ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF U.S. PUBLIC OPINION: CONGRESSIONAL ROLL CALL VOTES ON SEVEN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS

by

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ABSTRACT

Even with the heterogeneous nature of public attitudes on trade liberalization, public opinion still matters in the voting behavior of Congress. This paper examines the impact of public opinion on seven free trade agreements. The conclusion is that public attitudes play a significant role in the outcome of roll call voting in the House of Representatives. In accordance with Interest Group Theory, Democrats are highly sensitive to interests as expressed as public opinion and as campaign contributions. In accordance with Delegation Theory, on the other hand, House Republicans are consistently more supportive of the President on trade policy, even when their constituents' views on free trade agreements tend towards popular opposition. Applying the same variables to the Senate, however, did not lead to the same conclusion. This suggests some fundamental representational differences in Congress. The most obvious structural difference as it applies to public opinion is the distinctive election cycles for each chamber.

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Opening Comments

In the introduction to their book, *Congress Resurgent*, Randall Ripley and James Lindsay note that on foreign policy matters during the mid-twentieth century, U.S. congressional oversight of presidential authority was lax when compared with domestic policy concerns (1993, 4). International trade issues had been regarded as primarily belonging to the executive. But when stiff import competition began to impact the profit margins of domestic producers, from the 1970s onwards, congressional deference to the President began to decline. Global economic interdependence – as part of the globalization process – began to erode the once solid division between foreign and domestic policymaking (Ripley and Lindsay 1993, 13-14).

Trade liberalization, though, remains one of the hallmarks of U.S. foreign policy for both Democrat and Republican presidents alike. This has not gone unchallenged by political groups such as labor unions and environmentalists, who link this policy to economic and social exploitation at home and abroad. Sectoral concerns over textile and steel imports have since morphed into widespread public opposition to the trade liberalization policy itself, which crystallized during the 1992 debate over NAFTA. As Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter point out, a significant proportion of the American public has made a connection between trade liberalization, wage levels, and employment prospects in the U.S. (2001a, 93). Whether this connection is accurate is a moot point; the fact that politicians can excite the electorate's imagination over trade liberalization means that public opinion has become a variable to consider when explaining legislative outcomes in this policy domain.

The angst from many analysts who describe a popular backlash in their writings (Balint and Destler 1999; Baldwin and Magee 2000a; Biglaiser, Jackson, and, Peake 2004) demonstrates the point. President Clinton's failure to garner congressional approval to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement with Chile in 1997, and his failure to renew the Fast-Track authorization law from a Republican-dominated Congress during the 1990s, was partially the result of deep public skepticism of further trade liberalization. To date, however, the explanations in the scholarly literature remain dominated by economic variables with little or no consideration given to how the American electorate influences congressional actions in this policy area.

This paper seeks to address that omission by examining the impact of public opinion on seven free trade agreements (FTAs) introduced and passed in the 108th and 109th Congresses of the U.S. The conclusion is that public opinion plays a significant role in the outcome of roll call voting in the House of Representatives; and, along with the lobbying efforts of political action committees (PACs), public opinion can play a leading role in determining congressional behavior. Applying the same variables to the Senate, however, did not lead to the same conclusion. This suggests some fundamental representational differences in Congress. The most obvious structural difference as it applies to public opinion is the distinctive election cycles for each chamber.

Of the seven FTAs in this study, six are bilateral treaties between the U.S. and each of Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Morocco, Oman, and Singapore. The seventh FTA is the multilateral treaty between the U.S., Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. Some of the FTAs passed easily through Congress, while others – notably the Central American treaty – were only passed by slim

margins in the House. The established procedures for trade negotiations, generally referred to as Fast-Track, tend to restrict the ability of Congress to thwart these proposals with each successive step towards a finalized agreement. Hence, there is an institutional bias in favor of a FTA once the executive has obtained Fast-Track approval from Congress to negotiate the treaty.

Literature Review

This section begins with a brief discussion on public opinion as a determinant in policy research. This is followed with a description of Fast-Track, on its origins and its current procedures. Next comes a discussion of trade policy theories.

Public Opinion

An important ideal in a liberal democracy is that voters should be able to articulate policy preferences to their government. There are plenty of doubts, however, about the electorate's ability to effectively evaluate policy choices and the decisions made by their representatives (Brady, Canes-Wrone, and Cogan 2002). Anthony Downs's seminal contribution described a rational public having little incentive to inform themselves on policy when a single vote has such a small impact on the overall electoral result (1957). Perhaps this bias has lead many researchers to avoid including public opinion as a variable in their studies. In a recent review of the literature on public policy, Paul Burstein and April Linton noted that less than 10 percent of these studies have public opinion as a variable under consideration (2002, 395-396).

Larry Bartels asserts that regardless of the electorate's knowledge of policy, representatives do feel a moral obligation to reflect the views of their constituents at some meaningful level (1991, 458). Suzanna De Boef and James Stimson found that even with the high rates of incumbency, House members remained highly responsive to public opinion (1995, 346). At some level, congressmen do take voter attitudes into consideration when making their decisions. According to David Brady, Brandice Canes-Wrone, and John Cogan, one reason is that incumbency is not exogenous; electoral safety depends on the representatives' performance in Congress (2002, 135-136). Voters themselves may not be fully informed of the policy choices, but local elites and especially electoral competitors in the districts will highlight the voting records of incumbents (Brady, Canes-Wrone, and Cogan 2002, 138).

Since voters' knowledge on the issues vary, so does the congressional response to public opinion. House members may not take polling results at face value, says Bartels, giving that some constituents will have strong opinions on an issue, while others would be indifferent (1991, 468). Some sort of weighting of the relevant affected groups within the district is likely done.

This weighting is what Lawrence Jacobs, Eric Lawrence, Robert Shapiro, and Steven Smith found in a qualitative study on how congressional aides collect information about voter attitudes. Constituents' letters, phone calls, and person-to-person contacts are preferred over opinion polls. The intensity of the support or opposition to an issue is given a disproportionate level of attention from congressmen. Jacobs and his colleagues found that it is the congressional leadership, not individual representatives, who respond to public opinion polls. The leadership is seeking to improve their parties' respective

standings with the electorate, and to retain (or obtain) the coveted position of being the majority party in Congress (Jacobs et al 1998).

Issue salience is a key consideration here. Bartels showed that public opinion was the dominant variable in defense spending outcomes during the early years of the Reagan Presidency, due to issue salience (1991). Most researchers concur with Bartels that if public opinion becomes fixated on an issue, voter attitudes eclipse all other political considerations (Hinton-Andersson and Wood 1998; Jacobs et al 1998; Burstein and Linton 2002; Burstein 2003). A corollary to this belief is that congressmen will not always know when an issue becomes salient with voters. A seemingly trivial issue at one point in time can become an overriding concern at another point. Congressmen cannot be absolutely certain of the political consequences when they vote on a given policy (Brady, Canes-Wrone, and Cogan 2002).

Another important consideration is the election cycles of Congress. For the House, the the election cycles force members to be highly receptive to voter attitudes at all times (De Boef and Stimson 1995). For the Senate, however, the staggered electoral cycles means that Senators have more flexibility in responding to public opinion. Angela Hinton-Andersson and Dan Wood found that constituency concerns only mattered for Senators when it came time for them to run for re-election (1998, 728). They also found (contrary to De Boef's and Stimson's findings on House members) that the Senate's responsiveness to public opinion declined as rates of incumbency increased (Hinton-Andersson and Wood 1998, 726).

Fast-Track

Public opinion can have little influence on congressional voting behavior on trade agreements if congress defers to the President in this domain. But both Pietro Nivola and John Tierney indicate that congressional deference to the President on trade policy matters had ceased by the mid-1980s (Nivola 1993, 101; Tierney 1993, 101). The deference that developed after WWII, though, had more to do with an absence of opposition to trade liberalization. An expanding national economy that sought export markets combined with a lack of import competition from abroad produced a unique elite consensus. Certain economic sectors did gain protectionist measures from Congress, notably textile mills, but most industries were more concerned with exports than imports (Tierney 1993, 100).

The success of trade liberalization, however, proved to be the catalyst for opposition. Foreign suppliers to American manufacturing increased their market share of the U.S. industrial output from 4.3 percent in 1965 to 13.5 percent in 1980. These foreign suppliers began drawing the ire of domestic suppliers, such as the carbon-steel producers. Consumer demand for imports had also increased. The increased demand for Japanese cars, for instance, squeezed the U.S. automotive industry (Falke 1996; Moore 1996; Nelson 1996). The end result by the mid-1980s was a ballooning U.S. trade deficit and a visceral response from Congress.

Throughout this period, however, the demand from American industry for new export markets did not abate. Today, Congressmen are faced with heterogeneous constituency demands for both a more, and a less, open trade policy. As Dirk De Bièvre

and Andreas Dür explain, this dilemma is complicated further by the uncertainty over which vested interests would gain a greater salience in a particular constituency at any one point in time (2005, 1274 and 1291). Sharyn O'Halloran believes this uncertainty is what drives political behavior on trade policy: Congress requires sufficient information on how future trade agreements will impact their constituencies, in order for them to reduce their electoral risk of antagonizing nascent opposition to any particular trade proposal (1993, 295; 1994, 27 and 141). The result over time has been the creation of Fast-Track procedures.

Fast-Track commences when the President provides notification of trade talks to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. Congress has sixty days in which to disapprove of the negotiations. Should this first difficult step succeed, Congress foregos the right to amend an undefined trade proposal in exchange for access to the negotiating process, and enhanced information gathering over how local economic interests will be affected by trade liberalization. Congress can withdraw its support at any time during the trade talks (O'Halloran 1993; 1994). Once the finalized agreement is presented as legislation, however, only voting against the entire proposal can thwart the FTA.

The most contentious aspect of Fast-Track is the multi-staged public consultation process. These advisory panels allow certain motivated interest groups to address trade concerns and seek compensatory remedies. From the institutional point-of-view, both Congress and the President obtain valuable information on the likely opposition to the ongoing trade talks. Logrolling between the two branches of government tends to dominate the Fast-Track process, with the President offering considerable concessions to

key economic interests. Many of these concessions consist of replacing tariffs with non-tariff regulations that continue to impede trade flows (McGillivray 2004, 87-88).

There are two theories on who gains the most by Fast-Track procedures. Interest group theorists believe that Congress acts as a counterproductive force that undermines the essence of free trade arrangements. These theorists assume that congressmen are primarily utility maximizers attempting to advance their own interests, and those of their constituents (Zhang and Laband 2005). Delegation theorists, on the other hand, assume that congressmen are risk avoiders that pass the blame for import competition to the President while offering token criticisms of U.S. trade policy to their constituents (O'Halloran 1994). Delegation theorists believe that the President is securing the coalition necessary for executive policymaking.

Interest Group Theory

Interest group theorists Daowei Zhang and David Laband analyze the positions taken by Senators over the long-standing softwood lumber dispute with Canada. They conclude that the interests of lumber producers eclipse domestic U.S. consumer and homebuilder interests, even when the latter has mounted a serious lobbying effort to counter the position of the domestic suppliers. Consumer and homebuilder interests were simply denied access to the advisory panels, when Fast-Track had been approved for the U.S.-Canada free trade negotiations in 1986 (Zhang and Laband 2005).

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee examine the impact of PAC contributions on roll call votes to multilateral FTAs. They predict that without any labor group contributions, the probability of GATT (Uruguay Round) and NAFTA being approved

would have been 13 percent and 15 percent higher respectively; and without any business group contributions, the probability of approval would have been 8 percent and 9 percent lower respectively (Baldwin and Magee 2000a). PAC contributions, though, do not always matter to congressional outcomes. Magee later teamed up with Eugene Beaulieu to show that U.S. labor groups have had an inconsistent record in affecting congressional outcomes to trade votes (Beaulieu and Magee 2004).

Many American economists examining U.S. trade policy tend to be interest group theorists. Their focus is on capital-intensive, unionized-labor-force industries that are geographically concentrated. Michael Moore points to the steel industry's diminished effectiveness on lobbying Congress for protectionist measures as a result of declining numbers of blue-collar workers employed in Pennsylvania and Ohio (1996, 16 and 32). Michael Finger and Anne Harrison connect the collapse of the textile mill lobby to the defeat of many Southern Democrats during the 1994 mid-term elections (Finger and Harrison 1996, 49).

Public opinion as a variable in shaping policy, however, is incorporated in few of the interest group theorists' models. It can be implied from Zhang's and Laband's analysis that they substituted consumer and homebuilder interests as an indirect measure of what constituted public opinion. Baldwin and Magee gave little consideration to the impact of public opinion. As for Moore and Finger, they acknowledge public opinion mattered, but this fact was simply of secondary importance to their analysis. European-based trade policy researchers De Bièvre and Dür point out that the efforts of interest groups can be largely futile without public support. Should these groups mobilize public

opinion, though, the interaction effect between the two variables can be large and highly significant (De Bièvre and Dür 2005, 1274).

A question arises from the preceding statement, however, in whether public opinion actually reflects the local interest. It can be readily assumed that the general public has only a limited knowledge of FTAs. These trade negotiations, and the legislative logrolling sessions that follow, are not open to the public. As Fred Cutler points out, though, despite the level of knowledge that the general public may have on a particular issue, they do have an intuitive sense of what is in their own interest. The social and economic structures of the communities in which the voters live, and the daily interactions with the people that live with them, have a significant impact on public opinion formation (Cutler, 2007). Self-identification with a particular community incorporates the idea that people understand what are the underlying interests of that community.

Delegation Theory

Delegation theorists assume that the President is less susceptible than Congress to interest group activity. The domination of logrolling to secure passage of FTAs is acknowledged to diminish the impact of trade liberalization, but the overall objective – a more open trade policy – is never much in doubt. Fred Bergsten refers to this as the "one step backward, two steps forward" approach to trade policy (2002, 6). Andreas Falke believes that informed politicians know that the U.S. cannot shut out imports without severe economic consequences, and he laments the protectionist pressures that are placed on Congress and the President (1996, 281 and 289-290). Bergsten offer no such lament,

for he realizes that these pressures can and are be manipulated to force reticent countries to address U.S. trade irritants and open up their markets to American imports (2002, 9). Fast-Track procedures are designed to simultaneously address the heterogeneous constituency demands over U.S. trade policy. For American congressmen, Fast-Track has never been just about negotiating FTAs with other countries.

The research focus for delegation theorists is how levels of partisanship and ideological polarization impact decision-making. Richard Sherman pursues this approach with his analysis of trade-weighted average tariffs using economic and party affiliation variables. He concludes that Republican presidents have been more protectionist than Democrat presidents since WWII. The implication is that Republican presidents are building the necessary coalitions with a more protectionist Democratic Congress to secure trade agreements. Ephemeral protectionist measures, however, do not eclipse the long-term objective of trade liberalization (Sherman 2002).

Delegation theorists Glen Biglaiser, David Jackson, and Jeffrey Peake analyze the positions taken by Congress on the 1997 Chilean Fast-Track proposal and the 2001 presidential Trade-Promotional Authority. They use two sets of indexed congressional roll call votes (one for Republicans and one for Democrats) as dependent variables with interest group positions, constituency descriptives, and deference to the President as independent variables. They conclude that the most important influence on Congress delegating trade negotiation authority was party affiliation. Constituency factors were important to Republicans in 1997, when combined with their antipathy towards Clinton. But when Bush became President, constituency descriptives ceased to be statistically significant for Republicans. Democrats were more sensitive to one constituency variable:

the ratio of the blue-collar workers in their district. By implication, the prevalence of blue-collar workers is used a proxy for public opinion in these districts, even if that opinion is only latent. Democrats' opposition to trade liberalization was moderated by their loyalty to Clinton in 1997, but this effect disappeared in 2001 when Bush became President (Biglaiser, Jackson, and Peake 2004).

Similar to the interest group theorists, delegation theorists have taken an economic determinants approach to analyzing trade policy. There is a presumed influence of public opinion impacting presidential decision-making in Sherman's study, but he does not expand his model to include a public opinion variable. Biglaiser, Jackson, and Peake indirectly measure public opinion with their inclusion of the ratio of blue-collar workers as a variable, but this is unsatisfactory. These analysts assume that blue-collar workers, and only blue-collar workers, might be opposed to trade liberalization. They do note that Congress assesses public attitudes before voting on trade policy issues (Biglaiser, Jackson, and Peake 2004, 682). In the end, however, public opinion surveys were not added to their models.

Factor Mobility Theories

A second stream of literature on trade liberalization revolves around the economic concept of factor mobility. The factors in question are labor and capital. The two main theories are Heckscher-Ohlin model and the Ricardo-Viner model. The distinction between the two competing models is whether or not workers and investment can be moved effortlessly and without significant cost to owners of factors. If factors are highly mobile, then wage levels and returns on investment would be the same over the long-

term. This is the Heckscher-Ohlin model. If factor mobility is impaired, wage levels and returns on investments will stay varied between sectors. This is the Ricardo-Viner model. It is assumed by many economic analysts, such as Scheve and Slaughter, that the Ricardo-Viner model applies in the short-run outcome whereas the Heckscher-Ohlin model represents the long-run outcome (2001a, 48).

Two aspects of factor mobility impact international trade. First, under the assumption of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, those who possess an abundant amount of a factor are assumed to be able to withstand import competition more vigorously, and take advantage of export opportunities more readily, as compared to those who possess a scarce amount of a factor (Alt et al 1996, 692; Kaempfer and Marks 1993, 728). Second, under the assumption of the Mundell Equivalency, factor mobility and trade flows are economic substitutes. This means that the more mobile the factor is between sectors, the less effective protectionist measures should be in benefiting a particular sector (Hiscox 2004, 254). Taken together, if factor mobility is high, class-based characteristics would be the salient economic determinants on whether opinion would favor trade liberalization. If factor mobility is low, then sectoral interests ought to prevail when determining who would favor an open trade policy.

Sheve and Slaughter subscribe to the Heckscher-Ohlin model of factor mobility not just to international trade interdependence but also to many different aspects of globalization. They found that income and education levels mattered in public opinion formation on trade policy matters. One of the reasons for accepting the Heckscher-Ohlin model is that they found scant evidence that employment within an export-seeking, or

within an import-competing, sector mattered to public opinion formation with regards to trade policy (Sheve and Slaughter 2001a; 2001b).

Michael Hiscox adheres to the Ricardo-Viner model of factor mobility. He uses economic characteristics – agricultural, industrial, and capital ownership variables – to show long-term generational changes to U.S. factor mobility (Hiscox 2002a; 2002b). Hiscox believes factor mobility has declined in recent years, resulting in a less coherent trade policy being articulated by the U.S. federal government (2002b; 2004).

The discrepancy in the economic analyses is attributed to the heterogeneous nature of the U.S. economy, which has both export-seeking and import-competing sectors in the same regions. Added to this problem is the congressional districts themselves. District boundaries tend to cut through industrial areas, and are often composed of a multitude of very different communities. Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt identify this problem. They measure geographically-concentrated economic clusters within the U.S. as a unit of analysis. Busch and Reinhardt found public opinion formation based on sectoral interests to be highly significant within these economic clusters (Busch and Reinhardt 2000).

Another researcher related to the factor mobility literature is Fiona McGillivray. She is rather unique in her trade policy research, in showing how political institutions do not accommodate a homogeneous set of interests. The most obvious reason is that the House, the Senate, and the Office of the President all have different electoral bases and political constraints in which these institutions operate (McGillivray 1997, 592-593; 2004, 77). McGillivray analyses conclude that the most important predictors to modeling

trade policy, with congressional districts as a unit of analysis, are trade exposure, the unemployment rate, and the nature of the party system (2004, 84 and 118; 1997, 603).

Researchers on factor mobility sometimes take public opinion on trade more seriously as a variable, since they are looking for the underlying demographic characteristics to explain their models. The problem is trying to make the connection between factor mobility, public opinion, and congressional roll call voting. Busch and Reinhardt have resolved the issue by divorcing public opinion from political institutions. But political institutions in a liberal democracy are suppose to reflect public opinion.

Concluding Remarks

Congressmen can be more than just utility maximizers. Representation, as it assumed by the economic analysts, is taken too literally to simply mean advancing the economic interests of constituents. Representatives have many issues to consider when making political decisions. Congressmen may decide that even though a legislative decision adversely affects the interests of their district, the action may serve to advance some other cause. One plausible scenario is that politicians will vote in favor of a FTA, even if hurts their districts' short-term interests, in order to advance an ideological commitment on trade liberalization. This position would be more in line with Delegation Theory.

At the same time, though, congressmen must be mindful of their own electoral prospects. The principal task in this paper is to validate or refute De Bièvre's and Dür's assumption that public opinion combined with interest group activity has a powerful effect on legislative outcomes. Logrolling between politicians and interest groups,

however, is not openly observable to the public and is therefore not actually measurable (O'Halloran 1993, 303; 2004, 27). PAC contributions, as used in Baldwin's and Magee's analysis, represent the most plausible measure of interest group activity. If the combination of these two variables is significant, this would indicate Interest Group Theory is more relevant.

The competing theories on factor mobility are interesting as they relate to public opinion formation. The underlying consideration on Fast-Track procedures, though, is that constituency demands are heterogeneous. This implies the Ricardo-Viner model would outweigh the Heckscher-Ohlin model with regards to roll call votes. As Busch and Reinhardt point out, however, sectoral interests on trade policy are not easily translatable into congressional voting behavior. Only the Hechscher-Ohlin model will be tested in this paper.

Research Design

Given the heterogeneous nature of public opinion on trade policy, is it plausible to think public opinion matters on such a complex issue? Much of the FTA negotiations are outside of the scrutiny of the media and, perhaps, even among the less influential politicians. There are many facets of trade policy for congressmen to consider, and the elaborate procedures for Fast-Track would lead causal observers of Congress to say no to the preceding question. If voter attitudes did matter in a complex area such as trade liberalization, then policy researchers should think about adding public opinion as a determinant to consider in their own future studies.

Questions and Hypotheses

The first question to ask is a simple one: Does public opinion have an impact on congressional roll call voting with regards to FTAs? Economic variables such as income levels and trade exposure have found to be significant in the literature, as has interest group activity and party affiliation. But what is the impact when public opinion when incorporated with these other variables? De Bièvre and Dür suggest that public opinion should have an effect on legislative outcomes.

> **Hypothesis One**: Congress takes public opinion into consideration when voting on FTAs. Public opinion influences congressmen to vote for FTAs when there is popular support for these agreements in their district or state; and public opinion influences congressmen to vote against FTAs when there is popular opposition in their district or state.

Two more questions follow from Interest Group Theory. First, do PAC contributions have an impact on congressional roll call voting on FTAs? From the literature, Baldwin and Magee have found PAC contributions to be significant, although this effect varies.

> **Hypothesis Two**: Congress takes into account both business and labor PAC contributions when voting on FTAs. Business contributions will have an impact on voting for these agreements; and labor contributions will have an impact on voting against these agreements.

The third question is the interactive effect: Does the combination of public opinion and PAC contributions have an impact on congressional roll call voting on FTAs? Again, from the literature, the interaction should have a powerful effect on the outcome to legislative actions.

Hypothesis Three: Congress, when confronted with a congruence of popular support and business PAC contributions in favor of FTAs, will vote in favor of FTAs

Hypothesis Four: Congress, when confronted with a congruence of popular opposition and labor PAC contributions against FTAs, will vote against FTAs.

Delegation Theory implies another question: Does Congress delegate authority to the President on formulating and implementing FTAs? Biglaiser, Jackson, and Peake suggest that delegation to the executive only happens when the majority of congressmen belong to the same party as the President. For the 108th and 109th Congresses, Republicans would delegate authority to the President, whereas the Democrats would not delegate authority.

Hypothesis Five: Republicans will vote for FTAs regardless of public opinion in their district or state; Democrats will vote for FTAs if public opinion is favorable in their district or state, and Democrats will oppose FTAs if public opinion is opposed in their district or state.

The last question is with regards to the economic and social characteristics under Heckscher-Ohlin model of factor mobility: Do income and education levels in a district or a state impact congressional roll call voting on FTAs? These are class-based characteristics found to be significant by Scheve and Slaughter.

Hypothesis Six: Congress takes into account the class-based characteristics of income and education levels when voting on FTAs.

Since the dependent variable in this study is an indicator variable, hypotheses one, two, and six will be addressed using a binary logit regression model. Hypotheses three, four, and five will be answered using simulation techniques of this logit model to yield predicted probabilities for congressional voting behavior. The simulations will only be done, though, if the variables public opinion and/or PAC contributions are proven to be significant in the logit regression model.

Variables

The seven FTAs in this study correspond to a time when the Republicans controlled the House, the Senate, and the Office of the President. The intent of studying this period is avoid the partisan complications that were experienced in the 1990s, when a Republican Congress help thwart the trade policy proposals of a Democratic President. One of the motivations for the Republicans hindering Clinton's political agenda was quite simply that he was the leader of an opposing party. Republicans had no real desire to see a Democrat in the White House succeed on trade policy – even if they agreed with the objective of trade liberalization (Balint and Destler 1999, 23). Bush remained President for the 2003 to 2006 period, so partisan attitudes in Congress towards the executive should not have changed precipitously during this time frame. Moreover, the incumbency rates for the membership in Congress were very high. For the House, 98 percent of those elected in 2004 were incumbents; for the Senate, 96 percent were incumbents (Center for Responsive Politics, The big picture).

There are two dependent variables: one for the seven votes in the House and one for the seven votes in the Senate. The purpose of having two models is to see what

variables influence the outcomes of roll call votes in the two legislative bodies. For each dependent variable, the independent variables are constructed from the same sources using the exact same time frame, so that cross-chamber comparisons are relevant.

The final vote on each FTA Implementation Act is taken as the roll call vote. The principal source for the dependent variables is from Dr. Keith Poole's Voteview website. The data from this website has been confirmed with data from the Library of Congress' Thomas website (Poole; U.S. Library of Congress).

The main independent variable is Public Opinion on FTAs. The data is taken from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey. The question used is as follows: "The federal government (is) negotiating more free trade agreements like NAFTA: do you favor or oppose the federal government doing this?" (Annenberg Public Policy Center). Survey respondents were asked to rate their position on a five-point scale from strongly favor to strongly oppose (coded 2 to -2). There were more than 64,000 valid responses over a period from 7 October 2003 to 19 September 19 2004; of those respondents, 42 percent expressed their approval for the policy, 40 percent of them expressed disapproval. There were more than one-hundred responses from a majority of the congressional districts, and all but one district had more than fifty respondents to the trade question.

Party identification is minimally related to public opinion on trade. Four-five percent of Republican identifiers supported the policy, as compared to 40 percent of Democrats and 41 percent of independents. Thirty-seven percent of Republican identifiers opposed the policy, as compared to 41 percent of Democrats and 43 percent of independents.

When it comes to complex issues such as trade policy, as Hiscox notes, it is very easy to elicit a desired response to a leading question that emphasizes the costs of trade (such as outsourcing), as compared to a question that does not emphasize either the costs or the benefits (2006). Unfortunately, many surveys on trade policy matters deliberately or inadvertently asked leading questions that could bias the results. The trade question from the 2004 Annenburg survey, however, is sufficiently neutral in tone to prevent overtly biased results.

The Public Opinion variable takes on the mean values for each district and state. For the House, the values range from –0.876 to 0.599. The full descriptive statistics, as well as the sources for all the variables listed in this paper, are found in the appendices.

Thirteen percent of respondents said they "don't know" whether they approved or disapproved of the FTA policy (Annenberg Public Policy Center). Rather than remove nearly 9,000 responses from the analysis, this data was recoded as neutral (i.e. with those who said they did not approve or disapprove of the policy). The purpose for the recoding is twofold. First, these respondents represent potential voters who would be indifferent to trade issues, but perhaps still highly motivated to cast their ballot at election time. These potential voters would be of interest to office-seeking politicians. Second, because these respondents represent potential voters, the magnitude of the support or opposition to trade liberalization has to be placed in a proper context. There will be a significant numbers of voters in the population, come election time, that will not have strong opinions either way.

To ensure that adding the do-not-know responses does not bias the Public Opinion variable, a control variable called Lack of Opinion has been added to the model. This

variable is the proportion of do-not-know answers in each district and state. This procedure is an alternative proposal to listwise deletions as suggested in the companion book to the 2004 Annenberg survey (Romer et al 2006, 23). For the House, Lack of Opinion ranges from from 4.1 percent to 25.9 percent.

For the variable Party, Senator Jim Jeffords and Representative Bernard Sanders, both of Vermont, are coded as Democrats for this study, even though congressional records have them listed as independents (U.S. Congress). Both men had been included in the Democrats' caucus during the 108th and 109th Congresses. There are two control variables to Party, each representing the incumbency rates for Republicans and Democrats. The mean incumbency rate for Republicans in the House is 10 years; for Democrats, 12 years. The mean incumbency rate for Republicans in the Senate is 16 years; for Democrats, 21 years.

The PAC contribution variables are rounded to thousands of U.S. dollars. Business PACs contribute far more in funds than do Labor PACs. The maximum value given to a House member from Business PACs is $2.247 million; and from Labor PACs, it is $791,000.

There are six economic and social variables. Each of these variables are expressed as the difference between the district's, or the state's, measurement and the national measurement. For instance, for the variable Unemployment, if the rate of unemployment in Alabama is 7.2 percent and the national rate is 6.9 percent, then the difference is 0.3 percent. This indicates that Alabama has a slightly higher unemployment rate as compared to the U.S. average. The income variables are Per Capita and Median Household, measured in dollars. The former represents a district's

economic output; the latter represents household income alone. The reason for the two variables is that a suburb with little industry would have a lower economic output, but a high household income. Conversely a working-class district may have significant industrial output, but have a low household income. Education is the percent difference in those constituents twenty-five years or older who have a university degree. Export Exposure is the percent difference in ratio of a state's exports to its economic output as compared to the national ratio. Union Strength is the proportion of the workforce sixteen years or older that belong to a union.

Lastly, the data on roll call votes is stacked. This means there are a maximum of seven votes recorded by each House member and each Senator. Each FTA, called Bill, represents a fixed-effects cluster from which the individual characteristics of that vote are calculated separately. Hence, there are seven intercepts that represent the baseline support for each FTA. The formal model for roll call votes is showed in Figure 1, on page 39.

Analysis

The results of the logit regression models are in Tables 1 and 2, found on pages 34 and 35 of this paper. As expected, public opinion in the congressional districts does matter to House members. Given the short-term election cycles of just two years, this finding is not all that surprising. There is evidence to validate the hypothesis that House members do take public opinion into consideration when voting on FTAs. For the Senate model, however, Public Opinion does not matter. The problem is likely the staggered election cycle, in which only a third of Senators are actually thinking about the

immediate impact of their voting record. Even so, the Senate is suppose to be responsive to states' interests. Perhaps the lengthy years of service have made Senators insensitive to public opinion.

Does public opinion causes House members to vote for or against FTAs? Public opinion formation is derived from a variety of sources, especially locality. But incumbent House members would be leading opinion makers, influencing both voters and the local media to a particular position on issues such as trade liberalization. Busch and Reinhardt believe public opinion formation is derived independent of either politicians or the media (2000). Mobilization of public opinion on trade does happen regardless of which congressional district that voters reside in, or what level of political information they are acquiring from the media. Local interest, says Busch and Reinhardt, plays the dominate role in public opinion formation (2000, 714).

It is certainly plausible to believe that public opinion causes House members to vote for or against FTAs. Still, there is an information feedback loop between the media, the politicians, and the general public that cannot be fully isolated to determine a conclusive causal relationship. Therefore, there is qualified support for the idea that public opinion causes legislative behavior on FTAs.

The Lack of Opinion control variable is statistically insignificant for both models, implying that the do-not-know responses are sufficiently random so as not to bias the regression results for Public Opinion.

It is unexpected to see Party in the Senate model not be significant, since this is usually the strongest indicator of roll call voting in many analyses on Congress. The problem is the incumbency variables. When these variables are removed from Senate

model, Party does becomes a strong indicator on how Senators vote on FTAs. Party is the only variable that becomes statistically significant in the Senate model, however, when the incumbency variables are removed.

The length of congressional service does not appear to matter for Republicans with regards to voting on FTAs. Veteran Democrats in the Senate, however, are more inclined to vote against FTAs, on average, as compared to their caucus as a whole. The House incumbency variable for the Democrats is also significant, and the coefficient is in the same direction as the Senate. Veteran Democrats tend to be skeptical of Bush's policy on FTAs.

The two main PAC contribution variables are highly significant in the House model, but not in the Senate model. As with Public Opinion, this distinction likely has to do with the different election cycles for each chamber. The effects on the House model, although significant, are not very large. There is weak evidence to validate the hypothesis that House members do take PAC contributions into consideration when voting on FTAs.

Do business PAC contributions cause House members to vote for FTAs? Do labor PAC contributions cause House members to vote against FTAs? Are the congressmen voting on these agreements because of the contributions they are being given, or are the congressmen being given contributions for the way they vote? From the variance in PAC contributions, two observations can be noted. Contributions to congressional leaders are higher than those given to average House members. For instance, the then House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi received $684,000 in business PAC contributions and $349,000 in labor PAC contributions during the 109th Congress

(Center for Responsive Politics, Members of Congress). House Democrats, on average, received only $305,000 and $152,000 respectively during this same period. The implication is that PACs were attempting to garner influence from an established member of the Democratic leadership. On the other hand, for newly-elected Democrats to the 109th Congress, the average contribution was $338,000 from business PACs and $195,000 from labor PACs. These higher contribution averages are partially due to the freshmen campaigning in competitive electoral districts – but these freshmen have no congressional record. Clearly, PACs contributions are not just about making donations based on the way politicians vote in Congress. The answer to the last question has to be both responses. There is weak support for the idea that PAC contributions cause House members to act on FTAs.

Among the economic and social variables, Unemployment and Export Exposure are influential. The higher the percent difference in the unemployment rate for the districts, as compared to the national rate, the more likely House members will vote against FTAs. Conversely, the higher the percent difference in the export exposure, as compared to the national level, the more likely congressmen will vote in favor of FTAs. Although Unemployment is marginally significant in the Senate model, the direction of the coefficient is intuitively the wrong way. This indicates there are more problems associated with trying to make cross-chamber comparisons. As for the income and education variables, there is no evidence to validate the hypothesis that Congress does take class-based characteristics into account when voting on FTAs.

At this point, it should be clear that the logit regression model for the Senate did not reveal many details. Clearly, there are fundamental differences between the two

chambers, at least in the way these institutions address Bush's policy on FTAs. This paper does not present any further interpretation of the Senate model.

To provide a better understanding of the House regression results, simulations have be applied using the coefficient estimates to obtain the predicted probabilities for House roll call votes. The logit model assumptions still apply. One thousand simulations have been drawn. The general idea is to hold all but one of the independent variables constant at their respective mean values in order to obtain the predicted probabilities for House roll call votes, as only one independent variable is adjusted along set points.

To show the magnitude of change that public opinion has on roll call votes, the simulations are first used to predict what happens when attitudes on FTAs change dramatically in the districts. Taking the predicted probability that House members would vote for FTAs when Public Opinion is set at the 95th percentile, 0.378, and subtracting it from the 5th percentile, –0.478, reveals a 13 percent predicted change in congressional voting behavior. For Republicans, however, the predicted change is only 3 percent; for Democrats, the predicted change is 24 percent. This result suggests that Republicans and Democrats may behave differently on FTAs.

To examine this difference more throughly, the simulations are used to test whether Republicans delegate authority to President Bush and, conversely, whether Democrats do not delegate authority. In this particular case, Public Opinion has been adjusted along the five-point scale while the other variables are fixed at their respective mean values. Two sets of predicted probabilities have been obtained, one for each party. The results are in Table 3, on page 36 of this paper.

The first column represents the predicted probability that Republicans will vote for FTAs, at a given level of Public Opinion, in descending order of support. The second column represents the predicted probability for the Democrats. The value of most interest is the pivot point. This predicts where a majority in a caucus would vote against FTAs, given a certain level of public opposition to trade liberalization. The values of these pivot points are recorded in the last row of the table. The pivot points are showed in Figure 2, on page 40, where the yeas and nays intersect.

Democrats are predicted to be highly sensitive to public opinion. When there is public support for FTAs, the Democrats are predicted to vote for such agreements. This suggests that Democrats would not be opposed to Bush's policy of trade liberalization simply because the President is a Republican. The pivot point is effectively at the neutral position for Public Opinion. This would suggest that Democrats do not delegate to the President; rather, they are more concerned about public opinion in their districts.

Republicans are predicted to be far less responsive to even moderate levels of public opposition. There is a near 100 percent probability that they would vote for FTAs if public opinion is at least neutral to these agreements. Only when there is strong opposition in their districts would Republicans be compelled to vote against FTAs. The pivot point lies between strongly opposed and somewhat opposed. Clearly, the Republicans are predicted to ignore public opinion under all but the most extreme circumstances. This suggests that Republicans may be delegating authority to the President. Certainly, most Republicans have an ideological commitment to the President's policy objective on trade liberalization. Another plausible scenario, however,

is that Republicans are simply responding to business interests, which happens to be in line with the Republicans' ideological goal.

To see if business interests have an influence, further simulations are used to test the interactions between public opinion and PAC contributions. First, the simulations are used to predict the conditional impact of PAC contributions at differing levels of public opinion. Again, Public Opinion has been adjusted along the five-point scale while the other variables are fixed at their respective mean values. Second, the simulations are used to predict the conditional impact of public opinion at differing levels of PAC contributions. For both business and labor PACs, the starting point is zero contributions. The scale of the monetary values has been arbitrarily set based on a range of values in the dataset. The monetary values roughly approximate the midpoints of distinctive clusters in PAC contribution levels. Two sets of predicted probabilities have been obtained, one for each party. The results for the interactions between public opinion and business PACs are in Tables 4 and 5, which are on page 37 of this paper. The results for the interactions between public opinion and labor PACs are in Tables 6 and 7, which are on page 38 of this paper.

Starting with Table 4, the Republicans are predicted to support FTAs with near certainty provided that public opinion is not opposed to Bush's trade policy. In fact, the coefficients for the interaction between public opinion and business PAC contributions are nearly the same for public opinion alone (in Table 3). Democrats, on the other hand, are far more likely to be positively affected by business PAC contributions. The probability that Democrats would vote for FTAs at the neutral position jumps from 50

percent when considering public opinion alone, to 91 percent when public opinion and business PAC contributions are combined.

Looking at Table 5, Republicans are predicted with a high probability to vote for FTAs, regardless of what level of business PAC contributions are given to these congressmen. PACs may donate large sums of money to Republicans, but the predictions indicate that this money has little impact to these members' commitment to trade liberalization. For Democrats, the level of contributions matters. Donation levels at $350,000 are predicted to produce 16 percent increase in the probability that Democrats would vote in favor of FTAs, as compared to when business PACs make no campaign donations to these congressmen.

With greater certainty, having eliminated the business interests explanation, it can be said that there is evidence to validate the hypothesis that Republicans are delegating authority to the President on trade liberalization. There is no evidence to validate the hypothesis that Republicans alter their positions when confronted with a congruence of popular support and business PAC contributions in favor of FTAs. There is evidence, however, to suggest that Democrats do alter their positions.

Turning to the interactions between public opinion and labor PAC contributions, Table 6 indicates that both Republicans and Democrats are affected by donations from labor PACs. When public opinion is opposed to FTAs, the probability that either party would vote in favor of these agreements fall precipitously when public opinion and labor contributions are combined. The effect is even more dramatic in Table 7. Both parties are predicted with high probability to vote for FTAs when there are no labor PAC contributions. But the probabilities begin to fall rapidly after a mere $25,000 donation.

For Republicans, however, it should be noted that their average labor PAC contribution is only $26,000. There is evidence to validate the hypothesis that House members alter their positions when confronted with a congruence of popular opposition and labor PAC contributions against FTAs.

In summary, taking the logit regressions and simulations together, the congressional behavior of Democrats on FTAs tends to support Interest Group Theory. These congressmen are sensitive to public opinion, but their positions can be altered by both business and labor PACs. Democrats do not delegate authority to the President on trade policy. The congressional behavior of Republicans, on the other hand, tends towards Delegation Theory. These congressmen are not very responsive to public opinion on FTAs, and business PACs have little influence over their position on trade liberalization. Republicans do delegate authority to the President on trade policy.

Closing Comments

The passage of seven trade agreements was never in any doubt. The elaborate procedures of Fast-Track have an institutional bias in favor of a FTA's passage once the initial hard step has been taken to negotiate under these rules. In accordance with Delegation Theory, House Republicans are consistently more supportive of the President on trade policy, even when their constituents' views on FTAs tend towards popular opposition. No such support is given to Bush from the House Democrats, and these members are sensitive to swings in public opinion.

It should be noted, however, that the roll call votes are on government bills. Both the President and the congressional leadership had a strong influence in securing the

passage of the FTAs into law. As Jacobs and his colleagues have said, it is the congressional leadership – and not the individual members of Congress – who respond to public opinion.

Incumbency rates alter the voting behavior on FTAs for House Democrats only, with veteran Democrats being slightly less receptive to Bush's trade liberalization policy. On the other hand, incumbency rates do not change the significance that public opinion has on House FTA votes. The results for the Senate, though, reveal that public opinion has no effect. As noted by Hinton-Andersson and Wood, the combination of incumbency and the staggered election cycle can make Senators impervious to public opinion.

As has been discovered in other studies, PAC contributions have an impact on roll call votes. The degree of influence varies, though, on both what type of PAC is making the political contribution, and what political party is receiving the donation. Also, there are significant differences in the impact that PACs have on Congress; PACs have no influence in the Senate. Furthermore, PACs have heterogeneous motives for providing campaign contributions. The influence of PACs, as suggested in the House model, is relatively small when compared to public opinion.

In accordance with Interest Group Theory, Democrats are highly sensitive to interests as expressed as public opinion and as campaign contributions. De Bièvre and Dür are half correct to surmise that public opinion and interest group activity would prove to be a powerful interaction. In the case examined here, only House Democrats are sensitive to these influences.

Looking at factor mobility, the class-based characteristics of the districts do not alter the voting behavior on FTAs. Congressmen do not incorporate the income or the

education levels of their constituencies when determining to vote for or against FTAs. McGillivray's variables on trade exposure and the unemployment rate, however, did prove significant for the House votes.

The question first asked at the beginning of the research design section can be answered: Given the heterogeneous nature of public opinion on trade policy, is it plausible to think public opinion matters on such a complex issue? The answer is yes. Public opinion can matter under certain conditions, and those conditions can help researchers better interpret their results when analyzing trade policy. Researchers should think about adding public opinion as a determinant to consider in their own future studies.

Table 1. House roll call votes on FTAs in the U.S. Congress

Variable / Intercept	Pr (Roll Call Vote = 1)			
	Coefficient	(Robust Std. Error)	Odds Ratio	(Robust Std. Error)
Public Opinion	1.374**	(0.676)	3.950	(2.670)
Lack of Opinion	4.367	(3.178)	78.751	(250.300)
Party	0.857**	(0.403)	2.356	(0.950)
Rep. Incumbency	0.021	(0.021)	0.938	(0.014)
Dem. Incumbency	–0.066****	(0.015)	1.021	(0.022)
Business PAC	0.004****	(0.001)	1.004	(0.001)
Labor PAC	–0.009****	(0.001)	0.991	(0.001)
PO*Business PAC	0.004**	(0.002)	1.004	(0.002)
PO*Labor PAC	–0.012***	(0.004)	0.988	(0.004)
Per Capita	0.000	(0.000)	1.000	(0.000)
Median Household	0.000	(0.000)	1.000	(0.000)
Unemployment	–0.192***	(0.060)	0.825	(0.050)
Education	0.021	(0.024)	1.022	(0.024)
Export Exposure	0.109***	(0.036)	1.115	(0.040)
Union Strength	0.013	(0.017)	1.013	(0.017)
Australia Intercept	0.651	(0.500)		
Bahrain Intercept	0.167	(0.173)		
Chile Intercept	–0.804****	(0.180)		
CA DR Intercept	–2.018****	(0.209)		
Morocco Intercept	0.178	(0.160)		
Oman Intercept	–1.914****	(0.209)		
Singapore Intercept	–0.823****	(0.175)		
N	2830			
Log Pseudo-likelihood	– 1107.054			
Wald Chi-Squared	361.57****			
Pseudo R-Squared	0.3985			

* denotes p values <=0.1; ** p values <=0.05; *** p values <=0.01; **** p values <=0.001

Table 2. Senate roll call votes on FTAs in the U.S. Congress

Variable / Intercept	Pr (Roll Call Vote = 1)			
	Coefficient	(Robust Std. Error)	Odds Ratio	(Robust Std. Error)
Public Opinion	0.422	(2.006)	1.525	(3.060)
Lack of Opinion	–1.248	(12.665)	0.287	(3.634)
Party	0.713	(0.726)	2.041	(1.481)
Rep. Incumbency	0.026	(0.036)	1.026	(0.037)
Dem. Incumbency	–0.052***	(0.017)	0.949	(0.017)
Business PAC	0.001	(0.000)	1.001	(0.000)
Labor PAC	–0.001	(0.001)	0.999	(0.001)
PO*Business PAC	0.002*	(0.001)	1.002	(0.001)
PO*Labor PAC	–0.008	(0.005)	0.992	(0.005)
Per Capita	0.000	(0.000)	1.000	(0.000)
Median Household	0.000	(0.000)	1.000	(0.000)
Unemployment	0.321*	(0.175)	1.378	(0.241)
Education	0.090	(0.074)	1.094	(0.081)
Export Exposure	0.042	(0.068)	1.043	(0.071)
Union Strength	–0.033	(0.043)	0.967	(0.042)
Australia Intercept	2.310	(1.823)		
Bahrain Intercept	NA†	NA†		
Chile Intercept	–1.141***	(0.417)		
CA DR Intercept	–2.190****	(0.386)		
Morocco Intercept	0.266	(0.414)		
Oman Intercept	–1.572****	(0.378)		
Singapore Intercept	–1.275***	(0.435)		
N	560			
Log Pseudo-likelihood	– 241.212			
Wald Chi-Squared	79.68****			
Pseudo R-Squared	0.2760			

* denotes p values <=0.1; ** p values <=0.05; *** p values <=0.01; **** p values <=0.001
† passed by unanimous consent

Table 3. Predicted probabilities of voting in favor of FTAs, by political party, at differing levels of public opinion; House roll call votes on FTAs in the U.S. Congress

Public Opinion	Republicans Pr (Roll Call Vote = 1)		Democrats Pr (Roll Call Vote = 1)	
	Coefficient	(Standard Error)	Coefficient	(Standard Error)
Strongly favor	0.999	(0.001)	0.706	(0.163)
Somewhat favor	0.996	(0.004)	0.622	(0.107)
Neutral	0.963	(0.185)	0.506	(0.042)
Somewhat oppose	0.645	(0.144)	0.388	(0.102)
Strongly oppose	0.182	(0.173)	0.300	(0.161)
Value of Pivot Point	– 1.26		– 0.05	

Table 4. Predicted probabilities for the conditional impact of business PAC contributions, by political party, at differing levels of public opinion; House roll call votes on FTAs in the U.S. Congress

Public Opinion	Conditional on Republican Pr (Roll Call Vote = 1)‡		Conditional on Democrat Pr (Roll Call Vote = 1)‡	
	Coefficient	(Standard Error)	Coefficient	(Standard Error)
Strongly favor	0.999	(0.001)	0.998	(0.005)
Somewhat favor	0.999	(0.002)	0.988	(0.010)
Neutral	0.983	(0.005)	0.914	(0.030)
Somewhat oppose	0.732	(0.135)	0.529	(0.157)
Strongly oppose	0.209	(0.201)	0.155	(0.153)

‡ mean values, in U.S. dollars, for business PAC contributions; Republicans ($457,000), Democrats ($265,000)

Table 5. Predicted probabilities for the conditional impact of public opinion, by political party, at differing levels of business PAC contributions; House roll call votes on FTAs in the U.S. Congress

Business PAC Contributions	Conditional on Republican Pr (Roll Call Vote = 1)§		Conditional on Democrat Pr (Roll Call Vote = 1)§	
U.S. $ thousands	Coefficient	(Standard Error)	Coefficient	(Standard Error)
0	0.888	(0.030)	0.784	(0.057)
125	0.928	(0.019)	0.857	(0.043)
350	0.969	(0.008)	0.936	(0.024)
600	0.988	(0.004)	0.975	(0.012)
1000	0.997	(0.001)	0.995	(0.004)

§ mean values, on a scale from (-2) to (2), for public opinion; Republican-held districts (-.0666), Democrat-held districts (-.0108)

Table 6. Predicted probabilities on the conditional impact of labor PAC contributions, by political party, at differing levels of public opinion; House roll call votes on FTAs in the U.S. Congress

Public Opinion	Conditional on Republican Pr (Roll Call Vote = 1)[‖]		Conditional on Democrat Pr (Roll Call Vote = 1)[‖]	
	Coefficient	(Standard Error)	Coefficient	(Standard Error)
Strongly favor	0.977	(0.041)	0.738	(0.224)
Somewhat favor	0.964	(0.028)	0.706	(0.146)
Neutral	0.919	(0.021)	0.629	(0.061)
Somewhat oppose	0.780	(0.117)	0.518	(0.175)
Strongly oppose	0.563	(0.252)	0.435	(0.268)

‖ mean values, in U.S. dollars, for labor PAC contributions; Republicans ($26,000), Democrats ($149,000)

Table 7. Predicted probabilities for the conditional impact of public opinion, by political party, at differing levels of labor PAC contributions; House roll call votes on FTAs in the U.S. Congress

Labor PAC Contributions	Conditional on Republican Pr (Roll Call Vote = 1)[#]		Conditional on Democrat Pr (Roll Call Vote = 1)[#]	
U.S. $ thousands	Coefficient	(Standard Error)	Coefficient	(Standard Error)
0	0.928	(0.019)	0.855	(0.044)
25	0.914	(0.022)	0.827	(0.047)
125	0.829	(0.047)	0.676	(0.058)
250	0.647	(0.099)	0.423	(0.071)
400	0.378	(0.138)	0.177	(0.063)

mean values, on a scale from (-2) to (2), for public opinion; Republican-held districts (-.0666), Democrat-held districts (-.0108)

$$\Pr(\text{Roll Call} = 1 \mid \underline{\mathbf{x}})^{\dagger\dagger} = G[\beta_1 * \text{Public Opinion} + \beta_2 * \text{Lack of Opinion} +$$
$$\beta_3 * \text{Party} + \beta_4 * \text{Republican Incumbency} + \beta_5 * \text{Democrat Incumbency} +$$
$$\beta_6 * \text{Business PAC} + \beta_7 * \text{Labor PAC} +$$
$$\beta_8 * \text{Public Opinion} * \text{Business PAC} + \beta_9 * \text{Public Opinion} * \text{Labor PAC} +$$
$$\beta_{10} * \text{Per Capita} + \beta_{11} * \text{Median Household} + \beta_{12} * \text{Unemployment} +$$
$$\beta_{13} * \text{Education} + \beta_{14} * \text{Export Exposure} + \beta_{15} * \text{Union Strength} +$$
$$\Sigma \beta_j * \text{Bill}] + \varepsilon$$

Figure 1. Formal model for roll call votes

†† The model is duplicated twice, once for the House and once for the Senate



Figure 2. Predictive probability plots of House roll call votes, by political party, at differing levels of public opinion

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APPENDIX A: LIST OF DATA SOURCES

For the variables Public Opinion and Lack of Opinion, the mean value for the district or the state was taken from a CD-ROM produced by the Annenberg Public Policy Center. There is no public opinion data for either Hawaii or Alaska.

Annenberg Public Policy Center. 2006. National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) 2004: Cross sections; national rolling. CD-ROM. In *Capturing campaign dynamics, 2000 and 2004: The National Annenberg Election Survey*, ed. Daniel Romer, Daniel, Christopher Adasiewicz, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Kate Kenski, and Kenneth Winneg. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

For the PAC contribution variables, the actual values are taken from the OpenSecrets website. On the rare occasion when negative values were given, these values were recoded as zero. For Senators John Kerry and John Edwards, the PAC contributions towards their respective presidential campaigns in 2004 were omitted from the Senate dataset.

Center for Responsive Politics. OpenSecrets. Members of Congress. http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/index.asp (last accessed July 2007).

For the dependent variables and the party affliation variables, the actual values are taken from the Voteview website.

Poole, Keith. Voteview: University of California, San Diego. Nominate data, roll call data, and software. Roll call data. http://www.voteview.com (last accessed June 2007).

For the Union Strength variable, the actual values are taken from the Labor Statistics' website.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Labor force statistics from the current population survey. Household data series: Union membership tables. http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpslutab1.htm (last accessed July 2007).

For the Education, Export Exposure, Median Household, Per Capita, and Unemployment variables, the actual values are taken from the Census Bureau's website.

U.S. Bureau of the Census. American community profiles. FactFinder: datasets. Data profiles. http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en (last accessed July 2007).

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A final note with respect to the data for Texas. Due to mid-decade redistricting in this state, some of the measurements for the public opinion and demographic variables may be unreliable. As a result, the House roll call votes for Texas in the 108th Congress has been omitted from the regression analysis.

APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES

This appendix consists of three tables on most of the main variables tested in this paper. Party has been omitted. Table 8 contains the descriptive statistics for the House; Table 9 contains the descriptives for the Senate. Table 10 contains the top ten list for the strongest intensity in the Public Opinion variable, both for and against FTAs.

Table 8. Descriptive statistics for the House of Representatives

Variable	Mean	Range	Minimum	Maximum	5th Percentile	95th Percentile
Public Opinion	0.405	1.475	–0.876	0.599	–0.478	0.378
Lack of Opinion	0.133	0.218	0.041	0.259	0.081	0.190
Rep. Incumbency	10	35	1	36	1	25
Dem. Incumbency	12	51	1	52	1	29
Business PAC	367	2247	0	2247	44	909
Labor PAC	84	791	0	791	0	255
Per Capita	0	51170	–14249	36921	–8906	12819
Median Household	0	75768	–27224	48544	–14922	26949
Unemployment	0	13.7	–3.3	10.4	–2,5	3.7
Education	0	56.2	–20.8	35.4	–13.1	18.4
Export Exposure	0	17.3	–6.3	11.0	–4.0	5.7
Union Strength	0	23.8	–10.2	13.6	–8.0	11.7

Table 9. Descriptive statistics for the Senate

Variable	Mean	Range	Minimum	Maximum	5th Percentile	95th Percentile
Public Opinion	–0.099	0.717	–0.470	0.248	–0.377	0.173
Lack of Opinion	0.136	0.061	0.110	0.171	0.111	0.161
Rep. Incumbency	16	41	1	42	2	32
Dem. Incumbency	21	53	1	54	3	45
Business PAC	1242	5686	0	5686	10	2768
Labor PAC	139	1015	0	1015	0	480
Per Capita	0	15978	–7064	8914	–5710	6074
Median Household	0	28734	–13304	15430	–11243	14699
Unemployment	0	5.5	–3.1	2.4	–2.1	2.0
Education	0	20.0	–10.3	9.7	–8.3	7.7
Export Exposure	0	17.3	–6.3	11.0	–4.5	5.9
Union Strength	0	23.8	–10.2	13.6	–7.9	9.4

Table 10. Top ten districts in favor of, and oppose to, FTAs; Public Opinion variable

	District	Mean	Incumbent Party	Geographic or Metropolitan Area	A Major Population Area
1	Virginia 11th	0.599	Republican	Washington, DC	Fairfax
2	Texas 32nd	0.565	Republican	Dallas	Irving
3	New Jersey 13th	0.542	Democrat	New York City	Hoboken
4	Virginia 8th	0.527	Democrat	Washington, DC	Arlington
5	Texas 29th	0.525	Democrat	Houston	Pasadena
6	Texas 15th	0.523	Democrat	Southern State	Edinburg
7	Texas 25th	0.505	Democrat	Southern State	Austin
8	New York 18th	0.496	Democrat	New York City	White Plains
9	Virginia 10th	0.492	Republican	Washington, DC	Fairfax
10	California 43rd	0.474	Democrat	Los Angeles	San Bernardino
1	N Carolina 10th	– 0.876	Republican	Western State	Hickory
2	N Carolina 11th	– 0.708	Republican	Western State	Asheville
3	Mississippi 3rd	– 0.675	Republican	Central State	Jackson
4	N Carolina 5th	– 0.655	Republican	Western State	Statesville
5	N Carolina 2nd	– 0.648	Democrat	Central State	Raleigh
6	Ohio 9th	– 0.644	Democrat	Lake Erie Region	Toledo
7	Tennessee 4th	– 0.621	Democrat	Central State	Franklin
8	Michigan 5th	– 0.600	Democrat	Eastern State	Flint
9	Kentucky 5th	– 0.582	Republican	Eastern State	Corbin
10	Ohio 16th	– 0.564	Republican	Eastern State	Canton