

CLASS VOTING IN CANADA, 1962-1968:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS

by

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ABSTRACT

Unlike many western democracies, Canada has a party system which is not polarized in terms of class. Particularly since the early 1930's many writers have attacked "brokerage politics" on the grounds that it has enabled a small elite to control political debate, and in particular has prevented the party system from presenting meaningful alternatives for the social and economic development of the country. To people such as Frank Underhill, Gad Horowitz and Charles Taylor, "the politics of polarization" is essential to an efficient democratic political system. Another writer, Robert R. Alford in Party and Society, has concluded that the trends in Canada towards industrialization, urbanization and secularization are bound to encourage an increase in class-oriented voting behaviour. The large numbers of people working in the cities, coupled with a decline in the salience of regional, religious and ethnic issues, will increase working class consciousness to the point where a change in the substance of political debate is feasible.

The thesis examines the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) surveys for the 1962, 1963, 1965 and 1968 elections to see if Alford's forecast is substantiated. There are many shortcomings in both the data, and the approach used, but the analysis would suggest that the overwhelming importance of religious and linguistic factors has not significantly declined, and as far as this thesis can detect, there has been little increase in class voting.

A concluding chapter suggests other research approaches to the problem under investigation, which might well have produced different conclusions. However, a brief examination of the early political history of Canada would seem to indicate that the absorption of the working classes into the existing

party system was done in such a way as to permanently restrict the extent to which a working class consciousness is likely to develop. While there are signs indicating that class-oriented voting will probably increase, it is unlikely that the polarization will ever occur to the extent possible in countries which have developed, politically and economically, along different lines.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Canadian political parties have long been stereotyped as omnibus or brokerage parties. These terms connote loose and shifting alliances of diverse, conflicting interests, bound within a single party by a sense of compromise and expediency, rather than by common ideological commitment. In this view, both the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives are painted with the same colours -- both consist of similar elements, differing only in terms of leadership personalities or strategic considerations, rather than matters of substance. Promoters and detractors of this modus vivendi are agreed that the object of this arrangement is to avoid exacerbating the weakest spots in Canadian unity by focusing party debate on temporary and unemotional political issues. The two inconsistent but similar brokerage parties are both the means to and the price of an elusive Canadian national unity.

This unrefined description of brokerage politics, even though frequently accepted as stated, is not quite an accurate picture of Canadian parties. Conservatives and Liberals fought bitterly over the benefits and costs of economic nationalism versus those of continentalism -- hardly an unimportant or inconsequential debate in a developing and largely agricultural economy. Conflict was almost equally intense on Canada's place in the British imperial scheme; and on the ideal division of financial resources and political powers in the Canadian federal system. Religion, a political factor of importance even today, divided men in early Canada, but far from being purely emotion had specific implications for education policy, the disposal of public

lands, and a fairly extensive set of policy-relevant moral beliefs. Religion, in fact, because of its overlap with ethnicity, region and moral-political belief systems, was potentially and often actually the most divisive factor in politics, and hence the one which parties sought to obfuscate. Generally, only one party at a time has succeeded in bringing together an electoral or political coalition of both Protestants and Catholics.

However relevant might have been the debate over the strategy of economic development and national consolidation, it was not relevant indefinitely, and when the passion and fury of these issues began to fade, and certain assumptions about Canada began to solidify, Liberals and Conservatives, particularly in economic outlook, became more obviously similar. As Canada industrialized and an urban working class developed, the fact that both major parties were dominated by the business class of the country took on a greater importance. However much or little they conceded the relevance of past political debates, and however much or little they recognized the worth of parties dedicated to the task of clouding racial or religious issues, some observers no longer accepted that Canadian parties represented alternatives on the most important issues -- economic planning, social welfare, and in general, the increased role of the state in modern society.

Frank Underhill consistently attacked the Canadian two-party system for constantly advancing the interests of only the business sector of the community and for failing to meet the challenge created by industrialization and the creation of a large urban proletariat. He saw the end of World War I, which left Canada with a monopolistic capitalistic class as well as a new working class, as the signpost of the new era. The old party system had lost its justification, but "Age could not wither it nor custom stale its infinite

variety,"¹ and the old parties, " ... Punch and Judy who engage in mock combat before the public"² persisted. And they persisted despite the activities of Underhill and others in forming the socialist Cooperative Commonwealth Federation -- the C.C.F.

These objections to the nature of the Canadian party system have been continued, particularly by supporters of the C.C.F.'s successor the N.D.P. In The Pattern of Politics, Charles Taylor, a vice-president of the N.D.P., attacks "consensus politics" in much the same terms as did Underhill. Contrasting this with the "politics of polarization" Taylor writes:

To the politics of polarization, anything that presents itself as the consensus policy must be specious. For politics must either be in line with those identified with the status quo, in which case they go against the welfare of the majority, or they must involve the important changes necessary to serve the well-being of the majority, in which case they are bound to be opposed by those who are identified with the status quo. Moreover, if any policy is accepted on its face value as being the result of the consensus, this can only be because one or other group is being "taken in" or is unaware what the policy alternatives really are. 3

A similar but more comprehensive theoretical critique of the party system has been advanced by Gad Horowitz in "Towards the Democratic Class Struggle".⁴ Horowitz accepts the type of analysis of Underhill and other socialist writers which identifies the current brokerage system as a conven-

1 Frank H. Underhill, "The Canadian Party System in Transition", in In Search of Canadian Liberalism, Frank Underhill (Toronto: MacMillan, 1960), p. 193.

2 Ibid., p. 168.

3 Charles Taylor, The Pattern of Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), p. 4.

4 Gad Horowitz, "Towards the Democratic Class Struggle", Journal of Canadian Studies, 1, No. 3 (November 1966), pp. 3-10.

ient conceptualization for the preservation of the domination of both major parties by a capitalist elite. He advocates instead the polarization of Canadian politics, with a left and a right party competing for power.

If the party system is to play the role of moving us closer to democracy; if, in other words, our political elite is to be strengthened to the point where it replaces the corporate and bureaucratic elites as the source of the most important social decisions, our party system must be polarized on a left-right basis, and the main issues raised for discussion in the political arena must be class issues. 5

To Horowitz the push and pull of polarized parties is the dynamic of party government in modern industrial states; the innovation of left parties and consolidation of right parties the proper means of measured progress in society.

These views are mentioned to show that this has long been a debated topic among observers of Canadian politics. Their approach to the possibility of class politics might be called the moral imperative.

Another type of argument -- the modernization imperative -- largely eschews the moral approach but predicts class polarization as a natural development in advanced industrial societies. Such a view is put forward by Robert Alford in Party and Society.⁶ In examining the Anglo-American democracies -- Britain, Australia, the United States and Canada -- he discovered the least evidence of class voting in Canada. He attributed this to the perceived need in Canada for brokerage style parties to maintain national unity.

Class voting is low in Canada because the political parties are identified as representatives of regional, religious, and ethnic groupings rather than as

5 Ibid., p. 4.

6 Robert R. Alford, Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963).

representatives of national class interests, and this, in turn, is due to a relative lack of national integration. If, however, the conditions sustaining non-class solidarities are disappearing and a national identity is emerging, tendencies toward an increase in the level of class voting should be evident ... ?

The original factors responsible in Canada for the low incidence of class-based voting were the disparate economic interests of different sectors of the country, which were reinforced by a still relevant religious-ethnic cleavage and further reinforced by Canadian federalism. These divisions, excepting the institutional reinforcements, were cleavages usually associated with modernizing states and should begin to disappear in a highly urbanized and industrialized society.

Stated most generally and baldly, industrialization and urbanization may encourage national economic integration, cultural assimilation, national political integration, and secularization. 8

Canada, Alford felt, had reached this stage of development. National integration would hasten the development of a large urban proletariat, undivided by religious or ethnic consciousness. A change in the party system to accommodate this social polarization would naturally follow.

What Underhill, Taylor and Horowitz see as a moral necessity, Alford sees as an inevitability, given that industrialization and urbanization lead to national economic and cultural integration, which in turn gives rise to a class-oriented party system -- a causal chain he does not question.

The attainment of class politics would have wide-reaching implications for Canadian politics. For example, it is hypothesized that the following

7 Ibid., p. 251.

8 Ibid., p. 309.

changes might occur. Quite apart from a presumed change in the content of political debate, the party structures could be transformed. Because class issues tend to be more permanent than those in a brokerage system, stable class neighbourhoods would yield more safe parliamentary seats, with implications for party control of local organizations, national leadership power, and the stability of membership in the House of Commons. Parties might become more centralized than is presently the case, eventually leading to less interaction between provincial and federal parties or more intense competition between them if formally linked. In addition, intra-party competition might well become as intensified as inter-party competition.

These possible developments are listed to illustrate briefly the consequences of class polarization, and therefore the importance of the question as to whether the polarization hypothesis is correct. This paper will therefore examine voting data which might provide evidence of class voting in Canada, using in particular the Gallup Polls which Alford relied on, for an analysis of the federal elections of 1962, 1963, 1965 and 1968. A concluding chapter will interpret this evidence and comment on Alford's polarization scenario.

CHAPTER II

THE DATA AND ITS DEFICIENCIES

The Gallup Polls

Social scientists frequently preface their analyses with the assertion that they are working with "hard data". Regretfully such a claim cannot be advanced for the present work; only Gallup Poll surveys are available to aid in the investigation of all of the four most recent federal elections.

The Gallup, or Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, surveys are held regularly to describe the state of public opinion on certain public issues or to predict the outcome of a federal election. A Gallup promotional booklet describes their sampling method as follows:

Sample Design Normally 700-case samples are used when the area under study is limited to Quebec, Ontario and the West. However, the number of cases is increased if breakdowns of Maritime Provinces are desired. The sample size is also increased if socio-economic or regional breakdowns are required

A national probability sample is available for use as required. Generally most studies are conducted employing a probability sample down to the block level in urban areas and employing quota sampling methods with assignments for sex, age, and socio-economic levels in rural areas. All interviews are conducted personally in the homes of respondents. 9

In the samples dealt with in this study -- national election forecasts -- larger samples of from 1,654 to 2,129 are used in an attempt to provide an accurate assessment of voting preferences. According to Alford the method employed once the block level has been reached is as follows:

9 International Research -- International Association of Public Opinion Institutes (Princeton, New Jersey), p. 13.

Interviewers are sent to these selected blocks, and are allowed to select any house as a starting place. Once a house is selected, then they go to every second house for subsequent interviews. Within each household, those persons over 21 years of age who are at home at the moment are listed, and respondents are randomly selected from those listed. If no one is at home, or the selected respondent refuses, the interviewer goes to the second house and repeats the procedure until her quota of interviews is filled. The resulting interviews for each province are weighted by age in the office ... 10

Thus Gallup combines an element of stratified random sampling and quota sampling. This approach has the necessary virtue of being inexpensive and convenient to administer when compared to random methods, but much is lost in accuracy. Quota sampling itself is non-probabilistic, and it is therefore impossible to calculate the margin of error for the sample. Interviewers must find a certain number of respondents from certain defined groups, but otherwise may interview whomever they choose. Theoretically a stratified random sample is probabilistic and the margin of error can be computed, but the version used by the Gallup organization sacrifices randomness at the block level. Even if the interviewer is absolutely scrupulous in approaching every second house, people who are not at home during the interviewing period -- those who work, younger people, men -- do not have an equal chance of being interviewed. (This bias shows up in the polls being used here; only in the over fifty age category do men interviewed outnumber women.) In sum, the Gallup methods produce a survey which is suspect in terms of an accurate representation of all elements of the population, and for which the error factor is impossible to predict.

This does not mean that the Gallup Polls are entirely inaccurate or useless to the social scientist, particularly where no other data exist. In

10 Robert R. Alford, "The Social Bases of Political Cleavage", in Papers on the 1962 Election, ed., by John Meisel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 206.

noting the deficiencies of quota sampling, Blalock also points out:

This does not mean that nonprobability sampling is never appropriate. In exploratory studies, the main goal of which is to obtain valuable insights which ultimately may lead to testable hypotheses, probability sampling either may be too expensive or lead to fewer such insights. 11

In fact, several social scientists have used the Gallup Polls largely because of the scarcity of other materials. Alford used Gallup Polls, in addition to others where available, from all four Anglo-American Countries to draw his inferences on class voting. He stated that since he was not interested in predicting precise outcomes, the biases of the sample were relatively unimportant. This view seems a bit naive, since there is no guarantee that the groups he was interested in, even apart from their voting preference, were accurately portrayed by the survey. Alford, however, is careful to avoid breaking down the data too far, and in fact specifically notes the inappropriateness of provincial analysis.

As in the case of the national figures, only the overall relationships have much meaning, not the specific figures. The numbers of cases, particularly in the smaller provinces or regions, are too small to allow any inferences about changes in class voting in, say British Columbia versus the Atlantic Provinces. The more or less consistent rank order of the provinces and the consistently higher level of class voting in Ontario are the two main findings worth discussing. 12

Curiously enough, he provided just such a detailed breakdown in a paper on the Gallup Polls in Meisel's Papers on the 1962 Election,¹³ After comparing the

11 Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p.410.

12 Alford, Party and Society, p. 262.

13 Alford, "The Social Bases of Political Cleavage", pp. 203-234.

provincial results with the 1962 survey, Alford concluded that the particular survey was accurate enough to nullify his previous suspicions.

Alford accepts the Gallup Poll data with strong reservations, but Mildred Schwartz, in Public Opinion and Canadian Identity, an attitude survey based entirely on the Gallup Polls, is less hesitant:

Depending on the purpose of the analysis, whatever deficiencies do exist may be either negligible or may vitiate the findings. Personal experience with the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, however, has proved interviewing techniques to be, at the very least, adequate. Sample sizes range from 3,000 to 700 respondents; the more usual size is around 1,600 before 1958, and 700 after. Respondents are usually selected by quota samples designed to obtain a cross-section of the population with respect to location, age, occupation, origin, and similar attributes ... the record of the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion in predicting election results has been good. It was only in the election of 1957, when the Institute underestimated the Conservative share of the popular vote by 5 percent, that its figures differed appreciably from the results. For the purpose of this study this type of error was not too serious since the concern of the study was not with prediction. It was rather with trends in opinions and the association of these trends with particular groups in the population. Whatever bias has been introduced by the method of sampling has probably remained the same from one survey to the next, allowing comparisons between groups. 14

This optimism is presumably necessary for a book based entirely on Gallup Polls. However, as will be outlined below, the faith in the accuracy and consistency of the polls is not well-placed, and they ought to be treated with much more scepticism.

Two questions will be asked to briefly assess the extent to which the polls may be used as reliable guides to electoral behaviour. First, how accurate

14 Mildred A. Schwartz, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 55.

have the polls been in the last four federal elections? And secondly, are the proportions of any given group interviewed in each sample truly representative of the population? The latter check must be made against census data, and here a difficulty arises for the categories listed in Gallup do not compare readily with those in the 1961 census. However, a precise comparison is possible with two variables -- the percentage of Roman Catholics in the sample as opposed to the population, and the distribution of sample and true population by size of community.

As Table I -- national results -- reveals, the Gallup Poll for 1962 and 1963 is fairly accurate, but considerably less so for 1965 and 1968. This partly reflects the size of the polls, 2,129 in 1962; 2,073 in 1963 (these first two weighted by duplication of cards to 2,700 and 2,710 respectively), 2,976 in 1965 and 1,654 in 1968. In the first two elections the poll tends to overestimate Social Credit, and in the last two, the Liberal Party. However, the general proportions are correct, and only in 1962 and 1963 with respect to the closely placed N.D.P. and Social Credit, is the order wrong. In Tables II and III, in which other proportions can be checked, biases are also noticeable. Proportion of Roman Catholics in the sample hovers around 40 percent, while the 1961 census lists Catholics as representing 45.7 percent of the population. When the distribution of community sizes is compared to the sample population, the only serious discrepancy to be found is with respect to the percentage of those living on farms. They were actually overrepresented before the last federal election, but were then sampled quite closely to their true proportion in the population.

This does not tell us much about the proportional distribution of other variables in relation to their true weight in the population, nor does it guarantee that non-visible characteristics are random, or further, that

TABLE I

Election Results Compared to Gallup Polls

National

(Gallup figures in brackets)

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	<u>Other</u>
1962	37.3 (35.93)	37.3 (37.42)	13.5 (11.54)	11.6 (14.21)	0.2 (.90)
1963	32.9 (32.08)	41.7 (41.77)	13.1 (12.12)	11.9 (13.18)	0.4 (.85)
1965	32.4 (29.11)	40.2 (44.46)	17.9 (18.76)	8.4 (6.94)	1.2 (.73)
1968	31.3 (27.65)	45.2 (46.92)	17.4 (17.69)	5.2 (6.88)	0.9 (.86)

TABLE II

Percent Roman Catholics in National
Sample Compared to 1961 Census

1962	41.74 %	<u>1961 Census</u> 45.7 %
1963	39.85	
1965	39.94	
1968	42.41	

TABLE III

Size of Respondents' Community Distribution, Compared to 1961
and 1966 Census

<u>Sample</u>	<u>Rural Farm</u>	<u>Rural Non-Farm</u>	<u>Total Urban</u>	<u>Urban Breakdown (in thousands)</u>			
				<u>1-10</u>	<u>10-30</u>	<u>30-100</u>	<u>100 plus</u>
1962	15.57	17.08	67.35	12.05	6.35	8.86	40.09
1963	15.49	16.61	67.90	12.01	6.58	9.55	39.76
1965	11.21	17.37	71.42	10.05	5.61	10.79	44.97
1968	9.83	15.17	75.00	NOT AVAILABLE			
<u>Census</u>							
1961	11.36	19.00	69.64	11.09	5.75	9.35	43.45
1966	9.56	16.86	73.58	11.57	5.77	8.92	47.31

even the variables which appear correctly proportional do not disguise internal variations by some other criteria which might bias the results. Nonetheless, for several reasons it seems necessary to utilize the Gallup Polls to further explanations of the question under consideration. No other equally comprehensive material is available; the national results indicate that, in certain respects at least, the polls are roughly accurate, and, most important, they can probably be used for suggestive investigation providing that their limitations remain clearly in focus. Therefore, in order to attempt an assessment of any clear changes in voting preferences in the last four elections, the national Gallup data will be tabulated. The probable wide margin of sampling error will require considerable discretion in drawing conclusions, and minor percentage or index shifts will be treated as being of little consequence.

Canadian political scientists are accustomed to making numerous regional qualifications on national generalizations about voting behavior.¹⁵ Not infrequently, strong national trends are composed of a complex of contradictory regional variations, and indeed it is rare for a national study to avoid commenting upon them. Although this study recognizes the legitimacy of this approach, the data would be far stretched beyond the point of reliability if provincial or even regional descriptions were attempted. The first problem arises when the data are broken down by province; even if the national sample were completely random, the provincial "N" would be too small for valid statistical inference. The tables in Appendix A illustrate the second problem, and need little explication. In terms of accuracy of prediction, the Gallup Poll started out with rough approximations in 1962 and deteriorated from there.

15 " ... Canada's political life is distinguished by the degree to which every national trend in the voting behaviour of its citizens is contradicted by some important regional or provincial exception", John Meisel in Papers on the 1962 Election, p. 286.

This may in part be due to the almost bizarre variations in sample proportions within the provinces, again illustrated by reference to percent Roman Catholics and community size distribution (Appendix B). It is possible, for example, that the gross inaccuracy of the predicted vote in Alberta in 1968 is due in part to the reduction by two-thirds in the proportion of respondents living on farms from the 1965 to the 1968 survey. Quite apart from the effect on accuracy, these fluctuations in sample proportions make attempts to trace the provincial vote by reference to the different variables very close to meaningless.

The conclusion must be that the Gallup data is unsuitable for dissection at other than the national level. This necessary decision leaves a lamentable gap in the empirical evidence for this study, but this is obviously preferable to the utilization of erroneous information.

There is one further problem with the Gallup information, and that is the way in which the variables are constructed. Many of them are not sensitive to important distinctions, due to the large categories used. For example, the religious question gives the respondent a choice of "Protestants", "Jewish", "Roman Catholic", or "Other". In the four elections under study, however, the percentage of Jewish respondents never rises above 2.56, while the Protestant proportion is as high as 57.14 percent. Little is gained by separating Jewish respondents, but much is lost by not distinguishing among the Protestants, for many studies have concluded that different Protestants denominations have opposing political tendencies -- Anglicans and Presbyterians usually being strongly Progressive Conservative, while United Churchmen are more often Liberal. People who do not profess any religion are more frequently supporters of the N.D.P. than those who do.¹⁶ There is disagreement too with the Gallup age breakdown

¹⁶ See W. Gagne, S.P. Regenstrief, "Some Aspects of New Democratic Urban Support in 1965", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 33, no.4 (November 1967), p. 530; and J. Laponce, People vs. Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 64. The latter would put United Churchmen in the P.C. block.

of 21-29, 30-39, 40-49 and 50 plus. The last category in particular could lead to over-simplification, because it includes people at the height of their careers and earning years, while others are retired and living on small pensions. (Laponce, for example, finds 58 a better cut-off point, in People vs. Politics). The community size breakdown is similar to that in the Canadian census -- rural-agricultural, rural non-agricultural, and communities of one to ten thousand, ten to thirty thousand, thirty to one hundred thousand, and one hundred thousand plus. The detailed breakdown is fairly helpful in assessing voting behaviour; unfortunately the 1968 Poll lists only three categories -- rural agricultural, rural non-agricultural, and urban (1,000 plus). Thus some extremely valuable information is lost. The Socio-Economic Status (SES) scale is unsatisfactory in two senses. It is based on an A,B,C,D, scale, ranking from highest to lowest, and is derived from the interviewer's personal assessment of the home and circumstance of the respondent. It is therefore subject to much possible variation in criteria for judgement and may not be consistent or reliable. The scale also produces an unfortunate distribution when applied to Canada, for approximately 55 percent of the respondents end up in C, making differentiation between votes on the basis of the scale difficult. However, having made these points about the bluntness of the Gallup variables, it must be conceded that the problems of poor sampling might be multiplied if attempts were made to apply more sensitive categories.

Objective Versus Subjective Class Voting

What is class voting? Class voting is being used in this paper to mean the vote by persons in an economic class for a party which is identified by the author as advancing the interests of that class; other classes similarly vote for a party identified with their interest. The extent to which parties rely on the

support of their own class represents the extent of class voting or polarization in the political system.

Class membership and class vote may be measured subjectively or objectively. In the former, individual respondents are given the opportunity to specify their own class membership, and more frequently, are asked to identify political parties as representing one class or another. The key to class voting in the subjective sense is the voter's perception of himself and the parties; by comparing perception of party with respondent's vote, the analyst can detect class voting where it would otherwise be presumed to be absent. We may find a manual worker voting for a business party because he believes it to favour manual workers and not businessmen -- a case of "false perception" rather than false consciousness, but still an instance of class voting. It is possible also that many votes which appear to be anti-class, are votes based on strategy considerations. The manual worker votes for a centre party because the left party closest to his own preference has no chance of winning. Since the voter knowingly votes against his class party, his vote is not strictly a class vote. If the analyst finds widespread voting by false perception or strategic considerations, he may hypothesize that the potential for class voting is actually higher than at first appears, since people do consider class relevant to their vote.

Unfortunately, a subjective approach to class requires a detailed attitude-motivation survey, and the absence of this compels an objective approach. Respondents are arbitrarily grouped into classes by external criteria. In this study occupational status will be the principal class indicator, since this is a common criterion, and the most reliable indicator available in the Gallup survey. Non-manual workers will be contrasted with manual workers, although the more detailed classification will be frequently referred to. The

discussion will be in terms of party preference, rather than party preference as related to party perception, since there is no information on the latter. This restriction, of course, applies to the discussion of non-class variables as well.

An Index of Class Voting

In generalizing about class politics Alford is assisted by an index which enabled him to gage the extent of any increase or decrease in such behaviour. He subtracted the percentage of non-manual workers voting for a left party, from the percentage of manual workers voting for a left party, and used the difference as his index.¹⁷ This provided a measure of the accuracy of the assumption that only manual workers vote for a left party, and was therefore a measure of class voting. Since this figure is useful in explanation, the basic idea has been adopted here. Alford's method, unfortunately, is difficult to apply in a multi-party system, and he felt it necessary to unite the Liberals and New Democratic-C.C.F. Parties as his left party.

Because of this difficulty the following index has been constructed which allows each party to be treated separately, and which pays some attention to the strengths of the parties within the electorate:

$$\text{Class voting} = \frac{X_1 \% (A_1 - B_1) + X_2 \% (A_2 - B_2) + \dots + X_n \% (A_n - B_n)}{100}$$

100

Where:

X_1 % is the popular vote for party 1.

X_2 % is the popular vote for party 2, and so on to "n" parties.

A_1 is the percentage of those voters who should* vote for party 1, and did.

17 Alford, Party and Society, p. 79.

B_1 is the percentage of those voters who should not* vote for party 1, but did.

* - in a dichotomous situation, manual workers vote for a left party and non-manuals for a right party.

The problem in applying this index to Canada lies in the decision as to which party is left, and which right. We cannot, as we would with a subjective approach, allow a party to be defined in two ways, and so we must make a decision for each party. In a hypothetical bipolar system the Progressive Conservative Party would be "right" (i.e. supported by non-manuals) and the New Democratic Party left (i.e. supported by manual workers). The Liberal and Social Credit Parties are more difficult to place; it is difficult to justify either as a left party, except in the most casual sense of the word. The Liberal Party has enacted a long series of social welfare measures, and the Social Credit Party has a populist style of appeal attractive to many manual workers. Meisel in describing the Liberal Party's emphasis in recent years points to the contradictions inherent in any classification, but also, it seems, as to what the answer must be:

There has been little change in the Liberals' support of a powerful state apparatus which provides a minimum cushion of economic wellbeing to all citizens while at the same time fostering conditions enabling business to flourish. The party is sympathetic, therefore, not only to large-scale welfare measures, like government-operated medical insurance and pension programmes but also to providing a climate in which corporations can amass enormous resources, profits and, of course, influence. 18

The Liberal Party is a centre-right party, but in our idealized bipolar system, necessarily a right party. The sections of the Social Credit Party rooted in British Columbia and Alberta are much more easily connected with rightist

18 John Meisel, "Recent Changes in Canadian Parties", in Party Politics in Canada, 2nd ed., (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 46.

politics because of their identification with big business in the former case and the petit bourgeoisie in both. The work of both MacPherson and Irving on Alberta, plus Premier Manning's own book, emphasize the conservative elements of Social Credit there, and Martin Robin stresses the conservatism of the British Columbian variety.¹⁹ Quebec Social Credit, now the principal element in the national social credit movement, is more difficult to classify, being a party of economic dissatisfaction, and yet steeped in the Catholic conservatism of rural Quebec. By virtue of this general religious-based and economic philosophy, it seems reasonable to consider the Creditiste strain of social credit as "right" as well.

The index measures reality against an ideal type. If there were only two categories, then we would have to consider the N.D.P. as a left party and the others as right, and if we temporarily adopt these assumptions, how close is Canada to being a class dominated party system? The theoretical maximum would be 100 -- which would mean that no manual workers vote for a right party, and no non-manuals for a left party. Minus 100 is the absolute minimum, but a consistent minus figure of any magnitude would mean that all the parties had been allocated to the wrong column, or the political system was in a state of near catastrophic confusion. By dividing the parties in such a way that only the N.D.P. is a left party, the maximum could obviously only be approached if the N.D.P. was a major party with a chance of winning an electoral majority. Even where the N.D.P. is strong, however, the index figure could be lowered by undifferentiated support for it or any of the right parties. A system characterized by a lack of class voting should register close to "0". If this were

19 C.B. MacPherson, Democracy in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953); J.A. Irving, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959); E.C. Manning, Political Realignment (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967); Martin Robin, "The Social Basis of Party Politics in British Columbia" in Party Politics in Canada, 2nd ed., pp. 201-211.

the case then it is probable that some other cleavage is of greater importance, and if necessary a different type of system could be postulated by the theorist. The index enables a comprehensive measure of movement in the nature of the party system to be constructed, and assists in measuring change in one cleavage.

There are objections which can be made to the assumptions upon which the index has been based, and so it should be remembered that it is only intended to assist the analysis by providing a measure which takes into account several movements at once. The analysis in chapter three discusses the party bases in detail, and does not rely on these assumptions.

Representation Index

One final index has been calculated to assist in interpretation of the tables. They are tabulated to show the percentage of total party support which each party derives from a particular group. However, since the proportion of these groups within each sample is never quite constant, whether because of sampling fluctuations or changes in the population, it is necessary to stabilize the percentages to allow cross-election comparisons. The representation index, therefore divides the proportion of any given group within the sample into the proportion of a party's support derived from that group.²⁰ Thus if Roman Catholics comprised 45 percent of the sample population, but 55 percent of the supporters of the Liberal Party were Roman Catholics, the representation index figure for Roman Catholics in the Liberal Party would be $\frac{55}{45} \times 100 = 122$. The lower limit for this calculation is "0", and there is no precise maximum. One hundred would indicate perfectly proportional representa-

20 See Laponce, People vs. Politics, p. 64.

tion of a group within a party's share of the electorate. These index figures are listed in separate tables, and in addition to stabilizing sampling fluctuations, highlight party weaknesses and strengths in terms of group support.

CHAPTER III

NATIONAL VOTING BEHAVIOUR, 1962-1968

Whether we consider the national election returns, or the Gallup statistics, it is apparent that there have been substantial changes in the voting habits of Canadians in the period studied (Table IV). The Progressive Conservative Party has fallen to a poor second place in popular vote while the Liberal Party appears near a majority position in the electorate. Since the first federal election the N.D.P. contested, its support has risen substantially, but the party has not yet successfully challenged the P.C.'s for second place. After the split into a Quebec and "national" party, the Social Credit Party went into a swift decline and was obliterated in the 1968 election, while the Creditistes remain a major party in Quebec. (The Gallup Poll continues to list only one "Social Credit" Party, even though the formal split occurred before the 1965 election; this makes an analysis of the social credit vote impossible.) These changes in party strength are not the result of direct exchanges of voters as might be suggested by a cursory examination of the table on page 24. Their complexity can in part be traced by isolating those voters who changed between any two elections. (The Gallup Poll asks respondents, in addition to their anticipated vote, how they voted in the immediately preceding election.)

Table V shows that between 1962 and 1963, 22.3 percent of those who could remember how they voted in both elections switched party. The Progressive Conservative Party attracted 17.7 percent of these changers, but lost 54.9 -- 28.9 percent to the Liberal Party, 10.3 percent to the N.D.P., and 15.7 percent to Social Credit. As the table reveals, no trade-off not involving the Progressive Conservatives resulted in a net gain or loss of more than

4 percent of the total number of changers. It is interesting to note that the Liberal Party took its voters from the Progressive Conservative Party, but actually suffered a net loss to the N.D.P. and Social Credit.

1963 to 1965 presents a paradoxical picture because the Liberal Party increased its share of the popular vote, but came third in terms of its gains from switchers. This is explained by reference to new voters (those old enough to vote for the first time, see page 65), usually about half Liberal, and voters who had not bothered to vote in the previous election, also very heavily Liberal. Nevertheless the changes which took place among the 20.9 percent of those giving both votes, are extremely important, particularly where they show the New Democratic Party achieving a net gain in support from both the Liberal Party and the Progressive Conservatives. This suggests that there exists a body of supporters who not only adhere to minor parties in the face of a "majority government" election, but who actually leave the major parties at such a time. If it could be shown that such behaviour involves a rejection of a relatively content-free managerial style of politics, then the polarization hypothesis would gain in credibility.

However this pattern might be explained, it does not reappear in 1968 when the changers (23.6 percent of those who voted in both elections) were strongly pro-Liberal. Only in relation to Social Credit does the Liberal Party lose more votes than it gains. It is difficult to say what people were voting for in 1968, but the election seemed to illustrate the continuing potency in Canadian political life of the charismatic national-unifier. Although the question of party images is beyond the empirical scope of this paper, the differences between 1965 and 1968 should be kept in mind, since it is worth asking if the 1968 election was a reaffirmation of the traditional

TABLE IV

National VoteGallup Poll - 1962-1968

%

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
1962	36.3	37.8	11.6	14.3
1963	32.3	42.1	12.2	13.3
1965	29.6	44.6	18.8	7.0
1968	27.9	47.3	17.9	6.9

TABLE V

Changers 1962-1968

	<u>1962-63</u>		<u>1963-65</u>		<u>1965-68</u>	
<u>P.C.</u> from Liberal	8.6		16.0		16.9	
from N.D.P.	5.5	17.7	5.3	25.1	4.9	26.8
from S.C.	3.6		3.8		4.9	
<u>Liberal</u> from P.C.	28.9		12.5		26.3	
from N.D.P.	4.8	37.7	4.9	21.6	8.7	38.7
from S.C.	4.1		4.2		3.7	
<u>N.D.P.</u> from P.C.	10.3		14.0		11.5	
from Liberal	7.9	19.1	22.4	39.5	8.6	22.6
from S.C.	1.0		3.2		2.5	
<u>S.C.</u> from P.C.	15.7		7.2		4.9	
from Liberal	6.7	25.5	5.7	13.7	7.0	11.9
from N.D.P.	3.1		.8		---	
	100	100	100	100	100	100
% changers	22.3		20.9		23.6	
<u>N</u>	419		263		243	

style of Canadian politics, or simply a misleading deviation from a pattern already changing towards polarization.

This brief outline of movements between parties has sought to show the extent of movement in the electorate -- almost a quarter of those who remember both votes shift between elections, while from 7 percent to 9 percent of the total sample stated they had been old enough to vote in the previous election but did not. (This does not exclude the possibility that they may have been ineligible for some other reason.) Is there any evidence that the electorate is therefore changing the grounds upon which it makes political decisions? Obviously the question is related to attitude and is not measured by the data given here, but if there are large-scale shifts in the criteria upon which the electorate is basing its vote, we may expect this change to be revealed or at least suggested by an alteration in the relation between the socio-economic variables and voting choice. The following section will attempt to detect any such changes.

The Traditional Cleavages

Religion has played a crucial role in Canadian history and politics, and is still a potent factor in national elections. Since approximately the turn of the century Protestants have supported the Progressive Conservatives in larger numbers than have Roman Catholics, although the reverse has not always been true in the Liberal Party. Roman Catholic voters have also avoided the New Democratic Party, as its socialism and "materialism" has been condemned by the hierarchy.²¹ Since these two religious

²¹ See L. Macdonald, "Religion and Voting: A Study of the 1968 Federal Election in Ontario", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 120-144.

blocks constitute the vast majority of the Canadian population even slight shifts in party preference will have far-reaching consequences for party strengths. A reference to Tables VI and VII, on religion, shows that the above generalizations are still substantially true despite fluctuations in both the percentages and the index. In 1968 Progressive Conservatives reached their lowest point among Protestants and their highest among Roman Catholics, a surprising result if it accurately reflects the actual electoral behaviour. Liberals gain and lose reciprocally to the P.C.'s much as they did in 1963. There is a substantial increase in N.D.P. dependence upon Protestant voters, whereas there was some indication in the three previous elections that the party was becoming more proportionately supported by Roman Catholics. To examine the figures in another way (not shown) we find the Progressive Conservative gain among Roman Catholics was real as well as relative (17.86 percent of Roman Catholics voted P.C. in 1965 to 20.10 percent in 1968), as was their fall among Protestants (39.77 percent in 1965 to 35.58 percent in 1968). The Liberals rose from 32.66 to 38.16 percent among Protestants and declined from 60.15 to 57.92 percent among Roman Catholics. Protestants increased their vote for the New Democrats from 20.34 to 23.10 percent, but Roman Catholics decreased theirs from 15.11 to 10.05 percent. As the table shows, among the smaller religious groups the Jewish voters disproportionately favour the Liberals and New Democrats, while "Others" are disproportionately represented among the N.D.P. These shifts have, in sum, not been great, but have brought the two major parties a small ways towards a more equal representation among the two large religions, if we consider 1962 as our base year. However a similar situation was indicated in 1963, so these movements may be mere fluctuations in voting preference, or even in sampling accuracy. The change

TABLE VI

Percentage of Party Vote by Religion
(N in brackets)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>Protestant</u>						
1962	70.28 (558)	41.96 (347)	61.96 (158)	39.81 (125)	54.25	(1188)
1963	74.35 (559)	47.70 (467)	64.08 (182)	38.83 (120)	57.14	(1328)
1965	72.43 (352)	39.53 (289)	58.25 (180)	56.14 (64)	53.96	(885)
1968	64.25 (248)	40.61 (266)	65.18 (161)	22.92 (22)	50.36	(697)
<u>Roman Catholic</u>						
1962	27.20 (216)	53.93 (446)	29.41 (75)	56.37 (177)	41.74	(914)
1963	23.67 (178)	48.83 (478)	29.58 (84)	60.19 (186)	39.85	(926)
1965	24.07 (117)	53.90 (394)	32.04 (99)	39.47 (45)	39.94	(655)
1968	30.57 (118)	51.91 (340)	23.89 (59)	72.92 (70)	42.41	(587)
<u>Other</u>						
1962	1.39 (11)	.85 (7)	4.31 (11)	3.82 (12)	1.87	(41)
1963	1.46 (11)	2.55 (25)	4.58 (13)	.97 (3)	2.24	(52)
1965	3.09 (15)	2.87 (21)	5.83 (18)	3.51 (4)	3.54	(58)
1968	4.66 (18)	4.27 (28)	8.50 (21)	4.17 (4)	5.13	(71)
<u>Jewish</u>						
1962	1.33 (9)	3.26 (27)	4.31 (11)	--	2.15	(47)
1963	.53 (4)	.92 (9)	1.76 (5)	--	.77	(18)
1965	.41 (2)	3.69 (27)	3.88 (12)	.88 (1)	2.56	(42)
1968	.52 (2)	3.21 (21)	2.43 (6)	--	2.10	(29)

* Party columns for each year add vertically to 100 percent.

TABLE VII

Party Vote and Religion
Representation Index

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>Protestant</u>				
1962	129	77	114	73
1963	130	83	112	68
1965	134	74	108	104
1968	127	81	129	45
<u>Roman Catholic</u>				
1962	65	129	70	135
1963	59	123	76	151
1965	60	135	80	99
1968	72	122	56	172
<u>Other</u>				
1962	74	45	230	204
1963	65	114	204	43
1965	85	81	165	99
1968	91	83	166	81
<u>Jewish</u>				
1962	52	151	200	--
1963	69	119	229	--
1965	16	144	153	35
1968	25	153	116	--

Representation Index = $\frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$

in the N.D.P.'s support base seems the most substantial, and it is perhaps significant that a party which wishes to emphasize another cleavage should be so strongly discriminated against by Roman Catholics.

Language is closely connected with religion and so reveals much the same movement (Tables VIII and IX). Progressive Conservatives reach a low among English-speaking respondents and a high among French. The N.D.P. has risen disproportionately among English voters, but only by contrast to 1965. As Table X on religion and language shows, English-speaking Roman Catholics vote according to their religion, not their language.²² They are, in fact, even more strongly Liberal than French Roman Catholics, since they do not support the Creditistes in Quebec; elsewhere Social Credit is connected with Protestant, not Catholic religious preference.

There has been change among voters as measured by language and religion, but the pattern of religious support commonly described by Canadian political scientists remains essentially unaltered. Progressive Conservative and New Democratic voters are still far more likely to be Protestant than Roman Catholic; Liberals are more frequently Catholic. Gallup data suggests a disproportionate gain among Protestants for the Liberals in 1968, and a Liberal loss to the P.C.'s among Catholics, but there is no strong suggestion that this is anything more than a fluctuation, such as occurred in 1963.²³

22 For further information on the voting preferences of non-French Roman Catholics see also Grace M. Anderson, "Voting Behaviour and the Ethnic-Religious Variable: A Study of a Federal Election in Hamilton, Ontario", The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 32, No. 1 (February 1966), pp. 27-37; John Meisel, "Religious Affiliation and Electoral Behaviour: A Case Study" in Voting in Canada, ed. by John C. Courtney (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 144-161.

23 For confirmation of this increase in French-Canadian support for the Progressive Conservatives, see John Meisel, "Party Images in Canada: A Report on Work in Progress", (Paper presented to the Forty-Second Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, June 1970.) especially page 37.

TABLE VIII

Percentage of Party Vote by Language

(N in brackets)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>English</u>						
1962	74.18 (589)	57.19 (473)	69.41 (177)	32.80 (103)	61.28	(1342)
1963	72.34 (544)	59.35 (581)	66.20 (188)	34.63 (107)	61.10	(1420)
1965	75.72 (368)	54.64 (88)	63.75 (103)	47.37 (76)	62.10	(1019)
1968	68.91 (266)	57.10 (374)	65.99 (163)	20.83 (20)	59.47	(823)
<u>French</u>						
1962	16.88 (134)	30.83 (255)	9.80 (25)	50.32 (158)	26.12	(572)
1963	15.69 (118)	29.72 (291)	13.03 (37)	52.43 (162)	26.16	(608)
1965	15.23 (74)	31.69 (232)	17.48 (54)	29.82 (34)	24.01	(394)
1968	20.73 (80)	30.53 (200)	12.96 (32)	67.71 (65)	27.24	(377)
<u>Other</u>						
1962	8.94 (71)	11.97 (99)	20.78 (53)	16.88 (53)	12.60	(276)
1963	11.97 (90)	10.93 (107)	20.77 (59)	12.94 (40)	12.74	(296)
1965	9.05 (44)	13.66 (100)	18.77 (58)	22.81 (26)	13.89	(228)
1968	10.36 (40)	12.37 (81)	21.05 (52)	11.46 (11)	13.29	(184)

* Party columns for each year add vertically to 100 percent.

TABLE IX

Party Vote and Language
Representation Index

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>English</u>				
1962	121	93	113	53
1963	118	97	108	57
1965	122	88	103	76
1968	116	96	111	35
<u>French</u>				
1962	64	118	37	192
1963	60	114	50	200
1965	64	132	73	124
1968	76	112	48	249
<u>Other</u>				
1962	70	95	164	133
1963	94	86	163	102
1965	65	98	135	164
1968	78	93	158	86

$$\text{Representation Index} = \frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$$

TABLE X

English Roman Catholic Voters
Representation Index

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample <u>N</u>
1952	67	152	137	20	11.56	(243)
1963	57	154	91	45	9.54	(215)
1965	61	142	90	38	11.56	(178)
1968	72	145	56	18	12.15	(156)

$$\text{Representation Index} = \frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$$

The Class Indicators

The continuing relevance of the traditional religious and language variables does not necessarily mean there have not been noteworthy changes in the explanatory power of others. Have the class indicators -- occupation, socio-economic status, or union affiliation -- increased their salience to voting behaviour?

Alford draws his evidence on class polarization from occupational breakdowns of the Anglo-American electorates, and so it is particularly relevant to look at this variable first for the changes he predicted. Looking first at only the manual and non-manual categories (Tables XI and XII) it is difficult to discern consistent changes in the basic pattern of non-manual (professional, businessman-owner, sales, clerical) strata favoring the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives while the N.D.P. draws most heavily from the manual stratum. There are several exceptions to this generalization which make it difficult to draw the conclusion that significant polarization exists or is taking place. From 1963 to 1968, the Liberal Party dropped sharply in the proportion of its support derived from sales personnel, and the N.D.P. has risen sharply. The clerical sector is a Liberal stronghold. Skilled workers support the Liberal Party in proportion to their sample representation, and unskilled workers the Progressive Conservatives, although both manual strata are together over half the N.D.P.'s electoral strength. If any overall conclusions can be discerned from this table two features would be emphasized. First, the Liberal Party has retained its position as a brokerage party by avoiding serious underrepresentation in any category, except perhaps among unskilled workers. In terms of a manual/non-manual dichotomy (see occupation summary Tables XIII and XIV) there is less deviation from 100 on the representation index

TABLE XI

Percentage of Party Vote by Occupation

(N in brackets)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>Non-Manual</u>						
<u>Professional</u>						
1962	5.59 (44)	6.13 (50)	3.57 (9)	1.97 (6)	5.05	(109)
1963	5.40 (40)	6.83 (65)	6.55 (18)	2.95 (9)	5.81	(132)
1965 -	Not available					
1968	7.89 (30)	7.99 (52)	4.13 (10)	2.11 (2)	6.87	(94)
<u>Business-Owner</u>						
1962	12.07 (95)	10.67 (87)	7.14 (18)	8.85 (27)	10.51	(227)
1963	9.31 (69)	11.78 (112)	6.18 (17)	11.48 (35)	10.26	(233)
1965 -	Not available					
1968	13.42 (51)	12.44 (81)	7.85 (19)	7.37 (7)	11.55	(158)
<u>Sales</u>						
1962	4.32 (34)	3.07 (25)	.79 (2)	3.93 (12)	3.38	(73)
1963	3.51 (26)	5.78 (55)	4.73 (13)	3.28 (10)	4.58	(104)
1965 -	Not available					
1968	5.26 (20)	3.53 (23)	4.96 (12)	2.11 (2)	4.17	(57)
<u>Clerical</u>						
1962	8.51 (67)	9.20 (75)	8.73 (22)	8.52 (26)	8.80	(190)
1963	8.77 (65)	12.09 (115)	7.64 (21)	6.23 (19)	9.68	(220)
1965 -	Not available					
1968	8.95 (34)	14.13 (92)	5.37 (13)	8.42 (8)	10.75	(147)

Percentage of Party Vote by Occupation

(Continued)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>Manual</u>						
<u>Skilled</u>						
1962	24.42 (193)	30.43 (248)	47.22 (119)	29.51 (90)	30.11	(650)
1963	26.05 (193)	27.44 (261)	44.73 (123)	33.77 (103)	29.93	(680)
1965 - Not available						
1968	25.00 (95)	31.95 (208)	38.02 (92)	29.47 (28)	30.92	(423)
<u>Unskilled</u>						
1962	12.33 (97)	15.21 (124)	13.89 (35)	20.98 (64)	14.82	(320)
1963	12.28 (91)	13.04 (124)	12.73 (35)	22.62 (69)	14.04	(319)
1965 - Not available						
1968	13.95 (53)	11.37 (74)	17.36 (42)	23.16 (22)	13.96	(191)
<u>Others</u>						
<u>Farmers</u>						
1962	17.15 (135)	14.60 (119)	8.73 (22)	17.38 (53)	15.24	(329)
1963	20.51 (152)	11.36 (108)	9.09 (25)	10.82 (33)	14.00	(318)
1965 - Not available						
1968	11.32 (43)	5.84 (38)	8.26 (20)	7.37 (7)	7.89	(108)
<u>Widow-Spinster</u>						
1962	4.45 (35)	3.93 (32)	1.98 (5)	1.97 (6)	3.61	(78)
1963	2.56 (19)	4.00 (38)	1.45 (4)	1.31 (4)	2.86	(65)
1965 - Not available						
1968	3.16 (12)	3.38 (22)	2.89 (7)	5.26 (5)	3.36	(46)

Percentage of Party Vote by Occupation

(Continued)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>Others</u> (Continued)						
<u>Pensioned-Retired</u>						
1962	10.55 (83)	6.01 (49)	6.35 (16)	5.90 (18)	7.69	(166)
1963	10.66 (79)	7.15 (68)	5.09 (14)	5.57 (17)	7.83	(178)
1965 - Not available						
1968	10.53 (40)	8.45 (55)	9.92 (24)	11.58 (11)	9.50	(130)

* Party columns for each year add vertically to almost 100 percent -- Unemployed persons, .79 percent of the sample in 1963, 1.01 percent 1965 and 1.02 percent in 1968 have not been tabulated.

TABLE XII

Party Vote by Occupation
Representation Index

<u>Non-Manual</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>Professional</u>				
1962	110	121	70	39
1963	93	118	113	51
1965 - Not Available				
1968	115	116	60	31
<u>Business-Owner</u>				
1962	114	101	67	84
1963	91	115	60	112
1965 - Not Available				
1968	116	107	68	64
<u>Sales</u>				
1962	127	90	23	116
1963	77	126	103	72
1965 - Not Available				
1968	126	85	119	51
<u>Clerk</u>				
1962	96	104	99	96
1963	91	125	79	64
1965 - Not Available				
1968	83	132	50	78
<u>Manual</u>				
<u>Skilled</u>				
1962	81	101	156	98
1963	87	92	149	113
1965 - Not Available				
1968	81	103	123	95
<u>Unskilled</u>				
1962	83	102	93	141
1963	87	93	91	161
1965 - Not Available				
1968	100	81	124	166

Occupation Representation Index
(Continued)

<u>Others</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>Farmers</u>				
1962	112	95	57	114
1963	147	81	65	77
1965 - Not Available				
1968	143	74	104	93
<u>Widow-Spinster</u>				
1962	123	108	54	54
1963	90	140	51	46
1965 - Not Available				
1968	94	101	86	156
<u>Pensioned-Retired</u>				
1962	137	78	82	76
1963	136	91	82	76
1965 - Not Available				
1968	111	89	104	122

Representation Index = $\frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$

TABLE XIII

Percentage Party Vote by Occupation (Collapsed)

(N in brackets)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>Non-Manual</u>						
1962	36.09 (240)	32.55 (103)	22.47 (51)	25.54 (71)	31.56	(599)
1963	31.45 (200)	41.31 (347)	27.38 (69)	26.26 (73)	34.35	(689)
1965 - Not available						
1968	41.41 (135)	43.66 (248)	25.96 (54)	25.00 (19)	38.71	(456)
<u>Manual</u>						
1962	43.61 (290)	51.10 (372)	67.84 (154)	55.40 (154)	51.11	(970)
1963	44.65 (284)	45.83 (385)	62.70 (158)	61.87 (158)	49.80	(999)
1965 - Not available						
1968	45.40 (148)	49.65 (282)	64.42 (134)	65.79 (50)	52.12	(614)
<u>Farmer</u>						
1962	20.30 (135)	16.35 (119)	9.69 (22)	19.06 (53)	17.33	(329)
1963	23.90 (152)	12.86 (108)	9.92 (25)	11.87 (33)	15.85	(318)
1965 - Not available						
1968	13.19 (43)	6.69 (38)	9.62 (20)	9.21 (7)	9.17	(108)

* Party columns for each year add vertically to 100 percent.

TABLE XIV

Party Vote by Occupation (Collapsed)Representation Index

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>Non-Manual</u>				
1962	114	103	71	80
1963	90	119	79	76
1965 - Not Available				
1968	107	112	67	65
<u>Manual</u>				
1962	85	99	132	108
1963	90	92	126	124
1965 - Not Available				
1968	82	93	124	126
<u>Farmer</u>				
1962	117	94	55	109
1963	151	81	63	75
1965 - Not Available				
1968	144	73	105	100

$$\text{Representation Index} = \frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$$

than is the case with either other major party. In addition to this the Liberal Party does well among those at the bottom of the non-manual scale -- clerical workers -- and at the top of the manual scale -- skilled workers -- increasing the validity of its claim to be a party bridging two different classes.

Secondly, there appear to be strongly opposed support bases for the Progressive Conservative and New Democratic Parties. This distinction is sharp if we refer to the simplified breakdown between manuals and non-manuals (Tables XIII and XIV), but the two parties are also clearly opposites in the support they gain from professionals, businessmen and skilled labourers, and widely differentiated among clerical workers. That is to say that these two parties have a clear class orientation in terms of support even if the party system at the moment is dominated by a non or multi-class party, and even if we know that non-class factors are relevant to all parties.

The class index developed in the preceding chapter provides a further tool for the analysis of class polarization. This index reveals a steady, although quite small, increase in the level of class voting (Table XV). While the change is slight, and Canada is in fact still only marginally above a "classless" political party system (i.e. not far from "0"), the change is in the direction predicted by Alford. A further manipulation with the index stresses the difference between Protestant and Roman Catholic voting (Table XVI). The difference between the two class voting levels is not constant, but it is apparent that Protestants are more likely to vote along class lines than are Roman Catholics. This is presumably because of the "classless" support given by Roman Catholics to the Liberal Party and in Quebec to the Creditistes.

TABLE XV

Class Voting Index

1962	4.29
1963	5.12
1965	--
1968	7.09

TABLE XVI

Class Voting IndexBy Religion

<u>Protestant</u>	1962	6.50
	1963	7.24
	1965	--
	1968	14.53
<u>Roman Catholic</u>	1962	-11.60
	1963	4.10
	1965	--
	1968	2.90

To turn briefly to the three classifications outside the manual/non-manual dichotomy, there are evidently changes there as well (Tables XI and XII). There is little significant change in farm support for the Progressive Conservatives from the 1963 level. However, between 1963 and 1968 in terms of their vote distribution as a group (not shown) farmers almost trebled their support for the New Democratic Party -- from 7.86 to 21.70 percent. (In the largely agricultural province of Saskatchewan, the N.D.P. in 1968 won six new seats and increased its share of the popular vote from 26 to 35.9 percent.)

Among the two remaining groups "widows and spinsters" and "pensioned-retired", the Progressive Conservatives lost their advantage with the former in 1963 and with the latter to a lesser extent in 1968. The N.D.P. has gained among both since 1965 and the increased affinity between that party and these relatively poorly-off strata does give some credibility to the theory of polarization.

There is, then, some shifting of voting support bases in occupational terms, but the net effect does not yet give the party system a significantly stronger class orientation. This cautious evaluation of the last four elections is largely substantiated by references to Tables XVII and XVIII, the Socio-Economic, A,B,C,D scale. There is no decisive pattern of change among any of the three major parties in any group, but the basic support distribution illustrates more clearly the division between the parties. The Liberal Party is consistently more dependent on the C's than are the P.C.'s, and the N.D.P. is in turn more dependent on people in the C category than the Liberals. In 1968 the Liberals were strongly represented among B's, but underrepresented in D. The contrast between P.C. and N.D.P. is strongly evidenced in A and B and weakly so in C. As might be suggested

TABLE XVII

Percentage of Party Vote by
Socio-Economic Status

(N in brackets)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>A</u>						
1962	2.52 (20)	2.30 (19)	1.57 (4)	2.55 (8)	2.33	(51)
1963	4.52 (34)	3.17 (31)	1.41 (4)	.97 (3)	3.10	(72)
1965	4.32 (21)	2.87 (21)	.65 (2)	3.51 (4)	2.93	(48)
1968	5.44 (21)	3.82 (25)	2.43 (6)	3.13 (3)	3.97	(55)
<u>B</u>						
1962	29.22 (232)	22.85 (189)	14.90 (38)	18.47 (58)	23.61	(517)
1963	25.80 (194)	28.91 (283)	18.66 (53)	20.71 (64)	25.56	(594)
1965	26.34 (128)	23.77 (174)	22.01 (68)	21.93 (25)	24.07	(395)
1968	31.61 (122)	32.98 (216)	29.96 (74)	17.71 (17)	31.00	(429)
<u>C</u>						
1962	55.92 (444)	60.46 (500)	72.16 (184)	63.38 (194)	60.59	(1327)
1963	56.52 (425)	59.24 (580)	69.37 (197)	60.19 (186)	59.72	(1388)
1965	55.97 (272)	60.79 (445)	63.43 (196)	57.89 (66)	59.66	(979)
1968	52.07 (201)	54.35 (356)	56.68 (140)	57.29 (55)	54.35	(752)
<u>D</u>						
1962	12.34 (98)	14.39 (119)	11.37 (29)	15.61 (49)	13.47	(295)
1963	13.16 (99)	8.68 (85)	10.56 (30)	18.12 (56)	11.62	(270)
1965	13.37 (65)	12.57 (92)	13.92 (43)	16.67 (19)	13.35	(219)
1968	10.88 (42)	8.85 (58)	10.93 (27)	21.88 (21)	10.69	(148)

* Party columns for each year add vertically to 100 percent.

TABLE XVIII

Party Vote by Socio-Economic StatusRepresentation Index

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>A</u>				
1962	108	98	67	109
1963	146	102	46	31
1965	147	98	21	120
1968	137	96	61	79
<u>B</u>				
1962	123	96	63	78
1963	101	113	73	79
1965	109	97	94	93
1968	102	106	97	57
<u>C</u>				
1962	92	100	119	105
1963	95	99	116	101
1965	94	102	106	97
1968	96	100	104	105
<u>D</u>				
1962	92	107	87	116
1963	113	75	91	156
1965	100	94	104	125
1968	102	83	102	220

$$\text{Representation Index} = \frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$$

by the popularity of the Progressive Conservatives in the unskilled category and their remaining strength among "pension-retired" the Progressive Conservatives and the N.D.P. are actually tied in their index score in D in 1968.

As with the manual/non-manual classifications, introduction of a religious control reveals Protestants as more likely to vote according to class criteria (Tables XIX and XX). Progressive Conservatives are over-represented in all SES categories among Protestants, and discriminated against by all Roman Catholics, least so generally among lower status groups. The Liberals are almost the opposite, but the table shows great losses in 1968 among the Catholic C and D groups, while their gains were among the higher Protestant categories. It is interesting to note that among Protestants the N.D.P. is strongly correlated with low SES, but among Roman Catholics there is little difference, and even a suggestion, in 1968, that the protest vote of some upper status Roman Catholics goes to the N.D.P. The Progressive Conservatives weakly correlate with high SES among Protestants (D is the constant exception).

The only other Gallup indicator useful in assessing the existence of class voting is union affiliation (Tables XXI and XXII). Respondents are asked if anyone in the immediate family is a union member and listed as "yes" or "no" on this basis. Of course, the two categories do not correspond to working class and non-working class for many manual labourers will be non-union members, and some clerical workers will be unionized. Nevertheless, union affiliation is clearer than SES in showing the differences in party support. Progressive Conservatives are most dependent upon non-union members, the N.D.P. is very heavily dependent on union families, and the Liberals draw close to equally from both.

TABLE XIX

Party Vote by Religion and SES

(N in brackets)

		<u>P.C.</u> *	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>Protestant</u>							
<u>A</u>	1962	1.68 (13)	.50 (4)	.86 (2)	.66 (2)	1.00	(21)
	1963	3.66 (27)	1.06 (10)	.75 (2)	.98 (3)	1.68	(42)
	1965	3.62 (17)	1.61 (11)	.36 (1)	3.67 (4)	2.14	(33)
	1968	4.37 (16)	2.15 (13)	1.36 (3)	1.09 (1)	2.57	(33)
<u>B</u>	1962	23.00 (178)	10.97 (87)	9.01 (21)	8.61 (26)	14.84	(312)
	1963	21.30 (157)	15.13 (143)	13.53 (36)	9.15 (28)	16.15	(364)
	1965	21.54 (101)	12.74 (87)	13.26 (37)	13.76 (15)	15.58	(240)
	1968	22.94 (84)	17.00 (103)	25.00 (55)	7.61 (7)	19.39	(249)
<u>C</u>	1962	39.66 (307)	26.61 (211)	52.36 (122)	26.82 (81)	34.30	(721)
	1963	40.57 (299)	28.68 (271)	45.86 (122)	22.22 (68)	33.72	(760)
	1965	41.58 (195)	23.57 (161)	41.58 (116)	36.70 (40)	33.25	(512)
	1968	34.43 (126)	22.11 (134)	39.55 (87)	9.78 (9)	27.73	(356)
<u>D</u>	1962	7.75 (60)	5.67 (45)	5.58 (13)	5.30 (16)	6.37	(134)
	1963	10.31 (76)	4.55 (43)	8.27 (22)	6.86 (21)	7.19	(162)
	1965	8.32 (39)	4.39 (30)	9.32 (26)	4.59 (5)	6.49	(100)
	1968	6.01 (22)	2.64 (16)	7.27 (16)	5.43 (5)	4.60	(59)
<u>Roman Catholic</u>							
<u>A</u>	1962	.65 (5)	.88 (7)	.43 (1)	1.99 (6)	.90	(19)
	1963	.81 (6)	2.12 (20)	.38 (1)	--	1.20	(27)
	1965	.85 (4)	1.17 (8)	.36 (1)	--	.84	(13)
	1968	.82 (3)	1.82 (11)	1.36 (3)	2.17 (2)	1.48	(19)

Party Vote by Religion and SES

(Continued)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>Roman Catholic</u> (Continued)						
<u>B</u> 1962	6.07 (47)	10.97 (87)	6.44 (15)	8.94 (27)	8.37	(176)
1963	4.48 (33)	13.44 (127)	4.89 (13)	11.76 (36)	9.27	(209)
1965	4.26 (20)	10.40 (71)	7.89 (22)	8.26 (9)	7.92	(122)
1968	8.74 (32)	16.83 (102)	6.36 (14)	8.70 (8)	12.15	(156)
<u>C</u> 1962	16.80 (130)	35.06 (278)	19.31 (45)	37.09 (112)	26.88	(565)
1963	16.15 (119)	30.69 (290)	24.06 (64)	38.56 (118)	26.22	(591)
1965	14.50 (68)	38.21 (261)	22.58 (63)	21.10 (23)	26.95	(415)
1968	17.76 (65)	31.02 (188)	15.45 (34)	47.83 (44)	25.78	(331)
<u>D</u> 1962	4.39 (34)	9.33 (74)	6.01 (14)	10.60 (32)	7.33	(154)
1963	2.71 (20)	4.34 (41)	2.26 (6)	10.46 (32)	4.39	(99)
1965	5.33 (25)	7.91 (54)	4.66 (13)	11.93 (13)	6.82	(105)
1968	4.92 (18)	6.44 (39)	3.64 (8)	17.39 (16)	6.31	(81)

* Party columns for each year add vertically to 100 percent.

TABLE XX

Party Vote by SES and Religion
Representation Index

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>Protestant</u>				
<u>A</u> 1962	168	50	86	66
1963	192	57	40	53
1965	169	75	17	172
1968	170	84	53	42
<u>B</u> 1962	155	74	61	58
1963	132	94	84	58
1965	138	82	85	88
1968	118	88	129	39
<u>C</u> 1962	116	78	153	78
1963	120	85	136	66
1965	125	71	125	111
1968	124	80	143	35
<u>D</u> 1962	122	89	85	83
1963	143	63	115	95
1965	128	68	144	71
1968	130	57	158	118
<u>Roman Catholic</u>				
<u>A</u> 1962	73	98	48	221
1963	68	178	32	--
1965	101	139	43	--
1968	55	123	92	148
<u>B</u> 1962	73	131	77	107
1963	48	144	52	125
1965	54	131	100	104
1968	72	139	52	72
<u>C</u> 1962	63	130	72	138
1963	62	117	92	147
1965	54	142	84	78
1968	69	120	60	185
<u>D</u> 1962	60	127	82	145
1963	62	99	52	238
1965	78	116	69	175
1968	78	102	58	276

Representation Index = $\frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$

TABLE XXI

Union Member in Family

(N in brackets)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample <u>N</u>
<u>Yes</u>						
1962	18.64 (148)	26.72 (221)	50.20 (128)	25.80 (646)	26.39	(578)
1963	20.61 (155)	21.76 (213)	39.44 (112)	25.57 (79)	24.05	(559)
1965	25.31 (123)	25.55 (187)	41.75 (129)	24.56 (28)	28.46	(467)
1968	22.54 (87)	29.92 (196)	43.72 (108)	29.17 (28)	30.27	(419)
<u>No</u>						
1962	81.36 (646)	73.28 (606)	49.80 (127)	74.20 (233)	73.61	(1612)
1963	79.39 (597)	78.24 (766)	60.56 (172)	74.43 (230)	75.95	(1765)
1965	74.69 (363)	74.45 (545)	58.25 (180)	75.44 (86)	71.54	(1174)
1968	77.46 (299)	70.08 (459)	56.28 (81)	70.83 (102)	69.73	(965)

* Party columns for each year add vertically to 100 percent.

TABLE XXII

Union Member in FamilyRepresentation Index

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>Yes</u>				
1962	71	101	190	97
1963	36	91	164	106
1965	89	90	147	36
1968	75	99	144	96
<u>No</u>				
1962	110	99	67	100
1963	104	103	80	98
1965	104	104	81	105
1968	111	102	81	102

$$\text{Representation Index} = \frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$$

If we isolate the manual workers, and then divide them according to the presence or absence of union affiliation (Tables XXIII and XXIV), we obtain some insight into the source of union/low SES votes for the Progressive Conservative and Liberal Parties. The N.D.P., not surprisingly, does best among unionized manual workers; in 1963 and 1965 skilled union members were most strongly represented among N.D.P. voters, but in 1968 it was unskilled workers. Progressive Conservatives were most popular among non-union, particularly unskilled, and in 1968 even outdrew both the Liberals and N.D.P. in terms of the representation index of the latter. For some reason the attractiveness of the Liberal Party for skilled union members is not matched by the P.C.'s. The greatest division within the Liberal Party support from manual workers is not generally between union and non-union, but skilled and unskilled, while the reverse seems true of both other parties. In trying to explain this difference we may hypothesize that the unions act as agents of working class consciousness strong enough to affect the perception of the New Democratic and Progressive Conservative Parties, but not to interfere with the more prosperous workers' favourable perception of the Liberal Party. Many of those who are non-union working class are probably in occupations which bring them into frequent contact with higher occupational strata, and are accordingly more likely to form political judgments in line with non-class criteria.²⁴

Again the general conclusion after an examination of the variables is that there is little evidence of an unmistakable drift towards class politics. Clearly the Progressive Conservatives and New Democrats are diver-

²⁴ For a discussion of the connection between union membership, class consciousness and class voting, see Giovanni Sartori, "Sociology of Politics and Political Sociology", in Politics and the Social Sciences, ed. by Seymour M. Lipset. (London and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 84.

TABLE XXIII

Manual Workers by Union Affiliation

(N in Brackets)

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>Skilled Union</u>						
1962	10.29* (81)	14.85 (121)	31.35 (79)	12.79 (86)	14.82	(320)
1963	11.34 (84)	11.36 (108)	26.55 (73)	14.43 (44)	13.60	(309)
1965	- Not available					
1968	9.21 (35)	15.51 (101)	21.90 (53)	12.63 (12)	14.69	(201)
<u>Skilled Non-Union</u>						
1962	14.23 (112)	15.58 (127)	15.87 (40)	16.72 (51)	15.28	(330)
1963	14.71 (109)	16.09 (153)	18.13 (50)	19.34 (59)	16.33	(371)
1965	- Not available					
1968	15.79 (60)	16.44 (107)	16.11 (39)	16.84 (16)	16.23	(222)
<u>Unskilled Union</u>						
1962	4.19 (33)	5.40 (44)	9.13 (23)	9.51 (29)	5.97	(129)
1963	4.72 (35)	4.10 (39)	7.27 (20)	4.92 (15)	4.80	(109)
1965	- Not available					
1968	5.26 (20)	4.92 (32)	16.12 (28)	9.47 (9)	6.50	(89)
<u>Unskilled Non-Union</u>						
1962	8.13 (64)	9.82 (80)	4.76 (12)	11.48 (35)	8.85	(191)
1963	7.56 (56)	8.94 (85)	5.45 (15)	11.70 (54)	9.24	(210)
1965	- Not available					
1968	8.68 (33)	6.45 (42)	5.79 (14)	13.68 (13)	7.46	(102)

* This table represents a breakdown of the two manual occupation categories in Table XIII, and so do not add to 100 percent. When added to the non-manual and "Other" categories, for each party by year, the sum would be 100 percent.

TABLE XXIV

Manual Workers by Union AffiliationRepresentation Index

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>Skilled Union</u>				
1962	69	100	212	86
1963	83	84	195	106
1965 - Not Available				
1968	63	106	149	86
<u>Skilled Non-Union</u>				
1962	93	102	104	109
1963	90	99	111	118
1965 - Not Available				
1968	97	101	99	104
<u>Unskilled Union</u>				
1962	70	90	153	159
1963	98	85	151	103
1965 - Not Available				
1968	81	76	248	146
<u>Unskilled Non-Union</u>				
1962	92	111	54	129
1963	81	97	59	192
1965 - Not Available				
1968	116	86	78	183

$$\text{Representation Index} = \frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$$

gent in their class base, but there are overlaps which obfuscate the sharpness of this division. More important, the Liberal Party remains as a strong centre party, neither strongly dependent upon nor discriminated against by any important sector or class in the electorate.

Other Variables

What have been termed the "traditional" and "class" variables do not highlight all the important characteristics of recent Canadian voting behaviour. Gallup includes questions on respondent's community size, age, sex, and education, and the first in particular is a useful indicator.

It has become commonplace to point to the rural base of the Progressive Conservative Party and the urban support for Liberals and New Democrats. The accuracy of this generalization is confirmed in the Gallup Poll figures for 1962-1968. Unfortunately, as noted in Chapter II, it is not possible in 1968 to differentiate among "urban" communities, and that category includes every place over 1,000 inhabitants. Tables XXV and XXVI show a slight overall shift in voting patterns in the urban areas. Progressive Conservatives have lost slightly among the urban sector which has increased, according to Gallup, from 67.35 percent of the population in 1962 to 75 percent in 1968. (A Shift not too far out of line with reality, see Chapter II.) Liberals have increased and the N.D.P. has dropped in proportion of support from urban areas from 1965 to 1968, due both to an actual loss in the urban vote -- 18.11 from 20.48 in 1965 (not shown), and a climb in the rural non-farm vote -- 19.05 percent from 14.89 percent. These gross shifts do not appear to be very startling until we look at the breakdown of the urban category provided in the three elections previous to 1968. An

TABLE XXV

Percentage of Vote by Community Classification

(N in brackets)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>Rural-agricultural (farm)</u>						
1962	18.51 (147)	14.51 (120)	9.41 (24)	15.92 (50)	15.57	(341)
1963	21.68 (163)	13.28 (130)	9.51 (27)	12.94 (40)	15.49	(360)
1965	16.67 (81)	8.88 (65)	7.44 (23)	13.16 (15)	11.21	(184)
1968	12.95 (50)	8.70 (57)	7.69 (19)	10.42 (10)	9.83	(136)
<u>Rural non-agricultural</u>						
1962	19.65 (156)	15.11 (125)	16.08 (41)	16.56 (52)	17.08	(374)
1963	17.69 (133)	14.61 (143)	11.62 (33)	24.92 (77)	16.61	(386)
1965	19.14 (93)	15.85 (116)	14.89 (46)	26.32 (30)	17.37	(285)
1968	18.65 (72)	11.30 (74)	16.19 (40)	25.00 (24)	15.17	(210)
<u>1,000-10,000</u>						
1962	12.72 (101)	10.40 (86)	9.41 (24)	16.88 (53)	12.05	(264)
1963	11.30 (85)	12.16 (119)	6.69 (19)	18.12 (56)	12.01	(279)
1965	10.70 (52)	9.97 (73)	7.12 (22)	15.79 (18)	10.05	(165)
1968	- Not available					
<u>10,000-30,000</u>						
1962	6.80 (54)	5.93 (49)	3.53 (9)	8.60 (27)	6.35	(139)
1963	8.51 (64)	4.80 (47)	7.39 (21)	6.80 (21)	6.58	(153)
1965	6.79 (33)	4.51 (33)	4.53 (14)	10.53 (12)	5.61	(92)
1968	- Not available					

Percentage of Vote by Community Classification

(Continued)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample <u>N</u>
<u>30,000-100,000</u>						
1962	7.93 (63)	10.04 (83)	11.76 (30)	5.73 (18)	8.86	(194)
1963	12.10 (91)	8.99 (88)	9.15 (26)	5.50 (17)	9.95	(222)
1965	7.82 (38)	12.57 (92)	13.59 (42)	4.39 (5)	10.79	(177)
1968 - Not available						
<u>100,000 plus</u>						
1962	34.38 (273)	44.01 (364)	49.80 (127)	36.31 (114)	40.09	(878)
1963	28.72 (216)	26.17 (452)	55.63 (158)	31.72 (98)	39.76	(924)
1965	38.89 (189)	48.22 (353)	52.43 (162)	29.82 (34)	44.97	(738)
1968 - Not available						

* Party columns for each year, except 1968 add vertically to 100 percent.

All Urban Categories (1,000 up)*

1962	61.84 (491)	70.37 (582)	74.51 (190)	67.52 (212)	67.35	(1475)
1963	60.64 (456)	72.11 (706)	78.87 (224)	62.14 (192)	67.90	(1578)
1965	64.20 (312)	75.27 (551)	77.67 (240)	60.53 (69)	71.42	(1172)
1968	68.39 (264)	80.00 (524)	76.11 (188)	64.58 (62)	75.00	(1038)

* All urban categories, plus two rural categories equal 100 percent vertically for each party.

TABLE XXVI

Vote by Community ClassificationRepresentation Index

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>Rural-Agriculture</u>				
1962	119	93	60	102
1963	140	86	61	84
1965	149	79	66	121
1968	132	89	78	106
<u>Rural Non-Agricultural</u>				
1962	115	88	94	97
1963	107	88	70	151
1965	110	91	86	151
1968	123	75	107	165
<u>1,000-10,000</u>				
1962	106	86	78	140
1963	94	101	56	151
1965	106	99	71	152
1968 - Not Available				
<u>10,000-30,000</u>				
1962	107	93	56	135
1963	129	73	112	103
1965	121	80	81	188
1968 - Not Available				
<u>30,000-100,000</u>				
1962	90	113	133	65
1963	125	93	95	57
1965	72	116	121	41
1968 - Not Available				
<u>100,000 plus</u>				
1962	86	110	124	91
1963	72	114	142	80
1965	87	107	117	66
1968 - Not Available				

Vote by Community Classification
(Continued)

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>All Urban Categories (1,000 up)</u>				
1962	92	104	111	100
1963	89	106	116	92
1965	90	105	109	85
1968	91	107	101	86

Representation Index = $\frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$

TABLE XXVII

Percentage of Party Vote by Religion in Urban Areas

(N in Brackets)

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample <u>N</u>
<u>Urban Protestant</u>						
1962	44.44 (344)	29.26 (232)	46.78 (109)	25.50 (77)	36.25	(762)
1963	46.27 (341)	32.06 (303)	52.26 (139)	22.22 (68)	37.76	(851)
1965	46.27 (217)	30.75 (210)	48.39 (135)	33.03 (36)	38.83	(598)
1968	48.63 (178)	35.31 (214)	54.09 (119)	18.48 (17)	41.12	(528)
<u>Urban Catholic</u>						
1962	16.67 (129)	39.85 (316)	25.32 (59)	42.72 (129)	30.11	(633)
1963	14.25 (105)	39.15 (370)	25.56 (68)	39.54 (121)	29.46	(664)
1965	17.06 (80)	43.05 (294)	27.24 (76)	26.61 (29)	31.10	(479)
1968	20.49 (75)	44.22 (268)	20.91 (46)	46.74 (43)	33.64	(432)

Note: This table does not total 100 percent. It represents a breakdown of the percentages in the "All Urban Categories" in Table XXV. The total of party support for all sizes of communities equals 100 percent.

TABLE XXVIII

Party Vote by Religion in Urban AreasRepresentation Index

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>Urban Protestant</u>				
1962	126	83	133	72
1963	123	85	139	59
1965	120	79	124	85
1968	118	86	132	45

Urban Catholic

1962	54	123	81	137
1963	48	133	87	134
1965	55	138	83	86
1968	61	131	62	139

$$\text{Representation Index} = \frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$$

examination of the table in this light clearly shows that there is a sharp rural-urban split in party support distribution, if we define urban as those communities with a population of 30,000 plus, rather than 1,000 plus. In these terms the Progressive Conservative Party is usually badly under-represented in the urban areas, while the N.D.P. and the Liberal Party are strong. If we accept that the high urban index for the Liberal Party is explained by areas of over 30,000, as is indicated by the 1962-65 figures, then it seems probable that the slight rise for the Liberal Party in total urban support really represents a strong rise in communities over 30,000. It is similarly possible that the N.D.P. increase in independence on small rural settlements actually extends to large towns and that the Progressive Conservatives remained over-represented in the same areas.

Tables XXVII and XXVIII reveal the result of combining religion and urban residence -- a further exaggeration of the gap between Liberals and Conservatives among Roman Catholics.

If it is correct to conclude from the pre-1968 data that the fairly sharp division in party support which occurs at approximately 30,000 community size, occurs in that year also, then this may provide us with an important clue as to the future of the Canadian party system. The implications of this rural-urban cleavage will be more fully examined in the concluding chapter.

A study of Tables XXIX, XXX, XXXI, and XXXII, on vote by age group, reveals the accuracy of speculations on the preference of youth for the Liberal Party, and of older persons for the Progressive Conservatives. In three of the four elections the Progressive Conservatives have scored higher on the representation index as age rose. Both the Progressive Conservatives and New Democrats were more dependent on the two older groups than in 1965; the

TABLE XXIX

Percentage of Party Vote by Age

(N in brackets)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>21-29</u>						
1962	17.88 (142)	23.46 (194)	20.78 (53)	31.53 (99)	22.28	(488)
1963	19.02 (143)	22.68 (222)	25.00 (71)	27.83 (86)	22.46	(522)
1965	16.67 (81)	19.13 (140)	19.74 (61)	19.30 (22)	18.53	(304)
1968	17.36 (67)	25.34 (166)	17.81 (44)	31.25 (30)	22.18	(307)
<u>30-39</u>						
1962	24.69 (196)	25.03 (207)	27.06 (69)	27.71 (51)	25.53	(559)
1963	22.87 (172)	24.21 (237)	29.58 (84)	25.57 (79)	24.61	(572)
1965	20.99 (102)	22.95 (168)	25.57 (79)	19.30 (22)	22.61	(371)
1968	21.24 (82)	22.90 (150)	22.67 (56)	20.83 (20)	22.25	(308)
<u>40-49</u>						
1962	20.28 (161)	22.01 (182)	27.06 (69)	16.24 (51)	21.14	(463)
1963	23.14 (174)	21.96 (215)	24.30 (69)	23.30 (72)	22.81	(530)
1965	24.49 (119)	27.05 (198)	22.98 (71)	21.05 (24)	25.11	(412)
1968	22.80 (88)	21.98 (144)	27.94 (69)	17.71 (17)	22.98	(318)
<u>50 plus</u>						
1962	37.15 (295)	29.50 (244)	25.10 (64)	24.52 (77)	31.05	(680)
1963	34.97 (263)	31.15 (305)	21.13 (60)	23.30 (72)	30.12	(700)
1965	37.86 (184)	30.87 (226)	31.72 (98)	40.35 (46)	33.76	(554)
1968	38.60 (149)	29.77 (195)	31.58 (78)	30.21 (29)	32.59	(451)

* Party columns for each year add vertically to 100 percent.

TABLE XXX

Party Vote by AgeRepresentation Index

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>21-29</u>				
1962	80	105	93	141
1963	85	101	111	124
1965	90	103	106	104
1968	78	115	80	140
<u>30-39</u>				
1962	96	98	105	108
1963	93	98	120	104
1965	93	101	113	85
1968	96	103	102	93
<u>40-49</u>				
1962	95	104	128	76
1963	101	96	107	102
1965	98	108	92	84
1968	99	96	122	77
<u>50 plus</u>				
1962	119	95	80	78
1963	116	103	70	77
1965	112	92	94	119
1968	118	91	97	93

$$\text{Representation Index} = \frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$$

TABLE XXXI

Percentage Vote for each Party of New Voters

(N in brackets)

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample <u>%</u>	Sample <u>N</u>
<u>1962-1963</u>						
	21.8 (12)	47.3 (26)	12.7 (7)	18.2 (10)	2.36	(55)
<u>1963-1965</u>						
	17.4 (12)	47.4 (32)	23.2 (16)	13.0 (9)	4.20	(69)
<u>1965-1968</u>						
	23.2 (16)	57.0 (40)	13.0 (9)	5.8 (4)	5.08	(69)

Because of the small numbers involved this table is not percentaged in the same fashion as the other tables. It shows the distribution of the vote of those voting for the first time, rather than the proportion of party support derived from each group. The rows add horizontally to 100 percent.

TABLE XXXII

Class Index By Age

21-29	1962	.94
	1963	3.52
	1965	--
	1968	8.94
30-39	1962	5.46
	1963	7.50
	1965	--
	1968	2.90
40-49	1962	6.03
	1963	2.80
	1965	--
	1968	11.29
50 plus	1962	4.66
	1963	7.89
	1965	--
	1968	6.99

Liberals increased their vote most among voters 21 to 29, and took an even larger proportion than usual of those old enough to vote for the first time. Although the link between lower age and Liberal voting is not as sharp in every election as that between Conservative voting and higher age, the two parties can be clearly differentiated by the age criteria. The N.D.P. appears to vary in support by age group; it usually draws a higher proportion of supporters from ages 30-49, but this is not consistent.

Possibly if a new focus in Canadian party competition is developing, the change in perception of parties will become apparent among the younger voters, with older voters voting more along traditional lines. A calculation of class voting by age groups does not substantiate this speculation, for while class voting among the youngest voters has increased in every election, class voting among other groups is frequently higher in similar time periods, and there is no clear downward trend among older voters. It is likely, however, that the youngest age group is responsible for the overall increase from 1965 to 1968.

A study of the age data leaves us with what is for this study an unanswerable question. What is the causal relationship between age and vote? Do voters change party allegiance as they grow older, or are we really witnessing a drastic regeneration of the electorate with the eventual destruction of the Progressive Conservative Party a creeping inevitability?

Tables XXIII and XXXIV, showing representation by sex, are worth examining to make one point. Female voters have consistently discriminated against the New Democratic Party, preferring the parties more to the right. This discrimination was slightly attenuated in 1968, and this may herald a less hostile attitude to the N.D.P. among female voters.

TABLE XXXIII

Percentage of Party Vote by Sex

(N in brackets)

	<u>P.C.</u> [*]	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>Male</u>						
1962	47.48 (377)	49.70 (411)	58.43 (149)	52.23 (164)	50.27	(1101)
1963	49.87 (375)	48.31 (473)	57.39 (163)	51.78 (160)	50.39	(1171)
1965	45.88 (223)	48.77 (357)	56.63 (175)	49.12 (56)	49.42	(811)
1968	48.19 (186)	47.48 (311)	53.85 (133)	47.92 (46)	48.84	(676)
<u>Female</u>						
1962	52.52 (417)	50.30 (416)	41.57 (106)	47.77 (150)	49.73	(1089)
1963	50.13 (377)	51.69 (506)	42.61 (121)	48.22 (149)	49.61	(1153)
1965	54.12 (263)	51.23 (375)	43.37 (134)	50.88 (58)	50.58	(830)
1968	51.81 (200)	52.52 (344)	46.15 (114)	52.08 (50)	51.16	(704)

* Party columns for each year add vertically to 100 percent.

TABLE XXXIV

Party Vote by Sex
Representation Index

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>Male</u>				
1962	94	98	116	104
1963	99	96	114	103
1965	92	98	113	98
1968	99	97	110	98
<u>Female</u>				
1962	105	101	84	96
1963	101	104	86	97
1965	107	101	86	101
1968	101	103	90	102

$$\text{Representation Index} = \frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$$

TABLE XXXV

Percentage of Party Vote by Education (Summarized)**

(N in brackets)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>Public</u>						
1962	37.91 (287)	43.00 (344)	35.20 (88)	44.19 (193)	40.42	(852)
1963	36.42 (256)	36.81 (342)	24.28 (67)	47.37 (144)	36.57	(809)
1965	36.12 (151)	39.88 (262)	32.44 (85)	41.05 (39)	37.50	(537)
1968	33.25 (128)	28.57 (186)	29.34 (71)	53.68 (51)	31.76	(436)
<u>Secondary or Technical</u>						
1962	51.25 (388)	45.00 (360)	55.20 (138)	53.16 (160)	49.62	(1046)
1963	52.35 (368)	49.52 (460)	64.86 (179)	46.05 (140)	51.85	(1147)
1965	55.50 (232)	50.68 (333)	60.69 (159)	53.68 (51)	54.12	(775)
1968	55.32 (213)	57.76 (376)	64.88 (157)	44.21 (42)	57.39	(788)
<u>University</u>						
1962	10.83 (82)	12.00 (96)	9.60 (24)	2.66 (8)	9.96	(210)
1963	11.24 (79)	13.67 (127)	10.87 (30)	6.58 (20)	11.57	(256)
1965	8.37 (35)	9.44 (62)	6.87 (18)	5.26 (5)	8.38	(120)
1968	11.43 (44)	13.67 (89)	5.79 (14)	2.11 (2)	10.85	(149)

* Party columns for each year add vertically to 100 percent.

** See Appendix C for a detailed breakdown of education.

TABLE XXXVI

Party Support by Education (Summarized)Representation Index

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>Public</u>				
1962	93	106	87	109
1963	100	101	62	130
1965	96	106	87	109
1968	105	90	92	169
<u>Secondary or Technical</u>				
1962	103	90	111	107
1963	101	96	125	89
1965	103	94	112	99
1968	96	101	113	77
<u>University</u>				
1962	108	120	96	26
1963	97	118	94	57
1965	100	113	82	63
1968	105	126	53	19

$$\text{Representation Index} = \frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$$

A reference to Tables XXXV and XXXVI, on education, illustrates another dimension of the contrasting electoral foundation of the three parties. In each election university-educated people were more likely than others to vote Liberal. In 1968, for the first time in these four elections, the tendency to Liberal voting increased as education level rose. In 1962 the P.C.'s increased support as education rose, but after that year no clear relationship is in evidence. In 1968 the least and most educated were equally likely to be Progressive Conservative voters.

A Note on the Relative Importance of Variables

Table XXXVII attempts to show the relative importance of the Gallup variables by means of the V^2 statistic (Cramers V -- a chi-square based statistic which compensates for unequal columns and rows in the tables). Several points can be made. First, religion and language are almost always first or second, and generally quite a bit higher in score than the closest other variables. Only one class related variable -- union affiliation -- is consistently high, and SES is consistently low. Only five of the variables have increased their V^2 score from 1962 to 1968, but three of these -- SES, education and occupation -- are directly or indirectly related to a measurement of class voting differences. As we have seen, community is also an important variable in terms of the nature and consequence of political competition. Despite these changes there is very little startling change in the relative position of the variables. This would suggest that there has been little change in voting patterns.

TABLE XXXVII
Variables by Rank-Order of V^2

<u>1962</u>		<u>1963</u>		<u>1965</u>		<u>1968</u>	
1. Language	.051	Language	.033	Religion	.031	Language	.047
2. Union	.045	Religion	.029	Language	.026	Religion	.033
3. Religion	.032	Occupation	.021	Union	.020	Union	.020
4. Occupation	.012	Union	.019	Community	.011	Occupation	.016
5. Age	.007	Community	.014	Marital St.	.005	Education	.015
6. Education	.007	Education	.010	Sex	.005	Community	.010
7. Marital St.	.007	SES	.007	Education	.003	Age	.006
8. Sex	.005	Age	.005	SES	.003	SES	.006
9. SES	.005	Sex	.003	Age	.002	Sex	.002
10. Community	.005	Marital St.	.002			Marital St.	.002

Cramer's V (V^2) is a measure based on the chi square statistic. It compensates for unequal rows and columns in the tables being compared. In the above table V^2 has been computed for the cross tabulation of each of the variables with party vote. The writer is not aware of any method for assessing the statistical significance of the actual score, and so the greatest attention should be paid to the relative order of the variables for each year. For a full discussion of this statistic see Blalock, Social Statistics, page 230.

In concluding this analysis of the national Gallup data, the following points should be recalled. There is no compelling evidence to suggest any significant change in the relative importance of traditional versus class-voting descriptive variables. Religion and language still bear the closest relationship to voting behaviour. However, the breakdown of occupational and union affiliation data does reveal some continuing connection between social class and party vote, particularly with regard to the Progressive Conservative and New Democratic Parties. There have been fluctuations in all of these variables, but it is too early to discern a definite trend. Among the remaining variables, the divergent support bases of the parties in rural-urban dependence, probably has long term implications for the party system, and this may be particularly so when combined with the present evidence of class polarization.

The foregoing analysis indicates the essential stability in national voting trends, but does not deal with the possibility that there have been important variations at the provincial or local level. Deficiencies in the data discussed in the second chapter prevent the analysis from being carried to the provincial level, even though this may be essential to a full understanding of Canadian voting. It is difficult to avoid, however, a brief reference to provincial deviations from the national pattern, and for this purpose Table XXXVIII, showing the class voting index for each province, is included. This table shows great fluctuation, and as with other data these variations might easily be attributed to poor sampling. A few suggestive points can be made, however. First, with few exceptions, class voting is

TABLE XXXVIII

Provincial Class Voting Index

<u>Nova Scotia</u>	1962	4.18
	1963	3.92
	1965	--
	1968	10.81
<u>New Brunswick</u>	1962	6.58
	1963	8.29
	1965	--
	1968	1.24
<u>Newfoundland</u>	1962	1.32
	1963	-11.93
	1965	--
	1968	1.47
<u>Quebec</u>	1962	- .30
	1963	2.36
	1965	--
	1968	-2.75
<u>Ontario</u>	1962	8.90
	1963	8.68
	1965	--
	1968	9.04
<u>Manitoba</u>	1962	14.83
	1963	-2.26
	1965	--
	1968	17.79
<u>Saskatchewan</u>	1962	-3.28
	1963	-3.34
	1965	--
	1968	17.85
<u>Alberta</u>	1962	-2.35
	1963	.86
	1965	--
	1968	7.07
<u>British Columbia</u>	1962	5.20
	1963	9.58
	1965	--
	1968	24.85

very low east of Ontario, Nova Scotia in 1968 and New Brunswick in 1963 being these exceptions. Secondly, Ontario is very stable in the degree of class voting indicated, and usually higher than most other provinces. B.C. has increased substantially in every election. The third point to be made is that every province which has a C.C.F. - N.D.P. government or opposition revealed a high level of class voting in 1968. In Saskatchewan the sharp rise in the level of class voting may be attributed to the supplanting of the Progressive Conservatives by the N.D.P. as the chief agent of Prairie protest; a similar transference seems to have occurred in Manitoba.

The basic point to be made here is simply that several provinces, seemingly British Columbia, Ontario, and perhaps Manitoba and Saskatchewan, have significant levels of class voting.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Alternative Research Approaches

This paper has attempted to assess Alford's prediction that Canada's party system will become more polarized, in class terms, by referring to Gallup Poll data on the last four federal elections. The findings have been that, although some variations in party support can be attributed to the influence of class, there is no evidence definite enough to support his prediction. However, this conclusion has been at least partly dictated by the nature of the data used, by the definitions of class voting, and by the assumptions about the party system which have been adopted. Lower and middle class has been equated with manual or non-manual occupational status respectively. Class voting has been defined not merely as support of a party by a class, but dependence of a party on one class. Furthermore, this differential has been objectively connected with the idea of a class interest, so that class voting has been defined as support of a class for a party which is seen by the writer as having its chief interest in advancing the interests of that class. This operationalization might properly be said to have derived from what class voting means in Britain, where, with important exceptions, lower classes vote Labour and the middle and upper classes Conservative. The conclusions are only considered as valid within the framework of these assumptions, and these assumptions were necessary because of the unsophisticated nature of the data.

Therefore, before proceeding to some speculations about class and the Canadian party system, it is appropriate to briefly outline several alternative research approaches to a study of class voting, which although they might

well confirm the conclusions of this study, might as easily reject them.

Perhaps the most obvious bias of this study is that it deals only with national data on federal politics. Not only was the data not broken down by province -- a breakdown, one suspects, of crucial importance -- but there is no evidence available at all for discussing provincial political systems. Since the New Democratic Party is in power in Manitoba, and is the official opposition in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and a very strong third in Ontario, and because it is facing either Social Credit, right-wing Liberal, or Progressive Conservative opponents as the chief opposition (except perhaps in Ontario), it seems highly likely that a greater degree of class polarization would be discovered in these provinces than at the national level. It is possible that there is a greater potential for class-oriented politics at the provincial level because of the distribution of legislative powers, which gives most social welfare responsibilities to the provinces. Since the extent to which polarization occurs in the provincial sphere may have implications for the support available to the federal parties, an assessment of each province would be very useful.

Important discoveries might conceivably be made at an even more localized level -- the constituency. It is plausible that factors peculiar to individual ridings increase polarization in these ridings, contributing to an increase in overall class voting within the system, but in such a way as to be almost undetectable by national or even provincial analysis. An example of the potential of the constituency approach would be John Wilson's study of Waterloo South.²⁵ A suggestive finding emerged from this article;

²⁵ John Wilson, "Politics and Social Class in Canada: The Case of Waterloo South", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1, No. 3 (September, 1968), pp. 288-309.

the N.D.P. had altered the party orientation of the working class by an intensive propaganda campaign, indicating that under favourable circumstances some electorates will be responsive to a class appeal.²⁶ Further, investigations of this nature could increase our knowledge of the dynamics of polarization, and permit the detection of polarization which occurs sporadically rather than with national uniformity.

The other approach which will be discussed here was intimated in the second chapter, and is rather more than a difference in geographic focus -- that is, the subjective versus the objective approach. The subjective approach, by allowing respondents to specify their class membership, describe their impression of each party, and explain their reasons for supporting one of those parties, would avoid the rigid assumptions and restricted definitions used in this paper. It would be possible to determine if persons who appear to vote by class interest, actually see their vote in that light, or if people who vote contrary to class in the objective sense, actually see their vote as a class vote.

Little work has been done on questions of this sort in Canada, but John Meisel has included questions on subjective class status and respondent's party perceptions in his post-election surveys of the federal elections of 1965 and 1968. Respondents, in addition to describing their own class position, were asked to rank an "Ideal" party, and the actual parties, on a seven-point scale which separated pairs of alternatives. Did they see the parties as good-bad, honest-dishonest, exciting-dull, modern-out of date, young-old, for the working class-for the middle class, left wing-right wing, powerful-weak, competent-incompetent or united-split? By cross-tabulating

²⁶ Ibid., p. 305.

these choices with socio-economic variables similar in focus to the ones in the Gallup Poll, it was possible to link vote with party image.

Meisel discussed these results in a paper given to the C.P.S.A. in 1970, and several of the findings are relevant to this paper.²⁷ Canadians, on the average, viewed the ideal party as close to a centre party, indicating the electorate's satisfaction with an unpolarized system. However, when the party perceptions of lower class voters and middle class voters were contrasted, it was found that the former were much more likely to see the N.D.P. in **favourable terms** than was the middle class, and the latter was more inclined to so view the Conservatives and Liberals. Meisel's conclusion was that class (in the subjective sense) " ... is a relevant and important variable which cannot be ignored when one attempts to explain the political perceptions of Canadians." ²⁸

Meisel also examined perceptions by respondent's ethnic background, religion, education, sex and so on. His findings on the first are consonant with some of this study, for French-Canadians between 1965 and 1968 gave the Progressive Conservatives a greater improvement in their scores than either British or "Others" in eight of the dimensions listed above. In this study, it will be recalled, French-Canadians were found to have increased their support for Progressive Conservatives from 1965 to 1968.

Meisel's findings are helpful in describing the role of class in voting, but additional information could be sought to clarify other puzzles arising from a study of voting behaviour in Canada. Why does religion still correlate highly with party vote? Do voters perceive parties as Protestant

27 Meisel, "Party Images in Canada: A Report on Work in Progress".

28 Ibid., p. 44.

or Catholic? Can they give religious or ethnic reasons for their vote? How is union affiliation connected with vote -- do union members perceive parties as hostile or friendly? Do they recognize the union as an agent of class consciousness? Or further, does an attitude change explain the preference of older voters for more conservative parties?

Meisel's subjective approach has immense potential for clarifying the relationships discovered in this paper, and could allow a much more sophisticated study of voting than the data available have permitted.

A Note on Cleavage Formation in Canada

The remaining section will deal with Alford's theoretical assumptions in discussing class voting. The key argument in Alford's prediction that further class polarization will occur in Canada, is his belief that certain reactions are inevitable given an industrial society at a high level of development. To repeat the quotation given in the introduction:

Stated most generally and baldly, industrialization and urbanization may encourage national economic integration, cultural assimilation, national political integration, and secularization. 29

As the nation becomes integrated, cultural peculiarities are eliminated and religion loses its hold on people's political conduct, the cleavages based on this lack of integration, cultural diversity and religion will disappear, and the economic differences between classes will be more visible and assert themselves more strongly. Political parties will tend to represent these differences and Canada will have a class polarized political system. .

29 Alford, Party and Society, p. 309.

This section will argue that although there is some evidence in the data to suggest that an increase in class voting is a possibility, it is by no means obvious that this will be entirely due to the causal chain which Alford constructs. Nor will class polarization become as great a factor in Canadian politics as he seems to assume. Aside from some complications in his causal chain, Canada, it is hypothesized here, will not develop as he predicts because the course of history in Canada has resulted in a different social-political climate and a different kind of political culture than the older polarized western systems from which Alford presumably inferred the future course of Canadian development.

First, does it follow that industrialization and modernization in Canada will lead to economic integration, by which Alford means that all regions will be similar in economic structure? Two factors would interfere with the directness of this inference. First, the five major regions of Canada -- the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies and British Columbia -- are widely divergent in economic capacity. They vary between primary production and secondary industry, and between a wealth of resources and scarcity. Some regional economic goals are in conflict with others, and all regions compete for economic concessions in taxation, marketing or production, or just subsidization. Even were Alford to mean industrialization in the sense that all regional economies would be industrial, rather than dependent on primary industries, it is unlikely that the disparities in productive capacity or competitive advantage could be removed. Put bluntly, even between industrialized regional economies, there are likely to be highly visible and important differences in interest which will hinder economic integration.

But assuming that economic integration were actually occurring, will this necessarily lead to cultural assimilation? Surely, much of the present

separatist agitation in Quebec may be viewed as explicit resistance to the attempt by outside forces to integrate Quebec into the North American environment through industrialization. Appeals have been made to the power of the "state" of Quebec to promote cultural entrenchment, sometimes by, and often by not remaining in the Canadian polity. This reaction may be viewed as a common occurrence in modernizing societies, and yet it has been a feature of Quebec politics for over thirty years, and there is little evidence that the fear of cultural assimilation, and its political consequences, are receding. If this struggle continues, then it seems plausible to argue that French-Canadian ethnic consciousness will continue to prevent the development of class consciousness in Quebec. This in turn will give a strong impetus to the two major federal parties to continue to emphasize the linguistic-cultural cleavage, another way of phrasing the continuance of brokerage politics.

Does the growth of secularization necessarily mean an increase in politicization -- the substitution of rational "political" for religion-dictated motivations? Even at the present time it appears that the vote of large numbers of voters can be predicted by reference to religion, and yet not all voters appear to link religion and vote.³⁰ A possible explanation of this may be simply inertia or habit. While once political loyalties were explicitly connected with religion or religion-related questions, the tradition of party support has been passed through the family or peer group without explanation or justification. Party preference received non-rational reinforcement. This is, of course, only speculation, but if in fact much

30 Meisel, "Religious Affiliation and Electoral Behaviour", p. 150.

religious voting is only related indirectly to religious criteria, then will the increase in secularization necessarily change voting habits. It seems plausible that increased voting on some other basis will occur, but the slate has by no means been wiped clean, and the reinforcement by various means of religion-derived voting patterns may obscure or delay indefinitely a significant reorientation of the electorate.

Suppose, however, that the reader sweeps these objections aside and accepts that economic integration, cultural assimilation and secularization are all fact and not speculation. Does class politics then follow?

To deal with this question the paper will discuss briefly some aspects of Canadian political history. Basically the point is to show the relevance of S.M. Lipset's idea that certain developments in the early history of the political system have long-term effects for the development of politically salient cleavages in the society.³¹ Important factors to be considered include the manner in which the lower classes were brought into the political system, the nature of the economic system, the type of electoral system, and the nature of the existing cleavages. All these effect the political culture of a country; value assumptions are built into the political system which are not easily erased.

At the time of Confederation, 80 percent of Canada's work force was engaged in agricultural or extractive activities, and the manufacturing that was carried on was on a small scale.³² Although the National Policy had some

31 See in Particular, Seymour M. Lipset, "Political Cleavages in 'Developed' and 'Emerging' Politics", in Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology, ed. by S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (Toronto: Free Press, 1970); and S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction" in Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967).

32 W.T. Easterbrook, H.G.T. Aitken, Canadian Economic History (Toronto: MacMillan, 1965), p. 384.

effect on Canada's economy, her boom period did not occur in the nineteenth century. Thus at a time when many European countries were rapidly industrializing, with the accompanying misery of the great slums and harsh working conditions, the majority of the Canadian population was neither living in cities, nor working for large and dehumanized industries. Canada was still a sparsely settled rural community, with widely scattered population centres. For the first decades after 1867 there was neither widespread antagonism between employer and the small working class, nor communication facilities to permit the spread of a working class consciousness or ideology. Therefore an economic system with a capitalist strata standing in opposition to a large working class did not exist in Canada, at the very time when this situation did exist and did foster working class consciousness in some countries of Europe.

A further important distinction between industrializing Europe and the essentially ~~staple~~ ^{staple} economy of Canada was the nature of the political system. Canada had, in fact, nurtured a set of democratic assumptions more advanced than even those in the mother country. Thus the strategy of excluding large numbers of lower class people from the franchise, and therefore political participation, was contrary to the nascent Canadian political ethos and not an option for the power brokers in society. In Radical Politics and Canadian Labour Martin Robin observed that:

By 1900 the major portion of English Canada had become a formal political democracy and the notion that the franchise was a trust accompanying property rather than a right normally accompanying citizenship all but disappeared in federal and provincial politics ... The absorption of the artisan into the social and political system closely followed the extension of the franchise to the masses ... 33

33 Martin Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour 1880-1930 (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1968), p. 1.

Robin went on to describe the process by which the working class became tied to the two older parties. Religious and ethnic organizations were supported by the working man, often to protect job security from alien groups, often simply for religious reasons. However, such organizations as the Orangemen attracted working and middle class supporters alike, but the latter generally assumed leadership positions. They used their connections with the artisans to recruit them to the existing parties, and the artisan became part of their rank and file. Both old parties had large numbers of patronage jobs to distribute when in power, and with these they were able to reward followers of all classes, and win the approval of union leaders. Cooperation with the old parties became the natural course for the working man. Religious cross-class organizations, the availability of patronage and the need for immediate rather than long range pro-labour legislation, all assisted in the absorption of the lower class into "non-class" parties, which were, nevertheless, dominated by the entrepreneurs and professionals.

Meanwhile the few labour leaders who did try to organize labour parties were constantly frustrated by the isolated nature of many occupations in the primary industries, the headstart of the old parties in recruitment, the fissiparous tendencies to which small ideological parties seem susceptible, and the single member district/plurality vote electoral system, which served its usual role in freezing out small parties.

Briefly put, the economic and political conditions in Canada in the late nineteenth century militated against the formation of a working class consciousness. The vast majority of workers accepted the two party system,

brokerage politics, and the importance of their religious or ethnic community, and rejected or were apathetic to the idea of class politics. In several important respects, the point of congealment in the political system had been passed.

Not only did the working classes find it to their advantage to work through the old parties, but they also took on some of the capitalist-individualistic assumptions of the middle-class dominated parties. These views survived even the shocks of the depression. In describing the rejection of the C.C.F.'s appeal by most Canadians, despite the poverty of their circumstances, Walter Young notes:

Most Canadians were unwilling to see business, profits, and competition as evils, and were unmoved by the educational activities of the C.C.F. Those who were victims of capitalism often viewed their misfortunes as simply the luck of the game. The C.C.F. assumed the existence of a Canadian working class. Objectively, such a class existed, but the members of that class did not, for the most part, accept their position as such. Their aspirations and attitudes were middle class. They were not prepared to support a party that was not identified with the status to which they aspired. Democracy and the rags-to-riches philosophy were a part of the Canadian ethic. Those who accepted the major premise of unlimited upward mobility for those with energy and initiative could not support the C.C.F. 34

At a time of crises in the capitalist system, even the working class did not reject it.

With the formation of the New Democratic Party a pact was finally signed between organized labour and a left-wing political party. Even here, however, assumptions derived from Canadian political liberalism and individualism have prevented the full cooperation of labour and the New Democratic party:

34 Walter Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National C.C.F. 1932-61 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 289.

This liberal, individualist, anti-group, anti-class approach is not so strong in Canada as it is in the United States; but it is stronger in Canada than in Britain. Liberal, Conservative, and Social Credit attacks on the C.C.F.-N.D.P. as a "class party", and on labour political action as an infringement of the unionists' individual rights have always struck a responsive chord among many Canadian unionists, especially T.L.C. unions with an established tradition of non-partisanship. 35

The burden of Canadian history has been to unite rather than divide classes. They share similar assumptions and aspirations, and there have been few occasions which have brought classes into violent conflict. For whatever reason -- common ideology, material prosperity, ethnic or religious community, or belief in the reality of upward mobility -- class consciousness has not developed. The nature of past developments and the lack of polarization to date, must surely set some limits on the extent to which polarization may occur, no matter how industrialized or modernized the society, and no matter how certain the consequences of economic integration, cultural assimilation and secularization.

To reverse the argument for a moment, this pattern of development sets limits but does not preclude a higher degree of polarization and class politics than at present exists. Several possible courses of development could be suggested. The continuing predominance of an ethnic rather than a class consciousness in Quebec constitutes a major hindrance to a reorientation of the Canadian party system. While the original contention that assimilation pressures produce a strong reaction is not abandoned here, it has been suggested by a French-Canadian sociologist that this reaction has produced a largely middle class move to use the "state" as an agency of cultural defence.

35 Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 240.

However, it is conceivable, he continues, that control of the government by, and in the interests of the bourgeoisie, would be strongly resisted by the lower classes -- a resistance which would entail political organization as a class. ³⁶

It is debateable whether or not a polarized party system in Quebec would prove capable of integration with a polarized party system in English Canada, but the basic idea is intriguing, and such a development might deal a fatal blow to brokerage politics.

A second possibility is a catastrophic development in the Canadian economic system. For example, Horowitz concludes Canadian Labour in Politics with a pessimistic evaluation of the New Democratic Party's chances of achieving major party stature except:

If an external crisis does come, and if the N.D.P. is capable of appealing to the new mood which will be generated by the crisis, the events of the forties may be repeated; the party will score a few startling successes, success will breed further success, apathetic labour leaders will smell victory, craft union affiliations will quadruple, Frank Hall will make speeches, money and men will pour into the party, the voters will lose their fear of "wasting" their votes -- and then, perhaps, an N.D.P. official opposition. ³⁷

Or, there might be a gradual development. The N.D.P. may capitalize on provincial success or even status as chief opposition party by improving party organization and public image, and perhaps also by continuing their strategy of concentrating resources and capturing particular seats in general or by-elections.

These speculations have been largely divorced from the data, but one final possibility is suggested by it. There is a highly visible rural-urban split between Progressive Conservatives on the one hand, and the N.D.P. and Liberals on the other. This manifested itself to a high degree in the 1968

³⁶ Marcel Rioux, "Conscience ethnique et conscience de classe au Quebec", Recherches Sociographiques, 4, No. 1 (January-April, 1965), p. 31.

³⁷ Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, p. 263.

federal election, and the Conservatives won seats in few large urban centres outside the Atlantic Provinces and Alberta. It is possible that a consistent record of failure in such urban centres as Toronto will so undermine the party's credibility as a possible winner, and that the battle will be envisaged as Liberals versus N.D.P. This might lead to a situation in which more importance is attached to the record and direction of those two parties in class terms, and some degree of polarization might then occur. Meanwhile, the Progressive Conservatives would be relegated to the status of a rural party, or disappear entirely. These hypotheses all depend on the assumption that the N.D.P. is still identifiable as a working class-oriented party. Otherwise its achievement of majority status would not alter the basic nature of Canadian politics.

This paper has attempted to assess the accuracy of Alford's prediction that class voting will increase in Canada. By no means all the evidence which would be needed to categorically affirm or disprove his prediction has been available to the writer and the conclusions drawn have therefore been circumscribed. Since not even a decade has passed since the publication of his book, even complete data would not permit the dismissal of his thesis. The study undertaken here -- a study restricted in scope by the limitations imposed due to the unsatisfactory state of the Gallup Poll surveys, the restrictive definitions imposed on class voting, and the simplification of party images dictated by the data -- has not found substantial change in patterns of class voting from 1962 to 1968. While it is possible that other methods would yield different conclusions, it does not appear likely to the writer that class polarization will ever become as pronounced in Canada as in some European systems, because the course of development in Canada at the crucial

period of rapid industrialization did not permit the solidification of a working class consciousness. If the theorizing of Lipset concerning the time factor in cleavage formation has any merit, then it follows that the potential for class polarization in Canada must be viewed as definitely restricted.

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APPENDIX A

National Returns and Gallup Forecast

	<u>P.C.</u>		<u>Lib.</u>		<u>N.D.P.</u>		<u>S.C.</u>		<u>Others</u>	
	<u>National</u>	<u>Gallup</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>Gallup</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>Gallup</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>Gallup</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>Gallup</u>
<u>Canada</u>										
1962	37.3	35.93	37.3	37.42	13.5	11.54	11.6	14.21	0.2	.90
1963	32.9	32.08	41.7	41.77	13.1	12.12	11.9	13.18	0.4	.85
1965	32.4	29.11	40.2	44.46	17.9	18.76	8.4	6.94	1.2	.73
1968	31.3	27.65	45.2	46.92	17.4	17.69	5.2	6.88	0.9	.86
<u>Nova Scotia</u>										
1962	47.3	46.36	42.4	41.82	9.2	11.82	0.9	--	--	--
1963	46.8	46.09	46.7	45.22	6.4	6.09	0.1	2.61	--	--
1965	48.7	52.83	42.1	39.62	8.8	5.66	--	1.89	0.3	--
1968	55.1	48.00	37.9	44.00	6.8	8.00	--	--	0.1	--
<u>New Brunswick</u>										
1962	46.5	49.28	44.6	40.58	5.3	5.80	3.6	4.35	--	--
1963	40.4	41.18	47.2	42.65	3.7	2.94	8.7	13.24	--	--
1965	42.5	34.38	47.5	56.25	9.4	9.38	0.6	--	--	--
1968	49.9	45.10	44.1	52.94	4.9	1.96	0.7	--	0.3	--
<u>Newfoundland</u>										
1962	36.0	52.08	59.0	47.92	4.9	--	0.1	--	--	--
1963	30.0	31.82	64.5	68.18	4.2	--	--	--	1.3	--
1965	32.4	20.51	64.1	76.92	1.2	--	1.6	2.56	0.7	--
1968	53.0	57.14	42.5	25.00	4.4	17.86	0.1	--	--	--
<u>Quebec</u>										
1962	29.9	24.25	39.7	43.06	4.4	2.28	25.9	27.07	0.2	3.34
1963	19.6	18.44	45.6	46.51	7.1	6.64	27.3	25.08	0.4	3.32
1965	21.3	19.79	45.6	55.21	12.0	14.58	17.5	7.29	3.7	3.13
1968	21.1	18.35	53.3	54.26	8.0	8.01	16.4	17.05	1.2	2.33

National Returns and Gallup Forecast

(Continued)

	<u>P.C.</u>		<u>Lib.</u>		<u>N.D.P.</u>		<u>S.C.</u>		<u>Others</u>	
	<u>National</u>	<u>Gallup</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>Gallup</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>Gallup</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>Gallup</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>Gallup</u>
<u>Ontario</u>										
1962	39.3	39.95	41.7	39.95	17.0	16.00	1.8	3.97	0.1	.12
1963	35.3	34.75	46.3	44.56	16.0	16.90	2.0	3.73	0.4	--
1965	34.0	32.12	43.6	44.62	21.7	21.52	0.4	1.74	0.3	--
1968	31.6	31.00	46.3	48.40	21.1	19.80	--	.60	0.8	.20
<u>Manitoba</u>										
1962	41.6	41.74	31.1	34.78	19.7	13.91	6.8	9.57	0.8	--
1963	42.3	32.50	33.8	45.83	16.7	9.17	7.0	12.50	0.2	--
1965	40.7	37.38	30.9	37.38	24.0	14.95	4.3	10.28	0.1	--
1968	31.6	28.95	41.1	36.84	25.0	26.32	1.2	5.26	1.0	2.63
<u>Saskatchewan</u>										
1962	50.4	46.56	22.8	22.14	22.0	23.66	4.6	7.63	0.1	--
1963	53.7	55.78	24.1	23.13	18.2	19.73	3.9	1.36	0.1	--
1965	48.0	30.23	24.0	24.42	26.0	39.53	1.9	5.81	--	--
1968	36.9	36.92	27.0	29.23	35.9	32.31	--	1.54	0.2	--
<u>Alberta</u>										
1962	42.8	42.48	19.5	18.79	8.4	5.37	29.2	33.56	0.1	--
1963	45.4	34.88	22.1	25.58	6.4	4.07	25.9	35.47	0.2	--
1965	46.6	38.33	22.4	28.33	8.3	9.17	22.5	24.17	0.2	--
1968	50.3	28.87	35.4	52.58	9.4	8.25	2.1	10.31	2.7	--
<u>British Columbia</u>										
1962	27.3	21.89	27.3	30.85	30.9	20.40	14.2	26.87	0.3	--
1963	23.4	30.45	32.3	32.73	30.3	20.45	13.3	16.36	0.7	--
1965	19.2	18.47	30.0	34.39	32.9	29.30	17.5	17.83	0.5	--
1968	19.5	16.20	41.5	34.51	32.8	40.85	5.8	8.45	0.3	--

APPENDIX B

Census vs. Gallup
Percentage Roman Catholic

	<u>Gallup</u>		<u>Census</u>
<u>Nova Scotia</u>			
1962	29.09		
1963	23.48	1961	35.29
1965	28.30		
1968	36.00		
<u>New Brunswick</u>			
1962	52.17		
1963	50.00	1961	51.95
1965	39.06		
1968	62.75		
<u>Newfoundland</u>			
1962	33.33		
1963	22.73	1961	35.74
1965	33.33		
1968	35.71		
<u>Quebec</u>			
1962	89.64		
1963	93.64	1961	88.14
1965	89.76		
1968	87.83		
<u>Ontario</u>			
1962	23.98		
1963	21.16	1961	30.04
1965	29.27		
1968	24.65		
<u>Manitoba</u>			
1962	42.61		
1963	26.67	1961	22.88
1965	10.28		
1968	21.62		

Percentage Roman Catholic
(Continued)

<u>Gallup</u>		<u>Census</u>	
<u>Saskatchewan</u>			
1962	17.56		
1963	32.65	1961	26.25
1965	34.88		
1968	21.54		
<u>Alberta</u>			
1962	28.86		
1963	11.63	1961	22.43
1965	16.67		
1968	23.71		
<u>British Columbia</u>			
1962	18.41		
1963	13.64	1961	17.51
1965	14.01		
1968	13.38		

Percentage of Each Community Size

Nova Scotia - Farm

1962	14.55	1961	7.71
1963	18.26		
1965	3.77	1966	5.99
1968	10.00		

- Rural Non-Agricultural

1962	29.09	1961	37.95
1963	28.70		
1965	24.53	1966	25.96
1968	34.00		

- Urban

1962	56.36	1961	54.34
1963	53.04		
1965	71.70	1966	58.05
1968	56.00		

Percentage of Each Community Size

(Continued)

<u>Gallup</u>		(Continued)		<u>Census</u>
<u>New Brunswick</u> - Farm				
1962	14.49	1961		10.41
1963	13.24			
1965	7.81	1966		8.35
1968	15.69			
- Rural Non-Agricultural				
1962	34.73	1961		43.09
1963	29.41			
1965	35.94	1966		41.03
1968	45.10			
- Urban				
1962	50.72	1961		46.50
1963	57.35			
1965	56.25	1966		50.62
1968	39.22			
<u>Newfoundland</u> - Farm				
1962	12.50	1961		1.98
1963	11.36			
1965	7.69	1966		1.71
1968	7.14			
- Rural Non-Agricultural				
1962	45.83	1961		47.34
1963	43.18			
1965	43.59	1966		44.23
1968	35.71			
- Urban				
1962	41.67	1961		50.68
1963	45.45			
1965	48.72	1966		54.05
1968	57.14			
<u>Quebec</u> - Farm				
1962	14.13	1961		10.74
1963	13.92			
1965	11.56	1966		8.54
1968	7.67			

Percentage of Each Community Size

(Continued)

<u>Gallup</u>		<u>Census</u>	
<u>Quebec</u> (Continued)			
- Rural Non-Agricultural			
1962	14.36	1961	14.93
1963	14.60		
1965	13.17	1966	13.13
1968	14.02		
- Urban			
1962	71.45	1961	74.28
1963	71.48		
1965	75.27	1966	78.28
1968	78.31		
<u>Ontario</u> - Farm			
1962	11.13	1961	8.11
1963	10.87		
1965	7.59	1966	6.92
1968	8.02		
- Rural Non-Agricultural			
1962	12.55	1961	14.54
1963	12.41		
1965	12.82	1966	12.72
1968	9.22		
- Urban			
1962	76.27	1961	77.35
1963	76.71		
1965	79.59	1968	80.36
1968	82.77		
<u>Manitoba</u> - Farm			
1962	25.22	1961	18.60
1963	20.00		
1965	20.56	1966	16.60
1968	18.92		

Percentage of Each Community Size

(Continued)

<u>Gallup</u>		<u>Census</u>	
<u>Manitoba</u> (Continued)			
- Rural Non-Agricultural			
1962	14.78	1961	17.51
1963	16.67		
1965	16.82	1966	16.32
1968	5.41		
- Urban			
1962	60.00	1961	63.88
1963	63.33		
1965	62.62	1966	67.08
1968	75.68		
<u>Saskatchewan</u> - Farm			
1962	38.17	1961	32.93
1963	40.14		
1965	33.72	1966	29.27
1968	43.08		
- Rural Non-Agricultural			
1962	24.43	1961	24.04
1963	25.17		
1965	25.58	1966	21.71
1968	20.00		
- Urban			
1962	37.40	1961	43.03
1963	34.69		
1965	40.70	1966	49.02
1968	36.92		
<u>Alberta</u> - Farm			
1962	29.53	1961	21.46
1963	27.33		
1965	19.17	1966	18.97
1968	6.19		
- Non Rural-Agricultural			
1962	14.60	1961	15.23
1963	13.37		
1965	13.33	1966	12.18
1968	15.46		

Percentage of Each Community Size

(Continued)

<u>Gallup</u>		<u>Census</u>	
<u>Alberta (Continued)</u>			
- Urban			
1962	56.38	1961	63.31
1963	59.30		
1965	67.50	1966	68.85
1968	78.35		
<u>British Columbia - Farm</u>			
1962	7.96	1961	4.76
1963	8.18		
1965	3.82	1966	4.55
1968	2.82		
- Rural Non-Agricultural			
1962	17.91	1961	22.69
1963	17.27		
1965	24.84	1966	20.17
1968	20.42		
- Urban			
1962	74.13	1961	72.55
1963	74.55		
1965	71.34	1966	75.28
1968	76.76		

APPENDIX C

Percentage of Party Vote by Education*

(N in brackets)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	Sample %	Sample N
<u>Some Public School</u>						
1962	17.28 (132)	19.80 (159)	12.00 (30)	26.82 (81)	18.97	(402)
1963	18.81 (133)	18.41 (171)	10.51 (29)	28.95 (88)	19.00	(421)
1965	16.41 (72)	22.40 (155)	16.91 (46)	22.33 (23)	19.56	(296)
1968	15.28 (59)	14.66 (96)	13.77 (34)	36.46 (35)	16.18	(224)
<u>Finished Public School</u>						
1962	20.29 (155)	23.04 (185)	23.20 (108)	17.22 (52)	21.24	(450)
1963	17.40 (123)	18.41 (171)	13.77 (38)	18.42 (56)	17.51	(388)
1965	17.71 (79)	15.46 (107)	14.34 (39)	15.53 (16)	15.93	(241)
1968	17.88 (69)	13.74 (90)	14.98 (37)	16.67 (16)	15.32	(212)
<u>Some Secondary</u>						
1962	30.24 (231)	25.40 (204)	38.00 (95)	35.10 (106)	30.01	(636)
1963	30.41 (215)	29.28 (272)	40.22 (111)	33.22 (101)	31.54	(699)
1965	32.51 (145)	28.03 (194)	35.66 (97)	33.01 (34)	31.06	(470)
1968	30.31 (117)	32.52 (213)	38.46 (95)	32.29 (31)	32.95	(456)
<u>Finished Secondary</u>						
1962	16.62 (127)	16.56 (133)	12.80 (32)	16.56 (50)	16.14	(342)
1963	18.53 (131)	16.90 (157)	17.75 (49)	10.53 (32)	16.65	(369)
1965	16.37 (73)	16.91 (117)	18.38 (50)	13.59 (14)	16.79	(254)
1968	21.24 (82)	20.46 (134)	16.19 (40)	9.38 (9)	19.15	(265)

Percentage of Party Vote by Education**

(Continued)

	<u>P.C.*</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	<u>Sample %</u>	<u>Sample N</u>
<u>Some Technical</u>						
1962	1.57 (12)	1.37 (11)	.80 (2)	.99 (3)	1.32	(28)
1963	1.41 (10)	1.83 (17)	2.90 (8)	.99 (3)	1.71	(38)
1965	.67 (3)	1.16 (8)	2.21 (6)	1.94 (2)	1.26	(19)
1968	1.55 (6)	.92 (6)	5.67 (14)	2.08 (2)	2.02	(28)
<u>Finished Technical</u>						
1962	2.36 (13)	1.49 (12)	3.60 (9)	.33 (1)	1.89	(40)
1963	1.70 (12)	1.51 (14)	3.99 (11)	1.32 (4)	1.85	(41)
1965	2.47 (11)	2.02 (14)	2.21 (6)	.97 (1)	2.12	(32)
1968	2.07 (8)	3.51 (23)	3.24 (8)	--	2.82	(39)
<u>Some University</u>						
1962	7.20 (55)	5.35 (43)	7.60 (19)	.66 (2)	5.62	(119)
1963	6.65 (47)	7.53 (70)	5.43 (15)	5.59 (17)	6.72	(149)
1965	4.71 (21)	3.61 (25)	3.68 (10)	1.94 (2)	3.83	(58)
1968	4.40 (17)	6.56 (43)	3.24 (8)	1.04 (1)	4.99	(69)
<u>Finished University</u>						
1962	3.53 (27)	6.60 (53)	2.00 (5)	1.99 (6)	4.29	(91)
1963	4.53 (32)	6.14 (57)	5.43 (15)	.99 (3)	4.83	(107)
1965	3.14 (14)	5.35 (37)	2.94 (8)	2.91 (8)	4.10	(62)
1968	6.99 (27)	7.02 (46)	2.43 (6)	1.04 (1)	5.78	(80)

* Party columns for each group add vertically to 100 percent.

** 'No Education' and 'Refused' omitted (.52% in 1962, .18% in 1963, 5.35% in 1965, and .79% in 1968).

Party Vote by Education
Representation Index

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>Some Public School</u>				
1962	91	104	63	141
1963	99	97	55	152
1965	83	115	87	114
1968	95	91	85	236
<u>Finished Public School</u>				
1962	95	108	109	81
1963	99	105	79	105
1965	111	97	91	98
1968	117	90	98	109
<u>Some Secondary</u>				
1962	101	84	126	116
1963	96	93	127	105
1965	104	90	118	106
1968	91	99	117	99
<u>Finished Secondary</u>				
1962	102	102	79	102
1963	111	102	107	63
1965	98	101	109	81
1968	111	107	85	49
<u>Some Technical</u>				
1962	118	103	60	75
1963	82	107	170	58
1965	53	92	175	154
1968	77	46	230	103
<u>Finished Technical</u>				
1962	124	78	190	17
1963	92	82	216	71
1965	117	95	105	46
1968	73	124	115	--
<u>Some University</u>				
1962	128	95	135	11
1963	99	112	81	83
1965	123	94	96	51
1968	88	131	65	21

Party Vote by Education
(Continued)

	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>
<u>Finished University</u>				
1962	82	153	46	46
1963	94	127	112	20
1965	77	130	72	71
1968	121	121	42	18

$$\text{Representation Index} = \frac{\text{Party Percentage}}{\text{Sample Percentage}}$$