A SPATIAL PLAN WITHIN A CONTEMPORARY MILIEU:
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

by

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ABSTRACT

A Spatial Plan within a Contemporary Milieu: The Republic of Korea

The intention of this thesis is to develop a spatial plan for an underdeveloped country within the constraints of the current milieu. A three level approach is taken to describe the environment into which the eventual plan must fit. The general theme that runs throughout the three levels is one of a central oriented society. The plan suggests that the most rational location of new development under these constraints is the suburban area of the primate city and that the form of development might best be industrial estates.

The first level of analysis deals with centralization trends in contemporary Korea; the country is currently undergoing rapid urbanization. This is most intense in the capital city of Seoul, where there is a centripetal concentration of economic activity as well as population.

The second level is an investigation of the Korean government development policy. The First (1961) and Second (1966) Five-Year Plans have given priority to economic efficiency and increasing the industrial-manufacturing sector.

The third level, the cultural milieu, offers up an historic precedent as a basis for contemporary society. Examination within this context of the current broad based education system and the structure of government reveal an apparent institutional manifestation of earlier philosophical tenets.

The above three levels of investigation are developed in a parallel fashion, coming together in the proposed plan for the Republic of Korea - suburban development of industrial estates near Seoul.
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PREFACE

In this thesis an attempt has been made to develop a spatial plan for an underdeveloped country. The proposed plan for development is one of suburban industrial growth patterns. I have not suggested this because of a preconceived preference for either suburban development or industrial expansion. This plan has been developed within the following constraints: (1) the cultural milieu; and (2) the structure and development policy of a stable incumbent government. It is this point that I consider to be the most significant issue that is to be raised by these efforts. To wit, a plan must be built with a profound understanding of the people and the institutional environment for which it is conceived.

Planning for a society presupposes a good degree of predictability. That is, a planner ought to be able to indicate the logical consequence of his plans. Planning in a foreign culture is all the more intricate because the reaction of the people to the same stimulus may not be similar to the reaction induced in another environment. To influence life in an alien culture involves tampering with basic habits that are manifest both in behavior and belief. It calls for a reorientation of value systems. But, most of all, it requires a constant and intensive analysis of the existing relationships among the various aspects of culture--economic, social, educational, political and religious--before any kind of prediction can be made of the results that will follow the disturbance of the balance between them.
OVERVIEW

Broadly speaking, this thesis is devoted to looking at several aspects of a phenomenon that is occurring in Korea. The phenomenon is the centripetal force of Seoul, the capital city. Throughout the thesis, the terms centripetal, centralization, center oriented, et. al. are used interchangeably to express the finer nuances of this phenomenon in context. Generally, the centralization that is being considered refers not only to the physical massing of population, economic activity and administrative power in one city, but also refers to an historic and cultural value structure of the population. The latter, a perceived pyramid of central authority and the equation of this with superior status, is related back to the Confucian structure during the Yi Dynasty.

The centralization phenomenon will be examined in three sections: (1) Centralization Trends in the Republic of Korea; (2) Government Development Policy; and (3) The Cultural Milieu. Each thread of the picture shall be developed in an independent manner converging in conclusion in a suggested spatial plan for development within the described circumstance.

That there is a massive demographic shift occurring in Korea at present is undeniable. The primacy of Seoul has become firmly established and shows no sign of waning.

It is contended in this paper that the centralization in Seoul is not based simply on a matter of economics, any more than it is solely education, history or some mystical aura. It is clear that the migration is a complex phenomenon that must be studied from a broad interdisciplinary base.

Whether we view this centripetal movement as a result of "push"
related to poor conditions of the rural areas or "pull" related to economic, educational, government or whatever attraction to the city, either perceived or real, is not the primary concern in this paper. What is significant is the fact of centripetal movement. Energy will be expended to show various components of the phenomenon that suggest it is a combination of forces including historic antecedents. The degree of importance that is attached to the various reasons for the migration is less important than the fact that all the forces exist. In fact, the importance of the various component parts exists in a dynamic equilibrium. The significance of push factors in the rural areas, be they poor harvest, plague, generally poor living conditions, as well as pull factors such as economic, education, government opportunities in the primate city will both ebb and flow in significance. For instance, the initiation of a large scale public works project in the city may have a diminished pull impact if it should occur during a bountiful harvest, or conversely, a static level of perceived economic opportunity may become grossly exaggerated in the event of drought in the agricultural regions.

Thus, the degree of importance of the various push and pull factors is of less significance than to realize that these factors all exist and that to understand the centralization phenomenon, one must understand its distinct component parts.

CENTRALIZATION TRENDS

The first substantive section of this thesis is devoted to a description of the centralization trends in the Republic of Korea today. The bulk of this deals with the population trends, especially during the
The population growth rate for the country has dropped from 2.9 in 1955 to 1.8 in 1970; this has been concurrent to a massive population shift to the urban areas.

Urbanization in Korea, as urbanization throughout the underdeveloped world, has shown no signs of letting up. The Korean example has been distinctive in that internal migration has produced not so much a broadly diffused hierarchy of urban areas as the increasing population concentration in Seoul and to a lesser degree, Pusan.

After looking at the migration per se, the concept of centralization is expanded to include economic concentration in Seoul. As might be expected, the capital city functions as more than just the center of population growth; here, some of the linkages between economic expansion and the migration are considered.

**Government Development Policy**

Economic expansion in Seoul can be considered as a natural outcropping of the government development policy. In the First and Second Five-Year Plans for economic development, the emphasis has been on the industrial, manufacturing and export sector to the neglect of agriculture, fisheries, forestry, etc.

The absence of locational criteria in planning has done little to stem the tide of population and economic centralization. The government's role along with the cultural dictates, to be discussed, have been significant in shaping a society which has as its focus a center, a hub. There is no explicit government policy of centralization, but in the absence of a spatial dimension, there is little impetus to change existing patterns.
Cultural Milieu

The section on government development policy is followed by investigation of various tangential aspects of the cultural milieu. The historic antecedents, modern education and government structure will each be discussed, and their importance in influencing the centripetal phenomenon illustrated.

It is not sufficient to study the contemporary trends buttressed by government policy and then expect to comprehensively understand the behavior of the population. In the case of Korea, a look at the history of the country adds to a broader, and hence, more profound perspective for understanding the migration and other events.

During the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910), Confucian philosophy placed the rule of the country in the hands of the King. He, as the supreme head of state, derived his mandate from Heaven. The structure of authority was such that even the poorest people had a direct linear relationship with the King. This disavowed the legitimacy of any middle level of authority such as the Daimyos (feudal lords) of the Kamakura period in Japan.

An understanding of history is especially helpful in putting into perspective, the values and outlook of the people in a tradition-bound country such as Korea. The historic role of Confucianism in education and the structure of government have contemporary manifestations.

Two facets of education shall be viewed in conjunction with the population shift and the centripetal phenomenon. First, the more apparent role of education is that of a catalyst for social change in terms of individual perception of education as a means of social and economic advancement. The second role of education in the centripetal picture is two-pronged: the structure of the educational system as a direct
influence; and the teaching methodology and philosophy as an indirect influence to the central directed movement of the migration and the exaggerated primacy of Seoul.

A section is also devoted to the political and government structure. The "central oriented" emphasis has been evident in all government since before the Yi Dynasty to the present. Here, as in the consideration of education in Korea, the influence can be viewed as having two distinct but related aspects in regard to the centrality. The first aspect is again an historic tradition of distinct central authority. The second is the structure of modern government in Korea.

The Yi Dynasty ruled Korea with a strong central government. The influence of the Confucian form of government was considered universal in that it drew the frames of reference for the religious, political and social activity of the day. With this as an antecedent, the Japanese held Korea as a colony from 1910 to 1945, maintaining a strict autocratic central government. With the defeat of Japan in 1945, the legal authority changed from a foreign state to the hands of the people. However, the strong central government continued under the increasingly strong hand of Rhee, Syngman until 1960.

After a student revolution in 1960, the structure of government changed to a parliamentary system with a weak executive office. A year later this government was overthrown by a military junta which took over legislative, judicial and executive functions. It was in 1963 that a new constitution was approved by popular referendum and Park, Chung-hee, the leader of the military junta, was elected chief executive of the "Third Republic".

The enabling legislation of the Third Republic gives the President
strong powers and further leaves him virtually independent of legislative
or judicial review. The power of the national executive in administrative
control is at the cost of local autonomy. In this brief introduction,
suffice to say that this is manifest in the President's power of executive
appointment of the local level.

To this point, the purpose of this thesis is to present the
milieu into which a spatial plan will be introduced. This is done in
terms of describing current centralization trends and then contributing
factors which are considered causal, — government policy, cultural back­
ground and contemporary institutional structure.

The Plan

The final substantive section of this paper is devoted to the
description of a spatial planning concept that would be applicable in
Korea. The purpose of the scheme is to relieve mounting pressures on
the city of Seoul. This in and by itself would be a simplistic exercise
of advocating rural dispersion of development, except that the success of
the plan depends ultimately on its "fit" with the milieu in which it must
function. For this reason, a comprehensive view of the problem and the
accompanying environment, history, politics and culture is essential
before a feasible plan can be put forth.

Given: — the government policy priorities of industrial growth.
Proposal: — the concept of industrial estates is a viable economic
development alternative which ought to satisfy the strict economies of decision­making.

Given: — the high centripetal migration
- the historic centripetal orientation
 - the present manifestations of central power and status.
Proposal: — location in the Seoul suburban area would be a positive
location for development.
Chapter One

CENTRALIZATION TRENDS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Population Growth in Korea

It is difficult to trend population figures from before 1945 to the present because of the partition of the country after the Second World War. Suffice to mention that from 1920 to 1940, the population of the entire peninsula grew from 17 million to 23.5 million. In 1946, the estimated population of the Republic of Korea (south) stood at 19.4 million and by 1955 this figure rose to 21.5 million (Korea Annual, 1971). The succeeding decade brought about an exceedingly high level of growth both as a rate and in absolute figures. By 1966, the population of the Republic stood at 29.2 million, an increase of almost 8 million people (Choe, E.H. and Park, J.S., 1969). The most recent decennial census of 1970 put the population at 31.6 million (Korea Annual, 1971).

The significance of such an increase in a country the size of Korea with its existing high population density is difficult to comprehend. The density for the whole of Korea in 1968 was 312.2 persons per square kilometer (p/km²). This was higher than the 253 p/km² figure of Japan in 1968. In terms of absolute numbers, an increase of 10 million people in fifteen years ending in 1970 is greater than the entire population of Formosa or the total combined population of Scotland, Ireland and Wales. This increase was equal to a 47 per cent increase over the 1955 population of Korea (Korea Annual, 1971).

As impressive as the absolute figures may be, the rate of increase provides a more readily comprehensible indication as to the dynamic nature of the population growth phenomenon. The average annual
growth rate for the following years was: 1955-60, 2.9%; 1960-66, 2.4%; 1968, 2.2%; 1970, 1.8% (Choe, E.H. and Park, J.S., 1969; Korea Annual, 1971; Republic of Korea, 1971 C). This can be compared with the crude rate of net natural increase* of 1.01% for the relatively developed country of Canada ("Vital Statistics, December, 1971", 1972).

The decline in Korea's growth rate from 2.9% in 1960 to 1.8% in 1970 has been buttressed by government family planning programs carried out since 1962 (Republic of Korea, 1971 C). The impact of family planning publicity has had greatest effects in the major cities. It is there that mass media has a wider audience and the population is generally more receptive to new concepts. There was some indication of a falling birth rate in 1962, before the implementation of the government family planning program, and now the net effect has been an apparent wide based support of family planning. A recent government publication boasts "The percentage of persons who support the concept of family planning has increased to ninety per cent while thirty per cent of the population actually practice family planning programs." (Republic of Korea, 1971 D:80). While the statement is broad and ill-defined, it does project a strong general sentiment.

The significance of the increase in population on the national level lies in the fact that the increase has been at a declining rate. This is an important fact to bear in mind when confronted with the situation in urban areas where the population is increasing at an ever increasing rate. This is happening in a situation where the crude rate of net natural increase is in all likelihood well below the national level. The net population increase in urban areas then must be attributed to other than natural increase, i.e., a net in-migration from other areas.

* January to December, 1971 birthrate 1.74% minus death rate 0.73% ("Vital Statistics, December, 1971", 1972).
Urbanization in Underdeveloped Countries

The drift of population to urban areas is by no means unique to the Korean scene. Before discussing the Korean migration in particular, some broader comments about the growth of urban areas in underdeveloped countries in general are appropriate. Urbanization is increasingly apparent throughout the world; almost everywhere in the world urbanization is taking place at an accelerating rate. Korean urbanization then is not a unique phenomenon. The issue to be raised later, however, is that there are unique features in the contemporary milieu that contribute to the phenomenon.

Before going any further, "urbanization" ought to be carefully defined. Kingsley Davis (1965) refers to it as the proportion of the total population that is concentrated in an urban area or a rise in this proportion. A distinction must be made between population growth that is occurring in urban areas and urbanization. The former, if it takes place with a proportionate growth in the overall national population, reflects urban growth, but is not urbanization by this definition.

With this in mind, some notes by Gerald Breese are significant in viewing the world urbanization trends.

...In relative terms, the world's population grew by ...eleven percent in the 1930's, ten per cent in the 1940's and nineteen per cent in the 1950's...Urban population (20,000 and over) in each of these four decades increased by 30, 23, and 42 per cent; the city population (100,000 and over) increased by 33, 25, and 46 per cent; the successive increases in big city population (500,000 and over) were 32, 28, and 57 per cent. (Breese, 1970:37).

Breese continues and gives several generalizations about urbanization in developing countries that "...are so defensible for known reasons, that they might be considered 'givens'". (Breese, 1970:42).
For example, he asserts that although ranges are still unclear it is assumed that there will be a continued increase in total population. It is further assumed that there is likely to be a very rapid increase in urban population. As he notes from United Nations sources, not only has the rate of rural to urban migration increased considerably, but there is also much evidence that it is likely to increase very rapidly in the coming years (Breese, 1970).

Another of Breese's few assumptions in regard to urbanization is that "cities are here to stay. They are quite clearly unexpendable; there are no alternatives to their de-emphasis; no workable substitute has been invented; no modern nation of any size can exist without one." (Breese, 1970:43). In his estimation, the Soviet Union was one of the few countries that might have demonstrated possibilities of development without large cities, but they too seem to have discovered the necessity of urbanization. It is not a question of either cities or something else, but whether existing city distribution and size are proper and how their positive aspects might be best planned for. "Realistically speaking, we are doubtless committed for some time to cities and to big cities." (Breese, 1970).

There are two thoughts that are appropriate here before a fuller investigation of the urbanization and planning in Korea can be considered. The first is from a paper that Breese presented to the International Conference on Urban Problems and Regional Development held in 1970 at Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea.
In newly developing nations of the world the day never ends without an increase in urban population. There is no likelihood that this situation will change. Responsible urban officials and their citizenry will awaken every morning with the uncomfortable knowledge that the problems of their cities are larger than they were the day before and will again be larger the next day. The tide never recedes; it only comes in. (Breese, 1970:52).

The problems of cities appear to be overwhelming and almost unmanageable, but they must be overcome. Fundamental issues are involved. Tarlok Singh, a long time influential figure in the work of the Indian Planning Commission has noted:

An adequate urban policy cannot emerge until the role of the cities and towns as a positive ingredient in national economic development has been visualized clearly. There are two questions to be answered. How can the gains which the concentration of population at given points and the development of economic and social overheads associated with it be turned into a dynamic and constructive force for progress? How can the possible adverse consequences of this process be kept to a minimum? (Prakash and Jacobson, 1967:42).

Urbanization in Korea

As in most developing countries, large scale rural to urban migration is an issue in Korea. There has been a decreasing average annual population increase rate which stood at 2.4% as of 1967. The average annual urban population increase rate for the same year, however, was 7%, of which 5% was by rural to urban migration (Ro, Chung-hyun, 1971). This is rather blatantly contrasted with the average 1960-1968 annual growth rate for the rural population of .75% (Choe, Yang-boo, 1971). The table below shows that this is not just a recent shift, but one that has been going on since at least before the Korean war. In 1949, only 20.02% of the total population lived in roughly defined urban areas. By 1966, the figure had grown
to 33.48% and by 1968, 48.3%. This reflects a total of 14.76 million people (Ro, Chung-hyun, 1971:10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City Population (%)</th>
<th>Rural Population (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>20.02</td>
<td>79.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>25.50</td>
<td>74.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>28.78</td>
<td>71.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>33.58</td>
<td>66.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>48.30</td>
<td>51.70</td>
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(Ro, Chung-hyun, 1971: Table 3).

In 1966, the Economic Planning Board, a ministry level bureau in the national government, in conjunction with the Population and Development Studies Center of Seoul National University, conducted an extensive survey of current demographic issues (Choe, E.H. and Park, J.S., 1969). One of the main purposes of the survey was to monitor the migration of population during the preceding five years. By comparing the respondents' place of residence five years earlier, information was secured concerning the number of persons more than five years old who had changed their place of residence during the five years and were at the new residence at the time of the survey. The population was then classified into those who were living in the same house five years earlier; those who had changed houses but were living in the same province; and those who had moved to another province.

The survey's findings showed that an estimated 1.1 million persons had moved to cities of 50,000 or more during the five year period.
880,000 of them moved to Seoul or Pusan. These estimates only account for inter-provincial migration. Another 1.1 million people were estimated to have participated in intra-provincial movement (Choe, E.H. and Park, J.S., 1969:38). When inter- and intra-provincial in-migration is considered as an aggregate, the percentage of si, eup and myon* areas represent 64.08%, 8.41% and 27.51% respectively. Urbanization then, represents an overwhelming predominance of the migration (Ahn, Kye-choon, 1966).

A later study, (Lee, Han-soon, 1969) that dealt with the same period as the above study, regards urbanization as an even higher proportion of the migration. In this independent study, the purpose was to investigate "...the general pattern and character of migration related with cities in terms of direction and quantity of movement." (Lee, Han-soon, 1969:75). The results indicate that net urban migration comprised 90% of the internal movement in Korea**. It is disaggregated to show: rural-to-urban areas, 40%; inter-urban, "cross-current", 34%; and urban-to-rural areas, 15.5%.

Historic Perspective, Seoul

Lee, Man-gap (1970 A), a noted sociologist at Seoul National University has recently pointed out some of the benchmarks in Seoul's growth. Just before the turn of the twentieth century, the population of the capital city was about 200,000. He writes of photographs showing "...oxen dozing in the middle of Chong-no, a main thoroughfare (suggesting) the leisurely pace of life in that quiet city." Even twenty years later in 1915, however,

* Roughly translated: city, town and rural aggregate.
** It is assumed that the remaining 10% unaccounted for by Lee is inter-rural.
the Japan which ruled Korea as a de jure colony, heavily influenced the pattern of urbanization. Urbanization in Korea under the Japanese was extremely rapid. This was due to expanding economic opportunity in the urban areas and also to the "poverty conditions" of the densely populated agricultural areas (Wilkinson, 1954).

By 1935, the population had reached 400,000 and the metropolitan of the city was well underway (Lee, Man-gap, 1970 A). As a colony, Korea was strongly influenced by the political fortunes of Japan. In 1936, with Japan's expansion into Manchuria and North China, Seoul's population nearly doubled to 730,000. By 1942, it reached a high of 1.1 million. However, Korean cities were not developing as integrated parts of a national economy, but primarily as subservient administrative and distribution centers for the Japanese exploitation of Korean natural resources (Wilkinson, 1954).

Towards the end of the Second World War, Seoul's population reflected Japan's fortunes of war as both diminished. By 1945, just prior to the defeat of Japan and the consequent liberation of Korea, the population of Seoul stood at 900,000 (Lee, Man-gap, 1970 A). "In a circle of cause and effect, the capital's troubled economy was further worsened as many people left for the countryside. So as life became more difficult in Seoul, even more citizens were driven away." (Lee, Man-gap, 1970 A).

With the liberation in August, 1945, Seoul's population began to grow again and had reached 1,700,000 just before the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. Wartime conditions and the military retreat from Seoul reduced the city to less than half-size, where it remained until later in the war. By 1955, the population was back up to 1,600,000 and went on to increase at a constant rate, reaching 3,500,000 ten years
later in 1965. Three years after that, in 1968, the 4,500,000 level had
been passed (Lee, Man-gap, 1970 A). Most recently population figures show
that in October, 1970, the Seoul population had reached 5.5 million (Korea
Annual, 1971).

These statistics in and by themselves are impressive and
warrant note, but have little relevance to the planner unless put into
some context. The importance of these data in the planning process comes
forth when viewed together with such complementary data as: population
growth for the country as a whole; Seoul's growth vis a vis other cities;
migration; etc.

Centralization of the Population in Korea

It has been amply illustrated that there has been definite
urbanization trends in Korea during the last 15-20 years. Now, a closer
scrutiny of the data indicates that the movement towards the cities in
fact is largely a movement towards the capital city of Seoul and perhaps
Pusan.

Referring again to the Economic Planning Board and Seoul
National University demographic survey (Choe, E.H. and Park, J.S., 1969),
some significant facts are brought forth. That urbanization has not been
a broad based phenomenon taking place in many centers around the country
is supported by the following ratios of in-migrants to indigenous residents.
For Seoul and Pusan during the period 1960-1966, this ratio was 57.2:100
almost four times that for the country as a whole and 4.4 times that for
all other regions. This was at the same period where the ratio of out-
migrants for Seoul and Pusan was less than two-thirds that of the rest
of the country. The net result was a net ratio of 48.6:100 vis a vis
a -3.8:100 for all other regions. (See chart below).
## Table Two

**Migration Status Ratio**

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<th>All Korea</th>
<th>Seoul Pusan</th>
<th>All Other Regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Out-migrants per 100 indigenous residents</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-migrants per 100 indigenous residents</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net-migrants per 100 indigenous residents</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-migrants per 100 out-migrants</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>205.0</td>
<td>93.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(adapted from Choe E.H. and Park, J.S., 1969:90)

Although the above ratios are aggregated for Seoul and Pusan, an earlier study (Ahn, Kye-choon, 1966) gives some insight as to how the disaggregated ratios might look. Of all migrants in the country, it was estimated that 40.85% were bound for Seoul. This far exceeds the gross in-migration for all other urban areas for all provinces which was 23.23%.

For the period 1966-1968, urbanization was a continuing phenomenon in Korea, although as suggested above for 1960-1966, the rates varied. Seoul witnessed an annual growth rate of 6.96% where Jeonbuk, a rural agricultural province, had a rate of 2.36% (Choe, Yang-boo, 1971). The disparity of growth rates is seen not only by comparing Seoul to rural regions, but also in comparison with Pusan, the second largest city. Pusan had a gross out-migration of 131,000 whereas Seoul, a city with 2.9 times the population, had a smaller absolute out-migration of 122,000 (Choe, E.H. and Park, J.S., 1969:90). Korea Annual, 1971 reports that from 1966 to 1970, Seoul grew from 3.8 to 5.5 million, a net increase of
45%: Pusan, during the same period, grew from 1.43 to 1.88 million, a net increase of 31%.*

Centralization of Economic Activity in Korea

The phenomenon of urbanization and the centralization in Seoul is not only a shift in population; as might be suspected, there is a burgeoning of economic activity as well. This is worthy of note inasmuch as the great cities of Asia do not share the European tradition of being centers of trade and commerce. Cities such as Peking, Kyoto, and Seoul had as their raison d'etre, palacial and temple functions, unlike London, Paris or Amsterdam, which originated and grew as centers of trade and commerce (Breese, 1969).

The present degree of centralization of economic activity is extreme. Seoul as the capital city houses the main office of virtually every branch, every bureau, and every department of the national government. Every entrepreneur who wishes to take out a development permit or engage in commercial activity that falls under government regulation, must deal with the central bureaucracy. Likewise, Seoul, as the seat of every diplomatic mission to Korea, becomes a necessary place of call for businessmen wishing to deal in international trade. The city also functions as the financial center of the country and the head office of every major bank in Korea is consequently located there.

In the words of the Mayor of Seoul:

Seoul is the center of government, business, finance, industry, education, science, and culture in Korea. In many ways Seoul combines the functions of Washington, New York, Boston, Pittsburgh and Detroit. (Yang, Taek-shik, 1970).

* A portion of the population growth must be attributed to a recent boundary change in the metropolitan area.
The foregoing all tend to point up the findings of the above demographic survey which in the words of the authors illustrates that in Korea, "...internal migration produced not so much a broadly diffused urbanization as the concentration of an increasing population in one or two large cities." (Choe, E.H. and Park, J.S., 1969:35). A close look at the data from the survey as well as other sources noted above, further indicate that although Korea may have two millionaire cities, both growing at fast rates, Seoul has been much more predominant as the center of growth. This is seen in this section on centralization trends, and will be further illustrated in succeeding sections on historic development, government and economics, and finally in the proposed plan.
Chapter Two

GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Economic Planning in Korea

The Korean War, which started in 1950, wrought tremendous economic havoc upon the country and created a great deal of social upheaval, without creating either political unity or total disruption. Throughout the 1950's Rhee, Syngman continued in power and his government became increasingly autocratic (Henderson, 1968). In 1960, when the national uprising, led by the nation's students, overthrew the Rhee government, the new leaders dismantled Rhee's strong presidential system, set up parliamentary rule, and allowed freedom of speech and press. In less than a year, however, there was a split in the ruling party which virtually paralyzed the operation of the government (Henderson, 1968).

The subsequent military coup of 1961 brought into power a nationalistic and future-oriented leadership that espoused the national goal of economic modernization. After the military regime was voluntarily transferred to a civilian government in 1963, the government moved increasingly toward the recognition that economic development was the key to its own political success, as well as to the establishment of a stable Republic. It saw economic development as the means of overcoming negativism and frustration in Korea (Kim, C.I. Eugene, 1964).

With the emergence of a political leadership committed to
economic development, the nation's economy moved ahead rapidly after 1963. The economic progress was all the more remarkable in view of the country's earlier economic history. The story of the 1950's and the early 1960's had been one of overall economic stagnation. After an initial period of recovery from the Korean war, per capita income (GNP) remained stationary from 1958-1963 despite massive United States assistance. In addition, the country was in a state of chronic inflation, which became significantly worse between 1961 and 1963 as a result of attempts by the military regime to increase capital formation and to decrease the country's dependency on foreign aid through a very high rate of monetary expansion. A number of economic planning programs were sidetracked because of political developments (Korea Annual, 1971).

First Five-Year Plan

The official First Five-Year Plan was formally adopted in 1962, but was immediately attacked by the business and academic communities as well as by the political opposition. Goals were considered unrealistically high and an over-emphasis on monetary policy was charged (Kim, Nak-kwan, 1971). With the drought and subsequent poor harvests of 1962 and 1963, the First Plan was relegated to practical oblivion.

A revision of the First Five-Year Plan, which amounted to a drastic and rather arbitrary scaling down of targets, was completed in 1964, but it was largely ignored at the implementation level. Instead, the government's economic efforts turned primarily toward economic stabilization. The major policy efforts in 1964 and 1965 were devoted to curbing the rate of inflation by means of fiscal and monetary restraint, by promoting exports and establishing import-substitute industries by
means of devaluation and import liberalization and by progressively expanding the role of the price system to achieve more efficient resource allocation by loosening direct controls. The stabilization efforts met with substantial success, as did the export drive and policy attention again shifted toward emphasis on economic growth. Work on the Second Five-Year Plan started in 1965; the plan was approved by the President in August, 1966 and went into effect in January, 1967 (Adelman, 1969).

Second Five-Year Plan: Failure to Recognize Rural Regions

During the drafting of the Second Plan, one set of proposals was put forth which argued for continued expansion of exports and of agricultural production. The suggestion was that the plan ought to incorporate regional dimensions into its body. This would be accomplished by increasing reliance on a rural oriented industrial sector to supply the export commodities.

Stronger linkages between the urban and rural populations and improvement of the incomes of the rural inhabitants so that they could buy more of the rapidly growing industrial production were implicit in this suggestion. (Fei and Ranis, 1964). The basic strategy of export-led industrial development was generally accepted, but the concept of dispersion by rural industrial development was not. There was general concern that decentralized, small-scale enterprises might be less efficient and thereby impair the competitiveness of Korean exports in world markets. Although there was a willingness to give at least equal, if not some preferential treatment to smaller scale industry, there was a reluctance to try to push such industry out into the rural areas as
Fei and Ranis proposed. While recognizing that the output of the agricultural sector would grow less rapidly than that of manufacturing, farm income would continue to rise at a satisfactory rate. It was expected that this would occur partly as a result of the continuation of a First Plan trend where the agricultural population remained relatively stable while the amount of arable land was expanded. The population shift from rural to urban areas was inevitable as it was a priori that any rapid expansion of employment opportunities would occur in the cities (Cole and Nam, 1964).

Poor Performance in the Rural Sector

At the same time, the weakest part of the Second Plan was its program for the agricultural sector. Although the goal of self-sufficiency in food grains production was at the head of the list of targets, there was no attempt made to relate investments and policies to targets or to indicate the other kinds of inputs required to expand the agricultural output. Agricultural self-sufficiency has been a major target in all the plans; however, not only was this not achieved, but demand was underestimated.* The Second Plan food grains targets were above the First Plan and the Revised First Plan target levels, but slightly less than actual 1965-66 performance. Recently (1968-69) there was actually evidence of a slowdown in agricultural development programs (Kanesa-Thasen, 1969).

* Actual output of rice and other grains exceeded the First Plan and Revised First Plan targets, but the net export balance in rice in 1959-61 practically disappeared during 1962-66, while imports of other grains, cereals and cereal preparations rose sharply in 1962-66 over 1959-61 levels (Kanesa-Thasen, 1969).
The fragmentation of holdings that followed land reforms after World War II, especially because of new small holdings, made credit on reasonable terms impossible. This certainly added to the slowdown. The government's response was not to increase credit substantially, but to raise the minimum for the legal holding size. Another factor--revealed in April, 1968, was that farmers' incomes rose by only 8% in constant 1956 prices between 1960 and 1966, making it difficult to mobilize savings for agricultural investment* (Kuznets, P.W., 1969).

In terms of per capita income (GNP), the disparity between "farm households" and "non-farm households" is evidencing a widening gap. The Korean government's Economic Planning Board, Economic Survey, 1969, indicates that while the difference in farm and non-farm GNP was 20,000 won per capita in 1960, this amount had increased to 45,000 won in 1968 in 1965 constant market prices. From a parity position in 1960, the per capita GNP difference reached a disparity of 2.2 in 1968. Although the extreme may be somewhat exaggerated considering an unprecedented failure of crops due to drought in 1967 and 1968, the difference has been continuous and growing since 1960** (Republic of Korea, 1969,A).

Policy Emphasis in Industrial Sector

Meanwhile, the main choices confronting Korean planners in

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* The neglect of government investment described by Kuznets is further substantiated in detailed econometric analysis by Kim, Mahn-je and Irma Adelman, 1969.

** See accompanying table.
### Table Three

**Per Capita GNP of Farm and Non-farm Households**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Per Capita GNP of total</th>
<th>Per Capita GNP of farm</th>
<th>Per Capita GNP of Non-farm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(won)</td>
<td>Index</td>
<td>(won)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>23,573</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>15,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>23,876</td>
<td>101.3</td>
<td>17,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>24,023</td>
<td>101.9</td>
<td>15,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>25,494</td>
<td>108.1</td>
<td>16,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>26,023</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>18,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>28,108</td>
<td>119.2</td>
<td>18,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>31,287</td>
<td>132.7</td>
<td>20,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>33,422</td>
<td>141.8</td>
<td>18,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>36,936</td>
<td>156.7</td>
<td>18,279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

- All figures are estimated at 1965 constant market prices.
- Farm households include agriculture and fishery households.
- Total population is on the mid-year population, but farm population is on year-end population.
- Farm population in 1968 is estimated by the annual increase rate of 1.6 per cent during 1963-1966.
- 1965: 271.50 Won = $1.00 U.S.

(Source: Republic of Korea, 1969 A:207)
the area of industrial structure involved the division between agriculture and manufacturing and within manufacturing, the relative emphasis on light and heavy industry. The latter choice also has been related to the split between labor-intensive and capital-intensive production, the degree of integration of the industrial structure vs. international specialization, and thus the question of international trade patterns. There have been a number of shifts in the thinking of Korean policy-makers since the Korea war which have been reflected in the plan targets and strategies relating to industrial structure.

As early as the First Five-Year Plan, the emphasis in planning was on industrial structure. Although there was still concern about raising the relative output of capital goods, there was also a growing acceptance of the need for relatively high levels of imports and of the idea that the trade gap would have to be closed mainly by raising the export ratio. As stated in the Plan:

The ultimate course of the Korean economy lies in industrialization. During the plan period of preparation for industrialization, emphasis will be placed on...key industrial facilities and adequate provision of social overhead capital, utilization of idle resources, some improvement in the balance of international payments, primarily through increased exports, and technological advancement. (Republic of Korea, 1962 B:29)

As the preparation of the Second Five-Year Plan was getting underway, the positive aspects of the First Plan were becoming apparent and as a consequence, the questions that had to be answered in connection with industrial structure for the Second Plan were more in terms of how far the existing trends would or should be pursued and what marginal adjustments seemed appropriate rather than what major shifts in direction or policy were needed (Kuznets, 1969).
The basic objective of the Second Plan was "...to promote the modernization of the industrial structure and to build the foundations for a self-supporting economy." (Republic of Korea, 1966 B:33). Major Second Plan targets included the following: self-sufficiency in food production; increased output of the chemical, machinery and iron and steel industries; export expansion and further import substitution; encouragement of family planning and higher employment levels; substantial income growth, with special emphasis on improvement of manpower resources by promotion of scientific and management skills. "Key strategies" to be pursued to achieve these targets included rapid export expansion, increased capital mobilization, efficient manpower utilization and continuing financial stability (Republic of Korea, 1966 B).

In sum, the Second Plan decisions on industrial structure were dominated by the desire for high rates of growth and increased efficiency. By capitalizing on the rapid growth of exports, which emanated mainly from the less capital-intensive manufacturing industries, by delaying some of the more capital-intensive projects until adequate demand for their output was assured, and by relying heavily on imported machinery, the Plan was intended to keep the economy moving ahead strongly. Growth was in fact so rapid in 1966 and 1967 that what had previously seemed to be ample capacity in the infrastructure areas of power and transportation proved to be seriously deficient. Early revisions of the Second Plan involved major acceleration and expansion of investment in these two sectors so that they would not become serious bottlenecks to growth (Kuznets, 1969).
Export Industry Inducements

Expansion of exports was stimulated by a gradual and continuous devaluation of the currency and the provision of handsome incentives in various forms, such as total exemption from the business tax, fifty percent exemption from the personal income tax and the corporate income tax, total exemption of duties on raw materials and commodities imported for export production and reduction in railway freight rates for minerals and lower charges for electricity. Similar treatment was given for the use of domestic raw materials. To this package of incentives, low-interest credits were also added (Kim, Nak-kwan, 1971:49-64).

Growth of the Economy

From 1960 to the present, Korea's export picture has shown steady growth. In 1960, exports were only $32 million (U.S.); by 1964, $100 million; and by 1970, the goal of $1 billion was attained. This in itself is laudable. That manufactured goods and industrial growth has been the main thrust of this growth cannot be overlooked. In 1960, manufactured goods accounted for barely 18% of the total exports. By 1970, the ratio was reversed, 83% manufactured goods. This represents an overall industrialization of the trade structure. From a balance of payments perspective, this is a healthysign, as secondary production, industrial products bring in a greater profit margin than the previously concentrated on products of farm, mine and unprocessed fishery goods of the primary production sector. In terms of annual growth rates, the difference between the sectors is markedly uneven. The primary sector growth rate between 1967-1970 was only 2.4%, whereas during the same period, the secondary production sector grew at a rate of 21.7% (Kim, Nak-kwan, 1971). Judging from performance levels, the bias of government
development planning becomes apparent. There has been a decided emphasis in export-led industry-manufacturing sector to the apparent neglect of the primary production sector.

Conclusions

Rural development has been but a minor part of the programmed development plans for Korea. Traditionally, the rural sectors of the economy have been neglected and government incentive for rural location has been nil. These two features are coupled with the fact that no spatial controls on development locations have been enumerated in the official plans.

The encouragement of the secondary production sector of the economy under these conditions has been tantamount to encouraging urbanization; under conditions prevalent in underdeveloped nations including the Republic of Korea, the most "economically rational" location is the primate city. Beyond Western location theory, a myriad of non-quantifiable factors in the decision-making process also function. In underdeveloped countries such as Korea, these often culturally and situationally relevant factors also dictate location in the largest city. A discussion of these location factors, both quantifiable and non-quantifiable, will be covered in some depth with the presentation of the last chapter, A Spatial Plan for the Republic of Korea. In a foregoing chapter, this has been shown to be manifest in massive migration and hence spatial pressures on Seoul.
Chapter Three

CULTURAL MILIEU

Historic Background to Current Central Orientation: Summary

In purporting to plan in spatial terms for an underdeveloped country, understanding the milieu in more than superficial terms is imperative. This chapter is devoted to tracing the history of a government and consequently, a constituency that had been conditioned to a strictly central oriented chain of authority. In general terms, this is evident in the early history of the unified Silla (up to 918 A.D.) and Koryo Dynasties (918-1392). The Yi Dynasty brought in with it Confucian philosophy. The complete merging of moral precept and governing authority tended to further create a homogeneous population with loyalties directly to the central seat of power.

Historic Precedents

Economic factors are usually considered to be the most effective reason in urbanization. Yet, the psychological reasons seem to hold a strong significance. Attitude is the basic element which molds lives of human beings. It is taken as a priori that not every individual who has an opportunity to achieve a higher standard of living through migration desires to migrate. Even excepting McClelland's (1964) "N Achievement" arguments, that the desire for success is inherent and more than purely economic, those with high "N Achievement" quotients do not all
flock to the city to present their entrepreneurial skills. It is again not necessarily in the poorest agricultural districts that the impulse to move to the cities is the strongest. In many countries, the main sources of rural-urban migration have often been areas where the per capita output of agricultural labor was relatively high. Therefore, economic factors operate within a framework of externalities (Breese, 1969).

Within the Korean context, this "psychological factor" is what Ro, Chung-hyun (1971) calls the "yearning to get a better life." It is held to be the impetus for the majority of all migration and can be linked to the earliest period of the country's history and followed to the present.

Early History

Among historians, there is disagreement as to the dates of the origin of Korea. The generally accepted dates for the ancient period of history are from 2300 B.C. to 918 A.D. The medieval period covers from 918 A.D. to 1392, the beginning of the Yi Dynasty and the first fully accepted date. 1392 to the present is considered to be modern history. Although the dates of ancient history cannot be agreed upon, it is considered fact that the people were from a common stock as were the northern Chinese. The legendary leader of the first settlers was Tankun, who unified a number of nomadic tribes into a single kingdom in the region of Pyong-yang, the present capital of North Korea (Sunoo, 1970).

The Sinified government magnified unity and allegiance to the central authority. Ruling through carefully standardized institutions and relatively uniform means, its spirit was that of a jealous centralism dedicated to the obliteration of any unorthodox activities. Not only
political, but also economic activities that would have encouraged regional growth, the accumulation of individual wealth, or diverse influences from abroad through trade were either forbidden or rigidly controlled (Henderson, 1968).

Such regional differences as originally existed were therefore steadily eliminated through thirteen hundred years. A uniform nation-state had been created by at least the 17th Century, the middle of the Yi Dynasty. "Moreover, the smallness of the country, certain fluidities in its social system, the rapid appointments and exiles of its officials, the far-flung chain of regional markets, and the lack of internal obstructions as a result of the absence of local or feudal power tended to homogenize the culture." (Henderson, 1968:20). Not even the kokutai, the national polity of Japan, was devoid of deviation from the norm.

Silla Dynasty (? - 918 A.D.)

Although the records of the Silla period of history are drawn chiefly from two sources of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, long after the final fall early in the tenth century, some rather valid observations can be had (Suematsu, 1954). A semi-Sinified government bureaucracy was established, which included a primitive version of the Chinese examination system. Even local officials were drawn from the central ranks and received their lands, theoretically at least, from government grant. Originally, these local officials were independent, but gradually, they became lineage groups and the ties with the central government increased. A bureaucratic system developed such that even examination candidates were limited to hereditary ranks. Merit and
ascriptive systems began their long conflict, but it is the centralizing effect that is of concern here.

By examination or by incorporating local rank into hereditary central rank, central bureaucracy continually drew the elite away from local concerns toward central government. Except through Buddhist temples, local power left few impressive remains. The immense gulf that the Silla tombs show between the standards of the capital and of the countryside betray the values of the period.

Silla's centralization contained a further remarkable feature. It was not lodged in an autocratic rule. The Silla king was the first among equals, his legitimacy derived from his lineage status. There is little indication of divinity in rule. A council determined the non-hereditary succession to the throne and sometimes exercised a veto over the king's decisions. This council, not the king, may have drawn on the religious sanction. They are alleged to have always met on one of the four sacred peaks near the capital. High-born shamans also played a role in the society. The attraction of the elite to the capital was seemingly accompanied by the political and religious institutionalization of their access to power and right to rule. The potential of the power of election to the council would most certainly have added to the attraction of the capital city; this more so than a royal autocracy would have done.

A peculiar system of centralized oligarchy was initiated that has long persisted and may be viewed as the expression of a society demanding in multi-membered councils access of minimum numbers to power. Through this device, cultural concentration on the values of central rule began unusually early and intensely in Korea's history (Suematsu, 1954).
Koryo Dynasty (918-1392)

In essence, the Koryo Dynasty (918-1392) continued this center oriented structure it inherited from Silla and further developed an extensive Buddhist monastic system. This would seem to counter-balance the capital with an essentially local force, but these literally thousands of temples and monasteries were, in essence, local agents for the central government. Buddhism, as the established national religion, became an instrument of administrative rule. "Temples existed partly to pray--and even fight--for national security and to communicate support for the Koryo throne and its system, and the upper monastic hierarchy appropriately interwoven with the royal and noble houses of the country." (Henderson, 1968:22). This system is reminiscent of that known to pre-revolutionary Russia, to Europe in more distant times, and to Ethiopia today. The temple-monastery was a fruitful institution, useful for both central and local purposes. "With its rise and power must be closely associated the capacity of Korean culture to stand close to the forefront of world cultural achievement during much of the Koryo period, a position Korea was soon to lose when the Yi rulers weakened Buddhist institutions." (Henderson, 1968:25).

Yi Dynasty (1392-1910): Philosophical Basis

The change in dynastic order from the Koryo period to the Yi Dynasty, was accompanied by considerably more revolution than previous Korean political change. The new government adopted the Confucian form expounded by Chu Hsi in the twelfth century Ming China, and ensured the perpetuation of the monarchy and the diminishing role of Buddhism as the state religion. The political qualities of obedience and loyalty
strengthened within the value system. Buddhism, in the Koryo, had despised labor and was likewise afforded little respect in this new order. The new Confucian leaders had learned to resent the previous system of government which gave the advantages of Confucian learning nothing but literary and rhetorical recognition, and denied them the opportunity of getting into the heart of state affairs where they saw only corrupt or indolent monks (Sunoo, 1970). Of the various Confucian theories that modified the long entrenched body of Buddhist codes, the thoughts of Chu-shi, the important Sung innovator of the Master's teachings, was accorded the highest respect and recognition. With the adoption of these theories, the Yi Dynasty was subjected to the influence of rationality as opposed to the politics of the Koryo Dynasty which ruled with aristocratic authority (Henderson, 1966).

Confucianism was, first of all, a universalistic system. It provided for a comprehensive explanation and rule of life. It penetrated during its long dominance, every portion of the Korean peninsula and, with differing depth, every level of society. Its terms were resorted to not only for state organization and conduct, but for that of family, guild and clan. In these respects, it resembled the medieval church of Europe. But it differed vitally in its complete lack of division between church and state. Unlike European and even Near Eastern society, the church had no separate hierarchy. The apex of everything was the monarch and the upper bureaucracy that controlled him. Those exercising political power tended, as has been said of China, "...to be absolute within their own interpretation of ethical code." (Reischauer and Fairbank, 1960:30).

Officials represented this power in the king's name. Unlike
Europe’s medieval church or to a lesser degree, Islamic communities, or perhaps, even Koryo Buddhism, the Yi system allowed no institutions outside central government in which moral or religious power could, with any degree of independence, interfere in such a way as to check central power (Sunoo, 1970). The system gave the development of pluralism no prop and tended to push society so powerfully toward central power as to induce covert social mobility to reach it (Henderson, 1966).

As in China, Confucianism was built around the five relationships: father and son, husband and wife, ruler and subject, elder and younger brother, friend and friend. The first three of the relationships were most essential. These relationships formed a linearity but it is pertinent to observe that, when viewed from a "feudal European" or even Japanese viewpoint, the linearity was incomplete. Strong within household and village, it envisioned a world in which individuals or family heads had direct relationships with the ruler—direct at least emotionally—and it failed to provide guidance in relationships with one’s superiors in organizations between the village and the throne or with colleagues in such organizations. Beyond village bonds, it was weak in all representational relationships (Henderson, 1968).

Yi Dynasty: Manifestations of Philosophy

Changing the major domestic policies from Buddhist to Confucian brought many problems to the new dynasty. One of the basic problems for the new government was the problem of land economy. Like eighteenth century France, the church (temple) held much land, eliminating the need for many of the monks and temple officials to work for their living. Consequently, the taxes became so heavy for the commoners that they were
physically unable to cope with the situation. The Yi government planned to solve the problem by distributing the land to the peasants. During the Koryo Dynasty, about half of the land belonged either to the state or to the temple; distributing the lands to the peasants made possible an increased national production and personal income.

It is significant, though, that the actual title to the land was not rendered to the farmers, and that the rendering of the right to till the soil and harvest the crop came, not from a local authority, but from the central government. This enhanced the relationship between the king and subject, sans an intermediate level of loyalty. The right to the land was strictly controlled and generally only agricultural rights were granted and these only for life tenure. The fact that each succeeding generation had to renew this claim to the land did much to keep the linear relationship between king and subject alive. In only rare cases was the designee considered to be a meritous enough subject to have his rights run with the land in perpetuity (Henderson, 1966).

Even before the land reform in 1949, very few old large land holdings from the inner aristocratic circles survived until recent times and only two or three families today have had notable continuous wealth since 1900. There was no tendency to build up local power to make a bid at court. Rather, one started at court and came to own or derive benefit from rural land. When one fell from favor, he forfeited his holdings (Sunoo, 1970).

In order to promote Confucianism, the government erected several academic institutions as centers of Confucian learning. These included Sunggyungwan, a Confucian university attached to a Confucian shrine in
Seoul. The university still remains in operation today as a symbol of the highest level of Confucian scholarship in Korea (Sunoo, 1970).

Ritual and pageantry were important in the mystique that surrounded the monarch and influenced the hold he had over the common people. Witness the following account from an 1894 issue of Harper's Weekly:

...a royal procession in Seoul is by far the most extraordinary spectacle of the kind to be seen on the face of the earth. 'Barnum's grand parade is nothing in comparison,' my informant told me, 'and the Lord Mayor's pageant in London is paltry beside it.' In the King's company are trumpeters and musicians, ancient bowmen in the queerest and most preposterous uniforms, banners, masks, fan-bearers, gorgeous noblemen and all the rest that goes to make up the most splendid and fantastic Oriental pageantry. He moves about with a force of at least 2000 men, and they include every sort of functionary known to an eastern potentate. His majesty himself is adorned beyond the lilies in magnificence. He wears robes of purple ablaze with gold, both before and behind. He wears an extraordinary hat, and is seated in a splendid chair that is carried by sixty gorgeously clad bearers. He is sheltered by a magnificent awning or canopy of purple and gold. (Ralph, 1894:1039).

The great family clans moved to Seoul more or less permanently and their senior branches became known by their location in Seoul: the Tongnae Chongs from Hoedong, the Andong Kims from Changdong, etc. Living in the country became equated either with loss of favor or with determined and self-conscious refusal to serve the government.

The more remote one's residence, the less chance one's sons had of position. Except for a few 19th Century rebels like Hong Kyong-nae, it is hard to find any among the thousands of known names of Yi Dynasty men, whom Koreans would describe as real local leaders (Henderson, 1966).

Symbolic of the times was its chief punishment--exile to a remote place. This penalty was inflicted upon thousands and it was one
of the only forms of "local development" extractable from a dynastic system uncompromisingly centralized.

Yi Dynasty: Conclusion

In the final analysis, Confucianism was not only a political and an enforcement system, but also a moral, ethical and religious one. It had strong doctrines and impressive texts, rites and ceremonies. Yet it had no structured worship per se. Its theory was that rule was by a sage. But the sage was part of an embracing, unitary moral system of which the emperor was at the head. Social progress was on the whole, felt to take place when the sage correctly perceived the true intent of the classics so as to apply them to the given situation. Individual insights were sometimes respected and occasionally rewarded, but individualism had no place in the system. In essence, such theory strengthened education and individual understanding, but left a separate religious body with no role in the society. The question of whose understanding should dominate and in what degree was decided not by a church/religious hierarchy, but by governmental appointment. The ruler was the chief sage, and the wiser the official, the higher should be his relative position in the hierarchy of government. The ruler was thus the head of not only the administration, but for the moral and "religious" systems as well. He was responsible only to heaven for the political and moral tone of the realm; bureaucrats, ruling in his name, were sanctioned with a double mandate: heaven and the King. The literati who were appointed were, in effect, administrators, judges and theologians.

This system of government prevented any strong development of a church organization and consequently the rivalry between church and
state could not develop. It deprived the polity of a powerful rival hierarchy. The bureaucracy became the highest career; its power over all others grew; the centripetal forces of the state multiplied. Buddhism and its hierarchy were forced into something to be strongly detested or avoided completely. The function, for example, not only of the European church but even of Islam and its guilds and associations as pockets in a society that while "giving unto Caesar," still were able to resist encroachments and make authoritarian rules could not be institutionalized and developed in Korea. Government and administration became entwined with religious precept; departures from it were tantamount to heresy. Innovation and change were thus fettered. On the one hand, lack of alternative careers whetted political concern and contest for power through Confucian doctrinal criticism; opposition criticism was ever present and often vicious. On the other hand, any change involved not just administrative but, in effect, religious struggle. In theory and to some extent in practice, this religio-political combination served to knot society together into an obedient whole. By riveting on to government not only political but also moral and religious attentions, it tended to introduce a pattern of deep, emotional concern with politics and to flood administration with political, ethical, almost religious qualms and principles. Operating within Korea's confined geography, this pattern induced enormous centralization of politics, administration, values and even emotion.

Two Contemporary Manifestations of Traditional Patterns

The time hardened tradition of receiving the word of government with unquestioning acceptance has remained in evidence in many phases
of Korean society. The correlation between modern behavior and traditional belief cannot be proven as a case in hard science, but certain manifestations can be seen in contemporary Korea. These indicate that the Confucian tradition of the Koryo and Yi Dynasties has not been quashed by Japanese occupation, war, revolution or modernity.

The concepts of the vertical structure of the society, the centralization of power, in terms of economics, education and government politics as well as policy, all become manifest in viewing the contemporary scene in Korea.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections. In the first, "Educational System", the educational philosophy and policy and structure will be viewed. "Government Structure" is a descriptive portrayal of the pyramid structure, with the president at the apex.

The extent to which these sections reflect a philosophic and cultural background becomes crucial if the plan is to be appropriate for the people.

"Religion and basic philosophies have tended to hinder the implementation of plans for modernization in many Asian countries." (Hayashi, 1966:269). The problem exists in the attempts to coordinate modernization, which is a Western concept from a Christian tradition, with the ancient culture of the Asiatic countries. All too often, this is attempted without a consideration of the implications of the patterns of the intrinsic cultural-philosophical base of the country. The answer lies in the understanding of the contemporary manifestations of the traditional mores and morals. Substitution of Christianity, for which the cultural tradition does not exist for their own religion is no more the solution than the direct application of a "successful" program from
some other experience. A deeply rooted cultural-philosophical tradition that has made up the fundamental character of the people cannot be simply replaced or "planned around." The secret of the success of the Japanese modernization lay in the tolerance and flexibility of the basic philosophical beliefs (Hayashi, 1966).

The idea of geographic balance in development is foreign to the Korean context. Unlike the egalitarian theory of social function that is typical of North American tradition, the Korean legacy is one of vertical structure and centralism. Because of this fundamental difference between the two, the transplanting of Western economic development schemes of modernization and the new culture produced through contacts with the Korean traditional one, can hardly be the same as the original culture (Choi, Jaihi, 1966:83). Consequently, an understanding of the cultural-philosophical and political milieu is most significant if the outcome of a proposed plan is to be successful.

Educational System: Traditional

The role that education plays in the current cultural milieu is a good example of how the centralistic tendencies of the Yi Dynasty have manifested themselves in Korea today. By viewing the role of education in historic perspective it is possible to understand the basis of the current thinking of the people in regard to education as a key to success in other fields as well as an end in itself.

Under the influence of the Confucian philosophy which became dominant in Korea early in the Yi Dynasty, the learning of Confucian ethics by rote and the ability to write Chinese characters were stressed. The goal of education was to develop a small learned class, from which the
wisest men and rulers of the country would be provided. This clique would be able to find the proper ethical formula to solve any specific social problem. Little value was placed on the kind of critical examination which forms the base of Western logic.

There were basically two motivations for getting an education under this system. Ideally, education was valued as a means of enjoying the finer things of life and as a source of self-improvement. The operation of this ideal alone is found in the lives of some of the scholars, who, although highly regarded, received no financial rewards for their teaching. The most common motivation for education, however, was that education was a means of receiving a governmental appointment and entry into life of relative leisure, wealth and position. Theoretically, these positions were filled solely through an examination system. Actually, cheating and nepotism were not uncommon and at some periods they were the most common basis of governmental appointment. Even for those procuring a position through personal favoritism, however, years of study were still essential, and for the son of a family of moderate means and no powerful friends in the government, competence in the classics was the only road to social advance. The examination system was abandoned in 1895, although private schools giving this type of education persisted long after that date (Sunoo, 1970:24-47).

Shortly after the turn of the century, another educational system was forcibly impressed on the Korean people. The Japanese adopted a system of public education designed to help incorporate the Koreans into the Japanese cultural sphere and to make them useful citizens of an industrialization scheme they had for the Korean colony. Through Japanese
influence, elementary education and some technical skills were spread to a larger proportion of the population. The Japanese population in Korea, by virtue of their comparably higher level of education, held most of the administrative positions. This situation reinforced both resentment of the Japanese and the traditional view of education as a training ground for the elite and administrative officials. As part of their own cultural pattern, however, the Japanese maintained the emphasis on uncritical learning by rote, which is part of Confucian tradition.

Educational System: Contemporary Classroom Techniques

Today, the opportunity for "universal education" and a high literacy rate in Korea is real, but the educational process is much removed from that in the Western countries. Although the opportunity for all children to go to school, at least at the grammar school level, would lead one to think that the product of such a system would be a free-thinking, innovative younger generation, the apparent educational philosophy tends to minimize the chance for the students to gain a sense of innovative initiative.*

At the beginning of each school week, the entire student body is marched on to the playing field where standing in rigid formation, they listen to a speech by the principal of the school. He espouses the ideals of good scholarship, obeying the teachers and the regulations of the school. At the start of each class period, the students are called

* The observations of the Korean educational system were gleaned during 1967-1970, when the author was a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer in rural and urban Korean schools working as a teacher and also as an instructor in R.O.K. Ministry of Education teachers' workshops.
to attention by the class monitor, and on command, the class as a whole bows to or salutes the teacher. The monitor announces that the class is ready to listen.

In another vein, the teaching methods and presentation of the material are very regimented with a classical hierarchical structure. This is reminiscent of the Confucian type of learning, where state examinations were based on a fixed body of materials and on rote memorization. In the school system today, examinations are almost without exception objective tests of rote learning.

The art classes, where one would expect to find the virtue of creativity to be encouraged, in fact, differ little. Students are not marked on creative expression or fluidity of movement. Rather, they are marked on the rigid guidelines of form and proportion, shading and mastery of reproduction.

In 1969, the Ministry of Education in Seoul announced that henceforth, "creative writing" was to be an integral part of the curriculum of all secondary schools. On the surface, this might be thought to be a step towards a liberalization of educational philosophy, but in practice it has not proven to be more than a token gesture. The teachers who themselves have never learned the methods of creative expression are ill-equipped to guide their pupils in creative activities. Not only are they ill-trained to cope with the government policy, they are logistically unable. Each of the teachers must instruct five to seven different classes per day; each of the classes has fifty to seventy boys or girls. This renders the task of evaluation of even one assignment per week per student an overwhelming responsibility. Consequently, the task of
meaningful evaluation of the papers is neglected and student monitors are generally given the responsibility of simply noting which students handed in the assignments and which did not. The net change in terms of student input based on incentive is nil.*

Within the school and the learning experience, the main criticism of the curriculum is that elementary and secondary school training, which is all that the overwhelming majority of students will get, does not prepare them for the practical problems they will meet in the ordinary course of life. Great emphasis is still placed on rote memorization, concert recitation, and verbalized abstract learning unrelated to practical life (Henderson, 1968:364-67).

Within the schools then, there are residual traits of the traditional Confucian methods of instruction. Proper form and not imagination in the approach and solution to a problem is considered virtuous. Students who exhibit extreme creativity in school exercises are frowned upon as being "out of line", "improper", or even "brash". It is easy to see that in such a setting, the textbook or whatever the source of reference, would be given a position of unquestioned authority. In a similar way—the virtue of vertical structure and linearity is reinforced. If the "authority" is extolled as unquestionable, then it holds that the "authority" must be of superior position and therefore shown deference. The practical upshot of this is that the students are being conditioned into accepting the policy of a broader societal vertical

* Author's observations, 1967-1970.
structure with a logically defined apex of power.*

This concept of vertical structure manifests itself in the organizational structure of the educational system as well as in the above described educational "philosophy" and micro-environment of the classroom.

**Educational System: Structure**

Immediately after World War II, under the aegis of the American Military Government, South Korea's educational system was radically transformed. Japanese education, which had reached nearly two generations of Korean youth, was abolished and a new system was substituted in its place. The major premise in the newer system was the notion that "...the objective of education is to provide every child with the basic primary education essential to serve the national life." ([Korea Annual, 1971](#)). Subsequently, guarantees of education as a basic right of the people were written into the Republic of Korea's Constitution. The Education Law enacted in 1949 called for compulsory schooling of all children between the ages of 6-11 years old ([Republic of Korea, 1963](#)).

Korea currently has a combined system of state and private schools, which is supervised by the Ministry of Education of the national government in Seoul. Public schools are financed either by the central government, or in a few cases, schools are financed by city, county or provincial administrations. Schools of the latter type of financial dependency are usually limited to elementary level institutions ([Korea Annual, 1971](#)).

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* Author's observations, 1967-1970.
According to official figures, in 1952, a little over 70% of
of the children of the 6-11 year age group were attending primary schools;
by 1962, however, the official figure had risen to 95% for the same age
group. Although these figures drop off rather drastically for middle
school (44% of the elementary school graduates) and high school (29%
middle school graduates), the impact of a figure even close to the
purported enrollment of the elementary schools is profound. This is
especially true considering the type of educational philosophy under
which the pupils are educated (Paik, Hyun-ki, 1963).

The impact of the massive educational program that has taken
place in the sixties has changed the profile of the country's population
in drastic proportions. The government claims a literacy rate of 90% or
over, but most observers believe that effective literacy is perhaps 70%
or a little higher (Paik, Hyun-ki, 1963). With the vast expansion since
1945, this rate advances steadily. The 1944 census of the Government-
General of the Japanese colonial government lists 3,150,000 "educated"
and 19,692,775 "uneducated" out of a total population of 22,793,766.
Only 7,374 were enrolled at the university or graduate school level
beyond the high school and only 22,064 of the total population were
graduates of colleges or technical schools (Oh, John Kiechang, 1963).
Today, by contrast, the peninsula is populated by 45 million people,
31.5% of whom live in the Republic of Korea. Of these, 193,591 were in
institutions of higher learning as of 1970 (Korea Annual, 1971).

These students are enrolled in the 71 colleges and univer-
sities, 64 graduate schools, 13 junior colleges, 16 teachers' colleges,
22 vocational schools and 16 miscellaneous institutions of higher educa-
tion. Most of the institutions have responded to the tremendous desire
for higher education by enrolling students in excess of the allotted government allowances (Korea Annual, 1971).

The influence of the educational system on the total population is immense. Not only is the number of institutions and enrollments increasing, but it constitutes the largest single organization in the country. There are 7.5 million students, or 24% of the gross national population enrolled in schools under the sanction of the national government (Korea Annual, 1971). The ideas that the education system impose on the students six days a week for many of their formative years are bound to have lasting effects on the future thinking of the future adult population.

The control of education by the government is extensive. The Ministry of Education not only determines standards and general policy, but controls the employment and dismissal of teachers, the holding and grading of major examinations, the curricula, the selection of textbooks and the designation of agents from whom textbooks and supplies must be bought. The President of the Republic appoints the president of the national university and of the national provincial universities as well as controlling the selection of presidential candidates for the teachers' colleges (Paik, Hyun-ki, 1963).

This tight government control facilitates the proscription of points of view that the government deems to be unacceptable. Although the classroom teachers are relatively free of direct interference, there has been some indication that political affiliation has been influential in the demotion, advancement or transfer of school principals (Paik, Hyun-ki, 1963). One obvious criticism is that political affiliation as opposed to professional qualification has become paramount to much thinking
in the teachers' room where the prospect of promotion to principal or vice-principal looms. Further, the high degree of central control over the school system makes for a rigidity of policy which does not permit adjustment to varying situations or acceptance of innovation.

Students are personally affected by the central government's role in education where they have to compete in national examinations for high school and college. In the face of overwhelming odds, passing the examinations with sufficiently high scores to ensure a coveted seat in a prestigious institution, the parents of an individual go through as much pressure as does the student. The financial as well as the examination struggles to enter the best schools--virtually all located in Seoul--approach pandemonium. Many a family borrows beyond conceivable capacity to repay, mortgaging all property, skimping on food and clothing, making desperate sacrifices. In the villages, ambitious farmers sell not only cattle but sometimes house and land to send one son through college. The child is driven to almost constant study, and every crucial entrance examination becomes a shattering emotional crisis. The mother accompanies the child to the examination place and waits outside until it is over. Even a high-ranking father will not leave the country during the time when one of his children is undergoing his examinations.*

All this takes place in an arena where success in the academic round of trials does not by any means ensure success in the succeeding rounds. The overwhelming majority of college graduates face unemployment upon graduation; this they know beforehand. In the face of overwhelming odds, the aspiring student feels that his chances of success will be enhanced by the best attainable educational record. Another

* Author's observations, 1967-1970. See also Henderson, 1968.
rationalization is that it is better to be unemployed with an education, than to be unemployed without education. This vain idolization of educated men is deeply ingrained in the heart of even the poorest farmer. The abnormalities of vast excess education constitute an important key to the nation's character (Henderson, 1968). They mar the profile with waste and frustration. Such voluntarily imposed damage is difficult to explain without postulating its cause in cultural drives or needs of overriding importance.

Clearly in Korea, these needs are not education alone...The tumorous spread of education and its clustering in the capital, which has turned into probably the world's greatest producer of unemployed graduates, betray the single-mindedness of the culture's concentration on access to central power. (Choi, Jaihi, 1966).

Educational System: Conclusion

Education then, can be seen as a strong force in directing the thinking of the Korean people towards a central focus. This statement can be justified on the basis of education as a process, and the teaching techniques that are employed at all levels of school. Students are conditioned to respect the authority of the teacher at the head of the classroom as well as the authority of those who write textbooks and the Ministry of Education as the source of authority. The concept of education as a centralizing force on the thinking of the people can also be seen in the system of educational goals of the people. There are two factors that work in tandem to exaggerate the central oriented tendencies in the education sphere: a) the limited opportunities because of limited facilities and b) the concept that education holds the key to success in any future endeavors. Although the limited
opportunities may be real, the second factor is clearly a concept carried over from the Yi Dynasty perspective of education. However viewed, both of the above factors are undeniably strong centralizing factors in Korea today.

Government Structure: Philosophical Tenets

Traditional Korean concepts of government are embodied in Confucian teachings, which were the official doctrines of the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910). Government is viewed not as a contractual arrangement between the governing body and the people but as a natural institution designed to maintain proper relationship among men in a hierarchical social order.

Tongmong Sonsup (The First Reader of Confucian Ethics) teaches that "ruler and subject" represent one of the five natural relationships in the human community (Rutt, 1960).

The division between ruler and subject is the relation between heaven and earth. One is high and respected, the other is lowly and base; the high and respected commands the lowly and base, and the lowly and base serves the high and respected. This is the unchanging order of heaven and earth, the same now as of old. (Rutt, 1960:92).

Government was not based upon law, but was regarded essentially as a "government of men"—ideally, virtuous men to be respected and followed as models of wise conduct. The ideal ruler was primarily a teacher and a preceptor able to indoctrinate subjects with the rules of proper conduct. He exercised his punitive powers only when his subjects could not be swayed by reason and instruction. He was charged by Heaven to regard, as a father, the welfare of the people and was expected to cultivate virtue within himself.

Since government was one of men, man was responsible if the
country suffered disorder. Natural catastrophe or social unrest was viewed as an indication of Heaven's disfavor with rulers who deviated from their responsibilities and the prescribed order of the world. The right of social change initiated from the bottom upwards within the order of government was not allowed, although the right of rebellion was implicit in the theory (Rutt, 1960).

Government Structure: Twentieth Century to 1960

Today, the perception of a strong central government as "the natural order of life" is furthered by the governmental structure within which the populace must exist. That the actual roots of the present form of government can be traced to the Yi Dynasty of the last century may be a moot point. Although the Japanese created great bitterness, some feel that it was their strict and authoritarian rule that did much to encourage respect for law and order during their imperialistic rule over Korea ("What Korea Owes to Japan", 1904).

From 1910 until 1945, Korea was a de jure colony of the Japanese empire. In 1945, when Korea was liberated by virtue of Japan's defeat in the Pacific War, there was a general popular agreement in Korea on the broad issue of immediate national independence, but few could come to agreement on a constitutional framework. The first steps in writing a constitution for South Korea were taken in 1945 by the American Military Government after it replaced the Japanese in Korea. Under its direction, a mixed American-Korean committee, headed by an American, reviewed foreign constitutions in order to fashion a model. The representatives of the committee convened under the temporary chairman, Rhee, Syngman. A document was adopted on July 12 and
and promulgated on July 17, 1948 (Vinacke, 1956).

Throughout the Korean war and until 1960, there was an almost constant political struggle between the members of the Legislature and Rhee. The crux of the debate was the distribution of power. Over this period, the office of the President became more and more powerful. This trend continued until the 1960 amendment, essentially a new constitution, was effected in the wake of the student uprising of April, 1960 which had led to the fall of the Rhee regime.

Government Structure: 1960-1963

The 1960 amendment, the Constitution of the Second Republic, replaced the presidential system with a parliamentary system similar to the British model and drastically reduced the power of the President. He was to be elected by a joint session of the bicameral legislature and his role was limited to ceremonial duties only. The executive power of state was to be administered by a cabinet which was elected by the dominant party in the legislature (Henderson, 1968).

The Second Republic was short lived. In May, 1961, as a result of the military revolution, the Constitution was for all purposes suspended by the revolutionary junta and superseded by the Law Concerning the Extraordinary Measures for National Reconstruction of June 6, 1961. The emergency law provided that the fundamental rights of the people would be honored insofar as they did not conflict with the fulfillment of revolutionary tasks. The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, the governing body for the junta, took over the legislative, executive and judicial functions of the government. The functions of the courts were also suspended as was any element of
the Constitution which was in conflict with the ruling body. In anticipation of the restoration of political activities in 1963, the revolutionary government, aided by a contingent of constitutional lawyers and scholars, proposed a substantial change in the Constitution. The proposed amendment was approved through a popular referendum on December 17, 1962 by a majority of 78% of the ballots cast (Korea Annual, 1971).

Notwithstanding his public declaration not to take part in the civilian government, General Park, Chung-hee, who headed the military junta and the subsequent government, ran for President in the elections. In the October, 1963 elections he defeated former President Yun, Po-son by a margin of only 150,000 votes. The transition from military to civilian rule was completed with the general elections held in November for the National Assembly. In the parliamentary elections, the Democratic Republican Party, composed mainly of ex-military officers, and their followers, scored a victory over the badly split opposition forces. In the 175 seat legislature, the Democratic Republican Party took 110 of the seats (Henderson, 1966).

The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, which had held the administrative, legislative and judiciary power of the nation for 31 months, was dissolved on December 16, 1963. The new Constitution came into force as the new National Assembly opened on December 17, 1963. On the same day, Park, Chung-hee was inaugurated as the first President of the Third Republic (Korea Annual, 1971).

Government Structure: Third Republic (1963-Present)

The Third Republic, patterned mainly after the presidential system of the United States, was organized on the theory of the
separation of powers. The executive, legislative and judicial establish­ments were to be independent of one another so that no one would dominate the others. In practice, however, the executive branch, and especially the office of the presidency, functioned as the focal point of power. Many key powers were granted the President in the Constitution. These enable him to exercise almost complete authority over the administrative offices and to dictate all government policies (Henderson, 1966).

The Executive

The executive power is exercised by the President who is the head of state, head of the executive branch, and leader of the ruling political party. He is independent from and not answerable to the National Assembly. He is responsible only to the electorate and the Constitution (Korea Annual, 1971).

The President is also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, represents the state vis à vis foreign states, prepares major legislation and appoints the State Council. He is empowered to issue orders and decrees for the enforcement of laws, conclude treaties, declare war, receive and accredit diplomatic envoys, and proclaim a state of siege in accordance with the provisions of the law. He is vested with broad emergency powers permitting him to issue ordinances having the effect of law "in time of civil war, in a dangerous situation arising from foreign relations, in case of natural calamity, or on account of a grave economic or financial crisis." (Republic of Korea, 1962 A). The President also wields legislative power by means of signing or vetoing bills passed by the National Assembly. (Republic of Korea, 1962 A).
The Legislative

The "long arm" of the Executive office is felt across the so-called separation of powers. The legislative power is exercised by the National Assembly—a unicameral body. The Assembly is to convene annually and is also subject to special, emergency sessions at the call of the President or at the request of one-fourth or more of the representatives. The attendance of more than half of the members constitutes a quorum. The Assembly is empowered to consider and decide upon budgets, to consent to the ratification of treaties negotiated by the President. Members of the President's council, if requested, are required to attend any meeting of the Assembly and to answer questions. Except in case of flagrante delicto, no Assemblyman may be arrested or detained without the consent of the National Assembly when it is in session.

The National Assembly is empowered to review and inspect the activities of the executive establishment through its standing committees. If incompetence or corruption is uncovered, the Assembly may "advise" the President to remove responsible public officials. The advice is not, however, binding on the President (Republic of Korea, 1962).

Local Government

The country is divided into two special cities and nine provinces in its administrative composition. The special cities are Seoul, the capital, and Pusan, the second largest city. The "special cities" are empowered with the same status as provinces. The Constitution provides for local self-government, under the Local Autonomy
Law promulgated in July, 1949. The law calls for the setting up of special city and provincial governments as intermediate levels between strictly local enclaves and the national level of rule. The local autonomy system was not put into practice until 1952 because of the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. The first local elections were held on April 25 and May 10, 1952 to elect members of the provincial, city and local councils. Under a two-tiered system, mayors of special cities and governors of provinces were appointed by the President while mayors of cities and local officials were elected by local councils. The law was revised in February, 1956, to stipulate that the heads of local governments except special cities and provinces should be elected by direct election. The first direct elections were held in August, 1956 (Korea Annual, 1971).

Following the student uprising in 1960 that toppled the Rhee, Syngman government, the Local Autonomy Law was revised drastically to realize the local self-government to a full extent. One of the salient features in the revision was to elect mayors of special cities and governors of provinces by direct, popular vote. In the nation-wide elections held in December, 1960, all the heads of local governments including special cities and provinces and members of local councils were elected by universal, direct and secret votes. The military revolution in April, 1961, however, put an end to the local autonomy. All the local governments were disbanded and heads of local governments were picked by the military government. In December, 1963, when the national government power was restored to civilian rule, local autonomy was not (Mailer, 1970).
Currently, all the heads of local administrative units including special cities, provinces, counties, cities, towns and villages are appointed by the central government, while all local councils have still not been restored to active roles. No local elections have been held since 1961. There is no prospect that the local self-government may be restored in the near future, as the government plans seem to place this as a low priority (Mailer, 1970).

Just as the structure of the educational system leads to the strong centralist tendencies, the structure of government leads in the same direction. The pyramidal structure of government inevitably apexes at the office of the President. Every level of government and every government agency in the country has as its ultimate authority some office in Seoul which in turn has some direct link with the office of the President. That the structure of government in this respect follows the Confucian model cannot be denied.

Government Structure: Two Cases of Central Control

The following examples show two ways in which the center oriented Korean milieu has been manifest in the office of the chief executive. In the first case, this centrality is illustrated by the clear will of the people to endorse a stronger system of central power. In the second case, the exercise of central power is extended by the arbitrary rule from within the office of the President.

Constitutional Amendment

In 1969, during the spring and fall, there was much student unrest due to the ticklish question of amending the Constitution to allow the President to seek a third term in office. Central to the
controversy was the fact that the incumbent President was not only in his second term, but that he was the first President to serve under the Constitution of the Third Republic. It was felt that if the Constitution was to be the paramount law of the land, then amending it to accommodate the ambition of the incumbent President to seek a third term in office was tantamount to denying the principles of a constitutional form of government (Hong, Chong-in, 1969).

The procedure for amending the Korean Constitution is to first seek the endorsement of the National Assembly and then the electorate. Endorsement by the National Assembly posed no real difficulty as the President enjoyed a majority of legislature. The public referendum was punctuated by university riots, summary arrests, and closing of schools throughout the country. In areas of Seoul, the smell and effects of tear gas and "pepper gas" were in the air for days; troops dressed in riot gear were stationed ominously at every intersection, the government buildings were unapproachable except by special pass or recognition by the security guards.*

Considering the great furor which was raised over the referendum issue, the results of the balloting expressed an unquestionably clear mandate. Just prior to the voting, the President announced he would consider this as a vote of confidence. If he failed to receive a clear majority, he would resign his office effective immediately. Seventy-seven per cent of the registered voters cast ballots, 65% of which were in favor of the proposal. The issue was carried by the rural vote where the amendment was passed by virtually every non-urban area ("Referendum Passes", 1969).

* Author's personal observations.
New Presidential Powers

Most recently, the President made use of his broad base of power by declaring a state of emergency in the Republic and intimating the suspension of broad constitutional rights. This move was similar to the Prime Minister of Canada invoking the War Measures Act in 1970. An important contradistinction, however, is that in the Canadian experience, the move by the Prime Minister was precipitated by very specific and immediate events. This was not so in Korea. President Park invoked his power on the domestic front in a response to international affairs.

The President stated that his emergency declaration was intended to "...make the Korean people look at rapid changes in the international situation and at the cold reality of the Korean peninsula." (Halloran, 1971). The New York Times (Halloran, 1971) reported that the declaration appeared to be motivated "...as a continuation of Mr. Park's efforts to consolidate power in his own hands." It was also reported that there had been no signs of increased tension with North Korea and that the number of infiltrated agents had been declining and that these agents had shifted from the terrorism of three years ago to carrying propaganda leaflets.

Park's pointed declaration forbade "...all social unrest that might weaken national security", 'prohibits irresponsible arguments on national matters' and demands that in critical situations (such as now is purported to be) every citizen 'concede some of the freedom that he enjoys for the sake of national security.'" (Halloran, 1971).
A few days later, the declaration of the President was promulgated into law. The bill gave Park the power "...to control prices and wages, restrain labor unions, curb press freedom and take other measures under the 'state of emergency.'" (Korean Emergency, New Power for Park," 1971).

In the context of this thesis, it is significant that the people registered no overt criticism of this summary use of executive authority. "Residents (of Seoul) appeared to take the decree in stride. Most appeared oblivious of it as they went about personal and commercial business." (Halloran, 1971).

Cultural Milieu: Summary

It has been the contention in this chapter to describe the contemporary environment in Korea in terms of the cultural milieu. This has been done in three sections: "Historic Background", "Educational System" and "Government Structure." Each of the sections has pointed up a common theme — that the Korean society displays a centripetal orientation. This can be seen from two perspectives:

(1) the central orientation on a philosophical level of a population subjected to half a millennium of a Confucian model of society; and

(2) the central orientation of a pyrimidal institutional structure apexing on the office of the President in the present society.

The suggestion in this chapter is that the contemporary orientation has a historic basis in the Yi Dynasty model of government. During the five hundred year Dynasty (1392-1910), the rule of government was based on the universalistic Confucian system. It affected every portion of the Korean peninsula and every level of
society. The system was a total concept encompassing government, moral behavior, religion and social relations.

One of the basic precepts was the relationship of ruler and subject; that every subject had a direct linear relationship with the head of state. The dictates of the King were theoretically of direct significance to every subject. The King sat at the apex of power, responsible only to Heaven. This system of government prevented the development of any strong rival institution such as the church or feudal lords and discouraged responsibility to a middle level of government. The dictates of the King, therefore, would be unquestioned.

Today, the attitude of a linear relationship between the individual and the national level of government is perpetuated by the educational system on the micro-environment level of the classroom and on a broad-based level of teaching philosophy. Students are conditioned to have loyalties to the country epitomized by the capital, and to respect the dictates of the national level of government.

The two levels of manifestations this puts forth are (1) that students aspire for higher education in Seoul, and (2) that students are taught to respect authority without questioning and to look to Seoul as the ultimate seat of this authority.

The government in the Third Republic is similarly structured to give unquestioned authority to the head of central government. That this is a direct manifestation of the Yi Dynasty is a tenuous assertion, but that it represents a similar symbol which is consistent with the Confucian model is undeniable.

These factors all support the primacy of Seoul, indicating that it is a cultural and historic primacy as well as contemporary.
In the following chapter, the final substantive section, a plan for spatial development is proposed which is developed from within the constraints of the cultural milieu and is designed to function under the limitations imposed by government policies.
Chapter Four

A SPATIAL PLAN FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Introduction

In this, the final substantive section, a plan is proposed as a spatial development scheme for Korea. The plan is a deductive result of the points made in earlier sections: demographic pressures on the city proper, and the historic and contemporary complementary arguments. Heretofore, the segments of the milieu have been treated in parallel fashion with few inter-relationships enunciated. In this section, it shall be demonstrated how all these segments merge and how they can be incorporated into a logical "Korea-specific" plan for development. The essence of the plan is the development of industrial estates in the suburban areas of Seoul.

The Plan

Given: - the government policy priorities of industrial growth;

Proposal: - the concept of industrial estates is a viable economic development alternative which ought to satisfy the strict economies of government priorities.

Given: - the high centripetal migration;
- the historic centripetal orientation;
- the present manifestations of central power and status;

Proposal: - location in the Seoul suburban area would be a positive location for development.
It has been clearly illustrated that the development priorities of the government in Korea lies with the expansion of the industrial-manufacturing sector of the economy. Further, the recent support for the government was shown in the adoption of the constitutional amendment of 1970 and the subsequent re-election of Park, Chung-hee show a clear mandate for the government to pursue its plans. The concept of industrial estates is suggested as a workable method of encouraging industrial development. In a later section, the metropolitan location of industrial estates will be discussed in relation to the Korean situation.

**Defining Industrial Estates**

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a new method of organizing housing and servicing for industry began to be applied in some economically advanced countries of Western Europe and the United States. Industrial estates were set up for the purpose of assembling, improving and subdividing tracts of land, and frequently for erecting factory buildings according to a comprehensive plan, in advance of, or upon demand, either for sale or lease to prospective industrial occupants. The plan provided for streets, rail lead tracks and utilities and sewers, which were usually installed before the sites were sold or leased, or were otherwise assured to the prospective occupants. Control over the area and buildings was exerted by the developing agency through zoning and restrictive convenants incorporated in the deeds of sale or leases, and with a view to protecting the investments of both developers and occupants and ensuring compatibility among the industrial activities of the latter. A variety of services was provided by the developing agency (United Nations, 1966).
These features are common to the organizations known today as planned or organized industrial tracts, districts or parks in North America, trading estates or industrial estates in the United Kingdom, industrial zones in Italy, industrial subdivisions in Puerto Rico, industrial estates in India and other countries. These terms refer both to the site and installations. They differentiate these industrial communities from portions of a city reserved for industrial use by city zoning ordinances, from unimproved and unplanned tracts of land offered for sale as suitable for industry, or from sites improved for the use of an individual industrial establishment or of a very small number of industries (United Nations, 1962).

**Industrial Estates as a Development Tool**

Although the concept of the industrial estate was first popularized almost ninety years ago in 1885 when plans were made for setting up the "Clearing Industrial District" in Chicago, its use as a development tool is contemporary. Industrial estates originated and were principally developed in already industrialized countries.

In the experience of most underdeveloped countries, the adoption of this method of development has yielded some distinctive features calling for adaptation of standard planning (United Nations, 1966). In both cases, there is much that remains to be learned about the value of industrial estates as a tool in policies of location and growth of industry and about economic and social ramifications.

The relatively short period of time in which industrial estates have been used explains the lack of appraisals of their value in achieving the objectives assigned to them in development schemes. It also explains
the relative scarcity, in all countries, of recent data and statistics on virtually all aspects of the subject—number of types of estates, factories and workers, acreage, development costs, sales and lease terms, etc. Yet, the arguments in favor are so strong that, accompanied by judicious planning, the value of estates is unquestionable. The question of "degree" is the outstanding variable and this must be solved in judging the appropriateness of each case (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961).

Until the mid-sixties, India and Puerto Rico were the only underdeveloped countries with full scale industrial development policies giving major emphasis to the establishment of industrial estates and embarking upon nationwide construction programs. In other underdeveloped countries, a few industrial estates have been set up in recent years; in most cases on an experimental basis (United Nations, 1966).

India is rather exceptional, in that the establishment of industrial estates has a relatively long history in its development planning. Development of ten industrial estates was begun in 1955-56, towards the end of the period covered by the First Five-Year Plan. Greater impetus was given to the industrial estate program under the Second Plan: in 1960, out of a total of 120 estates planned, forty were occupied, thirty-eight were completed or were being readied for occupancy by the end of the year, and forty-two were at the planning stages (International Perspective Planning Team on Small Industry, 1963).

In the early 1950's, Puerto Rico entered the field of countries utilizing industrial estates in planning. They planned an entire network of small industrial estates throughout the island. By the end of 1959, thirty "industrial subdivisions" were completed and twelve additional ones were planned (United Nations, 1966).
Types of Estates

The United Nations defines five levels of industrial estates with varying degrees of attractiveness relative to the level of capital outlay by the sponsoring body. They are listed here to illustrate the vast spread of potential that a country might use in assuring the success of a planned industrial estate (United Nations, 1966).

(A) A fully planned estate with custom designed factories designed for pre-selected industries. It is felt that a complete factory facility would ensure a rational composition of industries and good operating conditions, as local potentialities and needs would be thoroughly taken into account. On the other hand, the lack of flexibility of a fully-planned estate might have some obvious disadvantages.

(B) A larger estate including both custom designed factories for a certain number of selected industries and general-purposed factories built in advance of demand. The custom factories would be the first to be erected; they would be built for industries having special plant requirements and presenting a particularly high priority both from the stand-point of general economic needs and from that of the further development of the estate. This form of organization would seem to commend itself by combining full planning in the initial stages—where the greatest difficulties are usually to be met and where the impact of success or failure may be decisive—with flexible, though controlled, development in the future.

(C) An estate of the early Indian model, featuring only general purpose factories of various sizes. These may range from "loft" factories providing workshop units for handicrafts and very small establishments to full-fledged plants for small-scale industries. Such an
estate is suitable for urban and rural localities with good prospects for industrialization.

(D) An estate offering general-purpose factories, improved sites and custom built factories including, if need be, medium-sized or large plants. The advantage here would be the allowing for maximum flexibility in organization and use of land and in the services extended to industry.

(E) An estate providing only improved sites. Establishment of such an estate in or near a large urban center may frequently be a sufficient incentive to the formation of industrial undertakings and the relocation of existing ones.

A Model for Korea

In proposing the concept of industrial estates as a developmental scheme for Korea, it is the second model that is seen as a tentative approach. A large estate including both custom designed factories for a certain number of selected industries and general-purpose factories built to lead demand. The government, in building a number of custom designed factories for leasehold or sale would be able to maintain control over new development as well as to build to a standard quality as examples for future private construction. The Korean government has shown itself to be anxious to guide the growth of industry in specified fields. It has done so in the past by reducing and eliminating certain import tariffs on specific manufacturing inputs such as Phillipine logs for plywood and veneer processing for export, or import of Dynel for wigs also for export earnings (Rose, 1970). By offering custom designed factories as a "carrot", the control of development patterns would likely be easily accepted. The other half
of this model of industrial estate, the general-purpose factories, would allow the government administrators flexibility to adjust emphasis to a dynamic schedule of trade projections. The high level of efficiency by direct supervision or enunciated standards would be more readily enforced in this type of estate where government participation is sizable.

The establishment of industrial estates has proven to be a most effective instrument to encourage the growth of small and medium industry. It can constitute a strong inducement to private investment because of its ability to capture the otherwise volatile external economies of agglomeration. Industrial estates can save a great deal of effort and expense in the erection of factory buildings and in the installation of public utilities. They can provide for a better division of labor by securing common technical, repair and information services which could not be supported by one small industry alone, but could be economically feasible for a collective unit. Tangentially, the administrative unit of an industrial estate could organize laborer as well as managerial housing, transportation and social amenities for workers, something no single industry could be capable of undertaking independently (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961).

Intramural Cooperation

Technical assistance to individual small industries scattered throughout underdeveloped countries or areas raises a number of difficult problems. In a typical case, an engineering expert goes from factory to factory, from one city or village to another. The time he may devote to each enterprise is limited and is usually employed in making a rapid diagnosis of operational problems and recommending remedial measures. Whether the proposed remedies are of an interim stopgap kind or consist of long
range reorganization plans, further problems may be raised for the small industrialist which the experts may not be able—for lack of time or competence—to solve himself, though he may generally provide some information and advice on the steps which could be taken. For instance, a recommendation to purchase certain pieces of machinery will raise for the industrialist a problem of financing, which may be complicated by the need to secure foreign exchange control authorizations and import licenses; installation of machinery may need to be supervised, additional manpower recruited, and some specialized training provided to new as well as to existing employees. These problems may often be exceedingly difficult or even insurmountable for a man with little experience in administrative and business procedures, small financial means and limited access to commercial sources of financing (Bredo, 1960).

Even if the expert proposes measures which do not raise such problems and leaves detailed instructions for carrying them out, he may not be able to follow up his recommendations, or may do so only after a fairly long time. In the interim, his advice may be neglected or misconstrued or further issues may crop up.

To a large extent, these difficulties—which are not always present but arise frequently enough—stem from the structural weaknesses of small scale industry. They also result from the fact that technical assistance organizations have limited resources which must be apportioned as economically as possible to serve a large number of needs. It is generally impractical to provide lengthy, concentrated and costly help to a large number of enterprises scattered all over a country.

The grouping of small enterprises on an industrial estate makes it practical and economical to give them not only sustained assistance,
but in many cases, integrated assistance, a benefit that can seldom be extended to individual small enterprises outside of cooperatives or industrial estates. If the estate is sufficiently large, facilities in such fields as engineering, quality control, maintenance of equipment, management, training and finance can be included as an integral part of the project. Certain facilities may be institutionalized in the form of industrial extension centers, vocational training centers, testing laboratories or even technological research institutes. Multiple assistance can also be provided to smaller estates when they are located in areas where prospects of industrial development justify the establishment of permanent assistance institutions to serve the region (Bredo, 1960).

Group servicing would evidently be beneficial to both givers and receivers. The time of technical advisors and instructors would be more fully and more economically utilized. Their work would not only be coordinated, but cooperatively centered on solving different aspects of the same problems. The implementation of their teaching could be followed up and supervised over a period of time.

Where complementary relationships exist among some occupants of an estate, technical assistance could be simultaneously extended to enterprises supplying and using products the other manufactures. Such assistance—which seldom or never takes place outside of industrial estates—would be particularly effective in improving the quality and lowering the cost of both the intermediate and final products involved (Bredo, 1960).

Also, technical assistance could be given to would-be entrepreneurs, a type of assistance which can seldom be provided under traditional set ups. Applicants for sites or factories could receive advice on choice of investment and working capital requirements, prospective marketing and other

Development of Estates: A Constraint

There must be a cautionary air with which to go about sounding praise for the industrial estate as the wherefore to end it all. Industrial estates in and by themselves will not automatically bring about industrial growth. As the scheme was newly introduced in India, the approach of many of the people was the same as that to other familiar development projects such as an irrigation canal or a new fertilizer plant. These people were expecting immediate results as soon as construction of the site was completed (Alexander, 1963). This type of thinking is reflective of the attitude that the industrial estate is such a powerful tool of industrialization that location is of only minor significance. This is not the case. The failure of many of the early Indian estates was in large, if not totally, a result of just such error in judgement (Alexander, 1963). Below, the idea of location criteria on the part of authorities' decision-making process shall be covered in much detail.

Location/Spatial Implications

The linkage between the development policy of the government and the results as they have become manifest today in spatial terms can be seen in terms of some of the following remarks on external economies and location. Although stated in general terms, these can be related to the specifics of the case at hand. As the economic development plans of Korea listed no regional preferences, incentives or prohibition for growth in Korea, the location decision can be considered as an entrepreneurial decision.

Some of the most significant criteria for the industrial
location in developing countries are considered under the heading of external economies. Unfortunately, these too are the most difficult to document. There exists no comprehensive, systematic categorization of them, nor positive tools for their analysis or the measurement of their effect. There is ample descriptive literature, but pertinent only to developed countries. There is considerable evidence that in many cases these external economies can more than compensate for higher costs of transportation, labor or other factors of production that generally are thought to be primary considerations in location decisions (Alonso, 1971).

Analysis here can begin by following a classic statement of external economies. E.M. Hoover points to three elements in external economies: multiples, massing of reserves and bulk transactions (E.M. Hoover, 1948:120-30).

The concepts apply to the location and size of firms; the converse can also be applied with equal validity to show how the size of a city as an economic center is significant.

**Principle of Multiples**

In the case of the firm, the concept of multiples implies that since machinery is designed to operate at certain capacities, the minimum efficient size for the firm is that which ensures that no piece of equipment is under-utilized. By way of illustration, imagine a three step process: If one machine at step C accommodates the output of two machines of step B, and one machine at step B accommodates the output of three machines at step A, the minimum efficient size of a plant would consist of six machines of step A, two machines of step B, and one machine of step C (Hoover, 1948).
The same logic applies to a city. A certain minimum size is required for the efficient use of an airport, a transport system, or other forms of infrastructure. Smaller sizes will mean over-capacity in performing one of these functions, and therefore, greater unit cost. At the same time, and perhaps more importantly, certain sizes must be reached to justify the coming into existence of specialized supporting services, such as specialized shippers and jobbers, financial agencies, trade publications, repair services, specialized printing, consulting services, equipment leasing, advanced education facilities, laboratories, etc. It should be noted that the principle of multiples, in its full sense, may result in higher productivity not only through the avoidance of idle capacity, but also by permitting firms to specialize more narrowly and thus increase productivity. A firm could have its catalogues printed by a printer who is especially set up and experienced in that type of work; it could seek advice from a lawyer who is particularly knowledgeable on the issues at hand; it could get its machines repaired by men who know them well and have the proper tools, and so forth.

**Principle of Massing Reserves**

The principle of massing of reserves is an actuarial principle. Imagine, for instance, that there are five firms, each of which plans to use ten units of a material, but each of which, because of the possibility of spoilage or unexpected orders, considers that there is an even chance that it will need an additional two units. If these firms are separated in space, each must have twelve units of material for that level of safety, and the five will need a total of sixty units. This constitutes a reserve of ten units or 20%. On the other hand, if all five firms are close to
each other and use a common supplier or have an understanding to assist each other, only four and one-half units or 9% of the material will be needed as a reserve for the same level of safety. The same logic applies to the advantages of larger pools of skilled labor, larger markets for the product and larger or more numerous suppliers of the factors of production, repair and other special services.

Whereas the principle of multiples refers to the determinate advantages of particular combinations, the principle of massing of reserves deals with the probabilistic advantages of sheer size. It is based on the fact that uncertainty, when spread over large numbers, is more predictable and therefore less risky. Further, large numbers permit much greater flexibility and adaptability to changing and often unforeseeable circumstances because more opportunities are open (Alonso, 1971).

An example of the above point could be where a firm changes its production process and thereby finds itself with a new waste product. It is far more likely that in a large city there will be some other firm which can make use of it than in a smaller city, thus transforming the waste product into a by-product. The converse holds true if the new process calls for some new input.

**Principle of Bulk Transactions**

The third element in the formulation is the principle of bulk transactions. In the case of the firm, this is based on the fact that buying or shipping in larger quantities usually results in lower unit prices. In the case of the city, the large scale of operations may result in lower rates and more frequent and convenient service for large-scale transfer and terminal facilities. The same may apply to other public and commercial services, primarily because fixed costs may decline per unit
and because more efficient processes can be used at larger scales. It is frequently suggested, however, that many functions in large cities operate under diminishing returns, principally because of congestion, either internal to the function or among functions. This point has not been settled by empirical research and constitutes the principal bone of contention between those who argue for and against big cities (Alonso, 1971).

The principle of bulk transactions has a less equivocal advantage, already encountered under the principle of multiples. A very large scale of operations permits specialization and increased productivity: the very large number of events and transactions make it possible to handle a wide variety of needs in a standardized and therefore more efficient and less costly manner. Specialized shippers, repairmen, professionals, subcontractors, etc. fall into this category. This does not contradict the subsequent argument that the large city is particularly hospitable to the non-standardized producer. The reason for this is that the unstandardized producer has greater need for supporting services and associated activities which are found in the big cities; further, in large cities they will be more specialized and standardized and therefore easier to use.

The applicability of the principles of location in the entrepreneurial location decision is perhaps a moot question in underdeveloped nations. But, on the other hand, the relative sophistication of Korean businessmen suggests that the 'Western tools of 'least-cost' corporate decision-making' are gaining broader acceptance (Meier, 1970). Like the Western countries from where most of this theory is derived, there is a myriad of factors which cannot be quantified. These too, are factored
into the decision-making process. In Korea, many of these non-quantifiable factors are tied to a cultural or situation trait that is peculiar to the case. The influence of these factors has been to induce central location within the country.

**Non-quantifiable Location Factors**

The subtle but enormous importance of face-to-face relations is not sufficiently recognized in the preceding formulation of external economies. Yet, these personal contacts are crucial in the Korean context for many reasons. At the most obvious level, underdeveloped countries have poorer communication systems. Telephones are scarcer and less dependable, mail is slower and less dependable, air connections are rarer. Consequently, physical distance between persons is a more formidable barrier to communication and this leads to the spatial concentration of those who must do business together.

In Korea, social forces, however, may exert an even stronger force toward spatial concentration. Most messages are less impersonal and standardized than in developed countries where much information is transmitted by trade journals, catalogues, government publications and other media. At the same time, in developed countries, contracts, terms of finance and details of payment and delivery, specification of the product and a myriad of other formal contracts tend to follow established method. In Korea as well as in other underdeveloped countries where business patterns are less established and communications depend far more on word of mouth, procedures are far less standardized, thus calling for discussion and negotiation. These circumstances require people to come together. Further, in a society that has traditional Confucian social stratification, the rituals of social contact when two-way communication is necessary
are very elaborate. Considerable time must be devoted to expressions of mutual respect, and no haste to get to the substance of the meeting may be shown. Even the substance of the conversation must be treated with the subtlety and indirection which baffles those used to procedures in developed countries. There are ways of saying yes which mean no, price and time estimates which mean something else, gentle probings and subtle hints. An order blank, a long-distance telephone call, a cable or business letter are instruments which are too blunt and insensitive for these complexities (Alonso, 1968).

Mechanical problems of communication and the customary modes of contact are not the only forces of this type which draw firms toward the largest city. The social and institutional matrix of communication and information also exerts pulls. Personal relations enter more frequently and more pervasively into human contacts of all types, including business relations. In developed countries, contacts are more segmented into well defined roles which are limited to the issues at hand.* In underdeveloped countries, it is often more important to cultivate sources, to establish a commonality of attitudes or class positions. Information on new developments becomes available at irregular intervals, and channels must be kept open to be certain of being informed. Since the information is unpredictable, often taking the form of rumors or confidential reportage, it is important to be in contact with many people and to see them even when no particular business is at hand. Conditions change frequently and unpredictably; regulations are changed, ministries are reorganized, the

* This is a matter of degree, e.g., even in developed countries, business is often pursued by warming personal relations in the sharing of meals or leisure.
relative costs and availability of production factors and financing shift suddenly. It is therefore often crucial to be at the centers of influence, decision and information. The heavy bureaucratic maze of permits and licenses requires that papers be personally shepherded from one official's desk to another. This is not only because rules and procedures are often confused or even contradictory, or because many an over-bureaucratized machine needs to be lubricated by flattery, persistence and great resources of persuasion, including bribery, but also because the low standards of professional competence of many government officials below the very top levels make it likely that papers will get lost on some desk or dusty file in the depths of a ministry.

It has been argued here that the fluidity of the situation, the lack of standardization of procedures, and the personalization of contacts pull forcefully towards the largest city. This pull is magnified by the scarcity of entrepreneurs and investment capital. In most firms, one or a few individuals have all the responsibilities of management, including general management, marketing, finance, purchasing, production and long and short range planning. For the reasons discussed, the management functions are pulled toward the city and they bring the production functions with them. The advantages of flexibility, adaptability and the conservation and efficient use of the scarce time of the management are likely to wash out any advantage of a few percentage points in transportation, labor or some other cost at an alternative location.

Metropolitan Location

The idea of metropolitan location for further economic development in underdeveloped countries is a relatively modern scheme which recognizes and accommodates the natural tendencies. François Perroux (1955)
talks of the *poles de croissance* as a formula for development. The basic idea is that economic growth never takes place at a uniform rate throughout an economy but tends to concentrate on one or a limited number of nodes or *poles de croissance* from which "spread effects" are generated to the rest of the economy (Perroux, 1955). Although the original theory did not include spatial implication, more recently the "growth pole" idea has taken on compatible spatial connotations (Rodwin, 1970). The basis of the theory is that economic growth ought to be encouraged where it has the most likelihood of succeeding, ergo where seeds of development have begun to sprout, they ought to be fertilized (Higgins, 1968).

The implication of this theory for development in Korea is that metropolitan location around Seoul would be the most positive location for further industrial growth. As it has been illustrated in the first and second chapters, economic growth has been focused on the industrial-manufacturing sector and the Seoul geographical area. To the extent that this would appear to be the most promising location, and to the extent that the government policy gives tacit acceptance of this *pole de croissance*, other alternatives would have to be considered secondary at best.

Britton Harris (1959) in talking about underdeveloped countries in general points up the significance of location factors in planning for industrial development. From his experiences, he suggests that growth in the industrial sector can be seen as roughly proportional to the existing population of small industrial firms in industries capable of expansion. This he suggests can be generalized to include the sector as a whole.

By and large, this means that existing large metropolitan centers will have an advantage which will tend to give a multitude of advantages to further growth. The largest cities are...par excellence, the incubators of small industry. (Harris, 1959; see also Vernon, 1957).
Within these cities, the small industries will, for a variety of reasons, tend to center on the urban core. The transplanting of these interests to the fringe, where they would still be able to enjoy the fruits of central location (in regional terms) and yet minimize their impact on the pressures of the urban core, will be a delicate and difficult operation. In spite of the importance of established centers, other things being equal, the newer interests will tend to overtake the older forms because of the tendency of the latter to cling to traditional forms of factory work and industrial organization. It is for this reason that young firms will be able to compete with established organizations, even in established markets.

Dis-economies of Rural Location

It is easy to surmise that there is an existing element of growth which will tend to accelerate the new concentration of population in the larger cities. Concurrently, this element can be seen as a powerful instrument for economic development in that it can be translated into a new source of capital, skills and higher income on a per capita basis. The focus of this process on larger centers is offset to a very limited extent by the pull of lower cost of labor in the rural areas, the smaller towns and the depressed regions (Harris, 1959). Trying to locate industry in a rural region because of a low level of employment or underemployment in that area is not an economically sound decision. Although the cost of labor will be low, the productivity will in all likelihood be even lower. Many past examples have shown that the "cheap labor" does not mean that it can adapt itself to a factory (Gerschenkron, 1966).

In a previous section, Hoover's (1948) principle of massing reserves was referred to in regard to industries in large metropolitan
areas being able to exist while maintaining smaller reserves of materials of production than would the same production capacity spread over several development areas. This same principle applies to labor. A metropolitan area can maintain a higher margin of safety in labor reserves at lower unemployment levels than can a smaller area at higher rates of unemployment. Conversely, layoffs by one firm in a small city are far less likely to be absorbed by other firms. Therefore, nations which seek growth together with full employment should recognize that a policy of decentralization is likely to carry with it a higher rate of idle labor (Alonso, 1968).

Decentralization in India

In contradistinction to this principle, Harris (1959) describes the Indian government's policy of industrial development as being basically against growth in larger cities and in favor of efforts to accelerate the increase of employment opportunities in the rural areas and smaller cities.

There are many bases in the culture and the ideology of the Congress Party for such an attitude. Urban growth is a recent enough phenomenon that many of the metropolitan intellectuals and businessmen who constitute the Congress Party had close ties with rural relatives and were familiar with rural conditions. The legitimate emphasis on agricultural improvements as an important step in economic development has combined with this concern for the rural masses to give rise to the community development program. The scarcity of resources for development suggests the desirability of creating a source of capital which would not otherwise exist by mobilizing underemployed rural labor in self-help projects (Harris, 1959).
In India, the government seems well equipped with policy but ill coordinated in its execution. Too many agencies control land use, factory construction, investment, etc. Only in the case of the very largest enterprises do we see any consistent application of the policy of industrial decentralization through the creation of new towns and, as the example of Bangalore illustrates, this is only partially successful. (Harris, 1959:195).

The utilization of rural labor is considered to be a primary factor in Harris' analysis of Indian policy towards decentralization. If the matter is pressed far enough, the belief in the importance of industrial decentralization seems to rest on the assumption that new industry in a locality provides employment opportunities, raises the standard of living, and thus attracts additional migration from more remote areas.

This position would seem to be largely in contradiction to the facts, although the detailed structure of this migration is not clearly understood. Apparently, like trends affect a few localities in the United States, but unlike the classical interpretations of population movement, the migration to the cities leads industrial economic development and creates an occupationally mobile labor pool which, in turn, attracts industry. If all this is correct, the process of slowing down migration to the larger centers through the relocation of industry would require that industrial expansion in these centers be strenuously repressed and employment opportunities restricted so that any continued migration would lead to a disastrous further decline in levels of living. This would in turn lead to giving these centers a "bad name" among potential migrants and would eventually slow down further growth (Rodwin, 1970).

Harris (1959) asserts that this policy is totally unworkable:
(1) because of the tremendous contribution to economic growth which would be nullified and

(2) because the worsening of conditions which would be necessary to discourage migration would be socially and politically disastrous.

Deductions of General Applicability

In addition to labor, Harris (1959) talks to many other specific problems that would tend to discourage rural dispersion of industrial development, and by the same token would lead to the natural metropolitanization of an existing core. Some examples of these specifics follow:

- public services may be inadequate
- water supply may be inadequate and unreliable
- electric service may be irregular and/or insufficient
- telecommunications with the center may be poor, international telecommunications may be near impossible
- contact with competitors, customers, suppliers and the market place or shipping terminals may be greatly impaired
- contact with government agencies may be difficult to pursue
- managers and proprietors will feel loss of status from central location; inadequate schools and non-existent cultural events
- transportation of goods will be expensive both in time and actual costs
- dirt streets become mud and slime in rainy season

It is of interest that many of these examples taken from Harris' (1959) actual field work are virtually the same problems of location that Hoover (1948) talked about in theory a decade before.

Harris (1959) asserts that outside the immediate vicinity of a large metropolitan center, any attempt to build up industrial centers is tenuous at best. Smaller centers could not provide the general external
economies of scale which are needed by industry.

Only the largest enterprises can afford the initial cost of overcoming all these difficulties and sacrifice the external economies of location. It is almost imperative that they build large self-contained units; that their labor costs be of dominating importance; and that their skills be easily acquired and that their product be fairly homogeneous and standardized.

Location Deductions from International Observation

An international team of experts conducted a study of small scale industries (International Perspective Planning Team, Ford Foundation, 1963) and observed that the success of industrial estates has varied tremendously with the location. In measures such as per dollar return on capital costs and the employment per square foot of factory space, a thirteen-fold variation was found among the twelve estates surveyed. If the highest benefit-cost ratios are taken as a reasonable test of good performance, it is clear that sizable losses or misdirected expenditures have been incurred on many estates. The causes for this may be linked to inadequate planning or decisions reached on less than comprehensive analysis of the situation.

In this study, the most successful estate by a crude benefit-cost test among ten for which these tests could be made was a large estate located in an industrialized city with a 1.1 partial ratio.* Its reported

* Only capital expended for land and estate construction was included. Machinery and equipment are ignored. Net output here is a rough approximation of value added, at 25% of the value of gross output—a relationship suggested by prior studies (International Perspective Planning Team, 1963).
employment per square foot of factory area was also the highest in the sample, 90 persons per 10,000 square feet. There was a sharp drop in benefits in the next group of three major estates with partial output—capital ratios of .1 or less, with employment falling as low as 7 persons per 10,000 square feet in one estate (International Perspective Planning Team, 1963).

Three of the four lowest utilization rates just cited were in small towns having few if any industrial advantages and lacking entrepreneurship on a developed level. Only 11 of the 54 factory sheds in these three estates were functioning in December, 1962, although they had been open for 15 to 18 months (International Perspective Planning Team, 1963).

As already noted, there are indications that the scope and speed of development are greater in estates located near large Indian cities. This appears to be corroborated by the experience of other countries, developed and underdeveloped, where estates have been set up in rural as well as in urban localities. It may be observed that in the United Kingdom, where the object of establishing industrial estates was to promote the growth of industry in the Development Areas and to check it in the already industrialized centers, important clusters of estates have been set up around some of the main cities in certain Development Areas and in Northern Ireland. It is these rather than the ones located in the hinterland that have evidenced the greatest success (United Nations, 1966).

ECOSOC suggests (United Nations, 1966) that where the goals of industrialization do not conflict with other aims, in particular with social, political or strategic ones, they might best be achieved by encouraging establishing estates located on zoned sites in or near the existing
metropolitan centers. If tendencies toward industrial concentration can be definitely ascertained in such localities, estates providing only improved sites may be sufficient to control the spatial characteristics of industrial growth.

The idea of location of industrial estates not conflicting with other social, political or strategic goals is important and ought to be discussed here in some detail. Israel is a good example of how social policy might be opposed to a purely economic basis of defining national priorities. The primacy of Tel-Aviv is reflected in the fact that in 1948, it housed 43.2% of the total Israeli population (Shachar, 1971). Its share of industrial production, commercial enterprises and cultural activities was even higher than its relative population. The spatial organization in Israel prior to 1948 can be described as an extremely centralized core in Tel-Aviv and secondary cores of Jerusalem and Haifa. After 1948, the vast stream of migrants outnumbered the existing population. This made possible the gradual incorporation of the new arrivals and made imperative a vast rethinking in spatial restructuring in the Israeli society.

Policy makers and planners formulated new national goals with a goal of social, not economic achievement, i.e., social values instead of economic efficiency. Basic economic goals such as achieving and maintaining a high rate of economic growth were not prime motives. Settling remote and heretofore sparsely settled regions with an eye to overcoming the regional imbalances in development was more important than maximizing industrialization or increasing export dollar earnings (Johnson, 1970). The support and success of this national policy to limit growth in Tel-Aviv can largely be attributed to a general emotional and ideological discontent
with living in large cities (Shachar, 1971).

The purpose of making mention of the Israel experience of development is two-fold. First to show how decentralization was legislated at the conscious transfer of goals from economic to social; secondly, to further emphasize the fact that the success in policy was well within what can be called the "natural tendency of the people" (Shachar, 1971). These points are important in application of the converse to the Korean situation. First, the Korean government, as illustrated in an earlier section, has given highest priority to accomplishing its economic goals. Second, the Korean people have had a positive orientation towards the primate city. Life in Seoul has not had the negative connotations that Shachar (1971) intimates have existed with the Jews in Tel-Aviv. In light of the foregoing discussion, the policy for Korean development becomes quite clear.

This is further borne out by some recommendations of the previously mentioned International Team (1963). First, they suggested that industrial estates alone could not create industry. An integrated approach to industrial development is necessary. They suggest combining analysis of industrial potential in an area in light of existing facilities, utilities, transportation, support services and industries. Only by guaranteeing coordination of these elements with estates both sectorially and spatially, could economic success be assured.

Second, they suggested that experience has shown failures are less likely to arise because of faulty physical planning than because of such factors as poor location or failure to coordinate development efforts with the social milieu.
Third, they suggested that pre-planning advice and assistance on all aspects of industrial estate planning, which experience shows to be important, should be given by knowledgeable experts. The work of the experts, however, must not only be the most economically rational decision, but that which takes into consideration current government, economic and political policy (International Perspective Planning Team, 1963).
CONCLUSION

The development of this thesis can be seen in the schematic diagram below. It portrays a common physical phenomenon—the internal centralization trends in Korea—as merely the "tip of the iceberg" in the country's milieu. Three contributing factors were then explored in their relationship to the central oriented migration pattern. The consideration of these three factors were parallel and basically independent of each other. In conclusion, they lead to a plan for spatial development that can be fitted into the constraints imposed by the framework.

Government Policy

Centralization Trends

History

Spatial Plan

Institutional Manifestations

The constraint of government developmental priorities was significant in determining the framework of the plan so that the suggested plan of suburban industrial estates near Seoul would function as a viable development tool. Arguments for dispersal can be put forth in terms of long run economic modelling, but the posture of government is more attuned to the efficiency of current operations and short run results. In his 1971 "New Year Message of the President," Park, Chung-hee stated that "It is (the) paramount task and goal of the nation to expedite economic development for the modernization of (Korea) at the earliest possible date..."
(Republic of Korea, 1971 D:3). To maximize the economies of scale, a centralized organization which would minimize the problems of linkages while internalizing costs and maximizing benefits seems most appropriate.

An investigation of the massive population shift taking place in Korea today indicates a strong centripetal orientation concurrent with the declining population growth rate of the country as a whole. There is an acceleration in the population growth rates of the urban areas. This is most obvious in the primate city of Seoul where there has been a continuous growth in population since after the Korean war. Population has mushroomed from 1.6 million in 1955 to 5.5 million in 1970.

Throughout this paper it has been suggested that attraction to Seoul has been motivated by more than glib reasons. A historic desire and respect for education; a deep-seated understanding of the capital city as the decision-making hub for government, business and culture have had more than passing influence on internal patterns of growth, migration and politics.

While it is not intended that we "travel into the future looking through a rear view mirror," it is suggested that a more than cursory understanding of a historic culture is necessary to comprehend and plan with the current behavior and societal structure of a people. During the Yi Dynasty, the Confucian philosophy placed the rule of the country in the hands of the King. The historic role of Confucianism in education and government have contemporary manifestations; these have been shown to be significant in the overall structure.

That the main thrust of all this activity today is in Seoul is indicative of the fact that no other city can be expected to fulfill its role or to substantially diminish the central orientation of the country.
Any government planning is likely to fail unless it considers the socio-cultural factors involved above and beyond the pure economics.

A city and especially Seoul, as suggested in previous sections, plays a role in the Korean milieu that is more than economic, it is a many faceted center.
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