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AMERICAN EFFORTS TO RAISE CHINA TO GREAT POWER STATUS: 1942-1945

by

CHARLES EDWARD STEWART CURMI

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## ABSTRACT

From the outset of its involvement in the Second World War, the United States found itself physically isolated from China. With the capture of Singapore by the Japanese and the subsequent downfall of the Philippines, this isolation increased and virtually cut China off from direct material support. To counter this impasse and maintain the Nationalists in the war against Japan, the U.S. resorted to diplomacy by sponsoring China as a founding member of the United Nations with a permanent seat on the Security Council. This move, though opportune under the circumstances then existing, failed to take into account the growing potential of the Chinese Communists and negated the long-range value of raising China to great power status.

The object of this study is to examine the material and diplomatic help provided China from Pearl Harbour to the Yalta Conference and the motives which led American diplomacy to support the Nationalists to the exclusion of all other political factions within China during this period.

Chapter I traces the application of the Open Door Policy to China from the first notes of 1899, down to the Stimson Non-Recognition

Doctrine of 1932. Some statistics are also given of the scope of U.S. economic interest in China up to Pearl Harbour. Chapter II delves into FDR's overall attitude toward China, the material help provided her to 1942, the logistics involved in its delivery, and the early American attempts to identify China with the three great powers. Chapter III follows American diplomatic moves to have China accepted by Britain and the U.S.S.R. into the U.N. Organization during its formative years at the Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran Conferences and the gradual relegation of China to a secondary role in the war in the Pacific. Chapter IV investigates the complexities of the Stilwell Mission, some Chinese reactions to it, the modest help provided China, and her relative neglect by the three great powers at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. The Yalta concessions to foster the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war in the Pacific are also examined in the context of a planned invasion of the Japanese mainland. Chapter V assesses the relative value of four years of U.S. diplomacy toward China which concentrated on raising the Nationalists to great power status with a seat in the U.N. Security Council whilst ignoring the growing potential for power of the Chinese Communists.



## Contents

Introduction:	1
I:      The Open Door as American Policy in China: 1899-1932	3
II:     Franklin D. Roosevelt and China: 1932-1942	27
III:    China as a Great Power: Moscow, Cairo and Teheran	47
IV:     Stilwell, The Chinese, Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta	65
V:      Four Years of Diplomacy: An Assessment	92
Bibliography:	121
Appendicies:	136

## INTRODUCTION

This study examines American diplomatic attempts to raise China to the level of a great power from Pearl Harbour to the Yalta Conference. The study includes a survey of Sino-American relations as exemplified by the Open Door Policy during the years 1899-1932, then concentrates on the following areas: The difficulties involved in providing China with material and advisory help throughout the war; the successful seating of the Nationalists in the U.N. Organization; some Chinese reactions to the modest help received, and an assessment of the motives which led American diplomacy to raise Nationalist China to great power status whilst ignoring the future potential of the Chinese Communists in their immediate and long-range plans for China.

The bulk of the material used consists of official American dispatches contained in the State Department publication: Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, covering the years 1942-45. This material is supplemented by selected memoirs of some of the individuals involved, general works by American and other scholars in American diplomacy and articles and periodicals specifically related to Sino-American relations during this period. An appendix reproducing the major documents referred to

throughout this study is added to the detailed bibliography.

## I

### THE OPEN DOOR AS AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA: 1899-1932

More than a hundred years before the American Government showed an interest in the territorial integrity of China, the myth of a fabulous China market had been firmly implanted in the minds of many New England traders. Cook's third voyage, 1776-1780, with its tempting accounts of sea otter trade not only created the myth, but led to the initial contacts between Americans and Chinese.

During the late 1780's and the first half of the nineteenth century, these contacts centered on the individual forays of traders and whalers, yet official interest in the Orient was not entirely lacking. The Wilkes expedition of 1838-1842 into the Southwest Pacific and Perry's forceful entry into Japan in 1853 followed by the Rodgers' survey of the North Pacific in 1853-1856, all provided needful data. Rodgers in fact, intended tracing a commercial route from San Francisco to Shanghai but a lack of funds on his return from Japan put an end to his scheme. However, his vision of Chinese goods being shipped across the Pacific to the California coast, then overland by rail to the Atlantic and the markets of Europe, was to persist well into the second

half of the nineteenth century.

With the linking of the Union and Central Pacific railroads in 1869, Rodgers' early vision was gradually transformed into reality. Yet, to the vast majority of Americans, China was destined to remain a rather nebulous entity. More "foreign" and more distant, China did not lend itself to that interest which Europe has continuously exerted on the American mind, both at the social and cultural levels of expression. The earliest ethnic bonds ran eastward to Britain, and later, with the first immigrant flood, spread to Ireland, to Germany, and in time, to the whole of Europe. The Chinese labor that first entered the west coast in 1848 was never able to achieve the degree of integration that most of its North European counterparts were to win for themselves even before the Civil War.

It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that Sino-American relations were considered important enough to warrant the effort of a major diplomatic move. The early treaties of Wanghia in 1844, Tientsin in 1858, and Washington in 1868, had restricted themselves to general questions of trade and consular services. By 1899 something more substantial was needed to cope with the spread of European interests in China, and the threat that these interests might exclude America from a potentially large market for its manufactured goods, curtail the existing minimal trade, and adversely affect its growing missionary

involvement in that country.

It should also be remembered that America was at the height of its jingoist adventure in the Philippines, which some viewed as a possible stepping stone to China.<sup>1</sup> Others, such as Senator Beveridge of Indiana, Theodore Roosevelt, and his friend Henry Cabot Lodge, were influenced by Captain Mahan's lucid: The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, and its plea for a two ocean navy to keep the sea lanes open to prospective colonies.

These expansionists, and a fairly wide segment of the American public whose taste for empire had not yet been soured by the tenacity of Emilio Aguinaldo, could hardly be expected to accept with benign detachment the vast colonial expansion of Britain and France's "New Imperialism."<sup>2</sup> In the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, Britain in effect, increased her empire by nearly five million square miles, whilst France multiplied hers to over six million. When the scramble for Africa ended in 1898 and the European powers turned to China, the U.S. decided to protect what few interests she had, or hoped to develop in the Philippines and on the Asian mainland.

The following year, a series of diplomatic notes were sent to the American diplomatic representatives in Great Britain, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, and Tokyo. Largely the work of Alfred Hippisley, a British Commissioner of Maritime Customs

in China who influenced to some extent Hay's Far Eastern advisor William Rockhill, the Open Door Notes of 1899-1900, set the stage for American policy in China up to and beyond December 7, 1941.

The first set of notes, those of September 6, 1899, were worded to convey the traditional abhorrence Americans held for spheres of influence, and suggested that all nations should enjoy equal access to the trade of China.<sup>3</sup> As a free trade theory postdating Adam Smith by nearly one and a quarter centuries, it could hardly claim the genesis of originality. What was different, was America's attempt to influence a host of European countries into cooperating with her to guarantee the integrity of a country outside her own continent. For a nation traditionally wary of foreign entanglements, here was as radical a change in foreign policy as any that had occurred since Washington's Farewell Address.<sup>4</sup>

With treaty rights in China since 1844, American commercial interests were rudely shaken on November 18, 1897 by the German seizure of the port of Kiaochou in Shantung. Less than five months later, Russia demanded the cession of Port Arthur at the tip of the Kwantung Peninsula, along with the port of Talienwan and an extensive lease in Southern Manchuria.

This move created a certain threat to American trade in Manchuria and Northern China, areas which absorbed two-thirds of all American exports to China. In Chefoo, for example, one

of the treaty ports now under German influence, U.S. exports of cotton, textiles, and kerosene, increased by 200-400 percent between 1894 and 1897.<sup>5</sup> Yet, when one considers that as late as 1914, American exports to China were less than 1 percent of total U.S. exports,<sup>6</sup> these increases do not on the whole amount to a great deal of trade. When viewed against a total U.S. overseas expansion of 10 to 12 percent between the years 1897-1916,<sup>7</sup> the overall size of this trade was of such insignificant proportions as to have no perceivable effect on the American economy.

In spite of these facts and no immediate rise in American corporate interest in China, the economic interpretations of the Open Door Notes persist amongst such widely read critics of American foreign policy as Walter LaFeber and W.A. Williams. Unfortunately, this approach ignores such factors as domestic politics and an ingrained sense of mission which permeated U.S. foreign policy during this period.

The New York Times seems to have been closer to the real intent of the notes when it stated on February 7, 1898, that the real threat "is not yet in our present trade with all Chinese ports, but the right to all that trade with its future increase...."<sup>8</sup> This fear from the business community that it might be cut off from a potentially vast market in China by the partitioning of that country into closed economic spheres of



interest, had probably a far greater effect in implementing the Hippisley-Rockhill-Hay policy than any immediate loss of trade, even considering the depression of the 1890's.

Though speculation as to the intent of the notes persist, what of their wording? As documents that guided American relations with China for over forty years, an analysis of both the wording and the construction of the notes of 1899 reveals an identifiable trend. First, comes a statement of fact admitting the existence of British, German, and Russian mining and railroad interests in China. Second, a definition of, and a plea for continuing the free trade or "open-door" policy Britain had been maintaining in spite of existing spheres by European powers "to insure to the commerce of the world in China equality of treatment within said 'spheres' for commerce and navigation." Third, a disavowal of spheres of interest, for "the United States will in no way commit itself to a recognition of exclusive rights of any power within or control over any portion of the Chinese Empire,..." for this could imperil existing American treaty rights. Fourth, another plea, this time more specifically aimed at preserving its existing trade, so that Americans "may not be prejudiced through exclusive treatment by any of the controlling powers within their so-called spheres of interest." Finally, having again restated a preference for an open market for world commerce, the notes turn to China and advocate "administrative

reforms so urgently needed for strengthening the Imperial Government and maintaining the integrity of China in which the whole western world is alike concerned."<sup>9</sup> This last statement, coming after the long preamble over the continuation and protection of foreign trade in China, could easily be construed as a mere sop to that nation's interests. It was all of that, though it also was aimed at pacifying the idealism of American missionaries in China and their supporters at home.

There is some evidence that the U.S. deluded no one as to the primary intent of the notes, and though Hay loudly claimed success, "the replies ... were couched in evasive and somewhat ambiguous terms."<sup>10</sup> On purely pragmatic grounds, none of the European powers were eager to guarantee to the U.S., or to the whole western world, rights and privileges they, unlike the U.S., were ready to protect through force. The only hopeful answer was Japan's, which viewed any policy which even on the surface restricted European expansion in China as beneficial to her own interests in that country.

In addition to protecting existing and future trading rights, the McKinley Administration also hoped the very wording of the notes would appeal to the broad spectrum of American idealism; to that self-conceived destiny, as old in China as the sixteenth and seventeenth century efforts of Ricci, Schall and Verbiest. This attitude assumed that Christianity with the aid of Western

science could make an appreciable impact on two thousand years of civilization. By catering to this impulse, McKinley was raising trade to the level of a moral issue, for "defense merely of ... commercial 'rights' in China had no such appeal as the 'Open Door' for all nations...."<sup>11</sup>

Unlike the Jesuits Schall and Verbiest, who through a demonstrated superiority in astrology managed to reach some of the Mandarins, the American missionary effort in China was more forcefully attuned to the evangelical zeal of nineteenth century Protestantism. First to set the pattern was Peter Parker a Yale medical missionary who landed in Canton in June, 1834, and immediately directed his efforts toward helping the Chinese people. By 1887, such prominent humanitarians as John Mott, Robert Spear, Sherwood Eddy and Henry Luce Sr., had dedicated themselves to the conversion of China through the Student Volunteers for Foreign Missions, and the Presbyterian Board of Missions. Later, the work initiated by these men would be continued by the Yale-in-China project which reached its apogée under the great Edward Hume, founder of the Yale medical school in Changsha, Hunan.

There was therefore, more than raw self-interest in a diplomatic move which sought to protect not only its traders, but also men as disinterested as these, especially on the part of a nation which so far, sought no territorial concessions from a weak and divided China. This mixture of secular theology and

commercial self-interest was fundamental to the whole American approach to China, and persisted well into the middle of the twentieth century. There were some exceptions however, such as the nationalist explosion of the Boxer Rebellion, which prompted the issuance of the second set of notes on July 3, 1900.

With Vienna, Brussels, Madrid, the Hague, and Lisbon added to the original list, the notes opened with a warning that the U.S. will hold to "the uttermost accountability" any transgression of her extraterritorial rights in China. Then follows a condemnation of the uprising as "virtual anarchy," and a statement of intent delineating what the U.S. intends rescuing in China: "American officials, missionaries, and other Americans,... [including] all legitimate American interests...." Finally, the notes end with an unequivocal pledge to "preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity...."<sup>12</sup> This final statement was to be repeated with monotonous regularity at every crisis China faced over the next forty-one years. It is a tribute to the persistence of myths, that during this period, the U.S. made no major attempt to implement these words, yet their very existence served to perpetuate the myth that China's territorial integrity was of paramount importance to American foreign policy.

In November 1900, Hay under pressure from the War and Navy Departments, attempted to gain naval and territorial concessions at Samsah Bay in Fukien province. Griswold, commenting on this

apparent loss of idealism, states that "the erstwhile champion of Chinese integrity, still outwardly loyal to the policy of his notes, had actually forsaken that policy and tried to enter the concessions-scramble."<sup>13</sup> Though the navy pressed again in 1901 and 1902, the U.S., alone of the foreign powers in China, refused to acquire any territorial concessions. Yet, so pervasive was the exploitation of China, even before the Boxer Rebellion, that none of the notes sent in 1900 were addressed to Peking. The U.S., in fact, sought guarantees for its own and China's interests from the very powers that were violating the latter's sovereignty.

Here finally, the Open Door Notes reveal some of their original intent: the protection of American interests and nationals in China from European and Japanese pressures. This is not to deny a sense of idealism amongst the policy planners of 1900, but it does reveal the appalling weakness of China, and her inability to protect her own interests.

The rhetoric of the notes which showed an interest in protecting China's territorial integrity, had little effect on the rush for Chinese plunder and concessions that followed the suppression of the rebellion. Nor did it prevent, as Marilyn Young adequately documents, some Americans from exacting their own toll for the excesses of the Boxers, an attitude sharply in contrast to the official position, which saw the U.S. returning to China

the reparations the Imperial Government had been forced to pay for the losses Americans had incurred during the fighting.<sup>14</sup>

Over the next thirty-two years, American interests on the Asian mainland would be repeatedly challenged, whilst China, saved from immediate partition by the rivalries of the concession powers, would finally emerge a truncated nation, her territorial and administrative integrity a mere phrase in an old diplomatic note, with Japan firmly holding the balance of power in the Far East.

The process was not long in starting. As early as 1902, Russia was barring American trade in Manchuria and consolidating its influence in a part of China it had preempted since the Boxer Rebellion. The following year, with U.S. consulates barred from the area, Hay summed up the impact of U.S. domestic politics on as independent a person as Theodore Roosevelt: "I take it for granted," he told T.R. on April 28, 1903, "that Russia knows as we do that we will not fight over Manchuria, for the simple reason that we cannot, ... we could never get a treaty through the Senate the object of which was to check Russian aggression."<sup>15</sup>

The Russo-Japanese War and the subsequent negotiations at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, which ended the conflict on September 5, 1905, revealed Japan as the strongest naval power in the Far East, and identified her as the greatest single threat to the Open Door in China. Though Roosevelt attempted to balance

Russian imperialism with Japanese power, Chinese sovereignty would ultimately suffer.

In May, 1908, the U.S. signed an arbitration treaty with Japan, prompting the Peking Chung Ying Tung Pao to wonder "how the Japanese would rage if China and any other power agreed to protect the independence and integrity of Japan!"<sup>16</sup> Six months later, Japan's presence in Manchuria was further strengthened through the Root-Takahira Agreement, where the U.S. exchanged the status quo in Asia for the security of the Philippines and the Open Door in China.<sup>17</sup> With the end of Roosevelt's second administration, Japan, with the tacit agreement of the U.S. and Britain, was securely ensconced in Korea, the Open Door was being gradually closed, and the security of the Philippines had taken precedence over China's territorial integrity.

By 1909, and the advent of William H. Taft to the White House, it was evident to both the new president and secretary Knox, that something new would have to be attempted to maintain America's presence in China. The Taft-Knox "Dollar-Diplomacy" which followed, attempted to force American capital into a region in which it was not in the least interested. Taft in fact, went so far as to personally telegraph the regent of China, Prince Chun, asking him to allow equal participation for American capital in the European controlled Hukuang railway loan. There was also an attempt to involve American bankers in reforming China's

currency. Again, as in the Hukuang loan, the initiative came from the Department of State, not American capital, which had little interest in investing in a virtually unknown entity with no immediate guaranteed return. By 1914, American investments in China amounted to only \$7,299,000, yet in the previous four years, the average "yearly" American import and export trade with Japan had exceeded that with China by \$78,700,000.<sup>18</sup>

The Wilson administration ended the Taft-Knox experiment on March 19, 1913, by withdrawing American support for the Hukuang loan, stating that the conditions of the loan were so unfavourable to China as to impinge on the latter's "administrative independence." Two months later, the Wilsonian idealism was again evident in the attempt to place a Y.M.C.A. official, John R. Mott, as U.S. Ambassador to China. In January, 1915, Japan, using her wartime alliance with Britain and France as a pretext, attempted to secure Shantung from Germany and increase her presence in Southern Manchuria.

The "Twenty-One Demands," which Japan presented to China, amounted to an ultimatum which threatened the latter's very existence as a national entity. Wilson after some hesitation, objected in principle to the demands. However, Bryan in a note to the Japanese Ambassador on March 13, stated that as far as Shantung, South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia were concerned, "territorial contiguity creates special relations between



Japan and these districts."<sup>19</sup> When China was finally forced to accept an altered version of the demands on May 7, Bryan warned Japan that the U.S. refused to recognize any agreement that impaired the Open Door in China.

Two years later, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement recognized "that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous."<sup>20</sup> At the Treaty of Versailles Japan was confirmed in her hold on Shantung, in spite of Wilson's obvious disgust in sacrificing Chinese sovereignty to appease Japan and maintain the idea of the League of Nations. From China, Bishop James W. Bashford and Samuel J. Woodbridge, a missionary and one of Wilson's relatives, refused to accept this rationalization of what they considered a moral issue. Wilson answered that both France and Britain "absolutely bound themselves by a treaty to Japan with regard to the Shantung settlement as it stands in the treaty with Germany."<sup>21</sup> Wilson also explained that a U.S. refusal to sign the treaty would in no way benefit China.

By 1921, Japan controlled the northern half of Sakhalin Island, Shantung, Germany's prewar colonies in the Pacific, and since the North Siberian intervention of 1918, Port Arthur, Dairen, and the South Manchurian Railway. That same year, the

Washington Conference on disarmament attempted to reset a semblance of a balance of power in Asia. The Five-Power Naval Treaty which emerged, limited the signing countries (including the U.S., Britain and Japan) to a 5-5-3 ratio in naval construction, and a Four-Power Treaty between the U.S., Britain, France, and Japan, eliminated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, which some American historians such as R.L. Buell, saw as one of the main causes of Japanese expansion.<sup>22</sup> This was followed in 1922 by a Nine-Power Treaty in which both the U.S. and Japan agreed to respect China's territorial and administrative integrity and the principles of the Open Door Policy. Japan also gave up the controversial "Group V" of the Twenty-One Demands, agreed to allow China to reinstate itself in Shantung, and at U.S. insistence, terminated the Lansing-Ishii Agreement.

At little cost to itself, the U.S. had apparently kept the door open to China, and on paper, reduced the naval advantage which Japan had enjoyed in Asia since 1902 through its naval alliance with Britain. On the other hand by not fortifying its island possessions west of Hawaii, and formulating no strategic plan to support its policy in Asia and in the Pacific, the U.S. granted Japan the privacy it needed to consolidate its expansion in the Pacific and ultimately in China.

Apart from the settlement of the Shantung question, the Treaty of Versailles maintained the commercial status quo in

China and weakened her attempts at unification. Sun Yat-sen, fully aware of the limitations the treaty continued to impose on the right of self-determination of the Chinese people, appealed to Secretary Hughes, but the latter did not even bother to open Sun's letter.<sup>23</sup> In an interview in the New York Times of July 22, 1923, Sun gave vent to his frustration: "We have lost hope of help from America, England, France, or any of the great Powers. The only country that shows any sign of helping us in the south is the Soviet Government of Russia."<sup>24</sup>

Three years after Sun's death in 1925, the U.S. recognized Chiang Kai-shek's Nanking Government and the partial reunification of China the Nationalists had managed to achieve. On July 28, 1928, the U.S. relinquished its control over China's tariffs, thereby becoming the first power to give up part of the privileges it enjoyed along with Japan and a host of European countries under the "Unequal Treaties" system of the nineteenth century.<sup>25</sup>

During the late twenties and the early part of the nineteen thirties, the speed with which Chinese nationalism grew, made a confrontation with one or another of the treaty powers inevitable. Spreading north of the Great Wall, the Nationalists, by 1931, had encompassed Manchuria, an area assigned to Japan as her own sphere of influence. On September 18, following a convenient explosion on the South Manchurian Railway, the Japanese Army oc-

cupied Mukden and began the invasion of Manchuria. On March 1 of the following year, the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo was declared, and Manchuria officially disappeared as a Chinese entity.

With the U.S. on the verge of the great depression, Herbert Hoover refused to react to Japan's blatant transgression of China's sovereignty, the Open Door Policy, the Nine-Power Treaty, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war. In fact, it was only after a heated argument with Secretary of State Stimson, that Hoover was dissuaded from publicly announcing his intention of not imposing economic sanctions on Japan. Stimson had hoped to use the uncertainty over those sanctions as a means of pressuring Japan out of Manchuria.<sup>26</sup> Though the U.S. was not a member of the League of Nations, Stimson nevertheless attempted to get the League to take some action against Japan who as a member was bound by its covenant.

On January 7, 1932, hobbled by Hoover's refusal to honour the commitments of the Open Door Policy, Stimson informed Japan and China that the U.S. would not recognize any treaty or agreement which ran counter to the Open Door Policy, or which was achieved by means contrary to the Kellogg-Briand Pact.<sup>27</sup> The Stimson Non-Recognition Doctrine which became an appendage to the Open Door Policy, had no visible effect in stemming the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. Nor was the League of Nations

more successful, for the Japanese ignored the time limits the League set for the withdrawal of her troops, and when condemned by the findings of the Lytton Commission, withdrew from the world organization in March, 1933.

If any doubts still lingered before the Stimson Doctrine that America would support China's territorial integrity with anything more solid than words, there were relatively few after January 7, 1932. For the next seven years, American diplomacy would follow with few exceptions the ambiguous path of denouncing the spread of Japanese imperialism in Asia, whilst at the same time indirectly supporting that same imperialism through trade.<sup>28</sup>

## NOTES

1 Charles Denby, the former U.S. Minister to China saw the retention of the Philippines as an "alternative" to acquiring territory in China. Quoted in R.H. Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and other Essays (New York: Knopf, 1966), pp. 167-68.

2 Hofstadter states that "it is revealing that the underdog forces in American society showed a considerably higher responsiveness to the idea of war with Spain, than the groups that were satisfied with their economic or political positions." Ibid., p. 185. See also ibid., pp. 169-82.

3 For the full text, see Appendix I.

4 W.A. Williams goes so far as to state that the Open Door Policy "expressed the basic strategy and tactics of America's secular and imperial expansion in the twentieth century. When combined with the ideology of an industrial Manifest Destiny, the history of the Open Door Notes became the history of American foreign relations from 1900 to 1958." The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1959), pp. 39-40.

5 T.V. McCormick, China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), p. 91.

6 F. Tannenbaum, The American Tradition in Foreign Policy (Norman: the University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), p. 108.

7 Williams, p. 41. Williams maintains that the corporate structure not only "thought" that this 10 percent was essential to its recovery but that it could "only" be obtained through increased overseas expansion. J.W. Pratt states that there existed as early as 1897 "a widespread belief that China was to provide an exceedingly important market for the surplus products of the United States." Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), p. 261, n. 81.

8 P. 6, quoted in McCormick, p. 91 (*Italics mine.*) R.W. Van Alstyne sees domestic pressures as having forced the McKinley administration into supporting the Open Door. "The American Empire: Its Historical Pattern and Evolution," Historical Association Pamphlet, No. 43 (1960), 26. See also McCormick, p. 19; Williams, pp. 37-39. For a sober appraisal of the limitations of economic explanations of U.S. 19th century imperialism, see Hofstadter, p. 183.

9 China White Paper: August 1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), I, 414-16. For the full text, see Appendix I.

10 F.R. Dulles, China and America: The story of their relations since 1784 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 111. O.E. Clubb adds that "the Russian reply was distinctly equivocal...." Twentieth Century China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 28.

11 L.J. Halle, American Foreign Policy: Theory and Reality (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960), pp. 224-25.

12 China White Paper, I, 416-17. For the full text, see Appendix II.

13 A.W. Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 83. One should not lose sight of the opposition to U.S. involvement overseas from such influential domestic groups as the Anti-Imperialist League, organized in 1898 with such national figures as Carl Schurz and David Starr Jordan as vice-presidents.

14 The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy 1895-1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). Young singles out the conduct of the Reverends W. Ament and E.G. Tewksbury, the latter, after the siege of the legations was lifted "took one of Peking's best [palaces], an estate consisting of about fifty buildings, fully furnished. Although the palace had been looted several times, some \$3,000 worth of silver was left...." Ibid., p. 191. See also ibid., pp. 192-97. Of the \$333 million awarded the U.S. as reparations, the latter only claimed \$25 million and in 1907 returned to China over \$10 million of this amount. Tannenbaum, p. 101.

15 Quoted in Griswold, p. 84. See also G.E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America (New York: Harper & Bros., 1962), p. 183.

16 Quoted in P.C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Dodd Mead, 1938), II, 43.

17 For the full text, see Appendix III. Griswold states that "at the very moment it was signed a Chinese diplomat was on his way to Washington in the forlorn hope of negotiating a German-Chinese-American treaty guaranteeing the territorial integrity of China: The Root-Takahira Agreement nipped his project in the bud." Griswold, p. 130.

18 Griswold, p. 174, n. 3, quoting F.V. Field (ed.), Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1934).

19 China White Paper, I, 433. E.T. Williams, the American Charge in Peking, went so far as to suggest that Japanese immigration to Manchuria might very well ease the tense situation in California over Japanese land ownership. Li, Tien-yi, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy (New York: University of Kansas City Press, 1952), p. 113. As to Wilson's response to the crisis, Li states that "President Wilson, like any American President before him, would not resort to other than 'peaceful means' for the preservation of Chinese territorial, administrative, or political integrity." Ibid., p. 129.

20 China White Paper, I, 437. By some obscure logic, the agreement goes on to state that the territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired.

21 Wilson to Woodbridge, September 2, 1919, Wilson Papers, quoted in P.A. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890-1952 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 145. See also A.S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1954), p. 81; E. McBurns, The American Idea of Mission: Concepts of national purpose and destiny (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957), pp. vii, 262; S. Freud and W. Bullitt, Thomas Woodrow Wilson, A Psychological Study (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 268.

22 The Washington Conference (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1922), pp. 103-34. The 5-5-3 ratio represented 500,000 tons each for the U.S. and Britain, and 300,000 for Japan. On December 5, the Conference allowed Japan to retain the battleships Mutsu and Nagato which prompted Britain to complete the "Hood," and the U.S. two battleships of the "West Virginia" class, thereby negating to a great extent the very idea of disarmament or parity.



23 Williams, p. 102.

24 Clubb, p. 121. That same year, Lenin sent Mikhail Borodin who arrived in Canton in October, ostensibly as a member of the Rosta News Agency. For a view of U.S. attitudes toward the Chinese Republic by 1925, see D. Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928 (New York: Octagon Books, 1968).

25 Forced on China through the 1842 Treaty of Nanking after the British Opium War of 1839-42. These treaties included extra-territorial rights for foreign concessions, the stationing of foreign troops and police to protect them, the control of five treaty ports, the lowering of import tariffs, the collection of tariffs, the "most favored nation" clause, the building of Christian Churches, the operation of independent post offices and telegraph agencies, the arbitrary leasing of Chinese territory and the proliferation of spheres of interest. In 1844, the Treaty of Wanghia granted U.S. citizens in China extraterritorial status in both civil and criminal cases. Clubb, pp. 12, 83, 158-59. For the full text, see Appendix IV.

26 E.E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 383, n. 22. See also W.A. Williams, The Shaping of American Diplomacy; readings and documents in American foreign relations, 1750-1955 (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1960), pp. 690-706. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928, to which Japan was a signatory, had outlawed war as a means of settling international disputes.

27 China White Paper, I, 446-47. See also Stimson to Borah, February 23, 1932, ibid., 447-50.

28 TABLE 1. -- Total U.S. trade with Japan & China, all commodities: 1920-33. Unit: million dollars throughout:

JAPAN

<u>Year</u>	<u>Export</u>	<u>% of T.E.</u>	<u>Import</u>	<u>% of Total Import</u>
1920	377	4.6	415	7.9
1924	252	5.5	340	9.4
1930	164	4.3	279	9.1
1933	143	8.6	128	8.8

CHINA

<u>Year</u>	<u>Export</u>	<u>% of T.E.</u>	<u>Import</u>	<u>% of Total Import</u>
1920	145	1.8	193	3.7
1924	109	2.4	118	3.3
1930	89	2.3	101	3.3
1933	63	3.8	43	3.0

F.V. Field (ed.), *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1934), pp. 470-71.

TABLE 2. -- Total Japanese trade with the U.S., all commodities: 1936-39. Unit: thousand dollars:

<u>Year</u>	<u>General Imports</u>	<u>General Exports</u>
1936	246,062	175,818
1937	365,502	188,090
1938	260,667	123,836

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, *Foreign Commerce Yearbook: 1939* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 268.

TABLE 3. -- Total Japanese trade with the U.S., all commodities: 1920-1941. Unit: thousand yen to 1936, million yen 1936-41 inc:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Import</u>	<u>Export</u>	<u>Exchange Rate</u>
1920	873,182	565,017	100 yen - 49.5/8 of U.S. dollar
1925	664,992	1,000,253	" - 40.3/4 "
1930	442,882	506,220	" - 49.367 "
1935	809,645	535,515	" - 28.570 "
1940	1,241	569	" - 23.437 "
1941	572	278	" - 23.437 "

One Hundred Years Statistics of the Japanese Economy (Tokyo: Statistics Department, Bank of Japan, 1966), pp. 290-93, 320, quoted by Consulate General of Japan, Vancouver, February 1, 1971.

TABLE 4. -- Total Japanese imports of petroleum products from the U.S. (inc. oils and fats): 1925-39. Unit: million yen throughout:

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Year	Import	% of Total Trade
1925-29	92.4	4.0
1930-34	114.6	6.8
1935	116.7	6.7
1937	297.8	7.9
1939	212.5	9.0

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F.V. Field, K.R.C. Greene, J.D. Phillips (eds.), An Economic Survey of the Pacific Area (New York: International Secretariat, IPR, 1942), p. 189.

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## II

### FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND CHINA: 1932-1942

The advent of the second Roosevelt to the presidency did not bring any immediate change to Sino-American relations, yet any assessment of his reactions to events in Asia from 1932 to 1942, must take into consideration the existing domestic conditions in America and his personal attitude toward China. For Roosevelt like Wilson, by-passed the State Department and made his own foreign policy, a policy which at times appeared contradictory, yet reflected both of the aforementioned factors.

In 1932 he became the first Democratic candidate to repudiate the League of Nations, but the following year he tried to redirect the London Economic Conference from "banker's issues ... to the realities of the world economic dilemma,..." earning in the process an accolade from John Maynard Keynes who headlined his article in the Daily Mail: "President Roosevelt is Magnificently Right."<sup>1</sup> He fully supported Stimson's Non-Recognition Doctrine and to the objections of his closest advisers, Moley and Tugwell, explained that he "had the deepest sympathy with the Chinese. How could you expect me not to go along with Stimson on Japan?"<sup>2</sup>

On December 6, 1934, he summed up his views on China:

"China has been the Mecca of the people whom I have called the 'money changers in the Temple.' They are still in absolute control. It will take many years and possibly several revolutions to eliminate them because the new China cannot be built up in a day."<sup>3</sup> Some months later he publicly stated at the San Diego Exposition that "'despite what happens in continents overseas, the United States of America shall and must remain, as long ago the Father of our country prayed that it might remain - unentangled and free.'"<sup>4</sup> This apparent reversal from an internationalist to an isolationist stand was reinforced by the first Neutrality Act which Roosevelt signed in October 1935, guaranteeing to the American people that the U.S. would not intervene in foreign wars (the act was amended in 1936 to cover the Spanish Civil War).

It is possible as Schlesinger suggests, that Roosevelt believed he could influence world affairs from outside the League of Nations and steer its members away from war.<sup>5</sup> It is also possible that seeing the futility of this approach by 1935, he resorted to neutrality as a means of keeping the U.S. out of a conflict he had come to accept as unavoidable. This logical premise does have some validity as far as Europe is concerned, but when applied to China, a nation with whom the U.S. shared a policy which explicitly defined America's interest in China's "territorial integrity," it raises more questions than it actu-

ally answers.

It does not for example explain the social and intellectual intangibles which affected Roosevelt's views on China. As late as 1969, an eminent U.S. historian still harped back to these intangibles, recalling that Roosevelt's mother had sailed for Hong Kong in a square-rigger at the age of seven. Also, that FDR throughout his life had enjoyed the tales of the Delanos and the China trade and that his uncle, Theodore Roosevelt, had presented him with a copy of Mahan's Influence of Sea Power... on his fifteenth birthday.<sup>6</sup> Nor does it explain some of the views he shared with a broad spectrum of American society, such as an historic sense of mission, that residual mixture of nineteenth century nationalism, pragmatism, and evangelical protestantism, so thoroughly enunciated by Josiah Strong. Though Roosevelt as a born conservative retained some of these cultural affinities, he also was the first president to break decisively with the long tradition of individualism in American domestic politics. To this ability to evolve, to cope with immediate problems as they developed, Roosevelt added an ingrained sense of justice which translated itself into a great deal of sympathy for the underdog.

When applied to diplomatic relations with China, this paternalistic "noblesse oblige," was faced with the near insoluble task of reconciling the free trade rhetoric of the Open Door

Policy, which precluded economic sanctions against China's main aggressor, Japan, with the sincere intent of helping China and also keeping America out of foreign wars. This writer therefore rejects the revisionist thesis so wholeheartedly exploited by the economic determinists, that Roosevelt knowingly precipitated the U.S. into World War II, for his reactions to Japanese aggression in China up to May, 1941, belie any such pernicious assumptions.<sup>7</sup>

In April 1934, with the publication of the Amai Declaration, the Japanese granted themselves a quasi-protectorate over China and assumed the role of "guardian of peace and order in eastern Asia."<sup>8</sup> That same month, the U.S. in a note to Japan reasserted its treaty rights in China and on July 7, protested against Japanese commercial monopolies in Manchuria. The following year, Cordell Hull issued a policy statement concerning Chinese-Japanese "activities" in North China, reiterated the truisms of the Open Door, and summed up by stating that the U.S. "had abiding faith in the fundamental principles of its traditional policy."<sup>9</sup> In other words, Japan need not fear direct American intervention or sanctions on behalf of China or the Open Door Policy. It was not until 1937 that this policy evinced a perceptible change.

Following the pretext provided by the Marco Polo Bridge incident on July 7, the Japanese launched their second invasion

of China. Hoping to escape international censure, they omitted the diplomatic niceties of an official declaration and the war remained an undeclared one. Secretary of State Hull responded two weeks later with a lengthy statement redefining the principles of international policy and of the Open Door, and on August 10, informally offered his country's services as mediator in the conflict. The Japanese, with the Treaty of Portsmouth probably in mind, rejected the offer. It was not until October 5, that Roosevelt in a speech in Chicago publicly revealed his concern over the deteriorating world situation: "It seems to be unfortunately true," he stated "that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease."<sup>10</sup>

The implied threat of economic sanctions could hardly have been lost on insular Japan. The next day however, a press release from the State Department annulled what little bellicosity the speech contained by reiterating the principle of nonintervention as a guide to international relations. Torn between neutrality and the urge to intervene, Roosevelt had evidently miscalculated the mood of the American public whose reaction to his "quarantine speech" was so bad, "that he felt compelled to immediately disavow the plain meaning of his own words."<sup>11</sup>



Even direct action against American nationals failed to move U.S. foreign policy out of its neutrality. On December 12, 1937, the Japanese Air Force sank the well marked U.S. gunboat Panay and three Standard Oil tankers on the upper reaches of the Yangtze. This time, public reaction flared up to such an extent, that Roosevelt personally wrote the memorandum that was handed to the Japanese Ambassador. However, before the message was retransmitted to Tokyo, the Japanese Foreign Minister apologized in person to the U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo, and with due compensations paid, the incident disappeared from the news.

Further incidents followed in 1938, including restrictive trade measures against American nationals and Ambassador Grew complained in a lengthy note to the Japanese Government. The Japanese answer avoided the central issues and Grew dispatched a second note on December 30, this time to the Japanese Foreign Minister, castigating the trade restrictions as "unjust" and "unwarranted" and specifically disclaiming any need for a Japanese "new order" in Asia.<sup>12</sup>

The following year the U.S. notified Japan that a commercial treaty in existence between the two countries since 1911 would be cancelled. The significance of such a move as early as July 26, 1939, added some credence to U.S. support of China's territorial integrity. On March 30, 1940, the diplomatic tempo was increased when Hull repudiated the Japanese puppet Government in

Nanking. Hull also indicated his country's unequivocal intention of continuing to recognize Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government as the sole government of China, and by the end of the year, a trade embargo on aviation fuel and strategic metals was imposed on Japan.

On May 6, 1941, in a major shift of policy, Roosevelt extended the Lend-Lease Act to China, publicly declaring her defense vital to that of the U.S.; scrap iron and oil nevertheless continued to escape the embargoes. On July 24, torn between a sentimental commitment to China, the domestic pressures of the oil industries (whose isolationism did not extend to trade), and a persistent majority of the American people who favored neutrality, Roosevelt attempted to justify his policy and in the process revealed his own dilemma:

Now, if we had cut the oil off, they probably would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war. Therefore, there was - you might call - a method in letting this oil go to Japan, with the hope - and it has worked for two years - of keeping war out of the South Pacific for our own good, for the good of the defence of Great Britain and the freedom of the seas.<sup>13</sup>

Two days later (July 26), all trade with Japan virtually ended with the freezing of the latter's assets in the U.S. On November 26, Hull, in answer to a Japanese proposal that verged on the arrogant, made a last attempt at reaching a modus vivendi with Japan. In a document handed to the Japanese Ambassador, the Secretary of State defined a list of specific requirements

the Japanese would have to meet to improve their relations with the U.S. As these requirements entailed the withdrawal of all Japanese police and armed forces from China and Indochina and contained no immediate promise to lift the arms and oil embargoes, the offer was rejected.<sup>14</sup> The Japanese reaction to this latest violation of the free trade basis of the Open Door Policy and America's support of China's territorial integrity, was immediate. On the very day Hull transmitted his country's document to Nomura, a Japanese fleet set sail at 1800 hours from Hittopapu Bay; on December 7, its carriers turned into the wind and at 7:55 A.M., the first bomb fell on Pearl Harbour.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, those aspects of the Open Door Policy that dealt with free trade, lost what little credibility they had managed to salvage since 1937. Though never intended as an interventionist policy, each successive administration (with the exception of Roosevelt's third) hoped its rhetoric would be sufficient to avoid American intervention on the Asian mainland. When in 1941 the U.S. unequivocally spoke in defense of China's sovereignty, it was more in response to Japan's turnabout from China to the Pacific, than as a direct reaction to Japanese aggression in China.

This redirection of Japanese "Co-Prosperity" efforts southward into an area of vital interest to the U.S. had been overtly apparent since 1939, when she occupied the island of Hainan,

placing herself astride the line of communication to the Philippines and the rubber and tin of Southeast Asia. In April 1941, Japan signed a nonaggression treaty with the U.S.S.R., thereby assuring herself a temporary respite on her northern flank. On July 2, the drive southward was formally endorsed by the Japanese military and nineteen days later the process began with the occupation of the southern half of Indochina.<sup>15</sup> On July 26, the total trade embargo was imposed cutting off the low grade oil Japan had been reprocessing into a usable aviation fuel.

To what extent this latest sanction (imposed after the occupation of southern Indochina) forced Japan to seek an alternative source of oil, is debatable. The fact remains however, that after July 26, the Japanese Navy with a daily consumption of 12,000 tons, could have run out of oil in eighteen months, the army in twelve.<sup>16</sup> There is also little reason to believe that the U.S. ignored these facts. Nor did they fail to reinforce the secondary nature of China in American diplomacy. Yet, to the American public, that interest in China, that mystique which transcended economic and political bounds persisted; as an astute observer of American foreign policy noted:

Our anti-European isolationists had been (and those that remain still are) our most militant advocates of intervention in the Far East. Isolationists are 'Asian-firsters'; 'Asian-firsters' are almost by definition, isolationists in relation to Europe. Perhaps one can say that typical American isolationists regard not only the Western Hemis-

phere, but the Far East as well, as our own preserve. Their hope for China has been its Americanization.<sup>17</sup>

Though there was little isolationism in Roosevelt, he also shared this hope for China's political Americanization in the distant future. Unlike the isolationists his vision was attuned to a broader world, a world in which China in spite of his sentiments, was not considered of immediate vital interest to his country. Pearl Harbour did not greatly alter this conviction, and though Roosevelt materially helped China throughout the war within the limits of his commitments in Europe and in the Pacific, China's problems continued to be of secondary importance to his immediate objective of winning the war in both of these theaters.

The attack on Pearl Harbour, combined to the simultaneous invasion of the Philippines, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies, confirmed beyond any reasonable doubt the direction and scope of Japan's immediate and long-range goals. For the first time in its history, the U.S. had been thrust into one of China's wars as both nations faced a common enemy. In May of that year, China had become eligible for Lend-Lease goods. By December 7, some of these supplies had already found their way to China, whilst others, scattered throughout the Pacific in such outposts as Wake Island, were destroyed before their surrender to the Japanese.<sup>18</sup>

The difficulty of supplying China with arms before Pearl Harbour was massively complicated by Japan's control of China's major ports. This fact restricted access to the Nationalist Government to the Burma Road; a tortuous supply route made more tenuous by graft, mismanagement, and the frequent attacks of the Japanese Air Force. It should also be remembered that by December 1941, the Nationalists had been pushed northward to Chungking in Szechuan Province by a Japanese Army that had ravaged large segments of China since 1937.

The outset of 1942, found the Japanese within a hundred miles of Singapore; by March, Rangoon, the last practicable port of access to the Burma Road had been captured, forcing all supplies to China to the airlift over the "Hump." This involved flying a shuttle service of D.C. 3's at 17,000 feet over the Himalayas from Assam in India to Kunming in Yunnan Province, China. The 500 miles involved in this route necessitated flying over some of the most rugged terrain in the world, to which was added the inclemencies of the seasonal monsoon, and at the Chinese end, a total lack of even such basic logistics as fuel.<sup>19</sup>

The problem of delivering what few supplies were available to China in spite of her physical isolation was never really solved and remained to plague Sino-American relations throughout the war. As late as October 3, 1944, Secretary of War Stimson, complained of the logistical drain the Hump airlift imposed on

## Operations in Europe:

Today we are hamstrung in Holland and the mouth of the Scheldt River for lack of transport planes necessary to make new air-borne flights in that neighborhood. The same lack is crippling us in Northern Italy. This effort over the mountains of Burma bids fair to cost us an extra winter in the main theater of war....<sup>20</sup>

Difficult of access before America's entry into World War II, China's isolation after Pearl Harbour and the subsequent loss of Singapore and the Philippines, was near complete. There also developed a growing reluctance from Britain and later from the U.S.S.R. to any diversion of Lend-Lease goods to China. Britain in fact, evinced from the very outset a marked aversion to military cooperation with the Chinese and sedulously avoided any operations in Burma that might cause the Japanese to overreact toward India.

Faced with factors that might have deterred a less resourceful nation, the U.S. resorted to diplomatic tools to strengthen the Nationalist Government of China. On January 1, 1942, twenty-five days after Pearl Harbour, China was included amongst the four great powers to sign the first Declaration by United Nations. This gesture of Allied solidarity initiated a policy the U.S. was to pursue throughout the Second World War: to treat China as a great power. This "Grand Alliance" as Churchill termed it, committed each country's resources to the war and bound each from signing a separate peace.<sup>21</sup>

There was no apparent opposition at this stage from either Britain or Soviet Russia to China's new status, a move they probably viewed as little more than a passing fantasy from an ally neither could afford to slight, given the ratio of forces in the world. Stalin, already indebted to the U.S., had in fact thanked Roosevelt a few weeks earlier for a billion dollar loan for the purchase of Lend-Lease goods.<sup>22</sup> Churchill's initial acquiescence was not to last however, and on his return from the Arcadia Conference early in January, he voiced his doubts as to China's relevance to the war and the American assessment of her capabilities:

At Washington I had found the extraordinary significance of China in American minds, even at the top, strangely out of proportion. I was conscious of a standard of values which accorded China almost an equal fighting power with the British Empire, and rated the Chinese armies as a factor to be mentioned in the same breath as the armies of Russia. I told the President how I felt American opinion overestimated the contribution which China could make to the general war. He differed strongly.<sup>23</sup>

Churchill's pessimism, fostered by his country's long colonial experience in Asia, was heightened by the fear that China's new status would cause a reduction in the flow of war materials to Britain. There was also Chiang Kai-shek's direct interference in India's internal affairs during a short visit to Calcutta on February 22. In an address to the Indian people, Chiang had stated that after the war, Britain "will as speedily as possible give them real political power."<sup>24</sup> The following month,



Churchill's sensitivity to Imperial matters was further aroused when largely at Roosevelt's insistence, the Cripps Mission tried without success to reach a political accommodation with the All India Congress.

In view of such attitudes, China's physical isolation, and Russia's vested interest in maintaining her neutral status with Japan, what did American diplomacy hope to achieve by including China amongst the great powers? Cordell Hull, then Secretary of State, lists two prime objectives:

The first was the effective joint prosecution of the war. The second was the recognition and building up of China as a major power entitled to equal rank with the three Western Allies, Russia, Britain, and the United States, during and after the war, both for the preparation of a postwar organization and for the establishment of stability and prosperity in the Orient.<sup>25</sup>

The immediate goal of keeping China in the war against Japan was of primary importance to the U.S. For the very fact of China's resistance, irrespective of its inefficiency, tied down masses of Japanese troops to the Asian mainland, troops that would otherwise be used in the Pacific or on the borders of India. The thought therefore, that China out of mere exhaustion might reach a separate agreement with Japan was never far from Roosevelt's mind.<sup>26</sup> As to Hull's second objective, it became the very essence of a new China policy. By treating China as a great power, U.S. diplomacy was filling the void left by the impossible supply situation and providing Roosevelt with the

excuse he needed to bring her into his proposed system of collective security.

On May 29, 1942, Roosevelt broached the subject of an international organization to Molotov. This comprised not only arms control but more specifically, a system to police the postwar world by the four great powers: the U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain and China. Molotov assured Roosevelt that Stalin fully agreed and that the latter had specifically mentioned Great Britain, the U.S., and "possibly China" as the policing powers.<sup>27</sup>

Five months later, Churchill in a minute to Eden commenting on Roosevelt's "Four Power Plan" to police the world, doubted that China could perform its future role: "I cannot regard the Chungking Government as representing a great world Power. Certainly there would be a faggot vote on the side of the United States in any attempt to liquidate the British overseas Empire."<sup>28</sup>

This astute observation failed to perceive a facet of Roosevelt's feelings: that inherent need to "do something for China," in spite of the realities of war, geography, and the complexities of Chinese politics. Though Roosevelt constantly prodded Churchill on colonial questions such as India and Hong Kong, the use American diplomacy hoped to draw from that "faggot vote" was far broader than the mere extinction of an empire that had long passed its peak. As the war progressed, factors would emerge to confirm this hypothesis, yet Churchill never lost the

impression that Roosevelt favored the dissolution of the British Empire. Unfortunately for China, this attitude strengthened Churchill's opposition to the American attempts to seat China in the forming world organization and stymied some of Roosevelt's plans to ease China's plight through direct military action.

## NOTES

1 Quoted in A.S. Schlesinger Jr., "As the world moved toward war, FDR watched and worked for peace." New York Times Book Review, July 6, 1969, p. 2. R. Hofstadter takes a different view of FDR in this instance: "It was he [Hofstadter states], "who killed the London Economic Conference in 1933 with a message minimizing the importance of international monetary agreements and affirming the intention of the United States to go its own way." The American Political Tradition and the men who made it (New York: Knopf, 1965), p. 339. See also W.E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1963), pp. 199, 200-05.

2 Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition..., p. 339, n. 14.

3 Roosevelt to Morgenthau, Jr., quoted in E.B. Nixon (ed.), Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, March, 1934-August, 1935 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), II, 306. Earlier in this memorandum, Roosevelt had advised Morgenthau to "please remember that I have a background of a little over a century in Chinese affairs, China in the past hundred years has not changed very much if you think of China as an aggregation of four hundred million people." Ibid. This background however, seems not to have made him aware of some of the social and political changes then taking place in China. Less than two months earlier, some ninety thousand Communist troops had broken out of the Kiangsi-Fukien area to begin the epic of the Long March and the ultimate consolidation of Mao Tse-tung's hold on the second most important political faction in China.

4 Quoted in McBurns, p. 284.

5 "Beginning at the start of his term [the 2nd], he addressed himself to two problems: first, how to slow down the world drift to war; and, second, if the drift seemed irresistible, how to avoid American involvement." Schlesinger, Times Book Review, p. 2.

6 Ibid.

7 On May 6, 1941, Roosevelt extended the Lend-Lease Act to China, declaring in the process that her defense was vital to that of the U.S. On July 26, 1939, the U.S. had notified Japan that it would end the Commercial treaty in existence between the two countries since February 21, 1911. The following works represent some of the more vicious attacks against Roosevelt in this respect. Charles A. Beard, the founder of the "America First" movement, deservedly heads the list: President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A study in appearances and realities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954). G. Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Random House, 1968). C.C. Tansill, Back door to War: the Roosevelt foreign policy, 1933-1941 (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1952). Two of the more balanced critiques of American foreign policy toward Japan in the few weeks before Pearl Harbour are: H. Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor: the coming of the war between the United States and Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), and G. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967). For a comprehensive assessment of some more recent revisionists, see I. Unger, "The 'New Left' and American History: Some Recent Trends in United States Historiography," AHR (July, 1967), LXXII, No. 4, 1237-63.

8 Clubb, p. 175; China White Paper, I, 15-16.

9 China White Paper, I, 450-51.

10 Williams, The Shaping..., p. 754.

11 Halle, p. 245.

12 China White Paper, I, 460-62.

13 New York Times, July 25, 1941, quoted in T.A. Bisson, America's Far Eastern Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1945), p. 221. During the first quarter of 1941, petroleum products rose to almost \$12,000,000., or some 40 percent of the total of all commodities shipped to Japan. Dulles, pp. 220-21.

14 Hull to Nomura, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1931-1941, Japan (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), II, 769.

15 The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, or Japan's "new order" for Asia. In September 1940, Japan occupied the northern part of French Indochina; a nominal Vichy regime was left in control of the south.

16 R.J.C. Butow, Tojo and the coming of the war (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 234, 237, 243.

17 Halle, p. 259.

18 Lauchlan Currie to author, personal interview, S.F.U., February 9, 1968. Currie also stated that as "special advocate for China" under Harry Hopkins, he had collected before Pearl Harbour, "odds and ends - here and there," for China. Ibid. A Master Lend-Lease Agreement with China was not signed until June 2, 1942.

19 An idea of the task performed by the India-China Division of the Air Transport Command, is evident in the fact that by June, 1945, a total of 33,938 American military personnel were involved in the process of ferrying supplies to China over the Himalayas (the Hump). These personnel were backed up by 47,009 civilians and 662.4 operational aircraft; during October 1944, 35,131 tons were safely flown into China. F. Romanus and R. Sunderland, The United States in World War II, III: Time Runs out in C.B.I. (Washington: Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), 538, quoting History of Services and Supply in India-Burma Theater, 1944-45, II, 383-86.

20 H.L. Stimson and McG. Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948), p. 538 (Italics mine.) Stimson's emphasis on Europe as the main theater of war is interesting, especially from a man who ardently supported China from the very outset of hostilities.

21 Foreign Relations, 1942, General, I (1960), 25-26. For the full text, see Appendix V.

22 Stalin to FDR, November 4, 1941. "Your decision Mr. President, to grant the Soviet Union an interest-free loan to the value of \$1,000,000,000... is accepted by the Soviet Government with heartfelt gratitude...." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the President of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), II, 15.

23 W.S. Churchill, The Second World War, IV: The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 133.

24 Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1941-1942 (Boston: World Peace Foundation), IV, 219.

25 The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948), II, 1583.

26 See R.E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948), p. 740; Hull, II, 1587.

27 Sherwood, p. 573.

28 Churchill, IV, 562.

### III

#### CHINA AS A GREAT POWER: MOSCOW, CAIRO AND TEHERAN

In spite of Churchill's reluctance, the State Department continued to foster China as an integral member of Roosevelt's Four Power Plan. This support was resented by Eden who expressed his doubts over China's future role during a visit to Washington early in 1943. To Roosevelt he stated that he "did not much like the idea of the Chinese running up and down the Pacific" after the war.<sup>1</sup>

During this same visit, Sumner Wells outlined the proposed structure of the U.N.: all the United Nations should be members of one world-wide body which would recommend policy, in turn, this body would be advised by geographically determined regional councils. The real decisions however, "should be made by the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China, who would ... police the world."<sup>2</sup> Eden however, still remained unconvinced as to the value of China's membership.

At the Quebec Conference (August 19-24, 1943), Churchill and Eden somewhat resigned to China's new role, approved a draft of a four nation declaration binding the Big Four together during



and after the war. Hull took the occasion to impress Churchill with the importance of getting Soviet acquiescence to a peace-keeping organization before the end of hostilities. By October, the U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union had agreed to a meeting of foreign ministers in Moscow, and Hull sent a copy of the Four Nation Declaration to Molotov. Before Hull's departure, Molotov informed the State Department that the U.S.S.R. could not accept the declaration because the document included China, a country without any interests in Europe. Hull's comments on this refusal are interesting, for they shed a good deal of light on the American appreciation of China in 1943:

The President and I believed, on the contrary, that China had a rightful place in such a declaration.... Of keen interest to us were the relations between Russia and China, who had the longest common boundary of any two nations in the world.... I was convinced that Russian cooperation would be of great assistance to us in rehabilitating and unifying China after the war. Russia would have moral influence on the Chinese Communists, even though their type of communism was not exactly the same as the Russians.<sup>3</sup>

Hull seems not to have been aware of the inherent Soviet fear of a united China, in spite of his knowledge of their long common border. Nor does he seem to have accurately assessed the real intent of Soviet foreign policy in China, both with reference to Chunking and the Communists.

The Moscow Conference began on October nineteenth and two days later the Four Nation Declaration was discussed. Hull mentioned to Molotov that China had been sent a draft and strongly

argued for her retention as a signatory. On the twenty-sixth, Molotov agreed to China's inclusion in the declaration, but doubted that her formal written approval could be received before the end of the conference. At this point, Hull felt that the Soviets were trying to postpone any action that would identify them publicly with the Chinese. On the twenty-eighth the authorization from Chungking arrived and two days later the Chinese Ambassador signed the declaration as one of the four great powers. Hull sums up in retrospect what American diplomacy had just achieved:

Now there was no longer any doubt that an international organization to keep the peace, by force if necessary, would be set up after the war.... Had I not persisted in the effort to get China in as one of the original signatories, her claim to permanent membership in the Security Council of the United Nations would not have been so solid.<sup>4</sup>

Hull had in effect guaranteed a permanent seat to a political regime broadly acceptable to his government and the American public. Now, whatever the vicissitudes of war or diplomacy, the U.S. had assured itself a majority in the vital council of the new world organization. Furthermore, the U.S. had negated (for the time being) the possibility of a Soviet hegemony in the Far East after the war.

On September 21, Congress endorsed American participation in the U.N. with the passing of the Connally-Fullbright Resolutions with only twenty-nine dissenting votes. Approved by the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee, the resolutions were ratified by the Senate on November 5, by a majority of eighty-five to five. With a minimum of hindrance, Roosevelt had quietly accomplished during a war what Woodrow Wilson had been unable to achieve in 1918. The specter of the dead President had no doubt played its part in facilitating the passage in the Senate of an ideal he had so tragically fought for, twenty-five years earlier.<sup>5</sup>

Having succeeded in identifying China with the three great powers, American diplomacy now faced the problem of getting Britain and the U.S.S.R. to accept her on an equal basis. To accomplish this, the U.S. would have to make China's new role credible, both to her allies and to China itself. During the first Cairo Conference (November 22-26, 1943), Roosevelt attempted to involve the Allies in military operations with the Chinese. Acting on Chiang Kai-shek's prompting, the President suggested that any new action in Burma be preceded by the capture of the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal. Code named BUCCANEER, this amphibious landing was opposed from the very outset by the British. The latter, woefully short of landing craft and with the Malaya campaign fresh in mind, resented any move that might bog them down in the Burmese jungles.<sup>6</sup>

At the November 23 meeting of the joint Chiefs-of-Staff, General Marshall for the U.S., reminded the British that the Chinese commitment in Burma was contingent on BUCCANEER. He

further stressed that a withdrawal now would cause Chiang a certain loss of face. In view of past difficulties in getting Chinese troops committed to any active land operations, this slight should be avoided. Churchill, ever on the alert to any weakening of effort in Europe, strongly argued against its necessity, in this, he was supported by his Chief-of-Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke. The General underlined his contempt for the Chinese by stating that Chiang's officers "understood nothing about strategy and higher tactics, and were quite unfit to discuss these questions."<sup>7</sup> Such sentiments toward the Chinese found a ready ear with Churchill who heartily resented the attention Roosevelt had given Chiang during the Conference:

The talks of the British and American Staffs were sadly distracted by the Chinese story, which was lengthy, complicated, and minor.... The President, who took an exaggerated view of the Indian-Chinese sphere, was soon closeted in long conferences with the Generalissimo.... Chinese business occupied first instead of last place at Cairo.<sup>8</sup>

Churchill seems not to have comprehended that Roosevelt was attempting to assuage Chiang's feelings of neglect through personal diplomacy. For prestige, even of a symbolic kind, was all that he could offer China as tangible proof of her new status. The Chinese, acutely sensitive to any implied or real loss of face from the ex-occupiers of Hong Kong, could hardly have failed to notice Alan Brooke's arrogance. Such an attitude from a supposed ally whom the Japanese had forced in 1940 to temporarily

close the Burma Road, was doubly resented. It also helped to confirm Chiang's doubts as to the effectiveness of the Grand Alliance.

Roosevelt nevertheless persisted through Marshall to press the Allies for a more active role with China in the war against Japan. Of his sincerity, Harry Hopkins states that at this time Roosevelt "went down the line in supporting the view of Chiang Kai-shek."<sup>9</sup> This support entailed operation BUCCANEER, the equipping of ninety Chinese divisions, and the return to China after the war of all her territories lost to Japan, including Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores. In the declaration issued at the end of the conference, China's status was further enhanced by being referred to as one of the "three great powers,"<sup>10</sup> in return, Chiang had promised to commit some of his troops in North Burma (operation ANAKIM).

Immediately following the conference, Roosevelt and Churchill met with Stalin at Teheran from November 27, to December 2. China, due to the Soviet nonaggression treaty with Japan of April 1941, was excluded from the meeting. In an informal talk with Roosevelt on the twenty-eighth, Stalin "expressed a low opinion of the fighting quality of the Chinese troops,... [adding] that this was the fault of their leaders."<sup>11</sup> Roosevelt, avoiding the implied criticism of Chiang, informed Stalin that the U.S. was now supplying and training thirty Chinese divisions and pro-

posed to supply and train thirty additional ones.<sup>12</sup> The following day, Roosevelt unveiled his plans for the peace-keeping role of the United Nations:

First - an Assembly composed of all members of the United Nations.... Second - an Executive Committee which would consist of the U.S.S.R., the U.S., the U.K. and China.... The third body,... was what he termed 'The Four Policemen' - the U.S.S.R., U.S., U.K. and China. This, as its name implied, would be the enforcing agency - with power to deal immediately with any threat to the peace or any sudden emergency.<sup>13</sup>

Stalin wondered whether the small nations of Europe would not resent being safeguarded by the Four Policemen. He also doubted that China would be in a very powerful position at the end of the war. He then suggested the idea of committees, the European one comprising the U.S., Britain, U.S.S.R., and possibly another European nation. The composition of the Far Eastern Committee was not divulged by either Churchill or Hopkins.

Roosevelt found this regional approach too similar to Churchill's idea of committees for Europe, the Far East and the Americas.<sup>14</sup> Stalin then stated that the Four Policemen idea "might require the sending of American troops overseas." To this, Roosevelt answered that the American commitment would be naval and air forces, the "land armies ... would have to be provided by Britain and the Soviet Union." Stalin thereupon submitted his idea of strong points both in and around Germany and specific islands around Japan. He also emphasized that any

peace-keeping organization should have the power for "continued military occupation ..." of these strong points. Roosevelt agreed, but sensing that Stalin was implying that China would not be strong enough to fulfill these duties, he told the Soviet leader:

He had insisted on the participation of China in the 4 Power Declaration at Moscow not because he did not realize the weakness of China at present, but he was thinking farther into the future and that after all China was a nation of 400 million people, and it was better to have them as friends rather than as a potential source of trouble.<sup>15</sup>

This frank and open statement characterized much of Roosevelt's dealings with Stalin, in whom he developed a certain trust. It also reveals Roosevelt's inability to evaluate China's potential as a great power on any other level than the demographic one.<sup>16</sup>

At the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff meeting of November 30, Alan Brooke, concerned about the chronic scarcity of landing craft for the invasion of Europe (OVERLORD), stated that:

He still thought that it would be better to use the landing craft allocated to BUCCANEER for this main effort against the Germans. In response to a question of Admiral Leahy as to whether the BUCCANEER landing craft would help OVERLORD at all, Sir Alan Brooke replied that it would, as it could be used both in the Aegean and against the South of France [ANVIL].<sup>17</sup>

The lack of enough landing craft was to plague the Allies throughout the war. The British, with Churchill's help, used this shortage to wear down Roosevelt's insistence on actively supporting the Chinese. The American Chiefs-of-Staff however, had made

their position quite clear at Cairo where Marshall had stated that "they had gone far to meet the British Chiefs-of-Staff views but the postponement of BUCCANEER they could not accept."<sup>18</sup> Both Marshall and Admiral King maintained this position throughout the Teheran Conference.

More crucial to China's real status as a great power, especially in the postwar period, were the decisions made at Teheran affecting her territorial sovereignty. Roosevelt considered the Soviet Union's entry into the war in the Pacific as one of the main goals of the conference. However, her nonaggression treaty with Japan had survived even the German-Japanese Alliance, and the U.S.S.R. would have to be compensated for forfeiting the "security" of her eastern frontiers, and such historic topics as Russia's lack of ice-free ports would no doubt come up for discussion.

At the lunch of the "Three Only," on November 30, Stalin raised the question of a warm-water port. To Churchill's comment that "Russia had Vladivostok," Stalin pointed out that it was icebound and that traffic to it could be controlled from the Straits of Tsushima. Churchill agreed with this logic and stated that he "wished to meet the Russian grievance because, the government of the world must be entrusted to satisfied nations, who wished nothing more for themselves than what they had."<sup>19</sup>

Roosevelt then mentioned for the first time here at Teheran



(and not as is often assumed, at Yalta), that the Soviet Union might have access to the Port of Dairen in Manchuria. Stalin immediately expressed the view that the Chinese would object, but Roosevelt reassured him by stating that the Chinese would agree were Dairen made a free port under international guarantee. Hopkins' biographer R.E. Sherwood, maintains that Roosevelt had discussed the question of Dairen with Chiang at Cairo.<sup>20</sup>

The Teheran Conference ended on December 2, and that same day Churchill and Roosevelt flew back to Cairo. Roosevelt was now convinced that Stalin would agree to China's membership in the Security Council of the U.N. The most important achievement however, was Stalin's unsolicited assurance that the U.S.S.R. would enter the war in the Pacific, upon Germany's defeat.<sup>21</sup> This promise had a profound impact on Roosevelt's attempts to involve the Chinese more actively in the war against Japan. Freed from the future task of a major landing in China, the U.S. could now concentrate her forces on winning the war in the Pacific and in Europe. From this point onwards, China and Southeast Asia would be increasingly relegated to the side lines of the War in the Pacific. The first step in this direction was the cancellation of BUCCANEER.

At the meeting of the Combined Chiefs on December 4, the third day of the Second Cairo Conference, Roosevelt persisted

against increased British pressure to promote BUCCANEER. Churchill in turn suggested that the operation be carried out after the monsoon. Admiral King, supporting Roosevelt, replied that a definite commitment had been made earlier to Chiang and should be maintained. Alan Brooke countered by stating that it would be better to employ all the BUCCANEER resources to strengthen the forces needed for the invasion of Europe.

There was still the question of China's immediate survival, a factor closely dependent on the reopening of the Burma Road, linking India to Western China. Chiang had insisted at the First Cairo Conference that operations in Burma to further this end were dependent on BUCCANEER. These included an airborne landing in Indaw, the capture of Myitkyina by the Stilwell-trained Chinese troops, and the securing of a bridgehead over the Irrawaddy. Grouped under the code name TARZAN, the latter were timed to coincide with BUCCANEER for the ultimate aim of increasing the tonnage delivered to China, tonnage now restricted to the airlift over the Hump.

The British, who would be primarily involved, argued that the success of TARZAN was not necessarily dependent on BUCCANEER and opposed any diversion of the scarce landing craft from Europe. Roosevelt finally ended the arguments by stating that: "we had a moral obligation to do something for China and he would not be prepared to forego the amphibious operation, except for

some very great and readily apparent reason."<sup>22</sup> The following day, Alan Brooke returned to the attack with the comment that the whole importance of BUCCANEER had been overemphasized. If it was not carried out the Chinese might withdraw from TARZAN, but "reports suggested that their troops now in action were not too promising."<sup>23</sup>

With increased pressure to cancel BUCCANEER, Roosevelt, at Churchill's insistence, gave in on the afternoon of December 5. This decision rebuffed the first signs of Chinese initiative and effectively delayed the reopening of the Burma Road. It also undermined Stilwell's attempts at getting Chiang to take a more active role in the war against Japan. With the exception of the Second Burma Campaign, Chinese troops did not fight alongside Allied forces until the very end of the war.

Admiral King's biographer states that King knew "that the Chinese headed by Chiang Kai-shek, would feel that they had been sold out - which was the case - and consequently would not do anything to aid Stilwell."<sup>24</sup> On December 23, in his answer to Roosevelt's wire advising him of the scrapping of BUCCANEER, Chiang's resentment was fully evident: "the Allied strategy of relegating the China War Theater to the background has given rise to serious misgivings on all sides. The success or failure of the Burma Campaign is a matter of life and death for China."<sup>25</sup>

Sherwood in assessing the different factors which Roosevelt

had to consider, states that "it was undoubtedly the shipping problem emphasized by Lewis Douglas ... who influenced Roosevelt's reluctant decision to abandon BUCCANEER...."<sup>26</sup> From a purely logistical point of view, this argument has a good deal of merit, it does not however, explain the subsequent British action. Writing on the subject, the official historians of the U.S. Army state:

As far as the landing craft that on Churchill's insistence were taken from SEAC [South East Asia Command] to reinforce ANVIL, several weeks later the British Chiefs-of-Staff, supported by the Prime Minister, made the first of several attempts to have ANVIL cancelled for operations elsewhere in the Mediterranean.<sup>27</sup>

The factors which mitigated against a major Allied intervention in Southeast Asia in 1943, in conjunction with the Chinese, were too great for Roosevelt to resist. Though lauded as a great power, China after Teheran, lost whatever strategic potential she might have enjoyed as a major foothold for the final invasion of Japan. The Second Cairo Conference confirmed what Teheran had decided: the war against Japan would be waged in the Pacific, not in China, whose liberation would depend largely on the Soviet entry into the war against Japan after Germany's defeat.

American diplomacy had succeeded in laying the foundations for its postwar policy in the Far East. The Moscow "Four Nation Declaration" had assured China a solid claim to a seat on the

future U.N. Security Council. The Cairo Declaration had reinforced that claim by identifying China with two of the four great powers: the U.S. and Britain. Finally, at Teheran, Stalin had assured the liberation of China upon Germany's defeat, and in so doing, reinforced the future image of the Nationalists as the sole legally constituted Government of China.

Eminently acceptable to both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, these practical arrangements were also acceptable to the Nationalists. And though Chiang was not immediately informed of Stalin's promise,<sup>28</sup> he had some concrete assurances that his government would be seated in the postwar world organization. Unfortunately, for American diplomacy, the whole process of mollifying China with great power status and U.N. prestige, failed to consider the changes then taking place in her social and political fabric; it also assumed that Chinese sensitivities could in effect be mollified.

The Chinese, with over a century of foreign depredations to draw from, were understandably sensitive to any future loss of face. Especially from powers such as Britain and Russia, who in the nineteenth century to further their own economic and territorial interests, had taken full advantage of China's technological backwardness. The specific issue of national prestige in a country gifted with over two thousand years of civilization, was of prime importance to all Chinese. Yet, by catering solely

to the Nationalists, American diplomacy was identifying itself with a political faction whose commitment to such an intangible was seriously doubted by the greater masses within China. What was bitterly resented by all factions however, was the myopic assumption that a cultural entity as ancient as theirs could not perceive the difference between the appearances and the realities.

## NOTES

1 Sherwood, p. 716.

2 Ibid., p. 717.

3 Hull, II, 1256-57.

4 Ibid., 1307. See also Foreign Relations, 1943, China (1957), p. 826. For the full text, see Appendix VI.

5 In part, the resolutions read: "The U.S. acting through its constitutional process, join with free and sovereign nations in establishment and maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world." H.B. Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 158. Westerfield points out that on the question of the U.N., both parties held surprisingly similar views, with the Republicans keenly aware of avoiding the stigma of a new betrayal. Ibid., pp. 165-67.

6 In May, before the Washington Conference, Churchill noted: "I disliked the idea of reconquering Burma by an advance along the miserable communications in Assam. I hated Jungles - which go to the winner anyway - and thought in terms of air-power, sea-power, amphibious operations, and key points." Churchill, IV, 786.

7 A. Bryant, The Turn of the Tide: 1939-1943 (London: Collins, 1957), p. 83.

8 Churchill, V: Closing the Ring (1951), 328.

9 Sherwood, p. 774.

10 The U.S., Britain and China. For the full text of the Cairo Declaration, see Appendix VII.

11 Sherwood, p. 777.

12 Foreign Relations, 1943, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran (1961), p. 484.

13 Sherwood, p. 785 (*Italics mine.*)

14 Ibid., p. 786. Churchill states that Roosevelt misquoted him: "He does not seem to have made it clear that I also contemplated a Supreme United Nations Council, of which the three regional committees would be components." Churchill, V, 363.

15 Foreign Relations, Cairo..., p. 532; Sherwood, p. 787. To Mountbatten, sometime after October 28, 1943, Roosevelt stated: "I really feel that it is a triumph to have got the 425 million Chinese in on the Allied side. This will be very useful twenty-five or fifty years hence, even though China cannot contribute much military or naval support for the moment." E. Roosevelt, F.D.R. His Personal Letters (New York: Duell Sloan & Pearce, 1947), II, 1468.

16 In a cable to Churchill in 1942, Roosevelt stated that he could "personally handle Stalin better than either your Foreign Office or my State Department." Churchill, IV, 201. The presumption of this statement, addressed to the leader of a nation that had had years of experience with Russia, decades before the U.S. was even formed, could hardly have gone unnoticed by as experienced an internationalist as Churchill.

17 Foreign Relations, Cairo..., p. 561-62.

18 Ibid., p. 365.

19 Churchill, V, 383.

20 "It is my understanding [Sherwood states] that Roosevelt was not merely guessing about this - that he had, in fact, discussed this very point [Dairen] with Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo a few days previously." Sherwood, p. 792. No documentary evidence of the content of this discussion was discovered by the writer.

21 Foreign Relations, Cairo..., pp. 675, 678; Sherwood, pp. 779, 800.

22 Foreign Relations, Cairo..., p. 680.

23 Ibid., p. 703. On December 7, Marshall stated that "the report received with regard to the bad morale of the Chinese forces had, he felt, been given too much weight. It was a report from one officer only, who was not in contact with the troops." Ibid., p. 758. For an insight into the fighting abilities of some Chinese troops, see W.I. Cohen, "Who fought the Japanese in Hunan? Some Views on China's War Effort." JAS, XXVII, No. I (November 1967), 111-15.



24 E.J. King and W.M. Whitehall, Fleet Admiral King (New York: Norton, 1952), II, 525.

25 Foreign Relations, Cairo..., p. 856.

26 Sherwood, p. 800.

27 Romanus & Sunderland, II: Stilwell's Command Problems (1956), 73.

28 To a comment by Churchill at the Second Cairo Conference to the effect that "he was very anxious lest the Russian promise [to enter the war in the Pacific] should leak out." Roosevelt agreed, adding "that it was impossible to tell the Chinese." Foreign Relations, Cairo..., p. 678.

#### IV

##### STILWELL, THE CHINESE, DUMBARTON OAKS AND YALTA

After the Second Cairo Conference it became increasingly difficult for the U.S. to disguise the secondary nature of China's part in the overall task of winning the war in Europe and in the Pacific. Admiral Leahy, himself no mean critic of the Nationalists, states that "hardly a week passed without someone from our shabbily treated ally, China, coming in to plead for assistance."<sup>1</sup> And Sherwood, in his assessment of Cairo, maintains that it was only in the last six months of the war that an overland supply route to China was actually operative, "by then [he adds], it was too late to matter much."<sup>2</sup>

It would be pointless to fault American policy toward China solely on the amount of matériel the latter received during the war, for the problems of supply and demand in the China theater were staggering. To the loss of her ports early in 1937, was added the capture of Rangoon in March 1942. The Burma Road, solely dependent on this port of access, now lost its *raison d'être* as a supply route to China. This last blow completed the isolation of China and restricted what little tonnage that could

reach her to the logistics of the Hump airlift. A second over-land route to replace the Burma Road required three years to complete, and as late as September 1945, carried less tonnage than that ferried over the Hump.<sup>3</sup>

From 1942 to 1945, the U.S. was also heavily involved in the amphibious war in the Pacific, the landing in North Africa, the Italian Campaign, and on "D Day," the cross-channel invasion of Europe. Under the Lend-Lease programme, American industry during this period, was providing weapons and munitions to every nation involved in the war in the Pacific, in Europe, in the Far and Near East, and also to the huge armies of Soviet Russia. In addition, there was China, a cultural entity of some 400 million souls that had been at war with Japan on her own soil for six consecutive years. In spite of such attritions, China did not sign a separate peace and remained on the side of the Allies throughout the war; a not inconsiderable achievement for a foreign policy hobbled by the aforementioned realities.<sup>4</sup>

Part of the long-term failure of U.S. policy toward China lay not so much in the moderate help provided its ally, but rather the disparity between what was promised and what was actually delivered. This last factor never ceased to infuriate a people endowed with all of the subtle shadings of diplomatic adroitness since before the birth of Christ. Closely allied to this constant slight, was the appointment of General Joseph W.

Stilwell as Chief-of-Staff to Chiang.

Had most of the preceding factors and the inherent corruption of the Kuomintang been less pervasive, Stilwell might have been an ideal choice. The tragedy of "Vinegar Joe" was that he simply took his appointment seriously, and as an honest man and an excellent soldier, attempted to carry out tasks beyond his means. Frank to the point of crudity and personally ill disposed toward Roosevelt and later Chiang, Stilwell never understood the very reason for his appointment. Obviously ill suited for the role of temporizer, he was nevertheless expected to substitute semantics for hardware, subtle persuasion for confrontation, and above all, a high degree of medieval tact in his dealings with what was in fact, an eastern potentate.

In addition, there developed early in 1942, a sharp rivalry between Stilwell and General Clair Chennault, a personal confidant of Chiang since the days of the Flying Tigers, and the commander of the China-based Fourteenth Airforce. The rift between these two men was deepened by Chennault's practice of writing directly to Roosevelt, by-passing Stilwell, his commander in the field. Roosevelt added fuel to the conflict by endorsing Chennault's exaggerated value of airpower in China.<sup>5</sup> Stilwell, the infantryman, who offered no easy or quick solutions in an age when the aircraft was being used as the ultimate weapon, stood out as an anachronism; an anachronism who not only marched with

his men, but actually believed in the fighting potential of the Chinese soldier. In an interview shortly before his appointment to Chiang's staff, Henry L. Stimson noted of Stilwell:

He knows China thoroughly and for more than two years campaigned with the Chinese armies against Japan in 1937-8-9. In half an hour he gave me a better first-hand picture of the valor of the Chinese armies than I had ever received before. Of this valor he had a very high opinion.<sup>6</sup>

As Secretary of War, Stimson was one of the few men who with Marshall, supported Stilwell in his attempts to reorganize the Chinese Army in preference to Chennault's emphasis on airpower. Both men agreed with Stilwell's logic to the effect that air-strikes from China against Japan could not be effective unless the airbases used were adequately protected from Japanese ground attack.<sup>7</sup>

Vulnerable to the spectacular claims of Chennault, Roosevelt at the Washington Conference of May 1943, granted him first priority in the allotment of supplies reaching China over the Hump. Stilwell attempted to state his case, but as he noted in his diary: "Roosevelt wouldn't let me speak my piece. I interrupted twice, but Churchill kept pulling away from the subject, and it was impossible."<sup>8</sup>

The following year, Stilwell's predictions were vindicated when the Japanese overran the forward airfields of the Fourteenth Airforce: "September 9 disaster approaching Kweilin, nothing to stop the Japs - about 50,000 demoralized Chinese in the area

against nine Jap divisions.... September 14,... demolition on fields tonight...."<sup>9</sup> On October 3, Stimson summed up the Stilwell-Chennault controversy in the light of the lost airfields: "We have been unable to save China from the Japanese attack owing to the failure to support Stilwell in training adequate Chinese ground forces to protect Kunming."<sup>10</sup>

Stilwell's resentment at what seemed to him the betrayal of the very task that had been assigned him: the reorganization of the Chinese Army, is fully evident in his diary. On the day following the cancellation of BUCCANEER, he met with Roosevelt:

FDR: Well, Joe, what do you think of the bad news?

JWS: I haven't heard yet how bad it is....

FDR: Well, now, we've been friends with China for a gre-e-e-at many years. I ascribe a large part of this feeling to the missionaries. You know I have a Chinese history. My grandfather went out there,... stayed out there all through the Civil War, and made a million....

JWS: I take it that it is our policy to build China up.

FDR: Yes. Yes. Build her up. After this war there will be a great need of our help. They will want loans. Madame Chiang and the G-mo wanted to get a loan of a billion dollars, but I told them it would be difficult to get Congress to agree to it.... How long do you think Chiang can last?

JWS: The situation is serious and a repetition of last May's attack might overturn him.

FDR: Well, then we should look for some other man or group of men, to carry on.

JWS: They would probably be looking for us.

FDR: Yes, they would come to us. They really like us and just between ourselves, they don't like the British. Now, we haven't the same aims as the British out there .... Well now, there you are and remember, you're my Ambassadors! HA! HA! HA! Yes, sir, you're my Ambassadors.

JWS: End of Conference. Draw your own conclusions.<sup>11</sup>

The value of such evidence, though debatable, cannot be

entirely ignored, for Stilwell's whole position vis-à-vis China was diametrically opposed to Roosevelt's most pervasive critics, the Republicans.<sup>12</sup> What he evidently failed to perceive was that under the President's cavalier manner lay an acute awareness of America's limited ability to help China's war effort.

On October 19, 1944, Roosevelt under pressure from Chiang, recalled Stilwell. By then, he had provided the Chinese with twenty trained infantry divisions, three of which proved to be of exceptional quality.<sup>13</sup> There is some evidence (discussed in the following chapter) that Stilwell at one time considered arming the Communists. Such a move, in spite of the so-called "United Front" in precarious existence between the Communists and the Nationalists since 1937, was politically unacceptable to Chiang.<sup>14</sup> What is more readily evident however, is the bitterness that marked Stilwell's relations with the Chinese Nationalist leader. Unable or unwilling to compromise with the latter's primary goal of self-survival, Stilwell was never granted the freedom he needed to carry out his plans to reorganize the bulk of the Chinese army. Nevertheless, it is to his credit that few of his successors so accurately assessed the underlying causes of China's weakness.<sup>15</sup>

The Chinese reactions to the visible neglect of a wartime ally became a permanent feature of U.S.-Chinese relations. As early as August 1943, China's Foreign Minister, T.V. Soong,

voiced his doubts as to the relative value of China's new status as a great power:

On many occasions the United States Government has declared it to be its policy that four amongst the United Nations ... shall also assume the responsibility for the conduct of the war and for the maintenance of peace.... On no major issue, however, either relative to the conduct of the war or to the preparation for the future peace, has this practice been followed so far.... While the assumed existence of the Four Power leadership continued to be emphasized by American and British officials, no Chinese representative was invited to the Casablanca or Washington Conference....<sup>16</sup>

On the day following this statement, the Quebec Conference took place and China though "kept informed," was not seated at the deliberations. That same year, the philosopher Lin, Yutang summed up the frustrations of the Nationalists and quite possibly those of other informed Chinese as well:

In the war councils of today, there is a blind spot, and that spot is Asia.... Why up to now is there no plan, and no wish for a plan, for China's partnership even in the war against Japan? There will be more planes sent to China as a gesture to pacify the American public, so that the public will be lulled into silence, but the basic policy will be unchanged .... President Roosevelt announces the intention to use China as a base to invade Japan - the only logical base, but between the announcement of intention and actual planning, there will be another time lag of years.<sup>17</sup>

The lack of drive of the Kuomintang in fighting the Japanese, and the employment of its best divisions in blockading the Communists in the North West, is quite naturally omitted here. Yet, in spite of Chiang's reluctance to use the matériel provided him to engage the Japanese, the disparity between what was promised and what was actually received, was real. A fitting



example of this neglect, was Roosevelt's pledge to Chiang at Cairo, to arm ninety Chinese divisions.

On December 10, 1943, Stilwell noted the offer in his diary during a conference at Cairo to discuss its implementation. Three weeks later, Marshall was informed by the Operations Division of the War Department: "The commitment regarding the Lend-Lease equipping of Chinese divisions the President actually made at SEXTANT [Cairo] is not known. We are proceeding on the assumption the President made no commitments on the timing of the flow of equipment."<sup>18</sup>

At Teheran, to further confuse the issue, Roosevelt told Stalin that the U.S. would ultimately train and equip sixty Chinese divisions. The matter was shelved until August 11, 1945, when it reappeared in a wire from the Ambassador to China to Secretary of State Byrnes. Hurley mentioned that Chiang had frequently queried him on "President Roosevelt's statement at Cairo to the effect that the United States would equip ninety Chinese divisions."<sup>19</sup>

A few weeks later, on September 3, Byrnes sent the following memorandum to President Truman:

T.V. Soong inquires whether we are prepared to complete our commitment to equip 100 Chinese divisions? This commitment is said to have been made to Chiang by President Roosevelt at Cairo. The commitment apparently is not in writing. Mr. Hopkins affirms that some such commitment was made at Cairo when action in the Chinese theater was agreed upon.... So far as I can ascertain about 30 divisions have already been

equipped under our commitment to Chiang. Soong speaks of 60 additional divisions to be equipped.<sup>20</sup>

Four days later Truman personally informed Soong that a search of the records had failed to produce any evidence of Roosevelt's promise.<sup>21</sup>

By the summer of 1944, the Chinese reactions to a long succession of unfulfilled promises had grown to such proportions that Roosevelt dispatched Vice-President Wallace to Chungking. Ostensibly charged with the task of reviving the defunct United Front, the main objective of appeasing Chiang somewhat backfired when on June 22, Chiang informed Wallace that:

The Chinese people had fought for seven years under conditions of great hardship, and that they had expected help from abroad; that they had expected an all-out Burma Campaign early this year and this would have resulted in bringing relief to the Chinese Army.... The Chinese people felt that they had been deserted.... He said that President Roosevelt had promised an all-out campaign in Burma early in 1944 but that at Teheran President Roosevelt had reversed his decision.... He ... went back again to the Cairo Conference decision regarding the Burma Campaign, stating that if it could have been carried out the effect on morale in China would have been very great....<sup>22</sup>

Faced with such a reaction, the U.S. once again turned to diplomacy to placate Chiang, and maintain his troops in their nominal holding role against the Japanese in China. In May, Hull had approached both the British and the Russians to admit China to the first U.N. Organizational Conference to be held at Dumbarton Oaks near Washington on August 21. Given the Soviet nonaggression pact with Japan, it was agreed that separate con-

current conferences would be held to avoid seating the Soviet Union with China.

On July 24, the Chinese were informed that they would be appraised of what was being discussed during the Soviet phase. This in fact did not occur, and the Chinese were only given a general outline of the talks. It seems that Roosevelt had some reservations as to the efficiency of Chinese security, for he had earlier instructed that the Chinese be not immediately informed of the progress of the talks, thus obviating the possibility of the matter "becoming publicly known."<sup>23</sup>

On August 21, the Soviet phase of the conference began, and though a deadlock soon developed over voting procedures in the Security Council, none occurred over China's membership. Thanks largely to Hull's insistence the previous year in Moscow, China's permanent seat did not have to be renegotiated. Hull, in fact goes so far as to state that the first several days revealed that there was a very large area of agreement on the basic principles involved. He adds that after three weeks, "the British, Russian, and American delegations had achieved a gratifying amount of agreement - enough for the conference to settle upon a proposed final draft of proposals for a United Nations Charter."<sup>24</sup> At the end of the Soviet phase, the latter's reluctance to identify itself with China was solved by issuing the final communiqué simultaneously in the four capitals of the powers involved.

The following day (September 29) the Chinese phase began with Britain and the U.S. sitting in with China. The Chinese did not make any changes to what had already been accepted, and when they attempted to do so they were promptly reminded of the desirability of publishing the present text without alterations, since any amendments would require referral to the Soviet Government and therefore involve delay.<sup>25</sup> On October 6, the document was read to the Chinese delegation which accepted it, though not without retaining the right to offer amendments at the first U.N. Conference. On the ninth, when the proposals were published, China's membership in the Security Council was clearly stated: "The Security Council should consist of ... representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom,... the [U.S.S.R.], the Republic of China...."<sup>26</sup>

American diplomacy had again accomplished its immediate and apparently its long-range policy goals for the Far East. Chiang had been given tangible encouragement to remain in the war, and through China's seat on the Security Council, the U.S. was acquiring a potential source of influence in the postwar structure of Asia. Unfortunately, some factors mitigated against the continuity of the second goal such as the secret agreements reached at Yalta between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for the latter's entry into the war in the Pacific.

Late in 1944, the war in Europe had progressed to such an

extent that Germany's defeat seemed possible within a year. On December 16, however, the Germans nearly pushed the troops under Eisenhower back to the Meuse in the disruptive Battle of the Bulge. Though the Germans lacked the logistics to exploit their initial success, the fact that they could still at this late date launch a major thrust, dissipated the hopes the Allies had previously held for an early victory. That the Allies grossly overreacted to this last German effort is clear today. In December 1944 however, an entirely different view prevailed, a view still in evidence on the eve of Yalta, where to quote F.C. Pogue:

"Marshall and his associates were convinced that Russian aid was essential to a successful and speedy culmination of the war in Europe...."27

If doubts existed in December 1944 on the exact date of Germany's defeat, few would hazard a guess as to when Japan would surrender. The Japanese were defending the outer rim of islands that screened their homeland with a ferocity unequalled in any other theater of war with casualties on both sides correspondingly high:

In this last six-month campaign to clear the Philippines, American forces were to suffer 60,000 casualties while killing 300,000 Japanese.... Iwo Jima ... the Marine Corps killed some 20,000 Japanese at a cost of nearly 7,000 dead and some 20,000 wounded.... Okinawa ... the Japanese force ... lost more than 100,000 dead. More than 7,800 planes were destroyed. But United States Army and Marine casualties numbered some 39,000, of whom 7,300 ... were dead. Naval casualties afloat were 10,000 with 5,000 dead. Japanese

planes sank 36 ships and damaged 368 others.<sup>28</sup>

So tenacious was the overall Japanese defense that during the first seven months of 1945 American casualties increased from an average of 3,200 to 12,750 per month.<sup>29</sup> On the basis of such evidence, the U.S. Chiefs-of-Staff predicted that Japan could not be defeated before December 1946. But the conquest of the Japanese home islands did not in itself guarantee the surrender of the highly independent Kwantung Army in Manchuria, or the equally large Japanese forces in China and Korea. And even without the help of these forces, the estimated cost of an invasion of Japan varied from half a million to one million American casualties.<sup>30</sup>

In spite of such estimates, the U.S. Airforce believed that it could unaided, accomplish the defeat of Japan, and by the end of 1944 some evidence did exist to support this view. Two ex-Japanese pilots writing after the war, state that:

By the close of 1944 the Americans actually had committed only a minor portion of their B-29 strength against Japan.... By the end of July [1945] some ninety cities had become literal ash-choked funeral pyres. Only four major cities in the country, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Sapporo remained undamaged,... the five largest cities [Tokyo-Yokohama, Osaka-Kobe, Nagoya] ... received nearly half of all bombs dropped by the enemy Twentieth Air Force. So thoroughly gutted were the major sections of these cities, with a combined total of 103.22 square miles destroyed, that the Americans eliminated them as targets.<sup>31</sup>

Herbert Feis adds that "one American incendiary air raid on the Tokyo area in March [9-10] 1945 did more damage and killed

and injured more Japanese than at Hiroshima;"<sup>32</sup> sixteen and a half square miles of Tokyo were destroyed, and the casualties ranged from eighty to three hundred thousand.<sup>33</sup> It should be noted here that all of these raids occurred "after Yalta," their precise effect on Japan's will to resist could not have been considered at that conference.

Of prime importance to Roosevelt, both from a political and a humanitarian point of view, was the estimated casualties an invasion of Japan would entail. There was of course Stalin's promise to enter the war in the Pacific upon Germany's defeat. By intervening in China, Manchuria and Korea, the Russians would prevent a mass of Japanese troops from reinforcing their home islands. With this in mind, Roosevelt in December 1944, inquired from his Ambassador in Moscow (Averell Harriman), what compensations Stalin expected for such an intervention. On the fourteenth, Harriman had an interview with Stalin and the following day cabled the results of the meeting to the President:

He [Stalin] went into the next room and brought out a map. He said that the Kurile Islands and the lower Sakhalin should be returned to Russia.... He drew a line around the Southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula including Port Arthur and Dairen saying that the Russians wished again to lease these ports and the surrounding area. I said that I recalled that you and he had discussed this question at Teheran and that, if my memory is correct, you had in fact initiated yourself the question of the need for Russia to have access to a warm water port in the Pacific.... Stalin said further that he wished to lease the Chinese-Eastern Railway.... He said the

only consideration he had not mentioned at Teheran was the recognition of the status quo in Outer Mongolia - the maintenance of the Republic of Outer Mongolia as an independent identity.<sup>34</sup>

At the Malta Conference on February 2, 1945, Roosevelt with the aforementioned information in hand told Churchill that the War in Europe would end in 1945, but that the struggle against Japan might continue until December 1946.<sup>35</sup> That same day at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs, Churchill queried Roosevelt on the realities of China. The President answered that "three generations of education and training would be required before China could become a serious factor."<sup>36</sup> On the eve of Yalta therefore, Roosevelt was fully aware of the human cost an invasion of Japan would incur; he knew the price the Soviet Union would exact for entering the war in the Pacific, and he had a limited view of China's power potential. In Europe, the Battle of the Bulge had also demonstrated the indispensability of the Soviet armies, who under Zhukov, were less than a hundred miles from Berlin when the conference began on February 4.<sup>37</sup>

On the first day of the Yalta Conference Harriman reminded Roosevelt that Stalin would raise the question of compensations for his entry into the war in the Pacific. Roosevelt answered that he wanted to consult with Chiang over the status quo in Mongolia, but was ready to go ahead on Stalin's other demands. On February 8, during the Roosevelt-Stalin meeting at Livadia



Palace, Roosevelt in answer to Stalin's query stated that "there would be no difficulty whatsoever in regard to the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands going to Russia at the end of the war."<sup>38</sup> Roosevelt then reminded Stalin that he (FDR) had mentioned the port of Dairen in their discussions at Teheran but that "he had not yet had an opportunity to discuss this matter with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, so therefore he could not speak for the Chinese."<sup>39</sup>

Nevertheless, Roosevelt discussed the means by which the U.S.S.R. could acquire the use of the port: outright leasing, or its conversion into a free port controlled by some form of international commission. Stalin then mentioned his interest in the postwar use of the Manchurian Railways, basing this interest on the right of access enjoyed by the Czars. Roosevelt again repeated the conditions suggested for the use of Dairen, with a commission possibly made up of "one Chinese and one Russian." To this, Stalin emphasized that if his basic demands were not met, "it would be difficult for him and Molotov to explain to the Soviet people why Russia was entering the war against Japan...."

Once again Roosevelt attempted to placate Stalin with the excuse that he had not discussed the question with Chiang, emphasizing that "anything said to them was known to the whole world in twenty-four hours." What followed, forms the nucleus of much of the controversy that still rages over the question of

Yalta: Roosevelt's acquiescence in writing, to Stalin's demands:

Marshal Stalin agreed [poor Chinese security] and said he did not think it was necessary yet to speak to the Chinese and that he could guarantee the security of the Supreme Soviet. He added that it would be well to leave here with these conditions set forth in writing agreed to by the three powers. The President indicated that he thought that this could be done.<sup>40</sup>

Two days later (February 10), Harriman informed Molotov of three amendments Roosevelt wanted to make to Stalin's conditions for entering the war in the Pacific. First, Port Arthur and Dairen should become free ports, second, the Manchurian Railways would be operated by a joint Chinese-Soviet Commission. In addition, Harriman added that he "felt sure that the President would not wish to dispose finally of these two matters in which China was interested without the concurrence of the Generalissimo."<sup>41</sup> Molotov had some difficulty in comprehending this last amendment, so Harriman immediately called on Roosevelt who endorsed it on the spot.

That same afternoon after the formal conference meeting, Stalin approached Harriman and said that "he was entirely willing to have Dairen a free port under international control, but that Port Arthur was different, it was to be a Russian naval base and therefore Russia required a lease." Harriman suggested he immediately see Roosevelt, which he did, and the President thereupon agreed that Russia be granted a lease to Port Arthur. Stalin now accepted a joint Chinese-Soviet commission for the

Manchurian Railroads, and agreed that Chiang's concurrence was needed. He emphasized however, that "the Generalissimo should also give his consent to [the] status quo in Outer Mongolia."<sup>42</sup>

Stalin then asked Roosevelt not to inform the Chinese of these decisions until he (Stalin) advised the President to do so, to which Roosevelt agreed. The following day (February 11), Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin signed the secret agreement by which the Soviet Union was to enter the war in the Pacific, two to three months after the defeat of Germany. Omitted from the protocol of the conference, this document was placed in Roosevelt's personal safe and released to the press exactly one year later.<sup>43</sup> Unfortunately, the nature of the agreement and its secrecy, in a nation traditionally encouraged to believe in open diplomacy, gave cause to Roosevelt's detractors who accused the President of betraying China at Yalta.<sup>44</sup>

One need hardly doubt that Roosevelt approached the Yalta Conference fully convinced of the necessity for a Soviet intervention in the Far East. Nor was he under any illusions as to the huge role the Soviet armies were playing in Eastern Europe. With these factors in mind, Roosevelt at Yalta, abandoned segments of China's territorial integrity to save American lives, to shorten the war, and guarantee the ultimate liberation of China from eight years of Japanese occupation. Given the fact that Dairen, Port Arthur, Outer Mongolia and large portions of

Manchuria had been out of Chinese control, in some instances since 1905, it can be argued this was not as great an affront to China's territorial integrity as some of Roosevelt's critics have maintained. To the nation affected however, it contradicted the essence of the Cairo Declaration, and when revealed in 1946 further discredited the great power image American diplomacy had created for China since January 1, 1942. It also reduced American prestige in China amongst all political factions and added another item to the long list of grievances the West had inflicted on China since before the Open Door Notes of 1899.

Three years after the war, the Director of the Chinese Government Information Office, Doctor H.K. Tong, was queried on an editorial comment in the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury. The editorial referred to a serialized portion of Sherwood's Roosevelt and Hopkins..., in the August 28, 1948, edition of Colliers, to the effect that Roosevelt had discussed with Chiang at Cairo the disposal of Dairen. Dr. Tong answered:

According to my recollection President Roosevelt,... inquired about possibility of conversion of Dairen into free port at end of war. The reply of President Chiang was that he might give consideration to such a proposal when time came, provided there was no in[fringement?] of the sovereignty of China. The nature of the commitment later made by President Roosevelt at Yalta differed from what President Roosevelt himself had suggested to President Chiang at Cairo. The Yalta commitment was not known to the Government of China at the time it was made.<sup>45</sup>

The existence of the document has never been denied by the

State Department and it is doubtful whether a logical case could be made for acting otherwise, given the state of Chinese security at that time. Such critics as Herbert Feis, G.A. Lensen, and the prewar U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew (amongst others), have roundly condemned Roosevelt's role at Yalta.<sup>46</sup> What is often neglected in this criticism is the final clause of the agreement in which Russia promises to sign a nonaggression pact with China and assist in her liberation from Japan. So crucial was this promise to the war in the Pacific (early in 1945), that Secretary of War Stimson was "willing to postpone all the divergent issues between the Soviet Union and the United States..." to achieve this end.<sup>47</sup> Seventeen days after Yalta, even General MacArthur believed that the invasion of Japan was contingent on the Japanese being "heavily engaged by the Russians in Manchuria."<sup>48</sup>

Of prime importance to the U.S., the Yalta Agreement was also vital to the survival of the Nationalists, for it promised the Kuomintang by treaty, Soviet assistance in its liberation from Japan. When the treaty was released one year later, Chiang was assured that he and no other Chinese political faction would reap the credit for freeing China from eight years of Japanese occupation. It also reassured the Nationalists that the U.S.S.R. would continue its policy of relative noninterference in Chinese internal affairs. This policy, in effect since at least 1937,

was never fully understood by American diplomacy. For of all the misconceptions which affected U.S. Chinese wartime relations, none equalled that which assumed that the ascendancy of the Chinese Communists over the Nationalists in the power struggle for China was of vital interest to Soviet Far Eastern policy.<sup>49</sup>

## NOTES

1 Fleet Admiral W.D. Leahy, I was there: The Personal Story of the Chief-of-Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 100.

2 Sherwood, p. 774.

3 Started in 1942, the road ran from Ledo in Assam province India, into North Burma and ultimately to Kunming in Western China. This latter connection was not secured until January 26, 1945; Chiang thereupon renamed the road in tribute to Stilwell. In September 1945, the tonnage delivered to China through the Stilwell Road was: 31.0 thousand short tons, this included 12.4 thousand short tons carried through the pipeline that paralleled the road. The Hump airlift during this same month ferried 49.2 thousand short tons into China. Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 275, n. 16.

4 Sherwood states that Roosevelt believed that "there was always the possibility that the Kuomintang might make a separate peace." Sherwood, p. 740. On November 29, 1943, Hull cabled Roosevelt at Cairo that the American Embassy in Chungking had informed him "that Japan was continuing to make peace offers to the Chinese Government, but without success." Hull, II, 1584.

5 In October 1942, Chennault had claimed that given 105 modern fighters, 30 medium bombers and later on, 12 heavy bombers, he could "accomplish the downfall of Japan." C.L. Chennault, Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Clair Lee Chennault (New York: Putnam's & Sons, 1949), p. 214. At the Washington Conference of May 1943, Chennault had also boasted that with 10,000 tons of supplies per month, he would sink and severely damage "more than a million tons of shipping." Ibid., pp. 225-26.

6 Stimson & Bundy, p. 530.

7 Ibid., p. 538.

8 T.H. White (ed.), The Stilwell Papers (New York: Duell Sloan & Pearce, 1948), p. 205. See also R.N. Current, Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954), p. 215. The following month, Roosevelt stated at a meeting in the White House "that Stilwell obviously hated the Chinese...." On the evidence of Stilwell's reference to Chiang in his cables as "Peanut," Roosevelt was drawing a rather broad conclusion. Sherwood, p. 739.

9 White (ed.), pp. 327, 330.

10 Stimson & Bundy, p. 538. In his interview with Stilwell before the latter's appointment to China, Stimson warned that his enemies in his new position would be four kinds: "Japanese, Chinese, British, and American." Ibid., p. 532.

11 White (ed.), pp. 251-54.

12 For instance, his willingness to arm the Chinese Communists along with the Nationalists, a suggestion vehemently condemned in the U.S. during the McCarthy era. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation: Report, 81st Cong., 2nd. Sess. Senate Report No. 2108 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950). R.Y. Koen quotes one of Chiang's strongest supporters in the China Lobby, to the effect that "Stilwell for personal reasons abetted it [the so-called Department of State plot to subvert the cause of the Nationalists to that of the Communists] to a considerable extent by his actions and certainly did nothing to oppose it." The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 191, quoting A. Kohlberg, "China Via Stilwell Road," The China Monthly (October 1948), IX, 283-87.

13 These were the three divisions trained at Ramgarh, India, which with two additional divisions fought under Stilwell in the Second Burma Campaign. The remaining fifteen were trained in Yunnan Province China and fought in the Salween Campaign.

14 See L.P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 92-99.

15 "I judge Kuomintang and Kungchantang [Communist Party], by what I saw: [K.M.T.] corruption, neglect, chaos economy, taxes, words and deeds. Hoarding, black market, trading with enemy. Communist program ... reduce taxes, rents, interest. Raise production and standard of living. Participate in govern-



ment. Practice what they preach." Undated entry before his 1944 recall, quoted in White (ed.), p. 316.

16 Soong to Stimson, Washington, August 18, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, China, p. 94.

17 Between Tears and Laughter (Toronto: Longmans Green, 1943), pp. 110-11. See also ibid., pp. 63, 173.

18 Romanus & Sunderland, II, 64.

19 Foreign Relations, Cairo..., p. 889.

20 Ibid., pp. 889-90.

21 Ibid., p. 890.

22 China White Paper, II, 551-52. Hull states that the trip "was without beneficial effect." Hull, II, 1585-86.

23 Foreign Relations, 1944, General, I (1966), 623, n. 19. See also Hull, II, 1650.

24 Hull, II, 1684.

25 U.S. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 332.

26 Foreign Relations, 1944, General, I, 893. For the full text, see Appendix VIII.

27 Quoted in J.N. Snell (ed.), The Meaning of Yalta: Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), pp. 29-30. Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, states that the German thrust of December 16, 1944, "gave the Allies their biggest shock since 1942...." The German Generals Talk (New York: Berkley, 1958), p. 238. See also ibid., pp. 239-43; R.E. Merriam, The Battle of the Bulge (New York: Ballantine Books, 1947); General F., von Senger und Etterling, Neither Fear Nor Hope (New York: Dutton, 1964), p. 324. As to Roosevelt's knowledge of the effectiveness of the atomic bomb at Yalta, Pogue contends that the President, Marshall and Stimson were notified by the end of December 1944, that an atomic bomb "possessing enormous destructive power would be ready for use about the first of August, 1945...." Quoted in Snell (ed.), p. 199.

28 Pogue, quoted in Snell (ed.), pp. 31-32.

29 Ibid., p. 33.

30 The half million casualty estimate is Truman's. Memoirs of Harry S. Truman (New York: Doubleday, 1955), p. 315. The one million estimate is Stimson's and entails a total projection of all U.S. casualties. Feis, Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 12, quoting Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's Magazine (February, 1947). See also J.R. Dean, The Strange Alliance: The Story of American Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia (New York: Viking Press, 1947), p. 225; J. Heffernan, "The bombing of Hiroshima Truman's decision alone," Vancouver Sun (August 6, 1970), p. 7, and especially Hans Bethe's letter to the New York Times (February 28, 1971), p. 12, entitled: "Yalta: Lack of Communication on Bomb," in which he states that by February 1945 there existed a 90 per cent probability that the atomic bomb would in fact explode.

31 O. Masatake, J. Horikoshi & M. Cadin, Zero: The Inside Story of Japan's Air War in the Pacific (New York: Ballantine Books, 1956), pp. 276-78. Yet this carnage was accomplished by virtually few raids. General L.S. Kuter who represented Arnold at Yalta, states: "By March 9, 1945, only 22 small-scale B-29 strikes had been flown against Japan from the Marianas.... It was sixty-five days [after Yalta] before the first five-hundred-airplane strike could be delivered...." Airman at Yalta (New York: Duell, Sloan, & Pearce, 1955), pp. 4, 9, quoted in Snell (ed.), p. 201. The highly combustible construction of Japanese urban dwellings as witnessed by this writer in these cities in 1951-54, was no doubt responsible for the ease with which they could be eliminated through relatively light fire bombings.

32 Feis, Japan Subdued..., p. 180.

33 Masatake et al., pp. 276-77.

34 Foreign Relations, 1945, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta (1955), pp. 378-79.

35 G.A. Lensen, quoted in Snell (ed.), p. 143.

36 Foreign Relations, Malta..., p. 544.

37 Pogue, quoted in Snell (ed.), p. 31.

38 Foreign Relations, Malta..., p. 768.

39 Ibid., p. 769. During this same conversation of February 8, 1945, Roosevelt informed Stalin on three distinct occasions that he had not had the opportunity to discuss with Chiang the question of Dairen and the Manchurian Railways. Ibid. Fourteen months earlier however, Roosevelt had assured the Soviet leader that the Chinese would agree to Soviet access to Dairen were it made a free port under international guarantee. Sherwood states that Roosevelt had in fact discussed the disposition of Dairen with Chiang at Cairo a few days before Teheran. Sherwood, p. 792. On June 23, 1944, during a conversation with Vice-President Wallace, Chiang stated that "he had discussed the matter [disposition of Dairen] with President Roosevelt at Cairo and had indicated his agreement provided the U.S.S.R. cooperated with China in the Far East and provided there was no impairment of Chinese sovereignty." China White Paper, II, 558. See also the comments of Dr. H.K. Tong of August 28, 1948, this paper, p. 83.

40 Foreign Relations, Malta..., p. 769 (Italics mine.)

41 Ibid., p. 894.

42 Ibid., p. 895 (Italics integral.)

43 Ibid., p. 984. For the full text see Appendicies IX - X.

44 The Chungking financed "China Lobby" actively fostered this myth throughout the U.S. In 1949, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, echoed this attitude when he stated of America's China policy: "The 'crime' goes back to Teheran and Yalta where FDR sold Chiang Kai-shek down the river in order to get Joe Stalin into the Jap war...." Quoted in Koen, p. 111. For a recent view of Yalta, see D.S. Clemens, Yalta (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 216-25, 244-55.

45 Foreign Relations, Cairo..., p. 891.

46 H. Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin: The War They Waged and The Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 513-15; Lensen states that "Roosevelt and Stalin took less than a quarter of an hour to consider Russian desires in the Far East." Quoted in Snell (ed.), p. 147; J.C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years: 1904-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942), II, 1444. It is interesting to note that it was not until four months "after Yalta" that Marquis Kido in a tentative draft of a proposal for the

Emperor, noted: "The statistics appended ... reveal that after the latter half of the year we shall completely lose our power in every way for prosecuting war." L. Mosley, Hirohito: Emperor of Japan (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 294.

47 Current, p. 226.

48 W. Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 31. Admiral Leahy shared an entirely different outlook however: "I was of the firm opinion that our war against Japan had progressed to the point where her defeat was only a matter of time and attrition. Therefore we did not need Stalin's help to defeat our enemy in the Pacific. The Army did not agree with me...." Leahy, p. 293. See also ibid., p. 317.

49 Clemens states that Stalin reminded Roosevelt at Yalta that "he [Stalin] consistently backed a united front policy, and (as far back as the 1920's, in fact) had insisted on it. He assured Roosevelt that he had never agreed with its dissolution." Clemens, p. 251. See also Van Slyke, pp. 92-96, 106, 113-16. It is interesting to note in view of Stalin's above assertion that the United Front did not entail any fundamental concessions on the part of the Chinese Communist Party (or the Kuomintang) to either fundamental ideology or ultimate goals. Ibid., p. 121. Chiang's insistence on a Sino-Soviet treaty during his conversation with Wallace on June 23, 1944, is treated in China White Paper, II, 558. For some Chinese and American reactions to the treaty, see ibid., I, 120-23.

## FOUR YEARS OF DIPLOMACY: AN ASSESSMENT

In attempting to assess the motives which prompted American diplomacy to foster the image of China as a great power from January 1, 1942 to Yalta, one is immediately faced with the lack of credibility such an effort was destined to evoke. If, as this writer maintains, China's new status amounted to nothing more tangible than convenient tokenism, why did the U.S. go to such lengths to create this image during the war and attempt to insure its perpetuation into the postwar era?

Four possibilities present themselves to this writer: First, the obvious necessity of maintaining China in the war against Japan to ensure her continued occupation by masses of Japanese troops that would otherwise be used against the U.S. and her allies in the Pacific. This factor increased in relevance as the war approached the Japanese home islands, and America faced the prospect of a landing in Japan and a mammoth battle for the Plain of Tokyo. The estimated casualties the U.S. would incur in such an action were so high as to directly influence the concessions of Yalta. For not only was it deemed vital that

China maintain the Japanese occupied on the Asian mainland, Russia was also counted on to engage the equally large Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea after Germany's defeat.

Given the pressures of supply and demand on a nation engaged in a war on two continents, coupled to the physical isolation of China, all the U.S. could offer China after Pearl Harbour was the appearances of a great power. Evidence has been submitted to underline the fact that in spite of these drawbacks, the U.S., though promising more than it actually delivered, nevertheless materially assisted the Nationalists throughout the war. The airlift over the Hump, the Stilwell mission and the construction of the Ledo-Stilwell road attest to this continuous aid. Even the Yalta concessions can be rationalized, both for their contribution to the war in the Pacific, and the explicit Russian commitment to assist in the liberation of China. Russia in effect, was bound by the Yalta Agreement to conclude a pact of friendship and alliance with the Nationalists, thereby assuring the survival of the political faction the U.S. had managed to seat in the U.N. Security Council.<sup>1</sup>

This first possibility therefore, exemplifies the traditional concensus approach which sees Roosevelt's decisions and U.S. policy toward China as a series of pragmatic reactions to immediate problems, set against the overriding priority of American security and the winning of the war. Such involved

participants as Cordell Hull, Dean Acheson, and to some extent E.R. Stettinius, have advocated this explanation.<sup>2</sup> In this, they have been supported by a number of historians including A.M. Schlesinger Jr., and G. Smith, amongst others.

The second possibility, and one expounded by some of the New Left Revisionist historians such as W.A. Williams, G. Kolko, and the semanticist N. Chomsky, would be to ascribe solely economic reasons to the American treatment of China as a great power.<sup>3</sup> The whole *raison d'être* of seating China in the U.N. Security Council is then seen as a premeditated move to control China in the postwar period to enhance American economic imperialism. Churchill's reference to China's "faggot vote" for U.S. policy in the Security Council, and Roosevelt's thinly veiled attempts throughout the war to exclude the old colonial powers from post-war Asia, add credence to this thesis. One of its most recent exponents goes so far as to state that:

Roosevelt hoped to expel the 'imperialists' - Britain, France, and Japan - from China and Korea, and possibly from Indochina and Hong Kong, and to substitute American economic hegemony.... To fill the gap, he sought to promote the Soviet Union as America's junior partner in Asia. After the war, the United States would control China and occupy Japan....<sup>4</sup>

Unfortunately, such an approach so easily accepted today in view of the global scope of U.S. capitalism, fails to explain why American investors from 1899 to 1945 showed a near total lack of interest in risking their capital in China. Nor does it

sufficiently consider such crucial contributing factors as domestic politics, the China Lobby, and in China, the absence of even a minimal industrial basis sufficiently developed to supply a reciprocal or extractive trade.<sup>5</sup>

A third approach is to conclude that Roosevelt misread the future basis of power in China, and consequently, supported Chiang to the exclusion of all other factions; the assumption being that the Nationalists would be strong enough (with some American help) to shift the balance of power in postwar Asia. This approach is more difficult to refute, for an assessment of Roosevelt's exclusive help to Chiang during the war, the solid fact of China's seat in the U.N. Security Council and the hope that Russia might contribute to the aforesaid balance, all add credence to such an hypothesis.<sup>6</sup>

By accepting this possibility however, one must also accept the reasoning that Roosevelt was either unaware of, or chose to ignore an impressive amount of evidence which indicated the continued corruption of the Nationalists and their probable debacle in the foreseeable future.<sup>7</sup> One finds it difficult to ascribe such naïveté to one of America's foremost statesmen, a man whose whole public life epitomized the art of the possible.<sup>8</sup>

As early as March 15, 1941, on his return from a survey of China's war potential, Lauchlan Currie, one of Roosevelt's personal assistants, warned the President of the political weak-



ness of the Kuomintang: "My general conclusion [he stated] is that while internal conflict will be held to minimum during the war there is a very dubious prospect of maintaining political stability in the postwar period."<sup>9</sup> At the Second Cairo Conference in December 1943, Stilwell's biographer maintains that Roosevelt suggested that maybe an alternative might have to be found to replace Chiang.<sup>10</sup> The following year, Stettinius noted that at a cabinet meeting Roosevelt had "stated that he was greatly concerned with the outlook relative to China and that he was apprehensive for the first time as to China holding together for the duration of the war...."<sup>11</sup> In July 1944, Hull in a conversation with Beaverbrook admitted that he himself believed "that China has only a fifty-fifty chance to reestablish herself as a great power...."<sup>12</sup> Stimson, though obviously biased, believed that "the entire Chinese war establishment was riddled with graft and personal power politics...."<sup>13</sup> In spite of Roosevelt's personal involvement in formulating foreign policy it would be inaccurate to suggest that such opinions were unknown to him, some of which were shared by members of his own cabinet.<sup>14</sup>

There was also a constant flow of reports to the State Department from its embassy in Chungking. Headed by C.E. Gauss, and staffed by such experienced analysts of China as J.S. Service, J.P. Davies, and O.E. Clubb, the embassy repeatedly warned Washington that popular support was passing out of the

hands of the Nationalists and into those of the Communists.

Early in January 1944, the Second Secretary of Embassy in China, J.P. Davies, stated in a memorandum that the Communists in Yen-an were "the most cohesive, disciplined and aggressively anti-Japanese regime in China,... the greatest single challenge ... to the Chiang Kai-shek government...."<sup>15</sup> On February 8, Ambassador Gauss reinforced Davies' memo when he informed Secretary of State Hull that a reliable eyewitness had informed him that the Chinese Communists had achieved broad support from all classes in the areas under their control.<sup>16</sup> On the sixteenth, in another message to Hull, Gauss commented on an interview Madame Sun Yat-sen had accorded J.S. Service to discuss the Kuomintang's refusal to allow her to visit the U.S.:

Madame Sun ascribed the refusal to the strong disapproval of her family and high Kuomintang officials to the publication in Reynolds Weekly,... of a report that she had sent a message to organizations in the United States appealing for the removal of the blockade against the Chinese Communists in order that they may receive medicine and other supplies and be given an equal opportunity to fight Japan.... Madame Sun's position is now a strained and difficult one.<sup>17</sup>

It should be remembered however, that Madame Sun had been associated with the Communists since the 1930's and was then (1944) and still is, most sympathetic to them. On the other hand, the Federation of Democratic Parties, an incipient form of opposition to the Kuomintang, directly blamed Chiang for China's critical situation.<sup>18</sup> Some substance was added to this charge by

Representative Mansfield when on his return to Washington on January 3, 1945, from a mission to China, he reported to Roosevelt that conscription in the Chinese army was tantamount to a death sentence.<sup>19</sup> On the sixteenth he followed up his report with a speech in the House in which he referred to the "disastrous results" which accrued from using 300,000 Nationalist troops to blockade the Communists in the northwest.<sup>20</sup>

With the resignation of Ambassador Gauss and the subsequent appointment of General P.J. Hurley on November 30, 1944, official attempts to mediate between the Nationalists and the Communists were initiated. The groundwork for these negotiations had been laid by Gauss who, with Roosevelt's direct assistance, had managed to place an American observer section in Yen-an to assess the military potential of the Chinese Communists. Unfortunately, Hurley, with relatively no diplomatic experience, and categorically opposed to any criticism of Chiang and the Nationalists, negated the faint possibility of a rapprochement between the two factions. His attitude also contributed to reduce the impact of the detailed reports from his own embassy staff and those from the observers in Yen-an. This partiality was evident in a dispatch to Hull on February 17, in which Hurley questioned the authenticity of a report alleging collusion between the Kuomintang and the Japanese. The report written by a Captain Evans, quoted excerpts from a conversation with Chou En-lai.<sup>21</sup>

That same month the Charge in China (Atcheson), taking advantage of Hurley's visit to Washington wired the Secretary of State. In a lengthy exposé written with the help of all of the embassy's political officers, Atcheson recommended that the U.S. provide arms to the Communists. Such a policy, he stated, would "secure the cooperation of all of China's forces in the war, to hold the Communists to our side rather than throw them into the arms of Russia...."<sup>22</sup>

The whole question of assisting the Communists in Yen-an had been initiated by Stilwell, a suggestion which played a major role in Chiang's insistence on his recall.<sup>23</sup> The impact of such a recommendation as late as 1945, supported by the political specialists on the spot, in direct contradiction to the policy of the absent ambassador could hardly have failed to attract Hull's attention. It also indicates the extent to which Hurley's partiality for Chiang constrained the embassy staff from expressing themselves freely to Washington.

In spite of such interference however, reports on conditions in China continued to reach the State Department. On March 1, 1945, the Assistant Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Chase), submitted a memorandum emphasizing the degree of corruption then evident in the Kuomintang administration.<sup>24</sup> The following day, Under Secretary of State Grew informed Roosevelt of his concern over Chiang's "intransigent attitude" toward the

Communists. Grew then suggested that Acheson's recommendations of February could very well be discussed with Hurley during his stay in Washington.<sup>25</sup> On March 20, J.S. Service, on duty with the observer section in Yen-an, reported on an alleged instance of collaboration between the general commanding the Second Nationalist War Zone and the Japanese.<sup>26</sup>

One week later Chase criticized the American policy of arming only the Nationalists, in a memorandum he stated that such a policy threatened not only to alienate the Communists but all other important non-Kuomintang groups:

If opposition to Chiang continues to grow at its present rate, such an alienation would mean that we would soon find the majority of politically conscious Chinese embittered against us for supporting a minority regime which could not maintain itself without our support. It would also set the stage for a head-on collision with Soviet Russia.<sup>27</sup>

On May 28, Chase's memorandum was given further emphasis by a State Department Paper circulated to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, concerning U.S. Chinese postwar military policies. After castigating the Kuomintang, the Nationalist army and airforce, it referred to the "widespread dissatisfaction" within China to the present national government. Under political considerations the paper defined the groups which were then opposed to the Kuomintang controlled National Government: The Communists in the provinces of Shensi, Shansi, Hopei, Shantung, Anhwei, and Kiangsu, in addition to a population of about 20 to

50 million; the Democratic League, which it defined as a loose federation of minor political parties; the war lords in Szechuan, Yunnan, Kwangsi, and the semi-independent military rulers of Tsinghai, Sikang, and Ninghsia, whose allegiance to the National Government was considered largely nominal.<sup>28</sup>

With even this minimal evidence available, it would be credulous in the extreme to conclude that Roosevelt failed to perceive the decreasing support for the Nationalists throughout China.<sup>29</sup> Nor is it realistic to maintain that he long remained blind to the popular acceptance of the Communists in the regions under their control. No tangible evidence was uncovered however, to indicate that a major change in policy toward the Nationalists or the Chinese Communists was initiated by Roosevelt, or carried out by the State Department up to the time of the President's death on April 12, 1945.

The third possibility therefore, can be generally accepted: Although aware of internal conditions in China and the continued weakness of the Nationalists regime, Roosevelt chose to ignore such evidence as indicative of Chiang's future collapse and the ensuing failure of U.S. postwar plans for Asia. Precisely why Roosevelt adhered to this myopic approach can only be conjectured on, yet some evidence does exist which tends to outline some of the broader reasons why he misjudged the future basis of power in China.

This evidence constitutes the fourth possibility and entails Roosevelt's failure to perceive that a largely nonindustrialized nation could through its own efforts, achieve genuine great power status.<sup>30</sup> It also involves the marked rigidity shared by even those observers most favourably impressed by the "progressiveness" of the Chinese Communists, in predicting what their future relations with the Soviet Union would be. The U.S.S.R. as the fountainhead of international Communism controlled a monolithic apparatus of which ipso facto, the Chinese Communists were a recognized appendage.<sup>31</sup> This attitude was also shared by some key policy makers, and later, some historians. Even Stilwell believed that if the Kuomintang-Communist split was not healed before the Soviet entrance into the war in the Pacific, "the Reds, being immediately accessible, will naturally gravitate to Russia's influence and control...."<sup>32</sup>

Whether Roosevelt fully shared this limited view is difficult to ascertain, yet its wide acceptance in Government circles precluded that he long remain unaware of its existence. However, neither the President nor Hull hesitated to involve the Soviet Union in their postwar plans for Asia, Hull in fact, saw Soviet assistance as a unifying factor in China.<sup>33</sup> Roosevelt on the other hand, assuaged what reservations he might have had over the Yalta Agreement by insisting in this same document that the U.S.S.R. bind itself to assist Nationalist China in its liberation

from the Japanese. Having said this, one cannot but advance some cautious speculations on the degree to which American diplomatic thinking on Sino-Soviet relations affected its wartime policy with China. In essence, was there any basis to the aforementioned rigid assessment of Soviet intentions in China and the degree of cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communists?

Early in July 1944, Mao Tse-tung informed Maurice Votaw, an American employee of the Chinese Ministry of Information, that there was no connection between his organization and the Soviet Communist Party.<sup>34</sup> That same year, the Soviet Ambassador to Chungking assured Chiang that his country was no longer giving aid to Communists in other countries, and would not give aid to the Chinese Communists.<sup>35</sup> In June, Stalin in a conversation with Harriman, reiterated what he had previously told Roosevelt, that Chiang must be supported as none better had arisen to replace him.<sup>36</sup>

In February 1945, J.P. Davies, now Second Secretary in the Moscow Embassy informed the Secretary of State of a talk he had had with Dr. Chen Hanseng, an outstanding Chinese intellectual in the British Ministry of Information. Dr. Chen stated that the pro-Soviet faction of the Chinese Communist Party headed by Wang Ming, a former member of the Comintern, was now defunct. He added that the present leaders of the Communist Party and espe-



cially Mao, "who has never been out of China, were without strong Russian ties."<sup>37</sup> In March, J.S. Service in a report from the observer section in Yen-an, added credence to Dr. Chen's statements by touching on some of the fundamental concepts of the Chinese Communist Party:

The Communist conception of the war against Japan as a national war of liberation [which] must at the same time, in order for its success, be an important and progressive stage in the Chinese revolution.... By an extension of this logic, the Communist leaders feel that the permitting of general expectation of easy salvation [as Chiang expected from U.S.A. and Russia] through Russian participation will be an impediment to the war effort and the accomplishment of its underlying revolutionary objectives.<sup>38</sup>

As to Soviet military assistance to the Chinese Communists, Service noted in his report of March 23, that the last direct connection between Yen-an and Moscow ended as early as November, 1942. On that occasion the Chinese Communists spent two days at Lanchow searching the last Soviet plane to leave their area. There were also at the time of Service's report, only three Russians in Yen-an, a Dr. Orloff and two Tass men with a one-way radio.<sup>39</sup> This lack of support of an ideological ally was also evident in 1945 during the Soviet relinquishment of Manchuria to the Nationalists. In an interview after the war with Anna Louise Strong, Lin Piao was asked what help the Chinese Communists received from the Soviet Government: "None [he answered].... No troops, no weapons, no advisors, nothing!... Whatever arms or war supplies they took from the Japanese they took into Russia

or destroyed on the spot."<sup>40</sup>

In 1948, Stalin, in a conversation with Georgi Dimitrov and Edvard Kardelj stated that he had tried after the war to dissuade the Chinese Communists from continuing their armed opposition to the Kuomintang. Stalin went so far as to suggest that the Communists seek a modus vivendi with Chiang and join his government.<sup>41</sup> Even without such evidence, Stalin's shoddy treatment of the Republicans during the Spanish Civil War might have suggested to the State Department the probable course of Soviet relations toward the Chinese Communists.<sup>42</sup> Unfortunately, such specific hindsight seems also to have been lacking on the more general question of China's future role as a great power in Asia.

Writing in Pacific Affairs, an American analyst stated early in 1945, that China's "past and present condition of security-dependency will not be materially altered by the war. For at least a generation after the war, for perhaps as much as fifty years.... China will in the main be a 'consumer' of security and not a 'dispenser' thereof."<sup>43</sup> Two years later the State Department's evaluation of China, and especially the Chinese Communists showed little digression from this shortsightedness. The view as Kennan saw it in 1947 was that "China was not a strong industrial power. She showed no promise of becoming one for a long time in the future."<sup>44</sup>

By 1949, some evolution had taken place within the State

Department and more emphasis was being laid on the potential strength of nationalism as a gauge of great power status. In a conference early in October attended by such well known analysts of China as Fairbank, Lattimore, Reischauer, Rossinger and Vinacke amongst others, one of the participants (G.E. Taylor) stated:

The major force in Asia that can be used against Communism is nationalism.... In China the Communists are using Chinese nationalism and riding in for their own purposes.... They are fighting us on the ideological level, institutional level, military level. We have to meet them on all levels....<sup>45</sup>

Unfortunately, the realization that nationalism was the unifying catalyst which the Communists had usurped from the Kuomintang, came too late to affect American policy toward China during World War II. By the end of the war, the political faction which would inherit mainland China four years later had been further estranged from American influence. The Chinese Communist potential to unify China at all of the aforementioned levels had been ignored, their ideological goals confused with those of international Communism, and a modicum of material help had been denied it in its struggle against the common enemy, Japan.

In essence, American foreign policy for all its inherent pragmatism failed to take into account the demonstrated fact that China under Communist control could become a great power without

American help, without a fully developed industrial machine and following a sustained civil war. That a different ideological faction than the Kuomintang was to achieve these ends is only relevant in so far as U.S. foreign policy failed to accurately assess the indigenous nature of Chinese Communism and its widespread appeal to Chinese nationalism.

Historically unwilling to accept revolution as a means of social change in spite of its own origins, the U.S. was also hobbled by a technological preeminence which permeated all facets of its national structure. This preeminence tended to shield its policy makers from the possibility that an agrarian mass driven by nationalism and a self-help ethic could achieve great power status.<sup>46</sup> When one considers the additional fact of China's historical past as a great power in the Far East, the American effort during World War II to provide the Chiang Kai-shek Government with a similar status, surely stands as one of the most expedient yet shortsighted moves in the history of U.S. diplomacy.

In an analysis of Boorstin's study The Americans: The Colonial Experience, John Higham inadvertently summed up the dilemma of American diplomacy and possibly the crucial factor in U.S. relations with China during World War II: "The Americans [he stated] ... grows out of an empirical conservatism, which rejects all ideologies in the name of long established insti-

tutions."<sup>47</sup> The Nationalists by 1942 with sixteen years of power behind them and five years of war with Japan were suitably devoid of ideology to suit the prerequisites of American conservatism. Whilst the Communists as the ideologists per se in their struggle for the mind of the Chinese peasant, presented too complex an entity, an entity which refused to guarantee any of the immediate solutions sought by an empirical approach to foreign policy.

Successful as an immediate measure to maintain the Nationalists in the war against Japan, the American effort to raise China to great power status failed as a long-term policy to stabilize the Far East. On the basis of even the evidence quoted in this study, evidence provided by his own analysts in China, Roosevelt would have been justified in providing a modicum of material help to the Chinese Communists. Had such a policy been adopted as Stilwell, Service, Davies, Clubb, Acheson and Chase repeatedly suggested, a sympathetic basis would have been laid for future relations with a political and military faction which an increasing amount of evidence indicated was destined to unite China.<sup>48</sup> It is possible that the prevalent suspicion in government quarters of Soviet intentions in China mitigated against any support for the Chinese Communists. Though no substantial evidence was uncovered to suggest that this suspicion unduly affected the President's decisions on China, its existence cannot be denied.

This writer therefore agrees with the third and fourth possibilities stated in this chapter: Roosevelt supported a government which shortly after his death lost effective control of China, thereby negating the value of four years of diplomacy. That contemporary events seem to add credence to this opinion is evident in the light of the proposed visit to Peking by the President of the United States, and the October 25, 1971 election of Mainland China to the seat made vacant in the U.N. Organization by the expulsion of the Nationalist Chinese.

## NOTES

1 For the full text of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945, see Appendix XI.

2 In his "Letter of Transmittal" prefacing the China White Paper, Acheson states: "The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the Civil War in China was beyond the control of the United States. Nothing this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not." Ibid., I, xvi. For an appraisal of American consensus historians, see J. Higham, "The Cult of the 'American Consensus,'" Commentary, XXVII, No. 2 (February, 1959), 93-100. A.M. Schlesinger Jr. with his consistent defense of Roosevelt's domestic and foreign policies, epitomises this school of thought. As recently as 1968, another exponent of this approach commenting on wartime Sino-American relations, stated that those involved in its formulation "committed no heinous blunders. True, they might have acted otherwise and changed the outcome, but the odds are that the change would have been for the worse, not better." G. Smith, "Last view of the Chinese Scene," Times Book Review (February 25, 1968), p. 35.

3 Williams, The Tragedy...; Williams, The Shaping.... Kolko, The Politics of War...; Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose (Boston: Beacon, 1969). N. Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1969). One could also include W. LaFeber, who in The New Empire..., applies the same narrow determinism to nineteenth century Sino-American relations. For a comprehensive view of the New Left, see Unger, AHR (July, 1967), LXXII, No. 4, 1237-63. Also C. Jencks, "Limits of the New Left," New Republic (October 21, 1967), pp. 19-21. In two articles, Zbigniew Brzezinski attacks some of the fundamental concepts of the New Left: "The American Transition," ibid. (December 23, 1967), pp. 18-21, and "Revolution and Counterrevolution," ibid. (June 1, 1968), pp. 23-25. The following year, A.P. Mendel took Brzezinski to task in "Robots and Rebels," ibid. (January 11, 1969), pp. 16-19. See also M. Harrington's review of C.

Lichtheim's, The Origins of Socialism, ibid. (February 8, 1969), pp. 30-32, and the Brzezinski-Mendel letters under "Correspondence," ibid., p. 32. M. Duberman also sheds some light on the New Left in his review of C. Lasch's, The Agony of the American Left, Times Book Review (March 29, 1969), pp. 1, 34-35. For an interesting article on a symposium at Princeton on American foreign policy which included Brzezinski, S. Hoffman, and J. Lifton, see I. Shenker, "6 Experts, interviewed in Princeton, Urge Complete Review of U.S. Foreign Policy," New York Times (December 8, 1968), p. 76. On the same topic, A.D. Barnett expresses some views in "New balance of power in East predicted by specialist on Asia," Toronto Globe and Mail (April 16, 1970), p. 57. On the neglect of domestic factors by the economic determinists in assessing U.S. foreign policy in Asia, M. Pfeffer states: "Do we really believe that domestic developments in the United States and American foreign policy in general are not factors influencing China? And more than that, can we believe that these factors do not affect relations between China and the United States, if only through their impact on America's China policy? Such a belief would be patently absurd." Quoted in A.D. Barnett & E.O. Reischauer (eds.), The United States and China: The Next Decade (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 22. J. Garraty states that the "New Left historians are unabashedly present-minded; their attack on the consensus school focuses on that group's failure to have provided them with a 'usable past,' meaning a history oriented around questions of current concern like poverty, the Negro, and imperialism." "A Then For a Now," Times Book Review (May 12, 1968). There is a good deal of validity to such a statement, especially when viewed against the lack of interest evinced for such embarrassing questions as the unequal treaties.

4 Clemens, p. 245. Early in March 1944, in a talk with Stettinius on the postwar status of Indochina, Roosevelt stated: "The country is worse off than it was a hundred years ago. The white man's rule there [France's] is nothing to be proud of.... A trusteeship is the only practical solution." Stettinius, p. 211. Omitted from the China White Paper when it was published in 1949, and again in its reedition in 1967, was a portion of H.A. Wallace's conversation with Chiang in Chungking on June 21, 1944. The omission indicated by ellipses appears in Vol. II, at the top of p. 550. In Foreign Relations 1944, China, VI, published in 1967, the ellipses are replaced by the text which reads in part: "Mr. Wallace then quoted to President Chiang the following statement - made by President Roosevelt: "'Churchill is old. A new British Government will give Hongkong to China and the next day China will make it a free port.'" Ibid., p. 223.



5 For China's industrial basis in March 1941, see Foreign Relations, 1941, The Far East, IV (1956), 18-95; for her economic situation in 1945, see China White Paper, II, 127-30.

6 For the composition of the Security Council as of May 4, 1945, see Appendix XII.

7 Hull states that "Chiang Kai-shek kept some of his best divisions near himself, traffic continued between the Chinese and Japanese Zones, and the Government seemed more interested in the blockade against the Communists than against Japan." Ibid., II, 1587. The State Department estimated that in January 1944, the troops blockading the Communists amounted to "possibly more than 400,000...." Foreign Relations, 1944, China, VI, 308. See also Representative [now Senator] M.J. Mansfield's report to Roosevelt on his return from China, January 3, 1945, in which he refers to the Nationalist soldier as having "no food and little equipment. They are starved and poorly equipped because of graft up above. The commanders hang on to much of the stuff they receive and then flood the black markets and enrich themselves." Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East, China, VII (1969), 7. See also ibid., pp. 75-76, 177, 293-94, 304.

8 Yet Roosevelt was capable of some appalling oversimplifications, such as his comment to Stalin at Yalta to the effect that "the Indochinese were people of small stature, like the Javanese and Burmese, and were not warlike." Foreign Relations, Malta..., p. 770. The survivors of the defense of Dienbienphu might not entirely agree with such an assessment of the Indochinese. As to detailed information on the Far East and specifically China, there was, apart from the State Department and its embassy in Chungking, the Institute of Pacific Relations with its 1,200 publications and the data it had been accumulating since 1926 through contacts with eleven countries in the general area of the Pacific.

9 Foreign Relations, 1941, The Far East, IV, 82-86.

10 See this paper p. 69.

11 Foreign Relations, 1944, China, VI, 230.

12 Hull, II, 1586. Beaverbrook answered that there was "a feeling in Britain that the Government of Chiang Kai-shek was not a real fighting Government but was 'something plastered on top of China like a button on a coat.'" Ibid.

13 Stimson & Bundy, p. 533. The wartime conscription system of the Kuomintang is a fair example of this graft at the lower levels: "The conscription officers made their money in collaboration with the officials and through their press gangs.... The dealer might give \$30,000 CN to the man who sells himself, or to the family or to the official. He sells the man for \$50,000 CN to the Hsienchang or conscription official who just left off a peasant's son for \$100,000 CN.... Many of those who run away run off during the first few days. Later they are too weak to run away. Those who are caught are cruelly beaten. They will be carried along with broken limbs and with wounds in maimed flesh in which infection turns quickly into blood poisoning and blood poisoning into death." Romanus & Sunderland, III, 369-70. One might contrast this treatment with that accorded the recruits in Yen-an as observed by J.S. Service, Foreign Relations, 1944, China, VI, 519. See also, J. Myrdal, Report from a Chinese Village (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 132-33.

14 H.J. Morgenthau states that "the course of American policy toward Germany and Japan during the initial phase of the Second World War was determined primarily by Presidential action ...." In 1944, 1 treaty was concluded as compared to 74 executive agreements, in 1945 the figures were 6 - 54. "Who Makes Those Commitments? Congress or Foreign Policy," New Republic (June 14, 1969), p. 18. Lensen states that "the State Department had no representative who sat with the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, and until late 1944 it did not even have a liaison officer with the White House." Quoted in Snell (ed.), p. 144.

15 Foreign Relations, 1944, China, VI, 307.

16 Ibid., p. 328.

17 Ibid., p. 341.

18 Ibid., p. 490. See also ibid., pp. 477, 494, 513.

19 Foreign Relations 1945, The Far East, China, VII, 7.

20 Ibid., p. 177.

21 Ibid., pp. 220-23.

22 Ibid., p. 246. Hurley's reaction was to stigmatize the wire as an act of disloyalty on the part of his staff: "It was over that same issue [he added] that General Stilwell had been recalled." Ibid., p. 261.

23 On October 21, 1944, at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang, Chiang is alleged to have said "that Stilwell had boasted that if he went to Yen-an he would be able to get the Red Army to cooperate immediately. 'That is nonsense' said Chiang. 'I will never permit Stilwell to go until the Communists submit to my orders; there can be no compromise with the Communists; if we give in now we shall have to surrender more later.'" Foreign Relations, 1944, China, VI, 265.

24 Foreign Relations 1945, The Far East, China, VII, 61. In part the memo read: "Such conditions include conscription abuses, neglect of training and discipline, incompetent leadership, underpay, shocking undernourishment and lack of medical care, defective and confused organization, personal allegiances, nepotism, graft, smuggling, oppression of the people, sickness and low morale." Ibid.

25 Ibid., p. 254. Grew suggested that they discuss "the Embassy's recommendations that we consider giving war supplies to the Chinese Communists as well as to Generalissimo Chiang." Ibid.

26 Ibid., pp. 293-94. Service had been in Yen-an with the observer section since the Summer of 1944. His report of March 20 (his 20th), stated in part, that the general's "position is so obvious that even the most charitable minded cannot assume that Chungking does not know the situation." Ibid., p. 294.

27 Ibid., p. 304. This memo referred to a report to Hurley by a political officer in China (R.M. Service), informing Hurley of Chiang's lack of support for the Provincial troops in Service's immediate area.

28 Ibid., pp. 74-78. Originally dated April 3, 1945, the paper was transmitted on May 28 with a covering memo from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. Included in the transmission of May 28, were quotations from a previous memo by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs of the State Department (Vincent), to the Acting Secretary of State, dated January 29, 1945, in answer to a query on U.S. China policy by the Secretaries of War and Navy. In part, this memo read: "It is believed that measures undertaken at this time to rearm China in order that it might become a strong Asiatic power would be impracticable.... It does not necessarily follow that China should be unified under Chiang Kai-shek. However, with regard to the short-term objective, Chiang appears to be the only leader who now offers a hope for unification. The alternative to the support of Chiang for

the attainment of our immediate objective might be chaos." Ibid., p. 78. See also memo by the Second Secretary in Chunking (R.P. Ludden), assessing the popular support enjoyed by the Communists in North China. Ibid., pp. 200-04. Ludden's assertions are endorsed by E.F. Dumright. Ibid., p. 204, n. 66.

29 This evidence, covering a period from March 15, 1941, to April 3, 1945, consists of quotations from two direct reports to Roosevelt, one address in the House of Representatives, one State Department Policy Paper, two of the President's conversations, and twelve reports and memorandums ranging from the Secretary of State to the political officers on duty with the observer section in Yen-an. This information was gleaned from the documentary sources of the State Department publication, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers.

30 One means "relative" great power status here, for prior to the industrial revolution, China had in fact been a great power in the Far East.

31 In a memo dated March 1, 1945, the Assistant Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs of the State Department (Chase), stated that "while Russia lends no direct material support to the Communists, the latter unquestionably derive indirect moral support from Moscow." Foreign Relations 1945, The Far East, China, VII, 59. On March 2, another memo from the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Dumright) echoed the fears of many State Department personnel: "In the event that Russia enters the Far Eastern conflict and commits Soviet troops to battle, it seems inevitable that they will link up with Chinese Communist troops which are now strongly entrenched in North China." Ibid., p. 253. In his report of March 23, from the observer section in Yen-an, Service still believed that there was some contact between the Chinese Communist Party and that of the Soviet Union: "What contact does exist is between the two Parties, not Governments. I think it likely that such contact exists." Ibid., p. 304. On April 3, a State Department Paper stated in part: "It is also believed that Soviet Russia is even more unlikely to give assistance to a Kuomintang controlled National Government; it is much more probable that Soviet Russia will assist the Chinese Communists. Ibid., p. 77. On April 23, in a wire to Stettinius from Moscow, G.F. Kennan, commenting on Hurley's recent interview with Stalin, reinforced the State Department's suspicions on Soviet intentions in China: "Russia [he stated] is entirely ready to support the principle of a 'united' China, knowing that this could be achieved in reality only if the demands of the Chinese Communists, which would ultimately amount to domination of the government, could be

realized...." Ibid., pp. 342-44. Four days later, Kennan again wired Stettinius, in part he stated: "It would not be out of accord with established Russian methods to hold open and exploit the possibility of collaboration with Chiang as a means of impressing Yen-an with the necessity of hewing closely to the line of solidarity with Russia." Ibid.

32 White (ed.), p. 322. Harriman went so far as to state at a meeting with Forrestal and King on May 11, 1945, that "once the Russians get in [to China], that the two or three hundred millions in that country would march when the Kremlin ordered." Millis (ed.), p. 55. Feis, writing in The China Tangle..., states that "every line about Soviet strategy must have suggested the question as to what the situation would be if China was still miserably divided when the Russian troop movement began, and if a rebellious Communist army was roaming over the northern regions of China which the Soviet forces might reach." Ibid., p. 227. Lensen sees even Roosevelt as sharing this limited view of the Chinese Communists: "Roosevelt knew, of course, that what Stalin really wanted [at Yalta], was the entrance of Chinese Communists into the national government at Chungking...." Quoted in Snell (ed.), p. 146. The epitomy of this attitude surfaced some five years after the war, when on February 9, 1950, Senator J.R. McCarthy in his denunciatory address in Wheeling, West Virginia, stated in part: "For years, the Russian Communists had plainly stated that international revolution was their aim. An international conspiratorial apparatus was under their control and in this apparatus the Chinese Communists had important places. Their hope of capturing the whole of China was freely acknowledged, their umbilical connection with Moscow well understood." Quoted in Koen, p. 120.

33 Writing on the eve of the Moscow Declaration of October 1943, Hull states: "I was convinced that Russian cooperation would be of great assistance to us in rehabilitating and unifying China after the war. Russia would have moral influence on the Chinese Communists, even though their type of Communism was not exactly the same as the Russians." Hull, II, 1257.

34 Foreign Relations, 1944, China, VI, 538.

35 Ibid., p. 793.

36 Ibid.

37 Foreign Relations 1945, The Far East, China, VII, 246-47. See also ibid., 247, n. 18.

38 Ibid., p. 280.

39 Ibid., p. 302.

40 Quoted by Nym Wales, "Anna Louise Strong, The Classic Fellow-Traveller," New Republic (April 25, 1970), p. 19. Strong also quoted the remarks of a Soviet major on the Chinese Communist reaction to this attitude: "The Chinese Communists were very annoyed ... when we threw them out of Mukden and put Chiang's men in. Chinese Communists had been there first. But what could we do? We had our treaty with Chiang." Ibid.

41 N.R. Carver, Moscow and Chinese Communists (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 222. See also C.B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 161, and especially the assessment of the Rogov article, of August 1, 1943 in Voyna i rabochii Klass. McLane, pp. 167-70. Also V. Avarin's article of December 1, 1944. Ibid., pp. 170-71. McLane concludes that Soviet criticism of the Kuomintang was much less severe than that in U.S. and English liberal periodicals. He also states that "until the Russians could observe the Chinese Communists at close hand, they appear not to have accepted these reports [Communist strength in China] as reliable intelligence. In the meantime direct military assistance to the Communists, in order to alter the balance of power in China in favor of Yen-an, was of course out of the question so long as the war with Japan continued and so long as Moscow wished to preserve the wartime alliance with the United States." Ibid., p. 181. See also his summary of the Soviet attitude toward the Chinese Communists at the end of the war. Ibid., p. 195.

42 Writing in The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper & Bros., 1961), Hugh Thomas states that as of September 28, 1936, the German Chargé in Moscow, Tippelspich, had not been able to provide Berlin with any violation of the arms embargo by Soviet Russia with regard to Spain. This situation had embittered Largo Caballero toward the Soviets and led Jesus Hernandez to complain to the Soviet military attaché "that the failure of Russia to send arms was making things very difficult for the Spanish Communists." Ibid., p. 294. Thomas sums up Soviet aid to the Republic by stating that "Stalin, entering upon the whole project with misgivings, took no risks in Spain. Before Soviet weapons were actually used on Spanish soil, the entire remaining Spanish gold reserve had been dispatched to Russia as security for payment. To the few Russian technicians and military experts whom he sent to Spain Stalin gave the order 'stay out of the range of

artillery fire.'" Ibid., p. 298, quoting Krivitsky, p. 126. Ilya Ehrenburg writing some years after Stalin's death states that in the thirties he saw what fascism was: "The resistance of the Spanish people was broken; the fascist dictators helped Franco, the Western democracies hypocritically declared the principle of non-intervention, and only a handful of Soviet army men fought on the Republican side." Post-War Years: 1945-54 (Cleveland: World Publishing Corp., 1967), p. 304.

43 D.N. Rowe, "Collective Security in the Pacific: An American View," Pacific Affairs, XVIII, No. 1 (March, 1945), 13.

44 Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 373-74. As to Kennan's misjudgement of the potential of the Chinese Communists, he states that he "doubted at that time [1947], and very wrongly so, the ability of the Chinese Communists to establish and maintain their rule for long over all of China.... In the event that they should succeed ... it was unlikely that they would themselves remain for long under Russian control." Ibid., p. 374 (Italics integral.)

45 U.S. Department of State. Conference on Problems of United States Policy in China (Washington: Division of Central Services, October 6-8, 1949), pp. B24-25.

46 On the American obsession with technological expertise, Owen Lattimore speaking at the State Department Conference of October 6-8, 1949, stated that "we cannot rely simply on joint action between American money and American know-how. Know-how exists on several levels and it isn't an American monopoly. There may be levels of know-how which are rather low as compared with American levels but are sufficient to defeat American purposes." Ibid., p. B21.

47 Commentary, XXVII, No. 2 (February, 1959), 99. Stanley Hoffman posits the idea that "the United States is not an ideological nation, and its policies are not ideological ones, if by ideology one means a body of ideas, emotions and symbols that aim at presenting a systematic and global vision of the world and its history...." "The American Style: Our Past And Our Principles," Foreign Affairs, 46, No. 2 (January, 1968), 367. J.K. Fairbank also sheds some light on the American dilemma with China: "In the nature of our relationship with China [he states], cultural conflicts inevitably arose every time Americans and Chinese were in contact because they were operating on different bases. The essence of the whole interaction was that when the cultural conflict became insoluble, the West resorted to force...." Quoted

in R.M. Pfeffer (ed.), No More Vietnams: The War and the future of American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1968), p. 19. Speaking at the first national convocation on "The United States and China: The Next Decade," held in New York City on March 20-21, 1969, Pfeffer added some candor to American analyses of China. In part he stated: "If we do not succeed in understanding ourselves, can we understand China - a country concerning which our cultural and political biases, compounded by our anxieties and ignorance, have produced stupid policy and, too frequently, poor journalism and mediocre scholarship?" Quoted in Barnett & Reischauer (eds.), p. 24. It fell to H.S. Commager to introduce a touch of intellectual humility to his country's relations with the world's most populous nation. Writing in the Times Magazine of March 12, 1967, he stated that "we [the U.S.] do not, however, have the material, intellectual or moral resources to be at once an American power, a European power and an Asian power." "How not to be a World Power," ibid., p. 28.

48 In a recent editorial entitled "Well, well, look who's here," The Nation attempted to vindicate the policies advocated some 26 years ago by Service, Davies and Clubb: "There they were, their photographs on the front page of The New York Times, John Stewart Service and John Paton Davies, distinguished former foreign service officers of the state department, who had concluded their testimony before a closed session of the Senate foreign relations committee. One Newspaper had subtitled the photographs 'The Resurrection.' It must have seemed like a resurrection to these men who had been hounded out of the service in the 1950s and have since lived in obscurity, Service as a library official at the University of California, in the Centre for Chinese Studies, and Davies as a furniture maker in Latin America. 'If the present approach to Mao and Chou had taken place 25 years ago,' Davies is quoted as saying, 'we might have been spared two wars.' And so we might. Then one finds a full page in Newsweek devoted to O.E. Clubb, a colleague of Service and Davies, with the caption 'A Diplomat Vindicated.' The story does not mention that Clubb's troubles began when the late Whittaker Chambers maliciously related a meaningless incident about him. He was, of course, vindicated even then, in 1952, but resigned from the service bitterly contending that his career had been irreparably damaged. 'We've had 20 years of error,' he insists, and who can doubt that statement? Then from Time one learns that 'few Westerners are as familiar with China and its leaders' as Edgar Snow. Can anyone doubt it? But what happened to Snow after The Saturday Evening Post let him leave for lack of assignments? If he is an outstanding authority now, and he is, why wasn't any greater use made of his journalistic skill and special knowledge



during all those intervening years when he lived more or less as a reporter-in-exile? Reading these stories about the 'resurrection' and 'vindication' of these men suggests that the Establishment and the Establishment press were in effect saying 'sorry about that.' But can 15 or 20 years carved out of the careers of such men be replaced with a phrase or a photograph? All four men have been magnanimous about their experience, one having said 'oh, well, it was an age of stupidities.' But was it only stupidity that drove Service, Davies and Clubb from the service to which they had devoted so many years? Stupidity, yes, but cowardice as well -- the failure of those who knew the real facts to come to their defence -- and the crass self-interest of politicians eager to exploit the theme 'the Democrats have given China to the Communists.' There is no point in naming these politicians -- and the list would be too long -- but the best known of them has announced he would soon be flying to Peking." Quoted in the Vancouver Sun (August 24, 1971), p. 5. President Nixon announced his intention of visiting Peking on television on the night of Thursday July 15, 1971.

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## APPENDIX I

SECRETARY HAY TO THE AMBASSADOR IN GREAT BRITAIN  
WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 6, 1899

SIR: The Government of Her Britannic Majesty has declared that its policy and its very traditions precluded it from using any privileges which might be granted it in China as a weapon for excluding commercial rivals, and that freedom of trade for Great Britain in that Empire meant freedom of trade for all the world alike. While conceding by formal agreements, first with Germany and then with Russia, the possession of "spheres of influence or interest" in China in which they are to enjoy special rights and privileges, more especially in respect of railroads and mining enterprises, Her Britannic Majesty's Government has therefore sought to maintain at the same time what is called the "open-door" policy, to insure to the commerce of the world in China equality of treatment within said "spheres" for commerce and navigation. This latter policy is alike urgently demanded by the British mercantile communities and by those of the United States, as it is justly held by them to be the only one which will improve existing conditions, enable them to maintain their positions in the markets of China, and extend their operations in the future. While the Government of the United States will in no way commit itself to a recognition of exclusive rights of any power within or control over any portion of the Chinese Empire under such agreements as have within the last year been made, it can not conceal its apprehension that under existing conditions there is a possibility, even a probability, of complications arising between the treaty powers which may imperil the rights insured to the United States under our treaties with China.

This Government is animated by a sincere desire that the interests of our citizens may not be prejudiced through exclusive treatment by any of the controlling powers within their so-called "spheres of interest" in China, and hopes also to retain there an open market for the commerce of the world, remove dangerous sources of international irritation, and hasten thereby united or concerted action of the powers at Peking in favor of the administrative reforms so urgently needed for strengthening the Imperial Government and maintaining the integrity of China in

which the whole western world is alike concerned. It believes that such a result may be greatly assisted by a declaration by the various powers claiming "spheres of interest" in China of their intentions as regards treatment of foreign trade therein. The present moment seems a particularly opportune one for informing Her Britannic Majesty's Government of the desire of the United States to see it make a formal declaration and to lend its support in obtaining similar declarations from the various powers claiming "spheres of influence" in China, to the effect that each in its respective spheres of interest or influence.

First. Will in no wise interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called "sphere of interest" or leased territory it may have in China.

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said "sphere of interest" (unless they be "free ports"), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor duties on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such "sphere" than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its "sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such "sphere" than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances.

The recent ukase of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, declaring the port of Ta-lien-wan open to the merchant ships of all nations during the whole of the lease under which it is to be held by Russia, removing as it does all uncertainty as to the liberal and conciliatory policy of that power, together with the assurances given this Government by Russia, justifies the expectation that His Majesty will cooperate in such an understanding as is here proposed, and our ambassador at the court of St. Petersburg has been instructed accordingly to submit the propositions above detailed to His Imperial Majesty, and ask their early consideration. Copy of my instruction to Mr. Tower is herewith inclosed for your confidential information.

The action of Germany in declaring the port of Kiaochao a "free port," and the aid the Imperial Government has given China in the establishment there of a Chinese custom-house, coupled with the oral assurance conveyed the United States by Germany that our interests within its "sphere" would in no wise be affected by its occupation of this portion of the province of Shang-tung, tend to show that little opposition may be anticipated from that power to the desired declaration.

The interests of Japan, the next most interested power in the

trade of China, will be so clearly served by the proposed arrangement, and the declaration of its statesmen within the last year are so entirely in line with the views here expressed, that its hearty cooperation is confidently counted on.

You will, at as early date as practicable, submit the considerations to Her Britannic Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs and request their immediate consideration.

I inclose herewith a copy of the instruction sent to our ambassador at Berlin bearing on the above subject.

I have the honor to be [etc.]

JOHN HAY.<sup>1</sup>

## APPENDIX II

SECRETARY HAY TO AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES AT BERLIN, PARIS, LONDON, ROME, ST. PETERSBURG, VIENNA, BRUSSELS, MADRID, TOKYO, THE HAGUE, AND LISBON.

WASHINGTON, JULY 3, 1900

In this critical posture of affairs in China it is deemed appropriate to define the attitude of the United States as far as present circumstances permit this to be done. We adhere to the policy initiated by us in 1857 of peace with the Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce, and of protection of lives and property of our citizens by all means guaranteed under extraterritorial treaty rights and by the law of nations. If wrong be done to our citizens we propose to hold the responsible authors to the uttermost accountability. We regard the condition at Peking as one of virtual anarchy, whereby power and responsibility are practically devolved upon the local provincial authorities. So long as they are not in overt collusion with rebellion and use their power to protect foreign life and property, we regard them as representing the Chinese people, with whom we seek to remain in peace and friendship. The purpose of the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently with the other powers; first, in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing the American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters. It is of course too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result; but the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.

You will communicate the purport of this instruction to the minister for foreign affairs.

JOHN HAY.<sup>2</sup>

## APPENDIX III

THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (TAKAHIRA) TO SECRETARY ROOT  
WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 30, 1908

SIR: The exchange of views between us, which has taken place at the several interviews which I have recently had the honor of holding with you, has shown that Japan and the United States holding important outlying insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean, the Governments of the two countries are animated by a common aim, policy, and intention in that region.

Believing that a frank avowal of that aim, policy, and intention would not only tend to strengthen the relations of friendship and good neighborhood, which have immemorially existed between Japan and the United States, but would materially contribute to the preservation of the general peace, the Imperial Government have authorized me to present to you an outline of their understanding of that common aim, policy, and intention:

1. It is the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean.

2. The policy of both Governments, uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region above mentioned and to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

3. They are accordingly firmly resolved reciprocally to respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in said region.

4. They are also determined to preserve the common interest of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire.

5. Should any event occur threatening the status quo as above described or the principle of equal opportunity as above defined, it remains for the two Governments to communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it useful to take.

If the foregoing outline accords with the view of the Government of the United States, I shall be gratified to receive your confirmation.

I take [etc.]

K. TAKAHIRA

SECRETARY ROOT TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (TAKAHIRA)  
WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 30, 1908

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of today setting forth the result of the exchange of views between us in our recent interviews defining the understanding of the two Governments in regard to their policy in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

It is a pleasure to inform you that this expression of mutual understanding is welcome to the Government of the United States as appropriate to the happy relations of the two countries and as the occasion for a concise mutual affirmation of that accordant policy respecting the Far East which the two Governments have so frequently declared in the past.

I am happy to be able to confirm to your excellency, on behalf of the United States, the declaration of the two Governments embodied in the following words:

1. It is the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean.

2. The policy of both Governments, uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region above mentioned, and to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

3. They are accordingly firmly resolved reciprocally to respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in said region.

4. They are also determined to preserve the common interests of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire.

5. Should any event occur threatening the status quo as above described or the principle of equal opportunity as above defined, it remains for the two Governments to communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it useful to take.

Accept [etc.]

ELIHU ROOT.<sup>3</sup>

## APPENDIX IV

TREATY OF WANGHIA (CUSHING TREATY), JULY 3, 1844

[EXTRACT]

## ARTICLE II

Citizens of the United States resorting to China for the purposes of commerce will pay the duties of import and export prescribed in the Tariff, which is fixed by and made a part of this Treaty. They shall, in no case, be subject to other or higher duties than are or shall be required of the people of any other nation whatever. Fees and charges of every sort are wholly abolished, and officers of the revenue, who may be guilty of exaction, shall be punished according to the laws of China. If the Chinese Government desire to modify, in any respect, the said tariff, such modifications shall be made only in consultation with Consuls or other functionaries thereto duly authorized in behalf of the United States, and with consent thereof. And if additional advantages or privileges, of whatever description be conceded hereafter by China to any other nation, the United States, and the citizens thereof, shall be entitled thereupon, to a complete, equal, and impartial participation in the same.<sup>4</sup>

## APPENDIX V

## JOINT DECLARATION BY UNITED NATIONS, JANUARY 1, 1942.

A JOINT DECLARATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, CHINA, AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, CANADA, COSTA RICA, CUBA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, EL SALVADOR, GREECE, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HONDURAS, INDIA, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NICARAGUA, NORWAY, PANAMA, POLAND, SOUTH AFRICA, YUGOSLAVIA

The Governments signatory hereto.

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter.

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world,

DECLARE:

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.

Done at WASHINGTON  
January First, 1942.



The United States of America  
by FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The United Kingdom of Great  
Britain & Northern Ireland  
by WINSTON CHURCHILL

On behalf of the Government of  
the Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics  
MAXIM LITVINOFF  
Ambassador

National Government of the  
Republic of China  
TSE-VUNG SOONG  
Minister for Foreign Affairs<sup>5</sup>

## APPENDIX VI

DECLARATION OF FOUR NATIONS ON GENERAL SECURITY  
MOSCOW, OCTOBER 30, 1943

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China;

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purposes of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the postwar period.<sup>6</sup>

## APPENDIX VII

## COMMUNIQUE OF THE FIRST CAIRO CONFERENCE

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air. This pressure is already rising.

"The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."<sup>7</sup>

## APPENDIX VIII

EXTRACT FROM THE DUMBARTON OAKS  
AGREED PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT  
OF A GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

## CHAPTER VI. THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Section A. Composition

The Security Council should consist of one representative of each of eleven members of the Organization. Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of China, and, in due course, France, should have permanent seats. The General Assembly should elect six states to fill the non-permanent seats. These six states should be elected for a term of two years, three retiring each year. They should not be immediately eligible for reelection. In the first election of the non-permanent members three should be chosen by the General Assembly for one-year terms and three for two-year terms.

Section B. Principal Functions and Powers

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the Organization, members of the Organization should by the Charter confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and should agree that in carrying out these duties under this responsibility it should act on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council should set in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization.

3. The specific powers conferred on the Security Council in order to carry out those duties are laid down in Chapter VIII.

4. All members of the Organization should obligate themselves to accept the decisions of the Security Council and to carry them out in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

5. In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments, the Security Council, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 9, should have the responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments for submission to the members of the Organization.

#### Section C. Voting

(Note.-- The question of voting procedure in the Security Council is still under discussion.)

#### Section D. Procedure

1. The Security Council should be so organized as to be able to function continuously and each state member of the Security Council should be permanently represented at the headquarters of the Organization. It may hold meetings at such other places as in its judgment may best facilitate its work. There should be periodic meetings at which each state member of the Security Council could if it so desired be represented by a member of the government or some other special representative.

2. The Security Council should be empowered to set up such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions including regional subcommittees of the Military Staff Committee.

3. The Security Council should adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

4. Any member of the Organization should participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the Security Council considers that the interests of that member of the Organization are specially affected.

5. Any member of the Organization not having a seat on the Security Council and any state not a member of the Organization, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, should be invited to participate in the discussion relating to the dispute.<sup>8</sup>

## APPENDIX IX

## Attachment 1 - Translation

DRAFT OF MARSHAL STALIN'S POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR  
RUSSIA'S ENTRY IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

The leaders of the three Great Powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has ended the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. Status quo in the Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian Peoples Republic) should be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 should be restored viz:

a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to this part of Sakhalin should be returned to the Soviet Union.

b) possession of Port Arthur and Dairen on lease should be restored,

c) the rights possessed by Russia before the Russo-Japanese war to the operation of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad providing an outlet to Dairen should be restored on the understanding that China should continue to possess full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union. Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be unquestionably satisfied after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its willingness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

## Attachment 2

MR. HARRIMAN'S SUGGESTED CHANGES IN MARSHAL STALIN'S DRAFT  
OF RUSSIA'S POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR RUSSIA'S ENTRY IN  
THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Item 2. b):

possession lease of the port areas of Port Arthur and Dairen on lease should be restored, or these areas should become free ports under international control.

Item 2. c):

Add the following after the word "Manchuria," at the end of the paragraph "or these railroads should be placed under the operational control of a Chinese-Soviet Commission."

Item 3.:

Add final paragraph:

"It is understood that the agreement concerning the ports and railways referred to above requires the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek."<sup>9</sup>



## APPENDIX X

AGREEMENT REGARDING ENTRY OF THE SOVIET UNION  
INTO THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

TOP SECRET

## AGREEMENT

The leaders of the three Great Powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain - have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored.

c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

**И.СТАЛИН**

FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT  
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL<sup>10</sup>

FEBRUARY 11, 1945.

## APPENDIX XI

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
AND THE U.S.S.R., AUGUST 14, 1945

The President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.,

Desirous of strengthening the friendly relations that have always existed between China and the U.S.S.R., through an alliance and good neighborly postwar collaboration,

Determined to assist each other in the struggle against aggression on the part of enemies of the United Nations in this world war, and to collaborate in the common war against Japan until her unconditional surrender,

Expressing their unswerving aspiration to cooperate in the cause of maintaining peace and security for the benefit of the peoples of both countries and of all the peace-loving nations,

Acting upon the principles enunciated in the joint declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1942, in the four power Declaration signed in Moscow on October 30, 1943, and in the Charter of the International Organization of the United Nations.

Have decided to conclude the present Treaty to this effect and appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The President of the National Government of the Republic of China;

His Excellency Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China,

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.;

His Excellency Mr. V. M. Molotov, the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.,

Who, after exchanging their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

## ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties undertake in association with the other United Nations to wage war against Japan until final victory is won. The High Contracting Parties undertake mutually to render to one another all necessary military and other assistance and support in this war.

## ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into separate negotiations with Japan and not to conclude, without mutual consent, any armistice or peace treaty either with the present Japanese Government or with any other government or authority set up in Japan which do not renounce all aggressive intentions.

## ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties undertake after the termination of the war against Japan to take jointly all measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Japan.

In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties becoming involved in hostilities with Japan in consequence of an attack by the latter against the said Contracting Party, the other High Contracting Party shall at once give to the Contracting Party so involved in hostilities all the military and other support and assistance with the means in its power.

This article shall remain in force until such time as the organization "The United Nations" may on request of the two High Contracting Parties be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by Japan.

## ARTICLE IV

Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take any part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party.

## ARTICLE V

The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests of the security and economic development of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the coming of peace and to act according to the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other contracting party.

## ARTICLE VI

The High Contracting Parties agree to render each other every possible economic assistance in the post-war period with a view to facilitating and accelerating reconstruction in both countries and to contributing to the cause of world prosperity.

## ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this treaty shall be so construed as may affect the rights or obligations of the High Contracting Parties as members of the organization "The United Nations".

## ARTICLE VIII

The present Treaty shall be ratified in the shortest possible time. The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place as soon as possible in Chungking.

The Treaty comes into force immediately upon its ratification and shall remain in force for a term of thirty years.

If neither of the High Contracting Parties has given notice, a year before the expiration of the term, of its desire to terminate the Treaty, it shall remain valid for an unlimited time, each of the High Contracting Parties being able to terminate its operation by giving notice to that effect one year in advance.

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and affixed their seals to it.

Done in Moscow, the Fourteenth August, 1945, corresponding to the Fourteenth day of the Eighth month of the Thirty-fourth year of the Chinese Republic, in two copies, each one in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authoritative.

THE PLENIPOTENTIARY OF  
THE SUPREME SOVIET  
OF THE U.S.S.R.

THE PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE PRESI-  
DENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MOLOTOV)  
TO THE CHINESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (WANG)  
AUGUST 14, 1945

YOUR EXCELLENCY, With reference to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed today between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R., I have the honor to put on record the understanding between the High Contracting Parties as follows:

1. In accordance with the spirit of the aforementioned Treaty, and in order to put into effect its aims and purposes, the Government of the U.S.S.R. agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the central government of China.

2. In the course of conversations regarding Dairen and Port Arthur and regarding the joint operation of the Chinese Changchun Railway, the Government of the U.S.S.R. regarded the Three Eastern Provinces as part of China and reaffirmed its respect for China's full sovereignty over the Three Eastern Provinces and recognize their territorial and administrative integrity.

3. As for the recent developments in Sinkiang the Soviet Government confirms that, as stated in Article V of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, it has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China.

If Your Excellency will be so good as to confirm that the understanding is correct as set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the present note and Your Excellency's reply thereto will constitute a part of the aforementioned Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.

I take [etc.]

V. M. MOLOTOV

THE CHINESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (WANG) TO THE PEOPLE'S  
 COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MOLOTOV)  
 AUGUST 14, 1945

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date reading as follows:

"With reference to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed today between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R., I have the honour to put on record the understanding between the High Contracting Parties as follows:

"1. In accordance with the spirit of the aforementioned Treaty, and in order to put into effect its aims and purposes, the Government of the U.S.S.R., agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the central Government of China.

"2. In the course of conversations regarding Dairen and Port Arthur and regarding the joint operation of the Chinese Changchun Railway, the Government of the U.S.S.R. regarded the Three Eastern Provinces as part of China and reaffirmed its respect for China's full sovereignty over the Three Eastern Provinces and recognize their territorial and administrative integrity.

"3. As for the recent developments in Sinkiang the Soviet Government confirms that, as stated in Article V of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, it has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China.

"If Your Excellency will be so good as to confirm that the understanding is correct as set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the present note and Your Excellency's reply thereto will constitute a part of the aforementioned Treaty of Friendship and Alliance."

I have the honour to confirm that the understanding is correct as set forth above.

I avail [etc.]

WANG SHIH-CHIEH<sup>11</sup>

## APPENDIX XII

AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
PROPOSED BY THE U.S. [AMENDMENTS INDICATED IN ITALICS]

## CHAPTER VI. THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Section A. Composition

The Security Council should consist of one representative of each of eleven members of the Organization. Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of China, and, in due course, France, should have permanent seats. The General Assembly should elect six states to fill the non-permanent seats, due regard being specially paid in the first instance to the contribution of members of the Organization towards the maintenance of international peace and security and towards the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution. These six states should be elected for a term of two years, three retiring each year. They should not be immediately eligible for reelection. In the first election of the non-permanent members three should be chosen by the General Assembly for one-year terms and three for two-year terms.

Section D. Procedure

2. The Security Council should be empowered to set up such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its function, ~~including regional subcommittees of the Military Staff Committee.~~

3. Any member of the Organization not having a seat on the Security Council and any state not a member of the Organization, if it is party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, should be invited to participate in the discussion relating to the dispute. In the case of a non-member, the Security Council should lay down such conditions as it may deem just for the participation of such a non-member.<sup>12</sup>



## NOTES

1 China White Paper, I, 414-16, quoting Foreign Relations, 1899, p. 131.

2 China White Paper, I, 416-17, quoting Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 299.

3 China White Paper, I, 427-28, quoting Foreign Relations, 1908, pp. 510-11.

4 China White Paper, I, 413, quoting Hunter Miller (ed.), Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, IV, 559-60.

5 Foreign Relations, 1942, General, I, 25-26.

6 Foreign Relations, 1943, I, 755-56.

7 Foreign Relations, Cairo..., pp. 448-49 (*Italics mine.*)

8 October 9, 1945, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 614.

9 Foreign Relations, Malta..., pp. 896-97. Attachment 1, is a copy of the original draft as given to Harriman by Molotov, February 10, 1945, 2:00 p.m. at Yusupov Palace, Yalta. Attachment 2, the amendments made to the aforementioned draft by Harriman in Molotov's presence and submitted to Roosevelt, who approved them the same day at 4:30 p.m. for resubmittal to Molotov. Note: Portions crossed out are deletions and portions underlined are additions to original document.

10 Ibid., p. 984. This is the final draft containing the Harriman amendments of February 10, 1945.

11 China White Paper, II, 585-88, quoting Department of State Bulletin (February 10, 1946), pp. 201-04.

12 Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 682-83. Submitted to the San Francisco Conference, May 4, 1945. (Crossed out sections are deletions.)