SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD:
INDICATORS OF INFLUENCE

by

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ABSTRACT

Discussion of the influence of the Soviet Union is often in vague terms. The term "Soviet influence" is usually used without concern for its clear definition.

This paper attempts to deal with the notion of Soviet influence as it relates to the Third World, and to analyse the extent of Soviet influence in Third World nations. In doing this, three main questions are asked:

What is influence? What evidence is there of Soviet influence? Can Soviet influence be measured?

First, the notion of influence is defined. Second, criteria -- the indicators of influence -- for identifying and measuring, relatively, Soviet influence in the Third World are outlined and evaluated. The indicators form a simple methodology for examining Soviet influence. Third, the indicators are applied to two case studies -- Somalia during the 1960s and 1970s, and Angola during the same time period.

The indicators are:

1/ Domestic Dissonance
2/ Soviet Acquisition of Military, Naval and Air Facilities
3/ Soviet Goals and Objectives
4/ Attitudes and Perceptions of B
5/ Quantitative Measures of Trade, Aid and Personnel
6/ The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation
7/ A Vanguard Party

Certain indicators are of less significance than is usually assumed: the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, the Vanguard
Party, Quantitative Measures of Trade and Aid, and Soviet Acquisition of Facilities. The most valuable indicators are Attitudes and Perceptions, Domestic Dissonance and possibly Personnel. The use of these indicators in conjunction with the analysis of a specific incident of attempted Soviet influence can determine the extent of Soviet influence.

Analysts tend to attribute significant influence to the Soviet Union. However, often what is assumed to be significant influence involves mutual benefits and/or a lack of commitment to the issue by the Third World nation. Two factors are very important for determining the extent of Soviet influence: (1) The importance of the issue to the Third World nation; (2) The degree of conflict between Soviet objectives and those of the Third World nation. In the Somalia and Angola case studies, the extent of Soviet influence became evident when the Third World nation's vital interests were at stake.

It is important not to overestimate Soviet influence, or to equate Soviet influence with Soviet control over a nation. The key to analysing inter-nation influence is realising that its extent can vary and it does have limitations.
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CHAPTER 1 -- INTRODUCTION

Often the role attributed to the Soviet Union in international affairs is based upon assumption rather than thorough research and analysis. Certainly, the U.S.S.R. is an important force in the international realm; from 1955 to 1990, its military might alone granted it the undeniable status of a superpower. But the discussion of the influence of the Soviet Union is often in vague terms.

As we will discuss in further detail, there is much evidence to show that a nation's power does not necessarily translate equivalently into influence. In many instances, a small and not very powerful nation -- as determined by any measurement, be it military, economic, political or whatever -- does not comply with the wishes of a stronger adversary or ally. Although the Soviet Union is a powerful nation and a significant player on the world stage, it, like other world powers, is often frustrated by the limits of its influence despite its extensive military, economic and political capabilities.

If the Soviets cannot translate their "power" into influence, then the concept of influence needs to be examined more closely. The term "Soviet influence" must also be defined.

The term "influence" tends to be utilized in such a broad sense with little concern for a clear definition that it
verges on being meaningless. For example, consider statements such as: The United States and the Soviet Union are battling for influence in the Middle East; the West must combat creeping Soviet influence in the Third World; the Soviet grand design involves expanding its influence throughout the globe. These statements seem to say something but lack specificity. The notion of influence is undefined and ominous; it seems to be a nebulous force that spreads insidiously. But what evidence is there of Soviet influence? How can it be identified? Can it be measured? All of these questions must be addressed.

This paper attempts to deal with the notion of Soviet influence as it relates to the Third World, and to analyze the extent of Soviet influence in Third World nations. This entails going beyond the vague notions and assumptions that characterize much of the past analysis of Soviet-Third World relations. The terms of reference of any analysis have to be clearly defined and understood before any further understanding can be accomplished. We must know what we mean by "influence" and, therefore, "Soviet influence" or everything that follows will magnify the initial failure to define our terms.

One reason for the lack of in-depth analysis of Soviet influence has been the secretive nature of the Soviet Union. In the past, the state has maintained firm control of information which has made analysis of Soviet foreign policy
very difficult. The closed society of the U.S.S.R. resulted in our lack of knowledge and understanding of that country. Despite the changes resulting from Gorbachev's glasnost, so very little is known about Soviet goals and the government's decision-making process that analysts tend to resort to assumption or extrapolation based upon minute pieces of evidence. Unfortunately, this lack of information means that analysts rely more heavily upon their preconceived notions than they might otherwise. An author may assume the Soviets are bent upon world domination or, on the contrary, will assume they are security-minded and have no desire for expansion. Whatever the assumption, it remains just that, an assumption. Every detail, every scrap of information regarding Soviet actions, is filtered through a particular mind-set.

Importantly, it is a rare occasion when assumptions are stated as such; more often they are presented as fact. However, an author's bias usually becomes evident to those who study Soviet foreign policy with any regularity, if not from a single article then from the consideration of a number of the analyst's written pieces.

An author's presentation of the "facts" is always affected by his or her bias. Analysts tend to be selective in their presentation of information in order to support their preconceived notions. Information and arguments contradicting these notions may be given little or no consideration in the
author's analysis. The author's belief as to what is correct will always influence his or her analysis. Therefore, true objectivity is non-existent. However, the bias of an author does not make the analysis useless. It is valuable to consider different viewpoints on an issue in order to gain a better understanding of the situation. Information and insight can be gained from analyses despite their inherent biases; an analyst must just be aware of the biases.

The actions of the Soviets must be examined despite the limitations of such an exercise while at the same time those limitations must be recognized and enunciated. If assumptions need to be made, then this should be stated at the outset.

The body of the thesis consists of three parts. First, the notion of influence is defined. The aim of this section is to limit and specify influence as a concept. In this theoretical examination of inter-nation influence the focus is upon the analyses of Kai Holsti, David Singer and Alvin Rubinstein.(1) Both Holsti and Rubinstein have produced writings which have been very useful in my attempt to clarify the concept of Soviet influence in international relations.

The second part of the body deals with the examination of what I call "indicators of influence." The aim of this section is to outline and evaluate criteria -- the indicators -- for identifying and measuring influence. The
indicators are specific criteria which will be the basis for determining the extent of Soviet influence upon a Third World nation. My intent is to critique the indicators in order to determine the usefulness of each for its application to other instances of Soviet and Third World nation interaction.

The third section of the body of the thesis consists of the application of the indicators of influence to two case studies -- Somalia during the 1960s and 1970s, and Angola during the same time period. Somalia and Angola were chosen for case studies because of the apparent influence that the Soviet Union had in these countries, and because a good deal of analysis has been done on the relationships of the Soviet Union with Somalia and Angola.

To try to deal with every Soviet interaction with a Third World nation is far beyond the scope of this paper. It has been necessary to limit the focus of this analysis to a manageable number of Soviet-Third World relationships.

Analysts of political science and international relations have often tried to make their respective disciplines more scientific, with little success. The goal of such attempts has been to limit the subjective element and maximize the objective and, thereby, make political science and international relations approach the stature of true sciences. This is not the aim of this thesis.

The purpose here is not to create a "scientific model" of inter-nation influence. Even if this were possible, which I
do not believe it to be, it is certainly beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the intention of this analysis is to clarify the idea of Soviet influence in the Third World. My aim is to create a simple methodology for identifying and measuring, relatively, Soviet influence. This analysis will be concerned with specific evidence of influence rather than vague references to, for example, the Soviet objective "to spread the political and economic influence of the Soviet Union in a manner consonant with its role as a world power."(2)

There is an important limitation to my attempt to "measure" influence. I will only be measuring influence in a very general sense. There will be no exact figures presented, no mathematical equation, no quantitative measure of any sort. At this point, it is not possible to quantify influence. It will be measured only as a matter of degree and through comparison. In other words, we will be able to say that it would seem to be that the U.S.S.R. is exerting very little, or conversely, significant influence over nation B; or that the Soviets have greater influence over nation B than nation C. We will not be able to say that this year the U.S.S.R. has X units of influence over nation B whereas last year it had Y units of influence.

If the Soviets fulfill 90 percent of the indicators of influence with respect to country B and only 50 percent of them for country C, we might conclude that the U.S.S.R. has
more influence in nation B. However, this raises the problem of weighing the importance of each indicator. Clearly, certain indicators are of more significance than others, even if an exact delineation of each indicator's significance is not possible. I will not create a numbering system for the indicators in order to give a more scientific appearance to this analysis; this research is far from meeting scientific standards and does not pretend to be otherwise. Instead, each indicator will be examined for its value in identifying Soviet influence.

To state the purpose of this paper in another way, the aim is to achieve a method for compiling and categorizing the evidence of Soviet influence in the Third World in a systematic manner. This is to be done through the indicators of influence. The evidence will be funnelled and filtered through the indicators. Also, each indicator will be critiqued for its value in determining Soviet influence. The questions, therefore, are: What are the indicators of influence? Is there some set of indicators which can be listed and then applied to various case studies, or must every investigation be completely singular with an individual set of indicators for each case? And how useful is each indicator?

It is my hypothesis that although there is, of course, individuality to each case study, a set of generally applicable influence indicators can be compiled. Despite the limitations of this exercise, it can serve as a valuable
improvement over the present situation in which analysis of Soviet influence relies upon assumption and suffers from a lack of clarity. The basic tenet of this analysis is the desire to attain a better understanding of Soviet influence in the Third World.
CHAPTER 2 -- THE NOTION OF INFLUENCE

The definition of terms is the important starting point for any analysis; it delineates the subject of analysis and lays bare the assumptions of the analyst. In order to examine Soviet influence in the Third World, the notion of influence itself must first be defined. In its "everyday" sense, influence can be defined as: to convince, to sway, to persuade. However, "influence" as it is used in the study of international relations must be defined. We need to move from generalities to specifics so as to lend some coherence and insight to discussions of Soviet influence in the underdeveloped world.

In studying inter-nation influence, a distinction must be made between power and influence. Kai Holsti defines power "as the general capacity of a state to control the behavior of others."(3) He delineates influence as an "aspect of power" which, rather than being an end in itself, is a tool for attaining or maintaining certain goals.(4)

Since Holsti considers influence to be an aspect of power, therefore, it cannot be equated with the power of a nation; it must always be just an element of the larger concept of power. If the two were equivalent, then surely the Soviet Union would have maximum influence over any Third World nation since it is clearly more powerful by any type of measurement. With its military, economic and political might,
the Soviet Union would be able to convince a poor, underdeveloped state to act as it wishes. Yet, despite the Soviet power, it cannot necessarily intimidate other international players into following its will: "effective influence cannot be deduced solely from the quantity and quality of physical capabilities."(5) Soviet power does not translate literally into influence. Exercising influence is "not at all a mere reflection of the differential in motivations and in the power base, defined in economic, military, or technological terms."(6)

Influence is a process involving subtleties that reach beyond the extent of a nation's physical capabilities. To equate a nation's influence with its power is to make a critical error. Examples of the failure of power to translate equivalently are numerous. A good example was the inability of the United States to achieve a victory in its battle against the militarily weaker North Vietnamese.

The crux of influence, as Holsti sees it, is that "A seeks to influence B because it has established certain objectives that cannot be achieved (it is perceived) unless B (and perhaps many other states as well) does X."(7) A nation has specific goals which it feels can only be fulfilled by influencing another nation.

Alvin Rubinstein defines influence as something "manifested when A affects through non-military means, directly or indirectly, the behavior of B so that it redounds
to the policy advantage of A."(8) Holsti differs from Rubinstein in his conception of influence since Holsti includes force as one of the possible tactics for wielding influence. Holsti's definition of influence includes a wider spectrum of influence tactics: (1) persuasion, (2) the offer of rewards, (3) the granting of rewards, (4) the threat of punishment, (5) the infliction of nonviolent punishment, and (6) force.(9)

Holsti states that the most common tactic for influencing a nation is simple persuasion -- "simply initiating or discussing a proposal with another and eliciting a favorable response without explicitly holding out the possibility of rewards or punishments."(10) Obviously, this involves only minimal influence by A. However, this paper is mainly concerned with the more significant acts of influence which involve threats, rewards and punishment.

Influence involves the interaction of two nations in which A attempts to get B to act as it desires in order to further A's policy objectives. This raises an interesting point. If a thorough analysis of inter-nation influence is to be accomplished, knowledge of A's policy objectives would seem to be of vast importance. With this knowledge we can determine whether A has fulfilled its objectives and, therefore, presumably, influenced B.

For significant influence to be exercised there must be conflict. In exercising influence, A attempts to have B act
in a manner which would be beneficial to the policy objectives of A. For A to truly influence B, the policy objectives of A and B should be divergent. In other words, the goals of the two nations are in conflict, but A succeeds in altering B's intended actions which thereby benefits A.

The conflict between the objectives of A and B is at the heart of the influence relationship. If the goals of A and B are not in conflict -- that is, the goals are in harmony -- then A cannot exercise significant influence over B. This situation requires only persuasion on the part of A.

Often what appears to be significant influence is actually a compatibility of interests. A appears to succeed in getting B to do X, yet B was already inclined to do X. In this case only minimal influence can be attributed to A. Furthermore, B may have little interest in the issue area and, therefore, little commitment to objectives relevant to the issue. If an issue is of minor importance to B, we cannot attribute more than minimal influence to A when it succeeds in reaching its objectives. Nation A has significant influence when it succeeds in influencing a nation which is strongly committed to an objective which is incompatible with the objective of A. The difficulty is knowing whether the objectives are in conflict and the degree of B's commitment. According to Rubinstein, "...there are in practice only a few issues of generally equal importance to A and to B on which B adjusts its preference to A's. In such a situation A
exercises significant influence; its influence is of lesser significance when B adapts to A's preferences on issues that are of low salience to B."(11) This is a very important distinction. Thus, the task is determining the salience of the issues to B.

The determination of a nation's foreign policy goals is always a contentious task. This is especially true for the U.S.S.R. When examining the Soviet Union, the unknown tends to overwhelm the known. Yet, without knowledge of policy objectives, it is difficult to know if A has achieved its goals and B has acted contrary to its own.

Based upon A's actions an analyst may make an accurate estimate of its objectives. For example, a successful move to acquire the use of B's port facilities is a concrete piece of evidence. Clearly, A's short term goal was the acquisition of the use of a port facility. However, as Robert Legvold asked, "How does the analyst decide what nation B has done or thought differently from what it would have done or thought but for something that nation A did or was?"(12)

Importantly, the exercising of influence goes beyond saying, "A acts upon B with outcome C." Influence is a much more complex and temporal process. It is a process over time entailing the interaction of two or more entities. Both nations have input into the outcome; B acts upon A and A acts upon B. Even though A may be by far the most powerful of the participants -- according to generally accepted standards --
the actions of B are not without relevance. A may have the apparently stronger hand, but B is never without some influence. Since A has an interest in the actions of B, B possesses some leverage in its dealings with A. Since A wants something from B, it is in a sense vulnerable to influence by B. Although A may not be as open to retribution as B is, it can still suffer by the failure to reach its objective. And the key to this objective is nation B. If B understands its relative position, then it may be able to successfully administer some influence of its own. If A depends upon a port facility within B, then B can use this dependence to its advantage. Unless one actor is completely overpowering, both participants will be active players in the game of international influence.

Influence is a relationship which fluctuates over time and from issue to issue. One example of the way in which influence between two nations can be more dependent upon the issue rather than upon the relative strengths of the participants can be found in the Nye and Keohane analysis of U.S.-Canada relations.\(^{(13)}\)

As a result of the difficulties of analysing influence relationships, arguments must be made circumstantially or by inference. Our lack of knowledge with respect to policy objectives and motives dictates that conclusions regarding influence be reached without a complete understanding of the situation. Assumptions must be made.
In most areas of political analysis conclusions are usually based upon limited knowledge -- we are by no means in the possession of an exact science -- so the situation for inter-nation influence analysis is not unique. The question is then whether, and by what means, valid conclusions can be reached.
CHAPTER 3 -- INDICATORS OF INFLUENCE

From my study and analysis of writings related to Soviet influence in the Third World, I have constructed a set of seven indicators of influence. These indicators have been utilized implicitly or explicitly by various authors as their own gauges of Soviet influence. Each indicator is evaluated as a source of evidence of Soviet influence upon a Third World nation. The aim of this critique is to reveal the usefulness of each indicator.

Rather than basing a conclusion regarding Soviet influence upon one or two indicators, as analysts usually do, this seven indicator system can give a more complete analysis of the extent of Soviet influence.

None of the indicators has been used by every analyst studied; and no author employed every single one of the indicators in the examination of Soviet-Third World relations. Some authors may have made use of only a single indicator. Only one analyst, Rubinstein, referred to any of these "indicators" as such. The term "indicators of influence" is used by me as the heading for this collection of influence criteria.

Since this study is based upon secondary sources, it does not pretend to make a definitive statement on Soviet influence in the Third World. This is part of an ongoing search for knowledge. Therefore, other indicators may be found through
further analysis of Soviet relations with Third World nations. It is important to remember that no value has been assigned to any indicator beyond its general value as an indicator of possible influence. To arrive at a quantitative value for the indicators is beyond the scope of this essay. The hope is that the categorization, critique and use of the indicators will help to classify the term influence and aid in its use with respect to the actions of the Soviet Union. The goal is to give a more concrete meaning to the notion of A influencing B. Therefore, we will have a better understanding of the term "Soviet influence." Further, the plan is to create a general outline for examining this influence which can be applied in a systematic manner to specific cases involving the Soviet Union and Third World nations.

What follows is an outline and evaluation of the indicators of influence utilized in this analysis. For each indicator, one question should be kept in mind: Is influence revealed by this indicator?

The indicators are:
1/ Domestic Dissonance
2/ Soviet Acquisition of Military, Naval and Air Facilities
3/ Soviet Goals and Objectives
4/ Attitudes and Perceptions of B
5/ Trade, Aid and Personnel
6/ The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation

7/ A Vanguard Party

1/ Domestic Dissonance

The first indicator of influence involves disruptions within the domestic political system of nation B which are related to nation A. This entails the examination of the attitudes, institutions and domestic politics of B for evidence of the influence of A. Basically, we are looking for disruptive activity within the domestic political sphere that can be linked to dealings with the Soviet Union. The term used by Rubinstein to describe this kind of activity is "domestic dissonance."(14)

The examination of the dissonance can, according to Rubinstein, help determine the importance of issues to B since debate and conflict will only arise over issues of importance. If the issue were unimportant, no one would be concerned. The importance of the issues to B is significant for determining whether A has influence within B. If B is not committed to the issue, then little influence is required for A to convince B to act as it wishes. A does not possess significant influence over B even if it succeeds in getting B to act as it desires, if the issue is of little importance to B. Thus, domestic dissonance indicates B's commitment, which in turn
indicates a situation for possible influence by nation A.

An example of domestic dissonance is a heated debate regarding Soviet-nation B relations within the government of B. An extreme instance would be when debate leads to bloodshed or even a coup. The idea is that the Soviet Union is affecting the domestic activity of B. The Soviet Union is indirectly the cause of a domestic disturbance. The initial manifestation of this disturbance is visible within the domestic political sphere although it may have further repercussions.

Of great importance for this indicator is the political power of B's ruling elite. The elite will utilize all its capabilities in order to fend off any threats, real or perceived, to its position. Domestic dissonance often manifests itself in the form of a power struggle between different factions within the government where one or more factions support a more "pro-Soviet" policy line. The more pro-Soviet faction may press for government actions favourable to the U.S.S.R. which other members of the ruling elite fear will compromise their power position.

This indicator has a number of weaknesses. First, the absence of domestic conflict could indicate either no Soviet influence or strong Soviet influence. An absence of domestic dissonance can be indicative of a lack of Soviet influence within nation B. However, an absence of conflict can occur in a situation when the Soviet Union does have extensive
influence, for example, East European countries in the 1960s. The greater the Soviets' influence, the less likely it is there will be dissonance because Soviet control is stronger. Dissonance indicates freedom of expression and action within B as well as B's commitment to the issue. Therefore, a lack of dissonance can indicate a lack of freedom of expression within B rather than an absence of Soviet influence. At some point Soviet influence becomes so strong that dissonance is eliminated. We would expect there to be little dissonance within a true Soviet satellite.

Second, there is difficulty in determining the Soviet connection to the domestic conflict. The Soviets could be orchestrating the conflict or merely taking advantage of the situation. Furthermore, focusing upon the conflict itself does not consider the motives of the Soviet Union. According to Rubinstein, "The issues salient to A will be even more difficult to pinpoint, but from the domestic debate in B on relations with A, B's interaction with A, a knowledge of A's broader objectives in the region, and commentaries in A, we may glean something of A's preferences. But there is no gainsaying the paucity of authoritative data on this facet of the problem."(15)

Vanneman and James state that, "Moscow believes that instability benefits it."(16) If we accept that the Soviet Union thrives on chaos, then its objective in encouraging domestic dissonance is clear. Yet, instability is not
necessarily to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Domestic conflict has resulted in losses and reversals for the Soviet influence position; for example, Nasser's crackdowns on local Communists in the supposed Soviet ally country of Egypt and the overthrow of Soviet supported leaders such as Algeria's Ahmed Ben Bella and Ghana's Nkrumah.

Third, the existence of domestic conflict within B over the Soviet Union does not tell us what the Soviet Union has accomplished through its supposed influence. The outcome of the conflict over the Soviet role in nation B is a better indicator of Soviet influence than simply the existence of domestic dissonance. The outcome involves B's response to the Soviet act of influence. Although his focus is upon the dissonance itself, Rubinstein does emphasise the examination of examples of domestic dissonance which "arise from responses that are made to A's presumed preferences or from concessions that are widely regarded as favoring A."(17) Concessions favouring A are what need to exist in order for significant influence to be present.

A good example of the value of using the outcome of domestic conflict as the indicator of Soviet influence is South Yemen in 1978. According to Francis Fukuyama, "East German and Cuban intelligence operatives and combat troops participated in the removal of President Selim Rubai Ali in June 1978 when he appeared too zealous in his quest for detente with the conservative Arab Gulf states."(18)
President Ali and the Soviet Union had severely different objectives which led to the Soviet use of force through its East German and Cuban proxies. Clearly, this successful use of force indicated that the Soviet Union had extensive influence in South Yemen.

Prior to 1977, Ethiopia had close relations with the United States and little contact with the Soviet Union. In 1977, Colonel Mengistu was offered military aid from the Soviets on the condition that Ethiopia sever its military ties with the Americans. This proposal caused dissonance within the Dergue, resulting in bloodshed in February of that year. Tefeii Banti, an opponent to the Soviet military aid plan, was killed and Mengistu assumed the position of Head of State. Mengistu promptly ended the American military aid program and ousted the U.S. military personnel from Ethiopia.(19)

The Ethiopian example has all of the characteristics for the application of the domestic dissonance indicator of influence. There was significant domestic conflict related to the military aid offer from the Soviet Union. And the outcome of the conflict favoured the Soviet Union since it replaced the United States as Ethiopia's superpower ally and arms supplier. The Soviet Union offered, and Ethiopia accepted, the reward of military aid in exchange for the severing of Ethiopia's military ties to the United States. The conclusion could be that the dissonance and favourable outcome indicate that the Soviet Union had influence in Ethiopia in 1977.
The dissonance does indicate the importance within Ethiopia of the Soviet military aid issue. Yet, it seems that Mengistu acted as he did in order to secure his power position and obtain the military aid that he wanted. He fought off the challenge from those who were against him and his objectives. Mengistu did not act contrary to his own objectives. The Soviets did not get him to do anything he was against. He responded to the Soviet offer as the Soviets wished but retained his independence of action. The situation was mutually beneficial for Mengistu and the Soviets.

As Holsti states, "We cannot assume that the exercise of influence is always against the wishes of others and that there are only two possible outcomes of the act, one favouring A, the other favouring B."(20) Even though the arrangement was mutually beneficial and Mengistu was probably predisposed to the arrangement, the Soviet Union did exercise some influence through its offer of the reward of military aid. Yet, because the Soviets did not influence Mengistu to act contrary to his own wishes, Soviet influence would seem to have been quite limited in this case.

The Soviet connection to the dissonance is still problematic when utilising the outcome. It may not be known whether, for example, a pro-Soviet force attempted a coup with Soviet aid or blessing. The case study of Angola provides an example of such a situation. If a pro-Soviet force acted independently, its failure does not reflect adversely upon the
influence capability of the Soviet Union. Limitations on available information may prevent us from determining the extent of Soviet involvement in a domestic conflict within B.

Also, using the outcome of the dissonance as the indicator does not deal with situations where an absence of conflict indicates strong influence. Since there is no dissonance, there is also no outcome to examine. However, there still is Soviet influence.

Evaluation -- Fair to Good

The existence of domestic dissonance indicates the importance of the issue to B, and, therefore, a situation for possible Soviet influence. Yet, the outcome of any Soviet-related domestic dissonance is important for determining the existence of Soviet influence in B with respect to the given issue. The outcome is a more valuable indicator than the dissonance itself. By focusing upon the outcome, such as in the South Yemen example, an analyst can see what the Soviet Union does or does not accomplish through its attempted influence.

The compatibility of interests, and, therefore, of Soviet and nation B objectives, needs to be known in order to determine the extent of Soviet influence. The outcome itself does not reveal the complete picture. It is the conflict between the objectives of the Soviet Union and nation B which determines the extent of Soviet influence. This conflict
tells us to what degree nation B acted contrary to its own objectives. However, the limited information regarding Soviet and nation B objectives hinders the effectiveness of this indicator. Since the Soviets intended to aid the overthrow of President Selim Rubai Ali, and Ali, presumably, did not want to be overthrown, the interests of the Soviet Union and Ali were incompatible. Therefore, the success of this operation indicates significant Soviet influence in South Yemen in 1978. However, in other less clear cut cases assumptions may have to be made regarding nation B and Soviet objectives. If an accurate estimation of the Soviet and nation B interests can be made, a strong conclusion regarding Soviet influence in B can be reached using the outcome of the domestic dissonance indicator of influence.

2/ Soviet Acquisition of Military, Naval and Air Facilities

A commonly used indicator of Soviet influence is the establishment of some type of military, naval or air facility in a Third World nation by the U.S.S.R. This includes the use of ports for military ships, the construction and use of landing strips, overflight rights and other variations on this type of facility. The logic of this indicator is that the Soviet establishment of rights to these facilities indicates influence over nation B. The outcome of this influence is a
closer connection of nation B with the Soviet Union, physically and politically, which, presumably, creates the potential for further Soviet influence.

The acquisition of a facility by the Soviets is seen to be a sign of influence both within nation B and in a larger strategic context. The facility enables the Soviets to maintain a local presence which, presumably, gives them the capacity to influence not just nation B, but other nations in the region. With the facility as a base for its operations, the Soviets can more easily participate in the internal workings of nation B, and through military aid and training, attempt to influence the political situations in other nations in which they do not have a direct presence. For example, Cuba and Nicaragua have both been viewed by American political figures and analysts as bases for the expansion of Soviet influence.

Access to facilities greatly improved the Soviet Union's ability to become involved in the affairs of Third World countries. Soviet acquisition of bases "permitted more active intervention than in the past. At the time of the Suez crisis in 1956, for example, Soviet defense minister Zhukov is said to have responded to a demand for intervention by President Quwatli of Syria by asking 'How can we go to the aid of Egypt? Tell me! Are we supposed to send our armies through Turkey, Iran, and then into Syria and Iraq and on into Israel and so eventually attack the British and French forces?'"(21)
Soviet power projection capability developed greatly in the 1970s through access to facilities in the Marxist-Leninist regimes of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Angola and temporarily, Somalia. This increased capability can be seen by contrasting the Soviets' ability to send large Cuban forces to both Angola and Ethiopia in the 1970s whereas they failed in their 1960 attempt to aid Lumumba in the Congo. (22) Presumably, this more active participation grants the Soviet Union increased influence in the Third World. Certainly, the increased power projection capability potentially gives the Soviet Union more influence. Without the ability to participate in the competition for influence, the Soviet Union cannot gain influence. The question is does the increased capability give the Soviets more influence, and if so, how much.

Along with the tangible increase in Soviet power projection capability, facility acquisition creates the perception of the Soviet Union being an important player in the international strategic game of influence. The perception seems to be that the acquisition of a facility is a significant infiltration by the Soviets which causes a shift in the balance of international influence. Facilities are viewed as important points of control whose acquisition are influence victories for the Soviet Union. And in keeping with zero-sum balance of power thinking, a victory for the Soviet Union is a loss for the United States or China. Thus, the
Soviet acquisition of facilities on the Horn of Africa or in Angola shifts the balance of influence in favour of the U.S.S.R.

Often the acquisition of facilities by the Soviets has come directly at the expense of the United States, with the Soviet Union obtaining the use of facilities formerly utilized by the United States. For example, Ethiopia, an ally of the United States during the rule of Haile Selassie, allowed the Soviet Union access to Ethiopian port facilities in 1977. Thus, the perceived increase in Soviet influence is even more damaging because it is coupled with an apparent reversal for the United States.

The acquisition of facilities is seen by analysts to be an infiltration of nation B by the Soviet Union which indicates a loss of sovereignty for B. The assumption is that the acquisition of the facilities is a step in the process of B falling under the control of the Soviet Union. In contrast to a situation in which the Soviet Union is a trading partner or supplier of aid, the acquisition of facilities is perceived as indicating a qualitative change in the Soviet influence capability because, presumably, the Soviet Union has now established itself as a player in the internal workings of nation B.

The establishment of Soviet facilities within B is thought to be indicative of increased dependence of nation B upon the Soviets. It is a sign of a closer connection between
nation B and the Soviet Union which would in turn facilitate further increases in Soviet influence. It has been thought that once the Soviets are established within a Third World nation, it would be very difficult to extricate them. Thus, Nation B would not be able to regain its full sovereignty given the controlling Soviet presence within it.

Soviet access to facilities is often perceived to be B's payment for Soviet aid or trade. According to Barry Lynch, "...continued Soviet economic support is linked to Ethiopia's ability to offer the U.S.S.R. a stable military base on the Red Sea, i.e. in Eritrea."(23) Thus, the Soviet Union only gives Ethiopia economic aid because it gets a military base in return. The assumption is that the Soviet Union would not give aid to a nation which could not supply it with a base or some equivalent benefit. Thus, without the base, the aid would be cut off. Conversely, the Ethiopian need for aid causes it to give up some of its sovereignty and allow the Soviet Union access to a military base. It is assumed that only because of this dependence upon Soviet aid would Ethiopia allow a Soviet presence within it.

Since the acquisition of bases appears to give the Soviet Union a foothold within B and often occurs at the expense of the United States, it is assumed that the Soviets have gained strong influence over nation B. This assumption fails to consider the interests of B. If the Soviet Union does acquire facilities in exchange for aid, it is still unclear how this
situation is indicative of significant Soviet influence. B
does not seem to have acted against its own wishes on an issue
of importance. It is a mutually beneficial situation. Also,
having a Soviet base in nation B could be beneficial in
itself. The Soviet presence need not just be a trade off for
some other benefit such as economic aid or trade. For
example, the Soviets and nation B may have a common enemy
which could be better combated through a greater Soviet
presence in B. Many Third World regimes, for example those of
Ethiopia and Angola, have suffered from attacks by internal or
external foes which necessitates the fortification afforded by
a Soviet presence. The Soviet presence could also be
beneficial through the training of nation B's armed forces.

If having a Soviet base is mutually beneficial, it
probably does not occur against the wishes of B. Therefore,
it is not indicative of significant Soviet influence. Nation
B allows the Soviets the use of the facility for B's own
benefit, not because of influence of the Soviet Union.

Obviously, there is a limit beyond which nation B will
not allow its sovereignty to be curtailed. For example, the
Soviets have not obtained bases in the "traditional sense
(i.e. territory and/or facilities over which it exercises
treaty-based rights of sovereignty)."(24) Possibly, as long
as B retains the territorial rights, it does not consider
allowing Soviet access to facilities to be a capitulation to
another nation or a surrendering of its sovereignty. This is
an issue about which Third World nations are very sensitive. Wary of appearing to be a satellite of another nation, the term "facility" is used by Third World countries instead of "base" because "it does not imply surrender of sovereignty or smack of colonial rule."(25)

Finally, the Soviet Union has suffered reversals of its rights to Third World nation facilities. The Soviets have been easily extricated from their position within nation B -- Egypt and Somalia are two examples -- despite the appearance of a long-term relationship. This fragility of the Soviet position further weakens the value of the Acquisition of Facilities as an indicator of Soviet influence.

Evaluation -- Poor

Soviet acquisition of facilities in a Third World nation has undeniable benefits to the Soviets for establishing a presence in the Third World, enhancing its power projection capability, and developing its relationship with nation B. Facilities have been particularly valuable to the Soviets for establishing influence within regions of the Third World. For example, bases in Vietnam and Ethiopia were important to the Soviet Union for establishing influence in South-east Asia and the Horn of Africa. Yet, the acquisition of the facilities indicates at most only limited Soviet influence within B. The benefits enjoyed by B due to the Soviet presence, the limit to which B will allow its sovereignty to be usurped, and the
speed and ease with which the Soviet Union can lose the rights to the facilities show the weakness of this indicator of influence. As a result, we cannot conclude that the Soviets have significant influence if they acquire the use of facilities within B.

3/ Soviet Goals and Objectives

So far, the indicators have focused upon the influence relationship from the perspective of nation B — domestic dissonance within B and facilities within B. A different viewpoint can be considered through examination of the goals and objectives of the Soviet Union. The indicator of influence is then the amount of success the Soviets have in achieving their goals; in other words, their success in wielding influence to further their specific objectives. The assumption of this indicator is that achieving goals indicates influence.

We can see that influence is closely linked to policy objectives. A tries to get B to fall in line with its objectives; success in doing so presumably indicates influence on the part of A. Therefore, a greater understanding of Soviet influence requires a knowledge of Soviet goals as they pertain to nation B.

Foreign policy analysis of any nation can be an arduous
endeavour, but a nation whose inner governmental workings have been as shielded from outside scrutiny as that of the Soviet Union complicates matters vastly. There is much that we just do not know. As a result, assumptions are made. Often these assumptions are based upon the analyst's preset notions regarding the Soviet Union. For example, analysts often assume either that the Soviet Union is opportunistic or that it follows a grand strategy. An analyst will, therefore, formulate different conclusions regarding Soviet objectives based upon his or her preset notions. As a result, each analysis may tell us more about the author than about Soviet foreign policy.

Robert Gorman states that during the 1970s two basic schools of thought emerged from Western debate on Soviet interventionism in Africa, the "African solutions to African problems school" and the "superpower responsibility school."(26)

Individuals belonging to the African solutions school generally share several basic assumptions and attitudes. They tend to downplay the significance of Soviet intervention on the Horn (and elsewhere in Africa), calling it a form of opportunism unconnected with any larger Soviet grand design to outmaneuver the West in Africa... [while the superpower responsibility school] is alarmed by Soviet military successes in Africa. Analysts in this school are more inclined to interpret recent Soviet activities in Africa as part of a larger strategic design. They stress the Soviet Union's resilience to its earlier setbacks and assume that it has learned from those unpleasant experiences(27)

It is my assumption that the Soviet Union is not an
adherent to a grand strategy. Post-World War II Soviet foreign policy in the Third World has largely consisted of challenges to the status quo. Except during Stalin's rule, the Soviet Union has viewed the Third World as an area for the pursuit of influence largely through the support of the "progressive forces" in their challenges to the "status quo backed by the United States."(28) Examples of this strategy include the Korean and Vietnam wars as well as the conflicts over the Suez in 1956, the Cuban Revolution, Algeria in the early 1960s, Angola in 1975 and the Horn of Africa in 1977-1978. As Francis Fukuyama puts it, "Soviet foreign policy in the Third World was chiefly concerned with how best to bring about revolutionary changes in the status quo, in ways that both were effective and did not unduly damage the interests of the USSR as a state."(29)

Stalin made little effort to develop Soviet relations with the noncommunist leaders of the newly independent countries of the Third World. As a result, the Soviet Union made few advances in the Third World during the Stalin era. According to Nogee and Donaldson:

Stalin's disastrous experience in applying the united front strategy during the Chinese revolution of the 1920s had a lasting effect on Soviet perceptions. Chiang Kai-shek manipulated Soviet and Comintern support of the Kuomintang to defeat the Chinese communists. Unaccustomed to being used to serve the purpose of others, Stalin apparently vowed never again to assist Asian nationalist leaders who were not under his direct control.(30)

Khrushchev, on the other hand, was confident
that aid from the socialist bloc could allow the Third World countries to break away from the imperialist economic grip and launch their plans for industrialized and truly independent national economies. The inevitable result of this process would be the emergence of a class-conscious proletariat ready to respond to the political program of its vanguard and -- once the 'national bourgeoisie' had revealed the compromising side of its dual nature -- to assume political power, even by peaceful means.(31)

However, Soviet successes were not nearly as great as Khrushchev had hoped. Although the nationalistic leaders of the Third World were influenced by Marxist thought, they were usually unwilling to accept the Soviet model and approach. Also, the fragility of Third World regimes meant that apparent Soviet advances were sometimes short-lived. For example, the Soviets suffered three quick reversals with the fall of Indonesia's Sukarno in 1965, Ghana's Nkrumah in 1966, and Mali's Keita in 1968. As the realities of the Third World became evident to the Soviet Union, Khrushchev's optimism for the success of Soviet socialism in the Third World gave way to the Brezhnev regime's more pragmatic approach and reserved expectations.

Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev pursued a similar policy of accommodation with the United States combined with an often seemingly contradictory strategy of challenging the status quo. Thus, while pursuing detente with the United States, the Soviets continued to strive for advances in the Third World. Khrushchev and Brezhnev did not want a war with the United States, especially given the devastation of nuclear weapons,
but they were also not willing to accept the status quo. As Fukuyama states:

While Soviet spokesmen began talking to Western audiences about the need for mutual superpower restraint in local conflicts, however, to their own ideological sympathizers they emphasized that detente between the superpowers on a state-to-state level did not mean an end to the struggle for national liberation or social change. And indeed, Soviet behaviour in the Third World became if anything more activist with the coming of detente.(32)

Given Soviet challenges to the status quo, the question is whether the Soviet Union had specific goals. Some analysts have attempted to categorize the goals of the U.S.S.R. in Africa. Robert Grey divided the possible explanations of Soviet goals into four categories: (1) geopolitical, (2) political, (3) ideological, and (4) economic. The geopolitical goal is "to increase the strength of the Soviet Union and its allies, while weakening both the N.A.T.O. alliance and China." The strategic value of oil is important for this category. The political explanation holds that the Soviet Union seeks to make friends and allies and undermine African ties with the West and China. In sharp contrast to the other goal categories, the ideology-based view states that the Soviets' top priority is the support of states of socialist orientation. The economic category has the Soviet exploitation of Africa's wealth as its basis.(33)

Before concluding that the ideological argument is the closest to the truth, Grey states, "I would go a further step
and assume a lack of unanimity even about goals. Thus, to pose the question, what does the U.S.S.R. want of Africa? is to ask what perspectives do various individuals, groups, or institutions have in or about Africa?"(34) This assumption of a lack of unanimity of goals illustrates the problem of our lack of knowledge of the internal workings of the Soviet government. We can assume a lack of unanimity, but we cannot be sure of such a situation.

David Albright formulated a list of four distinct goals which he contends the Soviets have pursued in Africa with some consistency. They are: (1) the establishment of bases, (2) the development of a voice in Africa, (3) undermining the West, and (4) counteracting China. First, for the bases, "the U.S.S.R. has sought forms of local support that would ease the logistical problems of maintaining its naval forces in waters surrounding Africa." The Soviet Union "has requested and received permission for its vessels to make calls at a variety of ports in littoral waters."(35)

Second, the Soviet Union has tried to establish a presence in African affairs, largely through military aid. Third, the Soviets have endeavoured to undercut Western influence in Africa. "At the same time, the U.S.S.R. has clearly maneuvered to establish itself as sole military supplier and/or political patron of a number of African states which formerly looked fundamentally to the West for support." The Soviet support of the M.P.L.A. in 1975-1976 can even be
seen as part of the scheme to undermine Western influence since "Moscow obviously did not want to see the Portuguese colonial regime there give way to a government composed of forces backed by the West in general and by the United States in particular."(36) Fourth, the Soviets have tried to prevent China from making inroads in Africa. For example, the Soviet Union countered a 1975 $17 million loan by China to Guinea-Bissau with an offer of $13 million in credits. This exceeded the offer to Angola which was supposed to be a close ally and has a population ten times that of Guinea-Bissau.(37) And according to Albright, the initial reason for the Soviet support of the M.P.L.A. in 1975 was to ensure that China did not become the dominant foreign power in that part of Africa.(38)

If the objectives of A and B are known, an accurate estimation of whether influence has been exercised by A can be made. When A achieves its goals and B acts contrary to its own, then A has significant influence over B. Thus, ostensibly this is the best indicator of Soviet influence. The problem is that the policy objectives of A are difficult to determine. Furthermore, little concern is usually given to the objectives of B; the assumption is that Soviet success in the pursuit of its goals necessarily indicates Soviet influence upon nation B. This assumption fails to consider the possibility of A and B having mutual interests or B having little commitment to the issue area.
Evaluation -- Fair to Good

Through its opportunistic challenges to the status quo, the Soviet Union has certainly had successes in the Third World. Starting with essentially no presence in the Third World in 1955, the Soviet Union has achieved alliances with the long-standing Marxist-Leninist states of North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba, as well as alliances with the numerous newer Marxist-Leninist states, such as Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Nicaragua, and Laos. And to varying degrees, the Soviet Union has achieved a presence in non-Marxist Third World nations such as Egypt and Syria. The question is to what degree this increased presence translates into Soviet influence.

If only the objectives of the Soviet Union are considered, this indicator is of limited value for evaluating Soviet influence upon B. Soviet goal achievement does not translate directly into influence within B. We need to know not just what the Soviets accomplish but under what circumstances. Knowledge of B's objectives is necessary in order to reveal whether the Soviets influenced B to act contrary to B's own wishes. Thus, this can be a very good indicator. Unfortunately, determining the objectives of both the Soviet Union and B is often hindered by a lack of information. Therefore, the value of this indicator is lessened because assumptions must be made regarding the nations' objectives.
The indicator of Attitudes and Perceptions outlined by Alvin Rubinstein encompasses various elements that a number of authors have utilised. It focuses upon perceptual and attitudinal change within B evident through the analysis of the media, joint communiques, official speeches and statements, and public opinion surveys. The theory is that "significant changes in attitude (as expressed in one or more of the above subcategories) have policy relevance for the relationship between A and B, and that, used wisely, they can provide insights into the strengths and difficulties inhering in the relationship."(39)

According to Rubinstein, the least useful measure is "public opinion polls, which measure A's prestige, not its influence; they tell us about the general image of A held by representative but unauthoritative groups in B who are ordinarily not in a position to know much about the A-B relationship."(40) He feels the most useful measures are joint communiques over a period of time and editorials in government-controlled media. The communiques and editorials reveal the attitudes and perceptions of the government leaders who set policy. For example, according to Nogee and Donaldson, problems between Egypt and the Soviet Union were signalled by the communique issued after Anwar Sadat's 1971 visit to Moscow, which described the talks between the two
nations as having taken place in a "spirit of frankness."(41)

Actions by B which contradict its earlier statements in communiques and editorials are a good sign of possible Soviet influence. For example, B might state that it would not allow Soviet bases but later allow them. An analyst could examine whether the change in B's behaviour -- allowing the bases -- is preceded by changes in B's attitude evident in editorials and communiques. If so, this indicator could have value for predicting Soviet influenced actions by B.

This indicator could be utilised by examining editorials, communiques, et cetera, in nations who were initially friendly with the Soviet Union but later suffered a fracturing of relations. Obviously, this split indicates an end to any Soviet influence in nation B. A good case study would be Egypt, from which the Soviets were ousted after the establishment of what was thought to be a long-term, in depth relationship. Some questions to be considered: What changes in the treatment of the Soviets in the editorials and communiques occurred prior to the split? Could the split be foreseen through the examination of the editorials and communiques?

Evaluation -- Very Good

This is a very good indicator. It is valuable because it entails a more causal analysis than most of the other indicators. Rather than focusing upon the superficial
appearances of apparent Soviet influence, it considers the roots of the Soviet-nation B relationship -- the attitudes and perceptions that motivate actions, and the conflict between the actions and attitudes. This indicator attempts to deal with the inner workings of the inter-nation relationship. It is within B where we can discover the commitment of B to an issue and whether it acts contrary to its own objectives. Unfortunately, the lack of necessary information places this kind of analysis beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, this indicator has not been utilized in my case studies of Somalia and Angola.

5/ Quantitative Measures of Trade, Aid and Personnel

Quantitative Measures of Trade, Aid and Personnel is probably the most commonly cited indicator of Soviet penetration and influence. Specifically, this indicator includes: the number of Soviet and Cuban personnel in nation B; the quantity of trade between the Soviets and B; the quantity of arms transfers from the Soviets to B; the quantity of military and economic aid the U.S.S.R. distributes to B; and the number of students from B studying in the Soviet Union. There are other examples, but these are the main ones. Although this indicator encompasses a wide variety of elements of an inter-nation relationship, I have divided them into four
basic categories -- (1) personnel, Soviet or nation B; (2) economic aid; (3) military aid; and (4) trade.

For the analysts who stress this indicator, the influence increases as the amount of trade, aid or personnel increases. For example, the greater the trade between B and the Soviets, the greater the Soviet influence. The logic is that an increase in the trade between B and the U.S.S.R. necessarily means an increase in the influence of the Soviets with respect to B. Implicit in this analysis is that increased trade signals a closer relationship which in turn lends itself to greater Soviet influence. Thus, B is drawn into the Soviet sphere of influence. The logic follows similarly for the other three categories.

Philip Roeder describes a more elaborate scenario of increased aid and trade with the Soviet Union in the theory of Soviet-centered dependence. The theory "links increases in Soviet aid to growing trade dependence on the Soviet Union, which in turn increases the political compliance of Third World recipients with Soviet policies."(42) The trade dependence means both increased trade with the Soviet Union and decreased trade with the West. The theory holds that "by expanding the volume of Soviet trade, by closing off the alternative of trade with the West, and, thus, by increasing the costs of any future cut-off of Soviet trade, Soviet aid leads to significant trade dependence on the Soviet Union."(43) The conclusion, simply, is that increased
Soviet aid leads to increased trade with the Soviets which leads to trade dependence. This dependence then leads to political compliance by B.

While there are some significant dissimilarities between the four categories of this indicator — for example, the far greater significance of arms transfers compared to students studying in the U.S.S.R. — the point of grouping these seemingly disparate entities together is that there exists a commonly held assumption that an increase in the amount of trade, aid or personnel necessarily portends a growth in Soviet influence. It is this tendency to base a judgement regarding influence upon quantity which ties together these assorted subjects into one category, as one indicator of influence.

The Quantitative Measures of Trade, Aid and Personnel indicator has a number of weaknesses. First, it minimises both the independence of B and the benefits enjoyed by B through its relationship with A. Aid and trade are not things which B is adverse to. On the contrary, it can be assumed that B is in favour of them. Except in cases of complete Soviet domination, such as East European countries in the 1960s, it seems unlikely that B would be forced against its will into a trade or aid relationship with A.

Second, aid or trade dependence by B is neither realistic nor desired by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union cannot afford to support another Cuba; nor has it appeared to want
to. The $6 million-a-day Soviet subsidy of the Cuban economy is an anomaly of Soviet-Third World relations.\(^{(44)}\) Despite its close relationship with the U.S.S.R. after 1976, Ethiopia was only given observer status to the C.M.E.A. According to Herbert Block:

> the C.M.E.A. already has several ailing members, and is not eager to become a nursing home for the chronically ill...The Soviet clients, having little to offer that interests Moscow, have import surpluses with the U.S.S.R., a situation that does not please the Soviets who are interested only in trade partners supplying high-priority goods or paying in hard currency.\(^{(45)}\)

Also, there are almost always other sources of aid and trade available to a Third World nation, many of which can offer products superior to those of the Soviet Union. The Soviets generally rely upon military aid which necessitates that B turn to the West for economic aid and trade. For example, of the $117 million in loans received by Ethiopia in 1979, more than 75 percent came from the West, notably the World Bank and the E.E.C.\(^{(46)}\) Also, into the late 1970s, Ethiopia was still drawing on its $100 million in credits provided by the Soviet Union in 1959.\(^{(47)}\) The Soviet Union even encourages its allies to take advantage of these other sources.

Third, aid and trade are common entities of inter-nation relations whose significance tends to be exaggerated when the U.S.S.R is involved. There seems to be an enlarged importance attributed to increases in Soviet-Third World trade and aid despite the often relatively small amounts involved. Only in
a few instances has Soviet trade — imports or exports — been a large portion of a Third World state's total trade. From 1978-1980, only eight Third World states shipped greater than 10 percent of their exports to the U.S.S.R — Afghanistan (53.7), Egypt (26.3), India (19.4), Ghana (19.4), Argentina (18), Syria (16.1) and Ethiopia (11.8). Only in a few instances has Soviet trade been a large portion of a Third World nation's total trade. In the 1960s and 1970s, trade with the Soviet Union accounted for less than 2 percent of all Third World trade. (48) From 1954-1979, the Soviet Union gave $8.23 billion in economic aid to Third World nations, excluding Cuba and Vietnam. In 1979 alone, the United States gave $7.012 billion in economic aid to Third World countries. (49)

Fourth, even apparent dependence upon Soviet aid and trade does not guarantee Soviet influence in nation B. For example, although "Cairo's dependence was total," the Soviet Union could not prevent Nasser from beginning a conflict with Israel in 1969. (50) As Rubinstein states:

...the army and air force had to be reequipped and retrained to handle advanced weaponry, and the economy required imports of food, industrial materials, and machinery, much of which Moscow bankrolled. Between 1967 and 1969 alone, the Soviet investment into Egypt was in the range of $3 to $4 billion. Nevertheless, against Soviet wishes, Nasser started a "war of attrition" against Israel along the length of the Suez canal in March 1969. (51)

Personnel can be a valuable indicator of influence. The
importance of personnel is the influence role they play within B rather than their mere presence or quantity. Soviet, East European or Cuban personnel can hold highly influential positions within the governmental apparatus of B. Many new states, Angola for example, were severely hurt by the exodus of colonial regime professionals when decolonization took place. A fragile government of a Third World nation desperate for development can become dependent upon the expertise of foreign advisers and officials. However, it is also likely that the ruling elite of B will keep the power and influence of the foreigners in check.

Evaluation -- Poor

This indicator's importance is largely based upon the assumption that increased trade, aid, et cetera involving the Soviet Union necessarily signifies Soviet influence. However, an assumption of Soviet influence is not valid given B's natural inclination to want the Soviet aid and trade. Cases of actual trade or aid dependence are rare since other sources are usually available to B and the U.S.S.R. has not wanted another relationship similar to the one it has with Cuba. Furthermore, as the Egyptian example shows, Soviet influence can be lacking even in cases of apparent nation B dependence upon Soviet aid or trade. Therefore, Quantitative Measures of Trade, Aid and Personnel is a poor indicator of Soviet influence.
The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation

A tangible and easily identifiable indicator of influence is the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. This treaty is a common component of Soviet-Third World relations, but is rare in Soviet relations with more developed nations. The only major power to have signed such a treaty is India. Other than India, the partners with the Soviet Union in a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation have been poor, underdeveloped countries such as Iraq, Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Angola. Those that have signed a treaty have neither taken a great risk nor garnered a significant reward. With its vague wording and only general commitments, there is never very much that either nation commits itself to in the treaty.

What is the significance of such a treaty? Largely, the significance attributed to the treaty is based upon a perception of Soviet control. The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation is perceived to be a strong link between B and the Soviet Union. It is given importance because it "institutionalizes" "Moscow's special relationship" with a Third World nation.(52) Nation B becomes tied to the Soviet Union by means of this treaty.

The example of India provides evidence of the weakness of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation as an indicator of influence. The 1971 treaty did not garner the Soviets greater
control of Indian foreign or domestic behaviour. Also, India successfully resisted repeated attempts by the Soviets to extend the length of time of the treaty and to expand its area of coverage. The Soviets like to renew treaties, and, if possible, to extend their length a good deal prior to the expiry date -- presumably as a sign of the relationship's continuing strength. However, the Soviet Union did not possess sufficient influence to force India to give in to this request. (53)

It is necessary to contemplate what the importance of a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation is in terms of the overall relationship between the Soviet Union and a Third World nation. Surely a treaty indicates a congeniality, or even friendship, between two nations. However, the treaty does not indicate more than marginal Soviet influence. Rubinstein described the Soviet-Egyptian treaty as follows:

Seeking to stabilize relations with Anwar Sadat...and to institutionalize its political and military presence, Moscow pressed for the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of friendship and cooperation of May 27, 1971. Article 7 of the treaty held that 'in the event of the development of situations creating, in the opinion of both sides, a danger to peace, they will contact each other without delay in order to concert their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or reestablishing peace.' For the first time, the USSR bound itself to a military commitment in the Third World -- a measure of Egypt's importance to Moscow and of the USSR's growing military confidence. Moscow hoped that the treaty would assure its position in Egypt and serve as a model for cementing ties with other Third World countries...Despite the treaty, the Soviet leadership found Sadat difficult." (54)
Thus, despite Moscow's hopes and military commitment, the treaty failed to curtail Sadat's independence.

Sadat's independence led to a turbulent Soviet-Egyptian relationship. In 1972, all Soviet military personnel were expelled from Egypt. The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was unilaterally abrogated by Sadat on March 15, 1976, followed a month later by the cancellation of facilities for the Soviet navy. Thus, the treaty did not even ensure lasting fraternal Soviet-Egyptian relations.

Evaluation -- Poor

It could be argued that a distinction should be made between the time when the treaty is signed and when it is abrogated by B. Thus, the abrogation of the treaty need not negate the significance of the presumably greater Soviet influence at the time it was signed. However, the lack of specific commitments by B, the independence of action by B despite a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, and the ease with which B can abrogate the treaty all reveal the weakness of this indicator. The examples of India and Egypt show the failure of the treaty to grant the Soviet Union influence within nation B. This is a poor indicator of Soviet influence.
7/ A Vanguard Party

The last indicator of Soviet influence is the creation within B of a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party of the form desired by Moscow. The Soviet Union's emphasis upon vanguard parties is indicative of its attempts to garner leverage within client states through more active involvement in their internal workings. As Francis Fukuyama states:

Encouragement of Marxist-Leninist national liberation movements and their transformation into elite vanguard parties has been an important element in this strategy (more active involvement in internal workings of client states)...because if those parties came to power, they will as a general rule be less reluctant to cooperate closely with the Soviet bloc. They provide an institutional basis for a long-term relationship with Moscow.(55)

The significance of vanguard parties to the Soviet Union, according to David Albright, is the result of the Soviet Union's emphasis upon political means for enlarging its range and depth of influence.

The U.S.S.R. does, of course, possess certain assets of an economic and military nature that are exploitable in this regard. But these tend to be limited in scope or of dubious utility for guaranteeing a local Soviet presence and a Soviet say in local affairs over the long haul. Not surprisingly, then, Moscow has looked with increasing favour on political means to further its purposes in the Third World. In this context, ties with vanguard parties have had special appeal.(56)

Thus, realising the limitations of influence tools like trade and aid, the Soviet Union emphasised scientific socialism and the vanguard party.
Third World leaders of former colonies have naturally been drawn to the anti-Western and anti-colonial character of Soviet socialism. Some, such as the leaders of Somalia, Angola and Ethiopia, have even formed vanguard parties. The vanguard party facilitates the Marxist-Leninist ideological relationship of a Third World nation and the Soviet Union. It provides a unique connection between the two nations based upon an approach which differs from the more dominant Western ideologies of democracy and capitalism.

In the 1970s, the Soviet definition of a vanguard party went through some changes. Previously, a "vanguard party had to accept not just 'scientific socialism' but the Soviet version there of. Thus, self-classification as a Marxist-Leninist entity would not qualify a body as a vanguard party unless it met Soviet standards as well."(57) However, by 1978, the Soviet Union began to recognise self-styled "vanguard" parties. The Soviets recognized a new kind of "revolutionary democrat" in countries such as Angola, South Yemen, Mozambique and Somalia but were not overly optimistic about the prospects for Soviet influence in these countries.(58) The definition was also loosened in order to give legitimacy to parties which had formed in opposition to pro-Soviet communist parties. For example, the Soviet Union wanted to see the unification of the two Indian communist parties, so the formerly illegitimate CP of India-Marxist was deemed legitimate through the new definition.(59)
According to Albright:

What set a reappraisal in motion remains somewhat foggy. Perhaps it was nothing more than the recent proliferation of self-styled Marxist-Leninist "vanguard" parties in the Third World...or other circumstances may have entered into the calculations. For instance, all of the "vanguard" parties that had come into being prior to 1977 had done so under the auspices of radical military leaders, but 1977 had witnessed the birth of some under civilian aegis.(60)

Prior to the reappraisal, the Soviet conception of a vanguard party adhered to conventional Leninist standards.

Such a party, in Soviet eyes, had to be an organization of tested cadres, not a mass body open to all, and it must operate according to the principle of democratic centralism, with its lower levels closely subordinated to its upper organizational roots among the masses, so as to be able to mobilize them behind its programs.(61)

The change to the definition was necessary in order for the Soviet Union to form alliances with parties and movements which were in power or in the process of taking power in Third World nations but often were not strictly speaking Marxist. With this change to the concept of the vanguard party the Soviet Union lost some of its control. "Moscow's stretching of its concept of a vanguard party to encompass unorthodox entities has greatly complicated the task of advancing its ends through exploitation of vanguard parties."(62) Few parties with significant political power fit the old definition of a vanguard party. So, in an attempt to expand its influence, the Soviet Union altered the definition. The down side of this "creative Marxism" for the Soviets was that
the newly defined vanguard parties would not adhere as closely to the commands of the Soviet Union.

The creation of a vanguard party means the transformation from military to civilian rule: the separation of the political elite from the military elite. In contrast to the leadership of many Third World Marxist-Leninist parties and liberation movements, the Soviet Politburo has never been controlled by the military. Given the political instability of many Third World countries, the life expectancy of a civilian government tends to be much less than that of a military one. Thus, the transformation of the ruling party into a vanguard is risky for B's rulers.

A military leader is in charge of both the country and the army. Furthermore, he is a part of the army. Although a military ruler can face the challenge of an attempted coup, he would most likely be able to call upon troops who remain loyal to him. A civilian leader could not count on such loyalty. Thus, should a challenge arise to the rule of a civilian party, it would have to rely upon other security services, possibly Soviet or East German, to protect it from a violent threat from within the country. On the other hand, a military ruler is less likely to require the protection services of the Soviets or others. This keeps the Soviets at a greater distance from the country's political power core.

The pro-Soviet factions within Third World nations favour the creation of vanguard parties so it would seem that the
formation of one would indicate an increase in power for these factions -- and thereby greater influence for the Soviet Union. It would seem that if a vanguard party is formed, then the pro-Soviet factions have succeeded in exercising influence in order to accomplish this. Furthermore, the Soviets would gain increased control with the establishment of a vanguard party since the civilian leadership would presumably be both more reliant upon the Soviets for military protection and the pro-Soviet factions of the government would presumably have greater power than previously.

The creation of a vanguard party indicates a government that is willing to take on the form desired by the Soviet Union. However, the formation of a vanguard party has not meant Soviet control within B. As the case studies of Somalia and Angola show, a vanguard party can still act in opposition to the wishes of the Soviet Union.

It is important to differentiate between those who form a vanguard party for foreign policy reasons -- to be aligned with the Soviet Union -- and those who are genuinely Marxist-Leninist in nature. Those without a true Marxist-Leninist basis are less likely to retain an affiliation with the U.S.S.R. They will form a vanguard based upon their short-term needs rather than ideological principles. Many Third World nations have switched rapidly from one allegiance to another. For example, Benin's President Kerekou quickly changed his nation's affiliation from scientific socialism to
Libyan-inspired Islamism. (63) A truly Marxist party is more likely to follow Soviet wishes but would still probably temper its actions with pragmatism.

Creating a vanguard party can be in the interests of B given the fragility of many Third World regimes. Through the creation of a vanguard, regimes have "consolidated their own power and created a variety of highly centralized, top-down hierarchical state institutions." (64) With the formation of a vanguard party and its accompanying institutions of control, a ruling party can strengthen its power base through bureaucratic and institutional means. Scientific socialism has the benefit for a ruling elite of legitimizing an ideologically justified dictatorship through the vanguard party. While the programs and methods of control are ostensibly for the benefit of the people, they can enable the elite to maintain a firm grip upon the reigns of power and control over the nation's people.

Whether a nation formed a vanguard depended more upon the desire of the nation to do so rather than Soviet influence. Those who did form a vanguard, such as Mozambique and Angola, did so according to their own timetables and often did not adhere to Soviet guidelines. It was the Soviet Union which altered its definition to encompass these self-styled vanguard parties. And even apparently close allies of the Soviet Union can resist Soviet pressure to form a vanguard. For example, although dependent upon Cuban forces for the survival of his
regime, Ethiopia's Colonel Mengistu resisted Soviet demands for the transformation of the ruling Provisional Military Administrative Council into a vanguard party. The army-controlled Dergue resisted the formation of even a civilian-based full-fledged political party.(65)

Evaluation -- Fair

Although a vanguard party may be an "institutional" basis for a Soviet-Third World nation relationship, it is not a strong indicator of Soviet influence. The common ideology of Marxism does create the potential for Soviet influence over a vanguard party. However, there are definite limits to this influence. Marxist governments, Mengistu's Ethiopia for example, have resisted Soviet pressure to form a vanguard party. Others, Somalia for example, have acted contrary to Soviet desires even though ruled by a vanguard party.

The wider definition of a vanguard created the impression of an increase in the number of close Soviet allies. However, the influence that the Soviets might have had upon these parties was diminished since the parties did not adhere as strictly to Soviet scientific socialism nor allow for as much Soviet input as previous vanguards. Rather than the actual domain of socialism increasing, the definition of socialism was changed in order to enlarge its domain.

The benefits that an ally of the Soviet Union can enjoy means that a nation might align itself as socialist largely
for the sake of appearances while having neither an historical
Marxist character nor a strong commitment to Marxism-Leninism.
Transforming a party into a vanguard can also benefit the
party in maintaining control of its regime. The methods which
are "necessary" in order to institute the socialist
transformation of the nation also help keep the elite in
power. These benefits to B indicate that the formation of a
vanguard party can be in B's self-interest rather than being
indicative of Soviet influence.

The assumption of this indicator is that the Marxist
nature of a vanguard party indicates Soviet control. This
would be the case when the Soviets "impose" a government in a
country, such as in Eastern Europe after World War II and more
recently in Afghanistan; Soviet influence over the ruling
vanguard would be great. In nations whose government is not
Soviet-imposed, Soviet scientific socialism is still presumed
to ensure Soviet influence within the vanguard party. This
assumption is similar to previous thinking about the
supposedly undivided nature of international communism.
Despite the Sino-Soviet split, some analysts continued to
argue that the two nations were inevitably connected, ignoring
the clearly independent actions of China and the animosity
between the Soviet and Chinese governments. A nation's
allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, long-standing or temporary,
has never assured the Soviet Union control over the nation.
CHAPTER 4 -- THE CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA

In 1960, Somalia became a newly independent nation. With the Soviet Union as its benefactor, Somalia built up its military forces during the 1960s and early 1970s. In 1977, Somalia invaded the eastern part of Ethiopia, the Ogaden, in the hopes of claiming this territory -- largely populated by Somalis -- as its own. It took this action against the wishes of the Soviet Union and at the threat of having the vital Somali military supply line cut by the Soviets. The Soviets were thought to have great influence in Somalia because of their role as a military supplier to Somalia, but the Soviets could not prevent the Somali military incursion into Ethiopia.(66)

The indicators of influence will be applied to the case study of Somalia in order to try to determine the extent of Soviet influence prior to the invasion. If influence can be established, the question to be considered is: Why did Somalia go against the desires of the Soviet Union?

1/ Domestic Dissonance

During the 1960s, Somalia suffered from wide-spread corruption. According to Bereket Selassie, "Western-style democracy had clearly failed, corrupted to suit the aims of
individuals, groups, and classes." (67) The National Assembly had become "widely regarded cynically as a sordid market-place where, with little concern for the interests of those who had voted for them, deputies traded their votes for personal gain." (68) Apparently Premier Igal spent over $1 million in public funds in payments to members of the Assembly between January and October, 1969. (69) The result of the corruption was the 1969 overthrow of the government by the forces led by General Siad Barre following the assassination of President Sharmarke.

There was speculation of Soviet complicity in the coup but no concrete evidence. There did not seem to be any motivation for Soviet complicity except for further speculation that the Sharmarke regime had been seeking aid from the West. (70) Yet, the Soviets have often been in favour of their allies obtaining Western aid.

The post-coup period was politically stable. Correspondingly, there was little domestic dissonance in Somalia during the 1970s. Gorman describes the Barre regime as authoritarian without a reputation for brutality and "largely unaffected by domestic dissension." (71)

Obviously, President Barre maintained strong control within his government. This is evident by the fact that there were only three significant incidents of internal dissent during the 1970s. First, in July 1972, two members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council were executed, having been
charged with attempting to overthrow the government. Second, in January 1975, ten religious leaders were executed. Third, in April 1978, army officers were executed for an attempted coup. (72)

The lack of Soviet-related domestic dissonance could mean a number of things. It could indicate strong Soviet influence. Somalia was considered a model ally of the Soviet Union because of its readiness to fulfill Soviet wishes; for example, Somalia allowed the Soviets access to Somali military facilities and signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. President Barre also fulfilled Soviet wishes by forming a vanguard party. The Somali willingness to adhere to Soviet desires could be perceived as capitulation to Soviet influence. This apparent lack of Somali free will could lead to the conclusion that Somalia was little more than a Soviet satellite. This apparent strong control by the Soviet Union would explain the lack of domestic conflict in Somalia.

Conversely, the lack of dissonance could be explained by the strong control of President Barre. His authoritarian control meant a lack of opposing voices to the policies and decision-making of the President. Therefore, there would not be much likelihood of domestic dissonance in Somalia. Furthermore, Somalia's later independence of action and split from the Soviets proves it was not a satellite of the Soviet Union. Rather than being indicative of extensive Soviet influence, the lack of dissonance was more likely the result
of President Barre's strong control. In this case, the lack of evident domestic dissonance is symptomatic of an authoritarian government rather than a nation under Soviet control.

As Rubinstein notes, it is difficult to locate expressions of dissonance in an authoritarian and relatively closed society. The control of information and lack of dissenting voices in an authoritarian regime makes those expressions of dissonance that do exist more likely to go unnoticed. (73) Therefore, there may have been dissonance in Somalia that was simply not evident. Possibly, a greater knowledge of the inner workings of the Somali domestic political sphere would reveal more subtle signs of Soviet-related domestic dissonance. However, the outcome of any domestic conflict would still have to be considered in order to reach a conclusion about Soviet influence. And given the Somali refusal to refrain from invading the Ogaden as the Soviets wanted, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union could have influenced President Barre to act contrary to his objectives.

2/ Soviet Acquisition of Military, Naval and Air Facilities

The U.S.S.R. benefitted from its investments in Somalia by receiving the rights to the use of naval, air and ground
In the early 1970s, the Soviets set up naval complexes at Berbera on the Gulf of Aden and at Mogadishu on the Indian Ocean, and were allowed access to Somali airfields at Berbera and Uanle Uen. By the mid-1970s, Berbera had a deep-water port, housing for 1500, a communications facility, the facilities for the storage of 175,000 barrels of fuel, an airfield, and a facility for the handling and storage of tactical missiles.

Through its acquisition of facilities in Somalia, "Moscow greatly extended the range of Soviet air reconnaissance and strengthened the support structure for Soviet naval capabilities in the Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean region." However, as Rubinstein states, "privileges and a major presence do not make a satellite." In 1977, with the deterioration of Somali-Soviet relations due to the growing Soviet-Ethiopian relationship, Siad Barre expelled the Soviet military personnel from Somalia and cancelled the Soviet Union's rights to the use of the Somali facilities.

Siad Barre was not adverse to the Soviet use of facilities in Somalia. On the contrary, it was in Barre's interests to allow the Soviets access to the facilities. The Soviet presence in Somalia was helpful for the training of Somalia's military forces and for the Somali military buildup. It would also have been beneficial in any clash with Somalia's enemy, Ethiopia, by making it more logistically feasible for Eastern bloc forces to intervene on the side of Somalia should
it be deemed necessary. Furthermore, the Soviet presence was a deterrent to an attack by Ethiopia or any other enemy.

Importantly, the Soviets lost access to the facilities as quickly as they gained it. The Soviets were forced to give up the facilities in which they had invested so much time and money because they did not have sufficient influence over President Barre. The Soviets enjoyed the use of the facilities only as long as Barre allowed them to do so.

3/ Soviet Goals and Objectives

The Soviets have been opportunistic in their search for allies in Africa. When the opportunity arose, they developed ties with Somalia in the 1960s by supplying military aid. This relationship was cemented with the ascension to power of Siad Barre who wanted to continue the Somali military buildup. Given the extended Soviet-Somali relationship, the Soviets appeared to have been very successful in Somalia. Importantly, the Soviet Union also seemed to undercut the United States and the other Western nations whose smaller offers of aid Somalia rejected. (78)

We can apply Albright's list of Soviet goals in Africa, mentioned earlier, in order to show whether the U.S.S.R. was successful in achieving its goals. To reiterate, Albright's four Soviet goals are: (1) the establishment of bases, (2) the
development of a voice in Africa, (3) undermining the West, and (4) counteracting China.

First, the Soviets successfully established Somalia as a base for its military, naval and air activities. Second, in keeping with Albright's definition, the Soviets established a presence in Somalia largely through military aid. Third, the Soviets achieved the goal of undermining the West, which had made attempts to develop its relationship with Somalia prior to the Soviet offer of aid. Fourth, China was not really a factor in the Soviet-Somali relationship.

As mentioned, it is difficult to determine the goals and objectives of the Soviet Union. Assuming that Albright's list of goals is a close approximation of Soviet goals, clearly, the Soviet Union was successful in the pursuit of these goals in Somalia. However, this does not tell us to what extent the Soviet Union had influence in Somalia. The assumption of this indicator is that Soviet success in the pursuit of its goals indicates Soviet influence. This is not necessarily so. To determine Soviet influence we need to consider the Somali perspective. In particular, Siad Barre's objectives must be examined.

There is no indication that Siad Barre was adverse to the Soviet presence in his country. Somalia pursued its own goal of a military buildup through its relationship with the Soviet Union. The goals that the Soviets achieved in Somalia were done in consort with President Barre rather than against his
wishes. Therefore, the Soviets' goal achievement did not occur through significant Soviet influence. Furthermore, we need only consider how quickly the Soviet successes were reversed in order to realise the weakness of this indicator as a gauge of Soviet influence in Somalia.

4/ Attitudes and Perceptions

Due to a lack of information I am unable to apply this indicator to the case study.

5/ Quantitative Measures of Trade, Aid and Personnel

The Soviet Union enabled the Somalis to build up their military through its contributions of training and large amounts of aid. At the same time, the Somalis were dependent upon the Soviet military supply line since they were always kept on short rations and had no other source of military aid. Despite this dependence, the Soviets could not control the behaviour of President Barre.

After independence, Somalia was first offered aid by the United Arab Republic in the form of a "small quantity of obsolete items from United Arab Republic inventories." (79) Although the United States refused Somalia's initial requests
for aid, the United Kingdom and Italy jointly offered $8.4 million in 1962. This was followed by an offer by the United States, Italy and West Germany, whereby they would provide $10 million in equipment in exchange for the Somalis agreeing not to take aid from any other source. This offer remained open for almost a year until it was rejected in favour of a $32 million agreement with the Soviet Union which involved the training and equipping of a 10,000 man Somali force. The bulk of the program was to be a grant, with the rest to be paid off over the next twenty years. (80)

In 1969, with the completion of the original buildup, the Soviet-Somali military aid program was increased. This was followed in 1974 by large commitments of aid to Somalia by Libya, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates. However, the actual disbursements of aid from these nations were slow in coming. In that same year, Saudi Arabia made an offer of $75 million dependent upon Somalia breaking its ties with the Soviet Union. The Somalis declined the offer. (81) In an unprecedented action, the Soviet Union proved to be a very generous ally by cancelling the approximately $45 million Somali foreign aid debt. (82)

Somalia received the largest amount of Soviet assistance of any African country during the first half of the 1970s. When the 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was signed with the Soviet Union, about $60 million in economic aid was extended to Somalia. Up to 1975, Somalia was given aid of
$132 million. More aid followed in 1976-1977. In total, about $155 million in economic credits was extended to Somalia. However, only about half of that amount was taken.\(83\)

Over eight years during Barre's rule, the Soviet Union gave Somalia $400 million in military aid. In conjunction with this receipt of military aid, Siad Barre expanded Somalia's armed forces vastly. The army had grown to 20,000 men by 1977, for what seemed to be irredentist purposes in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.\(84\) The Soviet-Somali military relationship was built upon the foundation of making war; Somalia wanted weaponry and training which the Soviet Union was willing to supply.

As Paul Henze put it, "Siad was a model friend of the Russians, who lavished military aid on him to ensure that conservative Arab offers would be less attractive." While receiving this aid, Somalia continued to benefit from Western, Chinese and Arab economic aid.\(85\) For example, Italy provided Somalia with significant economic support. "And, as an associate member of the European Economic Community, Somalia received substantial aid from the European Development Fund, which -- among other things -- financed expansion of the national university and, jointly with the World Bank, construction of a deep-water port for Mogadishu."\(86\) Thus, Somalia successfully played the West, the Arabs and the Soviet Union off of each other in order to pursue its goal of a
military buildup.

Somalia took the most appealing offer of military aid, that of the U.S.S.R. Wary of limiting its options, Somalia refused American and Saudi offers of aid which were conditional on a Somali promise to not accept aid from the U.S.S.R. Ostensibly, Somalia was dependent upon the Soviet Union for military aid and training. Yet, this seeming dependence did not prevent the Somali invasion of Ethiopia. Ironically, it was the Soviet-supplied arms and training which enabled Somalia to act against Soviet wishes and pursue its irredentist aims.

Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia shows that the Somali dependence upon Soviet military aid did not guarantee the Soviets influence in Somalia. This illustrates the weakness of military aid as an instrument of influence. Furthermore, at the time of the invasion, Somalia received offers of military aid from both Saudi Arabia and the United States.(87) Saudi Arabia offered Somalia more than $500 million for armaments.(88) True dependence is rare since there are almost always other sources of aid.

6/ The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation

In 1974, Somalia became the first African country to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the Soviet Union.
However, only three years later, in November 1977, the Somalis renounced the treaty and ousted the 6,000 military and civilian Soviet personnel. (89) This split was caused by the Soviets supplying arms to Ethiopia, Somalia's historical enemy, which was a violation of the treaty. (90) The renunciation of the treaty was an indication of the general disintegration of Soviet-Somali relations which occurred because of the Soviet pursuit of closer relations with Ethiopia.

President Barre was more than willing to take part in a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. It did not impinge upon his objectives; in fact, closer relations with the Soviet Union was one of his objectives because of the benefits such close relations could bring. The treaty did not affect Somali sovereignty nor Barre's power, so great significance should not be attached to it.

The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Somalia and the Soviet Union indicated only very limited Soviet influence. The limited commitments of the treaty and the ease with which it was abrogated by Somalia were indicative of the absence of significant Soviet influence in Somalia. Basically, the treaty was indicative of friendly Soviet-Somali relations. When these relations fell apart, the treaty became obsolete.
7/ A Vanguard Party

With the 1969 coup, the Somali Western-style parliamentary democracy was replaced by a "revolutionary democracy" that supposedly provided representation and self-government through a series of committees at the regional, district and village levels. The governing body of the newly renamed "Somali Democratic State," headed by President Siad Barre, was named the Supreme Revolutionary Council. "The new regime's aims stressed the elimination of corruption and tribal nepotism and the re-establishment of a just and honourable society in which proper attention would be given to real economic and social betterment for all." This was followed in October 1970 by the declaration by President Barre that from that time on Somalia would be dedicated to "Scientific Socialism."

President Barre was eager to form a classic Soviet-style vanguard party after signing the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in 1974, having announced his plans for the creation of a party modeled upon "scientific socialist" principles in 1973. According to Paul Henze, the "Somali security service was strengthened along standard Soviet lines." A 1974 reorganization of the Somali government prepared the way for the July 1976 introduction of the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party. The establishment of the new party was the final step in the process of the replacement of military
rule by civilian rule which the Soviets had been pressing for. (95) With this change from military to civilian rule, Somalia became a nation governed by a vanguard party, as defined by the Soviet Union.

The Soviets accomplished one of their goals by getting President Barre to transform the Somali government along the lines they desired. Yet, scientific socialism also served Barre's purposes. The transformation of the government was due more to Barre's desire to consolidate his power and deal with Somalia's problems of poverty, disease and ignorance rather than due to influence by the Soviets.

According to I.M. Lewis, a national cult was developed around Siad Barre whereby the President was presented as the 'Victorious Leader' (Guulwaadde), dauntlessly leading the nation in its unremitting struggle against its foes. Posters, poems, songs of praise and panegyric speeches soon monotonously proclaimed throughout the country the sublime calling of the heroic 'Father' of the nation, whose 'Mother' was the Revolution. (96)

The use of "this Maoist cult to focus the vital energies of the masses was supplemented by a growing plethora of other agencies of thought control." (97) Barre's socialist Somalia emphasised control of the people through the National Security Service (N.S.S.) and National Security Courts (N.S.C.), and organizations such as the national "orientation centers" and the vigilante Victory Pioneers. The N.S.S. and N.S.C.

...jointly dealt with a wide range of 'political' offences including nepotism and tribalism, as well as with such charges as 'lack of revolutionary zeal'
and treason. Members of the N.S.S., under a Sandhurst and K.G.B.-trained commander, enjoyed arbitrary powers of arrest, sometimes following the denunciation of a suspect by his personal enemies. (98)

The Victory Pioneers were a type of youth militia recruited mostly from the unemployed whose main purposes seemed to be "mobilizing the population for the compulsory essays in self-help and monitoring the activities of foreigners, particularly their contacts with Somalis." (99)

Scientific socialism provided the justification and the method for President Barre to consolidate his authoritarian regime. Lewis describes President Barre's regime as follows:

If this extraordinarily complex apparatus... included any members capable of seriously challenging the authority of the President it was certainly by accident... it was clear that the President had every intention of retaining as complete control as ever... What the new structure sought to do was to endow the President's authority with greater legitimacy... Certainly socialism was here a means rather than an end. (100)

As evidence of his ephemeral commitment to Marxism-Leninism, Barre's Marxist rhetoric ended with the disintegration of the Somali-Soviet relationship. Barre's statements were made for the benefit of the Soviet Union. Once the Soviet-Somali relationship disintegrated there was no longer a need for such statements. (101)

Siad Barre did act as the Soviets wished when he formed a vanguard party. However, the key point is that the Soviets did not accomplish this against the wishes of President Barre.
Actually, Barre readily took to scientific socialism and used it to his own end. Therefore, we cannot attribute significant influence to the Soviets with respect to this indicator.

Conclusion

From the time of the initial Soviet-Somali military aid agreement in the 1960s to the eventual split between the two countries in 1977, the Soviet Union had an extensive relationship with Somalia. The Soviet Union was Somalia's superpower benefactor, supplying it with military training and large amounts of military aid. By all appearances, Somalia was a strong Soviet ally, if not a near satellite.

With respect to Quantitative Measures of Trade, Aid and Personnel, the Soviet Union was Somalia's sole source for the extensive military aid and training it received during the 1960s and 1970s. President Barre readily converted the ruling Somali party into a Soviet-style vanguard party. The Soviet Union and Somalia signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1974. The Soviet Union also acquired extensive air, naval and military facilities in Somalia. The Soviets seemed to readily achieve their goals in Somalia. By all appearances, these indicators seem to show that the Soviets successfully exercised influence within their model ally, Somalia. Yet, this influence did not prevent Somali independence of action. There were definite limitations to
Soviet influence in Somalia.

Somalia invaded Ethiopia despite Soviet protestations and threats to the Somali military supply line. This is strong evidence that despite appearances, the Soviet Union did not have significant influence within Somalia. It was not a Soviet satellite. A close inspection of the indicators shows that the Soviets did not succeed in getting Siad Barre to act contrary to his interests. In fact, most of them indicate either a lack of commitment to the issue on Barre's part, or the mutual interests of Somalia and the Soviet Union.

The Quantitative Measures of Trade, Aid and Personnel, Acquisition of Facilities, Vanguard Party, and Soviet Goals indicators all involved mutual interests of the Soviet Union and Somalia. The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, Vanguard Party and Soviet Goals indicators involved issues of low importance to Somalia. Thus, these indicators did not reveal the Soviet Union to have influenced Siad Barre to act against his wishes on an issue of importance.

The clearest determination of influence is the outcome of a specific demand by A upon B, such as the Soviet Union's unheeded demand that Somalia not invade Ethiopia. This failure of the Soviets to influence President Barre is especially significant because of the strong Somali commitment to the goal of retrieving the "lost territories." The truest test of A's influence involves issues which are both of importance to nation B and with respect to which B and A have
different goals. Although Soviet influence fluctuates over time, the limitations of Soviet influence would have been revealed at any time the Soviets challenged Somalia's commitment to its long-standing goal of regaining the "lost territories." Referring to the Soviet failure to convince Somalia to abandon plans to invade the Ogaden, Marina Ottaway states that, "Material benefits could buy other material benefits in return but not influence over important policy decisions involving major goals."(102) The Soviet inability to influence President Barre on this issue makes evident the lack of significant Soviet influence within Somalia.
CHAPTER 5 -- THE CASE STUDY OF ANGOLA

The April 1974 coup which toppled President Caetano's Portuguese government led directly to the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola. The new Portuguese government favoured Angolan independence as soon as possible. On January 15, 1975, the Alvor Agreement was signed by the Portuguese government and representatives of the three Angolan liberation movements, the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA. The agreement provided for an immediate cease-fire between the Portuguese and guerrilla forces and the granting of independence on November 10, 1975.

Angola was considered a valuable prize in the U.S.-Soviet competition for influence in the Third World because of its economic potential and strategic value. Angola was valued because it is well-endowed with oil, diamonds, gold and other minerals, as well as coffee. And Angola's several excellent harbours and proximity to the Cape oil route from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe and the United States gave the nation a strategic importance to the superpowers. With the impending independence, the stage was set for a superpower competition for influence in Angola.

The transitional Angolan government was made up of members from all three liberation movements and acted in conjunction with a Portuguese High Commissioner. However, prior to the granting of independence, fighting broke out
between the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA. Angola degenerated into a state of civil war involving the liberation forces and troops from Zaire, South Africa and Cuba. The Soviet Union, China and the United States all provided arms and funds to the various liberation movements. In late 1975, the Soviets helped equip and transport to Angola Cuban troops to fight in support of the MPLA. As the fighting continued, Portugal withdrew its troops and granted independence but did not recognize any of the three movements as the legitimate Angolan government.

Although the March 1976 withdrawal of the South African forces marked the end of the so-called "Angolan War," the fighting continued. The Cuban troops remained to help the MPLA in its battles against the FNLA and UNITA. South African troops also made occasional forays into Angola. Due to the Soviet military aid and the presence of the 15,000-20,000 Cuban troops, the MPLA was able to establish itself as the government of Angola. However, the ongoing opposition from the FNLA and UNITA necessitated the continued presence of the Cuban forces in support of the MPLA government.

Clearly, the Soviet Union was a major player within Angola because of its roles as both an arms supplier to the MPLA and the conduit for the transportation of the Cuban forces to Angola. The indicators of influence will be applied to the case study of Angola in order to determine to what extent the Soviet Union's role in Angola translated into
The MPLA suffered from factionalism from the time of the election of Agostinho Neto as its president in December 1962. Having accused Neto of following a "revisionist trend," Viriato Da Cruz was removed as the MPLA secretary general in May 1963. Despite the factionalism, strong challenges to Neto's leadership did not occur until the first half of the 1970s. In May 1974, Mario de Andrade formed the mestico(mulatto)-dominated Active Revolt faction of the MPLA in opposition to Neto's "personalized methods of leadership." In the same year, Neto also faced a challenge to his presidency from the eastern front military commander, Daniel Chipenda. Chipenda, an Ovimbundu and the leader of most of the MPLA's military forces, wanted less influence by mesticos within the MPLA. According to Keith Somerville, Chipenda and his supporters posed a serious challenge to Neto and "at one stage during the split, reportedly succeeded in persuading the Soviet Union to support their faction rather than Neto's."(103) Chipenda was eventually expelled from the party in December of 1975.(104)

The strongest challenge to Neto's rule came from the Nitists, supporters of Nito Alves. Alves was more pro-Soviet
than Neto and was against ties with the West. As evidence of his close ties to the Soviet Union, Alves attended the February 1976 CPSU congress in Moscow and made pro-Soviet speeches upon his return to Angola. (105) An important leader in the MPLA, Alves led the battle against the FNLA in Luanda in July 1975 and supported President Neto in his leadership struggle with Daniel Chipenda. Nonetheless, in October 1976, Alves was expelled from the MPLA Central Committee for "factionalism." Neto, considered a moderate and wary of close ties to the Soviet Union, viewed Alves as a serious threat to his leadership. (106)

Apparently, Nito Alves was in jail on May 27, 1977 when his followers attempted to overthrow the Neto government. (107) With the help of the Cuban troops in Angola, the coup attempt was quickly thwarted.

The Soviet Union was slow in voicing its support for Neto at the time of the coup attempt. Not until June 5 did the Soviets publicly indicate their preference for Neto and their opposition to the "splittists." (108) Due to the lack of Soviet support for Neto and their favourable opinion of Alves, there has been speculation that the Soviets participated in the coup attempt. Andrew Young stated, "Did you know that the Russians tried to overthrow President Agostinho Neto's Government in May?" According to Gerald Bender, Alves thought he had the Soviets' "blessings." Furthermore, Simon Malley claims that the Nitists approached the East European embassies
prior to the coup attempt in order to secure support. Apparently, they said that they would allow Soviet air and naval bases in Angola. (109)

Despite the speculation of Soviet assistance, there is no concrete evidence that the Soviets aided the Nitists. However, according to Arthur Klinghoffer, the Soviet Union must have known about Alves' plot and neither warned Neto of it nor aided him during the revolt. Soviet advisers and intelligence agents in Angola were in close contact with Alves and must have had knowledge of his plans. As Klinghoffer states, the Soviet failure to expose Alves could lead to the accusation that they were tacitly abetting him. (110) Importantly, Neto suspected the Soviet Union of complicity in the coup attempt. The MPLA released a statement on factionalism which claimed that the Nitists distorted Marxist-Leninist concepts and had a "feigned dedication to some friendly country." Angolan supporters of Neto "were alleging that the Soviet Union was implicated in the Alves plot and it appears that Neto believed in connivance against him." (111)

If the Soviet Union did connive with the Nitists, Soviet influence upon the situation was very minimal. The ease with which the Nitists were defeated indicates that either they did not get much support from the Soviets or the Soviet support was completely ineffectual. In either case, the Soviet Union failed to achieve its goal of aiding Alves to come to power.
Interestingly, it appears that by supporting Neto, and thereby essentially maintaining him in power, the Cubans acted contrary to the wishes of the Soviet Union. According to Klinghoffer, "Cuba therefore defended the Neto government from the pro-Soviet Nitists while the Soviet Union turned a not so blind eye away from Alves' preparations."(112) This indicates an independence on the part of the Cuban forces which have generally been thought to be Soviet proxies.

Assuming Soviet support of Alves, the independent actions of the Cubans and the failure of the Nitists indicate a lack of Soviet influence in this instance of domestic dissonance. Since this was an issue of importance to Neto on which his goal differed from that of the Soviet Union, the absence of Soviet influence is especially significant.

2/ Soviet Acquisition of Military, Naval and Air Facilities

Article 16 of the post-colonial Angolan constitution prohibited the establishment of foreign military bases on Angolan soil. President Neto was opposed to having foreign bases in his country, but stated that they might be allowed if it was deemed to be essential to the defense of Angola.(113) The Soviets wanted access to facilities in Angola in order to increase their power projection capability and establish a presence in the region. Through their ties
with the MPLA, the Soviets acquired port rights in Luanda, Lobita and Mocamedes and operated aerial surveillance out of Luanda. The Soviets were granted the same port, overflight and landing rights previously enjoyed by the United States when Angola was under Portuguese rule. And in September 1981, the Soviet Union installed a drydock in Angola in order to service the Soviet navy.

The Soviet Union acquired the rights to facilities in Angola. How does this relate to Soviet influence in that nation? Klinghoffer emphasises the difference between influence and power projection capability:

...one must be careful to draw distinctions between the projection of Soviet power into Angola and the extension of Soviet influence over the MPLA. The former would include military base and overflight rights or the positioning of troops and weapons and need not be directly related to the degree of influence exercised over the MPLA leadership. In fact, the projection of Soviet power could lead to a logistic dependence relationship which provides the MPLA with added political leverage over the U.S.S.R.

It is interesting to consider that the Soviet acquisition of facilities in Angola could give the MPLA influence over the Soviet Union. By establishing themselves in a nation, the Soviets make an investment that they would not want to lose; an investment of not only financial expenditures, but of time and prestige.

The value to the Soviet Union of having a presence in Angola should give the MPLA a certain amount of leverage in dealing with the Soviets. The extent of this leverage depends
upon the importance of the facilities to the Soviet Union and the significance attached to losing them. As long as there are no readily available equivalent facilities, then Angola would have a stronger position from which to negotiate. And the significance of the facilities to the Soviet Union would be partially based upon the fact that both the United States and China would probably be eager to replace the Soviet presence. This would give the MPLA some influence over the U.S.S.R. However, port facilities in a distant Third World nation are not likely to be of such importance to the Soviet Union so as to give Neto substantial influence; the Soviet need for the base would probably never be strong enough. Still, the limited influence which can be accorded to Angola due to the importance of a facility to the Soviet Union is indicative of the two-way nature of inter-nation influence relationships.

This indicator does not show significant Soviet influence in Angola. The Soviet Union did obtain overflight, landing and port rights in Angola in exchange for Soviet military aid. This indicates some Soviet influence over the MPLA. However, it would be an assumption to say that Neto was strongly opposed to the Soviet presence and had to be pressured to allow it. This does not seem to have been the case. A Soviet base would always be beneficial to the MPLA as a conduit for Soviet aid, goods and personnel supplied to Angola. And based upon the history of Soviet-Third World relations, the Soviet
presence could probably have been readily eliminated. Furthermore, as Klinghoffer indicates, the MPLA acquired possible influence over the Soviet Union because of the economic, logistic and prestige value of the Angolan facilities to the Soviets.

As the Angolan constitution dictated, the Soviets were not allowed to have any military bases in Angola. Soviet acquisition of such a base would have been indicative of greater Soviet influence since it is forbidden in the constitution. However, Neto did state that a foreign base might be allowed, as the Cuban presence essentially was, if it were deemed to be in the defense interests of Angola. If this were the actual reason for allowing the base, it would not be indicative of significant Soviet influence.

3/ Soviet Goals and Objectives

As with the Somalia case study, we can apply Albright's list of Soviet goals to examine whether the U.S.S.R. achieved its objectives in Angola. The Soviets did have success in accomplishing the goals that Albright outlines: (1) the establishment of bases, (2) the development of a voice in Africa, (3) undermining the West, and (4) counteracting China.

First, although the Soviets did not obtain permanent bases, they did establish port, overflight and landing rights
in Angola. Second, the Soviets established a presence in Angola through arms and funds supplied to the MPLA and through their role in getting the Cuban troops to Angola to fight in support of the MPLA. Third, through its support of the MPLA, the Soviet Union successfully undermined the West, mainly the United States, who supported UNITA. Essentially, the Soviets replaced the American presence of colonial Angola. Fourth, China was not able to counter the Soviet ability to provide arms and advisers. Furthermore, China was discredited because of its support of the FNLA and its failure to recognize the MPLA government.\(^{(117)}\) Thus, according to Albright's guidelines, the Soviets were very successful in Angola.

In this case study I am maintaining that Albright's outline of Soviet goals in Africa is a close approximation of the Soviet Union's goals in Angola. These are goals of a very general nature which could be pursued by the Soviets when the opportunity arose, as it did in Angola. The Soviet Union took an ad hoc approach which had military aid as its foundation. There was no grand strategy to Soviet policy in Angola.

Initially, the Soviets aided the MPLA liberation movement as part of its general policy of backing anti-colonial challenges to the status quo. Since the MPLA did not achieve much success against the Portuguese colonial regime, the Soviets cut off the supply of arms and funds in 1974. The Soviets were caught off guard by the Portuguese coup and the resultant proclamation of Angolan independence. Having
stopped funding the MPLA, Soviet relations with Neto and the MPLA were in disarray at the time. The Soviets had to quickly re-establish their connection with the MPLA. Thus, as the opportunity presented itself, the Soviet Union again attempted to influence the Angolan situation.

The Soviet Union did accomplish some important objectives in Angola. However, the question is whether this Soviet success translated into influence. The Soviet and Cuban presence was beneficial to the MPLA and not established against its wishes. The MPLA needed the military aid and training that the Soviets provided. Certainly, this MPLA need gave the Soviets some influence within Angola. To support a conclusion of significant Soviet influence in Angola based upon Soviet goal achievement, it needs to be shown that the Soviet goals were achieved against the wishes of President Neto. This was not the case; Neto entered into a relationship with the Soviets because of its benefits to him and the MPLA, not because of Soviet influence. The Soviets were eager to aid the MPLA. Neto was eager to receive the aid. Thus, he pursued his goals as the Soviets pursued theirs. Rather than controlling the situation through influence, the Soviets took advantage of an opportunity which presented itself and established a mutually beneficial relationship with Neto and the MPLA.
4/ Attitudes and Perceptions

Due to a lack of information I am unable to apply this indicator of influence to the case study.

5/ Quantitative Measures of Trade, Aid and Personnel

The Soviet Union began to supply the MPLA with small amounts of arms and funds in 1964. The ineffectiveness of the MPLA as a liberation movement led to a slowdown in the Soviet supply of assistance in 1971. Then in early 1974 Soviet aid was completely cutoff. The total Soviet assistance prior to 1975 was about $54 million.\(118\) According to Klinghoffer, the Soviets probably stopped the flow of arms and funds because of Daniel Chipenda's challenge to Neto's leadership. It was unclear who would win the leadership struggle, so the Soviets took a wait-and-see attitude.\(119\)

With the Portuguese coup and the resultant impending Angolan independence, the Soviet Union began to supply extensive military aid to the MPLA in September 1975. The Soviet Union delivered approximately $300 million in arms from March 1975 until the end of most of the fighting in February 1976.\(120\) The Soviets also played a major role in transporting and equipping the Cuban troops which were so valuable in aiding the MPLA to secure dominance in
Angola. However, Soviet economic aid to Angola has been minimal. From 1975 to 1982, the Soviet Union offered Angola $40 million of economic aid, of which only about half was actually disbursed.

After Angolan independence, the Soviet Union and Angola developed a fairly extensive trade relationship. The Soviet Union has exported to Angola machinery and transport equipment such as planes, trucks and cars, and imported coffee. Angola and the Soviet Union signed a fishing agreement in April 1977 which involved the exchange of fishing equipment (including ships and technical assistance) for fishing rights in Angolan waters. The Soviets also pledged to help with the building and improvement of the Angolan fishing ports. Numerous other agreements were signed -- for sugar, agriculture, mining and so on, yet the Cuban presence was much more noticeable than that of the Soviets.

In January 1982, the Soviet Union and Angola signed a major trade and aid pact worth approximately $2 billion. The pact included a ten-year economic co-operation agreement which contained a clause pledging further co-operation in other areas and a Soviet commitment of further military aid. A more specific five-year trade, economic and technical accord was also signed at the same time.

Although trade between Angola and CMEA states increased, Angola's trade, based largely upon oil exports, remained geared strongly towards the Western nations. Even after ten
years of independence, trade with Western countries still accounted for more than 70 per cent of Angola's total trade. Trade between Angola and the socialist countries has never exceeded 10 per cent of Angola's total trade. (125)

The MPLA's need for Soviet military aid and Cuban troop assistance gave the Soviet Union a major presence in Angola. This need was most pronounced during the time leading up to and just after Angolan independence, but continued as long as the MPLA faced internal or external opposition. Of particular significance were the Cuban troops which aided the MPLA in its rise to power and ensured Neto's retention of power during the Nitist revolt. We might assume that this reliance upon the Cuban forces guaranteed the Soviets influence in Angola. The term often used to refer to Cuban forces, proxies, implies a subservience to the Soviets. With the Angolan government dependent upon a Cuban force subservient to the Soviet Union, the Soviets should have significant influence within Angola. However, Klinghoffer suggests something quite different. He states that the "Cubans were useful to Neto as a buffer to the Soviets...." (126) As mentioned in the Domestic Dissonance section, the Cubans appeared to have acted independently of the Soviet Union in their support of Neto during the Nitist revolt. The Soviets failed to give Neto even verbal support during, and immediately after, the coup attempt. Rather than taking the initiative, the Soviets took a more reactive, wait and see approach, as they did during the leadership struggle
between Neto and Daniel Chipenda. On the other hand, the Cubans were instrumental in defeating the Nitists. The Cubans had a greater impact upon the situation than the Soviets.

At the time of independence, Angola suffered from a "shortage of skilled and managerial manpower, resulting from the mass exodus of Portuguese settlers, who had monopolized all such skills during the colonial period."(127) Thus, Soviet supplied personnel played a major role in the newly independent Angola. After the war, there were an estimated 500 Soviet military advisers and 750 economic and cultural advisers in Angola.(128) The Times reported on June 9, 1976 that Soviet advisers had "direct and exclusive" control of the Angolan Defence Ministry.(129) According to Vanneman and James, "The Deputy Defence minister, Sergei Sokolov, visited the country in December 1977 to set the stage for a Soviet takeover of all Angolan military intelligence; and in 1978, 12 Russian generals assumed responsibility for military planning, which amounts to virtual command over the 14,000 Cuban troops there."

Cubans supervised the Ministry of the Interior and the powerful Directorate of Intelligence and Security. East German advisers took over direction of the government's internal administration and Romanian advisers did the same for the agricultural program and the development of natural resources. There was also joint Soviet-Cuban control of the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Angola.(131) Thus, Soviet, Cuban and East European
personnel established themselves in key positions of the Angolan government.

The large number of prominently placed Eastern Bloc advisers in Angola probably gave the Soviet Union influence because they could directly affect the running of the MPLA government. Even without being in positions of executive power, the MPLA reliance upon Soviet and other Eastern bloc personnel must have given the Soviet Union influence in Angola. A decision-maker is influenced by the bureaucratic organization of which he or she is a part. The bureaucracy is the decision-maker's main source of information and policy options. Eastern bloc personnel within the government could push policy options favourable to the Soviet Union and downplay or denigrate those unfavourable to the U.S.S.R. The higher up in the power structure that the Eastern bloc advisers are placed, the greater the possibility of Soviet influence. Yet, it is difficult to determine the extent of this influence since I do not have information regarding specific incidents of Soviet influence through the foreign personnel in Angola.

The ultimate reins of power rested with the ruling elite, in this case President Neto and the Central Committee of the MPLA. It is unlikely that Neto would have allowed his power to be usurped by foreign personnel regardless of their value to the running of the Angolan nation. Neto's retention of power would take precedence over all else. As we have seen in
nations such as Somalia and Egypt, the apparent infiltration of Eastern bloc personnel within a Third World nation may be quickly eliminated. Still, of the entities that comprise this indicator, Eastern bloc personnel in Angola gave the Soviet Union the greatest potential for influence.

6/ The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation

On October 8, 1976, Angola became the first sub-Saharan African state to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the Soviet Union. The treaty called for Soviet-Angolan military co-operation and the co-ordination of their positions should there be a threat to peace. As with other Treaties of Friendship and Co-operation, there was no explicit defense commitment by either nation.

From the Soviet viewpoint, the treaty was a method for developing closer Soviet-Angolan relations. It was described by TASS as being aimed at broadening Party contacts at all levels and providing for "comradely exchanges of views" on all questions of mutual interest. Arrangements were made for regular exchanges of delegations; for co-operation in the training of Party cadres and for the conducting of joint research into "topical problems of contemporary social development"; the cementing of contacts between Party press organs and other sections of the mass media; and the promoting
of friendly relations between "public organizations" (i.e. trade unions, cultural groups, et cetera) in the two countries. It was also agreed that the ruling parties of the Soviet Union and Angola should each year implement practical plans and measures of co-operation and that military co-operation should also be further developed in the interests of strengthening Angola's "defence capacity."(132) Thus, the Soviets themselves emphasised the mutual benefits of the treaty.

Although the treaty indicates closer Soviet-Angolan relations, it does not guarantee a continued Soviet-Angolan friendship. As Klinghoffer states, "Friendship treaties have not necessarily signified a strong or permanent attachment between the Soviet Union and a Third World state as several have been short-lived or rendered moribund. The Soviet Union and Angola now have fraternal relations but the tale of Cain and Abel has never been forgotten through out recorded history."(133)

The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation is indicative of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Angola. It allows the Soviet Union to have a voice in Angolan affairs through various channels. However, the benefits of the treaty are mutual and the commitments are limited and vague. Therefore, the treaty is indicative of limited, very general Soviet influence.
The MPLA has always had a Marxist foundation, well-trained administrative cadres and a multiracial and transtribal perspective. From its inception, it included many mulattoes (mesticos), assimilated blacks (assimilados) and whites, and had closer ties to the Portuguese colonial administration than the two other liberation movements. These factors helped attract Soviet and Cuban support for the MPLA.(134)

After World War II, the Portuguese Communist Party started to organize an affiliate in Angola with the help of white communists living there. The Partido Communisto de Angola was founded in October 1955. It later merged with other leftists to form the Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola. There was a further merging of leftists with the creation of the MPLA in December 1956. Thus, the MPLA included communists from its very inception.(135) Presumably, this historical Marxist connection increased the potential for Soviet influence over the MPLA. Certainly, the Marxist nature of the MPLA made it more likely to follow policies similar to those of the Soviet Union. However, as the history of Soviet-Chinese relations, for example, shows, the bonds of Marxism have never guaranteed the Soviet Union influence over a party or government.

At the February 1968 MPLA conference at Dolisie in Congo-
Brazzaville, it was decided that the MPLA would become a revolutionary party "once sufficient cadres had been educated" and that at some time in the future the movement would be transformed into a vanguard party. (136) However, Neto played down the Marxist elements of MPLA policies and emphasised Angolan independence. In August 1972, he stated that the MPLA "is socialist because we don't intend to allow either Angolans or foreigners to exploit others in the country...We think that ideologically we follow not necessarily the communist or Marxist line but we follow the socialist line, with justice for all." (137)

Shortly after the civil war, Prime Minister Nascimento stated, "Our people have brought off a socialist revolution, and we are firmly resolved to build the first socialist state in the African continent." (138) A statement from the MPLA Politburo marking the first anniversary of the People's Republic of Angola referred to the country as a "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and progressive sectors of the petty bourgeoisie." (139) This "revolutionary democratic dictatorship" was to be led by a vanguard party "formed from the most ideologically and politically reliable cadres of the liberation movement." (140) It was clear that, as Somerville states, "the MPLA had no intention of sharing power with other political forces." (141)

In the autumn of 1977, the MPLA's Central Committee
announced a "Program of Action" which called for the transformation of the MPLA into a vanguard party based upon scientific socialist principles. "African socialism" was explicitly rejected because of its failure to recognize class distinctions.(142) Supposedly, scientific socialism provided an ideology suitable for dealing with the Angolan political situation. Theoretically, Marxism's class basis provided a way of circumventing the ethnic and tribal divisions which plagued Angola. The MPLA attempted to unite Angolans by playing down the tribal divisions of the nation and emphasising its class structure. At the First Party Congress in December 1977, the MPLA was reconstituted as the MPLA-Party of Labour.(143)

The Soviets continually praised the progress of the MPLA, calling it a "revolutionary democratic party" and its ideology "very close to Marxism-Leninism." Angola was credited with having followed the "socialist path of development."(144)

The Marxist-Leninist character of the MPLA led to friendly MPLA-Soviet relations. This relationship developed with the alliance of the MPLA and the Soviet Union during the Angolan War. After the MPLA established itself as the Angolan government, the Soviet-MPLA relationship solidified as the MPLA embarked upon the path of scientific socialism. Yet, Neto did not blindly follow the principles of Soviet scientific socialism. Scientific socialism was applied pragmatically in Angola. For example, Neto was very careful
in dealing with the agricultural sector and did not attempt to nationalize or collectivize land. (145)

Although Neto transformed the MPLA into a vanguard, he did not call the MPLA communist nor advocate a transition beyond socialism to communism. (146) Rather than a sign of subservience to the Soviet Union, the transformation of the MPLA into a vanguard party was in keeping with the Neto's pragmatic, evolutionary approach to Marxism.

Given the history of Soviet-MPLA relations, it is unlikely that Neto would have become so complacent that he would have allowed himself to fall under the control of the Soviets. The Soviet discontinuation of military aid to the MPLA in 1974 and their lack of support for Neto during the Nitist revolt would have made any leader wary of significantly closer relations with the Soviet Union. Neto was an experienced political leader who knew how to maintain and consolidate his power position. He was a political survivor who was able to either eliminate or neutralise his foes. For example, he fended off the challenges to his leadership from Chipenda and Alves. He also increased his power by amending the Angolan constitution so that he would preside over cabinet meetings instead of Prime Minister Nascimento. (147) Neto did not fight so long and hard to retain control of the MPLA only to allow himself to be manipulated by the Soviet Union. According to Klinghoffer, the "Soviets had difficulty dealing with Neto on a personal level due to his secretive style and
inflexibility." Neto also maintained ties with the West because he did not want Angola to become too closely aligned with the Soviet Union.

Similar to the Somali situation, scientific socialism legitimized the MPLA's creation of a number of organizations which served to maintain MPLA control within Angola. The People's Defence Organization was "designed to unite and bring under party control many of the self-defense groups formed by MPLA supporters in the aftermath of the white backlash that followed the Portuguese revolution." The Angolan Directorate of Information and Security (DISA), the Angolan secret police, was established to "combat anti-MPLA and anti-state activities." In 1976, DISA was used by the MPLA against the leftist groups Active Revolt and the Organization of Angolan Communists. The MPLA created a Department for the Organization of the Masses in order to maintain control at the neighbourhood and village level. Also, mass organizations such as the Union of Angolan Workers, MPLA-Youth and the Organization of Angolan Women served the MPLA purposes of maintaining control and disseminating its policies.

Rather than an acquiescence to Soviet influence, the transformation of the MPLA into a vanguard party was a decision based upon the interests of Neto and the MPLA. Neto formed a vanguard party because the MPLA was a Marxist liberation movement, not because of Soviet influence. In contrast to Siad Barre's vanguard party, the MPLA's
transformation was a natural progression for a movement which was Marxist from its inception. Like Siad Barre, Neto's political power was his main concern. He was not about to entrust it to the Soviet Union. Thus, the transformation of the MPLA into a vanguard followed Neto's timetable, not the Soviet Union's.

Conclusion

The indicators of influence reveal a strong Soviet impact upon Angola and more influence than in Somalia. However, the indicators do not show that the Soviets had significant influence over Neto and the MPLA.

The Soviets were granted access to Angolan facilities in exchange for military aid. It might be assumed that only through significant influence would the Soviets be granted access to facilities in Angola. This is not necessarily so, since the Soviet presence was mutually beneficial. Neto allowed the Soviet presence because it was in Angola's interests. Also, it is important to differentiate between Soviet influence and Soviet power projection. Through access to Angolan facilities, the Soviet Union did increase its power projection capability. It is not evident that at the same time the Soviet Union garnered more than limited influence over the MPLA. Obviously, the MPLA was dependent upon Soviet
military aid. Yet, it is not apparent that the Soviets were able to translate this dependence into extensive influence.

Neither the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation nor the creation of a vanguard party revealed Neto to have acted contrary to his own objectives. Only minor influence can be attributed to the Soviet Union according to these indicators.

The Domestic Dissonance indicator was more valuable than the other indicators for determining Soviet influence in Angola. The failure of the Soviets to influence the Nitist coup attempt is similar to, but not as significant as, the Soviet failure to prevent the Somali invasion of Ethiopia. However, it is unclear to what extent the Soviet Union actually attempted to influence the Nitist revolt. The Soviets may have hoped Neto would be overthrown but did not want to risk being more directly involved in the process. Nonetheless, the lack of Soviet influence upon the situation is evident.

Without the Cuban presence in Angola and the Soviet military aid, it is unlikely that the MPLA would have been able to achieve and maintain its position of power. The MPLA government was also dependent upon the skills of Eastern bloc personnel. These dependencies must have given the Soviet Union influence over the MPLA. However, the Cubans also acted as a buffer between the MPLA and the Soviets. This allowed Neto to make use of substantial military support without having to rely directly upon the Soviet Union. Thus, Neto
retained his independence despite the fragility of his regime. Despite the Soviet-MPLA ideological connection, Neto was wary of being too closely aligned with the Soviet Union. He consolidated his power by shifting more pro-Soviet members of the MPLA to positions of less influence within the government. The Soviets also had difficulty dealing with Neto because of his independence. He applied scientific socialism in Angola pragmatically. Although the Soviet Union achieved more influence in Angola than in Somalia, this influence was not unlimited. Since Neto did not act contrary to his own objectives on an issue of importance to him, the Soviet Union did not have significant influence in Angola.
CHAPTER 6 -- CONCLUSION

From World War II until about the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union was in the favourable position of challenging the status quo on the side of the "progressive" forces of the international political system. As the pre-World War II colonial order disintegrated, there were a myriad of opportunities for the Soviet Union to advance its position in the Third World. However, not until the 1970s did the Soviet Union possess the capabilities to take full advantage of these opportunities.

With its development of an improved power projection capability, the Soviet Union appeared to greatly increase its influence throughout the Third World. At the same time, the Soviet Union essentially reached nuclear parity with the United States, thereby securing itself the stature equivalent to its superpower competitor. However, as it became apparent that Soviet socialism did not enable Third World nations to leap forward to the level of economic and political development of the developed world, the value of the Soviet Union as an ideological leader declined rapidly.

In contrast to the expansion of Soviet influence of the 1970s, the 1980s found the Soviet Union bogged down in Afghanistan and struggling to hold onto the advances it had made in the previous decade. The 1980s lacked the opportunities of the 1970s for the Soviets to pursue which the
disintegration of the Portuguese colonial empire had created. Under the leadership of Gorbachev, the politically and economically troubled Soviet Union began a retreat from the Third World.

The most notable example of this retreat was the Soviet withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan in 1989. This ten year war was an internationally embarrassing, internally demoralising and economically costly failure for the Soviet Union. Gorbachev referred to the Afghanistan war as a "bleeding sore." (151) For the first time, the Soviet Union used its own troops to support a Third World ally, only to fail to secure victory. In the span of about fifteen years, the Soviet Union went from the peak of its influence in the Third World, to suffering probably its greatest failure in the history of its Third World relations.

There are other examples of the Soviet Union's withdrawal from the Third World. The Soviet Union pressured Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea. The Soviets supported the U.S.-brokered talks on the independence of Namibia which saw the withdrawal of the Cuban troops in Angola. The Soviet Union encouraged the Ethiopian government to end its fighting with the Eritrean separatists. (152) The Soviets did not attempt to prevent the FSLN's loss of power through elections in Nicaragua. Recently, the Soviets watched, along with the rest of the world, as the Mengistu government fell to the rebels.

Few, if any, analysts predicted the Soviet retreat from
the Third World which has occurred. Analysing inter-nation
relations is difficult enough without having to predict the
future. Given the limitations of our knowledge and analysts'
preset notions, assumptions will always be made. However,
despite the lack of information for studying inter-nation
influence, some things can be stated with a high degree of
certainty.

By its simplest definition, influence is the ability of
nation A to get nation B to act as it wishes. The tactics
involved in this process range from simple persuasion to the
use of force. However, two key elements determine the extent
of the influence; they are: (1) the importance of the issue to
nation B, and (2) the compatibility of the objectives of
nation A and nation B. These two factors are essential to
determining the influence of nation A.

My analysis of the indicators of influence has reinforced
my initial belief that many of them are of limited value for
determining Soviet influence. The Treaty of Friendship and
Co-operation, Quantitative Measures of Trade and Aid, and the
Vanguard Party generally reveal only low levels of Soviet
influence. The Soviet Acquisition of Facilities and Soviet
Goals generally indicate low to medium levels of Soviet
influence. All of these indicators can reveal a Soviet
presence within the Third World nation which should not be
equated with Soviet influence. Just as power does not
translate equivalently into influence, neither does presence.
Often what is assumed to be significant influence involves mutual benefits for the Soviets and nation B and/or a lack of commitment to the issue on the part of B. For example, it may be assumed that because the Soviet Union acquires the rights to facilities in nation B in exchange for Soviet military aid, it must have extensive influence within B. This assumption fails to take into account the motives and perceptions of B. Perhaps B only needed to be persuaded because it felt that the Soviet presence was to its benefit. The mutually beneficial exchange of Soviet aid for a base within B does not mean the Soviets would be able to influence B's behaviour on major policy decisions, as the Somalia case study shows.

The temporal nature of influence can mean a quick changeover in alliances. Third World nations have often been able to manipulate the East-West competition for influence to serve their own purposes. They have successfully played the superpowers against each other in order to fulfill their needs and prevent subservience to any power. Somalia took military aid from the Soviet Union because it made the best offer. At the same time, Somalia accepted Western and Arab economic aid. If the United States or the Arab nations had made the best military aid offer, it would probably been accepted by Siad Barre.

In both case studies, despite apparent Soviet influence according to the indicators, an examination of specific
incidents revealed the limitations of this influence. The Somali invasion of Ethiopia and the expulsion of the Soviets from Somalia showed that the Soviet Union lacked influence over the Barre regime when vital interests were at stake. The Cuban independence during the Nitist revolt and the failure of the Soviets to play a significant role in the coup attempt revealed the limitations of the Soviet ability to control events in Angola.

In order to have a better understanding of Soviet influence upon nation B, we must closely examine B. Since Soviet-nation B relations involve two nations, it is logical that both nations should be examined as rigorously as possible. Many of the indicators focus upon the Soviet perspective, ignoring, or minimising, the role of nation B in the influence relationship. Attitudes and Perceptions, Domestic Dissonance, and Personnel have more value as indicators of Soviet influence because they consider the perspective of B.

Attitudes and Perceptions and Domestic Dissonance are particularly valuable because they can reveal both the importance of an issue to B, and B's objectives. Using these indicators, we can determine Soviet influence through the examination of the outcome of a specific attempt by the Soviet Union to influence nation B. The success or failure of the Soviet Union to get nation B to act contrary to B's own objective on an issue of importance to B is the determinant of
the extent of Soviet influence.

The limitation of using the Domestic Dissonance, Attitudes and Perceptions, and the role of Eastern bloc personnel is the availability of information from within the domestic political system of B. The development of techniques for the gathering of this information is an important area for further study. In particular, further analysis of Attitudes and Perceptions and the role of foreign personnel in B would be very valuable.

It is the specific Soviet influence attempts involving conflicting objectives on issues of importance to Barre and Neto, the Somali invasion and the Nitist coup attempt respectively, which reveal the limitations of Soviet influence. Thus, rather than assuming that the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation is a sign of extensive Soviet influence, the importance of the issue to nation B and the degree of conflict between the objectives of nation B and the Soviet Union need to be examined. The significance of the individual indicator can be determined by the consideration of these two factors. Certain indicators are of less significance than is usually assumed: the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, Vanguard Party, Quantitative Measures of Trade and Aid, and Soviet Acquisition of Facilities. These can indicate a strong Soviet presence, and even substantial Soviet influence. Although the influence increases with the fulfillment of each indicator, Soviet influence cannot be
demonstrated as long as nation B's vital interests are not at stake.

The most valuable indicators are Attitudes and Perceptions, Domestic Dissonance and possibly Personnel. The use of these indicators in conjunction with the analysis of a specific incident of attempted Soviet influence can determine the extent of Soviet influence. The outcome of the influence attempt tells us the success or failure of the Soviet Union in achieving its goal. The indicators tell us the extent of the Soviet influence given a Soviet success. In other words, first examine a concrete attempt by the Soviets to achieve a goal; for example, an attempt to acquire a naval facility within B or an attempt to prevent B from carrying out an act of aggression. Given a Soviet success, then, using the indicators, determine the degree of Soviet influence by analysing the importance of the issue to B and the compatibility of the objectives of the Soviet Union and B with respect to the incident.

The key to analysing inter-nation influence is realising that its extent can vary. It is important not to over estimate Soviet influence, or to equate Soviet influence with Soviet control over nation B. The Soviet Union was able to establish a dependence upon its military aid by both Somalia and Angola. Mainly through this dependence, the Soviets garnered influence in both nations. However, the Soviet influence was not unlimited. The limitations of Soviet
influence became evident when the Third World nation's vital interests were at stake. Hopefully, through careful consideration of the indicators of influence, an analyst can differentiate between the different levels of Soviet influence.
FOOTNOTES


4. Ibid., p. 145.

5. Ibid., p. 154.


10. Ibid., p. 155.


15. Ibid., p. 12.


22. Ibid., p. 201.


27. Ibid., pp. 192, 194.


29. Ibid., p. 199.


31. Ibid., p. 133.


34. Ibid., p. 516.

36. Ibid., p. 55.

37. Ibid., p. 56.

38. Ibid., p. 56.


40. Ibid., p. 16.

41. Nogee and Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 159.


43. Ibid., p. 193.


47. Ibid., p. 111.


50. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 201.

51. Ibid., pp. 201-202.

52. Nogee and Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 182.


57. Ibid., p. 214.

58. Ibid., p. 211.

59. Ibid., p. 214.

60. Ibid., p. 216.

61. Ibid., p. 214.

62. Ibid., p. 221.


69. Ibid., p. 286.

70. Ibid., p. 116.


77. Ibid., p. 180.


79. Ibid., p. 115.

80. Ibid., p. 115.

81. Ibid., p. 117.


91. Selassie, *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn*, p. 117.


95. Lewis, Somalia, p. 219.
97. Ibid., p. 211.
98. Ibid., p. 212.
100. Lewis, Somalia, p. 223, 225.
105. Somerville, Angola, p. 175.
107. Klinghoffer, Angolan War, p. 128.
108. Ibid., p. 130.
109. Ibid., p. 130.
110. Ibid., p. 131.
111. Ibid., pp. 129-130.
112. Ibid., p. 131.
113. Ibid., pp. 74-75.
114. Ibid., pp. 75, 78.
115. Vanneman and James, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 44.
117. Ibid., p. 127.
118. Ibid., p. 21.
119. Ibid., p. 21.
120. Ibid., p. 27.
121. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
122. Somerville, Angola, p. 149.
124. Vanneman and James, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 46.
125. Somerville, Angola, pp. 149, 178.
127. Somerville, Angola, p. 47.
128. Vanneman and James, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 45.
130. Vanneman and James, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 45.
132. Ibid., p. 108.
133. Ibid., p. 155.
135. Ibid., p. 10.
137. Ibid., pp. 37, 38.
138. Ibid., p. 121.
139. Ibid., p. 121.
140. Ibid., p. 81.
141. Ibid., p. 81.


144. Ibid., p. 126.


146. Ibid., p. 151.

147. Ibid., p. 125.

148. Ibid., p. 21.

149. Ibid., p. 48.

150. Ibid., p. 48.


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