UP JACOB'S LADDER: ANDREW JOHNSON'S
RISE TO POWER, 1835-1857

by

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The purpose of this study is to critically examine Andrew Johnson's early political career, from 1835 to 1857. Johnson remains today one of the most controversial figures in American history. His role as President during Reconstruction has initiated a century of debate over his character and behavior. In the process of this bitter controversy, few scholars have attempted to explain his personality and political behavior in terms of his early public life. This thesis will systematically investigate Johnson's career as a Tennessee representative and senator (1835-1843), United States Congressman (1843-1853), and Governor of Tennessee (1853-1857).

Through an intensive analysis of Johnson's letters and speeches, as well as contemporary accounts and newspaper sources, it will be established that throughout the period examined, Andrew Johnson behaved as a loyal Jacksonian Democrat and an ardent Southerner. In the process, the study will refute the modern historical interpretation which contends that Johnson was a political maverick and an abnormal personality. Through the use of recent social science methods such as roll-call analysis and attitude scaling, Johnson's voting pattern in Congress will be scrutinized and presented to determine political consistency and allegiances.

Johnson's political progression from a minor border state politician to presidential aspirant will be discussed in terms of his participation in the slavery controversy, the debates over tariffs, internal improvements, land, and other divisive and national issues, to bring into focus his political behavior in relation to the behavior of his contemporaries.

Andrew Johnson will emerge as an ambitious Southern Democrat, who followed his party, represented his people, and was loyal to his section, from the necessity of political expediency and from a sense of idealistic
conviction. Although neither a contemner of the popular will nor a selfless consul of the people's interests, Johnson achieved reforms and benefits for the people that could only have been achieved as a result of his driving ambition. One fact will be obvious: he did not act as the paranoidal and masochistic apolitical fanatic that modern scholarship has pictured him.
ALONE?

Is he alone at whose right side rides
Courage, with Skill within the hands
and Faith upon the left? Does solitude
surround the brave when Adventure leads
the way and ambition reads the winds?

-- Harold M. Anderson

*New York Sun*, May 21, 1927
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INTRODUCTION

"JOHNSONOGRAPHY" IN PERSPECTIVE

Centennials are a tradition among historically minded peoples. They are usually celebrated with pride and patriotism. May 26, 1968, marked the hundredth anniversary of Andrew Johnson's acquittal by the Senate. Johnson's impeachment and subsequent acquittal in 1868 have become symbolic of the triumph of the Presidential authority over Congressional authority, yet this symbolism is neither realistic nor accurate. Johnson's impeachment was a partisan political act, conceived and executed by politicians. Nevertheless, the characters of that historic impeachment have come to represent much more than the obvious.

Since 1868, Andrew Johnson and the Radical Republicans have connoted many images to generations of historians—who have tended to project the solutions and attitudes of the present into the complex problems of the Reconstruction era. The result is often symbolism and imagery: a history of Reconstruction where the Radical Republicans are Negrophile fanatics and Andrew Johnson is a patriotic defender of the Constitution, a bulwark against Congressional usurpation; or a history where the Radicals are honest men with humanitarian ideals and Andrew Johnson is a blundering, vindictive Negrophobe. Moral indictment such as this may satisfy the moralizing historian, but adds little to a historical understanding of the period.

The history of "Johnsonography" reveals that even today his personality and role are ill-defined. Most interpretations have been based almost entirely on his presidential career. Few scholars have undertaken a systematic study of his early public life. The studies of Johnson's presidential career are so contradictory that he still remains an enigmatic
figure in American history.

Contemporaries had argued about Andrew Johnson. Political opponents such as Henry Wilson, James G. Blaine, and James R. Lowell portrayed Johnson as an obstinate, conceited, boorish, and inept man who wilfully defied Congress and Northern public opinion with his plan of Reconstruction. Other contemporaries viewed the seventeenth President in a more favorable light. Cabinet members Gideon Welles and Hugh McCulloch, as well as many Southerners, praised Johnson for his dignity, sincerity, and intellectual prowess.

It was not until the turn of the century that professional historians devoted their studies to Andrew Johnson. John W. Burgess provided one of the first scholarly evaluations of Johnson in *Reconstruction and the Constitution 1866-1876*. "Mr. Johnson was an unfit person to be President of the United States," declared Burgess, "he was low-born and low-bred, violent in temper, obstinate, coarse, vindictive, and lacking in the sense of propriety. . . ." This harsh condemnation was concurred in by David M. De Witt, and Edward Channing, as well as other scholars of the period.

It was the appearance in 1906 of James Ford Rhodes's sixth volume of his *History of the United States From the Compromise of 1850*, which firmly established the interpretation of Andrew Johnson as an inept, obstinate politician, who, through his blundering, helped the Radical Republicans institute a harsh and vindictive Reconstruction. "Of all men in public life, it is difficult to conceive of one so ill-fitted for this delicate work as was Andrew Johnson," Rhodes exclaimed, "... the extremely egotistical, the self-confidence of the self-made man [obtruded itself in most of his utterances]." Rhodes believed Johnson was incompetent, "representing no considerable or enduring phase of sentiment in the North [in 1865] and had little comprehension of Northern public opinion, which Congress stood for. . . ."
The Senate's passage of the Civil Rights bill over his veto in 1866 demonstrated "... the defects of his character and especially his lack of political sense. ... His pride of opinion, his desire to beat, blinded him to the real welfare of the South and of the whole country." Rhodes concluded that Andrew Johnson "... insisted on doing things exactly his own way and no other; he thought that his wisdom was superior to the collective wisdom of Congress. ... It was dogmatism run mad." It was Rhodes's firm conviction that "no one else was so instrumental in defeating Johnson's own aims as was Johnson himself."  

Rhodes and other scholars who shared the same view of Andrew Johnson were Northerners by education or background. Rhodes's father was a friend of Stephen A. Douglas, and Rhodes himself viewed the Civil War in moralistic terms. Although his historical works are standard references, Rhodes knew little of the materials of the Reconstruction period. This, tempered by his doctrinaire preconceptions of the era, formed his condemnation of Johnson almost before it was written. In addition, the period in which Rhodes was writing reflected a reaction against the restoration of Southern rule, invariably connected to Johnson's reconstruction policies. 

Rhodes's presentation of Johnson and Reconstruction was refined by William A. Dunning, Columbia University scholar and student of John W. Burgess. Dunning reflected both the attitudes of his mentor and of Rhodes. Although he utilized the Johnson manuscripts more fully than did Rhodes, Dunning did not radically alter the Rhodes thesis. "It was not long before the bad judgment and worse taste of the President," Dunning wrote, "drove over to his enemies nearly the whole body of Republican congressmen, and compelled him to look for support to an insignificant minority. ..." Andrew Johnson was an unwise politician and statesman who accepted the advice of "outsiders" in crucial matters. There was, however, a positive side to Johnson. He
was "aggressive, and violent in controversy, fond of the fighting by which his convictions must be maintained." Nevertheless, in the formation "of his opinions of great questions of public policy was as diligent as any man in seeking and weighing the views of all who were competent to aid him." Involved in Johnson's policy "was a clear and promising scheme of party re-adjustment." Yet, Dunning insisted that Andrew Johnson forced most Republicans into the Radical camp and therefore was not "a statesman of national size."^7

World War I and the years immediately following revealed no significant additions to the Rhodes-Dunning interpretation. The school of history at Columbia University, under the guidance of Burgess and Dunning, educated a generation of scholars. These men, such as Dunning's student Walter L. Fleming in The Sequel of Appomatox (1919), described Johnson as "ill-educated, narrow, vindictive... stubborn, irascible, and undignified."^8 These historians viewed Andrew Johnson and the Radical Republicans unfavorably.

Harvard historian, James Schouler, blamed the evils of Reconstruction on the Radical Republicans, who were "revengeful and visionary." Andrew Johnson was almost schizophrenic. He was "proud, dignified, statesmanlike in action and utterance, fully in self-control," yet he was also "boastful, loquacious over his self-made image." Schouler blamed Johnson for possessing a "wilful and inflexible temper," for his adherence to "plans impossible of execution."^9 Several scholars agreed with Schouler.

John B. McMaster, along with E. P. Oberholtzer, viewed Johnson as a man of "sincerity" and "tact" as well as "decision," but blamed his failure on certain inconsistencies of political behavior as well as the influence of his political enemies. ^10

The concept of Andrew Johnson as an incompetent politician and non-
political personality persisted into the 1920's. By the end of the decade, however, there was a movement to challenge the Rhodes-Dunning thesis. This reverse was marked by the Supreme Court decision in the Myers v. United States case, in 1926, which ruled that Congress could not limit the President's power to remove executive officers. This was the essence of one of the charges against Johnson in his impeachment trial. He had removed Secretary of War Stanton, against Congress' wishes, a decision which has received the indictment of contemporaries and historians alike. The late 1920's and early 1930's witnessed the appearance of a new school of historical interpretation. Men of this school--"revisionists"--saw Reconstruction as a grandiose scheme of giant capitalists to exploit the South. This economic interpretation was highlighted by a favorable analysis of Andrew Johnson.

Five revisionist works within three years in the late 1920's and 1930 solidified the revolt against the Rhodes-Dunning thesis. In 1928, Robert W. Winston published the first authoritative biography of Johnson: Andrew Johnson, Plebeian and Patriot. Based upon extensive use of the Johnson papers and newspapers, Winston's biography pictures Johnson as a unique individual who brought "simplicity, dignity and honesty to the White House." Johnson's courage was indomitable, his determination to win and advance the interests of the common people incessant. Winston believed that these personality traits set Andrew Johnson against "Southern tradition, Southern aristocracy." Johnson's fault was not that he had changed from his supposed Radical inclinations when he became President, but "that he had not changed, and would not change. ... Andrew Johnson did not appreciate this fact. He set himself against a force. ..." It seemed ironical to Winston that "the most democratic of presidents should have happened to be a man ... who was so tactless in his own way, and
ran against snags that might have been avoided." In words that more than faintly foreshadowed Eric L. McLKitrick's interpretation in 1960, Winston analyzed the personality nuances that prompted Johnson to action, and he offered a theory that "Johnson's neglected and impoverished infancy developed a complex, perhaps an underdog and plebeian complex." In general, Robert Winston viewed Andrew Johnson as a protagonist, battling against the forces of evil. Although Winston's biography is noteworthy in many respects, his lack of sufficient evidence for many of his assertions reveal a non-professional background, and the "novelistic" nature of his work.

Other revisionists reaffirmed Winston's interpretation. Lloyd P. Stryker, Claude Bowers, George F. Milton and Howard K. Beale sustained the analysis of Johnson as a competent politician, and added a severe criticism of the Radical Republicans. Significantly, of these revisionists only Beale was a trained historian.

Stryker's biography of Johnson, Andrew Johnson, A Study in Courage (1929), is ardently partisan. The author utilized extensive newspaper accounts, and his style is animated, but the details of his judgment are often faulty. He views Johnson as an idealistic patriot with no major faults; the Radical Republicans as vindictive fanatics. Stryker attacked Rhodes for his condemnation of Johnson, claiming that early historians were reluctant to give Andrew Johnson his due praise because this would have entailed a condemnation of General Ulysses S. Grant and his administration.

Claude G. Bowers, a journalist, helped to popularize the bright image Andrew Johnson. The Tragic Era: The Revolution After Lincoln (1930), portrayed Johnson as a "Jeffersonian," the idol of the working classes. Bowers saw Johnson as a complex man--"honest, tender, able, forceful and tactless." Although Johnson was a hero in Bower's mind, his fundamental
failure was "an incurable deficiency in tact."  

George Fort Milton agreed. In The Age of Hate: Andrew Johnson and the Radicals (1930), Johnson was a shining example of "honesty of character" as well as "justice" and a "disciple of Jefferson and an apostle of Jackson." In contrast, the Radical Republicans were black in character and deed. 

The Stryker, Bowers, and Milton accounts are as melodramatic as they are partisan. Anyone who wants to approach the study of Andrew Johnson through a crowded and stirring narrative in which Andrew Johnson and Thaddeus Stevens are cast respectively as Gabriel and Satan, will find these books to his taste, but historians must doubt their permanent contribution to historical understanding.

The most important work in the revisionist period is Howard K. Beale's The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction (1930). The election year of 1866 is critically examined through the use of contemporary newspapers, private correspondence, and local campaign speeches to determine the true motives of Andrew Johnson and the Radical Republicans. Beale argues that the election was a decisive test of power between the rising industrialists and businessmen of the Northeast, represented by the Radical Republicans; and the agrarians of the South and West, represented by Andrew Johnson. Professor Beale utilizes the theories of economic determinism and monolithic economic and political interests, and concludes that the victory of the Radicals in 1866 was achieved by adroit propaganda. The campaign appealed to the sectionalism and post-war extremism of the electorate, rather than presenting any actual issues. "Andrew Johnson's reputation," Beale contends, "suffered from the enmity of newspapermen," who hated him because "he dealt with them brusquely." Yet Johnson was an honest, efficient and competent executive, worthy of more respect than historians have given him, Professor Beale insists. In his policies,
Johnson displayed "unusual patience and wisdom." With one eye on politics, he constantly counselled the South to be reasonable and tactful, yet his policies were made to look worse than they were by the impetuous and indiscreet actions of Southerners.

Beale was convinced that Johnson possessed certain character traits which aided his downfall. He had an inordinate faith in his own power of persuasion over the people; he was unable to gain personal loyalty from the people; he was too reserved and aloof; he was indecisive and unable to compromise. Howard K. Beale concludes that Andrew Johnson was neither a "fool nor a contemner of the popular will," but he was "perverted by the guiles of traitors and the dream of power." Yet had Johnson succeeded in his Reconstruction policy, his uncompromising sense of duty which brought obloquy upon his name would have been accredited the highest virtue of a great man. Beale was convinced that "Johnson possessed those characteristics what make men blessed or damned, famous or infamous, because chance leads them to success or failure."16

The depression and World War II produced no new monographs to alter the revisionist thesis. Histories tended to follow the economic interpretation of Reconstruction and the textbooks of the era contained basic revisionist portrayals of Andrew Johnson. Charles and Mary Beard's The Rise of American Civilization (1934) is an example of this textbook interpretation. Andrew Johnson emerges as a staunch conservative Democrat, a "foe of capitalism and slavocracy alike," a "primitive agrarian" who was rendered impotent by his foes, the Radical Republicans.17 Many other general histories reflected this revisionist analysis, the most notable was James G. Randall's Civil War and Reconstruction (1937). E. Merton Coulter's The South During Reconstruction also presented a distilled Bealean version of Andrew Johnson, and most studies during the 1940's
revealed nothing radical.\footnote{18}

In a poll of fifty-five American historians, conducted by Arthur M. Schlesinger in 1948, which rated the presidents according to "greatness," Andrew Johnson was ranked nineteenth on the list, in the "average" category. Although his reputation had undergone a drastic re-evaluation, he was still classified by most historians as being less than great as a President.\footnote{19}

During the 1950's there were some indications that the revisionist views of Andrew Johnson were being redefined. In 1952 Gregg Phifer studied Johnson's "Swing Around the Circle." Phifer demonstrated that Johnson had obtained much initial support on his campaign tour, but he played into the hands of the Radicals by refusing to emphasize economic policies. Johnson's failure to attack the Radicals for their exclusion of certain Southerners from public office was a political "blunder," and his arguments for states' rights and decentralization came too late for maximum effectiveness. Phifer contends that Johnson lost his best chance to win his objectives through a third party when the National Union Convention in Philadelphia adjourned without an organized party machinery. What was the result? Phifer concludes that "Johnson failed as a practical politician who neither held nor won party support. Johnson relied upon the weapon he knew best; his own power of oral persuasion." But his stump-speaking tour in 1866 was grossly misrepresented and misconstrued. Only 5% of the voters heard Johnson; the other 95% learned of the tour from the newspapers--most of which were controlled by Republicans.\footnote{20}

During the 1950's the only substantial challenge to the revisionist thesis was a challenge to the alleged economic and political solidarity of The Radical Republicans. Although Johnson was still viewed favorably, it was asserted by some that he was a "blunderer." David Donald announced: "in the unskillful hands of Andrew Johnson, Lincoln's suggestions were
converted into dogmas." In another article, Donald argued that through Johnson's unwillingness to "recognize his weak position, his inability to function as a party leader, he had sacrificed all the influence with the party which had elected him, and had turned over its control to Radicals vindictively opposed to his policies. Through political ineptitude he threw away a magnificent opportunity." Other studies reiterated Donald's view, although most concentrated on determining Reconstruction as an era of warring economic and political factions.

The first noteworthy study of Andrew Johnson since 1930 appeared in 1960. Eric L. McKitrick's *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction* almost convinces the reader of the cyclic nature of historical interpretation. Although McKitrick follows the ideas of the "New School" of historians who questioned the monolithic nature of political parties and economic groups during Reconstruction, he comes close to the interpretations of Robert Winston and William Dunning.

"How Andrew Johnson threw away his own power both as President and party leader, how he assisted materially, in spite of himself, in blocking the reconciliation of North and South, and what his behavior did toward disrupting the political life of an entire nation" is the thesis of McKitrick's study. Andrew Johnson was a "lone wolf" in almost every sense of the word; he was a "maverick, operating out of the fringe of things."

The role of an outsider shaped the man. A Democrat, but never a party man, Johnson was obsessed with himself, and with his grim ambition evolved an inner world of suspicious fantasy, a credo of plebeianism. Professor McKitrick concentrated upon activities between May 29, 1865 and March 2, 1867. Within this short period, Johnson had failed as a party leader, chief executive, and consul of the people. McKitrick contends that Johnson was animated both by his mystic vision of the people and a bizarre sense of con-
spiracies and plots. The Radical Republicans helped to destroy Andrew Johnson, but "there was a deep psychological need to eliminate Johnson from American life forever, and it was principally Johnson himself who had created it." 23

The McKitrick thesis remains the modern interpretation of Andrew Johnson. In 1962, Arthur Schlesinger's poll on presidential greatness was conducted again, and Andrew Johnson had dropped to twenty-first place, but still within the "average" category. 24

Minor challenges to the McKitrick thesis were forthcoming in studies by John H. and LaWanda Cox, and David Donald. In an article examining President Johnson's Freedman's Bureau and Civil Rights veto messages, the Coxes retracked the path followed by Dunning fifty-five years earlier. William H. Seward, Henry Stanberry, Gideon Welles, James Doolittle and Edwin Stanton all advised Johnson on his first veto, some contributing drafts. Yet Andrew Johnson's decision on whose advice and material to include in his message reveals considerable political sagacity. He showed acute sensitivity to the political implications of racial attitudes, and his Civil Rights veto was not a simple argument against the bill, but a "contradictory composite designed to attract political support among both Republicans and Democrats." There is much evidence that Johnson exhibited evasive contradictions, racist attitudes, and particularly concessions to political expedience. 25

In their Politics, Principle and Prejudice (1963), the Coxes did not see Johnson as "a politically inept chief executive during the first year of his administration, nor as a martyr to uncompromising constitutional principles. Rather . . . [they] found him a seasoned political veteran, who with good reason, accepted a view of politics then widely current—that the times were ripe for a new or transformed Union party centered about his leadership and his restoration policies." Andrew
Johnson here emerges as an ambitious political opportunist who was flexible in most issues except one: civil rights. Stubbornness and idealistic principles cannot explain Johnson's political behavior, the Coxes insist. He took care to create the public image of himself as one who could "afford to do right," who thought only of the Union, and one who rested secure in the approbation of the people. The Coxes present convincing evidence to demonstrate that one of Johnson's motivations was his desire to erect a third party to carry him to victory in 1868. Andrew Johnson was an astute, calculating politician, but he refused to yield on the civil rights issue. He may have been blinded by his own racial attitudes, or by his victory over Congress's Freedman's Bureau bill. He may have been guided by the hope that he would gain ultimate victory by encouraging extreme action on the part of the Radicals with the hope of garnering popular support for himself. But, by his decisions, Johnson "precipitated a great issue of moral principle central to the battle over Reconstruction: and he brought upon himself an unparalleled humiliation."  

In his *Politics of Reconstruction* (1965), David Donald abandoned his former position. Donald agreed with the Coxes and biographer Winston by asserting that Johnson never espoused radical ideas before his Presidency, and therefore cannot be accused of reneging on any promises. Donald doubts Johnson's alleged inflexible adherence to the Constitution, and the assumption that he was flattered into submission by Southern aristocrats. On the contrary, "practical political considerations" account for Johnson's behavior. Confronted with the problem of the restoration of the South in 1865, Johnson revealed himself to be a "virtuoso of politics." Why then did he fail? Not because of personal faults such as inflexibility of temper or intemperateness of language, contends Professor Donald. Rather, Johnson failed because he was associated with the Democratic party in the North and
the Democratic party was associated with disloyalty during the Civil War. Also, Andrew Johnson, politician, misread the basis and extent of the differences between the Moderate and Radical Republicans. Capable though he was, this one miscalculation proved fatal to his program and his career.

Although the Coxes and Donald pointed out some serious weaknesses in the McKitrick thesis, the McKitrick interpretation of Andrew Johnson is the one most subscribed to by modern scholars. It is apparent that the conception of Johnson as a man out of place in his office, and in politics in general, has taken hold of the historian's fancy, a hold which has survived for a century, and does not appear to be relinquishing its pressure.

Dunning, Winston, Beale, and McKitrick all worked with similar sources. Yet Andrew Johnson remains an enigmatic figure. Curiously, historians for a century have studied Johnson on the basis of his presidential career. Only his non-professional biographers attempted to systematically examine his early career. Although Johnson did not learn to read or write until he was a grown man, and thus did not leave a great store of papers relating to his early life, enough material is available to make a thorough study of his public career, prior to the Senate, worthwhile.

It is important to discover continuity and consistency in Andrew Johnson's behavior as it is to account for the changes and inconsistencies. A study of Andrew Johnson as state politician, Congressman and Governor reveals much about Andrew Johnson as President. The popular view is that Johnson was a plebeian—simplex munditus—a natural leader and politician, and that his career represented the rise from poverty and ignominy to fame and fortune. But what was his political philosophy? Was he a shrewd and calculating politician, and if so, how did he achieve his ambitions? Was he a regular party man—did he vote consistently with his party and section in Congress on the great national issues of the period? Was he an idealistic
reformer or an opportunist; a maverick and outsider, or an ambitious political infighter? No Johnson biography has satisfactorily answered these questions.

The purpose of this study is to critically examine Andrew Johnson's early political career. A presentation of the man in his own words and actions, tempered by the observations and reactions of his contemporaries, will exorcise many of the stereotypes relating to Johnson, the man and the politician.
NOTES FOR INTRODUCTION


3. John W. Burgess, Reconstruction and the Constitution 1866-1876 (New York: Charles Scribners, 1902), pp. 191-92. Burgess was a Northerner and established the highly influential Columbia University School of History and Political Science.


12. Stryker was a lawyer; Bowers and Milton were journalists.


CHAPTER ONE

"I AM A CANDIDATE"

"The secret of success is constancy of purpose"

--Benjamin Disraeli

Along with his appointment as Military Governor of Tennessee in March 1862, Andrew Johnson received a warning. "You must not expect to be received with enthusiasm; but rather the reverse," wrote Union General Don Carlos Buell. East Tennesseans welcomed Johnson as a Unionist hero, but in other parts of the state he was considered a "traitor." He had become an enemy of the state he had served with sincerity and devotion. Before he left for Nashville to assume his new duties, Johnson may have contemplated past events to fathom the irony of the situation. If so, he was undeterred. President Abraham Lincoln wanted a loyal Unionist as Military Governor; Johnson would "rather die in the last ditch than be scared off the track."\(^1\) In this he had remained steadfast since he was a young boy.

Life began as a struggle against poverty. As a young apprentice tailor in Raleigh, North Carolina, Johnson assumed the responsibility for the livelihood of his mother and brother soon after his father's tragic death.\(^2\) To most observers, Johnson was an independent boy determined to rise above his indigence. His aggressive characteristics served him well throughout half a century of political life. From tailor, he rose to alderman and to mayor of his town council. Entering state politics, he became state legislator, then state senator. Johnson subsequently rose to United States Congressman, Governor of Tennessee, United States Senator, Military Governor, Vice-President, and ultimately, President. On the strength of his own abilities, Johnson had risen from the tailor shop to the highest office in the land.
After his unhappy boyhood in North Carolina, Johnson migrated to Greeneville, East Tennessee. There he found the western environment congenial. By 1827, a year after settling in Greeneville, he had established a tailor shop and married Eliza McCardle, daughter of a Scotch shoemaker. His wife was to provide a calming influence on his sometimes volatile temper, and remain his most steadfast supporter throughout his public life.

In Greeneville, Tennessee, Johnson laid the foundations for political power and material success. A profitable business as tailor was the result of his determined labors, and it was not long before he was financially independent. This economic security allowed him to devote some of his time to two important avocations: self-education and local politics. Eager to acquire knowledge and involve himself in debate, Johnson was stimulated by various individuals in Greeneville, when he took part in the debating societies of the local colleges and academies. As he approached manhood, his intellect and oratorical abilities blossomed. Within two years of arriving in Greeneville, he had entered municipal politics. In 1828, he successfully ran for alderman of the town council. At the early age of twenty, Johnson had celebrated his first political victory.

A majority of the artisans and tradesmen in Greeneville supported Johnson. Yet, few people were elected to responsible offices in the early 1800's in the South without the support of the local "aristocracy." Johnson probably realized this and went out of his way to establish friendly relations with local patriarchs such as Alexander Williams. Later in his career, Johnson would solicit the power and influence of the wealthy and prominent, but only if it served his political ambitions. Once secure in the knowledge that he no longer needed the aid of patricians, Johnson did not hesitate ending any alliances. In one public address, he spared no epithets in his denunciations of former patron Alexander Williams:
He goes about through the community with his nostrils distended in quest of all the unsound spots upon character, like a green fly passing over all the pure places or sound portions of flesh, alighting upon the sores and scabs, for the purpose of satiating his depraved appetite.

By 1833, Andrew Johnson had successfully survived five years of political battles. He was re-elected alderman of the Greeneville council in 1829, elected mayor in 1830, and retained that post until 1833. During these years, Johnson advocated municipal reform, economy of government, and offered other proposals for the advancement of all the people of Greeneville.

Andrew Johnson's rise in municipal politics reflected certain changes in the social and political structure of the nation in the 1820's and 1830's. Although the results of Jacksonianism became manifest by 1840, the seeds of change had been evident a decade before. Particularly in the South, political office was the domain of "aristocrats." Wealth, birth, education, and marriage were the determinants for office, although social mobility was considerable. The Age of Jackson broke the aristocratic rule of the Virginia Dynasty, and introduced the "common man" to a fuller participation in the processes of democracy. These changes occurred at an opportune time for Johnson's entry into public life.

By 1834, Johnson had concluded that the time had come for his political advancement. As alderman and mayor of Greeneville, he had observed the broadening of the base of politics in Greene county: two tradesmen, John Balch and Jacob Bewley had risen from obscurity to prominence and power. Balch and Bewley had split the county into factions, and the state of affairs had become chaotic. Johnson was elected a delegate to the State Constitutional Convention; he made himself known throughout the county, probably as strategy for his move into state politics, an open field left by the retirement of Balch and Bewley. At the conclusion of the Convention, Johnson announced his candidacy for the State Legislature, representing
Greene and Washington counties. Culminating a spirited campaign against a prominent Revolutionary War veteran, Johnson emerged victorious.

He rose quickly in Tennessee politics, an impressive accomplishment considering the able men he encountered. Johnson's abilities did not escape the attention of prominent politicians such as James K. Polk, Cave Johnson, Felix Grundy, Amos Kendall, John Bell, and Samuel Houston.

Physically and mentally, Johnson was imposing. About five feet ten inches tall and one hundred and seventy-five pounds, Johnson was a striking figure when he entered the Tennessee State Legislature in 1835. His limbs were strong and muscular, his movements quick and powerful. A massive, round and broad head was supported by a short thick neck and large shoulders. His forehead was not high, but was very wide and perpendicular, and he possessed the famous knowledge bumps. Johnson's complexion was dark; complemented by black and piercing eyes. His countenance, when in repose, appeared gloomy, yet when expressed with a smile, was attractive. In ordinary conversation, Johnson's voice was low and soft, but when he became excited, it reverberated with power and volume. Nature had stamped him, like Jefferson Davis, an impressive personage.

When only a freshman in the Tennessee Legislature, Johnson had been noticed. One member of the House observed of him:

Though plainly clad . . . his marked and expressive features presented him well, and engaged attention when he arose to speak. He made more than the ordinary impression of a new member. He was punctual, laborious . . . kept a vigilant eye on the legislation proposed in molding the order of things under the new Constitution, and judiciously participated in debate. His style was . . . ready and pointed.

Although Johnson's presence in the Legislature was marked by many members, few were aware of his political principles or party loyalties.

Andrew Johnson's vague political allegiances were compounded by the factionalism in Tennessee political parties. In 1835, he was known as a
Whig because he had taken part in a legislative caucus which nominated Judge Hugh Lawson White (and not Jacksonian Martin Van Buren) as Tennessee's presidential candidate. Yet Johnson professed support for the Democratic party on numerous occasions. During the 1839 campaign for the State Legislature, he declared himself a John C. Calhoun Democrat, although East Tennesseans acknowledged Johnson as a Whig. In later campaign speeches, he bitterly attacked Martin Van Buren with the same breath that he assailed Henry Clay and the Whig party. Declaring allegiance to the regular Democratic party leadership in 1840, Johnson nevertheless asserted that he would have "no hesitancy in speaking out for John C. Calhoun," dissident Southern Democratic leader. 11

Andrew Johnson probably recognized the political instability in Tennessee during the 1830's. His flexibility of principle indicated that he would not let political success be determined by party loyalty alone. Although outward allegiance to Andrew Jackson was still a significant aspect of a politician's success, Jackson's economic policies had produced political cleavages. The eventual revolt against the Jackson party was, in part, an expression of dissatisfaction by rising young politicians such as Andrew Johnson, who became increasingly disaffected with the old party "hacks": "let the superannuated and broken down politicians have full swing and we modern men must step into the front ranks of the political cohorts."

Both Andrew Johnson and James K. Polk were part of this "Young Democracy," each struggling to achieve his own ambitions. Unlike Johnson, the opportunist, Polk could never sever the tie with the old party leaders. Although Johnson was as much a Jacksonian Democrat as Polk was, Johnson's politics in these early years were determined more by political expediency than by strict adherence to principles. 12

Johnson served in the Tennessee Legislature as representative and
24

senator from 1835 to 1843. In 1837 he was defeated for re-election, but he would not face defeat again for thirty-two years. He was consistently re-elected although the political opposition had ushered many of his prominent associates out of office. What can explain Andrew Johnson's unerring ability to remain in power?

The rapport that Johnson had with the people of East Tennessee partly explains his political success. He presented before the Tennessee House and Senate hundreds of his constituents' petitions and resolutions. As a member of the 1835 Legislature, he proposed to distribute surplus revenue from the State Bank among the counties according to their free white population. As a state senator in 1842, Johnson proposed a resolution calling for the establishment of the new state of Frankland, comprised of East Tennessee counties—a resolution that gained considerable public support throughout the state, and managed to pass the state senate. Later in the same year, Johnson proposed that Congressional districts be redrawn according to "the voting population, without regard to the three-fifths of negro population." This resolution benefitted the East Tennessee counties which would gain representation because of the large white population and small slave population. Although he was accused of abolitionism because of this proposal, Johnson advocated it as a benefit to the white freemen of East Tennessee rather than as a benefit for the Negro slave. In general, he advocated reform measures that would further the interests of the white citizens, proposals such as a state supported school system, and control over the State Bank. Johnson often had to determine the popularity of some of his reforms, such as the distribution of surplus revenue. He requested his Greeneville associate, William Lowry, to keep him constantly informed of the popularity of Johnson's proposals in his constituency.

Political opponents often referred to Johnson as a demagogue because
of his close association with his constituents, and his campaign rhetoric which pandered excessively to the prejudices of the people. Johnson appealed to the emotionality of the people in attacking various internal improvement programs. He claimed that the railroads "would introduce the most fatal disease; break down taverns, horses and wagons, and violate the laws of nature in pulling down hills and filling up hollows." Johnson was also accused of demagoguery for proposing a new state of East Tennessee. He often engaged in acrimonious arguments because of his identification with his constituents. "Why I have brought down the ire and indignation of a reckless press and its party upon my devoted head I cannot tell," Johnson defended himself in the Jonesboro Sentinel. "Is it because I sprang from the ranks a humble mechanic . . . ? Is it because a laboring man is somewhat offensive to a kind of aristocracy that infest this congressional district?" Johnson was incensed over the charge of demagoguery: "it is for being so radical in many things of this sort that I have brought down the vengeance of the aristocracy upon my head. . . ." He expressed his bitterness over these attacks in an intimate letter to lifelong friend and adviser, Blackston McDannel. Johnson hoped that when he died he would triumph over "the god for saken and hell deserving mony loving hypocrtical, back bighting sundy praying scoundrels of the town of Greeneville. . . ."15

Stump-speaking revealed Andrew Johnson's ruthlessness in debate and excellence in rhetoric. During election campaigns he could be frequently seen on the streets of a town engaged in an animated political discussion with the people. As an orator, Johnson was forceful and powerful without eloquence. His voice was loud, distinct and adapted to the outdoors. In his speeches he liberally punctuated his address with popular anecdotes, often chosen to excite the emotions of his listeners. In debate, Johnson vigorously defended himself with wit, invective, and complete confidence in
his knowledge of any issue. He rarely met his match on the debating platform. He had argued with such skilled men as John Bell, John J. Crittenden, Jefferson Davis, Joshua Giddings, John Slidell, Judah Benjamin, Robert Winthrop and Alfred Iverson, yet only on one occasion could his opponent claim the advantage. Considering Johnson was never formally educated, this accomplishment is even more remarkable. 16

In his first election campaign against Matthew Stephenson in 1835, Johnson's abilities in debate were manifest. Interested observers believed that Stephenson, a well-known Greene County politician, would easily defeat Johnson. But the former tailor had prepared himself well. Johnson countered Stephenson with an impressive array of statistics that showed how his opponent's proposals failed to benefit East Tennesseans. He also attacked Stephenson's early public record and private character. Ending the debates with a direct emotional appeal to the people, Johnson asserted constantly that he was an ardent Jacksonian and would work incessantly for his constituents. 17

During the 1840 presidential campaign, Johnson augmented his reputation as an orator and debater. He was chosen elector-at-large for the Democratic party, although prominent Democrats Cave Johnson and Aaron V. Brown vied for the position. Whigs John Bell, Ephraim Foster, and Spencer Jarnagin met Johnson in a series of debates. One Democrat informed party leader, James K. Polk, that in one exchange with the renowned Foster, "wherever Johnson gets a fair field at him he uses the gentleman up Completely." Polk believed Johnson was "greatly his [Foster's] superior in debate." Whig opponents described Andrew Johnson as "a strong minded man who cuts when he does not with a razor, but with a case knife." 18

The Tennessee State Senate, from 1841 to 1843, provided a ready audience for Johnson's rhetoric and aided his political ambitions. As one of the
leaders of the "Immortal Thirteen" Democratic senators, Johnson had asserted that the convention method of electing United States Senators was unconstitutional. Johnson and his twelve associates refused to sit in joint session with the State House and elect Senators; by this refusal, they successfully prevented the election of Whigs and thus silenced Tennessee's voice in the Senate for two years. Throughout the 1841-1842 session, Johnson championed his partisan cause in filibuster fashion. He assaulted the Whig party as one of "dumb idols," at war with the best interests of the people." Consistently Johnson accused the Whigs of attempting the conversion of government into a "despotism." He proudly proclaimed that his words and actions were designed to "promote and advance the public interest by keeping them [the Whigs] out of power."  

Johnson's partisanship was often marked by ruthless techniques. In political battles he studied the disposition of his adversary and affronted his opponent with as much personal indignity as he would endure. The pungency of Johnson's words often exceeded the novelty or import of his subject matter. For these reasons, he frequently made bitter enemies of his political adversaries. In the election campaigns from 1835 to 1857, Matthew Stephenson, Brookins Campbell, Ephraim Foster, John Aiken, William Brownlow, Oliver Temple, Landon Haynes, Gustavus Henry and Meredith Gentry all felt the sting of Johnson's personal invectives. The Nashville Whig, a partisan Whig newspaper, expressed anger over Johnson's personal attacks in the 1839 canvass: "he must have sir the feelings of a scavenger, a kitchen skullion, a reptile--[and is] a disgrace to his state." William G. "Parson" Brownlow, editor of the vitriolic Jonesboro Whig, met Johnson's personal affronts with slander:
You, a living mass of undulating filth, a political Skunk... a man whose mouth is always full of black guardism and profanation—whose soul is saturated with sin—whose heart is covered with the blackness and darkness of crime... a protest was drawn up, signed by ninety citizens of Greeneville and vicinity, of both political parties, declaring every charge you made to be false and slanderous.

Johnson was renewed with courage and determination by such libel. He declared that he did not like to be "taunted too much by his enemies," yet he refused to abandon his political obligations.20

At times, Johnson made no distinction between enemies in opposition parties and those in his own party. If adversaries attempted to thwart his purposes, he assailed them with vigor. During the "Immortal Thirteen" controversy, Johnson had differences with two fellow Democrats, Samuel and Hopkins Turney, both of whom were wavering in their support of his leadership. He attempted gentle persuasion, but when this failed, Johnson took every opportunity to attack them publicly. As a member of the senate committee on reapportioning the state districts, Johnson clashed with fellow Democratic committee members, John A. Gardner and Brookins Campbell, over the districting of East Tennessee counties. Publicly and privately, he referred to Campbell as a political "Judas," and accused Gardner of "imbecility." Both had sold the freemen of East Tennessee for "thirty pieces of silver."21

Andrew Johnson's behavior in these situations raises several important questions. Was he a political outsider—radically different in principle and behavior from the leaders and members of his own party? Did he refuse to adhere to the party leadership and established Democratic principles? Was he as tactful and diplomatic as he was caustic and vituperative?

Among members of his own party, Johnson provoked either loyalty and confidence or condemnation and distrust. Few men reacted toward him with
indifference. In contrast to Brookins Campbell, John Gardner, and Hopkins Turney, who took every opportunity to attack Johnson as a maverick, Samuel Laughlin, close adviser to James K. Polk, believed Johnson was "an intellect and leader of the first magnitude." Polk recognized Johnson's talents and loyalty to the party and argued that he would make a "reputable Senator."

From 1835 to 1843, Johnson worked diligently for the Democratic party. It is reasonable to assume on the basis of existing evidence that he was sincere. Johnson informed an associate in 1840, "our cause in going bravely Greene county will gain a much larger vote for the democratic ticket next fall than was given last summer . . . and if we succeed in getting Powell [county] established, there will not be one modern Whig in it." Prior to the 1841 election, Johnson assured Polk of his loyalty:

I am for commencing the work of reformation at once in our ranks. Put up the best material we have all over the State . . . . then lets make one more vigorous effort to redeem the State, and once redeemed resting upon pure democratic principles, ; . . . our over throw will be impossible . . . .

Johnson pledged with uncharacteristic modesty his personal support for Polk: "if I thought that I could give you any additional strength by running [for state senator] I would be willing to make any sacrifice. . . ." Like a true party man, he promised his associates that he would do all he could "in or out of the canvass." On the eve of his entrance into Congress in 1843, Johnson pledged his allegiance to the Democratic party, and attempted to rally the Democracy:

Let the Democracy organize and act as one man. The people of Tennessee are Democratic in principle, and are opposed to all the tendencies of Henry Clay's policy. . . . Then organize, organize, organize. . . ascertain the weak points and repair the breach . . . let the war be carried into the enemy's territory . . . .

Many Democrats heard these sentiments and observed Johnson's loyal work and were convinced he was as he claimed, "no six months man," but was
Andrew Johnson also played the role of conciliator and mediator for the warring factions of the Democratic party. A rift had occurred between leaders James K. Polk and A. O. P. Nicholson. Johnson had the confidence of both men and prior to the 1843 Congressional elections, made a sincere attempt for their reconciliation. "I was a friend to both of you, and wanted to soothe instead of exciting and widening the misunderstanding," Johnson wrote to Polk. "You have always been my first Choice for any thing, and I am equally frank in saying that Nicholson has been my Second, and I am in hopes by this time that you and him are on good terms." Later, Nicholson thanked his "true friend" Johnson for his role as mediator, indicating that relations with Polk were again cordial.

While he favored compromise rather than confrontation, the facet of the chronic dissident was an integral part of Johnson's character. The Democratic party should espouse the principles of Jacksonian Democracy, he insisted; deviations from these principles should bring the censure of all Democrats. Johnson also believed that he had a right to act as an individual, and would follow the party according to the dictates of his conscience. Yet he could not abandon the party completely or refuse to support its leaders during times of crisis, as Robert B. Rhett and others had done. Throughout his career, Johnson may have vocalized his disaffection, but he campaigned vigorously for the same policies and men he had criticized. In 1836 and 1840, Johnson expressed his dissatisfaction with Martin Van Buren. Although he canvassed the state for Van Buren in the 1840 presidential election, Johnson had privately indicated that Lewis Cass of Michigan "should have been the choice of the party." He frequently expressed his discontent with members of the party:
there are too many in our ranks that cant and prate a great deal about democracy that really does not understand one thing about it and too many of those that do, preach one thing to the people and then act out a very different set of principles.

Prior to the presidential election of 1844, Johnson criticized the party's strategy. Selecting a candidate too early was a mistake, he informed an associate:

I think it would have been best for the people to have moved off first, and while we were apparently waiting for the people to indicate there preference, our presses should have been pouring hot shot into the Clay doctrines . . . the public mind would have been so prejudiced in relation to Mr. Clay that it would have been prepared for the reception of any candidate. . . .

Although Johnson was not the political theorist that John C. Calhoun or Daniel Webster were, in many matters relating to constitutional or economic questions, his intellect contained a depth of original thought. As one of the managers of the "Immortal Thirteen," Johnson was not content with simple partisanship in preventing the election of Whig Senators. He offered a complex constitutional-legal argument, which could have come from one of the nation's finest legal minds. Johnson argued that the convention method of electing Senators changed the distinctive character of the State Legislature. This left future changes to "the will and pleasure of the two Houses . . . [and thus] the Constitution becomes a perfect nullity which can be expanded and contracted at the will and pleasure of every party in power. . . . The Senate represents the whole people of Tennessee: so does the House . . . [both are] responsible to the people . . . and not to one another." Johnson's elaborate defense was not one of temporary importance, for his argument was sustained by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1909. He revealed a deep understanding of the economic and political principles that governed the nation. In a series of debates with noted lawyers John Bell and T. A. R. Nelson, neither "could get the better of
The principles of Jacksonian Democracy were a significant part of Andrew Johnson's credo. Some of these principles were: popular participation in the processes of democracy, including such reforms as popular election of the President and Vice-President; a national homestead plan; opposition to a national bank, to internal improvements and to a protective tariff. An integral part of Jacksonian Democracy was its direction by the people: "we have an abiding confidence in the virtue, intelligence, and full capacity for self-government, of the great masses of our people--our industrious, honest, manly, intelligent millions of freemen," a Democratic newspaper of the era contended. The Democratic society would establish a system of advancement based on human merit and would "abolish all artificial distinctions, preventing the accumulation of any social obstacles . . . and would permit the free development of every germ of talent . . . whether on the proud mountain summit, in the humble valley, or by the wayside of common life." God directed this progress of democracy. The Democratic party contained the sense of "manifest destiny" which was "to lead our race toward the high destinies." Andrew Johnson consistently followed these party standards. Faced with popular support for internal improvements in East Tennessee from 1835 to 1843, he opposed the schemes as "unconstitutional" and detrimental to the Democracy. Throughout his political career, he resisted "excessive banking, and paper currency in all its forms." Johnson also contended that additional taxes would "most grievously oppress the poor man." His stand against the protective tariff was evident for three decades; he often criticized those men who were "calling themselves democrats what are for the protective tariff." One of the tenets of his political creed, he proclaimed, was that "there are no good laws but such as repeal other laws." His belief in the sovereignty
of the people Johnson expressed constantly; he also indicated that "a belief in the pure and unadulterated principles of Democracy, is a belief in the religion of our Savior."  

Political power and sovereignty of government resided with the people, Johnson argued fervently. As early as 1836, he advocated the popular election of the President and Vice-President; later, he also argued for popular election of United States Senators. A "Democrat is one who is in favor of government by the people," Johnson contended. The functional aim of the Democratic party should be "to preserve our Government in its original purity and simplicity." He argued that all Democrats must rely upon the people for inspiration and success:

The Spartan Democracy of the Mountains have thrown their banner to the breeze, and though recently battered and torn, they have nailed it to the outer wall, and are now ready to come forward and swear by the Gods and their altars that both shall sink in the dust together rather than a base submission to an upstart swell-headed monied aristocracy, such as now proposed by Clay and his party.

There is no doubt that Johnson's political power and constant success derived, in part, from his direct appeal to the people. He confided to an associate prior to an election campaign, "there is one thing that is certain, that is, the common people by a large majority are for me." He proudly boasted that he had "sprung from the ranks a humble mechanic," and that he would stand firmly "on the ramparts of equal rights, advocating to the utmost of... [his] ability, the interest of the common man." Johnson invariably ascertained how the people would receive his policies and speeches. He often wrote to his friends, instructing them to inform him how his latest position "taks, with the people." His rapport with his constituents was so substantial that Johnson could have been re-elected without the aid of the party organization. In the Gubernatorial, State, and Congressional elections of 1841 and 1843, prominent Democrats James K. Polk, A. V. Brown,
Samuel Turney, Samuel Laughlin, and John Gardner were all defeated. Andrew Johnson was returned to office by substantial majorities, although he ran in a Whig stronghold.  

While his political success could have been achieved independently, Johnson reaffirmed his loyalty to the party organization. Prior to the 1843 canvass, he assured Polk, "I am a Candidate Subject to a decision of the democratic party through a Convention." In reference to other candidates, Johnson affirmed that he would yield "his own individual preferences for the good of the common cause." He probably realized that power within the party could only magnify his political fortunes.

As a state legislator, Andrew Johnson was intensely passionate. Few things were accomplished with indifference. He loved and hated, believed and disbelieved, rewarded and took vengeance, served and opposed, with an intensity of righteous conviction. Men reacted toward him with undying loyalty or unending hatred. Johnson was a loyal party man as well as a chameleon. He could be flattering, persuasive, and diplomatic or intransigent and vindictive. As a politician, he was more than successful. Johnson practiced his arts with extraordinary ability. Throughout years of internecine party warfare and political upheavals in Tennessee, he remained in power. Beneath his dynamic and volatile personality lay his drive for power. And driven he was. Little else can explain his tenacity of purpose, his willingness to sacrifice party and friends when expedient. Yet, for Andrew Johnson, this ambition was in a sense selfless. For in the acquisition of power, and the realization of his goals, came the advancement of the people he represented. There was no conflict between his interests and those of his constituents. Only in the successful fulfillment of his ambition lay the amelioration of his people.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE


2 The events of Johnson's first twenty years are relatively obscure due to the absence of written records: Johnson did not learn to read or write until he was a grown man, and his parents were not educated. For similar biographical accounts see: John S. Savage, The Life and Public Services of Andrew Johnson (New York: Darby and Miller, 1866); James S. Jones, The Life of Andrew Johnson (Greeneville: East Tennessee Publishing Co., 1901); Robert W. Winston, Andrew Johnson, Plebian and Patriot (New York: Henry Holt, 1928); Lloyd P. Stryker, Andrew Johnson, A Study in Courage (New York: MacMillan, 1929).

3 Andrew Johnson to Alexander Williams, January 27, 1836, Johnson to Valentine Sevier, June 7, 1832, Johnson Papers, I, 14, 16. Both Williams and Sevier were wealthy and socially prominent.

4 Andrew Johnson to the Freemen of the First Congressional District of Tennessee, October 15, 1845, Johnson Papers, I, 220-272.

5 Richard P. McCormick, "New Perspectives on Jacksonian Politics," A.H.R., LXV (1959), 288-301, asserts that it was not until the election of 1840 that the Democracy flocked to the polls; it was then that the Jacksonian one-party system was replaced by a viable two-party system which gave voters a choice.

6 See Charles S. Sydnor, American Revolutionaries in the Making: Political Practices in Washington's Virginia (New York: Collier, 1962). He claims that up to the time of Jackson, it was custom for the aristocracy to fill public offices; few commoners enter public life in the Old South. I use the terms "aristocracy" and "commoners" in my paper in a limited sense, and distinguish these terms from their application in the British or European context. In America there was neither the hereditary landed aristocracy nor the feudal serfdom that existed in Europe. However, for want of better terms, aristocracy best describes the existence of a group in Southern American society which was determined by wealth, education, birth, and marriage, and exercised considerable influence and control over the economic, political and social life of the community. The feudal serfdom of Europe did not have its parallel in America--commoners in Southern society were aggressive tradesmen, artisans and yeoman farmers who owned their own land, and were capable of upward mobility. Johnson often refers to commoners and aristocrats without knowledge of the meaning of the terms, but generally, he was no friend to the indigent poor, and no friend to an aristocracy which had achieved its position without merit or honest labor.
Of course there is still argument over the origin and significant results of the Jacksonian movement. For an examination of the various interpretations see: Charles G. Sellers, *Jacksonian Democracy* (Washington: American Historical Association, 1958). Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Jackson* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945), saw the movement as a class movement; Marvin Meyers, "The Jacksonian Persuasion," *American Quarterly*, V (1953), 3-15, saw the Jackson movement as a conservative appeal to return to the old Jeffersonian order; Bray Hammond, *Banks and Politics in America From the Revolution to the Civil War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), asserts that socially, the Jackson movement signified a revolt against the rule of the Virginia Dynasty, and economically, signified that a nation of potential money makers could not abide by traditional conservative limitations set by the established capitalists. Regardless of the details of the debate, it is well established that the common man was considered as an active force in the 1820's in a way he was at no time before then. In Tennessee, participation of the people in politics was evident early: Charles G. Sellers, Jr., *James K. Polk, Jacksonian 1795-1843* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 66; Dewey Grantham, Jr., *The Democratic South* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1963), p. 12.


Quoted in Jones, *Life of Johnson*, p. 22.

Johnson to Alexander Williams, January 27, 1836, *Johnson Papers*, I, 16; Williams was a prominent Whig and pro-White man. Johnson to George W. Jones, December 25, 1836, *Johnson Papers*, I, 18; Johnson says in this letter that Van Buren was his second choice for the nomination. Johnson to Robert B. Reynolds, September 9, 1843, *Johnson Papers*, I, 121.


15 Nashville Whig, May 14, 1853; Savage, The Life of Johnson, p. 28. In contrast, other Democrats such as Alvan Cullum, A. O. P. Nicholson and Hopkins Turney advocated internal improvements, although none represented East Tennessee. Jonesboro Sentinel, November 18, 1843, quoted in Jonesboro Whig, December 13, 1843; Johnson to the First Congressional District of Tennessee, October 15, 1845, Johnson Papers, I, 270; Johnson to Blackston McDanel, January 10, 1847, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.

16 Savage, Life of Johnson, p. 29. I have examined all the debates in Congress in which Johnson took part, and only in the exchange with Alfred Iverson of Georgia in 1858 could either man claim victory: Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st session, 766.


20 Nashville Whig, December 2, 1837; Jonesboro Whig, December 13, 1843; Johnson to George W. Jones, December 25, 1836, Johnson Papers, I, 19; Johnson to Blackston McDanel, October 24, 1841, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.

21 J. P. Hardwicke to James K. Polk, December 15, 1844, quoted in White, Messages of the Governors, III, 542; Senate Journal, November 14, 1842, quoted in White, Ibid., 616.

22 Samuel H. Laughlin Diary 1840-1844, February 7, 1842 (microfilm copy, Tennessee State Library and Archives); James K. Polk to Sameul MacLin, January 17, 1842, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.
23 Johnson to John Young, March 10, 1840, Johnson Papers, I, 27; Johnson to James K. Polk, March 4, 1841, ibid., 30-31; Johnson to William Lowry, October 24, 1841, Johnson to Lowry, January 9, 1842, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I; Nashville Union, September 15, 1843.

24 Johnson to Polk, February 20, 1843, Johnson Papers, I, 113-114; Johnson to A. O. P. Nicholson, January 6, 1842, Samuel Milligan to David T. Patterson, November 16, 1845, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.

25 Johnson to Polk, March 4, 1841, Johnson to George W. Jones, February 13, 1843, Johnson to Robert B. Reynolds, September 9, 1843, Johnson Papers, I, 30, 111, 121. Johnson was acute in his judgment concerning a presidential candidate. Support for Martin Van Buren was announced early by many state delegations, and they had to defend him against Whig attacks for months; dissatisfied Democrats could not defend Van Buren with enthusiasm because of his opposition to Texas annexation. James K. Polk, a dark horse for the nomination, was not selected until after nine ballots at the Democratic Convention, and subsequently won the election.

26 Knoxville Argus, April 13, 1842, quoted in White, Messages of the Governors, III, 556-57; Nashville Union, July 20, 1840.


28 Johnson to George W. Jones, December 25, 1836, Johnson Papers, I, 18; White, Messages of the Governors, III, 473; Nashville Union, October 18, 1842; Johnson to A. O. P. Nicholson, February 12, 1844, Johnson Papers, I, 148; Johnson to the Freemen of the First Congressional District of Tennessee, October 15, 1845, ibid., 240.

29 Johnson to George W. Jones, December 25, 1836, Johnson Papers, I, 18; Speech in Defense of the "Immortal Thirteen," October 27, 28, 1841, in Knoxville Argus, April 13, 1842, quoted in White, Messages of the Governors, III, 557; Johnson to the Democratic Committee of Maury County, August 29, 1843, Johnson Papers, I, 119-120; Nashville Union, September 15, 1843.

30 Johnson to George W. Jones, February 13, 1843, Johnson Papers, I, 111; Jonesboro Sentinel, November 18, 1843, quoted in Jonesboro Whig, December 13, 1843; Johnson to William Lowry, January 9, 1842, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.

31 Temple, Notable Men, pp. 62, 216-17; Jones, Life of Johnson, p. 32.
32 Johnson to Polk, February 20, 1843, Johnson to Robert B. Reynolds, September 9, 1843, Johnson Papers, 1, 113, 121.
CHAPTER TWO

"I am no six months man"

"The difficulty in life is choice"

---George Moore

The importance of class and social acceptance "churned sourly in Andrew Johnson's vitals. . . . his own struggle to rise consumed and obsessed him. Grimly ambitious, he brooded over the wrongs, real or imaginary, which were thoughtlessly foisted upon him by his social betters, and out of his inner world of suspicious fantasy he evolved an extravagant credo of plebeian democracy and honest toil." This statement by Professor Eric L. McKitrick represents the modern interpretation of the character and personality of Johnson. Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction, as well as some monographs by David Donald and others, studied Johnson's role as President during Reconstruction. Explicit and implicit in the McKitrick analysis is that Johnson's personality possessed a certain constancy of behavior, and therefore he exhibited his same traits of character while state politician, congressman, governor and senator.¹

McKitrick presents his thesis in the most vivid terms, embellishing his views with modern psychological and sociological terminology.² According to this "New School" of thought advanced by McKitrick and others, politics for Andrew Johnson "was essentially a matter of principles that had to be defended rather than of a party organization that had to win elections. He was a Democrat, but never really a party man." The texture of Johnson's mind, this interpretation contends, was essentially abstract. Concrete problems never had the power to engage his interest that "principles" had. Despite his tendency to boast, Johnson was not fully confident of his intel-
lectual powers. He was "obsessed with himself to a degree that exceeded the normal" and with a "dogged masochism, he never ceased to harp publicly on his own humble origins."

Professor McKitrick contends that Andrew Johnson operated as an outsider all his life. A social and political outsider, Johnson's role was based on non-political behavior. Never a party leader, Johnson had been "tempermentally and sociologically a 'radical,'" opposed to the regular insider in the American political system.²

The McKitrick analysis makes several unsubstantiated, deductive assumptions. If Andrew Johnson behaved in an abnormal manner during Reconstruction, then he must have done so during his earlier political career. Yet McKitrick presents no evidence to support this analysis of Johnson's behavior before Reconstruction. Also, there is the assumption that the modern analyst can accurately label the behavior of a man a century in the past, using behavioral scientific definitions. At best, there is still argument over these definitions and their application today; to accurately delineate a dead man's psyche and personality nuances using those techniques exclusively taxes historical credibility.³

Professor McKitrick observed the Radical Republicans' warm and loyal response to Johnson shortly after his inauguration in 1865. Yet within a short time, these same Radicals--Charles Sumner, Thaddeus Stevens, and Benjamin Wade, to mention a few--hated the new President, and planned his downfall. This is an example of the basis for McKitrick's analysis of Johnson's political behavior. The foundation for such observations and subsequent conclusions regarding Johnson's character were the memoirs and letters of the Radicals and other Republicans, as well as contemporary newspapers. On the validity of this type of evidence, McKitrick concluded that Johnson was an incompetent "outsider"--because the sources said he was.
Deductive assumptions complete the theory: therefore Johnson must have been an incompetent outsider throughout his lifetime.

To delineate a man's personality and behavior in his entire public career relying upon such limited evidence is a kind of documentary determinism—conclusions became inevitable given the nature and scope of the examined documents. To be sure, in some instances, this type of contemporary evidence is all that is available to the researcher. But when a wealth of various kinds of material remains intact, it is the historian's task to utilize as much of the various types of evidence as possible, in order to accurately portray both the politician and the man.

Andrew Johnson elicited almost violent responses from those he contacted. Anorexia was rarely a frame of mind of men who left his presence. This intensity of emotion reflected Johnson's own volatile nature and dynamic personality. Consequently, the emotional reactions of Johnson, his associates, and opponents used as evidence in the formulation of a personality evaluation must be accepted with reservation and scrutiny by all investigators.

To conclude, on the basis of one speech on the undesirability of continuing the Mexican War, that Johnson was anti-war and anti-expansion, and stood in a radical position contrary to the administration and his party on the issue, assumes both the uniformity of a man's motivations and the infallibility of one document. The fundamental question that must be answered is: was Andrew Johnson a political outsider and maverick, or a Jackson Democrat, loyal to his party and the South throughout his Congressional career? It is here that the value of recent research methods in the social sciences becomes clear.

New statistical methods utilizing roll-call votes recorded in each Congress have proved to be invaluable in determining the behavior of not
only groups of legislators, but individuals as well. Used in conjunction with a Congressman's letters and other documentary evidence, this new method of investigation enables the historian to systematically analyze how an individual behaved in Congress.

A pioneering study utilizing these statistical techniques is Joel H. Silbey's *The Shrine of Party, Congressional Voting Behavior 1841-1852*, a work which analyzes the sectional nature of politics in the 1840's and 1850's. Professor Silbey implements a method of scaling attitudes through a roll-call analysis of Congressional votes. Silbey ranks each Congressman's votes on a scale indicating his voting position on any particular issue, relative to the voting responses of his party and section. 7

I have relied upon Professor Silbey's statistical information for Andrew Johnson's voting record on all major issues during his Congressional career. Most of Silbey's statistics are raw data; I have correlated and supplemented this data, unifying it into cohesive tables specifically relating to Johnson's voting response pattern. 8

Certainly there must be reservations about such statistical evidence. Used by itself, it offers only mathematical proof of the questions that the researcher wants answered. The chief value of this type of scaling procedure is that it provides a means of verifying general statements. Roll-call scaling offers a systematic method of testing hypotheses and, when used in conjunction with orthodox documentary evidence, can aid the historian to a great degree. 9 Thus, when the author asserts that Andrew Johnson throughout Congress was a vigorous Southerner in defending slavery, his voting record on this issue can verify this generalization. The kind of scale utilized here reveals more than Johnson's final vote on a particular issue like slavery—it is a scale which reveals his attitudes toward slavery by comparing a number of voting responses in a continuum to other
men's responses. The scale's fundamental utilization in my paper will be to supplement my analysis of Andrew Johnson's political behavior in comparison to the McKitrick thesis.

During the decade Johnson was in Congress—1843 to 1853—the most significant divisive and national problems of the ante-bellum period received the nation's attention. It was a period which saw the acquisition of huge territories through a vigorous expansion policy, as well as a concomitant reopening of the slavery question. Not only did the old policies concerning the traditional issues of tariff, internal improvements, and land distribution prove to be even greater divisive national problems during the 1840's and 1850's, but the static nature of the role of the central government revealed its incapacity to permanently solve the slavery question. It is during this period that the nature of national political parties would be altered, and new political groups would form according to the dissident expressions of certain Americans.

Andrew Johnson's political behavior in Congress during this era can be systematically examined through an analysis of his voting record on the seven major areas of concern facing the American people: slavery, expansion, war, compromise and sectionalism, tariff, internal improvements, and land policy. Voting patterns on these issues will determine, to a large degree, Johnson's consistency and loyalty as a Democrat and Southerner.

In the 1840's, the American people had entered a period of rapid industrial and commercial development. The two political parties—Whigs and Democrats—were equally strong and each had a clearly defined program for national fulfillment. In the mid-1840's, new problems suddenly arose; new territories were added as a result of President Polk's aggressive foreign policy. But the demands of both Northern and Southern leaders for the fruits of territorial conquest revitalized the slavery issue, which had been temporarily
settled by the Compromise of 1820.

Andrew Johnson had been elected to the Twenty-Eighth Congress in 1843, after an easy victory over his Whig opponent in East Tennessee. In his second major speech of the House, Johnson delivered a scathing attack on the abolitionists, particularly abusive to John Quincy Adams, and defended slavery with enthusiasm. If slavery were abolished, Johnson questioned, were the abolitionists prepared "to turn over two million of negroes loose upon the country, to become a terror and burden to society?" Slavery had existed for five thousand years, he emphasized. It existed for a reason: "the black race of Africa were inferior to the white man." No intelligent man would place every "splay-footed, bandy-shanked, hump-backed, thick-lipped, flat-nosed, wooly-headed, ebon-colored negro in the country upon an equality with the poor white man." The New England reformers, such as John Quincy Adams, should be the last ones to crusade for equality for the black man, while white slavery existed in the form of indenture in New England factories. Rallying his Southern associates, Johnson called for the South to unite, swearing "by their altars and their God, that they will all sink in the dirt together before they will yield the great Compromise contained in the Constitution. . . ." His effort impressed most observers. John Quincy Adams, having felt the bite of Johnson's invective, believed the young Tennessean was possessed of more "native ability than any man in the House." 11

Slavery was a divisive emotional issue throughout James K. Polk's administration. The Wilmot Proviso marked the beginning of animosities. An amendment to the Mexican War appropriation bill, it stipulated that none of the territory acquired from Mexico should be open to slavery. When first introduced, the Proviso produced indifference or confusion among most Southerners. Few men agreed with John C. Calhoun, who saw it as "an apple of discord that will do much to divide the party." 12
Did Johnson oppose the Proviso? Did he vote as he had spoken on the slavery issue? Johnson equated the Proviso with abolitionism—dammable and dangerous to the South. Recording his vote with such prominent Southern Democrats as Robert B. Rhett of South Carolina, James Seddon and Robert M. T. Hunter of Virginia, and Howell Cobb of Georgia on the slavery issue in the Twenty-Ninth Congress, Johnson voted with 97% of the Southerners in the House in defence of slavery. He contended that Congress had no right to legislate on the slavery issue.

Johnson joined most Southerners in supporting the Democratic platform of 1848. This platform, reflecting the popular attitude that the Wilmot Proviso must be settled immediately, warned against Congressional interference with slavery as leading to "the most alarming and dangerous consequences." During Zachary Taylor's administration, the agitation culminated in Daniel Gott's resolution in the House which proposed to abolish the slave trade in the District of Columbia. Johnson joined many Southern associates in calling the resolution "insidious"—a "blow against Southern rights."

In 1849, as in 1846, Johnson defended the South's peculiar institution with vigor. In this Thirtieth Congress, he voted with Robert B. Rhett, Howell Cobb, Robert M. T. Hunter, and Jefferson Davis, standing with 100% of the Southerners, as well as 63% of the Democrats in the House in his defense of slavery. Johnson had advised the people of Tennessee throughout this crucial period that Southerners must not view slavery as an ingredient of political weakness to the South. Slavery benefitted the common working people: "the laws of nature ... make it impossible for the white man to cultivate the hot sultry cotton fields." The one and one-quarter billion dollars invested "in slave labor . . . is a powerful auxiliary on the side of high prices for labor. . . . The slave holder of the South is the interested and therefore the most reliable friend and ablest advocate
of high prices for labor.\textsuperscript{16}

On other occasions, Andrew Johnson consistently defended slavery. He told a large audience in 1849 that it was unconstitutional for Congress to interfere with slavery; "it is an institution local in its character and peculiar to the states where it exists." Johnson attacked anti-slavery sympathizers such as Robert Winthrop, Millard Fillmore, and Abraham Lincoln. Winthrop recalled one such attack as "ferocious." The slavery question was one upon "which the Whigs and democrats of the South can, and . . . must unite;" Johnson entreated the people, "come take your stand against the encroachments of the North." The institution of slavery had its foundation "and would find its perpetuity, in the Union," and the Union would find its continuance by a "noninterference with slavery." Johnson prophesized that if Congress and the North kept up their agitation, "this mighty Union will melt in twain." The Constitution and all its compromises were "our only ark of safety . . . (and) the palladium of our civil and religious liberty."\textsuperscript{17}

The movement toward westward expansion was an integral part of the revitalization of the slavery question. When Johnson had entered Congress in 1843, Americans in all sections had expressed their support for the acquisition of Texas and Oregon and further expansion. In general, voting on the expansion issue during the Twenty-Eighth and Twenty-Ninth Congresses (1843-1847) surrounded debate over Texas and Oregon.

In the Twenty-Eighth Congress, Johnson strongly favored the admission of Texas as a state and the acquisition of Oregon up to \(54^\circ 40'\). He voted with 75\% of the Democrats and 64\% of the Southerners in the House, including Jefferson Davis, John Slidell of Louisiana, Sam Houston of Texas, William L. Yancey of Alabama, and Robert B. Rhett, for the prosecution of a vigorous expansion policy. During the Twenty-Ninth Congress, Johnson reaffirmed his loyalty to party principles and, along with Howell Cobb, Jefferson Davis,
Robert B. Rhett, and Robert M. T. Hunter, voted with 77% of the Democrats in the House in support of the administration's expansion program. The people had spoken, Johnson explained, "proclaiming in thunder tones, our right to the whole of Oregon up to 54° 40'". Texas had a right to enter the Union, just as the decree from "Heaven had gone forth against" Mexico and her dominions. The Anglo-Saxon race had been chosen as the power to redeem these areas. Any Americans who opposed this expansion policy were "enemies of their country." Johnson's expressions, and his voting responses, were those of a vigorous Southern Democrat, not those of a party and sectional outsider.

During the Mexican War, Johnson supported President James K. Polk's war policy. The war issue, during the first session of the Twenty-Ninth Congress, contained votes on additional war appropriations and the bestowance of greater war powers to the President. In accord with 85% of the Democrats in the House, including Howell Cobb, Robert M. T. Hunter, Robert B. Rhett, and Thomas Bayly of Virginia, Johnson supported a vigorous war policy. Yet, dissatisfaction with Polk's leadership was evident during the second session. Johnson, along with other colleagues such as Robert B. Rhett, restrained his enthusiasm for Polk's policy and voted in a moderate position on the scale. As the Mexican War drew to a close, Johnson's and the party's enthusiastic support for the administration's war policy returned. In company with Jefferson Davis, Robert B. Rhett, and Robert M. T. Hunter, Johnson voted with 91% of the Democrats in the House for a tenacious pursuit of the war.

The Compromise of 1850 proved to be only a temporary respite from the sectional debate over slavery. Primarily the work of old national political leaders, Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, the Compromise proposed: to admit California without Congressional action on slavery; to organize the re-
maining territory secured from Mexico without provision for or against the admission of slavery; to abolish the slave trade in the District of Columbia; and to enact a new and effective fugitive slave law. 20

Johnson threw his weight for the Compromise, although some Southerners reacted violently against it. Sectionalists such as John C. Calhoun believed that there was little prospect that the North "will come to our terms ... disunion is the only alternative." In all the debates and votes during the Thirty-First Congress comprising the sectional and compromise issues, Johnson voted for compromise and against sectional agitation. He refused to follow the lead of secessionists Calhoun, Rhett and Yancey. Johnson joined Sam Houston, Robert M. T. Hunter, and Thomas Bayly in voting with 55% of the Democrats and 63% of the Southerners in the House, in support of the Compromise as a settlement of the slavery question and a deterrent against dissolution of the Union. Although Johnson favored compromise, he did not cease to defend the South and slavery. On the sectional issue in 1850, he joined Sam Houston, Robert Toombs of Georgia, James Orr of South Carolina, and James Seddon in voting with 92% of the Southerners in the House in a defense of the South. During the Thirty-Second Congress (1851-1853), Johnson allied himself with Houston, Jefferson Davis, and John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, in voting with 61% of the Democrats and 79% of the Southerners in the House for non-agitation of sectional issues. 21 With a majority of his party and section, Johnson had proved that, although he was a Democrat and Southerner, he was not a disunionist.

Other national issues engaged the nation's attention during the 1840's and 1850's, although the most pressing problem continued to be slavery. Since the 1820's, the tariff, internal improvements, and land issues had been vital questions. For a decade previous to Johnson's entrance into Congress in 1843, the Democratic and Whig parties had differed significantly
over these questions.

Johnson's opposition to a protective tariff had been traditionally vociferous (see Chapter One). During President Polk's administration, he reiterated his position. In the second session of the Twenty-Ninth Congress, Johnson called for a low tariff, along with Southern Democrats Howell Cobb, Robert M. T. Hunter, and James Seddon. All true Democrats and Southerners should "go for the lowest rate of duty," Johnson argued.

Opposition to a protective tariff was accompanied by Johnson's vigorous anti internal improvement policy. The internal improvements issue had been a traditional question of party division. In general, the Democrats opposed increasing the Federal Government's powers through any such schemes; the Whigs claimed it was a responsibility of the government to direct and execute internal improvements. During the Thirtieth Congress the improvement issue consisted of plans to improve rivers and harbors and the issuance of railroad grants. With colleagues Howell Cobb, Robert B. Rhett, and Alfred Iverson of Georgia, Johnson voted with 62% of the Democrats in the House against all proposed government sponsored improvement schemes. Although the sectional voting patterns that emerged as a result of the Compromise of 1850 had destroyed party and sectional unity on the internal improvements issue, Johnson remained adamant against any improvement programs. During the Thirty-First Congress, votes on the internal improvement issue dealt with railroad grants and charters. While he voted with only 49% of the Democrats and 44% of the Southerners in the House, Andrew Johnson joined Jefferson Davis, Robert B. Rhett, and others in condemning internal improvement plans.

Land policy, along with tariff and internal improvement issues, was a fundamental problem of the expanding American nation. The emotional nature of politics in the 1840's and 1850's magnified the importance of the dis-
position of public lands. The Whigs wanted the public lands as a source of revenue and opposed the lowering of prices and the recognition of squatter rights. The Democrats favored a liberal land policy: a policy initially supported by many prominent Southern Democrats, before it became stigmatized by the Wilmot Proviso and the exclusion of slavery from the territories.

In the Twenty-Ninth, Thirty-First, and Thirty-Second Congresses, Andrew Johnson advocated a liberal land policy. With fellow countrymen Robert B. Rhett, James Seddon, and Howell Cobb, he voted with 76% of the Democrats in the House in the Twenty-Ninth Congress for a liberal land policy. By 1850, the votes comprising the land issue dealt specifically with land grants to war veterans and the Senate's price reduction land bill. Johnson doubted the wisdom of these measures and restrained his vigorous support. He voted in moderate position on the scale with 42% of the Democrats and 52% of the Southerners in the House, including James Orr and James Seddon. During the Thirty-Second Congress, the land issue revolved around Johnson's own Homestead bill, which proposed to give every head of a homeless family one hundred and sixty acres of land out of the public domain. Reverting to his previous liberal policy, Johnson naturally supported his own proposal. Yet he was counted with only 25% of the Southerners and 36% of the Democrats in the House in supporting a liberal land policy in 1851. Although Johnson vigorously denied that his homestead plan was tinctured with abolitionism and tied to the exclusion of slavery from the territories, it was apparent that by 1850 few Southern Democrats supported a liberal land policy.

Andrew Johnson's voting behavior was consistent throughout a decade of service in Congress. On the crucial economic and political issues of the period, he behaved as a regular Southern Democrat, allied with such men
as Jefferson Davis, Howell Cobb, and Robert B. Rhett. If his behavior as a politician can be classified as that of an outsider or maverick, then the same terms can be applied to Davis, Cobb, and Rhett, and others. If these men were all outside the political structure, then such terms as outsider and maverick would be meaningless.

Yet Andrew Johnson's voting record does not fully delineate the public man, much less the private man. His relations to party and constituency, his political ideas, and his personality must also be examined.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO


2 See Introduction.


7 Professor Silbey's conclusions were that sectionalism in Congress did not appear in 1846 or earlier as suggested by Avery Craven and others, but was not obvious until after the election of 1848, and not complete until

See Tables 1-17, Appendix A. An explanation of the scalogram and supplementary statistics is given.


The debate arose in 1844 when Joshua Giddings, with Adams's support, attempted to introduce an abolitionist petition over the Gag Rule—the House's Twenty-First Rule prohibiting anti-slavery petitions.

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Coming of the Civil War, p. 231; John C. Calhoun to Lewis S. Coryell, November 7, 1846, "Correspondence of John C. Calhoun," ed., J. F. Jameson, American Historical Association Anna REPORT, 1890, II, 779.

13 See Table 3, Appendix A; Table 34, Silbey, "Congressional Voting," pp. 496-97, 501; Globe, 29th Cong., 2 sess., 120, 176, 386, 424; Johnson to David T. Patterson, March 23, 1848, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I. Johnson agreed with Calhoun that the slavery debate would divide the party.


15 See Table 9, Appendix A; Table 36, Silbey, "Congressional Voting," pp. 505-506, 510; Globe, 31st Cong., 1 sess., 33-34.

16 Johnson to E. G. Eastman, May 27, 1849, Johnson Papers, 1, 509; Speech at Evans Crossroads, May 26, 1849, ibid., 498; Nashville Union and American, October 31, 1856.


18 Globe, 28th Cong., 2 sess., 201-216, App. 171; see Table 1, Appendix A; Table 15, Silbey, "Congressional Voting," pp. 420-423; Table 2, Appendix A; Table 21, Silbey, ibid., pp. 441-442, 447. The content of the expansion issue covered essentially the same questions. Globe, 28th Cong., 2 sess., App. 219-223; ibid., 29th Cong., 1 sess., 288, 885, 2 sess., 40. Johnson criticized Democratic leaders such as Thomas Hart Benton for their opposition. Andrew Johnson to David T. Patterson, April 14, 1844, Johnson Papers, 1, 160, 163.

19 Globe, 29th Cong., 1 sess., 275-276, 584, 667-669; Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years View (2 vols. New York: Appleton, 1883), II, 674. See Table 4, Appendix A; Silbey, Shrine of Party, p. 77; Table 25, Silbey, "Congressional Voting," pp. 458-463; Table 5, Appendix A; Table 27, Silbey, ibid., pp. 468-471; Table 10, Appendix A; Table 29, Silbey, ibid., pp. 475-479.

20 There were many subsequent debates and subtle changes, but this remained the essence of the compromise. See Craven, Coming of the Civil War, pp. 250-271; Holman Hamilton, "The 'Cave of Winds' and the Compromise of 1850," J. S. H., XIII (1957), 331-353.
21 John C. Calhoun to James Hammond, February 16, 1850, "Correspondence of Calhoun," 781; J.H. McHenry to Hunter, February 21, 1850, "Correspondence of Hunter," 105; Globe, 31st Cong., 1 sess., 555, App. 669-673; Nashville Union, July 22, 1850; Johnson to Patterson, April 5, 1850, Johnson Papers, 1, 533. See Table 14, Appendix A; Table 38, Silbey, ibid., pp. 519-521; Table 15, Appendix A; Table 40, Silbey, ibid., pp. 527-529; Table 17, Appendix A; Table 44, Silbey, ibid., pp. 545-547; Globe, 31st Cong., 2 sess., 12.

22 Calhoun to James Hammond, November 27, 1842, "Correspondence of Calhoun," 520-521; National Party Platforms, pp. 2-14; Nashville Union, March 30, 1844; Globe, 29th Cong., 2 sess., 74, 518, 635-636. See Table 6, Appendix A; Table 17, Silbey, ibid., pp. 426-431; Globe, 29th Cong., 2 sess., App. 160-163.

23 Table 6, Appendix A; Table 17, Silbey, ibid., pp. 427-431; Table 7, Appendix A; Table 33, Silbey, ibid., pp. 490-495; Johnson to Nicholson, February 12, 1844, Johnson Papers, I, 148; Globe, 29th Cong., 1 sess., 1000-1013. Johnson proposed an amendment to tax capital assets for revenue, presenting complete statistical data to show ten times the revenue capabilities.

24 Table 11, Appendix A; Table 32, ibid., pp. 487-489; Globe, 30th Cong., 1 sess., 500-502, 857; Table 13, Appendix A; Table 42, Silbey, ibid., pp. 538-539. Congressional voting during the 31st and 32nd Congresses revealed a basic change from the 28th and 29th Congresses: a sectional voting pattern had replaced a national voting party pattern.

25 National Party Platforms, pp. 2-8; Globe, 27th Cong., 1 sess., App. 3101. As early as 1840 Calhoun had favored a liberal public land policy. George Stephenson, Political History of the Public Lands (Boston: Ginn, 1917), presents an excellent history of the subject.

26 Table 8, Appendix A. The Votes included reductions in the prices of land and pre-emption rights. See also, Table 12, Appendix A; Table 41, Silbey, ibid., pp. 531-533; Table 16, Appendix A; Table 52, Silbey, ibid., pp. 573-577; Table 19, ibid., pp. 434-438. Jefferson Davis supported Johnson's Homestead bill.
CHAPTER THREE

"I am an American"

"A man should choose with careful eye
the things to be remembered by"

—Robert O. Coffin

Johnson made more than the average impression as a freshman member of Congress in 1843. In his first speech he ably defended Andrew Jackson before the whole House. His second major appearance saw him attack Joshua Giddings and John Quincy Adams over the Gag Resolution. These initial speeches suggest his self-confidence and aggressiveness. With the experience of eight years of state politics behind him, and an awareness of having made an impression on the House, Johnson participated in the parliamentary manoeuvres with enthusiasm, force and confidence.

Johnson joined many young Democrats who came into the House and Senate, in anticipation of the rewards of office, yet Johnson, Jefferson Davis, and others, grew restless as the 1844 presidential election approached. Martin Van Buren and the regular party leadership no longer appealed to these "Young Democrats." Johnson and his associates favored as the party's nominee, a man like Lewis Cass of Michigan, or John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, who believed: "Clayism and Jackson Van Burenism are worn out, and . . . a new order of things is approaching."¹ James K. Polk, a leading Van Buren supporter, heard that such young Democrats as Andrew Johnson and A. O. P. Nicholson were "ready to sacrifice you" to prevent Van Buren from retaining the leadership. Johnson had confided to Nicholson:

Gov Polk and his friends have over reached them Selves. . . . his ristless ambition has very much operated against us in Tennessee. . . . If we cannot rise under the lead of Polk and Van Buren, I think we should hav the poore privilege of selecting some other leader. . . .
Polk appeared to be "playing both ends against the middle"; while publicly announcing his loyalty to Van Buren, Polk's managers made it appear that he desired the vice-presidential nomination under Van Buren. Even a friend of Polk's advised Andrew Jackson that this strategy would "damn" Polk in the South. Andrew Johnson agreed, convinced that the Van Buren capital had been exhausted.

Johnson criticized the party leadership not as a maverick operating on the periphery of the party organization, but as a young dynamic leader who was tired of the "old party hacks that have pined themselves to the fortune of Mr Vanburen, and fear that under a new leader . . . they will be supplanted. . . ." He was convinced that it was time for him and others to receive a fair portion of patronage and power, as well as a leader who would firmly support the party's established principles.

Not until 1861 would dissaffection become rebellion for Andrew Johnson. He attended the Baltimore Convention as a Democratic delegate from Tennessee, cautiously favoring Lewis Cass, yet uncommitted to all candidates. A dark horse, James K. Polk, was nominated by the Convention, in a sense, repudiating the Van Buren leadership. Although Johnson favored Cass or John C. Calhoun, he voted for Polk, convinced he was expressing the "will of the people."

Johnson's rumored reluctance to support Polk's nomination had been marked by Polk and carried with bitterness into his presidency. On close examination, the conflict between Johnson and Polk, used as evidence by supporters of the McKitrick thesis as an indication of Johnson's radicalism, was actually Johnson's participation in a larger movement against Polk's leadership.

The acquisition of Oregon up to 54°40' and the admission of Texas as a state were fundamental planks in Johnson's and the National Democratic party's platform. President Polk failed to mollify the jealousies and irritations
of various party leaders such as Johnson, by his compromise on these two issues, as well as his controversial use of the patronage.

The conflict between Johnson and Polk intensified during Polk's administration. Polk records Johnson's alleged disloyalty in his diary on several occasions. On one visit to the White House, in company with John Blair and other advisers, Johnson confronted Polk. Johnson said that he had learned of Polk's concern over his behavior from Cave Johnson. Congressman Johnson queried the President as to the reasons. Polk replied that Johnson's course in Congress had been contrary and disloyal to the administration. Johnson became very "agitated"; he professed to be a good Democrat but insisted upon his right to act as an individual. Towards the end of his term, Polk vividly recorded Johnson's alleged disloyalty: the young Tennessean had not been his personal friend since 1839, and "professing to be a Democrat, he has been politically if not personally hostile to me during my whole term." Polk rewarded Johnson's behavior by stopping the flow of patronage into East Tennessee. Johnson expressed the attitude of many East Tennesseans in calling Polk's appointment policy the "most damnable" made by any president. Polk no longer seemed himself; he had fallen under the influence of the Van Buren "parasites." He seemed to be acting on the principle of "hanging an old friend for the purpose of making two new ones." Thoroughly perturbed by Polk's chastisement, Johnson claimed that he had "never betrayed a friend or . . . was never guilty of the black sin of ingratitude— I fear Mr Polk cannot say as much. . . ."

Did Andrew Johnson's political behavior in Congress substantiate James K. Polk's charge of disloyalty? An examination of Johnson's speeches and votes in the House from 1844 to 1848 reveals that Johnson consistently supported Polk and his administration.

During the Twenty-Eighth Congress, Johnson attacked Democrats Jacob Brinkeroff of Ohio, and Thomas Clingman of North Carolina, for their criticism
of Polk's war policies. Johnson asserted that the President had shown himself to be "a man of great moral courage," and was the "people's President." During the Twenty-Ninth Congress, in a speech on the admission of Oregon, Johnson criticized Democrat Thomas Bayly of Virginia for his censure of Polk's expansion policy. Johnson also defended the President's use of the veto. During the debate over the tariff and Oregon's admission, Johnson chastised Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois for criticizing Polk's appointment policy. On these and other occasions, Johnson acted not as a disloyal critic, but as a loyal supporter of James K. Polk.

Prior to his career as Congressman, Johnson had made singular efforts to advance Polk's career. He had spent time, money, and energy "to elivat him, and I suspect I received very little thanks for it." Although Johnson had balked at the Van Buren leadership, he was never as obtuse as some of the other young leaders like A. O. P. Nicholson and George W. Jones, who were viewed by Polk as "rabid." In contrast, Polk's advisers cautioned the President that Johnson's opposition had always been moderate and he was always "inclined to do right."

The only instance of outright personal opposition to Polk's administration by Johnson was his refusal to support the proposed tax on tea and coffee. The common people were fighting the Mexican War, Johnson stipulated; it was time to tax the wealthy to defray the expenses of fighting, for the war would benefit the wealthy the most. This was Johnson's only opposition, and in it he was joined by many Democrats in the House.

Johnson ardently engaged in debate and repartee with many members of the House. Thomas Clingman, Thomas Bayly, Robert Winthrop, John Quincy Adams, and Joshua Giddings, as well as many others, felt Johnson's invective. In particular, he was quick to defend any slurs on the character of the people. During the Twenty-Ninth Congress, in a speech on the military leadership in the Mexican
War, Jefferson Davis made a casual comment about the inadequacy of commoners as military strategists. Johnson leaped to his feet to reply. Using historical precedents, he cited the great generals of the past who rose from humble origins, while he castigated the upper class as an "illegitimate, swaggering bastard scrub aristocracy." In an attempt to heal the breach, Davis apologized to Johnson if any of his remarks were taken as a slur, as they were not intended to be, but Johnson was not quick to accept the apology, an incident that Davis would remember with displeasure.

The volatile and sensitive aspect of Johnson's personality is well known; not so obvious, but just as important, was his appreciation of humor. During many debates in the House, Johnson recounted humorous stories and anecdotes, often breaking the House into laughter. On one occasion, during a speech on the acquisition of Mexican territories, he referred to the abortive attempt to conquer California by Commodore Stockton of the Navy. Here was a man, Johnson concluded, who was determined to become an "amphibious politician." In private, as well as in public, Johnson's appreciation of the humor in life's situations reflected facets of his character often ignored by investigators. The bitter debate over the expansion issue resulted in personal hostilities breaching the dignity of the House of Representatives. Andrew Johnson described the outcome of one such confrontation, between Thomas Clingman of North Carolina and William L. Yancey of Alabama, a confrontation resulting in a duel. Yancey's first shot had struck the ground a few feet from Clingman, whereas Clingman's pistol had discharged at an angle of forty-five degrees into the air. When Yancey's ball struck the ground in front of Clingman, the North Carolinian was so shocked, Johnson observed, that "he not only made a copious discharge of water, but ... his short bread came from him in great profusion. ..." Johnson privately appreciated the comedy of life in another situation. In a private letter to an associate, he described William B. Carter, a Whig candidate
for Congress in 1845, remarking on his personal qualities and qualifications for office. Carter was reported to have been going "about with tobacco in his pockett, a bottle of whiskey in one hand, and his prick in the other—or in other words, that he was 'chewing, drinking & fucking his way to the Legislature'--this may be called cultivating a man's animal propensities if not his intellectual. . . ." 13

There were many sides to Andrew Johnson; his was a complex character. To delineate the more obvious traits neglects that he was human. No man can be entirely vindictive and sombre.

Johnson could be as ruthless and vitriolic as he was humorous and sensitive. The election of 1845 saw Johnson pitted against William G. "Parson" Brownlow, noted Tennessee preacher, politician, and editor of one of the most vituperative and partisan newspapers in the South. The contest developed into an intense personal confrontation. During the course of the campaign, Brownlow referred to Johnson as an atheist, a coward, and a bastard. 14 Johnson met Brownlow on his own ground, charging him with demagoguery. He warned Brownlow that if there was "to be a general tearing up of private and public character . . . henceforward . . . I am resolved . . . to defend my person and my character with my pen, my tongue and with my last dollar, and with the last drop of blood that courses through my veins." In retaliation to Brownlow's slander, Johnson often accused Brownlow of being an infidel and an abolitionist; Brownlow was a "Vulgar hero . . . the greatest curse that ever befel this nation." 15

These personal confrontations continued through the hot months of July and August, but Johnson was confident of victory, noting that even some Whigs preferred him to Brownlow. The election results vindicated Johnson's confidence; he won by a majority of 1,300 votes.

Johnson believed at this time that his success was due to his identification with the people. "I am for the people--they know that I love and desire the
approbation of the freemen of the state," he assured his constituents. The victory of 1845, as others, had "sunk" a confidence into him which "will only cease to be cherished with my last breath." Loyalty to the people meant loyalty to the Democratic party, for the people constituted the ranks of the party organization. "I prefer the ascendancy of my party and principles to my own individual aggrandizement," Johnson assured the party. "I am in the hands of the democratic party, to be disposed of by them in that way . . . best calculated to promote . . . the will of the democracy." 17

Although he had easily defeated Brownlow in 1845, Johnson almost faced political disaster two years later. In 1847, he was opposed for election by an able Whig, Oliver P. Temple, a younger version of Andrew Johnson. In addition to Temple's considerable oratorical and debating abilities, Johnson encountered some Democratic opposition in his district because of his rumored disloyalty to President Polk. Temple records that these Democrats "wanted Johnson to beat me by just one vote"—to suffer humiliation. Johnson did defeat Temple, although only by 300 votes. If anything, Johnson learned a little humility and a healthy respect for his opponents from the 1847 contest. 18

By the time Johnson returned to Washington, he had joined a Democratic movement to prevent President Polk's renomination in 1848. Johnson believed that the dissension in the ranks was due to Polk's inadequate patronage policy, as much as the aimless debate over slavery. Although Polk appeared to declaim any intention of running again, "the little man of the White House and his parasitical minions are moving heaven and earth to secure a second nomination." As the 1848 presidential election approached, Johnson had accurately observed that there was a decided movement away from Polk and towards a candidate who would guarantee Southern rights. 19 20

Johnson argued that his personal choice since 1840, Lewis Cass, was one of the only men who could allay Southern fears over the slavery question.
Cass had given the first full exposition of popular sovereignty in 1847, declaring Congress had no constituted power to regulate slavery in the territories. When Cass secured the 1848 nomination, Johnson proudly proclaimed that he had done everything "to defeat Mr. Polk for once, in his low cunning." The Whig party had nominated military hero, Zachary Taylor, a candidate Johnson and many other Democrats believed had neither the experience nor the abilities for the Presidency.21

In Congress in 1847, Johnson supported John C. Calhoun's resolutions countering the Wilmot Proviso, and denying the power of Congress to restrict slavery from the territories. Johnson agreed with many of his Southern associates in arguing that Southern rights had been infringed upon long enough.22

After 1848, movements for sectional unity and national unity became evident. Moderate Senators proposed the Clayton Compromise to settle the slavery question: this proposal called for the erection of territorial governments in Oregon, California, and New Mexico, and left the matter of slavery to the Supreme Court. Some Southerners wanted more absolute guarantees for Southern rights. These "Alabama Platform" dissidents, such as William L. Yancey, refused to support Cass in 1848, and warned of the disintegration of the Democratic party, and the rise of new parties. Robert B. Rhett proved to be prophetic, as the Free Soil party was created prior to the election of 1848, and the slavery question continued to divide the Democratic party.23

Throughout the Congressional campaign of 1849, Johnson took his stand on the slavery question, and garnered support for his Homestead bill. Speaking against Whig opponent Nathaniel Taylor, Johnson emphasized his loyalty to slavery. He wanted to assure the people that "defeat with a majority of my party holding to principles is far more preferable than success as a deserter."24 As one of the chief advisers to the Tennessee Democratic party organization, Johnson advised the party candidate for Governor, William Trousdale, to take
a stand for the Homestead. Trousdale did, and was elected by a comfortable majority, although the Whigs won most of the legislative seats. In his own campaign, Johnson pointed out that as an institution, slavery was "one of the principal ingredients of our political and social system." Johnson defeated Taylor by a large majority and had shown himself to be not only a man of the people and the "people's man," but loyal to his party and to the South.

After his triumphant return to Congress in 1849, Johnson became involved in a great crisis which would determine the permanency of the nation. The Gott resolution—a proposal to abolish the slave trade in the District of Columbia—almost ignited the fuse. Calhoun saw in the Gott resolution another opportunity to unite the South against Northern aggression. He called a caucus of all Southern Congressmen and Senators to consider action on the Gott resolution. Only sixty-nine of one hundred and twenty-one Southern Representatives and Senators attended. Andrew Johnson joined the meeting, believing caution and sanity should prevail. Calhoun prepared an address listing the South's grievances, and threatened secession if they were not redressed. Of the sixty-nine who attended, forty-eight signed this petition. Johnson joined Howell Cobb, Sam Houston, and Thomas Hart Benton, in refusing to sign. Convinced that the grievances were just, Johnson could not condone any threat of secession—Southern rights could only be secured inside the Union.

Johnson remained skeptical of this movement for Southern unity. In another attempt to counter the effects of the Compromise of 1850, Calhoun and his followers called the Nashville Convention to consider Southern action. The Convention, if anything, attempted to establish the right of secession. As became evident during the secession crisis of 1861, Johnson could not advocate this measure, convinced it was both unconstitutional and unwise. The Convention disbanded some months later with no concrete proposals for secession: as a
movement for Southern unity it had failed.

As often as Johnson asserted his position as a loyal party man, and a Southerner, he claimed the right of individual action based upon his own principles. Political ideas must be arrived at through personal conviction, he insisted. Opportunist that he was, Johnson was also a man of ideals. A Democrat by political affiliation, and a Southerner and member of the working classes by birth, he possessed the qualities of a Jacksonian reformer. He was not the professional reformer such as Wendell Phillips, or the moral crusader such as William L. Garrison. Johnson's reformist ideals, although tempered by his lack of education, his humble origins, and his crude political experiences, revealed originality and foresight.

Johnson realized that the people constituted the sovereignty of the nation; only the electorate was the final authority in determining a Congressman's actions—providing they did not conflict with the representative's moral ethics. He asserted on several occasions his intention to "act for himself . . . and did not admit the right of any individual to set himself up as the supervisor or censor of all who belonged to the democratic party. . . ." His choice of action would naturally approximate the wishes of the people because there was an identity of interests. 28

A Southern man "in his associations and feelings," Andrew Johnson was also an "American." Although the National Homestead bill is the most famous of his reform proposals, Johnson proposed other significant measures as a Congressman. One important measure was his proposal to effect a change in the taxation system. Early in 1844, he advocated a direct system of taxes, where the burden of taxation would be lifted from the poor. The unique feature of this proposal was Johnson's visionary stipulation that a tax be put on the capital assets of the wealthy. Besides providing a guaranteed source of revenue ten times that accumulated from the working people, Johnson added that
it would be just because it would result in "the greatest good to the greatest number." Although this reform proposal received scant attention in 1844, it predated Wendell Phillips's similar proposal in the 1860's.  

Most of Andrew Johnson's reforms were designed to give the people greater participation in government and the economy of the nation. Among proposals in this direction, Johnson advocated: the rotation and equalization (among the states) of appointive federal offices, with a greater recruitment of farmers and artisans; a proposal to regulate Indian affairs in Oregon territory, with procedures of prosecution of whites who violated Indian rights; and a reform of the penitentiary system in the District of Columbia, to remove the competition of convict labor with free white labor. Johnson also called for amendments to the Constitution allowing for the popular election of the President, the Vice-President, and United States Senators, as well as short, fixed terms for Supreme Court Justices. This last proposal had received the approbation of Andrew Jackson and Thomas Hart Benton some years earlier.  

All of these reforms had one object in mind: to enlarge the democratic process. "The permanency of a Democratic form of Government depends to a very great extent," Johnson emphasized, "upon the perfect equality of the citizens and the respectability of labor and the laborer, in all classes, and no distinction ought to be recognized in theory or practice in pure Democracy." So long as he had the breath to speak, he would "continue to act as their [the people's] humble advocate."  

Andrew Johnson can truly be called the "Father of the Homestead." Although he was neither the first nor the last to propose the idea, it was primarily through his efforts that it achieved public attention and Congressional approval. The Homestead bill was first introduced by Johnson on March 27, 1866, but did not become law until 1862. The Homestead called for the Federal Government to grant from the public lands one hundred and sixty acres of land to each head of a homeless American family.
The Homestead idea was neither new nor unique. As early as the 1790's there had been debate over whether the public lands should be sold at a fixed price or on a scale varying with the quality of the lands. In 1820 it was suggested prices be graduated, not on the basis of land values, but on the length of time the land remained unsold. During the next decade, both Henry Clay and Thomas Hart Benton advanced limited Homestead schemes. Clay's proposal called for sale of the lands at a nominal price, the proceeds to be distributed among the states. John C. Calhoun also favored this plan. Benton proposed a scale of land values ranging from a minimum price of $1.25 an acre, with squatter rights recognized. The first proposal made to Congress to give away the public lands was made in 1824, but this died in dormancy.\(^{32}\)

When Johnson first introduced his Homestead bill in 1846, many Democrats of the Old South supported it. President Polk favored the plan, as did Robert B. Rhett, James Seddon, William L. Yancey, Howell Cobb, R. M. T. Hunter, and Sam Houston. It was not until the Homestead became connected to the slavery extension issue that some Southerners withdrew their support.

The Homestead idea had its appeal and support in the western areas originally; Eastern groups supported it much later. Three other homestead proposals—all from the Western states—were introduced after Johnson's. In a sense, Tennessee was as much Western as Southern in its geographic, political, and economic aspects. With diversified farming, a relatively small slave population, an electorate sensitive to political change, Tennessee had reacted to changes in America in much the same way as Illinois or Ohio.\(^{34}\) Johnson's advocacy of the Homestead was a response to this type of Southern-Western influence. Although some Eastern land reform groups later elicited his support, he did not associate himself with them.

Johnson never hesitated to garner support from any quarter for his cause, however. By 1852, he had enlisted many prominent men in the country for the
Homestead. In the North, Joshua Giddings, George W. Julian, and William H. Seward favored the plan. The Washington Union and the Washington Globe were enthusiastic supporters, as was Horace Greeley's New York Tribune. The depth and all-encompassing variety of public support reveals Johnson's considerable talents at rallying men under his banner.

Comparable abilities at parliamentary maneuver matched Johnson's capacity for securing public support. The Homestead bill was introduced twice by Johnson during the Twenty-Ninth Congress, both times with little success. During the Thirtieth Congress, it was introduced three times but was not dealt with by the House. Finally, in the Thirty-First Congress, Johnson launched his shrewd plan of parliamentary infighting. Johnson was chosen as the Chairman of the Committee on Public Expenditures, as well as a member of the Committee on Agriculture, by the new Speaker, Howell Cobb. Johnson had voted for Cobb in the contest for the speakership with Robert Winthrop. When Johnson learned that the Committee on Public Lands did not favor his Homestead, he attempted to report the bill to the House as Chairman of his own committee. When this gambit was denied by the House, Johnson then moved that it be referred to the Committee on Agriculture. This too was denied by the House. Finally, as a member of the Committee on Agriculture, Johnson moved to include the bill as part of a broad proposal "to encourage agriculture." This tactic received support from Speaker Cobb, but the House tabled it into dormancy.

Resolute not to give up his Homestead bill, Johnson redoubled his efforts during the Thirty-First Congress' second session. Successfully presenting the bill again before the House, he then managed to print it and presented it in first reading before the Committee of the Whole. Lobbying for the support of Democrats and Whigs, Johnson pressed the measure forward throughout the Thirty-Second Congress, with notables Robert Toombs, Alexander Stephens, A. W. Venable, William Cobb, A. G. Brown, Sam Houston, and Stephen A. Douglas enlisted as
supporters. Submitting to sundry amendments, Johnson engaged in any form of compromise to secure the passage of his bill. For example, an amendment to restrict the Homestead's benefits to native born white citizens became a permanent feature of the bill in 1852.

Finally, the first phase of Johnson's crusade for the Homestead ended: on May 12, 1852, the bill passed the House by a vote of 107 to 56. The second phase of this crusade would begin when Johnson returned to Washington as a Senator in 1857.37

Andrew Johnson's Homestead bill was western in origin and Jacksonian in principle. Expressing his independence of thought and action to the labor movement in a speech in New York, Johnson advised several labor leaders, "I hope you will have your meeting gotten up as a Homestead gathering but not connected with any of the isms of the day."38 The disposition of public lands to the homeless envisioned by Johnson was a response to the currents of liberal thought and capitalistic entrepreneurship—both results of the Jackson era. Infused in these was Johnson's own sense of a divine reform—necessary for the advancement of democracy and Christianity. "The exclusion of the citizens from the cultivation of public lands," Johnson theorized, "destroyed one of the elements of national prosperity. . . . the necessity for cultivation of the earth was imposed on man by the law of his nature." In addition to producing "the most beneficial melioration in the condition of man; putting an end to war and famine," the Homestead would create a new source of public revenue of millions of dollars while it increased the value of the land,"by giving the poor man a portion of the public lands, you enable him to contribute to the expense of government." As often as he emphasized the Homestead to be a democratic reform, Johnson desired to be distinctly understood that he was "no agrarian, no leveller. . . . His system was to elevate, not pull down. . . . He believed that this scheme was connected to and lies at the very foundation of Christianity itself. . . ."39
As a result of the Homestead, Andrew Johnson's stature increased considerably in Congress and throughout the nation. Various leaders were impressed by his skill in handling the issue. Even one-time enemy and political rival, A.V. Brown, honored "the head that conceived 'the Homestead,' the heart that is capable of the appreciation of the poor man's worth is entitled to and receives the homage of my poor esteem. The Nation, indeed all mankind, should yield a grateful tribute to that mind that almost unaided, has forced the consideration of this question upon the American Congress." The *New York Times* had run a lengthy article on Johnson, written in flattering, yet reasonably accurate terms:

Though expressed in uncouth philosophy, his views are easily understood. . . . He thrusts his opponents through and through. . . . Woe to the luckless wight who offers him a personal indignity—for if he has to wait two years for the opportunity. . . . Mr. J. . . . parts no bridle upon his tongue; yet is never guilty of a personal disrespect to a fellow member, or even to the opposite party. . . . His efforts are slashingly crushing, for he chops to mince-meat and then grinds to powder, the men, measures and principles. . . . He takes, and maintains positions at times, which I can hear no other men advocate without feeling morally sure that the man is speaking without the least regard to the effect of his words upon his own prospects as a public man. . . . Mr. Johnson is, however, by no means afflicted with socialism. . . . the last man in the House to sanction the robbing of either class in society to pension any other class.

While some people believed that the Homestead portion of Johnson's appeal was "immoveable" and "undefeatable," others referred to the Homestead as "humbug" and Mr. J. as an *idle dreamer.* . . . denounced as a demagogue and the Homestead a miserable creature of his own futile fancy." The majority of the references to Johnson as a demagogue claimed he advocated the Homestead only as a theatrical trick to gain votes.

Johnson was aware of the popularity of the measure, yet his advocacy of the Homestead was also born of a sense of conviction. From the beginning, he confided to an associate, he was determined to fight for it, "let it terminate as it may." If he could see the Homestead become law, "I shall die happy."
Andrew Johnson had pursued the measure with the crusading zeal of a reformer, yet he did so neither as a maverick to his party or section.

In the winter of 1852, Johnson could look back on his decade in Congress with considerable pride. Acting with his party and for his native state in the South, he had witnessed the passage of his Homestead bill, gained national popularity, and participated in the great crises of the 1840's and 1850's. As the presidential election of 1852 approached, Johnson grew restless. Congress had offered him all it could for personal advancement and the amelioration of his people—at least for the time being. It was time to move on to greater things.

Sam Houston and Lewis Cass were spoken of as Democratic candidates for President in 1852. James Buchanan's friends "were making . . . an effort to place him in the lead . . . but the opinion of many" was that he had no popularity with the people. Stephen A. Douglas, another hopeful candidate, was "a dead cock in the pit," Johnson was convinced. Houston or Cass seemed to be the best choices of the party. 43

As for the vice-presidential nomination, Johnson argued that a certain Tennessean of prominence would be a judicious choice. The Tennessean with the greatest popularity and power at that time was Andrew Johnson. 44 The Democratic party chose neither Johnson nor any of the front running candidates. Dark horse Franklin Pierce was chosen for the presidential nomination, and William R. King of Alabama, as his running mate. With these men, the Democrats won the election of 1852.

Johnson had supported Pierce at the Democratic convention, and although he did not secure the vice-presidential nomination himself, Johnson's position as one of the most powerful leaders in the party in Tennessee was enhanced. If the Vice-Presidency could not be secured, he would pursue another opportunity: the Governorship of Tennessee. The election of 1853 was approaching, he would
have to make a crucial decision.

Andrew Johnson possessed depth and sensitivity; a man of principles, he was never a slave to them—principles only tempered his belief in the perfectability of man. And in order to attain this perfection, there must be an order of things in the universe. As he advised his daughter Mary in a warm family letter in 1850: "there must be some government and subordination and those that will not submit to the regulations of the institution must suffer the penalty. . . ." Johnson revealed a great deal about himself and his ideals in this letter to his daughter. In the society of man, as in the family, love and respect for everyone was essential. Every man, no matter his station in life, is finally responsible to himself and God for all his actions, he told Mary. She must, as all men must,

sustain yourself as honorable and highminded—be guilty of no low or vulgar acts or expressions even with your associates. . . . Let your bearing be dignified and chaste with your closest friend. . . . in making up your acquaintance among strangers, be careful who you make intimate friends—have but few if any secret keepers or in other words have no secrets to keep. . . .
The true policy is to be friendly to all and too friendly to none . . . command the love and respect of all . . . and the censure and ill will of none. . . .

A close examination of Johnson's Congressional career reveals that he was not an outsider, or maverick, but was a regular Democrat and a loyal Southerner. During his decade as a representative from Tennessee, he rarely operated on the periphery of the political power structure. In Washington, representing his people, he voted and argued with his party and his section on the great issues of the day. His drive for power dictated that his best chance for success lay in following party standards and appealing to Southern ideals. The political radical rarely broadens his base of public support; Johnson consistently did. The demagogue rarely follows his party and its leaders; Johnson consistently did.

With New Years' Eve, 1852, approaching, Andrew Johnson sat at his writing
desk, arranging some of his papers for a return home in March. In a letter to his son-in-law, he revealed thoughts of his extreme pride in his career, his ambition, and his desire to leave Congress and capture the Governor's chair in 1853.

Johnson had served "friends, my principles, my party and my country faithfully, and conscientiously." He should have added that he had served Andrew Johnson with merit. Indeed, Johnson had been and would continue to be, no "six months man"—he was enlisted for the duration of the war: for his people, his party, and the South, and for himself. For all of these, ambition was duty. Johnson was, as always, driven to climb the rungs of "Jacob's Ladder."
Notes for Chapter Three

1 Johnson to James K. Polk, February 20, 1843, Johnson Papers, 1, 114; Sellers, Polk, Continentalist, p. 10; Polk, Diary, II, 340, IV, 265; Cave Johnson to Polk, March 29, April 28, 30, 1844, "The Politics Behind A Presidential Nomination As Shown in Letters From Cave Johnson to James K. Polk," ed., C. L. Grant, Tennessee Historical Quarterly, XII (1953), 152-181; John C. Calhoun to R. M. T. Hunter, August 26, 1843, "Correspondence of Calhoun," 545; James A. Seddon to Hunter, April 1, 1843, Robert B. Rhett to Hunter, August 30, 1844, "Correspondence of Hunter," 63, 71.

2 Gideon Pillow to James K. Polk, May 21, 22, 1844, "Letters of Gideon Pillow to James K. Polk, 1844," ed., J. S. Reeves, A.H.R., XI (1905), 835-837; Cave Johnson to Polk, April 28, 1844, "Johnson-Polk Letters," 168. Both Pillow and Cave Johnson were maneuvering to get Polk the presidential nomination. See also, Andrew Johnson to A. O. P. Nicholson, February 12, 1844, Johnson Papers, 1, 148-150; Robert Armstrong to Andrew Jackson, June 1, 1844, quoted in Sellers, Polk, Continentalist, p. 104; Andrew Johnson to David T. Patterson, May 13, 1844, Johnson to William Lowry, March 30, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I. Van Buren would not support the annexation of Texas. Johnson to Patterson, February 27, 1844, Johnson Papers, 1, 154.

3 Johnson to Robert B. Reynolds, September 9, 1843, Johnson Papers, 1, 121; Johnson to William Lowry, March 30, 1844, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I; Nashville Union, March 25, 1844.

4 Tricamo, "Tennessee Politics 1845-1861." Tricamo was a graduate student of Eric L. McKitrick's, and his thesis was substantially influenced by his mentor.

5 Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union (2 vols. Boston: Charles Scribners, 1947), I, 6; Wiltse, Calhoun, Sectionalist, pp. 178-181; National Party Platforms, p. 3; Globe, 29th Cong., 2 sess., 286-289, App. 331-335. Here Johnson vigorously stated that the United States would drive the British Lion out "forever from this continent"; Globe, 29th Cong., 2 sess., 1011-1013, 2 sess., 38-40; here he asserted that the United States should prosecute the Mexican War until "the enemy had become so disabled as to be incapable of doing further injury." See also 30th Cong., 1 sess., App. 853-856.


8 Johnson to Polk, February 20, 1843, Johnson to Nicholson, February 12, 1844, Johnson Papers, 1, 114, 150; see also Pillow to Polk, May 25, 1844, "Pillow-Polk Letters," 839; Cave Johnson to Polk, April 30, 1844, "Johnson-Polk Letters," 178.

9 Globe, 29th Cong., 2 sess., App. 160-163; The Washington Union, July 1, 1846, opposed the tax on tea and coffee claiming it was the poor man's "only luxury"; Sellers, Polk, Continentalist, pp. 10, 455.

11 Globe, 29th Cong., 2 sess., 39; see also 32nd Cong., 1 sess., 2491 for another similar incident.

12 Johnson to Patterson, July 10, 1845, Johnson Papers, 1, 216-217.

13 Johnson to Blackston McDannel, January ?, 1845, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.


15 Johnson to McDannel, April 19, 1845, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I; Johnson to the Freemen of the First Congressional District of Tennessee, October 15, 1845, Johnson Papers, 1, 220-272.

16 Johnson to Polk, April 19, 1845, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I; Johnson to Patterson, July 10, 1845, Johnson Papers, I, 216-217.

17 Johnson to the Freemen. . ., October 15, 1845, Johnson to First District Democratic Committee, April 26, 1845, Johnson Papers, I, 216, 256. See Lewis A. Froman, Congressmen and Their Constituents (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), for an exposition of the factors that influence a Congressman's behavior.

18 Oliver P. Temple to William G. Brownlow, July 10, 1847, quoted in Temple, Notable Men, p. 223; Johnson to McDannel, January 10, 1847, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.


20 Johnson to McDannel, March 24, 1848, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I; S. E. Benston to Nicholson, April 14, 1848, "Some Tennessee Letters, 1844-1864," Tennessee Historical Quarterly, III (1944), 275-281; Polk, Diary, I, 369-371. Polk records Benton had reported that the President was "without a friend in Congress."

21 Globe, 31st Cong., February 20, 1850, passim; Johnson to Nicholson, May 14, 1848, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I; Samuel Rhea to Johnson, September 7, 1848, Johnson Papers, 1, 461-462.

22 Globe, 29th Cong., 2 sess., 453. Under the leadership of William L. Yancey, the "Alabama Resolutions" passed the Alabama state Democratic convention in 1848—they repudiated the Missouri Compromise and threatened secession if the Wilmot Proviso was passed. Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, I, 6.
Many Southern state legislatures protested against the Proviso and sent resolutions to Congress. House Miscellaneous Documents # 58 (microprint copy, U.B.C. Library); see also, Charleston Mercury, January 12, 1847, quoted in Nashville Union, January 22, 1847; Issac Holmes to Howell Cobb, August 21, 1847, "Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander Stephens and Howell Cobb," A.H.A. Annual Report, 1911, 88; John C. Calhoun to James Calhoun, July 9, 1848, "Calhoun Correspondence," 636, 759. Globe, 30th Cong., 2 sess., 950; Nashville Union, February 23, June 25, 1847. Democratic party cohesion declined sharply from the 29th to 30th Congress. Overall, in 1841, the party unity percentage was 88.4% on all issues, by 1847, this had declined to 68% and was dropping rapidly. Silbey, Shrine of Party, p. 94. W.W. Harlee to John C. Calhoun, June 8, 1848, Louis T. Wigfall to Calhoun, June 10, 1848, "Correspondence of Calhoun," 439-440; Robert B. Rhett to Calhoun, September 8, 1847, ibid., 1133.

Johnson to John Stanberry, April 27, 1849, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series II.

John to Patterson, May 9, 1849, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I; Speech at Evans Crossroads, May 26, 1849, Johnson to E. G. Eastman, May 27, 1849, Johnson Papers, 1, 498, 509; Johnson to Sam Milligan, June n.d., 1849, ibid., 510-511.

Wiltse, Calhoun, Sectionalist, p. 378; Richmond Enquirer, January 30, 1849, quoted in the Nashville Union, February 5, 1849.

Craven, Coming of the Civil War, pp. 245, 259-263; St. George L. Sioussat, "Tennessee, the Compromise of 1850 and the Nashville Convention," M.V.H.R., I (1914), 376-399; Nashville Union, March 5, 1851.

Globe, 28th Cong., 1 sess., 287, App. 332, 745.


Globe, 29th Cong., 1 sess., 755, 30th Cong., 1 sess., 800-802. H. B. Pearson, scion of one of Massachusetts' most distinguished families, expressed his approbation of Johnson's advocacy of democratic reform and equality, calling him a "maecenas from the state of the Cumberland mountains." Globe, 30th Cong., 1 sess., 801.


35 John Marcellus to Johnson, August n.d., 1850, Johnson Papers, I, 572. Marcellus was a Cleveland labor leader during the 1850's. Johnson received a few votes for the presidential nomination at the Industrial Congresses of America in 1852 in New York. *New York Tribune*, May 28, 1852, June 9, 1852, quoted in *Nashville Republican Banner*, July 14, 1855. Edmund Burke to Johnson, September 12, 1850, Johnson Papers, I, 588-590; Johnson to the Editor of the *Washington Union* (Thomas Ritchie), September 21, 1850, Johnson Papers, I, 590; Johnson to John C. Rives, May 10, 1851, Johnson to Horace Greeley, December 15, 1851, *ibid.*, 590-591, 614-615, 631-632. Rives was the editor of the influential *Washington Globe*; Greeley's *Tribune* was one of the most powerful newspapers in America at the time.


37 *Globe*, 32nd Cong., 1 sess., 1349-1350; *House Journal*, 696-706. Although the bill passed the House, it did not pass the Senate, and was not introduced to the House again until 1854.

38 Johnson to E. G. Eastman, May 27, 1849, Johnson Papers, I, 509; Johnson to Patterson, December 23, 1850, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I; *New York Tribune*, May 28, 1852, quoted in *Nashville Republican Banner*, July 14, 1855.

39 *Globe*, 31st Cong., 1 sess., 1449-1450, App. 950-952. Johnson claimed that any Democrat in the "proper sense" of the term must advocate not only the Homestead, but the interests of the common working people. Johnson to Edmund Burke, August 31, 1850, Johnson Papers, I, 587; *Globe*, 31st Cong., 2 sess., 312-313, 752.


42 John Shields to Johnson, June 9, 1850, Johnson to E. G. Eastman, May 27, 1849, Johnson Papers, I, 509, 553-554; *Greeneville Spy*, April 1, 1852.

43 Johnson to Nicholson, December 13, 1851, Johnson Papers, I, 629-630; Johnson to Patterson, April 4, 1852, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.

44 *Greeneville Spy*, May 20, 1852, endorsed Johnson for the vice-presidential nomination, as did other Tennessee newspapers.
45 Johnson to Mary Johnson, December 7, 1850, Johnson Papers, 1, 591-593.

46 Johnson to Patterson, December 30, 1852, Johnson to McDannel, January 10, 1847, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.
CHAPTER FOUR

"UP 'JACOB'S LADDER'"

"The rung of a ladder was never meant to rest upon but only to hold a man's foot long enough to enable him to put the other somewhat higher"

--Thomas H. Huxley

The guilded carriage of Governor William B. Campbell arrived at a prominent Nashville hotel in the autumn of 1853. One of the coachmen entered the hotel and announced that the Governor had arrived to take Governor-elect Andrew Johnson to the inauguration ceremonies at the Capitol. Impressive in his newest self-tailored suit, Johnson thanked Campbell for the honor of the escort, but politely and firmly declined the invitation, explaining: "this day I will walk the street with the people." Thus began his Governorship and continued his climb up "Jacob's Ladder"--his climb to power.

Andrew Johnson's election in 1853 marked an important watershed in his long and successful career. Not only would he become the first Democratic Governor to succeed himself in office for over thirty years, Johnson would also become the dominant force in Tennessee politics. From 1853 to 1865, he would wield the power in the Democratic party in the state, after Whig domination of Tennessee politics since 1834. This strength and endurance of leadership would augment his acquisition of national power, and mark the ascendency of the national Democratic party organization in Tennessee.

While in Congress, Johnson was eyed for the candidacy of Governor of Tennessee. As early as 1849, prominent Democrats in the state were enthusiastic about his prospects. "With all the masses in Tennessee," wrote Landon C. Haynes to fellow Democrat A. O. P. Nicholson, "it is believed he could make a more stronger
race than any other Democrat spoken of..."²

Johnson did not seriously consider running for the office until after the state elections of 1851-1852. The newly formed Whig Legislature, under the leadership of former opponent Brookins Campbell, and future opponent, Gustavus Henry, redistricted the Congressional districts. The district Johnson represented was dropped and added to Whig counties. This politician from Greeneville had proved himself a candidate who could not be defeated at the polls in his home counties.³

Both parties began searching for their strongest available candidates in December, 1852. The incumbent Whig Governor, William B. Campbell, declined to run again; the Whigs then nominated Gustavus Henry, a descendant of Patrick Henry, and an orator of great fame. The Democrats called for a state convention at Nashville. County delegates presented and urged the claims of their favorite sons, but Andrew Johnson received the endorsement for first and second choice from more counties than all the other candidates combined. Some indicated that he would be the best choice because he was "a man of the people, and the people's man."⁴

Johnson's ambition rarely could accept defeat. "I will not deny it, for I have my ambition; but while I freely make the admission," Johnson wrote to a friend, "I have been determined not to let it run me into excessive error." A shrewd politician, Johnson remained indecisive about accepting the nomination, afraid that if he lost, the defeat would retard his rise in politics. In the diplomatic manner of the reluctant nominee's acceptance, Johnson announced that he was "no aspirant to a Seat in Congress or to be Governor of the State; but... after a full consultation with my friends... I would be a candidate for either..."⁵

The proceedings of the Democratic convention demonstrated Johnson's power and influence. He was nominated unanimously on a platform of his specifications.
One contemporary newspaper observed, "it seems that Johnson is strong enough to run all the Democrats out of the convention and could run Henry out of the State." A.O.P. Nicholson, who had considered running for Governor, confided to President Franklin Pierce that he would run "upon one contingency—if Col. Andrew Johnson whom I regarded as our strongest man, should decline the nomination." A Democrat wrote Howell Cobb of Georgia: "our friend Andrew Johnson is the Democratic candidate for Governor . . . I doubt not he will make a bold, vigorous and energetic canvass. I hope he will succeed; I know he ought."6

The canvass against Gustavus Henry began in June 1853 and continued until the first week of August. Henry was a close associate of both John Bell and Henry Clay. His initial strategy was to confuse and confound Johnson. Possessed with a quick wit and devastating oratorical abilities, Henry was known for his annihilation of political opponents in debate.

Johnson had to defend his use of ruthless political tactics. In most of the debates, Henry attacked Johnson on his partisan leadership of the "Immortal Thirteen" in 1841-1842, charging that Johnson's actions had been illegal. The "Eagle Orator," as Henry was referred to, ridiculed Johnson's "White Basis" bill which provided for the repeal of the three-fifths Negro slave voting clause. Henry queried Johnson about his refusal to advocate this bill among his wealthy friends in West Tennessee. Johnson rebutted, affirming his adherence to Southern institutions, particularly slavery. He accused Henry of abolitionist tendencies, and denied that he had equivocated on the "White Basis" bill. Johnson did rest on precarious ground. In Knoxville, East Tennessee, the issue "involved a great principle which concerned the rights and interests of the masses," but in Memphis, West Tennessee, his supporters denied it was an issue at all.7 This issue revealed Johnson's flexibility of principle and his underlying drive for power and success above all. In East Tennessee, the common white population stood to gain representation because the slave population was almost negligible; in West
Tennessee, where the slave population was larger, Johnson feared he would annoy the larger planters who had supported him by offering such a proposal.

On one occasion in Columbia, Tennessee, Henry sought to embarrass Johnson as the advocate of the people. In Congress, Henry claimed, Johnson had voted against a resolution to appropriate money for famine-stricken Ireland. "How could any one be so inhuman, so heartless, as to cast such a vote?" Henry demanded. Johnson replied that he had "turned to . . . [his] fellow Congressmen and proposed to give fifty dollars of our own funds . . . and when they declined the proposition . . . [of voluntary contributions] pulled out fifty dollars . . . which I donated to the cause." Johnson questioned Henry, "how much did you give sir?". Henry had no reply, and the debate, as others, was a Johnson success.

Andrew Johnson impressed opponents and supporters with his campaign. Gustavus Henry credited Johnson for a superior campaign in a letter to a friend:

You have underestimated my opponent. I have never met so powerful a speaker as Andrew Johnson . . . [he is] as smart a fellow as I have met for many a day . . . once or twice I supposed I had him trapped; for he was not able immediately to answer me; but the next day he would assail me with the very points I had used, and evince more knowledge of the subject than I possessed.

Whig opponents referred to Johnson as a "fluent speaker," with the "faculty of impressing his hearers with a belief in his earnestness." The most prominent Democratic newspaper in the state had described Johnson in glowing terms: "no man within the border of our state has more in his character and history to challenge the wonder and respect of its citizens."

The results of the election in August proved Johnson's dominancy over Henry. A record vote was cast, reflecting public interest in the contest. Johnson received 63,413 votes, a majority of 2,250 over Henry. This was a gain for the Democratic party of almost 4,000 votes since the Presidential election of 1852, in which Pierce lost Tennessee to the Whigs. In a county breakdown, Johnson had carried fifteen counties in East Tennessee; Henry thirteen. This
gain of three counties for the Democrats since 1852, revealed Johnson's popularity in his home counties. Johnson's strength in that area was considerable, although surprising, as East Tennessee was traditionally a Whig stronghold. In Middle Tennessee, Henry carried thirteen counties; Johnson took twenty, with a majority of 3,612 votes. Traditionally, this area was a Democratic stronghold. The illuminating return came from West Tennessee, residence of the state's largest planters and slaveholders. Although Johnson won only seven counties to Henry's eleven, Henry's majority was only 827 votes. Henry was popular in West Tennessee, yet it is apparent that Johnson's appeal and influence among the wealthy and politically prominent was greater than has been surmised.

Many Whigs were bitter. Governor Campbell wrote to his uncle after the election, claiming that abolitionist sentiment in East Tennessee had elected Johnson. Cryptic editor William G. Brownlow carried this bitterness throughout Johnson's administrations. Once, while in Nashville during Johnson's first term, Brownlow harangued a crowd, almost under the new Governor's window, declaring: "I therefore pronounce your Governor, here upon his own dunghill, an unmitigated LIAR AND CALUMNATOR, AND A VILLAINOUS COWARD."

Most Democrats were elated by Johnson's victory. Not only could many anticipate manifold political appointments, but some party men were eyeing Johnson as a likely candidate for the 1856 presidential nomination. Tennessee had not had its share of offices on the national level since Polk's administration; with Johnson in the White House the emoluments of office would return. Prominent party members claimed Johnson had "gained a great triumph in Tennessee," a victory "for the people." They regarded Johnson as the "most powerful and successful Democrat" in Tennessee since Andrew Jackson.

Some contemporary sources proposed that Johnson had beaten not only the Whigs in the election, but also "a large part of the leaders of the democratic party."
This observation in Johnson's time, as well as subsequent subscription to the idea by later observers, assumes a dubious tenet: that political parties in the border states during the 1840's and 1850's were always united, and that the leadership was followed by all party members. This view of the nature of politics in Tennessee is both over-simplified and misleading.

Tennessee contained the elements of a viable two party political system in the 1830's. The revolt against Jackson had not only created two parties of equal appeal to voters, but had established a factionalism within each party which continued until the Civil War. This factionalism was, in part, a response to the geographic divisions of the state, and, in part, a reflection of the national mood of growth and flux which no one party could hope to satisfy. In Tennessee, William G. Brownlow and Thomas A. R. Nelson grappled with John Bell for control of the Whig party throughout the 1840's and 1850's. Similarly, James K. Polk's loyal follower, Aaron V. Brown, attempted to wrest complete control of the Democratic party from rising young leaders, Andrew Johnson and A. O. P. Nicholson. The shifting nature of factionalism dictated that no one man could retain complete unanimity in his party. Johnson had competed with A. V. Brown for the power in the party; during Polk's administration, Brown held the greater influence because of Polk's power; after Polk's departure from the White House, Brown's influence in the party waned as Johnson's grew. From 1848 to 1853, Johnson's power in the Democratic party increased rapidly. The Governorship would only add to this power.

Inauguration day proved to be an eventful one. Refusing a carriage ride to the Capitol, Johnson walked the distance on the warm clear autumn day, in company with many people. As always, he dressed impeccably. Several thousand people attended to hear Governor Johnson's inaugural speech. It proved to be an important document, one of significance in understanding the character and philosophy of the man.
Two-thirds of the address was a philosophic and intellectual discussion of man and society, and reveals the depth and flexibility of Johnson's ideas. The foundation of government, he believed, was comprised of the "interested and designing few, on the one hand, and the laboring many, on the other; political power has been vibrating as the pendulum, from the origin of man's condition to the present . . . between the two." The Democratic party inherited the Jeffersonian ideals of the placement of sovereign power "in the mass of the people." The heavy and grave responsibility rested upon the Democratic party, Governor Johnson contended, "of recurring once more to first principles . . . to bring it back to its republican simplicity. . . ." Here Johnson expressed the popular myth of the golden age of agrarian Republicanism engendered by the Jeffersonian ideas and carried into the Jackson era. Democracy, or man's capacity to govern himself, is a "principle that exists," he insisted. "That is inherent in the very nature of man . . . which enables him to determine between right and wrong, in all political affairs. . . . It is that which enables him to reason correctly, and to lift himself above all animal creation." Because man was a rational animal, Johnson suggested a universal principle:

It is this principle that constitutes the intelligence of man; or in other words, it is that in man which partakes most highly of the nature and character of Him in whose name he is made—which I term the Divinity of Man. And in proportion as this Divinity is enlarged the man becomes more and more capable of self-government. . . .

What was the role of Andrew Johnson and the Democratic party in this watchmaker's universe? For Johnson, both roles were crucial in attaining the ideal democratic state:

It is the business of the Democratic party to progress in the work of increasing this principle of Divinity, or Democracy. . . . I hold that the Democratic party proper, of the whole world, and especially of the United States, has undertaken the political redemption of man. . . . In the political world, it corresponds to that of Christianity in the moral.

Thus, Johnson contended that his actions and the behavior of his party must be
towards the establishment of a utopian state. Democracy and Christianity were
going along, he explained, not in divergent,
nor in parallels, but in converging lines—the one purifying
and elevating man religiously, the other politically. . . .
when finished, these two lines will have approximated each
other. . . . at this point it is that the Church Militant
will give way and cease to exist, and the Church Triumphant
begin; at the same point, Democracy progressive will give
way and cease to exist, and Theocracy begin.

What kind of a democracy was Johnson's? Was there a hierarchical structure?
What was the position and role of the people? "The voice of the people is the
voice of God," Johnson assured the masses. Democracy would form its structure
prophetic of the Bible. Society would form a "Jacob's Ladder," up which all
men "in proportion to their merits, may ascend, while it extends to the humblest
of all created beings here on earth below, it reaches to God on high." Not
only was Johnson's utopia based on equality and the measure of human worth, but
the measure of good works. In this, ambition was an integral part of the attain­
ment of salvation.

Johnson's ideas were neither revolutionary nor radical: they were not the
expressions of a political or social maverick as the McKitrick thesis would
suggest. Johnson merely re-iterated ideas that had been some of the basic
tenets of the Democratic party since the 1820's and would continue to be until
the Civil War.

The Democratic Review had offered views more than similar to Johnson's
inaugural address, and the Review was one of the popular organs of the Democratic
party in the Jacksonian era. The Review stipulated that democracy was founded
on the macrocosmic and

perfect self-government of the physical universe . . . [an
example] being written in letters of light on every page of
the great Bible of Nature. It contains the idea of the full
and fearless faith in the providence of the Creator. . . .
We are on the path toward that great result, to which mankind
is to be guided down the long vista of future years by the
democratic principle—while walking hand in hand with the sister
spirit of Christianity.
Even Andrew Johnson's successor to the Governorship, the wealthy and influential Isham G. Harris, embellished Johnson's expressions. In his inauguration speech of 1857, Harris asserted that God gave man the capacity to govern himself and "supreme sovereignty rests with the people" as a divine right.  

It is probable that Johnson expressed his philosophy from a sense of conviction rather than only a calculation to gain popularity. Although he belonged to no formal church, Johnson's belief in an egalitarian democratic society had been expressed in political campaigns for many years before and after 1853. As he was fond of reminding his constituents, "my religious creed first, my Democracy next; they are one and inseparably connected."  

Andrew Johnson's "City on the Hill" was vastly different from that of the revivalist. He stated on many occasions that he was "for no established religion—no Union of Church and State—but for their remaining separate and distinct." Rather, Johnson saw a Democracy in the fashion of a Thomas Moore's Utopia or a Plato's Republic. Believing in the innate goodness of man and his perfectability, he envisaged the ideal state where men advanced according to their merits—where a politician or a "philosopher-king" was chosen because of his natural abilities. Religion for Johnson was a pantheistic kind—without the need of a ritualistic formal organization. In this context, divinity permeated every man, and in the process of each man doing what he could do best in life, real democracy functioned and salvation was attained.

Although the majority of the address dealt with Johnson's philosophic considerations of politics and society, the remainder of the speech stressed a concrete reform program. In general terms, he recommended a new system of internal improvements, various legal and economic reforms, a public education system, and a Homestead policy. This was a prelude to his impressive regular legislative message which followed in two months and specifically outlined the Johnson program.
Reaction to Governor Johnson's "Jacob's Ladder" speech was varied. The Nashville Union and American, leading Democratic newspaper, called the address "an able and patriotic document," handled with "uncommon ability." The Nashville True Whig was not so complimentary: "all this absurd jargon about Federalism and democracy is . . . 'stale, flat and unprofitable.'" When the Governor spoke of democracy as the divinity of man, continued the Whig, it would be "interesting to know how far he thinks the so called 'democratic' administrations in this country in modern times, have successfully illustrated this. . . ." Public reaction flowed even beyond Tennessee's borders; the Western Democratic Review called the address "better than almost anything from Governor Johnson's pen."19

Johnson devoted almost all his time for the next two months in drafting his reform program. The proposals comprising the regular message of December, 1853 show Johnson as a liberal Jacksonian reformer and a Southerner. His legislative program demonstrates his vision and wisdom as an executive. Unlike the abstract nature of his inaugural address, the reform proposals rarely lacked a dozen tables of statistical information to verify his arguments. Divided into sub-headings, the legislative message dealt with each topic specifically and thoroughly; these twelve topics covered areas from state finances to the national Homestead.

In general, Johnson's reform program aimed at putting Tennessee on a firm economic base, free from debt, and involving the citizens equally in the profits of economic prosperity. Johnson's analysis of the finances of the state concluded that the state government was losing control over the economy and sinking rapidly into debt. To solve these problems, Johnson recommended a reorganization of the inefficient turnpike road system to secure more revenue, gradual liquidation of the Bank of Tennessee and its wildcat branches, the restriction of credit to prevent inflation, and the issuance of county and state corporation
bonds to provide financial stability.

Other democratic reforms completed Johnson's program. He called for a reform of the state penitentiary system—a system which had "failed in all the leading objects." Moral reformation of the inmates had failed, and a deficit of $100,000 had been incurred. Also, the system competed with the free white labor through the use of convict laborers. People were justified in demanding equality before the courts, Johnson insisted. He recommended to the Legislature a reorganization of the judiciary system, so that "law and equity can be administered by the same court" to all citizens. Johnson proposed the popular election of the President, Vice-President, United States Senators, and short fixed terms for Supreme Court Justices, through amendments to the Constitution. Not surprisingly, Johnson also recommended implementation of his Homestead plan.

Governor Johnson's most far reaching and significant proposal was his plan to establish a state supported public school system. He knew only too well the value of an education, having lacked one himself, and he pleaded with the Legislature to enact a law to establish such a system:

> Education is a companion which no misfortune can suppress—no clime destroy—no enemy alienate—no despotism enslave. At home, a friend; abroad, an introduction; in solitude, a solace; in society, an ornament. It lessens vice, it guards virtue, it gives at once a grace and government to genius. Without it, what is man? A splendid slave! a reasoning savage! vacillating between the dignity of intelligence derived from God, and the degradation of brutal passions.

In general, the legislative message was received by approbation by friends and enemies, supporters and opponents. The Democratic papers, in particular, commended Johnson for his "sagacity and vision." Unfortunately for Johnson, the Legislature did not react with such enthusiasm. The Whig party had an overall majority of twelve in the Legislature, and united, could block any of the Governor's proposals.

When the House and Senate proceeded on Johnson's outlined program it was obvious from the outset that partisan politics would reign over the Governor's
first term. The Legislature could not agree on one of several alternatives to stabilize Tennessee's financial problems, or on a systematic method of reforming the penitentiary system, or on regulation of the public roads network, and no action was taken on Johnson's recommendations for the Homestead or amendments to the Constitution regarding high offices. Positive legislative action was taken on only four of the twelve proposals in Johnson's program.

Yet, an arithmetic evaluation of Johnson's success is misleading. Whigs and Democrats united on various proposals to institute reforms that few Democratic Governors with Democratic majorities had been able to achieve. In accordance with Johnson's suggestions, a halt was made upon careless appropriations and the extension of credit. The high water mark of Johnson's Governorship was the enactment of a law establishing a publicly supported school system, the first such law in the history of the state. Andrew Johnson's advocacy of the measure earned him the title of the "Father of Public Education" in Tennessee textbooks. His earnest plea struck a responsive chord in the Legislature, for within two months of its introduction as a bill, it was a law. Although other proposals in the program did not receive immediate action, the Legislature debated long and furiously over such recommendations as the Homestead—passing a resolution calling the measure "an unmistakeable harbinger of the incalculable good."24

Andrew Johnson was the first Democratic Governor of Tennessee who devoted practically his entire time to matters pertaining to his office. He gave his personal attention to the administration of state affairs, and did not make any public political addresses during his first term. He frequently attended legislative sessions, and met with members of both parties for consultation. The harmony between the executive and legislative branches on some occasions was enthusiastically pointed out by Democratic newspapers: "rarely if ever, has there been a more harmonious session of the Legislature in this State, and
certainly never one which has transacted more important business." One Committee Chairman in the state senate believed that Johnson's role had been "forcible, clear and appropriate." Indeed, Johnson's success in his first term extended into Isham G. Harris's term in 1857.

Throughout his first term, Johnson became more and more the Governor of the people. His papers abound with letters and petitions from the people, a majority of which were marked across the back, in his hand, "Attended to." Governor Johnson was often found mingling with the people at outdoor barbecues and county fairs. His pride in his humble origins as well as his awareness of its political effects on his success undoubtedly were two motivations for his actions.

In an exchange of letters and tokens with another prominent Democrat, Judge W. W. Pepper of Kentucky, Johnson succinctly expressed his sensitivity and pride over his humble origins and his desire to advocate the interests of the people. "I am a mechanic, a plebian mechanic, and not ashamed nor afraid to admit it," Johnson told Pepper, "all those who have been Farmers and Mechanics who have distinguished themselves from Adam and Tubal Cain down to the present time" offer an example to all those who look down upon the people. Johnson expressed his abhorence of an aristocracy as well. The history of the common people "would instruct and no doubt surprise a kind of pseudo upstart aristocracy, who too infrequently infest our cities, towns and villages." Judge Pepper approved heartily of Johnson's sentiments. Pepper subscribed to the elevation of the common people, having once been a blacksmith himself. Governor Johnson was, in his eyes, "one of the champions of the great mechanical interest of the country." Accompanying the letter to the Governor, was a hand-tempered fire shovel, as a compliment both to Johnson and the laboring classes. Johnson was so impressed by the gift, he in turn tailored a suit coat for Pepper.
The man "who does not disgrace his profession will never be disgraced by it," he wrote to Pepper, "the motto of every genuine republican is individual merit...." Upon receiving the coat Johnson had made, Pepper replied that the coat and Johnson's letters were "valued by me infinitely above gold and silver." Pepper, like many others, had been won over by Johnson. He remained loyal to Johnson until death.

Although Johnson was often seen conversing and working with the people, he was a man who kept his own counsel and had few intimate friends. He did not shun the pleasures of high society--on one occasion he was known to have delighted several Nashville ladies by his wit and charm--but he preferred the company of his family, his few close friends, and his associates.

He found pleasure in advising his friends in their affairs, yet gave little indication that he would accept others' advice. Although he liked to unburden his troubles to his friends, Johnson usually required a listener rather than an advisor. As he had cautioned his daughter Mary, some years earlier, he believed it was best to keep one's own counsel, and be a friend to all yet too close to none. It is this trait of character that the McKitrick thesis utilizes as proof of Johnson's inconsistency of behavior. In 1865, many Radical Republicans such as Charles Sumner, Benjamin Wade, and Salmon P. Chase were convinced President Johnson would approve of Congressional Reconstruction: when they presented their plans to him, Johnson sat in silence. When Johnson subsequently chose a different course of action, the Radicals, and later, historians accused him of incompetency and treason for his apparent reversal of behavior. But for Andrew Johnson--as Governor or President--silence was neither approval nor disapproval.

Once he had befriended a man, Andrew Johnson remained loyal to him for life. Throughout his career, Johnson evinced his friendship and loyalty to Samuel Milligan and Blackston McDannel. From Mayor of Greeneville to President of the United States, Johnson placed these men first on his patronage list. Johnson, who knew how to reward his supporters, spent a good deal of his time dealing
with the distribution of patronage; rarely did he promise a favor he could not bestow. Although he realized his rapport with the people augured tremendous power for him, Johnson also realized that the distribution of patronage was an integral part of success.
Notes for Chapter Four

1 Nashville Union and American, October 18, 1853.


3 Andrew Johnson to David T. Patterson, December 30, 1852, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I. Oliver P. Temple, East Tennessee Whig, admitted this act of Gerrymandering. Temple, Notable Men, p. 379.

4 Nashville True Whig, January 18, 1853; Nashville Union and American, April 28, 29, 1853.

5 Johnson to David T. Patterson, December 30, 1852, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I. Several factors seemed to operate against his success: not only would there be a Whig majority in the district, but the A.V. Brown faction of the Democratic party refused to support Johnson; also, many people believed he was too young and inexperienced.

6 Nashville Republican Banner, April 29, 1853; A.O.P. Nicholson to Franklin Pierce, April 12, 1853, "Some Tennessee Letters," 247; George W. Jones to Howell Cobb, May 19, 1853, "Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens and Cobb," 328. Jones observed that Johnson would have to overcome the weight of executive appointments which had not favored Johnson supporters under the Polk administration.

7 Nashville Union and American, June 4, 10, 1853; Nashville Republican Banner, July 13, 23, 1855; Temple, Notable Men, p. 387.

8 Nashville Union and American, June 23, 1853. Typically, Johnson claimed that he did not run upon the "merits of General Pierce or anybody else" but on his own merits, Ibid., June 3, 1853.

9 Ibid., April 25, 28, 1853; Gustavus A. Henry to E.H. Foster, May 14, 1853, Gustavus Henry Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, microfilm copy).

10 Nashville Union and American, August 7, 1853. Winston, Stryker, and the Revisionists in general have all indicated that Johnson was an arch foe of the large slaveholders of West Tennessee.


13 S.R. Anderson to A.O.P. Nicholson, August 16, 1853, Ibid. These contemporary observations may well have been the basis for the McKitrick interpretation of Johnson as a maverick.

15 Nashville Union and American, October 18, 1853; White, Messages of the Governors, IV, 626. Both give the entire text of the address; all excerpts are from these sources.


17 Andrew Johnson to the Freemen ..., October 15, 1845, Johnson Papers, I, 267; Nashville True Whig, October 24, 1855; White, Messages of the Governors, IV, 631-33.

18 Johnson to Patterson, October 22, 1855, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I; Nashville Union and American, May 3, 1855.

19 Nashville Union and American, October 18, 1853; Nashville True Whig, October 20, 1853.

20 Nashville Union and American, December 19, 1853; White, Messages of the Governors, IV, 559-614.

21 Some of Johnson's twelve recommendations called only for a legislative resolution to be presented before Congress as the will of the people of Tennessee, rather than any specific legislative act. Johnson also recommended abolishing a tax on merchants and the establishment of a uniform weights and measures system.

22 Nashville Union and American, December 19, 1853.

23 Ibid., December 23, 1853; Nashville Republican Banner, January 2, 1854; Nashville True Whig, December 28, 1853.

24 White, Messages of the Governors, IV, 561-587. Many of Johnson proposed reforms reflected popular demand; hundreds of petitions and memorials by the "mechanics" of the state had been presented to the Legislature complaining of the competition with convict labor, pleading for reform.

25 Nashville Union and American, March 7, 1854.

26 See footnote 6, Chapter One for my explanation of Johnson's use of the terms "aristocracy" and "common people."

27 W.W. Pepper to Andrew Johnson, January 25, 1854, Johnson to Pepper, July 17, 1854, Pepper to Johnson, July 19, 1854, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.

28 A.O.P. Nicholson to George W. Jones, April 12, 1854, Nicholson Correspondence.

to Benjamin Wade, August 3, 1865, Sumner to Salmon P. Chase, July 1, 1865, quoted in McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction, p. 64.

CHAPTER FIVE

"YOUR DESTINY IS MY DESTINY"

"No man is an Island"

--John Donne

Suddenly, towards the end of his first term as Governor, there was a shift in Johnson's public image and political behavior. For over eighteen months he had been the dutiful Governor, promoting a public program of reform, befriending the people, rewarding supporters and friends—making himself agreeable to almost everyone. As he prepared to run again for Governor, Johnson was gathering forces and garnering public support for his presidential candidacy of 1856. With the people of Tennessee united in support, and with considerable management, he might be able to capture the nomination. If he could not, Johnson would still be in a favorable position for the 1860 nomination as Governor of Tennessee. As the end of his first term came to a close, Johnson once again vaulted onto the hustings and cajoled, threatened, and pleaded with the people in the manner he had campaigned for two decades.¹

Andrew Johnson's sudden vigorous political campaigning reflected some significant changes in the political and social structure of the nation by 1855. The downfall of the Whig party as a national political institution was due, in part, to the sectional controversy over slavery in the territories.² The Democrats had adapted to these changes, the Whig party had split and disintegrated. Two new parties were created in the aftermath—the Republican party and the American or Know-Nothing party. The American party based its appeal to voters on the rising prejudice against foreigners and Catholics. The Know-Nothing movement spread rapidly across America,
reinforced by the effects of the political upheavals in Europe in 1848, and by the slavery controversy in America. By 1852, the party had crystallized into a secret oath-bound organization.

Although the charm of secrecy which enveloped the party accounted for some of the phenomenal Know-Nothing growth, other influences were important. Old party lines had been altered. Many Whig-oriented voters, unwilling to cast their lot with either pro-slavery Democrats or anti-slavery Republicans, sought and found refuge in the Know-Nothing party. By mid-1854, Know-Nothing strength in Tennessee was evident. By June 1854, a Know-Nothing mayor and city council had been elected in Memphis, and Nashville elected a Know-Nothing mayor in September. The electorate had responded quickly and positively to this new party.

An indication of the nature of the American party can be obtained from numerous contemporary sources. One diarist recorded a Know-Nothing initiation meeting in cryptic terms:

Before going in a gentleman came into the anti-room with a mask on his face. . . . He had a black robe on, a sword by his side—and plumes in his hat. Those to be initiated were placed in the proper position with their toes on a crack in the floor. . . . The candidates were then blindfolded and required to take three high steps over sharp swords—with injunctions that if any blood was spilt— it would be ominous of evil consequences.  

The Know-Nothings entered the campaign for Governor of Tennessee, in 1855, with confidence. Because of the secret nature of the party they held no convention. Meredith P. Gentry, well-known Whig, announced his unopposed candidacy for the Know-Nothing nomination. Gentry had joined many ex-Whigs of fame in claiming that the influx of foreigners and Catholics had endangered the nation and that the American party was the only solution. Indeed, converted Know-Nothing and nephew of Andrew Jackson, Andrew J. Donelson, was reported to have charged that not only Andrew Johnson, but Henry Wise of Virginia and Jefferson Davis, were in open alliance with the Pope in Rome, plotting the overthrow of the government.
Again the reluctant candidate, Johnson was, nevertheless, determined to control the 1855 campaign as he had the 1853 contest. As it was to most candidates during this period, "the thought . . . of canvassing the State . . . was almost paralyzing" to Johnson. He told his advisers that he would consult his close friends as to "when and where I would like to have the convention in my power . . . ." The Democratic convention assembled in Nashville, March 27, 1855. During the next few weeks, the country organizations held meetings, drew up resolutions denouncing the Know-Nothings, and instructed delegates. Johnson received the endorsement of thirty-six of the forty counties which kept written records of their proceedings; the convention subsequently nominated him by acclamation. The platform was tailored to Johnson's wishes. In addition to reiteration of basic Democratic principles, the platform specifically denounced the Know-Nothing party for "its attempts to abridge the rights of conscience. . . . [it was] dangerous to the public liberty."5

The fundamental issue in the 1855 contest was "Americanism". Johnson and Gentry met and agreed upon a schedule of sixty debates, commencing in May 1855 and debating almost every day until the last day in July, a physical undertaking, one contemporary observed, "calculated to make most men recoil from." The Know-Nothings centered their campaign around the appeal to return to "American" life and the defeat of foreign and Catholic influences. Johnson's strategy was based upon a relentless attack on the proscriptive features of the Know-Nothing party. Two issues that sidelonged the campaign were the Kansas-Nebraska controversy and the Temperance issue. Johnson announced his support of the Kansas-Nebraska bill as a necessary compromise measure, but opposed prohibition as a restriction of personal freedom: Gentry opposed the Kansas-Nebraska compromise and prohibition.6

The atmosphere of the debate at Murfreesboro, on May 1, 1855, set the scene for the remainder of the campaign. The heat was oppressive for spring. Excitement over the debate surpassed the importance of any event in the city.
It was late afternoon when the city officials set up the speaker's podium and the chair-filled stage with its flag-draped railings.

A crowd of 5,000 pressed close to hear Johnson and Gentry assail each other. The exchange lasted for over five hours. Gentry accused Johnson of abolitionism for proposing his "White Basis" bill and called him a demagogue for his emotional appeals to the people. Johnson in turn called Gentry a disunionist because he had opposed the Kansas-Nebraska bill as well as the Compromise of 1850. A Democratic newspaper recorded Johnson's vilification of the Know-Nothing party:

The Devil, his Satanic Majesty, the Prince of Darkness, who presides over the secret conclave held in Pandemonium, make war upon one of the churches and thus far become allies of the Prince of Darkness. . . . All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience. . . . I intend to stand by them in the heat and the dust. . . .

Gentry's reply to Johnson's opening attack was an able defense of his political record, but he refused to defend the American party with the vigor that Johnson had attacked it; Gentry claimed instead that he "came out as the candidate of the people of Tennessee."7

Each man was permitted a rejoinder. Gentry very adroitly pointed out Johnson's political inconsistencies, his ruthless campaign tactics, and his disloyalty to his own party, but again, would not defend the Know-Nothings against Johnson's attacks. Johnson intensified his abuse of the American party: "SHOW ME THE DIMENSIONS OF A KNOW-NOTHING, AND I WILL SHOW YOU A HUGE REPTILE, UPON WHOSE NECK THE FOOT OF EVERY HONEST MAN OUGHT TO BE PLACED."8

The campaign became a bitter and controversial one. It revealed some of Johnson's strengths and weaknesses. Evident to all was that few men could match him on the stump. Evident also was his courage to face a new and powerful political party and to attack it in its own strongholds. East Tennessee, a traditional Whig area, became a hot-bed for the American party, yet Johnson launched some of his most vicious attacks there. His courage, at times, became obstinacy,
a blind pernacity, a determination to win at all costs. Even the threat of physical injury did not deter Johnson from his condemnation of the opposition.

Violence was an integral part of Southern life in the ante-bellum period. During the campaign of 1855, one observer commented only casually of a political meeting which witnessed a fatal argument between Democrats and Know-Nothings. The argument resulted in an altercation, in which "three men were shot in the square".

Johnson brushed with death many times during his career. He was familiar with threats against his life. During his first term, placards were posted in Nashville by his enemies, warning Johnson that he would be shot on sight. Friends eager to protect Johnson offered a personal bodyguard. The Governor refused defiantly: "if I am to be shot at, I want no man to be in the way of the bullet." During the campaign of 1855, Johnson had been informed that he would be shot if he attempted to speak before a large pro-Know-Nothing crowd. He faced his audience, his hand on his pistol, and invited the assassin to do his work. Silence greeted his invitation, and after a long pause, he began his speech. Characteristic of his obstinacy, he warned critics that he would continue to attack the proscriptive Know-Nothing party "if it blows the Democratic party to hell."9

His ruthlessness, as well as his courage, aided his ambition. Cunning and shrewd, Johnson had the flexibility to adapt to any political situation and capitalize on it. Near the end of the 1855 canvass, Gentry became ill. Johnson agreed to cease further speaking engagements, and was publicly praised for his dignified gesture. At Gentry's request, Oliver P. Temple accompanied Johnson to the various cities and towns scheduled for the remaining debates, to explain the cancellation. With shrewdness and sufficient vagueness to avoid criticism, Johnson would begin his explanation by saying: "I am not allowed by agreement with my competitor to make a speech. If I were allowed to do so, I would say," and he would go over the grounds in general terms of his proposed speech. Thus,
while agreeing to end the electioneering, he effectively continued the campaign.  

By the first week in August, election results were being forecasted. Although the Whig-Know-Nothing newspapers claimed Gentry had triumphed over Johnson, Democrats believed Johnson's attacks on the American party would take their toll. The Know-Nothing party organ, the Nashville Daily Gazette, referred to Johnson as "shrewd, cunning ... ambitious, and if he could, would be tyrannical ... [he is] known demagogism ... a bold, determined dictator." The Nashville Republic Banner, another Know-Nothing paper, charged that Johnson was in alliance with the Industrial Congress of America, and, along with Gerrit Smith of New York and Governor I.P. Walker of Wisconsin, advocated "the abolition of slavery." The Banner called Governor Johnson a "mobocrat ... a Cataline full of treason and hate against the rich ... Robespierre was as bad, but he used chaste language. . . ." Another American party supporter, the Nashville True Whig, was more tempered in its evaluation of Johnson and Gentry: "the half-hearted defense of it [the American party] by Gentry ... [made] its friends despondent. . . . On the other hand, Johnson's daring assaults had filled his friends with the highest courage and enthusiasm. . . ."

Democratic papers were as partisan in their support of Johnson. The Knoxville Standard claimed that Gentry was humiliated by his opponent, and the Nashville Union and American was lavish in its praise of Johnson's efforts. Democrats throughout the state complimented Johnson; even competitor A.V. Brown gave Johnson-credit for a superior campaign. The excitement and importance of the Johnson-Gentry conflict had reached beyond Tennessee's borders, attracting national publicity. The Ohio Democratic Herald viewed the contest with praise for Johnson.

By early August, speculation had ended. Andrew Johnson had received 67,499 votes to Gentry's 65,343, a majority of 2,167. In comparison with 1853, Johnson had gained strength in Middle and West Tennessee, but lost votes in East Tennessee.
He had defeated Gentry by 4,746 votes in Middle Tennessee, the Democratic stronghold. This represented a gain of 1,200 votes for Johnson since 1853. The surprising return came from East Tennessee where Johnson lost these counties by 1,500 votes, a loss of 1,000 since 1853. Historians and biographers have pointed out that this represented a dissatisfaction with Johnson's leadership in East Tennessee, that traditionally, that area had been a Johnson stronghold. This view is both oversimplified and misleading. Johnson's strength in East Tennessee was limited to those counties he had traditionally represented and which had voted Democratic. The majority of the East Tennessee counties had been Whig oriented since 1834 and voted Know-Nothing in 1855. Similarly, historians and biographers have insisted that Johnson's strength was with the common people only, that few large planters and slave owners supported him. Yet the election returns from West Tennessee, a planter stronghold, belies this view. Gentry won the West Tennessee counties by only two hundred votes, a vote which represented a gain for Johnson of 500 votes since 1853. Johnson's influence among the powerful was more manifest than has been apparent.

The results of the election of 1855 were significant for Andrew Johnson and the Democratic party. He was the first Democratic Governor to succeed himself in office for over two decades. The victory was probably the result of a combination of influences. The strength of the Whig party had declined sharply, and prompted the Democrats to greater unity and determination to secure the state for the party after a long Whig domination. Johnson's success sounded the death knoll for the Know-Nothing party as an effective organization in Tennessee. In the process, Andrew Johnson had gained the national attention he needed for advancement to greater heights.

Reaction to Johnson's victory was immediate. Many leading Whigs in Tennessee and in other Southern states believed Johnson was a fire-eating "disunionist." The Knoxville Whig ridiculed the Governor's victory, claiming he was "in league with the Pope at Rome." The Richmond Enquirer asserted that Johnson's success
was direct result of the work of foreigners. Democratic newspapers were as lavish in their praise as Whig-Know-Nothing papers were critical in their disapproval. The *Memphis Eagle and Enquirer* believed that "Progressives" had elected Johnson; the *Nashville Union and American* proclaimed: "never was there a battle fought more purely of principle." Northerners took notice of Johnson. The *New York Freeman's Journal* attributed Johnson's re-election to the support of "good American stock." Democrats throughout Tennessee closed ranks and backed Johnson. He was the strongest leader of the Democracy in the state after his victory; he had received recognition from various national leaders. Howell Cobb and Franklin Pierce noted with approval Johnson's rise to power, and expressed confidence in his ability as a party leader. 

Governor Johnson's victory was a signal for Democratic celebration. A Democratic newspaper records that great mass meetings were held in towns and villages, special days were set aside for jubilees, torchlight processions, and giant barbecues. Thousands attended the celebrations, many of which demanded the Governor's presence as a speaker, a request that Johnson fulfilled amiably and enthusiastically for several weeks. 

In October 1855, having been inaugurated the first Governor in the new State Capitol in Nashville, Johnson delivered a brief address. In content and import, it re-iterated the ideas of the 1853 address. He believed in 1855, as in 1853, that a basic program of reform to elevate the people of Tennessee must be completed. His entire efforts as Governor would be aimed at the elevation of the citizens of Tennessee. It was with them that "genuine Christianity and Democracy" originated. Johnson believed that an aristocracy of "virtue and intelligence, talent and genuine learning, honest industry, economy and real merit," combined with a love for mankind, had an important place in society. Governor Johnson concluded his address with an emotional appeal to the people: "the people have never deserted me, and God being willing, I will never desert them." The Governor's regular legislative message followed one week later. It was almost a duplicate of the legislative message of 1853.
Few of Johnson's recommendations were passed by the Tennessee Legislature; that body seemed determined to block his every move. Partisan politics lay behind this opposition. As in 1853, the Democrats were in the minority in the Legislature; the state senate organized with eleven Democrats and fourteen Whig-Know-Nothings, the House with thirty-four Democrats and thirty-six Whig-Know-Nothings. The Know-Nothings in particular wanted to revenge the vicious campaign Johnson had waged against them. The legislature repeatedly refused to confirm the nominations made by Johnson for the various boards and other high officials. In addition, several bills were introduced in an attempt to remove the Governor's appointive power. Johnson's firm reaction to this manoeuvre, claiming it was unconstitutional, foreshadowed his stand on Congress' attempt to impeach him for removing Secretary of War Stanton, in 1868. Some resolutions were passed in the Legislature criticizing Johnson's program. Referring to his recommendation for amendments to the Constitution, the state senate adopted a resolution calling the proposal "unwise, inexpedient, and dangerous to our liberty," and if adopted would open the door for other changes, and would be regarded "as the work of demagogues and fanatics."\(^\text{18}\)

Partisan opposition and personal revenge were revealed by bitter debate, particularly over whether or not to adjourn for the Thanksgiving holiday with a prayer. The Whigs and Know-Nothings assailed the Democrats and particularly Andrew Johnson for their opposition to such a prayer, claiming that Johnson had proved himself a believer in a theocracy--pointing to his "Jacob's Ladder" speech. One Know-Nothing introduced a resolution to authorize a member of the Legislature to "crack him \([\text{Johnson}]\) on the head with a round of \(\text{Jacob's Ladder}\)," if Johnson did not discharge his duties of office in an "appropriate manner." In the face of these attacks, Democrats leaped to their feet in defence of their leader, but they lacked the majority to vote these resolutions down. Most Democrats in the Legislature, agreed with one member, who believed that Johnson was discharging his duties with dignity and competence.\(^\text{19}\)
Despite the intransigence of the opposition, some constructive legislation was enacted. The Agricultural Bureau was expanded, and progress was made in introducing scientific methods in farming. Johnson heartily approved of and coordinated these measures. The public school program was expanded, with the addition of the state Normal School. Also, five hundred acres of Andrew Jackson's "Hermitage" was purchased on Johnson's recommendation, and offered to the Federal Government in return for the establishment of a Western Military Academy like West Point, on state land near Nashville.

Although the majority of Andrew Johnson's reform program during his two terms met obstruction and defeat, the measure of his success did not end with his term of office in 1857. Isham G. Harris, his successor, continued the Johnson program. One element of difference between success and failure between the two men was that Harris had a Democratic majority in the Legislature, Johnson did not. Under Harris, almost all of Johnson's proposals met with favorable legislative action. Ironically, Johnson's program of reform was successful after he was Governor.

For Andrew Johnson, 1855 was spent in planning and preparing for the presidential nominations of 1856. He would attempt to secure the nomination and advance to the highest office in the land. His ambitions for high office had been evident for some years. As early as 1852, while still a Congressman, Johnson had planned to capture the vice-presidential nomination. He had received the support of some prominent Democrats and newspapers in Tennessee for the nomination; presidential aspirant James Buchanan felt Johnson's ambitious presence, for when Johnson did not receive the nomination at the Democratic convention "his looks and expressions manifested his disappointment." By 1856, Johnson believed that his popularity and power were sufficient to capture the presidential nomination. Only occupying the White House would satisfy his ambition.

Events moved quickly in Tennessee, toward what Johnson hoped would be his success. The Democratic state convention met on January 8, 1856, to appoint
delegates to the National Convention. By invitation, Johnson was present to deliver a short address on the issues of the day. He vigorously defended the South and its institutions. "Slavery exists," he said, "it is black in the South and White in the North, and it will continue to exist." At the end of the proceedings, the state convention came out enthusiastically for Johnson as its presidential candidate. It passed a resolution praising President Franklin Pierce for his administration, and proclaimed that Andrew Johnson "as a statesman and patriot, has no superior; that he is our first preference, and we would delight to honor him with the highest office in the gift of the American people."23

By October 1855, Johnson's popularity was rising. There had been considerable support among many Democrats in the Tennessee Legislature favoring Johnson's nomination. Several country delegations came out in favor of him. Moving secretly, yet forcefully, he built up an organization to advance his interests. And advance them it did, at every opportunity. One observer of the state convention wrote: "we had considerable excitement occasioned by the over zealous friends of Andrew Johnson who desired to force the convention to recommend him for the Presidency to the National Convention." Another Democrat confided to A.O.P. Nicholson prior to the National Convention, "I have no doubt that the Tennessee aspirant to the White House will use every means to prevent the appointment of Pierce delegates. ..."24

Andrew Johnson faced failure at the Cincinnati convention; James Buchanan of Pennsylvania captured the nomination. Johnson kept his disappointment to himself. In private, however, he had his misgivings about Buchanan" Mr. Buchanan with his antecedents is harder to defend than any one of the candidates." A good part of this fear was a result of Johnson's frustrated ambitions, yet part of his criticism of Buchanan as a candidate reflected some public discontent of the choice. Although Johnson was apprehensive of Buchanan's success, he believed the platform, consisting primarily of a defense of slavery, was a "sound one."25

Regardless of his personal disappointment and his general fears about Buchanan, Johnson campaigned vigorously for him throughout Tennessee, convinced that "we must
do the best we can with him." Although Johnson often vocalized his discontent with party leadership, he did not act as the political outsider or maverick. Yet, his actions were not entirely selfless. Johnson realized his loyalty would be noticed by the party and his chance for the Presidency might come again in 1860.

At one of the great outdoor political meetings in Nashville, in July 1856, Governor Johnson delivered the "Key-note" address. Thousands of people attended. Johnson's oratory was superb. His three hour speech left such an impression on the people that thousands of copies of his address were ordered printed and distributed. Complimentary letters were written to the newspapers:

Mr. Editor: Scores of Americans as you know, thronged to Broad Street to hear the Governor on the questions of the day. So pleased are they with the Governor's speech, that a vast multitude of them desire to have a repetition of it. Allow us then, Mr. Editor, through your columns to request Governor Johnson to repeat the speech at an early day. We promise him a big crowd and the most respectful attention. Numerous Americans.

Although Johnson's oratory had surpassed all previous efforts, the content of his address was not new. He asserted ideas that he had expressed on many previous occasions as a Southern Democrat. While he indicated that he would evaluate the prospective candidates for the election with the people, it was soon obvious that the Republican and Know-Nothing candidates were to receive Johnson's typical vituperation. The Governor produced letters, which he waved before the crowd with his fist, to establish the contention that Millard Fillmore, the Know-Nothing candidate, and John C. Freemont, the Republican candidate, were both avowed abolitionists. On the other hand, Johnson claimed, James Buchanan was a tried and true Democrat of thirty-two years, a nationalist and not a sectionalist, and an ardent defender to the South and slavery.  

How should the people of the South act in the approaching election? "My own opinion is that the South has been engaged in compromises, as they are termed, long enough," Johnson answered, "we have been engaged in one compromise and then another ... until our rights have all been compromised away." The only way
to guarantee Southern rights was to vote for Buchanan. As to his allegiances, Johnson claimed, "I am for the South standing firmly and united. . . . I am not alarmist, but I speak what I think. This Union shall be preserved. Our Southern institutions depend upon the continuance of the Union and upon non-interference. . . . [with slavery]. Your destiny is my destiny, and Tennessee's destiny is with the South, and the South must be united." These were the words of a loyal Southern Democrat, not those of a maverick.

Johnson made many such speeches across the state, and even in other states. On one occasion he was invited to debate with John J. Crittenden, but for unknown reasons, he refused. In all his speeches, Johnson cautioned the people not to follow the rash Southern fire eaters like Yancey and Rhett, yet he denounced Northern aggression against slavery. Some observers believed that Johnson was at his greatest oratorical and popular heights, and Buchanan's success in Tennessee was a direct result of Andrew Johnson's efforts.

After the campaign, Johnson sat back with calm satisfaction. On a brief respite from the role of Governor, he relaxed in his comfortable home in Greeneville. One fall evening, as was his habit, he walked casually in the half acre of treed and cultivated pasture behind the house with his wife Eliza, his youngest son, and his two youngest daughters. His few domestic slaves worked in an atmosphere of relaxation. Later, Johnson returned to his study, and wrote letters to friends and associates, a task he took with pleasure and enthusiasm.

Johnson's conceit and pride in his accomplishments are revealed in a letter to his son-in-law, David T. Patterson. Johnson boasted that although he had not obtained the presidential nomination, he rationalized that his popularity was at his greatest height, and augured promise for the future. In another revealing letter, Johnson assured his oldest son Robert, and in a sense assured himself, that his strength among the members of the party was still considerable, as his speeches in the campaign had given "general satisfaction to the democrats everywhere I have been."
In the election of 1856, Johnson had shrewdly estimated the Democratic strength in the state. Buchanan had won the election and had carried Tennessee in the first Democratic victory in the state since 1832. Johnson predicted Buchanan's majority would be 7,000 to 8,000 votes in Tennessee. When election results were given, Buchanan's majority was 7,500. 31

On the whole, Johnson was pleased with Buchanan's and the party's victory, but he cautioned friends that Buchanan's course of action must be wise. In a letter to his intimate friend, Sam Milligan, Johnson claimed that the people "have shown their capacity for self-government more conclusively in this election than at any other time"; it was a triumph of "principle over faction and sectionalism." If Buchanan was not forceful in his leadership, catastrophic results would ensue: "The recent development of their [abolitionist's] strength will only cause them to redouble their energies and to come up to the next contest with more ardor and determination to elect a sectional abolition candidate . . . which will be tantamount to a dissolution of the Union." Johnson had his private fears: "I fear the question is not ended and what it is to end in God only knows." 32

As Buchanan prepared to take office as President, Andrew Johnson prepared to leave his office as Governor. He had decided not to run again for Governor of Tennessee; he believed his ambitions and the interests of the people would be better served if he could secure a seat in the Senate. 33

Governor Johnson remained devoted to his job as Governor to the last day. He travelled to Washington in January 1857, to press the claims of his proposed Western Military Academy. While returning from the White House, Johnson met with a nearly fatal accident. The train on which he was travelling left the track near Chattanooga and rolled down a sixty foot embankment. His right arm was severely broken and his face considerably bruised. This injury greatly impaired his health during the next few months and kept him from plunging whole-heartedly into politics, as was his habit. There was considerable alarm among friends and supporters over his health. Many letters were written
to Robert Johnson, inquiring of his father's condition, and the newspapers of the day received hundreds of solicitous messages which attested to Johnson's popularity. One such letter summed up the feeling: "since the days of Jackson no public man has stood so high in the affections of the Democrats as Andrew Johnson. He is the man of the times and the friend of the people."  

Governor Johnson recuperated from his accident in his home in Greeneville, but he did not withdraw completely from politics. Maneuvering from afar, Johnson kept in constant communication with friends and associates. He wanted to make sure that his personal choice for Governor, Isham G. Harris, would succeed him. Johnson men consolidated support for Harris at the nominating convention, which not only passed resolutions expressing its "gratitude to Andrew Johnson for his able and successful administration," but also unanimously nominated Harris. This relationship between Harris, a wealthy and influential West Tennessean, and Johnson, a humble artisan from East Tennessee, reveals some important aspects of Johnson's own political power as well as political events in Tennessee from 1857 to 1861.

Johnson's biographers and other historians have asserted that Johnson was vehemently opposed to the slavocracy of the state, and that prominent citizens of West Tennessee were not enamoured with the Governor. Harris represented the large planters in the Western part of the state, as well as the ultra-Southern viewpoint. Yet, it has been shown that West Tennessee not only voted for Andrew Johnson, but that later Johnson promoted and allied with one of its most prominent leaders--Isham G. Harris.

Throughout the gubernatorial campaign of 1857, Johnson advised and aided Harris. It was no coincidence that in the campaign Harris assailed the Know-Nothings and their candidate, Robert Hatton, in a style more than reminiscent of Johnson's. In constant communication with Harris, Johnson quieted fears of many Democrats about Harris, believing that his prospective successor "will come out with flying colors, redeeming himself, and increasing the democratic majority."
When he was able, Johnson delivered a few speeches in West Tennessee for Harris--speeches which were received enthusiastically in that area, and which aided Harris to a large extent.  

Even when Harris became Governor, there was a close rapport between him and Johnson. During the currency crisis of 1857-1858, Governor Harris requested his "friend" Johnson to come to Tennessee to advise him and the party "as to the precise and practical issue which shall be presented by the Democratic party on the question of currency in the next canvass." Similarly, prior to the contest of 1859, Harris again requested advice from Johnson on campaign strategy.

There was a continuity of political power between Harris and Johnson that had been neglected by students of the period. Harris continued Johnson's legislative program as well as practicing a powerful influence over Legislature and party. Another significant aspect of this close tie between the two men is Johnson's position with regard to party and section. If Johnson had been a maverick, he would not have chosen to ally himself with an ultra-Southern leader. Significantly, Johnson's loyalty to party and to the South had paradoxical and ironic consequences. From his Governor's chair Harris waged a battle against the North. Johnson and Harris joined forces in campaigning for the Southern Democratic nominee, John C. Breckinridge, in 1860. Yet, in a crucial period of a few months in 1861, Johnson would become the Lincoln-Unionist leader of Tennessee while Harris took steps to move Tennessee into the Confederacy. Only then would Johnson turn against his party and defend the people of East Tennessee. Political opportunism as much as loyalty to his constituents would then appear to be a driving motivation.

As chief executive of Tennessee, Andrew Johnson exercised his duties with energy, tact, and wisdom. He also revealed his ruthlessness in political warfare. Underlying his loyalty to party and his unerring leadership, regardless of his methods, lay Johnson's drive to acquire power. Johnson was known as a loyal party man to his friends and associates, yet he was his own man.
From Governor to Senator, Johnson let it be known that he was a Southerner first and last. His executive program through two terms of office reflected his adherence to his party's principles, and a responsiveness to the voice of the people. Johnson advocated his program of reform with force, competence and vision.

The inaugural of Isham G. Harris and Andrew Johnson's valedictory address were attended by a large concourse of citizens. Johnson's address was brief and humble. "I can give no other or higher guarantee for my future course, touching the common weal, than my past life," he assured the citizens. He passed his office on to Harris with "pleasure and full confidence" in his "respected and worthy successor." 39

Once the Tennessee Assembly of 1857 had been organized, the election of a successor to James C. Jones's expiring Senatorial seat was the item of greatest concern to all Democrats, especially to Andrew Johnson. But the strain of two successive terms as Governor, of campaigning for Pierce and Buchanan and Harris, of maintaining Democratic solidarity, of his injured arm and declining health, took some to the drive out of Johnson. At forty-nine, although he desired a Senate seat, he was tired. 40

Events would not leave Andrew Johnson in ill-health. He had yet to embark upon the greatest part of his long career. Health would return to this determined and resilient man. Ambition would once again propel him on to greater conquests. The Democracy of the South needed a man of the people and a Southerner who would defend them. The Democratic party of Tennessee would insist on his leadership. There was no conflict in the "mind of the democratic people"--he must once again climb "Jacob's Ladder." 41
Notes for Chapter Five

1. Greeneville Democrat, May 20, 1852; William Flinn to James Buchanan, April 15, 1865, The Works of James Buchanan, XI, 381; Johnson to D.T. Patterson, February 17, 1855, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.


4. Knoxville Whig, November 3, 1855; Nashville Republican Banner, November 4, 1855. Gentry was an opponent of Johnson's of long-standing. A member of the Tennessee Legislature from 1835 to 1839 he sat across the aisle from Johnson in the House. Gentry went on to serve twelve years in Congress and established himself as a leading Whig orator in Congress. Loyal to the principles of Henry Clay and a close associate of John Bell, he was a reluctant but ambitious Know-Nothing.

5. Johnson to David T. Patterson, February 17, 1855, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I. The campaigns were conducted through the hottest and most humid days of summer, for almost two months. Nashville Union and American, March 8, 1855, McGavock, Pen and Sword, March 27, 1855, p. 321.


9. McGavock, Pen and Sword, June 2, 1855, p. 332; Nashville Union and American, July 12, 1855; Greeneville Sun, February 23, 1911; Temple, Notable Men, p. 328.

10. Temple, Notable Men, p. 321; Nashville Republican Banner, July 26, 1855.


12. Knoxville Standard, May 16, 1855, quoted in Nashville Union and American, May 22, 1855; McGavock, Pen and Sword, May 1, 1855, p. 327. Johnson was supported by such Democrats as A.O.P. Nicholson, Cave Johnson, Amos Kendall, the Blair family, Felix Zollicoffer, George W. Jones, and James K. Polk's brother, William H. Polk.


15 Howell Cobb to George W. Jones, October 25, 1855, Franklin Pierce to A.O.P. Nicholson, December 2, 1855, Nicholson Correspondence; Louis T. Wigfall to Johnson, June 8, 1855, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.

16 *Nashville Union and American*, August 22, 1855.


19 *Nashville Union and American*, November 22, 1855.

20 Ibid., January 12, 26, 1856.


22 Greeneville Democrat, May 20, 1852; William Flinn to James Buchanan, April 15, 1865, *Works of James Buchanan*, XI, 381; Johnson to Patterson, February 17, 1855, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.

23 *Nashville Union and American*, March 5, 8, 1856; *Nashville True Whig*, March 10, 1856.


26 Johnson to William Lowry, June 26, 1856, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.

27 *Nashville Republican Banner*, July 28, 1856; *Nashville Union and American*, August 11, 15, 1856.

28 Ibid.
29 Johnson to Robert Johnson, September 19, 1856, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I; McGavock, Pen and Sword, July 4, 1856, p. 373; Nashville Union and American, December 12, 1856. On one occasion, Johnson addressed a crowd of 45,000.

30 Johnson to Patterson, September 19, 1856, Johnson to Robert Johnson, September 19, 1856, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.

31 Johnson to Robert Johnson, September 19, 1856, ibid., Nashville True Whig, November 10, 1856.

32 Johnson to Samuel Milligan, November 23, 1856, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.

33 Nashville Union and American, January 1, 1857. Johnson had expressed his desire for a Senate seat as early as October 1856. Johnson to Sam Milligan, November 23, 1856, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.

34 McGavock, Pen and Sword, February 3, 1857, p. 394; Robert Johnson to Sam Milligan, February 27, 1857, D.T. Patterson to Robert Johnson, February 24, 1857, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I; Nashville Union and American, March 5, 1857; Nashville True Whig, March 10, 1857; Nashville Republican Banner, March 14, 1857. Johnson's injury affected his handwriting for many years afterward, much to this observers' chagrin.

35 Robert Johnson to Sam Milligan, February 27, 1857, Andrew Johnson to Robert Johnson, March 18, 1857, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I; Nashville Union and American, April 17, 1857.


37 Johnson to Robert Johnson, July 18, 1857, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I; Nashville Republican Banner, July 22, 1857.

38 Isham G. Harris to Johnson, September 7, 1858, July 7, 1859, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I; McGavock, Pen and Sword, September 28, 1857, p. 433 describes the hysteria over the financial panic. Nashville True Whig, November 8, 1857.

39 Nashville Union and American, November 7, 1857.

40 Johnson to William Lowry, July 17, 1857, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.

41 Nashville Union and American, August 28, 1857.
CONCLUSIONS

Examination of Andrew Johnson's early political career has revealed that he was an ambitious Jacksonian Democrat and a Southerner; not a political outsider and maverick.

Johnson did not act in a vacuum. The factional nature of politics during the 1840's and 1850's made it appear that certain politicians functioned on the "outside" of the political system. In fact, most men belonged to a particular group or faction. No one faction could control the national, state, and local power structures. Thus, with the alternations of office following elections, not only did opposing political parties alternate the office of government, but factions within each party ebbed and flowed through the tide of patronage. The "ins" became the "outs" and the apparent "outs" became the power brokers. The Jacksonian era had ushered in the spoils system just as surely as it had democratic government.

The measure of a politician's success during this period of flux was his ability to remain in power for a long period of time, and to exercise some continuing influence over the party organization. Andrew Johnson was returned to office for twenty-nine years (except for one defeat as a sophomore state representative). Throughout this span, he significantly aggrandized his power and prestige in the state and national party organizations. Johnson's puissance led him from the Governorship of Tennessee to the Senate, and ultimately, to the Presidency. In the process, he became one of the most powerful men in the Union, and a consul of the people—a position that would be threatened only after his confrontation with the Radical Republicans in 1866.

As a state politician, ambition overrode other motivations in Johnson's climb to power. The period 1828 to 1843 was a formative period for Johnson's
political behavior. His indistinct political allegiances, demagogic
appeals to the people, and ruthless political practices, combined with his
determination to represent the people's interests and advocate democratic
reform, were being molded and united into a political credo and philo-
sophy of action. By 1843, Johnson's drive for power entailed more than the
obvious. His ambition was both inwardly and outwardly directed. Johnson
believed he could never achieve success for himself if he did not have the
confidence of the people, and conversely, he realized that his popularity
and success would increase if he promoted the people's interests.

As a Congressman, Johnson spoke and acted as a loyal Democrat and an
ardent Southerner. He was as vehement in defending slavery and the South
as were Jefferson Davis, William L. Yancey, and Robert B. Rhett. On the
crucial issues of the 1840's and 1850's, Johnson rarely behaved as a poli-
tical maverick.

As Governor of Tennessee, Johnson introduced a Jacksonian program
of democratic reform, which provided benefits for the people of his state
and aided his acquisition of power. In the process of battling the Whig
and Know-Nothings on the stump and in the Legislature, he demon-
strated his strength of purpose, his democratic ideals, his ruthless tactics,
and his capacity to expand his political fortunes.

That driving force, ambition, best explains Andrew Johnson's behavior.
Although he was a Jacksonian because it was often expedient, Johnson was
also a devoted representative of the people. Ambition for himself and for
the people, became inseparable. An opportunist, Johnson was also a man of
principle.

Power, continuity, and consistency: These words accurately describe
Andrew Johnson's political behavior during his early career. Add to these
the ideals of a Jacksonian reformer, and a sense of destiny, and Johnson
becomes more understandable.
Johnson possessed acute sensitivity to political change and public opinion. He almost always knew when and how to take action, and how to gage his popularity. As he confided to a close friend about political office, he would prefer "changing position . . . move upward and onward and not to pause any place until the people become tired and restless; it is better to get out of their way a little too soon than to be in their way a little too long."  

1 Johnson to Sam Milligan, December 10, 1856, Andrew Johnson Papers, Series I.
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I. PRIMARY SOURCES

A. Manuscript Collections

Bragg, Thomas, Diary, 1861-1862. Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina (microfilm copy, U.B.C. Library).


Henry, Gustavus, Papers, 1809-1888. Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.


Laughlin, Samuel H., Diary, 1840-1844. Tennessee State Library and Archives, University of Tennessee.


B. Federal Government Printed Publications


C. Published Letters, Diaries and Speeches


Calhoun, John C., "Correspondence of John C. Calhoun," edited by J.F. Jameson, American Historical Association Annual Report, 1890, II.


D. Memoirs and Reminiscences


Sherman, John, John Sherman's Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate and Cabinet. 2 vols. Chicago: Werner, 1895.


Temple, Oliver P., Notable Men of Tennessee 1833-1875, Their Time and Their Contemporaries. New York: Cosmopolitan, 1912.

Truman, Benjamin C., "Anecdotes of Andrew Johnson," Century, LXXXV (1913), 435-440


Welles, Gideon, "Lincoln and Johnson," Galaxy, XIII (1872), 659-703


E. Newspapers and Serial Publications


Atlantic Monthly. 1857-1880

Century Magazine (also referred to as Scribner's). 1871-1923.


East Tennessee Miscellany. 1852. (Microfilm copy, Tennessee State Library and Archives).

Greeneville Democrat. 1852-1860 (Microfilm copy, Tennessee State Library and Archives).

Greeneville Spy. 1850-1859. (Microfilm copy, Tennessee State Library and Archives).

Greeneville Sun. 1820-1845. (Microfilm copy, Tennessee State Library and Archives).


Knoxville Whig. 1844-1858. (Microfilm copy, Tennessee State Library and Archives).

Memphis Daily Eagle. 1845. (Microfilm copy, Tennessee State Library and Archives).

Memphis Eagle and Enquirer. 1852-1856. (Microfilm copy, Tennessee State Library and Archives).

Nashville Republican Banner. 1845-1860 (Microfilm copy, Tennessee State Library and Archives).

Nashville Union (in 1852 the Nashville Union and American). 1840-1860 (Microfilm copy, Tennessee State Library and Archives).

Nashville Whig (also referred to as Nashville True Whig). 1845-1857. (Microfilm copy, Tennessee State Library and Archives).


II. SECONDARY WORKS

A. General Histories and Reference Works


B. Unpublished Material


C. Monographs


Savage, John S., The Life and Public Services of Andrew Johnson. New York: Darby and Miller, 1866


C. Articles in Periodicals


Sheiler, R.J., "The Development of Unionism in East Tennessee 1860-1866," *Journal of Negro History*, XXIX (1944), 166-201.


Williams, T. Harry, "Andrew Johnson as a Member of the Committee on the Conduct of the War," East Tennessee Historical Society Publications, #12 (1940), 71-83.
Roll-call voting is particularly useful, since there, as contrasted to debates, most congressmen irrevocably commit themselves on an issue. However, an analysis of a limited number of roll-call votes distorts our knowledge of Congressional behavior. Selective analysis may determine whether or not Andrew Johnson was for or against slavery on one vote, but doesn't answer how much for and how much against. The maneuvering over a bill or issue is as important as the final vote. In recent years several methods of analyzing voting responses were developed to reveal people's attitudes towards particular subjects. A Guttman Scalogram is one method of determining individual or group attitudes toward a particular subject. Central to this concept applied to Congressional voting is the assumption that the individual congressman is usually quite consistent in his voting behavior, and that political parties do have ideological differences. When, for example, the slavery issue was presented before Congress, that problem passes through several stages before the final vote. Solutions are proposed, debated, and discussed. Through the successive phases of this process, the individual member places himself relative to the other members.

In order to determine how much Andrew Johnson was pro-slavery, or anti-bank, a scale of attitudes must be constructed. The Guttman Scalogram shows how each Congressman voted compared to Johnson, along a scale of attitudes ranging from most in favor of, to most against, the issue. The limits of this type of scale is obvious: it is a mechanical device for ordering certain types of material but it does not answer why a particular pattern occurred. That question must be answered by the historian using other skills.

The method of constructing the scalogram can be summarized briefly.
This is first done by ascertaining the individual Congressman's votes on all of the amendments to and versions of the type of legislation under consideration—on the slavery issue, for example. The result will be a summary chart of a great deal of crude data—referred to as a "preliminary universe of content." This "universe" is a continuum ranging from positive to negative, on the set of issues—graphically, from left to right. The aim of the scaling procedure is to locate the Congressman along this single dimension or continuum. Thus, the single dimension on the slavery issue would range from extremely pro-slavery to extremely anti-slavery. On the assumption that this continuum exists, the investigator concludes that every Congressman's response will fall within the dimension's limits. Each roll-call recorded must then be classified, indicating either a "positive" or "negative" vote. In this context, a "negative" vote could be either a "yea" or a "nay." The response pattern of each man on a set of items can be ascertained by combining his responses on individual items, deriving from this his classification as "positive" or negative" on each item, and then determining his group classification by utilizing computer techniques.

By continuing this process for all Congressmen on all votes, in one "universe," a scale is determined.

The tables used in this appendix are a compilation of scales used by Silbey. Andrew Johnson's voting response and scale position are given in all important issues during his decade as Congressman (Figure 2, all tables). His voting position can be referred to his standing to the group voting response and classification, on any particular issue (Figure 1, all tables). Also, there is a description of each individual vote comprising an issue, so that Johnson's vote in a microcosm can be seen (Figure 3, all tables).

I have checked a number of votes used by Silbey in determining his
scales, and found them to be accurate. This random sample, of course, assumes the accuracy of all the scales, but time and resources did not permit a complete verification.
### TABLE 1*

**EXPANSION ISSUE: TWENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS**  
*1843-1845*

**Figure 1**  
Expansion Issue, Party and Sectional Division, House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th></th>
<th>South</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Expansion (0-3)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (4-6)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Expansion (7-10)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2**  
Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Pro-Expansion</th>
<th>Anti-Expansion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>12345678910</td>
<td>12345678910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X xxxxxx x</td>
<td>x x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3**  
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nay to table motion ending debate on Texas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nay to table motion that Oregon is ours up to 54°40'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nay on amendment to Oregon Bill that we will have due regard for British rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aye to end debate on Oregon territorial bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nay to table motion to end Texas debate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aye on motion to print 15,000 extra copies of Tyler's Texas message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aye on referring joint annexation resolution to Committee of the whole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Nay on suspending rules to permit Whig motion that there be no annexation of Texas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aye on passage of Oregon territorial bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aye on passage of bill admitting Florida and Iowa as states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 5
### Table 2*

**Expansion Issue: Twenty-Ninth Congress 1845-1847**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>Democrats No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Expansion (0-3)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>77.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (4-8)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Expansion (9-13)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1**

Expansion Issue: Party Division, House

**Figure 2**

Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Pro-Expansion</th>
<th>Anti-Expansion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>12345678910111213</td>
<td>12345678910111213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>xxx x xx xx xx xx</td>
<td>x x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3**

Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nay on agreeing to peaceful notice to England on Oregon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nay to table motion to end Oregon notice debate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nay to recede from militant declaration of Oregon notice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aye to insist on same.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aye to pass militant Oregon notice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aye to pass bill to protect U.S. settlers in Oregon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aye to end Oregon debate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aye to table Massachusetts memorial against admission of Texas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aye on Texas admission resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Nay to table same.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Aye to pass militant Oregon notice again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Aye to engross same.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Aye to pass same in Committee of the Whole.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 6
TABLE 3*

SLAVERY ISSUE: TWENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
1845-1847

---

**Figure 1**
Slavery-Extension Issue—Sectional Division, House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>South No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Slavery (0-2)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>97.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (3-7)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Slavery (7-8)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2**
Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Pro-Slavery</th>
<th>Anti-Slavery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12345678</td>
<td>12345678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>xxxxxxx</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3**
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nay on passage of Oregon Territorial Bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aye to amend Oregon Bill to say slavery is excluded there because it is north of 36°30'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aye to table $3 million bill containing Wilmot Proviso.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nay on adding Wilmot Proviso to War Appropriation Bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nay on adding Proviso to $3 million bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nay on passage of $3 million bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nay on tabling War bill without Proviso.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aye on passage of War bill without Proviso.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 7
### TABLE 4*

**WAR ISSUE: TWENTY-NINTH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION**  
*1845-1846*

**Figure 1**  
*War Issue: 1st Session, Party Division, House*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-War (0-1)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (2-4)</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-War (5-6)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2**  
*Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Pro-War</th>
<th>Anti-War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>123456</td>
<td>123456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>xxxxxx</td>
<td>xxxxxx</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3**  
*Key to Scale*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nay on reconsidering bill to appropriate $2 million to terminate war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nay on motion to table same bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aye on engrossing same bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aye on passage of supplemental War bill to raise more troops, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aye on amendment to First War bill to give President $10 million to prosecute war begun by Mexico.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aye on passage of first War bill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 8
TABLE 5*

WAR ISSUE: TWENTY-NINTH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION 1846-1847

Figure 1
War Issue: 2nd Session, Party Division, House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-War (0-3)</td>
<td>123 87.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (4-7)</td>
<td>16 11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-War (8-11)</td>
<td>2 1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2
Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Pro-War</th>
<th>Anti-War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1234567891011</td>
<td>1234567891011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>xx xxx x x</td>
<td>x xxx</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aye on amendment to appoint a Lt.-General of the Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nay on motion to terminate war immediately and not carry it on for conquest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nay on amendment to Texas post route bill that nothing in bill accepts boundaries with Mexico.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nay on amendment to limit 10 Regiment bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nay on receding from General-in-Chief bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aye on giving the President power to appoint a General-in-Chief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nay on amendment to army appropriations that money does not sanction a war of conquest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Nay on suspending rules to receive resolution against our acquiring territory as a result of the war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nay on suspending rules to receive resolution to end war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aye on passage of 10 Regiment bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Aye on passage of substitute for 10 Regiment bill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 9
TABLE 6*

TARIFF ISSUE: TWENTY-NINTH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION
1845-1846

Figure 1
Tariff Issue, Party Division, House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Tariff (0-2)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (3-5)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Tariff (6-7)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2
Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Low Tariff............High Tariff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1234567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>xxxx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1234567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>oxx</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nay on tabling resolution to end tariff debate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nay on amendment placing salt on free list.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nay on similar amendment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nay on similar amendment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nay on amendment repealing bounties on cod fishing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nay on tabling tariff bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nay on tabling tariff bill from Senate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 10
TABLE 7*

TARIFF ISSUE: TWENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 2ND SESSION, HOUSE 1846-1847

Figure 1
Tariff Issue: Scale Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Tariff (0-2)</th>
<th>Moderate (3-5)</th>
<th>High Tariff (6-7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Figure 2
Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Low Tariff .................</th>
<th>High Tariff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1234567</td>
<td>1234567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>xx xxx</td>
<td>x x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nay on passage of resolution that it is inexpedient to lay duties on tea and coffee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aye on tabling same motion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nay on receiving resolution inquiring on what articles can duties be raised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nay on adding 10% War duties on manufactured goods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nay on tabling resolution to end debate on Treasury Note bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nay on suspending rules to receive resolution to revive Tariff of 1842.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aye on passage of Treasury Loan bill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 11
TABLE 8*

LAND ISSUE: TWENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
1845-1847

Figure 1
Land Issue: Party Division, House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>Democrats No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal (0-2)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (3-5)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative (6-7)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2
Andrew Johnson’s Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Liberal.........</th>
<th>Conservative.......</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1234567</td>
<td>1234567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>xxxxxxx</td>
<td>xxxxxxx</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aye on reading Graduation bill third time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nay on tabling Graduation bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aye on amendment to graduation bill to reduce price of land on market for a long period, and to sell it to actual settlers only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aye on passage of Graduation bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aye to reconsider vote to reduce price of land and grant pre-emption rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aye on passage of reduced price amendment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aye on passage of more conservative reduced-price amendment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 12
TABLE 9*

SLAVERY ISSUE: THIRTIETH CONGRESS
1847-1849

Figure 1
Slavery Extension Issue - Sectional Division, Party Division, House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>Democrats %</th>
<th>South No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Slavery  (0-3)</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate   (4-8)</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Slavery (9-12)</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2
Andrew Johnson’s Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Pro-Slavery..........</th>
<th>Anti-Slavery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>123456789101112</td>
<td>123456789101112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>xxxxxxx x x x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nay on passage of Oregon territorial bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aye to suspend rules to introduce a Fugitive Slave bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aye to table resolution that anti-slavery provisions be included in California and New Mexico bills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aye to table Gott resolution to end slave trade in Washington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nay to suspend rules to introduce bill repealing all acts maintaining slavery in District of Columbia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aye to table Gidding’s anti-slavery resolutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aye to table Gott resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Nay to table Clayton compromise bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aye to table resolution against slavery in Mexican Cession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aye to table bill to have referendum in Washington on ending slave trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Nay to table motion to consider Gott resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Aye to table several resolutions in regard to slavery.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 13
TABLE 10*

WAR ISSUE: THIRTIETH CONGRESS
1847-1849

Figure 1
War Issue: Party Division, House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-War</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-War</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2
Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Pro-War</th>
<th>Anti-War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1234567891011</td>
<td>1234567891011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>xxxxxox x x</td>
<td>xx</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nay on resolution asking Polk for information on Santa Anna's return to Mexico.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nay on asking Polk for copy of Mexican peace treaty and his instructions to the peace commissioners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nay to suspend rules to receive resolution inquiring into Scott's removal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aye on referring to regiment bill to Committee of the Whole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nay on amendment declaring Polk began War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nay on tabling motion asserting that our troops should not retreat to a defensive line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aye on motion to suspend rules and take up 10 regiment bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aye on motion to end debate on war loan bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aye on suspending rules to receive a resolution of thanks to various Democratic generals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Nay on resolution to withdraw troops to Rio Grande.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Aye on passage of Loan bill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 14
TABLE 11*

IMPROVEMENTS ISSUE: THIRTIETH CONGRESS
1847-1849

Figure 1
Improvement Issue: Party Division, House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Improvement</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Improvement</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2
Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Pro-Improvement</th>
<th>Anti-Improvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>.12345678910</td>
<td>.12345678910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x x</td>
<td>xxxxxxx x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nay to table Missouri railroad grant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nay on motion to strike $50,000 appropriation for Savannah River from Civil and Diplomatic Appropriations bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nay on tabling favorable report on Rivers and Harbors improvement from Commerce committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aye on resolution from same committee that Congress should use its powers to improve rivers and harbors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aye on suspending rules to allow rivers and harbors bill to be read a third time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aye on passage of same bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aye on printing memorial of Chicago Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Nay on tabling resolution that Congress has the right to improve rivers and harbors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aye on same resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aye on similar resolution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 15
TABLE 12*

LAND ISSUE: THIRTY-FIRST CONGRESS
1849-1851

Figure 1
Land Issue: Party and Sectional Divisions, House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>Democrats No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>South No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal (0-1)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (2-3)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative (4-5)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2
Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>12345</td>
<td>12345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>xxx</td>
<td>xo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aye on motion to close debate on Bounty Land bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aye on similar motion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aye on motion to take up Land bill from Senate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aye to suspend rules to take up Land bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aye on passage of Bounty Land bill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 16
TABLE 13*

IMPROVEMENT ISSUE: THIRTY-FIRST CONGRESS
1849-1851

Figure 1
Improvement Issue: Party and Sectional Divisions, House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th></th>
<th>South</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Imp.</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Imp.</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2
Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Pro-Improvements</th>
<th>Anti-Improvements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>123456789</td>
<td>123456789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>xxxxx xxx</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nay to table Missouri railroad grant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nay to send Alabama railroad grant to Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nay to table St. Joseph-Hannibal railroad grant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aye to table reconsideration of Illinois-Central railroad grant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nay to table Illinois-Central bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nay to table Alabama railroad grant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aye on passage of Illinois-Central bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aye on passage of Lighthouse bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aye to bring the same bill from Committee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 17
TABLE 14*

SECTONAL ISSUE: THIRTY-FIRST CONGRESS
1849-1851

Figure 1
Sectional Issue: Sectional Division, House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>South No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-North (0-4)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (5-9)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-South (10-13)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2
Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Pro-North</th>
<th>Pro-South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>12345678910111213</td>
<td>12345678910111213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x x</td>
<td>xxxxxxxoxox x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aye on tabling Fugitive Slave bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nay on tabling appeal from speaker's ruling in favor of considering dividing California.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nay on reading Fugitive Slave bill third time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nay on passage of same.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aye on motion to instruct select Committee to prohibit slavery in Mexican Cession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nay on reconsidering vote defeating motion to create territories and protecting slavery therein.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nay on creating New Mexico territory without mentioning slavery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Nay on amendment to Slave Trade bill outlawing slave enticement to escape.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aye on passage of bill outlawing slave trade in Washington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Nay on making California boundary 36°30'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Nay on making Constitutional compromises re: slavery applicable in New Mexico.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nay to create territory of South California.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Aye on passage of California bill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 18
TABLE 15*

COMPROMISE ISSUE: THIRTY-FIRST CONGRESS
1849-1851

Figure 1
Compromise Issue: Sectional and Party Division, House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>Democrats No.</th>
<th>Democrats %</th>
<th>South No.</th>
<th>South %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Compromise (0-4)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (5-7)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Compromise (8-13)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2
Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Pro-Compromise</th>
<th>Anti-Compromise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>12345678910111213</td>
<td>12345678910111213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aye on reading the Texas boundary bill the third time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aye on passage of Utah territorial bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aye on third reading of Texas bill with New Mexico and Colorado territories included in it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aye on reconsidering vote sending Texas bill to committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aye on adding Utah and Colorado bills to Texas bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aye on reading Texas bill with amendments third time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aye to reconsider vote against reading Texas bill a third time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aye on upholding Speaker's decision to include New Mexico and Colorado in Texas bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nay on tabling Texas bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aye on resolving that Howell Cobb is elected Speaker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Aye on tabling appeal against Speaker's ruling to bring up Texas bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nay on rejecting Texas boundary bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Nay on tabling same bill including New Mexico and Colorado territories in it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 19
TABLE 16*

SECTIONAL ISSUE: THIRTY-SECOND CONGRESS
1851-1853

Figure 1
Sectional Issue: Party and Sectional Division, House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th></th>
<th>South</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Agitation (0-1)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (3-5)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Agitation (6-7)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2
Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Sectional Agitation...Non-Sectional Agitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1234567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1234567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>xxxxxxx</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nay on motion that all people should abide by the Fugitive Slave Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nay to put question on motion that there should be adherence to the Compromise measures and no further agitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nay to receive motion to recognize the compromises in the Constitution and abide by them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nay on motion declaring Compromise measures of 1850 a permanent settlement of slavery question.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aye to table motion that there should be no further agitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aye on the same motion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aye that House adjourn (while discussing anti-agitation motion).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 20
TABLE 17*

LAND ISSUE: THIRTY-SECOND CONGRESS
1851-1853

Figure 1
Land Issue: Party and Sectional Divisions, House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Type</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal (0-2)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (3-5)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative (6-7)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2
Andrew Johnson's Voting Position on Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1234567</td>
<td>1234567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>xxxxxxx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3
Key to Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nay to strike out all parts of land warrant bill except first section.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aye to agree to Conference version of same bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nay to adjourn rather than discuss Homestead bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aye on restoring homestead clauses to Homestead bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aye on passage of Homestead bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aye on restoring most clauses of Homestead bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nay on tabling Homestead bill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Footnote 21
Notes to Appendix A


2 Duncan Macrae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting, passim.

3 Ibid., passim.

4 For example: a "positive" position on a slavery scale would be an aggressive anti-slavery position. If there were a total of three votes, one could be "yea" for the abolition of slavery, "nay" for the prohibition of anti-slavery petitions in Congress, and "yea" to resolve that Congress has authority to legislate on the matter.

5 Figure 1: Table 4.13, Silbey, Shrine of Party, p. 61; Figure 2: Table 15, Silbey, "Congressional Voting," p. 422; Figure 3: Ibid., 423.

6 Figure 1: Table 5.5, Silbey, Shrine of Party, p. 74 (cited hereafter as S. P.); Figure 2: Table 21, Silbey, "Congressional Voting," p. 441 (hereafter cited as "C. V."); Figure 3: Ibid., 447.

7 Figure 1: Table 6.9, Silbey, S. P., p. 90; Figure 2: Table 34, Silbey, "C. V.," p. 501; Figure 3: Ibid., p. 497.

8 Figure 1: Table 5.11, Silbey, S. P., p. 90; Figure 2: Table 25, Silbey, "C. V.," p. 458; Figure 3: Ibid., p. 463.

9 Figure 1: Table 6.1, Silbey, S. P., p. 86; Figure 2: Table 27, Silbey, "C. V.," p. 469; Figure 3: Ibid., p. 471.

10 Figure 1: Table 5.1, Silbey, S. P., p. 71; Figure 2: Table 17, Silbey, "C. V.," p. 428; Figure 3: Ibid., p. 431.

11 Figure 1: Table 5.1, Silbey, S. P., p. 71; Figure 2: Table 33, Silbey, "C. V.," p. 441; Figure 3: Ibid., p. 431.

12 Figure 1: Table 5.2, Silbey, S. P., p. 72; Figure 2: Table 19, "C. V.," p. 434; Figure 3: Ibid., p. 438.

13 Figure 1: Tables 6.11 and 6.17, Silbey, S. P., pp. 92, 96; Figure 2: Table 36, Silbey, "C. V.," p. 506; Figure 3: Ibid., p. 510.

14 Figure 1: Table 6.2, Silbey, S. P., p. 86; Figure 2: Table 29, Silbey, "C. V.," p. 475; Figure 3: Ibid., p. 479.

15 Figure 1: Table 6.8, Silbey, S. P., p. 88; Figure 2: Table 32, Silbey, "C. V.," p. 417; Figure 3: Ibid., p. 489.
16 Figure 1: Tables 8.11 and 8.12, Silbey, S.P., p. 115; Figure 2: Table 41, Silbey, "C.V.,” p. 531; Figure 3: ibid., p. 533.

17 Figure 1: Tables 8.15, and 8.16, Silbey, S.P., p. 116; Figure 2: Table 42, Silbey, "C.V.,” p. 538; Figure 3: ibid., p. 539.

18 Figure 1: Table 8.4, Silbey, S.P., p. 111; Figure 2: Table 38, Silbey, "C.V.,” p. 517; Figure 3: ibid., p. 519.

19 Figure 1: Tables 8.8 and 8.9, Silbey, S.P., p. 113; Figure 2: Table 40, Silbey, "C.V.,” p. 522; Figure 3: ibid., p. 527.

20 Figure 1: Tables 9.1 and 9.2, Silbey, S.P., p. 124; Figure 2: Table 44, Silbey, "C.V.,” p. 545; Figure 3: ibid., p. 546.

21 Figure 1: Table 9.16, Silbey, S.P., p. 132; Figure 2: Table 52, Silbey, "C.V.,” p. 573; Figure 3: ibid., p. 577.