SPARTAN PHILACHAIANISM

by

ROBERT GEORGE WILLIAM PETTIT

B.A., University of Victoria, 1967

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

CLASSICS

We accept this thesis as conforming to the

required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

April, 1973

ABSTRACT

During the first quarter of the sixth century Sparta was at war with Tegea. Shortly after 575 Sparta was badly defeated at the Battle of the Fetters. As a result of this defeat Sparta gave up conquest and sought instead to build up a league. To help her win over the non-Dorian states, she adopted philachaianism, a claim that she had Achaian connexions to her Dorian descent. The widely held belief that philachaianism was instituted by the ephor Chilon as part of a constitutional struggle is incorrect. A fragment of papyrus in the John Rylands collection at Manchester reveals that in 555 Sparta deposed the last Orthagorid tyrant of Sikyon, Aischines. This was done because the Orthagorids, through their anti-Dorianism, were potential rivals for the leadership of the non-Dorians and Sparta was beginning to have close relations with Sikyon's enemy, Korinth.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

B.J.R.L.   Bulletin of the John Rylands Library

C.Q.   Classical Quarterly

J.H.S.   Journal of Hellenic Studies

T.A.P.A.   Transactions and Proceedings of the American

                   Philological Association

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I should like to express my thanks to Dr. M. F. McGregor

and Dr. P. Harding for the help and encouragement they have

given me during the writing of this thesis.

FOREWORD

During the first half of the sixth century Sparta began
a policy of forming alliances with other states. An important
part of this policy was philachaianism, a public declaration that
Sparta was descended from Achaian as well as Dorian stock. This
claim was intended to make Sparta appear less hostile to the non-
Dorian states in the Peloponnese. In this thesis I shall discuss
the reasons for the adoption of philachaianism, showing how Sparta's
disastrous defeat by Tegea brought about a serious crisis that
threatened Sparta's future power and safety. In the course of the
discussion I shall indicate what role philachaianism was intended
to play, estimate the approximate date when it was adopted,
and show that philachaianism was not adopted, as is commonly held,
as part of a struggle for power between the kings and the ephors.
I shall conclude by discussing the evidence for dating the Spartan
deposition of Aischines, tyrant of Sikyon, to 555, and by explaining
how this action was connected with Sparta's foreign policy.

CHAPTER ONE

THE ADOPTION OF PHILACHAIANISM

After 600 Sparta was ready to expand her power into the north
and central Peloponnese. At home the Lykourgan reforms had establish-
ed a stable society by removing the worst social abuses and pro-
viding a form of government that satisfied the people. In the
west her power was supreme. She had crushed the recent Messenian
resistance, at least temporarily, and reduced the population to
the status of Helots. This pacification of Messenia was import-
ant, since the Spartan military system required that the Spartan
citizen be free from the necessity of working the land and so be
available for full-time military training and campaigning. During
the last stages of the Messenian wars Sparta had expanded her territory
to the southwestern coast of the Peloponnese by conquering Pylos.[1]

Her position, however, was by no means secure. To the north-
east lay Argos, an old and dangerous enemy that had inflicted a
crushing defeat upon Sparta at the Battle of Hysiai in 669.[2] Her
territory ran down the eastern coast of the Peloponnese to Cape

----

1 W. G. Forrest, A History of Sparta (London, 1968), p. 58.
In this and the following paragraph I am adopting the account of
Forrest.

2 Pausanias, II, 24, 7; Dionysios of Halikarnassos, Antiquitates
Romanae, III, 1.

Malea, including the island of Kythera, threatening Sparta's

eastern flank. Due north lay Arkadia, and beyond that Achaia.

Both regions were non-Dorian and bore racial animosity towards

Sparta.[3] In addition Arkadia had long been a supporter of the

Messenians, providing them with aid during the wars with Sparta,

and afterwards receiving refugees as citizens.[4] During the first

half of the sixth century Sparta was concerned with removing

these threats to her northeastern frontier.

The city of Tegea was Sparta's particular foe, with whom she

had waged long and generally unsuccessful wars.[5] The conquest

of Tegea was important, not only because it was a centre of

anti-Spartan feeling, but also for strategic reasons. Possession

of Tegea would put Sparta in a favourable position to strike east

and cut off Argos from her territory down the east coast.[6] About

----

3 D. H. Leahy, "The Bones of Tisamenos," Historia, IV (1955),
p. 30. At one time Argos and Arkadia had been allied, but the
alliance was dissolved after a popular uprising occurred in Argos,
probably in protest at returning to Arkadia land taken from Sparta
after the Battle of Hysiai, and the Argive king fled to Tegea (Dio-
doros, VII, 13, 2; Forrest, op. cit., p. 73).

4 Strabo, VIII, 4, 10; Polybios, IV, 33.

5 Pausanias, III, 7, 3; VIII, 5, 9; 48, 4-5; 53, 9-10.

6 A. J. Toynbee, Some Problems of Greek History (Oxford,
1969), p. 183.

570, in the reigns of Leon and Agasikles, Sparta made a final

effort to defeat Tegea.[7] She appealed to Delphoi and received

the following reply:

Ἀρκαδίην μ' αἰτεῖς; μέγα μ' αἰτεῖς· οὔ τοι δώσω.
πολλοὶ ἐν Ἀρκαδίῃ βαλανηφάγοι ἄνδρες ἔασιν
οἵ σ' ἀποκωλύσουσιν. ἐγὼ δέ τοι οὔτι μεγαίρω·
δώσω τοι Τεγέην ποσσίκροτον ὀρχήσασθαι
καὶ καλὸν πεδίον σχοίνῳ διαμετρήσασθαι.[8]

The Spartans interpreted the oracle as favourable and were

so confident that they marched into battle carrying the bonds

with which to secure their foes. Their confidence was unwarranted.

In the ensuing conflict they were decisively defeated, and the

army capitulated. The prisoners, chained in their own leg-irons,

worked the Tegean fields. The fetters were later displayed at

Tegea in the Temple of Athena Alea.[9]

----

7 The Spartan king lists are calculated largely by generation.

In the long run the chronology is reasonably accurate but the

dates for the individual kings are not exact. For a discussion

of this problem see K. A. Chrimes, Ancient Sparta (Manchester,

1949), pp. 333-340. The dates given for the kings in this study

will be those suggested by Forrest (op. cit., p. 21).

8 Herodotos, I, 66, 2.

9 Herodotos, I, 66, 4; Pausanias, VIII, 47, 2.

The Spartans did not give up the struggle, but despite their repeated attempts they failed to gain the upper hand. Finally they decided to ask Delphoi and messengers were again sent to enquire what should be done to end the series of defeats. The priestess replied that it was necessary to bring home the bones of Orestes, the son of Agamemnon. When the Spartans were unable to locate the tomb they sent a second embassy, which received this answer: Ἔστι τις Ἀρκαδίης Τεγέη λευρῷ ἐνὶ χώρῳ, ἔνθ' ἄνεμοι πνείουσι δύω κρατερῆς ὑπ' ἀνάγκης, καὶ τύπος ἀντίτυπος, καὶ πῆμ' ἐπὶ πήματι κεῖται. ἔνθ' Ἀγαμεμνονίδην κατέχει φυσίζοος αἶα· τὸν σὺ κομισσάμενος Τεγέης ἐπιτάρροθος ἔσσῃ. [10]

This oracle was no clearer than the first, and the Spartans were no better off than before until Lichas, one of the ἀγαθοεργοί, came across the tomb by accident.[11] In the course of a truce this man was visiting Tegea. On entering a smithy he watched with great interest while the smith forged iron. The smith said that if Lichas marvelled at the process he should see something

----

10 Herodotos, I, 67.

11 The ἀγαθοεργοί were the five senior members of the royal bodyguard who retired each year. In the year following retirement they served as special agents of the state (Herodotos, I, 67).

else, even more astounding. While digging a well in the courtyard,
the smith went on, he had found a coffin seven cubits long, and,
wondering if there really had been men of such a size, he had
opened it. Inside he found the bones of a giant, which he later
reburied. Lichas felt that this was the explanation of the oracle.
He reasoned that, as the discovery of iron led to men's injury,
the forged iron would be the anguish laid on anguish, while the
bellows were the winds and the anvil and hammer the shock and
counter-shock. He concluded that the bones found by the smith
must be those of Orestes. He revealed his discovery to the Spartans.
A false banishment to make him popular in Tegea was arranged. He
returned to Tegea, where after much difficulty he persuaded the
smith to lease him the courtyard. He dug up the bones and took
them back to Sparta. There followed another period of fighting,
during which the Spartans gained the upper hand.[12]

There has been some question whether the battle fought
during the reigns of Leon and Agasikles was the Battle of the
Fetters. Herodotos does not say definitely that the battle he
describes was fought under Leon and Agasikles, although he im-
plies that it was.[13] Pausanias says that the battle took place
in the reign of the Spartan king Charillos, who ruled ca 775-
750, and adds further details concerning the role played by the

----

12 Herodotos, I, 68; Pausanias, III, 5-6.

13 Herodotos, I, 65.

Tegean queen Choera and the Tegean women.[14] Chrimes accepts the version of Pausanias, but does so in the course of an argument for an early date for the Lykourgan reforms, and does not explain her choice.[15] Theopompos assigns a Spartan defeat to the lifetime of the Kretan seer Epimenides. He does not mention the fetters or the oracle, but uses the word $\dot{\epsilon}\lambda\dot{\eta}\phi\theta\eta\sigma\alpha\nu$ to describe the defeat.[16] [17] Leahy points out that as the capture of an army

----

14 Pausanias, III, 7, 3; VIII, 5, 9; 47, 2; 48, 4-5. For the date of Charillos see supra, p. 3, note 7.

15 Chrimes, op. cit., pp. 331-333.

16 Herodotos (IX, 26) records a dispute between the Tegeans and the Athenians over position in the line of battle at Plataia. To support their case the Tegeans recounted their long service to the Peloponnesians. This speech does not mention the Spartans by name, and implies friendship to the Achaians as well as to the Dorians. The passage does not provide any clue to the duration of the Spartan-Tegean friendship that began after the Battle of the Fetters.

17 Diogenes Laertios, I, 115. Theopompos also says that the battle took place $\pi\rho\dot{o}s$ $\dot{O}\rho\chi o\mu\dot{\epsilon}\nu\psi$. Leahy suggests that the Spartan army had advanced into the southwestern part of Arkadia, which was the centre of the pro-Messenian movement. The Tegeans drew north into Orchomenan territory to lure the Spartans into a trap ("The Spartan Defeat at Orchomenos," Phoenix, XII [1958], pp. 158-165).

was a rare occurrence it is likely that Theopompos was referring
to the Battle of the Fetters.[18] Although Epimenides is a rather
uncertain chronological guide, since the facts of his life are
confused with myth and there is some dispute over his period of
activity, nothing suggests that he lived in the eighth century.
His age is reported to have been 154, 157 or 229 years.[19] Suidas
records that he was born in the thirtieth Olympiad (660-657) and
was an old man when he came to Athens.[20] Aristotle reports that
he purified Athens after the Kylonian massacre ca 600.[21] Plato
says he came to Athens ca 500, but this statement was probably due
to confusion with a literary Epimenides.[22] The Battle of the
Fetters took place shortly after 575.[23] Epimenides would have
been ninety or more at that time, which is in keeping with the
tradition of his great age. There is no evidence to connect
him with the eighth century.

Huxley points out that the Spartans' excessive confidence

---

18 Leahy, op. cit., p. 153.

19 Diogenes Laertios, I, 109.

20 Suidas, s.v. Ἐπιμενίδης.

21 Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 1.

22 Plato, Laws I (642d); J. E. Sandys, Aristotle's
Constitution of Athens (London, 1912), p. 3.

23 See infra, pp.8, 17-18.

before the battle indicates an event late in the Tegean struggle,
which the evidence of Herodotos shows ended in the sixth century.[24]
This again supports a sixth-century date. The above facts indicate
that the Battle of the Fetters took place in the sixth century, and,
according to the chronology indicated, sometime between 575 and 560
when Leon and Agasikles were both ruling.

A Spartan victory finally ended the hostilities. Two clauses
of the treaty have survived. Unfortunately, they are brief, and
one of them is surrounded by much controversy, so that it is not
possible to learn the nature of the treaty or the state of
Spartan-Tegean relations. Plutarch records: Μεσσηνίους ἐκβαλεῖν
ἐκ τῆς χώρας, καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι χρηστοὺς ποιεῖν. ἐξηγούμενος
οὖν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τοῦτό φησι δύνασθαι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτιννύναι
βοηθείας χάριν τοῖς λακωνίζουσι τῶν Τεγεατῶν.
His briefer version gives: φησι μηδένα χρηστὸν ποιεῖν
βοηθείας χάριν τοῖς λακωνίζουσι τῶν Τεγεατῶν,
ὅπερ εἶναι μηδένα ἀποκτιννύναι.[25]

The clause requiring the expulsion of the Messenians would

----

24 Herodotos, I, 65; G. L. Huxley, Early Sparta (London,
1962), p. 66.

25 Plutarch, Quaest. Graec. 5 (Moralia 277c); the abridged
version is in Quaest. Rom. 52 (Moralia 292b).

9

be a natural demand on Sparta's part. The removal of the

Messenians would put an end to at least one source of anti-

Spartan feeling and help to preserve the peace.

The second phrase, καὶ μὴ ἐξ εἶναι χρηστοὺς ποιεῖν, presents some difficulties. The usual translation of χρηστός as "good", a euphemism for dead, has been rejected on the grounds of linguistics and common sense. Ehrenberg holds that here is the verbal adjective of χρᾶσθαι, which means "...the outlawed...the men to be used (in this case ill used)." He has based his argument mainly on the fact that ἄχρηστός in a Kretan inscription means "not to be used" in public business.[26] The supplement to Liddell and Scott gives tentative agreement to this view, saying that χρηστός "may be <u>good</u> as a euphemism for <u>dead</u>, but probably <u>outlawed</u>, liable <u>to be killed by any man</u>."[27] This is a subtle shift in meaning, from outright execution to the state of outlawry. Jacoby argues that it would be absurd to think that the Spartans would be at all concerned about protecting the lives of Messenians. He feels that χρηστός has the connotation of citizenship rather than outlawry.[28] Both of these

----

26 V. Ehrenberg, "An Early Source of Polis-Constitution", <u>C.Q.</u>, XXXVII (1943), pp. 14-18.

27 H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, <u>A Greek English Lexicon</u>, revised by H. S. Jones and R. McKenzie (Oxford, 1966), p. 2110.

28 F. Jacoby, "ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ," <u>C.Q.</u>, XXXVIII (1944), pp. 15-16.

translations assume that the Messenians are the object of both

verbs, and fail to discuss the statement of Aristotle that it

was the Spartan sympathizers rather than the Messenians who

were in danger of punishment. Ehrenberg merely ignores it,

while Jacoby contradicts himself, saying first that he does

not think that a reference to Spartan sympathizers belongs in

the treaty, yet later admitting to the presence of Spartan

adherents in Tegea.[29] The statement of Aristotle is important.

Plutarch's use of the quotation suggests that Aristotle had dis-

cussed the Tegean treaty and to him it had forbidden death to

the Spartan sympathizers. There is no ambiguity in his language.

Since there is no indication whether or not Plutarch was citing

the whole of the sentence in the treaty (and it must be re-

membered that he was concerned with explaining the word $\chi\rho\eta\sigma\tau\delta\varsigma$,

not with the Spartan-Tegean treaty), it is dangerous to build

too strong a case on what is preserved, and especially to use it

to refute Aristotle.[30] Jacoby's argument is further weakened by

——

29 "I shall not specify here why this possibility seems very

improbable to me" (p. 14); "...a real help to their adherents

in Tegea" (p. 15).

30 <u>Quaest</u>. <u>Graec</u>. 5 asks $\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\varsigma$ $o\acute{\iota}$ $\pi\alpha\rho'$ $\mathring{A}\rho\kappa\acute{\alpha}\sigma\iota$
$\kappa\alpha\grave{\iota}$ $\Lambda\alpha\kappa\epsilon\delta\alpha\iota\mu o\nu\acute{\iota}o\iota\varsigma$ $\chi\rho\eta\sigma\tau o\acute{\iota}$;

<u>Quaest</u>. <u>Rom</u>. 52 asks $\Delta\iota\grave{\alpha}$ $\tau\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\widehat{\eta}$ $\kappa\alpha\lambda o\upsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$ $\Gamma\epsilon\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\eta$
$M\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta$ $\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha$ $\theta\acute{\upsilon}o\upsilon\sigma\iota$ $\kappa\alpha\grave{\iota}$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\chi o\nu\tau\alpha\iota$
$\mu\eta\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha$ $\chi\rho\eta\sigma\tau\grave{o}\nu$ $\mathring{\alpha}\pi o\beta\widehat{\eta}\nu\alpha\iota$ $\tau\widehat{\omega}\nu$ $o\mathring{\iota}\kappa o\gamma\epsilon\nu\widehat{\omega}\nu$;

his translation of $\chi\rho\eta\sigma\tau\delta s$ as pertaining to citizenship. The clause would thus read that the Messenians were to be expelled and it would be illegal to make them citizens. This is contradictory, for the specification that the Messenians were not to be made citizens suggests that they were in fact to be allowed to remain in Tegea with some inferior status, yet the first clause called for their expulsion. His only explanation for this is inadequate: "It is useless to speculate whether Sparta thought that observance of the negative clause would admit of an easier and more complete control than that of the positive one."[31]

Neither author has explained why Aristotle's comment should be ignored. Jacoby's translation is not logical and, while Ehrenberg's presents no difficulty in the meaning of the clause, he has failed to show why the usual meaning of "put to death" cannot be used. In view of these facts, I hold that the treaty called for the expulsion of Messenian refugees and the protection of a pro-Spartan group in Tegea from death.

The scanty remains of the treaty do not reveal whether it was dictated by Sparta or negotiated on the basis of a mutual desire to stop fighting. Herodotos does not describe the nature of the Spartans' final victory, but his language suggests a series of small victories rather than a major decisive blow

----

31 Jacoby, op. cit., p. 15.

of the magnitude of the Battle of the Fetters.[32] As will be
shown in the next chapter, it is possible that this change in
fortunes was due to the adoption of philachaianism.

The Spartan seizure of the bones of Orestes was the first
public manifestation of the philachaian policy that was pursued
during the middle of the sixth century. Sparta was a Dorian
state and claimed descent from the Dorian leaders, the Herakleidai.
She would thus evoke racial as well as political hostility from
the non-Dorian states of Arkadia and Achaia. The adoption of
philachaianism was an attempt by Sparta to claim a connexion with
the House of Atreus, the original Achaian rulers of the Peloponnese,
and place less emphasis on her Dorian origin. Orestes, the son of
Agamemnon, had been the last great Achaian ruler. The seizure of
his bones and their transferral to Sparta were a public statement
by the Spartans that they claimed descent from him, and that they
acknowledged the greatness of his family.[33] Their action also
indicates their readiness to preserve and defend his remains.

There is some evidence that Sparta used literary means to
emphasize her Achaian association. The poet Stesichoros, who

----

32 Herodotos, I, 68, 6: Καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου,
ὅκως πειρῴατο ἀλλήλων, πολλῷ κατυπέρτεροι
τῷ πολέμῳ ἐγίνοντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι.

33 G. Dickins, "The Growth of Spartan Policy," J.H.S., XXXII
(1912), p. 12.

appears to have had Spartan connexions, wrote an <u>Oresteia</u> that
was presented at Sparta in the first half of the sixth century.[34]
In this work the Argive connexion of the principal figures was in
one instance replaced by a Spartan association, and in another de-
emphasized.

In the first place, Stesichoros says that the home of Agamem-
non was in Sparta, not in Mykenai as Homer does.[35] Secondly,
Stesichoros uses the patronymic Πλεισθενίδας to describe
Agamemnon or Menelaos or Orestes.[36] Hesiod explains that Agamemnon
was the son of Atreus, but took the patronymic Πλεισθενίδας
when his father died young.[37] Atreus was buried at Mykenai.[38]
Stesichoros freed Agamemnon from too close an Argive connexion

----

34 C. M. Bowra, <u>Greek Lyric Poetry</u> (Oxford, 1961), pp. 107-115.

35 Homer, Iliad, II, 569-577. For the version of Stesichoros
see the scholiast on Euripides' Orestes, 46, cited in Bowra,
p. 113. Ὅμηρος δὲ ἐν Μυκήναις φησὶν εἶναι τὰ
βασίλεια τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, Στησίχορος δὲ
καὶ Σιμωνίδης ἐν Λακεδαίμονι.

36 Bowra, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 114.

37 Hesiod, <u>Carmina</u>, ed. A. Rzach (Stuttgart, 1958), fr. 98.

38 Pausanias, II, 16, 6.

by using an alternative patronymic.[39]

A passage in Pausanias describes what may have been a further example of philachaianism. He states: Τισαμενοῦ δὲ τὸν νεκρὸν Ἀχαιῶν ἐν Ἑλίκῃ θαψάντων, ὕστερον χρόνῳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς σφισιν ἀνειπόντος χρηστηρίου κομίζουσι τὰ ὀστᾶ ἐς Σπάρτην, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ἔτι αὐτῷ τάφος, ἔνθα τὰ δεῖπνα Λακεδαιμονίους ἐστὶ τὰ φειδίτια καλούμενα.[40]

Tisamenos was the son of Orestes. Tradition held that when the Dorians invaded he led his people north to what was later called Achaia and drove out the Ionian inhabitants. Tisamenos himself fell in the assault on the capital, Helike, and the conquest was completed by his sons.[41]

The body of Tisamenos was a valuable find in the Spartans' quest for Achaian trophies since there was no awkward connexion with Argos to explain or conceal.[42] Leahy argues that the bones

----

39 Bowra holds the same view, but on the purely hypothetical grounds that Stesichoros used a non-Homeric version that made Pleisthenes the father of Agamemnon (op. cit., pp. 114-115).

40 Pausanias, VII, 1, 8.

41 Strabo, 383-384, 365C; Polybios, II, 41.

42 The possibility that the tomb seen by Pausanias was that of another Tisamenos is remote. The only other known Tisamenos was an Eleian seer who was active in the fifth century (Herodotos,

were used in an attempt to win over Helike in the same manner
as those of Orestes were used at Tegea. He cites no evidence,
but bases his hypothesis on the similarity in the method of
acquisition of the bodies and the fact that as Helike was the
leading city of Achaia it would have been the logical area to
begin the conquest of that region.[43] Leahy explains the absence
of proof by saying that Sparta's overtures to Helike were a fail-
ure and no alliance was made. He holds that Sparta suppressed
all reports of the matter, and that Helike was too remote from
the events of the Greek world to make the affair known.[44]

The suggestion of Leahy's discussed in the preceding para-
graph is accepted by Huxley and Parke and Wormell, but it is
questionable whether such unqualified acceptance is warranted.[45]
The basis of philachaianism was the Spartans' public pride in
their Achaian heritage. It was not in keeping with the policy
to make an appeal for an alliance that was not declared publicly.
This appeal would have to be made with much publicity. It is

IX, 33-35; Pausanias, III, 11-12). See also P. Poralla,
Prosopographie der Lakedaimonier (Breslau, 1913), p. 119, and
Leahy, op. cit. (supra, p. 2, note 3), p. 28.

43 Leahy, op. cit. (supra, p. 2, note 3), pp. 32-33.

44 Leahy, op. cit. (supra, p. 2, note 3), pp. 37-38.

45 Huxley, op. cit., pp. 32-33; H. W. Parke and D. E.
Wormell, The Delphic Oracle I (Oxford, 1956), p. 96.

too much to believe that diplomacy of such a nature was attempted
in such secrecy that the Spartans were able to erase all record of
it. A second weakness of Leahy's argument is his assertion that
the policy of philachaianism was successful with Tegea, and that
the Spartans were anxious to repeat what appeared to be winning
tactics.[46] Philachaianism will be analysed in detail in the
following chapter, and it suffices to say here that there is
no definite proof that philachaianism was responsible for the
victory over Tegea. The Spartans had no reason to believe
that they had discovered an infallible diplomatic weapon.

I believe, because of the facts just mentioned, that Leahy's
view is unacceptable, and that the acquisition of the body of
Tisamenos was not part of a diplomatic approach to Helike.

The reason for the adoption of philachaianism and its
date will be discussed in the next chapter.

————

46 Leahy, op. cit. (supra, p. 2, note 3), p. 31.

CHAPTER TWO

THE DATE AND PURPOSE OF PHILACHAIANISM

The adoption of philachaianism presents three problems.
These are its date, its purpose and the reason for its adoption.

The date of the beginning of philachaianism is the first of
these problems. Herodotos does not say in whose reign the Spartans
were told by Delphoi to find the body of Orestes, nor when the
series of Spartan victories began that terminated the war with
Tegea, but he does indicate that it was over when the Lydian
messengers arrived ca 550.[1] In 555 Sparta deposed the tyrant
of Sikyon, and, as it is not likely that she would have under--
taken this action unless the Tegean war had been concluded, 555
is the terminus ante quem.[2] I have demonstrated above that the
Battle of the Fetters, which preceded the adoption of philachaian-
ism, took place in the reign of Leon and Agasikles.[3] These two
kings ruled together between 575 and 560.[4] The terminus post
quem is thus 575. Herodotos records a series of events after the
Battle of the Fetters: the period of truce, the missions to Delphoi,

————

1 Herodotos, I, 65-68; Eusebios, Eusebi Chronicorum Canonum
Quae Supersunt, II, edited by A. Schoene (reprint, Zurich, 1967),
pp. 96-97.

2 See infra, pp. 32-44.

3 See supra, pp. 5-8.

4 Forrest, op. cit., p. 21.

and the period of renewed fighting that took place before the final

peace, but does not indicate how much time elapsed.[5] The probabil-

ity that Sparta restored Elis to the presidency of the Olympic

games in 568 suggests that she was making sufficient progress against

Tegea to undertake other actions, or had even ended the war.[6] In

view of the above facts, I feel that a likely date for the adoption

of philachaianism is ca 570.

The next matter to consider is the purpose of philachaianism.

Herodotos' account indicates that the acquisition of the body of

Orestes was a definite turning point in the war against Tegea.

Sparta had suffered a series of defeats at the hands of Tegea that

culminated in the Battle of the Fetters, but after the seizure

of Orestes' bones the course of events was reversed, and Sparta

became steadily victorious.[7] The succession, first of defeats, and

then of victories, was unbroken, and suggests that there was more

involved than the mere fortunes of battle. The reason for the

turn of events is not immediately apparent. There is no record

of a military reform in the first half of the sixth century

that would account for the improvement in Sparta's performance,

and Forrest goes as far as the say that the Spartan society itself

----

5 Herodotos, I, 67-68.

6 M. F. McGregor, "Kleisthenes of Sikyon and the Panhellenic

Festivals," T.A.P.A., LXXI (1941), p. 272.

7 Herodotos, I, 68.

was relatively unmilitaristic until the middle of the sixth century.[8]

In the absence of military reform to explain Sparta's sudden run of victories, it is necessary to examine the situation at the end of the war and consider whether philachaianism could have been a factor in Tegea's defeat.

The peace-treaty indicates that there was a group of Spartan sympathizers in Tegea who were in danger of losing their lives.[9] The fact that this group was in such danger at the time of defeat implies that they were held responsible by the majority of the citizens for Tegea's conquest by Sparta. Internal strife was a common problem in Greek city states.[10] I suggest that there was a faction in Tegea that felt that their cause would best be furthered by peace or even alliance with Sparta. With the Spartans'

----

8 Forrest, op. cit., p. 72. The word militaristic is applied only to the social structure, and not to the foreign policy. A country can venerate the soldier and war without actually fighting. Germany from 1870 to 1890 is a case in point. During these years German society was geared for war, yet Bismarck's whole foreign policy was based on keeping peace in Europe.

9 See supra, pp. 8-11.

10 See, for instance, the turmoil caused in Athens by Peisistratos during the sixth century.

new claim to philachaianism, the position of this group would have changed. Instead of being a party seeking peace to advance their own political ends, they assumed the respectable stature of advocates of association with a racially kindred state, and attracted a large enough following to divide the city and weaken its war effort.

There is no evidence available to lift the above suggestion out of the realm of conjecture, beyond the fact that it provides a reasonable explanation for Sparta's sudden change of fortune. If it is rejected, then philachaianism does not appear to have affected the war at all. If it is accepted, philachaianism served as propaganda to encourage political disputes in Tegea, and to be effective relied on the existence of a party inside Tegea that was strong enough to hinder the Tegean army and was willing to side with Sparta.

This heavy dependence on a certain set of favourable circumstances is hardly likely to have made philachaianism more than a diplomatic means to be employed occasionally, yet it appears to have been a continuing policy. There is an expression of belief in it long after the Tegean alliance. In 511 Kleomenes was in Athens supervising the expulsion of the Peisistratids. He attempted to enter the shrine of Athena on the Akropolis. When the priestess tried to block his entrance, protesting that it was sacrilege for a Dorian to enter the sanctuary, the king

brushed her aside saying: Ὦ γύναι, ἀλλ' οὐ Δωριεύς εἰμι ἀλλ' Ἀχαιός."

The long existence of philachaianism can be explained by an examination of another aspect of Spartan foreign policy. By the last quarter of the sixth century Sparta had abandoned her old policy of conquering other states and reducing them to inferior status, and had created a league of states of which she was the leader. In ca 508 when Kleomenes wished to restore Isagoras to Athens he did not employ only Spartan troops. Herodotos records: ... συνέλεγε ἐκ πάσης Πελοποννήσου στρατόν....[12] The allies, following the example of Korinth and the second Spartan king, Demaratos, left when they discovered the true purpose of the expedition. This refusal to fight makes it clear that the league members were free states, not the vassals of Sparta. This was emphasized again later when Kleomenes wanted to restore Hippias as tyrant in Athens: μεταπερψάμενοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ἀγγέλους. Korinth again led the opposition, and when the Korinthian ambassador, Sokles, had finished, the others agreed and refused to act.[13] Thus by about 505 Sparta led a league of states. The fact that

----

11 Herodotos, V, 72.

12 Herodotos, V, 74. For the date see Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 20; Parian Marble, ep. 46.

13 Herodotos, V, 91-93.

they assembled at Sparta's bidding, and had earlier furnished
troops at the command of Kleomenes, indicates that Sparta was
the acknowledged leader, but their double refusal to fight against
Athens is evidence of their continued independence. Sparta
controlled her allies by agreement, not force.

Thus, during the sixth century, Sparta was seeking to make
alliances with other states. At the same time she was practising
philachaianism. There appears to be a close connexion between the
two policies. Although the exact date when the policy of alliances
was undertaken is not known, the shattering defeat of the Battle of
the Fetters was a logical time for Sparta to re-examine her whole
foreign policy. Secondly, there is much similarity between the
two policies. While Sparta was seeking friends in Greece as a whole,
philachaianism was appealing for friendship to one special group:
the non-Dorians. I suggest that philachaianism was a part of Sparta's
overall foreign policy, and was intended to make a lasting peace with
Tegea after the war. Any effect it had on Tegea while hostilities
were still in progress was an added bonus.

It remains to discuss the question why Sparta adopted philachaianism.
Dickins connects the abandonment of conquest with philachaianism and
believes that it was adopted by the ephors as part of a constitutional
struggle to reduce the power of the kings. He goes so far as to claim
it was the work of the ephor Chilon.[14]

----

14 Dickins, op. cit., p. 23. Huxley (op. cit., p. 67) and
Forrest (op. cit., p. 76) agree with Dickins.

Dickins argues that successful campaigns greatly increased the prestige of the kings. The Spartan system of dividing the conquered land into κλῆροι would further add to the royal power, since a time would come when there would not be enough Spartiates to hold the new territories. In this case, Dickins states, either the holdings of each individual would be enlarged, or else foreigners would be admitted to some form of citizenship. In either case the new land-holders would owe their land to the kings and would thus provide a royalist faction.[15] Dickins assumes that the Spartans not only abandoned their plans for conquest, but also modified their vision of Sparta's future, seeing her as a relatively small Peloponnesian state. Dickins bases the preceding statement on the remark of Chilon concerning the island of Kythera: εἴθε μὴ ἐγεγόνει, ἢ γεγομένη κατεβυθίσθη.[16] Dickins interprets this remark as meaning that Chilon saw the danger that the island would pose to a state that lacked a strong military system. He goes on to say that, in order to prevent the population from becoming discontented at the lack of expansion, Chilon introduced or strengthened the ἀγωγή, stressing militarism and taking pains to exclude foreigners who might introduce dangerously liberal ideas. In connexion with this, Sparta embarked on an anti-

----

15 Dickins, op. cit., pp. 23-25.

16 Diogenes Laertios, I, 72-73; Herodotos, VII, 235.

tyrant policy, since the tyrants generally favoured Panhellen-
ism.[17]

There are several objections to this theory. First, Dickins
ignores the impact of the Battle of the Fetters on the domestic
situation. Secondly, he misinterprets the remark about Kythera.
The statement was a recognition of a weak point in Sparta's de-
fences. It could equally well mean that Sparta was planning a
policy of outright aggression and that Chilon regretted the
presence of such a danger in the rear.[18] Thirdly, Dickins is
inconsistent. He has laid great stress on the ephors' fear of
the kings gaining popular support through campaigns, yet he
suggests not only that the ephors under Chilon strengthened the
army, but also that they sent the kings out on expeditions against
the tyrants. The increased importance of the army would have
tended to emphasize the importance of the kings, who were the
supreme military commanders.[19] The successful depositions of
tyrants in the future, even if unaccompanied by the seizure of
territory, would have enhanced the kings' reputations.

There is also insufficient evidence concerning the life of

----

17 Dickins, op. cit., pp. 23-25.

18 The occupation of the island by Nikias in 425 indicates the
wisdom of this remark (Thucydides, IV, 53; A. W. Gomme, A
Historical Commentary on Thucydides, III [Oxford, 1956], p. 507).

19 For the kings' military authority see infra, pp. 35-36.

Chilon to indicate that he initiated the changes that Dickins attributes to him. His birthdate is not recorded.[20] His earliest known action was his advice to the father of Peisistratos, Hippokrates, to avoid siring a son.[21] As this was some time before Peisistratos' birth, it suggests that Chilon was influential before 590.[22] There is some evidence that describes his political career. He was ephor in 555.[23] There exists a tradition that he advanced

----

20 The only statement about his age is that he was a in the fifty-second Olympiad (572-569). Diogenes Laertios, I, 72.

21 Diogenes Laertios, I, 69; Herodotos, I, 59.

22 Huxley, op. cit., p. 69.

23 γέγονε δὲ ἔφορος κατὰ τὴν πεντηκοστὴν ἕκτην Ὀλυμπιάδα - Παμφίλη δέ φησι κατὰ τὴν ἕκτην, καὶ πρῶτον ἔφορον γενέσθαι - ἐπὶ Εὐθυδήμον, ὥς φησι Σωσικράτης.

(Diogenes Laertios, I, 68). The text used is that of Jacoby (Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, 2B, 244, fr. c). The report of Sosikrates is preferable because he drew on the chronologer Apollodoros (Huxley, op. cit., p. 69). For a discussion of the the date of the archonship of Euthydemos, 555, see T. J. Cadoux, "The Athenian Archons from Kreon to Hypsichides," J.H.S., LXVIII (1948), pp. 72, 76, 108-109.

the power of the ephors: καὶ πρῶτος εἰσηγήσατο
ἐφόρους τοῖς βασιλεῦσι παραζευγνύναι.[24]
This is not absolute proof, as Diogenes himself says that Satyros
states that Lykourgos increased the ephors' powers. Pamphilos
points out that Chilon was the first ephor, which is incorrect.[25]
The existence of the tradition, even though the details are in-
correct, suggests that Chilon was connected with the advancement
of the ephors' powers.

It is possible that Chilon was alive and instrumental in
the action of the ephors in attempting to compel Anaxandridas
to abandon his first wife on the grounds of infertility and
to take another wife. The king objected so strongly that the
ephors modified their demand to bigamy, to which Anaxandridas
agreed.[26] The second wife was the great-grand-daughter of

----

24 Diogenes Laertios, I, 68.

25 Diogenes Laertios, I, 68. See supra, note 23, on the text
used. The origins of the ephorate are clouded, but it is cer-
tain that it was created long before the sixth century. See H.
Michell, Sparta (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 119-125, for a discussion
of the beginnings of the ephorate. Eusebios places the first
ephor in Olympiad 5.4 (757, Hieronymos) or 6.1 (756, Versio
Armenia), op. cit., p. 80.

26 This event occurred no later than the 540s. Kleomenes,
the product of the union, came to the throne ca 519 (Herodotos,
VI, 108; Thucydides, III, 68). If he was in his twenties at

Chilon.[27] When we see that another great-grand-daughter was
married to the Eurypontid king Demaratos, it begins to look as
if Chilon were trying to ensure the close connexion of his family
with both the royal houses, perhaps to advance the power of the
ephors.[28]

The only evidence to connect Chilon with philachaianism is
weak. After Anaxandridas' second wife had given birth to
Kleomenes the king returned to his first wife, who then gave
birth to three sons. The eldest was called Dorieus, a name
that Huxley interprets as a rejection of philachaianism by the
king.[29] Anaxandridas deeply resented the interference in his
private life, especially when the pregnancy of the first wife
negated the reasons for the action. Forrest interprets the
choice of name as an insult to the ephors who were sponsoring phil-
achaianism.[30]

The above paragraphs have shown that there is no strong
evidence to connect Chilon with philachaianism, or to indicate
that he wanted to reduce the kings' authority and isolate Sparta,

————

the time, and there is no evidence to indicate that he came to
the throne exceptionally young, he would have been born before
540.

27 See Appendix, p. 48.

28 Herodotos, VI, 65.

29 Huxley, op. cit., p. 71.

30 Forrest, op. cit., p. 83.

as Dickins suggests.

There is, on the other hand, evidence that is quite con-
trary to Dickins views. Chilon died at Pisa from overexcite-
ment when his son won a boxing victory in the Olympic games.[31]
This is not an attitude likely to be found in one who wanted
to withdraw Sparta from the affairs of the Greek world.[32]

There are, moreover, indications that the kings were connected
with philachaianism. The technical aspects of the policy were
carried out by royal servants. The bones of Orestes were dis—
covered by one of the ἀγαθο εργοι, or royal pensioners. Delphoi
had suggested the acquisition of the bones, and it was the royal
prerogative to appoint the messengers to Delphoi, the Πύθιοι.[33]
It is not likely that, if the ephors were trying to reduce royal
power, they would have worked through royal officials.

The discussion in the preceding paragraphs indicates that

---

31 Diogenes Laertios, I, 72. The date is not known. There
is no preserved record of a Spartan victory in boxing in the
appropriate years. See L. Moretti, Olympionikai, I Vincitori
Negli Antichi Agoni (Rome, 1957), pp. 71-80.

32 His daughter was a Pythagorean, but we do not know his
views on this aspect of foreign culture within his family. See
Iamblikos of Chalkis, Life of Pythagoras, translated by T. Tay-
lor (London, 1818), p. 192.

33 Herodotos, I, 67; VI, 57.

there is insufficient evidence to attribute the adoption of
philachaianism to the ephors or the kings. It is therefore
necessary to reject Dickins' idea that philachaianism was intro-
duced as part of a constitutional struggle between the kings and
the ephors.

The question why Sparta adopted philachaianism remains. To
answer this it is necessary to consider the political situation
after the Battle of the Fetters. Before the battle Sparta had
been waging an unsuccessful war. Finally she gathered herself
for a supreme effort, and, believing she had the support of Delphoi,
launched what was, she hoped, the last campaign. With the over-
whelming defeat and capitulation of the army her hopes were dashed.
The disaster revealed that her military prowess was limited and
that conquest of the Peloponnese was very doubtful. As a result
she abandoned conquest and sought instead to win the friendship
of other states.

The settlement with Tegea, however, remained a problem.
Sparta still had to obtain a military victory, since suing for
peace after the Battle of the Fetters was admitting Tegean superior-
ity, but, once victory was achieved, Sparta had to obtain the
friendship of Tegea and ensure that the peace was based on a more
substantial foundation than the conquered's fear of the conqueror.
Complete victory would only wound Tegean pride, and leave the
frontier held by a defeated enemy that might seek revenge in the
future.[34]   Tegea, moreover, had considerable potential for

----

34 For the strategic position of Tegea see supra, p. 2.

causing trouble. In the first place, Tegea had previously supported Messenia, going so far as to provide refuge for Messenian exiles, and was thus in a good position to incite a Messenian uprising.[35] Secondly there was the threat of Argos. Tegea and Argos had once been friends, and there was the danger that the two states would settle their old quarrels and unite against Sparta.[36] It was to prevent just such an alliance that Sparta fought the Battle of Mantineia more than a century later.[37] Either of the two situations just outlined would have placed Sparta in great danger, which would have been increased if Tegea had allied herself with Argos against Sparta and stirred up Messenia at the same time, forcing Sparta to fight a major war while the helot system that supported the military structure was in chaos.

Philachaianism solved the dilemma. By adopting philachaianism Sparta could appear as a hitherto unrecognized friend and persuade Tegea to form an alliance. This alliance, founded on racial affinity, not the dictates of the conqueror, had the necessary degree of solidarity.

In view of the above discussion, I suggest that Sparta's new foreign policy was not the creation of any one group within

-----

35 Strabo, VIII, 4, 10; Polybios, IV, 33.

36 Diodoros, VII, 13, 2; supra, p. 2, note 3.

37 Thucydides, V, 64.

the state, but rather the response of Sparta's rulers to a national crisis.

CHAPTER THREE

THE DEPOSITION OF AISCHINES OF SIKYON

When the Tegean war had been settled, Sparta expelled
Aischines, the last Orthagorid tyrant of Sikyon. The evidence
is in a fragment of papyrus, No. 18 in the John Rylands collection
at Manchester.[1] The fragment measures 8.8 X 10.2 cm. The
upper portions of two columns remain, of which the left-hand
one is so badly mutilated that it is meaningless. The top
four lines of the right-hand column refer to a crossing to a
mainland and the foundation of a colony on a coast. With the

————

1 The text was first published by A. S. Hunt (Catalogue of
Greek Papyri in the John Rylands Library, I [Manchester, 1911]).
His text, with one exception in line 13, is reproduced by F.
Bilabel (Die Kleineren Historikerfragmente auf Papyrus [Bonn,
1923]). D. H. Leahy ("Chilon and Aischines," Bulletin of the
John Rylands Library [hereafter B.J.R.L.], XXXVIII [1956], pp.
406-435, and "Chilon and Aischines Again," Phoenix, XIII [1959],
pp. 31-37) discusses the text critically and analyses its re-
lationship to the downfall of the Orthagorid tyranny at Sikyon.
N. G. L. Hammond ("The Family of Orthagoras," C.Q., VI [1956],
pp. 45-53) and M. E. White ("The Dates of the Orthagorids,"
Phoenix, XII [1958], pp.2-14) also discuss the text and its in-
terpretation. Hunt's photograph is excellent, White's is ex-
ceptionally bad.

information at our disposal it is impossible to assign these lines to a definite event. It is generally agreed that the fragment is part of an epitome, but of what it is hazardous to say.[2] The papyrus is confidently assigned by Hunt to the middle of the second century B. C. on the basis of the hand.[3] This dating has gone unchallenged by other scholars.

The text of Column 2 as given by Hunt is as follows:

12 [..] .. Υ απ.ι.. τα διαℂ
    βασ εις την ηπειρου[
    [πο]λλην της παραλι
15 [ασ υ] πωρειας εκτισ[εν
    χιλων δε ο λακων

    εφορευσας και στρατ[ηγη
    σας Αναξανδριδη[ς τε
    τας εν τοις Ελλ[ησ]ιν
20 Υ[υρα]νυιδας κατελυ
    σα[ν]   εν Σικυων[ι] μεν
    Αι[σχ]ινην Ιππιαν δε
    [Αθηνησιν] Πεισιστρα
    [τ

----

2 Hunt comments: "...Of the character of this work it is hazardous to say much more than that it was historical; and even that statement needs to be made with some circumspection" (op. cit., p. 30).

3 Hunt, op. cit., p. 29.

The rho in the final word in line 17 is elevated, apparently having been inserted as a correction. It is very badly smudged, but Hunt comments:

"The overwritten rho is small and its tail faint, but to suppose that it is no letter but merely a blot is not a very satisfactory hypothesis; moreover, if the rho be rejected, apparently the only word practically possible is σΤα σ[ια]σας ; the vestige following σΤα is inconsistent with sigma, but well suits the cross bar of a tau."[4]

Leahy adds that the downward stroke of the rho has cut across the grain of the papyrus. If it had been only a blot the ink would have spread along the grain.[5] An examination of the plate accompanying Hunt's text verifies this. The ink on the lower portion of the vertical stroke is extremely faded, but is still visible. It is similar to the other rhos, in that all have very flattened circular strokes.

In line 17 the first epsilon of εφορενσας is unclear, there being no sign of the horizontal stroke. There is little trace of the phi.

In line 21 the second letter is almost entirely missing. Hunt says that it could be either alpha or epsilon.[6] E. G.

----

4 Hunt, op. cit., p. 31.

5 Leahy, B.J.R.L., p. 416.

6 Hunt, op. cit., p. 31.

Turner, in a private letter to White, agreed with Hunt, but added "I would prefer alpha." White does not discuss the point further.[7] Hammond and Leahy do not consider the matter on palaeographic grounds. All that remains of the letter is a vertical stroke with a hint of curvature. It is at the bottom of the left-hand edge of the letter-space. It could be the tip of an alpha or an epsilon, but it could also be a portion of a sigma. It is impossible to make a definite statement.

In line 22 only the $Α ι$ of the first word remain, the next two letters are missing and the final four are nearly illegible. Hunt feels that $Αισχίνης$ is the logical name to associate with Sikyon, and whatever letters, or traces of letters, remain do not argue against this restoration.[8]

The last textual point to be considered is the restoration of $τε$ in line 18. Hunt has restored it without comment. Turner supports this since he detects crowding of the preceding letters $δριδ$.[9]

The restoration raises a serious constitutional problem. Without $τε$ the translation is:

"When Chilon was ephor and Anaxandridas led the army...";

with the $τε$:

"When Chilon was ephor and general, along with Anaxandridas..."

----

7 White, op. cit., p. 4.

8 Hunt, op. cit., p. 31.

9 White, op. cit., p. 4.

There is no evidence that the ephor ever held the generalship.

The king, although limited by law in his civil jurisdiction, was

supreme while campaigning: ...ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ τὴν χώραν ἡγεμών ἐστι τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον.[10]

There was no place in the military structure for the ephor:

ἑκάστη δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν μορῶν ἔχει πολέμαρχον ἕνα, λοχαγοὺς τέτταρας, πεντηκοντῆρας ὀκτώ, ἐνωμοτάρχους ἑκκαίδεκα,[11]

or in the chain of command: βασιλέως γὰρ ἄγοντος ὑπ' ἐκείνου πάντα ἄρχεται, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πολεμάρχοις αὐτὸς φράζεται τὸ δέον, οἱ δὲ τοῖς λοχαγοῖς....[12] Two ephors did accomp-

any the kings on campaigns, but served only as supervisors of actions

with political overtones. Even this practice probably did not be-

gin until after 480.[13] There is no known instance of the ephors

assuming military command.[14]

Leahy defends restoring τε for several reasons. He holds

that the verb-ending in line 21 is εν and requires a singular

----

10   Aristotle, _Politics_, 1285a.

11   Xenophon, _Res. Lac._, 11, 4.

12   Thucydides, V, 66.

13   J. R. Grant, "Leonidas' Last Stand," _Phoenix_, XV (1961),

p. 26.

14   Leahy, _B.J.R.L._, p. 429.

subject. He goes on to argue that, if the $\widetilde{\tau\epsilon}$ were not included, the result would be a chiasmus that emphasizes the roles played by the two men, Chilon instituting the policy and Anaxandridas putting it into effect. He states that this device is forced and foreign to the type of account presented. Finally he feels that without the $\widetilde{\tau\epsilon}$ the line would be too short, and the $\widetilde{\tau\alpha\varsigma}$ of line 19 would logically be expected in line 18.[15] He dismisses the constitutional difficulties raised by suggesting that the author did not understand the Spartan political system.[16] White has accepted the reading of $\widetilde{\tau\epsilon}$ in view of the crowding of $\delta\rho\iota\delta$, but does not discuss the problem.[17]

Hammond feels that, in view of the constitutional difficulties raised, the restoration of $\widetilde{\tau\epsilon}$ must be rejected.[18]

We are thus faced with the fact that the restored letters create an impossible situation. Since the letters involved are not in the manuscript at all there must be very good reasons presented for restoring them and a satisfactory explanation of the problem they raise. These have not been given.

1. The crowding of $\delta\rho\iota\delta$ in line 18: Turner has noted crowding at the end of line 21. This line is short, with only fif-

----

15 Leahy, B.J.R.L., pp. 417-418.

16 Leahy, B.J.R.L., p. 430.

17 White, op. cit., p. 6.

18 Hammond, op. cit., p. 49.

19 White, op. cit., p. 4.

teen letters, and it has a blank space at the end. Clearly the crowding has no significance here. This example casts doubt on the significance of the crowding in line 18.

2. The line without $\tau\epsilon$ is too short with only fifteen letters. Lines 14 and 21 also have fifteen letters, and line 16 has thirteen.

3. The ending $\sigma\epsilon\nu$ in line 21 requires a singular subject. The letter in question cannot be read with certainty. It is unwise to build an argument on the trace that remains.

4. The chiastic construction: Leahy rejects it for lines 17 and 18 since "...it seems foreign to the type of account under consideration," but accepts it in lines 21-23 on the grounds that "...it seems the sort of thing which might easily occur in summarizing a list of persons and places."[20] There is no concrete evidence for either of these assertions. In a fragment as brief as this it is impossible to base arguments on stylistic points.

5. The author's lack of knowledge about the Spartan constitution: this is a guess without any facts to support it. White, who includes $\tau\epsilon$ does not discuss the point.

The arguments put forward to justify the restoration of are open to serious doubt, and do not give a reasonable explanation for the constitutional difficulty. It is thus unwise to insert $\tau\epsilon$.

----

20 Leahy, B.J.R.L., p. 417.

Apart from the textual matters, the interpretation of the
fragment is difficult. Sparta's action against many tyrants is
well attested: Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἵ τε Ἀθηναίων τύραννοι
καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ πρὶν
τυραννευθείσης οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τελευταῖοι πλὴν
τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων κατελύθησαν...[21]

Ἀθήνηθεν γὰρ ἐξέβαλον τοὺς Πεισιστρατίδας, ἐκ
δὲ Νάξου Λύγδαμιν τύραννον, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ
Κλεισθένους ἐκ Σικυῶνος.[22]

Καίτοι πόλιν ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις οὔτε
φιλότιμον οὕτως οὔτε μισοτύραννον ἴσμεν ὡς
τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων γενομένην· ποῖον γὰρ ἕνεκα
θώρακος ἢ τίνος κρατῆρος ἑτέρου Κυψελίδας
μὲν ἐξέβαλον ἐκ Κορίνθου καὶ Ἀμβρακίας ἐκ δὲ
Νάξου Λύγδαμιν ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν δὲ τοὺς Πεισιστράτου
παῖδας ἐκ δὲ Σικυῶνος Αἰσχίνην ἐκ Θάσου· δὲ
Σύμμαχον ἐκ δὲ Φωκέων Αὖλιν ἐκ Μιλήτου
δ' Ἀριστογένη, τὴν δ' ἐν Θετταλοῖς δυναστείαν
ἔπαυσαν, Ἀριστομήδη καὶ Ἀγέλαον κατα-
λύσαντες διὰ Λεωτυχίδου τοῦ βασιλέως;
περὶ ὧν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀκριβέστερον

----

21 Thucydides, I, 18.

22 Scholium on Aischines, II, 80, cited in Leahy, B.J.R.L., p. 408.

γέγραπται.[23]

The Kypselid tyranny fell no later than 582, long before the
ephorate of Chilon.[24] The exact date of the downfall of Lygdamis
is not certain, but some evidence connects it with the Spartan
attack on Samos in _ca_ 525.[25] The Peisistratids were driven out of
Athens in 511.[26] Aristogenes was probably expelled from Miletos after
the Persian War, and it is likely that Symmachos and Aulis were
driven out at the same time.[27] Aischines is the only tyrant left
undated.[28]

----

23 Plutarch, De Malignitate Herodoti, 21 (Moralia, 859 D).

24 Diogenes Laertios, I, 95, 98; Suidas, _s.v._ Περίανδρος;
Aristotle, Politics, 1315b; Eusebios, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

25 Diodoros, I, 68; Herodotos, III, 44-47. G. B. Ferngren,
A History of Samos to the Persian War (Thesis, University of British
Columbia, 1967), pp. 103-104.

26 Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 19; Parian Marble, ep. 45.

27 Leahy, "Chilon and Aischines Again,"(supra, p. 32, note 1),
p. 36.

28 It has been suggested that Plutarch's list is in chronological
order (White, op. cit., p. 13, and Leahy, "Chilon and Aischines Again,"
p. 37). This view is questionable in view of the variant orders of
the scholiast to Aischines and the Rylands Papyrus (see A. J. Earp,
The Tyranny of the Orthagorids [Thesis, University of Cincinnati,
1950], p. 12).

The problem of the papyrus hinges on the meaning of the punctuation in line 21. The line is marked by a paragraphus at the beginning and a blank after the first three letters:

$$\underline{\sigma \alpha [\nu]} \quad \epsilon \nu \quad \Sigma \iota \kappa \nu \omega \nu [\iota] \quad \mu \epsilon \nu.$$

White considers that this indicates the end of one sentence and the start of another. She also feels that the $\mu \acute{\epsilon} \nu - \delta \acute{\epsilon}$ construction in lines 21 and 22 indicates a new topic. Aischines is thus closely linked to Hippias. A logical subject for a sentence dealing with the expulsion of Hippias would be Kleomenes. If then Aischines was expelled by Kleomenes, his downfall occurred after ca 520 when Kleomenes' reign began.[29] This raises the problem of what tyrants the Spartans did expel in 555. Plutarch mentions other lists: $\pi \epsilon \rho \grave{\iota} \quad \tilde{\omega} \nu \quad \acute{\epsilon} \nu \quad \acute{\alpha} \lambda \lambda o \iota \varsigma \quad \acute{\alpha} \kappa \rho \iota \beta \acute{\epsilon} \sigma \tau \epsilon \rho o \nu \quad \gamma \acute{\epsilon} \gamma \rho \alpha \pi \tau \alpha \iota.$[30] Whether they contained more names or fuller accounts is not known. Placing the expulsion of Aischines after 520 requires the supposition that there was another tyrant in power in 555. Who he was or where he ruled can only be guessed.

Leahy argues that a particle is needed to indicate a change in subject. He states that in a fragment too brief to determine

---

29 White, op. cit., p. 8. For the date of Kleomenes' accession see Herodotos, VI, 108; Thucydides, III, 68.

30 Plutarch, De Malignitate Herodoti, 21 (Moralia, 859 D). For the full quotation see supra, p. 39.

the author's usage too much weight cannot be placed on the

punctuation. Lines 21 and 22 are thus the objects of καῖέλνσαν

This does not, he maintains, put Hippias' expulsion in 555.

He states that we need not expect strict chronological accuracy

in an epitome. The fragment would continue, he thinks, with

other names, forming a stock catalogue of expelled tyrants. As

it is an epitome, the first name, Aischines, who was expelled in

Chilon's time, is confused with the others who were not.[31]

Hammond follows Leahy in ignoring the punctuation, but he

avoids the discrepancy of the dates of Aischines and Hippias by

suggesting that the Hippias mentioned is not the son of Peisis-

tratos of Athens, but a hitherto unknown tyrant of Megara. The

presence of the Spartan army in Megara in the 550s was, he feels,

influential in causing the second exile of the Athenian Peisis-

tratos.[32] There is no record of any such action on the part of

Sparta at the time, nor is there any known tyrant of Megara in

the middle of the sixth century. Theagenes had ruled as tyrant

before 600, and had been overthrown long before the middle of the

----

31 Rees has suggested to Leahy that the list was added as an

afterthought by the scribe who forgot to erase the paragraphus.

The gap, according to Leahy, but without parallel, has the strength

of an English colon. Leahy, B.J.R.L., p. 423; "Chilon and Aischines

Again," pp. 34-35.

32 Hammond, op. cit., p. 51.

sixth century.[33]

Hammond's theory is completely without evidence and must be rejected. Leahy's arguments tend to be conjectural, but do have some points in their favour. The lack of a particle is strange, especially when one is used to introduce the section beginning with line 16. The suggestion that line 21 begins the standard list of tyrants is not impossible. Plutarch has shown that such lists were in use. This proposal, moreover, does not necessitate the creation of unknown tyrants.

----

33 The only known tyrant of Megara was Theagenes, who ruled before 600 (Thucydides, I, 126, 3; Eusebios, in J. Karst, Eusebios' Werke, V, cited in T. J. Cadoux, op. cit., p. 76). He was expelled, and the city enjoyed a period of moderate government that ended when demagogues took over. The rich were exiled and their lands confiscated (Plutarch, Quaest. Graec., 18 [Moralia, 295 D-E]). Finally law and order broke down completely. A drunken mob assaulted pilgrims going to Delphoi and was not punished by the government (Plutarch, Quaest. Graec., 95 [Moralia, 304 E-F]). The period of chaos ended when the exiled nobles returned and seized power by force (Theognis, 847-850, Aristotle, Politics, 1300a). Although the exact state of affairs in 555 is not known, it is certain that Theagenes was no longer ruling. Theognis, who was writing in the middle of the sixth century, describes the events that occurred after the tyrant's expulsion (Eusebios, op. cit., p. 96).

Apart from the Rylands papyrus, the evidence for the end
of Orthagorid power is inconclusive. It is possible to make
a case for either ca 560 or ca 510. Of the two, the earlier
involves less contradiction amongst the sources and is the more
likely.[34] This tends to confirm Leahy's interpretation.

To sum up: The later date requires the supposition of the
existence of unknown tyrants, while the earlier is based on the
more reasonable hypothesis of a stock list of tyrants. Of the
two choices the latter presents less difficulty, and also agrees
with the probable interpretation of external evidence. In view
of these considerations it is better to accept Leahy's view, but,
because of the brevity of the fragment and the problems that re-
main, tentatively.

The deposition of Aischines is very difficult to explain, since
there are reasons why Sparta should have been friendly with the
Sikyonian tyranny. Kleisthenes had fought a war with Argos.[35]
He also launched a vigorous campaign within Sikyon, aimed both
at removing all traces of Argive culture and at asserting the
superiority of the non-Dorian elements of the population. The
reading of the Homeric poems, which emphasized Argos, was banned.
The body of the Argive hero Adrastos was expelled. The Dorian

---

34 Earp, op. cit., p. 20.

35 Herodotos, V, 67.

tribes were renamed $^c \Upsilon \alpha \tau \alpha \iota,$ $^{\prime} O \nu \epsilon \hat{\alpha} \tau \alpha \iota,$ and $\chi o \iota \rho \epsilon \hat{\alpha} \tau \alpha \iota.$[36] Both states thus shared a hatred for Argos. The anti-Dorian attitude of the Orthagorids was apparently in keeping with the philachaianism of Sparta.

It is thus curious that Sparta deposed the Orthagorid ruler of Sikyon. Some attempts have been made to fit the action into a general anti-tyrant policy of Sparta. Dickins holds that the Spartans were hostile to the tyrants because they tended to rely on popular support and were champions of Panhellenism at a time when Sparta was isolating herself from Greek affairs.[37] It has been shown above that Chilon, who was responsible for overthrowing Aischines, was not a supporter of this policy.[38] Forrest has suggested that some of the tyrants overthrown by Sparta, notably Polycrates, Lygdamis, Peisistratos and the Kypselids, shared a common association with Argos, but this charge cannot be brought against Aischines.[39] A final view is that the tyrants were deposed by Sparta because they were pro-Persian.[40] Again,

————

36 Herodotos, V, 68. It is possible that these were nicknames (W. W. How and J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotos, II Oxford, 1961 , p. 35). Andrewes accepts the names as evidence of non-Dorian superiority (The Greek Tyrants New York, 1963 , p. 59).

37 Dickins, op. cit., p. 25.

38 See supra, pp. 24-29.

39 Forrest, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

40 Huxley, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

there is no evidence to connect Aischines with this. It seems

that the explanation for the Spartan action against Aischines is

not to be found in any general anti-tyrant policy.

The answer lies in Sikyon's potential ability to harm Sparta.

In the first place, Sikyon had acquired a navy in the course of the

Sacred War fought at the beginning of the sixth century.[41] Sparta's

weakness in the area of maritime defence and Chilon's concern for

this matter have been mentioned above.[42] Secondly, there was the

threat of the Orthagorids' anti-Dorianism. Philachaianism had been

adopted partly as part of Sparta's plan to achieve leadership of

Greece through her control of a league, but mainly to provide a

lasting settlement with Tegea after the war, and to secure the

northern frontier. Philachaianism was directed at the non-Dorian

states, and it was in this aspect of the policy that Sikyon presented

a challenge. The Orthagorids had adopted a stand that was violently

anti-Dorian, while Sparta had merely claimed an Achaian connexion with

her own Dorian descent. Should Sikyon and Sparta ever have fallen

into dispute over the leadership of the non-Dorians, Sikyon would

have had a far stronger claim.

The Orthagorids thus had the power to threaten both Sparta's

friendship with Tegea, on which the security of the northern fron-

----

41 Schol. Pindar, preface to Nem. 9, cited in P. N. Ure,

The Origin of Tyranny (New York, 1962), p. 260.

42 See supra, pp. 23-24.

tier depended, and her maritime defences.

It may be argued that Sikyon was too far away and that the Orthagorids had not shown any sign of interest in southern Greece. There are, however, indications that Sparta was showing interest in central Greece. If Plutarch is correct in his statement that Sparta expelled the Kypselids, then Sparta was associated with Korinth as early as ca 582.[43] Certainly Sparta and Korinth were friendly at the time of the attack on Samos in the 520s, and by the time of Kleomenes Korinth was a member of Sparta's league.[44] Furthermore, relations between Korinth and Sikyon appear to have deteriorated during the sixth century.[45] Thus, Sparta was not only showing interest in central Greece, but also she was aligning herself with a state on bad terms with Sikyon. I suggest that Sparta foresaw both the possible consequences of her association with Korinth and the danger that the Orthagorids could pose. By expelling Aischines, the last Orthagorid, Sparta removed the proponent of a policy that could have given Sikyon an advantage in any future dispute.

----

43 Plutarch, De Malignitate Herodoti, 21 (Moralia, 859 D).

44 Herodotos, III, 48; supra, pp. 21-22.

45 Herodotos, VI, 126; see also McGregor, op. cit., pp. 271-272.

APPENDIX

THE FAMILY OF CHILON

Damagetas
|
Chilon (Ephor)[1]
|
Chilonis[2]---------- Demarmenos[3]
|
Chilon[4]------------------- Prinetadas[5]
| |
Demaratos=Perkalos[6]   Daughter=Anaxandridas[7]
|
Kleomenes

----

1   Suidas, s.v.

2   Iamblikos, Life of Pythagoras, p. 269.

3   Herodotos, V, 41; VI, 65.

4   Herodotos, VI, 65.

5   Herodotos, VI, 65.

6   Herodotos, VI, 65.

7   Herodotos, V, 41.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ancient Authors

Aristotle, _Atheniensium Respublica_, ed. F. G. Kenyon. Oxford, 1958.

Aristotle, _Constitution of Athens and Related Texts_, trans. with
  Introduction and Notes by K. von Fritz and E. Kapp. New York, 1950.

Aristotle, _Fragmenta_, ed. V. Rose. Stuttgart, 1967.

Aristotle, _Politics_, trans. H. Rackham. London, 1959.

Diodoros Siculos, _Diodori Bibliotheca Historica_, ed. F. Vogel. 6 vols.
  reprint, Stuttgart, 1964.

Diogenes Laertios, _Lives of Eminent Philosophers_, trans. R. D. Hicks.
  2 vols. London, 1959.

Dionysios of Halikarnassos, _Antiquitates Romanae_, trans. E. Cary.
  7 vols. London, 1961.

Eusebios, _Eusebi Chronicorum Canonum Quae Supersunt_, ed. A. Schoene.
  2 vols. reprint, Zurich, 1967.

Herodotos, _Historiae_, ed. C. Hude. 2 vols. Oxford, 1966.

Hesiod, _Carmina_, ed. A. Rzach. Stuttgart, 1958.

Iamblikos of Chalkis, _Life of Pythagoras_, trans. T. Taylor. London, 1818.

Pausanias, _Descriptio Graeciae_, ed. F. Spiro. 5 vols. Stuttgart, 1959.

Pausanias, _Description of Greece_, trans. with a Commentary by J. G.
  Frazer. 6 vols. New York, 1965.

Philostratos, _Gymnastikos_, in _Opera_, ed. C. L. Kayser. Leipzig, 1871.

Pindar, _Odes_, trans. J. Sandys. London, 1961.

Plato, _Laws_, in _Platonis Opera_ V, ed. J. R. Burnett. 5 vols.
  Oxford, 1955.

Plutarch, _Moralia_, trans. F. C. Babbitt. 15 vols. London, 1962.

Polybios, _The Histories_, trans. W. R. Paton. 6 vols. London, 1960.

Strabo, _The Geography of Strabo_, trans. H. L. Jones. 8 vols.
  London, 1961.

Suidas, <u>Suidae Lexicon</u>, in <u>Lexicographi Graeci</u> I, ed. A. Adler. 5 vols. Stuttgart, 1971.

Theognis, <u>Elegiac Poems</u>, in <u>Elegy and Iambus</u> I, ed. and trans. J. M. Edmonds. 2 vols. London, 1954.

Thucydides, <u>Historiae</u>, ed. H. S. Jones, revised J. E. Powell. 2 vols. Oxford, 1958.

Xenophon, <u>Constitution of the Lacedaemonians</u>, <u>in</u> <u>Scriptora Minora</u>, trans. E. C. Marchant. London, 1962.

Modern Authors

Andrewes, A., <u>The Greek Tyrants</u>. New York, 1963.

Bengston, H., <u>Griechische Geschichte</u>. Munich, 1960.

Bickerman, E. J., <u>Chronology of the Ancient World</u>. London, 1968.

Bilabel, F., <u>Die Kleineren Historikerfragmente auf Papyrus</u>. Bonn, 1923.

Boer, W. D., <u>Laconian Studies</u>. Amsterdam, 1954.

Bowra, C. M., <u>Greek Lyric Poetry</u>, 2nd ed. revised. Oxford, 1961.

Brinkmann, A., "Die Olympische Chronik," <u>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</u>, LXX (1915), pp. 622-637.

Burn, A. R., <u>The Lyric Age of Greece</u>. London, 1960.

Cadoux, T. J., "The Athenian Archons from Kreon to Hypsichides," <u>Journal of Hellenic Studies</u>, LXVIII (1948), pp. 70-123.

Chrimes, K. M. T., <u>Ancient Sparta</u>. Manchester, 1949.

Denniston, J. D., <u>The Greek Particles</u>, 2nd ed. Oxford, 1959.

Devereux, G., "La Psychanalyse Appliquée a L'Histoire de Sparte," <u>Annales Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations</u>, XX (1965), pp. 18-44.

Dickins, G., "The Growth of Spartan Policy," <u>Journal of Hellenic Studies</u>, XXXII (1912), pp. 1-42.

Earp, A. J., <u>The Tyranny of the Orthagorids</u>. Thesis, University of Cincinnati, 1950.

Ehrenberg, V., "An Early Source of Polis Constitution," <u>Classical Quarterly</u>, XXXVII (1943), pp. 14-18.

Ferngren, G. B., *A History of Samos to the Persian War*. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1966.

Forrest, W. G., *A History of Sparta*. London, 1968.

Gardiner, E. N., *Athletics of the Ancient World*. Oxford, 1965.

Gomme, A. W., *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*. 3 vols. Oxford, 1945-1946.

Grant, J. R., "Leonidas' Last Stand," *Phoenix*, XV (1961), pp. 14-28.

Halliday, W. R., *The Greek Questions of Plutarch*. Oxford, 1928.

Hammond, N. G. L., "The Family of Orthagoras," *Classical Quarterly*, VI (1956), pp. 45-53.

Highbarger, E. L., *The History and Civilization of Ancient Megara*. Baltimore, 1927.

How, W. W., and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotos*. 2 vols. Oxford, 1928.

Hunt, A. S., *Catalogue of Greek Papyri in the John Rylands Library, Manchester* I. 2 vols. Manchester, 1911.

Huxley, G. L., *Early Sparta*. London, 1962.

Huxley, G. L., *The Early Ionians*. London, 1966.

Jacoby, F., *Das Marmor Parium*. Berlin, 1904.

Jacoby, F., *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*. 3 vols with supplements. Berlin, 1923-1930, Leiden, 1940.

Jacoby, F., "XPHΣTOYΣ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ ," *Classical Quarterly*, XXXVIII (1944), pp. 15-16.

Jones, A. H. M., *Sparta*. Oxford, 1967.

Larsen, J. A. O., "Sparta and the Ionian Revolt: a Study of Spartan Foreign Policy and the Genesis of the Peloponnesian League," *Classical Philology*, XXVII (1932), pp. 136-150.

Leahy, D. M., "Chilon and Aischines," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, XXXVIII (1955-1956), pp. 406-435.

Leahy, D. M., "Chilon and Aischines Again," *Phoenix*, XIII (1959), pp. 31-37.

Leahy, D. M., "The Bones of Tisamenos," <u>Historia</u>, IV (1955),
pp. 26-38.

Leahy, D. M., "The Spartan Defeat at Orchomenos," <u>Phoenix</u>, XII
(1958), pp. 141-165.

Liddell, H. G., and R. Scott, <u>A Greek English Lexicon</u>, 9th ed.,
revised and augmented by H. S. Jones assisted by R. McKenzie.
Oxford, 1966.

McGregor, M. F., "Kleisthenes of Sikyon and the Panhellenic Festivals,"
<u>Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association</u>,
LXXII (1941), pp. 266-287.

Michell, H., <u>Sparta</u>. Cambridge, 1952.

Moretti, L., <u>Olympionikai, I Vincitori Negli Antichi Agoni Olimpici</u>.
Rome, 1957.

Parke, H. W., and D. E. W. Wormell, <u>The Delphic Oracle</u>. 2 vols.
Oxford, 1956.

Parke, H. W., "Polykrates and Delos," <u>Classical Quarterly</u>, XL (1946),
pp. 105-108.

Poralla, P., <u>Prosopographie der Lakedaimonier</u>. Breslau, 1913.

Powell, J. E., <u>A Lexicon to Herodotos</u>. Hildesheim, 1966.

Sandys, J. E., <u>Aristotle's Constitution of Athens</u>. London, 1893.

Skalet, C., <u>Ancient Sikyon, with a Prosopographia Sikyona</u>. Baltimore,
1928.

Stubbs, H. W., "Spartan Austerity: A Possible Explanation,"
<u>Classical Quarterly</u>, XLIV (1950), pp. 33-37.

Tigerstedt, E. N., <u>The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity</u>.
2 vols. Stockholm, 1965.

Toynbee, A. J., <u>Some Problems of Greek History</u>. Oxford, 1969.

Turner, E. G., <u>Greek Papyri</u>. Oxford, 1968.

Ure, P. N., <u>The Origin of Tyranny</u>. New York, 1962.

White, M. E., "The Dates of the Orthagorids," <u>Phoenix</u>, XII (1958),
pp. 2-14.

Williams, T., "Theognis and His Poems," <u>Journal of Hellenic Studies</u>,
XXIII (1903), pp. 1-23.