and forestall the expansion of the United States of America north of the 49th parallel. Canadians, particularly in the Province of Ontario, wanted to secure the fertile plains between the Rocky Mountains and the Great Lakes in order

to provide space for the expansion of their own surplus population, for an increase in agricultural production and a market for eastern manufactures.

In 1870 Canada took possession of Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory in the hope of attaining these objectives. However neither the people nor the government of Canada had any interest in or knowledge of those regions of the Dominion's territorial acquisition lying north of the Great Plains. Canada made no provision for its immediate control or for its future development. The Dominion took title to the northern extremities of the North American continent simply because they came to her already united with the transcontinental band of land which she did want. She was content to own them, and to ignore them. Sixty years elapsed before Canada's title to the islands of the arctic archipelago secured international recognition from rival states. Indeed Canada only obtained ownership of those islands because she feared foreign encirclement, particularly encirclement by the United States of America, and when threatened made belated efforts to secure them for herself.

Between the years 1870 and 1905 the prairie regions of the original Northwest Territories experienced rapid settlement, and evolved through a Canadian form of territorial government to become the two provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta. In outward form Canadian territorial government was much influenced

by the example of territorial government in the United States, but in essential spirit Canadian policy towards the Northwest Territories remained close to the model of British colonial government. It was authoritarian and centralized. The federal government retained tight control over every aspect of territorial administration. Ottawa distrusted local elected representatives and reserved to herself supervision of regional law-making. The Northwest Territories long remained virtual colonies of the Government of Canada, in fact if not in name.

Until the sudden eruption of the Klondike Gold Rush in the years 1897-98, Canada gave no thought to the organization of territories lying north of the Great Plains. She believed that the north could wait, at least until the prairies were settled and fully developed. The Yukon upset the schedule of national priorities. In the new Yukon Territory an arbitrary "colonial" government was established under the strict and direct supervision of Ottawa. Eventually the "safety value" of an elected council was installed, but the federal government still retained complete control of administration and the management of all natural resources. It has continued to do so until 1967. Once the problems of the Yukon had been controlled, the Territory could safely be left to languish into a derelict mining camp, for the federal government still had no interest in the development of permanent settlements north of the 60th parallel. It might

only regret that the Yukon had not declined into oblivion, so that an expensive territorial government might be abolished completely.

After the establishment of the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1905 and the northward extension of the boundaries of Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec in 1912, Canada was content to permit the residual Northwest Territories to remain a deserted and forgotten national attic. The government might be striving to extend that attic to the North Pole, but it had no intention of furnishing it with meaningful government if the expense could be avoided.

No agent of government could be found permanently stationed anywhere in the Northwest Territories until the North West Mounted Police entered them in 1903, and no civil government was established north of the 60th parallel until 1921. In that year the Department of the Interior opened its first offices in the Mackenzie valley in expectation of an Oil Rush which might rival the Klondike Gold Rush. No Oil Rush occurred.

Nevertheless the foundation stones of civil government in the Northwest Territories were laid in 1921 when a territorial council modeled on the Keewatin Council of 1876 was conjured into reality after sixteen years of only theoretical existence. Laws suitable for the north could at last be made. The Northwest

Territories was at last equipped to set sail on the course on which it has continued to the present day, albeit often becalmed, occasionally beset by storms, and usually uncertain of its eventual destination. In September 1967 the territorial capital moved from Ottawa, Ontario to the mining town of Yellowknife on the northern shore of Great Slave Lake. A new era seems to be dawning for the residual Territories which now have reached the constitutional position of the "old" Northwest Territories between 1882 and 1888. If greater territorial autonomy seems likely to be gained in the future, it still remains likely that the influence of 97 years of federal attitudes and policies towards the northern territories will be felt for many years yet to come.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	i
Chapter I	1
II	29
III	47
IV	72
V	115
VI	138
NOTES	
BIBLIOGRAPHY	

MAPS

1. The Geographical Regions of Canada.....
2. Rupert's Land, 1857.
3. The Hudson's Bay Company's District Boundaries, 1832.
4. The Major Political Boundaries of Canada, 1867 - 1905.
5. Territorial and Intra-Territorial Boundaries, 1870 - 1898.
6. The Evolution of the Boundaries of Keewatin.
7. Explorations of Capt. Otto Svedrup, 1898 - 1902.

MAP I




Figure 22. The geographical regions of Canada (after Hewelcke).

MAP II




Figure 7. The extent of the territory of the Hudson's Bay Company according to a map by J. Arrowsmith, published in 1857.

MAP III




Figure 16. The Hudson's Bay Company's district boundaries according to a map by J. Arrowsmith, published in 1832.

MAP IV




Figure 10. The major political boundaries of Canada, 1867-1905.

MAP V




Figure 19. Territorial and intra-territorial boundaries, 1870-1898.

MAP VI




Figure 18. The evolution of the boundaries of Keewatin.

MAP VII




Figure 24. Capt. Otto Sverdrup, 1898-1902.

CHAPTER 1.

THE NORTHWESTWARD EXPANSION OF THE DOMINION

On July 15th 1870 the Dominion of Canada took official possession of the vast and remote areas of British North America hitherto known as Rupert's Land and the Northwestern Territory. The original small Confederation of 1867, confined to the valley of the St. Lawrence River and the Atlantic coasts, and comprising Upper and Lower Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, suddenly threw out its boundaries far to the north and west. From an area of 384,598 square miles Canada immediately increased her domain over seven-fold, to the enormous total of 2,988,909 square miles. (1) From the head of Lake Superior Canada stretched along the 49th Parallel to the Rocky Mountains, and around the boundaries of the Colony of British Columbia to the borders of Alaska; from the St. Lawrence basin she extended herself to the shores of James Bay, Hudson Bay, Hudson Strait, and the vaguely defined coasts of the Arctic Ocean. In one step the infant Dominion became quickly and easily the largest state in North America. She also became the second largest owner of Arctic land in the world, exceeded on this count only by Imperial Russia.

This territorial acquisition, this national expansion worthy of a Caesar's dreams, was an intended result of Confederation. Provision for it had been written into the British North America Act of 1867. Section 146 of that statute reads in part:

It shall be lawful for the Queen by and with the advice of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council... and on address from the Houses of the Parliament of Canada, to admit Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory, or either of them, into the Union, and on such Terms and Conditions in each Case as are in the Addresses expressed and as the Queen thinks fit to approve, subject to the Provision of this Act. (2)

This paragraph, so brief and bald, and so uninformative, was nevertheless one of the most significant, or potentially significant, clauses in the British North America Act. For if the greater part of the Act dealt with the details of constructing a federal system of government by devising a way out of the political and economic deadlock or cul-de-sacs in which the colonies of British North America found themselves in the 1860's, Section 146 contained the most ambitious hopes and opportunities for the new Confederation. Section 146 looked entirely to the future while the other clauses kept at least one eye on the past. Section 146 contained the succinct promise that Canada might become, and almost certainly would become, a trans-continental state of major proportions, rather than a mere collection of united but small colonies on the western shore of the Atlantic Ocean. This single paragraph

virtually designated that Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory were the young Dominion's rightful inheritance by law.

Together Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory included almost all of British North America either not united in Confederation or belonging to colonies remaining outside of the union. Rupert's Land consisted of all the lands over which the Hudson's Bay Company held proprietorship by right of the venerable Royal Charter of the 2nd May 1670: namely the entire watershed of all the rivers and streams falling into Hudson Strait, Hudson Bay and James Bay. This domain stretched from Cape Chidley at the north-eastern tip of the Labrador peninsula to the foothills of the Rocky Mountains. However those extremities of the drainage basin lying south of the 49th Parallel, notably the Red River valley, had been acquired by the United States of America as a result of the British-American convention respecting boundaries and fisheries, signed in 1818. (3)

"The North-western Territory" comprised the remaining portions of the interior of British North America; all those regions not drained by waterways falling into Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait. It included the remotest extremities of the continent which lay quite literally "north-west" of Rupert's Land: the Barren Lands, the Mackenzie River basin, and the upper portions of the Yukon River system.

Since 1821 the Hudson's Bay Company had exercised complete control over both Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory, administering both areas as parts of the one commercial monopoly. In practice there was no division and no difference between the two. On maps and in correspondence the name "North-western Territory" was rarely if ever employed. More frequently it was designated the "Licenced Territory" or occasionally "Indian Territory." Even an official cartographer of the Hudson's Bay Company, like Arrowsmith, only indicated the approximate limits of Rupert's Land, and left the regions to the north and west without a general name. Only the boundaries and the names of the Company's administrative districts were inscribed.

Before the union of the Hudson's Bay Company and the Montreal based North West Company in 1821, the "North West" as a geographical description, had covered a large and imprecise territory. It could mean, in Canadian terms, any frontier region lying north-west of the "old" Canada along the St. Lawrence river valley; and somewhat more specifically it could mean the wilderness lying beyond the Rupert's Land over which the Hudson's Bay Company had long held monopoly rights.

In 1821 the British Parliament passed an "Act for regulating the Fur Trade and establishing a Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction within certain parts of North America"; a statute

which would in effect maintain the monopoly of the new united Company over the whole northern interior of the continent. Thanks to the influence of Edward "Bear" Ellice, a Member of Parliament as well as a Director of the Hudson's Bay Company, the distinction was made between Rupert's Land, as defined in the Charter of 1670, and the regions of British North America lying beyond the original grant. The distinction was made in order to preserve the Chartered rights of the Honourable Company from any alteration or diminution. (4) It possessed only legal significance.

During the years following the union of the Hudson's Bay and the North West companies the differentiation between Rupert's Land and the North Western Territory gradually faded, and the interior of British North America was most frequently referred to as "The Hudson's Bay Company's Territory". (5) Then in the fourth draft of the British North America Act of 1867 a distinction was suddenly made between the "North-West" or "North-Western Territory" and Rupert's Land. In previous drafts one word had been used to describe the whole area. Evidently this change of wording was a stratagem of William McDougall, the leading advocate of western expansion attending the London Conference, in order,

...to give recognition to the Canadian contention that there was an area separate from the Hudson's Bay Company domain which, if not already Canada's by virtue of French exploration, and occupation, was at least not legally possessed by the Company. (6)

The claim, both pretentious and fragile, was advanced more in the hope of saving Canada's treasury from paying the Hudson's Bay Company a cent more than necessary than on grounds of legal or historical validity. By 1865 the name "North-Western Territory" possessed only legal meaning according to the convenience of either the Hudson's Bay Company or the Government of Canada. The boundaries between Rupert's Land and the North-Western or Licenced Territories were never defined, and in fact knowledge of the remoter parts of both areas was almost non-existent.

For a considerable number of years before the passage of the British North America Act of 1867, covetous Canadian eyes had been gazing at the continental interior ruled by the Hudson's Bay Company. Canada West, and most notably the city of Toronto jealously regarded the ancient monopoly of the Honourable Company. And in Toronto the leading apostle of westward expansion was the redoubtable George Brown, editor-proprietor of the most influential journal in the province, the Globe, as well as being a leader of the Reform Party. Brown's interest in the North-West, and his complementary hostility to the Hudson's Bay Company, were both fed by former residents of Rupert's Land and disgruntled former employees of the Hudson's Bay Company; men such as Alexander Isbister, Captain William Kennedy, and John McLean. (7)

Brown's personal interest in the North-West was first aroused as early as 1847, and thereafter was reflected in the Globe on increasingly frequent occasions. As early as 1850 the Globe launched an editorial attack on the validity of the Hudson's Bay Company charter; "It is unpardonable that civilization should be excluded from half a continent on at best a doubtful right of ownership". (8) After 1855 the Globe made Canadian expansion to the west of the Great Lakes a major public issue, to be advocated with compounding frequency and enthusiasm.

The issue of Canadian expansion into the North-West met a surprisingly swift public acceptance, at least in the Ontario peninsula. Not only was George Brown a persuasive advocate but local conditions encouraged such ambitions, and the time was opportune in respect to the position of the Hudson's Bay Company. As far as Canada West was concerned, a Canadian North-West could offer some hope to almost everybody. In 1855 the Globe itself had reported the auctioning of the last block of wild land left in the Upper Canadian peninsula. The agricultural frontier of the Province of Canada was disappearing; farmers had pushed to the outer limits of arable land. Settlers desiring new land would in future have to look elsewhere. Where else could they move in British North America but west of the Great Lakes, onto the interior plains rumoured to be so fertile. The prospering business community of Toronto and other Canadian towns was in a

Justifiably optimistic and "bullish" mood; it wanted, and it would soon need, larger markets and greater sources of supply. Entrepreneurs could see the possibility of developing profitable transportation routes to the North-West, and perhaps even onward to the Pacific. There was even talk of reviving a Toronto-based North-West Fur Company, along the lines of the famous Montreal corporation that had once closely linked the St. Lawrence Valley with the interior of the continent.

Then the licence granted to the Hudson's Bay Company for a period of twenty-one years of exclusive trade in the parts of British North America lying beyond Rupert's Land was due to expire in 1859. Would the British Government renew that licence? In 1857 the House of Commons struck a Select Committee to investigate the conduct and the situation of the Hudson's Bay Company. The moment seemed propitious for Canada to express her interest and advance her claims in the region. A Canadian representative, Chief Justice Draper, was despatched to Westminster. His instructions were not of the most precise nature, for although the Chief Justice was told to stand "four-square" on Canada's rights, those rights remained unspecified. (9)

After questioning many expert witnesses at length the Select Committee decided that in order to meet "the just and reasonable wishes of Canada" it was essential to annex the

lands neighbouring Canada for purposes of settlement. The Committee considered that "...the districts on the Red River and the Saskatchewan are among those likely to be desired for early occupation", and trusted that their transfer from the Hudson's Bay Company might be arranged without difficulty. (10)

From that day onward it must have seemed to all interested parties that the intended destiny of the whole interior of British North America was union with the Province of Canada. It would only be a matter of time, especially time for negotiation with the Hudson's Bay Company, before this would come about. How difficult and how prolonged those negotiations might be only the future would tell.

The Select Committee considered the possibility of establishing Crown Colonies in the western interior of North America, as well as a Union of the Honourable Company's domain with Canada. But Rupert's Land was empty, remote and extremely difficult of access from London. New Crown colonies on the Great Plains seemed to be an awkward and an unsatisfactory proposal, although it might have been a feasible necessity if Canada were not willing to expand westward.

Plainly the advantage of the situation lay with Canada. Only the technicalities of the transfer remained to be arranged; then central British North America would belong to

the old Province, or perhaps to a new Dominion of Canada. And surely it would not be hard to kill the monopoly of the Hudson's Bay Company, then approaching its two-hundredth anniversary, a commercial anachronism surviving from the reign of Charles II, and this in the year that the even more venerable, and more powerful East India Company was meeting its final dissolution. The government of Great Britain was falling into the hands of "little Englanders", the old faith in Empire was vanishing, while some parts of ^{British} North America were experiencing the first thrills of a new faith called "Manifest Destiny". It was the middle of the nineteenth century, and faith in Progress and the Future seemed universal.

Even an old Upper Canadian conservative like Chief Justice Draper declared his faith in the continental destinies of Canada to the Select Committee.

I hope you will not laugh at me as very visionary, but I hope to see the time, or that my children may live to see the time when there is a railway going all across that country and ending at the Pacific; and so far as individual opinion goes, I entertain no doubt that the time will arrive when that will be accomplished. (11)

But once the signals had been raised to indicate a possible westward expansion of Canada, it began to become apparent that not all Canadians shared the enthusiasm of Brown and his Canada West followers for such an event. French Canada, for example, was alarmingly cool to the proposal. Then French

Canadians had little to gain but much to lose from the extension of Upper Canada to the westward of the Great Lakes. Any increase in the numbers, the wealth and the physical dimensions of English-speaking Canada would only reduce the power and relative significance of French Canada within the context of the United Province of Canada. To permit an extension of Canada West might prove to be the signing of an eventual death-warrant for the French in North America. They would be submerged in a human ocean of English-speaking Canadians. (11A)

Then many English-speaking Canadians, especially conservative politicians, were hesitant about taking the responsibility of so vast and remote a wilderness. To them Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory combined, appeared to be far too large and awkward inheritance to be taken on the shoulders of any government backed only by the population and resources of the Province of Canada. Canada had expenses and problems enough without taking over the interior of British North America. In contrast to the aggressive optimism of George Brown and the Reformers, who had made the acquisition of the North West a plank in their political platform, was John A. Macdonald, already a much experienced leader of the Conservative party.

I would be quite willing, personally, to leave that whole country a wilderness for the next half-century, but I fear if Englishmen do not go there, Yankees will..... (12)

A much more strenuous critic of western expansion was Joseph Howe of Nova Scotia, who was of course an even more violent opponent of the whole scheme of Confederation. Howe thought that the Imperial Government should undertake the establishment of Crown Colonies in the Hudson's Bay Territories. Transfer from Hudson's Bay Company proprietorship to Canadian control would only be to change from one description of thralldom to another. "If it (the North-West) is to be ruled and governed by a distant authority, it does not much matter whether the seat of government is in London or in Ottawa." (13)

Above all things, do not let it be annexed to Canada, to weaken that Province by another thousand miles of frontier, and to multiply her perplexities an hundred fold. Fancy a country in Europe as large as England, France and Prussia, with only eight people to the square mile, and a debt of \$25 per head, wanting to purchase another country as large as Russia, and then guage if you can the measure of scorn and ridicule with which the proposition would be received. (14)

Fundamentally, the attitudes of John A. Macdonald and Joseph Howe were not far apart, only Macdonald, under the threat of the intrusion of the United States north of the 49th parallel, was willing to gamble on Canada's abilities to hold the continental interior.

Macdonald, however, was bound by political necessity if not by personal enthusiasm, to the Canadian acquisition of Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory. In 1864 George Brown and the Reformers joined the "Great Coalition" ministry which devised and piloted into harbour the scheme of Confederation. Since 1859 the Reformers had made Canadian expansion onto the prairies one of their principal political objectives. They now brought this "North-West" plank into the Coalition cabinet, and successfully proceeded to dovetail it into the framework of the proposed federal union of British North America. There it remained, an example of the political bargaining that made the Great Coalition, and Confederation itself, possible.

The most convincing argument for a Canadian North-West, at least for the reluctant, like Macdonald, was the influence of the United States of America. "The Yankees" were the remorseless spur, the deciding factor. Ever since the Oregon Boundary dispute the example of American expansion had been a latent threat to the interior wilderness of British North America. In 1857 Chief Justice Draper had told the Select Committee that unless the Hudson's Bay Territories were soon placed under an efficient government of some sort, Canadians entertained,

...a very serious apprehension that if something is not done that territory will in some way or another cease to be British Territory. (15)

By 1865 the American menace was much greater. The population of the State of Minnesota, which lay immediately to the south of the Red River Settlement, and on the most direct overland route to it, leapt from 6,000 in 1850, to 172,000 in 1860, to 439,706 in 1870. Further to the west North Dakota claimed a population of 2,405, while Montana could boast of 20,595 residents. (16) Furthermore in St. Paul, the capitol of the State of Minnesota, a noticeably vocal and aggressive party was urging on the federal government of the United States to take the necessary steps to ensure that the Hudson's Bay Territories would soon be annexed to the Republic.(17) Plainly, if Canada did not act to secure her expectations she might lose them altogether, to the enterprising "Yankees". And as the Globe editorialized in 1864,

Cooped up as Canada is between lake, river and the frozen north, should all the rest of the continent fall into the possession of the Americans, she will become of the smallest importance. (18)

One of the primary intentions of the British North America Act, and particularly of Section 146, was to prevent the northward extension of the United States, and to secure the 49th Parallel as the southern boundary of the new Dominion. Some Yankees saw the Statute in the same light, and some highly placed officers of state quickly mounted a reply.

Queen Victoria signed the British North America Act on March 29, 1867: in Washington D.C., on March 30, 1867, the

Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Russian Ambassador signed an agreement for the purchase of Russian America by the United States. Alaska was no longer a distant outpost of a troubled despotism, ruled remotely from the shores of the Baltic Sea, but a newly purchased northern frontier of an aggressive North American republic. Before Confederation could become a reality, or the new Dominion take the first steps to acquire the interior of the continent promised to her, the United States was out-flanking her inheritance. In the Senate chamber Charles Sumner declared that the Alaska purchase was, "a visible step in the occupation of the whole North American continent". (19) And the British Minister in Washington regarded the step as a strategic manoeuvre in attempting to bring into the Union all the territories between Alaska and the continental United States. He was only repeating arguments advanced in several American newspapers.

According to P.B. Waite's analysis, Canadian newspapers remained indifferent to the Alaska purchase, the Montreal Gazette remarking that the United States were welcome to Alaska, and, surprisingly, the Toronto Globe ignoring the transaction. Only Alexander Galt among Canadian public men, appears to have been aware of, or expressed any concern about the potential significance of the American move. At Lennoxville in the

Eastern Townships Galt described the Alaska Purchase as the American answer to Confederation, an answer that could not be ignored.

If the United States desire to outflank us on the West, we must lay our hand on British Columbia and the Pacific Ocean. This country cannot be surrounded by the United States - we are gone if we allow it.... We must have our back to the North. (20)

The single last sentence, "We must have our back to the North" was to prove time and again the fundamental source of Canada's attitudes and policies towards her northern territories. Galt was correct in his appreciation of the long-term significance of Alaska in relation to Canada. Fortunately for the Dominion the American government ignored Alaska almost completely once the purchase had been completed, and it received little more benefit of government than the adjacent Canadian territories did.

Extraordinarily little consideration seems to have been given by any Canadian to a comprehensive and detailed appreciation of the nature and consequences of taking title to Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory. Not even the initiators of westward expansion appear to have spared a thought for any area but the reputedly fertile regions on the prairies, most notably the valleys of the Red and the Saskatchewan rivers. The enthusiasts envisioned a narrow strip of easily settled land running not far north of the United States' border; they thought of peopling it, expanding their

markets and their sources of supply; they thought of such a fertile belt as constructing a barrier against the northern expansion of the United States and providing a transportation route to the Pacific, perhaps a transcontinental railway, such as Chief Justice Draper had projected in 1857. Hardly a flicker of recognition was given to the existence of any territory lying north of the plains.

Even to George Brown, the Globe and the Reformers, acquisition of the North-West appears to have meant the complete removal of the chartered rights of the Hudson's Bay Company in North America, the settlement of the prairies, preferably by Ontario farmers, and the establishment of a communication route to the Pacific coast. The forests north of the prairies, the barren lands, the Labrador peninsula, the hinterland of James Bay, the Mackenzie basin and the upper reaches of the Yukon basin, were simply not noticed. When Canada bought or took title to Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory, she took the whole although she only desired a fraction of their total extent. Furthermore she took the whole without any knowledge or interest in the greater part of the vast acquisition.

During the Confederation Debates of 1865 the only mention of any part of the North-West, apart from the fertile regions and the strategic belt of land running north of the 49th Parallel, was contained in some rather vague oratorical

allusions made by a pair of Members. Repeating a lecture he had delivered in 1859, Alexander Morris declaimed about great new British Empire of the North;

...that new English-speaking nation which will at one and no distant day people all this northern continent - a Russia, as has been well said, it may be, but yet an English Russia, with free institutions... with its face to the south and its back to the pole, with its right and left resting on the Atlantic and Pacific, and with the telegraph and the iron road connecting the two oceans? (21)

A member from Canada East, an opponent of Confederation, Joseph E. Perrault, also remarked,

The intention of the Confederation scheme, we are told by the Ministry, is the formation of a vast Empire, bounded by the Pacific ocean on one side, on the other by the Atlantic ocean, and on the south by the American Union, while on the north it would extend to the Pole, leaving Russian America on the West. (22)

These are the only two references to the northern extremities of the interior of British North America made in the whole lengthy examination of the Confederation proposals, and only worth quoting because of their rarity and illuminating casualness. Presumably there was a general assumption among Canadian public men, that the new Dominion would extend "to the Pole", to the effective ends of the earth, in such a way that Canada would be incapable of encirclement. No state could occupy land to the north of Canada, in order to sandwich her, so to speak, in the middle of North America. No statesman paid any more attention to the land north of the fertile plains than the average buyer of city real estate would pay to his legal rights

to the air space above and the mineral rights below the surface of his purchase.

In 1868 one Canadian authority, A.J. Russell, an official in the Crown Lands Office, did publish his estimate of the value to Canada of the Hudson's Bay and North-West territories. Of greatest importance he placed the central prairie country, the Red, Peace, Saskatchewan and Athabasca rivers. Second came the South Hudson's Bay Company Territory, up to the line of latitude 52°30', from a little above the mouth of the Albany River on Hudson Bay across to Lake Winnipeg, which had a considerable agricultural potential, although much less than that of the central prairies. Third in relative value Mr. Russell placed the "Pelly River, or Mountain Country", the region of the present Yukon Territory, for the upper Yukon River was still known as the Pelly River in 1868. This remote frontier would be valuable for reasons of defence.

Were it in the hands of a power owning the seaboard, with strong passes through it, our central prairie country would be exposed to being, at any time, suddenly overrun. (23)

The remainder of Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory he considered of little value. But in his estimate of the strategic significance of the Yukon frontier to Canada, Russell was several generations ahead of his time in foresight.

The first years of Confederation saw the new federal government taking steps to fulfill the promise of Section 146

of the British North America Act. After protracted negotiations with the Hudson's Bay Company and the British Government, and delays caused by the need to raise monies for the required payments to the Honourable Company, the way was finally cleared for Canada to take possession of Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory in December 1869. In anticipation of this event the Canadian Parliament passed "An Act for the temporary Government of Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory when united with Canada", to which assent was given on June 22nd, 1869. The Act passed through all stages in both Houses of Parliament without debate. It soon became important for what it did not contain rather than for what it did; for unfortunately it epitomized many of the attitudes that so swiftly led to the troubles in the Red River Settlement; attitudes which continued to be held by Ottawa towards the northern frontier long after the Red River settlement had been pacified.

No legislation could have been more inadequate than the Temporary Government Act of 1869 to meet the needs of so huge an area as the North West Territories. Its provisions were minimal. In a preamble and seven brief clauses it gave the name "North-West Territories" to the whole area, made provision for the appointment of a Lieutenant Governor and a Council of not less than seven members and not more than fifteen, and otherwise continued temporarily the existing governing regime

of the Hudson's Bay Company. All offices, and all office-holders were to remain undisturbed at least "until the next session of Parliament". (24) As the Prime Minister explained the following year;

It was passed simply for the purpose of having something like an organization ready, something like the rudiments of a Government, from the time the Territory was admitted into the Dominion, it being understood that the Act should continue in force only until the end of the present session of Parliament.... The government felt they were not in a position from acquaintance with the circumstances of the country and wants of its people, to settle anything like a fixed constitution upon the Territory. (25)

But ignorance and uncertainty are rarely adequate excuses for government action, or inaction, and especially so in this case. A dozen years had elapsed since the Government of the Province of Canada, of which Macdonald himself had been a member, had declared its ambition to take over the North-West by sending Chief Justice Draper to represent its interests before the Select Committee of 1857. Two years had passed since the British North America Act proclaimed Canada's territorial pretensions. Any government of the Dominion, a Dominion ambitious to become a transcontinental state, should have made itself familiar with the conditions, and with the desires of the population of the vast continental interior.

The inadequacy of the Temporary Government Act, the obscurity of the federal government's intentions, the economic, religious and cultural fears of the predominantly metis

population centered around the forks of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers, all contributed the combustibles that ignited into the Riel Rebellion of 1869-70. The rebellion delayed the union of the North-West with Canada until the summer of 1870, changed the course of the development of the plains fundamentally, and provoked the most unfortunate and long-lived reactions in the eastern provinces of the Dominion.

But the first Riel Rebellion did force the Canadian Government to make a rapid acquaintance with the North-West, with "the circumstances of the country and the wants of its people". This enforced study soon bore fruit in the form of the Manitoba Act of 1870.

The Manitoba Act was a statute mothered by expediency rather than by a newly formulated policy for the comprehensive long-term development of the North-West. Concessions were made in it to the formulated demands of the Red River insurgents, but the recipients of those concessions were hived into a small preserve radiating around Fort Garry. The centre of the rebellion was offered a measure of autonomy in the form of provincial status, and certain rights were constitutionally guaranteed. However the new province of Manitoba was given only "postage stamp" dimensions; 13,500 square miles. The remainder of the North-West Territories, 2,975,409 square miles in extent, was left in the same constitutional situation

as the whole area had been the previous year, before the rebellion broke out.

Debate on the Manitoba Act opened in the House of Commons on May 2nd 1870, amidst heavy fire on the Government's past conduct and present proposals. The Leader of the Opposition, Alexander Mackenzie, asked the Prime Minister if the Bill provided a constitution for the North-West Territories. Sir John A. Macdonald replied, "No. It simply provides that the Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba shall be Governor of the remaining portion of the Territory under directions of Orders in Council...." (26) Mackenzie was opposed to the establishment of any western province, particularly one of the character and size of Manitoba. He favoured a temporary form of government for the whole North-West, but with representative institutions built into it immediately, on the model of the territorial governments in the United States. For the present Mackenzie favoured an appointed Governor, with a Council of members to be elected from regular electoral divisions "who should indicate to Parliament what form of Government they desired". (27) Macdonald himself, perhaps motivated by antipathy to American models, had already debunked suggestions for the creation of some form of territorial government in Canada. He argued,

...such a thing as a Territory was not known to the British colonial system, that the expression was not recognized, that we thought it would be

better to adhere to the old and well known form of expression - well known to us as Colonists of the Empire - and not bring a new description into our statute book. But it was not a matter of any importance whether it was called a Province or a territory. (28)

From this slightly Delphic analysis it would seem that to Sir John the only difference between a province and a territory was a matter of semantics, not of constitutional development. The overwhelming bulk of Rupert's Land and the Licenced Territory still was called the "North-West Territories", but perhaps Sir John considered that a geographical description, not a constitutional status. Certainly one might conclude from his subsequent conduct that he regarded "territories" as the Canadian equivalent of crown colonies, to be ruled directly from Ottawa.

There is no evidence to suggest that up to 1870 the Conservative government gave much, or perhaps any thought to policies for the development of any part of the North-West Territories. Its conduct was in accord with the views privately expressed by Macdonald in 1865. The dominion's action in taking title to the whole region as far west as British Columbia, the Yankees had apparently been stopped from occupying it; now that it had been secured it could be left a wilderness, if necessary for the next half century. Canada was under no imperative to devise a schedule of constitutional evolution that would synchronize with settlement of the frontier.

No Canadian felt compelled to devise a scheme of frontier government comparable to Thomas Jefferson's NorthWest Ordinance of 1784, which would still be compatible with British parliamentary practice.

Perhaps Canada's physical structure as well as her political heritage was responsible for the Government's attitude. Even the closest of the original components of the Confederation stood almost one thousand miles from the fertile plains. There was no contiguous frontier between the Provinces of Canada and the settleable prairie; it was physically impossible for a man to transport himself westward through Canadian territory without the development of roads, railways, or steamship lines, across the Great Lakes and the rock, water and muskeg of the Laurentian Shield. Psychologically as well as physically, the Canadian North-West Territories seemed a very long distance from Ottawa.

The most unfortunate result of the Manitoba Act was that it deflected likely future attentions away from the North West Territories. In 1870 interest briefly concentrated on the immediate problems of the new province of Manitoba, its size, boundaries and political character. Two brief clauses of the Manitoba Act contained provisions for the government of all the remaining territory extending beyond the minute province's borders. Thirty-six sections made up the Manitoba Act, of which two, Sections 35 and 36, dealt with the North

West Territories. These merely continued the policy, if the word "policy" may be employed, which had applied to the whole of the North West in 1869, and which had provoked the first Riel Rebellion. The old District of Assiniboia, which had mounted armed resistance to that empty policy, won by its deed provincial status and the new name of Manitoba. The remainder of the Territories was presumably to rejoice under a persistent federal policy of "wait and see", a policy of government so minimal that it approached official anarchy, which would continue until at an unspecified future time a federal ministry regarded itself as acquainted with "the circumstances of the country and the wants of its people". Meanwhile Section 36 of the Manitoba Act extended the life of the Temporary Government Act for another year, while Section 35 allowed the Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba to be Lieutenant-Governor of the North West Territories at one and the same time.

Thus the Manitoba Act accomplished several functions; it solved the "western problem" by giving peace and adequate satisfaction to the centre of rebellion; it returned the greater part of the North West Territories to the form of government that Ottawa had first intended for the whole; it enabled Canada to take over all the interior of British North America with relative ease although with more trouble and expense than first anticipated. In total effect it allowed the Government, the Parliament and the people of Canada to turn their attention

away from the North West to other more familiar and perhaps more congenial problems. It created a legal entity with the name of the North West Territories. But beyond the boundaries of the province of Manitoba effective government remained almost completely unknown.

Dr. Lewis Thomas aptly epitomizes the significance of the Manitoba Act and the events that led to its passage, and not least meaningfully in respect to the subsequent history of the North West Territories throughout its many changes of physical shape and size.

The initial venture in applying measures conceived in Ottawa without reference to the experience and convictions of the North-West population had ended in dramatic defeat. The lesson, however, was never completely taken to heart, and so while the next twenty-seven years saw no such sudden change in the political evolution of the North-West, a peaceful struggle developed which after many vicissitudes forced the concession of self-government within a framework of territorial status. (29)

By the end of the year 1870 most of the themes and characteristics of Canada's policy towards her northern territories had appeared. The predominant philosophy was no more sophisticated than that suggested by such aphorisms as, "Let sleeping dogs lie"; and "...if you don't look it will go away". The practical watch-word of administration was economy; joint appointments were made to save expense. The Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba, residing in Winnipeg, also held appointment as Lieutenant Governor of the North West Territories.

The territorial budget was pared to the bone, with funds hardly sufficient for necessary expenditure, and with no provision made for any staff at all. There were too few attempts to anticipate future developments or prevent problems developing into serious crises. The sobriquet of the Prime Minister, "Old Tomorrow", epitomizes the attitudes and policy of the federal government. In the case of the remotest extremities of the North West Territories the attitudes and policies long survived the interment of Macdonald's bones.

CHAPTER II.

THE BEGINNINGS OF TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT IN CANADA

Concerning the northern territories of Canada, the Ungava peninsula, the hinterland of James Bay, the Barren Lands to the west of Hudson Bay, the Mackenzie and the Yukon basins, it could be said with a considerable measure of justice, that never has less happened to so large an area of the country over so long a period of time as during the quarter century following their union with the Dominion. For the north the years between 1870 and 1895 were a period of chronic disinterest, occasional discussion, and almost no activity. From a national point of view the region was completely inert.

Such interest as Canada did generate in the Northwest Territories was confined to the prairies, to the fertile belt, and particularly to the strip of land that could provide a communication route to the Pacific coast, and thus connect all the members of Confederation on a transcontinental axis. Such a communication belt would also secure Canada's southern border against expansionist pressure from the United States. Railway building, agricultural settlement, the constitutional framework of local government, the second Riel Rebellion; these were the subjects that stimulated Canadian interest in the southern strip of the Northwest Territories during the latter decades of the nineteenth century.

The prairie regions of the Territories began to receive federal attentions during the 1870's. In 1874 the North-West Mounted Police entered the Territories to bring regular law enforcement to the plains west of the boundaries of the Province of Manitoba for the first time. (1) Over two years later two Acts of the Canadian Parliament came into force on October 7th 1876, to open a new constitutional era for the North-west Territories. These statutes were the North-West Territories Act of 1875 and the Keewatin Act passed in 1876. (2) The North-West Territories Act of 1875 was the plan of the Liberal Government of Alexander Mackenzie to establish an autonomous territorial government physically located in the territories. It would separate the territorial government completely from the office of the Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba who in a dual gubernatorial capacity had governed the North-West Territories from Winnipeg since 1870. Henceforth the Lieutenant Governor of the North-West Territories was to be aided in his executive and legislative capacities by a Council of not more than five appointed members. (3) Previously the North-West Territories Council sitting in Winnipeg under the provisions of the Temporary Government Act of 1869, had numbered not less than seven and not more than fifteen appointed members. (4) In future three of the five council seats were to be filled ex-officio by the stipendiary magistrates of the Territories. The unending quest for administrative economy was

again apparent in this arrangement. One individual could occupy two positions at the price of one salary. The arrangement formerly applied to the Lieutenant Governorship was now applied to the reduced Council. (5)

The most significant sections of the Act of 1875 were those providing for the addition of elected members to the territorial Council.

13. When and so soon as the Lieutenant-Governor is satisfied by such proof as he may require, that any district or portion of the North-West Territories, not exceeding an area of one thousand square miles, contains a population of not less than one thousand inhabitants of adult age, exclusive of aliens or unenfranchised Indians, the Lieutenant-Governor shall, by proclamation, erect such district or portion into an electoral district.... (6)

When the population of a defined electoral district numbered two thousand adults of similar qualifications, it could elect two members to the Council. (7) When the total number of the elected members amounted to twenty-one, the Council was to become a Legislative Assembly, "and all the powers by this Act vested in the Council shall be thenceforth vested in and exercisable by the said Legislative Assembly". (8) Elected members were to hold their seats for terms not exceeding two years. (9)

Obviously this planned evolution towards the creation of a Legislative Assembly was influenced by the example of the territorial policies of the United States of America, as

formulated in the famed Northwest Ordinance of 1787. That Ordinance, itself derived from Jefferson's more liberal Northwest Ordinance of 1784, had originally applied only to the "old" Northwest Territory, the region claimed by the United States, which lay westward of the original states of the Union, "northwest" of the Ohio River, south of the Great Lakes, and east of the Mississippi. It comprised the area later divided into the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin.

The terms of the 1787 Ordinance anticipated the creation of not less than three and not more than five states within the Northwest Territory. At first the Territory was to be governed by a Governor, residing in the district. A court consisting of three judges was to be appointed, and the Governor with the judges, was given the power to make laws best suited to the requirements of the district. When five thousand free male inhabitants of full age should reside in a district, they were to be given authority to elect a representative to a general assembly. For every five hundred free male inhabitants there was to be one representative;

...and so on progressively, with the number of free male inhabitants, shall the right of representation increase until the number and proportion of representatives shall be regulated by the legislature. (10)

Congress was to appoint the Territorial Governor for a term of three years, and elected representatives were to enjoy two year terms.

When the population of a territorial district reached 60,000, it would be qualified to enter the Congress of the United States "on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever; and shall be at liberty to form a permanent constitution and State Government". (11)

Territorial government was definitely a temporary, not a permanent constitutional status in the United States of America. Constitutional equality in the form of statehood became the goal of American territorial policy for all parts of the Republic. During its territorial stage of evolution the Northwest Territory was the creature of Congress, and the powers of the Governor and the general assembly of the territory, although wide, were subject to Congressional veto. But a complete plan of orderly constitutional development was laid down even before the United States Constitution was ratified; and statehood was the promised goal at the end of every territorial road.

Canada's North-West Territories Act of 1875 did not go as far as the United States' Northwest Ordinance of 1787, nor did it possess the same complete logic within its own limits. True, when the Territories were qualified to elect twenty-one members to the Council, the Council was to become a Legislative Assembly. But what would this transformation mean? Would a Legislative Assembly mean the granting of a greater measure of

responsible government to the Territories? Would the Territories become a province, or provinces, as a result of this development? The Canadian Act made no specific provisions for the achievement of provincial status by the North-West Territories as a whole, or for the most populous parts of them. No mention was made of Territorial representation in either House of the federal parliament, either with or without the right to vote.

Indeed, the aims of the North-West Territories Act of 1875 were vague and imprecise. Future developments were only implied by comparative analogy with the American example. Provincehood was only hinted at; there was no timetable, no schedule of development into full equality in a Confederation of provinces. As the drafters of the 1875 legislation worked in haste, and as none of the principal authors had any first hand knowledge of local conditions in the west, six years passed before any part of the North-West Territories met the conditions which allowed it to elect one member to the Council.(12) The Dominion government retained full powers of disallowance over Territorial legislation. This did at least give the Territorial government power to act with greater speed, for hitherto all legislation could not be proclaimed until Ottawa had given it specific approval.

The North-West Territories of Canada were of course very different from the "old" Northwest Territory of the United

States of America. The American Territory was contiguous to the original states of the Union; it was relatively small in area compared with the Canadian Territories; and physically its climate and topographical character were quite uniform. The Canadian Territories were enormous, stretching to the barely known extremities of the continent; they varied in an extreme degree with respect to climate, terrain, and estimated potential; their most suitable regions for agricultural settlement were remote from the existing concentrations of Canadian population. Moreover Canada acquired her North-West Territories immediately, and entirely, by the stroke of a pen. The United States gradually extended itself across the North American continent by adding frontier and wilderness areas from time to time to the original Republic of the Atlantic seaboard. America was able to develop a territorial policy for one relatively small and well defined frontier area, while Canada had to devise some form of government immediately for a vast, little known, and much less promising northern hinterland. The North-West Territories Act of 1875 was essentially designed for the western plains, where large numbers of settlers were soon expected, not for the remoter parts of the wilderness. One of its deficiencies was that it made no distinction between the various regions of the North-West Territories, but attempted to impose one form of government on disparate and far flung sections of an inland empire including prairie grasslands and sub-arctic fur trapping preserves.

While the North-West Territories Act of 1875 was of the greatest importance to the political development of the western plains, the Act creating the District of Keewatin was to prove of much greater significance for the northern territories. This Act was drafted some months after the passage of the North-West Territories Act but proclaimed simultaneously with it on October 7th 1876.

The Keewatin District originated in the suggestion of Alexander Morris, Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba and the North-West Territories, who drew to the attention of the federal cabinet the difficulty of administering the vast districts lying to the north and east of the Province of Manitoba, from some sequestered seat of government standing far to the westward of the minute province. Morris proposed, therefore, that Manitoba be enlarged to the east, west and north, and that a new separate territory be created to the north and east of the enlarged province, "to be known as the Territory of 'Kee-wa-tin' which means in the Cree and Chippewa dialects 'the North Land'." (13) He also proposed that the Keewatin Territory be governed by the Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba and a council of three appointed members, who would have their seat of government in Winnipeg.

The people inhabiting the country (the proposed Keewatin Territory) hold no intercourse with the Western portion of the Territories, and their only communications are with Fort Garry or in the case of Moose Factory and York Factory (on Hudson Bay) with Great Britain. (14)

In 1876 the Mackenzie Government responded to Morris's recommendations by passing the Act creating the District of Keewatin. The most persuasive argument in favour of this legislation was the predicament of the Icelandic community recently settled on the west shore of Lake Winnipeg, but north of the Province of Manitoba, whose boundaries could not be extended until the Ontario-Manitoba boundary dispute had been settled. The Keewatin Act was intended to provide at least a temporary constitutional answer to the isolation of the Icelanders by bringing them within the scope of some effective government. (15)

The Keewatin Act differed from the recommendations of Alexander Morris in a number of particulars. As the government decided that it could not alter Manitoba's boundaries in any particular for the meanwhile, the Icelanders would have to remain outside of the province. Although the Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba was to become ex-officio Lieutenant Governor of the District of Keewatin, his council was not to have more than ten members nor less than five. (16) Morris had proposed a three member council. Moreover the Keewatin was to be a temporary, not a permanent constitutional phenomenon. When speaking on the first reading of the Bill on February 22nd 1876, Prime Minister Mackenzie specifically declared, "The Bill is only temporary in its character". (17) And shortly

after he provided revealing evidence of the importance with which his Ministry regarded the legislation.

The first section of the Bill is devoted entirely to a description of the boundary and the Territory. I cannot remember the name for it at present, but it is an Indian name. (18)

Somewhat ambiguously the Keewatin was not even given the title of a "territory" for on maps and in official documents it was named the "District" of Keewatin. In American practice "districts" of United States Territories had been temporary geographical definitions of areas within the territories before state boundaries had been definitely decided upon. (19)

Moreover under the terms of American legislation the definition of a "district" was synchronized with a sequence of constitutional advances which would conclude with the admission of a new state into the Union. The Canadian definition of a "district" out of part of the Territories promised no such correlated course of development. The Act of 1876 only established political boundaries, and promised no beginning to a course of constitutional evolution. Even the boundaries of the District of Keewatin were of the most indefinite and flexible kind, for the Act provided;

...that the Governor in Council may, by proclamation published in the Canada Gazette, at any time when it may appear to the public advantage so to do, detach any portion of the said district from the same, and re-annex it to that part of the North-West Territories not included in the said district; and the portion so detached shall then be subject to the same government and laws as that part of the said Territories to which it is re-annexed. (20)

Contradictorily the title of the Act announced a separate territory was to be created, but the provisions of the Act established the boundaries of a district. Presumably the titular description of "district" suggested something more ephemeral and plastic than the word "territory", at least to the minds of legislative draftsmen.

Shortly after the Keewatin District was proclaimed on October 7th 1876, a smallpox epidemic broke out among the Icelanders and Indians of the Lake Winnipeg area, and the Mackenzie government was promptly spurred into appointing a council of six members to deal with the emergency. But once the epidemic had been successfully controlled, the Keewatin Council was promptly dismissed. It had offended a primary rule of territorial government in Canada by spending money, extravagantly in the estimate of Ottawa, to eradicate the disease that had been the reason for its appointment. (21) No members of the Keewatin Council were ever again appointed. It continued to exist on paper, and the Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba continued to be Lieutenant Governor of the District of Keewatin in fact, until the Keewatin was re-incorporated into the Northwest Territories in 1905.

The failure to reappoint a Keewatin Council made it impossible to make any laws even within the narrow scope of the Keewatin Act. During the Council's brief life Lieutenant

Governor Morris had objected to the restriction imposed by Order in Council stopping ordinances from coming into force until Ottawa had approved them. (22) Morris's protests were ignored. However provision was made for the administration of justice in the Keewatin District by the passage of a statute which extended the jurisdiction of the courts of Manitoba over the whole of the Keewatin. (23) But once the Council had been so quickly dismissed it was not possible to pass legislation to provide local government for the Icelandic settlement whose existence had been one of the principal reasons for the establishment of the temporary Keewatin District. In 1878 the Minister of the Interior, David Mills, introduced a Bill into the House of Commons to permit the organization of municipal and school districts in the Keewatin, but it did not reach the stage of third reading before the Parliamentary Session ended. Thus it died on the Order Paper, and the Icelanders had to organize themselves voluntarily and unofficially until the boundaries of Manitoba were extended northward in 1881 (24) Presumably the Ministry did not regard the matter of sufficient importance to bother about insisting on its passage.

The incident provides an excellent example of the characteristic Ottawa habit of reserving as much power as possible for the central government, and then having done so, ignoring the distant local responsibilities it had chosen to take upon itself.

In 1876 the Government of Canada had a very low expectation of the economic potential of any part of Northwest Territories, except the fertile western plains. It had no ideas, let alone a viable policy, for the government of the remote or wilderness areas of the Territories, the tree-belt and the tundra north of the prairies, and the lakes and rocks of the Canadian Shield. The Keewatin District was given a nominal form of local government, but even its form only preserved in one limited area the same form of government that the whole North-West Territories had been graced with up to 1876, under the terms of the Temporary Government Act of 1869 and the Manitoba Act of 1870. That form of government was arbitrary in character and skeletal in substance. The temporizing policy of the Macdonald Government in 1869, the policy of doing nothing until more facts became known while doing nothing to ascertain more facts, was perpetuated by the Mackenzie Government in 1876, and indeed would be long continued by many succeeding governments of Canada. No federal administration knew what to do about the remoter parts of the North-West Territories and in their ignorance and indecision every administration preferred to do nothing.

Alexander Morris recommended the establishment of a Keewatin Territory to overcome the extreme difficulty of governing the regions east of Manitoba from some administrative centre on the western plains. Yet paradoxically the Keewatin

District, when established, only separated the two halves of the North-West Territories by an even greater distance. For the wilderness lying to the east of Manitoba and the Keewatin District was still left within the North-West Territories. All the Ungava Peninsula except the Atlantic coasts claimed by Newfoundland and the hinterland of the shores of James Bay and Hudson Bay up to a point east of the mouth of the Severn River, still remained within the Territories.

Why were these regions left as parts of the North-West Territories? Why were they not included in the Keewatin District? Could not the territories immediately to the north of the provinces of Quebec and Ontario have been placed under the jurisdiction of the Lieutenant Governor of one of those provinces, rather than under the rule of a Lieutenant Governor sitting at Swan River, or Battleford or Regina? Seemingly it would have been a more practical arrangement. However their population was sparse and composed almost entirely of aborigines, a minimal estimate was held of the resources of these regions, and their inaccessibility made them easy to ignore and forget. They could safely be let alone.

The Government knew nothing of the Arctic areas, and soon discovered that nobody else did either, not even the Hudson's Bay Company, from whom it begged information. By September 1882 the Privy Council of Canada recorded its concurrence with the views of Minister of Justice:

The Minister is not aware of any other source where such information as is desired may be sought, and he advises that no steps be taken with the view of legislating for the good government of the country until some influx of population or other circumstance shall occur to make such provision more imperative than it would at present seem to be. (25)

The Macdonald Ministry, and the responsible officials of the Department of the Interior had decided that the empty frontiers, like the Icelandic settlement on Lake Winnipeg, could be left to regulate themselves, free from the supervision and without the legal authority of the Government of Canada or the Government of the North-West Territories.

In actuality the regions of the North-West Territories lying directly northward of the prairies received as little government as the separated eastern Territories. On a map there was an obvious visual impression of their contiguity with the plains onto which the seat of Territorial Government had moved in 1876, first to Swan River and then to Battleford and finally to Regina. In practice no agents of the Federal or the Territorial Governments were located anywhere north of the prairies, nor was so much as an annual inspection or a casual patrol made into the Mackenzie or the Yukon Basins, or into the Barrens west of Hudson Bay, or after 1880 into the Arctic Islands.

In 1882 the second ministry of Sir John A. Macdonald submitted to Parliament for approval a recently passed Order in Council dividing the southern areas of the North-West

Territories into four provisional districts. Macdonald himself explained;

Great inconvenience has been found in the want of geographic or topographical sub-divisions of that country, especially as regards settlers. There it has been thought well to provide, provisionally, that the portions of the country which most likely will be supplied ere long, to which there will be a considerable emigration, should be thus divided. Of course it is not proposed to establish an organized Government among them. There will still be portions of the North-West governed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council of the North West. These are simply topographical divisions. But as it might result in those divisions becoming thereafter Provinces, if it was thought right and respectful to the Parliament to proceed in the present manner, no important step in regard to them to be hereafter taken without first submitting it to Parliament. (26)

The provisional districts were named Assiniboia, Saskatchewan, Alberta and Athabasca.

The pace of settlement had begun to quicken on the plains with the coming of the 1880's. At last the population achieved sufficient concentration to begin electing representatives to the North-West Council under the terms of the North-West Territories Act of 1875. (27) In 1881 the Governor General of Canada, the Marquis of Lorne, made a western tour of the Dominion, after which he sent some comments and advice to Sir John A. Macdonald. Though not suggesting that the time was yet ripe for territorial organization, or territorial subdivision, the Governor General decided that the time had arrived when regional names should be given to parts of the vastness of the North-West Territories. "Unless you christen

the North West provinces soon all Europe will believe they lie under the Red River floods", he wrote. (28)

Manitoba's boundaries had been enlarged in 1881, and a few months after this event occurred J.S. Dennis, Deputy Minister of the Interior, prepared the "...scheme showing the proposed sub-division of the North-West Territories of Canada into Provinces", a suggestion which formed the basic plan for the "Provisional Districts" presented to Parliament the next year. (29)

For the north, the only significance of this 1882 Order in Council was that the northern border of the Provisional District of Athabasca was made the 60th Parallel, which also formed the northern boundary of British Columbia, and this Parallel was extended to mark the southern limit of the North-West Territories.

The return of the first elected member to the North-West Council in 1881 signified a rapid course of political development, settlement and railway building on the prairies. In 1888 a Legislative Assembly replaced the Council of the North-West Territories, and after an involved and protracted struggle, responsible government in full measure was given the Territories in 1897. But all these events had no significance for the northern territories. From 1869-70 to 1897 the history of the North-West Territories is almost entirely the history of

Canada's western plains. The Territorial Government at Regina was no more interested in the north than the Department of the Interior, or the Federal Cabinet. Ungava, the "bottom of the Bay", the Mackenzie and Yukon Basins, the Arctic Islands and the District of Keewatin were left virtually untouched by government of any kind. What was significant for these northern regions was that in these years the federal government had acquired attitudes and approaches to the possession of remote frontiers even if it had not devised systematic policies for their control or development.

CHAPTER III.

THE ARCTIC AMBITIONS OF CANADA

Less than four years after taking possession of Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory Canada took steps to advance the boundaries of the Dominion even further north. The move appears somewhat surprising in view of the federal cabinet's tepid interest in the prairies and apparently complete disinterest in the amount of northern real estate the country already possessed. Perhaps the government's motivation originated from a general, although unformulated desire to place Canada's national back securely against a northern wall. Alexander Galt had expressed such a view in 1867. (1) Certainly Canada did not want any other government to acquire defensible claims to lands lying north of her own acknowledged borders. Most particularly Canada did not want the government of the United States of America to develop interests in either the known or the unexplored regions of the arctic archipelago.

Canada first began to devise her own national policy towards the arctic sector of the globe situated between the northern perimeter of North America and the north pole only after the British government received enquiries about the region in the spring of 1874. Apparently by chance two applications reached London at approximately the same time, concerning the

possible development of land in the vicinity of Cumberland Sound on the eastern coast of Baffin Island. This part of Baffin Island stood in a region of legal shadows so far as the subject of sovereignty was concerned, for it lay beyond the outer limits of either Rupert's Land or the North-western Territory. As the Arrowsmith Map of 1857 illustrates, the Hudson's Bay Company had quite properly claimed only the southern end of Baffin Island as being within the definition of Rupert's Land according to the terms of the Royal Charter of 1670.

The first enquiry to reach London came from an Englishman, A.W. Harvey, who wished to erect temporary buildings in the "land known as Cumberland on the West of Davis Strait", where he had been carrying on a fishery for the past two years. (2) Harvey wished to know if Baffin Island belonged to Great Britain or to the Dominion of Canada? The second enquiry came from Lieutenant William A. Mintzer of the United States Navy Corps of Engineers, who applied to the British Government for a tract of land twenty miles square, also on Cumberland Gulf, for purposes of carrying on a mining industry. It is an unanswered question whether or not there was any connection between these two almost simultaneous applications.

In a situation compounded of equal parts of ignorance and uncertainty, the British Government was undecided what to do or to say. On April 25, 1874, a Colonial Office official minuted;

It would be desirable to ascertain the views of the Dominion Government, I think, before the FO give any answer. We must remember that if this Yankee adventurer is informed by the British FO that the place indicated is not a portion of H.M. dominions he would no doubt think himself entitled to hoist the "Stars and Stripes" which would produce no end of complications. (3)

Thereafter a correspondence flourished between Ottawa and London, which established that Great Britain was willing to turn over to the Dominion Government all those British North American territories remaining under Imperial control and not yet annexed to any other colony, and the willingness of the Canadian Government to accept all the territories thus offered. It also established that neither the British Government nor the Canadian Government had a very precise knowledge of where the boundaries of those territories remaining in the north might be.

The Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, wrote to the Governor General of Canada, Lord Dufferin, on January 6th 1875;

...it appears that the boundaries of the Dominion towards the North East and North West are at present entirely undefined and that it is impossible to say what British territories on the North American Continent are not already annexed to Canada under the Order in Council of 23rd June 1870, which incorporated the whole of the territories of the Hudson's Bay Company as well as the North Western territory in the Dominion. (4)

Although the two principal parties were agreed on the solution of the question, namely the unequivocal transfer of ownership and control of the half-explored archipelago from Great Britain to Canada, the official wheels of negotiation

moved exceedingly slowly. Prolonged consideration of the technicalities of the transfer on both sides of the Atlantic was followed by long periods of silence and forgetfulness on the part of Canada. Finally, on May 3rd, 1878, the Canadian Government did introduce Resolutions to Parliament requesting the British Parliament to pass an Act defining the northerly boundaries of Canada according to mutual agreement.

The seven Resolutions were introduced into the House of Commons by the Minister of the Interior, the Honourable David Mills, in a speech so brief that it did not fill a whole page of Hansard. He alluded to recent activities by American speculators in the north, mentioned the Government's desire to remove all doubts with regard to Canada's exact limits to the north and the north-west, and referred to the lack of provisions in the British North America Act for the acquisition by Canada of the territories now at issue. (5)

Mills was immediately followed in the debate by the Honourable Peter Mitchell of Northumberland, New Brunswick, who was a severe and complete critic of the intended northern annexation; but then Maritimers seem to have been the perennial critics of Canada's territorial expansion. In Mitchell's opinion the annexation was unnecessary and would not be beneficial to the Dominion. There was no threat to the arctic regions from either of Canada's northern neighbours and possible

rivals, the United States of America and Denmark. Let not the Government,

...ask us to assume the responsibility of governing one fourth of the whole continent of North America, without a single reason being alleged that in its results it would benefit the Dominion....

There would be no desire felt by the people of this country to accept responsibilities from which they could derive no benefit. (6)

Canada had quite enough territory to manage at present; enough to keep her fully occupied for the next century.

It would be the greatest madness to submit to the House to assume the responsibility of governing that territory extending from the borders of civilization to the Arctic Ocean.

.....
The matter seemed simply preposterous; the country did not want another \$330,000 per year on the North-West Police, \$200,000 more on other useless stuff such as existed in the North West today. (7)

And Mitchell concluded his speech of denunciation with dire predictions of increasing and useless expenditures yet to come.

Before five years were over that territory would be costing us \$2,000,000 a year. Municipal institutions would be introduced for the Government of the Esquimaux and governors would be sent up there to interpret the laws to those ignorant people, who probably were never able to read a single line of the English language. (8)

Some of these remarks were doubtless the hyperbole of an Opposition member in full cry, but a great many Canadians probably shared the same suspicions about the usefulness of the arctic, and the same fears concerning its probable cost to the tax-payers as Mr. Mitchell. They would have agreed that no other government, foreign or even provincial, coveted the

half-known arctic islands, and the most sensible policy for Canada to follow would be to leave them alone. Leave them under the protecting arm of Great Britain; do not try to shelter them under the Dominion's weak young wings.

The front benches of both the Government and the Opposition however, showed a keener awareness of the possible significance of the north to Canada than did the Member for Northumberland. It was the Leader of the Opposition, Sir John A. Macdonald, who rose to rebutt Mr. Mitchell and defend the Government's Resolutions. Macdonald's principal reason for voting with the Ministry was the threat to Canada of encirclement by the United States. The Imperial Government had no interest in the vast arctic territories, and if Canada would not take over responsibility for their sovereignty and development Great Britain might as well surrender or abandon the whole region.

...and when England had abandoned that country, and Canada was so faint hearted as not to take possession of it, the Americans would be only too glad of the opportunity, and would hoist the American flag and take possession of that territory. (9)

An American was said to have boasted on the natural limits of the United States, that it was bound by Cape Horn and the Aurora Borealis; we must cut them out of that, we must extend our territory to that bright luminary. (10)

Macdonald was well aware of the faint implications in the Resolutions that the British title to these Arctic Islands

was not unchallengeable, and he complimented the Ministry on introducing Resolutions at the end of the Parliamentary Session in a semi-confidential way. "The less publicity was given to them, the better, because there (were) suggestions in them which might be used against us if they fell into unfriendly hands." (11)

As for the expenses of controlling the area, Macdonald hazarded on the basis of his own policy and experience respecting the North-West Territories that Mitchell's worries were exaggerated on this issue.

The Hon. Minister of the interior had informed them that the great North-West, the Arctic portion of British North America, had been owned by the British Nation since the time of Queen Elizabeth, and he did not think it had cost England much up to this time. He did not think it had cost her anything, and he did not suppose there was any necessity after its transfer to Canada, that it should cost Canada any more than it had cost England, until settlements were made there. (12)

Such was Sir John's shrewd estimate of the costs of territorial expansion. To him territorial expansion was nationally prudent, most especially as it need not cost a cent.

Macdonald's attitudes were supported by another leading member of the opposition from Quebec, Hector Langevin, who remarked that this proposed Arctic extension was only a natural consequence of the work commenced in 1867. It was necessary to extend and thus complete Canada's boundaries.

If after all these sacrifices they were not to refuse to accept a territory which England offered them for nothing they would not be true to themselves or the future of the country. The future greatness of this Dominion, and its position on the continent, required that from the boundary line of the United States up to the North Pole should be Canadian Territory. (13)

Other members of Parliament supporting the annexation of the Arctic Islands included the Prime Minister, Alexander MacKenzie, and Donald Smith, the member for Selkirk, Manitoba, later ennobled as Lord Strathcona. The Resolutions were approved by the House of Commons without division, and later were approved by the Senate without debate. (14)

The discussion of the Resolutions in the House of Commons did prove that in both the major parties of the day, leaders were convinced of the strategic importance of the north to Canada. It also illustrated a sense of a Canadian "manifest destiny" held by the country's leading men; a desire and an intention to expand the Dominion to its furthest "natural frontiers" at least in the north where no political boundaries stood to contain national ambitions. Canada's manifest destiny was to become the sovereign power over all British North America, and in 1878 the attainment of that destiny meant expanding northward, if possible to the Pole itself. Physical encirclement must be avoided, especially if the encircling power might prove to be the United States of America, Canada's principal rival for control of the North

American continent. The American purchase of Alaska in the year of Confederation had given Canada a forcible example of the quality of the international race for land which she had now entered herself.

Sir John A. Macdonald's speech also reveals a persistent federal attitude to the north; an attitude epitomized in the words "Strict Economy". By all means expand the size of Canada; acquire the arctic islands and if necessary claim all the territory extending up to the north pole; forestall American encirclement; and especially advance such grandiose ambitions if they are not likely to cost Canada perhaps as much as a single dollar. There will be no need to spend any money in the arctic islands until settlements are made there, and such developments are extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future. Claim the north, as much as can be obtained easily, but leave it for the meanwhile an untouched preserve.

The words and the reasoning were Macdonald's, but such a practice was followed by every federal government, Conservative, Liberal, or Coalition, at least until the conclusion of the First World War. Events were to prove that Peter Mitchell of Northumberland had no reason to fear that the northern territories would cost the Canadian treasury \$2,000,000. per annum for another half-century; in fact the total sum spent on that region in that time would not add up to half that figure.

More than two years elapsed between the approval of the Resolutions by the Canadian Parliament and the official transfer of the arctic islands to Canadian control. The delay was caused by the technicalities and uncertainties of international law, and so are of little relevance here. Instead of passing a statute to define the northerly boundaries of Canada as the Dominion Parliament requested in 1878, the British Government decided that the correct means of accomplishing the transfer was the passage of an Order in Council. That Order in Council was signed on 31 July 1880, giving Canada possession of the Arctic Islands, territories and archipelago on 1st September 1880, and was published the following month in the Canada Gazette. (15) Concerning the validity of the transfer, there was no doubt whatsoever. But what was not certain in 1880, or later, was the completeness of Britain's own title at the time of the transfer. As one scholar later stated the situation, "The Imperial Government did not know what they were transferring, and on the other hand the Canadian Government had no idea what they were receiving." (16)

A cause of worry in future years was the fact that once the transfer was complete, the Government of Canada made no attempt to acquire a detailed knowledge of the areas it had accepted. No measures were taken to secure the title which had been so easily acquired. The Arctic Islands did not cost

Canada any more than they had cost the British nation from the time of Queen Elizabeth I to the reign of Queen Victoria: nothing. But the unfortunate parsimony of the nineteenth century was to place Canada's claim to the region in serious jeopardy in the twentieth. No state could acquire so much land for nothing, and then ignore it for an indefinite period of time.

Ignorance of the Arctic and of the greater portion of Canada's North-West Territories was universally profound, and remained so until well into the twentieth century. For this state of knowledge Canada was of course in no way responsible. But the Government of Canada certainly was guilty of the sin of omission, or at least that of procrastination, in not making more energetic attempts to discover even the most basic facts concerning the greater part of the national domain. Individual Canadians in their private capacities and the Canadian Government as an official body, were alike conspicuous in all regions of the North by their absence. Englishmen, and with increasing frequency Americans, probed the North for scientific and commercial purposes; but not Canadians, to whose country the hyperborean vastness now officially belonged.

European whalers had been fishing Davis Strait since 1719 (17) with British, and particularly Scottish vessels dominating the industry during the nineteenth century. (18)

The application of the unknown W.A. Harvey, followed by that of Lieutenant W.A. Mintzer, U.S.N. for a legal title to land on Baffin Island had triggered the chain of events that led to the transfer of all the Arctic Islands to Canada. (19) American whalers too, had been penetrating further and further into northern waters, frequently appearing in Davis Strait and dominating almost entirely the whale fisheries in Hudson Bay after 1860. (20) As early as 1848 a New England whaler had passed through Bering Strait and in subsequent years increasing numbers of ships pursued their quarry eastward along the shores of the Beaufort Sea, until by 1889 they were wintering regularly on Herschel Island, a Canadian Island, lying immediately off the coast of what is today the Yukon Territory. (21) But there is no record of any Canadian enterprise in this field of maritime endeavour, or indeed in any other.

In the years after Confederation, British Arctic expeditions included the Admiralty's attempt to reach the North Pole in the years 1875-76, under the command of Captain George Nares, and the private expedition of Sir A. Young, during the same period, to investigate the North Magnetic Pole, and to attempt to make the North-West Passage in one season. (22) Thereafter American expeditions became much more numerous than ones made under the Union Jack. C.F. Hall made his second attempt to discover the fate of Sir John Franklin between the

years 1864 and 1869, and in the years 1871-73 he led an expedition, backed by the United States Government, to reach the North Pole. In 1878-80 Lieutenant Frederick Schwatka, U.S.N., went in search of Franklin relics and between 1881 and 1884 Lieutenant A.W. Greeley of the United States Army Corps of Signals commanded an American Polar Year expedition which established meteorological stations on Ellesmere Island.

Nations of continental Europe were also becoming interested in the Arctic during the final decades of the nineteenth century. Germany sent an international Polar Year Expedition to Baffin Island during the years 1882-83, led by Herr. W. Giese, and Dr. Franz Boas made an anthropological expedition to the same island during the season of 1883-4. Captain Otto Svedrup commanded a private Norwegian exploration of the Arctic Archipelago aboard the "Fram" during the years 1898-1902, making discoveries that were to cause the Canadian Government much serious anxiety in future years, (23) and between 1903 and 1906 Roald Amundsen, another Norwegian, completed the first North-West Passage ever made by sea. During those same years Robert Peary, the most successful of all American Arctic explorers, was attempting to reach the North Pole, making repeated attempts in 1898-99, 1900-1901, 1902, 1905-06, and finally in 1908-1909, when he achieved his ultimate ambition. (24)

None of the American or European expeditions applied to Canada's Government, or the Government of Great Britain, for permission to enter or explore the northern regions claimed by the Dominion; the Arctic might be claimed by Canada, but it was treated as much as an international No-man's Land as the oceans of the world. Nor during this period did Canada make any physical attempt to establish her sovereignty over the Arctic sector of the globe, between her continental shores and the Pole.

During the nineteenth century Canada was more concerned with mapping and assessing those areas of the North-West territories contiguous to the original Dominion than in participating in the discovery of the high Arctic. This tremendous, even if more southerly endeavour, fell to the lot of the Geological Survey of Canada which, small as it was, was the only Government organization capable of such an undertaking. (25) Investigation of the northern territories began in the summer of 1877, when the Geological Survey sent Robert Bell to explore the east coast of Hudson Bay, which he did from Moose Factory at the foot of James Bay, to Portland Promontory, 600 miles to the north, near the present Quebec coastal settlement of Port Harrison. (26)

In 1884 Canada despatched the first of three successive annual expeditions to investigate navigation conditions in Hudson Strait and Hudson Bay. The commencement of the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway had seeded many other railway

construction projects in the North-West, and by the beginning of 1883 three railways were seeking incorporation, "for the purpose of connecting "older" Canada with Hudson Bay". (27)

When Parliament debated the chartering of the Canadian Pacific some years earlier, some Members had mentioned the development of a communication route between Hudson Bay and England as the only means of preventing a railway monopoly in the North-West Territories. (28) To satisfy public curiosity concerning the practicality of the sea-route into the interior of the continent, as well as to assist the objectives of prospective railway builders, Lieutenant A.R. Gordon, R.N., was placed in command of the Hudson Bay Expeditions of 1884, 1885 and 1886. There would seem to be no substance to the later suggestion that the Gordon Expeditions were made in the interests of bolstering Canada's claims of territorial sovereignty in the north. (29)

In 1884 Robert Bell was assigned to the "Neptune", which carried the first Gordon Expedition, as taxidermist, photographer, botanist, zoologist and mineralogist, as well as the geologist of the Geological Survey of Canada. (30) George M. Dawson, assisted by R.G. McConnell made the first thorough scientific exploration of the Yukon region in the year 1887, and in 1893 the brothers J.B. and J.W. Tyrell made their epic journey through the Barren Lands west of Hudson Bay. As J.B. Tyrell later noted,

It has been my good fortune to travel over parts of the same country through which Hearne had journeyed one hundred and twenty-three years before me, and into which no white man had ventured during the intervening time. (31)

Another pioneer Canadian exploration was that which A.P. Low began into the heart of the Labrador Peninsula in 1892, and pursued for the ten following years. (32) Low's journey into this wilderness was the first recorded since John McLean traversed the peninsula in 1838. (33)

This is no attempt to make an exhaustive enumeration of Canadian investigations of the northern territories, but it nevertheless illustrates the degree of ignorance in which they remained, and the slowness and relative feebleness of the Government of Canada's attempts to acquire even a cursory knowledge of the topographical character of the whole Dominion. Officially and unofficially Canada and Canadians were prepared to allow those who chose, to explore the high Arctic at will, while the federal agencies slowly explored the more southerly, if equally unknown, regions of continental Canada in gradual piece-meal fashion. Apart from the strenuous professional curiosity of the Geological Survey, Canadian interest in the north remained extremely limited throughout the nineteenth century.

Lieut. A.R. Gordon, for example, repeatedly informed the Government of foreign maritime activity in northern waters

and advised it what to do about the situation. In his Report for the year 1884 he drew attention to the fact that all the fishing and trading done in the Hudson Bay region was presently in the hands of the Hudson's Bay Company or New England whalers. (34) The following year he stated:

Every U.S. whaler which goes into Hudson's Bay is also an unlicensed trader competing with the Hudson's Bay Company for the trade with the Esquimaux, the Company paying full duty on all articles imported for trade, whilst their competitors from New England take, duty free, goods from bonded stores or goods manufactured in the U.S., as best suits their business. (35)

And in his final Report covering the activities of the 1886 season Gordon boldly recommended that a Government vessel should annually visit the waters of Hudson Bay to regulate the fisheries as well as to survey the coast line. Furthermore the fisheries of Hudson Bay should be closed for the next five years, and in future all foreigners should be charged a heavy licence for fishing privileges. (36) The first action the Canadian Government took was to send the "Diana" north to Hudson Strait and Bay, under the command of William Wakeham in 1899.

Apart from official expeditions, the most important display of official interest in the northern territories occurred in 1888, when the Honourable Doctor John Christian Schultz of Manitoba, moved for the establishment of a Select Committee of the Senate to enquire into the possible commercial and agricultural value of the Great Mackenzie Basin. (37)

During the previous session of Parliament, in 1887, Senator Schultz had successfully presided over another Select Committee for the establishment of which he had been responsible; a Committee which had investigated the Natural Food Products of the North-West, but whose interests had been focussed on areas lying to the south of the Mackenzie Basin, the districts of Alberta, Assiniboin and Southern Saskatchewan. (38) Now he would direct the attention of Parliament, or at least that of the Senate, even further north.

The Great Mackenzie Basin Committee of 1888 heard the testimony of witnesses who included civil servants, members of the staff of the Geological Survey, fur traders, former members of the Council of the North-West Territories, Anglican and Roman Catholic missionaries, and a former United States consul at Winnipeg. Particular interest was displayed in the subjects of climate, agriculture, minerals, forestry, fur, game, and fisheries. But the final Report of the Committee stated;

Your committee may explain that very early in their investigations they became convinced that very little more was known of the northern and eastern portion of the area committed to them for investigation than was known of the interior of Africa or Australia. Arctic explorers had indeed traversed its coast line and descended two of the rivers which, east of the Mackenzie flow into the Arctic sea, but the object sought by them was one which had had no relation to that of the present inquiry, and it is only incidentally that their records are now valuable. The knowledge of missionaries and officers of the Hudson Bay Company is chiefly confined to the water-courses and the great lakes, while scientific exploration has not as yet extended north of Great Slave Lake. (39)

When moving the establishment of the 1888 Committee Schultz referred to the views widely held throughout Canada concerning the nature and value of the northern territories.

I am aware that this great region has been classed among those portions of our Dominion where ice and snow hold unbounded sway, producing only the scant vegetation of arctic and sub-arctic life. That it is the natural home of the reindeer and polar bear, the hatching ground of migratory wild fowl, and the residence of a few Esquimaux and Chipewyan Indians who eke out a scant subsistence by the pursuit of fur-bearing animals and the Cariboo, which Providence seems to have designed for their special use. (40)

And the Senator concluded his introductory remarks by stating that if the discoveries of the Committee did not illuminate tremendous potential resources in the Mackenzie Basin, "I will have occupied the time of this House to no good purpose, and I shall regret having done so. " (41) Even the most ardent northern publicists possessed severely utilitarian outlooks in the nineteenth century.

What did the 1888 Schultz Committee do? It collected a considerable amount of scattered general knowledge concerning the Mackenzie Basin, but it did not discover any new facts that would accelerate or in any way alter the course of its development. The Committee's greatest service was to give publicity to the pristine state of the northern territories and their development-potential.

For Schultz the chairmanship of the Select Committee was his final service in the Parliament of Canada, for shortly

after its Report was submitted he was appointed Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba. (42) Throughout his long career in the North-West Schultz had been sincerely, if controversially, and from some view-points, misguidedly, driven by an ambition for its development, and his labours on the Great Mackenzie Basin Committee seem to have been inspired with a fervour of visionary intensity. In every way it was Schultz's Committee; he was its initiator, director and motive power, although Senator Girard of St. Boniface was again his chief lieutenant as he had been the previous year on the Natural Food Products Committee. For practical purposes Senators Schultz and Girard were the executive of the Committee of 1888. Declared one Committee member critical of its purposes;

...and I think that "zeal" does not begin to describe the feelings which must have actuated the hon. gentleman to have induced him, ... to sit there day after day, engaged in this work which he had so set his heart upon. I was a member of the Committee, but I wish here publicly (sic) to state that I did not do my duty as a member of the Committee. The chairman was present all the time. The hon. gentleman from St. Boniface was present nearly all the time...so the work which has been done, and the report which has been made are really almost entirely the work of the chairman and his colleague from St. Boniface, of course added to the work done by the witnesses. (43)

Senator Power, who paid this tribute to Schultz, was the most vociferous critic of the very establishment of the Select Committee of 1888. He came from Halifax and was a Liberal, unlike another Maritimer, Peter Mitchell, M.P., of New Brunswick, who had opposed the annexation of the Arctic Islands ten years

previously. Senator Power reasoned;

...it will be quite time enough when Manitoba and the present North-West have been fairly well settled to expend large sums of money to develop the country further to the North.

The Mackenzie Basin is a region which is shut off from the United States by our own settled territories; it is shut off from the west by the Rocky Mountains, and it is not likely to be interfered with by outsiders. It will keep. (44)

In other words, the North should be treated as a national reserve, which presently should not be used or even investigated. Also advised Mr. Power, let the qualified and servants of the Government, whose duty it is to gather and report information to their superiors, do so in all parts of the North-West; such tasks were their properly assigned functions, not a suitable activity, or a duty, for politicians in either house of Parliament.

Certainly there was considerable sense in Power's suggestion; "Let us try to get the country that we have already organized respectably peopled, and then let us go on further." (45) Schultz himself was in agreement about the necessity of immediate development, although not about the prudence of investigation.

...and yet I would regret any attempt to colonize any portion of this vast region until the prairie region to the south and the province of Manitoba shall have a very much larger population than at present. I would feel averse to the granting of any considerable portion of this rich domain to aid new railways, and I deprecate the granting of new railway charters at present with that end in view. It is sufficient, I think, in the mean time to protect its present natural resources and leave the development of the country at least till after scientific exploration has fully determined the

extent and value of its minerals and other resources, and experiment shall have determined the kind of craft best suited for the navigation of its sea coasts and its great rivers and lakes.

....
Parts of it (the Mackenzie Basin) we do not now need for colonization, but it is well to know what we have in reserve, it may be called in bank parlance a "rest" to draw upon in the future, while we need meantime scientific exploration and investigation to follow this brief Senatorial examination. (46)

Senator Girard had fears for continued Canadian control of the Mackenzie Valley, fears springing from memories of American expansion down the Red River in 1870.

I think the time has arrived when the Government should not only ascertain the natural resources of that country but also adopt measures by which our natural wealth in that part of our territory will be protected, not from the people of the Dominion, but from the Americans. Expeditions will be coming in from the United States before long via the Mackenzie River, as they have done in the past in other new territories, but the most valuable portions of it will be appropriated for its wealth of fish and fur bearing animals and its mines. (47)

Perhaps inevitably, comparisons were made by Senators in 1888 between the Canadian North and Alaska. Certainly the United States had taken no more trouble than had Canada to organize its most northerly territory; until 1884 Alaska was given no civil government at all, enduring a seventeen-year era of total neglect. (48) And yet Alaska did provide revenue for the American Government, which Schultz estimated to amount to \$600,000. per annum. On an original outlay of \$7,200,000, "This is a very fair interest upon the investment". (49)

Senator Power suggested that it would be desirable to make the fur trade of the Mackenzie a source of revenue. The Alaska Seal Company paid some \$250,000. a year for their monopoly while the Hudson's Bay Company paid nothing whatsoever into the Canadian exchequer. (50)

Reference to the Honourable Company immediately provoked the suspicions of another Senator, Mr. Macdonald of Midland, who remembered that copies of Sir George Simpson's Journey Around the World were bought up and destroyed after Simpson had been forced to eat his published words before the Select Committee of 1857. Senator Macdonald continued:

Now I make this reference only for this purpose: is it not as much the interest of the Hudson's Bay Company to keep the people of Canada today in ignorance of the great resources of the Mackenzie Basin as it was in their interest to keep them in ignorance of the Hudson Bay Territory? I say assuredly it is and for that reason I look upon this investigation as having within it the germ of influences that will lead to the development of the resources of that country. It is supposed to be a preserve of the Hudson's Bay Company and it is to their interest that it should be so thought and regarded. (51)

Mr. Howland also desired to see the furs of the Hudson's Bay Company exported through Canada, not shipped out from a port on Hudson Bay, presumably without paying any tax whatever. Without examining the objectives and public relations policy of the Hudson's Bay Company, it is certain that it did not have to lift a finger in order to keep the people of Canada in ignorance of the resources of the Mackenzie Basin. It would

have been more plausible to argue that the Company could have spent its last cent on attempts to excite Canadian interest in the northern territories without meeting the slightest measure of success.

In respect to practical accomplishments the results of the Great Mackenzie Basin Committee of 1888 were pitifully few. The very fact that the Committee was sitting, the evidence of the witnesses called, and to a lesser extent, the final Report itself, gave publicity to all the information concerning the northern wilderness that could be gathered together. But as the Committee stated, that information was very sparse; the Canadian north was as little known as the interior of Africa or Australia. During the debate on the adoption of the Third Committee Report, Senator Girard mentioned that the Committee was attracting attention in England as well as in Canada. Although the Report was not yet published, the Geological Survey of Canada had organized an expedition to the country to the west of Hudson Bay, (presumably because of the interest the Commission was arousing) and the Government of Ontario had appointed a Commission to investigate the Province's mineral resources. Girard then quoted a despatch from the London, England, office of the Toronto Globe:

The cabled summary of the evidence taken by the Schultz Committee on the Mackenzie Basin is attracting notice here, as further evidence of the great undeveloped resources of the Dominion. The Daily News today,

editorially comments on it, and says the day may well come when British North America may support a population equal to more than half that of Europe. (52)

When another Senate Committee was examining the Mackenzie Basin almost twenty years later, Senator Davis remarked that he was aware that the report of the Schultz Committee of 1888 had not been favourably received, "...although it did an enormous amount of good." (53) The judgement is somewhat ambiguous, but presumably Senator Davis meant that the Schultz Committee was criticized for spending public monies to no obvious or immediate practical purpose. No important results followed the publication of its Report, although the evidence assembled by the Committee did have a valuable influence, in the long-term, on the permanent civil service, if not the general public or the ministry of the day.

The Great Mackenzie Basin Report of 1888 at least serves some historical purposes by focussing Parliamentary and public interest on the far northern territories for the first time, and by illuminating the contemporary degree of factual ignorance and public disinterest in them at that time; in retrospect its value is enhanced by its uniqueness.

CHAPTER IV.

THE PROBLEMS OF THE YUKON

The first significant human development to occur in Canada's northern territories was the much fabled Klondike Gold Rush of the years 1897 and 1898. From the federal government's point of view the sensational character of the Rush was particularly enhanced by the completely unexpected manner of its development as much as by the remoteness of its location. Every dimension of the Rush seemed to exceed everyone's wildest anticipations; the general and profound ignorance of the Yukon valley, its distance from any settled part of the Dominion, the tedious difficulties of communication and transportation, the complications of administration, and the astounding numbers of people attempting to reach the gold-laden river beds.

Previous to the year 1897 the expectations of general public and government officials alike had been that the settlement and development of the North-West Territories would proceed in a predictable and orderly manner. First agriculture would move westward along both sides of the trans-continental railway route from the Red River to the foothills of the Rockies, and then, when the southern band of agricultural land had been occupied, it would move steadily northward over the prairies

until the tree-belt was reached; a process which would take more years than any government would care to estimate. As for the enormous regions lying north of the central plains, they like the Ungava Peninsula, the hinterland of James Bay and the Keewatin District, could be left for consideration in a far distant future. Although these districts did not promise easy agricultural settlement they might contain other resources as yet undiscovered.

Even a preliminary appraisal of possible resources had not been made and development of any sort was not contemplated. The Mackenzie valley, for example, was regarded as one of the last, and perhaps the best sources of furs remaining in the world; most Canadians were content to let it remain so, and to permit the Hudson's Bay Company to retain a virtual monopoly of trade and continue to exert almost proprietorial rights in that whole sub-arctic wilderness. Indeed the Schultz Committee of 1888 had demonstrated a vague but growing awareness of the possibility of exploitable northern resources, but apart from the pioneering of farms, even John Schultz himself thought that the north could wait. To him it was a national "bank rest", a reserve which should remain untouched until the prairies were fully settled and completely organized. (1)

Such were the attitudes and expectations of the Government of Canada up to the time the Klondike Gold Rush

suddenly erupted, throwing a multitude of problems into the lap of the amazed, but responsible, federal administration.

Reversing every official and popular preconception, thousands of would-be miners ignored the virgin prairies, and began the struggle to enter the distant Yukon valley, one of the most ignored and inaccessible regions of the unorganized North-West Territories.

In retrospect the Klondike Rush seems all the more amazing and perhaps incomprehensible in the light of the reports coming from the Yukon during the ten previous years. Although news of gold discoveries and estimates of a fantastic possible mineral wealth had been appearing in official publications since 1887, they had been generally ignored even by the authorities responsible for their publication. It was only in July 1897, when some of the largest American newspapers made sensational headline stories of the fabulous gold discoveries on the tributaries of the Yukon River during the previous season, that the Rush to the north really began in earnest. Perhaps the human stampede which the flamboyant news reports provoked can only be convincingly explained in terms of public relations, of new techniques in mass communications, and of mob psychology. That human torrent was triggered by the new tabloid press, then being organized into trans-continental chains which were instantaneously connected by wire service.

On July 15th, 1897 the steamer "Excelsior" arrived in San Francisco with a number of prospectors aboard who had "struck it rich" on the Yukon in the summer of 1896. The Chronicle and the Call publicized their wealth in the most sensational manner possible. The New York Herald received the story overnight by wire service, and the next morning made a sensational story of the richest strike in all American mining history. The next day the New York Journal and the San Francisco Examiner, now owned by the same young publisher, made belated amends for initially giving the story only passing mention. With these press-headlines, repeated around the world, the Gold Rush began; and William Randolph Hearst became almost as much responsible for the Klondike Stampede as he was for the Spanish American War. (2)

Nevertheless, as early as the year 1887 reports of gold discoveries in the Yukon valley had provoked the Canadian Government into making a preliminary investigation of that hitherto almost unknown wilderness; and since then Ottawa had frequently received estimates of the golden wealth of the northern rivers. The original source of official curiosity about the Yukon was a most distinguished member of the Geological Survey of Canada, George M. Dawson, who heard accounts of gold discoveries in the Yukon basin while he was working on the British Columbia coast in 1886, and who consequently urged on the Minister of the Interior, the Hon. Thomas White, the

importance of gaining some accurate knowledge of the area and its possibilities, in the interests of Canada. (3) It is typical of the whole history of Canada's administration of the north, that the initiative came from a civil servant and not a politician or from representatives of the general public.

In 1887 White responded to Dawson's suggestion by despatching an expedition which included in its complement George M. Dawson and R.G. McConnell of the Geological Survey of Canada, who were to investigate the river systems and the geology of the region, and William Ogilvie of the Department of the Interior, who was assigned the task of determining the position of the 141st meridian of Longitude, which formed part of the agreed but undefined boundary between Canada and Alaska. (4)

On his return to Ottawa in the winter of 1887 Dawson reported that while all the large streams so far prospected in the Yukon basin had been found to yield placer gold in greater or lesser quantity, very little examination had been made of the smaller feeder streams. (5) Thus it might be said, "that the information now obtained is sufficient to warrant a confident belief in its (the Yukon basin's) great value". (6) Two years later, after a much longer sojourn in the Yukon, William Ogilvie wrote:

I think it may, with confidence, be asserted that rich finds will yet be made of both coarse gold and gold-bearing quartz. It is not likely in the nature of things, that such a vast extent of country should have all its fine gold deposited as sediment,

brought from a distance, in past ages of the world's development. If this is not the case, the matrix, from which all gold on these streams has come, must still exist, in part at least, and will no doubt be discovered, and thus enrich this otherwise gloomy and desolate region. (7)

From Ogilvie's preliminary reports the Deputy Minister of the Department of the Interior quickly formed a sanguine estimate of the Yukon's potential worth, and he publicly commented;

His (Ogilvie's) observations have not yet been completely reduced, but an approximate calculation shows that the boundary is nearly ninety miles below the point where it is marked on the United States maps. This is of great importance, as the line passes through the best gold bearing districts yet discovered in the country.

.....

The Yukon district appears to have a much greater value than was previously supposed. It would seem that for gold the best paying streams so far discovered are in Canadian territory. (8)

During the debate in 1888 on the Report of the Great MacKenzie Basin Committee, Senator Schultz had noted, on the evidence of the Dawson and Ogilvie reports, that miners were already attempting to reach gold deposits on the headwaters of the Liard and Yukon rivers, but this Parliamentary reference appears to have been the only public notice taken of the Yukon's potentialities.(9)

The one exception to the general disinterest was the Government of British Columbia, which did manifest some official curiosity about the Yukon. In 1888 the Legislative Assembly ordered the printing of a Sessional Paper, Report of Captain William Moore Upon the Yukon Country. Captain Moore, a German by birth, was one of British Columbia's most persistent, enduring

and amazing pioneers. He had pursued every gold discovery on the Pacific coast since the California rush of 1849. Accompanied by two of his sons he voluntarily joined the federal government's Yukon expedition of 1887, explored the White Pass, perhaps being the first European to cross it, and then explored the Yukon River, one of his sons journeying from its source to its mouth. (10) In his Report to the Government of British Columbia, Captain Moore told of gold to the value of \$150,000 being taken out of the Yukon in a period of two and a half months, and he boldly declared that, "Every stream entering the Upper Yukon has gold in it". (11) Yet the British Columbian reaction, as well as the Canadian reaction, to this and other reports coming from the north was almost non-existent. One well informed B.C. commentator later remarked;

Yet, with their usual apathy, the British Columbians took not the slightest interest in the matter. (Reports of wealth in the Yukon). Very few people in the Province had ever heard of Dr. Dawson's report until six months ago, (i.e. July 1897), and it is only now, when they have been rudely shaken out of their apathy by the stirring report of the discovery of rich placer ground on some of the tributaries of the Yukon, that people are beginning to ask each other where the Yukon is and which is the best way to get there; but even still there is not one man in a thousand who has any idea of the economic possibilities of the vast unexplored area lying to the east of the Yukon, drained by rivers in comparison to which the already famous Klondyke is a very small stream indeed. (12)

According to William Ogilvie's personal recollections, both the Hon. Edgar Dewdney, Minister of the Interior in succession to the deceased Thomas White, and the Deputy Minister

of the Department, A.M. Burgess, were anxious to receive all possible information about the virtually unknown Yukon, and awaited Ogilvie's return to Ottawa in January 1889 before taking any action respecting it. Ogilvie recommended that the Government take no action at that time, and Dewdney and his Deputy agreed. The Yukon should remain an unorganized region of the North-West Territories, a wilderness in which anarchy, at least in respect to government control and administration, would receive a sort of negative sanction from the federal capital for the meanwhile. Not even a policeman would be posted there to symbolize Canadian authority.

It was decided to allow things to stand as they were for a while, but I was directed to keep my eye on the region, and whenever I thought it time to take possession to notify the Department. In September 1893, I wrote to Mr. Burgess from Juneau, Alaska, where I was in connection with the work of the International Boundary Commission, that I thought it time we were moving in the matter of establishing authority over the Yukon in the gold-fields, or we might, if the work were delayed, have to face annoyances, if not complications through possession, without protest from us, by American citizens. (13)

All in all this seems to have been a rather risky and cavalier attitude for responsible officials of the Canadian Government to adopt. Presumably they agreed on such a policy as much for reasons of economy as for any others; it was not worth sending even one agent of government into the Yukon until the expense was absolutely necessary; the miners in the valley could regulate themselves until their presence threatened Canada's national interests. When Ogilvie at last did advise

the Department of the Interior to take action in 1893 it was because most of the miners were Americans, and Canada feared the consequences of effective control of any part of the Canadian domain by United States' citizens. The only influence capable of overcoming Canadian indifference to the north appears to have been external threats, particularly threats emanating from the United States.

After Ogilvie left the Yukon in 1888, increasing numbers of miners began to prospect up the river, and after 1892 when the Right Reverend William Carpenter Bompas, Bishop of the newly created Anglican diocese of Selkirk, took up residence in the settlement of Forty Mile, the federal government began to receive a series of letters calling attention to the illicit liquor traffic in the region and the need for law enforcement among the polyglot throng of miners. (14) Bompas regarded the separation of all the regions of the "north country" from the prairies as "essentially necessary", recommended that a gun boat be sent from Victoria, B.C. to Herschel Island to regulate the American whalers, and advised that the Yukon valley was,

...entirely disconnected with Mackenzie River, not only by the barrier of the Rocky Mountains, but because all access is from the Westward, so that we seem almost in another hemisphere. (15)

William Ogilvie's advice, added to these sundry reports, persuaded the Federal Cabinet to send Inspector Charles

Constantine of the North-West Mounted Police to the Yukon country in the summer of 1894 to investigate and report on the situation there, to enforce Canadian jurisdiction in all matters respecting government and to collect customs duties. All these orders Constantine executed, being the first individual to enforce the laws of Canada in the region. On his return to Regina in the autumn of 1894 he commented that "...although the Yukon district has been up to the present time a sort of "No-Man's" land, the boundary between Alaska and the North-West Territories not having been defined or officially declared... for a mining camp the place is very quiet." (16) Quiet or not, the Cabinet sent Constantine back to the Yukon in 1895 with a party of twenty officers and men to establish a permanent North-West Mounted Police post at Fort Cudahy on the Yukon River. (17)

In October 1895 the Yukon was created a Provincial District of the North-West Territories with defined boundaries.(18) Three other provisional districts were established in the north at the same time; Ungava, Mackenzie and Franklin. The Cabinet also announced its intention to add 470,000 square miles to the Keewatin District, a proposal which would divide the whole of the unorganized and unnamed areas of the Dominion into provisional districts. The necessity for the creation of a Yukon District in 1895 is obvious, but the reason behind the definition of the three other provisional districts remains somewhat obscure, although this legal declaration marks the first display of

Canadian interest in the arctic archipelago since Canada had acquired the uncertain title to it in 1880.

Presumably the demands of the Yukon valley acted as a catalyst on Government policy towards all the unorganized areas of the North-West Territories. Reports of American maritime activities in both the eastern and western Arctic waters had of course been arriving in Ottawa for many years, only to be customarily ignored. But now that developments in the Yukon forced consideration of the northwest corner of the Dominion, the federal government might as well avail itself of the opportunity to begin the organization of the Territories as a whole, commencing with the regions not yet explored. One obvious purpose of the Order in Council establishing the four provisional districts was to give notice to the world that Canada definitely did regard the entire northern portion of the North American continent, including the off-shore islands, alike the known and the undiscovered, as being part of her national estate. The geographical definition of the District of Franklin contained considerable potential international significance, for it described Franklin as being of "indefinite extent". (19)

The wording was typical of Canadian action, for the District of Franklin and consequently the northern boundary of Canada itself, thereby became an elastic geographic and legal

formula. It could be made to include, if desired, all lands up to the North Pole, lands both discovered and undiscovered. Thus Canada attempted to devise for herself a stretchable northern boundary that could include all possible land surfaces between the shores of the North American continent and the northern extremity of the globe, while at the same time exempting herself from the trouble and expense of arctic discovery and exploration.

While Ottawa was manoeuvring for the possible territorial expansion of Canada towards the Pole, the Yukon was coming under undisputed federal control. Throughout the years 1895 and 1896 the North-West Mounted Police detachment was successfully performing its assigned duties from Fort Cudahy while the number of miners in the valley rapidly increased and the value of gold discoveries multiplied. Civil government had been strengthened by the appointment of a Collector of Customs during 1896. (20) On August 17th 1896 George W. Carmack made the most famous of all Canadian gold-strikes in the sands of Bonanza Creek. (21)

News of the Bonanza Creek discoveries reached Ottawa early in 1897, but the federal government remained skeptical of the reports coming out of the north. In the course of his Annual Report for the preceeding year the Deputy Minister of the Department of the Interior, A.M. Burgess, wrote in March 1897;

Reports have from time to time been received from him, (Wm. Ogilvie) which contain accounts of extraordinary finds of gold in the district (the Yukon). Along the banks of the Klondak (sic) river and creeks which are tributary to it, discoveries are reported of simply fabulous value.... But it should be mentioned by way of caution that Mr. Ogilvie's statements represent not what he has seen or knows from personal observations, but what has been reported to him by others. (22)

So the Canadian government made cautious preparations for the 1897 mining season in the Yukon. Another detachment of Northwest Mounted Police was despatched to relieve and augment the force stationed at Fort Cudahy since 1895. A civil service staff was sent to take charge of the growing mining administration; Thomas Fawcett was appointed District Gold Commissioner with a supporting staff of two surveyors and four clerks. (23) He arrived at the townsite of Dawson City on June 15th 1897 to inaugurate civil administration in the Yukon barely a month before the Klondike Stampede began. Even so he was overwhelmed by the amount of work awaiting him, and the complex difficulties created by the miners already in the district. (24)

Until 1897 the miners in the Canadian Yukon had numbered in the hundreds, probably never exceeding one thousand at any time, (25) and with few exceptions all of these were experienced prospectors, well able to take care of themselves in the wilderness. They had no wives, no children, no fixed property and no expectation of remaining long in one vicinity. Yet in November

1896 Ogilvie was anticipating the arrival of "10,000 souls at least" in the Yukon within the next two years to assist in the exploitation of gold. (26) Apparently Ottawa discounted this estimate in the same proportion as it did the reports of the gold potential.

Given the social character of the miners, the remoteness of the Yukon valley, and the general expectations concerning the development of the Territories, Ottawa saw no need to provide such positive forms of government as municipal institutions, or public health or schools, or even improved means of transportation or communication. Nor did it even see the immediate need for a system of courts such as Ogilvie and Constantine emphatically recommended in their respective reports. (27) Consequently the North-West Mounted Police detachment commanded by Constantine and the six-man civil mining staff directed by Fawcett had to cope with every aspect of the arrival of the first wave of argonauts when they poured into the Yukon valley in the late summer of 1897.

Yukon gold had caused excitement down the Pacific Coast long before the riches of Bonanza Creek became international news. By the end of March 1897 rumours had caused a ferment in Seattle and shortly after Vancouver became aware of the opportunities promised by the north. (28) When the North-West Mounted Police relief force sailed from Vancouver on its way to

Fort Cudahy on April 11th, "...a large crowd saw us off on the 'Charmer' and gave us three hearty cheers to which we replied with a will". (29) A number of miners from Nanaimo later boarded the same ship as the "Mounties", also bound for the Yukon. (30) At the same time the British Columbia Legislature was busily passing bills permitting the construction of railways into the northern hinterland of the province and the Yukon; on May 8th 1897 assent was given to four such railway acts. (31)

If the federal government heard reports of this early excitement in British Columbia and down the Pacific coast, it ignored them. It had already made adequate preparations for the expected increase in mining activity in the Yukon District by reinforcing the police and installing a civil mining staff there. No further action seemed to be required. Or so the Government of Canada continued to think until the month of July.

The sensational world-wide newspaper coverage given to the arrival of the steamers 'Excelsior' at San Francisco on July 15th and the 'Portland' at Seattle on July 17th, was the first alarm that registered meaningfully in the ears of the national capital. This excitement could not be ignored or discounted. Within a matter of days the American newspapers, followed by Canadian and British ones, had started the Klondike migration on its way to the north. (32) Within a week of the first headlines Canada's Secretary of State, R.W. Scott, was

informing the Prime Minister, then in England, of the fabulous gold discoveries in the Yukon, the tremendous rush of people into that country, and the necessity of taking prompt action to protect Canadian interests. (33) Conditions now forced the Canadian government to act, and in a state of almost panic it began to do so.

On July 26th Commissioner L.W. Herchmer of the North-West Mounted Police was summoned from Regina to Ottawa, and on July 30th he instructed Assistant Commissioner McIllree to leave for the Yukon as soon as possible with police reinforcements.(34)

On August 24th, Before McIllree could leave Skagway, more police arrived in port, accompanied by a party of six civil servants from the Department of the Interior. (35) Already a Yukon Judicial District had been created by Proclamation on August 16th. (36) And on August 17th James Morrow Walsh, a retired veteran of the North-West Mounted Police, was appointed Chief Executive Officer of the Government of Canada in the Yukon District with the title of "Commissioner". (37)

That Canadian ministries ignored the developing problems of the Yukon during the 1890's is to a degree understandable in view of the many other issues then dominating the federal scene. Frequent changes of leadership marked the final years of the Conservative Party's long reign in Ottawa, and during the winter of 1895-96, when mining in the Yukon valley was developing to

significant importance, Sir Mackenzie Bowell's cabinet was disintegrating in a series of political convulsions. Sir Charles Tupper's government only held office from May 1st to July 8th, 1896, and during those weeks it fought and lost a general election. Then the Manitoba Schools Question occupied almost all the attention which any government could devote to western Canada during 1895 and 1896, for no Canadian parliament had yet been able to sustain profound interest in any aspect of the North-West Territories for more than a short period of time. When the Liberal Party took office on July 11th, 1896, no Minister of the Interior was appointed for many months. While the gold of Bonanza Creek was being unearthed, and reports of its richness were slowly permeating "outside", the federal portfolio responsible for the North-West Territories remained unoccupied. (38) Not until November 17th 1896 did Laurier appoint Clifford Sifton Minister of the Interior.

Sifton was the Member of Parliament for Brandon, Manitoba. An Ontario-born lawyer who had settled and prospered in the West, he was naturally pre-occupied with the problems of the prairies, particularly with the need for agricultural settlement, and a massive immigration program which would bring this about. He required time to familiarize himself with his Department and to reform it, for as a westerner he was in whole-hearted agreement with those critics who complained that

the Department of the Interior was, "...a department of delay, a department of circumlocution, a department which tired men to death who undertook to get any business transacted with it." (39) Furthermore it was not until March 1897 that the subject of the Klondike was even drawn to his attention. (40)

When the Laurier cabinet had to create Yukon policies in the summer of 1897 during the absence of the Prime Minister in Europe, responsibility for their devising fell almost exclusively onto the shoulders of the Minister of the Interior. The decisions the Government reached were largely Sifton's decisions, although somewhat modified by the advice and pressure of his political colleagues both in and out of Parliament. According to Sifton's biographer, J.W. Dafoe.

There were those who thought of the Yukon as a great permanent mining camp, which could be made an enduring source of wealth and revenue. Hence the suggestion that the miners should have only leasehold rights and that the State should participate, through these leases and otherwise, in the wealth that was to be produced in unfailing volume. To the Minister policies of this kind seemed chimerical. To his mind the fate of other placer-mining fields would be the fate of the Klondike: it would be invaded by a flood of fortune seekers, and in the course of a short time it would be dug out. The reasonable thing to do was to let things take this course, getting some revenue out of the field by imposing a royalty, and securing for Canadian business houses the largest possible share of the resulting trade. (41)

Thus Canada's Yukon policy came to be compounded of the following basic elements; the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty, the enforcement of civil order, attempts to make the District

yield revenue sufficient to meet the expenses it was causing, and schemes to benefit the Canadian economy generally. The Yukon would be made to serve "the purposes of the Dominion" as the resources of the entire North-West Territories had been designated to do since the year 1870. (42)

So the federal government devoted the concluding months of 1897 to attempts to keep the gold rush under effective control, and to deciding what might be the future requirements of the Yukon. The Parliamentary Session of 1898 witnessed the unveiling of specific policies for the District.

Four days after the opening of Parliament the Laurier ministry introduced Bill Number Six into the House of Commons on February 8th 1898, "...to confirm an agreement between Her Majesty the Queen and Messrs. Mackenzie and Mann and to incorporate the Canadian Yukon Railway Company. (43) It is a significant indication of the Government's scale of priorities that legislation respecting the political and constitutional status of the Yukon was not unveiled until May 18th, over three months later.

The Yukon Railway Bill immediately eclipsed all possible rivals as the most controversial legislation of the Parliamentary session. It was the Government's one major project for the Development of the Yukon, and was regarded by the Cabinet as the keystone of all other aspects of government in the north.

As the Minister of Railways, A.G. Blair, explained when he introduced the Bill;

We had to devise some means of solving the question as to how civil government should be effectively established and carried on in that region; we had to provide for the protection of life and property and the general preservation of public order, and we felt that in a great measure involving these was the question of providing proper transportation facilities into and out of that country. (44)

Canada's most ubiquitous railway contractors, William Mackenzie and Donald D. Mann were to build a railway approximately 150 miles in length between the navigable waters of the Stikine River and Teslin Lake by September 1st 1898. (45) They were also expected to build a sleigh-road or trail which would be passable within six weeks of the signing of the contract. The contractors were to receive in return a grant of 25,000 acres of land for every mile of railway built. Although the railway would lie entirely in British Columbia the land would be granted in the Yukon Provisional District, or in that region of the North-West Territories lying west of the Mackenzie and Liard rivers. (46) As the Minister of Railways explained; "We do not propose to give any money to the enterprise; we proposed that the Yukon territory should pay for the railway". (47) Northern development should pay for itself; it should not be a charge on the national treasury.

The proposed railway would create an essential link in an "all-Canadian" route between the Yukon and the rest of Canada.

From southern British Columbia ports coastal steamers would sail to Fort Wrangell, Alaska, near the mouth of the Stikine River. There passengers and cargo would be transferred to river vessels for the journey up-stream to Telegraph Creek, the southern terminus of the railway. Thanks to provisions of the 1871 Treaty of Washington, which guaranteed Canada the right of free navigation of the Stikine, it was assumed in Ottawa that both passengers and goods would be exempted from United States customs regulations when trans-shipping at Fort Wrangell for enforcement of the American regulations had already made use of the port of Skagway expensive and irksome for British subjects. (48)

The Government's choice of the Stikine-Teslin route suggests either a confused contradiction or a lack of faith in the final settlement of the Alaska boundary dispute in favour of Canada's claims, which would place the head of the Lynn canal and the ports of Dyea and Skagway within the Province of British Columbia. (See p. 86, Note 31) From Telegraph Creek the railway would travel to a terminus on Teslin Lake, one of the sources of the Yukon River system, where transfer would be made to a second fleet of river steamers for an uninterrupted passage down-stream to Dawson City, or if desired even to the river's mouth on the Bering Sea, and St. Michael's, Alaska.

When introducing the Canadian Yukon Railway Bill the Minister of Railways told the House of Commons;

The Stikine route was decided on by the Government largely because it afforded the nearest approach to an all-Canadian route that was possible under the circumstances; and it becomes possible, or will become possible if in the future there should be found to be any difficulty whatever in the way of the use of the Stikine River or the approach to it, as suggested... for the Government to have a railway connected with the railway known as the Stikine and Teslin Lake line, extending from Telegraph Creek south, and then brought to an ocean point which is purely and exclusively in Canadian Territory, and thus guarantee us for all time against any possible contingency as regards our Canadian line..... We have, as I have said, concluded that the railway must be built; we have concluded that the proper site for the railway under all the circumstances is from Telegraph Creek or from Stikine River to Teslin Lake. (49)

Recently the Yukon Railway Bill has been considered as one of the last significant steps in the implementation of the "National Policy" first devised by Sir John A. Macdonald in 1878; the domestic policy of economic nationalism based on railway building, immigration, settlement and protective tariffs.

Nevertheless the Glenora-Teslin Railway was the key to the successful application of the National Policy in the Yukon. Had it been completed the Canadian Yukon would have been economically tied to central Canada in the same way that the Canadian Pacific Railway a decade earlier had linked the St. Lawrence valley with the prairies and British Columbia. Trade goods manufactured in Hamilton, Toronto and Montreal might have been shipped over the Canadian Pacific to the west coast, transported by water to Glenora and thence by another Canadian Railway to market. The "all-Canadian" route envisaged by Sifton as a counter to the American trade monopoly

was not simply a Canadian railway into the Yukon, but rather the last link in a Canadian trade route that originated in central Canada and terminated in the wilds of the gold rush district. (50)

This "nationalist" interpretation of the Stikine-Teslin railway project, whether advanced by a cabinet minister in 1898 or analysed by a scholar in 1965, remains an attempt to push awkward facts into a theoretical mould into which they cannot be made to fit. Almost seventy years after the scheme was devised it seems increasingly certain that the Stikine-Teslin trail could never have been developed into an economically viable railway route. The terrain was physically difficult. Access from tidewater was always awkward and for many months of the year virtually impossible, and it could only be obtained from a port standing in a precarious and eventually prohibitive political situation. An author personally familiar with the area wrote in 1966;

...the Glenora-Teslin Lake trail proved to be hell almost from start to finish and its length was estimated at a hundred and fifty miles. So much for the short portage! (51)

The Yukon Field Force, which used the route in the summer of 1898 to reach Fort Selkirk and Dawson City did not find the trail quick or easy. Major-General E.T.H. Hutton, Commanding Officer of the Canadian Militia, commented;

The march of this force across an hitherto but little known and very difficult country was conducted with judgement and skill on the part of the officer in command. The difficulties encountered were not unlike those experienced by the Red River Expedition in 1870. (52)

The very fact that it took the Yukon Field Force from May to September to traverse the 200 walking miles of the trail from Telegraph Creek to Teslin Lake speaks for itself. (53) And it was over this terrain that the federal government expected Mackenzie and Mann to complete a passable trail within six weeks of the signature of a contract, and to construct a railway almost to completion by September 1st 1898. As the Minister of Railways told the House of Commons, "Yes, it is absolutely a gamble, nothing more and nothing less". (54) It was indeed, and the government bets were laid on a long-odds runner.

In 1897 the British Columbia government had chartered the White Pass and Yukon Railway to build from tidewater at Skagway to the headwaters of the Yukon River and it seems obvious in retrospect (as it did to many people actually in the Yukon during the winter of 1897-98) that this route would have every commercial advantage over the Stikine-Teslin project. (55) Coastal steamers could reach the railway terminus at tidewater, subtracting one trans-shipment point; only 40 miles of rail would have to be laid, compared to 150 on the Stikine-Teslin trail, before a navigable portion of the Yukon River system was reached, and the railway would be producing revenue. Clifford Sifton estimated the average journey from Vancouver to Dawson over the Stikine route to be thirteen days; three days from

Vancouver to Wrangell; two days from Wrangell to Telegraph Creek, one day from Telegraph Creek to Teslin, and seven days from Teslin Lake to Dawson City. (56) With quick connections Dawson could be reached from Vancouver via Skagway and the White Pass and Yukon route within a week. (57) Furthermore the Stikine-Teslin route would be impractical for many months of the year; Sifton himself stated that the water portions of the route would only be open from approximately the 15th or 20th of May to the 1st of November. (58) Construction of the railway between Telegraph Creek and the shores of Teslin Lake would have been physically difficult and expensive, while the river links with both termini would have raised operating costs to prohibitive levels, especially if the completed line had been forced to compete with an operating White Pass and Yukon route. The "nationalist" inspired Canadian Yukon Railway scheme never made practical economic sense, and details of the contract doomed it to political failure.

The Conservative opposition in Parliament took violent exception to the route the Government had chosen, the reliability of Fort Wrangell as a port of transfer in the context of Canadian-United States relations, the manner in which the contract with Mackenzie and Mann had been signed without tender or competition, and particularly the enormous land grant of three million acres in the potential gold-bearing regions of the north. (59) In addition it entertained suspicions concerning

the political and financial advantages which the Liberal Party hoped to reap from the Canadian Yukon Railway agreement. (60) After furious debates of considerable length the Yukon Railway Bill did pass through the House of Commons, although the Government received a reduced majority on its third reading. However the Conservative majority in the Senate emphatically defeated the Bill on March 30, 1898, by a vote of 52 to 14. (61)

Another defeat had already been suffered by the Yukon Railway Bill in another legislature far distant from Ottawa. The United States Senate had noted a monopoly clause in the Mackenzie and Mann contract, which it took to be a direct and dangerous threat to the best interest of America in Alaska. (62) A Committee of the United States Senate was considering an Alaska Railway Bill in the opening months of 1898. In retaliation for the monopoly clause in the Canadian legislation, the Committee began to attach to the Senate Bill various provisions which would deny Canada bonding privileges at the Lynn Canal and elsewhere in United States' territory. Even the free bonding of American-caught fish across Canadian territory on the North Atlantic Coast would have been prohibited. (63) Also the United States Government was not disposed to allow Canada to use Fort Wrangell, the sea terminus of the Stikine-Teslin route, as a free port. The Treaty of Washington might have granted Canada the right of free navigation of the Stikine

River in 1871, (64) but that right did not include the use of Fort Wrangell as a duty-free transfer point, least of all for use as a junction on "all-Canadian" route to the Yukon gold fields. But if the United States did not grant Canada free transfer rights or privileges at Fort Wrangell, the Stikine-Teslin railway would not be a viable "all-Canadian" route. Unfortunately the Canadian government did not check on its rights at Fort Wrangell before it hastily signed the Mackenzie and Mann contract. Even had the Canadian Parliament approved the Canadian Yukon Railroad Bill, American hostility would have aborted the project.

Once the Yukon Railway Bill had been killed in the Canadian Senate, the United States Senate saw fit to remove the restrictive provisions in its own legislation. When the American Alaska Railway Bill was approved on May 14th 1898, it provided for reciprocal Canadian and American mining rights by their respective citizens, and also for reciprocal bonding and trans-shipment privileges. (65)

The Laurier government was profoundly annoyed by the destruction of the key-stone of its Yukon policies, and for a few months after the defeat of the Canadian Yukon Railway Bill Sifton gave consideration to alternative Yukon railway projects. However construction of the White Pass and Yukon Railway began on May 28th 1898, (66) and the federal government as well as

Mackenzie and Mann soon lost enthusiasm for the original project, or any other alternatives, once this formidable rival was being built. (67)

The success of the privately financed White Pass and Yukon Railway before the Dominion government could launch a second railway scheme removed the necessity for such a project, for the White Pass quickly achieved the objectives the Stikine Teslin railway was expected to attain. At the end of the 1900 mining season the Commanding Officer of the North West Mounted Police in the Yukon reported; "in former years the class of goods shipped in here were mostly of American manufacture, but of the goods shipped in during the past season, it is generally estimated that between 75 and 80 per cent were Canadian". (68)

As subsequent events revealed, the supposed American trade monopoly in the Yukon was only a temporary phenomenon, not an intentionally planned economic aggression. Thanks to the long, if slowly developing trade between the American Pacific coast ports and Alaska, the United States possessed a natural head start in the Yukon trade once the gold rush began. The Yukon river system, entered from the delta on the Bering Sea, remained the only feasible entry for heavy cargoes into the Canadian Yukon as well as the interior of Alaska until the White Pass and Yukon Railway was completed. American traders had the

experience and "know-how"; they had the basic capital equipment, especially in respect to shipping. The economic battle for the Yukon trade was not so much one between Canada and the United States as between the port of Seattle and every other city on the Pacific coast, Canadian or American. (69) Once it became apparent that Canadian economic interests could hold their own in the Yukon, Ottawa rapidly lost its sense of urgent concern for the new territory.

Seven weeks after the Stikine-Teslin Railway scheme met defeat party tempers had cooled and Parliamentary interest in the Yukon was already subsiding. On May 18th the Minister of Justice, the Hon. David Mills, introduced a "Government of the Yukon District Bill" into the Canadian Senate. On May 25th the Bill received second reading, and on May 27th, after brief discussion, third and final reading. (70) In the House of Commons it was given even less debate and an even more rapid passage. On May 31st the legislation was given first reading, on June 2nd, second and third reading, and on June 13 Royal Assent. (71) Obviously other aspects of the gold rush interested Parliament much more than the political and administrative fate of the Yukon, which was now to become a separate territory. A "Commissioner" would become its chief executive officer and he, assisted by a council of six appointed members, would govern the territory under instructions from the Governor in Council or the Minister of the Interior. (72) Clifford Sifton told the House

of Commons;

The general scheme of the Bill is to adopt as far as possible the principles of the old North-West Territories Act. The only radical departure from that is, I think, that we have not provided for any elective members of the council. (73)

However he went on to explain that the Yukon Bill was only intended to be a temporary measure,

...to clothe the Government with power to maintain order and administer the country for a year or two until we shall have a better opportunity of knowing what kind of a community we shall have to provide laws for. As a matter of course, if a permanent population establishes itself in the district, some representative system similar in principle to what was given to the North-West Territories will have to be provided for later on. (74)

The Minister of Justice had earlier expounded a similar line of reasoning to the Senate.

Very few, perhaps none, have gone into that country (the Yukon) with the exception of becoming permanently domiciled there. They go there for the purpose of acquiring a fortune at as early a period as possible and withdrawing from the country as soon as that fortune is acquired, and so it was necessary to keep in view that fact in the constitution of a government for the country. We have endeavoured to provide as simple a system of government as it was possible to provide. We, of course, provide the measure not so much as one of a permanent nature but as a tentative measure necessary to meet the exigencies of the case at the present moment and until the government and parliament can acquire further information and we may be in a better position, at no distant day, to alter or amend it, or to provide a system of government suitable to the circumstances of the country than we are at the present moment. (75)

Mills also described the Minister of the Interior revealingly, as standing towards the Territory, "...in much the same position as the Secretary of State does towards a colony that is just struggling into existence." (76)

In the light of Sifton's belief that the Klondike would quickly be dug out, the number of American citizens in the area, and volatile character of mining frontiers generally, the political provisions of the Yukon Act seem reasonable and appropriate. While announcing an intention to give the Yukon representative institutions at a suitable time, the Government avoided any commitments concerning when, or under what conditions, such institutions might be introduced. Nor did the Government so much as murmur a word about the establishment of a Legislative Assembly. David Mills' explanation of the relationship between the Yukon Government and the Minister of the Interior revealed the extent to which Sir John A. Macdonald's colonial view of the North-West Territories had been adopted by the Laurier Liberals once they were in power, even by David Mills, an author of the North-West Territories Act of 1875. The Yukon would have to flourish as a colony of Ottawa, with its Commissioner having only as much freedom of action as distance and the difficulties of communications made necessary. (77)

In fact the choice of the title "Commissioner" seems to have been a significant indication of Ottawa's attitude and intentions towards the new northern territory. The Keewatin "District" still had a Lieutenant Governor, but the Yukon "Territory" was given as chief executive an officer with the precedent-making title of "Commissioner". The Minister of Justice explained;

...we do not wish to convey any erroneous impression by the adoption for the chief executive officer of a high-sounding title that might have the effect of misleading him with regards to the nature of the duties with which he was intrusted. (78)

And around the title of "Lieutenant Governor" floated a certain constitutional significance, a potentiality for the traditional processes of parliamentary evolution. In the unknown north the federal government was not prepared to take any more chances than circumstances forced it to do. There was to be no grain of sand, like a Lieutenant Governor, around which a dubious pearl like responsible government might grow. For responsible government had only been granted to the North-West Territories in the autumn of 1897, and the Laurier administration seems to have been determined to confine the scope of that long desired political gift exclusively to the provisional prairie districts of Athabasca, Assiniboia, Alberta and Saskatchewan.

The decision to cut the Yukon out of the North-West Territories was reached for a variety of reasons. The Yukon valley did form a definite geographical unit; the river basin was divided from the rest of the Territories by the Rocky Mountains and was most easily accessible from the Pacific Coast. To its inhabitants it seemed, in Bishop Bompas's words, almost "another hemisphere". To officials in Ottawa it seemed a forbidding sub-arctic waste, fit only for mining, and certainly not suitable for permanent agricultural settlement. The composition of its population and its exclusively gold-based

economy made it unique. Hence it ought to be made a separate territory, for it had nothing in common with the prairies, which now were under the control, in most important respects, of a responsible ministry in Regina.

Since 1870 at least, every federal government had been sure of the rightness of its own judgement and distrustful of the wisdom of all provincial and territorial governments to whom power might be delegated. Although Sifton had played an important role in the decision to grant responsible government to the North-West Territories in 1897, he was determined to keep all territorial lands and resources in the hands of Ottawa, and his determination applied as much to the Yukon as to the North-West Territories.

The achievement of responsible government by the North-West Territories may even have played a part in the decision to separate the Yukon from the rest of the Territories, for such a concentration of population as the Yukon could boast in 1898 would be entitled to representation in the Legislative Assembly at Regina. As Sifton wished to maintain complete and strict federal control over every aspect of the Yukon, such representation might well threaten federal authority over the northern gold fields, and perhaps even Canadian sovereignty in that remote frontier area.

The fact that the government of the North-West Territories had been granted responsible government in 1897, but not control over Territorial lands and resources, now began to influence Regina's attitudes to the Klondike, and to complicate the administration of the Yukon. The Territorial Government was in a financial vice, squeezed between the limited revenues it could raise by taxation or borrowing, and the rapidly increasing expenditures it was forced to make by the federal Government's successful immigration campaigns, which were beginning to bring a rising flood of farmers to settle on the western plains. (79) Ottawa continued to apportion inadequate financial grants to the Territorial Government even though it had demonstrated in 1897 greater constitutional liberality than at any previous time.

Once responsible government had been secured one of the first actions taken by Premier Frederick W. Haultain's ministry was to attempt to raise funds for the Territorial treasury in the Yukon provisional district. Through the North-West Mounted Police and the mining officials of the Department of the Interior, the federal government was bearing almost the entire expense of Yukon administration, but the Yukon District nevertheless remained as much a part of the North-West Territories as any of the other provisional districts. On January 22nd and 29th, 1898, the Lieutenant Governor of the North-West Territories conferred on G.H.V. Bulyea, a member of his new Executive Council, the

"powers" and "responsibilities" of administering the Territorial laws and jurisdiction "in that portion of the North-West Territories called the Yukon Provisional District". (80) He did so as the federal government, at Sifton's direction, gave the Territorial Government emphatic notice by telegram and letter that it intended to keep liquor under its own control. This intention the Territorial Government felt itself constitutionally empowered to ignore. (81)

On February 14th 1898 Bulyea arrived in Skagway, and on that day began a prolonged clash between the Canadian and the North-West Territories governments which reached its climax on May 21st on the streets of Dawson in a public argument between Bulyea and Commissioner Walsh, and concluded in the law courts of the Yukon Territory the following July. (82) Bulyea challenged Walsh's claims to superior and exclusive authority in the Provisional District and attempted to exert all the rights of the Government of the North-West Territories. Immediately after his arrival in Dawson on April 11, 1898, he established a three-member Board of Commissioners to regulate the sale of liquor. The Board quickly collected licence fees totalling \$24,962. (83) When Commissioner Walsh denied Bulyea's authority, Bulyea resorted to the Territorial Courts, and only a series of dubious delaying tactics by Walsh, his legal officers and Judge McGuire prevented a decision being reached

before the news reached Dawson that the proclamation of the Yukon Act on June 13, 1898, had indisputably removed the Yukon beyond the jurisdiction of Regina. In fact the belated judicial decision upheld the authority of Bulyea and the Government of the North-West Territories, and so the Territorial treasury could at least retain the monies it had raised from the bars of the Klondike.

The Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories reacted to the establishment of a separate Yukon Territory with a unanimous expression of its views.

That while the cutting off of the Yukon Judicial District may have been done in the general interests of the country, we cannot but view with apprehension any indication of a policy on the part of Parliament tending to the disintegration of the Territories as they are at present constituted, and note with satisfaction that the Government took the necessary steps to exercise their jurisdiction in the Yukon District, and will await with interest the report of the member of the Executive Council entrusted with that duty.

That we admit with His Honour that one of the most important duties devolving upon the Government arose from the imperative and immediate necessity for regulating the importation and sale of intoxicating liquor in the Yukon District, and are pleased to be informed that this work has been done with great care and consideration and that a statement of the action taken will be shortly laid before us. (84)

The Yukon liquor licencing incident illustrates the intensity of the federal government's determination to keep the Yukon exclusively under its own direct control, even to the extent of ignoring the constitutional division of powers it had

introduced itself. Territories were expected to submit to the wishes of Ottawa even in cases in which they were not legally obliged to do so. Although the North-West Territories might have a nominal size of more than three million square miles, its elected government was only expected, and intended, to administer the prairies from the boundaries of Manitoba to those of British Columbia, and from the 49th to the 60th parallels. The remainder of northern Canada only remained part of the North-West Territories to suit the administrative convenience, or the disinterest, of the Government of Canada.

Later events fully justified the "apprehension" of the Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories expressed in August 1898 concerning the federal intention to disintegrate the Territories as they were presently constituted. The creation of a Yukon Territory traced the handwriting on the wall for the creation of two provinces, not one, out of the prairie portions of the Territories, once its government was able to demand provincial status in 1905. 1898 produced the the first appearance of the Laurier Government's practical philosophy of Confederation: it should be a federal system in which each component province was as equal as possible in respect to potential as well as present size, wealth, population and influence. In those areas in which the federal government intended to rule, it would brook no rivals. (85)

Nothing mirrored more clearly the changing policies but persistent attitudes of the federal government towards the northern territories than the mining regulations applied to the Yukon. Those developing regulations variously reflect the perennial disinterest in the northern frontier, the alarm and concern once Americans began to intrude in significant numbers into the gold fields, the quick determination to make Klondike gold pay for the expenses it was causing the government, and finally the adoption of a policy which would safely permit Canada to relax back into an attitude of safe disinterest once the crisis of the gold rush was past.

Up to 1897 very few mines of economic significance had fallen under the jurisdiction of the Dominion Government. Coal mining in the Alberta Provisional District, so very different in every respect from placer mining on sub-arctic river beds, furnished the only appreciable mining experience the Department of the Interior had encountered in any part of the North-West Territories. (86) When the first gold was discovered in the Canadian Yukon during the 1880's, the mining regulations nominally in force there were in an embryonic state and bore little relation to actual conditions in the north. (87) Such regulations as the Department of the Interior had formulated were based primarily on British Columbia mining laws, "...and were ill-suited indeed to a region where eternal frost could be found almost anywhere a foot or so beneath the surface". (88)

The sensational publicity of July 1897 exaggerated accounts of the richness of the Klondike gold many fold, but such was the hysteria of the times that the Laurier Cabinet accepted them at face value, and swiftly imposed a royalty of ten percent on all gold mined in the Yukon. (89) Following British precedent Canada did not attempt to prevent aliens from making mining claims in her territory, but as the majority of miners were Americans who would be exporting any gold they might discover, and as one of the chief objectives of the Government was to contain and reduce United States influence in the north, it determined to secure a share of the mineral production in order to attempt to make the gold royalty revenue approximate administrative expenditure. Thus the ten percent royalty was imposed despite vociferous objections from Dawson City. (90)

In January 1898 the Department of the Interior promulgated additional mining regulations which provoked much more bitter and long-lived hostility than even the gold royalty had aroused. It formulated regulations which would encourage the development of large scale mining by hydraulic methods, and it granted a lease to an English mining engineer, Robert Anderson, permitting him to begin hydraulic operations on an unclaimed section of Hunker Creek. (91) Then another Englishman appeared on the Yukon Mining scene, the ingenious and cantankerous former

schoolmaster, A.C.N. Treadgold, who became the first man to begin the consolidation of claims and mining operations on the Klondike. (92)

Between 1899 and 1902 Treadgold devoted his energies to buying up claims of Bonanza Creek. During the same period he simultaneously persuaded the Dominion Government to grant a charter to companies he controlled, giving them the exclusive and automatic right of reversion of all lapsed claims on Bonanza Creek. (93) Such a concession aroused understandably the alarm and wrath of almost every independent miner in the Yukon, whose opportunity to compete for such lapsed claims was completely abrogated.

Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, the Laurier Government stood resolutely behind the Treadgold Concession. Indeed it had every reason for encouraging the development of hydraulic mining in the Yukon, and hardly one for opposing it, or sympathizing with the individual miners who denounced the scheme and its far-reaching consequences. Hydraulic mining would have to be undertaken by a few large corporations, not by a legion of independent miners. Most of the miners in the Yukon were foreigners, untrained, unskilled, inefficient, and likely to become charges on an unwilling and unprepared territorial government. Corporations would be easier for government to deal with, to control, and to extract revenue from than a

multitude of small claim holders who, once they had "struck it rich", would leave the country with at least ninety percent of their riches. Corporations would produce gold, and tax revenues, for longer and with fewer associated problems, than individual miners. Naturally the most significant social consequence of the consolidated hydraulic mining corporations would be a reduction in the Yukon's population. Fewer miners would require fewer merchants and fewer provisioners of services. But then the Government was not interested in the establishment of a large permanent population in the north. (94) As so much of the prairies still awaited settlement and development the northern territories could best serve the Dominion's interests by remaining a "national bank rest", a reserve of unappraised resources which should await exploitation at some unspecified time in a far distant future.

Hydraulic methods soon began to predominate all gold mining operations on the Klondike and its tributary rivers after 1900, and the victory of the new method accelerated the inevitable decline of the Yukon's population from the zenith reached in 1899. (95) Nevertheless the federal government began to give the Yukon Territory an ever increasing measure of representative institutions as the gold rush gradually subsided. In 1899 Parliament made provision for the election of two members to the Territorial Council; (96) in 1902 the elected

members were increased to five; (97) and in 1908 the Council was made an entirely representative body composed of ten elected members. (98) In 1902 the Yukon Representation Act made the Territory an electoral district with one seat in the House of Commons. (99) The fewer the number of people who remained in the Yukon, the more political representation they were given. But power remained concentrated in Ottawa; the Yukon Council in Dawson remained only a public "safety valve", not a responsible local government.

In respect to the Yukon the fundamental error of Clifford Sifton and his successor as Minister of the Interior, Frank Oliver, was one of timing. If the gold rush had collapsed after one or two seasons, as Sifton realistically expected in 1897, the government's policies would have been vindicated. However the staggering influx of people into the Yukon valley in 1897 and 1898, followed by the amazing continuation of the prosperity of the gold fields, persuaded Ottawa to change its first judgement of the situation in the north, and alter its initial policies. Installation of Representative institutions and an elaborate administrative apparatus had only just been completed when the Yukon's population declined to a number barely able to support such a superstructure of government. Thus the Dominion fell into a dilemma of its own creation, a dilemma originating from the lack of mature and coherent plans

for either the economic or political development of any part of Canada's northern territories. In the Yukon the federal government had to face up to the problems of dismembering or reducing the system of territorial government it had belatedly and unnecessarily created.

CHAPTER V.

THE SECURING OF CANADIAN ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY

For Canada the most significant consequence of the Klondike Gold Rush, both internally and internationally, proved to be the Alaska Boundary Question. The boundary between Alaska and British North America had long been agreed upon according to the provisions of the Anglo-Russian Treaty signed on February 28th, 1825. That document stated that the boundary across the neck of the Alaskan peninsula from the shore of the "frozen Ocean" south to the Pacific littoral should be the 141st meridian of West Longitude. However the boundary running the length of the Alaskan pan-handle was defined in much less precise terms. It was to follow "the summit of the mountains which extend in a direction parallel to the coast, from the 56th degree of north latitude to the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude".(1) In fact there was no continuous range of mountains parallel to the coast; verbal definitions bore no similarity to geographical reality. Did the boundary line follow every twist in the sinuous Alaskan coast, at a distance of ten leagues from the sea? Or did it follow a course parallel to the "general trend" of the coast? a line which would place the heads of many inlets within British North America, and not in Alaska? The question remained unresolved after 1825, and indeed it was seldom even proposed. Neither during the Russian or the American regimes in

Alaska was the pan-handle delimited. No government saw the necessity of such a difficult and costly project.

The Gold Rush, however, made agreement upon the location of a precise boundary a matter of urgent importance. The whole issue of control of the entry ports into the gold fields was at stake. Was the head of the Lynn Canal, including the ports of Dyce and Skagway, rightfully part of the British Columbia coast? Or was that strategic region part of Alaska? and thus as much a part of the United States as it was physically controlled by Americans up to 1897.

Since 1825 the matter of boundary delimitation had been discussed on several occasions, but little had been done to settle the issue. During the years 1892-1895 a joint United States-Canada Commission had made a survey of the boundary region, but the Commissioners submitted their report on December 31, 1895, and before any action was taken on their findings the Klondike Rush had commenced. Agreement on an international boundary then became a matter of immediate practical necessity. Thus on May 9th, 1898 the United States and Great Britain agreed to a temporary demarcation of the boundary in the vicinity of the Lynn Canal. Such a demarcation would not be permanently binding on either party, and would only remain in effect until both nations reached agreement on a final settlement. Negotiations as protracted as they were

unproductive followed from 1898 to 1903, and the temporary "modus vivendi" boundary remained in effect while the gold rush waxed and waned. On January 24th 1903 the United States and Great Britain agreed to submit the ultimate definition of the Alaska boundary to a tribunal of "six impartial jurists of repute".

From the moment the American members of the Tribunal were appointed the aggressive intention and bad faith of the United States' government became apparent - at least to Canadians. (2) President Theodore Roosevelt's appointees might or might not be "jurists of repute", but they certainly were not impartial. (3) When the Tribunal announced its decision of October 20th, 1903, Canada's worst fears were fully confirmed. The judgement was in almost complete agreement with the American contention in the question. It decided that the heads of all the inlets were definitely in United States' territory, and that the boundary should follow a line approximately thirty miles inland from the serpentine coast, not a line approximating the coast's general trend. Canada would have no outlet to tidewater north of the mouth of the Nass River.

The Two Canadian Commissioners, Allan Aylesworth and Sir Louis Jette, refused to sign the majority decision and published their own dissenting opinion, which declared the award "nothing less than a grotesque travesty of justice",

"totally unsupported either by argument or authority, and it was, moreover, illogical." (4) The president of the Tribunal, Lord Alverstone, voted with the American Commissioners, presumably in order to serve the wide "best interests" of Imperial foreign policy. But for Canada the service of those "best interests" was no consolation for the sacrifice of territory which she believed to be rightly hers. Understandably the Tribunal's decision blew up in a storm of indignation and alarm throughout the Dominion.

On the same day that the Alaska Boundary Tribunal published its judgement, October 20th 1903, Senator Pascal Poirier raised the subject in the Canadian Senate. (5) He spoke in order to "wake up" and "direct the attention of the government to the threat of American encirclement of Canada in the north." (6) While Poirier could find no fault with the legality of the Tribunal's judgement, he thought;

...it is time we called a halt and looked forward to see how many other slices we may be called upon to part with, and see if we cannot avert this process of dismembering our beautiful Dominion.... Shall we wait until we are entirely encircled by them (U.S.A.) before opening our eyes to coming dangers. I would say imminent dangers, which are staring us in the face? The next possible arbitration may be concerning Hudson Bay. Supposing at that time Greenland should be a possession of the United States, just how the iron circle would inclose us and how our chances would be increased of losing another slice, as occurred in this last arbitration here, in any arbitration concerning Hudson Bay? (7)

No doubt such American encirclement would lead to Canada making more sacrifices in the best interest of the Empire as a whole - unless she took precautions to secure what she claimed to be her own.

Just consider what our position will be if the Americans discover the North Pole and take possession of it. Although possibly there is no economic value attached to it at present, what is now just an academic and geographical point would become a political factor of great importance. (8)

Apparently Senator Poirier was unaware that the Canadian Government had already gone to the defense of the northern boundaries of the Dominion. The belligerent stance of the United States on the Alaska Boundary Tribunal had broken the back of more than thirty years' indifference to the Canadian Arctic. (9)

In the spring of 1903 the North West Mounted Police received orders to establish posts in the Canadian Arctic. Commissioner A. Bowen Perry remarked in the course of his Annual Report for the year;

They stand for law and good order, and show that no matter what the cost, nor how remote the region, the laws of Canada will be enforced, and the native population protected. (10)

Such objectives would certainly furnish an admirable objective for future Canadian policy towards the north, no matter how inaccurately they reflected its past application.

Superintendent Charles Constantine, the first Canadian policeman to enter the Yukon, led a detachment down the Mackenzie River to the shores of the Beaufort Sea, which resulted in Sergeant F.J. Fitzgerald establishing "a detachment the most northerly in the world" at Herschell Island, lying 2 miles off the Yukon coast and 65 miles west of the mouth of the Mackenzie River. (11) However the diminishing whaling fleets had almost abandoned Herschell Island by 1903.

Last winter there were only two small schooners there. For three winters there were none. The rendezvous for those who winter in the Arctic is now Baillie Island, not so far from Cape Bathurst, 300 miles to the east of Herschell, where there is a large settlement of natives the policy is now to winter in the Arctic. I was told I was six years too late. (12)

Once on Herschell Island the police could only listen to tales of remembered drinking debauches when the whalers were in harbour and witness the deaths of 70 of the 80 Eskimos on the island from the swift ravages of measles, (13) it was now time to regret that the Dominion Government had not heeded a decade earlier Bishop Bompas's pleas for an official Canadian presence on Arctic shores. (14)

However Canada now was active in the eastern as well as the western Arctic. On August 23rd 1903 the chartered sealing vessel "Neptune" sailed from Halifax bearing an expedition commanded by A.P. Low of the Geological Survey of Canada, and including a five man contingent of the North West Mounted Police,

led by Superintendent J.D. Moodie. (15) The "Neptune" received orders to patrol the waters of Hudson Bay and those adjacent to the eastern Arctic Islands. Before she returned to Halifax, on October 12, 1904, she also assisted the North West Mounted Police in establishing a permanent post at Cape Fullerton, for the "collection of customs, the administration of justice and the enforcement of the law as in other parts of the Dominion".(16) Cape Fullerton, in the north-west corner of Hudson Bay, was chosen as the site of a post because American whalers were known to winter there.

Before entering Hudson Bay, the "Neptune" also cruised about the whaling posts around Baffin Island. In Cumberland Sound the Scot in charge of the station owned by Noble Brothers of Aberdeen expressed pleasure on being told that annual visits might henceforth be expected from Canadian government vessels. He stated, "...that the firm had long wished that the Canadian government would look after affairs in that part." (17)

The commanders of the "Neptune" quickly reached the same opinions about the whaling industry as the Herschell Island detachment had in the western arctic. Low had been instructed to find, and if possible pass the winter of 1903-04 in company with, the American whalers in Hudson Bay. He could find only one. Whaling had declined further in the eastern arctic than in the western. That one American whaler was the schooner "Era"

of New Bedford, Massachusetts, commanded by Captain George Comer, a most versatile mariner who spent much time doing field work for the anthropologist Dr. Franz Boas of the American Museum of Natural History in New York. (18) Procrastinating Canada only began the attempt to regulate whaling in her waters when that ancient pursuit was about to vanish. (19)

While the departure of foreign vessels from northern waters might be of advantage to Canada's territorial ambitions, it would also saddle the Dominion Government with the direct responsibility for the welfare of the Eskimos, who had long since adopted their way of life to the whaling industry and were no longer capable of surviving once the whalers abandoned the arctic fisheries, (20) that as a general principle the north must pay for itself or be ignored. The cruise of the "Neptune" revealed that while the Dominion was almost too late to counter commercial and territorial challenges to Canadian sovereignty, it would soon fall heir to the type of financial obligations in the north which until then had always been successfully avoided. Nevertheless the year 1903 saw Canada inaugurate policies and recognize responsibilities in her northern extremities in which she might often hesitate, but never reverse. Foreign threats had accomplished more than domestic conscience could ever do. The American eagle had at least woken up the indifferent Canadian beaver.

Between 1903 and 1914 Canada despatched five sea-borne expeditions into the arctic archipelago. In 1904 the steamer "Arctic" commanded by Captain J.E. Bernier took supplies to the police post at Cape Fullerton, established during the cruise of the "Neptune" in the previous year. (21) On July 15 1906 the "Arctic" under Bernier's mastership, sailed on a full-scale expedition into northern waters from which she did not return until October 19, 1907. (22) Shortly before the "Arctic" sailed, the Canadian Parliament passed an act which incidentally declared Hudson Bay to be "wholly territorial water of Canada." (23) During debate on the amendment bill the Minister of Marine and Fisheries was asked, "What is the Arctic's object in cruising among the islands?" The Honourable L.P. Brodeur misleadingly replied; "To ascertain if whaling is carried on there. Our information is that there is whaling at the mouth of the Mackenzie river." (24) Brodeur was not able to answer a question as to whether or not the United States had accepted Canada's exclusive claim to Hudson Bay. (25) Nevertheless Bernier's objective throughout the voyage of 1906-07 was no innocent quest for information about whaling, and he had no orders and no intention of approaching the Mackenzie River delta. The "Arctic" sailed through the arctic archipelago as far west as Melville Island, raising the Canadian flag (26) with appropriate ceremonies on numerous islands, and generally "asserting Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic regions which are the

territory of this Dominion by right of cession made to Canada by the imperial government". (27) The maintenance and extension of Canadian sovereignty was its purpose, not the collection of whaling data.

While the "Arctic" was at sea the question of Canadian sovereignty in the north was again raised in Parliament. The Hon. Pascal Poirier moved in the Senate on February 20th 1907;

That it be resolved that the Senate is of the opinion that the time has come for Canada to make a formal declaration of possession of the lands and islands situated in the north of the Dominion and extending to the north pole. (28)

The later famous "sector principle" had been publically advanced for the first time as a factor in international law. (29)

Senator Poirier was disturbed by the reports he occasionally read in United States newspapers about Americans hoisting the "Stars and Stripes" on certain arctic islands. Although such incidents might at the time be merely "of a sportive character" or a "matter of amusement" he thought they still might have serious consequences in future, especially when he remembered the importance the United States had attached to small acts of possession in the past, most notably in the case of the Alaska frontier. Thus Poirier declared:

I have arrived at the conclusion that all the lands and islands that are situated north of the Canadian northern limits and extend to the north pole do belong unquestionably to the Crown of England and ever since the British North America Act, to the Dominion of Canada.

....

That question of title will, some day, be brought up in one way or other, and it is, I believe, proper that we should precede our friends to the south, and assert in as public a manner as possible our dominion over those lands. (30)

Ignorance and disbelief in any potential wealth in the northern reaches of the continent had caused Canada to lose Alaska. Now Canada was in danger of being "encircled all around".

I would suggest that the Canadian government consider this question of possession by us of our territory up to the north pole, and settle once for all with the United States people all pending questions, so that what Sir Wilfrid Laurier said the other day may have its full application, and that there may be no possible ground for strife of any kind between Canada and the United States. (31)

It would be interesting to discover to what extent Senator Poirier's theories influenced Captain Bernier, or vice-versa, and to assess how profoundly these gentlemen, by argument and action respectively, influenced the conduct of the Government of Canada during the following decades. After his 1906-07 voyage Bernier wrote,

It is of the utmost importance that the Dominion takes possession of all northern regions as far north as the North Pole. Those regions abound in valuable islands which contain vast quantities of coal and other minerals. (32)

Bernier next sailed north aboard the "Arctic" on July 28th 1908, with the assignment of, "patrolling the waters of that part of the Dominion of Canada already annexed, and for the further purpose of annexing territory of British possessions as far west as longitude 141 degrees". (33) It would seem that

he somewhat exceeded his orders according to the dictates of his own ambitions and along the lines of Poirier's "sector principle". With typical flair Bernier unveiled a monument on Melville Island on Dominion Day, 1909. He fixed on Parry's Rock a tablet sculpted by the "Arctic's" Chief Engineer, J.V. Koenig, bearing the inscription:

This Memorial is Erected today to Commemorate
The taking possession for the "Dominion of Canada"
of the whole "Arctic Archipelago" Lying to the north
of America from long. 60 w to 141 w up to latitude
90 n.
Winter Hbr. Melville Island, C.G.S. Arctic - July
1st 1909. (34)

The next voyage of the "Arctic" began in 1910, but as Bernier had already raised the Canadian flag on most of the principal known arctic islands on previous expeditions, the ship was ordered to attempt the Northwest Passage as well as patrol the waters "where whaling is prosecuted". Ice prevented a successful northwest passage, and no significant extensions of Canadian sovereignty were made. (35)

Although Canada's title to the Arctic Islands had been powerfully reinforced in the years following the painful experiences of 1903, the threat of American encirclement remained a very lively apprehension. No doubt the Reciprocity Election of 1911, with its accompanying annexationist perorations, like the notorious speech of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Champ Clark, influenced official interest in the north in much

the same way as it influenced the Canadian electorate as a whole. Canada stood on guard against any American entanglements. When Sir Wilfrid Laurier's ministry resigned on October 6th 1911 the new Borden government continued the nation-expanding and territory-securing policies of its Liberal predecessor.

When the Canadian government discovered in 1912 that the experienced arctic explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson was planning to lead another expedition, financed entirely by American interests, into the Canadian north, Borden took decisive steps to ensure that Stefansson only ventured forth under official Canadian auspices. (36) Thus the Canadian Arctic Expedition, the first major scientific investigation of the shores and islands of the Northwest Territories despatched by the Dominion government, sailed from Esquimalt in 1913, to remain almost forgotten in the north until its leader returned to civilization in 1918. (37)

As Stefansson reappeared in Ottawa almost precisely as the Armistice of November 11th, 1918, was signed, he was able to begin immediately the task of revivifying official interest in the arctic. In 1919 a Royal Commission to investigate the commercial possibilities of reindeer and musk-ox was appointed with Stefansson as one of the commissioners. (38) However Stefansson was also fascinated by the dawn of the age of

commercial airways, and particularly in the possibilities of trans-polar "great circle" flying ⁰ routes. Aeroplanes were now making Earth, for practical purposes, truly a globe, and not a convex cylinder around which man had to travel in an east-west or west-east direction.

Vilhjalmur Stefansson must have been one of the most persuasive explorers who ever breathed, for he next persuaded two Canadian ministries to engage in an unprecedented scheme of arctic imperialism. In the years 1920, 1921 and 1922 he succeeded in persuading two prime ministers, the hard-headed Arthur Meighen and the super-cautious W.L. Mackenzie King, to extend Canadian sovereignty over Wrangel Island, lying in the Arctic Ocean approximately one hundred miles from the coast of Siberia. Hitherto it had been assumed to be a Russian Island, but Stefansson stated that no state had ever officially claimed it. In claiming Wrangel Island would of course leap the confines of the "sector principle" of arctic sovereignty which she had been the first to advance. In less than twenty years the Dominion had been transformed from a state which could hardly bother to secure the boundaries she legally claimed, into one willing to seize any island that possibly might serve her national interests.

Wrangel Island had fish and fur resources, but Stefansson argued that its greatest value would be found in

the future, as an air-base on trans-polar flying routes. Furthermore it would serve the interests of the Empire as well as Canada, by furnishing a strategic base from which to contain the expansionist Japanese Empire. (39) He stated that the Russian claims to the Island were tenuous at best, and in the strictest terms of international law, non-existent. (40) No doubt international conditions favoured a Canadian exercise in territorial expansion. Russia was then torn by civil war, Allied troops had been fighting on her soil, a contingent of Royal Northwest Mounted Police cavalry had been despatched to Vladivostock in 1918, and the Hudson Bay Company was actively trading in eastern Siberia. In such circumstances no Canadian government had any scruples about claiming in perpetuity an arctic island contiguous to a remote Russian coast. (41)

Stefansson's daring proposals and irresistible enthusiasms might influence Canadian politicians, but senior permanent civil servants took a very hostile view of the Wrangel Island venture. Their reaction illustrates the fragility of Canada's own title to the arctic archipelago, at least until the year 1930.

On November 25th 1920 the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sir Joseph Pope, wrote a memorandum to the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Arthur Meighen, on the subject of "Canada's Claim to certain islands within the Arctic Circle".

Concerning Wrangel Island, Sir Joseph remarked that it was essentially an Asiatic Island, far removed from the Dominion and not even wholly in the western hemisphere. Obviously the Department of External Affairs was taking the "sector theory" to heart.

It was generally considered that any pretensions we might have to this island must be of a very unsubstantial character, and could only result in weakening our legitimate claims to the Arctic Islands contiguous to our own territory, for if we can go so far afield as Wrangel to take possession of islands, unconnected with Canada, what is there to prevent the United States, Denmark, or any other power, laying claim to islands far from their shores but adjacent to our own. (42)

In February 1921 Prime Minister Meighen withdrew the official backing he had promised for the effective occupation of Wrangel Island. But as Stefansson proceeded to launch his own privately financed Wrangel Island Expedition, it became apparent that both the Meighen government and the succeeding Mackenzie government, were fully willing to back Stefansson's claims if his occupation of the island proved to be successful. (43) They would be willing to share the credit for a successful occupation of the island, but not the possible international odium of initiating such a "land grab".

September 23rd 1921 saw the Stafansson Expedition land on Wrangel Island and claim it to be Canadian territory. Stefansson himself did not join the party, but remained in the United States on a lecture tour which would provide funds for

the Expedition's success. But by 1922 he was in urgent need of the monetary support of the Canadian government in order to supply and relieve the five-man group on the island. He began to besiege Prime Minister King, members of the cabinet and officials of the civil service for aid. When Mackenzie King requested advice on the subject from the Department of External Affairs, he received both a copy of Sir Joseph Pope's memorandum to Meighen of November 25 1920 and a secret memorandum from the Department's legal adviser, Loring Christie. Sir Joseph stated forthrightly;

In my judgement, no more far-fetched claim could well be imagined, and any attempt to associate Canada with such fantastic pretensions could scarcely fail to prejudice us in the eyes of the world, besides weakening our legitimate claim to certain Arctic islands adjacent to our own territory, in respect to which we have a strong case. (44)

Loring Christie, after examining and dismissing the advantages of Canadian ownership of Wrangel Island, remarked that no expert and no authoritative opinion whatever had been advanced to support Stefansson's contentions, and that neither the Air Board, the Naval Service Department, nor the British Air Ministry nor the Admiralty, had evidenced any interest in the island. The Russian Government had already protested and challenged Canada's claims; the American government was looking at the incident "with a cool eye" and would, in Christie's estimate, "support Russia if the matter came to an issue."

Doubtless the Japanese, who had so far been non-committal, were watching, and "would have to be reckoned with".

Still more serious, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that action on our part in Wrangel would result in weakening our case - already none too strong - for completing our ownership of the Arctic Archipelago immediately north of our mainland, which all agree to be clearly in our interest. (45)

Despite the uniform advice tendered by all permanent officials the King ministry persisted in claiming Wrangel Island for Canada. So long as the exploit avoided costs and international complications the Government was willing to support it morally. On May 12, 1922 the Prime Minister told the House of Commons; "The Government certainly maintains the position that Wrangel Island is part of the property of this country". (46) However when it became known that most members of the expedition had died tragically, and that the Russian government had removed the survivors from Wrangel Island, Canada swiftly lost interest in territorial expansion off the Siberian coast. In 1923 when asked in the House of Commons who owned Wrangel Island, Ernest Lapointe, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, replied, "I should like to know myself." (47) The Minister of the Interior, Charles Stewart, when asked the same question, hesitantly replied, "I don't think we own it." (48) Two years later Stewart's opinions had hardened considerably, for he felt able to assure members of parliament categorically;

"We have no interest in Wrangel Island". (49) Thus ended the Wrangel Island incident, an incongruous, futile and tragic episode which everyone involved seemed thankful to forget.

At approximately the same time as Stefansson was planning the Wrangel Island expedition Canada was faced with a statement of Danish claims to territory in the arctic archipelago. In 1920, as a result of the work of the Royal Commission on Reindeer and Musk-oxen, on which Stefansson had served, the Canadian Government requested the Danish Government to stop the Greenland eskimo from killing musk-oxen on Ellesmere Island. The Danish Government, backed by the advice of the arctic explorer Knud Rasmussen, suggested in reply that Ellesmere Island was a "No-man's land", not Canadian territory. (50) On July 13, 1920 the Canadian Government protested in return that Ellesmere Island came under British sovereignty, and was no "No-man's Land". As Stefansson remarked of the Danish claims:

This kindled interest, for it is human nature to want whatever someone else wants. The Government actually began to spend money, and plans of an expedition on a great scale took shape. (51)

Plans were made for the venerable "Arctic" to sail north once again, and under the command of the septuagenarian Captain Bernier the vessel sailed north on July 18th 1922, (52) to initiate what proved to be a continuous annual sequence of Eastern Arctic Patrols. On August 21st 1922 construction of a

Royal Canadian Mounted Police commenced at Craig Harbour at the southern end of Ellesmere Island, and Denmark's contention that the island belonged to no state was deflected by permanent Canadian occupation. Thereafter Denmark's interest in any part of the arctic archipelago lying to the west of Greenland evaporated.

In 1925 Canada obtained "de facto" recognition of her sovereignty over the arctic islands from the United States of America. Roald Amundsen, the Norwegian conqueror of the Northwest Passage, was now about to make an attempt to fly an aeroplane over the North Pole, and at the same time the United States Navy and the National Geographic Society were planning to send the American explorer Donald Macmillan to investigate the polar ice cap from a base to be established on Axel Heiberg Island. Concern was felt in Ottawa over both the possibility that Amundsen might land on the Svedrup Islands and the fact that Macmillan had not requested Canada's permission to use Axel Heiberg Island. In order to strengthen Canada's authority over those islands the Minister of the Interior introduced an amendment to the Northwest Territories Act to the House of Commons on June 1st 1925, which would give the government authority to exact licences from explorers and traders entering northern waters. On the Bill's second reading he explained;

Some explorers have voluntarily come to us and secured permits, but this had not been done in every case.... We are getting after men like MacMillan and Amundsen, men who are going in presumably for exploration purposes; but possibly there may arise a question as to the sovereignty over some land they may discover in the northern portion of Canada, and we claim all that portion. (53)

When a member of parliament asked the Minister if Canada claimed jurisdiction right up to the North Pole, Stewart replied, "Yes, right up to the North Pole". (54) Thus Canada became the first country to espouse officially the sector principle as a basis of her claims of sovereignty.

On Dominion Day 1925 the "Arctic" sailed north on her last Eastern Arctic Patrol, and on August 19th she encountered Macmillan's ships "Peary" and "Bowdoin" at the Greenland port of Etah. There Captain Bernier evidently convinced Macmillan and his second in command Richard Byrd, that they had been improperly informed about the scope of Canadian sovereignty in the north, and that they were trespassing without needed permission on Canadian territory. (55) In any event the Americans withdrew to the south immediately afterward, reputedly to examine the nesting place of the blue goose on Baffin Island. The threat of arctic encirclement at least by the United States had disappeared.

But the Norwegian claims to the Svedrup Islands had not yet been erased. In 1926 Staff Sergeant A.H. Joy made a successful expedition under orders from Craig Harbour to Axel

Heiberg Island. He became the first Canadian to set foot on its rocks since Svedrup announced its discovery twenty four years previously. On the strength of Joy's expedition the Canadian Government asked the Norwegian Government on June 2nd 1926 for particulars of its claims, if any, to the Svedrup Islands. (56) Slow negotiations followed between Svedrup and the Norwegian Government, and between the Norwegian Government and the Government of Canada. In 1930 agreement was reached that Norway would relinquish all rights to the Svedrup Islands in return for Canada paying monetary compensation to Captain Svedrup personally for his former expenses and surviving charts. On November 11th 1930 the Department of the Interior announced that Otto Svedrup had been paid \$67,000 in return for the withdrawal of Norwegian claims. (57) Canada's last rival for arctic territory had been removed. V. Kenneth Johnston remarked in 1933;

It may be said, therefore, that by the activities of the Canadian Government in the Arctic, the declaration of Bernier's in 1909 has now been validated. (58)

At last, sixty-three years after Confederation the Dominion's back had been securely placed against the North Pole.

CHAPTER VI.

THE RESIDUAL NORTHWEST TERRITORIES: 1905-1921.

The opening years of the twentieth century found the Government of the Northwest Territories, under the leadership of Premier Frederick W. Haultain, striving to attain a full measure of constitutional freedom as a province within Confederation. The formula of responsible government within the confines of territorial status, which had been implemented since 1897, failed to furnish the elected ministry at Regina with the ability to meet its growing fiscal obligations. Nor did it give adequate scope to the ambitions of the people, and especially the politicians of the Northwest Territories. (1)

In response to the mounting pressures on the western plains, Sir Wilfrid Laurier unveiled on February 21st, 1905, legislation for the creation of two provinces out of the prairies regions of the Territories. (2) The provisional districts of Athabasca, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Assiniboia would be divided into the new provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan on September 1st, 1905.

This legislation would soon place the problem of providing government for Canada's northern territories in isolation; these now comprised the provisional districts of Mackenzie, Franklin, and Ungava, and the District of Keewatin which had

nominally possessed its own government since 1876. All the districts were vast and unpopulated areas of arctic and sub-arctic character, but their further sub-division seemed almost a certainty in 1905. Only the precise lines of division remained to be agreed upon. Quebec and Ontario both wished to extend their boundaries northward to the shores of Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait, and Manitoba was in a state of official fury after July 24th 1905, when it discovered that the District of Keewatin, which it had long coveted, had been re-incorporated into the residual Northwest Territories.

A prominent member of Manitoba's Conservative government, the Hon. Robert Rogers, declared on September 8th;

The only remaining act, I fancy, which is left within Sir Wilfrid Laurier's power, by which any further injury could be done to us, is to wipe the Province off the map entirely. (3)

Manitoba believed that the schools question lay at the root of the federal government's decision to keep Manitoba, at least for the meanwhile, the smallest, as well as the oldest of the Dominion's western provinces. (4) In the Keewatin and in the residual Northwest Territories, separate schools were guaranteed by federal statute. Their continued existence might be imperiled if Manitoba took over parts of those territories unconditionally.

In November 1906 a federal-provincial conference did discuss provincial and territorial boundary changes, but because

of the dispute between the provinces of Manitoba and Ontario over their mutual borders, no changes were made. (5) Two years elapsed before the subject was again discussed publically.

On July 13th 1908, Sir Wilfrid Laurier introduced Resolutions into the House of Commons providing for the extension of the boundaries of Manitoba to the north and northeast on lines which would expand her area over most of the old Keewatin District which she had wanted for so long. Manitoba would acquire a coast line, and a planned ocean port on Hudson Bay even if she were deprived of an outlet on Lake Superior. (6) Perhaps Sir Wilfrid chose to introduce Resolutions forecasting such developments because of the imminence of a federal general election. On October 26th 1908 the Laurier Liberals were maintained in power. But no boundary changes followed. No alterations were made to any boundaries until 1912, when the Conservative government led by Robert Borden had come to office.

In 1908, after thirty eight years' experience with territorial government, Canada still had no generally accepted convictions concerning how it should be adapted to the requirements of her northern territories; to those remote regions unsuitable for agricultural settlement and unlikely to be populated for any other reason in the foreseeable future. According to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, there were in 1908 only two courses open in respect to the area of the old District of Keewatin.

One is to continue to administer this territory as we are doing at present; and the administration at the present time is practically nil, it simply provides for the administration of justice in case of crime committed, and some cases of a similar character, because there is practically no population in that territory. The other recommendation is to hand over this territory to the provinces which now claim it, and whose geographical form is such that it may be brought within the purview of their provincial and municipal organizations. Of these two courses before the government the more reasonable, the more practical and the more expedient in the interest of all parties appeared to be that these respective territories should be annexed to the provinces of Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec, so that there might be the usual provincial and municipal administration as their development takes place. (7)

Thus the federal government was prepared to "admit the claim of Manitoba to have its boundary extended northward up to the 60th parallel of latitude". (8)

Later in the debate Sir Wilfrid outlined the general principles on which he thought the Canadian federal system should develop. His goals displayed the strong influence of the example of territorial government in the United States of America. Unfortunately there appears to be a wide discrepancy between the theory of Sir Wilfrid's constitutional policy and the performance of his government in practice. The objectives were admirable, but the means by which to achieve them had not yet been devised. Hard physical facts blocked the prospects for every part of Canada becoming part of a province within the overall scheme of Confederation.

The basis of our national life is a federative system. This country is covered by provinces, that is the idea which we have always had before us. That has

been the case in the United States. The United States purchased territory from France, Louisiana and from other countries. Since that time her policy has been to turn those territories into states, forming now part of the American Union. This is the object we aim at. For my part I regret that the climatic conditions are such in this new territory that it cannot be created into new provinces. I wish we could form a new province on the Hudson Bay, I wish we could form a new province out of the Mackenzie river territory, I wish we could form a new province of Ungava. But while it is a wish I devoutly entertain, every man must see that such a thing is impossible. No man I am sure, from the maritime provinces pretends that we could form new provinces out of that territory. If then that territory cannot be turned into new provinces, does it not seem to my hon friend that the best way to deal with it is to annex it to the existing provinces? We must come to that conclusion. We cannot desire that at one end of this Dominion we should be provinces and at the other end a large unorganized territory. Is not that the goal to which we should aspire, that every inch of Canadian territory should ultimately be under provincial organization? (9)

Unfortunately the maritime provinces objected to the extension of the already large central provinces, for they feared that such expansion of area would tend to reduce still further their own declining representation in the federal parliament. (10)

Although the Laurier government had favoured two prairie provinces rather than the one large one desired by the elected government of the Northwest Territories before 1905, Sir Wilfrid himself, in an election year, seemed to favour the creation of larger provinces in the future. He would have liked to create more provinces in the Canadian north, if only conditions might favour such a development. But they did not. Every part of the continental United States might be suitable for evolution to

statehood, but conditions did not allow every part of continental Canada to realize a similar goal. Thus Sir Wilfrid contemplated the future of the Yukon Territory:

...but I do not know that I would turn the Yukon into a province; I think I would rather annex it to the province of British Columbia. Moreover, I do not think that the climate and soil in the Yukon are such that we could make it into a province. At all events, that is my opinion. You cannot hope, with the territory you now have in your hands, to make it into new provinces; and if that is so, the policy should be to bring this territory under the supervision and jurisdiction of the provinces to which geographically it belongs. That is the view we take and the policy we are pursuing at the present time. (11)

The government as a whole had no one co-ordinated policy towards the northern territories, for only a month before Sir Wilfrid gave his personal views, his ministry gave the Yukon Territory a completely elective council. And the surest way to promote a spirit of local autonomy in the Yukon, and to erect obstacles to a union of the Territory and British Columbia, was to install an elected council in Dawson City. Also the federal government still held strong reservations concerning the wisdom of allowing a territorial government to assume responsibility for any aspect of its own administration. As the Minister of the Interior, Frank Oliver, explained to the House of Commons on June 15th, 1905, when introducing the bill to amend the Yukon Act:

But we feel that the population is hardly large enough nor are the resources sufficient, to warrant any scheme of representative administration that would be satisfactory, that would be adequate, without, as we should regard it, very unduly increasing the expense. We think that under all the circumstances, we are meeting

to a fair degree the legitimate aspirations of the people. And yet are not thereby increasing the burdens upon the taxpayers of the country. (12)

The Yukon Council had only been transformed into an elected safety valve. As one opposition critic, George Foster, commented, it seemed a little peculiar to have the people elect their own representatives to do their legislation and then have the administration entirely vested in a Commissioner appointed by the federal government. (13)

In 1912 the boundaries of Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec were at last extended northward. The Prime Minister of the newly elected Conservative government, Robert Laird Borden, introduced three bills into Parliament which gave the three provinces the boundaries they have retained unaltered until 1967. (14) No doubt the political support the Conservative party received in each province encouraged Borden to act on a decision so long delayed. However the residual Northwest Territories did not seem to require attention in 1912; they still could be let safely alone.

In May 1905, after the conclusion of the tempestuous debates on the Saskatchewan and Alberta Acts, the Minister of Justice, Charles Fitzpatrick, revealed the Government's policy respecting the civil government of the residual Northwest Territories; it would be favoured with the benefits of the tried constitution of the District of Keewatin.

...it is proposed to erect into a district, with a constitution based upon that of the district of Keewatin, the Territory to the north of the new provinces and extending to the Arctic Ocean. (15)

The Northwest Territories would be governed henceforth by a Commissioner who would be assisted by a council consisting of four appointed members. Their legislative powers were to remain the same as those vested in the Lieutenant Governor and the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories prior to September 1st, 1905. (16)

Parliament had little interest to spare for the unpopulated north after the controversy over the schools clauses in the Alberta and Saskatchewan bills, and the new Northwest Territories constitution passed through both the House of Commons and the Senate with only the necessary formalities of debate. In any event it was expected to be only a temporary expedient until the boundaries of the Territories were altered soon again.

Such was the constitutional skeleton of the residual Northwest Territories. Unfortunately the Laurier cabinet failed to clothe the legal bones with the flesh of meaningful government. As Sir Wilfrid later admitted, the administration remained "practically nil". (17) Ottawa was to become the seat of the Northwest Territories government, and after some consideration of making the Minister of the Interior ex-officio Commissioner, it was decided to appoint the Ottawa based

Comptroller of the Royal North West Mounted Police to that office. (18) As the police were the only officers or agents of government to be found anywhere in the northern territories, and as the responsibilities of the Government of the Northwest Territories seemed likely to be very few, the system appeared to offer convenience, efficiency and minimum expense. The federal government desired to keep control of the territories exclusively in its own hands, and as the Comptroller of the R.N.W.M.P. reported directly to the Prime Minister's office, the device of a dual appointment as Commissioner-Comptroller seemed to offer every possible advantage in realizing official objectives. The only regular government expenditure north of the 60th Parallel and east of the Yukon boundary was on grants to mission schools, and these did not exceed \$4000. per annum until after the conclusion of the first World War. (19) The Dominion government might be increasingly concerned about Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic islands during the first decade of the twentieth century, but it remained content to leave the continental regions of the Northwest Territories as an unaudited "national bank rest".

The first Commissioner of the Northwest Territories was Lt. Colonel Fred White, long Sir John A. Macdonald's private secretary, and Comptroller of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police since 1880. The slender surviving volumes of his correspondence as Commissioner bear a stark negative testimony to the quality

of government in the north after, as well as before, the boundary changes of 1905. (20) Less than a year after being appointed Commissioner, White wrote;

The North West Territories, of which I am Commissioner, although covering an enormous area, represent merely the unorganized, and, to a great extent, the unexplored portions of Canada, in which there is very little commercial business at present. (21)

And not even the Commissioner had more than the vaguest idea of those parts of the Northwest Territories which lay beyond the tree-line. Such information as was readily available was somewhat obsolete.

With regard to the Western District from Herschel Island, eastward to the Gulf of Boothia, I do not think there is any information in the possession of any Department of the Public Service relating to Eskimos beyond that contained in books and such records of Sir John Franklin, and other explorers. I have laid my plans to get statistics, but it will be fully a year before they will be available. My own impression is that numbers have been greatly exaggerated. (22)

White presumed that the results of sending missionaries to the Eskimos in 1907 would not justify the expense to the home churches. Also he feared any developments which would draw natives from hunting and encourage them to live by begging around european settlements, or living off the prostitution of their women. (23) Natives were to be encouraged to maintain their traditional way of life, which would relieve government from responsibility for their welfare. Before the Commissioner could devise policies suitable for the residual Territories he

would first have to discover basic factual information about their needs and condition. Rather sadly he remarked;

I am doing all that is possible, with a Government appropriation at my back, to get at actual conditions, of which so little is known at present. (24)

Meanwhile attempts were made to persuade free enterprise to extend itself into the arctic. If the withdrawal of whaling vessels from arctic waters might leave the eskimos destitute, as the reports of the government expeditions aboard the "Neptune" and the "Arctic" advised, then perhaps an historic trading company might assume responsibilities which would otherwise fall on the Territorial government. White assured a Toronto correspondent; "I have done my best to induce the Hudson's Bay Company to push their traders further North". (25) Apparently the Commissioner's concerns centered on the coasts and islands of the Arctic Ocean, for no consideration appears to have been given to the situation of aborigines in the Ungava district, or those living on the west shores of Hudson Bay.

Unconcern for the southerly regions of the Northwest Territories no doubt stemmed from the expectation of their disappearance, and the northward extension of the boundaries of some neighbouring provinces. Uncertainty about the physical integrity of the Territories encouraged the Commissioner in maintaining to the greatest possible extent a general policy of "marking time." White explained to a colleague in the spring of 1908;

I have purposely felt myself in check in connection with the administration of the new North West Territories beyond ordinary routine.

.....
P Personally I feel that slow progress on our part, pending action by Parliament for the dividing up of the Territories will be best in the public interest, but complication may arise in connection with estates and lapse of legal time if we do not take some action. (26)

And almost simultaneously he wrote to a resident of the Territories:

We expect during the present session Parliament will enact laws respecting the distribution of portions of what is known as the North West Territories, but it would be quite impossible for me to anticipate what Parliament in its wisdom may decide to do. (27)

Meanwhile the unamended ordinances of the "old" Northwest Territories, legislation passed since 1877 for the rural and urban society of the western plains, remained theoretically in force in the residual Territories, no matter how inapplicable they might be for conditions in the sub-arctic. Neither could those ordinances be amended or repealed for the Territorial Council resembled the Keewatin Council on which it was modeled in fact as well as theory. For sixteen years no appointments were made to it; it existed on paper only until 1921. (28)

In the absence of a territorial council, and with no territorial public servants actually resident in the Territories, Commissioner White had to ponder in Ottawa such questions as a boiler inspection at The Pas, N.W.T. No longer was there a

Territorial boiler inspector. Could the inspection wait until Parliament divided the Territories? Or should a boiler inspector be hired to deal with each legally required inspection as it came due? (29) Fortunately an inspector was hired. This was the type of problem regularly facing the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, for such was the scope of government in the north, after as well as before 1905.

Education was a subject which regularly troubled the Commissioner. The Territorial government at Regina had paid grants to both Roman Catholic and Anglican mission schools in the Mackenzie valley since 1893. (30) Should these grants be continued now that the Dominion government had taken over responsibility for the northern provisional districts? White continued the grants on the same basis as Regina had made them;

I have been very careful not to do more in connection with school matters as Commissioner of the North West Territories, beyond continuing the allowances to sundry schools, some Protestant, some Roman Catholic, which had been made by Mr. Forget as Lieutenant Governor of the Territories. (31)

Although the incumbent Minister of the Interior had a strong personal dislike of mission schools no steps were taken to introduce public education into the Northwest Territories.

The Minister of the Interior objects to Mission Schools, but is disposed to consider any reasonable plan for payment by the Government of 50% to 75% of the teachers' salary, - provided the School is a public one, under proper local control, with trustees and others who will give full information respecting attendance, subjects taught, etc. etc. (32)

Such requirements were completely irrelevant to social conditions in the north, and in the absence of any alternative policy the grants to mission schools continued.

Fred White retired as Comptroller of the Royal North West Mounted Police in 1912, but he remained Commissioner of the Northwest Territories until his death on September 28th 1918, without once entering the Territories he governed. As the Auditor General commented, the duties of the Commissioner were not onerous. (33) The office provided a pleasant sinecure for an experienced public servant who well deserved a salary of \$1000 a year in addition to his pension. As White explained to a correspondent;

I owe you apologies for delay in replying to your letter. After 45 years of hard work I have been taking it easy for more than a year, and have been in Ottawa only occasionally. (34)

Even responsible officials of the Government of Canada remained unsure which agency of the public service was responsible for what aspects of administration of the Northwest Territories after 1905. Fortunately lack of business allowed a confused organizational structure to endure without causing any major problems. Commissioner White, supported by a part-time three man clerical staff, dealt with the routine matters of civil government, which was intentionally kept to a minimal level. The issue of liquor permits made up the largest single

item of business, and a changing handful of Royal North West Mounted Police detachments, never exceeding six in number, continued to be the only agents of government in the Territories. The Department of the Interior was chiefly responsible for the setting of policy, such as it was for the northern territories; Commissioner White was not consulted on any question related to the preparation or despatch of Stefansson's Canadian Arctic Expedition of 1913-18. The Department of the Interior and the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories only consulted each other when confusion arose over over-lapping authorities. (35)

During World War I the volume of Territorial business began to increase. Traders and trappers, perhaps motivated by the explorations of the Canadian Arctic Expedition, began to move ever further eastward along the arctic coasts towards the Coronation Gult. (36) Fred White anticipated expansion of his government as early as 1915, when he consented to move his office to smaller accommodations only for the duration of hostilities.

...when the War is over, and the Engineers vacate this flat, I may be allowed to re-occupy the large room which I am giving over to them. By that time North West Territories matters will, I expect have so developed as to necessitate my requiring more office space than at present. (37)

However he did not live to see the changes he confidently expected.

After White's death the organization of the Northwest Territories government was changed completely. The federal government expressed by example its intention to maintain and even strengthen its authority over the northern regions of the Dominion, and the Northwest Territories government lost what little semblance of autonomy it had possessed since 1905. In 1919 the Deputy Minister of the Department of the Interior, W.W. Cory, was appointed Commissioner in succession to White, but without salary, for as Arthur Meighen remarked when presenting his Department's estimates to the House of Commons, "The duties are very light indeed". (38) The Territorial estimates for that year amounted to \$8,000. Meighen explained;

As the Territories are administered by the Department of the Interior, it would appear to me inconvenient to have an officer of another department as administrator. I think when the administration is under my department the Commissioner ought to be an officer of that Department. (39)

Following the signing of the Armistice in 1918 events soon forced Ottawa to give more substance to the Government of the Northwest Territories. When pleading for the addition of more staff to the Commissioner's Office, the Territorial Accountant stated;

Now that the war is over settlers, miners, hunters, trappers and speculators are all turning to the far north and applications from Mining Companies, Fox Companies, trappers and others are being received, and in order to deal with the same one has to familiarize themselves with all the Ordinances passed by the North

West Territories Council before the formation of the Provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta, as they contain the laws now in force in the present Northwest Territories.

We have to deal with the work of a Municipality in connection with this office, issue liquor permits, marriage licenses, burial certificates, look after roads and all kinds of things. (40)

In 1920 oil was discovered at Normal Wells, on the east bank of the Mackenzie River, close to the arctic circle. To officials of the Department of the Interior it seemed that the Klondike Stampede was about to repeat itself, with petroleum, instead of gold, the quest of a legion of prospectors who would pour "down north" through the Mackenzie valley. Many of the Department's officials had themselves served in the Yukon, and they had a lively awareness of the "lessons of history", and of the unheeded warnings which had come out of the Yukon valley during the decade preceeding the Gold Rush. In 1921 they were determined that the Government of Canada would "be prepared".

I liken this year and next year to the years 1897 and 1898, in the Klondyke. You remember in 1897, while a considerable number of people went in yet the big rush did not occur until 1898. It was demonstrated, in the meantime, that there was an undoubted gold deposit so that in 1898 was the big rush. In this case, if the coming season demonstrates an undoubted deposit of oil, we can anticipate a big influx of people next year. (41)

Obviously new legislation would be required for the Northwest Territories, and so the council which had been provided for in the Act of 1905 was finally appointed. Four appointments were made in April 1921, and in June the number of

councillors was raised to six; all were civil servants representing the Department of the Interior, the Department of Indian Affairs, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. (42)

A twenty-one man party was sent to the Mackenzie valley in May 1921 by the Department of the Interior, to open administration and mining recording offices at Fort Smith and Norman Wells. The internal organization of the Department of the Interior was reformed to establish a new Northwest Territories and Yukon Branch. The Government of Canada was ready to cope with any human stampede into the northern territories. But none materialized. In 1922 the plans for the administration of the Mackenzie valley underwent a reduction and simplification. The office of Mining Recorder of the Mackenzie District was abolished, the recording office at Norman Wells was closed after one season, and the new office of District Agent, "admitting wider scope" was created. (43) The Council of the Northwest Territories only saw the need to pass eleven ordinances in the years between 1921 and 1930, and in some years it did not meet even once.

The distinguished ethnologist, Dr. Diamond Jenness has characterized the years between the First and Second World Wars; 1921-31, "A Shackled Administration"; 1931-40, "Bureaucracy in Inaction." (44) Yet 1921 did mark the beginnings of civil government in the Northwest Territories, from which there was no

turning back. Anticipation of an "Oil Rush" persuaded the federal government to lay foundations which proved to be permanent, even if no significant superstructure was built on them for more than twenty years. Administration of the north had ceased to be "practically nil". Canada still did not have a clear vision of what the future of the northern territories in Confederation should be, nor had she formulated any precise or detailed policies for their present management and future development. But she had unconsciously begun to organize the hyperborean regions of the globe which she had struggled, and was still struggling, to make sure were her own, even if she remained uncertain why she wanted them. For the Northwest Territories the year 1921 marked the small and hesitant beginnings of an era long over-due.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 1.

(1) M.C. Urquhart, K.A.H. Buckley, eds., Historical Statistics of Canada, Toronto, Macmillan, 1965, p. 314, Series K. 1-2.

(2) The British North America Act, 1867, British Statutes, 30 Victoria, Cap. 3.

(3) N.L. Nicholson, The Boundaries of Canada, its Provinces and Territories, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1954, p. 26.

(4) E.E. Rich, The Hudson's Bay Company 1670-1870, Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1959, Vol. 2, 1763-1870, p. 403.

(5) Arthur S. Morton, A History of the Canadian West to 1870-71, London, New York, Toronto, Thos. Nelson & Sons, 1939, p. 623.

(6) L.H. Thomas, The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West Territories 1870-97, University of Toronto Press, 1956, p. 6.

(7) W.L. Morton, ed., Alexander Begg's Red River Journal and Other Papers Relative to the Red River Resistance of 1869-1870, Toronto, The Champlain Society, 1956, Editor's Introduction,

(8) J.M.S. Careless, Brown of the Globe, Toronto, Macmillan, 1959, Vol. 1, p. 230.

(9) A.S. Morton, A History of the Canadian West to 1870-71, p. 713.

(10) Report of the Select Committee, pp. iii-iv, Section 7.

(11) Report of the Select Committee on the Hudson's Bay Company, 29 May 1857, Question 4102, p. 218.

(12) Macdonald Papers, Macdonald to Watkin, March 27, 1865 (private) quoted in P.B. Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation 1864-67, University of Toronto Press, 1962, p. 307.

(13) Joseph Howe, Confederation Considered in Relation to the Interests of the Empire, London, Edward Stanford, 1866, p. 16.

(14) Ibid., p. 16.

(15) Select Committee Report, 1857, Question 4062, pp. 212-213.

(16) United States, Bureau of the Census, A Statistical Abstract Supplement to Historical Statistics of the United States From Colonial Times to 1957, Washington, D.C., 1960, Series A, 123-180 p. 13.

(17) Alvin C. Gluek, Jr., Minnesota and the Manifest Destiny of the Canadian Northwest, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1965, pp. 204-219.

(18) Globe, 27, January 1864, quoted in J.M.S. Careless, George Brown, vol. 2, p. 108.

(19) Archie W. Shiels, The Purchase of Alaska, Fairbanks, University of Alaska Press, 1967, p. 47.

(20) P.B. Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, p. 306, quoting the Montreal Gazette, May 24 1867, Quebec Daily Mercury, May 25, 1867.

(21) Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation of the British North American Provinces, Quebec, Hunter Rose, 1865 p. 445. (Photographic Reproduction, King's Printer, 1951)

(22) Confederation Debates, 1865, p. 596.

(23) A.J. Russell, The Red River Country, Hudson's Bay and North West Territories Considered in Relation to Canada, Ottawa, Desbarats, 1869, p. 155.

(24) E.H. Oliver, The Canadian North-West: Its Early Development and Legislative Records, Ottawa, Government Printing Bureau, 1915, vol. 2, pp. 972-73.

(25) Debates, House of Commons, 2 May 1870, p. 1289. These remarks were delivered at the opening of the debate on the Manitoba bill. A more appropriate day to discuss the future government of the North-West could not have been chosen; it was the two-hundredth anniversary of the granting of the Royal Charter to the Hudson's Bay Company.

(26) Debates, House of Commons, 2 May 1870, Col. 1288.

- (27) Debates, House of Commons, 7 May 1870, Col. 1415.
- (28) Debates, House of Commons, 2 May 1870, Col. 1287.
- (29) L.H. Thomas, The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West Territories 1870-1897, University of Toronto Press, 1956, p. 44.
- (11 A) J.M.S. Careless, Brown of the Globe, vol. 1, p. 308.

CHAPTER II.

(1) During the debate on the Manitoba Act, Sir John A. Macdonald announced that a body of mounted rifles was presently being recruited for service in the Northwest Territories. It was intended to protect people "from the chance of Indian war", and was planned to be a bi-lingual force, raised in Upper and Lower Canada, and in the Territories themselves. See, Debates, House of Commons, 2 May 1870, p. 1300.

Unfortunately these admirable plans came to naught. The original North-West Mounted Police force was not raised until 1873.

(2) An Act to amend and consolidate the laws respecting the North West Territories, 38 Vict., c. 49.

An Act respecting the North-West Territories and to create a separate Territory out of part thereof, 39 Vict., c. 21.

(3) North-West Territories Act, 1875, Section 3.

(4) Temporary Government Act, 1869, Section 4.

(5) North-West Territories Act, 1875, Section 5.

Salary of the Lieutenant Governor:	not to exceed	\$7,000.
Salary of the Stipendary Magistrates, each:	" "	\$3,000.
Salaries of two Members of the Council: each:	" "	\$1,000.

(6) N.W.T. Act, 1875, Section 13.

(7) N.W.T. Act, 1875, Section 13, sub-section 1.

(8) N.W.T. Act, 1875, Section 13, sub-section 6.

(9) N.W.T. Act, 1875, Section 13, sub-section 7.

(10) An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest of the River Ohio, July 13, 1787. Section 9. Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States, Charles C. Tansill, editor, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1927, 69th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 398, p. 49.

(11) Ordinance of 1787, Article V.

(12) L.H. Thomas, The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West Territories, 1870-97, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1956, p. 74.

(13) Morris to the Secretary of State, October 13, 1875, Lieutenant Governor's Papers, Public Archives of Manitoba, quoted in L.H. Thomas, The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West Territories, p. 83.

(14) Ibid., p. 84.

(15) Debates, House of Commons, 22 February 1876, p. 194. (Hon. Alexander Mackenzie)

(16) An Act respecting the North-West Territories, and to create a separate Territory out of part thereof, 39 Vict. c. 21, Sections 3 and 4.

(17) Debates, House of Commons, 22 February 1876, p. 195.

(18) Debates, House of Commons, 22 February 1876, p. 194.

(19) An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest of the River Ohio, July 13, 1787, Articles IV and V.

(20) An Act respecting the North-West Territories, and to create a separate Territory out of part thereof, 39 Victoria, c. 21.

(21) Annual Report of the Department of the Interior for the Year Ended 30th June 1877, Sessional Papers (No. 10.) 41 Victoria A. 1878, p. ix.

"A much larger expenditure was incurred by the Council than Ministers had expected would be necessary, and on the 31st March last a circular was addressed by the Department of the Secretary of State to the gentlemen composing the Council of Keewatin, intimating the emergency which had necessitated their appointment as Councillors having ceased to exist, the Government would be prepared to accept their resignation of their offices, and on the 16th April last His Honor Lieutenant Governor Morris in his despatch of that date, notified the Secretary of State that the members of the Council had formally resigned.

"Although the accounts for the greater part of the expenditure made by the Council of Keewatin were approved by the Council and transmitted to the Department for payment, it was found necessary, in order to guard the Department against improper or extravagant demands, to make some investigation in conjunction with the Manitoba Government into the accounts so presented."

(22) Morris to Secretary of State, December 6, 1876, Morris Papers, Public Archives of Manitoba, quoted in L.H. Thomas, Struggle for Responsible Government, p. 85.

Minutes of the Council of the North-West Territories, Thursday, March 12th, 1874, E.H. Oliver, ed., The Canadian North-West, Its Early Development and Legislative Records, Vol. II, p. 1015, Appendix B.

(23) An Act to extend the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Manitoba, 40 Vict., c. 7.

(24) Debates, House of Commons, 22 February 1878, 22 March, 1878, p. 427.

(25) Order in Council, 25 September 1882, quoted in C.O. 42, Vol. 772, pp. 182-3, Dispatch No. 28, Sir W.J. Ritchie (Administrator) to Earl of Kimberley, Colonial Secretary. G.W. Smith, Transfer of Arctic Territories, 1880, Arctic 1961, Vol. 14, No. 1. p. 68.

(26) Debates, House of Commons, 16 May 1882, Sir John A. Macdonald, p. 1567.

(27) The Lieutenant Governor proclaimed the creation of the first territorial electoral district on November 13, 1880, the district of Lorne. The first election was held on March 23, 1881. L.H. Thomas, Struggle for Responsible Government, p. 115.

(28) W.S. MacNutt, Days of Lorne, Brunswick Press, Fredricton, New Brunswick, 1955, p. 97.

(29) L.H. Thomas, The Struggle for Responsible Government, pp. 96-97. Footnote No. 99. "Interior file no. 37906, memorandum Oct. 15, 1881. Dennis stated that he had submitted a scheme in 1876 at the request of the Minister, based on the original Pacific railway route; now that the route was changed a different subdivision was required."

CHAPTER III.

- (1) Cf. p. 16, Ch. I, Note 20.
- (2) Gordon W. Smith, "The Transfer of Arctic Territories from Great Britain to Canada in 1880 and Some Related Matters As Seen in Official Correspondence", Arctic, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 1961, pp. 53-54.
- (3) C.O. 42, Vol. 731, p. 52; quoted in Smith, "Transfer of Arctic Territories to Canada, p. 54.
- (4) C.O. 42, Vol. 731, pp. 196-199, Carnarvon to Dufferin, Jan. 6, 1875, Draft Copy; quoted in Smith, "Transfer of Arctic Territories to Canada", p. 55.
- (5) As the northern territories in question had not been part of either Rupert's Land or the North-western Territory, and as the British North America Act of 1867 provided specifically only for the admission of those areas into the Canadian union, therefore it was considered necessary for the enactment of imperial legislation to make the proposed annexation legally valid.
Debates, House of Commons, 3 May 1878, p. 2385.
- (6) Debates, House of Commons, 3 May 1878, p. 2388.
- (7) Ibid., p. 2389.
- (8) Ibid., p. 2393.
- (9) Debates, House of Commons, 3 May 1878, p. 2390.
- (10) Loc. cit.
- (11) Loc. cit.
- (12) Loc. cit.
- (13) Ibid., p. 2391.
- (14) Ibid., p. 2394.
Debates, Senate, 3 May 1878, p. 903.
- (15) The Canada Gazette, Vol. XIV, No. 15, (9 Oct. 1880) p. 389.
- (16) H.R. Holmden, Memo Re - The Arctic Islands, 1921, Manuscript, Public Archives of Canada.

(17) William Scoresby, Jun., An Account of the Arctic Regions with a History and Description of the Northern Whale-Fishery, Edinburgh, Archibald Constable, 1820, Vol. II, p. 64.

(18) Basil Lubbock, The Arctic Whalers, London, Brown, Son and Ferguson, 1935, p. 276.

(19) G.W. Smith, "Transfer of the Arctic Territories....", Arctic, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 1961. pp. 53-54.

(20) Alexander Starbuck, History of the American Whale Fishery from Its Earliest Inception to the Year 1876, re-print, Argosy-Antiquarian Ltd., New York, 1964, First Edition, Waltham Mass., 1878, Appendix A, p. 581

(21) V. Stefansson, My Life with the Eskimos, Macmillan, New York, 1913, p. 39.

(22) The Nares Expedition was the last officially-sponsored British polar expedition in the 19th Century. In 1875 A.H. Markham wrote in second edition of his A Whaling Cruise to Baffin's Bay p. v. Second Edition, London, Sampson Low, Marston, Low and Searle, 1875.

Those who have always had the interests of Arctic research at heart must indeed be gladdened at the recent decision of Mr. Disraeli's Government.
(to despatch the Nares Expedition)

...
The flag of England, the glorious Union Jack, will in a few short months be again unfurled with the Arctic zone, and displayed, it is confidently hoped and anticipated, in high northern latitude, if not at the North Pole itself.

Is it of significance that his Arctic Expedition was despatched not long after an Imperialist Ministry was elected to office? In 1880 the Arctic Islands were transferred to Canadian control, and thereafter the British Government displayed no active interest in further investigation of them. The change of ownership made it imperative that Canada fill the void left by the transfer of British interest elsewhere.

(23) T.C. Fairley, Svedrup's Arctic Adventures, London, Longmans, 1959, "Epilogue", pp. 262-296.
Adapted, and edited, from New Land: Four Years in the Arctic Regions, by Otto Svedrup, 2 vols. 1904.

(24) P.D. Baird, Expeditions to the Canadian Arctic, Reprinted from The Beaver, for March, June, September, 1949, Hudson's Bay Company, n.d., 16 pp.

(25) F.J. Alcock, A Century of the Geological Survey of Canada, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1948, p. 29.

Established in 1842, the Geological Survey had in 1870, a staff of six geologists, including the Director.

(26) Robert Bell, Report of an Exploration of the East Coast of Hudson's Bay, 1877, Geological Survey of Canada, Dawson Brothers, Montreal, 1879.

(27) Debates, House of Commons, 21 February, 1883, p. 64.

(28) Debates, House of Commons, 21 February, 1883, S.J. Dawson, M.P. Algoma, p. 63.

Simon James Dawson had been employed in 1868 to open up communications with Red River by what was later known as "the Dawson Route"; he had superintended the transport of troops on the Red River expedition of 1870, and had published Report on the line of route between Lake Superior and Red River Settlement, in 1868. He was M.P. for Algoma from 1878 to 1891. His informed interest in the Hudson Bay navigation route, and in railways was to be expected.

(29) A.E. Millward, Southern Baffin Island, King's Printer, 1930, p. 13: "At a relatively early date after the passing of the Order in Council of 1880 the Canadian Government took active steps to shoulder their new responsibilities in the North. In 1884 the Neptune...was sent out by the Department of Marine and Fisheries under the command of Lieut. A.R. Gordon, R.N. ..."

If by the phrase, "the shouldering of new responsibilities", Millward meant that Canada was attempting to exert some measure of control over the Arctic Islands, he seems to have been quite mistaken.

Lieut. Gordon never entered the region affected by the Order in Council of 1880, either in 1884, 1885, or 1886. His objective was solely the investigation of navigation conditions. On no occasion did Gordon participate in the type of activity that occurred on the next expedition to investigate navigation conditions in Hudson Strait and Bay, that of 1897, commanded by William Wakeham.

For example, Wakeham records in his journal when cruising the shores of Baffin Island, at Kekerton Harbour, Cumberland Sound (a Scottish whaling station), Tuesday 17th August, 1897. "Landed and hoisted the Union Jack in the presence of the agent, a number of our own officers and crew, and the Esquimaux, formally declaring in their presence that the flag was hoisted as an evidence that Baffin's Land with all the territories, islands and dependencies adjacent to it were, now, as they always had been since their first discovery and occupation, under the exclusive sovereignty of Great Britain."

Report of the Expedition to Hudson Bay and Cumberland Gulf in the Steamship "Diana" Under the Command of William Wakeham, Marine and Fisheries, Canada, in the Year 1897. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1898, p. 24.

The Gordon expeditions might have been investigating northern waters, but they were doing so for prairie purposes. For example, in 1885, the "Alert", the vessel used in that and the following year, carried D.G. Beaton, editor of the Winnipeg Times, "as the representative of the company who are interested in the construction of the rail road from Winnipeg to Hudson's Bay."

The Hudson Bay Expedition - 1885, Sessional Papers, (No. 11) Annual Report, Department of Marine, Appendix No. 29, 49 Victoria, A. 1886. p. 195.

(30) Robert Bell, Observations on the Geology, Minerology, Zoology, and Botany of the Labrador Coast, Hudson's Strait and Bay, Geological Survey of Canada, Dawson Brothers, Montreal, 1884, p. 5.

(31) Editor's Introduction, pp. 4-5, in J.B. Tyrell, editor, Samuel Hearne's, A Journey from Prince of Wales Fort in Hudson's Bay to the Northern Ocean in the Years 1769, 1770, 1771, and 1772, Toronto, Champlain Society, 1911.

(32) F.J. Alcock, A Century of the Geological Survey of Canada p. 58.

(33) John McLean, Notes of a Twenty-Five Years' Service In the Hudson's Bay Territory, Toronto, The Champlain Society, 1932, Chap. III, pp. 202-219. First edition, 1849.

Glyndwr Williams, Introduction, p. lxxvi, Northern Quebec and Labrador Journals and Correspondence 1819-35, K.G. Davies, Editor, London, The Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1963.

(34) Lieut. A.R. Gordon, The Hudson Bay Expedition - 1884, Sessional Papers, 48 Victoria, A. 1885, Annual Report, Department of Marine, Appendix No. 30, p. 202.

(35) Lieut. A.R. Gordon, Report of the Second Hudson's Bay Expedition, 1885, pp. 54-55.

(36) Report of the Hudson's Bay Expedition of 1886 under the Command of Lieutenant A.R. Gordon, R.N., Sessional Paper No. 15, Sessional Papers, Vol. 14, 50 Victoria, A. 1887, p. 67.

(37) Debates, Senate, 27 March 1888, Hon. Mr. Schultz, p. 213.

(38) Report and Minutes of evidence of the Select Committee of the Senate on existing natural Food Products of the North-West Territories, and the Best Means of Conserving and Increasing Them. Journals of the Senate of Canada, 1st Session, 6th Parliament, Vol. XXI, 50 Victoria A. 1887, Appendix No. 1, p. 6. Ottawa, Maclean and Roger & Co. 1887.

(39) Report of the Select Committee of the Senate Appointed to Enquire Into the Resources of the Great Mackenzie Basin, Ottawa, Brown Chamberlain, Queen's Printer, 1888, p. 11.

(40) Debates, Senate, 27 March 1888, Hon. Mr. Schultz, p. 214.

(41) Loc. cit.

(42) John Christian Schultz took the oath of office as Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba on 2nd July 1888. Canada and Its Provinces, Vol. 23, Historical Tables, p. 339.

(43) Debates, Senate, 11 May 1888, Hon. Mr. Power, p. 701.

(44) Debates, Senate, 27 March 1888, Hon. Mr. Power, p. 237.

(45) Debates, Senate, 7 April 1888, Hon. Mr. Power, p. 271.

(46) Debates, Senate, 7 May 1888, p. 567.

(47) Debates, Senate, 11 May 1888, p. 693.

(48) Ernest Gruening, The State of Alaska, New York, Random House, 1954, pp. 33-43.

(49) Debates, Senate, 7 May 1888, p. 567.

(50) Debates, Senate, 11 May 1888, Hon. Mr. Power, p. 701.

(51) Debates, Senate, 11 May 1888, Hon. Mr. Macdonald, p. 697.

(52) Debates, Senate, 11 May 1888, quoted by the Hon. Mr. Girard, p. 692.

(53) Debates, Senate, 24 January 1907, Hon. Mr. Davis, p. 144.

CHAPTER IV.

- (1) Senate Debates, 7 May 1888, Hon. J.C. Schultz, p. 567.
- (2) Tappan Adney, The Klondike Stampede, Harpers Brothers, New York, 1900, p. 1.
Pierre Berton, Klondike, W.H. Allen, London 1960, pp. 105-06.
W.A. Swanberg, Citizen Hearst, Scribners, New York, 1961, Book 3, Chapter 2, "I'll Furnish the War."
- (3) George M. Dawson, Historical Notes on the Yukon District, reprint, Review of Historical Publications Relating to Canada, Vol. II, Publications of the Year 1897, p. 12.
There had been no addition to geographical knowledge of the Yukon since John Bell's expedition of 1842, and the records of Bell's work were meagre. See L.J. Burpee, ed. Journal of the Yukon 1847-48, by Alexander Hunter Murray, Ottawa, Canadian Archives, Publication No. 4, Ottawa 1910, Editor's introduction, p. 9.
- (4) George M. Dawson, Report On An Exploration in the Yukon District N.W.T., And Adjacent Northern Portion of British Columbia - 1887. Geological Survey and Natural History Survey of Canada: Part B. Annual Report, 1887, Montreal, Dawson Brothers, 1888, p. 6.
- (5) Ibid., p. 27
- (6) Ibid., p. 29
- (7) William Ogilvie, Exploratory Survey of the Lewes, Tat-On-Duc, Porcupine, Bell, Trout, Peel, and Mackenzie Rivers, 1887-88, Ottawa, Brown Chamberlain, Queen's Printer, 1890, p. 41.
- (8) Report of the Deputy Minister, Annual Report of the Department of the Interior for the Year 1888, Sessional Papers, (No. 15.) A. 1889, pp. xxix-xxx.
- (9) Senate Debates, 27 March 1888, Hon. J.C. Schultz, p. 236.
- (10) C.L. Andrews, "Biographical Sketch of Captain William Moore", Washington Historical Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 1930, pp. 195-203, No. 4. Oct. 1930, pp. 271-280; Vol. 22, No.1, Jan. 1931, pp. 32-41.
When Moore reported his exploration of the pass to Ogilvie, Ogilvie named the pass the "White Pass" after Thomas White, Minister of the Interior. It was then regarded as being in Canada territory.

(11) Report of Captain William Moore Upon the Yukon Country, British Columbia, Sessional Papers, 2nd Session, 5th Parliament, A. 1888, p. 497.

(12) R.E. Gosnell, The Year Book of British Columbia and Manual of Provincial Information, To Which Is Added a Chapter Containing much special information respecting the Canadian Yukon, and Northern Territory generally, Victoria, 1897, p. 475.

(13) William Ogilvie, Early Days On the Yukon, p. 144.

(14) H.A. Cody, An Apostle of the North, Memoirs of the Rt. Rev. William Carpenter Bompas, D.D., Toronto, Musson Book Company, 1908, p. 204.

(15) Rt. Rev. Bishop Bompas to Hon. John Schultz, dated Rampart House, Porcupine River, Corus, N.W. Canada, 3 June 1892. Keewatin Letter Book A, Manitoba Archives. Bompas had met Schultz in the 1870's, and continued to correspond with him thereafter. On receiving this letter Schultz, as Lieut. Governor of the Keewatin District, forwarded a copy to the Minister of the Interior in Ottawa.

(16) Report of Inspector C. Constantine re Yukon District, Annual Report of the North-west Mounted Police; 1894. Sessional Papers (No. 15.), A. 1895, p. 80.

(17) Report of Inspector C. Constantine, Upper Yukon District, 20 January 1896, Sessional Papers (No. 15A.) A. 1896, p. 7. Annual Report of the Commissioner of the North-West Mounted Police for the Year 1895, Sessional Papers (No. 15.) A. 1896, p. 21.

When Constantine consulted with Ogilvie about the size of the force to be despatched to the Yukon, Ogilvie insisted that a detachment of twenty men was sufficient, while Constantine wished to have a much larger number. Ogilvie's counsel prevailed. Ogilvie's advice in this case seems to be in harmony with the policy of "no immediate action" he had advanced since 1889, and the super-economical caution of the federal administration, Parliament and the civil service together respecting the entire North-West Territories. See William Ogilvie, Early Days on the Yukon, p. 152.

(18) Order in Council No. 2640, 2nd October 1895, Canada Gazette, Vol. XXIX, No. 16, 19 Oct. 1895, pp. 283-85.

(19) Order in Council No. 2640, 2nd Oct. 1895, Canada Gazette, Vol. XXIX, No. 16, 19 Oct. 1895, p. 684.

(20) Annual Report of the Secretary of State for the Year 1896. Sessional Papers, (No. 16A.) A. 1897, Civil Service List, Department of Customs, Outside Service, British Columbia, p. 86. William Ogilvie wrote of Davis's appointment; "He is credited with telling that while his position and salary were being discussed by the Premier of Canada, Sir Mackenzie Bowell, and himself, that the Premier suggested his taking all duties he collected for his salary. If this is a fact, and he had accepted what a salary he would have had in 1897, 1898, 1899, 1900 and 1901!" Early Days on the Yukon, p. 266

Such a proposal, if indeed made, again shows the low expectations of the northland's value held by the federal government.

(21) Report, Fort Cudahy, 6 September 1896, Extracts from the Reports of William Ogilvie, D.L.S., Annual Report of the Department of the Interior for the Year 1896, Part II, Dominion Land Surveys, Report No. 2, p. 48, Sessional Papers, (No. 13.) A. 1897, p. 48.

(22) Report of the Deputy Minister, Annual Report of the Department of the Interior for the Year 1896, Sessional Papers (No. 13.) A. 1897, p. xxiv.

(23) Report of the Deputy Minister, Annual Report of the Department of the Interior for the Year 1897, Sessional Papers (No. 13) A. 1898, p. 8.

(24) Extracts from Reports of Thos. Fawcett, D.L.S., Gold Commissioner for the Yukon District, Annual Report of the Department of the Interior, Part II, Dominion Land Surveys, Report No. 17, Sessional Papers (No. 13.) A. 1898, Report, dated Dawson, 16 June 1897, pp. 74-75; Report dated Dawson, 11 July 1897, p. 75-76.

(25) Extracts from the Report of William Ogilvie, D.L.S., Annual Report of the Department of the Interior for the Year 1896, Sessional Papers (No. 13.) A. 1897, pp. 40-54.

(26) Extracts from the Reports of William Ogilvie, D.L.S., Annual Report of the Department of the Interior for the Year 1896, Sessional Papers, (No. 13.) A. 1897, Report dated Fort Cudahy, 6 November 1896, p. 51.

(27) Extracts from the Reports of William Ogilvie, D.L.S., Sessional Papers, (No. 13.) A. 1897, 10 June 1896, p. 45; 6 September 1896, p. 49. Report on the Yukon Detachment, Appendix DD, Annual Report of the North-West Mounted Police for the Year 1896, Sessional Papers (No. 15.) A. 1897, p. 235.

(28) Vancouver News Advertiser, 26 March 1897; quoted in Norman Hacking, Early Maritime History of British Columbia, B.A. Honours Essay, 1934, p. 136.

(29) Annual Report of Assistant Commissioner J.H. McIllree, Annual Report of the North-West Mounted Police for the Year 1897, Appendix A, p. 21, Sessional Papers, (No. 15.) A. 1898.

(30) Report of Trip to the Yukon by Inspector W.H. Scarth, Annual Report of the North-West Mounted Police for the Year 1897, Appendix K, p. 144, Sessional Papers, (No. 15.) A. 1898. The police changed ships at Victoria, sailing north on the American owned S.S. "City of Topeka". At this date no Canadian vessels ventured into Alaskan waters.

(31) On May 8th 1897 the Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia gave royal assent to: 1. Stikeen and Teslin Railway, Navigation and Colonization Company, 60 Vic., Cap. 38; British Columbia Yukon Railway Company, 60 Vic., Cap. 49; Cassiar Central Railway Company, 60 Vic., Cap. 52; and the Yukon Mining Trading, and Transportation Company, 60 Vic. Cap. 77.

At this time the Canadian-American boundary in the Alaska pan-handle remained undefined, and a matter of dispute. It was Canada's contention that the heads of many inlets, including the head of the Lynn Canal and the ports of Skagway and Dyea, rightfully belonged in Canadian territory, although they had been under intermittent American control for considerable time. Obviously the British Columbia government supported Canada's claims; when an Alaska boundary might be agreed upon the province could expect Skagway and Dyea to become British Columbia ports. Pending the boundary decision, American jurisdiction over the head of the Lynn Canal should be given temporary 'de facto' recognition.

The British Syndicate sponsoring the White Pass and Yukon Railway Company prudently made provision for any likely settlement of the boundary in the pan-handle. In 1898 they chartered the Pacific and Arctic Railway and Navigation Company in the State of Virginia. From Skagway to the Canadian boundary at the summit of the White Pass, the Company has continued to operate under the Virginia charter until 1967.

(32) See Tappan Adney, The Klondike Stampede of 1897-98, p. 9, for an illustration of the speed with which some Canadian commercial concerns took advantage of the Yukon's possibilities. "On the 30th July I purchased, at the office of the Canadian Pacific Railway in New York a through printed ticket reading, 'New York to Dyea' including passage in the steamer Islander, scheduled to leave Victoria on the 15th August on her second trip." (Underlining the author's.)

(33) Scott to Laurier, 20 July 1897, Laurier Papers; Scott to Laurier 23 July 1897, Scott Papers; quoted in R. Craig Brown, Canada's National Policy, p. 299.

(34) Annual Report of Assistant Commissioner J.H. McIllree, North-West Mounted Police Annual Report for the Year 1897, Appendix A., p. 24, Sessional Papers (No. 15) A. 1898.

(35) Loc. Cit.

(36) Canada Gazette, Vol. XXXI, No. 9, 28 August 1897, p. 392.

(37) Commission of Major Walsh as Executive Officer of the Yukon District, Sessional Papers (No. 38.) A. 1898.

Indicative of the haste with which the government was acting in the summer of 1897 is the fact that in the original commission, signed on August 17th, Walsh was wrongly named "John M." Walsh, an error which the Privy Council remedied on August 23rd, by issuing a second and corrected commission. See Sessional Papers (No. 38A.) A. 1898.

(38) Guide to Canadian Ministries Since Confederation, Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa, 1957, p. 29.

(39) Debates, House of Commons, 31 May 1906, p. 4270, Hon. Clifford Sifton.

(40) Debates, House of Commons, 29 June 1899, p. 6138, Hon. Clifford Sifton.

(41) J.W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton in Relation To His Times, p.153.

(42) Manitoba Act, 1870, Section 30. 33 Vict., Cap. 3.

(43) Debates, House of Commons, 8 February 1898, p. 186.

(44) Debates, House of Commons, 8 February 1898.
Blair, although Minister of Railways, had had nothing to do with the negotiation of the contract signed with Mackenzie and Mann on January 25th 1898. Sifton had devised that agreement. Blair was presented with a "fait accompli" and given the consolation of introducing the Canadian Yukon Railway Bill. He was badly briefed, and of course had no personal familiarity with the background of the contract or its ramifications. He was unable to answer opposition questions, and the Conservative party immediately stole the initiative which they kept until the Bill was defeated in the Senate.

(45) Contract between Her Majesty the Queen and William Mackenzie and Donald D. Mann, signed on 25th January, A.D. 1898, Clause 1. Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons, No. 4, Ottawa, Tuesday 8th February 1898, p. 37.

(46) Mackenzie and Mann Contract, 25 January 1898, Section 11.

(47) Debates, House of Commons, 8 February 1898, 195.

(48) Debates, House of Commons, 8 February 1898, p. 193. Of all the possible routes into the Yukon valley from Pacific tidewater, that via the Chilkat Pass appeared to be the most economically practical. Originally Mackenzie & Mann wished to construct a railroad over this route, but the Canadian Government persuaded them to build over the Stikine-Teslin route in return for the enormous land grant. The Government was seeking the politically desirable "all-Canadian" route, not the most easily constructed or most efficiently operable route.

(49) Debates, House of Commons, 8 February 1898, pp. 193-194.

(50) R. Craig Brown, Canada's National Policy, 1883-1900, p. 313.

(51) R.M. Patterson, Trail to the Interior, p. 29.

(52) Report of the Department of Militia and Defence for the Year ended 31 December 1898, "Yukon Field Force", p. 25. Sessional Papers (No. 19.) A. 1899.

(53) See The Canadian Journal of Lady Aberdeen, J.T. Saywell, ed., p. 458. Lady Aberdeen was much interested in the Yukon experiences of the two members of the Victoria Order of Nurses who accompanied the Field Force. "...then a weary tramp on foot for 150 miles, or rather 200 miles if the actual distance is counted across a terrible country - boulders & huge fallen trees were the least part of the difficulties for the worst part was the horrible swamps through which they had to wade up to their waists.... The only solace...is the glorious scenery & the profusion of flowers.... The Nurses say that their clothes & their boots which were intended to last them for three years are completely worn out - except the heavy winter things of course."

(54) Debates, House of Commons, 8 February 1898, p. 195.

(55) Senate Debates, 23 March 1898, p. 312. Hon. Senator Miller quoting the testimony of Mr. Livernash, a delegate of the Yukon miners to Ottawa, who had spoken to some senators the previous day. (See also p. 31)

(56) Debates, House of Commons, 16 February 1898, p. 633.

(57) Karl Baedeker, The Dominion of Canada with Newfoundland and an Excursion to Alaska, Handbook for Travellers, Leipzig and New York, 1907, pp. 301-304.

(58) Debates, House of Commons, 16 February 1898, p. 631.

(59) Debates, House of Commons, 8 February - 16 March, 1898; Debates, Senate, 18 March - 30 March 1898.

(60) Joseph Pope, then Under Secretary of State for Canada, recorded in his diary that some Conservatives told him that "...if the bill passed the contractors would have given the Liberal machine such a huge rake-off as to have assured them power for 20 years. That may be so." Pope Papers, 116, Diary, March 30, 1898, quoted in R. Craig Brown, Canada's National Policy, 1883-1900, p. 310.

(61) Debates, Senate, 30 March 1898, p. 542.

(62) Clause 4 of the Mackenzie & Mann contract of 25 January 1898 read; "4. For five years from the first of September, 1898, no line of railway shall be authorized by Parliament to be constructed from Lynn Canal or thereabouts or from any point at or near the international boundary between Canada and Alaska into the Yukon District, and for five years from said date no aid in land or money shall be granted to any person or company other than the contractors and the contractors' company to assist in building any such railway." Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons, No. 4, 8th February, 1898, p. 38.

The British Columbia Legislature had of course chartered the White Pass and Yukon railway in 1897, but it could, and did, reach the navigable waters of the Yukon River system within the boundaries of British Columbia. Any American railway which built from the head of the Lynn Canal would be forced by glaciers and mountain ranges to build through both B.C. and Yukon territory before it could penetrate into the interior of Alaska. Therefore the contentious clause was taken as an exclusive attack on the United States, and not a restriction on other railroads chartered by provincial governments of Canada.

(63) R. Craig Brown, Canada's National Policy, p. 304.

(64) Treaty of Washington, Article XXVI, Statutes of Canada, 1872, p. cxvii.

(65) R. Craig Brown, Canada's National Policy, p. 304.

(66) Norman Thompson, J.H. Edgar, Canadian Railway Development From the Earliest Times, Toronto, Macmillan 1933, p. 322.

(67) Mackenzie & Mann had bought the charter of the Stikine and Teslin Railway (British Columbia, 60 Vic., Cap. 71, 1897) which would have traversed the same route as the federally chartered Canadian Yukon Railway, which had met Parliamentary defeat. Land grants in British Columbia accompanied the provincial charter, but after 30 March 1898, the enormous federal acreage in the northern territories was beyond grasp. Mackenzie & Mann decided not to build over the Stikine Teslin route, although they were entitled to do so under provincial authority. Presumably they were more interested in the 3 million acres of potential gold-bearing land they might claim than in the construction of a railroad over a route which they had never favoured.

In any event the Exchequer Court of Canada awarded more than one half million dollars as a result of the collapse of the Canadian Yukon Railway contract; \$328,508 as damages, and the return of a \$250,000 deposit. See G.R. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, Volume 2, p. 86.

(68) Annual Report of the Commissioner of the North West Mounted Police for the year ending 30 November 1900, Part III, Yukon Territory, Supt. Z.T. Wood, p. 5. Sessional Papers (No. 28a.) A. 1901.

(69) Norbert Macdonald, Seattle, Vancouver, and the Klondike, unpublished article, 1967.

(70) Senate Journals, 1898, pp. 230, 234, 245. Senate Debates, pp. 798, 835, 868.

The House of Commons returned the Yukon Bill to the Senate with amendments in detail, which were accepted without debate on June 2nd, 1898. Senate Journals, p. 272; Senate Debates, p.

(71) Debates, House of Commons, pp. 6439, 6730 & ff., 6747. On the suggestion of Nicholas Flood Davin, the journalist-tribune of the North-West Territories, who thought that generally the Bill "meets the needs of the Yukon pretty well", the legislation was amended to make judges ex-officio members of the Yukon Council.

Debates, House of Commons, 2 June 1898, col. 6730.

In 1899 the Yukon Act was amended to remove the judges from the council, ex-officio, because the pressure of their legal duties and the conflict of interest between their legislative and judicial responsibilities. Senate Debates, 7 July 1899, p. 645, Hon. David Mills, Minister of Justice. Yukon Amendment Act.

(72) Yukon Act, 1898, 61 Vict., esp. 6, Sections 2, 3, 4.
 "There is this difference between the Territories and the Provinces, that in a province they are exercising powers which must be defined and limited, so as not to come in contact with the powers of the Dominion. This is a body subordinate to the Dominion and deriving its powers from the Dominion, and its powers would not avail if it legislated in contravention of them, and if it did impose direct taxation no injury could flow from it." Hon. David Mills, Minister of Justice, 28 July, 1899, Senate Debates, p. 983.

(73) Debates, House of Commons, 2 June 1898, p. 6729.
 Apart from the fact that the North-West Territories Act of 1875 created a separate Territorial government located in the Territories, and not in Manitoba, the most significant of its clauses were those devising ways of returning elected members to the Territorial Council.

(74) Debates, House of Commons, 2 June 1898, p. 6729.

(75) Senate Debates, 25 May 1896, p. 836.

(76) Senate Debates, 25 May 1898, p. 835.

(77) When the Conservative M.P. George Foster asked Sifton what was the objection to having all Yukon ordinances reserved before coming into force, Sifton replied, "The delay". Debates, House of Commons, 2 June 1898, col. 6728.

(78) Senate Debates, 25 May 1898, p. 835.

(79) J.W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton, pp. 128-30.
 C.C. Lingard, Territorial Government in Canada, p. 7.

(80) Report of G.H.V. Bulyea on his Expedition to the Yukon, Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories, Sessional Papers (No. 24.) (Not printed.) p. 1. Copy in the Saskatchewan Provincial Archives.

(81) Liquor Permits for the Yukon, Canada, Sessional Papers, (No. 51A.) A. 1898.

(82) Report of G.H.V. Bulyea on his Expedition to the Yukon, N.W.T. Sessional Papers (No. 24) A. 1898, 4th Session, 3rd Legislative Assembly.

(83) Bulyea Report, p. 8.

(84) Humble Address to His Honour the Lieutenant Governor, moved 19th August 1898, Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories, 1898, 4th Session, 3rd Legislative Assembly, p. 16.

(85) Debates, House of Commons, 21 Feb. 1905, cols. 1426-28, Sir Wilfrid Laurier.

(86) For an illustration of the insignificant extent of mining in the North West Territories up to the 1890's, see "Report of the Superintendent of Mines", Annual Report of the Department of the Interior for the Year 1895. Sessional Papers (No. 13.) A. 1896, pp. 18-23. It deals mostly with settlement and agriculture.

(87) Order in Council, 9 Nov. 1889.

(88) W. Ogilvie, Early Days on the Yukon, p. 138.
"Up to the year 1887, all mining done in the territory was on the bars and banks of the streams, and most of this was known as skim diggings, that is, only the two to four feet of the surface was worked. In view of these natural handicaps the regulation size of claim was unanimously considered too small." (It was one hundred feet square.)

(89) W. Ogilvie, Early Days on the Yukon, p. 221.
Ogilvie states categorically that the mining tax was imposed more because of the exaggerated reports of the richness of gold in western newspapers than for any other reason. He personally estimated the 1897 Yukon production to be approximately 2½ million, but reports reaching eastern Canada magnified this to 20 million.

(90) Canada Gazette, P.C. 2326, 29 July 1897.

(91) D. Morrison, Politics of the Yukon Territory: 1898-1908, p. 132.
"Annual Report of the Deputy Minister", Annual Report of the Department of the Interior, Sessional Papers (No. 13.) A. 1898, p. 12.

(92) Francis Cunynghame, The Lost Trail, The Story of Klondike Gold and the Man Who Fought for Control, Faber & Faber, London, 1953, p. 52.

(93) D. Morrison, Politics of the Yukon Territory: 1898-1908, pp. 133-135.

(94) A.C.N. Treadgold to Clifford Sifton, July 17 1900, Sifton Papers, vol. 90, p. 70030; quoted in Morrison, Politics of the Yukon Territory: 1898-1908, pp. 134-35.

"The output is sure to be more than maintained this year and maintained next, but I think that by the end of 1901 you may reduce your royalty (& your expenses too, eh?) for the Klondike, because by then the Yankees on Eldorado & Upper Bonanza will have cleared out and the lowgrade gravels can begin to be treated, if we get the water going all right."

(95) Urquhart, Buckley, eds., Historical Statistics of Canada, Table A 2 - 14, p. 14. The census of 1901 gave the Yukon a population of 27,219; the census of 1911 showed a decline to 8,512. In 1899 the population was estimated to exceed 40,000.

(96) Yukon Amendment Act, 1899, Section 4, 62-63 Vict., c. 11.

(97) Yukon Amendment Act, 1902, Section 3, 2 Edw. VII, C. 34.

(98) Yukon Amendment Act, 1908, 7-8 Edw. VII, c. 76.

(99) Yukon Representation Act, 2 Edw. VII, c. 37.

CHAPTER V.

(1) Treaty of February 28th 1825, Article IV, quoted in translation by James White in "The Alaska Boundary", Canada and Its Provinces, Vol. 8, Section IV, Part III, p. 928, Toronto, Glasgow Brook, 1914.

(2) O.D. Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1921, pp. 144-47.

(3) The three American Commissioners were, Hon. Elihu Root, Secretary of War in Roosevelt's Cabinet; 2. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who was reported to have declared that Canada's contentions were "baseless claims"; and 3. Senator George Turner of Washington, whose self interest in the Alaska Boundary question was obvious.

The British Commissioners were; 1. Lord Chief Justice Alverstone; 2. Sir Louis Jette, Chief Justice of Quebec; 3. Hon. J.D. Armour of the Supreme Court of Canada, and following his death a noted barrister, Mr. A.B. Aylesworth of Toronto.

See; Canada and Its Provinces, Vol. 8, pp. 156-57.

(4) Skelton, Laurier, Vol. 2, p. 153.

(5) Pascal Poirier, 1852-1933, born in Shediac, New Brunswick, of French-Acadian descent. Appointed to the Senate in 1885, and elected a member of the Royal Society of Canada in 1899. He was an author of several books on the Acadians.

W.S. Wallace, ed., The Macmillan Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Third Edition, Toronto, Macmillan, 1963, p. 598.

(6) Debates, Senate, 20 October 1903, pp. 1662-63.

(7) Senate Debates, 20 October. 1903, p. 1662.

(8) Senate Debates, 20 October 1903, p. 1663.

(9) According to T.C. Fairley, the spur to Canadian action came from the revelations of the discoveries and the territorial claims in the name of Norway, of Captain Otto Svedrup during the years 1898-1902. See, T.C. Fairley, Svedrup's Arctic Adventures, London, Longmans, 1959, pp. 275 - 277.

Svedrup spoke to the Royal Geographical Society in London on 27 April 1903 about his recent exploits. The veteran British explorer, Sir Leopold M'Clintock expressed his regrets on this occasion that the "Norwegians had stopped the advance of the British Empire in the islands north of Canada." (p. 274) When Ottawa received word of Svedrup's accomplishments and M'Clintock's interpretation it immediately took steps to forestall Norway's claims.

Fairley states that Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Clifford Sifton approached the Leader of the Opposition, Robert L. Borden, showed him a memorandum which outlined the threats to Canadian sovereignty in the north, and secured his agreement to a Parliamentary silence on the subject "for reasons of State".

Among the Borden Papers in the Public Archives of Canada lies an undated typed memorandum entitled "Arctic Islands". (Borden Papers M.G. 26, H. 2, 2(f) Vol. 301.) Presumably this is the memorandum to which Fairley refers. It contains no reference to Svedrup, or to any threat from any other government but that of the United States of America. The American traders and whalers on Herchell Island, in Hudson Bay, "and upon the islands North of the Hudson Bay in the Arctic Circle" and the "unfounded and troublesome claims they might make", are the only reasons cited for the proposed Canadian counter-action.

As Fairley does not cite references, it is impossible to deduce the source of his attribution of the source of the Canadian northern initiative to Svedrup and Norway.

(10) "Report of the Commissioner", Annual Report of the North West Mounted Police for the Year 1903, Sessional Paper No. 28, A. 1904, p. 2.

(11) "Report of Superintendent C. Constantine; trip to Mackenzie River, with Report of Sergeant Fitzgerald, Herchell Island Detachment," p. 49; Annual Report of the North West Mounted Police 1903, Appendix D., Sessional Paper No. 28, A. 1904.

(12) "Report of Sergeant Fitzgerald, Herchell Island Detachment," Appendix D., Annual Report of the North West Mounted Police, 1903, Sessional Paper No. 28, A. 1904.

(13) "Report of Sergeant Fitzgerald, Herchell Island Detachment", N.W.M.P. Annual Report for 1903, Appendix D. Sessional Paper No. 28, A. 1904, p. 46.

(14) Cf. Chapter IV. p. 80.

(15) A.P. Low, Cruise of the "Neptune", Ottawa.

(16) A.P. Low, Cruise of the "Neptune", p. 3.

(17) "Report of Superintendent J.D. Moodie on Service in Hudson Bay per S.S. Neptune, 1903-04", p. 3, Annual Report of the Royal North West Mounted Police for the Year 1904, Sessional Paper No. 28, A. 1904.

(18) The log-books of the "Era" and many of the papers of Captain George Comer are to be seen in the library of the Marine Historical Association, Mystic, Connecticut.

(19) A.P. Low reported that no new Scottish whaling vessels had been built for 25 years; that the Dundee fleet was reduced to 5 ships in 1903; and that it was unlikely these would be replaced. Any future whaling ships would probably be Norwegian built. The art of constructing wooden ships for Arctic waters was being lost. American whalers, because of their different methods as well as their foreign registry, mounted a greater threat to Canadian sovereignty than those of any other country. European whalers came only for the duration of one season. They appeared when the ice-pack broke up, and they disappeared as it re-froze.

The Americans were provisioned for two years and would remain one or two winters in the north on each voyage. The Americans were the first to erect permanent stations in the eastern Arctic, and from them they were well situated to trade with the aborigines. A.P. Low, Cruise of the Neptune, pp. 250-51.

(20) A.P. Low reported of the Scottish and American owned whaling stations on the Davis Strait shores of Baffin Island:

"None of these stations are making great profits and some of them are being maintained at a loss. They are of great assistance to the natives, and it is to be hoped that nothing will be done to discourage the owners who according to present returns, should be helped rather than hindered in their wish.

"Withdrawal of whalers would lead to great hardship and many deaths if the Government did not take their place and supply Eskimos with the necessary guns and ammunition."

Also Low thought that the whalers' influence was not as bad in the eastern as in the western arctic. Excessive use of alcohol was never practised, and now, (1903) had completely stopped. But the outlook of the whaling industry was gloomy. Cruise of the "Neptune" p. 27.

(21) Captain J.E. Bernier, Master Mariner and Arctic Explorer - A Narrative of 60 Years at Sea, Ottawa, Le Droit, 1939, p. 306.

(22) Captain J.E. Bernier, Report of the Dominion Government Expedition to the Arctic Islands and the Hudson Strait on Board the C.G.S. "Arctic", 1906-07, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1909, pp. 10 and 69.

(23) Fisheries Amendment Act, 1906, Statutes of Canada, 6 Edw VII c. 13, (July 13, 1906)

(24) Debates, House of Commons, 3 July 1906, col. 6855.

(25) Debates, House of Commons, 3 July 1906, Col. 6855.

(26) The Canadian flag used on this and following voyages was the Red Ensign, bearing a crowned shield in the right hand corner, emblazoned with all the provincial insignia, and surrounded by wreaths of maple leaves. Cruise of the "Arctic", 1906-07, Plate facing p. 195.

(27) Captain J.E. Bernier, Cruise of the "Arctic", 1906-07, p. 3.

(28) Senate Debates, February 20, 1907, p. 266.

(29) Gordon W. Smith, Territorial Sovereignty in the Canadian North: A Historical Outline of the Problem, Ottawa, Northern Co-ordination And Research Centre, 1963, p. 8.

(30) Senate Debates, February 20, 1907, p. 267.

(31) Senate Debates, February 20, 1907, p. 267.

(32) Captain J.E. Bernier, Cruise of the "Arctic": 1906-07, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1909, p. 127.

(33) Captain J.E. Bernier, Report of the Dominion of Canada Government Expedition to the Arctic Islands and Hudson Strait on Board the D.G.S. "Arctic", 1908-09, Ottawa, Government Printing Bureau, 1910, p. xix.

(34) Bernier, Cruise of the "Arctic": 1908-09, pp. 192-194.

(35) Captain J.E. Bernier, Report on the Dominion Government Expedition to the Northern Waters and Arctic Archipelago on the D.G.S. "Arctic" in 1910, Ottawa, Government Printing Office, p.

(36) V. Stefansson, The Friendly Arctic, New York, Macmillan, 1922, Introduction by the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Laird Borden, p. xxi.

(37) It is somewhat ironic that when Ottawa insisted on financing Stefansson's expedition completely, Gilbert Grovesnor, Director of the National Geographic Society, feared that "some politician or other at Ottawa", might try to influence the course of the expedition, thus interfering with its scientific value. See, Stefansson, The Friendly Arctic, p. ix.

(38) Report of the Royal Commission to investigate the possibilities of the Reindeer and Musk-ox industries in the Arctic and Sub-arctic regions of Canada, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1922.

Stefansson resigned in 1920 from the Commission before it had completed its work, in order to prosecute his personal interests in reindeer industries on Baffin Island.

(39) Vilhjalmur Stefansson, The Adventure of Wrangel Island, New York, Macmillan, 1925, p. 76.

(40) Some Canadian officials at first agreed with Stefansson on this point. "Their (the Russians') only claim seems to be because of the Geographical position of the Island and the fact that maps of that country frequently show it in the same colour as Siberia."

Memorandum: O.S. Finnie to W.W. Cory, Commissioner, Northwest Territories, 9 June 1922, File 930, N.W.T. Wrangel Island. Now in the custody of the Northern Administration Branch, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Canada's title to much of the arctic archipelago would also seem to have rested on little more than the colour of the map.

(41) Commissioner's Report, Annual Report R.N.W.M.P. for the year Ended 30 September 1919, "Overseas Contingent, "B" Squadron", Sessional Paper No. 28. A 1920. pp. 19-20.

(42) Sir Joseph Pope, Memorandum for the Rt. Hon. Mr. Meighen on Canada's Claim to certain islands within the Arctic Circle, 25th November 1920. Department of the Interior, File 930, N.W.T. Wrangel Island. Underlining is Sir Joseph Pope's.

(43) V. Stefansson, Adventure of Wrangel Island, p. 80.

(44) Sir Joseph Pope, Confidential Memorandum for the Prime Minister respecting Wrangel Island, 21 March 1922. File 930, N.W.T. Wrangel Island.

(45) Loring Christie, Department of External Affairs, August 9, 1922, SECRET, Memorandum Submitted to the Prime Minister - 9 - VIII - 22. Copy, File 930, Wrangel Island, Department of the Interior.

(46) Debates, House of Commons, 12 May 1922, p. 1751.

(47) Ibid., 31 May 1923, p. 3360.

(48) Ibid., 14 June 1923, p. 3948.

(49) Ibid., 1 June 1925, p. 3773.

(50) V. Kenneth Johnston, "Canada's Title to the Arctic Islands", Canadian Historical Review, March 1933, Vol. XIV, No. 1, p. 37.

(51) V. Stefansson, The Adventure of Wrangel Island, p. 71.

(52) Department of the Interior, Canada's Arctic Islands, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1927, p. 5.

(53) Debates, House of Commons, 10 June 1925, p. 4069.

(54) Loc. cit.

(55) T.C. Fairley, Svedrup's Arctic Adventures, p. 284.
Canada's Arctic Islands, pp. 44-45.

(56) T.C. Fairley, Svedrup's Arctic Adventures, p. 285.

(57) Department of the Interior, Natural Resources, 11 November 1930.

(58) V. Kenneth Johnston, "Canada's Title to the Arctic Islands", The Canadian Historical Review, XIV, No. 1, p. 41.

CHAPTER VI.

(1) C. Cecil Lingar, Territorial Government in Canada: The Autonomy Question in the old North-West Territories, pp. 21-35.

(2) Debates, House of Commons, 21 February 1905, Cols. 1421-59.

(3) J. Castell Hopkins, ed., Canadian Annual Review, 1905, Toronto, Annual Review Publishing Company, 1906, p. 365.

(4) Loc. cit.

(5) Canada, Dominion Provincial and Interprovincial Conferences from 1887 to 1926, King's Printer, Ottawa, 1951.

Debates, House of Commons, 13 July 1908, col. 12779.

(6) Debates, House of Commons, 13 July 1908, cols. 12776-77.

(7) Ibid., cols. 12777-78.

(8) Ibid., col. 12779.

(9) Ibid., cols. 12822-23.

(10) Ibid., cols. 12818-19, R.L. Borden.

(11) Ibid., col. 12823.

(12) Ibid., 15 June 1908, col. 10530.

(13) Ibid., col. 10530.

(14) The Manitoba Boundaries Extension Act, 1912, 2 Geo.V., c.32.
The Ontario Boundaries Extension Act, 2 Geo. V., c. 40.

The Quebec Boundaries Extension Act, 1912, 2 Geo.V., c.45.

In each of the three acts the rights of the Hudson's Bay Company were reserved, for the areas annexed by the acts had been part of Rupert's Land. In the case of Manitoba alone the Government of Canada retained control over the lands and natural resources of the areas to be annexed to the Province, "for the purposes of Canada."

(15) Debates, House of Commons, 17 May 1905, col. 6103.

(16) The Northwest Territories Act, 1905, 4-5 Edw. VII, c. 27.

(17) Debates, House of Commons, 13 July 1908, col. 12777.

(18) Ibid., 4 July 1905, col. 8766.

(19) In the fiscal year 1908-09, for example, the salary of the Commissioner was \$1000.; school grants totalled \$3,500; and the total budget for the civil government of the Northwest Territories amounted to \$9,800; the highest figure it reached before 1920-21.

See, Estimates, 1908-09; 1920-21.

(20) Commissioner's Letter Books, R.C.M.P. Papers, Comptroller's Office, Public Archives of Canada, Record Group 18.

(21) F. White to P.F. Brittain, Hon. Secretary, British Exporters' Association, 4 June 1906, Ibid., vol. 138, p. 62.

(22) F. White to H.S. Blake, Toronto, 30 May 1907, Ibid., p. 191.

(23) F. White to H.S. Blake, Toronto, 28 May 1907, Ibid., pp. 189-90.

(24) F. White to H.S. Blake, Toronto, 20 July 1907, Ibid., p. 208.

(25) F. White to H.S. Blake, Toronto, 23 July 1907, Ibid., pp. 213-15.

(26) F. White to N.L. Newcombe, Deputy Minister of Justice, 8 April, 1908, Ibid., pp. 354-55.

(27) F. White to A. Larose, The Pas, N.W.T., 3 April 1908, Ibid., p. 347.

(28) Commissioner White wrote to James McKay, K.C. of Prince Albert Saskatchewan, on 14 August, 1907:

"All ordinances of the old North West Territories which apply to the new territories are now being compiled and I hope will be issued under proper authority for the guidance of the public generally...." Commissioner's Letter Book, Vol. 138, p. 238.

They never were; the demand for them did not warrant the expenditure for publication. In fact the last ordinances of the "old" Northwest Territories were not repealed until 1954.

(29) Commissioner's Letter Book, 10 April 1908, vol. 138, p. 363.

(30) Report of the Auditor General, Public Accounts of Canada, 1893, Sessional Papers, (No. 2.) A. 1894.

(31) F. White to Frank Oliver, Minister of the Interior, 28 March 1907, Ibid., p. 165.

(32) F. White to E.L. Cash, M.D., M.P., Yorkton, Saskatchewan, 13 May 1907, Ibid., p. 184.

(33) Canada, Annual Report of the Auditor-General for the Fiscal Year ending 31 March 1913, "R" 3j. Sessional Paper No. 2.

(34) F. White to Captain C.W. Allen, Philadelphia, 5 June 1915, Ibid., Vol. 139, p. 90.

(35) For example, when considering the issue of game regulations in the Northwest Territories, the Deputy Minister of the Interior suggested; "At the same time before taking further steps, it might be well to make sure that similar action is not contemplated by the Commissioner of the Northwest Territory, or any other federal department." W.W. Cory, Deputy Minister of the Interior to the Minister of the Interior, W.J. Roche, 30 March 1914. Bordon Papers, RLB 529, 101528, Public Archives of Canada.

(36) Sam Lewis, Comptroller, R.N.W.M.P. to the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, 9 April 1918, Copy, in File 930, N.W.T., Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

(37) F. White to J.B. Hunter, Deputy Minister of Public Works, 18 May 1915, Commissioner's Letter Book, Vol. 139, p. 68.

(38) Debates, House of Commons, 25 June 1919, p. 4045.

(39) Loc. cit.

(40) Memorandum, re Secretary to Commissioner of the North West Territories, George D. Pope, Accountant to the Commissioner, to the Commissioner of the North West Territories, March 24, 1920. File 530, NWT, Department of the Interior. Public Archives Record Centre.

(41) O.S. Finnie, Acting Secretary, Northwest Territories, to J.H. Walker, Portland Oregon, 9th May 1921. File 498, NWT., P.A.R.C.

Finnie was a Yukon veteran, and had been Chief Mining Inspector of the Department of the Interior until 1921, when he was transferred to the Government of the Northwest Territories.

(42) Minute Books of the Council of the Northwest Territories, Vol. 1, Office of the Clerk of the Council of the Northwest Territories, Yellowknife, N.W.T.

(43) Northwest Territories and Yukon Branch, Report of the Director, O.S. Finnie, Part VI, Annual Report of the Department of the Interior, 1923, p. 153.

(44) Diamond Jenness, Eskimo Administration: II. Canada. Arctic Institute of North America, Technical Paper No. 14, Montreal, P.Q., Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 29, p. 49.

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