THE JAVANIZATION OF INDONESIAN POLITICS

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis applies the analytical concept of
political culture to politics in the Indonesian context.
The term "Javanization" is used to describe the process
whereby ethnic Javanese and Javanized individuals
gradually became the overwhelming and disproportionate
majority of the governing elite in the post-independence
era. It is further argued that the dominance in terms
of numbers has led to the Javanization of Indonesian
conceptions of state and limits of political behavior.

The first chapter surveys other theories of Indonesian
politics and makes a proposal for a cultural theory. The
cultural cleavages in Indonesian society in the horizontal
plane are described and a description of the government of
Mataram operating in a totally Javanese environment is
given. The changing roles of the primary bearers of
Javanese political culture and the nature of the state are
discussed.

Chapter Two interprets post-independence political
history from the perspective of increasing Javanization
and the gradual loss of national political influence by
non-Javanese Islamic political elements. Data on the
ethnic composition of the contemporary military,
governmental and political elite are presented.

Chapter Three is a discussion of contemporary (1959 to 1972) Indonesian government and politics using the same conceptual framework (structure, functions and style) as is used to discuss Mataram. Some similarities and dis-similarities are pointed out.

The thesis concludes with a discussion of the future of Javanization.

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David L. Thornton

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CHAPTER I

POLITICAL CULTURE, GOVERNMENT AND JAVANISM

Theorizing About Indonesian Politics: A Cultural Proposition

Indonesia is a large culturally, ethnically and linguistically diverse nation in Southeast Asia. Following four years of fighting the Dutch, the country became internationally recognized as an independent nation in 1950. Since that time Indonesia has suffered the many vicissitudes that seem so common in the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia. These include unsuccessful attempts at "Western style" democratic government, recurrent regional rebellions and revolts, "one-man" rule, and finally, military rule. Politically speaking, Indonesia has been a highly unstable nation with numerous changes of governments, constitutions, and other institutions.

Besides the numerous attempts at general theorizing about the flow and instability of politics in the newly independent nations[1], several authors have examined the Indonesian case in detail. Their theories can be broadly classified into three categories: the "skill theory", the "ethnic theory" and the "class theory".

In his _tour de force_ on Indonesian Politics of the 1950-58 period, Herbert Feith proposed that the flow of politics should best be seen as the conflict between two skill groups: the administrators and the solidarity-makers.[2]

Feith felt that the administrators were very pragmatically inclined and Western-oriented while the solidarity-makers were inclined to place politics and the "continuation of the revolution" above all other considerations. The "decline of constitutional democracy" was seen to represent the victory of the solidarity-makers over the administrator skill group. Feith identified the administrators mainly with two political parties, the Masjumi (a "modernist" Muslim party) and the PSI (a small intellectual-led socialist party). On the other hand, the solidarity-makers were seen as best represented in the person of Sukarno and the PNI (the nationalist party).

At about the same time that Feith published his book, Leslie Palmier wrote a book interpreting Indonesian politics as basically an ethnic conflict between the largest ethnic group, the Javanese, and the peoples of the Outer Islands or non-Javanese.[3] Given the fact that the Outer Islands had revolted against the Javanese-led central government during the 1956-58 period and that the Outer Island associated Masjumi and PSI were banned in its wake, leaving only the Javanese-dominated parties at the center, the Palmier theory seemed to have high explanatory value.

Much later David Levine and Jan Pluvier chose to interpret post-independence politics in Indonesia as basically an elite-mass conflict.[4] Levine said that Indonesia has

essentially a "retrogressive" social system in which the various factions of the elite fight among themselves for state power while at the same time attempting to keep the masses from exercising power in the political system. The decline of the parliamentary system in which the "people" (meaning the PKI for Levine) were on the verge of victory and the eventual destruction of the "people's party" by the military were seen as supporting this argument.

After detailed field research, Rex Mortimer greatly reduced the applicability of the Levine theory by pointing out that despite numerous attempts to do so, the PKI had never been able to exploit the class divisions in Indonesian society in the way in which Marxist-Leninist theory said it should.[5] The PKI had simply abandoned such an approach as inapplicable to Indonesian society.

Further, John Legge examined in detail the theories of Feith and Palmier and found that they were not completely convincing when actually applied to the specifics of any situation.[6] He concluded that both theories explained part of the truth but were entirely too narrow to be the all encompassing theories that their authors presented them to be.

After studying the above theories, my own conclusion is that the ethnic theory expanded to a political culture theory is the most promising way to conceptualize contemporary Indonesian politics.[7] Almond and Powell write "political

culture is the pattern of individual attitudes and
orientations toward politics among the members of a
political system ... the kinds of orientations which exist
in a population will have a significant influence on the
ways in which the political system works. The demands made
upon the system, the responses to law and to appeals for
support, and the conduct of individuals in their political
roles, will all be shaped and conditioned by the common
orientation patterns. They constitute the latent political
tendencies for political behavior and as such they are of
great importance in explaining and predicting political
action."[8] Clifford Geertz adds "one of the things everyone
knows but no one can quite think how to demonstrate is that
a country's politics reflect the design of its culture."[9]

Almond and Powell add that one nation-state may have
many political sub-cultures and that the dominant political
culture may not in fact be the national (in the sense of
widely-spread and accepted) political culture at all, nor
even the political culture of the numerical majority of the
country's inhabitants. This is particularly true in most
newly independent countries, although some older nations
also have similar difficulties, where in Geertz's words
there is a new state composed of an old society; usually
many old societies.[10]

The cultural heterogeneity of Indonesia is an

established fact and seems quite inviting for the application
of the concept of political culture as an analytical tool to
explore the flow of Indonesian politics. This paper examines
the notion of political culture as applied to the Indonesian
case. The term "Javanization" is presented to explain the
process of politics from independence to the present (1972).
"Javanization" means the process of gradual domination of
the Indonesian polity by ethnic Javanese and their variety
of political culture. A model of traditional Javanese
political culture is presented and its basic similarities to
contemporary Indonesian political culture are pointed out.
The process of "Javanization" is argued historically and
data on the composition of the contemporary Indonesian
political and governmental elite is presented to support it.
Finally, some discontinuities or counter-processes are
described and interpreted from the standpoint of their effect
on a "Javanized" government and political process.

Political Cultures in Indonesia:

It is almost impossible to successfully generalize
about Indonesia's culture because of the heterogeneity of
the population. It has been estimated that there are at least
200 completely different languages spoken in the vast archi-
pelago,[11] and each of these language groups usually has its
own adat or traditional customs. A simplistic but fairly
accurate description of the country's population would read

like this: The major linguistic and ethnic group is the

Javanese who comprise about 50% of the total population of

120 million[12] and then come the Sundanese who live on the

western end of the island of Java who compose about 12% of

the population and then there are many other small groups no

one of which totals more than 2 to 3% of the population.[13]

At independence there was no all-Indonesian culture.

There was one large sub-culture and a multitude of smaller

ones. Given the legacies of colonial rule which left the

Javanese not only the most numerous cultural group in the

new nation but also the best educated and most politically

mobilized, it was almost inevitable that the new political

culture of Indonesia would have strong traces of Javanese

influence. Observing the first nine years of independence

and commenting especially on the virtual civil war in 1958,

Daniel S. Lev wrote:

> The process of assimilation - to use the term loosely
> - had already begun, a fact which may have lent more
> bitterness to the conflict. Except for the Sundanese
> of West Java ... most of the outer island groups
> were not only small in numbers and mutually hostile
> but also culturally less self-assured than the
> Javanese. Their relationships with Java were and
> are ambivalent; the Javanese are seen as effete
> and elusive, but also as halus (refined and cultured)
> and also politically clever -- a people to be dis-
> dained but also to be emulated. For their part,
> the Javanese never doubted their cultural superiority
> over other groups; nor did they doubt their right
> to the principal voice in independent Indonesia. [14]

Despite the seeming multitude of small cultures in the

Outer Islands, there was a factor that unified a great number

of them, other than simple opposition to Java, and that was the influence of Islam.

In his work The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Feith discussed the idea of political culture before turning away from it to his skill group theory. He stated that history had created two major political cultures in Indonesia: Javanese aristocratic and Islamic entrepreneurial political cultures.[15] The roots of these, he wrote, could be attributed to the differences of historical experience of the different communities of the archipelago. The points of difference were: 1) differences in traditional political organization among the wet-rice cultivation areas, the dry-rice cultivation areas and the coastal maritime areas; 2) the difference in the degree of penetration of Islam; and 3) the differences in the impact of Dutch colonial rule.[16]

> The first of these (Javanese aristocratic political
> culture), which is the political culture of the
> great majority of the Javanese, was born of state
> organization in the wet-rice agriculture based
> inland empires of Java, of shallow Islamization,
> and a long period of intensive Dutch impact, which
> produced enormous densities of population, a hollow-
> ing out of the structures of social integration, and
> an incapacitation of entrepreneurship. The Islamic
> entrepreneurial political culture is one whose
> adherents are far more dispersed and socially
> disparate ... historically this political culture
> is a product of the maritime commercial towns,
> of thorough Islamization, of relatively slight
> Dutch impact, and of the revival of entrepreneurship
> in the present century. [17]

Generalizing even further, Feith points out that not only was one of the political cultures contemptuous of economic pursuits and the other respectful, but also one was associated with support for a secular and broadly theistic or pan-theistic state and the other with support for a state based on Islam. In addition, Javanese aristocratic political culture involved a greater intensity of anti-Dutch sentiment than did the other political culture and at the same time, a less intense hostility to the Chinese. Javanese aristocratic political culture tended toward nativism, while Islamic entrepreneurial political culture was generally more ready to accept and incorporate influences stemming from the modern West. But, according to Feith, the Javanese aristocratic political culture was far more sympathetic to socialist ideas.[18]

With the benefit of ten additional years of perspective on Feith, it can now be argued that the very factors that he believed created two major political cultures in the country, in fact, broke them down into other sub-cultures. The weakening of the structures of social integration and over-population caused by the intense impact of Dutch colonial rule, Japanese occupation, the four-year war for independence, the mass politics of constitutional and guided democracy, the penetration of contemporary world culture plus the coming of the "modernist" Islamic movement to the entire

country, shattered or at the very least, greatly eroded the periphery of the Javanese aristocratic and Islamic entrepreneurial political cultures which allowed the rise of other sub-cultures having some links to the original and remnant ones.

The Javanese aristocratic political culture has existed as the Great Tradition of agrarian Java for many centuries.[19] The coming of Islam to Java in the 15th and 16th centuries only added another layer of influence to the broadly Hindu-Javanese culture. Islam, although accepted as the single religion of Java, was thoroughly indigenized and mixed with more traditional variants of the "Javanese religion".

In many parts of the Outer Islands and in the non-Hinduized portions of Java, the initial coming of Islam had a much greater effect. Despite the fact that some indigenization and modification of Islam did occur in these areas, it was very minor compared with that in the interior of east and central Java. In the Outer Islands in general, but in Atjeh, Minangkabau, Makassar, West Java (Sunda) and the north coast of central and east Java in particular, Islam began to play a major, if not dominant, social role.

In the late 19th century, a new wave or current of Islam swept across the archipelago. This wave, known as "modernist" or "purist" Islam or Islamic reformism was much

less compatible with traditional forms of social and political organization. This "chauvinism" of "modernist" Islam set up abiding tensions even in Java that reflected the antagonism of the traditional order and the Islamic reformist movement.[20] Stated simply, the Outer Islands became more rigorously and strictly Islamic while only a small portion of the ethnic Javanese came to accept the new "modernist" doctrine.

With the birth of political parties, the differences between the "modernist" and the "traditionalist" varieties of the Islamic or santri[21] movement was institutionalized in the form of the Masjumi, a "modernist" Muslim party, and the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), a "traditionalist" Muslim party. Given the above background, it appears quite natural that the Masjumi had its greatest support in the Outer Islands and the NU in Java itself.

Javanese aristocratic culture or the culture of the Javanese prijaji and abangan[22] was attacked not only by Islam of two varieties but also by Western political thought and de-traditionalization in general. The creation of political parties saw this political culture split in much the same manner as was Islam, a modernist-traditionalist division. Simplistically, the split can be said to have been institutionalized in a division between the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) and the PNI (the Indonesian Nationalist Party). The latter was initially an organization that expected

traditional patrimonial social relations to give it strength
and the former hope that economic and class divisions would
give it mass support. The PNI was an extremely complex
organization, and conservative (read traditional) and radical
(read extreme nationalist) factions eventually appeared in
it.[23]

Since Soedjatmoko's initial writing on the subject in
the early 1950's, it has been recognized that rather than
being interest articulators or aggregators Indonesian
political parties represent aliran or various flows of
thought within the body politic.[24] Given the institutionali-
zation of these aliran as social forces[25] with mutually
antagonistic and exclusive ideologies or world views, it can
reasonably be argued that the aliran are, in fact, political
sub-cultures in themselves.

In a later writing, Feith gave the best graphic
presentation yet published of the division of aliran or sub-
cultures and their relationship to political parties.[26]
(See Figure I) From the diagram it can be seen that Feith
thinks there are five main political sub-cultures in the
country: communism, radical nationalism, Javanese tradition-
alism (here called Javanese aristocratic political culture),
democratic socialism and Islam. For some unexplainable
reason, he chose not to represent the real split in Islam
between the "modernist" and "traditionalist" or indigenized

varieties or to relate the Indonesian army to the sub-
cultures as he did the major political parties.[27] My
diagram (Figure II) is an attempt to remedy the latter
shortcoming.

The two diagrams clearly show the divisions in Indo-
nesian society described in the last several pages. The
crucial point, in my opinion, is that a portion of the PKI,
the PNI, the NU and the army all fall within the Javanese
traditionalist (or aristocratic) sphere. Each of these four
organizations have common Javanese roots. The army and the
PNI are most closely in the center of Javanese aristocratic
culture. As Lev noted about the three large Javanese based
parties (and I now add the army): "The NU kijaji ... the
PNI prijaji and the PKI peasant (and the army kesatria)
spoke the same language and shared the same stereotypes of
the non-Javanese for whom the Masjumi spoke. Social communi-
cations between the three (now four) groups flowed with more
or less traditional ease ..."[28]

The above statement sets the stage for the analysis
of Indonesian politics from the political culture perspective.
Broadly, the flow of politics can be seen as a two level
struggle: one between the groups most influenced by and
linked to Javanese aristocratic political culture versus the
Islamic entrepreneurial political culture and secondly, among
the variants or sub-cultures of the Javanese political culture.

FIGURES

I POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL ALIRAN
SOURCE: FEITH & CASTLES, OP. CIT., p.14

II POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES ON ABRI'S
OFFICER CORPS UNDER THE NEW ORDER

The overall process can best be described as "Javanization" of politics. "Javanization" will be used in preference to the term "Prijaji-ization", despite the fact that the latter term most closely describes the process. "Javanization" will be used to describe the progressive increase in influence and power of ethnic Javanese and other Indonesians who have become very Javanese in thought and action in the government and politics of Indonesia as a whole. Not only is this process seen as putting more ethnic Javanese in the government but especially Javanese of one cultural variant: the prijaji or Great Tradition of Java. This concept should be kept constantly in mind as the remainder of this paper is read.

A Note on the Cultural Influences on the Military:

In Figure II, I presented a rather controversial placement of the military in relationship to the aliran. The diagram only refers to the present leadership (as of 1972) and should not be seen as depicting a historical phenomenon. It should further be noted that no communist or "modernist" Islamic influences are shown. It is these two cultural and ideological tendencies that the Indonesian military (ABRI) is most hostile towards, and elements sympathetic to them have gradually been purged from the ranks -- assuming that they were ever present in the first place. Also note the limited influence of democratic socialism

(Western political philosophy)and radical nationalism. The
influence of the former on political thinking in ABRI has
seemingly decreased with the isolation of the Siliwangi
Division of West Java since 1966. The latter is more diffi-
cult to discuss. At the moment its influence seems to be
more latent than active. The sensitiveness of the President
to Indonesian businessmen's complaints about foreign
competition and ABRI's recent stress on the inheritance of
the "1945 Generation" or the spirit of revolutionary struggle
to the younger generation seem to be signs of its continued
presence. While the influence of Islam on the military in
general is small, most military people including the Javanese
acknowledge it as their religion,albeit with certain
reservations.

The relationship of "modern" or at least western
military doctrine and Javanese traditionalism would seem to
be the most controversial. The military and its spokesmen
are quick to proclaim their support for modernisasi and
pembangunan (modernization and development) and deny the role
of traditional values and influences. This does not, however,
correspond with my own feeling about the matter. That the
army has imported many modern organizational principles and
put them to good use is not denied. Certainly some political
doctrine expounded by ABRI is also of this variety. The
question remains as to the depth of the acceptance of the

values to go along with the organizational principles, and
only actions can give the proper answer to it. The army
with its dual function ideology certainly has created its
own format for a continuing political and social as well as
a military role which is very distinctly different from the
Western conceptions of the military's proper role. On the
other hand, ABRI's analysis of Indonesia's political problems
and its prescribed remedies at the Second Army Seminar in
Bandung during 1966 are decidedly Western in approach. To
this date the implementation of said remedies has had a
decidedly Javanese flavor to it, however. The correctness
of my placement of ABRI's present leadership on the diagram
can be better appreciated after the similarities between the
New Order and Mataram are pointed out.

Government and Politics in a Javanese Political Culture: Later Mataram (15th and 16th century)

While the northern coast of Java or the pasisir
succumbed to Islam in a very complete manner, this was not
true of the cultural heartland of Java on the interior of
the central and eastern portions of the island. There Islam
barely affected the traditional scheme of culture and govern-
ment. In the 15th and 16th century Java existed side by
side with the Dutch East India Company or VOC; yet little
affected by it. At this time the kingdom of Mataram controlled
the Javanese heartland. Excellent studies of this period of

history have been made by Moertono and Schrieke while
Anderson and Geertz have presented equally valuable
interpretations of "Javanism" as well.[29] From these studies,
a model of "Javanism" and the Javanese state in relatively
pure form can be obtained. While it is naturally impossible
to ascertain the full range of values, beliefs and attitudes
that formed traditional Javanese political culture, it is
possible to see the results of this political culture as
reflected in the structure, functions and style of Mataram's
government.[30] In turn this reflection can be compared with
contemporary Indonesian politics to discover the broad
similarities and dis-similarities.

Structure:

According to Steinberg, "the political structure of
Java in Mataram times began -- and theoretically speaking,
also ended -- with the king."[31] In theory, at least, there
were and could not be any limits on the powers and rights
of such a king for even with the acceptance of Islam, he was
still somewhat of a sacral figure.

The state itself was conceived of as consisting of
four concentric circles of territory that faded imperceptibly
into each other with increasing distance from the center.
The kraton or palace was the center which was surrounded by
the negara agung or royal land. The latter was the very core
of the kingdom, during Mataram times located in the area of

Solo and Jogjakarta. The next circle was the <u>mantja negara</u>
or outer provinces which at the height of Mataram's power
included all of Java except the very extreme eastern and
western tips of the island. Finally, there were the <u>tanah</u>
<u>sabrang</u> or overseas states that acknowledged the suzerainty
of the center.

Naturally an elaborate administration was required to
govern such a kingdom. By and large the realm was not
governed by members of the royal family for they were kept
at the court and hopefully, politically neutral. In some
of the outer provinces hereditary local lords were incor-
porated into the administration; otherwise their areas
were ruled through officials, who no matter how independent
they might be in reality, were in theory only servants of
the king.

At the center in the <u>kraton</u> and <u>negara agung</u>, there
was an elaborate structure of administration that in
composition was supposedly sacral.[32] Usually the ruling
council was composed of five ministers: a <u>patih</u> or chief
minister and four <u>wedana</u> or lesser ministers. On occasion
the king reserved the position of <u>patih</u> for himself. "The
functions of these officials, in contrast to the structure,
were imprecise; areas of responsibility and relative
importance seem to have depended more on their personal
relations with the king or their strength in court circles

than on the particular offices they occupied."[33] The structure
formally fit the pattern that kept order in the smaller world
of the kingdom, but "political business was conducted
primarily in terms of personal relations."[34] Moertono notes
that whatever the change in the functions of Mataram govern-
ment during its 400 years of existence, the ideological and
structural bases of state life seem not to have changed at
all.[35]

While the structure of the state was elaborate, in
reality the degree of control by the center was very low.
The degree of effectiveness of the king was measured by just
what degree he could tighten up the looseness of the structure
or in other words, accumulate power at the center. Therefore,
as Anderson notes, the Javanese seem to have held a view of
history that envisioned fluctuations of power at the center;
continual waxing and waning of power.[36] Times of tranquility
corresponded to strength and times of disorder to weakness
at the center. If there was any causal relationship seen
here, it was that weakness causes or allows disturbance,
rather than vice versa.

While rule in the negara agung could be controlled
closely, this was much less true in the outer provinces and
the overseas territory. A rule of financial self-sufficiency
or autonomous financing gave the officials there full and
undivided authority over their region. "It is therefore not

surprising that, within this region, he (the local official)
wielded the powers of administration, judge and commander of
the local contingent of troops ... the fact that regional
officials held undivided power made it essential that they
be chosen with great care."[37]   Simply stated, despite its
outward appearances, the state was primitively organized
and only held together by personal attachments and loyalties,
partly inevitable because of poor communications and the
far-flung nature of the kingdom; so, the danger of disin-
tegration was inherent in the system, especially as
hereditary succession stimulated the establishment of new
gentry families in the outer provinces and overseas
territories.[38]

Throughout the centuries the king's officials, from
the highest to the lowest, gradually became a social class
with an exclusive set of beliefs and values. They formed
the social stratum between the king plus the small group of
princes of royal blood and the great mass of private citizens
who, irrespective of wealth or means of living were called
the wong tjilik or small people. This administrative and
social group was known as the prijaji. Commoners could enter
this group but only by becoming a servant of the king, an
official.[39]

In such a polity, at least in theory, there was no
such phenomenon as politics for the king's slightest wish
became law. In actuality there were politics but of the court

or palace politics variety. There were multitudes of
intrigues, schemes and maneuverings for better position in
relationship to the ruler. The notion of mass politics and
participation was, however, alien to the system.

Functions:

In the Javanese belief system or world view, harmony
was the greatest value. Harmony as a goal meant to create
a "one-ness" with one's surroundings and above all with God.
It follows that the conception of the proper function of the
state was broader and at the same time narrower than the
modern one. Broader because harmony extended to the soul
and narrower because harmony meant, in many cases, the total
absence of government, if possible. "The Javanese, there-
fore, would not consider the state to have fulfilled its
obligation if it did not encourage inner psychological
order (<u>tenteram</u>, peace and tranquility of heart) as well as
enforcing the formal order (<u>tata</u>)." Continuing, Moertono
says:

> Following this line of reasoning, one can understand
> why state administration in the kingdoms of old
> seem to have neglected the people's needs, seems
> to have been detached from the toils of the common
> people. In agrarian countries where man's life
> depends so much more on the steady flow of seasonal
> change, where the concept of harmony is viewed more
> in terms of regularity and familiarity with the
> patterns of community life, any interference in the
> life of society may disturb the balance of the
> universe. Thus the state will as much as possible,
> refrain from interference. Such restraint is
> feasible too because of agrarian life, relatively,

> does not need much state stimulus to work ... It
> follows that progress in the modern sense of
> deliberate development and active stimulation
> could not have been considered a goal of the state.
> The role of the king is then more that of a
> protector than a developer ... with the all-
> dominating position of the king in state life,
> administration as a technical tool of kingship
> had to reflect the king's major concern, the
> preservation of harmony. This need ... determined
> the major and most important task, mainly, maintaining
> security. In practice this meant guarding against
> any possible disturbance from an outside foe as well
> as any internal crime or irregularity which might
> disturb the balance between the two cosmic
> spheres (the kingdom and the universe). [40]

Anyone who did disturb the internal order had to be

disposed of without delay, "just as one would dispose of a

caterpillar."[41] The efficiency of a regime was also

measured by the existence of such disturbances. In fact,

there were frequent rebellions, and bands of robbers often

roamed about plundering, but Moertono notes that once such

groups became territorial, they governed exactly like the

kingdom itself did.[42]

One can easily imagine that any change in the kingdom

became a threat to the regime, because change, any change,

would disturb the balance and inner tranquility of the state.

The Javanese universe became ordered by hard and stern rules

of action and interaction. The duty of the state and its

servants was to contain change in all forms. This passion

became so obsessive that history was continually rewritten to

prove the lack of change and emphasize continuity. The

ultimate enforcement of such reactionary "stability" had to

rest on something other than personal relationships, and in the final analysis, it was the ability and willingness of the regime to use force that maintained order and prevented deviation.

The final function of the state and its administration was taxation. Taxation was a kind of tribute exacted in exchange for the king's protection. This tribute was in the form of money, produce and labor. Especially in the mantja negara or outer provinces this taxation was farmed out to the regent or provincial governor, who had to be self-sufficient. An order came from the top of the hierarchy as to what was to be supplied and in what quantity. The local lord or regent then adjusted his own administration to that requirement. The state depended on this tribute to maintain itself and the elaborate life-style of the court, for it had little capacity to finance itself. In this sense then, the center could be viewed as attempting to extract much but offering little in return; especially if the center was weak, the room for deviation was great in the submission of tribute.

Style and Behavior:

The style and behavior of the ruled and the rulers in Mataram was governed by a very intricate set of social relationships and norms that ascribed a place to everything in the universe. The world view of the Javanese ascribed a

meaning to everything, every action, every event. In fact,
Moertono states that consequently Javanese are apt to search
for meaning in acts, words or situations, no matter how
rationally incomprehensible or unimportant they may seem.[43]

The central focus of action, however, was on the
creation and maintenance of harmony, both inside and outside
of the human being. This stress led to great emphasis on
ceremony and symbolism. The approach to any problem had to
be in harmony with the cosmos. Therefore, the outer form
of functions and behavior became much more important than
the content of action itself. This stress also gave rise
to the unbelievably elaborate style of the age that was
embodied in the prijaji.

Prijaji-ism has been well described by Clifford
Geertz.[44] The etiquette of the prijaji was so elaborate
and refined that he even called it a religion of sorts.
In short, the individual was supposed to express his own
inner harmony and his outer harmony with the surrounding
world in behavior. This style of behavior is called halus
and escapes full definition in English. Loosely, it means
"cultured" and "refined", but it has far reaching impli-
cations. Expression of emotion in daily conduct is forbidden.
Only smoothness of expression is allowed; hence, regardless
of one's true inner feelings, the countenance must remain
unperturbed. Opposition, anger, fear, jealousy, hate and the

like are only expressed openly by <u>kasar</u> or crude beings;
beings in their natural state without any concentration of
power or refinement in the inner soul. Consequently, it is
almost impossible for the <u>prijaji</u> to say "no", although
certain types of "yes" do mean "no". As expressed in the
structure and functions of the state, the form is much more
important than the content; in fact, the actual content is
very often hard to distinguish from the symbolism of the
form. Geertz goes even further in discussing the implications
of <u>halus</u>-ness by describing carefully a process called
<u>etok-etok</u> in which <u>prijaji</u> avoid telling the truth whenever
possible simply to preserve harmony(!)[45]

A <u>prijaji</u> must be <u>sabar</u>, <u>iklas</u> and <u>terima</u>, terms of
virtue which mean having patience, being sincere and devoted,
and willing to receive or accept all that comes one's way,
good or bad.[46] These terms express a strongly socialized
inclination of submission to fate.

> There is no room for a voluntary and mutual adjustment
> or a fine conciliation and conformation; rather the
> universe is ordered by hard and stern rules.
> Deviation from them would set off a chain reaction
> which might reach calamitous proportions. From here
> to a belief in the working of fate is but a very
> short distance. Harmony as a compelling need must
> therefore form the central concept in man's efforts
> toward organization ... thus the state as a replica
> of the cosmic order (harmony) must also have the
> propensities and capacities of that higher order,
> a power which as a part of the Great Order, no
> subject people dare restrict or disturb.[47]

The despotic possibilities of such attitudes are softened somewhat by the expression of paternalism for the subjects on the part of the ruler. He must care for their sufferings, so that, according to Moertono, the ruler assumes, in fact, a role of protective superiority, the ruled an attitude of acquiescent subservience.[48] This gives rise to a sort of patron-client relationship which is often called Bapak-ism or father-ism.[49] This type of patrimonial relationship was reflected in the formal central hierarchy of the state as well as in most forms of political and social organization. In addition to the central hierarchy or pyramid with the king at the top and all subjects below, the society itself was divided into many small "fiefdoms" or pyramids with similar composition.

Ben Anderson has presented what he feels is a Javanese or prijaji philosophy of power.[50] He believes it to be in many ways completely opposite from the social science conception of power today. Briefly, Anderson sees the Javanese as believing power is concrete, homogeneous, constant in total quantity and as automatically legitimate i.e. there are no moral questions involved with power or its use. On the other hand, he says Westerners view power as abstract, heterogeneous in its sources, unlimited in quantity and morally ambiguous. He further draws the implications of these observations in discussing political action and

behavior in the Javanese context, several points of which
have already been touched upon here.

Another result of the emphasis on harmony, as well as
the idea of power, was the importance of continuity.
Continuity is an expression of non-change. Dynasties had
to be related even if imaginary genealogies had to be created.
Hence, the Dutch, with a little twisting of history, became
descendants of ancient Javanese kings. Moertono stresses
that legitimacy was derived by these rewritings of history
while Anderson counters that the simple flowing of power
from a monarch to his opponent was enough confirmation of
legitimacy given the Javanese view of history; therefore,
historical rewriting was only additional support.[51]

The central roles of harmony and continuity in the
Javanese mind, and thus in the state, were also reflected in
a phenomenon known as syncretism. Syncretism á la Java was
essentially taking all threats, new ideas and associated
forms of change and assimilating them to the major body of
Javanese tradition and philosophy. Hence, Islam and even
Dutch colonialism came to be expressed in very Javanese
ways. The threat of new ideas was defused by absorption
into the mainstream. However, such domination of change
could only be maintained in the long run by the continuation
of Javanese power. As long as colonial rule remained indirect,
the prijaji were in a position to interpret new ideas as they
wished, but in the case of direct rule this could hardly be

the case.

Soldiers were also servants of the king. The knight or kesatria image of the humble soldier always loyal to his commander was clearly expressed as a part of the general prijaji belief system.

The means of socialization of the Great Tradition of the prijaji to the masses is not well understood. Ben Anderson pointed out that the wajang kulit or shadow puppet show was certainly a part of the process as it depicts the prijaji norms in ideal form and has been a great favorite of all levels of Javanese society for centuries.[52]

In summary, traditional Javanese society and government were very strong and absorptive. They were also extremely hierarchial in structure. The maintenance of harmony was the major function of the government. Change was seen as something to be tempered and controlled if it could not be prevented altogether.

The Changing Roles of the Prijaji and the State

The Prijaji:

The prijaji were the aristocracy of the Javanese abangan masses. It was the prijaji who carried out and administered the king's commands; they were the administrative class of the kingdom. "Java as a political entity rested on three things: a common language and culture, a political myth that was universally accepted because it

rested on and expressed common religious beliefs, and the
shared values of a Java-wide prijaji class."[52] The prijaji,
then, as opposed to the peasant masses, were the foremost
representatives of Javanese civilization in all of its
manifestations, cultural or political.

With the advent of Dutch colonialism and the subjugation
of Javanese royal power to that of the VOC or Dutch East India
Company in the eighteenth century, the role of the prijaji
initially did not change substantially. As Steinberg puts it:

> Alien though it was, the VOC was enacting a role in
> Javanese history. Its earlier naval domination in
> the archipelago was decaying; it had gone ashore
> on Java and was now the successor to Mataram. The
> circles of the realm were reversed, coastal Batavia
> (now Djakarta) was now the center, the Bupati now
> faced west and north, and Mataram princes were now
> outer vassals. But politically the underlying
> structure of Java had changed hardly at all.
> Socially, below a small conquering elite of Dutchmen,
> prijaji still lorded it over the wong tjilik; a
> multitude of local economies still sent tribute
> through local channels to a greedy but distant center.
> A Javanese writing of the 18th century, indifferent
> to the company's outside connections but sensitive
> to the imperatives of Javanese history, could explain
> this: 'Jang Kung' (Jan Coen, the Dutch Governor-
> General who founded Batavia), it said, was the son
> of a wandering foreigner and a princess of West Java
> who was destined to bear kings. Through her,
> therefore, descended a legitimate dynasty of Java. [53]

Thus was the strength of Javanese culture; early
company representatives in the interior became Javanized.
They took Javanese wives, spoke Javanese and wore Javanese
clothes. They became a part of the patrimonial system itself
and little disturbed the role of the prijaji or the continuity

of the civilization.

During the 18th century the VOC treated the inland
Javanese kingdoms as large and dangerous vassals that
maintained a great deal of independence. This period saw
a great flowering of prijaji culture, and the position of
the prijaji vis-à-vis the peasant was greatly strengthened
by the company. "The Dutch ruled, but daily government
remained in the hands of the prijaji; production was
increasingly commercial but it continued to be organized
in the feudal forms of tribute or appanage."[54]

The turn of the century saw the collapse of the VOC
and its replacement by the Dutch government. There was an
immediate shift in policy and quite naturally, it had an
effect on the role of the prijaji. "Daendels (the first
Governor-General appointed by the Dutch government) and his
successors came out from Europe determined to govern rather
than simply to control Java; they challenged the whole
system of arrangement by which company servants and Javans
had accommodated to each other for more than a century."[55]
The size and independence of the Javanese kingdoms were
reduced, and the Dutch attempted to transform the prijaji
from petty vassals into ordinary civil servants.

The ease of dealing with traditional Javanese insti-
tutions was again recognized by 1830 when the right of
hereditary succession was returned to the regents; the

Dutch discovered it was much easier to rule through the personal authority of the prijaji than not. Despite some administrative simplification, the prijaji were clearly once again in day to day control of governing Java.

The major social and economic transformations of the 19th and early 20th centuries began to undermine the old prijaji institutions. The Dutch policy of hereditary succession coupled with large population growth, relatively peaceful conditions and non-expansion of the native administration created a rift between the higher prijaji who were regents or bupatis and the lower prijaji who in more normal times would have looked forward to gaining a foothold in and ascending the administrative hierarchy through force or natural displacement.[56] However, the advent of the Ethical Policy[57] in the last decades of the 19th century, helped feudal Java to gradually evolve, at least formally, into a modern administrative state. This meant a large expansion of the number of government positions outside of the traditional hierarchy, and educational institutions were set up in the Indies to supply people with modern skills for these positions. The lower prijaji, without a chance for advancement in the "frozen" traditional hierarchy, eagerly grasped the new opportunities and became the doctors, lawyers, engineers and civil servants of the Netherlands Indies under Ethical rule. Initially, the status associated with these

posts was not high, but Van Niel notes, "by the end of the century (19th) most of these persons were coming to be viewed as prijaji of some standing by the common people of Indonesia, even though they were often not descended from the higher prijaji families."[58]

"Whereas in 1900 the prijaji group had been mainly nobles and administrators, by 1914 it contained increasing numbers of civil servants, government technicians and intellectuals who shared the elitist role and who in the eyes of the Indonesian common man of the village were included within the general designation of prijaji."[59] Most prijaji made outward adjustments to the West and Western style administration but continued to regulate their private lives on traditional patterns. The crucial point, however, was, "during the early 20th century the broadening leadership pattern of Indonesian society was almost exclusively a development within the prijaji group, and a sense of social distinctiveness remains a strong force among the elite."[60] Thus, the rise of nationalism was also the expression of one group: the prijaji.

The prijaji have always had top status in Indonesian society. The bureaucracy and white-collar positions that came to be associated with the prijaji were and are the most respected in the job hierarchy. Non-prijaji, whether peasants or even non-Javanese aspired to these positions and as a few

obtained them, became "prijaji-ized" in the process. To
this day the above pattern remains surprisingly constant.[61]

With the above in mind, the Javanese elite of today,
in my opinion, should be considered modern day prijaji.[62]
They include all government servants whether it be military,
civil servants, pamong-pradja (regional administrators
corps), teachers or the major white-collar service
professionals in law and medicine . Additionally, Geertz
has pointed out that invariably political party leaders in
Java, including, surprisingly, those of the PKI are of
prijaji origin.[63] Thus the sons of Java carry on the great
prijaji tradition, albeit in different roles.

The State:

While the prijaji were adapting to new roles, the
conception of the state was changing to some extent also.
Initially, Mataram and Batavia co-existed, but gradually
Batavia began to assume the role of the center. As noted
earlier, the Javanese even made the Dutch into legitimate
heirs to the kingship by rewriting history. As the structure
of Mataram had not changed for 400 years, the advent of
Dutch rule did not easily change the conception of the state
and its functions. For essentially, colonial rule was the
same thing as indigenous rule when seen from the viewpoint
of the effect on the population. It was still a paternal-
istic state. There was no role for the population other than

to accept the decisions of the new center and no way to
participate other than through traditional revolts against
authority. There was no conception of politics except the
old one: palace politics. There was no conception of
opposition except in the total and illegal variety, because
it was seen as a threat to the existing order. The channels
of communication remained the same: one way and always from
the top. If there was ever any formal local autonomy, it
was always granted from the top by the grace of the Governor-
General, the new king, and not obtained by any inherent right
of possession of it by the masses. Clive Day noted that
" ... the most striking characteristic is the immense concen-
tration of power in the Governor-General, who in his sole
person represents the royal authority and who is responsible
for the conduct of affairs. Both in the legislation and in
administration, he is without serious rival and with few
checks in the Indies; the only serious limitation on his
power is that imposed by the government in the Netherlands
(thousands of miles and several months away)."[64]

"During the colonial period the fundamental objective
of the government apparatus remained essentially the same;
the maintenance of political, economic and social control.
Compliance was achieved either by using coercion or by an
implicit willingness to use it on the part of the colonial
regime."[65]

The advent of the Ethical Policy in the late 19th century caused, at least on the surface, some rather drastic changes in the colonial government. Supposedly, the Netherlands Indies government stopped being merely a control apparatus and became interested in advancing the welfare of the native population. Heretofore, any roads or irrigation works had been constructed for the maintenance of security and creating infrastructure for Dutch investment. The new emphasis created a "modern" administrative state charged with supplying all sorts of social services to the population. This emphasis allowed the creation of Dutch language schools and eventually, even medical, law and engineering colleges for the natives. Native political organization was tolerated as long as it was not too open in its criticism of the regime or Dutch colonialism. Thus, the Ethical Policy gave rise to the Western-educated but prijaji elite that was later to lead the independence movements.

However, after the end of the First World War, the Ethical Policy came to an abrupt end. Political organization was no longer so easily tolerated, although the expansion of education for Indonesians did continue both in the Indies and in the Netherlands. Even the Volksraad or People's Assembly, conceived at the height of the liberal Ethical Policy, became a mere functionless organ with no power and serving only as a somewhat restricted forum of criticism of the regime.

Paternalism remained the dominating policy in terms of inter-relations between the rulers and the ruled.

Several trends continued up to the Japanese invasion that made the later Dutch regime seem much like the Javanese regimes of old. The emphasis on security and control and complete subjugation of the natives remained. Java remained the center of colonial rule even though the "kraton" itself moved to Batavia. The Dutch called all territories outside of Java "the Outer Islands", emphasizing the Java-centric nature of the regime. While the traditional institutions of Javanese rule were gradually eroded and replaced by the colonial government, the replacement was also bureaucratic in nature and easily adapted to old status, operational and political norms by the prijaji. The role of the bureaucracy in society increased greatly, and its fused nature was gradually somewhat differentiated, but the major point was that Dutch Indies government and its personnel performed the same functions as Javanese government always had and essentially through the same sorts of structures, both institutionally and socially.

Ted Smith notes that "Indonesian public institutions, during approximately 250 years of Dutch control absorbed many continental bureaucratic norms. But the fact that the Dutch relied primarily on indirect rule meant that not as many of these norms were transferred as might be indicated by the long

duration of colonial control. Sultans and regents in Java and local princes in the Outer Islands continued their traditional style of rule, shaping it only to meet whatever demands might be imposed upon them by their colonial superiors. Moreover, very few natives were brought into the higher levels of Dutch East Indies bureaucracy."[66] This meant that despite the outward appearance of Western-style bureaucracy, Indonesians would possess no solid core of high administrators at independence like one found in the ICS (Indian Civil Service) and MCS (Malayan Civil Service) of British India and Malaya.

While the fundamental nature of government in the Netherlands Indies did not change substantially, it did allow and force other changes. One of the most obvious was the increasing numbers of poor peasants on Java. The over-population of Java was, is and will be one of the foremost influences on the future of the country. The traditional structure and its conservatism could not handle the large numbers of landless and virtually landless peasants. For these people in their increasing millions had no reason to be thankful for peace and order for they have nothing to lose in upheaval.

Javanese political culture was and is a non-participatory political culture. It and its government are at their greatest strength when the majority of the population is

parochial rather than even subjects.[67] There were no

structures, be they formal or informal, in "Javanism" to

handle mass politics and in fact, all of the cultural norms

of the intensely elitest society argue against them. The

colonial government had little to fear as long as the masses

remained parochials and unmobilized. Without mobilization of

the masses, the prijaji elite could never have gained

independence from the Dutch on any terms but those of the

Dutch. The Dutch knew their own interests in Indonesia well,

and anytime political organizations began to attract mass

followings, for whatever the reason, they were quickly

suppressed; their prijaji leaders sent into exile. The

Japanese, however, had no compunctions against such organi-

zation, and their style of agitative colonialism created the

exact tool that the prijaji needed to do battle with the

Dutch.

On the other hand, Dutch colonialism of the later

period did allow one kind of organization to penetrate the

masses. According to Benda, "by the end of the 19th century,

the Dutch has ceased to play a Javanese game (colonial rule

became more and more direct in Java); in spite of several

difficulties, they did not by and large interfere with the

growth of modern Muslim movements."[68] Without Dutch support

neither the traditional nor the modern Javanese elite groups

could stem the Islamic tide. The "modernist" Muslim movement

thus escaped initially the brunt of the syncretic tendencies of "Javanism" and made inroads in the Javanese heartland. Java became divided against itself: between the syncretists and the Islamic purists. The long Javanese accommodation with Islam came to an end.

Such were the continuities and changes in Javanese political culture and institutions and their bearers until independence was declared. The elite remained prijaji, the government remained security and control (or harmony) oriented while traditional society continued to disintegrate and Islam grew in strength. The changes meant that there could never be a neo-Mataram without the adoption of radically different structures to handle the new forces set loose in society. But this did not mean that such an attempt on the part of the prijaji elite was impossible or would not be tried.

NOTES on Chapter I

[1] For instance Samuel Huntington, <u>Political Order in Changing Societies</u>, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) and David Apter, <u>The Politics of Modernization</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

[2] Herbert Feith, <u>The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia</u> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

[3] Leslie Palmier, <u>Indonesia and the Dutch</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).

[4] Jan Pluvier, <u>Confrontations: A Study in Indonesian Politics</u> (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford in Asia, 1965) and David Levine, "History and Social Structure in the Study of Contemporary Indonesia," <u>Indonesia</u>, 1969, No. 7.

[5] Rex Mortimer, "Class, Social Cleavage and Indonesian Communism", <u>Indonesia</u>, 1969, No. 8.

[6] John D. Legge, <u>Indonesia</u> (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 169.

[7] This was essentially Legge's conclusion as well, but he failed to expand the idea. <u>Ibid</u>. p. 170.

[8] Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, <u>Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach</u> (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p.50. When the term political culture is mentioned, it usually conjures up thoughts of systematic attitudinal survey research, such as was used by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in the well known study <u>The Civic Culture</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). Such work is far beyond the scope of this study. Political Culture here is used to refer to the horizontal cleavages in Indonesian society between its major cultural groups and to a lesser extent, to refer to the vertical cleavage between the elite and mass political cultures. As such it is little more than a broad term or tool used to picture social cleavages in the political dimension. Since basic survey data was not available, this paper follows the traditional pattern of using historical evidence and to a lesser extent data on the composition of the Indonesian elite to make a number of inferences about the state of the contemporary political process. This paper is perhaps a good starting point for an Almond-Verba type study but should not be considered more than that.

[9] Clifford Geertz, "Afterword: The Politics of Meaning", in Claire Holt (ed.), Politics and Culture in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 319.

[10] This term is from Clifford Geertz (ed.) Old Societies and New States (New York: The Free Press, 1963).

[11] Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities", in Ruth McVey (ed.) Indonesia (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1963), p. 24.

[12] According to the 1930 Census, ethnic Javanese composed 47% of the population. There is some reason to believe that this figure has declined by several percent (2 or 3) since that date. Recent census are of no value in calculating ethnic percentages as they only give regional population figures, and the population is spread around considerably from the ethnic viewpoint.

[13] The 1930 Census revealed that 3.4% of the population was Minangkabau, 2.6% was Bugis, 2% was Batak and 1.88% was Balinese.

[14] Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1967) p.3.

[15] Herbert Feith, op. cit., p.30.

[16] Ibid., p.31.

[17] Ibid., p.31.

[18] Ibid., p.32.

[19] Clifford Geertz uses the term Great Tradition to distinguish aristocratic or prijaji tradition from that of the peasant (Little Tradition). See Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), p.348.

[20] For the best description of this movement see Deliar Noer, The Rise and Development of the Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia During the Dutch Colonial Period (1900-1942) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1963).

[21] The term santri is used for strict Muslims in Indonesia while abangan is used for those accepting Islam but retaining largely traditional beliefs as the main form of religion. The greater portion of Javanese peasants are regarded as abangan. The traditional Javanese upper classes who shared a similar view of Islam as the abangan peasants are called Prijaji (the "j"

is pronounced as a "y"). Robert Cruikshank, "Abangan, Santri, and Prijaji", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1972, Vol.III, No. 1.

[22] See footnote No. 21.

[23] For a good discussion of the PNI factions see J.E. Rocamora, "The Partai Nasional Indonesia", Indonesia, 1970, No. 10.

[24] Soedjatmoko, "The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia" in Phillip W. Thayer (ed.), Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1956).

[25] The term is from Huntington, op.cit., p. 256.

[26] Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-65 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970) p.14.

[27] For criticism on these points see Alfian, Masalah Mental, Aliran Politk dan Radikalisme dalam Masjarakat Indonesia (Mental Problems, Political Aliran and Radicalism in Indonesian Society) (Djakarta: Leknas, 1970), p.35.

[28] Daniel S. Lev, op.cit., p.77. kijaji is the word for a respected Muslim leader and Kesatria is the Javanese word for knight or soldier.

[29] Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968); B.J.O. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies Part II, (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1957); Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960); and Ben Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture", in Claire Holt (ed.), Politics and Culture in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972). Much of the content of these works is conveniently summarized in David Joel Steinberg (ed.), In Search of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1971).

[30] The terms structure, functions and style are only analytical categories or tools used to order the discussion of Mataram and, later in the paper, contemporary Indonesian politics. They are by no means mutually exclusive categories, and the discussion freely flows back and forth between them.

[31] Steinberg, op.cit., p.81.

[32] Ibid., p.83.

[33] Ibid., p.83.

[34] Ibid., p.84.

[35] Moertono, op.cit., p.5.

[36] Anderson, op.cit., p. 20

[37] Moertono, op.cit., p.92.

[38] Ibid., p.109.

[39] Ibid., p.93.

[40] Ibid., p.4 and p.83.

[41] Ibid., p.85.

[42] Ibid., p.95.

[43] Ibid., p.20.

[44] Geertz, op.cit., pp. 227-339

[45] Ibid., p.246.

[46] Ibid., p.241.

[47] Moertono, op.cit., pp.3-4.

[48] Ibid., p.26.

[49] Geertz, op.cit., p.328.

[50] Anderson does so with the qualification that Javanese do not have the word or concept of "power" in their vocabulary. Anderson, op.cit., pp.5-8.

[51] Moertono, op.cit., pp.53-54, Anderson, op.cit. p.25

[52] Steinberg, op.cit., p.85.

[53] Ibid., p.86.

[54] Ibid., p.148.

[55] Ibid., p.150.

[56] This point is made with some force in Robert Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1960), pp.27-9.

[57]The Ethical Policy was in a sense a reaction to the earlier open exploitation of the Indies and the disturbing reports received in The Hague that native welfare was rapidly declining. Education and modern health services were rapidly expanded to improve this welfare. For further discussion of this policy see Steinberg, op.cit., p. 188.

[58]Van Niel, op.cit., p.29.

[59]Ibid., p.50.

[60]Ibid., p.50.

[61]Ted Smith, The Indonesian Bureaucracy: Stability, Change and Productivity (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1971), pp. 224-25.

[62]Further data / are presented on the social origins of the contemporary elite in the section entitled "The Current Political, Military and Governmental Elite" in Chapter II.

[63]Geertz, op.cit., pp.371-73.

[64]Clive Day, The Dutch in Java (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965), p.414.

[65]Moertono, op.cit., p.5.

[66]Smith, op.cit., p.202.

[67]The terms parochial, subject and participant are used as defined by Almond and Powell, op.cit., p.53.

[68]Harry Benda, "Decolonization in Indonesia: The Problem of Continuity and Change", American Historical Review, 1965, Vol. LXX, No.4.

CHAPTER II

JAVANIZATION: HISTORY AND DATA

History, Politics and Javanization

Having drawn a cultural map of Indonesia's diverse
population, presented a model of traditional Javanese
aristocratic political culture and government, and looked at
the changing role of the bearers of that political culture,
let us examine recent Indonesian political history to see
if the Javanization of Indonesia and Indonesian politics, in
any sense, can be plausibly argued.

The Pre-Independence Period:

While the long and increasingly direct colonial contact
was hollowing out the institutions of social integration
in Java, Dutch colonialism was, with minor exceptions,
little concerned with the islands outside of Java. Only
about the time of the Ethical Policy did the Dutch turn
their attention to those areas. Even by Japanese occu-
pation the Dutch impact could only be considered heavy
in the East Coast Residency of Sumatra around Medan.[1]
In the Outer Islands it was Islam, rather than colonialism,
that had the greatest impact on the traditional system.

Partly because the de-traditionalization process
had gone further in Java than anywhere else in the archi-
pelago and partly because the only educational facilities
in the Indies were located there, Java became the center
of nationalist agitation in the Dutch East Indies. The

early 20th century saw the rise in Java of Budi Utomo,
Sarekat Islam, the PKI and the early Partai Nasional
Indonesia[2] as modern political organizations. Occasionally,
such organizations appeared about to become mass parties,
only to have the masses disappear with government oppo-
sition and exile of the prijaji party leaders. Today
it seems that any mass following of these youthful
organizations can be explained in terms of Javanese
messianic expectations of a Ratu Adil or Just Prince of
Deliverance.[3] Despite the ominous forebodings raised by
the Communist uprisings of 1926-27 and the tremendous
economic decline of the Indies during the Great Depression,
there were no outward signs of a decline in the Dutch
position at the time of the Japanese invasion: the mass
of the population remained passive.

During the Japanese occupation, the Indies were
divided into three separate regions; Sumatra was ruled
along with Malaya by a division of the Japanese army,
Java from Batavia also by the army and Eastern Indonesia
from Makassar by the navy. The governing policies
differed widely, and only in Java were the masses organized,
mobilized and to some extent trained in military matters.
Sukarno and other nationalist leaders were brought back
from exile to lead mass organizations. Due to the shortage
of Japanese administrative personnel, large numbers of

prijaji bureaucrats attained high posts previously
reserved for Dutch nationals. The Japanese, however,
chose to play a "divide and rule" game between the
nationalists and the emerging Islamic elite; inevitably,
the gap between the two continued to widen.[4]

The War for National Independence:[5]

Although a hesitant Sukarno declared Indonesia
independent on August 17, 1945, it was to take four years
of fighting before the Dutch were to recognize it as a
fact. The initial bursts of fighting were spontaneous
and occurred throughout Java and to a lesser extent Sumatra
largely out of the control of the prijaji elite that had
declared independence. In some areas social as well as
political revolution took place. The masses of Indonesia
who for so long had been passive and subjugated rose to
the call of "revolusi" or revolution. The most obvious
symbols of feudalism were destroyed as Sultans were
dethroned and in some cases killed.

Gradually, the situation was controlled by the
conservative prijaji-led central government, and the
elements favoring social revolution were isolated and
then destroyed. While the most obvious symbols of Dutch
colonialism were destroyed, by and large, the lower prijaji
simply moved up a few steps to the top of the administrative
hierarchy and continued a conservative negotiation-oriented

policy toward the Allies and then the Dutch. Despite Tan Malaka's revolt and the communist-led Madiun Affair[6] plus some opposition from the army and PNI, conservatives willing to make concessions to the Dutch were able, albeit somewhat precariously, to maintain their grip on central power.

During this period could be seen the first signs of a split between the military and civilian elite,[7] although for our purposes it could best be interpreted as a split between the bearers of Javanism and the bearers of the Islamic-entrepreneurial political culture. Basically, the Javanese dominated army and PNI were lined up against the Masjumi and PSI over negotiation and military strategy.[8]

The final phase of Dutch opposition to the creation of an independent Indonesia consisted of isolating the belligerent Republic,[9] whose strength was on the interior of Central and East Java plus several interior areas of Sumatra, in a large number of member states of a federal organization known as the BFO. Many members of the traditional Outer Island's elite who were more afraid of "Javanese imperialism" than the Dutch cooperated with the BFO.

In December 1949 the United States of Indonesia was formed. The Dutch, in the last round of negotiations, had

insisted on a federal form of constitution for the new nation as a condition for their recognition of independence. So, the Republic became just one of the 16 member states of the new federally organized country. While, in fact, this was probably the best structure for such a diverse archipelago and to guarantee the containment of "Javanese imperialism", it was also a structure designed to protect the interests of the Dutch. So repulsive was the idea of continued Dutch influence to the nationalists that all persons supporting the federalist form were branded as "feudal, colonialists, compradores." All nationalists, be they Javanese or non-Javanese, were forced to outwardly support the idea of a unitary republic, regardless of their inner feelings about the matter. Within six months the federal structure collapsed to be replaced by the unitary Republic of Indonesia in August 1950.

In summary, the decade of Japanese occupation and "revolution" ended with the creation of a unitary national state composed of the entire former Dutch East Indies except West New Guinea. However, the brunt of occupation and revolution had been borne by Java. The Javanese and the heartland of Javanese culture became far more mobilized, organized and nationally conscious than any other segment of the population. The feudal and administrative elites of the Outer Islands had been destroyed, discredited or

isolated by the so-called social revolutions in North
Sumatra and Atjeh[10] and participation in the BFO. With
the traditional elite virtually incapacitated,[11] the only
representatives of Outer Island culture remaining with
influence were associated with "purist" or "modernist"
Islam, an ancient enemy of Javanism; this was to prove
fatal.

Constitutional Democracy:

The state of Indonesia existed in name, but
objectively, in 1950, there was little more. There was
no all-Indonesia culture, society or political system.
The only real bonds of unity were the shared experiences
of the nationalist elite in their opposition to colonial
rule. The elite had a set of symbols: a motto, a flag,
an anthem and a "national" language which most found diffi-
culty expressing themselves in. The mass of society was
hardly in any way attached to these symbols.

Little thought, planning or action could be given to
the above problems, however, because of the chaos existing
at independence and the series of crises that engulfed
the Republic during the next decade. Almost immediately after
independence, the separatist RMS (Republic of South Moluccas)
rebellion broke out and was quickly followed by Darul Islam
(Islamic state) guerilla operations in South Sulawesi, Atjeh
and West Java.[12] Thus, Islam became associated with revolt,

rebellion and disunity; the revolts had to be crushed by force.

Credit must be given to the nationalist elite for their initial efforts and idealism. They probably wished to create a new national political culture that would be unique and distinct from all of the various national sub-cultures. They certainly overestimated their own unity operating under the unitary and parliamentary structure created in 1950. In the long run investments in the parliamentary system's infrastructure and operation of the political game under them could have had powerful effects on the development of attitudes for a truly national political culture; in a sense, they did but mostly negatively. For these new institutions quickly became battlegrounds for the society's differing political cultures in quite a literal sense.

The various aliran or social forces whose ideologies were to a large extent mutually exclusive became institu-tionalized in the party system. The functioning of the system seemed only to bring out the extremes in each aliran. All of the horrors so well described in Huntington's model of the praetorian society came true in Indonesia.[13] These struggles coupled with a great deal of self-interest and real economic grievances began to take on centrifugal tendencies with the flaring up of regional military coups

in 1956-57 and the advent of civil war in 1958. To state

the problem simplistically, there were no underlying

national unity factors that could neutralize the fissi-

parous tendencies allowed and even encouraged by the

newly adopted system.

The parliamentary process, before the elections of

1955, witnessed the division of the aliran into two

broad coalitions. The Java based parties repeatedly

allied to defeat or obstruct action desired by the Masjumi

and PSI whose leaders were either very Western-oriented

or "modernist" Muslims. The country's two largest parties,

the PNI and the Masjumi, gradually began to be estranged

and could not cooperate on even the simplest of programs.[14]

The 1955 elections re-affirmed that the PNI and

Masjumi were indeed the nation's largest parties; together

they controlled 114 of the 256 parliamentary seats. The

one and only parliamentary cabinet formed after the

elections was a coalition between the Masjumi, PNI and NU.

The PKI refused to play the role of opponent to the full

cabinet or its total policy. Whenever the coalition should

have been constrained because the Masjumi objected to PNI

and NU proposals, it was not: the PNI knew it could

count on the PKI's support and votes on the parliament

floor. Because of this problem and other similar ones,

the Masjumi ministers resigned from the cabinet. Shortly

afterward the minority cabinet declared the nation under

martial law and resigned.

Coinciding with these parliamentary developments,
several Outer Island military commanders revolted and made
coup d'etat in their command regions. The cabinet proved
unable to control the military or the situation. This
coupled with the resignation of the Vice President, a
Sumatran, and the flight of top members of the PSI and
Masjumi to Sumatra, led to the declaration of martial law.
The regional dissidents then demanded greater autonomy
and the restoration of government under the leadership of
former Vice President Hatta. With the denial of these
requests a rebel government was set up in Padang, West
Sumatra, and civil war ensued.

Java was almost denuded of troops as the Outer
Islands were invaded and occupied. The civil war was
effectively over in three or four months although the last
groups of rebels did not surrender until 1961.[15] Party
politics were banned in the army occupied areas, and with
martial law, the military became the virtual rulers in the
regions. Sukarno appointed a government that was not
responsible to the parliament, and suddenly, Indonesia's
experiment with Western-style democracy was over.

With the Constitutional Assembly deadlocked between
Islamic elements and Javanese plus Christians over the return
to the 1945 Constitution and Presidential rule, Sukarno

simply declared the return himself. In the process of the
civil war and the return to the 1945 Constitution (UUD45),
large numbers of the Outer Island's political and military
elite were discredited and ostracized from central politics.
Suddenly, through a long and involved historical process,
the overwhelming majority of the "legitimate" national
political and military elite were from one ethnic group,
the Javanese. The UUD45, originally written by a committee
of mostly Javanese, could then be more easily adopted.
As Ben Anderson put it, the UUD45 was much more culturally
comfortable for the Javanese elite.[16]

The civil war was not a separatist attempt.[17] The
members of the Indonesian political elite who participated
in it never questioned the unity of the Indonesian state.
They were simply trying to right the balance between the
Outer Islands and Java, or, in other words, attempting to
win by threats and force what they had lost in the political
battle at the center. Compromise was not the order of the
day for the military and the Javanese political parties
in 1958. With the military defeat of the revolts and
occupation of the Outer Islands by loyal Javanese troops,
the political front of the revolts collapsed also, and
simply reinforced the Javanese political victory at the
center. With the banning of the Masjumi and PSI in 1960
and the continuation of martial law, the "takeover" was
confirmed.

The basis of a new Indonesian culture and political
system was to be Javanese and assuredly non-Islamic(purist).
Those who disagreed were not allowed to participate in the
system, in the political game, a game that in reality was
to be played mostly by Javanese and Javanized actors. If
there were a continued struggle for ultimate victory, it
was only to see which of the variants of Javanism was to
win.

It must be admitted that the political events of
the 1950's were very complex. Certainly, the struggle
was not consciously viewed by many of the participants as
either a cultural or ethnic battle. However, the results
should be clear from the above arguments. Perhaps there
was not another alternative, given the legacies of colo-
nialism, within the confines of a single state, but one
would never realize it from the length or the intensity
of the struggle. Daniel S. Lev has summed up the situation
well in these words:

> ... the Java-Outer Islands problem comprised a
> complicated combination of social and cultural,
> as well as political and economic hostilities.
> These hostilities might best be summed up as the
> test of Java's real and inevitable domination of
> the archipelago. Javanese dominance rested on
> superior numbers, a more elaborate culture and the
> disunity of the other Indonesian ethnic groups.
> The Javanese elite saw in independence an oppor-
> tunity, as it were, to fulfill the ambitions and
> promises of Javanese civilization in the new
> national state, while the smaller and more parti-
> cularistic societies of the rest of Indonesia
> recoiled before the vision of their eventual
> subordination or assimilation in a Javanese
> dominated nation.[18]

Guided Democracy:

Martial law and the return to the UUD45 legitimized
the dominance of Sukarno and the army over the political
system. Along with the PKI whom Sukarno used to offset
the strength of the military, the major political actors
(Sukarno and the army) were strong representatives of
Javanism. While Sukarno was too much of a political
manipulator to exclude Outer Islanders from his government,
their numbers did decrease, and those present appeared to
be little more than symbols or tools for Sukarno's mani-
pulations of politics.[19] It must be admitted, however,
that national politics became more and more focused upon
Sukarno himself. The Javanese dominated parties played
little role in decision-making. A politician's power
depended on his closeness to the President rather than on
what party, organization or ethnic group he represented.

Under Guided Democracy, "the supra-local polity,
the national state, (shrunk) more and more to the limits
of its traditional domain, the capital city-Djakarta-plus
a number of semi-independent tributary cities and towns
held to a minimal loyalty by the threat of centrally
applied force."[20] With the collapse of the national
transportation system and the economy in general after
1958, the regions, especially those outside of Java,
became isolated from the national polity. The "victory"

of the Javanese was bearable because of the lack of actual
control by the Javanese-dominated center.

The conclusion of the initial phase of struggle for
control of national power had ended with the Javanese in
a dominant position but that did not mean an end to the
political struggle in Indonesia or an end to mass politics,
though there were no elections. The national state was
just as fragile as at independence, and even if the
Outer Island problem had been settled, there was no guar-
antee that problems of a similar nature might not arise
again. Besides, even "mother" Java was divided among
itself. As Ted Smith put it, Sukarno had to make concrete
investments in solidarity, legitimacy and stability.[21]
After making such investments, and they were a continuous
process, there was little capital of any kind left for
investment in economically productive schemes. With the
continuing decline in national welfare, the struggle for
position and scarce resources grew even more intense, but
the Outer Islands and "modernist" Islam were in no position
to actively participate in that struggle; it was nearly
a completely Javanese one.

"Most (Indonesian) parties suffer in varying
degrees from the tension of being ideologically on the
left but socially on the right."[22] This gap grew noticeably
wider during Guided Democracy and the President was as

"guilty" of it as the parties. While Indonesian politics
of the period / were awash on a flood of revolutionary

rhetoric and sloganeering, actual government policy was

very conservative, even status quo-oriented. Beneath the

rhetoric, the conflict narrowed into increasing tensions

between the radicals of the PKI and increasingly, the PNI

and the conservatives of Islam and the rural areas as well

as the military. At the center Sukarno could balance the

two, but open clashes in the countryside over land reform

and squatter's rights revealed a struggle much less

controllable. By late 1964 and early 1965 Sukarno no

longer appeared able to balance the opposing forces and

increasingly tended to side with the radical forces, at

least verbally.

At this point the radicals seem to have aimed a

very small amount of violence at their foremost conservative

rivals, the military, hoping to thereby shift the central

balance of power decidedly in their direction and speed up

a radical takeover of the government.[23] There was indeed

a dramatic shift of power but, for the instigators, in the

wrong direction. For the first time in a decade or more,

Islam and sections of the Javanese elite worked together

or at least, in parallel. The military, the conservative

civilian elite (bureaucracy), the non-communist intellectuals

and the Islamic masses combined in an informal coalition

that destroyed the radicals.[24] The PKI and eventually,

Sukarno were removed from the political spectrum.

The New Order:

With the outside or opposition pressures removed

that had created the coalition in the first place, the

so-called New Order coalition began to collapse. The

students, initially, and then the "modernist" Muslims

were isolated from power by the military. The military

slowly isolated its own elements that had sympathy with

or supported these two groups. The ruling coalition

became a group of Javanese generals allied with civilian

technocrats, also led by Javanese. The momentary glimpses

of political power for non-Javanese were replaced by

promises of a fairer division of national wealth.

Despite the modernization and development ideology of

the military-led New Order, Outer Islanders and particu-

larly "modernist" Muslims were not allowed political

influence and in some cases, not even room for political

maneuver. The New Order drifted into a "centrist"

Javanese-dominated regime.

In summary, it can be historically argued that

independence has witnessed a process of Javanization in

Indonesia. Only brief emergencies during the revolution

and after the 1965 coup attempt, known as the G-30-S,

have Outer Islanders played dominant or equal roles with

the Javanese. It does seem plausible that the game of
Indonesian politics can only be played by those elements
willing to subordinate themselves to Javanism. All
previous attempts to participate in politics in other
than Javanese terms have led to failure and eventual
isolation and destruction. Assimilation to Javanism is
a fact of life that all Indonesians must face.

The Current Political, Military and Governmental Elite

If indeed any of the previous historical arguments
have any validity, one would expect that Javanese and
representatives of the Javanese-aristocratic political
culture would be very numerous, even dominant, in the key
governmental and elite positions. This, in fact, does
seem to be the case. The Javanese hold governmental
positions to be of very high status value; consequently,
the entire bureaucracy has very large numbers of Javanese
in it.[25] For the purposes of national unity this dominance
has never been widely publicized and no exact figures are
available on the subject. Estimates made by some Indo-
nesian sources have put the figure as high as 90% of the
total[26] while a 1971 review of the 207 top office holders
in the central bureaucracy by Ted Smith revealed that 71%
of them were ethnic Javanese.[27] This author's calculations
concerning 154 of the same positions revealed that 64% of
the total were Javanese. However, by reviewing the top

positions[28] in the major Ministries of Interior, Foreign

Affairs, Justice, Information, Industry, Trade, Agriculture,

Communications, Public Works and Health showed that the

percentage had increased to 73%. Further, if only the

extremely important control ministeries of Interior,

Finance, Communications and Information are included the

figure is 84%. Not only are the top officials ethnic

Javanese but they are strongly upper class (or prijaji)

in social background.

A glance at the reconstituted Kabinet Pembangunan

or Development Cabinet reveals that only 13 of the 23

ministers are Javanese while 3 are Sundanese, 4 are

Sumatrans and 2 are from Eastern Indonesia. Thus 57% of

the cabinet are ethnic Javanese, but the important fact

is that Christians are over-represented in the remainder

(3 out of 10) and the Islamic political culture is vastly

under-represented (only 2 and perhaps 3 of the Ministers

could possibly be considered santri Muslims).[29]

The major socio-political force, aside from the

civilian bureaucracy, in central Indonesian politics is

the military which historically has Javanese origins and

cultural influences. The army claims to be the most truly

national organization in the country, and it probably

is.[30] Its original territorial organization was very

regional in content and its actual workings were highly

reflective of the center-outer provinces and over-seas

territories relationships described for Later Mataram.[31]
Each major region had its own troops and command structure;
in the 1950's it was very difficult for the center to
appoint non-natives of the regions as the _Panglima_ or
regional commander. The military was _de facto_ federally
organized. The collapse of the regional revolts and the
Javanese occupation was the beginning of the end of such
a set up, however. This type of organization was seen as
allowing the army to be infiltrated and used by political
parties, especially the PKI, as well as threatening the
unity of the state. The military then has constantly been
trying to strengthen its own organization since independence
and the process has gone rapidly ahead since the disposal
of its two major "enemies", the PKI and President Sukarno,
during the 1965-67 period.[32] This unifying process coupled
with the revolts, the G-30-S, and subsequent intra-military
conflicts have succeeded in reducing the "national-ness"
of the military, at least in an ethnic sense. With the
decline of the Siliwangi Division's influence in central
military circles,[33] the military has drifted more and more
towards a Javanese pole.

Polomka estimates that fully 75% of the officer
corps is Javanese.[34] As of October 1965 Javanese held
62% of the central and regional command posts; by April
1967 the figure was 65%; as of April 1969 it was 72% and

in October 1970 it was fully 80%.[35]

Hindley has noted that it is extremely rare for a
member of the officer corps to come from either the lower
classes or from the santri aliran (Islamic-entrepreneurial
political culture).[36] In her study of the contemporary
elite structure and factionalism in Indonesia, Ann Gregory
noted that 7 of the 20 leaders of the ethnic Javanese
Diponegoro Division (also Suharto's former division)
interviewed were connected through kinship to one of the
four Javanese palaces and that 29 of the 39 leaders inter-
viewed from the army's major divisions (Siliwangi,
Diponegoro and Brawidjaja) were from gentry or nobility
classes while only 2 had merchant social backgrounds and
none had peasant backgrounds.[37] Virtually the same
generalization can be made about the military as about
the civilian bureaucracy: the Javanese and Christians
are over-represented while the santri aliran is vastly
under-represented.

As political parties have become less and less
important in decision-making and the functioning of
government since the regional rebellions of the late 1950's,
there is little point in giving detailed ethnic data on
their central leadership structures. Some generalizations
are appropriate, however. The 1955 elections clearly
pointed out that the constituencies of the parties were to

a large extent regionalized with the NU, the PNI and the
PKI, each having their greatest strength in Java while the
Masjumi's greatest strength was in the Outer Islands.
The NU is a santri party and gained some Outer Island and
Islamic "modernist" supporters by default with the banning
of the Masjumi. Nevertheless, the NU remained dominated
by Javanese leaders. Most "modernist" Muslims hoped that
the creation of a new santri party in 1968 would give a
place in the political constellation to the same aliran
that the Masjumi had represented. Clearly this was the
intention of a large part of the PMI or Parmusi leadership
but the military was not willing to fully sanction such
an occurrence. The initial chairman of the party was
Javanese but a majority of the central leadership was non-
Javanese.[38] Had the party not been paralyzed by internal
conflict and outside intervention, it probably would have
provided "modernist" Muslims, especially Outer Islanders
with a political outlet and done very well in the 1971
elections.[39] The PNI still has a strong Javanese image
and sections of the civilian bureaucracy still have
inclinations towards it.[40]

On the surface, at least, the successor to the
political parties has been the army sponsored Functional
Groups (Golongan Karya or Golkar) which holds an over-
whelming majority of seats in the parliament and is somewhat

more representative of the actual power constellation in
the country at present than are the political parties.
Of the central structure including the Dewan Pembina or
Advisory Council and the Dewan Pimpinan or Leadership
Council having 34 members, 25 or 74% are Javanese while
five of the remainder are non-Javanese Christians.[41]
Golkar which is itself in and of the bureaucracy or state
apparatus, both civilian and military, only reflects the
data presented above on it. The Islamic-entrepreneurial
political culture is under-represented.

In considering the above statistics and generali-
zations, it must be remembered that it is the central
government or bureaucracy that is under consideration.
As Smith points out government in the regions below Level
II which includes the Kabupaten (Regency), Ketjamatan
(District) and Kelurahan (Village) levels is largely in
the hands of local inhabitants.[42] There are 26
administrative regions or provinces in Indonesia, of
which only 3 are ethnically Javanese. There are 17
military regions in the country and only 2 are ethnically
Javanese. Yet 8 of the 26 Governors (head of the Province
level administration) are Javanese and 12 of the 17
regional military commanders are ethnic Javanese.[43]
These positions are appointed by the Javanese dominated
central government. Obviously, provincial government is

not a provincial affair, at least ethnically and perhaps
culturally as well.

The above data points out a trend that has been
noted before in post-independence Indonesia: there is
a division of labor in the small non-agricultural sector
of the country among ethnic groups (and political cultures?).
The Javanese and the Christian minority have dominated the
bureaucracy and military while the representatives of the
Islamic-entrepreneurial political culture (especially
Minangkabaus, Muslim Bataks and Bugis) along with the
Chinese have been clustered in commerce. Javanese are
seldom found in commerce with the exception of fields in
which "governmental" connections are very important, such
as brokerage and importing. The opposite seems to be
true for representatives of the santri aliran; they are
seldom found outside of the Ministry of Religion if they
are in the government.

NOTES on Chapter II

[1] The Minangkabau area on the West coast of Sumatra around Padang could be considered another area of intense impact but for rather different reasons than the Medan area. Padang was not a plantation area like Medan. The areas of Ambon in the Moluccas and Minahasa in Northeast Sulawesi were also strongly affected by Dutch colonialism for they were the fabled "Spice Islands" that had brought the Dutch to the Indies in the first place. By the turn of this century, however, these two areas were only "back-waters".

[2] Budi Utomo or "Beautiful Endeavor" was a Javanese nationalist organization; Sarekat Islam initially was a santri-led organization but later H.O.S. Tjokrominoto, a prijaji, became its most famous leader; both the PKI and PNI were forerunners of the contemporaries of the same name.

[3] Sukarno's popularity among the Javanese masses has been interpreted in this way in Bernard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), passim; and the popularity of the Sarekat Islam is interpreted in this light in Van Niel, op.cit., Chap. II.

[4] The Dutch had followed a similar policy of separating the traditional and religious elite in the Outer Islands. See Noer, op.cit., passim.

[5] Indonesians fondly call the 1945-50 period the revolution but it more closely fits with the definition of a war for national independence given in Samuel Huntington, op.cit., p.264.

[6] On the Madiun Affair see George Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), Chap. VIII. Ben Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972) discusses the 1945-46 period in detail and concludes that Tan Malaka was purposely made a scape-goat and his "plot" fabricated in order to crush the "true" revolutionaries.

[7] Anderson, op.cit., Chap. VII.

[8] Kahin, op.cit., Chaps. VI and X and A.H. Nasution, TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia Djilid I (TNI: The Indonesian National Army) (Djakarta: Seruling Masa, 1968), passim.

[9] The name used by the Sukarno-led Indonesian government.

[10] See Kahin, op.cit., p.179; and R. William Liddle, Ethnicity, Party and National Integration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) p.54, on the "social revolutions" in Sumatra.

[11] Actually, one-half of the parliament of the unitary Republic was made up of former BFO parliamentarians. This caused no small amount of ill feeling on the part of radical nationalists who wanted to be rid of all Dutch influence. The "October 19, 1952 Affair" in which the army asked Sukarno to disband the parliament was allegedly caused by this. See Feith, op.cit., pp. 246-73.

[12] For details on all of the revolts see Nugroho Notosuanto, Sedjarah and Hankam (History and the Hankam) (Djakarta: Lembaga Sedjarah Hankam, 1968), pp.82-92.

[13] For a definition of a praetorian society see Huntington, op.cit., pp. 194-97.

[14] For an excellent account concentrating on these pre-election coalitions see Herbert Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet: A Turning Point in Indonesian History (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958).

[15] For full details on the civil war see Daniel Lev and Herbert Feith, "The End of the Indonesian Rebellions" Pacific Affairs, 1963, XXXVI, No.1.

[16] Ben Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture" in Calire Holt (ed.), Politics and Culture in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p.37.

[17] For this view see Mohammed Nawawi, Regionalism and Regional Conflict in Indonesia (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1968).

[18] Lev, op.cit., p.3.

[19] The number of non-Javanese in the cabinets of Guided Democracy decreased by 10% over the Constitutional Democracy Period. Akio Yasunaka, "Basic Data on Indonesian Political Leaders" Indonesia, 1970, No.10.

[20] Quoted in Liddle, op.cit., p.221.

[21] Smith, op.cit., p.23.

[22]Daniel S. Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia"
Journal of Southeast Asian History, 1967, Vol.8, No.1, p.60.

[23]For a lucid discussion on this point see Guy Pauker,
"The Gestapu Affair of 1965: Reflections on the Politics
of Instability in Indonesia", Southeast Asia, 1971, Vols.
1-2, No.1.

[24]On this coalition see Don Hindley, "The Alirans and
the Fall of the Old Order", Indonesia, 1970, No.9.

[25]It should be pointed out here that membership in the
Javanese ethnic group coupled with social background is the
only "proven" indicator of membership in the somewhat wider
group which I have called "Javanized". The socialization of
members of other ethnic groups is more difficult to provide
hard data on. The Christian minority, in my opinion, is
the most Javanized of any of the other segments of the
society.

[26]Smith, op.cit., p.26.

[27]Ibid., p.39.

[28]These positions are defined as being Minister,
Secretary-General, Director-General and Inspector-General.
The source used for the calculations was O.G. Roeder,
Who's Who in Indonesia (Djakarta: Gunung Agung, 1972)
pp. 521-30.

[29]For a list of the new cabinet members and their
backgrounds see Pedoman, September 10, 1971.

[30]For further comments on this point see Harsja Bachtiar,
"The Legitimacy of the Indonesian Military as a National
Institution" in Kejakinan and Perdjuangan, (Djakarta:
Gunung Mulia, 1972). Bachtiar does not consider the
isolation of the Siliwangi Division from power in his
analysis which is a tremendous drawback.

[31]See the section of Chapter I entitled "Government and
Politics in a Javanese Political Culture: Later Mataram"
for this discussion.

[32]For an excellent discussion of the "tightening up"
process inside of the military see Ruth McVey, "The Post-
Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army,"
Indonesia 1971-72, Nos. 11 and 13.

[33]The Siliwangi whose regional area is West Java has long had the reputation of being the most "national" of all the army's divisions. Non-Sundanese have frequently been Panglima or Commander of Siliwangi while non-Javanese have never commanded the Diponegoro and Brawidjaja Divisions which are ethnic Javanese divisions. Siliwangi was closely associated with the so-called "radicals" of the New Order and highly influenced by ideas of democratic socialism. It had especially close links with former PSI members.

[34]Peter Polomka, Indonesia Since Sukarno (Victoria, Australia: Penguin, 1971), p.79.

[35]These figures were calculated from "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite" Indonesia, 1967, 1969 and 1970; Vols. 3, 7 and 10. The final figure was valid for after the major military re-organization of October 1969. The number of central positions dramatically increased at that time and may somewhat account for the large percentage increase of Javanese. It is worthy of note that only 3 Sundanese (about 5%) were in this final calculation while there were 26% of the 1967 figure and 20% of the 1965 figure.

[36]Hindley, op.cit., p.27.

[37]Ann Gregory, "Factionalism and the Indonesian Army", Journal of Comparative Administration, 1970, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 344.

[38]K.E. Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970), p.38.

[39]For details see Allan Samson's articles, "Islam and Indonesian Politics" Asian Survey, 1968, Vol. VIII, No. 12; and "Army and Islam in Indonesia" Pacific Affairs, 1971-2, Vol. XLIV, No.4.

[40]On this see Smith, op.cit., p.54.

[41]Tempo, July 31, 1971.

[42]Smith, op.cit., p.138.

[43]These were calculated from Sinar Harapan, July 1, 1972.

CHAPTER III

JAVANISM AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

The Structure of Indonesian Government

In early 1959 the Indonesian Constitutional
Assembly was hamstrung over the motion to return to the
1945 Constitution (UUD45) and abandon the parliamentary
form of government used since the time of the proclamation
of the unitary republic in 1950. Three votes on the
return to the UUD45 failed by narrow margins to receive
the necessary two-thirds majority. In July of that year
Sukarno by Presidential Decree ordered the return to the
UUD45, and the action was later unanimously approved by
the parliament which had been elected in 1955.[1]

The UUD45 acknowledges the sovereignty of the
people and calls for a Super-Parliament (MPR) to choose
the President and set the course of state policy.[2] The
President would appoint a cabinet of his own choosing
and hold office for a period of five years.[3] The President
would be responsible to no one except the MPR which was
not required to meet more often than once in five years
itself. One-half of the MPR membership was to be composed
of the entire single house parliament (DPR). The remainder
of the members were to be "delegations from the regions
and groups".[4] The UUD45 does not mention political

parties by name and the term golongan or group has been
interpreted to mean political parties and other social
groups who are not necessarily political in nature.[5]

The return to the UUD45 was outwardly seen and
spoken of as a solution to the problem of instability in
Indonesia. Inwardly the readoption of the UUD45 was a
way of making formal and informal norms about government
and power coincide. The strong executive was simply a
reflection of the nature of social relationships in Javanese
society. On the other hand, even the new constitution
contained formal concepts of the sovereignty of the people
and representation which had no counterpart in the organi-
zation of power relations in the society. This is perhaps
why these provisions of the UUD45 have been most often
ignored or handled in a manner inconsistent with the
intent of the formal document without severe social or
political repercussions.[6]

The UUD45 has become an uncriticizable and almost
sacred part of Indonesian government since its readoption
(under both Guided Democracy and the New Order), but
even to this present time political behavior does not
closely correspond with the formal norms set forth by the
document except for the position of the executive. If we
reflect on our earlier description of government in Old
Mataram, a similarity will be noted immediately. The

importance of the formal structure of the government was
to reflect harmony with the cosmos while actual political
behavior depended on other norms. This same gap between
theory and practice seems to be still present. Perhaps
the reasoning for the outward appearance has changed
somewhat; today world cultural norms demand that every
government, no matter whether its actual functioning be
close or far from the statement in practice, declare the
sovereignty of the people and the "democratic" nature of
its rule. This is a kind of harmony with the cosmos also.
The Ruler:

The country has had two Presidents, both of whom
were Javanese.[7] Neither of the two were appointed to their
posts by a popularly elected MPR.[8] In fact, the MPR that
gave Sukarno the title of President for life was entirely
appointed by Sukarno himself.[9] Suharto was appointed full
President by an MPR that had been purged of all real
opposition, the replacements subjected to investigation
and approval by the government before they could take
their seats and additional appointments made by Suharto.[10]
In fact, there was no election of a DPR or MPR under the
UUD45 until some 13 years after its reintroduction.

Sukarno actually proclaimed himself to be the
"people's tongue" which placed him above all others in
the state; for in Sukarno's own words he was the sole

interpreter of the people's wishes. The late President
acted as if this were indeed the case and almost all
decisions of state, no matter how large or how small,
passed through his hands to be rubber-stamped by the
Sukarno appointed DPR. The one direct affront to his
wishes -- the DPR rejected his budget proposals in 1960 --
resulted in the disbanding and replacement of that body.
Since General Suharto's election as full president in 1968
there has been no open challenge by the DPR to any policy
that he has put forward, nor is there likely to be any.
On several occasions political parties have expressed their
dismay at some of the government's actions but stated
quite simply what the President wants, the President gets.
In reality there is no outside control over the President,
whether it be formal or informal.[11] Despite the constitu-
tional prescription, authority and legitimacy seem to be
derived from other sources.

Since the country seems to have no tested device
for Presidential change, this raises the question as to
how a ruler acquires legitimacy in Indonesia. Several
answers seem possible in the case of Sukarno. Undoubtedly
he could have won an openly contested race for the position
if he had chosen to do so. He was the most outstanding
figure of the nationalist movement and somehow managed
to appear to be above all of the partisan political struggles

of "constitutional democracy". On the other hand, Bernard Dahm has attributed a part of his popularity and legitimacy to rather traditional sources like the "Ratu Adil" (Just Prince) legends of the Javanese and Sundanese.[12] This theory seems somewhat confirmed by the fact that Sukarno was definitely more popular among Javanese than any other ethnic group and that his ideologizing was definitely more worshipped there than any other place in the archipelago. It is possible that Sukarno was seen as rescuing the realm from one of those periods of waning power and increasing disturbance; accumulating power at the center again. Power may simply have appeared to have flowed to Sukarno because of his great concentration. As Anderson notes, Guided Democracy was a very powerful state in the traditional sense of the word, but it is doubtful if Sukarno and the mass of Javanese ever realized that it was not in the modern sense.[13]

Suharto is more difficult to picture in this perspective because of the Western-style cloak he has drawn around his regime. He too is probably more popular among Javanese than other groups. Also Suharto accumulated power at the center and saved the country after a period of chaotic drifting and waning of central power. For Javanese audiences, the relationship of Suharto's wife to the central Javanese royal house of Mankunegara has carefully been

emphasized.[14] The New Order too is a powerful state in
traditional terms and despite vigorous claims,has yet to
prove it is in the modern sense. The simple fact that
Suharto was able to defeat Sukarno without noticeable
effort on his part seems to have been enough of a sign of
legitimacy for him to maintain power initially.[15]

The New Order regime has criticized Sukarno greatly
for his "deviations" from the UUD45, but other than super-
ficially seems in no great hurry to make its own actions
conform to it to the letter either.[16] While neither of
the two UUD45 regimes has been totalitarian, if such is
even possible in Indonesia, they have been highly authori-
tarian and heavily centralized in the decision-making sense.
The executive seems to have absorbed the rule-making and
rule adjudication functions in addition to its own rule-
application functions.[17] This concentration of power and
the absence of checks upon it clearly resembles the nature
of the theoretical power of Mataram's god-king, even if it
is cloaked with modern day constitutional ornamentation.[18]

The Ruler's Assistants:

There are almost no elected posts of consequence in
the country outside of the Kepala Desa or Lurah (village
headman) and the DPR members.[19] The regional and
kabupaten parliaments or DPRDI and DPRDII have only been
elected once under the UUD45 (in July 1971) with the

remainder of the time being appointed and have very
little power within the framework of the unitary state.
All regional governors and military commanders are
appointed from the center. Under Sukarno the military
tried with some success to keep control of military
appointments, but with a military man like Suharto as
President both civilian and military posts in the regions
are controlled by the President.

As prescribed by the constitution, the cabinet is
appointed by the President. In the absence of open
competitive politics during Guided Democracy, Sukarno
used cabinet positions for rewards to his faithful
followers and parties that would support his policies.
This process got so far out of hand that in the last cabinet
that Sukarno was in full control of appointments there were
100 ministers. It proved just as hard for Sukarno to mani-
pulate the military at the center as in the regions and he
had great difficulty in controlling internal appointments.
The late President was able to replace General Nasution, an
arch rival, with Achmad Yani, considered at the time to
be more pliable, as Chief of Staff of the Army.[20] Suharto
too does not seem to mind using the cabinet as a reward
base -- though even this apparently is decreasing[21] -- but
still has managed to keep it to a reasonable size.
Manipulation of military personnel does not present too

much of a problem to President Suharto. Initially this
may have been the case but the Suharto faction is clearly
in control now. His men sit in all of the important
military positions and he has been able to appoint personal
friends as the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force and Navy
as well as the Army.

In addition to the cabinet, the military and
regional governors posts, President Suharto also directly
appoints a series of Inspector Generals(12), Secretary
Generals(27) and Director Generals(62) to ministries and
their departments in order to strengthen his influence in
the bureaucracy and obviously, increase control by having
friends there on the inside.

One further point has been consistent between the
two Presidents: that being the presence of a palace clique
or golongan istana. In Sukarno's day such people as Adit,
Charul Saleh and Subandrio assumed far greater roles in
decision-making than their official positions warranted.
Despite the advertized influence of the "technocrats" ---
who now sit at cabinet level positions --- Suharto has had
his special group of advisors and assistants from the
beginning of his rise to power. These men who without
exception are military have the official title of ASPRI or
private assistant to the President for certain fields such
as economics and special operations. Men like Ali Murtopo,

Sudjono Humardani and General Surjo have assumed some of

the functions that the bureaucracy was intended to handle

and in many cases their advice outweighs that of a minister.[22]

Despite New Order criticisms of the "cult of the

personality", it is very clear that power and position in

the new regime also heavily depend on personal relation-

ships with the ruler. While Suharto has been very astute

in his choices of highly qualified personnel for cabinet

posts, such qualifications seem mush less important in

other areas, particularly personal advisors and assistants.

Like Mataram, the ruler's control over his Outer Provinces

depend to a large degree on personal relationships and, of

course, in the last instance on force. Suharto has drawn

freely from his old friendships of the Diponegoro and

Mandala commands and this practice is unlikely to abate

in the near future.[23]

The Masses:

Political organization in the modern sense of the

word, whether it be among the elite or masses or sub-groups

thereof, is a relatively new phenomenon in Indonesia. At

best all such organizations' relationship to the government

during the colonial era was ambiguous, if not outright

illegal. During the revolution[24] and the initial period

of "constitutional democracy", the relationship of legally

organized political parties to the government was clear.

The strength and closeness to power of a party depended
on its number of representatives in the parliament which
theoretically, at least, was determined by popular
elections. Each of the major political parties had mass
organizations or ormas affiliated with it in the form of
Trade Unions, Peasant Unions, and Student Clubs. One
parliamentary election (1955) and one election for regional
assemblies were held under this system. The political
organizations came to realize that the way to win under
such a system was mass organization and mobilization for
numbers would count more than personal relations in
determining the party's closeness to power and rewards.[25]

Under the UUD45 the relationship of political
organization, specifically political parties, to the
government lapsed into an ambiguous state again and has
remained that way ever since. The President has never
been a member of a political party and, indeed, formal
politics outside of the palace itself have become
increasingly irrelevant to the system. Numbers were not
and are not as important as being close to the center of
power. The leadership of political parties has stagnated
except for forced or manipulated changes by the govern-
ment,[26] and younger political figures became involved in
mass organizations.[27] In outward appearance politics of
Guided Democracy were a series of challenges by the PKI

and radicals and reactions by the threatened conservatives
over issues like land reform and squatter's rights. Even
this limited measure of public politics has been removed
from the legitimate sphere of political activity for
political organizations under the New Order.[28] Politics
in any form has become more and more of an internal govern-
ment, and particularly army, affair-bureaucratic politics
of a sort.

Since the beginning of the pressures for the return
to the UUD45, the issue of the composition of the DPR and
MPR has been under discussion. The political parties with
their own interests in mind naturally felt that they had
the right to control such bodies, but the UUD45 did not
specifically mention the point. The army put forward the
idea of functional groups as part of the golongan, golongan
listed in the constitution as they would be legally
recognized as a political force in doing so. Sukarno
accepted this idea as it fit well with his concept of
national harmony through representation of all groups,
and he pushed for a DPR composed of one-half functional
groups and one-half political parties. This proposal was
not accepted by the parties, and eventually, Sukarno backed
away from the issue,[29] although he chose not to appoint any
of his political rivals to the DPR or MPR. As had been
hoped for, the military gained access to the cabinet, DPR
and MPR through the return to the UUD45. The initial ABRI

contingent was 35 but this had been expanded to 75 by the time of the 1971 DPR elections.

Before the advent of the 1971 elections the military revived the idea of a Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups, called at that time Sekber Golkar, to combat the elections against the parties.[30] Golkar is avowedly non-political with only an ideology of modernization and development. From the military's point of view Golkar functioned perfectly in the elections by winning 63% of the votes and 236 of the 360 elected seats. The nearest political party received only 18% of the vote and 58 seats.[31] After the elections Golkar held a working congress in which it made 21 formal decisions concerning the program it wanted to implement and they corresponded nearly 100% with ABRI wishes.[32]

Despite the fact that Golkar controls the DPR and later will control the MPR, it is not at all clear that it controls the government.[33] In fact we have already seen that the real center of power in the present government, both formally and informally, does not lie with the parties or functional groups but elsewhere. This is in a sense why the 1971 elections were so fruitless for political parties. For no matter how many seats any individual party won, it would not be any closer to actual power than before the election.

At the present time the government is preparing a bill on
the simplification of political parties and their organi-
zation to present to the DPR. This bill is expected to
force the fusion of the nation's 9 legal political parties
into two and eliminate all party organization below the
kabupaten level. This later concept is known as the
"floating mass" and envisions no permanent political
organization at the village level. According to the
philosophy behind this measure, political conflict is
to be removed from the village and only once in every 5
years will the people be allowed to participate in political
action through casting ballots for the party or Golkar of
their choice.

In practice demands and allocation of resources
are not made in the DPR. They are made through personal
relations and connections. Rosihan Anwar described
Indonesian political parties, not as devices for aggregating
and articulating group interests, but as platforms for
expressing the identity of the self within the stratifi-
cation of the political community.[34] Is Golkar anything
more than this also? The elimination of party structures
in the villages make it difficult to see how, but perhaps
the functional organizations within Golkar will eventually
be able to place demands on the system. At any rate with
the elimination of village political organization, the

existing political parties will probably be emasculated
in the next election with Golkar deriving the benefit.

While many historical and political arguments can
be put forward in defense of or against the emerging
system, it is difficult not to notice that the Western
concept of the role and functions of political parties
and organizations do not necessarily apply to the Indo-
nesian scene. The proper sphere of legitimate political
conduct compares favorably with that of Mataram. There
are new organizations, but the results seem the same.
The ruler through his bureaucracy governs and makes
decisions which are theoretically for the good of the
people.[35]

The Center-Periphery:

While Indonesia's geographic and ethnic hetero-
geneousness seem to call for some type of federal arrange-
ment for the national government, like Britain, Indonesia
is officially a unitary state. In 1957 the last
parliamentary cabinet passed a far reaching decentralization
law which would have allowed meaningful governmental
institutions in the regions with financial powers and
substantial freedom from central interference in selecting
regional governmental officials.[36] With the advent of
Guided Democracy, the emphasis shifted back in the other
direction and most of the 1957 law was changed or forgotten.

The regionally elected <u>Kepala Daerah</u> (Regional Head) was
reabsorbed into the central bureaucracy and appointed
governors made the order of the day. Today the local
DPRD's have no meaningful power in legislative or
financial matters. The central government collects
98.6% of all tax revenues and the regional governments
exist on allotments from the center whether they be in
the form of direct subsidy or ADO returns.[37] In July of
1966 the IV MPRS session passed a resolution calling for
the government to increase regional autonomy within three
years but up to this time the government has not acted.
All meaningful decisions concerning provincial development
allocations in addition to normal budget allocations are
still made at the center. Ted Smith notes that even when
a governor or <u>bupati</u> possesses the theoretical power to
take independent initiative on development projects, he
never has the financing or financing power to support the
effort.[38]

Despite the fact that the Outer Islands contribute
about 80% of Indonesia's exports, and Indonesia's economy
is an export economy, Java remains the center of the
country. It has been estimated that around 60% of all of
the money in circulation in the country is circulating in
Djakarta alone. Outer Island transportation systems in
general are equivalent to Java's 30 to 40 years ago.

The economic imbalances that contributed to the regional
revolts of 15 years ago still exist. A government post
outside of Java is considered sort of a demotion to the
jungles by many civil servants. Any policy that called
for the relative neglect of Java for development purposes
in the Outer Islands would simply be impossible for any
Javanese dominated government to consider seriously.
Although government attitudes and policy under the New
Order are considerably fairer to the regions than before,
the situation is far from ideal. Suharto himself
expressed a common Javanese opinion towards the other
regions when as _Panglima_ of the Diponegoro Division in
1957, he pointed out that any appeasement of the dissidents
in Sumatra and Sulawesi as perverse partiality. He said
that the 54 million people of Java would feel unjustly
treated should the government relax its development efforts
there in order to permit the obstreperous regions to
catch up.[39]

There seems to be an obvious _negara agung-mantja
negara_ comparison still existing in Indonesia. There is
a continual struggle to maintain the central structure and
power at the center. Any autonomy for the outer regions
could encourage dissidence and lead to the waning of central
power. The modern concept of the state does not quite
seem to fit: it is hard for a Javanese to consider a Dayak

village off in the wilds of Kalimantan on equal terms with
the thousands of Javanese villages he sees around him.[40]

The Functions of Indonesian Government

The two regimes under the UUD45 have been very
different in several ways. Sukarno was very skillful in
the manipulation of political symbols and almost deified
himself in the process as the symbol of the state; during
this time his regime neglected in fact most of the policies
that it espoused except confrontation e.g. sandang-pangan
(food and clothes for the people). On the other hand, the
New Order under the leadership of Suharto has expressed
itself in more mundane ways with an emphasis on stability
and economic development even though the same kinds of
ideological symbols are still there but in a somewhat less
prominent position.[41] With such a drastic shift in emphasis,
at first glance, it might seem very difficult to detect any
underlying common roots, but as our previous analysis of
political history points out, the former regime was much more
influenced by mass politics than is the present one and
this in itself is probably enough to account for a large
portion of surface differences. The internal workings and
the functions carried out by the two regimes may not, however,
turn out to be all that different. If this is true, some
comparisons with Mataram may also be appropriate.

Harmony through Control, Security and Stability:

The mass of ideology and symbolism used by Sukarno
has been well discussed by Feith and Weatherbee,[42] but some
facets of the maze are worth pointing out here. From the
beginning of his political career Sukarno never stopped
expressing what he felt was the essential unity and harmony
of Indonesian society. Bernard Dahm has shown the development
of Sukarno's NASAKOM policy was not new but followed consis-
tently by him from the late 1920's until his death.[43]
Sukarno analyzed Indonesian society as having three main
currents -- nationalism, religion(Islam) and communism --
which were syncretically blended into compatible ideologies
by Indonesians. He proclaimed himself to be all three at
the same time. When his pre-war PNI fractured and split
because of differences between these very ideologies,
Sukarno also quit party life and never rejoined a party.
His drive was syncretism and expressing unity. In October
1945 Sukarno could push for the creation of a single party
system but Vice President Hatta was the one who had to
decree that more parties could be created only a few days
later. Sukarno evidently honestly believed that a multitude
of parties divided the people. In 1956 he asked the people
to "bury the parties"[44] and later unveiled his Konsepsi
that if accepted would solve the problems of a weak
government. He proposed that all parties be represented

in a Gotong-Rojong (Mutual Help) cabinet and that all
decisions be taken in the traditional Indonesian manner
of musjawarah or consensus. Later after events had
propelled the country towards a return to the UUD45,
Sukarno still expressed his antagonism towards parties as
such. He tried to create a National Front in which all
groups were represented. He ever strived to create a DPR
and MPR that reflected his conception of the unique harmony
of the Indonesian people. He felt government could be run
without opposition and taking votes. According to Indo-
nesian tradition, Soekarno said, there were no losers and
no tyranny of the 50% + 1 majority.[45] Anyone or any
party who could not agree with this expression of true
"Indonesian-ness", then were no longer Indonesians but
outside influenced. In this way the Masjumi and PSI
committed suicide. They could not even superficially agree
with the Konsepsi and Guided Democracy, so they were banished
from the system. On the other hand, the military and the
PKI were probably equally opposed to portions of Sukarno's
plan for expressing and returning to the Indonesian
identity, but by verbally agreeing to it were allowed to
survive and at least covertly oppose the parts of the new
system that they did not like. At least in some respects
Donald Levine's statement about Amhara political culture
in Ethiopia seems relevant to the elements of Javanese

culture that Sukarno was calling Indonesian culture, and
to some extent what Suharto still expresses, when he said:
"In authoritarian relationship -- and again all political
interaction among the Amhara is contained within authori-
tarian relationships -- there are only three alternatives:
complete deference, acquiescence and flattery;   criticism
by devious and covert means;   or outright rebellion".[46]

According to Anderson "The NASAKOM formula tended
to be seen either as irresponsible and intellectually
incoherent slogan or as a subtle device for weaking the
anti-communist prejudices of powerful nationalist and
religious groups.   Such interpretations however, failed
to place the NASAKOM-politique within the context of
Javanese political thinking.   In his orientation, Sukarno's
formula could be interpreted not as a compromise or strategem,
but as a powerful claim to possession of power by the ruler.
For he alone was whole, sembada, absorbing all within
himself, making the syncretic conquest".[47]

For Sukarno and the New Order a powerful syncretic
tool or symbol, in addition to the UUD45, was the
Pantjasila.[48]   This doctrine became the basis of the
Indonesian state.   Its adoption assures the Javanese as
well as religious minority groups that their fundamental
belief systems are protected from "religious and cultural"
imperialism by Islam or any other monoistic and monopolistic

doctrine. Under Sukarno <u>Pantjasila</u> yielded the center-
stage to NASAKOM and MANIPOL but under the New Order has
once again risen to its central role again. Today
Indonesia is proclaimed as struggling to achieve Pantjasila
Democracy. It also tends to be a broadly syncretic
doctrine that clearly pictures the Javanese world view
more than it does any other part of Indonesian society.
Its lack of concreteness and flexibility, however, is
undoubtedly needed in a diverse country like Indonesia.
Suharto himself has stated that he believes harmony is
value in his culture (Javanese?) that is very real, both
harmony between man and society and man and god.[49] On
another occasion the President said "we have to strive to
cultivate harmony in the life of our society and feel calm
in the developing of the noble cultural values that are in
harmony with our people".[50] So the Nasakom formula exploded
with G-30-S but was promptly replaced by the Pantjasila
Doctrine as first state symbol. The declarations of the
basic "one-ness" of Indonesian society have not disappeared,
only a new enemy has been added to the list.

The New Order government identifies three enemies of
the people who are called <u>golongan tertentu</u> or fixed groups.
They are the <u>golongan ekstrim kiri</u> (extreme left-communists),
<u>golongan ekstrim kanan</u> (extreme right-proponents of an
Islamic state) and <u>golongan liberal</u> (liberal-proponents of

a return to parliamentary democracy).[51] These disturbers
of harmony are seen as very small groups who are determined
to impose their concept of society upon the majority.
New Order supporters claim that their victory over the
PKI shows clearly the people support Pantjasila. On the
other hand it is interesting to note that government by
either of the three enemies of the state would most likely
mean an end to prijaji and Javanese elite rule. Harmony
in its present day meaning also has status quo connotations
attached to it.

Harmony as a value is of very little use unless a
ruler can control and guarantee security in his society
for its implementation or continuation.[52] The chief
problem is whether harmony is seen as an end in itself or
a means to an end. Sukarno probably never saw the
difference in the two concepts, but he was very much
interested in control. All figures who would not submit
to his ideological version of the state were quickly
silenced. Hence the PSI and Masjumi were banned and most
of their leaders imprisoned or exiled. The same fate was
suffered by the Democratic League in 1960,[53] the Body for
the Promotion of Sukarnoism in 1964,[54] and the Murba Party
in 1965.[55] Various newspapers were closed and their
editors harrassed;[56] even the PKI's publishing organs
were restricted from time to time if they strayed too far

from the official line. The PNI, previously considered
the party closest to the President, lost an independent
political life apart from echoing the President's wishes.
The NU also cooperated without hesitation. Even the PKI
submitted to his control to the point that one American
political scientist wrote about the "domestication of the
PKI".[57] As already mentioned the DPR and MPR proved no
problem in manipulating and no elections were ever held.
The decentralization law was reversed and Sukarno appointed
the governors in addition to his already enormous
appointive power at the center.

On the other hand, the President was constantly at
odds with the military which should have been his most
potent tool of control. The army had developed substantial
political doctrine in addition to concrete political
interests of its own. It was not willing to be the
absolute tool of someone it did not completely trust.
Sukarno was extremely upset over the lenient policy of
the military towards the military participants in the
regional revolts and the banning of the PKI in several
regions in 1961 by the military martial law commanders.
After the repeal of martial law in 1963, Sukarno was able
to exert more leverage and was able to replace his long
time enemy General Nasution.

Probably until the end of his regime he believed

that he could manipulate the PKI to his own advantage.
He was clearly on the way to securing a stronghold in the
military (as was the PKI) at the outbreak of the G-30-S.[58]
He was attempting to de-politicize the bureaucracy to
insure its loyalty, and all open opposition (i.e. threats
to harmony) had disappeared.

As Pluvier noted in 1965,[59] despite all of the
radical rhetoric, the Sukarno regime was essentially a
conservative one, although that might have changed had the
G-30-S succeeded. The one big attempt by the PKI to
strike at the status quo through land reform actions
revealed a solid coalition of conservative forces that
retaliated to the point of causing severe instability in
the countryside. Sukarno asked the PKI to back down and
it did. Despite verbal attacks on the bureaucratic
capitalists, (read military managing nationalized firms)
nothing was ever done about it. While the call of return
to the tracks of the revolution and Indonesian socialism
filled the air, domestically the Sukarno regime was less
than radical. It simply was incapable of maintaining a
coherent and sustained program of any kind in any direction.
Harmony through control was the practice, but its effective-
ness was so low that Sukarno could not prevent the G-30-S,
if he even wanted to, or the military-led retaliation.

The New Order and Control:

Initially, the New Order government and most civilian intellectuals as well tended to see the weakness of Indonesia's political system as caused for the most part by the presence of ideologically oriented -- as opposed to program oriented -- political parties. In the army seminar in Bandung in 1966, the basic New Order program in the fields of economics and politics was mapped out. The cure for the ills of the political system was quite naturally seen to be best and most easily implemented through the framework of the UUD45 and Pantjasila Democracy.[60] Basically, what was proposed from the diagnosis was as follows: 1) a program oriented nation-wide two party system, as only through that type of party system could the UUD45 Presidential system work properly; 2) an electoral system based on districts with the winner-take-all mechanism rather than proportional representation and 3) low central control over candidate selections in the districts.[61] At that time it was thought that these proposals were widely accepted by even the military and that coupled with the MPRS decision that year to hold elections in 1968, they would be implemented as soon as possible. It turned out that the individuals who felt that way were small in number and eventually came to be known as the New Order "radicals"

which in the army part of the coalition was centered around the Siliwangi Division. Although some attempts at implementation of a two party or Two-Group system was tried in West Java, the core of the New Order coalition, Suharto and the Javanese generals around him, evidently withdrew their support from the proposals. The "radicals" gradually slipped into the background as did the idea of political reform. Electoral proposals were submitted to the DPR by the government calling for a single member constituency system but they were later withdrawn in the face of political party opposition.[62] The elections bill that finally was passed by the DPR was a proportional system still giving the central party headquarters complete control over candidate choice. The voters would cast their ballot for the party and not the man.

Given the fact that political parties were seen as the major disturbers of harmony and the creators of social division, it is not surprising that the policies and actions of the New Order have been highly detrimental to their strength and even existence.[63] Initial efforts by the new government to purge all parties of Old Order elements -- Sukarnoists and leftists -- was welcomed by most of the elite. This led to the banning of the PKI and later of Partindo as well as the expulsion of the radical wing of the PNI from the party. The government initially allowed

the creation of a new Muslim party but so restricted its

actions that it failed to develop and later a split was

sanctioned by the government with the appointment of a

cabinet member and close friend of Suharto's as general

chairman of the party.[64] The PNI was manipulated again

in its latest congress with a long-time friend of Suharto's

appointed chairman.[65] Political parties have at best

continued a tenuous existence. It was clear to all of

them that Suharto would not permit any challenge to the

newly found harmony and stability. All remaining political

parties have sworn their allegiance to the New Order and

Suharto personally, unanimously approving him as their

choice for President in 1973, and several have even

announced their willingness to disband and dissolve

themselves if it is the wish of the President.[66]

At this point it is worth considering why Suharto

would allow elections, if he believes in complete harmony,

because Indonesia's one experience with general elections

had seen the creation of a tremendous amount of social

tension. One cannot deny the President's honest intention

to "build democracy" which for him means that free elections

are regularly held. Additionally the 1966 MPRS had

commanded him to hold elections in 1968, and disobeying

that decision would have cost him crucial elite support as

well as destroy one of the "legitimacy" symbols of his

rule. Finally, there must have been some pressure from
the outside considering the large amounts of foreign aid
the New Order needs to implement its program. Even with
all of those "push" factors Suharto was very hesitant
about the actual implementation of the elections. He
took his case to the MPRS and won a three year delay but
even then adamantly stated that elections would not be
held until they would not disturb economic development
and rehabilitation, the stability of the regime plus
guarantee a victory for the New Order. With conditions
set it is little wonder that some observers were doubtful
that the elections would even be held in 1971 and that
there would be no possibility of Suharto being discredited
through them.[67]

Suharto and Election Control:

If the elections were to eventually be held, Suharto
was determined to control them. He probably concluded that
no drastic changes in the political system could be made
in the short run and that better control could be guaranteed
through the proportional system and behind the scenes
interference in party affairs. Still the New Order had
no organizational structure of its own to compete in the
election. A New Order political party was ruled out and
the military backed Golongan Karya or Golkar was revived
and to some extent reinvigorated to compete against the

parties.[68] Still unsure of Golkar's ability to attract
votes, Suharto insisted that he personally be allowed to
appoint 100 (out of a total of 460) members to the new
DPR and one-third of the MPR plus 20% of the regional
parliaments. Given the fractured nature of the political
party system, this appointment power essentially meant
that the President's fraction would be the largest in
the DPR even if Golkar did not win any seats at all.

However, just the largest contingent was not enough;
Suharto needed an absolute majority in the DPR to provide
the necessary legal coating for any policy he wanted to
implement.[69] While Ali Murtopo and his Special Operations
group were dividing the parties among themselves, Amir
Machmud, Minister of Interior, became Chairman of the
Elections Board to which the list of candidates from each
party had to be submitted for approval; names could
arbitrarily be removed if, according to the Board, their
New Order credentials were lacking. According to Berita
Yudha[70] some 550 candidates were disqualified in this
manner of the total of around 3,500. Machmud additionally
brought as much pressure as possible to bear on the
government apparatus to insure that it was loyal to
Golkar. As even school teachers are government employees,
this includes a large number of people and a very large
percentage of the politically aware people in the country.[71]

Finally, Golkar coopted almost all influential
community leaders on to their lists, whether they intended
for the individual to sit in the DPR later or not.[72] The
parties complained that their members were being forced
to join Golkar. Golkar was also clearly the best financed
of any of the contestants. The results, as mentioned
earlier, were astonishing. Two of the 9 parties did not
receive a seat and the largest party contingent was
almost 20 members smaller than the appointed 75 member
military fraction. The PNI, once the strongest non-
communist party in the country and the forecasted winner
by many observers, was virtually destroyed outside of
Djakarta and Central Java as its bureaucratic constituency
was taken away from it.[73]

With such an absolute election victory, the stage
was set for the destruction of the entire existing party
system in a legal manner. In speaking about a new system,
Amir Machmud stated "whether later we will have mass
parties or cadre parties depends on continuing research
but we have enough experience with the failure of mass
parties".[74] Perhaps this is part of the reasoning behind
the "floating mass" system which will forbid all parties
from organizing in the village -- control of the people
will become the sole property of ABRI and the civil
service. Additional blows were aimed at the parties,

existing or future ones, by forbidding labor unions to
associate with political parties and the continued
"depoliticization" of the civil service through the
creation of KORPRI (National Civil Servants Corps) to
which all civil servants must belong. It will be
affiliated with the "non-political" organization Golkar.[75]
So at the moment the two new political federations are
little more than hollow shells and in their anonymous
groups have lost all claims to separate identity and
ideological pulling power.[76] The central part of the
political system is clearly under tight control. With the
government's aid, Golkar already looks like an even bigger
winner in 1976.[77]

While political parties have proved very tame
and malleable for Suharto at the center, their strength
has always been at the village level. Who can keep the
parties out of the village in practice? Obviously the
civil service is one answer, but even with KORPRI, the
loyalty of many civil servants in the regions is doubtful
in the short run. The army is the second possible answer.
Suharto has had a long struggle gaining absolute control
over the military and creating a structure to maintain it,
but he seems to have been extremely successful.[78] Where
Sukarno had to continually battle with the military to get
it to obey, Suharto now has little trouble. His personal

friends and their friends in turn are scattered all through

the civil bureaucracy in the regions, and also are strong

in the military structure that parallels the civilian

one all the way to the village level.[79] The result is

that Indonesia is more secure and has less internal

disruption than at any time since independence.

When on March 11, 1966 Sukarno ceded full military

power to Suharto, he was given emergency authority to

deal with any security threat. KOPKAMTIB or the Command

for the Restoration of Peace and Security was set up with

extra-constitutional powers, and it still exists.[80]

The military has not hesitated to use its power. Thousands

of political prisoners attest to this fact. ABRI has

clearly performed its duties well as the destruction of

the G-30-S and the uprising near Blitar in 1968 show.

ABRI has also used its power to suspend PNI activities in

several areas and to prevent groups which it does not

trust from entering the villages.[81] As the military has

no intention of returning to the barracks,[82] control is

likely to continue to be a major function of the military

until Suharto feels he can trust the civilian apparatus

to do his bidding.

Thus, the politics of the New Order might be best

described as the politics of manipulation and intrigue.

Like the rulers of Mataram, Suharto seeks to have persons

who are personally loyal to him or his assistants in the key positions of the bureaucracy, military and regional government, even the political parties. Harmony, order and stability is maintained through the manipulation of these organizations and the "friends" within them. Ultimately, however, loyalty and obedience are maintained by the threat of force or the willingness to use it rather than through any over-riding feeling of attachment to the system, the nation or the regime. Today, the unity and strength of ABRI are direct measures of the strength of the regime and its ability to maintain harmony.

Despite the fact that Suharto has tightened up his control on Indonesia and has more and better facilities at his control for the penetration of the disparate society than any ruler in the archipelago's history, he, like the rulers of Mataram, is faced with the problem of theoretical and formal control but actual weakness. "Suharto must hesitate before he introduces measures which will add to the pressure which the government exerts on the great mass of the population, for he knows that most such measures are likely to be implemented in distorted fashion at the local level and to be used as warrants for more regulatory activity hampering the flow of trade."[83] Thus the problem of formal over-centralization but actual "under-centralization" still exists for the New Order just

as it did in the realm of Mataram.

The actions of Sukarno and Suharto can be attributed to the wishes of a ruler to accumulate power and simply be able to control his environment. The power thus accumulated can be used to proclaim the ruler's privilege and protect the status quo or to affect basic changes in the society. The former was the concept of Mataram and of the Dutch colonial regime in Indonesia. In describing Indonesian social structure, Levine called it essentially a "retrogressive" social system; the acute emphasis on privilege, status and its protection was his focus. Internally, the Sukarno regime acted in that manner and the contraction of the political system under the New Order too has been used, in General Nasution's own words, to protect the status quo.[84] On the other hand, the New Order has proclaimed as its major theme modernization and development change. What is the nature of this change?

The Problems of Change and Economic Development:

The late President Sukarno frankly admitted his dislike for the details of economics and obviously placed it low on his list of national priorities. Several times his regime began or almost began what looked like serious economic reform but in each instance could not maintain the initial direction and thrust.[85] Sukarno's attempts at real and consistent change, other than destruction of

institutions, were at best half-hearted[86] and usually

served as more of a symbolic act than anything else.

The New Order has placed economic development at the

top of its list of announced priorities. In a way

development or pembangunan (literally building) has

become one of the symbolic linch-pins of the New Order.

However, we are not looking at the New Order in historical

perspective. The new regime economically is only 5 or

at most 6 years old and in the long run could very well

drift into the same morass as other Javanized governments

have. The economic changes under the New Order are by

no means guaranteed or self-sustaining as of yet. The

simple fact that for the first time in the nation's history

modernization and development are widely discussed and

most importantly, something is being done about it calls

for some sort of examination of the roots of the shift.

Simply why has the Southeast Asian nation that has been

described as the least development minded suddenly become

one of the most so, and finally for what purpose is this

development being used?

It must be remembered that the members of the

political and bureaucratic elite that have governed

Indonesia since independence have now been pushed aside

or are in a position clearly subordinate to that of the

army. The military, despite some degree of prijaji and

kesatria influence and norms, is also the part of the
society that has been most greatly influenced by Western
organizational norms. If Robert M. Price's reference
group theory has any applicability, Indonesia is surely
one case of it.[87] Despite the much publicized Eastern
Block aid to the Indonesian military -- which was largely
concentrated on the navy and air force -- far greater
numbers of Indonesians went to the United States to study
military methods and organization. The army has always
been ideologically as well as technologically more oriented
toward the West than to the East.[88] While maintaining
its own doctrines of guerilla and territorial warfare,
in addition to building its Dual Function theory,[89] the
Indonesian army, if it had any outside reference group
to which it looked for professional and organizational
norms at all, was adopting ideas from Western, and
particularly United States' military establishments.

With this background in mind, one member of the
Indonesian military told this author that it was quite
natural for the military once in control to espouse
"development" as its major goal.[90] The military saw
many things in the West that they wished to have and
felt that they were in a good position to push the society
towards those material ends. Seeing modernization and
development primarily as technical matters, they assumed

that they were the best qualified section of the society to implement them. The military probably also felt that a large part of the reason for the strength of the PKI in Indonesia was the low standard of living coupled with the declining economy. In order for the polity to survive without further radical influence and deviation, the military felt economic development to be a must. It would assist the New Order elite in achieving Pantjasila Democracy and stability. Coupled with depoliticization, economic development became the solution to Indonesia's political and social problems.

The New Order's leaders and Ali Murtopo in particular are fond of talking of the next 25 years as a period of accelerated development.[91] This period is evidently envisioned as one of slow but constant change in the entire fabric of society. Development will control politics rather than vice versa. The process is one that cannot be made overnight but only with firm and stable leadership over the entire period. ABRI will constantly guard the Pant- jasila state from ideological and political excesses, guaranteeing order and stability. The private sector with assistance and guidance from the government will be expected to start industrialization of the country. The Green Revolution will be realized and Indonesia will become self-sufficient in rice. Eventually, the masses will

be educated formally and informally in "modern ways" and enjoy a higher standard of living.

All of this is to be accomplished through a series of five year development plans that are constantly being readjusted to meet new problems and demands. Originally the first plan Repelita I was to stress rehabilitation of the transportation system and increasing agricultural production, while the second plan was to place emphasis on industrialization. Non-party technocrats and intellectuals were coopted into the regime to assist the military in achieving the goals.

To this point the results have simply been amazing, if only in comparison with previous efforts. The Repelita I is coming to a seemingly successful conclusion and the immeasurably destructive hyperinflation of the early and mid-1960's has been brought to a dramatic halt. Prices are stable and exports rising. The economy is expanding at about 7% per year.[92] Statistically at least the New Order's program seems to be being implemented.

Despite the optimism expressed in some quarters for Indonesia's economic future there are signs of acute difficulties. Development as it has occurred so far seems to be happening despite the majority of the population rather than because of them. The great role played in all developments thus far by foreign aid and investment must

not be overlooked. The benefits of the New Order's stability and economic growth seem to be accruing to a very small portion of the population. With political demobilization, the masses are not participating in any process be it political or developmental. Thus far the New Order's development program has only reinforced the status and privilege of the rich and powerful as well as providing better means of control.[93]

The New Order government acknowledges this problem and says Pelita II will put emphasis on narrowing the income gap which in Indonesia's case is also a rural-urban gap.[94] President Suharto himself has said that if the benefits of development are not felt by all a social revolution will inevitably come.[95] Statements about good intentions for the future aside, however, even the New Order does not appear to be using their new tool of development to any different purpose than Mataram rulers used their existing tools of rulership. The purpose behind change is a very conservative one at best. As Huntington has put it the military's view of economic development is typically middle class and urban.[96] It remains to be seen how that view will change under pressure of the impoverished rural masses.

The Style of Indonesian Government

     We have previously discussed an alternative way to
view the structure and functions of the contemporary
Indonesian government. While our interpretation is
debatable for Indonesian and foreigner alike, the style
of Indonesian government is one thing that almost all
observers agree on as being very Javanese. Style is a
part of behavior but certainly not the total content of it.
Style is the way in which things are done and the way in
which problems are perceived and approached. Of course
style has influence on goals and results also for the
entire span of behavior is related.

     Anderson and Geertz both note that single-mindedness
of purpose is regarded by Javanese as the key to success.
Absolute concentration on the object desired is needed
before the goal can be achieved. This may help to account
for the seemingly single track of Guided Democracy in
relationship to the completion of the Indonesian Revolution.
Once this goal was perceived as the ultimate aim of the
nation, regardless of its true meaning or content, it
would have been heresy to lose concentration by being
side-tracked into economic stabilization and development.
The New Order has taken up the same stance. Modernization
and economic development to this point / are perceived as
the ultimate aim or goal of the regime while actual content

is again rather hazily understood, and nothing must be
allowed to stand in the way of its realization or it will
fail. Concentration must not be lost. Should this
observation have any degree of truth to it, it augurs
well for the continuance of present orientation at least
in name.[97]

On the other hand it is extremely bad taste for a
Javanese to show emotion and inner desires. For instance,
cultural norms in Javanese prijaji society are very strong
against the open display of riches or power seeking motives.
Thus the would-be ruler must seem to be inactive or passive;
power must flow to him because of his superior concentration
and inner qualities. This may also help to account for
Sukarno's hesitancy to appear willing to take the reins
of power and be a noticeably active ingredient in the
downfall of the parliamentary system. He gave suggestions
in public but from Feith and Lev's writing we know that
behind the scenes he was never willing to support the
existing system and did what he could to hasten its
downfall. As a result power seemed to just flow to
Sukarno and away from the old system. Westerners have
tended to see Sukarno as a very active element in the
decline of constitutional democracy, therefore to be
condemned, but Indonesians (Javanese?) tend to view him
as a saviour , as one whose approach to the situation was

strong and unyielding; whose inner strength allowed him
to restore order and concentrate power at the center again.

One of the more interesting frameworks for viewing
post-G-30-S politics has been presented by Peter Polomka
who points out that Indonesian politics seem more like a
wajang kulit or shadow play than anything else. By this
he means that it is almost impossible to tell by public
actions the real intents and purposes of the actors. This
is essentially an expression of the non-emotion and non-
desire norms we are talking about. It can clearly be
noticed during the Suharto-Sukarno struggle of 1965-1967.
Suharto was careful never to openly display a desire for
power or actively do anything to achieve it. Suharto's
struggle with Sukarno was very covert and often waged by
proxy. The students in the cities and the "fanatic" Muslims
in the villages had more to do with the destruction of the
PKI and Sukarno's support than Suharto appeared to. Even
the less Javanese elements (primarily Siliwangi and RPKAD)
of the army were the ones to openly display their opposition
to PKI and Sukarno. Thus Suharto just waited while his
opponents were destroyed and disclosures made about
Sukarno that weakened his public position, or so it all
appeared from the outside. Power seemed to be flowing to
Suharto quite without effort on his part; hence as a
result of his inner power and concentration.[98]

While it was not proper for Suharto to engage in a struggle with his technical superior, his assistants could do it without hesitation.[99]   Thus, the Special Operations or _Opsus_ group, which had arisen from pre-G-30-S opposition to Sukarno and Subandrio by the military and was led by a Diponegoro and Mandala subordinate of Suharto's, Ali Murtopo,[100] continued to operate while the aspirant remained untainted from the scars of "dirty" political battles and kept his "white Knight" image. The need for Special Operations has continued throughout the period of the New Order. The President does not usually get mixed up in political battles and publicly says little of them. But during both PNI party congresses since the G-30-S, _Opsus_ pressure was felt and on both occasions leaders acceptable to Suharto were elected to the top party posts and those hostile either ostracized or isolated. The 1968 MPRS session was manipulated behind the scenes by _Opsus_.[101] The 1971 PMI split was allegedly aided by _Opsus_ and for sure the West Irian plebiscite and the recent general elections were targets of the Special Operations group. Similarly there have been charges of the same kind of interference at the January 1972 NU Congress where the most avid critic of the military was subsequently kicked off the leadership council and retired.[102] Ali Murtopo is now the ASPRI for Special Operations and has acquired

quite a reputation as a "bulldozer" for the tactics he
uses. Whatever the truth of the matter is, his power
and influence have grown immensely with the successes of
these operations and the President has largely been able
to avoid expressing his emotion or showing any desire
for power in the process.[103]

It is further interesting to note here that although
Suharto's Presidential term is completed in 1973 and almost
everyone has spoken out in favor of his re-election, the
President himself has never spoken publicly about the
subject. In fact, the only time Suharto has even mentioned
the Presidency while this author was in the country, he
declared himself to be the humble servant of the people
and that if anyone wanted to replace him, they should do
so by constitutional means at the 1973 MPR session; yet
in reality to attempt to do so, no matter what the moti-
vation, would be tantamount to suicide for any individual
or group.[104] So for whatever the reason, Suharto has
shown a remarkable non-interest in the pursuit of
political power in public. This is perhaps why in 1969
Van der Kroef could remark, "....Suharto has increasingly
acquired the reputation of being a good man thrust into
a job seemingly beyond his capacities".[105] The real
politics of the New Order does not go on in public and
Suharto does not express dynamism through his public

speaking or actions. Publicly he gives the impression of
one subject or even victim to the flow of circumstances
and events, which as a good Javanese he should, but behind
the scenes it seems to be an entirely different matter:
the President is in absolute control.[106]

The President has decidedly shown emotion on only
two or three occasions since his rise to power and always
when he felt he was being pushed into a corner without
other choice except to lose face or his realm. One such
occasion was at the height of Muslim-Christian tensions
in 1968.[107] With the santri Muslims seemingly ready to
declare "Holy War" on the Christians who were seen as
"stealing" converts, Suharto had little choice but to
express his extreme displeasure at the thought of a
resultant civil war. Harmony could not be disturbed in
such an intolerant manner. Again in January 1972,
following two months of protests concerning a tourism and
cultural project proposed by his wife, Suharto lashed out
in public at those trying to undermine the stability of
the state. The President totally ignored all of the
economic arguments that had been put forward against the
project and interpreted the protests as personal attacks
upon himself and his family. In this case the President
must have felt his honor at stake and had to defend himself
and his family.[108]

The "wajang" sort of politics reflecting prijaji
social relations has a serious effect on the way that
Indonesian political and military leaders view any action.
Nothing can be taken for surface value; there always must
be a hidden motive for action. Since the Javanese
political leaders themselves do not play "honest" or
direct politics, they have no reason to expect other
political actors to do so either. The Djakarta elite
spends hours of discussion trying to discover the true
meaning and latar belakang (literally background) of any
statement made or action taken. Since most actors do
operate that way it is not an entirely fruitless task.
Since speaking directly from the heart or frankly is not
highly valued among Javanese but evidentally, is with
most "modernist" Muslims and many of the younger students,
particularly the non-Javanese ones, a serious communication
gap arises. This has to be a part of the reason 'modernist'
Muslims have been pushed out of the political system and
why the "Angkatan '66" or '66 Generation have not been
able to find a comfortable place in the New Order
constellation.[109] This also partly accounts for the
difficulty that foreigners have had in communicating with
the Old Order as well as the New Order regime.[110]

The above points out the futility of direct criticism
of the regime. It will not be understood and frequently

other motives attached to its utterance, getting the critic   in trouble or pointing him out as an automatic enemy of the regime, meaning that all his statements should be ignored. This has happened with the student protestersover and over again. They can make all of the "rational" arguments they want but they will be brushed aside in the search for ulterior motives. This happened in the KAK (Korps Anti-Korupsi), Mahasiswa Mengugat (Students Accuse), Kita Ingin Tahu (we want to know), Golput (Golongan Putih or White Group) and the Minatur Indonesia Indah protests as well.[111] When Ali Murtopo says that such protests do not harmonize with the spirit of struggle of the New Order[112] what he means is that such direct attacks on privilege are simply not in harmony with Javanese social etiquette.

This raises the question of the often stringent newspaper criticism and why it does exist while protest demonstrations are forbidden. One answer here is that direct personal attack on figures of the New Order leadership is not permitted.[113] And by and large newspapers reach only urban and semi-urban areas, probably affecting only 2 or 3% of the population at most. Besides this there are several indications that journalistic criticism is not taken into account by New Order leaders. General Sumitro, the power behind KOPKAMTIB, said that he did not

even bother to read Indonesian newspapers because they were not of high enough quality.[114] This does not mean that newspapers are not continually harassed and their credibility undermined by the regime.[115] On the other hand, there does exist a long literal tradition in Java where criticism was allowed if done in an individual way. Perhaps this is why Harian Kami and Indonesia Raja as well as the pure oppositionist Abadi can exist with as much freedom as they do.[116]

Unfortunately, the problem of opposition and criticism has certain ethnic overtones. Criticism can be accepted if it is done in a halus enough manner that it does not appear to be criticism at all. Naturally enough, this sort of persuasion is best done by someone with long experience in dealing with Javanese and who is very well acquainted with Javanese culture and language. Outer Islanders, particularly of the "modernist" Muslim group, seldom have such knowledge and experience or care to develop it. Even younger Javanese students with an urban background may have such problems. This has created a situation whereby the best and most effective critics are operating from inside the government rather than from outside and using indirect methods rather than direct confrontations to convey criticism. Despite all of the personal as well as government prestige wrapped up in the

BIMAS project for increasing rice production,[117] a

Javanese was able to approach the President and convince

him that the program had to be stopped and admitted as a

failure. Likewise, only a Javanese speaker appealing to

all of the cultural and paternal prejudices could get the

top military leaders to agree to the admission of the

Minatur Indonesia Indah project problem into the parliament

for open discussion -- discussion that would without a

doubt criticize the government and various government

officials (military and civilian) very directly and

heavily.[118] This kind of situation has very definite

implications for national communications about political

and economic issues. People with non-halus temperaments

like Arief Budiman and Buyung Nasution,[119] despite the

brilliance of their ideas, find it very difficult to make

themselves understood by the New Order regime.

Communication of alternatives and feedback is also

hindered by the Javanese notion of the patrimonial state.

Communication is not conceived of as a two-way process.

The method of rule by the prijaji, albeit heavily

reinforced by military norms, is by perintah or order;

government by command. The most common Javanese social

relationship type is the guru-murid, bapak-anak (father-son

or teacher-pupil) type. The former knows best and is not

to be questioned. This leads to a situation where policy

is formulated and executed without the expectation of
opposition or criticism or of failure (if the approach is
deemed correct). Hardly a day goes by without the
expression of paternalism by one major government official
in a public statement. The masses or massa bodoh
(literally, stupid masses) have to be dididik or educated.
The floating mass proposal, Amir Moertono's latest
statement on governor elections in the provinces,[120] or
the important recent book by Brigadier General Sajidiman
all show acute symptoms of paternalism. The Bimas program
is one example, however, where the massa bodohproved they
were quite expert in their own field. Bimas means mass
guidance and was used to increase rice production.
Several major foreign companies were hired by the govern-
ment to supply a package of fertilizer, high yielding rice
seed along with the necessary insecticide on credit.
According to the government policy decision the farmers
were to have no choice whether or not they enrolled in
the program and whether or not they wanted the entire
package. The farmers were to repay the credit to the
government from their increase in yields. What resulted
was a massive failure. The government was not paid back
and the state got very little of what it thought it was
paying for, an increase in rice yield. The farmers
simply resisted the decisions that were made for them

without knowledge of their particular conditions and
situation. Until the system was made more flexible
giving the farmers choice as to membership and the
elements of the package they received, the program did
not obtain worthwhile results.[121] The Bimas failure
evidently resulted from the initial feeling on the part
of the program designers that they could think for the
farmers.

The Minatur Indonesia Indah project was another
example of a high level Indonesian figure, the wife of
the President in this case, deciding to implement a
project using government influence without the slightest
suspicion that she could be challenged on it. The First
Lady assumed that since she wanted the project that
everyone else would automatically agree and contribute
their money for its construction. Once she was challenged
on the issue, she acted as if the criticizers did not
have the right to obstruct her wishes.[122]

The "Mini project" illustrates another problem
that in the West is known as conflict of interest but that
is seemingly unknown in Indonesia. There are no
prohibitions of high level government employees partici-
pating in private enterprise outside of their regular
government work.[123] Hence Ali Sadikin and Ali Murtopo
could serve as project officers to the "Mini project"

while officially it was a "private" project.[124]   This
fusion of interests and other obvious misuses of power
(in Western terms) such as corruption are all part of
the traditional patrimonial attitude towards government
on the part of the Javanese.   When one gives a gift to
a high government official or offers him an opportunity
to buy stock on credit, "facilities" are expected in
return.[125]

        We have already mentioned Sukarno's great stress
on the correct approach or symbolic form of policies
rather than on content and results.   To some extent, the
New Order has also been unable to escape this Javanese
habit either.   It has often been pointed out that Sukarno's
eight year plan of 1962 was little more than a symbol and
that it had been arranged and rearranged so that it
contained the proper number of volumes, chapters and
paragraphs to form 8-17-1945 or the date of Indonesian
independence.   Only this past year Golkar when shaping
its central institutions arranged them so that the
membership was 8-17-45;   once again to correspond to the
symbolic date.   Perhaps this is also one reason that the
"floating mass" is seen as so desirous.   It is symbolic
in forming a conflict-free environment but whether
legislation will actually remove conflict from the village
is another matter.

The same kind of form without content can be seen
in the decree disbanding all "youth gangs" in Djakarta
in the wake of the "Mini Project" protests. Symbolically
all gang members came to police headquarters to declare
that the gangs had been disbanded and dissolved. Notice,
however, that within only a few weeks there were gangs
forming again. After the KOPKAMTIB decree nothing was
done to change the objective condition that had caused
gangs to arise in the first place.

Finally, with the present emphasis on development
every province and kabupaten now has a development
operations room complete with charts, graphs, and
diagrams showing the progress of all development occurring
in the area. Polomka notes however that these rooms have
very little correspondence with reality and that frequently
the workers there do not even know what the diagrams stand
for.[126] The point is, however, that development means
having an operations and planning room whether there is
anything else or not.

In conclusion, it must be pointed out that the style
of contemporary Indonesian government in many ways resembles
that of Mataram. Rulers value concentration and non-
expression of emotion and desire. The form and approach
to any policy is extremely important and seems to take on
sacral qualities. The government and rulers view themselves

as such and conduct their business in a manner that could best be described as "protective superiority". Like Mataram also, the government of contemporary Indonesia has the capacity to "fool itself" in terms of what is happening in the country and the world around it. Rewriting history could not make the Dutch into Javanese for Mataram and calling old policies by new names will not create a modern and developed Indonesia for the New Order.

NOTES on Chapter III

[1] The decree, even with the Parliament's approval, was of dubious legality but clearly showed how shallow were the roots of the parliamentary system as well as who held the political initiative in the country. It is interesting to note that the army through General Nasution was the first to put forward the idea of the return to the UUD45.

[2] The text of the Constitution of 1945 with full explanation and most of the documents surrounding the return to it are given in J.C.T. Simorangkir and B. Mang Reng Say, Tentang dan Sekitar Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (About and Around the 1945 Constitution) (Djakarta: Djambatan, 1959). A very extensive discussion of the executive and his powers in relationship with other government organs is given in Ismail Suny, Pergeseran Kekuasan Exsekutif (The Changing Powers of the Executive) (Djakarta: C.V. Calindra, 1965). The Constitution itself is extremely brief with only 37 articles and about 1700 words. Only the barest outlines of state structure are given and almost everything in terms of content is explicitly stated as being left to further regulations. In theory, the MPR is supposed to play a role somewhat similar to that originally intended for the Electoral Board in the United States with the added responsibility of determining the broad outlines of state policy. In theory also, the President is directly responsible to the MPR for his actions and can be removed at its command.

[3] The President is not responsible to the DPR but neither can he dismiss it or any of its members at any time he wishes. Suny, op.cit., p.206.

[4] The UUD45 does not specify how the DPR should be chosen. Simorangkir and Say, op.cit., p.22.

[5] It must be remembered that there were no political parties in existence in the country at the time of the writing of the UUD45.

[6] This may also be true of the Vice President which is plainly called for in the UUD45 but there has not been one since its reintroduction in 1959.

[7] Besides being Javanese both Suharto and Sukarno have essentially Central Javanese and upper class backgrounds. Sukarno's father was supposedly of aristocratic origin and the young Sukarno was the protege of the prijaji leader of Sarekat Islam, Tjokrominoto. Suharto is the son of a lesser

village official but was raised by a prijaji family in Solo.
On Sukarno see Dahm, op.cit., passim; and on Suharto see O.G.
Roeder, The Smiling General (Djakarta: Gunung Agung, 1969).
The dominant position of the Javanese is tacitly recognized
by most Indonesians. No one in the country that I have ever
talked to felt that a non-Javanese could ever become
President. The feeling about the Vice-Presidency was just
the opposite: he should be non-Javanese. This may be one
reason why, despite the logic of it, Nasution, a Sumatran
Batak, did not become President in the wake of the G-30-S.
Despite his loyalty to the army, Nasution has become somewhat
of a critic of the operation of Javanese-led New Order and
closely associated with the "out" faction of the army. See
Berita Buana June 12, 1972 for some of his most recent comments.
In an April 7, 1972 interview, Nasution revealed his opposition
to the "floating mass" system.

All Murtopo, a Special Assistant to the President, has
announced that the Sultan of Jogjakarta will be Golkar's
nominee for Vice President at the upcoming 1973 MPR session.
While Suharto was careful enough to give the Outer Islands
representative equality with Java in the new DPR, it seems
that the Vice President is not to be Sumatran. Is a tacit
understanding about to be broken? For comments on Murtopo's
announcement see Pedoman April 24, 1972.

[8] This will no longer be true as of March 1973 when
Suharto will be reelected without opposition. However, 33%
of the MPR members will be direct Suharto appointees.

[9] Suny, op.cit., pp.214-5.

[10] Herbert Feith, "Soeharto's Search for a Political
Format", Indonesia, 1968, No. 6, p.98.

[11] This is other than internal military considerations.
The President seems to have overcome the major factional
problems there though. On this see Ulf Sundhaussen, "The
Military in Research on Indonesian Politics", The Journal
of Asian Studies, 1972, Vol. XXXI, No.2.

[12] See Dahm, op.cit., passim.

[13] Anderson, op.cit., p.64.

[14] Suripto, Soeharto: Suatu Sketsa Karier Dan Politik
(Soeharto: A Career and Political Sketch), (Surabaja: Grip,
1972), p.73.

[15] Anderson, op.cit., p.25.

[16]See Sajidiman, _Langkah, Langkah Perdjuangan Kita_ (The Steps of Our Struggle) (Djakarta: Pusat Sedjarah ABRI, 1971), pp. 75-8; and the Golkar Memorandum entitled "Tindjauan Situasi Nasional" (An Observation of the National Situation) (Djakarta: Stenciled, December 1970) as well as A.H. Nasution, _ABRI Penegak Demokrasi UUD45_ (ABRI: Upholder of Democracy of the 1945 Constitution) (Djakarta: Seruling Masa, 1966), pp. 5-26. The threats and force, albeit behind the scenes, of the New Order to get its way seem little different, although they are called "temporary necessities."

[17]The New Order theorists speak of the "Tres Politika" (meaning division and separation of powers) and its application to Indonesia under the UUD45, but it just does not seem to function that way. The executive, in reality, makes the laws, interprets them and attempts to enforce them. See Soediman Kartohadiprodjo, _Beberapa Pikiran Sekitar Pantjasila_ (Some Thoughts on Pantjasila) (Bandung: Alumni, 1970), pp. 189-98.

[18]Huntington makes the same point about tradition and the American presidential system. See Huntington, _op.cit._, pp. 93-139.

[19]Village elections usually are of the _musjawarah_ or consensus type, and it is not infrequent for the post to become considered hereditary. The selection of a village headman is subject to approval by the _bupati_ or district head who as often as not has been a military man since 1965. This means that there are definitely outside pressures as to who will be selected. For the description of one such election see Totok Suharto, "Factionalisme Mendjelang Pemilihan Lurah didesa 'Sumber Air'", _Tjakrawala_, 1972, Vol. IV, No.5. Also contrast the numbers of elected officials in Indonesia with those in India; See Myron Weiner in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, _Political Culture and Political Development_ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p.208.

[20]This turned out not to be such a victory for Sukarno after all. Yani proved to be hard to manipulate and staunchly anti-communist. He was eventually a victim of the G-30-S.

[21]As examples of such "rewards", witness the presence of Idham Chalid of the NU in the cabinet and also of M. Dachlan until the latest reshuffle. At Suharto's insistence Chalid was appointed Speaker of the DPR, despite the fact that the NU has only 1/5 the number of seats of Golkar.

[22]While in the field of economics Suharto has chosen
to rely on civilian advisors or experts for planning and
policy, this is much less true in the political field.
Military advice especially from the ASPRI on such matters
seems dominant. Even in the field of economics Sudjono
Humardani has played a great role, and one interviewee
expressed the belief that he was more important in dealing
with Japan than Widjojo Nitisastro or Adam Malik. It is
also interesting to note that there are four ASPRI, exactly
the same number of assistants possessed by the patih of
Mataram for symbolic reasons.

[23]The simple fact that Suharto depends largely on
personal friendship ties, which is the normal Javanese way
of doing things, has meant that most of his trusted assistants
and advisors are military men. The President, a professional
military man, has had little real contact with the civilian
world before attaining the position. His few civilian
advisors have been Javanese. As one interviewee put it,
Suharto is intellectually fascinated with civilians like
Widjojo and Soedjatmoko - two of the most important civilian
figures in the New Order. As of this writing 22 of 26
provincial governors were military men, and although Minister
for Social Affairs Mintaredja has announced that the government
intends to "civilianize" these posts along with lower level
provincial positions, such is very unlikely to occur in the
near future.

[24]With the exception of the Hatta Cabinet (January 1948-
December 1949), cabinets during the revolution were formed on
a parliamentary majority basis. After the creation of the
unitary Republic in August 1950 until the appointment of the
Djuanda Cabinet in 1957, the same was also true.

[25]See Daniel S. Lev, op.cit., passim; and Herbert Feith,
The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern
Indonesia Project, 1957) for excellent discussions of these
two elections. Lev seems to feel that the non-communist elite's
realization of the meaning of mass politics and their inability
to compete with the PKI on such a basis - thus a traditional
and self-interest reaction -- were the key factors in the
party elite's weak reaction and opposition to a Guided
Democracy system.

[26]Daniel S. Lev, op.cit., p.63.

[27]Daniel S. Lev, "Parties, Functional Groups and
Elections" Asia, Autumn 1970, p. 116.

[28]This occurred much to the relief of rural conservatives.

[29]Simorankir and Say, op.cit., pp.200-03.

[30]Sekber Golkar was originally formed by Presidential Decree No. 193/1964 as a part of Sukarno's National Front. It then consisted of 61 non-affiliated functional organizations and ABRI. As of present, there are 201 organizations affiliated with Golkar which in 1969 were grouped into 7 KINO's or Mother Organizational Groups according to the function of the organization itself. The symbol of Golkar is the banyan tree which is quite famous in Javanese folklore. For further details on Golkar see "The Sekber Golkar: A Bird's Eye View of its History", (Djakarta: Golkar Pusat, n.d.).

[31]For full election results see Don Hindley, "Indonesia 1971: Pantjasila Democracy and the Second Parliamentary Elections", Asian Survey, 1972, Vol. XII, No. 1, pp.59-62.

[32]For these decisions see Sinar Harapan March 18, 1972.

[33]Despite the President's statement that he expects Golkar to join in controlling the government, the actual prospects for it seem slight. For the President's statement see Berita Buana October 5, 1971. For arguments about the possibility of control by Golkar see Rosihan Anwar's article in Tempo July 10, 1971, p.9; and the Sinar Harapan editorial "Golkar Bukan Pemerintah" (Golkar is not the Government) on June 2, 1971. According to Golkar's leading civilian figure, Sumiskum, Golkar is basically three groups: ABRI, KORPRI and the Non-ABRI, Non-KORPRI of which the latter is by far the weakest. This makes Golkar appear to be the government and the military only.

[34]Rosihan Anwar, "Dead End in Indonesian Politics", Pacific Community (Tokyo), 1970, Vol. II, No.2, p.396.

[35]Suharto has already announced that there will only be three choices in the next election: two parties and one Golkar. Pedoman October 28, 1971. His basis for such action is Decision No. XXII of the MPRS session of 1966. It has been pointed out that the decision said nothing about how the parties were to be simplified with the implication that the President is not on solid constitutional ground. For a thoughtful discussion of the "Floating Mass" system, see Alfian in Kompas April 27-8, 1972.

[36]See Gerald Maryanov, Decentralization in Indonesia as a Political Problem (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958) and John Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961) for details of the 1957 law and the subsequent retreat from it. Due to the regional revolts most provisions of the new law never were fully implemented before their lapse.

[37]Ted Smith and R.S. Smith, "The Political Economy of Regional and Urban Revenue Policy in Indonesia", Asian Survey, 1972, Vol. XI, No.8, p.296. ADO funds are the fixed proportion (now 10%) of all the tax earnings by the central government on the province's exports which are automatically returned to the provincial government. Where the money will be spent is already decided before it is returned to the local or regional government, however.

[38]Ted Smith, The Indonesian Bureaucracy: Stability, Change and Productivity (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1971), p.143.

[39]Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1967) p.29. The government says it is seriously concerned with the overcrowding of Java and hopes that people can be encouraged to migrate. Unfortunately, a net migration to Java rather than away from it is occurring, because almost all of the country's modern industry is located there - especially around Djakarta. If the government really expects to spread out the population, spontaneously or through transmigration, very high rates of infrastructure investment in the Outer Islands are needed, yet Java gets first priority, Minister of Public Works Sutami (a Javanese) mentioned recently that all roads start from Java. When asked why, he jokingly replied because when he was in grade school, geography started with Java(!). For an intelligent discussion of the problem see Sajidiman, op.cit., pp. 56-71. For Sutami's comment see Sinar Harapan June 26, 1972.

[40]The new DPR has shown a good beginning in reviewing the regions' problems firsthand during the latest recess (March-April 1972), but unfortunately, they (the DPR members) are in little position to help with any problems they observed there. Such decisions and division of funds are made elsewhere.

[41]Pembangunan or development is probably no less of a symbol than was Nasakom, but the former is definitely more appealing to Western ears and thus far to Western pocketbooks.

[42]Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's Political Symbols and their Wielders", World Politics, 1963, Vol. XVI, No.1; and Donald Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

[43]Dahm, op.cit., passim. For Indonesian comments on these points see Alfian in Sinar Harapan July 19-23, 1971.

[44]See Sukarno's speeches attacking Liberal Democracy as translated in Feith and Castles, op.cit., Chap.2.

[45]Outer Islanders, as usual with anything Sukarno said, were rather skeptical about these "Indonesian" values. See Kahar Muzahar's writing in Feith and Castles, op.cit., pp. 330-5.

[46]See Levine in Pye and Verba, op.cit., p.280.

[47]Anderson, op.cit., p.15. Sembada means concentration of power because of meditation.

[48]For the text of Sukarno's speech "The Birth of the Pantjasila" see Feith and Castles, op.cit., p.40.

[49]Quoted in a book review in Tempo, April 8, 1972, p.52.

[50]Kompas March 5, 1972. While harmony in its broad meaning is the objective of almost any government, some societies tolerate larger degrees of conflict as normal and legitimate than do others. As we noted earlier, a pervasive prijaji norm was the total avoidance of even any sign of conflict. This moral standard is still considered valid as this Suharto quote shows.

[51]See Sajidiman, op.cit., pp. 78-9; and President Suharto's speech on the Minatur Indonesia Indah issue as summarized in Sinar Harapan January 6, 1972.

[52]Harmony (in its extreme form) as a cultural norm is by no means restricted to the Javanese elite. African leaders have often expressed "African Socialism" in much the same terms and the roots of the Panchajati Raj system in India seem to reflect a similar line of thinking. See Myron Weiner's comments on the Indian elite's attitudes towards conflict in their own society in Pye and Verba, op.cit., pp. 235-6. As does Ben Anderson, I attribute this characteristic to the Hindu-Buddhist base of Javanese culture and therefore, would expect similar sorts of values to be present in Thailand, Burma and Cambodia. Further comparison on the subject definitely would be of value.

[53]See J.A.C. Mackie, "Indonesian Politics Under Guided Democracy", Australian Outlook, 1961, Vol. XV, No.3, pp.269-76.

[54]See Justus Van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's 'Revolutionary Gymnastics'", Asian Survey, 1965, Vol.V, No.5, p. 321.

[55]Ibid., p.324.

[56]These included Mochtar Lubis's Indonesia Raja and Pedoman of the PSI, run by Soedjatmoko and Rosihan Anwar.

[57]Donald Hindley, "President Soekarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication", American Political Science Review, 1962, Vol. LVI, No.4.

[58]Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey wrote a controversial version of the G-30-S, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup Attempt in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971), in which they attributed the entire affair to a group of young officers dissatisfied with the conservativeness and opposition to Sukarno by the Army's General Staff. While this version of the affair has been shown to be rather distorted, there remains a great deal of truth to the statement that there was a high degree of tension in the army at the time. It is certain that the PKI used this tension to their own advantage and Sukarno was probably the focus of loyalty used to lure the young officers into action, not communism.

[59]Pluvier, op.cit., p. VIII.

[60]Despite the fact that Pantjasila is the single most important ideological symbol in the country today, most Indonesians will say that they do not have any idea what Pantjasila Democracy is. A few will attempt to say what it is not, but that is usually the limit. For a very good attempt to explain the concept see A.H. Nasution, Pantjasila Democracy Today and Tomorrow (Djakarta: Seruling Masa, 1971). Also see Hazairin, Demokrasi Pantjasila (Pantjasila Democracy) (Djakarta: Tintamas, 1970) and Ismaun, Tindjauan Pantjasila: Dasar Filsafat Negara Republik Indonesia (Observations of Pantjasila: The Basic Philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia) (Bandung: Carya Remadja, 1970).

[61]For a complete discussion of the diagnosis and the cure see R. William Liddle, "Modernizing Indonesian Politics" (Stenciled, n.d.). Also see Sri Soemantri, Sistim Dua Partai (The Two Party System) (Bandung: Binatjipta, 1968).

[62]Given the fact that Suharto has been able to secure the passage of any measure he feels vital by some means or another, the lack of "push" for the original bill showed how unimportant he felt the idea was. One of the more interesting features of the 1976 elections will be whether or not with its overwhelming majority, Golkar will pass a single member constituency bill. Among Golkar interviewees at this time, none had given it any thought--they said they were more concerned with the upcoming MPR session.

[63]One might want to speculate as to why parties were
not banned altogether if Suharto and his colleagues were so
opposed to them. New Order supporters now answer that such
a move would not have been "democratic", however, this
reasoning did not seem to apply to the PKI. This author
is led to the conclusion that Suharto, initially, thought
the parties to be much stronger than they later proved to be.
Outside factors such as effects on loan and aid givers
should not be under-estimated.

[64]See Samson, op.cit., passim. It now appears that
the permission for the creation of a new "modernist" Muslim
party was a "pay-off" to this group for their support in
the destruction of Sukarno and the PKI.

[65]See Don Hindley, "Indonesia 1970: The Workings of
Pantjasila Democracy", Asian Survey, 1971, Vol. XI, No.2,
p.117, for some discussion of the affair. For Indonesian
coverage of the Congress and charges of government inter-
vention see Harian Kami during April, 1970.

[66]PMI(Parmusi), Katolik, Parkindo and PSII.

[67]On the possible meaning of the elections, as viewed
beforehand, see J.A.C. Mackie, "Civil-Military Relations
and the 1971 Elections in Indonesia", Australian Outlook,
1970, Vol. 24, No.3. On the dilemmas of coercion for Suharto
see Herbert Feith, "Suharto's Search for a Political Format",
Indonesia, 1968, No.6, pp. 104-5.

[68]Golkar must not be seen as a party in any unified
sense. It is a mere coalition of forces brought together
by the military. Their common desire was and is development,
plus they are willing to acknowledge the fact that ABRI is
dominant in the society. Some civilians in the organization,
particularly a group from Bandung known as the independents
hope to play a role that is not 100% controlled by the
military. At this date, this particular group is pessimistic
of its chances to do so. Despite some hope for a big
Golkar reorganization after the election, Ali Murtopo
announced that Golkar would not become a party. Berita Buana
October 12, 1971.

[69]Previous to the formation of the new DPR, all decisions
had to be taken in musjawarah style, meaning that resolutions
had to be unanimous. As soon as Golkar obtained an absolute
majority, the rules were changed to permit majority decisions.
See Berita Buana December 23, 1971 on the changes. The
President called it "Stopping the Dictatorship of the Minority"
in Berita Buana October 12, 1971.

[70]March 5, 1971. All PKI and most Masjumi leaders could not participate at all either. The latter definitely hurt the PMI.

[71]All government employees had to vote at their places of work rather than at public polls. This made the total number of vote casters in any one poll station very small; even the public ones were seldom over 300. In several interviews with civil servants, I was told that direct pressure and threats were made towards them if the vote total did not turn out to be almost 100% for Golkar.

[72]Donald Hindley, "Indonesia 1971: Pantjasila Democracy and the Second Parliamentary Elections", Asian Survey, 1972, Vol. XII, No. 1, p.61. Golkar manipulated their candidates and lists at will, even after the results of the election had been announced. A good example of how this manipulation was done was the case of Adam Malik, the Foreign Minister. Malik campaigned long and hard in his home provinces of North Sumatra and was number one of the North Sumatra Provincial Golkar List. After the election Malik was removed from the Golkar list and replaced with the excuse that his ministerial duties were too heavy to permit him time for the DPR.

[73]Hindley gives a more complete list of the possible reasons for Golkar's victory. Hindley, op.cit., p.59.

[74]Berita Buana October 6, 1971.

[75]On the labor restriction see Kompas February 7, 1972. For a good summary of the position of organized labor under the New Order see Pedoman February 11, 1972. The right to strike is not recognized, although strikes do occasionally occur. On KORPRI see Sinar Harapan April 15, 1972 and the Kompas editorial of April 18, 1972. On depoliticization see the Kompas editorial of March 20, 1972.

[76]Anticipating the government bill to be submitted to Parliament, the Islamic parties grouped together to form the Kelompok Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Group while the PNI, Murba, IPKI and the two Christian parties formed the Kelompok Demokratis Pembangunan or Democratic Development Group. The latter has gone further than the former in creating a new political structure (probably because of the obstinance of the NU), but both remain essentially federations. Amir Machmud stated that fusion is a must and that federation can only be a transitory stage. Sinar Harapan April 1, 1972. As of this writing the bill has not been submitted to Parliament and this delay may represent some re-thinking of the problem inside the government.

[77] A member of the <u>Dewan Pimpinan Golkar</u> or Leadership Council, Lim Bian Kie, told me, "Look at the size of our victory with only one and one-half years of preparation; just think what we can do with five years to work on it." (March 24, 1972). Ali Murtopo has recently added that Golkar will be satisfied with a 5% increase in their vote in 1976.

[78] For some of Suharto's dealing with the internal military situation see Donald Hindley, "Alirans and the Fall of the Old Order", <u>Indonesia</u>, 1970, No. 9, p.50; and Donald Hindley, "Indonesia 1970: The Workings of Pantjasila Democracy" <u>Asian Survey</u> 1971, Vol. XI, No. 2, p.112.

[79] For this structure see Polomka, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp.96-7. The political parties, especially the PNI and NU, claim that this structure was used to control the outcome of the elections which to some extent was probably true.

[80] It is interesting to note that for only 3 years of the 13 since the return to the UUD45 Indonesia has not been under what amounts to martial law.

[81] This happened to WAY (World Assembly of Youth) which had development projects in the villages but that also contained "modernist" Muslim elements in the leadership that were not trusted by the military.

[82] The military through its <u>Dwi-Fungsi</u> or Dual Function Doctrine has stressed time and time again that it has no intention of being a mere <u>alat</u> or tool of civilians. See Suharto's speech "ABRI is not a Fireman" summarized in <u>Berita Buana</u> March 6, 1972.

[83] Feith, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.105.

[84] A.H. Nasution, "Political Restructuring After 'G-30-S'", <u>Pacific Community</u>, 1971, Vol.III, No.1, p.323.

[85] For a good discussion of the economic problems, especially inflation, see J.A.C. Mackie, <u>Indonesian Inflation</u> (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1967).

[86] Such attempts are described as half-hearted because of the only passing attention they received from Sukarno. For certain there was a lack of resources for economic development but outside resources, Sukarno was told, were available should he decide to concentrate on rehabilitation. The basic problem, then, seems to have been one of priorities and will.

[87] Robert M. Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case", World Politics, 1971, Vol. XXIII, No.3, pp.398-430.

[88] Ruth McVey notes that between 1958 and 1965 over 4,000 Indonesian officers were trained in the United States. Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army", Indonesia, 1972, No. 13, p.169. Also see Guy Pauker, "General Nasution's Mission to Moscow", Asian Survey, 1961, Vol.I, No.1.

[89] For a good discussion of Army philosophy see Michael Ehrmann, The Indonesian Army Under Guided Democracy (unpublished M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1967), Chap.II.

[90] From an interview with Nugroho Notosusanto, the head of the military's history center, March 1972. One could, of course, argue with Nugroho as to whether armies with such experience are always forces for modernization.

[91] Murtopo rather wildly predicted that Indonesia would catch up with Japan after the 25 year period.

[92] In a recent University of Indonesia seminar on economic growth Professor Sarbini Sumawinata challenged several of the government's technocrats and their predictions concerning the rate of growth of the GNP in Indonesia during the next decade. In a debate which he seemed to win, Sarbini said that present growth could not be sustained because of the low investment rate. The high growth rates now, he said, were the result of rehabilitation or quick yields that were brought about by simple infrastructure improvement. See Tempo August 14, 1971 and Melihat Kedepan Perspektif Ekonomi Indonesia (A Future Perspective of the Indonesian Economy) (Djakarta: LP38, 1971).

[93] The government is torn between the demands of the cities for low and stable rice prices and the countryside's demands for high but stable prices. A government supply bureau, Bulog, was set up to maintain price stability but the price decision definitely went in favor of the cities. Polomka notes that during 1970-1 Bulog acquired some 600,000 tons of rice at one-half the world market price and even then secured only from middlemen which meant the farmer did not even get the minimum price set by the government. Polomka, op.cit., p.15. This continues while consumption of luxury goods in the major cities, especially Djakarta, runs wild. Another development from this system is that rice in Java, a rice deficit area, is cheaper than in several rice surplus areas in the Outer Islands.

[94] Ben Higgins, "Survey of Recent Developments" Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 1972, Vol. VIII, No.1, p.25.

[95] Kompas April 11, 1972.

[96] Huntington, op.cit., p.222.

[97] This says nothing about the manner of goal selection which must be largely at the ruler's discretion. The paths to the goal are also defined by the ruler. Sukarno probably felt that his path for the completion of the "revolution" was a correct one. Hence, perhaps it should be said that "no deviation from the ruler's path to the goal can be allowed".

[98] All of this is in very different perspective than it is usually presented. For very Western approaches to the Sukarno-Suharto struggle see Justus Van der Kroef, "Sukarno's Fall", Orbis, 1967, Vol. XI, No.2; and Donald Hindley, "The Alirans and the Fall of the Old Order", Indonesia, 1970, No.9.

[99] The Sukarno-Suharto relationship can be viewed much like Karna's dilemma before the Bhrata Yudha as shown in the wajang kulit. Karna, of course, chose to follow his master rather than join the "right" and victorious side.

[100] Portions of the military had opposed Sukarno's confrontation policy and the increasing influence of Subandrio's intelligence organization. Murtopo carried on secret negotiations with Malaysia about confrontation. See Ekpres September 6, 1971 for a cover story on Murtopo with much biographical data.

[101] See Feith, op.cit., pp. 98-101 about this pressure.

[102] See Sinar Harapan January 3-5, 1972 for a series of articles on the NU Congress. Subchan, a young energetic leader, was subsequently removed from the party hierarchy. NU members that I spoke with were positive that some sort of deal had been made with Murtopo.

[103] Murtopo's power is largely non-institutionalized, and the military hierarchy has little control over his actions as he is responsible only to the President. Allegedly, this has given rise to some personal and institutional rivalries within ABRI. For some comments on this see Rosihan Anwar in Pedoman February 7, 1972.

[104] This was said in anger on January 6, 1972 in reply to the "Mini" protests - see Sinar Harapan of the same date.

[105] Justus Van der Kroef, "New Political Patterns in Indonesia", World Today, 1969, Vol. 25, No.5, p.219.

[106] Murtopo's ability to play what Indonesians call a "cowboy" role can probably be attributed to the lesser influence of prijaji culture in the area where he was born and raised -- the pasisir. It is worth noting that while those around Suharto including the ASPRI and Madame Suharto have not been able to avoid the "corruptor" label, the President has been able to do so.

[107] See Van der Kroef, op.cit., p.222 and Polomka, op.cit., pp.179-96 for a discussion of the Muslim-Christian conflict.

[108] The "Mini Affair" was a very complex issue. For further details see my manuscript (in preparation), "Elite Conflict in Indonesia: The Minatur Indonesia Indah Project".

[109] ABRI seems to be intent on "depoliticizing" Islam, partly because of its potential as an opposition force and partly because of the impossibility of communication between the two. Javanese, since independence, have consistently shown their inability to trust or communicate with "modernist" Muslims and vice versa. The biggest fear of all the elite is an Islam-non-Islam split which would polarize the polity into two almost equal parts. To help avoid this, ABRI believes the NU also must eventually abandon its political functions.

[110] This happened to Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey with their monograph on the G-30-S. Anderson and McVey, op.cit., passim. Its interpretation of events was exactly opposite from the military's and the army could not believe that it was written with no ulterior motives. To this day, over 6 years since the paper was written, interviewees and newspapers still lash out at the two scholars as tools of communism and opponents of the regime.

A more recent example is the visit of Professor Zasloff of the University of Pittsburgh. He has no claim to be a scholar of Indonesian politics. He made a lecture on political development in Semarang and mentioned that Indonesia was still hunting for institutions to fit the mood and temperament of its people -- which is obvious to anyone, if the changes of the party system are taken into consideration. Amir Machmud, Minister of Interior, immediately saw this as an attack on Pantjasila and the UUD45. Machmud invited Zasloff to stop interfering in Indonesia's internal affairs. See Tempo June 30, 1972.

[111]All listed are student protest actions. The first three were protests against corruption and <u>Golput</u> with the lack of real choice in the 1971 elections.

[112]Quoted in <u>Ekspres</u> September 6, 1971, p.16.

[113]T.D. Hafas editor of <u>Nusantara</u> was sentenced to jail for one year for such criticism and the magazine Sendi had its license revoked for much the same reason. On the Hafas case see <u>Tempo</u> September 18, 1971 and on <u>Sendi</u> see <u>Tempo</u> February 26, 1972 and <u>Sinar Harapan</u> March 1, 1972.

[114]Sumitro made this statement before the Foreign Correspondents Club in Djakarta on February 4, 1972.

[115]Amir Machmud has recently accused the press of deliberately mis-quoting and distorting his speeches and statements - See <u>Indonesia Raja</u> editorial June 13, 1972 and <u>Tempo</u> June 23, 1972. Earlier in the year <u>Sinar Harapan</u> was handled roughly by KOPKAMTIB for allegedly leaking an official background statement by BAKIN(Intelligence) Chief, Sutopo Juwono.

[116]<u>Harian Kami</u>, edited by Nono Anwar Makarim, is associated with the remnant of the youth forces of the Generation of '66. <u>Indonesia Raja</u> is an independent edited by Mochtar Lubis. <u>Abadi</u> is the voice of the "modernist" Muslims and is constantly at "war" with the army supported newspapers <u>Angkatan Bersendjata</u>, <u>Api Pantjasila</u> and <u>Berita Yudha</u> as well as the Golkar organ, <u>Suara Karya</u>.

[117]BIMAS (Bimbingan Masa) or Mass Guidance. There was also some heavy profit taking by high government people on "kickbacks" from the contract choices, if rumors and several confidential interviews are to be believed.

[118]This is one of the indications that Golkar is definitely subordinate to the government even in its parliamentary activities. The parliamentary discussions were little more than a repetition of previous public debate. The special committee on the problem issued a carefully worded report that was hardly objectionable to anyone, at least of on the government side, and that did not really tackle the issue at hand -- it was avoided by saying that the project was out of the DPR's competence if it was a private project. It did point out very well, however, the problem of the younger generation in communicating with the government. See DPR Memorandum 1076/P.Ch.M.I.I./72.

[119]Both Nasution and Budiman are non-Javanese and have a tendency to be too direct in their criticism. Neither are involved with the government, directly. Nasution does run the Djakarta City-sponsored Legal Aid Institute.

[120]Moertono, the military liaison with Golkar announced that the regional DPRD's would be torn apart and factionalized, hence paralyzed, if they had to select the region's governor. Sinar Harapan June 6, 1972. He seemed to be saying that they were not sufficiently dididik to handle the process.
The "Floating Mass", as described in the previous sections, is essentially a mis-reading of the method of operation of the American and British party systems. No local branches of parties will be allowed below the Kabupaten level except at election time every five years. The acceptance of such a plan reveals the idealistic nature of the government's conception of village life. If only parties could be removed, goes the argument, conflict at that level would disappear.

[121]See Gary Hansen, "Episodes in Rural Modernization: Problems in the BIMAS Program", Indonesia, 1971, No. 11.

[122]See my manuscript on the "Mini Affair".

[123]There is such a prohibition for Ministers and Secretary Generals but not for their wives and families or for the military at all.

[124]Sadikin explained his way out of the situation by saying that the Djakarta City Government had earlier given him authority to build a similar project. Murtopo offered no public explanation.

[125]Stories of corruption in Indonesia are numerous. For one such incident that never became public see my manuscript on the "Mini Affair". For excellent studies of the problem see Ted Smith, "Corruption in Indonesia", Indonesia, 1971, No. 11; and Soedarso, Korupsi di Indonesia (Corruption in Indonesia) (Djakarta: Bharata, 1969).

[126]Polomka, op. cit., pp. 24-6. Evidently, the idea was taken from the Malaysian Rural Development scheme. Statistics in Indonesia are highly suspect and with the pressure from above for progress and good results, it is probable that the control room figures are about as accurate as the "Vietnam Body-Count Totals".

CHAPTER IV

THE FUTURE OF JAVANIZATION

In the previous discussion, it was noted that there
are many basic similarities between the ideas, structures
and style of government in Mataram and in contemporary
Indonesia. The following list summarizes the major
similarities:

1) Structure: The formal and informal governmental
structure in Mataram and contemporary Indonesia are
extremely hierarchial in nature with very dominant rulers
and centers. The formal structure of the government does
not correspond to reality. The power and authority of
the ruler's assistants depends primarily on their personal
relationship to the ruler rather than on their formal
position in the hierarchy. There are no functioning
structures of mass participation in the political system.

2) Functions: The acknowledged primary function of the
government is to maintain "harmony" throughout the realm.
Thus, maintaining the status quo and stability are primary
goals of the regime. Various sorts of controls, manipu-
lations, and security measures are the main means to
ensure the establishment and maintenance of "harmony".
The government constantly struggles to prevent the
emergence of autonomous power centers within the realm

whether they be political or commercial. The chief
motivation for any form of change or "development" is to
strengthen the existing power distribution, not alter it.
3) Style: Both governments emphasize the correct approach
or form of approach to any problem much more than the
actual content of the policy. There is a high value placed
on single-mindedness of purpose and non-expression of
emotion or desire; hence, a style of wajang or shadow
politics is the result. There is little conception of
moral implications of power which provides many opportunities
for arbitrary use of state power and funds by the rulers.
There is little cognizance of the value of opposition or
criticism; it tends to be poorly tolerated or ignored.
On the whole, the style of government could best be
described as "protective superiority" or simply, paternalism.

There are many factors that could contribute to the
similarities described above. Basically, the diversity of
Indonesia has changed little since the time of Mataram.
While some of the tools of rulership, control and pene-
tration have changed since that time, the problems
associated with ruling the territory have not. The tools
of government may have improved but the forces of
disintegration may be stronger than previously.

The fact that Indonesia today is largely controlled
by the military may also contribute to some of the

similarities. Military norms which argue for stability and control must augment Javanese norms for such. Equally, the experiences of the constitutional democracy period, seemingly objectively showed Indonesians that Western style politics and government were ill suited either to the peculiarities of their nation or value system and increased a general desire for strong and authoritative government.

While one seeks to avoid the criticism of "cultural determinism", it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Javanese operating a government would operate it according to Javanese norms. Hence, it seems quite natural that the structure, functions and style of such a government would be rather Javanese. Further, the rules of participation and concept of the state would also be Javanese. The data given previously shows that, indeed, an overwhelming majority of all positions in the political, governmental and military elite are filled by Javanese or persons that are antagonistic toward the country's other major cultural group. Since the major characteristics of Guided Democracy and the New Order do correspond with the characteristics of Javanism, there is a strong indication that a process called Javanization has occurred within the political and governmental spheres.

On the Future of Javanization

The rulers of contemporary Indonesia have created
a government that might be best described as a neo-Mataram.
Javanese have imposed their conception of the state, their
ideas of proper political behavior, their own definitions
of the limits of political power and its uses on
Indonesian society. This process has been done under
the cloak of the search for Indonesia's true identity
and national soul. It has been made immeasurably easier
through the widespread adoption of a truly national
language, Bahasa Indonesia, rather than the use of
Javanese. Bahasa Indonesia has been greatly influenced
by the Javanese language but the national lingua franca
has had its own disintegrative effects upon Bahasa Djawa.
The same is true for much of what could be called
traditional Javanese culture. The Javanese have been
able to dominate but at the price of dilution of Javanism.

This dilution or softening of Javanism was
necessary for the creation of a nation out of a disparate
empire. Domination could never be clear and direct
imposition of one cultural pattern upon the rest of the
nation. If however, the domination were initiated and
implemented ostensibly as a genuine national phenomenon,
it might prove acceptable and eventually, become a
workable scheme. Assimilation to the "new" Indonesian-

-ness, though defined in a Javanese way, was conceivable
where any assimilation to Javanism was ipso facto
impossible.

Even the implementation of the "new" Indonesian
politics as defined by Javanese was to cost casualties
though far fewer than if Javanism had been imposed directly.
Certain sectors and segments of society would become
alienated, even revolt against the new definition of the
polity, but the question of ultimate success rested on
sheer politics, the politics of a minimal winning coalition,
and lastly on force.

The victory of the Javanese hinterland group of
the military led by Suharto was in a sense a regression
or "throw back" to control of the polity to the
traditionalist segment of the Javanese population. Since
Javanese aristocratic political culture has long been in
the process of decay and disintegration at the periphery,
only the remnant or rump of the totality of Java is
represented by this group. The actual functioning of the
government and political system would be much smoother
were it operating in the context of a traditional Javanese
polity such as Mataram. So, while the government attempts
to rule in a manner that closely resembles that of Mataram,
the society that it governs is very different from that
of Mataram.

Social change in Indonesia, particularly in Java, has gone on at a tremendous pace during the 20th century. The effects of the final years of Dutch Colonial Rule, the Great Depression, Japanese Occupation, the Revolution, the mass politics of Constitutional and Guided Democracy, vast overpopulation, rapid urbanization and widespread modern education have created a vortex of social mobilization[1] that has changed the face of contemporary Indonesia. Odd as it may seem, today the most traditional portions of Indonesia are the Outer Islands. They are more easily controlled than is Java through cooptation of the regional governmental and traditional elite by the central government.[2] The "concessions" of the governing elite to constitutionalism, parliaments, popular participation and ideas of popular sovereignty were made more to ethnically Javanese elements than they were to non-Javanese ones. As evidenced by the PKI and G-30-S, Javanese can also be the strongest enemies of Javanization, as defined here.

Djakarta, the most cosmopolitan and "Indonesian" of all the nation's cities, is the seat of the government. This capital city, located on the north coast of West Java, is far from the centers of traditional Javanese culture. Javanese are a minority of the capital's population. Djakarta in its own way is a force for the detraditionali-

zation of the government. There world culture and the
diverseness of the Indonesian cultures meet to form a
distinctive mix of style, form and behavior that assault
Javanism directly and influence a very large portion of
the rulers in everyday life.

It is in Djakarta and the associated university
towns that Javanese have started asking themselves what
Javanism is all about; what it is about Javanism that
is holding their society back and keeping Indonesia from
achieving the goals of modernity, stability and economic
growth that the elite espouses. Indonesians have their
own distinctive theories about prijaji-ism and neo-feudalism
and their effects on the society's functioning.[3]

The large numbers of Javanese in the government
and military is a fact of life that Indonesia will have
to live with for a long time. Present trends do not
reveal any desire on the part of Outer Islanders to join
the central government in greater numbers.[4] While some
Javanese are finding their way into commercial life and
some Outer Islanders (besides Christians) into government
service, the numbers are not large enough to have profound
effects on the ethnic composition of civil servants as a
group for several decades.

Likewise, the limitations and constraints on
political action and behavior that have been set by Javanese

are unlikely to be openly challenged and changed in the near future. The younger generation of Javanese and Outer Island elite are most likely going to grow up accepting the outlines of the state and government as it now stands. The Javanese definitions of this generation may well become the Indonesian definitions of the next generation.[5] Slow and constant change rather than a sudden shift in some of these fundamental definitions or limits is likely to occur. Erosion from the inside and change of the substance rather than the form is the most likely path for the future.

As Javanese and Javanized members of the elite change their own conceptions of politics, they are likely to change the definitions and limits of political action from the inside. Outside threats, whether it be from Islam, Communism or the West in the form of Democratic Socialism, have been successfully repelled by the core of Javanism but not without some change. Despite the limited horizons or worldview of the present ruling elite, they have been able to accept and use advice from other Javanese about innovations and changes that are desirable or necessary. Given the inclinations of Suharto and those around him, caution in any new undertaking is likely to continue to be a dominant quality. However, this is quite natural for anyone attempting to embark on "new" and untested paths of

governing. The major point is that innovations are
occurring within the framework that has been very loosely
but adamantly laid by Javanese themselves. Despite some
contestations to the contrary, the New Order has not
stagnated as yet. The idea of "dynamic stability" remains.

The greatest threats to the New Order and its form
of Javanism are the possibilities of a polarization between
Islamic and non-Islamic portions of the society, insufficient
attention to Outer Island demands for a larger portion of
the development budget and the increasing crisis of agri-
cultural poverty on Java itself. In order to prevent or
avoid chaos as a result of these problems, the government
will simply be forced to modify its own limits of behavior
and the distribution of power in the country. These
modifications will probably be small and initially, hard
to identify, but as in the past, Javanism will have to
adjust itself to a changing reality.

Up to the present, only minimal work has been done
by the New Order on creating institutions in the society
that can carry on its mission for even the so-called
period of 25 years of accelerated modernization. Of first
priority was the military and then the bureaucracy. The
reorganization and strengthening of the former seems
almost complete while the organization of the latter is
definitely fully underway. Golkar, relied upon without
much thought and of temporary necessity, will have to get

an increasing amount of attention, reorganization and
strengthening in the future, if indeed it is to be the
New Order's political tool for restructuring the Indo-
nesian polity. One prominent non-Javanese told me
"slowly but surely, the institutionalists are winning."[6]
If this is the case and institutionalization is a proper
path to attack and overcome the present ills of Indonesian
society, present trends augur well for Indonesia's future.[7]

Despite impressions to the contrary that may have
been created earlier in this paper, the "evils" of
contemporary Indonesian government do not arise from the
fact that Javanese control it. The very strength of
Javanese culture has been translated into an Indonesian
strength in the modern world. To make a value judgment
about Javanization is difficult but it may be that the
country has benefited and will continue to benefit from
the fact that Javanese rather than any other group control
the country. The inevitable process, as described by Lev,
could have been an extremely fortunate process. The
country has continuity of culture and rulership to rely
on and the dubious distinction of being ruled by a cultural
group that is known for its lack of extremism and overall
moderation in outlook, behavior and action.

The questions of the continuation of military rule,
actual commitment to moderniasasi and the like have little

importance in comparison with the fate of Javanization.
In fact, the answers to these questions may well depend
on the degree of legitimacy that non-Javanese cultural
groups accord to Javanization. For, ultimately, the
continuation of the nation depends on this very question
-- what is the fate of Javanization?

Notes on CHAPTER IV

[1]Social mobilization as defined in Karl Deutstch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", American Political Science Review, 1961, Vol.LV, No.3.

[2]I conclude this from the 1971 election results. The major tool of control of the outcome of the elections held by the government was its control of the bureaucracy of the entire country as well as the fact that Golkar was clearly the government "party". Despite the fact that Golkar is Javanese controlled, it did much better in many parts of the Outer Islands than in Java. Compare: Central Java - Golkar 54%; East Java - Golkar 50%; Djakarta - Golkar 42%; North Sumatra - Golkar 72%; Bali - Golkar 87%; Southeast Sulawesi - Golkar 92%; Riau - Golkar 77%; Djambi - 87%; and Kalimantan Selatan - Golkar 65%. These results were calculated from Sinar Harapan August 7, 1972.

[3]See Selo Soemardjan, "Asian Attitudes and Asian Development" Horizons, 1972, Vol. XXXI, No.2, pp.14-17; Soedjatmoko, Economic Development as a Cultural Problem (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957); Koentjaraningrat, "Masalah Sikap-Mental Yang Cocok Untuk Membangun" (The Problem of Mental Attitudes that Harmonize with Development) in Kejakinan dan Perdjuangan (Conviction and Struggle) (Djakarta: Gunung Mulia, 1972); "Beberapa Tjatatan Tentang Prijaji" (Some Notes About Prijaji) Sinar Harapan January 4, 1972. Also see the Panglima of Brawidjaja's statement on preventing prijaji and coolie attitudes, Sinar Harapan June 3, 1972. For an official view see Minister of Education Mashuri's article in Sinar Harapan June 28-29, 1972 which states that the present educational system breeds prijaji-ism. See Soedjatmoko's most recent statement on neo-feudalism in Sinar Harapan July 3, 1972.

[4]While no exact figures were available on such trends, interviews with both Javanese and non-Javanese with some knowledge on the subject indicated that the younger officer's corps of ABRI and the younger ranks of the civil service in the capital do not contain large numbers of non-Javanese. All of Indonesia's best universities are located on Java and the army's military academy is located in Magelang, just outside of Jogjakarta. Javanese obviously have the easiest access to them given the archipelago's poor communication system.

[5]This may seem to be somewhat of a contradiction given the rapid social change described in the previous paragraphs and it is. The elite has to accept these Javanese norms or be ostracized or destroyed by Javanese who still hold to them, namely the army. Like the PKI and ABRI under Sukarno, verbal acceptance does not mean that one does not strive to fight the limits of the system from within. The masses -- to use the term loosely -- especially on Java, have little reason to remain subdued or satisfied with a neo-Mataram type of political system. Given the traditional agrarian radicalism of Java and the continuance of the conditions that have encouraged it, the future is bleak unless there is change. Social explosions (the massacres) such as the ones that occurred after the G-30-S in 1965 are distinct possibilities in the future if the limits now placed on the polity are not relaxed. Survival, then, may dictate change. On these points see Sartono, "Peasant Radicalism in Java" in Claire Holt (ed.), Politics and Culture in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).

[6]Nono Anwar Makarim, editor of Harian Kami, in an interview, July 24, 1972.

[7]Huntington, op.cit., passim. postulates that institutionalization is the only path to stability for a polity such as Indonesia.

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GLOSSARY OF IMPORTANT INDONESIAN TERMS AND ACRONYMS

abangan — the Javanese masses that are Islamic in name only; their religious practices are a mixture of Islam, Hinduism and animism.

ABRI — Angatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of The Republic of Indonesia).

ASPRI — Asisten Pribadi (Personal Assistant); refers to President Suharto's personal staff.

BIMAS — Bimbingan Massa (Mass Guidance) – a government scheme for increasing rice production.

Brawidjaja — the Indonesian Army Division for the region of East Java.

bupati — the administrative head of a kabupaten or district.

Diponegoro — the Indonesian Army Division for the region of Central Java.

DPR — Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat (Council of People's Representatives or Paliament).

DPRD — Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah (Council of the People's Representatives of the Regions or Regional Parliament).

Gestapu or G-30-S — Gerakan Tigapuluh September (30th of September Movement).

Golkar — Golongan Karya (Functional Group); the government "party".

golongan tertentu — fixed or determined groups; used especially in reference to enemies of the state.

gotong-rojong — mutual or self-help; refers to doing things collectively rather than individually.

kabupaten	district; one administrative level below the Daerah Tingkat Satu or province; frequently referred to as Daerah Tingkat Dua (Second Level Region).
Kepala Daerah	literally Regional Head; today called governor.
Kepala Desa	Village Headman; in Java the term lurah is used.
kesatria	knight or soldier
kijaji	Islamic teacher
KINO	Kelompok Induk Organasasi (Mother Organization); refers to the seven different major divisions of functional groups within Golkar.
Konsepsi	Sukarno's idea for creating a stable government (1956).
massa bodoh	stupid or dumb masses
KOPKAMTIB	Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Command for Restoring Security and Public Order); an extra-constitutional military body set up in the wake of the G-30-S.
KORPRI	Korps Pegawai Negri (National Civil Servants Corps); one of the functional groups.
kraton	palace of the king or Sultan
lurah	village headman in Java; in the Outer Islands frequently called Kepala Desa.
MANIPOL	Political Manifesto; one of the key ideological symbols of the Sukarno regime.
MANDALA	the name given the command for the re-capturing of West Irian from the Dutch; Suharto was the head of this operation.
mantja negara	outer provinces

Masjumi	the "modernist" Muslim political party that was banned by Sukarno because of opposition to him.
MPR	Madjelis Permusjawarahan Rakjat (People's Deliberative Assembly or Super-Parliament).
musjawarah	consensus or unanimity
NASAKOM	Nasionalisme, Agama(Religion) dan Komunisme; another of the key symbols of the Sukarno regime.
negara agung	the king's land or the territory near the king's palace.
NU	Nahdatul Ulama; a "traditionalist" Muslim political party.
Panglima(Besar)	Regional Military Commander (Commander-in-Chief)
Parkindo	Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party)
prijaji	the aristocracy of the Javanese abangan masses.
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party).
PMI or Parmusi	Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party)
PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party).
PSI	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party);banned in 1960 by Sukarno.
PSII	Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia; a small Muslim party.
OPSUS	Operasi Chusus (Special Operations); led by Ali Murtopo

santri	a strict observer of Islam
Siliwangi	the Indonesian Army Division of the region of West Java
tanah sabrang	overseas territory
UUD45	Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (1945 Constitution).
wajang kulit	a shadow play made by using leather puppets; also frequently used to refer to the "Indonesian" style of politics.