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ABSTRACT

This paper is an attempt to explore some of the linkages between national and international political systems through an application of a modified version of Rosenau's pre-theory to the Sino-Indian and Sino-Burmese border disputes.

The Indian and Burmese cases presented contrasts on some of the variables considered in Rosenau's theory along with marked differences in the consequences of policy outputs. The case studies revealed important differences in the foreign policy making processes that could be linked to Rosenau's variables and to outcomes and consequences.

Concepts developed within the field of foreign policy analysis, the study of international political systems, and the theory of bargaining can readily be encompassed within the model. The model, however, presents some problems of definition and problems in causal analysis.
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The Model

A common method of distinguishing between approaches to the study of international politics has been that that distinguishes between the study of foreign policy and the study of the international political system. The foreign policy approach, found in most international relations textbooks, attempts to answer questions concerning the formation of a foreign policy and concerns itself with factors such as national goals, the personalities of the decision-makers, the nature of the governmental system and other factors that contribute to the formation of a policy. This approach has become most systematized and most restrictive in the decision making approach.


of Richard Snyder and his associates.\(^2\) Works with a systemic orientation focus upon such questions as the stability of the system, the integration or disintegration of the system or the presence or absence of violence in the system.

In his "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" James N. Rosenau pleads the need for an approach that will focus attention both on questions of formation of policy and upon the nature of the international system and also upon the linkages between system and sub-system. The foreign policy approach, as much as it treats the effect of factors in the international environment as inputs into the decision-making process, touches upon one of the linkages. This work however has in no way been carried on systematically. The other linkage, sub-system outputs into the system has not usually been a focus of attention. Even the first step in this direction, a classification of types of foreign policy outputs, has not often been taken.\(^3\)


made some attempt at linking sub-system and system. Even the most abstract systemic approaches usually differentiate sub-systems along the power dimension. There has been increasing attention given to the consequences for the system of different distributions of sub-systems differentiated according to such criteria as level of economic development or degree of internal conflict.

Rosenau, in his pre-theory, attempts to systematically focus attention on some of these linkages using the concepts of national attributes, penetration, issue areas, and process variables.

The systemic process variable and the concept of penetration relate to one linkage, systemic inputs into the sub-system. As it stands the pre-theory does not treat sub-systemic outputs. The scheme is truncated and biased in favor

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of a foreign policy approach. This paper is an attempt to extend the pre-theory through the linking of process to output and output to systemic consequences and to apply the modified pre-theory in a two case study of the Sino-Indian and Sino-Burmese boundary disputes.

Rosenau's model includes three sets of variables. (1) national attributes; (2) process variables, and (3) issue areas. Both national attributes and issue areas have consequences for the relative potency of the process variables. I have extended the model first with a linkage from process to outputs, which have been classified according to the degree of rigidity or flexibility in a series of outputs. The outputs have then been linked to the consequences for the international system, which have been described according to the success or failure of negotiations. The portion of the model applicable to the boundary disputes is shown in Diagram I. The variables are defined in the body of the paper.

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6/ Rosenau explains why his model is pre-theoretical rather than theoretical:

"To be theoretical in nature, the rankings would have to specify how much more potent each set of variables is than those below it on each scale, and the variables themselves would have to be causally linked to specific forms of external behavior." Rosenau, op. cit., p. 47. I agree the first task mentioned cannot be attempted now but feel that the linkage from process to output can be worked upon.

7/ The concept of penetration is not included in the modified pre-theory as I felt the phenomenon that it focuses upon are adequately handled through the systemic process variable.
Figure I
The Model

State of the Economy
Dev. Undev.

Size
Large Small

State of the Polity
Open Closed

State of the Polity
Open Closed

Issue Area
N H T S

Issue Area
N H T S N H T S

Process
i so
so i
sy sy
go go

Process
ry
i
so
sy

Process
ry
i
go
so

Outcomes
F R F R

Outcomes
F R

Outcomes
F R

Consequences
S U S U

Consequences
S U

Consequences
S U

N = nonhuman resources
H = human resources
T = territorial
S = status

i = idiosyncratic
so = societal
sy = systemic
go = governmental

F = flexible
R = rigid
S = successful negotiations
U = unsuccessful negotiations
The linkages represented by double lines in Diagram I are best described in the form of hypotheses.

Linkage 1 National Attributes to Process Variables

H1: In small nations systemic factors will be relatively important in the policy-making process.

Rationale: This idea may be somewhat akin to Rosenau's concept of penetration. Small nations because of lack of power and other resources would seem to be more vulnerable to the environment. Policy-makers would probably feel impelled to give environmental factors more weight than would policy makers in large nations who may have resources to enable them to ignore or change the environment. India and Burma provide a good comparison here.

H2: In underdeveloped countries idiosyncratic variables will be second in importance in small nations and most important in large nations.

Rationale: Where there is a relatively low level of institutionalization of the decision-making process and where a relatively low level of mobilization of the population makes for ineffective interest group participation in the process, idiosyncratic characteristics of the decision-makers would seem to be of great consequence (in effect through default of other factors). This idea is prevalent in much of the literature on development politics. The authors of a study of three decision-makers say:
Looking at the three leaders in grossest fashion an educated guess would be that Nkrumah, as ruler of the least developed and least institutionalized political system, enjoyed the most latitude in translating his personal likes and dislikes, his hates and fears into political deeds and symbols.\footnote{David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, \textit{Enemies in Politics}. Chicago, Illinois, Rand McNally \& Company, 1967. p. 235.}

In this paper the strength of idiosyncratic factors as opposed to the strength of other process variables is studied but no comparison can be made between a developed nation and an underdeveloped nation.

H3: In underdeveloped countries governmental factors will be relatively unimportant in the policy-making process.

Rationale: The rationale behind this hypothesis is closely related to that behind the previous one. Such factors as the underdevelopment of the bureaucracy or the ineffective functioning of the legislature often cited in the development literature would seem to mitigate against a potent governmental variable. A governmental monopoly of talent however has led to the opposite hypothesis being made concerning such countries as Pakistan.

H4: In an open polity societal variables will be more important than in a closed polity.

Rationale: Open polities are characterized by channels such as political parties, legislatures, and the press through which societal forces may enter the decision-making process.
Linkage 2 Issue Area to Process

H1: A change from a territorial issue to an issue of status will increase the relative importance of societal factors.

Rationale: A status issue is one in which both intangible ends and means are involved. It is therefore likely that a greater number of actors could be mobilized than would be the case where ends and means are more specific. Status issues are also usually issues which involve emotions, rather than specific technical skills or knowledge.

Linkage 3 Process to Output

H1: When societal pressures are strong policy outputs will tend to be rigid.

Rationale: Societal pressures are less subject to change due to changes in the situation at hand, new information concerning the situation or new positions taken by other actors.9/

H2: When systemic pressures are important policy outputs will tend to be flexible.

Rationale: It is through this variable that changes in the situation are directly felt and if that variable is strong changes in the situation will be acted upon in a more direct manner than if other variables are strong.


Linkage 4 Outputs to Consequences

HI: Where verbal outputs are rigid and of a negative nature there is less likelihood of successful negotiations and more likelihood of a resort to negative physical outputs than if verbal outputs are flexible.

The Historical Situation

The cases to be considered were selected through the use of three criteria which in order of priority were (a) interesting contrasts in terms of both national attributes and consequences of outputs; (b) similarities in the situation, time period, issue area, and regional environment; (c) availability of data.

The cases chosen were the border disputes between India and China and between Burma and China. The territories under dispute are shown in maps 1 - 3 in Appendix C. The Sino-Indian border is divided into the Western Sector, with Aksai Chin and the Demchok area under dispute, the Middle Sector, running through many disputed passes such as Shipki Pass and Barahoti, and the Eastern Sector, where most of N.E.F.A. is under dispute. In Burma, the border is also divided into three sections, that marked by the McMahon line, that by the Irrawaddy-Salween Watershed, and that by the 1941 Iselin Line. Both Nationalist and Communist Chinese governments had circulated maps with the boundaries marked as indicated in maps.
1 - 3 in Appendix C. Both regimes had issued periodic statements that such agreements as the 1842 treaty between Tibet and Kashmir and the 1914 Simla Convention, which India claimed had delimited the boundary, and the Simla Convention and the 1941 Iselin Commission, which Burma claimed had delimited the Sino-Burmese boundary, were illegal. In Burma notice was taken of the unstable situation, and the Burmese government asked for a settlement of the question in 1949, but received no reply. In 1954, a joint communique declared that both the Burmese and Chinese governments recognized the need for a peaceful settlement of the boundary problem. There occurred in 1955 and 1956 Chinese incursions past the 1941 line into the Wa State and past the Irrawaddy-Salween Watershed into the Hpimaw area, respectively. There followed a series of exchanges that resulted in the 1956 ceasefire agreement and finally in the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty of October 1, 1960.

After the initial circulation of maps, the Sino-Indian case progressed through a number of isolated border clashes in the Eastern and Middle Sectors from June 1954. There was a meeting of officials in 1958 to discuss the claims to Barihoti but no progress was made. The number of border incidents rose sharply in 1959. In April of 1960 there was a meeting of the two Prime Ministers in Delhi, but again no settlement was reached. Tension increased until the October 1962 invasion of Chinese forces into N.E.F.A. Part of the problem then is why
these two situations, in many respects very similar, (although the Sino-Indian case involved more territory and territory of much more strategic value) would have run such different courses.

The Model. Rosenau's model includes three sets of variables (1) broad national attributes such as size; (2) process variables such as idiosyncratic or societal factors; and (3) issue area.

National Attributes. The model suggests that national attributes will have consequences for the ordering of importance of the clusters of variables that are seen as funnelling into the policy process and through this mechanism for policy outputs and consequences. In a recently published article on the findings of the DON Project Rummel states that "nations vary in their national characteristics along seven major dimensions" and that "these seven dimensions have little correlation with each other". Three of these seven dimensions were called size, political orientation, and economic development. Size and economic development are measured here by indicators similar to Rummel's. He states further that

10/ Aksai Chin is the only convenient year-round route to Tibet.

Dissimilarities in size and economic development are the most important determinants of the variation in behavior of nations toward each other, explaining about 85 per cent of the variance.12/

The national attribute size was intuitively felt to be relevant through its high correlation with most indices of power such as wealth, military capability, and resources, and therefore also related to the range of possible policy outcomes available and to the nation's ability to change its environment.13/

In this case I have used population size as the indicator. A population of thirty million or over was defined as large. Using Russett's 1961 data 15 nations including India are classified as large, while 118 including Burma are classified as small.14/

The other two national attributes, state of the polity and state of the economy are in effect held constant throughout most of the period under investigation. The state of the polity (open or closed) would be expected to have a marked effect upon the policy making process, determining which interests can be systematically and legitimately brought to bear upon the

12/ Ibid., p. 238.
13/ Ibid., p. 240.
To be classified as open a policy must exhibit this characteristic.

Autonomous groups are free to enter politics and to oppose the government, save for extremist groups.

Oppose means to build organizations for the purpose of contesting elections, and to criticize the government in the mass media and in a legislature. Extremist groups are those that oppose through violence rather than by the above means.

During most of the period under consideration Burma and India would be classified as open. Before 1958 Burma had a multi-party system that included the A.F.P.F.L., the Burmese Communist Party, and sectional parties such as the Arkanese National United Organization. At certain intervals the Communist Party went underground, but this seems to have been for tactical reasons rather than the result of any government restriction on other means of opposition.

In 1956 all opposition parties joined to form the National Unity Front and oppose the dominant A.F.P.F.L. From September 26, 1958, to March 1960, Burma under the Caretaker Government would be classified as closed because although there was freedom to organize for the 1960 election, criticism of the


Caretaker Government was severely restricted.16/

India also had a multi-party system including two communist parties and such regional parties as the Dravida Munnertra Kazaghan, and the rightist Jan Sangh. The only evidence of restriction of opposition came in 1961 with the arrest of several Sikh leaders but they seem to have been closely connected with the communal riots and could be classified as the leaders of an extremist group.17/

The third national attribute, the state of the economy, was considered relevant since it can be related directly to the range of possible policy alternatives, and to the process through its correlation with the presence of certain types of interest groups and the degree of mobilization of the population. Here an economy will be considered developed if it produces a per capita gross national product of $600 or more. Using Banks' and Textor's 1961 data 91, including India and Burma, of 115 nations would be considered underdeveloped.18/


Issue Area

Rosenau defines issue area as:

...(1) a cluster of values, the allocation or potential allocation of which (2) leads the affected or potentially affected actors to differ so greatly over (a) the way in which the values should be allocated or (b) the horizontal levels at which the allocations should be authorized that (3) they engage in distinctive behavior designed to mobilize support for the attainment of their particular values.19/

Four issue areas distinguished on the basis of the tangible or intangible character of the ends and means will be used here (a) the non-human resources issue area is one where both ends and means are tangible; (b) the human resource issue area is one where the ends are intangible while the means are tangible; (c) the territorial issue area is one where the ends are tangible while the means are intangible; (d) the status issue area is one where both ends and means are intangible.

Issue is defined in terms of the perceptions of the policy makers. Evidence of the issue area in which they are operating is found in their discussions of the disputes. A territorial issue is evidenced by discussions revolving around either certain tracts of land or around the placement of major lines such as the McMahon Line. A status issue is indicated by references to such things as absolute values (eg. right, wrong, fair treatment), to honour, respect, and integrity, or to leadership positions.

19/ Rosenau, op. cit., p. 81.
The contention here is that the issue area remained almost purely territorial in the case of Burma while in the case of India the issue area changed during the period of the Tibetan rebellion in March and April 1959.

In India, up until 1959 there were frequent proposals for meetings of officials to discuss specific tracts of land, especially the passes. There was some agreement on the Middle sector passes in the 1954 Trade Agreement and officials met in 1958 to discuss Barahoti. There is no evidence of the matter being extended to any other issue areas except in the few notes exchanged that mentioned the disputes' adverse effects upon the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. In 1959 Nehru repeatedly and specifically made reference to his conviction that the situation was no longer a territorial dispute but an act of aggression on the part of China and a threat to the sovereignty, integrity, and honour of India.

But nothing can be a more amazing folly than for two great countries like India and China to get into a major conflict and war for the possession of a few mountainous peaks. But it is not a question of a mile or two. It is something more precious than a hundred or a thousand miles. People's passions have been brought to a high not because of a patch of territory but because they feel that we have not received a fair treatment in this matter and have been treated rather casually by the Chinese Government and an attempt has been made, if I may use the word, to bully us.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{20} Statement to the Rajya Sabha, Sept. 10/59.
Reaction in India to the Tibetan situation seems to have been a catalyst in this change of issue area when viewed either in terms of values:

Tragedy has been and is being enacted in Tibet, passions have been let loose, charges made and language used which cannot but worsen the situation and our relations with our northern neighbour.21/

or as a physical threat

Today it is Tibet. Tomorrow it may be Nepal, and the day after it may be us.22/

There were a series of demonstrations against the Chinese embassy and consulates. Menon, in an interview with Brecher, has said

...this unnecessary emotional romantic idea of assumed affinity with the Dalai Lama has been part of our sins in our relations with China.23/

Brecher, Lall, and Menon all make mention of the fact that Nehru felt the Chinese were attempting to discredit him, personally, and India, in the eyes of the Afro-Asian leaders.

There is not as much information on the Burmese situation but what there is would indicate that Burmese leaders viewed the dispute as purely territorial. Referring to the Sino-Burmese Boundary Agreement, U Nu said that the negotiations "were in reality a continuation of the uncompleted negotiations between

21/ Statement to the Lok Sabha, April 27/59.


the British and the Chinese."

In contrast to the Indian reaction to the Tibetan situation the Burmese reaction was described in the following way:

Burman public reaction was one of immediate shock, soon to be followed by indifference to a problem about which the Burma government could do nothing and a cause which it would certainly not wish to make its own. Passive interest in the Tibetan affair perhaps illustrated as much as anything the effects of long isolation by Burma from the main stream of world events and the consequent lack of desire to be participants in them.

The issue areas for the Indian and Burmese cases are summarized in Table I.

Definitions of the Process Variables

Most factors one could conceive of as influencing foreign policy decision-making could be fitted into one of Rosenau's process variable categories if the loose definitions he supplies are used. In order to focus the research, however, it was thought expedient to move into the case study with somewhat more clear cut but much narrower definitions of these variables. Rosenau identifies five major clusters of variables that can be seen as funnelling into the policy process. Only four, idiosyncratic, societal, systemic, and governmental, will be used here.


25/ Ibid., p. 185.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Areas</th>
<th>Burma</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tangible Ends</strong></td>
<td>Yes - the retention of the disputed territory with a discussion couched in terms either of specific tracts of land such as the Namwan Tract or of specific lines such as the Irrawaddy-Salween Watershed.</td>
<td>Yes - the retention of the disputed territory with a discussion couched in terms of specific tracts of land such as Barahoti or in terms of specific lines such as the McMahon Line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intangible Ends</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes - to deal effectively with a nation which was attempting to discredit both the leader and the nation in the eyes of the leaders and the people of the Afro-Asian states,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tangible Means</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>- to deal effectively with a nation that had not, as expected, reciprocated the goodwill India had shown in such actions as sponsoring Chinese U.N. membership,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intangible Means</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>- to deal effectively with a nation that was &quot;bullying&quot;, threatening the &quot;honour&quot; of India and violating all the &quot;right&quot; rules of conduct,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- (on the part of the public) a desire to rectify the situation in Tibet.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the following section these four variables are specifically defined. India and Burma are classified according to these definitions in the next section.

_Idiosyncratic Variables._ Idiosyncratic variables are those that would be expected to vary with the individual policy maker. Rosenau says they:

...include all those aspects of a decision-maker - his values, talents and prior experience - that distinguish his foreign policy choices or behavior from those of every other decision-maker.26/

They have long been an important source of data for students of foreign policy decision-making. The authors of _Enemies in Politics_ say of these variables:

In most instances, reality eludes such simple explanations [a personality theory of politics]. What is critical to appreciate is that few situations of conflict and its resolution can be understood without reference to the particular characteristics of the leaders who give shape and meaning (and often birth) to the political events, issue and enemies which come to embody the conflict.27/

Most idiosyncratic variables found in the literature can be described as either being concerned with rational factors, irrational personal factors28/ or sociological factors, concerned

26/ Rosenau, _op. cit._, p. 43.

27/ Finlay et al., _op. cit._, p. 233.

28/ I am using Verba's definition of rational and irrational factors here. "A non-logical influence is any influence acting upon the decision-maker of which he is unaware and which he would not consider a legitimate influence upon his decision if he were aware of it" Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-rationality in Models of the International System", in Knorr and Verba, _op. cit_, p. 94.
with such things as past career.

Studies making use of irrational personality variables, an example of which is Lewis J. Edinger's *Kurt Schumacher*, require great amounts of information and supply very tenuous linkages to outputs. Many studies using social background characteristics such as those in Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner's *World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements* and Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing's "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry", have found social background characteristics not to distinguish clearly between groups of elites and they would be expected to do so less clearly between individuals.

I have therefore chosen to rely on what could be termed the rational factors. Those to be specifically considered here are the substantive content of the individual's value system and his orientation toward this value system (its stability and the extent of its internalization). Using these two characteristics, idiosyncratic variables can be related to policy output in both a directional manner and in terms of some characteristic such as rigidity.

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The concept of the value system is similar to that of Scott's which he describes as

...the various goals, preferences, and values relating to the entity for which he is a decision-maker... These goals, values, and preferences will be organized in terms of relative priority on the basis of the intensity of feeling attached to each goal or value.32/

Since the value system relates "to the entity for which he is a decision-maker" there would seem to be a clearer relationship between these idiosyncratic characteristics and outputs than would be the case if a social background characteristic such as previous career or a personality characteristic such as authoritarianism were used. An approach somewhat like the one used here although on the level of an elite group rather than the individual is found in N. Leites' The Operational Code of the Politburo.33/ The concept of stability and locus of the goal or the extent of internalization are derived from the work of Riesman.34/ A fourfold table incorporates these two


concepts:

Table II

Goal Locus and Stability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCUS OF GOAL</th>
<th>Inflexible</th>
<th>Fluctuating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internalized</td>
<td>Inner-directed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culturally Derived</td>
<td>Tradition-directed</td>
<td>Other-directed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The matrix describes Riesman's three types and a fourth that he does not consider. Riesman describes what he feels to be the most common types, the inner-directed and other-directed personalities. The norms of the inner-directed personality are internalized and he shows an inflexible determination to achieve any of the possible goals which an expanding society might suggest. He has an intense conviction about the propriety of what he wants to do and can afford psychologically to ignore the wishes of peer groups. The locus of the goals of the other-directed personality is in the cultural system. The actor obeys a fluctuating series of short-run goals picked up by "radar". He believes it is appropriate to be able continually to shift aspirations and goals so that individual norms will be brought into accord with the changing demands of relevant groups.  

The measure of the stability and locus of goals will not be the extent to which the observer finds the individual's actions consistent with a relatively inflexible value system but the extent to which the actor himself measures his conduct against some standard.

**Societal Variables:**

These variables could range from the very broad concepts used in a national character approach to the more specific concepts used in the studies of interest group influence. Rosenau describes them as consisting "...of those nongovernmental aspects of a society which influence its behavior." 36/ There have been a number of studies investigating the channels for societal forces into the decision-making process in the United States. 37/ These

36/ Rosenau, op. cit., p. 43.


Jewell, op. cit.


studies are of limited use, however, in the study of other, and especially underdeveloped, countries.\textsuperscript{38/}

The specific societal variable to be considered here will be the freedom of the press. This idea is to some extent covered in the national attribute state of the polity but here the press is seen as a mechanism through which other societal pressures may act or be acted upon. The literature contains at least three types of mechanisms through which the press becomes an important factor. In some cases the press itself becomes in effect an opposition party. Silverstein thinks this was the case in Burma from 1950-1956 when the political parties were in an embryonic stage.\textsuperscript{39/} The press may also serve either as a reflection or a moulder of a generalized public opinion. The latter function would seem to be far less likely in nations such as India and Burma where newspaper circulation is very low. In this role of either reflector or moulder of public opinion the press may also serve as a link between decision-makers and the public. It could become the channel through which more general societal factors enter the decision-making process.\textsuperscript{40/}


\textsuperscript{39/} Silverstein, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 131.

\textsuperscript{40/} Cohen, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 195.
The attitude of the press toward the nation with which the interaction is taking place is the attribute of the press that will be looked at. The attitude of the press will be classified as either hostile or not hostile. The press in a nation would be hostile toward the nation with which the interaction is taking place if papers accounting for half or more of the circulation contained editorials concerning the nation in question half or more of which featured calls for stronger negative policies toward the nation, denunciations of existing policies as too 'soft' or negative allegations about the policies, leaders, or people of the nation.

**Governmental Variables:**

"Governmental variables refer to those aspects of a government's structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers".\(^{41/}\) Foreign policy literature is replete with hypotheses concerning the effect of different governmental structures upon policy making. Farrell's book contains two articles upon the effect of democratic and totalitarian governmental structures upon policy making.\(^{42/}\) The ideological penetration of the Soviet bureaucracy is cited as

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41/ Rosenau, *op. cit.*, p. 43.


making the bureaucracy ineffective in presenting alternatives that differ from those already considered by the political decision makers. The relative independence of the American bureaucracy is said to result in its playing the role of another interest group whose views are taken into account in the policy making process.\textsuperscript{43} The bureaucracy was chosen as the relevant governmental structure here since the way in which it plays its role as an information gathering and policy generating organization clearly can limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers and since the state of development of the bureaucracy is often seen as the factor behind different styles of decision-making.\textsuperscript{44} Here the size of the bureaucracy measured by bureaucratic personnel as a percentage of the working age population is taken as the variable. A bureaucracy that employs six percent or more of the working age population is considered large.

**Systemic Variables and Policy Outcomes:**

The policy making process can be influenced by internal variables that are properties of the national actor, the decision makers, the society or the governmental structure. Policy may also be affected by variables external to the state and these are here called systemic variables.

\textsuperscript{43} Brzezinski, \textit{op. cit.}, passim.

Policy is the relationship of a governmental unit to its environment. Policy outcomes are concrete manifestations of this policy.

These two variables are treated together since they can be viewed as constituting flows in opposite directions through linkages connecting sub-system to system. Systemic variables are inputs to the sub-system from the system and policy outcomes are inputs from the sub-system to the system. They involve the same problems of definition, data-gathering and coding.

At the broadest level both situations take place in a loose bi-polar system. Although many of the elements of the situation, such as the existence of India and Burma as non-aligned states, may have been determined by this system its use as the relevant system did not seem as fruitful as the use of a more limited system containing only the actors in the boundary disputes. Interactions within these systems would be more specific and would probably vary more in the short time period under consideration. This variance would make the task of relating the variable to outputs an easier one. The relevant systems will be the dyads China and India and Burma and China and the interactions, those concerning the boundary disputes.

Because of the dearth of work on the classification of outputs, two types of problems, although present in looking at


Rummell, op. cit.
Scott, op. cit.
any variables in the previous stages, become especially relevant here. Singer designates these problems as fact-finding problems and data-making problems.⁴⁶/ At the fact-finding level Burma represents close to the worst type of case. All information on inputs and outputs was gathered from secondary descriptive sources. India represents a much more favourable type of situation with the Government White Papers ostensibly including all notes and letters exchanged between Indian and China concerning the situation, published by a government with a good reputation regarding such things, showing no irregularities when compared with such other sources of documents as Ambekar or the documents from Peking nor any internal irregularities. Sources such as The New York Times Index and Facts on File were of little use in looking at these very specific interactions taking place primarily within the regional system. Regional sources like Asian Recorder reported events at a level similar to that of the descriptive studies used for the Burmese case but in no way approached the completeness of the Indian White Papers. These problems overlap those of the data-making nature. When using facts such as those collected for the paper in a comparative way the problem of what comprises a unit emerges. Most of the units in the Burmese case seem to be of a larger magnitude than those in the Indian case. Comparable data in the secondary

sources on the Indian case consists of letters exchanged between heads of state and some of what seem to be the more important notes are reported while almost none of the protest notes were mentioned. In an attempt to make the data somewhat more comparable letters of protest which accounted for one hundred and eighteen of the Indian outputs were excluded from the comparative part of the analysis. For the Burmese data, I had also to assume that incompleteness did not bias the sample in either a positive or a negative direction.

In view of the above statements and those such as the following

The New York Times was used initially and compared to the other sources. Little information not recorded elsewhere was found in the Asian Recorder, Asian Almanac, Keesing’s and Facts on File were utilized for most of the data collection. Within these sources the coverage of states and events was very uneven. The opposite was true for the Asian Almanac. Both of these underreported Australia...

For some states and types of outputs the data were more available than others.47/

Five sources -- The New York Times Index, New International Yearbook, Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Facts on File, and the Britannica Book of the Year -- were combed for data with respect to these measures. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives was found least productive of data, and, therefore, was used only in the very beginning of the data collection.48/

Some analysis of the characteristics of these widely used sources would be very helpful.49/

47/ Moul, Bill, seminar paper, p. 8.


Policy outcomes for India and Burma and inputs from China have simply been coded positive or negative. Outcomes coded negatively include (1) accusations; (2) protests; (3) presentation of a claim; (4) warnings or threats; (5) rejections of proposals for easing of tension; (6) rejections of proposals for settlement of the dispute; (7) rejections of allegations or protests; (8) rejections of claims. Those coded positively include (1) the making of a proposal for the reduction of tension; (2) the making of a proposal for settlement of the disputes; (3) the acceptance of claims; (4) the offering of a concession; (5) the acceptance of proposals for reduction of tension; (6) the acceptance of proposals for settlement of the dispute; (7) any outcome that represents a "softening" of the previous stand.

The Four Process Variables and Policy Outcomes in Burma and India

Idiosyncratic Variables:

Since both U Nu and Nehru, as Prime Ministers, took special interest in foreign policy, Nehru acting as his own foreign minister and U Nu usually overshadowing the many different foreign ministers that held office in Burma, theirs will be the only idiosyncratic characteristics examined. There was some problem with data in measuring this variable. Speeches reported in newspapers, records of parliamentary debates, and published collections of speeches were the most readily available sources. They were also the least satisfactory, as statements taken as a reflection of idiosyncratic characteristics had probably already been impinged upon by other process variables. This
was especially the case with the information on U Nu, almost all of which was in the form of speeches where there seemed to be a confounding of his value system and systemic influences. The predominance of Burmese independence as an element in his value system was certainly highlighted by the precarious situation of Burma that probably would have forced any leader to be at least primarily concerned with the same values. A better source of data would seem to be the actors' reflections on issues further removed from the policy-making process in either time or issue area. This type was found in the writings of the actors, especially those that were not designed for specific audiences or in relation to specific issues. Examples of this type of writing would be U Nu's plays and Nehru's Letters from Jail. These data, however, present the problem of linkage with the issue at hand because they are removed from the process under consideration. Data such as diaries during the relevant period could to some degree avoid both the problem of the impingement of other factors and linkage to the specific problem but would not be available for any very recent situations. I have, in this case, relied on the first two types of sources with the two types of problems in mind. The following delineation of the idiosyncratic characteristics of U Nu and Nehru is in no way systematic. The use of content analysis to find statements where the actors performance is justified in terms of a value system would have given a much more reliable picture.
In the case of U Nu, one value, that of the attainment and later the maintenance of independence seems to have been paramount. This value occurs throughout both his own discussions and the discussions of others concerning him. In an introduction to U Nu's play, *The People Win Through*, Hunter says "Everything except this objective (his country's security and sovereignty), is subordinate in him."\(^{50}\) The play itself looks at a Communist insurrection in Burma with the major theme couched in terms of the threat to the security of the nation and to no other values.

This goal seems to have eclipsed especially any values relating to the external world. Many policy decisions of great import are explained not on the basis of their intrinsic merit nor on the basis of their relationship to any higher value save that of Burmese security. The decision to follow a neutralist foreign policy has been explained on these grounds.\(^{51}\)

In explaining the Burmese position on the Korean situation U Nu said

> A small weak nation like ours, howsoever we strengthen our defenses, can never successfully defend ourselves alone...as, soon as aggression started in South Korea, the U.N. went to its assistance. This has set up a noble precedent. Henceforth, if aggression occurs elsewhere there too the U.N. must step in.\(^{52}\)

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52/ Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
Recognition of China in 1949 was also rationalized purely in terms of Burmese interests:

Be friendly with all foreign countries. Our tiny nation cannot have the effrontery to quarrel with any power.53/

In his book, *Burma Under the Japanese*, U Nu explains that his major reason for participating in the Ba Maw administration was to avoid a rift and the consequent weakening of the nationalist forces.54/ At this level then his value system and priority orderings are clearly defined. This is not the case in other areas. He is reported to have greatly valued the force of religion, any religion,55/ and especially that of Buddhism. He spent at least four hours a day in religious observances. His increasing attention to Buddhism seems to have influenced his political actions and ideology. He is reported to have felt that one of the most important reasons for his visit to the United States in 1955 was the propagation of Buddhism.56/ One of the reasons for his rejection of Marxism was that the deterministic ideology was in contradiction to the Buddhist doctrine of the creation of karma (good or bad).


55/ This was apparent during the religious school crisis in Burma as reported in Butwell, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

56/ Loc. cit.
In a spotty and superficial fashion he has expressed his views on the political process. The idea of the inadvisability of a majority forcing its views on a minority was a recurrent theme throughout the religious school crisis. In discussing this aspect of U Nu's value system Nehru has said:

Nu is not a speculative thinker. He tends to accept an existant belief system like Buddhism and act within it. However, Buddhism permits intellectual experimentation within its particular framework and this Nu engages in. We have talked about democracy's prospects in this or that country but not about the idea of democracy.57/

At one level, as indicated in Nehru's statement, U Nu through his adoption of Buddhist philosophy possesses a stable set of values that are culturally derived and could therefore be classified as a tradition-oriented personality. These values are, however, at a very high level of abstraction. At a more specific level there is some evidence that his values and their implementation are to a large extent dependent upon his peer groups, and not the larger Buddhist culture. During the Japanese occupation, as described in his book, his attitude toward the Japanese was to a large degree dependent upon the views of Ba Swe, a fellow political prisoner. His very decisions to seek office in 1942, 1947, and 1957 are explained in terms of the wishes of colleagues:

57/ Ibid., p. 80.
I had to comply with the request to stand for election from Merqui Constituency but I insisted on one condition, to permit me to leave office when the Constituent Assembly completed its function. (1947).58/

At least one observer describes him as being greatly dependent upon group approval

...this over-sensitivity has been a problem. Nu's difficulties with Kyaw Nyein from 1956-1958 before the two split politically, were partly occasioned by his feeling that he was not getting the recognition he deserved. In his 1956 letter to Kyaw Nyein, he wrote that he, as well as Aung San, had played "an important part in the independence struggle, I have a desire that the people should know about this." Nu was also annoyed when British Prime Minister Anthony Eden on a stopover in Rangoon...cabled Nu to meet him and to bring Kyaw Nyein and Ba Swe with him. "Why Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein also" Nu is reported to have said, "I am Prime Minister and the President of the A.F.P.F.L."59/

U Nu's value system then seems to contain the paramount value of independence and the maintenance of integrity, while all other values are loosely defined and with no determinant order. This finding may be to some extent the result of lack of information but many students of Burmese politics and people who have worked with U Nu have made comments that tend to reinforce this estimation.60/

58/ Ibid., p. 54.

59/ Ibid., p. 84.

His goals would seem to be culturally derived in two ways. His strong Buddhist orientation represents the stable culturally derived goals found in the tradition-directed personality and his reliance on the decisions and the approval of his colleagues represent the fluctuating culturally derived goals of the other-directed personality.

The primary goal is, of course, stable but the dependence on group approval seems to lead to an instability in all other areas that is heightened by the lack of any clear delineation of these other values. Since these lower level goals, such as neutralism, seem also to be viewed as means to the paramount goal, there is a further tendency toward instability.

In discussing Nehru it is possible to look at his reactions in some similar situations: (a) the struggle for independence; (b) the threat of Japanese occupation (rather than actual occupation); (c) the Korean situation; (d) the decision to take a neutralist policy.

Nehru's goal system seems a much more comprehensive and complicated one than was U Nu's. Because of the interrelatedness of a number of goals (an interrelatedness he has commented upon many times) no one goal stands out as prominently as does independence in the case of U Nu.

Independence was, of course, a high ranking value while the retention of independence was not a real problem as it was in Burma. But Nehru links independence both to an ideal economic
system, where there is no exploitation of the masses, and to an ideal international system in a much more complicated manner than U Nu's simple desire that Burma be left alone.61/

Nehru visualizes several types of international systems and sees the only rational course as one directed toward a system somewhat like Kaplan's "universal international system".62/

Small states will disappear and give place either to some world Federation or to three, or possibly four Federations or Empire States. If the latter emerge, there will be continuing hostility and conflict, both internal and external. Internal because an Empire State necessarily involves the enforced subjugation of other peoples and nations which will continually attempt to free themselves. External, because there will be rivalry between the different Empire States or Federations.63/

Nehru's reactions to events during the Second World War indicate how other values, especially those concerning the international system impinged on his desire for independence and how he went through the process of ordering these values:

I wanted India to take an eager and active part in the mighty conflict, for I felt that high principles would be at stake and out of this conflict would come great and revolutionary changes in India and the world...But I was convinced that only as a free country and an equal could she function.64/


63/ Norman, loc. cit.

64/ Ibid., 11, p. 141.
Satyagraha (adherence to truth and the practice of non-violent resistance) is not immediately indicated...I think it would be wrong for us at this particular moment when Britain is in peril to take advantage of her distress and rush at her throat.  

Nehru's broad and often philosophical approach to the Korean situation stands in great contrast to Nu's reaction quoted above.

It is extraordinary that we should seek to help our friends in ways which kill or destroy them. It is indeed a strange commentary on the way of violence which we are somehow forced to adopt in the present world.  

Neutralism and India's policy toward China are defined as having intrinsic value.

Dr. Kunzui referred to our non-alignment and to Panchsheel as a slogan and an opiate. I claim that these principles are right...The present Government will hold to non-alignment because it is a matter of principle, not of opportunism or the convenience of the day.

Although no one goal stands out as in U Nu's case and there is a difficulty in ordering the goals, they are well defined and at a very specific level. This lends a much greater stability to the system than in the case of Nu where most goals are really means. The value system would also seem to be highly internalized. Nehru was not a religious man and being much more Westernized than

65/ Ibid., 11, p. 21.
66/ Speech to the Rajya Sabba, June 12, 1953.
67/ Reply during debate in Rajya Sabha, Sept. 10/59.
U Nu, not deeply embued with traditional culture. Nor is there much evidence of any dependence upon the norms and the approval of groups in the culture nor even from such strong referents as his father and Gandhi. The earlier history of his political career exhibits many strong disagreements with his father and the consequent going of separate ways on the particular problems where there was disagreement. The following portion of one of Gandhi's letters, concerning individual civil disobedience hints at Nehru's unwillingness to follow, even on such a tactical matter:

> If this (the effect of individual civil disobedience) is hard for you to believe, I would ask you to suspend judgment and watch results...I know what strain you are bearing in giving me your loyalty.

From the above fragmentary evidence, I would redraw the fourfold table as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stable</th>
<th>Fluctuating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internalized</td>
<td>Nehru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culturally</td>
<td>U Nu</td>
<td>U Nu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derived</td>
<td>(higher level goals)</td>
<td>(lower level goals)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If idiosyncratic characteristics are important it is hypothesized that

\[ H_1 \] Nehru will tend to look at the dispute in terms of values representing such things as "right" conduct more than will U Nu.

\[ H_2 \] U Nu will tend to disregard all other values save the security of Burma in the dispute.

68/ Norman, op. cit., l, passim.
Nehru's decisions will tend to be more rigid than will U Nu's because his value system is more clearly defined and therefore a greater restricting force.

Societal Variable:

Because of the unavailability of data a measurement of the kind previously described was not possible. The only available indication of press opinion in India is in the *Sino-Indian Border Issue* (October 1959-February 1961): A Research Backgrounder which contains 19 editorials from selected newspapers between the dates indicated. Table 3 lists the newspapers, information on their circulation, on their political orientation, and on their representation in the Research Backgrounder.

Besides the general lack of availability of this type of information a problem with the information on this variable is that although Mallory's classification by political orientation would seem to be helpful in making inferences, from knowledge of the editorial policies of one paper, about the policies of other papers with a similar classification he gives no information on how these classifications were arrived at. It would be interesting to study the editorial policies of these papers for several issue areas to get some indication of how valid such inferences might be. Mallory's data also cover only English language dailies for India. Since, of the reported daily circulation in *The International Yearbook of...*

69/ (Hong Kong, 1961), passim.
### Table III
PRESS OPINION IN INDIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>Circulation</th>
<th>Political Orientation</th>
<th>No. of Editorials Concerning China</th>
<th>No. of Editorials Hostile Toward China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amrita Bazar Patrika</td>
<td>90,484</td>
<td>Pro-Congress</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Statesman</td>
<td>102,308</td>
<td>Independent-Nationalist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rindustan Standard</td>
<td>81,333</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Leader</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mail</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Express</td>
<td>55,546</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times of India</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>132,328</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Circulation figures are for 1966, the first year for which information was available. Total daily reported circulation in 1966 was 1,319,345.


1,319,345, a total of 832,012 was accounted for by papers of other languages, this is a serious gap. There is, however, a clear preponderance of hostile editorials. Although the Research Backgrounder seems to be slanted towards presenting a picture of hostile Indian opinion, the picture is not too far from that given by other observers. The Chinese seem to have shared the view that the Indian press was predominantly hostile and on April 27, 1959 the People's Daily estimated that between February 24 and April 7 the Indian press had published over 310,000 words of "unfriendly comments."

In Burma the only paper on which there is any evidence is The Nation, a major English daily in Rangoon, with a circulation of 10,000 out of a total Burmese newspaper circulation of 101,650. Its political orientation has been described as independent, pro-Western, and vigorously anti-communist. Other papers with a total circulation of 54,750 have been similarly described. The Nation gave the Burmese public its first knowledge

70/ Note the overrepresentation of the extremely hostile Indian Express.

71/ Tang, op. cit., passim.

Brecher, Menon, op. cit., passim.

Sharokle Sabavala, "Gulf in India" in Research Backgrounder, op. cit., p. 52.

72/ Tang, op. cit., p. 596.
of Chinese incursions in the north in July 1956. Its headlines were apparently panicky, proclaiming that the Chinese held 1,000 sq. miles of Burmese territory.\textsuperscript{73} Whittam describes The Nation's reaction to the 1960 Agreement with

The Nation, under less of an obligation to be diplomatic, said that the Burmese were paying a high price in principle, pride, and emotion, in order to put the Chinese in a position where they would never again be able to bully Burma without branding themselves as aggressors.\textsuperscript{74}

Some actions and statements of Burmese leaders would indicate that most of the press was in agreement with The Nation. In 1957 Ba Swe, Acting Prime Minister, attempted to withhold information as had been the policy up until 1956.\textsuperscript{75} On April 28, 1960 U Nu indicated that the Chinese government was being so severely criticized in Burma at that time that he appealed to the press "to refrain from publishing anything (further) that might jeopardize the negotiations."\textsuperscript{76}

On the basis of this information, the press in both India and Burma could be classified as hostile.


\textsuperscript{75} The \textit{New York Times Index}, 1957.

\textsuperscript{76} Trager, \textit{loc. cit.}
In India press opinion seems to have been reflective of broader public opinion. All opposition parties but the I.C.P. called for stronger measures against the Chinese.  

According to Tang after describing opposition views on the Tibetan events of 1959

This sentiment (antagonism toward China) was alarmingly widespread. Indian residents in numerous cities gathered to demonstrate before the Chinese Communist embassy and consulates.

On the occasion of Chou's April 17, 1960 visit to Delhi four political parties, the Praja-Socialists, the Jan Sangh, the Orissa Ganatantra Pareshad and the Republican Party organized anti-Chinese demonstrations. If societal characteristics are important it is hypothesized that

$$H_1 \text{ Both Burma and India will tend to produce negative policy outputs.}$$

**Governmental Variable:**

Using Russett's 1959-61 data and a cut off point of six percent of the working age population employed by the bureaucracy, ten bureaucracies, those of Norway, Ghana, Malaya, Kenya, Japan, Taiwan, Uganda, India, South Korea and Nigeria are classified as small. Eight bureaucracies, those of New Zealand, Australia, the

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77/ Research Backgrounder, p. 34.
78/ Tang, op. cit., p. 596.
79/ Ibid., p. 597.
80/ Russett, op. cit., p. 70.
United Kingdom, Denmark, Trinidad, the United States, France, and West Germany are classified as large. Figures from Braibanti reveal the Burmese bureaucracy to employ approximately two per cent of the working age population. \(^{81/}\)

It is hypothesized that

\[
H_1 \text{ The governmental factors will not be important in either Burma or India.}
\]

The Systemic Variable and Policy Outputs:

The policy outputs considered here are those directly related to ceasefire agreements or the reduction of border tension, the preparation for negotiation, and the negotiations. Thus there are no outcomes related to such areas as economic sanctions. As only the patterns of negative and positive responses will be looked at the problem of magnitude has been ignored.

Information on Burmese policy outcomes was not as detailed as that on India's but both sets can still be coded positively or negatively and it is assumed that although information on Burma is not nearly as complete there is no bias in favour of either positive or negative outputs. The date for Burma had to be collected from

---

a number of secondary sources,\(^{82}\) while the data for India came from the notes and memoranda exchanged between India and China published in the Government of India's White Papers.

These outcomes were linked to what seemed to be the relevant inputs coming from China. The inputs have been coded in the same way as the outputs and in cases where no specific input or output could be ascertained they were coded 0. The input and output for a certain time period were combined to form an input-output state.\(^{83}\)

For Burma the states were determined intuitively from the reconstructions of the events appearing in the secondary sources. In the case of India most notes and letters were in answer to specific notes or actions of the Chinese government. Brief descriptions of the inputs and outputs are contained in the appendices A and B.

\(^{82}\) Ambekar, G.V. and Divekar, V.D., Documents on China's Relations with South and South-east Asia (1949-62), (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private Ltd., 1964).

Table IV

INPUT-OUTPUT STATES FOR BURMA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of eight possible types of input-output states the twenty-seven states are distributed as follows:

Table V

DISTRIBUTION OF BURMESE INPUT-OUTPUT STATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Number of Times Appearing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-) (+)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+) (+)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0) (+)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure II

NUMBER OF NOTES CONCERNING BORDER INCIDENTS

Indian
Chinese
Figure III

NUMBER OF NOTES LODGING PROTESTS

---

Indian

Chinese
With the extent of the data\textsuperscript{84} on the Sino-Indian dispute it was possible to separate the exchanges dealing with arrangements for reducing tension, actual territorial claims, and arrangements for negotiations from those dealing solely with protests and allegations concerning the armed clashes. From 1954 to the end of 1962 there were at least 208 such notes exchanged. In the Burmese situation there were only two short periods in which armed clashes occurred and there are no data on the notes exchanged over these events. In Figure 1 the number of notes exchanged is plotted against time (at six month periods). It can be seen that there are sharp increases in the number of notes in 1959 and in 1962. Figure 2 plots the number of notes lodging formal protests against time. This would be some measure of the increasing hostility evident in the notes. An example of the tone of an early note would be

\begin{quote}
We regret to say that Chinese troops came south of the Tunjun La and were camping at Bara Hoti alongside our troops. We would like to repeat that we are most anxious to avoid any possible incident and we, therefore, suggest that strict instructions should be issued that no personnel from the Tibet region of China should cross into India without due permission from us.\textsuperscript{85}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{84} There is a serious gap in these data, however, as vol. 2 of the Government of India White Papers containing the exchanges from Sept. 1959 to Nov. 1959 is not available. Major letters exchanged were available in other sources such as Ambekar and the Documents published in Peking but there was no other source for the notes containing protests and allegations.

\textsuperscript{85} November 5/55.
and of a later note

The Government of India strongly protest against these repeated violations of Indian territory by Chinese armed forces. Until now Government have observed discreet reticence about these incidents although there is a good deal of concern among the Indian public, and in Parliament, about the security arrangements on India's northern frontier.86/

The Indian input output states will be described by the notes actually concerned with territorial claims, measure for reduction of tension, and arrangements for meetings and where possible the meetings themselves. Many of the notes exchanged contain references to more than one question and so there are several states in many time periods. Where a specific input has been made and not approved or rejected by the Indian side it has been coded (+) (0) and where the Indian side has made a proposal that is not linked to a previous chinese proposal it has been coded (0) (×).

86/ August 28/59.
### Table VI

**INPUT-OUTPUT STATES FOR INDIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
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<td>(-)</td>
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<td>24</td>
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</table>
The distribution of the Indian states are as follows

Table VII

DISTRIBUTION OF INDIAN INPUT-OUTPUT STATES

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<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>(0) (-)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+) (0)</td>
<td>11</td>
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The Processes

In looking at the decision-making process and estimating the relative potency of the process variables two approaches were used: (a) looking at the general picture of the process gleaned from descriptive studies, newspaper accounts, and accounts of participants such as Menon and through a process of recreating the events, reasoning which variables might be impinging most strongly on the process. This approach was used especially where there was no change in a process variable; (b) where a change occurred in a process variable an expected change in outcome could be hypothesized. This approach was carried out most fully in the case of the systemic variable and to a lesser extent in the Indian change in
the societal variable in 1959 and the Burmese change in the idiosyncratic variable in 1958.

The first part of the Sino-Indian border dispute (from 1954-March 1959) has been classified as a territorial dispute. It has been hypothesized that during the first part idiosyncratic variables would be more important than societal ones and that as the issue changed to one of status societal pressures would become more important. Information concerning the border dispute was not made available to the public until Nehru introduced the matter in Parliament on August 28, 1959 and the publication of the Government of India's first White Paper on the subject. There was, therefore, no press or public opinion impinging on the process in the particular issue until this time. Press and public opinion first became markedly hostile toward the Chinese Government in March of 1959 during the Tibetan rebellion. The process during the first period would, therefore, be expected to have been dominated by Nehru's non-violent but still rigid approach. His idiosyncratic characteristic of rigidness would be expected to become more prominent with the change of issue area. Figure 2 lends some credence to this hypothesis with the sharp increase in number of notes lodging protests in 1959. In Table VI only the first input output state occurred before 1959.

Most of Nehru's statements on the issue reflect his Gandhian, nonaligned, non-violent background. The following seems to have been typical of exchanges in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.
Mr. D.P. Singh

Do not the Government contemplate ousting the Chinese from this Indian territory by force?

The Prime Minister

No, Sir, The Government will not consider this course, because that is not the way the Government would like to function in such matters. In matters like this decisions can only be made by conferences, by agreement, Countries do not, and should not, go to war without proceeding in other ways.87/

He seems also to have projected this set of values to Indian society

We in India are by our background and temperament peaceful by nature. We earnestly believe in the settlement of differences by peaceful discussion and negotiations.88/

Nehru's conception of the change in issue area went along with a different conception of the role of public opinion in the dispute. Speaking of the earlier period he said

We thought at the time that it might be easier for us to deal with the Chinese Government without too much publicity.89/

and of the later period

...our failure to give publicity to this has resulted in sharp but legitimate criticism of the Government both in Parliament and in the press in our country.90/

87/ Exchange in Rajya Sabha, August 31/59.
88/ Speech, August 6/62.
89/ Address to the Rajya Sabha, August 31/1959.
90/ Note to the Chinese Premier dated September 26/59.
That policy, remained up until 1962 the acceptance of peaceful methods, is probably an indication of the predominance of Nehru's personality but there is evidence of the increasing force of public opinion. The severe criticism of Chou's April 1960 visit to Delhi and of V.K. Krishna Menon's talks in Geneva in 1962 with Marshall Chen Yi probably did much to retard progress in the direction of negotiations and forced Nehru to the rather weak defence that these were merely "talks" and not negotiations.\footnote{Lall, Arthur, Modern International Negotiations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 45.}

Evidence of the push against negotiations by the public and of Nehru's views is again evidenced in statements as late as August 14, 1962.

A great deal has been said: we must not talk to the Chinese unless they vacate. I refuse to accept this statement.\footnote{Address to the Lok Sabha.}

The most concrete example of the result of societal pressures is found in the resignation of Menon in 1962. Since he shared Nehru's views on nonalignment, nonviolence and friendship toward China or held them in more extreme form\footnote{Brecher, Menon, passim.} he was at variance with press opinion. There were objections to his role in the April 1960 talks\footnote{Research Backgrounder, p. 69.} and again to his role in 1962 at Geneva.\footnote{Lall, loc. cit.}


\footnote{Address to the Lok Sabha.}

\footnote{Brecher, Menon, passim.}

\footnote{Research Backgrounder, p. 69.}

\footnote{Lall, loc. cit.}
the armed clashes of October 1962 there was great public outcry for Menon's resignation. At first Nehru resisted the pressure then on October 31, he took over the portfolio of Defence and appointed Menon Minister of Defence Production.

But the clamour did not die down. A Delhi newspaper declared that, having tasted blood, the people should go for the kill and Menon subsequently resigned from the latter post.

However, not all of Nehru's idiosyncratic characteristics would point toward a more conciliatory approach in opposition to societal pressures. With the change of issue area to one in which he felt that such values as honour, integrity, and right conduct were at stake he would be expected to take on a less conciliatory attitude.

We believe firmly that peace is better than war. Nevertheless, if the Country's freedom or its integrity or its honour is attacked, we have to defend it with war if necessary.

Lall feels that such attitudes were responsible for the failure of negotiations.

Prime Minister Nehru's feelings deflected India from the course of negotiations... There was ample reason for negotiation and plenty of desire on both sides for it. However in this period the Chinese press and government officials opened a campaign of rude invective directed at


97/ Statement to the Lok Sabha, August 6, 1962.
Personally against Jawaharlal Nehru... It was clear that his feelings had been deeply wounded by the Chinese verbal barbs. He had come consequently to dislike the idea of dealing with them, and this was undoubtedly one of the reasons why several opportunities for negotiations were neglected (he then cites an incident where Nehru brought up the subject of Chinese verbal attacks although it was irrelevant)... My own suggestions (of talks with Chinese officials in 1961 at Geneva) were met with a frozen silence on the part of the Prime Minister. 98/

Since, in the second stage, both societal and idiosyncratic variables would seem to be oriented toward policy outcomes not favouring negotiations it is difficult to gauge their relative influence. However, since policy did not become one of physical violence, it would seem that idiosyncratic variables were still predominant. On the basis of the anecdotal evidence and the evidence concerning the exchanges of notes in Figures 1 and 2 there are some grounds for the conclusion that idiosyncratic variables are most important in both territorial and status issues in the Indian case but that societal variables become much more important in the status issue than in the territorial issue.

**Idiosyncratic and Societal Variables in Burma.** In the case of U Nu any values relevant to this situation would be subservient to the maintenance of Burmese sovereignty. China's influence both internal and external was one of the most important threats to this value. All policy seems oriented toward the avoidance of possible Chinese negative actions. In anticipation of

98/ Lall, op. cit., p. 148.
Chinese infiltration and aid to the B.C.P., U Nu in 1949 called for a negotiated settlement of the entire boundary, in effect, what India had denied throughout the Sino-Indian dispute. No other values such as questions of hegemony in Asia, the Tibetan rebellion, issues of honour and right conduct seem to have been brought into the dispute as would be expected from their secondary place in U Nu's value system.

The Burmese process produced a much more flexible series of outcomes than did the Indian processes. It resulted in first the admitting of the need for an overall settlement and then in the changing of the original demand for the Chinese to withdraw to the "legal boundary" the 1941 Line, to a request for withdrawal to the 1941 Line, as an interim measure until an overall settlement was reached. As stated in the section on societal variables the press advocated a less conciliatory policy but did not seem as reflective of a more generalized public opinion as did the press in India. Nor was public opinion as prone to bring in issues of status as it had been in India. U Nu did not experience as much societal pressure mitigating against the conciliatory policy that his idiosyncratic characteristics seem to have led to. What hostile public opinion there was, however, seems not to have had the opening into the process that it did in India. There was no deliberate decision to inform the public in 1956 as there had been in India in 1959. Public awareness was the result of the
reporting in *The Nation* and policy makers seemed not to recognize the legitimacy of public criticism in the situation. There were several reports of attempts by the government to return to the earlier policy of secrecy. 99/ U Nu on April 28, 1960 appealed to the press "to refrain from publishing anything (further) that might jeopardize the negotiations for a peaceful settlement." 100/

That the conciliatory, flexible approach of the Burmese government may not have been due entirely to the personality of U Nu is indicated by the June 1959 concession of the Panghang Area. From January 1958 there had been a stalemate in the negotiations and a less conciliatory policy on the part of the Burmese over this area. Soon after the coming of the Caretaker Regime, Ne Win made an offer of 56 square miles in the Panghang area that lead to the 1960 Boundary Agreement. There had been a change in both idiosyncratic variables and in the degree of openness in the polity, with the policy remaining as conciliatory as before or perhaps even more so, suggesting that variables other than idiosyncratic ones would be responsible for the generally conciliatory policy. When the 1960 Boundary Agreement was signed U Nu had warm praise for it suggesting that it had not been an idiosyncratic characteristic that had caused the 1958 stalemate. 101/

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100/ Trager, *loc. cit.*  
Societal pressures did not seem to be as important in Burma as in India even when the polity could be classified as open, although societal pressures may have been responsible for the slight show of intransigence over the Panghang area. With the coming of the Caretaker Government these pressures seem to have become even less influential. Criticism of government actions was severely restricted as was public knowledge of the progress of the boundary negotiations. There seems also at this time to have been an increase in importance of governmental factors. In 1958 there were still important differences concerning the areas of territories to be exchanged yet negotiations were handled by officials. There had been no meeting of officials before this time.

**Governmental Variables.** Governmental factors would seem to have ranked lowest in both nations. During the Sino-Indian dispute the Indian bureaucracy seems to have played admirably the role of information gatherer and dispenser

The Indians...have used their history in a way which Western scholars can understand and relish; but they have done so at great length. To 245 items of evidence mainly of historical nature which the Chinese produced in 1960-61 the Indians replied with no less than 630 items.\(^{102/}\)

The bureaucracy seems to have had no role in the actual presentation of alternatives or in the decision making. Illustrative of this

passive role is Lall's comment

Even if the Indian Foreign Office believed that talks might be initiated at Geneva (1961), knowing Mr. Nehru's feelings it would not have broached the subject to him.103/

In Burma the bureaucracy was not able to play the role of information gatherer. It is reported that, because of lack of staff and because of the disorganized state of the Burmese archives, during negotiations the Burmese delegation had to base its claims on Chinese documentation.104/ There is much evidence that U Nu's relationship with the bureaucracy in economic affairs was not a very satisfactory one.105/ It is probable that the relationship would have been even more strained in the field of foreign policy where U Nu considered himself the expert.

Indirectly Whittam's devotion of two pages of a nine page article to praise of the performance of the Burmese civil service in the purely technical task of demarcating the boundary, may also be evidence of its ineffectiveness.

It was noted earlier, however, that there was a much higher level of assignment of elite cadre officers to the Burmese foreign service than to the Indian foreign service and it was

103/ Lall, op. cit., p. 148.
104/ Johnstone, op. cit., p. 329.
suggested that perhaps this would lead to more bureaucratic
influence in decision-making in Burma than in India. There is
some scant evidence of this. First, there is Lall's first hand
report which attributes to the Indian bureaucracy a passive role
in the process.\footnote{106} Newspaper accounts of conferences make no
mention of senior civil servants but only of Nehru, Menon and other
cabinet ministers.\footnote{107} The only role besides that of information
gatherer played by the civil servant seems to have been during
"meetings of officials" to discuss minor points. There can also
be noted a marked reluctance on the part of Nehru to delegate
authority on any but the most minor points. In the Burmese case
Johnstone lists among the chief negotiators at the 1956 meeting
at least three senior civil servants.\footnote{108} Again in contrast to
the Indian situation, when there were still differences between
Burma and China over the amount of territory to be exchanged
negotiations were taken over by civil servants in 1959. There
seems then to have been a difference in the types of role played
by the bureaucrats. In India there was with the much more
developed bureaucracy an emphasis on data-gathering. In Burma lack
of resources made this impossible but the bureaucrats, possibly
because of a monopoly of talent, seem to have played a much larger
role in the actual negotiations.

\footnote{106} Lall, \textit{loc. cit.}  
\footnote{107} Research Backgrounder, passim.  
\footnote{108} Johnstone, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 239.
Systemic Variables. One measure of the effect of this systemic variable will be the extent to which the policy makers take into account these systemic actions or the anticipation of the actions, at the expense of internal pressures when making decisions. The other will be the extent to which there is found a pattern in the input-output sets that would indicate a definite patterned response to the systemic actions. It is hypothesized that the effects of systemic variables will be more marked in Burma than in India. In looking at the role of systemic variables it must first be noted that Burma was subject to a much wider range of possible Chinese actions than was India. There was an important Chinese community in Burma with ties to the homeland, there was actual and anticipated Chinese aid to insurrectionist border groups such as the Karens and to the B.C.P. and there were Chinese incursions into Burmese territory in pursuit of Kuomintang troops, besides the incursions directly related to the boundary dispute. India was subject only to actions directly related to the boundary dispute except in the marginal case of the Naga tribesmen in N.E.F.A. 109/ Systemic factors have been most important in Burma's general China policy. While in India, policies such as recognition of China, sponsorship of Chinese U.N. Membership, and the Five Principles have been justified in terms of right conduct, Burmese policy has been justified in terms of anticipation.

of hostile actions. On December 3, 1949 in discussing recognition of China, Foreign Minister E. Maung said:

We shall have to recognize the new government of China very soon. Nothing has been decided yet, but it is a question of recognizing facts... these (border) raids are likely to change in meaning... 110/

On the same question U Nu specifically mentions his disregard for internal pressures

In regard to our foreign policy also, we are convinced that the course we have adopted is the best in the circumstances of our country and we are therefore pursuing it steadfastly no matter how strongly it is criticized. 111/

During the actual border dispute, as stated above, societal pressures seem to have been no great force and the conciliatory policy may not have been due solely to idiosyncratic characteristics as U Nu and Ne Win seem to have followed the same general course. Tang's account of one part of the process reinforces the hypothesis that policy was guided by systemic factors

As summarized in Chou's July 57 letter and its accompanying maps, Peking represented additional arguments in claim to 186 square miles in Hpimaw-Gawlum-Kangfang area instead of the 56 square miles offered by Rangoon. Similarly, the territory to be exchanged for the Namwan Tract was extended to include 86 square miles within the 1941 Line. While the Burmese Government officially disallowed these claims, in October 1957, the Cabinet's Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee decided that in the event of Peking's rejection of the previously submitted Burmese proposals,

110/ Johnstone, op. cit., p. 56.

111/ Ibid., p. 57.
new conditions should be accepted as the basis for settlement.\textsuperscript{112/}

In the input-output states presented on pages 48 to 53 the input part of the statements indicate the systemic variable.

One way of obtaining an idea of the effect of these systemic variables would be to see if there exists any relationship between the patterns of inputs and outputs. The null hypothesis is that the type of input is not associated with the type of output. Extracting the input-output states that contain only positive or negative inputs and outputs and grouping congruent and non-congruent states one obtains a matrix for each of the countries as follows

\textbf{Table VIII}

\begin{tabular}{lcc}
 & \textbf{BURMA} & \textbf{INDIA} \\
\hline
\textbf{Congruent States} & \textbf{Non-Congruent States} & \textbf{Congruent States} & \textbf{Non-Congruent States} \\
17 & 6 & 15 & 17 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\[ x^2 = 5.26 \]
\[ p = .05 \]
\[ x^2 = .12 \]
\[ p = \text{N.S.} \]

This would seem to indicate that systemic factors are very important in the Burmese case and not so in the Indian case.

\textsuperscript{112/} Tang, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 596.
Flexibility: The series of policy outcomes were also to be coded in terms of flexibility-rigidity. Flexibility is defined as the ability to change from a positive to a negative outcome or from a negative to a positive outcome. In looking at the overall distribution of outcomes a rigid series would be defined as a series where the probability that the series came from a population of outcomes with an equal distribution of positive and negative units was less than .05. Burma had eleven positive and fourteen negative outcomes. The probability of this series coming from a population with equal distribution is .345. India had thirteen positive responses and twenty-seven negative responses with the probability of coming from an equally distributed population of .032.

Another indication of flexibility-rigidity is the number of actual concessions from previously held positions and the number of reiterations of previous responses. To get at this, I have extracted from the outcomes listed in Appendices A and B those statements that are linked to previously made statements either because they represent positive or negative deviations from the first statement or are reiterations of previously made statements. These statements were then coded either as a change or a reiteration and the results reported in Table IX.

113/ A treatment of rigidity in a positive direction is found in Scott, op. cit.
Table IX

FLEXIBILITY AND RIGIDITY IN INDIA AND BURMA

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<th>Time</th>
<th>Change or Reiteration</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Change or Reiteration</th>
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</thead>
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<td>2</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
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</table>

There is again some indication of more flexibility on the part of Burma as the same number of changes, three, appear in a series of eleven outcomes as opposed to India's nineteen outcomes. The difference is much more striking if one looks at the specific outputs. All the Burmese concessions were on major substantive issues. That in time period 4, accepted the 1941 Line as an interim line only. In time period 13 the Hpimaw area was given up, and in time period 23 the Panghang area was given up. All of India's concessions were procedural and only the first two would
be considered of any importance. The output from time period 5e was the acceptance of talks and that from 7e was concerned with the same issue. The output from time period 15 was the acceptance that there existed a legitimate difference of opinion over a translation of a section of the Report of Officials. Burma's series of outputs will therefore be classed as flexible and India's as rigid.

Consequences: The consequences of these outputs is the linkage of sub-system to system. It is through this linkage that the work of foreign policy analysts can be linked to such systemic concepts as integration, conflict, stability and equilibrium. In this paper an attempt is made to link the foregoing study of foreign policy making with some concepts from the work on negotiating behaviour and conflict.

The consequences of sub-systemic outputs have been defined as the success or failure of negotiation. Negotiation is defined as:

...the process of consideration of an international dispute or situation by peaceful means, other than judicial or arbitral processes, with a view to promoting or reaching among the parties concerned or interested some understanding, amelioration, adjustments, or settlement of the dispute or situation.\textsuperscript{114/}

Successful negotiations are those leading to amelioration or settlement of the dispute while unsuccessful negotiations are those leading to a resort to other than peaceful processes.

\textsuperscript{114/} Lall, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 5.
The exchanges between India and China and between Burma and China could then be seen as forms of negotiations, although for many parts of the processes such as Chou's April 1960 visit to Delhi or the meeting of Chou and Nu in Kunming in 1957 there is not much information. The consequences of the Burmese outputs were to bring about the successful conclusion of negotiations in the 1960 Boundary Treaty. The consequences of the Indian outputs were to bring a resort to other than peaceful means in October 1962.

These outcomes that led to such different consequences were precipitated by different types of processes that in turn were linked to different national attributes and different issue areas. What seem to have been the most striking differences in the situations concerned the great disparity in size, the change of issue area in India and the absence of this change in Burma, and the importance of systemic factors in Burma and their relative impotency in India.

The rationale for these linkages between national attributes, issue areas, process, and consequences will be discussed with references to some of the microsociological experiments of Morton Deutsch and the concept of responsiveness as
developed by Karl W. Deutsch and Dean G. Pruitt, and their parallel concepts of "successful negotiations" and "effective communications", and "threat potential" and "fate control".

Disparity in Size. The national attribute size has previously been linked to the concept of power. The possible link between power or size and the consequences for negotiations found here has an interesting parallel. In an experimental study of the effect of "threat potentials" on the behaviour of bargainers at the interpersonal level, Morton Deutsch came to several conclusions that are analogous to the conclusions that could be drawn from this discussion of bargaining at the international level. He found that in terms of defined goals and losses both parties did worst in the case of a bilateral threat which would approximate the Sino-Indian case. In the case of unilateral threat the actor possessing the threat did better than the other actor but the latter still did better than he had in the case of bilateral threat. In the boundary disputes if the success of negotiations or the avoidance of violence is held to


be the primary value the conclusions about losses and gains would be similar, as most observers feel that the Sino-Burmese negotiations did constitute something close to Deutsch's "effective communication":

It would seem that Peking, in this negotiation, though bargaining hard and insisting on some concessions, responded for its part by making concessions to the Burmese and finally arrived at a mutually acceptable arrangement that did not bear the clear marks of overweening Chinese power.116/

Change in Issue Area. In the same study, through a series of manipulations Deutsch introduced values other than the simple loss or gain defined in dollar terms. He found that the bargainers were then less inclined toward effective communication (communication that enhanced the dollar gains of both actors). If the change in issue area in the Sino-Indian case were considered analogous to Deutsch's introduction of other values and the avoidance of violence again held to be the primary value the same conclusion would be reached.

Systemic Variable; Flexibility, and Responsiveness. The concept responsiveness has been defined by Deutsch as:

...the probability of "favorable" or adequate response within a relevant time, where favourable, adequate and relevance can be defined in terms of empirical characteristics of the system under study.117/


117/ Karl W. Deutsch, op. cit., p. IX.
further defines it as

...the ability (of one political unit) to give messages from other political units adequate weight in the making of their own decisions, to perceive the needs of the populations and elites of these other units, and to respond to them quickly and adequately in terms of political or economic action. 118/

One measurement of this concept would be very much like the measurement of the association of the systemic variable with outputs used earlier in the paper. Both notions are related to the cybernetic problem of "the black box". 119/ Using the relationship between systemic variable and outputs as a measurement of responsiveness, the "adequate level" of response could be defined as the existence of more than a chance relationship between inputs and outputs and using the conclusions on systemic data, Burma would be classified as responsive and India as unresponsive. In this case also the Burmese outputs would seem to contain the added dimension of "favourableness" specified in Deutsch's and Pruitt's definitions.

Working from his definition of responsiveness, Pruitt comes up with a number of hypotheses about the typical negotiating behaviour of a responsive nation that seem well in line with the negotiating behaviour of Burma and that account well for the

118/ Pruitt, op. cit., p. 5.

119/ Ashby, op. cit., pp. 86-117.
The measurement of the association between systemic variable and outputs and "the black box" problem make no specifications about favourableness however.
differences in the consequences between the Indian and Burmese situations. His first hypothesis was that:

a) The more responsive a negotiator the more willing he will be to make costly concessions to the other side. This implies in turn that a more responsive negotiator will usually have a fall-back position which is less favourable to himself.120/

That Burma was more likely than India to make concessions and that these concessions were usually more costly than those made by India was evidenced by the data presented in the section on flexibility and rigidity. These concessions and descriptions of Burmese negotiating behaviour such as Tang's:

While the Burmese Government officially disallowed these claims, in October 1957 the Cabinet's Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee decided that in the event of Peking's rejection of the previously submitted Burmese proposals, new conditions should be accepted as the basis for settlement.121/

indicate the existence of fall-back positions,

b) The more responsive a negotiator, the less firmly will he adhere to his own proposals when they have been rejected by the other side.

This hypothesis is also directly related to the notion of flexibility. Adhering "to his own proposals after they have been rejected by the other side" is analogous to the reiteration of outputs used above in defining flexibility rigidity. Again Burma the most responsive nation was less likely to reiterate

120/ Pruitt, op. cit., p. 16.
121/ Tang, op. cit., p. 596.
proposals than was India. The reiteration of previous positions, was a striking characteristic of the Sino-Indian exchange.

Another hypothesis was:

The assumption that responsiveness causes greater willingness to abandon proposals that are rejected by the other party implies that negotiations will proceed more rapidly and with less conflict the more responsive are the negotiators to one another.122/

This hypothesis is in effect a restatement of the linkage between outputs and consequences as defined in this paper, that a flexible series of outputs, typical of the responsive nation will tend to result in successful negotiations and in less conflict within the system and that the more rigid series of outcomes, typical of the unresponsive, will tend to result in unsuccessful negotiations and more conflict within the system.

Pruitt then introduces the concept of fate control which he defines as the ability of a player to

...move the other player's reward - cost position to a new position. The greater the range of values through which he can move the other, the greater his fate control over the other.123/

He then hypothesizes:

When one side's fate control causes the other to be more responsive, the first side need rely less in naked threats or promises to get what he wants. This in turn may cause the negotiations to proceed more rapidly with less chance of failure...124/

122/ Pruitt, op. cit., p. 16.
123/ Ibid., p. 13.
124/ Ibid., p. 16.
With almost any operational definition of the term fate control China would be found to have more fate control over Burma than over India. The knowledge of this was a major factor in the policy making of both Burma and India. The hypothesis is based on the assumption that the use of threats tends to lessen the likelihood of successful negotiations. The use of threats could be assumed to enlarge the issue from the situation at hand, here the disputed territory, to issues that are less easy to negotiate, issues of status, national pride, fair play and right conduct, as happened in the Sino-Indian case.

The more interesting contrasts resulting from the question of different consequences to the system arose not as much from the differences in size, "threat potential", or fate control as from the differences in issue areas and processes that seem to be responsible for these consequences. Size need not be viewed here as the independent variable. In fact the model changes focus in the latter part of the analysis with what seem to be the more useful concepts, process variables, becoming the independent variables.

Conclusions:
A model or "pre-theory" may be evaluated using criteria some of which are:

a) the ability of the model to focus on empirically significant questions and comparisons,

b) the organizing power of the model,
c) the ease of definition within the model and,
d) the model's originality.

This exploratory two-case study would seem to indicate that the method of distinguishing between countries provided by the pre-theory is a fruitful one. In this case study Rosenau's scheme focussed attention upon some clearly identifiable differences in process, outputs and consequences.

The model organizes existing knowledge on at least two levels. The pre-theory as modified here and as Rosenau suggests it should bring within a single framework, work done at both the systemic and subsystemic levels.

The concepts national attributes and process variables and their linkages include many of the variables that could be found in traditional foreign policy analysis and also attempt their systematization. It is this inclusiveness, however, that leads to the problem of definition within the model. As stated earlier, in a case study it is necessary to choose only one or two aspects of a process variable for study. This problem makes the establishment of a number of comparable studies and measures of potency more difficult.

Problems are encountered when the model is applied at different levels of systems. This case study was concerned with a cluster of nations bordering upon each other and relative size played an important role in the analysis. In looking at the global

125/ Rosenau, op. cit., p. 47.
system, however, size in an absolute sense would be the relevant characteristic with a consequent different set of classifications and method of analysis. This aspect of the model also presents the problem of the classification of attributes. Here I have taken size to be a national attribute. When associated with the power configuration in the system it may also be considered an attribute of the system.

The originality of a model has been defined as being "its improbability within the ensemble of possible models at a given time and place." With the often commented upon gap between foreign policy analysts and systemic analysis, the improbability of a model deriving its strength from the linkages between the fields was fairly high.

126/ Deustch, op. cit., p. 18

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----. Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged Between India and China. V. 1 and V. 3-10.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTUAL TIME</th>
<th>TIME PERIOD</th>
<th>INPUTS</th>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No specific input. The coming to power of the Communist regime.</td>
<td>A request for a border settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Joint communique expressing the need for a peaceful border settlement.</td>
<td>Joint communique expressing the need for a peaceful border settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955 Nov.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chinese claim part of Wa State</td>
<td>Demand withdrawal of Chinese troops to the 1941 line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955 Dec.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Reject 1941 Line as an illegal line</td>
<td>Suggest withdrawal to the 1941 line as an interim measure until a settlement reached.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Reject proposal for withdrawal to 1941 Line and claim part of Kachin State north 25°.</td>
<td>Protest and reject Chinese claims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Propose the setting up of a commission.</td>
<td>Reject but propose a meeting of governments instead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Propose withdrawal to the 1941 Line, the McMahon Line, and the Irrawaddy-Salween watershed if the Burmese do not reoccupy the Hpimaw area.</td>
<td>Accept proposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Agree to meet.</td>
<td>Agree to meet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 Oct.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Chinese claim border should be east of the McMahon Line.</td>
<td>Burmese reject this and claim respect for British lines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 Oct.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Chinese accept 1941 Line as part of a general settlement</td>
<td>Burmese demand acceptance of Irrawaddy-Salween watershed also.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 Oct.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Chinese accept the Irrawaddy-Salween watershed</td>
<td>Burmese demand acceptance of the McMahon Line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 Oct.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Chinese accept the &quot;traditional customary&quot; Line which the Burmese take to be the McMahon Line.</td>
<td>Burmese give up the Namwan Tract in return for the Chinese acceptance of British lines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTUAL TIME</td>
<td>TIME PERIOD</td>
<td>INPUTS</td>
<td>OUTPUTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 Dec. 14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Chinese give up the Namwan Tract for the Hpimaw area.</td>
<td>Burmese accept this and offer 56 sq. mi. in the Hpimaw area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 Mar. 15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Chinese claim the area inhabited by the Panghang and Panglao tribes.</td>
<td>Burmese reject this claim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 Mar. 16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Chinese &quot;traditional customary&quot; line accepted in 1956 is not the same as the McMahon Line. (See period 14.).</td>
<td>Burmese reject this claim and insist upon the watershed principle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 17</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese would give up mining rights in Lufang area in return for acceptance of &quot;traditional customary&quot; line.</td>
<td>Burmese reject proposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 Mar. 18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Chinese claim 186 sq. mi. at Hpimaw.</td>
<td>Burmese reject claim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 Jul. 19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Same as above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 Jul. 20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Chinese extend claim in Panghang area to 86 sq. mi.</td>
<td>Burmese reject claim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958 Jan. 21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Chinese accept the watershed principle in substance but state there must be exceptions for monasteries and herb growing areas.</td>
<td>Burmese reject and state that there must be no exceptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 Jun. 23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>No specific input</td>
<td>Burmese offer 62 sq. mi. in the Panghang area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B
## INPUTS AND OUTPUTS FOR INDIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTUAL TIME</th>
<th>TIME PERIOD</th>
<th>INPUTS</th>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 14 1958</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1958 Nov. 3 Chinese ask for a border settlement</td>
<td>Declare borders are delimited and reject request for settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 22 1959</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1959 Jan. 23 Ask for a meeting to discuss border problems.</td>
<td>Reject proposal for meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 26 1959</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1959 Sept. 8</td>
<td>a. Lay claim to disputed area through legal arguments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. Claim border is not delimited and make claim to &quot;traditional customary&quot; Chinese portion.</td>
<td>b. Reject proposal for negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Ask for negotiations.</td>
<td>c. Make a proposal for withdrawal from and talks over Tamaden.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. No specific input.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 16 1959</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1959 Nov. 27</td>
<td>a. Reject proposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Propose withdrawal of 20 kil. from line of actual control in Western Sector.</td>
<td>c. Make proposal that there be no patrols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. No specific input</td>
<td>d. Make proposal to vacate Longju.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d. No specific input.</td>
<td>e. Accept talks if Chinese withdraw to line on Indian maps and Indians to line on Chinese maps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>e. Propose talks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTUAL TIME</td>
<td>TIME PERIOD</td>
<td>OUTPUTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1959</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1959 Dec. 17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. Propose 20 kil. withdrawal again.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Accept India's Longju proposal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Make proposal to extend the Longju proposal to all of the Eastern Sector.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d. Accept proposal for no patrols</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>e. Reject Ladakh proposal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>f. Reiterate claims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>g. Propose Dec. 26 talks between Prime Ministers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. No specific output.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Accept.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. No specific output.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d. Accept.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>e. No specific output.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>f. Reiterate claims.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>g. Reject proposal for talks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1959 Dec. 26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. Reiterate Chinese claims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Propose 20 kil. withdrawal again.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Propose negotiations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d. Offer to respect McMahon Line</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>e. No specific input</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>f. No specific input.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. Reject Chinese claims and reiterate Indian claims.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Reject withdrawal proposal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Reject request for negotiations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d. No specific output.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>e. Propose talks between Prime Ministers in New Delhi in March.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>f. Propose withdrawal as in period 5e.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1960 April 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>a. Reiterate claims.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Propose 20 kil. withdrawal again.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Reject Indian Ladakh proposal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. No specific outputs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. No specific output.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. No specific output.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTUAL TIME</td>
<td>TIME PERIOD</td>
<td>INPUTS</td>
<td>OUTPUTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 March</td>
<td>&amp; April</td>
<td>a. Meet at New Delhi</td>
<td>a. Meet at New Delhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. No agreement</td>
<td>b. No agreement on substantive problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Agree to set up Commission</td>
<td>c. Agree to set up Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 Dec.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Sign the Sino-Burmese Agreement</td>
<td>Protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961 Sept.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1961 Sept. 13 Reject June 15 protest.</td>
<td>Recognize that there is a legitimate difference of opinion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 May</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sign Sino-Pakistan Agreement</td>
<td>Protest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and from McMahon Line in the Eastern Sector</td>
<td>b. No specific output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Propose meeting of officials to negotiate disengagement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTUAL TIME</td>
<td>TIME PERIOD</td>
<td>INPUTS</td>
<td>OUTPUTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 Nov. 14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1962 Nov. 4</td>
<td>c. Propose a meeting of Prime Ministers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. Reject proposal to withdraw to Sept 8/62 positions.</td>
<td>c. Reject until there is a lessening of tension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. Declare a unilateral withdrawal of 20 kil. from Nov. 7/59 positions on Dec. 1.</td>
<td>a. Ask for clarification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Propose talks between Prime Ministers.</td>
<td>b. Ask for clarification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Propose unconditional withdrawal of positions.</td>
<td>c. Ask for clarification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d. Propose talks between Prime Ministers.</td>
<td>d. No specific output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 Nov. 30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1962 Nov. 26</td>
<td>Clarify previous proposals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. Will proceed with Nov. 21 proposal</td>
<td>Request further clarification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Propose talks between Prime Ministers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. Reject proposal for talks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Propose talks between Prime Ministers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Ask for clarification.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>d. No specific output.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C
Map 1

India, Western and Middle Sectors
Map 2

India, Eastern Sector
Map 3

Burma