STUDIES IN EARLY GREEK TYRANNY

by

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January 31, 1973
In Chapter One, 'The Economic Basis of Tyranny,' the view is questioned that early tyrannies, especially those in the Isthmian states, were connected with the growth of commercial prosperity and were established with the support of a new class of merchants and artisans. It is argued that in Corinth and elsewhere in Greece economic conditions seem not to have been sufficiently advanced when the earliest tyrants came to power in the mid-seventh century B.C. to have created a new class powerful enough to challenge aristocratic control of the polis. Extensive trade in the Aegean, a trade in volume capable of bringing prosperity to a large number of people and sufficient to produce social and political change, began later than the rise of the earliest tyrants. Thus a connexion between the growth of prosperity and the rise of the earliest tyrants is difficult to maintain.

In Chapter Two, 'The Hoplite Reform and Tyranny,' it is suggested that the evidence argues against associating the rise of early Greek tyrants with the support of a new hoplite class. It is unlikely that there existed in the mid-seventh century a sufficiently prosperous class of non-aristocratic citizens to supplement the nobles in filling the ranks of the earliest hoplite armies. The earliest hoplite armies were
probably composed of aristocrats, who were the only class of citizens able to furnish their own armour and the military skills required to form the earliest hoplite lines. There is no evidence to connect early tyrants with hoplite support and none to suggest that hoplites were a force in politics or even a separate political entity in the seventh century B.C.

In Chapter Three, 'Aristocratic Factionalism and the Origin of Tyranny,' evidence is adduced to indicate that factionalism within early aristocracies especially amongst rival families was a recurring problem in the archaic polis and that in many cities tyranny arose from aristocratic stasis. Tyranny was often gained through the normal magistracies within the framework of aristocratic politics. It grew out of two features of the aristocratic constitution: the possession by magistrates of great and sometimes nearly unchecked power; and long tenure of office. The Cretan cities, Mytilene, and Athens are cited as examples of cities in which tyranny seems to have arisen from aristocratic factionalism. When aristocrats gained the tyranny their rule was often conservative and employed ordinary methods of aristocratic rule. Tyranny in archaic Greece was an aristocratic, not a popular, phenomenon.

In Chapter Four, 'The Nature of Tyranny,' it is suggested that there is much evidence to contradict the view that early
tyrants usurped power and maintained it by force. Many accounts that tell of tyrants who seized power in a coup d'État are late, stereotyped, and suspect. Bodyguards granted to individuals were not private armies but had the official sanction of the poleis that granted them. It is likely that the grant of a bodyguard accompanied a magistracy or the assigning of special authority that eased the path to tyranny. It is doubtful that tyranny in early Greece was patterned after absolute monarchy as it existed in Lydia or anywhere else in Anatolia. Rather it denoted the assumption of great power by an individual with long tenure in the context of familiar magistracies in the polis. The position of a tyrant was probably ambiguous in his own day. Extraordinary magistracies existed in the archaic polis for the granting of special power to individuals and these may have served as models for aspiring tyrants. Early tyrants seem for the most part to have based their rule on constitutional magistracies. Tyranny was a Greek, not an oriental, phenomenon.
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis has had a curious history. It began as a history of archaic Mytilene. I initially chose to write on the early history of Mytilene because I was interested in early Greek tyranny and wished to investigate in some detail a particular tyranny. The succession of tyrants in archaic Mytilene offered an attractive subject because our most important sources are not only contemporary but first-hand accounts of the political struggles in early Mytilene; and they are tantalisingly fragmentary and give the historian an opportunity to reconstruct an interesting period of early Greek political history.

It was with this intention that I began to read about early tyranny. I became interested in the extraordinary office of aisymnetes that Pittakos held and its relationship to other kinds of tyranny and I tried to find where else in Greece this office had appeared. This search led me to the surprising statement of Theodoros Metochites that among those who held this office was Periandros of Corinth. I examined the sources for Periandros' tyranny and for the tyranny of his father Kypselos in an attempt to determine the basis of their rule. This led eventually to the subject of Chapter Four of my thesis, 'The Nature of Early Tyranny.'
In studying the Corinthian tyranny I repeatedly encountered the commonly held view that tyranny had first arisen in important commercial centres because the influx of new wealth into these cities had created a new class of wealthy men who were prepared, by their support of tyrants, to challenge men of noble birth in their exclusive control of political power. I began to explore the evidence for the 'economic revolution' of the eighth century that is often credited with having produced the political crises of the seventh century that in many cases resulted in tyranny. I came to doubt that economic growth had a significant impact on the politics of the seventh century and even that there existed anything so widespread as an 'economic revolution' in the eighth century (which is a far different thing from the gradual growth of trade and crafts that did occur). I have examined the evidence in what has become Chapter One of my thesis, 'The Economic Basis of Tyranny.'

It is widely believed that economic growth in the eighth century produced in Greece a new 'middle class' of artisans, merchants and smallholders who were wealthy enough to be able to furnish their own armour and to join the ranks of the new hoplite armies, which required their service. This new class used their service in hoplite armies as a reason to claim a share in political power; and when they did not obtain a
share of power they supported men who were willing to promise them rewards in return for support, aspiring tyrants who used hoplites to overthrow the ruling nobility and gain power for themselves. Snodgrass had already cast serious doubt on the connexion between the introduction of hoplite tactics and the rise of tyranny from an examination of the archaeological evidence. Yet there were other reasons for denying that hoplites provided the support for early tyrants and I have dealt with the question in Chapter Two, 'The Hoplite Reform and Tyranny.'

If the rise of tyranny was not due to the support of a new 'middle class' of hoplites what factors were responsible for its development in the seventh century? An examination of the political situation in the archaic polis and several archaic tyrannies led me to the conclusion that the rise of Greek tyranny in many cities in the seventh century can best be explained as the result of the factional strife that was characteristic of aristocracies generally and was a marked feature of the archaic polis. The evidence for this view is presented in Chapter Three, 'Aristocratic Factionalism and the Origin of Tyranny.'

When I first began to explore these questions I regarded them as merely preliminary to an investigation of the early tyrannies in Mytilene. Yet it soon became evident that
these questions merited discussion in a broader context than the history of Mytilene. Hence I reluctantly decided to abandon my original intention of investigating as a thesis-topic the early history of Mytilene and to deal instead with the questions that had been raised in the course of my research regarding the origin of early Greek tyranny. I am grateful to my supervisors, Professors M. F. McGregor and Phillip Harding, for their permission to change the subject of this thesis in mediis rebus.

I am greatly indebted to many scholars whose work I have found invaluable in the writing of this thesis. While many names could be mentioned, a few must suffice. I have learnt much, by agreement or disagreement, from the writings of A. Andrewes, R. M. Cook, T. J. Dunbabin, W. G. Forrest, J. Hasebroek, A. M. Snodgrass, C. G. Starr, P. N. Ure, Édouard Will, and R. F. Willetts.

Unless otherwise indicated all dates are B.C.
It is a commonplace of modern historical literature$^1$ that the origin of Greek tyranny was closely connected with the increase in prosperity brought about by the growth of trade and commerce that occurred in the eighth and seventh centuries, and, more particularly, with the demands of the discontented lower classes or the aspirations of a rising 'middle class' who challenged the traditional political monopoly of the landed aristocracy. Typical of this view is Andrewes' account$^2$ of the economic conditions that led to the rise of tyranny:


The isolation of primitive Greece had been ended in the middle of the eighth century; exploration, trade, and colonization developed very rapidly from 750 onwards; the transition from barter was brought towards a conclusion by the introduction of true coinage before the end of the seventh century. Through this period the material prosperity increased very greatly, so that, at the very least, a wider circle had now leisure to take an interest in politics, and the weight of wealth to back any claim they might make. Before long we find aristocratic poets, Alkaios and Theognis, complaining of the dilution of their class by men of low birth...there is no doubt of the importance of increased prosperity as a general precondition for the new political development.

The *locus classicus* of this view is a passage in Thucydides\(^3\) that is often cited in support:

Δυνατωτέρος δὲ γιγνομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κτήσιν ἐτὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρῶτον ποιουμένης τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι κατοίκοι, τῶν

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\(^3\) l. 13. 1.
In this chapter I shall argue that tyranny is not sufficiently explained as a result of the economic revival in Greece in the eighth and seventh centuries; that the evidence does not indicate that economic conditions were advanced enough to create in the seventh century a rising 'middle class' of merchants and craftsmen who were in a position to challenge the aristocracy by their support of tyrants; and that the volume of trade and industry necessary to produce social and political change is not to be found in Greece till the last quarter of the seventh century, at least a generation after the earliest tyrannies.

It is common in attempting to link tyranny with economic expansion in archaic Greece to point to the creation of early tyrannies in the Isthmian states (Corinth, Megara, and Sikyon), which were already centres of commercial activity. But commercial cities did not always produce tyrants; there are several important states that were known for their trade and commerce in early Greece that did

4. Thucydides need not be taken to imply a causal connexion between an increasing prosperity in Greece and the establishment of tyranny, only a temporal one.

5. See, e.g., Hammond 145.
not experience tyranny. Among the earliest and most enterprising of the Greek cities in commercial expansion in the period of the growth of trade were those on Buboia. Archaeological evidence indicates that New Eretria, founded in the early eighth century, very soon became one of the largest and most prosperous Greek cities. Eretria and Chalkis were thriving trading cities active both in the Levant and in the West: the Euboians founded the earliest colony, Pithekoussai, and Al Mina. Chalkis and Eretria colonised extensively in Italy, Sicily, and the North Aegean, and Euboian exports to the West were numerous in

7. Livy 8. 22. 5-6; Strabo 5. 4. 9, p. 247; for the pottery see Coldstream, *GGP* 354-355.
8. Boardman, *op. cit.* 5-7 and *JHS* 85 (1965) 12; Coldstream, *GGP* 310-316; Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece* 334-335 and 357 n. 43.
9. Thucydides 6. 3-5; Herakleides Pontikos, *FHG* 2 219, fr. 25; Strabo 6. 1. 6, p. 257; and 10. 1. 8, p. 447 and 7, fr. 11.

Chalkis alone is credited with thirty colonies in the North Aegean and at least eleven in Italy and Sicily (Bradeen, *A History of Chalkis to 338 B. C.* 30 n. 1).
the eighth century, both to their own colonies and to Etruria, with which the Euboians were the first Greeks to trade.\textsuperscript{10}

Chalkis and Eretria were the most active commercially of the Greek cities in the eighth century and, on the assumption that commercial expansion made possible the conditions that led to tyranny, we might expect an early and important tyranny to have arisen in Euboia comparable to the tyrannies in the Isthmian states in the seventh century. But evidence for an important or long-lived tyranny on Euboia is lacking. We do, indeed, have the names of two tyrants of Chalkis: Antileon, whose rule was followed by an oligarchy\textsuperscript{11}; and Phoxos, who was overthrown by an alliance of the people and nobles.\textsuperscript{12} There is also mentioned by Plutarch\textsuperscript{13} a Euboian tyrant by the name of Tynnondas, who is compared to Pittakos of Mytilene. We know that Tynnondas preceded Solon but the tyrannies of Antileon and Phoxos cannot be dated.\textsuperscript{14} I think

\textsuperscript{10} Coldstream, \textit{GGP} 370-371, 375-376; Boardman, \textit{The Greeks Overseas} 210-211, 214.
\textsuperscript{11} Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1316a 29-32.
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Pol.} 1340a 29-31.
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Solon} 14. 4.
\textsuperscript{14} Bradeen (\textit{op. cit.} 221-222) places Phoxos in the fourth century on the grounds that his support by both the nobles
that we are safe in arguing from the silence of our sources about these two tyrants that their tyrannies were short-lived and cannot be compared in importance to the Isthmian tyrannies of the seventh century. It is unlikely that they are members of the same dynasty; instead their tyrannies should probably be regarded as temporary interruptions in the oligarchy of the Hippobotai at Chalkis.15

It might be argued, however, that the reason that no important tyranny arose in Chalkis or Eretria, despite their early economic advancement, was that the great period of Euboian commercial activity ended before the middle of the seventh century, when the first Isthmian tyrannies began in

and the people suggests that the tyrant received support from an outside power and that this power was probably Thebes. This is, by Bradeen's own admission, highly conjectural. I think that the tyrants are likely to have been earlier, perhaps in the sixth century. For possible evidence for Antileon's date see Maas, CR N. S. 6 (1956) 200.

Greek. But if tyranny grew out of the rise to importance of a new class who challenged the aristocratic control of the state we should expect to find tyranny in Euboia in the eighth century, for Euboia was the most advanced area of Greece commercially and might therefore be expected to be the most

16. Euboian exports of pottery fell off after ca 700 both in the East and West (Coldstream, GGP 369). This almost complete disappearance of Euboian ceramic exports is attributed by Coldstream (GGP 369-370, 376) to exhaustion following the Lelantine War. But archaeological evidence indicates that, whereas in the seventh century Chalkis' prosperity declined, Eretria enjoyed continuous prosperity from the eighth to the sixth century with no alarming disasters or change of population' (Boardman, op. cit. [n. 6 above] 28). Moreover, by the end of the eighth century Eretria had established a distinctive local tradition of vase-painting that lasted into the sixth century. A more likely explanation of the decline of Euboian exports is, I think, that they were simply edged out of the ceramic markets by Corinthian wares. Corinthian pottery had already begun to surpass Euboian pottery in use in the West in the eighth century and it flooded the western markets after ca 700. In the seventh century Euboian imports of pottery are entirely lacking in the West (Coldstream, GGP 369).
advanced politically. 17 Corinth, on the other hand, did not come into her own in the commercial sphere till the seventh century; hence we might expect tyranny in Eretria or Chalkis to have preceded the Isthmian tyrannies. But this was not the case and the Euboian cities clearly do not fit the correlation between the growth of commerce and industry and the rise of tyranny.

Another state that was important in early Greece as a centre of commercial and industrial activity was Aigina. 18 Aigina provided perhaps the earliest merchants among the Greeks. 19 According to Hesiod 20 the Myrmidons of Aigina were the first to build ships and sail on the sea. At an early date the Aiginetans ran mule-caravans from Kyllene to Arkadia. 21 The island became a commercial state, according to Ephoros, 22 because of the poverty of the soil, which forced the Aiginetans to seek employment at sea as merchants.

17. According to the formula of Finley, Early Greece 106.
Aigina's importance as a commercial power is shown by the fact that whereas all other Greek states maintained a joint sanctuary at Naukratis only the Aiginetans, together with the Samians and the Milesians, had separate sanctuaries. The merchant who had made the greatest fortune of any Greek trader known to Herodotos was, characteristically, an Aiginetan, Sostratos. There is no doubt of Aigina's commercial importance from very early times; but, so far as we know, there were no tyrants who came to power on the island.

23. Herodotos 2. 178. 3. On Naukratis see Cook, JHS 57 (1937) 227-237; Boardman, The Greeks Overseas 134-150; Roebuck, CP 45 (1950) 236-247, and CP 46 (1951) 212-220; Austin, Greece and Egypt in the Archaic Age 22-34.

24. Herodotos 4. 152. 3.

25. The failure of economic prosperity to produce tyranny on Aigina is explained by Hegyi (Acta Antiqua 17 [1969] 175-176) by the assumption that slaves rather than free men were the dominant labour-force on the island; hence there was a failure of a middle class to develop. Hegyi's thesis is based on the statement of Aristotle (fr. 427 Rose ap. Athenaios 6. 272d) that there were 470,000 slaves in Aigina. Even if Aristotle's figure is not exaggerated (and it almost surely is) it will certainly have reference to a later period,
The lack of evidence for a connexion between ceramic activity and tyranny in Chalkis, Eretria, and Aigina suggests that there was not a necessary correlation between the rise of tyranny and commercial importance. In these states, which developed extensive commerce at an early date, we might expect to find a powerful new class to support a tyrant against the landed aristocracy. But in none of them does tyranny seem to have played an important role in political development; nor do these cities appear to have undergone greater political advancement earlier than other, less economically developed, states in Greece.

But let us examine the situation in Corinth, a state for which it has been argued that there was a connexion between the rise of manufacture and commerce and the advent of tyranny. Corinth furnishes a good test-case inasmuch as its fortunate commercial location and the early widespread use of its pottery have seemed to provide the economic background for the growth of a class of merchants and

craftsmen who are sometimes said to have supported the
Kypselids in their rise to power. In order to render
implausible the theory that the tyranny of the Kypselids
owed its origin to the support of a new 'middle class' or
even to the general commercial prosperity of Corinth, I
propose to show, first, that the peak of Corinthian commerce
and manufacturing, in which relatively large numbers of
Corinthians were engaged, followed rather than preceded the
rise of Kypselos to power; and, second, that there is not
likely to have existed in Corinth in the middle of the seventh
century a sufficiently numerous class of craftsmen and merchants
who were influential enough to challenge aristocratic control
of politics.

After nearly four centuries of isolation and decline the
communities of mainland Greece began in the ninth century to
resume communications with one another and with the
Mediterranean world. But this resumption of contacts and
trade was very slow; how slow it was in the case of Corinth
is shown by the distribution of Corinthian pottery. There
was little if any export of Corinthian Early Geometric in the
ninth century. During the first half of the eighth century

28. Heurtley (BSA 40 [1939-1940] 11-12). Robertson (BSA 43
the export of Corinthian pottery gradually increased: a few vases have been found in the south and east Aegean, but most Corinthian pottery was exported to a few sites west of Corinth, primarily to Perachora, Delphoi, and Ithaka. It was not till the Late Geometric period, in the third quarter of the eighth century, that Corinthian wares began to be exported in some quantity throughout the Greek world. During the Late Geometric period Corinthian potters began to surpass their rivals, and they began to specialise in the two shapes that were to become so popular as Corinthian exports: kotylai and aryballoi. When Corinthian potters became the first Greeks to adopt Orientalising patterns they established a dominance in the production of fine pottery that lasted for a century. From the last quarter of the eighth century to the last quarter of the seventh Corinth enjoyed a near

[1948] 53-54, 122) found Corinthian Geometric at Aetos on Ithaka, which he dated to the ninth century (ca 850); but this date should now be lowered by half a century (see Dunbabin, JHS 68 [1948] 65 n. 52). See also Coldstream, GGP 91.

29. Coldstream, GGP 352; Weinberg, AJA 45 (1941) 32.
31. Ibid. 365.
monopoly of the export of fine pottery on the Greek mainland and in the West, but not in the East Aegean.

It is tempting to overrate the commercial importance of the manufacture and export of pottery for Corinth in the early archaic period. But it is important to observe that while Protocorinthian pots are found on many sites on the mainland and abroad they are by no means everywhere found in quantity. Even more important, however, is the date at which the production of pottery begins to assume indications of extensive production. It is not till the Late Protocorinthian and Transitional periods that we observe the characteristics of manufacture on a large scale: bigger and elongated figures of animals mechanically and negligently drawn, an exact repetition of types, and very limited subject-matter. The real peak in the manufacture of Corinthian pottery was reached in the Early Ripe period in the last quarter of the seventh century, when indications of production of large quantities

32. Blakeway, BSA 33 (1932-1933) 203; Cook, GPP 40-41.
33. Cook, JHS 66 (1946) 83; Dunbabin, op. cit. (n. 28 above) 65.
34. Payne, NC 28-31, 48, 59; Cook, GPP 51-52. But even for this period the term 'mass production' is a misnomer: see Will, Etudes d'archéologie classique 1 (1955-1956) 155.
of pottery become clearly evident. It was at this time that the Corinthian Kerameikos underwent a great period of building activity. The chronology is significant. The height of the manufacture and export of pottery at Corinth was not reached till a quarter of a century after the rise to power of Kypselos. Moreover, the large-scale production

35. Cook, GPP 53, 55. Corinthian vases are distributed over a much wider area than are Protocorinthian vases. Protocorinthian pottery was not exported (so far as we can tell) to the region of the Black Sea, to the heart of Asia Minor or Palestine, to Naukratis, Kyrene, or Spain; whereas Corinthian pottery was (Payne, NC 184, 25).

36. Stillwell, Corinth 15, 1: The Potters' Quarter 20. Even so it was not very large: 'cela est petit, médiocre, ramassé,—une sorte de souk, en somme' (Will, op. cit. [n. 35 above] 154.

37. I adopt the traditional dating of the Kypselids that places their tyranny between 657 and 584/3. Busolt (Griechische Geschichte 1 638 n. 1) suggested a revised chronology that would place the Kypselids between ca 610 and ca 540, and this has been widely followed: see Lenschau, RE suppl. 4 cols. 1015-1017; Beloch, Griechische Geschichte 1, 2 274-284; Schachermeyr, RE 19 cols. 711-714; but contra,
of Corinthian pottery began after the middle of the seventh century. It is precisely in this period, in the years immediately following the establishment of the tyranny of Kypselos, that conditions may have been favourable for the creation of a group of craftsmen and artisans who would be numerous enough to have some influence in politics. It is unlikely that before the period of large-scale production of Corinthian pottery they can have been important enough to

Wade-Gery, CAH 3 764-765. Busolt's chronology was modified slightly by Will, following Smith (The Hearst Hydria [University of California Publications in Classical Archaeology, vol. 1 no. 10] 254-266, 273-277), who suggested dates of ca 620 to ca 550 (see Will's detailed discussion of the chronology of the Kypselids, Korinthiaka 363-440). But Will's dates have not been widely accepted: see the reviews of Korinthiaka by Roebuck, CP 53 (1958) 134-135; Harrison, CR N.S. 7 (1957) 63; and Benson, AJA 63 (1959) 306. Against the 'low chronology' see Page, Sappho and Alcaeus 152-161; Ducat, BCH 85 (1961) 418-425; Servais, Ant. Class. 38 (1969) 28-81; and Bradeen, Hesperia 32 (1963) 193-196. If Kypselos of Athens (who is generally regarded as the tyrant's grandson) was archon in 597/6, Busolt's chronology is certainly too low (SGHI p. 11).
have provided the force that brought Kypselos to power.  

We might expect craftsmen to be engaged in the manufacture of products other than pottery, for the large-scale manufacture of pots may lead us to assume that Corinth was an important producer of other items for export. Dunbabin suggests that a Corinthian monopoly in the production of fine pottery in archaic times indicates a similar predominance in industry generally; that trade in Corinthian manufactures, moreover, must have been in Corinthian hands and, therefore, Corinthian manufactures must have been carried in Corinthian ships. But our extremely fragmentary knowledge of trade in early Greece should make us cautious in obtaining such far-reaching deductions. As an example of how little we know of such matters, let us take the question of what the Corinthians put in their vases for export. It has been inferred that because the Corinthians exported aryballoi in large quantities there existed a perfume-industry in Corinth, since it seems unlikely to some that the Corinthians should export their

38. One cannot argue, moreover, that because a tyrant encouraged trade and commerce he owed his position to those who were engaged in these occupations (see Starr 356 n. 7).

vases, many of which were of poor artistic quality, empty. But we can as easily infer that inasmuch as the Corinthians produced the most pleasing and the cheapest aryballoi in Greece the pots were imported for their own sakes without perfume.

Dunbabin suggests that a Corinthian near-monopoly in the export of pottery to the West indicates a similar monopoly of trade with the West; in fact, at the same time that Corinthian pottery was exported extensively to the West it was exported in quantity throughout mainland Greece. If we argue for a monopoly of Corinthian trade with the West on the basis of the distribution of pottery, by the same token we must argue for a monopoly of Greek trade by the Corinthians on the mainland. In fact, however, one cannot use the distribution of pottery as a guide to general trade. Fine pottery was imported rather than made locally by most Greek states in the archaic (and classical) periods. Since

40. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* 243 (but see 261-263); Beaumont, *JHS* 56 (1936) 184; Payne, *NC* 5 n. 3-6 (where Pliny, *NH* 13. 2 is cited in support), 54.
43. Cook, *op. cit.* (n. 33 above) 84.
44. Cook, *GPP* 277.
Corinthian was the finest (and cheapest) ware produced in the seventh century it was widely used. But this does not exclude the possibility of local manufactures of other products. It does not follow that because Corinthian ware was widely exported other Corinthian manufactures were as well. The manufacture of fine pottery was a speciality in Corinth in the seventh century and it should not be used alone as evidence for the large-scale manufacture in Corinth of other items.


46. Pace Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* 17. For example, terra-cotta figurines were manufactured locally in the West rather than imported (Dunbabin 265). On the other hand, the large-scale production of Corinthian terra-cottas, indicated by the manufacture of figurines that could be made from a single mold, did not occur till the late sixth century (Stillwell, *Corinth* 15, 2: *The Potters' Quarter: The Terracottas* 9-10; see also Benson, *AJA* 60 [1956] 220-230).

47. Miss Richter (AJA 52 [1948] 331-335) has argued that the literary and archaeological evidence does not suggest that Corinth was predominant in the manufacture of terra-cotta sculptures more than any other city in early Greece; rather it indicates that there were many centres, of which Corinth was
That Corinthian artists produced fine examples of art in this period is certain. Few examples of Corinthian art have survived in Corinth itself, but in dependencies of Corinth, especially in Perachora, there are pieces of excellent workmanship in, among other things, bronze and ivory. We must be cautious, however, in taking these as wholly representative of Corinthian art, for the best artistic products of a manufacturing-centre are often exported. Most large Corinthian vases, for example, have been found outside Corinth.

The quality of Corinthian workmanship has also been inferred from the art produced in Corinthian colonies and dependencies, which is assumed to have imitated and reflected only one.

48. Richter, *Archaic Greek Art* 14-18; Payne, *NC* 210-262, and *Perachora* 1 70-71, 123, 168. Yet some of this evidence is ambiguous and not all of it can be said to be Corinthian. It is difficult in metalwork of this period to distinguish Corinthian from Argive and some of the objects found in, e.g., Perachora are Argive (Dunbabin, *op. cit.* [n. 28 above] 63; Payne, *NC* 223, 247).

49. Boardman, *op. cit.* (n. 6 above) 14.

50. Starr 233.
Corinthian art; an example is large sculpture, which is entirely lacking at Corinth for the early archaic period.\textsuperscript{51} Extensive artistic influence, such as Corinthian art seems to have had, need not necessarily be taken, however, to indicate a large trade.\textsuperscript{52} It may suggest widespread trade, but not always trade in quantity. It is natural that in Corinth's dependencies Corinthian art will have been imitated. But we should not expect that trade or manufacture of certain kinds of art will have been extensive: finely-carved sculpture is not produced in quantity or by many artists. Though Corinth may well have been an important artistic centre in early Greece the number of artisans engaged in this kind of work will most likely have been small.

Another qualification that must be made when estimating the size of industry and the influence of artisans in politics at Corinth or any other city in archaic Greece is that we do not know the citizenship of most craftsmen.\textsuperscript{53} That many

\textsuperscript{51} Richter, \textit{Archaic Greek Art} 15.

\textsuperscript{52} Cf. Richter, \textit{op. cit.} (n. 47 above) 334: 'But the invention of a technique does not imply continuous distinction or a flourishing export trade through several generations.'

\textsuperscript{53} The theory of the 'travelling potter' proposed by Bücher and adopted by Hasebroek (51; see also 42-43) has been widely
Artisans were foreigners at this time is suggested by Aristotle who says that ἔν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοις χρόνοις παρ'' ἐν λοις ὅσον τὸ βάναυσον ἢ ξενικήν, διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιούτου καὶ νῦν.\(^{54}\) Evidence for the mobility of craftsmen comes from Philostratos,\(^{55}\) who makes Apollonios of Tyana say:

ἡ δὲ ἀγαλματοποιία ἡ ἀρχαία οὐ τούτο ἔπραττεν, οὐδὲ περιήγεαν τὰς πόλεις ἀποδιδόμενοι τοὺς θεούς, ἀλλ' ἀπάγοντες μὸνον τὰς αὐτῶν χείρας καὶ ὄργανα λιθοργά καὶ ἑλκυντουργά, ἥλπν τε παρατιθέμενοι ἀργῆν, ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἱεροῖς τὰς δημιουργίας ἐποιεῖτο.

A busy port like Corinth will likely have attracted some craftsmen from abroad. It has been suggested, on good evidence, that Oriental craftsmen came to Greece in the eighth century, rejected: see Blakeway, \emph{op. cit.} (n. 32 above) 172-174; and Starr 213-214. Bücher and Hasebroek overstated their case, but there is a good deal of evidence, both in the sources and from archaeology, to indicate that there was some mobility amongst potters and other artisans.

\(^{54}\) \textit{Pol.} 1278a 6-8.

\(^{55}\) \textit{Life of Apollonios} 5. 20. On this passage see Barnett, \textit{JHS} 68 (1948) 1, 6.
where they helped to introduce Orientalising patterns.  

Four Protocorinthian vases with inscriptions in different alphabets have been taken as evidence of non-Corinthian potters working in Corinth.  

The influence of Corinthian art on Corinth's dependencies may indicate that Corinthian


Contra: Dunbabin, *op. cit.* (n. 28 above) 66; Starr 213-214.  


artisans migrated to areas where the demand for Corinthian products was great. Demaratos, a Bakchiad, is said to have fled from Corinth to Etruria after the overthrow of the Bakchiads with a number of workmen who included a craftsman and three potters.

In Homer artisans and craftsmen are very mobile. Demioergoi go from town to town as they are commissioned to do work and some make considerable reputations.

59. Dunbabin has found imitations of Corinthian pottery made in local clays in the West by potters whose work is so good that they must be regarded as Corinthian potters who migrated to the West (The Western Greeks 263-264). See also Dunbabin, Perachora 2 2 and references cited there for additional evidence of mobile Corinthian artists; and Blakeway, JRS 25 (1935) 132-133, 146.

60. Dionysios of Halikarnassos, Ant. Rom. 3. 46. 3-5; Pliny, NH 35, 16 and 152. For a defence of the authenticity of the story of Demaratos see Blakeway, op. cit. (n. 59 above) 147-149. For the archaeological evidence of early Corinthian trade with Etruria see the bibliography cited in n. 10 above.

61. Glotz, Ancient Greece at Work 28-29; Walcot, REG 80 (1967) 60-67. In the Odyssey Eumaios speaks of demioergoi, such as the seer, the physician, the carpenter, and the
mobility of craftsmen continued into archaic times. Tyrants summoned well-known artists to their courts where they patronised them handsomely. Polykrates of Samos is said by Alexis to have encouraged the immigration of technitai at very high wages. Among those whom Polykrates brought to Samos was the Megarian engineer Eupalinos, who built Polykrates' famous tunnel that so impressed Herodotos.

Because we cannot be sure how many craftsmen in any early Greek city were citizens of that city it is dangerous to infer the skill of Corinthian craftsmen (as Miss Richter minstrel, as strangers whom one sends for ἀλλοθεν (17. 382-386). Heralds are included in the category of demioergoi in 19. 135. Mention of the demioergoi occurs in Homer only in these two passages. On the word, the precise meaning of which is unclear, see Wace and Stubbings, Companion to Homer 537-538; Murakawa, Historia 6 (1957) 385-415; and Finley, The World of Odysseus 62-64. Migrant craftsmen were a feature of the ancient Near East: see Gordon, 'Ugaritic Guilds and Homeric δημοέργοι', in The Aegean and the Ancient Near East: Studies Presented to Hetty Goldman 136-143.

62. FGrH 3B 539 F 2 ap. Athenaios 12. 540d.

63. Herodotos 3. 60. 1-3.
has done) from the golden statue of Zeus and the chest of Kypselos, both dedicated at Olympia, or from the golden bowl in the Boston Museum that was dedicated by the Kypselids. These objects, of great value and requiring much skill, may well have been commissioned of foreign artisans with

64. *Archaic Greek Art* 14. But see her warning against assigning specific sculptures to local schools (*Archaic Greek Art* 194; *Kouroi* 5). Miss Richter cites the homogeneity of archaic Greek sculpture as evidence that sculptors travelled extensively in their work (*Archaic Greek Art* 194-196).

65. Pausanias 5. 2. 3; Strabo 8. 3. 30, p. 353; Plato, *Phaedrus* 236B; Diogenes Laertios 1. 96; the Suda and Photios s.v. Κυψέλιδος ἀνάθημα ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ. See Servais, *Ant. Class.* 34 (1965) 144-174.

66. Pausanias 5. 17. 5 - 5. 19. 10; Dio Chrysostomos, *Or.* 11. 45.

67. Payne, *NC* 161, 211-212; *CAH* 3 551 n. 1; Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* 127-128. Miss Richter might also have mentioned the bronze palm tree with frogs and snakes on its base dedicated by the Kypselids at Delphoi (Plutarch, *De Pyth.* *Or.* 12 [Moria 399F], *Sept. Sap.* 21 [Moria 164A-B]).
international reputations. That the commissioning of great works of art was a practice that preceded the tyrants is suggested by the statement of Pausanias that the chest of Kypselos was supposed to have been made for an ancestor of the tyrant\textsuperscript{68}; and by Alexis' remark that before Polykrates gained the tyranny he ordered expensive coverlets and drinking cups made, which he lent out to those celebrating weddings or very large entertainments.\textsuperscript{69} The practice of the tyrants of commissioning great works of art of foreign artists was probably inherited from the nobles of early Greece who, as the main consumers of the products of the artisans,\textsuperscript{70} provided the market for items of luxury.\textsuperscript{71}

There is, in short, a good deal of evidence to indicate

\textsuperscript{68} 5. 18. 7. But Payne (NC 351 and n. 4) follows Massow, (Ath. Mitt. 41 [1916] 13) in believing that the chest belongs to the first quarter of the sixth century.

\textsuperscript{69} FGrH 3B 539 F 2 ap. Athenaios 12. 540e. Ure's statement (79) that 'It could scarcely be more definitely stated that Polycrates owed his throne to his wealth in coverlets and drinking vessels' will not commend itself to the sober-minded.

\textsuperscript{70} Starr 361.

\textsuperscript{71} For a long list of early Greek artists who travelled and worked abroad see Richter, Archaic Greek Art 195.
that by no means all artists and craftsmen engaged in
Corinthian industry were citizens of Corinth. Hence we
should be cautious in imputing political ambitions to the
industrial class as a whole or in assuming that they might as
a class support the ambitions of a prospective tyrant.

How many people were engaged in industry in archaic
Corinth? We have not the evidence for any industry other
than the manufacture of pottery; but the evidence (what
little we have) suggests that the number engaged in what was
probably Corinth's chief industry must have been relatively
small even when that industry was flourishing. Stylistic
studies of Corinthian vase-painting have found only a
relatively small number of workshops producing figured vases
in Corinth in the seventh century. 72 These workshops,

72. Dunbabin, in a study of painters of Corinthian vases
from the middle and third quarter of the seventh century (JHS
71 [1951] 63-69) finds 'a close connection of Corinthian vase-
painters of this time; there appear to have been a small
number of workshops producing figured vases, which interacted
on one another...' (69). See also Dunbabin and Robertson,
BSA 48 (1953) 172-181: '...we have the impression that there
were not very many workshops producing figured vases during the
Protocorinthian period, the majority concentrating on linear'
moreover, seem to have been small, each supporting only a few potters or painters. We have a number of terra-cotta plaques from Corinth, most of them dating from the late seventh and early sixth century, which show Corinthian craftsmen at work. On no tablet are there more than two potters (or other workers) depicted. The number of workshops will have grown a good deal after the middle of the seventh century, but even then the numbers employed in the manufacture of pottery cannot have been great. Craftsmen employed in other industries will not have added many to this number, so that the total number of those engaged in artistic and manufacturing activities in Corinth must have formed only a very small

(173); and Benson, *Die Geschichte der korinthischen Vasen* 13-30. There was, however, also a production of Sub-Geometric pottery in the first half of the seventh century (Starr 237, 244).

73. Hasebroek 57. Limitations of space may prevent the plaques from depicting more than two potters, but there are other indications that the numbers employed in workshops were generally small (see Cook, *GPP* 271-272 and Will, *op. cit.* [n. 34 above] 154). On the small scale of industry in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries see Hasebroek 71-76, and Jones, *Athenian Democracy* 14-18.
proportion of the total Corinthian population.

Herodotos says that καὶ ἥρωικας καὶ σωθαὶς καὶ Πέρσας καὶ Ἀνδριὸς καὶ σχεδὸν πάντας τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀποτιμοτέρους τῶν ἄλλων ἡγιμένους πολιτέων τοὺς τὰς τέχνας μανθάνοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐκγένους τούτων. He states that all Greeks and especially the Lakedaimonians held this opinion, δὲ Κορίνθιοι ὤνονται τοὺς χειροτέχνας. Dunbabin saw in this passage the key to the interpretation of the history of Corinth: 'The Corinthians, more than other Greeks, had an individual way of life, recognised by their contemporaries, which can be used as a point from which to survey the Greek world.' Dunbabin seems to me to make more of the statement than Herodotos intended. Moreover, as Cook points out, although Dunbabin applied the remark to archaic Corinth, Herodotos is describing the Corinthian attitude of his own day.

As we have seen, Corinth could claim to be an industrial centre already in the late eighth century. But in the last

74. 2. 167.
75. See Xenophon, Const. Lak. 2. 1-2; Plutarch, Agesilaos 26.5; and Lykourgos 24. 2.
76. Dunbabin, op. cit. (n. 28 above) 59.
quarter of the eighth century, when the export of Corinthian pottery began to reach significant proportions, the Buboian cities were considerably more advanced commercially than Corinth. Yet although Chalkis and Eretria were perhaps the most important commercial centres on the mainland they placed a great deal of importance on land, for they fought a long and exhausting war over the small but fertile Lelantine Plain.\(^{78}\) This suggests that on Euboia commercial interests

\(^{78}\) There has been the widest disagreement as regards the date and extent of this war since our sources are fragmentary and chronological indications few. The war has been variously dated from the eighth to the sixth century. Blakeway ('The Date of Archilochus,' in *Greek Poetry and Life: Essays Presented to Gilbert Murray* 47-49), Forrest (*Historia* 6 [1957] 160-175), and Huxley (*BCH* 82 [1958] 588-601) assign the war to the late eighth century; Burn (*JHS* 49 [1929] 14-37) and Cary (*CAH* 3 622) to the first part of the seventh. Will (*Korinthiaka* 391-404) suggests that the war lasted with intervals from ca 700 to ca 550; and Boardman (*op. cit.* [n. 6 above] 27-29) distinguishes two phases or even separate conflicts of the war, the first after ca 750, the second ca 700. For a full discussion of the evidence see Bradeen (*TAPA* 78 [1947] 223-241), whose dates I accept.
were still second to agricultural concerns. This was almost certainly true of Corinth in the archaic period as it was, surely, of most Greek states. Strabo says that Corinthian soil was infertile and that Corinth owed its wealth to τὰς τέχνας τὰς δημιουργικὰς. It has been assumed from this passage that the infertility of the soil forced the Corinthians to turn to manufacturing. But, as Blegen has shown, the plain between Corinth and Sikyon was famous in antiquity and modern times for its fertility. Will suggests that the Korinthia attracted settlers in prehistoric times on account of its agricultural potential. Corinth controlled in antiquity a large surrounding territory estimated at some 340 square miles. There is no reason not to assume that in

Bradeen establishes 720 to 660 as outside dates of the war and places it more closely between 675 and 670. I agree with Coldstream (GGP 369) that the cause of the war was overpopulation against Boardman (op. cit. 27) that it was fought over copper and iron mines.

79. 8. 6. 23, p. 382.
80. See Hasebroek 55.
Corinth, as in most cities in archaic Greece, the greatest number of people made their living from the soil.\textsuperscript{84}

The best evidence for this assumption is the large scale on which the Corinthians colonised in the seventh century. It has been much debated whether colonies were founded primarily for trade or agriculture,\textsuperscript{85} but there is, 

\textsuperscript{84} Thucydides (2. 14. 2) says that as late as the beginning of the Peloponnesian War most Athenians still lived in the country. In 403, when the government of the oligarchs was abolished, Phormisios, a moderate conservative, introduced a measure that would have granted civic rights only to those who possessed land. By this measure about 5000 Athenians were to lose their civic rights (Dionysios of Halikarnassos, Lysias 32). This suggests that even near the end of the Peloponnesian War only a small part of the male population of Attika did not own some land (Bolkestein, Economic Life in Greece's Golden Age 17; but the figure is rejected by Gomme, The Population of Ancient Athens 27). From this figure it has been estimated that three-fourths of the Athenians owned some land in Attika at the end of the fifth century (Busolt-Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde 2 920).

\textsuperscript{85} Blakeway (BSA 33 [1932-1933] 170-208, and JRS 25 [1935] 129-149), in arguing for trade before the flag, suggested
I think, general agreement today that the primary reasons for the foundation of most colonies were overpopulation and land-hunger. Recent archaeological evidence has made our picture of pre-colonial trade with the West clearer. A few imports of Mature Geometric pottery in Etruria indicate that some trade existed in central Italy in the first quarter of the eighth century, a generation before the founding of the earliest colony in the West. But this trade was limited, that a flourishing Corinthian trade with Italy and Sicily existed before the foundation of the western colonies. He regarded the Corinthian colonies as intended for trade and as a means of gaining commercial advantage. Blakeway's thesis was based on a too early dating of Geometric pottery, which has since been revised downwards: see Cook, op. cit. (n. 33 above) 80-81, and CR 63 (1949) 113-114, a review of Dunbabin's The Western Greeks (Dunbabin followed Blakeway's views of pre-colonial trade); Will, Korinthiaka 319-323; and Graham, Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece 218-223.

86. The conclusions of Gwynn (JHS 38 [1918] 88-123), that colonisation was generally the result of overpopulation and the need for land, are firmly supported by Cook (op. cit. [n. 33 above] 80-83). See also Coldstream, GGP 373-374; and Graham, Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece 5.

and elsewhere the earliest pottery begins with the foundation of a colony. There is no evidence that colonies were established as markets for the goods of the mother-city or as strategic commercial posts.\textsuperscript{88} For the most part, trade followed the flag.

From about the middle of the eighth century colonies were founded by Corinth in nearly every generation\textsuperscript{89}: Syracuse\textsuperscript{90} and Kerkyra,\textsuperscript{91} ca 733; Chalkis,\textsuperscript{92} Makynia,\textsuperscript{93} Molykreon,\textsuperscript{94}

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{88} Ibid. 375. It is sometimes argued that the earliest colonies, Pithekoussai and Cumae, were exceptions: see, e.g., Snodgrass, \textit{The Dark Age of Greece} 335-336, who states the common theory that the metals of the region (iron ore from Elba and copper from Etruria) first attracted the Greeks. But see, contra, Cook, \textit{Historia} 11 (1962) 113-114; and Woodhead, \textit{The Greeks in the West} 34-35.
  \item\textsuperscript{89} For the general chronology see Will, \textit{Korinthiaka} 517-521; and Graham, \textit{Colony and Mother City} 30-31. On the status of the colonies see Graham, \textit{Colony and Mother City} 118-153.
  \item\textsuperscript{90} Thucydides 6. 3. 2; Strabo 6. 2. 4, p. 269.
  \item\textsuperscript{91} Strabo 6. 2. 3-4, pp. 269-270; Plutarch, \textit{Qu. Gr.} 11 (Moralia 293A-B).
  \item\textsuperscript{92} Thucydides 1. 108. 5; Graham, \textit{Historia} 11 (1962) 246.
  \item\textsuperscript{93} Strabo 10. 2. 4, p. 451; Hammond 659.
\end{itemize}
and Oiniadai,\textsuperscript{95} at the end of the eighth century; Sollion,\textsuperscript{96} Ambrakia, Anaktorion, and Leukas,\textsuperscript{97} and Epidamnos (a joint colony of Kerkyra and Corinth\textsuperscript{98}), under Kypselos; and Poteidaia\textsuperscript{99} and Apollonia,\textsuperscript{100} under Periandros, at the end of the seventh century. That Corinth founded as many colonies as she did in the eighth and seventh centuries indicates that most Corinthians were engaged in agriculture, and that when land at home became scarce the Corinthians went abroad to establish colonies instead of turning in large numbers to commerce as did the Aiginetans, who did not colonise.\textsuperscript{101} 

\begin{enumerate}
\item Thucydides 3. 102. 2.
\item Thucydides 2. 102. 6; Kirsten, \textit{RE} 17\textsubscript{2} col. 2209.
\item Thucydides 2. 30. 1; Geyer, \textit{RE} 3A\textsubscript{1} col. 932.
\item Strabo 10. 2. 8, p. 452; but see Plutarch, \textit{De Sera Num. Vinc.} 7 (\textit{Moralia} 552E-F).
\item Thucydides 1. 24. 2; Strabo 7. 5. 7, p. 316; Busebios (ap. Jerome).
\item Nikolaos of Damaskos, \textit{FGrH} 2A 90 F 59.
\item Strabo 7. 5. 8, p. 316; Plutarch, \textit{De Sera Num. Vinc.} 7 (\textit{Moralia} 552 E-F); Thucydides 1. 26. 2; van Compernolle, \textit{Ant. Class.} 22 (1953) 50-64.
\item See n. 22 above.
\end{enumerate}
It is often suggested\footnote{102} that there existed in many Greek cities discontented classes who gave their support to tyrants such as small or dispossessed farmers similar perhaps to those who existed in Attika at the time of Solon.\footnote{103} Can we expect to find such a class in Corinth who may have given their support to Kypselos? Not only is there little evidence in Corinth or in most other Greek cities of a class of dispossessed farmers or of those who had been reduced to a status resembling that of the \textit{hektemoroi} in Attika, but there is, I believe, little likelihood that conditions such as those that existed in Attika in Solon's time were widespread in archaic Greece. I suspect that Athens' social and economic problems at the time of Solon were relatively uncommon throughout the rest of Greece and that they were largely due in Attika to Athens' failure to colonise. The result was that in the absence of primogeniture \textit{kleroi} in Attika were divided amongst all the sons till some \textit{kleroi} became too small to be economically viable.\footnote{104} To prevent a division of one's \textit{kleros}

\footnote{102. See, \textit{e.g.}, Hammond 146; Finley, \textit{Early Greece} 106; Andrewes, \textit{The Greeks} 57.}

\footnote{103. Plutarch, \textit{Solon} 13. 2-3.}

\footnote{104. Isaios, 6 (Philoktemon) 25, p. 58; Harrison, \textit{The Law of Athens: the Family and Property} 130-131; Burn, \textit{The World of}
amongst heirs Hesiod recommended having only one son. Like Athens the Boiotian cities did not found colonies and perhaps faced a shortage of land as did Athens. I think that we should not assume that the economic situation that prevailed in Attika in Solon's time was normative for the rest of Greece, for colonisation ordinarily solved the problem of land-hunger that Athens found so critical. There is, I think, no reason to believe that because discontented members of the small land-holding class or those reduced to serfdom were a problem in Attika in the sixth century they were a problem elsewhere in Greece. We should not, therefore, expect to find at Corinth in the seventh century an economically depressed class of small landholders, since Corinth colonised so extensively in the eighth and seventh centuries. Discontent (at least over economic problems) will have been siphoned off to the colonies and there is little likelihood of a tyrant's having gained power through the

Hesiod 111.


106. Aigina did not found colonies but instead absorbed her population into commerce, while Sparta, another city that did not colonise (with the exception of Taras), solved the problem of overpopulation by invading Messenia.
support of large numbers of depressed landholders.

It is possible to reject the theory that the tyrants in the seventh century owed their positions to the support of a specific class of craftsmen and merchants and yet to hold that there was a connexion between growing prosperity in Greece generally and the rise of tyranny. This is the view of Forrest, for example. According to Forrest there was in the eighth century in Greece a general increase in prosperity that had by about 700 transformed perhaps a dozen cities into commercial centres. This increase in prosperity benefitted nearly everyone economically, the potter, the farmer, even the landless worker. Some obtained the leisure, the means, and the psychological independence to challenge the authority of the basileis. Through hoplite service they obtained the means to gain power by support of a tyrant.

Forrest's view requires a rapid increase in trade in the first half of the seventh century and an equally rapid rise in the prosperity of a large proportion of the population, at least in the commercially important cities, especially those in the Isthmus. Was there a significant rise in trade in Greece as early as Forrest suggests? It is clear that some commerce existed in Corinth from an early date; the

question for our purpose is, when did trade and commerce assume proportions great enough to produce a significant increase in the prosperity of a large number of people?

Thucydides furnishes evidence that the Corinthians were interested in shipbuilding and navies at the end of the eighth century. The Corinthians are said to have been the first Greeks to deal with matters of shipping 'in a modern fashion' (πρώτου δὲ Κορίνθιοι λέγονται ἐγγύτατα τοῦ νῦν τρόπου μεταχειρίσαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς). To the Corinthians, moreover, were ascribed the first triremes in Greece. In the late eighth century Ameinokles of Corinth built four ships for the Samians about 300 years before the end of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides says that the first battle at sea 'of which we know' was fought between the Corinthians and the Kerkyraians 260 years before the end of the Peloponnesian War (i.e., 664).

But an interest in navies and even in ship-building does not necessarily indicate extensive trade on the part of the

108. 1. 13. 2-4.

109. The question what kind of ship Ameinokles built for the Samians is much disputed: see Davison, CQ 41 (1947) 18-24; Carpenter, AJA 52 (1948) 7; Kirk, BSA 44 (1949) 142; Williams, JHS 78 (1958) 126-127.
Corinthians. Other evidence has been used, however, to suggest that the Corinthians were active in widespread commerce in the eighth century. Dunbabin states that at Perachora 'in the second half of the eighth century and the early seventh, scarabs are imported in scores, there are ivories, amber, and vases and fibulas from a number of Greek states.' But many of these are items of luxury, which had a limited market and do not indicate trade in quantity.

The wide export of Corinthian pottery has also been taken to indicate extensive Corinthian trade in the late eighth century. This seems at first to be a reasonable inference, but we must be cautious where we know so little of early trade and some qualifications seem to be necessary. It has, for example, been pointed out that finds of Corinthian pottery tell us nothing about the nationality of

111. '...The exceedingly small number of Oriental artefacts from Geometric sites contrasts with the comparatively numerous indications of Oriental contacts, a puzzle which persists in the Orientalising period' (Lorimer 138).
112. See, e.g., Dunbabin, The Western Greeks 16-17, 226-228.
the trader or the origin of the ship that carried the pottery. There are several instances in which it is likely that pottery (or other manufactures) was carried by foreign traders.\textsuperscript{114} Thus it seems probable that not all Corinthian pottery was carried in Corinthian ships and it is reasonable to assume that other cities (such as Aigina) built ships that were employed in the carrying trade. Doubtless, too, the colonies imported manufactures in their own ships, built from their extensive forests of pine and fir.\textsuperscript{115}

But how extensive was trade in quantity in Greece in the eighth and seventh centuries? The evidence, fragmentary as it is, indicates that it was still very limited. The requirements of life were simple and in the archaic period overseas trade seems largely to have been confined to valuable raw materials (especially metals), luxuries, and \textit{objets d'art}.\textsuperscript{116}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{114} See Vallet, \textit{Région et Zancle} 191; Coldstream, \textit{GGP} 389; Dunbabin, \textit{The Western Greeks} 232, 234, 238, 240.
\textsuperscript{115} Cook, \textit{op. cit.} (n. 41 above, second item) 116-117. \textit{Contra}, Dunbabin, \textit{The Western Greeks} 228.
\textsuperscript{116} Hasebroek 49, 69; Roebuck, \textit{Ionian Trade and Colonization} 132; Cook, \textit{op. cit.} (n. 33 above) 85-86; Heichelheim, \textit{An Ancient Economic History} 1 225; Beaumont, \textit{op. cit.} (n. 40 above) 184.
\end{footnotesize}
The market for these objects was small and Heichelheim estimates that the amount of trade in Greece in the eighth and seventh centuries was not very much greater than that carried in the tenth and ninth centuries. Indeed, the evidence as a whole, according to Roebuck, indicates that 'the economically significant point in the development of trade in the Aegean comes in the last quarter of the seventh century.' Roebuck suggests that this is true both of Ionia and the mainland: it was not till the last quarter of the seventh century that extensive trade existed with the region of the Black Sea; Corinthian manufacture of pottery did not reach large-scale production till the last quarter of the seventh century;

117. An Ancient Economic History 1 244.
118. CP 48 (1953) 13; see also Starr 349-350, 364.
119. Roebuck thinks that extensive trade with the Black Sea began after the foundation of the grain-producing colonies of Istros, Olbia, and Apollonia Pontika, which Cook dates to the last decade of the seventh century on the basis of archeological evidence (op. cit. [n. 33 above] 76). Cf. Heichelheim, An Ancient Economic History 242.
120. 'C'est au VIIe s. seulement, voire au VIe, qu'il appartiendra de mettre en valeur le carrefour isthmique, et particulièrement son axe maritime' (Will, Korinthiaka 78).
and Athens assumed real economic importance only in the middle of the sixth century, when Athenian pottery fully replaced Corinthian in the West.\textsuperscript{121} Heichelheim has observed that until the second half of the seventh century there was no permanent export of cheap articles for mass consumption in Greece.\textsuperscript{122} But the most important impetus to trade was the introduction of coinage (especially in small denominations), which greatly facilitated commerce by replacing the method of exchange by barter,\textsuperscript{123} and this was lacking before the late seventh century.\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{121} See French, \textit{JHS} 77 (1957) 239, for a similar conclusion.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{An Ancient Economic History} 1 241.

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Ibid.} 1 243; Toutain, \textit{The Economic Life of the Ancient World} 71. \textit{Contra}: Kraay, \textit{JHS} 84 (1964) 76-91.

\textsuperscript{124} I accept the 'low' dating for the introduction of coinage, based on a revised dating of the foundation-deposit from the Ephesian Artemision: see Robinson, \textit{JHS} 71 (1951) 156-167; and Jacobsthal, \textit{JHS} 71 (1951) 85-95. Robinson dates the first appearance of coinage 'well within the second half of the seventh century' (165). The first coins to appear in mainland Greece (those of Aigina) are brought down to the last quarter of the seventh century, while Corinthian coinage is assigned to the reign of Periandros.
From the point of view of economic history [writes Roebuck125] this solution, by the development of sea trade in bulk goods and mass volume, is more important than a small trickle of luxury goods and exotics such as may be found even in very primitive cultures. Volume trade will involve radical changes in the economic, social and political structure of the state, the other need not.

If extensive trade in the Aegean, a trade in volume capable of bringing prosperity to a large number of people, began in the last quarter of the seventh century, the connexion between growing prosperity in Greece and the rise of tyranny is difficult to maintain. This is true not only for Corinth but for the other 'commercial' states of the Isthmus, Sikyon and Megara, as well. Tyrants arose in these states in the middle of the seventh century and therefore preceded the beginnings of the extensive commercial life that could bring about an increase in the general level of prosperity sufficient to produce social and political change. It is

(166) and the first Athenian coinage is placed later than the 590's. See also Brown, Num. Chron. (Sixth Series) 10 (1950) 177-204; and Cook, Historia 7 (1958) 257-262.

difficult to see, moreover, how tyrants could look for support (in the seventh century, at any rate) to a large and prosperous industrial or commercial class. In Corinth and most likely in other states (to judge from the economic conditions that prevailed in the seventh century) such a class followed rather than preceded the tyrannies in the Isthmian states. There is little evidence, either, to suggest that tyrants received support from a class of economically depressed small landholders, for although the majority of the population of most states were employed in agriculture colonisation solved the problem of a shortage of land in most cities and probably acted as a 'safety-valve' for the economic causes of discontent. Indeed, economic factors do not play an important part in the accounts of most early tyrants: we read of no independent political force made up of commercial people, no 'merchant aristocracy,' not even of a mildly prosperous group of landowners who wished to gain some share in ruling their city and so formed the power-base of the tyrants. Nor do the tyrants of the seventh century, at any rate, appear as champions of the oppressed classes or even of the demos against their aristocratic rulers. Perhaps it is reasonable to conclude that economic factors were, after all, not very important as causes of early tyranny and that if we wish to account
for the rise of the tyrants in archaic Greece we must look elsewhere for an explanation.
CHAPTER TWO

THE HOPLITE REFORM AND TYRANNY

It has in recent years become common to connect the rise of the earliest Greek tyrants with the growth of the hoplite class. It has been suggested that an expansion of trade and manufacturing in the eighth century introduced into Greece new wealth that enabled an increasing number of men who were not aristocrats to furnish hoplite armour for themselves. According to this theory, the new hoplite force began to play a role in the political life of the polis as the hoplites' growing consciousness of their own military importance led them to challenge the monopoly of power that the nobles had previously enjoyed and to provide the support needed by aspiring tyrants to gain power.

This view has been most fully developed by Andrewes, who argues that the introduction of hoplite tactics produced great social and political changes in the polis. Andrewes believes that the system of fighting that prevailed

before the introduction of the hoplite phalanx was essentially individualistic and stressed the aristocratic ideals of individual valour and prowess, virtues of the ruling nobility that were displayed in duels on the battlefield. The introduction of hoplite tactics brought with it two important consequences. First, it necessitated adding large numbers of men from outside the aristocracy to the fighting force since the phalanx required more heavily-armed men than the system of warfare based on individual combat. Second, it replaced individual fighting with the necessity of acting in concert in the hoplite line and increased the military importance of the new hoplites at the expense of the aristocracy.

According to Andrewes, the introduction of the hoplite phalanx presupposes an increase in wealth generally throughout the Greek world, for each hoplite was required to furnish his own armour. The new hoplite class is presumed to have represented a new 'middle class' that the recent economic prosperity of the eighth century had created. Once

2. For the view (which I accept) that the differences between 'heroic' warfare and hoplite warfare were not so great as is usually thought, see Detienne in Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne 123-124.
this class had begun to take part in warfare it was only a matter of time before it demanded a share of the political power and this led to a widening of the basis of the constitution. Andrewes believes that inasmuch as the rule of the earliest tyrants began a generation after the introduction of hoplite armies there is likely to have been a connexion between them. Supported by the new middle class the tyrants overthrew the aristocrats and based their rule on the hoplite class. The new class developed a corporate identity and filled offices under the new regimes of the tyrants. The rule of the tyrants ended forever aristocratic rule so that when tyranny was overthrown the way lay open to isokratia.

Andrewes' theory has gained many adherents, but recent studies of the archaeological evidence have seriously undermined it. In an important article based on a close study of the archaeological evidence Snodgrass has presented cogent reasons for questioning Andrewes' thesis. I summarise them briefly with some discussion passim.

(1) Andrewes believes that 'the nature of hoplite equipment is such that it must from the first have been used

3. JHS 85 (1965) 110-122; see also Rivista storica italiana 77 (1965) 434-444.
in formation and cannot have been adopted piecemeal. But Snodgrass believes that the evidence indicates quite the reverse: that the adoption of the hoplite panoply was a long-drawn-out and piecemeal process that began about the middle of the eighth century. Although virtually all pieces of hoplite equipment were in use by ca 700, the late eighth

4. The Greek Tyrants 33; for a similar view see Lorimer 107.
5. The evidence consists of contemporary literary sources, primarily the lyric poets; grave-finds of armour; and especially vase-paintings, which are difficult to assess because of the tendency of the vase-painters to portray figures nude and because of the difficulty of portraying the phalanx (Snodgrass 110; Lorimer 110).
6. Snodgrass 110. See the Late Geometric amphora in the Benaki Museum (Lorimer 87 and plate 19a); the Geometric pyxis from Phaleron (AJA 46 [1942] 39 and 37, fg. 21; Lorimer 90); the 'Eretrian' Geometric amphora in Athens (BSA 47 [1952] 7 and plate 3A, and BSA 52 [1957] 29; Davison, Attic Geometric Workshops 69-70); and the magnificent bronze plate-corslet from Argos (Courbin, BCH 81 [1957] 340-356, plates 1-3).
and early seventh century was a transitional period in which both hoplite and pre-hoplite equipment and even tactics were used simultaneously.\footnote[7]{Snodgrass 113 and \textit{Early Greek Armour} 84, 237 n. 37; Nierhaus, \textit{Jdt} 53 (1938) 90-114. The warriors depicted on vases between \textit{ca} 750 and \textit{ca} 650 display a curious mixture of old- and new-style armour, weapons, and tactics: see, \textit{e.g.}, the aryballos from Perachora (Lorimer 94-95). On the Hymettus Amphora, while most of the combats are spear-duels, two are fought with spear against sword (Lorimer 87). Often two throwing spears 'mar the perfect picture of hoplite equipment' (Lorimer 104); this is true, \textit{e.g.}, of the Chigi vase (but see Snodgrass, \textit{Early Greek Armour} 138, 198-199, where it is suggested that two spears were carried by early hoplites and that one was thrown and one was used as a thrusting spear). The frequent mixture of hoplite and pre-hoplite equipment is attributed by Miss Lorimer to the desire of the author to mark scenes as heroic by introducing anachronistic equipment (95). But in many instances it is more likely that the artists were merely depicting what they observed in their own day: a transition between two types of fighting-equipment and tactics. Evidence for this transition may also be found in contemporary literary}
shown together for the first time on single warriors on Protocorinthian vases of the first quarter of the seventh century. The phalanx, however, is not clearly depicted on pottery before the middle of the seventh century. If, as the sources: see Kallinos 1 Diehl, lines 5, 10, and 14 (the use of the javelin, perhaps with hoplite shield and thrusting spear; contra Lorimer 120, but see Webster, From Mycenae to Homer 215 and Snodgrass, Early Greek Armour 180-181); Archilochos, fr. 3 Diehl (fighting in close combat with swords); contrast with fr. 2 (mention of a thrusting spear) and fr. 6 (leaving behind a shield); Tyrtaios 1 and 9 Diehl (description of a shield as \( \kappa \omicron \tau \omicron \lambda \omicron \varsigma \ [1, 11] \); but elsewhere as \( \delta \mu \phi \alpha \lambda \delta \sigma \sigma \omicron \omicron \ [9, 25] \): see Lorimer 122); and 8, 21-24 (mention of a body-shield, which Miss Lorimer [127] excises as a late pastiche; but see Snodgrass, Early Greek Armour 181). Tyrtaios seems to indicate that the phalanx was in use but not well established in Sparta: see Snodgrass 115-116 and Toynbee, Some Problems of Greek History 256-257.

8. See, e.g., the Middle Protocorinthian aryballos from Lechaion (Snodgrass, Early Greek Armour, plate 15a), which depicts a hoplite warrior in battle with light-armed men carrying 'Boiotian' shields.

9. Snodgrass (Early Greek Armour 197-198) thinks that the
evidence from pottery suggests, the hoplite phalanx did not appear till near the middle of the seventh century, it is difficult to argue, according to Snodgrass, that an established hoplite force provided the support for the seizure of tyranny by Kypselos or Pheidon of Argos.

(2) Snodgrass observes that the original hoplite class was limited by the requirement of wealth that was needed for a hoplite to furnish his own armour. Since only men of considerable wealth could afford the hoplite panoply the new class was probably limited to large landholders and can hardly have formed a revolutionary group. Moreover, since hoplite fighting was extremely gruelling and dangerous, warfare will have become even less attractive than before and the new class was probably not eager to fight. The traditional aristocratic warrior-class retained its supremacy till the adoption of the hoplite phalanx.

'Aigina stand' (dated in the second quarter of the seventh century) is the earliest possible portrayal of the phalanx (illustrated in Lorimer 90); and the Berlin aryballos (dated shortly after 650) the first certain example (illustrated in Lorimer 84). The earliest substantial representation is on the Chigi vase (Early Greek Armour, plate 36; see also Lorimer 81-83). On the date of the Chigi vase see Cook, Gnomon 32 (1960) 718.
(3) According to Snodgrass, evidence from the Etruscans supports the thesis that hoplite tactics were adopted gradually and piecemeal and that they did not involve immediate political or social change. In Etruria the adoption of the hoplite equipment occurred during the period of the kings, which was followed not by hoplite constitutions but by aristocratic rule. Snodgrass believes that the introduction of hoplite tactics at Rome was also an extended process and he follows Roman tradition in assigning the introduction of hoplite armour and phalanx to the sixth century, which was a period of aristocratic (not hoplite) ascendancy at Rome. But difficulties in dating the introduction of the hoplite phalanx at Rome make it unwise at present, I think, to state

10. For a summary of the archaeological evidence see Snodgrass 116-118.


13. The Romans believed that the hoplite phalanx was derived from the Etruscans (Diodoros 23. 2. 1) and tradition seems to connect its introduction at Rome with Servius Tullius (Dionysios of Halikarnassos, Ant. Rom. 4. 16. 2; Livy 1. 43. 2).
categorically that it produced no immediate political change in Rome.  

Snodgrass concludes that the adoption of hoplite tactics and equipment in Greece was gradual; that it did not bring about immediate political and social change; and that the introduction of the hoplite phalanx was roughly coaeval with the earliest tyrannies and therefore the hoplite class is not likely to have been the means by which the earliest tyrants seized power. Indeed, thinks Snodgrass, it is more likely that the creation of the hoplite phalanx should be credited to an early tyrant who simply wished to organise a more effective means of defending the state.

Snodgrass has adduced cogent reasons for questioning the connexion between the rise of the hoplite class and the beginnings of tyranny. Nevertheless, the archaeological

14. The hoplite reform has been placed in the mid-fifth century after the Battle of Cremera by Nilsson, op. cit. (n. 12 above) 1-11; D'Arms, op. cit. (n. 12 above) 424-426; and Wieacker in Les Origines de la République romaine (Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique 13, Fondation Hardt) 336. But see Ogilvie, CR N.S. 19 (1969) 325; and Momigliano, op. cit. (n. 11 above) 120.

15. See Andrewes' remarks in The Greeks 58.
evidence is not conclusive. The view that the introduction of the hoplite phalanx did not take place before the middle of the seventh century is to some extent based on an argumentum e silentio and some new find of pottery-sherds may provide us with evidence that the phalanx was introduced at an earlier date. Moreover, though the analogies of

16. See, e.g., Jones, Sparta 33, who believes that the phalanx is depicted on vases later than individual hoplites 'probably because the hoplite phalanx is more difficult to portray and less effective artistically than two or four warriors.' Cf. Webster, Greek Art and Literature 700-530 B.C. 260.

17. The phalanx has been placed as early as the mid-eighth century by Kirk (Museum Helveticum 17 [1960] 194) on the basis of the Argive corslet; by Webster, From Mycenae to Homer 215; and by Detienne in Probleme de la guerre en Grece ancienne 139-140. Detienne credits Timomachos the Aigeid, captor of Amyklai in the mid-eighth century, with hoplite tactics. But on the value of Pausanias for early Spartan history see Pearson, Historia 11 (1962) 397-426 and Starr, AJP 86 (1965) 111; see also Snodgrass, Early Greek Armour 186. Both Detienne and Webster assume that hoplite armour and tactics are inseparable, an assumption that I
Etruria and Rome reveal that in those states the introduction of hoplite tactics probably did not bring about immediate political and social changes (and certainly not 'hoplite constitutions') they do not rule out the possibility of that having happened in Greece. However, I believe that Snodgrass is correct in his view of the matter. Even should it be possible to date the introduction of the hoplite phalanx earlier than the mid-seventh century, there are other grounds for denying that early tyrants came to power by means of the support of a hoplite class.

It is common to attribute the invention of hoplite tactics to Argos or Corinth. This is sometimes done to explain the rise of Kypselos in Corinth or of Pheidon in Argos. Since Pheidon was the earliest tyrant of whom we follow Snodgrass in rejecting. On the date of the hoplite reform see also Benton, BSA 48 (1953) 340; and Kiechle, Lakonien und Sparta 266-270.

18. See Delienne in Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne 120 n. 5. Pleket, Talanta 1 (1969) 35-36, believes that hoplites were an important factor in establishing early tyrannies despite his acceptance of Snodgrass's conclusions.
know Argos is often credited with being the birthplace of hoplite tactics: 'We have to account both for this sudden display of Argive strength [at Hysiai] and for the special position ascribed to Pheidon, and both can be explained if we suppose that Argos was the first in the field with the new tactics and so gained temporary advantage.'

Archaeological evidence is sometimes adduced to suggest that hoplite tactics originated in Argos or Corinth; in fact, however, there is little evidence, literary or archaeological, that hoplite tactics were first used at either Argos or Corinth.

22. The literary evidence (P. Oxy. 10, fr. 1241, col. 5, 30-36 for Argos) is slight. The fact that the standard hoplite shield was by the fifth century called 'Argive' and the helmet 'Corinthian' (Snodgrass, *Arms and Armour* 67) is no more evidence for the hoplite equipment having begun in Argos or Corinth than is the widespread use of the 'Chalkidian' helmet evidence that hoplite tactics began in Buboia (Snodgrass, *Arms and Armour* 69-70). Moreover, to state that the chance find of the early hoplite panoply from Argos (see n. 6 above) is evidence that hoplite tactics
There is another city in Greece that has a very good
claim to the introduction of hoplite tactics: Chalkis in
Euboia.\textsuperscript{23} Aristotle\textsuperscript{24} cites Chalkis and Eretria as examples
of oligarchies whose strength lay in their cavalry and who
used horses in their wars against their neighbours. But we
are unusually well informed about the early military history
of Chalkis and Eretria and our sources indicate that the
Euboians were thought in antiquity to excel in weapons and
tactics.\textsuperscript{25} There is evidence to suggest that hoplite tactics
began in Argos is an \textit{argumentum e silentio}. Finally, the
frequent representation of hoplite scenes on Corinthian vases
is no evidence that hoplite tactics began in Corinth, for the
painters or the motifs may have come from outside Corinth
(cf. Snodgrass, \textit{Arms and Armour} 63).

23. Suggested by Boardman, \textit{BSA} 52 (1957) 29 (see also
Lorimer 118); rejected by Snodgrass, \textit{Arms and Armour} 71 (but
see \textit{Early Greek Armour} 202).

24. \textit{Pol.} 1289b 36-39; see also 1297b 16-22 and 1321a 8-11.

25. To the Euboians were attributed several developments in
arms and armour. According to legend the Kyklopes first made
weapons in Euboia, where Briareos was the first to wear armour
(\textit{P. Oxy.} 10, fr. 1241, col. 4, 10-16; \textit{Istros} [\textit{FGrH} 3B 334 F 71]
ap. Schol A Homer, \textit{Iliad} 10. 439; \textit{Bustathios} 817. 21;
were in use early in Buboia; and the cities of Buboia (and

Apollodoros 3. 15. 8; Hesychios, s.v. Χαλκιδικὸς λειμόν).

The Kouretes of Buboia are said to have been the first to make
and wear bronze weapons, presumably the bronze panoply (P.
Oxy. 10, fr. 1241, col. 4, 26-29; Strabo 10. 3. 19, p. 472
[see also 10. 3. 8, p. 467]; Steph. Byz., s.v. Ἀθηναῖος;
Servius, Aeneid 9. 503). These legends may have some basis
in fact: copper and iron were mined and worked in Chalkis
(Strabo 10. 1. 9, p. 447; Steph. Byz., s.v. Χαλκίς;
Eustathios ad Dionys. Per. 764 and ad Iliad 10. 435; Pliny,
NH 4. 64). Moreover, as early as the time of Alkaios Chalkis
356 [Nauck, Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta]). For the early
military reputation of Chalkis see Anth. Pal. 14, 73, Ion of
Chios (FHG 2 51, fr. 17), Strabo 10. 1. 13, p. 449; and
Bradeen, TAPA 78 (1947) 238, 240.

26. For evidence of possible early hoplite warfare in
Buboia see Archilochos, fr. 3 Diehl, who speaks of the
δοσπόται Εὔβοιας δουρικυττόμε (see Boardman, op. cit. [n. 23
above] 29); and P. Oxy. 30 no. 2508 (see Podlecki, CW 63
[1969] 75-76); Strabo 10. 1. 12, p. 448 (concerning a treaty
between Chalkis and Bretria forbidding the use of long-range
missiles, perhaps a requisite to the use of hoplite tactics:
Chalkis in particular) have perhaps a better claim than any other to have been the first to use hoplite armies. For see Lorimer 118); Plutarch, Amatorius 17 (Moralia 760E-761A), who mentions the use of hoplites in battle in the Lelantine War (on the date of this war see p. 30, n. 78 above).

27. There are three factors that lend credence to the thesis that hoplite tactics were first introduced on Euboia. First, it has been pointed out by Snodgrass (Early Greek Armour 11-14, 35, 54-55, 66-68, 194-195; and JHS 83 [1963] 201) that metal helmets worn by hoplites as well as single-grip round shields resemble Urartian and Assyrian types. If the Near East provided models for certain elements of the hoplite panoply the most probable place for their influence to have been passed to the Greeks was at the Euboian settlement at Al Mina, where the Chalkidians, with their interest in metal-working, are the most likely Greeks to have taken them over (Boardman, op. cit. [n. 23 above] 29, and The Greeks Overseas 66; Snodgrass, Early Greek Armour 200). Second, the Euboians enjoyed a reputation in the pre-hoplite period for prowess in hand-to-hand fighting in contrast to those who fought with long-distance weapons (see Strabo 10. 1. 13, pp. 448-449; Plutarch, Theseus 5. 2). The use of hoplite tactics may have developed from the Euboians' ability to fight
this reason we might expect on Andrewes' theory to find early
tyrannies in Euboia supported by a hoplite class. But the few
tyrannies that we hear of in Chalkis seem to have been only
temporary interruptions in the oligarchy of the Hippobotai, who continued to hold power in Chalkis till the time of Perikles. In Eretria the oligarchy of the 'knights' mentioned by Aristotle held power at least till the middle of the sixth century: an Eretrian suitor was present at the well at close range. Finally, the Lelantine Plain was a bone of contention between Chalkis and Eretria for centuries and their border-warfare over the plain both preceded and followed the Lelantine War (see Plutarch, Sept. Sap. Con. 10 [Moralia 153F] and Theognis 891-894; and Bradeen, op. cit. [n. 25 above] 228-229). The Euboian aristocrats may have introduced new tactics from a desire to gain military advantage after a succession of border-disputes in which cavalry-engagements repeatedly failed to prove effective.

28. See pp. 5-6 above on the Euboian tyrants and p. 6, n. 15 on the Hippobotai.
29. Plutarch, Perikles 23. 4. For mention of the Hippobotai in the late sixth century see Herodotos 5. 77. 2 and 6. 100. 1; and Aelian, VH 6. 1.
30. Pol. 1306a 35-36; see also 1289b 36-39.
court of Kleisthenes of Sikyon to bid for the hand of Agariste\textsuperscript{31}; and the aristocratic rulers of Eretria gave aid to Peisistratos during his second exile.\textsuperscript{32} Thus, although there is evidence that the Euboian cities employed hoplite tactics at an early date, their politics long remained aristocratic. Chalkis and Eretria did not experience tyrannies supported by hoplites nor did they develop 'hoplite constitutions' at an early date. Rather they continued to be ruled for generations by traditional aristocracies.

One reason for the failure of the hoplite reform to bring about rapid political change may be that the introduction of the phalanx did not immediately increase the number of men under arms in the polis. It is commonly held\textsuperscript{33} that the introduction of the phalanx necessitated an immediate widening of the army to include the non-aristocratic classes in order to provide enough men for the phalanx. The primary difficulty in this assumption is that in archaic Greece even more than in classical times the expensive hoplite panoply will have been prohibitive to all but a small number of citizens who could afford to supply their own armour. It

\textsuperscript{31} Herodotos 6. 127. 4.
\textsuperscript{32} Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 15. 2.
\textsuperscript{33} See, e.g., Starr 334; Snodgrass 114-115; Forrest 90.
must have been an expensive business to furnish a helmet, breastplate, greaves, shield, spear and sword, especially since tin and iron, and often copper, had to be imported. It has been suggested that in early Greece the only group likely to have formed the original hoplite class, for a time at any rate, were the large landholders, since smallholders will not have had the means to furnish their own armour. But surely the large landowners of the seventh century were, for the most part, the aristocrats. In archaic Greece there was a close connexion between aristocracy and ownership of land, which was the chief indication of wealth. Aristotle describes the aristocratic constitution as one of the rule of the Hippobotai in Chalkis Strabo says, μή μόνον πλούσιν άλλα καί ἀριστίνθην αἴρονται τὰς ἀρχὰς and

34. See Snodgrass, Early Greek Armour 89, 241 n. 58.
35. Cook, JHS 66 (1946) 85; Courbin in Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne 85. On the effects of the introduction of hoplite armour on metal-working see Benton, op. cit. (n. 27 above) 338-340.
36. By Snodgrass 114.
38. See Whibley 112, 126.
Large estates were common in aristocracies of 'knights' such as those of Thessaly and Boiotia, and presumably they were also the rule on Euboia. In most poleis the nobles are likely to have been the largest landholders and the number of those possessing enough land to permit them to furnish hoplite armour who were not aristocrats was probably small. It has been argued, of course, that the new economic prosperity of the seventh century created a new 'middle class' of men who had the means to serve in the new hoplite armies, and indeed 'merchants, shippers, and craftsmen' have been included among those belonging to the new class of hoplites. But a rise in trade sufficient to produce a significant increase in the prosperity of a large number of people in Greece seems not to have begun till the last quarter of the seventh century. There

40. 10. 1. 8, p. 447.
41. Toutain, The Economic Life of the Ancient World 38.
42. On the smallness of farms in classical Greece see Toutain, op. cit. 39; Michell, The Economics of Ancient Greece 43-44; French, Historia 10 (1961) 510-511.
43. Forrest 94.
44. By Finley, Early Greece 101.
45. See pp. 42-44 above.
probably did not exist in Greece what could be described very loosely as a 'middle class' much before the sixth century. Nor do merchants and craftsmen appear to have been a class likely to have furnished soldiers for hoplite armies in the seventh century. There were a few merchants who gained great wealth from trade, such as Kolaios of Samos and Sostratos of Aigina, but these were exceptional and that is why we hear of them. Whether even wealthy merchants and artisans were drafted into hoplite armies is doubtful. By the Servian reform, according to Dionysios of Halikarnassos, artisans were added to the second (non-hoplite) census-class at Rome; though Livy says that two centuries of fabri served with the first class but without arms, their duty being to carry (have charge of?) siege-equipment. It appears, whichever version we accept, that at Rome artisans were not given hoplite status. Whether they were in Hellas, where the hoplite army was based, in archaic and classical times, on

46. Herodotos 4. 152.
47. Ant. Rom. 4. 17. 3.
48. 1. 43. 3; cf. Cicero, De Rep. 2. 39.
49. Ogilvie (Commentary on Livy, Books 1-5 169) thinks that Dionysios is to be preferred to Livy.
landholders, is questionable.

In short, it appears unlikely that there existed in the mid-seventh century a sufficiently prosperous class of non-aristocratic citizens to supplement the nobles in filling the ranks of the earliest hoplite armies. The alternative to believing that hoplite arms were immediately extended to commoners is to assume that the earliest phalanxes were composed only of aristocrats. This would be unlikely if large numbers of men were required for the hoplite line as they were later. But there are two good reasons why the first phalanxes should have relied on nobles. In the first place, hoplite fighting was a difficult business that required properly armed men who were highly trained and disciplined. The phalanx depended on steeled warriors, not on men who had never carried a spear. Are we to assume


51. So Starr, *Historia* 10 (1961) 136 n. 24. But the number of hoplites employed in the fifth century is no indication of the number of hoplites a century or more earlier: see French, *op. cit.* (n. 42 above) 510.

52. Detienne, in *Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne*
that with the introduction of the hoplite line the aristocracy
turned to inexperienced commoners for as difficult a task as
hoplite warfare? Second, 'Can we believe that, from the first,
the aristocrats and men of exceptional wealth took their place
in the phalanx beside their supposed inferiors?' Snodgrass
believes they did and he follows Helbig in thinking that
aristocrats maintained their position by riding to battle on
their horses, where they dismounted and joined the line. But
it is difficult to see how any real distinction could be

134-142, convincingly shows that hoplites in archaic Greece
were 'spécialistes de la fonction guerrière' organised in
many cities in phalanxes of 300 men.

53. Snodgrass 114.

54. 'Les 'Ιππείς athéniens,' Monuments et Mémoires publiés par
l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres 37 (1904) 157-
264; and Über die Einführungszeit der geschlossenen Phalanx
passim. Helbig's view has recently been challenged by
Alföldi, 'Die Herrschaft der Reiterei in Griechenland und Rom
dem Sturz der Könige,' in Gestalt und Geschichte: Festschrift
Karl Schefold 13-47; and Accademia di archeologia lettere e
Belle arti, Rendiconti 40 (1965) 21-34.
maintained between aristocrats and commoners who wore the same panoply and fought side-by-side. It is more difficult to imagine that aristocrats who were used to fighting alongside aristocrats will, with the introduction of the hoplite phalanx, have at once incorporated commoners into the ranks. It is far more likely that the phalanx will have been regarded as another means by which the traditional warrior-class could wage war. 55

When it became necessary to fill the hoplite ranks, presumably men will have been sought who could furnish their own armour, who were skilled in fighting, and who shared the same values and background as the aristocrats. These qualities could have been found in the early seventh century

55. The evidence from grave-finds in the eighth century suggests that "hoplite" armour was first known as the possession of the eminent few' (Snodgrass, *Early Greek Armour* 89). 'A Argos, la tombe de l'armure...a un caractère exceptionnel...en comparaison de la grande majorité des autres tombes, où les armes sont relativement très rares, au protogéométrique comme au géométrique. Il en est de même à Athènes, où, au Céramique, 56 tombes protogéométriques et plus de cent tombes géométriques sont dépouvrues d'armes...' (Courbin in *Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne* 87 n. 145).
only amongst other aristocrats. If there were not enough nobles available locally in a _polis_ to form a hoplite line there were two possible alternatives: (1) to call upon aristocrats from other cities who were bound to one's _polis_ or family by ties of friendship or marriage; or (2) to engage mercenaries.

Military aid was often given in archaic Greece on the basis of personal alliances (examples are Pheidon's aid to a faction in Corinth, Kleomenes' aid to Isagoras, Theagenes' aid to Kylon, Eretrian, Theban, and Naxian aid to Peisistratos or sentimental ties with a _polis_ such as with a mother-city (e.g., the aid given by the Chalkidian colonies in Thrace to Chalkis during the Lelantine War). The Thessalian cavalry often took part in wars outside Thessaly

55a. See Alkaios Z 104 Lobel-Page (οὐδ’ ἐλκοπολὰ γὰρ νεται τὰ σήματα) and the scholiast's explanation: οὐ τιτρῶος τὰ ἐπὶ οὔτα οὔτα αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ διώκειν ἔχει, εἰ μὴ ἀρα ὁ φέρων αὐτὰ ἐὰν ἢ [ὅ] γενναῖος (Schol. M on Aischylos' _Septem_ 398).

56. Nikolaos of Damaskos, _FGrH_ 2A 90 F 35.
58. Thucydides 1. 126. 3-5.
60. Plutarch, _Amatorius_ 17 (Moralia 761A).
in aid of friends. Her cavalry helped Chalkis in the Lelantine War and fought briefly for the Peisistratids against Sparta near the end of the sixth century.

A second source of manpower for early hoplite ranks were mercenaries. Mercenaries were a prominent feature of the Aegean in the seventh century. We hear of early Greek hoplite mercenaries serving in Egypt, Babylonia, and Phrygia; Cretan archers are said to have taken part in the First and Second Messenian Wars; and Karians were well known as hoplite mercenaries.

61. Ibid. 760E-F.
62. Herodotos 5. 63. 3-4.
63. Herodotos 2. 152-154; SGHI 7 (Abu-Simbel inscription); Snodgrass, Early Greek Armour 185, 203; Lorimer 120.
65. See AJA 64 (1960) 240 and plate 60, fig. 25c; and Coldstream, GGP 379.
66. Pausanias 4. 8. 3; 4. 10. 1.
68. Archilochos, fr. 40 Diehl; Herodotos 2. 152. 4-5 (see Snodgrass, Early Greek Armour 262 n. 62). Against the ancient tradition that ascribed to the Karians the invention of hoplite armour see Snodgrass, JHS 84 (1964) 107-118.
The evidence for the composition of the first hoplite armies is, of course, slight; but it tends to support the thesis that the earliest hoplites were aristocrats. 69 We know, for example, that there were aristocrats who served as hoplite mercenaries, such as Alkaios' brother Antimenidas, who fought with the Babylonians, 70 and Archilochos, who fought in the Aegean. 71 Service as mercenaries may well have provided an outlet for the energies of nobles' sons or younger brothers who were unable to participate in politics at home. 72 Evidence that in Euboia at any rate armies were composed exclusively of aristocrats for a time comes from Archilochos, who speaks of δεσπόται Εὔβοιας δουρωκυνοί. 73 The warriors being described here may be hoplites 74; and

69. For a similar view see Drews, Historia 21 (1972) 140-142.
On the question whether Archilochos was a mercenary see Drews, op. cit. 141 n. 54.
72. See Aristotle, Pol. 1305b 6-8, 12-16.
73. Fr. 3 Diehl.
74. See Boardman, op. cit. (n. 23 above) 29.
they are specifically named as Euboian rulers. Additional evidence comes from Crete, where hoplite equipment appeared perhaps before the seventh century.\textsuperscript{75} In the Song of Hybrias,\textsuperscript{76} which has been dated as early as the sixth century,\textsuperscript{77} the Cretan Hybrias, who calls himself δυσποιτας, may be describing hoplite weapons when he says that his sword and spear are his wealth. Although he calls his shield a λαυθιον, we suspect that Hybrias uses the word with a sense of its antique, heroic air, not to describe a modern weapon.\textsuperscript{78} Hybrias may have been a mercenary,\textsuperscript{79} and he was certainly an aristocrat. Crete was known for the aristocratic constitutions of its cities even in classical

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item Snodgrass, \textit{Arms and Armour} 63; \textit{Early Greek Armour} 200-201.
\item Bowra, \textit{Greek Lyric Poetry} 401; Willetts, \textit{Cretan Cults and Festivals} 323.
\item Bowra, \textit{Greek Lyric Poetry} 401-402.
\item Ibid. 401-403. Contra: Willetts, \textit{Cretan Cults and Festivals} 319-320. Cretans were best known as archers (see Plato, \textit{Laws} 625D) and Cretan archers often served as mercenaries abroad (see p. 71 above).
\end{thebibliography}
Possession of arms was limited to the small class of free citizens who, like the Spartiates, underwent a rigorous military training in their youth. Far from widening the basis of the army the introduction of hoplite tactics restricted military service to a small warrior-class in Crete. Moreover, the basis of Cretan politics was not appreciably widened, for Crete kept its aristocratic society and constitution for centuries.

There is, then, no reason to assume that the introduction of the hoplite phalanx brought with it an immediate extension of hoplite arms to the non-aristocratic classes. Indeed several considerations make it likely that at first trained soldiers within the ranks of the aristocracy but from outside the polis were relied upon to supplement local nobles. There is, moreover, some evidence to support this view. The

80. Aristotle describes the constitutional nature of the Cretan cities as δυναστευτικά (Pol. 1272b 1-3, 9-11).
82. Strabo 10. 4. 16, pp. 480-481.
83. Aristotle, Pol. 1329a 40-1329b 5.
84. Willetts, Ancient Crete 69; Cretan Cults and Festivals 322.
employment of mercenaries and other aristocrats from outside the polis in the earliest hoplite phalanxes explains why mercenaries became so prominent a feature of Greek history in the seventh century; and it explains why we do not hear of the emergence in the seventh century of a new 'hoplite class' as a force in politics. 85

Indeed perhaps the strongest argument against the view that hoplites provided the support for the earliest tyrants is the complete silence of our sources regarding a connexion between hoplites and tyranny. 86 There is no evidence whatever that hoplites were a force in politics in the seventh century. In none of the accounts of tyrants who seized power in the seventh century do hoplites play a part; nor do we hear of struggles between hoplites as a class and the aristocracy in the seventh century.

85. Perhaps the rapid spread of hoplite tactics in the mid-seventh century was due to the widespread use of mercenaries who introduced the phalanx throughout Greece.

86. 'But the tyrannies begin a generation or so after the introduction of hoplites, and it is hardly possible that there should be no connection between them' (Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants 36). Of course this is post hoc ergo propter hoc and a weak argument.
Eventually non-aristocratic citizens were brought into the hoplite phalanx and in some states this resulted in widening the basis of the constitution. But the passage from Aristotle\(^7\) that is usually cited as evidence for the 'hoplite constitution' seems to indicate that the new hoplite class did not immediately enjoy much real influence in politics:

"καὶ ἡ πρώτη δὲ πολιτεία ἐν τοῖς ἔλθεσιν ἐγένετο μετὰ τὰς βασιλείας ἐκ τῶν πολεμοῦντων, ἡ μὲν ἐκ ἄρχης ἐκ τῶν ἵππεων... αὐξανομένων δὲ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὑπολοίς ἱσχυσάντων μᾶλλον πλεοῦσα μετεῖχον τῆς πολιτείας. διὸδερ ἤς νῦν καλοθευν πολιτείας, οἱ πρώτεροι ἡκάλουν δημοκρατίας ἦσαν δὲ ἡ ἀρχαιοποιοῦντες πολιτείαι εὐλαβείς ὑπολογίσκοι καὶ βασιλείαι. δι' ὑπολογισμῷ γὰρ οὐκ εἶχον πολὺ τὸ μέσον, ἢ γὰρ ὑπολογίσκοι τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν μᾶλλον ὑπέμενον τὸ ἀρχεῖαν.

I interpret this passage to mean that hereditary monarchies were succeeded by aristocracies in which the cavalry took a prominent part in warfare. Later, however, the basis of the constitution was widened by granting political rights to all who could furnish hoplite armour. But the extension of political rights to the hoplites did not

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\(^7\) Pol. 1297b 16-18, 22-28.
bring with it an immediate share in power since the hoplite class was still small and the structure of the state aristocratic. Aristotle thus indicates that while the basis of government was widened (hence the constitution was called a democracy) the polis continued to be ruled by aristocrats.

Andrewes cites this passage in support of his theory that early hoplites were able to secure a share of the political power of the polis and break the political monopoly of the aristocrats. But if I have correctly interpreted the passage it appears that hoplite participation in the political life of the polis at first brought no real share in the rule of the state. Perhaps members of the new 'hoplite class' attended meetings of the assembly and voted but did not hold office or sit on the council.

When did the political influence of the new hoplite class begin to be felt in Greece? I have already suggested that economic conditions are not likely to have created Aristotle's τὸ μέγαν much before the sixth century. We certainly do not hear of the participation of the demos in politics before the end of the sixth century. In Athens

88. The Greek Tyrants 34.
90. Cook, CR N. S. 7 (1957) 142.
the hoplites were not a political force before Kleisthenes made them one. The assumption even for the sixth century that there was a 'hoplite identity' that made the hoplites a distinctive political group is not supported by the evidence. It is possible that hoplites might join together in the assembly or as a military force to support a noble who favoured granting to them additional rights or breaking the monopoly of office held by the noble clans. But what we know of politics in the archaic polis indicates rather that candidates for magistracies or even aspiring tyrants are more likely to have relied for support on their dependents, those who were bound to them by ties of locality or kinship.

In summary, the evidence seems to argue against rather than for associating the rise of early Greek tyranny with the support of a new hoplite class. The Euboian cities, which perhaps have a better claim than any other cities in Greece to have first adopted hoplite tactics, produced neither important early tyrannies nor early hoplite

91. Herodotos 5. 66. 2; Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 20. 1; Hignett 394-395.
92. See Sealey, Historia 9 (1960) 155-175; Forrest 48-49.
constitutions. There is some evidence to suggest that the earliest hoplite phalanxes were composed of nobles rather than of a new 'middle class' that had political aspirations. The complete silence of our sources regarding hoplites as a separate political entity in the seventh century together with the fact that they do not appear to have been a political force in Greece till the end of the sixth century makes it difficult to posit a connexion between hoplites and the rise of tyranny. Finally, there is no mention in our sources of hoplite support for any of the tyrannies in the seventh century. Perhaps it is reasonable to conclude that hoplites did not play an important role in the rise of the tyrants in the seventh century and that we must look for other factors to explain the origin of tyranny.
CHAPTER THREE

ARISTOCRATIC FactionsALISM AND THE ORIGIN OF TYRANNY

The seventh century, in which the earliest Greek tyrants arose, was a period in which poleis were ruled by aristocracies.¹ The number of governing aristocrats in each polis was small: we hear of 100 oikiai that formed the aristocracy in Epizephyrian Lokroi.² The Bakchiads of Corinth numbered

1. On aristocratic government and society in archaic Greece see Busolt-Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde 1 341-369; Whibley passim; Ehrenberg, The Greek State 17-22; and Forrest 45-66. For a full discussion of aristocratic society and constitutional development in an area of Greece that remained aristocratic in its constitution throughout classical times see Willetts, Aristocratic Society in Ancient Crete.

2. Polybios 12. 5. 7. There is mention of assemblies of 1000 in several states: in Opountian Lokris (IG 9. 1 334, lines 38-41); Epizephyrian Lokroi (Polybios 12. 16. 10-11); Kroton (Valerius Maximus 8. 15 ext. 1); Rhetion (Herakleides Pontikos, FHG 2 219, fr. 25); Akragas (Diogenes Laertios 8. 66; see Ehrenberg, The Greek State 60); Kolophon (Theopompos [quoting Xenophanes], FGrH 2B 115 F 117 ap. Athenaios 12. 526c ); and Kyme (Herakleides Pontikos, FHG 2 217, fr. 11). Whibley
200, the aristocracy of Epidauros 180. The aristoi, as they called themselves, formed a closed society within the polis in which marriage in many cases was allowed only within their own order. Membership in the aristocracy depended on birth into a genos, a group of families that claimed to be descended from a single ancestor who was said to be of heroic or divine origin. Birth into a noble genos conferred arete, on which the aristoi based their claim of an inherent right to rule.

thinks that the assemblies of 1000 were connected with the constitutions of 100 oikiai (134); but they probably refer to hoplite constitutions (Ehrenberg, The Greek State 49).


4. Plutarch, Qu. Gr. 1 (Moralia 291 E).

5. See, e.g., Herodotos 5. 92 β1 on the Bakchiads of Corinth: ἔδοξον δὲ καὶ ἡγοῦτο ἐξ ἀλλήλων.

6. It is likely that in the seventh century gene were limited to noble oikiai. The literature on the Greek genos in archaic and classical times is large. Recent discussions include Hignett 61-67; Andrewes, JHS 81 (1961) 1-15; and Hammond, JHS 81 (1961) 76-98.

7. δοκεῖ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν εἶναι μάλιστα τὸ τὰς τιμὰς νενεμηθοῦσαι κατ' ἀρετήν, ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ἴρος ἄρετή, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλουτος (Aristotle, Pol. 1294a 11-12).
In some cities one clan dominated to the exclusion of other noble gene (e.g., the Bakchiads of Corinth\(^8\)); in others the aristocracy comprised all gene (e.g., the Eupatridai of Athens\(^9\)).

The most important organ of aristocratic government was the council (boule or gerousia), which consisted of small numbers of men\(^{10}\) of noble birth\(^{11}\) and usually of mature

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8. The Bakchiads traced their descent to Bakchis, a Heraklid and early king of Corinth (Diodoros 7, fr. 9. 4).
9. I take Eupatridai to be an inclusive term for all noble gene in Athens in the archaic period. The question whether the term refers to a genos (Isokrates 16. 25) as well as to 'nobility of birth' generally is a vexed one: see Wade-Gery, CQ 25 (1931) 1-11, 77-89 (=Essays in Greek History 86-115); Hignett 65-67, 315-316; Hammond, op. cit. (n. 6 above) 77-78; Wüst, Historia 6 (1957) 176-191, and Historia 8 (1959) 1-11; Sealey, Historia 9 (1960) 178-180, and Historia 10 (1961) 512-514.
10. τὸς δὲ προβοδοῦς δῆλεγος ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος, ὡςτ' ἀλγαρχίκως (Aristotle, Pol. 1299b 34-36). The Spartan Gerousia consisted of 30 members (Plutarch, Lykourgos 5. 7) including the two kings; the council of Elis consisted of 90 men (Aristotle, Pol. 1306a 16-18); that of Knidos 60 (Plutarch,
age\textsuperscript{12}; in some states it was composed of ex-magistrates.\textsuperscript{13} The powers of the aristocratic council are only vaguely defined in our sources.\textsuperscript{14} Councillors are referred to as


11. The councillors in Knidos were chosen \textit{\varepsilon}κ των \textit{\alpha\pi\iota\sigmaτων} (Plutarch, \textbf{Qu. Gr. 4 [Moralia 292 A]}); members of the Spartan Gerousia were chosen from \textit{οι καλοι καγαθοι} (Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1270b 23-25; on the question whether a Spartan nobility is meant here see Gilbert, \textit{Handbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthümer} \textsuperscript{12} 13 n. 1); in Crete \textit{ο\upsilon κ απ\acute{a}ντων αιρο\betaυνται το\upsilonς χσ\acute{e}ιμους \\acute{a}λλα \textit{\varepsilon}κ τιν\upsilonν γεν\upsilonν} (Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1272a 33-34).

12. Members of the Gerousia were 60 years of age or above in Sparta (Plutarch, \textit{Lykourgos} 26. 1); in a number of cities councillors were appointed for life: \textit{e.g.}, in Athens (to the Areiopagos: Aristotle, \textit{Ath. Pol.} 3. 6); Elis (Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1306a 16-18); and Knidos (Plutarch, \textbf{Qu. Gr. 4 [Moralia 292 A]}).

13. As was the Areiopagos in Athens (Aristotle, \textit{Ath. Pol.} 3. 6) and the council in Crete (Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1272a 34-35).

14. Headlam, \textit{CR} 6 (1892) 296-297, followed by Whibley (161) and Hignett (83), thinks that the council's powers were not well defined because they were unrestricted. But our sources
The Bakchiads of Corinth, for indicate that individual magistrates often possessed a great deal of power in aristocratic constitutions (see below pp. 109-110); hence, councils must have had only limited powers, though perhaps they enjoyed a great deal of auctoritas over the magistrates.

15. Plutarch, Qu. Gr. 4 (Moralia 292 A), where the councilors of Knidos are also called ἐπίσκοποι. Cf. Dionysios of Halikarnassos, Ant. Rom. 2. 14. 3 on the Spartan Gerousia: ἡ γερουσία πᾶν εἴχε τῶν κοινῶν τὸ κράτος.


17. See Aristotle, Pol. 1293b 7-12: οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ εἰσὶ τινες ἀι πρός τε τὰς διλαγχουμένας ἑχουσι διαφορὰς καὶ καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατεῖα καὶ πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην πολιτείαν. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ μὸνον πλουτὶν ἄλλα καὶ ἀριστὶν ἀιροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς, αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία διαφέρει τε ἀμφότεροι καὶ ἀριστοκρατικὴ καλεῖται.
example, annually chose one from their number to be prytanis.¹⁸
Magistrates may have been elected by the assembly as the
ephors were at Sparta,¹⁹ but in Athens the selection of
magistrates was entrusted to the Areiopagos.²⁰ Neither

Cf. Plutarch, Theseus 25. 2; and Aristotle, Pol. 1300a 15-19,
where birth is mentioned together with wealth and arete as a
qualification of magistrates in some states; and Ath. Pol. 3.
6: ἕ γὰρ αἱ̣ρέσις τῶν ἀρχιτυπῶν ἀριστίνθην καὶ πλουτίνθην ἤν κτλ.
On the necessity for a qualification of wealth for office in
an aristocracy see Whibley 111-115 and Hignett 78.

18. Diodoros 7, fr. 9. 6. Cf. Pausanias 1. 43. 3:
'Ὑπερίονος δὲ τοῦ Ἀγαμήμωνος - οὗτος γὰρ Μεγαρέων ἐβασίλευσεν
ὑστατός - τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρός ἀποθανόντος ὑπὸ Σανδίονος διὰ
πλεονεξίαν καὶ ὑβρίν, βασιλευθηκαί μὲν οἰκείῳ ὑπὸ ἑνὸς ἐδόθη
σφίσιν, εἶναι δὲ ἀρχοντας αἱ̣ρετοὺς καὶ ἀνὰ μέρος ἀνοδείν ἀλλήλων.

19. Aristotle, Pol. 1270b 25-27. This is the natural
interpretation of this passage and it is further suggested by
Aristotle's comparison of the ephorate with the Cretan office
of kosmos (Pol. 1272a 28-34). On the interpretation of the

[πάγυ βου]λὴ ἀνακαλεσμένη καὶ κρίνασα καθ' αὐτὴν τῶν
ἐπιτήθειον ἐρ' ἐκάστῃ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπ' [ἐν].ια [υτ].ον ,[διατάξα]σα
councillors nor magistrates could, in ordinary circumstances, be held accountable for their official actions.\textsuperscript{21}

The assembly existed in Greek cities from very early times,\textsuperscript{22} but it is doubtful if it was a formal or organised body.\textsuperscript{23} At any rate it certainly played a very limited part in political affairs in aristocratic constitutions.\textsuperscript{24} Perhaps

\begin{quote}
\textit{ἀπεστελλεν}. Cf. Isokrates, \textit{Areopagitikon} 7. 22. This is rejected by Hignett (78-79), mistakenly, I think. I see no conflict between \textit{Ath. Pol.} 8. 2 and \textit{Pol.} 1273b 41-1274a 3 (as do von Fritz and Kapp, \textit{Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts} 155-156). On the selection of archons in Athens before 487 see Buck, \textit{CP} 60 (1965) 96-101, with whom I agree.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{21} The councillors in Knidos could not be held to account for their actions (Plutarch, \textit{Qu. Gr.} 4 [\textit{Moralia} 292\textit{b}]); nor could the \textit{kosmoi} in Crete (Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1272a 36-38).
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{22} Atkinson, \textit{CR} N. S. 20 (1970) 58. To Odysseus the assembly was a sign of a civilised state that the Kyklopes did not possess (\textit{Od.} 9. 112).
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{23} M. F. McGregor has suggested to me that the early Greek assembly resembled the Roman \textit{contio} rather than the \textit{concilium}.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{24} On the function of the assembly in the early \textit{polis} see Andrewes in \textit{ASAI} 1-20; Griffith in \textit{ASAI} 115-138; Butler, \textit{Historia} 11 (1962) 385-396.
\end{quote}
it is for this reason that we are so badly informed about the composition and role of the assembly in the early polis. In many aristocracies assemblies seem to have consisted of male members of noble clans, and originally citizenship was apparently limited to heads of noble families.\textsuperscript{25} At some later date the composition of the assembly was apparently enlarged to include all those who could furnish their own armour.\textsuperscript{26} That the poorer classes could attend the assembly is unlikely. In Athenes the \textit{thetes} were not able to attend the assembly before the time of Solon.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{25} In a number of aristocratic constitutions only the head of the family enjoyed political rights (\textit{Pol.} 1292b 4-5). In these constitutions sons were excluded from office and apparently even from citizenship so long as their fathers lived. The father would be succeeded in citizenship by his oldest son, though younger brothers were still excluded. Aristotle says that this kind of aristocratic constitution existed in Massilia, Istros, Herakleia, and Knidos (\textit{Pol.} 1305b 2-16).

\textsuperscript{26} \ \alphaυξανομένων δὲ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὄπλοις ἵσχυσάνων μᾶλλον πλείους μετείχον τῆς πολιτείας (Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1297b 22-24).

\textsuperscript{27} Aristotle, \textit{Ath. Pol.} 7. 3; \textit{Pol.} 1274a 15-17. Cf. Hignett 84. Aristotle does not say, in fact, that the \textit{ekklesia} existed before Solon.
Whatever the composition of the assembly it is clear that it possessed no real power in the aristocratic polis, where administration was in the hands of the magistrates guided by the council. In aristocratic Crete the assembly had no powers except to confirm the resolutions passed by the council and the kosmoi. Aristotle makes it plain that the demos were not usually permitted in oligarchies to speak against proposals presented to the assembly. It is likely that the assembly in the aristocratic polis met only on rare occasions to listen to proposals of major concern to the community such as the making of war or peace. Perhaps the fullest picture

28. Aristotle, Pol. 1272a 10-12. Cf. the limited function of the assembly at Carthage (which, although not a Greek polis, is useful as an analogy): the decision whether or not to refer matters to the assembly rests with the basileis and the elders, if they agree unanimously; if they disagree the matter must be referred to the assembly (Aristotle, Pol. 1273a 6-9).


29a. Ostwald (Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy 156) thinks that the Athenian assembly before Kleisthenes 'gave its assent in much the same way as the Spartan assembly did: it listened and approved, but probably
that we have of the aristocratic assembly is that presented in Homer.\(^{30}\) The assembly in the aristocratic society of Homer's time was rarely called\(^{31}\) and was advisory only, its purpose being to reveal the sentiment of the community. Opinion was expressed by acclamation (apparently the customary method of voting in primitive assemblies\(^{32}\)), but the king was not bound
did not discuss.' He also thinks (157 n. 2) that most likely 'only members of the upper classes could address it.'


I think it likely that Homer lived during the last half of the eighth century. For convenient summaries of evidence for this view see Wade-Gery, *The Poet of the Iliad* 25-27 and Huxley, *Greek Epic Poetry from Bumelos to Panyassias* 124-125.

31. The assembly in Ithaka had not been summoned in Odysseus' absence for 20 years (Od. 2. 26-27).

to follow the assembly's opinion. Discussion at meetings of
the assembly was carried on by aristocrats. Only once in
Homer did a commoner, Thersites, speak in the assembly, and
he was promptly beaten and humiliated by Odysseus.

In the aristocratic milieu of the seventh century in
Greece we look in vain for any role played by the non-
aristocratic classes in politics. Aristocrats alone held the
political power in the early Greek poleis. Those who were
not born into a noble genos that gave arete, by which
aristocrats could lay claim to the inherent right to rule,
had no part in political power. Even the influx of sudden
new wealth into a community did not give claim to a share
of power that was limited to those of noble birth. Wealth

See Whibley 165 n. 1 and Sealey, *op. cit.* (n. 30 above) 262-
263.

33. *Il.* 1. 54-305.
34. *Il.* 2. 211-277.
35. It is a commonplace of modern historical writing that an
influx of new wealth in the seventh century 'introduced a new
factor into politics--a regard for wealth as a rival to regard
for birth' (Hammond 246). In support of this view are often
cited Theogonis' πλούτος ἐμελέξε γένος (line 190) and Alkaios'
χρήματι άινη, πένικρος δ' οὖν εἰς πέλετ' ἕνοικος οὐδε τιμίος
without birth did not grant the right to challenge the gene

(Z 37 Lobel-Page). But these statements do not suggest that wealth challenged birth as a factor in politics. Χρήματα cannot refer to coined money in the latter passage. Alkaios' remark suggests simply that wealth (property and possessions) was important to an aristocrat. Magistrates were elected in aristocracies on the basis of birth and wealth (see n. 17 above). 'Even in the aristocracies of birth the government of the few was generally the government of the wealthy' (Whibley 126). Moreover, the sentiment that Alkaios expresses was a stock theme from the time of Hesiod (see Page, Sappho and Alcaeus 315 for parallels): 'it is no better evidence in him than in Hesiod, Pindar, or Timocles, for the "struggle between a class of impoverished aristocrats and parvenu merchant-princes..."' (Page, op. cit. 315-316). Nor does Theognis' statement that πλούτος ἔμειξε γένος indicate that in early Megara commoners were marrying into noble families. A careful reading of lines 182-192 will reveal that Theognis' real complaint is πενίη:

tεθνάμεναι, ϕίλε Κρηνη, πενίχρῷ βέλτερον ἀνδρὶ

Η ζωεὶν χαλεπῇ τεθρόμενον πενίῃ.

Theognis sounds here rather like Alkaios' πενίχρῳ ἔσολος. It is possible, moreover, that when Theognis speaks of ἔσολοι
in their monopoly of magistracies. 36

and κακοί (lines 57-60, 891-894) he means not 'nobles' and 'commoners' (Williams, JHS 23 [1903] 9-10) but 'good nobles' (those of whom Theognis approves) and 'bad nobles' (those whom he does not like): see Starr 303 and n. 3 and Wheeler, AJP 72 (1951) 156 and cf. Alkaios' reference to Pittakos as 'base-born' (κακοπατρίδας, Z 24 Lobel-Page, line 1), where the word is employed as a term of abuse and tells us nothing about Pittakos' parentage. In short, Theognis perhaps displays in these lines the envy of an aristocrat of small means who complains that the wealthiest nobles (not the nouveaux riches) secure the fairest brides. Neither the lines from Alkaios nor those from Theognis give more than doubtful support to the view that wealth was a rival of birth in Greek politics in the seventh or early sixth century.

36. Forrest, who holds the common view (which I think is wrong) that an expanding economy in the seventh century introduced a new social mobility that produced political revolutions and brought tyrants to power, writes (p. 75): '...a Hesiod or for that matter a Kolaios or a Sostratos who is rich enough to relax, to buy for his son the equipment and the training to make him a leading warrior or an athlete, will sooner or later begin to wonder why he is not a basileus.'

I think that this statement shows a misreading of the political
It was in the aristocratic milieu of the seventh century that tyranny arose in Greece. We have seen that economic conditions were not sufficiently advanced at this time to create a commercial or industrial class powerful enough to challenge aristocratic control of the polis. Moreover, the evidence suggests that a non-aristocratic class of hoplites is not likely to have existed early enough to have provided the support for the earliest tyrants in Greece. There is another factor, however, that explains the circumstances that gave rise to the earliest Greek tyrants and fits quite well what we know of politics in Greece in the seventh century:

psychology of the seventh century and of the factors that dominated aristocratic politics. In the classical polis descent and not merely residence conferred citizenship. Similarly in the aristocratic polis descent and not merely wealth conferred a claim to rule. Aristocratic society was bound by a deep sense of themis that included recognition that aristocrats alone enjoyed the privilege of governing (see Finley, The World of Odysseus 94-95; cf. Starr's remarks on eunomia [343]). Wealth alone gave to no one the right to share in the privileges of the aristo from which one was excluded by birth.
factionalism within the aristocracy, especially amongst rival families.\textsuperscript{37}

Aristotle found factionalism to be the underlying cause of revolutions in oligarchies and aristocracies\textsuperscript{37a}: \textit{ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις γίγνονται αἱ στάσεις αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὀλιγοῦς τῶν τιμῶν μετέχειν, ὅπερ εἰρήται κινεῖν καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας κτλ.\textsuperscript{38}

The circumstances differed but they often involved exclusion from office by one group or another and the resulting formation of discontented factions.\textsuperscript{39} 'Ὅμονοούσα δὲ

37. The importance of \textit{stasis} in aristocratic politics has recently been suggested by Butler, \textit{Historia} 11 (1962) 385-396; Sealey, \textit{Historia} 9 (1960) 155-180 (=\textit{Essays in Greek Politics} 9-38), and \textit{CSCA} 2 (1969) 247-269; Ellis and Stanton, \textit{Phoenix} 22 (1968) 95-110. A connexion between aristocratic factionalism and tyranny has been made by Hasebroek, \textit{Griechische Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte bis zur Perserzeit} 172; Heuss, \textit{Antike und Abendland} 2 (1946) 45-48; Starr, \textit{Historia} 10 (1961) 134; and Finley, \textit{Early Greece} 102, 105-106.

37a. On the similarity between oligarchy and aristocracy see Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1306b 24-26, 1307a 34-35.


Aristotle observed, ὁμι πλούσιορος ἐξ αὐτῆς. So long as power was shared by members of the aristocracy, as at Corinth, where the Bakchiads ruled 'as a body,' the aristocracy was able to maintain its position. But when one or more members began to feel that they did not share sufficiently ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, or that they were excluded altogether, factions were formed and tyranny was often the result. The process is described in a familiar passage by Herodotos:

ἐν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πολλοῖς ἀρετὴν ἐπαυκέοις ἐς τὸ κοίνον ἔξθεα ἔσια ἰσχυρὰ φιλέει ἔγγίνεσθαι.

autós γὰρ ἐκαστὸς βουλημένος κορυφαῖος εἶναι γνώμης τε νικᾶν ἐς ἔξθεα μεγάλα ἀλλήλους ἀπικνέονται,

ἐξ δὲ τῶν στάσεως ἐγγίνονται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν στάσεων φόνος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ φόνου ἀπέβη ἐς μοναρχίαν κτλ. 42

Solon observed a similar connexion between stasis and tyranny, and Theognis uttered the same sentiment:

40. Pol. 1306a 9-10.
41. Diodoros 7, fr. 9. 6.
42. Herodotos 3. 82. 3. On the meaning of μοναρχία see Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants 27.
43. Solon 10 (Diehl) lines 3-4:

ἄνθρωπος δ’ ἐκ μεγάλων πόλεων ἀλλυται ἐς δὲ μοναρχοῦ 

δῆμος οἰκοδήμη δουλοσύνην ἐπεσεν.
There are several instances in which the rise of tyrants is connected in our sources with factional strife in aristocracies. In archaic Kolophon, where an oligarchy of 1000 ruled, on more than one occasion stasis broke out that led to tyranny. In sixth-century Naxos Lygdamis, who himself was a member of the ruling oligarchy, became tyrant in a period of very great factional strife. Arkesilaos II of Kyrene converted his kingship into a tyranny (άντι βασιλέως ἐγγέγνει τύραννος) during his reign that was marked by stasis amongst the king and his brothers. Two generations later, Arkesilaos III became involved in the civic disorders that arose over the magistracies and in regard to the powers of the king after the reforms of Demonax. The king

44. Theognis 51-52. I adopt Ahrens' emendation of μονάρχοι θ' for μονάρχοι δε of the MSS.
45. Athenaios 12. 526c.
46. Aristotle, Pol. 1305a 40-41.
47. Athenaios 8. 348c.
formed a faction, was defeated, and fled to Samos, but later returned and regained power, apparently as a tyrant. 49

There are, I think, three observations that can be made regarding the rule of the earliest Greek tyrants that argue against the usual view of tyranny, which postulates a struggle of the lower classes against the ruling aristocracy. First, all seventh-century tyrants whose backgrounds we know were aristocrats. Second, their rule was conservative and they generally left the social order in their respective states unchanged and their rule was usually followed by oligarchy. Third, the earliest tyrants for the most part gained the tyranny through elective office rather than through revolution and thus lie within the framework of aristocratic politics.

An examination of the background of the earliest tyrants will confirm, I think, the generalisation that the tyrants of the seventh century were aristocrats. Kypselos of Corinth was the son of a Bakchiad woman who had married into another aristocratic family of Corinth. 50 Prokles, tyrant of

50. Herodotos 5. 92β; Nikolaos of Damaskos, *FGrH* 2A 90 F 57.
Epidauros, was almost certainly of noble birth for he married his own daughter to Periandros, and he himself had married the daughter of Aristokrates, king of Arkadia. 51 The same can be said for Theagenes of Megara, whose daughter was married to Kylon, ‘Αθηναίος ἄνήρ Ὀλυμπιονίκης τῶν πάλαι εὐγενῆς τε καὶ δυνατῆς. 52 The one notable exception seems to have been Orthagoras of Sikyon, who is said to have been the son of a butcher or cook (μάγευρος), 'a commoner and of no account' (δημιουργ καὶ ψαλλον). 53 There are several grounds, however, for questioning the tradition of Orthagoras' humble origin. Charges of low birth were commonly used against one's opponents in the rough and tumble of aristocratic politics in Greece. Alkaios called Pittakos οικοπατριδας, 54 but he was almost certainly a member of the aristocracy at Mytilene. 55

It is, moreover, strange to find a common soldier, as Orthagoras is supposed to have been, chosen polemarch in aristocratic Sikyon. 56 Finally, it is surprising to find

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51. Herakleides Pontikos ap. Diogenes Laertios 1. 94.
52. Thucydides 1. 126. 3.
53. FGrH 2A 105 F 2 (P. Oxy. 11 no. 1365); Diodoros 8. 24.
Kleisthenes, the great-grandson of a cook, attracting the scions of noble families of Greece to woo his daughter. The first thing that Kleisthenes did after summoning the suitors was to enquire regarding the family and lineage of each suitor.\(^57\) Despite the lateness and questionable authority of our sources,\(^58\) we cannot rule out the possibility that Orthagoras was of humble birth and constitutes an exception to the rule that seventh-century tyrants were aristocrats; but it is more reasonable to assume that he was a noble than that he was a commoner who managed to break into the closed circle of aristocratic politics in Sikyon. Other less well known tyrants of the seventh century seem also to have been aristocrats. Panaitios of Leontinoi, whom Busebios dates in the last decade of the seventh century,\(^59\) held the office of polemarch,\(^60\) which in an aristocratic state will most likely have been held by a member of the ruling aristocracy.\(^61\) Melas, an early tyrant of Ephesos, married a daughter of Alyattes,\(^62\)

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57. Herodotos 6. 128. 1.
59. 608 (Armenian version); 615 (Latin version of Jerome).
60. Polyainos 5. 47.
61. See n. 17 above.
which indicates high birth for the tyrant.

Not only were the earliest tyrants aristocrats, but, in spite of the reputation of tyrants as being champions of the lower classes, the earliest tyrants seem to have been quite conservative. Tyrants are often said to have relied on the lower classes for support against the aristocracy. But Aristotle compared tyrannies with oligarchies in their similar treatment of τὸ πλῆθος: tyrants distrust the people, they strip them of weapons, they treat the mob badly, expel them from the city, and settle them apart. This statement does not suggest that the tyrants were social revolutionaries or even favourably disposed towards the commons. Moreover, if tyranny was based on the support of the lower classes, we should expect that tyrannies would have widened the basis of the constitutions that followed them and modified the aristocracies that preceded them. Yet in nearly every instance of which we know the rule of the early tyrants was followed by the restoration of aristocratic oligarchy. In

63. Cf. Hammond 150.
64. Aristotle, Pol. 1310b 12-16.
66. Though in some cases tyrants were popular: see Aristotle, Pol. 1315b 12-28.
Corinth the rule of the Kypselids was followed by an oligarchy in which the people were divided into eight tribes\textsuperscript{67} that elected a board of eight \textit{probouloi} and a council.\textsuperscript{68} The actual working of the constitution is in doubt, but it was oligarchic in nature: the election of magistrates by tribes, for example, was an oligarchic device.\textsuperscript{69} After the tyrant Theagenes was overthrown in Megara, says Plutarch,\textsuperscript{70} όλγον \χρόνον ἐσωφρόνησαν κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν, an indication that a conservative oligarchy had been established. In the sixth century Aischines, the last tyrant of Sikyon, was driven out by the Spartans,\textsuperscript{71} who perhaps made certain that a pro-Spartan oligarchy took its place, as the Spartans later attempted to ensure in Athens following the expulsion of the Peisistratids.\textsuperscript{72} It is likely that the oligarchy in

\textsuperscript{67} Photios, \textit{Suda} s.v. πάντα οικτο.

\textsuperscript{68} Nikolaos of Damaskos, \textit{FGrH} 2A 90 F 60 (2). See Will, \textit{Korinthiaka} 609-615.

\textsuperscript{69} Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1305a 32-34.

\textsuperscript{70} Qu. Gr. 18 (\textit{Moralia} 295 D).

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{FGrH} 2A 105 F 1 (Rylands Pap. 18); Plutarch, \textit{De Mal. Her.} 21 (\textit{Moralia} 859 D).

\textsuperscript{72} Herodotos 5. 72; Aristotle, \textit{Ath. Pol.} 20.
Epidaurus described by Plutarch followed the tyranny of Prokles.\textsuperscript{73} After the death of Pheidon Argos reverted to aristocratic rule, in which power was vested in a board of nine damiorgoi.\textsuperscript{74} In Akragas the rule of Phalaris was probably followed by an oligarchy. Telamachos and his son, Emmenes, grandfather of Theron, are variously credited with the overthrow of Phalaris,\textsuperscript{75} and a scholiast on Pindar says that Telemachos himself seized power\textsuperscript{76} (though the two events are not connected in the sources). But an anecdote preserved in a fragment of Diodoros\textsuperscript{77} has been taken to suggest that Phalaris was overthrown by a concerted effort, probably of aristocrats.\textsuperscript{78} The tyranny of Antileon of Chalkis and probably that of Phoxos, also of Chalkis, were followed by oligarchic rule, doubtless that of the aristocratic Hippobotai.\textsuperscript{79} Even at the end of the sixth century the

\textsuperscript{73} Qu. Gr. 1 (Moralia 291 E). See Hammond 149 and Whibley 79 n. 24.
\textsuperscript{74} SEG 11. 336. See Hammond, CQ N. S. 9 (1959) 33-36.
\textsuperscript{75} Schol. Pindar Ol. 3. 68.
\textsuperscript{76} Schol. Pindar Ol. 2. 82d.
\textsuperscript{77} Diodoros 9 fr. 30.
\textsuperscript{78} Dunbabin, The Western Greeks 322.
Peisistratids were expelled from Athens by aristocrats.\(^80\) It appears, then, that the earliest tyrants were generally conservative in their rule and that they left the social fabric unchanged.\(^81\) Though they sometimes were popular they seem not to have been concerned with advancing the political consciousness of the lower classes.\(^82\) We should expect, in fact, what we have some evidence for, that their sympathies were with the members of their own class and that they used aristocratic methods in their rule.\(^83\)

The third point that I wish to emphasise is that the tyrants of the seventh century, where we know the circumstances regarding their rise to power, obtained their rule by means of legitimate magistracies. This is not to say that there was not a good deal of violence associated with factional strife in the aristocratic \textit{polis}. There is ample evidence in our sources to indicate that armed strife was characteristic of aristocratic politics. But the

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1304a 29-31. The Hipppobotai held power with few interruptions at Chalkis till their expulsion by the Athenians in 445 (Strabo 10. 1. 8, p. 447; Plutarch, \textit{Perikles} 23. 2).


82. See Aristotle, \textit{Ath. Pol.} 15. 5 and 16. 3.

evidence indicates that the early tyrants usually made a magistracy the legal basis of their power and that they were no mere upstarts who seized power simply by force. Kypselos, Orthagoras, and Panaitios used the polemarchy as a stepping-stone to power, though Kypselos seems to have become tyrant ultimately through another magistracy. 84 Aristotle says that Phalaris obtained the tyranny ἐκ τῶν τιμῶν. 85 According to Polyainos 86 he was elected τελευνης by the people of Akragas over construction of the temple of Zeus Polieus. In Miletos tyranny (perhaps that of Thrasyboulos) arose from the office of prytanis. 87 This seems also to have been the magistracy that was held by the Kypselids in Corinth. 88

This is very nearly what Aristotle tells us about the earliest tyrants. Aristotle must be used with caution, of course, for in describing the means by which tyrants arose he makes no distinction between the circumstances surrounding

84. Kypselos: Nikolaos of Damaskos, FGrH 2A 90 F 57.
Orthagoras: FGrH 2A 105 F 2 (P. Oxy. 11 no. 1365).
Panaitios: Polyainos 5. 47.
85. Pol. 1310b 28-29.
86. Polyainos 5. 1. 1.
88. Diogenes Laertios 1. 97.
the rise of the earliest tyrants (those of the seventh and sixth centuries) and the conditions that led to the rise of tyrants in the fourth century. In neglecting to make this distinction he projects back into the seventh century the fourth-century phenomenon of the demagogue, and he finds in the demagogue the means to tyranny: 

\[ \text{ε\'π\' δ\' τ\'ων \'αρχ\'α\'ων, \'\'ε\'τε γε\'νοιτο \'δ\' α\'υτ\'ός δη\'μαγωγ\'ας κα\'λι στρατη\'γ\'ας, ε\'λις τυραννίδα με\'τε\'βαλλο\'ν\' \'σχε\'δον γ\'α\'ρ ο\'ι πλε\'\'\'το\'τοι τ\'ων \'αρχ\'α\'ων τυ\'\'ραννων \'ε\'κ δη\'μαγωγ\'\'ας γε\'γυ\'νασιν.} \]

Aristotle's confusion is evident from the examples that he gives of tyrants who arose from the position of demagogue. He cites Theagenes, Peisistratos, and Dionysios, and elsewhere Panaitios, Kypselos, and (again) Peisistratos and Dionysios. But of these five only Dionysios, who was tyrant in the fourth century, owed his tyranny to being a demagogue and a general. The δη\'μαγωγ\'ας was the product of a developed democracy that did not exist till the fifth century. In calling the early

89. Pol. 1305a 7-10. Cf. 1310b 14-16: σχεδον γαρ οι πλε\'\'\'το\'τοι τ\'ων τυρα\'\'νων γε\'γυ\'νασιν \'ε\'κ δη\'μαγωγ\'\'ας ο\'ς ε\'πε\'\'\'\'εν, πι\'\'\'ε\'\'\'σ\'\'\'ε\'\'τε\'\'\'ες \'ε\'κ τ\'ων δια\'βα\'\'λλε\'\'\'\'ειν το\'\'υς γνω\'\'ρ\'\'ιμους.


92. Ure 30.
tyrants demagogues Aristotle is reading into the aristocratic milieu of the seventh century a democratic phenomenon of the fourth century. Moreover, as Ure demonstrated, Aristotle was greatly influenced in his views of tyranny by Dionysios of Syracuse, with whose career he was familiar. Dionysios began his career as a military δημαρχωβος. He is frequently referred to by Aristotle in the Politics, which contains eight references each to the tyrants of Athens and Corinth, and twenty references to the tyrants of Syracuse. Aristotle has allowed the careers of the tyrants of the fourth century, who arose by different means from those employed by tyrants in the seventh century, to influence his understanding of early tyranny.

If we bear in mind this caveat Aristotle's Politics provides a useful source of information about Greek tyranny. Apart from this distortion his account of the rise of the earliest tyrants and the means by which they attained power is consistent both with what we know of political conditions in the seventh century and with other information that we have regarding the early tyrants. Aristotle says that

93. Ibid. 27-32.
94. Ibid. 30.
95. See Endt, Wiener Studien 24 (1902) 1-69; Nordin, Klio 5
tyranny often arose from *stasis* that resulted from the excessive prominence of one or more persons. 96 Elsewhere he observes that factions arise in aristocracies owing to the fact that only a few have a share in the magistracies, 97 and that factions are brought about by powerful men who wish to

(1905) 394-398; Mosse, 'Aristote et la tyrannie,' in *REPAE*:
Studies presented to George Thomson 163-169; Hegyi, *Acta Antiqua* 13 (1965) 305. It might be argued that so basic a misunderstanding of tyranny by Aristotle would detract from the value of his information about tyrants. But de Ste. Croix's comment on Thucydides (*Historia* 3 [1954] 3) might also be applied to Aristotle: 'Thucydides was such a remarkably objective historian that he himself has provided sufficient material for his own refutation. The news columns in Thucydides, so to speak, contradict the editorial Thucydides, and the editor himself does not always speak with the same voice.'

96. δι’ ὑπεροχήν δὲ, ὅταν τις ἢ τῇ δυνάμει μελζων (ἡ εἰς ἡ πλεοὺς) ἤ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν δυναμὸν τοῦ πολιτείματος γίνεσθαι γὰρ εἴσθεν ἐκ τῶν τοιοτῶν μοναρχία ἡ δυναστεία
(*Pol.* 1302b 15-18).

97. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις γένονται αἱ στάσεις αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὀλιγούς τῶν τιμῶν μετέχειν (Pol. 1306b 22-23).
be even greater in order that they may become sole rulers. 98
In an important passage 99 Aristotle describes the means by
which tyrants came to power. The greatest number of tyrants,
he says, arose from being demagogues; but others before these
(and here it is certain that he refers to much earlier tyrants,
who rose to power in an aristocratic context) attained the
tyranny by holding offices. There were several ways in which
this happened: early tyrants arose from kings departing from
their ancestral powers; from men who were elected to high
magistracies (which in early times were of long tenure); and
from single officials who were elected to the highest
magistracies in oligarchic states. Aristotle makes it clear
that it was a combination of powerful office and long tenure
that resulted in tyranny. 100

98. ἐτι εἶν τις μέγας ἢ καὶ δυνάμενος ἢ μείζων εἶναι,

99. μοναρχῇ (Pol. 1307a 2-3).

100. ἡπίρρητος τοῖς τρόποις τούτοις τὸ καταργήσεσθαι

μετά, εἰ μόνον βουλήθητεν, διὰ τὸ δύναμιν προϋπάρχειν

toῖς μὲν βασιλείας ἀρχὰς τοῖς δὲ τὴν τῆς τιμῆς (Pol. 1310b

23-26). οὐ γὰρ ὅμοιος ῥήματον κακονυργῆσαι ἀλλὰν χρόνον

ἀρχοντας καὶ πολέμῳ, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὸτοῦ ἐν ταῖς ἀληγράφαις καὶ

δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυραννίδες (Pol. 1308a 18-22).
It should occasion no surprise that in aristocratic poleis magistracies should so often have been converted into tyrannies. It was customary in aristocracies to entrust a great deal of power to magistrates\(^{101}\) and to grant them long tenure of office.\(^{102}\) Unlike democratic states, aristocratic constitutions favoured the concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals, and sometimes in the hands of only one.\(^{103}\) We know of at least one oligarchic state that permitted, even encouraged, an individual to hold several offices at the same time.\(^{104}\) The combination of these two features—concentrated power and long tenure—in magistracies of aristocratic states offered a natural temptation to aspiring autocrats, and it is not surprising that Aristotle noted the prevalence of tyranny amongst those in power for a long time.\(^{105}\) Aristotle observed that in Athens the powerful


\(^{103}\) See Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1301b 25-26: ολιγαρχικὸν δὲ καὶ δ᾿ ἄρχων δ᾿ εἰς ἑν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ (Epidamnos).

\(^{104}\) Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1273b 8-9: φαύλον δ᾿ ἄν δεξιεῖν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλέον ἄρχας τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν· ὅπερ εὔδοκιμεῖ παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.

\(^{105}\) See n. 100 above.
nature of the office of archon encouraged stasis.  

The aristocratic constitution, then, lent itself to the growth of tyranny. This was in marked contrast to the democratic constitution, which made every attempt to discourage tyranny by restricting the powers of magistrates, by limiting their tenure in office, by employing the lot and frequent rotation to ensure fair and widespread distribution of magistracies, and by subjecting office-holders to examination and audit. Tyranny was by its very nature closer to oligarchy than to democracy, for it made use of a number of oligarchic devices. The oligarchic man in Theophrastos' Characters says of magistrates αὐτοκράτορας τούτους εἶναι, καὶ ἅλλοι προβάλλωνται δένα, λέγειν: ἑκανὸς εἰς ἑτεί, τούτον δὲ ὧτι δὲ ἄνδρα εἶναι.' καὶ τῶν Ὁμήρου ἑπόν τοῦτο ἐν μῦνον κατέχειν, ὡτὶ 'οὐκ ἄγαθὸν πολιομορφίαν, εἰς κοιρανὸς ἔστω' κτλ. According to the

109. Aristotle (Pol. 1301b 25-26) says that a single archon was an oligarchic feature of the constitution of Epidamnos (cf. Pol. 1287a 6-8).
110. Theophrastos, Characters 26. 2.
constitution drawn up for the provisional government in Athens by the extreme oligarchs in 411 the ten generals were ἀρχεῖν ... αὐτοκράτορας. Jacoby has made the interesting observation that favourable judgement of tyranny in the fifth century came from oligarchic circles, while amongst the demos tyranny was feared and hated. Aristotle recognised that certain forms of oligarchy had affinities with tyranny, for he says that δυναστεία, his fourth kind of oligarchy, is near to μοναρχία.

The thesis that tyranny in early Greece arose out of factional conflict finds confirmation in a number of poleis in which several unrelated tyrannies were interspersed with periods of aristocratic rule. A common view of tyranny holds that the rule of tyrants usually lasted for two or three generations, during which time it broke the monopoly of the aristocracy in politics. Representative of this view is Mary White:

Two or three generations were enough to ensure that there could be no return to the old regime. Then the individual champions could be dispensed with;

112. Atthis 375 n. 114.
113. Pol. 1293a 31; cf. Thucydides 3. 62. 3.
in most cases by the second generation their rule came to be regarded as repressive. The circumstances attending their overthrow differed in each city, but the basic reason was the same: they had outlived their necessity.  

This statement is questionable in several respects: tyrants in most cases were not champions of the demos; and they did not 'ensure that there could be no return to the old regime,' for in many instances of which we know the downfall of tyranny was followed by a restoration of the 'old regime,' though in some cities perhaps in modified form. Moreover, while some cities indeed experienced tyranny that lasted for two or three generations in a few cases where tyrants were able to pass on their power, in a greater number of poleis that we know of there was a succession of several apparently unrelated tyrants whose tyrannies were interspersed with periods of aristocratic rule.

Dunbabin has pointed out that in Akragas there were three separate tyrannies within a period of a hundred years and that in each case the tyranny was followed by an oligarchy.  

Dunbabin could find no contemporary parallels.

114. White, Phoenix 9 (1955) 18; cf. Aelian, VH 6. 13. For a similar view see Burn, The Lyric Age of Greece 158.

115. The Western Greeks 323.
for this alternation of tyranny and oligarchy, though in fact there are several. In Mytilene there were three apparently unrelated tyrants within a period of under half a century.\footnote{See pp. 124-125 below.}

We hear of several tyrants in Ephesos\footnote{See Bürrchner, \textit{RE} 5\textsuperscript{2} 2788-2789; and Ure 271-273.}: Pythagoras, who lived before the reign of Cyrus and overthrew the rule of the Basilidai\footnote{Baton of Sinope, \textit{FGrH} 3A 268 F 3.}; Melas, who married a daughter of Alyattes, and his son, Pindaros, who was deprived of his rule by Kroisos\footnote{Aelian, \textit{VH} 3. 26; Polyainos 6. 50.}; Pasikles, who was chosen \textit{aisymnetes}\footnote{On the office of \textit{aisymnetes} see pp. 143-144 below.} after the expulsion of Melas\footnote{Aelian, \textit{VH} 3. 26; Kallimachos F 102 Pfeiffer and \textit{Diegesis}; Ovid, \textit{Ibis} 623-624 (see Stroux, \textit{Philologus} 89 [1934] 310-313).}; Athenagoras and Komas, who were contemporaries of the poet Hipponax\footnote{Suda, \textit{s.v.} 'Iπνωναξ.} (\textit{floruit} 540-537\footnote{Pliny, \textit{NH} 36. 4. 11.}); Aristarchos, who about the time when Cyrus overthrew the Medes and established the Persian Empire\footnote{Suda, \textit{s.v.} 'Λρسطαρχος.} seems to have been elected
aisymnetes; and Melankomas, whom Herakleitos persuaded to give up his tyranny.

There was a succession of unrelated tyrants in Miletos. The earliest was Epimenes, who was appointed aisymnetes after the fall of the monarchy. After Epimenes we know of two Milesian tyrants other than Thrasyboulos, Thoas and Damasenor. They too had successors in the tyranny but these were overthrown and the city was rent by two factions, which Plutarch calls πλοιτίς and χειρομάχα. Elsewhere

125. Bürchner, Re 5 2789, followed by Ure 272. According to the Suda's account Aristarchos was summoned to Ephesos from Athens as monarchos by some of his relatives. He ruled for five years. His aisymneteia perhaps was the result of the victory of his kinsmen's clan in Ephesian politics.

126. Herakleitos 22. 3 Diels-Kranz.

127. Nikolaos of Damaskos, FGrH 2A 90 F 53.

128. Plutarch, Qu. Gr. 32 (Moralia 298 C).

129. The meaning of these terms is uncertain. They are often translated 'Capital' and 'Labour' (e.g., by Burn, The Lyric Age of Greece 214). The χειρομάχα ἐταύρεια seems to be identified with the Ἑργυτές mentioned by the Suda (s.v.), where the word is glossed as χειρώνακτες; and by Herakleides Pontikos (ap. Athenaios 12. 524a), who says that Ἑργυτές was
Plutarch mentions another tyrant of Miletos, Aristogenes, who is said to have been expelled by the Spartans. We hear of several possible tyrants in Aiolian Kyme. Diodoros mentions a tyrant by the name of Malakas. A reformer (aisymnetes?) by the name of Pheidon changed the constitution of Kyme by making a law that granted political rights to everyone who possessed a horse. A possible candidate for tyrant is Thrasymachos, who put down a democracy in Kyme. But he is not called a tyrant and it is not specified which Kyme he was the name given to the demos by the wealthy. The Gergithes were a native people of Asia Minor (see Strabo 13.1.19, p. 589; Herodotos 5. 122. 2 and 7. 43. 2), who appear to have formed the subject population of Miletos (How and Wells, A Commentary on Herodotos 2 147). Their presence apparently introduced a racial factor into Milesian politics, which may have been the underlying cause of the factional strife. See Ure 269-270.

129a. De Herodoti Malignitate 21 (Moralia 859 D).
130. Diodoros 7 fr. 10.
Herakleides (loc. cit.) mentions another reformer, Promethios, who introduced an oligarchy of a thousand men.
active in. There were several apparently unrelated tyrants in Samos: Phoibias held the office of 
aisymnetes at an unknown date; Demoteles was a holder of a \( \mu \nu \omicron \nu \alpha \rho \chi \xi \) at an unknown date; we hear of an early tyrant named Syloson; and, of course, there was Polykrates.

The succession of unrelated tyrants in Akragas, Mytilene, Ephesos, Miletos, Kyme, and Samos, with apparent intervals of oligarchic rule by the aristocracy, suggests a constant struggle of factions and ambitious personalities to gain power. Miletos, in which we know of more than four tyrants, provides what may well have been a typical example of factionalism in an aristocratic state that resulted in a number of tyrannies. Our sources tell us that Miletos suffered a good deal from factional strife in the seventh

134. Plutarch, Qu. Gr. 57 (Moralia 303 B-304 C). See n. 42 above.
135. Polyainos 6. 45.
136. Herodotos 3. 39. 1-2; 120. 3; Polyainos 1. 23. See White, JHS 74 (1954) 36-43; Homann-Wedeking, Arch. Eph. 92-93 (2) 1953-1954 (1958) 185-191; and Barron, CO N. S. 14 (1964) 210-229, for attempts to prove the existence of a long continuous tyranny on Samos.
and sixth centuries. Herodotos says that the city was troubled by two generations of civil war in the sixth century.  

137 We hear of a number of ἐπαφέλαι, and Herakleides Pontikos gives us a grisly picture of πολιτικαὶ κάθοραι in Miletos.  

139 The connexion between factionalism and tyranny in Miletos is suggested by Aristotle.  

140 Aristotle says that tyrants make war on τοὺς γνωρίμους and destroy and banish them because it is from this group that αἱ ἐπιβουλαὶ arise, since they themselves wish to rule. As an example he cites the advice of Thrasyboulos to Periandros to decapitate any stalk that stands out above the rest ὡς δὲν αὐτὶ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν ἀναρχῆν. It is clear

137. Herodotos 5. 28.  
138. See n. 129 above.  
140. Pol. 1311a 15-20.  
141. Pol. 1311a 20-22; cf. 1284a 26-33. In both instances in the Politics in which Aristotle relates the story he makes Periandros give the advice to Thrasyboulos. Aristotle takes the anecdote from Herodotos (5. 92 β-η) and his inversion of the account is probably due to a lapse of memory (Newmnn, The Politics of Aristotle 3 247).
from this anecdote that those whom Thrasyboulos had reason to fear were his political opponents, the leaders of rival factions, who could be expected to try to gain power for themselves. Because of the factional strife that aristocracies engendered (Aristotle notes that oligarchies were more prone to *stasis* than democracies\(^\text{142}\)), single tyrannies, it appears, were much more common than those that lasted for several generations. This is understandable in the context of continuous factional strife, for presumably it was difficult to pass on a tyranny to a chosen successor. Indeed, this was successfully done in only a few states (Corinth, Sikyon, and Athens), while in most cities tyrants were unable to maintain their power for more than a generation and sometimes not even for life because of the aristocratic factionalism that made their position tenuous.

Clear evidence for a connexion between strife amongst noble families and tyranny in aristocratic states comes from the island of Crete. Cretan cities still had aristocratic

\(^{142}\) *Pol.* 1302a 8-13. Cf. Thucydides 8. 89. 3, where he describes the means by which an oligarchy formed from a democracy is destroyed: *πάντες γὰρ αὐθημερὸν ἄξιοσον οὐχ ὡς ἵκοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἑκαστὸς εἶναι.*
governments in classical times. Crete, like Sparta, which was supposed to have derived its constitution from Crete, was of considerable interest to political analysts for its archaic way of life, and the government of its cities was described and analysed by Aristotle and Polybios.\textsuperscript{143} Cretan politics seem to have supported Aristotle's observation that oligarchies are more prone to \textit{stasis} than are democracies, for throughout much of its history the island was notorious for the prevalence of factionalism and violence in its politics. Polybios (who contrasts Crete unfavourably with Sparta) remarks on the Cretans' involvement \textit{ἐν πλείσταις ἰδιᾳ (καὶ)} κατὰ κοινὸν στάσει καὶ φόνοις καὶ πολέμοις ἐμφυλιοῖς.\textsuperscript{144} This judgement finds general support in our sources for Cretan politics.\textsuperscript{145}

In this connexion Aristotle, in his detailed description of government in the Cretan \textit{poleis}, gives a picture of a constitution that is at once aristocratic and characterised by excessive clan-strife\textsuperscript{146}: the \textit{kosmoi} are chosen not from

\textsuperscript{143} Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1271b 20 - 1272b 23 (on Aristotle's sources of Cretan history see Huxley, \textit{GRBS} 12 [1971] 515 n. 28); Polybios 6. 45. 1 - 47. 6.

\textsuperscript{144} Polybios 6. 46. 9.


\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Pol.} 1272a 33 - 1272b 13.
the whole people but only from certain clans, and they cannot be held accountable for their official actions; moreover, they exercise their office at their own discretion rather than according to written law. Aristotle does not think that the constitution is a sound one, but he observes that the Cretans employ a curious remedy against the defect that the kosmoi are wholly unrestricted while in office:

πολλάκις γὰρ ἐκβάλλουσιν συστάντες τινὲς τοὺς κόσμους ἵν τῶν συναρχῶν αὐτῶν ἵ τῶν ἱδιωτῶν. ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ τοῖς κόσμοις ἀπεσπεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν...·πάντων δὲ φαυλότατον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας, ἣν καθίστασι πολλάκις οἱ ἄν μὴ ὅλικας βούλωνται δοῦναι τῶν δυνατῶν...·εἰδόθαι δὲ διαλαμβάνοντες τὸν δῆμον καὶ τοὺς φίλους μοναρχίαν ποιεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

In the last sentence of this passage recent editors have followed Bernays' emendation of ἀναρχίαν for μοναρχίαν, which is the reading of the MSS. But this emendation is both unnecessary and wrong: it deprives the sentence of


148. Ross (OCT); Rackham (Loeb).
logic (men do not form political divisions to create anarchy but to help gain power for themselves); and it destroys the contrast that is intended with ἡ αὐτοῖς of the next sentence (ἡ αὐτοῖς τί διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ διὰ τινὸς χρόνου μηκέτι πέλλυ εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἀλλὰ λύσονται τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν;).

Ratio et res ipsa support the reading of the MSS. It is common practice, says Aristotle, to create tyranny by creating divisions amongst the people and one's friends and to produce stasis and armed fighting.

Aristotle presents here a dreary picture of aristocratic factionalism that would reduce any government to perpetual crisis. Politics are at the mercy of opposing clans that are willing to resort to any measure to secure power: waging war with one another; expelling political opponents from office; and suspending the office of kosmos altogether (perhaps when the magistracies were controlled by a clan's political opponents). The office of kosmos was a political prize that was eagerly and ruthlessly sought, and it was passed back and forth, sometimes regularly, sometimes irregularly, amongst the opposing factions that controlled the various

149. According to Aristotle (Pol. 1272a 7) there were ten kosmoi; this is, however, doubted by Willetts, Aristocratic Society in Ancient Crete 167.
cities of Crete. Out of this factional strife tyranny arose on occasion in the Cretan poleis. How tyranny could arise out of clan-strife in Crete is suggested by the interesting inscription from Dreros, which has been dated to the latter half of the seventh century.150 The inscription records a law (perhaps the earliest extant Greek law on stone) that prohibits anyone from holding the office of kosmos more than once in ten years. Several explanations have been offered for this prohibition, but the most convincing reason given (in the context of the passage from Aristotle cited above) is that the law was intended to prevent anyone from using repeated tenure of office as a stepping-stone to tyranny.151 A similar provision is found in the Law-Code of Gortyn, where

150. SGHI 2; Demargne and van Effenterre, BCH 61 (1937) 333-348.

151. Demargne and van Effenterre, op. cit. 343. Ehrenberg (CQ 37 [1943] 14-18 [=Polis und Imperium 98-104]) suggests that the law was 'a safeguard of the nobility against individuals backed by their family or genos. It implies a struggle within the ruling class...' (16). This is close to the view advocated in this chapter. For a different view see Willetts, Aristocratic Society in Ancient Crete 167-169.
the intention may be the same. If this explanation of the Drerian inscription is correct, it adds weight to the thesis that tyrants in many cases came to power by means of political office. Moreover, it suggests that the office of kosmos was often suspended or the holders of the magistracy expelled because many had succeeded in transforming the office into a tyranny.

Perhaps the best evidence that tyranny was the direct result of the aristocratic factionalism that characterised the polis in the seventh century comes from early Mytilene. It is correct to say, I think, that we have more contemporary evidence for the events leading up to tyranny in Mytilene, in the form of first-hand accounts of one of the chief participants, than we have for almost any other city in Greece. The fragments of Alkaios (and to a lesser extent of Sappho) reveal a political situation in which aristocratic feuding, struggles for power amongst strong personalities, political exile, and even pitched battles were the order of the day. There is not a hint in the fragments of Alkaios that politics ever descended below the level of aristocratic families.

Between the time of overthrow of the Penthilidai and the

establishment of a ten-year aisymmeteia by Pittakos—a period of perhaps half a century—strife amongst noble families seems to have been almost continuous. Coalitions were formed and dissolved readily. Expedience was the rule, the object power.

Strabo says that Mytilene was ruled by several tyrants because of factional strife. He refers to Pittakos as one of the tyrants, as well as to Myrsilos, Melanchros, and the Kleanaktidai και ἄλλοις τισίν. Political strife preceded the fall of the hereditary monarchy. According to Aristotle the Penthilidai used to go around striking people with clubs. Megakles and his friends did away with them and later Smerdis killed Penthilos after he had been beaten and dragged from his wife. The earliest tyrant of whom we know was Melanchros. He was overthrown by Pittakos and his friends, who included the brothers of Alkaios. At some later date Myrsilos, a Kleanaktid, formed a conspiracy and became tyrant. Alkaios

155. Diogenes Laertios 1, 74. See Page, Sappho and Alcaeus 151-152.
156. Herakleitos, Quaest. Hom. 5 on Alkaios Z 2 Lobel-Page; see Page, Sappho and Alcaeus 188.
and his friends formed a plot against him but it failed, and they fled to Pyrrha.\textsuperscript{157} There followed a battle with the bodyguard of Myrsilos\textsuperscript{158} and a second exile, this time abroad.\textsuperscript{159} Aklaios' brother as well as Sappho also seem to have been exiled at about the same time.\textsuperscript{160} Allegiances were of short duration in such feuds, and alliances shifted rapidly. Pittakos, who was at one time associated with Alkaios in the plot against Myrsilos, later seems to have deserted Alkaios and joined the tyrant.\textsuperscript{161} There is mention in a fragment of Alkaios of Myrsilos' death.\textsuperscript{162} The next time that we hear of Pittakos he is tyrant,\textsuperscript{163} having been chosen \textit{aisymnetes} for a ten-year term of office.\textsuperscript{164}

\textit{It is natural [writes Denys Page] to expect that}

\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{157} Schol. Alkaios B 3 Lobel-Page.
\item\textsuperscript{158} Schol. Alkaios D 2 (a) Lobel-Page.
\item\textsuperscript{159} Strabo 1. 2. 30, p. 37; see Page, \textit{Sappho and Alcaeus} 223-226.
\item\textsuperscript{160} Antimenidas: Alkaios Z 27 Lobel-Page. Sappho: \textit{Marmor Parium} (\textit{FGrH} 2B 239 A 36).
\item\textsuperscript{161} Alkaios G 1, D 12 Lobel-Page; see Page, \textit{Sappho and Alcaeus} 236-237.
\item\textsuperscript{162} Alkaios Z 8 Lobel-Page.
\item\textsuperscript{163} Alkaios Z 24 Lobel-Page.
\item\textsuperscript{164} Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1285a 25-37; Diogenes Laertios 1. 75.
\end{enumerate}
the poems of Alcaeus will illuminate, with a brighter and more penetrating light than is available elsewhere, the history of the rise of tyrants in the Greek world at this era. Here, in considerable volume, is the testimony of a witness to the whole course of the political revolution, from the fall of the royal house of Penthilus to the popular election of a dictator. That expectation is not yet fulfilled. In particular, there is no trace of evidence in Alcaeus or elsewhere that Pittacus was at any time the leader of a popular party, the champion of the oppressed, the spokesman of the spirit of democracy. All these honourable titles have been, and continue to be, conferred upon him; but they have no foundation in evidence. Our records of the revolutions at Mytilene have nothing whatever to say about the struggle of the poor against the rich, or of the commons against the nobility, or of the parvenu merchant-prince against decadent landowners. They tell the story of noble families fighting against each other for supreme power in the
State. It makes little difference to the constitution, and none to the welfare of the populace, whether the name of the victor be Penthilus or Melanchrus or Myrsilus or Alcaeus—or even Pittacus....  

The last city whose politics I wish to examine is Athens, where attempts to gain tyranny seem to have been closely tied to factional strife. The first attempt at tyranny in Athens of which we know was that of Kylon. Kylon was an Athenian noble who had gained fame by winning the foot-race at the Olympic Games. He had also won the hand of the daughter of the Megarian tyrant, Theagenes. Perhaps in 632168

166. Thucydides 1. 126. 5; Herodotos 5. 71. 2; Eusebios (Armenian version), where the date is given as Ol. 35 (640).
167. Thucydides 1. 126. 3; Pausanias 1. 28. 1.
168. Thucydides says that Kylon's coup took place in an Olympic year and since we know that Kylon was an Olympic victor in 640 this provides a terminus post quem. The Ath. Pol. (4. 1) seems to date the event before Drakon (Cadoux, JHS 68 [1948] 91; on the date of Drakon see Stroud, Drakon's Law on Homicide 66-70). Thus 636, 632, 628, and perhaps 624 are possible dates, though an earlier date is more likely.
Kylon and a band of his supporters, with the aid of Megarian troops supplied by Theagenes, seized the Akropolis 'with a view to tyranny,' according to Thucydides. They were besieged by the people, who supported the magistrates. Kylon and his brother escaped; their followers surrendered on the promise that their lives would be spared, but they were massacred on the order of the archon, Megakles, even after they had taken sanctuary at the altar of the Eumenides.

Plutarch says that the followers of Kylon who survived the massacre recovered their strength and were continually engaged in strife with the descendants of Megakles: 'At this particular time the quarrel was at its height and the people divided between two factions.'

than a later one so that Kylon could exploit his recent Olympic victory (Thucydides l. 126. 5). For the literature on the date of the Kylonian conspiracy see Stroud, op. cit. 66 n. 7.

169. κατέλαβε τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ὡς ἐπὶ τυραννίδι (Thucydides l. 126. 5); οὗτος ἐπὶ τυραννίδι ἐκβιβασε (Herodotos 5. 71).

170. The earliest accounts (those of Herodotos and Thucydides) do not mention Megakles but his connexion with the Kylonian coup is attested by Plutarch (Solon 12).

171. Solon 12. 2.
Presumably the strife had preceded Kylon's seizure of the Akropolis. The dispute was not between the commons and the nobles and there is no evidence that Kylon had any popular support; quite to the contrary, the people supported the magistrates against the usurper. Rather Kylon's seizure of the Akropolis and the massacre of his followers by Megakles seem to have been a particularly violent episode in the rivalry of Athenian clans. Megakles, who held the archonship, was subject to an attempt by members of a rival family to challenge the Alkmeonids' control of the magistracies. Megakles, in turn, was prepared to offer

172. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς Κυλωνείου πεπαυμένης ταραχῆς καὶ μεθεστώτων, ὡσπερ εἴρηται, τῶν ἐναγών, τὴν παλαιὰν αὐθείς στάσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς πολιτείας ἐστασίαζον (Plutarch, Solon 13. 1); see Hignett 87.

173. Thucydides 1. 126. 7-8.

174. See Ellis and Stanton, op. cit. (n. 37 above) 97.

175. Sealey, op. cit. (n. 37 above, first item) 168, thinks that all nine archons were Alkmeonidai or their partisans. This seems to be implied by Plutarch (ἐφημησε συλλαμβάνειν ὁ Μεγακλῆς καὶ οἱ συνάρχοντες...ἐκ τούτου δὲ κατέχετες ἐναγεῖς ἐμισσόμενο [Solon 12. 1-2]); and by Thucydides, who lays the blame for the massacre of Kylon's supporters on all the
violence for violence. Since his faction held the magistracies, he could call the attack an insurrection and thereby claim justification for the massacre of Kylon's supporters. But he was careless in killing those of Kylon's followers who had taken sanctuary, for in so doing he incurred the charge of pollution. This provided a political tool that was used against Megakles and his family by rival clans to force them into exile and a charge that was to prove useful to the enemies of the Alkmeonidai for two centuries afterward. This episode reveals, I think, how illusory it is to impute an independent political consciousness to the _demos_ in the seventh century. Thucydides' account indicates that the people were not particularly interested in the Kylonian coup: the Athenians came in from the fields and laid siege to the Akropolis, but they soon grew weary and left the siege to the _archons_ καὶ τὸ πάν αὐτοκράτορος διαθετείναι ἕν ἄριστα διαγιγνώσκων. The _demos_ in most circumstances will probably have supported the magistrates regardless of which family was in power.

The political situation at Athens in the first half of magistrates (126. 8-11), even though Megakles gave the order. 176. Thucydides 1. 126. 12; Plutarch, _Solon_ 12. 2-3. 177. Thucydides 1. 126. 8.
the sixth century was characterised by intense factional strife. It has been suggested\textsuperscript{178} that aristocratic factionalism was responsible for the appointment of Solon as archon and arbitrator.\textsuperscript{179} Factionalism continued after Solon. In 590/89\textsuperscript{180} *stasis* prevented the election of an archon and in 586/5 led to the suspension of the archonship.\textsuperscript{181} In 582/1 Damasias was chosen archon, but he remained in office for two years and two months before he was driven from office by force. Ten archons were then chosen διὰ τὸ στασιαζεῖν in a coalition of various groups in Attika.\textsuperscript{182}

We hear of three factions in Athens after Solon\textsuperscript{183}: the Paraloi, led by Megakles; the Pedieis, headed by Lykourgos; and the Hyperakrioi, led by Peisistratos.\textsuperscript{184}

\textsuperscript{178.} Ellis and Stanton, \textit{op. cit.} (n. 37 above) 95-110.
\textsuperscript{179.} Aristotle, \textit{Ath. Pol.} 5. 2.
\textsuperscript{180.} For the dates of ἀναρχία and of Damasias' archonship see Cadoux, \textit{op. cit.} (n. 168 above) 93-95.
\textsuperscript{182.} \textit{Ath. Pol.} 13. 2.
\textsuperscript{183.} Plutarch, however, attests their existence after Kylon's seizure of the Akropolis (Solon 13. 1).
\textsuperscript{184.} Aristotle, \textit{Ath. Pol.} 13. 4 (where the form is Paralioi and the faction of Lykourgos are called Pediakoi, that of
The nature of these factions has been much discussed. The names indicate a regional basis of the factions. But Aristotle attributes different political positions to the factions: the Paraloi aimed at τὴν μέσην πολιτείαν, the Pedieis sought oligarchy, and the Diakrioi drew their support from the popular element, the poor, and those of impure descent. Modern historians have suggested that the factions represented economic or occupational divisions within Attika. But our earliest source, Herodotos, does not indicate that the factions comprised economic classes or that they offered different political programmes to the Athenians. Herodotos describes aristocratic politics characterised by personal alliances and shifting coalitions.

Peisistratos the Diakrioi [cf. Pol. 1305a 24]); Herodotos 1. 59. 3 (where Lykourgos' faction are called οἱ ἐκ τοῦ κεδίου); Plutarch, Solon 13. 1, 29. 1 (where the faction of Peisistratos are called the Diakrioi), and Amatorius 18 (Moralia 763 D), where the faction of Peisistratos are called the Epakrioi.

not of classes, but of factional leaders. 188

Out of this stasis Peisistratos gained the tyranny of Athens by a clever stratagem that got him a bodyguard, granted by the ekklesia, with which he seized the Akropolis about 561/60. 189 Later Megakles and Lykourgos combined to drive the tyrant from office. But the two leaders fell out and Megakles, περιελαυνόμενος... τῇ στάσει, arranged an alliance with Peisistratos by giving him his daughter in marriage. He then helped to restore Peisistratos to the tyranny by means of another stratagem. But Peisistratos' desire not to have children by his new wife aroused the anger of Megakles, who reconciled himself to Lykourgos, and the two began to plot against the tyrant. Peisistratos withdrew, first to Bretria, then to Thrace, where during an exile of over ten years


189. For the most part I accept the chronology of Peisistratos' tyranny proposed by Sumner, CQ N. S. 11 (1961) 37-48, against Adcock, CQ 18 (1924) 174-181. But I believe that the Battle of Pallene took place in 547/6: see Eliot, op. cit. 283 n. 24; and Braden, Hesperia 32 (1963) 192 n. 24 for bibliography.
he collected money, engaged mercenaries, and cemented personal alliances with heads of other states, all in preparation for a return to Athens. Finally, Peisistratos returned to Attika, landed near Marathon, and won a victory at Pallene. He consolidated his rule over Attika and governed it till his death. 190

There can be no doubt of Peisistratos' popularity in Athens amongst all classes; he enjoyed widespread support in all parts of Attika. 191 But there is no suggestion in our sources that he gained control of Athens on the basis of popular support. Tyranny in Athens in the sixth century, as in Mytilene, was brought about not by popular support but by factional politics amongst the aristocrats and their supporters.

The evidence that we have, fragmentary as it is, points to the conclusion that the cause of tyranny in the seventh century (and in some instances in the sixth) is not to be found in class-struggles or in the rise of a middle class of hoplites but rather in the factional strife amongst noble families that characterised aristocratic politics generally and was a marked feature of the archaic polis. *Stasis*, always the bane

of Greek politics, was (as Aristotle observed\textsuperscript{192}) a greater problem in aristocracies, where divisions arose out of the existence of a number of families who were competing for power, than it was in democracies, where \textit{stasis} often arose between only two factions, the few and the many. It was aristocratic factionalism and not the struggle of the lower or middle classes for representation or a share of power (of which there is no evidence in the seventh century\textsuperscript{193}) that was the cause of the repeated political crises that occurred in the early \textit{polis}. This is not to deny the existence of discontented elements amongst the lower classes. Hesiod and Solon are witnesses to the fact that discontent was widespread amongst at least some members of the lower classes in archaic Greece. But their discontent centred on social and economic rather than on political issues.\textsuperscript{194} Moreover, the lower classes had not the power or the means by which to bring about revolution. If we look for discontented elements in the \textit{polis} who had the ability to bring about political change we are more likely to find them amongst members of the noble families who did not enjoy participation in government (for in aristocracies

\textsuperscript{192} See n. 142 above.

\textsuperscript{193} Forrest 113.

\textsuperscript{194} Finley, \textit{Early Greece} 103.
political privileges were very restricted even amongst those of noble birth). Aristotle cites a number of aristocracies in which political rights were extended after younger brothers or sons who did not possess political privileges formed factions and succeeded in widening the constitution. 195

Tyranny in the seventh century (and for the most part in the sixth century) grew out of a milieu that was firmly aristocratic. The earliest tyrants were aristocrats, who ordinarily sought power by means of regular magistracies in the polis. On occasion, either to gain extraordinary power for themselves or to deny it to others, some aristocrats resorted to tyranny. In the early poleis of which we are best informed, such as Mytilene and Athens, tyranny seems to have been caused by aristocratic stasis. When aristocrats gained the tyranny their rule was generally conservative. Tyrants continued to maintain close personal ties with other aristocrats. There is no evidence, on the other hand, that tyrants relied for support on the demos. Tyranny in early Greece was an aristocratic, not a popular, phenomenon.

195. Pol. 1305b 1-16.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE NATURE OF EARLY TYRANNY

Aristotle's statement that early Greek tyrants gained power by means of kingship or magistracies contradicts the accounts that portray the tyrants as having seized power by violent means such as capturing an akropolis. The violent seizure of power by tyrants is frequently pictured by an author like Polyainos. The theme is a stock one and the stories that depict tyrants having risen to power by such familiar stratagems are often quite similar. Freeman has observed that 'All these stories of the rise of tyrants are suspicious. There are so many of them; they all practise tricks, differing in detail, but essentially of the same kind ... nothing is easier than to put the name of one city and one tyrant for another.' In order to seize an akropolis an aspiring tyrant needed men under arms, and the grant of a bodyguard to a tyrant by an assembly is another leitmotiv in

1. Pol. 1310b 16-29; cf. 1305a 15-18.
2. See, e.g., Polyainos 1. 23 (Polykrates); 5. 1 (Phalaris); 5. 47 (Panaitios); 6. 45 (Syloson of Samos). On Polyainos' method of composition see Stadter, Plutarch's Historical Methods: An Analysis of the Mulierum Virtutes 13-29, especially 27-29.
3. The History of Sicily 2 82. Cf. 58, 68; and Dunbabin, The Western Greeks 66.
the accounts of the rise to power of tyrants. But, as Ure perceptively remarks, 'Armed forces are not to be had for the asking.' In what circumstances were armed guards granted to aspiring tyrants? First of all, they are likely to have been circumstances in which armed violence had occurred or was a very real possibility. Our evidence indicates that there was a good deal of violence associated with factional strife amongst aristocrats in the seventh century. To Charondas, for example, is attributed a law against carrying a weapon into the assembly. This may suggest that an actual clash of arms in the assembly between supporters of various factions sometimes occurred. Second, the circumstances in which an armed guard was granted to a citizen are likely to have been critical enough that one man could ask for (and receive) extraordinary power to deal with some immediate crisis. The grant of a bodyguard may well have followed the grant of extraordinary power to magistrates who required protection for their office and enforcement of their authority. Aristotle says that it was the custom to grant a bodyguard to one group of tyrants, the aisymnetai, who are defined as 'elective tyrants.'

4. See Aristotle, Rhet. 1357b.
5. Ure 265.
granting of a bodyguard may have been a necessity in view of the violence that characterised rivalry amongst aristocratic families in early Greece.

The case of Peisistratos may be instructive. Peisistratos drove his chariot drawn by mules into Athens, having wounded himself and his animals. He appeared before the assembly and related that his enemies had wounded him in an attempt on his life. Peisistratos persuaded the assembly to grant him a bodyguard. Shortly afterwards he seized the Akropolis with the aid of his bodyguard. Peisistratos' bodyguard was no 'private army,' nor was it a body of foreign mercenaries hired by a private citizen. Rather it was, according to Herodotos, a bodyguard of citizens voted to him by the people of Athens. In view of the connexion that is often made between the support of hoplites and the rise of tyrants it is worth noting that Peisistratos' bodyguard consisted not of hoplites but of club-bearers. There is no evidence to connect Peisistratos' seizure of the Akropolis with the support of Athenian hoplites. Moreover, this is not the only instance of the use of club-bearers as bodyguards. The Penthilidai of

10. So Burn, The Lyric Age of Greece 305.
Mytilene apparently employed club-bearers as bodyguards.\textsuperscript{11} Perhaps lightly-armed club-bearers were used as a domestic police-force in some cities in early Greece. When the assembly voted a bodyguard for Peisistratos it will surely have been granted for possible use and one wonders whether the seizure of the Akropolis can have come as a complete surprise to those who voted the bodyguard for Peisistratos. If Peisistratos was given a public bodyguard of fifty men he most likely will have been given some position by which he could exercise proper authority over his men. In a political situation marked by factional strife in which violence might be expected to occur Peisistratos may have been given a position accompanied by a bodyguard \textit{ne quid respublica detrimenti caperet}.\textsuperscript{12}

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\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{11} This seems to be the most sensible interpretation of Aristotle's \textit{Pol.} 1311b 26-28.
\textsuperscript{12} Mary White, \textit{Phoenix} 9 (1955) 9, suggests that Peisistratos may have held the office of polemarch when he captured Nisaia from Megara before his tyranny (Herodotos 1. 59. 4). Pleket, \textit{Talanta} 1 (1969) 29, believes that Aristotle preserves a confused recollection of Peisistratos' polemarchy in his statement that most tyrants began as demagogues and in early times \textit{strategoi} and demagogues were often the same (\textit{Pol.} 1305a)
\end{quote}
\end{flushright}
Theagenes of Megara was a seventh-century tyrant whose rise to power was attributed to the use of force. Aristotle says that Theagenes was a champion of the demos who gained power by slaughtering the flocks of the wealthy. Some steps evidently have been left out of Aristotle's brief account of Theagenes' rise to power. Theagenes seems to have been an aristocrat, for he married his daughter to a distinguished Athenian noble and Olympic victor, Kylon. As an aristocrat he was most likely among the wealthy Megarians. Moreover, as Hammond has observed, 'a wholesale destruction of stock would be absurd,' and he suggests that Theagenes slaughtered only the stock of his enemies. Theagenes' support of the demos against the wealthy members of his own class sounds like an anachronistic attempt to read the class-struggle back into the seventh century. Elsewhere Aristotle tells us that

7-11; cf. 1310b 14-16). Aristotle specifically names Kypselos (who was polemarch) and Peisistratos as tyrants who began as demagogues (Pol. 1310b 29-31). It is possible that Peisistratos already held an office when he received a bodyguard.

14. Thucydides 1. 126. 3; Pausanias 1. 28. 1.
15. See p. 85 n. 17 above.
16. Hammond 149.
Theagenes, seeking to make himself tyrant, asked for a bodyguard.\textsuperscript{17} A bodyguard is not given by the state to anyone who requests it and there must have been a pressing reason to give one to Theagenes. As a public rather than a private force it carried with it public responsibility. Like Peisistratos, who was a distinguished citizen and a public hero, Theagenes is likely to have been a respected citizen to whom the Megarians were willing to entrust a public bodyguard for a specific purpose. Theagenes' slaughter of flocks may have been a phase of factional strife that ended when Theagenes' supporters succeeded in gaining control of an assembly that gave an extraordinary position to Theagenes together with a bodyguard to accompany that position.\textsuperscript{18}

Thus while in late authors like Polyainos the stories of tyrants' seizing power by force are often similar enough to arouse suspicion about the credibility of the accounts we have more reliable evidence (such as Herodotos' account of Peisistratos) for at least some early tyrants having been granted bodyguards. But even in the case of Peisistratos it is difficult to believe, in spite of the silence of Herodotos,

\textsuperscript{17} Rhet. 1357b.

\textsuperscript{18} Cf. Pittakos, leader of a faction in Mytilene, who was elected \textit{aisymnetes} to resist his enemies (Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1285a 35-37).
that Peisistratos received the bodyguard merely as a private citizen. Rather it is likely that the grant of a bodyguard accompanied a magistracy or the assigning of special authority. The granting of a bodyguard will have been an emergency-step, taken rarely and in time of crisis; and it seems probable that it was accompanied by extraordinary power that eased the path to tyranny.

There were models in the archaic polis for the granting of special power to individuals. A prominent feature of early aristocratic states was the existence of extraordinary magistrates who were appointed to arbitrate in factional disputes or constitutional crises. The two extraordinary magistrates who appear most frequently in our sources for the archaic period are the aisymnetes and the nomothetes. Aristotle called the aisymneteia an elective tyranny (\(\alpha\iota\rho\iota\varepsilon\\tau\iota\nu\varphi\alpha\nu\nu\iota\zeta\)) and said that some aisymnetai held the office for life while others held it for certain fixed periods of time or until the completion of their tasks.\(^{19}\)

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was an arbitrator who was invested with extraordinary powers; the most famous was Pittakos of Mytilene. The *nomothetes* must be placed in the same category. The terms of his commission were apparently somewhat different from those of the *aisymnetes*: Aristotle says that some introduced laws, others whole constitutions. But the reason for their appointment seems to have been the same: to restore order to cities torn by factional strife. The number of *aisymnetai* and *nomothetai* whom we know of in early Greece is large enough to suggest that factional strife was very common in aristocratic cities. Among those who held the *aisymneteia* we know of Pasikles of Ephesos, Epimenes of Miletos, Pittakos of Mytilene,

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574-575; Gottlieb, Timuchen: *ein Beitrag zum griechischen Staatsrecht* 20-22; Pleket, *op. cit.* (n. 12 above) 39 n. 70. Inscriptions show that the *aisymnetes* was a regular magistrate in Teos (SGHI 30, line 4); Megara (*SIG*³ 642, lines 1-2); Naxos (*SIG*³ 955, lines 1-2); Miletos (*SIG*³ 57, line 1); Chalkedon (*GDI* 3053, lines 1-5; *CIG* 379, line 7); and Selinos (*GDI* 3045, lines 5 ff).


Phoibias of Samos, Chairemon of Apollonia. 24 The lawgivers of the seventh century, such as Drakon, 25 Zaleukos of Lokroi, Charondas of Katane (who legislated for his own city as well as for other Chalkidic colonies, especially Rhegion), Philolaos of Corinth (who legislated for Thebes), and Androdamas of Rheidon (who legislated for Thrakian Chalkidike), 26 were aristocrats 27 whose laws were intended to preserve the

27. Charondas is credited by Aristotle with aristocratic legislation (Pol. 1297a 21-24), though he is made a member of the middle class together with Solon (who in fact was an aristocrat) in Pol. 1296a 18-21. But perhaps this may be attributed to Aristotle's own belief that the best lawgivers came from the middle class. Charondas was probably aristocratic as was Philolaos, who was a Bakchiad (Pol. 1274a 32-33). Zaleukos was said to have been of humble origin, the story being that he was a shepherd (Aristotle ap. Schol. Pindar, Ol. 10. 17); but it has been suggested that this tale derives from his being called something like ποιμήν λαοῦ
aristocracies in the cities for which they legislated. But

(Oldfather, RE 13 1319). Diodoros calls him an "νηπ ουγυςις" (12. 20. 1). His legislation was aristocratic (see the following note) and it may safely be said that Zaleukos was also a noble. On Charondas and Zaleukos see Freeman, The History of Sicily 2 60-63, 451-457; Busolt-Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde 1 375-379; Adcock, Cambridge Historical Journal 2 (1927) 95-109; Mühl, Klio 22 (1929) 105-124, 432-463; Dunbabin, The Western Greeks 68-75; and Vallet, Rhégion et Zancle 313-320.

28. On the aristocratic constitutions of the cities for which Charondas and Zaleukos legislated see Vallet, Rhégion et Zancle 315-317. Aristotle records a law at Lokroi (presumably that of Zaleukos) that a man cannot sell his kleros unless he can prove that he has suffered a misfortune (Pol. 1266b 18-21). Philolaos enacted similar legislation to preserve the number of kleroi (Pol. 1274b 2-5). This device was undoubtedly meant to preserve the property-basis of the existing aristocracy. Aristotle (Pol. 1297a 14-35) records a number of measures that were intended to preserve oligarchies. They include among other things fines for the wealthy (but not for the poor) who do not participate in government. Most of these were probably derived by Aristotle from the legislation of the lawgivers. One measure is specifically assigned to Charondas:
because of the prestige and nearly unlimited power that their offices conferred they may well have furnished models to holders of regular magistracies who desired greater power than their offices could give. In some cases extraordinary magistracies themselves led to tyranny: Aristotle says that in Larisa and Abydos a mediating magistrate became the master of both factions.\(^29\)

There is evidence to suggest that a distinction was not always recognised between extraordinary constitutional offices and tyranny. This seems to have been true in the case of the aisymnetes.\(^30\) Although the aisymnetes was an 'elected tyrant,' and therefore held a constitutional magistracy, there is no doubt that he was regarded as a tyrannos at least by some in his own day. Pittakos, who was chosen aisymnetes in Mytilene,\(^31\) was called a tyrannos by his political rival, the imposition of a large fine on wealthy persons if they do not serve on the jury but of a small fine on others (Pol. 1297a 21-24).

Alkaios, and Strabo includes him amongst the tyrannoi of Mytilene. When Solon's friends urged him to make himself a tyrant, they pointed to the example of Pittakos whom the Mytileneans had chosen to be their tyrannos.

Theodoros Metochites names four men who held the office of aisymnetes: Pittakos of Mytilene, Phoibias of Samos, Chairemon of Apollonia, and Periandros of Corinth. The mention of Pittakos as aisymnetes supports Aristotle's statement that he held this office. Phoibias and Chairemon are otherwise unknown. It is surprising to find Periandros included amongst the aisymnetai in Theodoros' list, for Periandros succeeded his father in the tyranny, and thus established a dynasty. Moreover, Aristotle says that the aisymnetes is elected and rules over willing subjects. Yet Aristotle makes Periandros the originator of most of the repressive safeguards of tyrants: suppressing outstanding men, prohibiting gatherings, employing spies, fostering

34. Plutarch, Solon 14. 7.
distrust amongst citizens, keeping subjects poor and occupied. There is a discrepancy here and it is a discrepancy that is found in the sources that deal with Periandros, and, indeed, in the sources for the Kypselid tyranny generally. The later accounts of Periandros, like that of Aristotle, reflect the anti-tyrannical temper of later Greek thought and represent Periandros as cruel and ruthless, the very archetype of the Greek tyrant. But another tradition was more favourable to the tyrant. This is shown most clearly by the inclusion of Periandros in the list of the 'Seven Wise Men' of Greece. Enough survives in our sources to show that


39. He is not included in the earliest extant list of the Seven, which is found in Plato's Protagoras (343a). This list named Thales of Miletos, Pittakos of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, Kleoboulous of Lindos, Solon of Athens, Chilon of Sparta, and Myson, of Chen. But although Plato's list represents our earliest extant source for the Seven it reveals the anti-tyrannical feeling that caused Periandros' name to be dropped from the list: see Fornara, Historia 17 (1968) 420-422. Diogenes Laertios, who is our chief source for the Seven Wise Men, says that instead of Myson Periandros appeared in other
Periandros enjoyed something of a reputation as a lawgiver, apparently one of the functions of an aisymnetes. Periandros limited expenditure on funerals; he drowned all procuresses; he forbade citizens to acquire slaves and to live in idleness; and he did not allow anyone to live in the city without his permission. He had a reputation for practical wisdom, as the apophthegms attributed to him indicate: 'Never do anything for money'; 'Gain is ignoble'; 'Whatever agreement lists (Diogenes Laertios 1. 30 and 1. 99). Periandros appears also in the following lists: Plutarch, De E apud Delphos 3 (Moralia 385 E); Dio Chrysostomos 37. 456 M (103 R); Plato, Epistulae 2 (311a). On the 'Seven Wise Men' see Burn, The Lyric Age of Greece 207-209.

41. Herakleides Pontikos, FHG 2 213; Nikolaos of Damaskos, FGrH 2A 90 F 58; Diogenes Laertios 1. 98 (quoting Ephoros and Aristotle). Ure (192) thinks that the statement that Periandros did not allow everyone to live in the city may be taken to mean that he tried to control the supply of labour in the city or to prevent the rural population from leaving the land. A more likely reason, perhaps, is that he wished to avoid stasis in the city. Cf. Peisistratos' legislation (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 16. 3; Plutarch, Solon 31. 5) and see Aristotle, Pol. 1311a 12-15.
you make, stay with it. That his reputation as arbitrator extended beyond the borders of Corinth in his own day is shown by his invitation to settle the dispute between Athens and Mytilene over Sigeion.

Theodoros Metochites is not the only author to call Periandros an aisymnetes; his rule is called an aisymneteia by Diogenes Laertios. We are told that Periandros, before he became tyrannical, was popular (δημοτικής). Popularity would have been a requisite to the election of an aisymnetes. But we know that Periandros inherited the tyranny from his father, Kypselos, and passed it on to Psammetichos. To discover how the rule was passed on we must examine the basis of Kypselos' power.

The story of Kypselos' birth is related by Herodotos, the account of his rise to power by Nikolaos of Damaskos. Labda,

42. Diogenes Laertios 1. 97.
43. Herodotos 5. 95. 2; Strabo 13. 1. 38, p. 600; Diogenes Laertios 1. 74.
44. Diogenes Laertios 1. 100.
45. Gregory of Cyprus 3. 30 (von Leutsch and Schneidewin, Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum 2 89); cf. Schol. Plato, Hippias Major 304 B.
46. Herodotos 5. 92 ζ1; Nikolaos of Damaskos, FGrH 2A 90 F 58; Aristotle, Pol. 1315b 22-26.
the mother of Kypselos, belonged to the ruling Bakchiad aristocracy, but because of her lameness she was forced to marry outside the Bakchiads. Her husband was Aëtion, who traced his descent from the pre-Dorian Lapithai. When a son was born to the couple the Bakchiads sent agents to kill the child, for an oracle had prophesied that Aëtion's son would one day threaten them. But out of pity they did not kill the child, though they reported that they had done so. Kypselos was sent abroad by his parents, first to Olympia and later to Kleonai. Afterwards, encouraged by a Delphic oracle, Kypselos returned to Corinth, where he became very popular and was elected polemarch. He surpassed all those who had ever held the office. Though the magistracy was a regular one, Kypselos succeeded in gaining additional powers: he introduced a law that gave himself judicial powers. He increased his popularity by showing leniency to debtors. In so doing he gained for himself a reputation for justice and clemency in contrast to the reputation of the Bakchiads. He won the support of the people, organised a ἑταρυκόν, and killed Patrokleides, the reigning basileus, who was acting illegally and was an object of hatred (παράνομον ὄντα καὶ ἐπαχθη). The demos quickly made

47. Herodotos 5. 92 άλ-ζι; Nikolaos of Damaskos, FGrH 2A 90 F 57.
him basileus in Patrokleides' place. He recalled those who had been banished by the Bakchiads and restored to full rights those who had been deprived of their civic rights. He ruled mildly and did not maintain a bodyguard.

A significant aspect of Kypselos' rule is that he was elected to the positions he held. He held power constitutionally, first as polemarch, then as basileus. In both instances he held ordinary magistracies but with apparently extraordinary powers or tenure. We do not know precisely which powers were included in the polemarchy at Corinth, but Kypselos had judicial powers added to the office. The basileia that Kypselos held was the chief magistracy at Corinth and the Bakchiads had previously controlled it. Diodoros says that when the Bakchiads ruled Corinth they annually chose one man to be prytanis and he held the position of king. The form of government, he says, lasted for ninety years till it was destroyed by the tyranny of Kypselos. But the office of prytanis was not destroyed by Kypselos, for Periandros held it. In his epitaph, quoted by Diogenes

48. Diodoros 7. 9. Cf. Pausanias 2. 4. 4: καὶ Τελέστην μὲν κατὰ ἔχος Ἀριεὺς καὶ Περάντας κτείνουσι, βασιλεὺς δὲ οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἐγένετο, πρυτανεῖς δὲ ἐκ Βακχιδῶν ἐνιαυτὸν ἄρχοντες, ἐς ὁ Κυψέλος τυραννήσας Ὀ Πετέλωνος ἔξεβαλε τοὺς Βακχίδας.
Laertios, he is named prytanis.49

The fall of the Bakchiads and the rise to power of Kypselos may well have been due to factionalism that existed amongst rival aristocrats in Corinth. Nikolaos says that while the Bakchiads held a monopoly of the chief magistracy, they deprived many of civic rights and banished others. These will most likely have been rival aristocrats. The situation at Corinth seems to have been much like that of other poleis of early Greece, with factional disputes existing amongst a number of families that sought power.50 So long as the

49. πλοῦτον καὶ σοφίας πρύτανιν πατρὶς ἦδε Κόρινθος

κόλποις ἀγχαλος γῆ Περίανδρον ἔχει

(Diogenes Laertios 1. 97). Kypselos is called basileus by Nikolaos of Damaskos (FGrH 2A 90 F 57, 58) and in the Delphic oracle quoted by Herodotos (5. 92 ε2). But Pausanias and Diodoros say that the Bakchiads ruled by holding the prytaneia annually and Periandros held this office as well. Most likely the tyrants held the office of prytaneia, while basileus was their popular title; for a discussion see Will, Korintiaka 298-300. Freeman has observed that basileus seems to have been a popular title for Polykrates of Samos and Gelon (The History of Sicily 2 434); cf. Hegyi, Acta Antiqua 13 (1965) 306.
Bakchiads were in power they were able to keep a monopoly of the chief magistracy and even to secure the banishment of some of their political enemies; but they were not able to control political affairs entirely to the exclusion of other clans. Enough members of rival aristocratic families apparently had voting rights to elect Kypselos polemarch and to grant him extraordinary powers. Kypselos, a clan- or factional leader (of a ἕταιρικόν), later became involved in violence and killed the reigning basileus.51 We hear of no hoplite armies, no class-struggle, only of aristocratic stasis. Violence was not uncommon in aristocratic stasis; this is clearly evident in the accounts of Kylon and the Alkmeonidai in Athens,52

50. Evidence for the existence of factional strife in Corinth in the seventh century is provided by Nikolaos of Damaskos (FGrH 2A 90 F 35), who says that Pheidon of Argos helped some Corinthian friends who were engaged in civil war and was killed in an attack made by his supporters.

51. There is no evidence for (and much against) the view of Drews (Historia 21 [1972] 134) that Kypselos was not a Corinthian, but a mercenary captain of Corinthian troops hired by the Bakchiads who overthrew his employers.

52. Herodotos 5. 71; Thucydidès 1. 126; Plutarch, Solon 12. 1.
Theagenes in Megara, and the factionalism in Mytilene at the time of Alkaios. Pheidon's death in factional strife in Corinth a few years before Kypselos' rule indicates that violence was not unknown in Corinthian politics.

Kypselos based his tyranny not on a hoplite revolution but on his being chosen basileus. We are told that he held power without a bodyguard (οὔτε δορυφόρους ἔχων), which seems out of character with later views of tyranny. Those who believe that Kypselos came to power with the support of hoplites interpret the absence of a bodyguard to mean that 'he could rely on the army.' But his lack of a bodyguard surely reflects a wider popularity than simply with the soldiers; and it is quite natural that an elected magistrate who was considered to be a constitutional ruler would not need a bodyguard. Later tradition considered Kypselos a tyrannos. But was his

position in Corinth any different from that of the Bakchiads who had previously held the basileia? The Bakchiads used force and the reigning basileus whom Kypselos killed was acting illegally.\footnote{Nikolaos of Damaskos, \textit{FGrH} 2A 90 F 57.} The Bakchiads were called mounarchoi,\footnote{Herodotos 5. 92 B2.} a synonym for tyrannoi,\footnote{See Andrewes, \textit{The Greek Tyrants} 27.} and indeed they fit the description of a dynasteia, which Aristotle thought to be close to monarchia.\footnote{\textit{Pol.} 1293a 26-31.} It is questionable whether the substitution of the Kypselids for the Bakchiads in control of the chief magistracy will have been regarded by most Corinthians as any more than the replacement of one ruling clan by another.

Our sources indicate, then, that Kypselos based his rule not on a hoplite revolution (of which there is no evidence), nor on the possession of power seized illegally and maintained by force. Kypselos was elected to the highest magistracy and held it as the Bakchiads had previously. This may have involved alliances with leaders of rival anti-Bakchiad clans, who desired a share in the magistracies and who were willing to support Kypselos as Megakles supported his rival Peisistratos.\footnote{Herodotos 1. 60. 2-3.} Perhaps Kypselos' continued maintenance of
power necessitated manipulation of the constitutional procedures. Whether he held repeated annual tenure of the prytaneia or was elected to this magistracy for life is unknown. But the evidence indicates that the constitutional machinery was maintained in Corinth under the rule of the Kypselids as it was under the Pesistratids in Athens. Aristotle says that Peisistratos governed constitutionally rather than tyrannically (μελλόν πολιτικός ἦν τυραννικός). According to Herodotos he did not disturb the existing magistracies or change the laws but governed Athens on the basis of the established constitution. The Areiopagos

63. Pleket, op. cit. (n. 12 above) 25 n. 25a, thinks that with 'the memory of the annual change of the basileus under the detested Bakchiads still fresh in their minds, the people decided to nominate Cypselos for life.'

64. Ath. Pol. 16. 2. The Ath. Pol. says that Peisistratos disarmed the demos after Pallene (15. 3-4); but this is doubted by Day and Chambers, Aristotle's History of Athenian Democracy 20-21, Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates 80, and Pleket, op. cit. (n. 12 above) 26 n. 29. Thucydides says that it was Hippias who disarmed the citizens after the murder of Hipparchos (6. 58. 2).

65. Herodotos 1. 59. 6. Thucydides says (6. 54. 6) that the
continued to meet in Athens and Peisistratos was even summoned to stand trial on a charge of homicide. 66

How did Kypselos pass his rule on to Periandros? 'A second generation despot,' writes Forrest, 'has no right to his father's place. He must either abdicate, like Richard Cromwell, or resist with force, like Tiberius or Periander.' 67 Not always. In Athens Peisistratos was succeeded by his sons in an orderly manner in which Hippias replaced his father as head of the family. 68 How Hippias maintained his rule is clear from the fortunate discovery of a fragment of the Athenian archon-list, 69 which reveals that he maintained alliances with several leading families in Attika who supported the rule of the Peisistratids and in return held magistracies under them.

Peisistratids took care to see that some of themselves should always hold the archonship. This was a practice no less characteristic of aristocratic politics controlled by a single clan (e.g., the Bakchiads of Corinth) than of tyranny.

66. Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 16. 8; Plutarch, Solon 31. 3.
68. Loenen (Mnemosyne Series 4 1 [1948] 81-89) argues (against Thucydides) that the sons of Peisistratos ruled jointly after the death of their father and that Hippias enjoyed supremacy because he was the oldest.
69. SGHI 6, fr. c.
Apparently the rule of one clan could be maintained most successfully with the support of other clans. In Corinth, as in Athens, the tyranny was passed on to the head of the family in power, i.e., to Periandros, who succeeded his father as head of the Kypselids and heir to the family's political fortunes. Andrewes believes that 'this revolution was the first of many which put down aristocracies and replaced them for the time being by those dictatorships which the Greeks called tyrannies.' The governing class had been broken, and Cypselus' council and minor magistrates will have been

70. There is no reason to assume that the inclusion of other families in the archonship at the beginning of Hippias' tyranny in Athens was anything but a continuation of Peisistratos' policy of allying himself with friendly nobles. Peisistratos formed an early alliance with Megakles (Herodotos 1. 60. 2 - 1. 61. 1; Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 14. 4). Aristotle says that the majority of the nobles favoured Peisistratos during his tyranny (Ath. Pol. 16. 9). Though Herodotos denies it, it is possible that the Alkmeonidai remained in Athens during the rule of Peisistratos: see Bicknell, Historia 19 (1970) 129-131; contra, Herodotos 1. 64. 3 and 6. 123. 1.

drawn from a new class not previously concerned with govern-
ment. But Kypselos was an aristocrat and it is reasonable
to assume that he maintained good relations with other non-
Bakchiad Corinthian aristocrats. Phalios, an aristocrat, was
sent out under Kypselos as oikist of Epidamnos. There is,
pace Andrewes, no evidence that Kypselos brought the lower
classes into the government, and there is no reason why he
should have done so. Some nobles will, in Corinth as in
Athens, have preferred a share in government under a rival
family in return for their political support to no share at
all in return for open hostility. We have no reason to assume
that in Corinth or elsewhere most aristocrats suffered under
tyrannies. Tyranny was not hostile to aristocracy, only to
certain (rival) aristocrats. Even then, accommodation could
be, and often was, made.

73. Thucydides 1. 24. 2. Miltiades went to the Thrakian
Chersonese with a number of Athenians (as oikist of an apoikia?).
I doubt if this was without Peisistratos' blessing; though
Miltiades had become irked at Peisistratos' rule (Herodotos
6. 35. 3).
74. I do not agree with Pleket (op. cit. [n. 12 above] 50) that
the tyrants practised an anti-aristocratic or a 'levelling policy.'
Periandros, then, most likely succeeded his father by virtue of his being head of his family, and he continued to control politics in Corinth, drawing on the popularity of his father and relying for support, most probably, on other noble families. The constitutional machinery was maintained: as we have seen, Periandros held the office of prytanis. Yet he apparently also held the extraordinary office of aisymmetes. Why Periandros should have been chosen to this position in place of (or in addition to) the office of prytanis is not known and we can only speculate. It may be that factional strife broke out once more after the death of Kypselos and that Periandros sought additional authority to deal with the possibility of stasis amongst rival families. This is suggested by Aristotle's statement that among the safeguards of tyrants introduced by Periandros were the prohibition of syssitia and hetairia and paideia, perhaps an attempt to destroy the bonds of hetaireiai that created stasis. It seems paradoxical that the leader of a faction should be chosen as the 'mediator' between factions. Yet this was the position of Pittakos, who was chosen aisymmetes to oppose the exiles, who were his rivals, under Antimenides and Alkaios.

75. Pol. 1313a 41 - 1313b 1.
76. Aristotle, Pol. 1285a 35-37.
Doubtless Pittakos and Periandros were able to gain this office because of the support of their dependents and allied clans. We are told that Periandros had an armed bodyguard of 300 men.\footnote{Nikolaos of Damaskos, \textit{FGrH} 2A 90 F 58.} He may have obtained this bodyguard with his election as \textit{aisymnetes}, for Aristotle says that the \textit{aisymnetes} was granted a bodyguard with his appointment.\footnote{Pol. 1286b 37-39.} It was after he received the advice of Thrasyboulos of Miletos that he should strengthen his \textit{aisymneteia} by cutting off the tallest stalks that Periandros began to kill or banish the chief citizens,\footnote{Diogenes Laertios 1. 100. See p. 117 n. 141 above.} perhaps members of rival families. He is said to have changed his \textit{arche} into a tyranny,\footnote{Diogenes Laertios 1. 98; cf. Herakleides Pontikos, \textit{FHG} 2 213, fr. 5, and Nikolaos of Damaskos, \textit{FGrH} 2A 90 F 58.} and his rule became increasingly harsh. According to Aristotle, most of the ordinary safeguards of tyranny were said to have been instituted by Periandros.\footnote{Pol. 1313a 34-37.}

It is commonly believed that tyrants secured their power by revolution and maintained their illegal rule by force. Of the archaic tyrannies this is misleading and largely untrue. It is misleading because it ignores the fact that the use of
violence was not peculiar to tyrants or their supporters; rather it seems to have been characteristic of aristocratic politics owing to the \textit{stasis} that sometimes existed amongst noble families. \textit{Stasis} was often violent in classical \textit{poleis} because of the hostility between the few and the many; but aristocratic politics offered greater possibility of violence because of the number of families that might be involved in \textit{stasis}.\textsuperscript{82} In Athens in the seventh century and in Mytilene and Miletos in the sixth political rivalry was marked by violence.\textsuperscript{83} Nor was violence employed only by those families that did not share in the control of the magistracies. The Penthilidai of Mytilene, the Bakchiads of Corinth, and the Alkmeonidai of Athens resorted to the use of violence while in power.\textsuperscript{84} If those who did not share in the magistracies used violence they employed means that were practised by aristocratic factions in and out of power. Moreover, illegal

\textsuperscript{83}. Athens: see n. 52 above. Mytilene: see n. 54 above. Miletos: see pp. 116-117 above.
\textsuperscript{84}. Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1311b 26-30 (Penthilidai); Nikolaos of Damaskos, \textit{FGrH} 2A 90 F 57 (Bakchiads, who are described as \textit{ὑριστάς τε ὄντας καὶ βιαλουχίας}); Thucydides 1. 126. 11-12, Herodotos 5. 71, Plutarch, \textit{Solon} 12. 1 (Alkmeonidai).
conduct was not a monopoly of tyrants. The Bakchiads of Corinth were said to have acted illegally. In Athens Damasias illegally extended the duration of his archonship till he was expelled by force. By contrast, many of the early tyrants were exemplary in respect of constitutional forms. The long rule of the Orthagorids in Sikyon is attributed partly to their obedience to the laws; and Peisistratos governed according to the established constitution.

The evidence, moreover, seems to contradict the view that early tyrants usurped power and maintained it by force. Many accounts that tell of tyrants that seized power in a coup d'état are late, stereotyped, and suspect. Of hoplite revolutions we hear virtually nothing. We have several accounts of men who requested bodyguards and used them to seize power. These bodyguards, however, were not private armies but guards that had the official sanction of the polis. The bodyguards are likely to have been given along with the official authority to use them if the need arose. When they

85. Nikolaos of Damaskos, FGrH 2A 90 F 57.
87. Aristotle, Pol. 1315b 12-16.
88. See n. 64 and n. 65 above.
were used it can hardly have come as a complete surprise to the citizens who granted the bodyguard. It does not appear that many tyrants in archaic Greece maintained themselves in power through force. Kypselos enjoyed popularity in Corinth and did not require a bodyguard. 89 The Orthagorids treated their subjects moderately and looked after the interests of the people. 90 The Peisistratids were popular with both the people and the nobles. 91 Aristotle is demonstrably wrong when he says that kings rule over willing subjects and according to law while tyrants rule over unwilling subjects and that for this reason kings have bodyguards of citizens and tyrants of foreigners. 92 This reflects his view that tyranny represents the opposite of basileia, constitutional kingship. Many early tyrants ruled over willing subjects and some (like Peisistratos) had bodyguards of citizens. Some tyrants employed mercenaries; Peisistratos secured his rule in Athens after the Battle of Pallene by the use of mercenaries. 93 But the employment of mercenaries was not peculiar to tyrants: oligarchs also

89. See n. 45 and n. 47 above (second item).


92. Pol. 1285a 25-29; cf. 1311a 7-8.

93. Herodotos 1. 64. 1.
employed mercenaries because of their distrust of the people.\footnote{94} Mercenaries were a common feature of the Mediterranean world in archaic Greece and they seem to have been employed less to keep the tyrant in power than by those tyrants who, like Polykrates of Samos,\footnote{95} pursued a vigorous foreign policy and required additional troops for battle.

Thus while armed violence was sometimes a prelude to tyranny most early tyrants based their rule on holding constitutional magistracies. Pheidon was basileus in Argos.\footnote{96} In Miletos tyranny arose from the office of prytanis.\footnote{97} In Corinth, as we have seen, Kypselos was elected basileus (though the actual title of his office was probably prytanis) and Periandros was chosen both prytanis and aisymnetes.\footnote{98} Orthagoras was chosen polemarch in Sikyon\footnote{99} and Panaitios held the same position in Leontinoi.\footnote{100} The position of aisymnetes was held by many individuals in archaic poleis,\footnote{101} but the

\footnote{94. Aristotle, Pol. 1306a 19-22.}
\footnote{95. Herodotos 3. 54. 2.}
\footnote{96. Aristotle, Pol. 1310b 26-28.}
\footnote{97. Aristotle, Pol. 1305a 15-18.}
\footnote{98. See n. 47 (second item) and n. 49 above (Kypselos); and n. 49 and n. 35 above (Periandros).}
\footnote{99. P. Oxy. 11, No. 1365 (FGrH 2A 105 F 2).}
\footnote{100. Polyainos 4. 47.}
\footnote{101. See pp. 144-145 above.}
aisymneteia was in no sense a special type of tyranny in being 'elective.' Whatever other characteristics tyrants possessed they were not mere usurpers who ruled extra-constitutionally. In most cases they seem rather to have been careful to ensure a constitutional basis for their rule.

It is commonly held that Greek tyranny had its origins in Anatolia, particularly in Lydia. According to this view, tyranny represented a new kind of rule in the polis that was based on the usurpation of power and was patterned after oriental monarchy as it existed in the ancient Near East. This view is based primarily on two considerations: (1) the Greek tradition that Gyges was the first tyrannos; and (2) the belief that tyrannos is not a Greek word but a loan-word from Anatolia.


103. Nordin, op. cit. (n. 19 above) 404-408.

104. See most recently Hegyi, op. cit. (n. 49 above) 303-318; Labarbe, op. cit. (n. 102 above) 471-504; Drews, op. cit. (n. 51 above) 129-144.
In a well known fragment Archilochos\textsuperscript{105} writes:

\begin{verbatim}
οὐ μοι τὰ Ἰ βγεῖ τοῦ πολυχρόνου μέλει
οὐδ' εἰλέ πώ με ξῆλος οὐδ' ἀγάλομαι
θεῖν ἔργα, μεγάλης δ' οὐκ ἐρέω τυραννίδος'
αὐτοῦ ἑπέθηκεν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀφθαλμὼν ἐμῶν.
\end{verbatim}

Hippias says that the word \textit{tyrannos} was not used by the Greeks till the time of Archilochos.\textsuperscript{106} Euphorion calls Gyges the first tyrant.\textsuperscript{107} One ancient etymology traces the word \textit{tyrannos} to Tyrrhas, a Lydian city where Gyges was first tyrant.\textsuperscript{108} On the basis of the fragment of Archilochos and the ancient tradition that referred to Gyges as a tyrant it has been concluded that Gyges 'was called \textit{tyrannos} by his subjects and their Greek neighbours.'\textsuperscript{109} Yet Archilochos does not call Gyges \textit{tyrannos} in this fragment\textsuperscript{110}; he refers only to

\textsuperscript{105.} Fr. 22 Diehl.
\textsuperscript{106.} Hippias fr. 9 Diels-Kranz (\textit{ap. Arg. 2}, Sophokles' \textit{Oed. Rex}).
\textsuperscript{107.} \textit{FHG} 3 72, fr. 1.
\textsuperscript{108.} \textit{Et. Gud.} 537, lines 26-28 (cf. 538, lines 4-5 and Labarbe, \textit{op. cit.} \textsuperscript{[n. 102 above]} 476-477); \textit{Et. Mag.} 771, lines 55-56. The MSS read 'Lykian' but this is usually emended to read 'Lydian' (Labarbe, \textit{op. cit.} 475).
\textsuperscript{109.} Drews, \textit{op. cit.} \textsuperscript{(n. 51 above)} 143.
\textsuperscript{110.} Mazzarino, \textit{Fra oriente e occidente} 201; \textit{contra}, Dunbabin,
Gyges' wealth. The ancient etymologies that trace the word *tyrannos* are worth little.\(^{111}\) The only known aspect of Gyges' reign that might be held to support his identification as a *tyrannos* is the fact that he apparently usurped power.\(^{112}\) But, as we have seen, the usurpation of power was not characteristic of Greek tyrants. The evidence that Gyges was called tyrant by the Lydians or by contemporary Greeks is too slender to support a strong argument that Gyges was known as a tyrant.

It has been common to assume an Anatolian, and specifically a Lydian, origin of the word *tyrannos*.\(^{113}\) But Mazzarino has shown that there did not exist a similar word...

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\(^{111}\) For a discussion see Labarbe, *op. cit.* (n. 102 above) 492-493. If Herodotos 1. 12. 2 refers to this poem and is not an interpolation (see Labarbe, *op. cit.* 491 n. 86 for a defence of the passage) Archilochos may refer to Gyges as tyrant, but this is problematical.

\(^{112}\) Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* 22.

\(^{113}\) Busolt-Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde* 1 381; Wade-Gery, *CAH* 3 549; Whatmough, *The Foundations of Roman Italy* 231; Forrest 78; Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen* 1 3.
in Lydian: the Lydian word for king was \textit{palm\`a}$.^{114}$ In a thorough discussion of the etymology of the word \textit{tyrannos} Hegyi also finds a Lydian origin of the word doubtful.$^{115}$ Of the four Lydian words that denote a reign none can be related to \textit{tyrannos}. Hegyi suggests that the word may derive from the Lykian word \textit{tern} for 'army.' But he admits that problems exist in postulating this derivation and concludes that '...the exact meaning and etymology of the word \textit{tyrannos} is for the time being an open question.'$^{116}$ How problematical an Anatolian origin of the word is may be seen by the divergent suggestions that have been made regarding the derivation of the word.$^{117}$ Not only must the verdict in regard to an Anatolian borrowing

$^{114}$. \textit{Fra oriente e occidente} 201-203.

$^{115}$. Hegyi, \textit{op. cit.} (n. 49 above) 314-318.


$^{117}$. In spite of the common opinion that \textit{tyrannos} is not Indo-European Riemschneider derives it from \textit{tarawana\`x}, a Luwian word that denoted a Hittite arbiter (Hegyi, \textit{op. cit.} [n. 49 above] 318). On the other hand a semitic origin of the word has been found in the Hebrew \textit{seran}, used of Philistine rulers (Dunbabin, \textit{The Greeks and their Eastern Neighbours} 58, following Cuny). For a long list of other attempts to trace the etymology of the word \textit{tyrannos} see Labarbe, \textit{op. cit.} (n. 102 above) 478-479.
be 'not proven,' but there are several considerations that argue against tyranny having been taken over from the ancient Near East. If tyrannos was a loan-word we should expect to find it used first among the Greeks in Asia Minor. Yet the earliest use of the word that we know of comes from Archilochos and Semonides. The earliest use of the word tyrannos that we have from the Eastern Greeks is found in Alkaios long after the word had gained currency elsewhere in Greece. Moreover, tyranny does not seem to have been introduced into Ionia before it appeared on the mainland: the earliest tyrannies that we know of were those in the Isthmian states. The absence of tyranny in Ionia before it appeared in the area of the Isthmus argues against the view that tyranny began in Anatolia.

The belief that tyranny had its origins in Lydia has fostered the view that it represented an oriental conception of monarchy that was borrowed from the Near East. This view

118. Archilochos fr. 22 Diehl; Semonides 7 line 69 Diehl. Another early possible mention of tyranny occurs in a papyrus-fragment ascribed to Archilochos: Χέλυς ἀνάσσε καὶ [τυρανν]ὴν ὑπὲρ (P. Oxy. 22 No. 2310, fr. 1, col. 1, line 20).
120. White, op. cit. (n. 12 above) 4.
has recently been restated by Labarbe, who traces the origin of tyranny to Lydia and believes that tyranny represented the introduction into Greece of the idea of absolute monarchy from Lydia. This theory might be said to find support in the close relations that were maintained between several early tyrants and the rulers of Egypt and Lydia as well as in the vigorous foreign policies of some tyrants. Individual tyrants, such as Polykrates of Samos, may indeed have been influenced by ideas of oriental monarchy, but on the whole it is difficult to find a consistent influence of ideas of oriental kingship on tyranny in Greece. The care that early tyrants took to rule through established magistracies and to rule within the constitutional framework of the polis, as well as the failure of some early tyrants to maintain bodyguards, argues against the theory that early tyrants tried to impose an oriental conception of absolute monarchy in any form on the early polis.


122. Even if the word tyrannos should prove to be a loan-word from Anatolia it need not follow that tyranny represented a new concept imported into Greece from that area. Early tyrants seem to have been called basileus more commonly than tyrannos in the seventh and sixth centuries, indicating perhaps that to the demos they were more closely identified with traditional rulers of the polis.
It is doubtful, then, that tyranny in Greece was patterned after absolute monarchy as it existed in Lydia or anywhere else in Anatolia. It signified neither usurpation of legal authority nor rule secured or maintained by force. What did tyranny mean to the Greeks in the seventh and sixth centuries? Andrewes suggests that the original use of the word *tyrannos* was as 'a simple equivalent' for *basileus*; and that when Archilochos adopted the word he 'meant no distinction between *tyrannos* and *basileus*.' The word 'went downhill' in conversation and prose and had already become a derogatory term in the poetry of Solon and Theognis. It retained this dyslogistic sense in ordinary prose in the fifth century but kept its original meaning in, e.g., Attic drama, where it is synonymous with *basileus*. Forrest finds Andrewes unconvincing and believes rather that the word *tyrannos* described a new phenomenon, a ruler who had seized power by force. He points out that to Solon "tyranny" was already a bad thing,' while 'Archilochos uses the word in a context where he is almost certainly thinking of Gyges whose rule was founded on revolution; the word was at once applied to Greeks

123. The Greek Tyrants 22-23.
124. Forrest 82-84.
This is very questionable: we cannot be certain that Archilochos called Gyges a tyrant; nor are we sure that the word was immediately applied to Greek tyrants. Mary white has observed that it is not certain that seventh-century tyrants were called *tyrannoi* by their contemporaries. But the greatest objection to Forrest's view is that the seizure of power by revolution was not necessarily a mark of tyranny in the seventh century. Forrest is correct in finding Andrewes' discussion of the word *tyrannos* unconvincing, but his view that *tyrannos* was used to describe a man who, like Gyges, seized power violently is equally questionable.

Yet tyranny seems to have had a distinctive meaning in the seventh and sixth centuries. Far from being a neutral term, *tyrannos* was used as a term of reproach by Solon and Theognis. But a passage in Plutarch's life of Solon indicates that it was not always used dyslogistically:

125. Ibid. 82, 83.
126. Op. cit. (n. 12 above) 4. Miss White errs, however, in saying that there is no certainty that tyrants of the sixth century were called tyrants by their contemporaries. Pittakos is called *tyrannos* by Alkaios (Z 24 Lobel-Page).
127. Theognis 823, 1181, 1204; Solon 23 lines 6, 9, 19 Diehl.
This passage makes it clear that tyranny was a position to be desired, for Solon's friends (his hetaireia?) suggested that he make himself tyrant. We are also told that the leaders of both sides of the conflict in Athens urged Solon to establish a tyranny.  

The tyrant was open to reproach, but the tyrannies of Tynnondas and Pittakos had become basileiai. It was the name of tyranny that was to be feared. The office itself was not bad: καλὸν μὲν εἶναι τὴν τυραννίδα χωρίον κτλ.  

The office reflected the reputation of its holder, whose arete could give it a good name.

What did tyranny mean to Solon's friends? I believe

129. Ibid. 14. 4-5.

130. On this passage see den Boer, Mnemosyne Series 4 19 (1966) 46-47, who argues that the line is a fragment of one of Solon's poems.
that it denoted an extraordinary position marked by power entrusted to an individual for a long period of time. It referred neither to an oriental despotism nor to power that had been obtained by usurping legally-constituted authority. Rather it reflected the culmination of tendencies already present in the aristocratic polis. I have argued in Chapter Three that tyranny grew out of two features of the aristocratic constitution: the possession by magistrates of great and sometimes nearly unchecked power; and long tenure of office. Tyranny was not a foreign idea transplanted to Greece, but the assumption of great power by an individual with long tenure in the context of familiar magistracies in the polis. In short tyranny was a Greek, not an oriental, phenomenon. Nor was tyranny a unique form of one-man rule in the archaic polis. Archaic Greece produced a number of outstanding individuals who held extraordinary positions in the polis. The age of tyrants was also the age of the great nomothetai.

132. 'It is, of course, no accident that the political rise of the individual belonged chiefly to an age in which individuality found its decisive expression in lyric poetry' (Ehrenberg, The Greek State 45).
Drakon, Charondas, Zaleukos, and Solon. There was a tendency towards personal government in archaic Greece even within aristocratic constitutions. We have seen how tyranny could develop out of ordinary magistracies, making use of the power already present in these offices. It was not a difficult step to go beyond the existing magistracies to create extraordinary offices such as the *aisymneteia* by which long tenure could be granted, even for a lifetime. A dominant faction could make use of the existing constitutional machinery or supplement it to give its leaders extended tenure of office and longer control of the *polis*. It was the great and lasting power of a tyrant that made tyranny more than a *basileia* and at once an object of admiration and hatred. For although it was based on the grant of authority by the *polis* it was most often the result of the dominance of one family or a coalition of families over the *polis*, of a faction over the state.

Mary White has suggested that in many ways Augustus' Principate and Perikles' *strategia* offer analogies to the rule

133. Jacoby has observed that 'every ancient legislation of which we know is the work of an individual, not of a board or a commission; commissions are an invention of radical democracy' (*Atthis* 94).
of the early Greek tyrants. I believe that the nature of Augustus' rule was quite unlike that of the early Greek tyrants; but although there was a very great difference between the nature of the constitutions in which the early tyrants, like Peisistratos, and Perikles operated I think that Perikles' position in Athens offers a closer analogy. Perikles was re-elected strategos for the last fifteen years of his life; though he held no greater power than any of his colleagues his prestige and reputation were greater and resulted in unsurpassed authority in Athens. Thucydides says that although Athens was in name a democracy it was in reality government by one man. Thucydides surely refers here to his auctoritas rather than to his imperium. Perikles did not have despotic power; he was limited by his magistracy and tenure and in his policy by his ability to convince the ekklesia. He needed the support of his followers and of varying groups or factions in the assembly. To some extent this will have been true of the early tyrants. They were, I believe, in many cases leaders of aristocratic families who

135. Thucydides 2. 65. 9; see the whole of 2. 65 - 66.
136. Perikles and his friends were called the 'new Peisistratidai' (Plutarch, Perikles 16. 1).
gained power by winning control of important magistracies of the polis. This did not always occur without violent strife (a characteristic element of tyranny according to the later Greek view of tyrants); but it usually involved constitutional procedure. In some cases this control was gained by the support of other families. The early career of Peisistratos reveals, however, that such coalitions could be as readily dissolved as formed. Thus a tyrant's lasting power was based on his ability to control factionalism and to retain the allegiance of his supporters. As long as a tyrant was a man of ability who was widely admired and respected he might retain his position by repeated election to a magistracy, by election to office for life, or by ensuring that his supporters always held the magistracies (as did the Peisistratids). He might retain the support of allied families by helping them to secure magistracies and so share in power. But the dissolution of a coalition of aristocratic families might bring an end to tyranny as happened in the case of Peisistratos before he established his final tyranny.137 Sometimes after the death of a tyrant his successors had difficulty in maintaining the coalition that had supported him. This seems to have been true in Sikyon after the death of Orthagoras when Isodemos

137. Herodotos 1. 61. 2.
lost support to Kleisthenes.  

Tyranny, then, was not merely a synonym for basileia; nor did it refer to the rule of a man who had usurped power and who ruled by force. Rather it denoted the rule of an individual who held supreme power in a polis over a long period of time and so gained unsurpassed authority in the state. But no tyrant, as far as we know, ever held the formal title of tyrannos. Most early tyrants were likely known within their respective poleis by the names of the magistracies they held. When did a magistracy become a tyranny? To this question, I think, there is no simple answer. I suggest that the position of a tyrant may have been ambiguous in his own day. An important factor will have been the length of time a magistrate held his position. Repeated tenure of magistracies or election to an extraordinary position is the most probable way in which a man who perpetuated his control of the polis came to be recognised as a tyrant. To a tyrant's supporters tyranny

138. See Nikolaos of Damaskos, FGrH 2A 90 F 61, where there are indications of rivalry amongst the brothers Myron, Isodemos, and Kleisthenes. Isodemos slew Myron and ruled Sikyon jointly with Kleisthenes, but Charidemos, a friend of Isodemos, transferred his allegiance to Kleisthenes, who made himself sole tyrant.

meant the continued maintenance of power by one's own clan or faction and the tyrant will have been the factional leader who succeeded in keeping power. To those clans who were denied a share in the rule of the polis tyranny became a political catchword that was used as a term of reproach against a successful opponent. It is so used by Alkaios of his erstwhile friend Pittakos.\textsuperscript{140} To the demos tyranny represented the outcome of struggles for power amongst various factions of the aristocracy. It probably did not make a great deal of difference except to the dependents of those nobles involved who won the struggle. There were exceptions, of course: in Corinth the rule of the Bakchiads had become unpopular and the rule of Kypselos was welcomed. Where local issues were involved the rule of one clan might be favoured above another. It would be wrong to deny that the demos had any interest in politics; but there were more pressing matters and political decisions were left to those who had always made them. To the demos in the archaic polis each period of stasis and the faction that it brought to power will have been merely another episode in the continuing struggle of the aristoi for power, in which the demos will have been involved for the most part only as spectators.

\textsuperscript{140} See n. 126 above.
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