THE CHILCOTIN UPRISING: A STUDY OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY BRITISH COLUMBIA

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department
of
History

We accept this thesis as conforming to the
required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
March, 1972

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ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with a disturbance which broke out in April of 1864 when a group of Chilcotin Indians massacred seventeen* workmen on a trail being built from Bute Inlet to the interior of British Columbia.

The main endeavours of this thesis are three-fold. It seeks to provide an accurate account of the main events: the killings and the para-military expeditions which resulted from them. It attempts to establish as far as possible the causes of the massacres. Finally, it examines the attitudes of whites towards the Indians as revealed in the actions they took and the views they expressed in connection with the uprising and the resulting expeditions to the Chilcotin territory.

Published and unpublished primary source material has given a detailed and verifiable picture of the events of the Chilcotin Uprising, and of various background events. It has revealed, besides, the verbal reactions of many whites and even of Indians who were involved.

To seek the underlying causes of the uprising and to get a clear view of white attitudes it has been necessary to probe both Chilcotin and European backgrounds. The studies of others have helped to shed light on Chilcotin society prior to the time of the uprising, on European thought as it developed in the Nineteenth Century, and on the general development of relationships between the white man and the Indian in British Columbia up to the period with which this thesis deals.

* The author requested that this be changed to read Fourteen, instead of seventeen. Mar. 31, 1973.

The causes of the uprising I have summarized under five main headings. The "chief motivating factor" was the rash threat by a white man to bring sickness on the Indians. The "predisposing causes" were events and circumstances which had no direct connection with the Chilcotins' decision to kill the whites but which must have helped to shape their adverse attitudes towards the whites. The "aggravating grievances" were a number of occurrences directly connected with the trail-building enterprise which may be regarded as grievances from the Chilcotins' viewpoint, aggravating the harm done by the threat made against the Chilcotins. The "material incentive" of plunder played its part in encouraging the uprising. Finally, there were a number of "facilitating factors" which made the uprising possible--factors making for the initial weakness of the whites and the strength of the Chilcotins.

The attitudes of the whites towards the Indians as revealed during the period of the Chilcotin Uprising are difficult to summarize without distortion. But five main points have been made in this thesis: (1) The whites at this time displayed, in varying forms, a universal confidence in the inherent superiority of European civilization. (2) Only to a limited extent can we identify particular attitudes expressed towards the Indians with particular classes or groups of colonial society. (3) Prejudice and questionings regarding white actions towards the Indian both emerged as a result of the uprising. There is evidence that there were many whites in Nineteenth Century British Columbia who not only used

individual judgement in making generalizations about the Indian but were willing to "test their stereotypes against reality" when they had dealings with particular Indians or Indian groups. (4) There was no really general fear for personal safety among the Europeans during the Chilcotin Uprising. (5) As a general rule we may say that those whom circumstances cast in the role of adversaries of the Chilcotins came to adopt increasingly hostile attitudes towards the Indians. Those who were less directly involved or who were cast in roles necessitating some understanding of the Chilcotins tended to adopt less hostile attitudes towards them.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my indebtedness to the staff of the Provincial Archives, particularly to Mr. George Newell, whose suggestions first led me to sources on the Chilcotin Uprising.

I also owe much to the staff of the Special Collections Division of the library of the University of British Columbia.

My thanks is due also to Dr. M. Ormsby and Mr. K. Ralston of the History Department of the University of British Columbia for benefit of their time spent and experienced advice given.

Especially I wish to thank my advisor, Dr. R. V. Kubicek, who made me aware of the possibilities of a study of Indian-white relationships and white attitudes to Indians. His constructive criticism, encouragement, and stimulus to thought during the time I have spent writing this thesis have been much appreciated.

PREFACE

This thesis deals with a disturbance which broke out in April of 1864 when a group of Chilcotin Indians massacred seventeen* workmen on a trail being built from Bute Inlet to the interior of British Columbia.

The Chilcotin Uprising at the time it occurred startled and shocked practically the whole white population of colonial British Columbia and Vancouver Island. Overwhelmingly outnumbered by the Indians, the whites were bound to take seriously any uprising which might threaten to become an Indian war such as the Americans to the south had experienced. The further killings which followed the initial massacre and the adventures and rumoured adventures of the resulting expeditions to the Chilcotin territory gained much public notice and for many months took up most of the attention of Governor Seymour and the top officials of the infant colony of British Columbia. As time went on and it became evident that the uprising was unlikely to involve more of the native population than a portion of the Chilcotin tribe, the white colonists became increasingly concerned at the, to them, enormous cost of the extensive operations in Chilcotin territory.

Today, though neither its threat to the European populace nor its effect on the colonial budget seem in retrospect to be important, the Chilcotin Uprising is of significance for other reasons.

The story of the Chilcotin Uprising is the best-documented account of conflict between Indians and whites in British Columbia. Accounts published in the Nineteenth Century together with a large amount of

*the author requested that this be changed to read fourteen, instead of seventeen. Mar. 31, 1973.

unpublished material give a detailed and verifiable picture of the events of the uprising. We also have detailed narratives of various background events, and of the verbal reactions of the whites and even of Indians who were involved.

Variously referred to in the accounts of the time as a series of massacres, as an insurrection, and as a war, the Chilcotin Uprising was the type of reaction to the inroads of Europeans which certain modern historians would prefer to label as a "resistance." I have chosen "uprising" as a term I consider adequately descriptive yet not reflecting any particular theory of social action.

The main endeavours of this thesis are three-fold. It seeks to provide an accurate account of the main events: the killings and the para-military expeditions which resulted from them. This has seemed to be of considerable importance, since no narrative of the uprising exists which tells all the events as accurately as available documents enable one to do today. A second thing this thesis attempts is to establish as far as is possible the causes of the massacres which occurred. The immediate cause was discovered by the enquiries of Judge Begbie after the surrender of a number of the Chilcotins involved in the uprising. The underlying causes, though not so obvious at the time, throw a good deal of light on the reaction of one group of native people to the Europeans whom they encountered. The third main task of this thesis has been to examine the attitudes of whites towards the Indians as revealed in the actions they took and the views they expressed in connection with the uprising and the resulting expeditions to the Chilcotin territory.

To seek the underlying causes of the uprising and to get a clear view of white attitudes it has been necessary to probe both Chilcotin and European backgrounds. It has only been possible to do this, of course, because others have carried out studies--historical, anthropological, and sociological in nature--which have shed light on Chilcotin society prior to the time of the massacres, on European thought as it developed in the Nineteenth Century, and on the general development of relationships between white man and Indian in British Columbia up to the period with which this thesis deals.

The early historiography of the Chilcotin Uprising I have discussed in the bibliographical essay which accompanies this thesis. Seymour's despatches to Cardwell contain the most accurate account of all the major events of the Uprising. All other contemporary accounts of the Uprising are only partial. Lundin Brown's is the most complete and accurate published account of the nineteenth century, but is not to be completely relied on.

Twentieth century accounts are either popularized versions of limited accuracy which have appeared in newspapers or periodicals or are necessarily curtailed in their scope because the Chilcotin Uprising is narrated as an event of limited significance in the history of British Columbia as a whole. F. W. Howay in British Columbia from the Earliest Times to the Present gives a fairly full and accurate account, but there are a number of factual errors in his work.

This thesis attempts to give a more detailed and accurate account of the events than has been given in the past. At the same time, though it is centred around one tribe and a single set of events, it is hoped it may, along with the studies of others, contribute to a greater understanding of the development of Indian-white relationships.

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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND: THE CHILCOTINS IN THEIR NATIVE ENVIRONMENT

Startling as the events of the Chilcotin uprising were to the white populace of Vancouver Island and British Columbia, the pattern of those events becomes, by hindsight, more explicable in the light of an examination of the background to the massacres. An important part of that background is supplied by a study of the Chilcotin Indians themselves: their ethnic characteristics, their aboriginal way of life, and the effects of early European contact on their lives and attitudes.

Linguistic Group

The Chilcotins form part of a remarkably wide-spread group of linguistically related Indians, the Dénés or Athapaskans, whose territory extended to Hudson Bay on the east, to the territory of the Eskimo on the north, and up to the delta of the Yukon River on the west.[1] The Apache and Navaho of the southwestern United States and a number of isolated groups in Pacific coastal states are southern representatives of the Dénés.

Most of the Athapaskan Indians of Canada lived north of the fifty-fifth parallel, but the territory of the western Dénés in British Columbia extended much further south. The Chilcotins were the most southerly Déné tribe in Canada with the probable exception of the Nicola, a small group which seems to have been originally Athapaskan in speech but which was absorbed by neighbouring Indians in the early nineteenth century.[2]

From Cornelius Osgood, "The Distribution of the Northern Athapaskan Indians," Yale University Publications in Anthropology, VII (1936), 4.



Map 1 Distribution of the Northern Athapaskan Indians

Physical Appearance

Reliable early information is scarce regarding the physical characteristics of the Chilcotins, and Lane decides that ". . . there is little point in attempting a physical description of the Chilcotin."[3] Morice was a careful observer and is usually a reliable informant, though he did not have contact with the Chilcotins till 1883[4] and was more familiar with the Carriers whose territory lies immediately to the north of the Chilcotins'.

> The Chilcotins . . . [Morice says] are of lower stature [than the Carriers], broad-chested, with square shoulders, heavy features and flattish faces . . . .[5]

He considered that the Chilcotins (as well as the Carriers) had become modified in their physical appearance due to intermixture with the coast Indians. He also believed that the Chilcotins had intermingled with the Salish to the south. Speaking of the Athapaskans generally, Morice says that they are ". . . remarkable for the scarcity of their facial hair," though he mentions some exceptions.[6]

Territory

For a number of reasons it is difficult to indicate the boundaries of Chilcotin territory with much precision. The Chilcotins did have a concept of territorial limits, but these limits could not have been precisely defined except where they were marked off by clearly recognizable natural boundaries. Then too, much information on the Chilcotins' ideas of their territorial boundaries[7] has come to us rather late, and, valuable though it is, should be treated with some caution. A further point to be borne in mind is the fact that boundaries could and did shift when one tribal group abandoned territory and another occupied it.

From Robert Brockstedt Lane, "Cultural Relations of the Chilcotin Indians of West Central British Columbia" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1953), p. 64. (Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1953).



Map 2 The Chilcotins and Their Neighbours

It is possible, however, to indicate in general terms the boundaries of Chilcotin-occupied country in the period from first contact with whites to the time of the 1864 uprising.[8] The Chilcotins inhabited the drainage basin of the Chilcotin River above a point thirty or forty miles up the Chilcotin from the Fraser (that is, near present-day Hanceville). In addition, they occupied the Dean River from Anahim Lake south, and the upper reaches of the Homathko and Kliniklini Rivers.[9]

Population

It seems impossible to make an estimate of any great reliability for the population of the Chilcotins at any time during the period with which we are concerned.

The population of the Chilcotins before contact with whites is a matter of very doubtful conjecture. Kroeber, following Mooney, gives an estimate of 2,500[10], but Lane gives what appear to be very valid reasons for rejecting this figure as giving much too high a population density.[11] Lane's own estimate for the population of the pre-nineteenth-century Chilcotins is a figure of from 1000 to 1500[12], which seems a more probable number in view of the extent of their territory compared to that of other Athapaskans, and the limits of the Chilcotins' food resources, and in view of the population estimates we have for later periods.

The total number of families which George McDougall reported having visited and heard of in 1822 was about 196.[13] Should there have been an average of four persons per family this would give a total of about 784 individuals. There were probably many families which he did not visit or hear of, since he writes of what was only part of the Chilcotin territory. It would seem, then, that there must have been considerably more than

the approximately 800 Chilcotins he reported on at that time. It should be noted, however, that most of his information on population was based on information given by Indians he met rather than on first-hand experience.

Ross Cox in his Adventures on the Columbia River passes on information on the Chilcotins which he obtained from Joseph McGillivray, and which may have been derived from information obtained during the 1822 trip which McDougall took. According to McGillivray's information, though it was "impossible to ascertain with accuracy the number of men in the tribe," it was thought that the "number of men capable of bearing arms could not be under one hundred and eighty."[14] Assuming that each of these men was the head of a family, the total reported by McGillivray would be reasonably close to that given by McDougall. A table, also attributed to McGillivray, showing the population of the tribes "about Fraser's River" contains a note stating:

> Our census of the Chilcotins is imperfect; but we reckoned two chiefs, 52 heads of families, and 130 married men between the age of twenty and forty.[15]

If the "chiefs," "heads of families," and "married men between the age of twenty and forty" were all separate individuals the total would be 184 men, agreeing with McGillivray's previously-given total. (Lane in error cites Cox as reporting 252 as the estimated population.)[16]

Douglas estimated the population in 1837 at 600, a figure which Lane accepts for the estimated population of the Chilcotins in the early nineteenth century.[17] This seems a rather drastic reduction in numbers from the time of McDougall's 1822 visit, though inter-tribal fighting and periods of starvation had intervened, and William Connolly did observe evidence of a great reduction during his visit of 1829.[18]

Morice placed the Chilcotin population before the smallpox outbreak of the 1860's as "fully 1500," which seems too high to agree with any of the previously-given estimates of early authorities. According to Morice the smallpox outbreaks reduced the population by two-thirds.[19] (Incidentally, the first outbreak was in 1862[20], not as Morice indicates in 1864.) It seems probable that he was more certain of the number who survived the outbreaks than of the original number, and that he obtained the "1500" by working backwards. Possibly two-thirds was too high a proportion, drastic as the results of the smallpox were. Therefore 500 (one-third of Morice's 1500) could be a fairly accurate number for the period after the smallpox visitations and immediately before the uprising. Since the British Columbia Athapaskan population declined till 1895,[21] and since Teit estimated the population of the Chilcotins as about 534 in 1906[22], it would seem reasonable to estimate their population in 1864 as between 500 and 600.

Way of Life

Even a cursory examination of what is known of the pre-contact way of life of the Chilcotins impresses one with the great contrast between that aboriginal existence and the conditions of existence which one would assume a European culture might impose once it began to make its impact felt.

Obtaining Food

The Athapaskan peoples of Canada were as a whole characterized by a nomadic existence which the search for food imposed upon them. Where there was a dependence upon fishing, however, this wandering was modified by the need to visit regular fishing spots at certain times of the year. The Chilcotins obtained food by fishing, hunting, and gathering roots and berries.

Their life was semi-nomadic. Their fishing activities led to particular groups of Chilcotins becoming associated with certain specific spots which they used during fishing seasons and established a type of ownership to through use. Their hunting, though, led to wide-ranging travels, as their fishing activites also did when the salmon run failed on the Chilcotin River. Salmon fishing was apparently an important activity for the Chilcotins, and the frequent failure of the salmon runs, as will be seen, helped to determine their relationships with coastal Indians.[23]

Salmon as well as roots and berries were dried and preserved for use during times when food was scarce, but times of hunger and starvation were still experienced.

The lives of the Chilcotins were not those of constant activity, but of activity alternating with leisure. A general impression from a white view-point of Déné life as later witnessed by Father Morice is given in his book The Great Déné Race when he remarks:

> ...we see that few people in the northern lands have more leisure, or manage to take life so easy as the Dénés that have made it their home. For weeks and weeks they will do nothing but smoke their pipe, visit and gossip, or lay idle in camp. Yet, as time flies and a moon succeeds another, the Déné is reminded by the change in the weather or the length of his hyperborean days that some particular kind of work lies in store for him, to which he must attend under pain of exposing himself and his family to the danger of starvation.[24]

In artistry and craftsmanship the Chilcotins were undistinguished compared with neighbouring coast tribes such as the Bella Coola and Kwakiutl. In the craft of basketry, however, the Chilcotins had developed considerable skill, and produced work comparable to that of neighbouring Interior Salish people. Baskets could be used for holding berries and carrying a variety of loads--and for cooking, for they could be used for boiling water.

Cradles were also made of basket-work.

Little decoration was used on Chilcotin clothing. Clothing was frequently quite scanty in the summer, but in the winter robes of fur were worn.

Chilcotin canoes, like those of the Carrier people, had "high rounded stems and sterns."[25] But they were smaller and less skillfully made than those of coastal peoples.[26]

Like those of the Canadian Déné generally, the tools of the Chilcotins were rather roughly made, though weapons for the hunt and for warfare were more carefully fashioned. During pre-contact times there were some iron tools in what is now British Columbia, ". . . most likely obtained by way of native trade routes from Asia"[27] in the judgement of Duff. But anthropological and archaeological literature examined makes no mention of these tools in connection with the Chilcotin. They were apparently dependent on stone, animal products, and wood and other plant material for tool-making.

The Chilcotins, like the Carriers, constructed weirs to trap fish, and they also built traps to capture mammals.

Apparently the horse had reached the Chilcotins and they had begun to make use of it before their first recorded meeting with the white men.[28]

Religion

Like other Indians of British Columbia, the Chilcotins were dominated in their religious beliefs by the idea of the importance of various spirits whose favour had to be sought or whose malevolence had to be avoided. Among the Chilcotins, as among other Indian tribes, it was important to obtain a guardian spirit. And, like other Indians, they believed that through

spirits it was possible to cause harm to others. They shaman who impressed members of his band with his apparent supernatural powers could exert considerable influence.

The Chilcotins believed in an existence beyond death, though their concepts of the nature of this existence seem to have been rather vague. They sometimes cremated the bodies of their dead and sometimes placed them in shallow graves and covered them with stones.

Mythology

Farrand's collection[29] published in 1900 and Lane's thesis of 1953 are the two chief sources for Chilcotin mythology. The main impressions conveyed in both works are the same: Chilcotin mythology is not marked by richness of quantity or artistic quality, and it is evident that it draws heavily from neighbouring mythology, particularly that of the Bella Coola Indians. There is no way of telling just how much of the myth-borrowing was done since the arrival of the white man, but since we know extensive friendly contact with the Bella Coolas antedated his arrival, it is logical to suppose that the process of borrowing did too.

The culture hero played an important part in Chilcotin myths. This role was frequently played by a creature part man and part dog, who was said to have come to the Chilcotin country from the north-west.

Socio-political Life

There is much disagreement in the literature on the Chilcotins regarding the question of their socio-political culture. But it is clear that the Chilcotins were made up of rather loosely-knit bands, and that the family was the most important unit for most activities.

More than one authority suggest that the clan system had spread to the Chilcotins, but Lane found no evidence in questioning informants that such a system had ever existed.[30] This may be explained by the lateness of his research, but it would seem that if the clan system did at one time exist it was not of great importance, since it apparently has faded so completely from the Chilcotins' memory.

The nature of leadership among the Chilcotins is not clear either. It is apparent that it could be quite informal but that the hereditary principle also played a part[31], at least in the post-contact period.

It is clear that there was some class feeling among the Chilcotins. A person might raise his social standing by potlatching, though this potlatching did not reach the same proportions it reached among the coast Indians. Among the Chilcotins there were some slaves. Of these all or most might have been obtained by capture, though it is possible that some could have been purchased from the Bella Coolas. About slavery, as about so many other features of pre-contact Chilcotin social structure, there is a lack of agreement among anthropologists. Lane cautions that the picture he gives of Chilcotin slavery may include some misrepresentation "...because slavery ceased prior to the lives of...[his] informants."[32] Lane says that men were not taken as slaves by the Chilcotins, and speaks as though they had no male slaves. However, the sources on the Chilcotin Uprising mention a male slave of the Chilcotins.[33] Of course, this does not prove that male slaves were held in pre-contact times.

Trade and Trade Routes

Before the coming of the Europeans trade was already important to the Chilcotins. Some of its extent may be indicated by the following quotation:

> Salmon was obtained from the Shuswaps and Bella Coola in exchange for dried berries. Furs went to the Coast, and woven blankets came back. Cedar-bark mats and clothing, stone pestles, wooden boxes, and baskets entered the Chilcotin territory to be kept or redistributed to other groups farther in the Interior.[34]

The extensive trade with the Bella Coola was an important means by which the culture of the coast Indians influenced that of the Chilcotins.

Relations with Surrounding Tribes

Considerable conflict marked the relationship of the Chilcotins with neighbouring tribes. A number of geographic, political, and economic facts help to explain the predominance of this conflict.

All around the Chilcotins were alien tribes--alien particularly in that they spoke languages distinct from that of the Chilcotins. In occupying this sort of position the Chilcotins were by no means unique. British Columbia was marked by its multiplicity of linguistic groups living in close proximity to one another. But then, what we know of the Indian history of British Columbia is marked by considerable conflict. To compare two situations which in other respects have little in common we might say that aboriginal Indian society was marked by the sort of international anarchy we have in the world of modern nations.

Furthermore there was no political organization or paramount authority to resolve conflicts within the Chilcotin tribe or to settle conflicts with surrounding tribes on behalf of all the Chilcotins. In this too the Chilcotins were not unique, since most of the surrounding tribes were similarly lacking in unity. But this simply added to the potential for conflict, since little feuds were easy to start and hard to stop.

Murder and feuding might be brought on by the desire for booty.[35]

Economic factors played a part in stirring up conflict. The Chilcotins lived in a section of the interior plateau which at times supplied their needs abundantly. But at other times the food supply failed and starvation threatened. This frequently occurred when the salmon run on the Chilcotin River failed. Then the Chilcotins sought out the more dependable fishing grounds beyond their own territory. In places where they could use these peacefully they might do so, but where it required force to make use of them force might be employed.

With two groups of Indians the Chilcotins had mainly friendly relationships. These were the Bella Coolas and the Canyon Shuswap. The Bella Coolas were a group of Salish-speaking Indians with a coastal culture. They formed a numerically powerful tribe which it would have been dangerous for the Chilcotins to attack. Their territory with its sea fishery was much richer than that of the Chilcotins, so that there was little economic incentive for the Bella Coolas to invade Chilcotin territory. With these Indians the Chilcotins managed to establish a friendly relationship marked by trading which was of mutual advantage. During times of starvation on the plateau Chilcotin individuals and families sought refuge among the Bella Coolas, and in the 1860's it was common for them to winter with these coastal Indians.

With the Canyon Shuswap the Chilcotins formed not only relationships of friendship but also many intermarriages. The Canyon Shuswap lived on Riske Creek and in two villages at the foot of the Chilcotin canyon. The Chilcotins traded with these Indians and visited with them on a friendly basis. Teit in 1909 wrote:

> The Cañon division, about fifty years ago, were strongly mixed with the Chilcotin, so much so that the people of the North Cañon band spoke chiefly Chilcotin in many houses; and the other bands along the Fraser had also a considerable amount of Chilcotin admixture.[36]

According to Lane,

> ...Chilcotin who had relatives among the Canyon Shuswap often came down to fish at the canyon. When there was starvation on the Plateau, many Chilcotin families also took refuge among the Canyon Shuswap.[37]

The Chilcotins' relations with other Shuswap Indians were in contrast to those with the Canyon villages. Although there were periods of peace, these were intermittently broken by conflict in the form of murders and blood-feuds.

Similar frequent feuding existed with the Lillooet Indians, another Salish group, and with those of the Carriers to the north with whom the Chilcotins came in contact.

In the area where the Chilcotin, Shuswap, and Lillooet territories met there seem to have been almost constant killings. Teit remarks that

> At a place...looked upon as a boundary-point between the grounds of the Lillooet, Chilcotin, and Shuswap, members of these tribes murdered one another every time they had a chance.... However, the Fraser River bands claim that they avenged all murders perpetrated on them by the Chilcotin, and that the last fight was in 1861 or 1862, when they killed in revenge for murders, and in spite of the Cañon Indians, some Chilcotin who had come to the Cañon to trade.... It seems that had it not been for the Cañon Indians, who acted as peace-makers, there would have been an almost constant state of warfare between the Fraser River bands and the Chilcotin.[38]

In the valleys of the Homathko and Southgate Rivers lived the Homathko Indians, a branch of the Comox subdivision of the Coast Salish. How far up the Homathko their territory extended is uncertain, but possibly it at one time reached beyond the junction of the East and West Branches of the river. It seems that the Chilcotins prior to their meeting whites

had contact with the Homathko, and that this contact was sometimes peaceful. Trading with the Homathko seems to have been carried on by the Chilcotins before 1822, for George McDougall, writing of a trip taken in January of 1822 to the Chilcotin country reported as follows:

> Ammunition I think they will freely purchase, some took a little even now, one of them had a Gun...he says he and several others have had Guns from Indians who came from the Sea, at the extremity of this Lake of theirs [which from the preceeding part of McDougall's letter appears to have been Chilko Lake], they cross over a Mountain, which portage takes them from 5 to 6 days light, where they fall upon a River running in a Southerly direction [no doubt the Homathko or the Southgate] & said to empty itself into the Sea.[39]

Relations with the Homathko, however, appear to have been mainly hostile. Failure of salmon runs in the Chilcotin River caused the Chilcotins intermittently to invade Homathko fishing grounds on the lower reaches of the Homathko River. The Chilcotins were feared by the Homathko, for the Chilcotins had often killed members of the coastal group. In the 1840's, for instance, the Chilcotins killed a number of Homathko fishermen.[40]

Between the Chilcotins and the neighbouring Kwakiutls there seems to have been little contact and little chance for either hostile or friendly relationships to develop. An absence of references to the Kwakiutl marks most literature that deals with the Chilcotins, and Lane concludes in his anthropological study that:

> Among surrounding groups, Kwakiutl seem to have had the least contact with the Chilcotin. Nothing in either culture points in any tangible way to mutual influences.[41]

We have seen that a number of causes might lead to conflict within the Chilcotin tribe or with outsiders. Murder and feuding were engaged in against Chilcotins or non-Chilcotins.

Before the coming of the white man the weapons which might be used against enemies were clubs, spears, daggers, and bows and arrows. After

European goods reached them, guns began to be added to their arsenals. The Chilcotins used a type of armor made of hide and slats. For combat, according to Lane, "the face was painted red, black, or red and black."[42]

Lane's description of the manner of conflict is pertinent, since, as we will see, so much that occurred in the Chilcotin uprising followed the native pattern of combat.

> Attacks commenced at dawn [he writes] and once undertaken usually were carried out with considerable tenacity. If the fight ended in victory for the raiders, they celebrated at the scene, feasting on the enemy's supplies and dancing and singing of their exploits.
>
> If a raid was retaliatory, scalps might be taken and the bodies of the enemy dead mutilated. En route home, the scalps were left under rocks in a swift flowing stream; and often body parts of the enemy dead were hung in trees along the trail.[43]

Morice narrates an incident of which he had been told that took place before the time of the first recorded Chilcotin contact with whites, about the year 1745 according to his reckoning. (Archaeological excavation reported by Borden, however, indicates that it may have occurred "... nearer the end of the eighteenth century.")[44]

At the confluence of the Stuart and Nechako Rivers was a sizeable Carrier village known as Chinlac. For some time the inhabitants of this village had expected that the Chilcotins would attack to avenge the death of one of their chief men. The attack came one morning and almost the whole population of the village was wiped out.

Khadintel, the "head chief" of the Carrier village, was absent during the attack.

> The spectacle which met Khadintel's eyes on his return to his village [writes Morice] was indeed heart-rending. On the ground, lying bathed in pools of blood, were the bodies of his own two wives and of nearly all his countrymen; while hanging on transversal poles resting on stout forked sticks planted in the ground, were the bodies

> of the children ripped open and spitted through the out-turned ribs in exactly the same way as salmon drying in the sun. Two such poles were loaded from end to end with that gruesome burden.[45]

Morice goes on to tell how, in the third year after this massacre, the Carriers took equally gory revenge on a Chilcotin village, erecting three poles loaded with the bodies of children.

Summary

The Chilcotins, we have seen, were a semi-nomadic tribe who, prior to their contact with whites, had already modified their rudimentary Athapaskan culture by accepting elements of the culture of neighbouring Indians. Trade was of some importance to them.

They had had mainly friendly relations with some of their neighbours, but recurring conflicts with others. These conflicts were marked by sudden retaliatory attacks, the mutilation of bodies, and plunder.

The Chilcotins' social structure was loose rather than rigid. Their sense of unity as a tribe was weak. They did have a concept of territorial boundaries, and, within the tribe, a rudimentary sense of "ownership," or possession through use, of particular fishing areas.

Footnotes for Chapter I

[1]See Figure 1, infra, p. 2 , from Cornelius Osgood, "The Distribution of the Northern Athapaskan Indians," Yale University Publications in Anthropology, VII (1936), 4.

[2]A[drian] G[abriel] Morice, "Notes on the Western Denes," Transactions of the Canadian Institute, IV, 23-24.

[3]Robert Brockstedt Lane, "Cultural Relations of the Chilcotin Indians of West Central British Columbia" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1953), p. 40. (Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1953).

[4][De la Seine] D.L.S. [pseud.], Fifty Years in Western Canada: being the Abridged Memoirs of Rev. A.G. Morice, O.M.I. (Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1930), pp. 24-25.

[5]A[drian] G[abriel] Morice, The Great Déné Race (Vienna: Administration of Anthropos," St. Gavriel-Modling, Near Vienna, Austira, n.d.), p. 63.

[6]Ibid., p. 76.

[7]found in Lane, "Cultural Relations", pp. 63-119, passim.

[8]See Figure 2, infra, p. 4 , after Lane, "Cultural Relations," p. 64.

[9]See Lane, "Cultural Relations," pp. 63-69; also Wilson Duff, The Indian History of British Columbia, Vol. I: The Impact of the White Man (Victoria, Provincial Museum of Natural History and Anthropology, 1964), Table 2, "British Columbia Tribes and Bands, 1850-1963," p. 33.

[10]Alfred L. Kroeber, Cultural and Natural Areas of Native North America, University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, Vol. I (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1939), p. 138, cited in Lane, "Cultural Relations," p. 39.

[11]Lane, "Cultural Relations," p. 39.

[12]Ibid., p. 40.

[13]George McDougall to John Stuart, cited in "Fort Chilcotin," typescript, Archives of British Columbia, pp. 1-4.

[14]Ross Cox, The Columbia River or Scenes and Adventures During a Residence of Six Years on the Western Side of the Rocky Mountains Among Various Tribes of Indians Hitherto Unknown; Together with "A Journey Across the American Continent," edited and with an introduction by Edgar I. Stewart and Jane R. Stewart, the American Exploration and Travel Series, (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1957), p. 374.

[15]Ibid., p. 383.

[16]Lane, "Cultural Relations," p. 39.

[17]Lane, "Cultural Relations," pp. 39-40, citing James Douglas, "New Caledonia Spring, 1839," Private Papers, Microfilm A092, Frame 9, University of Washington Library, Seattle.

[18]William Connolly to the Governor and Council of the Northern Department, Mar. 4, 1830, Hudson's Bay Company Archives D.4/123, fos. 80d-81d., cited in "Fort Chilcotin," p. 5.

[19]A.G. Morice, The Great Déné Race, p. 39, cited in Lane, "Cultural Relations," p. 39.

[20]See letter, Matt[hew] B. Begbie [to F. Seymour], Quesnellemouth, Sept. 30, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[21]Duff, The Indian History of British Columbia, Vol. I, The Impact of the White Man, p. 39.

[22]"Appendix: Notes on the Chilcotin Indians" in James Alexander Teit, The Shuswap, ed. by Franz Boas, Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History, Vol. IV, Part VII (reprint from Vol. II, Part VII of the Jessup North Pacific Expedition((Leiden, E.J. Brill Ltd., 1909), p. 760, referred to in Lane, "Cultural Relations," footnote, p. 40. Lane in error makes Teit give 450 as the estimated Chilcotin population. But a quick reading and calculation of his figures shows that Teit estimates it at about 534.

[23]William Connolly to the Governor and Council of the Northern Department, Mar. 4, 1830, Hudson's Bay Company Archives D. 4/123, fos. 80d.-81d., cited in "Fort Chilcotin", typescript, Archives of British Columbia.

[24]Morice, The Great Déné Race, p. 203, cited in British Columbia Provincial Archives and Provincial Museum, Déné, British Columbia Heritage Series, Series I: Our Native Peoples (Victoria, British Columbia, Department of Education; 1951), p. 46.

[25]Alice Ravenhill, The Native Tribes of British Columbia (Victoria, Charles F. Banfield, Printer to King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1938), p. 138.

[26]British Columbia Provincial Archives and Provicial Museum, Déné, p. 28.

[27]Duff, The Indian History of British Columbia, Vol. I: The Impact of the White Man, p. 56.

[28]Simon Fraser, The Letters and Journals of Simon Fraser, 1806-1808, edited and with an introduction by W. Kaye Lamb, Pioneer Books (Toronto, Macmillan Company of Canada, 1960), p. 69. See Chapter II of this thesis.

[29]Livingstone Farrand, "Traditions of the Chilcotin," Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History, Vol. IV: "Anthropology"; Vol. III: "Publications of the Jessup North Pacific Expedition", I.

[30]Lane, "Cultural Relations," pp. 186-187.

[31]Ibid., pp. 205-209.

[32]Lane, "Cultural Relations," p.

[33]Evidence of "George" taken at the inquest proceedings on the Homathko at Waddington, May 23, 1864, enclosure in C[hartres] Brew to Colonial Secretary [for British Columbia], May 23, 1864, Archives of British Columbia; also testimony of George in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians - Telloot, Klatsassin, Chessus, Piell or Pierre, Tah-pit a Chedekki," enclosure with letter, Matt[hew] B[aillie] Begbie [to F. Seymour], Quesnellemouth, Sept. 30, 1864.

[34]British Columbia Provincial Archives and Provincial Museum, Déné, p. 52.

[35]Lane, "Cultural Relations," p. 25.

[36]James [Alexander] Teit, The Shuswap, p. 469, cited in Lane, "Cultural Relations," p. 75.

[37]Lane, "Cultural Relations," p. 76.

[38]Teit, The Shuswap, p. 541, cited in Lane, "Cultural Relations," p. 79.

[39]George McDougall to John Stuart, Jan. 18, 1822, Hudson's Bay Company Archives, B. 188/b/1, fo. 33, cited in "Fort Chilcotin," p. 3. The words in square brackets are mine.

[40]Lane, "Cultural Relations," p. 89.

[41]Ibid., p. 31.

[42]Ibid., p. 54.

[43]Ibid., p. 55.

[44]Charles E. Borden, "Results of Archaeological Investigations in Central British Columbia," Anthropology in British Columbia, No. 3, 1952 (Victoria: British Columbia Provincial Museum, Department of Education), p. 34.

CHAPTER II

PRE-GOLD-RUSH RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CHILCOTINS AND EUROPEANS

Prior to the flood of European immigration that came with the gold rush, European influence had comparatively little effect in Chilcotin territory. Even before the coming of the Europeans to their region, though, the Chilcotins felt some of the effects of their proximity, since, as we have seen, European trade goods were able to reach them through the coastal Indians.

First Contact between Chilcotin and European

Alexander Mackenzie on his expedition to the Pacific in 1793 met no Chilcotins that we know of. His path to the present-day site of Bella Coola lay to the north of Chilcotin territory.

Simon Fraser's trip down the river which was to bear his name likewise bypassed Chilcotin country. But he apparently did meet Chilcotin Indians, who seem to have been visiting their Shuswap neighbours, and it is in Simon Fraser's journal that we have our first mention of them. In the entry for June 1, 1808 we read:

> The Indians seemed pleased in our Company. They carry no arms, and this confidence I suppose was meant as a testimony of their friendship. There is a tribe of "Carriers" among them, who inhabit the banks of a Large River to the right. They call themselves Chilk-hodins [Chilcotins].[1]

Later the explorer mentions, in the June 4th entry, that they

> ...passed a small river [the Chilcotin] on the right. The same upon which the Carriers we saw the other day, live. It runs through a fine country abounding with plenty of animals such as orignals [moose], Red Deer, Carriboux [caribou], Beaver &c. The Natives make use of horses.[2]

Plans for a Chilcotin Trading Post

In 1821, the same year that saw the union of the North West and Hudson's Bay Companies, Fort Alexandria was built on the Fraser River.[3] This post of the new Hudson's Bay Company among the Carriers was the base from which direct trading relations with the Chilcotins were later established on a regular basis.

In November of 1821 Chief Factor John Stuart wrote from Stuart Lake to George McDougall at Alexandria giving permission for a trip to the Chilcotin country. Accordingly, on January 2, 1822, McDougall set out with a party of men to visit the Chilcotin Indians. The trip was made too late in the winter season for it to yield many furs, but McDougall felt that future prospects were good.

> It is [he wrote] by far the poorest trip of its kind I ever made, however I have every reason to think it will be attended by many salutary advantages at a future period, they are certainly a fine brave looking set of Indians, whose lands are far from being poor either, as to Beaver or Large Animals.[4]

The Chilcotins appeared anxious to increase trade with the whites and apparently gave a glowing account of their own territory. McDougall was sufficiently impressed to suggest the possibility of establishing a trading post among them.

> ...if a person could believe them [he remarks], their Lands abound with Milk & honey but without doubt they, when once supplied with proper implements to work the Beaver, will be a great acquisition to this Establishment [Alexandria] & possibly in time might deserve an Establishment among themselves....[5]

In 1823 a resolution was passed at the Council of the Northern Development that a trading post be established among the Chilcotins, but because several Company employees were killed by Indians at Fort George

and Fort St. John, Stuart decided to concentrate his forces in those more northerly areas.

The new head of the New Caledonia district, William Connolly, visited the Chilcotin country himself in 1825, and reported "a prospect of future advantage,"[6] but hostilities which had broken out between Chilcotins and the Carrier Indians around Fort Alexandria prevented the establishment of a trading post among them at that time.

By early 1828 at the latest the conflict between the Chilcotins and the Indians of Fraser River had come to an end,[7] and in 1829 Chief Factor Connolly again visited the Chilcotin territory. This time his impressions were not nearly so favourable. The salmon run had failed them at least once in the intervening period.

> ...I saw nearly the whole of the Inhabitants whom I found greatly reduced in numbers since my visit in 1825, and in a state of utmost indigence [he reported to the Governor and Council of the Northern Department]. The information I received from them on this occasion in regard to the resources of their country varied materially from that which they had formerly given...they now acknowledge that their resources for subsistence were so extremely scanty and precarious that when salmon failed...they were reduced to the necessity of deserting their lands and of flying for relief to some other quarter near the sea coast...it could be of little advantage to occupy a country the Inhabitants of which are subject to such frequent migrations.[8]

Connolly could see no advantage to a permanent post, and thought it was more advantageous to trade with the Chilcotins by using "Derouins"--presumably short expeditions to them--and by having the Indians resume the practice of visiting Fort Alexandria. Nevertheless he did decide to establish a temporary post among them under the direction of George McDougall. In Connolly's instructions to McDougall at Alexandria he wrote in October, 1829:

> From the knowledge you have had opportunities of acquiring of the Chilcotins [sic] and the personal acquaintance you have with the principal Men of the Tribe, you are...better qualified for opening up a regular Trade with those people than any other Gentleman in the District....
>
> As soon as possible...you will...please to repair to the Chilcotin River with the men named in the list herewith transmitted....[9]

McDougall left Alexandria for the Chilcotin that same month, and the temporary post was duly established, but the returns in furs that season were disappointing, and by January of 1830 Connolly was writing that the post should be abandoned as soon as possible with the promise to the Indians that they would see the traders again the next summer.[10]

Relationships between Fur Traders and Indians at Fort Chilcotin

The history of Fort Chilcotin from the time of its establishment was marked by frequent abandonments and re-occupations in its early years, and by a chronic lack of success until it was finally replaced by a fort outside the Chilcotins' territory. There were a number of reasons for its lack of success: the migration of Indians in times of starvation, shortage of personnel, the unwillingness of the Indians to fit into the fur traders' plans for them, and positive animosity between the Indians and fur traders.

We have already seen that Chief Factor Connolly was aware of the disadvantages to the fur trade caused by the Chilcotins' migrations. As for the shortage of personnel, this might have been remedied had Fort Chilcotin proved as profitable as some of the other forts.

The unwillingness of the Indians to fit into the fur trading pattern and the animosity that was demonstrated are two phenomena worth investigation, as they may throw some light on the attitudes of Chilcotins and whites

towards one another, and thus, indirectly, on the causes of the Chilcotin Uprising.

In explaining the reasons for his ordering the Chilcotin post abandoned early in 1830 Connolly wrote to the Governor and Council of the Northern Department that since the onset of winter the Chilcotins had

> ...done nothing, nor will they resume their Hunts before the commencement of May. As we would necessarily be obliged to withdraw the post before that time, as I would consider it very unsafe to leave a small establishment amongst a people with whom we are not yet much acquainted, and of whose audacity we have sufficient proofs, I in consequence ordered its abandonment....[11]

The failure of the Chilcotins at this time to fit into the pattern of activities which the fur traders desired was not peculiar to these Indians. Morice gives a number of examples of the disgust with which the fur traders frequently regarded the Indians for their indolence (which in the fur traders' terms meant failure to bring in furs) and of the single-mindedness of many fur traders which prevented them from seeing the Indian in any light other than that of a fur-procurer. A letter from Thomas Dears, a senior clerk who had been left in charge at Stuart Lake in the absence of his superior, tells how six Babine Indians came to the portage between Babine and Stuart Lakes to kill some of the local Indians. But Dears had been told that after stabbing one young man they had allowed themselves to be appeased by presents. Regarding this fortunate turn of events Dears remarks: "On hearing this it gave me satisfaction, for had they succeeded in their horrid intentions it would have prevented many from hunting."[12]

Apparently the Chilcotin trading post was again operated in the winter of 1830-31, but again the results were not encouraging.

Chief Factor Dease, writing to the Governor and Council of the Northern Department, blamed the poor returns on a shortage of gentlemen to man the posts and the lack of respect of the Chilcotins for the common servants of the company, as well as on the fact that the Chilcotins had been forced by starvation to leave their lands and "resort to the neighbouring Tribes."[13]

Apparently Fort Chilcotin showed itself to be more profitable in some of the succeeding seasons, but it was the poor relations between the fur traders and the Indians which were the main cause of its ultimate failure.

The poor relations between Chilcotins and fur traders may perhaps have had their beginning in 1826 during the conflict already mentioned between the Chilcotins and the Carriers around Fort Alexandria (who were of the Talkotin subdivision). Ross Cox, apparently basing his account on Chief Trader Joseph McGillivray's "Narrative and Sketch of the Chilcotin Country,"[14] provides us with an account of the conflict.

> In the winter of 1826 [he tells us] four young men of the Talkotins proceeded on a hunting excursion to the Chilcotin lands. A quarrel, the cause of which we could never ascertain, occurred between them, and three of the young men were butchered. The fourth, who escaped dangerously wounded, arrived at the fort on the 19th March, and immediately communicated the disastrous intelligence to his countrymen.[15]

One Chilcotin, who was at the fort at the time, was concealed from the Carriers by the traders until he could escape.

There followed a number of forays by Carriers (Talkotins) and Chilcotins against one another. In September of 1826 a large band of Chilcotins made up of about eighty warriors appeared and attacked a fortified log-house of the Carriers. Although the Chilcotins suffered severe losses they pressed the attack and might have been successful against the Carriers had

the traders not sent the Carriers some arms and ammunition with which they checked the invaders. A Chilcotin woman who had been at the fort reported to her countrymen the assistance the traders had given their enemies. The departing Chilcotins, Cox wrote, "...pronounced vengeance against us, and threatened to cut off all white men that might thereafter fall in their way."[16]

The restoration of peace between themselves and the Carriers may have somewhat assuaged the hostile feelings of the Chilcotins towards the whites, but it seems likely that their desire for a close relationship with the traders remained somewhat dampened, and their less cordial feelings explained their reluctance to co-operate in the winter of 1829-30.

At any rate, the reports of Fort Chilcotin that we have, fragmentary as they are, indicate continued frequent tension between the fur traders and their customers.

> ...it would appear from a letter dated June 27, 1836, from Governor George Simpson to Chief Factor Peter Ogden, who was then in charge of the New Caledonia District, that the trade had had to be abandoned, presumably sometime during outfit 1835-36, as "the Indians of Frazers Lake and the Chilcotins" had been "troublesome and disorderly."[17]

In 1837 we find John McIntosh, a young man of mixed blood, at Fort Chilcotin, with Alex Fisher at Fort Alexandria as his immediate superior. Apparently McIntosh had written to Fisher expressing fears for his own safety and desiring to retain one of the men whom Fisher wished to return to Alexandria. Fisher brushed his fears aside.

> One moment's reflection [he wrote] would have told you that surely your story of the bull, the cow, the calf, the poisonous roots, the drowning of an Indian, the intention to murder a white man for the sake of revenge, etc., had nothing to do with the detention of my man....[18]

McIntosh may well have had cause to be nervous, in view of the widespread feeling among the Indians of New Caledonia that the death of a close relative demanded revenge, whether or not there was evidence of the death being caused by another person. Daniel Harmon at Stuart Lake among the more northerly Athapaskans, writing in 1813, told of the shooting of an old woman of the Sikani tribe who had herself been responsible for an act of "revenge" such as McIntosh in 1837 feared the Chilcotins were planning.

> All the savages, who have had a near relation killed [wrote Harmon in 1813], are never quiet until they have avenged the death, either by killing the murderer or some person nearly related to him. This spirit of revenge has occasioned the death of the old woman, above mentioned, and she undoubtedly, deserved to die; for, the last summer, she persuaded her husband to go and kill the cousin of her murderer, and that, merely because her own son had been drowned.[19]

McIntosh while living among the Chilcotins may well have added to the peril of his situation by his own folly. He was later killed by the Sikani Indians, and a letter of Governor Simpson's carries a comment which, if it is just, may throw light on McIntosh's character.

> I notice what you say [Simpson wrote] about the cause of the late John McIntosh's death, which, from all I can collect, arose in a great degree from his own want of sense in unneces sarily provoking the natives by threats of "bad medicine" and other injudicious conduct, for which he was long conspicuous.[20]

Lack of harmony at Fort Chilcotin was far too common for us to blame it solely on the folly or lack of tact of any one individual. Warlike and plundering propensities fostered by the aboriginal culture may well have been aroused by the whites' aid to the Chilcotins' enemies in 1827, and it is likely that the lack of personnel at Fort Chilcotin contributed to the fur-traders' difficulties by making them appear weak and relatively

defenceless. The records regarding Fort Chilcotin appear too fragmentary for us to come to any real conclusions about the wisdom or otherwise of the actions of the Company men while in the Chilcotins' territory. But the probability is high that these were not always conducive to peaceful relations, if they followed the pattern manifested elsewhere in the fur-trading district of New Caledonia.

Donald McLean, who was in charge of Fort Chilcotin at various times during the 1840's, was an example of the kind of fur trader who was little likely to contribute to a spirit of peace and of mutual respect between whites and Indians.

Apparently the first mention of McLean in any of the fur-trade manuscripts occurs in a letter from Chief Factor Peter Skene Ogden to John McLeod dated February 25, 1837: "A young man, by name Maclean--his father was killed in Red River--is in the Snake country."[21] In 1849 we find McLean in New Caledonia at the head of an avenging party in search of an Indian named Tlel (Tlhelh) who had shot a Company man named Bélanger. McLean's concept of justice to the Indians he later summarized in the words "...hang first, and then call a jury to find them guilty or not guilty."[22] One revealing passage from Morice's account of the avenging expedition, the "most minute detail of which" he says was "vouched for by eye-witnesses,"[23] gives us an idea of McLean's "justice" in action.

> Arrived at the Quesnel village, they noticed that, though this was deserted, three huts on the opposite (or right) side of the river seemed to be inhabited. Repairing thither, they entered one, where they found Tlhelh's uncle with his step-daughter and babe.
>
> "Where is Tlel?" cried out McLean through his interpreter, Jean-Marie Boucher, as he rushed in.
>
> "Tlhelh is not here," answered Nadetnoerh.

> "Well, where is he? Tell me quick," insisted McLean.
> "How can I know his whereabouts?" replied the old man; "all I know is that he is not here."
> "Then you shall be Tlel for to-day," declared the white man, who, firing with two pistols he held concealed about him, missed the mark, but finally shot the Indian dead with his musket.[24]

Such was the nature of one of the fur-traders with whom the Chilcotin had to do. Certainly he was not typical--rather, he was an extreme example--but the avenging expedition was typical of the fur-trade method of dealing with Indian acts of violence towards Company personnel. In other words, the fur traders engaged in the blood-feud as the Indians did rather than introduce the more cumbersome civilized method of trial, sentence, and punishment.

The Introduction of Alcohol among the Indians of New Caledonia

Another feature of white civilization they were not so slow to introduce. The opinion of observers of the later nineteenth century seems virtually unanimous as to the disastrous effects of alcohol on the Indians once it gained an important place in their society. The fragmentary records extant which deal with Fort Chilcotin appear to throw no light on the place of alcohol in the trade of that post. But the history of the fur trade in New Caledonia in general does disclose practices which must have had some effect on the Chilcotins during the pre-gold-rush period.

Indian reaction to intoxication before they tried alcohol, as well as Indian attitudes to whites are revealed by an account of Harmon's in his journal for January 1, 1811 when he was stationed at Fraser Lake.

> This being the first day of another year [he wrote], our people have passed it, according to the custom of Canadians, in drinking and fighting. Some of the principal Indians of the place, desired us to allow them to remain at the fort, that they might see our people drink. As soon as they began to be a little intoxicated, and to quarrel among themselves, the Natives began to be apprehensive, that something unpleasant might befall them also. They, therefore hid themselves under beds, and elsewhere, saying, that they thought the white people had run mad, for they appeared not to know what they were about.[25]

The following New Year's, Harmon, after the fur traders had dined, invited a number of Sikani and Crrier chiefs to partake of the food and drink that was left, and he was, he says, "...surprised to see them behave with much decency, and even proprietry, while eating, and while drinking a flagon or two of spirits."[26]

In the years that followed alcohol came to be used by traders as an incentive to keep the Indians coming to the forts and to induce them to hunt. In 1831 William Todd at McLeod Lake wrote:

> Mr. Connolly--the officer in charge of the district--previous to his departure from here, made them [the Sekanais Indians] very liberal promises of spirits and tobacco should their hunt, on his arrival in the fall, be found equal to his expectations.[27]

Apparently the practice of granting allowances of alcohol to the Indians became quite a regular affair, since we find Paul Fraser, temporarily in charge of the whole district, advising as follows in 1842:

> Regarding rum to be given to the Indians, I would recommend that the usual allowance be given to those who pay their debts.[28]

Some effort was apparently made by Company officials--though how intensive an effort it was is doubtful--to put a stop to the selling of liquor to Indians. Among the 1831 resolutions passed at the Annual Council, held at Norway House, is one issuing such a prohibition and ruling that

"not more than two gallons of spirituous liquors and four gallons of wine be sold at the depots to any individual in the Company's service, of what rank soever he may be."[29] Eight years later the brewing of beer and the distilling of liquors at Hudson's Bay Company posts was prohibited.[30] In spite of these official resolutions, however, the use of alcohol in the fur trade apparently continued.

The Fur Traders and Inter-tribal Warfare

It seems clear that the fur traders of New Caledonia cannot as a group be accused of deliberately fostering warfare between Indian tribes. The hinderance to the establishment of Fort Chilcotin imposed by the conflict between the Chilcotins and the Carriers around Fort Alexandria has already been noted. It is clear from the surviving records regarding Fort Chilcotin that conflict between the Chilcotins and nearby tribes was a recurring source of danger and difficulty to the fur traders. According to the "Fort Chilcotin" typescript it appears that the trade had to be temporarily abandoned some time during 1835-36, since "the Indians of Frazers Lake and the Chilcotins" were "troublesome and disorderly."[31] McBean at the Chilcotin post found his task made difficult by the fact that the Chilcotins were hostile to neighbouring Indians.[32]

It is obvious that not only did hostilities between tribes endanger the fur traders' lives, but also the time taken by the Indians in warfare was so much time lost to the hunt for furs. In 1811 we find Daniel Williams Harmon reasoning with the leader of a party of Sikanis who were contemplating a raid on the Indians of Fraser Lake.

> I asked him [he writes] whether he supposed that we supplied them with guns and ammunitions, to enable them to destroy their fellow creatures, or to kill the beaver, &c. I added that should they, in the fall, bring in an hundred scalps, they could not, with them all, procure a pint of rum, or a pipe full of tobacco; but, if they would bring beaver skins, they would be able to purchase the articles which they would need.[33]

In spite of the fact that it was in the fur traders' interests not to encourage inter-tribal warfare, the sale of firearms to the Indians inevitably led to their using the new weapons against one another, and on occasion against the white man. The tribes who gained easy access to the arms traded by the whites achieved a position of superiority over other tribes, as the Talkotin groups of Carriers did over the Chilcotins in their battle near Fort Alexandria. The Chilcotins, out of the fur-trading main stream, were bound to be at a disadvantage before Fort Chilcotin was established and again after it was displaced by another fort. This was especially true for those Chilcotins who were at a great distance from the trading posts outside their territory.

The Fur Traders' Influence on the Indians' Way of Life

The fur traders had come in order to make a profit, not to change the Indians' society. Yet the nature of the goods they introduced was such that the native society was bound to be changed. Indians who had previously hunted to obtain their own food and material for clothing now hunted also to obtain furs to exchange for European goods. Firearms and alcohol began to exert important influences on the Indians' way of life in New Caledonia. In addition, white fur traders formed liaisons with, or married, Indian women.

Generally speaking, the fur traders did not interfere deliberately in Indian customs, but there were exceptions. For example, they eventually encouraged the Carriers to abandon the practice of cremation, one example of a humanitarian interference, since widows suffered great mistreatment at such cremations.[34] The Hudson's Bay Company eventually provided some support for Catholic missionaries in New Caledonia, whose work will be examined.

There is little detailed evidence of the fur traders' influence on the Chilcotins in specific areas of culture. Yet the general pattern that emerges points to a similarity between the influence of the fur traders on the neighbouring interior Indians such as the Carriers and their influence on the Chilcotins with their rather similar cultural and economic bases. The greatest differences appear to be in the degree and duration of their influence. The Chilcotins were subjected to a much less intense and protracted influence. Frequent hostile feelings between Indians and fur traders were not limited to the Chilcotin region, but the Chilcotins experienced these hostile feelings without their developing a relationship of continued dependence of the white man.

The Abandonment of Fort Chilcotin

In 1844 Fort Chilcotin was abandoned in favour of a new fort at Lake Tluz-cuz, or "Sluz-cuz." In recommending the change Alexander Anderson had written in 1843 to Sir George Simpson as follows:

> To maintain the [Chilcotin] post, owing to the evil disposition of the Chilcotin Indians...an officer and at least two men are necessary; a number that would suffice at Tluz-cuz, where the natives, on the contrary, are well disposed, industrious, and extremely urgent that we should settle among them.[35]

Fourteen years after its establishment as a temporary post, then, Fort Chilcotin was replaced in the Hudson's Bay Company trading network by another fort.[36] During those years it had not been manned continuously, and when it had been manned it had apparently been frequently understaffed. Now the Chilcotins' connection with white civilization was even more remote, especially for those living far from Alexandria or the new fort of Tluz-cuz.

Earliest Religious Influences of Europeans

If Chilcotin country was a backwater in the stream of fur-trading enterprise, it was even more distinctly so in the stream of missionary endeavour. Yet it is likely that the Chilcotins heard of Christian teachings long before the arrival of those who came as missionaries. Among the fur traders were some whose devotion to Christianity was ardent enough to move them to attempt the instruction of the surrounding Indians. Among these fur traders was Daniel Williams Harmon, who in the early days of the North-West Company in New Caledonia was stationed at Stuart's Lake and Fraser's Lake among Indians to the north of the Chilcotins. In September of 1813 he experienced a conversion which altered his previously skeptical attitude towards Christianity. In his entry for October 13, 1815 he tells of visiting a sick young Indian woman at the request of people from her village.

> I understood [he writes] that her relations had said, that a certain Indian, by his magic, had caused her illness, and that he would finally take her life. I therefore, took this opportunity of repeating again, what I had often told them before, that God, the infinitely powerful being, who made every thing, had alone the power of causing their dissolution whenever he thought proper.[37]

The wife of Peter Skene Ogden is credited by Morice with doing much from 1834 on to the 1840's towards preparing the way for the Catholic missionaries by "...communicating her religious knowledge to the aborigines who repaired to Fort St. James, on Stuart Lake...."[38] The spread of religious teachings also occurred, Morice points out, through the intermarriage of whites and Indians.

The Chilcotins may well have first heard of Christian teachings through natives who had had more direct contact than they with devout members of the fur-trading community such as Harmon and Mrs. Ogden. But they probably also heard, more directly, the preaching of William B. McBean, who as early as 1825 was apparently assisting George McDougall at Alexandria. According to the "Fort Chilcotin" typescript in the British Columbia Archives, a William McBean who must have been either he or his son was apparently in charge at Fort Chilcotin at a later date.[39]

McBean was of part white, part Cree origin, and his religion, according to Father Morice, was of a hybrid variety, consisting "...mostly of vague notions about the Deity and the primary precepts of the natural law, coupled with vain observances, the main burden of which was reduced to shouting and dance."[40] Apparently he made quite an impression on the Indians to whom he preached.

About the year 1834 the southern Carriers were being stirred by a religious movement which was likewise a hybrid composed of some Christian teachings and practices derived from native culture. Apparently two natives of Oregon were responsible for its initial propagation in New Caledonia. Singing and dancing were prominent in this religious movement,

and its appeal was apparently great, since it spread with great rapidity.[41] Whether or not it affected the Chilcotins, or to what extent, is not clear, but it was influential among the Indians around For Alexandria.

Missionary Enterprise among the Chilcotins

The first white missionary whom we find visiting the Chilcotins with the purpose of preaching to them is a Catholic priest named Modeste Demers. In response to a request for financial help, a number of Hudson's Bay Company men in New Caledonia, including William McBean, had contributed to the support of the Roman Catholic missionaries stationed on the lower Columbia River. In 1842 Father Demers joined the fur brigade that was leaving for the northern posts. Demers travelled as far north as Stuart Lake, then returned to Fort Alexandria, where on his trip north he had been impressed by the corruption of the mixed population of that place. The Fort Alexandria journal records the fact that Father Demers in October of 1842 paid a visit to the Chilcotins, leaving on the sixth and returning on the twenty-seventh of the month.[42] Of this brief visit Demers gave a glowing account in a letter to the Bishop of Quebec, though he does not mention the Chilcotins by name.

> God heaped His benedictions upon me there [he wrote] and made me feel comforts such as I never felt since He deigned to call me to make known His holy name. His merciful grace showed itself quite visibly in the sight of those good natives, and seemed to have shaped quite purposefully their simple souls for the yoke of the gospel. After sixteen days of happiness spent in conducting that mission I returned on October 27 to Alexandria.[43]

In February of 1843 Demers set out on the return journey to the Columbia.

The next and apparently the only other Roman Catholic priest to visit the Chilcotins prior to 1864 was Father Nobili, whose first visit to New Caledonia was in 1845. Nobili probably visited the Chilcotins in 1847, though the date is uncertain. Apparently he visited three meeting-places of the Chilcotins, blessed at least one burying-ground for them, and baptized a number of individuals in this tribe. Morice comments that "Father Nobili baptized among the Chilcotins a number of adults whom he would undoubtedly have left longer under probation had he possessed more experience of their natural fickleness."[44]

Father Nobili returned to the Columbia in 1847. His was the last recorded visit of a Catholic priest to the territory of the Chilcotins prior to the outbreak of the Chilcotin Uprising. In fact they received no visits in their own territory from any missionary up to the time of the uprising, as far as we can tell. The visits that had been paid them, as will have been seen, were short, and probably left only superficial impressions.

The Prophet Movements

But, though missionaries were lacking in New Caledonia, religious leaders of a different sort did not fail to arise. Prophet movements, here, as in many other parts of North America, seemed to develop spontaneously as a result of the superficial contact of native peoples with Christian teachings and as a result of factors which are more difficult to explain. These "prophets", like the shamans of the aboriginal culture, claimed supernatural powers and a knowledge of revelations which they experienced in dreams. according to Morice "All villages of any importance, especially

in the north of New Caledonia, boasted at a time the presence of some such self-appointed priest."[45] To what extent the Chilcotins in the south of New Caledonia were affected is not clear, but it would seem likely that some of them were influenced. However, even among those Indians most influenced, the prophet movements in New Caledonia were short-lived because the interest of the prophets' adherents waned and the prophets, around whom the movements had centred, died.

Results of Pre-Gold-Rush Contacts of Chilcotins and Europeans

Well before the Chilcotin uprising the influence of the fur traders on the Chilcotins had waned and visits from missionaries to their territory had apparently ceased. The superficiality of white contacts with the Chilcotins meant that in the years preceeding the gold rush the way of life of most Chilcotins was still basically unaltered. The Chilcotins before the gold rush seem to have suffered less from the effects of disease and must have suffered less from the effects of alcohol than did other Indians who were in more intensive contact with the fur traders. At the same time they were perhaps less able to assess the potential power of the whites--and certainly less cowed and more convinced that their own way of life could be preserved.

The relationships they had experienced with fur traders had frequently been strained or hostile ones. The fleeting nature of their experience with missionaries hardly gave opportunity for trust to develop. The Chilcotins were ill-prepared for the torrent of European influence that was to sweep in with the gold rush, affecting even their hitherto isolated tribe.

Footnotes for Chapter II

[1]Simon Fraser, The Letters and Journals of Simon Fraser, 1806-1808, edited and with an introduction by W. Kaye Lamb, Pioneer Books (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1960), p. 69. The word "Chilcotins" in square brackets is supplied by Lamb.

[2]Ibid., p. 73. The words in square brackets are Lamb's.

[3]A[drian] G[abriel] Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, Formerly New Caledonia (Toronto: William Briggs, 1904), p. 122.

[4]Letter, George McDougall to John Stuart, Jan. 18, 1822, Hudson's Bay Company Archives B. 188/b/1, fo. 34-34d, cited in "Fort Chilcotin", typescript, Archives of British Columbia, p. 2.

[5]Ibid., p. 3.

[6]"Fort Chilcotin," p. 4, citing Hudson's Bay Company Archives D.4/119, fo. 65-65d.; The Publications of the Hudson's Bay Record Society, Vol. X: Simpson's 1828 Journey to the Columbia (London: Champlain Society for the Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1947), p. 216.

[7]Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, p. 156.

[8]Report of William Connolly to the Governor and Council of the Northern Department, Mar. 4, 1830, Hudson's Bay Company Archives D.4/123, fos. 80d.-81d., cited in "Fort Chilcotin," p. 5.

[9]Letter, William Connolly to George McDougall, Jan. 28, 1830, Hudson's Bay Company Archives B.188/b/7, fos. 6d.-9d., cited in "Fort Chilcotin," p. 6.

[10]Letter, William Connolly to George McDougall, Jan. 28, 1830, Hudson's Bay Company Archives B.188/b/7, fos. 19-20 cited in "Fort Chilcotin", pp. 9-10. E. O. S. Scholefield, British Columbia from the Earliest Times to the Present (Vancouver, Winnipeg, Montreal, Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing Company, n. d.), pp. 402-403. Scholefield writes that Sir George Simpson in an 1826 memorandum for the Right Honourable Henry Addington, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, reported thirteen establishments

east of the Rocky Mountains, among them Chilcotin. However, it is clear that either Simpson was counting this establishment before it hatched or he made a simple error, since it is clear both from Connolly's remarks in his March 4, 1830 report to the Governor and Council of the Northern Department (quoted above) and from Simpson's own statement elsewhere that Chilcotin had not been established at the time he wrote the 1826 memorandum to Addington. See Simpson's 1828 Journey to the Columbia, p. 216.

The exact location of the Chilcotin post is difficult to determine. Connolly advised that it be established at the "first point of woods" one came to after reaching the Chilcotin River. (Letter, William Connolly to George McDougall, Oct. 1, 1829, Hudson's Bay Company Archives B.188/b/7, fos. 6d.-9d., cited in "Fort Chilcotin," p. 8) However, McDougall found this precise location unsuitable.

> "...I went [he reports] some distance above along the banks of both rivers [He may refer to the Chilcotin and Chilko Rivers.], but found the country still more barren of wood to answer our purpose, the only eligible place I have been able to find is a cluster of poplars below the monte...." (Letter, George McDougall to William Connolly, Oct. 18, 1829, Hudson's Bay Company Archives B.188/b/7, fos. 25d.-26, cited in "Fort Chilcotin," p. 8).

At this spot he decided to build their winter huts, but suggested that a more suitable location might be looked for later. It is possible that a new site was chosen later. The 1871 "Map of British Columbia" of the British Columbia Lands and Works Office places Fort Chilcotin at the foot of Chizicut Lake. (British Columbia, "Map of British Columbia to the 56th Parallel, North Latitude", Victoria: Lands and Works Office, 1871) However, this map is grossly inaccurate for the Chilcotin country. According to Palmer in his 1863 Report, "the site of old fort Chilcotin" was thirty-seven miles from Puntzee (Puntzi Lake). (H[enry] Spencer Palmer, Report of a Journey of Survey from Victoria to Fort Alexander via North Bentinck Arm; Victoria: Lands and Works Office, 1871) His "Sketch of the Route from North Bentinck Arm to Fort Alexander" marks the "Probable site of old H. B. station" at a point about at the confluence of the Chilco and Chilcotin Rivers, on the north bank of the Chilcotin. (H[enry] S[pencer] Palmer, "Sketch of the Route from North Bentinck Arm to Fort Alexander," drawn by J. Turnbull; British Columbia: "To accompany Report of 24th November 1862").

[11]Letter, William Connolly to the Governor and Council of the Northern Department, Mar. 4, 1830, Hudson's Bay Company Archives D.4/123, fo. 81d, cited in "For Chilcotin," p. 10.

[12]MS letter, Thomas Dears to Peter Warren Dease, July, 1831, cited by Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, pp. 161-62.

[13]Letter, Peter Warren Dease to the Governor and Council of the Northern Department, April 19, 1831, Hudson's Bay Company Archives D.4/125, fo. 24-24d., cited in "Fort Chilcotin," p. 11.

[14]See Joseph McGillivray, "Narrative and Sketch of the Chilcotin Country," The Publications of the Hudson's Bay Record Society, Volume X: Simpson's 1828 Journey to the Columbia (London: Champlain Society for the Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1947), Appendix A, pp. 213-216.

[15]Ross Cox, The Columbia River, or Scenes and Adventure During a Residence of Six Years on the Western Side of the Rocky Mountains among Various Tribes of Indians Hitherto Unknown; Together with "A Journey across the American Continent," edited and with an introduction by Edgar I. Stewart and Jane Stewart, The American Exploration and Travel Series (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957), p. 372.

[16]Ibid., p. 373.

[17]"Fort Chilcotin," p. 13, citing letter, Governor George Simpson to Peter Skene Ogden, June 27, 1836, Hudson's Bay Company Archives D.4/22, fo. 36.

[18]Letter, Alex. Fisher to John McIntosh, June 11, 1837, cited by Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, p. 178.

[19]Daniel William Harmon, A Journal of Voyages and Travels in the Interior of North America between the 47th and 58th Degrees of N. Lat., Extending from Montreal Nearly to the Pacific, a Distance of about 5,000 miles, Including an Account of the Principal Occurrences During a Residence of Nineteen Years in Different Parts of the Country (New York: Barnes and Company, 1903), p. 193.

[20]Letter, George Simpson to Donald Manson, July 1, 1847, cited by Morice, The History of the NOrthern Interiro of British Columbia, p. 181.

[21]Letter, Peter Skene Ogden to John McLeod, Feb. 25, 1837, cited by Morice, The History of the Northern Interiror of British Columbia, p. 171.

[22]MS letter, Donald McLean to Donald Manson, Mar., 1850, cited by Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, p. 267.

[23]Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, p. 266.

[24]Ibid., p. 265.

[25]Harmon, A Journal of Voyages and Travels in the Interior of North America, pp. 162-53, cited by Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, p. 85.

[26]Ibid., p. 179.

[27]Letter, William Todd to Peter Warren Dease, Aug. 28, 1831, cited by Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, p. 113. The words in square brackets are supplied by Morice.

[28]Letter, Paul Fraser to H. Maxwell, Mar. 29, 1832 (sic for 1842), cited by Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, pp. 113-14.

[29]Hudson's Bay Company, "Resolution 95," Annual Council, Norway House, 1831, cited by Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, p. 114.

[30]Hudson's Bay Company, "Resolution 78," Annual Council, June 7, 1845, cited by Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, p. 114.

[31]"Fort Chilcotin," p. 13, citing Hudson's Bay Company Archives D.4/22, fo. 36.

[32]"Fort Chilcotin," p. 13.

[33]Harmon, A Journal of Voyages and Travels in the Interior of North America, p. 169.

[34]Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, p. 89. Morice here retells from Harmon the story of the cremation of a man who was survived by two widows.

> "After the fire had been lighted, his wives, one of whom stood at the head and the other at the feet of the corpse, kept patting it, while burning, with both hands alternately, a ceremony which was interrupted by turns of fainting arising from the intensity of the heat. 'If they did not soon recover from these turns and commence the operation of striking the corpse,' . . . 'the men would seize them by the little remaining hair on their heads and push them into the flames in order to compel them to do it. This violence was especially used toward one of the wives of the deceased, who had frequently run away from him while he was living.'"

Morice states that the account confirmed what he himself had learned from informants of his own time. (He remarks in a footnote that for patting, "Harmon, not knowing the reason for the act, says 'striking.' Morice cites from Harmon, A Journal of Voyages and Travels in the Interiour of North America. . . (Andover: Flagg and Gould, 1820), p. 89.

[35]Letter, Alexander Caulfield Anderson to Sir George Simpson, Jan. 21, 1843. Hudson's Bay Company Archives D.5/8, fo. 40-40d., cited in "Fort Chilcotin," p. 17.

[36]Note: letter, James Douglas to Captain J. Sheppard, May 28, 1849, cited in E.O.S. Scholefield, British Columbia from the Earliest Times to the Present (Vancouver, Winnipeg, Montreal, Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing Company, n.d.), pp. 375-80. This letter makes one wonder whether Fort Chilcotin was not re-occupied some time after 1844, since Douglas lists Chilcotin among the Company's trading posts. However, in giving an estimate of the annual imports Douglas in the same letter says that he has no books to refer to, so that it seems his listing of the forts was from memory. Douglas, in recalling the names of the Company's forts, seems to have inadvertently used information that was no longer valid, thus listing Chilcotin rather than Tluz-cuz.

[37]Harmon, A Journal of Voyages and Travels in the Interior of North America, pp. 215-16.

[38]Morice, A[drian] G[abriel], History of the Catholic Church in Western Canada, from Lake Superior to the Pacific (1659-1895) (2 vols.; Toronto: Musson Book Company, 1910), II, 280.

[39]"Fort Chilcotin," pp. 13-15. If the William McBean referred to in "Fort Chilcotin" is the same William McBean referred to by Morice throughout The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, then there is an inexplicable conflict in the dates given. The "Fort Chilcotin" typescript (p. 13) states that William McBean went to Fort Chilcotin ". . . to take charge of the Company's business" in October of 1837 (Reference is made to the Hudson's Bay Company Archives B.5/a/4; B.37/a/1, fo.3.). Yet according to Morice, William McBean appears to have been at Fort Kilmers on Babine Lake from as early as 1836 until 1842 (The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, pp. 205-207).

[40]Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, p. 221.

[41]John M'Lean, Notes of a Twenty-five Years' Service in the Hudson's Bay Territory (London: Richard Bentley, 1849), I, 263, referred to in Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, p. 221. See new edition: John McLean, Notes of a Twenty-fives Years' Service in the Hudson's Bay Territory, ed. by W. S. Wallace (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1932), p. 159.

[42]"Fort Chilcotin", p. 16.

[43]Letter, Modeste Demers to the Bishop of Quebec, Dec. 20, 1842, in Notices and Voyages of the Famed Quebec Mission to the Pacific Northwest, trans. and ed. by Carl Landerholm (Portland: Campoeg Press, Reed College, for the Oregon Historical Society, 1956), p. 161.

[44]Morice, History of the Catholic Church in Western Canada, II, 2940295.

[45]Morice, The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, p. 234.

CHAPTER III

THE IMPACT OF THE GOLD RUSH ON RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN EUROPEANS AND INDIANS IN VANCOUVER ISLAND AND BRITISH COLUMBIA

The Gold Rush of 1858 had an immediate and revolutionary effect on the relationships between Indian and white man in what is now British Columbia. Its long-term effect, too, was to alter irrevocably the extent and nature of white settlement in the area and to change its economic basis from one of Indian production of pelts to white production of mineral and agricultural wealth.

The Chilcotins at first, compared to other tribes, were little affected by the gold rush. But ultimately and somewhat indirectly they too were to be drastically affected.

At this point, if we are to gain as full an understanding as possible of the Chilcotin Uprising and white reactions to it, we ought to take a wider look at events and conditions in Vancouver Island and British Columbia as a whole as they affected relationships between whites and Indians.

Tension between Miners and Indians

For some years before the 1858 Gold Rush, gold had been found in small quantities in various parts of what is now British Columbia. Gold discoveries in the Queen Charlotte Islands resulted in a flurry of prospecting in 1852, which, however, ended in disappointment.[1]

In a despatch dated April 16, 1856 James Douglas, Governor of Vancouver Island, communicated to London news of the discovery of gold on the Columbia River in British territory.[2] In a later despatch Douglas, speaking of this same area, makes an early reference to animosity felt by the Indians

for American miners:

> ...I have heard...that the number of persons engaged in gold digging is yet extremely limited, in consequence of the threatening attitude of the native tribes, who being hostile to the Americans, have uniformly opposed the entrance of American citizens into their country.
>
> ...The persons at present engaged in the search of gold are chiefly of British origin and retired servants of the Hudson's Bay Company, who, being well acquainted with the natives, and connected by old acquaintanceship and the ties of friendship, are more disposed to aid and assist each other in their common pursuits than to commit injuries against persons or property.[3]

Douglas goes on to speak of "...the successful result of experiments made in washing gold from the sands of the tributary streams of Fraser's River." He even entertains hopes that the wealth will perhaps come to equal that of the gold fields of California.[3]

In a letter dated July 15, 1857, Douglas confirms the gold-bearing nature of "...certain districts of the country on the right bank of the Columbia River, and of the extensive table land which divides it from Fraser's River."[4] In the same letter Governor Douglas showed his alertness to the possibilities of trouble between miners and Indians.

> A new element of difficulty in exploring the gold country has been interposed [he wrote] through the opposition of the native Indian tribes of Thompson's River, who have lately taken the high-handed, though probably not unwise course, of expelling all the parties of gold diggers, composed chiefly of persons from the American territories, who had forced an entrance into their country. They have also openly expressed a determination to resist all attempts at working gold in any of the streams flowing into Thompson's River, both from a desire to monopolize the precious metal for their own benefit, and from a well-founded impression that the shoals of salmon which annually ascend these rivers...will be driven off, and prevented from making their annual migrations from the sea.[4]

Douglas went on to assure Labouchere that there was nothing to fear from the actions of Hudson's Bay Company servants, since the Company's officers had been ordered not to employ them in washing out gold without the Indians' consent. He felt, though, that peace might well be threatened by

the "motley adventurers" from the United States and went on to suggest that it might become necessary to appoint an officer for the protection of the natives.

As a Hudson's Bay Company man, Douglas might be expected to have more confidence in Company servants than in the newcomers, but his fears regarding the preservation of peace in the face of the influx of miners were well-founded.

In December of 1857 Douglas reported that the wealth found in the interior mines in British territory was causing great excitement in the territories of Washington and Oregon in the United States. He had taken the initiative of issuing a proclamation forbidding the digging or disturbing of the soil in search of gold unless authorized by Her Majesty's Government.[5]

In a despatch dated April 6, 1858, Douglas reported that even retired Hudson's Bay Company men had been prevented from obtaining gold in the Thompson's River District. Apparently the Indians, according to the accounts Douglas had received, had carried out a calculated and careful policy, hustling and crowding out the whites after they had excavated to the gold-bearing strata.

> Such conduct [Douglas remarked] was unwarrantable and exceedingly trying to the temper of spirited men, but the savages were far too numerous for resistance, and they had to submit to their dictation. It is, however, worthy of remark, and a circumstance highly honourable to the character of those savages, that they have on all occasions scrupulously respected the persons and property of their white visitors, at the same time that they have expressed a determination to reserve the gold for their own benefit.[6]

Douglas was certain that the influx of more gold-seekers would make necessary "the intervention of Her Majesty's Government" in order to

"restore and maintain the peace."[6]

Meanwhile reports of gold in the British territory to the north had reached and were circulating in California. The month of April saw the beginning of a mass immigration of miners, many of whom arrived by steamer from the gold-fields of California.[7] Others came overland through the interior.

Hostilities between Miners and Indians

One of the parties that followed the inland route was led by David McLaughlin, son of John McLaughlin of Oregon, who had been a Chief Factor in the Hudson's Bay Company. David McLaughlin, according to one who claimed to have known him, "...was considered a fast young man to drink, gamble and carouse, and a great Indian fighter and scout in several Indian wars on the Pacific coast."[8] He was, incidentally, of mixed blood himself.

McLaughlin's party, which started from Walla Walla, was organized on a military basis and consisted of one hundred and sixty well-armed men with about three hundred horses and mules. The military nature of its organization was due to the reputed hostility of the tribes through whose lands the party was to pass. On the Columbia plains one member of the expedition who had lagged behind was seized and killed by the Indians. Near the boundary line the party was attacked by Indians who were protected by crude fortifications on either side of the road where they had to pass through a canyon. An all-night fight ensued, with the whites and Indians setting fires in an attempt to burn one another out. Three of the whites were killed. Two or three days later, on the west side of the Okanagan River, the expedition was attacked by a hundred mounted Okanagan Indians, who attempted to separate them from their animals but were thwarted.

Peace was made, but immediately afterwards two Indians were caught jerking beef from cattle stolen from the expedition. The two were taken prisoners, though they were released at the request of Chief Trader McDonald of Fort Colville who happened to come along on his way to Fort Hope. The Okanagans continued to follow the party to within three days' journey from the Thompson River.[9]

Herman Francis Reinhart's account of his journey through the inland route reveals the lawlessness and brutality that characterized some of the miners from California.

> Our advance guards saw some Indians just leaving their camp and cross the lake Okanagan in canoes for fear of us [he writes]. The boys saw a couple of their dogs at their old camp ground, and shot them down, and they saw some old huts where the Indians had stored a lot of berries for the winter, blackberries and nuts, fifty or a hundred bushels. They helped themselves to the berries and nuts, filling several sacks to take along, and the balance they just emptied into the lake, destroying them so that the Indians should not have them for provision for the winter.[10]

Reinhart and many of the other miners remonstrated with those who had stolen and destroyed the Indians' stores, but apparently made little impression. Later the Indians tried to cut off one of the men from the rest of the company but he succeeded in rejoining his companions.

After the party moved on from their campsites on the bank of the lake in the mornings the Indians would come to get what old supplies or scraps of food the miners had thrown away. One morning twenty-five miners decided to remain behind to ambush the Indians who came to the camp-site. The men who formed the ambush later related how

> ...they were all lying down in the gulch, to be out of sight, and they got to talking to each other and forgot about the Indians to be ambushed, and they were surprised as well as the Indians.... ...some white happened to raise up to see if the Indians had landed yet, when behold! the Indians were within eight or ten feet from him [sic], and they did not see the whites till they all raised and made a rush for the Indians with their guns and pistols all ready to shoot.[11]

The whites shot down the unarmed Indians in cold blood. "It was a brutal affair [Reinhart comments], but the perpetrators of the outrage thought they were heroes, and were victors in some well-fought battle."[12] These incidents related by Reinhart took place in the summer of 1858.

Meanwhile the Fraser Canyon had seen its share of slaughter. The miners of Hill's Bar had shown themselves aware of the dangerous possibilities of disorder, and, in the absence of any visible representative of British government, had enacted their own laws which provided for the punishment of any who might abuse the Indians or provide them with liquor. A few days after these rules had been posted Douglas arrived at Fort Hope and began calling at the neighbouring mining camps. It was plain that Indian trouble threatened, and Douglas took action in an attempt to prevent it materializing. Besides making George Perrier a justice of the peace, Douglas appointed Indian magistrates who were to bring to justice natives charged with offences. After some plain speaking to both whites and Indians, Douglas left.

But threatening demonstrations by the Indians and the slaughter of miners up the canyon, whose bodies came floating downstream, aroused the miners. Early in August forty miners from Yale organized under Captain Rouse and set out to force a passage to the forks (present-day Lytton). They combined with miners from Boston Bar and met a body of Indians near the head of Big Canyon, where a fight ensued, resulting in the killing of a number of Indians and the expulsion of all Indians from that part of the canyon.

At Yale over two thousand miners met to decide on a course of action in dealing with the Indians. Snyder, who favoured more moderate measures,

was supported by the majority. Graham, favouring more extreme action, had a smaller following. Over one hundred and fifty men set out the same day and camped at Spuzzum, where the next day Snyder called a meeting and gained overwhelming support for his plan of action from an augmented body of men.

Some of the details of what followed differ in various accounts, but the upshot was that the more moderate miners succeeded in making treaties with many groups of Indians, while Graham's party was fired on and Graham himself killed. The miners' "treaties" with the Indians apparently were followed by a great increase in tranquility.[13]

Reasons for Differences between Indian Relationships with Fur Traders and Indian Relationships with Miners

The clashes between miners and Indians, whether in the Fraser Canyon or further in the interior, indicated a marked difference between the attitude of the Indian to the fur traders and his attitude to the miners. In part this may be accounted for by the difference in the functions of the two types of white men. The fur trader, while making a profit for his company, was also performing a service which the Indian valued. Through the fur trader the native received goods which he was otherwise unable to obtain. The miner, essentially, was there to take something of which the Indians had learned the value but which the miner did not expect to pay the Indians for. (Miners were often willing to pay the Indians for labor performed, but they did not expect to pay for the gold itself.)

Violent acts of revenge had been perpetrated by fur traders on individual Indians, but because of the interdependence of the fur trader and the Indian a relatively stable relationship involving a considerable degree of trust had been built up over a period of time between the fur

traders and many groups of native people with whom they had to do

Of course, quite apart from the fact that the miner was relatively independent of the Indian, the time was too short for any stable relationship to have developed between miner and Indian in 1858. In addition, many of the miners came from regions of the western United States where much lawlessness prevailed, and where the attitude towards the Indian could all too frequently be expressed by the statement that the only good Indian was a dead one.

A New Era

The coming of the miner ended the economic dependence of the white man on the Indian. Other white men with different pursuits followed in the miner's path, but never again were white men to be dependent on the Indians for their livelihood. The Indian may have appeared child-like in some respects in his lack of understanding of European culture, but in reality he was no child, and came to understand very quickly the basic reality of the new situation.

This basic understanding did not mean that the Indians were able to cope with the changes brought by the white influx. One of these changes was a great increase in the availability of liquor. The hard-drinking miners were a dependable market for the liquor merchant, and the Indian likewise proved an eager customer.

Though the effect of over-drinking on himself may not have greatly worried the white man, its effects on the Indian did worry him, since he feared for his own safety in the midst of a relatively large native population. As we have noted, the miners of Hill's Bar in their home-made

set of laws banned the provision of liquor to the Indians.

One of the proclamations Governor Douglas made even before he was made governor of the mainland was one forbidding the sale of giving of liquor to the Indians. Its wording is significant as indicating a dual motive for the proclamation: both the protection of the Indian and the preservation of peace.

> Whereas, it has been represented to me that Spirituous and other Intoxicating Liquors, have been sold to the Native Indians of Fraser River, and elsewhere, to the great injury and demoralization of the said Indians; and also thereby endangering the Public peace, and the lives and property of Her Majesty's subjects and others in the said Districts.
>
> Now be it known unto all men, that the Sale or Gift of Spirituous or other Intoxicating drinks to the said Native Indians is contrary to Law, and is hereby strictly prohibited....[14]

A penalty of from five to twenty pounds, or, in default of payment, of from two to six months in jail with or without hard labour was provided.

In spite of the proclamation, succeeding years saw the continued consumption of liquor by the Indians, and the demoralization of which the proclamation spoke also continued and was universally attested to.

Prostitution and general sexual promiscuity between white men and Indian women also resulted from the influx brought by the gold rush. Reinhart's account refers to its prevalence in Victoria in 1858.

> A miner told me he was in Victoria in June 1858 [he writes], and in the hight [sic] of the gold excitement for Fraser River, and that there were over ten thousand miners at Victoria, and the Indians from up north in their large war canoes...were trading with the Hudson Bay Company stores, and the squaws got badly demoralized, and the miners had plenty of money to spend with them, and they gave them whiskey and there was an awful time among them, and they dressed up as fine as "White Soiled Doves" do in California.[15]

Apparently it became in time a regular thing for some Indians of the north coast to travel to Victoria to trade, obtain liquor, and prostitute their women.[16]

Varieties of Attitudes to Indians and Relationships with Them

In the immediately preceeding chapter, in examining the pre-gold-rush relationships of fur traders and Indians in the Chilcotin and near-by areas we encountered a sufficient number of fur traders to gain some idea of the variety of attitudes held by them towards the Indians. For example, there were the contrasting attitudes of Daniel Williams Harmon and Donald McLean, the former attempting to prevent violence between the Indians, the latter showing great violence towards them himself. Then there was the attitude of William McBean with his desire to proselatize the natives to his hybrid religious beliefs. It will be evident that the relationships between fur traders and Indians depended in a great measure on the individual attitudes of the fur traders towards the Indians among whom they were stationed. The relationships did not depend only on the function of the fur-traders, which, as has already been suggested, involved an interdependence between fur-trader and Indian which in general developed a certain stability of relationship.

The coming of the Gold Rush brought a great variety of individuals to British Columbia who, as might be expected, differed in their personal attitudes towards the Indians. They also differed in their functional relationships with the Indians. We have noted that some of the miners had hostile personal attitudes towards the Indians and that the nature of their occupation meant that there was no essential interdependence between them and the Indians. They could take the gold without the Indians getting anything of value in return.

In the wake of the miners came men of a number of different occupations. These individuals having a variety of personal attitudes towards the Indians, also differed in their functional relationships with them, since their occupations differed. The land-holding settler, like the miner, had no relationship involving essential interdependence between himself and the Indian. In fact he frequently occupied land which the Indian himself had been accustomed to use. The missionary, who, as we have seen, was already active before the Gold Rush, had a relationship involving an essential interdependence, since the success of his mission depended on his maintaining the good-will of the Indians and the Indians depended on him to act as an intermediary between them and the rest of white society, interpreting that society for them.

Examples of the Varying Nature of White Attitudes to Indians

A sampling of Europeans' expressions of opinion will give some idea of the varieties of attitudes, whether determined by the functional relationships with the Indians that the Europeans experienced or by the Europeans' personal ideosyncracies, or philosophies, or religious beliefs.

Francis Poole, who had had charge of a group of miners in the Queen Charlotte Islands, wrote an account of his experiences which was published in London in 1871. According to his narrative he had far more difficulty with the miners under him than he had with the local Haida. In fact, he came to look to the Indians for protection from the unruly whites under him.

> The Queen Charlotte Islanders [he wrote] are justly considered the finest sample of the Indian race in the North Pacific. Their faults are the usual Indian ones; but I did not find them to be naturally revengeful or bloodthirsty, except when smarting under the sense of a real and grave injury, or when seeking to avert an imaginary wrong.

> If honestly and firmly treated, no natives could be better disposed towards the white men.[17]

Captain C. E. Barrett-Lennard published in London in 1862 an account of Travels in British Columbia with the Narrative of a Yacht Voyage round Vancouver's Island. His impression of Indian character tended to be adverse.

> My long sojurn among the Indians of different tribes inhabiting the coasts of Vancouver's Island [he wrote] did not tend to impress me with a high opinion of the morality of the untutored savage. I regard them as being, generally speaking, treacherous and deceitful, and cannot help looking on every Indian as more or less a thief at heart.[18]

At the same time he credited them with some good qualities.

> In common with all their race [he wrote], they possess the savage attributes of a wonderfully passive endurance of hardship and suffering, and a stoic indifference to torture and death when inevitable, which amounts to a kind of rude heroism. Of their natural courage there can be no doubt. If they can be preserved from the curse of drinking, they are frugal and abstemious in their way of living, and, although not fond of work, they can be taught to acquit themselves creditably of any ordinary task that may be assigned to them, and make in many cases very fair household servants.[19]

Duncan George Macdonald in British Columbia and Vancouver's Island, also published in London in 1862, painted the British Columbia Indian in the darkest of colours, as he painted British Columbia itself. Speaking of the Carriers, in which group he included the Chilcotins, he wrote:

> Like all the savages in the territory of British Columbia, they are not only most filthy in their habits, but are extremely debauched and sensual, syphilitic complaints of the very worst kind being prevalent amongst them....some of them burrow in the earth and live like badgers or ground-hogs. They are, moreover, very superstitious, and great believers in the magical powers of their medicinemen or conjurors....[20]

The Haida, according to sources which Macdonald mentioned approvingly, were said to contrast favourably with other Indians. After speaking of their physical appearance as being better than those of more southerly

tribes, Macdonald remarks that "We have seen some whose natural complexion is as white as that of the people of Southern Europe."[21] Presumably he regarded this as a point in their favour. He gives the Haidas credit for "ingenuity and mechanical dexterity,"[21] but calls them "...a most treacherous race, and always ready for mischief."[22]

> The wild man of British Columbia [Macdonald generalized] is as savage as the scenes which surround him, and in harmony with the freaks of nature....his morals are the promptings of untutored instinct...[23]

Giving his literary talents a yet wider field of endeavor, Macdonald describes the North American Indians as

> ...no ordinary race of savages; they exhibit [he says] almost all the traits of the worst form of barbarism....Murder is no crime among these ferocious beings, who stab, shoot, scalp, and eat their enemies, with the voracity of their companion wolves.[23]

Yet presently our author lapses into sentiment:

> There is in the fate of these unfortunate beings [he says] much to awaken our sympathy. What can be more melancholy than their history? By a law of their nature they seem destined to extermination. They fade away at the approach of the white man, and mournfully pass by us to return no more....Poor human beings! if they have the vices of savage life, they have the virtues also. If their revenge and insatiable thirst for blood is terrible, their fidelity to their kinsmen is unconquerable also.[24]

Macdonald's passing expressions of sympathy for the British Columbia Indian appear to be literary devices rather than manifestations of genuine concern. The Indian's inevitable fate as an inferior being is to be superseded by a superior race.

> He will recede before the white man as his fathers have done, and at last yield to the inevitable law which decrees that the inferior races shall vanish from the face of the earth, and that the truculent unimprovable savage shall give place to families capable of higher development.[25]

Macdonald's real sympathies, apparently, went out to Indians with whom the author was not personally involved.

> The Indians of Florida [he remarks] were men of a different class, and deserving of a better fate. There were few who did not sympathise with them when they were driven from the native land...[25]

Settlers and Indians

An insight into the potentials for hostility inherrent in the relationship between settler and Indian is given in Scenes and Studies of Savage Life by G. M. Sproat, who "...was for five years a colonial magistrate, and also a proprietor of the settlement at Alberni," which was at the time "the only civilized settlement on the west coast."[26] In 1860 Sproat with about fifty other men sailed up the Alberni canal in two armed vessels to take possession of the Alberni district. It so happened that a summer encampment of Indians was at the time occupying a spot desired by the prospective settlers. (The site was in the Nootka territory.)

> In the morning [Sproat writes] I sent for the chief, and explained to him that his tribe must move their encampment, as we had bought all the surrounding land from the Queen of England, and wished to occupy the site of the village for a particular purpose. He replied that the land belonged to themselves, but that they were willing to sell it. The price being not excessive, I paid him what was asked...[27]

The following day the Indians proved reluctant to move. "...as an excuse," Sproat says, "it was stated that the children were sick."[28] Signs of resistance were evident among the Indians, but a show of force by the whites persuaded the natives to carry out the removal.

The Indians were not only aware of their inability to effectively resist, but apprehensive of their complete loss of independence.

> "They say that more King-George men ["English"] will soon be here" [the old chief told Sproat], "and will take our land, our firewood, our fishing-grounds; that we shall be placed on a little spot, and shall have to do everything according to the fancies of the King-George men."[28]

Sproat said little to reassure him.

As time went on Sproat observed changes in the nearby Indian community. Apparently it was rather thoroughly demoralized. The Indians had become listless and apprehensive and were disregarding their old practices and ceremonies. Sickness increased. Sproat attributed it to the disquiet produced by the presence of settlers with their superior civilization.

Sproat and the Americans who chiefly made up his party of settlers were aware of the ethical issues involved in their actions. They used to sit around in the evenings and discuss the question of native rights in some depth. The Americans, Sproat says,

> ...considered that any right in the soil which these natives had as occupiers was partial and imperfect, as, with the exception of hunting animals in the forests, plucking wild fruits, and cutting a few trees to make canoes and houses, the natives did not, in any civilized sense, occupy the land.[29]

Civilized men had a right to occupy such a land, bringing progress by colonization, they concluded.

Sproat himself felt their argument was only partial justification for the whites' actions. He felt the use the natives made of the land had some bearing on the question, but admitted, in effect, that in practice the whites were acting on the principle that might is right.[30]

The basic conflict of interest between settlers and Indians was felt in many parts of what is now British Columbia. The fact of the tension between settler and Indian is evident in the official correspondence of the period. For example, a dispute (relatively minor) which arose between whites and Indians regarding land at the northern end of Okanagan Lake,

on the east bank, is referred to by William G. Cox in 1861 in a letter to the Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works.[31] In the same year Charles Good, Acting Private Secretary to the Governor, refers to a "misunderstanding" over boundaries that arose between Mr. Atkins of Coquitlam Farm and the Indians of the district.[32]

Townspeople and Indians

Tension over Indians arose not only in the country, but in the growing towns of Victoria and New Westminster. The close proximity of whites and Indians had its dire effects on the Indians, though these were not of paramount concern to most whites.

> The residents of Victoria [Ormsby writes] had become accustomed to the growing depravity and demoralization of the Indians. Little more than idle comment was passed when, on numerous occasions, the body of an Indian woman was discovered floating on the waters of the Inner Harbour.[33]

But if white townspeople generally were not greatly concerned with the effect of their presence on the Indians, they could become greatly concerned with the effect of the Indians' presence on themselves. Of course merchants valued the Indians as customers, but whites often felt their presence as near neighbours was most undesirable. Articles in the Colonist of Victoria bore such titles as "Indian Murders and Depradations in Victoria,"[34] "Clearing the Streets,"[35] "Make 'em Decent,"[36] and "Disorderly Siwashes."[37] The New Westminster's British Columbian had frequent comment on "the Indian question".[38] The spread of small-pox among the Indians caused the northern Indians to be expelled from the Victoria

area and hastened the establishment of a reservation for the New Westminster Indians.[40]

The British Columbian, in pressing for the allotment of a reservation for the Indians of New Westminster, pointed out the benefits this would bring the Indians themselves, but the general tone of its comments indicate that its main concern in pressing for reservation was the benefit of the whites. An article in 1862 reporting the stabbing of an Indian was an occasion for a renewed demand for an Indian reservation.

> Four miners recently returned from Victoria on their way to Cariboo [it reported], having got on a 'bend' adjourned about midnight to an Indian rancheria hard by, where the inmates being intoxicated, a difficulty soon arose, resulting in a general scuffle, when one of the miners drew a knife and stabbed one of the Indians in the back, between the shoulders....
>
> We have reason to congratulate ourselves upon the comparative paucity of cases of this sort heretofore; but, unless something be done by the authorities to remove the Indians to a reserve at a suitable distance from the city, we have every reason to anticipate just such a result as that experienced in Victoria. The Indians are now encamped in considerable numbers almost in the very centre of the city, where they are permitted to make a display of their licentiousness and corruption in the blaze of the day, under the gaze of respectable families--where all night long peaceful slumbers are disturbed by their drunken orgies. Of what avail will it be to punish the white man, who, under the influence of alcohol, is sure to fall into their net, if this sink of iniquity be permitted to revel in our midst?[41]

The desire of the white townspeople to have reservations established no doubt worked in the best interests of the Indians, for the testimony of contemporary writers to the demoralization of the Indians in the towns is quite convincing. But the practical interest of most urban dwellers in the Indians did not, it seems, extend much beyond seeing the Indian depart from their midst.

Missionaries and Indians

The interest of the Indian, then, did not coincide with the interests or concerns of the white miners, settlers, or townspeople, and frequently clashed with the apparent interests of the settlers in particular. Who, then, was to speak for the Indian? Time and again in this period we find the missionary acting as spokesman for the Indians, and as guardian of the Indians' interests as he saw them.

A well-known missionary of this period was William Duncan, who, with amazing initiative and drive, led a group of Tsimshian Indians to establish a model Christian community called Metlakatla on the Nass River in 1862.

As early as 1860 we find Duncan concerning himself with the conditions of the Indians encamped in the vicinity of Victoria. The fact that by 1860 thousands of Indians were living on the outskirts of Victoria in terrible conditions, and that these Indians' camps were the scenes of much violence, greatly concerned Duncan as well as some of the Victoria townspeople at this time. The question had already arisen as to whether these Indians were to be driven from Victoria and gunboats stationed on the north coast to prevent their returning.

> ...Duncan [says Usher] was certain that it would lead to "a quarrel, then a war, then we should have had a repetition of the Misery and trouble the Americans have experienced with the Indians in their western territories."[42]
>
> . . . . . .
>
> ...Duncan advised Victoria, "as you deal with the rowdy whites, so deal with the rowdy Indians: make them obey the laws."[43] The colony was expanding rapidly, he pointed out. White settlement might soon spread north and inland, and it would be impossible to provide gunboats for the entire region. But apart from the practical drawbacks of such a restrictive policy, Duncan emphasised that it was contrary to the laws of humanity, and inconsistent with the spirit of true religion.[44]

Duncan believed that the Indians should be permitted to visit Victoria provided they were willing to live there under the right conditions. Duncan presented Douglas with a plan for their organization under a system designed to bring law and order and good social conditions.

The small-pox epidemic in 1862 resulted in the expulsion against which Duncan had argued. But the dreadful epidemic also resulted in great exertions by some whites on behalf of the Indians. The British Columbian, referring to the epidemic in Victoria, reported:

> The Rev. Mr. Garrett appears to be exerting himself in ameliorating as far as possible the sufferings of the poor Indians. Through his praise-worthy exertions a temporary Hospital for the sick has been erected on the Indian Reserve.[45]

The same newspaper reported on the work of a Roman Catholic missionary on the mainland:

> The Revd. Mr. Fouquet, Catholic Missionary here, has visited Yale recently, calling at all the intermediate rancherias and vaccinating the Indians. During the last twelve days he has vaccinated no fewer than three thousand four hundred between this City and Yale inclusive.[46]

John Sheepshanks, rector of the Anglican church in New Westminster, obtaining lancets and vaccine from the Royal Engineers, vaccinated some of the Indians of the interior on his journey to visit the miners of the Cariboo.[47]

Missionaries were active in attempting to act as spokesmen to ensure that land was reserved for the Indians. The British Columbian reported that it had learned from "the Rev. Mr. Fouquet," who it said was "possessed of very extensive information upon the subject," that the great majority of Indians were willing and anxious that permanent reserves be established.[48]

The fact that the missionary was often both a spokesman for the Indian and a source of information relied on by the government seems to

have been felt as an awkward and embarrassing circumstance by government officials on occasion. In a confidential letter to Governor Douglas, R. C. Moody, in his capacity of Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works, wrote:

> I endeavoured to carry out through the medium of the Reverend M. Fouquet, R.C., the idea laid down in an accompanying letter as to obtaining the numbers of villages, population, extent of land, etc., and furnished him with stakes all in accordance with that which seemed to be suitable at the time. M. Fouquet conferred with your Excellency in my presence, but I very quickly had occasion to desist from such a course from the extreme want of judgement shown by that gentleman, in fact from the operations of the Roman Catholic Missionaries, (philanthropic in spirit no doubt), we are likely to have embarrassments....[49]

Through the Colonial Secretary for the colony Governor Douglas informed Moody that he did not think it "at all necessary or expedient" to use the assistance of the Roman Catholic missionaries in laying out reserves for the Indians, although he apparently still regarded them as useful in supplying information on the population of the tribes. Douglas was concerned himself that the area of the reserves be sufficient, for he directed, "...in all cases where the land pointed out by the Indians appears to the officer employed on the service to be inadequate for their support, a larger area is at once to be set apart."[50]

In a letter to Douglas written in April of 1863 Moody speaks of the Catholic priests encouraging the Indians to pre-empt land like white men. "It is a growing question that will have to be met,"[51] Moody commented.

Considerable space could be taken in describing the numerous ways in which missionaries were involved in seeking to better the social conditions of the Indians. The missionary on the one hand saw it as his duty to bring about the abolition of those features of native society which he regarded as harmful. This might involve replacing them with features of European society which the missionary regarded as beneficial. On the other

hand, the missionary saw it as his duty to combat those features of western society which he saw as harmful and which other Europeans might seek to introduce to the natives. Education in many cases was closely linked with missionary work. William Duncan, for example, began a school for Tsimshian children at Fort Simpson as early as 1859. Missionaries were actively involved in combatting the activities of those who supplied liquor to the Indians, and Indians were encouraged to "take the pledge".

As has been mentioned, the nature of the relationship between missionary and Indian involved an essential interdependence, since the success of the missionary's endeavours depended on his maintaining the goodwill of the Indian, while at the same time the Indian depended on the missionary to act as intermediary between himself and the rest of white society. But it would be wrong to dismiss the missionary's work for the Indian's material welfare as merely an attempt to gain the Indians' goodwill. After all, the very fact of his having taken on a mission to the Indians might be presumed to indicate a certain concern for their welfare. The missionary's efforts as advocate for the Indians may be regarded as essentially part of his mission and as resulting from his taking seriously his Christian beliefs. For example, in expressing his views against the forcible expulsion of the Indians from the vicinity of the whites, Duncan wrote:

> We are taught by our religion that all men are brethren of one blood, and if some possess greater advantages than others, those advantages are given them to use for the common good of all...How are we then, discharging our duties to them, when, after corrupting them by our vices, we drive them out of our sight.[52]

It should not be imagined that missionaries of the time admired Indian society any more than the majority of their fellow-Europeans did. In fact, many aspects of it were abhorrent to them. Nor did most of them have any illusions about the "noble savage" as an individual. William Duncan in 1865 made a list of twenty-two points "To be remembered in discoursing to the Indians"[53] in which he listed at length the faults of those with whom he was working. The missionaries of the period characteristically saw civilization as necessary for a Christian society, and freely introduced aspects of their own Victorian society into Indian society, though they were selective in doing this. Though the degree of ethnocentricity in their outlook varied, universally they desired the replacement of many features of Indian culture by features similar to those found in European society. But whatever the missionary thought of Indian society or Indian characteristics, he was firmly committed to the belief that the Indian was worth working with both in the spiritual and temporal spheres.

The Influence of the British Humanitarian Movement

Outside of Vancouver Island and British Columbia there were others who exerted their influence on behalf of the Indians of the region. The Aborigines Protection Society of Britain was in a position to affect the policies of the Imperial Government itself.

The humanitarian movement, with its origins in the latter half of the eighteenth century, had had some notable successes in the first half of the nineteenth. In 1807 the slave trade had been outlawed in the British Empire. In 1833 slavery itself had been abolished by law. The Aborigines

Protection Society exerted a continuing pressure on behalf of natives throughout the British Empire. The numerous and extensive missionary reports sent back to Britain were an important means by which the society was able to act as a watchdog on behalf of the interests of the natives. The campaigns on behalf of the abolition of slavery and of the slave trade had proved the possible effect on public opinion of humanitarian propaganda, and had drawn to the humanitarian movement a number of very prominent persons.

The Imperial Government and the Indians

As early as July 31, 1858 we find the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir E. B. Lytton, directing Governor Douglas

> ...to consider the best and most humane means of dealing with the Native Indians. The feelings of this country [he wrote] would be strongly opposed to the adoption of any arbitrary or oppressive measures towards them.[54]

Lytton hesitated to suggest specific measures to prevent trouble between Indians and immigrants, leaving these to Douglas to decide upon. But he observed "...that it should be an invariable condition, in all bargains or treaties with the natives for the cession of lands possessed by them, that subsistence should be supplied to them in some other shape...." It was desired that "early attention" be given by Douglas "...to the best means of diffusing the blessings of the Christian Religion and of civilization among the natives."[54]

On September 2, 1858 the Secretary of State for the Colonies sent to Douglas a copy of a letter from the Aborigines Protection Society to himself (Lytton). In doing so Lytton again reminded Douglas of the

importance he attached to the protection of the Indians. At the same time he begged him to observe that Douglas was not to understand him as "...adopting the views of the Society as to the means by which this may be best accomplished."[55]

In its letter to Lytton the Aborigines Protection Society addressed Lytton "...on certain matters affecting they said not only the rights and interests but very existence of the numerous Indian population of the new Colony of British Columbia,"[56] The letter quoted the New York Times to illustrate the "reckless inhumanity" of the miners of California towards the Indians. The Society asked that measures be taken to protect the Indians and further asked that the native title be recognized in British Columbia and that a reasonable adjustment be made of their claims.

Government is in large part concerned with responding to the varying pressures of different sectors of society, as well as with providing for the varying needs of a society. The Imperial Government was concerned with responding to the pressure of the humanitarian cause. But it was also concerned with the desire of the settlers for land and the need to build up the population of the colony. Thus we find Lytton on May 20, 1859 cautioning Douglas that, while he was to concern himself with the welfare of the natives, he should also avoid checking the progress of the white colonists in his laying out of reserves.[57]

Colonial Government and the Indians

Douglas, on his part, besides seeking to carry out the wishes of the Imperial Government, had to consider his responses to various sectors of the colonial society. In considering the question of land reservations, for example, he had to keep in mind the pressures of land-hungry or land-

greedy settlers on the one hand and of Indians and missionaries on the other. Both settlers and missionaries had contacts in Britain who could complain to the Imperial Government. Indians were relatively numerous and could create trouble if aroused. And the possibility existed that the settlers if dissatisfied might grow tired of colonial rule, opting for union with the United States.

A brief summary of Douglas's handling of the Indian land problem will perhaps give some indication of his attitude towards the Indians and of the various factors that shaped his practical policy towards them.

In the early years, beginning in 1850, Douglas followed the practice of purchasing land from the Indians for the Hudson's Bay Company. Perhaps this was done with a view to the possible later reimbursement of the Company by the British Government. A number of agreements were signed with various tribes of Vancouver Island. The prices paid varied. Seventy-five pounds sterling was paid to the "Swengwhung Tribe" of Victoria Peninsula, south of Colquitz. The conditions of sale of the land belonging to this tribe may be quoted as representative of the conditions in the other agreements:

> ...our village sites and enclosed fields are to be kept for our own use, for the use of our children, and for those who may follow after us; and the land shall be properly surveyed hereafter. It is understood, however, that the land itself, with these small exceptions, becomes the entire property of the white people for ever; it is also understood that we are at liberty to hunt over the unoccupied lands, and to carry on our fisheries as formerly.[58]

In a despatch to Douglas dated December 30, 1858 Lytton inquired as to the feasibility of settling the Indians permanently in villages, contributing to their civilization. Law and relgion, he suggested, could be

introduced and would "...contribute to their own security against the aggressions of immigrant."[59] Some form of taxation could be imposed, the proceeds of which would go to benefit the Indians. Douglas responded indicating his wholehearted agreement with such a scheme, and making detailed proposals for establishing such self-supporting settlements.[60]

Meanwhile Douglas had taken steps to ensure that the land reserved near Victoria for the Indians was not obtained from them by private individuals. Douglas issued a public notice to the effect that this land was the property of the Crown and that the Indians themselves could not legally sell it.

In 1861 Douglas wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies transmitting a petition from the Vancouver Island House of Assembly requesting aid in extinguishing the Indian land title. Douglas added his own appeal suggesting that the Imperial Government advance 3,000 "...to be eventually repaid out of the Colonial Land Fund."[61] However, Newcastle, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, refused any aid, stating that this was purely a colonial matter. Since the colonists were unwilling, and considered themselves unable, to provide money for the continued purchase of native title, it ceased to be purchased.

In both Vancouver Island and the mainland colony of British Columbia reserves were laid out as settlement made threatening inroads on Indian lands, but title was no longer purchased. Government came to regard the land as its own without having purchased it.

Another problem faced by Douglas was that of dealing with destruction and violence involving the Indian. His main concern was the restoration

of order and the prevention of further violence. In the early party of his career as governor, Douglas did not usually concern himself with violence among the Indians if it did not involve whites. In this he was following typical Hudson's Bay Company practice.

> Having no power to protect [he wrote Newcastle] it would have been unjust to punish and unwise to involve the Government in questions of which we could learn neither the merits nor the true bearings...[62]

If an Indian were responsible for the death of a white man, Douglas' method was to use a show of force to induce his tribe to hand over the Indian for trial. If the village concerned refused, war was, in effect, made on it till it capitulated. Coastal villages could be shelled from gunboats. But Douglas often went to great lengths to avoid such general hostilities. In his dealings with the Cowichans over the 1852 killing of two Hudson's Bay Company shepherds Douglas had even risked his own life to avoid general conflict.[63]

One instance referred to by G. E. Shankel in his thesis on The Development of Indian Policy in British Columbia shows Douglas capable of taking strong measures to bring the white murderer of an Indian to justice. For the capture of Richard Jones, who had killed an Indian in Victoria, he offered a fifty pound reward, and threatened with prosecution anyone giving him aid.[64]

The gathering of vast numbers of Indians of various tribes at Victoria predictably resulted in violence between the Indians. They were at such close quarters to the whites that the violence threatened the peace and welfare of the white community, and was brought forcibly to Douglas's attention. Under these circumstances he took measures to intervene,

warning the Indians' chief men against the consequences of their taking revenge instead of appealing to the law.[65]

James Douglas's personal attitude had no doubt been shaped by his long years in the service of the Hudson's Bay Company, where he had come to appreciate the importance of good relations with the Indians, while adopting a "hands-off" attitude towards their internal affairs. He did seem to have developed a genuine concern for the Indians' welfare: a concern which was manifested not only verbally in his despatches to London, but also in his practical support of William Duncan and his instructions that adequate reserves be set aside for the Indians. This is not to say that their welfare was his paramount concern. Rather it was one of numerous considerations which occupied his attention and helped to shape his policies.

As the most important member of the judicial branch of the government of the mainland colony, Judge Matthew Baillie Begbie was to have many direct dealings with the Indians, including his conducting the trials that followed the Chilcotin Uprising. His early attitude towards the Indians is therefore of special interest to us. In his report of 1859 of his "Journey into the Interior of British Columbia" he shows judicial impartiality and independence of judgement in delineating his impressions of Indian character.

> Two chiefs, said to be of extensive authority, paid me a visit while at Cayoosh [he wrote]. They complained of the conduct of the citizens of the United States in preventing them from mining, in destroying and carrying away their root-crops without compensation, and in laying wholly upon the Indians many depredations on cattle and horses which these Indians informed me were in part, at least, committed by "Boston men." On the other hand, many cases of cattle-stealing were alleged by the whites of all nations against

> the Indians; and stealing, indeed, of anything which could by possibility be eaten. For even the cattle which Indians stole they did not attempt to sell or make use of otherwise than as food; and it was admitted on all hands that many hundreds of Indians had died of absolute starvation during the winter.
>
> The whites alleged, what is obvious to everybody, that the Indians are extremely averse to work, except under the pressure of immediate hunger; and that they are so improvident as rarely to look beyond the wants of the day, and never to consider the wants of a winter beforehand. If I may venture an opinion, I should think that this is much more true of the savages who have never been brought into contact with civilization than with those who have had even a little acquaintance with the whites. We found almost everywhere Indians willing to labour hard for wages, and bargaining acutely for wages; and perfectly acquainted with gold-dust, and the minute weights for measuring one and two dollars with. These circumstances are inconsistent with an utter heedlessness for the next day's provisions, for in all cases we had to find these Indians in provisions as well as wages.[66]

Personal Attitudes Towards the Indians and Nineteenth-Century Currents of Thought

Even a brief examination of Europeans' actions and expressions of opinion makes obvious the fact that the attitudes of white men towards the Indians in this period varied widely. Yet there were also points of common agreement. Sometimes this common agreement was the result of personal observation of the same facts of Indian life. As often or more often it resulted from commonly held nineteenth-century notions about the nature of men. Divergence in attitudes, however, could result from contact with varying nineteenth-century ideas.

The fact that the whites of gold-rush British Columbia and Vancouver Island formed their attitudes to a great extent on the basis of notions which were current at the time says nothing as to the rightness or wrongness of their attitudes. The ideas about mankind current in the nineteenth

century, like those of the twentieth century, were based partly on philosophical and religious concepts derived from or related to personal subjective experience. They were partly based also on the evidence as seen by Europeans and interpreted in the light of those philosophical and religious concepts.

In comparing and contrasting the attitudes revealed in the actions and statements we have examined, it will be well to also be aware of the relationship of those attitudes to the thought generally current at the time.

If any one concept with regard to the Indian was universal at this time among those who dealt with the Indian and who wrote about him, it was the belief in the inherent superiority of white civilization over that of the Indian. If this belief was seldom directly stated it was due to the fact of its being a generally accepted assumption. This assumption is usually quietly made by British Columbia writers of this period. It is, however, held in widely varying forms, accompanied by widely varying emotional responses, and followed by widely varying conclusions. The form this assumption took with the missionary William Duncan differed markedly from the form it took with a man such as Duncan George Macdonald. For William Duncan the essential superiority of true civilization was rooted in Christianity. The Indian, becoming a Christian, could participate truly in civilization. For Macdonald the essential superiority of western civilization lay in race. The Indian, unable to change the characteristics of his race, was doomed to "recede before the white man"[67] and to "at last yield to the inevitable law which decrees that the inferior races shall vanish from the face of the earth."[67]

William Duncan may be taken as representative of the humanitarian movement which gained influence in the early decades of the nineteenth century and, according to P. D. Curtin (in The Image of Africa), reached its "high-water mark of dominance in British colonial affairs" in the years 1835-41.[68] Curtin takes 1852 as the end of the humanitarian era.[69] But while this year may have ended its dominance in the Colonial Office, it did not end its influence there, and it certainly remained an important current of influence among individuals and societies as well as in government circles for a long time to come.

Duncan Forbes Macdonald, in contrast to William Duncan, may be taken as representative of another trend in nineteenth-century thought. This was the current of "pseudo-scientific racism" which began to gain strength about the middle of the nineteenth century (at the same time as the humanitarian influence lost its dominance).[70] According to this theory, race was the key which explained the essential difference in cultures. This concept took many forms, but its most extreme form led to the conclusion that the non-white races were fated to permanent subjugation by the whites or ultimate extinction.

Macdonald's belief that the Indian would vanish from the earth he regarded as stemming from his general racist beliefs, but the possible extinction of the Indian was suggested to many by publicity regarding the disappearance of the Indians which gained wide circulation in the mid-nineteenth century.[71] Indians were still numerous in Vancouver Island and British Columbia during the gold-rush period, so that their extinction, when envisaged, was regarded as a far-distant event. Most Europeans of

the two colonies do not seem to have regarded the extinction of the Indian as inevitable even after the widespread deaths among the Indians in the area which resulted from the smallpox epidemic of 1862-63.

The actions and expressed attitudes of missionaries such as William Duncan and others as well as those of Governor James Douglas indicate that those involved in attempting to change the lot of the Indian regarded his future as lying in the adoption of white civilization. William Duncan in the organization of the Indian village of Metlakatla along essentially European lines gave evidence of this belief. So did he in his advice to Douglas against the expulsion of the Indians from Victoria and in favour of their being allowed to remain on the basis of their obeying the same laws as those which applied to the whites. The fact that Catholic were said to have encouraged the Indians to pre-empt land as the whites did would seem to indicate their desire that the Indian adopt the life of the white settler. The fact that James Douglas responded enthusiastically to Lytton's enquiry regarding the feasibility of settling the Indians for the purpose of civilization indicates that he too believed that in the adoption of European civilization lay the Indians' hopes for the future.

At the same time, none of those whom we observe in any way attempting to better the lot of the Indian believed that he was capable of stepping immediately into the position of the white man in white society. There was consistent agreement that the Indian needed protection against those features of white society which would be harmful to him. Duncan's society at Metlakatla was a tightly regulated one, and even though there were

Indian officials it was dominated by the towering personality of Duncan in his roles of missionary and magistrate. Duncan's advice to Douglas regarding the Indians visiting Victoria was not merely that Douglas should allow them to stay, but also that they should be organized, and he presented Douglas with his plans for such organization.

The desire to protect the Indian came not so much from theory as from first-hand experience of the adverse effects of white contact on the Indians. These adverse effects were attested to by practically everyone who had anything to do with the Indians, whether he was involved in trying to ameliorate their conditions or not. Thus we have heard the description given Reinhart, and reported to as second-hand, of the demoralization of the Indians in Victoria. Sproat attested to the sickness which apparently resulted from the Indians' contact with his own group of settlers and noted, with some puzzlement, their listless and apprehensive state after having been forced off their land.

The early proclamation of James Douglas against the sale or gift of liquor to the Indians on the mainland was an example of attempting to protect the Indians through law-making from "injury and demoralization" from alcohol. Of course this law involved treating the Indian as different from the white man, and it was indeed felt that he was different, in, among other things, his need for protection. The attempt to protect the Indian from alcohol, however, was never completely successful, and the demoralization of Indian women through prostitution was not eliminated.

The establishment of land reserves for the Indians was designed, among other things, to protect them from the encroachments of white land-

grabbers. This protection, too, involved treating the Indian as a special case, since the land reserved was not held under the free-hold system as the white settler could hold his. Thus the Indians could not sell reserved land to individual whites.

Little could be done to protect the Indians from some diseases, it seemed, but, as we have seen, some attempt was made to prevent or limit the spread of smallpox by means of vaccination.

The belief in the conversion of the natives to western civilization was common in this period in the British Empire. P. D. Curtin, dealing primarily with attitudes towards Africans, refers to the middle decades of the nineteenth century as representing "the height of conversionist sentiment."[72] After 1870 this idea of conversion declined, he says, and the idea of trusteeship over native races for their protection gradually replaced it. In British Columbia and Vancouver Island in the gold-rush period we find elements of both these ideas. Conversion to western civilization was the ideal. Whether it could be fully achieved or not was seldom stated. But in the meantime protection was required. The government in some degree had begun to exercise a trusteeship over the Indians.

What, in general, did the European think of the Indian as a person? It would be wrong to suggest that because he believed in the inherent superiority of European culture he did not see any virtue in the Indian. A common attitude expressed in this period and earlier was the belief that the Indian was characterized by vices and virtues different from those typical of the civilized white man. Thus we have seen Francis Poole

speaking of the Haida faults as "the usual Indian ones."[73] Captain C. E. Barrett-Lennard found that the Vancouver Island Indians did not impress him "with a high opinion of the morality of the untutored savage"[74] but he credited them with "the savage attributes of a wonderfully passive endurance of hardship and suffering," with a "stoic indifference to torture and death when inevitable," and with "natural courage."[75] Duncan George Macdonald we find allowing that if the Indians "...have the vices of savage life, they have the virtues also."[76] As widely varying in other respects as these three authors are, we find them all subscribing to a similar notion with regard to the virtues and vices of the Indian. They were viewing the Indians of whom they were writing in the light of what Roy Harvey Pearce calls the "idea of savagism."[77] According to this concept, which Pearce in The Savages of America traces in origin to Scottish writers, "...there were, along with savage vices, concomittant savage virtues"[78] and "Savage virtues are undeniably virtues, for they are incident to man's essential 'sociality'."[79] Pearce suggests that Americans, confronted with the relationship between the Indian and civilization, found the concept of savagism a particularly useful one to explain how the Indian was different from themselves and why he did not adapt to civilization. It seems that a number of writers who dealt with British Columbia Indians also found the concept a useful one. Pearce suggests that in the 1850's and after the concept began to lose its appeal. This may indeed have been so in many parts of the United States, but the very reasons he gives for its loss of appeal there suggest why it was still an attractive concept under conditions in frontier British Columbia and Vancouver Island.

> In the 1850's and after [he writes] one could be objective about the Indian as one could not have been ten, twenty, or thirty years before; one could be objective about a creature who had been reduced to the status of a specimen picked up on field trips. One could move toward scientific analysis and away from pity and censure.
>
> With the beginnings of such a move, we can see, if dimly, the beginnings of the end of the idea of savagism and of the Indian as savage.[80]

In British Columbia and Vancouver Island in the 1850's and 60's the Indian was not yet "reduced to the status of a specimen." He was still numerous and potentially a threat to civilization. Because he was a part of their life there were many who felt the need to view the Indian in a "historical-moral" rather than in a merely scientific light. The concept of savagism answered this need.

The Growth of Colonial Government

A brief note is necessary regarding changes in government of what is now British Columbia, prior to the Chilcotin Uprising in 1864.

In March of 1850 Richard Blanshard, sent out as the first governor of Vancouver Island, read the proclamation and commission which instituted colonial government on the island. The unfortunate Blanshard soon found, however, that the real power was still held by the Hudson's Bay Company. Blanshard resigned in 1851 and James Douglas, still Chief Factor, became governor of Vancouver Island as well. The mainland remained under the informal rule of the Hudson's Bay Company.

The gold rush of 1858 led Douglas, as the nearest representative of the imperial government, to take the initiative of extending his authority to the mainland. The situation was regularized by the establishment of the mainland colony of British Columbia in the same year, with Douglas appointed as its governor on condition of his severance of ties with the

Hudson's Bay Company. Douglas thereafter was governor of both colonies till his resignation in 1864, which opened the way for separate governorships with Arthur Kennedy over Vancouver Island and Frederick Seymour over the mainland colony of British Columbia.

Footnotes for Chapter III

[1]Hubert Howe Bancroft [et al.], History of British Columbia, 1792-1887, The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft, Vol. XXXII (San Francisco, History Company, 1887), pp. 344-45.

[2]Despatch, James Douglas to Henry Labouchere, Apr. 16, 1856 in Great Britain, Parliament, Copies or Extracts of Correspondence Relative to the Discovery of Gold in the Fraser's River District, in British North America, Cmd. 2398, 1st series (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1858), p. 5.

[3]Ibid., p. 6, Douglas to Labouchere, Oct. 29, 1856.

[4]Ibid., p. 7, Douglas to Labouchere, July 15, 1857.

[5]Ibid., p. 8, Douglas to Labouchere, Dec. 29, 1857.

[6]Ibid., p. 10, Douglas to Labouchere, Apr. 6, 1858.

[7]Margaret A. Ormsby, British Columbia: A History (Vancouver: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1958), p. 139, and Bancroft [et al.], History of British Columbia, p. 359.

[8]Herman Francis Reinhart, The Golden Frontier: The Recollections of Herman Francis Reinhart, 1851-1869, ed. by Doyce B. Nunis, Jr. with a Foreward by Nora B. Cunningham (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962), p. 125. The editor remarks, "David's reputation is fairly stated by Reinhart."

[9]See Bancroft [et al.], History of British Columbia, pp. 367-68.

[10]Reinhart, The Golden Frontier, pp. 125-26

[11]Ibid., p. 126.

[12]Ibid., p. 127.

[13]For a fuller account of these Fraser Canyon troubles of 1858 see Bancroft [et al.], History of British Columbia, pp. 392-99.

[14]British Columbia, Proclamations and Ordinances, 1858-65, Proclamation of Sept. 6, 1858.

[15]Reinhart, The Golden Frontier, p. 143.

[16]See Jean Usher, "William Duncan of Metlakatla" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1969), p. 139.

[17]Francis Poole, Queen Charlotte Islands: A Narrative of Discovery and Adventure in the North Pacific, ed. by John W. Lyndon (London: Hurst and Blackett), p. 310. The date of publication is given on the title page as 1872, but in a copy in the library of the University of British Columbia, Special Collections Division, the presentation is dated Dec. 24, 1871, and a clipping advertising the book is pasted and its date penned as Dec., 1871.

[18]C[harles] E[dward] Barrett-Lennard, Travels in British Columbia with the Narrative of a Yacht Voyage Round Vancouver's Island (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1862), p. 59.

[19]Ibid., pp. 59-60.

[20]Duncan George Forbes Macdonald, British Columbia and Vancouver's Island (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1862), p. 127.

[21]Ibid., p. 128.

[22]Ibid., p. 129.

[23]Ibid., p. 131.

[24]Ibid., p. 132.

[25]Ibid., p. 133.

[26]Gilbert Malcolm Sproat, Scenes and Studies of Savage Life (London: Smith, Elder and Company, 1868), p. xii (Preface).

[27]Ibid., p. 2.

[28]Ibid., p. 3.

[29]Ibid., p. 7.

[30]Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[31]Letter, William George Cox to R. C. Moody the Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works, Feb. 12, 1861, in British Columbia, Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, 1850-1875 (Victoria: 1875), p. 20.

[32]Letter, Charles Good to the Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works, May 15, 1861, in Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, p. 22.

[33]Ormsby, British Columbia: A History, p. 168.

[34]Daily British Colonist, (Victoria), June 17, 1859, p. 2.

[35]Ibid., May 10, 1860, p. 2.

[36]Ibid., July 10, 1860, p. 2.

[37]Daily British Colonist (Victoria), Sept. 3, 1861, p. 2.

[38]See, for example, "The Indian Question Again," British Columbian (New Westminster), Dec. 19, 1861, p. 2.

[39]See Usher, "William Duncan of Metlakatla," p. 162.

[40]See "The Executive Demented," British Columbian, May 21, 1862, p. 2.

[41]"Stabbing Indians," British Columbian, Feb. 27, 1862, p. 2.

[42]Usher, citing Church Missionary Society Papers 105, W. Duncan to Church Missionary Society, Fort Simpson, August 24, 1860.

[43]Usher, citing Daily British Colonist, Victoria, W. Duncan to the Editor, July 4, 1861, p. 1.

[44]Usher, "William Duncan of Metlakatla," p. 140.

[45]"The Small-Pox," British Columbian, May 3, 1862, p. 2. See also "The Small Pox," Daily British Colonist, Apr. 28, 1862, p. 3 and Apr. 30, 1862, p. 3.

[46]"Vaccinating the Indians," British Columbian, May 14, 1862, p. 3.

[47]See J[ohn] J[oseph] Halcombe, ed., The Emigrant and the Heathen or Sketches of Missionary Life (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, [1874]), p. 191 and [John Sheepshanks], A Bishop in the Rough, ed. by D. Wallace Duthie with a Preface by the Lord Bishop of Norwich (London: Smith, Elder and Company, 1909), p. 67.

[48]"The Small-Pox," British Columbian, June 21, 1862, p. 1.

[49]Confidential letter, R. C. Moody to James Douglas, Apr. 28, 1863, in Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, p. 28.

[50]Letter, William A. G. Young to the Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works, May 11, 1863, in Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, p. 28.

[51]Letter, R. C. Moody to James Douglas, Apr. 28, 1863, in Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, p. 27.

[52]Daily British Colonist, Victoria. W. Duncan to the Editor, July 4, 1861, p. 1, cited in Usher, "William Duncan of Metlakatla," p. 141.

[53]William Duncan Papers 2159, Notes and Memoranda, 1865, cited in Usher, "William Duncan of Metlakatla," p. 364 (Table 3).

[54]Extract from a despatch, E. B. Lytton to James Douglas, July 31, 1858, in Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, p. 12.

[55]Despatch, E. B. Lytton to James Douglas, Sept. 2, 1858, in Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, p. 12.

[56]Letter, F. W. Chesson, Secretary of the Aborigines Protection Society, to E. B. Lytton, in Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, p. 12. (The date of the letter is not given.)

[57]Despatch, E. B. Lytton to James Douglas, May 20, 1859, in Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, p. 18.

[58]Agreement signed Apr. 30, 1850, in Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, p. 6.

[59]Despatch, E. B. Lytton to James Douglas, Dec. 30, 1858, in Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, p. 15.

[60]Despatch, James Douglas to E. B. Lytton, Mar. 14, 1859, in Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, pp. 16-17.

[61]Despatch, James Douglas to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mar. 25, 1861, in Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, p. 19.

[62]Douglas to Newcastle, July 28, 1853, Despatches to London October 31, 1851 - June 13, 1863, cited in George Edgar Shankel, "The Development of Indian Policy in British Columbia" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1945), p. 58.

[63]George Edgar Shankel, "The Development of Indian Policy in British Columbia", pp. 59-60. (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1945).

[64]Ibid., p. 60.

[65]Ibid., pp. 56-57.

[66]"Matthew B[aillie] Begbie, "Journey into the Interior of British Columbia" (Report, Begbie to James Douglas, April 25, 1859), Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, XXXI, 1861, pp. 242-43.

[67]Macdonald, British Columbia and Vancouver's Island, p. 133 (cited previously in this chapter).

[68]Philip D. Curtin, The Image of Africa: British Ideas and Action, 1780-1850 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 290.

[69]Ibid., p. 291.

[70]Ibid., p. 381 and p. 387.

[71]Ibid., pp. 373-374.

[72]Ibid., p. 415.

[73]Poole, Queen Charlotte Islands, p. 310 (cited previously in this chapter).

[74]Barrett-Lennard, Travels in British Columbia, p. 59 (cited previously in this chapter).

[75]Ibid., pp. 59-60 (cited previously in this chapter).

[76]Macdonald, British Columbia and Vancouver's Island, p. 132 (cited previously in this chapter).

[77]Roy Harvey Pearce, The Savages of America: A Study of the Indian and the Idea of Civilization (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 76.

[78]Ibid., p. 87, paraphrasing the thought of William Robertson, History of America (1777).

[79]Pearce, The Savages of America, p. 85, paraphrasing Adam Ferguson, Essay on the History of Civil Society [1767] (Philadelphia, 1819).

[80]Pearce, The Savages of America, p. 129.

CHAPTER IV

THE BUTE INLET TRAIL

The Need for Roads

As the search for gold extended farther and farther up the Fraser River it led naturally to a demand for roads. James Douglas was anxious to do what he could to develop the routes to the diggings from the lower Fraser, not merely to satisfy the miners, but also to discourage the use of the inland route from the United States which threatened both to reduce revenue and to make the northern gold fields dependent on the Americans.

Two rival paths to "the northern mines" were developed: the Douglas-Lillooet route and the Yale-Lytton route. The rivalry resulted from the fact that these two roads were built by private enterprise in return for charters granted by the government. Only in this way, it seemed, could roadways and bridges of decent standard be constructed without the imposition of taxes the miners would consider oppressive. Tolls were exacted of course, but supplies reached the mines much more cheaply than they might otherwise have done.

By a combination of land and water travel, supplies were carried into the rich gold-mining country of the Cariboo. The routes were long, involving much difficult land travel, and attempts to find an easier and cheaper route began early.

Interest in a New Route from the Coast

As early as 1859 Major William Downie's services were used by Governor Douglas in the investigation of possible routes from coastal inlets, but

none were found that Downie considered practical. A number of other attempts to find new routes from the coast were made in 1859 and 1860, but nothing conclusive was proved about the practicality of any of the routes. Nevertheless, interest in the finding of a practical new coast route to the interior persisted.

Almost simultaneously in 1861 interest was aroused in two possible routes which suggested themselves. One was the Bentinck Arm route. (At North Bentinck Arm at present-day Bella Coola Alexander Mackenzie had reached the Pacific Coast "from Canada by land.") Another was the Bute Inlet route, the theoretical possibilities of which were no doubt suggested by its deep penetration into the mainland and its comparative nearness to Victoria. Downie in his explorations of 1859 had not ascended to the head of Bute Inlet. He later exprssed the view that from that point the mountains must be impassable, judging from the area's general topographical features and the absence of any parties of Indians from the interior fishing in the vicinity.[1]

Alfred Waddington

Reports of possible serious physical obstacles barring the way do not seem to have troubled the mind of Alfred Waddington. From the moment the idea of the route was conceived in his mind this inveterate optimist seems to have been convinced of its feasibility.

Born of an upper-class English family, possessed of a good education and a talent for fluency of tongue and pen, Waddington, in the small and undeveloped colony of Vancouver Island, seemed a prince among men. Waddington had come to British Columbia by way of California where he had pursued a mercantile calling during the gold rush there.[2] In 1858 his little book

entitled The Fraser Mines Vindicated was published--the first non-government book printed in the colony.[3] In it he expressed his optimism with regard to the future of the island and mainland colonies. Later he was elected a member of the Vancouver Island legislative assembly, where his eloquence was put to effective use till his resignation in 1861.

Plans for Exploration

In the spring of 1861 Waddington proposed an exploration to discover a route from Bute Inlet. At the same time two men, Kenny and McKenzie, were crossing from Alexandria to the coast and emerged at South Bentinck Arm.[4]

From the very beginning, New Westminster recognized the economic threat that would be posed by the development of any practical north coastal route to the Cariboo gold fields. The British Columbian of New Westminster, the mouthpiece of the fiery future premier John Robson, did not delay in expressing its editorial disapproval.[5]

In Victoria those who advocated the investigation of the Bute Inlet route regarded the project as a scheme which, if successful, would benefit Victoria by diverting much traffic to the north, and, they hoped, would make Victoria once more secure as the dominant port of call for ocean-going vessels.[6]

On June 4 a citizens' meeting was held to consider the exploration of a Bute Inlet route, and Waddington spoke, no doubt with characteristic optimism and eloquence, of the "vast benefits" such as a route could bring to Victoria.[7] The adjourned meeting convened again on June 10. The Colonist reported the names of several other prominent Islanders who were at this meeting: Amor de Cosmos, Trutch, and Helmcken.[8] Amor de Cosmos, a future

premier of the ~~united colony~~ province of British Columbia, was the editor of the Colonist. Joseph W. Trutch was an engineer who had contracted to build a section of the Cariboo Road in the Fraser canyon. In 1871 he was to become the first lieutenant-governor of the province of British Columbia.[9] John S. Helmcken was a physician who had in 1852 married a daughter of James Douglas. He had already become active in politics, and was long to remain so.[10]

But not all Victoria was in support of the Bute Inlet route. The Colonist's rival, the Press, in its edition of June 16 pooh-poohed a map of the proposed Bute Inlet route which had been placed on public view. It advised the public to view the map while mocking what it termed its "waggish distortion of rivers and mountains."[11]

Bute Inlet Exploration

In the next while, the Bute Inlet fever seems to have gripped Victoria. Several expeditions to the inlet were made. Major Downie, in spite of his previously-stated disillustionment with northern routes, went up to have a look at the possibilities of Bute Inlet, but did not succeed in discovering a route. He arrived in Victoria on August 13, after spending five days alone in a canoe, having been deserted by the two Indians with whom he had started from the inlet.[12] He submitted a written report to Governor Douglas in which he stated his conviction that the route was valueless, and on August 19 he spoke to a meeting of citizens.[13]

On September 9, in a letter to Douglas, Waddington enquired what privileges he would be granted if he succeeded in finding a Bute Inlet route,[14]

and the same month Waddington set out for Bute Inlet on the Steamer "Henrietta." He returned to Victoria at the end of the month, having left a small exploring party thirty-two miles up the Homathko.[15] The exploring party returned in October, and was said to have come within one-and-a-half days' journey of the bunch grass country.[16] The later despatch of a surveying party to Bute Inlet, however, was less successful. The ill-starred party lost a canoe in one of th rapids of the Homathko and had to come down in rafts. They spent ten days stranded at the head of Bute Inlet till they were rescued by Indians of Desolation Sound and were brought back to Victoria in December, having suffered great hardships.[17]

A Draft Agreement

The information brought by the surveying party was, however, apparently satisfactory enough for Waddington, and by February of 1862 his negotiations with the government had resulted in the British Columbia Colonial Secretary's sending him a draf agreement. It contained the terms under which the government would be willing to grant a charter for the construction of a road from Bute Inlet into the Chilcotin region.[18]

Competition with Bentinck Road Proponents

Meanwhile the proponents of the Bentinck Arm Road had been active. It appears from a letter Moody wrote to the Colonial Secretary that as early as September, 1861, Governor Douglas had given some encouragement to a company seeking to obtain a charter for a road to be built from North Bentinck Arm to the Cariboo. (Moody says he had promised them a charter.)[19] At any rate the negotiations regarding this route were well under way by March,

1962, though they were held up for a time by Moody's objections to the fact that a proper townsite at Bentinck Arm had not been selected or approved.

With an agreement of his own in sight Waddington pressed ahead with his project. The Colonist reported that on March 20:

> The canoe Success left...for Bute Inlet with six men and a two-month's supply of provisions. They are sent out for the purpose of commencing the trail to Alexandria, finishing two stores already commenced, and constructing a bridge over a small stream making into the Homathko (or Pryce) River.[20]

On March 28, 1862, Waddington and Moody (the latter on behalf of the government) signed an agreement for the construction of a "bridle road" from Bute or the Homathko to the Chilcotin, and provision was made in a memorandum of April 16 for its conversion to a wagon road.

Waddington no doubt was beginning to feel the pressure of time, for by April 7, 1862, the Press was reporting that his rivals, the Bentinck Arm Company, were negotiating with the Hudson's Bay Company for the Steamer "Otter" to carry miners to Bella Coola for the journey to the Cariboo. An April 11th advertisement in the Press proclaimed that the Bentinck Arm Route was the "Nearest and cheapest way to the Cariboo Mines, 215 miles to Antler Creek."

No doubt feeling the pressure of competition, the Bute Inlet promoters engaged the sloop "Boz" to carry freight and passengers,[21] and on April 18 their advertisement appeared, announcing that the "Boz" would sail for Bute Inlet on the twenty-third, and that it had room for six passengers at ten dollars each. A party of four men awaited their arrival at Bute Inlet to proceed to Alexandria, the advertisement said. A large northern canoe was to take the party, free, forty-four miles up-river, from which point the

distance on foot was said to be "...150 miles through an easily travelled country." There would be "...no difficulty in obtaining Indians to pack at very low rates." The party was to be "...piloted through to Alexandria."[22]

Such an adverstisement for customers who were to be "piloted" over a practically trackless and unknown route is difficult to explain except as an example of Waddington's boundless optimism. Presumably the customers were to be "piloted" through by Mr. Tiedeman's exploring party, and presumably there were no takers. The exploring party left in a canoe on May 15 or 16--over a week early.[23]

Agreement on the Sale of Lots at Bute Inlet

In an exchange of letters between Colonel Moody and the Colonial Secretary, a plan was arrived at whereby lots at Bute Inlet Town Site would be sold, and seventy-five per cent of the proceeds would go to Waddington and Helmcken, who had previously agreed to give up their pre-emption claims at the site. Lots for public purposes would be reserved, however; and any lands that might be claimed by the Indians would also be reserved, a stipulation which had been made by the Governor, apparently, and communicated to Moody by Young, the Colonial Secretary. Waddington, in June, wrote to Moody enclosing his own and Helmcken's acceptance of the terms.[24]

Adverse Publicity for the Bentinck Arm Route

The same month a detachment of Royal Engineers under Lieutenant Palmer left for Bentinck Arm to carry out an exploration from that place to Alexandria

to determine the practicality of the Bentinck Arm route. His report was to be unfavourable to it, but, even before the return of his expedition, reports from those who had tried the route gave it distinctly adverse publicity. "Important from the Coast Route--Destitute and Suffering," the Colonist headed an article:

> On the Governor Douglas yesterday morning several men who had taken the Coast Route to the Fraser River came down. They gave a woeful account of matters there. Pearson and party got through to Alexandria in fifteen days from the Big Slide, and, although short of provisions, suffered but little. Forty men, however, who left the Big Slide several days behind Pearson, suffered dreadfully, and out of the entire party only nine had reached Alexandria twenty days after starting.[25]

The British Columbian was caustic. "One of the unfortunate victims of the interested, selfish, criminal misrepresentations of a gang of Victoria land speculators came down on Sunday last," it reported.[26]

The Bute Inlet Waggon Road Company

Such adverse publicity for a rival route could not have been unwelcome to Alfred Waddington, particularly since his own party of explorers under Tiedeman had reached Alexandria and on July 29 the return party under Henry McNeil reached Victoria.[27] Waddington's optimism must have carried him almost beyond the bounds of reason, if a statement reported in the Press of August 4 can be accepted as his.

> Mr. Waddington said [it reported] that in one month men would be able to reach Alexandria by Bute Inlet in a week, and that all the Fraser river pack trains would go that way.[28]

The Press, predictably, ridiculed his ideas the next day.

But in Victoria as a whole Waddington's planned route was evidently popular. Three hundred people attended a public meeting at the Victoria

Theatre on August 26, where Waddington "explained the advantages of the Bute Inlet route," announced the projected formation of a new company, and invited subscribers to its shares.[30]

On September 4 the Steamer "Otter" left the Hudson's Bay Company Wharf in Victoria with seventy workmen who were to begin the construction of a road without delay.[31] Waddington himself went along, and on November 15 the Colonist reported that Waddington and his party had returned the previous day in good health and spirits.[32] Meanwhile, stock in the Bute Inlet Waggon Road Company had been advertised and further subscribers invited.[33]

A Modified Agreement

On January 6, 1863, the officers of the Bute Inlet Company were elected.[34] In the same month Waddington wrote to Moody requesting more favourable terms for the charter under which the road would operate.[35] In February Moody informed Waddington that the Governor had consented to an extension from five to ten years of the period of the charter under which the road would operate, as well as to an extension to the end of 1864 of the time for the completion of the waggon road. In return the Bute Inlet Company was to reduce the maximum toll levied from five cents to three cents.[36]

In a letter in March, Waddington further requested permission to levy a toll on the trail which would be made before the actual road was built, as well as on the ferry.[37] To this proposal too the Governor signified his approval, but the preparation of a modified agreement covering the changes was delayed till towards the end of the year, probably due to the opposition which was aroused in New Westminster.

By 1863 Waddington realized that the task of building a road would be

greater also. Nevertheless, the Chronicle reported that at an April 13 meeting the shareholders of the Bute Inlet Road Company had unanimously decided to give the enterprise their financial support.[40]

Towards the end of the month Waddington and a party of workmen sailed to Bute Inlet to again begin work on the trail.[41] By the autumn of 1863 a government agent was surveying the townsite at the head of Bute Inlet,[42] and in November Governor Douglas had approved "Waddington" as the name of the new town.[43]

Indian-White Relationships: 1861-1863

Little mention has so far been made of the Indian-White relationships which developed in the course of the attempts that were made to open up and use the new coastal routes from Bentinck Arm and Bute Inlet. It will be well to examine these now.

1861

During the spate of exploration in the Bute Inlet area that took place in 1861 encounters were naturally made between the explorers and the Indians of Bute Inlet.

One of the Bute Inlet explorers of 1861 was a Dr. Dechesne, who left Victoria in June, accompanied, according to the Colonist by one white companion and three Indians. Dechesne's party reportedly found the Bute Inlet Indians threatening, and, after ascending the inlet for forty miles, decided to turn back.[44]

An exploring party under Madden and Kenny which had sailed from Victoria in the Schooner "Antelope" attempted to procure a canoe for travel inland

from the head of Bute Inlet, but apparently they ran into difficulties due to the inter-tribal hostilities which existed, probably between the Homathkos and the Chilcotins. The Bute Inlet group asserted "...that two days journey up the river a tribe of Indians dwelt who would kill them."[45] In spite of being offered a large sum of money the coast Indians refused to go with the explorers.

It seems that Major Downie's party also experienced the Homathkos' fear of the Chilcotins. The Colonist reported on a Captain Taylor's journey up the "Me-mi-er" [Southgate] River.[46]

> The party proceeded three or four mile up the river against a rapid current and encamped for the night. The Indians at the head of this river are called the Ech-e-nam, and were represented by the Indians (who seemed much alarmed at the prospect of encountering them) as very bad and warlike.[47]

1862

Waddington apparently succeeded early in establishing friendly relations with the Homathkis. However, his work crew in 1862 had some difficulty with the warlike Euclataws, a branch of the Kwakiutls. Some of these Indians apparently fished at the head of Bute Inlet, though their winter headquarters was elsewhere.[48]

> The Euclutaus [reported the Colonist] were at first troublesome, but finally allowed the party to work on being promised presents from the Victoria tyhee (Mr. Waddington). The Indians filled twenty canoes, and were fishing for oolachans.

The same report speaks of Chilcotins being attracted to the coast by the presence of the whites.

> Six Chilcotin Indians--three from the rapids above the canon and three direct from Alexandria, learning that there were whites at the head of the Inlet, came down to trade furs, but on obtaining information that the Euclutaus were there, they retreated immediately and could not be prevailed on to return.[49]

In the same year contact with the whites was beginning to have drastic effects on the Chilcotins in the interior. The poverty of gold in their territory and the riches of the region to the north had protected them from the main influx of the gold-seekers. But, though the much-talked-of Bentinck Arm Road was not materializing, the route was already being used in 1862 by some who were willing to risk it. And since it passed through Chilcotin country, with Alexandria as its terminus on the Fraser, the Chilcotins found employment as packers on the route. A letter from Bentinck Arm dated May 30, 1862, appeared in the Colonist in June. The writer complained that the Bentinck Arm Trail was not begun but went on to describe how it was possible to use the route in spite of the lack of a proper trail.

> As it is [he wrote], goods can be forwarded by canoes to the head of navigation, forty miles, thence to the head of slide, by Indians, for about 12 1/2 cts. per pound--from whence Chilcoaten Indians or pack trains from Fort Alexandria can be obtained to pack the balance of the road.[50]

In 1862 the small-pox spread with lightning-like rapidity among the Indian people of the west coast. The Chilcotins were not to be spared. Among the whites who attempted to use the Bentinck Arm route were those who had the small-pox amongst them. Mention has already been made of the party of forty who set out on the route, of whom only nine had reached Alexandria twenty days after starting. (Among this party, incidentally, was Francis Poole, later author of Queen Charlotte Islands.)[51] While on the trail, several members of the party fell ill of the small-pox and

were left with the Indians. "Two Canadians" were left with the Chilcotins.[52] In all likelihood this, as well as their contacts with coast Indians, contributed to the devastating spread of small-pox among the Chilcotins in 1862.

In 1862, also, Mr. Waddington's men had begun work on the trail. Difficulties were experienced in employing Indian labour. A letter from "Observer" in the Press reported:

> The Indians at the end of a week having declined working any longer, and on leaving the Canadians and halfbreeds being all required to navigate the canoes for the commissariat department, Mr. Waddington manned his with three very good young men but with very little experience....[53]

Hostilities between tribes also hindered the trail-making project in 1862. The Colonist reported that feuds between the "Nicletaws" and "Talsenies" nearly put a stop to Waddington's expedition. The transportation of supplies on the river was in fact completely halted. Reportedly the eleven-year-old daughter of a chief of the "Talsenies" had been stolen by one of the "Nicletaws" and had to be ransomed. A long negotiation led to peace being restored.[54] It seems impossible to identify with certainty the Indian groups referred to as "Nicletaws" and "Talsenies," but the "Nicletaws" may have been the "Euclataws" or "Yucultas" and the "Talsenies" Chilcotins.

At any rate, peace was apparently made between the Chilcotins and the coast Indians of Bute Inlet in 1862, as Seymour indicated in a despatch to the Colonial office in May of 1864.

> A deadly feud existed recently between them [the Chilcotins] and the coast Indians Clayoosh and Euclataw ["Klahuse" here apparently referring to the Homathko Indians], but two years ago Mr. Waddington succeeded in making peace between the tribes, who have since remained on tolerable terms though still suspicious of each other.[55]

Enmity between the Chilcotins and the Homathkos had had a long history. According to the Daily Chronicle of May 12, 1864, the Chilcotins twenty years before had fallen on a Homathko village, killing nineteen Homathkos and leaving only six survivors. Making peace between the Chilcotins and Homathkos in 1862 must have seemed an important accomplishment, and one very necessary to the success of the Bute Inlet route, since the trail was to pass through the territories of both groups.

1863

As a result of the peace which had been made between themselves and the coast Indians, the Chilcotins were able to come freely to the coast to trade or to work for the whites. Just as the Chilcotins had been in the habit of frequently wintering with the Bella Coolas, they could now spend the winter among the Bute Inlet Indians. An article of March 31, 1863, in the Chronicle reported that Alexander McDonald had come through the Chilcotin region by the Bute Inlet route and had arrived at Victoria. It also reported that twenty "Chilcooten" Indians were wintering at the head of Bute Inlet. The Chilcotins had no canoes, but McDonald had obtained a canoe from other Indians who came up, and so he had set out for Victoria.[57]

In April, 1863, Waddington went up to Bute Inlet with the party which was to resume work on the trail. He was annoyed to find quite a large number of Indians of various tribes awaiting him at the head of the inlet right where he planned to erect the town.

> We were not a little surprised on reaching here [he wrote] to find a long row of wooden huts built by the Indians along the front of the river in evident expectation of our arrival, since we had never seen a living Indian here before. They numbered

> from 200 to 250, composed of Clahoosh, Comax, Nicletaws and Chilcoaten Indians, all awaiting their prey like vultures, and were not a little disappointed when they saw the mules landed and learned that these were to carry all the provisions. They have been useful however in bringing us a good deal of game.[58]

Apparently the waiting Indians were hoping to obtain something from the whites in exchange for packing. Later some Chilcotins were hired for packing, and seemingly the trade goods they most desired were muskets. The Colonist of July 6 reported that the Indians had done some packing, but after earning a musket each had given it up, and had gone to a lake 120 or 130 miles in the interior.[59] The whites by this time evidently had sufficient confidence in the Indians to barter their firearms in return for the Indians' labour or furs.[60]

A day or so after Waddington's arrival at Bute Inlet for the 1863 season he encountered trouble from the illegal liquor trade. "...a small plunger was seen at the head of the Inlet," he wrote, "and the next day a number of our Indians were raving mad with drink." Waddington acted promptly. He sent down a large canoe with ten armed men.

> ...to haul up the plunger and confiscate every kind of liquor on board. They found her near the entrance of the river, but the liquor had probably been hid on shore, for nothing was found but an empty 20-gallon keg with about a glass of some infernal mixture in it.[61]

Along with Waddington's expedition to Bute Inlet in 1863 there sailed a number of persons who went as pre-emptors and prospective settlers. The Colonist's editorial comments were glowing. A new field for settlement was opening up at Bute Inlet, it reported.

> Parties who went up with Mr. Waddington's expedition party, have already commenced to pre-empt farms and build houses, even below the cañon. The town has been laid out, and some houses and a wharf built, a road constructed to about the mouth of the Cañon...The whole road is now becoming dotted with the farms and houses of settlers.[62]

Allowance, no doubt, must be made for the enthusiastic exaggeration of a newspaper which had committed itself to the promotion of the Bute Inlet scheme, but it is not difficult to imagine the uneasiness with which the Indians may have watched the activities of the settlers.

In the year 1863 a number of murders of whites by Indians were reported, including the killing of three persons at Bentinck Arm.[63] Over the years numerous killings had occurred on the coast. The renewed reports of murders in 1863 disturbed the whites but were not alarming enough to create any general fear of the Indians. The government continued the practice of having gunboats visit localities where whites had been killed in order to ensure that the suspected murderers be handed over for trial. However, the suspect was not always arrested very quickly. For example, an Indian suspected of committing murder at Bentinck Arm in 1863 was not arrested until the end of May, 1864.

Difficulties and Limited Progress in 1863

The difficulties he met in 1863 were wearing even for such a persistent optimist as Mr. Waddington. The Chronicle of July 7 reported that a bluff of rocks in the canyon would take one hundred men six months to remove at the cost of $30,000. Mr. Waddington, it reported, was anxious and uneasy. The absence of Indian packers was greatly increasing the cost of the work, since white men had to be paid extra wages to do work the Indians might have done.[64]

A group of fourteen men were sent from Bute Inlet to Alexandria. Their guide lost the way, and their expedition was a failure.[65]

Waddington decided to take the trail over a hill to avoid the canyon. In a letter dated July 8, and printed in the Colonist, he confessed to having experienced difficulties but still managed to sound an optimistic note, as indeed he had to if his company was to continue to receive financial support.[66]

At the head of Bute Inlet signs of the embryonic town were beginning to be seen. The Chronicle on July 28 had reported that eight houses and a hotel were built.[67]

In September Mr. Brewster, the foreman of Waddington's work party, who was in Victoria hiring new men, predicted that the trail would be through before the end of the fall.[68] The working year was a long one. The workmen did not leave Bute Inlet till December 28 but the trail was still not nearly completed.[69]

The Threat from the Bentinck Arm Project

Meanwhile, plans for the long-delayed Bentinck Arm route were under way. A letter from the British Columbia Colonial Secretary to the Attorney General dated February 1, 1864, forwarded a copy of a letter from a Mr. Hood, the Colonial Secretary's reply to it, the draft of an agreement on a road from Bentinck Arm, and the specification and plan of the road. The Attorney General was requested to examine the agreement and to put it in final form in accordance with the general terms already proposed by the government.[70]

Waddington must have felt the pressure of the threatened competition. Not only would the proposed Bentinck Arm road be a threat if it were completed, but it must already have been a financial hazard, threatening to draw much-needed investment from the Bute Inlet project. In December, 1863, there had been advertised the sale of 720 Bute Inlet Waggon Road Company

shares which had still not been purchased.[71] The difficulties which had been encountered after Waddington's glowing predictions of early success must have done much to discourage financial support of the scheme.

Frederick Whymper's Visit

On March 16, 1864, a schooner left Victoria for Bute Inlet with men and supplies. On board also was the artist, Frederick Whymper, whom Waddington had offered passage to give him an opportunity to view and sketch the magnificent glacier country in the region of Bute Inlet. Whymper gives us an account of the schooner's arrival at the mouth of the Homathko River on March 22, and of his first encounter with the Chilcotins there. Their appearance reflected a limited contact with whites and their trade goods.

> Near the river some Chilcotin Indians paddled out in their canoes [he wrote], and came on board to get a free ride. They had rings through their noses, were much painted, and wore the inevitable blanket of the coast. For the rest, there was nothing very characteristic in their costume; some having a shirt without breeches, some breeches without a shirt. Two of them were picturesque with wolf-skin robes, hair turned inwards, and the outer side adorned with fringes of tails derived from marten or squirrel. Among them one old hag attracted some notice, from her repulsive appearance and the short pipe she seemed to enjoy.[72]

One white man greeted the party of men who arrived on the schooner. He had been left in charge of mules and other property, and the Indians, according to Whymper, had sometimes threatened his life. One incident which had occurred Whymper regarded as amusing.

> He had missed many small things from his log house, and could not catch the thief, whoever he might be, but who he had reason to believe must have entered the cabin by the large open chimney. At last he got a friend to go inside with a quarter of a pound of gunpowder, and locking the door, made pretence of leaving, but crept back near the house to

> watch the result. Soon an Indian came stealthily along....He climbed the roof, and got nearly down the chimney, when the man inside threw the powder on the smouldering ashes, and off it went. The Indian went off also! and with a terrific yell.... He afforded for some time afterwards a very wholesome warning to his tribe, being unable to sit or lie down.

Whymper does not inform us to which tribe the Indian belonged, nor whether it was before or after this incident that the white man's life was threatened. Nor does he seem to perceive any possible adverse effect the event may have had on Indian-white relations.

The Indians apparently were very short of food at the time the expedition arrived, and, Whymper relates, "...disputed with their wretched 'cayota' dogs anything that we threw out of the camp, in the shape of bones, bacon rind, or tea leaves, and similar luxuries." Almost certainly many of these Indians were Chilcotins. Whymper mentions that many of them were afterwards employed in packing, and some of them in building the road.[73]

After arriving at the most distant construction camp Whymper secured the services of an Indian and started out for the "Great Glacier." Finding that he was unable to communicate properly with this guide, Whymper returned to the camp and secured the services of "Tellot" [Telloot], an old Chilcotin "chief" whom Whymper describes as "an Indian of some intelligence."[74]

A number of Indians accompanied Tellot and Whymper up the Homathko till Whymper and his guide left the main stream. The Indians were headed for Tatla Lake. They begged Whymper for a gift and he gave them a little flour, tobacco, and so on. After returning and resting at the construction camp, Whymper headed back towards the coast, sketching on his way. He spent two days with Smith, the man in charge of the ferry. On April 29

late in the evening Whymper reached the station at the mouth of the river.

> Early next morning [he wrote], whilst I was yet sleeping soundly in company with the packers and two of the workmen who were about to leave the party, some friendly Indians broke into the room without warning, and awoke us, saying, in an excited and disjointed manner, that the man in charge of the ferry (thirty miles higher up the river) had been murdered by the Chilcotens for refusing to give away the provisions and other property in his care.[75]

The immediate reaction of Whymper and the other white men with him was one of genuine disbelief. They seemed to think it impossible that Smith could have been killed by the Indians when the other workmen were encamped such a short distance away from him. Whymper left by canoe that same day, April 30, arriving in Victoria on May 5, bearing news of the ferryman's rumoured murder. Whymper's report caused little stir in Victoria. Isolated killings had occurred before without causing undue apprehension. Besides, Whymper, while not dismissing the possibility of Smith's murder, expressed some doubt about the matter. The fact that no word had been sent from the road party seemed to him an argument against the truth of the murder report.

> Up to the time of leaving [he reported], no one came from above, and as they would know of it far earlier than we could, the party being chiefly camped 7 miles above the ferry--and would hurry down, knowing that two of the road party were coming away with me, we have great hopes that it is false or exaggerated. On the other hand, Smith had had some trouble with them before, and an Indian had drawn a knife on him, which he got from him.[76]

Definite News of the Homathko Massacres

Not till May 11 did the steamer "Emily Harris" reach Victoria with the startling news that not one but fourteen of Waddington's men had perished. "HORRIBLE MASSACRE," the Daily Chronicle extra headlined the news.

> The steamer Emily Harris arrived from Nanaimo this morning. She brings three men as passengers who are the sole survivors of Waddington's party of seventeen workmen, the remaining fourteen having been massacred by Chilcooten Indians who had been hired to pack for them.[77]

The extent of the massacre and its nature were such as to fire the excitement of the public in both colonies and to occupy much of the attention of the mainland government for many months to come.

Reproduced from British Columbia, Department of Lands, Forest, and Water Resources, "Mount Waddington, British Columbia" (Sheet 92N, First Status Edition) and British Columbia, Department of Lands and Forests, "Bute Inlet, British Columbia" (Sheet 92K, Second Status Edition). Scale 1: 250,000 or approximately 4 miles to 1 inch. Trail shown approximately as A. Waddington's "Map A referred to in my letter of January 31st 1863 to the Chief Commissioner of Lands & Works."

Equivalents in the Naming of Watercourses

Old Name (As on Waddington's "Map A")	Modern Name
West Branch of Homathco River	Mosley Creek
East Branch of Homathco River	Homathco River [continued up-stream]
Downie's Creek	Klattasine Creek
West Creek	Scar Creek
[Waddington does not name but shows "Bella Coola Trail" there.]	Coola Creek



Map 3 Waddington's Bute Inlet Trail

Footnotes for Chapter IV

[1]See letter, William Downie to James Douglas, Mar. 19, 1859, in Downie, "Explorations in Jervis Inlet and Desolation Sound," Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, XXXI (1861), p. 249; also "Major Downie and the Coast Route" (letter, William Downie to the editor, Apr. 13, [1861], Daily Evening Press (Victoria), Apr. 16, 1861, p. 2, published in British Columbian (New Westminster), Apr. 25, 1861, p. 1; also Margaret A. Ormsby, British Columbia: a History (Vancouver: Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1958), p. 205. According to Downie's letter to the editor of the Press, he carried on explorations in 1858 also, at least in the country between Lillooet Lake and Howe Sound.

[2]See "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," File 2, Special Collections, University of British Columbia, and R. L. Reid, "Alfred Waddington, who Left a Splendid British Home to Pioneer in B. C. 70 Years Ago," Vancouver Sunday Province, Mar. 13, 1927, p. 2.

[3]Alfred P. Waddington, The Fraser Mines Vindicated, or The History of Four Months (Victoria: Printed by P. de Garre, 1858).

[4]"The Coast Route Exploration," Daily British Colonist (Victoria) June 21, 1861, p. 2. For this reference and numerous others in this chapter I am indebted to the R. L. Reid Papers, "Alfred Waddington" files, now refiled under the title "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872."

[5]"The Northern Route," British Columbian, Apr. 18, 1861, p. 2. In its next issue it reprinted from the Press of Victoria a letter written by Downie expressing his scepticism regarding the existence of a practical new coast route. ("Major Downie and the Coast Route," Press, Apr. 16, 1861, p. 2, published in British Columbian, Apr. 25, 1861, p. 1) In the same issue an "advertisement" appeared which pointedly expressed in satirical form the New Westminster attitude towards all northern routes:

"WADDINGTON!

Great Sale of Town Lots!!

ROUSING OPPORTUNITY!!!

On the 1st of April, 1862, will be offered, on the ground, 5,000 Town Lots, being the entire site of WADDINGTON, at the head of DEAN'S CANAL, on the

North Coast of British Columbia

A few citizens of Victoria, having been moved by a philanthropic desire to build up a Town at that point, are prepared to offer Extraordinary Inducements! And, in order that said point may be the seaport of British Columbia, steps will be taken to fill up the present "dangerous" entrance to Fraser River and Burrard Inlet.

For Plans, and further particulars, apply at the Waddington office, No. 10 Siwash Alley, Victoria.

P. S. Should parties making purchases at the above sale desire to have half the purchase money refunded, the thing can be done, as the philanthropic citizens aforesaid have a way of managing such matters with the government. As the navigation is very bad at present, balloons will be provided to convey intending purchasers to the place of sale, free of charge."
("Waddington!" British Columbian, Apr. 25, 1861, p. 3)

[6]"Bute Inlet Route," Daily British Colonist, May 6, 1861, p. 2:

"Exertions are being made by some of our public-spirited citizens to start an exploring party on the Bute Inlet route to Alexandria. The expedition will start in a few weeks or as soon as the snow on the mountains may not interpose any difficulty to the explorers. . .should a practicable route be discovered it will have a direct tendency to benefit Victoria."

[7]"Coast Route Meeting," Daily British Colonist, June 5, 1861, p. 3.

[8]"Coast Route Meeting," Daily British Colonist, June 11, 1861, p. 3.

[9]See Margaret A. Ormsby, British Columbia: A History (Vancouver, Macmillan Company of Canada, 1958), p. 188 and p. 251.

[10]See Harry Gregson, A History of Victoria, 1842-1970 (Victoria: Victoria Observor Publishing Co. Ltd., 1970), p. 10, pp. 15-16, and Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 114.

[11]"The Bute Route," Daily Evening Press, June 16, 1861, p. 2.

[12]"Arrival of Major Downie," Daily British Colonist, Aug. 14, 1861, p. 3.

[13]"Major Downie's Meeting," Daily British Colonist, Aug. 20, 1861, p. 3.

[14]Letter, A. Waddington to James Douglas, Victoria, Sept. 9, 1861 (typescript copy in "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," File 6).

[15]"Return of the 'Henrietta' from Bute Inlet," Daily British Colonist, Oct. 1, 1861, p. 3.

[16]"Return of the Bute Inlet Exploring Party," Daily British Colonist, Oct. 25, 1861, p. 3.

[17]"The Bute Inlet Surveying Party," Daily British Colonist, Dec. 21, 1861, p. 3.

[18]Letter, Colonial Secretary of British Columbia to A. Waddington, Feb. 27, 1862, enclosing a draft agreement, referred to in letter, Waddington to Colonial Secretary of B. C., Mar. 14, 1862 (typescript copy, "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," File 7).

[19]Letter, R. C. Moody to the Colonial Secretary for B. C., Mar. 19, 1862 (typescript copy, "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," File 7).

[20]"For Bute Inlet," Daily British Colonist, Mar. 21, 1862, p. 3.

[21]"Local Intelligence: For Bute Inlet," Daily Evening Press, April 18, 1862, p. 3.

[22]"New Advertisements: For Bute Inlet," Daily Evening Press, Apr. 18, 1862, p. 2.

[23]"Local Intelligence: For Bute Inlet," Daily Evening Press, May 16, 1862, p. 3, and "The Bute Inlet Route," letter, A. Waddington to Editor, Daily British Colonist, Aug. 1, 1862, p. 3.

[24]Letter, A. Waddington to R. C. Moody, Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works, June 23, 1862 (typescript copy, "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," File 7).

[25]"Important from the Coast Route--Destitute and Starving," Daily British Colonist, July 22, 1862, p. 3.

[26]"A Trip to Cariboo Via Bentinck," British Columbian, July 23, 1862, p. 2.

[27]"Return of the Bute Inlet Explorers," Daily British Colonist, July 30, 1862, p. 3.

[28]"Immigration and Employment," Daily Evening Press, Aug. 4, 1862, p. 3.

[29]"Our Immigration Meetings," Daily Evening Press, Aug. 5, 1862, p. 2.

[30]"The Bute Inlet Meeting," Daily British Colonist, Aug. 27, 1862, p. 3.

[31]Letter, A. R. Green to R. C. Moody, Sept. 10, 1862 (typescript copy in "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," file 7), and "Bute Inlet Expedition," Daily Evening Press, Sept. 4, 1862, p. 3.

[32]"Return of the Bute Inlet Expedition," Daily British Colonist, Nov. 15, 1862, p. 3.

[33]"Bute Inlet Wagon Road Company-(Limited) [advertisement]," Daily Evening Press, Aug. 22, 1862, p. 2.

[34]"Bute Inlet Company," Daily British Colonist, Jan. 7, 1863, p. 3.

[35]Letter, A. Waddington to R. C. Moody, Jan. 19, 1863 (typescript copy in "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," File 8).

[36]Letter, R. C. Moody to A. Waddington, Feb. 28, 1863, referred to in Waddington to Colonial Secretary of British Columbia, No. 28, 1863 (typescript copy of part of this letter in Reid Papers, "Alfred Waddington, 1863").

[37]Letter, Waddington to Colonial Secretary of B. C., Mar. 16, 1863 (typescript copy in "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," File 8).

[38]Letter, W. A. G. Young [to R. C. Moody], Apr. 1, 1863 (typescript copy in "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," File 8).

[39]Letter, W. A. G. Young to Attorney General, Dec. 3, 1863, in British Columbia, Colonial Secretary, "Outward Correspondence: November, 1863--September, 1864," Archives of British Columbia, p. 26.

[40]"Bute Inlet," Victoria Daily Chronicle (Victoria), Apr. 14, 1863, p. 3.

[41]"For Bute Inlet," Victoria Daily Chronicle, Apr. 24, 1863, p. 3.

[42]"From Bute Inlet," Victoria Daily Chronicle, Oct. 9, 1863, p. 3.

[43]Letter, W. A. G. Young to the Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works, Nov. 5, 1863 (typescript copy in "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," File 8).

[44]"From Bute Inlet," Daily British Colonist, July 6, 1861, p. 3.

[45]"From Bute Inlet," Daily British Colonist, July 13, 1861, p. 3.

[46]For the identification of the "Me-mi-er" with the Southgate River see Homer G. Barnett, The Coast Salish of British Columbia (Eugene, Oregon: University of Oregon, 1955), p. 26. The native form of the word given by Barnett is "mimaiya". The phonetic system used is ". . . the simplified one suggested by the American Anthropological Association." (Barnett, p. 4).

[47]"More about Bute Inlet," Daily British Colonist, July 17, 1861, p. 3.

[48]See letter, Downie to the Editor of the Press, published in British Columbian, Apr. 25, 1861, p. 1.

[49]"Bute Inlet," Daily British Colonist, May 7, 1862, p. 3.

[50]"Bentinck Arm," letter, May 30, 1862, in Daily British Colonist, June 12, 1862, p. 3.

[51]Francis Poole, Queen Charlotte Islands: A Narrative of Discovery and Adventure in the North Pacific, ed. by John W. Lyndon (London: Hurst and Blackett, [1871]).

[52]"Important from the Coast Route--Destitution and Suffering," Daily British Colonist, July 22, 1862, p. 3.

[53]"Bute Inlet" (letter, "Observer to editor," n.d.), Daily Evening Press, Oct. 3, 1862, p. 3.

[54]"Return of the Bute Inlet Expedition," Daily British Colonist, Nov. 15, 1862, p. 3.

[55]British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 18-19, Frederick Seymour to the Duke of Newcastle, May 20, 1864.

The term "Clayoosh" (modern "Klahuse") seems to have been applied to the Homathko Indians, near "relatives" of the Klahuse proper. The Euclataws (or Yucultas) seem to have moved into the area of upper Bute Inlet previously occupied only by the Homathkos.

[56]"The Indian Massacre," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 12, 1864, p. 2. See also Robert B. Lane, "Cultural Relations of the Chilcotin Indians of West Central British Columbia" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, Seattle, 1953), p. 89. (Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1953).

[57]"Bute Inlet Route a Success," Victoria Daily Chronicle, Mar. 31, 1863, p. 3.

[58]"Mr. Waddington at Bute Inlet," letter, Alfred Waddington to the Secretary of the [Bute Inlet] Company, May 23, 1863, published in Daily British Colonist, June 2, 1863, p. 3.

[59]"Latest from Bute Inlet," Daily British Colonist, July 6, 1863, p. 3.

[60]See "Despatches from Seymour and Birch," IV, 15, Seymour to Duke of Newcastle, May 20, 1864.

[61]"Mr. Waddington at Bute Inlet," letter, Waddington to Secretary of the Company, May 23, 1863, published in Daily British Colonist, June 2, 1863, p. 3.

[62]"Field for Settlement," Daily British Colonist, June 2, 1863, p. 2.

[63]"Latest from the North Coast," Daily British Colonist, May 19, 1863, p. 3.

[64]"Later from Bute Inlet," Victoria Daily Chronicle, July 7, 1863, p. 3. At about the beginning of September, 1863, a group of Chilcotins came down from the interior to fish for salmon. ("Bute Inlet Trail," Daily British Colonist, Sept. 15, 1863, p. 3). How long they stayed is difficult to say.

[65]"From Bute Inlet," Victoria Daily Chronicle, July 24, 1863, p. 3.

[66]"Bute Inlet," letter, A. Waddington to A. R. Green, July 8, 1863, published in Daily British Colonist, July 25, 1863, p. 3.

[67]"From Bute Inlet," Victoria Daily Chronicle, July 28, 1863, p. 2.

[68]"Bute Inlet," Daily British Colonist, Sept. 14, 1863, p. 3.

[69]"From Bute Inlet," Daily British Colonist, Jan. 4, 1864, p. 3.

[70]Letter, W. A. G. Young to the Attorney General, Feb. 1, 1864, Archives of British Columbia, F 332 28.

[71]"Bute Inlet Wagon Road Company," typescript of advertisement, Dec. 11, 1863, in "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," File 8.

[72]Frederick Whymper, Travel and Adventure in the Territory of Alaska Formerly Russian America--Now Ceded to the United States--and in Various Other Parts of the North Pacific (London: John Murray, 1868), p. 19.

[73]Ibid., p. 20.

[74]Ibid., p. 22.

[75]Ibid., p. 29.

[76]"From Bute Inlet," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 6, 1864, p. 3.

[77]"Horrible Massacre," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 12, 1864, p. 3 (from the extra of May 11, 1864).

CHAPTER V

THE MASSACRES AND THEIR CAUSES

The slaughter which fell with such apparent suddeness on Waddington's road party was in fact not without its prelude of increasing tension and misunderstanding between Chilcotins and whites. Some of the possible causes of this tension and misunderstanding have been examined or suggested in previous chapters. In this chapter we will first examine some possibly significant incidents which directly affected the Chilcotins involved in the massacres. Then we will go on to examine the massacres themselves. The nature of the massacres may in itself give us some clues as to the thoughts and feelings of the Chilcotins who were involved. Finally, we will examine the relationship between the various factors, direct and indirect, which helped to bring about the Uprising.

Some Incidents Preceeding the Uprising

The smallpox epidemic which reached the Chilcotins in 1862 may well have first reached them through their contact with the sick white men from Francis Poole's party who were left among them.[1] It probably was also spread by the Chilcotins' association with the Bella Coolas on the coast. Something of the fear and panic produced by the spread of the disease among the Indians may be sensed in Lieutenant Palmer's account of his journey to Fort Alexandria by way of Bentinck Arm in July and August of 1863. Referring to the Bella Coola Indians he writes:

> Smallpox has this year contributed a sad quota of death. During my stay there this disease, which had only just broken out when I arrived, spread so rapidly that, in a week, nearly all the healthy had scattered from the lodges and gone to encamp by families in the woods, only, it is to be feared, to carry away the seeds of infection and death in the blankets and other articles they took with them. Numbers were dying each day; sick men and women were taken out into the woods and left with a blanket and two or three salmon to die by themselves and rot unburied; sick children were tied to trees, and naked, gray-haired medicine-men, hideously painted, howled and gesticulated night and day in front of the lodges in mad efforts to stay the progress of the disease.[2]

Detailed accounts of the spread of the disease among the Chilcotins appear to be lacking, but its effect was devastating. As has been mentioned in Chapter Two, Morice estimated that two-thirds of the Chilcotins were wiped out.[3] Begbie, who had an opportunity to make a contemporary judgement, thought that one half was a "moderate computation" of the number who died.[4]

The effect of the smallpox epidemic on the Chilcotins' relations with the whites might have been negligible had it not been for the native beliefs regarding sickness, the attempt of a certain white man to capitalize on those beliefs, and his ignorance regarding the possible full consequences of the Chilcotins' dread of the terrible sickness. The Chilcotins, as has been mentioned in Chapter Two, believed that through spirits it was possible to bring harm on others. This harm might come through disease. Not long before the smallpox reached them in 1862 a white man in the interior was said to have threatened to bring the smallpox on the Chilcotins.[5] Whether he actually threatened them with the disease or merely predicted its arrival, the effect of his statement may have been the same. The Chilcotins could well have taken the prediction to have been a threat once the disease spread among them, seemingly by the white shaman's supernatural powers.

At any rate, his statement and the epidemic that followed had its effect on the Chilcotins' minds when a real threat was made against them later, in the spring of 1864.

Another incident which had occurred seemed well calculated to arouse the distrust and hostility of the Indians. It is not clear whether it was the Bella Coolas or the Chilcotins who were immediately affected by it, but, even if it was the Bella Coolas, the Chilcotins are likely to have heard of it and to have been influenced by it. Certain white men took the blankets of those who had died of smallpox and sold them to other Indians, spreading the disease yet more.[6] The Indians, as can be seen in the quotation from Palmer, realized something of the contagious nature of the disease[7] and could certainly have associated the spread of the epidemic with the sale of the blankets which came from the bodies of the dead. (The belief in the spread of the disease by contagion would not cancel out the Chilcotin's belief in its introduction by supernatural means.)

Most if not all the Chilcotins who took part in the massacres on the Homathko had apparently spent the winter near the coast,[8] though they may not have been seen at the head of the inlet till the early spring.[9] During the time that no work was being done on the road, from the beginning of January till late March, only one or two or perhaps several settlers were left among the Indians. The petty thefts from Clark's house and the resulting incident in which Clark attempted to teach the thieving Indian a lesson have been already mentioned. It is most likely that Clark's action left the Indian--who was probably a Chilcotin--with a feeling of bitterness at having been shamed before the other members of his tribe.

Clark may or may not have shared some of his food with the Indians, but according to Frederick Whymper the Indians at the head of Bute Inlet were very short of food at the time the spring work party arrived. And apparently, while they remained at the townsite, the Indians had to be content with what scraps the whites of the work party threw out.[10] Quite probably the unwillingness of the whites to share their apparent abundance with them would embitter the Chilcotins considerably. Customs of hospitality among Indian groups adjacent to the Chilcotins and no doubt among the Chilcotins themselves would cetainly put the stingy practice of the whites in an unfavourable light. Lundin Brown writes of meeting an unidentified group of Indians on his way to Fort Alexander and of partaking of their native food.

> They were uncommonly gruff and disagreeable [he writes], but still had enough of humanity to produce what food they possessed, consisting of some rather dity dried service-berries.[11]

The theft of supplies from the whites produced some inevitable tensions between whites and Indians.[12] In all probability the Chilcotins participated in these thefts, though they may have been blamed for some they had nothing to do with.

During the time that no road-party was working, early in 1864, a Chilcotin had been left in charge of some Bute Inlet Company stores. However, he left the vicinity, and while he was gone some Indians (Chilcotins or others) broke into the log store-house and took the flour. When Waddington's party came up in the spring of 1864 enquiries were made regarding the loss of the flour. When the Chilcotins were questioned they gave no information, but, according to one account, at last said, "You are in our

country; you owe us bread."[13] The white man questioning them through an interpreter took down the Chilcotins' names, then told them that they would all die.[14] The man who made the threat, who is unidentified in the documents and printed accounts of the period, returned on the steamer, but the effect of his attempt to take advantage of Indian beliefs was disastrous. The Chilcotins had not only heard his threat, reminiscent of the threat or prediction that preceeded the smallpox outbreak of 1862, but also they had actually seen the white man perform what to them seemed powerful magic. Their names had been written down. Doubtless they did believe, as Lundin Brown indicates, that the white man had acquired a power of life and death over them with sinister possibilities for the future.[15]

Whatever their thoughts at the time the threat was made against them, the Chilcotins (or at least a number of them) continued working for the road-makers. One of them at least, namely Telloot, had been in the group of Chilcotins who had worked the previous year.[16]

Chilcotins had been acquainted with the use of firearms since before 1822, as we have seen.[17] But apparently the Chilcotins who came down the Homathko to work on the road had been short of them. In 1863 they had "...seemed very anxious to trade for muskets and ammunition,"[18] and the road party had been willing enough to trade them. To the Chilcotins, no doubt, firearms meant not only an increased ability to hunt for food, which they sometimes had found difficult to obtain, but also the arms represented increased power in relation to surrounding tribes. By the time the Bute Inlet massacres began the Chilcotins were equipped with a number of muskets, as well as with axes and knives.

The whites at this time must have presented a picture of weakness to the Chilcotins. Among the seventeen men who were attacked on the Homathko there was only one gun, according to Governor Seymour.[19] Besides, the Chilcotins may have heard of the murder of whites which had taken place at Bentinck Arm in 1863,[20] and may have known that the perpetrators of the murders had still not been arrested. The Chilcotins who participated in the uprising came from an extremely isolated area, and could have had no concept of the number of whites in the colony or their strength compared to their own. At the same time, the stores of food and other supplies which the whites possessed must have seemed immensely attractive to the poverty-stricken and sometimes hungry interior Indians.

Disagreement over the terms under which they worked contributed to the store of ill-will towards the whites which the Chilcotins were building up. Brewster, the foreman, felt that the Indians should have to earn any food they were given. But the Chilcotins felt that once they were working for the whites they should be fed free of charge, and they refused to accept food in payment for their work. Brewster in his report to the Colonial Secretary wrote later concerning the Chilcotins:

> They never took provisions in payment they thought they had a right to be fed but they were not. They begged food or stole it and if these means failed them they hunted or fished.[21]

Grudges against individual workmen and fresh irritations that occurred from time to time must have served to increase Chilcotin hostility to the whites. It was reported that the Indians had threatened Tim Smith the ferry-keeper previously (before the day on which he was killed). This may have been due to his exposed position as a lone keeper of valuable stores

rather than to any fault of his own in dealing with the Indians. On the other hand, Clarke, the settler who had "taught the Indian a lesson," was one of the road work-men,[22] and it seems likely that ill-will towards him may have played its part in increasing Chilcotin hostility towards the whites.

Reports in 1864 and later suggested that jealousy of white men's "interference" with Chilcotin women may have been a cause of the outbreak. Probably the first of these reports, and the one that originated the others, is found in Brew's May 23rd letter from Waddington to the Colonial Secretary of British Columbia.

> The women particularly the younger ones [he wrote] were better fed than the men as the price of prostitution to the hungry wretches was enough to eat.[23]

Brew does not give the source of his information, though it could have been the Bute Inlet Indians. Prostitution of Indian women was common enough in British Columbia and Vancouver Island at the time. However, in Begbie's or Lundin Brown's accounts of their dealings with the Chilcotins there is no hint that it was one of the grievances which contributed to the outbreak. There remains the possibility that it was, but nothing more can be said with certainty.

A further possible cause of enmity towards the whites was the fact that the road was about to enter or had entered Chilcotin territory. Whether or not it had reached what was regarded as Chilcotin territory at this time, the Chilcotins knew its direction and purpose. And in 1863 there had been numerous signs at the townsite and further up the river that the coming of the white man's road meant the coming of the white settler.

The Massacres Themselves

In spite of the occurrence of various incidents, which by hindsight we can see could have contributed to feelings of hostility on the part of the Chilcotins, their apparent relationships with the road workmen were in the main outwardly peaceful. Two the Chilcotins who were sick had been cared for in the camp, according to Waddington.[24] It is likely that the spirit of jovial comradeship with the workmen which seemed to be evident the evening before the massacre at the main road-campt had been demonstrated on more than one occassion before. Waddington's men on the Homathko, though no doubt aware of differences which had arisen with the Chilcotins from time to time, were seemingly quite unaware of any build-up of resentment on the part of their Indian co-workers and certainly quite unsuspecting of any thoughts of violence the Chilcotins might harbour.

About thirty miles from the head of Bute Inlet was the ferry, where a lone ferry-keeper, Tim Smith, minded both the ferry and the abundant supply of provisions stored in the log house. Some seven to ten miles on, on the opposite side of the river to the ferry-house, was the main road-camp where actual construction of the trail was taking place. About two miles further still was the advance camp of the men who were blazing the trail and preparing the way.[25]

About April 26 a group of Chilcotins camped twenty or thirty feet from the main road-camp. The group may have included all the Chilcotins who had come down to work on the road. At any rate it included Klatsassin, Telloot, and Chedekki, who were later tried at Quesnel for their part in the uprising. Both Klatsassin and Telloot were chiefs--that is, important

leaders--and Klatsassin was to take a dominant role in the events which were to follow. On the night when they encamped near the whites, however, the Chilcotins gave no sign of hostility to the road-party. They did have some muskets among them, but this did not alarm the whites. After all, they and the work-party of the previous year had freely traded off their weapons to the Chilcotins. The Chilcotins were freely employed in packing for the whites. Telloot and Chedekki, it was later testified, packed up till the night before the attack on the main road-party.[26]

The main instigator of the Bute Inlet slaughters and the one who stood out as the leader of the Uprising was Klatsassin. His commanding qualities seem to have impressed those whites who later conversed with him.

> His was a striking face [wrote Lundin Brown]; the great under-jaw betokened strong power of will; the eyes, which were not black, like most Indians', but of a very dark blue, and full of a strange, it might be a dangerous light, were keen and searching.[27]

Allowance must be made for Brown's tendency to romanticize his descriptions, and probably little reliance should be placed on the descriptive details of Klatsassin's appearance,[28] but the striking impression he made was felt even by the more tough-minded Begbie, who wrote, "Klatsassin is the finest savage I have met with yet, I think."[29]

On the morning of April 29 Klatsassin arrived at the ferry-site. He was, it seems, accompanied by his two sons, three other Indian men, and some Indian women.[30] The details of what followed are not clear. Klatsassin may have first demanded food or other goods from Tim Smith, or the ferry-keeper's end may have come almost without warning. He was apparently sitting or standing near the fire when Klatsassin shot him. (A great pool of blood

was later found near the fire and a bullet was found lodged in a tree close by.) Smith's body was dragged to the river and thrown in.[31] It was never found.

Following the killing the Chilcotins proceeded to loot the stores which were kept at the ferry site. According to one account these amounted to about two tons of provisions.[32] The Chilcotins carried off some of the goods, hid others, and destroyed what they could neither use nor carry away. Among the plunder the Indians got possession of two kegs of gunpowder and thirty pounds of balls[33]--ammunition which they would find most valuable in a conflict with the whites in which the Chilcotins would be unable to replenish their supplies. The Chilcotins took one other step which indicated foresight. They cast the scow adrift and cut the ferry skiff to pieces with axes, cutting off the up-river whites from the route to the coast.[34] The cable over the river, however, was left where it was.

It so happened that a Clahuse or Homathco Indian named Squinteye and the Chilcotin chief Telloot had been sent down-river on the morning of April 29. About a mile above the ferry, according to Squinteye's later account, they met Klatsassin and the party of Chilcotins already mentioned.[35] Klatsassin told Squinteye that he had killed the ferry-keeper. After some argument Telloot joined Klatsassin, and Squinteye hurried down-river bearing the news of Smith's death. At the station at the mouth of the river the artist Frederick Whimper and his companions were awakened to hear the news, and Whymper, as has been narrated, brought the still-doubted news to Victoria.

The Chilcotins whom Squinteye had met, with the addition of Telloot, proceeded up the river to the main camp, where they joined the other Chilcotins.

No indication of what had occurred was perceived by the whites at the main camp. The Chilcotins, it was said, "...talked and joked with the workmen after supper and sang Indian songs during a part of the night."[36] The workmen lay down as usual without a watch being kep and without apprehension of danger from the nearby Chilcotins.

At about dawn the twelve workmen were sleeping in their six tents, with the possible exception of the cook, Charles Butler, who was probably attending to the morning fire. The Chilcotins, as was a common practice in their warfare, chose this time to attack. Butler was apparently shot in the back. At the same time or immediately after, the Chilcotins attacked the other workmen who lay in their tents. The attackers stabbed, clubbed, and shot the men, pulling the tents down over them to prevent escape. The strategy was almost completely successful. Most of the men never had a chance. Probably some never awakened. Three, however, managed to escape.

Philip Buckley was lying asleep when a Chilcotin entered the tent and struck him a blow on the head. The partially stunned and confused workman jumped up and made for the door of the tent, only to be met by two Indians who stabbed him with their knives. Buckley fell down and was apparently left for dead by the Indians. He crawled into the under-brush and fainted away.[37]

Edward Mosely was sleeping along with Joseph Fielding and James Campbell when two Chilcotins lifted up the end of the tent, whooped, and fired immediately, shooting Mosely's two companions. The Indians then pulled the tent down and hacked and cut at Fielding and Campbell.

Mosely was protected by the tent pole, which had fallen on top of him. He lay quietly till the Indians rushed off to attack another tent; then he crawled out and plunged into the river, which was only a couple of steps off from the tent. He ran through the water for some distance, stooping beneath the bank to escape notice. He looked back just long enought to see a number of Chilcotin women and children gathered around Charles Butler's tent, where the provisions were kept. Mosely continued his flight down-river.[38]

Peter Petersen awoke to hear two shots fired. He jumped up, rushed from the tent, and saw two Indians firing into the tent next to his. One of the Chilcotins saw Petersen, rushed up to him, and aimed a blow at his head with the butt-end of a musket. Petersen warded it off and jumped away, but another Chilcotin came up to him and struck at him with an axe. Petersen jumped aside in time and took shelter behind a tree by the river-bank, as the Indian who first struck came up with his musket to shoot. The Chilcotin waited for his chance, then shot and wounded Petersen in the left arm. Petersen jumped into the river, his arm bleeding badly. The Indian, seeing the flow of blood, may have thought Petersen had been killed, for he did not try to follow. Petersen was carried down-stream for some distance before he managed to crawl out. Then after he had proceeded for about one hundred yeards Mosely overtook him. Mosely was unwounded, while Petersen was weakened from loss of blood, so Mosely left him and went on for help to the ferry-site where he imagined Smith was.[39]

Meanwhile, at the advance camp about two miles up-river, the four workmen--William Brewster (foreman), James Gaudet (or Gaudie), John Clarke,

and Baptiste Demarest--had risen and breakfasted. Besides the men there was the cook, a Homathko Indian boy in his teens who was known as George. After breakfast the men went out to work with their axes while George did the dishes. Brewster was ahead of the others, blazing the trail. As George was working about six or seven Indians came to the camp-site. One of them George later described as a slave of the Chilcotins; the others were Chilcotins. The slave and one other had no gun; the others had.[40] The Chilcotins went out on the trail and shot all the men with the possible exception of Baptiste Demarest, whose footsteps indicated he may have jumped into the river. "In the place where he leaped," wrote Chartres Brew after visiting the spot, "no man could escape drowning."[41] It was Brew's party which discovered the bodies of the other three men. Gaudet (or Gaudie) had been shot. Clark had been shot and his head beaten in. Brewster too had been shot and his head smashed, but also his corpse had been deliberately mutilated.

The slave of the Chilcotins, who knew the Indian boy, told him to run away. About half-way down the trail to the main road-camp George met a large group of Chilcotins hurrying along. The women among them were carrying heavy loads on their backs. With them were about ten men, among whom, George later testified, were Telloot and Klatsassin (as well as Piell or Pierre, Klatsassin's son, and Chedekki). George hurried on down the trail, passing the main road-camp, where he saw the bodies of some of the white men. Arriving at the ferry-site he saw two white men: Mosely, and Petersen, who by this time had joined him. George heard them calling and apparently thought they were calling him, but did not go to

them. In his haste to get home he swam the river and arrived at the lower station after nightfall with news of the massacre.[42]

Meanwhile Buckley, who had been lying amid the underbrush, had recovered from his faint. He could now hear a noise in the camp, and though he could see nothing from where he was, guessed that the Chilcotins were packing away the plunder. He managed to crawl to some water, where he drank thirstily. Thinking that he would never have the strength to reach the ferry on his own, he resolved on trying to reach Brewster's camp only two miles or so ahead. He managed to crawl along to the advance camp-site, but here he saw fires burning and heard dogs barking. Knowing that there had been no dogs in Brewster's camp, he concluded that the advance party had suffered a fate similar to that of his own group. Buckley lay among the rocks till almost daylight, then started for the ferry, which he safely reached, and there joined Mosely and Petersen. Buckley had been a sailor, so the three men fixed a loop to the cable which stretched across the river, and Buckley, getting into the loop, worked his way across till within a short distance of the opposite bank, when he dropped into the river and swam the rest of the way across. The other two survivors followed his example. On the other side of the river they saw the evidence of the attack which had ended Smith's life and which explained why their calls to the ferry-man had been unanswered. In about an hour two French Canadian packers and five Bute Inlet Indians who had heard of the massacre from George, arrived to rescue them.[43]

By the time the three survivors of the Bute Inlet massacres had brought their news to Victoria, the Chilcotins had had ample opportunity to cross the Coast Range barrier to the interior. Flushed with victory, Klatsassin and his followers now dreamed larger dreams of exterminating the encroaching white men. Meanwhile, another group of whites, oblivious to their danger, were preparing to enter Chilcotin territory by the Bentinck Arm route. On April 25 Waddington had dispatched the schooner Amelia to Bentinck Arm to take up a party of men who were to work on the Bute Inlet Trail from the upper end (the interior). The contract for this work had been awarded to Alexander Macdonald. Macdonald apparently already had a vested interest in the trail, since he and his partner Manning had a ranch at ~~Puntzee~~ Puntzi Lake. Manning, who had remained on the ranch, was the only white settler in the whole of the Chilcotin country.

On May 17, 1864, Macdonald set out with his pack-train from the head of Bentinck Arm, still apparently oblivious to the fate which had overtaken the whites on the Homathko.[44] With Macdonald were seven other white men and a number of Indians. Some of the whites were reportedly headed for the Cariboo gold fields. The pack-train consisted of twenty-eight loaded pack animals and a large number of unloaded ones. Peter McDougall, for whom the expedition seems to have been a trading venture, reportedly had been unable to buy sufficient goods at the head of Bentinck Arm and was taking through a large number of unloaded animals. With McDougall was his common-law wife who was a Chilcotin from the Nacoontloon (modern Anahim) Lake band of which Annichim was the chief.

Crossing the difficult "Great Slide," the pack train reached the easier interior section of the route and, probably towards the end of May, arrived at Anahim Lake. Klatsassin had arrived before them. Whether he had learned from the Homathko road-workers that the pack-train was coming through is uncertain, though it seems likely that he had, and that his trip to Nancootloon was another example of his deliberate planning. At any rate, he had no doubt already told the Nancootloon Chilcotins of his signal success on the Homathko, and if he had not already done so he would now, with the arrival of the pack-train, point out to them the advantages to be gained in attacking and plundering it and annihilating yet another group of white men. His suggestions fell on ready ears, and the massacre might have been a total one had it not been for McDougall's Chilcotin wife. (Lundin Brown refers to her by the name "Klymtedza," ~~we~~ which we may use for convenience.) Visiting with her own people, Klymtedza learned of the planned attack on the pack-train. Apparently her loyalties lay with her husband, for she divulged the secret to the whites. According to Lundin Brown, there was a division of opinion among the members of the group, some wishing to return immediately to the coast, abandoning their goods to the Indians, others being unwilling to do this. At last the decision was made to dig a defensive entrenchment and to throw up earthworks behind which they could occupy a position which could be defended against the Indians. Here, according to Brown's account, they remained for two days. However long they stayed, time must have crawled as they awaited the expected attack. It failed to materialize, and the men decided to leave their crude fortifications and head for the coast, though taking their loads of provisions

with them. Somehow, though, the Chilcotins got wind of this. The packers seem to have constructed their earthworks some distance beyond Anahim (Nancootloon) Lake. They had reached a point possibly ten miles from Anahim Lake on their retreat to the coast when they were suddenly fired on by the Chilcotins who lay in ambush on either side of their pathway. Two of the men--Higgins and McDougall-were killed outright. Macdonald's horse was shot from under him. He mounted another, and, when that was shot also, continued to put up a fight till he was finally killed. Klymtedza, according to one report, was also killed in the attack.[45] Five men managed to escape and made their way to Bentinck Arm. Four of the five had been wounded. One of these, John Grant, made his way to the ranch of a settler named Hamilton and his family. Grant burst in upon the family and told them how his party had been massacred. The Chilcotins were pursuing him, and Grant and the Hamiltons got away in a canoe just in time. They looked back to see the Chilcotins high on the river-bank. The Chilcotins, however, did not fire, being apparently distracted by the opportunity for plundering the settler's house.

Charles Farquharson, who escaped unhurt from the scene of the attack, survived a number of days in the woods and finally made his way to the Hamilton ranch. This he found abandoned, but he reached the head of Bentinck Arm thanks to a canoe which Hamilton sent up for him.

At Puntzeen or Puntzi Lake lived the settler William Manning.[46] Here, where Indian paths had long met, the proposed trail from Bute Inlet was to meet the undeveloped but already used trail from Bentinck Arm. Near the shores of Puntzi Lake Manning had planted a garden and built a log house,

and taken advantage of the readily available spring water. It so happened that the place Manning had chosen to settle had long been used as a camping ground by some of the Chilcotin Indians. Judge Matthew Baillie Begbie's later investigations indicated that Manning had driven off these Chilcotins and taken possession of the spring.[47] Manning, however, now considered himself on good relations with the Chilcotins. They had worked for him readily, and reportedly he had supported them almost entirely one winter when they were short of food. Living with Manning was an Indian woman, known as Nancy, who was apparently herself a Chilcotin.

However friendly Manning's relations with the Chilcotins may have appeared to him to have been, it appears there was an underlying resentment towards him which the success of the Chilcotins in killing other whites encouraged them to express in action. The exact date when Manning was killed is uncertain, though it seems to have come after the slaughter of Macdonald's party on the Bentinck trail.

Nancy was first warned of the plan to kill Manning. According to one account (given by Brown) she participated in the plot by hiding his ammunition. But her own testimony before Begbie was very different. According to her account she was told of the plot by two Indian women who warned her to leave, and she herself told Manning. Manning, however, refused to believe that the Chilcotins would harm him. Later Nancy was warned by two other Indian women and she was just leaving when Manning was shot. The Chilcotin who carried out the shooting was Tahpit. But according to Tahpit the instigator of the plot was Annichim, who was there with him when the shooting was done, though Tahpit did not deny

his own part in it.

William Manning's body was later found by the expedition sent under William Cox. It was lying hidden in a stream some fifty yards from the site of the house. A bullet wound passed from the right breast to the left shoulder blade. According to Brown's account the body was also mutilated.

Following the murder of Manning the Chilcotins first looted the house, then destroyed it. According to Brown's account and Seymour's they also destroyed Manning's plow and other agricultural implements and wrecked the garden and field. We can hardly doubt the resentment of the Chilcotins towards Manning for taking over their camping-ground. Their wrecking of his implements, garden, and field may also have been expressive of resentment against the introduction of agriculture, which they saw as a threat to their way of life based on hunting and fishing.

The Nature of the Uprising

The massacres on the Homathko, the attack on the pack-train, and the killing of William Manning had now revealed the main pattern of the Chilcotin Uprising.

In a number of features the Chilcotin Uprising was typical of Chilcotin warfare. These features were not exclusively characteristic of the Chilcotins, in that they shared such patterns of warfare with adjacent tribes. However, they do mark the Chilcotin Uprising as distinctively native in many of its patterns. The Chilcotins who participated in the massacres were in the main those who had been least deeply influenced by white culture. In

spite of what had seemed an easy adaption to closer contact with the whites, in reality their patterns of thought were still deeply Chilcotin as opposed to European. These patterns of thought were evident in many of the ways in which the uprising was carried out, in spite of the use of the white man's weapons.

Dawn, the time of the attack on the Homathko road-camps, was, as we have seen in Chapter One, a typical one for the Chilcotins. It was no doubt the most favourable one for the element of surprise which was typical of their warfare. The use of ambush to attack the pack-train was yet another means of attempting to ensure that the attack was unexpected.

White men in British Columbia had on occasion shown themselves quite capable of ambushing and slaughtering unarmed and unsuspecting Indians, as Reinhart's account of the slaughter at Lake Okanagan has illustrated.[48] Such an action was contrary to the usually-accepted white norms of conduct at the time and was viewed with revulsion by Reinhart and no doubt by others in the party. But a surprise attack on an unarmed and unsuspecting party <u>was</u> an accepted norm of Chilcotin warfare. The Chilcotin prisoners at Quesnel when first visited by Brown, who had been appointed their chaplain, insisted that "They meant war, not murder"[49] in falling on the road-men on the Homathko.

One or two ritualistic or semi-realistic features of warfare were present in the uprising. According to the testimony of the Homathko boy George, one of the Chilcotins at least (of those who came to Brewster's camp) had his face blackened, a sign well understood to indicate warfare or enmity towards an enemy.[50] The mutilation of the body of an enemy was, as we have seen in Chapter Two, one feature of Chilcotin warfare. Such

mutilation was carried out on the body of Brewster, the road foreman.[51]

In one important way the Chilcotin Uprising differed from previous Chilcotin warfare. For the first time Chilcotin warfare was specifically directed against the White Man. In previous times Chilcotins had feuded with Chilcotins of other families or bands in conflicts which displayed family or band consciousness. They had warred on neighbouring tribes, and perhaps shown some evidence in these conflicts of Chilcotin consciousness. But in the Chilcotin Uprising for the first time they warred against the White Man as such. In this they showed evidence of a newly developed Indian consciousness.

From the very beginning the Chilcotins' actions were directed specifically against whites. In spite of the Chilcotins' previous history of conflict with the Bute Inlet Indians, Squinteye and the Homathko boy George were unharmed. Both were allowed to go their way in spite of the fact that this would enable them if they so desired (as they did) to bring the news of the massacre to the ears of the whites at the head of the Inlet. On the other hand, no attempt was apparently made to induce either of the two to join the Chilcotins against the whites. The Chilcotins made a difference between white and Indian as such. They had developed an Indian consciousness. But they still made a difference between Chilcotin and non-Chilcotin Indians. Non-Chilcotin Indians were unharmed. Chilcotin Indians of the interior were encouraged to join the uprising. Klatsassin journeyed to Anahim Lake to stir up the Indians there. Booty from the raid on Macdonald's pack-train was reportedly distributed to other Chilcotins who did not participate directly in the attack.

The Chilcotin Uprising was an uprising in that it was directed against all whites in the area where the "insurgent" Chilcotins were, and in defiance of white authority. If it was not a true uprising at the very beginning it rapidly became one. According to Brown's account, which may not be very accurate for some of the events on the Homathko, the Chilcotins before the attacks on the road-parties agreed to kill all the whites they could lay their hands on. This may have been before or after the murder of Smith, the ferry-man, an event to which Brown for some reason does not refer. According to "Squinteye's Declaration," Telloot for one did not join with Klatsassin till after the murder of Smith.[52] It may have been after the killing of Smith and before the attack on the main road-camp that the plot to exterminate as many whites as possible was made. At any rate, the events that materialized and which have already been described gave the evident character of an uprising to the Chilcotins' actions. And once the colonial government sent expeditions against them the Chilcotins who had openly participated in the Uprising were faced with the choice of either giving themselves up or openly resisting the government's armed expeditions.

The Chilcotin Uprising was not an uprising of all the Chilcotins. The Chilcotins who participated, as has been already mentioned, were mainly those who had absorbed the least white culture. They were also the most isolated from centres of white settlement, and had probably the least understanding of the degree of white strength. Other groups of Chilcotins, as we shall see, had been more deeply influenced by the whites and had a better idea of the futility of pitting their strength against that of the

Europeans. The uneveness of exposure to white culture worked against the development of a "pan-Chilcotin" uprising. But the disunity of the Chilcotins also stemmed from aboriginal times. Many other native peoples of North America had a comparable disunity, which goes far to explain the rapid achievement of ascendency by the White Man.

Causes of the Uprising

"Chief Motivating Cause"

The Chilcotin Uprising, like many other human actions carried out by groups and individuals, had one chief motivating cause but many contributing causes. The chief motivating cause--the reason for their actions which was uppermost in the Chilcotins' minds--was given by the Chilcotin prisoners at their trial and in conversation with Judge Begbie, and with Lundin Brown.[53] This was the threat which had been made by someone at Bute Inlet to bring a plague of sickness upon them. The Chilcotins' repeated references to this incident, their unanimous testimony to its occurrence, and the fact that they had no good reason to fabricate the story are convincing reasons for accepting it as the chief motivating cause of the Uprising.

Surprising as it seems at first that a mere threat should prove to have such importance, the Chilcotins' beliefs regarding disease and the terror produced by the epidemics of 1862-63 are ample explanations of the effect that the threat had. The rashness of the unidentified white man's action was a case of "a little knowledge" being "a dangerous thing." He knew enough about Chilcotin or British Columbia Indian beliefs to be aware that his threat would frighten them, but he was unaware of the possible consequences of his threat. To the Chilcotins who had come down the Homathko to

the Bute Inlet region, wiping out the whites seemed not only a revenge for the threat but also the only way to prevent the whites from bringing the smallpox.[54]

"Predisposing Causes"

Behind the chief motivating cause (the threat made against the Chilcotins) we may discern a number of contributing causes. Some of these, which might be termed "predisposing causes," were events and circumstances which had no direct connection with the Chilcotins' deciding to slaughter the whites, but which must have helped to shape their adverse attitutde towards the whites. These events and circumstances, some of which were connected with the earlier history of the Pacific Northwest, we have looked at in previous chapters, though not at the nature of their relationship to the Chilcotin Uprising.

In Chapter ~~Two~~ One we noted that the Chilcotins from aboriginal times had a history of warfare and feuding with many surrounding groups: specifically with the Homathkos, Shuswaps (except Canyon Shuswaps), Lillooets, and Carriers. Whereas another group might have developed a pattern of avoidance and retreat in the face of encroachments or threatened conflict with others, the Chilcotins had developed a pattern of warfare in self-defense --and in aggression against weaker groups such as the Homathkos. Warfare, then, might be expected from the Chilcotins as a defensive reaction, or in revenge, or in aggression, provided the right conditions of provocation or incentive were present.

The pre-gold-rush history of Chilcotins' dealings with Europeans was, as has been seen, marked by frequently uneasy and even hostile relationships with the fur-traders. This, we may suppose, left its mark on the Chilcotins'

attitudes towards the White Man. At the same time, the Chilcotins during the pre-gold-rush period did not develop as great a dependence on the white man as did some other Indian tribes. This would have been particularly true of those Chilcotins who lived far from Fort Alexandria. Lack of economic dependence must have contributed to their independence of attitude, evidenced in their willingness to do without peaceful relations with the white man.

The Chilcotins' relationships with the missionaries up to the time of the Uprising had generally been fleeting and superficial. Here again those furthest removed from Fort Alexandria would have been least influenced by the missionaries.[55] In view of the fact that the missionaries acted as transmitters of European culture and as intermediaries between the Indians and other whites, the lack of close contact with them must have contributed to the Chilcotins' unfamiliarity with white culture. This in turn must have greatly increased the possibilities for misunderstanding with the whites, and probably contributed to feelings of bewilderment and fear when the Chilcotins were confronted with European ways.

We have noted that the coming of the Gold Rush brought the sudden influx of a large white population distinctly different from the fur traders in many ways. These new Europeans--miners and those who followed in their tracks--had no relationships of essential interdependence with the Indians, no long background in dealing with the Indians, and in some cases had attitudes of positive hostility towards them. We have little knowledge of what direct dealings the Chilcotins had with the gold miners. They would have had much less to do with them than the Indians of the Fraser River did. But some parties bound for the Cariboo passed through Chilcotin territory by the

Bentinck Arm route, as we have seen. And the Chilcotins may well have heard stories of conflict between miners and Indians in the Fraser Canyon.

The smallpox outbreak of 1862-63 was fresh in the Chilcotins' minds. In wiping out a large proportion of the Chilcotin population it must have created great disruption in Chilcotin society. And, as we have seen, some of the circumstances under which the smallpox came to the Chilcotins were such as to link it in their minds with the influx of the whites.

Prior to the threat made against the Chilcotins at Bute Inlet, then, the Chilcotins who were later involved in the uprising had had few experiences which would be likely to dispose them to trust the whites or develop friendliness towards them. On the other hand, they had had a number of experiences which would be likely to arouse their hostility towards the White Man. And their culture from aboriginal times favoured the expression of this hostility in acts of war if opportunity offered, rather than the passive acceptance of a situation which had led to their hostile feelings.

A number of circumstances and events, then, had set the mood for the Chilcotin Uprising, creating a feeling of suspicion and sometimes latent hostility towards the whites. These feelings were no doubt shared more by some Chilcotins than by others, being particularly strong in those who had previously been most isolated, as those who participated in the uprising generally speaking had been.

The Chilcotin hostility was centred and given direction by a single issue: namely, the threat of sickness which had been made against them.

"Aggravating Grievances"

Earlier in this chapter, in dealing with preceeding incidents which directly affected the Chilcotins involved in the uprising, we examined a number of occurrences directly connected with the road-building enterprise which may be regarded as grievances from the Chilcotins' viewpoint, aggravating the harm done by the threat made against the Chilcotins.

Waddington's trail had just entered or was about to enter Chilcotin territory and the Chilcotins may by now have been growing uneasy at the thought of a possible influx of settlers into the Chilcotin region once the trail was extended farther. (Their experiences with Manning, who had occupied a Chilcotin camping site, would surely have given them some uneasiness.)

The failure of Waddington's party to provide the starving or near-starving Chilcotins with food when the road-party arrived in March of 1864 must have caused resentment. This resentment was increased by the failure of Brewster to provide the Chilcotins with food in addition to wages once the interior Indians began working for the road-builders. Brewster's unwillingness to supply food on the basis the Chilcotins regarded as their right must certainly have contributed to the special ill-will they felt towards him: ill-will which was no doubt extended by association to the other road-builders as well.

Grudges against other workmen such as Clark and possibly Smith and fresh irritations that occurred from time to time must have served to aggravate the Chilcotins' largely-hidden hostility towards the whites.

"Material Incentive"

Among the causes of the uprising the material incentive of plunder must have played a definite part. Lane, in his thesis on "Cultural Relations of the Chilcotin Indians . . ." remarks, as we have seen in Chapter ~~Two~~ One, on their practice of feasting on the enemies' supplies.[56] Booty was a natural fruit of warfare.

To the frequently-hungry and poverty-stricken Chilcotins the provisions which they knew were kept for the road-party must have seemed a most attractive store of wealth in goods and food ready for the taking. Plunder was not the main cause of the uprising, but it must have been a powerful incentive, and one which Klatsassin could use to persuade others to join in his plot to annihilate the road-workers. In persuading the Anahim (Nancootloon) Chilcotins to join him in attacking the pack-train, plunder must have played an equally important part--or likely a more important one, since the Anahim Indians had not the same direct experience of the threat against them nor of the aggravating grievances which Klatsassin's immediate followers had. Again, in the attack on Manning the knowledge that there was booty to be gained must have played its part in encouraging the Chilcotins to kill the settler.

"Facilitating Factors"

No matter how numerous the motives of the Chilcotins nor how great the hostility which they had built up, the uprising would not have taken place had the right facilitating factors not been present. Not only did the Chilcotins have the urge to perpetrate the attacks on the whites, but also just the right set of circumstances was present to make the uprising possible and to make it appear capable of success in the eyes of the Chilcotins.

One of the circumstances was the defenceless state of the whites on the Bute Inlet Trail. The ferry-keeper was alone, and the road-workers were split into two parties, the advance one consisting of only four white men.[57] Not only did the whites have little or no ammunition, but no watch was kept at night, so confident were the white men of their safety. In short, the road-party was an ideal target for the type of surprise attack the Chilcotins were in the habit of resorting to in their warfare.

In addition to this, the Chilcotins had acquired the advantage of the White Man's arms and ammunition, which the Chilcotins on the Homathko had mostly gained quite late but had had sufficient time to become familiar with.

Thanks, ironically, to the mediation of Waddington, the Chilcotins had in the two years that preceeded the uprising gained in security by the fact that peace had been made with the Homathkos, Klahuse, and Euclataws, three coastal groups whom they had previously regarded as enemies.[58] It is likely that the feeling of increased security which must have come to them contributed to their confidence in attacking the Whites.

Finally, among the circumstances which helped to make the Uprising possible was the circumstance of effective leadership. Without the leadership of Klatsassin it is doubtful whether the attacks on the road workmen on the Homathko would have ever been carried out, let alone carried out with almost complete success as they were. The first white to be killed was killed by Klatsassin, and his role in every part of the Uprising with the exception of the attack on Manning was a prominent one. His leadership stemmed from his ability and his apparently forceful personality. Yet the fact that he embarked on what was from the beginning a hopeless resistance to the White Man shows how little he understood the weakness of his own people's position and the strength of the white men's.

Footnotes for Chapter V

[1]"Important from the Coast Route--Destitute and Suffering," Daily British Colonist, July 22, 1862, p. 3. See Chapter IV of this thesis.

[2]H[enry] Spencer Palmer, Report of a Journey of Survey from Victoria to Fort Alexander via Bentinck Arm (New Westminster: Royal Engineer Press, 1863), p. 7.

[3]A[drian] G[abriel] Morice, The Great Dene Race (St. Gabriel-Modling, near Vienna, Austria, Administration of "Anthropos" [1928?]), p. 39, cited in Robert Brockstedt Lane, "Cultural Relations of the Chilcotin Indians of West Central British Columbia" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1953), p. 39. (Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1953).

[4]Letter, Matt[hew] B. Begbie [to F. Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Letter, Alfred Waddington to the Editor of the Daily British Colonist, published in Weekly Colonist, June 14, 1864, p. . Waddington does not make it absolutely clear that it was the Chilcotins who were affected. Waddington names two whites, Angus McLeod and Taylor, as responsible, but "Verax" in a letter to the Editor of the British Columbian states that the two whites were Angus McLeod and Wallace. (Letter, "Verax" to the Editor, June 21, 1864, in British Columbian, June 22, 1864, p. 3.)

[7]The Chilcotins' associations with the Bella Coolas were close enough to ensure that the latter's realization of the contagious nature of smallpox would be shared by the Chilcotins also.

[8]Testimony of the Homathko boy "George" and of "Squinteye," Sept. 28, 1864, in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians--Telloot, Klatsassin, Chessus, Piel or Pierre, Tah-pit & Chedekki," enclosure in Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[9]"Thrilling Details by Mr. Waddington: Origin of the Massacre," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 29, 1864, p. 3.

[10]Frederick Whymper, Travel and Adventure in the Territory of Alaska, Formerly Russian America--Now Ceded to the United States--and in Various Other Parts of the North Pacific (London: John Murray, 1868), p. 20.

[11]R[obert] C[hristopher] Lundin Brown, Klatsassan and Other Reminiscences of Missionary Life in British Columbia (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1873), p. 2.

[12]Testimony of Klatsassin, Sept. 29, 1864, in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . . ," enclosure in Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[13]R. C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassán, p. 9.

[14]Ibid., p. 10 and p. 100; also Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864, and Klatsassin's statement (Sept. 29(when brought into court for sentencing, in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . . ," enclosure in Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864.

[15]R. C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassin, pp. 10-11.

[16]Frederick John Saunders, "Homatcho, or The Story of the Bute Inlet Expedition, and the Massacre by the Chilcoaten Indians," Resources of British Columbia, III, No. 1 (Mar., 1885), p. 6.

[17]Letter, George McDougall to John Stuart in "Fort Chilcotin," typescript, Archives of British Columbia, see Chapter I of this thesis.

[18]Saunders, "Homatcho," p. 6.

[19]British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," May 20, 1864.

[20]"Latest from the North Coast," Daily British Colonist, May 19, 1863, p. 3. See Chapter IV of this thesis.

[21]Letter, Chartres Brew to Colonial Secretary [of British Columbia], May 23, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[22]"Thrilling Details by Mr. Waddington: 'Supposed Murderers' and 'Bodies Found'," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 29, 1864, p. 3.

[23]Letter, Brew to Colonial Secretary, May 23, 1864.

[24]Letter, Alfred Waddington to the Editor, June 12, 1864, in Daily British Colonist, June 13, 1864, p. 3.

[25]Distances are from: "From Bute Inlet: The Trail--Rumored Murder by an Indian," Victoria Daily Chronicle. May 6, 1864, p. 3; despatch, Seymour to Newcastle, May 20, 1864; "A Survivor's Account," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 12, 1864, p. 3; letter, Brew to Colonial Secretary [B.C.], May 23, 1864; testimony of Philip Buckley, Sept. 28, 1864, in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . . ."

[26]Testimony of Philip Buckley in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . . ."

[27]R. C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassin, p. 5.

[28]The blue eyes may be a figment of Brown's ethnocentric imagination. He may have expected an Indian of exceptional ability to have some European characteristics. The great under-jaw could be simply a reflection of the strong tendency during this period to see physical manifestations of character, as in phrenology.

[29]Letter, Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864.

[30]"Thrilling Details by Mr. Waddington: Squinteye's Declaration," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 29, 1864, p. 3.

[31]"News from the Bute Expedition," British Columbian, May 28, 1864, p. 3 and "A Survivor's Account," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 12, 1864, p. 3.

[32]"Thrilling Details by Mr. Waddington: Origin of the Massacre," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 29, 1864, p. 3.

[33]Brew to Colonial Secretary [B.C.], May 23, 1864.

[34]"A Survivor's Account," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 12, 1864, p. 3. Klatsassin may have intended to kill Waddington as well as his road-party, judging from one report:
"The intention of Klattasen . . . had been . . . to return to Benchee [Puntzi] Lake by the Memeya [Southgate] and Bridge rivers; he was only waiting, as he said, for Mr. Waddington's arrival, after whom he inquired anxiously every day, and whether he would bring many men and provisions with him. He said he wanted him to get back his daughter from the Euclataws [Yucultas]. In the meantime his eldest boy Pierre . . . went up with the packers . . . to the Ferry, where he had a long talk with the Chilcoatens of the upper camp, and returned in the morning of Friday the 23rd, when his father Klatasen immediately changed his mind, as he told the packers on the Saturday morning. He would now give a canoe, six blankets, and two muskets, for his daughter, and started on Tuesday morning . . . for the Ferry . . . ." ("Thrilling Details by Mr. Waddington" Origin of the Massacre," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 29, 1864, p. 3).

[35]"Thrilling Details by Mr. Waddington: Squinteye's Declaration," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 29, 1864, p. 3.

[36]"Thrilling Details by Mr. Waddington: Origin of the Massacre," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 29, 1864, p. 3.

[37]Buckley's testimony in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . ."; "Buckley's Statement," Daily British Colonist, May 12, 1864, p. 3; Buckley's account in "Extracts from the depositions respecting the Bute Inlet Massacre made before J. L. Wood, Esq., Acting Stipendiary Magistrate for Vancouver Island, which may lead to the identification of

the murderers," The Government Gazette, June 25, 1864, p. 3; also "A Survivor's Account" (the story of the massacre as received from Mosely), Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 12, 1864, p. 3.

[38]"A Survivor's Account," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 12, 1864, p. 3, and Mosely's account in "Extracts from the depositions respecting the Bute Inlet Massacre . . . ," The Government Gazette, June 25, 1864, p. 3.

[39]"A Survivor's Account," Petersen's account in "Extracts from the depositions respecting the Bute I et Massacre . . ." (The name is spelled "Peterson" there, but his signature is written as "Petersen" in receipt, June 7, 1864, for certificate of special deposit, filed with letter, Arthur Birch to Acting Colonial Secretary, Vancouver Island, May 28, 1864, Archives of British Columbia; and "Peter Petersen's Statement," Weekly Colonist, May 17, 1864, from Daily British Colonist, May 12, 1864, ("Waddington, 1864" file, Reid Papers).

[40]Testimony of "George" in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . ."; "Tenas George's Statement" in "Origin of the Massacre."

[41]Letter, Brew to Colonial Secretary [B.C.], May 23, 1864.

[42]Testimony of "George" in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . ."; "Tenas George's Statement" in "Origin of the Massacre;" evidence of "George" in "Proceedings of Inquest," enclosure with letter, Brew to Colonial Secretary [B.C.], May 23, 1864.

[43]"Buckley's statement," Daily British Colonist, May 12, 1864, p. 3; Buckley's testimony in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . . "; "A Survivor's Account," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 12, 1864, p. 3.

[44]Sources for the narrative concerning Macdonald's pack-train are: "More Indian Murders!" "Our ~~Special~~ Special Correspondence," and "Letter from Bentinck Arm" (A.W. Wallace, Custom House Officer, to editor) in Daily British Colonist, June 27, 1864, p. 3; "The Bentinck Arm Tragedy," (letter, A.W. Wallace to editor) Colonist, July 15, 1864, p. 3; "The Chilcoaten Expedition: Diary of a Volunteer," Colonist. Oct. 14, 1864, p. 3; "Regina v. Klatsassin and Piell or Pierre," Sept. 29, 1864, in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . .," enclosure in letter, Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864; R.C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassan, pp. 16-36.

[45]There is apparently no account of what happened to the other Indians who were in the party when it was attacked.

[46]Sources for the narrative concerning the killing of Manning are: "Regina v. Tah-pit," Sept. 29, 1864, in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . ."; letter, William George Cox to A. Birch, Colonial Secretary B.C., June 19, 1864, Archives of British Columbia; British Columbia,

"Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch to the Colonial Office, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 58-80, Frederick Seymour to Edward Cardwell, Sept. 9, 1864, No. 37 [Photostat copy of mss. in Archives Department, Ottawa, G. series, no. 353-358]; R.C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassan, pp. 36-43.

[47]M. B. Begbie, note inserted in Nancy's testimony in "Regina v. Tah-pit," Sept. 29, 1864, in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . . ."

[48]Herman Francis Reinhart, The Golden Frontier: The Recollections of Herman Francis Reinhart, 1851-1869, ed. by Doyce B. Nunis, Jr. with a Foreword by Nora B. Cunningham (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962), pp. 126-127. See Chapter III of this thesis.

[49]R. C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassan, p. 100.

[50]Testimony of "George," Sept. 28, 1864, in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . . ."

[51]Letter, Brew to Colonial Secretary [B. C.], May 23, 1864.

[52]"Squinteye's Declaration" in "Origin of the Massacre," "Origin of the Massacre" makes it appear that Klatsassin through his son Pierre may have pre-arranged the massacre with the Chilcotins at the road-camp before coming there himself. (See foot-note 34.)

[53]Letter, Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864; R. C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassan, p. 100.

[54]See Klatsassin's statement on being brought in for sentencing, Sept. 29, 1864, in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . . ."

[55]Lundin Brown in instructing the prisoners in Christian teaching found that "One of them had been pretty fully instructed by a Roman Catholic priest, and he had imparted what he knew to the others." (R.C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassan, p. 104). It may be noted, however, that only one had been "pretty fully instructed"; and it seems likely that he had imparted most of his instruction to the others after they had been condemned and after Brown had first visited them. Judging from Morice, the contact with missionaries of thos Chilcotins living at a distance from Fort Alexandria was very superficial. Morice, A[drian] G[abriel], History of the Catholic Church in Western Canada, from Lake Superior to the Pacific (1659-1895) (2 vols.; Toronto: Musson Book Company, 1910), II. See Chapter II of this thesis.

[56]Lane, "Cultural Relations of the Chilcotin Indians of West Central British Columbia," p. 55. See Chapter I of this thesis.

[57]Strictly speaking, one of these men, Baptiste Demarest, was of mixed blood.

[58]British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 18-19, Frederick Seymour to the Duke of Newcastle, May 20, 1864, No. 7. See Chapter IV of this thesis.

CHAPTER VI

THE WHITE REACTION TO THE MASSACRES

". . . The most startling thing of the kind that has yet taken place in either colony."[1] --This was the way the Colonist described the slaughter on the Homathko. This massacre and the others which followed captured the attention of the whole European populace of the two Pacific colonies of British North America. The reactions, or responses, of whites as expressed in words and in the actions they took reveal much about their attitudes both towards themselves and towards the Indians. In this chapter we will seek to examine many of those responses: the reactions of the public in Victoria and in New Westminster; the reactions of officials, particularly on the mainland. It will be necessary to note differences in the public reactions in the two capitals, as well as the changes in the nature of responses in both places as time passed until attitudes became more or less fixed. In describing the reactions of officials we are equally concerned with statements made and actions taken.

There has existed no authentic and complete account drawing on all available sources, which described the white expeditions to the Chilcotin region and the Chilcotin surrender, trial, imprisonment, and executions. I have therefore felt compelled to establish just what happened. Hence some of what is related in this chapter has at the most a marginal bearing on the nature of white reactions to the massacres.

Inevitably in discussing outward reactions one deals with attitudes also. But no attempt will be made until the final chapter to present an over-all analysis of white attitudes towards the Indians as revealed in the Chilcotin crisis.

Public Reaction in Victoria

Initial Public Reaction

Accustomed to unsubstantiated rumors and somewhat inured to isolated killings which had occurred on the northern coast, Victoria's residents had shown little excitement over the unconfirmed report of the ferry-man's murder. But the survivors' account of the large-scale massacre of Waddington's road-party was a different matter. The news created a great stir. A large party of white men had been murdered where they slept through the treachery of the Indian. The men were Vancouver Islanders, hired from Victoria, with friends and close acquaintances in the island capital. The excitement was further stimulated by the report that the victims' bodies had been mutilated.

> The wretches, not content with depriving the poor fellows of life, hacked and mutilated the bodies in a most shocking manner [reported the Daily Chronicle].
>
> . . . . . .
>
> The Indian, who escaped, says that he concealed himself in the vicinity of the camp until the next morning, and saw all of the bodies. The heads of some had been hacked off--others were ripped open, and the fiends, in more than one instance, had quartered the bodies of their victims.[2]

Various later accounts differed as to the extent of the mutilation. Brewster's body at least was mutilated. At any rate, the report of extensive mutilation added to the horror of the story of the massacre as it was first received.

> On the spread of the news in this city [reported the Daily Chronicle], the first feeling which showed itself was a strong desire for a bloody revenge upon those dangerous races who live around us, but whom we can never trust. Had the people of Victoria the power, they would gladly have exterminated the whole tribe to which the murderers belong.

With the passing of the first shock of the news, the public mood became somewhat more discriminating, according to the same report.

> With returning reason . . . [it continued] the public are willing to discriminate between the innocent and the guilty, but all who imbued their hands in blood, or connived at that horrible deed ought to be hunted down, and either punished on the spot, or brought to account for their crimes, before the regular Tribunals of Justice.[3]

Further Public Reaction

In the days that followed, public interest in the massacres at Bute Inlet remained high in Victoria. The Weekly Colonist of May 24, 1864, spoke approvingly of the energetic action Governor Seymour of the mainland colony had by that time taken. It expressed the hope that the perpetrators of the massacres might soon be captured. And it advocated dispensing with time-consuming processes of justice in favour of speedy executions.

> It is to be hoped [the article concluded] that the ridiculous farce of bringing them down to New Westminster and trying them by jury will not be attempted in case of their apprehension. A summary examination, and a hempen noose each from the nearest tree, in presence of all the tribe, would have a hundredfold more effect on all the Indians of the coast than the solemn and (to them) unintelligible mummery of a trial by jury.[4]

A report from Soda Creek told of the murder of Manning and several others at Puntzi Lake. (Actually only Manning was killed there.) The Indians were also said to be heading down the Bentinck Arm trail to kill all the white men they could find.[5] This report and details of the expedition sent by the mainland government to the site of the Bute Inlet massacres, together with speculation as to the fate of MacDonald's men, no doubt helped to keep public excitement at a high pitch. On June 1 the Colonist reported that MacDonald and all his party had been slain.

The same day in the Victoria Theatre a meeting of citizens was held to consider means of assisting British Columbia in capturing and punishing the perpetrators of the Bute Inlet massacre. The mayor of Victoria was the chairman. Amor de Cosmos moved the first resolution. De Cosmos, who had

flamboyantly changed his name from "William Alexander Smith" had been born in Nova Scotia. Like Alfred Waddington and so many others, he had spent some time in California before coming north. In 1858, the same year in which he had arrived in Victoria, he founded the Colonist, but late in 1863 he had resigned from its editorship.[6] After moving the resolution, an expression of sorrow and indignation regarding the massacre and of anxiety for outlying settlements, De Cosmos openly avowed his hostility and hatred for the Indian and called for a policy of taking blood for blood, which was, he said, the only law the Indian knew.

> He had lived among Indians and knew their treachery. He had known what it was to crawl on all fours after them with his bowie knife in his mouth, and had inherited his antipathy to the savages from outrages committed on his own family.

De Cosmos expressed, also, his belief that Mr. Waddington was entitled to compensation for his losses.

The Rev. Mr. Garrett, as we have seen, had, during the smallpox epidemic of 1862 worked for the erection of a temporary hospital for the sick on the Indian Reserve. He now spoke, and endorsed De Cosmos' sentiments.

> There was a time when he differed with him in his views of Indian character [wrote the Weekly Colonist in reporting his speech]. His views have now changed; I have now learned that we must deal with the Indian with truth, justice and severity. White men could not look on calmly when their brethren had their hearts torn from their bodies, but the most determined resolution show the Indians that such crime must meet with the most condign punishment.

Mr. Garrett's speech was greeted with "tremendous applause."

Alfred Waddington was called on to speak. He failed to understand why no war vessel had been sent to Bella Coola, although he had urged Governor Seymour that this be done.

> He said his firm belief was that ere this time the Indians, glutted with blood, had murdered every living soul in Bella Coola, and they numbered twelve on his finger-ends.
>
> . . . . . .

> He would only add [he said in conclusion] that when he saw the mangled body of his poor foreman Brewster, he simply looked up to heaven for forbearance, but he looked to his countrymen for justice.

This was greeted by "thundering applause."

P. M. Backus moved the second resolution, to the effect that the Governor of Vancouver Island be requested to tender to the Governor of British Columbia ". . . the services of not less than 100 men fully armed and equipped . . .," to help in the capture of the murderers. Backus ". . . hoped that whenever they caught one they would hang him there and then."

C. B. Young spoke in rather a different vein. In fact, he appears to have been the only one to moderate the discussion by suggesting that the Indian had not always been treated fairly. "He had heard of justice to the Indians, but he considered that justice had not been meted out to the natives."[7]

> He approved of punishment, severe punishment being dealt to the Indian. But on the other hand justice should be even handed. Their potato patches on Bentinck Arm had been appropriated by white men and fenced in. Was that justice?--Compensation had been promised to Cowichan Indians. Had they ever had anything? Was that justice? --At Nanaimo an Indian reservation was made; a cricket ground was wanted, it was formed of the reservation. Was that justice?

The Rev. Dr. Evans, though he thought that the Indian had not been treated fairly in the matter of compensation, ". . . advocated in this matter prompt and decisive measures; a drum-head court martial if necessary." This was greeted with "Hear, hear." and someone cried out, "and hanging!" To which Dr. Evans responded, "Yes, and hanging on the spot too."[9]

The final resolution of the three which were moved and adopted at the meeting was that an enrolment list be opened of persons volunteering to join the proposed force, that the names be submitted to the Governor (of Vancouver Island), and that a committee be appointed by the Mayor to meet with the Governor to discuss means of implementing the resolutions.

In the intensity of public excitement over the massacre, violent emotions had come to the surface. Though apparently no-one at the meeting suggested actually circumventing legally constituted authority, many white citizens were ready to advocate the use of that authority to deal out summary punishment which would by-pass the regular procedures of civil justice.

The committee appointed duly met with Governor Kennedy, who expressed his agreement with the resolutions passed. He had offered aid to the government of British Columbia, and Governor Seymour had sent a certain Mr. Good to Victoria ". . . to make the necessary arrangements . . ., but had not said whether the services of . . . volunteers from . . . [Vancouver Island] would be required."[10] Kennedy indicated that he ~~would~~ would submit the proposals to Governor Seymour, without whose consent nothing could be done. In the meantime Governor Kennedy said that enrolment should be encouraged. He himself would inspect the volunteers.

Well over the suggested minimum of one hundred men signed the list indicating their desire to join the volunteer force, and waited for news of whether their services would be required.[11]

Meanwhile the report of the slaughter of MacDonald's men which had been published in Victoria on the day the public meeting was held, spread growing excitement through the city. The Colonist, though no longer edited by De Cosmos, expressed itself in terms of which he would no doubt have approved.

> The news of the last wholesale massacre of our countrymen by the bloodthirsty savages [orated the Weekly Colonist] has filled the city with a blaze of excitement, and a universal feeling prevails among all classes that the most prompt and energetic steps should at once be taken to obtain summary vengeance on the cowardly assassins . . . . It is mere folly to await the tardy action of the authorities. Let the citizens take the matter in hand at once--today! There are hundred of bold hardy spirits who would at once volunteer to march

> against the savage murderers; hundreds of rifles in the hands of Government, and hundreds of citizens who will cheerfully contribute liberally to charter a steamer to convey the volunteers to the scene of the thrice repeated atrocities where let them not stay their hands till every member of the rascally murderous tribe is suspended to the trees of their own forests--a salutary warning to the whole coast for years to come.[12]

Public Reaction in New Westminster

Initial Public Reaction

The news of the massacre on the Homathko reached the general public in New Westminster on May 14. The account of the slaughter, taken from the Victoria papers and published in the British Columbian, seemed to be as startling to the residents of New Westminster as it was to those of Victoria. For the time being all the bitter recriminations which had been exchanged between the two communities were forgotten. Fourteen white men had been massacred by Indians! Suddenly, common bonds of race seemed to have increased importance. "We hope the two will unite," editorialized the Columbian, "in dealing out speedy justice, at whatever cost, to these sixteen devils done up in red skins." But the Columbian qualified its comments with a warning. "We don't want another Kagosima affair--no indiscriminate slaughter [it continued] for that would not mend, but aggravate, the matter." Action was what the Columbian wanted, and plenty of it. Specific proposals for sweeping measures were forthcoming.

> Let the guilty parties [it went on] be hunted up if they should cost the country ten thousand dollars a head, and let them be made an example of to the rest of the native population, such as will not readily be forgotten. In this matter promptitude is everything. Let the fleet be ordered at once to the Inlet and let Volunteer forces from here and Victoria go with it. . . Well planned and prompt action now may save much trouble in future. The country will look for it at the hands of both Governments--the blood of fourteen butchered men, all of them British subjects save one, demands it![13]

New Westminster men were prompt to volunteer. The Hyack Fire Company[14] and the New Westminster Rifle Company both offered their services in bringing the perpetrators of the massacre to justice, and so did a large number of private individuals.[15]

The Columbian followed up its previous warning against extreme measures with a more well-thought-out and extensive editorial comment.

> We are too apt, in the first flush of excited indignation [the editor wrote] to cry out for the utter and indiscriminate extermination of the savages, dealing out to them Lynch law instead of British justice.

He went on to imply that the Indian was frequently treated unfairly in his dealings with white men. He had no desire to excite sympathy for the perpetrators of the massacre, since as far as was known none was due them, but he hoped to see the same impartial justice excercised towards the Indians as the whites would desire for themselves. In fact, if there was to be any difference the Indians should be ". . . treated more leniently in consideration of their untutored mind and their indistinct conception of right and wrong."

The writer took advantage of the opportunity to point out the need for immediately available power to suppress outbreaks and enforce law. He called for the stationing of a gunboat at New Westminster for service on the Fraser River and on the coast of the mainland colony. It was not likely that the natives around New Westminster were dangerous. But in the interior and on the coast there were still tribes who were ". . . comparatively powerful and warlike," the management of which was often difficult.[16]

Further Public Reaction

Though the news of the massacres near Bute Inlet was perhaps as startling to the residents of New Westminster as it was to those of Victoria, nevertheless as time passed a somewhat different response developed in the

mainland capital.

Part of the difference can be attributed to the relatively moderate stance taken by the British Columbian, edited by John Robson. The Columbian, as we have seen had called for the punishment of those Indians responsible for the massacre, but had warned against any indiscriminate slaughter of the Indians. On May 21, in an article entitled "An Indian Policy," it drew a contrast between the American doctrine of "manifest destiny" as applied to the Indian in its extreme form and the policy of the British Imperial Government.

> We are quite aware [commented the Columbian] that there are those amongst us who are disposed to ignore altogether the rights of the Indians and their claims upon us--who hold the American doctrine of "manifest destiny" in its most fatal form, and say that the native tribes will die off to make way for the Anglo-Saxon race, and the quicker the better; and, under the shadow of this unchristian doctrine, the cry for "extermination" is raised at every pretext. Very different, however, are the views and sentiments held in reference to the Indians by the British Government. The representatives of that Government [the Columbian added] may not, in every instance, faithfully delineate the Imperial mind in this respect.

The article called for a policy of honesty towards the Indian:

> Depend upon it for every acre of land we obtain by improper means we will have to pay for dearly in the end, and every wrong committed upon these poor people will be visited upon our heads as sure as justice is one of the immutable attributes of Him who avengeth the wrongs of the weak and oppressed of whatever colour or caste.

The writer went on to speak of the "total absence of policy," which he blamed on the rule of Governor Douglas. He expressed the wish that a gathering of the Indians at New Westminster which Seymour, the new Governor, had arranged for May 24 ". . . might be turned to good account as the first step . . ." towards the establishment of an Indian system which would ". . . tend to reconcile, elevate and civilize the aborigines" while it would ". . . reassure the whites and place the country on a more healthy and enduring basis."[17]

The attitude of the Columbian takes on particular importance as a moderating influence on public opinion when contrasted with the Colonist and inflamatory invective. It is also important as representing the viewpoint of its editor (a future premier of British Columbia) who even at this point would likely have had some influence in government circles, especially in view of the fact that he had enthusiastic praise for the actions which Seymour took.

Quite apart from the moderating influence of the Columbian, the people of New Westminster were in a somewhat better position than were Victoria residents to regard the massacres dispassionately since it was Victoria men who had been slain.

The revival of the feud between Victoria and the mainland capital was also a crucial factor influencing New Westminster attitudes, even causing New Westminster to go so far as to lay a large portion of the blame for the massacre on the shoulders of whites. Chartres Brew, sent by Seymour to the scene of the massacres on the Homathko, severely criticized Waddington and his road party for their dealings with the Chilcotin Indians. His criticism quickly became public knowledge. New Westminster people, who had always been against the Bute Inlet Road scheme anyway, found it easy to believe that the road-party had acted badly towards the Indians.

An attempt by Waddington to have the British Columbia government buy his road charter probably did as much as anything to heat up the feud between Victoria and New Westminster once again. Their disapproval of the request made it particularly easy for the people of New Westminster to believe that men from Victoria were guilty of provoking the massacre. Waddington had taken an early opportunity to speak to Governor Seymour of the losses which

the massacre had brought to the road project. Then, in a letter of May 28, he outlined those losses and, rather than ask for an outright indemnity, to which he implied he was entitled, he expressed the desire to surrender the agreement in return for a payment of $100,000.[18] This proposal was turned down by Seymour, who through the Colonial Secretary for British Columbia expressed sympathy for the losses Waddington had suffered but stated that he was not prepared to recommend that the Legislative Council purchase Waddington's rights.[19] Waddington responded by asking whether the Governor intended to allow him any indemnity for his losses.[20] This too was refused, and the letter of refusal placed definite blame on the road-party for their carelessness in not taking ordinary precautions for their own safety.[21] Seymour in a letter to Governor Kennedy of Vancouver Island even hinted at the road-party's possible mis-treatment of the Chilcotins. Others in New Westminster did not hesitate to blame openly Waddington's party for alleged provocations that led to the massacre. Waddington lashed back with counter-charges against other whites, and the argument raged on.

Official Reaction

Governor Kennedy's Delay

By contrast with that of the public in Victoria, the reaction of Arthur Kennedy, the new Governor of Vancouver Island, was oddly casual. The massacre had taken place in territory under the jurisdiction of Governor Frederick Seymour (who himself had arrived in the mainland colony only two weeks prior to the slaughter). But Kennedy took no special measures to get the news to Seymour quickly. Though there were two gunboats and a frigate in Esquimalt harbour, he did not requisition their use, but waited to send word until the departure of the regular freight and mail steamer at noon on May 13. As a result, his letter did not reach Seymour until 10:30 that night.

From British Columbia Provincial Archives, Victoria, B.C.

Plate 1 Governor Frederick Seymour

Governor Seymour's Initial Measures

Seymour, who had been welcomed enthusiastically by the mainlanders as the first resident governor of their colony, reacted with alacrity to this first crisis of his new position. Within half an hour of receiving the news, he wrote to Lord Gilford, the Senior Naval Officer stationed at Esquimalt, for assistance. During the night Seymour had the heavy cargo of the steamer unloaded quickly at government expense, and by three o'clock the next morning his request to Lord Gilford had left New Westminster.[22] The same morning Seymour had his Colonial Secretary send off a letter to William G. Cox, Gold Commissioner in the Cariboo, requesting that he organize an expedition from Alexandria which would penetrate Chilcotin country to demand the surrender of those responsible for the massacre.

In the same letter Cox was informed of what other measures Seymour contemplated. Forty or fifty marines, he thought, should be sent into the interior from Bute Inlet. To this force Seymour planned to add about twenty-five special constables under the command of Police Magistrate Chartres Brew. Brew would be in command of the whole force despatched from Bute Inlet, and this bore out the non-military nature of the expedition, the object of which was ". . . merely to assert the supremacy of the law." Every effort was to be made to prevent a collision with the Indians. The "well-disposed" Indians were to be persuaded "to capture and hand over the Murderers." Of course the expedition would use force to capture the culprits if force was found to be necessary.

Cox's expedition was to have the same objects as Brew's. The Governor left Cox wide discretion as to the make-up of his force, merely suggesting that it be not so weak as to invite attack and not so large as to over-burden the colonial treasury. In concluding the letter the Colonial Secretary emphasized the wish of the Governor that Cox avoid as far as possible ". . .

all acts which may lead to collision with the Indians."[23]

On Sunday morning, May 15, the gunboat Forward with Lord Gilford aboard, arrived in New Westminster. Seymour was disappointed to find that the temporary use of the Forward was all the aid he could expect. The plan to use the marines in an expedition from Bute Inlet had to be abandoned. However, Chartres Brew and a force of twenty-eight men sworn in as special constables were despatched for Bute Inlet that same day.

On May 18 in a letter to William Cox the Colonial Secretary informed him of the change in plans due to the limited naval support available. (The Governor had also learned something of the wild nature of the country between Bute Inlet and the interior and was very doubtful whether Brew's expedition could get through.) Seymour was now placing his main reliance on Cox's expedition.

Someone had apparently recommended to the Governor the services of Donald McLean and his sons--the same McLean who had been in charge of Fort Chilcotin at times during the 1840's, and whose avenging expedition in 1849 with its attendent needless bloodshed is so graphically described by Morice, as we have seen in Chapter Two of this thesis. Seymour through the Colonial Secretary now recommended to Cox that he try to gain the services of the McLeans.[24] As it turned out, Cox was successful in employing Donald McLean and one of his sons.

On May 20 Seymour wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, the colonial secretary in London, regarding the massacre and the measures he had taken. In a second despatch the same day he dealt with the colony's need for defence.

Seymour spoke of various hypotheses which had been advanced regarding the cause of the massacre, but emphasized that the motives were still unknown.

Each of the possible causes which had been advanced seemed unsatisfactory in some way as an explanation.

Seymour spoke of the massacre as being the work of members of an off-shoot branch of the Chilcotins, the first Chilcotin tribe to be met in advancing from Bute Inlet to the interior. Their chief, he said, was Teloot (though Klatsassin, it later became clear, was the real leader of the Uprising). The Chilcotins responsible must have now crossed the mountains to the interior where it was fishing season at the lakes in the Chilcotin country. Seymour did not expect that Brew's party would cross the mountains to the interior, and the main reliance was on Cox's mounted expedition from Alexandria.

Seymour emphasized that there was as yet no war, and he was aiming only at securing justice. Only magistrates and constables were in the field. Seymour had ". . . rejected all offers of assistance beyond the Colony from men bent on vengenace." (This was obviously a reference to offers from Victoria.)[25]

In the second despatch of the same day--dealing with the "defenceless state" of the colony--Seymour spoke of Lord Gilford's hesitation in responding to his request for assistance. Seymour expressed his doubt as to whether the Forward would be loaned him long enough to enable him to keep up communication with Brew.[26]

Concerned that he have an opportunity to make himself known and to begin the establishment of firm friendship and trust between himself and the Indians, Seymour invited the tribes from up the Fraser and Thompson Rivers to a grand celebration of the Queen's birthday on the twenty-fourth of May. Thousands of Indians came in their canoes. Speeches were exchanged between three of the fifty-seven chiefs present and the Governor, with the Catholic

missionary, Pierre Fouquet, acting as English-Chinook translator and native interpreters translating from Chinook to the tribal languages and "vice versa." The fifty-seven chiefs received presents from the Governor.[27]

Brew's Expedition to Bute Inlet

Meanwhile, Brew's party on board the Forward had on May 17 arrived at Waddington. By May 19 they reached the ferry site where Tim Smith had been slain. Here they were delayed seven hours, but finally managed to cross the swollen river and camp on the other side.[28] The next day the party reached the site of the main road-camp where the twelve road-workers had been attacked. Here search was made in all directions, but none of the bodies were found. Brew's party found the marks of blood in each of the tents except the one which was occupied by the cook, Charles Buttle, and which had contained provisions. His coat was found ". . . all bloody with two bullet holes in the back. . ." A party of men was sent ahead to Brewster's camp. They searched but failed to find any bodies. In the afternoon, however, Waddington, who had also come to Bute Inlet, arrived. With him was "Little George," who had been cook for Brewster and the other road-workers at the advance camp. He pointed out the spot where he had heard the firing the day of the massacre. "In a short time," Brew wrote, "the tainted air led to the discovery of three of the bodies. . ." The footsteps of the fourth, as we have seen, indicated he may have jumped into the river, where he could not have escaped drowning.

On the twenty-first an inquest was held on the three bodies, and was adjuourned to the twenty-third to receive evidence. The bodies of the three men were ". . . as decently interred as circumstances would allow."

Mr. Elwyn, who with Brew had held the inquest, read the burial service, following which Brew began the return trip to the head of the Inlet. He arrived at Waddington with his party on the twenty-third. Here the evidence for the inquest was taken down from "Little George" and Edward Mosley and Brew set down a hasty report to the Colonial Secretary.

Brew concluded in his report that it would be impracticable to advance into the interior without greatly increasing the means at his command. He made it clear that his opinion was against such an effort, though in a rather heroic phrase he stated, "If His Excellency The Governor wish me to advance into the interior I shall make the attempt, let the undertaking be ever so difficult."

Brew's impression of the route Waddington had chosen and of his trail was anything but favourable, judging by his report.

> No just impression of the Country or the Trail [he wrote] can be formed from Mr. Waddington's flattering description of it. Within a distance of four miles the Trail crosses a mountain I consider 2000 feet high Mr. Waddington says 1100.

Waddington and his road party came in for severe criticism for their dealings with the Chilcotins. Brew blamed the road men for their ". . . blind confidence in fickle savages." They had made no effort, he said, to gain the Chilcotins' good will or to ". . . guard against their enmity." Brew thought the Indians ought to have been paid their wages in money rather than by "orders" for goods which they desired. (In this he may have been mistaken, for it seems unlikely that the Chilcotins involved would have had much choice in places to spend any money they received.) Brew pointed out that the Indians thought they should have been given their food in addition to their wages but they were not. He referred to the Chilcotin women being given food in return for prostitution. And he placed

responsibility with Waddington for supplying the Chilcotins with firearms. In short, he believed that the Chilcotins had been ". . . most injudiciously treated." He believed that "if a sound discretion had been exercised towards them" the massacre would not have occurred.[29] This general conclusion was a sound one, but Brew had not heard of the smallpox threat against the Chilcotins which was the chief motivating factor in bringing about the massacre. Thus the workmen had to bear a disproportionate share of the blame. Brew might possibly have found out more had it not been for the language barrier, for the Bute Inlet Indians he tried to examine knew, he said, not a word of Chinook. The Chinook trade jargon was the "lingua franca" for dealings between the white man and the Indian in much of coastal British Columbia, but apparently it was not commonly understood by the Indians of this particular area.

On May 26 Governor Seymour left New Westminster for Bute Inlet on board the gunboat Forward. Presumably it was as a result of his conferring with Brew at Bute Inlet that the final decision to bring back the volunteers was made. Seymour, and Brew's Bute Inlet party, returned to New Westminster on May 31.[30]

Seymour's Refusal of the Victoria Offer

Seymour, in a letter dated June 4, replied to the Victoria Volunteers' offer, transmitted by Kennedy. He politely declined to accept their services for the time being. He had already been offered the services of the North West Rifle Volunteer Company and of the Hyack Fire Brigade as well as of individuals, so that if he accepted he could ". . . enrol a force greatly exceeding in numbers the whole Chilcotin tribe." Seymour gathered that the public meeting in Victoria had been held because of a second rumoured

massacre (apparently the rumour concerning the annihilation of Macdonald's party). But this was only a rumour which in fact had originated in Victoria.

Governor Seymour indicated that the action he had taken had been in response to the advice of Sir James Douglas, whom he had consulted.

> In every respect [he wrote] my predecessor's suggestions have been exceeded by my actions, and additional steps equalling at least in vigour any yet taken, would long ere this have been adopted had I received the co-operation I anticipated from a branch of Her Majesty's service, seldom slow in protecting the lives of our fellow-countrymen, and supporting the authority of the law.

Seymour still hoped for the support of the navy, and, he revealed, hoped to send an expedition to penetrate the Chilcotin country from Bentinck Arm. He might possibly accept the help of some of the Victoria Volunteers for this expedition, but he did not think he would have to do so. If the unexpected happened, though, and there broke out a general Indian insurrection ". . . among the tribes between the upper Fraser and the sea . . ." he would call on the assistance of the Victoria volunteers.

One phrase in Seymour's letter hints at his displeasure with Kennedy's previous lack of promptness in sending the news of the massacre. Seymour refers to ". . . the much delayed receipt by me of the intelligence of the melancholy affair at Bute Inlet."

We may surmise that, perhaps because of details he had heard of the Victoria public meeting, and perhaps because of his growing identification with New Westminster and the mainland colony, Seymour did not trust the Victoria Volunteers. Should any of them join the Bentinck Expedition, Seymour wrote,

> . . . I would inform them at the outset that their duties will not probably be of that exciting kind which tempt young men from their homes. We are not at war with the Indians, and the energy of the volunteers restrained by their oaths as special constables, will probably have only to be directed towards making passable for themselves and packers the many swamps and rocks which impede their progress.

Seymour obliquely referred to the possibility that the Chilcotins had been ill-used by the road-workers from Victoria,

> We apprehend [he wrote] no serious resistance from the small band of assassins who even though excited by ill-usage would not have dared to face the men who fell their victims.[31]

Cox's Expedition to Puntzi Lake

By May 29 Gold Commissioner William Cox in the Cariboo received the Colonial Secretary's letter informing him of the Bute Inlet massacre and asking that he take charge of an expedition to the Chilcotin from Alexandria. The same day he wrote to say that he was leaving Richfield the next morning for Quesnelmouth where he would make the necessary arrangements for the expedition.[32]

On June 1 Ogilvy wrote to the Colonial Secretary to report his arrival in Alexandria accompanied by McLean, whose services he had apparently secured on the way. They were waiting for Cox, whom they expected at any hour. Ogilvy reported that "Alexie" (Alexis) had previous to their arrival brought down to Alexandria news of the murder of Manning. Alexis and the greater portion of his tribe, Ogilvy reported, had declared that they did not intend to protect the murderers but would help to bring them to justice.[33]

Donald McLean, now an experienced fur-trader and far more familiar with the interior and its Indians than the newcomers who had arrived with the gold rush, was by this time looked up to as a man of action who was just the sort of person required for an expedition of this sort. He had been recommended to Governor Seymour, and he was mentioned to Governor Kennedy as one whose services would be valuable - mentioned, oddly enough, by C. B. Young whose concern for the just treatment of the Indian we have already noted.[34]

McLean was said to have married a Chilcotin woman and his knowledge of the Chilcotin country and people from his fur-trade experiences in it naturally made him appear an especially valuable asset for the expedition. He was a great story-teller and no doubt his tales of executing frontier "justice" on the Indians helped to make him somewhat of a hero among the rough miners of the interior.

In the reports that reached the coast Donald McLean soon began to appear as a major figure.[35] His impatience was apparently beginning to be evident. The Columbian reported that Cox had not yet arrived at Fort Alexandria, that ". . . those more or less interested in the Expedition against the Indians" were becoming impatient, and that "Capt. McLean even went so far as to talk of returning home."[36]

Cox, having arrived at Quesnel, had found that the steamer Enterprise was out of service. Hence the delay. However, he managed to construct a raft, by means of which he brought down the volunteers he had collected up to that point, and arrived safely at Fort Alexandria.[37]

On June 8 Cox with his expedition left Alexandria. His force, including himself, was made up of fifty men and an Indian boy.[38] Later it was apparently increased to some sixty or sixty-five.[39] Cox had hoped to have the services of Alexis as guide but he could not be found. Apparently he and his family had fled to the mountains, reports having been circulated that the whites were bent on the indiscriminate slaughter of all Indians. Possibly these reports had started with the boasts of some of Cox's men. Drawn from the gold-mining region and many of them no doubt having come from the gold mines of California, it is likely that many of Cox's party had little relish for the restraint which they were supposed to be under as men whose mission was not to avenge but "merely to assert the supremacy of the law."

By June 12 Cox arrived at Puntzi Lake. Here, covered in a ditch, the body of William Manning was discovered. An inquest was held and the body buried. The following day Cox sent Donald McLean, his son, another man, and "Indian Jack" to Chilcotin Forks to secure the services of Alexis as interpreter and guide. About mid-day a scouting party returned to Cox's camp at Puntzi and reported having seen an Indian dog on the ridge of a hill. Cox sent a party of men out with an Indian boy to follow the dog and bring back any Indian they might encounter so that Cox might make known the purpose of his mission in the region. After the party had penetrated about a half-mile into the woods the guide ". . . made signs indicating that Indians were near,"[40] when instantly they were fired on by Indians concealed in the woods. An exchange of fire resulted, the Indians retreating and taking cover behind the trees as they went, "whooping as they flew" as Cox put it. One of the expeditionary party was wounded in the thigh.

Cox, hearing the firing, sent out a second party of eight men and went with Ogilvy and six men in another direction in order to surround the Indians, but without success, for they were nowhere to be seen. Cox wrote, "we constructed good breastworks for our protection during the nights."

The next day Cox's party heard firing in the same direction as before. Five Indians showed themselves and discharged their firearms into the air. Cox felt this open defiance was a trap and decided not to follow them or risk the lives of his men in any way until Alexis had arrived. On the sixteenth McLean and the three men with him returned to report that they had met Alexis' tribe and family, who had been all in arms at their approach. McLean had assured them of the white's peaceful intentions, and they had promised to send for Alexis, who was away in the mountains.

Cox remained waiting at Puntzi Lake for the arrival of Alexis. Over the rude fort which they had constructed Cox flew the white flag to denote his peaceful intentions.[41]

Brew's Expedition by Way of Bentinck Arm

By the time Cox and his expedition had reached Puntzi Lake from Alexandria preparations were under way for launching a second expedition into Chilcotin country. Admiral Kingcome had consented to convey an expedition to Bentinck Arm and a party of forty volunteers had been raised in New Westminster. These, like the party who had gone to Bute Inlet, were to be under the command of Police Magistrate Chartres Brew. The volunteers were of rather a different sort than Cox's party, being largely of British background, many of them discharged sappers from the Royal Engineers.[42] On June 11 Brew arrived in Victoria aboard the Alexandria. Here he awaited the arrival of his men.[43]

Governor Frederick Seymour, young and adventurous, had decided to accompany the expedition himself. The H.M.S. Sutlej carried Seymour, Brew, and the men of the Expedition north to Bentinck Arm,[44] where they arrived on June 18. On the following day the party landed at "Rascal's Village" (Bella Coola), and on the twentieth set out for Puntzi Lake. With them they took about thirty Bella Coolas whom Brew, with Seymour's approval, had hired.[45] Others who had previously used the Bentinck Arm route had gone by canoe up the river to where land transportation by means of pack animals began. The Bentinck Arm expeditionary party, having brought their own horses, cut a trail up the river valley.[46] Progress was slowed but they reached the head of navigation by the twenty-fourth and were then able to take the regular route. On the path leading up the Great Slide

some shouts were heard in the bushes and the Indians who were with the expedition "captured" a Chilcotin who was lurking nearby. Possibly in the light of what happened a little later, the Chilcotin meant to be captured. According to Seymour, they learned later that Anaheim and his followers had been lurking in the woods. "Perhaps the resolute bearing of the Volunteers, perhaps the presence among us of friendly Indians [wrote Seymour later] prevented the attack which appears to have been meditated."[47]

At the top of the Great Slide a day's halt was called to rest the horses, and here a party of twelve men sent by Cox under Ogilvey met them. A letter was handed to Seymour in which Cox informed the Governor of his actions and stated that his force was ample for its task. Seymour, however, had decided to push on with the Bentinck Arm expedition. Ogilvey and his men started back the next day to rejoin Cox's party. Brew and Seymour with the Bentinck Expedition came on more slowly. By June 30 Brew's party reached the summit of the Coast Range. They now considered themselves to be in Chilcotin country.

Arriving at Anahim Lake, the whites found Nancootloon, Anaheim's village, deserted. Believing that Anaheim had not openly declared himself an enemy, the whites left the village without destroying it.

Soon the expedition came across signs of goods from Macdonald's fated expedition. After several miles they came to the wolf-torn body of Macdonald. Some distance on the body of Higgins, and still further the remains of McDougal. Next day the expedition passed the earthworks which Macdonald and his party had thrown up as a defence against the Indians. About two miles further on was a palisaded blockhouse of the Indians on the summit of a hill, near Sutiko. Since these Chilcotins had been definitely

involved in the massacre and since the blockhouse was capable of being used again, the whites destroyed it by fire. The smoke of the destruction apparently alarmed some Chilcotins camped on the opposite side of the lake. A shot was heard, and the men of the expedition some hours later discovered about a dozen hastily-abandoned huts. The track of the Indians led towards Bute Inlet, so a "flying party" of twenty-five was sent after them under Lieutenant Cooper. The party followed the Indians for many days, led principally by the Chilcotin who had been captured on the "Great Slide." In the end their guide deserted them, and they were forced to make their way back without having achieved success.

The Combined Expedition

Meanwhile, the rest of the New Westminster Volunteers with Brew and Governor Seymour had pushed on to Puntzi Lake where they joined Cox's party on July 6.

There was great enthusiasm at the successful joining of the two parties, and Governor Seymour was heartily cheered by Cox's men. However, the parochial rivalry of this colonial period of British Columbia history soon began to manifest itself in petty jealousy. Perhaps the different make-up of the two parties helped to accentuate this jealousy. Governor Seymour, thoroughly identifying with the New Westminster group, drew the following contrast when communicating later with the Colonial Office.

> The few hours that the two parties had passed together sufficed to show the difference in their character. The men raised in the gold districts, mostly Americans, passed the greater part of the night in dancing and playing cards to an accompanyment of war whoops and the beating of tin pots. The New Westminster Expedition almost exclusively English, and comprisng many discharged sappers, spent the evening in their usual quiet soldier-like manner. No spirituous liquor was in either camp, yet the amusements were kept up in the one long after total silence prevailed in the other, and a slight estrangement commenced between the occupiers of the fort and those encamped on the plain below, which was never entirely healed.[48]

Seymour was not particularly impressed with the leadership Cox had shown, either, and, according to his despatch to the Colonial Office, asked Cox why he had kept his force inactive so long. They had, of course, been waiting for the arrival of Alexis, but he still had not turned up. At any rate, it was arranged that Cox's party should wait no longer, but leave the next morning heading in the direction of Tatla Lake and the mountains of Bute Inlet. This they did, and the New Westminster party with the Governor and Chartres Brew was left holding the position at Puntzi Lake.

Cox's Expedition South-Westwards

Cox's party travelled beyond Tatla Lake to the region around the headwaters of the Homathko[49] or between there and the headwaters of the Southgate River.[50] Signs of the Chilcotins were evident, but the Indians generally kept out of shooting distance. Lundin Brown tells of the whites surprising several of the Chilcotins and giving chase, shooting, but without apparent result. One of the Chilcotins, according to Lundin Brown, was Klatsassin, who finally escaped by plunging into a lake and swimming underwater till he could take cover among the reeds.[51]

Cox's party on this expedition, reportedly on July 17, suffered the only loss of life inflicted on the whites of the expeditions which were sent to the Chilcotin country. Against Cox's orders Donald McLean, impatient and independent as ever, left the camp-site in search of Chilcotins, accompanied by one Indian, said to be a Shuswap. According to the account given in the Colonist, he caught sight of a blind of boughs piled against the trunk of a tall tree. McLean threw up his rifle and prepared to fire when a shot from

a clump of willows on the opposite side of the trail felled him instantly. The Indian who accompanied McLean managed to get safely back to the camp. A number of men were sent in pursuit but without success. McLean's body was brought in, and in the evening was buried.[52]

William Cox's men returned on July 20 to Puntzi Lake with no success to report and with news of the death of McLean whose reputation as an "expert" in dealing with the Indians had made him somewhat a hero in both British Columbia and Vancouver Island. Rumour had it that nineteen Indians had at one time or another fallen at the hands of this self-appointed avenger.[53]

Brew's Party at Puntzi Lake

At Puntzi Lake the New Westminster Volunteers had run very short of food by the time William Cox's men returned. A pack train with an escort had been sent for supplies to the summit of the Great Slide right after Cox's men had left, but it had still not arrived by the twentieth. The despatch of the pack-train had left the New Westminster Volunteers greatly reduced in numbers. The barking of Indian dogs and signs of Indian tracks indicated to the men that Chilcotins were near-by, and the men dared not separate even to go hunting and fishing. The flying party which had been sent after the Chilcotins on the second rejoined the New Westminster Volunteers at Puntzi Lake on the tenth, making hunting and fishing safer. The Bella Coola Indians had helped by fishing while the fish lasted, and the menu was eked out by berries, but rations had been cut very low.[54]

"Nancy," the Chilcotin woman who had lived with Manning, had remained at the site of his farm. Brew persuaded her to go as an emissary to Alexis, and she left on July 7. Little by little, members of Alexis's band began

to visit the camp. Finally they promised that Alexis himself would come if the Governor remained in the camp.[55]

Alexis's Visit

When the Alexandria party returned to Puntzi Lake, Cox advised Seymour that the pursuit of the Indians be given up until the winter (when starvation might force them to surrender). Brew expressed his agreement with this advice. But, fearing the results of the loss of face if the Chilcotin insurgents were allowed to gain an apparent victory, Seymour decided that action must be continued against them. He ordered that the New Westminster Volunteers take up the work of scouring the country, while Cox's men were to man the "fort" at Puntzi Lake.

Before the New Westminster Volunteers had a chance to leave, however, an event occurred which gave some encouragement to the disheartened leaders of the expeditions. A large party of Indians appeared, which turned out to be Alexis and his followers. A messenger having been sent to him, Alexis agreed to come into the camp, after he had been assured that the Governor was still there.[56]

Seymour's conversation with Alexis was unsatisfactory to the Governor, but revealing as to Alexis's attitude. Seymour complained of the murder of Manning in what he apparently regarded as Alexis's territory, and he enquired ". . . how he, the Chief of the country, could think it right to go Cariboo hunting when his men were killing every white person they saw." Alexis's response tells something both about the impact of white society on the Chilcotins and about the fragmentary nature of authority among the Chilcotins.

> He said, which is true [wrote Seymour], that the great Chiefs have lost much of their authority since the Indians hear every white man assume the distinction. That the men under Klatsassin and Tellot have renounced all connection with him, and have a right to make war on us without it being any affair of his.
>
> Seymour asked what the whites had done to provoke ". . . hostilities which had been carried on against them in such a barbarous manner."[57]
>
> His answer [wrote Seymour] was interpreted to me in Canadian French, that Klatsassin's men were "des mauvais sauvages, qui connaissent pas le bon Dieu."[58]

Alexis's description of the insurgent Chilcotins as "some bad savages who do not know the good God" reflects the differences in exposure to European influences among the various groups of Chilcotins. Those Chilcotins responsible for the massacres were those least deeply influenced by the whites. Alexis and his band, however, because of the position of their territory, had experienced a longer and deeper exposure to white influence than had any of the other Chilcotins. Alexis, Seymour wrote, "had. . . frequent intercourse with the whites of the Hudson's Bay Fort on the Fraser [Fort Alexandria] and had been occasionally visited by the Roman Catholic priests."[59] Not only would Alexis be more aware of white power than were other Chilcotin leaders, but it is quite possible that the teachings of the missionaries were influential in preventing his taking part in the violent uprising instigated by Klatsassin. At the same time Alexis at this point indicated some sympathy for the insurgent Chilcotins. He indicated his reluctance to take an active part against his fellow Chilcotins by stating that Klatsassin and Tellot had a right to make war on the whites ". . . without it being any affair of his."[60] Seymour apparently sensed some hostility in Alexis's attitude. "He enquired with something approaching a sneer," the Governor wrote, "how long I meant to remain on his hunting

grounds." "Three years;"[61] was Seymour's reply, intended, of course, to convey his determination.

Alexis's visit brought little satisfaction to the men of the Alexandria Expedition. They already felt slighted by having been assigned a defensive role at Puntzi Lake while Brew's men had been ordered to take up the work of scouring the country looking for the insurgents. Cox's men, who, according to Seymour, made up ". . . a sort of deliberate assembly,"

> . . . agreed to insist on being allowed to march against the Indians or to retire. To make matters worse, Alexis's right-hand man was recognized as having been present at Bute Inlet during the massacre, and Mr. Cox's men were anxious to hang him at once or burn him alive. . .

To prevent trouble, the suspect, Ulnas, was arrested ". . . for his own protection."[62]

The shortage of food in the camp prevented Alexis being accorded the generous treatment which it would have been desirable to give a potential ally. Alexis, apparently unimpressed with the reception given him, had ordered his horses to be saddled in preparation for departure. At Chartres Brew's suggestion, however, the chief was asked to escort the Governor to Alexandria. "Surprised but flattered by this mark of confidence," as Seymour put it, "he agreed to remain."[63]

Things took another turn for the better with the arrival of the pack train which had previously been sent by Brew. Apparently horses had just been started off to Alexandria for supplies when the long-awaited pack-train arrived.

The arrival of supplies may have done something to sway Alexis, who now agreed ". . . to accompany the Expedition to the Bute Inlet Mountains with a considerable force."[64]

Seymour, having decided that he had accomplished his purpose in

the expedition, left for Alexandria, with the intention of visiting the Cariboo before returning to New Westminster. Whether Alexis escorted the Governor to Alexandria as previously arranged is uncertain.

Seymour foresaw the possible expedience of holding trials "on the spot" if the sought-for Chilcotins should be taken prisoners.

> . . . I left with Mr. Brew, an experienced Magistrate, a man of admiral temper and discretion, full powers for holding a Court of Justice in the Chilcoaten country.[65]

Brew's Expedition South-westwards

Seymour left Puntzi Lake on July 25. Brew and his men left Puntzi on August 8 and arrived at Lake Tathalco [Tatlayoko?] on the twelfth. A portion of his men Brew placed in a party under Elwyn, his second in command. The two parties of men searched the district in the area of the lakes and the Homathko River and saw signs of Indians, but failed to make contact with any of them.[66]

The Surrender of Eight Chilcotins

Possibly even before Brew and his party left Puntzi Lake, according to an account given in the Columbian, the son of Tapitt, one of the insurgent chiefs, had come to William Cox's camp with a message from Klatsassin and Tellot.[67] The messenger was accompanied by Alexis. The message was that if the whites would remain where they were the two Chilcotin chiefs would gather together all the murderers and come and give themselves up. Cox replied to the effect that, though he would not remain where he was encamped, he would be camped for a few days at the Hudson's Bay Company's old fort on the "Chezco" River. Klatsassin if he wished could surrender himself there. No further message was received from the insurgent Chilcotins till August 10 when Tapitt's son came to the camp at the fort

site which Cox had mentioned. He said that Klatsassin had sent runners to the Indians who were scattered about the mountains and that within four days they would be in. The messenger brought some money from Klatsassin as an apparent token of good faith. Four days later he returned with the message that Klatsassin, Telloot and six others would come in the next morning. Klatsassin had not, however, succeeded in finding the other Indians concerned in the massacre. The next day, August 15, at half past eight in the morning, the eight Chilcotins came as promised. Klatsassin was the spokeman and evident leader.

> I have brought seven murderers, and I am one myself [began his statement as translated and taken before Cox]. I return you one horse, one mule, and Twenty dollars for the Governor, as a token of good faith.
>
> The names of the men present are: Myself, Telloot, Chee-loot, Tapitt, Piem, Chassis, Cheddiki, Sanstanki.[68]

Ten more, he said, were at large. Three others were dead. (One had been killed by Macdonald and the other two had killed themselves.) Twenty-one Indians in all had been implicated in the massacre. Anaheim's party had taken the greater part of the plunder.

Thus, quietly, the leading Chilcotins involved in the Uprising and some of their most deeply implicated followers entered William Cox's camp unarmed and peacefully. As far as Cox was concerned it was an outright surrender on the part of these Chilcotins. There only remained the question of where and by whom they would be tried.

Brew had been empowered with a commission to try the Chilcotins in their own country, but Cox had no such power.[69] Accordingly it was arranged that Chief Justice Matthew Baillie Begbie should try the prisoners. The trial was to be at Quesnel.

The surrender of the eight Chilcotins came with a suddeness startling to the whites who had pursued the insurgents with so little apparent success up to this time. It would never have come about in the way it did had the Chilcotins understood the consequences of their surrender.

In a message to Klatsassin, Cox had stated that he would not harm the Chilcotins if they came into his camp, that he had no power to kill them, but that he would "hand them over to the big chief" (meaning Chief Justice Begbie).[70] This message Klatsassin and his followers interpreted as a promise that they would be allowed to camp in freedom near Cox, that they would not be killed, and that they would have an interview with Governor Seymour himself.

It was two days after they received this message that Klatsassin and the seven other Chilcotins came into Cox's camp. They had received a present of tobacco from Cox, and this, Klatsassin later told Begbie, they had smoked after coming into his camp.

> Then, said Klatsassin [to Begbie], we thought ourselves safe. We have all heard [wrote Begbie to Seymour] of the sacredness of the pipe of peace on the Eastern side among the Indians--I never had any experience on the matter here. . . .[71]

The Chilcotins were not allowed to camp freely but were treated as prisoners. Alexis, who had acted as a go-between, apparently considered that Cox had broken his promise. ". . . Mr. Cox must have two tongues," he said, according to Begbie, when told that the Chilcotins would not be allowed to camp with him.[72]

The Chilcotins' mistaken belief that they were to have an interview with Seymour seems to have partly risen because someone (not Cox, according to Begbie) showed them a picture of the Governor.[73] That there was misunderstanding is certain. Whether or not the Chilcotins were deliberately misled seems, now, impossible to ascertain.

The Trials at Quesnel[74]

The trials of six of the eight Chilcotins who surrendered were held at Quesnel on September 28 and 29. On the twenty-eighth an indictment was entered against Telloot as "principal in wounding Buckley with intent to murder and against Klatsassin, Chessus, Piele and Chedékki on one count as aiding and abetting and on a second count as inciting," that is as "accessories before the fact."[75] Telloot was found guilty on the first count and Klatsassin on the second. The jury failed to reach agreement on the guilt of Piele, Chessus, and Chedékki. (One member of the jury was in disagreement with the eleven others.)

On the next day Tah-pit was tried and found guilty of the murder of William Manning, Klatsassin and Piele of the murder of Alexander Macdonald, and Chessus of the murder of James Gaudet. Begbie sentenced all five convicted prisoners to be hung. Chedékki, whom no witness had recognized but who it was said would be recognized by Peterson, was to be sent to New Westminster for trial. The other two prisoners, Tnananki [?] and his son, Cheloot, had no specific charge against them and had already been allowed to go free since there was nothing against them except Klatsassin's opening remarks on coming to Cox's camp.

The final decision as to whether the hangings were to be carried out was Seymour's, since he had the power to exercise clemency. This, however, he did not see fit to do.

The Imprisonment

The prisoners, while awaiting execution, were kept in an improvised gaol, "a mere log house, with part partitioned off for a cell."

On October 2, as Begbie was about to leave, R. C. Lundin Brown, a

minister of the Church of England, arrived at Quesnelmouth from the gold fields where he had been preaching. He boarded the steamer Enterprise, and there had a word with the judge, who told him about the condemned Chilcotins. Lundin Brown agreed to stay and give spiritual instruction to the condemned men.

Securing an interpreter, Baptiste, Lundin Brown made his way to the improvised gaol where the heavily shackled prisoners sat squatting on the floor. Day after day Lundin Brown instructed them in Christian teachings. The Chilcotins, seeing he had no crucifix about his neck, were somewhat dubious of his credentials as a true priest, but before the time of their execution came they had accepted him and satisfied him as to their repentance and true faith. Two of the Chilcotins, Lundin Brown says, had been baptized previously. Klatsassin and Teloot, and probably Chessus also, Lundin Brown christened himself. The morning of their execution he administered the Lord's Supper to the Chilcotins. The prisoners had breakfast, and then as they were called out one by one to be pinioned for execution, Lundin Brown bid them farewell.

The prisoners were led to the scaffold. A crowd of about two hundred whites and Indians had gathered. Brief prayers were said in Chilcotin, which Lundin Brown had gained some knowledge of, and then as each prisoner was blindfolded and readied for execution the minister spoke the words "Jesu Christ nerhunschita sincha coontse" ("Jesus Christ be with thy spirit.")[77]

In the midst of all this Tah-pit suddenly called out to his fellow-prisoners to "have courage." Then, addressing the Carrier Indians who were gathered there and who had been formerly at war with the Chilcotins, he said, "Tell the Chilcoatens to cease anger against the whites." He

then added, "We are going to see the Great Father."

The Chilcotins were buried ". . . in a wood near Quesnelmouth, not far from the Cariboo road. A wooden cross with a rude inscription [writes Lundin Brown] was set up to mark the spot. . . ."

Chedekki, who had been imprisoned with the other Chilcotins, was sent down for trial at New Westminster but managed to escape on the way and was never caught.[78]

The next year Ahan, another of the Chilcotins who had been involved in the uprising, decided to attempt to make peace with the white authorities. He travelled down the Bella Coola River with several hundred dollars' worth of furs which he regarded as compensation for his part in the massacres. Anaheim informed the whites of his coming, and Ahan was taken into custody, as was Lutas, a relative of his who was also said to have been involved in the massacres. On July 3 and 4, 1865, Ahan and Lutas were tried and the death sentence was passed on them. Ahan was executed on July 18, but Lutas was pardoned--the only one of the Chilcotins sentenced to whom the executive extended clemency.[79]

Footnotes for Chapter VI

[1]"The Latest Indian Atrocity," Daily British Colonist (Victoria), May 12, 1864, p. 2.

[2]"Horrible Massacre!! Fourteen Men Murdered at Bute Inlet," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 12, 1864, p. 3, from the extra of May 11, 1864.

[3]"The Indian Massacre," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 12, 1864, p. 2.

[4]"The Bute Massacre," Weekly British Colonist (Victoria), May 24, 1864, p. 8.

[5]"Another Indian Massacre," Victoria Daily Chronicle, May 29, 1864, p. 3, from "Another Indian Massacre!" British Columbian, May 28, 1864, p. 3.

[6]Derek Pethick, James Douglas: Servant of Two Empires (Vancouver: Mitchell Press Limited, 1969), p. 183, pp. 210-211, p. 243.

[7]"Emergency Meeting," Daily British Colonist, June 2, 1864, p. 3.

[8]"Bute Inlet Massacres, Minutes of a Public Meeting held in Victoria Theatre 8 p.m., June 1st, 1864," Archives of British Columbia, F57 B97m.

[9]"Emergency Meeting," Daily British Colonist, June 2, 1864, p. 3.

[10]"The Governor on the Bute Tragedy," Daily British Colonist, June 3, 1864, p. 3.

[11]"Bute Inlet Massacre," volunteer list with "Bute Inlet Massacres, Minutes of a Public Meeting held in Victoria Theatre, 8 p.m. June 1st 1864."

[12]"The Indian Murders," Weekly British Colonist, June 7, 1864, p. 6.

[13]"The Bute Massacre," British Columbian, May 14, 1864, p. 3.

[14]"The Hyacks Volunteer," British Columbian, May 18, 1864, p. 3.

[15]"The New Westminster Volunteers," British Columbian, June 8, 1864, p. 1.

[16]"The Bute Massacre," British Columbian, May 18, 1864, p. 2.

[17]"An Indian Policy," British Columbian, May 21, 1864, p. 2.

[18]Typescript copy of letter, A. Waddington to Colonial Secretary of British Columbia, May 28, 1864, "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," File 9, Special Collections, University of British Columbia.

[19]Copy of letter, Arthur N. Birch to A. Waddington, June 3, 1864 in British Columbia, Colonial Secretary, "Outward Correspondence: November, 1863 -September, 1864," Archives of British Columbia.

[20]Typescript copy of letter, A. Waddington to Colonial Secretary, June 9, 1864, "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," File 9, ~~Sepcial~~ Special Collections, University of British Columbia.

[21]Copy of letter, Arthur N. Birch to A. Waddington, June 3, 1864, in British Columbia, Colonial Secretary, "Outward Correspondence: November, 1863-September, 1864," Archives of British Columbia.

[22]British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 18-19, Frederick Seymour to the Duke of Newcastle, May 20, 1864.

[23]Copy of letter, Arthur N. Birch to W. G. Cox, May 14, 1864, in British Columbia, Colonial Secretary, "Outward Correspondence: November, 1863 to September, 1864, pp. 196-198, Archives of British Columbia.

[24]Copy of letter, Birch to Cox, May 18, 1864, in British Columbia, Colonial Secretary, "Outward Correspondence: November, 1863 to September, 1864, pp. 203-206, Archives of British Columbia.

[25]British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 18-19, Frederick Seymour to the Duke of Newcastle, No. 8, May 20, 1864.

In the same despatch, although Seymour begged "distincly to be understood as not making a complaint against anyone . . .," he outlined the delay which had occurred in sending him the news of the massacre. He spoke of the danger to the men who had been sent over the Bentinck Arm route. "This was known in Victoria," he wrote, "why were two days lost in communicating with me?"

[26]British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from . . . Seymour and . . . Birch, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 18-19, Frederick Seymour

to the Duke of Newcastle, No. 8, May 20, 1864.

Seymour spoke of the colony's lack of a seagoing steamer, a lack for which he had already attempted to compensate in part by sending an agent to Portland, Oregon, to purchase a small vessel with the Governor's own travelling allowance. This vessel, however, would not be dependable in rough weather. Seymour was ". . . ignorant of the instructions furnished to the Admiral of the Pacific station . . ., but felt that British Columbia at the "still early stage of its existence" had a claim to some naval protection from the Mother Country.

[27]"The Indian Celebration," British Columbian, May 25, 1864, p. 3.

[28]"News from the Bute Expedition," British Columbian, May 28, 1864, p. 3.

[29]C[hartres] Brew to Colonial Secretary [Arthur N. Birch], May 23, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[30]"Return of the Bute Inlet Expedition," British Columbian, June 1, 1864, p. 3.

[31]Letter, Governor Frederick Seymour to Governor Kennedy, June 4, 1864, in Weekly Colonist, June 7, 1864, p.

[32]Typescript copy of letter, William G. Cox [to the Colonial Secretary of British Columbia], May 29, 1864, "Waddington . . .," File 9, Special Collections, University of British Columbia.

[33]Typescript copy of letter, J.D.B. Ogilvy to A. N. Birch, Colonial Secretary, June 1, 1864, "Waddington . . .," File 9.

[34]Untitled news item, Weekly British Colonist, June 7, 1864, p. 5; "The Governor on the Bute Tragedy," Weekly British Colonist, Supplement, p. 2.

[35]According to the report of a "Mr. Ladner" who had just come down from "Mouth of Quesnelle,"

> "Mr. McLean had not been idle while waiting at the Fort. His enquiries had resulted in confirmation of the reported murder of Manning and his party. [It is not clear whether the words ". . . and his party" refer to members of MacDonald's pack train.] Mr. McLean, who is acquainted with the Chillicooten, and, in fact, most of the Indians in the interior, says that the man Tellot [Telloot] is the head of a small band who have in a measure

become detached from the main tribe and who only occasionally visit them. His policy is to secure the head men of the tribe and hold them as hostages for the surrender of the murderers."
("Later from the Interior," British Columbian, June 8, 1864, p. 3).

According to the Weekly Colonist of June 14, McLean was reported to have sent a number of Indian scouts to Puntzi Lake, who confirmed Manning's murder.

[36]"From Fort Alexandria," British Columbian, June 11, 1864, p. 3.

[37]"Way Items," British Columbian, June 15, 1864, p. 3.

[38]Letter, William G. Cox to A. N. Birch, June 19, 1864, Archives of British Columbia. This is the main source for the narrative of Cox's activities in this sub-section.

[39]British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, to the Colonial Office, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," [Photostat copy of mss. in Archives Department, Ottawa, G. series, no. 353-358] IV, 47 & 76, Frederick Seymour to Edward Cardwell, Aug. 30, No. 25.

[40]Letter, Cox to Birch, June 19, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[41]British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch to the Colonial Office," Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 65, Frederick Seymour to Edward Cardwell, Sept. 9, 1864, No. 37.

[42]Ibid., p. 71.

[43]Brew's men were due to arrive the evening of the same day. However, the "H.M.S. Tribune" which was to have transported them got stuck on the "sandheads" [sandbars?] at the mouth of the Fraser River, and the gunboat "Forward," sent for them instead, carried the men from New Westminster to Esquimalt. ("The Bute Inlet Massacre," Daily Evening Express, June 11, 1864, p. 3; "The Bentinck Arm Expedition," Daily Evening Express, June 13, 1864, p. 3; "Disaster to H.M.S. Tribune," Daily Evening Express, June 23, 1864, p. 3; "Departure of the Expedition," British Columbian, June 15, 1864, p. 3.)

[44]"Bentinck Arm Expedition," Weekly British Colonist, June 21, 1864, p. 7.

[45]British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch to the Colonial Office, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 66, Frederick Seymour to Edward Cardwell, Sept. 9, 1864, No. 37.

This despatch is a major source of information on the events connected with "Brew's Expedition by Way of Bentinck Arm."

[46]The freight, however, was carried up in canoes according to a letter written by E. A. Atkins, manuscript and typescript copies, Archives of British Columbia. Neither the letter's date nor the name of the person to whom it was written are indicated. This is a first-person account from memory, apparently written many years after the events occurred, by a volunteer who participated in the Bute Inlet and Bentinck Arm Expeditions under Brew.

[47]British Columbia, "Despatches," IV, 67, Seymour to Cardwell, Sept. 9, 1864, No. 37.

[48]Ibid, p. 71.

[49]R[obert] C[hristopher] Lundin Brown, Klatsassin and Other Reminiscences of Missionary Life in British Columbia (London, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1873), pp. 65-68.

[50]"News from the Chilacoten Country" ("intelligence . . . received from Lieut. Cooper, Aid-de-camp to . . . the Governor), British Columbian, Aug. 6, 1864, p. 3.

[51]R. C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassin, pp. 65-68.

[52]Sources for the account of McLean's death are:

Weekly Colonist, Aug. 2, 1864, p. ; "News from the Chilicooten Country," British Columbian, Aug. 3, 1864, p. 2; "News from the Chilacoten [sic] Country," British Columbian, Aug. 6, 1864, p. 3; "Diary of a Volunteer," Daily British Colonist, Oct. 15, 1864; copy of despatch, Seymour to Cardwell, Aug. 30, 1864, No. 25; copy of despatch, Seymour to Cardwell, Sept. 9, 1864, No. 37; R. C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassin, pp. 68-76.

[53]R. C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassin, p. 69.

[54]British Columbia, "Despatches," IV, 73, Seymour to Cardwell, Sept. 9, 1864, No. 37 and "News from the Chilacoten Country," British Columbian, Aug. 6, 1864, p. 3.

[55][Nancy, Seymour reported,] ". . . came backwards and forwards once or twice, brought in some children, then one man, who seemed to be sent to test the sincerity of our professions of moderation. When he had returned unharmed, a considerable number of squaws formed a fishing station six miles off and entered the Camp almost daily with growing confidence to barter trout for sugar, the only article of which we had a sufficient supply. Fully satisfied at last of our good faith the women promised that Alexis should come in, if the Governor remained, and then finally departed in search of him. (British Columbia,

"Desptaches," IV, 72-73, Seymour to Cardwell, Sept. 9, 1864, No. 37.

[56]Ibid., p. 75. "Alexis and his men [wrote Seymour] come on at the best pace of the horses holding their muskets over their heads to show they come in peace. Having ascertained which was the Governor, the Chief threw himself from his horse, and at once approached me. He was dressed in a French uniform such as one sees in the pictures of Montcalm" (Ibid.)

[57]Ibid., p. 75.

[58]Ibid., pp. 75-75.

[59]Ibid., p. 61.

[60]Ibid., p. 75.

[61]Ibid., p. 76.

[62]Ibid., p. 76.

[63]Ibid., p. 77.

[64]Ibid., p. 77.

[65]Ibid., p. 78.

[66]Letter, C. Brew to the Governor [F. Seymour], Aug. 18, 1864, and letter, C. Brew to Colonial Secretary [of British Columbia], Sept. 8, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[67]Letter, J.D.B. Ogilvy to the editor ("The Chilacoaten Expedition"), British Columbian, Sept. 17, 1864, p. 3.

[68]Klatsassin's statement before W. Cox, quoted in "Glorious News from the Chilacooten Country! The Expedition Safe! Surrender of Eight of the Murderers!" British Columbian, Aug. 24, 1864, p. 3.

[69]Letter, W. Cox to the Governor [F. Seymour], Aug. 15, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[70]Testimony of Cox and note by Begbie, Sept. 28, 1864, in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians - Tellot, Klatsassin, Chessus, Piel or Pierre, Tah-pit & Chedekki," enclosure in M[atthew] B[aillie] Begbie [to F. Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[71]Letter, Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

Though there seems to be no other extant evidence of the Chilcotins having adopted the idea of the peace-pipe, they may well have done so by this time. It could have been introduced to them by fur-trade-company employees such as the part-Cree McBean, or it may have reached them through one of the prophet cults. (See Chapter III of this thesis).

[72]Letter, Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[73]Testimony of Cox and note by Begbie, Sept. 28, 1864, in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . .," enclosure in Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[74]Letter, Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864, and enclosed "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . .," Sept. 30, 1864.

[75]"Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . . ."

[76]R[obert] C[hristopher] Lundin Brown, Klatsassan and Other Reminiscences of Missionary Life in British Columbia (London, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1873), p. 97.

[77]Ibid., p. 121.

[78]Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864, and British Columbia, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch to the Colonial Office, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 119-120, Frederick Seymour to Edward Cardwell, Nov . 23, 1864, No. 69.

[79]"The Chilicoaten Murderers," British Columbian, June 1, 1865, p. 3; British Columbia, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch to the Colonial Office, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 249-251, Seymour to Cardwell, June 8, 1865, No. 81; "The Special Assize," British Columbian, July 4, 1865, p. 3; "Royal Clemency," British Columbian, July 15, 1865, p. 3; "Executed," British Columbian, July 18, 1865, p. 3.

CHAPTER VII

WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE INDIANS AS REVEALED AND EXPRESSED DURING THE CHILCOTIN UPRISING

Chapter Three examined the general attitudes of whites towards the Indian during the period with which we are dealing. This chapter will seek to answer the question "How were the attitudes of Europeans particularly revealed and expressed in response to the events of the Chilcotin Uprising?" The immediate responses of the whites to the Chilcotin Uprising have already been described in the previous chapter. Though in this chapter further responses will be described, the prime purpose will be to examine the relationship between responses - the external reactions of the moment - and attitudes - the "internal" view-points of those who did the reacting.

The Range of Attitudes

As one examines the varying responses of whites during the Chilcotin Uprising it becomes evident that these responses represent the same range of attitudes we have noted in Chapter Three in a more general and static analysis.

In the white reaction to the Chilcotin massacres we observe what we have already seen in Chapter Three: a universal confidence in the inherent superiority of European civilization. But it is also evident from white responses that this belief in the superiority of white over Indian culture took different forms with different people and that different individuals saw different consequences as following from it.

The feature of European civilization which was most immediately relevant to the Chilcotin crisis was its system of law and law enforcement. Articulate whites unanimously expressed their desire to see the Indian killers brought to justice. But different people meant different things when they talked about the Chilcotins being brought to justice. Many, regarding the European or more particularly the English system of law as being founded on universal principles of justice, believed that the Indians could be brought to understand and accept it. Certainly Seymour took this position in most of his correspondence during the Chilcotin uprising. It was also the position taken by the British Columbian and even by many of the speakers at the Victoria citizens' meeting.

Among those who called for the bringing of the white man's law to the Chilcotins there was a wide range of attitude. Many thought only of bringing the Indian to justice, not of bringing justice to the Indian in any general sense. This was the attitude expressed by most at the Victoria citizens' meeting. Others, such as C. B. Young at the Victoria meeting and Robson, editor of the British Columbian, while they thought that the Chilcotins guilty of perpetrating the massacre should be punished, at the same time believed that justice in a wider sense should be brought to the Indian, and critized the lack of justice which had been shown towards him, particularly on the land question.

There were some who, while they may have talked of bringing the Indian to justice, actually took the same position as Amor de Cosmos who had uttered the cry for simple revenge. Implicit in this response was not only a disregard for justice and the rule of law which was supposed to maintain

it, but also a crude racism expressed in de Cosmos's statement that blood for blood was the only law the Indian knew, and, he implied, the only one he was capable of knowing.[1]

Colonial Class Structure and Attitudes Expressed

To what extent can we identify particular attitudes expressed towards the Indian with particular classes or groups of colonial society? Only to a limited extent, it would appear. In the first place, colonial society in Vancouver Island and British Columbia at this time had had very little time to form its own strata. Social mobility, we may gather, was considerably greater than it would have been in an older society. The white population of the two colonies was also a very small one. Consequently opinions were spread the more easily through it, like gossip in a small village. The newspapers, the only mass media of the time, were designed to be read by all classes, or they would hardly have had large enough readerships to survive.

In spite of social mobility there was some class structure in colonial society at the time. Most people's positions in society were in part determined by the social and educational advantages gained before coming to the colonies. The class strata were to a large extent pre-formed, not formed locally. One group in colonial society was made up of the officials appointed by the British government: Seymour, Begbie, and Brew being the most prominent in the events we have narrated. These, of course, were the official elite by virtue of their positions. Among the public there was also an "elite", the members of which were marked by superior educational

background and their involvement in occupations making use of that background. In this group we may include clergymen and the editors of colonial newspapers. In the "non-elite" portion of the public may be included small farmers, labourers, and miners.

An examination of public opinion expressed during the Chilcotin Uprising reveals divisions of attitude which cut across class lines. There was a wide divergence in attitude among men of the same social group (for example, de Cosmos and Robson). Morever, the attitudes held by some of the "elite" public were apparently very similar to those which the rough men of the mining district enlisted under Cox were said to hold. Most of the speakers at the June 1 Victoria Theatre meeting (apparently men of influence and position), indicated their reliance on established authority, but did not show any general tendency to moderate its use.[2] Many, in fact, were in favour of using that authority in ways which short-circuited the whites' own principles of legality. The elite of Victoria, then, were not so very different from Cox's men from the mining district, whom Seymour characterized as ". . . not much disposed to relish the restraint which I put upon them in carrying out operations against the Indians."[3] Cox's men, like many of the Victoria elite, apparently wanted harsher methods used against the Chilcotins. The difference between the two social groups appears even less when it is considered that the men of Cox's expedition, though apparently restive under the restrictions placed upon the, generally submitted to those restrictions. They, too, had some respect for established authority.

> . . . all these 8 prisoners [Begbie pointed out in his letter of September 30 to Seymour] have been brought a long distance without any attempt at mob law, or even an insult . . . . Two of them at large on parol [sic] in the streets of the town quite unmolested.[4]

Mention has been made in Chapter Four of the fact that missionaries often acted as spokesmen for the Indians. Missionaries do not, however, appear in this role in the Chilcotin Uprising. For one thing, the particular group of Chilcotins involved in the massacre had not as a group been in contact with missionaries. We must make a distinction between missionaries, deeply involved with the Indians, and clergymen not so involved. The clergymen speaking at the Victoria meeting exercised no moderating influence, Garrett in effect agreeing with de Cosmos, and Evans advocating a "drumhead court martial if necessary" and "hanging on the spot."[5] That the views of these clergymen were not representative of all the colonial church is indicated in a prayer quoted in the British Columbian as having been offered in at least one of the churches following the news of the Victoria meeting: "Lord restrain the vengeance of the savage, and bring speedily to an end the blood-thirstiness of professing Christians."[6] The Roman Catholic missionary Pierre Fouquet showed a different sort of interest in the Chilcotins than that shown by Garrett or Evans. At the time of the uprising he left Alexandria accompanied only by an old Chilcotin man and made a ten days' circuit of the Chilcotins' territory seeking (though without success) to make contact with them.[7]

The attitude expressed by R. C. Lundin Brown, the minister of the Church of England who gave spiritual counsel to the condemned Chilcotins, is interesting. In 1861 he had had a chance meeting with the Chilcotins while on his way to Fort Alexandria where he was to hold a service. Among the Chilcotins he met with was Klatsassin.[8] In 1863 Lundin Brown was occupying the position of minister at St. Mary's, Lillooet.[9] It was,

as we have seen, while on his way from preaching to the miners of the Cariboo that he met Begbie at Quesnelmouth in October of 1864 and agreed to instruct the condemned Chilcotins.

As he became better acquainted with the Chilcotins, Brown's sympathy for them increased. He felt particularly drawn to Klatsassin. Lundin Brown's account of his conversations with the Chilcotins along with Begbie's account of his give us our best insight into the thinking of the Chilcotins and the "chief motivating cause" for their perpetrating the massacres. (This we have discussed in Chapter Six). Lundin Brown's sympathies for the Chilcotins no doubt led him to record their side of the story. At the same time his belief in the universal basis of British justice and its applicability to the Indian reconciled him more or less completely to the fact that their hanging was a necessity. The Chilcotins had maintained that "They meant war, not murder." But the surprise nature of the Chilcotin attack on the whites with whom they had been at peace at Bute Inlet convinced Brown that it was indeed murder. When the time arrived for the execution of the condemned Chilcotins Brown accepted the sentence as just, though there is in his comments a hint of disapproval of the failure of the Governor to show mercy.

> The executive, it appeared, thought not of mercy [he wrote]; all five were to be hanged; and in two or three days. Fearful doom! Just, no doubt, perfectly just. But - all five? Could they not be contented with one or two of the number? At all events, might not young Pierre have been spared? - Pierre, a handsome lad of eighteen who had a wife and child at home, - Pierre, who, in what he had done had only acted in obedience to the chief, whom he believed himself bound by all laws, human and divine, to obey. But no! Justice must take its course. Ignorance in the eyes of the law is no excuse. Terror must be struck into all the Indian tribes. All five must die.[10]

If the attitudes towards the Indian expressed by the "elite" portion of the public varied widely, what of the attitude of the general public? Here the direct verbal evidence is more scanty, for it is mainly the elite members of the public who were articulate. We do, however, have a number of indirect indications of what the general public thought, as well as some reporting of verbally expressed reactions.

The resolutions passed at the well-attended June first public meeting in Victoria and the enthusiastic rush of volunteers for expeditions to the Chilcotin country in both Victoria and New Westminster indicate hearty public approval of the proposed action to punish the Chilcotins responsible for the massacres. And reportedly the white population of the interior, having heard the news of the Bute Inlet massacre and rumour of subsequent massacres closer to themselves, burned ". . . with rage to bring the murderers to speedy justice."[11]

What did the general public conceive of as justice in this situation? Judging from the reportedly enthusiastic response given at the Victoria public meeting to the more extreme demands for vengeance, much of the public there supported the views of those who advocated simple vengeance or at least a minimum regard for the formalities of law.

Judging by the editorial comments of Robson in the British Columbian, the attitudes of many of his fellow-citizens in New Westminster was considerably less moderate than his own. The "Yankee doctrine of extermination," he found, appeared "to meet with especial favour on the shores of the Pacific."[12] Whatever may have been the proportion of people favouring this "doctrine of extermination," we have no evidence to link it particularly to the lower classes of the public in New Westminster any more than in Victoria. Robson

classified it as a "Yankee doctrine." This might appear to be an early example of a British North American habit of blaming all things evil on the Americans, but in this instance influences from the United States do seem to have played a part in spreading to British Columbia this "doctrine of extermination," or at least of the necessity of violent conflict with the Indian. We have noted in Chapter Three Reinhart's account of the antagonism and brutality that characterized the attitude towards the Indians of some of the miners from California. In the same chapter we encountered the doctrine of the American settlers in Sproat's party which attempted to justify disregard of the Indian's prior occupancy of the land. The history of the United States a little prior to 1864 had, of course, given abundant examples of the slaughter of the Indians and the disregard of his rights that came with the arrival of the American settlers in the west. The miners who largely made up Cox's expedition were, according to Seymour, largely American. They were "not much disposed [he said] to relish the restraint which I put upon them in carrying on operations against the Indians."[13]

But, though some attitudes of hostility towards the Indian originated in the United States, it would be fallacious to try to explain hostility as merely the result of American influence.

The Part Played by Prejudice

To what extent were the attitudes expressed by whites during the Chilcotin Uprising manifestations of prejudice? Philip Mason remarks that the word prejudice, ". . . in the context of race relations, seems to be legitimately used of a judgement based on a fixed mental image of some

groups or class, without being tested against reality."[14] We have examined in Chapter Three some of the opinions expressed by whites, prior to the uprising, regarding the Indians. It is evident that whites of British Columbia were affected by various stereotypes of the Indian. Both Barrett-Lennard and Macdonald, for example, made sweepingly generalized statements about the Indians. But this is not to say that all whites made judgements based on a fixed mental image of the Indian and went on to apply those judgements to all individual Indians. Certainly Douglas made a judgement independent of any unfavourable stereotype of the Indian when he remarked in a despatch regarding relationships between gold-seekers and Indians,

> It is . . . a circumstance highly honourable to the character of those savages, that they have on all occasions scrupulously respected the persons and property of their white visitors.[15]

Reinhart did not share the contempt of some of his fellow gold-seekers for the Indians. And Begbie in his report of his "Journey into the Interior of British Columbia" showed that he did not accept at face value the gneralizations about the Indians made by the miners.

It is no doubt true that every white had some stereotyped image of the Indian. Philip Mason remarks that ". . . while some kind of stereotype is necessary if one is to have any mental picture of a foreign group, a sensible person will test his stereotype against reality in any individual case."[16] There is evidence that many whites of nineteen-century British Columbia not only used individual judgement in making generalizations about the Indian but were willing to "test their stereotypes against reality" when they had dealings with particular Indians or groups of Indians.

The Chilcotin Uprising, however, did give an occasion for the existing prejudices among whites to make themselves heard as they were in the Victoria

Theatre meeting. Those who already held the stereotype of the Indian as blood-thirsty savage seemingly had their views confirmed by the massacres which took place, and they for a time gained a willing audience among a large sector of the public. As time went on, however, doubts were raised, particularly by Robson in New Westminster, as to the wisdom and justice of the whites in dealing with the Chilcotins. The trial of the five Chilcotins at Quesnel confirmed those doubts, though in a rather different way than expected.

Though prejudice did indeed rise to the surface as a result of the Chilcotin Uprising it cannot be said that it determined the official reaction to the massacre, which at the beginning was cautiously legal and non-provocative.

The Part Played by Fear

Earlier in this study we observed the part their fear of white man's threat played in causing the Chilcotins to kill the whites at Bute Inlet. To what extent did fear in the whites determine their reaction to the massacres?

Seymour estimated the white population of the mainland colony at about 7000 and the Indian population at about 60,000. This estimate would yield a ratio of from 1:8 to 1:9. This proportion, judging from Philip Mason's study in Race Relations, is in accord with those found in other societies where the relationship between what Mason calls the superordinate and subordinate groups is a dominant one. By a dominant relationship Mason means one where there is ". . . a monopoly of privilege and no intention of parting with it."[17] The maintenance of a dominant relationship may be an indication of fear on the part of the superordinate group. Monopoly of

privilege was largely the result of the wide gap between Indian and white cultures. Whites in large numbers had only recently settled in British Columbia. The question of whether the monopoly should be maintained had hardly been raised, though we have looked at particular issues such as the Indian land rights problem which were related to the question. The dominant form of the relationship between whites and Indians cannot be said to indicate deep-seated fear on the part of the whites.

In some parts of British Columbia the numerical superiority of the Indians was so overwhelming as to cause whites to fear for their lives on occasion. Thus it was in isolated coastal points that the Chilcotin Uprising caused the most fear. But no great fear for safety of lives seems to have been aroused in New Westminster or in the mining settlements of the Cariboo, nor in Victoria in the Vancouver Island colony. The superior organization of the whites, the lack of unity on the part of the Indian tribes, the military technology at the disposal of the whites, and their past successes in dealing with the Indians gave them an overall feeling of safety. This was a period when the European was most confident of his own superiority and this confidence prevented any really general feeling of fear for personal safety.

There was, however, a "tribal" feeling of loyalty to one another which, as we have seen, caused the whites of Victoria, New Westminster, and the Cariboo to respond with alacrity to the apparent need to take vigorous measures to punish the Chilcotins. No doubt, too, there was fear of a subtle kind--fear that the prestige of the European would be damaged by an unrevenged defeat at the hands of the Indians. Undoubtedly the lack of

immediate success against the Chilcotins increased this fear in the whites of the expeditionary forces. Certainly, too, Seymour's fear for the loss of his own prestige may help to explain the change in his feelings towards the Chilcotins.

The Relation between Roles Played and Attitudes Taken

Attitudes can never be entirely accounted for, since they partly result from philosophies chosen, and there is an uninvestigable element of personal choice in the adoption of those philosophies. But, as a whole, a significant pattern does emerge in the attitudes shown during the Chilcotin crisis. As a general rule we may say that those whom circumstances cast in the role of adversaries of the Chilcotins came to adopt increasingly hostile attitudes towards the Indians. Those who were less directly involved or who were cast in roles of mediation tended to adopt less hostile attitudes towards them. Some of the rank and file of the Bentinck Arm and Alexandria expeditions may have joined because they were already hostile to the Indian - that is, attitude may have determined role - but most articulate individuals and groups involved in the Chilcotin crisis had no choice in the role in which they found themselves.

The hostility of so many of the people of Victoria can be understood when it is considered that the Bute Inlet massacre itself cast them into the role of adversaries of the Chilcotins. The slaughtered men had come from Victoria and a good many of the elite in Victoria were financially involved in Waddington's Bute Inlet road scheme.

On the other hand, the people of New Westminster for their own interests had long opposed Waddington's road. While, on the one hand, as Europeans, they were cast into the role of adversaries of the Chilcotins, they were also

adversaries of Victoria. As we have seen in the previous chapter, this tended to moderate their attitude towards the Chilcotins at the beginning of the Chilcotin Uprising. The attitudes of both Victoria and New Westminster residents were affected by the roles they found themselves in.

The effect of the role played on the attitude adopted is illustrated by the striking change in Governor Seymour's attitude which occurred as he, accompanying Brew's Bentinck Arm expedition, found himself in the role of an adversary of the Chilcotins. Seymour had at the beginning emphasized that the object of the expedition against the Chilcotins was "merely to assert the supremacy of the law."[18] By employing sworn constables he had made specific the civil nature of the action taken. Before leaving the Chilcotin country, however, he had begun to think of the action in terms of warfare, and he envisaged the possibility of more warlike action on the part of the whites.

> My great object in joining the expedition [Seymour wrote to Cardwell] was to secure moderation from the white men in their treatment of the Indians. I was determined to show, what had not previously been seen in this part of the world, a government calm and just under circumstances calculated to create exasperation. But there was no longer any use shutting my eyes to the fact that this was a war, merciless on one side in which we were engaged in with the great part of the Chilcoaten nation and must be carried on as a war with us. Happily for the occasion, our Constables knew the use of the rifle and revolver, at least as well, as the more peaceful instruments generally used in support of the law.[19]

Later, after the five Chilcotins had been hanged at Quesnel, Seymour spoke of possible future action which would have directly conflicted with the policy he himself had set out prior to his involvement in the Bentinck Arm Expedition.

> The Indian insurrection [he wrote to Cardwell] is merely referred to by you as a question of Colonial importance. I would, however, beg most respectfully to point out, that should a real war take place between the Indian population and the whites, the former numbering

> 60,000 and the latter about 7000 I may find myself compelled to follow in the footsteps of the Governor of Colorado. . . and invite every white man to shoot each Indian he may meet. Such a proclamation would not be badly received here in case of emergency.[20]

Seymour at this point was trying to make a case for imperial financial support in dealing with the Indians, at least in helping to pay for the costs of the Chilcotin expeditions. No doubt he wanted to make clear to the London authorities the embarrassing position in which they would be placed in case of a general Indian insurrection. Nevertheless, the fact that he was willing to threaten such action against the Indians is an indication of how much his thinking had changed.

The imperial authorities, thousands of miles from the scene of the uprising, were not likely to regard themselves as personal adversaries of the Chilcotins. True, ships of the imperial navy had been involved in supporting roles, but the British Empire was hardly threatened by the temporary defiance of a handful of Indians of a hitherto unheard-of tribe.[21] The uprising was a matter involving Indians and colonists, and the main concern of the Colonial Office was that it should not mushroom into a major conflict. With this in mind, the authority of the Colonial Office was exerted throughout the period of the uprising to moderate the counter-actions of the British Columbian whites.

On July 16 Cardwell, in response to the news of the massacre by the Chilcotins, wrote to Seymour;

> . . . it is necessary for me, while deeply regretting the melancholy loss of life which has occurred and the probable disastrous consequences, to draw your serious attention to the great importance of moderating by every means in your power the spirit of retaliation to which such events too naturally give rise, and of confining within the limits of justice and of sound policy the measures of chastisement to which you may find it necessary to have recourse. These measures must be guided solely by a sense of justice and a desire to re-establish peace and order upon a permanent basis.

> I should deprecate nothing so much as the breaking out of a war which you justly say would be very costly, and which might lend to prolonged feelings of animosity between the two races which could be productive of nothing but evil and danger.[22]

A little later, in reply to Seymour's account of his plans "for the detection and punishment of the murderers" Cardwell wrote:

> I have noticed with especial satisfaction your anxiety to give your proceedings a strictly legal character, and your refusal of offers of assistance made from beyond the Colony which might have impressed a different character on your proceedings. I rejoice to see that you are fully alive to the consequences which an Indian war would entail upon the Colony, and I trust that you will be especially careful not to take any measures which may convert an isolated outrage perpetrated by a band of murders into a tribal war.[23]

Seymour, then, according to his instructions from the Colonial Office, was to be guided by a concern for justice, by the need "to re-establish peace and order upon a permanent basis," and by the need to limit expenses.

Expenses entailed in dealing with the uprising, were, it was to be understood, a burden which the colony itself would have to bear.

> I am sensible of the expense which is thrown upon the Colony by the operations which you report [Cardwell wrote], but I would observe that they are undertaken exclusively in the interest of the Colony, and that the expense is in a great measure due to the high rate of profit which the Colonists are realizing and therefore can hardly be viewed as any matter of complaint.[24]

Throughout the time that Seymour was with Brew's and Cox's expeditions he followed in the main the principles he had set out at the beginning. This despite his change in attitude towards the Indians. His actions as reported to the Colonial Office won the approbation of his superior.

> I await your fuller report on the subject [wrote Cardwell on October 29th, 1864], but in the meantime, I have to express my very great satisfaction that you have safely returned to the duties of your Government, and that so much discipline and good order was maintained and so little loss of life incurred.
>
> I hope that in the result security will be re-established and friendly relations with the Indians generally not disturbed.[25]

Seymour's mention of the possibility of inviting "every white man to shoot each Indian he may meet" brought a firm, if tactful, rebuke from Cardwell.

> I have [he wrote] every reason to approve of the moderation and justice enforced by you during the late expeditions into the country of the Chilcoaten Indians.
>
> I do not understand the meaning of the paragraph in which you speak of inviting every white man to shoot every Indian he might meet. I shall rely on your continued adherence to the line of conduct hitherto pursued by you, which appears to have been perfectly consistent with humanity and good policy.[26]

Matthew Baillie Begbie's attitude towards the Chilcotins quite accurately reflects the role which he felt called upon to play. He was, of course, the enforcer of English law in a region where previously it had not prevailed. It was new even to many of the whites with whom Begbie dealt. To the Indians even many of the principles on which it was founded were strange.

Begbie was duty-bound not merely to enforce English law, but also to exercise judicial impartiality. The "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians" and Begbie's accompanying letter to Seymour indicate that he recognized this duty to be judicially impartial.[27] The trials, however short by modern standards, gave an opportunity for the prisoners to be defended by a person ["Mr. Barnston"] who was requested by the court to take up the case. (Unfortunately, however, the notes of the trials, while indicating occasions on which he cross-examined witnesses and spoke for the defence, do not give his actual words.) Begbie's cautioning remarks to the jury are evidence of his desire to extend British justice to the accused Chilcotins in a positive as well as in a negative sense. His duty to be judicially impartial was not something from outside of Begbie's cultural heritage. It was a part of it. So the fact that he attempted to exercise this impartiality is not in itself evidence of his viewing things from outside his own cultural frame of reference. There is evidence, however, that in addition to trying to exercise British judicial impartiality,

From British Columbia Provincial Archives, Victoria, B.C.



Plate 2 Judge Matthew Baillie Begbie

Begbie made some attempt to look at things from a Chilcotin point of view. In referring to Inanski and Cheloot, who were set free, Begbie says ". . . all the prisoners, who I believe speak truth as in the presence of a higher power, exonerate them from all participation in anything we could well call a murder in any Chilcotin construction of the word."[28] At the time he sentenced the five Chilcotins convicted of murder he asked them

> . . . what their law was against murderers? - They replied Death. I said [writes Begbie] our law just the same. That they were thus guilty of death - Why should it not be pronounced?[29]

Begbie was not trying the Chilcotins on the a basis of Chilcotin customs. He was trying them under English law. But he obviously felt the need of confirming his belief that the English law regarding murder and its punishment would be recognized even by the Chilcotins as just in its basis. Thus he wrote to Seymour:

> There can be no doubt of the guilty complicity of the 5 prisoners in all the murders - as they must be considered in the eyes of the law - and I should think, in a common sense view too, even making large allowances for the ignorance and habits of the prisoners.[30]

Begbie's belief in the universal basis of English law and his own position as the enforcer of that law justified in his own mind the sentence he passed on the five Chilcotins. But his duty to be judicially impartial led him to investigate the Chilcotins' side of the story and to report certain mitigating factors even though he did not regard those factors as mitigating the Chilcotins' crimes to the extent of saving them from the gallows. Thus he writes:

> I was particular in inquiring into the name of the individual who as they all assert and I have not the least doubt, truly, was by his rash threat the cause of all this uproar, and of the death of 21 white men and 3 Indians already, and nobody can say how many more by the hand of the executioner and famine in the fall and winter.[31]

Again, Begbie adds a note to "Nancy's" testimony to say that the ground occupied by Manning ". . . appeared to have been formerly a constant

camping place of Tahpit and his tribe, but Manning had driven them off, and taken possession of the spring."[32]

Begbie's final attitude towards the Chilcotins was one of personal sympathy to them as fellow human beings, yet the nature of what the Chilcotins regarded as warfare revolted him. His confidence in the applicability of English law gave him justification for sentencing the five Chilcotins to be hanged and his revulsion at the nature of their crimes prevented his making any recommendation of mercy. Thus he wrote to Seymour:

> All the 5 convicts have confessed their guilt of capital offences generally and of the offences for which they have been convicted in particular [.]
>
> The conviction of Telloot would not be followed, in England, by execution: at least where others suffered capitally for the same offence. - Piell is young - very mild-looking, much under the influence of Klatsassin. But he shot Macdonald's horse, riding away. Klatsassin is the finest savage I have met with yet, I think. But I believe also he has fired more shots than any of them. It seems horrible to hang 5 men at once - especially under the circumstances of the capitulation. Yet the blood of 21 whites calls for retribution. And these fellows are cruel, murdering pirates - taking life and making slaves in the same spirit in which you or I would go out after partridges or rabbit shooting. "Squint-eye's" tribe is nearly annihilated by them. Klatsassin shoots Macdonald as he lies on the ground, distributes his horses, and carries off his servant "Tom" as a slave.
>
> I do not envy you your task of coming to a decision.[33]

Lundon Brown's attitude, which in large we have examined already, was very similar to that of Begbie. His role, though different from Begbie's, similarly forced him to communicate with the Chilcotins and to listen to their side of the story. This in turn aroused his sympathy for the condemned men. As we have seen, his belief in the universal basis of British justice reconciled him more or less completely to the Chilcotins' fate, but his sympathy for them led him to record some events from the Chilcotins' point

of view. He tries to give an idea of the Chilcotins' thoughts regarding the smallpox threat, for example,[34] and records that Manning, though he had given the Indians food, had also taken their camping-ground.[35]

Lundin Brown's sense of racial superiority, however, limited his effectiveness in presenting the Chilcotin viewpoint. For example he narrates what he supposes are Klatsassin's thoughts on sighting Cox's men.

> His eyes fell on lithe and stalwart frames, on countenances full of intelligence and self-reliance. A type of character so unlike the Indian, who alone is nothing, however brave he may be at times in company with others, could not fail to strike our chief. He felt they belonged to a race which was destined, wherever they went, to have dominion. "Each man as a king and the son of a king." No, his people never could stand against such as these.[36]

Although the roles played by the whites frequently exerted an important influence on their attitudes, it is necessary also to recognize the limitations of that influence. Chartres Brew, for example, having expressed his views at the outset of his involvement in the Chilcotin affair, apparently did not allow his role as leader of an expedition against the Chilcotin insurgents to alter his thinking.

In his letter from Bute Inlet addressed to the Colonial Secretary of British Columbia (Arthur Birch), Brew blamed the massacre on the whites' injudicious handling of the Chilcotins. Although he regarded the Chilcotins, or at least those who had been employed at Bute Inlet as "fickle savages," he did not believe that the Chilcotin tribe as a whole would become involved in war on account of ". . . a few men of a branch of the Chilcoten tribe."[37] Throughout the time that Brew spent on his expedition to the Chilcotin country he relied on his own diplomacy in dealing with the Indians. For example, he took with him on the Bentinck Arm expedition (obviously with Seymour's approval) some thirty or forty Bella Coolas: this in spite of

the previous friendly association of the Bella Coolas and the Chilcotins. The decision to take along the Bella Coolas as auxiliaries was criticized by Waddington and others according to the Weekly Colonist.[38]

Brew's apparently "soft" treatment of the Chilcotins themselves also came in for criticism. The British Colonist, gathering its information from the diary of a volunteer in Brew's party, reported that

> The party. . . were treacherously led off to the old trail by the Anaham Indian, whom Mr. Brew, contrary to the advice of the most experienced men of his party, allowed to guide the party. "So much," . . . [the Colonist reported the volunteer as writing] "for Mr. Brew's maudlin sympathy for the Indians, and his orders that the Chilcoaten rascal should not be treated as a prisoner!"[39]

The write of this same diary, or possibly the Colonist using information from the diary, also criticized Brew, by implication, for his softness towards Anaheim on the return trip to Bella Coola.

> The ranches of the Indians were searched and among other things a carpet sack and part of a buckskin coat were found and identified as having belonged to McDonell [McDonald?], yet Mr. Brew thought there was not sufficient proof to criminate Anaham or his tribe. They had already heard that Anaham had seven horse loads of the plunder in his possession.[40]

In spite of Seymour's changes in attitude during the time he had spent in the Chilcotin country, he defended the actions of Chartres Brew, of whom he had come to think very highly. In reporting to Cardwell Seymour wrote:

> . . . [Brew] proceeded to Naucootloon to receive the submission of Anaheim and his portion of the tribe. The Chief restored unreservedly all his share of the plunder, but seemed to expect little mercy. As, however, his hands had not been stained in white man's blood, Mr. Brew very properly gave him his pardon.[41]

Of William Cox's personal attitudes towards the Indians very little is revealed in the letters he wrote. He appears to have been a practical-minded man, not much given to reflection. Nor do his actions do much to make

his attitude clear. He was apparently popular with the men he led, but whether he shared their attitudes towards the Indians is difficult to ascertain.

Summary and Conclusion

The common assumption that European culture was superior to native culture manifested itself during the Chilcotin Uprising in widely varying ways, since the whites had varying notions of what was at the heart of European cultural superiority as well as divergent notions about the nature of the Indian. Concepts such as these depended on personal ideas which might be derived from any of a number of schools of thought current at the time.

Neither nationality nor class nor membership in particular occupations can be regarded as the major determiners of attitude as revealed during the Chilcotin Uprising. The general assumption of European cultural superiority as well as the personal philosophies already adopted largely determined in a general way certain attitudes towards the Indians which whites possessed before the Chilcotin Uprising. Next to these factors, the role that individuals were called upon to play during the Chilcotin Uprising emerges as the most significant single factor determining the attitudes of whites who were involved in the crisis. In general, those who found themselves in the role of adversaries of the Chilcotins tended to adopt attitudes of greater hostility towards them or to Indians in general. Those who found themselves in roles which necessitated coming to some understanding of the Chilcotins tended to have their attitudes influenced towards sympathy or empathy for them. Roles which had nothing to do with forcing people to be adversaries or to understand nevertheless exerted an influence in other ways:

Citizens of Victoria and New Westminster were affected by their local patriotisms and parochial rivalries; imperial authorities by their self-interested need to keep down colonial expenditures and contribute to peace.

It seems important to point out both the limitations and the possible implications of this study. In this chapter we have noted shifts in attitude which took place in the minds of some who were involved directly in the Chilcotin crisis. We have not determined in this thesis how permanent those shifts in attitude were. Moreover, though they were common, they did not inevitably take place, as the example of Brew shows.

If we have had some experience in approaching problems from an academic and detached viewpoint we tend to expect attitudes to be affected by the coherent philosophies of those holding them. But the importance of role in influencing attitudes during the Chilcotin crisis suggests that the position in which members of one race find themselves in relation to those of another race may be of great importance in determining their attitudes towards that race. Earlier in this tudy, in Chapter Three, we have noted the differing relationships that whites of varying occupations had with the Indians. Besides the nature of an occupation, numerous other factors may determine the role played in relation to another race. Philip Mason points out that the relative numbers and the nature of the cultures of two racial groups may help to determine the relationships between them.

Much as we might like to think that human reason and good-will were major determinants of attitude towards other races, there are numerous indications that other forces have been of major importance in shaping those attitudes. The importance of the role played in determining attitude suggests that because of self-centeredness on the part of individuals,

their own position frequently becomes more important in determining their attitude than does an objective view of the whole situation.

The important of role in other inter-racial situations may be suggested by the fact that liberal attitudes towards the ~~Nego~~ Negro have been mainly found among northern whites rather than among southern whites in the United States. (There were--until recently--far fewer Negroes in the North to pose a threat to the whites' control of society). It may be suggested also by the apparent growth of racial prejudice in Great Britain with the recent arrival of increased numbers of non-whites who seemed to threaten the homogeneity of the British population.

It is not intended to extend the definite conclusions of this thesis to areas which are beyond its immediate concern. But it seems important to suggest that a study of the Chilcotin Uprising, a comparatively minor event in British Columbian history, yields insights which, combined with insights from other studies, could be of significance to a more general study of race relations.

Footnotes for Chapter VII

[1]"Emergency Meeting," Daily British Colonist (Victoria), June 2, 1864, p. 3. See this thesis, Chapter VI, p. 154.

[2]"Emergency Meeting," Daily British Colonist, June 2, 1864, p. 3, and "Bute Inlet Massacres, Minutes of a Public Meeting held in Victoria Theatre 8 p.m. June 1st, 1864," Archives of British Columbia, F57 B97m.

[3]British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 64, Frederick Seymour to Edward Cardwell, No. 37, Sept. 9, 1864.

[4]Letter, Matt[hew] B[aillie] Begbie [to Frederick Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[5]"Emergency Meeting," Daily British Colonist, June 2, 1864, p. 3. See this thesis, Chapter VI, pp. 154-155.

The British Columbian commented slyly on Garrett's speech:

"The Colonist says that the Indians shot two cows belonging to the Rev. A. C. Garrett on the Reserve on Tues - se'nnight [sic], and in a subsequent issue it publishes a rumor that they had shot the reverend gentleman's horses on his Cowichan farm. An uncharitable fellow at our elbow wonders whether these Indians may not have attended the great "expediency meeting" and listened to Mr. Garrett's speech. ("The Indians and Mr. Garrett's Cows," British Columbian [New Westminster], June 22, 1864, p. 3)

[6]"Our Indian Difficulties," British Columbian, June 11, 1864, p. 3.

[7]"News from the Interior," British Columbian, July 9, 1864, p. 3.

[8]R[obert] C[hristopher] Lundin Brown, Klatsassin and Other Reminiscences of Missionary Life in British Columbia (London, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1873), pp. 1-8.

[9]R[obert] C[hristopher] Lundin Brown, British Columbia: An Essay (New Westminster: Royal Engineers Press, 1863), title page.

[10]Ibid., pp. 110-111.

[11]Letter, John Cullen Colguhoun [sic] and James Wilcox [to the Express] cited in "Another Indian Massacre!" British Columbian, May 28, 1864, p. 3.

[12]"The Governor's Late Tour," British Columbian, Aug. 10, 1864, p. 1.

[13]British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 64, Frederick Seymour to Edward Cardwell, No. 37, Sept. 9, 1864.

[14]Philip Mason, Race Relations, Oxford Paperbacks University Series, No. 53 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 52.

[15]Despatch, James Douglas to Henry Loubouchere, Apr. 6, 1858, in British Columbia, Correspondence Relative to the Discovery of Gold in the Fraser's River District, in British North America, n. d., p. 10.

[16]Mason, Race Relations, p. 53.

[17]Ibid., p. 144.

[18]Copy of letter, Arthur N. Birch to W.G. Cox, May 14, 1864, in British Columbia, Colonial Secretary, "Outward Correspondence: November, 1863 to September, 1864, pp. 196-198, Archives of British Columbia.

[19]British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 78, Frederick Seymour to Edward Cardwell, No. 37, Sept. 9, 1864.

[20]British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 102-103, Frederick Seymour to Edward Cardwell, No. 56, Oct. 4, 1864.

[21]The supporting role played by ships of the British navy might be worthy of more investigation in a study with a different focus. In spite of Seymour's evident dissatisfaction with the reluctant initial support, considerable aid was later given. The gunboat "Grappler" was sent to Bentinck Arm to relieve the "Sutlej" which returned to more southerly waters bringing down an Indian who had been arrested as a spy and as one of the party that attacked Macdonald's pack train. (Express, July 13, 1864, (p. ?), and Weekly British Colonist, July 19, 1864, p. 3) Judging from the later silence regarding this Indian it seems he must have been released. The deposition of "Alpicmush," a typescript copy of which is in the Waddington papers of R.L. Reid, may have been this Indian's. (Deposition of "Alpicmush" taken by Morris Moss, Oct. 8, 1864, typescript copy in "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," File 10, Special Collections, University of British Columbia).

Besides being used in support of the Bute Inlet and Bentinck Arm expeditions, the navy was used in an attempt to prevent the Chilcotins from returning to Bute Inlet to fish. The "Forward" was sent to the Homathko River and its launch was left there. Two Indians were hired to act as scouts and to give any information to the officer in charge of the launch. (Copy of letter, Horace D. Lascelles to John Kingcome, Aug. 13, 1864, enclosure in letter, John Kingcome to Frederick Seymour, Aug. 15, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.)

[22]Despatch, Edward Cardwell to Frederick Seymour, July 16, 1864, No. 23, "Book 345, Dominion Archives" (typescript copy in "Waddington, Alfred, 1801-1872," File 10, Special Collections, University of British Columbia; corrected from draft copy in Colonial Office (London), Microfilm, C. O. 60/20, 1864, pp. 13-14.

[23]Despatch, Cardwell to Seymour, Aug. 1, 1864, No. 30, "Vol. G345," typescript copy in "Waddington," File 10, Special Collections, University of British Columbia; draft copy in Colonial Office (London), Microfilm, C. O. 60, Vol. 18, 1864, pp. 299-300.

[24]Despatch, Cardwell to Seymour, Aug. 1, 1864, No. 30, typescript in "Waddington," File 10, Special Collections, University of British Columbia; also draft copy, Microfilm, C.O. 60, Vol. 18, 1864, pp. 300-301.

[25]Despatch, Cardwell to Seymour, Oct. 29, 1864, No. 39, "Book G 345," Dominion Archives, typescript copy in "Waddington," File 10, Special Collections, University of British Columbia.

[26]Despatch, Cardwell to Seymour, Dec. 1, 1864, No. 53, "Book G 345," Dominion Archives, typescript copy in "Waddington," File 10, Special Collections, University of British Columbia.

[27]Letter, Matt[hew] B[aillie] Begbie [to Frederick Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864, and enclosed "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians - Tellot, Klatsassin, Chessus, Piel or Pierre, Tah-pit & Chedekhi," Sept. 30, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[28]Letter, Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864.

[29]"Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . ."

[30]Letter, Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864.

[31]Ibid.

[32]"Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . ."

[33]Letter, Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864.

[34]Lundin Brown, Klatsassin, pp. 10-11.

[35]Ibid., pp. 37-38.

[36]Ibid., p. 54.

[37]C[hartres] Brew to Colonial Secretary [Arthur N. Birch], May 23, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

[38]"The Bella Coola Auxiliaries," Daily British Colonist, June 27, 1864, p.3.

[39]"The Chilcoaten Expedition: Diary of a Volunteer," Daily British Colonist, Oct. 14, 1864, p. 3.

[40]"The Chilcoaten Expedition: Diary of a Volunteer (concluded)," Daily British Colonist, Oct. 17, 1864, p. 3.

[41]British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 105, Frederick Seymour to Edward Cardwell, No. 58, Oct. 7, 1864.

A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

ON CHIEF SOURCES USED IN WRITING THIS THESIS

Although there is ample documentation for the story of the Chilcotin Uprising itself, there is a poverty of material to indicate some of the details of pre-contact Chilcotin culture. Recorded contact with whites did not take place until Simon Fraser's meeting with them in 1808, and their contacts with whites for a long time after that date were not extensive. Most references to the Chilcotin during the pre-goldrush era were made casually by traders who were more immediately concerned with the Carriers. Hence, in spite of the comparatively late date of his writings, the works of Morice on the Dene generally take on some importance. Morice was more closely acquainted with the adjacent Carriers also, but was alert to differences between them and the Chilcotins, and sometimes makes mention of those differences. The relevant contribution of the Jessup North Pacific Expedition is limited to Livingston Farrand's recording of Chilcotin myths in "Traditions of the Chilcotin."

The most valuable single source of information on pre-contact Chilcotin culture is Lane's unpublished Ph.D. thesis, "Cultural Relations of the Chilcotin Indians of West Central British Columbia." It is the only major work dealing exclusively with Chilcotin culture and is valuable for its anthropological insights. The very late nature of the field work undertaken for this 1953 thesis, however, makes one cautious about accepting it as a basis for some information, particularly on the important question of the nature of leadership among the Chilcotins. Nevertheless, the thesis is most valuable when used in conjunction with historical information and

the limited number of other anthropological sources we have.

European fur-traders were more interested in the Chilcotins' relationships with themselves and with adjacent Indians than they were in Chilcotin culture. Our information regarding "Pre-Gold-Rush Relationships between Chilcotins and Europeans" is fairly good. Much of this information, however, is in unpublished form in a "Fort Chilcotin" transcript at the Archives of British Columbia. This transcript consists mainly of citations from material in the Hudson's Bay Company Archives, with brief editorial statements linking them in a connecting narrative. Unfortunately, the name of the editor is not given. One other source for the chapter on "Pre-Gold-Rush Relationships . . ." proved particularly valuable: The History of the Northern Interior of British Columbia, by Morice. The picture of the Chilcotins' pre-gold-rush relationships with the whites is considerably clarified by the general picutre Morice gives of relationships between Indians and whites in the area of "New Caledonia." Besides, there are a number of pieces of information bearing specifically on the Chilcotins.

In attempting to assess "The Impact of the Gold Rush on Relationships between Europeans and Indians in Vancouver Island and British Columbia," I found it necessary to use sources of a widely varying nature. Authoritative information on events of this period as well as an insight into the attitudes of James Douglas is to be found in printed form both in Correspondence Relative to the Discovery of Gold in the Fraser's River District, in British North America and in Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, 1850-1875.

Reinhart's The Golden Frontier . . ., and Bancroft's History of British Columbia are valuable sources of information on early conflict between miners and Indians. A number of first-person accounts by contemporary whites round out the picture of non-official attitudes towards the Indian. Mention should be made of one secondary source: Jean Usher's recent thesis on "William Duncan of Metlakatla," an interesting account and of value for this study since Duncan, as Usher points out, was in his thinking not untypical of missionaries of his day, though his ability was exceptional.

P. D. Curtin's Image of Africa . . . and R. H. Pearce's The Savages of America have stimulated my own analysis in this chapter and helped me to relate personal attitudes of whites in Gold Rush British Columbia to general European thought of the period. Curtin's book, though written about the European "Image of Africa," reveals much about general European attitudes towards native peoples regarded as uncivilized. Pearce's work traces in some detail what he calls the "idea of savagism," a concept which for some of the whites of British Columbia during the 1850's and 1860's summed up the nature of the Indian as they saw it.

For the narrative of the planning and the attempted construction of "The Bute Inlet Trail" contemporary newspaper accounts of the time were the main sources. The trail was a project of private enterprise, and government concern with it was limited to conditions for granting a charter, so government correspondence is of limited value. The newspapers convey a sense of the rivalry between Victoria and New Westminster which they helped to intensify. The material in this chapter owes much to the papers on Alfred Waddington donated by R. L. Reid, which are found in

the Special Collections Divison of the University of British Columbia library. Much searching was saved by consulting the extensive typescripts in these papers, but it is most necessary to check newspaper articles in their original issues, since the Reid typescripts do have a number of errors and from time to time the direct quotation in them changes to Reid's paraphrase of the original.

For the account of "The Massacres and Their Causes" there is fortunately a large body of valuable source material to draw on, so that one can feel quite confident of the main facts and even of some of the details which add to the vivid picture we can form of what took place. Newspapers of the time where they give reports obtained directly from those involved in the events can be relied on for much greater accuracy than is usual in press reports. (The Victoria Daily Chronicle gives "Squinteye's Declaration" and "A Survivor's Account," and the Victoria Daily Colonist gives "Buckley's Statement.") Besides these sources we have those of an official nature: the manuscript "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians" in Begbie [to Seymour], Sept. 30, 1864, "Extracts from the depositions respecting the Bute Inlet Massacre . . ." which appeared in the Government Gazette of June 25, 1864, and letters from Cox and Brew to the Governor and Colonial Secretary for British Columbia.

Begbie's "Notes taken by the Court . . ." and Lundin Brown's Klatsassin . . . put us on the right track with regard to the chief motivating cause of the massacres, though in the twentieth century we are interested in going more deeply into the causes than were contemporaries. Lundin Brown's narrative, the most complete of published accounts, is in some respects

too complete--where the author attempts to round out his story with narrative for which he could not likely have had reliable sources. Brown does seem to have had some independent sources which cannot be traced today. His work is extremely valuable for the light it throws on the Chilcotins' thinking, and where he is likely to have had special knowledge he provides one or two checks on other sources, but only his first-person account of his dealings with the Chilcotin prisoners can be relied on in the absence of corroborating information from other sources.

The same sources, mainly, were used for the last two chapters of the thesis: "The White Reaction to the Massacres" and "White Attitudes Towards the Indian as Revealed and Expressed During the Chilcotin Uprising." Contemporary newspapers were invaluable in assessing non-official reactions and attitudes. Lundin Brown's book is useful in this chapter also, shedding light on the author's attitudes. A detailed and authoritative account of measures taken against the Chilcotins is provided in despatches from Seymour to London in the letter-book "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865." This is supplemented by letters from Arthur N. Birch, British Columbia Colonial Secretary, to W. G. Cox and T. Ogilvy (in "Outward Correspondence: November, 1863 to September, 1864") and by letters from Cox, Ogilvy, and Chartres Brew to the Colonial Secretary. The "Outward Correspondence" as well as Seymour's despatches to Cardwell are revealing as to Seymour's attitudes, as is Brew's letter as to his own attitude.

Begbie [to Seymour], September 30, 1864 gives a candid, almost intimate, glimpse of Begbie's feelings towards the Indians, of his view of his own position, and of his ideas on the relationship of the Chilcotins to British law.

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