CONJECTURES WITHOUT REFUTATIONS: KARL POPPER'S CRITICISMS OF MANNHEIM'S SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

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ABSTRACT

The subject of this study is the criticisms advanced by the philosopher of science Karl Popper against the sociology of knowledge and philosophy of social science of Karl Mannheim. The thesis of this analysis is that Popper's arguments reveal a remarkable misunderstanding of Mannheim's position and that taking these misinterpretations into account reveals the more fundamental complementarity and convergence of their views.

That these affinities have not been previously noted is linked to the specific circumstances of the interpretation and development of the work of Popper and Mannheim within the framework of post-World War II English-speaking philosophy and social research.

That their interests and social philosophical positions converged despite incompatible neo-positivist and neo-idealistic backgrounds is related to the trajectory of their careers as liberal intellectuals who fled to English-speaking democracies in response to the rise of Fascism in the 1930's.

These arguments are followed by a textual analysis which attempts to show that: 1) Popper misinterprets the central concepts of the sociology of knowledge, erroneously stigmatizing it as "sociologism"; 2) that he thus fails to perceive the similarity of his own epistemology with that of Mannheim, falsely attributing to him an individualistic theory of knowledge; and 3) that his primary disagreement with Mannheim is not an antithetical theory of
social science, or even philosophy of history, so much as a more pessimistic attitude toward the possibility of social knowledge as the basis for a non-coercive political consensus. As a consequence, he adopts a more restrictive "negative" conception of individual freedom.

In conclusion, it is argued that Popper's failure to have realized these affinities and thus grasped the significance of the sociology of knowledge for the philosophy of social science calls into question the credibility of his "critical rationalism" in its present form.

Ricardo Muratorio
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I. INTRODUCTION: CONJECTURES WITHOUT REFUTATIONS

The philosopher Karl Popper has devoted less than a decade of his long career to the philosophy of the social sciences. Yet the resulting contributions - *The Open Society and its Enemies* and *The Poverty of Historicism* - were guaranteed a far-reaching influence by their stylistic verve, breadth of interests, and publication at a decisive moment -- the end of the Second World War. His self-proclaimed task was the demystification of the ideological demons of totalitarianism; his means was to trace their sources in the tradition of Classical European philosophy. Plato, Hegel and Marx figure as the central villains in this intellectual drama, though others -- Aristotle, J.S. Mill and Karl Mannheim -- play secondary roles. Rejecting the dogmatic formalism and narrow specialism of logical positivism, he sought to actively rescue its rational commitment through the elaboration of a less vulnerable, and therefore more persuasive, philosophy of science. Only such a "critical rationalism" directed toward the social as well as the natural sciences could, he thought, preserve civilization and reason from the irrationalism ultimately generated by the fear of social change.

Positively, this mission required the reformulation of the problem of the logic of validation through a shift of emphasis from the verification to the falsification of theories. Negatively, Popper turned to a criticism of those methods of the social sciences which he felt violated or ignored the procedures of science and thus failed to provide adequate grounds for the demarcation of testable from non-testable propositions. Above all this attack challenged the sociological analysis of history for its alleged hypostasization of categories, whether of concepts in general ("essentialism") or of col-
lective terms in particular ("holism"). For such errors, combined with the fear elicited by rapid social change, had repeatedly culminated in a doctrine -- "historicism" or historical prophesy -- which crippled the social sciences and facilitated the rise of totalitarianism. Moreover, the ostensibly rational effort to control change through centralized planning had failed to escape the irrationalist implications of its "utopian," "historicism" and "holistic" assumptions.

In his studies in the social sciences, Popper seized upon Karl Mannheim as the most sophisticated purveyor of such doctrines in the academic sociology of his day. No other social scientist is given similar attention; Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and his advocacy of "utopian planning" are presented as the contemporary manifestation, albeit in rational guise, of the same philosophical errors which constituted the theoretical foundations of modern irrationalism and totalitarianism.

The thesis of this essay is that Popper's polemic against Mannheim contains ambiguities and misconceptions which obscure the latent affinities between himself and Mannheim. This confusion on Popper's part can be revealed through an examination of the superficiality of his exegesis of Mannheim, as well as through a consideration of the implications of Popper's own views. The argument of this hypothesis requires demonstration of the following points:

(1) That Popper thoroughly misinterprets the central concepts and propositions of the sociology of knowledge and thus fails to grasp its claims and objectives as a mode of socio-historical analysis;

(2) That he does not provide an adequate analysis of the philos-
ophical implications of the sociology of knowledge and therefore fails to grasp the fundamental compatibility of his own and Mannheim's epistemological views as to the objective basis of knowledge;

(3) That Popper's primary disagreement with Mannheim stems not from a fundamentally different conception of social science, but rather from a more pessimistic view of the possibilities of socio-historical knowledge and from a different conception of freedom.

At first glance this proposed complementarity might appear ill-advised to the skeptical reader. As a consequence, the comparative textual analysis of Mannheim and Popper's relevant works is supplemented by a brief consideration of why this convergence has not been generally noticed and an account of the specific circumstances of their intellectual biographies which lend additional plausibility to the proposed affinity of their philosophies of social science.

That this remarkable degree of convergence has not been previously noted and emphasized in the standard literature, and that as a consequence Popper's misinterpretation of Mannheim continues to exert an influence is evidence of the deficiencies of the critical community of social science. More specifically, it is conjectured, the previous failure of the Anglo-American social scientific community to have fully assimilated the Hegelian-Marxist tradition -- a situation exacerbated for some time by the Cold War -- created a milieu which inhibited a critical examination of the issues raised by Mannheim and Popper. These general conditions were reinforced by the premature death of Mannheim and Popper's return to problems in the logic of natural science.
The biographical basis of this convergence is sketched in conjunction with a brief description of Mannheim's and Popper's respective intellectual careers. Though initially trained in antithetical idealistic and positivistic philosophical traditions, their early initiation into the overriding epistemological problematic of early twentieth century Central Europe— the threat of relativism, the rise of totalitarianism, their emigration to English-speaking countries, and their desire to re-establish the theoretical legitimacy of enlightened reason and liberal democracy can all be viewed as powerful factors shaping their criticism of their predecessors and forcing a movement toward a compatible understanding of the nature and tasks of the social sciences in a liberal society.

This study does not propose to provide a comprehensive analysis of the social theories of either Popper or Mannheim. The objective is simply to demonstrate the conceptual confusions and contradictions in Popper's attempt to disassociate his own position from that of Mannheim. Thus, the development of the critical discussion does not presuppose or require the elaboration of an external philosophical position. Rather, the common ground between Popper and Mannheim serves to illuminate some of the difficulties of Popper's analysis. As a consequence, Popper's arch-enemy becomes a critical instrument for indicating directions which, had Popper been able to take into account, might have allowed him to avert some of the inconsistencies of his own pragmatic liberal social philosophy. For in its present form, it is concluded, Popper's "critical rationalism" is called into question by his interpretation of Mannheim.

The argument will be developed in the following order. In
Chapter II the role of Mannheim and Popper in the context of post-war social research is discussed. In Chapter III the biographical circumstances of their convergent interests and interpretations are indicated. Then (Chapter IV) Popper's philosophical position -- his "critical rationalism" -- is outlined as an introduction to his attack on Mannheim. In the three succeeding chapters (V - VII), Popper's conception of Mannheim's sociology of science, analysis of his theory of objective knowledge, and criticism of his ostensible program of social planning are elaborated and analysed. In the concluding chapter (VIII), the implications of the previous discussion for Popper's "critical rationalism" are tentatively developed.
II. THE PROBLEM IN THE CONTEXT OF POST-WAR SOCIAL RESEARCH

A discussion limited to Popper's critique of Mannheim might seem to be removed from the current tasks of social research. Such a view reflects the difficulty of bringing their concerns clearly into focus. Popper's ideological rhetoric and Mannheim's philosophical pretensions tend to mark them as part of another era.¹ And indeed, this suspicion of anachronism would be valid if cumulative developments in the social sciences over the past quarter-century had resolved the dilemmas to which they directed attention. Yet there is little basis for such an optimistic appraisal. When we look at the philosophical self-examination of the social scientist, at attacks on the legitimacy and place of social research within and outside the universities and the general decline of the authority of institutions of higher learning and of government, there is little justification for the consoling thought that the sciences of man have achieved that envied security and maturity displayed by those of nature.² Such considerations suggest that more than antiquarian interests are to be served by re-opening a closed chapter in the recent history of social science.

A detailed examination of Popper's philosophy is warranted by the assumption that he is one of the most important philosophers of science to have given extensive attention to the social sciences. The extent of this influence is difficult to estimate precisely. As one of the few major philosophers of his generation to have undertaken an examination of methodological problems of general interest and with ideological implications, his work became a significant factor in the formation of the scientific perspective of social researchers and
philosophers in the immediate post-1945 period, especially in Britain. This is reflected in the many editions and translations of his studies -- a popularity that is especially striking for such abstruse topics. The nature of this influence is more readily assessed. His negative arguments -- his catalogue of philosophical and methodological sins -- was undoubtedly more effective than his positive suggestions. While there were a number of philosophers of science attempting to demonstrate how the social studies might become truly scientific, there were few who had the breadth or wit to undertake an extensive critique of approaches to be avoided. While his negative-critical introduction to the Hegelian-Marxian tradition was only a distorted echo of the liberal-Marxist debates found in West Germany and France in the post-1945 period, it did provide English-speaking readers with a taste of the kinds of issues that would re-emerge again late in the 1960's.

Aside from any assessment of the nature and extent of Popper's past influence, his work may be viewed as an important point of departure for the reformulation of the problem of the relationships between epistemology, science, and social philosophy. For in his philosophy of science, logic is not simply considered as an abstraction but as part of the history and traditions of a particular type of rational activity. And despite his consistent repudiation of the philosophical or cognitive significance of the history and sociology of science, it is clear that in his work the question of the relationship between the logic and history of science emerges as the center of the epistemological problematic. As some of his successors have shown, his theory of science leads inevitably to recognition of the discontinuities of the history of science and the ideological characteristics of scientific methods.
Popper's reformulation of the theory of confirmation drew him away from the neo-positivist camp and pushed him toward a sophisticated pragmatism in which the fallibilism and uncertainty of knowledge was emphasized. Most importantly, this provided the grounds for a critique of the scientistic hubris of neo-positivism and Marxism alike. This fallibilistic emphasis served as the basis for supporting the liberal thesis that pluralistic competition provided the best principle for institutionalizing social control and ensuring the progressive development of science and society. Such an epistemology of uncertainty thus becomes for Popper a new foundation for the liberal principle of negative freedom. As one philosopher has suggested, "perhaps he will be considered the John Locke of our century" (Radnitzky, 1968:139).

In this way Popper sidestepped the extremes of the logical positivism and existentialism which constituted a specifically European manifestation of the crisis of liberalism and the failure of modern science to resolve the conflicts of modern society. Drawing back from what he considered the pseudo-rationalism of the former -- which included positivistic versions of Marxism -- and the explicit anti-rationalism of the latter, he sought to re-establish the place of reason through a reformulation of the epistemology of the sciences. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that he moved in the general direction of American pragmatism which had developed in relative tranquility and in isolation from the conflicts of Europe. In this way, pragmatism pointed the way for 20th century liberalism. Popper might be viewed as an independent thinker whose concerns led him in a similar direction.
In practice, the political leaders responsible for the large-scale institutionalization of social research have been dominated by a pragmatic-instrumental conception of social science as the technology of power. Within this perspective neo-positivism can be assimilated only to the degree that it furthers such technological ends. Pragmatism and not positivism has been the most congenial epistemological foundation of modern liberalism and constitutes the implicit philosophical orientation of the elites of contemporary capitalist democracies. As one of the most significant figures to have articulated the assumptions of such a liberalism, Popper should be considered one of the most important ideologues in the West.

While Popper provided a critical view of the Hegelian-Marxian tradition of social philosophy from his external vantage point as a heretical neo-positivist, Mannheim constituted an example of how a sociologist working out of that tradition might adapt some of its basic insights to a reformist research orientation. First introduced to the English-reading public in the open-minded, experimental intellectual climate of the mid-1930's, Mannheim enjoyed an initially enthusiastic acceptance. He brought to the attention of many American researchers the lack of a fully developed historical and structural dimension in pragmatist social theory and thus contributed to its re-appraisal by an emergent radical wing. But in the following decade the termination of the Depression, World War II, the gradual revelation of the Stalinist atrocities, and the emergence of the Cold War combined to discredit the aims of the radical-progressive elements whose politics were associated with social planning and re-organization. Much as the content and reception of Ideology and Utopia
typified the fluid intellectual situation of 1936, Popper's *Open Society and its Enemies* of 1945 expressed the profound polarization of intellectual opinion by the end of this period.

Given the mood of the Cold War and the anti-metaphysical, ahistorical, empiricist traditions of Anglo-American social theory and philosophy, it was inevitable that Popper's interpretations were taken very seriously by most readers. What is less understandable is that Popper's conjectures -- and his attack on Mannheim -- failed to draw the comprehensive and detailed critical analysis they deserved. For whatever his confusions and eccentricities, Popper could not be easily ignored or dismissed in the long-run: he made explicit the stakes involved in the issues of the philosophy of science.

Various scholars turned to a defense of individual personalities in which they had invested their academic reputations. Symptomatically, the most heated discussions came from the fraternity of classicists which was aroused to defend Plato from the charge of totalitarian sympathies. Given the state of Hegelian scholarship, Popper's account of Hegel did not rouse more than a trickle of opposition. Orthodox Marxists, when they did not simply ignore Popper as a reactionary ideologue, rarely had the philosophical skills to meet him on his own ground. In any case, these individual defenses failed to provide a comprehensive critique of Popper's philosophy of social science.

An entire chapter of Popper's *Open Society* and sections of the *Poverty of Historicism* were devoted to Mannheim. Curiously -- unlike Plato, Hegel and Marx -- Mannheim has not even found a modicum of support. As we shall see, this is all the more remarkable because this discussion of Mannheim reveals some of Popper's crucial misconceptions and
is a key to unraveling some of his contradictions. In part, this silence may reflect the widespread conviction that this was one of the strongest and most convincing sections of Popper's work. This was suggested in a 1952 review by an authority in the field of the history of social thought -- John Plamenatz -- who concluded that "had all the chapters been as good as the last four, Professor Popper might indeed have written what one of the reviewers quoted on the dust cover has called 'beyond any doubt a great book!'" (1967:273).

The second of these four chapters is concerned with Mannheim's version of the sociology of knowledge. A more recent estimate of the continuing importance of this chapter is implicit in its inclusion -- without critical editorial comment or forewarning of its deficiencies -- in the first English-language reader in the sociology of knowledge.

But perhaps the most revealing evidence of the failure to re-examine Popper's analysis has recently been provided by I. C. Jarvie, a professor of the philosophy of social science, who naively repeats Popper's arguments as if they were authoritative. Unlike in the philosophy of the natural sciences, where Popper's disciples have shown themselves to be rebellious successors, the result in social sciences seems to have been dogmatism and superficiality. Thus Jarvie notes, writing in 1972:

In the form that it has come down to us, i.e. Mannheim's version, the sociology of knowledge has been vulgarized in a crucial way, not in order to overcome relativism, but to serve as a strange and inconsistent hybrid between relativism, but to serve as a strange and inconsistent hybrid between relativism and absolutism. Whereas Scheler argued that socio-economic conditions could determine the arrival of an idea at a particular time and place, but not the content of that idea, Mannheim claimed that socio-economic conditions determine content as well as arrival. He thus used the sociology of knowledge to expose the distortions and 'false consciousness' of total ideologies. Only the freely poised intelligentsia,
he allowed, could escape this relativism and see them for what they were, limited and partial.

In their critique of Mannheim, Berger and Luckmann entirely fail to mention that, as long ago as 1945 in *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (or even 1944), when *The Poverty of Historicism* was published in *Economica*, Popper, as we have seen, had executed a more extensive critique than theirs ... Whether Popper's critique has any influence in bringing about the situation of neglect of the sociology of knowledge, which Berger and Luckmann complain about, is difficult to tell. Popper's work is widely diffused and read, but rarely referred to. Moreover, believers in the sociology of knowledge could easily dismiss Popper's criticism. Being unattached intellectuals, at least ostensibly, i.e. free of imprisoning ideologies, it would be easy for them to ignore Popper's criticism as the hopeless distortions of bourgeois ideology (1972:135-6).

Jarvie's entire discussion of the sociology of knowledge is marred by confusions stemming from taking a paraphrase of Popper's chapter on Mannheim as his point of departure (131-33). In accepting Popper's interpretation without question, he apparently did not find it necessary to consult Mannheim. As a consequence, his entire chapter on "The Sociology of Knowledge Reconsidered" illustrates vividly the continuing impact of Popper's misconceived comments on Mannheim.

That such naive misconceptions could be glibly repeated a quarter of a century later testifies to the deficiencies of the critical community of social science. Obviously, Jarvie had read nothing to shake his assessment of Popper's account. The general reasons for this situation have been touched upon in the discussion of the mood of post-1945 philosophy and social science. Yet, in principle, one of the functions of the philosophy of the social sciences should be to detect such problems and facilitate intra- and inter-disciplinary communication. But the rapid growth of the social sciences has made it increasingly difficult to keep up with the full range of developments. And further, the meagre concern of philosophers with social science and their generally narrow analytic and non-historical
approaches have not provided a milieu in which the kinds of issues raised by Mannheim and Popper might receive systematic attention and further development. Nor have the social sciences themselves proven immune to such inwardly directed disciplinary myopia. As Irving Louis Horowitz would lament in the mid-1960's: "too many technicians are emerging from graduate schools and too few intellectuals. One reason ... is that we leave them as we find them -- philosophically illiterate" (1965:28).

Finally, there are more specific factors which may be cited as contributing to the evasion of these questions as raised by Popper and Mannheim in particular. Perhaps decisive here was Mannheim's location in England, his lack of graduate students after leaving Germany, and his early death.\(^{13}\) In the case of Popper, the shift of his interests back to the natural sciences provided little occasion for the intensive re-examination of his own position and he does not seem to have encouraged any of his many students to do so, at least with reference to the social sciences. His confrontation with the historian of science Thomas Kuhn in 1965 might have been the occasion for a reappraisal, but Popper gave no indication of modifying his hostility to "historical relativism".\(^{14}\)

In short, Popper's interpretation of the sociology of knowledge remains one of the most paradoxical and perplexing elements of his theory of science. Despite the many elements of his own thinking which would seem to make him amenable to an acknowledgement of the philosophical significance of the historical sociology of science, his persistent association of such approaches with irrationalism can be viewed as an aberration. Ironically, the consequences of Popper's doctrinal rejection of the sociology of knowledge would entail -- if
taken seriously by scientific researchers -- a restriction of inquiries which have proven to be of value. Fortunately, the special disciplines have not been greatly inhibited by his fears. Yet his dogmatism has impeded clarification of the complementary interests of genetic and logical approaches to knowledge and the elucidation of their proper roles in the production, validation, and distribution of various types of knowledge.
NOTES: CHAPTER II

1 Popper's militantly liberal tone is inevitably discomfiting even to his sympathizers. As for Mannheim the charge of anachronism was implicit even in the first major English-language review of Ideology and Utopia in 1936 (Von Schelting, 1936). More recently it has been suggested that

In the main stream of sociology today, as in most contemporary discussions, Karl Mannheim's work in the sociology of knowledge is respected -- when it is at all recalled -- as a pioneering contribution to a new inquiry, but as a work unfortunately marred by certain epistemological and ethical pretensions which are seen to emanate in part from the obfuscating influence of Central European philosophy ... (Kettler, 1967:399).

2 A representative sample of this mood can be found in Bendix (1970), Gouléner (1970), Friedrichs (1970), and Birnbaum (1971).

3 In West Germany the leading figures have been liberals such as Hans Albert and Ralf Dahrendorf versus neo-Marxists of the Frankfurt School. In France Georges Gurvitch and Raymond Aron have long been similarly confronted with the neo-Marxisms of Henri Lefebvre, Jean-Paul Sartre, Lucien Goldmann, and Louis Althusser. Needless to say, Britain and North America had no comparable polemics, at least until the emergence of Herbert Marcuse as a popular figure in the late 1960's. Yet even this remained an echo of the European debate.

4 Most notably, Paul Feyerabend (1970).

5 Elaboration of the proposition that Popper's philosophy of science be regarded as a "logical pragmatism" would require another study. A few circumstantial bits of evidence for this conjecture can be advanced, however. First, there is the common revolt against Hegelianism and metaphysics. Second, though Popper specifically rejects instrumentalism and pragmatism in favor of his own "realism," it is instructive to recall Nagel's argument with respect to the difference between the "instrumentalist" and "realist" view of theories: "the opposition between these views is a conflict over preferred modes of speech" (1961:152). Another clue is found in Popper's admission that Charles Sanders Peirce was "one of the greatest philosophers of all time" (OK:212). It is also significant that in the United States Ernest Nagel and Sidney Hook undertook studies which paralleled those of Popper in both style, content, and conclusions. In fact, Hook, a student of Dewey, had published a series of essays by 1940 (cf. Hook, 1940) which
provided a sophisticated pragmatist response to Marxism which Popper's work five years later largely repeated. Nagel, more a logician than a social philosopher, flirted with pragmatism in his early years and remained a sympathetic critic. Even though he was greatly influenced by the logical positivists, his work never betrayed their dogmatism and inflexibility (cf. Nagel, 1956). This is also reflected in his interest in the social sciences. Thus though the influence of Hook and Nagel was stronger in the United States and Popper in Britain, the general direction of their criticisms and liberal social philosophy were similar.

The substantive affinity of Popper with pragmatism can be seen in his revival of parallel doctrines to two key injunctions of the pragmatists: the "autonomy of inquiry" and the denial of the "quest for certainty." The evolutionary principle of trial-and-error also central to pragmatism comes to be identified for Popper with reason, the good society, and the means for the gradual movement toward "truth". For the evolutionary aspects of Popper's epistemology see Campbell (1970); for the philosophy of science of pragmatism see Kaplan (1964).

Demonstration of the movement of Popper's work toward a sophisticated pragmatism would be another way of supporting the thesis of a convergence with Mannheim. For as the pragmatists were quick to recognize (cf. especially Mills (1967) and Lavine (1944), Mannheim's epistemology had in its bold outlines long "been familiar to the American mind" (Merton, 1968:562).

Though pragmatism has been described as a variant of positivism, this is a debatable point. The American situation has been characterized as follows:

American thought is identical with the most attractive of the positivist doctrines, pragmatism. Pragmatism is the theory of nontheory. Unlike the older positivism, pragmatic philosophy does not even retain the principle of objective truth arising from the correspondence of generalizations of experience with reality. Pragmatism is the explicit reduction of reason to its instrumental value, carrying the utilitarianism of liberalism to its logical conclusion.

In its most sophisticated form, pragmatism asserts the truth of any proposition in the agreement of qualified scientists about a particular phenomenon. The test of truth is its practical value for the achievement of human ends. Reality itself becomes an object of manipulation through human practice ... Unlike the older positivism, which claims the radical separation between value and truth, pragmatism asserts their unity. Subject and object are united and critical theory becomes pure poetry or literature. For pragmatism, there are no transcendental criteria for human action. Such transcendence is attacked
as metaphysics, since the values which determine human action are essentially identical to action itself. Pragmatic philosophy has attempted to eliminate the impractical from thought, to frame questions which have practical consequences and nothing else. Thus it leaves no room for critical theory which relies on the epistemological premise of objective truth, even if historically grounded (Aronowitz, 1972:XV-XVI).

Two American sociologists have recently tried to demonstrate the identity of Dewey and Marx's conceptions of truth (Rytina and Loomis, 1970). Both are held to be defective because they failed to posit an externally validated formal logical system and thus permit those with power to define scientific truth. The authors seem to assume this problem can be solved by assuming a logical system independent of social action. This is of course Popper's position as well. Yet they fail to note the important differences between pragmatism and Marxism, notably the transcendental element in the latter's philosophy of history. See, for instance, Kolakowski (1968:38-66).

Some confusion stems from narrow and broad conceptions of "pragmatism." Rytina and Loomis operate with a restricted notion whereas this study, in identifying Popper with pragmatism, assumes the broader one. Some precedent is found for this in the argument that:

While it is easy to say what pragmatism is not, it is more difficult to say just what pragmatism is and what is the role that action plays. If one considers pragmatism in perspective as a movement that has its beginnings with Peirce and is today manifested in the work of Quine, Sellars, Popper, Feyerabend, Hampshire, Nagel and many others, we discover the outlines of a new approach to knowledge, inquiry, and conduct (Bernstein, 1971:174).

In a very real sense Popper can be viewed as continuing Dewey's reformist philosophy into the post-war period. The connections are not historical so much as a similar attempt of the reconstruction of problems in European philosophy. Popper differed largely in his concern with formal logic as a criterion of truth and his tendency to emphasize the role of choice in the matter of values. As Bernstein suggests with respect to Dewey and Marx, "the issues that arise from this confrontation are the central issues of social philosophy in our time" (71:81). If so, Popper must be included as well.

Accordingly, the Russian I.S. Kon, in his two-volume study the philosophy of history in the 20th century, gives Popper pride of place in discussing the impact of neo-positivism on the logic and methodology of history (1964:275-324). As Kon points out, there is scarcely a "critic" of Marxism who does not include a reverential reference to Popper's works (276).
Kurt Wolff suggests that "Mannheim's work arrived on the American scene between the Depression and the war (and the war and postwar booms) and may have tempted its American readers to envisage the "reality" of society and to be bewildered about that of the individual; thus it may be understandable that his receptions should have been as we have seen" (1967:24). For the subsequent impact of European totalitarianism on American social thought see Skotheim (1971).

Some of these discussions of Plato have been collected in an anthology by Bambrough, (1967).

Kauffman (1960:95-128) provided an insightful defense of Hegel which was first published in 1951.

For instance, Cornforth (1968).


Representative lines of such research include educational psychology (Scriven, 1972), psychology (Mischel, 1971), futurology (Bell and Mau, 1971), evolutionary anthropology (Ribeiro, 1971), and cognitive sociology (Martins, 1972). As the philosopher of science Toulmin has pointed out in surveying the "Formalist Reformation" of which Popper is an heir:

In both sociological theory and philosophy of science ... questions about historical change were set aside at the turn of the century in reaction against the historicism of the German idealist tradition and against the misconceived "evolutionism" of Spencer and his successors. What we now have to do is to take up the discussion once again at the point where it broke off some 60 years ago. Whether we are concerned with conceptual change in scientific disciplines, or with cultural change in primitive societies, or with institutional change in complex, industrialised states: in each case, the difficulty we now have in explaining the grounds of rational criticism springs from a half-century's failure to analyse clearly the historical processes of social and intellectual evolution (1971:63).
Toulmin neglects the degree to which this ahistorical shift reflected a reaction to the threat of Marxism. One advantage of discussing this question in relation to Popper is that this connection is clear. Moreover, in having pushed formalism back toward the questions raised by the problem of historical change, his theory of science offers the opportunity for dialogue with its dialectical opposite.
III. THE INTELLECTUAL CAREERS OF MANNHEIM AND POPPER

The careers of Mannheim and Popper illustrate the sociological thesis that political, social, and philosophical thought cannot be understood without reference to their social genesis. In struggling to elaborate the broader implications of the epistemological crisis of late 19th and early 20th century Europe, both were swept into historical currents which disrupted their academic careers and profoundly shaped their conceptions of modern society. Only a brief account of these circumstances can be developed here as a supporting argument for the convergence of thinking described in the analysis of their actual texts.  

Both Mannheim and Popper must be viewed within the framework of one of the most remarkable flights of intellectuals in history. The movement of these largely German-speaking scholars from Budapest, Vienna, and the university towns of Germany created profound discontinuities of experience, which would profoundly re-direct and enrich the intellectual activities of a generation. Only when we have an adequate account of the impact of this migration on the social thinkers of this group of exiles and of their impact upon their hosts, will we be in a position to adequately interpret the social thought of the inter-war and post-World War II periods. The lack of such investigations makes it difficult even now to provide more than a rough sketch of the impact of these events upon Mannheim and Popper.  

The most recurrent theme found in the writings of these
exiles, especially during the first decade following their flight, was explaining the fact of the crisis of Central Europe. Above all this required an interpretation of the ideological movements -- Fascism and Communism -- which had provided the intellectual justification for what came to be termed a unitary phenomenon: totalitarianism. This elusive concept, whose questionable meanings would become only fully apparent some time later, provided the analytical framework within which a generation of Western social scientists worked. With the collapse of liberal institutions, a renewed awareness of the fragility of liberal democratic stability contributed to a polarization between the defenders of "freedom" and its enemies. Mannheim and Popper were amongst those who opted for the former and were also concerned with alternative means for meeting the needs to which totalitarianism had been a response. In reacting to this crisis, they were but two of the many exiles whose efforts would revitalize European social thought and nourish the most significant social and political theory following World War II.

The studies in the philosophy of social science which are the focus of this essay were written during the years 1929 to 1947. It was in these two decades of depression and war that Mannheim and Popper attempted to reassess the methods and place of the social sciences in the light of the crisis of liberal democracy. Around this set of issues the trajectories of their intellectual concerns would temporarily converge.

Despite his short lifetime of some 51 years (1893-1947), Karl Mannheim enjoyed an extremely productive and wide-ranging academic career. His early years brought him into contact with the person
or work of the major figures of 19th century and early 20th century philosophy. This is reflected in the eclecticism that marked his efforts to bring all these currents together in his sociological theory of knowledge. Born into the German-speaking intellectual culture of Budapest, university studies took him to Berlin, Paris, Freiburg and Heidelberg, then the center of the German academic world. In 1926 he became a Privatdozent there and moved on to Frankfurt in 1930 when offered a professorship. There he remained until his dismissal in the spring of 1933 led him to move to England where he became a lecturer in sociology from 1933 until 1945. At that time he transferred to the position of professor of sociology and philosophy of education until his death in 1947.6

Mannheim's work falls into two distinct phases which correspond closely to his residence in Germany and England.7 The first produced his sociology of knowledge; the second was marked by a turn toward political sociology and efforts to popularize his interpretation of the crisis of modern industrial society. In this phase the previously dominant epistemological and historical concerns dropped out of sight.

The first phase of Mannheim's intellectual career ranges from his youthful pamphlet on "Soul and Culture" (1918) to an encyclopedia review article on the sociology of knowledge (1931). Though he would not depart for England for a couple of years, his interests had already been re-directed; this is reflected in reviews of American and German sociology, as well as in drafts of articles that would either be published posthumously or appear in the German
edition of Man and Society in 1935. Prior to this shift of interests which coincided to the political crisis of the last years of the Weimar Republic, Mannheim's research had been confined to epistemology and the elaboration of the idea of the sociology of knowledge. Here he broke with the idealism of the Geisteswissenschafiten which confined themselves to internal or immanent interpretations of thought products. This method, he would hold, had to be complemented by the extrinsic interpretation provided by sociology. Because of the philosophical implications of this position most of his effort was devoted to an articulation of the details of such a sociology of "mind". The highpoints of these studies were of course Ideology and Utopia (1929) and the historical essay on "Conservative Thought" (1927) which exemplified his method. Yet throughout this period the political concerns which would dominate the work of his second phase is implicit in the issues with which he struggled. This is most evident in his search for a "science of politics" in Ideology and Utopia and in some of his as yet still unpublished papers.

The problem posed by the sociology of knowledge was a peculiar expression of the intellectual conflicts of Weimar Germany, a period which Mannheim had forecast shortly before its collapse would be looked back upon as a new Periclean age. Thought the intellectual roots of the sociology of knowledge lead directly back to Marx, its emergence in the form of historical relativism was unique to the Weimer period: "it's most important conceptions are deeply rooted in the German intellectual context" and it "mirrors the methodological as well as the substantive dilemmas of those days."
Beginning in the early 1930's and accelerated by his move to England, Mannheim's attention shifted toward an effort to understand and diagnose the social conflicts of his time. As a consequence, in none of his subsequent work does the sociology of knowledge figure as a center of attention, though it is often implicit in his analysis. The first major expression of this orientation was the publication of *Man and Society*, a first edition being published in Amsterdam in German in 1935 and a second, expanded version in English in 1940. Here the crisis of capitalist democracy is presented as the irrationality of laissez-faire and unplanned regulation; the choice was thus not whether or not to plan, but whether planning would be democratic or totalitarian.

In *Diagnosis of our Time*, a popularization of *Man and Society* which appeared during the war, Mannheim entertained the possibility that Christianity might play a role in creating the integrative values necessary for the planned social order envisioned. Finally, in the posthumously published *Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning* (1950), the question of power emerges as the central theme for the first time. This reflects his turn to an examination of the actual situation emerging in the immediate postwar period. Though such preoccupations earned Mannheim a reputation as a daring and radical thinker, there was nothing of the revolutionary element of Marxism and his politics could only be described as liberal and reformist, even if of a radical variety. This attitude reflected in part the contrast between the Weimar situation he had fled and the functioning liberal democratic politics of Britain. This stimulated a new sense of optimism which is manifested in his effort to popularize his ideas and thus have some personal impact on the
course of events.\textsuperscript{12}

Though some nine years younger than Mannheim, Popper can be described as part of the same generation of European intellectuals. For both, the crucial formative years of their education took place during and in the aftermath of World War I. Yet their earliest intellectual mentors represented the opposite poles of philosophical thought. Whereas Mannheim was nurtured by heirs to German idealism such as Simmel, Dilthey and Troeltsch, Popper's interest in science brought him into contact with the neo-positivist philosophers of science which had come to center around the so-called "Vienna Circle". Such beginnings offered little hint of the possibility of a convergence of their interests, let alone of the substance of their thinking.

In the numerous biographical details dispersed throughout his work, Popper gives a frank indication of the major sources of his intellectual development. Consideration of these details is essential because of the insight they provide into Popper's shift in mid-career to problems of the social sciences. This phase marked an abrupt departure from his earlier and later preoccupations with the logic of physics and of natural science.

The first phase of Popper's intellectual development as a philosopher of science began in the autumn of 1919, with the excitement produced by Eddington's eclipse observations which provided the first significant confirmation of Einstein's gravitational theory. His own words best convey his preoccupations:

\begin{quote}
'When should a theory be ranked as scientific?' or 'Is there a criterion for the scientific character or status of a theory?'
\end{quote}

The problem which troubled me at the time was neither, 'When is a theory true?' nor, "When is a theory acceptable?"
My problem was different. I wished to distinguish between science and pseudo-science; knowing very well that science often errs, and that pseudo-science may happen to stumble on the truth.

I knew, of course, the most widely accepted answer to my problem: that science is distinguished from pseudo-science -- or form 'metaphysics' -- by its empirical method, which is essentially inductive, proceeding from observation or experiment. But this did not satisfy me. On the contrary, I often formulated my problem as one of distinguishing between a genuinely empirical method and a non-empirical or even a pseudo-empirical method -- that is to say, a method which, although it appeals to observation and experiment, nevertheless does not come up to scientific standards. The latter method may be exemplified by astrology, with its stupendous mass of empirical evidence based on observation -- on horoscopes and on biographies.

But as it was not the example of astrology which led me to my problem I should perhaps briefly describe the atmosphere in which my problem arose and the examples by which it was stimulated. After the collapse of the Austrian Empire there had been a revolution in Austria: the air was full of revolutionary slogans and ideas, and new and often wild theories. Among the theories which interested me Einstein's theory of relativity was no doubt by far the most important. Three others were Marx's theory of history, Freud's psycho-analysis, and Alfred Adler's so-called 'individual psychology' ... I myself happened to come into personal contact with Alfred Adler, and even to co-operate with him in his social work among the children and young people in the working-class districts of Vienna where he had established social guidance clinics.

It was during the summer of 1919 that I began to feel more and more dissatisfied with these three theories ... and I began to feel dubious about their claims to scientific status. My problem perhaps first took the simple form, "What is wrong with Marxism, psycho-analysis, and individual psychology? Why are they so different from physical theories, from Newton's theory, and especially from the theory of relativity?" (CR:33-4).

The next 15 years were spent in wrestling with this problem in physics, culminating in Die Logik der Forschung in 1934. In contrast to the above statement, where he points out the stimulation caused by his dissatisfaction with social theories, Popper claims that the theory of science he subsequently developed made no attempt to take into
account the social sciences and realized the applicability of his theory to them only after the fact. As he puts it:

I have every reason to believe that my interpretation of the methods of science was not influenced by any knowledge of the methods of the social sciences; for when I developed it first, I had only the natural sciences in mind, and I knew next to nothing about the social sciences (PH: 178-8).

Yet one might point to the general ambience of Vienna in the years after World War I as an extremely fertile situation for bringing together the problems of philosophy and empirical social science. The general stimulation provided by the Vienna Circle of logical positivists was part of a much larger matrix in which Marxism and Freudianism were also at work. Interestingly, the most important work for the social sciences did not stem directly from the logical positivist group. Though often lumped with them, Popper has always denied this association and they have reciprocated.

The second phase of Popper's career took shape in the 1930's with the progressive deterioration of the political situation in Europe. As he would later explain his turn to the logic of social science:

My interest in this problem was greatly stimulated by the rise of totalitarianism and by the failure of the various social sciences and social philosophies to make sense of it (OS-I:2).

Since he lived in Austria, the year 1933 did not have the immediate repercussions it did on Mannheim -- dismissal, but the news of such events increasingly drew Popper toward social questions. By 1937 he had fled to New Zealand where he remained throughout the second war. He would accept a post at the London School of Economics in 1945. By that time he had completed the major studies that made
up his contribution to the social sciences: the two-volume *Open Society and its Enemies* and the *Poverty of Historicism*. These studies were thus conceived as a direct response to the rise of Hitler. As Popper noted in a 1950 preface of the *Open Society*:

> Although much of what is contained in this book took shape at an earlier date, the final decision to write it was made in March 1938, on the day I received the news of the invasion of Austria. The writing extended into 1943; and the fact that most of the book was written during the grave years when the outcome of the war was uncertain may help to explain why some of its criticism strikes me today as more emotional and harsher in tone than I could wish. But it was not the time to mince words -- or at least, this was what I then felt. Neither the war nor any other contemporary event was explicitly mentioned in the book; but it was an attempt to understand those events and their background, and some of the issues which were likely to arise after the war was won. The expectation that Marxism would become a major problem was the reason for treating it at some length (OS-I:viii).

As Popper would admit more than a decade later, these circumstances sharpened the polemical tone of his comments. In reply to some of his critics, he suggested:

> It should not be forgotten that I looked upon my book as my war effort: believing as I did in the responsibility of Hegel and the Hegelians for much of what happened in Germany, I felt that it was my task as a philosopher, to show that this philosophy was a pseudo-philosophy (OS-II:393).

This concern with the social sciences absorbed nearly a decade of Popper's energies and had the effect of delaying the impact and development of his theory of science. Though his major study in the philosophy of science -- *The Logic of Discovery* -- had appeared in 1935, the book did not appear in English until 1959. This delay has also been related by Popper to his own long silence which resulted from an overwhelming encounter with Rudolf Carnap in 1932. Popper admits that this "silenced me for many years"; he did not begin to
publish his differences with Carnap until 1955 (CR:254-5). As a consequence, his views and especially the full implications they had as a critique of the major tenents of the logical empiricists did not become widely known until his papers began appearing in English in the 1950's. This marked the third phase of his career which continues up until the present. This work has been gathered in two collections put together almost exclusively from this post-war period. The first appeared in 1962 under the title *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*. Here for the first time the full scope and implications of his theory of science became widely available. The second volume, published a decade later, continues along similar lines but with the addition of the concept of "evolution" to his epistemological vocabulary. Entitled *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach*, it brings together a number of articles which suggest the distance toward pragmatism which he had traveled. This theme had only been implicit in elements of his conception of the social sciences.

What emerges from these brief accounts of Mannheim's and Popper's careers is a sense of their profound commitments as liberal intellectuals. Both valued the pursuit of reason and its manifestations in science as the supreme vocations, however much they might disagree about how they are to be defined or advanced. Thus, the relativism which had become prevalent in the social sciences was viewed by both as a threat to the advancement of such reason and a source of the rise of totalitarianism. Only by establishing new foundations for objective knowledge in the social sciences was there hope for liberal democratic alternatives to Fascism and Communism. This faith in
the power of the products of the intellect and the sense of their mission as intellectuals was stimulated by their move to English-speaking countries. As self-conscious prophets trying to influence the events of the post-War era, Mannheim and Popper tried to communicate with the intellectual elites of America and England. Writing for a general rather than a specialized audience, trying to explain the rise of totalitarianism, committed to liberal democratic reform, and sustained by a faith in the power of human intelligence, Mannheim and Popper unconsciously moved toward similar reformulations of the question of the crisis of Western society and the place of social science and philosophy in resolving it. But Popper was seemingly blind to this and turned upon Mannheim as an enemy of the "open society."

In sum, the plausibility of the unconscious and generally unnoticed convergence of the thinking of Mannheim and Popper can be supported by reference to the trajectory of their intellectual biographies. Early initiation of both into the epistemological problematic of early twentieth century Central Europe brought about by the relativistic implications of psychological and socio-historical research (Marx, The Historical School, Freud, etc.) and the challenge of Einstein's theory to classical epistemology of science established a common framework of questions which each developed respectively in the natural and social scientific spheres. The rise of totalitarianism and emigration to English-speaking countries stimulated both to a profound concern with the re-establishment of the theoretical possibility of liberal democracy as the basis of a non-revolutionary adaptation to the crisis of advanced capitalism. As a
consequence, in this effort to deal with the concrete crisis of their day, each successively modified and criticised the idealistic and positivistic tradition of his predecessors in such a way as to render it less vulnerable to irrationalist attacks and misunderstanding. This convergent movement, however, was obscured by Popper's polemical attack on Mannheim and the unpropitious circumstances in English-speaking countries in the post-1945 period for a clarification of the issues at stake.
At the present time there is almost no detailed biographical material readily available for either Popper or Mannheim. David Kettler, however, has published a study (1967a) which takes up Mannheim's early association with Georg Lukacs. According to Wolff (1971:1xxi) Kettler is also preparing an intellectual biography spanning Mannheim's full career. As for Popper, a volume in the "Library of Living Philosophers" series edited by Paul Schilpp should provide important biographical material as well as some of the most important discussions of Popper's philosophy. This long-delayed volume is scheduled to appear in the fall of 1973.

The anthology of statements by immigrants edited by Fleming and Ballyn (1969) and the sketchy survey by Fermi (1968) provide useful introductions to this flight and some of its personalities.

To my knowledge, the only systematic study of the social theorists involved in this movement is Martin Jay's work on the Frankfurt School. See also, Shils (1970).

The question of totalitarianism has generated an extensive and important literature. An adequate account of Popper and Mannheim would attempt to locate their particular versions within this framework. Carl Friedrich's formulation has been most influential among social scientists and has been re-examined in Friedrich, Curtis, and Barber (1969). See also Janicke (1971) and Schapiro (1972).

To name at random some of the figures who would have to be included here: Lukacs, Goldmann, Fromm, Michael and Karl Polanyi, Hayek, Adorno, Horkheimer, Lowenthal, Marcuse, Reich, Cassirer.

Cf. Shils (1968:557); Wolf (1971:xi) for obituary type accounts of Mannheim's career.

Remmling (1961;1968) tries to force Mannheim into four periods, giving them relatively equal weight. I have followed Shils (1968) and others who emphasize the basic discontinuity of Mannheim's German and English phases. Remmling's effort to break up the English period into three sections appears to be of dubious value.

It was here that the influence of Marxism and especially Lukacs came into play. Cf. Kettler (1967b:416ff); Lichtheim (1967:36-43).

These papers are discussed and the "moral-philosophical" continuity of Mannheim's thought is argued in Kettler (1967b).

Ringer (1969:418). This theme is developed further in Lenk (1972) who traces the reception of the Marxian theory of ideology in German sociology after the turn of the century.

His appointment as head of the newly formed Unesco just prior to his death symbolized this increasingly activist orientation.

This milieu produced the pioneer sociologist of science Edgar Zilsel and the influential methodologist Paul Lazarsfeld. Zilsel, who committed suicide right after World War II while living in the U.S., published a number of monographic studies on the historical sociology of the rise of modern science. As one observer has recalled:

There were two outstandingly brilliant minds in Vienna who, though close to us in philosophical orientation, never joined the Circle: Edgar Zilsel and Karl Popper. Both were convinced of their intellectual independence from us, and tried to preserve that independence by remaining outside the circle. Indeed, I felt that both these men, each in his own way, were among our most valuable critics (Feigl, 1969:641).

Surprisingly, Popper seems not to have been aware of Zilsel's studies in the history of science and that they involved application of the insights of the sociology of knowledge.

Lazarsfeld, on the other hand, developed a similar orientation toward science more indirectly. Like Popper, he found his notions of science emerge from a confrontation with the contrast between the achievements of natural science and the failures of social science. As Lazarsfeld (1972:247) notes:

My reference group was the movement around Alfred Adler ... Intellectually, the main influence was a group of writers famous in science and philosophy of science: Ernst Mach, Henri Poincare, and Einstein.

Because he had "virtually no contact with the 'Wiener Kreis,'" Lazarsfeld concludes his similar views were "probably more due to a common background than to direct influence" (248). Describing himself as an activist in the Socialist Student Movement, Lazarsfeld relates his turn to social psychology with reflections upon the failure of his propaganda efforts:

We were concerned with why our propaganda was unsuccessful, and wanted to conduct psychological studies to explain it. I remember a formula I created at the time: a fighting revolution requires economics (Marx); a victorious revolution requires engineers (Russia); a defeated revolution calls for psychology (Vienna)(247).
This association of Marxism with neo-positivism which took place in Vienna (most notably in Neurath) suggests the background of Popper's sympathetic attitude toward the reformist aspects of Marxism. Moreover, he absorbed considerably more from this association than he realized; his sociological conception of the scientific community might have its roots here. In any case, it is clear that the common thread of Marxism links the otherwise antithetical early interests and philosophical leanings of Popper and Mannheim.

14 This has been noted by both Feigl (1969:641) and Hempel (1969:164-5) who suggests that

... though Popper carried on an intensive and fruitful exchange of ideas with various logical positivists, and, although there were important affinities between his views and theirs, he has consistently represented himself as an outside critic of the movement, and he cannot, therefore, be reckoned among its proponents.

15 Though the Open Society was published in 1945, The Poverty of Historicism was not published in book form in English until 1957. Yet its thesis -- "that there can not be prediction of the course of human history by scientific or any other rational methods -- goes back to the winter of 1919-20. The main outline was completed by 1935 ..." (PH:v). Publication was delayed some years by initial rejection by a philosophical journal. It first appeared in Economica in three parts in 1944 and 1945.
IV. POPPER'S RATIONALISM

Popper's attack on the sociology of knowledge takes as its point of critical reference his own philosophical position. Accordingly, only on the basis of this position can we begin to examine the charges against Mannheim. The central elements of Popper's social philosophy are his "critical rationalism," "fallibilistic" theory of science, and the theory of the "open society." And it is on principles derived from these sources that he develops his critique of the "historicism," "holism," and "Utopianism" which are held to inhibit the growth of social scientific knowledge.

The central theme underlying Popper's work on the social sciences is the conviction that "the conflict between rationalism and irrationalism has become the most important intellectual, and perhaps even moral, issues of our time" (OS-II:224). By "rationalism" he refers not to the traditional philosophical term used as a contrast to "empiricism", but to "rationalism" in its widest sense as the opposite of "irrationalism." Thus, very much in the tradition of the Enlightenment he speaks of it as "an attitude that seeks to solve as many problems as possible by an appeal to reason, i.e. to clear thought and experience, rather than by an appeal to emotions and passion" (224). Yet in translating this notion into more concrete language, he reveals a concern with the social dimension of reason as part of a process of dialogue:

... it may be better to explain rationalism in terms of practical attitudes and behaviour. We could then say that rationalism is an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience. It is
fundamentally an attitude of admitting that 'I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer the truth' .... In short, the rationalist attitude, or, as I may perhaps label it, the 'attitude of reasonableness', is very similar to the scientific attitude, to the belief that in the search for truth we need cooperation, and that, with the help of argument, we can in time attain something like objectivity (225).

This sense of rationalism is illuminated through a contrast with its many antitheses: pseudo-rationalism, mysticism, and ir-rationalism. For Popper such anti-rationalistic doctrines are based upon the assumption -- originally Platonic -- that reason is a type of "faculty" whose actual and potential development varies widely among men. As a consequence, "this authoritarian intellectualism" with its belief in an "infallible method" fails to "distinguish between a man's intellectual power and his indebtedness to others for all he can possibly know or understand" (227). Thus, rationality is not the gift of genius but a product of the "social character of reasonableness" (225). For example, a Robinson Crusoe might be intelligent enough to adapt to some difficult situations, but he could not invent language or argument or science.

In this process of rational dialogue, ad hominem arguments have no place for Popper. Claims must be critically considered on their merits and not on characteristics of those who hold them. Only by evaluating arguments can we "recognize everybody with whom we communicate as a potential source of argument and of reasonable information; it thus establishes what may be described as the 'rational unity of mankind'" (225).

This social view of reason and science commits Popper to an institutional interpretation of the conditions under which they may flourish.¹ And it is for this reason he can justify political
intervention into the functioning of socio-economic structures.

Reason can be guaranteed only by appropriate traditions and institutions:

Reason, like science, grows by way of mutual criticism; the only possible way of 'planning' its growth is to develop those institutions that safeguard the freedom of this criticism, that is to say, the freedom of thought (OS-II:227).

As a consequence:

Ultimately, in this way, rationalism is linked up with the recognition of the necessity of social institutions to protect freedom of criticism ... This is why rationalism is closely linked up with the political demand for practical social engineering ... in the humanitarian sense, with the demand for the rationalization of society, for planning for freedom, and for its control by reason; not by 'science', not by a Platonic, a pseudo-rational authority, but by that Socratic reason which is aware of its limitations, and which therefore respects the other man and does not aspire to coerce him -- not even into happiness (238-9).

This rationalism and its institutional conception of science and freedom is distinguished from Hegel's "collectivism" on the one hand and from non-critical rationalism on the other. The institutional version of science differs from that of the Hegelians in that:

Hegel and the Hegelians are collectivists. They argue that, since we owe our reason to 'society' -- or to a certain society such as a nation -- 'society' is everything and the individual nothing; or that whatever value the individual possesses is derived from the collective ... As opposed to this, the position presented here does not assume the existence of collectives ... Therefore, in speaking of a 'social' theory of reason (or of scientific method), I mean more precisely that the theory is an inter-personal one, and never that it is a collectivist theory (226).

This rationalism is also "critical" in that it accepts its own position and presuppositions as subject to discussion. Most importantly, it recognizes that these ultimate presuppositions cannot be completely justified by logical argument or experience (230).
The position of the uncritical rationalist who argues that he is unwilling to accept anything which cannot be justified by argument or experience is rejected as contradictory. Critical rationalism on the contrary acknowledges that its own assumptions require an act of faith, a "faith in reason" (231). This decision is thus not scientific deduction but a moral act. For as Popper emphasizes: "I am a rationalist because I see in the attitude of reasonableness the only alternative to violence" (CR:355).

Yet Popper is unwilling to allow this choice of initial starting points, or ethical decisions in general, to lapse into a question of mere taste. Though he distinguishes between the nature of facts and decisions, he argues that the method -- critical and rational discussion -- should be the same in both cases. The difference lies in the asymmetry between the creation of facts and standards. Whereas facts in some sense "correspond" to a statement or proposition, value judgements are not as clearly regulated by notions such as "right" and "good." Despite this logical difference, however, both factual proposals and standards of decision are subject to rational scrutiny (OS-II:383-6). This position renders untenable any radical separation of knowledge and values because knowledge becomes a means of anticipating the effects of particular types of decisions:

"The choice before us is not simply an intellectual affair, or a matter of taste. It is a moral decision ... arguments cannot determine such a fundamental moral decision. But this does not imply that our choice cannot be helped by any kind of argument whatever. On the contrary, whenever we are faced with a moral decision of a more abstract kind, it is most helpful to analyse carefully the consequences which are likely to result from the alternatives between which we have to choose. For only if we can visualize these consequences in a concrete and practical way, do we really know what our decision is about; otherwise we decide blindly (232)."
It is in the name of this "critical rationalism" that Popper's philosophical efforts in the social sciences are justified. Though he admits that his logical criticisms of "historicism" aim at "something like scientific status" (OS-I:3), he makes no pretensions to the "scientific" nature of his critical enterprise:

Many of the opinions expressed are personal. What it owes to scientific method is largely the awareness of its limitation: it does not offer proofs where nothing can be proved, nor does it pretend to be scientific where it cannot give more than a personal point of view. It does not try to replace the old systems of philosophy by a new system. It does not try to add to all these volumes filled with wisdom, to the metaphysics of history and destiny, such as are fashionable nowadays (3).

But his discussion of the social sciences does proceed from his theory of science. In dismissing the notion that any scientific theory can ever be "verified," Popper is forced to accept the implications of the tentativeness of all hypotheses and the possibility that they might one day be refuted. This fallibilistic assumption introduces an element of uncertainty which completely transforms the problem of scientific validation. At best we can hope for testing theories with the hope of falsifying them by finding inconsistent results. In Popper's view "the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability" (CR:37).

This theory of science is designed to deal with the greatest modern threat to reason:

The main philosophical malady of our time is an intellectual and moral relativism, the latter being at least in part based upon the former. By relativism -- or, if you like, scepticism -- I mean here, briefly, the theory that the choice between competing theories is arbitrary .... (OS-II:369).

This scepticism is derived from a reaction to an obsolete
epistemology: the search for a general criterion of truth. And this is the contribution of such relativism: "The kernel of truth is just that there exists no general criterion of truth" (374). Truth is rather something toward which scientific efforts are directed even though as humans we are inevitably fallible. Thus, Popper terms his theory of knowledge as "fallibilism:"

By 'fallibilism' I mean here the view, or the acceptance of the fact, that we may err, and that the quest for certainty (or even the quest for high probability) is a mistaken quest. But this does not imply that the quest for truth is mistaken. On the contrary, the idea of error implies that of the truth as the standard of which we may fall short (375).

Now it is crucial to remember that he is not proposing a "falsifiability criterion of meaning." In his own words:

I personally was never interested in the so-called problem of meaning; on the contrary, it appeared to me a verbal problem, a typical pseudo-problem. I was interested only in the problem of demarcation, i.e. in finding a criterion of the scientific character of theories (CR:40).

As a consequence, all statements which cannot be classified as "scientific" are not necessarily nonsense. Many kinds of statements have a meaning which derives from their mythical functions, whether as scientific conjectures or as components of social traditions. Though he nowhere gives any detailed consideration of the logical status of such non-scientific knowledge, he does suggest sociology has a part to play in understanding it. This point is briefly developed in his short essay on "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition" where he argues that "a theory of tradition must be a sociological theory, because tradition is obviously a social phenomenon" (CR:123). It is in the context of a theory of institutional traditions that Popper locates the nature of science:
My thesis is that what we call 'science' is differentiated from the older myths not by being something distinct from a myth, but by being accompanied by a second-order tradition -- that of critically discussing the myth (127).

Nor are non-scientific statements completely immune from rational criticism. Just because a theory cannot be conclusively tested does not mean that the choice between theories is arbitrary. Popper uses an example of this the point of view provided by general "historical interpretations." As he argues:

Interpretations are important since they represent a point of view. But ... a theory which can be tested and which is therefore of scientific character can only rarely be obtained ... But this does not mean, of course, that all interpretations are of equal merit. First, there are always interpretations which are not really in keeping with the accepted records; secondly, there are some which need a number of more or less plausible auxiliar hypotheses if they are to escape falsification by the records; next, there are some that are unable to connect a number of facts which another interpretation can connect, and in so far 'explain'. There may accordingly be a considerable amount of progress even within the field of historical interpretation. Furthermore, there may be all kinds of intermediate stages between more or less universal 'points of view' ... (05-II:266).

As a consequence, Popper's task in his discussion of "historicism" is to provide rational arguments which render a particular type of historical interpretation -- that of a belief in historical prophecy -- implausible. Yet it is clear that he does not in principle reject either the need for or the rational means for constructing such quasi-theories. What he is concerned about is the desire to give them the status of scientific laws in whose name crimes against humanity might be committed. Only by accepting the uncertainty and tentativeness of both scientific hypotheses and historical interpretations can the dangers of dogmatism be avoided.
Popper's primary task in his studies of the social sciences is to unmask those methods which are pseudo-scientific within the sense defined by his principle of falsifiability. Though mythical -- non-scientific -- ideas may have positive functions as in the tradition of science or liberalism, in others they may serve irrationalist forces. Such irrationalism is not simply arbitrary deviation or the result of some perversity of human nature. Rather, Popper links the emergence of irrationalist social theories to specific structural features of the transition from primitive to modern societies. This fact is often obscured by his tendency to describe philosophers as having succumbed to the "influence" of some predecessor. Yet a closer look reveals that Popper actually operates with a rudimentary "theory" of the social conditioning of socio-political ideas.

This aspect of Popper's analysis is revealed in his discussion of how through his own self-critical attitude he came to revise his image of Plato. On the basis of an initial examination of Plato's texts, he had concluded that Platonic philosophy could be summarized by the proposition that "true happiness ... is achieved only by justice, i.e., by keeping one's place; the ruler must find happiness in ruling, the warrior in warring; and, we may infer, the slave in slaving" (OS-I:169). Consequently, Plato must be regarded as "a totalitarian party-politician, unsuccessful in his immediate and practical undertakings, but on the long run only too successful in his propaganda for the arrest and overthrow of a civilization which he hated" (169-70). A search for any evidence which would contradict this interpretation succeeded only for one point: Plato's
undeniably sincere hatred of tyranny. How is this contradiction to be resolved? Popper suggests:

... my attempt to understand Plato by analogy with modern totalitarianism led me, to my own surprise, to modify my view of totalitarianism. It did not modify my hostility, but it ultimately led me to see that the strength of both the old and the new totalitarian movements rested on the fact that they attempted to answer a very real need, however badly conceived this attempt may have been (170: emphasis added).

With this discovery, Popper was in a position to frame the question of the rise of totalitarian ideologies in a sociological manner as a theory of history, or as he would phrase it: "historical interpretation." This is expressed in the theory of the transition from the "closed" to the "open" society. Thus the Greeks are the source of Western civilization because they were the first to make the transition from "tribalism" to "humanitarianism" (171). Disregarding the diversity of tribal societies, nearly all share a "magical or irrational attitude towards the customs of social life, and the corresponding rigidity of these customs" (172). This results in the failure to distinguish the "conventional regularities" of the social order from those found in nature. Even though this attitude continues to exist -- "our own ways of life are still beset with taboos" -- there is a fundamental difference: an increasing opportunity for personal decisions and the resulting responsibilities.

From this distinction stems the following definitions:

... the magical or tribal or collectivist society will also be called the closed society, and the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions, the open society (173).

What Popper has provided is simply a schematic version of the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft dichotomy that characterized classical
19th century social theory. As in both the liberal and socialist versions of this theme, Popper emphasizes that despite the costs this movement constitutes progress in that it made possible movement toward individual freedom. Unlike "closed" societies, for which the biological organic model is appropriate, the "open society" provides the basis for an endless progression toward individual freedom and responsibility. Such an "abstract society" first began in the 6th century Greece where "the strain of civilization was beginning to be felt" (OS-I:176).

What were the pre-conditions of this breakdown of the "closed society"? Popper suggests that in the case of Sparta and Athens, "perhaps the most powerful cause ... was the development of sea-communications and commerce" (177). Moreover, the "strain" produced by the new order can be "most closely related to the problem of tension between the classes", a problem unknown previously (176). Yet these very conditions made possible the emergence of critical thought:

The rise of philosophy itself can be interpreted, I think, as a response to the breakdown of the closed society and its magical beliefs ... it modifies the tradition of passing on a theory or a myth by founding a new tradition -- the tradition of challenging theories and myths and of critically discussing them (188).

In such a period of crisis, historical prophecies and utopian aspirations are propounded and nourished by leaders. Popper sees this relationship in implicitly social psychological terms. First, there is the appeal of being part of an inner circle of the initiated or the chosen. Then there are deeper motives arising from frustrations which are given expression in the dreams of prophets.
Finally, such beliefs relieve individuals of responsibility for doing something to change the course of events, though Popper admits that Marxism is somewhat of an exception in this respect (4).

Paradoxically, such irrational beliefs are the result of moral idealism:

Why do all these social philosophies support the revolt against civilization? And what is the secret of their popularity? Why do they attract and seduce so many intellectuals? I am inclined to think that the reason is that they give expression to a deep-felt dissatisfaction with a world which does not, and cannot, live up to our moral ideals and to our dreams of perfection (5).

For Popper the freedom offered by the "open society" is necessarily characterized by what we subjectively experience as "strain": 6

This strain, this uneasiness ... (is) ... created by the effort which life in an open and partially abstract society continually demands from us -- by the endeavour to be rational, to forego at least some of our emotional social needs, to look after ourselves, and to accept responsibilities. We must, I believe, bear this strain as the price to be paid by every increase in knowledge, in reasonableness, in co-operation and in mutual help, and consequently for our chances of survival, and in the size of the population. It is the price we have to pay for being human (176; emphasis added).

Popper concludes his first volume of the Open Society with the painful realism of his liberal theory of history:

Arresting political change is not the remedy; it cannot bring happiness. We can never return to the alleged innocence and beauty of the closed society. Our dream of heaven cannot be realized on earth ... For those who have eaten of the tree of knowledge, paradise is lost. The more we try to return to the heroic age of tribalism, the more surely do we arrive at the Inquisition, at the Secret Politics, and at a romanticized gangsterism. Beginning with the suppression of reason and truth, we must end with the most brutal and violent destruction of all that is human. There is no return to a harmonious state of nature. If we turn back, then we must go the whole way -- we must return to the beasts ... We must go on into the unknown, the uncertain and insecure, using what reason we may have to plan as well as we can for both, security and freedom (201).
On the basis of this outline of Popper's philosophical position, theory of science, his method of historical analysis, some surprising features emerge. Despite his castigation of historical prophecy based on some ostensibly scientific "law", he is prepared to admit the cognitive value of some effort to interpret the overall pattern of historical change. Thus, his own liberal philosophy of history -- that of the "open society" -- re-introduces a style of inquiry which he has often been taken, by superficial readers, to have rejected altogether. Nor is he willing to reject the possibility of indirectly testing elements of such historical interpretations. Understanding social change is also considered necessary to comprehend the way in which specific types of thinking (such as "historicism" and "Utopianism") represent responses to real human needs. Rapid social change, class conflict, and the natural desire for moral perfection all combine to produce irrational ideologies which can be countered only by reasoned argument and the political intervention essential for eliminating human suffering. Even though scientific propositions are carefully distinguished from non-testable or mythical ones, this does not mean that science constitutes absolute truth or that mythical thinking is not an important and necessary component of social life. Both are subject to criticism: scientific hypotheses are subject to elimination and pernicious traditions can be replaced by those which are more rational, as for instance the replacement of traditionalism by liberalism.

In the next three chapters Popper's effort to distinguish his own position from that of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge
will be examined in detail. This attack will be analysed in terms of the three central types of problems it raises: 1) the definition of the objectives and claims of the sociology of knowledge; 2) the foundations of objective knowledge; and 3) the task of the social sciences in modern society.
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1 See especially his essay "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition" (CR:120-35). This emphasis on the institutional framework of scientific activity is one of the most novel features of Popper's theory of science. This shifts the focus of epistemology from the individual's reason and application of method to that of the group as a critical community. What he fails to see is that such a theory of science presupposes and requires a sociology of science -- that philosophy or history by themselves do not suffice. Cf. Elias (1972); Martins (1972); Toulmin (1972).

2 This faith in the intrinsic value of rationality as a practical ideal to be realized, is expressed as follows:

   The 'world' is not rational, but it is the task of science to rationalize it. 'Society' is not rational, but it is the task of the social engineer to rationalize it. (This does not mean, of course, that he should 'direct' it, or that centralized or collectivist 'planning' is desirable.) Ordinary language is not rational, but it is our task to rationalize it, or at least to deep up its standards of clarity. The attitude here characterized could be described as 'pragmatic rationalism'. This pragmatic rationalism is related to an uncritical rationalism and to irrationalism in a similar way as critical rationalism is related to these two ... pragmatic rationalism may recognize that the world is not rational, but demand that we submit or subject it to reason, as far as possible (OS-II:357, fn.19).

3 Though he makes no effort to specify the matter more clearly -- an essential problem which is not dealt with in the intellectual history of the Open Society, Popper operates with the assumption that though "it is impossible to fully understand mental developments without understanding their background, it is at least as impossible to understand economic developments without understanding the development of, for instance, scientific or religious ideas" (CR:332).

4 Of course the effort to lump Fascism and Communism together as "totalitarianism" and explain them in terms of a theory of totalitarianism presents insuperable difficulties. Popper's effort is one of the more simplistic versions of this strategy. Cf. Marcuse (1972). For a discussion and criticism of the more sophisticated attempts (Arendt, Friedrichs) see Friedrichs, Curtis, and Barber (1969).
These concepts were of course introduced by Toennies. Popper claims that he derived the terms "open" and "closed society" from Bergson, a thinker with which he otherwise has little in common. Apparently, Bergson used it in a religious context where the mysticism of the "closed society" is positively evaluated. As for Durkheim, who would seem a more likely source for Popper's general thesis, he is mentioned only in passing to suggest that he did not understand that "modern open societies function largely by way of abstract relations, such as exchange or co-operation" (DS-I:175). Curiously, this misunderstanding of Durkheim extends to a failure to see the affinity between "organic" and "mechanical solidarity" and the "open" and "closed" society.

This concept of "strain" is not acknowledged to be related to the themes of classical social theory which bear an obvious resemblance: alienation (Marx), anomie (Durkheim), and rationalization (Weber). In fact, Popper's thesis of the rationalization of the "open society" is strikingly similar to Weber's account. A detailed comparison of their views would likely bring this out more clearly.
V. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Popper's rejection of the sociology of knowledge -- which he identifies with "sociologism" -- stems from his conviction that it is irrationalistic and incompatible with the philosophical theory of knowledge. But from the outset it is apparent that his discussion is marred by a profound interpretation of the objectives of this discipline, at least as a method of socio-historical research as defined by Karl Mannheim. Since Popper acknowledges that Mannheim is the leading exponent of this approach, it is appropriate to turn to Mannheim's texts to confirm, reject or modify Popper's accusations.

A basic obstacle to the isolation of Popper's critical argument against the sociology of knowledge is posed by his ad hominem method of analysis. Mannheim is assumed to be guilty of all the philosophical sins of Hegel and Marx, though we are given only circumstantial evidence to substantiate this charge. One could begin with Popper's discussions of Hegel and Marx to indicate the ways in which distortions of their positions are then extended to Mannheim, for he did share (as does Popper) many of their assumptions. Yet Mannheim's divergencies from Hegel and Marx are equally significant and are based upon criticisms similar to those of Popper. For, Mannheim concludes, that "dialectical thinking is in fact rationalistic but it culminates in irrationalism" (IU:133). Though he is more sympathetic to the idea of dialectical thinking than Popper, he agrees that it has been used for obscurantist purposes. Since the objective here is to develop the proposition that Popper and Mannheim in fact operate with largely
complementary assumptions, unraveling their relative positions with respect to Hegel and Marx will be ignored. Instead, Popper's specific criticisms of Mannheim will be taken as the focus of reference. The question thus becomes: what did Popper apparently think that Mannheim was claiming about the sociology of knowledge?

For Popper the sociology of knowledge is intimately involved with the collectivist theory of central planning. Since Mannheim certainly makes social planning a central theme of his later work, this is certainly a legitimate assumption, though the relationship is not a necessary one. Yet for Popper it is the irrationalist theory of knowledge propounded by "sociologism" that is responsible for the terror of Stalinist planning. Though the principle of planning may appear to be a rational response to the problem of rapid social change, Popper concedes, it is undermined by the fact that

.... it occurs in closest alliance with a doctrine which is definitely opposed to rationalism .... one which is well in keeping with the irrationalist and mystical tendencies of our time (OS-II:213).

This irrational element is

.... the Marxist doctrine that our opinions, including our moral and scientific opinions, are determined by class interest, and more generally by the social and historical situation of our time. Under the name of 'sociology of knowledge' or 'sociologism', this doctrine has been developed recently (especially by M. Scheler and K. Mannheim) as a theory of the social determination of scientific knowledge (213; emphasis added).

This latter statement reveals two assumptions about the self-definition of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge: that it purports to be a sociological theory of scientific knowledge and that it claims that such scientific knowledge can be deterministically explained by sociological analysis. An examination of Mannheim's position on
these two points reveals that Popper has completely failed to penetrate the distinctive efforts of Mannheim to avoid these two charges.

As is self-evident with Mannheim's preoccupation with "ideology" and "utopia", the sociology of knowledge for him is mainly a tool for the analysis of philosophical, political and social thought. Popper's difficulty is that he fails to grasp the difference between the philosophical and sociological uses of the concept "knowledge". For the sociologist, "knowledge" has been used to refer to whatever people take as factual or true regardless of its epistemological status for the philosopher. Such knowledge (or belief) is acted upon as if it were "true". Whereas Mannheim generally concerned himself with the action-oriented beliefs of political and social thought, others have analysed various other types, ranging from the scientific-technological to those of everyday life.²

Though Mannheim is insufficiently explicit -- a reflection of his own uncertainties -- he can be shown to have worked from the premise of a distinction between exact and existentially-bound knowledge.³ Only in the latter case did he argue that social circumstances influence the content of propositions. Though this distinction largely corresponds to, it is not identical with, the differences between natural and social science. He seems to grant some aspects of social research (formal sociology) something like the capacity for non-existentially bound knowledge.

As he emphatically states on the very first page of *Ideology and Utopia*, he is not concerned with the "scientific" knowledge of philosophy.⁴ His central problem arises from the "plurality of thought-styles" which have emerged in the modern world in response
to new contexts of social activity. Not content with the rational reconstruction of what "knowledge" should look like, based on the example of a particular science, he is intent upon the examination of action-oriented knowledge:

This book is concerned with the problem of how men actually think. The aim of these studies is to investigate not how thinking appears in textbooks on logic, but how it really functions in public life and in politics as an instrument of collective action (IU:1; emphasis added).

This type of knowledge, Mannheim declares, has been ignored by the philosophers of science. Yet for anyone interested in the possibility of a "science of politics" it is evident such a science "implies quite a different form of knowledge from one customarily conceived. Pure intellectualism would not tolerate a science which is so intimately tied up with practice" (164). Because of the failure of positivist philosophers to deal with this question, he makes a distinction between the "exact" sciences described by logicians and the "so-called pre-scientific inexact mode of thought" for which logic must be supplemented by the analysis of historical genesis:

Meanwhile, acting men have, for better or for worse, proceeded to develop a variety of methods for the experiential and intellectual penetration of the world in which they live, which have never been analysed with the same precision as the so-called exact modes of knowing. When, however, any human activity continues over a long period without being subjected to intellectual controls or criticism, it tends to get out of hand ... This so-called pre-scientific inexact mode of thought, however (which, paradoxically, the logicians and philosophers also use when they have to make practical decisions), is not to be understood solely by the use of logical analysis. It constitutes a complex which cannot be readily detached either from the psychological roots of the emotional and vital impulses which underlie it or from the situation in which it arises and which it seeks to solve.

It is the most essential task of this book to work out a suitable method for the description and analysis of this type of thought and its changes ... The method which we will seek to present is that of the sociology of knowledge (1-2).
In short, Mannheim does not seek to challenge the kind of formal and abstract propositions which Popper's principle of demarcation seeks to distinguish as science. The problem with such propositions in the social sciences is that they fail to provide the kind of knowledge necessary for social life to be carried on at all. And it is with propositions which are impregnated with human meanings which are the source of controversy:

Nor are we aided when we are directed to a few propositions in which the context is so formal and abstract (e.g. in mathematics, geometry, and pure economics) that in fact they seem to be completely detached from the thinking social individual. The battle is not about these propositions but about that greater wealth of factual determinations in which man concretely diagnoses his individual and social situation, in which happenings external to us are first correctly understood. The battle rages concerning those propositions in which every concept is meaningfully oriented from the first, in which we use words like conflict, breakdown, alienation, insurrection, resentment -- words which do not reduce complex situations for the sake of an externalizing, formal description without ever being able to build them up again and which would lose their content if their orientation, their evaluative elements, were dropped out (43).

For Mannheim the crucial test for the separation of exact from inexact knowledge is whether or not social genesis has any implications for validity. This largely corresponds to Popper's distinction between science and non-science. Thus, there seems to be no basis whatsoever for the assumption that Mannheim is interested in a theory of "scientific knowledge". Rather, he is engaged in a complementary enterprise. Whereas Popper sought to develop a theory of the logical and institutional bases of exact science, Mannheim attempted to develop a theory of the logic and socio-historical origins of inexact or action-oriented social beliefs. Thus Mannheim argues:
The historical and social genesis of an idea would be irrelevant to its ultimate validity if the temporal and social conditions of its emergence had no effect on its content and form. If this were the case, any two periods in the history of human knowledge would only be distinguished from one another by the fact that in the earlier period certain things were still unknown and certain errors still existed which, through later knowledge, were completely corrected. This simple relationship between an earlier incomplete and a later complete period of knowledge may to a large extent be appropriate for the exact sciences (although indeed to-day the notion of the stability of the categorical structure of the exact sciences is, compared with the logic of classical physics, considerably shaken). For the history of the cultural sciences, however, the earlier stages are not quite so simply superseded ... Every epoch has its fundamentally new approach and its characteristic point of view, and consequently sees the 'same' object from a new perspective (IU:271).

This view is almost identical to that of Popper. As noted previously, he emphasized the necessity of distinguishing between the logical characteristics of scientific theories and general interpretations. Though Popper's characterization of scientific knowledge is considerably more rigorous than the vague notion of "exact" knowledge, Mannheim provides a more sophisticated analysis of the question of historical interpretation in his discussion of perspectives. Nor does Popper deny the significance of this kind of knowledge and its practical importance. Acknowledging "that those universal laws which historical explanation uses provide no selective and unifying principle, no 'point of view' for history," he goes on to advocate that we cannot let an "inapplicable idea of objectivity" from preventing us from providing such interpretations even though they cannot be "scientific" in the formal sense (OS-II:265-9). Popper would be forced then to admit that for such interpretations social genesis is bound up with their validity. For as he admits, since "each generation has its own troubles and problems, and therefore
its own interests and point of view, it follows that each generation has a right to look upon and re-interpret history in its own way ..." (267). It was precisely this type of "knowledge" which is the object of Mannheim's sociology.

Popper not only fails to note Mannheim's sociological use of the term "knowledge", but then proceeds to assume that the posited relationship between thought and existence is a mechanical-deterministic one. At least that is the implication the reader is left to infer. Taken literally, his use of the phrase "social determination" has a reductive connotation which he makes every effort to take advantage of in order to discredit the sociology of knowledge. Nor does he make any attempt to refer to the kind of linkages established by Mannheim in his historical studies. The reader is left to assume that "determination" is to be understood in the sense of reduction in the form of a hypothetico-deductive explanation.6

To interpret Mannheim's intentions in this way is to betray a complete misunderstanding of the sociology of knowledge and of the philosophical tradition from which it is derived. To begin with, "social determination" is not an adequate rendering of the original German Seinsverbundenheit which is usually termed "situational" or "existential determination". Perhaps less misleading would be "existential conditioning" or the very literal "existence-boundedness". For as Mannheim emphasized in a footnote to the English edition of Ideology and Utopia:

Here we do not mean by 'determination' a mechanical cause-effect sequence: we leave the meaning of 'determination' open, and only empirical investigation will show us how strict is the correlation between life-situation and thought-process, or what scope exists for variations in the correlation (267, fn.1).
To be sure, Mannheim does not resolve this problem or even attempt to provide a systematic analysis of the possible ways of conceiving such a relationship. Had he been more attentive to the real dilemma here, Popper as a philosopher might have been able to provide some constructive analysis. Yet his simplistic identification of the problem of the sociology of knowledge with "sociologism" blinded him to genuine issues.

Ironically, as we have just seen with respect to the types of knowledge distinguished, Popper does not really disagree with what Mannheim is trying to say. In his *Open Society* volumes Popper himself had indulged in some amateurish sociological analysis of intellectual history. For instance, as previously pointed out, he postulates that "historicism" was a phenomenon which became prominent only under particular social conditions -- periods characterized by rapid change -- and that the context of the resulting doctrines mirrored the specific traditions and conflicts of the societies in question.

Nor was Popper unaware of his use of this method or of its intellectual sources:

Everyone learned from Marx that the development of ideas cannot be fully understood if the history of ideas is treated (although such a treatment may often have its great merits) without mentioning the conditions of their origin and the situation of their originators, among which the economic aspect is highly significant (CR:332).

What Popper objects to is a "vulgar materialism" which he identifies with Marx and transfers to Mannheim:

Nevertheless I personally think that Marx's economism -- his emphasis on the economic background as the ultimate basis of any sort of development -- is mistaken and in fact untenable ... granted that it is at least as impossible to understand economic developments without understanding the development of, for instance, scientific or religious ideas (332).
Within these limitations then, he is willing to accept the principle of sociological analysis:

I do not deny that there are certain interesting sociological aspects of Beethoven's work. It is well known, for instance, that the transition from a small to a large symphony orchestra is connected, in some way, with a socio-political development. Orchestras cease to be private hobbies of princes, and are at least partly supported by a middle class whose interest in music greatly increases. I am willing to appreciate any sociological 'explanation' of this sort, and I admit that such aspects may be worthy of scientific study. (After all, I myself have attempted similar things in this book, for instance, in my treatment of Plato.)

What then, more precisely, is the object of my attack? It is the exaggeration and generalization of any aspect of this kind. If we 'explain' Beethoven's symphony orchestra in the way hinted above, we have explained very little ... We cannot attempt to explain Beethoven's genius in this way, or in any way at all (OS-II:210-1).

This final comment reveals yet another misunderstanding. The sociology of knowledge, to the degree that it seeks to provide causal-functional type explanations, is concerned with types of events or aspects of them rather than individual events and their unique aspects. The explanation of the "genius" of an individual person is more an historical than a sociological problem. The task of a sociological approach would be to see that genius or aspects of it as an individual manifestation of specific socio-historical circumstances, whether of changes in class relationships, a cultural renaissance, new forms of technology or whatever. None of these conditioning factors can ultimately explain all of the unique elements of a specific historical phenomenon, though they can go a long way toward explaining the appearance of a type of event. To the degree that there is an effort to explain such unique features of individual events, the mode of explanation necessarily becomes increasingly "interpretive" and less "nomothetic".
It is difficult to understand how anyone could accuse Mannheim of "sociologism" when one of his most distinctive contributions was to have confronted the dialectical relationship between the immanent and external explanation of cultural phenomena. This particular problem was the central theme of much of his early work in philosophy. Having started in the idealistic tradition of Geistesgeschichte, he gradually came to appreciate the significance of the Marxist contribution. To cite a clear statement of his position:

A second fallacy which, much like the immanence doctrine, has encumbered German reflections on history, is expressed by the polarized conception of the ideal and the material realm of things. Once again one cannot help asking why a basically simple subject could be so persistently misconstrued. How was it possible to doubt the social character of the mind and to ignore the mental involvements of social behaviour? To cogitate an abstract intellect without concrete persons who act in given social situations is as absurd as to assume the opposite, a society without such functions as communication, ideation, and evaluation (1953:33-3).

In sum, it is difficult to sustain the charge that the sociology of knowledge as a method of research expounded by Mannheim is intrinsically irrationalistic or sociologistic. Remarkably, Popper attempted to burden Mannheim with the irrationalism of sociologistic reductionism when one of Mannheim's major contributions was to have emphasized ways of overcoming this problem. When seen in the context of Popper's own admission of the possibility of a sociological analysis of ideas, Mannheim's effort to overcome can be seen as a partial effort to the kinds of problems to which Popper was referring. This error on Popper's part reflects in the first instance his misunderstanding of Hegel and Marx and thus his further failure -- stemming from his superficial reading of Ideology and Utopia -- to distinguish Mannheim's position
from his predecessors. Popper simply glosses over the profoundly rational objectives of Mannheim as expressed in his quest for a "science of politics" and the rationalization of modern society.

As we shall see, this initial identification of the sociology of knowledge as "sociologism" constitutes an error which undermines Popper's account of Mannheim at every turn. But even accepting all this, Popper could still argue that neither rational intentions nor a more limited conception of the sociology of knowledge alter his more fundamental objection. Even if the sociology of knowledge may provide a description of how social science is actually created, this does not mean that this is the way it should be produced or even provides any insight into how it should be. That, Popper would counter, is a question of scientific method. As a consequence, he might contend that Mannheim's effort to put the social sciences on a more secure foundation through the sociology of knowledge was misguided -- a contribution to the "irrational and mystical tendencies of our time" -- because it requires an individualistic epistemology in which the individual knower is the basis of objectivity. In shifting his criticism to the epistemological assumptions of the sociology of knowledge, or at least what he took them to be, Popper thus might be able to claim that skeptical relativism is a necessary implication of the prescriptions of the sociology of knowledge for social science. His attack on the presumed epistemology of the sociology of knowledge is the subject of the next chapter.
1 Had Popper chosen some other representative -- say Paréto or Durkeim -- he might have found some basis for the charge of "sociologism". As it happens, Mannheim's version of the sociology of knowledge does not share the non-dialectical conception of the relationship between thought and reality characteristic of the so-called "positivistic" sociologies of knowledge.

2 This raises, of course, one of the most fundamental conceptual problems in this area -- the forms and types of "knowledge" which are the object of inquiry. In its most inclusive definition as the "sociology of culture" the field embraces any cultural product (Cf. Curtis and Petras, 1970:65). The term "cognitive sociology" has been proposed for the purpose analyzing both natural scientific and social ideological forms of knowledge with the same frame of reference (Martins, 1972). The question of the forms and types of "knowledge" has been dealt with most extensively by Gurvitch (1971:23-41) who proposes a typology of 7 types and 5 forms.

3 The most definitive evidence for this distinction between exact and inexact knowledge is to be found in an as yet unpublished essay which was written in 1924. Titled "A Sociological Theory of Culture and its Knowability: Conjunctive and Communicative Thought", this essay provided a detailed elaboration of the contrast between general scientific explanation (communicative) and that based upon the interpretation of human meanings (conjunctive), according to Kettler (1967b:420-4). Such conjunctive knowledge corresponds to products of thinking which can be described as 'moral-philosophic'. Having worked out for himself the nature and significance of this distinction, he apparently tacitly took it for granted in Ideology and Utopia, leading to misunderstandings on the part of some readers. As Kettler notes:

   This accounts for the lack of clarity about just what constitutes 'knowledge' of the sort for which information about social genesis has a bearing on assessment; the concern throughout is with a 'conjunctive' interpretation of 'conjunctive' types of aspects of knowledge. It accounts for Mannheim's strenuous but unclear insistence on the difference between relativism and relationism or perspectivism; conjunctive knowledge firmly rooted in a group at a time has all the certainty and security of which it allows. And it accounts for the frustrating lack of precision in the terms used to characterize the presumed relationships between sub- and super-structures. The 'naming' and 'describing' terms of conjunctive inquiry cannot aspire to univocality; precisely the richness of their associations gives them their vitality (424).
To be fair to Popper, some of the following citations from Ideology and Utopia did not appear in the original German edition (1929) he used. Two new chapters were included in the 1936 English edition. The first was specially prepared for the new edition. The other was a reprint of an article published in a well-known sociological handbook in 1931. All of these should have been readily available to Popper. Moreover, he has had some time to revise his views on the basis of the additional evidence.

As is evident from this statement, Mannheim is uncertain as to the degree of categorical stability in the natural sciences. Thus, part of his ambiguity stems from a reluctance to make an absolute distinction between exact and inexact knowledge. He is confident, however, in his emphasis on the practical difference between the two: the perspectivist element in the cultural sciences is essential to understanding them and their history.

Subsequent work in the history and philosophy of science has indicated that conceptual change has indeed been significant and that a re-interpretation of the conceptual evolution of science is necessary. See especially Toulmin (1972) and Martins (1972), as well as the pioneering historical study by Kuhn (1970).

Ironically, Mannheim has more often been criticized by sociologists for not providing sufficiently rigorous causal correlations in his analyses. Popper, on the other hand, chides him for "sociologism".

Merton (1968:552-6) provides the most succinct discussion of the various forms of "determination" that appear in Mannheim. Stark (1958:246-63) distinguishes three general approaches to social determination: the causalistic, the functionalistic, and elective affinity. He associates Mannheim with the latter two.
The conclusion of Popper's epistemological critique of Mannheim is that the sociology of knowledge culminates in a relativistic skepticism. Two interrelated arguments lead him to this judgement: first, that the sociology of knowledge is based upon an individualistic epistemology which assumes impartiality is the foundation of objectivity; and second, that it advocates the self-contradictory doctrine that the objectivity of the social sciences therefore requires a kind of "sociotherapy" possible only for a "freely-poised intelligentsia" uniquely exempt from the effects of social determination.

An examination of Mannheim's texts, however, reveals that the first charge is simply incorrect: he neither denies the importance of scientific tests nor the social and institutional basis of scientific production. At the same time Popper's own theory of science, with its understanding of the indispensable functions of traditions in scientific research, contains an awareness of those aspects of science which are the object of Mannheim's concern. As a consequence, Mannheim's discussion of the sociological analysis of social perspectives can be assimilated into Popper's call for the rational criticism of traditions. Establishing these points is the task of the first part of this chapter.

What constitutes the problem of objectivity for Popper? Rather than social scientists trying to make their "heads" more "objective", he argues, they should realize that:
It is a matter of scientific method. And, ironically enough, objectivity is closely bound up with the social aspect of scientific method, with the fact that science and scientific objectivity do not (and cannot) result from the attempts of an individual scientist to be 'objective', but from the co-operation of many scientists. Scientific objectivity can be described as the inter-subjectivity of scientific method. But this social aspect of science is almost entirely neglected by those who call themselves sociologists of knowledge (OS-II:217).

He identifies two basic elements of this "public character of scientific method". First, the ideal of "free criticism" impels fellow scientists to challenge every proposed theory because of a recognition that the scientific attitude means criticizing everything. And second, this assumes that they try to communicate to each other in a common language that avoids talking at cross-purposes. This requires that experience of a "public" character be the "impartial arbiter" of controversy. All of this does not preclude that some individual may fail to live up to such standards, but does not undermine the progress of science because "it does not undermine the working of various social institutions which have been designed to further scientific objectivity and criticism; for instance the laboratories, the scientific periodicals, the congresses" (218).

Popper's theory of science is thus composed of three elements: 1) scientific method or the logic of testing; 2) social institutions organizing the application of such methods, guaranteeing their public character; and 3) a tradition of free criticism which refuses to take any presupposition for granted. It is significant that he places a great deal of stress upon the role of such traditions and their relationship to institutions:

Institutions and traditions have much in common ... But we may say, perhaps, that we are inclined to speak of
institutions wherever a (changing) body of people observe a certain set of norms or fulfil certain *prima facie* social functions (such as teaching, policing, or selling groceries) which serve certain *prima facie* social purposes (such as the propagation of knowledge, or protection from violence or starvation), while we speak of traditions mainly when we wish to describe a uniformity of people's attitudes, or ways of behaviour, or aims or values, tastes ...

They take, as it were, an intermediate place, in social theory, between persons and institutions ... The difference in question may be made clearer by reference to what I have sometimes called the 'ambivalence of social institutions', or the fact that a social institution may, in certain circumstances, function in a way which strikingly contrasts with its *prima facie* or 'proper' function ...

It may be said, perhaps, that the long-term 'proper' functioning of institutions depends mainly upon such traditions (CR:133-4).

Taken as a whole, however, his description of science is an implicitly normative one: a theory of what science should be rather than an empirical description of how it actually functions. Popper provides no particular direction as to the way in which such a departure from this ideal might occur, how it might be revealed, what effect it would have on scientific results, or how it might be overcome.¹

On the basis of his superficial reading of Mannheim, Popper concludes that the sociology of knowledge opposes this view with an individualistic epistemology which fails to grasp the nature of science, that it .... shows an astounding failure to understand precisely its main subject, the social aspects of knowledge, or rather, of scientific method. It looks upon science or knowledge as a process in the mind or 'consciousness' of the individual scientist, or perhaps as the product of such a process. If considered in this way, what we call scientific objectivity must indeed become completely ununderstandable, or even impossible; and not only in the social or political sciences, where class interests and similar hidden motives may play a part, but just as much in the natural sciences ... if scientific objectivity were founded, as the sociologicistic theory of knowledge naively assumes, upon the individual scientists impartiality or objectivity, then we should have to say good-bye to it (OS-II:217; emphasis added).
As a characterization of Mannheim's general epistemological position this statement is a profound distortion. Mannheim flatly contradicts this view in his discussion of the successive emergence and mutual interaction of the epistemological, psychological, and sociological points of view in the wake of the break of the medieval synthesis (IU:13-33). As he concludes:

The fiction of the isolated and self-sufficient individual underlies in various forms the individualistic epistemology and genetic psychology ... it is much more correct to say that knowledge is from the very beginning a co-operative process of group life, in which everyone unfolds his knowledge within the framework of a common fate, a common activity, and the overcoming of common difficulties ... (28-9).

As a consequence:

The isolated thinker may have the impression that his crucial ideas occurred to him personally, independent of his social setting. It is easy for living in a provincial and circumscribed social world to think that the events which touch him are isolated facts for which fate alone is responsible. Sociology, however, cannot be content with understanding immediate problems and events emerging from this myopic perspective which obscures every significant relationship (109-10).

One of the contributions of Mannheim's analysis is to provide a sketch of the conditions which made it possible for those like Popper to develop their conceptions of science in opposition to the individualistic-psychologistic Kantian and English empiricist traditions. For in Mannheim's words, "it was the merit of the sociological point of view that it set alongside the individual genesis of meaning, the genesis from the context of group life" (28). Popper has proceeded to elaborate the logic of validation appropriate to that perspective which views science as a product of collective activity.

Popper seems to have mistaken Mannheim's comments on ideology
criticism as a general sociological criterion of truth which set itself against more conventional norms of scientific validation. But Mannheim notes that the sociology of knowledge is no substitute for direct investigation nor alternative to epistemology. He does not deny the normative principles of scientific inquiry; rather, he seeks to supplement them with a concern of the social factors which inhibit the realization of those formal ideals and how they might be corrected. As a consequence, Popper's defense of the procedural and institutional basis of science is beside the point. As Mannheim acknowledges:

Of course in theory the only aim of research is to establish the facts of the case and get at the truth, and the forum in which the merits of every achievement must be judged is scientific publicity (MS:27).

Moreover:

It is, of course, true that in the social sciences, as elsewhere, the ultimate criterion of truth or falsity is to be found in the investigation of the object, and the sociology of knowledge is no substitute for this (IU:5).

Mannheim accepts all this in principle, but is concerned about the realization of these formal requirements. For the difficulty is

... the examination of the object is not an isolated act; it takes place in a context which is coloured by values and collective-unconscious, volitional impulse. In the social sciences it is this intellectual interest, oriented in a matrix of collective activity, which provides not only the general questions, but the concrete hypotheses for research and the thought-models for the ordering of experience. Only as we succeed in bringing into the areas of conscious and explicit observation the various points of departure and of approach to the facts ... can we hope ... to control the unconscious motivations and presuppositions which, in the last analysis, have brought these modes of thought into existence. A new type of objectivity in the social sciences is attainable not through the exclusion of evaluations but through the critical awareness and control of them (5; emphasis added).
Popper's abstract analysis of the scientific community does not take into account the implications of its diversity, of its fragmentation into a multiplicity of publics. The advantage of Mannheim's position is to be able to begin to assess the significance of such factors for the methods of science and to investigate the very specialization which Popper sees as a threat to creative science. For as Mannheim notes:

In fact, from the sociological point of view, there is no scientific publicity as such. There are only the scientific publics of historians, psychologists, anthropologists, and so on, which inherit many of the characteristics of human groups, and very often betray all the symptoms of sectarian thinking. But a careful analysis of this collective attitude shows that every branch of science is expert, not merely at devising methods of studying certain provinces of life, but also at creating inhibitions and defense mechanisms which bar the way to a complete and adequate knowledge of society ... the contempt the sciences so often feel for one another, the defense mechanisms they devise to shield themselves against each other's methods, are a kind of professional ideology..." (MS:27-9).

Here Mannheim is alluding to the specific cognitive cultures -- the traditions -- which make up and differentiate the various disciplines. Whereas Popper can take the matter of a critical, rational tradition for granted in the natural sciences, this is only a characteristic of natural science in the modern world. When we recall the origins of modern science, the different results of metaphysical presuppositions underlying ostensibly scientific activity can be seen to produce different kinds of science. The example of the work of those influenced by alchemy comes to mind. Ultimately, the institutionalization of the scientific role as we know it required the emergence of a new conception of man's relationship to and the philosophy of nature which came to be accepted by the most powerful groups competing in society. Such a perspective -- the
myth, as Popper would say -- was necessary for the elimination of previous competing philosophies of nature as serious competitors. To the degree that man is continuous with nature and his interest in such knowledge generally shared, such a conception of science can be directly transferred to human behavior. But to the extent that it is discontinuous, divergent philosophical anthropologies compete to provide the basis for a science of man. Unlike for nature, there has yet to emerge a universally recognized perspective for the philosophy of the human sciences.

For the core propositions of the social sciences which lend themselves to formalization, the direct transfer of the natural scientific attitude does not pose significant problems. But this holds only to the degree that such propositions do not presuppose or contain judgements of values and interpretations of meaning. Yet this very process of methodically removing such meaningful content produces a result whose abstractness prevludes application to the concrete reality within which men live and decide. This is the very reason that the most important sociological questions tend to be also the most intractable: they presume propositions which are so value-empregnated that competing theories are the rule. The philosopher's claim that in principle social science can be ahistorically objective may in some sense be valid, but the very requirements of such objectivity guarantees the assent of all at the expense of facilitating the action of none. (Which raises the question of the value of an epistemology which defines scientific truth with a criterion that assures the practical triviality of the results.)

In short, the existence of multiple traditions in the social sciences cannot be readily eliminated simply by imitation of natural
science. Refinement of the scientific method or of institutions of sciences cannot by themselves come to terms with the problem of multiple perspectives. Mannheim's effort is directed toward the sociological analysis of such traditions in the hope of facilitating the emergence of a transcendent viewpoint.\(^5\)

Having argued that Popper's criticisms of Mannheim's ostensibly "individualistic" epistemology was misguided and that Mannheim's concern with social "perspectives" corresponded to Popper's understanding of the role of "traditions", it is possible to move on to Popper's second charge: that the sociology of knowledge believes in a self-contradictory form of objectivity which can be characterized as "sociotherapy". This conclusion, however, is built upon a series of erroneous assumptions which have already been indicated. On the basis of these corrections of Popper's errors of interpretation it is necessary to re-interpret the significance of Mannheim's comments on the intellectuals. In the course of the remainder of this chapter it will be suggested that Mannheim's conjectures touch upon genuine difficulties in the social sciences and that Popper implicitly takes them into account, even if he glosses over their significance and fails to bring them directly to the attention of his readers.

Popper attempts to refute Mannheim's remarks on the role of the analysis of ideology in social research through the sophistic argument that it is a self-contradictory enterprise, that the intellectuals constitute an interest group and would simply produce another distorted ideology. First he describes this proposal as Mannheim's resolution of the problem of objectivity, as his alternative to skeptical relativism:
... the sociology of knowledge believes that the highest degree of objectivity can be reached by the freely poised intelligence analyzing the various hidden ideologies and their anchorage in the unconscious. The way to true knowledge appears to be the unveiling of unconscious assumptions, a kind of psycho-therapy, as it were, or if I may say so a socio-therapy. Only he who has been socio-analyzed or who has socio-analysed himself, and who is freed from this social complex, i.e. from his social ideology, can attain to the highest synthesis of objective knowledge (OS-II:215).

But, Popper suggests, this method can, like psycho-analysis, be turned upon the sociologist himself:

For is not their description of an intelligentsia which is only loosely anchored in tradition a very neat description of their own social group? ... Is it not, therefore, to be expected ... that those who hold it will unconsciously deceive themselves by producing an amendment to the theory in order to establish the objectivity of their own views? Can we, then take seriously their claim that by their sociological self-analysis they have reached a higher degree of objectivity; and their claim that socio-analysis can cast out total ideology (216)?

Yet this argument depends upon the erroneous assumption that Mannheim equates social "determination" with falsity. It was one of the pioneering aspects of Mannheim's work, however, to have insisted that all thought is socially conditioned, including valid propositions. Mannheim acknowledges that his notion of synthesis is another total ideology, but insists that it would constitute a superior perspective from which to understand historical reality. As a consequence, his remarks on the lack of "attachment" of intellectuals is meant only in a relative sense: that the theorist has more autonomy with respect to his past and circumstances because he takes critical self-reflection and mutual criticism as his vocation. A closer examination of Mannheim's remarks makes this evident.

Mannheim's comments on the role of the intellectuals cannot
be separated from his concern with the problem of a synthesizing perspective that would overcome the proliferation of party schools of thought. Ultimately, this is viewed not simply as a matter of individual "sociotherapy" -- though this might be a byproduct -- but one of institutionalizing a particular tradition to guide social research. For he suggests that the "science of politics" which he seeks would have to be carried out in institutions or specialized institutes. This would not require that teachers be "partyless", but that they be open to careful deliberation and self-criticism (163). Departing from Max Weber's somewhat related conception of political sociology, Mannheim thus rejects the notion of "impartiality" based upon a pure detachment justified by an untenable disjunction of theory and "valuation (163). Contrary to Popper's impressions, Mannheim's concern is with the awareness of partiality and not the resurrection of some abstract notion of impartiality based upon an individualistic epistemology. For Mannheim views ideology criticism as inevitably part of an institutional context and as a critical supplement rather than an alternative to the normative principles of the logic of science.

Only by recognizing the difficulties of such a project in the social sciences, Mannheim argues, will progress be possible:

A problem cannot be solved by obscuring its difficulties, but only by stating them as sharply and as pronouncedly as possible. Hence it is our task definitely to establish the thesis that in politics the statement of a problem and the logical techniques involved vary with the political position of the observer (117).

One of Popper's failures was to have glossed over the significance of such difficulties. For this reason he could not grasp the point of Mannheim's discussion of the possibility of a synthesis
-- an emergent philosophical anthropology -- which might unify the social sciences in a manner analogous to the natural sciences. The paradox of Mannheim's entire discussion of this matter is that it is prospective, based upon a proposed synthesis which had not fully emerged. What he proposes is that if such a synthesis were to appear, it would transcend and encompass all existing viewpoints, would likely arise from the intellectual stratum, and its diffusion and adoption within this group would require a process of self-clarification and introspection as by-products of critical discussion. Without such a consensus-building perspective, however, Mannheim's program for a new kind of objectivity may be translated into an apology for whatever is in fact the dominant perspective.

Mannheim's views here are developed in conjunction with the question of why it is that we have still not witnessed the emergence of a "science of politics". For "in a world which is as permeated by a rationalistic ethos, as is our own, this fact represents a striking anomaly" (11). Now it must be understood that he is using the notion of a "science of politics" in a restrictive sense based upon the distinction between "routine affairs of state" or administration and the non-routinized, irrational matrix of politics within which administrative activities are embedded (113-4). Whereas administrative decisions can be made on the basis of an explicit rule on the analogy of legal decision-making, politics gives rise to a field of events governed by a "process of becoming, in which, in individual cases, decisions have to be made that give rise to new and unique situations" (113). This distinction between "rationalized scheme" and "irrational setting" provides the basis for his
definition of the concept of conduct as "the areas where rationalization has not yet penetrated" and where "the whole problem of the relations between theory and practice arises" (IV:115).

The task of a synthesizing perspective is to guide conduct within the political realm. This would constitute what has been termed a "responsible ideology". For Mannheim this meant overcoming the irreconcilable perspectives characteristic of his age: beaucratic conservatism, conservative historicism, liberal-democratic bourgeois thought, socialist-communist conceptions, and fascism (118). He even relates the objective possibility of a transcendent perspective to the fact of increasing awareness of and ability to analyse these different perspectives:

Just because to-day we are in a position to see with increasing clarity that mutually opposing views and theories are not infinite in number and are not products of arbitrary will but are mutually complementary and derive from specific social situations, politics as a science is for the first time possible. The present structure of society makes possible a political science which will not be merely a party science, but a science of the whole. Political sociology, as the science which comprehends the whole political sphere, thus attains the stage of realization (149).

Having established for himself the historical possibility of such a synthesis, Mannheim then proceeds to conjecture as to the social origins of the creators and carriers of such an integral viewpoint. Thus, he raises the sociological question: "how are we to conceive of the social and political bearers of whatever synthesis there is? What political interest will undertake the problem of synthesis as its task and who will strive to realize it in society" (153)?

First it is acknowledged that "the exponents of synthesis have always represented definite social strata, mainly classes who feel threatened from above and below and who, out of social necessity,
seek a middle way out" (154). But in considering what a dynamic synthesis in his own time would require, Mannheim concluded that none of the existing classes offered any hope of supplying such a universal perspective:

Such an experimental outlook, unceasingly sensitive to the dynamic nature of society and to its wholeness, is not likely to be developed by a class occupying a middle position but only by a relatively classless stratum which is not too firmly situated in the social order (154).

Such a position is most characteristic for the "unanchored, relatively classless stratum", that is, the "socially unattached intelligentsia." This group cannot, he continues, be understood exclusively in socio-economic terms. While its members are socially heterogeneous and drawn from all walks of life, they are loosely bound together by a single common trait: education. This fact allows a progressive repression of traditional social ties such as birth, status, profession, and wealth. Yet "nothing could be more wrong than to misinterpret this view and maintain that the class and status ties of the individual disappear completely by virtue of this" (155).

Why then are we to accept the probability of this stratum of producing such a perspective? Mannheim links this to a crucial distinguishing characteristic of intellectual activity in modern life:

... unlike preceding cultures, intellectual activity is not carried on exclusively by a socially rigidly defined class, such as a priesthood, but rather by a social stratus which is to a large degree unattached to any social class and which is recruited from an increasingly inclusive area of social life. This sociological fact determines essentially the uniqueness of the modern mind, which is characteristically not based upon the authority of the priesthood, which is not closed and finished, but which is rather dynamic, elastic, in a constant state of flux, and perpetually confronted by new problems (156).
Traditionally, this lack of "attachment" has been a source of criticism directed against intellectuals who were seen as a threat against particular interests. Yet two different paths toward commitment have in fact been more characteristic: affiliation with one of the existing classes in conflict or "scrutiny of their own social moorings and the quest for the fulfilment of their mission as the predestined advocate of the intellectual interests of the whole" (IV:158). While he accepts the important role to be played in the first case, Mannheim emphasizes the latter possibility as the basis for his hope for:

... the discovery of the position from which a total perspective would be possible. Thus they might play the part of watchman in what otherwise would be a pitch-black night (160-1).

Ultimately, Popper too puts his voluntaristic faith, not in "science" or even "reason," but the "intellectuals" who offer the prospect of re-integrating what they had previously undermined. As he notes with respect to his own theory of knowledge:

It may be said that this new way of knowing is too abstract and too sophisticated to replace the loss of authoritarian religion. This may be true. But we must not underrate the power of the intellectual and the intellectuals. It was the intellectuals -- the 'second-hand dealers in ideas', as F. A. Hayek calls them -- who spread relativism, nihilism, and intellectual despair. There is no reason why some intellectuals -- some more enlightened intellectuals -- should not eventually succeed in spreading the good news that the nihilist ado was indeed about nothing (OS-II:383).

One of the primary achievements of Mannheim's analysis, however, was to considerably advance the "critical" principle of rationalism, a point Popper does not seem to grasp. Popper simply cannot make sense of the proposition "that epistemology is as intimately enmeshed in the social process as is the totality of our thinking and that it will make progress to the extent that it can
master the complications arising out of the changing structure of thought" (IU:79). Thus Mannheim's distinction between relativism and relationism is not recognized as a possible way of reformulating the problem of objectivity in the light of the fact of conceptual change. Relativism resulted from the discovery of the socio-historical conditioning of thought by those tied to an epistemology whose model of knowledge was static. In response to this crisis Popper elaborates such a relational conception in his analysis of natural science and attempts to transfer it to social science. Within the social sciences, however, this principle is complicated by the multiplicity of viewpoints which must be related. This raises the problem of the most adequate vantage point. As Mannheim poses this question: "which social standpoint vis-a-vis of history offers the best chance for reaching an optimum of truth" (80)? But this presupposes a theory of history and a philosophical anthropology whose function as part of the tradition of social science Popper has been reluctant to recognize. Yet it is apparent this is not inconsistent with his general view of science. He is very much aware that the natural sciences presuppose a common view of nature and seeks to impose a similar one upon the sciences of man. Thus, much of the difference between Mannheim's and Popper's conceptions of objectivity is not so much a logical one as it is a reflection of the different kinds of "reality" described in the natural as opposed to the socio-historical sciences, though it is apparent that biological and human evolution raise similar explanatory problems. Mannheim, of course, would be the first to agree, which is why he rejected from the outset the assumption that the form of explanation in the historical sciences would be identical to that in physics.
Ironically, it is Popper whose position is threatened by the very relativism he so deplored. In placing the problem of historical interpretation in an ambiguous relation to scientific explanation, he runs the risk of implying that one interpretive theory is as good as another, though he draws back from this through the admission that such theories contain some testable elements and differ with respect to their "fertility". But in rejecting the formal scientific status of such theories because they cannot be assimilated into the explanatory paradigm of natural science, he opens the door to irrationalism and leaves unresolved the logical characteristics of adequate historical interpretation. But in practice he does not completely ignore such matters even if he does not face them directly: his theory of the "open society" and his philosophy of "critical rationalism" contain the rudiments of a theory of history and a philosophical anthropology which could serve as a perspective for the social sciences. And this was his ultimate objective as a social philosopher.

These considerations force the conclusion that Popper's analysis of Mannheim's epistemological position completely bypassed the authentic issues. In burdening Mannheim with an individualistic epistemology, Popper engages in outright distortion. This initial assumption then provides the basis for a whole series of criticisms of Mannheim surrounding his conception of the role of perspectives in social science. Yet as we saw, Popper's own theory of science contained an acknowledgement of the importance of traditions in science and the possibility of rationally criticizing them. This is precisely the methodological task of the sociology of knowledge as envisioned by Mannheim. His discussion of the relative autonomy
of intellectuals in modern life provided a sociological account of why it is possible to assume that it is now possible for social scientists to engage in radical self-criticism. It is this very capacity for criticizing traditions and philosophical perspectives that makes possible an advance in the objectivity of social science. Popper's difficulty is that he oversimplifies the problem of the kind of perspective necessary for the social sciences, despite the fact that his own work on the social origins of "historicist" methods is an example of the critical function of the sociology of knowledge. In presenting his philosophy of social science within the framework of his "critical rationalism" and theory of the "open society" he is implicitly acknowledging the need for a philosophical anthropology that makes some sense of human history. But acutely aware of the difficulty of forming a consensus as to the perspective of social science, Popper falls back upon a minimal definition as a realistic means of uniting otherwise divergent interests. Mannheim's aims, on the other hand, are somewhat more utopian. He looks upon the tactic of compromise implicit in such a minimal definition of the task of social science as inadequate either for resolution of the crisis of modern society or the realization of human freedom. Thus, in the contrast between Popper's and Mannheim's characterization of social planning, it is possible to begin to develop the latent differences which emerge despite the broad convergencies in their thinking. This is the topic of the next chapter.
1. Though Popper admits that traditions are subject to rational scrutiny -- and that this is largely a sociological problem, his misunderstanding of the sociology of knowledge obscures that this is one of its major tasks. As a consequence, he rejects the very method essential for the analysis of those traditions necessary for the proper functioning of scientific institutions. The problem of perspectives in the social sciences is the central issue in the "tradition" of social research.

2. Such an analysis

... implies only the suspicion that this assertion might represent a partial view ... but these analyses ... do not by themselves fully reveal the truth because the mere delimitation of the perspectives is by no means a substitute for the immediate and direct discussion between the divergent points of view or for the direct examination of the facts " (IU:284-5) ... (As a consequence) ... epistemology is not supplanted by the sociology of knowledge but a new kind of epistemology is called for which will reckon with the facts brought to light by the sociology of knowledge (294).

Two recent important statements of such a socio-historically aware epistemology are to be found in Habermas (1971) and Toulmin (1972). For an earlier version directed specifically toward the historical sciences see Goldman (1969).

3. On the metaphysical presuppositions of modern science see Buchdahl (1971) and Wartofsky (1968) who have followed up the pioneering work of Koyre and Burtt. For the scientific role see Ben-David (1971).

4. This view assumes, of course, that the difference in this respect is one of degree and not of kind. As Goldmann puts it:

In reality we know today that the difference between the working conditions of 'physicists, chemists and physiologists' and those of sociologists or historians is not one of degree but of kind; at the start of physical or chemical research there is a real and implicit agreement among all classes which make up modern society on the value, the nature and the goal of this research ... In this case, the want of objectivity in the work of a scientist can be due only to personal defects (esprit de systeme, lack of great penetration, impassioned character, vanity, and, at worst, lack of intellectual honesty" (1969:39).
But note this holds only for "pure" science. In the realm of applied science, difficulties related to those of the conflicts within the social sciences emerge.

Assessment of Mannheim's position is not a task of this study. But it is appropriate to note that a pragmatic liberalism, dialectical materialism, and a critical neo-Marxism seem to be the prime contenders for such a universal perspective. Much of the confusion surrounding Mannheim's work stems from the ambiguities of his own eclectic and only partially articulated perspective which stands somewhere between a liberal pragmatic and neo-Marxist position. These unresolved tensions mark the unfinished, experimental character of his work.

In Mannheim's words:

We need not regard it as a source of error that all thought is so rooted. Just as the individual who participates in a complex of vital social relations with other men thereby enjoys a chance of obtaining a more precise and penetrating insight into his fellows, so a given point of view and a given set of concepts, because they are bound up with and grow out of a certain social reality, offer, through intimate contact with this reality, a greater chance of revealing their meaning (IU:80).

The notion of a "responsible ideology" has been defined as follows:

The fully responsible ideology is one in which there is a serious and continuing effort to formulate publicly all of the factors that influence decisions at each stage of inquiry (Connolly, 67:137).

See Lenk (1967) and Nevsuss (1968) for detailed critical analysis of Mannheim's theory of the intellectual stratum. Subsequently, Mannheim came to realize that his position had been misinterpreted. Thus he added:

Let us re-emphasize at this point that intellectuals do not form an exalted stratum above the classes and are in no way better endowed with a capacity to overcome their own class attachments than other groups ... The expression simply alluded to the well-established fact that intellectuals do not react to given issues as cohesively as for example employees and workers do ... After this reminder, my thesis to the easily refutable proposition that the intelligentsia is an exalted stratum above all classes or that it is privy to revelations. In regard to the latter my claim was merely that certain types of intellectuals have a maximum opportunity to test and employ the socially available vistas and to experience their inconsistencies (1953:105-6).
But even in *Ideology and Utopia* this point is clear to the careful reader. There he notes, for instance:

Hitherto all classes have included, in addition to those who actually represented their direct interests, a stratum more oriented towards what might be called the realm of the spirit. Sociologically, they could be called "intellectuals", but for present purpose we must be more precise. We are not referring here to those who bear the outward insignia of education, but to those few among them who consciously or unconsciously, are interested in something else than success (258).

In these terms it is clear that Mannheim's perspective offers a more fundamental critical position which illuminates Popper's incapacity to grasp the implications of the sociology of knowledge despite the fact that his own position, aside from his apparent a priori assumption of the autonomy of logic, had largely converged with that of Mannheim. Popper's heretical version of neo-positivism may be taken as the most daring effort to rescue science from the implications of historicization. He simply could not conceive of anything other than irrationalsim as the alternative to the autonomy of logic. Mannheim was profoundly aware of this kind of concern, but saw it as the expression of the professional mentality of an academic philosophy which sought to construct an epistemology independent of the results of all the special sciences:

Our point is not, therefore, that the sociology of knowledge will, by its very nature, supplant epistemological and noological inquiry, but rather that it has made certain discoveries which have more than a mere factual relevance, and which cannot be adequately dealt with until some of the conceptions and prejudices of contemporary epistemology have been revised ... Under the dominant presuppositions of present-day philosophy it will be impossible to utilize this new insight for epistemology, because modern theory of knowledge is based on the supposition that bare fact-finding has no relevance to validity. Under the sanctions of this article of faith, every enrichment of knowledge arising out of concrete research, which -- seen from a wider point of view -- dares to open up more fundamental considerations, is stigmatized with the phrase "sociologism" ... With the peace of mind that comes from the a priori premise that epistemology is independent of the "empirical" special sciences, the mind is once and for all closed to the insight which a broadened empiricism might bring. The result is that one fails to see that this theory of self-sufficiency, this gesture of self-preservation, serves no other purpose than that of a bulwark for a certain type of academic epistemology which, in its last stages, is attempting to preserve itself from the collapse which might result from a more developed empiricism (IU:288).
As a consequence, for neither Nagel nor Merton -- despite their other criticisms and failure to fully take into account the implications of Mannheim's understanding of perspectives, does the principle of "relationism" imply a skeptical relativism. Nagel goes so far as to argue that "it is difficult to see in what way 'relational objectivity' differs from 'objectivity' without the qualifying adjective and in the customary sense of the word" (1961:501). Merton concurs with the view that:

In expounding his relationist views ... Mannheim has come full circle to his point of departure; so much so that his present observations may be readily assimilated to those by Rickert and Max Weber... the 'particularizing function' of the sociology of knowledge simply assists us in ascertaining the limits within which generalized propositions are valid. What Mannheim calls particularization is, of course, nothing but a new term for a widely recognized methodological precept, namely, that whatever is found true under certain conditions should not be assumed to be true universally or without limits and conditions ...

... Mannheim's conception of "perspectivism" is substantially the same as the Rickert-Weber conception of Wertbeziehung (which holds that values are relevant to the formulation of the scientific problem and choice of materials but are not relevant to the validity of the results) ...

In part, Mannheim's inconsistency in his earlier writings stems from an indefinite distinction between incorrectness (invalidity) and perspective (onesidedness). Perspectival statements are presumably not incorrect, if their author recognizes and allows for their partial nature; they are then simply abstract formulations of certain aspects of the concrete action. They are, however, definitely invalid if they are submitted as significantly complete representations of the phenomena in question (Whitehead's 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness' (1969:559-60).

Nor does Merton see the epistemological implications all that revolutionary, at least for anyone acquainted with American pragmatism:

As for the veritable revolution in the theory of knowledge which sees as deriving from an appropriate extension of Wissenssoziologie, it can be said that in its bold outlines this epistemology has for some time been familiar to the American mind. It is that of Peirce and James, mediated by Dewey and Mead... (562).

Moreover, at least two books in the theory of sociological method take as their point of departure the proposition that "the research techniques and measurement scales of any science can be viewed as a problem in the sociology of knowledge" (Cicourel, 1964:7); cf. Sjoberg and Nett (1968).
Accordingly, the most general epistemological model is perhaps historical. Mannheim outlines the basically Darwinian conception of intellectual change in his essay on "Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon" where he argues that:

... the so-called 'dialectical' (as distinct from the unilinear (continuous) form of evolution and change in mental life can be largely traced back to two very simple structural determinants of social character: to the existence of generations, and to the existence of the phenomenon of competition ... (1952:193).

Popper describes this phenomenon as follows:

All this may be expressed by saying that the growth of our knowledge is the result of a process closely resembling what Darwin called 'natural selection'; that is, the natural selection of hypotheses: our knowledge consists, at every moment, of those hypotheses which have shown their (comparative) fitness by surviving so far in their struggle for existence; a competitive struggle which eliminates those hypotheses which are unfit ... This statement of the situation is meant to describe how knowledge really grows. It is not meant metaphorically, though of course it makes use of metaphors. The theory of knowledge which I wish to propose is a largely Darwinian theory of the growth of knowledge (CK:261).

Within this framework the significance of the valuational or ideological component of the socio-historical sciences becomes fully apparent.

This "evolutionary epistemology" has received important recent treatments and developments in Campbell (1970) and Toulmin (1972).
VII. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PLANNING

In Chapter V, we saw how Popper's caricature of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge as "sociologism" betrayed a profound misunderstanding of its claims and objectives. This lead directly to a consideration of the general epistemological viewpoints of Popper and Mannheim in Chapter VI. Both were in self-conscious revolt against classical (Kantian and empiricist) philosophy with its centering of the problem of objective knowledge on the characteristics of the individual knower. Popper, however, misunderstood Mannheim's comments on the intellectuals as a general statement in the theory of knowledge rather than a sociological explanation of their social theoretical creativity coupled with an appeal for a new, transcendent world view. Moreover, both sought to assimilate the problem posed by history for their respective areas of concern. For Popper this meant an evolutionary conception of scientific "truth" as simply a progressive movement toward a regulative ideal. For Mannheim it assumed the ideal of a relational interpretation of perspectives. Thus both rejected any absolute claims to certitude or truth, introduced dynamic elements into epistemology, and sought to counteract the relativistic, skeptical, and nihilistic tendencies coincident with the breakdown of classical epistemologies. Their resulting evolutionary and historical epistemologies were based upon the natural and the historical sciences respectively. Each had been stimulated by the intellectual revol-
Central Europe: Einstein's theory for Popper and the Hegelian-Marxian tradition for Mannheim. Despite these different starting points, both developed a social epistemology which stressed the traditions and institutions of science and distinguished the peculiar difficulties of introducing scientific controls into historical interpretation.

This general epistemological convergence of Popper and Mannheim was accompanied by remarkably similar formulations of the role of the social sciences in society. Indeed, we find both emphasizing the instrumental and adaptive functions of scientific knowledge. Accordingly, both conclude in response to the rise of totalitarianism that only a self-critical reason as embodied in experimentally guided planning by technical elites provides hope for the preservation of liberal democracy and rationality itself. Yet again Popper persists in his effort to convince the reader of his fundamental divergence from Mannheim. This point is elaborated in a distinction between "piecemeal" and "Utopian" social engineering.

Popper readily acknowledges that the question of the "practical task of the social sciences" provided a common ground of discussion between himself and some historicists, namely, Mannheim (PH:57). The terminological emphasis on "piecemeal" reflects a desire to differentiate his position from that of the the Utopian "collectivist planning" of Mannheim. This point is ultimately based on Popper's theory of knowledge. Only adequately tested -- piece-meal -- knowledge should be the basis for social intervention, he argues. Centralized planning requires types of knowledge which simply do not exist. Even if such knowledge did exist, it could
not be sufficiently centralized in one head in the manner required for decision-making (PH:64). Thus, while it "is easy to centralize power" it is "impossible to centralize all that knowledge which is distributed over many individual minds, and whose centralization would be necessary for the wise wielding of power" (89-90). Precisely this imperfect knowledge makes centralized planning impossible. As a consequence, Popper concludes, all planning is in fact "piecemeal," for "the greater the holistic changes attempted, the greater are the unintended and largely unexpected repercussions, forcing upon the holistic engineer the expedient of piecemeal "improvisation" (68). Nevertheless, the belief in total planning has the 'effect of prejudging decisions in favor of a necessary total reconstruction: "it prejudices the Utopianist against certain sociological hypotheses which state limits to institutional control ..." (69). This is especially the case with the uncertainty created by the "human factor". The only alternative to this sort of uncertainty is coercion and the transformation of man such that he becomes predictable (70). For such planning aims at what Popper describes -- citing phrases from Mannheim out of context -- as remodelling

... the 'whole of society' in accordance with a definite plan or blueprint; it aims at 'seizing the key positions' and at extending 'the power of the State ... until the State becomes nearly identical with 'society', and it aims, furthermore, at controlling from these 'key positions' the historical forces that mould the future of the developing society: either by arresting this development, or else by foreseeing its course and adjusting to it (67).

The task now is to assess Popper's characterization of Mannheim's theory of social planning. Before we turn to the details of this, however, it is necessary to digress for a moment to clarify the central concept of Popper's critique: historicism.
In the first pages of *The Poverty of Historicism* Popper provides this succinct definition of his subject:

... I mean by 'historicism' an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 'rhythms' or the 'patterns', the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history (PH:3).

The importance of such beliefs is underscored by his conviction that "such historicist doctrines of method are at bottom responsible for the unsatisfactory state of the theoretical social sciences (other than economic theory) ..." (3). He concedes that he is using a type construct which does not correspond to any existing doctrine. Rather, he suggests that he has constructed the best possible case for a number of interrelated ideas which share common elements which have repeatedly appeared during periods of rapid social change and conflict. By introducing such an unfamiliar label, he had hoped to avoid merely verbal quibbles:

... for nobody, I hope, will be tempted to question whether any of the arguments here discussed really or properly or essentially belong to historicism, or what the word 'historicism' really or properly means (4).

This hope has in fact been dashed, the term "historicism" has been subject to considerable commentary in which Popper's interpretation has been subject to severe criticism.

At least five basic contexts of use have been identified (Lee and Beck, 1954). The first refers to the general reaction against 18th century rationalism and is associated with the emergence of genetic-historical types of analysis as the basis of explanation and evaluation. This involved in part emphasis on development and individuality in place of the stability of human
nature and reason characteristic of the natural law theorists. In this sense, the term refers to an "age" or period of European history (568-70). The second meaning refers to the specific school of historiography which became the source of a methodical elaboration of aspects of this "historicist" tradition. This German Historismus came to embody a *Weltanschauung* as well (570). This movement, though indebted to Hegel in many ways, was anti-Hegelian, especially in its rejection of historical dynamics. The central notion emerging of the culminating figures of this tradition -- Troeltsch and Meinicke -- is an emphasis on the individuality of events and the intuitive and sympathetic understanding of the historian who is also part of the historical stream he attempts to describe. Thus, "historicism for Meinicke is a way of looking at life and the world -- a *Weltanschauung* -- but it is not a deterministic philosophy of history. Life is too fluid and too concrete for that. In short, his historicism is historicising of life and enlivening of history" (571).

A third version has been described as the 'historicization of philosophy' and is manifested in the work of Croce and Collingwood. For Croce historicism becomes "the affirmation that life and reality are history and history alone." Collingwood's related thinking, while stopping short of such a formulation, does involve an attempt to free history from science through the notion of history as the history of thought (572-3).

A fourth sense identifies "historicism" with historical relativism and relationism with explicit reference to Mannheim (573-4). This definition, however, corresponds to what Popper
referred to as either "sociologism" or "historism". As he put it:

A theory of this kind which emphasizes the sociological dependence of our opinions is sometimes called sociologism; if the historical dependence is emphasized, it is called historism (OS-II:208).

The final sense of historicism is Popper's where it is associated with historical prediction. In the light of the above variations of meaning, it is understandable that the reviewers of the history of the concept suggest:

... Popper's use of the term 'historicism' to mean a methodology that 'aims at historical prediction' would seem unfortunate because almost all the proponents of historicism repudiate any search for 'laws' in the physical science sense, and hence deny that history offers a basis for prediction (Lee and Beck, 1954:577).

This conclusion, however, only holds for what Popper terms "naturalistic" historicism, as we shall see. For he also distinguishes a less obvious "anti-naturalistic" variety which prophesizes without invoking the natural scientific model. This suggests a closer examination of Popper's application of the concept is required in order to assess his version. In any case, for expository convenience, Popper's distinction between "historicism" and "historism" will be followed with the above definitions in mind.

Aside from these definitional matters, Popper's use of the term historicism suffers from a serious inconsistency. Within its strict deterministic sense the idea of "historicism" has some use as a description of a particular variety of philosophy of history. In its anti-naturalistic form this is manifested in an inexorable, intuitionally perceived destiny; in its naturalistic form it asserts a single law of historical evolution. In the first instance the form of explanation is prophetic and in the second it
is predictive. Popper dismisses the first as sheer mysticism. As for the second, which he takes more seriously because of its scientific pretensions, he argues that it indiscriminately applies the concept of a scientific law to a unique event. This rejection of the principle of such a "law of the evolution of society" is persuasive and need not detain us. His argument is simple and cogent: 1) that historical evolution is a single, unique event and cannot be described in terms of a single law any more than can biological evolution (PH:108-9); and 2) that the future course of history cannot be predicted because of the impossibility of predicting the future growth of scientific knowledge (vi-viii). At the same time he admits the legitimacy of trend statements with the proviso that they do not constitute scientific laws. The failure to understand this, he claims, is the primary confusion underlying "historicism" (115-6).

Yet how many philosophers of history have really held to such prophetic and predictive views? Certainly not as many as Popper would have us believe. Apparently, he is reacting to the popular vulgarizations of historical theories prevalent in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In his case, the views of Spengler and of "vulgar" Marxism were the two most influential in the period in which he resided in Austria. The difficulty is that as the historical "determinism" of social theorists departs from the pure type of history-as-a-law, it becomes increasingly questionable to label them as such. At what point does an historical interpretation become non-historicist?

In polemically polarizing the dichotomy of scientific explanation and historicist mystification and pseudo-science, Popper
failed to develop his analysis of historical interpretation of the non-historicist variety. In failing to elaborate this issue, he leaves many readers with the impression that anyone who makes an effort to provide a dynamic description of society is an "historicist". But this is not quite the case as we have seen in his acknowledgement of the practical importance of "historical interpretations". What he objects to is that historicists present them as scientific laws rather than as "more or less interesting points of view ... which are fundamentally on the same level of both suggestiveness and arbitrariness (even though some of them may be distinguished by their fertility -- a point of some importance)" (151). We are given no firm indication of the criteria by which we might determine such "fertility". In logically severing the question of explanation of the historical process from scientific explanation in general, he leaves completely open the matter of the logical nature and status of such interpretive "theory" and opens the way for the relativism he fears. As we have seen, this is a matter which Mannheim has given considerable attention to under the heading of "perspectives".

Popper's tendency to reify the concept of historicism and stretch it to accommodate any historical theory he does not like results in an ambiguity of meaning which becomes most apparent in his discussion of "utopian historicism". Such thought is characteristic of theorists like Plato and Marx (and Mannheim) who combine, he suggests, a faith in historical prediction with a desire to control or speed up the historical process. For instance, Plato had a pessimistic view of history in which change was identified with decay so he projected a "Utopian blueprint" which would arrest change
altogether. This constituted, according to Popper, what amounts to a static, as opposed to the dynamic Marxist version, of the fusion of "historicism" and "activism" (FH:73). For Marxists, a historical sociology can even be interpreted as a kind of technology which may help (as Marx put it) to 'shorten and lessen the birth pangs' of a new historical period" (71). What makes possible such a fusion of perfectionist, voluntarist, and determinist elements? The source, Popper suggests, is a shared methodological "holism". This method is also the basis of the "moral historicism" also characteristic of Utopians and historicists: "both believe that their aims or ends are not a matter of choice, or of moral decision, but that they may be scientifically discovered by them within their fields of inquiry" (74).

This contradictory "Utopian historicism" calls into question the initial definition of "historicism" as faith in the law of history. For we are left with the prospect of voluntaristic historicists who would stop, spped-up, and/or control history! Popper would have perhaps benefited from a more refined typology of philosophies of history. In this case he might have admitted a type of interpretation of history which argued that without self-conscious human intervention that historical change would necessarily, on the basis of rationally describable and partially testable processes, proceed in a particular direction. But this would be more akin to what he calls "trend statements", a method of analysis which he finds perfectly acceptable.

The bankruptcy of Popper's conceptual monism becomes fully apparent in his analysis of Mannheim's "utopian historicism". As Popper avers with respect to Mannheim's work: it is "the most
elaborate exposition of a holistic and historicist programme known to me" (67). For it represents the threat posed by collectivist planning, the theoretical consequence of an "unholy alliance" between historicism and Utopianism. Thus, Mannheim's conjectures on the place of the social sciences in the social planning process are attacked for: 1) an irrational sociological theory of knowledge; 2) historicism; 3) holistic methods, and 4) moral Utopianism.

The task of the remainder of this chapter is to assess the validity of these charges in the light of Popper's own critical principles.

1. For Popper one of the flaws of Mannheim's proposals for social planning is that it "occurs in closest alliance with a doctrine which is definitely opposed to rationalism" -- the sociology of knowledge (OS-II:212-3). His alternative is to bypass questions based on an irrational theory of knowledge, "to forget all about the verbal fireworks and to tackle the practical problems of our time with the help of the theoretical methods which are fundamentally the same in all sciences" (222). This stems from his erroneous belief that Mannheim suggests that aloofness and detachment are the basis of objectivity in social research. Popper creates the impression of an opposition between his own advocacy of empirical procedures and Mannheim's interest in the sociology of knowledge:

As opposed to this, the sociology of knowledge hopes to reform the social sciences by making the social scientist aware of the social forces and ideologies which unconsciously beset him (222).

More accurately Popper might have said "in addition to this." For as has been demonstrated previously Mannheim was very much aware of the principles of scientific method applied to the social sciences.
What he sought to do was move one step beyond this by asking about how the application of such methods occurred in a social and historical framework. Only by asking questions of this kind is Popper going to be able to understand why in fact the social sciences are underdeveloped and the particular forms that underdevelopment takes. Only with such research would it be possible to establish clear guidelines as to exactly what kind of "democratic institutions" are necessary for the progress of social science and what progress would actually mean.

I It is difficult to see how Popper can persist in the assertion that Mannheim disassociated "will" and "interest" from "theory" and "practice" when Mannheim's entire effort to establish the basis for a "science of politics" assumes that interest and cognition are ultimately inseparable. Moreover, the volume Man and Society is devoted primarily to a consideration of the importance of social technology for social control of the planning process. Mannheim's call for a relative detachment relates to another question, that of perspectives; and is a response to his awareness of the dangers of a non-critical pragmatism totally confined to immediate practical interests.

Far from there being any opposition between the sociology of knowledge and Popper's conception of "piecemeal" planning they are in fact complementary. While indeed "self analysis is no substitute for those practical actions which are necessary for establishing the democratic institutions which alone can guarantee the freedom of thought, and the progress of science" (OS-II:223), this is not the specific task, but rather one of the byproducts of such sociological
analysis. Popper can appeal only to "reason", a reason which has ceased to be self-critical because it refuses to acknowledge itself as something less than completely autonomous.

The absurdity of Popper's interpretation of the implications of the principle of the social conditioning of knowledge and of behavior in general is revealed by his interpretation of the following statement by Mannheim who writes:

There is an increasing tendency towards making conscious the factors by which we have so far been unconsciously ruled ... Those who fear that our increasing knowledge of determining factors may paralyse our decisions and threaten "freedom" should put their minds at rest. For only he is truly determined who does not know the most essential determining factors but act immediately under the pressure of determinants unknown to him (Cited OS-II:223; cf. IU:180).

To this Popper replies:

Now this is clearly just a repetition of a pet idea of Hegel's which Engels naively repeated when he said: 'Freedom is the appreciation of necessity.' And it is a reactionary prejudice. For are those who act under the pressure of well-known determinants, for example of political tyranny, made free by their knowledge (OS-II:223)?

What he fails to note is that Mannheim adds in his following sentence:

Whenever we become aware of a determinant which has dominated us, we remove it from the realm of unconscious motivation into that of controllable, calculable, and objectified. Choice and decision are thereby not eliminated; on the contrary, motives which previously dominate us become subject to our domination ... (IU:189-90).

Running throughout Mannheim's work is the assumption that knowledge serves as the basis for action. For Popper to accuse Mannheim of Hegelian quietism -- "that freedom is the appreciation of necessity" -- is misguided. Mannheim's voluntarism is fundamental to his whole theory of planning:
... the man of to-day has far more freedom in the determination of his destiny than the unsociological ethics of the past would have us believe... Rightly understood, recent tendencies towards a mass society, and our ever increasing awareness of the determinism of sociological factors do not release us from responsibility for the future; responsibility increases with every advance in the course of history, and has never been greater than it is to-day (MS: 381).

2. Mannheim is taken up by Popper in the context of the "anti-naturalist" variety of historicism which implies that he is guilty of the "prophetic" rather than "predictive" impulse. The central piece of evidence used to sustain this charge of Mannheim's belief in historical prophecy is his frequent assertion of the inevitability of planning. Thus as one of the advocates of "Utopian planning", he is used by Popper to illustrate the point that they "tell us that planning is simply inevitable, owing to the direction in which history is proceeding; and that we must plan, whether we like it or not" (PH: 75). And indeed, this thesis does underlie Mannheim's concerns in Man and Society:

It seems to the writer that after studying the matter from many angles and weighing the different interpretations of the changes of the last decade, we are bound to come to the conclusion that in the period before us, planning will be inevitable. We naturally hope it will take a very different form from that conceived by the dictatorships... Given this assumption there is no longer any choice between planning and laisser-faire, but only between good planning and bad (6).

But is this an example of "historicism"? Certainly, it does assume a particular interpretation of history which Mannheim links in part to a notion of "three fundamental stages in the history of thought" (150). These are the stages of "chance discovery", "inventing" and "planning". In the first custom and tradition rule and discovery is based exclusively on chance. Natural selection
tended to preserve those groups which can retain and transmit those findings with adaptive significance. At the second stage, "single tools and institutions were consciously modified and then directed towards particular goals" (151). Yet in this stage, which brought forth the development of technology culminating in the industrial revolution, conscious regulation by society is minimal. Though Mannheim considered this "inventing" stage still to be dominant, he anticipated an incipient transition to the third or planning stage where

... man and society advance from the deliberate invention of single objects or institutions to the deliberate regulation and intelligent mastery of the relationships between these objects ... The most decisive change occurs when man awakes to the necessity of regulating these gaps between existing relationships and when, in response to this, new patterns of thought arise (152-3).

Now Mannheim explicitly denies that this kind of analysis is intended as a form of prophecy:

None of us can clearly prophesy to-day what form the society of the future will take. But we know from history that even what is radically new in the contemporary situation is usually only one factor in the later reality, for history always has more forces at work than reformers who look for a single panacea are willing to admit (13).12

This statement expresses Popper's sentiments exactly. Moreover, when we recall Popper's criticism of Marx, we find that it is the inaccuracy of his supposed predictions that are the problem. For Popper is concerned to emphasize that the failure of the socialists to have anticipated the need for social technology was largely responsible for their failure once they gained power. This is precisely the argument that Mannheim uses to justify his emphasis on the importance of developing the technology of planning.14

Upon closer examination we find both Mannheim and Popper
speaking of a "third way" between the polarized views of history as inexorable laws versus history as blind chance. For instance, Mannheim speaks of the "post-mortem point of view of the specialized historians" which is "based on the idea that the present cannot be scientifically studied because it is still in the process of emergence and that it is impossible to know which series of facts is really important" (MS:186). On the other hand, there are those political groups which similarly oppose the scientific attitude in that they assume that they have certain knowledge of the outcome of current trends:

Thus they renounce the experimental attitude in favour of a prophetic one ... What it really does when it claims to grasp the significance of events which are taking place and to render unproblematic what is really problematic is no more than to describe dogmatically what will happen in terms of its own wishes" (189).

In short, we find Mannheim shares Popper's hostility toward "naturalistic" historicism. Rather, he calls for a synthesis of these two approaches guided by the experimental attitude:

Besides the post-mortem approach to history and the prophetic attitude of determined politicians, we must plead for a third method of observation which is in statu nascendi and proceeds in terms of an experimental attitude. A method of approach must be developed which treats the horizon of expectations as an open horizon, and not as a map which charts already established facts ... We, however, who are on the point of traversing a new section of our history, must find the way for ourselves. But we cannot build our roads just as we please. Faced with such obstacles, men in the age of magic would have tried to compel the hidden forces to act as they wished. In a later age of religious fatalism, though active in carrying out individual undertakings, sought to leave events as a whole in the hands of God. The essential attitude of the planning age seems to be synthesis of these two types of approach. Once more it displays the courage to intervene in the interplay of fundamental forces; on the other hand it inherits something of the humility of the religious mind in that it does not pretend to act as a creator of these forces, but rather as a strategist, who only watches over the factors as work in society in order to detect
the new possibilities which are coming to the surface at the proper moment, and to reinforce them at those points where vital decisions must be made (190).

Similarly, Popper's "third possibility":

It appears that one of the motives of historicism is that the historicist does not see that there is a third alternative, besides the two which he allows: either that the world is ruled by superior powers, by an 'essential destiny' or Hegelian 'Reason', or that it is a mere wheel of chance, irrational, on the level of a gamble. But there is a third possibility: that we may introduce reason into it ... that although the world does not progress, we may progress, individually as well as in co-operation (GS-II:366, fn. 27).

For Mannheim, however, this introduction of reason entails a theory of the historical process and the development of instruments to guide it. This is Popper's view as well, though he does not seem to clearly heed Mannheim's injunction that "we cannot build our roads just as we please" (MS:190).

Popper acknowledged the need for what he called "historical interpretations" even though he carefully distinguished them from scientific theories. His own work in the social sciences, especially his theory of the "open society" -- constitutes just such a philosophy of history. Apparently both he and Mannheim agree that something like a "third way" is possible and that this represents a more rational and scientific answer to the questions posed. Under the heading of what he termed "perspectives" Mannheim considered such interpretations and concluded they could not be assimilated into the formal model of scientific explanation. As a consequence, though empirical evidence and tests of propositions were important, by themselves they could not force a choice of theories. It was in this context that he suggested that the intellectual, with his
relative autonomy, self-critical habits, and broader field of vision, was the most likely source of a more all-encompassing historical interpretation. And it was this suggestion that Popper took to be as proof of Mannheim's belief in an individualistic epistemology. Yet when we see Popper turn to the peculiar difficulties of "objectivity" in historical interpretations, where formal tests do not suffice to resolve all conflicts, he moves very close to Mannheim's previously denounced "sociotherapy":

The main thing is to be conscious of one's point of view, and critical, that is to say, to avoid, as far as this is possible, unconscious and therefore uncritical bias in the presentation of the facts. In every other respect, the interpretation must speak for itself; and its merits will be its fertility, its ability to elucidate the facts of history, as well as its topical interests, its ability to elucidate the problems of the day (OS-II:268).

In short, Popper has moved full circle to embrace Mannheim's position without, however, being aware of the fact. For the sociology of knowledge provides an excellent means of identifying such "unconscious and therefore uncritical bias" and thus assumes an important place in the methodology and philosophy of the historical sciences. Moreover, Mannheim is no more of a historicist than Popper himself in that both reject historical prophecy and irrationalism and advocate the application of reason to the understanding and control of historical forces.

3. Popper defines the pejorative methodological term "holism" through a differentiation of two different senses of the "whole" in social science:

a) the totality of all the properties or aspects of a thing, and especially of all the relations holding between its constituent parts, and

b) certain special properties or aspects of the things in question, namely those which make it appear an organized structure rather than a 'mere heap' (PH:76).
While accepting the legitimacy of b) as a scientific procedure exemplified by Gestalt psychology, he rejects the first because "if we wish to study a thing, we are bound to select certain aspects of it" (77). Referring specifically to Mannheim he adds:

But the fact that wholes in the sense of totalities cannot be made the object of scientific study, or of any other activity such as control or reconstruction, seems to have escaped the holists, even those of them who admit that, as a rule, science is selective (78).

As a consequence:

The doctrine that we may obtain a kind of concrete knowledge of 'reality itself' is a well known part of what can be technically described as mysticism; and so is the clamour for 'wholes' (78, fn. 3).

First of all, it is clear that Mannheim is one of those who recognizes that "science is selective". As he describes his "evaluative" approach to history:

It is with this type of sociological approach to history that we identify ourselves ... Such a method of diagnosing an epoch, thought it may begin non-evaluatively, will not long remain so. We shall be forced eventually to assume an evaluative position. The transition to an evaluative point of view is necessitated from the very beginning by the fact that history as history is unintelligible unless certain of its aspects are emphasized in contrast to others. This selection and accentuation of certain aspects of historical totality may be regarded as the first step in the direction which ultimately leads to an evaluative procedure and to ontological judgments (IU:93-4; emphasis added).

The very concept of "perspective" in Mannheim, like that of "historical interpretation" in Popper, assumes the partiality of each explanation, though their equality is rejected. To accept their equality would imply a total relativism; to acknowledge their partiality is simply to deny any claim to absolute cognitive status. In words reminiscent of Popper in this regard, Mannheim argues:
Hence it has become extremely questionable whether, in the flux of life, it is a genuinely worthwhile intellectual problem to seek to discover fixed and immutable ideas or absolutes ... it is nothing less than shocking to discover that those persons who claim to have discovered an absolute are usually those persons who also pretend to be superior to the rest (87).

Mannheim links the notion of a selective view of the total structure of phenomenon to the idea of a "genuine" empiricism:

Genuine sociological empiricism can never consist of piecemeal observation but must always include theoretical reconstruction of the nature of the whole process as well as an emphasis on petty details ... facts and structure are continuously related to each other and facts only become more than data if their function in the whole mechanism is adequately realized, for it is the total structure of society alone which reveals the real function and meaning of the parts (M5:26). 18

It is for this reason that Mannheim argues the priority of this view of the total structure as the evaluative guide for the selection and implementation of actual empirical studies of the kind Popper advocates:

The forced imposition of mathematical and mensurative methods has gradually led to a situation in which certain sciences no longer ask what is worth knowing but regard as worth knowing only what is measurable. As against this point of view we should insist that in the social sciences we are absolutely bound to concern ourselves with the immediate task of the total social situation, and that can only be adequately grasped through qualitative analysis ... Quantitative analysis cannot take place until a qualitative analysis has been made (185).

These considerations suggest that Mannheim can be considered a "holist" only in the degree to which Popper is willing to admit his concept of "historical interpretation" necessarily involves "holism" in the illegitimate sense. Both seek to guide the application of science to social reality on the basis of such interpretations. As a consequence, the major difference between Popper and Mannheim's conception of this role of the social sciences begins with their
somewhat divergent theories of history and most especially the concept of freedom implicit in them.

This conclusion is reinforced when we examine Mannheim's theory of planning. Though Popper castigates it as "holisitic", it is clear that Mannheim has benefited from the lesson of Stalinism as much as Popper. Thus the allegation that Mannheim speaks of a "blueprint" ignores his many statements to the contrary. This point is carefully developed in the distinction between "founding" and "planning". The founding of a city, for instance, takes place in an abstract milieu and thus can be patterned after a blueprint (191). On the other hand:

In this sense society as a whole can never be established or founded, for the elements of which it is constructed are always found in a certain historical relationship ... establishment proceeds from a fixed and finished scheme which exists in the minds of the founders before it is carried out, and like the Fichtian ideas it is translated from this supersensory condition into actual fact ... Planning, on the other hand, begins with the use of what is immediately available. The ends, means, and foundations of planning exist on the same plane of historical reality ... (192).

Unlike administration of completely organized structures, such planning is political in that it is concerned with gaining control over historical forces previously regulated only by conflict and competition. In these circumstances Mannheim acknowledges that dogmatism and the effort to plan every detail must be avoided at all costs:

The real danger in planned thinking is that instead of constantly experimenting, it tends to turn into a rigid system. 'Dogmatism' on the planning level is nothing but a mistaken view of planning as being a purely theoretical scheming. In planning the highest level of experimental thought and conduct is reached ... Doctrinaire, rigid consistency is useless when we enter into what is still unknown ... But in spite of this it is possible to press
forward intellectually, in a spirit of inquiry. This reckoning with facts which are not yet fully understood from the intellectual point of view is by no means to be confused with the thoughtlessness which to-day calls itself irrationalism. In our present historical situation planned thinking counterbalances this growing and ever more destructive irrationality (MS:234-5).

Mannheim's conception of planning as an experimentally guided activity based on imperfect knowledge coincides with Popper's. For both "planning for freedom" is the only rational alternative to increasing irrationalism. Where they part is over the "freedom" to be realized.

4. From Popper's point of view perhaps the most serious criticism of Mannheim's conception of planning is its "moral historicism." This term refers to the historical relativism implicit in the sociological view of moral categories as a product of historical circumstances. This position denies, Popper holds, the possibility of any positive ethical theory except to the extent that one assumes the possibility of scientific historical prophecy. Such foresight provides the basis for knowledge of the morality of the emergent historical context (OS-II:202-4). But as Popper concludes, "there is no prophetic sociology to help us in selecting a moral system!" (208). Thus he takes Mannheim's proposal that planning is an historical necessity as an attitude which suggests that the most reasonable course of action "is to adjust one's system of values as to make it conform to impending changes" (PH:54-5). Unlike the piecemeal technologist and engineer for whom values are a matter of "decision":

... the historicist and the Utopianist ... both believe that their aims or ends are not a matter of choice, or of moral decision, but that they may be scientifically discovered ... Both the historicist and the Utopianist believe that they can find out what the true aims or ends of 'society' are; for example, by determining its historical tendencies, or by diagnosing 'the needs of their time" (74-5).
Now it is true that Mannheim, especially in some of his earlier writings, exhibited a degree of such "moral historicism". But with the rise of totalitarianism he shifted away from the assumption that all moral systems had a meaningful and necessary relationship to the totality of the historical process. This culminated in a more voluntaristic stance which viewed totalitarianism as an aberration of rather than a necessary stage of historical development. The relationship between the sociology of value and philosophical ethics remained, however, a tension in his thought which was never fully resolved. This is a crucial problem given his own belief that every perspective begins and is based upon evaluative presuppositions. In short, he never carefully articulated the principles upon which his own position rested.

Granted the difficulties posed by effort to break out of the dilemmas imposed by the denial of extra-historical autonomy to ethical theory, this does not mean that Mannheim took the further step of assuming that knowledge of the laws of history solved the problem. For Mannheim such analysis of values is retrospective rather than prospective: the historical sociologist can begin to comprehend historically adaptive value changes in the past but can only conjecture in the present. There is nothing in Mannheim of the "true aims or ends of 'society'". What then are we to make of his effort to "diagnose" the crisis of modern society? In what sense does this imply "moral historicism" in Popper's pejorative sense? Moreover, does this coupling of moral imperative with estimates of social trends differ from Popper's own efforts along this line?
There is every indication that Popper assumes a close link between his theory of history and the restriction on the range of value choices this implies. He shows a tendency to adjust his values to the "needs of the time". For instance, despite his distrust of all state authority, he advocates a program of social engineering on the grounds that without such intervention movements like those of the communists and fascists will provide the alternative. This analysis and justification is analogous to that of Mannheim's. This becomes even clearer when we note Popper's emphasis that

... progress rests with us, with our watchfulness, with our efforts, with the clarity of our conception of our ends, and with the realism of their choice (OS-II:280; emphasis added).

The notion of "realistic choice" is an echo of "moral historicism" which presumes that it is in fact possible to discover the actual trends of social development which render some value aspirations unrealistic and illusory. It is difficult to see the essential difference in the structure of the arguments of Popper and Mannheim in this respect. Their differences reflect somewhat different conceptions of the historical process and the scope of the freedom which both assume to be the ultimate goal of such choices. For both value claims had to be justified with respect to both some kind real historical constraints and ultimate value claims -- freedom -- which were ethical-philosophical.

The differences between Mannheim and Popper's philosophy of history are not fundamental. For both the process of "rationalization" constitutes the most significant expression of the historical process. The possibility of science and of social technology
thus represents the most recent expression of the achievements of human reason. Mannheim is, to be sure, more aware of the social constraints upon the development of this process of rationalization and this leads him to emphasize a greater role for social science in suggesting the kinds of structural and institutional changes which would facilitate a more aware populace. But as we have seen, Popper is not oblivious to the institutional and traditional basis of reason and science and would not in principle be opposed to this kind of "planning for freedom" without contradicting his own arguments.

But there is a fundamental division between them with respect to the objective of such rationalization, that is, individual freedom. It is this difference above all which perhaps lies at the source of Popper's instinctive reaction against Mannheim's proposals despite the remarkable similarity of their other views on social science. For both take rather distant positions on the continuum of "positive" and "negative" freedom. It is here that their divergent philosophical starting points -- neo-positivism and neo-idealism -- exert a final check on the movement of their thinking toward a shared conception of the task of social science in advanced industrial societies.

Popper defines his conception of individual freedom in contrast to the "radicalism" of those like Plato and Marx who seek to impose an "aesthetic" ideal of society and personality:

This sweep, this extreme radicalism of the Platonic approach (and of the Marxian as well) is, I believe, connected with its aestheticism, i.e. with the desire to build a world which is not only a little better and more rational than ours, but which is free from all its ugliness: not a crazy quilt, an old garment badly patched, but an entirely new gown, a really beautific new world.
... But here I must protest. I do not believe that human lives may be made the means for satisfying an artist's desire for self-expression. We must demand, rather, that every man should be given, if he wishes, the right to model his life himself, as far as this does not interfere too much with others (08-I:164-5; emphasis added).

As a consequence, he projects only negative goals -- a negative utilitarianism -- to guide the work of piecemeal engineering:

... every generation of men, and therefore the living, have a claim; perhaps not so much a claim to be made happy, for there are no institutional means of making a man happy, but a claim not to be made unhappy, where it can be avoided. They have claim to be given all possible help, if they suffer. The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest good (158).

As opposed to this, "Utopian engineering" assumes that for action to be rational ultimate political aims must be decided upon before planning can begin (157). But since such a Utopian blueprint cannot be decided upon by purely rational or scientific methods, coercion and violence become the only alternative (CR:359). Only with a more limited goal such as the elimination of suffering is there only hope of gaining the necessary consensus for democratic action.

It is not clear, however, that Mannheim represents a case of the kind of "Utopianism" that Popper is warning against. For instance, Manhheim agrees that the ultimate aim of a planned society cannot be agreed upon democratically, but suggests that "we must ... ask ourselves whether it is not possible to find the mean between the two extremes of absolute indeterminateness of social aims and the dictatorial imposition of a closed system of dogmas" (MS:346).
But this suggestion is offered in anticipation of the kinds of alternatives that might be available in the situations which would raise such questions. War and economic upheaval would be the most likely occasion for the necessity of such a choice (346-7). Such suggestions are not directed simply toward the realization of "aesthetic" ideals but as necessary for adapting to the breakdown of an unregulated society.

Not that Mannheim is not critical of the proponents of "liberal freedom". For as he notes:

No answer is given to the simple question: "freedom for what?" Instead, freedom is described in negative terms as the non-intervention of the state in the private life of the individual, or in the form of maxims which merely limit its range, as in the dictum that individual freedom of action is only restricted as far as is necessary to prevent it encroaching on the freedom of others (346).

Yet he does not propose a specific ideal of personality as the objective of freedom, but seeks instead to decide the social prerequisites of individual choice:

Planning for freedom does not mean prescribing a definite form which individuality must take, but having both the knowledge and experience to decide what kind of education, what kind of social groups and what kind of situations afford the best chance of kindling initiative, the desire to form one's own character and decide one's own destiny (265).

As a consequence, he regards the liberal ideal of personality as one of the valuable contributions of liberalism:

... from the wreckage of liberalism nothing can be saved but its values, among others, the belief in a free personality. But its technique, which is based on the principle of laissez-faire, is gone forever ... Thus the old ideal of freedom can only be attained by the technique of planning for freedom.

Freedom and democracy can no longer be preserved through the idle praise of abstract principles by men who are entirely ignorant of the social techniques which could render them effective ... (363).
With Popper he acknowledges:

There is, of course, one question which we can never answer scientifically, namely: What are the unique and individual paths which a given person must follow to attain a rational and moral way of life (MS:51)?

Most importantly, the realization of these values if for Mannheim a matter of will and choice and not a matter of historical destiny:

To predict is the task of prophets, and every prophecy of necessity transforms history into a purely deterministic system, depriving us thereby of the possibility of choice and decision ... The only form in which the future presents itself to us is that of possibility, while the imperative, the "should", tells us which of these possibilities we should choose. As regards knowledge, the future -- in so far as we are not concerned with the purely organized and rationalized part of it -- presents itself as an impenetrable medium, an unyielding wall. And when our attempts to see through it are repulsed, we first become aware of the necessity of willfully choosing our course and, in close connection with it, the need for an imperative (a utopia) to drive us onward (IU:260).

And as he admits:

The chances of achieving this new society, to be sure, are limited. It is not absolutely predetermined. But this is just where our new freedom begins (MS:380).

Even though Popper is unwilling to entertain such a broad understanding of freedom as a practical objective, he concludes on a similarly voluntaristic note:

Although history has no ends, we can impose these ends of ours upon it; and although history has no meaning, we can give it a meaning ... Instead of posing as prophets we must become the makers of our fate (OS-II:278-80).
NOTES: CHAPTER VII

1 This is not to say that they succeeded in developing an adequate analysis on the relationship between the formal and historical sciences. Perhaps this interest has been most notably advanced in the recent work of Toulmin, Habermas, and Althusser. Each works within a distinct philosophical tradition and comparison of their positions is difficult.

2 The theme of economic planning constituted one of the central concerns of social theorists throughout the 1930's and 1940's, first in response to the Depression and the Russian experiments and later in anticipation of war and post-war reconstruction. The survival of regulated (but planned) capitalist economies in the post-war period was accompanied by a decline of interest in such issues at the theoretical level. But the continuous development of new planning techniques whose use was largely confined to large private corporations and military organizations gave some indication remarkable breakthroughs in planning capabilities. The emergence of an "environmental crisis" after two decades of spectacular economic growth reflected both changing sensibilities and the fact of resource constraints which provide a new basis for the necessity of economic planning. Thus, the adaptation of biological concepts such as "steady-state" have increasingly become the basis for a theoretical re-examination of the question of "total" or "systems" planning. As a consequence the question of societal guidance has re-emerged as a central theme of political sociology. For a brief review of the earlier version of the question see Sartori (1965:384-415); important recent theoretical considerations of societies as self-guided cybernetic or learning systems have been provided by the sociologist Etzioni (1968) and the economist Dunn (1971). The implications of cybernetics for social theory and philosophy has been extensively discussed by a number of West Germans; the actual development of the techniques has been largely American. Mannheim's concerns are no longer anachronistic, nor is "Utopianism" quite what it used to be.

3 The development of modern computers and systems technologies offers the prospect of centralizing knowledge as well as power. To this extent, Popper's and Hayek's case here has been undermined by technological advance. For a more sophisticated restatement of this position which takes such factors into account, see Dahrendorf's essay "Uncertainty, Science, and Democracy" (1968:232-55).

4 Though Mannheim elaborates some of his ideas on planning in more detail in later work, especially the posthumous Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning (1950), Man and Society states his basic position.
Since this latter book is Popper's primary source, examination of his criticisms of Mannheim will be based largely on the same text.

5 This is a dubious thesis whose opposite is more likely. The historical concerns of the social sciences began to decline in English-speaking social thought with the revolt against Darwinism in the 1920's. The recognition during the past few years that "social change" has been a neglected area of research confirms this point. It would seem that the "historicists" were dealing with genuine problems even if they did not provide adequate solutions. A more plausible thesis as to the unsatisfactory state of the theoretical social sciences would probably be more sociological than intellectual-philosophical. However, Popper's view has been recently given support in a survey of sociology from 1945-1965:

It is difficult to attribute sociology's recent scientific self-consciousness to any one source, but I believe that Sir Karl Popper's writings ... deserve special mention ... The influence of such views on post-war sociologists has been immense; historical interpretation on the grand scale, so popular in the nineteenth and lingering well into the twentieth, has virtually disappeared as a sociological activity (Mennell, 1972:154-55).

6 See also Iggers (1968:287-90) for further comments and references.

7 This version of "historicism" was the subject of one of Mannheim's essays in 1924 (1952:84-133).

8 As Iggers in his study of German historiography concludes:

The German Historical School, with its emphasis upon diversity and individuality, is interpreted as an expression of historicism in contrast by the attempts by Hegelians to see in historical development a unified, logical process (1968:289).

9 Nevertheless, even Mannheim did not give any specific attention to the logical peculiarities of evolutionary and historical explanations. Popper, of course, assumed in his logical studies that scientific explanation and prediction are symmetrical (LSD:59-60); (PH:124). Yet in his more recent work he seems to have accepted the status of biological evolution as a form of explanation despite its lack of universal laws and predictive capabilities. Thus he writes:

A word may be added here on the logical form of a theory of natural selection ... I can only briefly mention a point or two.

The theory of natural selection is an historical one: it constructs a situation and shows that, given that situation, these things whose existence we wish to explain are indeed likely to happen.
To put it more precisely, Darwin's theory is a generalized historical explanation. This means that the situation is supposed to be typical rather than unique. Thus it may be possible to construct at times a simplified model of the situation (OK:270).

Nevertheless:

Darwin's discovery of the theory of natural selection has often been compared to Newton's discovery of the theory of gravitation. This is a mistake. Newton formulated a set of universal laws intended to describe the interaction, and consequent behaviour, of the physical universe. Darwin's theory of evolution proposed no such universal laws. There are no Darwinian laws of evolution ... Nevertheless, Darwin's revolutionary influence upon our picture of the world around us was at least as great ... For Darwin's theory of natural selection showed that it is in principle possible to reduce teleology to causation by explaining, in purely physical terms, the existence of design and purpose in the world: (267).

What Popper fails to do, however, is relate these considerations back to the problem of explanation in the history of societies. If he were to do so he might be able to conceive of non-predictive but nevertheless scientific explanations of the historical process. This might return to problem of "historical interpretations" back to the fold of science.

The asymmetry of prediction and explanation has been emphasized by Scriven who suggests that "the most important lesson to be learned from evolutionary theory today is a negative one: the theory shows us what scientific explanations need not do" (1969:117). As he concludes:

It is natural enough that the logic of explanation should appear to parallel that of prediction. Sometimes, in fact, it does. There are specific occasions, particularly in classical physics, when we explain and predict by reference to the same laws. But this is an accident, not a necessity, as it turns out. Put the matter in general logical terms and the similarity still appears to hold: to predict we need a correlation between present events and future ones -- to explain between present ones and past ones" (121). Cf. Toulmin (1972: 135ff) on the general pattern of historical explanation.

Popper writes:

Sociologism believes that it is not their unpractical character, but rather the fact that practical and theoretical problems are too much intertwined in the field of social and political knowledge, that creates the methodo-
logical difficulties of these sciences ... To this we can reply that 'knowledge' and 'will' are, in a certain sense, always inseparable ... Practice is not the enemy of theoretical knowledge but the most valuable incentive to it. Though a certain amount of aloofness may be becoming to the scientist, there are many examples to show that it is not always important for a scientist to be thus disinterested. But it is important for him to remain in touch with reality, with practice, for those who overlook it have to pay by lapsing into scholasticism (OS-II:222).

Mannheim would certainly agree with all this, but suggest awareness of those "interests" is crucial and cannot be taken for granted.

For instance, even the use of social science for limited aims requires experimentation with large groups of people in natural settings and the necessary machinery required for evaluation of the results. Such projects have been extremely rare and undertaken in the most unusual circumstances and rarely repeated, not simply because of a lack of social technique, but because of vested interests. The case of the TVA project illustrates this. Most so-called "experiments" are simply ad hoc government responses to crisis situations in which solutions are designed around political pressures rather than experimental design. As a consequence, most planning is "rational" only in a political sense. But when we raise questions like this a sociological perspective is essential. The "progress" of social science, despite Popper's effort to gloss over these questions, cannot be sustained without reducing research to the servant of the existing structure of power which may have a vested interest in the maintenance of suffering.

Marcuse, one of the few to have provided a cogent critique of Popper's concept of "historicism" defends Mannheim on this point:

Popper cites Mannheim's proposition that 'the power of the State is bound to increase until the State becomes nearly identical with society'; he calls this proposition a 'prophecy' and the 'intuition' expressed in it the 'totalitarian intuition'. Now I think it is rather obvious that the cited passage has long since ceased to be a 'prophecy' and has become a statement of fact. Moreover, one may criticize Mannheim on many grounds, but to count him among the 'holists' and to charge him with 'totalitarian intuition' is to confuse an analysis of observable trends with their advocacy and justification (1972:202).

At another point he emphasizes again:

It is, therefore, not our task to make prophecies, but rather to seek out a clue which will help us observe the effect of the most essential social factors influencing culture" (MS:80).
Popper reflects:

Looking back at the events from 1864 to 1939, I think that but for the somewhat accidental fact that Marx discouraged research in social technology, European affairs might possibly have developed, under the influence of this prophetic religion, towards a socialism of the non-collectivist type. A thorough preparation for social engineering, for planning for freedom, on the part of the Russian Marxists as well as those in Central Europe, might possibly have led to an unmistakable success convincing to all friends of the open society. But this would not have been a corroboration of a scientific prophecy. It would have been the result of a religious movement -- the result of the faith in humanitarianism, combined with a critical use of our reason for the purpose of changing the world (OS-II:198; emphasis added).

This constitutes a virtual acceptance of the entire argument of Mannheim's *Man and Society* where the identical thesis is proposed:

... it should also not be forgotten that even the most absolute power is useless if we have not the technical knowledge to show us how it could be wholesomely applied in the interest of the entire community.

The political theory that we are living in an age of class warfare and that social and technical considerations are therefore of no importance has delayed the rational discussion of the problem whether planning and democracy are compatible ... the technical problems of society cannot be solved by tactics and class warfare alone. There is a terrible destiny in store for generations who are brought up to believe in the false alternative democracy or planning, no synthesis on the plane of theoretical analysis being possible (MS:339).

Mannheim develops his position with the concept of *principia media* which are described as "a kind of regularly recurring special laws, special relationships of a certain historical phase in a particular social setting" (MS:177). Thus, they constitute "universal forces in a concrete setting as they become integrated out of the various forces in a concrete setting as they become integrated out of the various factors at work in a given place at a given time -- a particular combination of circumstances which may never be repeated". While in principle reducible to general principles, their actual utilization must be "in their concrete setting as they confront us at a certain stage of development ..." (178).

In a section entitled "Generalizations Confined to Periods" Popper takes up the matter of *principia media* and seems to accept its essential contention, though this is obscured by criticism of Mannheim on a peripheral logical point. For what Popper wishes to argue is simply that the natural sciences have similar problems
of establishing initial conditions for propositions which may in fact be confined to a historical period (PH:97-104).

Mannheim describes this contrast in more detail as follows:

... Historians have tried to grasp the uniqueness of each epoch as something which can be understood only by immediate intuition (Romanticism) or to deduce it as a type of unique historical dialectic (historicism, Hegelianism, and Marxism). The first solution renounced scientific methods in the study of history completely. The second constructed two independent and co-existent logics; a generalizing logic which deals with what is general, and another which traces the relationships between events in a unique historical issue. As the latter, theoretical approach creates a dialectic which is entirely independent of a generalizing theory of factors, it is also inclined to use unscientific methods. In its concrete form it is mainly inspired by a philosophy of history, which draws its vision of the course of history from the particular aims of certain groups. We think that in spite of this the exponents of the dialectical approach rightly understood that the individual development of certain historical and social units had to be studied scientifically and could not simply be left to the causal epic style of the historian. The mistake they made was to reconstruct the individual framework of a society, or its individual development without taking universal factors into account (MS:178).

Mannheim shows an acute awareness of the dangers of "intuitionism" and sees his own effort as a rational alternative:

Everything we have said above concerning interdependent thinking and principia media, is contrary to the trend of intuitive thought. But our aim is not that of the Romantics -- to escape the general rationalizing process of modern times. We want to to refine and extend the methods of rational analysis that they enable us to grasp scientifically the concrete object in its concrete context. This is true even ... (for) the type of investigator who ... looks upon interdependent thinking as an incursion into the realm of the irrational ... He forgets ... that these principia media are irrationalities only when measured by his abstract system of co-ordinates, and that the method which has been described here does not try to grasp the individual by intuition or by apprehension (Schau), but rather through a further differentiation of the rationalizing frame of reference (MS:170).

Furthermore, Mannheim emphasizes also the danger of disciplinary myopia:
Once a single branch of knowledge is studied in isolation it becomes unreal, and paradoxical as it may sound, the only person who is acting realistically is the theorist, who pieces these fragmentary observations together to form a coherent scheme ... Every specialist is acting in good faith when he believes that his own method is the right one, for he unconsciously confuses the section of reality on which he is working with reality itself ..." (MS:29).

19 Most explicitly he writes in Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning:

This book gives no blueprints; it is neither a list of abstract desiderata for the philosopher nor a detailed program for the administrator. The last bitter decades have taught us that one can neither conceive of a good society without reference to the actual state of affairs nor construct a whole social order by piecemeal administrative reforms. But we can very well lay down principles to convey the general vision of the kind of society we want to build (1950:xvii).

20 In his words:

Planning is the reconstruction of an historically developed society into a unity which is regulated more and more perfectly by mankind from certain central positions ... As we understand it, planning is foresight deliberately applied to human affairs, so that the social process is no longer merely the product of conflict and competition (MS:193).

21 Thus Kecskemeti notes:

... the problem of interpreting historic reality and adopting the historically 'right' position assumed a new form for Mannheim when totalitarianism emerged as a dominant trend ... For that theory presupposed a 'wholeness' of social reality in which no part could be missed, and none was illegitimate ... With the emergence of totalitarianism, however, the spell of history was broken; one had to recognize that the historically dominant trend was a destructive aberration ... This trend had to be overcome in order to restore the wholeness and meaningfulness of human reality (1953:2-3).

Rempel notes this shift and relates it to Mannheim's revision of his understanding of value culminating in a "more intensive voluntaristic emphasis" (65:104).

22 This point is carefully developed in Rempel (1965).
As he puts it:

For while we can see the meaning, the goal-directedness of the overall development in so far as closed periods are concerned, we cannot see such a goal-meaning for our own period. Since the future is always a secret, we can only make conjectures about the total pattern of meaning of which our present is a part; and since we can have nothing more than conjectures, it is understandable enough that each current of thought assumes that the goal-meaning of the present is identical with those contemporary trends with which that current happens to identify itself (1952:172).

This assumption is implicit in Popper's philosophy of the "open society" and in Mannheim's third stage of "planning" in the evolution of human learning. A detailed comparison of their concepts of rationality would be instructive but is not possible here. For a comparison of Mannheim and Weber's theories of the rationalization process see Boris (1971:11-46).

This distinction is subtly explored by Berlin in his essay on "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1966:118-72). See also Aron (1970), and Wood (1972).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS: THE LIMITS OF "CRITICAL RATIONALISM"

In the course of this essay a detailed examination of Karl Popper's criticisms of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge has revealed surprising misinterpretations. Taking these into account, it has been possible to bring out the remarkable complementary and convergent elements of the work of Popper and Mannheim. This study has restricted itself to a demonstration of this point through a comparison of the texts of Popper and Mannheim.

A more comprehensive inquiry would be required to establish more precisely the implications of this analysis and the issues raised by bringing together the philosophies of social science of Mannheim and Popper. Some of the directions in which this might lead have been indicated in the notes. Suffice it to say here that the questions which divided and obscured communication between the followers of Popper and the sympathizers of Mannheim constitute some of the decisive problems of contemporary social theory and philosophy. Working within the common framework of a social-evolutionary epistemology, Popper and Mannheim taken together define most of the principal issues generated by the confluence of the Hegelian-Marxian concern with the interpretation of meaning, historical totalities and social development and the neo-positivist focus on the falsification and testability of theories. In their work points of contact and thus of potential dialogue between these two traditions become manifest in the pragmatic liberalism which defined their convergent response to the crisis of industrial capitalism.
That the convergent aspects of the work of Popper and Mannheim has not received attention has been linked to general characteristics of Western philosophy and social science in English-speaking countries in the post-World War II period, as well as to specific circumstances of their academic careers. These factors combined to inhibit the kind of response to Popper's polemics that might have facilitated a general reconsideration of the epistemological foundations of the social sciences. This failure of the social scientific community as a critical medium has done Popper a great disservice; in depriving him of the kind of challenge that would have elicited a constructive re-appraisal of his position, his conjectures have been turned to dogmatic ends rather than serving as a spur to critical reflection.

Today such a re-examination of the social sciences is in process, but owes its existence to rather different historical circumstances. In this current debate the cases of Popper and Mannheim have been largely ignored as anachronistic and because their compromises tend to offend the partisans of both neo-positivism and neo-Marxism. Perhaps one of the central lessons of this study is that the failure of liberal pragmatism as a social philosophy must be fully understood if we are to salvage something of the spirit of "critical rationalism."

That Popper and Mannheim came to deal with common problems in the philosophy of the social sciences despite their divergent backgrounds -- Mannheim in German neo-idealistic philosophy and Popper in modern physics and neo-positivistic philosophy of natural science -- has been traced to their participation in the turn of the century debates in German philosophical circles generated by
the challenge of Marxism. It is this pervasive influence which above all created the initial common thread which would later bring together the interests of Popper and Mannheim. This, combined with the rise of totalitarianism and flight to English-speaking countries, provided the matrix for their parallel efforts to reassert the possibility of liberal democracy. Popper's apparent inability to appreciate this, and the failure of the English-speaking community of scholars to have pointed it out, has prevented recognition of the convergent movement of ideas which coincided with the trajectory of their intellectual careers through the 1930's and 1940's.

Popper's misinterpretation of the basic concepts and claims of the sociology of knowledge is manifested in his treatment of two of its most basic categories. He does not grasp the type of dialectical relationship between thought and social circumstances expressed by the notion of "existential determination" and ignores the contextual use of the term "knowledge" by social scientists. As a consequence, he is able to lay a spurious charge of irrationalistic "sociologism" against Mannheim who is held to be providing a theory of the "social determination" of "scientific knowledge" when in fact he presents a theory of the "existential determination" of "inexact" or socio-historical knowledge. Though Mannheim does fail to fully clarify the implications of social genesis for the "formal" sciences and to provide an adequate account of the properties of various types of knowledge, he does develop a brilliant account of historical socio-political ideologies. Rather than attempting to constructively criticize Mannheim's analysis by a consideration of problems in the sociology of science, Popper becomes embroiled in
self-generated issues that relate only to a caricature.

In attempting to sustain the charge of irrationalism on epistemological grounds, Popper only succeeds in further demonstrating his superficial reading of Mannheim. He erroneously attributes to him an individualistic epistemology when the sociology of knowledge presumes a social and historical one. Mannheim's analysis of the social pre-conditions for the emergence of a transcendent synthesizing perspective -- found in his discussion of the intellectuals -- is taken by Popper as a general epistemological statement of a theory of science. Thus, his criticisms bypass Mannheim's concern that the conflict of perspectives characteristic of the social scientific tradition must be partially overcome to allow the development of an authentic "science of politics". As a consequence, Popper does not seem to realize that Mannheim's concern with the "perspectives" of social research corresponds to what Popper himself has termed the "traditions" of science, a subject he had defined as properly sociological. Finally, with his "critical rationalism" and his theory of the "open society" Popper can be seen as attempting to provide a unitary perspective for the social sciences through a theory of history and a philosophical anthropology.

In Popper's attack on Mannheim's theory of planning, it becomes apparent that the charges of "historicism", "holism" and "moral historicism" were largely without foundation, representing a culmination of all his previous errors of interpretation. Upon closer examination his own proposal for social planning could not be fundamentally distinguished from that of Mannheim, except in terms of the relative scope of the freedom to be realized by the planning process. For both, planning was seen as an experimental
task to be carried out by democratically restrained technical elites which would provide a pragmatically liberal alternative to totalitarianism. Popper's fear of "utopianism", however, led him to restrict the objectives of planning to the elimination of suffering. His pessimistic view of the possibilities of social knowledge precluded the ideal of any stable consensus on a larger range of issues embracing positive freedoms. Accordingly, he felt that coercion constituted the only means for realizing such objectives. Mannheim, however, was convinced of the possibility of establishing scientifically the social pre-conditions of individual choice and to develop the necessary social controls to bring them into being. He saw the continuation of this utopian spirit as largely a responsibility of the intellectual stratum.

How then are we to view the relative merits of the positions of Mannheim and Popper as starting points for the understanding of social science? It is the thesis of this study that Popper's misinterpretations of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge reveals the limitations of his "critical rationalism". Mannheim's perspective, on the other hand, provides the rudiments for comprehending the nature and sources of Popper's difficulties. As Lucien Goldmann has suggested on the problem of comparing two different world-views:

Viewed in terms of their effect on scientific thought, different perspectives and ideologies do not exist on the same plane. Some value-judgments permit a better understanding of reality than others. When it is a question of determining which of two conflicting sociologies has the greater scientific value, the first step is to ask which of them permits the understanding of the other as a social and human phenomenon, reveals its infrastructure, and clarifies, by means of an immanent critical principle, its inconsistencies and its limitations (1969:52).

Popper's inability to grasp the argument of Mannheim's soci-
ology of knowledge provides convincing support of the thesis that
the sociological critique of "critical rationalism" has touched
upon its "inconsistencies and limitations". Mannheim was well
aware of the difficulty posed by the sociology of knowledge for the
autonomy of philosophy. And while he recognized the part to play
by the philosophical theory of knowledge, he was also able to inter­
pret the instinctive reaction of those who would dogmatically stig­
matize the propositions of the sociology of knowledge as "sociologism".
For the assumption a priori of the autonomy of epistemology from
specialized sciences, close the mind to the possibility of a broader
empiricism and consequently, "this gesture of self-preservation",
as he termed it, served "no other purpose than that of a bulwark for
a certain type of academic epistemology ..." (IU:287-8). Yet, Popper
was not one of those who alleged the autonomy of epistemology from
the special sciences; on the contrary, as he points out in his
criticism of linguistic and ordinary language philosophies, they fail
to analyse the scientific problems, theories, procedures and dis­
cussions which are the key to the central problem of epistemology --
the growth of knowledge (LSD:22). But his rejection of the results
of the sociology of knowledge as having any scientific value, allowed
him to dispense with incorporating its findings into his theory of
social science. As we have seen, he provided a pseudo-solution with
his demarcation between scientific and non-scientific knowledge.
Whatever value this might have as a normative guide, it fails to
contribute to the dilemmas posed by the almost total absence of social
science taken in this rigorous sense. Only the sociology of knowledge
provides the critical tools for understanding the kinds of knowledge
which constitute the bulk of social science and philosophy.
In short, such considerations call into question the "critical" self-awareness of Popper's rationalist credo. Nor can it be argued that these earlier views were aberrations, expressions of the peculiar circumstances of their genesis. For Popper dogmatically holds fast to his interpretation of the sociology of knowledge. More recently, he went so far as to suggest that "the present trend in the so-called empirical investigations of the natural sciences is likely to contribute to the decay of science" (1970b:258). At the same time he is puzzled by the continued failure of the social sciences and is forced to lament two decades after the publication of his studies in the philosophy of social science:

Somehow or other, the unintended repercussions of our heedless technological advance seem to be nobody's business. The possibilities of application seem to be intoxicating ... The problem of the unintended consequences of our actions, consequences which are not only unintended but often very difficult to foresee, is the fundamental problem of the social sciences (1969b: 56-7).

This is certainly a legitimate concern, but Popper is unable to formulate the social sources of this failure. In denying the legitimacy of the sociology of knowledge, he cannot begin to explain why it is that "critical reason" has not established itself as readily in the social as in the natural sciences. Nor can he see the way in which his own doctrines have actually been an obstacle to finding out why such matters as "heedless technological advance" seem to be "nobody's business". Ironically, his only response has been to revolt against the very thesis of rationalization that he had militantly defended in the Open Society. For he sees the villain of contemporary science the problem of specialization with its resulting emphasis on "normal" science. As he laments:
If the many, the specialists, gain the day, it will be the end of science as we know it -- of great science. It will be a spiritual catastrophe comparable in its consequences to nuclear armament (1970b:259).

Further, he draws a parallel between the natural and the social sciences where "the degeneration into impressive but more or less empty verbalism has gone further than in the natural sciences" (258). Yet even in the natural sciences:

More and more PhD. candidates receive a merely technical training, a training in certain techniques of measurement; they are not initiated into the scientific tradition, the critical tradition of questioning, of being tempted and guided by great and apparently insoluble riddles rather than by the solubility of little puzzles (259).

And this is the man who is also the advocate of "piecemeal social engineering" and the critic of theoretical history? Here he laments the decline of types of inquiry in natural science which two decades earlier he had tried to dismiss in social science. Might not the sociology of knowledge be an integral part and expression of this "critical tradition of questioning"? Might not the sociology of science contribute to an understanding of the sources and effects of specialization? Might not the need to be "tempted and guided by great and apparently insoluble riddles rather than by the solubility of little puzzles" be as much a prerequisite of the creativity of the social sciences as the natural?

Popper's agonizing re-appraisal of current trends in science borders upon the tragic. Burdened by a misunderstanding of the sociology of knowledge, he sees it as the primary source of irrationalism rather than as a means of its control. Bewildered by the fact that no one seems concerned with the effects of technology, he is unable to formulate the problem to explain why this is the
case, for again it requires a sociological interpretation. He laments the relentless pressure of specialization and the failure of the generalizing capacity which is the source of all creative break-throughs, yet cannot link this to a theory of history which would make sense of the process and indicate how human controls might be instituted to alter it. In sum, Popper's incapability of recognizing his affinity with Mannheim, a man whose relationship to the social sciences paralleled Popper's to the natural, cuts him off from the very source of insight that might transform his truncated "critical rationalism" into a liberative one.
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