

THE DEVELOPMENT OF XENOPHON'S
POLITICAL IDEAS

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis traces the development of Xenophon's political ideas from his youth to old age. Special attention is given to statements of evaluation in the Hellenica concerning events that occurred in his lifetime. The basic attitudes and ideas of his other works are analysed and fitted into the chronological framework provided by the study of the Hellenica. Then we conclude that Xenophon's ideas were not static but changed to meet the immediate needs of the Greek states. The bases upon which his ideas are founded are two attitudes that are constantly in a tension. These are, on the one hand, an aristocratic admiration of the heroic warrior and, on the other, an attitude designated as philanthropia.

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ABBREVIATIONS

I Ancient Authors

<u>Ath. Pol.</u>	Aristotle, <u>Atheniensium Respublica.</u>
<u>de inv.</u>	Cicero, <u>de inventione.</u>
<u>Diog. Laert.</u>	Diogenes Laertius, <u>Vitae Philosophorum.</u>
<u>Pan.</u>	Isocrates, <u>Panegyricus.</u>
<u>Thuc.</u>	Thucydides, <u>Historia.</u>
<u>Anab.</u>	Xenophon, <u>Anabasis.</u>
<u>Cyn.</u>	Xenophon, <u>Cynegeticus.</u>
<u>Cyr.</u>	Xenophon, <u>Cyropaedia.</u>
<u>Hell.</u>	Xenophon, <u>Hellenica.</u>
<u>Mem.</u>	Xenophon, <u>Memorabilia.</u>
<u>Resp. Lac.</u>	Xenophon, <u>Respublica Lacedaemoniorum.</u>
<u>vect.</u>	Xenophon, <u>de vectigalibus.</u>

II Journals

<u>AJP</u>	<u>American Journal of Philology.</u>
<u>TAPA</u>	<u>American Philological Association Transactions</u> <u>and Proceedings.</u>
<u>APh</u>	<u>L'Année Philologique.</u>
<u>JAW</u>	<u>Bursian's Jahresbericht.</u>
<u>Class. et Med.</u>	<u>Classica et Mediaevalia.</u>
<u>Class. Journ.</u>	<u>Classical Journal.</u>
<u>Class. Phil.</u>	<u>Classical Philology.</u>
<u>Class. Rev.</u>	<u>Classical Review.</u>
<u>Class. Wor.</u>	<u>Classical World (=Classical Weekly).</u>

<u>JHS</u>	<u>Journal of Hellenic Studies.</u>
<u>Mus. Hel.</u>	<u>Museum Helveticum.</u>
<u>REG</u>	<u>Revue des Etudes greques.</u>
<u>Rhein. Mus.</u>	<u>Rheinisches Museum.</u>
<u>Wien. Stud.</u>	<u>Wiener Studien.</u>

INTRODUCTION

Any attempt to understand and to evaluate the work of an author must consider the age in which he lived and the society that influenced him. Such is the case with Xenophon. The lack of appeal that he has for our age¹ exists, I believe, because he has been dealt with in an uncritical manner. Xenophon has often been censured because he is moralistic, shallow and prejudiced.² Most scholars of our times have arbitrarily and unsympathetically compared him with their own likes and dislikes and failed to notice the influence of the society in which he lived and his experiences upon him. It is in this vein that H. J. Rose writes:

For great is not the word to use of Xenophon. In him, a mind which it would be flattery to call second-rate and a character hide-bound with convention attain somehow to a very respectable

¹One need only examine the indices of any classical publication during the past ten years to notice the dearth of articles on Xenophon in comparison with the large number of his works.

²E.g., J. B. Bury, The Ancient Greek Historians, 153, and C. M. Bowra, Ancient Greek Literature, 147. For full bibliographical data see pages 106-117.

literary expression and are presented with at least two subjects on which it is nearly impossible to be wholly dull.³

Judgments of such a kind presuppose that the scholar's own system of values is in some way better than Xenophon's. This is an assumption that cannot be proved. Another approach seeks rather to understand Xenophon in the light of the society in which he lived. Inquiry must be made into the events that took place during his lifetime and consideration given to ideas and attitudes of his contemporaries in order to determine what the major issues of his day were and what may have been the questions with which he was confronted. Only when it is clear to what questions he addressed himself can we begin to understand how Xenophon's ideas changed and developed. Since Xenophon's lifetime covered a span of approximately seventy-five years, it is probable that the politically important questions of his age will have undergone some change. Xenophon's answers will undoubtedly have varied with the modification or the recasting of political views and the eventful life that he lived. This work attempts to understand the contrasting political ideas of Xenophon that are found in his work in the light of his generation and his experiences. That these contrasting ideas were not haphazardly assumed but were part of a particular view of life and therefore deliberately espoused at different times will, I hope, also be demonstrated.

³H. J. Rose, A Handbook of Greek Literature, 305.

The desirability of such a study arises from the growing tendency among scholars⁴ to find in the writings of Xenophon and particularly in the Hellenica subjective accounts of events. Much of his narrative assumes that the reader of his day had previous knowledge of Xenophon's ideas as expressed in other works. Some attempts have been made to set forth what is known as "Xenophon's political idealism."⁵ An attempt of this kind is, however, not sufficient since it assumes that Xenophon's ideas remained static and that they are fully and comprehensively expressed in the Cyropaedia. The following pages will give a wider scope to Xenophon's political views.

⁴E.g., H. R. Breitenbach, Xenophon von Athen, 1656 - 1701, and Peter Kräfft, "Vier Beispiele des Xenophontischen in Xenophons Hellenika," Rhein. Mus., CX (1967), 103-150.

⁵W. Weathers, "Xenophon's Political Idealism," Class. Journ., XLIX (1953-54), 317-321.

CHAPTER 1

XENOPHON'S EARLY LIFE

Xenophon was born in Attica in the deme of Erchia¹ about 430 B.C.² He grew up amidst the exaltation and the anguish that Athens experienced during the Peloponnesian War. He saw the political confrontation between the democrats and the oligarchs. He noticed how the mob could be swayed against the advice of a man like Pericles by the oratory of a demagogue like Cleon or Alcibiades³ so that the Athenians refused peace in 425, undertook the expedition against Syracuse in 415 and eventually brought ruin upon the great city of Athens. The continuing trials of Athens after 415 caused deep resentment among those who bore the burden of taxation and who saw decisions being made for them by others. To the question "Why is Athens losing the war?" the answer was often given that it was the fault of the political system in which the demos was easily swayed and turned to what was

¹Diog. Laert., 2, 48.

²Anab., III, 1, 25 and 2, 37. Both passages indicate that Xenophon took part in Cyrus' march when he was either too young to be elected strategos or had just reached the minimum age of thirty. O. Gigon, Kommentar zum Ersten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien, 106, places Xenophon's birthdate in the year 441/0 B.C., following Apollodorus, although he questions the grounds upon which the date is based (cf. F. Jacoby, Frag. gr. Hist., no. 244, comm. to frag. 343).

³Thuc., IV 15-23; VI, 9-15.

readily at hand.⁴ Although we do not know whether Xenophon took part in the resulting oligarchic revolution in 411 we suspect that he came from a home that was oligarchic in sympathy because he belonged to the class of knights (for the hippeis supported the oligarchs both in 411 and in 404/3). Later he considered himself a candidate for the position of strategos.⁵ In 409/8 he probably accompanied the Athenian expedition that undertook the siege of Chalcedon and in 406 he participated in the seabattle at Arginusae.⁶

In the oligarchic revolution in 404/3 he served in the cavalry under the guidance of the Eleven.⁷ That he could support the bloodshed and exiles of that year indicates how thoroughly he must have been disillusioned with the demos.

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⁴Thuc., I, 20, 1 and 3.

⁵Anab. III, 2, 37 (certainly an easier position to obtain if one had been prominent through birth or political activity).

⁶Hell. I, 4, 25 and 35. The conclusion is based on the fullness of the description given and on the theory that much of the narrative is basically Xenophon's eye-witness account.

⁷Hell. II, 3, 12 indicates Xenophon's sympathy for the early work of the Thirty. His ability as a cavalryman is clear from his works de equitandi ratione and de equitum magistro. He mentions that he rode during the return from the Anabasis (Anab. III, 3, 19; VII, 8, 6). Finally his description of the cavalry's activity under the Thirty is very full; Hell. II 4, 2-10 and 24-26. In fact the description of the year of the Thirty occupies half as much space as the account of the previous six years together. See W. P. Henry, Greek Historical Writing, 73.

It was during these years of crisis and political turmoil that Socrates became eminent. The association of Critias and Alcibiades with Socrates before they achieved political prominence (or notoriety) had created great animosities between the demos and those who had a reputation for wisdom. The hatred and fear of oligarchy in any form that were rife in Athens after 403 extended to the social and intellectual circles from which the extremists had sprung. The relationship of the extreme oligarchs with the Sophists, and also with Socrates, was widely known among the people of Athens but greatly misunderstood.⁸ As a result, Socrates was associated indiscriminately with all the attributes of the Sophists. Hence, he appeared to some as a friend of the aristocrats, a despiser of the common people, a corrupter of morals and an atheist. Xenophon also experienced something of this hostility, for he had supported the oligarchs. Furthermore, a personal relationship existed between Xenophon and Socrates.⁹

It is as a result of these factors that the Cynegeticus (the earliest of his works¹⁰) contains his strong castigation of

⁸Mem. I, 2, 16.

⁹Cicero, de inv. I, 31, 5 quotes the Socratic Aeschines in a passage that links Xenophon and his wife with Socrates. Xenophon himself both in Mem. I, 3, 8-13 and in Anab. III, 1, 5-7 makes a point of his relationship with Socrates.

¹⁰The evidence for considering this work early in origin is given by H. Richards, "The Hellenics of Xenophon," Class. Rev., XV (1901) 197-203, and "The Minor Works of Xenophon," Class. Rev., XII (1898) 285-292; J. Mewaldt, "Die Composition des Xenophontischen Kynegetikos," Hermes, XLVI (1911) 70-92.

the Sophists.¹¹ The majority claim to lead the young to virtue but they do the opposite. They write books that offer empty pleasures to the young but contain no ἀρετή. Concerning their style Xenophon says that τὰ μὲν ῥήματα αὐτοῖς ἐξήπτηται, γινώμαι δὲ ὁρθῶς ἔχουσαι ... οὐδαμοῦ .¹² Then he seeks to align himself with the people of his own day when he says, φέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοὺς νῦν σοφιστὰς καὶ οὐ [τοὺς] φιλοσόφους, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς νοήμασι .¹³ He is expressing an attitude that is the antithesis of his attitude to the Sophist Gorgias, as he enunciates it in the Anabasis.¹⁴ For Proxenus as a pupil of Gorgias seems to have displayed some rather lofty ideals and qualities in his quest for fame, power and wealth. The explanation for the expression of Xenophon's attitude toward the Sophists in the Cynegeticus is of a two-fold nature. First, I think that he actually felt some antagonism toward those who appeared wise and, for a fee, surrounded themselves with pupils, in direct contrast to Socrates, who asked nothing of other men except a willingness to engage in discussion. These are the men who ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται καὶ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς νοήμασιν . Those whom Xenophon called Sophists ἐπὶ τῷ ἐξαπατᾶν λέγουσι καὶ γράφουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἑαυτῶν κέρδει, ... οὐδὲ γὰρ σοφὸς αὐτῶν ἐγένετο οὐδεὶς¹⁵

¹¹ Cyn. 13,1.

¹² Cyn. 13,3.

¹³ Ibid., 6.

¹⁴ Anab. II, 2, 6, 16-20.

¹⁵ Cyn. 13,8.

Xenophon identified himself with οἱ πολλοί to gain their attention and sympathy in order that he might reveal the second reason for his castigation of the Sophists. He wished to rectify the misunderstanding that had arisen concerning the relationship of Socrates to himself and others of oligarchic sympathy against whom there was obvious hostility, in spite of the general amnesty that had been declared after the restoration of the democracy in 403¹⁶, and direct this hostility where he thought it belonged--against the demagogues. To this end he concludes his harangue against the Sophists as follows: τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν σοφιστῶν παραγγέλματα παραινῶ φυλάττεσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐνθυμήματα μὴ ἀτιμάζειν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ σοφιστὰὶ πλουσίους καὶ νέους θηρῶνται, οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι πᾶσι κοινοὶ καὶ φίλοι .¹⁷ He here attempts to make a simple distinction by means of which the common people of Athens may clearly identify who are their real foes and who are not. Furthermore, since Xenophon was associated with Socrates, who according to Xenophon's definition could not be considered a Sophist, the hostility that had arisen after 404/3 against the social and intellectual circle in which Xenophon moved might be diverted elsewhere. This was the extent of his defence against the hostility of the general public. Never did he try to hide his high regard for the true philosopher or deny his relationship with him.

¹⁶Hell. II, 4, 43.

¹⁷Cyn. 13, 9.

This brings us face to face with the problem of what this relationship was. If one considers the account of Socrates' behaviour as Xenophon gives it in the Memorabilia, two characteristics become evident. First, it has an extraordinary emphasis on the religious nature of Socrates' conduct.¹⁸ In these religious references several scholars¹⁹ have found a thematic and rhetorical arrangement that serves as the framework within which we see Socrates actively engaged in improving the people with whom he comes in contact. This is the second characteristic of Xenophon's account. Socrates is constantly described with the words οὕτως ὠφελεῖν ἐδόκει μοι τοὺς σύνόντας.²⁰ When one considers this statement in relation to the dialogue with Aristippus,²¹ where the main point is that whether something is καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν is relative to whether it is εὐχρηστον it quickly becomes apparent that Socrates is exemplary in his behaviour.²² What is relative can best be taught by example. Therefore Socrates engages in

¹⁸Mem. I, 1, 1-9, 20; I 3, 1-4; I, 4, 2-19; III, 8, 10;

III, 9, 15; IV, 3, 2-18; IV, 6, 1-5; IV, 7, 6, and 10; IV, 8, 1-11.

¹⁹Ivo Bruns, Das Literarische Porträt der Griechen, 361-378; H. Erbse, "Die Architektonik im Aufbau von Xenophons Memorabilien, "Hermes, LXXXIX (1961), 257-287; O. Gigon, Kommentar zum Ersten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien and Kommentar zum Zweiten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien, passim.

²⁰Mem. I, 3, 1; I, 4, 1; II, 1, 1; III, 1, 1; IV, 1, 1;

²¹Mem. III, 8, 1-7.

²²Mem. I, 2, 17; I, 2, 1; I, 5, 6; IV, 1, 1.

making good soldiers, good citizens and good people by νομίζων καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων.²³ In this usefulness Socrates became noble and good. From these two distinctive features of the work I think it necessary to conclude that in the Memorabilia Xenophon considered the formal charges brought against Socrates at his trial of grave importance.

When one compares this attitude toward his trial with that of Plato in the Apology the dissimilitude is at once obvious. In the latter account hostility against Socrates arose not from impiety or corrupting the youth (as the formal charge stated) but from his relationship to the leading political men of the city.²⁴ He had incurred their hatred (and along with this the prejudice of the majority of the citizens)²⁵ by revealing their lack of wisdom through questioning and cross-examination. What Socrates' role had been in the state and what it would continue to be if he remained alive ~~were~~ depicted by the example of the fly that arouses a big and well-bred but lethargic horse to action.²⁶ In the midst of this hostile setting, Socrates twice came to the city's attention, once when he opposed the illegal trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae and later when contrary to

²³Mem. II, 10, 6; II, 9, 4.

²⁴Plato, Apology, 21B-22A; 29C-30B.

²⁵Plato, Apology, 28B.

²⁶Ibid., 30E, 31A.

the orders of the Thirty he refused to bring Leon the Salaminian to be put to death.²⁷ Plato then makes Socrates' political activity the main source of Athens' enmity toward him and, indirectly, of his death.

This delineation of Socrates' behaviour seems to agree at least in part with the quibbling character whom Aristophanes lampoons in the Clouds.²⁸ Xenophon himself gives some credence to the Platonic portrayal in that he considers the opposition of Socrates to the trial of generals worthy of mention in his historical narrative.²⁹ Even in the Memorabilia Xenophon repeats the account of Socrates' behaviour in public office³⁰ but then passes on hurriedly to other things. It seems reasonable, then, to assume that he was aware of another view of the trial of Socrates and that he deliberately chose to give his portrayal the emphasis denoted above.

The question why religion plays such an important part in the Memorabilia becomes even more perplexing when one notes that some of Xenophon's early work³¹ is written without reference to

²⁷Plato, Apology, 32A-E.

²⁸Aristophanes, Clouds, 143-168.

²⁹Hell. I, 7, 15. For the latest discussion concerning the problems that arise from comparison of the various accounts of these events see Henry, Greek Historical Writing, 100 - 107.

³⁰Mem. IV, 4, 1-4.

³¹Cynegeticus; de equitandi ratione; de equitum magistro.

the gods. Among these the Hellenica reveals the most startling tendency because in Books one and two he ignores religious ritual (e.g. sacrifices before a campaign) but from the beginning of Book three such matters are mentioned with increasing frequency. Thus he displays a growing awareness of the role of religion in Greek society. Furthermore Anabasis, VII, 8, 5, indicates that Xenophon made some sort of return to the paternal gods.³² The date of writing of the Memorabilia (see infra 52) is long after the year 399/8, when the change in Xenophon's religious attitudes is supposed to have taken place. Hence it seems reasonable to hope that in the essence of his religion we shall find some reason for the emphasis in the portrayal of Socrates.

The opportunity to express his religious conception in his own way was given to him at Scyllus.³³ Here, having been granted an estate by the Spartans, he purchased a sacred precinct that he made of special importance to the surrounding Greek peoples by financing a religious festival with the produce taken from the land. Part of the ritual was a hunt organized by Xenophon's sons; and others, οἱ βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες, joined in.³⁴ The religious activity of Xenophon then provided the neighbourhood with an opportunity to meet in a social and festive atmosphere. No doubt people attending the Olympic games also visited Xenophon.³⁵ Thus

³²It is interesting to note that on this occasion he sacrifices to Zeus Μετρίχιος, "the soother," "the kind one."

³³Anab. V, 3, 7-13.

³⁴Anab. V, 3, 10.

³⁵Anab. V, 3, 7.

Xenophon could see near at hand how the pan-Hellenic religious festivals fostered the sense of Greek community and identity. It was here that the Olympic spirit worked for concord and fellow-feeling. As Gilbert Murray says with reference to the fifth century, "It is, after all, a good deal to say, that in Greek history we find almost no warring of sects, no mutual tortures or even blasphemies."³⁶ In the Olympian religion, without roots in any particular soil, Xenophon found a most powerful auxiliary in bringing about Greek harmony, for each state could find some aspect of the individual god's worship with which it could identify and on which it could project its own conceptions and so feel that it fitted in with things Greek.

In the Memorabilia itself we find at least two passages that seem in accord with the ideas expressed above. In the first,³⁷ Xenophon tells the story of how the Priestess, in answer to the question how it was necessary to act concerning sacrifices or ancestral cults or other such things, replied that one should act νόμῳ πόλεως. While the story itself may well illustrate the political astuteness of Delphi in maintaining a non-sectarian nature, it is told by the author to show that Socrates' religious behaviour was in accord with this attitude.

The second passage³⁸ has been exhaustively dealt with by

³⁶G. Murray, Five Stages of Greek Religion, 70.

³⁷Mem. I, 3, 1.

³⁸Mem. III, 8, 10.

Gunnar Rudberg.³⁹ In his discussion he points out how this statement with its certainty of tone and its interest in the physical universe stands in contrast to the usual hesitancy and ideological concern of Socrates in other Socratic works. He then goes on to suggest that this passage is an example of an author imposing on Socrates, the epitome of wisdom, a typically Hellenic attitude--in this instance, in the sphere of religion. Thus Xenophon has given expression to a common Greek notion through the mouth of Socrates.

To sum up, then, we must say that the remarkable religious stress of Xenophon's Socratic writing is found not because of Socrates's influence on our author but rather because the views of the author have in some instances been placed in the mouth of Socrates. In fact Xenophon's awareness of the importance and function of religion in Greek society comes after the death of Socrates and is intimately connected with the author's political ideas (see infra 57). The presentation of Socrates as an exemplary individual is probably a similar mixture of idealism and historical reality. Therefore Xenophon took the formal charges against Socrates seriously because thus he could best express what he considered to be important attitudes and aspirations. Xenophon has consciously deployed his material to present to us an exemplary figure with particular emphasis on his religious nature since this was in harmony with Xenophon's political ideas.

³⁹G. Rudberg, "Tempel und Altar bei Xenophon," Symbolae Osloenses, XVIII (1938), 1-8. On the other hand O. Gigon, "Xenophontea," Eranos, (1946) 131-152 points out what he considers to be the core of historical Socratic dialogue.

Perhaps the most significant political influence that affected Xenophon in his youth was the work of Thucydides. Thucydides was, as a result of family-background, oligarchic and anti-democratic. He had experienced exile because of what the demos considered failure. M. F. McGregor⁴⁰ has pointed out that, while Thucydides could admire a great man (Pericles) in political office in a democratic state, he reserved and maintained

⁴⁰M. F. McGregor, "The Politics of the Historian Thucydides," Phoenix, X (1956), 93-102. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, "The Character of the Athenian Empire," Historia, III (1954), 1-41 (particularly 31-37), anticipates much that McGregor says in his article. H. D. F. Kitto, Poiesis, 313, writes that it would be small-minded to say simply (because of Thuc. VIII, 97, 2): "Thucydides was anti-democratic." But then he goes on to postulate (339) that a large group of Thucydidean generalisations in the speeches revolve around the uncertainty of the future. On page 342 he writes that these generalisations (e.g., IV, 65, 4) "resemble outcrops of rock which indicate the presence below the surface of a continuous stratum. They are part of what Thucydides himself is thinking." Thus he uses a method much more tenuous than McGregor's in ascribing to Thucydides what is most certainly a conservative attitude. Finally, we should note that John H. Finley Jr., Thucydides, 28-33, gives a synthesis of the two points of view outlined above by suggesting that Thucydides, a democrat in his youth, gradually became a disillusioned conservative in old age.

a distrust of the democratic system, which caused him to express certain brief but pregnant remarks concerning τὸ πλῆθος. It was this same reasoned distrust of democracy that led him to evaluate the first days of government under the moderate oligarchy of the Five Thousand as a time when οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες.⁴¹ This was the man who was still living during Xenophon's youth; whom Xenophon must have read carefully; and whom he tried to emulate by continuing the history of Athens and Sparta where Thucydides left off. Some scholars even think that they worked together for some time before Thucydides died.⁴²

That both were of the same intellectual circle and attached to men of similar policies is perceptible when one considers for a moment the comments that they make concerning a number of their contemporaries who are linked politically. Thucydides writes of Antiphon as the man who devised the overthrow of the democracy by the council of the Five Thousand.⁴³ Later he most ably (ἄριστα) defended himself in his alliance with the Four Hundred. Finally Thucydides describes him as a man inferior to no one of the Athenians of his own day in ἀρετή.

⁴¹Thuc. VIII, 97, 2.

⁴²F. E. Adcock, Thucydides and his History, 98-100. For the latest discussion concerning this theory see W. P. Henry, Greek Historical Writing, 74-81.

⁴³Thuc. VIII, 68, 1-2.

In the Hellenica the account of the trial and death of Theramenes⁴⁴ for opposing the more extreme policies of Critias evokes from Xenophon a statement of admiration because Theramenes displayed τὸ φρόνιμον even in death.⁴⁵ Theramenes links his own condemnation with that of three others--Leon the Salaminian; Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and Antiphon.⁴⁶ A little later he places himself in the political party that opposes Thrasybulus, Anytus and Alcibiades,⁴⁷ who rely on the political support of τὸ πλῆθος. Xenophon thus approves of an attitude towards the demos similar to that expressed by Thucydides. That both give approval to people of the same circle indicates that Thucydides and Xenophon, in his early days, were of a similar political orientation.

This brings us to the question raised above of Thucydides' direct influence on Xenophon. W. P. Henry has attacked the idea that Xenophon wrote a continuation of Thucydides⁴⁸ because this theory has hindered scholars from considering his work as an

⁴⁴Hell. II, 3, 15-56. Cf. Aristotle, Ath. Pol., 28, 5; 33-37. Lysias, 12, 66, and possibly Thucydides, VIII, 89, 2 indicate a different attitude to Theramenes. Raphael Sealey, "The Revolution of 411 B.C.," in Essays in Greek Politics, 111-133, questions the whole concept of loyalty to a political party or group.

⁴⁵Hell. II, 3, 56.

⁴⁶Hell. II, 3, 38-40.

⁴⁷Hell. II, 3, 42.

⁴⁸Greek Historical Writing, 14-54.

expression of its author and, therefore, studying it for what it says. This attack is necessary since it does seem a somewhat extreme assumption to expect a carbon-copy of Thucydides in the Hellenica. Nevertheless one should not be hesitant about seeing the influence of Thucydides in some part of Xenophon's work since this need not detract from appreciation of the author--in fact, it may show his good sense.

Thus I see nothing unlikely in believing that Xenophon did indeed make use of certain conventions of Thucydides (e.g., ἀρχομένου χειμῶνος, ἀρχομένου τοῦ θέρους; and to these we might add citations of the ephor at Sparta, and archon at Athens).⁴⁹ If Xenophon uses these conventions inconsistently this is in no sense proof that he denies "at every turn there is any connection between his own and the history of Thucydides."⁵⁰

Let us, however, revert to Xenophon and see what he says about historical writing. The first passage where Xenophon indicates some criteria reads as follows:

καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἄγνοῶ, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀποφθέγματα
οὐκ ἀξιόλογα, ἐκείνο δὲ κρίνω τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαστόν,
τὸ τοῦ θανάτου παρεστηκότος μήτε τὸ φρόνιμον
μήτε τὸ παιγνιῶδες ἀπολιπεῖν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς.⁵¹

The words ταῦτα ἀποφθέγματα refer to the entire account of the condemnation and death of Theramenes. His apology results from

⁴⁹ H. R. Breitenbach, Xenophon von Athen, 1656-1658, outlines the chronological references. For mention of ephors and archons see Hell. I, 3, 1; I, 6, 1; II, 1,10; II, 3, 1. Cf. Thuc. II, 1 and 2.

⁵⁰W. P. Henry, Greek Historical Writing, 54.

an awareness that they are not noteworthy (ἀξιόλογα). Thus he implies that there are some established criteria for historical writing to which he still adheres in part. In using μέν and δέ he further indicates that there exists in his mind a tension between established criteria that he has learned and a natural inclination within himself.

The next passage that we shall consider sheds further light on what these criteria might be. It reads in part as follows:

γινώσκω μὲν οὖν ὅτι ἐν τούτοις οὔτε
δαπάνημα οὔτε κίνδυνον οὔτε μηχανήμα
ἀξιόλογον οὐδὲν διηγοῦμαι.... τοῦτο γὰρ
ἤδη πολλῶν καὶ χρημάτων καὶ κινδύνων
ἀξιολογώτατον ἀνδρὸς ἔργον ἐστίν.⁵²

Here it becomes quite plain that according to usual criteria the noteworthy subjects in history are great expenditure (δαπάνημα), danger (κίνδυνος) and strategy (μηχανήμα). Furthermore, Xenophon candidly records his growing opposition to these established criteria through the use of the superlative ἀξιολογώτατον.

The last passage adds some further detail. Xenophon writes:

ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῶν μὲν μεγάλων πόλεων, εἴ τι
καλὸν ἔπραξαν, ἅπαντες οἱ συγγραφεῖς
μέμνηνται. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴ τις
μικρὰ πόλεις οὔσα πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα
διαπέπρακται, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἄξιον εἶναι ἀποφαίνειν.⁵³

⁵¹Hell. II, 3, 56.

⁵²Hell. V, 1, 4.

⁵³Hell. VII, 2, 1.

This passage was written after 366, for it serves as an introduction to an account of the activities of the people of Phlius. Here it becomes evident that according to these criteria approved by [#]ἅπαντες οἱ συγγραφεῖς the usual participants in a historical account are great cities. Here, also, Xenophon declares that his is a still more worthy (ἔτι μᾶλλον ἄξιον) subject for historical writing than that of other writers. We can now conclude from our investigation that for Xenophon the concept of what was noteworthy governed his choice of historical material and that as he interpreted this concept for himself he was gradually forced to oppose the traditional selection of subject matter--namely, great cities making great expenditures, enduring great dangers and inventing new strategy.

Where did this concept of noteworthiness come from? Who first used as subject matter for history great cities making great expenditures? We turn to the opening chapter of Thucydides:

... ἄρξάμενος εὐθὺς καθισταμένου καὶ ἐλπίσας
 μέγαν τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγε-
 γενημένων, τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι ἀκμάζοντές τε ἦσαν
 ἐς αὐτὸν ἀμφότεροι παρασκευῇ τῇ πάσι
 κίνησις γὰρ αὕτη μεγίστη δὴ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν
 ἐγένετο καὶ μέρει τινὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ὥς
 δὲ εἶπεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων. ⁵⁴

⁵⁴Thuc. I, 1, 1, 2.

Again we read:

τούτου δὲ τοῦ πολέμου μῆκος τε μέγα προύβη,
παθήματά τε ξυνηνέχθη γενέσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ
Ἑλλάδι οἷα οὐχ ἕτερα ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ .⁵⁵

The ideas that recur are remarkably familiar. The work is to be the historical narrative of a war that is the most noteworthy of all that have taken place. This is why the author undertook to recount what happened. What makes the events noteworthy in the eyes of the author is that both cities at the height of their power (*ἀκμάζοντες*) entered a war that was very long, brought great sufferings into Greece and affected a great part of mankind (indirectly, then, great expenditures, great dangers and much strategy; cf. *Thuc.* I, 18, 3.) There seems little doubt that Thucydides influenced Xenophon both implicitly and explicitly in what he writes in his historical narrative.

Finally an amplification of Xenophon's political views, closely linked to his early experience, is also found in the *Cynegeticus*. One of the most obvious attitudes that Xenophon displays in this work is his commitment to a society engaged in a war-effort. Man may engage in the sport of hunting for his enjoyment and exercise but its chief result is to train people for war:

⁵⁵*Thuc.* I, 23, 1.

ὠφελήσονται δ' οἱ ἐπιθυμήσαντες τούτου
 τοῦ ἔργου πολλά· ὑγίειάν τε γὰρ τοῖς
 σώμασι παρασκευάζει καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν
 μᾶλλον, γηράσκειν δὲ ἥττον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς
 τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα παιδεύει. ⁵⁶

Xenophon had experienced nothing but external and internal strife during the early years of his life. Military force seemed to be the most vital concern for a state at war. If a man could not fight he was of little use to the state. Hunting was the first pursuit that a young man should take up⁵⁷ since it could best inculcate valour in young men and make them ἀρίστους.⁵⁸ Training in hunting would make men serviceable to their fellow-citizens and particularly fit for war.⁵⁹

Clearly, then, by the time Xenophon made his first literary attempt certain political attitudes had begun to crystallize as a result of his family background, intellectual association and early experience. There was a preoccupation with war and an emphasis on direct physical involvement. Political activity also required that attention be given to philosophy and to the wise men of the state. Although relating politics with philosophy engendered certain hostile associations in the minds of the populace, this union, he felt, must be expounded

⁵⁶Cyn. 12,1.

⁵⁷Cyn. 2,1.

⁵⁸Ibid., 12, 7-9.

⁵⁹Ibid., 13, 11.

and defended. The gradual depletion through execution of the intellectual circle to which Xenophon belonged revealed the grim necessity for creating an atmosphere of harmony and self-control in order to achieve a stable political system. His association with people like Thucydides (whose views he must have known rather well in order to be able to consciously forsake them when he grew older) and Socrates influenced him toward what must be regarded as a conservative approach to political problems.

CHAPTER II
XENOPHON IN THE PRIME OF LIFE

After the revolution in 404/3 the hatred of the demos for all the supporters of oligarchy and the social and intellectual circles from which they arose blazed forth into renewed fighting when the Thirty and their supporters in Eleusis began to hire mercenaries. It was at this point that all the forces of democratic Athens took the field and when they had called the generals of the oligarchic faction to a conference they killed them and persuaded the others through relatives and friends to return to Athens and live together under a democratic government.¹ Clearly the demos had, at this point, gained the upper hand in Athens and it must have been a very uncomfortable place in which to live for those who had formerly been the active supporters of oligarchy.

Aristotle indicates that after the general amnesty: (1) many intended to migrate (καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἐπινοοῦντων ἐξοικεῖν) but were foiled in the attempt to register; 2) there was a movement against the members of the oligarchic party: (τις ἤρξατο τῶν κατεληλυθότων μνησικακεῖν) that was quietly suppressed. Thus one can rightly assume that there was a general distrust of the amnesty or a refusal to work with democracy among those who had supported the oligarchs. That Xenophon can rightly be considered in this number is shown by his attitudes toward Athens that he displays in his early work (see infra29). The movement against

¹Hell. II, 4, 43. Cf. Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 40.

the oligarchic party after the amnesty, although put down, would only have increased the suspicion with which the conservatives viewed the general amnesty.

As a result Xenophon was quick to leave Athens and join his friend Proxenus to take part in the events that he describes in the Anabasis. The eagerness with which Xenophon joined this campaign is demonstrated by the discussion with Socrates.² He suggested that Xenophon inquire at Delphi whether he should go with Proxenus. Xenophon, however, did not even question whether he should go or not, but only to what gods he should sacrifice in order to return successfully. That Xenophon showed such eagerness to go on the expedition, in spite of the warning of Socrates that this journey might give the Athenians grounds to accuse him of ^{being} philo-Laconian, indicates how desirous he was of leaving Athens.

Perhaps the passage that most clearly sets forth why Xenophon left Athens comes in the Anabasis.³ Proxenus extended to Xenophon the invitation to join the expedition (and Proxenus was a very upright and outstanding person).⁴ Then Pheidias had added a promise that carried a definite appeal for Xenophon.

ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ, εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον αὐτὸν Κύρῳ ποιήσιν

ὃν αὐτὸς ἔφη κρείττω ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος. ⁵

There is an indication here that Xenophon was interested in individuals who were prominent in the ancient world. Thus to

²Anab. III, 1, 5-7.

³Anab. III, 1, 4-10.

⁴Anab. III, 1, 4.

⁵Anab. III, 1, 10. Cf. Anab. I, 9, 17.

become acquainted with Cyrus was one of the motivating factors in the decision to go to Sardis. There Xenophon must also have been affected by Cyrus the Younger, for he says that when they reached Cilicia it seemed clear that the attack was directed against the King. Then he adds:

φοβούμενοι δὲ τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ ἄκοντες ὅμως οἱ πολλοὶ

δι' αἰσχύνην καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ Κύρου συνηκολούθησαν.⁶

This statement implies that the Greeks' decision to continue the march was to some extent related to their regard for Cyrus. Then the author of the Anabasis continues: ὧν εἷς καὶ Ξενοφῶν ἦν. Proxenus' judgment that Cyrus was of more concern to him than was his native state seems to indicate that the entire narrative may be viewed as an account of the alternatives open to Xenophon. The final statement reveals that Xenophon's concern with the great individual already was an influencing factor in political decisions that he made as early as 400 B.C.

Xenophon gives further insight into what motivated the soldiers (of whom he has said he was one) in a later passage.

τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν οἱ πλείστοι ἦσαν οὐ

σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες ἐπὶ ταύτην

τὴν μισθοφοράν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν

ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας ἄγοντες,

οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανηλωκότες χρήματα, . . .⁷

Thus a portion of the men who were mobilized under Cyrus were not without means. In fact some even spent money to go on the

⁶Anab. III, 1, 10. Cf. Anab. I, 9, 17.

⁷Anab. VI, 4, 8.

expedition because they had heard of the military excellence (ἀρετή) of Cyrus.⁸ There seems to have been a desire for an experience here that was different from the ordinary since people actually spent money to engage in warfare on the side that they thought would be victorious. The desire for adventure was another important motivating factor among those joining the expedition.

Monetary considerations may also have influenced Xenophon to leave Athens. The Peloponnesian War had drained the city of its wealth. In addition the oligarchic revolution and its later overthrow had caused its supporters further economic hardship. On the other hand reports indicated that other people had fared well in the service of Cyrus.⁹ As a result, Xenophon says, some men had gone on this expedition ὡς χρήματ' αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἤξοντες πάλιν. That Xenophon belonged to this group is possible since he himself had to sell his horse upon reaching the Hellespont because of lack of finances.¹⁰ In fact, the behaviour of the entire mercenary army upon reaching the Hellespont seems to be dictated by the possibility of obtaining plunder and wealth.¹¹

⁸"Military excellence," because we are dealing with the thoughts of mercenaries who would be concerned with war.

⁹Anab. VI, 4, 8.

¹⁰Anab. VII, 8, 6.

¹¹Anab. VI, 6, 37, 38. The Greek army's involvement with Seuthes seems to be motivated mainly by monetary considerations; Anab. VII, 2, 10-38.

The opportunity of a journey to Asia Minor, then, provided Xenophon with an escape from the hostility of his fellow Athenians and with the possibility of making the acquaintance of a man of his time whom some considered great.

As Xenophon returned through the fertile territory of northern Mesopotamia he noted the richness of the land and the great quantity of food that had been harvested during the autumn of 401.¹² He recognized with what ease these possessions could be taken from the Persians and, remembering the Battle of Cunaxa, he became aware of the obvious superiority of the Greek armies.¹³ As he realized that the strength of most barbarian armies lay in Greek mercenaries, Xenophon must have been vividly aware of the tragedy of Greek dissention. He saw the betrayal of Greeks to the Persians by a Greek, Phalinus, bought by promises of wealth and power;¹⁴ he saw the constant factional strife based on regional loyalties among the Greeks themselves¹⁵ and, gradually, he comprehended the need for unity among all Greeks¹⁶ if they were not to become the victims of their own concept of political freedom.

Another result of the excursion into Persia was a broadening of interest in mankind in general. As he travelled he

¹²Anab. II, 3, 14-16.

¹³Anab. III, 2, 14-16.

¹⁴Anab. II, 1, 7-10.

¹⁵Anab. V, 6, 25.

¹⁶Anab. III, 1, 38. Cf. III, 2, 29-32.

perceived something of Herodotus' interest in the customs of various peoples¹⁷ and as a result he noted the distinctive peculiarities of various tribes--the pierced ears of the Lydians,¹⁸ the dances of the Paphlagonians,¹⁹ the sexual attitudes of the Mossynoecians,²⁰ the underground houses of a barbarian village,²¹ and the contrast between the Persian splendour and the Spartan simplicity.²² This interest in other people grew beyond an interest in their customs until it found expression in a deep reverence for life that extended even to one's enemies and saw the horror of the senseless destruction of humanity.²³

¹⁷H. R. Breitenbach, Xenophon von Athen, 1899, and Wilhelm Schmid, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur, Part I, Vol. II, 664-665, say that Xenophon writes under the influence of Herodotus. G. A. Sauppe, Lexicologus Xenophonteus, has shown that Xenophon's usage is a mixture of many dialects. Although it is easy to see this as the result of Xenophon's changing his place of residence several times during his lifetime, it may be that he has purposely chosen to vary his style to emphasize what he thought (see infra 35-37) about Greek unity; he is aware of style (see Cyn. 13) and his usage is the result of conscious effort.

¹⁸Anab. III, 1, 32.

¹⁹Anab. IV, 1, 5-14.

²⁰Anab. V, 4, 30-34.

²¹Anab. IV, 5, 25-26.

²²Hell. IV, 1, 29-31.

²³Anab. IV, 7, 13, 14.

Xenophon clearly analysed the reason for enmity among men in his account of the Greek army's dealings with Paphlagonians.²⁴ Here the story begins with the Greeks pillaging the Paphlagonians' territory and the Paphlagonians engaged in kidnapping and furtive attack. After ambassadors came from the Paphlagonians, there was a night of feasting and dancing out of which there arose an admiration for the culture and skill of the other group. The end of the story came the next morning when the Paphlagonian ambassadors were introduced to the army. The result: καὶ ἔδοξε τοῖς στρατιώταις μήτε ἀδικεῖν Παφλαγόνας μήτε ἀδικεῖσθαι .²⁵

Xenophon had learned that one of the causes of the disharmony among the races was a lack of understanding and appreciation for the culture of other peoples.²⁶

As a result of this insight Xenophon undertook to extend his sympathy and philanthropia even to those who were reputed to be enemies. In consequence of this view Xenophon broke what was for him a guiding principle of behaviour, namely, obedience

²⁴Anab. VI, 1, 1, -14

²⁵Anab. VI, 1, 14.

²⁶This sympathy for the other races was later developed to such an extent that when Xenophon wrote the Anabasis he rarely showed open disapproval of alien customs. Hence when he made a judgment concerning a culture (the Mossynoecians') he removed the responsibility for this judgment from himself and placed it on τοὺς συστρατευομένους (Anab. V, 4, 34).

to those who represented the leaders of Greece (the Spartan general, Cheirisophos), and disagreed concerning the treatment of the barbarian chieftain who served as their guide. As Xenophon himself says, τοῦτό γε δὴ Χειρισόφῳ καὶ Ξενοφῶντι μόνον διάφορον ἐν τῇ πορείᾳ ἐγένετο, ἡ τοῦ ἡγέμονος κάκῳσις καὶ ἀμέλεια.²⁷ Thus Xenophon became a champion of the dignified treatment that he felt all men, be they friends or enemies, deserve simply because they are human beings. This attitude resulted, from the hostility that he had experienced and the suffering and anxiety he had endured during the excursion into Persia. Hostility usually breeds hostility, but, on the other hand, when men are confronted with enmity they can sometimes turn it aside through dignified and sympathetic treatment of those with whom they differ. Perhaps Xenophon discovered that it was easier to remove hostility by philanthropia than by violence as he moved from youthful idealism to maturity.

After the Ten Thousand returned from Persia they remained under Xenophon's leadership until the spring of 399, when he handed the command over to Thibron.²⁸ Xenophon himself remained in Asia with the troops²⁹ and did not return to Athens until the spring of 395.³⁰ Perhaps his decision to remain in Asia was influenced by the news of the death of Socrates in 399. When

²⁷Anab. IV, 6, 3.

²⁸Anab. VII, 8, 24.

²⁹Hell. III, 2, 7.

³⁰Hell. III, 5, 1-25.

Xenophon heard that he had been found guilty, οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων...,³¹ he was perplexed. In his youthful idealism, Xenophon had seen only the Socrates who was, in his eyes, in search of truth (both political and moral) and who stood for obedience to the law.³² The shock of his trial and death seems to have brought to Xenophon's attention the instability of the Athenian constitution and the refusal of the Athenians to recognize ἀρετή in their midst.³³ Disillusioned by the events at Athens he began to look elsewhere for a constitution that would make men practise ἀρετή since no one would follow it voluntarily.³⁴ Thus Xenophon felt that the rule of law was essential since through it men could be compelled to practise ἀρετή and καλοκαγαθία.³⁵ For the laws to be effective there must be respect for the constitution among the citizens. To instill this in the citizen body the laws must be very old³⁶ and, if possible, have obtained divine sanction.³⁷ To this must be added the importance of example since, as we saw in Chapter I, virtue and goodness cannot be taught in any other manner

³¹Mem. I, 1, 1.

³²Hell. I, 7, 15.

³³This is an important feature of what he portrays in Hell. I and II. Cf. Hell. I, 7, 33.

³⁴Resp. Lac. 10, 4.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Resp. Lac. 10, 8.

³⁷Resp. Lac. 8, 5.

(see supra 6). In the Respublica Lacedaemoniorum Xenophon found what he thought at that time to be the most essential requirements for good government.³⁸ Here was a constitution that compelled its citizens to act in accordance with ἀρετή, that was very old, sanctioned by the divine and praised by all

³⁸The date for the writing of the Resp. Lac. is based on Sparta's lack of popularity described in chapter 14. This gives a possible date between 395, just before the Battle of Coronea, and 383, when the Spartans had seized Cadmea. Resp. Lac. 15 indicates appreciation of Spartan kingship, an attitude he certainly did not hold after Cadmea. W. Jaeger, Paideia, III, 166, 167, and 326 note 56, argues for the late dating of both the Respublica Lacedaemoniorum and the Cyropaedia on the basis of the similarity of the endings, in which Xenophon blames the contemporary Persians and Spartans for lapsing from their own ideals. He concludes that this similarity proves their authenticity and that therefore both must have been published in the last ten years of his life, for the Cyropaedia (VIII, 8, 4) mentions the betrayal of the satrap Ariobarzenes by his own son in 360. I find this unsatisfactory because similarity of ending, while it may indicate authenticity, does not prove that both works were published at the same time. Furthermore, as will be argued later (see infra 42,43), the conclusion of the Cyropaedia contradicts much of the rest of the work and in order to account for this contradiction I believe there was a change in Xenophon's political ideas that would require a time-lapse between the bulk of his writing and his final chapter just after 360. Cyr. VIII, 8, 4 in no way proves that the whole work was written at about that time.

men,³⁹ and that provided an example for the citizen body in the persons of the Kings who, as Donald Kagan suggests, became the embodiment of law.⁴⁰

Thus the years just before the Battle of Coronea reveal Xenophon as a man disillusioned with his native state, giving careful thought to politics and political systems, preoccupied with the laws and customs of mankind in general, and fascinated by the behaviour of individuals. These varying streams of thought he attempted to assimilate in the Respublica Lacedaemoniorum. A fuller expression of these and other ideas can be discovered in another work of Xenophon's, the Cyropaedia.

³⁹Resp. Lac. 10, 8.

⁴⁰Resp. Lac. 13 and 15. Donald Kagan, The Great Dialogue, 152-154.

CHAPTER III

XENOPHON AND THE BATTLE OF CORONEA

While Xenophon remained in Asia he became acquainted with Agesilaus, who had been sent to wage war on the Persians.¹ Xenophon probably noted with some delight how Agesilaus obtained the loyalty of his soldiers and enjoyed great success in his early campaigns. Nevertheless, Xenophon wished to test the political atmosphere of his home-state after a prolonged absence. The performance of the religious rites that he had vowed to fulfill when he left with Proxenus on the excursion into Persia provided an ideal opportunity for the project. Therefore, he returned to Greece and made his dedication at the Athenian shrine in Delphi.² The democratic rule in Athens must have been rather unsatisfactory to Xenophon, for in the spring of 394 he rejoined Agesilaus in Asia to pursue his quest for the subjugation of Persia. The democratic faction at Athens had been unsympathetic to any policies that Xenophon endorsed,³ and, perhaps hostile to his person. At any rate, war against the riches of Persia seemed the most readily available alternative to life in Attica, and Agesilaus⁴ the man most likely to carry out what Xenophon viewed as a most profitable venture.

¹Hell. III, 4, 1.

²Anab. V, 3, 5.

³See supra 13,14.

⁴In fact Agesilaus advocated this policy at Sparta before he was sent to Asia; Hell. III, 4, 1 and 2.

Because of the success of Agesilaus, the Persian satrap adopted a policy of bribing certain states in Greece to start a war, in order to bring the Spartans into conflict with their fellow Greeks and thus cause the recall and removal of Agesilaus from Asia. In this the Persian was most successful and as a result we find Xenophon present at the Battle of Coronea in the camp of the enemy of Athens in 394. That Xenophon was not present at this battle as a victim of circumstance or chance, but rather because of a deliberate choice, seems clear from a discussion in the Anabasis⁶ concerning his administration of the tithe from the sale of booty. Xenophon says that before he set out with Agesilaus against Boeotia he left the share belonging to Artemis with her priest, Megabyzus, at Ephesus, ὅτι αὐτὸς κινδυνεύσων ἐδόκει λέναι, καὶ ἐπέστειλεν, ἣν μὲν αὐτὸς σωθῆ, αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι· ἣν δέ τι πάθῃ, ἀναθεῖναι ποιησάμενον τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι ὃ τι οἴοιτο χαριεῖσθαι τῇ θεῷ. From the foregoing statement it is clear that Xenophon knew before he set out with Agesilaus that he would encounter danger to his life. That this danger would come in part from the Athenians, the foes of Agesilaus, was obvious. Yet Xenophon consciously chose to remain on the Spartan side. As a result, he was exiled from Athens, not as is often suggested because of his campaign with Cyrus, but because of his actions

⁵According to Xenophon (Hell. III, 5, 1) Tithraustes of Sardis; according to Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (II, 5) Pharnabazus of Phrygia, which is supported by Polyaeus, I, 48.

⁶Anab. V, 3, 4-6.

at Coronea.⁷ He then settled on an estate in Scyllus near Olympia, which he received from the Spartans.⁸

That Xenophon should suddenly turn his back on his home when only a few years before during the anabasis⁹ he was proud that he was an Athenian requires explanation. Why did he turn to violence against his own state? A partial answer may lie in the hostility that he had faced at Athens and in his own disillusionment with the Athenian constitution. This answer, however,

⁷I think Xenophon's exile must be placed after the Battle of Coronea, for in Anab. V, 3, 7 immediately after the discussion concerning the deposit left with Megabyzus before the battle Xenophon says, 'Ἐπειδὴ δ' ἔφευγεν ὁ Ξενοφῶν, Megabyzus returned to him the deposit. If ἔπειδὴ is temporal and means "When Xenophon was in exile," then his exile must have taken place after Coronea. If on the other hand ἔπειδὴ is causal, "Since Xenophon was in exile," it indicates that exile causes Megabyzus to bring the deposit to Xenophon in Scyllus. Instead of one of the expected alternatives, death or a safe return, exile has resulted from the Battle of Coronea. In either case the battle, his exile and the return of the deposit are all linked in Xenophon's mind. Although Anab. III, 1, 5-7 mentions another possible reason for his exile and is used as evidence of an earlier date, I consider this passage to be consistent with one of the basic aims of his later work. See infra 56.

⁸Anab. V, 3, 7.

⁹Anab. III, 1, 45.

denies the insights that he received concerning the treatment of one's enemies during the excursion with the Ten Thousand. I think that a better and more complete answer lies in an examination of the Cyropaedia, which he produced shortly after these events.

Xenophon had seen the luxury of Persia and compared it with the poverty of the Greeks. He realized that the Greeks as fighting men were far superior to the barbarians. He was also aware that the Greeks neutralized their superiority because of internal strife and disunity. Since he had fought and marched with the Greeks of other states he had lost his parochial viewpoint. He wanted all Greece to be united in the quickest and best way possible. In Agesilaus he felt that he had found the man who could best bring about political unity and also conduct a successful campaign against Persia. In the victory of Agesilaus at Coronea, Xenophon must have had his hopes strengthened. It was after this that he produced the Cyropaedia,¹⁰ to lay out what seemed to him the ideal form of government for the Hellenic world torn by parochialism, namely a beneficent monarchy.

¹⁰The exact date of the writing of the Cyropaedia is unknown. That it was written after Xenophon had opportunity to observe the Spartan system is likely, since Book I seems to be a description of the Spartan training for boys. That Xenophon wrote the work before he became disillusioned with tyranny (about 370, see infra 48-50) is obvious. Also see supra 30 note 38.

In this work Xenophon states that his interest in Cyrus is based on the fact that τοσοῦτον διήνεγκεν εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν ἀνθρώπων.¹¹ He attributes Cyrus' success to four things--his cultivation of established religion, his military training, his humane treatment of all men and his dedication to philosophy. In accordance with the nature of established religion, he constantly prayed 'Εστία πατρώα καὶ Διὶ πατρώω.¹² He was guided by omens.¹³ He never undertook an important campaign without sacrificing to the gods. Finally, when he had conquered, he maintained his worship of Zeus and the other gods.¹⁴ The motivation of his religious life follows:

τοὺς δὲ παρέχοντας ἑαυτοὺς ἐνόμισε μάλιστ' ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐπαίρειν, ἐπεὶ περ ἄρχων ἦν αὐτῶν, εἰ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύειν πειρῶτο τοῖς ἀρχομένοις πάντων μάλιστα κεκοσμημένον τῇ ἀρετῇ.¹⁵ ...οὕτω δὲ γιγνώσκων πρῶτον μὲν τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς μᾶλλον ἐκπονοῦντα ἐπεδείκνυεν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, ἐπεὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἦν.¹⁶

Thus his religious example was to direct his subjects to be καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί.

Cyrus, as has already been pointed out, was trained in regimental fashion similar to that of the Spartans.

¹²Cyr. I, 6, 1; III, 3, 58; VII, 1, 26; VII, 5, 57; VIII, 7, 2. Greek religion did not have an extreme sense of its own uniqueness and thus a Greek would simply apply the customary names to foreign equivalents; cf. Herodotus, Book II.

¹³Cyr. I, 6, 1; II, 4, 19.

¹⁴Cyr. VIII, 3, 11, 12.

¹⁵Cyr. VIII, 1, 21.

¹⁶Cyr. VIII, 1, 23.

He also practised for war in the way that was considered the best,¹⁷ by hunting.¹⁸ He developed his men for war by putting them through exercises designed to make them perspire and by taking them on the hunt.¹⁹

Cyrus then set up an elaborate military system.²⁰ The reason for this is clear from one of his speeches: ... ἃ δ' ἂν ἀσύντακτα ἦ, ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἀεὶ πράγματα παρέχειν.²¹ The result of the pyramidal structure of command that is used in Cyrus' army is discipline and a transmission of honourable military skills through the example of the leaders.²²

From these elaborate military preparations come two positive benefits. In addition to presenting the obvious military superiority of Cyrus' troops, Xenophon emphasizes that Cyrus accumulated knowledge that enabled him to form a government, bureaucratic in nature. As a result of this bureaucracy Cyrus had centralized all the administrative functions, ὥστε καὶ τῷ Κύρῳ ἐγένετο ὀλίγοις διαλεγόμενῳ μηδὲν τῶν οἰκείων ἀτημελήτως ἔχειν.²³ Military experience, then, produced a careful and complete ruler.

¹⁷Cyr. I, 2, 10.

¹⁸Cyr. I, 4, 15.

¹⁹Cyr. II, 1, 20-22; VIII, 1, 34.

²⁰Cyr. V, 1, 20-28.

²¹Cyr. IV, 5, 37.

²²Cyr. II, 1, 30, 31 and II, 2, 28.

²³Cyr. VIII, 1, 14, 15. See Neal Wood, "Xenophon's Theory of Leadership," Class. et Med., XXV (1964) 33-66.

Cyrus also possessed the quality of philanthropia. Through the exercise of this quality he won the allegiance of his fellow countrymen²⁴ who later became the basis of his powerful army.²⁵ Cyrus also sought to inculcate this quality in his soldiers. In one of his speeches concerning their conduct he says of the confiscation of an enemy's property, οὐκ οὖν ἀδικία γε ἔξετε ὅτι ἂν ἔχητε, ἀλλὰ φιλανθρωπία· οὐκ ἄφαιρήσεσθε, ἣν τι ἔατε ἔχειν αὐτούς.²⁶ Cyrus' philanthropia is based on enlightened self-interest. He exhibits this trait as the best way to remove enmities and ill-will, whether this concerns the nations that his army conquers or his own personal safety.

πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ διὰ αἰὲ τοῦ χρόνου φιλανθρωπίαν τῆς
φυχῆς ὡς ἐδύνατο μάλιστα ἐνεφάνιζεν, ἡγούμενος, ὥσπερ οὐ
ῥαδιόν ἐστι φιλεῖν τοὺς μισεῖν δοκοῦντας οὐδ' εὐνοεῖν τοῖς
κακόνοις, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς γνωσθέντας ὡς φιλοῦσι καὶ εὐνοοῦσιν,
οὐκ ἂν δύνασθαι μισεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλεῖσθαι ἡγουμένων.²⁷

As a result, first Cyrus obtains the willing obedience of his subordinates. One of these, Chrysantes, addresses his fellow-commanders and urges them to obey Cyrus and to offer themselves for whatever service Cyrus may need them. The motivation for this is stated at the beginning of his speech:

οἳ τε γὰρ πατέρες προνοοῦσι τῶν παίδων
ὅπως μήποτε αὐτοὺς τάγαθὰ ἐπιλείψει,

²⁴Cyr. I, 4, 1.

²⁵Cyr. II, 1, 19.

²⁶Cyr. VII, 5, 73.

²⁷Cyr. VIII, 2, 1.

Κῦρός τέ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν συμβουλεύειν ἡμῖν ἀφ'
ὧν μάλιστ' ἂν εὐδαιμονοῦντες διατελοῖμεν.²⁸

Second, Cyrus achieves a lasting fame in which the fact that he was φιλανθρωπότατος in spirit is told in story and celebrated in song ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἔτι καὶ νῦν.²⁹

Cyrus is also celebrated in song because he is φιλομαθέστατος.³⁰ This quality is demonstrated when Cyrus engages in a long dialogue with his father concerning the importance of religious observance, the practical expression and value of beneficence, the best kinds of military training and tactics (when it is best to attack the enemy, and how to take advantage of the enemy's weakness). S. I. Pease³¹ has, among other things, analysed the various types of battles in which Xenophon sets forth the tactics involved. These include the open battlefield (7, 1), siege (7, 5), border-raids (1, 4), mountain-fighting (3, 2), and night-fighting (3, 3-4, 2). Many of these are preceded or followed by discussion between Cyrus and some of his closest advisers and friends in which the actions undertaken are discussed. While these can hardly be considered as examples of philosophical literature of the Platonic type, the fact that many of these matters are set forth in dialogue form impresses one with

²⁸Cyr. VIII, 1, 1.

²⁹Cyr. I, 2, 1.

³⁰Cyr. I, 6, 2.

³¹S. I. Pease, "Xenophon's Cyropaedia, the Compleat General," Class. Journ., XXIX (1933) 436-40.

the idea that Cyrus was a rational, calculating, perceptive and self-controlled man who refused to act without giving his policies careful consideration.

While this type of discussion is of great importance, what makes Cyrus peculiarly fit to rule is that he surpasses all his fellows in foresight and intellectual ability. The entire dialogue³² between Cyrus and his father assumes Cyrus' superior rationality. Near the end the discussion turns to Cyrus' relationship with his subjects. His father (who is obviously giving Xenophontean advice) says,

εὖ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰδέειν ὅτι ὁπόσους
 ἂν ἀξιούῃς σοι πείθεσθαι, καὶ ἐκεῖνοι πάντες
 ἀξιώσουσι σὲ πρὸ ἑαυτῶν βουλευέσθαι. ³³

A man who wishes to rule successfully and obtain the obedience of his people must have greater wisdom than most men since this is what his countrymen expect of him.

Nevertheless this does not free the monarch to make arbitrary decisions as he pleases. In addition to the restraints placed upon him by his discussions with his advisers, he makes his decisions with the law as his guide. This is the advice that his mother gives the young Cyrus concerning the principle of kingship that distinguishes Persian monarchy from Median tyranny.

³²Cyr. I, 6, 1-46.

³³Cyr. I, 6, 42.

καὶ ὁ σὸς πατὴρ πρῶτος τὰ τεταγμένα μὲν ποιεῖ
 τῇ πόλει, τὰ τεταγμένα δὲ λαμβάνει, μέτρον δὲ
 αὐτῷ οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀλλ' ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. ³⁴

The reason that νόμος is to be Cyrus' (and the ideal king's) guide is that it adduces the cooperation of the people of the nation. Again we return to the dialogue and this time note what part of his father's advice Cyrus repeats.

τοὺς δὲ ἀθέμιτα εὐχομένους ὁμοίως ἔφησθα
 εἰκὸς εἶναι παρὰ θεῶν ἀτυχεῖν ὥσπερ καὶ
 παρὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀπρακτεῖν τοὺς παράνομα δεομένους. ³⁵

Thus regard for νόμος is essential if one is to achieve anything among men and becomes the key to the ideal ruler's success. The successful monarch, then, displays religious reverence, philanthropia, military excellence and intellectual superiority within the framework of νόμος. As the embodiment of good government Cyrus is an exemplary individual.

This kind of polity was espoused by Xenophon because of its great stability.³⁶ He had begun by reflecting on the many revolutions that take place and then noticed the inability of masters even in private homes to maintain their authority. In contrast, one man, Cyrus, ruled not only his own household but a vast empire. As a result Xenophon says, ἡναγκαζόμεθα μετανοεῖν μὴ οὔτε τῶν ἀδυνάτων οὔτε τῶν χαλεπῶν ἔργων ἢ τὸ ἀνθρώπων ἄρχειν, ἣν τις ἐπισταμένως τοῦτο πράττη. ³⁷

³⁴Cyr. I, 3, 18.

³⁵Cyr. I, 6, 6.

³⁶Cyr. I, 1, 1.

³⁷Cyr. I, 1, 3.

The adverb ἐπισταμένως indicates that the author intends to describe one who does know how to provide stability in his rule.

As a result of the foregoing consideration, I think that we can now give a reasonable and unwavering answer to the question, "Why did Xenophon fight against his home-state at Coronea?" Wearied of the continual quarreling and provincialism, Xenophon felt that the only hope for the Greek states was to set up the most stable form of government he could imagine--a beneficent monarchy. Agesilaus momentarily seemed to fit this ideal and so Xenophon rejected his mother-state for the good of all Greece.

No discussion of the Cyropaedia is complete without examination of the last chapter. Xenophon states that the purpose of his investigation is the discovery and presentation of a man who excelled in governing.³⁸ Yet in the last part of his work he says:

ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ οἶμαι ἅπερ ὑπεθέμην ἀπειργάσθαι μοι.

φημὶ γὰρ Πέρσας καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀσεβεστέρους

περὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνοσιωτέρους περὶ συγγενεῖς καὶ

ἀδικωτέρους περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ ἀνανδροτέρους

τὰ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον νῦν ἢ πρόσθεν ἀποδεδείχθαι.³⁹

To prove that the Persians of his day are inferior to those of the past does not seem to be the purpose of Books I - VIII, 7, 28, which are clearly presenting Cyrus and all the Persians in a most favourable light. Only the last chapter indicates anything derogatory about the Persians and this in direct contradiction to

³⁸Cyr. I, 1, 6.

³⁹Cyr. VIII, 8, 27.

statements of the preceding part of the book. Xenophon introduces his record of the Persians' degenerate tendencies with the following statement: πολὺ δὲ καὶ τάδε χεῖρονες νῦν εἰσι.⁴⁰

In contrast the institutions and practices of Cyrus in the previous part of the work are frequently said to endure οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι.⁴¹ These contradictory statements can be resolved by the assumption that there is a long time-lapse between one adverb ((νῦν)) and the other. That ten or twenty years have passed is possible. Nevertheless, this does not seem to me to be sufficient. There is an obvious change of purpose. What the nature of this change is, why and when it came about, must be the subject of our further consideration.

⁴⁰Cyr. VIII, 8, 4.

⁴¹Cyr. I, 3, 2; I, 4, 27; II, 4, 20; III, 3, 26; IV, 2, 8; IV, 3, 23; VIII, 1, 6; VIII, 1, 37; VIII, 2, 4; VIII, 2, 7; VIII, 4, 5; VIII, 6, 16. Not one of these passages indicates anything derogatory about "the present-day Persian."

CHAPTER IV
XENOPHON AND TYRANNY

After the Battle of Coronea, Xenophon continued his friendship with Agesilaus and encouraged him in the pursuit of a united Greece. Until the King's Peace of 386 Agesilaus was the dominant figure on the Greek political scene.¹ It was also during this time that Thebes tried to reestablish the Boeotian League and thus incurred the hatred of Agesilaus,² Xenophon and, probably, the whole of Greece.³ Xenophon's dislike of Thebes was based on the fact that she was one of the main causes of the strife that followed both Coronea in 394 and the King's Peace of 386. As a result, Xenophon could view only with great dislike those who συνεχῶς δὲ βουλευόμενοι ... ὅπως ἂν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν λάβοιεν τῆς Ἑλλάδος,⁴ since they disrupted the plan that was uppermost in Xenophon's mind: to bring an end to the internal strife among the Hellenes and to their self-destruction. It was because of this disruptive work of the Thebans, the rebuilding of Athenian strength and the activity of Conon on behalf of the Persians, that Sparta and Agesilaus no more than held their own against their antagonists.⁵ But when Antalcidas managed to negotiate a peace with King

¹Hell. IV, 5, 1.

²Hell. V, 1, 33.

³Henry, Greek Historical Writing, 207, 208.

⁴Hell. VII, 1, 33.

⁵Hell. V, 1, 36.

Artaxerxes in which the Greek states were to be autonomous,⁶ and Athens was pacified in that she was allowed to retain Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros; Xenophon says that the Spartans πολὺ ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγένοντο.⁷ In becoming the champion of the King's Peace Sparta obtained control of the internal and external policy of the Greek states. Through making the other states autonomous Sparta destroyed the Boeotian League and much of the power of Athens.⁸ Thus Sparta was now in a position to give leadership to all Greece in dealing with Persia and Agesilaus in particular could, as king of Sparta, go about the business of making all the Greeks favourable to him and of fulfilling the expectations that Xenophon expresses in the Cyropaedia. This was Xenophon's hope as he viewed the King's Peace.

It appears that, at first, Agesilaus tried to follow the policy of treating those who had been hostile before the Peace of 386 with kindness⁹ in accordance with the ideal policy that Xenophon sets forth in the Cyropaedia.¹⁰ For when the Spartans

⁶Hell. V, 1, 31.

⁷Hell. V, 1, 36. That Xenophon miscalculated the amount of antagonism that the Peace evoked among the Greek states is obvious. Cf. Isocrates, Panegyricus 115-122.

⁸Hell. V, 1, 36.

⁹Hell. V, 2, 1-3.

¹⁰The story of Panthea is one of Xenophon's most vivid illustrations of the advantages of treating a captured enemy with dignity and respect, V, 1, 2-17; VI, 1, 45.

set out to chastise the Mantineans,¹¹ Agesilaus excused himself from leading an expedition of revenge.¹² Gradually, however, as the Spartans continued their arrogant and vengeful policy, Agesilaus was also drawn into the turmoil¹³ and, instead of attaching the other Greek states to Sparta through kind and dignified treatment, he alienated many Hellenes by helping to set up pro-Spartan oligarchies in several of the states.¹⁴

It seems that it was during this period of increased harshness on the part of the Spartans that Xenophon gradually became aware of some of the difficulties that are present in a monarchy. After describing the defeat of the Spartans at Olynthus in 381 he suggests that men should never chastise anyone, even slaves, in anger, *πολλάκις γὰρ καὶ δεσπότης ὀργιζόμενος μείζω κακὰ ἔπαθον ἢ ἐποίησαν..... ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀργὴ ἀπρονόητον, ἡ δὲ γνώμη σκοπεῖ οὐδὲν ἥττον μὴ τι πάθῃ ἢ ὅπως βλάβῃ τι τοῦς πολεμίους.*¹⁵ This censure echoes the policy already enunciated in the *Cyropaedia* that in dealing with one's enemies one must seek above all to avoid haste and thoughtlessness.

¹¹Hell. V, 2, 1.

¹²Hell. V, 2, 3.

¹³Hell. V, 3, 13.

¹⁴Hell. V, 3, 25.

¹⁵Hell. V, 3, 7.

After the King's Peace the Spartans achieved a position in which the Thebans were completely in their power since they held the Theban acropolis, the Corinthians were forced to support Sparta, the Argives were humbled, the Athenians were without allies and their own unfaithful allies had been punished.¹⁶ Xenophon ends the account of these Spartan achievements with the statement, παντάπασιν ἤδη καλῶς καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς κατεσκευάσθαι. That Xenophon questioned the validity of this superficial tranquillity seems obvious from the statement that introduces the next section, in which he lays the blame for Sparta's defeat at Leuctra in 371 on the Lacedaemonians for failing to abide by the King's Peace, which guaranteed that the Greek states should remain autonomous.¹⁷ Xenophon writes,

πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἂν τις ἔχοι καὶ ἄλλα λέγειν καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ βαρβαρικά, ὥς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν ἀσεβούντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων ἀμελοῦσι· νῦν γε μὴν λέξω τὰ προκείμενα. Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε γὰρ οἱ ὁμόσαντες αὐτονόμους ἐάσειν τὰς πόλεις τὴν ἐν Θήβαις ἀκρόπολιν κατασχόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν μόνων τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἐκολάσθησαν. καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν οἶον

By using words such as ἀνόσια, ἀδικηθέντων and ἐκολάσθησαν he indicates that the Thebans had been treated unjustly, that the guilt lay with the Spartans and that seizing the Theban acropolis

¹⁶Hell. V, 3, 27.

¹⁷Hell. V, 4, 1. Cf. Hell. VII, 3, 6-12 where there is a severe indictment of one-man rule.

was an act of irreverence. That Xenophon's condemnation applies not only to Sparta generally but to Agesilaus in particular becomes evident--when one reads the account of Sparta's invasion of Cadmea carefully. Here Xenophon mentions specifically that Agesilaus supported Phoebidas' invasion of Cadmea in face of the anger of the Ephors and the majority of the citizens.¹⁸ Thus there is little doubt that Xenophon disagreed with Agesilaus over the policy followed after 386. As he saw the mistreatment of the other Greek states by Sparta and Agesilaus under the pretext of enforcing the King's Peace, he became disillusioned with his former ideal government and realized that beneficent one-man rule was perhaps an impractical ideal. It was for this reason that he wrote the Hiero, in which he expresses his growing doubt about kingship (significantly Hiero is a tyrant) as the ideal form of government in a rather oblique way.¹⁹ This work presents an imaginary conversation between the tyrant Hiero and the poet Simonides. L. Strauss²⁰ has pointed out that the use of conversation puts the work in the realm of philosophical literature, compels a confrontation of the wise man and the pupil, and leads one to consider the question of the relationship of theory to practice. It also furnishes proof of the unjust tyrant's unhappiness since the tyrant himself indicts tyranny in the first

¹⁸Hell. V, 2, 25-32.

¹⁹He is oblique because Agesilaus and the Spartans had befriended him and it would have been rather incongruent with the interests of Xenophon to speak clearly.

²⁰L. Strauss, On Tyranny 33.

portion.²¹ It does not prove that a beneficent tyrant is happy. It only promises.²² The work then places an actual situation opposite an ideal one; we know that the former exists. The basis upon which an appeal to the ideal one-man rule is made to Hiero is that it will give him greater pleasure and more honour and love.²³ A political conversation that one would expect to be dealing with such ideas as virtue, justice and government in contrast emphasizes the pleasure or pain arising from the acts of the ruler. This demonstrates that on a practical level the one-man government is motivated by an introspective kind of selfishness--a level at which appeals to a lofty ideal such as virtue or justice are useless. Nevertheless, a wise man must try to improve the government and thus Simonides appeals as best he can to Hiero by first making him aware of his wretched lot and then setting before him the alternative that, since rulers are able *πολλαπλάσια μὲν διαπράττοντες ὠφελεῖν*,²⁴ it is likely that they *καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι τῶν ἰδιωτῶν*.²⁵

The advice of Simonides is listened to by Hiero but after he has heard it he does not say anything. The implication is

²¹Hiero 1-8, 13.

²²Hiero 11, 14.

²³Hiero 11, 12.

²⁴Hiero 8, 7.

²⁵Ibid.

that he believes Simonides' advice to be full of wisdom for he acknowledges that Simonides is a wise man.²⁶ But, as A. Kojève has pointed out,²⁷ he does not say that he is going to follow Simonides's advice and hence we assume that he is not going to do anything about it. Simonides has set the good tyranny opposite the bad one. It is up to Hiero to ask Simonides how he could maintain himself in power without having recourse to violence while gaining χάρις by means of appropriate measures. Hiero does not do this. By portraying Hiero as rejecting good advice, Xenophon further indicates that good tyranny that is not legal rule but nevertheless rule over willing subjects (as in the Cyropaedia) and thus dependent on the character of the tyrant is achieved with great difficulty.

²⁶Hiero 1, 1.

²⁷Alexandre Kojève, "Tyranny and Wisdom," in L. Strauss, On Tyranny, 144.

CHAPTER V
XENOPHON'S DEFENCE

In 371 after the Battle of Leuctra Scyllus fell into the hands of the Elaeans and Xenophon went to live in Corinth.¹ As a result of this battle Athens and Sparta moved closer together politically and a reconciliation seems to have taken place between him and Athens since his son died while fighting in the Athenian cavalry in 362.² Because he had observed that Agesilaus had failed to check the rising power of Thebes, Xenophon was driven to seek a new solution to the problem of Greek disunity. As he considered his own experience (perhaps in analysing what had made it possible for the Ten Thousand to act in harmony) he concluded that unity had been the result of the combined leadership of an Athenian, himself,³ and a Spartan, Cheirisophos. As he generalized from his own experience, he must have seen a ray

¹Diog. Laert., 2, 53, and 54.

²Ibid.

³That this might be an exaggerated role is doubtful when one reflects that Xenophon rose to a position of prominence after the Greek strategoi had been killed. J. Roy ("The Mercenaries of Cyrus" Historia XVI [1967] 293) defends the position of Xenophon in the Anabasis by drawing a parallel from Anab. II, 2, 5, where Clearchus held the position of primus inter pares not because he had been elected but because his colleagues saw that he was a natural leader.

of hope for all Greece. Perhaps, under the combined leadership of Athens and Sparta, Greece could achieve political harmony.

In order to convince the Athenians of what was for Xenophon a new political ideal, it was essential that he make a defence acceptable to them. About 370 he undertook the writing of the Memorabilia.⁴ That he began it as an apology of Socrates is clear.⁵ Part of this apology seems to be that Socrates' teaching was protreptic in that he always led his true students to arete, before he made them masters of dialectic. He did this mainly through his knowledge of religion. According to the presentation in the Memorabilia, Socrates believed in a kind of all-pervasive divinity. γνώσει τὸ θεῖον ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥσθ' ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν καὶ πάντα ἀκούειν καὶ πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.⁶ This divinity, when worshipped νόμφ πόλεως... κατὰ δυνάμιν,⁷ will counsel man in matters that are unknown to him.⁸ By setting forth these ideas as the basis of Socrates' religion, Xenophon makes him a supporter of traditional Greek religion in order to answer the charge that he did not believe in the gods of the state.

⁴Mem. III, 5, 4 anticipates a Boeotian invasion. This was highly unlikely between 403 and approximately 371 because Thebes and Athens were nominally involved in intrigue against Sparta (Hell. VI, 3, 1). Hence one must assume that publication was after 371.

⁵Mem. I, 1, 1.

⁶Mem. I, 4, 18. Socrates is speaking to Aristodemus.

⁷Mem. IV, 3, 16. Cf. I, 3, 1 and 3.

⁸Mem. I, 4, 18.

Xenophon makes another point in Socrates's defence. He had also been accused of bringing new gods into the state. The extent to which this charge was true according to the Memorabilia was that Socrates' psyche had a greater share in τὸ θεῖον, because of which he had special guidance ἃ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μὴ.⁹

Since all men share to some degree in τὸ θεῖον,¹⁰ Socrates' religion is presented as the normal religion of all the Greeks. That Socrates experienced special guidance in comparison with other Greeks emphasizes the paradox of Socrates' religious views. His religion is at the same time similar to the common religion of most Greeks and yet superior.

In considering the purpose to be served by these religious views, we find Xenophon's defence linked with that of Socrates. It seems that a man of ability could be kept from injustice and evil-doing by the proper awareness of the gods. For Xenophon says of Socrates:

τὸ μὲν οὖν λεκτικούς καὶ πρακτικούς καὶ μηχανικούς
γίγνεσθαι τοὺς συνόντας οὐκ ἔσπευδεν, ἀλλὰ πρότερον
τούτων ᾤετο χρῆναι σωφροσύνην αὐτοῖς ἐγγενέσθαι.
τοὺς γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ταῦτα δυναμένους ἴδεν
ἀδικοτέρους τε καὶ δυνατωτέρους κακουργεῖν

⁹Mem. IV, 3, 12.

¹⁰Mem. IV, 3, 14.

ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοὺς

ἐπειρᾶτο σῶφρονας ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας.¹¹

Conversely, if someone has been made σῶφρων περὶ θεοῦς (prudent concerning traditional Greek religion) by Socrates (and Xenophon takes care to point out that he himself heard the conversation concerning the gods recorded in IV, 3, 2-18) such a person is obviously δικαιότερος καὶ δυνατώτερος ἀγαθουργεῖν.

The establishment of this relationship between Xenophon and Socrates could hardly be considered as a defence of Socrates (unless there was also a defence of Xenophon) since Xenophon had been in disgrace at Athens for approximately twenty years before he wrote the Memorabilia. But should there be a defence of Xenophon and should his exile be repealed (although, in fact, brought about by political pressure) Socrates would indirectly be justified in the eyes of the common people. The defence of one was part of the defence of the other. Then the question whether the publication of the Memorabilia, the Hellenica,¹² and

¹¹Mem. IV, 3, 1-2. σῶφρων περὶ θεοῦς means "of a sound mind, prudent, discreet concerning the gods." Since Socrates is trying to make men thus, Xenophon must mean σῶφρων in the Socratic religious sense discussed above.

¹²The date of the publication of the Hellenica depends on a statement of Xenophon that, after the death of Alexander of Pherae in 358, Tisiphonus held the position of ruler ἄχρι οὗ ὅδε ὁ λόγος ἐγράφετο (Hell. IV, 4, 38).

the Anabasis¹³ came before or after Xenophon's exile was rescinded is unimportant. Of importance is the fact that the common people of Athens read them.

¹³The Anabasis was written after 394 since Xenophon had not yet been exiled at that time and reference is made to ~~his~~ exile in VII, 7, 57. A. Lesky, A History of Greek Literature, 618, suggests that the publishing of the Anabasis can be put after 379 as it assumes the withdrawal of the Spartan garrison from Theban Cadmea; Anab. VI, 6, 9. Cf. Hell. V, 4. Joseph Mesk, "Die Tendenz der Xenophontischen Anabasis," Wien. Stud., XLIII (1922-23) 136-146, suggests that the best evidence for the publication-date, however, is found in the description of his estate at Scyllus in V, 3, 7-13. In this passage all the festivities celebrated there are described either in the imperfect or the aorist tense. If these activities persisted when this passage was written, the use of these tenses would be inappropriate. The imperfects clearly indicate reiterative activity previous to the writing of this passage, and the aorists activity in the past that has stopped. There are a number of forms of εἰμί (ἐνεῖμαι, ἐστίν[3]) in the present tense. Most of these refer to the estate, which would naturally continue to exist even though Xenophon did not occupy the land. There is also one perfect, ἔστηκε, which refers to the altar that was set up in past time and is probably still in existence at the time of writing. From the foregoing it seems clear that Xenophon no longer occupied Scyllus when this passage was written. Hence, the Anabasis must have been published after Leuctra (371). In addition I hope to show (see infra 56-60)

In making his defence in the Anabasis Xenophon pointedly ignores his exile for his part in the Battle of Coronea and hints that it was because of his excursion with Cyrus.¹⁴ Now there is no doubt that any involvement with the Persians would irritate many of the people of Athens (for they had supported Sparta in the Peloponnesian War) but that he had been in the Spartan camp at Coronea would have been intolerable. Therefore, he candidly admits that he went with the Persians; not as a mercenary, however, but as a friend of Proxenus.¹⁵ His only

that the work contains apologetic elements. Certainly there would have been little point in publishing such a document before 371 since III, 1, 5-7 hints that Xenophon was philo-Laconian and publication would only have increased hostility toward him. After this date, however, the treaty between Athens and Sparta would have removed some of the stigma of being pro-Spartan. Cf. G. B. Nussbaum, The Ten Thousand, 5. For further discussion see A. Kappelmacher, "Xenophon und Isokrates," Wien. Stud., XLIII (1922) 212-213; J. Morr, "Zum Sprachgebrauche Xenophons," Wien. Stud., XLVIII (1930) 11-24; and M. MacLaren, "Xenophon and Themistogenes," TAPA LXV (1934) 240-247.

¹⁴Anab. III, 1, 4-7.

¹⁵Ibid. III, 1, 107.

activity until the death of Cyrus is to fulfill the customary religious ritual.¹⁶ Furthermore, Xenophon and the other Greeks had been deceived about the purpose of the expedition.¹⁷ Only after the Battle of Cunaxa does Xenophon undertake to fight and then it is clearly for the Greeks against the Persians.

One of the most striking things about his autobiography in the Anabasis is his constant attendance to customary religious ritual. First, we note that he set out on this expedition after he had offered sacrifices according to the prescription of the Delphic Oracle.¹⁸ Again, we find that Xenophon and the generals dutifully set aside a tenth of the plunder for Apollo of Delphi and Artemis of Ephesus.¹⁹ When the army has been contaminated by an impious deed of a large body of men, it is at Xenophon's suggestion that it is cleansed by the customary purification-rites.²⁰ Finally, before his last undertaking in the work (which is, of course, successful), we find him sacrificing whole swine τῷ πατρίῳ νόμῳ.²¹ In all this he is obviously acting in accord with τὰ περὶ θεοῦ νόμιμα.

¹⁶Anab. I, 8, 15, 16.

¹⁷Anab. III, 1, 10.

¹⁸Anab. III, 1, 8.

¹⁹Anab. V, 3, 4.

²⁰Anab. V, 7, 35.

²¹Anab. VII, 8, 5.

There is, however, much more to Xenophon's religion than that. He also has a share of that peculiar divinity attributed to Socrates. During the course of the army's return he is guided by the gods in a dream to predict that the difficult situation in which the army finds itself will be favourably resolved.²² Again, in the midst of a difficult battle, a god reveals battle-tactics to Xenophon through a natural phenomenon.²³ As a result of this guiding genius Xenophon and his companions, οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἀρχόμενοι, have not erred in policy, and achieve more honour than those who talked boastfully, as though possessing greater wisdom, made a tactical error and suffered as a result.²⁴

Closely related to the idea of guiding genius is Xenophon's ability to understand divination because of his constant attendance at sacrifices. In fact, even an authority in divination, Silanus, ὁ μάντις, did not dare to distort the omens when Xenophon was looking on.²⁵ On the basis of this great knowledge of omens, Xenophon refused to usurp the military leadership that rightly belonged to the Lacedaemonians;²⁶ he was forced to remain with the army when it reached the Hellespont, although he desired

²²Anab. IV, 3, 8-13. Cf. also III, 1, 11-25.

²³Anab. V, 2-24.

²⁴Anab. VI, 3, 18.

²⁵Anab. V, 6, 29.

²⁶Anab. VI, 1, 31.

to go home;²⁷ he refused to hand over the army to Cleander, the governor of Byzantium²⁸ (which undoubtedly would have caused difficulty for some members of the army, such as Agasias and perhaps those mercenaries who were from the states friendly to the Athenians at that time); and he did not remain with Seuthes, the Thracian,²⁹ but went back into Ionia (where he later handed over the army to the Spartan, Thibron). Some of these acts seem almost contradictory. Some might have been the cause of ill-will at Athens or Sparta. However, on the basis of his skill in divination he must be exonerated,³⁰ for this reliance on the will of the gods makes his leadership free from self-interest and his actions unassailable by all who actually believe in the gods and those who seem to. Only those who are unconcerned that they might appear impious would dare to harbour any ill-will toward Xenophon openly.

Throughout the actual fighting and daily activity of the return march it seems to be Xenophon's purpose εὖ ποιεῖν ἄλλους. Xenophon demonstrates this most vividly in his account of the soldier's inquiry into the conduct of all the generals.³¹

²⁷Anab. VI, 2, 15.

²⁸Anab. VI, 6, 36.

²⁹Anab. VII, 6, 44.

³⁰G. B. Nussbaum, The Ten Thousand, 140-146, analyses the importance of the "higher frame" in Xenophon's leadership. Cf. Anab. V, 6, 28.

³¹Anab. V, 8, 2-11.

Here Xenophon, too, is charged (with striking a soldier) but it is clearly shown that the motivation for his action is his reverence for life in that he forced one of his soldiers to carry a wounded and dying man when he was about to bury him in the snow. The rebuttal of his accuser is that the man died later and, hence, he implies that Xenophon struck him unjustly. To this Xenophon gives the following reply:

καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ... πάντες ἀποθανούμεθα· τούτου ἕνεκα
οὖν ἔνεκα ζῶντας ἡμᾶς δεῖ κατορυχθῆναι; ³²

Clearly it was Xenophon's purpose that life, although only a flicker, be preserved. This was the basis of his acquittal.

This theme of his concern for others is constantly reiterated throughout the work. Finally, in the last chapter, after the army has obtained a great deal of booty, Xenophon is rewarded by those he has led, ὥστε ἱκανὸν καὶ ἄλλον ἤδη εὖ ποιεῖν.³³ Thus his philanthropia, which is the basis both of his acquittal and commendation by those he led, becomes an integral part of his apology.

In the Hellenica there is a further defence of Xenophon's involvement with the Ten Thousand. On their return to the Hellespont the army under Thibron's leadership had oppressed certain Greek cities in a manner inconsistent with their relationship as allies. This had caused some criticism of Xenophon for handing over the army to Thibron³⁴ and had also brought the

³²Anab. V, 8, 11.

³³Anab. VII, 8, 24. Cf. V, 6, 28.

³⁴Anab. VII, 8, 24.

army the censure of the Spartans. Xenophon's defence on the first charge is found in the fact that even the Athenians had sent a detachment of cavalry to Thibron.³⁵ His defence against the second charge is based on the commendation sent by the ephors to the army under its new leader, to which the reply is made, ἀλλ', ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἡμεῖς μὲν ἐσμεν οἱ αὐτοὶ νῦν τε καὶ πέρυσιν· ἄρχων δὲ ἄλλος μὲν νῦν, ἄλλος δὲ τὸ παρελθόν. τὸ οὖν αἴτιον τοῦ νῦν μὲν μὴ ἐξαμαρτάνειν, τότε δέ, αὐτοὶ ἤδη ἱκανοὶ ἐστε γιγνώσκειν.³⁶ Since we have suggested that Xenophon's exile is to be associated with the events of 394 it is also of interest to note how Xenophon presents the Battles of Nemea and Coronea. First, the Athenians are described as the bravest of the allies, for while the Boeotians were opposite the Spartans they were not eager to fight, but, when the Athenians κατὰ Λακεδαιμονίους ἐγένοντο, the Boeotians εὐθύς τᾷτε ἱερὰ καλὰ ἔφασαν εἶναι καὶ παρήγειλαν παρασκευάζεσθαι ὡς μάχης ἐσομένης.³⁷ Within a few months Agesilaus accompanied by Xenophon³⁸ came from Asia with his troops. He was met by Boeotians, Athenians, Argives, Corinthians, Aenianians, Euboeans and both groups of Locrians.³⁹ Agesilaus occupied the right wing with the Orchomenians on his extreme

³⁵Hell. III, 1, 4.

³⁶Hell. III, 2, 7.

³⁷Hell. IV, 2, 18

³⁸Anab. V, 3, 6.

³⁹Hell. IV, 3, 15.

left.⁴⁰ Against him were stationed the Argives, while the Thebans (as usual) were facing the Orchomenians. When the forces met, Agesilaus defeated the Argives, the Thebans defeated the Orchomenians, and the phalanx commanded by Herippidas and with him the Ionians, Aeolians and Hellespontines rushed forth and εἰς δόρυ ἀφικόμενοι ἔτρεψαν τὸ καθ' αὐτούς.⁴¹ Among the group designated by τό are to be found also the Athenians but there is no further mention of their name in connection with the Battle of Coronea.⁴² Obviously Xenophon seeks to avoid irritating the Athenians in what must be for him a very delicate situation.

From our discussion we can conclude then that Xenophon's defence of himself consists of the following points: 1) as a friend of Socrates he had been subjected to Socrates' teaching concerning the gods and thus was able to behave justly and to do good (ἀγαθοῦργεῖν); 2) his account of his behaviour in the Anabasis demonstrates his self-sacrifice in doing good within a religious framework; 3) the activity of Xenophon and the army of the Ten Thousand after its return to the area of the Aegean although irritating to some Greek states (Athens included) is the fault of a leader imposed on the army by Sparta; 4) in discussing the Battle of Coronea Xenophon attempts to play down the involvement of Athens and to emphasize that it was Spartan against Theban military policy. When he had made these points he was able to urge a political alliance.

⁴⁰Hell. IV, 3, 16.

⁴¹Hell. IV, 3, 17.

⁴²Hell. IV, 3, 15-23.

CHAPTER VI

GREECE AND PERSIA

In the previous chapter we noted that Xenophon's conception of a new solution to the problem of Greek disunity had motivated him to make a defence of himself and Socrates whose pupil he was. If he was already considering a new approach to the problem then it should not be surprising if we should also find mention of his solution in the works that contain his defence. This, in fact, is what we find. The Memorabilia, the Anabasis and the Hellenica, which, as has been demonstrated, contain apologetic elements, also express political ideas that differ markedly from his earlier views on the subject of Greek unity. Since these ideas are sometimes expressed in oblique ways, before we undertake consideration of them, it is necessary to look at Xenophon's method of presentation.

One of the most obvious ways in which Xenophon presents ideas is to take some figure from an earlier generation and to idealize him to such an extent that he becomes the perfect biographical expression of these ideas. We have already seen that he does this in the Cyropaedia, where Cyrus the Great becomes the ideal monarch, although we know that not all his actions were of such an ideal nature.¹ Xenophon uses Socrates in somewhat the

¹Herodotus, I, 95-216. See also R. Hoistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King, 82-86.

same manner but the account is tempered because other people still remembered the historical Socrates when the Memorabilia was written.

Closely related to this biographical method is what might be called autobiographical expression. Xenophon portrays himself in the Anabasis acting out the ideas that are enunciated by Socrates in the Memorabilia. As has already been shown there is a close identification between his religious piety and the teachings of Socrates as Xenophon gives them.² Thus through his association with Socrates he enhances his own reputation.

It is this method of expression that also enables Xenophon to speak out on the political issues of the day. In the Memorabilia Socrates engages in political discussions with three men--Pericles, Glaucon, and Charmides. Of immediate concern are the latter two. Glaucon was a foolish youth ἐπιθυμῶν προστατεύειν τῆς πόλεως³ who had become καταγέλαστος. Socrates through skillful questioning shows Glaucon how utterly ignorant he is and thus restrains him from making further foolish statements in public. The implication is that if one knows nothing about politics one should keep quiet. On the contrary Socrates' discussion with

²Not only in religion but also in the area of philanthropia is Xenophon portrayed as the embodiment of Socrates' teaching. Cf. Mem. III, 9, 14, 15 and Anab. VII, 6, 4; 8, 23.

³Mem. III, 6, 1.

Charmides, who does understand politics, is concluded by the following:

καὶ μὴ ἀμέλει τῶν τῆς πόλεως,
 εἴ τι δυνατόν ἐστι διὰ σέ βέλτιον ἔχειν.
 τούτων γὰρ καλῶς ἔχόντων οὐ μόνον οἱ
 ἄλλοι πολῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ σοὶ φίλοι
 καὶ αὐτὸς σὺ οὐκ ἐλάχιστα ὠφελήσῃ. ⁴

It is the duty of the knowledgeable man to be active in political life in order to benefit his fellow citizens and hence himself. The motivation is once again the sort that Xenophon's age in retrospect would clearly understand. Since the idea of Xenophon as the embodiment of Socrates' teachings seems well developed in the spheres of religion and philanthropia, perhaps Xenophon here endows himself with Socratic authority to speak and act concerning the political situation in Greece.

Finally, Xenophon also uses speeches, given in a historical setting, and direct statement to express certain political ideas. The speech of Cyrus at the beginning of the inland march⁵ demonstrates this technique rather well. Cyrus, hoping to inspire his troops, sets before them a picture of Persian riches. Although this may have been the basic description of Persia that Cyrus actually gave to his troops in 401, the fact that Greeks read

⁴Mem. III, 7, 9. Both Xenophon and Plato agree that although Socrates did not particularly enjoy political involvement he showed his political concern by trying to make politicians better. Xenophon makes Socrates practical rather than ideological.

⁵Anab. I, 7, 6.

this after 370 must suggest to the minds of Xenophon's readers the desirability of an invasion of Persia to bolster the sagging fortunes of the Greek states.

To determine whether Xenophon is consciously presenting these ideas one requires some direct statement. That such statements exist in the works of Xenophon that are at present under consideration will be shown in our further discussion.

With the preceding methods of expression in mind let us turn to an analysis of Xenophon's attitudes toward the three states that were most prominently involved in the events that transpired during his lifetime. If Xenophon still felt the necessity of war against Persia that had led him to show great appreciation for the work of Agesilaus in Asia from 396 to 394 and if at the same time he had lost confidence in one-man rule, then it is reasonable that he would somehow involve Sparta, Athens or Thebes in such an undertaking.

The favourable portrayal of the Spartans in the Hellenica has been considered an indirect defence of Xenophon's relationship with them. Most certainly Xenophon exonerates the Spartans for their actions in enforcing the King's Peace by placing the blame for the beginning of hostilities upon the Argives, Boeotians and the Corinthians for accepting Persian gold.⁶ Xenophon also defends Agesilaus for acquitting Sphodrias (for Xenophon admits

⁶Hell. IV, 4, 2.

καὶ πολλοῖς ἔδοξεν αὕτη δὲ ἀδικώτατα ἐν Λακεδαίμονι <ἢ> δίκη κριθῆναι) ⁷

because of the philanthropia of their two sons and of Sphodrias' honourable behaviour after the acquittal.⁸ Certainly this invasion of Piraeus by Sphodrias (because of the monetary exhortation of the Thebans) was considered in a very grave light by the Athenians. Xenophon's portrayal of these affairs might seem an indirect apology for himself. I do not think that this is his purpose. Xenophon could not undertake a defence of his relationship with the Spartans because this would have emphasized the political gap between Athens and Sparta and would therefore have been contrary to his other purpose, namely, the uniting of all Greece under the hegemony of Athens and Sparta. E. Schwartz has suggested that the Hellenica is Xenophon's interpretation of Sparta's involvement in the events of the first half of the fourth century. He seeks to clarify Spartan action to the Athenians (and to other Greek states) in order to bring them closer together.⁹ I should modify this and say that this is one of his purposes in the second part of the Hellenica (II, 3, 10 - VII, 5, 27),¹⁰ but the first part

⁷Hell. V, 4, 24.

⁸Hell. V, 4, 33.

⁹Schwartz, E. "Quellenuntersuchung zur Griechischen Geschichte," Rhein. Mus., XLIV (1889) 161-193.

¹⁰In addition to presenting the rise, decline and fall of Sparta up to the Battle of Mantinea, Xenophon displays a fascination for instruction through biographical paradigms. See Peter Krafft, "Vier Beispiele des Xenophontischen in Xenophons Hellenika," Rhein. Mus. CX (1967) 103-150.

is much earlier and had been undertaken as a completion of Thucydides.¹¹

¹¹H. Richards ("The Hellenics of Xenophon," Class. Rev. XV [1901] 197-203) has demonstrated that only Hellenica I-II, 3, 10 (Hell. A) shows any clear resemblance to his earliest work, the Cynegeticus. Hell. B is distinctly different in style. MacLaren ("On the Composition of Xenophon's Hellenica," AJP LV [1934] 123-139) enumerates the following: 1) the annalistic method of reporting events is used in Hell. A but abandoned in Hell. B. 2) Sacrifices before a battle are mentioned only in Hell. B. 3) No expressions of praise or censure are found in Hell. A. 4) The words μήν, ἄτε, ὥστε, αὖ, μέντοι, γε, δὴ are rarely found in Hell. A but often in Hell. B. 5) The future optative is employed only in Hell. B. 6) The military usages in Hell. A are similar to those of Thucydides and are non-Doric; the usages in Hell. B are often Doric and characteristic of the Anabasis. 7) At the end of the account in Hell. B there is usually a short sentence containing a demonstrative word such as οὕτως that really adds nothing to the narrative; this phenomenon occurs 49 times in Hell. B, once in Hell. A. 8) Xenophon never speaks in the first person in Hell. A, but 19 times in Hell. B. E. MacLaren enumerates some other differences but I have chosen only those that I find most convincing. Many of the others can be dismissed either as subjective statement or as proportionate to the amount of material in each part of the work. This drastic change, because it occurs immediately after II, 3, 10 and is based on many instances, is interpreted as proof that a definite interval of time passed between the composition of Hell. A and B.

Xenophon's presentation of his relationship to the Spartans in the Anabasis further emphasizes that he has no intention of defending himself against any charge of being in sympathy with them. In fact, Xenophon stresses that he worked in complete harmony with the Spartan Cheirisophos. After Cheirisophos recognizes the worth of Xenophon to the army and also identifies him as an Athenian¹² there is complete harmony between the two leaders, except for one incident when there is disagreement over the treatment of a captive guide. Xenophon says that τοῦτό γε δὴ Χειρισόφῳ καὶ Ξενοφῶντι μόνον διάφορον ἐν τῇ πορείᾳ ἐγένετο...¹³ In addition to this Xenophon constantly shows the utmost deference to the Spartan state. As a result of this deference he, an Athenian, refuses to be chosen¹⁴ the single leader of the army, Λακεδαιμονίου ἀνδρὸς παρόντος. The Spartans deserve this respect because they are the strongest Greek state.

ὁρῶ γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῇ πατρίδι μου οὐ πρόσθεν ἐπαύσαντο
πολεμοῦντες πρὶν ἐποίησαν πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν ὁμολογεῖν
Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ αὐτῶν ἡγεμόνας εἶναι.¹⁵

That this deference is in accord with the will of the gods simply reinforces the position that the Spartans had attained. Clearly, then, Xenophon's relationship with the Lacedaemonians is not one to be despised or defended but rather exalted.

¹²Anab. III, 1, 45.

¹³Anab. IV, 6, 3.

¹⁴Anab. VI, 1, 26.

¹⁵Anab. VI, 1, 27. Xenophon is speaking.

Nevertheless, there is another aspect to the incident. Xenophon was the first choice of the soldiers.¹⁶ Later when Xenophon is on his way home but the army is in difficulty Xenophon sails back and goes to them. οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται ἐδέξαντο ἡδέως καὶ εὐθὺς εἶποντο ἄσμενοι .¹⁷ At another time Xenophon is described as φιλοστρατιώτης.¹⁸ Clearly, he had a great influence on and appeal to the soldiers. Cheirisophos indicates this in the speech he makes to the soldiers in accepting the highest command when he quotes someone as saying of Xenophon, before the election of one commanding officer, that αὐτὸν Τιμασίῳνι μᾶλλον ἄρχειν συνεθελήσθαι Δαρδανεῖ ὄντι τοῦ Κλεάρχου στρατεύματος ἢ ἑαυτῷ Λάκωνι ὄντι. This indicates that, although a supreme commander had been elected, Xenophon would always have an unofficial share of the command. In addition to portraying himself as the εὐεργέτης of the army, Xenophon here defines by example the role of the Athenians in a united Greece. In the contrast between his own and the leadership of Clearchus, the Spartan, the need for Athenian influence in Greek politics is most evident. The first two books of the Anabasis give us an insight into the activities of Clearchus as primus inter pares. Xenophon sums up Clearchus' leadership²⁰ as follows: a) he was fond of war; b) he was in a constant state of readiness for

¹⁶Anab. VI, 1, 19.

¹⁷Anab. VII, 2, 9.

¹⁸Anab. VII, 6, 4.

¹⁹Anab. VI, 1, 32. The συν probably goes with ἄρχειν.

²⁰Anab. II, 6, 1-15.

battle; c) he was self-controlled in frightening circumstances. The next point is introduced with the statement, καὶ ἀρχικὸς δ' ἐλέγετο εἶναι...²¹ The word ἐλέγετο indicates that there is some doubt in Xenophon's mind about the accuracy of this statement. He then goes on to admit that Clearchus was competent in providing for his army. It is in the area of human relations that Xenophon disagreed with the Spartan for he relied strictly on compulsion and punished the army on principle because he said

ὥς δέοι τὸν στρατιώτην φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον

τὸν ἄρχοντα ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους, εἰ μέλλοι

ἢ φυλακὰς φυλάξειν ἢ φίλων ἀφέξεσθαι ἢ

ἀπροφασίστως ἰέναι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους.²²

The result of this kind of leadership was that in danger his men followed him readily but, when the danger was past, those who could would ~~desert~~ him for another commander. Xenophon ends the section concerning Clearchus' relationship to his soldiers thus:

καὶ γὰρ οὖν φιλία μὲν καὶ εὐνοία ἐπομένους οὐδέποτε εἶχεν.²³

²¹Anab. II, 6, 8. The word ἐλέγετο is a third person passive. Whenever Xenophon wishes to express praise or blame he does so in the first person as in the rest of this passage. Impersonal or third-person construction usually indicates that Xenophon does not agree. Consider the incident of Sphodrias; Hell. V, 4, 15-34.

²²Anab. II, 6, 10.

²³Anab. II, 6, 13.

The implication is that, in addition to instilling discipline, leadership must develop friendship and goodwill among the followers--something the Spartan had failed to do.

Clearchus has another fault as well. Although he is a good administrator, he lacks directive ability. G. B. Nussbaum²⁴ has traced extensively his attempts to deceive the army by failing to go through the organizational channels that the Greek soldiers assumed to be in existence. Thus Clearchus lost the confidence of the army, and in its place mistrust and suspicion arose. It was, in fact, his total lack of inventiveness and reluctance to commit himself to a course of action that precipitated the crisis in which the army found itself when Xenophon was elected general.²⁵ The contrast is obvious. Clearchus the Spartan although a good military administrator, failed miserably in the important areas of human relations and political resourcefulness. On the other hand, under the combined direction of the Spartan, Cheirisophos (who possessed mainly administrative ability)²⁶

²⁴G. B. Nussbaum, The Ten Thousand, 118-120.

²⁵Anab. II, 2, 1-5, 34.

²⁶See G. B. Nussbaum, The Ten Thousand, 117. Part of the success of this leadership also lies in its greater dependence on the assembly. Xenophon displays an increased awareness of the limitations of the individual and a more active reliance on collective ingenuity than he does in the Cyropaedia. This is a more democratic attitude.

and the Athenian Xenophon (who specialized in philanthropia and inventiveness) the army survived and escaped from its dangerous situation. Thus it is the harshness and lack of creative policy-making of the Spartans that evoke Athenian influence in Greek politics.

Nevertheless, throughout the speeches in the Anabasis Xenophon frequently makes the point that to survive against the Persians good leadership and discipline are absolutely essential,

ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρχόντων οὐδὲν ἂν οὔτε καλὸν
οὔτε ἀγαθὸν γένοιτο ὥς μὲν συνελόντι
εἰπεῖν οὐδαμοῦ, ἐν δὲ δὴ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς
παντάπασιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ εὐταξία σφῶζειν δοκεῖ,
ἡ δὲ ἀταξία πολλοὺς ἤδη ἀπολώλεκεν. ²⁷

Only under skillful guidance, with unity among the ranks, will the Greeks be able λαμβάνειν τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων. But faction and division can lead only to destruction. ²⁸

In order to avoid this the leader must be strong and willing to exercise discipline. The Spartans are the strongest. But the people of culture and refinement, with an awareness of human dignity, are the Athenians. Because of their appeal to the other Greeks they can be the unifying force by means of which all Greece may unite under Sparta's leadership but whom Sparta must acknowledge particularly in making policy.

The Hellenica clearly reinforces this suggestion. Sparta is the strongest. She is the disciplinarian. She enforces the

²⁷Anab. III, 1, 38. Cf. III, 2, 29-32.

²⁸Anab. V, 6, 32.

King's Peace of 386.²⁹ The Spartans were defeated in the Battle of Leuctra³⁰ by the Thebans (as agents of the gods) not because they were the weakest, since they still had two regiments (one-third of the army) at home, but because they had misused their power.³¹ After this battle we find the Athenians taking the lead in establishing an alliance based on the King's Peace and thus in essence uniting much of Greece under Spartan leadership while still maintaining αὐτονόμους εἶναι ὁμοίως καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας πόλεις.³² Before the Battle of Leuctra there is a series of three speeches delivered by Athenian ambassadors to Sparta.³³ Among these the first speaker, Callias, speaks in diplomatic fashion about the desirability of peace between Athens and Sparta from a historical and a religious perspective. The second speaker, Autocles, in pointing out the causes of war, speaks out on behalf of the other cities of Greece. Finally, the third speaker, Callistratus, points out the advantages of an alliance among the cities of Greece with Athens and Sparta taking the lead for

εἰσὶ μὲν δῆπου πασῶν τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν τὰ
 ὑμέτερα, αἱ δὲ τὰ ἡμέτερα φρονούσαι, καὶ ἐν
 ἑκάστη πόλει οἱ μὲν λακωνίζουσιν, οἱ ἀττικίζουσιν. ³⁴

²⁹Hell. V, 1, 35, 36.

³⁰Hell. VI, 4, 13-15.

³¹Hell. V, 4, 1.

³²Hell. VI, 5, 1-3.

³³Hell. VI, 3, 1-20.

³⁴Hell. VI, 3, 14.

That Athens fulfills the role of uniting Greece in a historical situation does not necessarily mean that Xenophon had this in mind for her. That ambassadors make speeches that suggest this course of action to his readers does emphasize the role that Xenophon had defined for her by example in the Anabasis.

The presentation of the political activities from 374 to 369 in the Hellenica³⁵ reveals clearly what policies Xenophon endorsed by the attitudes he expresses toward the men involved. Two of the men who are linked in the narrative are the Athenians, Iphicrates and Callistratus (mentioned earlier). When Xenophon has given the account of Iphicrates' hasty sea voyage to Corcyra to give aid to the democratic faction fighting against the Spartans and commended him for his training methods, he writes the following.

ἰ ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταύτην τὴν στρατηγίαν τῶν
 Ἰφικράτους οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐπαινῶ, ἔπειτα καὶ
 τὸ προσελέσθαι κελεύσαι ἑαυτῷ Καλλίστρατόν
 τε τὸν δημηγόρον, οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον ὄντα³⁶

Two very important points emerge from this passage. First, the words οὐχ ἥκιστα indicate that, although there has been no mention of it thus far, Iphicrates' attempt to work together with Callistratus is one of the foremost reasons for the praise that he receives in the Hellenica. Second, we notice that in some way they were opposed to one another (Καλλίστρατον οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον ὄντα).). This difference between them was political.

³⁵Hell. VI, 2, 1, - VII, 1, 14.

³⁶Hell. VI, 2, 39.

Callistratus was concerned with bringing about peace between Athens and Sparta.³⁷ Iphicrates' antagonism to the Lacedaemonians becomes apparent in his delaying tactics³⁸ as general of the army that was to go to the aid of Spartans when the Thebans invaded their land late in 370. This activity is summed up as follows:

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλο τι καλῶς ἐστρατήγησεν, οὐ
 φέγω· ἐκεῖνα μέντοι ἃ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ἐκείνῳ
 ἔπραξε, πάντα εὐρίσκω τὰ μὲν μάτην, τὰ δὲ
 καὶ ἄσυμφόρως πεπραγμένα αὐτῷ.

At another point in describing Iphicrates' behaviour he asks the rhetorical question, *πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀφροσύνη;*³⁹ In this statement and by the use of the words *μάτην* and *ἄσυμφόρως* Xenophon indicates his sense of frustration because of the failure of the Athenian army to aid Sparta effectively. In Xenophon's mind Iphicrates must bear the blame for this. Athens could have made the ties with Sparta much stronger through an effectual program of aid. That this did not occur could only be the result of Iphicrates' deliberate policy since he had displayed outstanding military ability previously.

The structure of the narrative⁴⁰ of the conference at Athens in 370 that resulted in the auxiliary expedition of Iphicrates also reveals what policies and which speakers were of importance to Xenophon. A. Banderet has enumerated some of the important

³⁷Hell. VI, 3, 3.

³⁸Hell. VI, 5, 49.

³⁹Hell. VI, 5, 51 and 52.

⁴⁰Hell. VI, 5, 33-49.

points.⁴¹ The two speeches that hold our attention and are central to the account are those of Cleiteles the Corinthian and Procles the Phliasian. The introduction to these speeches is a generalized statement of what the Spartan ambassadors said, then a hasty résumé of specific points and the result--an uproar in the Athenian assembly. Then come the two speeches and in the concluding statement Xenophon hastily passes over the arguments of the opposition with the following words: μετὰ ταῦτα ἐβούλοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀντιλεγόντων οὐκ ἡνείχοντο ἀκούοντες...⁴² From the list of names of the Spartan ambassadors it is obvious that the author did have more specific knowledge concerning the arguments and courses of action suggested by the other parties than he mentions in his account. He has suppressed this information in order to give prominence to the two speeches he does narrate.

The first speech,⁴³ by Cleiteles, is very short and makes the Corinthians innocent victims, suffering at the hands of the Thebans. Therefore they deserve the aid of Athens. In an assembly dealing with Spartan-Athenian relations this speech that justifies Corinth seems almost superfluous. What we do have here is Corinth acting as a mediator between Athens and Sparta. One must remember that at this time Xenophon himself was living

⁴¹A. Banderet, Untersuchungen zu Xenophons Hellenika, commentary to the passage specified.

⁴²Hell. VI, 5, 49.

⁴³Hell. VI, 5, 37.

at Corinth. The Corinthian policy enunciated and demonstrated in this passage attracted him to this city. Thus Xenophon's personal politics influenced the narrative structure.

Procles' speech,⁴⁴ by far the longer and therefore structurally more important, urges that the Athenians give aid to the Lacedaemonians. He gives the following reasons: 1) If they refuse, the Thebans will turn against Attica after devastating Sparta and Athens will then have to fight them alone.⁴⁵ 2) The Athenians' past history (when they aided all who were wronged and fled to them for refuge) compels them to undertake to assist Sparta.⁴⁶ 3) There is the hint of another war with Persia (εἴ ποτε πάλιν ἔλθοι τῇ Ἑλλάδι κίνδυνος ὑπὸ βαρβάρων). In such a circumstance, whom would they rather trust as allies than the Spartans whose countrymen fell at Thermopylae before the Persian (ὁ βάρβαρος) could gain entry into Greece.⁴⁷ 4) The gods who see and know all have provided this opportunity (ὕμῖν δὲ νῦν ἐκ θεῶν τινος καιρὸς παραγεγέννηται) for Athenians to aid the Spartans and obtain them as staunch (ἀπροφασίστους) allies.⁴⁸ The decision of the Athenian assembly to follow the advice of Procles could be

⁴⁴Hell. VI, 5, 38-48.

⁴⁵Hell. VI, 5, 38, 39.

⁴⁶Hell. VI, 5, 44-47.

⁴⁷Ibid., 43.

⁴⁸Ibid., 41.

seen as proof of the historical importance of this speech and therefore one could argue that the structure in no way indicates any personal political concerns of Xenophon. However, in the next year at another conference in Athens to discuss the terms of the alliance Procles, the Phliasian ambassador to Athens, emphasizes (again in a speech)⁴⁹ that the relationship between the two cities should be one of united leadership with Athens ruling by sea and Sparta by land.

ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ

μᾶλλον ἢ θεῖα φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ διωρίσθαι.⁵⁰

That Athens and Sparta share the hegemony of the Greek states is divine will. The speech from which this sentence is taken is again the longest, the most explicit, and central to the structure, yet this time the assembly acts differently from what Procles advises. Thus we have two speeches (similar in theme) by the same man given equal narrative importance but varying in the response they evoke. That Xenophon records the second speech, although it may be historically insignificant and is a minority opinion, whereas he virtually ignores the minority view in the previous account, indicates the accord that he feels for the ideas that Procles expresses.

⁴⁹Hell. VII, 1, 1-14.

⁵⁰Hell. VII, 1, 2. This in no way contradicts the humanitarian role emphasized earlier. Nowhere has Xenophon suggested that Athens should not be involved in martial leadership as well.

The presentation of the Boeotians in Xenophon's works is of interest because he is often accused of prejudice toward the Thebans and of ignoring Epaminondas.⁵¹ That he ignores Epaminondas may be questioned. Albert Banderet has noted that, when Epaminondas was first elected general, Pelopidas still exercised a great deal of influence in Thebes.⁵² Epaminondas' early reputation is probably the result of an exaggerated account by historians such as Kallisthenes, called anti-Spartan and pro-Boeotian by K. Münscher.⁵³ To this one might add the observation that since the settlement that Epaminondas made with the Achaeans was criticized and revoked at Thebes we might conclude that in 367 his influence was not as great as is sometimes suggested.⁵⁴ When he does assume the undisputed leadership of the Boeotians he receives the admiration of Xenophon.

εὐτυχῇ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγε φήσαιμι τὴν
στρατηγίαν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι· ὅσα μέντοι προνοίας

⁵¹For the latest discussion see W. P. Henry, Greek Historical Writing, 194.

⁵²A. Banderet, Untersuchungen zu Xenophons Hellenika, Commentary to VII, 1, 33-38.

⁵³K. Münscher, "Xenophon in der Griechischen-Römischen Literatur," Philologus, Supp. XIII, 30.

⁵⁴Hell. VII, 1, 41-43.

ἔργα καὶ τόλμης ἐστίν, οὐδὲν μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ
ἐλλιπεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐπαινῶ⁵⁵

Then Xenophon goes on to praise several of his tactical manoeuvres and his leadership. Thus the author evinces an appreciation for Epaminondas similar to what he has for many other individuals.

That he presents the Boeotians in general and the Thebans in particular in a bad light is the result of their working at cross-purposes to him. Almost as soon as Xenophon begins to offer advice to his fellow Greeks in the Anabasis a man with a Boeotian dialect suggests that the only means of safety for the army lies in negotiation with the Persian king.⁵⁶ This man's attitude is rejected because events have shown that the Persians cannot be trusted. A man with such ideas καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καταισχύνει καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ὅτι Ἕλληνας ὠντοιοῦτός ἐστιν.⁵⁷ This attitude is unworthy of the Greek race (and in a humorous moment the man turns out to ^{be} a kind of Lydian who wears earrings).⁵⁸ Later in the Anabasis Xenophon has further trouble with Thorax, the Boeotian,⁵⁹ ὅς περὶ στρατηγίας Ξενοφῶντι ἐμάχετο. In the Hellenica the Thebans are constantly negotiating with Persia and seeking the hegemony of the Greek states. In this they do not have the support of their fellow Boeotians.⁶⁰ Perhaps the most obvious statement of

⁵⁵Hell. VII, 5, 8.

⁵⁶Anab. III, 1, 26.

⁵⁷Anab. III, 1, 30.

⁵⁸Anab. III, 1, 31.

⁵⁹Anab. V, 6, 25. Cf. V, 6, 19, 25.

⁶⁰Hell. VI, 3, 19, 20.

Theban intentions is found after the description of the Battle of Leuctra. The Thebans now wish to become enforcers of a new King's Peace that has been written out according to their request.⁶¹ They invite all the Greek cities to come and hear it proclaimed. When the ambassadors are present, they ask them to swear but the ambassadors reply that they have come to hear, not to swear. Xenophon ends the account with the following words: καὶ αὕτη μὲν ἡ Πελοπίδου καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς περιβολὴ οὕτω διελύθη.⁶² The word αὕτη seems to indicate that there were other attempts of a similar nature. Perhaps W. P. Henry is correct when he says that Xenophon reflected an age that hated the Thebans and deservedly so.⁶³ Certainly it would be unsuitable for such a state to try to bring about harmony among the Greek states.

The ideas that Xenophon expresses about the three leading Greek states indicate that: 1) Sparta is basically the strongest and the best equipped to fight on land and to act as an executive body but she lacks humanity; 2) Athens is more appealing to the Greeks because she has a greater sense of the humane and she is naturally the leader by sea; 3) Thebes, although her people are good soldiers, is hated by most Greeks and therefore cannot undertake a leading role.

Since we have established that Xenophon supported a united hegemony for Greece we must next determine whether the presentation of the Persians is also coherent with his purpose. They

⁶¹Hell. VII, 1, 36.

⁶²Hell. VII, 1, 40.

⁶³Henry, Greek Historical Writing, 194.

are the ancestral enemies of the Greeks.⁶⁴ The Greeks are hardly superior to the Persians in fighting for did they not defeat a vast Persian army at Cunaxa almost by themselves?⁶⁵ In fact the Greeks were such good fighters during the Anabasis that later the Persian satrap, Tissaphernes, remembering how Cyrus' Greek forces fought and thinking all the Greeks similar, οὐκ ἐβούλετο μάχεσθαι but would rather negotiate.⁶⁶ In addition, Xenophon presents the luxury of the Persian. At the beginning of the Anabasis Cyrus makes a speech to the Greeks portraying the riches of Persia.⁶⁷ Later the Greek soldiers enter villages rich in all kinds of foods, which are described in some detail.⁶⁸ In the Hellenica Pharnabazus and his luxurious carpets are contrasted with the simplicity of the Greeks.⁶⁹

Not only, however, is Persia a land of riches. Its people are also weak and easily conquered. In his account of events after 374 Xenophon shows a certain preoccupation with Persia that often appears in his narrative. P. Krafft⁷⁰ has analysed the story of Jason⁷¹ and concludes that the author makes many

⁶⁴Anab. III, 1, 12, 13.

⁶⁵Anab. III, 2, 14-16.

⁶⁶Hell. III, 2, 18.

⁶⁷Anab. I, 7, 6.

⁶⁸Anab. II, 3, 14-16.

⁶⁹Hell. IV, 29-32.

⁷⁰P. Krafft, "Vier Beispiele des Xenophontischen in Xenophons Hellenika," Rhein. Mus., CX (1967) 103-150.

assumptions about his readers' understanding of the behaviour of Jason. Hence he tells us that Jason went about building morale among his soldiers and rewarding them. But Xenophon does not say why Jason undertook these procedures. He assumes that the reader knows that these are the actions of a good leader as described in the Cyropaedia. These assumptions show that Xenophon was so involved in his own thoughts that he failed to notice that he really conveyed little historical information. This explains why in the midst of Jason's plans for expansion we suddenly find a discussion of the Persians and how easily they could be conquered. Jason ends his discussion of Persia with the words, οἶδα γὰρ πάντας τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἀνθρώπους πλὴν ἑνὸς μάλλον δουλείαν ἢ ἀλήθειαν μεμελετηκότας.⁷² Krafft suggests that for someone who is talking about the military and political weakness of a people to be concerned with one exception (πλὴν ἑνός) is ridiculous. The point is that Xenophon is projecting his own thoughts about Persia into the conversation. In fact, talk of conquering Persia is ludicrous for someone who has not yet gained control of the territory on either side of his own state. This discussion of Persia is a subjective viewpoint of Xenophon coming to the surface quite unconsciously with the talk of expansion.⁷³

This same preoccupation with expansion to the East is evident in the Anabasis. The Persian empire is described thus

⁷²Hell. VI, 1, 12.

⁷³Cf. Hell. VII, 1, 38.

by Xenophon: καὶ συνιδεῖν δ' ἦν τῷ προσέχοντι τὸν νοῦν τῇ
 βασιλέως ἀρχῇ πλήθει μὲν χώρας καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα,
 τοῖς δὲ μήκεσι τῶν ὁδῶν καὶ τῷ διεσπᾶσθαι τὰς δυνάμεις ἀσθενής,
 εἴ τις διὰ ταχέων τὸν πόλεμον ποιοῖτο.⁷⁴ Clearly, Xenophon has
 considered this empire and noted its weakness, εἴ τις (Greek?)
 should undertake a campaign. The most direct statement of a
 Greek campaign against Persia comes in a speech Xenophon makes
 to his army. One of the motivating factors he suggests for
 trying to return home is the improvement of the Greek lot.
 δοκεῖ οὖν μοι εἰκὸς καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι πρῶτον εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ
 πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους πειρᾶσθαι ἀφικνεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπιδεῖξαι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν
 ὅτι ἐκόντες πένονται, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς τοὺς νῦν σκληρῶς ἐκεῖ πολιτεύ-
 οντας ἐνθάδε κομισαμένους πλουσίους ὁρᾶν.⁷⁵ He suggests
 that if a Greek is suffering from poverty (and many Greeks were
 after the Peloponnesian War and the quarrels of the early fourth
 century) it is his own fault because the riches of Persia are
 there to be taken.

Finally, let us consider Socrates' discussion with Pericles
 in the Memorabilia.⁷⁶ The first point Socrates makes is that
 historically and in matters of unity the Athenians surpass the
 Boeotians.⁷⁷ The Spartans are superior to the Athenians because

⁷⁴Anab. I, 5, 9.

⁷⁵Anab. III, 2, 26.

⁷⁶Mem. 3, 5.

⁷⁷Mem. 2-4.

of their obedience, harmony and their training.⁷⁸ The Athenians, however, historically shared the laurels for great deeds with the Spartans.⁷⁹ Now finally (although this is not the obvious purpose of the dialogue) Socrates points out that the Mysians and the Pisidians κούφως ὥπλισμένοι δύνανται πολλὰ μὲν τὴν βασιλέως χώραν καταθέοντες κακοποιεῖν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ζῆν ἐλεύθεροι.⁸⁰ This mention of the King's territory seems relatively meaningless to the obvious purpose. Xenophon could have chosen other examples. This choice indicates that there is in this dialogue a second level of intent that emphasizes much that has been suggested in the Anabasis and the Hellenica.

The question whether Xenophon consciously took up this political theme in his writings has been put by Mesk.⁸¹ In order to answer this it seems best now to return to the last chapter of the Cyropaedia. If one can find in this section (so radically different from the rest of the work) some evidence of the ideas just presented I believe it fair to assume that it was the conscious political purpose of Xenophon to urge the Greeks to unite against the Persians.

The first point that Xenophon makes is that the Persians have deteriorated and at the present time are much worse than in the past.⁸² This deterioration was unknown to the Greeks who

⁷⁸Mem. 15-17.

⁷⁹Mem. 10-11.

⁸⁰Mem. 3, 5, 26.

⁸¹Mesk, J. "Die Tendenz der Xenophontischen Anabasis," Wien. Stud., XLIII (1922-23) 136-146.

⁸²Cyr. VIII, 8, 2, 4.

joined the expedition of Cyrus the Younger.⁸³ Physically, they have grown weak because of luxury; they have ceased to hunt.⁸⁴ Finally, any wars they undertake require the help of the Greek mercenaries even when fighting against the Greeks.⁸⁵ From this, it appears first that the Greeks who undertook the expedition with Cyrus are not to be censured since they were deluded by promises that the Persians failed to keep--a statement apologetic in nature. That the Persians have become lazy and degenerate seems an insufficient motive, in and of itself, for writing this last chapter unless it contributes to an overall conscious purpose, namely, a Greek expedition directed against these Persians.

The question, "When did Xenophon conceive of this purpose?" is raised by J. Morr,⁸⁶ who suggests that Xenophon became conscious of such an excursion during the *Anabasis* in 401/0. This is undoubtedly true. Under what sort of leadership this military expedition was to take place was not however satisfactorily resolved in Xenophon's mind until later in his life. It seems to me that the conscious purpose of uniting the Greeks under the combined leadership of Athens and Sparta must coincide with Xenophon's growing disillusionment with one-man rule. Historically, this occurred about the time of the Battle of Leuctra.

⁸³Cyr. VIII, 8, 2, 3.

⁸⁴Cyr. VIII, 8, 2, 12.

⁸⁵Cyr. VIII, 8, 2, 26.

⁸⁶Morr, J. "Xenophon und der Gedanke eines all-Griechischen Eroberungszuges gegen Persien," Wien. Stud. XLV (1926-27) 186-201.

Certainly, this agrees with the date of publication of the Memorabilia and the Anabasis (see supra 54,55).

Why did Xenophon undertake to set the desirability of a campaign against the Persians before the eyes of Greece? From boyhood he had been influenced by or involved in war. It was a part of the heroic and, perhaps, aristocratic tradition. The inevitability of war seemed to Xenophon's generation to be an established fact. If Greece must be at war, let it be against an external foe. Internal strife could lead only to self-annihilation. Xenophon's own words in concluding the Hellenica and the description of the Battle of Mantinea express this idea most vividly.

τούτων δὲ πραχθέντων τούναντίον ἐγεγένητο οὐ ἐνόμισαν πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἔσεσθαι. συνεληλυθυίας γὰρ σχεδὸν ἀπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ ἀντιτεταγμένων, οὐδεὶς ἦν ὅστις οὐκ ᾔετο, εἰ μάχη ἔσοιτο, τοὺς μὲν κρατήσαντας ἄρξειν, τοὺς δὲ κρατηθέντας ὑπηκόους ἔσεσθαι· ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὕτως ἐποίησεν ὥστε ἀμφοτέρω μὲν τροπαῖον ὡς νενικηκότες ἐστήσαντο, τοὺς δὲ ἰσταμένους οὐδέτεροι ἐκώλυνον, νεκροὺς δὲ ,ἀμφοτέρω μὲν ὡς νενικηκότες ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδωκαν, ἀμφοτέρω δὲ ὡς ἡττημένοι ὑποσπόνδους ἀπελάμβανον, νενικηκέναι δὲ φάσκοντες ἑκάτεροι οὔτε χώρα οὔτε πόλει οὔτε ἀρχῇ οὐδέτεροι οὐδὲν πλέον ἔχοντες ἐφάνησαν ἢ πρὶν τὴν μάχην γενέσθαι· ἀκρισία δὲ καὶ ταραχὴ ἔτι πλείων μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐγένετο ἢ πρόσθεν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι.

CHAPTER VII

XENOPHON AND ISOCRATES

Before we consider Xenophon's last study, de vectigalibus, it is necessary to discuss briefly the work of another literary figure of the fourth century whom because of the obvious similarities of theme in his writings we can no longer ignore. Isocrates was born in 436.¹ He studied under Gorgias of Leontini,² one of the first (at the Olympic festival of 408) to urge the Greeks to unite and make war against the barbarians.³ He was also a ἐταῖρος of Socrates for whom Socrates predicted a great future.⁴ Of particular concern to us are four of his works published in Xenophon's lifetime, the Panegyricus in 380,⁵ his letters to Dionysius after 370⁶ and to Archidamus in 356,⁷ and de Pace in 355.⁸

¹In the archonship of Lysimachos, 436/5, Ol. 86.1: Diog. Laert. 3.3.

²Cicero, Orator, 176.

³Philostratus, Ep. 73 in H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, edited by Walther Kranz; sixth edition, II, 279. F.W. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit, I, 59 argues for 392.

⁴Plato, Phaedrus, 278,279.

⁵This work was written when Athens was without any position of leadership and Sparta was at the height of her power, hence, shortly before the Second Athenian Confederacy of 378/7.

⁶After 370 since the Spartans are no longer in power; Ep.,1,8.

⁷Isocrates says he was eighty years of age when he wrote it; Ep. 9,16.

⁸The revolts of Chios, Kos, Rhodes and Byzantium, which occurred between 357 and 355, are specifically referred to in de Pace 16.

In the Panegyricus Isoc̃rates addresses himself to a number of political problems. In 380 Sparta as the enforcer of the King's Peace held almost absolute sway over Greece. Although Athens had little authority outside Attica, Isocrates sensed the disillusionment with Sparta present in some states. When he writes, τῶν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων οἱ μὲν ὑφ' ἡμῖν, οἱ δ' ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίοις εἰσίν,⁹ he is obliquely calling upon Athens to reestablish her leadership among the Greek states. Tactfully (because Sparta held the hegemony at this time) he says that Athens and Sparta should share the hegemony of Greece.¹⁰ He then goes on to explain why Athens deserves the leadership. She has held a traditional place of honour among the Greek states and has bestowed the greatest benefits on her fellow-Greeks.¹¹ Nowhere does he mention any reason why Sparta should have a share in the hegemony. Instead he says that the Spartans are hard to persuade, παρειλήφασι γὰρ ψευδῆ λόγον, ὥς ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἡγεῖσθαι πάτριον· ἦν δ' ἐπιδείξει τις αὐτοῖς ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν ἡμετέραν οὔσαν μᾶλλον ἢ κείνων¹² In another passage, while defending the actions of Athens in the punishment of Melos, (416 B.C.), Isocrates emphasizes that the harsh treatment of Athens' allies, although at times necessary, was still more restrained than the behaviour of the Spartans.¹³

⁹Pan. 16.

¹⁰Pan. 17.

¹¹Pan. 21, 22.

¹²Pan. 18

¹³Pan. 100-106.

Clearly, as he says later,¹⁴ he was calling on Athens to unite the Greek states. The motivation for establishing this hegemony was a lack of homonia in Greece about 380. Greek states were in financial trouble. As a result they became aggressive toward one another in the hope of easing their economic distress by seizing land and wealth from neighbouring states.¹⁵ At the same time each state experienced internal quarrels because of strife between rich and poor.¹⁶ To alleviate the economic crises the Greeks needed a state to lead a campaign against Persia. In this conquest of a large portion of Persia, plunder and wealth would be brought back to Greece and the poverty-stricken Greeks from the various states could be settled in Persia.¹⁷ This, then, is to be the nature of the hegemony-leadership in a war against Persia, which will be voluntarily accepted by other Greek

¹⁴Antidosis 57, 58. K. Bringman, Studien zu den politischen Ideen des Isokrates, 28-46, disputes this idea that Isocrates urged a revival of the naval empire. I think that by praising the first Confederacy (Pan. 103-106) and using it as an example of how to benefit the Greek states, he gave strong impetus to the reestablishment of the naval empire at Athens whether this was his intention or not.

¹⁵Pan. 173, 174.

¹⁶Pan. 36.

¹⁷Pan. 173.

states.¹⁸ Isocrates must have been pleased to see the Second Athenian Confederacy begun in 378/7, which promised to each of Athens' allies ... ἐξεῖναι αὐ[τ]ῶ[ι] ἐλευθέρ[ω]ι ὄντι καὶ αὐτονόμωι, πολιτ[ευομέν]ωι πολιτεῖαν ἣν ἂν βούληται, μήτε [φρουρ]ὰν εἰσδεχομένωι μήτε ἄρχοντα ὑπο[δεχ]ομένωι μήτε φόρον φέροντι.¹⁹

Xenophon in the presentation of the ideas discussed in the previous chapter was obviously in agreement with Isocrates concerning the need for a campaign against Persia to relieve the financial distress in Greece. He also agreed that there was a need for someone to give leadership. That the Athenians should have a share in this leadership and that they were to fulfill a humane and harmonizing rôle in Greek politics were absolutely essential to the success of any united campaign. I think, however, that he differed strongly with Isocrates concerning Sparta. While Isocrates considered that Sparta was ἐμποδὼν τῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εὐδαιμονίᾳ,²⁰ Xenophon, as has been shown,

¹⁸Isocrates even suggests that they need not trouble the rest of Greece to contribute soldiers since all will want to join voluntarily when they see the nature of the expedition; Pan. 185.

¹⁹The decrees relating to this alliance are found in M. N. Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions, vol. 2, 118, 121, 122, 123. For the passage see 123. 15-23 (IG II² 43).

²⁰Pan. 20.

constantly, defers to the Spartans, since all Greece agrees that τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἡγεμόνας εἶναι.²¹

In the de Pace Isocrates reveals great dissatisfaction with the policies that Athens followed in the Second Athenian Alliance.

²¹Anab. VI, 1, 26, 27. The question whether Xenophon influenced Isocrates or vice-versa has been the subject of much controversy among German scholars. Cf. Josef Mesk, "Die Tendenz der Xenophontischen Anabasis," Wien. Stud., XLIII (1922) 136-146; Alfred Kappelmacher, "Xenophon und Isokrates," Wien. Stud., XLIII (1922) 212-213; Josef Morr, "Xenophon und der Gedanke eines allgriechischen Eroberungszuges gegen Persien," Wien. Stud., XLV (1927) 186-201; and K. Münscher, "Xenophon in der griechisch-römischen Literatur," Philologus, Supp. XIII, part II, 1-24. Since there is a demonstrable friendship between Xenophon and Isocrates (cf. Münscher, loc. cit.), it seems foolish to insist that, because a passage in one author is similar to a passage in the other author, one was therefore written before the other, or vice-versa, or perhaps at the same time. (The assumption is that priority of writing proves the first author to be the dominant influence.) Friends tend to exercise an unconscious influence on one another and often ideas between them have been discussed long before they appear in print. Thus we shall confine ourselves to pointing out some of the similarities and the differences in the works of Xenophon and Isocrates, admitting the dependence of one on the other.

Instead of uniting Greece, Athens conducted herself in such a way that Chios, Kos, Rhodes and Byzantium revolted from the confederacy in 357. As a result Isocrates wrote the de Pace to suggest χρῆναι ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ μόνον πρὸς Χίους καὶ Ῥοδίους καὶ Βυζαντίους καὶ Κώους ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους.²²

To emphasize this he expounds the thesis that injustice and imperialism are great folly and madness that bring disaster.²³

Even with all her riches Athens could not maintain the first empire.²⁴ Certainly in her present financially bereft condition Athens will not be able to control her second empire, although this seems to be her intention since she has fallen back into her old imperialistic attitude.²⁵ Sparta had also obtained a large empire and because of it was almost destroyed in a very short time.²⁶ As a result of imperialistic policy both cities obtained only the hatred of their fellow Greeks.²⁷ Therefore it becomes obvious that injustice, which is equated with imperialism, is unprofitable.

On the other hand, a policy based on εὐσέβεια, δικαιοσύνη, and σωφροσύνη (which are identified with repudiation of naval

²²de Pace 16.

²³de Pace 17.

²⁴de Pace 75-90.

²⁵de Pace 29.

²⁶de Pace 95.

²⁷de Pace 104, 105.

imperialism) will bring prosperity to the state.²⁸ If Athens will return to the original policy of the Second Naval League (to treat her allies as friends, not subjects, and to defend their autonomy) she will win the favour of the rest of Greece.²⁹ This policy seems to have taken precedence over the idea of a march against Persia.³⁰ Nevertheless Athens must still maintain a strong military organization to be used to aid other Greek states that have been oppressed or attacked unjustly.³¹ Athens will obtain the friendship of other states and will prosper if she seeks a position in Greece analagous to that of the Spartan kings, who could be put to death for wrongdoing but whom every Spartan was eager to defend at the cost, even of his life because of their position of honour.³²

That Isocrates had not given up his idea of war against Persia is indicated by several of the letters that he sent to various tyrants of his time. The first of these, to Dionysius of Syracuse, was written after 370.³³ In it he advises Dionysius that Athens will ally herself to him εἴ τι πράττοις ὑπὲρ τῆς

²⁸de Pace 63, 64.

²⁹de Pace 134, 135. This leads Isocrates to the statement:
μηδὲ δεσποτικῶς, ἀλλὰ συμμαχικῶς αὐτῶν ἐπιστατῶμεν.

³⁰de Pace 16.

³¹de Pace 136-141.

³²de Pace 142, 143.

³³See supra 89 n. 6.

'Ελλάδος ἀγαθόν.³⁴ In 356,³⁵ shortly before he wrote de Pace, he sent a letter to Archidamus in which he decried the lot of the Greeks and suggested that Archidamus would find the rest of Greece ready to choose him as leader in a united campaign against Persia.³⁶ Later he similarly urged Philip to undertake such a campaign, in which he would find Athens the most useful of all Greek cities if she should become his ally.³⁷ The conclusion that "the symmarchy of Isocrates' dream was a military entente of autonomous cities under a generalissimo who might be king in his own country, but among his allies was simply chosen as commander"³⁸ seems correct. However, when Isocrates wrote the de Pace he had become aware that Athens, rather than contributing to homonoia among Greek states, was again acting as a disruptive force in Greek politics. Hence, he changed his ideas about the campaign against Persia as they had been expressed in the Panegyricus in that he no longer thought that a Persian expedition would bring peace to Greece but, rather, that harmony among the Greek states was a prerequisite to a successful war against Persia. Therefore he urged Athens to forget about aggression against Persia since she seemed invariably to transfer this aggression to her fellow-

³⁴Ep. 1, 8.

³⁵See supra 90 n. 7.

³⁶Ep. 9, 17.

³⁷Ep. 12, 17.

³⁸E. Barker, "Greek Political Thought and Theory in the Fourth Century," CAH VI 519.

Greeks. Rather Athens should leave the leadership against the Persians to one of the monarchs of the time and concentrate on creating harmony among the Greeks.

It seems reasonably clear that in the de Pace Isocrates has suggested a role for Athens that is similar to what Xenophon has written (see supra 69-73). He differs from Xenophon in the type of leadership he envisages for Greece. Where Xenophon had earlier suggested a beneficent tyranny in which the King first conquers the state and then wins the loyalty of the people through philanthropia, Isocrates thought that the Greeks would voluntarily choose a monarch, Archidamus, as leader. At a later date Xenophon had gradually moved from the thought of a beneficent tyranny to the idea of Sparta (in alliance with Athens) responsible for the actual command against the Persians. Whether Isocrates ever honestly displayed any philo-Laconian attitudes is open to question.

Xenophon's final work, de vectigalibus, written about 355,³⁹

³⁹Dating is based on the condition of Athens presented in the work and on the statement that the Phocians are in control of Delphi (Vect. 5, 10), which happened in 356. He died shortly afterwards. W. Schwahn, "Die Xenophontischen ^{πόροι} und die athenische Industrie in vierten Jahrhundert," Rhein. Mus., LXXX (1931) 253-278, indicates his doubt about the authorship of this work. His view is opposed (correctly) by A. Wilhelm, "Untersuchungen zu Xenophons πόροι," Wien. Stud., LII (1934) 18-56.

shows some similarity to the de Pace in that Xenophon also opposes the idea that εἰς χρήματα κερδαλεώτερον ... εἶναι τῇ πόλει πόλεμον ἢ εἰρήνην.⁴⁰

Xenophon had seen that the financial distress of Athens had motivated her to follow a policy of injustice toward other cities and now he seeks a method of supplying Athens with the financial resources that will allow her to pursue a peaceful policy and remove enmities from her. He suggests increased responsibility for the metic,⁴¹ greater attention to the needs of commercial men,⁴² more lodging houses near the harbour to attract visitors,⁴³ a publicly owned merchant-fleet,⁴⁴ re-opening the silver mines at Laurium⁴⁵ and obtaining a public body of slaves.⁴⁶ If Athens is to enjoy this financial restoration she must have peace. Not coercion but good service to her fellow Greeks formerly gave Athens a position of ascendancy.⁴⁷

These suggested reforms appear to be radically liberal in nature. They stand out as attempts to make life more pleasing to immigrants, foreigners, and people who lacked the privileges

⁴⁰Vect. 5, 11.

⁴¹Vect. 2, 1-5.

⁴²Vect. 3, 1-4.

⁴³Vect. 3, 12.

⁴⁴Vect. 3, 14.

⁴⁵Vect. 4, 1-12.

⁴⁶Vect. 4, 14-25.

⁴⁷Vect. 5, 1 and 5.

of citizenship. They also reflect Xenophon's own attitudes to other Greeks as he revealed them at Scyllus.

In the next passage Xenophon once again re-echoes the political ideas and attitudes that have previously been discussed. His philo-Laconian feeling is still present:

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοι οὐ βιασθέντες ὑφ'
 ἡμῶν ἀλλ' εὖ πάσχοντες ἐπέτρεψαν Ἀθηναίοις
 περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας θέσθαι ὅπως βούλονται.⁴⁸

Once again he reminds the Athenians of the Spartan position and then suggests that Athens go about the business of reconciling Greece, καὶ ἄνευ πόνων καὶ ἄνευ κινδύνων καὶ δαπάνης.⁴⁹

Xenophon's philanthropia is displayed in his advice to Athens in defending herself. For if she should be wronged by any states but followed a policy of justice, he suggests, πολὺ θᾶττον ἂν τιμωροίμεθα αὐτούς, since the enemy οὐδένα... ἂν ἔχοιεν σύμμαχον.⁵⁰

In offering advice to Athens the final chapter reveals another of Xenophon's political ideas. He still maintains some of his respect for the old customs, institutions and religion. For he suggests, ἱερεῦσι δὲ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἱππεῦσι τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν.⁵¹ If it seems best to Athens to undertake these economic reforms, he says, συμβουλευσάμ' ἂν ἔγωγε πέμψαντας καὶ εἰς Δωδώνην καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐπερέσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς.⁵²

Thus the de vectigalibus reaffirms that Xenophon held many of the attitudes discussed in the previous chapters. These

⁴⁸Vect. 5, 7.

⁴⁹Vect. 5, 8.

⁵⁰Vect. 5, 13.

⁵¹Vect. 6, 1.

⁵²Vect. 6, 2.

always affected his ideas about Greek unity. However, the economic crisis that threatened Greece and caused much of the political turmoil forced him, as it did Isocrates, to pursue new ideas in the hope of solving the problem. Although he began by tracing a federal solution to the economic problem, the strife and discord among local states forced him to look for some means of setting before the eyes of Greece a state that could serve as a model in repudiating a policy of aggression against other Greeks and in seeking a solution to its problems within the confines of its own territory. Therefore he called upon Athens to make another effort to be a benefactor to all Greece, as she had been formerly, by pooling her internal resources and making certain commercial innovations to alleviate economic distress and so remove one of the causes of Greek disunity.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages we have traced Xenophon's political ideas as they varied throughout his lifetime. To this end we have looked carefully at his expressions of appreciation and censure concerning the events that he describes in the Hellenica. To amplify these statements, affinitive ideas in his other major works have been drawn into the discussion.

There are two paradoxical attitudes that Xenophon held. First, he maintained a deep and enduring respect for the aristocratic conception of the heroic warrior. The individual who surpassed all his fellows in religious piety, ability, knowledge and wisdom is seen in the Hellenica, the Cyropaedia and the Memorabilia.¹ This same notion is responsible for his philo-Laconian attitude. The Spartan warrior was the closest contemporary incorporation of this old ideal. Sparta's constitution still attempted to develop citizens of such a kind.

The second attitude that was deeply ingrained in Xenophon's mind has been designated as philanthropia. It was a respect for the customs, behaviour and persons of all men. This consideration led Xenophon to oppose the extreme oligarchy of Critias and to

¹Even Socrates engages in discussion of battle-tactics in the Memorabilia, III, 5. Xenophon reveals a soldier's fascination for military matters in almost all his works.

express appreciation for the work of Theramenes. It was this same conception that gave rise to the increased importance of the assembly that we find in the Anabasis and was enunciated in its most radical form in the de vectigalibus.

These attitudes are in a constant tension in Xenophon's writing. This tension is underlined by three things. First, his life's span covered a time of extremely rapid change. He saw the first Athenian empire and Athens as a rich and powerful state. He also saw the disintegration of the empire and later the financially bereft condition of Athens in 355. He also saw Sparta approach the pinnacle of power among the Greek states only to lose her control through harsh and inconsiderate treatment of other Greeks. Thus he felt that the solution for Athens was more discipline and for Sparta greater humaneness. Second, Xenophon had a sense of involvement in the events of his time that forced him to take a stand quickly, practically and therefore sometimes with limited objectivity. He was involved in the revolutions of 411 and 404. He was present at the Battle of Coronea. His son died in the cavalry skirmish before Mantinea in 362. Xenophon's exile from Athens also indicates active political involvement. Thus Xenophon's decisions and thoughts were in some measure affected by external forces. Third, we have a large collection of his works covering almost the entire spectrum of his life. I think that this invariably makes the task of finding a "consistency" in his work much more difficult since it seems to me a rare phenomenon when a person pursues only one interest with singleness of mind for an entire lifetime. Certainly Xenophon's

ideas under the stress of the changing times and constant involvement could hardly be expected to remain rigid from youth to old age.

Thus Xenophon's political ideas work themselves out in a tension between the concept of the heroic individual and the interest in mankind generally. It is his concern with the former that reveals itself in his espousal of oligarchy while the latter motivated him to support the moderates in 404. The defeat of Athens by Sparta and his friendship with Agesilaus again reinforced his admiration for the heroic individual and led to his writing of the Respublica Lacedaemoniorum and the Cyropaedia. His philanthropia brought about his disapproval of Sparta's and Agesilaus' activity after the King's Peace of 386. This attitude gains even more emphasis in the Anabasis where the assembly is of much greater importance to the leaders than the common people or the circle of advisers are to Cyrus in the Cyropaedia. Nevertheless he still maintained his interest in the individual, as is demonstrated in his accounts of Jason of Pherae,² Iphicrates,³ Epaminondas,⁴ and Socrates. In his last work, his concern for common people led him to suggest that metics be given greater political responsibility in Athens and other similarly radical ideas. Thus it is clear that politics for Xenophon meant

²Hell. VI, 1, 4-19 and 4, 20-37.

³Hell. VI, 2, 13-39.

⁴Hell. VII, 5, 4-25.

espousing the policy that the immediate situation demanded. Once again we are reminded of Socrates' discussion with Aristippus where the main point of the conversation is that the beautiful and the good are relative concepts.

πάντα γὰρ ἀγαθὰ μὲν καὶ καλὰ ἔστι πρὸς ᾧ ἂν εὖ ἔχη⁵

Xenophon lays great stress on καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.⁶ This is what he wishes to see among the Greek-speaking peoples and what he stresses in his own life. It seems reasonable, then, to expect Xenophon to make practical decisions in keeping with the circumstances.

In addition to the teaching of Socrates, to whom Xenophon ascribes this pragmatic philosophy of life, Gorgias may have influenced Xenophon to follow the course he did in the making of decisions. Wilhelm Nestle⁷ makes the following points: 1) Xenophon knew the teaching of Gorgias very well (cf. Anab. II, 6, 16-20); 2) one of Gorgias' main teachings was that decisions must be made on the basis of present circumstances, one's ultimate goal and whether one was dealing with friends or enemies; and 3) Xenophon rightly makes Gorgias the teacher of Proxenus, his friend, but ignores that he was also the teacher of Menon, his enemy. Thus Xenophon seems to have had some admiration for Gorgias.

⁵Mem. III, 8, 7.

⁶Lac. Pol. 10, 4.

⁷Wilhelm Nestle, "Xenophon und die Sophistik," Philologus, XCIV (1939) 31-50.

Whether we ascribe this pragmatic philosophy to Socrates or Gorgias, I think that Xenophon deliberately espoused the political policy that seemed best for the states of Hellas in a given situation. Thus one must be very careful in speaking of a political ideal in Xenophon since his politics were subject to change according to the circumstances.

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