AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONTRIBUTION TO THE
SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA MADE BY THE
1971 FIVE POWER DEFENCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department
of
Political Science

We accept this thesis as conforming to the
required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

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Date August 15, 1972
ABSTRACT

The security arrangements established between Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, announced in April 1971, are remarkable for their lack of explicit detail and formalised commitment. This vagueness has discouraged a positive assessment of the contribution toward regional security that may be represented by the arrangements, and most academic and popular evaluations have been superficial or simply derogatory.

In order to uncover the real intentions of the five participants, and thus establish the effectiveness and credibility of their joint defence system, it was considered necessary to subject to systematic analysis the decision-making processes by which each of the five states arrived at the point of agreement. Although Graham T. Allison's system of analysis was designed to illuminate a crisis situation that bears only a limited resemblance to the kind of almost evolutionary decision-making processes represented by this problem, his trifocal framework was found to be readily applicable. The thesis reports in some detail the analytical proceedings and findings in the case of the British decision-making process, which is considered to be of the greatest interest and importance, and also reports more briefly on the results of similar analyses of the decision-making processes of the other participants.

The Allison framework is found to be particularly productive in both identifying and evaluating the intentions of the five powers, and in the second part of the thesis the way in which these intentions have been translated into actual strategic dispositions receives general attention, and the
capabilities of the ANZUK forces are compared with the various threats and dangers with which they are likely to be confronted.

In conclusion it is found that the original intentions of the five participants have already been outpaced and outmoded by certain major shifts in the systemic and subsystemic political environment of Southeast Asia. However, it seems that several of these obsolete functions have been replaced by others that will serve to extend the usefulness of the arrangements beyond the immediate future.
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I INTRODUCTION

Definition of the thesis problem and explanation of the approach taken.

This thesis is focused not so much on the relationship of Malaysian and Singaporean security to that of Southeast Asia in general, but is rather based on the assumption that a stabilised ASEAN (which consists of Malaysia, Singapore, and their three neighbours, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines) will automatically contribute toward peace in the entire sub-system. Assessment of the effectiveness of the Five Power Agreement in the preservation of stability of the ASEAN region requires some estimate be made of the level and nature of the commitment of the five Powers. This estimate can best be made by investigating the intentions of the governments at the time that the commitment was entered into. It will be necessary to provide a clear indication of just how purposive and rational the actions of each government were, and from this can be derived some measure of the real value of the arrangements at the time that they were conceived.

It may be precipitant to regard an agreement which has been in effect for less than a year as having already been modified in function as a result of shifts in the systemic and sub-systemic environment, but Southeast Asia has witnessed some very rapid and important developments that were not taken into account, or in any way anticipated, by the negotiations leading up to the Five Power Agreement. It will therefore be necessary to examine the possible functions of the ANZUK forces in the light of these recent developments and discover whether the original intentions of the particip-
ants are still appropriate, or whether some significant modifications or reassessments will not be necessary. The first section of the thesis then, will be devoted to an examination of the intentions of the five governments, and particularly those of the guarantors; in the critical period during which the Agreement was formulated. This examination will depend very heavily on a framework of analysis which serves to illuminate the decision-making processes by indicating in each country which set of determining factors were of greater or lesser importance, and therefore to what degree the intentions may be described as being purposive and rational.

Considerable space is devoted to describing this framework of analysis, and showing how it is particularly applicable to the thesis problem. This is followed by an analysis of the British process, which is seen to have been of the greatest importance, with briefer reports on the results of similar analyses for the other countries.

The second major section of the thesis moves on to consider how the original intentions of the five governments have subsequently been implemented. The disposition and capabilities of the ANZUK forces are related to the more probable and possible sources of danger, and the earlier assessments of the intentions and level of commitment of the guarantor states are re-examined in the light of subsequent domestic developments and the transformed strategic environment. Finally there is an assessment of the extent to which the arrangement makes a contribution to regional security, and an indication of the factors which will determine the future prospects for the Five Power Agreement.
The terms of the Agreement, and the Composition of the Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom (ANZUK) Force.

The Anglo-Malaysian Defence Treaty\(^1\) which was negotiated prior to the granting of independence in 1957 was a reflection of a situation in which British forces were quite successfully repressing a chronic insurgency problem. Article I bound Britain to afford Malaysia "such assistance as it may require," and this readiness to accept a major role was still in evidence in 1963, when the British desire to send the carrier "Victorious" through the Sunda Straits, thus provoking an escalation of the "Confrontation," was only restrained by the most vehement protests from the Australians. Mr. Wilson's government, that came into office in 1964, had a very different attitude, and sought to scale down both commitments and capacity in the region. In the debate on the 1967 White Paper on Defence, Wilson emphasised that AMDA contained provisions for review so as to allow for "changed conditions," and indicated that his government would not renew an unchanged agreement when it expired on November 1, 1971. The agreement that was announced by communique on April 17, 1971, (to take effect on November 1) represents a considerable scaling down of the previous AMDA obligations. However, the agreement is an indication of a continuing British interest in the security of the region, and does mean that Mr. Heath's government has reversed the previous cabinet's decision to withdraw altogether, and intends to maintain token British forces in Singapore for a few more years at least.

The April 1971 agreements were the results of a protracted series of negotiations that had begun immediately after the end of the "Confrontation,"
when it had become clear that Britain was reviewing the East of Suez commitments. The main features of the arrangements were clearly visible in the Communique following the Commonwealth Defence Ministers' Conference on June 10-11, 1968. A second meeting on June 19-20, 1969, in Canberra, took note of the Australian and New Zealand decision to carry on with their contribution to the defence of the region after 1971, even though Britain planned total withdrawal, and established command structures for the joint air and naval defence systems. At this stage it appeared that AMDA would be succeeded by a four power agreement, with Britain contributing only a few aircraft, and continuing to make a minimal use of the Jungle Warfare Training School. Then in 1970 there was a change of government in Britain, and this led to a reversal of policy and the appearance of a Five Power Agreement.

The new arrangements are not expressed in the form of a treaty, but it is agreed that in the event of any armed attack or threat of attack externally organised or supported against Malaysia or Singapore, the five governments would consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken, jointly or separately. The obligation merely to consult, does not in itself amount to much of an indication of the level of commitment represented by the Agreement, and this can better be gauged by an analysis of the process by which the Agreement was reached, and an examination of the composition and disposition of forces actually set up under the arrangements. At the height of the Confrontation, Britain had contributed over 60,000 men to what was sometimes then referred to as the Commonwealth Reserve, while the contributions of Australia and New
Zealand had been only a few thousand. The ANZUK force is now composed of approximately equal contributions from each of the three guarantors, and amounts to a single infantry brigade group and a logistical support group together with naval and air components totalling only some 2,000 uniformed personnel. The infantry brigade is equipped and organised for counter-insurgency operations, and has helicopter and fixed wing surveillance and transport support. The very small scale of these units has led to their frequently being described as 'token' forces, but they do represent a tangible indication of the three guarantor governments' intent to preserve their commitment, and they also allow for contingency planning and command structures that ensure a high probability of involvement in the event of hostilities.
II TRANSFORMATIONS IN PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES IN FIVE COUNTRIES LEADING TO THE 1971 AGREEMENT

Graham T. Allison's theoretical framework and its applicability to the research problem.

1. The Five Power Agreement came into effect on November 1, 1971 with the minimum of publicity or academic comment, and an assessment of what is admittedly a peripheral and minor part of the security system of Southeast Asia, may give the initial appearance of giving few difficulties to the analyst. However, even a casual glance reveals a bewildering complexity of actors, including besides the five participants, all the possible opponents and supporters within the subsystem. This scholar is acutely aware of the relationship between academic costs in terms of time, and returns in terms of a marginal addition to an understanding of a world that seems to be always more rapidly receding into the future. In these circumstances it is tempting to do the usual thing and treat the actors as if each were a "black box," concentrating solely on the possible and probably interactions among them; and indeed in the second part of this study it has been found necessary to largely resort to this simplification. However, the existence of the three quite contrasting general evaluations of the arrangement that are found in the literature seems to compel the necessity to pry open the black boxes of the five participants in order to discover more about their decision-making processes. The three evaluations are as follows, the agreement being seen as:

(a) A fig-leaf; a conscious or unconscious manoeuvre to conceal or mitigate the effects of an abrupt reassessment of interests and
responsibilities.

(b) A reflex action; the last spasm of a set of perceptions loosely categorised as the Empire-Commonwealth myth.

(c) A rational response to the defence requirements of the five participants.

In his recent book, *The Essence of Decision*, Allison has elaborated and extended a theoretical framework that promises a systematic and economic route into the black box, and, as will be shown, seems to illuminate the contents in a way that gives particular access to the problem of deciding which of the three popular assessments listed above has most validity. Allison recommends that the analyst should don tri-focal spectacles that permit him to see his problem in three quite different perspectives. He calls these lenses models I, II and III, and his skilful use of them to build a rich and provocative analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, has resulted in a broad acceptance of his own claim that, "many readers have found the general argument a suggestive contribution to general thought about government behaviour, especially in foreign and military affairs."^4

Before going on to give a more complete description of the analytical tools proffered by *The Essence of Decision*, it is necessary to state some reservations, and make some defence for what may seem to be an excessive reliance on a largely untested theoretical framework. Allison's propositions have been fairly criticised as lacking in rigour, and for being often "meta-theoretical rather than theoretical in nature."^6 But the same critic suggests that ways of improving these tools will only be discovered
when they are put to use on research problems. 7

It may be argued that any theory developed along the frontiers of the discipline would be either too delicate or too ponderous to employ on such a minor and mundane problem as this, but Allison's contribution is not one that really explores new territory. Rather, he is synthesizing the work of many others and in some respects his framework serves mainly to simplify and popularize the aggregate of recent academic trends.

The Three Models

It would be presumptuous to attempt to encapsule the full theoretical content of the three models 8 in the space available here, and there is no substitute for a familiarity with the book itself, 9 but for the purposes of this study a brief account of Allison's approaches is required at this point.

Model 1: The Rational Actor

Decision making is seen as a process of problem solving, and the basic concepts are goals, payoffs, utility, rank ordering of alternatives and value-maximizing choices. The actor essentially remains a black box, and it is assumed that if the goals are known and certain constraints are taken into account, 10 a state will generally behave rationally. The model corresponds closely with the classical approach, where the state is personified, and everyday assumptions about individual behaviour being "intendedly rational" are transferred to behaviour of the state. Action is seen as a steady state choice among alternative outcomes, rather than a large number of partial choices in a dynamic stream, and the welter of
organisational and political complications are ignored, the emphasis being given to certain major features which are seen as turning points in the development of a unitary policy.\textsuperscript{11}

Described in this bold fashion, the model is obviously very unsophisticated, and lacks explanatory or even descriptive power, but it is still frequently assumed to yield good predictions, and is probably the basis or starting point for most analysis of state behaviour at the international level. There is a strong parallel with the assumptions of 'rational man' and the 'hidden hand' mechanism in classical economics, and in a similar fashion Model I analysis is closely associated with a normative bias that favours 'rational' as opposed to irrational policies.*

Model II: Organisational Process

Government action is seen as the aggregate of organisational outputs, and the basic concepts are standard operating procedures, programs, repertoires, and linear or incremental policy changes. Decisions are not imposed by executive power, but instead policy declarations are seen as ex post facto ratifications, or even rationalisations, of organisational

*Use of the word 'rational' invites semantic debate: not only is there the danger of different scholars employing quite varying definitions of the concept of rationality (i.e. Schelling's rationality of the irrational), but also there is an almost unavoidable tendency for any individual analyst to employ, sometimes unintentionally, several versions of the concept within a single piece of analysis. For the purposes of this study, a rational foreign policy is considered to be one which combines certain agreed conscious goals with certain identifiable modalities in such a way as to be pragmatically satisfactory. (For further discussion see below pages 44-46.) It would be naive to assume, however, that the policies which have yielded the best results have always, or even usually, been those which appear to be the most rational.
recommendations that spring from a process of satisficing and uncertainty avoidance. The primary goal of the state is the health of its central organisations, expressed in terms of budgets, manpower, influence and territory. Conflict between organisations leads to marked inconsistencies in state behaviour, and deadlock can result in temporary inaction. Policy problems are divided between several organisations in such a way that the executive is strained to perform essential coordinating functions, or even process the flood of information, all of which stresses parochial priorities and perceptions. Associated with Model II are normative assumptions about the inadequacy and inflexibility of organisational response to change and the necessity for strong executive mediation and direction.

Model III: Governmental Politics

The decisions and actions of a government are the results, or resultants, of a complex and interrelated series of 'games,' in which various 'players' compete for and exercise a share of the available 'power.' Analysis proceeds by identifying the major games, the players, their positions and attributes, the current rules and probable plays or action channels. Certain behaviour patterns can be observed in all of the games, and these permit the analyst to make some predictions even though he is obviously confronted with a plethora of unmeasurable variables. The games in play at any given time may correspond only very approximately with the situational or external demands placed upon a government. Play consists of "pulling and hauling" and involves coalitions, bargaining and compromises; and frequent foul ups. (It is the latter which contribute most to
spectator entertainment). Players are primarily concerned with preserving their places in the various teams, and this preoccupation may assume greater importance than any broader national goals, particularly during critical plays. In these circumstances government policies may appear schizophrenic as fortunes ebb and flow, and the consistency and effectiveness of action is dependent on the ascendency and skill of certain players or teams. Associated with Model III are normative assumptions about fair play and the extent to which players should allow themselves to lose sight of long range or common goals.

In this way Allison distinguishes between and delineates three major styles of analysis that have in fact been used by political scientists and historians in an unconscious and instinctive fashion since ancient times. The models are seen to be distributed along two general dimensions. One resembles levels of analysis, ranging from nations through organisations to individuals, the other is concerned with kinds, and perhaps qualities of behaviour, ranging from the strategic through the routine to the merely political. (The factors which determine which model or mixture of models is adopted by each scholar do not receive much attention by Allison, but it can be assumed that predilections have resulted from the temperament and convictions of the analyst as much as from the nature of his subject matter.) By identifying units of analysis, organising concepts, dominant inference patterns and specific propositions, Allison permits a new degree of self-awareness, and encourages a much more scientific and rigorous approach to analysis.
Analysis can be thought of as a process with four major components; description, explanation, prediction and finally prescription. It is usually accepted that the first three are pre-requisite for the fourth, although this has on occasion been disputed. In economics it is accepted by both pro- and anti-Keynesians that a good general theory may have relatively weak descriptive or explanatory power, particularly at the micro level.

Similarly, a rational policy analysis can make few claims as an accurate description of actual political behaviour, while retaining supposed powers of explanation and prescription. But even if one accepts that a good solution may be prescribed through Model I analysis, it still behooves the analyst to demonstrate how his solution might in fact be implemented. Implementation requires an understanding of the machinery of politics; the political scientist must do more than draft out the blueprints, he must also be capable of directing the engineering, and show how the actual nuts and bolts fit together. Few scholars have been prepared to undertake such responsibilities, and this is because they have not been equipped with any understanding of the daily practicalities of the political process.

This 'analysis gap' (Allison p. 267) must be bridged, and the way to do this is to improve on the descriptive and explanatory components of analysis by the more extensive use of Models II and III.

It is clear that different governmental actions will lend themselves more to one model than to the others. Eventually it should prove to be possible to develop a typology of actions which would suggest which
model should be most effective for a first cut at the problem, even if it seems likely that the other two models can always add further insight. Some of the dimensions along which a typology might be constructed have been suggested by Allison, and he has argued that the Cuban Missile Crisis lies across these dimensions in a way that makes it particularly susceptible to a Model I approach. The Five Power Agreement was the result of a process that straddles the dimensions in quite a different way. The process occurred in a non-crisis situation; there was no element of surprise (apart, perhaps, from the sudden necessity to devalue), and the issue was not given the highest priority by decision makers. The decisions were made slowly, almost reluctantly, and there was no remarkable degree of stress. Finally the process involved many extra-national as well as intra-national factors; it was a multi-actor process. However, in one vital respect the process leading up to the Five Power Agreement does resemble the 1962 Crisis, in that it was concerned in all five countries with national security interests and its substance was strategic and military.

Allison claims that his framework is of universal applicability, and can be used to good effect to investigate countries which are structured very differently from the United States, or which for one reason or another do not readily yield large quantities of information about their internal affairs. He admits that the USSR presents the appearance of an impenetrable black box, "But if the tentative hypotheses of organisation theory (and game theory) are used to sift the available information, the results
are suggestive." (p. 102) Allison has acquired an enviable quantity of data, much of it from personal interviews, on American policy-making in the 1962 Crisis, but he consciously restricts himself in his analysis to publicly available and secondary information in order to emphasise that the quality of his analysis is the product not of his diligence, but rather of the analytic tools that he has employed. In the case of the Russian behaviour he must perforce work with the same informational handicaps as other sovietologists, but the tri-focal approach allows him to produce a composite analysis of apparently very high credibility. The five actors with which we are concerned represent boxes that are various shades of black. Britain is the most penetrable, and there exists an almost embarrassingly large volume of data. Australia also is an open society, but like New Zealand the small scale of the internal dialogue and the tendency towards provincialism places severe restrictions on the quality and quantity of data. Malaysia and Singapore are by virtue of their size and political development far less penetrable. It is indeed ambitious to attempt to impose an analytical framework on all five black boxes, and it must be admitted that to apply it to Britain alone would test the limitations of a dissertation. However, we are convinced that the power of this framework is such that its hypotheses will yield suggestive results even if they are applied in a somewhat impressionistic fashion.

Before proceeding with an examination of the first of the black boxes, it is as well to take note of the fact that the Allison framework not only
provides a methodology for descriptive and explanatory analysis, but also elevates certain vantage points from which to make predictive and prescriptive assessments. Use of each of the three models alerts and sensitises the analyst to quite different normative perspectives.

In the early part of his book Allison does not attach norms to each of the models with quite the same directness as has been done above. In his chess analogy, he sidesteps the normative question, and does not indicate whether a single intelligence will play a better game than a collective intelligence. (p. 7) But in the conclusion he observed that the different models generate different "lessons" about the 1962 Crisis. "The most widely believed and frequently cited lessons of the Crisis have emerged from Model I analysis ... that ... in situations involving the vital interests of the superpowers, the leaders of both nations will have little difficulty in thinking through the problem and its alternatives, finding limited actions (the blockade) that communicate resolve, and thus settling the issue (withdrawal of the missiles)." (p. 259) The Model II analysis emphasized "crucial organisational rigidities and even mistakes," (p. 259), one of which, the inaccurate estimate of American capability for a surgical mistake, served rather paradoxically to cloud the rationality of the decision-making process in what appears now to be a rather beneficial way. The Model III analysis produced lessons that give "even less reason to be sanguine about our understanding of nuclear crises or about the impossibility of nuclear war." (p. 260) "The mix of personality, expertise, influence and temperament (in the ExCom) that allows such a group to
clarify alternatives even while it pulls and hauls for separate preferences should be better understood before we start down the path to nuclear confrontation again. On the evidence of the Cuban Missile Crisis, clarification is scarcely assured." (p. 261) "Thus Model II and Model III analysts caution against confidence in the impossibility of nations stumbling - "irrationally" - into a nuclear exchange." (p. 259)

In this way Allison extracts quite different "lessons" from each mode of analysis. He preserves his own detachment from the norm of rationality only by the narrowest of margins when he argues, "We must find new ways of thinking about improving the capabilities of the 'system' to select and implement actions. The central questions concern the impact of the structure of political games and the character of organisations on policy outcomes. For example, what information do existing organisational procedures make available at what points and how can this information be improved? How can organisation be encouraged to produce a longer list of alternatives? Can means be devised for checking the programs that organisations are prepared to implement and making the repertoire of programs more relevant? What structure of a bureaucratic political game facilitates the identification of issues and production of a good map of alternatives and arguments?" (p. 269) Allison seems in each of these questions to be implying quite clearly that the better policy will result from a maximisation of optimal choices from the broadest range of practical alternatives, and that where, for instance, a Model II analysis appears to possess the most descriptive and explanatory power, the analyst is
likely to deduce an evaluation that is concerned with the appropriateness of established routines. Allison asks 'But if one accepts a Model II or Model III analysis, does this not require him to modify the norms he uses in evaluating that behaviour?' (p. 270) ... (and also) sensitize him to certain warning signs about the behaviour of nations that he might otherwise overlook?' (p. 271) Thus it seems reasonable to infer that if, for instance, Model III seems to yield the best insights into a particular action, the norms associated usually with a Model III analysis will be useful in extracting a suitable 'lesson' on advocating an appropriate prescription.

In the following sections the decision-making processes by which each of the participants came to enter the Five Power Agreement (with emphasis on the two main guarantors, Britain and Australia) will be subjected to analysis through the three lenses provided by the Allison framework. Such analyses will be of necessity incomplete as a result of a lack of data, and indeed it may seem that such a complex and ambitious route to reach the peak of what is far from being a prominent feature in the strategic landscape of Southeast Asia is unnecessarily hazardous. However, it is to be hoped that the route will provide suggestive if not actually exciting panoramas, which will test validity of the three popular evaluations of the Agreement that were listed at the beginning of this section (on pages 6 and 7). If it can be shown in all or most of the five actors, a Model III analysis is the most powerful, the policies represented by the Agreement can be seen as the resultants of a set of games where,
because of relentless environmental changes, players have been forced to abandon policies in which they have invested heavy stakes (perhaps even their shirts). In this situation the Agreement is seen as a fig-leaf, designed, either consciously or unconsciously, * to preserve self respect, and also perhaps to disguise from the tyros that a new game with new rules has started. Therefore a strong Model III analysis would tend to give support to the first of the popular evaluations, and as a consequence, the Agreement would appear to have very limited strategic capabilities. In politics, once a fig-leaf has been recognised, it becomes instantly transparent. If policy-makers in Southeast Asia come to see the Agreement as being primarily a device whereby British and Australian leaders seek to hide their nakedness from their own electorates, ** it will be dismissed as a temporary and essentially empty gesture.

*The attributes of 'unconscious' purposes or motivation to policy-makers is a conjectural leap that is made with surprising frequency by Model I analysts. Such an attribution would have more descriptive validity in the case of a Model III analysis, where it is often observed that the players become so preoccupied with the skills of pulling and hauling, and the demands of the 41-59 principle, that they lose their awareness of why they are pulling in one direction rather than in another. According to Reed and Williams, Dennis Healey provides an excellent example of this phenomenon. One of the greater shortcomings of the Allison framework is its failure to incorporate the psychological aspects of the decision-making process.

**Such a device could be described as being 'rational' in that it serves the ends of particular decision-makers. However, such ends do not meet the criterion of unanimity or correspond in any way with the larger interests of the state, and therefore policy which springs from such a device is, according to the definition on page 9, essentially irrational. Of course, establishing the rationality of the motivations and intentions of policy-makers does not necessarily ensure the subsequent efficaciousness of their policies. Bernard Shaw has observed that the British are particularly adept at doing the right things for the wrong reasons, and "visa versa."
If a Model II analysis proves to have strong descriptive and explanatory power, the Agreement can be seen as the outcome of certain standard operating procedures, produced by the more important organisations involved, in a rigidly linear and incremental fashion. Policy may then have resulted from a set of perceptions that were far too closely blinkered by the Commonwealth defence experiences of the past, and have led the guarantors to undertake commitments which, if put to the test, would inevitably receive drastic reassessment. Thus a strong Model II analysis would support the second of the popular evaluations listed on pages 6 and 7, and lead again to the conclusion that the Agreement makes a limited or even nominal contribution to the security of Southeast Asia. Both Model II and Model II analyses, if sufficiently powerful, would indicate that the Five Power Agreement has resulted from essentially non-rational policies in the guarantor states, because the pragmatic links between the available military modalities and the potential security challenges have not received the proper consideration, and in the event of a challenge, the hollowness of the commitment will be revealed.

A Model I analysis that has convincing descriptive and explanatory qualities would do much to support the third of the popular evaluations. Policy-makers will be seen as having taken into consideration the best available assessments of the strategic situation, and the arrangement can be seen as a carefully calculated response to a particularly obscure and indefinite set of security problems. This response might well include strong elements of bluff (outrageous, and therefore successful bluff has
been a prominent feature of British strategic history), but such a conscious, if well concealed bluff, is to be distinguished from the kind of unintentional and irrational disproportion between commitments and capacity that would perhaps be indicated by strong Model II or Model III analyses. Of course the distinction is not easy to make in practice, and there may in fact be a mixture of motives. The high-level perpetrators of a bluff are far more likely to be successful if the commanders on the ground are themselves convinced of the credibility of their stance. On the other hand, this can backfire disastrously, as it did in Singapore in 1942.

Finally, it should be noted that the three models not only have descriptive, explanatory and evaluatory qualities: they also provide the basis for prediction. Thus, exposure of the decision-making processes of the states involved will, as well as generating a means whereby to reach some conclusions about the strategic utility of the Agreement, also provide the basis for projections of those processes, thus allowing for the development of a prognosis.

The Process by which Britain arrived at the 1971 Agreement.

The process to be examined is quite lengthy and very complicated. Its beginnings can be traced to the proclamation of the British Indian Ocean Territory in November 1965, and the most critical phases occurred between July 1967 and January 1968, and in the period immediately after the improbable Conservative Party victory at the polls in June 1970. No attempt has been made to separate the defence of Malaysia and Singapore from the rest of the East of Suez issue: such a separation would be very
difficult, and largely artificial, because the 1971 arrangements are best seen as a residual of the East of Suez policy.

A Model I Analysis

Goals.

In its first Defence White Paper (Cmnd 2592) the new Labour Government expressed a clear awareness of the need to impose a rational connection between ends and means: "There has been no real attempt to match political commitments to military resources, still less to relate the resources made available for defence to the economic circumstances of the nation." The Government was largely united in its perception of what were the proper ends to be pursued in its East of Suez policies, and this perception was not significantly modified right up until it became necessary to abandon the policy completely. These ends are summarized by Wilson in his recollection of debate in March 1966 on pre-election defence policy: "Our left wing and a minority of cabinet favoured pulling out totally: a majority, including myself, moved more by thoughts of a contribution to international peace than by considerations of imperial splendour, favoured the retention of a minimum force there" (Wilson, p. 212). A socialist government would not, in the view of its supporters, be motivated by considerations of neo-colonialism; its intentions were pure, and were best seen as a natural and laudable desire to protect the interests of fellow Commonwealth countries. Between 1948 and 1960 these interests had been threatened by the guerilla insurgency in Malaya known as the "Emergency," and between 1962 and 1966 these interests had been threatened by a series
of attacks and harassments from Indonesia, which acquired the ambiguous title of the "Confrontation." Countering these specific threats was seen as part of a general obligation to contribute toward the peace and security of the entire East of Suez region.

Options and costs.

The debate within the cabinet was not so much over the ends of policy but rather the means by which they were to be secured. British governments have been bedevilled by economic difficulties, and in particular balance of payments crises, almost without respite since 1945. The weight of the defence burden has been aggravated by the pace of the technological revolution, which has made it increasingly difficult for Britain, France and others to maintain the appearances of keeping up with the equipment available either to the two superpowers or even the lesser states with whom they might become engaged. A fighter-bomber now costs about one hundred times as much as its predecessor did in 1943, and this is at a time when action in the 1967 June war, in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and in the 1972 Vietnam campaign seems to emphasize the pre-eminence of air power. The decision taken in February 1966 not to proceed with the CVA01 aircraft carrier is, in accordance with the tenets of the Model, a correct recognition that sea-borne air power was no longer within British means, and it is not insignificant that the announcement of this decision was delayed to coincide with the negotiated end of "Confrontation" in August 1966.

The government inherited a situation where there was a disproportion
between commitments and resources, but this was not a static situation, and in fact without a stepped up defence expenditure, the disproportion would be found to grow larger, as equipment became obsolete. Even though the end of "Confrontation" may seem to have given the government some slack defence capacity, in fact this was illusory. The 1967 Defence White Paper (Cmnd 3203) recognized the reduction in British strength by speaking only of a "military capacity" instead of a "military presence" East of Suez.

All the government's reductions in the defence burden failed to avert devaluation, and when it came in October 1967, its immediate effect was to add £50 million a year to overseas defence costs. Plans for staging posts in the Indian Ocean and a base in Australia were immediately scrapped and after two months of soul searching the government admitted in its February 1968 Defence White Paper (Cmnd 3540) that: "Britain's defence effort will in future be concentrated mainly in Europe and the North Atlantic." After three years of attempting to choose between the various means available for achieving the goals of an East of Suez policy, Wilson and his colleagues were forced to accept that none of them would be sufficient.

Choice.

It has been suggested that the government reached its decision in a rather inconsistent and irrational fashion, and that it would have been wiser to have grasped the nettle of withdrawal, and devaluation, in 1966 or even earlier. Patrick Gordon Walker, a member of the cabinet through-
out most of this period, makes a close and authentic analysis of this particular decision in his book, *The Cabinet*, and poses the question: "Does the inconsequent and dilatory progress towards the great decision disclose a defect in the nature of cabinet government?" (p. 131) He admits that although all the issues having a bearing on the matter were considered and settled either in the Overseas Policy and Defence Committee or in the cabinet itself, "factors and policies that were clearly linked were not correlated." Gordon Walker, not surprisingly, comes to a generous conclusion about the cabinet's rationality and consistency. The decision was made "at the earliest moment when such a policy became practical (which was then) ... it was widely accepted both at home and in the Commonwealth countries principally and critically concerned."\(^{16}\)

**Constraints**

Gordon Walker's evaluation takes into account one of the major constraints within which any government has to work. "Even if the way toward balancing commitment and resources were clearly indicated by external analysts, the problem would still remain of winning people, politicians and bureaucrats to this particular interpretation of rationality."\(^{17}\)

This constraint is one that applies to all countries except those that accept benevolent dictatorship, but the difficulty experienced by a government in securing acceptance of the rationality of its policies is probably less in Britain than in most countries. Other important constraints are those imposed by the necessity to take into consideration and perhaps even accede to the demands of allies. Thus Christopher Mayhew, in
explaining his resignation over the carrier issue in 1966, concedes that even though it may not be good sense: "Dislike of offending the Americans and of discouraging their support for sterling could legitimately be taken into account by the British government in deciding to stay East of Suez" (p. 47). Gordon Walker rejects this as a myth (Gordon Walker, p. 124) but admits that it had been argued in cabinet that the policy gave some influence over the United States. Certainly the question of influence of the United States over Britain and vice versa was a highly emotive one within the cabinet and the country generally, and it did much to cloud the thinking of a usually perspicacious Harold Wilson, who was also well aware that it was the special relationship between the Anglo-Saxons that marred his assiduous courtship of De Gaulle and the Common Market. Thus it can be seen that this decision to withdraw from East of Suez took much more into consideration than the simple relationship between the desirable goals of regional peace and security and the available military modalities.

Bipartisanship

"The change in government in 1964 made no perceptible impact upon policy," claims Gordon Walker (p. 125), and in his preface Mayhew argues strongly that the East of Suez debate cannot be explained in terms of party differences. F. S. Northedge has documented the generally conservative and bipartisan nature of British foreign policy in the postwar years, and apart from a more explicit recognition that no overseas bases could be usefully held against the opposition of the local population, there was
little to indicate the Labour government would, within less than four years initiate: "the most momentous shift in our foreign policy for a century and a half" (Gordon Walker, p. 122).

Wilson did his best to preserve this bipartisan tradition in recognition that foreign commitments are undertaken not by a party of a government, but by the nation. He even attempted to extend it by offering joint talks with the opposition on privy counsellor terms, intended to supplant the routine foreign policy debates, which "ran along well worn lines" and were "bedevilled for years by electioneering and obscured by security considerations." (Wilson, p. 78) Although this offer was never taken up, there was a strong congruence between the perceptions about foreign policy and defence of spokesmen for both major parties. Besides the 'Emergency' and 'Confrontation,' they also shared memories of successful actions in Kuwait in 1961, and in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika in 1964. Similarly, reactions to the events of June 1967 were closely parallel on either side of the house. Wilson was able to draw bipartisan support for his abortive scheme to protect the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Aqaba, and the inability of the military presence to avert Arab reprisals against British trade and oil supplies in the Gulf did much to shift perceptions on all sides about the utility of an East of Suez policy. There was a strange alliance between left wing elements in the Labour Party who had always opposed the policy, and certain right wing elements of the Conservative Party, led by the redoubtable Enoch Powell. While initially the pressures toward bipartisanship can be explained by the government's
slender majority up until the March 1966 election, subsequently it resulted largely from the pressures exerted on the moderates of each party by their more extremist colleagues.

The results of this bipartisanship became clear in 1970. During the election neither party sought to make foreign policy in general or the East of Suez issue in particular a matter of contention. The Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy (Cmnd 4521) produced by the Conservative Government within a few months of its appointment speaks boldly of intentions "to make good the damage" of the period between 1964 and 1970, and "to enable Britain to resume, within her resources, a proper share of the responsibility for the preservation of peace and stability in the world."

But the substance of the supplementary statement amounted to very minor changes in the arrangements proposed for the security of Malaysia and Singapore, involving the retention of a small permanent garrison, and an extra cost of a mere £5 to £10 million per year. The statement went on to accuse the previous government of exceeding its expenditure targets, and thus by a sleight of hand, to claim that the increase in the new targets for the Defence Budget for 1972-73 of £40 million to £2,270 million, would actually result in a reduction in expenditure of some £35 million.

The Conservative Government has pursued the same general defence policy since then. The debate on the 1972 Defence White Paper (Cmnd 4891) was marked by a left wing amendment that condemned the failure to restrain arms spending. George Thompson, a leading member of the shadow cabinet, expressed the Labour party's opposition to the amendment, saying that the statement on the estimates represented a culmination of a
process by which the Conservatives had accepted, with essentially minor modifications, "the massive and historic change in Britain's defence role overseas, brought about the previous government." (Hansard, February 23, 1972) There was no rejoinder.

The level of debate.

In his critique of British defence policy, Walter Goldstein laments that he was forced to reply for his data about defence spending on material published in *The Guardian*, and notes the lack of any official review of military preparedness along American lines, which he claims "impedes the public debate over military planning." (p. 21) In fact, however, the debate was fueled by a very rich supply of highly qualified and informed journalists who are attached to each of the three major daily and weekend newspapers. In addition, there are the defence correspondents of the two highly influential weekly journals which generally purvey the perceptions and propensities of the Labour and Conservative Parties. Both Neville Brown of the *New Statesman* and Lawrence Martin of the *Spectator* are leading academic figures in the field of strategy, and a sampling of their weekly contributions reveals a standard of debate and a degree of bipartisanship that is most instructive.

If amplitude of information was the most prominent feature of the debate, the next, and more surprising, was the general absence of popular involvement and the consequent political rancour. To outsiders, one of the most puzzling and faintly disconcerting elements of the British political system is the way in which the decisive dialogue on major issues is still
confined to a remarkably small and homogeneous group of insiders, who manage to retain their anonymity and distance from the political arena.

A Model II analysis

A Model II or III analysis has much higher information costs than those imposed by Model I, which can in some fashion be attempted by an armchair strategist. The organisations which are considered to have contributed to the process of decision-making between 1965 and 1971 are the three services, the Foreign Office and the Treasury. These organisations have a reputation for reticence that might well be envied by their transatlantic equivalents, and there have been no revelations, such as were provided by the Pentagon Papers, to illuminate their inner workings. Analysis must proceed from a sparse collection of fragmentary clues, and entails a heavy reliance on the inferences of Allison's paradigm.

Writing in 1966, Goldstein found that "there was no intermediary agency in the British system to stabilize the decision-making process and to mediate the conflict of competing interests" (p. 39). This low opinion of the cabinet was perhaps well justified, particularly with regard to defence policy, and there was also much to support his contention that "the tradition of muddling through administrative dilemmas is deeply rooted in British government and industry."²³ Labour had been out of office for thirteen years, and only three out of twenty-three members of the 1964 cabinet had previously been ministers. It was not surprising that there would be some delay before the permanent civil service became fully responsive to a new style of executive direction, and after such a long
period of dealing with a socially and perhaps politically more compatible ministry, the civil service would energetically seek to preserve or extend its prerogatives. Wilson observes, "Neutral and non-political though the civil service is, it is as sharp as any other body of men in recognizing political realities. The first draft of the Queen's speech was ready within days ... or was it, I wondered, even ready before?" (p. 20)

The Defence Ministry

Conditions had not been conducive to good health among the three organisations within the defence ministry during the post-war period. Steadily declining budgets and a rapid turnover of ministers (nine in thirteen years) combined to produce increasing anxiety and internecine strife. "The divisions ... had been deep, and had indeed, in a manner uncharacteristic of Whitehall, reached a point familiar in Washington, where one department was actively briefing the press against another" (Wilson, p. 42). Mayhew diagnosed the maladies of defence policy in terms of a "lack of any set, long term purpose," resulting in a "flight from pillar to post that was not foreseen or planned" (p. 96). He saw organisational pressures resulting in a "build up in Kenya after Suez, Aden after Kenya, and Gulf after Aden ..." (p. 41). The air force, having lost all these, pressed for staging posts at Diego Garcia, Gan, Masirab, Seychelles; and then the navy, observing that the weakness of these was their exposure to interference from the sea ...

The process was endlessly self reinforcing, and was only curtailed when it brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy. £100 million had
been lost on the Blue Streak missile, and £200 million on the TSR2 bomber. Britain "lacked an imperious Forrestal or a resourceful McNamara" (Goldstein, p. 38), and Dennis Healey was never able to rise above the endless struggles over rival programs, and impose acceptable long term objectives. Wilson reports, optimistically, that "Healey (in February 1965) was able to report progress on integration and the desperately difficult problem of getting away from the inward looking preoccupations of individual service departments and inter-service rivalries and disputes" (p. 78), but the optimism was misplaced. Christopher Mayhew, minister for the navy, and Sir David Luce, the first Sea Lord, resigned only nine days before the 1966 election, and this was a powerful indication of the amount of disharmony within the defence organisations. Wilson admits that there had been "a tremendous battle," and argues in confused but revealing terms that, "the issue was not so much the strategy as the decisions we had to take about air and naval forces (equipment)" (p. 212). Repeatedly Healey took decisions on equipment and bases that preordained the outcome of debates on strategy in the cabinet that sometimes did not occur until months or years later. It is obvious that these decisions were taken as a result of immediate pressures from the services and from the Treasury, without a full awareness of their strategic consequences.

Typical of such decisions was the failure to purchase a number of Lockheed C5 Galaxy transport aircraft, (costing £10 million each) which was the only way of preserving the credibility of the mobile force idea, without which the entire strategy of the 1971 arrangements might be considered suspect (see below pages 56-57).
Little has changed under the Conservative government. An example is the decision to prolong the life of the "Ark Royal," the last of Britain's carriers, from 1972 until the late 70's. The Northern European theatre is as well supplied with airstrips as anywhere in the world, and nothing can be done to improve the obsolescent aircraft, so the decision can best be interpreted as a response to pressure from the 3,000 men who have vested their careers in the Fleet Air Arm.  

The Foreign Office

No branch of the civil service is more reticent or aloof than the Foreign Office, and it is impossible to achieve sufficient penetration to do more than speculate on its "Standard Operating Procedures" or "repertoires," but one can make safer estimates about the perceptions and goals of its senior members. These men will usually have spent more than thirty years in the department, and their formative years will have been in a period when Britain still controlled 10% and not 0.02% of the world's land surface. Organisation health is naturally directly correlated to the number and size of overseas missions, which in turn is related to an intent to retain the status of a world power. The Commonwealth has been seen as a buttress of that status, and its erosion, up until 1971 at least, has been resisted with zealous stubbornness. This perception of Britain having a right, if not a duty, to a world role has been accepted without question by successive foreign ministers. Mayhew remarks that if any other country "sought to maintain peace by establishing overseas bases we would be astonished, and probably indignant and alarmed"
But his scepticism was not shared by other Labour Ministers. Like the service departments, the Foreign Office has met with frustrations and disappointments, which have served only to increase the tenacity with which it adheres to its goals and perceptions. Repeated rebuffs from Europe blocked the possibility that new roles and vistas could be developed in that direction, and it was in this connection that Wilson ran into his greatest contretemps with the civil service, in February 1969: the notorious "Soames Affair." He reports, "Those responsible in the Foreign Office no doubt felt that it was all a famous victory." (Wilson, p. 618). Clearly, after almost five years of Labour government, the Foreign Office enjoyed a remarkable degree of autonomy, and was able to place the prime minister in a position with Kiesinger and De Gaulle, that he found to be irritating and embarrassing, if not directly harmful to his diplomacy.

The Treasury

Defence expenditure between 1964 and 1968 seems to have been largely determined by economy cuts made immediately necessary by unforeseen financial crises. Mayhew's central theme is that the government decided on its expenditure ceilings and its defence strategy as though they were unconnected factors. As a result, "our role East of Suez is like a sacred cow ... the economic departments will not let the role be properly financed and the overseas departments will not let it be wound up" (p. 96). Other observers tend to see the Treasury as having far more than half of the share of the control of defence policy. Laurence Martin argues that
it "has for many years been dictated more by the budgetary axe than by political and strategic analysis," and another regular contributor to the Spectator, Jack Bruce-Gardyne, M.P., writing of the January 1968 cuts, says bluntly, "they were the outcome of three weeks of horse-trading between the different spending ministries ... to make devaluation work." This view is pressed most firmly by an authority generally sympathetic to the Labour government, Neville Brown, who explains that although defence spending "across the exchanges" was less than 3% of total expenditures abroad in 1967, it happened to be only a little less than equivalent to the average annual deficit on current account between 1964 and 1967. It was to be expected that the Treasury would see its elimination as an obvious solution to its balance of payments difficulties. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was compelled to pursue financial policies of extreme orthodoxy, and this resulted in the steady reduction of defence expenditure as a percentage of GNP, despite the rapid increase in technological complexity, from 6.5% in 1965 to 5.5% in 1971. This reduction has been achieved not by a conscious and deliberate long term scaling down of commitments, but rather by a series of unintended but expedient emergency measures.

A Model III Analysis

"If I were forced to choose between the documents on the one hand, and late, limited, partial interviews with some of the principal participants on the other, I would be forced to discard the documents." Neustadt's indication of the kind of evidence required for a Model III
analysis is a warning of the limitations of what follows, based as it is on the fragmentary and self-serving recollections of still active politicians, and the comments of journalists and commentators who make little claim to academic objectivity. The unreliability and subjectivity of such data explains the reluctance of serious scholars to engage in this level of analysis, and this is specially the case when the events to be studied are recent, and still highly charged with political tensions. Many of the key games and action channels remain completely obscured, and it is not even possible to detect which games were of more or of less importance at certain critical junctures. For example, there are no records even of the frequency of meetings of the all important cabinet committees, and it is impossible to know whether an issue was discussed, for instance, only within the Overseas Policy and Defence Committee, or whether it was brought, with the chairman's permission, before the entire cabinet.

However, it would be wrong to argue that because information is not available it is therefore not of importance, and some attempt will be made to describe three of the games that are perhaps of central importance: those played within the cabinet, between the cabinet and the Labour Party, and between the two front benches.

The Cabinet

Unlike the "ExCom" of 1962, the British cabinet operates within a long established and generally accepted set of conventions, the most important of which is the doctrine of collective responsibility. The doctrine has evolved in response to the necessity in a parliamentary situation
of maintaining the appearances of unanimity, and indeed it is the preserv-
ation of this appearance, involving continuous consensus construction,
that might properly be regarded as the central objective of the cabinet
game. The prime minister is responsible for ensuring that consensus is
reached on each issue, and he is aware that failure to perform this function
may lead to his replacement at any time.

The Labour government was plagued repeatedly by rumours of palace
revolutions, and although there was no substance to most of them, it is
clear that Wilson never achieved the kind of security enjoyed by Clement
Atlee, and was forced on several occasions to dismantle incipient
rebellions. The ease with which he was able to do this is a reflection of
his skill as a political tactition, and he used the technique of the cabinet
reshuffle with a ruthlessness equalled only by MacMillan. After the
redistribution of responsibilities in July 1966, Wilson is reported to have
remarked, "Now I have got four heirs apparent instead of one," and it has
been suggested that the danger of a Brown-Callaghan axis had been
adroitly removed by giving Brown the job that Callaghan wanted, the
Foreign Office. Wilson himself interprets this reshuffle on Model II
lines, by saying that he had used Brown to set up the Department of
Economic Affairs, the main purpose of which was to reduce the territory of
the Treasury, and now it was time to use his extraordinary talents to give
that second bastion of the civil service, the Foreign Office, "a shake up
and a little more dynamism." (Wilson, p. 272) He goes on to decry the
importance of the fact that Brown, whom he had so narrowly defeated in
the contest for the leadership in 1963, was now officially number two on the "pecking list," and claims, rather incredibly, that this was a consideration to which he himself had paid no attention when he was a member of Atlee's administration. However, Wilson cannot resist the temptation of disclosing how he was eventually able to outmanoeuvre and defeat his chief rival: "I have not felt it appropriate in general to draw back the veil which rightly covers the detailed transaction of a cabinet, but ..." (p. 473).

Brown's tenure at the Foreign Office lasted until March 1968, and thus covered the period during which the essential decisions on East of Suez were taken. It seems that Brown was persuaded to take the job only on condition that the entry into the European Community be given top priority (Butler, p. 15), and from October 1966, when the application received the approval of the Labour Party Conference, until the summer of 1967, there ensued in the cabinet a prolonged struggle between the "Europeanists" allied with the "economizers," against those who wished to retain the role East of Suez. Wilson's part in this struggle reflects Allison's comment on the position of the president, whose "own costs and benefits often require that he decide as little as possible, keeping his options open" (p. 172). Indeed few politicians can have been aware as much as Wilson that "misperception is in a sense the grease that allows cooperation" (Allison, p. 178), and he gave every appearance of being in favour of both courses of action even though he knew them to be mutually contradictory. His prime purpose was to keep his team together and preserve
his personal ascendency. He could not afford to oppose Brown and Callaghan, but nor could he be seen to sacrifice all the personal stakes he had placed in the East of Suez policy. The result was that, although withdrawal had really been inevitable from the time of the carrier decision in February 1966, the cabinet continued to equivocate until Wilson was able to convincingly re-establish his dominant position, as a result of the South African Arms crisis of December, 1967.

Gordon Walker gives the student only a glimmering of the nature of this struggle within the cabinet, and it is necessary to read his commentary with a particular care in order to penetrate the gloss of reasonableness with which everything has been spread. He laments that the cabinet is not "a detached body of men united in aloof wisdom" (p. 133), and that an attempt to search for the rational causes of any specific decision must "distort reality, and presuppose the isolation of an issue from its background: an isolation which no Cabinet or any other decision making apparatus is capable" (p. 131). Indeed a cabinet that was "detached from its political context ... would in a parliamentary democracy be a monstrosity ... All questions before Cabinet are in some degree interacting. They are running side by side. Each of them may widen or lessen or shift the divisions in the cabinet and influence the relationship between its members, and thus alter the balance within the Cabinet when another decision fails to be made ... Ministers are very conscious of the interconnection between issues: one reason why they may not clearly detect the interconnection between various factors affecting an isolated issue is that
they connect them all together in a living and continuing nexus" (p. 132).

The essence of this nexus from the point of view of each minister is whether or not he continues to be prepared to accept his share of responsibility for the cabinet's actions. Ultimately only two manoeuvres are available to him by which he can exert his influence on decisions: the threat of resignation and the use of the "unattributable leak." Both methods involve dangers for the user, as Brown discovered when he finally exhausted the patience of his colleagues. But at times of crisis or closely contested debate, such as occurred over East of Suez in January 1968, "There had been perfectly legitimate warnings by this or that minister that he must reserve his position" (Wilson, p. 482), and "After each meeting, press stories appeared, even with some degree of accuracy on how the Cabinet had divided" (p. 480). At such times each minister is supremely conscious that power wisely invested yields an enhanced reputation for effectiveness, but that also very few Cabinet ministers have advanced their careers by resignation.

In this particular crisis, which Wilson describes as the most difficult with which he had to deal, the role played by Healey was central and highly significant. No Labour defence minister can rely on the support of his party, as a Conservative one can in almost any circumstances, and although Healey won and retained the respect of his department by his intellectual grasps and administrative proficiency, his political base was never secure. In these circumstances he was compelled to become the most loyal of Wilson's "court favourites": in all our expenditure reviews, both before and after January 1968, Healey was the anchor
man" (p. 480). He could be relied upon to follow all the twists and turns of policy that resulted from Wilson's expediencies, even when they required him to sacrifice his considerable personal stakes in programs such as the Flll purchase, or retract commitments such as those he had given to the Australians.

Before leaving this description of the Cabinet game, it is worth taking a second look at the Mayhew resignation through the Model III lens. Allison remarks, as an afterthought, that "American culture tends to legitimise national interests and render 'political considerations' beyond the pale. This makes it difficult for many players to articulate, even to themselves, the priorities that their behaviour suggests" (p. 171). Mayhew describes the rules governing the special subset of players within the defence departments, and explains how they had been set up to his disadvantage. He gives an account of the stakes involved, (including even, his own personal chauffeur) but insists that "Potential occasions for mutual irritation never produced the slightest ill-will or damaged the good personal relations between us" (p. 147). It is possible that he would now admit that his resignation was a political mistake: had it been threatened earlier it might have saved the CVA 01, had it been kept in reserve it might have led to the adoption of the policies he advocated a little sooner than actually occurred. Mayhew's resignation statement was unable to dispel the impression that he was a frustrated hawk, and there are probably inverse parallels to the situation that occurred on the "day of decision" in the "ex com" when speculation has it that Kennedy sacrificed
Stevenson to the hawks. (Allison, p. 209) Certainly the resignation did nothing to damage Labour's victory in the general election that followed almost immediately.

The Labour Party

It is not possible to develop in the space available a full account of the game played between the leaders and the followers of the British Labour Party. It is sufficient to note that it is, perhaps, an excessively democratic institution. (The annual conference claims a say in policy even when the party is in office, and in opposition it actually elects the entire shadow cabinet.) The Parliamentary Labour Party has a strong tradition of non-conformity, and the experiments in liberalism conducted by chief whip Silken during 1966 and 1967 did nothing to ease the tensions that were generated by the Cabinet's attempts to carry out progressive reforms simultaneously with the orthodox, even conservative, economic and foreign policy. Wilson had always been a man of the left, he had been backed by the "Tribune Group" of left wingers in his struggles against Gaitskill and Brown, and as prime minister had their respect by clearly not being seduced by the establishment, but in February 1967 he was confronted by sixty-two abstentions, representing "a substantial section of the PLP, going much further than the traditional left" who were opposed to the Defence White Paper. "Looking back I can see that more time and care (pulling and hauling) should have been given to anticipating the trouble" (p. 377). Wilson's attempts to restore discipline backfired badly, and it was this that led to the revisions of defence policy that
were incorporated in the Supplementary Statement of July 1967 (Cmnd 3203). The Economist of July 22, 1967 adhered to this interpretation, and bluntly accused Wilson of withdrawing from East of Suez in order to placate the forthcoming Labour Party Conference at Scarborough in October.

The Opposition

The game played between the two front benches is the central and most fascinating feature of the British Constitution, and an account of it clearly lies beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that it is the Opposition's duty to oppose, and particularly when there seems to be little immediate likelihood of its achieving office, a shadow cabinet may find itself espousing policies that are of greater political than practical value. Thus when the government was still in favour of an East of Suez policy, and Enoch Powell was still sufficiently respectable for the Conservative Party to retain him as shadow Defence Minister, he was permitted to express his rejection of Asia, Asians, and the Asian Commonwealth. Subsequently, as Labour abandoned the world role, Heath found it convenient to draw on the support of the traditional right, and make speeches in Australia promising to reverse the decision of January 1968. Despite all of Heath's attempts to shackle Powell, nothing could prevent the racial issue becoming of decisive importance in the 1970 election, and it was probably Powell's extreme but regretably popular stand on immigration which brought the Conservatives their unexpected victory. This resulted in a situation where the new government, to its own surprise, and perhaps embarrassment, found itself committed to a policy
towards Malaysia and Singapore that it had neither the financial resources nor the internal party support to carry through. 38

Summary

Which of these three analyses makes the most contribution toward an understanding of the processes that led up to the 1971 agreement? How does one set about measuring their descriptive, explanatory, predictive and evaluatory powers? At the onset it is necessary to take note of two cautions: one is the danger of assuming that the majority opinion of academic observers is likely to be the most valid; the other is the temptation to fall victim to the persuasiveness of participants, who are normally anxious to preserve the appearance of their having been motivated by nothing but the loftiest intentions. Allison draws our attention to both of these pitfalls: "Most analysts proceed predominantly - albeit most often implicitly - in terms of a Model I framework" (p. 11). And, even "members of the intelligence community who are often very familiar with the details of a process ... feel that by putting an occurrence in a larger rational framework they make it more comprehensive to their audience." (p. 38)

A participant thus is always prone to the tendency to slip unconsciously from reporting a rationale for his actions into fabricating a rationalization, and will be encouraged to do so by the desire for simplicity and ease of explanation.

The best way to measure descriptive and explanatory power is to identify the points at which the three analyses are incompatible or complementary. Allison himself defers this task to his forthcoming full-length
book on the missile crisis, and clearly this brief study does no more than suggest possibilities for the most tentative of conclusions. For instance Models I and II show that the decision to withdraw was precipitated by the devaluation, while Model III indicates that it resulted from the game played between leaders and followers several months earlier. This scholar shies away from the task of identifying all such points and submitting them to the proper scrutiny, and seeks instead to claim the right to express an opinion on the relative potency of the three analyses, that is based more on a general impression and feel for the material, than the kind of meticulous argument that would be mandatory in a study of the British decision-making process with regard to the security of Malaysia and Singapore that might make any claim to being definitive. Such a right should not be granted lightly by the reader, because it is this point in the development of the thesis that paths will tend to diverge, as individual bias inevitably, and quite properly, comes into operation.

Model I seems "to imply coincidence of perceptions, control of choice and co-ordination of movement within the government-as-unitary actor." (p. 246) Sigal reinforces this requirement for what may be considered as the central feature of an action that lends itself to a Model I analysis, when he asks, "under what circumstances does it make sense to speak of a government having an intention? Either when all its policy makers share precisely the same priorities and reach unanimous decision, or when an individual who is conscious of both his long term and short term goals makes the decision alone" (p. 121). There will be reference
to the latter alternative in the discussion of the Malaysian and Singaporean factors, but for the present, Sigal's singling out of unanimity as the main criterion seems to give support to the validity of the Model I analysis of the British process. The expenditure review of January 1968 which included the decision to withdraw, was carried through the cabinet with only a single resignation (and that was on the issue of the school leaving-age). The decision stirred up very little public protest, and furthermore, as has been demonstrated, it received the tacit support of the opposition. In some respects the choice was unduly delayed, but when it came the existing Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement still had almost four years to run, which gave reasonable scope for alternative arrangements to be evolved. The decision once taken, was implemented with dispatch, and the necessary diplomatic and military planning measures were initiated, leading within a matter of months to the settling of most of the details of what subsequently became the Five Power Arrangements. Of course, no government approaches the ideal Model of the unitary actor, but few came as close to it as Wilson's did over this issue.

Acceptance of the general validity of the Model I analysis allows for confident prediction and, to some extent, evaluation, on the basis of the norm of rationality. If government action resulted from the logic of the debate over the connection between certain ends and means, it is reasonable to suppose that similar logic will apply in the further implementation of the 1971 agreement. However, one must be careful to note at this point that such a pragmatic evaluation does not take into consideration the fact that the ends sought by the government may themselves be either
unwise or actually reprehensible, and that the means might be effective, but improper. "That Britain should strain itself to put men in far flung, tottering bases is not so strange when one considers the motives of the super-powers for putting men in outer space" (Goldstein, p. 30).

Certainly the Model II analysis is also powerful, but again it would appear that, while of course there is a continuous running battle between the executive and administrative branches of government in Britain, that battle is less debilitating, and contains fewer defeats for the executive, than is the case in most other states.

The Model III analysis has many attractions, and in some ways adds almost as much to the composite picture as Model I. It has been suggested that the rules of the various games that are played in England have evolved happily enough so that more often than not the best men do prevail. A minister's power rests not so much upon his popular backing as upon his performance before parliament and cabinet, and his ability to "stand the heat in his own kitchen." Thus Brown and Powell, both of whom enjoyed more popular support than any of their colleagues, have been cast into the wilderness, while Healey survived as defence minister throughout the period of the Labour Government. Healey's survival was largely due to Wilson's respect for his strategic thinking, and Wilson himself is a particularly rational, if not actually a calculating leader. "Those who are forced to despair of mankind's rationality by the fact that so many of them persist in smoking themselves to death, may draw a conclusion from the fact that Wilson, who is addicted to his pipe, insisted that there should be no smoking during cabinet meetings."
In sum then, in order to assess the potential of the Five Power Agreement, it is necessary to understand the level and nature of the commitment of each of its adherents, and particularly of the guarantors. In the crunch, what will happen will be the sum of the various intentions of the countries concerned. In the case of Britain it has been shown that the acceptance of the commitment was in principle a unitary action. However, the £5 or £10 million modification introduced by the Conservatives may have just possibly seriously undermined the unanimity, thus introducing an unfortunate element of unpredictability into the strategic calculation.

**Australian and New Zealand reactions to the British decision to withdraw from East of Suez, and the reaffirmation of the forward defence policy.**

In terms of the forces actually stationed in the area, the Australian guarantee is of equal importance to that of Britain, and, by virtue of the invisible but essential link with the United States through the ANZUS treaty (see below, pages 60-63) the Australian commitment may actually have been of greater significance than Britain's. It is clear that until the Australian government had expressed a willingness to continue maintaining forces in Malaysia and Singapore, if necessary without British support, Wilson and Healey remained reticent about their plans for a continued British commitment of any kind after 1971. Had the Australians not determined to soldier on alone, and had that decision not been ratified by a general election, fought largely on foreign and defence issues, it is extremely improbable that even a Conservative government in Britain would have been prepared to undertake the responsibilities represented by the
1971 Agreement. For these reasons it is necessary to focus on the period between the impact of the British devaluation and consequent expenditure review, and the Australian general election of October 1969. This relatively brief two year period reduces the scale of the analytical problem, but in other respects the Australian black box is far less penetrable than that of Britain. There is an insuperable paucity of authoritative data. T. B. Millar's excellent texts on Australian Defence and Foreign Policy have not yet been updated: H. S. Albinuski's provocative and multi-model study takes us only into the early part of 1968, and is in any case focused almost entirely on the Vietnam issue. Authoritative memoirs of the kind provided by Mayhew, Gordon Walker and Wilson are completely lacking.

For these reasons, as well as limitations imposed by space and the reader's patience, it is best not to report the three analyses that have been generated by the trifocal approach, but instead to proceed directly to consideration of various inferences that they have produced. Again it is necessary to emphasize the impressionistic and tentative nature of these findings.

Model I.

The process did not seem to lend itself to a Model I analysis in several important respects. There was an evident lack of unanimity within

*The abbreviated nature of this section precludes the necessity for copious references to sources, but these and other books, and a selection of articles, are listed in the bibliography. The author was fortunate to be able to discuss the three analyses and his evaluation of the Australian commitment with Coral Bell and Tom Millar, and owes a heavy debt to their insights and observations.
parliament or within the government itself. The opposition were hostile to
the involvement in Vietnam, and by inference, the whole domino theory
upon which the Australian position was based. (After the election, and
particularly after the decision to withdraw from Vietnam, the positions of
the two major parties have drawn much closer together, propelled by
pressures from the left and right wings, that favour a "fortress Australia"
policy. This process bears a strong resemblance to that described in
Britain, and also to the trend toward isolationism in the U.S.A.) The
level of debate also fell far short of the rational ideal. The energies of
the relatively small House of Representatives have traditionally been con­
sumed with inter-party and provincial issues, and there has been a marked
reluctance to deal with foreign policy and defence issues other than within
the framework of the inflexible cold-war ideology, that once again received
public endorsement in the 1969 election. That election had followed too
closely on the traumatic shocks represented by the British withdrawal and
the American acceptance of non-victory in Vietnam, to allow the public to
appreciate the need for a totally fresh assessment of Australian strategy.

Most importantly, the rationality of Gorton and other decision-
makers was severely limited by the constraints placed upon it by the
necessity to take into account the vicissitudes of American policy.*

*It has been suggested that alliances should not be regarded as con­
straints on rationality, but rather as one of the means by which a govern­
ment might attain its ends. In other words, the delay in making the policy
review, and the eventual decision to adopt a policy of "more of the same,"
was a perfectly rational response in the circumstances. This view would
certainly be acceptable in the case of a great power, which is much more
Thus although the cabinet had admitted the necessity for a review of defence policy in August 1968, no decisions could be made or announced until after the inauguration of the new president, early in 1969.

Model II

Gorton apparently gave a high priority to the battle against the permanent civil service, replacing the secretary to the Prime Minister's office with a pretty twenty year old, touring the United States without any advisors from the department of external affairs, and surrounding himself with aides appointed in the American pattern. But the organisations did not seem to wilt under these attacks: the service departments evaded the kind of centralisation that had been recommended by a Royal Commission years before, and external seemed to enjoy, if anything, even greater autonomy. Strangely enough, it seems that the fiasco that resulted from the appointment of an inexperienced junior minister to the position for external affairs was not the outcome of organizational incrementalism. On the contrary, it appears that Gordon Freeth was persuaded by the senior officials to "bring Australian policy from the 50's into the 70's," and that it was the department that was trying to compel the government to recognize the necessity for adaptability to change.39

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free to direct and manipulate its alliances, but in the case of the more mendicant powers, the attitude of their allies is something over which they may at times have little control. This is certainly one point at which Allison's framework could benefit from more rigorous formulation.
The death of Holt on December 17, 1967 coincided exactly with Callaghan's resignation and the beginning of the expenditure review in Britain, and it threw the ruling coalition government into a state of inner conflict and turmoil from which it did not recover until Gorton was eventually replaced in March 1971. His appointment owed more to the exigencies of coalition government than to his own record as a senator, and his performance as prime minister was so inept that a regrettably large proportion of ministers' energies were devoted to providing him with a successor. The process of consensus building was neglected. This became clear at the time of his repudiation of the Freeth speech, when Gorton freely admitted that it was not his custom to have such major foreign policy speeches brought before cabinet, or even before the foreign policy and defence committee. Fairhall, the defence minister, promptly resigned. Thus the parochial nature of Australian politics, combined with the novelty of the question of forward defence without "great and powerful friends," produced a process that lends itself unfortunately at least as much to a Model III analysis as to the others, and leads to an evaluation of the Australian commitment, as it stood in 1971, that makes it little more than a meaningless gesture. Such a harsh evaluation should, however, be modified as a result of the growing degree of bipartisanship, the evolving sophistication of public debate, and the relative unanimity with the country and Liberal party government since the installation of prime minister McMahon.
There are four reasons why New Zealand receives very little attention in this study, of which three are good: New Zealand is 3,000 miles away from Southeast Asia, and its vital interests are not directly involved; its military contribution to the arrangements is miniscule, and its government has not been able to significantly affect the course of negotiations. The fourth reason is, of course, the lack of data, and that is why the following comments and assessments are so brief. Two factors suggest that the New Zealand participation was the result of a process of decision-making that might lend itself more to a Model I analysis. The first is the long-standing stability of Holyoake's government, and the very smooth succession of his long time deputy as prime minister in February 1972. The other is the degree of bipartisanship and unanimity that is evidenced by the Labour party's recent declaration that, if elected in 1972, it intends to maintain the present Five Power Arrangements.

It is tempting to dispense with an account of the Malaysian and Singaporean processes on the grounds that an examination of the potential of a security arrangement does not require assessment of the level of commitment of those who are being guaranteed. This would be too facile, since the agreement will only be invoked by the beneficiaries, and the fashion in which they choose to do this will vitally affect the ways in which the guarantors respond. However, in both countries a full analysis is both obstructed and made superfluous by the fact that decisions on military and strategic matters are largely within the control of a single
man. There has been no significant dialogue on these matters, and therefore there is little on which to base explanation or prediction other than the known preferences of Prime Ministers Razak and Lee. Razak perhaps, has to take into consideration more Model II and Model II factors than does Lee, who enjoys an apparently unchallenged political ascendency, but both men are clearly aware of both short and long term considerations, and have a reputation for rational policy which would be the envy of many statesmen in more developed countries.

In this section of the thesis it has been argued that in order to assess the contribution of the Five Power Agreement to the security of Southeast Asia it is first necessary to develop some understanding of the way in which the five nations, and particularly the guarantors, came to enter into the undertaking, and thus to be able to make an objective evaluation of their intentions. The word "intentions" implies a purposive and rational connection between certain ends and means. The tri-focal analysis has produced, admittedly more suggestively than definitively, an indication that in four of the five countries there was a "rational analysis of the problem, alternatives and consequences," which provide a "benchmark against which the behaviour of governments is tested" (Allison, p. 270). In the case of Australia, despite appearances to the contrary, the decision was taken more in response to internal political demands and alliance pressures than in response to the logic of the strategic situation. This is
especially alarming because it was the Australian initiative which encouraged the British Conservative Government to undertake the obligations of 1971 which extend beyond those perceived as necessary by the previous government, and which serve to undermine the bipartisan solidarity of the British commitment.

In a period of rapid flux, the original intentions may or may not continue to represent an appropriate appreciation of strategic and political trends. The extent to which the Five Power Agreement has a real strategic potential depends upon how well it continues to perform certain functions that are still perceived to be appropriate and useful, and perhaps also whether it has acquired other functions, unforeseen at the time of its gestation, that give it a renewed or even reinforced significance. The second major section of the thesis examines the ways in which the intentions expressed in the Agreement have been translated into actual dispositions of forces, and goes on to assess the ability of these forces to respond effectively to the various possible and probable challenges to regional security. This discussion leads toward an evaluation of the various functions performed by the arrangements.
III STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE ANZUK FORCES

Deterrence and the credibility of the token forces.

Reputation

The successful actions of British, Australian and New Zealand forces in East and West Malaysia have done much to counter-weigh the effect of the easy victory secured by the Japanese in 1942. The prolonged campaigns of the "Emergency" period were successful not only in eliminating the Min Yuen, but also in winning the support of the rural population, and in Sarawak the Australians acquired a reputation during the "Confrontation" that compares very favourably with that of the Malaysian security forces operating in the area at present. The withdrawal of the last Australian from the peninsula to Singapore occurred only a few weeks before the tragic riots in Kuala Lumpur in May 1969. No authority has suggested the two events were causally linked, and it is true that the Australian Government had only recently reasserted its determination not to allow its forces to become involved in internal security problems; but it should also be noted that the response of the authorities to the crisis included immediate plans to enlarge the size of the security forces available in the capital, and by far more than the 1,200 that had been withdrawn by Australia.

Apart from the aircrews stationed at Butterworth and the small numbers who are in training at any given time in Kota Tinggi at the Jungle Warfare School, the ANZUK force is concentrated entirely in Singapore. The opportunities for its exercising throughout the region have not been
extensive, and the respect and rapport that had been built up in the areas historically prone to terrorist activity will be eroded with the passage of time.

Study of the exercise "Bersatu Padu," that was held in the summer of 1970 gives an indication of the way in which a small ANZUK force might be deployed to snuff out terrorist infiltration, but the exercise was far too expensive to be repeated on a regular basis. The main set-piece of the exercise, "Operation Granada," involved the coordination of a mixed force of 25,000 men under the command of a Malaysian general, against 1,850 "enemies" that were infiltrating an imaginary country lying between West Malaysia and Thailand. The "enemy" were able to give a very good account of themselves, and this would give support to the general rule of thumb that a 15 to 1 advantage is required to ensure the containment of an insurrection.

"Bersatu Padu," (meaning complete unity), had been planned at the June 1968 Defence Ministers' Conference as a means by which to demonstrate the practicability of the mobile force idea. Transport Command flew in 3,600 men, 400 vehicles, 21 helicopters and 140 tons of freight, using 118 sorties over the 8,000 mile haul, all in the space of a week. But, although half the men had had previous jungle warfare experience, it was still found necessary to plan for a six week training and acclimatisation period before the main operation began, and even then the imported forces were hard taxed to keep up with the "enemy," who consisted largely of Gurkhas normally stationed in Brunei. This was certainly one of the
"lessons" learned from the exercise that contributed towards the Conservative Government's decision to preserve a permanent force in the area.

The extent to which the present force could be rapidly reinforced is dependent on three major logistical factors: the availability of airfields, the existence of barracks, and the stockpiling of supplies and heavy equipment. Not surprisingly, enquiries in Whitehall have not resulted in clear answers to questions on these topics, but informed sources indicate that although the largest airfield has been given over to the Lockheed Aircraft Company as a repair and servicing base (mainly for American Service Aircraft) it would still be available in the case of an emergency. Much of the accommodation remains within the control of the Singaporean army, and would similarly be available. Some stockpiling has occurred, but not on a large scale, and this supports the suspicion that rapid withdrawal is considered to be as likely a contingency as rapid reinforcement.

The ANZUK force thus presents some of the appearances of being more than a mere token: it has inherited a reputation for successful action, it has demonstrated a capability to operate in conjunction with the forces of Malaysia and Singapore, and there is still the potential for reinforcement from Britain and elsewhere. The extent to which these appearances are real or illusory will be further examined in the following sections.

The forces as hostages: the level of commitment and the potential for swift withdrawal.

Having their wives and families with them greatly increases the
appearance of having an intention to stay, but the ANZUK forces are also faced with much greater difficulties if they are instructed to pull out without delay. The concept of an ally's forces acting as a hostage to the enemy was developed with regard to a nuclear exchange in Europe, and those who have tried to apply it to the situation in Malaysia and Singapore fail to take note of the fact that these forces are unlikely to become the victim of a sudden cataclysmic blow, leaving their governments with little choice but to respond in kind; on the contrary their involvement in any future conflict is more likely to be a step by step enmeshment on the pattern experienced by the Americans in Vietnam. Therefore the concept which might be more appropriate to apply to this situation is that of the tripwire, which responds to a certain level and kind of pressure by triggering the involvement of much greater forces.

However, a central feature of such forces is that they are a tripwire which is removeable, and if the three governments saw any danger of an escalation that threatened to trigger the apparatus of explicit and implicit alliance with the U.S.A., they might well decide to avoid having to demonstrate how flimsy it is. Such a swift withdrawal would require to be timed with some delicacy. It would likely have to proceed without the co-operation, and perhaps even with the active opposition of the local authorities, who might feel some sense of injury at such a narrow interpretation of the Agreement. Logistical difficulties would greatly depend on the proximity of the British and Australian helicopter carriers, and the rapidity with which the Nimrod aircraft can be converted to their troop-
carrying role. Politically, the manoeuvre would be far from easy to carry off, particularly by non-socialist governments in either Britain or Australia. It seems unlikely that the three governments would have sufficiently similar perceptions of the situation to agree precisely at which point matters had deteriorated so that withdrawal were to become the only expedient course. Of course, any hint of such calculations, expressed diplomatically or in the form of troop deployment, would serve only to hasten the moment of decision. The painful decision to withdraw could only be made by governments which approximate closely to the rational actor model: no joint staff contingency council is likely to have worked out SOP's for such a withdrawal, and no politician with heavy stakes invested in a forward defence policy is going to be prepared to sacrifice those stakes with equanimity.

The forces as a tripwire: the Agreement as part of the Western security system, and the vital link with ANZUS and American policy.

For a tripwire to be an effective deterrent, the enemy must see that it is linked to an escalatory apparatus, and be aware of exactly what kinds of pressure are likely to result in activation. At this time the tripwire represented by the ANZUK forces is unlikely to be tested, there being no significantly dangerous groups of subversives, and therefore it is sufficient to simply display the presence of the tripwire without indicating the mechanics of triggering or the critical pressures. However, in a situation where for instance, Thailand had come under the influence of a united Indo-China, and infiltration from the north began to reach such
proportions that the authority of the government in Kuala Lumpur began to be challenged in many areas, it would become necessary to deal with all kinds of probes that would be designed to establish exactly at which point the tripwire would function. It is uncertain whether terrorist groups would have enough diplomatic subtlety to conduct such probes with any delicacy, and this would contribute to a situation where there would be every likelihood of misread signals and either unnecessary escalation, or precipitant withdrawal.

The largely unanticipated move toward rapprochement between the United States and China has changed everything in the strategic landscape of Southeast Asia, so that whereas before the British had regarded the Anglo-Malaysia Defence Agreement as their contribution toward the containment of China, and had even requested American financial assistance on these grounds, it now appears that China is not seen as such a great threat, and that as a consequence of the Vietnam trauma, the United States is anxious to retreat to an insular policy. This development, although it was heralded by the Guam doctrine in 1969, had really only materialised since the Five Power Agreement was negotiated, and has had the effect of severely reducing its functions as a tripwire. The deterrence credibility of the token ANZUK forces is in part a function of the American commitment to the defence of Australia and New Zealand as it has evolved under the terms of the ANZUS treaty of 1952. Article IV binds each party to "act to meet the common danger, in accordance with its constitutional practices." Furthermore, Article V includes guarantees not only of Australia (and New
Zealand) but also "island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific, or its armed forces public vessels, or aircraft, in the Pacific." In Article VIII there is mention of a future "more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific," and Canberra hoped to extract from Washington an arrangement that would be as binding and inclusive as NATO. In the event, SEATO added nothing to the protection already afforded by ANZUS, and today most Australian authorities would concur with Denis Healey's view that SEATO is dead. But the real content of the treaty cannot be revealed by an examination of terms that were written twenty years ago, and in order to understand the present position, it is necessary to take note of some of the developments and reinterpretations that have occurred.

In 1955 when Britain requested Australia to provide troops for assistance in the "Emergency" the Menzies government first went to Washington to seek assurances from Dulles that American support would be available if necessary. The mission was not entirely satisfactory. Dulles was reluctant to become involved with what was in his view a colonialist regime, and was prepared to speak of 'co-operation' only, under the terms of the SEATO and not the ANZUS arrangements. Menzies announced that this was "eminently satisfactory and comforting," but actually of course it fell far short of what he had hoped for.

The American reluctance to accept defence responsibilities in the region was again evident in 1958 over the issue of West Irian. Australia was not anxious to acquire a nine hundred mile jungle border with
Indonesia, and therefore sympathized with the Dutch and attempted to prevent the issue being brought before the United Nations. This policy did not sit well with Washington, and, as American arms continued to flow to Djakarta, Robert Kennedy applied pressure on Holland and Australia to reverse their policies. Perhaps as a reward for Canberra's compliance, the ANZUS council meeting of May 8, 1959 specifically confirmed that Australian New Guinea was included under the terms of Article V.

As the "confrontation" progressed during 1964 a very delicate situation developed between Canberra and Washington. Borneo is probably 'in the Pacific,' but the United States government very much preferred not to have the treaty invoked if it could be avoided. In April 1964 Sir Carfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs in Canberra, warned Sukarno that escalation of the conflict would eventually lead to the invoking of the treaty, but the communique issued after the July ANZUS council meeting gave little credibility to that threat. The Americans were not convinced of the seriousness of the Indonesian menace, and of course the events of September 30, 1965 in Djakarta were to prove them right.

In May 1962 Dean Rusk had suggested that the United States might choose only to defend those of its allies who showed a willingness to defend themselves, and this was interpreted in Canberra to mean that it was no longer enough to spend less than three per cent of GNP on defence. In 1963 conscription was resorted to as the only way to increase the armed forces, and there were extensive orders for American equipment, including the F111 (which, perhaps fortunately, never arrived).
In 1964 the Australian government announced its approval of the American actions in response to the Tonkin Gulf incident on the very next day, and although no troops were sent to Vietnam until after a persuasive visit from Lodge, there was no hesitation on the part of the government or the public about paying the premium for the insurance provided by ANZUS.

In the light of this history it is not surprising that many Australians regarded the Tet Offensive, the Guam Doctrine and the apparent American defeat in Vietnam as signs that their insurance company was going bankrupt. When O'Neil says that "withdrawal from Vietnam has brought forward defence into question," he is really voicing his disquiet about the credibility of ANZUS. Canberra has few illusions about the readiness of the United States to desert its allies after her experiences at the Suez Crisis in 1956, and of course the treatment recently accorded to Japan and Taiwan adds to the general concern. This concern can also be detented in a recent statement by Lee Kuan Yew which underlines the central importance of American policy to the credibility of the Five Power Agreement, "I doubt whether ANZUK will be such a powerful cornerstone of Australian, New Zealand and British security unless the Americans recover their poise."

This examination of the origins and development of the ANZUS treaty reveals a strong tendency for the Australians to place too much confidence in it, and Canberra is still reluctant to admit that the Americans would spring to their assistance only if the Australian mainland itself were attacked. As has been argued above, this seems a very remote possibility in the foreseeable future. In these changed circumstances the tripwire
function of the token forces becomes extremely suspect. It is clear that no British government would proceed with military responsibilities in Southeast Asia without firm assurances of American military involvement, and such assurances, particularly from a Democratic president, would simply not be forthcoming. These are painful realities to accept in London or Canberra, and perhaps they have yet been admitted, but it must be clear to many in Malaysia and Singapore that the tripwire has been disconnected by the exigencies of the November 1972 presidential elections in the United States.

Regional Security

Decline of the domino theory: vacuums and spheres of influence.

As recently as 1969, Prime Minister Gorton was still defending Australia's participation in Vietnam in terms of the domino theory, but he was by that time uncomfortably aware that others were reconsidering, as perceptions struggled to keep up with the pace of events, the validity of this rationale of American involvement in Southeast Asia. Those events are still unfolding, with what seems to be, after the long relatively static era of the cold war, an almost incomprehensible haste. Accounts of these developments from various points of view abound in the literature, and they contain a richness of alternative perceptions and prognoses. It would appear that the new scene can best be described in terms of a struggle for spheres of influence between Russia and China, with America more on the sidelines. The future alignment of the states of Indochina and Thailand will become of critical importance, and it seems unlikely they
would both incline toward the same power. The chances of their preserving
full autonomy and remaining outside spheres of influence are less than
those of the five members of ASEAN, who have now expressed a desire for
a neutralised status.

The ASEAN declaration of November 27, 1971 was naturally uncertain
in intent and ambiguous in content, and the promised follow-up meeting of
foreign ministers has had to be postponed; but the possibility of ASEAN
standing aside from the contest for spheres of influence remains worth
considering. There is ambivalence about the question of whether the
ASEAN countries are to be neutralized by a self-denying agreement among
the great powers, or whether they are to achieve a neutralist or non-
aligned status by virtue of their own capacity to resist great power inter-
vention. These two alternative routes to the goal of independence are
not necessarily incompatible: on the contrary, it may well be that the
great powers would only agree not to extend their influence and control
over the five members of ASEAN if they were convinced of the high costs
of such a move.

Neutralism has usually been associated with the idea of non-
alignment, and in a bipolar situation it was necessary for a neutralist
state to maintain an equidistant position between East and West in order
maximise the advantages of the role. In a situation where three or maybe
more powers are vying for influence, it becomes quite possible for states
which are anxious to stay out of the competition to secure military and
diplomatic assistance from other outside powers. Thus Malaysia and
Singapore in no way compromise their claims to a neutralist status by the arrangement with Britain, Australia and New Zealand, precisely because these powers do not have any pretentions of securing influence in the region. The position of Thailand, and the Philippines, which have close bilateral links with the United States, is altogether different, and it seems unlikely that they will easily achieve the status desired by the other members of ASEAN. If Thailand ever replaces her reliance on the United States, it might be only to exchange it for a reliance on China in a fashion similar to that of Pakistan, while historical forces seem to bind the Philippines too closely to America to permit a really neutralist policy.

Proposals for the internationalisation of the Straits of Malacca, and the compatibility of these proposals with the ANZUK presence.

The way in which the question of the control of a narrow and vital waterway can generate a major international clash was well demonstrated in the case of Suez in 1956 and Aqaba in 1967, and the danger of similar disputes flaring up over the Straits of Malacca has been indicated by the way in which Russia and China have taken opposed positions on the question of their regulation. There are very real navigational and ecological problems that must receive some attention in the near future, but the riparian states and the prime users seem to be drifting away from a negotiated settlement. Behind all the discussions on dredging and traffic flows there lies the security concerns that have been generated by the remilitarisation of the Indian Ocean. Also to be considered are the possible frictions between Indonesia, which enjoys a local military pre-
dominance, and Singapore, which secures a disproportionate share of the business that derives from the flow of shipping. What contribution do the ANZUK forces make to the security of the shipping that uses the Straits, and how is their presence likely to effect the progress of negotiations on the future arrangements in the area?

The 1971 Arrangement provides for joint air and naval forces, and if these were to include all the units available from Malaysia they would comprise a grouping strong enough to provide effective policing functions and to deter Indonesia from attempts to expand her influence. However, it appears that the greater part of the Malaysian navy, which is much stronger than that of Singapore, is to be withdrawn from its traditional base on the island and transferred to a new base being constructed on the Malaysian mainland. Malaysia and Indonesia have asserted claims to territorial waters and the right to restrict access to the Straits to shipping on innocent passage, but it seems very unlikely that the ANZUK forces would play any part in giving support to these claims. Unofficial suggestions emanating from Malaysia that the two riparian states impose a toll on all shipping, with perhaps extra charges for those which call at Singapore instead of the newly constructed ports in Malaysia and Indonesia give an indication of the way in which the wind might be blowing. Such restrictions on the flow of trade would certainly not be welcome to any of the prime users, which include Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and would probably result in Russia and Japan being joined by the United States in calling for an imposed internationalisation of the Straits.
It is difficult to see how such an imposition could be contrived. The Straits are quite narrow and in places only sixty feet deep, and it would be almost as easy for the Indonesians to close off the key channels as it was for the Egyptians to block the canal in 1956. The Indonesians have recently acquired six new minelayers from the Americans, and closure of the Straits of Malacca would very likely increase the flow of trade through the Lombok Straits, bringing business to recently constructed Indonesian ports in that area.

If the threat of such a closure were effected with the co-operation of Malaysia the great powers would be faced with a challenge that could prove politically and strategically embarrassing. The Russian navy would not relish the prospect of entering into such confined waters without the benefit of air support, particularly since the Malaysian navy has just acquired a number of the latest French missile firing patrol boats. The loss of even a single Soviet cruiser or a few minesweepers would completely deflate the image of Russian power that has so skilfully and so inexpensively been constructed by the deployment of a handful of naval units in the Indian Ocean. The Japanese navy is not yet powerful enough to act on its own, and it seems unlikely that any perceived economic benefits in terms of oil costs would outweigh the political costs. In any case the larger tankers are already having to use the Lombok Straits, and plans have recently been announced for the construction of a pipeline across the Kra Peninsula. Only the American navy would have the necessary air power and minesweepers to clear the Straits by force, and consideration of the
relatively small amount of American shipping using the Straits and the very high political costs involved make such an intervention extremely improbable.

These calculations indicate that actions designed to extract tolls from the Straits and divert business from Singapore may well be initiated with some prospects of success, and that the ANZUK forces would not have much opportunity to influence the course of events once Malaysia and Indonesia had found a pretext for putting their legal claims into practice. However, frequent naval and air patrols might serve to prevent the occasion for such a pretext, and the restraining influence would be greatly enhanced if Britain would establish a mediary stance between the riparian states and those who are calling for internationalization.

Specific threats and the capability to deter or resist.

Although the ANZUK forces may have lost what little credibility they ever had as a tripwire, they still comprise a respectable force in themselves, and are quite capable of certain kinds of limited operations. In this section the ways in which such operations might contribute to the security of first Malaysia and then Singapore will be set out, and this will lead on to a discussion of the role played by the forces in the actual defence of British, Australian and New Zealand interests.
Malaysia: the potential dangers.

Northern insurgencies.

Between 1960 when the "Emergency" was declared terminated, and 1968 there was little trouble from the remnants of the Min Yuen; however, since that year the scale and seriousness of guerilla activities have steadily increased. The problems are compounded by the failure of the Thai authorities to exercise effective control of their side of the border, despite the development of quite satisfactory arrangements for joint naval patrols and hot pursuit. Improvements in the quality and quantity of anti-terrorist forces have not succeeded in reversing the spread of subversive activities, which have recently penetrated to within a few miles of the key Butterworth air base. The situation is certainly far from being out of hand but if communist forces secure further successes in Northern Thailand, and Malaysian forces become more heavily committed in Eastern Malaysia, the situation might deteriorate sharply.

Eastern Malaysia.

The end of confrontation saw a remarkable shift of alliances that permitted Malaysian and Indonesian forces to begin combined operations against the various communist groups operating in Central Borneo. The incorporation of Sarawak and Sabah into the Malaysian Confederation has never met with the full approval of the local populations, and this discontent has not been reduced by the policies of the Malaysian authorities in recent years. In these circumstances the various rebel groups have
been able to extend the scope of their activities, and it seems only a matter of time before they will make their presence felt throughout Sarawak, in Sabah and maybe even in Brunei.

The delicate communal balance in Malaysia resulting from the 1969 elections cannot be stabilized by the kind of unifying legislation introduced by the Alliance party, and a real equilibrium will only result from policies which strike the right compromise between the competing demands and power of the major racial groups. Such policies could only be introduced by a government that enjoyed the confidence and support of a broad section of the population. The Alliance party once enjoyed such support, but the Chinese wing of the party suffered heavily at the 1969 elections, while the Malay wing is still being challenged by a vigorously chauvinist Islamic party. If these centrifugal forces persist, Razak will only be able to hold his party together by granting a series of counter-balancing favours to each racial group. Such a process can only end in the exacerbation of racial tensions. One side effect of this situation is the enhanced desirability of better relations with China, which would be welcomed by both rural and urban Chinese. However, attempts to move toward better relations with China have not met with success. Although the recently announced contracts for rubber sales appear to be substantial, and give the Chinese market an importance equal to that of Russia, attempts to bypass the middle men in Hong Kong and Singapore have not received co-operation from Chinese authorities. There are no real signs of any reduction in
the volume or stridency of Chinese radio propaganda, which continues to
give encouragement and direction to the various insurgency groups, and
reflects the close interconnection between the problems of communal
friction, communist infiltration and diplomatic relations with China.

Malaysia must take into account the long term possibility of direct
attack from Indonesia, the Philippines or Thailand. In each case there
are unresolved points of friction which could conceivably be magnified
into the occasion for an attack, and also in each case Malaysia would
find itself dealing with much larger and better-equipped forces. Such
attacks are not likely to occur between the ASEAN countries while they
continue to perceive a common interest in avoiding the contest for spheres
of influence between the great powers, but in the event of a general
systemic transformation the old conflicts might resurface.

These four dangers that confront Malaysia have been listed in order
of probability, not severity, and it is the first of them which is most likely
to result in the engagement of the ANZUK forces. The exercise Bersadu
Padu was based on this contingency, and the forces are trained and
equipped for this kind of anti-guerrilla activity. It is difficult to assess
how effective intervention of this kind would actually be. The force would
not go into action until after a Malaysian request, and a period of con-
sultations. It is unlikely that Razak, who as Minister of Defence had
been so eager to get the Australian forces out of Sarawak in 1966, would
call on the assistance of such an elite strike force of non-Asian troops
until all alternatives had been exhausted. By that time it is probable
that the injection of a few thousand men would be too late to make very much difference, and if this were recognised by the ANZUK commanders, they might urge against an intervention that would serve only to destroy their strongest asset, their reputation for successful operations. In any case even a successful intervention that succeeded in tipping the scales could only be of short duration, since none of the three guarantors seems prepared to send substantial reinforcements, or become engaged in any kind of prolonged or escalatory situation. Of course, this kind of short term foray is the very kind which is most unlikely to employ the necessary mixture of military and socio-political measures that had proved so successful during the "Emergency." For all these reasons it is quite difficult to envisage a situation where the intervention of the ANZUK forces could be of vital importance to the outcome of the campaigns along the Thai border.

The difficulties in Eastern Malaysia are more difficult to attribute solely to the pernicious doctrines of expansionary communism. The perceptions of Australian and British officials are likely to diverge on the nature and seriousness of this threat, since it has been clear since 1969 that Australia does not consider Borneo within the scope of the Five Power Arrangements, while Britain has recently reaffirmed the protectorate that it affords to Brunei. Now that Sarawak produces oil revenues almost equal to those of Brunei the discrepancies between the levels of political and economic development in the two states will become more noticeable. As terrorist activity increases in those parts of Sarawak
adjacent to Brunei the British will have to decide whether assisting the
Malaysian forces would not be the most efficient method of undertaking
their obligations to the Sultan. However, it should be noted that this
kind of contingency has clearly not figured very largely in British calcula-
tions, since the largely Gurkha troops in Brunei remain under the Hong
Kong command, while the ANZUK forces in Singapore can only operate as a
joint unit, so that an Australian veto would render it incapable of
operations in Borneo.

The Malaysian Government has made it clear that there are no circum-
stances under which it would use foreign troops to impose order over a
communal conflict, and this makes good political sense in a country which
is still very sensitive about its recently achieved independence. Similarly
the guarantors have admitted that ANZUK forces are unlikely to be able to
make any direct contribution to internal security, but they have not over-
looked the fact that the extent to which Malaysian forces are relieved of
external defence responsibilities is related to the degree to which they can
concentrate on preserving internal security. It is clear that the maintenance
of stable, pro western regimes is one of the basic objectives of the Five
Power Arrangements.

The joint air defence system was set up because it was recognised
that the peninsula was extremely vulnerable to attack or threats of attack
from much larger and more modern air forces of the adjacent powers. Radar
warning screens have been established now that cover the gaps between
Butterworth and Singapore, and to some extent the hitherto totally unpro-
ected Eastern Coastline. These measures indicate an intent to be prepared for air attack, but of course the aircraft available to Malaysia and Singapore are no match for those possessed by Thailand or the Philippines. However, there is no doubt that the Arrangement has significantly improved the defensive posture of both Malaysia and Singapore vis-à-vis the other members of ASEAN, and has thus enabled them to acquire and exercise a much more equal role in that organisation than might otherwise have been likely. 65

In sum it could be said that the ANZUK forces make a measurable contribution to the security of Malaysia. In the case of the Northern insurgency their presence is hardly a deterrent, since rural terrorists are unlikely to be impressed by the chance that their actions might provoke an intervention from such remote and unknown forces. But it is conceivable that if the forces were called upon at the right time their contribution might be of some importance. The ANZUK forces will play no direct role in controlling the situation in Eastern Malaysia or in preserving racial harmony, but their indirect contribution is of some significance. Finally, the provisions for the joint forces, and particularly the air forces, indicate that the ANZUK forces have been making a vital contribution to defence against Malaysia's larger neighbours, but of course it should be noted that in the present strategic setting this kind of conflict is extremely improbable.

Singapore: The potential dangers.

In the case of Singapore it is not so easy to rank the dangers in order of probability, because, unlike Malaysia, Singapore is not involved
at this time with any imminent threats. But the quite unusually high expendi-
ture on defence made by Lee's government indicates a strong awareness of certain dangers which will be listed here in random order.

Subversion.

The People's Action Party enjoys a political monopoly that is unlikely to be contested by any other legal party for some years to come, and on the face of it there are few regimes which have less to be concerned about with regard to internal security. The recent press crisis can be read as evidence of the government's strength, and it is indeed remarkable that such arbitrary restrictions could be placed on the right to dissent without any sign of popular protest. 66 However, the reason given for these strong measures was that the foreign ownership of the media represented a threat to Singaporean independence, and there is every reason to suspect that the government's concern was genuine. Singapore is the youngest nation in the area, and its nationhood is entirely ersatz, consciously and elaborately contrived by a party that is aware that it is conducting an unprecedented experiment in instant identity building. With a population that is so predominantly young, prosperous and Chinese, there are many ways in which the experiment may splutter, or get out of control.

Control of the Straits.

Although the proportion of Singapore's wealth that comes directly from entrepot trade has declined to only 11% of GNP, the Straits still pro-
vide the only means by which the manufacturing and service industries may maintain access to their markets. 67 Lee's government would probably
prefer that things stay as they are, but if changes in the arrangements under which shipping is to operate in the Straits are to come, and for ecological reasons alone this seems to be inevitable, Singapore's negotiating position will be of necessity somewhat parlous. Local control and regulation by the riparian states would involve Singapore in a minority position where the interests of the larger but poorer states might well tend to receive preference. In the absence of such a locally negotiated system of control, the prime users and major powers might succeed in imposing some form of internationalization. For Singapore this could be accompanied by the penetration of her economy by international corporations to a degree well beyond that point where they serve to assure a general interest in the future survival of the island state, and become a direct threat to sovereign independence. Naturally Singapore would prefer some middle course that would avoid these dangers, and of course the stronger military status that is conferred by participation in the Five Power Agreement could do much to enhance Lee's bargaining position both with regard to Malaysia and Indonesia, and to the Great Powers.

Attacks from Indonesia and Malaysia

The massive differences in wealth and rates of economic growth between Singapore and her neighbours plus the closely related racial factors, create a tension which could easily be allowed to drift toward overt hostilities. The unorganised style of Indonesian government, particularly during the Sukarno era, permitted the growth of a vast and totally unregulated business across the Straits which amounts to a
surprisingly large proportion of Singapore's total trade. This semi-legal trade provides for many occasions for real and imagined grievances between the two governments, and could be the source of dangerous conflict. Malaysia and Indonesia have set an ominous precedent by collaborating in the suppression of "smuggling" between Northern Borneo and the Philippines; and they may be tempted to use a similar lever against Singapore. 69

The situation with regard to Malaysia is complicated by the trauma of the breakup of the federation, and compounded by the sympathy felt in Singapore for the difficulties experienced by Chinese minorities in Malaysia. This latter, largely emotional factor, is reciprocated by Malays who fear that somehow Singapore will succeed in engineering a restoration and perpetuation of the economic and maybe even political predominance of the Chinese minority. A history of rivalry and suspicion since independence has vitiated attempts to co-operate on economically viable projects such as the joint air line, and the bitterness surrounding the dismantling of this enterprise was such that it necessitated Lee's going to the extreme of making his first post-confederation visit to Kuala Lumpur.

In which ways and to what extent can the Five Power Arrangement contribute to averting these four sources of danger that constitute Singapore's security problem? Before entering into the discussion it should be noted that no mention has been made of the possibility of Singapore becoming one in a line of tumbling dominoes. This is not because this possibility is not perceived by Lee, and indeed he has always
preserved a tactful silence about Vietnam, and certainly sees an American defeat and subsequent withdrawal as a bad thing for the security of Southeast Asia. The reason for the neglect of this real danger is that clearly it would be far easier strategically to prop up the Malaysian domino, and that once that had fallen nothing could avail Singapore. It is appreciation of this fact that led Malaysia and Singapore to announce the indivisibility of their Security Systems in 1968.

Internal security requires political control backed by a well equipped force that is well trained in the control of urban guerrillas. The ANZUK force can only provide the most indirect assistance in this task, and any increase in the profile presented by such 'imperialist' troops would be highly counter-productive. The Singaporean army has preferred to call on Israeli advisors for training,* and indeed until the troubles began in Ireland the British army had little experience in this kind of action.

The small ANZUK squadron of two or three frigates and a submarine that operates out of Singapore does add very significantly to the power represented by Singapore's own navy, and the information provided by the surveillance aircraft make available a clear picture of all surface activity within several hundred miles of the Straits, giving Singapore a distinct opportunity to retain the initiative as any future crisis unfolds. These

*In fact, Israel army advisors have been in Singapore since 1968, and this has not sat well with Malaysia and Indonesia, who have vociferously joined the Islamic and nonaligned nations' condemnation of Israel in the United Nations and at the Lusaka conference. Furthermore there has been an inevitable identification by Singapore with an Israel that is perceived to share a similar predicament in being surrounded by a ring of poor, alien, and vastly more numerous neighbours.
aircraft also will have a stand-off missile which might be sufficient to deter Russia or other great powers from attempting to gain political predominance by a show of naval muscle. Singapore has a long established claim to the right to control and police the Straits, and the ANZUK forces do provide the minimum equipment with which to perform this role.

In the same way it is the ANZUK forces that provide Singapore with a deterrence capability against Indonesia. Any conflict would probably take the form of the actions typical of the "Confrontation," and consist of the harassment of trading vessels. The existing naval and air forces are sufficient to be able to respond to such probes with convincing vigour, and establish an ascendency as effective as that which prevented the escalation of the conflict in 1964.

The greatest contribution made by the Arrangement to the security of the region is the way in which it obstructs the growth of contention between Malaysia and Singapore, and compels them to focus on the indivisible nature of their regional security problems rather than their own immediate differences. It was hoped that functional interdependence would generate and necessitate political collaboration, and this has happened with, for instance, the joint air defence arrangements. However, units from the five countries are still far from operating as a unified group. The 1970 exercise revealed wide disparities in command and control procedures. Malaysian forces, which are largely racially homogeneous, use only the Malay language, and this has for instance, made it necessary for the British to operate the Jungle Warfare Training School in separation from the
Malaysian army training facilities at the same location. The decision of the Malaysian navy to move its two frigates and thirty-six patrol boats away from the ANZUK headquarters is unmistakable evidence that in this aspect at least Kuala Lumpur sees defence as being increasingly divisible.  

The nature of the delicate intermediary position occupied by the three guarantor states in this situation is exemplified by the request made by the Singapore government in 1971 for the use of tank-training facilities in Australia. The acquisition of fifty French AMX13 tanks by Singapore can only be interpreted as a bid to secure means by which to ensure the continued availability of water supplies from Johore in the event of any local unrest, or as recognition of the lessons of 1942 which indicate that the island is best defended by denying the opposing shoreline to the enemy. The Australian authorities could give their assent only at the price of damaging their relationship with Malaysia, which was already tense enough; and so they preferred instead to make concessions on the negotiations then in progress over the rental for the accommodation of the Australian forces and their families in Singapore. Almost certainly this concession had been the real motive for the request for tank-training, and by securing it Lee compelled Gorton to acknowledge that the presence of the Australian component of the ANZUK force stood to serve the interests of Australia as much if not more than those of Singapore.

Specific threats to the interests of Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and the capacity of the ANZUK forces to deter or resist them.

Both New Zealand and Britain perceive intra-regional conflict as a
threat to their commercial interests, although in fact only about one third of New Zealand's trade actually passes through the area and there is very little direct trade. For Britain the commercial importance of the region has declined very sharply, in relative if not absolute terms. About one eighth of the total British investment overseas is located in Malaysia and Singapore, and this has been estimated to earn maybe as much as £100 million p.a. But defence expenditure designed to preserve regimes in Malaysia, Singapore and Borneo that are much more generous in their terms as a result of the Commonwealth connection than those in Indonesia or Thailand is hard to justify when the British observe the Japanese moving in with no defence costs at all. Japan now does about five times as much business with Singapore as Britain, whereas in 1960 it was scarcely twice as much. It is true that the present British commitment of forces is largely a result of moral and historical obligations, and was arranged with regard to "values, as well as interests narrowly defined." But in the event of any intra-regional conflict in the future, the British are likely to look very hard at the potential costs of military involvement before they spring to the protection of their commercial interests.

Any hopes that the British may have had that the beneficiaries of the 1971 arrangements would express their appreciation in the form of economic concessions have not been realised. In fact, Malaysia and Singapore have even chosen to acquire their military equipment from France and Canada. Razak and Lee have both found occasion to make public disparagements of the agreement, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to interpret this as a means whereby to deflect attention from any forth-
coming trade concessions. Thus the British find themselves in a position where they have nothing to gain by maintaining their commitment, but quite a lot to lose if they withdraw.

Australia and New Zealand have very limited economic stakes in Southeast Asia, and apart from concern about the freedom of navigation in the Straits, their interest is primarily expressed by the notion of 'forward defence.'

Australia shares with Russia an unreasoning but powerful fear of the Asian hordes. The trauma of the fall of Singapore remains the main feature in defence policy attitudes, and although the fear of Japan that was evident at the time of the initiation of the ANZUK treaty has since been transferred to China, there seems little possibility of the 'yellow peril' myth soon being eliminated at the popular level. McMahon-Ball asserts that "the overwhelming weight of relatively detached and expert opinion is that the risk of Soviet or Chinese overt aggression in Southeast Asia in the foreseeable future is negligible." This may be true, but Arthur Huck's surveys indicate that this sanguine viewpoint is shared by less than a third of the electorate, and is found in strength only among supporters of the Labour party.

The forward defence policy is the natural result of having been forced in 1943 to abandon even pretence of being able to defend the Northern half of the continent. Involvement in the regional defence arrangements is seen as the best way of defending Australia's own virtually indefencible shoreline. The trick is in persuading the states in the region that it is in their
interest to be part of Australia's "cordon sanitaire," which means accepting a military presence that does not get dangerously implicated in any intra-regional or internal conflicts. This is a very difficult path to tread, and it is not made any easier by rhetoric that suggests that the Australian presence is purely altruistic, or that because Australia has better relations with each of the members of ASEAN than they have with each other, she has a special responsibility for mediation and the preservation of harmony. The fact is that Australian forces are there for their own purposes, and that is to 'protect our sphere of interest in the NW shelf, Papua and New Guinea' and to be able where necessary to 'carry the military initiative into other parts of our region.'

For forward defence to work, it is essential that Australia have friendly relationships with all the countries within the general area, but Gorton has in fact succeeded in antagonising Razak and Lee, and has been unable to make much progress with Suharto.

The Sukarno era brought home to the electorate the unpalatable fact that Indonesia has the potential for posing a direct threat to Australia. Relations between the two countries have never been close despite the obvious geographical propinquity, and this is probably the result of the rigidly exclusive nature of the Dutch colonial system. The two economies are not in any way complementary, and Australia can secure most of the items that Indonesia has to offer from New Guinea or Papua. Indonesia vetoed the hinted proposal for Australian membership in ASEAN on the grounds that Canberra would be there merely to carry the ball for
Washington, but the real reasons were probably more likely to have been a reluctance to admit a countervailing influence to Indonesian predominance in the group, and a well-based suspicion that Australia would not be able to pay more than lip service to the ideal of racial equality. Canberra has made some gestures of friendliness, such as supplying a little aid and responding co-operatively to Indonesian requests for help in training officers and collecting intelligence information, but in general the two countries have preferred to remain aloof from one another. The likelihood of a real threat either to Australia itself or to New Guinea before it secures its independence, is not seen to be very strong in the short run at least, but to some extent Canberra views the Five Power Agreement as an instrument capable of deterring any future régime in Djakarta from embarking on an expansionist path.

Papua and New Guinea will become independent within the next five years, and it is not yet clear whether Australia will be prepared to undertake defence responsibilities for territories which are bound to be characterized by extreme internal instability and external vulnerability. It is possible that Canberra would like to see an adherence by the territories to the Five Power Arrangements, but this would cut across plans for better relations with Suharto, who would feel, with some justification, that there is no cause to suspect Indonesian intentions with regard to East Irian. The Australian government has taken care to retain sovereign control over all the islands, and the territorial waters attached to them, that lie between Australia and the territories, thus preserving control over
navigational passages that could become of vital importance in the event of a closure of the Straits of Malacca.

This determination to preserve and reassert Australian rights over the continental shelf has been reinforced by the acquisition of ships and aircraft that are designed to give a surveillance capacity that extends some five hundred miles off the North and West Coasts. This capacity has been justified rather anachronistically in terms of the protection of sea lanes, and there has been a genuine concern about the Russian naval presence that has led to the Australians eventually developing the Cockburn Sound naval base at their own expense. There have been credible rumours that Japanese and Australian naval officials have consulted together on joint measures for the protection of the substantial trade flowing from the West Coast mining operations.

In some ways there are strong parallels between this Australian activity and the recent assertions of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, but in fact the situations are quite different because in the Australian case these expressions of aspirant nationalism may actually provoke resentment and hostility among her Southeast Asian neighbours, and thus prove to be very counterproductive. In these circumstances it may be best for Australia to abandon the forward defence strategy altogether and seek to defend the legitimate interests in the continental shelf and the shipping routes, from bases located solely within Australian territory. The ANZUK force is unlikely to be used to further any specifically Australian interest in the region. Neither Britain nor New Zealand would
be prepared to become involved with the security problems of Papua and New Guinea, and if these are in fact the primary concerns that Australia has in the area, it would be advantageous to withdraw the ground forces from ANZUK and station them in Northern Australia. This, of course, is the declared policy of Lance Barnard, the defence and foreign policy spokesman of the Australian Labour Party.

* * * * *

The analysis in this third section of the thesis has been predominantly of the rational policy variety, and the style and method is that of the vicarious problem solver. Each participant has been perceived as having certain attributes and interests and the behaviour of each is seen as being conditioned by a systemic setting that is common to them all. The analysis has revealed a strategic complex that provides a reasonable explanation of why the ANZUK force is located only in Singapore, and why and to what extent the defence of Malaysia and Singapore is considered to be indivisible. The analysis has also indicated the possible roles of the force in deterring or resisting various kinds of threats, and has allowed for some comparisons between those roles and the functions anticipated within the various intentions of the governments concerned when the arrangements were hammered out between 1968 and 1971. In the
last section these comparisons between the 'intentions' of several years ago and the new strategic, domestic and political "realities"* will be examined in order to provide a prognosis for the future of the arrangement.

*The use of the work "realities" is sure to attract the critical attention of those who argue that in a game such as this, where the stakes are so nebulous and the military action so hard to assess in simple win-loss terms, the phenomenological factor has become predominant. In this situation there are a multitude of contradictory signals but no hard indicators, and in the absence of any scope for decisive conflict, the strategic nexus may amount to nothing more than the aggregate perceptions of the participants.
IV CONCLUSIONS AND PROGNOSIS

Allison's framework has provided an approach whereby to assess the concept of a state's intentions along a dimension with rationality at one end and non-rationality at the other. It has been argued that when a Model I analysis proves to be more convincing or apparently powerful, it is justifiable to assume that the intentions of the state involved were derived from a process of reasonable internal dialogue, and represented a sound appreciation of the pragmatic relationship between the available means and the agreed ends. In the case of the Five Power Agreement, it has been demonstrated that there was a genuine congruence of generally rational intentions, producing a security arrangement that therefore possessed the most important requisites for effectiveness and durability. While there are enough historical examples of supposedly rational policies proving in practice to be disastrously misconceived, and other examples of non-rational policies yielding good results when employed by a single factor, it seems improbable that a joint security arrangement can function unless both its participants and its opponents are convinced of the credibility of

*The obvious example of a misconceived rational policy is that of appeasement, which was adopted by the Chamberlain government, with the concurrence of most politicians and political scientists, after a protracted and generally well informed internal debate. To some extent the reverse side of this coin, the Nazi plan for aggression, is an example of a non-rational policy that was successful. It was agreed by both German and British strategists that the Nazi war machine was not sufficient to attain the extravagant ends sought by Hitler, and it was the unpredictable (in military if not political terms) collapse of the French defences that served both to render successful an otherwise impracticable strategy, and also to permit Hitler to embark on a totally irrational attack on Russia.
the level of commitment. It must be perceived that the participants, and particularly the guarantors, have a genuine attachment to common goals or interests, and that there is a rational connection between the forces that they have made available and the task of securing those goals and interests. In other words the members of the arrangement must persuade each other and those to whom they are opposed of the seriousness of their intentions.

Before considering how these intentions may have subsequently been modified or even entirely supplanted, it is appropriate at this point to note one observation about the utility of the Allison framework that appears evident as a result of this study. Allison calls for the development of a typology of actions, identified by their location along a certain set of dimensions, that will give some guide as to which kinds of action will best respond to which models. The experience of this study would suggest that a typology would likely be better drawn up by categorising not the actions, but the actors. It appears that certain political cultures may tend to produce generally the same mode of action through repeated and various issue areas. Of course, such a suggestion is not particularly welcome to those who would like to be able to view the national components of international behaviour as being of lesser importance than the influences which are common to all states.

The guarantor powers intended the Five Power Agreement to contribute toward the security of Southeast Asia in four ways. First, the ANZUK force was to provide co-ordinating and training services that would
accelerate the Malaysian and Singaporean armed forces towards self-sufficiency. Second, there would be a strike force, reinforced by distant mobile units, that would be capable of playing a decisive part in the suppression of a resurgence of Communist activity in West Malaysia. Third, the joint sea and air defence systems would ensure the indivisible nature of Malaysian and Singaporean defence planning. And further, the arrangement would buttress the American policy of containment, and would act as a tripwire that was sufficiently credible to deter Chinese or Chinese inspired aggression. It is clear that all but the first of these intentions have been weakened or rendered inappropriate by the developments of the past two years. It is now evident that the ANZUK force could make only a marginal contribution to the struggle against the Communists in West Malaysia, and that Britain is very unlikely to permit the escalation of any ANZUK involvement in such a situation. The joint forces have not produced the integration that had been hoped for, and the defence of Malaysia and Singapore is more divisible than before. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the new assessment of the Chinese threat that inspired the Nixon visit to Peking has resulted in the abandonment of containment, and domino theories, and totally destroyed the credibility of the force as a tripwire.

In these circumstances it is to be expected that the guarantor nations will either drop the arrangements altogether or seek to modify their intentions to bring them more into accordance with current strategic realities. Perhaps unfortunately, it is unlikely that the guarantors could
bring themselves to abrogate responsibilities that have so recently been undertaken, and so in the immediate future at least it seems more likely that the latter course will be chosen.

Three new or modified intentions have surfaced in recent months, and some measure of the ways in which the ANZUK force might serve to assist such purposes may be derived from the analysis. The first of these new intentions is to give support to the ASEAN bid for neutralization. The Soviets and Chinese have condemned the Commonwealth defence link as being directly opposed to the concept of non-alignment, but this does not necessarily reflect their true assessment of the situation. Actually, the non-aligned states themselves have raised no objection to alignment with second and third class powers like Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and as long as the governments of Razak and Lee are seen not to be resting on ANZUK support for their internal security, the existing arrangement may well serve to strengthen the probability of a neutralized ASEAN.

The second and third of the new intentions are concerned with naval power and the Straits of Malacca. The rise in the profile of the Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean is closely related with the sudden concern over the freedom of the Straits, and the Five Power Agreement provides an avenue which permits the exercise of some Western influence on the course of events.

It can thus be seen that those of the original intentions that have been sidelined by the onrush of events have been supplanted by new ones which are in some ways still furthered by the existing arrangements. This conclusion gives the agreement a viability which may extend into the near
future, but it is far more difficult to suggest a prognosis for the longer term.

Most would agree with Hedley Bull when he described the 1971 agreement as an "extrication technique" and a "transitional device designed to provide Malaysia and Singapore with time in which to adjust to the new era of self reliance." Millar also speaks of a "transitional period of some years," but joins with his colleague in avoiding a description of the ultimate strategic situation. This caution is a result of the daunting complexity and fluidity of the major determinants that require to be considered, and all that will be attempted here is the identification of these major determinants, accompanied by some assessment of their relative importance.

Four sets of factors seem to emerge as being of foremost importance. The first are those concerned with developments within each of the five participatory powers. Malaysia and Singapore exhibit more stability than other Southeast states, and the possibility of abrupt change can be discounted. In all three guarantor states present political trends would indicate success for the socialist parties at the next election, but it has been shown that in all three countries there is a high measure of bipartisan-ship, and the changes in policy introduced would only be marginal. Thus changes within the black boxes may be of relatively less importance.

The second cluster of determining factors are those connected with the development of the Sino-Soviet struggle for influence in Southeast Asia. The pace and level of this conflict will determine the outcome of both the
ASEAN initiative towards neutralization and the Russo-Japanese bid to internationalize the Straits of Malacca. A stalemate situation between Russia and China might well lead to a situation where they would be prepared to recognize the very limited strategic and economic value of the region, and be eager to have lesser powers such as Britain, or other European countries, play a mediatory role.

A third factor will be the role played by Japan. Of course, Japan could decisively affect the outcome of the Sino-Soviet struggle for influence, but it seems more likely that the present policy of non-involvement is to continue to be seen as the best way to maximize economic opportunities.⁸⁶

The fourth and most important factor is the future policy of the United States, which will, of course, be largely in response to Chinese, Soviet and Japanese actions. Australian disillusionment with the United States could be driven to the point where forces on the right and left combined to establish a "fortress Australia" policy.⁸⁷ There is also the possibility of a post-Vietnam withdrawal to an ASEAN perimeter, with the United States protecting its sphere of influence with proxy forces such as ANZUK, in conjunction with the omnipresent 7th fleet.

Such speculation does no more than to indicate the extreme difficulty of providing a prognosis for the Five Power Agreement. In a period of such unprecedented flux, the appearance of such a complex and delicately balanced arrangement is in itself quite remarkable, and it would be too much to expect it to continue for more than a year or so without further significant modifications.
FOOTNOTES


2 The adherence of Australia and New Zealand to AMDA, and the modifications necessitated by the secession of Singapore from Malaysia in 1963 were similarly achieved simply by an exchange of letters.

3 For further details see Appendix I.


6 O. R. Holsti. Review of *The Essence of Decision* in *Western Political Quarterly* (March 1972), pp. 88-89

7 He is endorsing Allison's own assertion: "What we need is a new kind of case study done with theoretical alertness to the range of factors identified by Models I, II and III (and others), on the basis of which to begin refining and testing propositions and models." Allison, p. 273.

8 Objections have been raised to the use of the word 'model' by the scientifically inclined, who would prefer to reserve it for more abstract and rigorous theoretical constructs. Allison is aware of this objection and sometimes uses paradigm instead. Perhaps perspective or approach would be more suitable, but model was probably retained in the interests of popularisation (despite its unfortunate and entirely spurious resemblance to consciousness I, II and III).

9 The arguments are succinctly summarised in the penultimate chapter of the *Essence of Decision*. The summary chart appears on p. 256.

10 Constraints will of course vary from crisis to non-crisis situations, and rationality will always be impeded by some degree of stress.

11 Perhaps the most extreme example of this kind of Model I thinking is found in C. A. McClelland. "Action Structures and Communication in Two International Crises: Quemoy and Berlin," *Background VII* (1964), pp. 201-215.
However, there is as yet no scholarly account of the 'East of Suez' issue over the period with which we are concerned, from 1964 to 1971.


The extent to which lesser states have become equipped with modern weapons is detailed in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *The Arms Trade with the Third World* (New York: Humanities Press, 1972).


The acceptance in Canberra and Singapore was rather ungraceful.


American observers generally conclude that Britain had no appreciable influence over American policy at the time of Cuba or even during the controversy over the MLF, which Wilson claims as a great diplomatic victory. See Wilson, pp. 40-51; Goldstein, p. 36, and R. N. Rosecrance, *Defense of the Realm, British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968) p. 260. Allison's analysis of the missile crisis indicates that little consideration was given to the wishes of allies, (viz Canada), and that this constraint did little to impede the rationality of American decision-making.

Wilson gives special attention to his meeting with De Gaulle on June 18, 1967. "The whole situation would be very different if France were genuinely convinced that Britain really was disengaging from the United States in all major matters, such as defence policy and in areas such as Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe." (p. 408)


Although Goldstein's comment is here being used to support a Model II analysis, it should be noted that Allison describes the use of a national characteristic as an explanatory variable as a usual motif of a
Model I analyst, which Goldstein is.


25 Rosecrance's assessment of these disappointments is harsh, if apposite. "It is puzzling that Britain devotes a higher proportion of its GNP to arms than do the French, Germans or Japanese, yet the last three nations seem to be regarded as more formidable powers," R. N. Rosecrance, *Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 271.


29 According to Wilson, this factor explains most if not all of the shortcomings of the Labour government. See Wilson p. 37, et passim.

30 A statement attributed to Richard E. Neustadt, Allison p. 181. It is interesting that both Wilson and Gordon Walker make reference to Neustadt's *Presidential Power* (London: John Wiley, 1960), and their familiarity with the book which is seminal to the Model III approach may be significant.

31 One of the effects of this feature of British government is supposed to be to reduce the effects of the "where you stand depends upon where you sit" proposition (Allison p. 176).


33 Butler et alius give a penetrating Model III analysis of this crisis pp. 28-33.

34 The development of this perhaps regrettable convention is discussed in Gordon Walker, pp. 32-35.

35 Wilson is of course an exception. He and Bevan resigned from the Atlee government in 1951.

37 Alexander and Watkins note that Powell differed from the Defence Committee of the Tory party on Vietnam, East of Suez, the nuclear deterrent and the need for conscription, "but Powell had remarkable leadership qualities." (p. 88) In April 1968 Powell's opposition to the Race Relations bill led to the "Tiber flowing with blood" speech and his subsequent ejection from the shadow cabinet. His tremendous impact on the election of 1970, despite his position in the wilderness, is testimony to the importance of the idiosyncratic factor in British politics.

38 A Conservative backbencher, writing in the Spectator expressed the opposition of the Bow Group to Heath's Canberra Speech. "Even if the next Conservative government revived our dying commitment in Asia, it would be, like the housemaid's baby, only a little one." (J. Bruce-Gardyne. Spectator, August 23, 1968)


42 Actually, spending had risen to 4.9% in 1967, but declined since then to about 3.6%.

43 In 1944 Australia had 300,000 men serving overseas. Conscription was not introduced until 1942. In 1966 the armed forces totalled only 37,500 and Holt turned down requests from Washington for additions to the 8,000 men in Vietnam.


47 See the report by Rajaratnam in The Mirror, Jan. 31, 1972; Far
The members of ASEAN have moved further toward a more unitary foreign policy by preceding their recognitions of Bangla Desh with joint consultations. A similar procedure has been agreed to with regard to any future recognitions of China. *Asia Research Bulletin*, Vol. 1, No. 8, p. 788.

Domo Pranoto, Indonesian parliamentary leader, is quoted as saying, "We should prove our neutrality by action and capabilities so that we need not ask the super powers to recognise and respect our neutrality." This statement was in response to the Malaysia sponsored 'declaration of neutralization' signed on Nov. 27, 1972 at Kuala Lumpur. See *Indonesian News and Views*, Nov. 29, 1971 (No. 12), Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, pp. 4-5.

Mr. Anthony Royle, the Undersecretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, responded very warmly to the ASEAN proposal for neutralisation, and claimed that "we ensure that there will be no outside interference." Nigel Bowen, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, echoed these sentiments.

Russian commentary in Pravda and Izvestia mentions the Five Power Agreement as an obstacle in the path toward neutralisation, and warns Indonesia against Australian attempts to draw Djakarta into defence arrangements. The gift by Australia of sixteen sabre jets to Indonesia in 1971 could be interpreted as an indication that Canberra does entertain hopes for closer defence collaboration.

Chinese naval capacity is not great, and their opposition to the internationalisation of the Straits is unlikely to be translated into action, and can be best seen as a gambit to win influence. However, the claims recently announced by China to the South China Sea, including the Sprattley Islands and the Tsengmu Reef which are within a few miles of Sarawak, represent an official extension of a sphere of influence that could ultimately be given naval backing, thus bringing China into the Straits of Malacca issue as an adjoining power.

The original Japanese proposals for internationally sanctioned traffic separation were put before the Inter-Maritime Consultative Organisation of the United Nations in 1968. These proposals recognise only a three mile territorial waters limit: at their narrowest point the Straits are 7.8 miles wide. Russia, which claims a twelve mile territorial waters limit for itself, recognises only three miles in the Straits.

In March 1970 Malaysia and Indonesia ratified a friendship treaty which confirmed their joint adherence to the twelve mile limit.
54 See Robert Reece in *The Guardian*, March 25, 1972 for an account of the proposals for a tariff made by the head of the Malaysian State Trading Organisation, PERNAS.

55 Indonesia and Malaysia have jointly rejected proposals for further dredging of the Straits "for security reasons." Major General Moertopo of Indonesia noted that the USSR is building a naval base in the Andaman Islands, and that "dredging will invite foreign warships to operate in the region and will eventually endanger security," (Reuter, Sept. 24, 1971).

56 The problems along the 275 mile long border are exacerbated by the activities of the National Liberation Front of the Patani Republic, which represents the separatist aspirations of the Muslim majority in the southernmost province of Thailand. These Thai Muslims believe that Patani had been under Malay control prior to the Anglo-Thai Treaty of 1909. See Astri Suhrke, "The Thai Muslims, Some Aspects of Minority Integration," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XLIII, No. 14 (Winter 1970).

57 According to a guarded article in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* of Feb. 5, 1972 there are perhaps 1,000 terrorists, mostly members of PARAKU, operating in Sarawak. They are being contained by 6,000 men from the Malay Regiment, Sarawak Rangers Police Field force and river units of the Royal Malaysian navy. Malaysian determination to suppress separatist feeling is motivated by rapidly growing oil revenues from Sarawak which have offset the losses in foreign exchange resulting from the fall in world rubber prices. Revenues doubled in 1971 to $437 million and should equal those of Brunei this year. There is widespread unemployment and poverty in Sarawak. Terrorist activities in the area adjacent to Brunei have begun only in the last few months. See also Peter Schumacher, *The Guardian*, August 21, 1971 for a description of the methods used to suppress insurgents in Sarawak.

58 Malaysia and Singapore had supported Chinese entry into the United Nations since 1965, and have made commercial arrangements which result in a balance of trade that is heavily in China's favour. The move toward China has been explained as a result of a situation where the internal scene is so tense and rigid that the only freedom of manoeuvre is to be found in foreign policy initiatives. More recently it has been suggested that somehow closer relations with Peking would counterbalance the Commonwealth defence connection, thus adding to the credibility of a neutralist orientation.
Data for 1971 indicate that China bought only 4% of the total Malaysian rubber output:

West Malaysian Rubber Exports - Tons

January - November (11 months), 1971: Total: 1,203,546

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>303,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>174,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>114,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>98,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>64,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>57,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>53,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>49,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>309,140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It was reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review, February 12, 1972, p. 31, that an agreement to sell 200,000 tons of rubber to China over the next two years was "on the point of conclusion."

The Philippines have regarded the Five Power Arrangements with some suspicion, but Romulo's request at the 1971 SEATO ministerial Conference for assurances that the arrangements were not contrary to the purposes of that organisation was apparently satisfied, even though he had made specific reference to the Sabah issue.

Razak has discounted the use of ANZUK troops in the struggle against the MCP in West Malaysia, which has "consistently been regarded as an internal matter" - see Lau Teik Soon. "The Security Situation on the Malaysia Thailand Border," Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. One, No. 2 (July 1971), pp. 85-87. If Lau's view is correct, it would be very difficult for Razak to call upon the ANZUK force at all.

In the scenario developed by Gordon he concludes that given a necessary ratio of troops to terrorists of 15 to 1, a mobile force of 10,000 "would represent a very significant contribution" if it were equipped with the necessary American material, including "1500 trucks, 400 helicopters, 500 machine guns ... and the largest transport aircraft." Such a mobile force would of course be drawn from a "total ASEAN force of between 35,000 and 50,000 men." The ANZUK group of two thousand is equipped with only a fraction of the equipment indicated as minimal by Gordon, and clearly does not measure up to the requirements of his scenario. See Bernard K. Gordon, Towards Disengagement In Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1969), pp. 154-165.
Indonesian acquiescence in the setting up of the Five Power Agreement is in part a result of the Australian exclusion of Borneo from the scope of the arrangement.

A revised agreement between Britain and Brunei was announced on May 5, 1971. Britain continues to have the responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, but ceases to be committed automatically in the event of an external attack. Instead, the two governments would consult together in a manner similar to that provided for under the Five Power Arrangements.

The importance of military weight in the relationships between the members of ASEAN is indicated by the fact that Adam Malik, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, took military advisors with him to Kuala Lumpur in November 1971 because "Neutralisation involves the security problem, and how can civilians discuss such matters?"

For an explanation of this incident see Lau Teik Soon "Singapore and Political Stability" Pacific Community, Jan. 1972. Lau says that "It was not in the national interest to reveal the whole circumstances of the foreign involvement." (In the "Herald")

Singapore, the world's fourth largest port, services 2,000-3,000 ships per month. Between 1959 and 1969 there was a 300% increase in port tonnage and a 500% increase in air traffic. About 45% of this trade is with the other members of ASEAN. Oil from the Gulf is the biggest single trade item, but oil from Brunei, rubber from Indonesia and textiles to both Malaysia and Indonesia are of major importance. 37,000 ships passed through the Straits in 1970, about 7,000 of which were oil tankers. Traffic has been increasing by almost 20% p.a. (Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 7, p. 523). Lee Kuan Yew reported in the "Mirror", Nov. 29, 1971 that shipping could be "politically harassed if you have not got some one there who would see that the rules of a peaceful passage of the high seas are observed" (emphasis added). Mr. Rajaratnam, Singapore Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote in The Mirror, Singapore, Jan. 10, 1972, p.8: "Singapore which commands the sea routes between the Pacific and Indian Ocean, must learn to cope with the dangers emanating from two oceans."

A general policy of seeking interdependence as a form of insurance is spurred by the obvious and increasing disparities in wealth and population. In 1970 the GNP per capital in Singapore was £390, and had been increasing since 1967 at an average rate of 14.6% p.a. Malaysia with a population of 10.2 million had a GNP per capita of £160 p.a., which had been increasing over the same period by 7.8% while Indonesia with a population around 130 million had a GNP per capita of only £33, increasing at 6.6%. This degree of relative prosperity for Singapore has been generated entirely by the entrepreneurial energy of its traders.
Economic disparities will increase in the future in terms of GNP per capita not only because of this remarkable demand for Singapore's functions as an entrepot but also because of the differences in rates of population growth. Between 1958 and 1968 the net rate of population growth in Singapore was reduced from 4.2% to 1.5% whereas in Indonesia attempts to introduce a birth control program have met with little success and the net rate of increase remains in excess of 2.4% p.a.


69 The Indonesian admiral, Sudomo, spoke during a visit to Kuala Lumpur in October 1971 of plans for joint Indonesian-Malaysian naval exercises, and mentioned smuggling and piracy in the Straits.

70 Malaysia is spending $30 million on a naval complex at Lumut, on the West Coast of Malaysia, which will become the headquarters of the Malaysia navy within five years. Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. No. 8, p. 720.


74 Robert O'Neill has remarked that the main problem of Australian foreign policy is in the reconciling of her history and geography. To this should be added her economics, since the dependence of Australia upon the Southeast Asian security system is accompanied by trade patterns that relate her mainly to Japan, Europe and North America. Only 18% of Australian exports go to Asian countries (excluding Japan), and less than 9% of her imports come from Asia. This is not unconnected with the fact that there is an average tariff on manufactured goods of 36%. The limitations of the economic links within the Five Power Agreement is shown by the fact that only 4% of Australia's exports go to Malaysia and Singapore combined. See Robert O'Neill, "New Attitudes for a new Decade," Australian Outlook, Aug. 1970.


Whitlam, leader of the ALP, spoke against Gorton's policies in parliament on February 27, 1969 and took the line that Australia has "special responsibilities in Asia" and argued for more support for Malaysia. These views were not in accordance with party policy and they were never repeated.


Oil had been the major item of trade but Australia now is becoming increasingly self-sufficient in this commodity. See P. J. Eldridge, "Indonesia and Australia," *Australia's Neighbours*, Sept. and Oct. 1971.

Australia now admits about 3,000 Asian immigrants p.a. but they are not being readily assimilated.

A trickle of aid was continued throughout the "Confrontation." In total Australia had contributed about .43% of the aid received by Indonesia up to 1965, but since then the amounts have been more significant, and unlike most countries, Australia gives aid in the form of a direct grant. See H. W. Arndt. "Australian Economic Aid to Indonesia," *Australian Outlook*, Aug. 1970.

At the Commonwealth Conference on Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, held in Kuala Lumpur on Sept. 13, 1971 the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Ismail Abdul Rahman said, among many other things, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements have been accepted by the Nonaligned Group as not being at variance with a nonaligned foreign policy. These arrangements are not directed against anyone or any ideology and they are not concluded in the context of great power rivalries." Verbatim report of the proceedings, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, London: March 1972, p. 4.


See Lau Teik Soon, "Security and Stability in the ASEAN Region," *Asia Research Bulletin*, September 1971. Lau says that the United States would like to give Japan a security role in the region. For reasons of space the question of the possible future adherence of Japan to the existing Five Power Agreement has not been discussed. It could be argued that the advantages enjoyed by Britain as a non-great power are also enjoyed by Japan, and that Japanese forces would therefore be equally acceptable in the region. This view neglects the fact that Japan does not share Britain's favourable historical record in the region, and that although Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia are the only Southeast Asian countries to enjoy a trade surplus with Japan, her economic stake in the area is many times greater than that of Britain, Australia and New Zealand.

Santamaria, the rather hawkish foreign policy spokesman for the DLP, whose motto is "Intentions vary, capacity remains," has suggested (besides spending six and one-half per cent of GNP on defence and acquiring a nuclear capacity) that Japan be invited to share the base at Cockburn Sound. Barnard, the ALP defence spokesman, is likewise prepared to consider the Japanese as potential allies, and has suggested weapon standardization. This friendly attitude toward Japan is not shared by Singapore, Malaysia or the other members of the ASEAN.

The option for the acquisition of a nuclear capability has been left open by the present government in Canberra, and this is a possibility that would be equally attractive to the hawkish elements among the right wing Liberals, DLP and the radical socialists. The recent visit by assistant secretary of state Marshall Green to reassure Canberra about the consequences of Nixon's China policy have not been successful in reducing the considerable disquiet felt in all parties. Almost a year ago Denis Warner noted that "there were now even question marks about ANZUS," and in January 1972 a government spokesman on defence said,

"It is vitally necessary for us in Australia to learn the politico-military lessons of Indo-China and Taiwan, as well as those of central Europe. We have seen the sentiment, loyalty or morality factors sink to bottom place among necessary consideration. Indo-China and Taiwan are cases in point. The world generally is apparently prepared to sacrifice the freedom of these countries and with it the lives of millions who have trusted their word, for motives varying from sheer indifference to a transient political expediency."

Mackay, *op. cit.*
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APPENDIX I

The Five Power Defence Arrangements

The Agreement that was announced by communique, after a conference of defence ministers in London in April 1971, amounts to a severe modification of the treaty that had been in effect between Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia, between 1957 and November 1, 1971.

The new arrangements are not expressed in the form of a treaty, but it is agreed that in the event of any armed attack or threat of attack externally organized or supported against Malaysia or Singapore, the five governments would consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken, jointly or separately.

The actual forces contributed by the guarantors are much smaller than they had been under AMDA.

The British contribution is as follows:

1 battalion group in Singapore.

Up to 6 frigates East of Suez, with two at any one time in the Straits region.

4 Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft.

1 squadron of Whirlwind helicopters.

1 submarine: on rotation with Australia.

Australian contribution:

1 battalion group in Singapore (with a rotating company at
the Butterworth air force base).

2 squadrons of Mirage III's.

1 destroyer or frigate.

1 submarine on rotation with Britain.

New Zealand's contribution:

1 infantry battalion.

1 frigate.

"a contribution" (?) to air defence.

These forces are co-ordinated by a Five Power Joint Committative Council, at the senior official level, and commanded by an Australian rear-admiral. The Integrated Air Defence System is commanded separately by an Australian air vice-marshall.