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THE TERROR IN MARSEILLES:

A CASE STUDY OF RESISTANCE  
TO CENTRALIZATION DURING THE  
FRENCH REVOLUTION

by

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## ABSTRACT

Localism in Marseilles was rooted in the institutions of the ancien régime. As a free port, the city was politically separate from the County of Provence and enjoyed considerable economic privileges. Marseilles had a large, prosperous bourgeoisie, and as an urban commercial centre was also culturally distinct from rural Provence. In the revolutionary period Marseilles had ample opportunity to express its particularism: during the administrative disorganization of 1789-1793 newly founded municipalities, among them Marseilles, became the basic units of government in France. Marseilles, in part looking back to ancien régime particularism, and in part developing its new revolutionary localism, attempted to spread its revolutionary principles, and fulfill its regionalist ambitions by fighting all forms of counterrevolution in the region, in particular the "reactionary" authorities of the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône, established in Marseilles' historic rival, Aix-en-Provence. Marseilles commerce did not suffer during the first three years of the Revolution. With steady food supplies and prosperity there were no disturbances in the city, and Marseilles could regard itself as a politically unified, secure bastion of the Revolution surrounded by a sea of counterrevolution.

In 1792, with the outbreak of war, France, including Marseilles, entered a crisis period. With political pressures and deteriorating economic conditions the revolutionary political unity of Marseilles broke up. When the Paris government attempted to impose central control on Marseilles in the spring of 1793, the Marseilles bourgeoisie revolted against the central government's representatives. They had considerable popular support, for many Marseilles sans-culottes, hurt by shortages and

inflation, were ready to listen to particularist appeals. Federalism in Marseilles represents a case of local resistance to the Paris government's first attempts at centralization.

The period of the Terror, following the defeat of federalism, did not witness the defeat of Marseilles localism. The Marseilles Jacobins, having been released from federalist prisons, and having assumed control of the city, pursued a locally based and regionally oriented political course. Since the central government's representatives were preoccupied with problems of procuring supplies and waging war, they allowed the Marseilles Jacobins a free hand in Marseilles. Only in December 1793 and January 1794 did Barras and Fréron attack the local authorities in Marseilles. The attack was unsuccessful. Instead of establishing central government control it provoked a powerful local reaction: Marseilles municipal pride was not prepared to submit. The Committee of Public Safety repudiated Barras's and Fréron's policies because they were unsuccessful, but also because they were fundamentally misguided. The Mountain intended the Terror to be used pragmatically, to aid in establishing efficient national administration. This is what the Montagnard policy of centralization meant. Well-functioning locally based authorities were not to be destroyed, but were to be integrated into the national administration. Maignet, Barras's and Fréron's successor, succeeded in accomplishing this goal in Marseilles, and thus applied the Terror as intended by the two ruling committees. Maignet was an obedient, hard-working bureaucrat, the grey administrator every authoritarian government requires. That the Montagnard war dictatorship had too many supporters like Barras and Fréron, and too few like Maignet, in part accounts for its failure.



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## ABBREVIATIONS

AULARD, vol. no., page no.

F.A. Aulard, Recueil des actes du Comité du salut public etc. . . .,  
28 vols., + 2 vols. tables, Paris, 1891.

AHRF, Annales historiques de la Révolution française.

B & F, page no.

E. Poupé, Lettres de Barras et Fréron en mission dans le Midi.

MICHON, vol. no., page no.

Correspondance de Maximilien et Augustin Robespierre, recueilli  
et publiée par Georges Michon, 2 volumes, Paris, 1926.

MONITEUR, vol. no., page no.

Ré-impression de l'ancien Moniteur, 32 vols. + 2 vols. tables,  
Paris, 1863.

RF, La Révolution française.

RICORD, partie no., page no.

'Première (or Deuxième) partie du rapport de Ricord etc. . . . ,  
McClure Collection of French Revolutionary Materials etc. . . . ,  
vol. 1185, parts 5 & 6.

## PART ONE - INTRODUCTION

### CHAPTER 1.- Centralism, Localism, Revolution and Terror.

#### I

In the New Cambridge Modern History, John Bosher has succinctly described an important historical tendency of the second half of the eighteenth century:

During the late eighteenth century there was a movement common to many European countries towards powerful and efficient central government. This movement was the counterpart of the more spectacular endeavours to increase the liberty of the individual. Thus the era of the American Declaration of Independence, of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, the charter of economic liberalism was the time when the modern state began to consolidate its forces.<sup>1</sup>

On the continent of Europe the movement to governmental centralization was perhaps strongest in France. The French royal bureaucracy grew in efficiency throughout the last century of the ancien régime. The royal intendants, directly responsible to Paris, controlled provincial administration, and the central government became more complex, with a larger, more rationally functioning bureaucracy at its disposal.<sup>2</sup>

The concrete achievements of this growing, centralized bureaucracy were, however, not very extensive for a variety of reasons. A multitude of powerful vested interests were rooted in the archaic social and administrative structure of the ancien régime, and they resisted, on the whole successfully, most of the monarchy's attempts at reform. In fact, a great profusion of often conflicting economic, political and judicial jurisdictions persisted until the Revolution. The absolute monarchy's

policy of centralization did not destroy the chaos of outdated medieval institutions; it attempted to place the new centralized bureaucracy above them. As Pierre Goubert has stated:

Le propre de l'Ancien Régime c'est la confusion. . .  
 Il [l'Ancien Régime] est un magma de choses habituellement séculaires, parfois millénaires dont il n'a jamais supprimé aucune. Il fut profondément conservateur, et souvent conservateur de vieilleries, ou, si l'on préfère, d'antiquités, à la fois respectées, vénérées, déformées, oubliées, ressuscitées, fossilisées.<sup>3</sup>

Vested interests were not content to exist in a subordinate position to the royal bureaucracy. Instead, they attempted to reverse the process of governmental centralization and regain a more decisive voice in governing France.

Their opposition to reform and centralization was mainly conducted through the parlements. There were thirteen parlements and four other sovereign courts in Paris and the provinces, all of them modelled on the original parlement of Paris.<sup>4</sup> The parlements, "the last great relics of the medieval French constitution",<sup>5</sup> were bastions of aristocratic privilege, and fought against any measure which threatened the special status of the nobility and clergy. Fundamentally judicial institutions, in politics the parlements only possessed the single major weapon of refusing to register royal decrees; but by using this weapon they were able between 1715 and 1789 effectively to stifle all attempts of the central government to institute financial reforms. Thus, they were able to preserve the considerable financial privileges of the First and Second Estates.<sup>6</sup>

The continued existence and power of the parlements, together with the continued existence of noble and clerical privileges, of privileged provinces (pays d'état as opposed to pays d'élection), of cities with special privileges (Marseilles was one of these), and of an immensely complicated and archaic system of internal tariffs and taxes, ensured

the continued existence of ancien régime particularisms. The considerable reserves of administrative ability, intent on basic reforms, concentrated in the central government, was, in the final accounting, unable to overcome the inertia of the ancien régime's deep-rooted particularisms. To a large extent this was due to the character of France's last two monarchs. Despite the growing efficiency of the royal administration, the power of the absolute monarchy, following Louis XIV's energetic opposition to particularism, declined during the eighteenth century because of the chronic inability of Louis XV and Louis XVI to provide support for their reform ministries.

The 1780's saw the powerful resurgence of aristocratic reaction, and the Revolution started as the last great Fronde of the ancien régime. The parlements challenged the monarchy -- hard pressed because of the unresolved issue of state finances -- to recall the long dormant Estates General and thereby retreat from its policy of centralization and hand power to a loose gathering of nobles, clerics and bourgeois, representing an array of particular interests. This final reaction of the ancien régime's aristocratic vested interests, usually referred to as the révolte nobilaire, is seen by some historians as the starting point of the Revolution, and is referred to by some -- Egret, for example -- as the pre-Revolution. Egret, in a series of studies on the pre-Revolution in the provinces, has shown that the révolte nobilaire was a many-faceted event, and that the French provincial aristocracy, true to its fragmented nature, had mainly localized, particular interests and demands. For example, the provincial nobility of Provence clamoured for the restoration of the local Provincial Estates.<sup>7</sup>

The French Revolution was an historic event, or rather, a series of historical events in the course of which many problems that could not be



solved by the monarchy were resolved in a violent manner. Vested interests which were unwilling to change, to adjust themselves to a new, developing political and social reality, were swept away. Thus, among the first targets of 1789 were noble and clerical privileges, the power of the parlements and the power of the absolute monarchy. The Revolution quickly did away with the great political adversaries of the eighteenth century.

The fundamental changes of the revolutionary period should not, however, blind us to the essential continuity underlying them. As de Tocqueville pointed out over a century ago: "the principle of the centralization of power did not perish in the Revolution . . . this very centralization of power was at once the Revolution's starting-off point and one of its guiding principles."<sup>8</sup> What changed during the Revolution was the institutional structure through which power was exercised, and the people who exercised it, but the basic principle of centralized, bureaucratic government remained a main characteristic of France throughout the modern era.

Ironically, the parlements, in working out and refining the thèse nobilaire, provided not only the theoretical foundation for the aristocracy's opposition to absolute monarchy, but also contributed to the fashioning of a theoretical foundation for the Third Estate's revolutionary principles of government. In the 1753 Grandes Remonstrances, as Alfred Cobban observes:

the parlement of Paris speaks of 'une espèce de contrat' between the sovereign and the people, and asserts that 'if subjects owe obedience to Kings, Kings for their part owe obedience to the laws'. They [the parlements] now cease to rely mainly on their historical claims and begin to appeal to the rights of the nation, of which they regard themselves as the representative. . . It is not unreasonable to suggest that the parlements played a large part in spreading the idea that the people is the only rightful source of power.<sup>9</sup>

Thus, a desire to dethrone a concept of the State which saw unlimited sovereignty resting in the person of the monarch was common to the most reactionary, tradition-bound institutions of the ancien régime and to the bourgeois of the revolutionary assemblies attempting to establish a new definition of sovereignty. Of course, the revolutionary concept of the state probably owed as much to the Enlightenment's forward-looking endeavours to increase the liberty of the individual as to the parlement's backward-looking endeavours to safeguard the liberties of two small, privileged orders. Nonetheless, Cobban has performed a very useful service in pointing out the Revolution's debt to the thèse nobiliaire, for in the historiography the emphasis had been placed almost entirely on the Revolution's debt to the philosophes.

In terms of the new revolutionary conception of the State, the Third Estate -- acting independently -- variously saw itself as the "assembly of the recognized and accredited representatives of the French nation" (Sieyès's definition), or as "the representatives of the greater part of the French nation acting in absence of the lesser part" (Mounier's definition).<sup>10</sup> In the end, against the recalcitrance of the first two Estates and the Monarch, the Third Estate declared itself to be the "National Assembly" and implicitly made the claim that sovereignty rested in itself, as the direct, elected representative body of the French nation, rather than in the person of the king. In juridical terms the Revolution was accomplished when the rights of the French "people" or "nation" replaced the obligations of the nation to its kings as the basis for the definition of the French State. The change of designation of Louis XVI from roi de France et de Navarre to roi des français symbolized the changed status of the king from absolute to constitutional monarch and implied that whereas previously the king was above the nation, henceforth the nation would

stand above the king.<sup>11</sup>

After redefining sovereignty, the revolutionaries needed to reply to the questions "who is the people?" and "what is the nation?" The attempted answers to these difficult questions constituted one of the main political issues of the Revolution.

When the Third Estate in the Estates General defined itself as the valid representative of the people or the nation, it in effect claimed sovereignty for a group predominantly composed of lawyers, notaries, and middle-level officials -- people who made up the working bureaucracy of the ancien régime, and who wanted to displace the first two estates and claim credit for ability in place of privilege. Thus, as Cobban has shown, the revolutionary bourgeoisie was chiefly composed of legal professionals and bureaucrats rather than of the commercial middle classes.<sup>12</sup> Naturally, the National Assembly conceived of the nation in a unified sense, for the revolutionary bourgeoisie inherited the principle of centralization from the ancien régime and carried it over to the revolutionary era. Thus, in Paris, at the heart of the Revolution, in the National and Constituent Assemblies and later in the National Convention, centralization became a cornerstone of revolutionary political oratory and thought. There are exceptions to this rule. The Girondins, for example, were willing to abandon the principle of centralization. However, they did this not from conviction, but rather because of extreme political pressures.

However, many revolutionaries in the provinces understood popular sovereignty in an entirely different manner. Medievally-based particularist sentiments were still strong in the eighteenth century, especially in regions far removed from Paris, and regions such as Brittany and Provence, which had entered the French monarchy only relatively recently. It

was the person of the king that unified many of the outlying provinces to France, and not any deeprooted sense of being French. Once popular sovereignty was enshrined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, certain articulate political groups in the provinces could, and often did, think of sovereignty as belonging directly to them, rather than to a far-removed representative body in Paris. Here too historical continuity triumphed over innovations.<sup>13</sup>

Ancien régime particularisms survived not only in a counterrevolutionary form, but assumed new revolutionary forms, as 'municipalism', as Jacobin localism, and in 1793-94, as the highly fragmented, localized sans-culotte movement.

That the localisms of the revolutionary period were indeed basic, deeprooted revolutionary manifestations is proved by their spontaneous, enthusiastic beginnings and by their tenacity. As both Lefebvre and Cobban have observed, during the opening months of the Revolution, spontaneous revolutionary movements broke out in scattered communities, large and small, throughout France.<sup>14</sup> The leaders of these movements established new revolutionary municipalities. The National Assembly had, in fact, no choice but to accept these municipalities as a fait accompli. That the leaders of the National Assembly, guided by the principle of government centralization, disapproved in principle of the establishment of a great multitude of municipal administrations is shown by Sieyès's later comments on this system, which he described as "l'insigne folie". He continued by stating that, "A l'époque dont nous parlons, les quarante-quatre mille municipalités se trouvèrent exister tout à coup, non par l'effet d'ancien système philosophique, mais par une inévitable suite de l'insurrection générale."<sup>15</sup>

This system of locally-directed, semi-autonomous revolutionary

municipalities -- creating a degree of permanent administrative anarchy at the national level -- remained the major aspect of French provincial administration until 1793. It was able to survive because the Paris government did not have the means to implement its policy of centralization. As Cobban has stated, "the reaction against the ancien régime had produced a system in which all power was placed in the hands of committees. 'Tout le monde délibérait, personne n'avait mission d'agir!'"<sup>16</sup> An effective effort to centralize government and destroy localist, centrifugal tendencies emerged only in 1793-94, during the period of the Terror.

## II

To this point we have restricted our analysis to the political, administrative and intellectual aspects of centralism and localism in ancien régime and revolutionary France. But the Revolution was a major social upheaval accompanied by and in part caused by large-scale financial and economic difficulties, and cannot be understood without paying attention to these factors. This is especially true of the period of the Great Terror in 1793-94.

To explain the Terror close attention must be paid to political factors, the most important of which was the outbreak of war in 1792; administrative factors, such as the crying need for a centralized administration; financial factors -- there was runaway inflation of the assignat, the revolutionary paper money in 1792-93; economic factors, above all the shortages of food supplies and war matériel; and social factors -- the growing economic, financial and political difficulties created a growing state of unrest among large segments of the country's population, who attempted to find their own solutions to the problems

plaguing France. All these factors were closely interrelated, and a truly integrated picture of the Great Terror of 1793-94 cannot omit any of them.

As virtually all students of French popular movements~~ss~~ have observed, popular agitation was a common phenomenon in pre-revolutionary France. In the ancien régime the typical popular demonstration was the bread riot. George Rudé has shown that the great Paris bread riots of May 1775 had as their object the guaranteeing of bread to the common people at a reasonable price, and squarely opposed the "progressive", physiocratic economic policies of Turgot, which advocated the free movement of grain within France.<sup>17</sup> As Rose has pointed out, the normal economic policy of the ancien régime rested on the careful regulation of the grain trade, including price fixing in periods of dearth.<sup>18</sup> Williams, in a useful little book, has summed up the results of recent research on popular movements. As he shows, in the "non-political" society of pre-revolutionary France, the food riot and the taxation populaire (popular enforcement of a "just price") were the typical manifestations of crowd action.<sup>19</sup> However, in the early stages of the Revolution, the actions of bread-hungry mobs coincided with revolutionary political agitation and assumed a political aspect. "Throughout this incredible year 1789 'traditional' crowd actions were drenched in the new rhetoric of revolution and, in effect, ceased to be 'traditional' ".<sup>20</sup> Despite this, we must not lose sight of the essential continuity between the "traditional" pre-revolutionary bread rioter and the politically conscious revolutionary sans-culotte of 1793. However aware the sans-culotte may have been of revolutionary rhetoric, of his rights as a member of the "people" or the "nation", his basic motivation was still usually economic, and, as Rose observes, in matters of food distribution he demanded a return to pre-revolutionary

principles.<sup>21</sup>

As Cobban has observed, Hippolyte Taine made two basic contributions to the study of the Revolution, despite his violent polemics and his deeply-rooted, unshakable prejudices:

In the first place he realized that the Revolution was accompanied throughout by the Terror, and that this was not an accidental aberration but an essential and inseparable element in it. . . . Secondly, Taine saw that a great historical movement like the Revolution was not to be explained in terms of a simple political narrative, but only by means of the analysis of social forces.<sup>22</sup>

Taine placed the menu peuple at the centre of the dynamics of the Revolution, but in his unreasoning hatred of the crowds he failed to see that they were generally only agents and sometimes victims of the great social upheavals of 1789, and that they were usually conditioned to act by overwhelming economic needs. The Revolution started not only as the last great Fronde, but also as the last great bread riot of the ancien régime.

To understand the Great Terror we must keep in mind that the popular disturbances of 1789 were still basically bread riots and assumed a political significance only because they happened to coincide with the political agitation of 1789; that in 1789 the menu peuple had neither political institutions nor a developed consciousness of itself as a political force; and that following the disturbances of 1789 popular involvement in the Revolution was minimal until late 1791 and early 1792.

Many historians have observed that the outbreak of the war between revolutionary France and the old continental monarchies in the spring of 1792 produced a decisive change in the internal situation of France. Norman Hampson has stated that the war "simplified all issues and eliminated all nuances. Henceforth the struggle lay between those who, with whatever reservations, wished for the restoration of the royal authority at the

price of the defeat of France, and those whose attachment to the Revolution led them to make whatever concessions might be the price of military victory."<sup>23</sup> Hampson's statement, emphasizing the extreme political polarization produced by the war, in effect defines the Terror in its most basic political sense. Its all important phrase is "whatever concessions might be the price of military victory." The price that the new republic paid for military victory was the institution of a ruthless system of "prompt severe and inflexible justice" against all enemies of the Revolution, defined by Robespierre as the Terror.<sup>24</sup>

Again, we must remember that an essential continuity underlay the great changes of the revolutionary period. As Taine has asserted, Terror, meaning the irreconcilable political enmity of the revolutionaries and the counterrevolutionaries, had accompanied revolutionary developments from the beginning, and the crisis years of 1793-94 saw only the resolution of deeply felt hatreds at a higher degree of intensity than ever before.

But who were the counterrevolutionaries? In the final accounting, this could be decided only by those who held power in Paris. In the emergency situation created by the war, the revolutionary leadership had to deal rapidly with internal enemies and so had to differentiate in a rapid, black-and-white, authoritarian manner between friends and foes of the Revolution. But in order to act in an authoritarian manner authority is needed. Early in 1792, in a country without an effective centralized administrative system, without an effective judicial system or police apparatus, the revolutionaries had only very limited authority.<sup>25</sup>

This is the point where the sans-culottes, the popular movement, enter the stage of the Revolution. In early 1792, inflation and food shortages provoked sporadic cases of bread rioting. Through the spring of 1792 the inflation and the shortages worsened, and popular tempers rose.<sup>26</sup>



As in 1789, economic and financial difficulties again coincided with political difficulties. With the monarchy openly turning counterrevolutionary, expecting imminent aid from foreign princes and émigrés, it was not difficult for the Paris Jacobin Club, the central institution of the capital's leading revolutionaries, to direct the energies of the Paris crowds into political channels. In August 1792 the Paris sans-culottes, with the cooperation of provincial Fédéré battallions, toppled the monarchy and established the republic.<sup>27</sup>

In accepting sans-culotte support, the predominantly bourgeois revolutionary leadership, believing in the necessity of establishing centrally controlled, efficient political institutions, accepted the aid of crowds, composed of artisans, small merchants, workers, transients and even some wealthy individuals, that believed in direct government through their own locally controlled political institutions. A basic aspect of the era immediately preceding the Great Terror was the fact that the Jacobin leadership was forced, in the absence of any other effective executive arm, to rely on the support of the sans-culottes.

Albert Soboul's monumental study of the Parisian sans-culottes has demonstrated that one basic difference between the sans-culottes and earlier popular movements was that in the course of 1792 and 1793 the sans-culottes did not disperse following their violent activities on the streets, but returned to their own newly formed or newly conquered political institutions, such as the sections of the cities, the Paris Commune, some popular societies, and later in 1793, those most typical of sans-culotte institutions, the revolutionary armies.<sup>28</sup>

The advent of the sans-culottes produced a serious rift within the Paris Jacobin Club. One segment of the Jacobins, which later became known as the Girondins, recoiled from an alliance with the Parisian

sans-culottes, especially after the September prison massacres. The second segment, eventually emerging triumphant and appropriating the general designation of Jacobin, recognized that the sans-culottes had energy and a basic commitment to the Revolution; and to ensure the Revolution's victory over both internal and external enemies, it was willing to use the sans-culottes' scattered, but enormous energies.<sup>29</sup>

The first historian to note the essential organic relationship between sans-culottes and Jacobins was Albert Mathiez.<sup>30</sup> He has posited a direct cause and effect relation between inflation and the mood, demands and actions of the sans-culottes. The consumers of the cities, the people living on fixed incomes, the artisans, the workers, viz. all those who could not compensate for the loss of the assignat's value through increased earnings, were victims of inflation. They did not resign themselves to paying the costs of the Revolution, but revolted against the economic liberalism of the bourgeois revolutionaries, and demanded a return to the pre-1789 system of regulations.<sup>31</sup> The sans-culottes imposed their economic ideas on the predominantly bourgeois Jacobin group, and its parliamentary vanguard, the Mountain. In return for essential sans-culotte political support, the Jacobins were willing to abandon liberal economic ideals. The Terror of 1793-94 was, according to Mathiez, the direct result of the maximum général on food prices, which in September 1793 was forced on an unwilling Jacobin Convention by the rioting Paris sans-culottes. The maximum attacked most particular economic interests, and in order to enforce it the Mountain had to establish a systematic dictatorship of the central power. In Mathiez's view political and economic Terror were closely interrelated.<sup>32</sup>

Mathiez's analysis implies that the political Terror was put into effect in order to enforce the sans-culotte brand of economic Terror.

This, however, appears to be only partly true. The most basic concern of the Jacobins was to cope with the political problems posed by the war crisis; they realized that the most urgent need of the new republic was administrative centralization. Economic issues concerned them only to the extent that the country's economy had to be organized to wage war effectively. To be sure, they submitted to sans-culotte economic demands in order to retain sans-culotte political support; but during the winter of 1793-94, as it became clear that many sans-culotte economic policies were injurious to the Mountain's ultimate goal of efficient administration, these were dispensed with, and replaced by the Mountain's own economic policies, often equally severe, but primarily aimed at supplying the armies and the civilian populations rather than individual powerful pressure groups.

During the winter of 1792-93, the Jacobins began a concerted drive for power which eventually culminated in the political dictatorship of the two ruling committees in the Year II.<sup>33</sup> Their first task was to overcome Girondin obstructionism, a basically negative tendency embodied by a scattered group of anti-Jacobin and anti-sans-culotte deputies with varied regional interests, united only in their opposition to the Paris sans-culottes. As the Jacobins gradually gained a widening base of support in Paris and especially in the National Convention, the Girondins widened their opposition to include not only the sans-culottes, but also the entire decision making apparatus of the nation centered in Paris.

On the basis of Sydenham's studies, one can hypothesize the concept of a nascent Jacobin political party standing for centralized, efficient government, opposed by localist, disunited Girondin deputies.<sup>34</sup> The Jacobins built an extra-parliamentary power base in the form of a nationwide system of popular societies in constant communication with the Paris

Jacobin Club and usually following the lead of the Paris Club.<sup>35</sup>

They established a system of représentants en mission (representatives on mission), roving deputies of the National Convention, the overwhelming majority of whom were Jacobins, and who were in steady contact both with Paris and with local Jacobin bodies in the provinces. In early 1793 the Jacobins established virtually all the institutions -- vigilance committees, the Paris Revolutionary Tribunal, the Committee of Public Safety -- which were to assume responsibility for governing France and the war dictatorship of the Year II.<sup>36</sup>

The Jacobin drive to establish a centralized government reached its first major climax with the Paris journées of May 31 and June 2. With the aid of the Paris sans-culottes, the Mountain was able to oust the Girondins from the National Convention. However, the defeat of the Girondins did not yet mean that the Mountain was securely in control of the republic. On the one hand the Paris sans-culottes, ensconced in the Paris Commune and sections, and led by a handful of skilful popular agitators, regarded the victories of May 31 and June 2 as their own and were pressing for a more effective role in national politics. On the other hand, the centralist drive of the Jacobins through the winter and spring of 1792-93 clashed with particular interests and aspirations in the provinces, and awakened the suspicions of locally-based, provincial administrators with vested interests, of royalist elements still active in the provinces, of particular economic interests, of certain locally established provincial Jacobins, and sometimes, as in the case of Lyons, and less obviously of Marseilles, even of some provincial sans-culottes. The Mountain, newly victorious in Paris, was faced, in June 1793, with a host of federalist insurrections especially in the major provincial cities such as Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux and Caen.<sup>37</sup>

## III

Before proceeding with a discussion of how the Mountain solved the pressing problems of mid-1793, we should make an attempt to clarify the nature of sans-culottism. To this point we have posited that the direct ancestors of the sans-culottes were the bread-rioters of the eighteenth century, that the sans-culottes, like their ancestors, were basically economically motivated, but that in the course of the revolutionary crisis which started with the outbreak of the war, they began to emerge as an independent political force with their own permanent institutions; indeed, that having their own institutions and a more or less defined political position transformed the bread rioters into sans-culottes.

Several historians have attempted to define the sans-culottes in social terms. In The Crowd in the French Revolution, Rudé attempts to use the designation sans-culotte only in a social and not in a political sense.<sup>38</sup> He sees the Paris sans-culottes as composed of "small shopkeepers, petty traders, craftsmen, journeymen, labourers, vagrants, and city poor."<sup>39</sup> In effect, Rudé's social definition is an extremely simple one. He divides the population of Paris into two unequal segments: the first, consisting of the clergy, the nobility, and the financial, commercial, manufacturing and professional bourgeoisie, he designated as the "privileged or wealthier classes", and the second, consisting of the rest of the Parisian population and encompassing all poorer elements -- probably accounting for some 90 per cent of the city's inhabitants -- as the sans-culottes.<sup>40</sup> Yet even this simple definition is inadequate for, as Rudé himself recognizes, from 1792 the term sans-culotte was "applied to extreme Republicans in general -- even to those of personal wealth."<sup>41</sup>

Mazauric also believes that the sans-culottes can be defined in class terms. He insists that:

the Parisian sans-culottes formed nothing less than a social class, if by this term we mean men bound together by a certain common position in the economic process and subject to the same ideological tendencies. The sans-culotte is one who lives by his work, whether he is a salaried journeyman, an occasional day-laborer, a self-employed artisan, or a keeper of his own shop. There is no 'class consciousness' in the modern sense of the word.<sup>42</sup>

It is little wonder that 'there is 'no class consciousness' in the modern sense of the word', for despite Mazauric's assertion there appears to exist no class in any sense of the word. The 'class' which Mazauric describes is in fact a socially heterogeneous mixture of lower middle class, proletarian, indigent transient, and bourgeois elements. Mazauric himself points out that among the sans-culotte master artisans we 'find the independent artisan in easy circumstances, such as Duplay, the joiner, who collected 10,000 livres income from his houses, or 'Mauvage, the fanmaker, a militant sans-culotte . . . who owned a fan factory, employing more than sixty workers''.<sup>43</sup> It seems clear that Duplay and Mauvage lived from the proceeds of property and the profits of entrepreneurial activity, but not by their own work. At the other end of the sans-culotte social spectrum were the large number of rootless indigents who in periods of shortages lived as beggars or criminals by their wits rather than by their work. Yet Mazauric himself testified that these men and women 'played a decisive role in the popular uprisings, triggered by famine, in year II and especially year III.'<sup>44</sup>

But let us, with a reasonable degree of justification, accept that the majority of sans-culottes was neither bourgeois nor indigent. Can we call the mass of sans-culottes, stemming from small artisan, shopkeeper or tradesman social backgrounds a social class? To answer this

question let us turn to certain basic definitions of social class:

The lower strata of the middle class -- the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants -- all these sink gradually into the proletariat, . . . Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population.<sup>45</sup>

And further:

The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay, more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat.<sup>46</sup>

The above two citations, quoted from the Communist Manifesto, indicate that Marx and Engels, the originators of the notion of social class in the modern sense of the word, did not consider that the social groups of small tradespeople, small manufacturers, shopkeepers, artisans, viz. the social groups most widely represented among the sans-culottes, formed a separate social class, but considered these groups to be the lower strata of the middle class. Admittedly, Marx and Engels expected that with the coming of industrialization these groups would sink into the proletariat, but they also clearly warned that in pre-industrial conditions these social groups might play a conservative historical role. Thus, in classical Marxist terms the chief social groups composing the revolutionary sans-culotterie cannot be considered to constitute a social class.

It is noteworthy that the basically backward-looking economic aspirations of the sans-culottes, looking back to the simple, pre-revolutionary days of the "just price", of the small market place, of a society of small, individual producers, fit well the Marxian notion of a conservative lower middle class.

But if the sans-culotte is difficult to define in social or class

terms, if in economic terms he looked to eighteenth century norms, how can he be defined as a revolutionary? Soboul provides a partial answer to this question:

The social definition of a sans-culotte must be qualified by a political definition: they cannot be separated. "One can only find virtue and patriotism", announces the Père Duchesne, "amongst the sans-culottes: without them, the Revolution would be finished. The salvation of the Republic lies in their hands." Here the word sans-culotte is used as a synonym for patriot and republican. For the sans-culotte, it was not simply a question of describing oneself as a sans-culotte, . . . , it was a question of political conduct.<sup>47</sup>

Two points stand out in Soboul's description of a sans-culotte: first, the sans-culotte may be defined in political terms as a patriot and a republican, without whom the Revolution and the republic would perish, and secondly, the sans-culotte may be defined not merely in political terms, but in dynamic political terms, as a revolutionary actor.

But how then does the sans-culotte differ from the similarly politically defined Jacobin? To answer this question we must again return to an earlier aspect of our argument. Unlike the Jacobin, the sans-culotte, although pre-eminently a political creature, received his original impetus for action from economic causes. Before he was politicized, the sans-culotte was usually a simple urban small man, who wanted, before all else, stable food prices and plentiful food supplies. As a sans-culotte he stood against forces which menaced him directly, but which he could neither understand nor control. This is why the sans-culotte's chief enemies were inflation and dearth, which he personalized as counter-revolutionary speculators and food hoarders (accapareurs).

In a positive sense the sans-culotte stood for the promise of freedom,



which he understood the Revolution to make to him personally:

the sans-culotte, a little man, would henceforth, as a member of the "people" or the "nation", as a defender of the patrie, have the power of decision over his own actions. Popular sovereignty, the basic political theoretical innovation of the Revolution, had, in the person of the sans-culotte, reached the people. The sans-culotte understood popular sovereignty to apply to himself and therefore considered his own activities as revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary any one or any group that stood against him. Soboul has pointed out that the sans-culotte conception of unrestricted popular sovereignty led to the practice of direct government by the smallest armed sans-culotte units (the section en permanence, or armed section in Paris), and that the sans-culottes attached greater importance to local affairs, to controlling the communal assemblies, the general assemblies, and popular societies in the Paris sections, than to national affairs.<sup>48</sup>

In a large body of published work Richard Cobb has introduced a very important change of emphasis into the study of popular movements during the Revolution. He has insisted not only on examining the actions and attitudes of the common people during the revolutionary era -- as Rudé and Soboul have also done -- but has moved his main field of research outside Paris. He is the first historian to study the sans-culottes in the provinces. Cobb's work is based on a large selection of material from a variety of provincial archives; in this way he is able to examine certain established historical issues from a new perspective.

Cobb emphasizes the essentially local, fragmentary character of the revolutionary popular movements, and insists that they never had much hope of influencing national events.<sup>49</sup> According to him "the development of the sans-culotte movement during 1793 was entirely accidental and arose

from the convenient pretext of total mobilization and emergency.<sup>50</sup> In the provinces the sans-culottes were occupied with their own, often petty, local concerns, and were incapable of thinking in national terms.<sup>51</sup> Thus, Cobb's findings on the locally oriented concerns of provincial sans-culottes agrees with Soboul's findings on the Paris sans-culottes; though predictably, the provincial sans-culottes, removed from the central stage of national politics, were even more parochial than their Paris brethren.<sup>52</sup>

In the final accounting, the sans-culottes represented revolutionary violence at its most basic popular, local level, and as such may perhaps best be defined in terms of temperament and mentality rather than in social or even strictly political terms. The sans-culottes, in the disorganized conditions of late 1793 and early 1794 represented, in Cobb's words;

a form of 'popular federalism'. . . anarchical and undisciplined, it attracted men of a certain type, instead of a certain social condition: it attracted revolutionary optimists, zealots, and wild men, the 'perfectionists' of the revolutionary period, who believed in taking on everything and everybody at once and who, in the government's view did not know where to stop.<sup>53</sup>

#### IV

Having defeated the Girondins, the Montagnards were yet faced with an array of problems. In order to feed, clothe and supply the armies defending France against outside enemies, they had to organized effectively the internal economic and political administration of the country. But the great Montagnard centralizing initiative was fought tooth and nail by a number of locally based interests.

The clearest manifestations of this localist reaction were the federalist revolts of the summer of 1793. Local interests reacted against the presence of central government agents; against economic policies which favoured the interests of the Jacobins' urban sans-culotte allies,

but injured the interests of the rural producers and of the provincial commercial classes; and against the mass military recruitment orders of early 1793.

That the Mountain emerged victorious against the federalist revolts, which broke out in some sixty departments and virtually all large provincial cities, provides convincing evidence that the Montagnard leadership's early initiatives toward centralization were successful. The disorganized, indecisive, highly fragmented federalists were contained in their provincial strongholds, and were dealt with individually by representatives on mission, who were in direct contact with the Committee of Public Safety, by popular societies in steady communication with each other and with the Jacobin Club in Paris, and by enthusiastic Jacobin and sans-culotte troops of the republican armies.<sup>54</sup>

But federalism was only the first of the major challenges faced by the Montagnards. The sans-culottes, as we have seen, stood for the political ideal of direct popular democracy and the economic ideal of strict price controls favouring the urban, in particular in Paris, menu peuple. These sans-culotte ideals were translated into political action through the periodic sans-culotte journées, the last of which (previous to the fall of the Montagnard dictatorship in Thermidor, Year II) on September 4, 1793, forced the Mountain to promulgate the maximum général. Along with the maximum, the Montagnards also agreed with sans-culotte demands for the establishment of the sans-culotte armées révolutionnaires, which were to act as executive agents to enforce the maximum.<sup>55</sup> In their efforts to enforce the maximum in the countryside, the urban sans-culottes of the revolutionary armies became feared and resented by a significant portion of the rural population, especially in areas which had food supply surpluses. As Cobb has stated:

la plupart des cultivateurs devaient s'opposer de leur mieux à une politique conçue dans l'intérêt de la ville.<sup>56</sup>

Whether as enforcers of the maximum, popular dechristianizers, or political shock troops acting against federalist insurrection, the revolutionary armies operated in an independent manner, on their own responsibility and dispensed terror autonomously.

But it was not only the urban, especially the Paris, sans-culottes who acted in an independent manner in the provinces. Representatives on mission, chosen for their trustworthiness and Jacobin sympathies, often undertook to act quite independently of the central government. Carrier's terrorist acts in the Vendée, Fouché's dechristianization in Nièvre, Barras's and Fréron's terrorism in Marseilles were all autonomous initiatives, without Paris approval.

In late 1793 the authority of representatives on mission was misused in other ways as well. Representatives competed with each other in procuring food supplies and in overseeing the operations of the armies and of civilian authorities. With ill-defined authority, often overlapping military and civilian jurisdictions, and with the inevitable ambitions of individuals more acutely interested in their own personal advancement and enrichment than in the good of the republic, this was virtually unavoidable.<sup>57</sup>

Neither did revolutionary localism and regionalism disappear with the ~~defeat~~ defeat of the federalists. Provincial Jacobins and sans-culottes, many of whom had suffered at the hands of the federalists, often assumed that following the defeat of federalism they could act as autonomous local authorities. Congresses of popular societies, powerful Jacobin Clubs of the cities, provincial revolutionary armies, provincial popular tribunals and vigilance committees all had their own notions about the meaning of

revolutionary government. In the opinion of the Montagnard leadership, such centrifugal political tendencies added up to a dangerous decentralizing movement which threatened to rend asunder the Mountain's centralization initiative. To conduct the war effectively, the two ruling executive committees, which in late 1793 gained complete ascendancy over the National Convention, came to believe in the necessity of dealing severely with all elements whose activities, intentionally or unintentionally, opposed the ultimate goal of establishing an effective, centralized and national administration. With the promulgation of the law of 14 frimaire, defining the administrative structure of the temporary war dictatorship, a strict authoritarian centralized administration was established, at least in theory. To make the theory reality the Terror was used.<sup>58</sup>

What was the Terror? We have arrived at the point where we must attempt to define it. We have already offered a partial, largely theoretical political definition when we asserted, following Taine and Cobban, that the Terror accompanied the Revolution from the beginning, that this meant, following Robespierre's contemporary definition, the exercise of "prompt, severe inflexible justice" against all forms of counterrevolution, and that, as Hampson has suggested, the revolutionaries were willing to take any action, pay any price for the victory of the Revolution.<sup>59</sup> It is evident, then, that the Terror, as far as the individual revolutionary was concerned, was based on a set of mental attitudes, a frame of mind which helped him define himself as a revolutionary by his inflexible stand, mirrored in action and in speech, against any real or suspected forms of counterrevolution.

This definition of the Terror in terms of mental attitudes brings us back to Cobb's description of a revolutionary and especially a sans-culotte in terms of temperament and mentality.<sup>60</sup> Terror was an essential aspect

of sans-culotte revolutionary actions. In the form of armed crowds dispensing rapid, merciless justice to counterrevolutionaries, of relentless, peripatetic revolutionary armies accompanied by travelling guillotines, or of military commissions, often manned by Paris sans-culottes, dispatching batches of counterrevolutionaries to the guillotine in regions of civil war, the Terror was the weapon of the sans-culottes in all their activities.

This form of the Terror was spontaneous and democratic in the most essential sense of the word. But it was also conceived in terms of narrow local interests, and was fragmented and parochial -- as were the sans-culottes themselves. As both Cobb and Soboul have observed, grass-roots sans-culotte Terror was incompatible with the successful conduct of the war and the organization of centralized, efficient government.<sup>61</sup> Cobb has formulated this view in a clear and succinct manner:

The conflict between the Jacobin dictatorship and the popular movement, the parting of the ways between the robepierrists and the sans-culottes, was much more than has often been suggested. Programme played little part in this divorce, nor can any 'inevitability' of conflict be discovered in terms of class. The two sides represented forms of government (un-government might be a better term to describe the communalism of the popular militants) that could not co-exist for more than a few months. It took the central government some time to realize what was going on in the Departments -- it was uninformed or misinformed -- and a good deal longer to make its will felt and to put an end to the various experiments in popular government. No government can tolerate anarchy indefinitely, and that of the year II had both the will and the means of putting an end to it and of subjecting France to a single central impulsion.<sup>62</sup>

In early 1794 the dictatorship of the Montagnard committees took the Terror out of the hands of the various popular elements which previously exercised it and turned it against all enemies of the new war dictatorship. The sans-culottes, by standing for decentralized, direct

people's government, stood in the way of the Mountain's authoritarian centralizing impulse, and thus themselves fell victim to the Montagnard Terror. As Soboul has stated, "The sans-culottes had asked for a strong government to crush the aristocracy; they never considered that, in order to do this, it would be forced to discipline the popular movement."<sup>63</sup>

The Montagnards used Terror, administered bureaucratically through the Paris Revolutionary Tribunal, and through trustworthy agents of the ruling committees in the provinces, finally to establish an authoritarian war republic. Not only the popular movement, but all other centrifugal impulses which threatened the Montagnard war republic were dealt with mercilessly. Dantonists, Hébertists, revolutionary armies, congresses of popular societies, independent representatives on mission, all fell victim to the Mountain's centralizing impulse.

Thus, it is clear that the two basic political impulses of localism and centralism survived the ancien régime, remained important during the early years of the Revolution, and that the opposition between them was one of the chief issues of the Age of the Terror.

## V

The study of municipal institutions in southern France has been, until now, a relatively neglected field of research. Recently, a group of historians have published some articles about municipal administration in the Midi, under the direction of Jacques Godechot.<sup>64</sup> Basing his opinion on these studies, Godechot has observed that "le Midi était, en général, plus progressiste en politique, que le nord de la France,"<sup>65</sup>

and that many southern municipal institutions, rooted in the ancien régime, survived the Revolution, and became building blocks of modern French democracy.<sup>66</sup>

A study of Marseilles provides a degree of further proof for Godechot's assertions. Marseilles' municipal administration was transformed during the revolutionary era, but underlying all transformations was a deep-seated local municipal patriotism. Because of its geographical distance from the capital, of the relatively recent date -- late fifteenth century -- of its absorption by the monarchy, and of its extensive particular privileges which survived into the revolutionary era, localist sentiments were very strong in Marseilles. They found expression through revolutionary municipalism between 1789 and 1793, partly reverted to the more rigid particularism of the ancien régime during the federalist interlude of the summer of 1793, but were also expressed through the strong regionalist position of the Marseilles Jacobins.

How localism and regionalism were expressed in Marseilles during the Revolution, and how the Montagnards dealt with it is the main subject of this thesis. Unfortunately, my approach to the problem of Marseilles localism has been hampered by the fact that I did not have access to local archival sources. Consequently I was forced to use mainly printed primary sources, and the work of local historians. Nonetheless, I believe that this study has value, since it is the first effort to apply certain recent general hypotheses on the Terror, the popular movements, the relationship of Jacobins and Girondins, and federalism, to the particular case of Marseilles. Some of the results of this effort should help to throw a small measure of new light on certain basic issues of revolutionary history, most importantly the relation of centralization and locally based reaction during the era of the Terror.



## NOTES FOR CHAPTER I.

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## PART TWO

### Marseilles from the Beginning of the Revolution

#### Until the End of Federalism

### CHAPTER II - The Rivalry of Aix and Marseilles; Marseilles, the Bastion of the Revolution in the Mediterranean Region; Growth of Marseilles' Municipalism and Regionalism

One of the outstanding features of the French Revolution on the Mediterranean seaboard was the conflict between the large commercial city Marseilles and the ancien régime administrative centre Aix-en-Provence. By no means unique to Provence, this conflict had counterparts in Brittany where the large commercial port Nantes challenged the administrative centre Rennes, and in Auvergne where Clermont and Riom engaged in a struggle for political authority.

Although the Marseilles-Aix conflict had strong social overtones, the Aix élite being heavily aristocratic and the Marseilles revolutionaries being almost exclusively drawn from the intellectual, professional and commercial bourgeoisie, the conflict was in essence political and regional. The Marseilles revolutionaries, gaining independence from the royalist administrative élite of Aix in early 1790, carried the fight against counterrevolution beyond the confines of Marseilles. In the administrative anarchy of 1790-92 they were free to do this. The Marseilles effort on behalf of the revolution was simultaneously a drive for regional political control and from the beginning was based in part on local pride. This

local municipal patriotism was reenforced by the lack of serious counter-revolutionary activity in Marseilles from mid-1790 until mid-1792: when the Marseilles revolutionaries compared the apparently unified revolutionary consensus of their city with the counterrevolutionary anarchy prevailing in much of the southeast, they felt justified in congratulating themselves.

Marseilles' revolutionary unity depended on the prosperity of Marseilles' commerce, which insured the adherence of the commercial bourgeoisie to the Revolution, and on the provision of adequate food supplies and relatively stable prices which insured the adherence of the lower classes to the Revolution. Marseilles remained a relatively unified city until the first half of 1792, when these conditions were first seriously disturbed.

In this chapter I will trace the political struggle between Marseilles and Aix during the early part of the Revolution and the drive of the Marseilles revolutionaries against counterrevolution in the southeastern region, a drive which culminated in the Marseilles Fédérés! expedition to Paris in 1792.

## II

In 1789 Marseilles was the third largest city of France, after Paris and Lyons, and was the largest commercial seaport on the Mediterranean. The only other French port comparable with Marseilles in terms of population and wealth was Bordeaux, but Bordeaux was only one of several important ports on the Atlantic coast, while Marseilles was the only important French commercial port on the Mediterranean coast.<sup>1</sup>

Marseilles was situated in the county of Provence and the généralité

of Aix. The two highest constituted bodies of Provence -- a pays d'état -- were the Parlement of Aix and the Assembly of Communities. The intendant of Aix, representing royal power, held the position of Premier-Président of the Parlement, and the Archbishop of Aix presided over the Assembly of Communities.<sup>2</sup>

In Aix, a local administrative and legal bureaucracy, containing both noblesse de robe and roturier (commoner) elements had grown up. In the Parlement nobles were in the majority, while the Assembly of Communities consisted largely of lawyers and small town administrators. While the Parlement was the more prestigious of the two bodies, the bulk of the administrative labour was performed by a standing committee of the Assembly of Communities under the direction of an important Aix lawyer bearing the title of Assessor.<sup>3</sup> The Aix bureaucracy was in general dominated by the larger towns of Provence, viz. Aix, Arles and Toulon, excluding, however, Provence's largest city, Marseilles.<sup>4</sup>

Demographically and economically Marseilles dominated Provence, containing 14% of the county's total population and over 60% of its urban population.<sup>5</sup> Yet because of the jurisdictional peculiarities dating from the Middle Ages, Marseilles was excluded from significant influence on the political life of the county; on the other hand, it retained a large measure of formal (de jure) political independence from Provence.<sup>6</sup>

During the seventeenth century the monarchy attempted to concentrate the national administration in the hands of the royal bureaucracy, in order to counteract the centrifugal tendencies inherent in regional administrations with particular rights and institutions, claiming varying degrees of local autonomy. Most Provincial Estates, including that of Provence, were suppressed, and intendants, directly responsible to the crown were set above local institutions. However, in the course of the eighteenth

century the control of the monarchy over the intendants gradually weakened, and the Parlements waged a continual battle for local autonomy and against royal absolutism. In Aix, the last two intendants came from the Gallois de la Tour family, who ruled the généralité for about half a century before the Revolution and established a veritable "family compact", rampant with nepotism. The intendant's functions and responsibilities as a royal representative were often contradicted by interests and obligations imposed upon him by his position as the Premier-Président of the Parlement of Aix -- a position which made him the most significant local dignitary and the head of the local nobility.<sup>7</sup>

The Intendant of Aix also gained direct control over the independent political and commercial institutions of Marseilles: the Chamber of Commerce, the Bureau d'Abondance and the Bureau du Vin.<sup>8</sup> The élite of Marseilles resented the incursions against the city's independence by the intendant, whom it regarded as a member of the Aix ruling class. Marseilles' claim to equal and separate status vis-à-vis the county of Provence was continually reiterated by the élite of Marseilles. The eighteenth-century political jealousies between the administrative centre Aix and the commercial centre Marseilles were the basis for the regional enmity which forms a significant aspect of the history of the Revolution in the southeast.

Commercial privileges were the basis of Marseilles' powerful economic position, the two most significant privileges being the Freedom (Franchise) of the Port and the right of quarantine. Through the Freedom of the Port the city received an exemption from the 20% tariff duty imposed on all merchandise entering France from anywhere in the Mediterranean basin, and through the right of quarantine all ships entering France from the Orient or North Africa were forced to undergo sanitary inspection at



Marseilles. These privileges gave Marseilles a virtual monopoly of foreign trade on the Mediterranean coast.<sup>9</sup>

Marseilles' prosperity and population increased steadily during the decade preceding the Revolution.<sup>10</sup> By 1790, the city's population was slightly over 100,000, and Marseilles had become the most important import-export centre in the southeast. Marseilles' foreign trade was characterized by a steady excess of imports over exports, with foodstuffs and raw materials constituting the majority of the imports and manufactured items accounting for the majority of the exports. In the import category cereals were overwhelmingly important, making Marseilles the greatest grain importing centre of the French kingdom and the largest grain market on the Mediterranean coast, supplying large areas of southeastern France with bread. Marseilles also served as an export outlet for the manufacturing centres of the Rhône valley as far north as Lyons.<sup>11</sup>

The commercial operations of the port of Marseilles were overseen by the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce, generally staffed by large-scale merchants (négociants), shipoutfitters, and manufacturers -- members of a flourishing local economic élite which had accumulated great wealth during Marseilles' long period of prosperity. Some of the members of this commercial class came from old Marseilles families, but others had established themselves in the city only recently, and a sizeable minority were Protestants. They prided themselves on their culture and their cosmopolitan outlook, but jealously guarded Marseilles' commercial privileges, which constituted the foundation of their wealth. Despite their great wealth they were barred from political advancement in Provence by the entrenched political élite of Aix, and from social advancement by their commoner status.<sup>12</sup>

At least a segment of the Marseilles commercial élite, like wealthy commercial élites in other French cities, especially the seaports, welcomed

the Revolution as a means of breaking down barriers to political and social advancement. Yet from the beginning apprehension was expressed about the fate of Marseilles' special commercial privileges, which formed an integral part of the ancien régime's political system.

### III

With the calling of the Provincial Estates in 1787, long smoldering antagonisms between the aristocracy and the Third Estate were reignited in Provence. The aristocracy agitated for reinstating the Provincial Estates in the ancient, pre-1639 manner, by means of which the great majority of seats would go to fief-possessing nobles; while the Third Estate, led by the legal élite of the Assembly of Communities, resisted the nobles' demands and proposed a basic reform of the ancient constitution of Provence. Foremost on the reform agenda were fundamental changes in the terms of representation in the Provincial Estates and the abolition of noble immunity from fiscal responsibility. The nobility, having behind it the power of the Parlement of Aix, and the support of the intendant, was victorious, and the Provincial Estates were convened in 1787 in the ancient manner.<sup>13</sup>

The struggle between the Second and Third Estates lasted from mid-1787 until early 1789. Its last phase concerned the election of deputies to the Estates General. The nobles had claimed that only the Provincial Estates, convened in the ancient manner, had the right to name deputies to the Estates General, but the Third Estate, emboldened by two years continuous opposition to aristocratic privilege, fought with all its power against this mode of election, and the Provincial Estates fizzled out in a complete deadlock in early 1789. Necker, faced with the deadlock in

Provence, decided that the best solution would be to submit Provence to the procedure followed in the non-privileged pays d'élection, and have the electoral assemblies of the sénéchaussées choose the region's delegates to the Estates General. In effect, Necker's decision meant a complete victory of the Third Estate, for the Third Estate was allowed to choose its representatives independently, in its own electoral assemblies, and even in the electoral assemblies of the Second Estate and the fief-possessing nobles were outnumbered by nobles who did not possess fiefs.<sup>14</sup>

Marseilles, excluded from the political life of Provence, showed relatively little interest in the political struggle in Aix. However, with the convening of the electoral assemblies and the drafting of the cahiers, political interest was quickly aroused in the port city. Divided into two sénéchaussées, Marseilles elected to the Estates General two representatives for the nobility, two for the clergy and four for the Third Estate. Representatives for the nobility and clergy were chosen directly by seneschal assemblies consisting of all members of their order, but the representatives of the numerous Third Estate were elected indirectly: electoral assemblies were chosen which then chose the representatives. Generally, the literate, wealthy commercial bourgeois were chosen to the Third Estate's electoral assemblies, and every representative of the Marseilles Third Estate to the Estates General came from the ranks of the or professional commercial bourgeoisie.<sup>15</sup>

The overall tone of the Marseilles cahiers is conservative and particularist, demanding respect for the city's privileges. The general cahier of the Third Estate insisted that since commerce was the lifeblood of Marseilles, the freedom of the port which was the cornerstone of the city's commerce should be safeguarded. To be sure, the general cahier of the Third Estate, the cahier of the nobility and the cahiers of the thirteen

corporations were all in favour of freedom of trade, meaning by this internal free trade, free trade with the Indies, and the destruction of the Royal Trading Companies' monopolies, but they exempted the Marseilles-based Royal Africa company from this call for free trade.<sup>16</sup> Thus the cahiers give an impression of satisfaction on the part of Marseilles with its economic status, and anxiety for its preservation. The Marseilles cahiers support Cobban's contention that the "merchants of the towns wanted freedom for their own trade and prohibitions on that of any possible rivals."<sup>17</sup>

At the height of the political unrest accompanying the elections and the drafting of the cahiers, a new element entered the political picture of Provence. The bad harvest of 1788 and the severe winter of 1788-89 were followed by grain shortages and rising food prices in the spring of 1789. The populace of Provence reacted to the shortages in the usual eighteenth-century manner, through a series of bread riots in March 1789. But the riots in Marseilles, Aix, Toulon and a score of smaller communities coincided with the meeting of the seneschal assemblies and quickly assumed a political character, becoming manifestations against the local political élites.<sup>18</sup>

The popular rioting produced an immediate reaction on the part of the Marseilles commercial bourgeoisie. A military group, the garde bourgeoise, drawn principally from the ranks of bourgeois youth, was formed in late March to protect property, law and order. However, this forerunner of the National Guard also attempted to seize the municipal government and establish Marseilles' independence vis-à-vis the Intendant and the royal bureaucracy. The popular rioters unwittingly aided the designs of the garde bourgeoise by expelling the aristocratic mayor and assessor, creatures of the intendant, from the city.<sup>19</sup>

In Aix, the March riots evoked great consternation. Legal bourgeoisie, enfeoffed nobility, and royal bureaucracy all saw power slipping from their

hands. Faced with the common popular foe and the municipal revolutionary movement of Marseilles, the leaders of the Third Estate and the nobles of the Parlement patched up their differences. Henceforth the important lawyers of Aix, including the assessor Pascalis, who had led the Third Estate in 1787 and 1788, assumed an increasingly conservative political position.

The royal bureaucracy of Aix considered the formation of the Marseilles garde bourgeoise and the expulsion of the leading municipal officials from the port city a provocation against constituted authority. The intendant dispatched to Marseilles a military force under Count Caraman, the military commander of Provence. Caraman disbanded the garde bourgeoise and re-established the old municipality; he ruled Marseilles with the support of the intendant, the Archbishop of Aix and the Parlement until July 1789.<sup>20</sup>

The dismissal of Necker and the Paris revolution of July 14 triggered a series of municipal revolutions in the provinces.<sup>21</sup> In Marseilles, the initiators of the March municipal movement once more took matters into their hands, and on July 23 at an emergency general meeting of the city's three estates declared the municipal government backed by Caraman's troops to be illegal, legality residing with the gathered assembly. Furthermore, the Marseilles assembly asked Caraman to withdraw his troops, and refused to recognise the Aix Parlement's authority over Marseilles. The municipal revolutionaries also reorganized the garde bourgeoise, and renamed it garde nationale.<sup>22</sup>

The municipal revolutionaries of Marseilles temporarily succeeded in July 1789 because they had the support of large popular crowds, kept in a state of agitation by unfounded rumours of foreign invasion on the Alps frontier and of counterrevolutionary brigands roaming the countryside. In the last week of July the Marseilles crowd opened the prisons of the

city, then marched to Aix and opened the prisons there.<sup>23</sup> However, the activity of the crowd was temporary: the immediate revolutionary excitement quickly subsided, and as the rumours proved to be false, the popular element dispersed. Although the Marseilles National Guard put up determined resistance, Caraman's troops were able to recapture Marseilles by late August and to retain control until spring 1790.<sup>24</sup>

Upon reassuming authority in Marseilles, Caraman imprisoned about fifty of the Marseilles municipal revolutionaries, suppressed the National Guard, and reinstated the old municipality subservient to Aix's authority.<sup>25</sup>

The Aix establishment's power over Marseilles was finally destroyed in February 1790. In the municipal elections of February 9, the négociant Etienne Martin, a respected member of the commercial bourgeoisie, was elected mayor and the municipal council was filled with the revolutionaries of March and July, 1789, many of them still imprisoned at the time of their election.<sup>26</sup> Caraman attempted to reach a compromise with Etienne Martin, and thus retain partial control of Marseilles, but popular action foiled his designs. In a number of stormy journées, during March and April 1790, the royalist bureaucrats and officers and the Royal Marine Regiment were expelled from the city, and the new revolutionary municipality assumed authority.<sup>27</sup>

Socially, the revolutionaries of Marseilles were drawn from the ranks of the enlightened intellectuals and professionals, including a large contingent of lawyers, and from the ranks of the commercial bourgeoisie. In the immediate pre-revolutionary era it is difficult to draw social distinctions between these groups. They frequented the same social gatherings, their literary salons were modelled on those of Paris, they read the same political philosophers, and not infrequently they had identical interests. For instance, the youthful Charles Barbaroux, a

leader of the Marseilles revolutionary bourgeoisie, had legal training and had studied science, but he came from a commercial family, his father having been a négociant and a plantation owner in the West Indies. Lautard, a royalist historian, argues that Mirabeau inspired the jeunes littérateurs of Marseilles with revolutionary principles,<sup>28</sup> but Mirabeau left for Paris in the spring of 1789. In effect the principal members of the municipal revolutionary élite were Branca, a "man of letters", Barbaroux, the lawyers Chéri, Chompré and Brémond-Julien, the wine and spirits dealer Rebecqui, the négociant Granet, and the printer Mossy Jr.-- a cross-section of what may loosely be termed the upper bourgeoisie of Marseilles.<sup>29</sup>

Using available sources it is much more difficult to draw a satisfactory picture of the revolutionary crowds of Marseilles. To be sure, the National Guard remained bourgeois because of property qualifications. However, the crowds during the journées consisted of a much larger cross-section of Marseilles' population than the National Guard. Guibal claims that the secret workers' brotherhoods, the compagnons du devoir, became the nuclei of the most turbulent elements of the city's population.<sup>30</sup> This is possible, but I have no further proof for it.

Marseilles, a major seaport, contained at all times a large transient population of sailors and itinerant workers. A contemporary observer, whose identity I could not ascertain, but who is quoted in a footnote to Barbaroux's Mémoires stated that "Toutes les fois que la garde nationale de Marseilles s'est mise en marche au dehors de ses murs la horde de brigands sans patrie n'a jamais manqué de se jeter à la suite. . ."<sup>31</sup> [emphasis mine]. The representative on mission Ricord stated in 1794 that Marseilles' population consisted of 40% foreigners, and unless they were removed the city would retain its turbulent character.<sup>32</sup> Vovelle, in his study of Marseilles' floating population in 1791 and 1792, does

not provide a good independent estimate of the number of outsiders in Marseilles during the early revolutionary period, but he does consider the estimate of 25,000 -- provided by the Statistique de Prisons de Marseilles, a publication from the 1820's -- relatively reliable.

Furthermore, Vovelle shows that the area of the lowest-class garnis (rooming houses) coincided with the most turbulent district of Marseilles.<sup>33</sup> The above evidence leads me to conclude that transient elements formed a considerable part of the Marseilles revolutionary crowds.

Only with the support of the revolutionary crowds were the Marseilles municipal revolutionaries able to assume control of the city. Yet it would be wrong to presuppose a permanent alliance throughout the Revolution between the revolutionary leadership and the lower classes. The consistent support of the revolutionary crowds for the municipal revolutionary leaders between mid-1789 and spring 1792 was possible only because during this period Marseilles had sufficient food supplies, and relatively stable prices; the major causes of contention between rich and poor were thus missing.

#### IV

In Provence, the ancien régime's administrative system survived the winter of 1789-90. Not until the spring of 1790 was the ancien régime administrators' power over Marseilles broken, and by this time their authority in Aix had also become precarious. By the spring of 1790 the intendant and the chief members of the royalist élite had emigrated, among them the military governor Caraman.<sup>34</sup> A weakened rump Parlement remained in session in Aix until mid-1790, when it was prorogued, never again to be recalled.<sup>35</sup> In face of significant changes in the constitution



of Provence, which threatened their own as well as the nobility's and the royal bureaucracy's positions, part of the Aix legal élite assumed an openly counterrevolutionary position. Pascalis, the leader of the Third Estate's struggle against the nobility during the pre-revolutionary period, now became a chief defender of the Parlement of Aix and of Provence's historic rights within a well-ordered monarchy.<sup>36</sup>

Meanwhile the Constituent Assembly in Paris was proceeding with the work of nation-wide administrative reconstruction, and the approximately thirty généralités were replaced by eighty-three departments. The basic purpose of the administrative reconstruction was to nationalize and thereby bring unity to the country's archaic administrative structure and to replace the antiquated, badly functioning bureaucracy.<sup>37</sup> However, the Constituent Assembly created no governmental machinery to connect local administrations and the central government; therefore until the Committee of Public Safety's program of centralization in 1793-94, the entire revolutionary administration was characterized by a large measure of local autonomy.<sup>38</sup>

Provence was divided into the three departments of Var, Basses-Alpes and the Bouches-du-Rhône. Against the Marseilles representatives' strenuous opposition, the three major cities of Aix, Arles and Marseilles were all placed in the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône. The aim of the new division of Provence was to control Provençal particularism by breaking up the county, and to balance Marseilles' overwhelming demographic and economic importance by placing the port city in a comparatively well-urbanized department and by situating the departmental administration in Aix.<sup>39</sup> As Cobban observes, the "essential object of . . . the administrative change was to destroy the provincial spirit."<sup>40</sup>

Against the Paris lawmakers' intentions, however, the new division of Provence only accentuated the traditional antagonism between Marseilles and

Aix. In the absence of effective central authority the Marseilles municipal administration challenged the departmental administration at Aix for the control of the department. The conservative political tone of the departmental administration, consisting largely of members of the old legal bourgeoisie, facilitated the Marseilles revolutionaries' task, because it gave them a plausible justification for attacking the alleged counter-revolutionaries in Aix. Yet the Marseilles revolutionaries' regional stand against counterrevolution rapidly became fused with a jealous municipal patriotism which would later resist the centralizing tendency emanating from Paris.

Marseilles' commercial privileges were renamed in 1789 as a "particular city organization", but in effect the city retained its special status, retaining the freedom of the port and all the rights pertaining to it, although Marseilles did lose its special privileges over the Levant trade.<sup>41</sup> This meant that until 1793, when the effects of the British Mediterranean blockade began to be felt, Marseilles' foreign commerce continued undisturbed and the commercial classes remained prosperous. Ironically, only the retention of Marseilles' special economic status, a legacy of the ancien régime, insured the adherence of the city's commercial bourgeoisie to the Revolution.

## V

The central revolutionary body of Marseilles, the Marseilles Popular Society, or Club of the Rue Thubaneau, was founded amidst the revolutionary turbulence of the spring of 1790. Although Etienne Martin, the newly elected mayor, was also chosen president of the new club, the Marseilles Popular Society was from its beginnings more radical than the municipal

administration: many younger, more revolutionary men who held only minor positions with the municipality were very important in the club. For example, Charles Barbaroux, who was at this time only a clerk in the municipality, immediately became one of the chief agitators of the Popular Society.<sup>42</sup> The social composition of the Popular Society was not appreciably different from that of the municipality. Both bodies were dominated by the professional, intellectual and commercial bourgeois, prominent in the municipal revolutionary movements of 1789-90. The difference between the two bodies was based more on the temperament and age of the members than on social composition.<sup>43</sup>

To oppose counterrevolution in Marseilles, the conservative legal bourgeoisie of Aix and army units under conservative leadership in Aix, the Marseilles municipality depended on the support of the Popular Society. Yet the municipality also had to protect itself against being overwhelmed by the radical influence of the club, which attempted to force it to assume an ever sharper revolutionary position. To be sure, the alliance of the Popular Society and the municipality remained unshaken until late 1792, but only in the face of the common counterrevolutionary threat and buttressed by the common desire to extend Marseilles' authority through the Mediterranean region.

Neither the municipality nor the Popular Society showed great concern for the welfare of the lower classes. For example, when in November 1791 a coalition of blacksmiths petitioned the municipality for wage increases, the Popular Society fully supported the municipality's rejection of this demand, and issued a strongly worded warning against any kind of worker's assemblies for economic purposes.<sup>44</sup> The radical revolutionary aspects of the Marseilles Popular Society's activities were political rather than social or economic, and consisted chiefly of readiness to initiate or

to participate in action against counterrevolution, be it military expeditions against royalists or aid to beleaguered sister Popular Societies.

A major source of the strength of the Marseilles Popular Society, and of the revolutionary unity of Marseilles, was that the Club of the Rue Thubaneau remained the only significant political club of Marseilles. In other cities of the southeast (and throughout France) like Aix, Arles and Toulon, conservative and royalist political clubs challenged the local revolutionary clubs and made the positions of the local revolutionaries highly insecure.<sup>45</sup>

Following the municipal revolution of the spring of 1790, the Marseilles municipality, with the support of the Popular Society, organized the first Federation of Provençal municipalities.<sup>46</sup> By this move Marseilles demonstrated to the departmental administration its independence and its willingness to assume leadership in the region. Meanwhile, there was a virtual epidemic of desertions from the Army units in Aix, the deserting soldiers drifting to Marseilles in large numbers. Their stories about the counterrevolutionary attitudes of their officers further strengthened the animosity of the Marseilles revolutionaries against Aix.<sup>47</sup>

In the summer of 1790 a counterrevolutionary attempt took place in Marseilles. Lieutaud, an ex-officer who had good contacts in Paris through Mirabeau, and who managed to gain the support of some influential members of the municipality, attempted to gain control over the municipal administration. Lieutaud obtained a power base in the National Guard, whose command he assumed in June 1790. He then attacked the Popular Society, national guards loyal to him becoming involved in street fighting with Club members. However, when Lieutaud attempted to close the Popular Society and thereby remove the chief obstacle between himself and control of the municipality, many national guards turned against him, and the

municipality, with the support of the Popular Society, deposed him from his position as commander of the National Guard. Lieutaud escaped from Marseilles before he could be arrested and fled to Paris.<sup>48</sup>

Lieutaud's attempted "coup" in Marseilles, together with increased counterrevolutionary activity throughout the southeast (to be discussed in the next section), sharpened the Marseilles revolutionaries' feeling of being an island of the Revolution in a sea of counterrevolution, and thereby increased their vigilance and their aggressiveness. Furthermore, since Lieutaud's coup was the last major counterrevolutionary attempt in Marseilles until the outbreak of Federalism in 1793, the Marseilles revolutionaries, comparing their own city with the surrounding region, or with France as a whole, could congratulate themselves on the revolutionary unity of the city.

## VI

To understand the actions of the Marseilles municipality, Popular Society and National Guard as defenders of the Revolution in the southeast, we should examine the political situation in the surrounding region. We have already seen that Aix remained a centre for the old legal bourgeoisie of Provence, and that this same group dominated the new departmental administration of the Bouches-du-Rhône. Of the other major cities of the region, Toulon was badly divided: the workers of the Naval Arsenal and the sailors of the Mediterranean fleet faced the departmental and district administrators and the royalist naval officers, with the municipality attempting to maintain an uneasy balance.<sup>49</sup> Draguignan had a royalist municipality, as did Arles.<sup>50</sup> In the latter city, the most aristocratic of pre-revolutionary Provence, the revolutionary Monnaidier Club was

unsuccessfully opposing the powerful royalist Chiffonist Club.<sup>51</sup> In Nîmes the Protestant minority had grasped control of the municipality and the Popular Society, awakening the age-old resentments of the Catholics, and making the hinterland of the Gard, Aveyron, Ardèche and Lozère a fruitful region for counterrevolutionary agitation.<sup>52</sup> Just north of the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône lay the papal enclaves of Avignon and Comtat Venaissin. Culturally these areas were part of Provence and the Revolution in France provided the impetus for an indigenous revolutionary outbreak. However, both institutionally and socially the enclaves were divided into two distinct areas, with Avignon, the seat of an intellectually alive, commercially ambitious bourgeoisie favouring immediate union with France, and Carpentras, the seat of the aristocracy, being fearful of losing its privileges and of falling into Avignon's power. Avignon asked for help from France continually, the logical place to which it turned being the surrounding French departments.<sup>53</sup>

The danger of unrest in the southeast was increased by the machinations of the counterrevolutionary shadow government at Turin, led by the comte d'Artois, which was aware of the deepening internal divisions of the southeast, and considered the entire region favourable for a royalist revival.<sup>54</sup>

As we have seen earlier, the right-wing of the Aix legal bourgeoisie, led by Pascalis, agitated actively against the administrative reconstruction of Provence. In reaction to Pascalis' counterrevolutionary position, rumours began to circulate among the revolutionary elements about Pascalis' and his associates' counterrevolutionary contacts, and of the imminent danger of a local royalist takeover. These rumours were well-founded, for Pascalis was indeed in contact with Vernègues, an agent of the Turin royalists. In late 1790, revolutionary agitation spread

among the Aix crowds, resulting in the foundation of a new radical club called the Antipolitiques, by the dissident cleric, Abbé Rive, and culminating in the rioting of December 12 to 12 and the mob lynching of Pascalis and two of his associates.<sup>55</sup>

With the December riots the initial efforts of the counterrevolution in Aix were frustrated and a radical association opposed the conservative élite of Provence's ancient capital. This however did not mean that revolutionaries had come to power in Aix. The departmental and district administrations remained conservative, and following its brief outburst of energy the Antipolitiques Club remained in opposition to the ruling institutions of the city, and to the original Aix Popular Society, which, with the departure of the firebrand revolutionaries for the Antipolitiques, became a meeting-place for conservatives.

The riots of Aix had followed the first royalist military assembly at Jalès (in the hinterland of Gard), Lieutaud's attempted counter-revolutionary "coup" in Marseilles, and the sharpening of tensions in the Papal Enclaves. All these counterrevolutionary moves were part of a large-scale plan for royalist counterrevolution by the Turin émigrés, the so-called Languedoc Plan.<sup>56</sup> Hence the counterrevolutionary danger in the southeast was not a remote possibility but a highly concrete actuality. The Marseilles Popular Society sent sporadic aid to the revolutionaries of Avignon and to sister Popular Societies, but Marseilles' first major revolutionary expedition did not take place until July 1791, after the King's flight to Varennes and the Champs-de-Mars massacre had deeply polarized French political opinion into pro- and anti-royalist factions.

In May 1791 the Constituent Assembly, in view of the continuing civil war in the Papal Enclaves, decided to mediate between the opposing

factions, "restore order and consult the population" concerning union with France.<sup>57</sup> To this end national agents were dispatched to Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin. However, they were unable to quell the disturbances, and in July 1791 they requested armed aid from the departmental authorities of the Bouches-du-Rhône. The conservative Departmental Directory refused to send aid and ordered the Marseilles municipality also to disregard the request. But the Marseilles municipality, supported by the Popular Society, overrode the departmental order and immediately dispatched 500 Marseilles National Guards to Avignon. The Marseilles detachment was the only armed aid to Avignon from the surrounding area, and played an important role in supporting the pro-French faction in the Papal Enclaves.<sup>58</sup>

Following this incident, the Popular Society of Marseilles accused the Departmental Directory of the Bouches-du-Rhône and the Directory of the district of Aix of counterrevolutionary designs. Two agents of the Marseilles Popular Society were dispatched to Aix with a warning to the Aix administrative bodies that unless the latter changed their ways, the Marseilles revolutionaries would make an appeal throughout the department and "inviterons tous les griefs qu'ils ont contre vous, pour provoquer un tout qui provoquera une justice exemplaire."<sup>59</sup>

In late August 1791 the Marseilles municipality sent 500 National Guards to Toulon, to aid the revolutionary St. Jean Club in its struggle against the royalist St. Pierre Club, which was supported by the conservative Departmental Directory of Var. With the aid of the armed forces from Marseilles, the Toulon revolutionaries were victorious.<sup>60</sup>

The expeditions to Avignon and Toulon were to be followed in September 1791 by another projected military effort, again spearheaded by the Marseilles National Guards, to suppress the royalist municipality



of Arles. Although a large military force gathered, this expedition was called off at the last moment because of the obstructionist attitude of the Aix authorities, and the warnings, received from the royalist Feuillant Ministry from Paris, against unauthorized local military actions. The royalists remained in power in Arles, and the already profound rift between the Aix authorities and the municipality and Popular Society of Marseilles grew even deeper.<sup>61</sup>

In the 1791-92 Paris struggle between the royalist Feuillants and the anti-royalist Jacobins, Marseilles gave its full support to the Jacobins. In Paris, the revolutionaries of Marseilles were gaining a reputation for active adherence to extreme revolutionary principles. On a number of occasions, royalists in the National Assembly had accused Marseilles of attempting to build a little empire in the southeast. Thus the first attacks against Marseilles regionalism were made by the right-wing of the National Assembly. Marseilles' representatives argued in reply that Marseilles only wished to defend the hard-won fruits of the Revolution against the intrigues of counterrevolutionaries who were striving to resurrect the ancien régime.<sup>62</sup>

In the Legislative Assembly, the rift between the Feuillants, attempting to reach a compromise with the monarchy, and the Jacobins, favouring a republican solution, became even deeper. The position of the partisans of compromise was becoming untenable as reports of an imminent counterrevolutionary crusade against France, led by the royalist shadow-government at Coblenz and supported by the monarchies of Europe, became more and more believable. The French royal family was stalling, expecting to be rescued by counterrevolutionary armies, and a small group of Jacobins from the provinces, led by Brissot, began to agitate for a preemptive war. Thus compromise became impossible,

since both the majority of the Jacobins within the Legislative Assembly and the royalists had for different reasons opted for a war policy. To be sure, a small number of Jacobins, led by Robespierre, were suspicious of a war policy, but their warnings were not heeded.

To the Marseilles patriots, a war policy implied an immediate battle against the all too visible enemies of the Revolution inside France. The Ernest Swiss Regiment, which the Marseillais had succeeded in removing from their city, was now stationed in Aix, and the Marseilles municipality viewed with indignation the fraternization between this suspect foreign Regiment and the departmental authorities. On January 31, 1792 Mayor Mouraille summed up the situation: "le département cherche à paralyser notre administration municipale, il agit en despote; il casse suivant ses caprices, les délibérations les plus sages et les plus urgentes du conseil-général; il se montre ouvertement l'ennemi de la constitution pour l'anéantir et la perdre."<sup>63</sup>

Marseilles decided in early 1792 to initiate independent military action against Arles. Barbaroux and Loys were chosen to justify to the National Assembly the Marseilles action and to prevent Marseilles' complaints against the city of Arles and the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône. Rebecqui and Bertin were named as commisaires extraordinaires charged with raising an army of National Guards.<sup>64</sup>

With their army of over 2,000 men, Rebecqui and Bertin marched against Arles, entering the city on March 30, 1792. Meanwhile, Barbaroux presented Marseilles' case in Paris, and, against the strong opposition of the royalists, gained the approval of the Legislative Assembly. Rebecqui and Bertin proceeded to purge the municipality of Arles and to destroy the royalist Chiffonistes. By mid-April, Arles was securely in Jacobin hands.<sup>65</sup> Civil strife continued unabated

in the former Papal enclaves during the winter of 1791-92. The Marseilles municipality considered the danger of counterrevolution intense; therefore, it gave Rebecqui's army permission to march from Arles to Avignon. The Marseilles forces aided the Avignon pro-French revolutionary faction to establish two new districts in the region, which were included in the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône. On their return to Marseilles, Rebecqui, Bertin and the National Guards were greeted as conquering heroes. However, in the National Assembly Marseilles' action in Avignon was regarded with grave suspicion, and in June Rebecqui left for Paris to aid Barbaroux in defending the revolutionary activities of Marseilles.<sup>66</sup>

In the course of his mission to Paris Charles Barbaroux became a supporter of the Brissotin war party. The exposure of the impressionable young Marseillais to Mme. Roland's influence played a role in determining Barbaroux's political sympathies.<sup>67</sup> Also, there can be little doubt that the simplistic moralistic appeal of the Brissotins for a revolutionary war of liberation seemed reasonable to the young Marseilles revolutionary, who had ample evidence from the southeast of the efficacy of direct military action as an antidote to counterrevolution.<sup>68</sup>

The Brissotin (Dumouriez) ministry declared war on April 20, 1792. The war began badly, undisciplined French troops suffering setbacks on the northeastern frontier. The king, confident of imminent rescue by the approaching counterrevolutionary forces, dismissed the Brissotins. In the face of internal royalist reaction, the pro-war Brissotins and the anti-war Robespierrists momentarily joined forces. Meanwhile, the Paris crowd was set in motion by the rising prices and food shortages in the spring of 1792. The agitation in the Paris sections quickly became political, taking royalist reaction as its principal foe.

The journée of August 10, 1792 was the culmination of the struggle

between the Paris Jacobins and the royalists; the fall of the monarchy and the founding of the republic was a major victory for the Jacobins. August 10 also marked the transformation of the Paris crowd into an independent political force, the sans-culotte movement, and henceforth the Jacobins would find it progressively more difficult to control and channel sans-culotte energies.<sup>69</sup>

A contingent of the Marseilles Fédérés, picked members of the Marseilles National Guard, sent to Paris on Barbaroux's request, fought alongside their brethren the Breton Fédérés, and the Paris sans-culottes in storming the Tuilleries Palace. The Fédérés' Paris expedition was the apogee of the Marseilles revolutionaries' crusade against the counter-revolution. Their march through the French countryside, dragging their cannon and singing the revolutionary hymn which has borne their name ever since, is part of the legend of the Revolution.<sup>70</sup> But in another sense the Marseilles Fédérés' Paris expedition marks the end of a period in Marseilles' revolutionary history, for even as the Fédérés were on the road to the capital, new elements were destroying the revolutionary consensus which had characterized Marseilles politics from mid-1790 until mid-1792.

## VII

Localism, which can be traced back to the ancien régime, to privileges which Marseilles inherited from the Middle Ages, was the dominant characteristic of Marseilles municipal politics during the first three years of the revolutionary period. In the immediate pre-revolutionary era the institutions of Provence, although full of anachronisms and inefficiency, were relatively stable. Nominal political authority over all of Provence outside of Marseilles rested in the hands of the Aix noblesse de robe and

legal bourgeoisie, and the Marseilles commercial bourgeoisie nominally controlled overseas trade and municipal politics. In fact, the intendant of Aix had final say over the affairs both of Aix and of Marseilles. Marseilles' leaders jealously protected the city's rights against any outside incursion, but this was more rhetorical than real, since Marseilles' privileges had not been under serious attack since the seventeenth century. In any case, the intendant had the power to take serious steps against Marseilles' privileges had he chosen to do so. He never did, for preserving Marseilles as a commercially autonomous, prosperous free port was in the best interests of the monarchy.

The Revolution dramatically altered the political situation in Provence. The old institutions were destroyed and for some time there was no effective national administration to take their place. The ensuing political vacuum invited the growth of autonomous political institutions like the Marseilles municipality, Popular Society, and National Guard. A new group of people, distinguished by their revolutionary zeal and patriotism, and on some occasions relying for support on urban crowds, obtained the leading positions in the new institutions. The Marseilles revolutionaries acquired a good deal of autonomy and rapidly sought to spread their power beyond the immediate confines of the city, to Aix and to the hinterland of Provence. 1791 and 1792 saw a number of military expeditions by the Marseilles revolutionaries, to Aix, Arles, Toulon, Avignon, and as the crowning achievement, to Paris, to help the Paris sans-culottes overthrow the monarchy. Marseilles localism, or municipalism, or municipal patriotism (different terms describing different aspects of the same concept) exalted Marseilles as a bastion of the revolution. Loyalty to the revolution and loyalty to Marseilles became closely related concepts in the popular mind.

## NOTES FOR CHAPTER II

1. Paul Masson, Marseille depuis 1789, vol. 1 Paris, Hachette, 1919, pp. 26-27; T.J.A. Le Goff & J. Meyer, "Les constructions navales en France pendant la seconde moitié du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle", Annales 26, 1971, pp. 173-185.

Masson compares figures on Marseilles and Bordeaux shipping and arrives at the conclusion that Marseilles led Bordeaux in shipping tonnages during the period immediately preceding the Revolution. I found it impossible to control Masson's figures, but a recent article by T.J.A. Le Goff and J. Meyer casts doubts on them. Le Goff and Meyer show that between 1762 and 1787 new ship construction was strongest on the Atlantic coast of France, in Brittany and Bordeaux. In terms of the number of vessels constructed, the Breton ports Vannes, Nantes and Saint-Malo were the leaders, while in terms of new tonnage construction Nantes and Bordeaux were the overwhelming leaders. Le Goff's and Meyer's statistics support the contention that Atlantic commerce and especially commerce with the West Indies, dominated French overseas commerce in the second half of the eighteenth century. Interestingly, Le Goff's and Meyer's findings support Arthur Young's impression that on the eve of the Revolution Bordeaux was a more active, imposing port than Marseilles, and appeared to have a more bustling commercial activity. (See Arthur Young, Travels in France, Cambridge, U. Press, 1950, p. 229.)

However, Le Goff's and Meyer's findings, do not disprove Masson's contention, for there is no necessary correlation between new shipping tonnage construction in a city and the amount of shipping traffic which a port city handles. Le Goff and Meyer do not point out that the larger vessels built in Bordeaux (more than twice as large on the average as the Marseilles built ships), carried the long distance, hazardous Atlantic traffic, requiring much longer timespans for each voyage, and that thus it is possible that Marseilles, handling the short distance traffic of the Mediterranean, requiring generally short time periods for each voyage, might have handled as much traffic with smaller and fewer ships as Bordeaux. But even accepting that Marseilles' traffic probably was inferior to Bordeaux's does not change the fact that Marseilles was by far the largest commercial port of the Mediterranean coast and that its relative regional importance was very great.

2. Raoul Busquet, Histoire des institutions de la Provence de 1488 à 1790. Marseille, Barlatier, 1920, p. 35 and passim.
3. Jean Egret, "The Pre-Revolution in Provence", in New Perspectives on the French Revolution. Ed. Jeffry Kaplow, New York, John Wiley, 1965, pp. 154-155; and Busquet, op. cit., pp. 203-211.
4. Aix and Toulon were the most significant bastions of the legal bureaucracy, and the city of Arles was the most significant bastion of the land-owning nobility. The power of the nobility in Arles may be gauged by the fact that while the nobles owned approximately

20% of the total land of Provence, in Arles over 50% of the land was owned by nobles. It should be recalled that in otherwise rocky and agriculturally poor Provence, Arles was surrounded by a rich grain-producing plain. See René Baehrel, Une Croissance: la Basse-Provence rurale. Paris, S.E.V.P.E.N., 1961, pp. 395-430.

5. Paul Masson, La Provence au XVIIIe siècle, Paris, Hachette, 1936, p. 14 & p. 767.
6. Busquet, op. cit., pp. 40-60. Marseilles' independence was juridically recognized through the city's special status as terre adjacente and terre séparée.
7. Norman Hampson, A Social History of the French Revolution. Toronto, U. of T. Press, 1964, p. 3; and Busquet, op. cit., p. 34.
8. Miraille Zarb, Les privilèges de la ville de Marseille du X siècle à la Révolution, Paris, A. & J. Picard, 1961, pp. 130-131 and *passim*.
9. Ibid., pp. 333-343. Marseilles' freedom was granted to the city by Colbert, after it became clear that mercantilist economic policies would strangle Marseilles' Mediterranean trade.
10. Le Goff and Meyer, op. cit., p. 184. During the financial crisis following the American War of Independence, Marseilles commerce experienced a slump, which may be seen by the reduced amount of shipbuilding activity. But during the 1780's ship construction in Marseilles, as on the whole Mediterranean coast, increased by leaps and bounds, indicating a decade of prosperity.
11. Masson, La Provence. . . , p. 741 & p. 764; & Masson, Marseille. . . , vol. I, pp. 319-321.
12. Masson, La Provence. . . , pp. 156-158 & pp. 353-356.
13. Egret, op. cit., p. 155.
14. Ibid., pp. 166-169.
15. Jules Viguiier, "Marseille et ses représentants à l'Assemblée nationale constituante", La Révolution française 40, 1901, pp. 194-200.
16. Masson, Marseille. . . , vol. I, pp. 32-34.
17. Alfred Cobban, The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution. Cambridge, University Press, 1968. p. 76.
18. Georges Guibal, Mirabeau et la Provence, 1. Partie. Paris, Thorin, 1889, pp. 160-161.
19. Ibid., pp. 105-107.

20. Georges Guibal, Mirabeau et la Provence, 2. Partie. Paris, Thorin, 1891, pp. 19-57.
21. George Lefebvre, The Coming of the French Revolution. New York, Vintage Books, 1947, pp. 107-112.
22. Guibal, op. cit., 2. Partie, pp. 61-63.
23. C. Lourde, Histoire de la Révolution à Marseille et en Provence, vol. 1, Marseille, Senès, 1838, pp. 77-83.
24. Guibal, op. cit., 2. Partie, pp. 86-105.
25. Lourde, op. cit., pp. 130-136.
26. Guibal, op. cit., 2. Partie, pp. 208-212.
27. Ibid., pp. 232-275.
28. Laurent Lautard, Esquisses historiques. Marseille depuis 1789 jusqu'en 1815, vol. 1. Marseille, Marius Olive, 1844, p. 35.
29. Guibal, op. cit., 2. Partie, pp. 60-61.
30. Ibid., p. 88.
31. Mémoires de Charles Barbaroux, Ed. Berville & Barrière, Paris, Baudoin frères, 1822, p. 41, f.n. 1.
32. J.F. Ricord, "Deuxième partie du rapport de Ricord sur ses différentes missions à l'armée d'Italie, à Marseilles et dans quelques départements méridionaux". p. 9 in The MacLure Collection of French Revolutionary Materials of the University of Pennsylvania, vol. 1185, no. 6.
33. Michel Vovelle, "Le prolétariat flottant à Marseille sous la Révolution française." Annales de Démographie historique, 1968, pp. 111-138.
34. Guibal, op. cit., 2. Partie, pp. 232-275.
35. Viguier, Les Débuts. . . , pp. 332-336.
36. Guibal, op. cit., 2. Partie, p. 357.
37. Alfred Cobban, Aspects of the French Revolution. London, Jonathan Cape, 1968, pp. 113-116.
38. Hampson, op. cit., p. 115.
39. Viguier, Les Débuts. . . , pp. 44-53.
40. Alfred Cobban, A History of Modern France, vol. 1. London, Penguin Books, 1957, p. 166.



41. Zarb, op. cit., p. 119; Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to 1793. Columbia University Press, 1965, p. 161.
42. Lautard, op. cit., p. 73.
43. Richard Cobb, "Some aspects of the Revolutionary Mentality" in Jeffry Kaplow, New Perspectives on the French Revolution: Readings in Historical Sociology. New York, John Wiley, 1965, p. 335.
44. Lourde, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 64-66.
45. H. Chobaut, "Compte-rendu de 'de Cardenal, La province pendant la Révolution. Histoire des Clubs Jacobin 1789-1795'." AHRF 6, 1929, pp. 406-408.
46. Guibal, op. cit., 2. Partie, pp. 326-348.
47. Lourde, op. cit., vol. I, passim.
48. Guibal, op. cit., 2. Partie, pp. 430-487.
49. Eugène Coulet, Jacobins et royalists à Toulon, 1790-92. Toulon, Galliati, 1964, pp. 7-17.
50. Emmanuel Vingtrinier, La Contre-Révolution, première période 1787-1792, vol. I. Paris, Emile-Paul, 1942, p. 135.
51. Lieutenant Vialla, "'l'Insurrection d'Arles et la première expedition Marseillaise,'" RE 58, 1910, pp. 246-247.
52. Ernest Daudet, Histoire des conspirations royalistes du Midi sous la Révolution 1790-1793. Paris, Hachette, 1881, pp. 1-27; & James N. Hood, "Protestant-Catholic Relations and the Roots of the First Popular Counter-revolutionary Movement in France." Journal of Modern History 43, 1971, pp. 245-275. James N. Hood argues that the civil disturbances in Nîmes represent the first popular counterrevolutionary movement of the revolutionary epoch, and that "its leaders prematurely expended its force and thereby helped to discredit royalism in southeastern France until after Thermidor." (p. 275). It seems to me that while Hood's argument concerning Nîmes may be correct, his conclusion about the discrediting of royalism in southeastern France flies in the face of evidence. In Arles, Aix, Toulon, the Avignon region and the rural area of Gard and Lozère royalism remained a powerful force through 1791 and 1792, and during the Federalist outbreak. Royalists also headed the Marseilles Departmental Army during the last stage of its operations and handed Toulon over to the British.
53. Jules Viguiier, "La réunion d'Avignon et du Comtat-Venaissin à la France, part I." RE 21, pp. 424-449.
54. Vingtrinier, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 70-75.
55. Guibal, op. cit., 2. Partie, pp. 388-429.
56. Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to 1793. New York, Columbia University Press, 1965, p. 142.

57. Ibid., p. 196.
58. Viguier, "La réunion. . . part III", RF 26, p. 160; & Lourde, op. cit., vol. II, p. 31.
59. Lourde, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 34-37.
60. Coulet, op. cit., pp. 11-16; & Lourde, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 95-98.
61. Vialla, op. cit., pp. 255-263.
62. Lourde, op. cit., vol. II, *passim* and in particular pp. 54-63.
63. Ibid., pp. 298-299.
64. Ibid., p. 300.
65. Ibid., pp. 300-345.
66. Ibid., vol. III, pp. 2-25..
67. M.J. Sydenham, The French Revolution. London, Methuen, 1969, p. 129.
68. Ibid., p. 91.
69. As Hampson notes, the serious disturbances of the early spring of 1792 "had given a foretaste of what peasant and sans-culotte demands were going to involve". (p. 141). When the passive citizens received the vote in the summer of 1792, the way was open for the sans-culottes to exercise their influence, especially through the grass-roots ward assemblies, the sections of the major cities. The war simplified political issues, destroyed nuances, defined interests in "black and white", revolutionary versus counterrevolutionary terms, and this loss of complexity favoured the entry of the politically unsophisticated sans-culottes into revolutionary politics as an independent force. See Norman Hampson, A Social History of the French Revolution, Toronto, U. of T. Press, 1964, pp. 137-142.
70. Sydenham, op. cit., p. 105.

# CHAPTER III - 1792-1793: The Breakup of Marseilles' Unified Political Consensus

## I

This chapter will trace the destruction of Marseilles' political consensus and the emergence of strong antagonism between the two extremes of the city's political opinion during the autumn of 1792 and the winter of 1792-93.

Popular rioting was decisive in the process of political polarization in Marseilles. After two years of relative peace within the city, the sans-culottes became active, and this caused large numbers of the politically influential bourgeois, unsettled by the economic deterioration of early 1792, to adopt a cautious, anti-Jacobin political position. They were opposed by the Marseilles Popular Society, which faithfully followed the direction of the Paris Jacobins, and abandoned certain of its most important leaders, among them Charles Barbaroux, who joined the anti-Jacobin ranks.

The sans-culottes played an independent role, outside of organized politics. In early 1793, the Popular Society reluctantly allied itself with the sans-culotte sections, and with popular support made great strides in gaining control of the city. However, the popular elements, as we shall see, were susceptible to economic pressures and to appeals to their regional loyalties, and so their alliance with the Jacobins was vulnerable. Attacks on the Jacobin sans-culotte bond did materialize in the spring of 1793, but these will not be considered until the next chapter.

## II

An important development seriously undermined Marseilles' political unity in the first half of 1792: the revolutionary paper money, the assignat, underwent the first nationwide, steady, long-term depreciation of its history. In the southeastern region the assignat fell from 84% to 64% of its face value between November 1791 and April 1792, the most serious regional inflation in France.<sup>1</sup>

The initial entry of the assignat into national circulation did not affect adversely Marseilles' commercial classes. In fact, circulation of the locally printed, small-denomination coupons d'assignats, issued by newly founded caisses patriotiques, provided lucrative speculative opportunities for the commercial bourgeois.<sup>2</sup> However, following the runaway inflation of 1791-92, the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce, the semi-independent agency staffed by the high commercial bourgeoisie and representing its interest, was replaced by a municipal commercial commission simply named bureau provisoire, presided over by the mayor, so that the commerce of Marseilles came under the direct control of the municipality.<sup>3</sup> The inflation, followed by the outbreak of war, also undermined the credit of French commercial agents abroad, and this was very unsettling for Marseilles' commerce, heavily dependent on foreign trade.<sup>4</sup> By this time the position of the mercantile elements in the municipal administration was also under attack, and Mouraille, an astronomer and académicien closely associated with the Popular Society, had replaced the négociant Etienne Martin as mayor of Marseilles in October 1791.<sup>5</sup>

Throughout France the inflation precipitated the fear of famine: grain transports were stopped in many localities, and despite the relatively good harvests of 1791, there were serious regional food shortages. As an important grain importing center, Marseilles received relatively steady food supplies. Yet the general inflation forced bread prices in Marseilles steadily higher: the price of white bread rose by one-third between December 1791 and August 1792. Not only were bread prices rising, but bread quality was deteriorating. Despite the municipality's attempts to exercise stringent control over the bakers, there were complaints that the bakers were reducing the size of bread loaves, and were selling bread with impurities in it.<sup>6</sup>

The rising bread prices provoked the first cases of popular rioting in Marseilles since early 1790: on April 19 and April 20, 1792, angry women marched to the Popular Society and demanded arms -- presumably to force the bakers to sell them cheaper and better quality bread.<sup>7</sup>

The declaration of war in later April was followed by royalist reaction in Paris. Fédérés from all parts of the kingdom, including Marseilles, departed to the capital to join the Paris sans-culottes. News of Lafayette's summons to the National Assembly on June 18 to break up the popular democratic movement of Paris, reached the provinces. The provincial sans-culottes showed their sympathies by turning against the Fayettists and Feuillants.<sup>8</sup>

In Marseilles, Lafayette's "betrayal" of the sans-culottes was seen as proof of counterrevolutionary intrigue. Lafayette was hanged in effigy on July 11 and July 14, and on each night during early July large crowds roamed the city streets. Rumours of a counterrevolutionary plan to take over the military installations of Marseilles, and of a plan for a massacre général of patriots were published in the Popular

Society's newspaper. On the morning of July 21 an angry crowd lynched Boyer, a marchand drapier, leader of the supposed counterrevolutionary intrigue. During the following two nights eight more lynchings of suspected counterrevolutionaries took place: Olivier and Beaucàire, professeurs d'escrime (fencing teachers), Belan, a perruquier (wigmaker), Nuirak and Tassy, priests belonging to a religious order, Chabert de Nîmes, a courtier (commercial broker), Melon, a ci-devant garde de police (ex-policeman) fell victims to popular anger.<sup>9</sup>

These acts of revolutionary vengeance did not derive from a developed sense of class antagonism, for the victims were socially heterogeneous; neither did the crowd's anger have economic causes, since none of the victims stemmed from a social stratum to which serious blame could be attached for the rising bread prices. The only tenable conclusion concerning the July riots is that they were a political demonstration against counterrevolution and royalism and in support of the republican and popular movements of Paris.

The rioting of July 1792 marked the beginning of the popular movement in Marseilles. Certainly popular action had influenced politics in Marseilles before July 1792, as the previous chapter has shown; but previously the crowd's actions had lacked independent, well-defined political aims and the crowd's energy had been quickly dissipated. It is only with the July riots that the sans-culottes become a political factor in their own right, although they remained outside the established political institutions -- except for one of their leaders, Jean Savon. However, they obtained control of five or six sections (out of twenty-four) of the city, and while this did not enable them to influence directly decisions made by administrative bodies, it provided them with an important extra-governmental power base.

Leaders of the rioting crowds came from the lower classes: both Jean Savon and Armand Gaît were portefaix (porters), and Laurent Savon (whose occupation I could not ascertain) presumably came from the same social stratum as his brother Jean.<sup>10</sup> Porters, the manual transportation workers of Marseilles, formed a distinct social group in the eighteenth century. Vovelle divides the Marseilles proletariat into three strata and the portefaix are found in the lowest, along with robeyrols (manual workers of the harbour) and mendicants. This lowest social stratum of the Marseilles proletariat was concentrated in the district of butte de Carmes, an area of dingy bougies (rooming houses for poor transients), and the most turbulent district of the city, containing the sans-culotte sections 9, 11 and 13.<sup>11</sup>

Faced with the angry crowds and the fait accompli of the lynchings, the municipality approved the popular actions and Jean Savon even became a minor advisor of mayor Mouraille.<sup>12</sup> The important voices among the Marseilles Jacobins acted likewise: Mouraille, the Popular Society, and Barbaroux all accepted the riots as necessary action against threatening counterrevolution.<sup>13</sup> The bloody acts of the crowd awakened the dormant fears of the Marseilles bourgeoisie, all the more since the riots came at a time when the commercial bourgeoisie's status was under attack from the municipality, and inflation was hurting the négociants' foreign trade. Momentarily, it even appeared that the municipal administration was on the side of the rioters. Faced with these facts, a large segment of the Marseilles bourgeoisie was becoming wary of any new revolutionary developments, especially if they would mean further economic deterioration and a greater political voice for the popular elements of the city. However, as long as the rioting sans-culottes were in the streets and the Marseilles political leadership acquiesced in the sans-culotte actions,

opponents of popular activity dared not openly oppose the sans-culottes. Following the riots there was a minor upsurge of emigration among the commercial bourgeoisie, although none of the major négociants were among the émigrés.<sup>14</sup>

### III

The increased readiness of the Marseilles crowds to engage in violent revolutionary action, and the victory of the republican forces in Paris on August 10, encouraged the Marseilles Popular Society to take further determined action against the conservatives of the southeast. In late August, the Marseilles Popular Society despatched an armed force to Aix and forced the Departmental Assembly and Criminal Tribunal of the Bouches-du-Rhône to move to Marseilles. With this move Aix's power was further reduced, and Marseilles' -- in particular the Marseilles Popular Society's -- claim to predominance in the southeastern region received a strong boost.<sup>15</sup>

The Electoral Assembly of the Bouches-du-Rhône, sitting at Avignon in late August and early September, unanimously approved the transfer of the departmental authorities to Marseilles; this is not surprising, since Barbaroux, a zealous Marseilles patriot and a leader of the Marseilles Popular Society, presided at the Electoral Assembly's meetings, and other representatives of the Marseilles Popular Society, for example, Chompré, played important roles at the Avignon Assembly.<sup>16</sup>

In the interval between the riots of July and new riots in September Marseilles was relatively peaceful. During this period, the established political groups of Marseilles founded the Marseilles Popular Tribunal for the express purpose of controlling popular "anarchy".



Ironically, the initiative for the formation of the new judicial body came from the same Charles Barbaroux who in July had defended the Marseilles sans-culottes' actions before the National Assembly.<sup>17</sup> Barbaroux's proposal was welcomed by the Popular Society and by the constituted authorities: all parties agreed that sans-culotte energies had to be curbed to ensure the control of Marseilles. Only Mayor Mouraille was opposed to the establishment of the new court on legal grounds -- the founding of a new local court without the permission of national authorities was illegal -- but eventually he was persuaded by his colleagues to acquiesce. The Marseilles Popular Tribunal was voted into being by an assembly of the three constituted bodies on August 30, 1792 and was installed in office on October 1.<sup>18</sup>

The Marseilles Popular Tribunal was established on the model of the Paris Popular Tribunal, with each of the twenty-four section assemblies of the city naming one member to the Chambre d'Accusation and one to the Chambre de Jugement.<sup>19</sup> That the members of the anti-sans-culotte Popular Tribunal were chosen by the Marseilles sections is not a contradiction: the majority of the Marseilles sections were dominated by elements opposed to popular action.

Barbaroux and Rebecqui were elected as deputies to the National Convention in September 1792. With their permanent absence from Marseilles, their influence over the Marseilles Popular Society was greatly diminished. In the local elections of 1792 the complexion of the Marseilles municipality remained largely unchanged, with Mouraille retaining the post of mayor and Seytres that of procureur. However, the composition of the formerly conservative Departmental Assembly and Criminal Tribunal, changed considerably. Through the direct influence of the Marseilles Popular Society, Marseilles revolutionaries were elected as leaders of the two departmental bodies: Maillet Jr., Giraud and Chompré became

respectively the president, the prosecutor and the clerk (greffier) of the Criminal Tribunal and Paris became the president of the Departmental Assembly.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, by mid-autumn 1792 the political situation of Marseilles had changed significantly from what it had been in the spring. Marseilles' political unity was shaken by the double onslaught of economic deterioration and sans-culotte rioting. The latter coincided with the great confrontation between republicans and royalists in Paris, and therefore received the reluctant support of the local revolutionary authorities. In the period of relative calm following the riots there was general agreement that the sans-culottes had to be controlled and the Marseilles Popular Tribunal was founded. But after a new bout of sans-culotte rioting at the end of September -- coinciding with the September massacres in Paris -- which took the lives of six suspected Marseilles counterrevolutionaries, a new political spectrum emerged in Marseilles.

On the "right" of the new political spectrum "law and order" mixed royalist and pro-Brissotin elements, including most of the mercantile bourgeoisie, dominated the new Popular Tribunal. Barbaroux and Rebecqui, who had become staunch opponents of the Mountain and who strongly opposed popular action and the domination by Paris over the provinces, became the chief representatives of this new Marseilles "right-wing" in the National Convention.

The cornerstone of the Marseilles political "left" was the Popular Society. The Society's new leaders, after the decline of Barbaroux's influence, were Maillet Jr., Giraud, Chompré and Paris, all of whom also played leading roles in the newly elected Departmental Assembly and Criminal Tribunal. Among the Marseilles representatives to the

National Convention who joined the Mountain and represented the Marseilles Jacobins in Paris, Moyse Bayle and Granet stood out. In general, the Marseilles Popular Society followed the political line of the Paris Jacobins.

Mayor Mouraille attempted to maintain a neutral position through the winter of 1792-93. This became increasingly more difficult since the "Girondin", royalist right-wing, remembering his original rejection of the Popular Tribunal, charged him with sheltering Jean Savon and excessive reliance on his advice. There is little proof that this charge was true, but it served to push Mouraille further toward the Popular Society's position. On the other hand, Mouraille was afraid for his own authority in face of political pressure from the Popular Society; his position may be best described as being in the center, but leaning strongly toward the Jacobins. Mouraille's position in the municipal administration was balanced by the royalist sympathies of the municipal procureur, Seytres.

#### IV

Early in October 1792, only a few days after the Marseilles Popular Tribunal had begun to function, the "law and order" faction won a major victory: Seytres, the procureur, was able to persuade the Municipal Council to extend the authority of the Popular Tribunal to the surrounding departments. As the historian Robert, generally very sympathetic to the Popular Tribunal, observed, this was clearly an illegal act. But the very establishment of the Popular Tribunal was illegal, since it took place without the approval of national authorities. Thus the Popular Tribunal arbitrarily assumed regionalist pretensions.<sup>21</sup>

On his return to Paris, Barbaroux immediately became involved in Roland's campaign to "protect" the National Convention and intimidate the Paris Commune.<sup>22</sup> He again asked Marseilles to come to the aid of the Fatherland by sending a second Fédéré battalion to Paris. The Marseilles municipality, not recognizing the anti-Jacobin implications of this request, responded by recruiting a battalion of 800 men, which arrived in Paris on October 20. As Barbaroux stated, "ce corps est composé d'hommes entièrement indépendants du côté de la fortune."<sup>23</sup> Of course, the departure of a bourgeois armed force of this size left the anti-sans-culotte elements in the city considerably weakened.

As a result of his anti-Paris stand, Barbaroux, as well as other Brissotins, was expelled from the Paris Jacobin Club. At this point the Marseilles Popular Society completely abandoned its former leader, whom it now regarded as a counterrevolutionary.<sup>24</sup>

By attempting to control the Paris revolutionaries through the use of provincial armed forces Barbaroux also left himself vulnerable to the charge of federalism. Thus, in the period between spring and autumn 1792, Marseilles regionalism had evolved the novel aspect of a counterrevolutionary tendency used by the Marseilles Popular Tribunal to extend its influence in the southeast, and by Barbaroux as the basis for an anti-Paris and anti-Jacobin political stand.

During the autumn of 1792 the Popular Tribunal dealt with a number of charges against suspected counterrevolutionaries. In all of these cases the Popular Tribunal was openly sympathetic to the accused, and in all cases the charges were dismissed by the Chambre d'Accusation.<sup>25</sup>

In October, following the first mass dismissal of charges against suspected counterrevolutionaries by the Popular Tribunal, the Marseilles sans-culottes once more began to clamour for direct action: lists of

suspects were drawn up and there was talk of new hangings. The Popular Society, although strongly opposed to the Popular Tribunal's actions, was not ready to countenance another bout of rioting and joined the Popular Tribunal in a proclamation against vengeful, "anarchic" action.<sup>26</sup> Ironically, the fear of independent popular action -- the basic factor in turning the Marseilles bourgeoisie against the Revolution and so the most important cause for the breakup of the Mediterranean city's political unity -- also served to prevent the complete political polarization of Marseilles until early 1793, since the Marseilles Jacobins were also wary of independent popular action.

As we have seen, commissaires of the Marseilles Popular Society had been active in the southeast since mid-1791, and armed forces from Marseilles helped to quell counterrevolutionary disturbances in the region on a number of occasions. The Popular Society's activity outside Marseilles did not diminish with the growing political polarization of Marseilles in the autumn of 1792. In mid-September emissaries of the Marseilles Popular Society frustrated a royalist political takeover in the small town of Auriol, and in early 1793 representatives of the Marseilles Popular Society, accompanied by emissaries of the Department of the Bouches-du-Rhône, checked a right-wing takeover attempt in Salon.<sup>27</sup> This continued exertion of the Marseilles Popular Society's power throughout the southeast meant that in the autumn of 1792 Marseilles regionalist expansion had two opposing manifestations: anti-Jacobin through the Popular Tribunal, and pro-Jacobin through the Popular Society.

## V

In mid-January 1793, the Marseilles sans-culottes mounted a determined attack against the Popular Tribunal. This attack was occasioned by an isolated case of sans-culotte vengeance: on January 13 a popular crowd lynched a priest known for his counterrevolutionary sympathies. Supported by some of Marseilles' conservative sections, the Popular Tribunal issued a public statement condemning 'mob Justice'. In response, section 13 -- the sans-culotte leader Jean Savon's home section -- supported by the Popular Society, petitioned the municipality for a purge of the Popular Tribunal. This petition was seriously discussed by the municipal authorities, but elements favouring the Tribunal were still too powerful in the municipality, and the petition was rejected. However, on this occasion, unlike a number of previous ones in 1792, the Popular Society backed the sans-culottes. Jacobin influence in the municipal government was strong enough to cripple the operations of the Popular Tribunal: from mid-January to mid-March no cases of any importance were referred to it, and in effect it lost its power. The crippling of the Popular Tribunal demonstrates the influence which an alliance of the Marseilles sans-culottes and the Popular Society could wield.<sup>28</sup>

In January 1793 the political split in Paris deepened even more over the issue of the execution of Louis XVI. The "Girondins" favoured putting the question of the King's fate to the French people by allowing the primary electoral assemblies to decide whether Louis should live or die, while the Montagnards wanted him to be executed on the authority of the National Convention. The Montagnards relied on the Paris sans-

culottes and the Paris Commune and preferred to make the decision on the king's fate in Paris, while the "Girondins" wanted to determine the most significant political question facing the Republic outside of Paris, since they deeply mistrusted the growing influence of the extra-parliamentary Jacobin movement in Paris. The delegation to the National Convention from the Bouches-du-Rhône was split on the question of the "appeal to the people". Barbaroux, Rebecqui and other opponents of the Mountain voted for the appeal, but the Jacobin sympathizers, among them Moyse Bayle and Granet, voted against the appeal. The Montagnards won a narrow victory, and the king was executed on January 21.

The Marseilles Popular Society strongly supported the Montagnards and the Paris Jacobin Club on the issue of the "appeal to the people". In a letter to the deputies of the Bouches-du-Rhône it declared those deputies who were against the king's execution and for the "appeal" to be traitors against the Fatherland. The Marseilles Jacobins singled out Barbaroux, accusing him of failing to act in accordance with his oath and mandate.<sup>29</sup> With its pro-Jacobin and anti-Barbaroux stand, the Marseilles Popular Society put the finishing touches on the process of political polarization in Marseilles, alienating all supporters of Barbaroux in the city, who accounted for a large segment of the commercial bourgeoisie.

The Marseilles Popular Society's discrediting of the Popular Tribunal and its strong disapproval of "Girondin" obstructionism in Paris were part of a determined bid to obtain complete political control of Marseilles between January and April 1793. In February the Popular Society established a Central Committee of twelve members to direct "secret affairs" and to spearhead the Jacobin political drive. By mid-March the Jacobins were strong enough to dictate to the constituted

authorities the establishment of a new municipal Finance Committee to tax all well-to-do citizens, and on March 19 the Central Committee of the Popular Society initiated a city-wide disarming of suspects.<sup>30</sup>

Also in mid-March the leaders of the Marseilles Popular Society, Maillet Jr., Chompré and Guinot prepared an address to the National Convention -- a statement of the political position of the Marseilles Jacobins. The address accused those who had wanted to defer the king's fate to the nation of perfidy, declaring that they had lost the confidence of Marseilles.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, the Marseilles Popular Society avowed its adherence to the Jacobins of Paris by declaring that it recognized only the Mountain as the true National Convention and that in solidarity with the Mountain it would save the Fatherland. The "Girondins" greeted the Marseilles address with derision, calling it a federalist tract which would cast France into the throes of Civil War, but the Jacobins welcomed the adherence of Marseilles and averred that with this address the southern city once more proved itself to be the citadel of French liberty.<sup>32</sup>

## VI

Following a brief economic recovery from August to October 1792, reflected in a temporary rally of the assignat, Marseilles' economic situation once more began to deteriorate.<sup>33</sup> The harvest of 1792 was deficient throughout France, but in the Mediterranean region the situation was especially critical. The best grain lands of the Bouches-du-Rhône, around Arles and Tarascon, had suffered so much from floods, that in this region, usually self-sufficient in grains, the total harvest was sufficient for no more than two months. In Var, the grain supply



was expected to last less than a half year, and the situation was similar in the Alpine regions of old Provence. Wheat shipments from Burgundy and Languedoc destined for Avignon and Orange were commandeered along the way by other communities, and the Department of Lozère was also without wheat. This entire region was counting on grain imports via Marseilles to ease the shortage.<sup>34</sup>

However, Marseilles' ability to supply the region with grain was slowly weakening. While the need increased, grain shipments to Marseilles diminished in volume. The grain purchased abroad by agents of the Africa Company had largely to be paid for in numéraire, since the assignat was accepted only reluctantly as a medium of foreign exchange.<sup>35</sup>

In mid-October the assignat again began rapidly to depreciate, and continued on its inflationary course until August 1793. With the inflation, the price of bread resumed its rapid rise: by April 1793, bread in Marseilles cost twice as much as it had in April 1791. Yet even with the rising prices the bakers were operating at a loss, and during the winter of 1792-93 fifteen Marseilles bakers closed their ovens.<sup>36</sup>

Prodded by the worsening economic situation, the group of national deputies in favour of easing France's economic difficulties through the imposition of strict controls on the national economy became more vociferous in late 1792. These deputies formed no recognizable party, counting among their numbers some Jacobins, like Robespierre, who favoured placing controls on grain distribution, but also some non-Jacobins.<sup>37</sup> In the field of foreign trade a number of influential deputies led by Barère followed the theories promulgated by the economist Dücher, advocating a protectionist trade policy by imposing restriction on both exports and imports.<sup>38</sup>

The economic deterioration generated discontent among the Paris

sans-culottes, and the flames of their unrest were fanned by agitators like Varlet and Jacques Roux. The main sans-culotte demands were economic and included outlawing hoarding, imposing a controlled price on grain, and establishing the assignat as the sole legal tender. In effect, the Paris sans-culottes wanted the re-establishment of the controls that had been a feature of the ancien régime during periods of economic pressure and food shortages.<sup>39</sup> Thus the group in the National Convention favouring a controlled economy received important support from the streets of Paris. By late February 1793, under the pressure of a series of sans-culotte food riots, the Paris Jacobins and the Montagnards in the National Convention adopted the policy of a regulated economy, partly because some of them believed in it, but principally to gain the political support of the Paris sans-culottes.

The war, which had been favourable to France in late 1792, also took a drastic turn for the worse early in 1793. Dumouriez's treatment of conquered Belgium, the French saction against Holland, including the opening of the Scheldt, and the French Republic's newly announced intention to carry the Revolution abroad by the force of arms, caused previously neutral Britain to adopt an increasingly belligerent stance toward France. In January Pitt put into effect a limited commercial blockade by halting shipments of grain and raw materials to France. Following Louis XVI's execution the British asked the French ambassador to leave Britain, and an outraged National Convention declared war against England, and England's protégé Holland.

As we have seen, Marseilles' prosperity depended on foreign trade and the preservation of her status as a free port. A regulated domestic economy, a protectionist trade policy, and the war with Britain, promising a British Mediterranean naval blockade, presented enormous economic

dangers to Marseilles and especially to its commercial classes.

The commercial classes blamed the Jacobins for the threatening destruction of Marseilles' commerce, and the already deep political split between the temporarily ascendant Marseilles Popular Society and the commercial bourgeoisie of the city became unbreachable. Only the sans-culotte sections of Marseilles provided the Popular Society with protection against its enemies, but as the next chapter will demonstrate, the sans-culottes' loyalties were not constant.

## NOTES FOR CHAPTER III.

1. S.E. Harris. The Assignats. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p. 123.
2. Paul Masson, Marseilles . . ., vol. I, pp. 93-94.
3. Ibid., pp. 39-41.
4. Ibid., pp. 105-106.
5. Ibid., p. 72.
6. Ibid., pp. 89-90. While according to Harris the inflation in the southeastern region reached a peak in April 1792, Masson claims that in Marseilles bread prices rose until August 1792. However, Harris does point out that his findings are based on data gathered over a large area, and that individual localities may present significant discrepancies to the over-all findings. Therefore, Masson's findings are probably more reliable than Harris' for Marseilles.
7. C. Lourde, op. cit., vol. III, p. 20, f.n. 1. Lourde claims that the women rioted because counterrevolutionary priests provoked them. While it is possible that priests may have acted as agitators, it appears to me that rising bread prices had a probable causal relationship to the women's rioting.
8. See f.n. 69, chapter II, p.61.
9. Lourde, op. cit., vol. III, pp. 65-68.
10. Ibid., pp. 58-70 & Georges Guibal, Le Mouvement Fédéraliste en Provence en 1793, Paris, Plon, 1908, p. 16.
11. Michèl Vovelle, op. cit., pp. 129-133.
12. Guibal, Le mouvement . . ., p. 16 & P.A. Robert, Le Tribunal Populaire 1792-1793, Paris, Arthur Rousseau, p. 12. Both Guibal and Robert refer to Savon as a close advisor and intimate friend of mayor Mouraille. (The fact that these sources corroborate each other is misleading, for Robert's information probably stems from Guibal.) But there is no proof that Savon was indeed an important advisor of Mouraille, whereas events in the spring of 1793 indicate that the relationship between the two men was not close. (see chapter IV, p.98). Consequently, I conclude that Savon's position in the municipal administration was a minor one.
13. Lourde, op. cit., vol. III, p. 68, f.n. 1. Barbaroux defended the actions of the Marseilles crowd in front of the National Assembly as the necessary response against an imminent counter-revolutionary intrigue. He only took exception to the sans-culottes acting outside the framework of the law.

14. Masson, Marseille . . . , vol. I, pp. 84-85.
15. Guibal, Le mouvement. . . , p. 4.
16. Ibid., p. 4 & Barbaroux, Mémoires., op. cit., p. 88.
17. Barbaroux, op. cit., pp. 85-86 & Robert, op. cit., p. 14.  
Barbaroux's actions were consistent with his reservation against the sans-culottes acting outside the law. Furthermore, he defended the Marseilles crowds in Paris, not fully cognizant of the extent of Popular rioting; once he arrived back in Marseilles, he turned against what he, along with many of his bourgeois associates, considered to be 'outrages committed by the canaille'.
18. Robert, op. cit., pp. 16-21.
19. Robert, op. cit., pp. 14-17.
20. Guibal, Le mouvement. . . , p. 5.
21. Ibid., pp. 29-30.
22. J.M. Thompson, The French Revolution, New York, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 335.
23. Lourde, op. cit., vol. III, p. 122.
24. M.J. Sydenham, op. cit., pp. 134-135. Using the word Brissotin instead of "Girondin" and placing "Girondin" between inverted commas, is justified by Sydenham's redefinition of the power struggle in the National Convention in 1792-93. For a more complete treatment of Sydenham's thesis, see chapter IV, pp.85-86.
25. Robert, op. cit., pp. 24-60.
26. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
27. Guibal, Le mouvement. . . , pp. 7-8.
28. Robert, op. cit., pp. 61-68.
29. Lourde, op. cit., vol. III, p. 152.
30. Guibal, Le mouvement. . . , pp. 5-22.
31. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
32. Moniteur, v. 15, pp. 756-768 & pp. 807-808.
33. Harris, op. cit., p. 123.
34. Masson, Marseille . . . , vol. I, pp. 103-104.
35. Ibid., p. 106.

36. Harris, op. cit., p. 123 & Charles Carrière, "Le problème des grains et farines à Marseille", Mémoires et Documents 82 Congrès des Sociétés Savantes, Paris, 1958, p. 167.
37. Maximilien Robespierre, "On Food Supplies (December 2, 1792)" as quoted in Robespierre, ed. George Rudé, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 45.
38. Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution from 1793 to 1799. New York, Columbia University Press, 1967, pp. 40-41.
39. Ibid., pp. 42-43.

# CHAPTER IV - Federalism in Marseilles, its Origins, Success and Failure; the Early Confrontation of Centralism against Localism in the Mediterranean City.

## I

This chapter will examine the federalist takeover of power in Marseilles, the reasons for the initial federalist success, the strengths and weaknesses of the federalist régime, and how and why the Jacobins triumphed over federalism.

Federalism has not yet been satisfactorily explained in French revolutionary historiography. A dominant school of thought sees it as part of a "Girondin" drive for power; and until recently it has generally been supposed to have been the work of landowners, property owners, the haute bourgeoisie. Yet no direct link can be demonstrated between the "Girondins" in Paris and the Marseilles federalist takeover; and Cobb, Hampson and Goodwin have shown that federalism enjoyed considerable popular support and was not only the work of the propertied classes.

In my view, the federalist takeover of power in Marseilles was an example of local reaction against the national government's early attempts at centralization. It became anti-Jacobin because the Jacobins favoured the centralizing tendency. The municipal patriotism which was the ideological basis for Marseilles federalism was an expression of revolutionary "municipalism" which evolved during the early years of the Revolution, when, in the absence of effective central government, the revolutionary municipalities were transformed into semi-independent

local centres of government. In Marseilles, municipal patriotism was further strengthened by the fact that a large part of the Marseilles population regarded their city as the bulwark of the Revolution in southeastern France. Thus it was natural that federalism would at its inception enjoy a wide measure of popular support.

Of course, as we have seen in Chapter II, Marseilles municipal patriotism had strong roots in the ancien régime. Particularism was imbedded in the city's special privileges dating back to the Middle Ages, and Marseilles protected her special status against the incursions of royal absolutism and of the Aix political establishment. During the revolutionary era Marseilles particularism had assumed a new revolutionary form, but as the federalist interlude demonstrates, it could also revert to its older form, resist the revolutionary government's attempt at centralization, and thereby become counterrevolutionary.

The restricted regionalist nature of federalism largely accounts for the federalist movement's (or rather movements') failure. While Jacobinism was a dynamic national movement with well-defined political aims, federalism could never divorce itself from its limited regional bases and could not develop a coherent political program. The federalists were neither republicans nor royalists, and their lack of decisiveness made them the easy prey of the Jacobins.

## II

Attempts by the historians of the French Revolution to explain the origins of the federalist outbreaks of the summer of 1793 have encountered considerable difficulties. Good local studies like Guibal's (Provence) and Riffaterre's (Lyons) have been produced, but there exists



no satisfactory explanation of federalism on a generalized, national basis.<sup>1</sup>

Several historians have attempted to set up a model of federalism. Mathiez has advanced the view that it was the work of bourgeois counter-revolutionaries wishing to destroy the Republic.<sup>2</sup> He has stated that the federalist rising "was essentially the work of the departmental and district administrations, composed of rich property-holders."<sup>3</sup> According to this view the Paris sans-culottes in alliance with the Jacobins saved the Republic against the counterrevolutionary federalist rebels.

In Lefebvre's view -- which follows essentially, and elaborates Jaurès's conception -- the question of power was unresolved until late June 1793, the "Girondins" threatening the Jacobins as well as the Jacobins the "Girondins". The Jacobin "coup" is seen by him as a defensive reaction against a "Girondin" push for power and the federalist movement as a part of this push. The "Girondin" initiative was by no means limited to the provinces, since the pro-"Girondin" sectional movement, which was a common manifestation of federalism in the provincial centers, also had numerous adherents in Paris. Lefebvre sees as the main elements of federalism the support of certain provinces for the "Girondins"; the fear of centralization and of the loss of local authority by provincial administrations; particularism, i.e. the attachment of certain localities to particular privileges dating back to the ancien régime; and a grass-roots federalist democratism by provincial intellectuals who remembered Rousseau's teachings.<sup>4</sup>

Hampson observes that the municipal federalist revolutions of Lyons and Marseilles were triggered by resentment over the new levy of troops which was necessitated by the military crisis of the spring of 1793. This analysis fits well with his hypothesis that the war

was the major cause of political polarization of revolutionary France. Hampson also points out that the moderates who seized power had a measure of popular support: "The municipal revolutions were generally the work of the sections" and the sections were usually grass-roots assemblies. He quotes Barbaroux's claim that in Marseilles "the poorer classes themselves joined the property owners". Goodwin's findings on Caën, and Hampson's study on the dockyard workers of Toulon provide support for the view that the federalist rebellions were not the work only of the rich property owners, but had considerable popular support.<sup>5</sup>

Cobb, in his work on the revolutionary armies, states that the personnel of the departmental (federalist) and revolutionary (terrorist) armies were interchangeable. But he warns against drawing hasty conclusions, insisting that the departmental armies remained class instruments of the grande bourgeoisie because it controlled their leadership.<sup>6</sup> In a more recent study Cobb concedes that in Lyons federalism was a truly popular movement: "in their own view, they the Lyons federalists represented the very essence of sans-culottisme"; furthermore, the federalist takeover had popular support in Marseilles, the Marseilles sans-culottes "did what the sectionary leaders told them; for the section could never be wrong, being the quintessence of sans-culottisme."<sup>7</sup>

The view that the journées of May 31 and June 2 were preceded by a power struggle between "Girondins" and Jacobins, and represented a Jacobin reaction to a "Girondin" attack has been challenged by Sydenham. According to Sydenham "The Girondin 'party' or 'faction' was for the most part a political myth manufactured by. . . Jacobins for their own purposes, and . . . the real antagonism lay not between Mountain and Gironde but between the Mountain, an aggressive minority, and the rest of the Convention which it wishes to dominate, and of

which the Girondins were merely the most conspicuous representatives."<sup>8</sup> The Mountain was "the spearhead of an extra-parliamentary movement, that of the Jacobins. . . .",<sup>9</sup> and thus the struggle was between a largely amorphous, disorganized Convention and a well-organized political movement based on the revolutionary political clubs, especially the Jacobin Club of Paris.

Allison Patrick has rejected Sydenham's thesis and has argued that the Mountain was as unorganized as the Gironde. On the basis of an analysis of votes on key issues in the National Convention she sees both as fragmented, but nevertheless recognisable political groups. In my opinion the statistics of voting patterns which Patrick provides as evidence support Sydenham's conclusions and bely her own.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, Patrick's finding that during the first half of 1793 the Montagnards were doing most of the administrative work of the Convention, both on the committees and as representatives on mission, suggest that they formed a party working to take over the government.<sup>11</sup>

Sydenham's view of the "Girondins" and Jacobins combined with Cobb's and Hampson's observations on popular support for the federalists provide clues for a reconsideration of the origins of federalism. If the "Girondins" were not a party fighting the Jacobins for power, then the conception of the federalist takeovers as a part of a "Girondin" push for power ceases to be convincing. Furthermore, if federalism had widespread popular support in majors centres like Lyon and Marseilles, and in smaller cities like Toulon and Caën, then it becomes more difficult to regard it as a movement of rich property-holders and the grande bourgeoisie. The latter view can retain a large degree of validity, for popular elements may support a political movement led by rich propertyholders or the grande bourgeoisie; in this

case an explanation of why the sans-culottes supported the rich should be attempted.

Marseilles provides an excellent example for testing an interpretation of the origins of federalism, because Marseilles was the first city in which the federalists came to power. Of course, one should use great caution in drawing generalizations on the basis of a single example about a movement which encompassed a large part of France. Yet, if the federalist takeover in Marseilles can be shown to fit a new approach then possibly concepts borrowed from recent important interpretations such as Sydenham's, Cobb's and Hampson's may be profitably applied to other examples of federalism.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Marseilles Jacobins had made a concerted effort to gain political control of the city in the first quarter of 1793. Their adherence to the Montagnard position on the question of the King's execution, their loss of confidence in Barbaroux, and their address in March fully supporting the Mountain, demonstrate that they narrowly followed the political line of the Paris Jacobin Club. Like their brethren in Paris, the Marseilles Jacobins formed an alliance with the Marseilles sans-culottes to pursue their political aims. Until early April it appeared that the Marseilles Popular Society could depend on the sections. The volatile sans-culotte sections of the butte de Carmes district supported especially vociferously the measures introduced by the Popular Society concerning a general disarmament of suspects and taxation of the rich.<sup>12</sup>

But the economic situation of Marseilles was deteriorating quickly in early 1793, principally because of a serious inflationary wave. Under the pressure of rapidly rising prices the loyalties of

of the politically unsophisticated common people were easily swayed. Even Mathiez, one of the most consistent advocates of the working classes observes: "As for the artisans of the towns and the labourers of the country districts, the privations and the destitution against which they were struggling made them alternately ready to listen to the incitements of the reactionaries and the appeals for a fresh revolution."<sup>13</sup> The non-propertied classes suffered most acutely from the economic difficulties and skilful anti-Jacobin agitators could turn their sympathies against the Jacobins. According to Guibal, there was no shortage of agitators in Marseilles, for in early 1793 many émigrés and royalists reentered southeastern France.<sup>14</sup>

A number of circumstances coincided in April 1793 to make this period especially favourable for anti-Jacobin agitation in Marseilles. The first was the arrival in Marseilles on March 28 of Moyse Bayle and Boisset, representing the authority of the National Convention. The representatives had been sent to the southeast to oversee recruiting in the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône, but their commission extended to the prevention of counterrevolutionary outbreaks and the review of local administrative bodies, thus placing them above local government. Although neither Bayle nor Boisset was a member of the Paris Jacobin Club, both were supporters of the Mountain and both had voted against the "appeal to the people".<sup>16</sup> The Marseilles Popular Society, glad of receiving reenforcement from Paris, gave the representatives an enthusiastic reception.<sup>17</sup>

In their first report to Paris, Bayle and Boisset were forced to acknowledge that the armed forces in the southeast (the Army of Italy) were badly led, and that the naval forces at Toulon (the main Mediterranean naval harbour) were disorganized, suffering from

manpower shortages and from insubordination among the crews.<sup>18</sup> The representatives Roubaud and Despinassy confirmed Bayle's and Boisset's gloomy report: there were internal disturbances and shortages of all kinds of provisions at Toulon, and the British fleet had entered the Mediterranean.<sup>19</sup>

To these worries were added the news of counterrevolutionary disturbances: in Beaucaire national guards had killed three local Jacobins, and in Tarascon a Jacobin leader was stoned and thrown into the Rhône by an anti-Jacobin mob. Reports from the canton of Fontvieille indicated that local patriots were at the mercy of royalists, and reports of counterrevolutionary stirrings reached Marseilles from the former Papal Enclaves. Throughout the south-eastern region the rural populations were reacting against rising food prices and large-scale recruiting.<sup>20</sup>

Bayle and Boisset regarded the deteriorating conditions in Provence's hinterland with grave misgivings. They feared the outbreak of a second Vendée, and to forestall counterrevolution ordered the immediate levy of a 6,000 man special security force in the Bouches-du-Rhône, of whom 2,000 men were to be raised in Marseilles.<sup>21</sup>

With this order the national representatives began to exercise authority without the consent of local governmental bodies. Mayor Mouraille and procureur Seytres resented this 'arbitrary' exercise of outside authority, and were slow to transmit the recruitment order to the municipal council. The Popular Society, on the other hand, fully supported the representatives. The Marseilles Jacobins, considering this a good opportunity to remove the indecisive mayor and the openly anti-Jacobin procureur, accused the two municipal leaders of obstructionism and demanded their arrest by Bayle and

Boisset. The Jacobin demand received the support of the Marseilles sections: the sans-culotte sections were still following the Jacobins' lead, while the anti-Jacobins had their own grievances against Mouraille, whom they regarded as a protector of the Savon brothers, and were glad of the opportunity to obstruct the city's administration. To safeguard their own authority, the representatives ordered the arrest of Mouraille and Seytres on April 13.<sup>22</sup>

Meanwhile, agitators unleashed a direct attack against the representatives: rumours circulated in the Marseilles sections alleging that the special security force was to be formed not to fight against counterrevolutionaries in the southeast, but to aid the Mountain in Paris in its sectarian battle for control of the National Convention.<sup>23</sup> In Aix, the four sections, generally more conservative than the Marseilles sections, rebelled against the special recruitment order, set themselves up in permanence, and attacked the Jacobin Anti-politiques Club and the Aix municipality.<sup>24</sup>

Bayle and Boisset felt authority slipping from their grasp. They reacted to the events in Aix by immediately despatching there a Marseilles armed force under the command of Moisson, the captain of the Marseilles Fédéré contingent of August 10, and accompanied by Paris, the Jacobin president of the departmental assembly of the Bouches-du-Rhône. The Marseilles contingent quickly repressed the Aix sections' movement.<sup>25</sup>

While Marseillais were repressing the sectional movement in Aix a similar movement was developing in Marseilles. A secret revolutionary committee, charged with the preparation of accusations against Mouraille and Seytres, was set up in each section. Representatives of section 11, one of the most vociferous sans-culotte sections,

proposed that the secret sectional committee be made a permanent institution, and that a new central committee, consisting of two delegates from each of the twenty-four urban sections, be formed. On April 17 the Central Committee of the Marseilles Sections had its first meeting, and its initial act was to invite the national representatives to recognize the sovereign authority of the people of Marseilles, meaning by this the authority of the Marseilles sections.<sup>26</sup> The die was cast: Marseilles had challenged the newly imposed national authority in the persons of the representatives on mission.

The Marseilles Popular Society was faced with the difficult decision of whether to adhere to the direction of the Paris Jacobin Club by respecting the Montagnard representatives' authority, or to join the Marseilles sections' regionalist drive, thus turning against the national Jacobin movement. The Marseilles Jacobins made the former choice: they refused to adhere to the sections' declaration of independence and so lost contact with the political movement in the sections.

Now the only possibility left to the Jacobins was to attempt to defeat the sectional movement. On April 19 the Popular Society sent a threatening circular to the sections, warning them that aristocrats were leading them astray.<sup>27</sup> The Jacobins' fears indeed came true: bereft of Jacobin direction, resenting the national representatives' authority and the Marseilles' Jacobins' high-handed warnings, the Marseilles sections easily fell under the influence of anti-Jacobin, émigré -- and at times even royalist -- agitators.

No longer fearing popular opposition, the anti-Jacobin leadership unleashed a full-scale attack against the sans-culotte leader Jean Savon,



using as its instrument the sectionalist movement. Bayle and Boisset, still attempting to rescue their crumbling authority, bent over backwards to satisfy the sections' wishes. They ordered the arrest of Jean Savon, and to please the local anti-Jacobins referred the fate of Savon, Mouraille and Seytres to the long dormant Popular Tribunal.<sup>28</sup>

However, a new circumstance turned Marseilles irrevocably against the local Jacobins and the Montagnard representatives on mission. On April 21, Philip Egalité, the former Duke of Orléans, and his two sons arrived in Marseilles.<sup>29</sup> The Duke of Orléans' presence in Paris had become highly embarrassing to the Mountain during early 1793. Anti-Jacobin orators such as Buzot had implied that the Mountain, many of whose members had close ties with the Duke of Orléans, harboured royalist designs: with the execution of Louis XVI the road would be open for the Jacobins to place their candidate on the throne.<sup>30</sup> Dumouriez's desertion provided the opportunity for removing the Duke from Paris. The Montagnards (with the exception of Marat) abandoned him, he was accused of collusion with the traitor general, and was sent as far from the capital as possible, to Marseilles.<sup>31</sup>

As Bayle and Boisset reported, corroborated by the reports of the representatives Beauvais and Pierre Baille, the arrival of the Orléans family was the last straw tipping the balance in favour of the anti-Jacobin elements in the Marseilles sections. The anti-Jacobins were provided with a powerful propaganda weapon: the despatch of Philip Egalité could easily be interpreted as a Paris Jacobin insult against the revolutionary honour of the Mediterranean city. Now Marseilles opinion was ready for a direct attack against the Montagnard representatives. On April 27 the sections decided to launch an investigation of Bayle and Boisset, who fled the city on April 29.<sup>32</sup> Marseilles federalism

was now an accomplished fact.

It is striking that of the twenty-four sections of Marseilles twenty-two adhered to the launching of the investigation of Bayle and Boisset;<sup>33</sup> that the sans-culotte section 11 was among the originators of the sectional movement; and that only section 13, the home of the sans-culotte leader, defended Jean Savon against attack.<sup>34</sup> An address which the Marseilles sectional government presented to the National Convention on May 25 allegedly carried twenty-five thousand signatures and even if only a portion of these is authentic, they show that the sectional government had widespread support at the start of its ascendancy. These points all support the supposition that the federalist sectional movement in Marseilles had considerable popular support. However, the address of May 25 made repeated references to the defence of property, and this provides indirect evidence that the leadership of the Marseilles sections was allied with the propertied elements.<sup>35</sup>

Was the federalist takeover in Marseilles part of a nationwide "Girondin" political drive? My evidence appears to provide a negative answer to this question. Barbaroux was the most important member from Marseilles of the so-called "Girondin" inner circle. As we have seen, until the autumn of 1792 he was one of the principal leaders of the Marseilles Popular Society and the revolutionary party of Marseilles. Were the federalist movement in Marseilles part of a nationwide "Girondin" push for power, Barbaroux should have been in steady contact with the pro-'Girondin' elements of Marseilles. But in a letter written on May 13, 1793, more than two weeks after the federalist takeover in Marseilles, Barbaroux states that he had conducted no correspondence with Marseilles for two months. Moreover, Barbaroux wonders why the Marseilles federalists had arrested Mouraille, whom he knew to be a good

republican. This implies that Barbaroux was out of touch with the recent political developments in Marseilles, an impossible supposition if the Marseilles federalist takeover were indeed part of a nationwide "Girondin" political push. Thus one may conclude -- supposing that Barbaroux had written the truth -- that the federalist takeover of power in Marseilles was independent of a "Girondin" political drive, and was basically a local event with national repercussions.<sup>36</sup>

Jaurès' and Lefebvre's concept that federalism was part of a nationwide "Girondin" push is not substantiated by the Marseilles example. Sydenham's thesis about the myth of a "Girondin" party provides a useful conceptual framework for attacking the idea of a nationwide "Girondin" push: if no "Girondin" party existed such a push is unlikely. The fact that the Marseilles federalists apparently were not connected with a "Girondin" drive provides a measure of indirect proof for Sydenham's thesis.

Mathiez's suggestion that the federalist rising originated with the departmental and district administrations also cannot be substantiated by the example of Marseilles, where the departmental and to a lesser extent the district administrations were under Jacobin control after late summer 1792; following the federalist takeover many important administrators fled Marseilles.

Since the major interpretations of the causes of federalism are not substantiated by the Marseilles example, I have drawn a number of conclusions -- based on the information presented in this chapter -- about the federalist takeover of power in Marseilles.

The economic deterioration of early 1793 created favourable conditions for a federalist takeover in Marseilles, since it shook the loyalties of the popular classes to the Jacobins. Then the conjunction

of two circumstances, the imposition of national authority on Marseilles through the representatives on mission, and the despatch of the Orléans family to Marseilles, turned the Marseilles sections against Jacobinism.

Through the national representatives, there was an attempt to impose outside authority on Marseilles for the first time since early 1790. In the period between early 1790 and early 1793, Marseilles regionalism evolved not as a reactionary, idealistic particularism looking back to the virtues of the ancien régime, but as the expression of pragmatic municipal politics through which, in the absence of effective central government, the city was governed, and its authority extended to the surrounding region. Marseilles' local patriotism and regionalism became such powerful forces that all wings of the local political spectrum embraced them. When in April 1793 the Marseilles Popular Society turned against its own strong localist position to support the Montagnard representatives on mission, Marseilles public opinion turned against it. The population of Marseilles, including most of the sans-culotte sections, opposed the Marseilles Jacobins because they could be depicted as betrayers of local interests in favour of the centralizing interests of Paris.

Although primary sources stress the importance of the arrival of the Orléans family to Marseilles, historians have missed its significance.<sup>37</sup> I believe that this is due to an unclear conception of the nature of local patriotism and regionalism in Marseilles. Since a powerful local patriotism -- although it had strong roots in ancien régime municipal patriotism -- evolved in Marseilles during the revolutionary period and since a large part of the Marseilles population regarded their city as the bulwark of the Revolution in southeastern France, loyalty to Marseilles and loyalty to the Revolution were closely linked in the

popular mind. The Jacobins had insulted Marseilles by sending the suspected traitor Philip Egalité to the Mediterranean city -- a view easily spread by anti-Jacobin agitators among the unsophisticated -- and an insult against Marseilles was an insult against the Revolution. This argument, when added to the already anti-Jacobin mood of the sections, sufficed to tip the balance in Marseilles in favour of radical anti-Jacobinism.

Thus I see Marseilles regionalist reaction against the first Paris attempts at centralization as the principal cause of the federalist takeover in Marseilles. Federalism swept the Marseilles Jacobins out of power because they were caught on the side of the anti-Marseilles centralizing tendency. To be sure, the main beneficiaries of the federalist takeover were the local rightwing elements, the members of the haute bourgeoisie; yet they had widespread popular support, since for the moment they represented Marseilles' pretensions to regional autonomy.

### III

To give a detailed description of the federalist period in Marseilles would be pointless since this has been already adequately done by Guibal. However, it is necessary to outline the main characteristics of this interlude in order to account for the federalists' failure.

With the federalist assumption of power the General Committee of the Marseilles sections became the effective government of the city. Many Jacobin leaders of the three local administrative bodies and of the Popular Society fled from Marseilles along with Bayle and Boisset. They immediately attempted to act against the Marseilles federalists by setting up a Jacobin Central Committee at Salon to stifle counter-

revolution. Bayle and Boisset published a decree from Montélimar breaking the power of the Marseilles sections and of the Popular Tribunal.<sup>38</sup>

From its inception, the fate of Marseilles federalism was precarious. Both the Jacobins from Salon and the federalists from Marseilles appealed for support to Moisson, the captain of the Marseilles force sent to Aix in April to suppress the sectional movement and still stationed there. Moisson's decision in favour of Marseilles gave federalism an initial advantage.<sup>39</sup> Moisson's decision also may have influenced the Aix sections, which were again set up in permanence and adhered to the federalists of Marseilles.<sup>40</sup> In view of the deteriorating situation the Jacobins were forced to abandon their Salon bridgehead and to retreat toward the North.<sup>41</sup>

During the weeks before the journées of May 31 and June 2, the anti-Jacobin elements in the National Convention reacted to Jacobin and sans-culotte pressure by launching a vigorous anti-Jacobin counter-offensive; Barbaroux and Gaudet attacked Bayle's and Boisset's anti-federalist decree and succeeded in having it temporarily suspended.<sup>42</sup> The May 25 address of the Marseilles sectional government to the National Convention provided support for the anti-Jacobin drive. The alleged 25,000 signatures accompanying the address were meant to demonstrate that anti-Jacobinism in Marseilles had popular support.<sup>43</sup>

As we have seen, the Marseilles right-wing had been strongly antagonistic to the sans-culottes ever since the riots and lynchings of July 1792. This hatred was deepened by further sporadic rioting in the autumn of 1792 and the winter of 1792-93. Following the federalist takeover it could find expression. Jean Savon already had been arrested at the beginning of the sectional independence movement, and the General Committee

immediately ordered the arrest of six more sans-culotte leaders, including Laurent Savon and Armand Gait. Ironically, two of those ordered arrested were officers in Moisson's battalion, whose support the federalists badly needed. The accused popular leaders were quickly brought before the re-instated Popular Tribunal, tried and sentenced. On May 16 the Savon brothers and Gait were executed. The other popular leaders committed suicide in prison, while one of Moisson's accused officers, Peyron, was able to escape and make his way to Paris.<sup>44</sup>

These acts of vengeance underline the nature of the federalist leadership: it championed "law and order" and was violently opposed to popular action. I am forced to rely on a purely political definition of the federalist leadership, for a definition formulated in terms of social status does not differentiate between federalist and the Jacobin leadership: Peloux, marchand de son (bran merchant) was the president of the federalist General Committee, Castallenet a notary, was its secretary, and Paul Rambaud Russac, maître de langues (language teacher) was its vice-president.<sup>45</sup> None of the federalist leaders was socially distinguishable from the Jacobin leaders of Marseilles.

After the federalists had satisfied their desire for vengeance against the sans-culotte leaders, they released Mouraille and Seytres from prison.<sup>46</sup> This was not surprising in the case of Seytres, an advocate of the Popular Tribunal since its inception and an ally of the Marseilles right-wing. On the other hand, Mouraille had opposed the establishment of the Popular Tribunal and allegedly had protected Jean Savon and relied on his counsel. Mouraille's quick release by the federalists suggests that the close relationship between the mayor and Jean Savon had been exaggerated.

After assuming power the federalists reorganized Marseilles' administration. They quickly forced the three local administrative bodies

to accept the direction of the General Committee of the Sections. The Criminal Tribunal of the Bouches-du-Rhône was not officially banned, but neither was it allowed to function during the federalists' rule; its place was taken by the Popular Tribunal. Next, the sectional leadership bolstered its position by allowing the eight rural sections of Marseilles to name representatives both to the General Committee and to the Popular Tribunal. By this move the number of Marseilles sections was increased from twenty-four to thirty-two, and the federalists insured that even if the central wards of the city were to turn against Marseilles' new rulers, the popular sections would be outvoted.<sup>47</sup>

Leading Jacobins who remained in Marseilles were forced to resign from their official positions and were arrested. Among them were Maillet, the president of both the Popular Society and the Criminal Tribunal, and Giraud, the prosecutor of the Popular Tribunal. In all approximately thirty Jacobins were imprisoned by the Marseilles federalists.<sup>48</sup> On June 3, the Marseilles Popular Society was closed down.<sup>49</sup>

Like the Jacobins and the conservatives of the Popular Tribunal before them, the Marseilles federalists had a strong regionalist, expansionist orientation. Soon after assuming power they despatched to the hinterland of Provence a large number of federalist agents, who purged the towns of Jacobin influence -- usually the Popular Societies -- and preached anti-Paris propaganda. They aided the Toulon federalists to assume power, and exercised control over areas as far removed from Marseilles as the department of Basses-Alpes.<sup>50</sup>

In Marseilles itself, the dangerous popular sections were kept relatively quiet until mid-August through economic means: from April until August the price of bread remained constant, and grainships continued to deliver provisions until late June.<sup>51</sup>



Yet the federalists of Marseilles faced some serious problems. Most importantly, they were unable to spread their influence beyond their limited regional stronghold. To be sure, they established communications with the federalists of Lyon, Bordeaux and other federalist centres, but the major federalist centres could not effect any united course of action against Paris, and the Jacobins were able to deal with each federalist stronghold separately.<sup>52</sup>

Furthermore, the Marseilles federalists possessed only badly organized, ineffective military forces to oppose the national armies. Although Captain Moisson originally supported the sections rather than the Jacobins, his decision was the result of a difficult choice. As he stated in early May: "les ordres que je reçois se contrarient presque tous et . . . je ne sais par conséquent à qui obéir, ni avec qui correspondre pour les dispositions de l'armée"<sup>53</sup>. The federalists considered him suspect, and Moisson, the most respected revolutionary soldier in Marseilles, the leader of the Marseilles contingent of August 10, withdrew from public life during the federalist period. Rousselet and Villeneuve-Tourettes, who assumed control of the federalists' departmental army, proved to be mediocre commanders leading highly disorganized forces, and their army suffered a series of humiliating defeats.<sup>54</sup>

Until three weeks before their final collapse, the Marseilles federalists insisted on maintaining the fiction that they and not the Paris Jacobins were the legitimate representatives of the French Republic. While their language was extreme, they did not consistently follow an extreme anti-Jacobin course of action. For example, Rousselet, the first general of the federalist forces, was reluctant to engage the national army despite the federalists' decided manpower advantage.<sup>55</sup> This, like the federalist army's weak performance, cannot be explained by Rousselet's

incompetence alone, for Carteaux, the commander of the Jacobin army, was also an inexperienced general and later proved himself incompetent.<sup>56</sup>

It seems to me that the Marseilles federalist army's failure was occasioned by a general lack of confidence, a foreboding of failure, which permeated Marseilles despite the federalists' brave words. Until early August the Marseilles federalists attempted to pursue a middle road between Jacobinism and royalism; but in the political atmosphere of the summer of 1793 a middle road was unrealistic. A principal source of the federalists' failure was their inability to decide upon a firm course of action.

The most striking example of federalist procrastination is the fate of the Marseilles Jacobins, who, arrested early in the federalist period, were never brought to trial and emerged unharmed from the city's prisons when Carteaux entered Marseilles. While the Marseilles Popular Tribunal prosecuted and condemned sans-culotte leaders from Aix and Salon, it continually refused to bring the Marseilles Jacobins to trial. In general, the Popular Tribunal's activity during the three months of federalist rule was relatively restrained: I could trace no more than twenty-two death sentences during the entire period.<sup>57</sup>

Only in August, as the Jacobin army approached Marseilles, did the General Committee of the Marseilles Sections turn reluctantly to royalism. By August 15, the federalists were open royalists: on that date a royalist religious procession was held in Marseilles.<sup>58</sup>

To forestall the predictable anti-royalist reaction in the popular sections the federalists ordered the disarming of section 11 on August 18. However, section 11 resisted, turned against the federalist leaders of Marseilles, and on August 21 accepted the Jacobin Constitution of 1793.<sup>59</sup> On the same day bourgeois panic occasioned an astronomic rise in the price

of bread.<sup>60</sup> On August 23, sections 9, 12, 13 and 14 joined section 11, announcing their adherence to the new constitution, and fighting broke out between the popular sections and the National Guard.<sup>61</sup>

On August 22 the General Committee of the sections, faced with the imminent entry of the Jacobin troops into Marseilles, decided to take the extreme step of inviting the British Mediterranean Fleet to protect the city. Two agents were dispatched to Admiral Hood's flagship, cruising a few miles off the coast.<sup>62</sup> However, before the British could take advantage of the federalists' offer, Carteaux entered Marseilles. He was welcomed by the fighting sans-culottes of the popular sections; for although the Marseilles sans-culottes had been willing to abandon Jacobinism, they were not willing to support the federalists' slide into royalism and treason.

#### IV

The sections' assumption of power in Marseilles was followed by federalist takeovers in other parts of France. For a short period the anti-Jacobin wave seemed immensely powerful and it appears difficult to explain how the Jacobins emerged victoriously in a relatively short time, and with relatively minor losses of manpower, against the forces of 60 rebel departments and of great cities like Lyons, Marseilles and Bordeaux. Yet apart from the royalist army in the Vendée and later the Chouan guerilla forces in Brittany, only Lyons and Toulon -- the latter with a large-scale infusion of English and Spanish military forces -- were able to resist the Jacobin armies for any length of time. If one considers that simultaneously with the anti-Jacobin risings in the provinces the French Republic was also facing foreign foes, and that despite the journées of May 31

and June 2 the Mountain was forced to work in Paris with only a tenuous hold on government until at least late July, the Jacobin successes appear even more remarkable.

However, Sydenham's idea of the "myth of a Girondin party" comes once again to our aid. The "Girondins" certainly welcomed the anti-Jacobin federalist victories of April and May. Gaudet greeted the turnover in Marseilles with the cry of "Heureuse révolution!" and optimistically prophesied that the provincial federalist groundswell would sweep away the Jacobin factieux and désorganiseurs.<sup>63</sup> (Two favourite expressions of the anti-Jacobin wing in the National Convention; while the former fits the Jacobins well enough the latter is more justly applied to their enemies.) Yet as we have seen in the case of Marseilles, this by no means implies that the "Girondins" were the instigators of the federalist movements. On the contrary, the disorganization of the federalists and the inability of the federalist centers to formulate a practicable common course of action suggest that the federalist outbreaks were independent regionalist anti-Jacobin and anti-centralizing reactions, and did not form a national movement. The Jacobins, on the other hand, formed a relatively well-organized national movement which could act in a unified manner against the fragmented federalist challenge. In large part this explains the Jacobin successes of the summer of 1793.

The representatives on mission played an important role in organizing the Jacobin victory. They relayed the Committee of Public Safety's orders to the armies; they accompanied the armies on their campaigns and reviewed the military leadership; they attempted to create a functioning national administrative framework by relying on provincial Jacobins and Popular Societies and by reviewing the membership of provincial administrative bodies. In short, they provided a national governmental network in direct

contact with Paris. However weak this network was -- and one cannot deny that it was weak -- it was much more than the "Girondins" or the federalists possessed.<sup>64</sup> Why were the representatives on-mission chosen predominantly from Montagnard ranks? Thompson argues that "Girondins" were still in control of the National Convention in March 1793 and chose, in the main, Jacobin sympathizers for recruiting missions in order to weaken the Jacobins in Paris.<sup>65</sup> Lefebvre argues along the same lines, stating that "the Girondins had judged it shrewd to select these deputies from among the Montagnards, in order to weaken opposition in the Convention, . . ."<sup>66</sup> Patrick's recent detailed analysis of the National Convention's composition suggests a different answer. She has demonstrated that the Montagnards formed a very substantial minority of the National Convention, not a small group as has been previously supposed; in fact they were more numerous than the "Girondins". She also states that the majority of the representatives on mission stemmed from the Montagnard ranks. Thus the despatch of Montagnards as representatives on mission appears to be a logical consequence of the growing Montagnard influence in the national government rather than the result of a "Girondin" political manoeuvre.<sup>67</sup>

Another important factor which helped to prepare a Jacobin victory was the existence of a network of Jacobin societies, providing a national communication network and a source of manpower for the armies and for the reconstituted local administrative bodies. The army which marched against Marseilles was accompanied by the convinced Montagnard representative Albitte, was under the command of the sans-culotte general Carteaux, and contained a large number of convinced Jacobins; the Allobroge contingent, consisting of enthusiastic Savoyard Jacobins under Doppet's command, was especially feared by the Marseilles federalists.<sup>68</sup>

In reply to the federalist danger the Jacobins of the Rhône valley immediately began to organize; the first congress of Popular Societies was set up at Valence, halfway between Marseilles and Lyons, in June 1793.<sup>69</sup> That faithful local Jacobins occupied the Rhône valley played an important part in preventing the Marseilles and Lyons federalists from joining forces.

Thus, the decisive difference between federalists and Jacobins was that the former relied on geographically isolated regional centers of power, and were ineffectual beyond their strongholds, while the latter possessed a rudimentary national administrative framework supported by the extra-parliamentary nation-wide Jacobin movement.

## V

For the greater part of the period with which Part II (chapters 2, 3 and 4) of this thesis has been concerned, France was a collection of semi-autonomous municipal republics rather than a centralized state governed from its capital. Localism during the revolutionary era developed as a result of this decentralized interlude. Local loyalties often became more powerful than class or political loyalties.

The majority of the Marseilles sans-culotte sections placed loyalty to their city before loyalty to the Paris sans-culottes or to the Marseilles Jacobins. With the political unsophistication of the uneducated, they fell prey to the federalists who claimed to represent Marseilles' interests against outsiders. The Marseilles sans-culottes were quickly disabused of their illusions. Once the Marseilles right-wingers gained power as federalists, their first move was to wreak vengeance upon the sans-culotte leaders, whom they had come to despise more and more in the course of the

major rioting of July 1792, and the minor but frequent riots of the autumn of 1792 and the winter of 1792-93.

With the war and nation-wide economic difficulties in late 1792, a movement to centralize France and to create a truly national government slowly began. Federalism was a localist reaction against this nascent centralizing tendency. With the defeat of the federalists, a major road-block obstructing governmental centralization was removed. To be sure, in the period immediately following the defeat of federalism in Marseilles the central government's agents were too busy with foreign invasion and the procurement of food supplies to pay very much attention to uprooting localism in Marseilles, and Marseilles remained in local Jacobin hands -- trustworthy in the eyes of the majority of the national representatives -- for another four months. Nonetheless, the period of the Terror in Marseilles is closely related to the previous era, since the Terror as conceived by the Committee of Public Safety attempted radically to resolve the burning issue of localism versus centralism in favour of the latter alternative, but met with stiff local opposition.

## NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

1. Georges Guibal, Le mouvement . . ., & C. Riffaterre, Le mouvement anti-Jacobin et antiparisien à Lyon. Paris, Picard, 1912.
2. Albert Mathiez, The French Revolution. New York, Grosset and Dunlap, 1964, p. 333. Mathiez accepts the view of his hero Robespierre: "The internal dangers come from the middle classes; in order to defeat the middle classes we must rally the people." Robespierre's conception of an alliance with the people, meaning the sans-culottes, became a basic tenet of Jacobinism. For a long time French revolutionary historiography pushed to the background the possibility that the sans-culottes may not have wished for such an alliance. However, more recently it has been demonstrated by historians as diverse in outlooks as Soboul and Cobb, that on different occasions the sans-culottes did assume an anti-Jacobin political position.
3. Ibid., p. 336.
4. Georges Lefebvre, Le gouvernement révolutionnaire. Paris, Tournier & Constans, 1947, pp. 5-13 & pp. 24-31. & Jean Jaurès, Histoire socialiste (1789-1900). Volume IV, La Convention II 1793-1794. Paris, Jules Rouff, 1903, pp. 1267-1289.
5. Norman Hampson, op. cit., p. 173; A. Goodwin, "The Federalist Movement in Caën during the French Revolution", Bulletin of John Rylands Library, 42, 1960. pp. 313-343; Norman Hampson, "Les ouvriers des arsenaux de la marine pendant la Révolution française", Revue d'Histoire Economique et Sociale, 39, 1961, pp. 442-473.
6. Richard Cobb, Les armées révolutionnaires. Instrument de la Terreur dans les départements. Avril 1793-Floréal An II. Volume 1, Paris, Mouton & Co., 1961, p. 49.
7. Richard Cobb, The Police and the People. French Popular Protest. 1789-1820. Oxford, Clarendon, 1970, pp. 200-201. In asserting that the Section was "The quintessence of sans-culottisme", Cobb carries his argument a little too far. The sections were city wards, and each had its own political and social loyalties. Certain sections were definitely sans-culotte, which in essence meant that they were loud and simple supporters of the Revolution, providing the "shock troops" of the popular movement. In fact, these sections were in a minority in Marseilles, but they exercised a powerful influence because through rioting they had intimidated the majority of Marseilles' sections. Without a doubt the sans-culotte sections had to be persuaded to support or acquiesce in a federalist takeover of power. I hope to show in the main text how this was achieved. But calling the Section the quintessence of sans-culottism seems to deprive even further the much abused term sans-culotte of concrete meaning. (This is in no way meant as a general critique of Cobb's book, which I think is an excellent treatment of popular protest during the revolutionary era.)



8. Michael J. Sydenham, "The Montagnards and Their Opponents: Some Considerations on a Recent Reassessment of the Conflicts in the French National Convention, 1792-93." Journal of Modern History, 43, 2, June 1971, p. 287. This definition is really Allison Patrick's, but Sydenham states that "So concise and fair a statement . . . of Sydenham's view should . . . be allowed to stand in full"; so I feel no compunction in taking Patrick's definition. See Allison Patrick, "Political Division in the French National Convention, 1792-93," Journal of Modern History 41 (December 1969), p. 421.
9. Michael J. Sydenham, The French Revolution, p. 130.
10. Patrick, op. cit., pp. 421-474. Here I must argue with Sydenham's statement that his remarks do not "Invalidate the conclusions which are drawn from them Patrick's statistics." (Sydenham, "The Montagnards. . .", p. 291). Patrick, after dismissing Sydenham's thesis of a united Montagnard party says in a footnote: "The appels are the only occasions on which deputies formally recorded final political decisions. The Mountain, as far as its voting went, was astonishingly united"; (f.n. 191, p. 474). Indeed, if one examines Patrick's Tables 3 and 4 (p. 448 & p. 450), it becomes evident that on the appels only 70.8% of the "Gironde" voted for a referendum on the king's fate, while 94.3% of the Mountain voted against it; and only 71.9% of the "Gironde" voted for mercy toward Louis XVI, while 94.8% of the Mountain voted against mercy. Patrick's next table of voting is on the Marat impeachment (Table 5, p. 458). Although this was a direct "Girondin" attack against the "l'ami du peuple", only 62.8% of the "Gironde" voted for impeachment, while 10.3% of the "Girondins" abstained. Yet surprisingly, only 27.2% of the Mountain voted against impeachment. On first sight this implies that the Mountain was not as united as may have appeared from the voting on the king's fate. But, if we take into account that 31.8% of the Mountain was away on mission at the time of the Marat impeachment vote and that another 31.5% were absent from the National Convention, a different picture begins to emerge. First, one should note that the vote for Marat's impeachment was rapidly forced through a half-empty National Convention: "the voting was begun very late at night and did not end until 7:00 A.M." (f.n. 135, p. 459). The "abstained/for adjournment" vote should in large part be taken as a conditional vote against impeachment, for as Patrick states, there were "demands for an adjournment (to consider the evidence and allow Marat to defend himself)". (f.n. 135, pp. 458-459). Patrick concludes that "What happened on April 13 was not that the Convention as a whole turned away from Montagnard policy, but rather that the Right was present in much larger numbers than the Left and had therefore no difficulty in taking control." (p. 459). Considering the rigged character of the Marat impeachment vote and the confusion which prevailed in the Convention, the one reliable indicator for Montagnard opinion is the percentage of the Mountain that voted for Marat's impeachment: this is a very low 2.3%. Furthermore, if one compares the vote of the "Mountain/Jacobin" group, i.e. deputies who were members of the Jacobin Club and whom Patrick classifies as being members of the Mountain and who were thus the inner core of the Mountain, with the vote of the "Girondin" "inner sixty", one notices that the core of the "Girondins" was more lukewarm about the

impeachment than the "Gironde" as a whole (60.0% vs. 62.8% for impeachment), while the Montagnard core stood against the impeachment more determinedly than the Mountain as a whole (37.5% vs. 27.2% against impeachment). Lastly, if we accept Patrick's claim that the Mountain was almost twice as numerous as the "Gironde" (302 members vs. 175 members) it becomes even more remarkable that on all three votes the Mountain showed greater cohesion than the "Gironde". In the vote on the "reinstatement of the Commission of Twelve" (Table 7, p. 465) the pattern is once more reenforced. If we subtract those deputies who were away on mission from the given percentages, (Patrick does not do this and therefore her percentages are somewhat misleading), 76.9% of the Gironde voted for the reenstatement while 80% of the Mountain voted against it (only 5% of the Mountain voted for it). Thus it seems to me that Patrick's statistics show that the Mountain was much more consistent in its voting patterns than the "Gironde", in spite of its larger membership; that the Mountain's members had taken over national administration by serving as representatives on mission (22 to 32% of the Mountain was away on mission at the time of the last two votes compared with only 4 to 5% of the "Gironde"); in short that the Mountain was indeed a nascent political party, while the "Gironde" was but a group of vociferously anti-Jacobin deputies.

11. Ibid., p. 466 f.n. 155 & Tables 5 and 7, p. 458 & p. 465.
12. Guibal, Le mouvement. . . , pp. 5-22.
13. Mathiez, The French Revolution, pp. 10-12.
14. Guibal, Le mouvement. . . , pp. 10-12.
15. Ibid., p. 24.
16. A. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire des Conventionnels, Paris, 1919, p. 41 and p. 64.
17. Guibal, Le mouvement. . . , p. 24.
18. AULARD, III, p. 14.
19. Ibid., III, p. 106.
20. Guibal, Le mouvement. . . , p. 25.
21. Ibid., pp. 25-27. It should be emphasized that this recruitment order was a special recruitment order. It seems to me that the federalist reaction in Marseilles was not against general recruitment as supposed by Hampson, Sydenham and others. (Hampson, The Social History. . . , p. 173; Sydenham, History of the French Revolution, p. 154). Possibly a certain degree of confusion has entered the historiography of the French Revolution on this point. It is accepted that the outbreak of the war in the Vendée was, after many years of irritation, touched off by opposition to recruitment. As we have seen, in the rural areas of the southeast there was considerable opposition to recruitment. It is tempting to accept recruitment as

one of the reasons for the federalist reaction. But recruitment was a cause of a counterrevolutionary reaction in rural areas where the general call-up of early 1793 was a rallying point to rural populations which already greatly resented urban incursions in the countryside. (The clearest demonstrated example for this is the Vendée. See Charles Tilly, The Vendée, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1964, p. 309). Marseilles -- probably like other urban areas -- previously had shown on a number of occasions that she could easily set up armed forces, and that she was willing to fight for the Revolution. As Guibal has shown, at the time of Bayle's and Boisset's special recruitment order there was adequate manpower in Marseilles to set up a 2,000 men contingent, since both Fédéré battalions had returned to the city and were eager to serve the Revolution. The significant aspect of the representatives' order was the exercise of "arbitrary", i.e. not locally based, authority above local government.

22. Guibal, Le mouvement. . . , pp. 28-29, & Aulard, III, p. 237.
23. Guibal, Le mouvement. . . , p. 27.
24. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
25. Ibid., pp. 57-62.
26. Ibid., pp. 50-52. Also the sections swore to defend those who incriminated Mouraille and Seytres and declared the National Guard to be in permanent state of requisition.
27. Ibid., p. 55.
28. Ibid., pp. 69-70.
29. Ibid., p. 62.
30. Jaures, op. cit., volume IV, part II, pp. 866-867.
31. Kuscinski, op. cit., p. 241.
32. Guibal, Le mouvement. . . , p. 72.
33. Ibid., p. 69.
34. Robert, op. cit., p. 73.
35. MONITEUR, XVI, pp. 372-373.
36. Barbaroux to Manent, 13 May 1793, in P. Vaillandet, "Lettres inédits de Barbaroux". AHRF 10, 1933, pp. 348-350.
37. MONITEUR, XVI, p. 371 - Letter of Bayle and Boisset to the National Convention, 4 May, 1793.
38. AULARD, op. cit., IV, pp. 216-224.
39. Guibal, Le mouvement. . . , p. 83.

40. Ibid., p. 86.
41. Ibid., p. 107.
42. MONITEUR, 16, pp. 476-478.
43. Ibid., 16, pp. 476-478.
44. Robert, op. cit., pp. 193-99.
45. Guibal, op. cit., p. 116.
46. Ibid., p. 111.
47. Robert, op. cit., p. 107 & p. 129.
48. Ibid., pp. 103-104.
49. Guibal, op. cit., p. 147.
50. G.L. Pelissier, "La propagande fédéraliste dans les Bouches-du-Rhône (30 mai - 11 juillet 1793)", Annales Révolutionnaires 11, 1909, pp. 395-425.
51. Carrière, op. cit., pp. 166-169.
52. The earliest federalist idea for setting up a new government was to call the suppléants (substitute representatives), and set up a new federalist Convention at Bourges, away from the influence of Paris. Another idea was to form a united army of the federalist cities. It seems to me that the most important aspect of these ideas was that they came to nothing, and thus indicate the extent of federalist disorganization.
53. Guibal, Le mouvement. . . , p. 83.
54. Joseph Etienne Michel d'Eygières, Histoire de l'armée départementale des Bouches-du-Rhône. Paris, du Pont, An V - 1797, pp. 94-120. On the disorganization of the Marseilles departmental army the eyewitness account of federalist commissaire civil in that army, Michel d'Eygières is particularly instructive.
55. Guibal, Le mouvement. . . , pp. 209-210, pp. 230-234.
56. Carteaux's performance at the siege of Toulon was second rate. The representatives Salicetti, Gasparin and Augustin Robespierre reported on various occasions to the Committee of Public Safety that he was a bad general and could not live up to the reputation he gained at Marseilles. See AULARD VII, pp. 79-81, pp. 392-393; VIII, p. 195, p. 480.
57. Robert, op. cit., pp. 136-139. Of course, the fact that the Marseilles federalists promptly avenged themselves on the sans-culottes, but did not act against the leading captured Jacobins implies that the federalists considered the class-ties which bound them with the leading Jacobins more important than the political

opposition between them. Nonetheless, this implies lack of political decisiveness; the Jacobins, after all, had no similar qualms when the fate of the Republic was at stake. In this respect, a comparison of the actions of white terrorists with those of the federalists would prove to be instructive: following the Terror, the White terrorists took systematic political vengeance on leading Jacobins. (That White terrorist activity was systematic rather than disorganized -- as generally supposed -- is persuasively argued by Richard Cobb in The Police and the People.)

58. Lautard, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 269-270.
59. J.B. Buchez & P.C. Roux, Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution française, v. 28, Paris, Paulin, 1836, p. 494, Lautard, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 269.
60. Carrière, op. cit., p. 169.
61. Buchez & Roux, op. cit., v. 28, p. 494, & Lautard, op. cit., v. 1, p. 269. The strength of the sans-culotte sections may be gauged by the fact that a mass meeting was held when the five popular sections concluded their alliance against the federalists: Buchez and Roux estimate 5,000 to 6,000 people present at this meeting and Lautard estimates 2,000.
62. Lautard, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 267.
63. MONITEUR XVI, p. 372.
64. AULARD IV, pp. 23-43. The first extended definition of the representatives' duties and powers appeared on May 7, 1793 in a proposal prepared by the Committee of Public Safety. Thus, the functions of the representatives on mission were already well defined during the summer of 1793, although of course, they underwent major redefinitions during the Terror. Very significantly the Committee of Public Safety proposed that the representatives should have unlimited authority, (pouvoirs illimités) and that all aspects of provincial French administration, both military and civil, should be under their surveillance.
65. J.M. Thompson, The French Revolution. New York, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 381-382.
66. Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution from 1793 to 1799, p. 48.
67. See note 10, above.
68. Lautard, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 251. Tales circulated among the Marseilles bourgeois about the ferocity of the Allobroges. According to Lautard they had the "renommé de nouveaux Vandales, et Marseille, la riche proie, compta. . . leurs jours de marche en frémissant."
69. Cobb, Les armées révolutionnaires . . . , vol. 1, p. 52.

## PART THREE - Marseilles during the Period of the Terror

### CHAPTER V - The Early Period of the Terror in Marseilles:

#### The Terror as Applied by the Local Jacobins.

##### I

There were important variations in the application of the Terror throughout France. It was applied with varying degrees of severity according to the intensity of counterrevolutionary disturbances; in regions of civil war, invasion, or counterrevolutionary guerilla activity it was usually more severe, and in peaceful areas it was usually less severe. The Terror differed in Paris and the provinces, and in urban and rural areas. The varying seriousness of the economic crisis, especially the crisis of food provisioning, also greatly affected the forms which the Terror took. Lastly, the personalities of both local and centrally delegated political leaders played significant roles in determining the course of the Terror in different regions. As Richard Cobb rightly suggests, if one wishes to remain strictly accurate, one ought not to speak of a single unified Terror, but only of the Terror in particular cities, regions or departments.<sup>1</sup>

Nonetheless, there were two major political directions from the interaction of which a unified -- if approximate -- model of the Terror may be constructed. The first was the so-called popular, "spontaneous", or locally directed Terror, which often tended to increase administrative disorganization. The second was the centrally controlled Terror imposed by the National Convention and its Committees of Public Safety and General Security, one of whose chief goals was to curb the overly enthusiastic energies unleashed by the "spontaneous" Terror and uproot administrative

disorder.

In Marseilles the locally directed Terror was relatively well organized. The autumn of 1793 was a period of local Jacobin control in the city, yet it was not a period in which "spontaneous" popular initiatives dominated. During this early phase of the Terror, Marseilles was tranquil and the Terror was chiefly manifested in a judicial manner through the smooth and rapid work of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal. This is not to say that there were no "spontaneous" popular manifestations of the Terror: but these were controlled and utilized by the city's Jacobin leaders.

This chapter is concerned with the period of locally directed Terror in Marseilles, and traces this period to the point when representatives of the central government first made a concerted effort to destroy local Jacobin rule in early December, 1793.

## II

On August 25, 1793 Carteaux's troops entered a city much of whose population was apparently glad to be liberated; the fighting sans-culottes of the five anti-royalist sections joyously welcomed the National Convention's army into Marseilles.<sup>2</sup> But a large part of Marseilles' population, especially among the bourgeoisie, was deeply fearful of Jacobin revenge and many persons fled, accompanying the federalist army, which beat a hasty and disorganized retreat toward Toulon. According to Greer "at least two thousand. . . fugitives followed Villeneuve to Toulon, and many others scattered over the country, escaped by sea, or reached Italy by land."<sup>3</sup> Although with the sources at my disposal I could make no exact estimate of the number of federalist leaders who emigrated from Marseilles at

this time, there can be no doubt that a large number escaped from the city.

Carteaux's army, which was a contingent of the Army of the Alps, was accompanied by the representatives on mission Albitte, Escudier, Gasparin, Niöche and Saliceti. On August 29 these representatives were temporarily joined by Ricord and Augustin Robespierre, who were on their way to Nice and the Army of Italy; Barras and Fréron, also with the Army of Italy, were in Marseilles from September 3 to September 6. During September and October, 1793 the representatives Pomme l'Américain, Charbonnier and Servièrre were also in Marseilles for varying lengths of time.<sup>4</sup>

To the surprise of many frightened bourgeois, the initial treatment accorded to Marseilles by the central government's representatives was mild. The memorandum which the national representatives addressed to Marseilles upon entering the city stressed the heroism of the Marseilles sans-culottes who had rebelled against the federalists, despite vicious federalist anti-Jacobin and anti-Paris propaganda; the representatives, while condemning the rebels, conveyed the impression that they considered Marseilles to possess a solid revolutionary core, and that therefore Marseilles would not be punished indiscriminately.<sup>5</sup> Albitte urged general clemency, and the punishment only of the federalist leaders; he avowed that three-quarters of Marseilles' population had aided the federalists in some way, but he considered the simple Marseillais to have been led astray (égarés).<sup>6</sup> Augustin Robespierre also believed that the mass of Marseilles' ignorant and gullible population had been led astray by counterrevolutionaries; he warned his brother that wholesale punishment of federalists by patriots would lead to a renewed right-wing reaction and interminable civil war.<sup>7</sup> Carteaux had an even more indiscriminating attitude, accepting a number of Marseillais into his army, among them some turncoat officers of the



federalist army.<sup>8</sup>

The new masters of Marseilles quickly reestablished the pre-federalist local administrative bodies and reopened the Popular Society. Mouraille remained the mayor of the city, but he was eclipsed by the Jacobin Isoard, who assumed the post of municipal procureur and was to remain a leading spokesman of the municipality until early December 1793. Another leading member of the local administration was Ricord Jr. (no relation of the representative on mission, Ricord), who was the procureur général syndic of the department and the editor of the Jacobin Journal républicain de Marseilles. In general, Jacobins released from jail or returning to Marseilles in the wake of Carteaux's army, dominated the reconstituted administrative bodies. Jacobins who were members of Marseilles' administrative bodies previous to the federalist régime tended to gain their old posts, while posts vacated by hiding or escaped federalists were generally also filled by Jacobins. The only important body which retained its pre-federalist membership completely unchanged was the Criminal Tribunal of the Bouches-du-Rhône: upon emerging from prison Maillet Jr. and Giraud immediately reassumed their old positions as president and prosecutor of the Tribunal. Maillet Jr. also reoccupied the post of president in the Marseilles Popular Society, and thus had a position of unusual strength on the local political scene. A Vigilance Committee (comité de surveillance) was created; one of its members whom Fréron singled out for mention was Loys. According to Fréron the Marseilles municipality and the Vigilance Committee, in the persons of Isoard and Loys, worked closely together in search of suspects in the autumn of 1793. The arrest of suspects began immediately upon the entry of Carteaux into Marseilles. The suspects were referred to the now "revolutionary" Criminal Tribunal of the Bouches-du-Rhône, which had its first sitting on August 28.<sup>9</sup>

One of the national representatives' first acts was to order the general disarmament of Marseilles, except for the sans-culotte sections. How this disarmament proceeded I have no means of ascertaining, but I presume that the armed sans-culottes must have been the chief instruments through whom the federalists and other suspects were disarmed. By August 29 the representatives on mission could report to the Committee of Public Safety that Marseilles' disarmament had been accomplished.<sup>10</sup> That the representatives were satisfied with the results of the general disarmament may be gauged from their report of early September to the National Convention, in which they stated that enough weapons and munitions had been turned up in Marseilles to arm 60,000 men.<sup>11</sup>

In late August objections were raised in Paris against the lenient treatment of rebellious Marseilles. Danton, for instance, advocated making an example of the Marseilles commercial bourgeoisie:

La nation vient de donner une grande leçon à l'aristocratie marchande des Marseillais. Il faut que cette leçon ne soit pas perdue; . . . il faut que les commerçants qui ont vu avec plaisir l'abaissement des nobles et des prêtres, dans l'espérance de s'engraisser de leurs biens, et qui aujourd'hui désirent la contrerévolution avec plus de perfidie soient abaissés;<sup>12</sup>

However, this was a minority view. The Committee of Public Safety informed Albitte that it entirely trusted his judgement on how to proceed in Marseilles, and thus gave its implicit approval to the mild treatment of the southern city.<sup>13</sup> Since in early September the National Convention and its committees were having difficulty preserving their authority in the capital in face of a sans-culotte challenge, it is not surprising that at this time they could not pay very close attention to provincial developments, and entrusted the national representatives in distant Marseilles with virtually unlimited powers.

## III

Confirmation that Admiral Trogoff had invited the British to occupy Toulon and had handed the French Mediterranean Fleet to the enemy reached Marseilles one day after the event and the national representatives' attention immediately shifted to the new danger area. By August 29 Carteaux's troops were leaving for Toulon and only the armed sans-culottes remained behind to garrison Marseilles.<sup>14</sup> Albitte observed that the federalists feared that the departure of Carteaux's forces would leave them defenceless against local Jacobin and sans-culotte vengeance.<sup>15</sup>

The expenses of supplying the army assembling under Toulon were borne in large measure by the Marseilles commercial bourgeoisie. On August 29 the national representatives in Marseilles ordered the city's commercial classes to contribute four million livres to this end.<sup>16</sup> It would be tempting but wrong to consider this forced loan as class punishment; Marseilles' commercial classes were burdened with expenses because they had ready funds, and were vulnerable to pressure, and thus it was expedient to tax them. The National Convention ordered the Minister of the Interior to reimburse the loan, and to send an additional two million livres to the Toulon army.<sup>17</sup> To be sure, only a fraction of these sums was actually sent to the Mediterranean coast, but this was due to the severe general shortage of funds, and not to a consciously formulated central policy of class punishment. In early September 1793, despite the fact that the sans-culottes were clamouring for it, class punishment was not a part of the nascent system of centralized political and economic Terror.

Carteaux's 2,000 men were joined under Toulon by a 4,000 man unit

from the Army of Italy.<sup>18</sup> The Army of Italy was leaderless, for Brunet, its commander-in-chief, had been arrested in August by Barras and Fréron for having shown pro-federalist leanings and having refused to send part of his army against the Toulon federalists.<sup>19</sup> Despite his lack of experience, Carteaux was the senior officer under Toulon, and was officially made head of the new, temporary Army of the Var on September 11.<sup>20</sup>

The new army was encumbered by serious problems. It suffered from shortages of bread, meat, forage, clothes and ammunition, and had only very insufficient funds to buy supplies. Its effective strength was about six thousand men; thus it was originally inferior in number to the allied British-Spanish force holding Toulon. Until military levies in the southeast began to provide recruits late in September, an effective si ge of Toulon could not even be considered.<sup>21</sup>

The Committee of Public Safety was very concerned about the situation in Toulon. After a number of stopgap measures, in November 1793 it ordered all representatives in the Mediterranean region to concentrate their efforts on the re-conquest of Toulon.<sup>22</sup> But this order left the way open for personal jealousies and conflicts between too many representatives charged with the same task.

#### IV

After the end of September 1793, none of the numerous representatives stationed in the southeast were primarily concerned with affairs in Marseilles, since they were more urgently needed at the siege of Toulon or to oversee armies and the procurement of food supplies. The lion's share of administrative and judicial work in Marseilles, including the punishment

of counterrevolutionaries and federalists, thus fell to local authorities, so that in effect Marseilles was under local and not national control.

The Criminal Tribunal of the Department of the Bouches-du-Rhône, renamed the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal in the autumn of 1793, was the judicial organ which prosecuted political suspects in Marseilles in the autumn of 1793. In addition to president Maillet Jr. and prosecutor Giraud it consisted of six judges and a clerk (greffier).<sup>23</sup> The Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal was "revolutionary" in that following late August 1793 it functioned without juries, judged without appeal, and its sentences were carried out at the highest possible speed.<sup>24</sup>

Greer does not differentiate between periods of activity of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal and thus does not take into account the changed political and economic conditions between the autumn of 1793 (the first period of the Tribunal's activity) and March-April 1794 (the second period of the Tribunal's activity). Considering these two periods of the Tribunal's activity separately should shed light on the differences in attitudes and approaches to revolutionary justice by the representatives Barras and Fréron, on mission in Marseilles during the first period, and the representative Maignet, on mission in Marseilles during the second. Greer evidently did not possess sufficient information to analyse the occupational (social) incidence of the Terror in Marseilles; but by using a list of victims provided by Gaffarel I can attempt to do this. Using Gaffarel's list I can also attempt to analyse the statistical distribution of the charges on the bases of which the accused were condemned to death (see the Appendix p.220 for methodology of statistical analysis).

According to Greer the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal passed 186 death sentences between August 1793 and April 1794.<sup>25</sup> Using

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES		CHARGES ON THE BASES OF WHICH THE ACCUSED WERE CONVICTED					NUMBER OF CONDEMNATIONS PER OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE OF CONDEMNATIONS PER OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY (EXCLUDING N.O.S.G. & OTHER)
		LEADERSHIP OF FEDERALIST BODIES IN MARSEILLES	MINOR BUT SPECIFIC FEDERALIST ACTIVITY IN MARSEILLES	GENERAL (UNSPECIFIED) FEDERALIST OR COUNTERREV. ACTIVITY OR SENTIMENTS IN MARSEILLES	FEDERALIST OR COUNTERREV. ACTIVITY OR SENTIMENTS OUTSIDE MARSEILLES	OTHER		
NOBLE								
PRIEST		1		1	5		7	8.3 %
PEASANT		1	1	1			3	3.6
BOURGEOIS	ADMINISTR.	3		1	1	3	8	9.5
	PROFESSION.	2	5	5	3		15	17.9
	COMMERCIAL	7	2	4	1	2	16	19.1
	PROPERTY HOLDER	1	5	2	1		9	10.7
TOTAL BOURGEOIS		13	12	12	6	5	48	57.2
OFFICER (MILIT. or NAVAL)		5	1				6	7.2
ARTISAN	INDUSTRIAL	1					1	1.2
	GENERAL SERVICE	5	5	4	2	3	19	22.6
N.O.S.G. & OTHER		3	2	4	6		15	
TOTAL		29	21	22	19	8		

Table 1. Occupational Distribution of Death Sentences, and Distribution According to the Charges on the Bases of which the Accused were Convicted. Marseilles (Maillet-Giraud) Revolutionary Tribunal August 1793-January 1794.

information from Gaffarel I have ascertained the names of 195 victims. Of these, 99 or about one-half were convicted between late August and December 1793, before the Revolutionary Tribunal stopped functioning on Barras' and Fréron's orders.<sup>26</sup> The occupational incidence of death sentences and the distribution according to the charges on the basis of which the accused were convicted are tabulated in Table 1.

Table 1 reveals that a significant majority (57%) of the condemned whose occupational status could be determined were bourgeois, and that among the bourgeois victims the commercial and professional bourgeois predominated. In fact, these two subcategories contain close to 40% of all the victims whose occupational status could be determined. Table 1 also shows that the most common charge on the basis of which the accused were convicted was the serious charge of leadership of federalist bodies in Marseilles. The two occupational groups which stand out in having had a large number of the condemned from their ranks charged with being Marseilles federalist leaders were the commercial bourgeois and the officers (military or naval). The condemned from the professional bourgeois and bourgeois property holder groups were mainly charged either with minor federalist or counterrevolutionary activity in Marseilles, or with general (unspecified) federalist or counterrevolutionary activity or sentiments in Marseilles. Only a very small number of condemned from these two groups (three individuals) were convicted on the more serious charge of federalist leadership in Marseilles. The category of priest is remarkable since of the few priests condemned (seven individuals) five were convicted for counterrevolutionary or federalist activity or sentiments outside Marseilles.

A number of conclusions may be drawn on the basis of Table 1. The predominance of bourgeois occupations among the victims suggests that the

Marseilles bourgeois were especially numerous among the opponents of Jacobinism and the supporters of federalism. More specifically, the relatively high number of commercial bourgeois executed as federalist leaders provides further proof for the hypothesis, presented in Chapters 3 and 4, that political and economic developments during 1792-93 pushed the Marseilles commercial bourgeoisie towards an anti-Jacobin, anti-centralist, federalist political position. The fact that a great majority of the condemned belonging to the professional and property holder bourgeois categories were convicted on the basis of minor charges, and only an insignificant number on the basis of the major charge of federalist leadership, provides further proof that the commercial bourgeois were the chief leaders of Marseilles federalism, the other bourgeois being mainly federalist supporters and sympathizers. The large number of officers among the federalist leaders suggests that many officers stationed in Marseilles also turned against Jacobinism and assumed the leadership of the federalist army.

The large proportion of priests charged with counterrevolutionary or federalist activity or sentiment outside Marseilles compared with the small proportion of priests charged with counterrevolutionary or federalist activity or sentiments in Marseilles allows us to make two hypotheses. First, priests in large, urban, sophisticated Marseilles were probably too uninfluential to take an active part in politics. But secondly, in the smaller rural communes of the countryside of Lower Provence they were evidently still leading individuals and many of them assumed an anti-Jacobin, federalist or counterrevolutionary political position.

In summary, Table 1 demonstrates that in punishing the political opponents of the revolutionary régime during the autumn of 1793, the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal heavily punished the city's bourgeoisie



which in the preceding period had assumed a militantly anti-Jacobin political position. While the Revolutionary Tribunal's activity was rapid, and in about 70% of the cases in which guilty verdicts were handed down the penalty was death, more than half of the accused were acquitted, and each case was judged individually (there were no mass condemnations). Thus, during the autumn of 1793 the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal appears generally to have judged on a fair and rational basis.<sup>27</sup>

Military units recruited in sans-culotte sections of Marseilles provided armed support for the Vigilance Committee in rounding up suspects for the Revolutionary Tribunal. According to the representatives on mission with Carteaux's army a gendarmerie nationale (national police) was organized in Marseilles immediately after the reconquest of the city.<sup>28</sup> This gendarmerie nationale was not mentioned again in the representatives' reports. Cobb, who has made a thorough search for popular armed forces in the Midi during the period of the Terror, does not mention them either. But the national representatives confirmed that after the general disarmament of Marseilles in late August only the loyal sans-culotte sections remained armed, and Cobb describes a revolutionary force in Marseilles called the bataillon des sans-culottes, which was primarily "employé pour protéger le désarmement et l'arrestation des gens suspects dans le terroir de Marseilles. . . ."<sup>29</sup> A secondary duty of the sans-culotte bataillon was to police Marseilles; for example, on October 6 the municipality ordered it to suppress gangs of juveniles who were disturbing the peace.<sup>30</sup> Based on the above information it seems safe to conclude that the gendarmerie nationale either merged with the bataillon des sans-culottes or was renamed and became the bataillon des sans-culottes.

The name of the bataillon des sans-culottes gives a clue to its social composition: most of its soldiers were poor local sans-culottes.

This assumption is supported by a number of facts: the bataillon's commander-in-chief and four officers whose names are known all stemmed from Marseilles and none of them were professional soldiers; Marseilles was disarmed in late August except for the sans-culotte sections; and on September 7, the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône fixed the daily pay of a volunteer in the bataillon at 2 livres, and the prospect of a well-paid job likely attracted many poor men into the bataillon. Since the department passed the decree on the sans-culotte soldiers' pay, the bataillon's wages were presumably paid by the departmental authorities and hence the bataillon des sans-culottes was probably under the direct control of the department.<sup>31</sup>

The work of the bataillon des sans-culottes was conducted inside the city of Marseilles and consisted of political or police duties; in this respect the Marseilles revolutionary army differed sharply from most other revolutionary armies, whose work took place chiefly in the rural areas, and was overwhelmingly economic, aimed at provisioning the urban areas of France.

As mentioned in Chapter IV, in June 1793 the popular societies of the Midi formed a congress in Valence to fight federalism and this congress substantially aided the republic's army to defeat federalism in the Mediterranean region.<sup>32</sup> In the first days of September, this congress, which had become inactive as the danger of federalist conquest receded, was again reactivated. The chief reason for its reactivation was the new extreme danger from Toulon. In order to get as close to the danger area as was geographically feasible, the Congress first moved its headquarters to Avignon, and thence on October 3 to Marseilles.<sup>33</sup>

The Valence Congress decided to raise a revolutionary army, the Légion de la Montagne, whose headquarters moved to Marseilles with the Congress.

Unlike the Marseilles bataillon des sans-culottes, the Légion de la Montagne had pretensions of being a national force. It was established as a "fille des sociétés populaires", meaning all popular societies of the republic. There were appeals for men for this revolutionary army in places as far removed from the Mediterranean coast as Lille and Grenoble. The character of the Légion de la Montagne was indeed cosmopolitan: its commander-in-chief, a professional soldier, stemmed from Savoy, while its second in command and a large proportion of its membership came from the departments of Drôme and Ardèche. In this respect the Légion de la Montagne resembled its originator, the Marseilles Congress of Popular Societies. Although the Légion de la Montagne's headquarters remained in Marseilles, under the direct influence of the Congress, its troops departed for the siège of Toulon as soon as they were raised.<sup>34</sup> Partly because it was a center of revolutionary sentiment, but more importantly because it raised sorely needed troops for the siège of Toulon, the Marseilles Congress of Popular Societies was considered by the representatives on mission to be a most useful revolutionary organ; Pomme, Servièrre and Charbonnière ordered that each deputy to the Congress be paid a salary of 10 francs per day.<sup>35</sup>

Thus the local centers of power in Marseilles in the autumn of 1793 were the municipal directory of Marseilles, the departmental directory of the Bouches-du-Rhône, the Vigilance Committee, the Revolutionary Tribunal, the Popular Society and the Congress of Popular Societies of the Midi in permanent session at Marseilles. Of these bodies the Marseilles Popular Society appears to have been the most favourably placed to hold the central power position in the city: its president, Maillet Jr., was also the president of the Revolutionary Tribunal, and the chief local administrators were generally also leading members of the Popular Society. As the host, the Marseilles Popular Society exercised a

dominating influence over the deliberations of the Congress of Popular Societies, and through issuing the certificats de civisme the Popular Society had a strong check over the composition of the local administrative bodies. But in two respects the Popular Society's power position was insecure: the bataillon des sans-culottes, the only local armed force, was under the control of the departmental directory, and the growth of central authority inevitably tended to undermine all local centres of power.

## V

How were the Jacobins of Marseilles able to control sans-culotte energies in the autumn of 1793? That the federalists had executed all sans-culotte leaders who gave direction to the crowds' anger in 1792-93 offers a tentative explanation for the relative calm in the sans-culotte sections. But the sans-culotte crowds did not always require leadership. When the external stimuli were present the crowds created their leaders on the spur of the moment. This undoubtedly took place in the Marseilles riots of 1789 and 1790, when the popular leadership remained faceless and nameless. Even in July 1792 agitation by a few leaders would obviously have been inadequate to keep the Marseilles sans-culottes in a state of excitement for two weeks had they not been prepared for rioting by the conjunction of external political and economic circumstances. The sans-culotte sections' rebellion against the federalists' slide into treason provides the final proof that they were able to act decisively even without their old leadership when circumstances required.

A much weightier explanation for the Marseilles sans-culottes' calm is that they were first coopted by and then in part brought under the

direct control of Marseilles' Jacobin leadership. Service in the bataillon des sans-culottes provided a secure livelihood for a larger number of poor sans-culottes and placed them under the surveillance of Jacobin authorities. Also, from the end of September the ateliers of Marseilles began to work to produce war material for the armies of the Midi, providing work for an additional number of sans-culottes, so reducing economic hardship and consequently the readiness of the city's poor for revolutionary action in the streets.<sup>36</sup> Only thus can it be explained that despite the Marseilles haute bourgeoisie's fears, the period between late August and early December 1793 was relatively peaceful, the punishment of federalists and counter-revolutionaries proceeded in an orderly manner, without a single instance of sans-culotte rioting. Ironically, the bataillon des sans-culottes became such a trustworthy pillar of law and order that it was used to contain occasional outbreaks of hooliganism.

To avert sans-culotte unrest in Marseilles it was not enough to provide the lower classes with a steady source of income, it was of the highest importance that the city also be provisioned with a steady flow of food, especially grain supplies. Cobb observes that the region between Nice and Marseilles was the only area of France where constant arrival of grain from Genoa preserved the civilian population from famine.<sup>37</sup> Carrière's detailed study of Marseilles' bread and flour provisioning shows conditions to have been worse than Cobb's general statement suggests: at times during the autumn of 1793 grain reserves in Marseilles were exhausted and only last-minute arrivals of grain shipments averted hunger. However, Carrière concludes that except for a few periods, Marseilles was normally supplied, and while the sceptre of famine intermittently threatened the city, in the end famine was always averted. Compared to the rest of France the Mediterranean seaboard was well provisioned.<sup>38</sup>

From the beginning of the Revolution until the end of the federalist régime the responsibility for provisioning Marseilles was in local hands, under the control of the Marseilles municipality. Usually Marseilles' principal grain suppliers were North Africa and Italy, but in June 1793 the allied blockade of France became fully operational and from this time until the end of 1793 no grain ships reached Marseilles and the port virtually ceased operations.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, until the end of the federalist rule, agents of the Marseilles municipality were able to purchase grain from the plain of Arles and from Languedoc. This grain cost approximately twice as much as overseas grain -- 180 livres per charge for the former against 90 to 100 livres per charge for the latter (1 Marseilles charge = 140 kg.) -- but at no time until the end of August did grain shortages actualize in Marseilles.<sup>40</sup>

With the arrival of Carteaux's forces in Marseilles and the occupation of Toulon by the enemy, the problem of Mediterranean grain supplies assumed a new urgency. To the difficulty of the highly effective Anglo-Spanish Mediterranean blockade was added the difficulty of enemy-occupied Toulon blocking the major landroute from Genoa to Marseilles. Also, the army besieging Toulon, the Army of Italy, and the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees stationed on the Spanish frontier all had to be supplied, in addition to the civilian population of the south.

The entire question of food supplies was redefined on the national level by the law of the General Maximum, voted into effect by the National Convention on September 4 and clarified on September 29, as a result of pressure from the Paris sans-culottes. The maximum générale froze the price of grain and of most other foods, and at the frozen prices French farmers were reluctant to sell to the urban markets or the armies. Thus despite the good harvest of 1793 serious food shortages developed throughout

France, and only through requisitioning could the maximum générale be enforced.

The food supplies problem of Provence was somewhat different from the problem in the rest of France. Since Provence was never self-sufficient in cereals, requisitioning was not in itself a realistic solution to adequate food provisioning. The bulk of Provence's cereal supplies had always come from overseas, and with three armies and large civilian populations competing for the limited supply of domestic grain from the plain of Arles and Languedoc, the Mediterranean coast had, more than ever, to rely on foreign supplies. But the major procuror of supplies, the high commercial class of Marseilles, was powerless to act since all sea-routes to Marseilles were cut.

The Marseilles municipality's bureau de subsistances was reorganized in late August, but it quickly recognized its own impotence: grain belonging to Marseilles was waiting in Genoa and Leghorn, but the Marseilles négociants had no means of transporting it to France. In this difficult situation the Marseilles municipality relinquished its hold over provisioning. On September 11 the bureau de subsistances reached an agreement with the Army of Italy: the Army was given all rights to Marseilles' blockaded grain in Genoa in exchange for providing adequate grain for the city. Thus the responsibility for insuring Marseilles' provisioning devolved on the representatives on mission.<sup>41</sup>

Albitte and his colleagues regarded the grain supplies situation as very serious. In his report on conditions in Marseilles in early September, Albitte pointed out that commerce had ground to a halt and that famine was threatening.<sup>42</sup> In mid-September there was only a ten days' supply of grain left in Marseilles, and Albitte dispatched Pomme l'Américain to Arles to procure grain.<sup>43</sup>

Thus, from mid-September there were two groups of representatives responsible for feeding Marseilles: Ricord and Robespierre Jr. added the responsibility of supplying Marseilles to their job of supplying the Army of Italy, chiefly from abroad, especially Italy; and Pomme l'Américain joined Servièrre and Charbonnière in procuring inland grain. That these groups of representatives were on the whole successful is borne out by the fact that the revolutionary armies of Marseilles remained political forces and did not need to become urban sans-culotte units roaming the countryside and forcing the farmers of the surrounding region to give up their grain in order to feed the cities; the latter being the principal function of revolutionary armies in all parts of France except for the Mediterranean coast.<sup>44</sup>

Ironically, the success of the national representatives in feeding Marseilles increased the political power of the Marseilles administrative bodies. In the first place, since the Marseilles bataillon des sans-culottes was not required as a food requisitioning force outside Marseilles, it remained a municipal army under the control of local authorities. Secondly, Pomme, Servièrre and Charbonnière, away on grain requisitioning missions, spent too little time in Marseilles to influence strongly local political affairs.

On September 29, Pomme and Charbonnier declared Marseilles to be in a state of war. This declaration was an economic and not a political measure, and conferred a favoured status on Marseilles, similar to that of Paris, for it implied that because of its size and strategic importance, supplying the Mediterranean city with food had become a national responsibility.<sup>45</sup> Although the Marseilles bureau de subsistance survived, it was renamed the bureau de liquidation et repartition and became directly responsible to the representatives rather than to the municipality.<sup>46</sup>



Food transportation and distribution were the principal problems in provisioning the southeast, but a major related problem was that of payment for provisions. While the economic measures of September temporarily halted the inflationary cycle inside France, the value of the assignat continued to drop abroad,<sup>47</sup> and this had an important effect on the problem of provisioning the southeast. Ricord, responsible for overseeing wheat purchased in Italy, reported that in Nice the value of the assignat had dropped to 15% of its nominal value, and in Genoa the assignat was virtually WORTHLESS.<sup>48</sup> Robespierre Jr. and Ricord considered the maximum to be unenforceable; they openly admitted to the Committee of Public Safety that in order to buy provisions and avoid the danger of famine they had been forced to pay in numéraire (metallic currency) at prices above those set by the maximum.<sup>49</sup>

One result of shared and often conflicting responsibilities for provisioning in a situation of food and fund shortages was continual bickering among the representatives on mission. For example, in Nice, Ricord complained of the unjustified demands for metallic currency which the representatives in Marseilles were making on the coffers of the Army of Italy,<sup>50</sup> and in Marseilles, Pomme and Charbonnier complained that large quantities of grain which they had requisitioned in Languedoc were halted and derouted to the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees.<sup>51</sup> The examples could be multiplied, but even the above two demonstrate the reservoir of bad feeling among the representatives on mission which the provisioning problem was creating.

## VI

Incessant disagreements among representatives on mission formed a

major aspect of the southeastern region's political and administrative history in the period between the reconquest of Marseilles from the federalists and the reconquest of Toulon from the British. Competition for provisions was an important cause of disagreement, but there were other, equally important reasons for the degeneration of personal relationships between the representatives.

The first of these was the fact that the national representatives' competence was too broadly defined, without the specifications necessary for a well-functioning bureaucracy. Theoretically representatives on mission were sent to specific geographic regions or armies, and in the area of their jurisdiction possessed supreme powers. But in the confusion of civil war and foreign invasion many representatives were displaced from their specified area of jurisdiction and began to exercise their unlimited authority in competition with other representatives. On the one hand, the availability of able men with unlimited authority, who were in contact with Paris, but who could act quickly and decisively in trouble spots, without needing to wait for the permission and directions of the central government, gave the Republic a great advantage over its enemies. Yet on the other hand, such a system contained the danger of the rise of centrifugal political tendencies, generated by the too independent behaviour of representatives with unlimited powers, and the possibility of administrative chaos because of personal differences and disagreements among representatives on mission.

An important aspect of this problem was that representatives who did not have a specific mission -- for some time Fréron belonged in this category -- and representatives in an area different than that to which they were assigned -- Saliceti, for example -- attempted to bolster their position by an appearance of zealotry in the execution of their duties, and the continual criticism of their colleagues.

Only following the law of Frimaire 14 (December 4) which defined in detail the operational structure of the provisional revolutionary government, was the Committee of Public Safety able to exercise effective control over the representatives on mission, reduce their number, and forbid them to operate outside their specified area of jurisdiction.

A second reason for personal enmity among the representatives was that in September and October 1793 there were still some representatives on mission who were responsible to the Executive Council rather than the Committee of Public Safety; Charbonnier was one of these. Despite the decree of October 10, which officially placed the Executive Council under the control of the Committee of Public Safety, these representatives often refused to confide in their colleagues who were under the direct control of the Committee of Public Safety. Only on Frimaire 5 (November 22) were all representatives finally placed under the direct supervision of the Committee of Public Safety.<sup>52</sup>

The documents at my disposal, chiefly reports and letters to Paris of the national representatives in the southeast, give only an inadequate idea of the relationships between the representatives on mission. In them, the representatives were reluctant to mount open attacks on each other, since these could easily recoil against the attacker. Thus there was probably a greater feeling of enmity among certain representatives than is indicated by their letters and reports. There are two exceptions to this generalization. First, against Charbonnier there was a general chorus of condemnation; it was obvious that with the loss of power of the Executive Council, he was vulnerable to attack, and his unwillingness to cooperate, and the cloak of secrecy with which he surrounded himself, aroused the suspicions of his colleagues. Secondly, Fréron put all the force of his volatile penmanship, and self-centered personality into attacks

against colleagues.

Already in early October, only a few days after Charbonnier's arrival in Marseilles, Pomme complained that the administrators attached to Charbonnier's mission were suspect.<sup>53</sup> A few days later Gasparin and Escudier reported that Charbonnier refused to communicate to them the purpose of his mission.<sup>54</sup> On October 17, Saliceti and Gasparin accused Charbonnier of counterrevolutionary activity.<sup>55</sup> Charbonnier was recalled to Paris on November 2, under pain of arrest, but was able to clear himself of the charges of counterrevolution, and survived the period of the Terror.<sup>56</sup>

In late October Saliceti and Gasparin criticized all of the representatives on mission in Marseilles:

Nous avons à Marseille cinq de nos collègues: Pomme et Servièrre, . . . Barras et Fréron . . . et Charbonnier. . . Il paraît, . . . qu'ils ne délibèrent ensemble, qu'il y a souvent de la contradiction qui leur donnant un air de mésintelligence, produit le plus mauvais effect pour la Convention nationale et peut servir d'aliment à l'intrigue dans un pays où elle est très active. . . <sup>57</sup>

The contested leadership of the Army of the Var was a major cause of contention between Fréron and the trio of Ricord, Robespierre Jr. and Saliceti. Fréron strongly supported general La Poype, his brother-in-law, for this post and originally it appeared that he might be successful, since Saliceti, Ricord and Robespierre Jr. considered Carteaux to be conducting the siege of Toulon incompetently.<sup>58</sup> However, as Saliceti states, Carteaux had the confidence of the troops and La Poype did not; furthermore, there was doubt about La Poype's trustworthiness, since his wife and child were being held as hostages inside Toulon.<sup>59</sup> The issue temporarily subsided when Doppet was chosen to replace Carteaux as commander-in-chief of the Army of the Var. But this choice pleased no one; in early November Ricord journeyed to Paris where he persuaded the Committee

of Public Safety to choose Dugommier, who was an "homme d'une réputation militaire"<sup>60</sup> as the new head of the Army of the Var. While Ricord was in Paris, Hébert denounced Fréron at the Jacobin Club as a muscadin and an aristocrate; Hébert further accused Fréron of nepotistically wishing to hand the Republic's armies to aristocrats like La Poype.<sup>61</sup> Fréron replied with a flow of bitter denunciations against his colleagues in letters and reports, calling them intriguers, incompetents and nepotists.<sup>62</sup>

Another target of Fréron's denunciations was Albitte, whom he accused of having lost in late August the opportunities to radically punish the Marseilles rebels and rapidly to reconquer Toulon.<sup>63</sup>

Thus it is clear that relationships between the representatives on mission in the southeast were at best tense, and often deteriorated into open enmity. But what effect did this have on developments in Marseilles? In the latter half of the autumn of 1793, Barras and Fréron, especially the latter, were the chief national representatives in Marseilles. Fréron, whose mission in the southeast was not legitimized for two months during the summer, obviously felt insecure, especially following Hébert's powerful attack against him. The strict punishment meted out to reconquered Lyons in October convinced Barras and Fréron that terrorism was now the official policy of the central government, and their strong stand against Marseilles' local authorities in December was partly prompted by Barras' and Fréron's desire to prove themselves to be better patriots than their rivals, and to demonstrate that suspicions against themselves were groundless.\*

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\* While Barras and Fréron believed in a policy of Terror in early December 1793, they were not yet entirely sure of themselves. For further treatment of this topic, see Chapter VI, pp. 160.

## VII

The personalities of Barras and Fréron played an important role in the conflict which erupted in early December 1793 between these two representatives on mission and the local administrators of Marseilles.

Paul Barras stemmed from an old, rural aristocratic family of Provence. He obtained considerable military experience overseas, principally in India, and in the period immediately preceding the Revolution he frequented the fashionable salon society of Paris and the royal court at Versailles. At the beginning of the Revolution he retired from public life, but quickly recognized that if he espoused revolutionary principles the road to political success would not necessarily be barred to him. He resurfaced in 1791 as a member of the National Assembly for Var, and in 1792 he was elected to the National Convention. Probably to compensate for his aristocratic past and because he had good political instincts and recognized the winning side, Barras became a member of the Mountain, voting for the execution of Louis XVI and against the "appeal to the people".<sup>64</sup>

In March 1793 Barras and Fréron were sent on a recruiting mission to the departments of Basses-Alpes and Hautes-Alpes, and in July 1793 Barras was appointed representative to the Army of Italy. He was well acquainted with rural Provence and in the autumn of 1793 was the representative chiefly responsible for the purge of federalists and other counter-revolutionaries in the smaller communities of Provence's hinterland. With Fréron he returned to Paris in February 1794, and in July took part in the conspiracy against Robespierre and became a leader of the Thermidorian reaction.

In the gay social life which flourished in the capital during the Thermidorian period -- despite the terrifying deprivation of the poor -- Barras was in his element: he was involved in large-scale embezzlement, in bribery, in amorous intrigue. Although eclipsed during the Napoleonic period, he ended his life in luxury, living on a pension from the restored Bourbons, his salon one of the centres of social life in restoration Paris. Thus Barras' life was a long (he was over 80 years old when he died) search for fame, political position, and the luxurious life of Paris high society; he appeared to have no principles or scruples and used any methods to attain these goals.

Stanislas Fréron was an easily excitable man.<sup>65</sup> He was the son of the editor of the l'Année littéraire, who was an important literary figure of the eighteenth century. Fréron was educated at the collège Louis-le-Grand where the elder Robespierre and Camille Desmoulins were among his classmates. Before the Revolution, Fréron lived the dissolute life of Paris salon society; he was known for his love of women and gambling, and acquired considerable debts. His excitable nature found its element in the upheavals of the revolutionary period. Fréron participated in the storming of the Bastille with his brother-in-law the ex-marquis La Poype. He entered politics in 1789 as an elector for the Third Estate of his district in Paris, and drew attention to himself at the electoral assembly's meetings through the extreme violence of his rhetoric, a characteristic which he preserved for the rest of his life. In 1790 Fréron founded the l'Orateur du Peuple, a popular propaganda sheet modelled on Marat's l'Ami du Peuple, which he edited in collaboration with La Poype. With the l'Orateur du Peuple he became one of the most important propagandists of the Revolution. Camille Desmoulins ranked him in the same category with Marat, writing that "vous [Marat and Fréron] êtes notre comité des recherches et les dénonciateurs par

excellence."<sup>66</sup> When Marat publicized a list of the heroes of the Revolution, of "neuf vrais apôtres de la liberté", Fréron's name appeared on this list, alongside Danton and Robespierre.<sup>67</sup>

In the spring of 1793 Fréron was sent on a recruiting mission to the departments of Basses-Alpes and Hautes-Alpes with Paul Barras. Unlike Barras, he was not well acquainted with Provence; and while Barras's mission was renewed in mid-summer 1793, Fréron's mission was not renewed until mid-September and he moved in an official limbo for some two months. These factors -- together with his bad relations with his colleagues and Hébert's attack (dealt with in the previous section) -- occasioned a feeling of insecurity in Fréron which contributed to sharpening his rhetoric against counterrevolution and Marseilles' local administrators.

Fréron took part in the conspiracy against Robespierre, and during the Thermidorian Reaction resumed the publication of the l'Orateur du Peuple. The same virulent journalism which Fréron had used to agitate the people for the Revolution was now put in the service of the reaction. Fréron also organized the so-called jeunesse dorée (gilded youth) of Paris, white terroristgangs who hunted "terrorists" and terrified the sans-culottes. Fréron's political talents never equalled his journalistic and propaganda talents; during the Directory he fell into obscurity and died in 1799. Thus Fréron was an unscrupulous and self-centered opportunist, to whom the turbulence of the revolutionary period provided the opportunity to attempt to gain the position to which he believed his literary talents entitled him.

Even though Barras is generally regarded as the more important of the two representatives, Fréron probably played the greater role in Marseilles in the autumn of 1793. This is borne out by the fact that the majority of the reports and letters from Marseilles were written by Fréron. It may be argued that this only indicates that Fréron was the more literarily inclined



of the two, which is indeed true; however, the fact that Barras was absent from Marseilles for extended periods from early October until early December 1793, while Fréron remained in Marseilles continuously during this period, argues for Fréron's importance in Marseilles affairs.<sup>68</sup>

During the month of October relations between local authorities in Marseilles, the Congress of Popular Societies of the Midi, and Barras and Fréron were cordial. This is demonstrated by an address, which Alexandre Ricord, procureur général syndic of the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône and editor of the Journal républicain de Marseilles, presented to the Paris Jacobin Club on Brumaire 6 (October 27) on behalf of the Congress of Popular Societies of the Midi. In this address Ricord referred to Barras and Fréron as the only representatives in the Midi "qui sont à la hauteur des principes et agissent révolutionnairement."<sup>69</sup> Presumably the revolutionary activity of Barras and Fréron which impressed the Congress was their -- especially Barras's -- vigorous purification of rural communities in Provence's hinterland.

However, in a number of ways Barras and Fréron were slowly discrediting themselves in the eyes of the local authorities of Marseilles in the fall of 1793. The bickering and lack of trust among various groups of representatives on mission in Marseilles served to lower the prestige of the national representation in general. Also, Barras and Fréron installed themselves at the luxurious Hôtel Borély and lived in high style; parties, often degenerating into orgies, were a common occurrence.<sup>70</sup> Naturally enough, the ostentation of the representatives, financed from the coffers of the nation, aroused the ire of the Marseilles Jacobins. To be sure, there were a number of Marseilles Jacobin administrators whose relations with the representatives were friendly enough to extend to the social life of the Borély mansion. Among these were Alexander Ricord, Granet Jr. and Gérin, all of them departmental administrators.<sup>71</sup> That Fréron's and Barras's

local support came from the departmental administration was to prove important in the show-off between the local authorities and the representatives.

## VIII

The original impulse for the quarrel between the national representation in Marseilles and the local authorities came from Paris. As Cobb observes, the period preceding the Law of Frimaire 14 (December 4), the law which laid down the administrative structure of the revolutionary government, was characterized by administrative anarchy. The great, spontaneous popular revolutionary initiatives which characterized the early Terror, such as the revolutionary armies, the sans-culotte sectional institutions, dechristianization, and the congresses of popular societies, all had their origins in this period. But these scattered popular initiatives, like locally controlled administrative institutions, even when they were in Jacobin hands, "tendent à la décentralisation, à une sorte de 'fédéralisme' populaire et à la naissance d'un contre-pouvoir qui risque d'échapper à la Convention et à ses comités."<sup>72</sup>

This danger was recognized early by certain representatives in the southeast. On October 27 Saliceti and Gasparin reported to the Committee of Public Safety that the Marseilles Congress of Popular Societies had sent commissaires to the Army of Var, who conducted propaganda among the soldiers; the representatives admitted that these commissaires had conducted themselves well, but asked the Committee uneasily whether this kind of activity might not be inconvenient, viz., a breach against national authority.<sup>73</sup> At about the same time the delegation from the Marseilles Congress of Popular Societies dared openly to criticize the activities of the Paris Revolutionary Tribunal.<sup>74</sup>

The Committee of Public Safety responded rapidly to these attacks against national authority. On November 4 the Committee decreed the establishment of a national garrison in Marseilles under the command of La Poype, and ordered that the representatives on mission, with the aid of this garrison "empêcheront que l'aristocratie, même sous le voile de Sociétés populaires, n'usurpe l'autorité nationale. . . ." (emphasis mine).<sup>75</sup>

In a report written on Frimaire 22 (December 12), Fréron claimed that the Marseilles Congress of Popular Societies had given him and Barras many worries, even before the Committee of Public Safety's order, because it exercised autonomous power in Marseilles and because its commissaires overran the surrounding departments and hindered military operations.<sup>76</sup> However, Fréron did not act against the Congress until after the receipt of the Committee's order.

Immediately upon receiving the order from Paris, Fréron dissolved the Marseilles Congress of Popular Societies. He took this step on November 19 (Brumaire 29) without the co-consent of Barras, who was absent at the time.<sup>77</sup> Although Fréron stated that the leaders of the Marseilles Popular Society spoke out against the dissolution, in fact, the Congress was dissolved peacefully. One need not seek far for the causes of this lack of opposition. The members of the Congress were mostly outsiders brought to Marseilles by the temporary need occasioned by the siege of Toulon, and had no lasting commitment to their gathering. The Congress possessed no powerful armed force, for its Légion de la Montagne had been incorporated into the Army of the Var. The Marseilles Jacobins, although conscious of the threat which the dissolution of the Congress presented to their own power, were not willing to oppose national authority over the fate of outsiders. And last, but by no means least, Fréron and Barras, on the latter's return to Marseilles, distributed one-hundred thousand livres among the deputies

to the Congress in order to "renvoyer ces bons citoyens chez eux", and this large sum undoubtedly helped many deputies to decide in favour of leaving Marseilles.<sup>78</sup>

Relations between Barras and Fréron and the local authorities continued to deteriorate. In early November the two representatives had Marseilles churches, châteaux, stores and warehouses stripped of copper and iron to supply the Toulon army; they had the tombs of the Counts and Countesses of Provence opened and their ashes removed to a public cemetery, an act which must have insulted the particularistic sentiments of considerable segments of the population; and they required 20,000 "rich citizens" of Marseilles to contribute two shirts each for the Army of Italy.<sup>79</sup> If we consider that Marseilles' population hovered around the 100,000 mark, it is easy to see that this last special requisition must have been levied not only against rich citizens, but against virtually the entire population of the town (arbitrarily but plausibly estimating the size of an average Marseilles family to have been five members), and must have aroused considerable resentment.<sup>80</sup>

A confrontation between Barras and Fréron and the local authorities of Marseilles erupted in early December. I possess three versions of this event: the first is contained in a letter by Barras to Moyse Bayle,<sup>81</sup> the second in a report by Ricord,<sup>82</sup> and the third in a report by Fréron.<sup>83</sup> The first two present rather vague outlines of the event, while Fréron's report presents a more detailed version; since there is no essential disagreement between the three accounts, I will take Fréron's report as the basis of my discussion.

The confrontation followed the representatives' decree of Frimaire 13 (December 3), which placed Marseilles in a state of siege (quite a different proposition from the state of war decree of September 29); and ordered :

the Marseilles bataillon des sans-culottes to leave immediately for the siege of Toulon. Fréron argued that this order was promulgated in answer to the insolence of Marseilles' local bodies, which were arbitrarily exercising their authority. According to Fréron, the Revolutionary Tribunal had prosecuted the misguided poor rather than the rich négociants, and the Popular Society in connivance with the Vigilance Committee was planning a prison massacre, which had been averted only at the last moment by the state of siège order. Fréron claimed that the state of siège decree was legal since it was in accordance with orders from the Committee of Public Safety.

The response of the Marseilles Jacobins to the "state of siege" was rapid. Among the common people a general feeling of fear was aroused; rumours circulated that the "state of siege" meant that Marseilles would be besieged. In an explosive session during the night of December 3 to 4 (Frimaire 13 to 14), the Marseilles Popular Society, under the leadership of Maillet Jr., declared itself to be sitting in permanence and ordered the temporary military commander, Montmeau, who had promulgated the state of siege order in the representatives' name, to account for this action. The Marseilles municipality rallied to the Popular Society and formerly countermanded the representatives' order to have the bataillon des sans-culottes leave for Toulon.

In this dangerous situation the national representatives were able to save their position by quick, determined action. They immediately declared the Marseilles municipality and Vigilance Committee dissolved and the Popular Society closed. At the same time, they ordered the bataillon des sans-culottes to leave the city immediately and commanded two army units from outside Marseilles to march into the city. In the face of these decisive acts, the municipality retreated, and by December 4 (Frimaire 14) the representatives on mission appeared to be in control of

the city. Barras's and Fréron's good relations with the departmental authorities contributed in no small measure to the representatives' victory, for the Marseilles bataillon des sans-culottes was under the immediate control of the department, leaving the Marseilles Jacobins without an armed force to support their coup against the national representation.

How justified were the charges against the local authorities of Marseilles on which Barras's and Fréron's drastic state of siege order was based? The most serious charge of a projected prison massacre appears to be entirely unfounded. In the first place, the activity from late August until early December of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal was generally fair and rational; it is highly improbable that it would have agreed to any such bloodthirsty plan, and its connivance would have been necessary, as its leadership largely overlapped with that of the Popular Society. Secondly, Fréron's charge that the Revolutionary Tribunal let négociants off while prosecuting the poor is contradicted by our findings: the largest group of the Revolutionary Tribunal's victims came from the commercial bourgeoisie. Lastly, and perhaps most convincingly, in February 1794 the Paris Revolutionary Tribunal cleared Maillet Jr. and Giraud of all charges which Barras and Fréron had raised against them.<sup>84</sup>

That Barras and Fréron were acting on instructions from the Committee of Public Safety is not supported by convincing factual evidence either. The only instruction to which Fréron could have been referring was the Committee's order of November 4. On the one hand, half of this order had been carried out already, since the Marseilles Congress of Popular Societies had been dissolved without undue difficulties. On the other hand, Barras and Fréron themselves failed to carry out the second half of this order, since they did not yet establish La Poype as military commander of Marseilles and their state of siege decree had to be carried out by the

temporary commander Montmeau.

The real motivation for Barras's and Fréron's actions is revealed in their vehement denunciation of the insolent Marseilles authorities. The representatives' order to remove the bataillon des sans-culottes from Marseilles and to place the city in a state of siege was taken in order to destroy the municipal power base of the Marseilles Jacobins' and to impose the representatives' authority, which Barras and Fréron saw as representing the power of the central government. The very text of the state of siege decree provides proof of this assertion:

à Marseille on élève sans cesse une lutte criminelle  
des volontés particulières contre la volonté générale.  
On ne veut voir que Marseilles dans toute la république.<sup>85</sup>

But in fact the representatives' orders of December 3 were taken arbitrarily, on their own responsibility and without the approval of the central government. Ironically, through their actions Barras and Fréron opposed the most fundamental principle of the revolutionary government of 1793-94, since they helped to promote administrative disorder, the very thing which the Committee of Public Safety wished to avoid at all costs. In effect the confrontation between Barras and Fréron and the Marseilles Jacobins represented an attempt by the national representatives to extend their personal authority -- but not in any real sense the power of the central government -- at the expense of locally based political authority.

## IX

Now the major trends of this chapter should be drawn together in order to outline the chief characteristics of the early period of the Terror in Marseilles in the autumn of 1793.

Following the defeat of federalism the Marseilles Jacobins assumed sole responsibility for local government. They were able to do this because the right-wing of the Marseilles political spectrum was completely destroyed through its federalist sympathies and subsequent defeat by Carteaux's army: because the representatives on mission were too preoccupied with other problems -- the English occupation of Toulon and the procurement of supplies -- to concern themselves seriously with Marseilles municipal politics; and because the Marseilles sans-culottes after their brief and energetic flare-up during the last days of the federalist period, were easily brought under the control of the local Jacobin leadership and during the autumn of 1793 showed no capacity for independent action.

It is well-known that in France as a whole the autumn of 1793 was the great period of independent sans-culotte initiatives. Yet the Marseilles sans-culottes, who had proved their capacity for vigorous independent action only recently, were quiescent during this period. Unlike other parts of France, Marseilles had relatively plentiful food and work, so there was no need for sans-culotte armies to scour the countryside for a livelihood. The bataillon des sans-culottes of Marseilles remained inside the city and was turned into a municipal police force under local Jacobin control.

What of the sans-culotte Congress of Popular Societies of the Midi? Although this began as a genuinely independent body, in Marseilles it fell under the control of the Jacobins of the Marseilles Popular Society and showed its basic weakness when it did not dare to oppose its own dissolution by Barras and Fréron.

Highly localized Jacobin control over Marseilles' internal affairs, including the administration of revolutionary justice, was the single most outstanding characteristic of the early Terror in Marseilles. On the whole,



the local Jacobin administration was successful: unlike in the winter of 1792-93 and the spring of 1793, the city was relatively peaceful, and revolutionary justice was executed swiftly but fairly by the Criminal Tribunal of the Bouches-du-Rhône, now renamed the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal, against enemies of the revolutionary régime, the majority of whom were members of the Marseilles bourgeoisie.

However, certain major aspects of government passed out of local hands immediately upon the reconquest of Marseilles by Carteaux's army. The two most important of these were control over military operations and over the procurement of food supplies. Both became the responsibility of the representatives on mission, members of the National Convention who represented the power of the central government in the provinces and were usually under the direct control of the Committee of Public Safety. The local authorities of Marseilles were willing to restrict their power to the city and gladly left the difficult problem of food provisioning in the hands of the representatives, while the latter were too occupied with the pressing military and economic needs of the southeastern region to concern themselves with the Marseilles' municipal administration. Thus, in September and October 1793, a good working arrangement existed between the two centres of authority in Marseilles.

But in November and December the representatives Barras and Fréron attacked the Jacobin administrators of Marseilles. This attack was an attempt by the two representatives to extend their personal power over the city of Marseilles, probably motivated in large measure by personal ambition, and by a desire to prove themselves to be good revolutionaries by applying their interpretation of the central government's policy in Marseilles. They attempted to rationalize their actions as the execution of the central government's new policy against centrifugal localist tendencies in the

provinces. But Barras and Fréron acted in a direction diametrically opposed to the Committee of Public Safety's policy, whose rationale was to increase administrative efficiency and thereby facilitate the conduct of the war, and which therefore only wished to destroy those local institutions which tended to augment the dangerous tendency to administrative anarchy. In fact, the local Jacobin administration of Marseilles was functioning in a relatively stable manner, and Barras and Fréron created disorganization through their attack upon it. Thus the first stage of the period of the Terror in Marseilles reached a climax over the question of political authority, when two national representatives launched a wholesale attack against the local Jacobin leadership without official sanction.

## NOTES FOR CHAPTER V.

1. Cobb, The Police and the People, p. XVI.
2. AULARD, VI, p. 112.
3. Donald Greer, The Incidence of the Emigration during the French Revolution. Cambridge, Harvard, 1951, p. 53 & AULARD, VII, p. 535.
4. Buchez & Roux, op. cit., v. 28, pp. 494-497 & AULARD, V, p. 488, AULARD, VI, pp. 157-158, p. 268, p. 326, p. 329, AULARD, VII, p. 373 & B&F, pp. 13-14.
5. Buchez & Roux, op. cit., v. 28, pp. 494-497.
6. AULARD, VI, p. 457.
7. MICHON, I, pp. 183-184.
8. P. Gaffarel, "La Terreur à Marseilles". Annales de Provence. 1913, X, p. 160.
9. I gathered the information on the membership of the reconstituted administrative bodies of Marseilles and on the Marseilles Popular Society from various sources. I deduced the relative importance of leading political individuals by how often their names are mentioned by the representatives on mission; see B&F, pp. 70-71, RICORD, II, p. 7, AULARD, VI, p. 144.
10. AULARD, VI, p. 180.
11. MONITEUR, XVII, p. 640.
12. Ibid., XVII, p. 544.
13. AULARD, VI, p. 458.
14. MONITEUR, XVII, p. 573.
15. AULARD, VI, pp. 158-161.
16. MONITEUR, XVII, p. 573.
17. Ibid., XVII, p. 574.
18. RICORD, I, pp. 2-3.
19. B&F, pp. 11-12.
20. MONITEUR, XVII, p. 655.

21. AULARD, VI, p. 477, AULARD, VII, pp. 79-81 & pp. 392-393. RICORD, I, pp. 2-7.
22. AULARD, VII, p. 263, p. 512, AULARD, VIII, p. 160.
23. Donald Greer, The Incidence of the Terror during the French Revolution. Cambridge, Harvard, 1935, p. 137, p. 170 & Gaffarel, op. cit. passim. Donald Greer, obtaining his information on the Bouches-du-Rhône exclusively from Berriat St. Prix's work on revolutionary justice, refers to the Criminal Tribunal as the Revolutionary Tribunal of Marseilles; Gaffarel also refers to it as the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal. While this practice is contemporary and generally accepted, it is somewhat misleading for it tends to obscure the essential continuity between the pre-federalist Criminal Tribunal and the post-federalist Revolutionary Tribunal. As I have previously pointed out, the Criminal Tribunal retained its pre-federalist membership unchanged following Carteaux's victory. Henceforth I will also use the appellation Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal, but I wish to stress that the title Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal during the Terror and the title Criminal Tribunal of the Bouches-du-Rhône in the pre-federalist era were different names in different periods for the same institution.
24. Greer, The Incidence of the Terror. . . , p. 22.
25. Ibid., p. 137.
26. Gaffarel, op. cit., passim.
27. Ibid., passim.
28. AULARD, VI, p. 551.
29. Richard Cobb, "Les armées révolutionnaires des départements du Midi" Cahier No. 1 de l'Association Marc Bloch de Toulouse, Toulouse, 1955, p. 71, f.n. 25.
30. Ibid., p. 71, f.n. 32.
31. Ibid., pp. 71-72 & p. 72, f.n. 39.
32. Cobb, Les armées révolutionnaires, Instruments, V. I, p. 52 & MONITEUR, 17, pp. 203-204.
33. Cobb, Les armées révolutionnaires, Instruments, V. I, pp. 52-53 & Cobb, "Les armées révolutionnaires. . . du Midi", p. 11.
34. Cobb, "Les armées révolutionnaires. . . du Midi". pp. 66-67 & Cobb, Les armées révolutionnaires, Instruments. . . , V. I, p. 52, p. 55, f.n. 84.
35. B&F, p. 67.
36. MONITEUR, XVIII, pp. 384-385.
37. Cobb, Les armées révolutionnaires, Instruments. . . V. II, p. 428.

38. Carrière, op. cit., p. 177-179.
39. Ibid., pp. 168-172.
40. Ibid., p. 168, f.n. 2.
41. Ibid., p. 173. Of course, the central government assumed control over foreign commerce in the course of the autumn of 1793. But it is interesting to observe that the representatives of Marseilles high commerce relinquished their official hold over foreign trades voluntarily in return for regular food supplies.
42. AULARD, VI, p. 457.
43. Ibid., VI, p. 531.
44. Cobb, Les armées révolutionnaires. Instrument . . . , passim, see especially V. II, pp. 428-429. Cobb, "Les armées révolutionnaires. . . du Midi". pp. 14-15.
45. AULARD, VII, p. 128 & Cobb, Les armées révolutionnaires. Instrument . . . , V. II, p. 426.
46. Carrière, op. cit., p. 174.
47. S.E. Harris, The Assignats, Cambridge, Harvard, 1930, p. 124.
48. RICORD, I, p.5.
49. MICHON, II, p. 58.
50. RICORD, I, p. 18.
51. AULARD, VII, p. 316.
52. AULARD, VIII, pp. 690-691.
53. Ibid., VII, pp. 272-273.
54. Ibid., VII, p. 479.
55. Ibid., VII, p. 479.
56. Ibid., VIII, pp. 175-176.
57. Ibid., VII, pp. 73-74.
58. B&F, p. 41; AULARD, VII, pp. 79-81, pp. 392-292; AULARD, VIII, p. 195.
59. AULARD, VIII, p. 406-35
60. MONITEUR, XVIII, p. 335.
61. Ibid., XVIII, p. 335.
62. See for example B&F, pp. 107-110.

63. B&F, p. 47, AULARD, VII, p. 533.
64. The description of Barras's life and character is based on Jacques Vivent, Barras, le "roi" de la République, Paris, Hachette, 1938; A. Kuscinski, Dictionnaire des conventionnels, Paris, 1919, pp. 29-32; Memoirs of Barras (4 vols.), ed. George Duruy, London, Osgood & McIlvaine, 1895.
65. The description of Fréron's life and character is based on Raoul Arnaud, Le fils de Fréron, Paris, Perrin, 1909; A. Kuscinski, op. cit., pp. 150-152, 273-274.
66. ARNAUD, op. cit., p. 113.
67. Ibid., p. 179.
68. B&F, pp. 17-23.
69. MONITEUR, 18, p. 288.
70. Gaffarel, op. cit., p. 175.
71. B&F, p. 70.
72. Cobb, Les armées révolutionnaires. Instrument . . ., V. I, p. 3.
73. AULARD, VIII, pp. 72-73.
74. MONITEUR, XVIII, pp. 287-288.
75. AULARD, VIII, p. 222.
76. B&F, pp. 66-67.
77. Ibid., p. 67.
78. Ibid., p. 52.
79. MONITEUR, XVIII, p. 384-385.
80. The levy of the shirts, like other overambitious patriotic projects of this period, was probably not carried out in full; the logistic difficulties associated with it appear to be too great. Nevertheless, the representatives' order probably did arouse strong resentment.
81. B&F, pp. 55-57.
82. RICORD, II, pp. 4-8.
83. B&F, pp. 66-81.
84. MONITEUR, XIX, p. 588.
85. Ibid., XVIII, p. 588.

CHAPTER VI - An Ill-Conceived Effort to Apply the Central Government's Policy of Centralization: Barras's and Fréron's Attempt to Dislodge the Marseilles Jacobins from Power and to Replace the Locally Directed Terror with Terror Applied by Outsiders.

I

This chapter will trace the history of Marseilles from early December 1793 until early February 1794 -- a period crucial to an understanding of the Terror in Marseilles. During it, the representatives on mission, Barras and Fréron, attempted in a spectacular manner to repress localist tendencies in the Mediterranean city. Barras and Fréron failed, and it is important to note that their failure was to a large extent occasioned by the central government's opposition to their actions. This finding has important implications for a general understanding of the Terror, for it shows that during the winter of 1793-94 terrorist activity by representatives of the central government was approved by Paris only when it served the larger goal of establishing a well-functioning, centralized administration. When, as in the case of Marseilles, terrorist activity appeared to encourage national disintegration, it was censured by the central government.

The Great Terror, at least until mid-spring 1794, was a tool of national integration and as such varied from region to region and locality to locality as varying conditions demanded different methods to achieve it.

II

The promulgation of the Law of Frimaire 14, which established the administrative structure of revolutionary government (revolutionary

government referring to the period of domination by the Committees of Public Safety and General Security in 1793-94) in a more or less final form, exactly coincided in time with the initial attack by Barras and Fréron against the local administrative bodies of Marseilles. The Law of Frimaire 14 is one of the most important documents of the French Revolution and many historians have analysed it; nonetheless, to place the period following early December in Marseilles into a national context, we will highlight briefly the Law of Frimaire 14's salient points.<sup>1</sup>

In essence the new law intended to ensure the rapid and uniform application of the revolutionary government's decrees throughout the Republic. To this end it redefined the functions of the constituted administrative bodies, attempted to establish an efficient communication system between them and the central government, to eliminate arbitrary action at all levels of government, and to dissolve all political or semi-political bodies, such as congresses of popular societies or revolutionary armies which functioned outside the administrative framework without express permission of the central government.

In particular, the powers of the departmental administrations and municipalities were curtailed, and the district administrative bodies which had few powers were given wide-ranging powers. The districts became responsible for revolutionary surveillance, viz., for seeing that the laws and decrees of the revolutionary government were carried out at the provincial level, and the previously obscure procureurs-syndics of the districts were transformed into national agents (agents nationaux) who thus became potentially the most powerful provincially-based political dignitaries. (Although national agents were also attached to the municipalities, they were subordinate to the district national agents.)

As deputies of the National Convention, the representatives on mission



stood above all locally-based political authority and thus remained the most powerful agents of the central government in the provinces. In view of the confusion which the representatives' badly defined powers and responsibilities had caused in the departments during the autumn of 1793, they were warned to conform strictly to the orders of the Committee of Public Safety, and were ordered to restrict their activities to the immediate area of their responsibility, "à ne point sortir du cercle qui est déterminé quant objet de votre mission."<sup>2</sup> All representatives on mission and district national agents were ordered to report every ten days to the Committee of Public Safety, and lower echelon dignitaries were ordered to report regularly to their superiors.

The Law of Frimaire 14 was an impressive blueprint for an efficient centralized bureaucratic framework for France. Unfortunately many of its provisions were not carried out, and, given the conditions of 1793-94, could not be carried out. For example, as Cobb observes, the great volume of reports which was supposed to reach the Committee of Public Safety from the provinces never in fact did, and had it done so the already overworked Committee would have drowned in an overwhelming mass of paper which it did not have the facilities to digest.<sup>3</sup>

Even some of the best meant parts of the law misfired in particular cases. For example, the departmental administrations were stripped of their authority for the good reason that they were the most reactionary and royalist of the three constituted administrative bodies in the provinces. But in Marseilles, following the fall of federalism the departmental administrators were Jacobins, and in fact were the closest associates of the national representatives Barrar and Fréron. Reporting on the Marseilles showdown of early December 1793, Fréron observed that "le département. . . s'est parfaitement conduit et. . . nous a toujours entourés."<sup>4</sup> Thus in

Marseilles the administrative confusion resulting from the conflict between the locally and nationally delegated authorities did not disappear as a result of the Law of Frimaire 14, since the law did not specifically attack those local leaders -- in the Revolutionary Tribunal, the Popular Society, the municipality -- who were the national administrators' most dangerous opponents.

### III

Following the confrontation of December 3 and 4 between Barras and Fréron and the local Jacobin leadership of Marseilles, in particular the Marseilles Popular Society, the city remained peaceful and was not purged for another month. At first sight this appears surprising, since Barras and Fréron had forced the local authorities to back down and accept the siege decree, and further, had promised an immediate purge of the rebellious Marseilles leadership. But a number of circumstances account for Barras' and Fréron's delay.

In early December the drawn-out siege of Toulon finally reached the stage where the Republic's forces were ready for a decisive onslaught against the occupied city. Officially Barras's and Fréron's mission was with the Army of Italy besieging Toulon, and on December 7 the Committee of Public Safety emphatically ordered Barras to join the Toulon forces.<sup>5</sup> By December 10 Barras was with the Army of the Var and Fréron joined him a few days later.<sup>6</sup> From this time until early January 1794 Toulon claimed the lion's share of Barras's and Fréron's attention, and this in large part accounts for their delay in purging Marseilles.

Barras's and Fréron's cruel punishment of conquered Toulon is a well-known part of the Terror's historiography. Nevertheless, it is necessary

to highlight aspects of their terrorist activity in Toulon, as this allows their later actions in Marseilles to be seen in clearer perspective.<sup>7</sup>

From our point of view, the first important aspect of the reconquest of Toulon was the presence of five representatives -- Barras, Fréron, Ricord, Robespierre Jr. and Saliceti -- with the victorious republican army. This presented a renewed opportunity for rivalries between the representatives. The intensity which interpersonal rivalries reached is clearly documented in Fréron's shrill accusations to Paris against Ricord, Robespierre Jr. and Saliceti: Fréron claimed that the other three deputies intentionally underplayed his and Barras's role in the final battle for Toulon.<sup>8</sup> Rivalry between groups of representatives on mission implied that each group would attempt to prove its own patriotism by the severe punishment of the Toulon counterrevolutionaries. The opportunistic, ambitious Barras and Fréron took a leading role in the severe punishment of Toulon to demonstrate their own revolutionary zeal.

Virtually the entire federalist leadership of Toulon joined the refugees who left the port with the retreating Anglo-Spanish forces. The very inexact estimates of the number of refugees range from 7,500 to 20,000, in either case a significant percentage of Toulon's population.<sup>9</sup> As the republican troops were already in the outskirts of the city, conditions in Toulon harbour were terrible: the harbour was under steady republican fire and some 400 persons drowned in the panic which accompanied the embarkation into the retreating ships.<sup>10</sup> Besides the federalist leadership, most of the bourgeoisie and probably all people who had the material resources to leave and who had anything to fear from the republicans, left the city. As even Fréron observed: "Trogoff, Puissant, Chaussegros, Imbert et Cazales [the Toulon federalist leaders] ont été les premiers à fuir, . . . il ne reste plus qu'un vil tas d'obscurs

conspirateurs."<sup>11</sup>

Nonetheless, during the last weeks of December 1793 and in early January 1794 Barras and Fréron proceeded to punish Toulon's remaining population in a simple but effective manner: 260 sans-culottes who had been imprisoned by the English pointed out alleged counterrevolutionaries among the male population of the city; these were herded into the Champ de Mars, and were immediately shot.<sup>12</sup> Denunciations and mass shootings continued until early January, although they assumed a more legalized and organized form with the establishment of a Commission Militaire.<sup>13</sup> The punishment of Toulon was extremely severe and is comparable with only two other cases of revolutionary vengeance: the mass punishments of Lyons and the Vendée. A characteristic aspect of the treatment which Barras and Fréron meted out to Toulon was the arbitrary and rhetorically grandiose manner in which they attempted to brand Toulon as an enemy of the French nation by changing the city's name to Ville Infâme and Ville Plate (they alternated between the two designations) before the National Convention renamed Toulon as Port de la Montagne.<sup>14</sup>

The second factor which delayed Marseilles' purge was the comparative strength of the Marseilles Jacobin leadership. The Popular Society, the heart of the insurrection against the state of siege order, had 2,200 members (according to Fréron) and was thus too powerful to be attacked directly.<sup>15</sup> Also, immediately before its dissolution, the Marseilles municipality, in a brilliant propaganda move, managed to sway any possible support away from Barras and Fréron by lowering the price of bread from 5 sols to 4 sols per pound.<sup>16</sup>

Although Fréron names Isoard, Loys, Carle, Requier, Lamiscard, Berger and Giraud as the leaders of the local opposition, none of these individuals was immediately arrested.<sup>17</sup> Although Fréron repeatedly

accused Maillet Jr., the president of the Popular Society and of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal, of being the heart of the local opposition, he remained at large and the Revolutionary Tribunal remained functioning.<sup>18</sup> The Popular Society treated the members of the suppressed municipality as heroes, and the municipality continued its struggle against Barras and Fréron by despatching a special courier to the Committee of Public Safety to accuse the two representatives of improper action.<sup>19</sup> Thus, until early January 1794 the local Jacobins retained a reduced and precarious, but nevertheless considerable, authority in Marseilles.

A third factor which curbed Barras's and Fréron's "terrorism" in Marseilles in December 1793 was that they did not wish to be out of line with the central government's still undecided policy toward the Terror. Thus Fréron proudly reported that the December victory over the local authorities of Marseilles had been accomplished "sans tiraillement, sans attenter aux droits des citoyens de se rassembler."<sup>20</sup> It was not until early 1794 that the Committee of Public Safety with some reluctance adopted a policy of full-scale Terror.

The policy of full-scale Terror had been long in the making. Upon assuming power the Montagnards had hoped to retain the support of the urban sans-culottes and the poorer peasants, in addition to the countrywide support of the Jacobin movement. However, while the sans-culottes readily supported the Mountain as long as it was the vanguard of a revolutionary movement attempting to gain control of government, once in control of government the Mountain began to lose contact with the popular movement.

The drifting apart of sans-culottes and Montagnards was virtually inevitable, for while both supported revolutionary government, their

conceptions of its implementation were in fundamental opposition. The sans-culottes' political ideal of popular sovereignty resting in grass-roots assemblies necessarily tended to produce a fragmentation of political authority and thus diametrically to oppose the Montagnards goal of a unified republic ruled by a centralized government able to wage war successfully against both foreign and domestic forces.

For a time it appeared that the sans-culottes might be able to gain control of the revolutionary government. The Paris sans-culottes succeeded in placing Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois, two popular leaders, on the Committee of Public Safety, and Hébert, a political opportunist who claimed to represent the sans-culottes, even initiated a nearly successful drive to gain control of the Paris Jacobin Club.

The Mountain demonstrated that it was willing to pay a high price for sans-culotte support when it adopted the radical economic program advocated by the sans-culottes. But when sans-culotte pressure threatened both the political power of the Montagnard leadership and the political program of the Mountain, the two leading Committees were forced to react rapidly against the popular movement. Revolutionary armies, Congresses of popular societies, the section assemblies of the cities, viz. all sans-culotte institutions became suspect in the late autumn of 1793. At the same time the Mountain reacted against all other -- not necessarily sans-culotte -- centrifugal tendencies, such as overly independent representatives on mission and provincial political bodies. In opposing all these tendencies the Mountain was slowly creating a reservoir of ill-feeling against itself. Seeing that the Mountain was being forced to adopt a more moderate political stance in reaction to the popular movement, the Indulgents, led by Danton, began to agitate for a curbing of the Terror and for negotiating an end to the war. This type of agitation still had appeal for the Mountain

in late 1793, for the Terror still appeared to the Montagnard leadership as a policy forced upon the revolutionary government by radical outsiders. However, under the pressure of circumstances, such as the discrediting of the Dantonists due to corruption in their ranks, and Collot d'Herbois' impressive defence of terrorist policies at the Jacobin Club, the Comité de Public Safety slowly adopted a favourable attitude to the imposition of a policy of Terror. Maximilien Robespierre, who just two years previously had opposed capital punishment and had been the most convinced advocate of political democracy, in late December 1793 adopted the position that the Terror was a necessary expedient to keep the Mountain in power.<sup>21</sup>

#### IV

By January 1794 Barras and Fréron were in a position to launch a sweeping attack against Marseilles' political autonomy: the policy of full-scale Terror had been vindicated in Paris and Toulon, which no longer required their urgent attention, provided Barras and Fréron with experience in the tactics of violent Terror.

A peculiar incident had strengthened Barras's and Fréron's determination to pursue a policy of strict punishment in Marseilles. On December 5 and 8 two letters had arrived in Paris which attempted to throw suspicion on Barras and Fréron. The first was supposedly from the émigré Calonne to the British commander of Toulon, and proposed a drive for the conquest of all of Provence, which could then be used as a bridgehead to conquer the rest of France.<sup>22</sup> The second letter, signed by Barras and Fréron, proposed the abandonment of Provence, stating "Pourquoi ne leur [to the English] abandonnerions nous pas tout le terrain stérile jusqu'à la Durance."<sup>23</sup> In conjunction, the two letters strongly implied that

Barras and Fréron had betrayed the Republic; indeed, Billaud-Varenne drew this conclusion, and stated before the Committee of Public Safety that "Barras et Fréron trahissent; ils veulent réaliser les projets de Calonne."<sup>24</sup> Fortunately for the two representatives on mission, Moyse Bayle, their friend and steady correspondent in Paris, was able to persuade the Committee that the second letter was a forgery and thus Barras and Fréron escaped censure. The two representatives hotly denied authorship of the letter, and the forgery reenforced their resolve to punish Marseilles, for they suspected it to have originated with the Marseilles Jacobins as an attempt to stop Barras and Fréron's drive against Marseilles' autonomy.<sup>25</sup>

On January 6, 1794 (17 Nivôse), Barras and Fréron, still in Toulon, issued a decree ordering the arrest of the former Marseilles municipality, the dissolution of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal, and the provisional renaming of Marseilles as Sans Nom. On the same date they ordered the establishment of a new military commission in Marseilles.<sup>26</sup> These two decrees heralded a new stage of the Terror in Marseilles;

The representatives had military muscle to back up their decrees. Following the siege of Toulon, La Poype had finally taken over command of the Marseilles garrison. He had taken with him 3,000 troops from the dissolved Army of the Var to join the two units which Barras and Fréron had ordered to Marseilles in early DECEMBER. These soldiers were not from Marseilles, and had no particular loyalty to the city.<sup>27</sup>

However, even after the decrees of January 6 events in Marseilles did not move with dramatic rapidity. To be sure, many of the members of the former municipality and of the vigilance committee were arrested, but some of the most important local leaders, among them Isoard and Loys, succeeded in eluding Barras and Fréron and making their way to Paris.



The purge of the Popular Society and of the Revolutionary Tribunal was delayed another two weeks; Maillet Jr. and Giraud were arrested only on January 19.<sup>28</sup> The chief reason for this new delay was that Barras and Fréron were virtually without support among Marseilles' civilian population, especially after the representatives' change of Marseilles' name, a deliberate insult against Marseilles' deeprooted municipal patriotism. Fréron bemoaned the lack of sufficient support in Marseilles when he complained that "Il faudrait encore à Marseille au moins 100 bons Jacobins. . ." <sup>29</sup>

Barras and Fréron received the aid they sought in the person of Louis dit Brutus père (this is the only name we have for him, usually he was just called Brutus), a member of those popular administrative "shocktroops" of the revolutionary government in the provinces, without whom the Terror could not have functioned. Cobb calls Brutus a spécialiste de la répression and he may be seen as a typical sans-culotte both in his temperament and in his social origins (if indeed one can talk of a typical sans-culotte in regard to social origins). He was a Paris concièrge, regarded as a good revolutionary in his section. He took part in the great repressive measures against Lyons, and then proceeded to Marseilles where on January 20 Barras and Fréron appointed him president of the new Marseilles Military Commission. Two other Parisians, Thiberge and Lefebvre were named as judges of the Military Commission. With these three outsiders, Barras and Fréron possessed the judicial machinery for instituting repression in Marseilles.<sup>30</sup>

Beginning with its installation on January 20, 1794 (Pluviôse 1), the Marseilles Military Commission had 10 sittings, during which it judged 219 people, of whom 95 were acquitted and 124 were condemned, 123 to death. A good overview of the operation of the Military Commission may be gained by comparing its operation with that of the Marseilles

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES	CHARGES ON THE BASES OF WHICH THE ACCUSED WERE CONVICTED					NUMBER OF CONDEMNATIONS PER OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE OF CONDEMNATIONS PER OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY (EXCLUDING N.D.S.G. & OTHER)
	LEADERSHIP OF FEDERALIST BODIES IN MARSEILLES	MINOR BUT SPECIFIC FEDERALIST ACTIVITY IN MARSEILLES	GENERAL (UNSPECIFIED) FEDERALIST OR COUNTERREV. ACTIVITY OR SENTIMENTS IN MARSEILLES	FEDERALIST OR COUNTERREV. ACTIVITY OR SENTIMENTS OUTSIDE MARSEILLES	OTHER		
NOBLE							
PRIEST		1				1	5.9 %
PEASANT							
BOURGEOIS	ADMINISTR.	1				1	5.9
	PROFESSION.	3	2			5	29.4
	COMMERCIAL	2	1	3		6	35.3
	PROPERTY HOLDER		1	1		3	17.7
TOTAL BOURGEOIS	5	5	4	1		15	88.3
OFFICER (MILIT. or NAVAL)							
ARTISAN	INDUSTRIAL						
	GENERAL SERVICE		1			1	5.9
N.D.S.G. & OTHER			1	1		2	
TOTAL	5	6	6	2		19	

Table 2. Occupational Distribution of Death Sentences, and Distribution According to the Charges on the Bases of which the Accused Were Convicted. Marseilles (Brutus) Military Commission. January-February 1794.

Revolutionary Tribunal, which it replaced. The Revolutionary Tribunal, consisting of a president, a prosecutor and six judges, judged between eight and ten suspects per session, and acquitted over one-half of the accused, condemning to death only some 30%. The Military Commission, consisting of a president and two judges, judged over twenty suspects per session, acquitted 45%, and with one exception condemned all other accused to death. Thus it is evident that despite its short-term acquaintance with local conditions, the Brutus Military Commission judged more rapidly and harshly than the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal.<sup>31</sup>

Using the same sources as for Table 1 I was able to obtain only a very incomplete list of 19 victims of the Marseilles Military Commission, and could ascertain the occupational status of only 17 victims, or of about 15% of the total number of the condemned. The results are tabulated in Table 2 (see Appendix, p. 220 for the methodology of preparing tables). Although this sample is relatively small, it does indicate an important trend so clearly that I feel justified to draw a number of tentative conclusions on its basis.

88% of the Military Commission's victims whose occupational status could be determined were bourgeois, and over 65% of the victims belonged to the commercial or professional bourgeoisie. The two charges on the basis of which most of the accused were convicted were minor but specific federalist activity in Marseilles, and general (unspecified) federalist or counterrevolutionary activity or sentiments in Marseilles.

Thus, it appears that the activity of the Military Commission was not only rapid and harsh, but was overwhelmingly directed against the Marseilles bourgeoisie, specifically against the commercial and professional bourgeoisie of the port city. The Brutus Commission prosecuted the Marseilles bourgeois chiefly on the basis of minor

charges, and it may not be farfetched to suggest that the Marseilles bourgeoisie was deliberately persecuted by its Paris sans-culotte judges. One can offer a two-fold explanation for this. First, Barras and Fréron had on a number of occasions berated the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal for favouring the Marseilles bourgeoisie, and especially the commercial classes. We have seen that Barras's and Fréron's accusations had no basis in fact, that the Maillet-Giraud Tribunal dealt vigorously, albeit fairly with the Marseilles bourgeoisie. But in order to be consistent Barras's and Fréron's picked judicial organ had to deal more harshly with the Marseilles bourgeoisie than its predecessor. Secondly, the members of the Brutus Military Commission were all active Paris sans-culottes, professional terrorists who advocated punishing the rich, so that it was natural for them to attack the rich Marseilles bourgeoisie.

Barras's and Fréron's anger against Marseilles was manifested in many ways. They despatched the arrested Maillet Jr. and Giraud to the Paris Revolutionary Tribunal, hoping for a show trial in Paris which would draw attention to themselves and vindicate their own terrorist program in Marseilles.<sup>32</sup> Barras and Fréron instituted a large-scale program of building demolition: they destroyed not only the standing symbols of féodalité, but also the meeting halls of the sections and the Bourse; when Maignet arrived in Marseilles they were on the point of demolishing the Hôtel de Ville.<sup>33</sup> This wanton destruction was a further blow against Marseilles' municipal pride, already deeply injured by the demeaning name which Barras and Fréron had given to the city.

## V

Barras's and Fréron's January 6 decrees received a hostile reception in Paris. Their two closest influential friends in the capital, Moyse Bayle

and Laurent Granet, both stemmed from Marseilles and were outraged by their arbitrary and insulting change of Marseilles' name. Moyse Bayle argued that Marseilles was less guilty than other provincial cities, and if "Marseille méritait de perdre son nom, Bordeaux mériterait d'être bouleversé jusque dans ses fondements."<sup>34</sup> Bayle and Granet started a campaign in the capital to have Barras's and Fréron's decree annulled, in the course of which Bayle published a brochure praising Marseilles' glorious past and the services which she had rendered to the revolution.<sup>35</sup> Laurent Granet wrote a letter to his brother in Marseilles, in which he expressed his sympathy with the wronged city and bemoaned Barras's and Fréron's actions. This letter was publicly circulated in Marseilles, increasing the bad feeling against Barras and Fréron.<sup>36</sup> It is indicative of the general trend of Marseilles opinion -- and of the strength of Marseilles municipal patriotism -- that the younger Granet, who circulated his brother's letter in Marseilles, was a member of the departmental directory of the Bouches-du-Rhône, had been one of Barras's and Fréron's chief supporters in Marseilles in December 1793, but turned against the two representatives following their January decrees.

Bayle's and Granet's Paris campaign was evidently successful, for the Committee of Public Safety wrote to Barras and Fréron on January 23, deprecating the measures which the two representatives had taken. To be sure, the tone of this letter was friendly and the Committee praised Barras's and Fréron's revolutionary vigour; but the Committee disapproved of the change of Marseilles' name, repeating Moyse Bayle's argument that the city had a heroic revolutionary past and that it had never been as guilty of counterrevolution as many other cities whose names had not been changed.<sup>37</sup>

Of course, the Committee of Public Safety was primarily concerned

with preserving public order, and not with safeguarding Marseilles' dignity. Previously, certain hasty and arbitrary actions of representatives on mission -- for example, Fouché's dechristianization campaign in Nièvre -- had endangered internal peace and the revolutionary government's program of national unification and centralization. It was evident to the Committee of Public Safety that the change of Marseilles' name had provoked a strong reaction against the national representation, and this was undesirable when it did not involve an essential issue.<sup>38</sup>

Surprisingly, Barras and Fréron persisted in their resolve to change Marseilles' name. They justified themselves by stating that "L'importance que l'on met à conserver le nom de Marseille serait peut-être la raison la plus puissante pour le changer."<sup>39</sup> They meant by this that in order to unify the country it was important to destroy the stubborn municipal patriotism of Marseilles. This was at best a weak, unconsidered rationalization, at worst a contradiction: the very name which Barras and Fréron had chosen for Marseilles was an insult to the city and could only arouse the strongest reaction of the Marseillais and thereby increase municipal patriotism. Nonetheless, it is difficult to explain why Barras and Fréron, two complete political opportunists, chose to defy the superior authority of the central government. A plausible explanation for their resolve may be that once engaged in a course of action, they were reluctant to change too quickly, for this might imply that they carried favour and were not determined patriots and revolutionaries, an impression which Barras and Fréron wished to avoid at all cost.

By early February, the authorities in Paris were entirely opposed to Barras's and Fréron's dangerous course of action in Marseilles. When Loys reached Paris, he provided fuel for the campaign against the two representatives by denouncing them at the Jacobin Club. On February 12 the National

Convention annulled the change of Marseilles' name.<sup>40</sup> The Committee of Public Safety realized that retaining Barras and Fréron in Marseilles could only cause the situation in the Mediterranean city to deteriorate, and as soon as their replacement arrived in Marseilles they were recalled to Paris.<sup>41</sup>

## VI

In December 1793 two events strongly influenced the economic situation of Marseilles. First, in line with a policy of stiffening economic controls and centralization, the central government ordered the dissolution of the last locally controlled commercial agency of Marseilles, the provisional municipal bureau de commerce, and the arrest of its members until they could give an exact accounting of the funds at their disposal.<sup>42</sup> However, Barras and Fréron, for once agreeing with Marseilles opinion, saw that some local body was needed to oversee the provisioning of Marseilles, and on December 6 they called into being a new comité maritime des approvisionnements, staffed by Marseillais but under the direct control of the national representation.<sup>43</sup>

Secondly, the food supplies situation in the entire southeastern region was eased with the reconquest of Toulon. Large stores of supplies left behind by the retreating Anglo-Spanish forces were captured by the republican army, and the coastal transportation routes to Italy were once more opened, enabling new supplies to reach France from abroad.<sup>44</sup>

Thus in December and January the provisioning of the southeastern region improved, and with it the general economic situation. This improvement indirectly enabled Barras and Fréron and the Brutus Military Commission to persecute Marseilles' high commercial classes. With a

reasonably steady flow of food supplies from Italy, overseen largely by agents of the Army of Italy, and the still effective English blockade of Mediterranean searoutes to Africa, the merchants of Marseilles became expendable and the terrorists could persecute particular négociants without the danger of causing an economic slowdown. As we have seen, they did this with relish, and sent many of the wealthiest members of Marseilles' commercial classes to the guillotine.

## VII

Following their return from Toulon, Barras and Fréron could finally institute full-scale Terror in Marseilles. They ordered the arrest of their stubborn local opponents, the Marseilles Jacobin leaders, they attempted to uproot municipal patriotism, and through their newly appointed Military Commission they persecuted the high commercial bourgeoisie. On first sight it appears that Barras and Fréron were applying the Terror as it was meant to be applied by the central government. But this impression is deceptive. The Terror, as originally conceived by the Montagnards, was not an end in itself, but only a means to an end. As we have seen through examining the Law of Frimaire 14, the goal of the Paris committees was the establishment of an efficient, centralized national administrative network, and the officially sanctioned Terror was the severe, but apparently necessary, method of establishing revolutionary government and ensuring its functioning.

As Donald Greer has demonstrated, the Terror was applied with differing degrees of intensity in different regions of France, varying from great severity in regions of civil war and foreign invasion to almost non-existence in peaceful areas.<sup>45</sup> On the Mediterranean seaboard,



a region ravaged by both foreign invasion and civil war, the Terror was relatively severe. Examining the situation on the Mediterranean seaboard more closely, it becomes apparent that even within a single region there were great variations in the application of the Terror.

In Toulon, there was quick, cruel and large-scale punishment of suspected counterrevolutionaries in order to impress the traitor port with the Republic's determination to root out treason and counterrevolution and to maintain the revolutionary government. In the course of the Terror in Toulon such steps as the destruction of buildings and the renaming of the city were approved by the central government as valid measures in punishing rebellion and repressing localist tendencies. Barras and Fréron, basing their actions on the precedents of Toulon and Lyons, believed that the repression of Marseilles' powerful localist tradition would be in line with the aims of the central government and proceeded to persecute local leaders, to change the city's name, and to demolish buildings which were symbols of Marseilles' local autonomy.

The powerful reaction of the Marseillais against these measures convinced the Committee of Public Safety that this policy was mistaken in Marseilles and would only be an obstacle to the establishment of efficient administration under national control in Marseilles. Barras and Fréron were recalled and their measure changing Marseilles' name was annulled.

Marseilles' example clearly demonstrates that, as originally conceived by the new executive of the ruling committees, the Terror was a means to the end of establishing efficient national administration. As such, it was a greatly varying and fragmented phenomenon, for methods which served the cause of national unification in some places could easily hinder the same cause in other localities.

## NOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

1. Good analyses of the Law of Frimaire 14 are available in Cobb, Les armées révolutionnaires. Instrument. . ., vol. II, pp. 748-776. Mathiez, The French Revolution, pp. 391-393. However, my analysis is based on the text of the law as reproduced in AULARD, IX, pp.149-161.
2. AULARD, IX, p. 163.
3. Cobb, The Police and the People, pp.50-54.
4. B&F, p. 81.
5. AULARD, IX, 241.
6. B&F, p. 58; B&F, p. 87.
7. For a full treatment of the reconquest of Toulon see Paul Cottin, Toulon et les Anglais en 1793. Ollendorf, Paris, 1898.
8. AULARD, X, pp. 80-82.
9. For the 7,500 estimate see Greer, The Incidence of Emigration. . ., p. 55; for the 20,000 estimate see M.Z. Pons, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la ville de Toulon en 1793. Trouve, Paris, 1825, p. 154.
10. B&F, p. 96.
11. Ibid., p. 96.
12. Pons, op. cit., pp. 169-171.
13. B&F, p. 130.
14. Ibid., p. 106, p. 114, p. 118.
15. Ibid., p. 77.
16. Ibid., p. 73.
17. Ibid., p. 80.
18. Ibid., p. 74, p. 77, p. 80, p. 126.
19. Ibid., p. 76.
20. Ibid., p. 68.
21. For the development of the Terror in Paris see Hampson, Social History. . ., pp. 182-232; Rudé, The Crowd in the French Revolution,

- pp. 113-141;
22. MONITEUR, 18, pp. 604-605.
  23. Ibid., 18, p. 624.
  24. B&F, p. 182.
  25. MONITEUR, XIX, pp. 63-64.
  26. B&F, p. 128 f.n. 3; and Cobb, Les armées révolutionnaires. Instrument. . . vol. I, p. 206, f.n. 200.
  27. AULARD, IX, p. 694.
  28. B&F, p. 142.
  29. Ibid., p. 136.
  30. Cobb, Les armées révolutionnaires. Instrument. . ., vol. I, p. 206, f.n. 200.
  31. Gaffarel, op. cit., pp. 166-167, pp. 245-247.
  32. B&F, p. 146.
  33. Gaffarel, op. cit., p. 234; AULARD, X, p. 429; AULARD, X, pp. 762-769.
  34. B&F, p. 191.
  35. Ibid., p. 25, f.n. 2, Bayle's brochure was also signed by Granet, Laurent, Pélissier and LeBlanc, other deputies of the Bouches-du-Rhône at the National Convention.
  36. Ibid., p. 148.
  37. AULARD, X, pp. 400-403.
  38. Ibid., X, p. 401. The Committee of Public Safety warned Barras and Fréron that there are "considérations que l'étude de mœurs, la science des localités commandent," viz. that they ought to pay heed to Marseilles local opinion and not alienate the city, through their unconsidered actions.
  39. B&F, p. 157.
  40. MONITEUR, XIX, pp. 436-437; AULARD, XI, p. 93.
  41. AULARD, XI, pp. 274-275.
  42. MONITEUR, 18, p. 583.
  43. Georges Lefebvre, "Le commerce extérieur en 1793" in Etudes sur la Révolution française, Paris, 1954, p. 176.

44. B&F, p. 94; Carrière, op. cit., pp. 175-176.

45. Greer, The Incidence of the Terror. . . , pp.38-43 & 68-70.

## CHAPTER VII - Maignet's Mission in Marseilles: the Reestablishment of Tranquility and Administrative Efficiency.

### I

This chapter will trace developments in Marseilles under the proconsulship of the representative on mission Maignet. Maignet's task in Marseilles was to rebuild local government from the shambles in which Barras's and Fréron's policies had left it. Maignet, a first-rate administrator, and an obedient bureaucrat, careful in carrying out the policies of the central government, succeeded admirably in his task. By mid-April 1794, when affairs in the department of Vaucluse began to claim most of his attention, Marseilles was once more tranquil, and administered in a manner of which the central government could approve.

### II

Maignet was named as the national representative to the departments of the Bouches-du-Rhône and Vaucluse in a decree of the National Convention issued on December 29.<sup>1</sup> This decree attempted to implement the rationalization of national administration outlined in the Law of Frimaire 14. It reduced the number of representatives on mission to 58, carefully designated the area of operation of each representative, and emphatically warned representatives against exercising their powers outside their designated regions of jurisdiction. Neither Barras nor Fréron was given a new mission in the provinces, implying that their bombastic language and erratic behaviour had aroused the suspicions of the Committee of Public

Safety by this time.

The difficult assignment facing Maignet in Marseilles was the re-establishment of a well-functioning local administration which would loyally carry out the policies of the national government and help to keep the city orderly and tranquil. From the very beginning of his Mediterranean mission, Maignet realized that the fundamental error of Barras and Fréron had been their attempt to strangle the deep-rooted municipal patriotism of the Marseillais. He recognized that in order to keep Marseilles securely under the national government's authority, one had to grant the Mediterranean city a certain degree of local autonomy. In following this policy, Maignet was following the lead of the central government, which by disallowing Barras's and Fréron's change of Marseilles' name, by recalling the two representatives, and by acquitting Maillet Jr. and Giraud, gave implicit support for a policy of limited autonomy for Marseilles.

Maignet's first report from Marseilles, drafted on February 7, three days after his arrival, well demonstrates certain personal qualities which made him especially well-fitted to carry out the central government's policies in Marseilles.<sup>2</sup> In contrast to Barras and even more to Fréron, who were bombastic in their reports and letters, were always concerned with maximizing their own role in shaping events and with presenting themselves to the Committee of Public Safety as self-assured and decisive in any situation, Maignet appears cautious and restrained, always relying more on the Committee of Public Safety's judgement than his own. Statements like the following are characteristic of Maignet's attitudes:

le peu de ressources que j'avais trouvé. . .  
m'auraient exposé à tomber dans des erreurs. . .<sup>3</sup>

Me suis-je trompé? Eclairiez-moi: il vous importe  
de la faire afin que je prenne pas de fausse  
direction.<sup>4</sup>

Of course, Maignet's attitudes were greatly influenced by external circumstances such as the extension of the Committee's powers and the condemnation of Barras and Fréron. In the conditions of the spring of 1794 it was prudent and cautious on the part of a representative on mission to subordinate himself to the Committee of Public Safety's wishes. But the very fact that Maignet, unlike Barras and Fréron, recognized this contributes to our estimate of him as a rational, cautious individual. Although he was sent to replace Barras and Fréron, who had proved themselves less than competent, Maignet refrained from criticizing his predecessors. Unlike Barras and Fréron, who were characterized more by their love of luxury and easy living than by hard work, Maignet -- a stranger to Marseilles -- immediately attempted to familiarize himself with the situation in Marseilles by plunging into an examination of local reports and decrees, and by assuming contact with local leaders. Thus, Maignet's first report from Marseilles indicates that a new type of national administrator had assumed control in Marseilles: a cautious, prudent, hard-working bureaucrat subordinate and obedient to Paris authority, a member of a centralized governmental network. (Unfortunately no book length biography of Maignet exists, but Gaffarel's and Vaillandet's studies and Kuscinski's short biographical sketch also supports this contention.)<sup>5</sup>

Maignet's first task was to persuade Fréron -- Barras was not in Marseilles in early February -- to reverse his decision concerning Marseilles' change of name and the wholesale demolition of public edifices, or failing this, to persuade him quickly to leave the city.<sup>6</sup> Fréron balked, insisting that until he received the Committee of Public Safety's official orders, he had no power to change his and Barras's earlier decree.<sup>7</sup>

Nonetheless, Maignet's authority was superior to Fréron's, since Maignet was now the official representative in Marseilles, and Fréron realized that despite Maignet's apparently mild attitude, a course of action which met with disapproval from Paris could not be indefinitely prolonged. Thus, pressured by Maignet, Fréron soon left Marseilles, joined Barras, and the two of them hurried back to the capital personally to justify themselves.<sup>8</sup>

### III

News of the National Committee's official repudiation of Barras's and Fréron's change of Marseilles' name, voted into effect on February 12, reached Marseilles on February 19.<sup>9</sup> Initially, Maignet was pleased by the news from Paris, for he recognized that the National Convention's order was needed to make his own repudiation of Barras's and Fréron's policies credible in the eyes of the Marseilles municipal patriots, and therefore to strengthen his position in Marseilles. But the arrival of the Paris news provoked a reaction in Marseilles which Maignet appears not to have foreseen.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Barras's and Fréron's terrorist policies against a stubbornly resisting Marseilles could be implemented only with the aid of a large military garrison composed of outsiders, under the command of an officer loyal to Barras and Fréron. According to Maignet the Marseilles garrison still consisted of 6,842 soldiers in mid-February.<sup>10</sup> As long as Barras's and Fréron's policies were in the ascendent, the population of Marseilles was cowed into submission by the presence of a powerful, hostile militia. However, as it became obvious that Maignet was repudiating Barras's and Fréron's line of action, minor disturbances broke out between the garrison and the local population.



Maignet was well aware of these disturbances, but hoped that the arrival of the National Convention's official repudiation of Barras's and Fréron's policies would satisfy the Marseillais and serve to quell local tempers.<sup>11</sup> Maignet was mistaken. The arrival of the National Convention's return-of-name order produced great popular rejoicing in Marseilles and the excitement of the crowds found outlet in serious streetfighting between local sans-culottes and the soldiers of the garrison.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately I do not possess a detailed account of these disturbances, but they were serious enough to force Maignet to issue an edict forbidding street assemblies, and to order the closing of cafés and taverns.<sup>13</sup> On February 25, after a week of rioting, the exasperated Maignet momentarily lost his usual composure and cried out to the Committee of Public Safety:

Vous ne pouvez vous faire, citoyens collègues,  
une idée de la crise dans laquelle je me suis trouvé  
et d'où je ne suis sans doute pas encore sorti.<sup>14</sup>

The seriousness of the rioting may be gauged from the fact that the young general Bonaparte, who, following his service at the siege of Toulon, became chief of artillery in Marseilles under La Poype, proposed repairing and rearming the damaged and abandoned Fort St. Nicolas, a strategic stronghold which could control the entire city and harbour of Marseilles.<sup>15</sup>

It is revealing that Maignet, faced with repeated disturbances in Marseilles, nevertheless rejected Bonaparte's military solution, and by implication placed the blame for the disturbances on the military garrison rather than the Marseilles civilians. He proposed radically to reduce the size of the Marseilles garrison, and to remove the Nièvre battalion which was especially odious to the Marseilles sans-culottes.<sup>16</sup> Thus, Maignet evidently believed that the rioting in Marseilles was not a serious counterrevolutionary manifestation, but an expression of local

frustrations against outsiders attempting to oppress the local population. Developments proved Mignet correct, for following the reduction of the Marseilles garrison the disturbances quickly subsided.

The above discussion of Mignet's early activity in Marseilles may have created the impression that Mignet was "soft" vis-à-vis the local authorities and population. This was not the case. In his early reports from Marseilles Mignet complained that the Marseilles prisons were not full, and he soon proceeded to fill them with the aid of the Marseilles revolutionary committee.<sup>17</sup> Nor did he act as he did out of naive trust of the Marseillais. In his reports he stated repeatedly that the majority of Marseilles' population had been implicated in some kind of counterrevolutionary activity and that the Popular Society could not be trusted entirely. Mignet behaved as he did because he believed that it was expedient to give Marseilles local patriotism an outlet, as long as that patriotism remained a largely rhetorical force which was controllable in real political terms, if in return the local leaders would be loyal supporters of the republic, and act as relatively efficient and orderly administrators of local affairs.

#### IV

By early March 1794 Mignet's program of pacification and reconstruction in Marseilles was progressing well. To ease the friction between soldiers and civilians, Mignet dismissed General La Poype as the head of the Marseilles garrison. Mignet rightly conjectured that La Poype was hated in Marseilles because of his close connections with Fréron, and because he insisted on regarding the city as a nest of brigands.<sup>18</sup> General Voulland, the officer Mignet invited to succeed La Poype, was

an elderly man who climbed royal army ranks during the ancien régime and had a singularly uneventful military career. (He was close to 70 years old in 1794 and the last time he had seen service outside France was in 1749.)<sup>19</sup> It is reasonable to conclude that Voulland could offer no affront to the Marseillais and that this was a major reason for choosing him to replace La Poype.

In early March, Mignet also put into effect the proposed reduction of the Marseilles garrison to 3,000 men, less than half its previous size. The troops who became available through this move were sent to strengthen the Army of Italy.<sup>20</sup>

Next, Mignet turned his attention to the administration of revolutionary justice. The final step in the central government's repudiation of Barras's and Fréron's policies was the Paris Revolutionary Tribunal's acquittal of Maillet Jr. and Giraud on February 28. With this, the former president and prosecutor of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal were cleared of all suspicion.<sup>21</sup> Mignet realized that revolutionary justice in Marseilles, as administered by the outsiders of the Brutus Military Commission, added to the confusion in Marseilles and that it was not an efficient arm of revolutionary justice. Mignet's specific complaints against the Brutus Commission were that being composed of outsiders, it was unfamiliar with the city and could not judge with sufficient knowledge; and that it judged in a too simple black and white manner, its only penalty being condemnation to death.<sup>22</sup> When news of Maillet Jr.'s and Giraud's acquittal reached Marseilles, Mignet quickly suspended the Brutus Military Commission and voiced his intention to reestablish the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal with Maillet Jr. and Giraud once more at its head.<sup>23</sup>

However, Maillet Jr. and Giraud did not return from Paris until April 10, and in the interim Mignet named Bompard provisional president

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES	CHARGES ON THE BASES OF WHICH THE ACCUSED WERE CONVICTED					NUMBER OF CONDEMNATIONS PER OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE OF CONDEMNATIONS PER OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY (EXCLUDING N.O.S.G. & OTHER)
	LEADERSHIP OF FEDERALIST BODIES IN MARSEILLES	MINOR BUT SPECIFIC FEDERALIST ACTIVITY IN MARSEILLES	GENERAL (UNSPECIFIED) FEDERALIST OR COUNTERREV. ACTIVITY OR SENTIMENTS IN MARSEILLES	FEDERALIST OR COUNTERREV. ACTIVITY OR SENTIMENTS OUTSIDE MARSEILLES	OTHER		
NOBLE		1		2		3	13.0%
PRIEST		1	1			2	8.7
PEASANT		1			2	3	13.0
BOURGEOIS	ADMINISTR.	1	1			2	8.7
	PROFESSION	1	3		1	5	21.8
	COMMERCIAL		1			1	4.3
	PROPERTY HOLDER		2	1		3	13.0
TOTAL BOURGEOIS	2	7		1	1	11	47.8
OFFICER (MILIT. or NAVAL)		1				1	4.3
ARTISAN	INDUSTRIAL						
	GENERAL SERVICE		1	2		3	13.0
N.O.S.G. & OTHER	5			1	8	14	
TOTAL	7	12	1	6	11	37	

Table 3. Occupational Distribution of Death Sentences, and Distribution According to the Charges on the Bases of which the Accused were Convicted. Marseilles (Bompard-Riquier) Revolutionary Tribunal. March-April 1794.

and Riquier provisional prosecutor of the new revolutionary tribunal.<sup>24</sup> We know almost nothing about Bompard and Riquier. Only in connection with their temporary posts on the Revolutionary Tribunal do they momentarily become important. They appear to have been subservient to Maignet.

With the aid of Gaffarel's lists I was able to trace 37 death sentences passed by the Bompard-Riquier Tribunal during its brief four weeks in office. The occupational status of 24 victims could be determined and the results are tabulated in Table 3. (See Appendix p.220 for the methodology of preparing tables.)<sup>25</sup>

Close to 50% of the victims of the Bompard-Riquier Tribunal whose occupational status could be determined were bourgeois. Surprisingly, however, there was only one member of the commercial bourgeoisie among them. The most numerous single group of victims belonged to the professional bourgeoisie. The charge on the basis of which most victims (twelve individuals) were convicted was minor but specific federalist activity in Marseilles. Only seven accused were convicted on the more serious charge of federalist leadership in Marseilles.

A number of conclusions may be drawn on the basis of the Bompard-Riquier Tribunal's activity. Following the Brutus Military Commission's extreme terrorist tactics against the Marseilles bourgeoisie, especially the commercial bourgeoisie, the city's middle classes were again in a more secure position with the reestablishment of the Revolutionary Tribunal. To be sure, the local bourgeoisie was still the major victim of revolutionary justice in Marseilles. Nonetheless, the Bompard-Riquier Tribunal's operations were considerably less anti-bourgeois than the mass condemnations of wealthy négociants which appear to have been common during the Brutus Commission's operations. By the spring of 1794, seven

months after the defeat of federalism, most federalist leaders had either been judged or had escaped, and most of the Bompard-Riquier Tribunal's convictions were consequently for minor offences.

I cannot explain why the Bompard-Riquier Tribunal condemned so few commercial bourgeois. Perhaps Bompard and Riquier had personal friendly contacts with the commercial classes; we can only speculate, but have no evidence. As Table 4 will demonstrate, however, a stricter treatment of the commercial bourgeoisie began again with Maillet Jr.'s and Giraud's return to Marseilles.

On a single important point the powers of the renewed Revolutionary Tribunal were greater than those of previous courts of revolutionary justice in Marseilles. In compliance with Saint-Just's Ventôse Decrees which proposed the confiscation of the property of enemies of the Republic and its distribution to indigent sans-culottes, Maignet in mid-March empowered the Bompard-Riquier Tribunal to confiscate the property of suspects.<sup>26</sup>

With the reformation of the military garrison and the renewal of the revolutionary tribunal, Maignet completed the task of reforming Marseilles following the destructive interlude of Barras's and Fréron's rule in the city. That Maignet was satisfied with the new atmosphere of Marseilles is demonstrated in his report of March 20 to the Committee of Public Safety, in which he wrote of the renewed patriotism of Marseilles, and prophesied that the Republic might yet expect great services from the Marseilles sans-culottes.<sup>27</sup>

## V

After their return from Paris Maillet Jr. and Giraud reassumed control over the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal. They directed it

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES	CHARGES ON THE BASES OF WHICH THE ACCUSED WERE CONVICTED					NUMBER OF CONDEMNATIONS PER OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE OF CONDEMNATIONS PER OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY (EXCLUDING N.O.S.G. & OTHER)
	LEADERSHIP OF FEDERALIST BODIES IN MARSEILLES	MINOR BUT SPECIFIC FEDERALIST ACTIVITY IN MARSEILLES	GENERAL (UNSPECIFIED) FEDERALIST OR COUNTERREV. ACTIVITY OR SENTIMENTS IN MARSEILLES	FEDERALIST OR COUNTERREV. ACTIVITY OR SENTIMENTS OUTSIDE MARSEILLES	OTHER		
NOBLE							
PRIEST			1	1		2	3.8 %
PEASANT		1		3		4	7.7
BOURGEOIS	ADMINISTR.	1	1	1		4	7.7
	PROFESSION.		3	3		6	11.5
	COMMERCIAL	2	8	2	2	14	26.9
	PROPERTY HOLDER	1	3	5		9	17.3
TOTAL BOURGEOIS	4	15	1	11	2	33	63.4
OFFICER (MILIT. or NAVAL)				2		2	3.8
ARTISAN	INDUSTRIAL						
	GENERAL SERVICE	2	4	1		7	13.5
N.O.S.G. & OTHER	1	5		4	1	11	
TOTAL	7	25	2	22	3	59	

Table 4. Occupational Distribution of Death Sentences, and Distribution According to the Charges on the Bases of which the Accused were Convicted. Marseilles (Maillet-Giraud) Revolutionary Tribunal. April 1794.

for a scant two weeks between April 10 and April 24, but during this short period they handed down at least 59 death sentences. (This is the number I obtained from Gaffarel, but since Gaffarel's figure of the total number of death sentences passed by the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal is some 30% lower than Greer's, the second Maillet-Giraud Tribunal probably condemned more than 60 individuals to death.) The Maillet-Giraud Tribunal set a speed record in the spring of 1794; it sent the guilty to the guillotine faster than it had in the autumn of 1793, faster than had the Bompard-Riquier Tribunal, and indeed even faster than the Brutus Military Commission had.<sup>28</sup>

Their acquittal and subsequent favourable reception in Paris seem to have convinced Maillet Jr. and Giraud of the rightness of their political stance in late 1793, reenforced their self-confidence, and increased their revolutionary zeal. They were in Paris during a period of feverish activity by the Paris Revolutionary Tribunal -- the trial of the Hebertists and of the Indulgents took place during their stay in the capital -- and evidently Maillet Jr. and Giraud attempted to emulate in Marseilles the zeal of the Paris Revolutionary Tribunal. It also seems likely that by the speed of their operation, the two wished to free themselves of any still lingering suspicion against them.

The occupational distribution of death sentences and the distribution according to the charges on the bases of which the accused were condemned during the Maillet-Giraud Tribunal's second period of operation are tabulated in Table 4. (See Appendix p.220 for methodology of setting up tables.)

The largest group of condemned (over 60% of the total) came from the ranks of the bourgeoisie, with the commercial bourgeois subcategory accounting for 27% of the victims whose social status could be determined.



Convictions on the most serious charge of federalist leadership in Marseilles became rare (only 7 convictions), and the charges of minor but specific federalist activity in Marseilles (25 convictions), and federalist or counterrevolutionary activity or sentiments outside Marseilles (22 convictions) accounted for most death sentences. A majority of commercial bourgeois victims (8 individuals) were convicted for minor federalist activity in Marseilles, while only a small number (2 individuals) were convicted for federalist or counterrevolutionary activity or sentiments outside Marseilles. On the other hand, the majority of convicted property holder bourgeois (5 individuals) were charged with federalist or counterrevolutionary activity or sentiments outside Marseilles.

I have drawn a number of conclusions from Table 4. The bourgeoisie remained the major victim of revolutionary justice in Marseilles during this second period of the Maillet-Giraud Tribunal's activity. After the brief respite which the Marseilles commercial bourgeois enjoyed during the Bompard-Riquier interlude, they once more became the chief target of revolutionary justice, although Maillet Jr.'s and Giraud's persecution of the commercial bourgeoisie never equalled the level reached by the Brutus Commission. Furthermore, at this time, unlike in the autumn of 1793, the Marseilles commercial bourgeois were convicted principally on minor charges. This seems to imply that Maillet Jr. and Giraud were motivated to a certain extent by class vengeance.

The large number of victims from outside Marseilles indicates that after their vindication in Paris the Marseilles Jacobins were once more ready to assume their pretensions to regional authority. Even outside Marseilles they persecuted the bourgeoisie, although here, of course, their chief target was not the urban commercial bourgeoisie, but

the rural property holder bourgeoisie.

Maillet Jr.'s and Giraud's presence in Marseilles had effects reaching beyond the administration of revolutionary justice. Of course, previous to their arrest by Barras and Fréron, Maillet Jr. and Giraud had not only been the president and prosecutor of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal, but also leaders of the Marseilles Popular Society and as such leaders of the local autonomy movement which came into conflict with Barras and Fréron. With their reestablishment in Marseilles, and with the vindication they had received in Paris, Maillet Jr. and Giraud would again assume leading positions in Marseilles Jacobin circles.

In late March 1794 the situation in the Mediterranean region altered. Maignet received word of serious disturbances in the department of Vaucluse, and news of the same difficulties also reached Paris. The Committee of Public Safety urgently requested representatives in the southeast to investigate the situation in Avignon.<sup>29</sup> Maignet quickly complied with the Committee's wishes and by April 6 he had moved his headquarters to Avignon. By this time, Maignet reported, Marseilles was secure and tranquil and he could safely turn his attention to the problems of Vaucluse.<sup>30</sup>

On April 17, Maignet ordered Maillet Jr., Giraud and Chompré (the clerk of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal) to remove to Aix, where they were to take charge of the Criminal Tribunal of the Bouches-du-Rhône. The duties of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal were to be assumed by the Criminal Tribunal of the Bouches-du-Rhône. Although it was Maignet himself who had reestablished Maillet Jr. and Giraud in control of Marseilles revolutionary justice, it is likely that in ordering this change Maignet was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to remove Maillet Jr. and Giraud from Marseilles, for fear that their revolutionary

zeal would trigger a reawakening of Marseilles' pretensions to local autonomy and regional control.<sup>31</sup>

Thus the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal traversed a full cycle. Having been originally transferred from Aix to Marseilles as the Criminal Tribunal of the Bouches-du-Rhône, and having in Marseilles assumed the title and function of an extraordinary arm of revolutionary justice, it was now retransferred to Aix and reassumed its more modest title and functions.

On April 16 the Committee of Public Safety, wishing to concentrate all revolutionary justice in the Paris Revolutionary Tribunal, and having reached a stage where it mistrusted any revolutionary agency not under the direct surveillance of Paris authorities, ordered the suppression of all provincial revolutionary tribunals.<sup>32</sup> Thus, in transferring the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal to Aix, Mignet unknowingly complied with the Committee of Public Safety's decree. There is no possibility that Mignet could have had knowledge in Avignon on April 17 of a decree issued in Paris on April 16. Of course, it is possible that Mignet had forewarnings from Paris that the Committee of Public Safety was considering closing down provincial revolutionary tribunals. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the primary reason for Mignet's suppression of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal was his fear of reawakening uncontrolled localist tendencies in Marseilles; and that the Committee of Public Safety's official endorsement of his action was to Mignet a corroboration of his earlier decision. Partial proof for this hypothesis is provided by the fact that in special cases the Committee of Public Safety was willing to make exceptions to its ruling against provincial revolutionary tribunals: Mignet, one of the Committee's most trusted provincial administrators, received permission to set up a new revolutionary tribunal in Orange in the department of

Vaucluse. Thus, had Maignet been in favour of retaining the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal, he could probably have obtained permission to do so relatively easily. That he chose to do the opposite even before receiving the Committee of Public Safety's order implies that he mistrusted the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal when it was not under his own immediate supervision.

## VI

In our discussion of the Terror in Marseilles we have not yet touched upon the important phenomenon of dechristianization. Marcel Reinhard considers that dechristianization accompanied the Revolution from its beginnings, and was an aspect of the ideology of most revolutionaries. He traces revolutionary dechristianization to the generally anti-Christian, deistic or atheistic bias of Enlightenment thought.<sup>33</sup> During the Revolution the anti-Christian bias of the majority of revolutionaries found expression in legislation against the Church and in attempts to uproot the Christian cultural heritage by such measures as introducing "rational" cults -- the Cult of REASON and the Cult of the Supreme Being -- and a new calendar. But during the Terror dechristianization progressed from a non-violent creed to active persecution of Christianity. When most historians refer to dechristianization they mean the active and intense phenomenon of 1793-94, in the course of which churches were closed and stripped of valuables and priests were forced to abdicate. Indeed, active dechristianization is generally regarded as one of the most typical manifestations of the Terror.

That most historians consider only the intense revolutionary dechristianization of 1793-94 is seen by Richard Plongeron as a shortcoming.

According to Plongeron this type of treatment emphasizes the ephemeral aspects of the phenomenon and tends to lead to an apparent contradiction between the temporary, short-term nature of revolutionary dechristianization and its alleged long-term roots in the anti-Christian and anti-clerical intellectual bias of the 18th century.<sup>34</sup> Plongeron proposes that the violence of the short-term (ponctuel) terrorist dechristianization may be understood only within the context of the slow changes in mental attitudes and socio-religious conditions through the 18th century.<sup>35</sup> He praises Albert Soboul and Richard Cobb for having recognized the positive aspects of dechristianization, i.e. that the negative, destructive outbreaks against the Christian cult were accompanied by the emergence of a changed, developing religious consciousness, but he takes all researchers to task for dealing only with the attitudes and actions of the dechristianizers, disregarding the reactions of those being dechristianized, and thus presenting a one-sided, distorted picture of dechristianization.<sup>36</sup>

While Plongeron insists on placing revolutionary dechristianization into the broad chronological context of the long-term, slow religious changes of the eighteenth century, Richard Cobb insists that dechristianization, like any other single aspect of the Terror, may not be treated in isolation but must be seen within the context of the large, composite phenomenon of the Terror. Thus, before assigning ideological motivations to the dechristianizers' actions, Cobb would consider other, more prosaic material motives, such as for example the need for metals for war production, which set in motion the looting and closing of churches (often legal and disciplined) and the forced abdication of priests.<sup>37</sup> Cobb sees dechristianization as either legal or revolutionary. By legal dechristianization he understands anti-Christian activity which stayed within limits acceptable to the central government; by revolutionary dechristianization, anti-

Christian activity which went beyond limits acceptable to the central government. Under the heading of revolutionary dechristianization Cobb again distinguishes several types of initiatives. There were episodes of revolutionary dechristianization initiated and controlled by representatives on mission which went beyond limits acceptable to the central government -- Fouché's activities in Nièvre serve as an excellent example; and there was widespread violent dechristianizing activity by the urban sans-culottes.<sup>38</sup> Both Cobb and Albert Soboul place emphasis on the grass-roots, popular aspects of dechristianization, the anti-Christian activities of the urban sans-culottes, of the revolutionary armies and the soldiers of the regular army in the countryside. Cobb sees dechristianization as the chief means of transporting the predominantly urban Terror from the cities to the countryside: "La déchristianisation frappe en effet les départements plutôt que Paris et son action brutale atteint le plat pays encore que les villes. La Terreur au village, . . . c'est surtout la déchristianisation."<sup>39</sup> Soboul claims that dechristianization was in many, perhaps most instances, a spontaneous popular movement, since the dechristianizers were usually genuinely anti-Christian urban sans-culottes, and engaged in dechristianizing activity with enthusiasm and often on their own initiative.<sup>40</sup>

John McManners agrees with the generally accepted view that dechristianization was the result not of central government directives, but of local initiatives. Unlike Cobb and Soboul however, McManners emphasizes the importance of the initiatives of the individual representatives on mission; he considers that the dechristianizing activities of the armées révolutionnaires and the regular army usually occurred as a direct consequence of orders from representatives on mission.<sup>41</sup> McManners' views differ sharply from Cobb's on the principal arena of the dechristianizers'

activities. He believes that "It was in sizeable towns that the de-Christianizers could most effectively organize their pressure",<sup>42</sup> viz. that dechristianization was basically a forced (not spontaneous) urban phenomenon. According to McManners the representatives' "de-Christianization policies were partly the result of their own hatred of the Catholicism which had betrayed the Revolution, and partly an expedient to bolster morale and whip up frenzy among members of the clubs and the officials and all those other Frenchmen who were committed, however vaguely, to the Revolution."<sup>43</sup>

The often ruthless, overzealous dechristianization of the autumn of 1793 provoked the people of the countryside against the central government and it became clear to the majority of the Committee of Public Safety that supporting dechristianization was not politically expedient. Robespierre, who in late 1793 was one of the dominant members of the Committee of Public Safety, became an early opponent of dechristianization. In November 1793 he warned the popular societies that "the more violent the struggles of fanaticism Christianity, the more careful should we be in our treatment of it. We must not give it fresh weapons, by using force instead of education."<sup>44</sup> Robespierre, with the aid of Danton, fought the dechristianizers at the Jacobin Club, and on December 6, 1793 succeeded in forcing a decree through the National Convention affirming freedom of worship.

Robespierre's attack on dechristianization effectively stopped the dechristianizing wave of the autumn of 1793. However, in Marseilles and the rest of the Mediterranean region dechristianization did not start in earnest until late February 1794, and did not reach peak intensity until mid-March.

Vovelle has studied dechristianization in Provence.<sup>45</sup> Taking the number of forced abdications of priests as his base he has found that

the period of greatest dechristianization in Provence occurred during the last ten days of Ventôse (March 11-March 20).<sup>46</sup> He has also found that in the departments of the Bouches-du-Rhône and Vaucluse the representative on mission Mignet was the motivating force behind dechristianization, and that in Provence dechristianization was chiefly an urban phenomenon -- in the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône 230 cases of abdication of a total of 250 were urban.<sup>47</sup> Thus Vovelle's particular findings agree closely with McManners' general hypotheses on dechristianization: in Provence dechristianization was initiated by a representative on mission and was predominantly urban.

But neither Vovelle's findings nor McManners' hypotheses explain why Mignet, who had often demonstrated that he paid careful attention to the directives of the Committee of Public Safety initiated a dechristianization campaign at a time when dechristianization was out of favour. On this point Cobb's criticism of Vovelle aids us: "La Terreur est indivisible; on ne peut en détacher une partie, pour la traiter isolément. . ."<sup>48</sup> Documents do exist on whose basis we can attempt to relate Mignet's dechristianization campaign to the general flow of events in the southeastern region in 1794.

As we have repeatedly seen, procuring a steady flow of food supplies was one of the major responsibilities of the representatives on mission. Mignet was no exception in this respect. Although food supplies arrived relatively steadily in Marseilles immediately after the reconquest of Toulon, by early February the situation had once more deteriorated. On February 13 Mignet reported to the Committee of Public Safety that the food supplies situation in Marseilles was terrible, and that he had to do something about this or it could provide a pretext for political agitation.<sup>49</sup> Mignet considered a number of ways to ease the situation. For example, he proposed the exchange of French wines for foreign grain.<sup>50</sup>



The Marseilles comité maritime des approvisionnements was powerless to obtain supplies because shipments were still not arriving from Africa and the Levant, and because the ranks of the Marseilles commercial bourgeoisie had been badly thinned by the Brutus Military Commission. The only reliable suppliers of cereals to both the military forces and the civilian population of the Mediterranean coast was Haller, Ricord's agent in Italy. (Ricord was still stationed in Nice with the Army of Italy.) But Haller continually asked for new funds in order to buy grain.<sup>51</sup>

On February 24 (Ventôse 6) Maignet wrote Ricord that Marseilles needed grain desperately, and that he would melt down all silver in Marseilles to provide funds, but that Haller must provide grains.<sup>52</sup> On March 13 (Ventôse 23) Maignet reported to the Committee of Public Safety that grain was arriving in Marseilles and that he would send silver to Haller in return, and on March 27 (Germinal 7) Maignet ordered all communes in the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône to send all silver still in the churches to the Hôtel de la Monnaie in Marseilles.<sup>53</sup>

Vovelle's study shows that most of the abdications in the Bouches-du-Rhône and Vaucluse took place between the beginning of Ventose and the end of the second décade of Germinal, the very period during which Maignet melted down all the silver he could obtain. The conclusion is inescapable: the principal motive for Maignet's dechristianization campaign was to obtain silver from the churches with which to pay for urgently needed food supplies. Dechristianization in Provence can be integrated within the larger history of the Terror in the region and it becomes clear why Maignet's dechristianization campaign took place two months after active dechristianization was discredited by the Committee of Public Safety: Maignet needed metallic currency in February and March 1794 and he could readily obtain it from the churches. The urban nature of dechristianization in Provence also becomes clear: as McManners has hypothesized, the city churches were

logistically more available for looting, and they were probably also wealthier than rural churches.

Thus, the dechristianization campaign in Marseilles was an aspect of the problem of provisioning. This conclusion also substantially supports Cobb's conclusion that dechristianization by the revolutionary armies was a sideproduct of the revolutionary armies' search for food.

## VII

From early April until 9 Thermidor and the end of the Terror, Maignet's base of operations was in Avignon and he was almost entirely (as far as documents allow one to judge) concerned with matters in the department of Vaucluse. Although it is a digression from the main theme of this thesis, I will deal with several important aspects of Maignet's Vaucluse operations, because they shed light on the nature of both the Terror in general and of the role Maignet played in the Terror in the southeast.

Maignet's activities in Vaucluse were characterized by much greater harshness than his operations in Marseilles.<sup>54</sup> He dealt quickly and ruthlessly with Jourdan, an Avignon sans-culotte leader, who with his private army terrorized a number of communes in Vaucluse. When Jourdan refused to stop acting as a law unto himself, Maignet had him arrested and guillotined. Another example of Maignet's ruthlessness was the burning down of the whole village of Bédoin, renowned for its royalist sympathies, for having uprooted the local tree of liberty. Finally, Maignet dealt with corruption absolutely without mercy. The sale of national property (former lands of the church, sold to provide funds for the republic, especially to support the assignat) took place in Vaucluse under

extremely fraudulent conditions. A society, many of whose members were local dignitaries, was formed, and was able to purchase national property at very low prices by the use of corrupt auctions, intimidation and confidential information. Mignet smashed this society and brought those involved in it to trial at the Orange Revolutionary Tribunal. In three months of operation the Orange Revolutionary Tribunal condemned 332 persons to death.<sup>55</sup>

Thus Mignet's policies in Vaucluse were apparently the opposite of his policies in Marseilles: in Marseilles he tempered the policies of his predecessors and provided the local leaders with the opportunity to prove themselves loyal to the central government; in Vaucluse he ruthlessly suppressed all opposition to the administration of the central Government. This strong divergence in policy can be explained in part by the fact that the opposition to the central government's policy was more serious in nature in Vaucluse than in Marseilles, but more importantly by the change which took place in Paris between the time of Mignet's activities in Marseilles and the time of his activities in Vaucluse.

Following the trials of the Hébertists and the Dantonists, and the demise of the sans-culotte movement with the final dissolution of the revolutionary armies, the ruling committees in Paris alienated any elements of the body politic on whom they could previously rely for support. For the last four months of its existence the Terror reached a peak of intensity in Paris; with greatly diminished support the committees had to rely on terror to be able to rule.

Saint-Just's Ventôse decrees, a major piece of social legislation, remained a dead letter, and although some historians argue that the Committee of Public Safety was motivated by a genuine social conscience,

in fact during the last four months of the Terror nothing was done for the poor. The committees, in a situation where they had little to offer to any of their supporters, attempted to gain support and to justify the extreme Terror in Paris, by an appeal to moral sensibilities, inaugurating the "Republic of Virtue". This meant that citizenship became defined as the moral responsibility of each individual Frenchman to the nation, and that all corruption or counterrevolutionary activity was punished severely. Paris during the last four months of the Terror became an informer's paradise.

Within this context Maignet's behaviour in Vaucluse is readily understandable. Maignet, the efficient, obedient administrator followed the actuel policy of the central government and acted with extreme severity against counterrevolution and corruption. We do not mean to imply that Maignet behaved in the way he did only from considerations of expediency; his personality made him susceptible to moral, patriotic appeals, and it is probable that he believed in the course of action which he followed in Vaucluse. Nonetheless, the major motive for Maignet's actions appears at all times to have been his desire to carry out his duty and when he understood his duty to be harshness he acted harshly.

## VIII

For the last four months of the Terror there is an unfortunate paucity of information for Marseilles. Published reports, letters and decrees dealing with the Marseilles situation, quite numerous in the previous period, suddenly become suddenly non-existent. Gaffarel, the only historian who has traced developments in Marseilles in some detail to the end of Maignet's sojourn in the city, does not follow them beyond this point. Only with the opportunity to consult local archives

or local newspapers, which the author unfortunately did not have, could an account of this stage of Marseilles' history be undertaken.

Yet even with limited information one can draw certain conclusions about the state of Marseilles during this period. Carrière has shown that from the beginning of Floréal (mid-April) Marseilles' food provisioning became normal: a local bureau de distribution was opened, overseas trade recommenced, the Agence d'Afrique (the reconstructed and renamed Africa Company) after a hiatus of over one year, again received wheat from North Africa.<sup>56</sup> Lefebvre also testifies that foreign commerce was on the way to recovery in Floréal, year II; he observes that étatisme was being downgraded by the central Commission of Commerce and Provisioning.<sup>57</sup> This meant that in foreign trade the policy of governmental centralization was being abandoned, and a more decentralized policy, again involving the experts (négociants, shipoutfitters, etc.) in the port cities, was being adopted. Thus in the port cities, including Marseilles, the economic Terror slowly eased in the course of the spring of 1794.

But as we have seen, the judicial Terror ended in Marseilles with the removal from the city of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal, and some of the most important Jacobin leaders. These facts suggest a plausible hypothesis: there is a paucity of documentation from Marseilles during the last four months of the Terror because little of importance happened in the Mediterranean city. With the improvement of the food supplies situation, the departure of Maignet, and the removal of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal, the Terror in Marseilles was at an end.

## XI

This chapter has outlined Maignet's reconstruction of Marseilles following the destructive period of Barras's and Fréron's control. Maignet, under instructions from the Committee of Public Safety, and using a rapidly acquired knowledge of the local situation, reversed earlier decisions which were odious to the Marseillais. He returned Marseilles its name and stopped the demolition of public buildings; he dismissed Fréron's brother-in-law La Poype as head of the Marseilles garrison, and drastically reduced the garrison's size; and finally he replaced the Brutus Military Commission, dominated by outsiders, with the Marseilles based and controlled Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal. In short, Maignet purchased the loyalty of the Marseilles municipal patriots to the central government by giving them limited autonomy. Maignet further proved his abilities as an administrator by averting the spectre of famine from Marseilles through stripping Marseilles' churches of all valuables in order to procure much needed precious metals to pay for food supplies from Italy; he was able to do this without provoking a hostile reaction either from the local population, or from the Committee of Public Safety, which by this time regarded dechristianization with disfavour.

In Marseilles the last episode of sans-culotte rioting during the period of the Terror occurred in late-February 1794. After mid-April 1794, foreign shipping routes were once more open and from then on Marseilles was again normally supplied with food. The removal of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal to Aix on Maignet's orders probably helped to ensure calm in Marseilles. During the last four months of the era of the Terror, no further manifestations of the Terror appear to have taken place in Marseilles. Thus the Terror in Marseilles appears to

have come to an end four months earlier than the Terror in Paris.

## NOTES FOR CHAPTER VII

1. AULARD, IX, pp. 746-748.
2. Ibid., X, pp. 762-769.
3. Ibid., X, p. 763.
4. Ibid., X, p. 768.
5. Paul Gaffarel, "La mission de Maignet dans les Bouches-du-Rhône et en Vaucluse", Annales de la Faculté de Lettres d'Aix, VI, nos.1-2, 1912, passim, especially pp. 1-10; (see Flandet, below for Vajjlandet citation.) Kuscinski, op. cit., pp. 421-423.
6. Ibid., X, p. 762, f.n. 3.
7. Ibid., XI, p. 33.
8. Ibid., XI, pp. 283-284.
9. AULARD, XI, p. 93; AULARD, XI, p. 289.
10. Ibid., XI, p. 407.
11. Ibid., XI, pp. 327-328.
12. Ibid., XI, pp. 327-328.
13. Ibid., XI, pp. 327-328.
14. Ibid., XI, p. 406.
15. AULARD, XI, p. 209; MONITEUR, XIX, p. 565.
16. AULARD, XI, p. 408.
17. Paul Gaffarel, "La mission de Maignet. . .", p. 13.
18. AULARD, XI, p. 545.
19. Georges Six, Dictionnaire biographique des généraux et amiraux français de la révolution et de l'empire. (1792-1814). Paris, Saffroy, 1934, vol. II, p. 563.
20. AULARD, XI, pp. 686-689.
21. MONITEUR, XIX, p. 588.



22. AULARD, XI, pp. 25-32.
23. AULARD, XI, pp.686-689; Gaffarel, "La mission de Maignet. . . ", p. 14.
24. Gaffarel, "La mission de Maignet. . . ", p. 15.
25. Statistical information on the Bompard-Riquier Tribunal's functioning was gathered from Gaffarel, "La mission de Maignet. . . ", pp. 16-26.
26. Ibid., p. 16.
27. AULARD, XII, p. 82.
28. Gaffarel, "La mission de Maignet. . . ", pp. 16-26. Again, all the statistical information used in the analysis of the second Maillet-Giraud Tribunal's operation was gathered from Gaffarel's article.
29. AULARD, XI, pp. 706-709; AULARD, XII, pp. 487-488.
30. AULARD, XII, p. 82.
31. Gaffarel, "La mission de Maignet. . . ", p. 26.
32. Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution from 1793 to 1799, p. 121.
33. Marcel Reinhard, Religion, révolution et contre-révolution. Les Cours de Sorbonne, Centre de Documentation Universitaire, 1960, pp. 138-139.
34. Bernard Plongeron, Conscience religieuse en Révolution, Paris, A. & J. Picard, 1969, p. 103.
35. Ibid., pp. 154-177.
36. Ibid., pp. 99-154.
37. Cobb, Les armées révolutionnaires, Instrument. . ., v. II, p. 637.
38. Ibid., v. II, pp. 636-641.
39. Ibid., v. II, p. 636.
40. Albert Soboul, Les sans-culottes parisiens en l'an II, La Roche-sur-Yon, 1958, p. 317.
41. John McManners, The French Revolution and the Church, London, S.P.C.L., 1969, pp. 87-88.
42. Ibid., p. 109.
43. Ibid., p. 88.
44. J.M. Thompson, Robespierre, v. II, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1935, p. 107.

45. Michel Vovelle, "Prêtres abdicataires et déchristianisation en Provence", Actes 89<sup>e</sup> Congrès Soc. Savantes, Lyon, 1964, pp. 63-98 and "Déchristianisation spontanée et déchristianisation provoquée dans le Sud-Est sous la Révolution française", Bulletin de la Société d'Histoire Moderne, 1964 a 63 serie 12, no. 31, pp. 5-11.
46. Vovelle, "Prêtres abdicataires. . .", pp. 68-69.
47. Vovelle, "Déchristianisation spontanée. . .", p. 6.
48. Ibid., p. 10.
49. AULARD, XI, p. 136.
50. Ibid., XI, p. 175.
51. RICORD, II, pp. 26-36.
52. Ibid., II, supplementary documentary material provided by Ricord at the end of his report.
53. AULARD, XI, p. 686; AULARD, XII, p. 231.
54. For Maignet's Vaucluse operations see G. Vaillandet, "La mission de Maignet en Vaucluse, L'Épuration des autorités constitutionnelles." AHRF 3, 1926, pp. 168-178; & G. Vaillandet, "La mission de Maignet en Vaucluse. L'affaire Jourdan." AHRF 3, 1926, pp. 240-263.
55. Greer, The Incidence of the Terror. . ., p. 138.
56. Carriere, op. cit.
57. Lefebvre, "Le Commerce extérieure . . .", p. 171.

## PART FOUR - CHAPTER VIII

## CONCLUSION

In an interview televised on November 17, 1971, Georges Pompidou, president of France, stated that "Il n'y a rien de plus absurde, à mes yeux, que le conflit entre Paris et la province."<sup>1</sup> He made this statement à propos the public debate concerning the respective advantages of central vs. regional control, which has been an important aspect of the politics of the Fifth French Republic. Pompidou continued by stating that:

Paris est la capitale de la France et, à ce titre, elle joue un rôle qui bénéficie à toutes les provinces françaises, à tous les départements français. Une ville illustre, visitée, prestigieuse et un élément essentiel de la grandeur d'un pays, ce qui fait que travailler pour Paris et la région parisienne c'est travailler pour la France tout entière.

Evidently Pompidou represents a strongly centralist political position.

On the other hand, Gaston Defferre, the socialist mayor of Marseilles, supports a large measure of regional control. He has stated repeatedly that Paris has attempted to impose its ideas of development on Marseilles and the Mediterranean region. Defferre, with the support of other socialist and communist mayors of communes in the Marseilles area, has strenuously objected to the application of the loi Boscher, which plans large-scale industrial and urban developments around the Etang de Berre, a few miles to the northwest of Marseilles. Defferre claims that the Paris technocrats want to impose a pattern of development according to plans made in the capital, on the Marseilles area without consulting the inhabitants. According to Defferre, the central government's bureaucrats are "irrésponsables parisiens", who treat the local population "comme des sous-développés", or "des indigènes".<sup>3</sup> The persistent problem of local vs. central control is obviously still a very important aspect of politics in Marseilles and in the Mediterranean region.

During the revolutionary period locally based government assumed a

a number of forms in Marseilles. It appeared as the communalism and regionalism of the revolutionary Marseilles municipality, the particularism of the federalists, and as the localism of the Marseilles Jacobins. Our study has demonstrated that in the final accounting the Montagnards did not eliminate local government in Marseilles. Cobb's researches and the studies of a number of his students have shown that this situation was not unique to Marseilles:

the Terror period should not be written off as one of extreme centralization and of maximum effectiveness of government. . . [Any government], even . . . the much vaunted Revolutionary government [was often ineffective] in the face of well-organized local pressure groups. Even then, the maire was, in the long run, a more important person than the roving Représentant en mission. The maire would have the last word. . . [Recently] I have been made aware, that I have myself greatly overestimated the effectiveness of the Revolutionary Government, especially in respect to the implementation of the law of 14 frimaire.<sup>4</sup>

This does not necessarily imply that the central government's policies were not carried out in Marseilles and the Mediterranean region. But it may mean that the historiography of the Terror, having concentrated on political events in the capital, and on laws and decrees promulgated by the Mountain in Paris rather than on their application in the provinces, has not yet quite grasped the meaning of centralization as it was conceived and applied by the Revolutionary Government during the age of the Terror.

To the Mountain, centralization was not an abstract ideal; rather, it was the pragmatic response to an extremely difficult situation. Montagnard centralization certainly implied acting promptly against truly centrifugal tendencies such as congresses of popular societies, revolutionary armies, and autonomous representatives on mission bickering among themselves and often displaying too much independent revolutionary zeal. But the principal objective of the Mountain's centralization campaign appears not to have been the destruction of all local government, but the establishment

of effective political, economic and military administration. If this meant, as in the case of Marseilles, allowing a degree of political power to remain in reliable local hands, the central government was usually willing to go along with this.

In late 1793 the three principal concerns of the central government's representatives on the Mediterranean seaboard were, in order of importance, resisting foreign invasion, providing the armies and the civilian populations with supplies, and instituting relatively peaceful, relatively well-functioning political administrations. The first two of these concerns claimed the bulk of the representatives' energies, so that following the defeat of federalism in Marseilles, they could pay relatively little attention to the city's internal affairs.

In the absence of interference from the central government's representatives, the local Jacobins of Marseilles administered the city between September and December 1793. As far as our sources allow us to judge they were successful: the city was peaceful and orderly. During this period the Terror in Marseilles, in local hands, ensured the quick but orderly punishment of the republic's enemies. The majority of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal's victims came from the ranks of the city's bourgeoisie, many of whom had during the federalist interlude rebelled against the Jacobins' centralization campaign and their alliance with the sans-culottes, bitterly resented the decline of Mediterranean commerce, and had been prepared to resist the attack against local liberties.

The Terror in Toulon was radically different from the early Terror in Marseilles. To reestablish the republic's authority, Barras and Fréron punished the traitor city's population indiscriminately, using only the most rudimentary legal procedures. In January and February 1794, with the Toulon experience behind them, Barras and Fréron attempted to do the

same in Marseilles. They instituted their own military commission, manned by Paris sans-culottes; they removed Marseilles' name and demolished the city hall in a crude attempt to break the pride of an entire city. In justification of their actions, Barras and Fréron argued that following the defeat of federalism Marseilles had not been made to pay for its resistance, and that consequently an arrogant, anti-Parisian particularist attitude prevailed in the city, even among the local Jacobins.

Barras's and Fréron's actions in Marseilles and the central government's reactions to those actions disclose certain basic characteristics of the Montagnard war dictatorship and the Terror. Evidently, not all attacks by the central government's representatives against local institutions lay within the framework of the Montagnard committees' policy of centralization. When, as in the case of Marseilles, the central government's representatives arbitrarily, without previous Paris authorization, attacked well-functioning local institutions which were not directly antagonistic to Paris, they acted against the basic policy of the Montagnards -- the establishment of efficient administration. Since Barras's and Fréron's initiatives threatened to unleash a wave of local reaction in Marseilles, they in effect endangered the Mountain's centralization policy. The Mountain did not sanction this inefficient use of the Terror.

Maignet, replacing Barras and Fréron, finally introduced the basic principles of Revolutionary Government in Marseilles. He allowed trustworthy local administrators a degree of independence, but kept a close watch on their activities to ensure the execution of central government policies. He allowed local Jacobins to continue the persecution of local counterrevolutionaries, mostly members of the Marseilles bourgeoisie, but he kept a close watch on the activities of the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal. When he was forced to leave Marseilles and could not continue

this close supervision, he ordered the removal of the Revolutionary Tribunal to Aix. He used the Terror, in the form of dechristianization and the consequent stripping of valuables from churches, to the practical end of establishing currency to pay for the continued flow of food supplies to Marseilles.

Maignet recognized the strength of localism in Marseilles and realized that in order to administer the city successfully he had to reach an accommodation with the Marseilles patriots' local loyalties. Barras and Fréron had not recognized this and their reckless, self-seeking actions had brought the central government's policies into danger.

Maignet's character closely fits Cobb's description of a government terrorist. Like Cobb's typical government terrorist, Cochon Lapparent, Maignet was an "utterly typical member of the professional legal class."<sup>5</sup> Maignet, like Cochon, was "nearly always the right thing at the right moment."<sup>6</sup> Maignet's violent activities in the Vaucluse show that he "employed violence calculatedly, in the interest of the state."<sup>7</sup> Thus, like Cochon, Maignet "could be a terrorist when required to be by the Government in power, or a moderate if that was what was asked of him."<sup>8</sup> From this perspective the apparent contradiction between Maignet's moderate behaviour in Marseilles, and his ruthlessness in the Vaucluse may be understood. He followed central government policy as a ruthless terrorist and as a moderate administrator.

The centralized, bureaucratic Terror may perhaps best be understood through studying men like Maignet and Cochon Lapparent. Grey and anonymous, they were the obedient, prudent, hard-working administrators without whom no authoritarian government can function for long. One reason for the final failure of the Montagnard dictatorship was that it had too few conscientious administrators like Maignet and too many corrupt and

self-seeking supporters like Barras and Fréron.

During Maignet's preoccupation with affairs in the Vaucluse there was no representative of the central government stationed in Marseilles; the principal arm of the Terror in the city, the revolutionary tribunal, was removed from Marseilles; the local commercial bourgeoisie began to reassume control of Mediterranean commerce; and finally, in the absence of a central government representative, political power reverted to local hands. Though the central government's representatives on the Mediterranean seaboard had achieved their immediate objectives -- the defeat of federalism, the steady flow of food supplies, and the repulsion of foreign invasion -- it appears that both the Terror and the Mountain's centralization campaign were on the retreat in Marseilles in the summer of 1794, during the period of the most severe repression in Paris, months before the end of the Terror in the capital. The situation in Marseilles can only be explained by reference to the situation in Paris.

During 1794 the ruling committees operated in an atmosphere of increasing mistrust. Only a few of the Mountain's supporters had a deep commitment to the Montagnard policy of centralization, and when the Mountain assumed dictatorial executive power, most of them, accustomed to uncontrolled political action, behaved in a manner contradicting the two ruling committees' intentions. With enemies and political disintegration on all sides, the two ruling committees waged a furious battle to hold on to power. Indulgents, Hébertists, sans-culottes, all fell. The Terror was slowly transformed from a means to ensure effective administration, to an instrument to keep a small authoritarian political élite in power. Locked in a life-and-death struggle, the Montagnard Committees could pay only scant attention to provincial administration. Further, there was only a small number of faithful bureaucrats they could trust to administer



the provinces. Thus, the increased local control in Marseilles and the end of revolutionary repression in the city were probably a counterpart of the increasing mistrust and repression in Paris. The Montagnards did not have the resources to cope, under pressure, with problems both in the capital and in the provinces. Consequently, in Marseilles, as throughout France, strong particularist tendencies reasserted themselves months before Thermidor, pointing the way to the decentralization of the Thermidorian period.

## NOTES FOR CHAPTER VIII.

1. Le Monde, November 19, 1971, p. 3.
2. Ibid., November 19, 1971, p. 13.
3. Ibid., May 26, 1972, p. 36.
4. Richard C. Cobb, Reactions to the French Revolution, London, Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 7.
5. Ibid., p. 94.
6. Unsigned review of Paul Boucher, Charles Cochon Lapparent, Paris, Picard, 1970; in the Times Literary Supplement, 19.1.'70, p.109.
7. Ibid., p. 109.
8. Ibid., p. 109.

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## APPENDIX

The Gathering and Tabulation of Statistical Material.

Paul Gaffarel in "La Terreur à Marseille", Annales de Provence, 1913, X, pp. 167-168, pp. 177-181, p. 245, and in "La mission de Maignet dans les Bouches-du-Rhône et en Vaucluse", Annales de la Faculté de Lettres d'Aix, VI, 1912, pp. 16-26, provides a list of the names of persons condemned to death by the Marseilles Revolutionary Tribunal and the Marseilles Military Commission. As Gaffarel himself states, and as a comparison with Greer's figures proves, this list is incomplete. (For Greer's figures see Donald Greer, The Incidence of the Terror during the French Revolution, Harvard, 1935, p. 137). Nonetheless, it provides a reasonable basis for attempting an analysis of the occupational distribution of persons sentenced to death, and the distribution according to the charges on the bases of which the accused were convicted.

Although I have made certain changes to suit the nature of my material, my occupational distribution scheme is essentially modelled on Tilly's Occupational Classification Scheme in Charles Tilly, The Vendée, New York, John Wiley, 1967, pp. 348-349. I have added one major occupational category, that of Officer (Military or Naval). Tilly's major categories of Miller and Innkeeper were deleted, since in my entire sample there were only one miller and one innkeeper. The innkeeper has been transferred to the Commercial Bourgeois subcategory, and the miller to the General Service Artisan subcategory. I have deleted Tilly's subcategories from the major categories of Priest and Peasant, since in my sample they were not important enough to warrant their

subdivision. I have also deleted Tilly's subcategory of Agricultural Service Artisan, since I found no condemned persons belonging to this subcategory. I changed the designation of Tilly's Bourgeois subcategory D from Other to Property holder. Tilly lists bourgeois, rentier, propriétaire, "sieur", and "vivant de son bien" in Bourgeois subcategory D. It seems to me that common to all these groups was their non-noble status and ownership of sufficient property to allow them to live comfortably without needing to work; therefore, Bourgeois, Property holder seems to be a more appropriate designation than Bourgeois, Other. Since I had a large number of persons whose occupational status could not be determined I added the classification of No Occupational Status Given. After these changes my occupational classification scheme used in the Tables has been constructed as follows:

1. Noble.
2. Priest.
3. Peasant.
4. Bourgeois.
  - A. Administrative: commis, greffier, huissier, juge, lieutenant des tarifs, officier départemental, officier municipal.
  - B. Professional: académicien, architecte, avocat, chirurgien-dentiste, "homme de lois", ingénieur (hydrographe), mathématicien, médecin, notaire, professeur.
  - C. Commercial: aubergiste, armateur, courtier (commercial broker), droguiste, entrepreneur, fabricant, marchand, marchand-capitaine, négociant.

- D. Property holder: bourgeois, proprietaire, rentier,  
"vivant de son bien".
- 5. Officer (Military or Naval).
- 6. Artisan.
  - A. Industrial: imprimeur, ouvrier.
  - B. General service: boucher, boulanger, ceramiste,  
charpentier, coiffeur, confiseur, cordier, cordonnier,  
ferblantier, menuisier, meunier, perruquier, tailleur,  
voilier.
- 7. No Occupational Status Given (N.O.S.G.) and Other.

In his lists of the condemned Gaffarel states the charge on the basis of which the accused were convicted. Using this information I was able to make an attempt to analyze the incidence of death sentences according to the type of charges against the condemned. Unfortunately, I did not possess an example comparable to Tilly's for the occupational distribution, and I was forced to construct my own categories. I could distinguish eleven different charges which I then reduced to four chief categories. Condemnations for which no charges were listed, or where the listed charges could not be fitted into one of the major charge categories were included under the heading of Other. Thus, my charge classification scheme for the Tables has been constructed as follows:

- 1. Membership of leading federalist bodies in Marseilles:  
Popular Tribunal member, member of the Committee of 32  
Sections, Officer of the federalist (departmental) army.

2. Minor but specific federalist activity in Marseilles:  
provisional federalist administrator, commissioner or  
commissaire of the Committee of 32 Sections, witness  
(false) before the Popular Tribunal.
3. General (unspecified) federalist or counterrevolutionary  
activity or sentiments in Marseilles: counterrevolution,  
federalism, royalism, support for Barbaroux and Roland.
4. Federalist or counterrevolutionary activity or sentiments  
outside Marseilles.
5. Other.