MIGRANTS AND URBAN POVERTY ISSUES 
IN LATIN AMERICA

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis treats a wide variety of sociological issues within the context of urban Latin America. The selected and utilized urbanization-migration materials converge around a common denominator, popularly known as poverty. The chapters are designed to provide renewed examinations and interpretations of discussions relating to poor urbanites.

Opening passages reveal several widely shared empirical generalizations about urbanization. Throughout the thesis, it is essential to keep in mind that urban populations in Latin America are increasing rapidly, that the poor component to urban populations is extremely large and continues to expand, and that the tenement slums, shack slums and progressive squatter settlements are swelling.

Because it contributes heavily to the growth of urban populations in general and urban poverty segments in particular, the process of internal migration holds an important position for topical analyses in this study. Crucial points to grasp are the not-so-rural origins of
migrants, the typical step-wise pattern of city-ward movement, the reliance on a mixture of former and newly acquired experiences and interactions for suitable urban existence, the variable motives for migration, and the heterogeneous residence patterns of recent and established migrants.

Theoretical and conceptual examinations portray and contrast two sides of a debate over poverty perspectives. A look at the "psycho-cultural" perspective, as clearly applied in Oscar Lewis' "culture of poverty" model, reveals the need to critically question value-laden claims such as poverty-culture inferiority and distinctiveness, psycho-social breakdown, personal unworthiness and resistance to change which are supposedly preventing the elimination of poverty. The "situational-structural" perspective represents an attempt to understand many poor urbanites' attitudes, actions and reactions in terms of adaptive responses to constraining situations imposed on them by total social and economic structures. The effective elimination of poverty relies on an extensive modification of structural flaws and an immediate introduction of socio-economic improvements to the deserving poor.

Empirical re-analyses of posited "culture of poverty" traits and of recent and established migrant
political destabilization cast serious doubts on the validity, exclusiveness and explanatory potential of such notorious poverty images. "Situational-structural" considerations of existing data furnish more realistic explanations of specific urban poverty conditions, as well as social, economic and political attitudes and behaviours displayed by poor urbanites.

Lastly, a careful investigation of various kinds of public housing schemes which intend to cater to lower-income families discloses an elaborate assortment of unnecessary problems being levied on both poor urbanites and urban society as a whole. When considered objectively, there are remarkably valuable lessons to be learned from the practical and sensible housing approaches being favoured and employed by so many Latin American urban squatters.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

There is an ever-expanding supply of urbanization-migration literature for Third World areas. At least in the case of Latin America, the most pressing problem is not a lack of research. Rather, the major setbacks appear to lie in the highly questionable theoretical and empirical quality of much of the current research, in the inability of many researchers to effectively and accurately synthesize a wide gamut of data and arguments, and in a natural tendency to generalize on issues which really demand more precise and sophisticated distinctions. As such, a general purpose of this thesis is to re-examine and re-evaluate the assumptions, findings and implications advanced in a large number of existing studies so that basic weaknesses and shortcomings may be identified.

Four inter-related levels of analysis provide coherence to this study. Each may be regarded as another aspect of the urban poverty motif which so consistently predominates in a significant majority of urbanization-migration literature.
First of all, one level of analysis focuses around the process of internal migration which replenishes and boosts poverty segments in Latin American cities. In order to understand why migrants depend upon certain residence patterns and exhibit certain responses within the urban environment, it is crucial to reconsider their origins, their patterns of city-ward movement, their imported and newly acquired types of experience and modes of interaction, and their motives for migration. Careful investigations of existing theories and data shed new light on such issues which often have been improperly interpreted and inadequately supported.

A second level of analysis is concerned with illustrating Latin American urban poverty in terms of heterogeneity. As in many other branches of social science, a North American middle-class conception of both the urban poor and their neighbourhoods seems to have invaded the Latin American literature. This North American conception is one of homogeneity. That is, North American poverty neighbourhoods are simply labelled as slums or urban ghettos and their residents are called "the poor." These types of simplistic models are being rigorously challenged within North America and cannot be transferred to the Latin American urban scene without harmful consequences.
Urban poverty in Latin America is a highly complex matter. By and large, poverty neighbourhoods there do not conform to the slum stereotypes of North American cities. There is a great diversity among lower-class Latin American housing-settlement types, which include both tenement and squatter residences. These cater to various groups of people and differ noticeably in terms of location, size, density, permanency, and physical and socio-economic conditions. A notion of heterogeneity encourages one to properly take into account behavioural variations which are obviously influenced by the residential environments in which they occur. Such an approach contributes to a better understanding of the problem of Latin American urban poverty and its many related issues, and could also shed some light on the different attitudes of poor people in the North American situation.

A third level of analysis concentrates on the conceptual, theoretical and empirical quality of a fallacious poverty-culture perspective which has swayed much of the contemporary literature. On the one hand, it is important to fully understand the foundations of poverty-culture reasoning so that it may be challenged conceptually and theoretically. On the other hand, it is also essential to closely examine the ensuing descriptions of a poverty-culture approach and
the data on which they are based so that it may be questioned empirically. Both types of criticism are valuable and should be used to complement one another. Basic questions at this level of analysis are directed at value-laden perceptions of culture, behaviour and change.

The urban poor appear to often be branded as a culturally inferior population whose behaviours supposedly represent all kinds of social and psychological pathology. A deficient life-style exclusive to the poor allegedly induces personal unworthiness and resistance to change, and provides the greatest obstacle for the elimination of poverty. As such, the way to overcome poverty is to first slowly alter or destroy the unregenerate poverty-culture and replace it with affluent life-style standards, and then to introduce essential socio-economic improvements. This study strongly opposes such reasoning. A dramatically different viewpoint is revealed in an alternate poverty perspective which considers poverty and its concomitant aspects in relation to constraining situations imposed on people by total social and economic structures. Accordingly, the emphasis shifts from "psycho-cultural" images of breakdown to "situational-structural" images of adaptation.

A fourth level of analysis offers a critical consideration of the urban model and of poor urbanites' reactions
to it. A consistent implication seems to be that affluent life-style standards dictate a quality to be sought and cherished by all urbanites. Hence, poor urban citizens are relegated to one of two groups, each group's uniformity resting in the form of reaction exhibited by its members toward the affluent urban model. First, there are those who assimilate or accept the urban model in its entirety, and whose behaviours conform to the standards waved before them. Second, there are those who resist or reject the urban model, and whose behaviours threaten the stability of those same standards. Such a spurious design is totally simplistic, and fails to identify and comprehend other possibilities.

First of all, poor individuals may accept some aspects of the affluent urban model and oppose others. That is, they may re-assess standards being presented and pick and choose between them. They may substitute displaced standards with self-styled mechanisms and accept a modified version of the urban model. Or, they may act to constructively transform the urban model so that socio-economic discrepancies can be minimized. A careful consideration of such options provides crucial insights for understanding short- and long-term behavioural patterns, poverty politics, and housing issues in urban Latin America.
Poor urbanites have repeatedly been examined as problem citizens or as real or potential liabilities on the total societies which contain them. They have been described and analysed in terms of the preconceived notions which stigmatize them. There is an urgent need to break these chains of misapprehension and to reveal a more humanized side to the story. This thesis provides such a preliminary attempt.
Chapter 2

SETTING

Some Problems of Urbanization

Throughout the vast array of urbanization literature in the Third World, and more specifically Latin America, very few points receive unanimous agreement. There are, however, at least three empirical generalizations that do appear to be widely shared.

First, it is unanimously accepted that the urban populations of Third World countries are increasing dramatically. For the world as a whole, according to 1968 United Nations estimates, population in urban areas of more than 20,000 inhabitants increased from 253 million in 1920 to 752 million in 1960 (U.N., 1968a:9-35). Moreover, the population of big cities (500,000 or more inhabitants) grew from 96 million to 351 million — these expansions occurring within an overall total for the world of 1860 million people in 1920 to approximately 3 billion in 1960 (Ward, 1969:56). Between 1920-1960, the impact of urbanization has been significantly
greater in the Third World. For example: "Big cities grew about two and one-half times in the developed world. But in the developing regions, the increase has been more than eightfold" (Ward, 1969:57).

One author has succinctly stated the matter:

_Virtually everywhere in the developing world, regardless of level of urbanization already achieved, cities are growing at rates of from 5 to 8 per cent annually._ (Nelson, 1969:1)

For instance, Santo Domingo had a 7.3% population growth rate during the 1950's while Panama City grew at a rate of 7.9%. In the 1950's and 1960's, Bogotá's and Cali's populations rose, respectively, at averages of 6.8% and 6.3% per annum (Nelson, 1969:71 — fn. 1). In Peru, between 1940-1961, the urban population grew from 35.4% to 47.4% (Delgado, 1969:35). Or in terms of actual numbers, Lima's population, for example, increased from 700,000 in 1940 to 2,100,000 in 1965 — a threefold expansion. Guatemala City's population doubled to 600,000 between 1952-1966 (Roberts, 1970:349). Frank reports: "Latin America already has a great and growing urban population which in several of its countries exceeds 50 per cent" (Frank, 1966:215). Such figures, though alarming to many, are no longer of great surprise to social scientists; these figures are typical or even modest portrayals
of a very real situation. One forecasted estimate warns that by the year 2000, Latin America's urban population will have increased from 144 million (in 1960) to 650 million — almost a 400% increase within a 40 year period (Abrams, 1966:16). Another forecast claims that by 1980, "18 cities in Latin America will be beyond the million mark; Lima will have more than 3 million inhabitants, Bogotá 5 million, Buenos Aires 9 million" (Ward, 1969:57).

Why urban populations in Latin America are growing so rapidly is a much more complex question. Some, for example Arriaga (1968), suggest that natural growth in countries such as Mexico, Venezuela and Chile during 1950-1960 accounts for 58% to 70% of the population increase in cities of over 2,000 (Morse, 1971a:17). Another earlier study also concludes that Latin America's dramatic rate of urbanization is largely a function of the phenomenally high rate of total population growth:

... total populations increased by about 4/5 between 1920 and 1950, a rate of growth well above the world average; and... the population of Latin America, growing at a rate of 2.5% per year, may double within the next 30 years. (U.N., 1961:76)

On another tangent, the Population Branch of the United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs has suggested that, contrary to frequent popular belief: (i) the excessive rates of
urban population growth cannot be attributed to exceptionally high urban fertility ratios, and moreover, (ii) in most of the 20 Latin American countries it documented, "effective fertility...is uniformly lower in urban localities than elsewhere..." (U.N. Population Branch, 1961:102).

By far, the most frequently recorded and the most widely accepted reason for the fantastic rates of Latin American urban population growth is that the rates of migration to cities have reached and continue to reach stunning proportions. It has been loosely conjectured that at least 1/2 to 2/3 of recent (1950 to 1970) city population growth in Latin America has depended on internal migrations (Morse, 1965:43; Morse, 1971a:17). Delgado, referring to a 1967 study conducted by metropolitan Lima-Callao's Oficina Nacional de Planeamiento, provides an interesting case:

The volume of migration to the metropolitan area in the five year period 1956-1961 showed an increase of 300 per cent over the number of migrants that arrived in the five year period 1941-1946. It is estimated that during 1967 there has been an influx of approximately 75,000 people to the capital city, an increase equivalent to the total population of such important Peruvian cities as Huancay. (Delgado, 1969:43 — fn. 6)

Or Morse (1971a:18) reports existing data which show that:
(i) During the 1940's, internal migrations accounted for more than 70% of the population increase of Brazil's six largest
cities, and (ii) Over 2/3 of Cali's population growth during the 1950's relied on internal migrations. Roberts explains that much of the increase in the twofold expansion of Guatemala City's population to 600,000 between 1952-1966 was "produced by migration from small towns and villages to the city" (Roberts, 1970:349). Mangin sums up the general point very concisely: "The cities of the world are growing at a rapid rate and much of the growth is directly attributable to...migration" (Mangin, 1970a:xxx).2

A second generalization about urbanization is that the unstable, low-income sectors of urban areas are drastically rising. That fact may be considered as a function of the ever-growing, disproportionate relationship that exists between excessive rates of urbanization and stunted rates of industrialization. For example:

In country after country, the percentage of population in towns is considerably higher than the percentage of men working in industry. In Brasil in 1960 the proportions were 28.1 and 9.5; in Venezuela in 1961 a fantastic contrast of 47.2 and 8.8 per cent. (Ward, 1969:57)

It can be fairly said that, contrary to the 19th century European and North American experiences, the Third World cities exist ahead of an industrial foundation which, 100 years ago, provided cities with a firm base for economic life.
Due to the great imbalance between Latin American urbanization and industrialization, so-called tertiary economic activities are rapidly expanding. While a large tertiary sector is supposed to be an index of high economic development, it is confusing that Latin America's tertiary sector is larger than that of the United States. As one author adeptly explains this anomaly:

... on closer examination this turns out to be the petty hawking, shoe-shining, message-running type of employment which keeps the man from absolute starvation but contributes all but nothing either to the economy's development or to his own acquisition of skills and confidence.  
(Ward, 1969:57)

Frank (1966) has labelled those who survive in the tertiary sector as members of an urban "floating population." Under conditions which provide an over-abundant urban labour force and a simultaneous lack of jobs, people in the "floating population" are the last to be hired and the first to be fired — hence, their unstable status. Ward (1969:57) refers to a recent Inter-American Development Bank estimate which suggests that 30% of Latin America's urban labour force may be under- or un-employed.

The point to stress here is that because Latin American cities already cannot provide sufficient employment to a high percentage of their current populations, the number
of poor urbanites is extremely large and will continue to grow even larger as urban populations increase dynamically.

The third generalization is a corollary of the prior two. It says that because urban populations are growing extremely rapidly and because the number of poor urbanites is also increasing, therefore: (i) the city tenement slums are getting more and more overcrowded, and (ii) the numbers of squatter settlements and squatters are continuously swelling.

Tenement slums refer to the classic, low-income urban Latin American neighbourhoods that are found in the central areas of large cities (20,000 or more people) — or very close to principal business and employment markets. These tenement slums are very densely populated, squalid and physically depressed districts that are notorious for their miserable living quarters (which are generally in or centred around old, dilapidated buildings) and high rents. As a single, identifiable housing-settlement category, they remain the least researched and the poorest in terms of socio-economic and physical lacks and absences. They have alternately been called "centre-city slums," "inner-city slums," and "individual slums" in the literature. Some Latin American examples are: conventillos (Argentina and Chile), tugurios (Colombia, Peru, Mexico), vecindades (Mexico), barrios insalubres, casas subdividas, decaidas,
quintas, callejones, corralones (Peru), casas decadentes, casas de cômodo, corticos, cabeçaux de porco (Brazil).  

There is very little empirical data to support the fact that tenement slums are getting more and more crowded; most writers seem to just take that for granted. For example, Roberts (1970:349) loosely claims that as urban expansion outruns the available supply of housing, older city neighbourhoods (e.g., tenement slums) become more densely populated. One thing seems certain, though. Even if tenement slums are not becoming astonishingly overpopulated at extremely rapid rates, they are in no way becoming less densely populated. Tenement slums, generally speaking, are as old a phenomenon as the Latin American cities in which they exist. As long as there are poor urbanites and not enough suitable places to accommodate them, there will always be tenement slums. With these thoughts in mind, one very revealing housing statistic for the Greater Lima area is that only 45,712 dwellings were built between 1949-1956, whereas the population there increased by 76,000 families (Dorich, 1961:281). Moreover, of the total number of dwellings built in all of Peru during that same period, only 5,746 houses were built by the Peruvian government:

... less than one per cent of the housing deficit during those years, and at a unit cost that made repayment by the average
urban family impossible. And that is an exceptionally active period in government building work. (Turner et al., 1963:389)

As urban concentrations rise, unemployment problems regress, and housing deficits stagnate or deteriorate, many poor urbanites are encouraged or even compelled to find shelter in squatter settlements. For this paper, "a squatter is one who settles on the land [public or private] of another without any legal authority" (squatting); the holding occupied by a squatter is termed a squatment; and, the congregation of many squatters (and thus many squatments) in a single, identifiable urban space — either within a city or toward its periphery — may be called a squatter settlement. The data and evidence offered till now, with respect to squatter settlements in general, are still sketchy in many areas and are far from conclusive. Some Latin American examples of squatter settlements are: favelas (Brazil), barriadas (Peru), ranchos (Venezuela), barrios clandestinos (Colombia), jacales, colonias proletarias, barrios paracaidistas (Mexico), callampas (Chile), villas miserias (Argentina), barrios brujas (Panama), contegritles (Uruguay), arrabales (Puerto Rico), invasiones (Bogotá), mucombos (Recife).

It is essential to further qualify the squatter settlement concept. There are at least two broad types to
distinguish: shack slums and progressive squatter settlements. Shack slums refer to the post-1920, squatter neighbourhoods that are found in both the central (e.g., hillside *favelas* of Rio) and peripheral sections of, predominantly, large cities — usually close to major or minor commercial zones. These shack slums hold the anomalous position of simultaneously resembling tenement slums in terms of their dire, physical and socio-economic privations, and recently formed progressive squatter settlements in terms of their flimsy housing construction (shanties) and ambiguous legal status. These shack slums are typically the poorest of the squatter settlements. They have alternately been called "provisional squatter settlements," "slummy squatter shantytowns," and "slum areas" in the literature. Progressive squatter settlements refer to the post-1920, intricately planned and organized "invasions" of publicly/privately owned land, located almost exclusively in peripheral urban sites. As land tenancy becomes more certain and as economic resources permit, the original makeshift housing materials (e.g., straw, matting, tin, mud, scrap wood, clay, etc.) are replaced by more solid, modern and permanent construction. These progressive squatter settlements are remarkable for the degrees to which they ultimately come to very closely resemble more affluent, urban and suburban residential zones. They have alternately been
called "peripheral slums," "incomplete-modern (or incipient) squatter settlements," "invasions," and "towns in formation."\(^{14}\)

Roberts (1970:349) claims that just as the increasing densities in old urban neighbourhoods are a consequence of dramatic urban expansion, so too the proliferation of squatter settlements may be considered as a product of society's failure to match housing supplies with high rates of urbanization. Turner presents a similar case, arguing convincingly that: (i) the uncontrolled growth of squatter communities represents an inevitable result of the gap that exists between the popular demand for accommodation and that low-income accommodation offered by governments, and (ii) squatter settlements (of various types, locations, sizes and densities, and at varying degrees of physical and socio-economic development) may be viewed as a "solution for large and dominant sectors of the urban populations whose housing needs are inadequately served by society's formal institutions" (Turner, 1968b:120-121).\(^{15}\)

A common point to stress in both of the above cases is that squatter settlements represent a logical response by poor urbanites to defects in the total economic and social structures. Matos Mar (1961:171), accounting for the existence of squatter settlements in Lima, and Mangin (1967a:67), accounting for the existence of squatter settlements throughout Latin America, add support to that general point.
During the 1920's, as urban areas began to feel the initial waves of migration, the low-income response to housing shortages seems to have manifested itself in what may be considered the first squatter settlements as we know them today. These early squatter settlements conform to what have previously been called shack slums. Between 1930-1940, these shack slums began to appear on a rather widespread basis throughout most of Latin America, in tempo with the increasing rates of migration. Between 1940-1950, shack slums were already a well-known housing-settlement phenomenon, and the progressive squatter settlements were now gaining their reputation. The oldest progressive squatter settlements are, as a general rule, not more than about 25 years old. They appeared not so much as survival centres for recent migrants but as places where more established migrants could congregate to, at first collectively and later more individually, secure land, property, and more prestigious socio-economic statuses. While the tenement slums have been around for a very long time, the squatter settlements (and in particular the progressive squatter settlements) represent a relatively recent, housing-settlement phenomenon. To the best of this writer's knowledge, there are no thorough, systematic accounts of the historical entrance and subsequent development of Latin American squatter settlements.
Demographic Highlights

A brief look at some of the startling, squatter population figures for Latin American countries is now warranted. First of all, though, the reader must be cautioned that all numerical representations of squatter populations are unfortunately bound to be inaccurate because: (i) It seems impossible to keep close track of the number of people squatting from day to day. Squatter settlements are formed and dismantled almost daily; (ii) Very frequently, many squatters go unreported. That is, they do not always appear in normal census data, due to the ambiguous, legal status of their habitats.

In Lima, between 1940-1965, while population increased by 300% from 700,000 to 2,100,000, the squatter population grew to be 25% of the 1965 total. In 1940 the squatter population in Lima was unrecorded and relatively insignificant (Turner, 1967:3). In Arequipa, between 1940-1965, the squatter population increased from an estimated 22%-23% to a reported 50% of the 1965 total population of 200,000 (Turner, 1967:3). And dramatically, from 1940-1960, "the number of squatters in Peru spurted from 45,000 to 958,000 or, an increase of 2150 percent" (Abrams, 1966:2). Delgado (1969:43 — fn. 7) suggests that by 1980 the squatter population of metropolitan Lima (Lima-Callao)
could constitute as much as 40% of the total metropolitan population.

In Rio, between 1950–1960, the favela population grew from about 203,000, or 8.5% of Rio's 1950 total population, to about 600,000, or about 16% of Rio's 1960 total population (Morse, 1965:50). Salmen (1969:74) estimates that in 1969 about one million people were inhabiting Rio's favelas. In Mexico City, over 1/2 of the 1966 total population, or 1.5 million people, lived in colonias proletarias (Turner, 1967:3). Charles Abrams' pioneering study offers some other revealing statistics about the squatter populations of some principal Latin American cities. In his own words:

In Caracas, Venezuela, the squatters numbered, according to official figures, more than 263,000 in 1962, with the unofficial estimates going as high as 400,000. Squatters would thus constitute about 35 percent of Caracas' population. In Maracaibo, Venezuela's second largest city, 50 percent are squatters. Cali, Colombia has a squatter population that makes up about 30 percent of its total population; in Santiago, Chile, squatters represent an estimated 25 percent of the population. . . . (Abrams, 1966:2)

Due to its significant size, the squatter component to urban populations is increasingly attracting the attention of social scientists and city authorities. Any sincere
efforts to comprehend urban poverty issues must carefully take into account the experiences and problems which are facing impressive numbers of Latin American urban squatters. Constructive presentations cannot neglect such considerations.
Chapter 3

INTERNAL MIGRATION TOPICS

Migrant Origins and Related Theoretical Disputes

As late as the mid-1960's, the most commonly presented theory of migrant origins was simply that migrants come from "rural" areas and move directly to "urban" areas. This so-called "direct migration" theory views the migrant as the peasant-farmer who is leaving the hoe and axe tradition to seek "greener pastures" in the enticing cities. Or, in an even greater economic sense, peasants en masse are, without any prior urban experience, leaving a subsistence economy for a money-market economy. One author warns: "Veritable invading hordes — swollen far beyond mere migrating bands — of landless rural populations are moving upon the cities. . ." (Szulc, 1965:46). Another writer claims: "... poor rural people have flocked to the cities, found no opportunities but stayed on in urban fringe shanty-towns" (Schulman, 1966:1004). Fanon (1965:90) advises that the world's cities are being swarmed by rural mobs. And even
occasionally, as recent as 1969, writers are describing a consistently rural to urban, direct form of migration. Casasco's (1969:89) revealing question, "Why do rural people move to cities?" is but one such example. As a scientific theory, "direct migration" is greatly lacking in both empirical evidence and explanatory potential.

The early 1960's witnessed the introduction of a fresher, more plausible and realistic theory of migrant origins. Contrary to "direct migration" beliefs, that newer school of thought which may be labelled as "step-migration" points out that most migrations to large cities are established by stages of proximity to the ultimate urban destination. What this means is that before locating in major urban areas, most migrants make temporary stops along the way. The most typically reported cases of internal migration to Latin American urban centres involve either the movement of peasants to towns, small cities and finally to large metropolises all within a single generation, or the movement of peasants to towns and small cities followed by their siblings' moves to large cities. Mangin (1965) indicates that Lima migrants are not moving directly from mountain communities such as Vicos. Rather, "individuals leaving Vicos-type communities generally go to small towns or cities of the same mountain valley or to a commercial farm on the
coast. They, or more likely their children, may later migrate to Lima" (Mangin, 1965:21).

Breese (1966:83) loosely comments that there is considerable evidence to suggest step-by-step migration in Third World countries. Butterworth expresses that, with Mexico as an exception, the general pattern of Latin American migration has been "step-wise migration from village to small city to capital city" (Butterworth, 1962:101). Frank (1966:216) maintains that those migrants inhabiting Latin American squatter settlements have not come directly from rural settings. Mangin (1967a:69) reports that Lima's migrants, though often originally from rural provinces, have migrated to the capital city from towns and not farms. Matos Mar (1961:173) spells out a migration pattern, very similar to Mangin's description, that involves the movement of large numbers of people from agricultural areas to the nearest centres of population, and from there to the largest regional towns, and finally to Lima itself. A. Leeds (1969:62) contends that step-migration is characteristic in Peru and almost universal in Brazil.

Some particular cases are extremely relevant. Germani (1961:212), commenting on the origins of migrants in a Buenos Aires villa miseria, states that the majority did not come from rural areas. In his sample, only about
15% had migrated from areas of less than 2,000 inhabitants; more than 33.3% had migrated from areas of 2,000 to 20,000 residents; and, 50% had come to Buenos Aires from large towns (20,000 or more people). Peattie (1968:13), in her study of the La Laja barrio in Venezuela, mentions that while only 10% of the barrio’s residents had come from the rural state of Sucre along Venezuela's northeast coast, about 30% had come from towns surrounding the delta of Orinoco. Havens and Flinn (1970a:215) relate that in their study of two Bogotá barrios, El Gavilan and El Carmen, over 40% of the residents in each barrio had migrated from towns and cities whose populations exceeded 2,000 inhabitants. A. and E. Leeds, commenting on the origins of migrants residing in Rio's favelas, propose:

... it is not surprising that truly rural migrants in Rio favelas are so few. What is surprising is how very few there are. Our guess is that they constitute no more than 5% of the population of the favelas.

Without belabouring the issue, suffice it to say that there now exists a convincing supply of material to stress "step-migration" and to underscore "direct migration." The point is not that migrants leave all of their pre-migration heritage behind when they move to urban centres, but rather that their locations in those urban settings normally
represent a sequence of calculated moves instead of a fatal jump from a friendly, rural to an alien, urban milieu. Cases of direct rural to urban migration appear to be the exception and not the norm.

Some earlier studies employ such phrases as "rural culture in the city" (Matos Mar, 1961:174) and "rural slum within the city" (Bonilla, 1961) to indicate the lack of prior urban experience supposedly characteristic of Latin American migrants. Breese (1968:87) attributes migrant problems in the cities of Third World nations to the inadequate rural culture brought by them to the cities, and to their ignorance of and unfamiliarity with the urban ambience and way of life. Very recently, over the last five years, Anthony Leeds (1967) and Anthony and Elizabeth Leeds (1970) have been providing explanations and empirical evidence, in especially Rio favelas and Lima barriadas, to contradict such fallacious claims — or, what they term "the myth of urban rurality." A. and E. Leeds' latest ideas furnish a major breakthrough for the urbanization-migration theme.

First of all, A. Leeds (1967:72) explains that the whole concept of "rural" is ambiguous and confusing because it equates some drastically different social situations which are really urban situations.
in the countryside with those situations which are more specifically truly rural (e.g., subsistence farming). He lists, for example, the plantation as an essentially industrial organization out in the field that familiarizes its workers with managerial hierarchies and operations in a money market, which in turn, are all valuable sources of experience for people migrating to cities. Morse (1971a:19) strongly supports such reasoning.

A. Leeds (1967) and A. and E. Leeds (1970) contend that when closely examined, most migrants have not moved to large urban centres from rural places where they were just formerly working with pick-axe and hoe in the fields. A. Leeds (1967:72) estimates that of the favela and barriada residents he spoke with, about 90% had impressive prior experience with money, money markets, exchanges, cash crops, urban occupational specialties, communication networks, and the city. Reporting a typical conversation with a poor migrant, A. and E. Leeds (1970:233) note that the respondent had formerly worked on a farm, had sold crops in a money market, was aware of and familiar with business dealings, the urban ambience and urban institutions — such as police, bureaucrats, licensing officers, trade, exchange and transportation.

Furthermore, A. and E. Leeds (1970:242) assert that those migrants coming from agrarian parts of the country
most frequently had held secondary, former jobs such as barbering, store-keeping and selling in town markets. Others had surprisingly little farm experience and instead had worked in nearby towns as clerks, masons, bricklayers, electricians, truck drivers, secretaries and domestic aids. Therefore, such migrants have normally gained considerable prior experience with money, exchange, taxes, minor authorities, official documents, modern working tools, communications, transportation, etc. As well, it should be added that migrants very frequently retain ties with their former home-places, returning occasionally to visit friends and/or relatives, or to participate in special festivities. Through conversations and visual contacts, those who have not yet moved to the cities are further exposed to urban ways. The essential, overall point is well summed up by the following statement:

In other words, migrants from all places except for the most stagnant backland villages and rural areas have been continuously experiencing the urbanization process before they ever left their points of origin. (A. and E. Leeds, 1970:327)

In general, very few migrants indeed are as unaware or uninformed of the ins and outs of urban existence as some writers would try to have us believe. Just as it has been illustrated that migrants are not generally truly rural in origin and that they do possess
urban experience prior to migration, it may be shown that
migrant life in Latin American urban areas represents an
intricate meshing between former and newly acquired cultural
patterns and modes of interaction. A. Leeds is all but too
explicit on that basic point:

The rural-urban migrants [in Rio] are
NOT THAT rural. They do NOT behave in
rural ways, and that includes the fact
that they have both the face-to-face
relations which you are calling 'rural'
(but which are just as common in cities),
and the impersonal relations which, pre­
sumably, are more characteristic of urban
than of rural life. (A. Leeds, 1967:68)

Butterworth (1962), Mangin (1962) and O. Lewis
(1952) compare the lives led by migrants in their former
home-sites and in their new city settings. All three authors,
though emphasizing different examples, come up with very
similar conclusions. The migrant in the city is living by
a combination of cultural patterns, values and customs that
reflects the retention of some former features in modified
versions, the outright rejection of other less useful and/or
less cherished features, and the adoption of some new urban
features. By making personal choices and decisions, migrants
attempt to find a balance between previous life-styles and
current urban challenges. Morse referring to Rogler (1967),
proposes a very fitting and perceptive remark:
For him [Rogler] the critical issue is not whether rural community patterns are sometimes imported into the city... but the conditions under which quasi-rural patterns are sometimes recreated in the city as an aggressive response to the progressive limitation of options. (Morse, 1965:55)

There are, at the same time, striking similarities and differences between people who have migrated to cities and people who have remained away from cities. The person who has migrated to and taken up residence in or around a city is neither exclusively rural nor urban in terms of lifestyle. He may be considered as a rather unique mixture of some of both simultaneously.

On the question of personal modes of interaction, it has been intimated elsewhere that if such a feature appears consistently in Latin American urban societies, that is not really because migrants import it but because it has in fact already penetrated whole national societies (Morse, 1971b:34). In any event, one fact seems evident. Migrants in Latin American urban areas do make optimal use of personal face-to-face relations.

Silberstein (1969) stresses that at least in Brazil, migrants to Sao Paulo and Rio who reside in favelas elaborately apply and depend upon personal solutions to the problems of city life facing them. By establishing close, reliable relationships with a few good friends who can help
out in crises, by entering into two-way dependency "friendships" with those who provide urban goods and services, by maintaining good relations with a boss who can supply extra benefits in aggravating, financial circumstances, and by gaining the confidence and dependency of other favelados through the provision of informal assistance or co-operation in quasi-legal activities, favela residents are able to realize necessary advantages and rewards. That is their way of rendering life in the favela liveable.

A. and E. Leeds (1970:233-234) call attention to so-called "rural values" which are ingeniously used by many migrants. For example, "peasant shrewdness" and the paternalistic mode of relationship which are frequently assumed to be characteristic of Brazil's ruralities, may be used in very elaborate ways for counter-exploitation of the socio-economic and political systems in urban areas — "by milking a patrao ('boss' or 'patron'), a social service agency, a welfare body, a church or women's group, a Peace Corps, a US-AID, anthropologists, and others" (A. and E. Leeds, 1970: 234). Or, within his own neighbourhood, a favelado may install, for example, a T.V. in his home and pay for its costs by charging a minimal entrance fee to any other residents who wish to watch the T.V. In addition, among migrants who take up residence in, for example, Brazil's favelas, there exists an elaborate sort of semi-money economy which
enables the *favelados* to somehow nourish themselves. This supplementary economy is based on the fact that the *favela* residents "have a steady supply of emergency resources consisting of pigs, chickens, and other animals and birds, fruit trees, vegetables, and the like, under the hazardous conditions of urban employment instability" (A. Leeds, 1967:24).

As well, in and around Latin America's cities migrants continue to daily acquire new experience and to learn more and more about the complexities of urban life. That is achieved by both their face-to-face and less personal contacts with formal work (trades and skills, employers and fellow-employees), supplementary economic activities, banks, stores, local squatter associations, regional associations (which cross-cut socio-economic levels, urban neighbourhoods, and kinship lines), cultural entertainments, sports, clubs, mass media communications, transportation, government agencies, hospitals, police, and other classifications of public officials. Briefly, many Latin American migrants call upon both former and newly acquired experiences in their efforts to adapt to urban society.6

It has been argued above that many of the problems so commonly applied to the urbanization-migration theme do not hold up under careful investigation. The real problems to be examined are NOT embedded in the erroneous assumptions
of migrants' rural origins, in their supposed lack of prior urban experience, in the nature of an alleged rural way of life in the city, or in the use of personal modes of interaction. The obvious question to raise becomes what, therefore, are the veritable problems? Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are dedicated to exposing how Latin American migrants' basic problems do not stem from built-in, cultural lacks and absences imported by adults to the cities and inherited by children, but rather from the constraining personal circumstances imposed on them in the cities by total social, economic and political structures.

Motives for Internal Migration

One significant effect of the modernization process is that the average non-urban community in Latin America becomes very open to the influences displayed by urban living (e.g., via the media, market relationships, inter-regional contacts, etc.). In this way, potential urbanites are able to more clearly realize that, in their present locations, they are not benefiting equally from as many goods and services as are available in the large cities. As people have the occasion to compare themselves with better-off reference groups, they tend to seek ways for improving their relative situations.
Those Latin Americans who do not reside in or around major cities, and who are able to visualize inadequacies and inequalities by comparison with more affluent reference groups, can pursue at least three modes of attack or "ways out." They can remain in predominantly rural areas and eventually benefit from land reforms (if effective land reforms do exist). They may decide to entertain active behaviour in the countryside by encouraging and/or participating in organized peasant movements. Or, they can head for the cities which hold a monopoly on the benefits of modernization. This presentation concerns itself with the third of these "ways out."

To consider internal migration as a response by vast numbers of people to the omnipresent forces of modernization is essential. The fact that so many each year do choose the migration alternative — as indicated in Chapter 2 — makes it a very important response to understand. Unfortunately, the literature on the motives for internal migration throughout Latin America remains extremely superficial. Only the most obvious avenues have been probed and the most basic ideas proposed. A brief summary of the current standing of that facet in the urbanization-migration literature now follows.

For some, migration may reflect a response to alterations in levels of aspirations; for others it may merely
reflect the continuation of a prior aspiration; and still for others it may be a desperate action forced into existence by undesirable economic and/or political conditions. Migration may reflect hope for the future or it may reflect despair about the present. Whatever the case may be, there appear to be several features about urban society that are appealing to those who do choose to migrate.

Matos Mar (1961:182) lists at least six reasons why many Peruvians migrate to Lima: economic, social, educational, military, health and housing reasons. That is, Peruvians migrate to the capital city to increase their chances for employment, to enjoy cultural entertainments and to achieve a higher social status simply by living in an urban area, to receive education for themselves but especially for their children, to join the military service which teaches them to read and write, to receive more low-cost professional medical services and treatment, and to live in houses that are at least as comfortable as their former dwellings but more convenient in terms of electricity, gas, water, and so on. Matos Mar's survey indicates a noticeable emphasis on the economic, educational and social aspects, that is, 61.05% of the respondents offer an economic reason, 22.85% offer a social reason, 8.62% offer an educational reason. In other words, 92.5% offer a reason that relates directly to economic, social or educational issues.
Germani (1961:212-213) states that migrants to Buenos Aires are coming to find better jobs, to simply change the pace of their lives, and to join many of their friends and/or relatives who have previously migrated. While most migrants are optimistic about finding work in Buenos Aires, very few have any well developed plans about how to achieve that task. The sole reason for many of them appears to relate directly to "the fact that they had relatives or friends or both in Buenos Aires" (Germani, 1961: 213).

Butterworth (1962:106) stresses the economic and educational aspects. Mixtec migrants from Tilantongo are moving to Mexico City to escape a predominantly subsistence economy and to come into closer contact with urban money-markets and wage-employment, as well as to obtain better educational opportunities for their children and their children's children, etc.

Mangin (1963:47) suggests that Peruvians are well aware that cities such as Lima centralize social, political, economic, and cultural rewards. Their migrations reflect a strong desire to be where the greatest supply of rewards is in order to maximize on and benefit from them. And according to Mangin, the most highly valued rewards are ones which relate to jobs and money, to increased social status
by simply being an urbanite, and to educational and training opportunities.

Hutchinson (1963) emphasizes that Brazilian migrants move to the cities to attain economic improvements and to satiate their desires to experience the vitality and romances of city life which they hear so much about. Ward, in agreement with the vitality-romance proposition, prescribes:

So people in the developing world move to the big cities not so much because of the pull of employment — although the belief in non-existent opportunities is part of the attraction — but rather because, like Everest, the cities are just there. (Ward, 1969:62)

Abrams (1966:19-20) suggests that migrants in Third World countries are attracted to the cities by wage-employment, the desire to trade in markets, the urge to be with kinsmen who are already in cities, the longing for land and the hope of obtaining it, and the wish to receive vocational training and to provide children with schooling.

Clearly, there are only two generalizations that may be made from all this. First of all, no two migrants come to a city for exactly the same reasons. There is no "motives formula" for migrants as a whole. To delimit migrants as a specific study group must not falsely convey a homogeneity of motives for internal migration. It must
not be overlooked that migrants are individuals who decide to adopt similar forms of action for diverse reasons.

Secondly, the explanation behind any particular migrant's choice for moving to a major urban area most often consists of a mixture between a concrete, widely valued set of socio-cultural, economic and educational commitments, on the one hand, and a very individual set of personal whims, on the other hand. Just as wage-employment, elaborate money markets, land and home ownership, urban status, schooling for children, radios, T.V.'s, sports, cultural entertainments, and so on are highly prized by urban-born and raised individuals, so are they highly prized by migrants. Furthermore, it is plausible to suggest that such features are often treasured by migrants because prior urban experience has just managed to wet their appetites for the centres of all sorts of attraction. City-ward movement, for many migrants, appears to be a way of attempting to satisfy varying appetites introduced and intensified by ever-growing urban exposure. As well, assuming that proximity of friends and relatives is another feature valued extensively in both urban and non-urban regions, migration provides a way to re-establish former out-of-the-city kin and friend relationships. And all these are only some of the most salient
features of attraction; less obvious ones remain to be discovered and investigated.

**Residences and Residence Patterns**

It is essential to keep in mind three broad types of Latin American, poor urbanites: (i) recent or new migrants (which includes their children born prior to migration but socialized in the city); (ii) established migrants; (iii) urban-born poor individuals. Throughout this paper there is a deliberate emphasis on the first two types. The length of residence in the city, which acts as a dividing line between recent and established migrants, "is clearly arbitrary, and may vary according to the form in which the data are available" (Nelson, 1969:74 — fn. 3). The third type of poor urbanite is both born and socialized in the city environment.

In most cases, newly arriving migrants are the poorest Latin American urbanites. Such people are initially preoccupied with and motivated by two prime concerns: (i) To quickly find a place to use as a base, (ii) To find employment — casual, seasonal or steady. These concerns are most likely to be satisfied if the recent migrant can temporarily locate in or very close to the central business and commercial districts, or in close proximity to other
principal areas of enterprise situated elsewhere in the metropolitan region.

Tenement slums and shack slums serve as the major reception centres for poor recent migrants. Those who cannot find room in the overcrowded tenement slums or who have friends and/or relatives in a shack slum who are willing to act as temporary hosts, or who simply cannot afford to pay the exorbitant tenement rents and city taxes are usually compelled to follow the shack slum solution. Both tenement and shack slums may be thought of as "bridgeheads"; their residents may be thought of as "bridgeheaders":

The very poor [are provided] with strategically located 'bridgeheads' from which they stand their best chance of getting jobs and solving their immediate and overwhelming problem — survival. All the 'bridgeheader' and his dependents need is a place to sleep and leave their few belongings while looking for and picking up odd jobs on which their immediate survival and ultimate progress depend. It is essential for the extremely poor, aspiring to become fully participating citizens with relatively adequate and secure living standards, to concentrate whatever energies they may have on getting and holding jobs. (Turner, 1968b:117)

That is, tenement and shack slums allow the recent migrant to practically approach the satisfaction of his initial prime concerns. There is reason to believe that recent adult migrant expectations are not generally so high as
commonly assumed. Once they have found a home, received employment, and enrolled their children in school, most recent adult migrants have achieved a large portion of their expectations. Further, it seems likely that many tenement and shack slum dwellers consider these poor urban accommodations to be as good or better than what they had before migration.  

Several qualifications are warranted. Firstly, tenement and shack slums do not always only receive recent migrants; they may also act as the refuge of poor families that have participated in the maintenance and improvement, or the formation of a progressive squatter settlement which has been forcibly dismantled by government authorities. In these cases, homeless people need temporary domiciles until a new progressive squatter settlement has been planned, organized and initiated. As well, a growing part of tenement and shack slum populations consists of urban-born citizens who have by-passed the whole process of internal migration. Secondly, note that individual recent migrants having friends and/or relatives whose families are established in progressive squatter settlements, or those recent migrant families which are wealthier, may not have to locate
at all in the tenement or shack slums. For example, A. and E. Leeds suggest:

... in the favelas of Rio, we also encountered a goodly number of persons who had come directly from some point of origin outside the city. This was especially true of the Northeasterners from the state of Paraiba whose later migrants often appeared to be family segments or friends of the earlier migrant groups and who would move to the same house or location as the latter. (A. and E. Leeds, 1970:23)

Elsewhere, Havens and Flinn (1970a:208) report that the relatively more affluent migrants often settle immediately in Bogotá's progressive squatter settlements.

Thirdly, while the tenement slums (unless eradicated) always remain as slums, not all shack slums do. Sometimes, due to the efforts of enterprising adults who wish to achieve self-improvements without altering their residence locations, and due to an increased legal acceptance of that settlement, a shack slum may very slowly be transformed into a quasi-legal, respectable community. For example:

The very poor shanty-dweller may very well become a wage-earner, quite able to afford a few dollar's worth of building materials every week. If this change of economic status takes place without a change of location, and if the original shanty site is large enough and sufficiently accessible, the shanty will be
replaced by a more solidly built house, which results in a mixture of shacks and solid structures. (Turner, 1968b:116)

As well, Nelson states:

Where squatters are not harassed by the police and where terrain and initial density of settlement permit, many shanty-towns evolve over 10 or 15 years into acceptable working class neighborhoods. (Nelson, 1969:56)

Delgado (1969:38) accounts for such possibilities within the Lima-Callao metropolitan area. A general survey of the literature does not permit for any conclusive statement to be made on the frequency of such occurrences. All that may be definitely said is that such cases do exist.

Lastly, the populations of tenement and shack slums are constantly fluctuating. Some people are moving in and others are moving out. Recent migrants are looking for instant quarters; more established migrants are exiting to take part in the formation of new progressive squatter settlements. Land evictions are forcing whole troops of people to find havens in other depressed locales. Some are trying out life in public housing projects; others are going back to their original urban locations. Apart from those occasional migrants who do seem to meet continual disaster, such as the character residing in Lima's La Parada tenement slum depicted by Patch (1967a) or the well-known
Carolina Maria de Jesus (1962) of the former Caninde favela in Sao Paulo, there is for the tenement and shack slums a perpetual in-and-out flow of all sorts of people.

Whereas the poorest and least secure recent migrants typically seek residential accommodations which will provide them with strategically located "bridgeheads," the more stable and more economically sound established migrants who have "secured a minimum of occupational stability" (Portes, 1970:12) are looking for ways and means to firmly establish their current socio-economic advances and to attain even greater self-improvements. For example:

. . . many of those who migrate from the authorized city to the favelas. . . are the more enterprising, those who are more aware of urban, economic, social, political, and administrative facts and policies; . . . some of those who migrate are doing so to preserve or improve their social and economic situation under the regnant difficulties of the Brazilian economy and social system. (A. and E. Leeds, 1970:235)

Mangin views this event "as a process of social reconstruction through popular initiative" (Mangin, 1967a:67).

Progressive squatter settlements cater to the interests of such enterprising persons. Contrary to often popular belief, and as implied above, only very few of those settlers have not already lived in a city. In fact, most writers generally agree that progressive squatter
settlement dwellers have first resided in the more internal sections of major cities for up to ten years. The peripheral settlement is often an area sought after, rather than escaped from" (Portes, 1970:12). These peoples' flights from the tenement slums and the poorer shack slums reflect firm desires to escape high rents and/or overcrowded, unbearable living conditions, to be able to build and own their dwellings, and to be able to attain more space, light, air and privacy at home. In brief, the general concern for such settlers is to ensure the consolidation of personal property, land, dwellings and economic self-sufficiency. As such it is appropriate to think of progressive squatter settlements as "consolidation" areas; their inhabitants may be thought of as "consolidators":

. . . the permanently established, self-improving [consolidation] settlements suit the more regularly employed. These settlers . . . are less troubled by hunger and the problem of physical survival than they are of losing their jobs or their savings and of slipping back down into the depths of poverty. The self-improving settlements of securely held land and permanent building construction are the means by which these 'consolidators' invest their savings and protect themselves, from some of the consequences of unemployment — eviction and homelessness, which can have far more serious social and psychological consequences for the established and self-respecting household
than for the unestablished very poor who have nothing to lose and no status to defend. (Turner, 1968b:117)

The progressive squatter settlements are rather unique in the manner in which they are set up. They are formed by groups of uniting families who have carefully planned and organized to invade publicly or privately owned land, sometimes in direct opposition to police or military units. 10 A typical description of the organization and planning involved in the formation of progressive squatter settlements runs as follows:

The organizational work involved in planning and organizing an invasion includes alerting newspapers, one of which can always be assumed to be anti-government and willing to feature embarrassing news, and calling for help from, or at least the blessing of, some prominent political or popular figures — for example, a bishop or the president's wife. These are last minute details that top off long months of secret planning and organizing. Some of the early invasions were probably spontaneous and involved trial-and-error learning. Now the matter is fairly well established.

(Mangin, 1968:180-181)

These settlements are most typically established in peripheral urban sites, but more centrally located ones have been reported. Examples of the latter are San Lorenzo in Guatemala City (Roberts, 1970), and Mariano Melgar and El Augustino in Lima (Caminos et al., 1969). As a matter of interest, a
wide variety of occupations is reported in the progressive squatter settlements which may run anywhere from construction workers and factory labourers, in the most normal cases, to the occasional policeman, government official, businessman, or bank manager, in the more exceptional instances. \(^{12}\) As well, it is important to note that a growing portion of these neighbourhoods' populations consists of children born elsewhere in the city and children born within those very settlements.

These invaded neighbourhoods have locally elected squatter associations which protect the general welfare of residents, collect dues for community projects, mediate land disputes, attempt to prevent land speculation, represent the settlement in public encounters, and screen new applicants. \(^{13}\) Individual adults wishing to construct dwellings within a particular progressive squatter settlement may be effectively prevented from doing so by an active squatter association. For example, with respect to the progressive squatter settlements (barriadas) of Lima: "Childless couples are rare in barriadas and single adults not part of a larger household are usually barred from invasion groups and excluded from later residence, where possible, by the barriada associations" (Mangin, 1968b:414). The established progressive squatter settlement associations
favour nuclear families with employed male family-heads (Mangin, 1967a:70). But even those eligible families that wish to settle in an already-established progressive squatter settlement must approach the elected association to obtain entrance consent and approval. Should that be denied any particular family, in most cases it will have to make similar entrance attempts elsewhere or will have to participate in the formation of another progressive squatter settlement.

There are some critical points that must be made explicit. Firstly, to endure, a progressive squatter settlement must lie on land which is not slated for metropolitan expansion. Otherwise, its inhabitants face the probable misfortunes of ever-present opposition and of threatening eviction.

Secondly, to endure, a progressive squatter settlement must progressively achieve legal status. The more legally recognized a progressive squatter settlement becomes, the more practical and wiser it is for the residents to magnify the consolidation of personal dwellings and of community infrastructure. As economic resources permit and as land tenancy becomes more certain and permanent, temporary makeshift dwellings are replaced by more solid, modern constructions. As personal and community development proceed,
progressive squatter settlement dwellers develop some strong relationships with the central city (e.g., using utilities, working, buying and selling in principal markets, frequenting cultural/entertainment attractions, etc.) and their neighbourhoods come to increasingly resemble the more reputable parts of the city (e.g., banks, stores, schools, roads, T.V. antennas, electric circuiting, dwelling designs, etc.). Regardless of the achieved stage of personal and collective consolidation, and despite the typical increase of family transportation costs, most progressive squatter settlement dwellers seem to perceive their current situations as a step ahead and their dwellings as improvements over what they inhabited before.

Thirdly, as a corollary of the above arguments, successful progressive squatter settlements are self-improving, low-income neighbourhoods (in a word "nonslums") that usually have more in common with residential suburbs than with tenement or depressed shack slums. In Turner's words:

_Cuevas, along with at least 2/3 of the barriadas of Peru, the majority of colonias proletarias of Mexico City... can be more appropriately described as self-improving suburbs than as 'slums.'_ (Turner, 1967:5)

Henry Dietz offers:
The improving 'suburban' barriadas contain over 1/2 a million people, with (at a rough estimate) a good deal more than one half of them housed in permanent, solidly built structures. (Dietz, 1969:364)

And, in terms of standard socio-economic indexes, Mangin and Turner (1968:155) claim that in Peru's progressive squatter settlements (nonslum barriadas) employment rates, wages, literacy and education are all higher than in both the tenement and shack slums and exceed the national average. As well, such activities as crime, juvenile delinquency, gambling and prostitution are rare in the progressive squatter settlements, and the incidence of petty thievery is greater in other parts of urban centres.

Accordingly, by no means are all low-income, urban Latin American neighbourhoods "slums" or even like slums. There are within Latin American urban areas many settlements, catering to the needs and financial capabilities of many less affluent urbanites, that are not characterized by ever-present, deteriorating squalor but by ever-increasing, gradual, socio-economic and physical betterment. The successful progressive squatter settlements, and the reported improving shack slums, provide relevant examples. If the "slum" concept must continue to be used in such cases, it should be in the context of, for example, "slums of hope" and not "slums of despair." A. Leeds suggests:
In general, favelas, barriadas, barrios and arrabales are areas of urban growth and development, areas of slow improvement both of individual houses and of neighborhood as a whole.

(A. Leeds, 1971:238)

To neglect this distinction, as has too frequently been the case, is to drastically misrepresent an ever-expanding segment of Latin America's poor urban population. In this respect, Dietz offers two extremely appropriate and pertinent incites:

The English word 'slum' has no connotation of...self-improvement. To equate the Peruvian word *barriada* with *slum* is therefore to do more than to mistranslate; it is to commit a serious error, and to express what may be a rigid and narrow point of view.

(Dietz, 1969:364)

'Slum' in general usage connotes social and physical decay; such an image, however, may be inaccurate. If the term 'slum' is loosely applied to any area of burgeoning urban growth it is inadequate and may be misleading.

(Dietz, 1969:363)

Similarly, it must be noted that in general, the term "shantytown" is often too freely used in the literature to denote any existing squatter settlement. Though all squatter settlements do begin as shantytowns (characterized by flimsy dwellings and lack of infrastructure), and admittedly some remain at least partially so, the
shantytown notion "obscures the fact that most squatter settlements are constantly improving their environments and that they represent a tremendous social and political investment in community organization as well as a multi-million dollar investment in house construction, the development of services, and the creation of small businesses" (Mangin, 1968b:176). Roberts (1970:367) supports such a statement. The inconsistent use of "shantytown" makes it an ambiguous verbal tool. For example, Schulman refers to the shantytown as "the rudest kind of slum clustering like a dirty beehive around the edges of any principal city in Latin America" (Schulman, 1966:1004). Ward (1969) and Fanon (1965) use the shantytown notion to depict what this writer is calling shack slums. Havens and Flinn (1970a) use shantytown to represent Bogotá's progressive squatter settlements. The essential point to offer is that the shantytown term must be used very cautiously; it and the squatter settlement concept should not be automatically employed as synonyms.

A major source of contention for Latin American urban poverty topics appears to lie in the imprecise meanings explicitly or implicitly applied to the "slum" and "shantytown" terms. Such conceptual inaccuracies very often tend to improperly lump all urban poverty neighbourhoods
under a single typology of social and physical decay which significantly influences theoretical perspectives on behaviour. Hence, behavioural patterns displayed by all poor urbanites are treated as a homogeneity of excessively negative qualities. To ambiguously utilize conventional poverty concepts is to greatly hinder the search for objective reality.
Chapter 4

TWO POVERTY PERSPECTIVES

Within the general study area of Latin American urban poverty there has developed an elaborate debate over perspectives. The two sides of that debate are represented by what may be termed the "psycho-cultural" and "situational-structural" perspectives. The following passages portray and contrast these two perspectives which differ significantly in assumptions, derived conclusions and implications.

The "Psycho-Cultural" Perspective

A "psycho-cultural" perspective assumes that poor peoples' reactions to change are exclusively in terms of existing values and behavioural norms provided for them by their culture. Accordingly, it is said that people adopt only those changes that do not disturb and are congruent with their culture. Culture receives a behavioural definition that emphasizes the limited ways poor persons act in
order to preserve the life-style common to them, and that neglects the existence of aspirations which really are common to both the poor and non-poor alike.

As well, culture is conceptualized as a holistic system of intricately related parts, so that a change of any single cultural element apparently cannot be achieved without resulting in ramifications across the entire system. "Culture becomes its own cause, and change is possible only if the culture as a whole is somehow changed" (Gans, 1969:209). It is crucial to note that: (i) Very little attention is paid to the conditions which may induce a particular behavioural pattern (a symptom), or to the conditions which may influence the alteration of a given, human action or reaction; (ii) Change is viewed as a very difficult process, so that the diminishment or elimination of poverty can only be achieved slowly.

A "psycho-cultural" interpretation of urban poverty and of its victims maintains that the characteristics of poverty are generated within and along kinship lines. That is, the mechanisms by which behaviour and attitudes are necessarily transmitted across generations are stressed. The family, and socialization in general, provides the nucleus around which culture is most easily observed and at which change-inducing stimuli must be directed.
For too long now, Latin America's poor urbanites and neighbourhoods have been treated as homogenous entities, and have been characterized excessively by negative images. It seems that the permanent, unsightly nature of some of Latin America's most noticeable, low-income neighbourhoods ("bridgeheads" — e.g., tenement slums and shack slums) have influenced the notorious derogatory reputations ironically held by even the most advanced of the "consolidation" communities (e.g., progressive squatter settlements). The behaviour of those poor urbanites residing in either "bridgehead" or "consolidation" habitats is presumed to not only deviate from institutional society's normative standards but also to be pathological, irrational, and illogical. Such generalizations falsely equate inhabitants' behaviours according to the observable standards of their habitats, fail to comprehend why urban poor people are consciously, deliberately and rationally deciding to do much of what they do, and do not realize or accept the distinctions about neighbourhoods and poor urbanites already presented.\(^2\)

One of the more unfortunate results is that, regardless of significant variations, all of Latin America's squatter settlements become known by such distasteful terms as: "festering sores," "festering pockets (or rings) of
misery," "belts of mushrooming misery," "little kingdoms of misery," "malignant wounds," "social aberrations," "sweating slums," "sweating culture baths," "cancerous growths on the city," etc. One extremely pungent account reads as follows:

Sometimes the modern highway passes above them. Looking down, the traveller catches a glimpse, under a pall of smoke from cooking pots in backyards, of mile on mile of little alleys snaking through densely pocketed huts of straw, crumbling brick or beaten tin cans. Or the settlements are above the route, clinging to hillsides reached only by endless little stairways carved from the mud, down which the waters rush, in the rainy season, scouring away rubbish and dirt and pouring, as often as not, through the shacks themselves. Or the main road slices through some pre-existent shanty town and, for a brief span, the visitor looks down the endless length of rows of huts, sees the holes, the mud, the rubbish in the alleyways, skinny chickens picking in the dirt, multitudes of nearly naked children, hair matted, eyes dull, spindly legs, and above them, pathetic lines of rags and torn garments strung up to dry between the stunted trees. (Ward, 1969:56)

A second adverse consequence is that all low-income urban Latin Americans become the target of verbal and written abuse, being referred to as, for example: evil, mean, sordid, violent, hopeless, miserable, fatalistic, despairing, disorderly, disorganized, politically destabilizing,
suffering, and inferior. In Bonilla's words, addressing favelados in general:

As a group, the favela population is on the wrong side of every standard index of social disorganization, whether it be illiteracy, malnutrition, disease, job instability, irregular sexual unions, alcoholism, criminal violence, or almost any other of the familiar list.

(Bonilla, 1961:75)

This and other similar negative attacks scattered throughout the literature treat Latin America's poor urbanites as "social problems" — "designated as breakdowns or deviations of social behaviour, involving a considerable number of people, which are of serious concern to many members of the society in which the aberrations occur" (Eisenstadt, 1966:23).

The "psycho-cultural" approach blames the existence of the urban poor's supposed deviant and socially pathological behaviour on a set of bad, undesirable, illogical, irrational or inferior (from a more affluent point of view) cultural characteristics that are said to belong only to them. Change is regarded as a uni-directional process, so that it is claimed that Latin America's urban poor must proceed along a "path" of development to become culturally, then socio-economically like the urban non-poor.
The suggested way to overcome poverty is to eliminate a faulty, poor way of life which is supposed to be responsible for the poor urbanite's unfortunate plight in society; basic society-wide structural flaws or injustices are ignored or denied. It is asserted that once the cultural characteristics of the urban poor are moulded to more closely resemble the cultural characteristics of the more affluent sectors, inequitable situations will begin to fade away and will be replaced by more advantageous situations, socio-economic conditions for the urban poor will improve, and the poor will then be able to eliminate the remnants of poverty largely by their own efforts.

The general tactic proposed and followed by institutional society seems to be to resocialize the urban poor so that when ultimately offered more opportune situations, they will act and react in socially acceptable ways (by institutional society's standards).

As the late Oscar Lewis' "culture of poverty" concept is the essence of a well-known, widely discussed, and at times, heated controversy, a clear statement of some of its more salient features is warranted. It is perhaps the most obvious example of the application of a "psycho-cultural" perspective culminating in negative images of the poor.
Lewis' most disturbing contradiction is that he begins by pretending that the behaviour of the poor in a "culture of poverty" (which may appear in both rural and urban settings) represents an adaptation and expected reaction by them to their unjust position in society, and concludes by contending that the "culture of poverty" poor are distinguishable by all sorts of social and psychological breakdown.

In the opening paragraphs of *La Vida*, Lewis states:

> The culture of poverty is both an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individuated capitalist society. It represents an effort to cope with feelings of hopelessness and despair which develop from the realization of the improbability of achieving success in terms of the values and goals of the larger society. Indeed, many of the traits of the culture of poverty can be viewed as attempts at local solutions for problems not met by existing institutions and agencies.

(Lewis, 1970a:69)

Elsewhere, Lewis intimates that the "culture of poverty" is "positive in the sense that it has a structure, a rationale, and defense mechanisms without which the poor could hardly carry on," "a way of life, remarkably stable and persistent..." (Lewis, 1961:xxlv). Perhaps one of his best-known
statements is that the "culture of poverty" is a "culture in the traditional anthropological sense in that it provides human beings with a design for living, with a ready-made set of solutions for human problems, and so serves a significant adaptive function" (Lewis, 1968c:406).

To the reader's chagrin, in the last analysis the "culture of poverty" picture is strikingly different. The "culture of poverty" becomes the catch-all term for attributing all sorts of psycho-social pathology and weakness to a great majority of poor people. For example:

... on the whole, it seems to me that it [the 'culture of poverty'] is a thin, relatively superficial culture. There is a great deal of pathos, suffering and emptiness among those who live in the culture of poverty. It does not provide much support or satisfaction and its encouragement of mistrust tends to magnify helplessness and isolation. Indeed the poverty of culture is one of the crucial aspects of the culture of poverty.

(Lewis, 1970a:78)

Or in the words of one of Lewis' most notorious and biting critics:

Group disintegration, social disorganization, resignation, fatalism and lack of purposeful action seem to be the major traits that finally distinguish the un-regenerate poverty culture.

(Valetine, 1969:77)
These in fact are the negative situations typically denoted by the popular usage of the "culture of poverty" concept.

The "culture of poverty," as presented by Lewis, is self-perpetuating — "a way of life handed on from generation to generation along family lines" (Lewis, 1968c: 406). It is emphasized that children inherit their parents' lowly socio-economic positions and live by the same set of cultural traits — preventing the effective utilization of better conditions or the realization of newly offered opportunities:

Once it [the 'culture of poverty'] comes into existence, it tends to perpetuate itself from generation to generation because of its effect on the children. By the time slum children are six or seven years old, they usually have absorbed the basic values and attitudes of their subculture and are not psychologically geared to take full advantage of changing conditions or increased opportunities which may occur in their lifetime.

(Lewis, 1970a:69)

Without intending it, Lewis' "culture of poverty" notion takes on the semblance of a "chicken and the egg" dispute. There is throughout his "culture of poverty" materials a glowing dichotomy between the cause/effect nature of that concept. Does the "culture of poverty" cause poverty to persist or does the persistence of poverty cause the "culture of poverty" to develop? Posed slightly differently, is the "culture of poverty" a cause or an effect of poverty?
For Lewis, the "culture of poverty" is a distinctive culture because the values, actions, reactions, etc. (traits in Lewis' jargon) associated with it are supposedly attributable and peculiar only to many poor families:

There is an awareness of middle-class values. People talk about them and even claim some of them as their own. On the whole, however, they do not live by them. (Lewis, 1968c:406)

Furthermore, any aspirations they might have, manifest themselves in the form of feelings such as apathy, despair, and helplessness which are claimed to be "so diagnostic of urban slums in the culture of poverty" (Lewis, 1970a:75). It comes as no great surprise that Lewis lists the supposed lack of effective participation and integration of the poor in society's major institutions as one of the "culture of poverty's" crucial characteristics (Lewis, 1970a:70).

Three important points require special mention here. Firstly, Lewis' model of culture — the "culture of poverty" — is based solely on family studies. He makes very general statements about a posited whole way of life, a life-style, from the results of his several family case studies within Mexican vecindades and one San Juan squatter settlement. Not only may such a family approach culminate in partial or inaccurate statements, but also (as some
writers have already argued) the families selected for investigation by Lewis and his research teams — e.g., the Rios family in La Vida — seem very possibly to be atypical.\footnote{11}

Secondly, that Lewis lumps tenement-type neighbourhoods and squatter communities under the general and vague category of "urban slums" is quite clear throughout his writings. In fact, for example, in the entire "Setting" of La Vida (Lewis, 1965-1966:xxii-xlii) the only passing remark to indicate that La Perla in San Juan is a squatter settlement reads as follows:

Unlike other slums studied, in which four out of five families were illegal squatters who had built or purchased their homes on government land, in La Esmeralda only about 15% of the residents owned their house.

Lewis' conception of the poor housing-settlement types in urban Latin America appears to be very ambiguous and confusing. There is extremely minimal distinction between, for example, arrabales and vecindades.\footnote{12} As a result, Lewis' "culture of poverty" ideas draw extensive criticism from those researchers whose squatter settlement studies are now properly demonstrating highly variable, poor housing-settlement characteristics which Lewis himself fails to consider.
Thirdly, Lewis attempts to distinguish between poverty per se and the "culture of poverty." For example:

Some of the confusion results from the failure to distinguish between poverty per se and the culture of poverty. (Lewis, 1970a:68)

I have tried to document a broader generalization, namely that it is a serious mistake to lump all poor people together. (Lewis, 1970a:79)

But many of the traits attributed by Lewis to the "culture of poverty" poor are so general that they may be readily found among all sorts of affluent and deprived peoples alike. "Culture of poverty" traits wither in importance because of their non-exclusiveness, that is, their inability (singly or as a total set) to adequately differentiate any group of people from other groups. Moreover, while Lewis cautions the reader that the "culture of poverty" is not defined by any one, distinctive trait but rather by the conjunction, function and patterning of many traits together (Lewis, 1970a:73), he does not tell us which traits are particular to and most essentially displayed by "culture of poverty" dwellers. Briefly, Lewis fails to specify any identifiable target population, thus weakening or nullifying distinctions he has hoped to offer between poverty per se and the "culture of poverty."
Consistent in Lewis' "culture of poverty" writings is the implicit assumption that the culture being matched with many poor people is deficient and that its bearers are not deserving of admittance to affluent society as equals, with all the economic, social and political redistribution such a situation suggests. Accordingly, the "culture of poverty" poor must render themselves or must be made deserving. The culture which makes it "impossible for poor people to develop the behaviour patterns and values that would enable them to participate in the affluent society" (Gans, 1969:203) must first be altered or replaced before the conditions which guarantee socio-economic hardships and ensure that many children are made in the image of their parents may be effectively changed. The image of the non-deserving poor places most of the blame for poverty on the poor so that the onus for change falls heavily on them.

"Culture of poverty" reasoning (and, in general, any "psycho-cultural" argument portraying negative images) calls for the elimination of the supposed, deficient lifestyle of the poor, prior to the elimination of poverty:

*In the end, Lewis chooses to lay all his emphasis not on eliminating poverty but rather on doing away with the 'culture of poverty.'*

(Valentine, 1969:73)
Presumably, poverty will then decline as affected people are allowed, indeed encouraged, to escape undesirable cultural patterns. In Lewis' own words:

... it is much more difficult to eliminate the culture of poverty than to eliminate poverty per se.

(Lewis, 1970a:77)

... the elimination of physical poverty per se may not be enough to eliminate the culture of poverty which is a whole way of life.

(Lewis, 1970a:78)

The culture of many of the poor is, for Lewis, the essence of an endemic psycho-social pathology which must be cured where it exists and prevented where it might occur. The secret success-formula seems to rest in discovering ways to make the poor culturally like the more affluent. That is strongly hinted in the following statement by Lewis:

The [poverty] subculture develops mechanisms that tend to perpetuate it, especially because of what happens to the world view, aspirations, and character of the children who grow up in it. For this reason, improved economic opportunities... are not sufficient to alter basically or eliminate the subculture of poverty. Moreover, elimination is a process that will take more than a single generation, even under the best of circumstances...
The "Situational-Structural" Perspective

In contrast to the "psycho-cultural" perspective, the "situational-structural" poverty perspective is more objective in approach and less derogatory (to the poor) in depiction. Urban poor Latin Americans and their habitats are not uniformly treated as infections of society that must be suppressed and stifled. Instead, both "bridgeheaders" and "consolidators" are regarded as normal individuals who all naturally face living problems and who are more and less successful at various times in handling and providing practical solutions to those problems. It is asserted that, upon closer examination, the urban poor and the more affluent in Latin America strive (each in their own ways) to protect self-interests and to approach coveted goals. Portes provides instructive examples of an academic commitment to humanize discussions of urban poor Latin Americans:

The consistent theme... is the fundamental similarity between individuals in the Latin American urban slum and those in the more integrated middle and upper quarters of the same cities. Slum settlers and more established groups share the same emphasis on defense and promotion of self interests and the same rational logic in going about the task. (Portes, 1970:18)
As well, such a view casts a theoretical blow against those outsiders who insist on seeing the intrinsic experiences of low-income, Latin American urbanites from external, affluent visors.

A "situational-structural" perspective expands the definition of culture to more properly include not only values that are lived by (internalized behavioural norms) but also values that express the desire for alternate forms of behaviour (aspirations). Culture comes to consist of at least two identifiable aspects: "behavioural culture" and "aspirational culture." It is emphasized that while poor people desire and value (aspire to) goals and ends that are similar to those aspired to by the more affluent, their aspirations are forced to remain latent — being covered by socially learned, immediate responses that are adaptations to present injustices. In Valentine's words:

> We may view behaviours and values peculiar to the poor as responses to the experiences of their special socioeconomic environment and as adaptations to this environment.  
> (Valentine, 1969:116)

That many of the urban poor in Latin America frequently exhibit behaviour that deviates from the accepted norms of institutional society is not denied; that their behaviour is pathological, being based on irrational,
illogical, inferior, etc. cultural characteristics is rejected. Rather, because their situations are so depressing, deprived, and degrading, the urban poor must find short-term ways to render life possible and meaningful. In Rodman's words, members of the low-income sectors "share the general values of the society with members of other classes, but in addition have stretched these values, or developed alternative values, which help them to adjust to their deprived circumstances" (Rodman, 1963:209). This process of "value stretch" is, to a large extent, responsible for hiding the aspirations of the urban poor from the rest of society. These alternative or "stretched" values lead to behaviour that is being increasingly, popularly expressed as rational, logical, practical, and expected under the regnant negative circumstances.18

Everyday values of the urban poor are forced to be different from the everyday values of the more affluent, but similar long-term desires are common to both. If culture is conceptualized in terms of its "behavioural" and "aspirational" aspects, it may be credible to speak of a "behavioural culture," but not of an "aspirational culture," which is of necessity particular to many poor Latin American urbanites.19 The conceivable prevalence of such a "behavioural culture" may represent a display of
behavioural patterns which are most typical of many low-income dwellers, but that display reflects decisions made to meet immediate constraints as best as possible. In other words, it becomes unrealistic to speak of an independent, wholly distinct "culture of poverty" — or in Portes' terms, "a unique 'way of being' or a 'deviant culture of irrationality'" (Portes, 1970:18). Would-be culturally engrained attitudes, actions, reactions, etc. which are frequently regarded as resistant to change by "psychocultural" interpretations, are here considered as really only temporary defence mechanisms that may be quickly relinquished under improving circumstances. The point is eloquently expressed by Mangin:

> There seems to be evidence that the culture of poverty is more of a quasi-culture in that it can be thrown off so fast with changes in economic and social opportunities.  
> (Mangin, 1968b:428)

Or A. Leeds, in his thorough critique of Lewis' "culture of poverty," contends that the traits attached by Lewis to that conceptual model "disappear rapidly when the constraints weaken or are removed" (A. Leeds, 1971:256).

> Here, one qualification requires special mention. It is occasionally overlooked by "situational-structural" proponents that some impoverished individuals become so used
to applying certain defence mechanisms, in order to cope with a life in poverty, that they may genuinely have great difficulty in relinquishing those long-used, relied on, defence mechanisms. To say that all the behavioural norms developed to cope with poverty conditions will automatically be discarded by all poor individuals, upon the introduction of more desirable socio-economic conditions and opportunities, is indeed an over-simplification. Moreover, not all individuals can be expected to react identically to new improvements; people are not automatons.

Instead of assuming the deficiency of a posited "culture of poverty," a "situational-structural" interpretation of urban poverty and of its victims stipulates the defectiveness of institutional society as a whole. For example:

At Lima, as in other capitals in South America, various factors, which are generally representative of defects in the economic and social structure of the nation as a whole, have given rise to colonies of dwellings that are known by different names but are, as a rule, fairly similar. [my emphasis]
(Matos Mar, 1961:171)

Many posited "culture of poverty" traits and negative depictions in general, attributed by "psycho-cultural" students to the poor, are here treated not as illustrations of an inferior way of life but as reflexes which are symptomatic
of structural defects. Most of the blame for the existence of poverty, and the onus for supplying the impetus to change the structural features of society that deprive so many from social, economic and political resources which should be more readily available, falls heavily on the non-poor.

While the family remains but one of the many institutions affecting the lives of the urban poor to be considered, there is no claim of a necessary intergenerational transmission of permanently held, culturally derived values, behaviour and attitudes. The obstacle(s) to change is(are) not a rigid poverty life-style but rather the unwillingness on the part of the more affluent to encourage and initiate changes that would effectively benefit the urban poor, the ever-worsening, inadequate distribution of existing resources, the lack of "equality of opportunity" and "equality of results" for the poor, the presently inevitable development of some deeply embedded poverty behavioural norms or defence mechanisms that have been and continue to be reinforced by aggravating circumstances, and so on.

In short, the urban poor in Latin America are "citizens minus" whose unjust position in the total society is generated and strengthened by society's structural inadequacies or flaws. A point to underline is not so much
that many of the urban poor are culturally and socio-
economically isolated from institutional society (a fact
which incidentally is frequently opposed and disproved in
the literature) but rather it is that regardless of the
extent of their participation and integration, the urban
poor are cast to the bottom of the larger collectivity of
which they are a part:

... lack of work, lack of income and
the rest pose conditions to which the
poor must adapt through whatever socio-
cultural resources they control. That
is, these conditions are phenomena of
the environment in which the lower
class lives, determined not so much by
behaviour and values of the poor as by
the structure of the total social
system. [my emphasis]

(Valentine, 1969:116)

Despite the sometimes visually disconcerting and
morally upsetting (for outsiders) nature of some Latin
American poor urban neighbourhoods, both the poorest "bridge-
headers" and the most successful "consolidators" are de-
serving and presently prepared for admittance to urban
society as equals — with all the new-found economic, social,
and political benefits that entails. Indeed, both "bridge-
headers" and "consolidators" are actively taking it upon
themselves to currently seek their own self-styled means of
fairer admittance and of becoming upwardly mobile.
The conditions which guarantee socio-economic hardships and too frequently cause children to be made in their parents' images must be corrected now. The need for coping with and refurbishing structural faults, and for providing the urban poor with a much more just position in society as a whole, is immediate. Change is viewed as urgent so that the diminishment or elimination of poverty must be achieved rapidly. And structural readjustments may result in the displacement of one or more poverty, behavioural defence mechanisms, causing neither society-wide reverberations nor chaotic normlessness (anomie) within poor urban communities. The crucial message is that, just as they manage to cope with personal problems — ranging from survival to employment to housing to community and family organization — and provide immediate, practical responses to deprived situations, many or most of Latin America's urban poor are presently capable of maximizing on the introduction of long-awaited, urgently needed and justly demanded opportunities. That point is well-made by Turner, generally addressing the problems of urban poverty and of housing the urban poor in Third World countries:

A poor man's dignity is not damaged by his poor house but by his poverty (a modern house exacerbates rather than eliminates the problem). But enable
the poor man to get a job by helping him to live (no matter how poorly) where he can find one, or if he already has one, provide him with a piece of building land and advice where needed, and he will then make the best use of his opportunities and, slowly but surely, will cease to be poor. As he ceases to be poor, he will cease to live in a poor house. (Turner, 1968b:127)

Lastly, implicit by now and of key importance, the "situational-structural" proponent calls for the immediate elimination of poverty, and not for the prior elimination of an illusive "culture of poverty." The frontal attack is not to be against the cultural characteristics and behaviour of the urban poor (i.e., to make them culturally then socio-economically like the more affluent); nor is it to be simply against the obvious, physical symptoms of poverty (e.g., welfare-type programs and medical aid do help to impede, but not to eliminate and prevent the growth of particular poverty symptoms). Rather, it must be against the structural features of society which demoralize vast numbers of urban Latin Americans and keep them in subordinate and dependent positions. The occupational system, and social stratification in general, supply the focal point of concern. Policies should aim at improving and coordinating government efforts in crucial and intricately
related areas such as employment, housing, transportation, education, and loan/credit financing.

If future government endeavours to effectively assist Latin America's urban poor are destined to resemble those efforts from the past, then the likelihood of such a structural attack materializing is not overly encouraging. Meanwhile, the common unwillingness or failure of institutional society to expose itself to essential structural reforms or alterations — which would properly benefit those now living as "citizens minus" — creates an atmosphere in which the urban poor are induced to mobilize and unite (locally, provincially, and even nationally) in order to more clearly and loudly vocalize their rising expectations. While it is not feasible in this paper to entertain a thorough critique of the structural features of Latin American society, Chapter 6 will examine and generally criticize some of the urban accommodation strategies that have been offered by Latin American governments in their attempts to minimize structural imbalances.
Chapter 5

A RE-EXAMINATION OF SOME NOTORIOUS POVERTY IMAGES

The following re-examination is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. Two broad topics are dealt with and may be referred to as: (i) Posited "Culture of Poverty" Traits, and (ii) Political Destabilization and the Urban Poor. By treating those two topics, and capitalizing on the merits of "situational-structural" interpretations, the present analysis concentrates on exposing three essential matters. Firstly, serious doubts about the empirical validity of particular poverty images are raised. Secondly, the appearance of other poverty images are proposed to be logical consequences of adverse circumstances. That is, it is argued that many poverty images are not generic parts of a poor, whole way of life but are pragmatic adjustments and reactions by poor people to structural constraints. And thirdly, it is suggested that some images attributed exclusively to the poor are not particular
to them but appear instead to be widely found throughout all strata of society.

Posited "Culture of Poverty" Traits

The following sections of criticism relate to the four viewpoints from which Oscar Lewis (1970a:70-74) chooses to study the "culture of poverty." My discussion of posited "culture of poverty" traits conforms as closely as possible to the order in which those traits are presented by Lewis.

The relationship between "culture of poverty" members and the larger society:

Lewis charges that the poor in a "culture of poverty" suffer from a lack of effective participation and integration in society's major institutions. Low wages, chronic unemployment and underemployment, low income, lack of property ownership, absence of savings, absence of food reserves in the home, and a chronic shortage of cash are listed as the prime cultural obstacles to effective involvement. Traits that are supposed to reflect a lack of social involvement and membership in a "culture of poverty" are illiteracy, provincialism, free unions, abandonment of
women and children, lack of membership in voluntary associations beyond the extended family. Furthermore, traits that allegedly appear as results of this lack of social engagement are a high incidence of pawning of personal goods, borrowing from local money lenders at usurious rates of interest, spontaneous informal credit devices organized by neighbours, the use of second-hand clothing and furniture, and the pattern of purchasing small amounts of food many times daily as needs arise.

Firstly, low wages and chronic un- and/or underemployment are not part of a poverty-culture. These are characteristics of total economies structured by existing technology, available capital resources, location of enterprises, the number and quality of training organizations, labour demand, trade and marketing arrangements, and a capitalist profit ethic. Low wages say nothing about a culture, but much about the consequences of over-abundant labour forces in underdeveloped economies. It is the structure of whole societies and not imagined poverty-cultures which produces employment problems and depressed wages. Naturally, the poorest and least skilled segments are affected the most. Similarly, low incomes, lack of property ownership, absence of savings, absence of food reserves in the home, and a chronic shortage of cash are not
separate cultural elements, but are logically derivable from the structural realities of un- and under-employment and low wages. None of these portray an inferior, irrational way of life but rather stipulate some of the glaring effects of depressed conditions.

Secondly, one cannot deduce anything about a posited poverty-culture by remarking a high incidence of illiteracy, provincialism, free unions, abandonment of women and children, and a lack of voluntary association membership. Again, these are all reflexes of the socio-economic structure which creates and maintains poor people. These traits require further qualification.

Literacy rates, for example, vary from city to city, poor neighbourhood to neighbourhood, and generation to generation. For instance, Mangin and Turner (1968:155) report surprisingly high literacy rates in the Lima barriadas they investigated. A reliance on provincial and local orientations is a necessary, adaptive feature which helps poor urbanites to survive and to solve problems. Here, an instructive case is provided in Silberstein's (1969) examination of favelados' personal (locally oriented) approaches to very real poverty situations (previously mentioned in Chapter 3). Free unions are not exclusive to the urban poor or to any subgroup of the urban poor, and
as such are not illustrative of a "culture of poverty"; that marital phenomenon appears ubiquitously across all socio-economic strata of Latin American society. Abandonment of women and children should be analysed not as a cultural component but as a structural response to a system of socio-economic constraints. High rates of abandonment among the poor represents one of many symptoms whose roots lie deeply in the harsh realities of poverty, and NOT in the distinctiveness of a supposed, self-perpetuating lifestyle. Lack of membership in voluntary associations does not help to describe a poverty-culture. Where poor urbanites do choose to refrain from joining voluntary associations, that choice represents a rational consideration of personal scarce resources — time and money. Moreover, the assumption of abstention from membership in voluntary associations is empirically erroneous in the case of many "bridgeheaders" and "consolidators." Mangin (1965) and Doughty (1970:34-42) convincingly demonstrate that many poor Latin American urbanites do join regional associations and do experiment socially, politically and economically in them.

Thirdly, activities such as pawning of personal goods, borrowing from local money lenders at usurious rates of interest, the use of second-hand clothing and furniture, and so on, do not pass as cultural entities. Where poor
urbanites cannot mobilize cash within the formal structure of credit agencies, banks, loan and savings associations, they must either devise their own resource mobilization systems or must rely on intermediaries to provide substitute systems. Accordingly, pawning personal goods and borrowing from local money lenders at exorbitant interest rates become necessary alternatives. A. Leeds (1971:249) looks at these as samples of structural parasitism which "are among the few semi-formal courses open to the poor for moving resources and quite rational ones to use."

Similarly, where there is a chronic shortage of cash, the urban poor are compelled to reduce costs however possible. Buying used clothing and furniture must be viewed as two of those cost-reducing mechanisms. In like fashion, without refrigerators, without sufficient amounts of money to buy large quantities of food, with limited or total lack of storage room, and with the operation of outdoor markets selling fresh food items as they become available, poor urbanites are encouraged to buy small quantities of food as needs arise.²

a necessary, temporary condition for "bridgeheaders" who are preoccupied with the problems of job-hunting and housing. Over time, poor urbanites do acquire jobs, do solidify employment contacts, do develop complex trade and market relations, do frequent the athletic and entertainment attractions, do purchase and rely on newspapers, radios, telephones and T.V.'s, do utilize transit systems, banks, stores, schools, police protection, hospitals and government agencies. These are all over and above increasing levels of membership in voluntary, regional associations. Where relative isolation occurs, it cannot be explained by a "culture of poverty" argument; and in many other instances, relative isolation is an exaggerated presumption.

The "culture of poverty" at the local community level:

The "culture of poverty" traits consigned to the local community level include poor housing conditions, crowding, gregariousness, and a minimum of organization beyond the level of the nuclear and extended family. Clearly, those first three features are not attributable to or deducible from any special poverty-culture.

Poor housing is an unfortunate reality facing anybody who, in a capitalist system, lacks steady employment
and/or sufficient funds. And in the case of many squatter settlements, poor housing conditions do give way to sturdier and more adequate dwelling structures as personal resources and land tenancy permit. Crowdedness has no logical independence as a trait. Where personal finances are deficient and job attainment is urgent, poor urbanites are forced to the most crowded and centrally located quarters. Those who cannot afford to live in tenement-type residences are further compelled to seek tenuous asylum in shack slums. The existence and persistence of crowding among the poor is a function of the total economic situation. Moreover, dense habitation is not restricted to the poor or to any segment of the poor who are lumped into a supposed "culture of poverty." A. Leeds (1971:253) points out that in Brazil, large numbers of affluent urbanites congregate around Copacabana which has a living density of close to 3,000 persons per hectare. In this case, however, it is the prestige and pleasure of living by the sea and beach — and NOT the constraining realities of economic deprivation — which result in crowding. Similarly, gregariousness is a function of crowdedness and must be viewed as a pragmatic way for poor urbanites to establish effective communications between kin, friends and neighbours. Gregariousness acts as
an essential requisite for intra-community resource mobilization, without which many of the urban poor would not be able to manage.

A low level of community organization is not a measure of cultural inferiority or irrationality. On that matter, Portes (1970:6-10) provides a masterly analysis within the Latin American context. His discussion focuses around the low-income communal associations which are viewed not as ends in themselves but as means for achieving ends, or as local instruments to be utilized when necessary.

Firstly, referring to a 1968 government study of seventeen progressive squatter settlements in Santiago, Chile, data are presented by Portes to explain the levels of activity found in Juntas de Vecinos (Committees of Neighbours). In that Santiago study, Level of Communal Participation was operationalized as an index of: frequency of attendance at meetings, degree of co-operation in associational activities, and amount of participation in associational decisions. That index was cross-tabulated with the respondent's evaluation of dwelling quality, with a report of being or not being the legal owner of the dwelling, and with the length of residence in the squatter community. Consistent with the assumption that participation in communal associations reflects a rational attempt
to attain individual goals, data provided by Portes (1970: Table 1) support the anticipated conclusion that those living in the worst housing conditions will participate more than those whose housing problems are not so urgent. Similarly, long-term residents and dwelling owners who have begun to consolidate and who have already solved their most critical housing difficulties are less interested in using the squatter associations as a way to approach personal ends. The same data support the suggestion that, for rational-utilitarian considerations, associational participation is significantly higher among non-proprietors and new squatters.

Secondly, assuming that participation in squatter associations is largely determined by rational deliberations, other data from the same Santiago study strongly support the prediction that participation in the activities of squatter associations rises directly as the perception of their efficiency in promoting personal interests increases (Portes, 1970:Table 2). That represents an obvious factor in determining participation levels for innumerable voluntary associations among all socio-economic strata of society; but too frequently, in the cases of poor urbanites, it is totally neglected.

Thirdly, according to the investigation by Goldrich et al. (1967-1968:185-188), Portes (1970:8) reports that
participation in the communal organizations of the more advanced low-income communities (Pampa Seca and Santo Domingo) reaches levels of 10% and 6%. In contrast, participation in the associations of the less developed neighbourhoods (El Espíritu and 3 de Mayo) surpasses 20% in both cases. Once again, assuming that rationality guides membership in communal associations, Goldrich et al.'s data (1967-1968) articulate that associational participation appears to be at its highest in the low-income neighbourhoods having the most pressing, collectively solvable problems. Both Goldrich et al. (1967-1968:185) for Lima and Santiago, and Mangin (1960:550) for Lima, suggest that participation in the local voluntary associations tends to naturally wither as the community becomes established.

Fourthly, Portes (1979:9) discusses results of his own recent (unpublished) study of four peripherally located, low-income communities in Santiago. Villa Norte fits the typical description of a deteriorating shack slum out of which families are attempting to escape. Villa Sur-Oeste is an old, relatively successful government housing project for the very poor, possessing dwellings and services of superior quality to those in any of the other study areas. Villa Oeste is a progressive squatter settlement which at the time of the survey was, at best, in the incipient stages of consolidation. Villa Sur-Este is a
government-sponsored attempt to provide poor families with a lot on which to build their homes. Each community has its own Junta de Vecinos (Committee of Neighbours). Portes' data (1970:Table 3) show that Villa Sur-Este — the newest, most troubled area with the greatest need for the Junta — yields the highest rate of associational participation (72%). Villa Oeste — though older and more established than Villa Sur-Este — still is plagued by many problems and follows in second place with a rate of 54%. The lowest levels of participation occur in Villa Norte (39%) where the Junta lacks support because residents do not wish to settle permanently, and in Villa Sur-Oeste (46%) which is the oldest, most established, and best area in terms of dwelling and infrastructure quality. Findings such as these, and NOT a "culture of poverty" model, help to explain where and why community organization among the poor is expected to be low.

The "culture of poverty" at the family level:

At the family level, Lewis lists as major "culture of poverty" traits the absence of childhood as a specifically prolonged and protected stage in the life cycle, early initiation into sex, free unions or consensual marriages, a relatively high incidence of the abandonment of wives and
children, a trend toward female- or mother-centred families, a strong predisposition to authoritarianism, lack of privacy, and a verbal emphasis upon family solidarity which is only rarely achieved due to sibling rivalry and competition for limited goods and maternal affection.

The absence of childhood as a specifically prolonged and protected stage in the life cycle as well as an early initiation to sex are not explained by an alleged poverty-culture but by the socio-economic conditions which compel poor families to modify behaviours for adaptive purposes. Where childhood is accompanied by so many hardships and handicaps, there is obviously little reason to prolong and defend it. Where family cash is scarce, there is every reason to encourage children to seek employment and to bring home money as soon as possible. Where the hard realities of life are so glaring at so early an age, there is no reason to "protect" children from the reality of sexual experiences. Moreover, the trait of early initiation to sex reflects a striking middle-class value-judgement which is now being challenged by all strata throughout at least the entire Western world.

The marriage and abandonment traits have already been discussed above. On the latter trait, one further issue requires mention. Referring to Lewis' *La Vida*, A. Leeds (1971:270) suggests that it is not clear whether the man
always or even most often does the abandoning. Lewis (1966-1967:xlvi) himself contradicts the trait of male abandonment of women and children, pointing out that women frequently initiate the divisive process by refusing formal marriage, by remaining flexible and free in the marital situation, by retaining the unwritten right to leave their male partners, and by maintaining property rights in, for example, the house. Whether for economic and/or psychological motives, and despite the direction of initiation, abandonment is a structural and NOT a cultural fact. The divisive process cannot be explained by poverty-culture reasoning, nor may it be exalted as empirical support of a "culture of poverty." In this respect, a trend toward female- or mother-centred families is a natural consequence of a structural reality.

A strong predisposition to authoritarianism is irrelevant to any definition of an alleged poverty-culture. In the Latin American areas where that trait does prevail, it appears to permeate all strata of society. For example, A. Leeds (1971:265) suggests that in Mexico, the structure and procedures of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the paternal controls over girls in affluent strata, the doctrines of the Catholic Church, or the various types of corporativist-fascist ideology all reflect authoritarianism. It is interesting to note that A. Leeds' own experience in
Rio favelas points to much higher levels of authoritarianism among the upper and middle classes than among the urban poor. That situation is partly explained by the fact that poor urban Brazilians express a strong value for independence and liberty, and are inclined to strive for greater equality in the parent-sibling relationship and to minimize familial discipline wherever possible.

Lack of privacy is not a poverty cultural element but is a logical consequence of residential crowdedness and concomitant gregariousness. A. Leeds suggests that privacy is not specifically a value of the urban poor, though in certain contexts it seems to be preferred:

... privacy is a positive disadvantage to the urban poor, as a large number of them recognized when helter-skelter urban renewal, or removal to other residential locations without regard to prior community living patterns, broke them away from their old neighbourhood ties consisting of linked kin- and non-kin domiciles and friendship networks... which operated as mutual information and security systems. (A. Leeds, 1971:254)

Furthermore, where limited privacy does prevail — for example in some parts of Rio, Brazil — it appears to be common among all classes.

Lastly, it is absurd to even insinuate that a verbal emphasis upon family solidarity is a cultural trait exclusive to any group of people. Surely, across the entire
world, families — in various ways — strive for and verbalize strong preferences for family solidarity. This is generally true of both the rich and the poor in any one society. Moreover, while sibling rivalry and competition for limited goods and maternal affection may be important factors behind the lack of solidarity among certain poor families, those same factors apply to family difficulties encountered by more affluent groups. This set of traits is so widespread among all strata of many societies that it cannot help to support or explain any would-be, distinct "culture of poverty."

The "culture of poverty" at the individual level:

Among the salient traits attributed to the individual level by Lewis are: a strong feeling of marginality, of helplessness, of dependence, and of inferiority, a sense of resignation and fatalism, and a strong present-time orientation with little ability to defer gratification and plan for the future.

Clearly, feelings of marginality, helplessness, dependence, and inferiority are all reflections of a common outlook — alienation. On the one hand, if poor urbanites do feel alienated from institutional society, that is because they are strikingly aware of their unjust position in the
total social and economic structures. The existence of reality-based feelings and observations is not illustrative of a specific way of life. But Lewis fallaciously derives the presence of a "culture of poverty" from a simple fact that poor people recognize their relative exclusion from significant institutions of society. On the other hand, feelings of alienation do seem to diminish over time as personal socio-economic conditions improve and as institutions contain more relevance for the less affluent. This is only too evident in the case of "consolidators" living in progressive squatter settlements. Such psychological perceptions represent logical, temporary responses to deprived situations and do NOT appear as autonomous cultural patterns of a self-perpetuating poverty life-style.

Resignation and fatalism, where they are found among the poor, have logical explanations. On the one hand, people who are socio-economically ostracized, treated with prejudice and discrimination, and continually labelled as worthless and/or inferior naturally develop resigned and fatalistic airs. "The most terrible thing that prejudice can do to a human being is to make him tend to become what the prejudiced image of him says that he is" (Berger, 1963: 102). On the other hand, experience constantly impresses on the urban poor that resigned and fatalistic behaviour helps to protect them from insults, imprisonment, beatings,
and so on. Resignation and fatalism are situational adjustments or defence mechanisms which should diminish quickly as soon as socio-economic constraints weaken or disappear. A. Leeds illustrates the perceptiveness on the part of many poor urbanites who realize very clearly the obstacles maintaining and reinforcing their submissive attitudes and behaviours:

Although the Brazilian poor indicate fatalism when they say, 'O pobre não tem vez' ('The poor man has no chance') or that doing something 'não adianta' ('doesn't get you anywhere'), they are in fact also recognizing that they could have his chance if the very real barriers were not in the way (Lewis fails to recognize this positive aspect of the cognition). Thus the moment a constraint is removed or changes, a behaviour changes, too.

(A. Leeds, 1971:256)

In this light, resignation and/or fatalism are obviously not indicative of a posited "culture of poverty."

One avenue of resignation/fatalism criticism remains. Empirically, those traits appear to lack validity. Examinations and re-examinations of squatter settlements in, for example, Rio, Lima, Bogotá, Santiago, Mexico City, Buenos Aires, and San Juan do not support Lewis' general findings and instead suggest that while poor urbanites are not uniformly resigned and fatalistic, individual families may be. Many squatters throughout Latin America — regardless
of demoralizing constraints — work hard at finding and retaining jobs, obtain building materials, improve their homes, and contribute to the betterment of their communities. For example, La Perla — the San Juan squatter settlement discussed in Lewis' *La Vida* — in 1967 contradicts Lewis' 1965-1966 "culture of poverty" assertions, being characterized not by stagnation or deterioration but by noticeable physical improvements and social co-operation.\(^4\) As well, it is worth re-noting that the decision to take part in a squatter invasion reflects aggressiveness and determination in the attainment of personal ends. That, too, runs completely contrary to the "culture of poverty."

Of all Lewis' "culture of poverty" traits, perhaps the least understood and the most confusing is the claim of present-time orientation with little ability to defer gratification and plan for the future. Here, there are at least two critical approaches to follow.

Firstly, it may be fairly argued that in many cases a strong present-time orientation is not a cultural choice but a structural necessity. Where the present is so difficult and the future seems so far away, there is no sense in delaying gratification. For example, "bridgeheaders" are confronted with the task of urban survival; for those who must worry about mere existence from day to day, looking to the future serves no purpose. Planning a future with an
insufficient socio-economic foundation seems an exercise in futility. A present-time orientation allows the most deprived to tackle immediate problems and to undertake the development of that basic foundation. Or, alternatively, some poor urbanites are extremely skeptical about what the future holds — or more precisely fails to hold — in store for them. Once again, the most logical response is to make the best of immediate circumstances. In any event, if certain impoverished individuals do display present-time attitudes and behaviour, it is essential to understand why. The "culture of poverty" does not satisfy that requirement.

Secondly, at least in the case of "consolidators" there is considerable reason to believe that not present-time but future-time orientation prevails. The formation of a progressive squatter settlement represents a firm commitment to plan for and benefit from improvements in the future. Incidentally, such action frequently involves high levels of risk — which are commonly associated with future-time orientation and deferment of Gratification. For a long while, the invaders of progressive squatter settlements never certainly know from day to day whether their dwellings and community will be permitted to remain by the authorities. In the areas of dwelling construction and community development, "consolidators" show a remarkable ability to delay gratifications. Their houses begin as
scanty structures which improve in tune with the amelioration of personal socio-economic situations and the permanency of land holdings. Their communities commence as ill-defined agglomerations of mutually interested urbanites and also receive only very gradual improvements. The comforts of a modern home and the advantages of a modern community are postponed until such time as they may be logically and practically attained. High levels of participation in local associations during these stages of incipient consolidation show a keen interest in shaping long-term, personal situations. In the area of education, "consolidator" parents reveal great interest in the future merely by so earnestly pursuing the goal of providing their children with formal education. Parents often defer or even relinquish potential personal gratifications so that their children may be better provided for and enrolled in the best possible schools. Such examples are diametrically opposed to Lewis' present-time orientation trait in particular, and raise serious doubts about the empirical validity and logic of the "culture of poverty" model in general.

Political Destabilization and the Urban Poor

Nelson (1969) provides a partial but stimulating and impressive analysis of theories about the alleged
political destabilization among migrants in Third World countries. With the assistance of some matters discussed in earlier sections of the current presentation and with some additional Latin American materials, a cursory consideration of some of Nelson's basic tenets is instructive.

**Recent migrants:**

First of all, Nelson attacks the view of the supposed disruptive recent migrants. That view is well illuminated in the following citations:

*The utter misery in many of the rural areas, where millions live outside the money economy and produce only the bare minimum they must have to subsist, sends a mounting wave of the peasant population migrating to the cities. Their presence in the urban centers creates an added demand for food that the countryside cannot satisfy, because those who remain behind do not produce enough to spare. Shelter and jobs are not available, either, to the migrating families in the cities. A parasite population of millions is thereby created, which offers superb breeding grounds for every type of political agitation.*

(Szulc, 1965:48)

*The men whom the growing population of the country districts and colonial expropriation have brought to desert their family holdings circle tirelessly around the different towns, hoping that one day or another they will be allowed inside. . . It is within this mass of humanity, this people of the shantytowns, at the core of the lumpen proletariat, that the rebellion*
will find its urban spearhead. For the lumpen-proletariat, that horde of starving men, uprooted from their tribe and from their clan, constitutes one of the most spontaneous and radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people. (Fanon, 1965:103)

According to Nelson, the assumption that recent migrants tend to be politically disruptive is based on images of migrant uprootedness, social isolation, deprivation, anomie (normlessness), frustration, and high probabilities of venting dissatisfaction through political routes. Inaccuracies in these images stipulate essential flaws embedded in the view of politically disruptive, recent migrants.

While it is logical to consider recent migrants uprooted, that in no way suggests that they are ill-prepared or totally unprepared for city life. Nor can it be presumed that recent migrants are plagued by excess anomie. As Chapter 3 has indicated, the vast majority of Latin American migrants are not moving directly from truly rural areas but are instead proceeding towards large urban centres in stages. As they move, they are acquiring all sorts of urban experience along the way. Even those who are coming from predominantly agricultural districts acquire urban experience from wage-market relationships and from supplementary jobs held in their villages or in nearby towns. Pre-migration exposure to the urban ambience acts to considerably reduce potential anxieties of shock and anomie.
Though new migrants are likely to initially feel more socially isolated than established urbanites, Nelson suggests that there is reason to believe that they suffer much less from social isolation than commonly believed. Recent migrants typically do have kin or friend contacts in the cities when they arrive. As well, they make new contacts in regional associations which act as social forums for urbanites sharing common origins. Prior urban experience substantially eases the initial problems of relative isolation, permitting these "bridgeheaders" to minimize psychological traumas and to maximize on urban adaptation and the task of attaining employment, educational and housing aspirations. Social isolation is an unfortunate, temporary reality but does not appear to be so devastating that "bridgeheaders" will rally behind any disruptive movement that comes along. Rather, the time-consuming efforts involved in initial city adjustments would seem to leave little excess time for politically subversive action. "The bridgeheaders seem too preoccupied with their immediate problems to concern themselves with [extra-community] political matters. . ." (Turner, 1968b:119).

The assumption that new migrants are disappointed and frustrated by economic conditions in the city is underscored by existing materials. First of all, recalling from Chapter 3, most "bridgeheaders" express that, regardless of
their type of habitat, urban residence represents a general improvement over what they had before. Secondly, Nelson presents interesting evidence to suggest that many recent migrants seeking urban employment find it reasonably quickly. "Moreover, the great majority find their new work an improvement over their positions before moving, in terms of working conditions and, less uniformly, status and earnings" (Nelson, 1969:18). Job situations also enable recent migrants to form new social contacts and to diminish degrees of isolation. Thirdly, the existence of petty-capitalist activities and a semi-money economy provide recent migrants with additional sources of livelihood. It would be naive to deny that some recent migrants do experience initial periods of struggling to survive on odd jobs, but that cannot cover the fact that many other recent migrants bring commendable skills and education to the urban centres and quickly manage quite well. Unfortunately, existing studies do not deal adequately with the ways by which new urbanites acquire employment. Examining how recent migrants obtain their first jobs could expose elaborate and sometimes subtle mechanisms of social interaction to be investigated and understood.

Where feelings of anomie, social isolation or frustration do exist among recent migrants, it does not follow that bitterness will necessarily be expressed through
political channels. There is an almost infinite number of ways to show tensions — implemented by both poor and affluent segments of society:

They may turn their anger inward in withdrawal and defeat; they may beat their wives or quarrel with their neighbours; they may seek oblivion in alcohol or solace in religion. In addition to these individual reactions, there are many associational responses with little or no political relevance. Political action, whether individual or associational, moderate or extremist, legal or illegal, is only one class of reactions to frustration among many others. The point is obvious yet it is often overlooked.  
(Nelson, 1969:21)

Further, any political behaviours exhibited by recent migrants in cities are not so much reflections of emotional shocks involved with the process of migration but rather are combined consequences of the political attitudes and behaviour imported by them, on the one hand, and of their exposure to political socialization in the city, on the other hand. For example, Hobsbawm (1967:60-61) argues that recent migrants lack familiarity with socialist/anarchist or labour movements and instead typically unite within cities around the habits and reactions of former kinship and communal life. That is exemplified by their settling in groups from the same village or province, and by their reliance on mutual aid for initial dwelling constructions. "But it [reliance on former kinship
and communal life] does not...reach up far enough socially to be a political guide" (Hobsbawm, 1967:61). It would appear that the guide behind recent migrant political behaviours stems much more from imported traditions of political patronage and personal leadership. Recent migrants may be expected to offer loyalty to any leader or movement — traditional or revolutionary — which can provide them with real socio-economic benefits in return for their support. As well, Hobsbawm suggests that the cautious and fluctuating political attitudes and allegiances of recent migrants are dictated by their poverty, their insecurity, their precarious living conditions, and their disaffection with a large and ever-growing urban proletariat.

It is also crucial to stress that the degrees of subversion and/or aggressiveness appearing in recent migrant, political behaviours may be expected to vary both geographically and temporally. Those who warn of recent migrant disruptions in Third World cities are victims of over-generalization. To identify the existence of subversion in one place at one time is not to necessarily demonstrate a norm. Subversive behaviour grows as a result of varying circumstances, and demands different social, economic, and political climates in different places over time. Furthermore, when subversion does exist, it is not usually restricted to recent migrants.
Finally, surely the most realistic viewpoint to entertain is that under the proper conditions, in the right place, at the opportune time, and guided by efficient leadership, recent migrants can be very susceptible to mass mobilization for political ends. Moreover, to unequivocally regard political aggressiveness on the part of recent migrants as a disfavourable response is indeed a misnomer. Frequently, for masses of urbanites who are most directly affected by the existence and imposition of exorbitant structural constraints, the most sensible, the most effective means of complaint is via extensive and unified opposition.

**Established migrants:**

A central question Nelson poses is that if recent migrants do not represent so politically destabilizing a factor as commonly believed, what happens to these people and their children after prolonged urban exposure? Radicalization theorists consider that the actual threat of political unrest does not lie in the constant flow of migrants to cities but rather in the absorption of them and their families in a hostile urban environment. As the gap between aspirations and the satisfaction of aspirations widens, it is concluded that people will revert to political extremism out of desperation.
The radicalization outlook is portrayed clearly in the following citations:

Feelings of relative reward are replaced by feelings of relative deprivation as urban living makes socio-economic inequality more visible. The rewarding comparison with a rural life fades into the past, and gives way to a damaging comparison with higher standards of living. These observed standards probably tend to heighten the level of aspiration of many. To the extent that these aspirations are frustrated, they are open to extreme leftist indoctrination. The process of radicalization seems to be dependent upon the race between urbanization, which heightens the level of aspirations for increasing numbers of people, and industrialization, which satisfies them.

(Soares, 1964:192,195)

Several factors work against these youths adapting easily to their barrio status. They have grown up in the cities and are not aware of how much less satisfactory life in the countryside can be. Their education is more advanced than their elders'. And they have had far more exposure to the world of party politics than their parents had at the same age: a significant number have already had experience in political action, and the parties providing this experience usually are not the traditional parties. As these barrio youths grow older and are obliged for the first time to face the hard realities of barrio life, their situation will seem worse to them than it did for their parents; they will be more aware than the preceding generation of what they want and what they do not have. Although they should also be more qualified for employment, they will still find jobs very difficult to secure. Their formal schooling and their life-long exposure to urban
politics will have left them more alert to their political strength and the means available for voicing their demands.

(Ray, 1969:175)

For the most part clustered in pockets... largely in dislocated city slums, the teeming poor are a ripe field for Castroist and Communist political exploitation.

(Parks, 1961:86)

Those are the types of description writers such as Mangin (1967a), Mangin and Turner (1968), A. Leeds (1969), and Portes (1970) are now ardently attempting to discredit in their analyses of Latin American squatter settlements.

Much research on the dominant political orientation of "consolidators" living in progressive squatter settlements underscores or even rejects the weighty assumptions of radicalization. Goldrich, referring to Bonilla (1961), makes the point that, contrary to popular belief, many Rio favelados express apathy towards national politics and disinterest in utilizing radical maneuvers for goal achievement:

In the swelling favelas of Rio de Janeiro, where observers have imagined politicization to be high, nearly half the residents interviewed in a recent study saw nothing to be gained through political action, and less than one fifth had discussed politics heatedly with a friend in the previous six months. . . .

(Goldrich, 1965:364)
But it is important to add that while interest in national politics and in radical activity may be low, many *favelados* still exhibit impressive degrees of political shrewdness at the local level. A. Leeds is precise on that point:

...they [*favelados*] are extraordinarily astute politicians; there is no place that is more political than a favela. They're just as political as other urban residents, and probably more than most, especially the so-called middle sectors. They know most of the political ropes, but they do not have access to some of the information of the political and economic systems at the top, of the elite. This is where the main barriers come in, in the juridical system, for example, but the moment they acquire these skills, they use them as slickly as anybody else.

(A. Leeds, 1967:73)

Goldrich *et al.* (1967-1968:206) present data to indicate the apparent weakness of leftist radicalism in Lima and Santiago poverty neighbourhoods. Radical attitudes reflected by disagreement with the phrase, "Violence should never be the way to resolve political problems," were a minority in each of the four study sites. The percentages of disagreement were 34%, 38% and 15% for the progressive squatter settlements of Pampa Seca, El Espíritu and 3 de Mayo, respectively and 12% for the Chilean housing project, Santo Domingo. Similarly, disagreement with the statement, "Social change is acceptable only if it does not provoke
disorder," were reported at 20%, 28%, 6% and 5% for Pampa Seca, El Espíritu, 3 de Mayo and Santo Domingo, respectively.

Nelson (1969:37,38) refers to two questions utilized in a Mexican study to approximate established migrants' willingness to exert strong pressure or violence. When presented with five techniques of influencing the government — working through personal connections, writing to public officials, forming an interest group, working through an established political party, or demonstrating — only 11% of a 235 respondent sample chose the demonstration option. When asked to describe the best way to influence the government, only 5% of the same sample suggested violence. Furthermore, where political demonstrations and the like do take place in cities, researchers have not been able to substantiate general statements about high concentrations of lower class support with empirical evidence. With these thoughts in mind, it is interesting to note that Needler chooses to attribute the instigation of violence in Latin America not on the urban poor per se but on students:

Political violence has, of course, been taking place in many of the urban areas of Latin America in the forms of demonstrations, riots, and even organized terrorism, but, as in the gubernatorial nomination in Sonora, in 1967, the instigators have frequently not been the poor at all, but rather, the students.

(Needler, 1970:293)
Portes (1970:14), commenting on his own study of a Santiago progressive squatter settlement, indicates that reported membership in the extreme-left Communist or Socialist parties reaches only 7% of the entire sample of residents. Similarly, referring to Germani (1961), Portes (1970:16) notes that the large majority of Argentinian migrants questioned are supporters of Peronism and not Communism. Nelson (1969:36,37) adds that low-income support of a radical party in any single election may also represent an inaccurate index of sustained radicalism. For example, an expressed preference for the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) among manual workers in Rio does indicate interest in social reform, but in no way implies an automatic yearning for radical social and economic transformations of the total Brazilian society. Or, as another possibility, support of radical parties may reflect that poor people are responding to hints and promises of betterment more than they are condoning and/or supporting extremism.

As stated earlier in Chapter 3, a consistent finding of studies on Latin American progressive squatter settlements is that "consolidators" evaluate their present situations as improvements. This is in part due to the relatively modest scope of aspirations found among them — housing, occupational stability and educational opportunities
for siblings. Living in a progressive squatter settlement, obtaining steady urban employment, and entering children in school are all regarded as extremely positive achievements:

Aspiration levels for many adult migrants are very low and many of them feel that when they have a steady income, a house of their own, and their children in school, they have achieved more than they had believed possible. (Mangin, 1967a:85)

This appears to have a limiting effect on degrees of affiliation with radical and/or extremist activities.

Also, among "consolidators" there appears to be an individualist ethic of self-promotion. "The crucial concern is not collective progress for the poorer classes, but individual advancement away from them" (Portes, 1970:16). While "consolidators" generally have a vested interest in the community — so far as community advancement encourages individual socio-economic improvements — they have many reasons to remain politically conservative. Unlike "bridgeheaders" who are facing all sorts of initial hardships, "consolidators" have increasing personal achievements to promote and defend. The general point is stated succinctly by Mangin:

The dominant ideology of most of the active barriada people appeared to be very similar to the beliefs of the operator of a small
business in 19th century England or the U.S. These can be summed up in the familiar and accepted maxims: 'Work hard, save your money, trust only family members (and them not too much), outwit the state, vote conservatively if possible, but always in your own economic self-interest; educate your children for their future and as old age insurance for yourself.'

(Mangin, 1967a:84-85)

Such an ideology tends to deflect the revolutionary potential of frustrations by exacting the blame for socio-economic failures more on individual or accidental conditions, rather than on the wider social and economic structures.\(^9\)

Two matters regarding the education and occupational mobility of second, third, etc., generation poor urbanites require special mention. Firstly, one of the most potentially destabilizing factors in the lives of squatters focuses around the unreality of the aspirations held by parents for their childrens' futures. For example, 54% to 73% of adult male favelados in Bonilla's (1961) survey express that favela children can become large business owners, lawyers, university professors, high-ranking government officials, or members of the Chamber of Deputies. Similarly, Nelson (1969:60) reports evidence to show that 80% to 90% of adult rancho respondents in a Caracas study express that any initiative young person in Venezuela can become the owner of a small enterprise, a lawyer, a high
official, an army officer, or a politician. But as Mangin perceptively indicates in Lima, though *barriada* parents say they want their children to become professionals and executives, "it is highly unlikely that they will be, unless there are monumental changes in Peru" (Mangin, 1963:54).

Secondly, another admittedly potential source of unrest may lie in the realization by urban-born squatters that they cannot and will not be able to exactly satisfy the expectations imposed on them by their parents:

... when the children come to this realization, they may fulfill the presently paranoid prophecy of many middle and upper class Peruvians who see the *barriada* population as rebellious and revolutionary. (Mangin, 1963:54)

That appears to be Ray's (1969) major concern for the urban Venezuelan scene. But again, Nelson (1969:55) discloses fragmentary evidence suggesting that while poor urban children are likely to be less satisfied with manual work and less social status than their parents were, occupational mobility for each generation is likely to be progressively better. While Nelson's data for Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires (dating back to 1960) cannot support any fine conclusions, it does remain clear that a significant majority (approximately 69% in the Sao Paulo sample, and 79% in the Buenos Aires
sample) of those born into the lower socio-economic strata escaped and moved upward:

Most became skilled manual workers, but substantial fractions found their way into lower- or higher-level non-manual jobs, and a few broad-jumped into higher administrative, business, or professional positions. (Nelson, 1969:55)

As such, the possibility is left open that poor childrens' higher aspirations for occupational mobility are in part matched by their higher levels of achievement. That does not nullify discontent, but may help to reduce it.

Most theories of radicalization simply assume and do not explain the political socialization process. Radicalization theorists, by and large, fail to realize that not all social and economic discontent culminates in political activity. Much frustration is expressed in apolitical ways not only by established low-incomers but by all segments of urban society.10 Moreover, not all political activity expresses frustration. For example, the active political climate found inside many squatter associations represents hope for and concern about the future, and is guided more by optimism than by discontent. But even when frustrations do lead to protest forms of political activity, such activity should often be viewed as an expression of rational and pragmatic responses to structural deficiencies. With this
in mind, the fundamental decision made by "consolidators" to take part in squatter settlement invasions must be construed as an active reply to limited and insufficient accommodation alternatives, and not as a concerted attempt to create or intensify havoc for urban society. To uniformly equate active behaviour among established migrants with violence and/or radicalism is to be simplistic and to misinterpret a wide range of experiences:

... the probability that political protest will take the specific forms of violence and/or radicalism is strongly conditioned by the existing political climate and institutions.

(Nelson, 1969:45)

Theories of radicalization, warning of mounting urban discontent and explosive climaxes, may be valid under some conditions; unfortunately, though, nowhere are those conditions clearly stipulated. In their present, partial and loosely articulated state, hypotheses of radicalism among established migrants cannot be properly tested.
Squatter Settlements as a Purported Problem

Latin American governments seem to be expressly troubled by the ever-growing numbers of squatter settlements and settlers. So many government housing plans and designs implicitly convey an assumption that all squatter settlements represent disreputable communities which must be eliminated and restrained. Their approaches to the housing dilemma tend to be based on a view of modern urban existence which fails to properly take account of many poor urbanites' particular experiences, needs and possibilities. What poor families want in the area of urban accommodation and what housing authorities are frequently offering are two very different things.

Many Latin American squatter settlements are characterized by "progressive development" techniques "by which low-income families build their housing and their
community in stages as their resources permit, the more im-
portant elements first" (Turner, 1967:1). These construction
procedures, logically selected by poor urban settlers who
are acting in accordance with their own needs, permit syn-
chronization between individual and community investments,
on the one hand, and the rhythm of socio-economic changes,
on the other hand. Conversely, "instant development," 
characteristic of so many public housing schemes, compli-
cates current housing problems "by requiring minimum modern
standard structures and installations prior to settlement" 
and "by disregarding the economic and social needs of the

"Progressive development" is based on a set of
"popular" housing norms, or priorities desired and expressed
by low-income families struggling to establish a home in
the urban environment: "land tenure, community facilities,
an adequate dwelling and utilities in that order" (Turner,
1967:15). "Instant development" is based on a set of
"official" norms (opposite to "popular" norms), or accom-
modation standards stipulated by government authorities:
"a modern (but minimum) house in the first place, some
community facilities (generally at later stages), and even-
tually title to property after the mortgage has been paid"
(Turner, 1967:15). On these grounds alone, it is no great
surprise that so many poor urbanites choose to reject many government housing programs.

When squatter settlements are unequivocally regarded as problematic for urban society, there are at least two government strategies that appear. The least acted upon but most verbally common strategy is to eradicate the existing squatter settlements one by one and to send their residents back to the fields. This so-called "eradication-deportation" government "solution" not only fails to identify any favourable aspects of squatting but also falls into the trap of assuming that squatter settlers were all peasant-farmers prior to internal migration. Such an assumption is nearly consistently wrong in both the shack slum and progressive squatter settlement cases. The "eradication-deportation" strategy is not examined further in this presentation because so far it remains but a conversation controversy; there is no data to check and interpret.¹

The second and most commonly implemented strategy, "eradication-relocation," involves the dismantling of existing squatter settlements and the resettlement of their residents in spontaneously provided, "instant development" sites. In such a strategy, Latin American governments are either unaware of or are deliberately neglecting the favourable aspects of squatting. Moreover, the types of "instant development" housing being sponsored by government agencies
are in many ways not suitable for most of their intended target populations. These government housing schemes include the high-rise apartment complexes and the satellite cities being built to especially re-accommodate squatter populations. Examinations of such government housing schemes illustrate how and why they are generally hindering and aggravating poor urbanites instead of helping them.2

Safa (1964) stipulates some of the problems involved with the relocation of Puerto Rican shantytown dwellers to public housing apartment projects. She shows how urban relocation reinforces a trend toward matrifocality by further weakening the male's status in the low-income family. For example, women no longer rely on husbands to provide dwellings and now turn to management for home repairs and maintenance — previously a part of the man's role in the shantytown (Safa, 1964:9). Moreover, neighbourhood affairs in the public housing sites are now in the hands of management and not of the male residents (Safa, 1964:9). Only families with specified limited incomes are eligible for admission to the public housing project, and personal economic increases are penalized by higher rents or even eviction. As a result, the comparatively wide range of incomes found in the shantytown is drastically reduced in the public housing project (Safa, 1964:9-10). Men in the public housing area frequently express a decline in the opportunity for making friends, as well as a decline in the avenues of co-operation
which formerly existed in the shantytown. Safa's overall point is not so much that many new problems arise in the relocation site, but rather that problems already found in the shantytown become worse in the relocation site:

*Job instability, limited opportunities for upward mobility, the strict division of labour in the household and the strong emotional bond between a mother, her children and her female relatives all contribute to the marginal position of the man in both the shanty town and project household. In public housing his status is weakened further by a paternalistic project management which takes over many of his responsibilities while the woman's role in running the household and rearing the children is left largely intact.*

(Safa, 1964:13)

Hollingshead and Rogler (1963) examine poor, urban Puerto Ricans' attitudes towards public housing apartments (*caseríos*) versus shack slums. A general finding is that for their sample, 65% of the men and women living in the shack slums like those settlements, while 86% of the men and 71% of the women in *caseríos* dislike those residences. The basic dislike of *caseríos* is reflected in responses to questions focusing around relations with neighbours, persons *caserío* residents would prefer not to have as neighbours, behaviour exhibited by neighbours that husbands and wives oppose, the suitability of *caseríos* for raising children, and the desire to retain or alter residence types and locations (Hollingshead and Rogler, 1963:238-239).
In addition, the Puerto Rican government has imposed a set of irritating regulations on caserío inhabitants. For example, caseríos are rented to nuclear families which are not permitted to accommodate stray kinsmen. "[For the caserío family] to turn away a relative is reprehensible; to disregard a government regulation is not" (Hollingshead and Rogler, 1963:240). Or, in another area, Housing Authority rules prohibit the retention of livestock in caserío quarters. However, caserío families keep all sorts of subsistence animals in their bathrooms and on their balconies until such violations are reported by a neighbour. Then, management forces the family to get rid of its animals, and as a result, interpersonal relations between the animal's owner and the real or suspected informer are seriously damaged (Hollingshead and Rogler, 1963:240). In still another area, economic ceilings encourage caserío dwellers to have personal incomes that do not surpass stipulated maximums, or to conceal some economic assets from management officials. And monthly rentals are very rigid so that the policy of "... 'pay or get out,' coupled with the rule of maximum earnings, eliminates those who cannot pay rent, as well as those who can afford private housing (Hollingshead and Rogler, 1963:241).

The general displeasure with and disapproval of caseríos, on the one hand, and the relative satisfaction with and preference for shack slums, on the other hand, lead
Hollingshead and Rogler to propose two very significant conclusions. Firstly, *caserío* families want homes of their own and do not desire more and better *caseríos*; secondly, shack slum families also want homes of their own, but not in *caseríos* (Hollingshead and Rogler, 1963:242).

Bryce-Laporte (1970) considers the undesirable effects of a public housing apartment project (El Caserío) on Puerto Ricans formerly residing in a shack slum (El Arrabal). Urban relocation to El Caserío eliminates kin contiguity or affinity, thus destroying a formerly stable, conjugal, coresidential family unit. Not only does urban relocation disrupt the normal closeness of kin ties, but also in the absence of economic or transportational means it leads to new and more extensive visiting patterns, decreases opportunities for supervising children, and complicates the traditional structure of authority and responsibility. By removing the former feature of closely-knit family organization, urban resettlement creates difficulties of communication and control between professionals and low-income clients. Because it separates relatives, urban relocation creates hardships which influence people to revert to an extended family pattern at irregular occasions.

Urban relocation exposes its target to a very different structural-ecological setting and simultaneously, by enforcing regulations, deprives those people of former adaptive
means for overcoming obstacles being presented by their new environment. And finally, by stipulating a maximum income level, urban relocation forces residents to behave deviously and secretly with regard to activities that normally indicate "drive, ingenuity, and independence believed to be so necessary for socio-economic advancement and family autonomy in a society based on free enterprise" (Bryce-Laporte, 1970:95). In short, regardless of perhaps a noble and sincere government attempt to help poor urbanites, El Caserío creates a varied set of strenuous and highly problematic cultural and socio-economic living conditions for its target population.

Oscar Lewis (1966b) expresses how, for the subject in question, a move from the La Esmeralda shack slum in San Juan, Puerto Rico to the Villa Hermosa housing project really represents a move from socio-economic deprivation to sheer disaster. For example, Cruz the crippled mulatto girl who relocates in Villa Hermosa hates to go out because of the great difficulties in finding her way back home, even with the proper address. Also, rents in Villa Hermosa must be consistently paid on time:

*I'm jittery, really nervous, because if you fail to pay the rent even once here, the following month you're thrown out. [If I did ever get behind in rent payments in La Esmeralda], I knew that they wouldn't put me out in the street.*

(Lewis, 1966b:22)
By providing them with houses that physically conform to middle-class standards, the Villa Hermosa housing project forces its residents to compare themselves to richer urbanites in other aspects of their life-style and to become depressed about all they lack and will likely never have. The personalized ties that people relied upon so much in La Esmeralda do not exist as often in Villa Hermosa: "I have friends but they're sort of artificial, pasted on friends. I couldn't confide in them at all" (Lewis, 1966b: 23). These and other statements made by Cruz illustrate the potential liabilities of relocation schemes — social, economic and psychological liabilities. Such a relocation move is normally not regarded by the victim as a progression but as a regression.

Turner (1967:14), Turner et al. (1963:373-374) and Mangin (1967a:86) argue that high-rise apartment complexes provided during the late 1950's and early 1960's in, for example, Caracas, Venezuela to accommodate poor urbanites were miserable failures from multi-angle perspectives. Firstly, Caracas' superbloques were too much of a steady drain on government funds; the monthly maintenance costs per apartment averaged $U.S. 53.44 in 1959, while the average construction cost per apartment was in the area of $U.S. 10,000. Moreover, because tenants' average monthly incomes
were not generally greater than $U.S. 170, very few were able to contribute to the upkeep and administration costs even if they wished to.

Secondly, the labour demand encouraged by the construction of *superbloques* significantly increased migration to Caracas. And, while the 1959 *superbloques* population was recorded at 160,000, it is doubtful that Caracas' *rancho* population decreased by that amount: "... thousands in the Superblocks have had no diminishing effect on migration to Caracas or on the population expansion in the *ranchos*" (Mangin, 1967a:86). While vast sums of money were expended, the *superbloque* projects only very superficially scratched the ever-growing housing shortage in Caracas.

Thirdly, there is reason to believe that high-rise accommodation in Caracas provided poor residents with minimal or no real improvements in their living conditions:

> ... the lifts were usually out of order, the stairwells were frequently used as latrines, garbage was thrown indiscriminately from the building (from considerable heights), and the blocks were dominated by gangs, which effectively prevented police surveillance.

*(Turner, 1968b:125)*

Briefly, considering the magnanimous public investments that went into the *superbloques*, very few benefits were reaped for anybody — individual tenants or urban
society as a whole. Providing "instant," modern residential buildings in Caracas did not seem to solve very much but did seem to create new problems and to contribute to the complication of existing difficulties.

Frank (1966:220-224) suggests some of the difficulties embedded in Latin American public housing, relocation projects. Firstly, residents of such public housing projects too frequently suffer from many of the same deficiencies that characterize some shack slums — such as lack of urban, educational, health and retail facilities. Secondly, the rents which those people have to pay are too steep. Poor urbanites cannot afford such high monthly rents; squatter settlements are much cheaper for poor urbanites in that dwellings and community may be improved in stages as economic resources and tenancy permit. Thirdly, too many relocation housing complexes fail to improve or even hinder their residents' employment opportunities by not providing employment in those residential districts, by increasing the distance to other reputable employment centres, and by not occurring in conjunction with necessary alterations in the structure of the total society and economy. Fourthly, the every-day social problems of urban life in the housing projects become more important than the lack of work. Collective organizations do appear in the housing projects, though not so much to help defend and locate employment but
to improve local living conditions and to help residents survive in a residential setting which commonly seems hostile to them. The general point to stress is that too many Latin American public housing projects do not ease unjust circumstances but magnify them. Life in the public housing projects becomes more difficult and less attractive.

Salmen (1969) discusses cases of squatter resettlement in two Brazilian satellite cities — Vila Kennedy, costing $U.S. 10 million and located 31 miles from the centre of Rio, and Vila Esperanca, costing about the same but located just 40 minutes from the centre of Rio. Salmen's major, single finding was that more than 1/3 of the persons asked in Vila Kennedy and approximately 1/5 of those asked in Vila Esperanca stated that they would prefer to live once again in a favela instead of in the vila. And, if favela tenure could be assured, even more respondents in each sample would likely prefer to move back to their squatter communities.

Reasons for satellite city dissatisfaction range from economic complaints in both vilas to distance and isolation complaints in Vila Kennedy. Houses in both vilas sold for about $U.S. 2,000 each. A family was expected to pay off its mortgage at an annual rate of approximately 15% of personal income; in this way, it would take close to 15 years of occupancy to guarantee house ownership. Vila
Kennedy's 31 mile distance from Rio's centre resulted in the curtailment of job opportunities, the time and financial increases of back and forth transportation, and the separation from the excitement and attraction of big city life. Such satellite cities have turned out to be too expensive, impractical and disheartening for their poor target populations:

... serious problems have developed in these communities. They are in isolated suburban areas, far from the favela dwellers' jobs. There are no large local industries, and unemployment is rise. Transportation costs to jobs take up 20 per cent or more of take-home pay.

(de Onis, 1966:12)

The satellite cities of Ventanilla (Lima), Ciudad Kennedy (Bogotá), and Vila Kennedy and Esperanca (Rio) ... have turned out to be still too expensive for poor people. They have met the needs of some of the more affluent working class and white-collar members of the population, but have had little effect on the housing shortages experienced by masses of city dwellers.

(Mangin, 1968b:191)

Roberts (1970:365-367), comparing San Lorenzo (a progressive squatter settlement located near the centre of Guatemala City) and Planificada (a government alloted, low-income neighbourhood located at some distance from the centre of Guatemala City) explains a number of the latter's shortcomings. A greater living density in San Lorenzo allows for easier and faster mobilization of residents for
communal projects and meetings; Planificada families keep more to themselves and offer little community co-operation. San Lorenzo betterment committees, even though San Lorenzo lacks legal status, are able to exert greater pressure on the surrounding municipality to help install water faucets, to provide building materials and medical assistance.

Planificada, even though an officially settled legal community, lacks adequate sewage facilities, a sufficient water supply, and paved roads. As well, Planificada's greater distance from central Guatemala City means that its residents spend considerably more time commuting to and from employment, and have much less time for communal activities, residential recreation, and centre-city entertainment. Planificada is supposed to be a more desirable neighbourhood for low-income urbanites, but is in fact inferior in many ways to the illegal, squatter community of San Lorenzo.

Instructive case studies of successful progressive squatter settlements have only appeared sporadically over the last decade. Turner et al. (1963:376-377), contend that the Pampa de Comas barriada (Lima), for example, is able to appreciably satisfy poor urbanites' desires for land, shelter and then utilities. Each family has a plot of land and a temporary shelter or half-built house which gradually is converted into a sturdy, brick and concrete home. Within the settlement there are a few schools and other basic
community facilities. Public utilities such as electricity, tap water and sewage disposal are lacking but residents are confident that these will develop in good time. The important message is clearly expressed as follows:

_Socially and quantitatively, even if not architecturally speaking, the barriadas are, undoubtedly, the most effective solution yet offered to the problem of urbanization in Peru._

(Turner _et al._, 1963:376)

Peattie (1968:14,29,33) shows that the La Laja _barrio_ (Venezuela) provides its residents with the security necessary for the eventual construction of solid dwellings which demand financially sizeable, long-term investments. Moreover, as of 1962 (some 15 years after its creation), La Laja has a modern two-room educational unit, a community centre, a volleyball court, a baseball diamond, a playground, a water line connected to nine public taps, and electric power installed by the national electricity agency. By utilizing "progressive development" techniques and applying "popular" priorities La Laja residents are slowly able to achieve much of what they wish to achieve.

By examining the case of Segundo and his family in the El Mariscal zone of the Pampa de Arena _barriada_ (Lima), Dietz (1969:364) concludes that a strong pride of ownership and the prospect of permanence create an atmosphere conducive to personal and community development. Segundo's
salient concerns are attaining a reasonable level of security for himself and his family, and completing the construction of his home (Dietz, 1969:359).

Within one year of residence (1966-1967), Segundo has his own plot of land, his own semi-permanent two-room house, and a self-constructed stone wall surrounding his property. When he has the money, he plans to replace the stone wall with a seven foot high brick wall, to build some extra rooms at the front of the lot, and to cast a reinforced concrete roof which would support a second floor. The entire process may run from five to ten years and depends on Segundo's own efforts, as well as on the efforts of friends, relatives, neighbours or even outside contractors who may be required periodically (Dietz, 1969:362).

There is only one school for all eight zones of Pampa de Arena. There are no utilities as such, but Segundo's district, through community effort, manages to supply itself with water by intercepting a nearby water main. There are neither proper sewage systems nor electricity, though both are forthcoming from the national housing authority (Dietz, 1969:358). Segundo and his family seem happy with their current situations, and look forward to a future of gradual socio-economic advancement and community development.

Turner (1967:4-15) relates the case of the Pampa de Cuevas barriada (Lima). At Cuevas' incipience in 1960,
each family has a delimited plot of rent-free land with minimal fear of eviction, a temporary self-built shelter with more space, sunlight and fresh air than in the former tenement residences, and access to a manual water supply, public transportation, an elementary school and some retail facilities. By 1965, 80% of the dwellings are receiving self-help permanent construction, with 40% already having walls completed to roof level. As well, there are now a number of schools (primary and secondary), a medical post, a police post, a chapel, at least 218 retail shops and 14 artisan workshops. Electricity is still an exceptional luxury, and a provisional tap water supply, though installed by the national government, is not yet operable. Successful development in Cuevas follows a "popular" sequence of land ownership, community facilities and services, dwelling construction, and public utilities. According to personal finances and to the degrees of locational permanency, Cuevas families provide themselves with what they believe is most urgent and most desired.

Mangin and Turner (1968:156-161), by considering the example of the Perez family in the Benavides barriada (Lima), convincingly demonstrate that such self-established neighbourhoods meet the spatial requirements of many poor urbanites during their periods of serious need:
As Patrick Geddes observed in 1917 (in India) and as confirmed by...
the demand for space by the Perez family: 'The essential need of a
family and a house is room and...
the essential improvement of a house
and a family is more room.'
(Mangin and Turner, 1968:158)

A rent- or mortgage-free plot of land which is not being
threatened by government intervention encourages the Perez
family to progressively invest its own savings, administrative
and manual skills, and spare time for dwelling construction
and community amenities.

Benavides provides its residents with considerable
socio-economic advantages. For instance, the Perez family
reduces individual expenses by acting as its own general
contractor, by building without costly credit, by eliminat­ing
exorbitant professional/legal fees and taxes, by evading
cost-inflating building regulations, and by providing self­
help labour. Other benefits include the security of a
house (albeit incomplete) which is more spacious and far
superior to the overcrowded, decrepit tenement and shack
slums; the ability of a family to build what it requires
most urgently in accordance with changing styles of house­
hold life; and, the invaluable utility of a self-built
domicile and neighbourhood as agents of family and intra­
community unification and development.
Unprejudiced observations of many family experiences similar to that of the Perez' convince Mangin and Turner (1968:161) that "the environments selected and built by ordinary people, when free to invest their own resources in their own ways, are highly effective vehicles for social change." Progressive squatter settlements such as Benavides are extremely responsive to their residents' socio-economic conditions and aspirations.

A number of general points arise from the preceding discussions. Firstly, "instant development" public housing schemes seem to subject individuals (and entire low-income communities) to many of the same social, economic, cultural and psychological difficulties that prevailed in their former residences. Very often, those difficulties become even worse in the "instant development" project and are accompanied by new aggravating problems. As a result, there is for a multitude of reasons a general dislike of and dissatisfaction with such public housing schemes. Secondly, immense government funds have been expended for little avail to anyone; accomplishments in most "instant development" projects seem to have been minimal or non-existent. Such accommodation endeavours very frequently fail to cater to the poorest urbanites. Thirdly, in comparison to the "instant development" public housing approach, the
self-help "progressive development" strategy bares remarkable social and material benefits for large numbers of poor urbanites. A strong preference by the urban poor for "progressive development" accommodation is logical, economically feasible, and socially advantageous. And, fourthly, an unintended but costly outcome of the "instant development" projects has been to indicate the urgency for co-operation between government financial, technical and human assistance, on the one hand, and popular needs, desires and initiative, on the other hand.

"Instant Development" Housing as a Veritable Problem

The flaws and inadequacies of "instant development" government housing projects are now well-known throughout Latin America. Newer government strategies, involving the utilization of "progressive development" techniques and the application of "popular" priorities, are being designed and tried. This section of Chapter 6 briefly looks at two types of such government housing policy — the rehabilitation or redevelopment of existing squatter settlements that contain high development potential, and the provision of suitable accommodation to evicted squatters and to potential squatters.
The 1966 AID Housing Report provides a major opposition to the "eradication-relocation" philosophy. According to that U.S. report, in 1966 the 185 reported favelas scattered throughout Rio, Brazil represent a total investment of more than $U.S. 50 million for the 500,000 citizens inhabiting them. It is advised that the costs of rehabilitating existing Rio favelas would be cheaper than the costs of eradicating those settlements and relocating their residents in government, "instant" housing sites:

The minimal cost of the new housing would be $1,000 a unit while state housing engineers estimate that the favelas could be rebuilt at an average cost of $500 a unit, along with salvage of large investments already made by the dwellers. (de Onis, 1966:12)

Rehabilitation projects call for community involvement, collective co-operation, and government technical and financial (easy credit and low-cost loans) assistance. The ultimate success of redevelopment projects depends on the ability of the community, with the encouragement of government assistance, to unite and maximize its potential human and economic resources — initiative, effort, skills and small savings.

There are extremely limited data on the rehabilitation projects. The few cases that are sketchily reported appear to involve "municipalization," or in other words, the
incorporation of a progressive squatter settlement into the surrounding municipality. In this way, the settlement achieves legal status and becomes eligible for municipal services; residents are guaranteed official tenure to their homesteads as soon as improvement costs are paid back to the municipality. Cuevas, El Ermitaño, Pampa Seca, San Martín de Porres (Lima) and Mariano Melgar (Arequipa) provide pertinent examples. Government efforts in these projects complement personal efforts and expectations and do not fight against them, as do the typical "instant development," "eradication-relocation" projects.

Clearly, the rehabilitation tactic cannot be applied in all cases. Some squatter settlements lack any solid foundation and are destined to remain as extremely depressed neighbourhoods (e.g., the poorest, most permanent shack slums) and other squatter settlements are located so that they interfere with major metropolitan expansion plans. The more successful relocation schemes allow resettled people to work towards "popular" priorities and to apply "progressive development" building techniques. El Gallo (Venezuela), a development sponsored in 1964 as part of the Ciudad Guayana Development Program by the Corporación Venezolana de Guayana (C.V.G.), permitted relocated residents to build their dwellings in stages and to gradually improve community infrastructure. By 1967, almost all the
provisional dwellings had been replaced by permanent, complete dwellings, and the community contained roads, electricity, a sewage disposal system, a school, and so on (Caminos et al., 1969:215-228). The Valdivieso (Lima) project, started in 1960, located its residents only a few miles from downtown Lima, and provided plots of land and provisional dwellings of cane matting and bamboo for 700 families. The only additional service provided at the earliest stages of the project was a number of strategically placed drinking water spigots. The cost to each family was about $U.S. 450 — $U.S. 260 for the dwelling structure and a concrete floor, $U.S. 75 for the land, and $U.S. 115 for the water. As an incentive, a credit on those payments was provided for up to 12 years at a modest annual interest of 6 per cent (Turner, 1968b:124). Turner (1967:12) maintains that such "progressive development" housing programs can be at least 100% cheaper than the "instant development" counterparts, for individual families and on urban society public funds.

Recently, Latin American governments are trying to anticipate and check the growth of squatter settlements and squatter populations by providing housing programs that take into consideration the popular preference for "progressive development." Because these programs aim at preventing the expansion of squatter settlement segments by
supplying assistance and guidance to potential squatters, they may be labelled as "prevention-guidance" programs. Unfortunately, though, simply abandoning the "instant development"/"official" philosophy for the "progressive development"/"popular" philosophy does not automatically mean that "prevention-guidance" projects will attain their aspired successes. There are a number of difficulties to watch out for.

First of all, while financial loans may be available to housing candidates, those loans frequently stipulate unreasonable conditions. For example, poor urban settlers prefer to have electricity before bathrooms, or both if possible. But many financial institutions will only provide loans on houses that have bathrooms (Mangin, 1968b:424). Or, many loans require marriage and birth certificates from applicants. Hopeful couples arrange to marry legally and do obtain the necessary marriage papers, only to realize that they are still ineligible for a loan because they lack the necessary birth certificates. And even those who do qualify for loans may lose all faith in urban society when they are neglected because of bureaucratic nepotism or red tape. Effective housing projects eliminate such absurd requirements.

Secondly, too many "prevention-guidance" projects do not allow residents to do their own building. Residents
may be forced to not only purchase building materials but also to pay for supplied outside labour (Frank, 1966:229). Successful projects must supply materials and architectural/contractual services, but also must employ the owner-occupiers and pay them either in the form of real money wages or of legal rights to one of the completed dwellings upon fulfilment of a specified amount of construction time. This type of approach has received some optimistic success in the Ciudad Guayana case (Turner, 1968b:126).

Thirdly, while many of the "prevention-guidance" schemes are loosely referred to as low-cost housing, the costs in a large number of cases are still too excessive for the poorest urbanites. That becomes clear when one realizes that in some intricately planned housing schemes, squatter settlements appear on the site prior to project implementation. Goldrich et al. (1967-1968:182) recount the Chilean government's consternation and displeasure upon discovering that their elaborately planned 1960 Santo Domingo housing project had been invaded by a massive group of squatters, before the registered families were able to move onto the site. Casasco (1969:101-102) describes the revealing case of Brasilia, which even prior to becoming a new city and Brazil's capital, had a large squatter settlement population. Low-income speculators anticipated an attractive opportunity and acted before government plans were
ready for implementation. Mangin, adding a reference to the Ciudad Guayana case, maintains:

*Brasilia and Ciudad Guayana, Venezuela, are spectacular attempts to decentralize, and have been more or less successful, but squatter settlements had developed in both places before the planned cities were constructed.* (Mangin, 1967a:86)

And fourthly, because they often do not cater to the poorest urbanites and because urban birth rates and migration rates are constantly on the upswing, there is reason to believe that "prevention-guidance" schemes may not have much of a dampening effect on the numerical growth of squatter settlements and the demographic growth of squatters. Furthermore, it is even conceivable that "prevention-guidance" schemes may indirectly add to the growth of squatter settlements and populations by attracting even greater numbers of migrants to city life and by providing new, strategically located spaces for both shack slums and progressive squatter settlements. It seems highly probable that squatter settlements, along with the modernization and urbanization of Latin America and the Third World in general, have an extremely long history ahead.

As a concluding reflection, the urban poor and their squatting tactics have for too long been only considered as liabilities on urban society. Their actions have
been loathed and/or vehemently opposed by official ranks of society. Now, Latin American authorities (some bureaucrats, politicians, architects, engineers, planners, etc.) are beginning to become cognizant of some of the assets which must be attributed to the drive, talent, initiative and determination of less affluent urbanites. Particularly in the area of low-income housing, poor peoples' priorities and methods have paved the way for reforms, alterations and experimentation. It is becoming more and more evident that their own approach to the complex matter of urban accommodation reflects a mixture of rational, logical and practical responses — the results of sincere and committed efforts to successfully adapt to one of the greatest challenges of urban existence.

"Progressive development" building techniques and "popular" housing norms are gradually becoming the key symbols of urban housing strategy. With the proper combinations of government assistance and popular resources, there are remarkable social and economic benefits to be shared by both individual urbanites and by urban society as a whole. Instead of the persistence of ever-increasing tension and hostility between the urban poor and official circles, there is the hope of ever-improving co-operation and complementation. There are still problems of quantity and quality in low-income housing, but at least those
problems are starting to be tackled more intelligently. The future contains a wide gamut of surely intriguing urban accommodation issues and debates.
Chapter 7

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A general setting or background has revealed three widely shared empirical generalizations about urbanization. Firstly, urban populations in Third World areas in general, and in Latin America in particular, are growing dramatically. Major reasons for dynamic population increases in Latin America appear to relate to a phenomenally high rate of total population growth, on the one hand, and to stunning rates of internal migration, on the other hand. Secondly, due to an ever-widening gap between the rates of industrialization and urbanization, the number of poor urban Latin Americans is extremely large and continues to grow. Thirdly, as the number of poor Latin American urbanites grows, more and more people must take up residence in tenement slums. And as unemployment problems and housing shortages stagnate or intensity, many poor urbanites are encouraged and compelled to find shelter in shack slums and progressive squatter settlements.
A glimpse at some of the startling population figures for Latin American squatter settlements has provided two notable observations. First, squatter settlement populations appear to be increasing as rapidly as or even more rapidly than the urban areas in which they are situated. Second, after 1960, many squatter settlement populations account for anywhere from 10% to 50% of a given city's total population. The squatter component to urban populations is clearly sizeable enough to warrant extensive research and analysis.

An investigation of existing internal migration theories and data has shed new light on a wide scope of issues. Firstly, the theory of "direct migration" has been challenged. It has been argued that, in Latin America, the most typical cases of city-ward movement are not simple rural to urban shifts but rather conform to what has been called "step-migration" or migration by stages. Further, it has been shown that very few migrants indeed appear to have truly rural origins, and that the vast majority (whether formerly living in agricultural villages or small towns) have been exposed to and have gained considerable urban experience during their stages of city-ward migration. Contrary to the beliefs of those who accuse migrants of importing an inadequate rural culture to the city, it has
been argued that migrant adaptations to the urban environment rely on an intricate meshing between former and newly acquired modes of interaction. That mixture includes their personal, face-to-face relationships as well as their more formal contacts with social, economic and political institutions. Herein lies one example of how poor people may re-shape the urban model to more closely suit their personal circumstances.

Secondly, migration has been considered as one of several available alternatives used by many Latin Americans in response to the all-encompassing forces of modernization. It has been argued that the motives for migration are many and vary from case to case. The most obvious and frequently reported motives relate to such factors as jobs, housing, schooling, kin and friend proximity, urban status, city luxuries, and entertainments. These should not be accepted as the only sources of motivation, but at this stage of intellectual inquiry they appear to be the only investigated ones.

Thirdly, a notion of heterogeneity has emphasized distinctions between "bridgehead" and "consolidation" poverty neighbourhoods — the former catering usually to the poorest and least secure recent migrants, the latter to the more economically self-sufficient established migrants.
"Bridgeheaders" have been presented as those recent migrants typically seeking temporary asylum and urgently needed urban employment. It has been demonstrated that the tenement and shack slums serve as the most practical residences for the satisfaction of such concerns. "Consolidators" have been depicted as those who typically have already experienced the "bridgehead" situation and are now seeking permanent, more spacious homes, and who are concerned with retaining their jobs and staying above the depths of abject poverty. It has been shown that the progressive squatter settlements serve as the most practical residences for the satisfaction of these interests. Finally, the existence of many successful progressive squatter settlements and some improving shack slums which gradually come to closely resemble modern residential areas, as well as the strong social and economic relationships that develop between those poverty communities and the central city, have indicated the urgency to more cautiously use the ambiguous "slum" and "shantytown" terms.

A theoretical and conceptual examination has portrayed basic features of a "psycho-cultural" poverty perspective. That perspective has been viewed as a subjective or biased attempt to single out the urban poor as a deviant and socially pathological population whose
behaviours are falsely attributed to a self-perpetuating set of distinctly illogical, irrational or inferior cultural characteristics. "Culture" becomes synonymous with the limited ways poor people act to protect their exclusive life-style. The existence of aspirations is neglected, and poor peoples' actions and reactions are treated as resistant to change. Images of breakdown and all sorts of verbal abuse are directed at poor urbanites in general, and at all types of poverty neighbourhoods — including successful progressive squatter settlements. Supposedly, the elimination of poverty is necessarily a slow process, dependent on the resocialization of the poor who must become culturally and then economically like the more affluent. The elimination of a faulty and deficient poverty-culture will render the poor deserving of fairer treatment and must precede the effective elimination of poverty. As inferior values, attitudes and behaviours are remodelled to more closely resemble affluent standards, poverty will begin to disappear. The introduction of material improvements must wait till poor people have been properly trained to respond to them in socially acceptable ways.

A preliminary look at the theoretical framework behind Oscar Lewis' "culture of poverty" model has provided a glowing example of how a "psycho-cultural" perspective
appears as the backbone for a large and highly controversial body of poverty analysis. Lewis' has been discussed as a relatively sophisticated application which must be examined carefully for its inherent assumptions, concluding emphases, and implications.

A dramatically different and more realistic viewpoint has been outlined in a "situational-structural" poverty perspective. Firstly, the urban poor are treated as normal individuals who all encounter living problems, some of which are handled and solved better than others. "Situational-structural" poverty analysis identifies not only values that are lived by but also aspirations which, in the case of the urban poor, are hidden by situational responses to current injustices. Poor peoples' behaviours which may often deviate from society's normative standards really represent immediate or short-term responses to render life in poverty meaningful and possible. Such reasoning has supplied a further example of some of the optional reactions — re-assessing and re-designing — which fall between assimilation to and resistance of the affluent urban model.

Secondly, when "culture" is divided into its "behavioural" and "aspirational" aspects, it becomes conceivable to speak of a "behavioural culture" which may often
be found predominantly among poverty segments. However, the attitudes, actions and reactions which would fit into that category do not reflect all sorts of social and psychological breakdown, but rather reflect decisions that are rationally, logically and practically made each day by poor urbanites in order to cope with pressing constraints as best as possible. Those decisions are manifested in the form of defence mechanisms, many of which are expected to decline when constraints are removed and socio-economic conditions improved. The temporary nature of so many attitudes, actions and reactions renders it misleading to speak of an independent, totally distinct, self-perpetuating poverty life-style. Poor urbanites are not the victims of a deficient or substandard way of life.

Thirdly, a "situational-structural" perspective stresses the defectiveness of institutional society as a whole. It is the affluent who must initiate structural alterations which would redistribute social, economic and political resources more equitably. The urban poor are thought of as "citizens minus" whose unjust situation at the bottom of the total society is generated and reinforced by structural weaknesses and shortcomings. These "citizens minus" are regarded as presently worthy of and prepared for the introduction of socio-economic changes and new opportunities which would properly benefit them.
Lastly, structural adjustments and the elimination of poverty are considered to be complementary processes that require rapid action. The "situational-structural" proponent calls for the immediate elimination of poverty and does not advocate wasting time and money on attempting to eliminate an illusive poverty-culture. Without arresting the struggle against physical poverty symptoms, the all-out attack must be on the structural features of society which demoralize and aggravate vast numbers of urban Latin Americans and keep them in subordinate and dependent positions.

Most criticisms of Oscar Lewis' "culture of poverty" tend to provide abstract, theoretical and conceptual discussions and stop there. This writer has offered a preliminary attempt to advance more concrete criticisms based on outstanding traits portrayed in the "culture of poverty" model.

"Culture of poverty" traits, in general, do not provide evidence for or substantiate the existence of an inferior, irrational way of life but instead stipulate some of the obvious effects of structural constraints and poverty. Many traits may be thought of as reflexes of total social and economic structures which create and maintain poor people. Most of these appear as representations of behavioural
and physical poverty symptoms whose roots of causation are incorrectly construed as a defective life-style. Many other separately listed traits turn out to really be logically derivable or deducible from earlier-mentioned traits. Some traits vary from case to case and cannot be so easily generalized. Some appear as necessary and highly adaptive features which temporarily help poor urbanites to survive; some are based on pragmatic, rational-utilitarian deliberations. Many are not exclusive to the urban poor or to any segment of the urban poor, but instead permeate all levels of society. And lastly, a number of traits appear to be empirically inaccurate surmises.

Treatises on poverty politics within Latin America have been inundated with fears of urban unrest. It is often warned that the swelling masses of poor urbanites will prove to be politically destabilizing. That is, the urban poor are expected to provide mass support for radical political parties, or to frequently and violently participate in subversive demonstrations which threaten political administration and may conceivably even overthrow governments. This exaggerated concern, which clearly illustrates a narrow impression of reactions to the affluent urban model, has been re-examined and re-evaluated separately for the cases of recent and established migrants.
First, the assumptions and arguments behind the view of politically disruptive, recent migrants have been challenged. It has been suggested that recent migrant uprootedness does not imply unreadiness for city life. Prior urban experience and pre-migration exposure to the urban ambience help to substantially reduce migrant feelings of shock and anomie. Those who are witnessing the "bridgehead" experience do seem to be subjected to temporary isolation, but this condition does not incite "bridgeheaders" to involve themselves in any disruptive movements which simply happen to appear. There is reason to believe that "bridgeheaders" are too busy facing the immediate problems of survival. Recent migrants are not so disappointed and frustrated by urban economic conditions as is commonly assumed. Many seem pleased by the mere fact of urban residence, do locate jobs rather quickly, and do take advantage of petty-capitalist activities and semi-money economies which operate to provide them with extra sources of livelihood. Such features reflect a partial acceptance of the affluent urban model.

On the one hand, where recent migrant disaffections do exist, it has been suggested that bitterness need not be expressed through political channels. On the other hand, it has been argued that political behaviours which are exhibited by recent migrants relate to the styles of political
knowledge imported by them, and to the degrees of political socialization experienced in the city. When, under the proper climate and set of conditions, aggressive and/or subversive political behaviours do exist, these displays are not usually exclusive to recent migrants. Furthermore, in the case of those poor urbanites who are most directly affected by structural constraints, political aggressiveness and unified opposition often represent sensible and effective responses aimed at constructive urban transformations.

Second, the assumptions and arguments behind the view of radical, established migrants have been challenged. It has been suggested that while impressive degrees of political shrewdness seem to exist at local, low-income community levels, established migrants express very negligible interest in national politics and in radical maneuvers. Many current studies have revealed low levels of established migrant support for violence, demonstrations, and extreme-left Communist or Socialist parties. As well, expressed preferences for radical parties can only indicate interests in social reform or constructive alterations, and not automatic commitments to extremist upheaval.

For those who are witnessing the "consolidation" experience, several factors have appeared which help to reduce degrees of affiliation with radical or extremist
activities. For example, a relatively modest scope of aspirations found among "consolidators" often leads them to be extremely pleased with any noticeable housing, occupational and educational improvements. As well, an individualist ethic of self-promotion leads them to be very cautious and frequently conservative in their expressions of political behaviour. On the other hand, two admittedly potential sources of unrest which could culminate in radical behaviour appear to focus around unrealistic aspirations held by parents for their children and around the realization by urban-socialized children that they will not be able to exactly satisfy expectations imposed on them by their parents.

Lastly, radicalization theories do not explain the process of political socialization, do not take into account apolitical forms of expressing frustration, fail to understand some types of political activity which are not expressing frustration, and do not articulate conditions under which mounting urban tension and explosive climaxes are expected to be valid predictions.

Within the field of Latin American, low-income accommodation a clash between poor peoples' desires and governments' standards has prevailed. "Progressive development" building techniques have been considered as an expression of "popular" desires, very clearly exemplified in many
squatter settlements; "instant development" techniques have been considered as an expression of "official" standards, very clearly exemplified in many public housing projects.

When squatter settlements are indiscriminately regarded as burdens on society, at least two government housing strategies have appeared. One, an extremely harsh and insensitive verbal plan, advocates the eradication of existing squatter settlements coupled with the deportation of their inhabitants to the countryside. It has been referred to as "eradication-deportation." The other, a somewhat modified but still unperceptive, implemented plan, recommends the eradication of existing squatter settlements and the relocation or resettlement of residents to apartment high-rises or satellite cities. This latter strategy, "eradication-relocation," has been examined in some detail.

"Eradication-relocation" documentation has shown that many of the same problems appearing in squatter settlements reappear in the relocation sites, sometimes in even worse degrees and often accompanied by new socio-economic, cultural and psychological hardships. Instead of effectively improving them, many relocation projects hinder or aggravate poor urbanites' situations. It is not surprising that among involved families there is a general disapproval of and displeasure with such government housing schemes. Vast sums of public money have been spent in resettlement programs
which have provided substantial gains to neither the urban poor nor to urban Latin America as a whole. Comparisons with the glaring liabilities of "instant development" accommodation have indicated that poor peoples' preferences for "progressive development" accommodation lead to remarkable social and economic, personal and community benefits.

More recent government housing strategies have attempted to utilize "progressive development" techniques and to apply "popular" priorities. One such strategy involves the rehabilitation or redevelopment of existing squatter settlements which contain appreciable development potential. Rehabilitation projects demand high levels of personal initiative, efforts, skills and small savings (popular resources), as well as suitable and sufficient government technical, financial and human assistance. Rehabilitation appears to imply that affected squatter settlements (usually progressive squatter settlements) are incorporated into a surrounding municipality so that settlement legal status, community services and home ownership may be readily attained. Of utmost importance, government efforts in these projects work in conjunction with popular commitments and expectations, unlike the "instant development" "eradication-relocation" projects. As well, there is reason to believe that, in comparison to many "eradication-relocation"
projects, squatter settlement rehabilitation is a much less costly venture.

Another strategy aims at providing suitable accommodation to both evicted and potential squatters. When particular squatter settlements must be eliminated, the most successful examples of re-accommodating evicted squatters seem to be where little more than a plot of land, a basic shelter and credit incentives are provided. In this way, both dwellings and community facilities improve in gradual stages. Poor families are able to furnish themselves with the housing designs and services they wish, in order of personal priority. In contrast to their "instant development" counterparts, these "progressive development" examples demand substantially less expenditures from both individual families and housing corporations.

Those housing programs which aim at preventing the expansion of squatter settlement segments by supplying assistance and guidance to potential squatters have been referred to as "prevention-guidance" programs. Though such programs do consider the popular preference for "progressive development" techniques, they may often experience any of a number of difficulties. For example, some of the available financial loan schemes operate under absurd regulations; some of these housing programs require residents to buy
expensive building materials and to pay for outside labour; total costs in general are frequently too excessive for the poorest urbanites; and, squatter settlement populations seem to remain high and may even continue to grow.

A look at the many-faceted Latin American housing question has revealed that many poor urbanites apply logical, practical and rational approaches to the solution of a serious urban problem. Though urban squatters have so frequently rejected government housing standards, it has become evident that their own approaches to the housing dilemma do not represent attempts to thwart or topple the affluent urban model, but rather signify determined efforts to constructively readjust the housing component to that model so that it more genuinely coincides with the realities of poverty. Poor peoples' housing priorities and methods have proved to be a great asset to themselves and to urban society, and have also led the way to substantive, low-income housing reforms and experimentation. While quantitative and qualitative difficulties still remain in housing programs for the urban poor, it has been suggested that some Latin American officials are slowly coming to realize that co-operation between government assistance and popular resources not only helps to lessen tensions and hostilities, but also encourages all sorts of social and economic advantages for poor individuals and for urban society in general.
In closing, let it be stressed that there has been no intention in this thesis to idealize or romanticize the role of poor urban Latin Americans. Such an elaboration would only replace one exaggerated scene with another. Instead, there has been a deliberate attempt to humanize the role of poor Latin American urbanites within a wide spectrum of social, economic and political experiences which are part and parcel of that unfortunate reality we call poverty. Through re-examinations and re-evaluations this thesis has endeavoured to indicate some of the ways to rectify libelous poverty portrayals.
1. One very great problem with urban population figures is that there are various ways to define "urban" districts — e.g., as 2,000 or more people, as 20,000 or more people, as 100,000 or more people, in terms of infrastructural and institutional characteristics, or whatever. Regardless of what the best definition may be, the general point remains the same: Urban populations in Third World areas, for example Latin America, are definitely increasing very quickly.


2. Migrations from external countries (i.e., immigration) have been excluded. In the case of at least one Latin American country, Argentina, it is essential to note that immigration has played an extraordinary role in the urbanization process. "... in Argentina for more than 60 years foreigners represented around 70 per cent of the adult population in the capital city. ..." (Germani, 1970:289).

3. Refer also to: (Morse, 1965:44).

4. Frank (1966) also speaks of a rural part to the "floating population." That is excluded from the present discussion.

5. The "poverty" concept is a relative one: relative to place, time and reference group. To say that someone is "poor" implies that he/she is being compared to others,
in a particular milieu and at a particular time. Poverty represents an involuntary deprivation from a given, known supply of socio-economic and political resources, as well as a whole set of experiences whose development is largely influenced by the degrees of that relative deprivation.

Mangin (1970a) discusses the "poverty" concept as it applies to the Latin American, and more generally Third World, scene.

6. The low-income housing-settlement types in urban Latin America cover a vast and varying range. This presentation is limited to discussions focusing on the tenement slums, shack slums and progressive squatter settlements introduced in Chapter 2, and the public housing projects elaborated in Chapter 6. Examples of the latter are the caserios in Puerto Rico, the superbloques in Venezuela, the vilas in Brazil (e.g., Vilas Esperanca and Kennedy), Planificada in Guatemala, Santo Domingo in Chile, and Valdivieso in Peru. These public housing projects are sponsored by Latin American governments, usually in the form of a housing authority or corporation.

7. Patch (1970a) suggests that the real slums of Latin America are not the squatter communities but the tenement slums, or as he calls them, "centre-city slums" or "inner-city slums." O. Lewis (e.g., 1952,1959,1961) has examined family life in Latin American vecindades. Delgado (1969) has employed the term "individual slums" (tugurios in Spanish), identifying five main categories in Lima: alley slums, courtyard slums, rooftop slums, subdivided houses, and deteriorated rural houses in the urban zone (Delgado, 1969:44 — fn. 21). Frank (1966), A. Leeds (1971), A. and E. Leeds(1970), Turner (1965), and Goldrich et al. (1967-1968) also provide some Latin American terms for the tenement slums.

8. Patch (1967a) argues that tenement slums continue to become more and more densely populated in Lima, Peru.

A number of notes are required here. Firstly, no two squatting settlements are the same. "Squatments vary enormously in form, characteristics, and state of development" (A. Leeds, 1969:49). Secondly, this presentation is concerned with urban squatting settlements accommodating low-income people in Latin America and purposely excludes: (i) "peripheral squatting settlements in rural areas" (Delgado, 1969:38), and (ii) "semi-legal" or "semi-squatter" settlements which attract mostly middle-income people who wish to circumvent legal requirements and cost-inflating regulations (Turner, 1968b:115). Thirdly, in much of the literature, the terms "squatment" and "squatter settlement" are used interchangeably when speaking of illegally inhabited, low-income urban neighbourhoods. On that matter, see for example: A. Leeds (1969), (A. and E. Leeds, 1970:262,263, fn. 1), and (A. Leeds, 1971:236-237, and fn. 7). Fourthly, to the best of this writer's knowledge, only four English materials provide useful discussions about the legal aspects involved in the squatting process: (Abrams, 1966: Part III), A. Leeds (1969), Cohn (1969), Manaster (1968).


Safa (1968:338) compares and contrasts between what have here been called "tenement slums" and "shack slums," as they apply to the San Juan, Puerto Rico case.

The terms "provisional squatter settlement" and "slummy squatter shantytown" have been popularized in the literature by Turner (1968a, 1968b). Delgado (1969) has chosen to employ the term "slum areas."

15. At this stage it should be noted that not only are the supplies of dwellings offered by Latin American governments grossly insufficient, but also the types of dwellings provided are very often inadequate for poor urbanites in terms of, for example, costs, requirements, proximity to employment centres, suitable neighbour relationships, and desired architectural design. These problems are all treated in Chapter 6.

16. Pearse (1961:191-193) provides a very brief account of the historical appearance and subsequent development of Brazil's (i.e., Rio's) shack slums. Morse (1965) suggests that in the case of Rio, at least, favelas appeared even before 1920 — dating from the 1890's. As well, he suspects that "peripheral clusters of squatters or rural-type dwellings are a traditional urban feature, particularly in the Indian countries" (Morse, 1965:49). Safa (1968:337) claims that the arrabales, or as she says "shanty towns," of San Juan are a very recent phenomenon, attaining a notorious reputation during the initial, peak migration years of 1935-1940.


18. For additional comments on the Rio case, see: (Pearse, 1961:191-193). For additional comments on the Mexico City case, see: (Morse, 1965:50).
19. For additional comments on the Caracas and Santiago cases, see: (Morse, 1965:50). Morse (1965:50) also offers some calculated guesses about the size of Buenos Aires' squatter population. Mangin (1967a:68) is a good, general source to consult. He discusses the squatter populations for various well-known Latin American metropolises.
Chapter 3

1. For example, O. Lewis (1952) and Butterworth (1962) refer to such mechanisms of urban exposure.

2. Matos Mar (1961:73) concedes that as early as the late 1950's, mass media were beginning to have noticeable effects on Indian groups in the more remote areas of highland Peru. In his own words: "the age of pioneers has passed..."

3. Pearse (1961:196-198) discusses features of family structure and organization that remain the same or very similar in Rio *favelas* as they were prior to migration.

4. For some specific examples taken from Butterworth (1962), Mangin (1962) and O. Lewis (1952), see my unpublished term paper entitled, "Urban Slum Dwellers' Adaptations From a Rural to Urban Setting: The Latin American Scene." That manuscript is available on request.

5. Pearse (1961:200-202) also makes the point that migrants in Rio *favelas* continue to rely on paternalistic relationships within their own neighbourhoods and in the city as a whole.

6. These in-the-city contacts that migrants have, mentioned briefly here, receive additional treatment in Chapter 5. Parts of Chapter 5 will be devoted to showing ways in which residents of some squatter settlements do participate in local (i.e., within the settlement) and city organizations and institutions.

7. See, for example: (Havens and Flinn, 1970a:207-208), (Turner, 1968b:116,117) and (Portes, 1970:12).


10. Mangin (1967b:5), Turner (1967:6), Dietz (1969:357) and Goldrich et al. (1967-1968:181-182) recount the violence sometimes involved with the formation of a progressive squatter settlement. Some examples of progressive squatter settlements are: Cuevas, San Martin de Porres, Pampa Seca, El Espíritu, El Ermintaño, El Augustino (Lima), Mariano Melgar (Arequipa), Villa Oeste (Santiago), EL Gavilan, El Carmen (Bogotá).

11. For other such descriptions, see: (Dietz, 1969:356-357), (Delgado, 1969:38), (Turner, 1967:6,7), (Matos Mar, 1961:176-177) and (Mangin, 1963:50-51).

12. See, for example: (Mangin, 1967a:75) and (Mangin, 1968b:183).

13. The locally elected squatter associations have, in the literature, been alternately called "local associations," "communal associations," "Junta de Vecinos" and "Comité de Vecinos" (Committee of Neighbours), "Asociación de la Barriada" (Barriada Association). For discussions of the structure and purposes of squatter associations, see for example: (Matos Mar, 1961:176-177), (Mangin, 1967b:5), (Mangin and Turner, 1968:155), (Goldrich et al., 1967-1968:185-188), (Peattie, 1968:Chapter 6), (Portes, 1970:6-11), (Ray, 1969:43-46), and (Dietz, 1969:369).


17. Stokes (1962) was the first to employ the phrases "slums of hope" and "slums of despair." Since then, Turner (1968b:119-120) and Casasco (1969:94-96) have applied those terms to the Latin American scene.

18. Turner (1965) and Morse (1971a:54) draw very crucial distinctions between Lima's corralones (slums) and progressive squatter settlements (nonslum barriadas). Delgado (1969:42), in his revised scheme of metropolitan underdevelopment in Lima, clearly distinguishes between "slums" (i.e., Social Universe of Slum Formation) and "nonslums" (i.e., Nonslum Social Universe).
Chapter 4

1. See, for example: (Rossi and Blum, 1969:57).

2. Turner (1968b:117 — fn. 6) warns against the error of equating inhabitants' behaviours to the observable standards of their habitats. "Rational" refers to "a deliberate calculation of means and ends" (Portes, 1970:2). Conversely, "irrational" refers to impulsive, emotion-based action that does "not involve a calculated sequence of acts exclusively aimed at securing attainment of a purpose" (Portes, 1970:4).

3. For similar citations, see: (Mangin, 1968a:56), (Doughty, 1970:42,43).

4. It would currently be too lengthy and arduous a task to present a bibliography of materials which include discussions of the "culture of poverty." Instead, interested readers are referred to O. Lewis' works listed in this paper's "BIBLIOGRAPHY" and to some of the following key sources also listed: Valentine (1969,1971), Valentine et al. (1969), O. Lewis et al. (1967), Roach and Gurslin (1967), G.K. Lewis (1967), Opler (1968), A. Leeds (1971).

Note: A. Leeds (1971) is especially relevant to the Latin American scene. As well, additional sources may be found in the extensive bibliographies provided by Morse (1971a,1971b).

5. Lewis incurs other notable contradictions. For example: (i) He states of those people living in a "culture of poverty":

   They have a critical attitude toward some of the basic institutions of the dominant classes, hatred of police, mistrust of government, and those in a high position,
and a cynicism which extends even to the church. This gives the culture of poverty a high potential for protest and for being used in political movements aimed against the existing social order. (Lewis, 1970a:71)

Later, in the same article, he indicates that "culture of poverty" members are conservative and lacking in revolutionary fervour:

My own studies of the urban poor in the slums of San Juan do not support the generalization of Fanon. I have found little revolutionary spirit or radical ideology among low-income Puerto Ricans. On the contrary, most of the families I studied were quite conservative politically. . . . (Lewis, 1970a:76)

(ii) Lewis advises that the "culture of poverty" is a product of capitalism; at the same time, he deplores the absence of studies within socialist countries. For more on this point, see: (A. Leeds, 1971:231).

(iii) Lewis speaks simultaneously about a "predominance of the nuclear family" and a "trend toward mother-centred families" within the "culture of poverty." Clearly, a mother-centred family household is not a nuclear family household. Further, Lewis' own statistics raise serious doubts about the "predominance of the nuclear family" and about the normalcy of households examined. In one very poor Mexican vecindad, six out of thirteen households had immediate families as their social composition. Yet in a better-off vecindad, 72% of the 71 sampled households were nuclear families (Lewis, 1959:26,27). For further discussion of this point, refer to: (A. Leeds, 1971:267 and fn. 9).

6. "Adaptation" refers to "the processes by which a population or group alters its relation to its habitat" (Cohen, 1968:4). "Breakdown" refers to the effects of a population's or group's inability to favourably alter its relation to its habitat.

7. For example, see: (Portes, 1970:2).
8. For a discussion and criticism of trait analysis, in general, and also more particularly of the traits attached to the "culture of poverty" victims by Lewis, see: (A. Leeds, 1971:229-277).

9. In the words of J.L. Roach and O.R. Gurslin:

   An important distinction is that between the causal and descriptive conceptions of a culture of poverty. Many students of poverty tend to confuse these conceptions and conclude in effect that the traits of the poor are the cause of the traits of the poor. (Roach and Gurslin, 1967:392)

10. A conceptual controversy has developed over Lewis' application of "culture." Lewis (1970a:68 — fn. 3; 1966a:fn. 1) claims that his choice of the "culture" concept over the "subculture" concept is a matter of convenience. If we recall Lewis' contentions that the "culture of poverty" is a culture in the traditional anthropological sense, and if we accept Rainwater's meaning for "subculture" —

   . . . a distinctive pattern of existential and evaluative elements, a pattern distinctive to a particular group in a larger collectivity and consequential for the way their life differs from that of others in the collectivity. The distinctive pattern consists of elements that are shared with the larger collectivity and ones that are peculiar to the group — it is the configuration of both kinds of elements that is distinctive to the lower class. (Rainwater, 1969:241)

   — it becomes clear that "subculture" would not really accurately identify what Lewis is addressing.

For criticisms of Lewis' imprecise usage of culture/subculture, see: (Valentine, 1969:104,107-120), (A. Leeds, 1971:231), (Valentine et al., 1969:198). This last reference is extremely clear and to the point:
On culture and subculture, the major issue is that, regardless of terminology, Lewis often writes about the subject as if he had a full culture in mind.


12. For further substantiation of this criticism, see: (A. Leeds, 1971:235-238).

13. The non-exclusiveness of "culture of poverty" traits receives additional commentary in Chapter 5.

14. Other unsuccessful attempts by Lewis to distinguish between poverty per se and the "culture of poverty" are listed in A. Leeds (1971:263-264 — fn. 25).

A most revealing and interesting illustration of the "culture of poverty's" inability to identify a target is provided by A. Leeds (1971). He sarcastically wonders that because university students often display many of the traits associated with the "culture of poverty," should they too be considered as "culture of poverty" members? "Or do they lack some critical trait for such membership?" (A. Leeds, 1971:271 — fn. 31). For a general discussion of Lewis' failure to delimit a "culture of poverty" population, see: (A. Leeds, 1971:261-262).


16. Silberstein (1969), Turner (1967,1968b), A. Leeds (1971), A. and E. Leeds (1970), Mangin (1967a,1968b) and Dietz (1969), for example, all stress similar points. Lewis (1952) ironically supports this type of argument. His 1952 conclusions run counter to "findings [that] on the whole highlighted the negative aspects, such as personal maladjustment, breakdown of family life, decline of religion, and increase of delinquency" (Lewis, 1952:413-414). Oddly enough, though, Lewis' post-1952 publications definitely contradict the very conclusions he had so talently maintained in 1952.
17. Refer to: (Gans, 1969:211-213).

18. One of the best and most convincing articles dealing with the pragmatic behavioural approaches utilized by poor Latin American urbanites is Portes' (1970) unpublished paper.


20. Materials such as those by Silberstein, Mangin, A. Leeds, A. and E. Leeds, Peattie, Frank, Portes, Roberts, Germani, Doughty, Dietz, Turner, Matos Mar, Pearse, Mangin and Turner, and others (all appearing in this paper's "BIBLIOGRAPHY") do not limit their discussions to only family issues. Instead, they expand their examinations to include a much wider network of social interactions: — e.g., employee/employer; friend/friend; involvement with voluntary associations; involvement with local leaders; involvement with state and national politicians and bureaucrats; individuals/money lenders; games played in the local community; entertainment, business and trade contacts between low-income neighbourhoods and metropolitan centres, etc.

21. That issue is discussed in Chapter 5.

22. In no way is it being suggested that the battle against poverty's devastating physical symptoms should be stopped. Conversely, arresting the growth of physical poverty symptoms should be a supplement to, and not a substitute for, the sort of structural offensive being advocated.
CHAPTER 5

1. Some of the current sections of criticism apply the merits of A. Leeds' (1971) comprehensive attack on Lewis' "culture of poverty." A. Leeds has provided a biting, revealing and convincing anthropological critique.

2. A. Leeds (1971:252 — fn. 16) explains that favela residents' food-shopping patterns are closely related to buyer-seller bargaining relationships, the structure of the marketing and transportation systems, the fluctuating times of arrival for different stocks of food, the typical shortage of food items in the markets, and the occasional appearance of peddlers.

3. The following is the Chilean government study utilized by Portes (1970):


5. See: (McClelland, 1961:210).


7. See also: Schulman (1966).

8. Survey questions which probe for measures of demonstrating and violence among established migrants must be interpreted with caution. It is very possible that some respondents have very deliberately concealed radical
attitudes and that others have provided blatantly false answers. Results of such questioning may lack considerable validity and utility.

9. Turner urges that progressive squatter settlements catering to "consolidators" not be viewed as revolutionary breeding grounds:

Rather than being a 'misery belt' of the dispossessed, waiting only for that revolutionary spark to drive them to the destruction of the citadels of society which they surround, the [consolidation] settlements could more accurately be described as social safety belts. (Turner, 1968b:119)

10. Refer to the same point made in the preceding discussion for recent migrants.

11. Some advantages of squatter approaches to the solution of urban accommodation problems become evident in Chapter 6.
1. Mangin (1967a:85; 1968b:188) refers to the "eradication-deportation" strategy. He lists its more colloquial synonym as the "festering sore-hard nosed" strategy.

2. Mangin (1967a:85-86; 1968b:189-191) refers to the "eradication-relocation" strategy. He lists its more colloquial synonym as the "festering sore-bleeding heart" strategy.

3. In reference to an article by Lance Belville in The New York Times (November 21, 1965), Mangin reprints an emotional, disgruntled appeal by a former favela dweller who now resides in the Vila Aliance satellite city (Rio):

   I hate it here. . .they brought me to this place in handcuffs. . . . it's too far from my work. . . .My old shack had plenty of room for me and the family. . . .and the shack didn't leak. . . .I'm too far from the beach to go find crabs. . . .Sometimes I just can't make the payments on the house. . . .The house can wait. My children cannot wait.

   (Mangin, 1968b:190)

4. For brief descriptions of these cases, see: (Caminos et al., 1969:135,145,201), (Goldrich et al., 1967-1968: 188), (Turner, 1968b:125).
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