THE MAY THIRTIETH INCIDENT IN SHANGHAI: WU-SA SHIH-CHIEN

by

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We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

September, 1971

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ABSTRACT: On May Thirtieth 1925 in Shanghai, a group of Municipal police officers under the command of a British Inspector fired upon a crowd of Chinese students and pedestrians killing twelve and wounding numerous others. This thesis is an examination of the May Thirtieth Incident; but it is also an examination of the background to the Incident and its resulting aftermath. Foreign interest and action in China played an important role in the background to the May Thirtieth Incident as did nationalist and anti-foreign propaganda and agitation. It was, however, domestic issues and events in Shanghai that led directly to the student demonstrations on May 30th. Once the Incident occurred, nationalist and anti-foreign sentiments again became quite important as did the role and influence of the CCP. There ensued in Shanghai and other centers further agitation, strikes, and general boycotts against foreign interests in China.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 1. THE BACKGROUND

Section

A. PREFACE 5

B. ANTI-FOREIGN ATTITUDES AND THEIR ORIGINS PRIOR TO MAY 30th 9

Anti-foreign Attitudes in China
Anti-foreign Attitudes in Shanghai
Shanghai: A Description
Shanghai: Anti-foreign Attitudes
The Leading Organizations and Groups Important in influencing Anti-foreign Attitudes Prior to May 30th
The KMT and CCP
The Students
The Labourers
The Chinese Merchants and Industrialists

C. THE EVENTS THAT LED TO THE MAY 30th INCIDENT . 50

The Strikes in the Japanese Mills
The Death of Sun Yat-sen and the Reading of his Will
The Peking Incident
The Municipal Council and its new Bylaws
The Mill Strikes of May
May 15th and the Death of Ku Cheng-hung
The Reaction
Mobilization
The Memorial March
The Meeting of the SSU on May 27th
The Meeting of the CC-CCP on May 29th
The Meeting of the SSU on May 29th

CHAPTER II. THE EVENTS OF MAY THIRTIETH

A. PREFACE 79

B. THE MAY THIRTIETH INCIDENT 80

Description of the Louza Area
Nanking Road
Louza Police Station
Events Leading up to the Incident

The Incident
A Quiet Morning of Preparations
The Nanking Railway Assembly
Louza Police Station
The Mixed Court Assembly - Part I
The Speaking Brigade of Ta'ai Hung-li
The Speaking Brigade of Liang Yu-hua
The Lloyd Road Incident
The First Thibet Road Incident
More Patrolling
The Mixed Court Assembly - Part II
The Second Thibet Road Incident
The Mixed Court Procession on The Chekiang Road
Nanking Road: More Patrols
The Arrival of the Chekiang Procession
The Police Retreat
The Firing
Aftermath
Summary

C. DEBATES, CONFLICTS, AND CONTROVERSIES 133

Preface
The Students in the Settlement Prior to three p.m.
Their Aims
Their Size
Their Composition
The Crowds on Nanking Road at the time of the Firing
Their Time of Arrival and Their Size
Their Composition
Their Temperament
Main Controversies
Other Debate
Resistance
Weapons
Refusal to Disperse
Violence
Traffic Tie-ups
The Firing
The Stated Causes
The Warning
The Precautions
An Examination of Those Killed and Wounded
Preface
The Reports
TFTC
KWCP
The Doctors' Reports

The Analysis
Those Killed
Those Wounded
Conclusions
The Role of the CCP
Summary

CHAPTER III. THE AFTERMATH

A. PREFACE 181

B. RESPONSES TO THE MAY 30th INCIDENT: AGITATION, INCIDENTS, AND STRIKES 183
Shanghai
The Meeting of May 31st
The Shanghai General Strike
Organizations
Dissension
The General Boycott
Settlement
The Reorganization of the SSU and the Rise of New Unions
Other Centers
Agitation, Demonstrations, and further Incidents

C. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INCIDENT 218
The Diplomatic Exchanges and the Findings of the Mixed Court
The Diplomatic Body and Chinese Commissions
The Judicial Inquiry

D. THE EFFECTS OF THE MAY 30th INCIDENT AND SUBSEQUENT INCIDENTS ON THE UNEQUAL TREATIES 228

E. THE ROLE OF RUSSIA, THE COMINTERN, AND THE CCP IN THE VARIOUS INCIDENTS 231

F. MAY THIRTIETH AND CHINESE NATIONALISM 234

CONCLUSIONS 236

FOOTNOTES 243

APPENDIX 269

BIBLIOGRAPHY 276

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Summary of the Doctors' Report 173

2. A Listing of Those Killed 175

3. A Listing of Those Wounded 177

LIST OF MAPS

Map		Page
1.	Shanghai	18
2.	Shanghai Showing Regional Development . . .	20
3.	The Louza District	82
4.	The Louza Police Station	84
5.	Assemblies From One p.m. to Two p.m.	91
6.	The Louza District - One p.m. to Two p.m. .	92
7.	Assemblies From Two p.m. to Three p.m. . . .	103
8.	The Louza District - Two p.m. to Three . . .	104
9.	Assemblies From Three p.m. to 3:37 p.m.. . .	113
10.	The Louza District - Three p.m. to 3:37 p.m.	114
11.	The Sight of the Firing	126

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCC	The Shanghai Chinese Chamber of Commerce
CC-CCP	Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CKCN	Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien (中国青年)
CYB	China Yearbook
HTCP	Hsiang-tao chou-pao (向导周报)
ICJ	International Commission of Judges
ICJ-A	Report of E. Johnson, American Judge
ICJ-B	Report of G. Gollan, British Judge
ICJ-J	Report of K, Suga, Japanese Judge
Joint-Comm.	Joint Committee of Labour, Tradesmen, and Students
KMT	Kuomintang
KWCP	Kuo-wen chou-pao (国闻周报)
KWCP-1	"The Blood on Nanking Road", June 7, 1925
KWCP-2	"Aspects of the Period Since May 30th Massacre", June 7, 1925
KWCP-3	"Waves from the May 30th Incident", June 14, 1925
NCH	North China Herald
NSU	National Students' Union
SSU	Shanghai Students' union
TFTC	Tung-fang tsa-chih (東方雜誌)
TFTC-1	"The Responsibility for and a Reconstruction of the May 30th Incident", July 1925
TFTC-2	"Analysis and Proof from the facts of May 30th Massacre", July 1925
TFTC-3	"Records of the May 30th Incident" July 1925
TFTC-4	"Summation of the Records of the Mixed Court", July 1925

THE MAY THIRTIETH INCIDENT IN SHANGHAI: WU-SA SHIH-CHIEN

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

In 1925, two mass movements that had important social, economic, and political implications for the history of China were developing. A rural movement was organizing in the provinces of Kwangtung, Hupei and Hunan that soon developed into the explosive peasant movement of 1926 and 1927. An important urban mass movement, known as the May Thirtieth Movement, had also begun to take form in many of the major cities and sea-ports.

When the British-officered police of the Shanghai Municipal Council killed twelve demonstrators in Nanking Road on May 30th, there ensued a nationwide multiclass movement of protests, demonstrations, strikes and boycotts, militantly anti-foreign and anti-treaty in nature. This May 30th Movement soon transcended all previous anti-foreign movements as workers, students and merchants in the beginning united to oppose "foreign aggression" and to boycott foreign goods.

It was not only the negative manifestation of opposition to foreign interests that had united workers, students and merchants in this movement. The positive nature of anti-foreignism at that time, nationalism, had meant that students, workers and merchants also joined together in cries proclaiming their desire to control their own destiny and save China from both the militarists and the foreigners.

The effect of the movement was swift and tumultous. Shanghai, the great foreign stronghold with its Western banks and mills and its foreign concessions, was paralyzed by a general strike and boycott movement. The strike and boycott spread as other cities joined in. With the Shameen Incident of June, South China followed suit, and Hongkong, the fortress of Britain in China, soon became totally immobilized.

The events, with other incidents and issues, afforded a great opportunity for students and labourers to continue agitation and for most classes in China to mobilize in a great national cause. Both the KMT and CCP took advantages of those opportunities. The strike and boycott in the South enabled the KMT to consolidate its power in Kwangtung. At the end of June 1925, it organized and proclaimed a new National Government of China, and began to look northward toward the sources of real national power in Central and North China.

The term "May 30th Movement" first came into use with the students and the press shortly after the Incident, and was meant to apply only to the Incident of May 30th in Shanghai and the associated nationwide events which immediately followed - most notably other incidents, and the general strikes and boycotts against British and Japanese interests in China. In later years, the term gradually acquired a much broader meaning.

Throughout Chinese history, important "movements" have frequently taken their name from the date of their most important incident. For example, May Fourth (1919) and December Ninth (1936) are described as the most significant focal point in the events of the May Fourth Movement and the December Ninth Movement. The same is true of the May 30th Movement where May 30th is seen as the "jumping-off" point, the focussing point of the anti-foreign, pro-nationalist movement that followed. The incident became a movement.

How an incident becomes a movement is a question most complex in nature, and would require a dissertation in itself. That, however, is not the purpose of this paper. Instead, the emphasis will be placed on the Incident of May 30th rather than how it became a movement.

Surprisingly, although considerable work has been done on various aspects of the May 30th Movement, very little has been done on the May 30th Incident itself. In the work that has been done, the nature and achievements of the Incident, the identity of its leadership, and its definition have become points of dispute. Vast amounts have been done on the successes of the Hongkong Strike, but relatively little has been done on Shanghai and the Incident.

It therefore is the purpose of this paper to examine

the Incident of May 30, 1925. To understand that Incident, it will be examined in three different aspects: from where did the Incident arise (the background), what actually was the Incident (the events), and what were the results of the Incident (the aftermath).

This three-fold description is very much like the analysis of the Incident made by student and commercial publications immediately following the events of May 30th. This does not, however, mean that these were the only sources used here in an attempt to reconstruct that period. Other sources, such as the testimony to the Mixed Court, the findings of the Judicial Inquiry, and local newspapers have proved most useful. The three-fold approach only seems to be the clearest.

CHAPTER I THE BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 1

THE BACKGROUND

A. PREFACE

What was termed "anti-foreignism" in China during the 1920's was a complexity of emotions: resentments, sentiments, ambitions, and aspirations of various Chinese derived from actions of foreign governments and foreign individuals. Anti-foreign attitudes were of three natures - anti-foreign in general, nationalist anti-foreign and anti-imperialistic.

General anti-foreign attitudes could be broad, irrational, racist and bigoted in nature, or specific and very rational. They may have been aimed at the unequal treaties, foreign interests, the Imperialist Powers, or only local discriminatory policies.

Anti-foreignism as manifested in nationalist expression could encompass both general anti-foreign attitudes and anti-imperialist attitudes. These nationalist anti-foreign attitudes, however, implied a much more positive nature than xenophobia, racism, or opposition to foreign interests. In particular, they demanded a national consciousness, a positive sense on the part of each person that his own national state's intrinsic worth and excellence required him to be loyal to it above every other thing. For Chinese in the 1920's, nationalist anti-foreignism was expressed in a desire

for Chinese to gain control of their own destiny and to save China from foreign interests.

Anti-imperialist attitudes, although anti-foreign in nature, were much more specific and demanded a high level of political consciousness. Marxist-Leninist in orientation, these anti-imperialist attitudes stressed over and over that the ills of China were due to foreign imperialist exploitation and foreign-imposed treaties.

Prior to 1925, general anti-foreignism, nationalist anti-foreignism, and anti-imperialism were all to be found in various sectors of Chinese society. That had not always been the case in either the 19th or early 20th centuries.

Chinese reaction to foreigners, initially xenophobic, became more specifically anti-foreign and nationalistic as foreign powers became more entrenched in China. National consciousness was accompanied by a breakdown in the old social system, and reaction to foreigners began to be directed against the foreign interests and their treaties. The 1905 Boycott Movement marks the beginning of modern Chinese nationalism (China seen as a national state with definite sovereign rights). What had been previously xenophobic was quickly becoming a kind of nationalist anti-foreignism, but one that was primarily limited to intellectuals and Chinese businessmen. The

May Fourth Movement saw the further spreading of that nationalist anti-foreignism.

About the same time, anti-imperialist assertions began to spread amongst a few prominent intellectuals, and from 1919 to 1926 Marxist-Leninist doctrines found increasing acceptance among the student and working classes. Until late 1923, the only anti-imperialist program in China was that of the CCP, a party with a small membership, limited to specific regional bases. After 1923, new gains for a program of anti-imperialism came when the CCP and KMT parties joined in January 1924 and created a united front. Through important propaganda work, the anti-foreignism of more and more Chinese was directed into the channels of Marxist-Leninist anti-imperialist doctrine. It should not, however, be forgotten that these attitudes were mainly found in the urban centers close to foreign settlements and amongst a very small proportion of the Chinese population.

Prior to May 30th, 1925, strong anti-foreign attitudes, some anti-imperialist and nationalistic, had been developing in many of the major cities in China. Propaganda work of the CCP and KMT had convinced many workers and students that foreigners and their treaties were in some manner the reason for China's backwardness.[1] The North China Herald had sensed these sentiments early in 1925 when it reported:[2]

> The wave of anti-Christian and anti-foreign propaganda is now sweeping throughout China . . . What appears to us more probable is that the present propaganda is part of a widespread movement working up to a general repudiation of the treaties.

Shanghai, like other major cities, also saw widespread anti-foreign sentiments throughout the 1920's. One of the original treaty ports, Shanghai was acutely aware of the impact of foreign presence. Of this, T. F. Millard, an American in China at the time, had said:[3]

> Shanghai is the real citadel of the old treaty status. The foreign settlements at Shanghai may have been grafted on China, but they have grown into the commercial, financial and industrial organisms of the country . . . Every condition caused by the impact of Western political thought and material evolution is found there in its best and its worst forms. Shanghai . . . is a concrete example of the problems of China. The foreign settlements elsewhere reproduced its features on a smaller scale.

Anti-Christian slogans and campaigns, anti-imperialist propaganda, the Rights Recovery Movement and the failure to revise the old treaties, had helped to make many Chinese in Shanghai aware of the "evils" of imperialism and the "injusticies" of the treaty system. This awareness was heightened by the development of nationalists sentiments alongside anti-foreign ones.

Such problems as the Municipal Council, its expansionist policy, the Shanghai police force, the Mixed Court and the large

foreign mill complexes had also heightened the development of anti-foreign attitudes in Shanghai. Amidst this, the May 30th incident occurred, and the movement that followed soon co-opted many of these issues as its driving force and basis for settlement.

Specific historical events that occurred prior to May 30th did have some direct influence on events that occurred during May 30th. Attitudes were also important, and although general anti-foreign attitudes such as those directed against the treaties were present, they were, however, not as important as specific local grievances that were bothering many students and workers of Shanghai.

It is therefore the purpose of this chapter on background, to examine the inter-relationship and consequences of those attitudes and events in Shanghai and China that led directly and indirectly to the occurrence of the May 30th incident.

B. ATTITUDES AND ORGANIZATIONS CONTRIBUTING TO ANTI-FOREIGN ATTITUDES PRIOR TO MAY 30TH

1. ANTI-FOREIGN ATTITUDES IN CHINA

During and after the May Fourth Movement, anti-foreign attitudes increased in their importance. The year 1924 marked a new change. Following the lectures of Dr. Sun and his propaganda teams, anti-foreign attitudes and anti-imperialist

attitudes began to spread with greater vehemence. As he travelled from city to city and school to school, propaganda teams followed to complete the indoctrination. Other teams were dispatched to the interior to make the students there aware of the unequal treaties, foreign "aggression" and warlord "atrocities".[4] Students proved most receptive as this anti-imperialist and nationalist theme continued to spread.[5] For example, on July 16, 1924, the Rights Recovery Movement led by Yun Tai-ying in Peking began to organize a Federation For Anti-Imperialist Agitation. Centering its attacks upon the unequal treaties, the Federation soon had branch offices in various schools in Peking, Shanghai and Canton.[6] Nationalism also proved to be one of the main features of this movement as it spread alongside anti-imperialist sentiments.

By 1925, although not every Chinese was necessarily becoming anti-imperialistic, more and more were becoming conscious of the issues that bothered many of their national leaders, students and workers.

The Issues. All foreign activity in China ultimately rested upon the treaty system, and in this sense bore directly upon China's national sovereignty. For this reason, it was these treaties that usually bore the brunt of the attack. To Chinese nationalists, they were seen as unequal agreements

that had been forced upon a weak China.[7] In particular, tariff restrictions[8], extrality[9], concessions and settlements[10], and leased territory[11] were seen as the leading unequal features in those treaties.[12] Campaigns against these features had occurred frequently since the Twenty-One Demands of 1915, and continued to gain momentum in the 1920's.

During the 20th century, demands for change became stronger and stronger both from the Chinese government and from the Chinese people.[13] Soon, however, it became obvious that few foreign governments were willing to implement change. At both the Versailles Treaty Conference and the Washington Conference, the Chinese attempted to change the treaties; both attempts ended in failure.

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the Chinese entered claims, inter alia, for the removal of the treaty restrictions on tariff autonomy, for the relinquishment of consular jurisdiction and extrality, for the restoration of concessions and settlements, and for the return of the leased territories. To these claims the victorious powers turned a deaf ear, in spite of the fact that they had enunciated such a policy of self-determination and adopted it for Europe.[14]

By invitation China was represented at the Washington Conference for Armaments Limitations held in November 1921.

Her representatives attended hoping to extract from the Conference, the "abrogation of all existing impairments on her sovereignty".[15] In this they were disappointed. Agreements were reached in regard to doing away with foreign post offices. A Commission was to be appointed to take up immediately the matter of tariff revision and another Commission was to be appointed to visit China for the purpose of studying the judicial system with a view to determining when extrality might be safely abolished.[16]

Some Chinese nationalists were somewhat gratified with the outcome of the Washington Conference, and patiently waited for the results of the Commissions. As evidence of this good feeling, an anti-Japanese economic boycott was discarded.[17] Others, however, realized the shortcomings of the agreements.[18]

After the Washington Conference, China did achieve some steps that were seen as progress towards independence. In 1923, China received from Japan, the first remittance of the Boxer indemnity funds for the purpose of education. Britain, United States and the Soviet Union soon followed, renouncing claims they had received since 1901.[19] Relations were established with the Vatican. Foreign shipping was prohibited from the Sungari River. In 1924, the first ambassador to China from the Soviet Union arrived in Peking.[20]

China's gains, however, were indeed quite insignificant when compared with the major disappointments and problems that arose during the same period; problems and disappointments that were most noticeable to the Chinese nationalists.

During this time, the Chinese were particularly sensitive to Japanese interests in China. Attempts to end the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 and various new agreements had created tense moments between China and Japan throughout the 1920's. On March 10, 1923, the Chinese demanded the nullification of the agreements made with Japan concerning leases, railways, extrality, mining, loan agreements and so on, but to no effect. Boycotts and anti-Japanese demonstrations followed, and in June, Japanese Marines killed two Chinese demonstrators in Changsha.[21] The incident was settled quietly, but it received wide publicity in the Chinese press.

Foreign governments also acted slowly in carrying out the provisions of the Washington Conference, and that only further annoyed Chinese patriots. On May 31, 1923, an agreement was drafted for the return of the British leased territory of Wei-hai-wei, but because the Chinese Government objected to the terms proposed, negotiations were suspended by the British.[22] France postponed both ratification of the Tariff Treaty and implementation of the Extrality Commission to press for settlement of the gold franc issue.[23] For the

same reason France held up the Salt Gabelle.[24]

The Chinese Foreign Office also believed the Powers' implementation of the Nine-Power Treaty's provisions were too slow, and thus decided to act. On November 1, 1923 Peking asked for the Conference on Extrality, but the Lenching Incident put dampers on that.[25] On March 10, 1924, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs proposed a Customs Conference which was turned down by the Powers because it was regarded as premature.[26] Attempts were made to press for the abolition of the Mixed Court at Shanghai, but they too were turned back by the foreigners in Shanghai.[27]

These problems all remained sore spots throughout 1924 at a time when the propaganda work of the KMT and the CCP was increasing its attack against the Great Powers and the treaties, and at a time when nationalism and a sense of Chinese importance were quickly spreading throughout much of China. As a result of this anti-imperialist campaign, various slogans about economic penetration by foreign capitalists became prominent in some quarters. Slogans frequently expressed resentment of foreign management, excessive foreign profits, alleged exclusion of Chinese from new forms of enterprise, and "Chinese deficiencies in competition with the West".[28] Others complained that foreign firms could evade Chinese legislation and escape forced loans and taxation that the Chinese could not.[29] It

was not uncommon to find workers who believed the claim that because foreigners were immune from Chinese laws, they could exploit Chinese workers as cheap labourers.[30] It was easy to convince them that their low standard of living would come only with the end of the privileged position of foreigners and the unequal treaties.

A particularly troublesome aspect of foreign economic penetration was the foreign loans made to finance projects of economic development and the Chinese government itself. It was claimed that because interest had to be paid, the net effect was a bleeding of China of needed funds for industrialization. The loans were also seen as attempts on the part of the foreign governments, especially Japan, to keep the militarists in power in China so as to guarantee their own foothold. Thus it was believed the loans contributed to the disunity of the Chinese people.[31]

Chinese patriots were also annoyed at the amount of industry owned by foreigners. In the 1920's, foreign capital owned nearly half of the Chinese cotton industry. It owned a third of railways outright and held mortgages on the rest. It owned and operated more than half of the shipping in Chinese waters and carried nearly 80% of China's foreign and coastal trade.[32]

Public indignation was further aroused by the alleged reckless and surreptitious export of rice out of the country. Most patriots charged that the smuggling proceeded directly under the protection of the government in Peking and involved mainly foreign traders, in particular, the Japanese.[33]

By early 1925, anti-foreign attitudes in China were wide-spread and were mainly focussed upon the unequal treaties, foreign economic penetration and foreign presence in China. Anti-imperialist attitudes had continued to spread since 1924 amongst the students and working classes. Anti-foreign attitudes were not solely negative manifestations, but in many cases were accompanied with important nationalist sentiments. Not only did many Chinese call for the end of the unequal treaties, but many now believed that that end would only come with the unification of China and the destruction of the militarists. A similar situation had developed in Shanghai.

2. ANTI-FOREIGN ATTITUDES IN SHANGHAI

Characteristics unique to Shanghai had created a city most receptive to anti-foreign attitudes. Broad anti-foreign issues together with local anti-foreign issues made Shanghai, as the "bastion of foreign control", potentially the most likely place for an attack on foreign capital and the unequal treaties.

a. SHANGHAI: A DESCRIPTION

In 1925, the port city of Shanghai had a population of about two and one-half million. Of these, about 40,000 were foreigners: 18,000 Japanese, 9,000 Russians, 7,000 British, 4,200 Americans, 1,000 French, 900 Germans, 300 Italians, 300 Dutch, and the remainder divided among fifty other nationalities.[34] It was a "society in which settlements, centers of culture, divisions of social groups, sharp regional feelings and differences in wealth and interdependence, and the impact of critical historical events and social institutions, all acted together to produce a highly differentiated and cluster society".[35]

Unlike old Peking, Shanghai had a modern sector, a commercial and industrial sector, and had a population heterogeneous in nature. In 1925, at least five major groups had been exerting various degrees of social influence on that society: the small foreign community; the new intelligentsia that included professors, teachers, students, and professional men; the new commercial and industrial classes that included traders, businessmen, clerks, and compradors; the urban workers that included common labourers, skilled and unskilled workers, artisans, and handicraft workers; and the "lumpen proletariat" that generally comprised the unemployed vagrants and the socially "undesirable elements".[36] Each group had not always been a part of Shanghai, but had arrived at different times

MAP LISTING ONE

SHANGHAI

Major Schools, Universities, and Colleges

1. St. John's University
2. Shanghai Law School
3. T'ung-chi Medical School
4. Kwanghua University
5. Futan University
6. Nanyang University
7. Tungwen College
8. Siccawei (St. Ignace)
9. Aurora University
10. Shanghai University
11. Medhurst College
12. Chingchong Middle School
13. Shanghai Baptist College
14. Shanghai College
15. Tatung University

Hospitals and Others

16. Red Cross Hospital
17. Paolin Hospital
18. Jen-chi Hospital
19. Louza Police Station
20. Central Police Station
21. North Station
22. Mixed Court


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT AND FRENCH CONCESSION
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT
FRENCH CONCESSION
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT
A Sept 20,1846
B Nov 27,1848
C June 25,1863
D 1899
FRENCH CONCESSION
1 Apr 6,1849
2 Oct 29,1861
3 Jan 27,1900
4 July 20,1914
CHINESE MUNICIPALITY OF GREATER SHANGHAI
CHAPEI
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT
FRENCH CONCESSION
HONGKEW DISTRICT
CHINESE CIVIC CENTER
PARK
HONGKEW PARK
Japanese Naval Depot (Landing Party Barracks)
SINGAPORE PARK
MOORE MEMORIAL CHURCH
ST JOHN'S UNIV.
JESSFIELD PARK
McTYEIRE GIRLS' HS
RECREATION GROUND
Municipal Bldg
Italian Consulate
Czechoslovakian Consulate
Polish Legation
Danish Consulate
Belgian Consulate
FRENCH PARK
ST MARIE HOSP
ISOLATION HOSP.
SHANGHAI AMERICAN SCHOOL
MARGARET WILLIAMSON HOSPITAL
LUNG HWEN COLLEGE
ZIKAWEI
Willow Pattern Tea House and Lee
OLD CHINESE CITY
CONFUCIUS TEMPLE
French Cons
Native Customs House
POOTUNG POINT
POOTUNG ROAD
WHANGPOO
TUNG
Japanese Consulate
American Consulate
German Consulate
British Consulate
Customs
NORTH STA
SOUTH STATION
Shanghai Arsenal
Chinese Naval Airdrome
HANGCHOW NINGPO R.R.
SHANGHAI NANKING RAILWAY
CHUNG SAN ROAD
PAOSHAN
HSIANG YING ROAD
SZE PIEH ROAD
SEE WAY ROAD
CHUNG KUNG ROAD
NANTAO
CENTRAL PORTION OF GREATER SHANGHAI
TOTAL POPULATION, 1,300,000
SCALE
0 ¼ ½ ¾ 1 MILE
BASED ON MAP PUBLISHED BY THE NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS AND HERALD, LTD.
DRAWN BY P. STANLEY KING
LEGEND
Extra settlement
Harbin
Vladivostok
Mukden
Peiping
Tientsin
Dairen
Nanking
Nagasaki
SHANGHAI
Foochow
Canton
Hong Kong
SCALE
MILES

over the previous one hundred years.

The opening of Shanghai in 1842 as a treaty port by the Treaty of Nanking opened the city to foreign residents. Foreigners began to arrive, bringing with them their own administrative systems and economic and social institutions. Quickly they forced many changes in transportation, communication, trading and manufacturing. In order to protect their own interests, the foreigners forced on the Chinese government the Land Regulations of 1845. Twenty-three in number, they dealt with the "method of acquiring land in the area set aside for foreigners, the laying out and repairing of roads, the building of jetties, bridges, drains, and public markets, and the levying of wharfage dues".[37] In time, it was planned to exclude the Chinese from the foreign areas. Instead, the opposite occurred. Due to the effective protection afforded by the foreign authorities, large numbers of Chinese flocked to the city. At the same time, the establishment of modern commercial and industrial enterprises by the foreign community soon brought economic gains to the city. The result was the rise of the Chinese factory workers, the Chinese clerks, merchants, and compradores, and the wharf coolies, stevedores, maids, and chauffeurs. With this also came the unemployed, the malcontent, the prostitutes and the beggars.[38]

2. SHANGHAI SHOWING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT



Modern large-scale industry, however, had largely developed only since 1900. With the introduction of foreign industry following the Sino-Japanese War, some Chinese owned industry also began to develop. After 1914 all types of industry received tremendous impetus due to wartime scarcity of products, and national industry, in particular, developed most rapidly as a result of the temporary withdrawal of foreign economic activities in China. A new business and a new industrial class began to grow alongside a large urban working class.[39]

By 1925 Shanghai no longer functioned primarily as a residential area of primary importance to foreigners engaged in trade; instead the city was comprised of various groups with an economy of primary importance to the developing economy of China itself. It was, in fact, one of the industrial and financial centers of China.

In 1925, no less than 45% of all foreign investment in China was invested in Shanghai.[40] The significance of Shanghai to the foreign Powers was based largely on this fact. Further significance, however, lay in the fact that at that time close to 90% of all foreign investment in Shanghai belonged to the Japanese (30%) and the British (60%). Most of that, as well as two-thirds of all Shanghai factories, were located in the International Settlement.[41]

To put Shanghai into proper perspective, it must really be regarded as four separate 'towns'. Containing most of the commercial and industrial life of the city, the International Settlement, governed by a Municipal Council, dominated the port. The French concession, located to the south of the Settlement, was controlled by the French Municipal Council. The two Chinese cities of Nantao (south) and Chapei (north) were in theory administered by the Chinese government in Peking; but in practice, after 1920 they mainly came under the various warlord powers who attempted to collect taxes from them. All of these towns were found so close to one another that any person might merely cross a street to pass into another one.[41a]

The International Settlement was originally set aside for the residence of foreign traders shortly after the Opium War. In course of time, however, the foreigners residing there acquired the right of "municipal home rule", with the rights of police and municipal administration. With the Land Regulations as their basis of authority, and by the adoption of bylaws without the consent of the Chinese government, they extended their power to such an extent that the International Settlement had been converted into a "small separate state in the Empire of China".[42] As time passed, attempts were made to exert their authority over the Chinese citizens who

lived outside of the Settlement areas.[43]

The Municipal Council, the sole administrative organ of the International Settlement, was neither extensive nor complex. A chairman and vice-chairman were chosen at the first meeting of the Council each year. The secretary, appointed and on a paid salary, was usually the most important individual. The Council was assisted by twelve different committees that acted as advisors in such areas as taxation, finance, public works, and police administration. In general, the British as the majority of the voting ratepayers, monopolized the various elected posts as well as the appointed bureaucratic positions. In the post-War period, however, the increasing importance of the Japanese community in Shanghai was reflected in the appointment of Japanese members to the Council, of a certain number of Japanese to the Council's advisory committees, and in the growth of the Japanese Branch of the Municipal Police. No Chinese sat on any committee, let alone the Council.[44]

The electorate exercised its powers and performed its functions in an annual meeting of the Ratepayers and in any special meeting that might be called by the Council. In December of each year, the Council listed the qualified voters, and before every meeting voting tickets were registered as the voter entered the meetings. Decisions at all meetings

were made by the majority of a quorum present. Although Chinese owned as much as 90% of all property and paid most of the taxes, very few were actually allowed to attend these meetings or to vote.[45]

Police administration of the Settlement was based on a nucleus of foreign officers: a foreign chief of police, inspectors, captains, sergeants, patrolmen, and detectives. Chinese and Sikhs filled the majority of the 2,795 posts, but they did not hold important or major posts. In all, 310 white foreigners, 805 Sikhs, and 1680 Chinese, all under the command of the Chief of Police and the Municipal Council, were scattered throughout the Settlement districts in the various local police stations. As well as being armed, each police station housed their own constables in barracks adjacent to the police offices. Police jurisdiction in the Settlement extended to all inhabitants including the Chinese. Their jurisdiction was not supposed to extend to the inhabitants of the Chinese cities. In reality, however, Municipal police officers at various times entered the Chinese cities to carry out patrol duty and to make arrests.[46]

Shanghai also remained one of the great centers of learning in China. Of the 111 institutions of higher learning in China, 25 were located in Shanghai (17 in Peking and 5 in Nanking). Of the 3,047 institutions of secondary education,

141 were in Shanghai (75 in Peking and 25 in Nanking). Shanghai's students had been a part of the new schools since 1905, and a part of the new nationalist curriculum since 1921. Further significance lay in the fact that a majority of the students in Shanghai were from all parts of the country, and not from Chekiang and Kiangsu alone.[47]

Once in Shanghai, these students were particularly ripe for nationalist and anti-foreign sentiments. Constant contact with foreign interests and foreign ideas were the chief factors for this development.

b. SHANGHAI: ANTI-FOREIGN ATTITUDES

The entire area of Greater Shanghai, which had once started as a mud flat was valued in 1926 at about U.S. $100 billion. Interests invested in Shanghai totalled more than three times that amount.[48] Chinese nationalists simply wanted to regard this as Chinese property open to Chinese laws and taxes. Many foreigners, however, were not quite prepared to acknowledge that reality in either fact or principle.

With the beginning of municipal organization by the Chinese in the Chapei region in 1906, conflicts of jurisdiction became more frequent. Chinese citizens outside of the settlement areas began to actively object to the extensions of settlement boundaries and roads, while the Chinese residents in the International Settlement began to revolt against

"paternal government" and to demand a voice in municipal affairs.[49]

Protest and serious riots against foreign control had occurred as early as 1874, but those remained primarily anti-Christian and xenophobic in nature.[50] The year 1905 saw a change in the attitudes of many Chinese, especially the educated. It became evident that many were no longer willing to submit passively to what they regarded as an infringement on their rights as Chinese. That year, during a campaign against American immigration policy, the Louza Police Station was burnt down, and a boycott against American trade was instigated.[51] What had been xenophobic was distinctively becoming a kind of nationalist anti-foreignism.

The May Fourth Movement in Shanghai saw the spread of anti-foreign attitudes and Chinese nationalism as merchants, workers, and students joined in a strike and general boycott movement against the Japanese. After 1922, with the presence of the important Communist members and party organs, anti-imperialist sentiments amongst the workers began to spread. Those attitudes, however, were limited and not particularly effective. In 1925, anti-foreign attitudes began to spread about the same time that local Shanghai issues concerning foreign rule were once again flaring up.

The form and nature of the extent of the government of the settlement remained the primary cause of antagonism and of mutual suspicion between the foreign community and the Chinese residents right up until 1925. The Chinese who lived under this system had frequently complained about policy regarding taxation and representation in the Municipal government.[52] Efforts to gain an active and official participation in the Settlement government had failed several times prior to 1925. The Chinese business community in particular had been a driving force towards this goal for some time. They had been quite indignant over the fact that they had no control over the taxes they paid, nor over the increase of the licenses or wharfage fees.

In 1920, some Chinese businessmen began to agitate for representation. Many of them had felt that if any of them were to ever understand the complex legal technicalities regarding property ownership, they would have to gain representation on the Council, and thus learn how to effect their change.[53] Extensive amounts of propaganda were distributed and the campaign received wide coverage in the Chinese press. The leaders at that time argued that they had never been consulted concerning measures that affected the Chinese communities. Others charged that of the taxes that they paid, very little was ever used to help them. It was noticed that of

the funds collected by the Council, 70% was used for the education of foreign children, with the remainder being used to fill the municipal libraries with foreign books.[54] Few Shanghai Chinese could forget that they paid about 90% of the taxes.[55] That campaign also ended in failure, but the result was that more and more Chinese in Shanghai began to question the "good intentions" of their foreign rulers.

Different Chinese residents had at various times voiced their opposition to resolutions passed by the Municipal Council. Increases in the various licenses and taxes, ie. on rice shops, markets and bicycles had annoyed workers and merchants alike.[56] Attempts to control the press and publication media had annoyed many of the students and intellectuals who objected to censorship.[57] Working conditions and salaries in the factories had for a long time created problems there, while attempts by the Council to prevent child employment from 1920-25 made matters only worse. By 1925, these problems were beginning to come to an explosive head.

Growing opposition to the Council had not been limited only to the Chinese residents in the Settlement area. As F. L. Hawks Pott said:[58]

> The attention of the Chinese became fixed on the gradual and irrestable penetration of foreign influence into Chinese territory . . . Foreign mills, factories, and residences had

> been erected outside of the International Settlement boundaries . . . and roads had been constructed connecting them with the Settlement.

The right of the International Settlement authorities to exercise jurisdiction over these extra-concessional areas and roads had been a matter of constant conflict and dispute since 1906. It continued to be so during the 1920's. One writer of that time reported:[59]

> Settlement extension and the construction and control of extra-concessional roads are undoubtedly among the questions that have caused innumerable protests and counter-protests, and have disturbed the general peace of the International Settlement.

The Chinese government's point of view was expressed quite clearly on September 16, 1922. It said:[60]

> . . . The common limits of Chinese and foreign areas are strictly defined . . . there is no need to trouble the International Settlement authorities to do the work for us.

Questions then arose as to how to supply these localities with water and electricity, and of policing the roads and keeping them in repair. The Municipal authorities felt that the answer was to extend their authority and have the Municipal Police patrol the roads.[61] The Chinese objected strenuously; yet as long as the Chinese police made no attempt to interfere with the foreign police there were relatively few controversies or conflicts until 1924, when it became an issue of jurisdiction again.[62]

The Mixed Court had also become unpopular with the Chinese community, inasmuch as it expressed very clearly the dominant position of the foreigner in the Court and the inflated jurisdiction of the Court itself in the International Settlement.[63] From 1912 onward, strenuous attempts were made by the Chinese authorities to secure the restoration of the Mixed Court to its own realm; but instead, the Mixed Court up until 1926 steadily extended its jurisdiction in various directions.[64] Foreign assessors were appointed to hear Chinese civil cases, while foreign judges alone were responsible for foreign civil cases. In response, Chinese began to argue that the precincts of the Court were excluded under the Land Regulations from Municipal control.[65] The foreigners disagreed. At first it appeared that the Commission to review Extrality and thus the Mixed Court, might find a solution, but being delayed and blocked by the various tactics of the foreign governments, it bogged down and appeared to undermine any chance at change.

The Chinese bitterly complained that discrimination was not merely restricted to the Courts or Municipal Council. Chinese sports teams were not allowed to play matches in the International Settlement, but the Koreans and the Japanese could.[66] Many visitors observed the condescending attitude toward the Chinese by many foreigners. Others noticed that

colonial attitudes were still strong in many parts of Shanghai. Both were most noticeable in the foreign-run police force.[67] Of course, there was the matter of excluding Chinese from public parks and recreation grounds in the International Settlement inself.[68]

To many Chinese in Shanghai, it still appeared that in 1925 the opium problem had never been settled. The China Year Book of 1926 reported:[69]

> Shanghai is one of the largest opium traffic centers in the world . . . The Chinese government in May of 1925 sent a Commissioner to Shanghai to investigate the opium scandal. Officials continually fought for control of the illicit trade. The National Anti-opium Association in their report gives the name of thirty-six shops in the French Concession alone where opium is sold secretly.

Two major scandals in 1925 received much publicity that involved both the Japanese merchants and authorities in Japan, and the British traders - foreign groups not particularly liked by the Shanghai Chinese. The first was the Hoshi deal in Formosa. Turkish opium was imported by a permit from Japanese authorities. The cargo was stored at Yokohama and slowly found its way into China via Taiwan. The outcry was loud and immediate. The second was a big deal involving the British firm of Ezra. When the cargo could not reach Vladivostok as planned, the dealers decided to discharge the opium outside of Shanghai. The opium found its way into Shanghai, and soon

received front page coverage as the news was revealed by the Chinese authorities.[70]

The Chinese citizens of both the Settlement areas and the Chinese cities had a particular distaste for the Municipal Police Force. The Chinese especially disliked the Sikhs who were seen throughout Shanghai as police constables and watchmen in the factories that employed most of the workers. The police was also disliked for its attempts to extend its jurisdiction into the Chinese cities. It was not uncommon to see the Municipal Police enter Chapei to arrest persons they considered "activists" or "dangerous elements".[71] Frequent cases of the police arresting so-called left-wing teachers for Bolshevik activities were often reported in the Chinese dailies.[72]

By 1925, then, various individuals in Shanghai were in some capacity involved in a loosely defined anti-foreign movement. Although their reasons for involvement may have been different, they were unified on one basic aim - the end of foreign interest in Shanghai. It is questionable whether they in 1925 fully comprehended the issues that disturbed the activists (the unequal treaties, the Mixed Court, economic penetration); they, nevertheless, were conscious of a domineering foreign government and the presence of foreign interest. Anti-imperialist attitudes were

present, but they were limited to individuals in the working and student classes. What now seemed to be needed if action was to occur were the leaders and organizations that could bring together these sentiments.

3. THE LEADING ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPS IMPORTANT IN INFLUENCING ANTI-FOREIGN ATTITUDES PRIOR TO MAY 30TH

By 1925 street demonstrations, press campaigns, and political actions of various kinds had become an important reality in the affairs of China. Anti-Christian and anti-foreign campaigns had mobilized many students and intellectuals into strikes and marches throughout 1924. Since 1922, CCP influence and agitation had effectively reorganized a strong labour union force that was involved in strikes throughout China. At the same time, businessmen and merchant organizations began to contribute to various anti-foreign campaigns in hope that they would somehow put an end to specific domestic problems found in Shanghai, Peking, and Canton.

Each group in their own way continued to affect anti-foreign attitudes as they spread in 1924 and 1925.

a. THE KUOMINTANG AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

Prior to 1924, two national parties, the KMT and the CCP, had vied for the support of the Chinese public in their campaigns to rid China of foreigners and the unequal treaties, and to unify China under one national government. The

KMT, an old revolutionary party of Sun Yat-sen, had always had a sentimental impact. With its reorganization in 1924, that Party was to have an even more important impact on anti-foreign and anti-imperialist attitudes as it campaigned for the end of the treaties. Its new alliance with the CCP that same year was to have important effects on the anti-imperialist movement.

Throughout 1924, Dr. Sun and his propaganda teams continued to lecture to schools and factories throughout South China with the result that more and more students and workers began to join their ranks, some even holding membership in both the CCP and KMT parties. In turn, more and more Chinese began to believe that it would be only through this alliance of the CCP and KMT that China would finally be united and would end the unequal treaties.[73]

During 1924, various communists were able to become key men in some workers' and students' organizations, and thus were to have special influence on the nature of the anti-foreign attitudes at those levels.[74] KMT organizers who facilitated anti-religious and anti-foreign campaigns, however, were not all communist sympathizers. In fact in most cases, the movement to revitalize China was rapidly proceeding among the students and intellectuals prior to 1925 without important or direct communist influence.[75] That was

not true of the labour movement.

For the purpose of this paper, it would be impossible to attempt to determine precisely the degree of control the CCP and its members had on the anti-imperialist movement. Instead it will be important to recognize that KMT-CCP propaganda and institutions were important in helping to spread anti-foreign and anti-imperialist sentiments prior to May 30th.

KMT-CCP efforts throughout 1924 were made to arouse the "national conscience of the people, to unify the country, and to protest against capitalistic imperialism".[76] Education was seized upon and made to serve the ideals for which the KMT stood, and by late 1924 concepts of national power, national unity, national culture, and national sovereignty found their expression in the school curriculum, promoted by teachers sympathetic to KMT platforms.[77] Attempts were made to reach not only the government schools but the private foreign schools as well. With KMT-CCP leadership in organization and planning, with the creation of the Youth Department in 1924 in the central as well as the local branches of the KMT, and with the creation of the Young Communist Leagues in counter-reaction to the National Students' Union, the student movement in China gradually became affiliated with this nationalist movement.[78]

Throughout 1924 KMT influence in Shanghai had remained relatively weak. That Party was then preoccupied with affairs in Canton. By late 1924, KMT members began to increase their activities in Shanghai. The KMT could not forget that Shanghai custom taxes provided close to 40% of the revenue of the Chinese government in Peking.[79] Following December 1924, the following leaflets of the KMT were seen more frequently in Shanghai:[80] "END: Militarism from within; and Imperialism from without." Soon youth organizations of both the CCP and KMT were to have some influence in the schools and on the Shanghai Students' Union (SSU).

Similar to the national scene, the anti-foreign movement in Shanghai was proceeding without important communist guidance. With the increasing importance of Shanghai University in the SSU after February 1925, that began to change somewhat (see section on students).

As the KMT-CCP organizers began to activate some of the students, CCP members became concerned with the politicization of the labour force. (See section on Labourers.) A strong Labour Secretariat under the guidance of Li Li-san reorganized old unions and founded new ones. By late 1924, those unions were well organized and prepared for action. In November and December, the Party and unions began to support strikes in foreign mills and some large Chinese factories.

By February, their attention was focussed on the foreign mills, in particular, the Japanese.[81]

b. THE STUDENTS

Whether the historical tradition is a strong factor or not, modern students in China have always assumed a special sense of responsibility for the salvation and the future of China, even to the point of placing themselves in positions of foremost leadership.[82] The May Fourth Movement, the various student strikes, journals, and newspapers, the effects of the propaganda of Sun Yat-sen, and the several anti-religious campaigns had politicized many students into action. In his thesis, the May Fourth Movement in Shanghai, J. Chen attempted to answer why students were brought into direct action. He explained:[83]

> Students as junior members of the intelligentsia, naturally inherited certain traditional characteristics of the latter. They stressed self-development and showed a universal hatred of oppression. They too believed in their obligation to serve for the welfare of the nation and the people. They too shared a deep resentment and a sense of deprivation of national dignity which accompanied China's political humiliation . . .
>
> Their contact with Western thought and culture . . . had led them directly into criticizing and challenging the validity of Chinese traditional thought, institutions, and values.

There was also the psychological factor:[84]

> Students generally were ardent activists when aroused and awakened. As they examined the entire political situation in China . . . they realized not only had the early Republican Revolution failed, but the existing political outlook for China was also gloomy.

Students, however, had not always been the most dependable in national movements. Aims fluctuated frequently as did the number of those who participated. Yet, a dedicated core of leaders did survive and keep various issues active.

In 1919, the National Students' Union was founded with the aim of attempting to unify the actions of the students under the leadership of national student leaders. Lack of interest made the task difficult for its President, Ho Pao-jen.[85] By 1920, that lack of interest was accompanied by students returning to their classes. Student strikes were in many cases, no longer co-ordinated with the national bodies. Some students remained active, but their time was spent on strikes concerned with local issues. Chang Monlin wrote of the students of that time saying:[86]

> . . . students usurped the rights of the authorities to engage or dismiss a teacher . . . struck against teachers who required a severe exam or stood for sterner discipline. They demanded subsidies from the schools for travelling expenses . . . It was a matter of getting as much as possible out of the school in every conceivable way . . .

The issues were no longer national, but local. For example, Shanghai and Peking daily newspapers in 1922 listed 106 school strikes where students refused to take exams or conflicted with

the teachers over school curriculum.[87]

Some students, however, attempted to focus on national issues. When the Conference of World Christian Students' Federation met in Peking in April 1922, students in Shanghai and Peking organized themselves into a non-Christian Student Federation that soon became a part of the strong anti-religious campaign. This movement was mainly confined to large cities and rarely spread to any rural area.[88]

Accompanying this pattern of 'local concern' was the actual state of affairs in the schools themselves. The political situation at that time had had a disastrous effect on education. Almost all schools were handicapped by the lack of strong financial backing. Most schools' funds were often appropriated for military purposes. Government schools were often on the verge of closing down, while school teachers, always underpaid, were for long periods of time not paid at all. This economic insecurity in the schools as it grew worse only helped to heighten the students' dissatisfaction with their depressed social and economic status.[89]

China's failures at the Peace Conference, the disappointments at the Washington Conference, an effective Rights Recovery Movement of 1924, the powerful appeal of Sun Yat-sen, the effectiveness of the new nationalistic education, and the alliance

of the CCP and KMT, all helped the students to again focus their attention upon the national political scene and the problems that seemed to retard Chinese unity. Student publications began to see their enemies as two, foreign imperialism, and internal militarism.[90] The two were also seen as interlocking, because civil strife facilitated domination by Western imperialism and imperialist maneuvering sustained the rivalry of the factional warlords.

The National Students' Union at their Fifth (1923), Sixth (1924) and Seventh (1925) meetings, pledged support to the political platform of the KMT and sent out directives to follow in an anti-imperialist campaign. "Down with the Imperialists" and "Down with the Militarists" became their main slogans. Discussions and lectures were then set up in most schools. A movement against imperialism was gaining momentum among some student groups.[91]

The students of Shanghai had followed stages of development similar to those observed on the national level. Strong student leaders had not prevented their fellow students from becoming apathetic. Strikes occurred, but they centered around local issues and economic problems.[92] By 1925, however, that was beginning to change.

Under the leadership of Ho Pao-jen and Ch'en Pao-o, the National Students' Union and its local, the Shanghai Students' Union, had by 1921 created one of the best organized and most active student organizations in China.[93] The SSU was especially active. Representing 61 schools and 12,000 students, the SSU was supposed to act as the direct liaison for the National Students' Union to local schools, but in reality the opposite occurred.[94]

Each school in the SSU was organized under a local student union and where possible a student publication was created for each school.[95] In theory, the students in each of those schools were organized into different committees to make their actions more coherent and better disciplined. They were: Lecturing Corps, Inspection Corps, Groups of Ten, Student Volunteers Corps, Consultative Branch Office, the Publishing Corps, Editorial Corps, Service Corps, Liaison Committee, and Disciplinary Corps.[96] In practice, however, the actual committees functioning varied from school to school depending on its size and the effectiveness of its authorities. The most organized schools were generally those most active in demonstrations and lecture tours.

By 1925, the most powerful unions in the SSU were Shanghai University, T'ung-chi Medical School, Nanyang University, and Chingchong Middle School.[97]

The SSU was indeed an important organization in Shanghai. Representatives from various school unions met frequently to decide policy and course of action. Every week a SSU publication was sent to members announcing policy and plans. Throughout 1924 and 1925, it organized strikes, speaking tours, and demonstrations in support of various issues. Slogans demanding the end of foreign rule and the unequal treaties were frequently seen in its publications. Calls for support of the workers were also seen.[98]

Although there is no evidence to suggest that CCP members directly manipulated the SSU and its policy, a university sympathetic to the CCP, Shanghai University, was one of its most active members. Throughout 1925, students from that school served as President and Secretary of the SSU. Other members held minor official posts.[99] Time after time it was their speaking brigades that went out to lecture against the treaties and the working conditions in the mills. Yet, how effectively Shanghai University controlled the SSU and its policy is unknown. Most likely, a dedicated core of activists mainly from the Shanghai University ran the SSU offices and filled many of its committees. Other schools may or may not have supported that situation. That is unknown, for throughout most activity, other union members generally allowed the SSU leaders to run the organization as they saw fit to. Prior

to May 30th, it appears that no direct challenge was ever made to the SSU leadership.

Shanghai University, known as the "Red University" to foreigners in Shanghai, was attended by many individuals sympathetic to the CCP and the anti-imperialist movement. Several faculty members and students were actual members of the CCP. The Municipal Police had at various different times raided the campus, confiscating material demanding the end of the imperialist rule in China and the unequal treaties. Financial backing of the university came from the Comintern in Moscow and the KMT in Canton.[100] Although it is not known how broad CCP influence over Shanghai University was, it is important to know that students from Shanghai University were most receptive to CCP directives. They would then pass those directives on to their own student union, who would then pass it on to the SSU. How far those directives were carried in the process is difficult to determine.

In order to help the students and their organizations reach down to the people more effectively, the Shanghai students had developed the following propaganda techniques during the May Fourth Movement and they continued to use them right up until May 30th:[101]

1) the staging of parades, demonstrations, and public speeches;

2) the forming of advisory corps;

3) the formulation of forceful slogans and distribution of literature;

4) the staging of folk-plays and dramas;

5) the issuing of extras;

6) the issuing of public announcements and papers;

7) the publishing of student dailies; and

8) the contacting of other student groups outside of Shanghai.

Under the supervision of the SSU, the students of Shanghai had succeeded in making their viewpoints known to the people of Shanghai. Through effective utilization of the above mentioned techniques and organizations, the students were able to mobilize and unify a large number of students quickly and efficiently; and it was precisely because the students had such effective means of control and communication that they were one of the main leaders in Shanghai.

c. THE LABOURERS

Unionization in the Chinese labour force had occurred well before the organization of the CCP, but following the First National Congress of the CCP in July 1921, its members quickly moved to bring the labour force under its influence and guidance. That same month, the Secretariat of the Chinese Labour Union (Chung-kuo lao-tung tsu-ho shu-chi-pu) was formed

(by the CCP) with Chang Kuo-t'ao as its head to carry out that task. To organize agitation, the CCP began evening classes for workers and founded a publishing office.[102] Despite obstacles and mistakes, the CCP soon succeeded in organizing the labour unions in major industrial centers, and among seamen and railway workers. In January 1922, the Hongkong Seamen's Strike was launched, and was successfully concluded in March.[103] In May, the CCP convened the First All-China Labour Congress in Canton. Labour organization was moving quickly.

On February 7, 1923, the movement suffered its first major set-back. Known as the "February Seventh Massacre",[104] it was the suppression of the Peking-Hankow Railway Workers' Strike by the soldiers of General Wu P'ei-fu. Suppression occurred in other areas and union membership was soon restricted. Slowly the CCP began to re-establish control over the unions; but that was a long and strenuous task.

The first trade unions to be organized in Shanghai, under the guidance of the CCP, were the mechanics' union, the printers' union, and the textile workers' union - all in 1921. Those unions also received set-backs in 1923 through suppression and the arrest of their leaders; but by the summer of 1924, with the founding of the Shanghai Federation of Labour Unions, the labour force in Shanghai was again becoming organizationally

active, and again under the influence of the CCP.[105]

It was in the factories that CCP workers found the labourers most receptive. In 1925, factory labourers, the largest segment of the working force in Shanghai, made up about 226,718 workers; less than 10% of the Shanghai population. In all the working force was only about 500,000.[106] Slowly Li Li-san and the General Federation of Labour Unions rebuilt the old unions and organized them into a strong membership.[107] As the movement became stronger, the organizers began to realize the usefulness of anti-foreign sentiment. At first the work went slowly, but as the workers began to think that their low standard of living was directly linked to foreign imperialism, strike campaigns were quickly directed towards foreign mills and factories. Members of the CCP, KMT, and some student bodies effectively convinced the workers that their livelihood would improve only upon restoration of Chinese sovereignty. The workers listened and joined in for several reasons.[108]

Conditions in the factories and mills provided for much discontent among the workers. The absence of any industrial regulations by either the authorities of the foreign settlements or the Chinese government had allowed the owners to disregard questions as to hours of work, wages, and conditions of the labour.[109]

Long hours had always been a complaint. The working day was from nine to fifteen hours with many factories maintaining two or three shifts. On the average, only two spells of fifteen minutes were given to allow time for dinner. It was quite common for employers to demand a certain volume of production. Failure to achieve this resulted in fines and in many cases those fines would make the difference between bare subsistence and sub-subsistence.[110] Low wages were also complicated by the depreciation in the currency and by the high prices of rice.[111] Wages were further decreased in value by excessive taxation.[112] Inability to support a family on the low wages gave rise to a preponderance of women and child workers. Inadequate stairways, insufficient exits, and improper storage resulted in unnecessary loss of life in fires and explosions.[113]

Such working conditions of course, provided a fertile field for agitation in 1924 and 1925. CCP labour organizers, however, did not concentrate their efforts on agitating for reform but instead, on building up the labour force organizations. In their efforts to organize, CCP workers found anti-foreign agreements most useful. As a result, strong anti-imperialist sentiments were instilled in the labour movement. Of this, Blanshard reported:[114]

> The Shanghai strikes are partial answers to bitter economic oppression, but first of all they are patriotic strikes of the Chinese people against foreign aggression. The Chinese people are wary of swaggering overlords who kick and curse them, pay them 40 cents a day, and then retire to London, New York, and Toyko to live on the fruits of their sagacity.

By 1925, many Chinese labourers were truly beginning to believe the slogan that foreign exploitation of cheap Chinese labour and foreign encroachment were protected by the treaties and forced on a weak government in Peking.[115] The strikes of January and February were reactions to that situation and a result of effective work by the CCP.

d. THE CHINESE MERCHANTS AND INDUSTRIALISTS

Prior to May 30th, merchants and businessmen had played a minor, yet important, role in the creation of anti-foreign attitudes and the spreading of nationalist sentiments. Their support of boycotts and strikes against foreign goods and mills had taught many of them that they could probably advance their own interests more readily with the end of the special status of foreign industry. Chinese merchants, however, had also shown some nationalist zeal even when their own interests were not directly involved. The boycott of 1905

was such an example. During, and occasionally after May Fourth, many began to actively support boycotts, strikes and demonstrations with financial aid. Students were supported in their attempts to end the treaties, while workers were supported in their attempts to "cripple" foreign mills.[116]

The merchants in Shanghai seemed to have been more active than their counterparts elsewhere. Concerned about such issues as license taxes, wharfage dues, confusing property ownership laws, they had provided press campaigns and personal advertisements that helped to make many Chinese in Shanghai aware of the inequities in the treaty system. In early 1925, merchants and industrialists again campaigned for representation on the Municipal Council. Others campaigned against the newly proposed bylaws. Still others complained that they were being excessively taxed by both the Chinese and foreign governments.[117]

Further power to influence the Shanghai citizens lay in the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. In times of strikes, that organization had been called on as a mediator. In time of boycotts, it had frequently served as campaign headquarters.[118]

By May 1925, support by the Chinese merchants and industrialists had increased. Press campaigns against foreign

"paternal government" and the new bylaws occurred more frequently, while small merchants were generous in giving large donations to the striking workers.

C. THE EVENTS THAT LED TO THE MAY 30TH INCIDENT

1. THE STRIKES IN THE JAPANESE MILLS (JANUARY TO APRIL)

Agitation among the labouring masses in the urban centers grew more and more manifest in 1925, and workers in Shanghai became even more politically active. The organizing of workers into unions proceeded with amazing swiftness, and meetings and processions held throughout January in the Chinese cities, continued to denounce the Japanese and foreign imperialists.[119] Others denounced the Municipal Council and urged the workers of Shanghai to place themselves under the banner of the KMT and to fight the imperialists and militarists.[120] Teng Chung-hsia, a CCP member, at that time, described his work with the labourers as follows:[121]

> Almost every day, we held a mass meeting, every day there was some kind of new handbill and song sheets. The masses were

> not allowed to sit like wooden sticks, so each day things would change . . . When we had meetings we did not just have speeches, but mass activity by sections . . . Thus the workers gradually were organized and the labour union then actually assumed control.

Shanghai labourers quickly moved towards points of direct confrontation.

It was in the Japanese mills of the Yangtzepoo district of Shanghai that the May 30th Incident began to evolve. Those mills, according to reports at that time, were large, new, modern-equipped, efficient and well policed. Efficient methods and better machinery had enabled the Japanese to cut the staff almost in half by 1925.[122] Because the owners had found males more prone to strike and cause trouble, more women were hired to replace them.[123] Chinese at that time continually complained of cruelty in the Japanese mills, high pay deductions, and of beatings and torture.[124] They particularly complained of the workmen's retirement fund in these mills that operated on a withholding basis culmulating in ten years.[125]

By January 1925, inflamatory attitudes towards the Japanese mills had heightened. Many workers began to speak

of striking.[126] On January 18th, a strike was reported at the British Ewo Mills in Yangtzepoo over compensation to the family of a labourer alleged to have died from being beaten by a Chinese watchman at the mill. Some violence occurred, but the strike was settled.[127]

A strike of a most serious nature commenced on February 9th at the No. 5 mill of the Japanese Naigai Wata Kaisha, 14 Ichang Road. By February 15th, the strike had extended to six different Japanese companies in the Western and Yangtzepoo districts, involving around 31,000 workers.[128]

The dispute seemed to have its origin in the dismissal of forty male workers on February 2nd for disobedience at the No. 5 mill. The hostility was further aroused by the prosecution and imprisonment of those workers a few days later.[129] This led to campaigns against the mills, various lectures, and meetings. On February 9th, a Japanese foreman allegedly beat a twelve year old girl with a lash. The workers of No. 5 mill walked out. They proceeded to march to Nos. 7, 8, and 12 mills situated in the same compound to compel the workers there to join in. The strikers, blocked by the Japanese employers and several police that had been called in, were not able

to enter the premises and thus left.[130]

Agitators of various backgrounds saw the incident as the perfect opportunity to further their aims. Printed handbills containing demands for the re-instatement of the dismissed men, an increase of 10% in wages, and improved working conditions appeared almost immediately, although no direct demands were made to the Japanese authorities.[131] A Chinese school that had been previously moved to the Chinese city soon became the strike headquarters, and from here the whole movement was directed as union members laid out careful plans for the coming days.[132]

It soon became evident that the strike was not to be a spasmodic outbreak; but instead used the pretext of the child beating to implement plans that had been carefully made the previous days. It was noticed that students were also involved as leaders and organizational workers. The China Year Book reported:[133]

> That agitators of the educated class were behind the strikers was evident by the good composition used in the handbills and by the presence among the workers of students and others connected with seats of learning notorious for their extremist proclivities.

At first the strike literature had taken the form of handbills which at first merely gave a résume of the strikers' demands and grievances, but later, with the object of winning the support of the Chinese public in Shanghai, the new handbills endeavored to show that as well as the workers' demands, national issues of far wider importance were also involved.[134]

The workers and students, however, were also to learn from their experiences as the strike continued. As processions, demonstrations, and lectures proved to be successful, more and more workers and students were sent out to engage in further activities. In many ways, it was the success of the methods used in these strikes that convinced many organizations of their validity, and hence of their continued application on and after May 30th.

Acting apparently on instructions from strike headquarters, 300 strikers on February 10th crossed the Soochow Creek from Chinese territory and invaded the Naigai Wata Kaisha No. 9 mill.[135] Considerable damage was done to office furniture and machinery. Workers stopped and joined the mêlée. The agitation, however, had not been a complete success. Police arrived on the scene and 13 of the original agitators were arrested.[136]

Their conviction a month later was to cause further trouble. For the time being, however, the activists decided not to be found in the Settlement areas. Instead, they decided to concentrate their efforts on the majority of the workers who lived in the Chinese cities.[137]

Further agitation resulted in the extension of the strike on February 11th to mills Nos. 7, 8, 12, 13, and 14 of the Naigai Wata Kaisha.[138] Nos. 3, 4, and 15 joined in on February 13th, when all Naigai mills closed down.[139] Encouraged by these new successes, the strike promoters continued to organize further meetings and intensified their propaganda. In return, the Municipal authorities complained that the Chinese police were neglecting their duties.[140] New processions continued, and pickets were sent to various landing stages on the creek where they searched all workers they encountered to confiscate their mill books.[141]

By February 15th, the strike had extended to the Japanese-owned China Mill, Dah Kong Cotton Mill, and Toyoda Cotton Mill.[142] Cessation of work was effected usually without serious trouble, but trouble did occur at the Toyoda Mill where nine workers and students were arrested.[143]

The Municipal authorities continued to make arrests of major agitators. Warrants were produced to procure the arrests

of any possible agitator whether student, merchant or worker. In this way, sixty persons were arrested while eighteen others managed to escape.[144] The men appeared before the Mixed Court charged with subversion and inciting the strikes. Thirteen were remanded for a new trial.[145]

The North China Herald continued to report the presence of students among the strikers and demonstrators. On February 18th and 21st, students were reported urging the strikers to keep on in the strike so as to continue the struggle against imperialism.[146]

By mid-February, the Japanese mill owners were looking for means to break the strike. At first, the owners offered 30% of the wages to any workers who made their appearance in the mills. Slowly the numbers increased as police continued to arrest the strike leaders, but by February 20th that tactic had not proved very successful. Most mills were still on strike.[147] Next the Japanese turned to the Chinese government.[148] The presentation of certain demands to the mill owners, however, eased the situation as the Japanese expressed their willingness to enter into negotiations.[149] Handbills continued to be circulated attacking the Japanese and imperialism, and students continued to assemble at the Labourers' Club to distribute funds to the workers there.[150]

On February 27th, after seventeen days of a strike full of riots and disturbances, a settlement was reached between the representatives of the mills and the Chinese labourers.[151] The conclusion of this agreement aroused great enthusiasm not only amongst the mill workers but also amongst the public at large. New handbills interpreted the end as a decisive victory over the Japanese, and the release or light sentencing of most men arrested were seen as important victories over the Municipal authorities and their police force.[152] Few would forget how effective the techniques used were, and they would continue to be used in the months to come.

Unexpectedly and contrary to good faith, shortly after the resumption of work, the Japanese managers in most mills refused to execute the agreements of the settlements. On the contrary, beating and tortures were reported to have increased while many of the strikers were being dismissed. No savings accounts were refunded, and in some cases, wages were cut to pay for the losses encountered while on strike.[153] As a result, many workers continued to strike.

Throughout the months of March and April, strikes continued in Shanghai. Strikes continued in the Japanese mills. New dismissals resulted in more walk-outs. The Naigai Wata Kaisha mills in particular, were the hardest hit as the lab-

ourers continued to sporadically strike.[154]

Students continued to give support to the workers through donations and campaigns that saw them in the streets speaking. The labour unions and the Labour Secretariat, however, were occupied with other things. During March, they began to concentrate their attention on preparations for the coming Second All-China Labour Congress planned for May. As a result, important leaders could not find the time for strike campaigns. Naturally, the strikes became less frequent and more disorganized. Strikes, nevertheless, continued.[155]

Arrests continued, and on March 10th, fifty-nine labourers and students were brought into the Mixed Court on various charges in connection with the strikes in the Japanese mills. More appeared on March 14th and 21st. Most received short sentences, but few Chinese were pleased with the results.[156]

Throughout April, the Shanghai public continued to be agitated by the strikes, by the patriotic activities and slogans of various groups, and by the student activists.

2. THE DEATH OF SUN YAT-SEN AND THE READING OF HIS WILL

In March, two events occurred that were to have an important influence on events in Shanghai. Those events were the death of Sun Yat-sen on March 12, 1925, and the subsequent

reading of his will following the funeral.

Prior to his trip to Peking, Dr. Sun had stopped at Shanghai. When he arrived, he gave the following to the Chinese press:[157]

> Shanghai is China's territory . . . We are the hosts . . . This being the case, I, as a citizen of China, have every right to reside in my territory, whereas foreign residents in this country, as our guests, have no authority whatever to oppose the presence of their hosts . . . I am prepared to take drastic steps . . . Chinese people are not to be trifled with . . . in their own territory. Indeed, the time has come when all foreign settlements should be abrogated.

In addition, Dr. Sun gave various speeches to different groups in the city speaking on the unequal treaties. But his speeches were not the only advantages found in his presence. Many groups held meetings to welcome him and to organize processions and demonstrations to oppose the foreign presence in Shanghai and to wish him luck in his attempts to unify China. Time after time his speeches and slogans found publicity on the front pages of local Chinese newspapers.[158]

Dr. Sun proceeded to Peking but he did not live long enough to effect any change or come to any agreements. He died on March 12th, and a small quiet funeral was held by his family. Members of his own Party then held another large public funeral in order to draw more attention to his ideas. The memorial march as it spread throughout China proved most useful

for it "dramatized his issues and his programs, and simultaneously challenged the rival government at Peking as well as the representatives of the foreign governments in Peking."[159]

A few days later his will was read to the people of China. Newspapers throughout China published it in whole or in part and as such it reached millions of Chinese. The will had immediate impact in Shanghai as students, workers and residents marched in various processions to honour the man and his ideas, and to read his will. School after school and factory after factory closed in his honour and the reading of his will continued in small groups.[160]

In his will and the statements to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Dr. Sun attempted to satisfy the needs of all members of the CCP and KMT parties, and offered hope of freedom from imperialism and from foreign control. The will stated:[161]

> . . . I leave behind me a Party which, as I always hoped, will be bound up with you in the historic work of the final liberation of China . . . from the yoke of imperialism . . . continue the work so that China, reduced by the imperialist to the position of a semi-colonial country, shall become free . . .

Dr. Sun, while alive, had proved a compelling speaker and an effective money raiser. He had effected few changes in his effort to rid China of imperialism and militarism; but his chief contribution had come through his attempt to define the fundamental ideology of the new Chinese nationalism. His

death was to provide even further dynamism to this. More and more persons came directly into contact with the anti-imperialist campaigns of the CCP-KMT, and becoming ardent disciples of Dr. Sun, many began to actively urge the masses to follow him and his call for the abolition of the unequal treaties and for the unification of China.[162]

3. THE PEKING INCIDENT

Another event, again from Peking, was to effect Shanghai. That event was the Peking Incident that involved over 30,000 students and teachers in marches against the pro-Japanese Anfu Government.

The Peking Incident, however, did not have its beginning in Peking, but in the Tsingtao Japanese cotton mill strikes of mid-April. Some agitators from Shanghai and Canton had organized workers in the mills early in March and had by mid-April, instigated a strike.[163] From the beginning, clashes between management and the workers had occurred, and had assumed such threatening dimensions that the Japanese Government sent a note to the Waichiaopu (the Chinese Foreign Office). Under instructions from the Peking authorities, a large group of Chinese police officers raided a strikers meeting and arrested several leaders and workers. This action was followed by a strike and by serious student disturbances. The incident received wide coverage in Peking and Shanghai newspapers.[164] As

students continued to protest, the police of Peking on May 4th were instructed to maintain close surveillance over the schools. The anniversary of National Humiliation Day (May 7th) was approaching, and this Anfu Government did not want a repeat of the 1919 student performance.[165]

Finally on the night of May 6th, the Minister of Education issued an order forbidding the demonstration planned for May 7th, and instructed the schools to keep their students occupied. As the North China Herald reported, "it was an unprecendented order".[166]

The Government schools in Peking obeyed the law, but about 400 students from private and Christian schools turned out. They tried to hold a meeting opposite the Central Park but instead found the police who told the students that the area had been reserved for a fire drill by the foreign "Peking Brigade". The students then marched off to Coal Hill, where Feng Yu-hsiang's forces allowed them to hold their meeting. Resolutions of protest against the Anfu Government's actions were passed, and it was decided to try and see the Minister of Education. A call there produced the reply that Chang Shih-chao was at home. Off the group marched to his home. There, the demonstrators were told that Chang was not at home but at the Ministry. The students then forced entry into the residence. Before the police arrived, the students had already smashed

windows and had broken furniture in their search for Chang. With the arrival of the police, seventeen student leaders were arrested. A mêlée followed in which it was later reported, three students were killed.[167]

The report of the death of three students and the arrest of seventeen, incensed other Peking students. On May 8th, at various meetings, it was decided to hold a mammoth parade for Saturday, May 9th.[168] Another meeting of students decided to send a circular telegram to all provinces, calling their attention to the alleged illegal prohibition of participation in the National Humiliation Day observance.[169]

On May 9th, twenty to thirty thousand students from most of the colleges and schools in Peking paraded through the city in protest against the action of the Government and its police.[170] Demands asking for the death of the Minister of Education, the release of the 17 students, the dismissal of the Chief of Police, and reparation for those killed were presented to the Chief Executive. Pending reply to the demands, the students returned home.[171]

Monday, May 10th proved quiet as the students waited for the reply. The Government finally rejected the demands, and on May 11th, it was reported that the great majority of students in Peking had gone on strike. They would not return

to their studies until their demands were acceded to.[172] Later in the day, the strike was partly settled. It was agreed that both parties should express regret for what occurred. The Government agreed to release the arrested students. The strike, however, continued sporadically as the students called for the dismissal of the Minister of Education. By May 15th, most of the students had returned to their classes.[173]

Throughout the Incident and the strike that followed, Chinese communist publications day after day pushed the theme of imperialist co-operation with the Anfu Government. Others reported that it had been the result of the pro-Japanese Anfu Clique.[174] The result was that in Shanghai the students became more anti-Japanese and even more determined to end foreign domination.[175] Kotenev reported:[176]

> The news about the events in Peking reached Shanghai and filled the masses of youth with a keen desire for activity and movement, in which their indignation and patriotism could find an outlet. The excited mass of students, encouraged by success in the past, resolved to head the strike movement against the Japanese mills.

Students the next few days were seen throughout the Settlement area talking to workers and pedestrians on the streets.

4. THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL AND ITS NEW BYLAWS

Events outside of Shanghai continued to affect the nature of anti-foreign attitudes in Shanghai, but gradually the events in Shanghai itself became more important, as they

created new reasons to agitate and broadened the scope of the anti-foreign attitudes.

In early May 1925, the Municipal Council announced its intentions to reintroduce and have passed certain amendments to the municipal regulations concerning child labour,[177] wharfage fees, the licensing of stock and produce exchanges, and a bylaw on printing and publishing of newspapers, pamphlets, leaflets, and placards.[178] To enable the measures to be carried out, it became necessary for the Council to seek powers with which it was not invested under its then existing administrative code.[179] A Special Meeting of Ratepayers was, therefore, convened to be held in the Town Hall on April 15th with a view to the adoption of a new bylaw framed to provide these powers. Due publicity was given to the Council's intention throughout the Settlement.[180]

Chinese opposition came almost immediately. Although some businessmen had favoured the restrictions on child labour, few would support press censorship and the increase in the license and wharfage dues. Many Chinese thought that the Child Labour Amendment was simply bait to get a full quorum to pass the other undesirable measures.[181] More important was the fact that few Chinese labourers wanted the amendment. Too many wanted their young children to work. As a Chinese millowner at that time said:[182]

> . . . the employment of children by millowners is a matter of charitable nature toward the workers' parents; for so long as their children are employed it adds to their income, relieving the burden of supporting their children, and also removes their anxiety for the safety of their children who, from the parents point of view, are safer and more comfortable in the mills . . .

The foreign community had simply not understood public opinion. As one writer to the North China Herald said:[183]

> . . . those who were fighting the battle for the restriction of Child Labour could not understand the local situation . . . They were incorrectly informed of Chinese public opinion by Chinese Christians and reformers, who had come to believe that their own advanced opinions were the same as that of other Chinese . . .

Chinese opposition continued and gained momentum as the days passed. Students and workers together gave speeches in the Settlement on main highways and in the mills. Chinese businessmen spent large sums on press campaigns and donated to the strikers, and the student and worker campaigns.[184]

At first Chinese agitation seemingly proved successful for on April 15th, no quorum was present at the ratepayers meeting. However, attempts to have the amendments passed continued. On April 24th, a petition was circulated throughout the Settlement calling for a special meeting to consider the Child Labour Bylaw. In all, seventy persons of various nationalities signed the petition. As a result, the Council decided

to call another meeting for June 2nd. In addition, the Council decided to include the other bylaws again.[185]

Chinese opposition to the special meeting, set for June 2nd, developed quickly during the month of May. Placards, leaflets, and pamphlets were seen throughout Shanghai denouncing this new attempt to abscond with the freedoms of the Shanghai citizens. On May 29th, thirty leading Chinese organizations, through the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, issued a manifesto denouncing the Municipal Council and its actions.[186] By that time, however, the real issue was no longer the bylaws, but whether foreigners had the right to rule over Chinese citizens. As one foreigner wrote:[187]

> Opposition to the Child labour reform came not through the issue itself, but from those whose minds were set on having no new regulations that were not Chinese, and opposed to co-operation in any way whatsoever that might increase the power of the foreign Municipal Council in Shanghai.

The real issue was anti-foreignism.

Actions in the cotton mills in early May, however, were to shift the emphasis away from the Municipal Council and the British, to the Japanese and Japanese mill owners. The May 30th Incident later was to have the opposite effect.

5. THE MILL STRIKES OF MAY

The Incident of May 30th arose not as a political issue, but as a result of circumstances in the Japanese mills. Those circumstances, however, were a result of both economic and political issues. Since the February strikes had not spread in the Japanese mills after the 25th, the organizers of the labour movement had contented themselves with testing their proven techniques and strengthening their control in the labour unions. By May, that was beginning to change.

a. MAY 15TH AND THE DEATH OF KU CHENG-HUNG

During the early part of May, new strikes began to break out in the Japanese cotton mills as a result of CCP propaganda. The North China Herald reported that the riots had become a daily occurrence in the vicinity of the mills by that time, and spoke of students leading them.[188]

On May 15th, the employees of No. 12 mill of the Naigai Wata Kaisha declared a strike as a protest against the discharge of two Chinese foremen. The stoppage of the mills resulted in the shutdown of another mill (#4) which depended on the first for material.[189] Notices were posted to the effect that workmen unemployed would be given only half of their wages.

Shortly after five p.m. that evening, three hundred workers assembled in front of the mill demanding an explanation of the lock-out and complaining about the expulsion of trade union leaders from the factory. The operators forced their way into the mill, breaking down the closed doors. Passing through the factory compound, the workers were met by a large contingent of Sikh and Japanese watchmen who had been posted in anticipation of the demonstration.[189a] The operators succeeded in getting through the barriers of the watchmen and began to destroy machinery and tools. At that time, one of the labourers, Ku Cheng-hung, in a heated debate, was shot by a Japanese mill manager.[190] A general mêlée ensued during which time several Sikh guards were ordered to fire into the air. By this time, the police had been notified of the affair and as the situation seemed to be developing into a serious riot, a strong force of Western and Sikh police constables were dispatched to the scene. Another mêlée occurred. The crowd then attempted to rush No. 5 mill, nearby, but were prevented from entering the property by the police. The crowd attacked the police, and in a hand-to-hand struggle attempted to obtain the possession of the Sikhs' carbines. The police were then ordered to open fire. Several arrests were made of the ringleaders and the most noisy agitators. That night the newspapers reported the wounding of ten persons[191], and the death of Ku Cheng-hung.[192]

b. THE REACTION

i. MOBILIZATION

The following day, various labour delegates took the corpse of Ku Cheng-hung to the Municipal Council Building and asked the Municipal authorities to redress the wrong. Contrary to expectations, instead of entertaining the workers' grievances with sympathy, the authorities took into custody the labour delegates, regarding them as the ringleaders of the disorder the night before.[193] No arrest would be made of the Japanese foreman who had killed Ku.

Immediately following Ku's death, the Labour Secretariat began to organize the textile workers for action. Demands by its workers were drawn up while others worked out plans for demonstrations and marches.[194] Appeals were made to the SSU and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to join the workers as they made the following demands to the mill owners:[195] Dismissal and punishment of persons responsible for the death and injuries; payment and compensation to the bereaved families; prohibition of arms carried by foremen; recognition of the union; reinstatement of the discharged employees; regular wages pending the settlement of the strike, enforement of a bonus system; and abolition of the guaranteed retirement fund.

On May 16, 17, and 18 the situation was quiet, with the majority of operators at work. The owners were repairing damage

done to their machinery. Students from various colleges were out speaking against the alleged murder of Ku, imperialism, and the bylaws.[196]

University students were determined that the incident should be published in the presses of Shanghai, and they regarded what they believed to be the restriction and soft-pedalling of the incident as an indication that if it could be publicized, they might gain the support of the Chinese public.[197] Consequently they dedicated themselves to propagandizing the incident virtually on "the foreigners' doorstep as well as inside their homes".[198] Demonstrations were held with a view towards collecting funds and towards speaking to the Chinese citizens of Shanghai. Economic issues, however, were not the only issues raised. Kotenev noticed this when he wrote:[199]

> Where the strike of February appeared to be on the surface one of an economic character, this time the mask was thrown aside and banners bearing inscriptions against imperialism and capitalism were observed much more frequently.

On May 16th, students from Wen-chih University were seen speaking against foreign incursions upon national sovereignty to crowds in the International Settlement.[200] On May 17th, a group of students from Nanyang and Shanghai Universities were speaking to crowds on Tung-ching Road against the bylaws and alleged murder of Ku. Others urged the people of

Shanghai to support the workers in their struggle against imperialism.[201] Following the speeches, several of the students were arrested and sent to the P'u-tu-lu Police Station.

On May 17th, the SSU held a meeting. That body decided to send representatives to the police station to obtain the release of all arrested workers and students, and to further send a delegation to the Waichiaopu to ask for support.[202] Both delegations failed, and the SSU then decided to send out new speaking teams to rally the people against the arrests, the new bylaws, and the Japanese imperialists.[203]

On May 19th, Shanghai and Nanyang Universities' Speaking Brigades were sent out to speak on An-ssu Road and Ai-wen-i Road. More arrests occurred.[204] The same day, a Japanese constable attempted to arrest three demonstrators who were distributing pamphlets at No. 5 mill (Naigai) on West Soochow Road. The demonstrators retaliated and threw the constable into Soochow Creek. While in the Creek, the constable drew his revolver firing three shots at the demonstrators. His aim proved accurate for one of the demonstrators was killed and the others wounded.[205]

More students' speaking brigades from Nanyang University, Shanghai University, and Wenchih University were lecturing on May 20th on Ku-li-ma Road.[206] On May 22nd, students from

Nanyang University were speaking to several hundred persons on Lao-pa-tzu Road. The Municipal Police arrived to break up the crowd and a general brawl occurred. More arrests were made.[207]

From May 16th until May 23rd, students were out almost every day in various parts of Shanghai speaking to small and large crowds. Their speeches were mainly directed against the alleged murder of Ku, the new bylaws, the alleged cruelty of the Japanese imperialists, and the arrest of students and workers. At the same time, workers in almost all of the factories were holding daily meetings to denounce the Japanese "butchers" and the unequal treaties. Propaganda became more intensive and began to reach more and more Chinese in Shanghai. The students and workers called for the revival of the spirit of May Fourth.[208]

Since May 16th, the various Shanghai labour unions and student organizations had been preparing for the proposed memorial march to honour the dead man, Ku Cheng-hung. His body had been lying in state in Chapei, directly across the Soochow Creek from the cotton mill that he had been killed in. The march was to be held on May 24th.[209]

ii. THE MEMORIAL MARCH, MAY 24TH

On May 24th, a memorial march service was held in Chapei for Ku Cheng-hung. From five to ten thousand persons

attended the service.[210] The coffin containing the remains of the deceased was exhibited amid a mass of scrolls and banners with the inscriptions inviting retaliation for his death. The meeting, however, passed without any incident and the police remained away. Peace and order was generally the case for the city, except for those areas adjacent to the mills where small skirmishes broke out between authorities and workers. Some businesses closed down for the service, but by afternoon the business and social life of the city appeared to be proceeding normally.[211]

Some students who had attended the service for Ku planned to speak to Chinese residents and shoppers in the International Settlement. Later in the afternoon, a speaking brigade from Shanghai University was speaking to a crowd on Chao-teng Road. One student was reported to have given the following speech:[212]

> The Shanghai people under the administration of foreigners and foreign governments are already no different than the wretch who had no country. They are without the freedom of speech, action, assembly, and everywhere are under the surveillance of foreigners with pointed spears and iron clubs. Most recently, in the Japanese cotton mills, the Japanese authorities without reason, refused to allow the workers to work; the workers attempted to talk with them but they responded with iron clubs and then opened fire with hand-pistols killing Ku Cheng-hung . . .

The police arrived and four students were arrested and taken to the Louza Police Station to be arraigned.[213] These students

soon became a center of attraction that resulted in the calling of the demonstration for May 30th. Plans, however, had to be made.

iii. THE MEETING OF THE SSU ON MAY 27TH

Following the events of May 24th, several students of Shanghai University began a campaign among their own colleagues to further the demands for redress in connection with Ku's death and for the release of all arrested students. More speaking brigades were sent out, while student leaders sought support from other schools. Finally, a meeting of the SSU was called.[214] That meeting was to be held on May 27th.

In the meantime, small groups were still sent out to collect funds for the strikers and to speak against the by-laws, Ku's death, and the arrests.[215] On May 25th, two more students were arrested, but were released after being warned not to return to the Settlement area.[216]

Early in the morning of May 27th, students at Shanghai University met to decide their policy for the SSU meeting later that day. Although little is actually known of that meeting, it was, however, reported that the students declared that they would take the lead to demand redress in connection with the death of Ku and the release of the arrested students. This would be done through speaking-brigades and demonstrations. Advisors would also be sent to the SSU meeting in hope that

they could convince others to follow their example.[217]

Later that day, twenty-two students, representing twenty different unions in the SSU met at T'ung-chi Medical School. The students at that meeting resolved that: measures should be taken to effect the release of those students arrested on May 24th if they had not been released before May 30th; and that assistance should be given to the strikers in the Japanese mills by means of speeches and the distribution of circulars.[218] The students, appearing to have accepted suggestions proposed by Shanghai University students, returned to their own schools to organize fellow students into speaking brigades and committees, and began to print the needed circulars.[219]

iv. THE MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CCP ON MAY 28TH

On May 28th, the Central Committee of the CCP in Shanghai met in an emergency meeting.[220] The meeting was particularly disturbed by the approaching meeting of the Municipal Council Ratepayers arranged for June 2nd, at which the new bylaws would be put to a vote. The Committee was also disturbed by the recent news from Peking that serious incidents there had occurred in a clash between students and Chinese police. According to Li Ming of the CCP, Ts'ai Ho-sen, an associate of Mao Tse-tung in Hunan, at that meeting advocated

"expanding the labour conflict into a political struggle of the entire population of Shanghai and giving the movement a definite anti-imperialist character".[221] Heated debate occurred between Ts'ai and Ch'en Tü-hsiu, who had only a lukewarm attitude toward the plan. In the end, Ts'ai overcame the hesitation of Ch'en and it was decided to hold another demonstration for "the combined purpose of further commemorating Ku Cheng-hung and of stimulating an all out fight against the Treaty Powers".[222]

The workers' club under the influence of the CCP prepared to take part in the demonstration for May 30th, and made approaches to the student associations, calling upon them to "revive the spirit of May Fourth".[223]

Exactly how much of an impact this call to arms by the CCP and its organizations had on the students cannot be ascertained. In any case, the SSU decided to call another meeting.

v. THE MEETING OF THE SSU ON MAY 29TH

On the evening of May 29th, the SSU convened another meeting, and it was decided: 1) to organize more speaking brigades from the various colleges and schools that would go into the International Settlement on May 30th and speak first on behalf of the students arrested and then to speak about the

death of Ku; and 2) to organize various students on May 30th to unite for an assembly at the Mixed Court during the trial.[224] The students rejected the idea of a student-worker demonstration that would join together in a march down Nanking Road, although the SSU had accepted the idea of at least demonstrating on May 30th. Instead, the SSU had mainly focused their attention on the speaking-brigades and the idea of a Mixed Court Assembly.

That night, several pamphlets were printed by the students to emphasize the following issues: 1) the cruelty of the Japanese managers toward their workers and the significance of the workers' opposition to this cruelty; 2) the failure of the Chinese industries due to Japanese oppression; 3) the significance of students aiding the workers; 4) the reality of the Great Powers suppressing the Chinese people, 5) the need to abolish the unequal treaties and the concession areas; 6) the need to release the students arrested, and 7) the need to oppose the newly proposed bylaws.[225]

Thus did the SSU prepare for the following day.

CHAPTER II THE INCIDENT

CHAPTER 2

THE EVENTS OF MAY THIRTIETH

A. PREFACE

Although the May 30th Incident appears to be a watershed in Chinese history, little up to this time has actually been done to understand what actually happened on the afternoon of May 30th. Detailed accounts can be found of the shooting at 3:37 p.m. on Nanking Road, but few can be found that describe the events or actions of the students or police leading up to that time. The accounts we have are full of conflicting reports and leave great gaps. Few writers have ever attempted to answer such basic questions as: Why was there a big crowd outside of the Louza Police Station? What was that crowd's composition? and from where did it come?

Despite the gaps and the conflicting reports, it is still crucial that one try to understand what happened on May 30th if one is ever to attempt to understand the significance of the May 30th Movement. For this reason, this chapter will attempt to examine the events of that day. In particular, it will focus on the Nanking Road Incident and those events that led up to it; emphasis will be placed on the Nanking Road assemblies and the Mixed Court Assembly.

This chapter has been divided into two major sections: (1) the Incident and (2) those debates and controversies that created confusion and conflict about the Incident itself. The first will be the most important, for it will deal entirely with what happened from about eleven a.m. to about four p.m. The second will attempt to examine what various witnesses thought occurred that day, and the questions that they debated. Each section will contain a short summary, but the actual conclusions made concerning the Incident will be left for the end of the paper.

B. THE MAY THIRTIETH INCIDENT

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE LOUZA AREA

a. NANKING ROAD (NANCHING IN MANDARIN)[1]

The activities of the students on the afternoon of May 30th were mainly concentrated in one of Shanghai's most important business and recreational centers, the Louza District (Laoch'a). In particular, their activity was focused on a main highway that ran through that district, Nanking Road. Nanking Road, known in Chinese as the ta-ma-lu or the great highway, was one of the most important thoroughfares in Shanghai. Described at that time as the "trading center of China's greatest city",[2] it was a little over a mile in length and extended from the Palace Hotel in the Bund area to the Recreational Ground at the other end. It was well populated with major stores and companies important to Shanghai, stores and


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



companies that served Chinese and foreigners alike. Tram cars ran down its middle, and modern automobiles filled its paved road in most normal periods of time. Tea shops, bakeries, company offices, restaurants, and various markets that populated the road on both sides were always filled with shoppers and sight-seers.

The road itself, was intersected with several other important streets. Such streets as Szechuan, Kiangse, Shangtung, Honan, Fukien, Chekiang, Kweichou, Yunnan, Thibet, and Bubbling Well made Nanking Road accessible from most parts of the Settlement areas. Students, workers, and shoppers had no great difficulty in getting onto Nanking Road, nor in leaving it.

Large crowds were always seen on Nanking Road during daylight hours. The daily shoppers, sight-seers, pedestrians (hsing-jen) and workers filled the area, and traffic remained heavy. It was indeed one of Shanghai's busiest streets, and the afternoon of May 30th proved to be no exception. Large numbers of persons were seen throughout the day, and the traffic remained busy right up until the time of the shooting.

The area of Nanking Road was mainly patrolled by the police constables of Louza Police Station, a station under the command of Inspector R. Everson. The station, itself,



3. THE LOUZA DISTRICT

1. Northern Shanghai-Nanking Railway Station
2. The Mixed Court
3. Louza Police Station
4. Central Police Station
5. Recreation Grounds and Race Tract

Louza District — Nanking Road

had a history of conflict with the Chinese community of Shanghai. Both in 1905 and 1919, Chinese citizens had attacked that station, and in 1905 managed to burn it down. Students had several times before gathered in front of the police station gates to heckle the officers on duty, and Municipal authorities remained extremely nervous over the possibility of demonstrations on Nanking Road.

b. THE LOUZA POLICE STATION[3]

The police station, the actual center of the Incident, was situated directly between Kweichow and Yunnan Road. The station, however, was not really on Nanking Road. Set in from Nanking Road about one hundred feet, it was surrounded on all four sides by commercial shops and restaurants. Entrance to the police station offices were accessible by two gates. One, the rear entrance, was situated on Kweichow Road, and completely restricted to off-duty constables. The door was usually locked or kept closed. The other, the front entrance, was well off of Nanking Road at the end of a long narrow alley about one hundred to one hundred and fifty feet in length. The entrance onto the alley from the road was about fifty feet in width, closed by a large cement wall that could be blocked by one long chain. Behind this wall stood the various commercial shops and the Police Compound area. About one hundred feet from the front cement wall to the police sta-



4. THE LOUZA POLICE STATION

tion building, there was another large stone wall that ran straight across the alley. Under the wall, there hung a heavy iron gate that led into the police station building. The gate also was usually closed. Although there was an entrance in behind this gate, it was not the main entrance. The main entrance to the offices and the Charge Room lay further back, accessible only by another short narrow raised path about fifty feet in length. At the end of this path was another heavy iron gate and the entrance to the Charge Room.

The police station was a four storey building that contained both the offices as well as the private residences of the police constables. The first floor was used for offices and detention cells, with a large mess hall situated in the back. The second storey was used as the residence for the Sikh and Western policemen. The third storey served as the dorms for the Chinese constables; the fourth for storage.

Patrols around the entrance of the station were made extremely difficult because of the several commercial shops that surrounded it. Other shops found in the alleyway and filled with customers made it difficult for the police to distinguish the customers from possible trouble-makers.

On May 30th, the force under the command of Inspector Everson consisted of 318 men, of whom 25 were Europeans, 65

Sikhs, and 227 Chinese.[4] Of this number only about one-third were actually on duty; the remaining two-thirds were generally at liberty to dispose of their time as they thought fit. In addition, a small force known as the "Peacekeeping Brigade" was always on call in preparation against any trouble that might occur in the area.

Although there are no records showing who was on duty that day, we do know that Inspector Everson, Sub-Inspector Shellswell, Sergeants Willgross, Papp, and Tatrum, and Constables Stevens, Cole, Whyte, and Talbrum were. Few names can be found concerning the Chinese or Sikh constables. Throughout the entire reports, the Chinese and Sikh officers are referred to by their number or their race, seldom by their names.

The Municipal Police were armed throughout the Settlement and the Louza Police Station was no exception. At the station, there were 66 carbines (.303 calibre), 48 automatic pistols (.45 calibre), 8 automatic pistols (.32 calibre), and 10 revolvers (.45 calibre), as well as 10,220 rounds of ammunition for all arms. Each police constable on patrol always carried at least one weapon; the Sergeants usually carried revolvers, while the constables the carbine rifles.[5]

2. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE INCIDENT

Prior to May 30th, plans for a demonstration developed slowly. In the previous chapter, it was pointed out that on May 27th, several students at a meeting of the SSU decided to concentrate their attention on the arrested students. Plans were made to send out lecture and propaganda teams, and to take "action" if the students were not released by May 30th. It appears, however, that no plans were made at that time to hold a mammoth demonstration.

Proposals for a mass demonstration came on May 28th when CCP members in a meeting of the Central Committee decided to call for a joint student-worker assembly and march on May 30th. Members of the SSU, however, on May 29th, decided against that, Instead, they made plans to hold their own assembly outside of the Mixed Court. Students, however, decided to add to their list of complaints, other issues supported by the CCP.

3. THE MAY THIRTIETH INCIDENT

a. A QUIET MORNING OF PREPARATIONS

During the morning of May 30th, nothing abnormal appeared to have occurred in the Louza District, Shortly before noon, students were reported to have been sighted near the Northern Railway Station in the Chinese City, but no police station nor police officer reported the sighting of any obvious student

activities in the International Settlement before noon.[6]

Students in the Chinese City, however, were indeed active. Bit by bit, the morning preparations were coming to an end as students began to put into operation the various plans that had been agreed upon during the previous three nights. Student speaking brigades that had gathered together earlier in the morning were now quietly slipping into the International Settlement with their leaflets and banners. Once inside they quickly moved to the areas where they had agreed to speak. Those who wished to participate in the march on the Mixed Court patiently waited at the railway station to avoid being arrested by the Municipal police forces. Still others entered the Settlement as Saturday shoppers, prepared to give support to those who needed it.[7]

The students in the speaking brigades had planned to form two main types of groups once inside the Settlement. Each small brigade of two to five students would position itself at the corner of any busy intersection. Once the group had attracted a crowd of people from a size of five to twenty in number, the main leader would begin to speak. As soon as this leader had gained the attention of the crowd, he was to speak only for a short time. One of his colleagues was then supposed to take the last few minutes. Once this was done, the original speaker was to move on to another corner and start the process

over again. The process was to be repeated over and over again so large numbers of the Chinese residents in the city would be reached. It was hoped that members of the crowd would join the students enabling the demonstration to carry on without their aid; but it was not absolutely necessary. What was important was the fact that the students had relayed information of vital importance to the people of Shanghai that the newspapers could not and would not carry.[8]

The first major report of student activity in the International Settlement area was received at about one p.m., when it was reported that a body of students had collected in the compound of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway Station. It was further reported that students were carrying a number of flags and banners, and that they were jeering at and harassing the Municipal Police who were on duty at the Boundary Road crossing.[9]

b. THE NORTHERN RAILWAY STATION ASSEMBLY

The police in the International Settlement had first heard of the students' activities shortly before noon. The information was, however, quite sketchy. Sub-Inspector Givens of the West Hankow Police Station had noticed that there was a gathering of students at the railway station, and the following information was relayed to the Central Police Station at 11:35 a.m.:[10]

> Please tell your Sergeant on duty that Chinese students are delivering violent anti-Japanese lectures on Honan Road at the railway station.

In absence of any serious disturbances in the Settlement areas, the Central Police Station at that time decided to take no extra-ordinary precautions.[11] The Emergency Corps would not be mobilized, nor would the police stations be notified of the situation.*

At 12:15 another telephone call was made by Givens, this time to all police stations. Givens reported:[12]

> Students and others are planning to distribute anti-Japanese circulars and deliver anti-Japanese speeches. The Commissioner of Police has given instructions that officers in charge of the station must take special precautions to insure that these activities are not extended.

This message was received at the Louza Station, but it does not appear on record whether or not it was received at the other stations.

c. LOUZA POLICE STATION - 11 a.m. to 1 p.m.

On that morning from ten a.m. to about 12:30 p.m., Inspector Everson was engaged in paying the Sikh and Chinese constables under his command.[13] About 12:40, according to his later statement to the Judicial Inquiry, he states that

* Immediately after the mill troubles on May 15th, the Commissioner of Police had mobilized an emergency corps of 120 armed men, and kept it at Gordon Road Station, ready to turn out at a moments notice.[15]



5. ASSEMBLIES FROM ONE P.M. TO TWO P.M.

→→ Mixed Court Assembly Processions

✕ Speaking Brigades



6. THE LOUZA DISTRICT - ONE P.M. TO TWO P.M.

1. Ts'ai Hung-li with Shanghai University Speaking Brigade
2. Ts'ai and his group at 1:15
3. Ts'ai and his group at 1:20
4. Liang Yü-hua and Shanghai University Speaking Brigade about 1:20
5. Liang and his group at 1:30
6. Lloyd Road Incident 1:45 - 2:20
7. Lloyd Road group moves into Charge Room

he then went into the Charge Room, examined the office books and had his attention drawn by Constable Stevens to the circular message sent by Givens and the Commissioner of Police at 12:15.[14] As the Louza District was surrounded by several other police areas, Inspector Everson decided that this circular message did not impose any special duty on him, except that it meant he would have to stay in the police station that afternoon. He did, however, caution his men to prevent any students from speaking in the Louza area.[16]

During this time, the police station and its offices remained generally empty. Most men on duty remained either out on patrol or if inside, at the back getting coffee or having a meal break. Only Constable Stevens and Sergeant Willgross remained in the Charge Room for any great deal of time.[17]

Shortly before one o'clock, Inspector Everson and a small police patrol left the Louza Station for the boundary area to check on student assemblies. Finished with their own work there, they proceeded to the Mixed Court. No reason was ever given as to why Inspector Everson left the Louza Station for the Mixed Court area; but it appears that it was to accompany the group of students arrested on May 24th.[18]

Finally at 1:15, Captain Martin who was then in charge of the Municipal Police while the Commissioner was off-duty*, received Sub-Inspector Given's message. Martin instructed Givens to take away the flags and banners of the demonstrators and to break up the procession if it should enter the Settlement area. He further added that after this he could only be reached at the Recreation Grounds; he was planning on playing cricket.[19]

d. THE MIXED COURT ASSEMBLY - PART I

Shortly after one o'clock, the four students charged with creating a riot and destroying private property on May 24th appeared before the Japanese Assessor, Mr. Tajima, and Magistrate Loh. As the Mixed Court convened, a great crowd of students assembled outside of it to await the results. In all there were about four hundred.[20] The crowd remained generally quiet, but unhappy over the fact that it was a Japanese Assessor who sat in judgment over their companions.

Nearly every Chinese educational establishment was represented in the crowd. Most prominent, however, were the various schools' Speaking Brigades, the Shanghai College of

* Commissioner McEuen, after one p.m., left his office to have lunch with two friends at the Kiangwan Race Club. He was planning to take the afternoon off.

Law, Nanyang College, and Shanghai University. The North China Herald reported:[21]

"The Shanghai branches of the KMT were out in strong forces."

The proceedings in the Court were of a formal character only, and again the accused were remanded for a special hearing. It was decided that they would be allowed bail of personal security of one hundred dollars. Unable to pay this, they would be forced to remain in custody. None of the four could pay, and it was decided that they should be returned to the Louza Police Station to await the special hearing.[22]

As the crowd continued to grow, the authorities decided to delay the return of the students to Louza. Meanwhile, Inspector Everson and his patrol returned to Louza without the students. The students outside the Mixed Court waited for the results.[23]

e. THE SPEAKING BRIGADE OF TS'AI HUNG-LI

While Inspector Everson was absent from Louza, students began to assemble and speak on Nanking Road. At one p.m., Ts'ai Hung-li, a leader of one of the Speaking Brigades from Shanghai University, began to speak to a small crowd near the Grandstand, just off of Bubbling Well Road. Around 1:15, he moved on to the New World Building at the corner of Thibet and Nanking Roads. At that time, he was accompanied by 12 other

students. Together, they proceeded to move along Thibet Road, speaking to small groups as they walked.[24] In court, Ts'ai later said that he had been speaking of Ku's death as well as the need of a strong Chinese patriotic movement.[25]

Police patrols at that time reported seeing other speaking brigades on Honan, Kweichow, Fukien, and Lloyd Roads.

f. THE SPEAKING BRIGADE OF LIANG YÜ-HUA

Around 1:20 Liang Yü-hua, another student from Shanghai University, was walking down Nanking Road, heading east. He was accompanied by seven other students. Several of the latter began to speak to several persons at the corner of Yunnan and Nanking Roads, directly opposite the police station. The students were soon spotted, and a group of policemen arrived about 1:25 to inquire as to the nature of their speeches. Although Liang himself had not yet spoken to any of the persons in the crowd, when the police discovered that he was the students' leader, they decided to arrest him and return to the station. After being warned not to return to the area, Liang was finally released, and he returned to his friends, who were now at the corner of Lloyd and Nanking Roads. They decided to move up Lloyd Road. Again they began to speak and pass out their literature.[26]

g. THE LLOYD ROAD INCIDENT - 1:45 to 2:20

At 1:55, Inspector Everson left the mess hall to go to

his quarters, having just a short time before arrived back from the Mixed Court.[27] At that time he heard the telephone ringing. He answered and was informed by Sergeant Willgross, who was in the Charge Room, that the station had just been informed by Chinese Sergeant #254, Ch'ien Mou-ping, that students were holding a meeting at the corner of Lloyd and Nanking Roads. Everson then called Sub-Inspector Shellswell and ordered him to go out and guard the outer entrance. After this, Everson went to the Charge Room to examine the report and to talk to the Chinese Sergeant. Sergeant Ch'ien handed the following report to Everson:[28]

> At the intersection of Nanking and Lloyd Roads at 1:55, I saw many people facing the alley. I went over to examine, and saw six or seven students passing out white leaflets. Others were standing beside them, speaking to a crowd of three hundred or more. I watched them and recorded part of their speech. Since many streetcars passed by here, I asked them to go to a quieter place. They heard me and replied that since we were Chinese, how could we aid these foreigners? "Why not come and join us?" At this point I returned to the station.

With him were two other Chinese patrolmen.[29]

Li Yung-sheng, who saw this group as he was walking on Nanking Road, did not find the crowd quite so large. He reported:[30]

> Near the mouth of the ta-chu-li, there were a good many students speaking; more stood nearby, some holding inscriptions standing on either side of the alleyway. Altogether, a little more than one hundred listened nearby.

The brigade was in fact the same one that had previously headed up Lloyd Road about 1:30. It had returned to the inter-section shortly before 1:50, with Liang Yü-hua still leading them. As soon as the group arrived at the corner, Liang began to speak in front of the Mu-shih-chih-mao Company. Minutes later, his speaking was interrupted by Sergeant Ch'ien and his two constables. After Ch'ien left, Liang began to speak again. Other students passed out more leaflets.[31] In all there were about seven to ten students with about fifty to one hundred persons listening.[32]

About 1:59, Inspector Everson decided to investigate the situation himself. Collecting Talbrum and Stevens from the Charge Room, and Sub-Inspector Shellswell at the gate, Inspector Everson proceeded toward the assembly at the corner, about forty yards from the station entrance. When the patrol reached the area, they saw the group of students standing on the sidewalk at the opening, left-side of Lloyd Road. Shang En-kan was now speaking to the crowd. Students on all sides surrounded him with small flags and banners.[33]

At first Inspector Everson approached the one making the speech, and inquired as to its nature. The speaker replied that he did not understand or speak English. With the aid of an interpreter, Inspector Everson continued to listen to the speech and had others examine the leaflets and banners.

Finding that the speech was anti-Japanese in tone and anti-foreign in character, Inspector Everson decided to make several arrests.[34] Sub-Inspector Shellswell was ordered to seize the main speaker Shang, while Talbrum and Stevens were ordered to take Huang Yun-hsiang and Liang Yü-hua.* Shellswell left first for the station; Stevens and Talbrum followed right behind. Inspector Everson decided to remain behind to observe the crowd for a while longer;** but he had little chance to do so, for as Shellswell left, a group of about fifteen students began to follow them. Everson saw this and decided he could learn more from the prisoners than by staying where he was.[35] The fifteen students marched behind Inspector Everson, and followed him and the three prisoners inside of the alley, then into the Charge Room. The three students were charged. Everson then began to ask them questions. The other fifteen watched quietly. At first Everson spoke to the main speaker and asked him questions on the nature of his speeches. In general the student answered that he only spoke

* Although Liang was not speaking, Shellswell had recognized him from before and thus notified Everson. Everson, then ordered him to be arrested.[36]

** Everson described the crowd as: "There were about 80-100 persons. Around 12-20 students. Others consisted of shoppers, workers, and pedestrians.[37]

to show the students' opposition to the Japanese killing of Chinese workers.[38] Everson then spoke to the other two who had been arrested. These students admitted that their speeches were anti-Japanese in tone; but warned Everson that because they had co-operated with several other brigades from other schools, he would have great difficulty in arresting them all. Their plans were too well arranged.[39] Somewhat annoyed, Everson warned the three that they were breaking the law of the Municipal Council, for to march or hold a demonstration in the Settlement area, they first had to gain the permission of the authorities. They had not.[40] After several minutes of heated debate, Inspector Everson offered to release the students if they would promise to leave the International Settlement and give no more speeches. The students refused to do so, and Everson ordered them to be incarcerated. The crowd was told to leave the Charge Room, but they refused to do this unless their three companions were released. Otherwise, they would have to join them in arrest. Subsequently, all eighteen students were locked up.[41]

In all, this short affair had taken about twenty minutes, from about two p.m. to about two-twenty. At 2:40 a telephone message was sent to Central Police Station which read "Chinese students parading in the Louza District, carrying flags and making anti-Japanese speeches. Several have been arrested". The message was received at 2:50.[42]

Inspector Everson, Sub-Inspector Shellswell, and Constables Cole, Stevens, and Talbrum, continued to sight speaking brigades throughout the area while out on patrols.[43] Of this, Everson reported:[44]

> Shortly after two p.m., one right after another, my men went to Thibet Road, Chekiang Road, Nanking Road, and Honan Road, where there were numerous assemblies. I recognized it was necessary to arrest them all . . . so as to examine their material and to warn them . . . Of more importance, was the necessity to prevent them from forming further assemblies . . . This kind of thing continued to happen right until two forty-five.

Reverend S. R. Anderson, a missionary in China since 1911 who was further down on Nanking Road, noticed assemblies there also. He said:[45]

> Travelling up Nanking Road to the New World Building, I noticed a small crowd of students at the opening of Honan Road. There were about five or six in all talking to a Sikh policeman . . . it was rather quiet.

The police began to arrest the students in greater numbers than before. Constable Cole, who was also on patrol at that time, said:[46]

> At 2:20 Inspector Everson ordered me to go out and help disperse any crowds on Nanking Road, and to arrest any students who were speaking to those crowds. Between 2:20 and 2:30, I seized several student agitators around the area of the Police Station.

h. THE FIRST THIBET ROAD INCIDENT - 2:10 to 2:30

About 2:10, Ch'a Hung-li, the leader of a Shanghai

University Speaking Brigade, was again speaking on the corner of Thibet and Nanking Roads. Because Inspector Everson and other constables were occupied in the Police Station with the group from Lloyd Road, Ch'a was able to speak uninhibited up until about 2:20. By then, Everson was able to take out more patrols to examine the conditions on Nanking Road. At first he did not notice any new assemblies; but as he walked westward toward Thibet Road, he saw Ch'a and several others carrying banners. At that time Ch'a was standing on the sidewalk by a rail speaking to a small crowd.[47]

Noticing what he considered to be anti-Japanese slogans on the banners, Inspector Everson decided to seize the group's leader and those two students beside him who were holding banners. Everson, himself, seized Ch'a, while two of his Chinese constables who had accompanied him, seized Kao Tao-ch'un and one other.[48] The men and their prisoners all headed back toward the police station. As before, several of the students in the crowd began to follow them. By the time they had reached the Station Compound, only 5 or 6 students were still following. Shoppers, workers, and pedestrians, however, had joined these few students swelling the group to well over thirty persons. The time was 2:25 p.m.[49]

The police decided to stop in the alley for a few moments. Ch'a Hung-li, when in Court, claimed that before being



7. ASSEMBLIES FROM TWO P.M. TO THREE P.M.

→→ Mixed Court-Chekiang Road Procession

✕ Speaking Brigades



8. THE LOUZA DISTRICT - TWO P.M. TO THREE P.M.

1. The First Thibet Road Incident 2:10 - 2:30
2. The Second Thibet Road Incident 2:30 - 3:15
3. Lloyd Road Group and Shellsell at 2:30
4. First Thibet Road group in Charge Room
5. Second Thibet Road group in Charge Room
6. Police Peacekeeping Brigade mobilized at 2:30
7. Anderson at 2:35
8. W. Cameron at 2:40
9. Everson until 3:20

taken into the police station offices, he was tied up so as to prevent escape.[50] Inspector Everson did not remember this particular episode, but a foreigner on Nanking Road at that time did. Reverend John Wesley Cline reported the following to the Court:[51]

> When I passed the opening of the police station alley, walking westward, I saw one Asian policeman, who had seized two students, helping a foreign police officer tie them up with ropes as if they were dangerous criminals. The incident occurred about 2:30.

Anderson also noticed that episode, but he reported that the crowd following was quiet and offered no resistance as the police tied up their companions.[52]

Again as the police officers and their prisoners entered the Charge Room, the crowd outside followed them inside. Sergeant Willgross was given the task of charging the prisoners while Inspector Everson attempted to read the various reports of the patrols received while he was gone. The large crowd, inside now, watched on in silence.[53]

Convinced that the demonstrators in and about Nanking Road were to continue, Inspector Everson decided more men were needed. He ordered the fire alarm to be rung, which had the effect of bringing to his assistance the aid of some five Western, sixteen Sikh, and twelve Chinese constables. These men were then ordered to clear the Charge Room and the

Police Compound.[54] While these men were clearing the area, and while Sergeant Willgross charged the five or six students who refused to leave the Room when ordered to do so, Inspector Everson sent Sergeant Tatrum (about 2:30) to report the state of affairs to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Captain Martin. Among other matters, Sergeant Tatrum told the Captain that the situation was well in hand and that Inspector Everson had all of the men he wanted.[55]

i. MORE PATROLLING

Between 2:30 and 3 o'clock, by Inspector Everson's orders, various members of the police force were on patrol duty on Nanking Road. Of this period Sub-Inspector Shellswell reported:[56]

> After dropping off the prisoners to be charged, I returned to Nanking Road over and over . . . I began to disperse several people who had begun to assemble in the vicinity of the police station. I walked eastwards toward Fukien and saw students distributing leaflets to pedestrians. I arrested one and returned to the police station . . . The same thing happened at Lloyd as well as Chekiang and Honan Roads.

Anderson also reported:[57]

> At 2:30, I left my family and went out towards Wing On's. Later I saw one Westerner seize two students as I passed by the Company. The constable had seized them by the back of the neck. Others in the front were extremely quiet while those following said little and offered no resistance.

Constables Cole and Stevens were performing similar tasks on Chekiang and Nanking Roads.

At this time, the main crowd on Nanking Road mainly consisted of Saturday shoppers, the store workers, and those usual pedestrians out for their stroll. Various student groups were scattered throughout the area speaking to small groups. No acts of violence were reported, nor were there any cases where persons were found unco-operative. If anything, the police complained that the students were too co-operative as the police cells were quickly filling up. Although the crowds were large, there had been "no idea present . . . in the mind of Inspector Everson that the public peace was in any way in danger of disturbance".[58] By 2:45, however, things began to change and Inspector Everson was beginning to notice it.

j. THE MIXED COURT ASSEMBLY - PART II

While waiting for the transporting of the four prisoners to the Louza Police Station, the assembly of students slowly began to dwindle. Many of the speaking brigades returned to several different areas throughout the International Settlement to continue their work; others headed toward the Nanking Road area to support any assemblies there. By the time the prisoners were removed from the Court House, the crowd had dwindled to only about two hundred.[59]

Some time around 2:45, the accused were finally moved. The entire group assembled outside decided to follow. As the

procession began to move away on to Chekiang Road, various members in the crowd were observed to be carrying banners and pennants proclaiming: "The Japanese have torn our national Flag." "Oppose the construction of roads on Chinese territory." "Oppose the printed bylaws." "Let us rescue the students who have been arrested." "Cancel all unequal treaties."[60] Slowly the group moved down Chekiang Road toward Nanking Road. As it moved closer to Nanking Road, its numbers began to increase. Shoppers, workers, and pedestrians on the street began to join the students as they marched along, chanting loudly for the release of the student prisoners. As they neared Nanking Road about 3:30, their number had swelled to over a thousand people.[61]

k. THE SECOND THIBET ROAD INCIDENT - 2:30 to 3:15

Around 2:30, the police station again received reports of another assembly on Thibet Road. The station, however, had only six constables and could send no-one to check it. The other officers were scattered throughout Nanking Road breaking up small assemblies.

Outside, Constable Stevens, who had been previously ordered to protect the police entrance, noticed the disturbance at Thibet Road corner. Stevens then ordered two Sikh officers to follow him. As they passed by Lloyd Road, they saw several students there speaking to a small gathering of about thirty

people. Once past this group, the three men continued toward Thibet Road. Several students from the Lloyd Road group then began to follow the police patrol, heckling them as they walked. The police and the students following them reached Thibet Road around 2:45. Stevens noticed that one student was speaking to a crowd of about one hundred.[62] He described his actions following this as:[63]

> I went to the one speaking. He was able to speak English and I peacefully asked him to disperse. He said he wished to continue to speak. I then arrested him and one other leader, and attempted to return to the police station; but about twenty students surrounded me preventing me from doing so. We fought for a while and I had to use my club. But in the end, I retained the two prisoners.

Several Sikh officers heard the commotion and went to Steven's aid. Several more students thought to be too rowdy were seized. Sub-Inspector Shellswell also arrived on the scene and attempted to help the men disperse the group.[64]

In all six of the assailants were finally arrested and taken to the station. On arrival, the police officers noticed a large crowd of about two hundred persons following them.[65] About three p.m., a part of this group forced their way into the Charge Room. According to police witnesses, this group was about 80 to 100 in number with the students in a minority.[66] Sergeant Willgross noticed that although the crowd was creating great confusion, there was no violence, no

acts of resistance, nor any obstruction of the proceedings in the Charge Room.[67]

At that time, Stevens informed Inspector Everson who had been in the Charge Room since 2:30, that he had arrested these students for taking part in a meeting at the corner of Thibet and Nanking Roads; that he had been knocked down by some of them; and that an effort had been made to take his pistol from him.[68]

Orders were then given to drive the crowd out of the Charge Room; and a great deal of energy was exhausted to do so. In the confusion, however, the six students who had been charged with assault managed to escape. Finally, the police were able to push the crowd outside of the Charge Room into the Police Compound and onto Nanking Road in an eastward direction. The whole affair had taken over twenty minutes. It was now 3:15.[69]

After the crowd was forced out of the Compound, it slowly retreated eastward. Police officers continually urged the crowd to disperse, peacefully if possible. When about one hundred yards east of the station gates, directly opposite Wing-on's, the crowd halted and set upon two foreign constables, Whyte and Cole. Attempts were made to wrest away the police officers' firearms. Several police responded, and they now

began to use their sticks much more freely than they had before. The crowd again retreated eastward.[70] This time Stevens complained of being beaten. He said:[71]

> As we pushed the crowd away, I was knocked to the ground, and the students began to beat me with their sticks.

Gradually, the crowd in front of the police station entrance was entirely dispersed. Anyone still in the Charge Room or the Compound was immediately arrested. In Everson's own words, "peace and quiet temporarily returned to the police station".[72]

At that time, there were about nine hundred to a thousand persons on Nanking Road; perhaps as few as eight hundred.[73] Some of these were positioned between the police station and Lloyd Road; others were between the police station entrance and Kweichow Road. The crowd assembed by Kweichow Road was standing in front of the Town Hall; the other in front of the Wing-on Company.[74] The crowd was large but was not yet violent nor was it blocking any traffic.[75]

1. THE MIXED COURT PROCESSION ON CHEKIANG

As early as 2:45, small groups of the larger procession on Chekiang Road began to arrive at the intersection of Nanking Road. Immediately, they began to dispense pamphlets and to speak to various groups gathered there. Sub-Inspector Shellswell nearby, noticed this group when he saw a student climb

atop of the tea-house at the corner, and throw leaflets down to the crowd below. Shellswell reported:[76]

> I stood east of the gate at the police station and it was sometime before three p.m. I heard sounds on North Chekiang Road. When I turned toward that area, I couldn't see anything; I only saw a good many leaflets falling from the east and north corners of the tea-house. Then I saw several persons holding banners. By the time I reached that area, I was pretty well surrounded. I only saw one Sikh and a student fighting. I ordered that student arrested. Leaflets continued to fall. The traffic had stopped and Chekiang was covered with paper. I proceeded up Chekiang to disperse the crowd there and to restore the traffic flow. I was there about fifteen minutes and returned to the police station about 3:18.

Several times after this, Shellswell and other constables were forced to return to Chekiang Road to disperse new crowds and to arrest students speaking. None of them, however, reported they had at that time spotted a large group arrive via Chekiang.[77]

m. NANKING ROAD - MORE PATROLS AND ASSEMBLIES

Regarding the conditions on Nanking Road itself, the Commissioner of Police provided rather interesting evidence. Commissioner McEuen had left the International Settlement to have lunch at the Kiangwan Club at 1:15. At a little past three, on his return, he passed up Nanking Road on his way to the Race Course. He was accompanied by two friends, Messrs. McGuire and Weston, and all three of them later stated that



9. ASSEMBLIES FROM THREE P.M. TO 3:37 P.M.

→→ Chekiang Road Procession

X Speaking Brigades and Assemblies



10. THE LOUZA DISTRICT - THREE P.M. TO 3:37 P.M.

1. Second Thibet Road group at 3:10
2. Brawl on Kweichow Road at 3:20
3. Anderson at 3:10
4. Commssioner at 3:10
5. Tatlock at 3 p.m.
6. Tatlock at 3:30
7. H.P. King at 3:20
8. O'neill is beaten
9. Cameron at 3:28
10. Arrival of Chekiang Group 3:25
11. Covey at 3:30
12. Covey at 3:37
13. Burtons in their car
14. Westridge in tram at 3:30
15. Witchner in car at 3:20
16. Cline at 3:30
17. Brierly in car at 3:20
18. Pe cekeeping Brigade

A. Assemblies 3:15

B. Assemblies 3:37

at that time (3:15) there was only the Saturday afternoon crowd on the street, and that there was nothing to attract their special attention as to the size or the behavior of that crowd.[78]

Mr. Brierly contributed further information on the conditions of Nanking Road. He stated that he passed the Race Course about 3:20 heading eastward, and found that the road to the east of the entrance of the Race Course to the police station entrance was clear, and to the east of it clear until he came to Chekiang Road. There, a crowd had collected, he said, because of a large number of pamphlets having been thrown amongst the crowd.[79]

The crowd of about one thousand[80] moved up and down, back and forth on Nanking Road. Several times, different groups entered the police station only to be quickly expelled. Police were seen fighting with students; students were seen attempting to disarm the police officers.[81]

The Police Commissioner, having reached the Race Course, rang up Inspector Everson, and got hold of him about 3:14 to 3:20. Inspector Everson told the Commissioner that he was having trouble with students, that he had locked up a large number of them, that there were fifty of them in the Charge Room at that moment, and that he wanted instructions as to how

to deal with them. The Commissioner at first told the Inspector to caution the students and then send them away; but on learning that some had assaulted the police, he gave instructions that the latter should be detained and the others sent away. The Commissioner further questioned the Inspector about the state of affairs in Louza District and inquired of the latter whether he had sufficient men; to which the Inspector answered in the affirmative.[82]

About the same time, Sub-Inspector Shellswell was again patrolling the area of Chekiang Road on horseback.[83] As he returned to Nanking Road, he noticed several persons brawling with some police officers near Kweichow Road. As he headed that way, four Westerners in an automobile stopped him and complained of the great confusion they had seen at the police station. He was, however, concerned with aiding Constables Cole and Stevens at that moment. The three men managed to finally push the crowd back, eastward, toward the Town Hall.[84]

At the same time, another crowd managed to assemble directly in front of the police station. A much smaller crowd than the one at the Town Hall, it presented little difficulty for the police who quickly pushed it eastward and into the group at the Town Hall.[85]

Inspector Everson, who was outside at that time, did not like what he saw. He decided to return to the offices to try to contact the Commissioner on the phone again. As soon as he returned to the Charge Office, he found another group of about one hundred persons there. Only a small number of them were students.[86] Sergeant Papp complained to the Inspector that the group was making so much noise that he could not carry out his work. Inspector Everson then attempted to contact the Commissioner on the phone; but he failed to do so due to the prevailing disorder. With the assistance of about six other police constables, the Inspector and Papp were finally able to expel this group from the Charge Room. The time was about 3:30.[87]

Once outside, the group was met by Sub-Inspector Shellswell who was still on horseback. With two others, he managed to push this group back towards Kweichow Road and the Town Hall.[88]

By 3:31, Inspector Everson was again outside to re-examine the conditions on Nanking Road. Somewhat concerned, he decided that the situation was serious enough to send Sergeant Papp to inform Captain Martin that his presence was urgently needed.[89]

The crowd on Nanking Road contined to grow. As the crowd was forced back, more and more pedestrians and onlookers joined in. According to the various police witnesses, at that time the crowd moved slowly back to a spot near the main entrance of the Town Hall which was about three hundred feet to the east of the police station entrance. Sub-Inspector Shellswell and Constables Cole, Stevens, and Finnigan as well as several Sikh patrolmen, were in front of this crowd forcing it to retreat. Most witnesses agreed that the police were now using their police sticks and batons quite freely in order to control the crowd.[90] Once the police had forced the crowd as far back as the Town Hall, the congestion became so great that they could push it back no further. The traffic was forced to stop, and the crowd became much noisier than before. At one point Shellswell and others were attacked by students. He reported:[91]

> I seized one of the attackers. At that time the people rushed ahead and knocked Cole to the ground attempting to seize his gun. Others attempted to cut the rope the gun was on. Several of us went to his aid but were also attacked. After several moments Stevens was injured by members of the crowd who also wanted his gun; but they could not knock him down... Moments later I was attacked by five or six more students and the leader went for my gun. The others rescued me. Slowly we continued to push the crowd back...The crowd became noisier and noisier, and several times I heard the words, "Kill the foreigners".

Inspector Everson also saw the clashes. He reported:[92]

> At that time, I again saw my officers trying to stop the crowd that was in front of them. Several of them were attacked. Shellswell and Whyte were both injured. Cole and Stevens were both beaten. The crowd was extremely hostile.

Anderson could not agree with Everson or Shellswell as to whom were violent. He stated:[93]

> As I left Nanking Road, I saw several people being pushed away from the police station. Slowly the police dispersed the crowd. As I walked, I saw no resistance...but about two hundred students with several of them holding flags and banners...However, it was the lu-kuo-jen who saw trouble and thus joined in. The students were still talking to various groups in the crowd ...I saw no weapons; only loud shouting...I did not hear any anti-foreign slogans either...

Dr. Cline basically agreed with his friend Anderson.[94]

There were at this time some armed policemen at the entrance to the police station on Nanking Road. Inspector Everson had placed Sergeant Tatrum to take command while he went inside to the Charge Room to check the reports. Finished with the reports, he then ran to the back of the police station at the entrance on Kweichow Road to make sure its gates were closed. A group of armed Sikhs were then ordered on guard there so as to prevent any one from entering.[95] At that moment several armed Chinese and Sikhs began to

return from their patrols. Inspector Everson ordered them outside to join in the guarding of the outside front gate with Sergeant Tatrum.[96] The call for reinforcements from the men off-duty had by this time also began to be answered; among the first to arrive were a number of officers who had been called away from their games at the Recreation Grounds, and who had joined the general melee in their sporting attire. Most of these men, however, did not really begin to arrive in any large numbers until about 3:35 and they were found in the crowd when the firing occurred.[97]

Inspector Everson stated that he was back at the Nanking Road entrance and the patrol about two or three minutes (about 3:34) at which point he stood and watched a party of police officers attempting to hold back the crowd that was in front of the Town Hall.[98]

n. THE ARRIVAL OF THE CHEKIANG ROAD PROCESSION

By about 3:25 or 3:30, the large group that was marching down Chekiang Road from the Mixed Court began to arrive on Nanking Road. Noticing the large crowd retreating on Nanking Road by the Town Hall, this group decided to head that way to give them reinforcements. As the two groups met, a marked difference in the mood and the confidence of the two groups was noticed.[99] Inspector Everson noticed it immediately. He said:[100]

> It appeared that the people were moving slowly in front of the Town Hall. No one could move either way as new forces rushed westward from Chekiang blocking off the route of retreat. At that time I saw several more pamphlets being distributed while a good many people holding banners and flags, were heading towards the north side of Nanking. Pamphlets were flying everywhere...It appeared that the people of Nanking Road had gained new confidence and thus turned around, moving again toward the police station.

There was a motor car standing outside of the police station entrance. Unable to see the crowd at the Town Hall any longer, Inspector Everson jumped on to the hood of it to get a better view. What he thought he saw was a large uncontrolled crowd that was moving away from the Town Hall toward the police station. In front of that crowd stood six or eight police constables who were attempting to stop it. About 3:35 Everson jumped off the car and raced back to the armed patrol at the entrance to prepare to give instructions as to how his men should react.[101]

o. THE POLICE RETREAT

The advance of the crowd toward the police station was at first slow with few cases of violence being reported. As those in the front ranks drew closer to the police clubs, they became more reluctant to advance any farther; but those in the rear pushed ahead with the result that many in the

front were pushed on to the police officers and were thus badly clubbed. Several were injured, but they had no way to withdraw. Those in the rear could not see what was happening and continued to push ahead. The result was that many in the front ranks began to fight back. Several persons struck out at the police officers while others knocked them to the ground. The police retaliated, attempting to protect those members in their ranks who had been injured. As the crowd pushed ahead, many more persons began to join in from off the sidewalks. Persons poured in from Yunnan and Kweichow Roads. The fighting continued.[102]

Constable Cole was knocked to the ground and several persons attempted to disarm him. He was rescued; but immediately afterwards, Stevens was attacked by another group. Nearby, Sub-Inspector Shellswell was caught by the throat; but he managed to escape with the aid of two Sikh constables. In another area, Whyte was injured and had to be carried back to the police station.[103]

Quite concerned with the situation, Sub-Inspector Shellswell decided to order the others to follow him in retreat. He later reported:[104]

> Realizing the gravity of the situation, I ordered the others to follow me; all of us half dead from exhaustion. Because the crowd continued to rush forward, I ordered the men to return to the police station. I was tired of continually being attacked.

The North China Herald was much more vivid in its description of the crowd. It reported:[105]

> Gathering for further effort, the crowd swept back the police cordon across the street and once more headed toward the police station entrance. It was a heaving, surging mass, the ground stewn with hats and garments lost in the struggle, and passers-by who had been quite innocently drawn into the mob being willy nilly carried into the general rush towards the station gates...

The police retreated in the direction of the police station's entrance towards a streetcar that was coming from the direction of Bubbling Well Road. When they were about two hundred feet away from the entrance, the tram passed by them slowly, dividing them from the crowd; thus enabling them to retreat to the patrol in front of the entrance. The effect of the tram on the crowd was to slow it down. The traffic, however, was also forced to come to a standstill as the crowd drew nearer and nearer to the station.[106]

By 3:35, the majority of the police officers on Nanking Road were found stationed directly outside the entrance to the Police Compound, all under the command of Inspector Everson. Each man was armed and was prepared for any trouble. Most of these men were part of the Peacekeeping Brigade that Everson had mobilized earlier at 2:30.[107] As the other constables retreated from the large crowd, Everson ordered them to stand in behind his columns and rest for

a moment. At that time Shellswell, Cole, and Stevens stood by the wall itself, on the east side of the gate. In front of them were 11 Sikhs, 12 Chinese, and Inspector Everson.[108]

Shortly after 3:35, Inspector Everson ordered the men to take the form of a semi-crescent shape and to make ready for any counter-actions that might have to be taken. The formation was about four feet from the entrance on the east side of the entrance, right in front of Shellswell and Cole. The eleven Sikh constables stood in the front ranks by Inspector Everson. The Chinese constables stood right behind the Sikhs. Stevens stood off to the West.[109]

The crowd that Inspector Everson and the others watched had already increased to more than two thousand persons and was still growing. The main group of persons was spread out from the police station down Nanking Road to the intersection of Chekiang and Nanking Roads. Smaller groups were seen by the Inspector, one west of the police station (about 50 to 100) and another on Yunnan Road directly opposite the police station at T'ai-chong's. Students continued to pass out pamphlets and to speak as the crowd moved ahead. Many of the students remained out in front shouting instructions. Many stayed there right until the time of the shooting.[110]

Just before the actual firing occurred, the police ranks were thrown into disorder when a student named

Chü Ching-pai attempted to climb the stone wall by the gate entrance, and thus gain entry to the Police Compound. Inspector Everson, who had seen the student earlier on Kweichow Road, thought that he was nothing more than a vanguard of a crowd prepared to seize the station. The Inspector ordered the student arrested and taken to the Charge Room. Constable Stevens followed the Inspector's orders and returned to the front ranks about 3:35.[111] The crowd on the street had become noisier and seemed more violent in its action. Inspector Everson was quite frightened by this turn of events. Of this he later said:[112]

> Around 3:34, I felt that there was absolutely no way to disperse the crowd. One clash after another only convinced me that more was to come.

He also said:[113]

> At that time there were also four or five cars and trams that were stopped, carrying foreigners...Many of them had women in them. They were thus in danger...The crowd was annoying these people from all sides.

p. THE FIRING

The large mass of people continued to surge ahead toward the police station. Witnesses nearby watched but could not make out any slogans cried out, nor any harassing calls; the noise was too deafening. About 3:36, the crowd was about ten yards from the police ranks. As the mass moved closer, Inspector Everson ordered his Sikh and



11. THE SIGHT OF THE FIRING

1. Everson
2. Shellswell
3. Stevens
4. Cole
5. Tatlock
6. O'Neill
7. Cameron
8. Cline
9. Westridge
10. Anderson
11. Covey
12. Kingman
13. Sergeant Willgross and Constable Whyte

- Chinese (12)
- Sikhs (11)
- Position of those killed and wounded

Chinese constables to "stand ready", and to load their guns.[114] As he gave the orders, Everson believed that he saw several more students attempting to climb the stone wall.[115] No other person, including other police officers, noticed these students.[116] The crowd continued to move ahead. Westridge, a witness across the street from the station, described the crowd somewhat excitedly as follows:[117]

> The crowd was all outside the police station rushing toward it; they had already assembled as a wild, confused, and disorderly mob.

At that point Inspector Everson took out his pistol and pointed it at the crowd, in particular at the various persons in the front ranks. It was to serve as an initial warning. Everson later said of this warning:[118]

> I knew that it was useless but I directed it at them anyway...I don't think they would have dispersed; but they should have known that pointing a gun at a crowd by a police officer is a grave thing. Any person should know this and ought to disperse before we fire...

As he raised his gun, the Inspector yelled out in Shanghai Chinese, "T'ing, wu t'ing chih mo, yao ta sha", meaning "if you don't stop, I will fire and kill."[119] Realizing that few could hear him, he waved his pistol again at the crowd.[120]

Whether the crowd heard or not, they continued to move toward the entrance of the police station. By the time they were within six feet of the gate, Everson ordered his men to open fire.[121] There had only lapsed ten to twelve seconds between the time the police had fired and the time that the Inspector had given the warning to stop. It had all happened very quickly.[122]

It appears from the actual count that forty-four shots were fired, most of which took effect.[123] Inspector Everson thought that he had ordered two rounds to be fired; but the firing was too quick for him to be sure.[124] In fact, between the time the Inspector ordered his men to fire and the time that he ordered them to stop, there elapsed only a few seconds.[125] The Sikhs in the front ranks had used their magazine carbines (.333 calibre), while the Inspector and Shellswell both used their automatic pistols (.32 calibre). All of these men fired directly at the front ranks. The Chinses constables at the rear, however, were not able to fire through the taller Sikhs and thus did not fire directly at the crowd. Instead their bullets hit the bricks of the building directly opposite the entrance.[126]

The result was immediate. Within a few minutes, the street in the immediate area of the police station was

cleared. Several of the persons in the crowd lay dead on the pavement, while more lay there wounded. Some of the wounded and those killed were carried off by their companions; but many others remained there waiting for the police constables to pick them up and send them to the nearby hospitals. Several foreigners in the area attempted to aid the wounded, but Inspector Everson's orders to disperse the entire crowd made this difficult. The remaining wounded and killed were then moved into the Police Compound, while police officers made arrangements to take the injured to the various hospitals in the area.[127] In all, twelve were killed, sixteen were known to be seriously wounded, and incalculable numbers were slightly injured. (See the section on Those Killed and Wounded).

q. THE AFTERMATH

Immediately following the firing, the fire hoses were finally brought out by Inspector Everson. They served a most useful purpose; they were used to wash off the blood stains on Nanking Road.[128]

At 3:43, Inspector Everson relayed the following message to Headquarters at the Central Station:[129]

We are firing on students on Nanking Road. Circulate.

At 3:55 Captain Martin responded to it with a new circular that read:[130]

All men are confined to barracks.

No record of this message being received at Louza Police Station was ever found; and thus the men continued to patrol Nanking Road and disperse anyone walking there.[131] At four p.m. a message was finally received from the Commissioner of Police and recorded in the Central Station. He had ordered immediate mobilization of the Emergency Corps.[132]

As the crowd moved off Nanking Road, heavily armed police guards of the Emergency Corps were placed at the various major intersections along it. Armoured cars, mounted with machine guns, moved up and down it on various patrols. The street was slowly being evacuated.[133]

Following the shooting, a number of students immediately set out for the Bureau of Foreign Affairs in the French Concession Area, where they interviewed the Chinese delegate, S.K. Chen. They urged an immediate protest and demanded the release of all the students arrested that day and previously who were being held in the Louza Police Station. They further demanded that the police "culprits" be punished; that the International Settlement authorities

be called upon to apologize to the Chinese Government and the schools concerned; that in the future no restriction be placed upon the "patriotic movement;" that the Japanese millowners be asked to accept the demands of their employees; and that no restriction be placed upon the publication of news concerning the "massacre" of that day.[134] Representatives of several schools later that day also approached the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce as well as the leaders of the various Street Unions urging them to assist the students in obtaining redress for the killed and wounded. It was decided to hold a joint-meeting for the next day.[135]

4. SUMMARY

During the early morning of May 30th, students throughout the city of Shanghai began to make preparations for their efforts planned that afternoon. Speaking brigades of the various schools began to collect together to prepare for their afternoon activities. Others headed toward the railway station. As several began to enter the Settlement as Saturday shoppers, the group at the railway station slowly increased to a size of about four hundred persons. Patiently they waited to march to the Mixed Court. Somewhere around one p.m., this group entered the Settlement and headed to the Mixed Court.

The first major incident that occurred in the Settlement involving the student speaking brigades and the Louza Police Station took place about 1:45 at Lloyd and Nanking Road. At the end of the affair at 2:15, eighteen students had been arrested. Incidents like this continued to occur right up until 3:30. More arrests were made. Reports of violence around 2:45 had been received at the police station, but these remained somewhat isolated until about 3:15.

At the Mixed Court, the officials had decided to retain the students for a special hearing. It was decided to return the students to the Louza Police Station. When returning them to the station, the group outside of the Mixed Court began to follow. The group marched down Chekiang Road on their way to the station. As their shouts grew louder and louder, various persons from the sidewalk began to join in, swelling the ranks to well over a thousand persons.

Slowly, the remaining speaking brigades on Nanking Road began to dwindle as more and more students were arrested. Soon many students were joined by pedestrians and curiosity seekers as they protested the arrests in front of the station. Several times, members of the crowds entered the Charge Room to voice their dissent. More arrests resulted. Several times police constables had to

disperse the crowds and push them back to the Town Hall. By 3:10, the size and composition of the crowds had changed.

By 3:15, violence became more frequent, at a time when Everson and his men were becoming more intolerant of the events on Nanking Road. Amid all of this, the group from the Mixed Court arrived and united with this group in front of the Town Hall. A distinct change in the mood of the crowd was noticed. As the united group pushed ahead toward the police station entrance, violence occurred even more frequently. The police used their clubs and the crowd retaliated with their fists. The crowd surged ahead; and Everson became convinced that the crowd wanted to attack the station. The result was that at 3:37, the May 30th Incident occurred.

C. DEBATES, CONFLICTS, AND CONTROVERSIES

1. PREFACE

Upon a careful reading of all the evidence, including the documents of the Judicial Inquiry (Oct. 1925), the Mixed Court testimony (June 1925), the Police reports, and the various newspaper articles and journal reports, it can easily be seen that many of the witnesses agreed upon certain facts but were evidently divergent on others. Such questions as the mood of the crowd, the make-up of the

crowd, the actions of the crowd, the time of its arrival, the reason why students spoke that day, the reason why the police opened fire, and the need of better precautions, served to divide the witnesses into two opposing camps. The police and the witnesses who supported them attempted to prove that the mass assembled on Nanking Road was intent on destroying the Louza Police Station. Others disagreed, and claimed that the firing should have never occurred.

It was this debate that almost totally monopolized the various studies and reports of the Incident during the year, 1925. Police witnesses were called into the Mixed Court to support the prosecutor's case against fifty-two students. Defense lawyers called other witnesses and medical personnel to dispute that case. And so on.

The Chinese community of Shanghai, however, boycotted both the trials and the Judicial inquiry. No Chinese gave evidence. Western reports and inquiries had to rely solely upon the police witnesses and some American missionaries who did not hold the police point of view. It is not surprising that the Japanese and British judges when they met five months later, exonerated the police and blamed the students for the firing.

The Chinese community, on the other hand, paid little attention to the reports prepared by the foreign communities. Instead, they concentrated their efforts on providing effective information to their own fellow Chinese readers. Thus, Chinese newspapers, journals, and magazines were flooded with reports, summaries of eye-witness accounts, articles defending the students and opposing the Municipal Police, and detailed reports examining what each writer thought actually happened. Such magazines as Hsiang-tao chou-pao, Tung-fang tsa-chih, Kuo-wen chou-pao, and Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien organized special issues to convince their readers that the Municipal police and authorities had murdered Chinese students.

It was these reports, inquiries, and articles from both sides that played an important part in the creation of myths centered on the May 30th Incident. Depending on the side you supported, a particular mythology was created and drawn from to support that viewpoint. The same witnesses were cited by both Chinese and Westerners alike to prove directly opposite contentions; and the witnesses that could not be categorized were declared either too humanitarian to be able to give an honest answer or too pro-Western to present an accurate account of the day. As persons began to write about the Incident much later, they too, began to assume the biases already found in the reports.

Any examination of the Incident, for this reason, must at least contain a discussion of the various reports and debates that were raised by the various witnesses. What each witness thought became a part of the reports that followed. This section, however, will not deal with the viewpoints of each witness separately, but will deal only with the major controversies. Nor will all the witnesses be included in the various sections; instead only those who had an important impact on the evidence itself will be mentioned.

This discussion of the various debates and problems is not supposed to provide the final understanding as to what actually happened on May 30th. It does, however, provide small parcels of information that are vitally important to any comprehension of the Incident itself.

Something, however, should be briefly said about the testimonies and important publications themselves. In addition to the problem of who wrote the article or gave the testimony (whether foreigner or Chinese, and of what political viewpoint), the actual time that the article was published or the testimony given also presents problems of accuracy and interpretation. Information, in many cases, was collected long after the Incident. The TFTC did not publish its "Special Edition" until late July: the KWCP

only after July 7th. In CKCN and HTCP, articles about the Incident came in great numbers during 1926, with very few before. Testimony collected in June and July was in the end never published, while the Judicial Inquiry did not come into being until late October.

Too often, the information collected tended to confuse the actual nature of affairs in Shanghai before and after the Incident. What were considered to be the issues involved after May 30th and the role of the CCP after the Incident, were considered to have remained constant since before May 30th itself. For example, following the Incident, broad anti-foreign issues became more important than local domestic ones.

The role of the CCP was also more important after the Incident. Yet many individuals, when testifying or writing simply assumed that prior to May 30th there was a strong anti-foreign campaign that was being masterfully manipulated by the CCP for its own ends. It was not simply an anti-foreign campaign manipulated by the CCP. There were also local leaders, organizations, and issues involved.

2. THE STUDENTS IN THE SETTLEMENT AREA PRIOR TO THREE P.M.

a. THEIR AIMS

Few witnesses agreed as to why the students were in the International Settlement on May 30th. On the one hand,

the police and the Municipal authorities contended that the students spoke for two reasons: to oppose the Japanese because they had shot Ku Cheng-hung, and to incite crowds to seek the release of the students arrested on May 24th by attacking the police station. On the other hand, Chinese writers contended that the students were originally not speaking about important issues and were not attempting to incite persons to attack the police station. Both saw the actions of the students as anti-foreign, and anti-Japanese in particular.

In Court, Inspector Everson spoke of the groups that he had ordered arrested that day:[136]

> We had one man inquire of their speeches to find out what were their nature, and found them to be clearly anti-Japanese. Their general tone, however, was clearly anti-foreign.

Although the Inspector was concerned about the anti-foreign, anti-Japanese nature of the speeches, he was, however, more concerned about other problems. He was in fact, mainly concerned about the possibility that the student agitators might incite a crowd large enough to attack the police station and thus obtain the release of their arrested companions. Inspector Everson stated that he had become convinced that the students were intent on attacking Louza as early as two p.m., when a group of eighteen

students had to be arrested.[137] The Inspector responded by ringing the fire bell (at 2:30) to put more men on duty. Although he realized the students were not out in any great numbers that day, he thought the real danger lay not in the size of the students but in their capacity to influence others.[138] Police constables were thus sent out on patrols to seize any student that was speaking or passing out information to persons in the Settlement area.[139]

In the past, the Municipal Police in Shanghai had rarely understood why students would go out and "sacrifice" themselves by speaking without permission in the Settlement areas. Many times the Municipal authorities had complained that the Chinese police had not made enough efforts to control the student agitators, and instead allowed them to go uninhibited into the International Settlement and cause trouble. On May 30th, Inspector Everson, believing that he had read the minds of the students properly, was determined that they would not remain in the Settlement for long and thus gain the chance to attack a station that was well armed.[140]

Wang Yun-wu, in the magazine TFTC, wrote an account of the students and their aims that disagreed with Inspector Everson and the Municipal authorities. He believed

that the majority of students that day were out mainly parading and speaking for three reasons: (1) because the Japanese had killed a Chinese worker, they sought immediate prosecution of the guilty party as well as better working conditions for the workers; (2) because four students had been seized and arrested for marching on May 24th, they sought to obtain their release; and (3) because the Municipal Council wished to propose a publication regulation, to levy wharf taxes, and to propose a new trade regulation, they went out to warn the Chinese citizens of Shanghai, and thus urge those people to make their feelings known to the settlement authorities.[141] The students were seen as a group of individuals attempting to rally Chinese public opinion against these issues, and not as agitators attempting to incite a mob to attack the foreign police station.

The North China Herald reported the presence of other students who "seemed to be somewhat more sophisticated in their opposition to the Japanese, the arrests, and the by-laws and who were making speeches in the Settlement area that day."[142] It reported that one of these students most lively leaflets read:[143]

> Brethren. Do you experience pain and difficulty in gaining your livelihood? And do you know why you experience more pain and difficulty than before? Here are the reasons:

> 1. The imperialism of Great Britain, United States, and Japan has resulted in the occupation of Chinese Customs. They have levied an import duty less than the export duty in order to retard the development of Chinese industry. The foreigners have taken our money from us by making us buy their goods, this making the Chinese poorer and poorer day by day;
>
> 2. These nations often assist Chinese militarists in exchange for concessions and benefits regarding mines and railways. The militarists secure loans and buy arms and ammunition so they can run their civil wars...;
>
> 3. The Japanese have killed our brethren labouring classes and the police have arrested workmen. In order to eliminate trouble among the labouring classes, students are trying to collect contributions for their relief and yet the police have arrested them. When we paid our last respects to Ku Cheng-hung who was killed by the Japanese students were again arrested by the police. They have put them into gaol, cold and hungry...;
>
> 4. Recently the Municipal Council trespassed into Chinese territory in order to make roads and occupy Chinese area. Again they try to carry out the Printed-matter and Wharfage dues bylaws...
>
> Unite and defeat Imperialism and Capitalism.

The NCH reporters further noticed that amongst these students, anti-imperialist slogans frequently took the place of anti-Japanese slogans; while broader issues concerning capitalism, the treaties, and the problem of the Municipal Council were contained in their lectures.[144] Unlike many of the other students, these students were often trained revolutionaries holding membership in either the CCP or KMT parties.[145]

Students in speaking brigades on Nanking Road had originally intended to keep moving so as to avoid arrest. It was hoped that in this way the small number of students in each brigade would be able to reach greater numbers of Chinese shoppers and pedestrians on Nanking Road. At first, most groups followed that plan. By two p.m., however, that plan was beginning to break down. Instead of moving on when a leader was arrested, students in the brigades began to offer themselves up for arrest. At 2:10, eighteen students were taken into custody when they refused to leave the Charge Room of the Louza Police Station. By 3:30, more than 50 students had been arrested in a similar manner.

The aims and actions of the students at the Mixed Court appear to have been not as well defined or organized as those of the students on Nanking Road. The assembly there was held to protest the trial of four students arrested on May 24th. All schools were represented, although no plans seemed to have been made for action after the trial. The aims of the assembly, however, became manifest when the Municipal authorities decided to detain the students for trial at a later date. When the students were returned to the Louza Police Station, the assembly decided to follow, forming the Chekiang Road Procession.

b. THEIR SIZE

Before 3:00 p.m. most witnesses placed the majority of the students assembled or speaking in the International Assembly at the Mixed Court. It was estimated by the North China Herald that there were as many as three or four hundred students there as early as 1:20 p.m.[146] Police evidence supported that report.[147] No other witnesses were called, and the Chinese would not testify.

The number of students speaking on Nanking Road was a difficult figure to estimate. Unlike the assembly at the Mixed Court, the students on Nanking Road were scattered throughout the area at the major intersections in small groups or brigades of about five to ten persons. Most witnesses, as they walked along Nanking Road, only saw the brigades in the area that they walked in. Figures they gave were thus often too low, and in most cases representative of no more than two or three brigades. Police officers managed to sight more brigades, and thus their figures were usually higher.

In estimating the size of the students speaking, Inspector Everson stated that there were about one to two hundred students in various brigades around Nanking Road.[148] Supposedly, his figures were based upon the collective reports of his police officers that day. Sub-Inspector

Shellswell, who seemed to be everywhere that day, thought the students were about two hundred to two hundred and fifty.[149] Rev. Anderson, who covered about the same area as Shellswell, estimated the students to be about one hundred and fifty.[150]

By 2:00 p.m., the combined total of the two areas important to the May 30th Incident represented about five hundred student agitators who were speaking, passing out literature, holding banners or simply marching. The number, however, may have been as large as seven hundred or as small as four hundred.

c. COMPOSITION

Following the Incident, the exact background of the students represented at the Mixed Court and in the speaking brigades on Nanking Road became entwined in the controversial charges that the whole affair had been Bolshevik inspired and Bolshevik led. As it became known that the CCP was playing an increasingly important role in the Shanghai General Strike that followed the Incident, more and more writers became convinced that the CCP had in some manner manipulated the students to incite the Incident. On June 6th, the North China Herald declared that the student agitators were Bolshevik inspired and that all assemblies had been planned from the "Red University" -

Shanghai University.[151] The police further charged that Shanghai University had acted on direct orders received from the Central Committee of the CCP on May 29th. Thus, it was reported that several students were sent out to agitate and start trouble in any way they could on May 30th.[152]

During the Mixed Court trials, most of the witnesses attempted to support the police reports; some, however, did not. On June 4th, Harry Kingman sent a letter to the Ta-lu-pao newspaper that attempted to refute the police charges of direct Bolshevik guidance. He said:[153]

> Being personally acquainted with some of the students, I state with conviction that the students, the great majority, at least prior to the killing on Saturday afternoon, were neither pro-Bolshevik nor anti-foreign. They were typical college and preparatory schoolmen and nothing more.

The question of composition, however, should not be side-tracked by the attempt to determine the percentage of communist activists amongst the students who were alleged to have been looking for an opportunity to start an incident. It should be sufficient to know that such persons may have been present. Their actual size is not important for if they as activists were particularly efficient, it would not take many of them to incite a large crowd or

assembly into mob action in conditions where persons were most receptive to that kind of suggestion.

Few witnesses actually saw the assembly at the Mixed Court. Reports were kept by the police station in that area, and it was these reports that the North China Herald mainly used to write various articles and editorials concerning this assembly. One article in particular provides useful information on the composition of the students gathered there. It reported that almost every school in Shanghai was represented. Students from Nanyang College, Shanghai Law School, T'ung-chi Medical School, and Shanghai University were out in the greatest numbers; but other schools such as St. John's University, Aurora University, Shanghai Baptist College, and Futan University were also represented. Banners and flags were sighted, announcing the presence of speaking brigades from every school. Slogans representing every viewpoint were noticed.[154]

The composition of the student agitators on Nanking Road in the various speaking brigades was open to more disagreement and confusion. Almost every student arrested prior to 3:00 p.m. (49 out of 50) was from Shanghai University. Following the Incident, it then became very easy for many witnesses and writers to accept the "Bolshevik conspiracy theory" as being the reason that assemblies had

occurred on Nanking Road that day. No evidence, however, was really ever given to support that contention. The accusation was simply repeated over and over at the trials and at the Judicial Inquiry.[155]

Although students from Shanghai University seemed to be the majority of those speaking in the Louza District, an examination of the reports of the police officers who made the arrests does not support the contention that these students were communists. Instead, it only points out that these students were anti-Japanese or anti-foreign, mainly speaking against the arrest of Chinese students and the death of Ku Cheng-hung.[156] Others were reported to be seen speaking against the Municipal Government, the bylaws, and the treaties; but their speeches were never categorized as anti-imperialist or anti-capitalist. Whether they were Bolshevik or not was simply not proven.

It can be concluded, however, that the composition of the student agitators in the International Settlement prior to three p.m. at the Mixed Court and in the Louza District represented a wide background of schools. Various viewpoints were expressed representing concern for local issues as well as braod national ones. Shanghai University students were predominant in the Louza District although others from Nanyang College were also arrested there for

speaking. No conclusions, however, can be drawn regarding the political background, affiliation, or philosophy of the individual students.

3. THE CROWDS ON NANKING ROAD AT THE TIME OF THE FIRING

Although the testimony on the size and composition of the students in the Settlement prior to three p.m. was riddled with several major controversies, that controversy was really quite minor when compared to the debate surrounding the crowd in front of the Louza Police Station at 3:37. Such questions as its size, temperament, and its composition created major clashes in both the Mixed Court and the various editorials in the Shanghai newspapers.

a. THE TIMES OF ARRIVAL AND THE SIZE OF THE CROWDS

Most witnesses agreed that the large assembly at the time of the firing was somewhere around fifteen hundred to two thousand two hundred people, generally scattered from Yunnan Road to Chekiang Road.[157] The witnesses also agreed that the majority of the crowd arrived from the east via Chekiang Road; the others from the various sidestreets surrounding Nanking Road. They did, however, disagree as to the time that this large assembly became the large mass that began to push down Nanking Road toward the police station. Some believed the crowd, or at least a large part

of it, was on Naking Road as early as 3:05 or 3:10; others felt that it was closer to 3:20 or 3:25. Others believed that a major part of that group was there as early as 3:00 p.m., possibly as early as 2:45.[158]

The Commissioner of Police had testified that he passed the point where the disturbances had occurred around 3:10; he had found everything to be quite normal. Although he had noticed many people, he thought they were mainly Saturday shoppers.[159] Dr. Cline had walked past the entrance to the police station shortly after three (about 3:05). He noticed a large crowd; but he felt that it was no larger than a normal Saturday afternoon crowd. He did, however, notice several student groups speaking to different assemblies in that crowd. He estimated them to be no more than fifty to one hundred persons in all. The street was quiet.[160] Mr. Anderson, also shopping on Nanking Road at the time, agreed with Dr. Cline.[161] Mr. William Cameron, about 3:15, noticed that the crowd in front of him was exceptionally thick. At that time he was standing at the entrance of the Public Library in the Town Hall. As he walked towards Chekiang Road, he also saw how the crowd became thicker and thicker. About 3:20 or 3:25 he noticed several more "reinforcements" arriving via Chekiang Road, making it extremely difficult to travel on

Nanking Road.[162] Messrs. O'Neill, H.P. King, Harold G. Witcher, Harry Westridge, and Thomas Tatlock, in general, all supported the testimony of Cline, Anderson, and Cameron regarding the conditions on Nanking Road.[163] These men were at that time scattered throughout Nanking Road; some were in their autos, others were walking.

Inspector Everson, when giving evidence, felt that the assembly in front of the police station at 3:00 p.m. was as large as eight hundred or a thousand persons. He stated:[164]

> As early as 3:00 p.m., there were about 800-1000 persons on Nanking Road by the entrance to the police station. Of these about 70-100 were inside the station in the Charge Room.

When he was recalled to testify, the Inspector was again asked about the composition of this crowd. He answered that some were students, some were shoppers, some were curiosity watchers, and some were merely loafers. Upon further examination, the Inspector discovered that his answers on size were not so much in contradiction with those of other witnesses as he had once believed. In his estimation of the size of the crowd, he had included everyone that was on Nanking Road by the entrance; the same persons that Dr. Cline had spoken of. The difference had been that Dr. Cline had spoken of these persons as

being a normal Saturday afternoon crowd, while Everson spoke of them as being a potentially dangerous group that could join in with any assembly that was forming on Nanking Road."[165]

In the record books at the Louza Police Station, the Inspector at 3:10 recorded the size of the crowd on Nanking Road to be about nine hundred persons.[166] Including both the demonstrators and the on-lookers, the figures correspond to both Anderson's and Cline's. The Inspector further reported that there were about one to two hundred students in the crowd speaking.[167] The figure was also the same as Anderson's.[168] The Inspector agreed with other witnesses as to the time of arrival of the group from Chekiang Road on to Nanking Road. He said:[169]

> I saw more people rush in from Chekiang Road and join the crowd assembled on Nanking in front of the Town Hall about 3:25. In all there were now about two thousand persons; but it was growing too quick to keep a count.

From all this collective evidence, it appears that most of the witnesses had noticed a large number of people on Nanking Road prior to 3:20--in all likelihood, one that was close to the size of a normal Saturday afternoon crowd. Students were scattered throughout that group speaking and passing out literature. The crowd was no larger than

one thousand, but no smaller than seven hundred. The students were no more than one-fifth of it. The greatest part of the demonstrators arrived somewhere around 3:25 via Chekiang Road; and it was this group that pushed the smaller assembly back toward the police station.

b. THE COMPOSITION OF THE CROWDS

By three p.m., the witnesses agreed, the student agitators were no longer the only active members on Nanking Road. As more arrests were made, non-student elements began to join the student ranks to protest the police action. Where before 2:30 the student activists were mainly the only persons engaged in speaking and marching on Nanking Road, by 2:45 p.m., this began to change. Non-student elements joined the assemblies and began to join the students as they entered the Charge Room at various times. Finally, about three p.m., the students were in the minority. Inspector Everson and Sub-Inspector Shellswell both reported that after three, of the persons who entered the Charge Room at different times, only a small proportion were students.[170] Sergeant Papp verified this in his testimony.[171] In fact, they all reported that the students were now only about one-fifth of the total number of persons outside of the police station (200 out of 1000).[172] It was also reported that many of the remaining four-fifths were no longer idly watching or shopping as they had before.[173]

The witnesses agreed that it was the speeches, pamphlets, and actions of the student agitators as well as the counter-actions of the police that enticed many of the non-student members to join in the crowds and marches on the police station.[174] As the police continued to make more arrests, these actions only made the words of the students more believable. Persons watching, thus, joined the small groups as they marched to the police station to voice their objections. But as Dr. Cline and Rev. Anderson pointed out, many of the persons standing nearby were swept into the crowds as they marched by. These persons often found themselves in a position of not being able to return to their original standing place.[175]

As the group arrived from the Mixed Court, the students/non-student ratio remained much the same. Of this group from Chekiang Road of about one thousand in number, the students were no more than two to three hundred.[176] As this group joined the mass of people in front of the Town Hall, a combined crowd of now about two thousand persons, the students were about four or five hundred in number, about one-fifth of the total.

The exact breakdown of the non-student elements participating in the large assembly as it moved ahead toward the police station is rather difficult to determine. Witnesses nearby often made no distinctions between those

participating and those who were not. Other witnesses were limited as to how many persons they could actually see. Most witnesses, however, agreed that these non-student elements consisted of curiosity-seekers, on-lookers, afternoon shoppers, loafers, and other pedestrians sympathetic to the students and their demands. Inspector Everson and Sub-Inspector Shellswell reported that they saw "rowdy undesirable elements" and professional trouble-makers who had managed to push the demonstration far beyond the control of the students.[177] In the same breath, Inspector Everson claimed that the students in the front ranks were still speaking, enticing the others to follow them in an attack on the police station.[178]

The composition of the students in the crowd at 3:30 had changed radically with the arrival of the Chekiang Procession. Students from Shanghai University were no longer the majority of those students on Nanking Road. Students from such schools as Nanyang College, T'ung-chi Medical School, and Chingchong Middle School were seen as part of the front ranks as the crowd moved toward the station.[179] Students from St. John's University, Futan University, Shanghai Law School, and Shanghai University were observed speaking to different groups in the crowd itself. The students from the Mixed Court were now in the majority.

Thus, by 3:30, the exact composition of those persons involved in demonstrations on Nanking Road had radically changed. There were no longer only students marching. Pedestrians, shoppers, and others had joined in different assemblies to voice their opposition to police action and to voice their support for the various student demands. Some had willingly joined in; others had not.

c. THE TEMPERAMENT OF THE CROWDS

i. MAIN CONTROVERSIES

The temperament of the crowd at 3:30 proved to be one of the most hotly disputed issues. On the one hand, the crowd was described as a screaming wild mob that was rushing toward the police station; while on the other hand, it was depicted as an orderly group, advancing slowly, intent on attacking the police station. One was chaotic, the other controlled.

In spite of the fact that the crowds were continually becoming larger and larger, right up until 3:00 o'clock Inspector Everson sincerely believed that he would have no difficulty in dispersing the "hostile" crowds.[180] Other police officers felt the same as Everson did.[181] By 3:20, however, they began to change their minds, for they noticed what they considered to be an important

change in the mood of the crowd. Everson felt that it was becoming even more intent on attacking the station to obtain the release of the students.[182] With the arrival of the Chekiang Road group and the increase in violent acts, the Inspector became concerned with the possibility of attack. Everson described the crowd as very hostile and extremely dangerous.[183]

Dr. Cline, this time at the corner of Thibet Road heading eastward, noticed that there was a considerable amount of noise being made by the crowd on Nanking Road, and there were several flags and banners being waved; but so far as he could see the crowd was not offering any violent resistance, although he noticed the police were slowly being forced to retreat.[184]

Mr. Arthur Covey, who was proceeding up Nanking in a rickshaw about 3:30, saw the same crowd that Dr. Cline had described as noisy. Covey reported in Court that it was precisely as Dr. Cline had described it.[185] At Chekiang Road he noticed a considerable gathering of people on both sides of the road; but he claimed that he saw nothing peculiar that would have drawn his attention.[186]

Dr. and Mrs. Burton, also at Chekiang and Nanking Roads at that time, disagreed with Covey. Caught in the

midst of what he called a wild and noisy mass, Dr. Burton felt the demeanour of this crowd was definitely hostile and dangerous. The crowd at the Louza Police Station appeared to be even worse.[187]

Mr. Cameron, who was also by the police station at that time, agreed with the Burtons.[188] Mr. O'Neill, who was at Yunnan Road shortly before the shooting, had been struck by a bamboo stick and pushed around by a small group there. He naturally felt the crowd to be hostile, if not very dangerous.[189] Mr. Witcher described the demeanour of the crowd as nasty; while Harry Westridge depicted it as a situation where the students were looking for trouble.[190] Harry Kingman disagreed and described the situation as calm.[191]

Any actual comprehension of the demeanour of the crowd, however, must rest upon an examination of the actions of the crowd as it pushed toward the police station. One of the most useful descriptions of that crowd at that time is found in the "Special Edition of the T'ung-fang tsa-chih about May 30th. The author of one article described the crowd not as a violent riot nor as a controlled assembly, but as a confused mass of individuals intent on various different actions.[192] The situation to him appeared as follows:[193]

> Shortly before 3:30, a large crowd of seventy to one hundred persons, not all students, had been forced slowly out of the Charge Room onto Nanking Road, and then eastward toward the Town Hall. At this point, the crowd moved backward with no resistance. This crowd was pushed into the group in front of the Town Hall. There were about nine hundred persons now being slowly pushed back. Then, this group was stopped by a much larger one coming from Chekiang Road. Unable to see what was happening out front, this larger group moved ahead pushing the front ranks onto the police constables who were trying to push them back. The police responded with their clubs and the crowd in front countered with their fists. The police retreated and those at the rear continued to push ahead. The advance was not quick for the crowd was forced to slow down several times by the on-coming traffic. As the crowd moved closer to the police formation at the station entrance, several persons in the front stopped and attempted to push backward; but those in the rear who could not see, continued to push ahead. As they reached within ten feet of the entrance, the police fired.

In the end, however, the actual demeanour of the crowd at that time or the way that it moved toward the police station is not that important. What was important was that Inspector Everson believed that it was hostile and dangerous, and that it was intent on attacking the station. The crowd was extremely noisy. Incidents of violence were increasing more frequently after 3:20. One student was seen to rush the station walls while others followed him later. It was these things that Inspector Everson reacted to.

ii. OTHER DEBATE

Other issues concerning the temperament of the crowd were raised in the Mixed Court by the Chief Prosecutor so as to convey the idea that the crowd in front of the entrance was really quite violent and thus intent on attacking the station. Such questions as whether the students or members of the crowd carried any type of weapons, whether the students had resisted the police when arrested, whether the crowd were unwilling to disperse at any given time, whether there were frequent outbreaks of violence, or whether the crowds were deliberately attempting to tie up the traffic, were all put forward in hopes that all would be answered in the affirmative. However, the testimony on these questions was confusing and most frequently in disagreement with the prosecutor's contentions.

RESISTANCE

Although Chief Prosecutor Maitland attempted to prove that the students before the firing had resisted arrest several different times, the testimony, in general, did not support him. Inspector Everson testified that he had encountered no resistance whatsoever when he had ordered several students to be seized.[194] In fact, with the arrest of two or three students, he found that several times he was forced to arrest several more students upon their own request. Although some students escaped when

the Charge Room was occupied, only Shellswell claimed that he found resistance at any time.[195] Shellswell's testimony was refuted by Dr. Cline when he testified that he had seen Shellswell tie up his prisoners, thus allowing them little chance to escape or even offer resistance.[196] In general, other witnesses supported the view that prior to 3:15 persons offered little resistance when arrested.

After 3:15, those conditions began to change. Violence became more frequent as students refused to watch as their companions were being arrested. Around 3:20, attempts were made to arrest those students still speaking or passing out literature on Nanking Road. Various police officers attempted to do this, but instead found it necessary to fight off the students who came to the aid of their companions. Clashes continued to occur, until finally Shellswell ordered the men to return to the police station.

Resistance, however, was not only limited to the students. At various times, non-students were seen defending students when the police attempted to seize them.

WEAPONS

The question of weapons proved to be a more difficult one to answer. Dr. Cline and Rev. Anderson, as well

as several other witnesses, claimed that they saw no weapons.[197] Inspector Everson stated that he saw only banners and leaflets in the hands of the students; but after three he was seldom outside of the entrance of the police station entrance, and was thus very restricted as to what he could see.[198] Constables Stevens and Cole agreed with Shellswell when he stated that he had seen some weapons in the crowd in front of the Town Hall. They claimed that about 3:30, they had seen four flat-sticks and several bamboo clubs in the hands of demonstrators.[199] When asked to clarify as to what they meant by bamboo clubs, Cole replied that they were not really clubs, but were the poles of the banners and flags that the demonstrators were carrying.[200] Thus, sometime just before the firing, three constables claimed that they had seen a sum total of four flat-sticks and various types of bamboo poles that could be construed as possible weapons; a total of about twenty weapons in a crowd of well over two thousand.

REFUSAL TO DISPERSE

Few witnesses disputed the fact that during the last march on the police station at 3:35, it was virtually impossible for a small number of police officers to stop it by attempting to push it backwards. The brute force

of the crowd as it pushed ahead made this impossible. Where the witnesses began to disagree was whether the crowd would have dispersed if given proper time. Everson, who believed that the crowd was about to attack the police station, did not think they would disperse with the use of peaceful means.[201] Witnesses such as Dr. Cline and Rev. Anderson disagreed, and felt that had the proper warnings been given the crowd would have dispersed. Had the police fired in the air, then no one would have mistaken their intentions.[202]

VIOLENCE

The first act of violence occurred about 2:45 or 2:50 when some members of the group on Lloyd Road fought with two Sikhs and Constable Stevens.[203] There were no reports of more violence occurring until about 3:15 when it was noted that the police were using their clubs quite freely and members in the crowd were attacking police officers. At that time, Constables Cole and Whyte were both attacked and attempts were made to disarm them. Shortly afterwards, Shellswell was attacked as he attempted to aid several Sikh officers. Neither Dr. Cline or Rev. Anderson saw any of the police officers being beaten; but, as they readily admitted, they were not in the front lines and thus their vision was limited considerably.[204] Most other witnesses were not in the exact area of the march, and

thus did not give any information that could be helpful.

It is known, however, that after 3:15, violence escalated quickly; quickly enough for the police officers to feel threatened and thus return to the police station.

TRAFFIC TIE-UPS

In general most witnesses agreed that the traffic had not been deliberately tied up by the students or the crowds on Nanking Road prior to 3:30. Although several police constables were concerned about the traffic and conveyed this to the crowds they talked to, the traffic continued to flow right up until the time of the firing. Most witnesses agreed that they had little trouble driving up Nanking Road or on the side roads off from it.[205] Dr. Burton, who found the crowd both dangerous and hostile, nevertheless admitted that he found no difficulty in travelling past that group.[206] At 3:30, as the crowd moved on the police station, the traffic was definitely forced to slow down and at times had to stop; but most witnesses agreed that there was no deliberate attempt to keep the traffic stopped.[207] A tram car had stopped for a few moments as the police escaped in behind it; but the tram was certainly not overturned as one witness attempted to claim.[208]

4. THE FIRING

a. THE STATED CAUSES

The evidence as to the real cause of the shooting varied from the assertion that no justifiable cause or reason existed for it, to the statement made by Inspector Everson that the Louza Police Station would have been destroyed had he not ordered his men to fire. He stated:[209]

> They would have taken my station, an armed station. I have not the slightest doubt that this would have happened at that time.

Rev. Anderson disagreed, feeling that no one had the intention of attacking the station.[210] One other witness attempted to describe this phenomena as "typical Chinese in a crowd reaction."[211]

That day, Inspector Everson, prior to the firing, had been under tremendous strain. He (who had earlier realized that he was short of policement for patrolling), was at one moment assisting in the arrest of individuals some distance away from the station; at another time, trying with much difficulty to report to the Commissioner of Police; then directing and assisting the ejection of several large crowds from the Charge Room; then rushing out onto the street to acquaint himself with conditions there and back again inside to check the reports there; remembering the occurrence of 1905 when a large crowd had attacked and

burnt the station and also noting the gradual increase in the size of the crowd and its change in character.[212] It is amazing that Inspector Everson was able to give orders to his police officers at all. For almost two hours straight he had been constantly on the go, and his mental capacity and his sense of responsibility were continually put under incredible strain and stress. It is not at all difficult to see why he had had a hard time in gauging the temperament of the crowd during the entire afternoon.

It was under these circumstances that the Inspector was submitted to even greater stress as the crowd pushed ahead on Nanking Road. As this large mass moved ahead, one student at that time attempted to enter the police compound by climbing the stone wall to the west of the police formation. A few moments later, others attempted the same thing. Everson concluded that his station was under attack and thus decided to order his men to fire.[213]

b. THE WARNING

The police witnesses claimed that a warning had been given in Chinese and English shortly before the police fired on the crowd. Soon this became a major part of the defense to justify the shooting. To have warned a violent crowd that the police would fire if they did not immediately disperse was thought to be sufficient warning, no

matter how effective that warning may have been.[214] Other witnesses, such as Anderson, Cline, and Covey, claimed they heard no warning at all.[215] But each one admitted the crowd was extremely noisy and the warning could have been muffled.[216]

Less than a minute before the police fired, Inspector Everson attempted to warn the crowd for the first time. He held up his gun and then pointed it at the crowd, at those in the front ranks.[217] Witnesses directly in front of the police ranks testified that they did not see the gun, and Inspector Everson himself admitted that he really did not expect the crowd to understand his actions or even see them.[218] In any case, it is unlikely that very many persons in the crowd actually saw the warning.

A few seconds later Inspector Everson then shouted a warning in English and Chinese at the crowd. The warning was short, and in Chinese very confusing. The warning had only told the crowd to stop. It said nothing of the need to disperse.[219] Most witnesses heard no verbal warning at all. Shellswell, only fifteen feet behind the Inspector, claimed that he only heard the warning in English.[220] Constables Cole and Stevens, in the same place, heard only the words "T'ing. T'ing." At that time the crowd was about ten to fifteen yards away. Shellswell and other others were about ten feet away.[221]

When asked whether he thought the crowd could hear him, Everson replied that they probably could not as his voice was quite hoarse and would not project any great distance. The crowd was also too noisy.[222] Ten seconds later, the police were ordered to fire. When questionned about the shortness of the time in allowing the crowd to disperse, Everson replied that they could not have dispersed, but they could have withdrawn from the "danger area."[223] He never explained what he meant by "danger area."[224]

Several defense lawyers in the Mixed Court trial had attacked the Municipal Police for not firing blanks at the crowd. Dr. Cline had criticized the force for not firing at least at their feet or else over their heads.[225] Anderson also criticized the police for the same reason in various newspapers.[226] Everson in Court replied to the criticisms. He stated:[227]

> Had I done this, I would have directly opposed my orders received from Headquarters. Those orders were "if the crowd should back up, I was not to fire; but if I had to fire, then I was to shoot to kill." This I had told my men. Those were my orders and I could not disobey them...Neither could I fire over their heads for the same reason. Besides, I might have injured some innocent by-standers.

A warning was thus given; but few individuals ever heard or saw it. They were given little chance to disperse, for the police fired almost immediately after warning.

c. THE PRECAUTIONS

Some witnesses such as Dr. Cline and Rev. Anderson believed that the Incident had occurred because the police had not taken any proper precautions prior to the shooting. Reinforcements had not been sent for as it was customary in times of emergencies. No efforts were made to defend the station from inside the Police Compound, where it would have been necessary to fire at only those who attempted to climb the wall. Instead the men were placed in a formation outside of the entrance, allowing them to be directly attacked. None of the front gates were ever closed during that day. Had they been closed, few groups would have ever been able to enter the Charge Room.[228] The police were also criticized for not taking out the fire hoses and using them instead of the guns. Cold water had proved quite effective in dispersing crowds on Nanking Road in the past.[229]

It was well known that twice that afternoon Inspector Everson had been asked by both Captain Martin and Commissioner McEuen if he needed any more troops. Both times he replied that he did not. Yet, in anticipation of larger crowds, Everson decided to put into operation the Peacekeeping force. By 3:30, he finally realized that he was far too short of men needed to stop the advancing crowd. At 3:37 he gave the orders to fire.

5. AN EXAMINATION OF THOSE KILLED AND WOUNDED

a. PREFACE

Similar to the examination of the conditions in and around Louza Police Station at the time of the firing, the examination of those killed and wounded provided heated debates and left many problems unanswered. Doctors disagreed as to the size of the bullet wounds, how far away the killed and wounded were from the actual site of the firing, and whether the bullets entered by the back, front or side. Even the number of those killed or wounded varied from side to side. To make evidence even more confusing, some English medical officers ignored performing any serious autopsies or detailed examinations of those wounded and yet attempted to answer detailed and specific questions when asked in Court. Chinese doctors, on the other hand, provided detailed reports; but with evidence in contradiction with their hospital authorities' reports.

In all, about twelve persons were killed from wounds received while on Nanking Road. The number of those wounded is more difficult to ascertain. From the Doctors' Reports we know that thirty-six were treated for wounds. Jen-chi Hospital authorities, however, stated that they treated thirty patients for wounds.[230] Twenty-four are accounted for in the records. Therefore, we at least know forty-two were treated for wounds. As for those who were

not treated, there is no way to know their numbers.

b. THE REPORTS

i. Tung-fang tsa-chih[231]

An important part of the information of those wounded and killed comes from the reports and investigations of the SSU immediately following the Incident. The SSU Report of June 3rd is duplicated in the Tung-fang tsa-chih and provides extremely useful information on those dead, their background, place of residence, and if possible where they were injured. In all, ten persons are listed as dead. Only eight persons are listed as injured, and again excellent breakdowns are provided for each person. The Report recognized that two others were killed; but no reason is given as to why they were not listed. The Report, however, does admit that the many wounded were not listed or examined as too many were discharged before precise information could be obtained.

ii. Kuo-wen chou-pao[232]

In addition to the students' report, the Kuo-wen chou-pao compiled another list that was published in one of its summaries on the May 30th Incident. This list is similar to that of the TFTC but discrepancies do occur. Eleven names are listed as dead while thirteen as injured. Two of those killed do not appear in the TFTC report

while seven injured do not. In addition, the reports are not as detailed as those of the TFTC; but they do serve as a useful check on the background of each person and the location of their wounds.

iii. The Doctors' Report[233]

An important part of the information comes from the reports to the Mixed Court of the individual doctors who had examined those killed and wounded - the doctors of Jen-chi Hospital on Tiendong Road, the Red Cross Hospital on Avenue Petain, and the Paolun Hospital on Bubbling Well Road.

The reports of these doctors have been summarized in the chart on "A Summary of the Location of Bullet Wounds." In all forty-eight killed and wounded are listed according to the location where each person received his wound. Each doctor is listed separately as well as the place that he worked.

Several problems, however, arise as to how valid or how useful the various reports are. Dr. Muir, who performed an autopsy on five persons, decided that a detailed examination was not needed. He finished his work in fifteen minutes.[234] Dr. Leeds, who treated fifteen persons, also decided to ignore any detailed report.[235] Yet, both men in Court proceeded to answer questions on bullet en-

try, powder wounds, and even age, questions that had all demanded a precise examination.[236]

Both Chinese and Western doctors clashed over evidence. Western doctors concluded that persons were injured in the front or side; the Chinese doctors concluded that most persons were shot in the back. The Western doctors decided that the persons were close to the rifle muzzles; Chinese concluded that they had been quite far away.[237]

c. THE ANALYSIS

i. Those Killed

In all, twelve persons died from wounds received on May 30th. Eight were pronounced dead on arrival at the various hospitals. Four succumbed to their wounds the following day.

Of the twelve killed, six were students, five were workers, and one was unemployed. All lived in Shanghai. Contrary to the police reports, most of the six students killed were not from Shanghai University, but were from several different educational institutes in Shanghai.[238] Two were from T'ung-chi Medical School, one from Nanyang College, and one from a small middle school. One other was from Shanghai University. The sixth school was not

NAME	HOSPITAL	WHETHER DEAD OR INJURED	TOTAL	LOCATION OF THE WOUNDS FRONT	SIDE	BACK	UNKNOWN	MISCELLANEOUS
Leed	Jen-chi	injured	15	4	8	0	3	0
Hsieh Ying-jui	same	same	3	1	0	2	0	0
Chiang Ming-yang	same	same	6	1	0	4	0	1
Muir	same	dead	5	4	1	0	0	0
Nu Hui-sheng	1. Red Cross	injured	4	0	0	2	2	0
	2. Jen-chi	dead	6	0	0	4	2	0
Ch'en hsi-yang	1. Red Cross	dead	3	1	0	1	1	0
	2. Jen-chi	dead	4	2	0	1	1	0
Tsung Li-chun	Paolun	injured	2	0	0	2	0	0
	Totals		48	13(27%)	9(19%)	17(35%)	8(17%)	1(2%)
	Dead		12	7(59)	1(8)	3(25)	1(8)	0
	Injured		36	6(18)	8(22)	14(37)	7(20)	1(3)

listed. The average age of the students was about 21 (21, 23, 19, 21), but one was as old as 38 and one as young as 14. Only one student in the group was born in the Kiangsu area. The others were from Kwangtung, Szechuan, and Shantung. It is likely that most of them had been out that day either in speaking brigades or at the Mixed Court. At the time of the firing, they were probably in the front ranks.

None of the five workers came from the Japanese mills that were on strike, as the North China Herald had suggested. Instead, they came from other foreign companies, a theatre, a restaurant, and a private home. All but one of them was from the Chekiang-Kiangsu area. In general, most of them were likely persons on Nanking Road who had joined the melee, willingly or unwillingly, and pushed ahead towards the station in the front ranks.

From the various reports, it can be seen that a good many of those killed died from wounds received in the back.

	Front	Back	Side	Other	Unknown
Doctors' reports	59%	25%	8%	8%	-
KWCP-TFTC	8%	58%	26%	8%	-
Average	35%	42%	17%	8%	6%

Another large group was shot in the side. Only about one-third of the numbers killed were actually shot in the front and facing the policemen as they fired.

2. ALLISTING OF THOSE KILLED

NAME	CHARACTERS	AGE	BIRTH PLACE	RESIDENCE	OCCUPATION	HOSPITAL	INJURY	DATE OF DEATH	SOURCE
Yin Ching-i	君景伊	21	Shantung	T'ung-chi Medical School	Medical Student	Jen-chi	BACK	May 30th	KWCP TFTC
Ho Nien-t'zu	何念慈	23	Szechuan	Shanghai University	student	Jen-chi	back	May 31st	KWCP TFTC
Ch'en Yü-ch'ing	陳虞卿	17	Canton	Nanyang University	student	Jen-chi	back	May 31st	KWCP TFTC
Wu Chin-hua	烏金華	14	Fenghua	Great World	student	Jen-chi	side	May 30	KWCP TFTC
Ch'en Pao-tsung	陳寶驄	38	Kwangtung	School T'ung-chi	Medical student	Jen-chi	back	May 31st	KWCP
Shih Tsung-sheng	石松盛	20	Chekiang	-	electrician	Pao-lun	front	May 30th	KWCP TFTC
Wang Chi-fu	王紀福	36	Chekiang	Chekiang Road	unemployed	Jen-chi	front	May 30th	KWCP TFTC
Shih Chih-ying	石志英	21	Kiangsu	-	student	Jen-chi	back	May 31st	KWCP
T'ang Liang-sheng	唐良生	36 (24)	Kiangsu	-	telephone company	Pao-lun	back	May 30th	KWCP TFTC
Ch'en Fei-chang	陳非長	18	Kwangtung	~~actor~~	actor	Red Cross	back	May 30th	KWCP TFTC
Chu Ning-shang	朱甯尚(和尚)	16	Kiangsu	-	servant	Red Cross	side	May 30th	KWCP TFTC
T'an Chin-fu	談金福	27	Kiangsu	ChiuKiang Road	waiter	Jen-chi	-	May 30th	TFTC

ii. THOSE WOUNDED

Of all the various students and non-students injured on May 30th, complete records were kept for only sixteen. Position of the bullet wounds can be found for only thirty-six persons, but these are incomplete and at times unreliable. Any examination of those wounded, for this reason, would be incomplete if not misleading. Few conclusions can be drawn about the entire group that was injured; but some can be made about those we do have records for.

Of the sixteen listed as injured, only two are students. No background is given for them. The other fourteen are divided between factory workers, company workers, servants, and waiters. Three persons' occupations are not listed. All of the sixteen lived in Shanghai, but only seven of them actually came from the Shanghai area. It seems most likely that many of these persons were in the crowd, not as agitators, but as followers.

From the reports, it can be seen that most of the persons listed as injured were shot in the back. Another large group was shot in the side. Only about one-eighth of those listed were actually facing the police ranks when they were shot.

NAME	AGE	BIRTH PLACE	RESIDENCE	OCCUPATION	INJURY	HOSPITAL	SOURCE
Ch'en Shih-mei 陳鉄梅	27	Chekiang	Lin Yun Rd.	student	back	Jen-chi	KWCP
Ch'en Chin-fa 陳全發	28	Kiangsu	Nanking Rd	mover	misc.	Jen-chi	KWCP TFTC
Hsu Tuan-hao 徐端鶴	19	Chaohsing	-	-	head	Jen-chi	KWCP
Ts'ai Hung-chun 蔡洪春	22	Chekiang	Chekiang Rd.	Mover	back	Jen-chi	KWCP
Wei Chin-ting 魏金定	34	Kiangsu	Szechuan Road	boatsmen	side	Jen-chi	KWCP
Yü Mei-wan 俞美萬	24	Huichou	Chia Road	servant	back	Jen-chi	LLLC KWCP
Tsou Pai-shan 鄒百山	31	Chang-chou	-	actor	-	Jen-chi	LLLC KWCP TFTC
Hu Ch'ang-sheng 胡長生	31	Kiangsu	Chiafei	factory worker	back	Jen-chi	KWCP TFTC
Ch'ien Shih-shan 錢石山	27	Kiangsu	French Settlement	official	arm	Jen-chi	KWCP TFTC
Ch'en Fu-ts'ai 陳富才	21	Chekiang	-	worker	eye	Jen-chi	KWCP TFTC
Chang Pao 章保	29	Szechuan	Chiming Rd.	-	front	Jen-chi	KWCP
Fen Yuan-ch'iu 伝韻秋	26	Szechuan	Road # 20	servant	-	Jen-chi	KWCP
Shih Chu-pao 石珠寶	23	-	-	-	-	Red Cross	TFTC
Ma Mi-chün 馬米均	18	Peking	Hsiangshan Road	student	back	Red Cross	TFTC
Yang Tsai-chung 易采忠	26	-	-	worker	back	Red Cross	KWCP
Chang Hsiang-wu 張香吳	21	-	-	-	side	Red Cross	KWCP

	Front	Back	Side	Other	Unknown
Doctors' reports	18%	37%	22%	20%	3%
TFTC-KWCP	6%	37%	13%	19%	26%
Average	12%	37%	17%	20%	14%

d. CONCLUSIONS

One of the most striking features of an examination of those killed and wounded is the fact that many of them came from such a wide variety of backgrounds and professions. Of the twenty-eight known to be killed or wounded, only eight were students. The remaining twenty-two were workers, boatsmen, actors, servants, and waiters. The students had been very active. Persons from varying backgrounds had been convinced to join in the assemblies. Even the background of the students varied.

Another striking feature is the fact that at least half of those listed were shot in either the backside or in the side. Only small numbers were shot in the front. It seems highly unlikely that these persons were still rushing the police ranks as the police continued to fire.

6. THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE CCP IN THE MAY 30th INCIDENT

The part played by the CCP in the events of May 30th does not appear to have been as important as their part following the Incident. Instead, it was an indirect

role through its advice to either the SSU or Shanghai University, and through its control over the labour movement in Shanghai.

Students arrested on May 24th had been arrested following the memorial march for a worker killed by a Japanese manager. That worker, a CCP member and organizer in a local union, had been arranging strikes in some Japanese mills since early May. The plans for those strikes had come from the Labour Secretariat under Li Li-san.

Prior to May 30th, the CCP had suggested a mass assembly to be held on May 30th with both workers and students protesting the death of Ku, the bylaws, and the arrest of four students on May 24th. The idea had come from Ts'ai Ho-sen.[239] Although the students rejected the idea of a joint assembly, they nevertheless decided to hold a demonstration outside of the Mixed Court. It was also decided to broaden the issues that would be raised.

7. SUMMARY

What witnesses thought occurred, either at the Mixed Court or on Nanking Road on May 30th, conflicted. Police witnesses were called to refute those who appeared to oppose the police testimony, and others were then called to refute them. As the inquiries proceeded, it became

obvious that the main attention was to be focussed on the Nanking Road Incident at 3:37. Little was to be actually said about the Mixed Court Assembly. More witnesses were called, and what now became important was whether the police had acted justifiably, and not an account of what happened. Witnesses, whether consciously or unconsciously, were forced to support one side or the other. The inquiries bogged down, and accomplished little in deciding what happened on May 30th.

CHAPTER III

THE AFTERMATH

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A. PREFACE

The Incident on May 30th was by no means the only time that Chinese collected in an assembly had been killed or wounded by Chinese or foreign police. At Nanking, after May 4, 1919, Chinese police wounded 28 students; one other was killed at Wuhan and one at Fukien.[1] In 1920, soldiers wounded more than 80 students at Tientsin who were instigating a boycott movement there.[2] Other shootings occurred in 1921, 1922, 1923, and 1924. In April, 1925, at Foochow, more students were killed by local troops and police.[3] As Tsingtao on May 29th, Chinese forces protecting Japanese mills killed and wounded several labourers and students.[4] Suddenly the May 30th Incident occurred, and the months that followed produced strikes, boycotts, agitation, shootings, and violence that had not been seen for many years. Agitation, strikes, and boycotts soon spread, and more and more Chinese became involved in an important urban mass movement. CCP members, student organizations, Chinese patriots, and KMT workers all effectively focussed Chinese attention on the May 30th. The Incident gave rise to the May Thirtieth Movement. The Incident, directed in the beginning against local problems,

soon broadened in scope to include protest against foreign interest in China, the treaties, and foreign governing bodies. Those aims were in turn directed towards the unification of China and the destruction of warlord governments.

This chapter, however, is not meant to be a discussion of the May 30th Movement. (This is beyond the present scope of this paper). Instead, it will concentrate on those events directly related to the May 30th incident. Attention will be paid to conditions and events in Shanghai following the Incident (such as the general strike and boycott movements, further agitation, and more shootings) as well as the spread of further incidents throughout China. Attempts to settle the Incident became an important part of the aftermath as national issues were added as a final basis for settlement. Attention, in particular, was focussed on the unequal treaties as they were affected by the incidents. This chapter will also include an examination of the effects of the Incident on Shanghai, its foreign concessions, and its foreign governments. The question of the roles of Russia and the CCP in the various incidents has always been a matter of great controversy. An attempt will be made, although only in general terms, to examine those roles.

For these reasons, this chapter is entitled "The Aftermath" and not "The May 30th Movement."

B. RESPONSES TO THE MAY 30th INCIDENT: Agitation, Incidents, Strikes

As soon as the events of May30th became known, Chinese throughout the country quickly united in their condemnation of the action of the Shanghai foreign police. Agitation continued to occur in Shanghai, and more Chinese were shot by the foreign authorities. Agitation spread to other centers with more incidents occurring. General strikes began and new organizations were formed to run those strikes. Incidents continued to occur with the result that each incident in itself provoked new incidents, until finally on June 23rd, a large number of Chinese students were killed in Shameen. A general boycott declared in South China suddenly became the new center of the movement against foreigners and their goods. Japan, all of a sudden was replaced by Britain, who was now forced to bear the brunt of the attack.

1. SHANGHAI

a. THE MEETING OF MAY 31st

Another demonstration, but one less menancing in character, was organized by students on early Sunday morning, May 31st, to protest the events of the day before. In spite of the rain, students went out to speak, Nanking Road again being the location of operations.[5] Of that group, the North China Herald reported:[6]

> Between 300-500 youngsters of the student class drifted along from various quarters early in the day, a number of girls among them, and began the distribution of leaflets calling upon the shopkeepers to strike. Some busied themselves at the Chekiang Road tea-houses throwing down sheaves of handbills to people below, while others plastered shop windows and shutters with more or less inflamatory notices.

The students remained non-violent and no arrests were made.

Later that day, a mass meeting was held in the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, on North Honan Road, to consider the policy which should be adopted by Chinese residents of the International Settlement in connections with the shootings of the students and residents the day before. In all 1500 persons attended the meeting. The majority were students and labourers, with a minority that included representatives from about 100 secondary organizations such as the Street Unions, radical societies, and shop assistants' associations. The labourers were represented by the Shanghai kung-t'uan lien-ho-hui (Shanghai Federation of Labour Unions); the students by the Chinese National Student's Unions and the Shanghai Students' Unions (SSU). Ling Kyung (Shanghai dialect), a representative of the SSU, took the chair.[7]

The meeting, although somewhat disorganized, finally decided to call a general strike. The North China Herald reported:[8]

> Wang Zao-zung, a representative of the Senza Road Street Union, then suggested that a general strike should be declared...This proposal was condemned...but order was again restored by the appearance of Woo Tsz-au, Chairman of the Fokien Road Street Unions... his remarks confirmed by Wong Han-liang, a representative of the Canton Road Street Unions. Proceedings were then suspended for ten minutes, after which the following proposals were approved, made by an unknown student:
>
> 1. That the payment of taxes to the Shanghai Municipal Council be immediately suspended:
> 2. That a temporary boycott be declared against all foreigners; and
> 3. That the Chinese be urged to use only Chinese goods. Digressions were then made...by a man who represented himself as a member of the Labourers' Club in Tan Tsz-wen, Chapei who urged that a general strike be declared...One Van Dah-tseng, owner of the Ching-tsing Powder Paper Factory disagreed. ...Ling Kyung took order as chairman and spoke of ill treatment of labourers by imperialists and militarists...delegates of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Chinese Ratepayers' Association wanted a special meeting but radical elements wanted a strike now which passed...supported finally by street unions and the representatives of the Electrical Workers' Union.

A general strike had been decided upon; yet no definite date had been set for implementation.

That meeting further adopted a form of "13 Demands" and its four preliminary demands. These seventeen demands were soon to represent the conditions that had to be settled if the general strike was to end. Still

disorganized, the meeting adjourned.[9]

No plans had been made. The students and street unions, however, decided to declare the formation of the general strike for June 3rd;[10] but they, too, did not have the organization or leaders that could manage the running of the strike. That would have to wait until the following week.

b. AGITATION, MORE SHOOTING

During the first few days of June, more violent incidents occurred in the center of the Settlement with the police and the Volunteers several times firing on the students and labourers who were distributing handbills and haranguing crowds.[11] The Settlement authorities again and again responded with the use of more force: the Volunteers were mobilized, martial law was declared, 26 gunboats were brought up the Whangpoo, marines were landed, and various schools were occupied or closed.[12] The Settlement was to be protected as machine-guns and armoured cars maintained an effective guard from points of vantage.

Articles in both Chinese and foreign newspapers continually attacked one another. Chinese complained of massacres, foreigners of anarchy and planned violence. One Chinese patriot attempted to describe those days as following:[13]

> ...for 10 days following, a reign of terror prevailed. On June 1st, some Chinese persuading their compatriots to boycott the English tramway in Shanghai were fired upon by the police. On June 2nd, Englishmen again shot Chinese. On the same evening, The Shanghai Volunteer Corps, coming into conflict with some Chinese on the roof of a pleasure resort, opened fire with machine guns on Chinese civilians. On June 5th, foreign police and soldiers fired on an unarmed crowd of Chinese labourers. As a result, a total of 32 Chinese were reported to have been killed and 57 seriously wounded...

Although exaggerated and one-sided, that type of account continued to be printed throughout China, and whether true or not, Chinese seem to believe it.

Monday, June 1st

On June 1st, early in the morning, the SSU met in their offices at No. 20 Yang Tsung-fong, a building constantly being guarded to prevent any raid by the Municipal authorities.[14] That meeting decided to continue to send out delegates to speak in the Settlement and the Chinese cities. Others were to interview those shopkeepers in the Settlement who were not closed and urge them to close their premises, threatening that if that course was not taken the students themselves would prevent customers from entering.[15] Later that morning Speaking Brigades out agitating clashed with the Settlement police. As a result several persons were arrested and many were injured.[16]

Conditions in the French Concession remained quiet until late in the afternoon when a few students attempted

to distribute pamphlets. This was promptly put to a stop by the French police with the students being taken to a police station for arraignment.[17]

Everything remained quiet in Chapei and the Native City with no demonstrations occurring. Numerous deputations of students and labourers, however, visited the Yamen of Huihai Taoyin and the Shanghai District Magistrate as well as the Commissioner of Police and Commissioner of Foreign Affairs with requests that the Chinese officials should take up the affair as strongly as possible and demand a heavy indemnity and full apologies from the foreign officials concerned.[18]

The Settlement area was not quite so fortunate. Many shops remained closed or had their shutters up. Strikers and students continued to speak to crowds and to demonstrate. Various police stations received reports that Chinese were seen breaking windows and manhandling foreigners, especially in the area of Nanking Road. The police were then ordered to arrest all demonstrators.[19]

Shortly after mid-day a large group of strikers came into confrontation with the police. Reported as "looking for trouble," the group of about 1000-2000 attacked a Japanese who was rescued by a Sikh policeman.[20] The Sikh returned to the Louza Police Station to obtain support.

Under the command of Inspector Everson again, the police party fired several shots into the crowd. The crowd dispersed with many reported injured.[21] (Reports here are mostly based upon NCH accounts).

Further trouble came to the attention of the police at 5:30 p.m. when a large crowd of nearly 1000 assaulted three Japanese in the vicinity of Carter and Sinza Roads. The crowd, from all reports, had been molesting the trams, pulling off trolleys, and throwing bricks. The arrival of Inspector Mills and a party of men from Sinza Police Station brought about the dispersal of the crowd. Injuries were received, but no one was reported killed.[22]

Incidents such as these generally reflected the events in Shanghai for the next ten days. Students, workers, and strikers concentrated their efforts on closing all shops in the Settlement, and reaching all Chinese in Shanghai. The reaction of the police in attempting to arrest the leaders and trouble-makers only resulted in resistance and further violence. That resulted in more shootings that were exaggerated in reports throughout China.

The police, however, were not always successful in dispersing agitators. For example, on June 1st, when police attempted to arrest two students distributing hand-

bills on Jessfield Road, they were stopped by Chinese nearby and by the Chapei Merchants' Volunteers.[23]

In response to the events of June 1st, the Shanghai Municipal Council later that day declared a "state of emergency," equivalent to a proclamation of martial law. The proclamation was posted throughout the city with each document personally signed by the Council Secretary, E.S. Benbowe Rowe. It prohibited: (1) any action that might cause a crowd to collect in any public street or public area; (2) publishing, printing, or exhibiting of any document, picture or flag; (3) inventing or spreading any rumour that might foment trouble.[24]

Tuesday, June 2nd

June 2nd was the day that the Ratepayers' Meeting was to be held to adopt the controversial bylaws. Compounded with the declaration of martial law, Tuesday proved to be an eventful day.

Early in the morning, members of the "Citizens' Defense League against Japanese Diplomacy" met to discuss Saturday's and Monday's events. Although the meeting advocated a boycott against all foreigners in Shanghai, its members thought that it was more important to continue the lectures and the distribution of pamphlets in spite of the ordinance. It was further resolved to "telegraph all

parts of China to secure organization for the purpose of affording redress." The word British was also added to its name to be equal with Japan.[25]

Also during the morning, malcontents attacked trams on Nanking Road, threw stones at the trolleys, and insulted passengers in the motor cars. Their number continued to increase and one large group on Hopei and Naking Roads was hosed down and forced to disperse. Later, the same assembly claimed it was fired upon by a group of police officers when it would not disperse.[26]

Just before 11 a.m., students attacked a group of police officers by Louza Police Station with the result that three students were killed and fourteen were wounded.[27] It was reported that those students had earlier been attempting to close shops of the merchants that remained open.

In the meantime, the authorities of the Settlement had not been idle. The Shanghai Volunteer Corps that had been mobilized that morning was dispatched to various points to prevent assemblies. Lines of police officers were stationed across major roadways to prevent disruption of traffic. Various assemblies were dispersed and more arrests were made.[28]

Shortly after six p.m., armed Chinese[29] made an attack upon foreign troops and civilians from the roof of the New World Building, at the corner of Nanking and Thibet Roads. There was a fair amount of foreign traffic, tram cars, and automobiles in the thoroughfare, and a mere handful of American troopers and several Municipal Police and "Specials." The attack came with the conclusion of the Ratepayers' Meeting that had ended for a lack of a quorum. Firing continued by both sides at a great pace. Two hundred Volunteers arrived with their Lewis guns and armoured cars. By seven, the firing had stopped. The police and Volunteers advanced on the building, smashed in the doors and made a thorough search of the premises. No guns were found although six hundred persons were arrested and escorted to the Louza Police Station. Most were freed "with the exception of those who seemed to be of the student classes," and Nanking Road was declared a forbidden area to every Chinese.[30] More clashes occurred that night, and it was later reported that two workers had been killed in the Japanese mills.[31]

In spite of the conditions that day, the Municipal authorities decided to araign those persons arrested on Saturday and Monday. Some 49 persons appeared before the Mixed Court, In order to prevent any trouble on the part of the students, the entrance was heavily guarded and

fire engines were placed in the yard. The gates of the Court were also closed. The prisoners were bound over for trial with seven remanded without bail, five released on $100 bail, and the remainder on $5 each.[32]

Wednesday, June 3rd

More skirmishes occurred in the International Settlement, and more were reported killed or wounded.[33] The Defense Force and Volunteer Corps received strong reinforcements as British and American sailors and marines continued to arrive in Shanghai.[34]

Thursday, June 4th

As more troops began to arrive in Shanghai, accommodation space for them became critical. Finally, on June 4th the Municipal authorities decided to barrack the men at various school dorms. That day, American marines were sent to Shanghai University with orders to occupy and close it for the purpose of using it as their living quarters. Several students resisted, but the campus was eventually occupied and the students arrested.[35] Other schools were occupied and closed the following few days.[36]

Friday, June 5th

Tram cars in various parts of the Settlement were again besieged and stoned. Students again clashed with the police constables, and another incident occurred at

the New World Building.[37] The SSU offices were raided the same day with two students arrested and all banners and seditious literature being confiscated.[38]

More shooting occurred on June 8th, 9th, and 10th, with as many as three reported killed. More riots occurred and more arrests. Schools not on strike soon found themselves occupied and closed down.

The week following May 30th proved to be a hectic one for both the Chinese and the Settlement authorities. Riots and demonstrations occurred almost continually, and although it is not generally recognized, at least eight more Chinese were killed and forty-four wounded by foreign troops or police.[39] As conditions began to deteriorate, the Shanghai general strike began to take on a more important role.

c. THE SHANGHAI GENERAL STRIKE

i. ORGANIZATION

In concurrence with the sentiments expressed at the meeting of May 31st, work came to a stop in many shops in the International Settlement and teaching establishments on June 1st. The strike soon gained momentum in the various factories as labourers forced many of their employers to close down. Students and workers continued to encourage

those shops and schools not closed to join the strike. In the first few days, however, leadership remained rather helter-skelter, and was left to fall quite quickly into the hands of the communist workers and unions.

On the evening of May 31st, Communist Party members in Shanghai met with workers from different unions.[40] Taking their sanctions from various proposals passed at the Second National Labour Congress, the group present hastily organized the Shanghai tsung-kung-hui (Shanghai General Labour Union) for the purpose of organizing the strike movement and new unions. The Union was to supercede the Shanghai Federation of Labour Unions.[41]

At first other organizations, not necessarily communist controlled, attempted to broaden the general strike. On June 3rd, the SSU, the National Students' Unions, and the Association of Street Unions[42] met to declare their intentions and their support for a general strike.[43] Shanghai University, through its influence in the SSU, soon directed those three groups towards the Shanghai General Labour Union. Its own students, through its own student publication, the Je-hsueh Jih-pao (Hot Blood Daily News), edited by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai,[44] soon reached many other students, convincing them to cooperate with the workers. As the strike continued, that Journal soon became the chief propaganda organ of the striking workers and students.[45]

By June 4th, the general strike was making important gains. About 74,000 strikers were involved. Many foreign enterprises had been closed, with the British and Japanese being the hardest hit. Ships were immobilized in the docks as goods were left standing on the wharfs. The telephones ceased to function, and foreign newspapers were forced to publish less frequently. The public utilities were empty except for the electrical office that was being run by the Russians. Several Sikhs and Chinese were reported to have "defected" from the Municipal Police. The Settlement was finding itself near paralysis.[46]

Between June 1st and 4th, the General Labour Union had in each factory been rapidly organizing new unions and reorganizing old ones so that by June 5th over 128 unions representing 218,000 workers were under its leadership.[47] Many of them may have been poorly organized, but they were nevertheless susceptible to communist propaganda.

On June 5th, the General Labour Union decided to bring the whole strike movement under its director control. That same day, it proposed cooperation with other groups who had shown interest in the strike. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce refused to participate, but the two student federations and the Association of Street Unions agreed to.[48]

On June 7th, an action committee was convened at the instigation of the General Labour Union. The four

groups participating (SSU, National Federation of Students, the Union, and Street Unions) agreed to each appoint six members to serve on a kung-shang-hsueh lien-ho wei-yuan-hui (Joint Committee of Labour, Tradesmen, and Students).[49] The committee became the general guiding force of the Shanghai general strike, and from the outset it was the General Labour Union that dominated that committee.[50] While some conflict eventually developed among the various groups, in the beginning relations among the students, workers, and merchants were particularly good.[51]

The same week the National Students' Unions called a conference to discuss the problem. The following four points were adopted as they attempted to make public their feelings toward the strike movement:[52]

1. To endorse the labourers' cause in their fight against capitalism and assist them to secure adequate protection from the government.

2. To render necessary assistance in starting labour organizations and continue to carry out propaganda work.

3. To establish night schools and public mass education literature to help the workers to acquire adequate knowledge in political matters.

4. To give proper backing to idle workers during the course of the strike.

The majority of that work burden, naturally, rested on the shoulders of the SSU who began to organize almost imme-

diately. One result of that work was the reorganization of the student union structure in Shanghai, an event that was to affect the development of student politics in Shanghai for some time to come. (See the section on Reorganization, part d.).

Once the machinery for the general strike had been set in motion, judgments expressing the issues involved began to take shape. At the meeting of the Joint Committee on June 7th, the delegates drew up a list of terms for the settlement of the strike, all based on the recommendations of May 31st. Four preliminary demands called for "the cancellation of the state of emergency, the withdrawal of landing parties and demolition of the Volunteer Corps, the release of all persons arrested, and the return of all colleges seized."[53] These were followed by a ratification of the 13 "formal demands" accepted on May 31st. They were:[54]

1. To punish the criminals. Concerning the murderers who quickly gave the order to open fire and those who fired killing workers, students, and citizens, we oppose and moreover ask that they be handed over to the Chinese government for trial, detention, and punishment.

2. To compensate. Because this cruel case had caused direct and indirect injuries and casualties...all must be carefully examined to determine a compensation which ought to be directly from the Municipal Council.

3. To apologize...the two concerned countries of England and Japan ought to in detail apologize through their ambassador to the Chinese government and moreover to assure them that hereafter this kind of thing will not happen.

4. To remove the Secretary of the Municipal Council, Mr. Rowe.

5. The Chinese in the I.S. must have the absolute freedoms of speech, publication, and assembly.

6. To treat with politeness the workers. The factories established by foreigners must through joint action of the Council and Chinese Ratepayers Association conclude a law that would protect the Chinese worker, that would also not allow ill-treatment of the worker. In addition it would recognize the freedom of the worker to organize labour unions and to strike. Finally it would not be able to fire the workers because they had struck.

7. To alot the upper eschelon of the police. The police ought to establish a Chinese Commissioner of Police, well under him there ought to be Chinese in one half of all positions.

8. They must remove the publishing bylaw, cancel the increase in the wharf tax, and cancel the bylaw concerning licensing of exchange...

9. To restrict the encroachment policy concerning highway construction. The Council must not over-exceed the sphere of the Settlement in the construction of highways, and those already built must be returned to the control of the Chinese government.

10. To return the Mixed Court to Chinese jurisdiction.

11. The Case of Municipal voting rights...Before the Settlement is returned, the municipal rights of the Settlement ought to consist of the following two regulations:

1. The Municipal Council and Tax Collecting Conference would collect taxes, organized by Chinese. The quota of Chinese directors and tax collectors will be determined by relative amount of tax collected. The attendance and voting rights of the tax collectors at the yearly assembly will be absolutely equal.
2. The right to vote shall be determined according to ownership and production.

12. Extrality should be abolished forthwith.

13. British and Japanese gunboats must be withdrawn from Shanghai permanently.

The demands were presented to the Municipal Council that same night.[55]

At this point, the Shanghai General Labour Union was in firm control of the Shanghai general strike. From its headquarters in Chapei, that Union continued to establish new branches in Pootung, Yangtzepoo, and Hsiaohatu so as to deal more efficiently with the allocation of strike duties. In order to counteract the propaganda in Chinese issued by the Municipal Council, the Union established a bulletin and provided a daily supplement to the Je-hsueh Jih-pao.[56] Such leaders as Li Li-san, Liu Shao-chi, Liu Hua, Sun Liang-hui (leader of the West Shanghai Workers' Club), Yang Chih-hua, Hsiang Ying, and Ts'ai Ho-sen, all members of the CCP, continued to control that Union, and thus the strike.[57] As Thurston Griggs pointed out, the "Communist used the general strike to spread their complaints and their ideology among such groups as Labour Volunteers, Agriculture Volunteers, Student Associations, Anti-Imperialist Alliance, People's Freedom Society, Loyal Workers' Union, Masons' and Carpenters' Unions, Ricksha Pullers' Union, and the Chinese Compositors' Union... all dedicated to overthrow those opposed to the principles of the KMT."[58] Each group was persuaded to distribute strike certificates, to organize pickets, and to make contacts for the purpose of creating a strike fund.[59]

In order to meet the cost of the strike, a strike fund was finally organized with the help of the students, and contributions were collected in the Chinese-owned factories, from the shopkeepers' associations, and from sympathetic citizens throughout Shanghai. Funds soon were collected from most areas in China as well as from KMT organizations and the Comintern.[60] Yet, as this strike continued to gain momentum, dissension in its own ranks began to weaken its own effectiveness.

ii. DISSENSION

It is not at all certain that Chinese factory owners were truly sincere in their decision on May 31st to endorse the idea of a general strike. Writers at that time had suggested that members of the Chamber of Commerce and the Chinese Ratepayers' Association had been coerced into agreement. Many, however, realized that the time was opportune for winning concessions from the Municipal authorities with regard to such issues as representation, the bylaws, and the Mixed Court.[61] Yet that group was soon to conflict with the Joint Committee over the demands presented to the Council.

Once the demands were presented to the Council, the Chamber of Commerce, under the auspices of Yu Hsia-ch'ing, decided to revise the seventeen points listed.[62] The Joint Committee reacted immediately calling for a mass

meeting for June 11th. On that day, 20,000 workers and students marched in Chapei and ratified the demands as proposed by the Joint Committee.[63] Ignoring the parade, Yu then submitted the revised list to the Peking government, which relayed that list to the foreign diplomatic corps, a list that was to form the basis of negotiation which shortly followed between China and the foreign powers. The Chamber of Commerce had made the following deletions.[64]

1. The Preface,

2. It deleted the demands calling for abolition of extrality, permanent withdrawal of foreign troops, and the appointment of a Chinese commissioner of police; and

3. It deleted the section on labour improvement.

Conflicts also arose concerning the control of the strike relief funds. The strike had mainly been supported by contributions in China, with others coming from outside. Among the contributors were the Comintern, overseas Chinese ($38,873 and 10,000 taels), Feng Yü-hsiang ($15,000), and Marshal Tuan's Government ($100,000 from the Ministry of Finance).[65] Some of the contributions were sent directly to the Joint Committee or to the General Labour Union, but most were sent to the Chamber of Commerce, who reported a collection fund of $2.2 million. Instead of turning the funds over to the Joint Committee, the Chamber of Commerce decided to form the Chi-an-hui (Relief Committee) that would distribute the funds to the workers.[66] That

Committee, through reports of alleged inefficient and corrupt management, came into conflict with the Joint Committee, and when the Chamber of Commerce began to openly oppose the Joint Committee, it then decided to "choke off the flow of funds then put into the support of the workers."[67]

The gap between the Chamber of Commerce and the strike organizers continued to widen. Near the end of June, Chinese businessmen began to complain of their losses as a result of the strike.[68] The Shameen Incident and the prospect of a general boycott seemed to offer a temporary solution for them. As William Ayers stated:[69]

> Chinese capitalists saw they could remedy the situation and at the same time profit at the expense of alien industry by calling off the general strike, which affected many of their own establishments, limiting the strike to foreign factories, and concentrating on the boycott of foreign goods.

They were thus, in the beginning, prepared to give full support to the boycott movement.

iii. THE GENERAL BOYCOTT

To further their own aims, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce suggested that the general strike come to an end at midnight June 25th. Small shopkeepers who had also suffered financial losses in the strike agreed with them, and finally the Joint Committee consented. The general

strike, thus, in theory came to an end on June 26th. That same day, the general boycott of foreign goods and the continuation of the strike in the foreign owned factories were declared by the Shanghai General Labour Union.[70]

The International Settlement again found itself paralyzed as even the poorest worker continued to strike. Chinese workers left their jobs in the public services, in the printing department of leading foreign newspapers, and among shipping firms. Again, the British and Japanese mills were severely hit.

In answer to the boycott movement, the Municipal authorities notified the Chinese industrialists that their electrical power would be shut off on July 6th. Conscious of the conflict between the industrialists and the strike organizers, foreign authorities had hoped that this move would cripple the labour unions through the pressure of the owners. The cut-off occurred and Chinese owners were forced to compensate their employees. From this point on, few Chinese industrialists were prepared to outwardly support the boycott or the strikers.[71]

While the strike and boycott movement continued to suffer set-backs, other events not directly related to

these movements occurred that had the effect of disrupting the Chinese resistance. In the early part of July, General Hsing Shih-lien, friendly to the British and Japanese as well as Chinese industrialists, occupied Shanghai and declared martial law. Although orders were given to arrest all law-breakers or trouble-makers at that time, however, he decided to make no move against the strikers that might look as if he were attempting to destroy the labour organization .[72]

iv. SETTLEMENT

The strike of Japanese and British mills continued throughout July and the first week of August. The discouraging trend of it, however, soon caused labour to alter its strategy and original aims. The CCP declared that the "May 30th Movement"should descend from the height of 'national revolutionary demands' to the plane of 'economic legal demands'".[73] Political aims should be pursued only if they were of minor local nature; the workers should recommend that major political problems be turned over to a joint commission appointed by the Northern and Southern governments. The Party's decision was made because of the change of attitude by the bourgioisie, the need to avoid suppression by the militarists, and because dissension was also noticed among certain sectors of the labour front.[73a]

With the organizers largely abandoning their political demands, many students were also lost as ardent allies. Summer vacation had commenced and many students had returned to their parents' home. About the same time, many workers began to believe that now was the time to settle. With the end of the important strike fund (See Dissension), most workers received no strike pay and thus had accumulated large debts over the past three months.[73b]

On August 11th, the strikes in the Japanese mills were settled, although the settlement proved to be no spectacular victory for the workers. In response to various demands of the workers, the employers agreed to "recognize factory unions only if the Peking government passed a labour union law, to consider a wage increase only after labour production resumed, to forbid foremen to carry arms, and to make no dismissals without good cause."[74] In the British mills, negotiations continued in hope of an end to the strikes.

As the Chinese industrialists continued to fight for the end of the strikes and the settlement of the boycott, they became further alienated from the labour movement. In response to the withdrawal of the owners' support, the labour unions began to call their men out on strike

against Chinese owned mills. By September, more than half the mills on strike were Chinese owned.[75] As the situation became tighter, the Chinese industrialists turned to General Hsing for support. Earlier in July, General Hsing had unsuccessfully attempted to close the Joint Committee offices, but in September he found little opposition and decided to move again.[76] Both the offices of the Joint Committee and the General Labour Union were successfully closed. During the following days, his troops began to seal the premises of the 120-odd affiliates of the Union.[77]

This suppression resulted in quick settlement of strikes in British textile mills and of the shipping strikes. Settlement was basically the same as that in the Japanese mills. The labourers had gained few advantages. Yet, General Hsing's actions had not entirely destroyed the General Labour Union which now moved underground. Throughout the remaining months of 1925, that union continued to organize small but effective strikes. For the most part, however, the strike and boycott movement in Shanghai had now lost its impetus, and it was the boycott and strike movement in South China that was beginning to take on the more important role.[78]

D. THE REORGANIZATION OF SSU AND THE RISE OF NEW STUDENT UNIONS IN THE SUMMER OF 1925[79]

As the students in Shanghai continued to pledge their support to aid the workers' strike and the general strike, the SSU decided to reorganize its structure with the aim of making it more efficient and closer to individual member unions. The main force behind this campaign was Shanghai University. Soon, the SSU had effective control over the strike activities of the major universities, colleges, and middle schools in Shanghai.

In this way, the SSU was able to provide more workers who could be involved in picket lines, on collecting committees, speaking-brigades, propaganda brigades, and so on. That reorganization, however, made it easier to be suppressed. With the occupation of Shanghai by General Hsing, the SSU and its affiliates became more open to direct attack. As students became more disinterested in late July, Hsing was able to move in and close down more student headquarters and arrest the student leaders.[80] In this way, important leaders were swept away at a time when many students were becoming terribly disillusioned. The result was that after September, 1925, the student movement in Shanghai fell into the hands of very dedicated agitators; and it was they who continued to keep contacts with the labourers and to send out speaking brigades.

Student participation in activities after the May 30th Incident was very similar to their involvement in the May Fourth Movement and the December Ninth Movement of 1936. Initially, students became involved through a particular action. In 1919, it was the Twenty-One demands of 1915 and the Versailles Treaty; in 1936 it was because of Japanese aggression in North China. In 1925 it was because of the death of Ku Cheng-hung and the arrest of Chinese students. Action on the part of the students resulted in an 'incident'. That resulted in broad political action on the part of the students. To focus that action, new leadership and organizations came into being. As the movement advanced, disillusionment set in, and political action was left to a small core of dedicated agitators. In Shanghai, they were usually members of the CCP.

Another result of the May30th Incident in Shanghai was the involvement of many new schools in the anti-foreign campaigns, especially the mission schools in Shanghai. On June 5th, representatives from the Eastern Chinese Christian Colleges and Universities (Nanking, Ginling, Soochow, Shanghai College, and St. John's) met to deplore the action of the past few days. The president of SSU met with them and convinced many delegates to join in the strike campaign.[81] The students who returned to St. John's

attempted to instigate a strike, but that was suppressed by the school authorities. The conflicts that followed resulted in the formation of a separate university (Kwanghua) by those who disagreed with the foreign administrators.[82]

In spite of the quick end of the general strike and the breakdown of the boycott movement in Shanghai, these movements, nevertheless, had achieved some important consequences. Through the establishment of a strong General Labour Union under the direct control of communists, the political consciousness of the labourers had been raised considerably. Through reorganization of the students, student radicals and communists had gained important inroads there. The boycott of British goods was far more effective than that against the Japanese, but these "blows at foreign economic privilege compelled the granting of political concessions."[83]

2. OTHER CENTERS

a. AGITATION, DEMONSTRATIONS, AND MORE INCIDENTS

The reaction to the shooting on May 30th was by no means limited to the residents of Shanghai. Demonstrations, marches, and strikes occurred throughout China, but in no case were they as inflamatory as those that occurred in Shanghai during the first week of June.

Peking

On June 2nd, various meetings took place in the colleges and schools of Peking to discuss the Shanghai affair. On June 3rd, practically all universities and colleges were on strike to protest the killings. Between 10,000-15,000 students paraded through the streets that afternoon with all schools reported in attendance, even the missionary schools. Many of the students were seen haranguing passers-by and distributing handbills. Later in the day, delegates were received at both the Waichiaopu and the residence of Premier Tuan where the demands of the student body were presented. They requested punishment of guilty parties, release of arrested students, apologies, aid for the mill strikers at Shanghai, abolition of concession areas and extrality, and withdrawal of foreign military forces, all remarkably similar to the demands in Shanghai.[84]

On June 5th the Union of Chinese Chambers of Commerce in Peking appealed to the government to sever China's economic relations with Britain and Japan.[85]

For several days the student agitation continued. Up to that time, however, no violence had been reported although merchants were observed to have been threatened physically by students if they showed reluctance to join the boycott.[86]

On June 15th, 15,000 students again paraded to Tuan's residence to present their demands. On June 18th, propaganda increased in intensity as plans were being laid for a mass parade involving 100,000 persons.[87] Student fervor continued to mount and finally the mass parade was held. Students from Pei-ta led the demonstrators to Tuan's residence. A nervous regiment reacted and fired upon the demonstrators. When finished, at least 24 were reported killed and more than 100 wounded.[88]

Agitation followed in the capital for several weeks and although limited at first to the students, it quickly spread to support from the merchants and labourers.[89] Finally, in reaction, Chinese troops were asked to surround the Legation Quarters to protect it, and they did.

Tientsin

More than 1,000 students demonstrated in the native city on June 4th and 5th. The students were joined by several professors and strikers from the Japanese mills in the days to come. Demands for the restoration of Dairen, a boycott of British goods, and the abolition of all concessions were presented to the Tientsin authorities.[90]

Chinkiang

At Chinkiang on June 5th, a crowd forced its way into

the British Concession where it wrecked the Municipal Building, set fire to a number of houses, and assaulted the British Consul. Order was finally restored by the Chinese soldiers and police.[91] A few days later a telegram arrived saying that 500 students had been shot in Shanghai. That precipitated a parade involving considerable violence and vandalism. Order was restored when Chinese soldiers fired into the crowds.[92]

Chungking

In Chungking, a mob surrounded a compound in which British citizens had taken refuge. A naval party was landed from a British gunboat to protect the compound and disperse the crowd. The marines fired at the crowd and four Chinese were reported to have been killed.[93]

Amoy

Demonstrators in Amoy paraded with some banners written in blood with sentiments such as "annihilate the imperialists," "give us back the concessions," "Britains have slain our compatriots," and "abolish Consuls." One rock was thrown at a Japanese bank; bullets were returned, although no injuries were reported. British troops cooperating with the Chinese Marines were finally able to disperse the crowd.[94]

At Kiukiang on June 13th, students and labourers rushed into the British Concession, attacked the British and Japanese consulates, looted several buildings, and completely gutted the local branch of the Bank of Taiwan.[95]

Mankow

During the early weeks in June, one of the most serious disturbances, again involving the British occurred in Hankow. Agitation first occurred there on June 5th when about 20,000 students marched and distributed pamphlets. Violence occurred on June 11th when, according to foreign accounts, coolies incited by students wrecked a row of Japanese houses and killed one Japanese. British naval forces from the H.M.S. Bee were immediately mobilized. After clashes of two and one half hours, the sailors opened fire killing five to eight and wounding six to ten.[96] A general strike and boycott against British goods results.

Others

Agitation occurred in other cities. In Canton a small group of students and workers paraded on June 2nd in sympathy with the Shanghai students.[97] On June 3rd, in Wuchang, a two-day strike was accompanied by student demonstrations.[98] At Ningpo on June 5th, students held

several peaceful demonstrations.[99] Kaifeng and Chengchow also saw demonstrations. On June 8th, the office of the Asiatic Petroleum Company was destroyed by strikers in T'aiyuan.[100] In Nanking, agitation occurred almost daily and it reached its highpoint when on June 8th students canvassed house-to-house for funds and workers were shot by British forces outside of a British factory.[101] Even areas such as Shantung were hit in spite of the attempt to suppress agitation by General Chang Tsung-ch'ang.[102]

While these were the most conspicuous of the events precipitated by the May 30th Incident, there were many similar happenings in other Chinese cities throughout that summer. They were generally followed by boycotts in most areas and strikes in many of the foreign mills. Yet the intensity varied from area to area.[103]

It was in South China, however, that events in June were to play a decisive role in the events that followed May 30th. In fact, the emphasis of the May 30th Movement that had been previously centered in Shanghai was to suddenly shift to Canton where the movement fell directly under the influence of the KMT. Soon the Shameen Incident and the Hongkong strike were seen as the Southern equivalent to the May 30th Incident and the Shanghai general strike. The result was the further mobilization of Chinese

there into organizational, propaganda, and military work.

b. SOUTH CHINA: THE SHAMEEN INCIDENT

When the May 30th Incident occurred, the Canton Government controlled by the KMT, was occupied by other more pressing matters and was not in a position to give full support to the responses in Canton to the Shanghai Incident.[104]

With those problems under control the government was finally ready to act.

On June 18th, at a mass meeting, the government violently condemned the shooting and pledged its support to the student strike and boycott there. It further urged a general strike in Canton and Hongkong to be directed against the British and Japanese. It then decided to call for the holding of a mass parade to commemorate the Incident.[105]

The Hongkong-Canton strike commenced on June 20th. Thousands of workers left Hongkong and shipping was brought to a full stop. The strike spread that day to the French Concession of Shameen where more Chinese left their jobs.[106]

While these events were developing, on June 22nd, Sir James Jamieson, the British Consul-General at Canton,

warned the KMT not to hold the demonstrations for the following day. He further warned that such an act would warrant the actions taken in Chinkiang, Kiukiang, and Hankow. The same day barricades were constructed with machine guns strategically placed in Shameen.[107]

The demonstration proceeded as planned. Concerning the events of June 23rd, Douglas Jenkins, the American Consul-General, wrote:[108]

> The procession appeared about 2:30 p.m. It was orderly and at first consisted of only students, Boy Scouts, labourers, etc. For about half an hour, it continued to pass Shameen and as there was no sign of trouble, on-lookers began to breathe with more ease... It was then observed, however, that soldiers were bringing up the rear of the procession and that they were armed. These troops consisted of the Whampoo Cadets and ordinary Cantonese contingents. No actual account could be made but it is estimated that there were more than a 1000 men...
> Just as the first of the troops reached a point in front of the Victoria Hotel near the British bridge the procession stopped, probably because of congestion ahead. The troops began to show signs of nervousness and the students and civilians nearby seemed to increase their yelling and waving. Suddenly the soldiers were seen to break their formation and a shot rang out. This was followed by several more in rapid succession and then a perfect din of rifles and machine guns began.
> It is impossible to say from which side the first shot was fired. The British and other foreigners are practically unanimous in declaring that a Chinese fired first, but the Chinese assert that the shot came from Shameen. At any rate the firing spread rapidly along the bund and the French were hotly engaged...Heavy firing lasted about 15 minutes.

In all 52 Chinese died on the Shakee Road Bridge and 117 were wounded.[109]

The Shameen Incident was immediately followed by a more intensive strike against the British. The Strikers' Delegates' Conference and its Canton Strike Committee took control of the strike movement and boycott which soon paralyzed both Hongkong and Canton.[110] As this movement became more important and Shanghai's strike was dispersing, the May 30th Movement entered into a new phase, one that was affected by both South China and the KMP. The Hongkong boycott and strike officially ended on October 10, 1926, and it had an important effect on both developments within the KMT and on China's relations with other nations.[111]

C. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INCIDENT

Actual settlement of the May 30th Incident did little to dispose of the issues raised before it or quiet the agitation that had arisen as a result of it. Formal commissions of the Chinese and foreign governments as well as various informal inquiries all attempted to establish what actually happened on May 30th so that negotiations could proceed. Finding no uniformed agreement as to what the facts were, negotiations for settlement proceeded slowly. In the end, the findings of the various inquiries

and commissions came to have little direct effect on settlement, and at times appeared to be completely irrelevant. Their importance, however, was in the fact that they became an important part of the propaganda that flowed between the various factions. Final settlement would have to wait until after the findings of the Judicial inquiry in October; but in the meantime, diplomatic channels and foreign affairs in Peking and Shanghai would be shaken up in attempts to reach settlement.

1. THE DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES AND THE MIXED COURT FINDINGS

a. NOTES AND RESPONSES

Shortly after the May 30th Incident, students continued to meet at the Waichiaopu hoping to pressure the government to act. At first the Peking Government acted cautiously, but finally it responded on June 3rd. Earlier, 15,000 students had again marched to present their demands. Yet, even then, the Note of the Waichiaopu, delivered to the Senior Minister of the Foreign Diplomatic Body, was couched in a moderate tone, and expressed more regret than accusation and demands for redress. It stated:[112]

> No matter what the nature of their demonstration may have been, the students being young men of good family, full of patriotism, and unarmed, should not be treated, no matter what the circumstances, as

> ordinary lawbreakers and criminals. The police, instead of attempting to pacify the students by appropriate means, used those extreme measures which must be condemned both on humanitarian grounds and legal grounds.

On June 4th, the Diplomatic Body replied, defending the shooting as necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and proposed an investigation of the facts as the only basis of negotiation.[113]

In the meantime, confronted by growing Chinese opposition to the foreign involvement in the Incident the Peking government decided to send two High Commissioners to Shanghai to investigate the Incident, and to devise means to settle it there. In a telegram dated June 6th, Marshall Tuan announced the appointment of the Special Commission to investigate the shooting. The telegram further urged both merchants and students to attend to their own affairs and wait for the results of diplomatic negotiations.[114]

A second Note, dispatched to the Diplomatic Body on June 4th by the Waichiaopu, condemned the continuation of the shootings and asked for the release of all arrested students.[115] The Diplomatic Body replied on June 6th asking the Peking government to make itself acquainted with the conditions in China that were frustrating Peking's

attempts to maintain order in the country.[116] The Note further informed the Waichiaopu that the Powers had given renewed and specific instructions to the Municipal Police in Shanghai concerning the use of arms, and that the Diplomatic Body was sending a delegation to investigate and report on the conditions in Shanghai. The delegation was to leave on June 8th.[117]

Notes continued to be exchanged between the Waichiaopu and the Dean of the Diplomatic Body expressing the desire to cooperate in their investigations. Common grounds for agreement, however, were not found and the two investigating bodies were sent independently to Shanghai.[118]

Up to this time, however, although students in Peking had been interested in the re-negotiation of treaty relationships, the Waichiaopu had not been. That was to change with the dispatching of the Commissioners to Shanghai.

b. THE FINDINGS OF THE MIXED COURT

On June 11th, the Mixed Court entered the controversy when it published its own findings on the events of May 30th. Its Report read:[119]

> The Court finds that on May 30, 1925, a number of Chinese students...began a campaign of speech-making and the distribution of pamphlets near Louza which the police made the effort to stop...

> These students are mere boys and youths who, the Court believes, had no intention at the beginning to create a riot. Of those before the Court who are not students, the Court believes they were attracted to the crowd either by curiosity or accident. In view of these facts, therefore, the Court only requires the defendent to sign a personal bond to keep the peace in the future.

The International Settlement authorities of Shanghai reacted immediately, complaining that the report was an attempt to soft-pedal the Incident to please the Chinese, and further that it had completely overlooked the possibility that the Incident had been staged.[120] At this point, major interest was turned to the two commissions investigating the incident, and the findings of the Mixed Court were soon lost in the long flow of words that was to pass between the commissions, the foreigners, the Chinese, and the Municipal authorities.

2. THE CHINESE SPECIAL COMMISSION AND THE DIPLOMATIC BODY'S INVESTIGATION COMMISSION

Both Commissions arrived in Shanghai in the second week of June. The terms of the settlement, however, had already been predetermined by demands raised in Shanghai long before the two delegations left Peking. The Joint Committee and its supporters had already presented their demands to the Council on June 6th. The Chamber of

Commerce had already presented its revised demands to the government in Peking. Thus, the delegations were, on their arrival confronted with a fait accompli, which neither of them could ignore.[121]

The Chinese Commissioners, Admiral Ts'ai T'ing-kan and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Tseng Tsung-chien, met with various groups in Shanghai between June 6th and 16th. Upon the suggestion of the Chamber of Commerce, the Commissioners accepted the revised Thirteen Demands (See page 198and footnote 64), and declared these unfulfilled demands to be the "primary and fundamental causes of the trouble."[122]

The Diplomatic Commission held its meeting after June 11th and soon came into contact with the Chinese Commission. The two groups decided to enter into negotiations and on June 16th the Chinese delegates presented the Diplomatic delegates with the 13 Demands to be used as the basis of negotiations.[123] Conflicts arose at once due to the entirely different instructions given to the two Commissions. The Legations had limited their delegates to the consideration of issues directly relating to May 30th. The Chinese, on the other hand, were prepared to discuss issues that went far beyond that scope.[124]

As a result of these differences, negotiations broke down and on June 18th, the Head of the Legations in Peking recalled their representatives.[125] The Chinese Commissioners also returned to Peking. The negotiations for settlement once again re-entered the realm of the diplomatic channels in Peking.

The failure of both delegations to produce any satisfactory results was followed by two more Notes addressed to all foreign Powers by the Peking government. In the first, dated June 24th, the Peking government proposed that the 13 Demands were the only means to settle the Incident;[126] the second was an urgent request for a readjustment of China's treaty status.[127] The Diplomatic Body rejected the Demands per se, but relayed its interest in continuing the negotiations. The Peking Government had now for the first time switched the subject of negotiations from that of only the issues of the Incident to negotiation of the revision of the treaties themselves.

With this in mind, the Diplomatic Body prepared a report based on the investigations in Shanghai. In general the Report was surprisingly severe in its censure of the Shanghai administration, the Commissioner of Police, and of the students.[128]

On July 1st, the Legations decided to make the Report public hoping to weaken the anti-foreign incidents that continued to occur. Unfortunately, instead of stabilizing the situation, the Report proved to be a fresh source of conflict. The Ministers in Peking had called for the dismissal of the Commissioner of Police, but the Municipal Council refused to accept this as it claimed responsibility not to Peking but to the electorate of the Settlement.[129] At that point, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Sir Austin Chamberlain, stated that he would prefer to hold a judicial inquiry rather than to proceed any further on the basis of the decisions reached by the Diplomatic Body.[130] As a result, the Report was suppressed and many Chinese became convinced that it was withheld because of findings in their favour.[131]

At that point, the Diplomatic Body proposed to the Chinese government as a mode of settlement, a judicial inquiry of a public character to be undertaken by a Commission of Jurors from China, America, Britain, and Japan.[132] The Chinese government rejected the proposal, stating that with the lapse of time, most of the evidence was now unavailable and had probably disappeared. Instead, they wished to accept the Report of the Diplomatic Body that had already been suppressed.[133] Contrary to

Chinese wishes, the foreign ministers set up a Judiciary of Commission of Inquiry on September 15, 1925.

3. THE JUDICIAL INQUIRY

The so-called International Commission of Judges met from October 7 to 27, 1925, and held in all thirteen sessions.[134] The members of the Commission were Finley Johnson (American), Henry C. Gollan (British), and Kitsuburo Suga (Japanese). As a result of the attitudes held by the Chinese governments in Peking and Canton, the Inquiry was boycotted by the Chinese, and thus, no Chinese witnesses appeared during the sessions. The Commission could not reach a unanimous decision, and, thus, each jurist decided to submit his own report.[135]

The decisions of the judges were not known until December, when it was discovered that those of the British and Japanese jurists differed radically from that of the American. Justices Gollan and Suga had exonerated the police force and the administration of the International Settlement. Justice Johnson, on the other hand, asserted that "with a much larger force of policement on duty at the scene of the disturbances before 3:15 p.m., the necessity for the firing might have been avoided."[136] He had further asserted that an "anti-foreignism transcended the

entire incident."[137] Justice Johnson also had analyzed what he regarded as the proximate and long-standing causes of the Shanghai disturbances.

Once the recommendations of the Judicial Inquiry were released, it soon became apparent that the American Report was much more important than either of the other two reports or the thirteen Demands. Yet although letters to the NCH showed a distinct preference for the findings of the British and Japanese judges, the Municipal Council, for reasons unclear at this time, seem instead to have accepted the recommendations of the American judge. As a result, the Council accepted the resignation of K.J. McEuen, Commissioner of Police, and Inspector Everson. It also offered compensation of $75,000 to the family of Ku Cheng-hung, and agreed to seat three Chinese representatives on the Council.[138] Reaction to these measures was mixed, as Chinese regarded them as inadequate and foreigners too generous. No new assemblies, however, would be held to protest them. The only group active at that time, the merchants, was extremely pleased with the settlement. In addition, Shanghai was now under the strict control of General Hsing, and few Shanghai citizens were willing to confront his forces.

Areas outside of Shanghai, however, reacted and they now began to concentrate their efforts on revision of the

unequal treaties.

D. THE EFFECT OF THE INCIDENTS ON THE UNEQUAL TREATIES

Although successes achieved in changing the treaties were not always immediate or complete, they nevertheless did occur. As a result of the May 30th Incident and other incidents that followed, more foreigners in China became aware of the contradictions that existed in the treaty system. Others began to even talk about treaty revision.

With the problem of the settlement partly out of the way, the Peking government was now able to concentrate its efforts upon achieving treaty revision. Both the boycott movement and the strikes in the foreign factories proved to be most useful for this purpose.

Somewhat concerned by the remergence of strong anti-foreign sentiments in 1925, the foreign government began to pay closer attention to the Washington Treaty Agreements.

In October of 1925, a Tariff Conference to discuss the Washington Agreements opened in Peking.[139] Despite all genuine difficulties that continued to confront the delegates as they met throughout the fall and winter months, the Conference moved ahead with considerable vigor. Agreements were made to raise the tariff on condition

that likin be abolished, but political conditions in China made it impossible to further the discussions. Civil war had only created indecision on the part of the foreigners as to whom they should support. Finally the overthrow of Tuan in April, 1926, terminated the formal sessions. The foreign Powers declared that they would have to simply wait until re-unification of China had created a strong government that they could deal with. Although it went slowly, tariff autonomy was finally fully recovered in 1933, together with the Maritime Customs.[140]

A Commission on Extrality was set to meet on December 18th, 1925, but owing to the civil war in North China, it was forced to delay its sessions until January 12, 1926.[141] Throughout 1926, all sides patiently waited for the results of that Commission. Finally, the Report was completed in September. A detailed document on the legal system in China, it did, however, offer some recommendations for restructuring of the old treaty agreements.[142] One of those recommendations came sooner than most people had expected; that of rendition of the Mixed Court. On August 31, 1926, an agreement for the replacement of the Mixed Court with a purely Chinese Provisional District Court to take effect on January 1, 1927, was signed.[143]

Extrality, however, was not to be changed for the time being.

In general, few agreements were reached during 1925-26 concerning the termination of foreign concession areas or leased territories. In January 6, 1927, however, Britain agreed to give up its concession areas in Hankow and Kuikiang.[144]

As a result of the May 30th Incident, important changes in the Shanghai administrative structure were to occur. Strong demands for Chinese representation on the Council proved successful when in 1926 at the annual meeting of the ratepayers, it was agreed to seat three Chinese representatives on the Council. Chinese would also be appointed to the various Council committees.[145] That same year, it was agreed that the Mixed Court would be replaced. For the time being, the Council decided not to attempt to construct any further roads outside of the Settlement areas.[146] Public parks were finally opened to Chinese residents the same year.[147] The bylaws that proved so controversial were finally dropped permanently. Yet, at that time, foreigners in Shanghai were not at all prepared to begin to talk about the abolition of the Settlement itself, a question that many Chinese wanted to discuss.

E. THE ROLE OF RUSSIA, THE COMINTERN, AND THE CCP IN THE VARIOUS INCIDENTS AND AGITATION[150]

Charges that the Soviet Union and the Third International were the actual instigators and leaders of the various forms of agitation that occurred in 1925 continued to be raised in the foreign newspapers for some time to come. During the summer, one writer went so far as to accuse the strike by printers in Shanghai as "a deliberate attempt on the part of Chinese radicals aided and abetted from behind by Soviet agents to prevent the expression of foreign opinion."[148] The Russians reacted and attacks continued to flow back and forth.[149]

The exact role of Russia and the Comintern is difficult to assess, but certain conclusions can be made. Russia's role, both diplomatically and through its agents in the KMT, was much less significant than that of the various native Chinese. It is certain that the Comintern lent the Chinese the full support of its propaganda organs as it appealed for international aid to support the strikers; but in most cases policy arose not in Russia but in China itself.[151] From international communist sources and the Comintern, contributions continued to flow into China to support the general strike, but the greatest proportion of it came from inside China and not from the

outside.[152] It is also doubtful whether any Russian agent had personally involved himself in the planning or implementation of the strike program in Shanghai or even in its on-the-scene formation.[153]

The importance of the CCP and Chinese communists, however, was quite a different matter. Right from the start, CCP members in Shanghai through their control of the labour unions and the newly established General Labour Union were able to control an important part of the strike movement. In fact, it was from communists that major strategy came although students and workers were left with the task of carrying out that policy. Communists such as Liu Hua, Li Li-san, and Liu Shao-ch'i used the general strike to spread their complaints and ideology amongst various groups.[154] More and more workers began to join the CCP so that by the end of 1925, membership had jumped from 200 to 800 persons,[155] and by the end of the summer of 1925, the General Labour Union under Li Li-san had swallowed up the Federation of Labour Unions and controlled 220,000 workers.

As the strike spread, labour-organization accelerated, and so therefore did the influence of the CCP. In Canton, the labour movement underwent a consolidation somewhat similar to that of Shanghai's, and CCP influence continued

to grow. That was also true of other commercial centers where CCP membership in China trebled in one year to a total of about 10,000-20,000 persons.[156]

The communists had also gained important inroads into various student organizations during 1925. Few at that time, however, were actually controlled or directed by the CCP. Shanghai University and its control over the SSU were the exceptions. Although students were continually influenced by communists and communist propaganda that year, few actually joined the CCP.[157] Yet, the Party did gain some dedicated student revolutionaries that were to play important roles in the years to come.[158]

These successes in 1925 had the effect of re-inforcing the Communist belief that saw the proletariat as the forefront leader in the revolution, and saw the students as 'liberals' who made great noise. As a result, agitation amongst the labouring forces was heightened so as to "increase the contradictions in the camps of the imperialists that would hasten the downfall of world capitalism."[159] Instead, the result was the split with the KMT and a line that was to create problems for many years to come.

F. MAY THIRTIETH AND NATIONALISM

The events of May 30th and those that followed that date have had two distinct positive effects on modern Chinese nationalism. In the first instance, those events had the effect of broadening nationalism (the belief that China was a sovereign nation with certain inalienable rights) and widening the numbers of persons involved in the nationalist movement. In the second instance, the events had the result of heightening the confidence of Chinese nationalists, and thus intensifying both the aims and demands of the nationalist movement itself.

Like May Fourth, the May Thirtieth Movement saw the rapid spread of national consciousness and nationalist anti-foreignism. Unlike May Fourth, however, it carried that nationalistic sentiment even further, both geographically and socially. More and more areas were involved in a nationalist movement as was a wider variety of Chinese classes. Nationalism during May Thirtieth was not necessarily different from that of May Fourth, but it was indeed much broader.

The events of May Fourth had shown Chinese that mass political action could cause warlord governments to change policy concerning domestic and foreign affairs. It was the events of May Thirtieth that convinced many Chinese

that the same kind of political action could make foreigners and foreign governments yield in their policies. More and more patriots became confident that mass political action could thus definitely affect the unequal treaties, foreign interests, and the reunification of China.

Nationalism did indeed affect the treaties, foreign interests, and Chinese reunification. Nationalist anti-foreignism became more intense; foreigners became willing to talk of negotiations and the settlement of various incidents. Negotiations for treaty revision began. Shanghai and its foreign community saw important changes. Bit by bit, the foreigners continued to yield to Chinese pressure. The Northern Expedition began, and finally in 1928 China appeared to be re-united for the first time in more than fifteen years. The new nationalist KMT government, partly Westernized in training and outlook, found little difficulty in negotiating with the foreign governments. The KMT in the future, however, gradually found itself alienated from that nationalist movement as it continued to develop; and in the end found itself totally cut off from it.

CONCLUSIONS

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The events of May 30, 1925 had evolved out of labour strife and economic conditions. Anti-foreign and anti-imperialist sentiments were observed to be on the increase and did affect events as they occurred between February and May; but it was specific local events that were to provoke the actual Incident of May 30th. National events also proved important, but it was the death of Ku Cheng-hung on May 15th and the arrest of four students on May 24th that precipitated the plans for demonstrations on May 30th. As a result of these two events, students in Shanghai decided to hold demonstrations and speaking-tours in the International Settlement on the following day.

For the most part, the events of May 30th remained student orientated, in organization, plans and involvement. Shortly after one p.m., four to five hundred students entered the International Settlement to form two basic groups; the Mixed Court Assembly and the Speaking Brigades. Due to certain circumstances and events, both groups met on Nanking Road about 3:30 p.m. Effective propaganda had at the same time created a mass of well over two thousand people there. Although the students were only one-fifth of the assembly, they, nevertheless, were the most active in speaking and distributing literature. At 3:37, the police were ordered to commence firing.

The CCP does not appear to have been responsible for the Incident. Indeed, their influence came only indirectly, through the suggestion of a demonstration by Ts'ai Ho-sen, the Party's influence amongst labour unions, and its influence in the SSU through Shanghai University students. The CCP's influence after the events of May 30th, however, was extremely important. It was the CCP that organized the Shanghai General Labour Union that came to dominate the Shanghai general strike. It was the CCP workers and their propaganda that were most important in shifting the emphasis of the Incident away from issues and problems specific to Shanghai to issues concerning treaty revision, unification of China, foreign interests in China, and finally against the Chinese industrialists.

In short, after May 30th, a May 30th Movement occurred throughout major urban centers in China; a movement that gave expression to the growing antagonism felt by some industrialists, the students, the workers, and the small merchants toward the Treaty Powers; a movement that also gave expression and encouragement to nationalism. At first, it remained mainly focussed on Shanghai. With the Shameen Incident and the declaration of the Hongkong Canton Strike, the attention shifted from Shanghai to Canton and South China, where the Movement fell under

the direct influence of the KMT. Quickly, students and labourers, and in some instances, peasants, were organized in a movement against foreign interests and the warlords. In the end, however, the KMP was to reject this kind of mass action and was to initiate new purges amongst the student and working classes. The KMT was to unify China militarily, but at the cost of alienating itself from two important groups in modern Chinese society.

The Incident and all subsequent agitation were important in the spreading of nationalist anti-foreign sentiments. In the end they were to affect the treaties, foreign interest, and Chinese nationalism. Yet, for all the successes won, they had by 1926 failed to unite China and to oust the foreign "imperialists." The movement's real success, however, lay in the reaction it provoked within China. Each reaction tended to become a force in itself, spreading broader national consciousness and further anti-imperialist sentiments. The result was a strong nationalist anti-foreign, anti-militarist movement, and the eventual unification of China under the KMT.

In spite of growing signs of weakness following May 30th, the movement gave the CCP rank and file an intoxicating sense of power. Talk of insurrection flared up as the strike wave began to recede and the workers began to

talk of compromise. CCP leaders moved towards the left as KMT leaders moved to the right with the results of profound importance in recent Chinese history.

Those who tried to keep the movement alive after May 30th were the students and the labourers co-ordinated by the CCP. These aims for settlement were mainly expressed in the original "Seventeen Demands." Yet, in the end, it was these two groups that gained the least.

The students in the short run received a chance to encourage nationalist anti-foreign sentiments; but in terms of immediate issues the student movement was gradually tempered and placed under the control of a few radical members. That, in turn, led to the student purges in 1927.

Considering the complaints and issues raised by the labourers throughout the period, it was they who received the worst treatment and enjoyed the least success. Although actively involved in the strike and boycott movements, the labourers found that the settlement of these afforded them little advantage. Such important issues as freedom to form unions, the end of the retirement funds, and the right to strike had been in many instances completely ignored. With the ascendance of the KMT power in 1927 in Shanghai, it was the labourers and the strikers

in particular that were to be the most thoroughly suppressed and purged.

In the beginning, the two political parties achieved important gains in membership, and successes in organizational and propaganda work. That in return, resulted in important gains for the Northern Expedition. Finally the KMT founded a new national government; but in the meantime, the CCP had found its old partner less willing to share in its national successes. Purges resulted and the CCP was forced to go underground and to initiate new plans and organizations.

It was the merchants of Shanghai, however, that appear to have been the biggest winners. Once the Incident had occurred there arose in Shanghai a united-front with what appeared to have unity of objectives and methods of dealing with the events. With the general strike and boycott, that unity began to break down. Students, workers, and the two parties were prepared to go as far as to end the settlement areas and foreign interests in Shanghai. The merchants were not; they had only wanted to reform the Shanghai Municipal Council in hopes that they might gain control of the government of Shanghai. They did not want to end foreign presence or foreign special status that offered protection to them as well as foreigners. By the

time of the Judicial Inquiry in October 1925, it was the merchants that were in a position to negotiate change and settlement. The student movement had already receded; the labour movement was without money and factionalized. It was therefore the issues that the merchants were primarily concerned with e.g. representation on the Municipal Council, and the dismissal of McEuen and Everson, that were finally accepted by the Shanghai Municipal Council authorities. With settlement reached, the merchants seemed to be in an even stronger position than they were in before the Incident. As a result, the merchants were in a strengthened position to deal with Chiang K'ai-shek when he arrived in Shanghai in 1927.

Anti-foreignism had remained an important part of the events after May 30th; but it was also accompanied by strong nationalist sentiments. Once the incidents took on the form of a nationalist anti-foreign movement under the guidance of the KMT, anti-foreign sentiments became less important than nationalist ones. In the Northern Expedition, the KMT were less concerned about foreign interests than they were about unification and the destruction of local militarists. Once established in power in Nanking, the KMT government had little opportunity to reconsider the importance of the anti-foreign sentiments. It now had to concern itself with such matters as relations

with the Foreign Powers, official recognition, and financial aid.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER I

[1] F.L. Hawks Pott, A Short History of Shanghai (Hongkong: 1928), p. 196.

[2] "The Anti-Christian Movement", North China Herald (NCH), Jan. 10, 1925, p. 41.

[3] Thomas F. Millard, China: Where it is at and Why (New York: 1928), p. 249.

[4] Leon Wieger, Chine Modern (Shanghai: 1924), Vol. IV, p. 212, 214, 216.

[5] Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 8.

[6] Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 217-19. According to Thurston Griggs, the Federation was an organ of the CCP Party Line. Thurston Griggs, The Anti-Imperialist Theme in Chinese Nationalism, 1919-26 (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation from Harvard: 1952), p. 230.

[7] W.W.Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China (Baltimore: 1927), Vol. II, p. 581.

[8] M.J. Bau, China and World Peace: Studies in Chinese International Relations (New York: 1928), p. 14. Tariffs were seen as fixed rates imposed on the Chinese by governments of the foreigners who ran the Maritimes Customs.

[9] Ibid., p. 14-15. Extrality was seen as a way that many foreigners became exempt from Chinese laws.

[10] Ibid., p. 15-16. Concerning the concessions and settlements, the infringement on Chinese sovereignty seemed to be even more apparent. Orginally they had been set aside for the residence for foreign traders, but in the course of time they acquired the right of "home-rule".

[11] Ibid., p. 16. Leased Territories constantly reminded the Chinese that many of them had been demanded of a Chinese government powerless to refuse in the great scramble for spheres of influence following the Sino-Japanese War.

[12] Ibid., p. 14.

[13] Willoughby, op. cit., p. 236-54.

[14] Ibid., p. 267-74.

[15] Pott, op. cit., p. 249.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Bau, op. cit., p. 30.

[18] Ibid., p. 20.

[19] Willoughby, op. cit., p. 240-41.

[20] Ibid., p. 328-29.

[21] R.T. Pollard, China's Foreign Relations 1917-31 (New York: 1945), p. 259.

[22] Ibid., p. 254-56.

[23] Ibid., p. 262, 265. France, in asking China to resume Boxer Indemnity Payments, wanted payments specified in the Agreement of 1905 instead of the devalued franc.

[24] Ibid., p. 265.

[25] Ibid., p. 282. The Lenching Incident occurred when 25 foreigners on an express train were kidnapped and held hostage for one month.

[26] Ibid., p. 286.

[27] Ibid., p. 288.

[28] A.M. Kotenev, New Lamps for Old (Shanghai: 1931), p. 130. Ch'i Shu-fen, Ching-chi chin-lueh-hsia chih Chung-kuo (China Under Economic Encroachment) (Shanghai: 1925), p. 451.

[29] Ch'i, op. cit., p. 452.

[30] Griggs, op. cit., p. 452.

[31] J.H. Dolson, The Awakening of China (Chicago: 1926), p. 210.

[32] H. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (London: 1938), p. 29.

[33] Dolson, op. cit., p. 211.

[34] For books with good descriptions of Shanghai, see Millard, Hsia, Kotenev, Pott, Johnstone, JOnes, and the China Yearbook listed in the Bibliography.

[35] J.T. Chen, The May Fourth Movement in Shanghai (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation from Berkerley:1964), p. 45.

[36] The divisions are mainly from Chen (p. 11), but the first one is my own.

[37] F.C. Jones, Shanghai and Tientsin (Shanghai: 1940), p. 4.

[38] Chen, op. cit., p. 5.

[39] W.C. Johnstone, The Shanghai Problem (Stanford), p. 178.

[40] Jones, op. cit., p. xi. Millard, op. cit., p. 290.

[41] C.F. Remer, Foreign Investment in China (New York: 1933), p. 393-5.

[41a] Chen, op. cit., p. 90.

[42] Bau, op. cit., p. 39.

[43] Johnstone, op. cit., p. 64.

[44] Jones, op. cit., p. 38. The Municipal Council consisted of none members, six of whom were British in 1924.

[45] Johnstone, op. cit., p. 55. Millard, op. cit., p. 253.

[46] Millard, op. cit., p. 294. Johstone, op. cit., p. 75-77.

[47] Wen-han Kiang, The Chinese Student Movement (Shanghai: 1929), p. 4.

[48] Ching-ling Hsia, The Status of Shanghai (Shanghai:1929), p. 102-3.

[49] Jones, op. cit., p. 33. Pott, op. cit., p. 309.

[50] Pott, op. cit., p. 96. 125.

[51] Ibid., p. 163-65.

[52] Johstone, op. cit., p. 239. Ptt, op. cit., p. 121.

[53] Willoughby, op. cit., p. 520.

[54] Hsia, op. cit., p. 127-28. Pott, op. cit., p. 37.

[55] Millard, op. cit., p. 254.

[56] Pott, op. cit., p. 179, 250, 254.

[57] Ibid., p. 179.

[58] Ibid., p. 175-76. [59] Hsia, op. cit., p. 102-03.

[60] Ibid., p. 102.

[61] Pott, op. cit., p. 176.

[62] Johnstone, op. cit., p. 219.

[63] Hsia, op. cit., p. 69.

[64] Ibid., p. 66. [65] Pott, op. cit., p. 169.

[66] Millard, op. cit., p. 165.

[67] Hsia, op. cit., p. 127-28.

[68] Millard, op. cit., p. 297.

[69] The China Yearbook (CYB) 1926-27, p. 634.

[70] Ibid., p. 621-22.

[71] Millard, op. cit., p. 296.

[72] Wieger, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 136.

[73] Kiang, op. cit., p. 76.

[74] Wieger, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 276, 281, 283.

[75] E.R. Hughes, The Invasion of China by the Western World (New York: 1938), p. 182-84.

[76] Chiu-sam Tsang, Nationalism in School Education in China since the Opening of the 20th Century (Hongkong: 1933), p. 26.

[77] Ibid., p. 50-81.

[78] Ibid., p. 160. Dolson, op. cit., p. 172-73.

[79] Johnstone, op. cit., p. 175.

[80] NCH, Jan. 3, 1925, p. 215.

[81] Nym Wales, The Chinese Labour Movement (New York: 1945), p.40

[82] Tsang, op. cit., p. 132.

[83] Chen, op. cit., p. 27.

[84] Ibid., p. 29-30.

[85] Ibid., p. 199.

[86] Quoted in Kiang, op. cit., p. 112.

[87] Griggs, op. cit., p. 103.

[88] NCH, Jan. 10, 1925, p. 72. Tsang, op. cit, p. 158-59.

[89] Chen, op. cit., p. 25, 29.

[90] Ibid., p. 30. Tsang, op. cit., p. 160.

[91] Kiang, op. cit., p. 108-09. Tsang, op. cit., p. 42.

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[94] Ibid,, p. 80. Kiang, op. cit., p. 110.

[95] Chen, op. cit., p. 80. [96] Ibid., p. 89-90.

[97] Kotenev, op. cit., p. 123. [98] Griggs, op. cit., p. 256.

[99] NCH, Jan. 10, 1925, p. 73.

[100] W. Ayers, "Shanghai Labour and the May 30th Movement", Papers on China (Cambridge: 1950), p. 14.

[101] Chen, op. cit., p. 54-56.

[102] Chi-ming Hou, Foreign Investment and Development in China, 1840-1937 (Cambridge: 1965), p. 18-19.

[103] C. Brandt, et al. A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (New York: 1958), p. 30.

[104] F.W. Houns, A Short History of Chinese Communism (New Jersey: 1967), p. 18-19.

[105] Wei Lin, Chinese Labour Disputes Since 1919 (NAnking:1933), p. 19.

[106] Ayers, op. cit., p. 3.

[107] Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour Movement (London: 1968), p. 179.

[108] Johnstone, op. cit., p. 178-80.

[109] Ibid., p. 178. [110] Ibid., p. 180.

[111] CYB 1926-27, p. 898.

[112] Ibid., p. 903.

[113] Johnstone, op. cit., p. 179.

[114] See Blamchard's quote in Ayers, op. cit., p. 12.

115 Ayers, op. cit., p. 7.

116 Griggs, op. cit., p. 354-56. 117 Ibid.

118 CYB 1926-27, p. 930-89.

119 A.M. Kotenev, Shanghai: Its Municipality and the Chinese (Shanghai: 1926), p. 126.

120 Ibid., p. 125.

121 Griggs, op. cit., p. 358.

122 Ibid., p. 352.

123 Bau, op. cit., p. 41.

124 Ibid., p. 40.

125 A.M. Anderson, Humanity and Labour in China (London: 1928), p. 248.

126 Ibid., p. 244-46.

127 CYB 1926-27, p. 915. 128 Ibid.

129 Ibid. 130 Ibid.

131 Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 122.

132 Griggs, op. cit., p. 354.

133 CYB 1926-27, p. 915.

134 Ibid. , p. 914-15, 917.

135 Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 122

136 Ibid., p. 123.

137 Ibid., p. 134.

138 Nos. 8, 7, and 12 on Macao Raod; 13 and 14 on Robinson; and 4 on Soochow Road with 3.

139 Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 122.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid., p. 124.

142 They were located on Robinson, Tengyueh, and Jessfield Roads respectively.

143 CYB 1926-27, p. 916. The leader appeared to be female.

144 Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 122-23.

145 Ibid., p. 124-25.

146 NCH, April-June 1925, p. 265.

147 Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 123.

148 CYB 1926-27, p. 917.

149 Ibid. Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 123.

150 CYB 1926-27, p. 917.

151 Ibid., p. 918.

152 Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 123-34.

153 Bau, op. cit., p. 41.

154 Griggs, op. cit., p. 368.

155 CYB 1926-27, p. 918.

156 Ibid.

157 Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 127. NCH April-JUne, p. 448.

158 Griggs, op. cit., p. 250.

159 Ibid., p. 250a.

160 Ibid., p. 251.

161 Ibid., p. 250a.

162 Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 127.

163 Ibid., p. 128.

164 NCH, April-June 1925, p. 313.

165 Ibid.

166 Ibid.

167 Ibid., p. 270, 313.

168 Ibid.

169 Ibid.

170 Ibid.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid.

174 For an example see Hsiang-tao chou-pao, 1925, p. 1059-60.

[175] NCH, April-June 1925, p. 270. On May 7th two processions involving 10,000 and 5,000 were held.

[176] Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 130. Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 260.

[177] Anderson, op. cit., p. 249.

[178] Under the provisions of the Land Regulations, it was required that the proposed bylaws be passed and approved by a Special meeting of the Ratepayers, the quorum only being one-third of the eligible voters.

[179] CYB 1926-27, p. 904.

[180] Ibid., p. 905.

[181] Anderson, op. cit., p. 246-47.

[182] NCH, April-June 1925, p. 46.

[183] Ibid., p. 47.

[184] Griggs, op. cit., p. 356.

[185] Ibid., p. 354.

[186] CYB 1926-27, p. 907.

[187] Anderson, op. cit., p. 252.

[188] CYB 1926-27, p. 919.

[189] Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 128.

[189a] CYB 1926-27, p. 919.

[190] Bau, op. cit., p. 41-42.

[191] NCH, MAy 23, 1925, p. 327.

[192] Ku Cheng-hung was a member of the CCP and an organizer of workers in the Hsiao-sha-t'ou district. Wales, op. cit., p. 45-50.

[193] Bau, op. cit., p. 41-43.

[194] Ibid., p. 43.

[195] Lin Wei, op. cit., p. 72.

[196] Koteneve, Shanghai, p. 129.

[197] Griggs, op. cit., p. 360. The police informed various Chinese newspapers that they could not print news or announcements advantageous to the workers. Also found in HTCP, p. 1059.

198 Ibid., p. 360.

199 Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 129.

200 Yang Hsien-shiang, Wu-sa-hou chih Shang-hai hsueh-sheng (Shanghai Students after the May 30th Incident)(Shanghai: 1926), p. 3.

201 Ibid. 202 Ibid., p. 4.

203 Ihid., p. 5. 204 Ibid.

205 NCH, April-JUne 1925, p. 413.

206 Yang, op. cit., p. 4.

207 Ibid., p. 5.

208 Ibid., p. 6. HTCP 1925, p. 1068.

209 Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 263. CYB 1926-27, p. 919.

210 Lin Wei, op. cit., p. 72-73. Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 263.

211 Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 129-30.

212 HTCP 1925, p. 1069. Yang, op. cit., p. 5.

213 Yang, op. cit., p. 3. Kiang, op. cit., p. 5.

214 Kiang, op. cit., p. 89.

215 CYB 1926-27, p. 920.

216 Lin Wei, op. cit., p. 73.

217 Kotenev, shanghai, p. 130. Griggs, op. cit., p. 363.

218 CYB 1926-27, p. 920.

219 International Commission of Judges. Report of G. Gollan, British Judge of the Inquiry, p. 2-4.

220 Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 263-64.

221 Ayers, op. cit., p. 15-16.

222 Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 264.

223 Ibid., p. 263-65.

224 Kuo-wen Chou-pao (KWCP-1), "The Blood on Nanking Road", June 7, 1925, p. 6-7.

225 Ibid., p. 7.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER II

[1] For sources on Nanking Road, see C.E. Darwent, Shanghai: A Handbook for Travellers and REsidents to the Chief Objects of Interest in and around the Foreign Settlement and the Native City (Shanghai: 1920). Also see F.C. Jones, Shanghai and Tien-tsin (new York: 1940); W.C. Johnstone, The Shanghai Problem (Stanford: 1937).

[2] F.L. Hawks Pott, A Short History of Shanghai (Hongkong: 1928), p. 43.

[3] Tung-fang tsa-chih (TFTC-3), "Records of the May 30th Incident". July 1925, p. 2-3.

[4] International Commission of Judges. Report of G. Gollan, British Judge of the Inquiry (ICJ-B), p. 5.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., p. 5-6.

[8] Kuo-wen chou-pao (KWCP-1), "The Blood on Nanking Road", June 7, 1925, p. 6.

[9] ICJ-B, p. 6.

[10] International Commission of Judges. Report of K. Sugs, JApanese Judge of the Inquiry (ICJ-J), p. 3.

[11] ICJ-B, p. 6.

[12] International Commission of Judges. Report of E. Johnson, American Judge of the Inquiry (ICJ-A), p. 15.

[13] ICJ-B, p. 6.

[14] Tung-fang tsa-chih (TFTC-4), "Summation of the Records of the Mixed Court", July 1925, p. 8-9.

[15] ICJ-J, p. 3.

[16] KWCP-1, p. 8. ICJ-B, p. 5. ICJ-A, p. 4.

[17] North China Herald (NCH), June 6, 1925, p. 415.

[18] ICJ-B, p. 5. ICJ-A, p. 4.

[19] ICJ-J, p. 4.

[20] NCH, June 6, 1925, p. 411.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., p. 414.

[23] Ibid., p. 411.

[24] TFTC-4, p. 78.

[25] Ibid., p. 77-78.

[26] Ibid., p. 73.

[27] Ibid., p. 9. ICJ-A, p. 15.

[28] TFTC-4, p. 44. KWCP-1, p. 9.

[29] Tung-fang tsa-chih (TFTC-2), "Analysis and Proof from the facts of May 30th", July 1925, p. 5.

[30] Ibid., p. 5.

[31] TFTC-4, p. 74.

[32] Ibid., p. 73.

[33] Ibid., p. 17.

[34] ICJ-B, p. 6.

[35] TFTC-4, p. 44.

[36] Ibid., p. 17 (Shellsweel) and 44 (Everson).

[37] Ibid., p. 44.

[38] NCH, June 6, 1925, p. 411.

[39] ICJ-B, p. 6.

[40] Ibid.

[41] NCH, June 6, 1925, p. 411. KWCP-1, p. 8.

[42] ICJ-A, p. 16.

[43] TFTC-4, p. 10.

[44] Ibid., p. 9.

[45] Ibid., p. 54.

46 Ibid., p. 36.

47 TFTC-2, p. 10. CYB 1926-27, p. 920.

48 TFTC-4, p. 78.

49 Ibid., p. 80.

50 Ibid., p. 69. TFTC-2, p. 6.

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59 NCH, June 6, 1925, p. 411.

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75 Ibid., p. 69.

76 Ibid., p. 18. KWCP-1, p. 9.

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83 TFTC-4, p. 55.

84 KWCP-1, p. 9. TFTC-4, p. 14, 28, 68.

85 TFTC-4, p. 10.

86 Ibid., p. 11.

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110 Ibid., p. 7, 11, 12, 37, 47. ICJ-B. p. 9.

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122 Ibid., p. 16. KWCP-1, p. 9.

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152 ICJ-B, p. 14. CYB 1926-27, p. 431.

153 NCH, June 13, 1925, p. 432.

154 Shanghai Times , June 2nd reprinted in TFTC-2, p. 6-7.

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156 See reports given in CYB and ICJ.

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187 ICJ-B, p. 12.

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231 Ibid., p. 26-30.

232 KWCP-2, p. 11-12.

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234 TFTC-4, p. 16.

235 TFTC-2, p. 15-16.

236 See TFTC-2, and TFTC-4.

237 TFTC-2, p. 23-25.

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239 Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour Movement (London: 1968), p. 266.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER III

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[3] NCH, May 2, 1925, p. 45.

[4] Thurston Griggs, The Anti-Imperialist Theme in Chinese Nationalism 1919-26 (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation from Harvard: 1952), p. 383.

[5] Yang Hsien-chiang, Wu-sa-hou chih Shang-hai hsueh-sheng (Shanghai Students after the May 30th Incident) (Shanghai: 1926), p. 5.

[6] NCH, June 6, 1925, p. 412.

[7] Ibid., p. 415. China Yearbook 1926-27 (CYB), p. 922.

[8] Ibid., p. 414.

[9] Ibid., p. 416.

[10] Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour Movement (London: 1968), p. 269.

[11] Ibid., p. 264.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Yang, op. cit., p. 7.

[14] NCH, June 6, 1925, p. 414.

[15] Ibid., p. 412.

[16] Yang, op. cit., p. 7.

[17] NCH, June 6, 1925, p. 414.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] NCH, June 6, 1925, p. 412-14.

[21] Ibid., p. 414. Four were listed as killed and thirteen as wounded.

[22] Ibid., p. 412.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid., p. 414.

[25] Ibid., p. 412.

[26] Wu-sa T'ung-shih (Record of May 30th) (Shanghai: 1925), p. 7. It listed One dead and two injured.

[27] NCH, June 6, 1925, p. 412.

[28] Ibid. It was reported that all were released after being cautioned.

[29] Ibid. It was reported that seven men who looked like students had opened fire.

[30] For a report on the New World Building Incident, see NCN, June 6, 1925, p. 412-414. Also see China Weekly Review (CWR), p. 14-15 and 36-42.

[31] NCH, June 11, 1925, p. 417. Also Wu-sa T'ung-shih, p. 7.

[32] Ibid., p. 414.

[33] Ibid., p. 417. It was reported one dead and five wounded.

[34] Ibid., p. 418.

[35] Ibid. Also June 13, p. 448.

[36] For a detailed account of all the colleges closed see Kuo-wen chou-pao (KWCP-3), :Various Aspects after May 30th Massacre", June 14, 1925, p. 14-15.

[37] NCH, June 11, 1925, p. 417.

[38] Ibid., June 13, p. 447.

[39] Listed in KWCP-3, p. 11-13.

[40] For an account in English see W. Ayers, "Shanghai Labour and the May 30th Movement", Papers on China (Cambridge: 1951), p. 11-12.

[41] Ibid., p. 12

[42] Ibid. The street unions (ma-lu lien-ho-hui) were groupings of several guilds of small tradesmen organized by street. Also see Chow Tse-tsung, May Fourth Movement (Stanford: 1967), p. 255.

[43] NCH, June 6, 1925, p. 414.

[44] Griggs, op. cit., p. 364.

[46] Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 264.

[45] Griggs, op. cit., p. 364. Ayers, op. cit., p. 16.

[47] Ayers, op. cit., p. 16.

[48] Ibid., p. 27. Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 265. NCH, June 13, 1925, p. 444. CWR, June 13, 1925, p. 39.

[49] Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 266. Chesneaux calls this Federation the Shanghai's Workers', Merchants', Students' Federation. I have followed Ayer's.

[50] Ayers, op. cit., p.12. President of the Union was Li Li-san with Liu Hua as Vice-President. Both men were responsible to Liu Shao-ch'i who was the President of the newly formed All-China Federation of Labour. Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 265-66.

[51] Ayers, op. cit., p. 12.

[52] Reported in Ayers, op. cit., p. 13, from "Labour Problems in China in 1925", The Chinese Economic Monthly, March 1926, p. 105.

[53] Ayers, op. cit., p. 12.

[54] NCH, June 13, 1925, p. 443. G.E. Sokolsky, The Tinder Box of Asia (New York: 1932), p. 928-29. KWCP-3, p. 10.

[55] NCH, JUne 13, 1925, p. 445-46.

[56] Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 265.

[57] Ibid., p. 264. Ayers, op. cit., p. 13-16.

[58] Griggs, op. cit., p. 381.

[59] Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 263.

[60] Ibid., p. 268.

[61] Ayers, op. cit., p. 20.

[62] Ibid., p. 21.

[63] Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 265. Ayers, op. cit, p. 21.

[64] Sokolsky, op. cit., p. 12-22.

[65] NCH,June 18, 1925, p. 20. Also Nov. 14, p. 294.

[66] Ayers, op. cit., p. 21-22.

[67] Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (London: 1938), p. 84.

[68] Ayers, op. cit., p. 21. Chinese businessmen estimated they lost three million dollars a day.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid., p. 27. Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 267.

[71] NCH, June 18, 1925, p. 48.

[72] Ibid., p. 49. CYB 1926-27, p. 925-26.

[73] Ayers, op. cit., p. 23.

[73a] Ibid. [73b] Ibid., p. 24-25.

[74] Ibid., p. 25. NCH, Aug. 1, 1925, p. 80; Aug. 15, p. 167; and Aug. 22, p. 207.

[75] Ayers, op. cit., p. 22.

[76] NCH, July 25, 1925, p. 50.

[77] Ibid., Sept. 26, 1925, p. 430-31.

[78] Ibid., July 25, 1925, p. 52.

[79] Ibid., June 13, 1925, p. 443-45.

[80] Ibid., p. 443. [81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid., p. 447.

[83] Ayers, op. cit., p. 28.

[84] NCH, June 6, 1925, p. 414-17.

[85] Ibid., p. 416. [86] Ibid., p. 414.

[87] Griggs, op. cit., p. 384.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution 1925-28 (New York: 1947), p. 39. Also see NCH, June 6, 1925, p. 417.

[90] NCH, June 20, 1925, p. 443.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Griggs, op. cit., p. 385.

[93] CYB 1926-27, p. 962.

[94] Griggs, op. cit., p. 385.

[95] NCH, June 20, 1925, p. 463.

[96] Griggs, op. cit., p. 385-6.

[97] A.M. Kotenev, Shanghai: Its Municipality and the Chinese (Shanghai: 1927), p. 134.

[98] Griggs, op. cit., p. 384.

[99] Ibid. [100] Ibid., p. 385.

[101] CYB 1926-27, p. 964.

[102] Griggs, op. cit., p. 384-85.

[103] Remer, op. cit., p. 95-102.

[104] There was the problem of agreeing upon a successor to Sun Yat-sen, but more immediatley, there was the problem of meeting the military challenge posed by the Canton Government's erstwhile ally Ch'en Ch'iung-ming and by its present allies, the Yunnan-Kwangsi armies. See E.J. Rhoads, "Lingnam's Response to the Rise of Chinese Nationalism", Papers on China (Cambridge: 1961), p. 124.

[105] Griggs, op. cit., p. 389.

[106] Borg, op. cit., p. 41.

[107] CYB 1926-27, p. 988.

[108] Ibid. [109] Ibid.

[110] Isaacs, op. cit., p. 76.

[111] Borg, op. cit., p. 45.

[112] KWCP-3, p. 6-7.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 135.

[115] KWCP-3, p. 6-7.

[116] Ibid., p. 7. [117] Ibid.

[118] Ibid., p. 8-9, 16-24.

[119] Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 130.

[120] Griggs, op. cit., p. 386-87.

[121] Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 137.

122 Ibid., p. 128-30. Griggs, op. cit., p. 386.

123 Kotenev, Shanghai, p. 137.

124 Borg, op. cit., p. 30. 125 Ibid., p. 31.

126 Ibid., p. 32. 127 Ibid.

128 Ibid., p. 34. 129 Ibid., p. 33.

130 Ibid., p. 34. 131 Ibid., p. 35.

132 Ibid., p. 46.

133 Griggs, op. cit., p. 389.

134 CYB 1926-27, p. 951 et seq.

135 Griggs, op. cit., p. 408.

136 CYB 1926-27, p. 952. 137 Ibid., p. 954.

138 Ayers, op. cit., p. 30.

139 Stanley Wright, China's Struggle for Tariff Autonomy (Shanghai: 1938), Chapter II and III. Borg, op. cit., p. 95-121.

140 Borg, op. cit., p. 95-97. 141 Ibid., p. 154-82.

142 Ibid., p. 157.

143 Ching-lin Hsia, Status of Shanghai (Shanghai: 1929), p. 70

144 Borg, op. cit., p. 286-89.

145 Hsia, op. cit., p. 102.

146 Ibid., p. 103. 147 Ibid., p. 104.

148 Ayers, op. cit., p. 18. 149 Ibid., p. 16-17.

150 Ibid., p. 17-18. 151 Ibid.

152 NCH, July 18, 1925, p. 20.

153 Ayers, op. cit., p. 18. 154 Ibid., p. 27.

155 Nym Wales, The Chinese Labour Movement (New York: 1954), p. 47.

156 Griggs, op. cit., p. 382. 157 Ibid., p. 386.

158 Yang Chih-hua, wife of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, was an example.

159 Ayers, op. cit., p. 30-31.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY

1925

Jan. 18	Ewo Mill strikes
Feb. 9-27	Naigai Wata Kaisha Strikes
Mar. 19	Death of Sun Yat-sen
April 15	Municipal Council "bylaws" Ratepayers Meeting
May 7	Peking "Incident"
May 15	Death of Ku Cheng-hung
May 16-29	Various assemblies and speaking tours
May 24	Memorial March
	Arrest of the famous "Four" students
May 27	Meeting of the SSU
May 28	Meeting of the CC-CCP
May 29	Tsingtao "Incident"
	Meeting of the SSU
MAY 30	
May 31	Meeting of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce
	Acceptance of the "Thirteen Demands"
	Formation of the General Labour Union by CCP
June 1	Beginning of the general strike by some groups
	Declaration of Martial Law by the Municipal Council
June 2	New World Building Incident in Shanghai
	Ratepayers Meeting

June 3	Declaration of the general strike by students and Street Unions
	First Waichiaopu's Note to the Diplomatic Body Concerning the Incident
June 4	Shanghai University occupied and closed
	Reply of Diplomatic Body to Waichiaopu's First Note
	Second Waichiaopu's Note to Diplomatic Body
June 5	Chinkiang "Incident"
June 6	Reply to Diplomatic Body to Waichiaopu's Second Note
June 6-21	Sessions of the Chinese Commissioners in Shanghai
June 7	Formation of the Joint Committee
	Presentation of the Thirteen Demands to Municipal Council
June 8	Nanking "Incident"
June 8-18	Diplomatic Body's Commission in Shanghai
June 11	Hankow "Incident"
	Release of the Findings of the Mixed Court
June 13	Kiukiang Agitation
June 18	24 killed in Peking
June 20	Declaration of general strike in Hongkong
June 23	Shameen Incident
June 24	Note of Waichiaopu to the Diplomatic Body concerning Thirteen Demands
June 26	Note of Waichiaopu to Deiplomatic Body concerning treaty revision
	End of the General Strike in Shanghai
	Declaration of the General Boycott In Shanghai

Aug. 11	Settlement of the strikes in Japanese Mills in Shanghai
Sept.	Settlement of the strikes in the British mills
Oct.	Tariff Conference met in Peking
Oct. 7-27	Judicial Inquiry in Shanghai

1926

Jan.	Commission on Extrality
Aug. 31	Agreement to abolish Mixed Court
Sept.	Report of the Commission on Extrality

MAY THIRTIETH

11:35	Sightings at the Northern Railway Station
12:15	Note of Givens to the Louza Police Station
12:50	Everson off to the Mixed Court and Boundary area
1:00	Ch'a Hung-li speaking at the Grandstand
1:15	Martin instructed Givens to prevent students from speaking in the Settlement area
1:20	Students entered the I.S. from the railway station off to the Mixed Court
1:20	Liang Tu-hua and 7 others on Yunnan and Nanking Roads
1:20	Ch'a Hung'li and 12 others on Thibet Road and Nanking Road
1:25	Liang then arrested, but released. Off to Lloyd Road
1:45 to 2:20	Lloyd Road Incident
1:55	Ch'ien Po-ping confronted Liang Tu-hua on Lloyd
2:00	Everson arrives on Lloyd
2:10	Everson orders three arrested and off to station
2:10 to 2:30	First Thibet Road Incident
2:20	Arrest of 18 students in Charge Room
2:25	Everson on Thibet Road and orders the arrest of three. Off to the Charge Room
2:30	Everson rings Fire-bell to clear Charge Room
2:30	Everson sends Tatrum to Martin to report state of affairs
2:30 to 2:45	More assemblies and more arrests

2:30 to 3:15	Second Thibet Road Incident
2:45	Students moved from the Mixed Court to Chekiang Road
3:00	After first act violence, arrest of more is ordered. Charge Room filled again.
3:15	Charge Room is cleared. Large crowd on Nanking Road
3:20	Commissioner of Police ordered Everson to arrest trouble-makers
3:20	Charge Room cleared again
3:30	Charge Room cleared again
3:30	Arrival of the Shekiang Procession
3:35	Police Retreated
3:35	Chu Cheng-pai rushed the wall
3:36	Warning given to disperse
3:37	The Firing
3:43	Report to the Central Station
3:55	Order to "be confined to barracks"
4:00	Mobilization of the Emergency Corps
4:00	Students off ~~the~~ to see the Bureau of Foreign Affairs in Shanghai
Evening	SSU and students approached the Chinese Chamber of Commerce for meeting the next day

GLOSSARY

Ai-wen -i Road 愛文义路

An-ssu Road 安寺路

Chao-teng Road 召等路

Chi-an hui (Relief Committee) 濟安會

Ch'ien Mou-ping 錢某稟

Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 瞿秋白

Ch'ü ching-pai 瞿景白

Chung-hua min-kuo hsueh-sheng lien-ho-hui (NSU)
中華民国学生聯合會

Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien (Chinese Youth) 中国青年

Chung-kuo hsueh-sheng (Chinese Students) 中国学生

Chung-kuo lao-tung tsu-ho shu-chi-pu (Chinese Labour Organization Secretariat) 中国劳动組合書記部

FAn-ti-kuo chu-i ta t'ung-meng (Great League of anti-Imperialism) 反帝国主义大同盟

Hsiang-tao chou-pao (Guide Weekly) 向导周报

General Hsing Shih-lien 邢士廉

hsing-jen 行人

Huang Yun-hsiang 黃儁享

Je-hsueh jih-pao (Hot Blood DAily News) 熱血日报

Kao Tao-ch'un 高道純

Ku Cheng-hung 顧正洪

Kung-shang-hsueh lien-ho wei-yuan hui (Joint Committee of Labour, Tradesmen, and Students) 工商学聯合委員會

Lao-pu-tsu Road 老靶子路

Liang Yü-hua 梁郁華

Louza (Laoch'a) 老閘

lu-kuo-jen 路過人

Ma-lu lien-ho-hui (Street Unions) 馬路聯合會

Mu-shih-chih-mao Company 木事製帽公司

Nanking Road 南京

Nan-yang Ta-hsueh (Nanyang University) 南洋大學

P'u-tu Road 普渡路

Shang. En-kan 傷因感

Shanghai hsueh-sheng lien-ho-hui (SSU) 上海学生聯合會

Shang-hai kung-t'uan lien-ho-hui (Shanghai Federation of Labour Unions) 上海工团聯合會

Shang-hai Ta-hsueh (Shanghai University) 上海大学

Shang-hai Tsung-shang-hui (Shanghai Chinese Chamber of Commerce) 上海總商會

Shang-hai Tsung-kung-hui (Shanghai General Labour Union) 上海總工會

ta-chu-li 大屋立

ta-lu-pao 大路报

ta-ma-lu 大馬路

TAng-fang tsa-chih 東方雜誌

T'ing. Wu t'ing chih mo, yao ta sha. 停.無停止末,要打杀!

Ts'ai Ho-sen(shen) 蔡和森

Ts'ai Hung-li 蔡鴻立

Tuan Ch'i-jui 段棋瑞

tung-ch'ing Road 动情路

tung-yeh kung-hui (trade unions)

Wen-chih 文治

Yü Hsiang-ch'ing 虞洽卿

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