DRUSUS CAESAR, THE SON OF TIBERIUS

BY

MILLO L.G. SHAW

B.A. (Hons.), The University of Manitoba, 1974
M.A., The University of British Columbia, 1979
LL.B., The University of British Columbia, 1984

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Classics)

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
September 1990

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Department of Classics

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date November 14, 1980
ABSTRACT

This dissertation attempts to deduce from the ancient sources and assess the life of Drusus, the son of Tiberius, focussing upon his position and conduct within the Julio-Claudian principate and succession. The study is worthwhile, but difficult. Drusus was a prominent member of the imperial family, but the surviving literary references to him are deficient in both detail and quality, probably because the original sources were biased in favour of the Julian side of the family, chiefly represented by Germanicus, and against the Claudian members, like Drusus.

He was born on October 7th, probably between 15 and 13 BC. His father, Tiberius Claudius Nero, had illustrious patrician forbears and was stepson to Augustus Caesar, while his mother, Vipsania Agrippina, was daughter of the Emperor's right-hand man, Marcus Agrippa. Drusus was initially excluded from the imperial succession because he lacked direct kinship with the Emperor, but in AD 4 he was made the adoptive grandson of Augustus and fourth in the line of succession after Tiberius, Agrippa Postumus, and Germanicus, who were also adopted. His name was changed to Drusus Julius Caesar, reflecting his full-fledged membership in the Julian dynasty. He received extraordinary honours, including a distinguished marriage to his cousin, Livilla, accelerated promotion through the cursus honorum, and official pairing with his adoptive brother, Germanicus.
Upon the deaths of Augustus and Postumus and the accession of Tiberius in AD 14, Drusus stood second in the succession. He lived up to his high position. In 14 he expeditiously suppressed a dangerous mutiny among the Pannonian legions, and from late 17 to early 20 his activities along the Danube frontier so weakened the German tribes that they would not bother the Empire for another fifty years. As a civilian magistrate and senator he acted competently and fairly. He was praised for checking grave abuses of the law of treason. He appears to have had an open, friendly disposition and a beneficial influence upon the Emperor.

Germanicus' death in AD 19 left Drusus as Tiberius' primary successor. Tiberius formally confirmed his new status by sharing a consulship with him in 21 and, in particular, by requesting the tribunician power for him in 22. Numismatic evidence suggests the possibility that, by 22 or 23 at the latest, the Emperor transferred the imperial dynasty to Drusus as well by placing his twin sons, born probably near the end of 19, ahead of the sons of Germanicus in the succession.

Tragically, in September, 23, at the very peak of his career, Drusus died. At the time he was thought to have passed away from natural causes, but in 31 the stunning charge was made that he had been poisoned by his wife and others in conspiracy with the commander of the Praetorian Guard, Aelius Sejanus. The allegation was believed by
Tiberius and the source tradition, but the evidence preserved in the historical record is inconclusive. Drusus' death proved a significant loss both for his family and for the principate. The dynasty shifted back to the Julians and Tiberius' regime began to fall away from the moderation, justice, and efficient administration that had prevailed while Drusus was alive. Perhaps worst of all, the way was opened for Caligula to become the next Emperor. If Drusus had survived to succeed his father, the record of his conduct and character suggests that his reign could have matched Augustus' in excellence.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am especially grateful to my supervisor, Dr. A.A. Barrett, who recommended the thesis topic, guided and corrected my work, and showed extraordinary patience at the long gestation of this dissertation. I also wish to thank Dr. K.A. Dusing and Dr. J.A.S. Evans, members of the thesis committee, for their helpful comments and criticism.

I am very grateful as well to my parents, without whose generous support, including the use of their word processor, I should not have been able to complete the dissertation. I am also indebted to my sister, Jennifer Hidlebaugh, for her help in typing, editing, and copying.

Many others, including Ed Clark, Andrew Sherwood, David Vogt, Dr. M. Yedlin, Dr. C. Simpson, and my fellow students in the Reading Room, have given me useful information and suggestions about individual historical and technical problems. I thank them all.
DRUSUS CAESAR, THE SON OF TIBERIUS

CHAPTER 1: BIRTH AND BACKGROUND

Drusus Julius Caesar, the son of Tiberius, was a pre-eminent member of the Julio-Claudian dynasty. In AD 4 he was made grandson of Augustus by adoption and thereby became a potential candidate for the principate. Upon Augustus' death in AD 14 only Tiberius and Germanicus stood between him and the throne, and upon Germanicus' death in 19 he became de facto heir presumptive. Tiberius confirmed that he intended Drusus to be the next emperor by sharing a consulship with him in 21 and by bestowing the tribunician power upon him in 22. Premature death in 23 alone forestalled his ascent to the throne. Drusus also won distinction in the practical affairs of the state. In particular, he played a significant role in the establishment of Tiberius' regime in AD 14 and in pacifying the Empire's German frontier, an outstanding achievement that had eluded Augustus, Tiberius, Nero Drusus, and Germanicus. He deserved a primary place in the historical record.

He did not get it. He appears, for the most part, a shadowy, background figure in the record of early imperial affairs. The surviving references to him are frequently indirect and present only a fragmentary picture. His undeserved obscurity may be due, at least in part, to a distortion in the sources. Most of the surviving evidence
about his life is preserved in Tacitus' *Annals* and Cassius Dio's *Roman History*, composed, respectively, nearly one and two centuries after his death. They in turn depended on a tradition which appears to have been biased in favour of Drusus' cousin and adoptive brother, Germanicus, and against Drusus and his father (see Excursus I). Such limitations preclude a totally satisfactory reconstruction of Drusus' life, but careful analysis of the evidence can clarify important biographical details, add insights, and help, perhaps, to render a fairer assessment of the man and his deeds.

The fragmentary picture of Drusus begins with his birth. The only reasonably certain information about his origins and early life concerns his lineage. It seems likely that his parents were Tiberius Claudius Nero, Emperor in AD 14, and Vipsania Agrippina, the daughter of Augustus' right-hand man, Marcus Agrippa. One passage in Dio sounds a dissonant note: he explains Tiberius' hostility towards Gaius Asinius Gallus as arising in part from the latter's claim that Drusus was his son (ὑἱός). There is, however, no evidence elsewhere in the sources to verify such a claim, and it should be noted that Dio, after all, merely reports it; he does not vouch for it. In fact, Dio himself evidently did not believe it because wherever else he makes reference to Drusus' father, he always mentions Tiberius. Perhaps Gallus meant nothing more than that Drusus was his stepson, a claim that, as the second husband of Drusus' mother, he would have
been entitled to make (see Excursus II). At any rate, the general opinion that Drusus was the son of Tiberius and Vipsania may be accepted as authoritative.

Drusus' date of birth is much more difficult to pin down. The Feriale Cumanum records the month and day as October 7th, but no ancient authority indicates the year. It is possible, nevertheless, to establish from the available evidence a narrow range of years. On the one hand Germanicus' consistent precedence over Drusus in the cursus honorum presents the strong likelihood that he was older than Drusus. Tiberius' request to the Senate for the appointment of Germanicus to the East in AD 17, partly on the grounds that Drusus was too young for the job, supports this view. Since Germanicus was born May 24, 15 BC Drusus' birth would thus have occurred after this date. On the other hand, since both Dio and Suetonius record that Augustus betrothed Julia to Tiberius after Vipsania had borne him Drusus and had become pregnant again, and since Dio reports that the betrothal took place prior to Tiberius' campaign against the Pannonians in 12 BC, it follows that Drusus must have been born before this campaign. The outer limits for his date of birth can be fixed, thus, at October 7, 15 BC and October 7, 12 BC.

The circumstances of Tiberius' divorce from Vipsania in 12 BC permit a narrowing of this range. Augustus obliged him to divorce her after the death of Marcus Agrippa because he was the best available candidate to replace Agrippa in his
essential roles as colleague to the Emperor, husband to Julia, and father and potential regent for the Emperor's grandsons and adopted sons, Gaius and Lucius Caesar. Agrippa seems to have died no later than the end of March, 12 BC. Augustus, obviously, could have ordered the divorce only after that date. On the other hand, Dio, as noted, places Vipsania's second pregnancy and the end of her marriage before Tiberius' expedition against the Pannonians, which must have been launched prior to the end of the campaigning season in the summer of 12. So the second pregnancy and divorce must also have taken place before the end of the summer. The marriage of Tiberius and Vipsania must have been dissolved, then, sometime in the spring or summer of 12 BC. It is probable that the divorce occurred in the latter part of the summer. Suetonius says that Augustus took a long time (diu) in selecting a new husband for Julia after Agrippa's death. Diu can be interpreted here with a relative value: a period of even a few - perhaps as many as six months could indeed be considered a long time for the resolution of a matter of state as weighty as the replacement of Marcus Agrippa. So Tiberius' divorce from Vipsania, which came later than both the birth of Drusus and her second pregnancy, can be assigned with some confidence to the late summer, August or September at the latest, of 12 BC. It seems safe to conclude, then, that Drusus was born well before the end of the summer in 12. It follows that his birth could have occurred no later than October 7th of the
previous year, 13 BC. It seems that the range can be narrowed from the early limit as well. It cannot be proved that Drusus was not born in 15 BC but Tiberius would surely not have requested the Senate to appoint Germanicus to an eastern mission in AD 17 on the grounds, in part, that Drusus was not yet old enough for the task if Drusus had been born in the same year as Germanicus, namely, 15 BC. Surely the explicit distinction made by Tiberius in such formal, official circumstances would require, of necessity, that Drusus should be at least one year younger than Germanicus. This inference would raise the early limit of Drusus' birth to the year 14.

On the basis of the evidence presented so far, then, the maximum range for Drusus' birth can be set, with a high degree of probability, between October 7th, 15 BC and October 7th, 13 BC. There is, additionally, a strong argument in favour of advancing the early limit to October 7th, 14 BC (see Excursus III).

Perhaps the darkest mystery besetting Drusus' origins concerns his name. The full name that Tiberius bestowed upon him at birth remains unknown. In the surviving source material he is designated only as "Drusus," "Drusus Caesar," or "Drusus Julius Caesar," and the latter two sets of names cannot be dated any earlier than his father's arrogation by Augustus in AD 4. Petersen believes that his original full name, that is, his tria nomina, was "Nero Claudius Drusus" on
the basis of two inscriptions from Epidaurus, which refer, in Greek, to "Nero Claudius Drusus, the son of Tiberius." Gardthausen, however, argues cogently that this particular title fits Tiberius' brother, Nero Drusus, more aptly than his son. Certainly "Nero Claudius Drusus" is attested elsewhere for the brother as it is not for the son, and the former's father also bore the name "Tiberius". It can be safely assumed that Drusus' first *tria nomina* did include "Claudius", the gentile *nomen* of his family. Further sound reconstruction of his original name, however, is difficult, if not impossible. The fragmentary sources suggest a long family tradition in which every father, beginning with the first Tiberius Claudius Nero, the son of Ap. Claudius Caecus, named his first-born son after himself. That tradition must have weighed heavily with the conservative Tiberius, the son of Livia, when he was considering names for his first-born. Whether, however, he submitted to or resisted the pressure remains unknown. The very name, "Drusus", the only non-Julian name of Tiberius' son preserved in the historical record, actually complicates the attempt to reconstruct his original *tria nomina*. It begs three questions. First, why would a first-born male in the line of the Claudian Nerones have received a non-Claudian name? Second, since "Drusus" cannot be attested as one of Drusus' names before the name change resulting from his adoption into Augustus' family in AD 4, when exactly did he become "Drusus"? That he need not have held the name from birth is
demonstrated by the analogy of his uncle, Nero Drusus, whose praenomen had been changed from "Decimus" to "Nero". 11 Third, how could the traditional cognomen "Drusus" have become a praenomen - as it did no later than AD 4 when Drusus received his final name, "Drusus Julius Caesar"? Tentative answers can be suggested for all of these questions but none of them are verifiable. So, apart from the nomen "Claudius", Drusus' original name remains an enigma (see Excursus IV).

Through his father Drusus belonged to one of the outstanding patrician gentes of Rome, the Claudii. Tiberius could trace both his paternal and maternal ancestry back to Ap. Claudius Caecus, the famous censor in 312 BC and consul in 307 and 296 BC. From one of Caecus' sons, Ti. Claudius Nero, Tiberius' father, also named Tiberius Claudius Nero, was descended. From another son of Caecus, P. Claudius Pulcher, consul in 249 BC, was descended Tiberius' mother, Livia Drusilla. Livia's side of the family had achieved greater prominence than had Nero's. The last Claudius Nero to hold the consulship had been Ti. Claudius Nero in 202, while Claudii Pulchri had been consuls in 92, 79, and 54, and numbered among their ranks Cicero's enemy, P. Clodius, who had been tribune of the plebs in 58 BC. Moreover, Livia's father had been adopted by M. Livius Drusus, tribune in 91 BC, and had thereby acquired the name M. Livius Drusus Claudianus. 12 Through his grandmother, then, Drusus could claim ancestry in both the Livian and the more illustrious side of the Claudian houses, and inherited the name by which
It was also through Livia that Drusus' family was brought into the household of the Caesars. His grandfather, Nero, had been a supporter of Antony. After the disaster of the Perusine War in 41 BC Nero had been forced to flee to Sicily with his young wife and infant son, Tiberius. In 39, however, Nero benefited from an amnesty and returned to Rome with his family, whereupon he appears to have become as obliging as possible towards Octavian. Indeed, so accommodating was he that, after Octavian had fallen in love with his wife, Nero readily divorced her, pregnant though she was with their second child. On January 14, 38 BC, Livia gave birth to Nero Claudius Drusus, and on January 17th was married to Octavian. Her first husband conveniently disappeared from public life and died in obscurity in 33 BC.\(^{13}\)

Octavian's relations with Nero and Livia undoubtedly helped to determine his treatment of their sons, treatment that would in turn later help to determine Drusus' position within the Emperor's household. On the one hand, because Tiberius and Nero Drusus were the sons of a humiliated adversary and not of his own blood, Octavian did not show them the same favour that he would later bestow upon Agrippa's sons, Gaius and Lucius. So, for example, when he married Livia he declined to adopt them but only accepted guardianship from their father.\(^{14}\) On the other hand, because both boys were also the offspring of Livia, whom Octavian
always held in high esteem and affection, he reserved important positions for them in his imperial plans. Consequently Tiberius and his brother, and later his son, Drusus, at first found themselves excluded from the principate's centre of power and the succession, but assured of prominence within the secondary ranks of the imperial family.

It was not long before Octavian began to make use of Tiberius. He betrothed him to Marcus Agrippa's daughter, Vipsania Agrippina. The actual date of the betrothal is not known, but since Vipsania's maternal grandfather, the knight Titus Pomponius Atticus, was alive at the time, it must have occurred before his death on March 31st, 32 BC. It is known that Vipsania was barely a year old when the arrangement was made. Tiberius himself could have been no more than nine years old. Octavian, however, never showed hesitation to engage in such manipulations of his family and friends where they could secure his imperial and dynastic interests.

His interests did not necessarily coincide with those of Tiberius. The betrothal could certainly be construed as an honour for Agrippa who would have the prospect of grandchildren belonging to the Claudian gens, a substantial attraction for a novus homo. The advantages for Tiberius, however, appear more ambiguous. It is possible that Livia was trying to strengthen the position of the Claudian house by establishing a link between it and the princeps' most prominent henchman. One may see here just as well though,
surely, the independent hand of Octavian seeking to keep Tiberius and his potential descendants within the circle of his family and friends, while holding them back from the first rank. However the betrothal may have benefited the imperial Claudians it also diminished them, for it engaged the patrician Tiberius to the granddaughter of a mere knight and the daughter of a man who was, after all, despite his closeness to Octavian, a novus hom of obscure origins. Many years later, in fact, partisans would cite Drusus' equestrian ancestry as proof of his inferiority to Germanicus who could claim Augustus as his great uncle and Mark Antony as his grandfather. Octavian intended the union of Tiberius and Vipsania to be a mixed, or at least limited, blessing. At the start he showed that he intended to keep the purely Claudian line in a subordinate position within his household, a policy that would restrict the development of Drusus' career until the death of Germanicus.

Octavian confirmed Tiberius' secondary importance in his arrangements for his triumph on 13 - 15 August, 29 BC, for his victory at Actium. In the third day's procession Tiberius rode in the place of second honour: on the left-hand trace-horse. In the place of first honour on the right rode Octavian's nephew, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, born, like Tiberius, in 42 BC. Here, for the first time perhaps, Octavian revealed in public a policy of establishing pairs at the top of the imperial hierarchy which German scholars have called the "Vieraugensystem", in which one
member was inferior to the other, usually on the bases of blood kinship and age. Drusus would later play his own part in this system as the junior partner of Germanicus.

Till the latter part of his reign Augustus abided by his original intention to exclude Livia's sons from the first rank of power. Around 25 BC he appears to have begun arrangements for a dynastic succession by marrying his daughter Julia to his nephew Marcellus. Marcellus' premature death having thwarted that scheme, Augustus turned, not to Tiberius, but to his loyal partisan, the experienced and popular Agrippa, whom he compelled to divorce Marcella, Augustus' own niece, in order to marry his widowed daughter, Julia, in 21 BC. He thereby killed two birds with one stone: he created the possibility of having descendants of his own blood while guaranteeing support and protection for those descendants from the powerful Agrippa. It was a politically sagacious decision. It was not, however, advantageous to the Claudians.

In 20 BC and the years following, Tiberius and his brother saw themselves moved farther from the centre of power. In 20 a son, Gaius, and thus a new potential successor to the principate ahead of Livia's sons, was born to Julia and Agrippa. In 18 BC Augustus bestowed the tribunicia potestas for five years upon Agrippa. In 17 BC Julia gave birth to Lucius and Augustus adopted both grandsons, thereby elevating them above everyone except the princeps himself and marking them out as his heirs.
Augustus' scheme of power and dynastic succession was complete, consisting of two pairs: himself and Agrippa as ruler, colleague, and guardians of Julia's sons, and Gaius and Lucius as the heirs to the principate. From this inner circle of power and succession Tiberius and his brother were excluded.

They were not, however, forgotten. They still figured prominently in the imperial administration. Augustus continued to honour them and to allow them to advance at ages younger than normal through the *cursus honorum* while showing due regard for the rights of seniority by promoting Tiberius at a fixed rate ahead of his brother. To a large extent they deserved their promotions, for, in addition to performing the normal functions of a civilian magistrate, Tiberius conducted military expeditions to the East, Gaul, and Germany while Nero Drusus fought and worked in the West.

Augustus may have continued to foster the careers of Livia's sons out of more than simple respect for Livia. He may have wanted to make provision for the real possibility that he and Agrippa could suddenly succumb to the natural infirmities of old age before Gaius and Lucius would be old enough to look after their own and Rome's affairs. He may have looked to his stepsons to protect and support his sons in such a contingency. Prudence, then, would help to explain why Augustus retained Tiberius and Drusus in the third rank, as it were, of his hierarchy.
Tiberius and his brother seem to have understood and accepted their function and rank within Augustus' system, as Tiberius' son would later on. They demonstrated unswerving loyalty and obedience to him, even at great personal sacrifice, as, for example, in the case of Tiberius' divorce from his beloved Vipsania in 12 BC. Tiberius' self-imposed exile to Rhodes in 6 BC marked the only exception to the rule. In conformity with the Emperor's plans, the brothers were prepared to defer to Agrippa and his sons, as Tiberius showed when, as consul in 13 BC, he placed the boy Gaius next to Augustus in the celebrations in honour of the Emperor's return from Gaul. Livia's sons seemed in public content with their third rank.

At the time of his birth, then, between 15 and 13 BC, Drusus, the son of Tiberius, could look forward to a life of privilege and power within the family of Augustus. The imperial succession, however, appeared closed to him. Despite his grandmother Livia's marriage to and influence upon the princeps, his fortunes were determined largely by his father's, who remained at the time, after all, a stepson, not a son, of Augustus.
EXCURSUS I
Sources for the Life of Drusus

Primary sources of evidence about Drusus, such as inscriptions, coins, sculptures, medallions, and various other archaeological artifacts, survive in such sparse and fragmentary form that they can provide, in general, information of only secondary importance in the reconstruction of his life. They are, nevertheless, helpful in confirming and adding to the record specific details, such as days and months of birth and death; offices, honours, and priesthoods; Drusus’ status in the principate; and the names of both Drusus and his sons after the adoptions of AD 4. They have particular importance in two areas: in demonstrating the wide range of Drusus’ Illyrian mission beginning in AD 17 and in indicating the possibility that Tiberius had decided to transfer the imperial succession from the sons of Germanicus to Drusus’ twins by AD 23. In their current exigency the primary sources have little more to offer about Drusus’ life.

Most information on the subject survives in Roman literary works. Of these Tacitus’ Annals, especially Books 1 to 4, contain the most and best material. Books 54 to 57 of Cassius Dio’s Roman History also preserve much useful information. Dio’s text, however, has a major shortcoming: it breaks off for the year AD 17 and resumes again only for 31. The intervening period is covered only briefly and
selectively by various epitomizers. As a result, in the surviving compilation the last climactic six years of Drusus' life, including his mission to Pannonia, his confirmation as Tiberius' successor after Germanicus' death, and his subsequent activities in Rome, are only crudely and inadequately sketched. In his Lives of the Caesars, particularly those of Tiberius and Augustus, Suetonius reports some noteworthy details about Drusus. Additional, limited references can be found scattered among the works of Roman imperial authors, such as Book 2 of Velleius Paterculus' History of Rome, Eusebius' Chronica, Book 18 of Josephus' Jewish Antiquities, Ovid's exile poetry, Philo's Embassy to Gaius, Pliny's Natural History, Seneca's Octavia and Consolation to Marcia, and Strabo's Geography.

The three main authorities, Tacitus, Dio, and Suetonius, lived and wrote well after Drusus' death in AD 23. Tacitus, suffect consul in 97, probably began writing the Annals well into Trajan's reign, perhaps between 104 and 117. Dio, suffect consul in about 205, would have researched and written his history between about 211 and 231. Suetonius, born probably between 61 and 70, became an imperial secretary ab epistulis under Hadrian and published his Lives of the Caesars, probably, between 117 and 122. Obviously, these later writers depended, ultimately, on earlier sources of information for their descriptions of Drusus.

The later authors appear to have referred to a great number of works. Tacitus, for instance, claims to cite the
most numerous and trustworthy authorities for his account of Drusus' death. Similar references to multiple sources are common through the first six books of the Annals. Dio, too, not infrequently makes oblique, anonymous mention of apparently numerous earlier sources, and even, in effect, claims to have read nearly all works on Roman history. Suetonius appears to have drawn eclectically from a great number and wide variety of writers to whom he refers in such terms as alii, quidam, plures dicunt, and the like.27

It is very difficult, however, to identify these earlier authorities and the extent to which they were drawn on. Tacitus, Dio, and Suetonius tend not to name their sources. In the books of the Annals covering Tiberius' life Tacitus identifies only two earlier works: the history of the German wars by Pliny the elder and the memoirs of Agrippina the younger. He cites each, however, only to report a particular detail about the life of Agrippina the Elder, in the latter case expressly stating and in the former implying that the information lies outside the main source tradition.28 Neither Dio nor Suetonius explicitly links any earlier work with the life of Drusus. Sure designation of the original sources is rendered, thus, impossible.

At best one can attempt only to deduce the works that might have pertained to Drusus and that would have been available to the later historians. First, it is conceivable that either Tacitus or Suetonius might have referred to the other's work, depending on who published first, and that Dio
might have perused either or both of them. The proposition, however, can be neither proved nor disproved. In their coverage of the period in which Drusus lived, all three have many similarities in their relation of facts. In particular Dio's narrative closely parallels Suetonius' writing in a number of references to minor matters, explanations, and anecdotes. In such instances the former could well be reproducing the latter. It could be equally the case, however, that both were following the same earlier source. Moreover, regardless of any mutual references the three might have made, they also disagree with each other in significant details, so that they must have used, to some degree, different original sources. Suetonius, for example, refers to only three testamentary documents associated with Augustus' will, while Dio includes four. Another example can be found in Suetonius' claim that Tiberius hated his son, which Dio expressly and Tacitus implicitly contradict. Tacitus represents the shared consulship of Tiberius and Drusus as a propitious, or at least happy, event. Dio describes it as ill-omened. According to Suetonius and Dio, Germanicus' death precipitated the decline of Tiberius' regime into viciousness and corruption. According to Tacitus, the turning point was marked by Drusus' death. Dio can be careless about chronology. In the introduction to his account of Tiberius' reign, for example, he refers to items which occur as late as AD 37 in Tacitus. He may, then, have been depending more upon non-annalistic sources than did
Tacitus.  At any rate, Tacitus, Dio, and Suetonius must have had recourse to many more authorities than each other.

Official documents, preserved in the Senate and other government archives, would have offered one source of information. Tacitus certainly consulted the Senate's record of proceedings, the *commentarii Senatus*, although there is disagreement on the extent to which he did. Both he and Suetonius resorted to the daily gazette, a sort of journal listing daily official public transactions and proceedings, and variously known as the *acta populi*, *acta*, *diurna populi Romani*, etc. It may be presumed that such documents would have held the most accurate and impartial information available to later writers simply because they were official records.

The later historians might also have had to hand collections of letters, similar to those of the younger Pliny, and speeches, whether published or preserved in the Senate archives. Drusus' defence of the right of wives to accompany their husbands to provincial governorships might have fallen into the latter category. Oral tradition would have provided another source of secondary information.

Later writers would have had access as well to the records of the imperial family. Tacitus says that the memoirs of Agrippina the younger, referred to earlier, recounted her own life *et casus suorum*. Since she was born in AD 15 she could have recalled details about Drusus' later years. Tiberius also wrote a brief summary of his own life.
Its authority with later historians may be questioned, however. Suetonius cites it only to refute Tiberius' claim that he punished Sejanus because of his attack on Germanicus' children. Suetonius also speaks of the *commentarios et acta* of Tiberius which were avidly read by Domitian. Tiberius' speeches were apparently recorded, and were later read by Tacitus at least. Claudius wrote an autobiography in eight books, according to Suetonius, *magis inepte quam ineleganter*, as well as a general history in forty-one books from the end of the civil war.  

The names of a few contemporary historians outside the imperial family are known. The work of only one man, Velleius Paterculus, who served in the army under Tiberius, has survived. In the second book of his *History of Rome* he gives a slight sketch of the first sixteen years of Tiberius' principate. As indicated earlier, however, this work, though still extant, says very little about Drusus. Cremonius Cordus and T. Labienus, an orator, both wrote histories that might have included the period of Drusus' life while Augustus was still alive. Since the Senate had ordered their works to be banned, it may be assumed that they were anti-Caesarian in tone. The ban was lifted by Caligula. M. Seneca the rhetor wrote a history from the beginning of the civil wars to at least the death of Tiberius in 37. His son, L. Seneca, seems to have had a high opinion of the work's objectivity, which would mean that it, too, was probably anti-Caesarian. Marcus Servilius Nonianus, who served as consul in AD 35 and
died in 59, was both orator and historian. The range of his history in unknown, but Servilius was highly regarded by both Quintilian and Tacitus. Quintilian praised very highly the work of Aufidius Bassus, who wrote a little earlier than Servilius. He composed a monograph on the "German war" and a general history still unfinished at the time of his death, presumably in the middle of Nero's reign. The latter work may have covered most of the period in which Drusus was alive; Bassus was cited in the Chronicle of Cassiodorus, written in the sixth century, for the list of Roman consuls between 8 BC and AD 31. It can be speculated that the monograph might have referred to Drusus' operations on the Danube from AD 17 to 20, since they effectively terminated the German threat to the Roman Empire for a long time. Aufidius' history was resumed by Pliny the elder, who also wrote an account of the German wars, as noted earlier. Since the latter work is known to have referred to Germanicus' expedition into Germany in 15, it is tempting, again, to suppose that it might have described as well Drusus' resolution of the German problem in 17 to 20. Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus, consul in 26, is known to have written something about Caligula. He may well, then, have written about Tiberius and Drusus, Caligula's contemporaries and predecessors in the principate and succession. The histories of Cluvius Rufus are cited by Tacitus for matters occurring in Nero's reign. Rufus served as consul before AD 65 and seems to have been active primarily in the reigns of
Nero, Galba, and Otho. Since, however, he might also have been consul before 41, and since Plutarch quotes him as an authority on a matter relating to the plague in Rome of 364 BC, his histories might have had a starting-point well before Nero came to the throne. No other individuals can be reasonably identified as possible sources for the life of Drusus. One suspects that even those whose names are known represent only a small portion of the authorities to whom Tacitus, Dio, and Suetonius could have had access.

Assessing the trustworthiness of the original sources is difficult. If possible, error and bias must be identified. In the absence of nearly all original evidence, the accuracy of the sources must be deduced from the works of the later historians. Within such methodological limitations the deductions will be tentative at best. They will also be negative. Searching for signs of inconsistency or bias in the later historians offers the only possible approach to the problem. Merely finding such signs, however, is not sufficient. One must determine whether the inconsistency or bias was likely to have been introduced by the later historians themselves. Only if the latter analysis produces a negative result can a serious argument be made for the possibility of flaws in the original sources. Of course, failure to identify inconsistency or bias proves nothing about accuracy. It demonstrates at most the apparent absence of inconsistency or bias. The scope for assessing the truth of the tradition about Drusus' life is, thus, very narrow.
indeed.

In fact inconsistency and bias do appear in this tradition. Three examples stand out. First, Tacitus, Dio, and Suetonius generally present a negative assessment of Drusus' character without substantiating it. Second, they tend to downplay Drusus' significant military and political accomplishments and to highlight the more questionable achievements of Germanicus. Drusus put down the Pannonian mutiny firmly and expeditiously in AD 14, yet he is given relatively short shrift by the main tradition, which preserves a much more extensive and sympathetic account of Germanicus' bungled handling of the Rhine mutiny. In the space of little more than two years, from late 17 to early 20, Drusus stabilized the Danube frontier and weakened the Germans to the point where they would not bother the Roman Empire for half a century. Again, however, the main tradition, particularly as embodied in Tacitus' *Annals*, pays very little attention to this outstanding achievement, preferring instead to glorify Germanicus' futile and wasteful expeditions against the Germans in 15 and 16, and his excursion through the eastern Empire from 17 to 19, where he accomplished little of value to the Empire comparable to Drusus' success. Germanicus was also responsible for stirring up discord and bad feeling through his quarrelling with Piso and Plancina and his unauthorized entry into Egypt. Third, the surviving tradition presents more or less uncritically the story that Drusus died from poisoning at the
hands of his wife, Livilla, acting in conspiracy with Sejanus and others. The problem here is that no substantiating evidence is offered beyond a single, undetailed allegation made some eight years after the fact by a source of, prima facie, highly dubious credibility, corroborated only by testimony extracted under torture. \(^41\) With such doubtful elements, the main tradition about Drusus' life has to be considered with scepticism.

It should also be noted that remnants survive of a tradition contradicting significant aspects of the main portrayal of Drusus. Velleius Paterculus, a contemporary of Drusus, belongs to the dissenting minority. In one passage he compares favourably Drusus' suppression of the Pannonian mutiny with Germanicus' concessions to the mutineers on the Rhine, noting that, while Germanicus gave much away, Drusus acted decisively, using *prisca antiquaque severitate*. Velleius' writing is vitiated by a strong pro-Tiberian bias that frequently degenerates into unconcealed, bombastic flattery. Nevertheless, viewed objectively, his comparison between Germanicus and Drusus accords very well with the facts as laid out by Tacitus himself. Even Tacitus preserves details that do not square with the "authorized version" about Drusus. He refers, for example, to his *nobilitas ingenita* in addressing the mutineers, his consistently excellent relations with Germanicus and his sons, his expression of affection for his family, including his wife, his moderating influence on his father, and his congeniality
and sociableness. Moreover, the surviving portrait of Drusus' public conduct, particularly in Tacitus' *Annals*, shows him to have been a competent official and statesman. All of these positive references suggest the possibility that the prevailing, strongly pro-Germanicus tradition was not the only one that originally circulated.

The negative picture of Drusus is not likely to have originated with the later Roman historians. A case can be made that Tacitus' idealized republican sympathies and detestation of the Emperor Domitian might have tempted him to assimilate Tiberius to an evil tyrant and thereby to condemn Drusus as well for his connection to him, as though by contamination. Such a theory, however, begs the question of what grounds, what original evidence, Tacitus would have had for believing that such an assimilation was warranted. Moreover, Dio and Suetonius had no known reasons for personal animosity against either Drusus or Tiberius. Unlike Tacitus they tended to treat their source material uncritically, fusing and regurgitating it according to fairly superficial criteria. Dio, for example, appears to have included some details simply because he believed that they would interest his readers, and to have left out others because he thought that they would bore. He also had a tendency to exclude evidence that he considered to conflict with what he believed to be the main or preferred tradition. For example, both Tacitus and Dio appear to have read the same source(s) describing the judgments of the Roman populace upon Augustus
during his funeral. Tacitus, however, included in the *Annals*
both favourable and critical comments, while Dio, in keeping
with his own bias for monarchy, retained only the favourable
views. The latter would, thus, have been inclined to
suppress the minority of pro-Tiberius, pro-Drusus histories
in favour of the majority exalting Germanicus. Suetonius,
for his part, appears to have preferred amassing material
from various sources to subjecting it to a critical and
coherent analysis and presentation. In consequence his
narrative often seems a loose and disjointed succession of
topics, further vitiated at times with confusing
inconsistencies. In conclusion, it seems highly unlikely
that either Dio or Suetonius could have invented the negative
tradition about Tiberius and Drusus. They must, then, have
inherited it from their sources. Since Tacitus' general
presentation of Tiberius as man and emperor corresponds
closely to that of Dio and Suetonius, he, too, must have
reproduced in its essentials the same earlier tradition.

The question arises how this version of events,
favouring Germanicus and denigrating Tiberius and Drusus,
could have become established. Tacitus himself may provide
part of the answer. He notes first of all that, from the
time of Tiberius' reign, Roman writers began to distort the
record of history through flattery while an emperor was alive
and through hatred after he was dead. It follows from this
observation that the accounts of Tiberius and Drusus written
between AD 14 and 37 would have been biased in their favour.
The adulatory writing of Velleius Paterculus probably provides a good example of this sort of production. When Tiberius died, however, according to Tacitus' rule, the picture of Tiberius and Drusus would have been falsified again, this time by unfair defamation.44

An additional factor would have deepened their eclipse. In his *Annals* for the year 17 Tacitus notes a division in the imperial court between supporters of Drusus and Germanicus. The rivalry seems to have focussed on blood and ancestry. In essence it was a dispute over right to the succession between partisans of the Claudian house, represented by Livia, Tiberius, Drusus, and Livilla, and those of the Julian house, represented by Germanicus and Agrippina. Livia was Augustus' wife and, by this time, Tiberius and Drusus were his son and grandson by adoption, but it seems that, in this rivalry at any rate, blood kinship was considered to outweigh such artificial links and neither Livia, Tiberius, nor Drusus had any Julian blood. Through their maternal grandmother, Octavia, Augustus' sister, Livilla's natural kinship to Augustus was as close as Germanicus's, and, through their paternal grandparents, Germanicus had as much Claudian blood as Livilla. Livilla's marriage, however, to Drusus, by whom she had had at least one child, would have been viewed as placing her squarely in the Claudians' camp. Similarly Germanicus' marriage to Augustus' granddaughter, by whom he had numerous offspring, added to his natural kinship to Augustus and his status as
Augustus' adoptive grandson and favourite, would have confirmed his alignment with the Julian side. From this perspective the pro-Julians would have regarded Tiberius, no doubt, as a Claudian interloper on the principate, which they would have considered to be a Julian prerogative. Doubtless, too, they would have feared that Tiberius might be tempted to extend the Claudian intrusion indefinitely by reserving the succession for Drusus and his sons. Hence, even as early as 17, the pro-Julians would have been anxious to assert the superiority of Germanicus' and Agrippina's dynastic claims. So the death of Germanicus in 19 and the contemporary birth of twins to Livilla would have fallen upon the Julian party as grievous blows. These events would have both guaranteed the succession to Drusus and opened the possibility for a Claudian dynasty. It is no wonder, then, that the twins' birth evoked a mean-spirited response from Germanicus' supporters. These developments would have deepened and hardened the antipathy between the pro-Julians and pro-Claudians so that it would acquire, as it were, a life of its own, lasting beyond the deaths of Drusus, his sons, and Tiberius. Upon Caligula's accession, the Claudian memory would have had to face not only the expected reversal from flattery to disparagement by historians, but also the triumph of the Julian house, whose ascendancy would endure through the reigns of Germanicus' son, Caligula, his brother, Claudius, and his grandson, Nero. The Julian partisans, seeing their house back in power, would have wanted — and
been able - to complete the Claudians' rout by ensuring that
the Julian version of imperial history would prevail.
Accordingly, the tradition of the Julio-Claudian principate
would have become, and remained, dominated by writers with a
pro-Julian, pro-Germanicus bias. Works favouring the
Claudians, including Drusus and Livilla, would have
disappeared completely or been relegated, probably like
Velleius Paterculus' History, to inferior status. Caligula
himself heralded the new trend at Tiberius' funeral, when,
according to Dio, he delivered a speech devoted more to the
memory of Germanicus and Augustus, and to his own
commendation, than to Tiberius. It may be suspected, then,
that more than coincidence is involved when all the chief
members of the imperial Claudian family, including Tiberius,
Livia, Drusus, and Livilla, as well as Tiberius' chief
supporter, Sejanus, are generally portrayed as
unprepossessing at best or, frequently, vicious. In
particular, the later historians' disparagement of Drusus,
eglect of his achievements, and acceptance that he died
ingloriously in a sordid plot hatched by his own adulterous
wife and the commander of the Praetorian Guard may be based
more on Julian propaganda than actual fact.

The works most likely to have carried this bias would
have been composed by individuals who had no reason, or way,
to eschew it. Three types of authors could have fallen into
this category: outright partisans, like Agrippina the
younger, opportunists who wished to curry favour with the
Julian establishment, and persons who were afraid to annoy them. Since their point of view came to prevail, it is conceivable that the source tradition became dominated by the types of writing that they would have been most likely to produce: literary works in the form of memoirs, histories, or biographies. These authors would have been under no obligation simply to record facts. They would have had the freedom to select, interpret, and, where they wished, alter information.

In contrast, writers of official documents would have felt more obliged to avoid distorted reporting. Accuracy and objectivity would, surely, have been considered fundamental requirements for the competent production of official records of senatorial, judicial, and administrative proceedings, including speeches. Significantly, the picture of Drusus appears most free from bias and distortion when the later historians, particularly Tacitus, show him acting in some official capacity, such as representative of the Roman government charged with suppressing a mutiny, or simply as a senator speaking and working in the *curia*. One may surmise that, in these instances, Tacitus resorted to official records in order to obtain detailed information. In such cases his narrative appears much more balanced than his descriptions elsewhere of Drusus' private life, for which he probably relied more on unofficial, literary works.
EXCURSUS II
Drusus' Relation to Gaius Asinius Gallus

It is difficult to see what factual grounds Gallus could have had for his claim, according to Dio, that Drusus was his son. He did marry Vipsania at some point after her divorce from Tiberius, but as Suetonius says that she had given birth to Drusus before her divorce, Gallus could not have fathered Drusus after his marriage to her (or, in fact, at any time after her divorce). Further conjecture that Drusus could have been conceived from relations between Gallus and Vipsania while she was still married to Tiberius seems unwarranted. Not only would Gallus have placed himself in extreme opprobrium and danger by admitting such moral turpitude - and imperial cuckolding - but the high degree of congeniality between Tiberius and Vipsania reported by Suetonius appears greatly to reduce even the possibility of such adultery. Nor can adoption of Drusus by Gallus be given serious consideration. By Roman law, a citizen could only take on another's nomen through direct personal adoption or through the other's adoption (technically called "arrogation") of the citizen's paterfamilias. Drusus, then, could only have acquired his names, "Julius Caesar", through Augustus' adoption of him or his paterfamilias. The sources indicate that Augustus adopted directly just two persons after Gaius and Lucius: Agrippa Postumus and Tiberius. Accordingly, when Augustus adopted Tiberius in AD 4 the
latter must still have been the paterfamilias of Drusus. Drusus, then, could not have been the adoptive son of Gallus. In addition Drusus, if he had been adopted by Gallus, would have acquired, according to normal practice, at least one Asinian name. Yet there is absolutely no evidence that he had anything but Julio-Claudian and Livian names either before or after his adoption by Augustus. There seems, then, to have been no basis to the claim attributed to Gallus by Dio. Perhaps it was nothing more than an invention by an anti-Claudian source tradition inherited by Dio, intended to cast doubts on Drusus' legitimacy or, at least, on his and his descendants' claims to the throne.
EXCURSUS III

Drusus' Tribunician Power and his Date of Birth

Tacitus' Annals for AD 23 contain information relevant to the problem of Drusus' date of birth. He says that Tiberius wrote to the Senate to request the tribunician power (tribunicia potestas) for Drusus and listed among his son's qualifications the fact that he had reached the age (eam...aetatem) at which Tiberius himself had been ordered by Augustus to take up the power in 6 BC. When precisely in 6 Tiberius actually did assume it is unknown - although he appears to have done so early in the year. At any rate it is very likely that he would have had the power well before his thirty-sixth birthday on November 16th.\(^5\) In other words, he would have been thirty-five, and probably closer to his thirty-fifth birthday than his thirty-sixth. If, then, there is no exaggeration in Tiberius' statement to the Senate, Drusus would have been about thirty-five years old in the first half of AD 22. The qualification, "about", must be applied because Tiberius' statement does not draw an exact equivalence in years and months between his own and his son's ages. The comparison is significant: it provides the best evidence in all the source material for Drusus' age and, thus, his date of birth.

How narrowly the equivalence asserted by Tiberius should be construed is difficult to reckon. On the one hand it is unlikely that Tiberius would have indulged in the
inaccuracies and exaggerations that he so loathed in the Senate's references to the imperial family, particularly in view of the context of the age comparison: a formal letter to the Senate concerning an extremely important issue. It can be argued, then, that it is improbable that he would have intended his comparison between his own and his son's ages to be interpreted broadly. On the other hand, Tiberius does not give numerical precision to his age comparison. Rather he centres the comparison on the non-numerical expression, eam aetatem. Because of the Roman tendency for inclusive reckoning a person could actually be up to one year younger or older than his apparent age. Thus, when he received the tribunician power in 6 BC Tiberius had been triginta quinque annos natus and tricesimo sexto anno. So Tiberius' statement on Drusus' aetas would have been considered exact enough if Drusus had been at this time either 34 (tricesimo quinto anno) or 35 (as Tiberius) or even 36 (triginta sex annos natus). Whatever Drusus' age his latest relevant birthday would have fallen in AD 21, since he got the tribunician power before his birthday in 22. The suggested construction of Tiberius' comparison between his own and his son's ages would thus produce a range of dates from October 7th, 16 BC to October 7th, 14 BC for Drusus' birth. This range overlaps the chronological boundaries deduced earlier in this chapter: 15 to 13 BC. Unfortunately Tiberius' age comparison does not permit a more exact conclusion.
EXCURSUS IV

Drusus' Original Name

Any attempt to reconstruct Drusus' original name must deal with the three issues raised by the name "Drusus" itself, noted on pages 6 and 7 above. The associated problems cannot be solved but some deductions can be made that shed light on them.

First, the Claudian Tiberius did have at least a partial precedent for including the non-Claudian "Drusus" among his son's names. Tiberius' younger brother had, apparently, originally been named "Decimus Claudius Drusus" or, possibly, "Decimus Claudius Nero Drusus". This choice of names was anomalous. The available evidence does not show "Decimus" to have served as a common praenomen among the Claudian Nerones, while "Drusus" belonged to none of them at all, but rather to the Livii Drusi, to which gens Livia belonged by virtue of the adoption of her father, M. Livius Drusus Claudianus. C.J. Simpson offers the best explanation for the anomaly. By the time of Livia's younger son's birth she had divorced his father - whose fortunes were at a particularly low ebb - and had married, or was about to marry, Octavian:

In such a situation, it would not have been unreasonable for Drusus's parents to have laid less emphasis on the infant's paternal lineage and, in bestowing the cognomen Drusus, to have brought to the fore the child's maternal ancestry and links with the Livian gens through his grandfather M. Livius Drusus Claudianus. (58)
The use of nomenclature in this case to obscure less glorious and emphasize more glorious connections would not have been an aberration. Others in the late Republic and early Empire also engaged in this practice. The question is, to what extent might Tiberius, possibly influenced by his mother and stepfather, have had recourse to it in naming his first-born son?

It was not his only or even his most compelling option. He might have felt at least as much pressure to continue the ancestral tradition of naming his first-born son "Tiberius Claudius Nero". For it seems unlikely that the misfortunes of one bearer of such a time-honoured name, Tiberius' father, should have been considered sufficiently grave to keep it suppressed for long. Certainly Tiberius himself appears to have had no qualms about retaining the full name before his adoption by Augustus in AD 4. Moreover, any abasement his family had suffered in association with his father he had more than made up for by 15 to 13 BC, during which period Drusus was most likely born, with the high honours and appointments he had received from Augustus. Then, too, if considerations of paternal disgrace had played a role in the naming of Tiberius' younger brother they had probably started to become muted by around 20 BC when, according to Simpson, the praenomen "Decimus" was most likely to have been dropped in favour of the father's and brother's "Nero". Even the praenomen "Tiberius" made a reappearance in the naming of Nero Drusus' second son. The future emperor
Claudius, born in 10 BC, was originally called "Tiberius Claudius Drusus". Later - probably no later than AD 4 - he is recorded as having held the full title "Tiberius Claudius Nero". In fact, each of the tria nomina of Livia's first husband appeared in various combinations with other names among the Julio-Claudians until the extinction of their line in 68. So while Livia and her sons - and possibly Octavian as well - may have been embarrassed by Tiberius Claudius Nero in the fourth decade BC, subsequent use of his three names suggests that they could not have been much bothered by him by the second decade, in which the Drusus of this study was born.

Moreover, the argument can at least be mooted that, whatever ignominy Tiberius' father suffered, the analogy between the motives for naming Tiberius' brother and Tiberius' son does not hold. Naming novelties might only have been allowed after transmission of the title, "Tiberius Claudius Nero", had been secured in the elder son. Accordingly an option would have lain open for the naming of Livia's younger son which would not have been available to Tiberius in the naming of his first-born.

Certainly if Drusus did get the names "Tiberius" and/or "Nero" he would most likely have received them at birth - since they were his father's names. But while Tiberius may have named Drusus "Drusus" at birth there was no overriding necessity for him to do so. The death of Drusus' uncle, Tiberius' beloved brother, Nero Drusus, in 9 BC would
have offered another possible occasion for the bestowal of
the name. If Tiberius did pass "Drusus" on to his son at
that time, he would have been acting in accordance with the
general mood of the Senate, and, no doubt, of the People and
his family as well. The Senate at that time decreed that
Livia's younger son and his sons should henceforth bear the
title "Germanicus". Tiberius, wishing to do his part in
honouring and memorializing his brother, may have followed
suit by giving the cognomen "Drusus", by which his brother
had been best known, to his own son.

There remains to be considered the problem of how
"Drusus", which had always previously served as a cognomen,
that is, a third or last name, could have changed to a
praenomen, or first name, in the AD 4 adoption when Drusus
became "Drusus Julius Caesar". Reference must be made to a
fashion arising among the nobility of the late Republic in
which the cognomen had begun increasingly to replace the
praenomen as a term of identification. If Drusus had
possessed only his father's names in addition to "Drusus", as
he may very well have done, then identification by cognomen,
"Drusus", rather than praenomen, "Tiberius", would have
proved not only fashionable but extremely practical: it
would have provided a means of distinguishing the son from
his father. And if, for these reasons, "Drusus" had become
the name by which Drusus was generally identified before he
was adopted into Augustus' family in AD 4, it would have made
sense that it alone of his older names should be retained in
his new adoptive name and transformed into an identifying praenomen. There was, moreover, precedent for such a transformation. From at least the time of Sulla a practice had arisen in some noble families of giving sons notable cognomina as their first names in place of the traditional praenomina. So Sulla Felix called his son Faustus Sulla, L. Aemilius Paullus called his son Paullus Aemilius Lepidus, and Mark Antony called his younger son Iullus Antonius in honour of Julius Caesar ("Iullus" being an obsolete name belonging to the Julii). Moreover, replacement of a name normally a praenomen by a name normally a cognomen could happen even within the same generation. Tiberius' brother lost the praenomen "Decimus" in favour of the traditional cognomen "Nero" as his first name, while his son, who only acquired the cognomen "Germanicus" in 9 BC, had it changed to his first name, that is, his praenomen, upon his adoption in AD 4. If the fashion prevailed with Drusus' uncle and cousin then, surely, it could have prevailed with the younger Drusus as well. There is thus no need to postulate that "Drusus" served as anything other than a cognomen before AD 4.

In view of the arguments above it can be hypothesized that Drusus could have been called "Tiberius Claudius Nero" at birth and "Tiberius Claudius Nero Drusus" in 9 BC or, simply, "Tiberius Claudius Nero Drusus" from birth. Nothing certain, however, can be known about his name before he entered Augustus' family in AD 4 as "Drusus Julius Caesar".
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. On Drusus in general see PIR (2nd ed.) I 219, pp. 173-176; and V. Gardthausen, "Drusus Julius Caesar," RE 10.1, no. 136, pp. 431-434. The most comprehensive study of Drusus in modern scholarship has been carried out by R.S. Rogers, "Drusus Julius Caesar: A Historical and Biographical Study," Studies in the Reign of Tiberius (Baltimore: 1943), 89-153. He deals only summarily with many aspects of Drusus' life, however, and in some cases his information and conclusions have become dated.

2. Gallus' claim: Dio 57.2.7. Tiberius' as Drusus' father: see, e.g., Dio 56.17.3, 25.4, 28.1.


4. Betrothal after birth of Drusus and Vipsania's second pregnancy: Dio 54.31.2; Suet. Aug. 63.2, Tib. 7.2; betrothal prior to campaign: Dio 54.31.2.

5. See Sumner, 413-435.

6. The divorce: Dio 54.31.1-2; Suet. Aug. 63.2; Tib. 7.2. Agrippa' death: Augustus learned at some point between March 19 and 24 that Agrippa was gravely ill in Campania. He immediately departed Athens for Italy, but found him dead: Dio 54.28.3; see M. Reinhold, Marcus Agrippa (Geneva, New York: 1933), 1 and 126. Pregnancy and divorce before expedition: Dio 54.31.2-3. For a summary of the evidence of Tiberius' expedition launched against the Pannonians in 12 BC see Dobo, 15-16. Roman army campaigns were normally carried out in the summer months. See G. Webster, The Roman Imperial Army (London: 1969), 50. Divorce in spring or summer of 12: Sumner, 427-428.

7. Diu: Suet. Aug. 63.2. It may well be, as Sumner, 428 suggests, that Suetonius is under some confusion here; he may have in mind "the fact that there was a year or more between Julia's being widowed and her remarriage [in 11 BC]." Relative value of diu: Sumner, 428. Terminus ante quern: see Th. Mommsen, "Das Augustische Festverzeichniss von Cumae," Hermes 17 (1882): 634.

8. See Tac. Ann. 2.43.1 and Rogers, 92; see the discussions by Levick (1966), 238, and Sumner, 430. The argument can be made that Tiberius would not have drawn so explicit a contrast between Drusus' and Tiberius' ages unless Drusus
were at least two years younger than Germanicus, that is, unless Drusus had been born in 13 BC. On the other hand, Tiberius may have made the point only to emphasize Germanicus' seniority, in support of his superior claim to the prestigious eastern mission. Certainly Germanicus had had more experience that Drusus in diplomatic and administrative matters (see Sumner, 430), and the words attributed by Tacitus to Tiberius may carry a connotation of relative inexperience as much as youth: "... aetatem ... Drusi nondum satis adolevisse." Whatever the actual difference in their ages, however, there can be little doubt that Tiberius' comparison indicates that Drusus was younger than Germanicus.


12. Livia's ancestry: Suet. Tib. 2-3; Seager, 7.

13. Nero's misfortunes: Suet. Tib. 4-6; Vell. Pat. 2.75.1-3, 76.1, 77.3; Tac. Ann. 5.1; Dio 48.15.3, 44.1. Nero's return: Tac. Ann. 5.1; Suet. Tib. 4.3; Vell. Pat. 2.77.3; Seager, 10. Divorce: Suet. Tib. 4.3. Birth of Nero Drusus, marriage to Octavian, and disappearance and death of first husband: Seager, 10-11.

14. Dio 48.44.5. The fact that Tiberius' and Nero Drusus' father was still alive would not have precluded their adoption by Octavian. While little evidence survives of the actual practice and frequency of adoptio (as opposed to adrogatio) in this period, the legal form of the process involved the active participation of the pater familias who would, in most cases, have been the natural


17. Octavian's triumph and the arrangements for it: F. Tr. Barb. (EJ 35); F. Ant. (EJ 50); Suet. Tib. 6.4; Dio 51.21.5-7; birth: Propertius 3.18.15. "Vieraugensystem": Kornemann, 9.


20. Levick (1966), 235-236. So, whereas Tiberius received in 24 BC the right to seek the higher magistracies five years before the normal minimum age, Nero Drusus won it in 19 BC (Dio 53.28.3; 54.10.4; Tac. Ann. 3.29.). Tiberius obtained the quaestorship for 23 BC, Drusus for, probably, 18 BC (see PIR [2nd ed.] C 857, p. 196). Tiberius was awarded the ornamenta praetoria in 19 BC (Dio 54.10.4), Drusus in 15 BC (Dio 54.22.3). Tiberius became praetor in 16 BC (Dio 54.19.6), Drusus in 11 BC (Dio 54.32.3; 54.34.1).


22. Levick, 30.

23. Dio 54.27.1; ILS 88.


25. Syme I, 173; see Dio 57.18 - 58.4.


28. German wars: Tac. Ann. 1.69.2; Agrippina's memoirs: Tac. Ann. 4.53.2; purpose of citations: see Furneaux, 13, and Martin, op. cit., 199-200.

29. Millar, 86.


31. The commentarii Senatus: Tac. Ann. 15.74. Syme I, 286 argues that Tacitus used them extensively. In refutation A.D. Momigliano, Gnomon 33 (1961): 55-58 argues that Tacitus' confusion over the consular elections in 15 suggests that he could not have been very familiar with the acta. Daily gazette: Furneaux, 19; see, e.g., Tac. Ann. 3.3 and Suet. Cal. 8.

32. Letters and speeches: Furneaux, 18, Tac. Ann. 3.34.6. Tacitus was certainly aware of oral tradition. He refers to it for a detail about Piso's trial (Ann. 3.16.1) and refutes the undocumented stories (auditiones) that Tiberius was involved in murdering Drusus (Ann. 4.11.3).

33. Agrippina's memoirs: Tac. Ann. 4.53.2; Tiberius' autobiography: Suet. Tib. 61.1; commentarios: Suet. Dom. 20, see Wilkes, 181; speeches: Tac. Ann. 1.81.1; Claudius' works: Suet. Claud. 41.2-3, see Furneaux, 14.

35. Furneaux, 15, L. Seneca, fr. 15 (Haase). Suet. Tib. 73.2 refers to Seneca's account of Tiberius' death; see Wilkes, 184-85.


37. Quint. Inst. 10.1.103, Pliny NH praef. 20, epist. 3.5.6, Chron. Min. 2, pp. 112-13, 135-36, 161; see Wilkes, 192-93; for Bassus' possible influence on later writers see Syme I, 274-75.

38. Continuation of Aufidius' history: Pliny NH praef. 20, Epist. 3.5.6, the German wars: Tac. Ann. 1.69.2.

39. Suet. Cal. 8.1-2; see PIR (2nd ed.) C 1390, Wilkes, 185-86.


41. Negative assessment of Drusus: see Chapter 5, pp. 130-35; the mutinies: see Tac. Ann. 1.24-49, Dio 57.4-6, Suet. Tib. 25, Cal. 1, and Chapter 4; Germanicus' activities in Germany: see Tac. Ann. 1.49-52, 55-71, 2.5-26; in the Orient: 2.53-61, 69-72; Drusus' activities on the Danube: Tac. Ann. 2.62-63; on the adulation of Germanicus in the surviving tradition see Syme I, 418 and n. 7; Drusus' death: see Chapter 11.

42. prisca ... severitate: Vell. Pat. 2.125.4; Drusus' nobilitas ingenita: Tac. Ann. 1.29.1; relations with Germanicus and sons: see Tac. Ann. 2.43.6, 2.53.1, 4.4.1; family affection: 3.34.6; moderating influence and congeniality: 3.37.2.


44. Distortion of the historical record: Tac. Ann. 1.1.2. Tac. Ann. 4.11 indicates fairly clearly that Tiberius, at least, suffered from posthumous defamation. Tacitus rejects the rumour that the Emperor was involved in the murder of his own son, partly on the grounds that "no
writers have made the charge even though, in their hostility, they have searched out and exaggerated everything else about Tiberius."

45. Division in the imperial court: Tac. Ann. 2.43; response to twins' birth: Tac. Ann. 2.84.2.

46. Domination of the tradition by pro-Germanicus, pro-Julian, anti-Claudian writers: see Syme I, 418, n. 7. E. Schwartz, "Cassius Dio Cocceianus," RE 3.2 (1899): no. 40, 1716-17, argues that this domination would have been primarily effected by the work of one unknown annalist of superior skill writing under Caligula. According to Schwartz, both Tacitus and Dio would have depended upon the anonymous author for their portrayals of Tiberius and Germanicus. Schwartz's theory still has currency among some scholars (see, e.g., Martin, op. cit., 204-05 and M.M. Sage, "Tacitus and the Accession of Tiberius," Anc. Soc. 13/14 [1982/1983]: 321), but since Caligula and the Julian party would have controlled the whole tradition, its consistency need not have depended, surely, on a single author. See Syme I, 272-73.

47. Dio 59.3.8.

48. The Julian view of the Claudians and Sejanus, and the reasons for it, may be preserved by Suet. Tib. 55: Tiberius had advanced Sejanus to the highest power "not so much out of good will towards him as in order to displace the children of Germanicus through his assistance and deception and to secure the succession for his own grandson, the child of his son Drusus."

49. Marriage to Vipsania: CIL V 6359 = ILS 165; CIL IX 2201; Tac. Ann. 1.12; Dio 57.2.7. Drusus' birth before divorce: Suet. Tib. 7.2; cf. Aug. 63.2; cf. Dio 54.31.2.

50. Suet. Tib. 7.2.

51. Roman law of adoption: see Berger, 350: adoptio. Augustus' adoptions: Suet. Tib. 15.2, Aug. 65.1; Dio 55.13.2; Vell. Pat. 2.103.3, 104.1, 112.7, 122.2; see PIR (2nd ed.) C 941, p. 222.

52. The date of Tiberius' first tribunicia potestas: Suet. Tib. 9.3 appears to say that Tiberius got both the consulship and the tribunician power together. Since the consulship for 6 would have begun in January, so, by this interpretation, would have Tiberius' trib. pot. See Vell. Pat. 2.39.1; Dio 55.9.4; and PIR (2nd ed.) C 941, p. 222. Tiberius' birthday: Suet. Tib. 5; see 73.1; Tac. Ann. 6.50; Dio 58.28.5, 57.2.4.

53. Sumner, 427.
54. Ibid.

55. cf. Levick (1966), 237.

56. Suet. Claud. 1.1


58. Ibid., 174.


60. Simpson, op. cit., 3.

61. Birth: Suet. Claud. 2.1; Dio 60.5.3. Names: Suet. Claud. 2.1; Dio 55.27.3; see PIR (2nd ed.) C 942.

62. Suet. Claud. 1.3; Dio 55.2.3.


64. Ibid., 173-74.
Drusus' family circumstances after his birth gave promise of a career of great power and prestige, but one that would continue to be limited to the third rank of the imperial succession, behind Gaius, Lucius, and their natural father, M. Agrippa. Tiberius, as his own career continued to advance at an accelerated rate, seemed content with the relegation of himself and his descendants outside the centre of power and attention. In 13 BC, as consul, he would have been instrumental in introducing the legislation confirming the renewal of Agrippa's tribunician power and the bestowal of *imperium maius* upon him, honours which made him, in legal theory at least, inferior to Augustus only in *auctoritas*. In the same year, in organizing the celebrations for Augustus' return from Gaul, Tiberius did not hesitate to arrange that Gaius Caesar should have the seat of honour next to his adoptive father. Assured of political and social importance for his family second only to that of the imperial succession, Drusus' father was thus not inclined to chafe publicly at his, and by inference, his descendants' circumstances. The Claudian Nerones had never stood higher in the Roman state.

In theory, the death of Agrippa in 12 BC, Tiberius' divorce from Vipsania, and his remarriage to Julia in 11 BC should have elevated the Claudian Nerones, including Drusus, Tiberius' son, one rung up the ladder of the imperial
succession. In fact, these developments do not appear to have brought the family much closer to the centre of power. Augustus did have a critical need for Tiberius' services. He found himself without a colleague and deputy, his daughter without a husband, and his adopted sons, Gaius and Lucius, without a father or guardian in the event of his own demise. Augustus had no interest, however, in raising Tiberius and his family higher in the state and succession. What, in effect, he sought was someone to share his burdens and responsibilities, but not his power and prestige. Dio even says that Augustus chose Tiberius only reluctantly, simply because there was no one else with the qualifications necessary to fill the gap opened by Agrippa's death (and, it may be assumed, no one else whom Augustus could trust). He took great care to ensure that the Claudians within his family should not get too much glory. He gave Tiberius neither Agrippa's tribunicia potestas nor his imperium maius. He denied the triumph voted by the Senate to Tiberius for his success against the Pannonians and Dalmatians in 12 BC. He refused to ratify the title imperator given Tiberius and his brother by their troops in 11 BC but took it for himself instead. He intended Tiberius to serve simply as a stand-in until Gaius and Lucius should attain sufficient maturity and experience to replace him. So the divorce and remarriage in 12 and 11 BC do not appear to have changed much the prospects of Tiberius' son, Drusus, for attainment of the principate. Augustus may have had a secondary motive in his
selection of Tiberius, which may explain why he went so far as to force him to marry Julia. Upon the death of Agrippa he may have seen the possibility that, in the event of his own sudden death, Tiberius would pose the greatest potential challenge to his daughter and unprotected sons. Tiberius, the senior Claudian, married to a daughter of Agrippa, blessed with a son and expecting soon another child, possessed a ready-made potential dynasty closer to the centre of power than any other. By marrying him to Julia Augustus could remove this threat with the same economy and completeness with which he had solved an earlier, similar problem, by marrying Agrippa to Julia. Instead of menacing Gaius and Lucius as a potential adversary Tiberius would be their guardian, and any future offspring Tiberius might beget would hold, as sons of Julia, rank superior to his Claudian son, Drusus, and inferior to their elder Julian brothers. By the marriage Augustus could secure the interests of his own line while actually preventing any potential advancement of either Tiberius or Drusus above the second rank.\textsuperscript{4}

Of course, if Tiberius and Julia had produced any sons who survived, the effect would actually have been to lower Drusus back to the third rank within the imperial succession. As it turned out, Julia did give birth to a son at Aquileia in about 10 BC, but he died in infancy, and since Julia and Tiberius subsequently declined to live together, the threat to Drusus could not arise again.\textsuperscript{5} He remained, with his father, established in the second rank.
What Drusus felt about his parents' divorce and remarriages cannot be known. It is likely that the initial effects on him were minimal since he would not have been older than two or three in 12 BC. There is no evidence about the later effects but, given his patrician background, there is no reason to believe that they would have greatly upset him. The Roman nobility, certainly by the late Republic, regarded divorce and remarriage as standard options in the constant pursuit of family advantage. In this context the events of 12 and 11 BC would probably impress themselves upon Drusus as offering a vivid and memorable lesson of the supremacy of imperial dynastic arrangements over everything else. His conformity to such arrangements in his own life would seem to indicate that, whatever he might have felt about them privately, he would not dissent publicly from the system of values underpinning them.

The sources do not tell where, and under whose tutelage, Drusus went after the dissolution of his parents' marriage. Several possibilities suggest themselves. He may have gone with his mother to the home of Gaius Asinius Gallus, an arrangement that might explain the close connection to him Gallus seems to have asserted. Alternatively, he may have gone to live with his father and stepmother, Julia, or his grandmother, Livia, or, finally, his Claudian relatives, his uncle Nero Drusus and his aunt Antonia. The last possibility has much to commend it. Josephus says that Julius Agrippa, the grandson of King
Herod, came to Rome as a boy a little before Herod's death, which probably happened in 4 BC. In Rome he was brought up in close intimacy with Drusus and friendship with Antonia. The implication of Josephus' record is that Agrippa was living in Antonia's home and, thus, that Drusus was as well at some point before 4 BC. Such hospitality would not have been uncharacteristic of Antonia. She had inherited her father's close contacts with many eastern kings and potentates, such as Herod of Judaea, and Julius Agrippa's mother, Berenice, was her personal friend. From AD 29 to 31-32 her grandchildren, Caligula and Drusilla, lived with her and she probably gave lodging at the same time to the three sons of the Thracian king, Rhoemetalces, Polemo, and Cotys, who were being educated in Rome. If Drusus was also brought up in her home, the experience would probably have given him contacts in the eastern Empire in addition to Julius Agrippa, and would have contributed to the close relationships that he enjoyed throughout his adult life with two of Antonia's children, Livilla, his future wife, and Germanicus, later his adoptive brother. Precisely when before 4 BC Drusus might have come under his Claudian relatives' roof cannot, however, be determined.

Whatever the arrangements for his care and upbringing, Drusus saw little of his father after the divorce from Vipsania. Almost immediately Tiberius was sent to deal with rebellions in the north, in which activity he was preoccupied for most of the period 12 to 9 BC, particularly
in Pannonia and Dalmatia. For a good part of 9 and 8 BC he was engaged in Germany, where he went to accompany the return home of his brother's corpse and, subsequently, to continue the war against the Germans. In 7 BC he entered his second consulship, but even during his tenure of this office his stay at Rome was interrupted by renewed trouble in Germany. In 6 BC he departed for his unofficial exile in Rhodes where he remained till AD 2. Tiberius could not, thus, have exercised a direct hand in the upbringing and education of his son.

Tiberius' departure into voluntary exile on Rhodes dealt a heavy blow to the prospects and prestige of Drusus and the rest of the Claudians. It left Drusus in effect fatherless and with no one to promote him, cutting him off from the imperial stage now occupied by Augustus, Gaius, and Lucius alone. Only Livia remained to defend his and the other Claudians' interests.

The family's prospects undoubtedly continued to dim as Tiberius' absence lengthened. Gaius and Lucius continued to advance in honours, culminating in Gaius' consulship in AD 1 when he was only 10 years old. Without doubt both brothers would have continued to progress from strength to strength, leaving the Claudians far behind, had not their lives been cut abruptly short. In addition, a crisis erupted within Augustus' own family. In 2 BC he lost all patience with his dissolute daughter, Julia, and, after banishing her, sent her a bill of divorce in Tiberius' name. One effect of
the divorce was symbolically to sever an important tie between Augustus and Tiberius - and thus Drusus. Nor was Augustus ready to forge new links: when, in 2 or 1 BC, the period of Tiberius' tribunician power expired and he, now without any function or official power in the state, requested to be allowed to visit his relatives, Augustus flatly turned him down. All that Tiberius and his son could rely upon at this point were the good offices of Livia. Their fortunes had never been at a lower ebb.

In AD 2, ostensibly because Gaius had adopted a more favourable opinion of Tiberius, Augustus allowed him to return to Rome on condition that he take no part in state affairs. Under such a restriction he certainly could not recover any of his lost power and prestige, but at least he was no longer buried in the oblivion of exile. Perhaps, too, Augustus was no longer alienated from Tiberius and his son. Finally, after eight years, Drusus was no longer fatherless and his family had a leader once again.

From Drusus' point of view Tiberius' return from Rhodes brought the added advantage of enabling his formal initiation into manhood, including the divestment of the *toga praetexta*, the donning of the *toga virilis*, and the *deductio in forum*. The ceremony had major importance, for, in theory at least, it signified a boy's acquisition of full citizenship rights, including full capacity to contract, to make a will, and to marry. Moreover, it made him eligible for the last stages in his education: formal preparation for
political and legal activity, a period called the *tirocinium fori*, to be followed by preparation for military life, the *tirocinium militiae*. In effect, his donning of the *toga virilis* marked the beginning of Drusus' public career as a Roman noble.

The precise date of his initiation cannot be determined. His father came back to Rome in AD 2 at some point prior to Lucius Caesar's death on August 20th. Suetonius gives the impression that Tiberius conducted Drusus' *deductio* shortly after his return. Since the period of mourning, including probably a *iustitium*, following Lucius' death would have prevented the early performance of a public office, it is not likely that the initiation would have been held after August 20th. There is a good possibility, then, that Drusus donned the *toga virilis* in the first part of AD 2.

The uncertainties involving the dates of Drusus' *deductio* and his birth preclude any precise definition of his age at the time of the ceremony. In the late Republic and early Empire the Romans appear to have set fourteen as, generally, the minimum age for entry into manhood. The ceremony could be deferred well into the later teens but was usually conducted no later than sixteen. In addition, the evidence suggests that within Augustus' household there was a tendency, if not a deliberate policy, to induct boys into manhood not too long after the minimum age had been reached - a tendency well suited to the general Augustan policy of
advancing the young men of the imperial family at a rapid rate through the cursus honorum. Thus Gaius and Lucius Caesar, as well as Agrippa Postumus, were either fourteen or fifteen when they put on the toga virilis, while Drusus' own father, Tiberius, was about fourteen and a half years old when he donned it. Drusus, then, could well have been fourteen to fifteen himself.

The sources are silent about Drusus' other activities in AD 2 and 3. Normally a young man beginning his tirocinium fori would be conducted for at least a year by his father or by an experienced statesman and family friend through the various aspects of a citizen's public life. No information exists to indicate who might have supervised Drusus or whether he even underwent the tirocinium, but it would have been in character for Tiberius to have done his duty by his son. Suetonius does say that after conducting Drusus' deductio Tiberius immediately secluded himself in his new residence in the gardens of Maecenas on the Esquiline hill, publicorum munerum expers, in keeping with the restrictions imposed by Augustus on his public activities. Suetonius adds, however, that Tiberius did in fact discharge his privata officia, and this could well have embraced his taking direct charge of Drusus' tirocinium, or at least playing a direct role in delegating some prominent senator active in public affairs.

Whatever Drusus' activities during the remainder of AD 2 and 3, the death of Lucius Caesar on August 20th in 2
did not change his position or prospects. Augustus made no
new arrangements. Gaius Caesar's career continued to cast
into the shade all the other male members of the imperial
household except Augustus. In effect he functioned as both
deputy and successor to the princeps, shutting out all others
from the centre of power. The whole situation changed,
however, with Gaius' death from a festering wound on February
21st, AD 4. At one fell swoop Augustus lost both his
deputy and his successor and was forced once again to reshape
the roles of the other members of the imperial household to
make up the loss.

The changes for Drusus were dramatic. He became the
adoptive, agnatic grandson of the princeps and bearer of a
new name: Drusus Julius Caesar. The new relationship
resulted from Augustus' arrogation of Tiberius on June 26th
or 27th, AD 4. On the same day Augustus also adopted his own
grandson, Agrippa Postumus, the youngest brother of the
deceased Gaius and Lucius. Earlier, the Emperor had
compelled Tiberius to adopt his own nephew, Germanicus. Thus, within a fairly short period of time, Drusus' step-grandfather turned into his legal grandfather, his
maternal uncle and former stepbrother, Agrippa Postumus,
became his paternal uncle, and his cousin, Germanicus, was
transformed into his brother. Yet Augustus' radical
reorganization of his family bore a good deal more
significance for Drusus, as well as for the others, than a
mere metamorphosis of private family relationships. By
making Drusus his agnate grandson the princeps indicated that he now intended him to be a potential successor to his power and privilege in a way that he did not intend others to be, even those connected to him by blood, such as Germanicus' younger brother, the future emperor Claudius. Some scholars, such as F.B. Marsh and V. Gardthausen, have in the past tried to argue that, because Augustus took no direct part in the adoption of Drusus, Drusus must have had no place in his plans for the succession.  

But the mere fact, that Drusus' adoption, however indirectly it may have come about, gave him the special names, "Julius Caesar", was sufficient to show that he represented in his own person an extension of Augustus and, thus, continuity of his power, privilege, and auctoritas. With those names Drusus could not be considered anything other than a potential successor to the Emperor and a potential continuer of his dynasty. This point was officially emphasized in the titulature now accorded Drusus in inscriptions and on coins. His official descriptions, using expressions like "son of Tiberius Augustus, grandson of the divine Augustus," and even "son of Tiberius Augustus, grandson of the divine Augustus, great grandson of the divine Julius," stressed his connection to the founders and leaders of the Julian dynasty. Drusus was now integrally and inseparably identified with the principate.

Moreover, Drusus' adoption, resulting automatically from Tiberius' arrogation, also shared in the supreme
importance of that arrogation. By adopting Tiberius directly (unlike Drusus and Germanicus) and by bestowing upon him more and greater honours than on any one else, including the tribunician power for ten years and an army command in Germany, and by declaring publicly that he adopted him rei publicae causa, Augustus showed in effect that he intended to make him both his principal successor and his second-in-command. In his description of the arrogated Tiberius as filius, collega imperii, consors tribuniciae potestatis, Tacitus emphasizes that Augustus raised him virtually to his own level. Such pre-eminence in prestige and power must inevitably have reflected upon Tiberius' natural son, now also the adoptive grandson of Augustus. If nothing else, Tiberius' position must have guaranteed Drusus' status as a potential successor to Augustus.

Balancing this, it must be conceded that Drusus received personally the least standing among Augustus' four adoptees. His father and Agrippa Postumus preceded him if for no other reason than that Augustus adopted them directly. Moreover, Postumus, as the son of Julia, had the advantage of blood kinship to the princeps. Germanicus' case might prima facie appear to place him in a position inferior to that of Drusus. His connection to Augustus was dependent on two adoptions: Tiberius' of him, then Augustus' of Tiberius, in contrast to Drusus' dependence on just one. Germanicus' adoption by Tiberius prior to Tiberius' own arrogation made the former subordinate to the latter and of rank inferior to
that of Postumus.\textsuperscript{27} In the sum total of all its aspects, however, the position of Germanicus after adoption was stronger than that of Drusus. He, like Postumus, was related by blood to Augustus, though less directly, through his mother, Antonia minor, the daughter of Octavia, sister of Augustus. He was older than Drusus. While remaining generally silent about the opinion in which Drusus was held by AD 4, the sources testify to Germanicus' great popularity both with his own family and with the people. Again, while the sources give no explicit indication of Augustus' intentions regarding Drusus, Suetonius states that the princeps at one time considered making Germanicus his successor, even in preference to Tiberius. Germanicus' subsequent marked precedence ahead of Drusus in promotion and in awards of honour and responsibility confirmed the superiority of his position at the time of adoption. It seems that Augustus intended Drusus to play Lucius to Germanicus' Gaius. Verses from one of Ovid's exile poems, through the priority they give Germanicus, suggest such a closely connected, yet unequal, relation:

\begin{verbatim}
praeterit ipse suos animo Germanicus annos, 
 nec vigor est Drusi nobilitate minor.\textsuperscript{(28)}
\end{verbatim}

There can be little doubt that, of the four men to whom Augustus became \textit{paterfamilias} through his program of adoptions in AD 4, Drusus held the most junior rank. Even as the most junior of the adoptees, however, Drusus was now established within the highest circle of the imperial family.
His special rank would determine the character and direction of his whole career.

Like his father and uncle before him Drusus seems to have accepted readily the position and role mapped out and thrust upon him by Augustus. No expression of his views on these matters has survived but it would appear that he always responded promptly and resolutely to the tasks assigned him, never tried to push beyond the career and rate of advancement fixed for him, and always amicably deferred to his superiors within the principate, including Germanicus. He seems to have inherited his father's inclination for strict adherence to the requirements of piety and duty.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Tiberius and Agrippa's honours: Levick, 30. Tiberius and Gaius: Dio 54.27.1; Seager, 24.

2. Dio 54.31.1.

3. Denial of triumph: Dio 54.31.4; Suet. Tib. 9.2. Refusal to ratify imperatorial acclamation: Dio 54.34.3; 33.5. Tiberius as stand-in: Dio 54.31.1.


6. Jos. AJ 18.143. On Julius Agrippa see PIR (2nd ed.) I 132, pp. 132-34. Where Antonia and Nero Drusus lived is not known. Since, however, many of their prominent relatives, including M. Livius Drusus, Mark Antony, Augustus, Livia, Tiberius, and, later, Germanicus, had homes on the Palatine, the most fashionable residential district in Rome, it is a reasonable inference that they did too. See D.R. Dudley, Urbs Roma (London: 1967), 160-66, and Platner-Ashby, 156-58, 181, 184, 191-94.


8. Rebellions in the north: Suet. Tib. 9.1-2, Dio 54.31.2-3, 54.33.5, 54.34.3, 54.36.2-3; see Rogers, Studies, 93. Mission for dead brother: Val. Max. 5.5.3; Dio 55.2.1; Suet. Tib. 7.3. Continuing war against Germans: Suet. Tib. 9.1-2; Dio 55.6; Vell. Pat. 2.97.4. Second consulship: Dio 55.8.3. Exile on Rhodes: Dio 55.9.5-8; Suet. Tib. 14.1.

9. On Gaius' and Lucius' honours see Dio 55.9.4, 9.9, 9.10, 10.6, 10.18, and, in general, PIR (2nd ed.) I 216, pp. 166-67 (Gaius), and 222, pp. 186-87 (Lucius).


14. The traditional, preferred date in the Republic for "coming of age" had been set at March 17, the festival of the Liberalia. By the time of the late Republic and early Empire, however, strict adherence to this date was no longer practised: Scullard, op.cit., 92. Return to Rome: Vell. Pat. 2.103.1; date of death: fasti Antiates, CIL X 6638; Drusus' deductio: Suet. Tib. 15.1.

15. Marquardt, 125-129.


17. This range is consonant with the range of possible birth-dates for Drusus suggested earlier (see pp. 3-5): October 7th, 15 to 13 BC. If his deductio was conducted after his birthday in AD 2, then he would have had to have turned at least fourteen on October 7th, in which case he would have been born in 13 BC. If, as would seem more likely in view of the evidence presented earlier, the deductio was conducted before his birthday in 2, in fact, not much later than August 20th, then he would have had to have turned at least fourteen on October 7th, AD 1, which would place his date of birth in 14 BC. If he was fifteen around August 20th in 2 he would have been born in 15 BC. Not too much can be made of this coincidence but at least it does not bring into question the conclusions reached about Drusus' date of birth. It also suggests that, at least on the level of the initiation into manhood, Drusus was not being excluded from the privileges granted to other, better placed members of the imperial household.

18. Marquardt, 132; Regner, op. cit., 1450.


20. Seager, 36.

21. Date in F. Gab., F. Cupr. (EJ, p. 39); F. Ver. (EJ, p. 47); ILS 140 (EJ, p. 69).

22. Adoption and name change of Drusus: see footnote no. 9 in Chapter 1, p. 40 above. Adoption of Tiberius and Postumus: Suet. Tib. 15.2; Aug. 65.1; Vell. Pat.
2.112.7; see PIR (2nd ed.) C 941, p. 222. Adoption of Germanicus: Suet. Tib. 15.2, 21; Cal. 1.1, 4; Tac. Ann. 1.3, 4.57; Dio 55.13.2, 55.27.4.


25. First title: Ti.AVG.F.DIVI.AVG.N. (BMC I, p. 133, nos. 95-97); second title: Ti. Aug. filius, divi Aug. nepos, divi Iuli pronepos (CIL II 2040, 3829 = ILS 167); see PIR (2nd ed.) I 219, p. 174 for more examples. Drusus' full inclusion in the imperial family was later presupposed by Ovid. For example, writing from exile in Tomis in AD 15 (on the date see H.B. Evans, Publica Carmina. Ovid's Books from Exile [Lincoln, Nebraska and London: 1983], 154), the poet says that he maintains a personal cult for the family with a collection of silver pieces representing Drusus and Germanicus in addition to Augustus, Livia, and Tiberius: Ov. Pont. 4.9.105-112. I am grateful to Dr. D. Fishwick for pointing out this reference to me.


27. Subordination of Germanicus to Tiberius: Kuntz, 40.

28. Germanicus' kinship with Augustus: Suet. Cal. 1.1; Plut. Ant. 87. His popularity with both the people and Augustus: Suet. Cal. 4 (the possibility should not be overlooked that the general adulation claimed for Germanicus may be nothing more than a figment of the pro-Julian source tradition; see Chapter 1, Excursus I). Germanicus' precedence in promotion: see Sumner, 241, and Schrömbges, 160. Ovid's view: Pont. 2.2.71-72; see Rogers, 95.
CHAPTER 3: THE BEGINNING OF DRUSUS' CAREER

The elevation of Drusus to the status of grandson of the princeps brought with it appropriate honours. His cousin and new brother, Germanicus, received preference, yet the honours awarded both upon their adoption paralleled each other so closely in the majority of cases that the official, public image of Germanicus and Drusus must have been that of a pair - a hierarchical pair, to be sure, but an inseparable pair nevertheless. Augustus, perhaps thinking of his earlier successors, Gaius and Lucius, probably intended this image.

Their marriages were closely linked. Both became the husbands of prominent Julio-Claudian ladies. Drusus received the hand of his cousin Livilla (Claudia Livia Julia), sister of Germanicus, the daughter of Nero Drusus and Antonia minor, herself the daughter of Octavia, the sister of Augustus. Germanicus for his part married Agrippina, the daughter of Agrippa and Julia. Although the precise dates of both marriages cannot be ascertained they may not have been separated by much. The wedding of Drusus and Livilla must have taken place sometime after February 21st, AD 4, when Gaius Caesar, Livilla's first husband, died. But since Julia, the daughter of Drusus and Livilla, became the wife of Germanicus' son, Nero, in AD 20 and Roman law established twelve years as the minimum age for a female to wed, Drusus and Livilla could not have married later than AD 7. On the other hand, since Nero, the eldest known son of Germanicus
and Agrippina, was born c. AD 6, that couple could not have wed any later than c. AD 5.\(^1\) The correspondence between the two marriages probably reflects Augustus' intention to keep Drusus and Germanicus closely associated in his system of succession, and they may even have been planned as part of the succession settlement worked out in AD 4.\(^2\)

Drusus and Germanicus may also have been linked by Augustus as principes iuventutis, "leaders of the youth." The equestrian order had first given the title to Gaius and Lucius Caesar to signify that each was a leader of the equites ego publico, equites under the age of 35 who were still iuniores technically, and sons of senators under the age of 25 who had not yet held a senatorial magistracy. The honour probably also meant that Gaius and Lucius, as principes, were generally, perhaps even officially, understood to be successors to the great princeps himself. They received silver spears and shields as badges of office.\(^3\) No extant source material states expressly that Drusus and Germanicus inherited the title, but sufficient circumstantial evidence remains to suggest that they did. Certainly the name did not disappear with Gaius and Lucius; both Tiberius Gemellus and Nero received it later. In a fragmentary inscription concerning funeral honours paid to Drusus, mention is made of the equestrian order formally bearing one of the articles associated with the title, a silver shield, in the annual transvectio equitum. Additional evidence exists for Germanicus' receipt of the honour, and if
Germanicus was princeps iuventutis his partner could only have been his adoptive brother Drusus. If the title was bestowed upon them it would have given further confirmation, as in the case of Gaius and Lucius before, of their position as successors to Augustus.⁴

There is also evidence of a practice, perhaps officially encouraged, of assimilating Drusus and Germanicus to the divine brothers, the Dioscuri. Ovid, for example, describes the young men as sidus iuvenale, thereby linking them to the constellation Gemini, representing Castor and Pollux (or, simply, the Castores, as the Romans frequently called them). He makes the connection even more explicit in his reference to the adoptive brothers as

\[ \text{fratribus adsimiles, quos proxima templo tenentis} \]
\[ \text{divus ab excelsa Iulius aede videt}, \]

namely, of course, Castor and Pollux.⁵ The brothers' association with the Dioscuri gave them their own cult with a flamen at Nemausus (Nimes).⁶ The connection would have enhanced their public twinned image. Moreover, the imagined link with the divine and superhuman would have served to enhance Drusus' and Germanicus' prestige and auctoritas, qualities essential for the credibility and security of a largely extra-constitutional dynasty like the Julio-Claudian principate. The very effort to honour Drusus and Germanicus in this way would have shown that they were now perceived to be fully integrated into Augustus' dynasty.

The association with the Dioscuri strengthens the
possibility that the brothers were inducted into the *principatus iuventutis*. The Roman knights worshipped the Dioscuri as their guardian and patron gods and regarded the *principes iuventutis* not only as equestrian leaders but as the human counterparts to and representatives of the twin deities. Ovid intimates this association in his description of both Drusus and Germanicus as *sidus iuvenale*, noted above, in which he not only refers to the *Gemini* but echoes *iuventutis in iuvenale*. While the association cannot prove that Drusus and Germanicus were made *principes iuventutis* it certainly presents a remarkable coincidence and circumstantial evidence for the honour.

Consistently with and, perhaps, conditioned by their close official bond, Drusus and Germanicus always maintained the public appearance of a close, harmonious friendship. Tacitus reports that even when the court became split into opposing factions favouring Drusus or Germanicus, the brothers stayed *egregie concordes*. They remained so throughout their lives. There is no evidence that either ever tried to seek advantage over the other during either Augustus' or Tiberius' reign. Their publicly displayed fraternity conformed well with the dual position that Augustus had assigned them in his system of succession.

In addition, not long after their adoptions both Drusus and Germanicus appear to have received numerous, roughly equivalent honours, though the difficulty of dating many of them renders precise comparison impossible. For
example, both had their portraits set up, together with those of Augustus and Tiberius, in Athens in AD 4. In AD 7/8 their portraits appeared beside each other, no doubt, as Kornemann suggests, "als praesumptive Nachfolger", among the ten set up on the arch of Ticinum. At some point before Germanicus' death dedications to Germanicus and Drusus were inscribed at Forum Clodii. Such honours reflected, again, the close union of the brothers in the imperial hierarchy.

Yet, however closely yoked together they may have appeared officially, there can also be no doubt that, between the pair, from the time of their adoptions, Drusus held the junior, inferior position. Their marriages clearly showed their relative importance. Drusus' wife, Livilla, certainly had exalted rank: not only was she the daughter of the great Drusus Germanicus and Antonia minor, daughter of Octavia, sister of Augustus, but she had been married to Gaius Caesar, in his time the Emperor's chosen successor. Statues and inscriptions reflected her prominence as a member of the imperial family. Yet she could not, in the final analysis, match Germanicus' wife, Agrippina, for the latter could claim direct descent from Augustus himself, her mother's father. It is true that within the imperial family there were few ladies eligible to wed Drusus and Germanicus in any case. If the Emperor had wished, however, to preserve the brothers' equality in marriage he did have the means to hand. He could have made his older granddaughter, Julia, available for either of the pair. He chose not to. So the reservation
of a descendant for Germanicus alone can leave no doubt that Augustus ranked him ahead of Drusus. Moreover, the inequality in marriage was more than just symbolic or formal. It had important practical consequences. Any children that Germanicus and Agrippina might have would share a good deal more Julian blood than would offspring produced by the Claudian Drusus and Livilla. Consequently the former couple would benefit from Augustus' preference for advancing his own blood relations, where possible, ahead of all others, as the examples of his nephew Marcellus, his grandsons Gaius and Lucius, and his grandnephew Germanicus demonstrated. As will be seen, Germanicus' subsequent rapid acceleration ahead of Drusus in honours would confirm his superiority.

The sources reveal little about Drusus' activities over the years AD 5 to 10. As early as AD 4, after the adoptions, Augustus had sent Tiberius to Germany to deal with restive German tribes which he strove to pacify till the year 6. Apparently he spent only the winters of 4/5 and 5/6 in Rome. Drusus might have accompanied his father, perhaps only as an observer, on one of his German expeditions. Since he had donned the *toga virilis* in 2, he was by 4 (in which he would have passed at least his sixteenth year) eligible for the *tirocinium militiae*. He had, moreover, the precedent of his own father who, in 26/25 BC, only fourteen or fifteen himself, had accompanied Augustus on a military expedition to Spain in the office of military tribune. Certainly such experience would have been considered invaluable, if not
essential, for a successor to Augustus. Germanicus was soon to be initiated, if he had not already been, and Drusus would definitely have need of the experience by AD 14 at the very latest when he would have to deal with the Pannonian mutiny. The possibility of military training must, however, remain hypothetical. There is no evidence that Drusus even left Rome before 14.

Whatever Drusus did in 6 the gap between his career and Germanicus' began to widen. The latter was granted the right to enter the cursus honorum with the quaestorship five years in advance of the legally stipulated age, that is, twenty-five. Drusus, falling behind, was not, however, forgotten. In either 7 or 8 he was made pontifex and was thus initiated into the highest order of priesthood in Rome. Membership among the pontifices was considered a prerequisite for promotion to the highest priestly office in the state, that of pontifex maximus, which Augustus himself had been careful to secure on the death of Lepidus in 12 BC. Drusus' admission into the pontificate showed that, while he held lower rank than Germanicus, he still had privileged status.

In fact, Drusus' pontificate could be interpreted as creating an anomaly in the imperial hierarchy, at least in regard to his status relative to Germanicus. Around the time that Drusus was made pontifex, Germanicus became augur. Yet the augurate was definitely considered the inferior office. Moreover, the bestowal of these priestships on members of
Augustus' family normally corresponded to their relative importance within it. Thus, the senior members, Marcellus, Tiberius, and Gaius Caesar, were all made pontifices, while the junior members, including Tiberius' younger brother, Nero Drusus, L. Caesar, and Claudius, who seems never to have been considered for the succession, were all made augurs. Yet Drusus, who was Germanicus' junior, received both the pontificate and the augurate while Germanicus was made only augur. The distinction between their priestly honours in AD 7/8 would seem, thus, prima facie an inexplicable aberration from Augustus' general policy towards the pair.

The priesthoods of the adoptive brothers, however, must be seen in the context of their careers, which cannot leave any doubt about Augustus' overall preference for Germanicus. In AD 7 he entered the cursus honorum as quaestor five years in advance of the normal minimum age. In the same year Augustus sent him out at the head of a newly conscripted army to reinforce Tiberius in Dalmatia, where he would distinguish himself in the fighting. On the arch of Ticinum set up in 7/8 Germanicus' portrait was placed one position closer to Augustus' portrait than was Drusus'. Drusus' pontificate alone, whatever its prestige and significance, could not match the sum of Germanicus' honours. Germanicus' career continued to accelerate ahead of Drusus' over the next few years. In AD 8 Augustus conducted circus games in the name of Germanicus and Claudius, perhaps in memory of their dead father. In 9, for his part in the
crushing of Bato's rebellion in Dalmatia, Germanicus was awarded triumphal ornaments, praetorian rank, the right of giving his opinion first after the consuls in the Senate, and, finally, the right to hold the consulship before the established minimum age. Drusus was granted only the privileges of attending the Senate before becoming a senator himself and of delivering his opinion before the ex-praetors when he should become quaestor. These honours, however, were not insignificant. They showed that Drusus still had special status transcending that of Romans outside the imperial family.

Dio says that these privileges were given Drusus even though he had not participated in the Dalmatian war. It might be inferred from this observation either that Augustus deliberately elevated Drusus at the time to prevent the appearance of his exclusion from the succession in light of the rapid advancement of Germanicus, or that Drusus had within Augustus' hierarchy an assured position that would be developed according to a strict timetable independent of all other circumstances. Either alternative would affirm Drusus' continuing importance in Augustus' plans.

Drusus was certainly faring much better than the unhappy Agrippa Postumus whose status had been, in theory at least, on a par with Tiberius' after the adoptions of AD 4. Postumus acquired the *toga virilis* in AD 5 but no other honours. In fact, suffering apparently from some sort of worsening depravity of character or mind, he received not
advancement but humiliation at Augustus' hands. He was first confined to Surrentum and then, in AD 7/8, banished under guard to the island of Planasia. He would never leave it alive. His disappearance effectively left Germanicus as the only successor having blood kinship with Augustus, and, after Augustus' death, it would be to Germanicus that the members and supporters of the Julian house would look as their natural leader. Postumus' disgrace also, however, removed significant Julian competition in the succession from Tiberius and Drusus and placed greater responsibility upon them.22

In the year 11, according to Dio, Drusus entered the first stage of the *cursus honorum*, the quaestorship. There is no reason to doubt Dio's evidence that Drusus did serve as quaestor for that year. The author's earlier indication that a quaestorship was in prospect, at least, for Drusus in 9 virtually confirms the quaestorship in 11.23 To be eligible for the office he had to meet its age qualifications.24 In principle, the minimum age had been established under Augustus as twenty-five years. According to the range of birth dates deduced for Drusus earlier, October 7th, 15 to 13 BC, he could not satisfy that requirement. Even if he had been born in 15 BC he would have been only twenty-four on December 5th in AD 10 when the quaestorship for 11 actually began.25 Practice, however, had established modifications to the strict rule. For example, a candidate for the quaestorship could be deemed to have satisfied the age
requirement so long as he had merely begun his twenty-fifth year, that is, had passed his twenty-fourth birthday, before he entered office. This qualification would admit Drusus to the quaestorship for 11 if he had been born in 15 BC. Further reduction of the minimum age was permitted by the _lex Papia Poppaea_ according to which a candidate for the quaestorship was permitted to subtract one year from the minimum age for each child born to him. Since by the time that he stood for the quaestorship Drusus had at least one child, his daughter Julia, he could claim the privilege. The cumulative effect of the deeming provision and the _lex Papia Poppaea_ meant that Drusus needed only to have passed his twenty-third birthday on October 7th, AD 10, in other words, that he could have been born on October 7th, 14 BC. Further reductions from the minimum age requirement do not appear to have been available to him. His quaestorship in 11 would seem, then, to rule out 13 BC as his year of birth while leaving 15 or 14 as possible alternatives. So Drusus would have been twenty-three or twenty-four when he began the _cursus honorum_.

In the very year in which Drusus exercised his quaestorship, Augustus continued to affirm the relative pre-eminence of Germanicus. Not only did the latter accompany Tiberius into Germany for the extremely important purpose of restoring Roman power, influence, and prestige after the Varan disaster in AD 9, but he was also made consul designate for 12, in effect bypassing the praetorship.
the end of his consulship Germanicus was well ahead of Drusus in honours and rank.

In AD 13 the special status of Augustus' adopted heirs, apart from wretched Postumus, became even more apparent. The Emperor sought to have the succession regulated publicly as far as was possible. To this end he had Tiberius' tribunician power renewed, made the consuls carry a law that Tiberius should administer the provinces jointly with him, had the Senate and People decree that Tiberius should have power equal to his own, and gave Tiberius the right to conduct the census with him. Tiberius may even have won the right to attach "Augustus" to his own name. His elevation was publicized throughout the Empire by a new issue of gold and silver coins minted at Lugdunum. Cumulatively Tiberius' new honours made him virtually Augustus' equal in legal power and inferior to him only in auctoritas. Augustus could not go much farther in assimilating Tiberius' position within the state to his own in order to clear the way for a smooth and speedy succession.

Since Germanicus and Drusus were integrally connected to Tiberius in Augustus' preparations for the succession, Tiberius' elevation automatically involved the enhancement of their positions as well. Germanicus had completed his first consulship in AD 12 and, probably later in 13, was sent to Germany as legatus Augusti pro praetore to take up the supreme command of the armies there, some eight legions, a position most recently held by Tiberius. At the same time
Augustus began to narrow the gap in rank and honours that had, in recent years, been widening between Germanicus and Drusus. He granted Drusus the same privilege he had bestowed on Germanicus in 9, the right to hold the consulship without having to serve as praetor, and designated 15 as his year of office.\(^{34}\)

The special importance of Drusus and Germanicus in the state was further emphasized when Augustus reorganized his consilium to aid him in his deliberations now that old age was restricting his ability to attend the Senate. The new consilium was to consist of himself, twenty counsellors (probably senators) annually appointed, the consuls of the year, the consuls designate, Tiberius, Drusus, and Germanicus, and other individuals whom Augustus might from time to time desire to consult.\(^{35}\) The old consilium had been merely probouleutic. According to Dio the new consilium, and thus Drusus and Germanicus, had great powers, for the Senate voted that all decisions reached by the princeps with the consilium should be as valid as if they had been made by the whole Senate.\(^{36}\)

Drusus' and Germanicus' prominence in the state was further demonstrated in an indirect way. In AD 6 Augustus had established a five percent tax on inheritances and bequests (the vicesima hereditatum) to help fund his aerarium militare.\(^{37}\) According to Dio the tax became so unpopular that an insurrection threatened. Augustus, faced with the problem of defusing the animosity against himself as the
author of the tax while retaining the source of essential revenue, hit upon a clever political solution that would shift responsibility onto the Senate. He requested the senators to find other sources of revenue, knowing full well that, since they would not be able to, they would have to accept and ratify the *vicesima hereditatum*, thereby drawing upon themselves all resentment previously directed at the *princeps*. He was also fully aware, however, that Drusus and Germanicus were generally considered so prominent and so intimate with him that any comment that they might make about the tax would automatically be construed to reflect his own mind. The Senate would be sure to act on it and would then be deemed by all to be carrying out Augustus' own instructions. At that point the unpopularity of and blame for the tax would deflect back onto the Emperor. Accordingly, he instructed Drusus and Germanicus to hold their peace.38

Drusus' career continued to blossom in AD 14. On May 14th he was co-opted into the priestly college of the *Fratres Arvales*.39 Of obscure origins in early Roman antiquity, the *Fratres* were revitalized by Augustus. They held their meetings in a sacred grove near the fifth milestone of the *Via Campana*. During the Empire they appear to have practised two main cults: for the mysterious agricultural, fertility goddess, Dea Dia, and for the imperial family, for whom they sought divine protection and blessing. In consequence of the latter devotion in particular the *Fratres* became one of the
most exclusive and prestigious priesthoods in imperial Rome. Their membership was restricted to twelve men, generally drawn from the most distinguished senatorial families, plus the Emperor himself as a supernumerary. Membership was for life, and enrollment took place solely by co-option rather than election in the popular assemblies, the normal procedure for admission to the pontifices, the augures, and the quindecimviri sacris faciundis. Drusus himself was co-opted to replace the deceased member, Lucius Aemilius Paullus. His initiation on May 14th appears to have taken place during the Fratres' main annual festival in honour of the Dea Dia. The fragmentary records of the college reveal his attendance at meetings on at least three other occasions: December 15 in 14, May in 16, and May in 21. His admission into this exclusive, august company gives a further sign that he, like Germanicus who was also a member, had great prominence and influence within both the Roman state and the imperial family.

2. Birch, op. cit., 159.


4. Gemellus and Nero: Suet. Cal. 15.2; Tac. Ann. 12.41; CIL VI 921. Silver shield: ... cum titulo eum clupeum ab ipsis (sc. equitibus) datum esse Druso Caesarl Ti. Caesaris Aug. F., CIL VI 31,200 b': see J.P.V.D. Balsdon, "Gaius and the Grand Cameo of Paris," JRS 26 (1936): 152-160. Germanicus and the honour: Ovid refers to him as princeps iuvenum, virtually a synonym for princeps iuventutis (Pont. 2.5.41). Ovid also employs princeps iuvenum to refer to another princeps iuventutis, Gaius Caesar (Ars Am. I.1.194; see L.G. Koch, De principe iuventutis [Leipzig: 1883], 22). Tacitus reports that the equestrian order renamed their cuneum iuniorum the cuneum Germanici after Germanicus' death, and ordered that turmae idibus Iulius sequerentur just as they would have followed Germanicus, while living, had he been princeps iuventutis (Tac. Ann. 2.83; Koch, op. cit., 22-23). Meaning for the succession: Beringer, op. cit., 2301.


6. CIL XII 3180, 3207. Drusus and Germanicus also appear together as the Dioscuri in inscriptions at Patara in Lycia, at Olympia, and on coins. (Rogers, 103: CIL XII 3180, 3207; IGRR III 680; Inscr. Olymp. 372; BMC Lydia, Sardes 104 - 109; see 110 - 112; BMC Caria, Tabae 61, 62; see BMC Phrygia, Hierapolis, 111; and CAH, Plates IV, 200q.).

7. Thus, the ceremonial parade of the knights (the
transvectio equitum) took place on the feast of the Dioscuri, July 15th, and was led by the principes iuventutis, probably representing the Dioscuri entering Rome at the head of the equestrian order (Beringer, op. cit., 2301).

8. Rogers, 102.


10. Athens: M. Stuart, "How Were Imperial Portraits Distributed Throughout the Roman Empire?" AJA 43 (1939): 605. Ticinum: Kornemann, 40; CIL XI 3308; Stuart, op. cit., 604. Forum Clodii: CIL XI 3308; Stuart, op. cit., 604. In addition the birthdays of Drusus, Germanicus, and Tiberius were all observed at Cumae by supplications to the same goddess: Vesta (Ital. Inscr. 13.2, p. 279). I am grateful to Dr. D. Fishwick for this last reference.

11. Statues: Tac. Ann. 6.2.1: effigies; inscriptions: e.g. associating her with Aphrodite: ILS 8787; SEG XI 922 - 23; EJ 87 - 89, no. 102; see Meise, 62.

12. She had, to be sure, been married to L. Aemilius Paulus, probably since 4 BC, but Augustus had never shown squeamishness before about dissolving and arranging marriages to satisfy his own priorities - as Drusus' own father could attest. On Julia see PIR (2nd ed.) I 635, p. 301.

13. Tiberius' mission to Germany: Vell. Pat. 2.104.2-4; Suet. Tib. 16.1; Dio 55.13.2. Duration of mission: Vell. Pat. 2.105-108, 122.2; Dio 55.28.5-7, 29.1, 30.1; Tac. Ann. 2.46. Winters in Rome: Vell. Pat. 2.105.3; 107.3; Dio 55.27.5.


15. Suet. Tib. 9.1; Dio 53.25-26; Seager, 15.


17. Dio 54.27.2-3; Lewis, 94.

18. Germanicus as augur: PIR (2nd ed.) I 221, p. 185: Tac. Ann. 2.83.1, CIL V 6416 = ILS 107; CIL III 334 = ILS 174; CIL II 1517, 2198; VI 909, 921; IX 2326; X 460, 513, 1198, 1415, 4572. Relative value of augurate and pontificate and their bestowal upon members of the imperial family: Lewis, 94. Drusus' augurate: CIL XII 147 = ILS 169; CIL V 6416 = ILS 107. The latter
inscription refers to both Drusus and Germanicus and indicates that Drusus held the pontificate when Germanicus did not.


20. Circus games: Dio 55.33.4. Germanicus' honours in 9: Dio 56.17.2. Drusus' privileges: Dio 56.17.3. Unless he was specially invited, no citizen could enter the senate-house until he became quaestor (Richard J.A. Talbert, The Senate of Imperial Rome [Princeton: 1984], 14, 154-56). In normal practice, formalized by the lex Julia of 9 BC, seniority determined the order of speaking in the Senate; as the most junior members, quaestors would speak last (ibid., 222, 240-41, 249). So Drusus was indeed granted special privileges.

21. Dio 56.17.3; see Rogers, 104.

22. Postumus' toga virilis: Dio 55.22.4; his savage disposition: Dio 55.32.1-2, Suet. Aug. 65.1, Tac. Ann. 1.3.4, 4.2, Vell. Pat. 2.112.7; his dismissal to Surrentum: Suet. Aug. 65.1; exile in Planasia: Dio 55.32.2, Tac. Ann. 1.3.4, see 6.2; see, in general, Seager, 46 and PIR (2nd ed.) I 214, p. 155.

23. Entry into the cursus honorum: ILS 169, Dio 56.25.4. Prospect of quaestorship: Dio 56.17.3; Sumner, 428.

24. The following argument concerning Drusus' age at the time of his quaestorship is based largely on the cogent study of Sumner, 413-435.


26. Ulpian, Digest, L 48; see Paulus, ibid., 36.1.76, Sumner, 422.

27. Lex Papia Poppaea: Dig., IV.4.2; Mommsen, GS, 4, 414-15; RS (3rd ed.) I, 575; see Sumner, 428-29. Drusus' eligibility: The lex Papia Poppaea was passed by the consuls of AD 9 so it would have been available to Drusus in AD 10 when he stood for the quaestorship. He would have been able to take advantage of the law because his daughter Julia could have been born no later than AD 8. She was married to Nero Caesar in 20 when she would have had to have been at least twelve years old, the minimum legal age. See Tac. Ann. 3.29.3, Marquardt, 28.
28. Actually, another modification to the minimum age requirement was also potentially available to Drusus: the special five-year remission known as the quinquennium. This extraordinary privilege was accorded to a number of Drusus' close relations within the imperial hierarchy: his father Tiberius, his uncle Nero Drusus, and his cousin and adoptive brother Germanicus all received it (Dio 53.28.3; 54.10.4; Tac. Ann. 3.29; Suet. Cal. 1.1). It would not, then, have been anomalous if Drusus himself had also been so honoured. There are, however, arguments against the possibility (see Sumner, 428). First of all, no indication of so great a distinction survives in the sources. Secondly, if Drusus had received it in its full form, his age could not be squared with the best theories as to the range of possible dates for his birth. By the application of the quinquennium to the general law, Drusus, if he had received the privilege, needed only to have been twenty rather than twenty-five when he entered the quaestorship. His twentieth birthday, thus, would have fallen on October 7th, AD 10; but this would mean that he must have been born no earlier than October 7th, 11 BC, a full two years after the latest possible date indicated earlier, a highly unlikely result. Of course, if additional remissions had been granted him, such as the deeming provision and the Papia Poppaea reduction, remissions to which Drusus would have been, in theory at least, entitled, his birth date would have to be advanced another one to two years - to 10 or even 9 BC - dates which are virtually inconceivable. On the other hand, Dr. D. Fishwick has pointed out to me that it is not inconceivable that Augustus might have granted Drusus the quinquennium as a formal honour but, consistently with his policy of advancing his grandsons at fixed rates through the cursus honorum, prevented him from taking it up at the earliest possible date.


32. Sutherland (1951), 77.

33. Vell. Pat. 2.123.1; Tac. Ann. 1.3.5; Suet. Cal. 8.3; Oros. 7.4.3.

34. Dio 56.28.1.


36. Dio 56.28.2-3; Rogers, 105; H.H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1970), 230-31. Dio does not define the legal nature of the consilium's decisions: "Πάντα (όσα ἐν άυτῷ) [Αὔγουστος]
...βουλευτεύοντα δόγμα, κατὰ τὸν τις ἐν τῇ ἐργοῦσα
εὐσεβίας εἰς..." Crook (op. cit., (15) and Scullard (Op. cit., 231) believe that they had validity equal to senatus consulta.

37. Dio 55.25.5; Scullard, op. cit., 229.

38. Dio 56.28.4-6; Rogers, 105.


40. Olshausen, op. cit., 826. Under the principate election of priests by comitia was reduced largely to a formality since the Emperor and priestly colleges selected the candidates. Nevertheless there is evidence that comitial election continued in some form till at least the reign of Trajan (see Lewis, 15-16).

CHAPTER 4: THE DEATH OF AUGUSTUS

On August 19th, AD 14, Augustus died. Arrangements had to be made to bury him, settle his estate, conclude the unfinished business of his regime, and secure the continuation of the system of government that had evolved. Unforeseen consequences of his death, such as unrest in the army, also had to be dealt with. In the overwhelming press of events Tiberius, Augustus' chosen and carefully prepared successor, tried to leave as much as possible of the resolution of constitutional problems to the Senate, while he turned to the next rank of the succession to help him meet his family and military obligations. In the absence of Germanicus, who was occupied with his duties as governor of the three Gauls, the new princeps had to rely upon Drusus.

There is no evidence that Drusus might have been involved in the first bloodshed after the death, the assassination of Agrippa Postumus. Responsibility for the murder could not be definitely assigned, though Augustus (through secret orders made before his death), Tiberius, and Livia, whether acting together or independently, were the most likely suspects. Drusus did, however, benefit from Postumus' liquidation. Whatever the constitutional character of the principate in Augustus' declining years, transmission of power had come to be considered, to a large degree, de facto hereditary. Obviously the heir by blood had a potentially stronger case for succession than the adoptive
heirs. Accordingly, his removal helped to secure the establishment of Tiberius' principate and, thus, of Drusus' and Germanicus' positions as successors.

Drusus played a significant or at least highly visible role in Augustus' last rites, the reading of his testamentary papers, and the deliberation upon and treatment of the constitutional problems resulting from his death. First of all, he accompanied Tiberius into the senate-house on the day after Augustus' body had been brought into Rome from Nola. The father and son observed the formalities of official mourning by wearing dark clothes and offering incense (and wine, according to Suetonius). Next, when his father proved unable to finish his introductory speech out of grief, whether faked or real, Drusus completed it for him. Subsequently, according to Dio, he was charged with fetching Augustus' testamentary papers from the Vestal Virgins. The imperial freedman, Polybius, declared the contents of the will, but Drusus was given the responsibility of reading out the three (according to Suetonius) or four (according to Dio) other documents, including Augustus' own detailed funeral instructions; the Emperor's account of his life - usually referred to as the Res Gestae Divi Augusti; a summary of the condition of the Empire, focusing on the number of men in the army, the amount of assets in the treasury and fiscus, and tax accounts receivable; and, finally, according to Dio, a list of orders and injunctions for Tiberius and the Roman public.

After the reading of the will and associated
documents in the curia the funeral procession began. Augustus' body was transported from his house to a pyre in the Campus Martius. Along the way the procession stopped to allow Drusus to deliver a eulogy on the dead Emperor, mainly from a private, family perspective, from the old rostra, and Tiberius to praise him on a more official public theme from the temple of Julius Caesar. The eulogy had occupied an important place in funerals for distinguished Romans from at least the second century BC. To share the privilege of eulogizing so pre-eminent a Roman as Augustus amounted, thus, to a great honour for Drusus. His holding of the honour on so public an occasion would have reinforced in the minds of all Romans his prominence within both the imperial family and the state. After the panegyrics, the procession continued to the Campus Martius for Augustus' cremation.

Augustus' will confirmed the hierarchy that he had established in the last decade of his life. The actual heirs, that is, in the first degree, were Tiberius for two thirds of Augustus' estate and Livia for one third. Among the honorary heirs, that is, in the second degree, Germanicus and his three sons were bequeathed two thirds of the estate while Drusus was given only one third. The larger award to Germanicus can be explained in part by the fact that, when Augustus completed his will in April, 13, Germanicus alone of his two adoptive grandsons had male heirs. In the main, however, it reflects Germanicus' precedence over Drusus in the imperial hierarchy. Yet it was not an enormous
precedence: Drusus shared Germanicus' lofty status as heir in the second degree, and a third of Augustus' estate would still have amounted to an immense bequest. The award kept him firmly ensconced near the apex of the principate.  

Drusus' closer kinship to the new Emperor did not give him a career advantage over Germanicus. In his own arrangements for the hierarchy and succession, Tiberius appears to have adhered to the system presupposed in Augustus' will, continuing in fact the status quo of the end of his regime. This policy may be explained in part by Tiberius' inherent conservatism and fidelity to Augustus. Tacitus remarks in the Agricola that what Augustus had called consilium, Tiberius considered praeceptum. In addition he no doubt realised that the authority and stability of the principate and, thus, of his own regime depended, to a large extent, on Augustus' continuing popularity and auctoritas – and thus on his own conformity to Augustus' system and plans. The continuity of that auctoritas and its constraint of Tiberius were ensured by the official deification of Augustus on September 17th. This measure did not simply add a new god to the official Roman pantheon, but, in effect, consecrated Augustus' life's work and policies so that they would continue beyond the grave. Moreover an official cult was instituted around the new divus with its own priesthood, known as the sodales Augustales, to which the male members of the imperial family, including Drusus, belonged. Tiberius showed great devotion to the cult, a devotion that reflected
the continuity and predominance of Augustus' reign through his own. It is not surprising, then, that he upheld Augustus' conception of Drusus' and Germanicus' roles within his imperial hierarchy and system of succession: a close pair, but with Germanicus holding precedence over Drusus. Moreover, he upheld it strictly. He kept rigorously to Augustus' timetable of promotion for the brothers until well after not only Augustus' death but Germanicus' as well: he maintained a three year interval between Germanicus' and Drusus' first and second consulships, which they held in AD 12 and 15, and in 18 and 21 respectively. Tiberius preferred adherence to the rules laid down by the late Emperor to promotion of his natural son ahead of his adopted one.

Drusus' relegation to second place after Germanicus was confirmed in the senatorial deliberations following Augustus' death. Tiberius asked for proconsulare imperium for Germanicus. He did not make a similar request on Drusus' behalf. According to Tacitus, the omission is to be explained not as a deliberate attempt on Tiberius' part to hold his son back, but by the fact that Drusus was consul designate (to hold power in the next year, 15) and present in Rome, proconsulare imperium being valid only outside of the City. Another factor in the omission may have been Drusus' presence in the senate-house when the matter was being discussed. It was the custom in the Senate for consuls designate to be granted the privilege of delivering their
opinions on an issue first (after the consuls, of course) - in which case Drusus would have found himself in the embarrassing position of being asked to speak to his own grant of *imperium proconsulare*. Whatever the explanation for Drusus' being passed over, however, the fact is that the special award of *imperium* to Germanicus, in combination with his governorship of the Gauls, bringing with it command of the Rhine armies - a command formerly held by Tiberius himself, and his popularity among the Roman armies and people, gave him eminence in the Empire inferior only to that of the new Emperor. Drusus still stood third in line.

He was certainly not, however, insignificant. Just how important a position he held in the state was soon to be demonstrated. Towards the end of or just after the constitutional discussions following Augustus' funeral, news reached Rome that the three legions of Pannonia, VIII Augusta, IX Hispana, and XV Apollinaris, had mutinied upon learning of the death of the Emperor. It was later discovered that the four legions of the army of the lower Rhine had also mutinied on the same occasion for the same reasons. The mutineers appear to have been aggrieved mainly about poor pay, brutal centurions, service prolonged well beyond the appointed time, and worthless land-allotments among marshes and mountains for those who survived till retirement. Several more immediate factors helped to erode the normal restraints upon the soldiers' expression of resentment. There was a general perception of governmental
weakness in the period of transition between the rule of Augustus and that of Tiberius. The provincial governor and commander of the Pannonian legions, Junius Blaesus, unwisely ordered a relaxation of discipline to allow mourning for Augustus' death and celebration for Tiberius' accession. The last straw was the inflammatory rhetoric of a theatrically trained legionary named Percennius. All combined to stir up the soldiers to the point where they were prepared to defy military order and discipline in support of their grievances. Percennius was probably representing the genuine wishes of the soldiers when he demanded payment of a denarius per day to replace the current salary of less than 2/3 of a denarius - a denarius still being only half the daily wages of the much less burdened praetorians - and a maximum of sixteen years of service with a complete discharge from the army at the end of that period. His demands were, in themselves, arguably reasonable. Their context, however, made them irrelevant. The soldiers were now effectively out of control, posing a dangerous, ineluctable problem for the Roman government in general and, in particular, for the supreme military authority established under the Augustan constitution: the Emperor.

Pannonia, inhabited by a mixture of Illyrian and Celtic peoples, lay south and west of the Danube between Carnuntum and Sirmium in the Save valley. It had been constituted as an imperial province distinct from Dalmatia probably around AD 8, and was generally known as Illyricum
Inferius until later in the first century, possibly in the reign of Vespasian, when the name Pannonia came to predominate. The province was strategically important in the Empire because of its proximity to Italy and Rome, its frontier on the Danube facing the Germans - the Romans' most turbulent and vexatious neighbours, and its situation across the communications to the eastern Empire around the head of the Adriatic Sea. The region had also held the attention of the Roman military because of the Pannonian revolt, which had blazed up in AD 6 and died down only after much hard toil and fighting in 9. The three legions based in the area were considered to play a crucial role in the Empire's security.

The bases of the legions cannot be identified with certainty. Inscriptional evidence suggests that VIII Augusta was centred in Poetovio on the River Drave from at least the time of Tiberius and XV Apollinaris in Carnuntum on the Danube from AD 14/15 at the latest. No main base for IX Hispana has been found, although it is generally assumed to have been located at Siscia, a strong-point in the Save valley occupied by Roman troops since 35 BC. At the time of Augustus' death the three legions were probably concentrated in a summer camp in the vicinity of the neighbouring towns of Nauportus and Emona in the Julian Alps. The legionaries were likely engaged in construction work, mainly road- and bridge-building, as good communications were vital for the security of the area. As part of this general activity, some detachments had been sent to Nauportus. When mutiny broke
out in the summer camp, the men in these work parties joined in, and proceeded to plunder the neighbouring villages and even Nauportus itself. There would seem, thus, to have been close contact between the work-parties and the camp, so it may be assumed that the latter was located very close to Nauportus.

The mutinies in Pannonia and Germany were particularly grave for two reasons: they threatened to expose and disrupt the Roman frontier in two of its most strategically sensitive areas and, occurring when they did, they threatened the stability of Tiberius' new regime. According to Dio, the Pannonian mutineers were well aware of this double threat. They asserted that, if their demands should not be met, they would stir up the people of Pannonia, so recently pacified, into revolt, and march on Rome, that is, against Tiberius. The mutineers on the Rhine, for their part, according to the sources, indicated at first that replacement of Tiberius by Germanicus was one of their main goals. The mutinies placed Tiberius in a dilemma. He must quell both as quickly as possible, but, if he acted only by himself, he would have to leave one unchecked and, in marching out of Rome, he would expose a power vacuum in the heart of the Empire.

For these reasons Tiberius decided to stay in the capital and to use his sons to settle the mutinies. Germanicus, as governor of the three Gauls and, hence, supreme commander over the Rhine armies, was already ideally
placed, while Drusus was available to march to Pannonia. Both mutinies could thus be dealt with while Tiberius consolidated his position in Rome where his power and auctoritas could not be menaced or discredited by remote rebels. In addition, this arrangement would give the new Emperor two lines of defence against the mutineers. Any difficulties his sons could not overcome could be dealt with much more easily by him, in reserve as it were, than if he treated with the mutineers directly, with nothing to fall back on. So Drusus suddenly found thrust upon him a task of critical importance. The very security of the Empire and the establishment of his father's regime now depended upon him.

One might wonder why Tiberius was so ready to rely on Drusus. Desperation was probably a factor but, even so, the new Emperor could not overlook the fact that his son had never before (as far as is known) participated in, let alone commanded, any kind of military activity. One can only assume that Tiberius was able to perceive substantial potential ability within his son. Probably, too, he would have had good reason to calculate that Drusus had by now acquired sufficient auctoritas in the Empire to command to a satisfactory degree the attention and respect of the mutinous troops and to make them accept him as an official, effective representative of the Roman Emperor and government. The extent of the father's trust in the son can be measured by the fact that he gave him virtual carte blanche to assess and
deal with the mutiny.\textsuperscript{22}

Nor did Drusus hesitate to obey his father's commission. The primary imperative of carrying out the commands and policies of his \textit{paterfamilias}, the Emperor, formerly Augustus, now Tiberius, would have been thoroughly inculcated in him, and he would have had the example of Tiberius' generally selfless obedience to the \textit{princeps} ever before his eyes. The continuation of the principle of filial devotion to the Emperor is reflected in a laudatory observation by Strabo, a contemporary of the first part of Tiberius' reign. He commends Tiberius for making Augustus the standard (literally, the "canon" [\textit{kαυῷ}] of his own administration and rule, and praises Germanicus and Drusus, whom he calls assistants (\textit{ὑπουργοί}) to their father, for making Tiberius their standard.\textsuperscript{23} With this unbroken chain of authority and obedience in force, it was only to be expected that a \textit{ὑπουργός} to the Emperor should receive an important task to carry out and that he should willingly undertake it.

The importance of Drusus' mission was reflected in the composition of the force assigned to him. It consisted of elite units, including two cohorts of the Praetorian Guard strengthened by a special draft of troops, a large contingent from the Praetorian cavalry, and the best of the German warriors in the imperial bodyguard. Accompanying Drusus were a commander of the Praetorian Guard and a group of leading statesmen.\textsuperscript{24} The commander's name was Lucius Aelius Sejanus.
The names of only two of the statesmen are known. The first, Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus, may have been consul in 18 or 14 BC. He had a good reputation: he was known even among the mutineers ante alios aetate et gloria belli, perhaps for service as a legatus Augusti in defeating the Dacians. The second, Lucius Aponius, a knight, may have served as praefectus castrorum and praefectus equitum, as well as tribune in the 7th and 22nd legions and as prefect of Gaius Caesar's duovirate in Baeterrae, Narbonese Gaul. Sejanus, already magna apud Tiberium auctoritate, was now assigned to the Pannonian mission to serve as a guide and adviser to Drusus (rector iuveni) in recognition of the limitations of Drusus' experience, and as periculorum praemiorumque ostentator to everyone else. The very expression used by Tacitus, rector iuveni, may well indicate that Tiberius was deliberately continuing the policy, originally based on Stoic precepts and taken up by Augustus, of providing rectores, especially himself, for the princes of the imperial household (just as Augustus had acted for Tiberius) in order to train them in the arts and duties of government. Drusus' other distinguished companions were doubtless also intended to help him, providing him with an experienced and able political and military council. They may also have had a supervisory role to keep Drusus within limits acceptable to the Roman government when he negotiated with the mutineers and, if he should lose control of the situation, to replace him in command. Drusus could also have relied upon their status and
auctoritas as leading men of the Empire to impress, if not overawe, the mutineers.29

The sources do not specify the nature of Drusus' command. From the observation, however, that he negotiated directly with the mutineers and took the final decisions in the subsequent quelling of the mutiny, one may reasonably infer that he did have authority greater than anyone else present, including the legionary commander and provincial legate, Junius Blaesus. If he did, then he was likely to have had imperium maius, imperium, that is, greater than that possessed by the legate.30

Drusus and his escort left Rome probably in the first week of September and likely reached the mutineers' base on September 26th (see Excursus I). By the time that they arrived the situation had got almost completely out of control.31 The commander, Junius Blaesus, had shown exemplary courage and determination in attempting to retrieve order and authority. In the first outbreak of mutinous activity, involving the construction of a turf tribunal as a focus for the troops' agitation, Blaesus had managed to capture and hold their grudging attention long enough to reach at least a temporary compromise: Blaesus' son, a tribune, would be sent to Rome with an initial request for the discharge of all soldiers who had served sixteen years or more. The departure of the tribune restored a measure of order and calm to the camp. Before long, however, a second upsurge of agitation wrecked Blaesus' efforts at
conciliation. When the detachments of troops at Naupactus learned of the disturbance at their base camp, they embarked on a rampage of looting in the town and its environs. They soon ranged as far afield as the legionary camp itself, where they managed to stir up the main body of troops once again. Their fractiousness was further inflamed by the histrionics of a private soldier, Vibulenus, with the result that all official authority in the camp was not only flouted but even threatened. Most centurions had to run for cover. The unpopular Lucilius was slain, and even the clever and apparently popular, or at least respected, Julius Clemens was virtually held hostage. The tribunes and camp prefect were expelled, and the life of Blaeusus was endangered. Into this highly volatile, extremely menacing state of affairs came Drusus and his escort.

His reception did not appear propitious. Once he had entered the camp the mutineers immediately put armed guards at the gates and other strategic locations. Drusus, however, for all his apparent inexperience, showed himself equal to the challenge. In fact, in his handling of the mutiny he showed outstanding courage, intelligence, initiative, and natural leadership. He undoubtedly enjoyed the close counsel of Sejanus and the other primores civitatis in his retinue, as well as the advice of Junius Blaeusus, whom Velleius, doubtless with some typical exaggeration, describes as a singularis adiutor in the affair. Nevertheless, the sources, and particularly Tacitus, show that Drusus himself
was mainly responsible for bringing the mutiny to a swift and satisfactory conclusion. The episode is noteworthy because it reveals for the first time in the historical record, and in a positive light, significant aspects of Drusus' character and personality.

It was primarily Drusus' abilities to assess and swiftly exploit to his advantage each new set of circumstances that enabled him to quell the mutiny. Whether in recognition of these virtues or not, Tiberius had burdened Drusus with nothing more than a letter to read to the troops; otherwise he allowed Drusus to proceed nullis satis certis mandatis, ex re consulturum. Drusus took full advantage of the broad freedom of action accorded him. On his first sight of the camp he immediately assessed the state of affairs and seized upon the best method for dealing with it. Realising that in order to recover any authority at all over the anarchic rebels he would have to get their undivided attention focussed on himself, perhaps taking a leaf out of Blaesus' book, he ignored their threatening pickets and boldly marched straight to the heart of his opposition, the camp tribunal, where he stood up in the full view of all and beckoned for their silence. Although the mutineers responded sullenly and truculently at first, Drusus held the initiative for the moment. Conditioned, no doubt, by years of harsh military discipline to heed one who acted so resolutely and authoritatively, they gradually yielded to the dynamics of the situation and allowed him to speak.
Drusus seized the opportunity. He read out his father's letter which Tiberius had worded to be most likely to appeal to and mollify the rebels. By reading the letter Drusus sought first of all to buttress his own authority - and thus his control over the situation - with that of his father. Secondly, he sought to ingratiate himself and his father with the troops without making any immediate, concrete concessions to them. The letter in effect assured the legionaries of the new Emperor's personal concern for them, recalling and thus raising in their consciences his service with them in the past, flattering them, seeking their respect and sympathy for his piety in mourning Augustus, promising them that he would take up their demands with the Senate while cleverly omitting any indication that their demands would actually be met, and presenting Drusus to them as authorized to grant immediately whatever could be granted to them on the spot - again carefully refraining from indicating whether any concessions actually would be granted or what they would be. Thirdly, Drusus sought to sow caution and restraint with, perhaps, a little healthy fear in the minds of his listeners by reminding them, through the letter, that the Roman government, represented by the Senate, neque gratiae neque severitatis expertem haberi par esset. Finally, through the letter's assurance that Tiberius had sent Drusus ut sine cunctatione concederet quae statim tribui possent, Drusus sought to convert the current situation from one of impasse, resulting in ever increasing anarchy and
violence, to one of dialogue and negotiation, in which the men's energies and intellects would be more constructively engaged and thus susceptible to the restoration of order and discipline.

The plan almost worked. The mutineers did not attack Drusus but entered, at first, into the game of constructive negotiations with which he had tempted them. They immediately put forward Julius Clemens to communicate their demands. The game, however, soon broke down. Through Clemens the mutineers presented and apparently expected the immediate satisfaction of all their chief grievances. Drusus, whose main objective in opening negotiations must have been simply to re-establish official authority within the camp, had no intention of making any substantive concessions, so he insisted on referring them to the Senate and Emperor. The mutineers, or at least their leaders, began to realize that they were being fobbed off. They raised the valid legal question why their requests needed to be presented to the Senate at all and objected that Drusus was employing an old trick of his father's, referring requests to higher authorities while never hesitating to impose punishments, executions, and orders for battle without any consultation. At that point the mutineers all withdrew from the parley.

Responsibility for the breakdown did not really lie with Drusus. He may have had no authorization to make any but minor concessions. He probably shared with Tiberius the
conviction that yielding to the demands of insubordinate troops would set a bad precedent. It would undermine the Emperor's authority over the whole army by creating an impression of contemptible weakness and by encouraging soldiers everywhere to follow suit to their Pannonian brothers' insolence. In this game Drusus held a weak hand. Unless he could somehow induce the rebels to return to obedience of their own accord his chances for success were very limited indeed.

Still, he carefully avoided provoking the legionaries to further drastic measures, all the while refusing to show weakness or, in what was swiftly becoming a war of nerves, to make the first concession. He did not threaten, bluster, or withdraw any of the possibilities for reconciliation intimated in Tiberius' letter. He refused to turn his back on the rebels and order his escort back to Rome. That would allow the mutineers to declare a de facto victory over the Emperor and, in any case, would make further negotiations very difficult, if not impossible. Rather he carefully followed a policy that would limit the mutineers' options while pressuring them to come to some sort of decision that would break the current stalemate. Because they had walked away from the parley with Drusus, they bore the burden of intransigence. Drusus' refusal to budge from their presence meant that, if they declined coming to terms with him, they really had only one option left: to fight it out.

There must have been few legionaries who could not
foresaw how grave the consequences of that course of action would be. Although Drusus' force was outnumbered, nevertheless two well reinforced cohorts of Praetorian Guards, stiffened with a contingent of German imperial bodyguards, could be expected to offer a good enough account of themselves as to give even the most belligerent legionaries pause. Moreover, combat with a special official force of the Roman government would elevate the current crisis from a serious "labour dispute" to a civil war, in which the Pannonian legions would have to face the wrath not just of Tiberius but of the rest of the Empire.

To make this option even more unpalatable Drusus did not hesitate to drive home to the rebels that force would be met with force. So long as they did not act aggressively, Drusus ensured that his own men made no threatening moves against them. When, however, the mutineers ganged up on one of his advisers, Gnaeus Lentulus, Drusus straightaway ordered his men to rescue him. Apparently they used just enough force to separate Lentulus from his assailants without precipitating a major skirmish. The mutineers, thus, were reminded that they were confronted with the stark choice between having their grievances attended to on the Roman government's terms or initiating a hard fight that they could not ultimately hope to win. Through controlled, resolute application of balanced tactics, Drusus had retained the advantage.

Tacitus says that the adversaries in the camp were
facing a noctem minacem et in scelus erupturam. Yet all Drusus needed was some small development to tip the balance towards a favourable conclusion. He got it from an unusual source: an eclipse of the moon, sometime in the early morning of September 27th. The native superstition of the ordinary soldiers, greatly aroused by the celestial omen and further agitated by the pressures of the moment, began to awaken guilt and doubt among them. Drusus showed acute perceptiveness in noticing the change and demonstrated swift initiative in taking advantage of it: Utendum inclinatione ea Caesar et quae casus obtulerat in sapientiam vertenda ratus .... His adversaries had lowered their guard, and Drusus exploited their newly revealed weakness to the fullest, sending around centurions trusted by the men to insinuate themselves and play upon the legionaries' newly accessible hopes, fears, doubts, and mutual suspicions, offering them continuously as it were a carrot and a stick, to the point where they would be divided among themselves and ready to accept the re-imposition of order. Drusus in effect applied the principle of "divide and rule;" - and it worked. The men began to recover their old legionary identities and to coalesce in their old formations.

Having softened the mutineers up, Drusus never relaxed the pressure on them. At daybreak he harangued them on parade, an arrangement that gave him the initiative in directing their behaviour and permitted them to respond only within the narrow parameters set up by him. Again he used
the "carrot and stick" approach, representing himself as unyielding in the face of their insubordination and truculence but, at the same time, prepared to take up their case if they showed themselves repentant and tractable - as though his mere support for their cause instead of the actual fulfilment of their demands was the best they could hope for. In his speech he was *rudis dicendi* - but that could only appeal to the rough natures of the soldiers, - and he increased the influence of his oratory by his *nobilitate ingenita* - his display (whether genuine or not) of natural dignity. His relentless pressure continued to bear fruit: the legionaries gladly accepted his nebulous offer, with the result that additional envoys were sent off to Rome.

At this point, according to Tacitus, a debate arose among Drusus' officers. One side argued that they should not push their luck any farther but deal magnanimously with the restive troops until the envoys returned with answers from the Roman government. The other side urged that, on the contrary, they should press home their advantage and liquidate the mutiny's leaders, thereby killing two birds with one stone. Such resolute action would cut off the head of the rebellion, thereby depriving it of all initiative, coordination, and direction. Dispatching the ringleaders would also provide an example "pour encourager les autres:" it would cow the rank and file into complete submission.

Drusus settled on the latter option, according to Tacitus, because of his *promptum ad asperiora ingenium*. 
Tacitus' assessment may be questioned. It appears to be based more on a rigid, a priori opinion about Drusus' character than on logical deduction from the facts of his behaviour in putting down the mutiny. The sources do preserve an unflattering tradition about Drusus' character and reputation, but it will be shown to be, in general, unsupported by evidence. Certainly the allegation that he was strongly inclined to cruelty does not offer the most plausible explanation for his conduct in this instance. Executing the ringleaders was the next logical step in his general strategy of breaking the mutineers by relentlessly increasing the pressure on them. At the very least, relaxing the pressure would have meant yielding the hard won and precarious initiative, which could in turn have quickly revived the rebels' insolence and exposed the authorities once more to peril. Drusus did not suddenly erupt in gratuitous cruelty. He did nothing more than to complete the discomfiture of the mutineers and the restoration of official control, order, and discipline within the Pannonian legions, his appointed task. His action had a logic that the ordinary soldiers would have understood perfectly. It should also be remembered that no competent military authority has ever been disposed to display magnanimity or delicacy towards mutineers.

In the final analysis, Drusus' conduct can be judged by its effectiveness. His steady and intelligent application of pressure, including selective harshness, accelerated the
Pannonian mutiny towards a favourable conclusion. Vibulenus and Percennius, the two ringleaders, were haled before Drusus and promptly dispatched, right in his tent. Tacitus records a divided tradition as to the disposal of their bodies: the majority of authorities, he says, report that they were buried inside the tent. A minority, however, assert that the bodies were thrown outside the camp's vallum for public display.\(^{33}\) The latter measure by its shock value would seem to have suited better Drusus' general strategy for breaking the mutineers. Whatever he did, however, the summary execution of the ringleaders delivered the coup de grace to the Pannonian mutiny. The rebellious soldiers fell rapidly back into line. Indeed, so loyal did they become that they turned on all their erstwhile leaders and handed them over to the authorities or even allowed them to be slain by the centurions and Praetorians. Once again nature itself aided Drusus by unleashing early winter storms upon the troops, heightening their misery, depression, guilt, and fear of divine wrath, and thus thoroughly dousing whatever spark of conviction or rebellion remained in them. Their complete submission was demonstrated when the legions separated to go to their different winter quarters even before the return of their envoys from Rome. As soon as they had gone, Drusus, realising that his task of restoring the legions to order and obedience had been accomplished, departed himself for Rome without waiting for the envoys.

So smoothly and apparently inevitably did Drusus wind
up the Pannonian mutiny that the magnitude of his achievement can be easily overlooked. It can be placed in perspective when compared - and contrasted - with Germanicus' response to the mutiny of the legions on the lower Rhine. Drusus was supposedly the tiro in military matters; Germanicus had the established military reputation. Drusus receives at best only summary, neutral portraits by the Roman historians; Germanicus is treated much more sympathetically and in much more detail, particularly by Tacitus, whose imagination Drusus never seems to have caught. Even so, when the facts of the Pannonian and German mutinies are viewed objectively, Drusus comes off far better than his adoptive brother. While Germanicus had initially a potentially greater problem to deal with on the Rhine, in fact only the army of the Lower Rhine mutinied, a total of four legions, involving just one legion more than the mutiny in Pannonia. While Drusus went prepared, backed by a strong force, into the camp of the mutineers, Germanicus went unprepared, with little military support, though he could have counted on some segments at least of the army of the Upper Rhine. Whereas Drusus shrewdly took stock of the situation confronting him and pressed home his best advantage, Germanicus completely misread the mood of the mutineers facing him. Drusus read out Tiberius' letter to the troops as part of a careful plan to defuse the rebels' animosity and to steer them back into obedience. By contrast, Germanicus launched into an emotional harangue that showed no understanding of the
soldiers' mood and no plan to regain control of them. He started with a useless panegyric on Augustus and Tiberius and the well-ordered state of the rest of the Empire, and proceeded to try to shame the troops back to their senses. His speech had the opposite of its intended effect. His failure even to appear to address the soldiers' concerns infuriated them more than before. Whereas, even when the Pannonian mutineers broke off negotiations, Drusus kept his composure and his ability to control events and to regain the initiative, Germanicus completely lost control of himself when the Rhine rebels reacted against him. He leapt down from the tribunal and, in a melodramatic gesture, threatened to kill himself rather than join an insurrection against Tiberius. Such histrionics effectively removed, or at least severely weakened, any countervailing authoritative presence or force against the mutineers, leaving them, effectively, with the initiative. Whereas Drusus, by never backing down, was able to limit his concessions to nothing more than a promise to relay the legionaries' grievances to the Roman government, Germanicus, having lost all ability to restrain the Rhine mutineers, was forced to accede to their demands on the spot, relying on the undignified expedient of letters forged in the name of the Emperor, and was ineffectual before their near murder of ambassadors from Rome. Tacitus sums up well the scene of Germanicus' preparations to send his family away from the tumultuous camp: non florentis Caesaris neque suis in castris, set velut in urbe victa facies. Moreover,
the concessions wrung from Germanicus had to be passed on to the other German legions and the Pannonian army as well. It is hardly surprising, then, that, according to Tacitus, Tiberius sounded insincere in his praise for Germanicus for finally bringing the Rhine legions back to heel, while paucioribus Drusum et finem Illyrici motus laudavit, sed intentior et fida oratione. Such insincerity might be explained in part by Tiberius' suspicion of Germanicus and his ambitions - a suspicion aggravated, no doubt, by reports of the Rhine mutineers' open exhortations to Germanicus to supplant Tiberius. Tiberius may also have had a natural degree of partiality for his natural son. Nevertheless, in this particular instance, whatever his dislike of Germanicus, the Emperor had sound, objective reasons for showing greater appreciation of Drusus. Drusus had saved the Empire from humiliation, military expense, and logistical difficulties; Germanicus had burdened the Empire and brought shame on its government. Drusus had controlled events; Germanicus had merely reacted to them. The skill and assurance with which Drusus handled the Pannonian mutiny might suggest that he was not inexperienced in military matters, however silent the sources on the subject. Yet whatever his experience, the episode definitely reveals that he did have at least some substantial virtues to offset the vices ascribed to him elsewhere in the historical record: he did indeed have nobilitas ingenita. In this instance Velleius Paterculus, whose analysis often degenerates into
inflated flattery, perhaps gives the fairest assessment of Drusus of all:

While Germanicus at this time made many concessions, Drusus, for his part, employing the characteristic severity of our ancestors, put an end to a situation dangerous to himself and as pernicious in fact as in the precedent that it could set. He was sent by his father right into the blazing heart of a military revolt where, his ipsis militum gladiis, quibus obsessus erat, obsidentes coercuit...(38)

The Pannonian episode, contrasted with the mutiny on the Rhine, supports the argument that, whether by nature or training or both, Drusus was potentially a better military commander than Germanicus. Unlike his adoptive brother, Drusus appears to have been shaped in the same, highly competent military mould as his father. He would confirm his competence on his next mission into the Pannonian area in 17.
Detailing the precise chronology of Drusus' Pannonian expedition is virtually impossible due to the sparse and obscure nature of the relevant source material, and has led, in fact, to a much vexed controversy among scholars. Only two relevant dates can be identified with any certainty: Augustus' death on August 19th and his official deification on September 17th. A third date can be accepted with some confidence. Tacitus says that the lunar eclipse that so terrified the mutineers occurred towards the end of darkness after the day on which Drusus and his men arrived in the rebels' camp. Modern astronomical calculations concur in fixing this event on the morning of September 27th. These three dates provide the only basis on which the pattern of events connected to Drusus' mission can be reconstructed.

The biggest obstacle to reconstruction is raised, paradoxically, by obscurity in the source with the most detailed account of the events following Augustus' death: Tacitus' Annals. For the day of Augustus' funeral Tacitus' narrative focuses on comments made by the Roman populace, principally about Augustus' life. Only at the end of this indirect appraisal of Augustus, his achievements, and his appointment of Tiberius to succeed him, does Tacitus actually deal with the business at hand - in one laconic statement:

ceterum sepultura more perfecta templum et caelestes
religiones decernuntur. Having dealt with Augustus' obsequies, Tacitus turns his attention to the problem of the accession of his chosen successor, Tiberius: versae inde ad Tiberium preces. In Tacitus' narrative, only after Tiberius gave in to the Senate's preces did the news of the Pannonian mutiny arrive. After outlining the inception of the mutiny, Tacitus says that the news impelled Tiberius to send out Drusus with his supporting force. In all this narrative most commentators see a strict chronological sequence: Augustus' funeral would have been followed by his deification (templum et caelestes religiones decernuntur), which the Fasti indicate to have occurred on September 17th, AD 14. Only after the deification had been completed would the problem of Tiberius' accession have been discussed in the curia (versae inde ad Tiberium preces) and only after this would the news of the Pannonian mutiny have arrived and would Tiberius have responded to it. This interpretation requires that Drusus' mission set out from Rome no earlier than September 17th. Since, however, he arrived in the mutineers' camp on September 26th, the day before the eclipse, the strict chronological interpretation of Tacitus can lead only to the conclusion that Drusus' force was able to cover the entire distance from Rome to the camp, some 460 Roman miles, in at most nine days, in other words at a rate of about (at least) 50 Roman miles per day. And herein lies the problem. All commentators are agreed that a combined cavalry and infantry force like Drusus' could not possibly maintain a
rate of 50 Roman miles per day even on a forced march. The evidence suggests that, on good roads within the frontiers of the Empire, Roman infantrymen could march at an average rate of 18 - 20 Roman miles per day over an extended period.\(^{41}\) How then is the enormous discrepancy, deriving from what Wellesley calls the "orthodox view" of Tacitus' narrative, to be explained?

Various ingenious theories have been proposed. Some circumvent the time and distance problem by suggesting that Drusus' force must have been divided, most of it, including the infantry, setting out some time before September 17th, and the remainder, including Drusus himself, all mounted on horses, starting after the 17th and riding at break-neck speed to catch up with the infantry.\(^{42}\) Indeed, the strict chronological approach permits no other logical solution to the problem. This solution, however, raises as many difficulties as it attempts to remove. For one thing there is no express evidence for a division in Drusus' expeditionary force. On the contrary, according to the plain meaning of his words, Tacitus can only mean that the entire company departed together. Secondly, Tiberius could have divided Drusus' force in the first place only if he had known about the mutiny well before the discussions following Augustus' deification on September 17th; but the evidence strongly suggests that he did not have this knowledge. Certainly there is no mention of the mutiny in these discussions. That so weighty a matter should have been
ignored had it been known - a matter important enough for Tiberius to send out immediately an elite expeditionary force under the command of his own son - seems unlikely. According to the strict chronological interpretation of his words, Tacitus seems to indicate that, at the very least, the whole subject of the Pannonian mutiny came up in Rome only after the constitutional arrangements supposedly following Augustus' deification: *Hic rerum urbanarum status erat, cum Pannonicas legiones seditio incessit*. There is also the difficulty of understanding why Tiberius would have declined to request for Drusus the same *imperium proconsulare* he had asked for Germanicus, or some similar special power, if he had known before the discussions following Augustus' deification that a mutiny had taken place and that he would have to send Drusus out to deal with it. Tacitus' explanation for this omission must surely import that, on the contrary, Tiberius certainly did not envisage Drusus' leaving Rome at the time: *quo minus idem [proconsulare imperium] pro Druso postularetur, ea causa quod designatus consul Drusus praesensque erat*. The "divided force" theory, which requires that Tiberius knew about the Pannonian mutiny prior to the constitutional discussions in the Senate is supported by no testimony in the sources.

Some scholars, dissatisfied with the strict chronological approach, have sought to tinker with it. While accepting that the constitutional discussions and activities outlined in the *Annals* could have occurred only after
Augustus' deification on September 17th, they have sought to give a less chronological interpretation to Tacitus' claim that Tiberius did not request proconsulare imperium for Drusus because designatus consul Drusus praesensque erat. In particular, they have interpreted praesensque erat as having more of a technical than a temporal significance. They read it as indicating not so much that Drusus was actually, physically present in the Senate during the discussions on or after the 17th, as that, when he became consul, he would be "domiciled" in Rome and, thus, ineligible for proconsulare imperium. By this interpretation, accordingly, Drusus could have departed Rome for Pannonia before the discussions following the deification, with sufficient time to allow him to arrive there on the 26th.44

This reading of praesensque, however, is implausible. In principle the plain meaning of a word - here, temporal and spatial - should always be preferred to a narrow secondary meaning unsupported by further evidence. Even if praesensque does have a purely technical meaning, moreover, it cannot remove some significant anomalies from the chronological reconstruction of the mutiny episode. It still does not explain the absence of all reference to the mutiny in the discussions supposedly following Augustus' deification. At the very least it would entail a major defect in Tacitus' narrative technique. He definitely gives the impression that news of the Pannonian mutiny broke only after the constitutional discussions and activities in Rome had been
completed or at least initiated, an impression profoundly misleading if the preparations for dealing with the mutiny had actually been made earlier.\textsuperscript{45} The technical interpretation of \textit{praesensque}, quite apart from its inherent inferiority to the plain meaning of the word, leaves too much awkwardness in Tacitus' account of the events of September, AD 14, to be worthy of endorsement.

The crux of the whole problem lies in the interpretation of the transition between two sections of Tacitus' narrative, the first ending with the sentence, \textit{ceterum sepultura more perfecta templum et caelestes religiones decernuntur}, and the second beginning with \textit{versae inde ad Tiberium preces}.\textsuperscript{46} Taken by themselves, these two sentences appear, \textit{prima facie}, to present a strictly sequential series of events: Augustus' funeral, followed by his deification, followed by the initiation of discussions on Tiberius' role as \textit{princeps}. If Tacitus really meant to delineate such a sequence, there is no way around the obstacles indicated above. But is the \textit{prima facie} impression what Tacitus intended?

K. Wellesley thinks not.\textsuperscript{47} In the context of Tacitus' whole narrative about Augustus' death and burial, the assessment of him by ordinary Romans, and the commencement of Tiberius' regime, the transition between the two sections can be seen in a different light. Wellesley points out that the sentence, \textit{ceterum sepultura more perfecta templum et caelestes religiones decernuntur}, concludes a long
passage purporting to relate bystanders' views, pro and con, on Augustus at his funeral. The long passage has itself interrupted the chronological flow of Tacitus' narrative. Of the two sets of views on Augustus, the first is complimentary, an effective apologia. The second and longer notice condemns him as a bloodthirsty and treacherous schemer who has sought a posthumous rehabilitation by selecting as his successor a man even more baleful than himself. This savage attack, and the whole digression, are effectively concluded by the heavy irony of the last sentence ...: ceterum sepultura more perfecta templum et caelestes honores decernuntur. The principate was a sham, the deification a blasphemous comedy. As a literary and polemical tour de force the juxtaposition is devastating. And with it, we return to a forward movement in the narration. (48)

It is not, however, necessary to go so far as to construe the sentence as a deliberately ironical device, although irony may well be present in it. It is sufficient to see it as fulfilling a primarily functional purpose in Tacitus' narrative, a function to which Wellesley alludes: it closes a lengthy digression and, at the same time, a particular episode in the sequence of events related by Tacitus: the end of Augustus' life and reign.

In dealing with the events of August - September, AD 14, Tacitus was confronted with a major literary problem: to present clearly and sequentially - and comprehensibly - two otherwise confusingly intermingled sets of events: those associated with the death of Augustus, and those connected to the accession of Tiberius. In fact Tacitus could proceed only by sacrificing either strict chronology or integrity and clarity. He chose, apparently, to sacrifice the former in
order to preserve the latter. Accordingly, he dealt first of all with the subject of Augustus' death, and having completed that, shifted the whole focus of his narrative to the subject of Tiberius' accession. The last sentence in the section concerning Augustus' death, with its sudden telescoping of time, serves not to mark a return to a strictly chronological sequence but to tie off one historical subject so that the historian can begin another.  

By the "formal" analysis of Tacitus' text, then, inde in the context discussed (versae inde ad Tiberium preces) signifies not the next link in the chain of events after templum et caelestes religiones decernuntur but rather the transition in the narrative from the end of Augustus' regime to the beginning of Tiberius'. Accordingly, in strictly chronological terms the major event preceding the constitutional discussions on Tiberius' position in the state would not have been the deification of Augustus but his funeral. There is, then, no textual necessity for news of the Pannonian mutiny to have reached Rome and, thus, for Drusus' Pannonian mission to have departed the City as late as September 17th.

These conclusions concur well with the general impressions left by the accounts of Suetonius, Dio, and Vellelius concerning the events of August - September, AD 14: namely, that Augustus' funeral was followed closely by the constitutional discussions on Tiberius' accession, which were in turn followed closely by news of the Pannonian mutiny.
It is true that both Suetonius and Dio ascribe the cause of Tiberius' hesitation in formally accepting the principate, at least in part, to his fear and suspicion of the armies on the Rhine and the Danube, from which evidence it might be argued that he had received news of their mutinies before the constitutional discussions of the Senate. In fact, fear and suspicion are not the same as knowledge: "Suspicion excludes knowledge. It would require no great prescience in Tiberius to anticipate that a change of government might well encourage discontented soldiers to agitate for higher pay and better conditions." It is also true that it is impossible to determine the precise chronology of events in the period August - September, 14 from the works of Suetonius, Dio, and Velleius, and, indeed, in many areas their evidence appears to conflict - with each other's as well as with Tacitus'. Nevertheless, the overall impressions left by each of these historians concerning the general sequence of events form a striking coincidence. The suggested reading of Tacitus' narrative removes the most serious chronological obstacles to the reconstruction of the transition from Augustus' regime to Tiberius' and, thus, of the formation and operation of Drusus' Pannonian mission.

If, then, Drusus and his escort need not have departed Rome for Pannonia on or after September 17th, when were they most likely to have done so? The distance from Rome to the summer camp of the Pannonian legions would have been, as noted earlier, about 460 Roman miles. Since the
average marching rate for a Roman infantryman over long
distances was 18 to 20 Roman miles per day, Drusus and his
men could not reasonably be expected to have completed the
journey in less than 23 days. So, as Drusus arrived not
later than the evening of 26th September, he cannot have left
the capital much later than September 4th.53

The latter date falls within the possible range for
the sequence of events that followed Augustus' death and led
up to Drusus' departure. Suetonius suggests that the cortege
bearing Augustus' body to Rome from Nola, where he had died
on August 19th, travelled at a slow rate. Because of the
summer heat the body was transported only at night from town
to town along the route and was attended by ceremonies that
would have further slowed down the pace of the cortege. The
senators of each municipality and colony as far as Bovillae
bore the body; from Bovillae knights carried the body into
Rome itself.54 Calculating the rate of progress along the
150 (Roman) mile route from Nola to Rome must involve
guesswork, but Wellesley offers at least reasonable
conjecture:

Eight hours of darkness at the solemn pace of 2 mp
[mille passuum = Roman mile] hourly might make 15 mp
nightly no very incredible performance, and ten nights
at 15 mp will get us to Rome at dawn on 29th August.
Let us be cautious and allow two days for preparation
and reception. On this reckoning we are still left with
an interval of four days (31st August, 1st, 2nd and 3rd
September) for meetings of the Senate, at least two in
number, perhaps more.(55)

The first meeting of the Senate took place, according to Dio,
on the day after the Emperor's body arrived in Rome. Tacitus
says that the meeting dealt only with matters concerned with the death of Augustus. By Wellesley's reckoning there would still have been enough time, say three or four days, for Augustus' funeral, which followed the first meeting, and for the constitutional discussions that followed the funeral, to precede Drusus' departure for Pannonia. All could have taken place between the end of August and the end of the first week in September.

The mutiny and the report of it in Rome could also have happened between August 19th, when Augustus died, and early September. The maximum speed attainable by imperial couriers, probably only for matters of the gravest urgency, was up to 125 Roman miles per day. Couriers bearing news of so grave a matter as the Emperor's death would thus have been able to cover the 600 Roman miles from his death-bed in Nola to the legions encamped near Emona in about five days, so that the news would have arrived about 24th - 25th August. Tacitus gives the impression that the legionaries took a little time to become mutinous. It may then have been towards the end of the month that the mutiny had developed to the point where the commander, Junius Blaesus, felt that he must appeal to Rome. The courier, travelling the 460-odd mile journey at top speed, would have taken no more than four or five days to reach the City. The news of the Pannonian mutiny, then, could have arrived in Rome early enough to make it possible for Drusus to march out in the first week of September. The chronology proposed by Wellesley for the
sequence of events between Augustus' death and Drusus' arrival in the mutineers' camp is internally consistent.

The general impressions created by the narratives of Suetonius, Dio, and Velleius give additional support to this condensed chronology. Suetonius and Dio in particular present a tradition of a highly concentrated series of developments. Their accounts of the beginning of Tiberius' reign give the impression that all three (or, according to Dio, four) scrolls sealed by Augustus in addition to his will were opened at the same Senate meeting in which the will was read out, whereas Tacitus records that, at the first meeting, only Augustus' will and last rites were discussed. If the records of Suetonius and Dio or their sources are conflated in this instance, the type of chronology suggested by Wellesley would certainly help to explain how it happened. The rapid onset of frequently overlapping events in the space of just one month, from Augustus' death to his deification, most of them actually occurring in little more than a fortnight, could conceivably have led to confusion even among contemporary witnesses with resultant obscurity, incoherence and inconsistency in the records of later authors.

To sum up: it may be tentatively suggested that Drusus and his escort of leading statesmen, Praetorian infantry and cavalry, and German imperial bodyguards set out from Rome for Pannonia in the first week of September, AD 14. They certainly arrived in the summer camp of the mutinous legions on September 26th, the day before a lunar eclipse.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4


3. Drusus' accompaniment of Tiberius: Dio 56.31.2-3. Observation of formalities: ibid.; Suet. Tib. 70.3. Drusus' completion of Tiberius' speech: Suet. Tib. 23.1. Introduction of Augustus' will: Dio 56.32.1. Suet. Aug. 101.1 says that the Vestals produced (protulerunt) the will. Tac. Ann. 1.8.1 says simply that the will was brought into the Senate by the agency of (per) the Vestals. The related documents: Suet. Aug. 101.1; Dio 56.33.1.

4. Reading of the will: Dio 56.32.1; Suet. Tib. 23. The other documents: Dio 56.33.1-3; Suet. Aug. 101.4. Tac. Ann. 1.11 apparently refers only to the third document (on the condition of the Empire).

5. Procession to the Campus Martius: Suet. Aug. 100.2-3; Dio 56.34.1 - 42.4. Eulogies: Suet. Aug. 100.3; Dio 56.34.4. History of the eulogy: J.M.C. Toynbee, Death and Burial in the Roman World (New York: 1971), 47.


7. Certainly, at the time of Augustus' will, Drusus had at least one daughter, Julia, alive; just before he died Augustus asked after her health (Suet. Aug. 99.1). Dio refers to a son of Drusus dying in 15, but gives no indication as to his date of birth (Dio 57.14.6); since the boy is not certainly mentioned elsewhere in the sources, he may have died in infancy and so would not have been born before Augustus completed his will, in which case, as far as the will would have been concerned, Drusus would have lacked male heirs (Levick [1966], 241).


11. Tacitus, in his account of Tiberius' request for tribuniciam power for Drusus in AD 22, remarks that, as
far as the imperial succession was concerned, Tiberius had suspended judgment between Drusus and Germanicus so long as the latter was alive (Ann. 3.56.3). Tacitus may only mean, however, that Tiberius did not interfere with the ongoing execution of Augustus' plans for their careers and ranking (see p. 246 below).


13. Tac. Ann. 1.14.3; see Furneaux ad loc.

14. Talbert, op. cit., 242. The possibility of Drusus' presence at this particular meeting is, however, disputed; - see pp. 113-15 above.


17. On Pannonia and its history see Mócsy, 4, and Dobó, 11. The earliest known mention of Pannonia as the official name of the province occurs in the Flavian inscriptions, CIL X 6225 = ILS 985, and CIL XVI 14; see Mócsy, 39.


19. Pannonian mutineers: Dio 57.4.2. Rhine mutineers: Tac. Ann. 1.31.1; Suet. Tib. 25.2, Cal. 1.1; Dio 57.5.1; Vell. Pat. 2.125.2. The sincerity of the Rhine mutineers or the soundness of the tradition passed on by Tacitus, Suetonius, and Dio, biased as it probably was against Tiberius, may be questioned in view of the complete lack


21. Levick, 158.


24. H.H. Schmitt, "Der pannonische Aufstand des Jahres 14 N. Chr. und der Regierungsantritt des Tiberius," Historia 7 (1958): 379, estimates that the entire armed force would have totalled about 1000 infantry and 1250 cavalry. J. Crook, Consilium Principis (Cambridge: 1955), 37, suggests that the group of statesmen, referred to by Tacitus as primores civitatis (Ann. 1.24.1) and amici Caesaris (Ann. 1.27.1), was none other than the consilium principis inherited by Tiberius from Augustus (see p. 74 above). If his suggestion is correct, it would attest to the gravity with which Tiberius regarded the Pannonian mutiny.


26. CIL XII 4230 (see 4235); see PIR (2nd ed.) A 934 and Rogers, 108-109.


29. Lentulus certainly caught the rebels' attention. They believed that he was encouraging and hardening Drusus to stand against them: Tac. Ann. 1.27.1.

30 In his description of the proceedings in the Senate following Augustus' death, Tac. Ann. 1.14.3 does say explicitly that Tiberius declined to request imperium for Drusus. Tiberius would probably have envisaged, however, that Drusus would remain in Rome engaged in non-military activities: the senatorial proceedings likely took place before news of the mutiny reached Rome (see Excursus I). The radical, unforeseen change of circumstances, suddenly necessitating Drusus' departure from Rome to perform a military task, would have made a request for imperium
entirely justified, indeed, imperative. Because the request would have been made hurriedly, perhaps irregularly, in a context of general consternation, it could easily have been forgotten in subsequent records of these events.


37. Dio 57.6. Tacitus, Suetonius, and Dio all agree that Tiberius feared and distrusted Germanicus. All three, however, may simply be passing on the pro-Germanicus, anti-Claudian bias of the source tradition. cf. Seager, 63-64.

38. Vell. Pat. 2.125.4.


41. Wellesley, 25.


45. Vell. Pat. 2.125 gives the definite impression that the news of the Pannonian mutiny reached Rome only after Tiberius' accession and, thus, the constitutional discussions preceding it. See Sage, op. cit., 315-16.

46. Tac. Ann. 1.10.8 - 1.11.1.

47. Wellesley, 23-30; followed by Castritius.


49. Incidentally, Dio recognized the same difficulty in presenting the intermingled events at the end of Augustus' reign and the beginning of Tiberius'. His solution was similar to Tacitus': to ignore strict chronology and devote one section of his narrative, the final chapters of Book 56, to the first subject and the next section, the first two chapters of Book 57, to the second subject. Consequently there is some overlapping of events between the two books, but the result makes much more sense than what would be otherwise a jumble of information.

50. Suet. Tib. 22-25, see Aug. 100-101; Dio 57.2-4, see 56.31-34, 42-43.1; Vell. Pat. 2.124-125.1-4.
51. Suet. Tib. 25.1; Dio 57.3.1-2.

52. Wellesley, 28.


54. Suet. Aug. 100.2.

55. Wellesley, 27. cf. Levick, 69-70, and 246-47, f.n. 4: she suggests approximately the same duration, about 2 weeks, for the journey. She would, however, place the arrival of the funeral cortege in Rome on September 2nd to 3rd, later than the date suggested by Wellesley.

56. First meeting of the Senate: Dio 56.31.2; Tac. Ann. 1.8.1.

57. Timetable for the outbreak of mutiny and arrival of news in Rome: Wellesley, 27; see ibid., 25.

CHAPTER 5: THE BEGINNING OF TIBERIUS' PRINCIPATE

The year encompassing Augustus' death and Tiberius' accession brought Drusus distinction and responsibility befitting a successor of the princeps. The assignment to quell the Pannonian mutiny exemplified his new importance in the state. He could be proud of his swift and effective settlement of that problem. As noted earlier, he had been initiated into the sodales Augustales, the new and highly prominent priesthood responsible for the cults of the divine Julius and Augustus. He continued to play a significant if not extraordinary role in the consilium principis, the powerful body of advisers created by Augustus and continued by Tiberius. Dio reports that Drusus conducted himself just like the other advisers, sometimes speaking first, sometimes after others. Finally, having bypassed the praetorship, he could look forward to his first consulship and continued prestigious service to the state in AD 15, the first full year of his father's reign.

The sources preserve few details about the major events directly associated with Drusus' consulship. Apparently he continued in office for the whole year while his first colleague, Gaius Norbanus Flaccus, was succeeded by a suffect, Marcus Junius Silanus, probably at the beginning of August. Doubtless his consulship would have stood out in most Romans' memories as the year in which Tiberius paid out to the people the bequests made by Augustus. In addition,
although the sources do not make the connection, charges of
sacrilege against the knights, Faianius and Rubrius, and of
maiestas against Granius Marcellus would have come before
Drusus and his colleagues, although all were quashed soon
after by Tiberius. In general, Drusus seems to have
conducted his magistracy competently, if not remarkably. Dio
says that he carried out his duties 

Some details in the sources shed light on Drusus' political and social position in 15. Dio, for instance, says
that he would act as pall-bearer to anyone who had named him
as an heir. The point would have been noteworthy only if it
reflected a new and fairly frequent experience in Drusus' life. He must have found himself being increasingly
mentioned in wills and expected, thus, to provide services to
the testators and their families in return. The practice
grew out of a custom established in senatorial circles in the
late Republic in which friendships, amicitiae, were formally
sealed through desired friends or allies, amici, being named
as legatees in wills. Amicitia, as the Romans conceived it,
involved mutual obligations, officia, on analogy with the
patron-client relationship. A beneficiary under someone's
will was expected to provide services in return. As the
Republic evolved into the Empire the man perceived to be
capable of performing the most and best services was,
obviously, the Emperor, so he soon, frequently found himself
being named as a legatee in ordinary citizens' wills. As it
was for the Emperor so, to a lesser degree, it was for the
other members of the imperial family. Drusus' sudden popularity as a legatee indicates that, by the time of his father's accession and his own consulship, amicitia with him was considered highly prestigious and profitable. He would have been generally perceived to be prominent and influential within both the imperial family and the state.

Drusus' greater prominence also began, naturally, to draw public attention to his personality and private life. According to the descriptions that have survived he appears to have been extroverted and high-spirited, and to have plunged enthusiastically into the social activities favoured by young aristocrats in Rome, frequently indeed, but probably not unusually, to the point of intemperance. For example, he arranged gladiatorial games in his own and Germanicus' name which were considered to breach propriety. He was only performing the type of public service expected of every Roman magistrate, but he spiced up the entertainment by allowing a pair of knights to fight in single combat, an aberration that Tiberius censured when he heard of it. Nor was he averse to "contact sports" himself. As the sources portray him, he does not appear to have been inclined to suppress his feelings and to brood as his father was reputed to do. Dio reports that once, in 15, Drusus got in a number of blows on an unnamed but distinguished knight who had enraged him. In consequence he won the ironical and, one suspects, good-humoured nickname, "Castor" (see Excursus I). His high spirits manifested themselves in other ways as well. He was
fond of *convivia*. Dio says that he was becoming so avid a drinker that once, in reply to a request for water, after he had been conscripted to help the Praetorian Guards put out a fire, he could not resist the witticism, "Pour them hot water" - hot water being a standard complement to wine. He fraternized with the members of one of Rome's livelier and, admittedly, more unruly and disreputable professions, the actors. He apparently affected some sort of dandyism, coming under the influence of the wealthy and eccentric hedonist and gourmet, M. Gavius, also known as Apicius. The elder Pliny tells the anecdote that Tiberius criticized Drusus for subscribing to Apicius' effete disdain for cabbage sprouts.  

In his private life, as in his treatment of the Pannonian mutiny, Drusus gave indications of an original, audacious personality.  

The sources, however, condemn Drusus' youthful exuberance and excess as symptoms of a vicious, depraved character. Suetonius gives the general judgment that he was of a *fluxioris remissiorisque vitae*, allegedly to the point that his vices shocked even his father.  

Dio takes a particularly dim view of his physical boisterousness, censuring him outright for being by nature *aselgestatos* and *omotatos* (extremely licentious [or brutal] and cruel), and claiming that the sharpest swords were called *Drousiana* after him. He adds that Tiberius once actually even threatened him in the presence of witnesses that if he should dare to do anything violent or insolent while his father was alive, he
would not do it after Tiberius was dead. Dio offers only Drusus' bad temper as an explanation for his fight with the unnamed knight. He ascribes Drusus' fondness for wine not to youthful intemperance but to an absolute, sodden addiction, a charge echoed by Pliny who goes so far as to claim that he inherited an alcoholic tendency from his father. Dio translates Drusus' association with the actors into the direct cause of their riotous outburst in 15. Tacitus refrains from these sweeping judgments but he does make a number of quick stabs which, if anything, go deeper. One recalls, for example, his barbed comment on the decision to slay the ringleaders of the Pannonian mutiny: Drusus' ingenium was promptum ad asperiora. Tacitus implies that the gladiatorial games arranged by Drusus in 15 were a particularly brutal affair because he was vili sanguine nimis gaudens, a trait that so terrified the Roman vulgus (perhaps because the vulgus thought that it might seem itself vilis sanguinis) that Tiberius himself was said to have reproved Drusus for it. In reporting the various explanations given for Tiberius' own absence from these games Tacitus cannot resist passing on the choice gossip that he may have wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to have his son expose his natural viciousness and thus become the focus of Roman disapproval - and foil to the Emperor. Altogether Drusus' social comportment has received a very bad press.

The condemnation by the sources may, however, be questioned. None of the descriptions of Drusus' personal
behaviour provide clear demonstrations of any of the charges of viciousness or depravity. In fact, even assuming that they are reporting fact and not anti-Claudian fancy, none of them expose anything more than the normal, relatively mild intemperance of an exuberant, high-spirited youth. His alleged acquiescence in, or even encouragement of the voluntary duel of the knights in his gladiatorial games would hardly have amounted to a crime. Any censure of the activity should properly have fallen upon the knights themselves who voluntarily engaged in it. Indeed, Tiberius confined the public expression of his disapproval to prohibiting the survivor from entering the arena again. As for Tacitus' charge that Drusus was vili sanguine nimis gaudens in the games, one would like to know, in the absence of detailed illustration, how his interest could be distinguished from that of the other spectators or, indeed, from that of the Roman populace in general with its long practice of and enthusiasm for wars, bloody spectacles, enslavement, and other forms of brutality and excess. Tacitus' barb that Tiberius may have stayed away from the games in order to allow his son to expose his natural viciousness (a piece of defamation to which, after making it, he rather disingenuously says that he would not subscribe) can be refuted by another reason that he himself suggests: that Tiberius may have feared comparison with Augustus, who had been a convivial spectator. If the great Augustus himself had been enthusiastic about such bloodshed how can Drusus be
fairly charged with taking excessive delight in it? It has already been shown that his harsh treatment of the Pannonian mutiny's ringleaders was perfectly justified under the circumstances. If criticism is to be levelled against him for brawling and drinking then, for the sake of fairness, it should probably be extended to the large majority of wealthy Roman youths. Dio's "Pour them hot water" anecdote, even if it is true, reveals no alcoholic stupor but high-spirited, albeit insensitive, wit. One suspects as well, judging from the interests of other young men of the upper classes in the late Republic and early Empire - Catullus and Ovid certainly come to mind - that Drusus' susceptibility to the sort of precious influence wielded by Apicius would not have been unusual. Dio's claim that Drusus was responsible for the actors' riots in 15 can be refuted by Tacitus' report that they had actually been caused by the actors' own rivalry in 14. Nor can Drusus be condemned merely for associating with actors. They had, in fact, extensive contacts and influence throughout the upper echelons of society even up to the Emperor himself in the early Empire. Moreover, as far as Drusus' reputation was concerned, he does not appear to have been as unpopular as the sinister portrait drawn by the sources would have warranted. Tacitus concedes that his general sociability was looked upon with favour while even his openly displayed intemperance was not regarded with disfavour in comparison with Tiberius' brooding reserve and seclusion.11 The sources' denigration of Drusus' character
remains unsubstantiated.

How then could it have arisen? General circumstances may have had an effect. His father's accession and his own entry into the consulship would have placed Drusus more squarely in the limelight than ever before. Under the harsh glare of public scrutiny small faults could easily have been magnified into large ones. Moreover, Tiberius' criticisms of his son, perhaps no more frequent or harsh than those made by any ordinary father of any normal Roman youth, would have received special attention because they were directed from the Emperor to a potential successor; in that serious context they could easily have been construed to be exposing a thoroughly wicked character. Even if Tiberius did reprimand Drusus more frequently and more harshly than other fathers would have censured their sons, he might have been constrained to do so by the fact that he, now shouldering not just Augustus' power but also his moral authority and responsibility within the state, was obliged, publicly at least, to hold himself and the members of his family to higher standards of conduct than prevailed among the general populace. Drusus has also likely suffered from the anti-Claudian, pro-Germanicus bias of most of the sources. As the natural son of Tiberius it is only to be expected that he should have been tarred with the same brush as his father and presented as a foil to his highly favoured, adoptive brother, Germanicus. The defamatory tradition about Drusus need not have arisen because it was actually true.
The record's allegations of intemperate behaviour do not cast the only shadows upon Drusus' year of consulship.

As noted earlier, Dio records that an otherwise unmentioned son of Drusus died in 15. Unfortunately he provides no more information about the child. It appears, in fact, that he gives the notice only to illustrate Tiberius' self-control in times of personal tragedy. Drusus' reaction is unknown. Presumably he would have been encouraged to conform to his father's stoic example. The legitimacy of the child, his name, and his age are also unknown.

In 16, after Drusus had completed his consulship, Tiberius began to lay the groundwork for his son's next major service to the state - and career advancement: the pacification of the German frontier. He was dissatisfied with Germanicus' efforts to that end and sent a stream of letters requesting him to leave off his prodigious but largely futile military actions against the Germans. Germanicus did not, at first, respond, so Tiberius, not wishing to offend his by now popular and influential general and successor, had to find tactful but forceful means of persuasion. He dangled in front of him the inducements of a triumph and a second consulship, but he also appealed to his fraternal magnanimity by asking him to leave some possibility for military glory for Drusus "who, with no other foe available at the time, would not be able to strive to win the title, Imperator, and to carry off the victor's crown except in Germany itself." Tiberius' words can be construed in
two ways and, considering his reputation for ambivalence and inscrutability, one may suspect that he intended the ambiguity. First, he may have meant a compliment to Germanicus with gentle humour at Drusus' expense, the implication being that Germanicus had succeeded so well against the Germans that there was indeed a real possibility that his brother would have no opportunity to win glory.\textsuperscript{15} But he was also speaking in earnest about Drusus. On the one hand he was adumbrating his plans for future treatment of the "German problem": he wanted to replace Germanicus with Drusus as head of German operations, a goal that he would effectively achieve in 17 when he would dispatch Drusus on a mission to Illyricum. That mission would result, by 20, in the thorough pacification of the German frontier.\textsuperscript{16} On the other hand Tiberius was probably genuinely concerned about Drusus' inadequate military experience. Augustus had required military service from his successors and Tiberius, still loyal to his predecessor's memory, would have wanted to comply with the precedent.\textsuperscript{17} As it would turn out, while Drusus' successful resolution of German matters appears to have involved mainly diplomatic and political activities, his mission would also have a military dimension sufficient to enable him to win a minor triumph.\textsuperscript{18} Tiberius' real hopes for Drusus would be fulfilled.

In the meantime Drusus' prominence in the state and close association with the principate meant not only a guarantee of high honours and influence but exposure to peril
as well. In 16 the Senate, on the accusation of Fulcinius Trio, a professional informer, tried M. Scribonius Libo Drusus for plotting revolution. According to the tradition preserved in the Fasti Amiternini the plot involved nefaria consilia about the safety of Tiberius, his sons, and other leading citizens and threatened the republic itself. Libo, a rather dim-witted young man, seems to have been puffed up with an exaggerated opinion about his own importance and prospects by reason, in part, of his glorious lineage and connections, including Pompey the Great, his great grandfather; Scribonia, the first wife of Augustus, mother of Julia, and Libo's great-aunt; and Julia's grandsons, Nero and Drusus Caesar, Libo's cousins. It was believed that he had begun to imagine even the principate itself within his grasp. An allegation about his ambitions was made to Tiberius. The Emperor, however, wanted more evidence and so, at first, allowed no legal action to be initiated, although he took precautions for his personal safety, including once requiring Drusus to be present when he received Libo for an interview. Finally, however, new evidence reached Fulcinius Trio, and he and others were then allowed to prosecute Libo before the Senate. It seems that Libo was accused of planning to murder Tiberius, Germanicus, and Drusus together with some leading senators in the hope that in the resulting confusion he would be able to seize the throne. The selection of victims can be explained by the requirements of the objective: if Libo was serious about overturning the Julio-Claudian principate, it
would not be enough simply to eliminate the Emperor. To succeed, to guarantee that he would not have to face the avenging wrath of the Julio-Claudian household or leave rallying points for their supporters among the government, army, and people, he must cut off at once all the heads of the family, including Germanicus and Drusus, as well as their principal supporters in the Senate. The danger was effectively nullified by discovery of the plot and Libo's subsequent suicide. The Roman government considered that a major catastrophe had been averted: the day of the discovery of the plot, September 13, was commemorated in the calendar by decree of the Senate. The plot reveals, albeit in a negative way, how important and how integrally connected to the principate Drusus had become.

It was probably in consequence of the Libo plot that Drusus assisted his father in undertaking a major purge of occultists, both foreign and native, in Rome in 16. Libo, according to Tacitus, had had frequent and wide-ranging recourse to diviners, perhaps to seek supernatural assistance and assurance of success for his revolutionary schemes and to gain confirmation of what he hoped his destiny would be. Much of the case against Libo had been built up, apparently, with evidence supplied by witnesses of his contacts with these charlatans. Fulcinius Trio's case against Libo, for example, appears to have centred on testimony provided by a necromancer named Junius. Whatever the full role played in the plot by occult practices, Drusus and his father pressed
the practitioners hard. Foreign magicians were executed; citizens were banished; immunity was granted only to those who had obeyed an earlier decree to desist from these unsavoury activities. A majority in the Senate opposed Drusus' and Tiberius' policy, but they were overridden in turn by a tribune's veto. Drusus and Tiberius probably wanted to ensure that these troublesome dabblers in the supernatural could never endanger their lives again.

In his record for the year 17 Tacitus notes for the first time that Drusus and Germanicus found themselves at the centre of a family storm. The court, he claims, was divisa et discors by support for the brothers. He clearly implies, however, that the division went much deeper and consisted, essentially, of dynastic rivalry between the imperial Claudians and Julians and their supporters. The rivalry focussed on Drusus and Germanicus because they were the chief candidates for the succession, and whoever succeeded Tiberius would determine whose dynasty, Claudian or Julian respectively, would prevail. Tacitus' description of the discord must be assessed with great caution because it bears the characteristics to be expected of an account biased in favour of Germanicus and the Julians, whose supporters would have resented the Claudians as usurpers of the Julian prerogative and would have wanted to assert their own claim to the throne and the justice of their cause. The arguments arising from the division in the court split exactly along Julio-Claudian lines, ranging the chief representatives of
the Claudians, Livia, Tiberius, Drusus, and Livilla, against those of the Julians, Germanicus and Agrippina. The main bearer of Julian blood, Agrippina, is depicted as a victim of hatred and persecution by the Claudian matron, Livia. The Claudian interloper, Tiberius, is said to have favoured Drusus as the son of his own body, the clear implication being that he wanted to subvert Augustus' preference for Germanicus as the next emperor. Germanicus' popularity is said to have been increased by the general knowledge of the lack of sympathy between himself and Tiberius, a double-edged remark that emphasizes both the general antipathy towards Tiberius and, thus, his unfitness to rule, and justifies Germanicus' claim to the throne. Germanicus' Claudian ancestry is ignored while his Julian and Antonian lineage is stressed. Similar selectivity highlights Drusus' descent from an obscure knight, Pomponius Atticus, because the latter is felt to vitiate his descendant's Claudian nobility. Drusus' otherwise impressive aristocratic pedigree, and the fact that his maternal grandfather was none other than Augustus' closest friend and colleague, the illustrious Marcus Agrippa, are passed over in silence. Drusus' and Germanicus' wives are also brought into the argument. Agrippina's relative advantages in *fecunditate* and *fama* are pointed out to belittle Livilla and, thus, her husband as well. The whole comparison is so pointed and coloured that its historicity can surely be questioned. It seems precisely the sort of slanted reporting one would expect in the memoirs
of Agrippina the younger and the other pro-Germanicus, pro-Julian works that probably came to dominate the historical record for this period. There may have been a division in the court at this time, but, if so, it could very well have been initiated and exacerbated by proud and resentful Julians, not the Claudians. Certainly there is no concrete evidence of any action or policy undertaken at this time by Tiberius and Drusus to circumvent Augustus' wishes and to suppress Germanicus' dynastic rights. The positive evidence indicates that Germanicus was secure in the succession.21

In the light of this analysis, Tacitus' reporting seems to accord much better with probability when he concludes that, regardless of the tension surrounding them, Drusus and Germanicus got on, or at least gave the appearance of getting on, very well together: *sed fratres egregie concordes et proximorum certaminibus inconcussi.*22 They lived up to their official "Dioscuri," devoted brothers' image. On his way, for example, to take up his special commission in the eastern Empire in late 17 or early 18, Germanicus made a point of stopping off in the relatively uncouth conditions of Dalmatia especially to visit Drusus.23 In reflection of their officially close relationship in the imperial succession as the sons of Tiberius, they were often twinned in official portraiture and inscriptions, both on statues and on coins.24 Regardless of what others thought of them, each, apparently, knew his place and had no intention
of challenging the other.\textsuperscript{25} On the contrary they worked harmoniously together.

They were increasingly aware of their \textit{de facto} power and prestige within the state - and were prepared to use it. When the praetor Vipstanus Gallus died in office, Drusus helped Germanicus to support their kinsman, Decimus Haterius Agrippa, as a candidate to replace him.\textsuperscript{26} He did not, however, win the praetorship as a matter of course. A sizeable body of senators supported another candidate and invoked a section of the \textit{Lex Papia Poppaea} which provided that, of two candidates for office receiving an equal number of votes, the one having the larger number of children was to be elected.\textsuperscript{27} Apparently there arose over the issue no small debate. In the end Drusus' and Germanicus' prestige and influence carried the day, but Haterius won by only a few votes. The procedure and result seem to indicate that the brothers did not try to threaten or bully the Senate into accepting their brief, but submitted themselves to its rules of debate and its authority. Apparently Drusus and Germanicus, while aware of their influence and prepared to use it, nevertheless strove to act without arrogance, and, as much as possible, within a constitutional framework.\textsuperscript{28}
EXCURSUS I

The Significance of Drusus' Nickname, "Castor"

According to Dio, Drusus, during his consulship, acquired the nickname, "Castor", after raining blows upon an unnamed but distinguished knight who had enraged him. Some commentators see here a reference to a celebrated gladiator of the time called "Castor". But the pun may go much deeper. The nickname had a humorous point. One of the Dioscuri was traditionally honoured as a sort of archetypal boxer. Originally he had been identified as Pollux (Polydeuces), but Roman religion had so closely assimilated him to his twin, Castor, that both were frequently referred to simply as the "Castores." Moreover the Dioscuri were the patron gods of the Roman knights, Castor being, of the two, the knights' chief patron and protector. As noted in Chapter 3, there had been a tradition, or at least a tendency, to view the Emperor's first pair of successors as leaders of the equestrian order and, thus, associated with the Dioscuri. So the designation of Drusus as "Castor" in the context of the incident reported by Dio may intend an acute, multi-layered irony: Drusus, the boxer, leader, and representative of the divine patrons and protectors of the knights went so far as to "box" a prominent member of the equestrian order who would, normally, have been able to claim special favour and protection from him! Drusus found himself cast in the burlesque role of the divine Castor uncharacteristically
turning his pugilistic talents against one of his own devotees. By calling Drusus "Castor", the Romans may have been laughing at him as a sorry patron of the knights and, probably, at the assimilation of rulers to gods.\textsuperscript{29}
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Dio 57.7.3.


5. Dio 57.14.3.

6. Dio 57.14.9. This incident bears a remarkable similarity to another or perhaps two others, apparently occurring at a later date, recorded by Dio and Tacitus as part of the background to Drusus' death. Dio 57.22.1 says that the enmity that had arisen between Drusus and Sejanus was once manifested by Sejanus striking Drusus a blow with his fist. Tac. Ann. 4.3.2 also records a boxing match between the two but restores the initiative to Drusus and explains the altercation as resulting from Drusus' quick temper and impatience with a rival. Since Sejanus was himself a distinguished knight the three passages may actually refer to one and the same incident occurring perhaps in 15 but more likely in 22 or 23, closer to Drusus' death. See K. Scott, "Drusus, Nicknamed "Castor"," CP 25 (1930): 156, and Rogers, 142. On the full significance of the nickname, "Castor", see Excursus I.


12. See Chapter 1, Excursus I.

13. Dio 57.14.6. See Chapter 4, footnote 7. Since this particular child is not mentioned elsewhere in the sources the possibility can be entertained that here, as in other instances, Dio's chronology might be confused. If such is the case, then Dio might be referring to Gemellus' twin, Germanicus, who, according to Tac. *Ann.* 4.15.1, died in AD 23. See Millar, 87.


15. Tarver, 228.


17. Schrömbges, 165.

18. Tac. *Ann.* 2.64.1.


23. Ibid., 2.53.1.

25. Marsh, 86.

26. Tac. Ann. 2.51; on Haterius Agrippa, see PIR (2nd ed.) H 25 and Levick, 274, note 68: "Haterius was half cousin to Drusus, half nephew to Agrippina, and half cousin once removed to Germanicus; the connexion with Agrippina explains why Tac. Ann. II.51.2, should say that Germanicus and Drusus favoured him as propinquum Germanici."

27. Rogers, 118.

28. Their attitude and conduct would have pleased Tiberius. According to Tac. Ann. 2.51.2, Tiberius, observing the Haterius proceedings, laetabatur ... cum inter filios eius et leges senatus disceptaret: he was glad that the Senate was actually debating an issue between his sons and the laws instead of supinely caving in to them: Rogers, 118; see discussion by Goodyear II, 347, on Ann. 2.51.2. Haterius would later try to return the favour to Drusus, at least in part, through zealous prosecution of Clutorius Priscus for writing a poem anticipating Drusus' death: Tac. Ann. 3.49; see p. 239 below.

CHAPTER 6: DRUSUS' MISSION TO ILLYRICUM: BACKGROUND

In 17 Tiberius decided again to make use of his sons' abilities and prestige abroad. First of all, matters had arisen in Armenia, Asia Minor, Syria and Judea that required, so it seemed, "hands on" treatment by the Roman government. For this mission Tiberius chose Germanicus rather than Drusus because, he said, the turbulent East could only be settled by Germanici sapientia, and he himself was too old for the job, while Drusus was not sufficiently mature. Prima facie his words seem clear enough and delivered in good faith. However ineffective Germanicus might have proved in military strategy and tactics, he did have a high degree of sapientia in public relations as evidenced by his reputedly enormous popularity among both army and people. He, if anyone, would have sufficient diplomatic skills to settle the volatile politics of the eastern Empire. Drusus, who had shown that he was ready to resort to fists or the sword to settle an argument, might not have had the patience or amiability necessary for so sensitive a mission. He was also junior to Germanicus. Tiberius himself was getting on. In 17 he was in his fifty-eighth year. Germanicus really was the best candidate for this job.

In recommending Germanicus, however, Tiberius appears to have had more in mind than just the resolution of eastern political problems. Perhaps in order to compensate Germanicus for the loss of the German command, Tiberius was,
in effect, endorsing him and distinguishing him from Drusus in the imperial hierarchy. He demonstrated his confidence and trust by authorizing enormous power for his mission. The Senate decreed that Germanicus was to have entrusted to him the eastern provinces with *maius imperium* over all governors, both senatorial and imperial, wherever he should go. In addition the consulship for 18, to be shared with the Emperor himself, was reserved for him. 2 Nor was Germanicus' mission significant only for its present objectives. In going East he was following in the illustrious footsteps of M. Agrippa, Augustus' colleague in power; C. Caesar, Augustus' appointed successor; and Tiberius himself who, having served as consul in 7 BC and having received a five year grant of *tribunicia potestas* in 6, had been given a commission by Augustus appropriate to his prestige and power: the settlement of Armenia. In the light of these noble precedents and the special power bestowed upon him, Germanicus' appointment to the East amounted to an official acknowledgment that he was Tiberius' successor. Tiberius may well have emphasized that Drusus was too young for the job in order to drive home this significance. So prestigious a mission had to be reserved for the Emperor's senior, primary successor. 3

Drusus had to yield pride of place to Germanicus. He remained, however, the junior candidate for the succession. He and his career were still inextricably linked to Germanicus. So he, too, had to be given a special responsibility and honour which would appear at the same time
inferior to Germanicus'. Accordingly, he was assigned a
military command in Illyricum, a rugged country whose
rebellious, barbarian inhabitants had been only recently
pacified.¹

Tacitus purports to reveal Tiberius' motives for
sending Drusus to Illyricum. His analysis must be approached
with caution. Where he discusses thought and intention
rather than concrete and objective facts his source evidence
has critical importance. Unfortunately, he does not usually
identify his sources or indicate their soundness. The
inherent bias in his work against Tiberius and his own
judgment of the man as inscrutable give grounds for
additional reservations about his understanding of the
Emperor's thinking. While, then, Tacitus' assertions on this
matter must be borne in mind, it would be imprudent to accept
them uncritically. They must be judged, as much as possible,
in the light of concrete facts.

Tacitus claims that Tiberius had three main motives
for commissioning Drusus.⁵ First, he wanted to improve
Drusus' military experience and standing with the troops. In
truth, Drusus had shown great promise as a commander in 14
with his suppression of the Pannonian mutiny but he may never
have had other military experience. He needed it. After
all, the Emperor's authority, throne, and, indeed, his very
life depended ultimately upon his military power. Tacitus'
reporting here seems sound.

Secondly, he says that the Emperor wanted to remove
his son from the urban flesh pots where he had been indulging in *luxus* and *lascivia*. This assertion deserves to be treated with scepticism. To be sure, the reference to Drusus' penchant for the intemperate life is consistent with allusions elsewhere to his enthusiasm for drinking and brawling. Undoubtedly, too, from his perspective as official guardian of the morals of the Roman people, Tiberius, who held a personal preference for an austere way of life anyway, would have been sensitive to reports of his own son's intemperance and its potential for damaging the reputation — and thus the authority — of himself and his family. Yet the claim that Drusus had sunk or was sinking into degeneracy so profound as to necessitate, as Tacitus clearly implies, his moral rescue may very well be based more on the anti-Claudian bias of the original sources, noted earlier, than on actual fact. Tiberius may have deliberated removing Drusus from the limelight and even entrusting him to the military life to "build his character", but such could hardly have amounted to primary considerations.

Thirdly, Tacitus says that the Emperor wanted to increase his own security by having Drusus as well as Germanicus hold military power: *segue tutoirem rebatur utroque filio legiones obtinentes*. This passage is deliberately, perhaps even maliciously, ambiguous. It could mean that Tiberius thought that, since both sons would be able to exercise control over more troops than could Germanicus alone, together they would be able to provide him
with, as it were, twice the security afforded by Germanicus. Or it could mean that Tiberius would feel more secure knowing that Germanicus' military power was balanced by Drusus'. It might even be inferred that the enigmatic emperor had both considerations in mind. From both points of view, however, the arrangement enhanced Tiberius' security and, thus, could have provided one of his motives for sending Drusus north.

Tacitus' analysis of Tiberius' motives for assigning Drusus to a military mission seems, then, plausible as far as it goes, except for the concern about Drusus' moral degeneracy. His analysis does not, however, go far enough. It does not explain why Tiberius chose Illyricum for the mission rather than some other region of the Empire.

Two personal reasons for the choice readily suggest themselves. First, Tiberius had spent a good deal of his military career campaigning in the area and was thus very well acquainted with it, its peoples, and the Roman forces stationed there. Second, Drusus shared some of this familiarity: a large proportion of the army that he would command would consist of the very legions - and men - that his skill and firmness had restored to obedience after the Pannonian mutiny of 14. These are, however, merely personal reasons. Germanicus was sent East in part to deal with important political problems. Drusus' mission must also have involved practical imperial considerations beyond the mere furtherance of his career.

However uncouth it was, Illyricum had enormous
strategic importance in the Empire. First, it was bounded in the north by the River Danube, which constituted with the Rhine the main border between the Empire and the turbulent German tribes. The Romans were particularly sensitive about the Danube frontier because it was unstable, exposed, and lay, for much of its length, only two hundred miles from the Alps - and Italy. Second, Illyricum straddled the land communications between the western and eastern parts of the Empire. Thus, in assigning Drusus to the armies of Illyricum Tiberius was giving him a command of great power with crucial responsibility. In fact, while Germanicus' mission to the East carried greater prestige, control of matters in Illyricum was in practical terms at least as, if not more, important. The assignment shows that Tiberius placed a high degree of trust and confidence in Drusus.

Tiberius seems, moreover, to have had more in mind than just preservation by Drusus of the strategic status quo. He seems to have been particularly concerned about the Danube frontier. Tacitus says that the Suebian king, Maroboduus, requested Roman help in his war against another German army, composed mainly of members of the Gherusci tribe under the command of Quintilius Varus' old nemesis, Arminius. He asserts that this request served only as the pretext for Drusus' mission in distinction from the personal considerations noted above. His claim, however, is inconsistent with his own narrative and what actually happened. No sooner has Tacitus outlined Tiberius' main
reasons for ordering Drusus to Illyricum than he shifts the focus of his narrative to the events connected with the mere "pretext" for his mission: Maroboduus' request for aid. In fact German affairs north of the Danube appear to have held the centre of Drusus' attention over the next two years.

Unfortunately neither Tacitus nor any other source indicates clearly what Drusus did or even what he was supposed to do in regard to Maroboduus and the Germans. Tacitus says that Tiberius turned down Maroboduus' request for aid against Arminius and the Cherusci on the grounds that Maroboduus had not helped the Romans when they were fighting the same enemy. The Emperor was content to let the king continue to battle the Cherusci without Roman intervention. Yet, says Tacitus in the next sentence, missus tamen Drusus ... paci firmator.\(^\text{10}\) He does not even explain how or in relation to what Drusus was supposed to be paci firmator. Later, as if he has not sown enough confusion, Tacitus records among the events of AD 19 that Drusus haud leve decus ... quaesivit inliciens Germanos ad discordias, thereby completing the destruction of Maroboduus who had been already seriously weakened.\(^\text{11}\) He does not explain why Drusus, supposedly the paci firmator, should be engaged in inducing the Germans to fight among themselves, or why he should seek to complete the downfall of Maroboduus who had expressly asked the Romans for help, or even how, exactly, he brought about this confusion and destruction. Tacitus' account of Drusus' mission to Illyricum raises far more questions than
Consideration of the history of Maroboduus' kingdom and of his relations with other Germans and Rome can shed light on at least some fundamental aspects of the policy formulated by Tiberius and executed by Drusus. Maroboduus was remarkable among the German chiefs. While allowance must be made for Velleius' tendency to exaggeration, his summary of the qualities of the king cannot fail to impress: *genere nobilis, corpore praevalens, animo ferox, natione magis quam ratione barbarus*. Strabo records that he had actually lived in Rome as a youth and had even been shown favour by Augustus. His status in Rome is unknown, but it may well have been in the imperial court that he acquired the political ideas and skills that were later to set him apart from his countrymen. He returned to Germany by 9 BC, or shortly thereafter, and was able to persuade his people, the Marcomanni, one of the main Suebian tribes, to emigrate from the Main Valley to the relatively unpopulated area of Boiohaemum, the Bohemian basin, in the heart of the Hercynian Forest. Not content with the traditional loose political structures of the German tribes, which tended to limit and diffuse power, he proceeded to re-organize his people and land into a permanent, unified state centred upon himself. Further to consolidate his state and his power he established an army of some 70,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry which he distinguished from other barbarian hosts by making it a standing force and drilling it along Roman lines. No longer
a tribal chieftain but a powerful king, he could not resist the temptation to expand his power at his weaker neighbours' expense. Partly by peaceful negotiations and partly by force, he proceeded to push his borders northward to the lower Elbe and southward to the Danube. He created, in effect, the first German empire known to history.  

Maroboduus seems to have wanted to avoid direct conflict with the Romans, but friction became inevitable. His growing kingdom soon came into contact with areas under Roman control or, at least, subject to their military influence, making it impossible for them to ignore him. Augustus decided that the potential threat had to be removed and commissioned Tiberius to conquer Maroboduus and his kingdom. The outbreak of a major revolt in Pannonia forestalled Tiberius' attack, however, and forced him to make peace with Maroboduus in AD 6. The terms of the peace treaty are not preserved in the sources but they probably included an agreement for each side to refrain from acts of aggression against the other's territory and to observe friendly neutrality in each other's wars. Whatever the terms, the treaty could not offer a permanent solution to the threat perceived by the Romans from the Marcomannic kingdom. Distractions elsewhere, however, prevented them from dealing with the problem for the next ten years.

Maroboduus' treaty with Rome and his general policy of neutrality got him into trouble with Arminius, the acknowledged leader of the rest of the Germans. After the
withdrawal of the Romans in 16, Arminius, smarting no doubt from his recent battering at the hands of Germanicus, was all too ready to take out his frustrations on the one German leader who could have tipped the balance in his favour: Maroboduus. Arminius brought him to battle north of Bohemia and won a technical victory. In consequence nearly all Maroboduus' former subjects and allies outside his own tribe deserted him. With his back against the wall, facing a now greatly superior foe, he appealed to Tiberius for aid. He reasoned, no doubt, that the Romans would concur that Arminius was just as much a menace to themselves as to him and that, without his support, they would find Arminius much more difficult to contain.¹⁹

Unfortunately for Maroboduus Tiberius had a different perspective on Germany. By now, certainly, if the Romans had actually ever striven to conquer Germany for its own sake, they had given up that dream. But they retained the old, more practical goal of controlling Germany in order to neutralize all possible threats from that quarter to the Empire west of the Rhine and south of the Danube.²⁰ Tiberius had come to believe from years of hard experience that this particular end could probably be achieved by what he called (according to Tacitus) consilium at least as effectively as by force of arms - and certainly a good deal more cheaply in blood and expenditure. By consilium Tiberius, or at least Tacitus, seems to have meant the rational appraisal and manipulation of circumstances to one's own advantage without
the use of main force. Tiberius' rational, experienced appraisal of the German situation taught him that the Germans could be left weak and self-preoccupied - and thus unthreatening to the Empire - if they were allowed - or better still encouraged - to expend their energies on their traditional, numerous tribal conflicts. News of an enormous struggle between the two most powerful and famous German leaders and their supporters would not, thus, have been unwelcome to him. He would not have been inclined to comply with Maroboduus' request for aid.

Yet, in this particular struggle, Tiberius did not apply the policy of "divide and weaken" in a simple, straightforward manner. Indeed, prima facie he contravened it, for he did not remain neutral: he appears actually to have wanted and contributed to Maroboduus' destruction. He confirmed his hostility later in an address to the Senate. Without his usual equivocation, he described Maroboduus as a greater danger than Pyrrhus or Antiochus had been to Rome, and than Philip had been to the Athenians. Yet his opposition to Maroboduus could only, ostensibly, benefit Arminius, one of Rome's most destructive and implacable foes. He was leading an immense army and, it could be argued, in the event of Maroboduus' collapse Arminius would stand pre-eminent in Germany with nothing further to impede him from opening full-scale hostilities against the Roman Empire. In the light of such a potential consequence Tiberius' German policy seems perverse.
The sources do not explain the policy. One may infer, however, that the main reason for Tiberius' concentration on Maroboduus was the unusually high degree of political as well as military organization and power that he had established in his kingdom. The combination made him potentially a much greater threat than Arminius who, in fact, had no political basis for his large but loose tribal alliance. Arminius could only expect to keep his league together under strong external pressure or general German perception of an external threat. Tiberius must have calculated that, after the withdrawal of Roman forces from Germany in 16, Arminius, for all his military prowess and reputation, would not be able for long to pose a significant threat to the Empire. That he was able to lead a major German alliance against Maroboduus in 17 at all was probably due to the fact that the tribesmen recognized and feared in the Marcomannic kingdom exactly what they had feared about the Roman occupation: the establishment in their midst of an alien organization with a large and permanent power base having the potential to expand and absorb the much less organized German tribes. Arminius' inability to follow through his victory even with the Romans working against Maroboduus shows that Tiberius was justified in his assessment of his power. Maroboduus, however, although he had been weakened in battle, still possessed a permanent, organized power base that, after the inevitable disintegration of Arminius' host, would be able to recover
its losses and resume its expansion, once again threatening the Danube frontier. So, Tiberius correctly reckoned, it was Maroboduus, not Arminius who had to be destroyed.

When, thus, in 17 Tiberius saw the opportunity open at last to break Maroboduus and his kingdom for good, he seized it, employing Drusus as his agent. Tacitus' reference to Drusus' activities in AD 19 probably outlines the policy that he was to follow from the first: to incite the Germans to mutual discord and thereby to complete the destruction of Maroboduus, already severely weakened. So Tacitus' rather cryptic statement that Drusus was sent to Illyricum paci firmator can only mean that Tiberius commissioned him not to establish peace among the warring Germans but, on the contrary, to aggravate their internecine strife precisely in order to strengthen the peace and security of the Roman frontier. Drusus was best suited to this task. The intelligence, initiative, and toughness that he had shown in resolving the Pannonian mutiny, as well as the active, unshrinking qualities that he seems to have displayed in his private life, made him an excellent candidate for the job of stirring up discord among the Germans in the interests of Rome. Certainly he was a better choice than the amiable, conciliatory, and relatively undiscerning Germanicus.

How Drusus was supposed to carry out this policy is not known. Tiberius must have ordered him to limit the use of military force over the frontier in accordance with his principle that more could be accomplished against the Germans
consilio quam vi, but what kind of consilium he was supposed to use can only be guessed at. Whatever he did, the policy he implemented would achieve spectacular results.

The evidence is sufficient, then, to show that Drusus marched north for several reasons much more important than the "official" ones recorded by Tacitus, namely, to gain military experience, favour with the army, and deliverance from a wastrel's life in Rome. The Emperor aimed at establishing his natural son in an extremely important military and strategic position on the Empire's northern boundary and on the eastern approaches to Italy. There Drusus would be able to execute two of the most important programs in the Emperor's foreign policy: first, to divide, weaken, and control the Germans, and second, to complement and counterbalance the power and influence of Germanicus. Obviously it would have been neither advantageous nor characteristic for Tiberius to publicize these objectives.

The reticence of the sources about the strategic purposes of Drusus' mission to Illyricum is complemented by their obscurity about the scope and nature of his command. The few references to his mission speak simply of "Illyricum", but Illyricum as a single province had ceased to exist by AD 8. It had been divided into Illyricum superius, or Dalmatia, and Illyricum inferius, or Pannonia. When, thereafter, the term Illyricum was used in reference to a specific province it could mean either Pannonia or, less frequently, Dalmatia. As Tacitus used the term, however, it
could refer to anything from the north-west Balkan provinces to, generally, the whole north-eastern area of the Empire. In addition to Pannonia and Dalmatia, Illyricum could embrace Noricum, Raetia, and even Moesia.  

The evidence for Drusus' whereabouts, activity, and influence suggests that he had a wide ranging command in keeping with the broader connotation of Illyricum. It is in Dalmatia that his presence seems best attested. When Germanicus set out for Asia near the beginning of 18 he paid a visit to his adoptive brother in Delmatia agente. In 20, after Piso had tried to sound out Drusus about Germanicus' death, Tacitus records that he proceeded to Ancona, Delmatico mari tramisso. It is likely, then, that he had met and left Drusus in Dalmatia. An inscription discovered on the island of Issa or Lissa (modern Vis) off the Dalmatian coast records the dedication by Drusus of a parade ground (campus) there in AD 20 and mentions the Dalmatian Legate, Dolabella. The island probably had a close connection with the near-by Dalmatian provincial capital of Salona where, at some point during his mission, Drusus accepted the office of quattuorvir quinquennalis and appointed L. Anicius to represent him. The relatively greater surviving testimony for his presence in this province, the fact that it was relatively more settled than the rest of Illyricum, and its speedy access to Italy and Rome by sea all support the hypothesis that Dalmatia served as Drusus' main base of operations.
There is evidence to show that he operated elsewhere as well. Catualda's overthrow of Maroboduus in 19, followed by the latter's flight into the Empire, could not have occurred without the knowledge and approval of the Roman government and, in particular, of its representative in the area, Drusus. The Marcomannic kingdom based at Boiohaemum bordered on Raetia and Noricum. Accordingly, Drusus probably stationed himself in either or both of these districts in order, first, to conduct the Roman side, whatever it was, of Catualda's operations and, second, to "receive Maroboduus" (one of the official reasons for his ovatio in 20) when the king crossed the Danube into Noricum. In Brigantium (modern Bregenz on the Bodensee) in Raetia has been found a stone inscribed DRUSO TIB. F. CAESARI. This item, originally presumed to have been connected with the foundation of the Roman fort whose remains have been identified in Brigantium, was not found in situ. Still, it is not likely to have originated far away. One need not look, perhaps, much farther than Cambodunum, also in Raetia.

After Catualda's downfall the Romans, again under the direction of Drusus, sought to ensure the frontier's stability by arranging the formation of the so-called regnum Vannianum between the rivers Marus and Cusus on the farther bank of the Danube on the northern border of Pannonia. Drusus' activity in this area may be attested by a fragmentary inscription found at Aquincum, near the
north-eastern bend of the river. If the inscription does record his name, it would connect him with the foundation of an *ala* camp there.  

His jurisdiction may even have extended to the mouth of the Danube and, thus, to Moesia. An inscription at Ilium honours one Titus Valerius Proclus, whom it identifies as Drusus' procurator, for clearing the Hellespont of pirates.  

Thrace, not Moesia, bordered the Hellespont. At this point in history, however, Thrace was still a client kingdom, so maintenance of maritime law and order in the area may have devolved upon forces in the nearest Roman provinces, one of which was Moesia, lying north of Thrace and fronting on the Black Sea. What sort of procuratorship Proclus held or even whether he was still functioning as Drusus' procurator when he cleared the Hellespont is unknown. The fact that he rather than Drusus was honoured suggests that the latter did not travel this far. Nevertheless the extension of Drusus' authority into Moesia would not have been inconsistent with the elastic meaning given by Tacitus to *Illyricum*, noted above.  

Probably, then, at the very least, Drusus' command would have comprised Dalmatia, Pannonia, Noricum and Raetia. It may have included Moesia as well.  

The sources do not indicate in what official capacity Drusus set off for *Illyricum*. Since he was acting for Tiberius in provinces and military districts reserved for the Emperor's exclusive jurisdiction, he must, in theory, have had the status of a *legatus Augusti*. In that capacity he
would not have served merely as a provincial or district governor. It appears that the provinces and districts where he was active already had resident governors. In Dalmatia, certainly, where, according to Tacitus, Germanicus visited Drusus on his way east, Publius Cornelius Dolabella continued in charge throughout the period of Drusus' commission. Inscriptions referring to Dolabella's administration can be dated to AD 14, 16/17, 18/19, and 19/20. There is no record to indicate whether Quintus Junius Blaesus, governor of the other strictly "Illyrian" province, Pannonia, in 14, continued in that position during Drusus' presence. He was certainly in Rome in 21, but Dolabella was as well. Raetia and Noricum apparently had procurators whose names are not known. Moreover, because Drusus was active in more than one province he must have had powers superior to those of an ordinary governor since no governor would have had authority outside his own province or military district.

It seems most likely, then, that Drusus would have gone to Illyricum as a sort of super-Legate with authority granted by the Emperor greater than that of all provincial officials whom he would encounter. He would have had proconsulare imperium maius such as Germanicus was granted for his mission to the East. He would actually have had more effective power than Germanicus, for he, unlike his adoptive brother, had direct command of troops. Germanicus had been awarded the more prestigious mission but Drusus had been assigned the more important one.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. Tac. Ann. 2.43.1.


3. Tiberius' illustrious predecessors: Schrömbges, 163. For some unknown reason Tiberius declined the eastern commission and retired to virtual exile in Rhodes.: RG 27; Tac. Ann. 2.3-4; Dio 55.9.4-5; 10.18-20; Vell. Pat. 2.99.1; Suet. Tib. 10-11; see Anderson, CAH 10, 27, p. 273; Seager, 29. Tiberius' successor: Kornemann, 40-41. Mission reserved: Goodyear II, 322, on Ann. 2.43.1. Germanicus' eastern mission also worked to Tiberius' advantage, a point that he did not mention in advocating Germanicus' selection. While remaining in Rome would certainly allow Tiberius to avoid straining his aging limbs, it also left him in the Empire's centre of power where the (reputedly) immensely popular Germanicus, once out of sight, might eventually be out of mind as well (Koestermann [1957], 332). Tacitus even goes so far as to claim that Tiberius found the idea of an eastern appointment for Germanicus attractive in part because it would provide opportunities to remove the prince permanently from the scene dolo simul et casibus (Tac. Ann. 2.5.1) - although this imputation may be based on nothing more than the malice of Tacitus' pro-Julian sources. In addition, because Germanicus' mission was diplomatic rather than military, Tiberius would not have to worry about his having direct command of large bodies of troops - such as he had had in Gaul and Germany.

4. On Drusus' mission to Illyricum see Tac. Ann. 2.44.1, 46.5, 53.1.

5. Tac. Ann. 2.44.1.

6. Other allusions to drinking and brawling: see Chapter 5, pp. 130-31, 134. Anti-Claudian bias: see Chapter 1, Excursus I.

7. Vell. Pat. 2.109; Dobíáš, 158-59. Naturally, the Romans always regarded the security of Italy as a priority.

8. Koestermann (1957), 332, appropriately calls Illyricum a "Schlüsselstellung".

9. Tac. Ann. 2.44.2: sed Suebi praetendebantur auxilium adversus Cheruscos. See Goodyear II and Koestermann I, ad loc.; see 2.45; 46; 46.5. The Suebians: Tacitus first employed the term Suebi in the Germania as the collective name of a group of German tribes living east
of the Elbe, including the Hermunduri, Marcomanni, Quadi, and Semnones among others. By the time that he wrote the Annals he seems to have limited the name to the Marcomanni and Quadi (see Schönfeld, "Suebi," RE [1931] IV A.1, pp. 564-579). The Cherusci: a German tribe living around the middle Weser. They were implacable opponents of Rome in Germany during the early first century AD. Their chieftain, Arminius, led the revolt of AD 9 which resulted in the destruction of Varus' army and they defended themselves fiercely against Germanicus' punitive expeditions in 15-16, inflicting heavy losses on the Romans (see E.A. Thompson, The Early Germans [Oxford: 1965], esp. ch. 3; and Ihm, "Cherusci," RE [1899] III.2, pp. 2270-72).

10. Tiberius' refusal of Maroboduus' request; Drusus as paci firmator: Tac. Ann. 2.46.5. The manuscript tradition preserves paci not pacis firmator. Dr. A. Barrett notes that this conspicuous use of the dative may echo Anchises' endorsement of Roman imperialism in the Aeneid (6.851-53):

\[
\text{tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento}
\]
\[
\text{(hae tibi erunt artes), pacique imponere morem,}
\]
\[
\text{parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.}
\]

The allusion may indicate that Tacitus thought that Tiberius wanted Drusus to establish peace on the Roman frontier through war - in this case war among, instead of against, the Germans.


13. Vell. Pat. 2.108.2; Strabo Geog. 7.1.3.

14. Dobias, 155. Dobias, 155-56 speculates that since Augustus took care of the sons of foreign client kings and had them educated with his own grandsons, Gaius and Lucius (Suet. Aug. 48), Maroboduus may have received part of his education in this select and specially trained group.

15. Vell. Pat. 2.108.2 emphasizes the distinctive nature of Maroboduus' regime relative to normal German political organization: "... non tumultiurium neque fortuitum neque mobilem et ex voluptate parentium constantem inter suos occupavit [Maroboduus] principatum, sed certum imperium vimque regiam complexus. Dobias, 156 comments: "It was, therefore, not a mere principatus (chieftainship), such a
command as Germans normally entrusted to an able prince for a limited period (mobilis) in the hurried emergency of immediate war danger (tumultuarius)."


17. On Roman concern about Maroboduus' increasing power see Dobíaś, 158.

18. This agreement can be inferred from Maroboduus' refusals to aid the Pannonian rebels in AD 6, to join Arminius either before or after the clades Variana in 9, and to help Tiberius and Germanicus in their attempts subsequently to retrieve Roman power along the Rhine (Dobiaś, 159).

19. Arminius and Maroboduus: Dobíaś, 162. Their battle: Tac. Ann. 2.44-46; Dobíaś, 163. Consequences of their battle: Dobíaś, 163-64; see Tac. Ann. 2.46.3-5. Maroboduus' appeal to the Romans: see Goodyear II, 330: on Annals 2.44.2.

20. The perspective of Tiberius and the Romans on Germany: Timpe, 284.


22. This understanding lay behind Tiberius' explanation to Germanicus why he wanted him to leave Germany: posse et Cheruscos ceterasque rebellium gentis, quoniam Romanae ultioni consultum esse t, internis discordiis relinquui (Tac. Ann. 2.26.3).

23. Tac. Ann. 2.63.3.

24. Timpe, 279.


26. Tac. Ann. 2.62.1; see Vell. Pat. 2.129.3.

27. Furneaux, 284: note on Annals 2.46.6; Goodyear II, 330.

28. For speculation on this subject see A. Spengel, Zur Geschichte des Kaisers Tiberius, SBAW (1903), Heft 1, 39.

30. Tacitus' references: Ann. 2.53.1 and Ann. 3.9.1.


32. CIL III 14712 = ILS 7160; see Wilkes, op. cit., 82. Dolabella had held the office before Drusus. Additional possible evidence of Drusus' presence or influence along the Dalmatian coast appears farther north: a bust thought to represent him and dated between AD 18 and 19 was found before the Second World War in the sea near Osor (ancient Apsorus) on the island of Cres (Cambi, op. cit., 169-70). There is also possible evidence of Drusus' presence or influence further inland in Dalmatia. A glass phalera, a military ornament, was found at Burnum, camp of Legio XI Claudia, bearing a portrait interpreted as that of Drusus in a style dating from the years 19 to 20 (Cambi, op. cit., 170, citing Alföldi, 70). Since Tacitus says that after attending Germanicus' funeral Drusus returned Illyricos ad exercitus (Tac. Ann. 3.7.1), it would not be surprising if an ornament honouring him should turn up in a legionary camp in Dalmatia.

33. Tac. Ann. 2.62; 2.63.1.

34. CIL III 5769 = 11879.


archaeological evidence exists for the Roman military occupation of north-eastern Pannonia prior to AD 50. They would date the inscription to the reign of Vespasian. They do not, however, give as convincing a reconstruction of the inscription as Szilagyi.

37. CIG II 3612 = IGR IV 219 = EJ 227.

38. Goodyear II, 329.

39. See Castritius, 64.

40. Rogers, 120; the inscriptions: CIL III 1741 = ILS 938 in AD 14; 3198 = 10156 = ILS 5829 in 16/17; 3199 = 10157 before 18; 2908 = ILS 5829 in 19/20; see 3200 = 10158, 14712.

41. Blaesus and Dolabella: Rogers, 120; Tac. Ann. 3.47.4. Raetia and Noricum: Rogers, 120.

42. Super-Legate: Castritius, 64, concludes that Drusus must have been operating as a legatus Augusti but does not consider the magnitude of his power. Proconsulare imperium maius: Mommsen, RS II 1152, n.1; Kornemann, 41; Rogers, 120; see Timpe, 271-72. Germanicus' imperium maius: Tac. Ann. 2.43.1.

There are additional indications that Drusus held imperium proconsulare for the Illyricum mission. Tac. Ann. 3.19.3 says that he had to "resume his auspices." The right to possess auspices (ius auspiciorum) was a prerogative of holders of imperium (see Berger, s.v. auspicio). In 20 Drusus celebrated an ovation awarded for his work in Illyricum (Tac. Ann. 2.64.1, 3.19.3, 3.56.4; Inscr. Ital. 13.1.186). The right to celebrate an ovatio presupposed possession of imperium proconsulare (Syme [1979], 310-11).

It may be objected that the sources contain no express reference to an award of proconsulare imperium maius. In particular, it might seem unlikely that Tac. Ann. 2.43.1 would mention Germanicus' imperium maius but say nothing about a similar award to Drusus if it was granted at the same time (see Castritius, 64). Tacitus, however, may simply have been following the pro-Julian, anti-Claudian tradition of his sources, which would have played up Germanicus' honours and played down Drusus'.
The date of Drusus' departure from Rome for Illyricum can be placed in the fall of 17. He received his commission after Germanicus' new appointment. Germanicus' appointment in turn was made only after he had celebrated his triumph on May 26th in 17 for his efforts against the Germans. Drusus, however, anticipated his brother in setting out, for Germanicus visited him already resident in Dalmatia. The visit was made when both the Adriatic and Ionian seas had become inhospitable, probably from late fall or early winter weather. Drusus thus had almost certainly taken up his duties by late 17 or early 18.

The chronology of his activities over the next two years, 18 and 19, is bedevilled by a major problem in the Annals. Its sequence of events appears discontinuous. Having begun with the events of the year 19, Tacitus completes an account of Germanicus' trip to Egypt. He then switches to Drusus' operations, summing them up as an attempt to stir up strife among the Germans in order to complete the downfall of Maroboduus. He says, however, that these operations happened during the summer in which Germanicus was passing *plures per provincias*. This coincidence raises two difficulties. First, Tacitus' narrative for 19 indicates that Germanicus was in only two provinces, Egypt and Syria, hardly *plures*. According to the Annals, it had actually been during the previous year, 18, that Germanicus had passed
through a large number of provinces on his way to Armenia. Second, if Drusus started to execute Tiberius' strategy against the Germans only in the summer of 19, he was guilty of inactivity and neglect of duty throughout 18 and responsible for an incredible explosion of enterprise in the latter half of 19. Tacitus says that a great number of major developments took place during Drusus' mission, including the fomenting of strife among the German tribes, the rise of Catualda and his overthrow of Maroboduus, Maroboduus' flight to Italy and discussion with Tiberius of the terms of his refuge there, Catualda's reign, downfall, and exile, and the establishment of Vannius' kingdom, all of which, according to the standard reading of Tacitus' text, would have begun only in the summer of 19 and ended early in 20. The problem does not stop here. Later, having completed his narration of Drusus' settlement of the "German problem", Tacitus (again, according to the standard interpretation of his text) asserts that the news of Germanicus' establishment of Artaxias as king of the Armenians reached the Senate at the same time as the news of Drusus' settlement of the Danube frontier. The latter achievement, in the light of the apparent sequence of events in the Annals, could only have been completed by late summer in 19 at the earliest. Yet Tacitus has earlier recorded Germanicus' crowning of Artaxias among the events for the year 18, probably in the summer of that year. The news from Armenia, then, would have taken at least a year to reach Rome. Such tardiness is difficult to explain.
The problem, however, is not beyond resolution. It is possible that Tacitus, in order to present coherently and effectively the roughly contemporary experiences of Germanicus and Drusus in the years 18 and 19, in other words, with due regard for the requirements of narrative art, decided to separate them and to complete the theme of Germanicus' travels and achievements in the East before turning to the theme of Drusus' mission in Illyricum. Unfortunately, he would have neglected to acknowledge that he was doing so. The summer to which he connected the beginning of his Drusus narrative would thus belong to the year 18, not 19. This reading of the text would remove the awkward problem of explaining Drusus' apparent inactivity during 18 by placing the overthrow of Maroboduus in that year. It would also eliminate the difficulty noted about Tacitus' claim that the news of both Germanicus' settlement in Armenia and Drusus' success against Maroboduus reached Rome at the same time. If both achievements took place in 18, it is entirely credible that reports of them could have reached Rome at the same time. In addition, the credibility of what Tacitus says actually took place during Drusus' mission would be much enhanced. Two years, 18 and 19, instead of little more than six months would be available for the wide range of developments initiated by him. The suggested thematic, non-chronological construction makes sense of Tacitus' narrative and should, then, be preferred in this instance to the standard chronological reading.
Tiberius, according to Tacitus, had sent Drusus to be paci firmator in Illyricum and would undoubtedly have impressed upon him the principle that he had expounded to Germanicus, that more was to be accomplished among the Germans by consilium than by vis. Nevertheless, Drusus would have had to keep substantial military force close to him for a number of reasons. He had, first of all, to impress upon the barbarians that he was dealing from strength, and to dissuade them from making any intrusions into Roman territory to counteract his influence across the Danube. In addition, the strategically important location of Illyricum on the eastern and northern approaches to Italy made the maintenance of its security absolutely essential, and that, too, would have required a substantial military force. Furthermore, because Illyricum had been only recently subdued, the last flames of the Pannonian revolt having died down in AD 9, strong military pressure had to be applied to ensure that the area stayed pacified. Moreover, because the absorption of Illyricum into the Empire had been accomplished mainly by brute military force - and recent military force at that - the Roman presence and infrastructure in the area were, of necessity, predominantly military. The military character of Drusus' mission is confirmed by evidence. First, he won a minor triumph, an ovatio, for his successes against Maroboduus and the Germans. For all its inferiority to a full triumph, the actions that it honoured still had to have a large military component. Second, Tacitus reports that
when the official period of mourning for Germanicus ended in AD 20 Drusus returned *Illyricos ad exercitus*. Third, in requesting the Senate to grant tribuniciian power to his son in 22, Tiberius, according to Tacitus, referred to Drusus' *bellis compositis* as an eminent qualification.\(^8\) Even in so remote and apparently insignificant a corner of Dalmatia as the island of Issa his presence or influence is linked with military concerns: the inscription discovered there records his dedication of a military parade ground.\(^9\)

In *Illyricum* "proper", Pannonia and Dalmatia, Drusus would have had command of five legions: in Pannonia, VIII Augusta, IX Hispana, and XV Apollinaris, whose men would all have been familiar with him from their disagreeable encounter in the mutiny of AD 14, and, in Dalmatia, VII Claudia and XI Claudia. His auxiliary troops cannot be identified.\(^10\)

With only a few exceptions, the places where Drusus was active cannot be certainly located. He must have been using military communications and staying in army bases if for no other reason than that, beyond the Dalmatian coast, nothing else was available. Aquincum on the Danube, where a stone fortress is *possibly* to be dated to the period of Drusus' presence, might have served as a temporary residence.\(^11\) Another possibility would have been Carnuntum, also on the Danube to the west, which faced Maroboduus' kingdom in Boiohaemum, and which Tiberius had selected as a base for the invasion of the kingdom in AD 6. Carnuntum became the base of Legio XV Apollinaris, although when the
legion actually moved there is not known. The earliest datable evidence linking the two falls in the reign of Claudius. It is likely, however, that Drusus established the legion there as early as AD 17 or 18, or even 14. Even though he was not leading an invasion force, he would have found Carnuntum's location as useful for his plans concerning Maroboduus as Tiberius had for his. In Dalmatia VII Claudia was based near Gardun and XI Claudia at Burnum. When Germanicus visited Drusus in Dalmatia in late 17 he may well have found him in one of these legionary camps. At the times when Drusus was not residing in the Dalmatian bases he was probably living in the provincial capital, Salona, near the coast where, as noted earlier, he became a quattuorvir quinquennalis. Salona became a major military communications centre during his mission.

Military considerations probably motivated Drusus to continue his father's policy of road-building and upgrading in Illyricum. The more strategically important, rugged, and potentially hostile an area, such as Dalmatia and Pannonia, the greater is the need for good communications. In particular, in order to secure the Empire's northern borders and to stir up trouble among the Germans, Drusus would have had to have easy and rapid access to the Danube frontier. His presence furnishes the best context for the construction of at least part of the road from Aquileia to Carnuntum. Moreover, during his commission several roads were probably built from Salona to the River Save, including
two that can be dated to the years 19—20. Drusus' concern with communications between the Adriatic and the Danube confirms his policy of forward defence.

The members of Drusus' staff and retinue, apart from Dolabella in Dalmatia and Proclus on the Hellespont, cannot be identified. It is possible, however, that T. Rlius Crispinus, referred to in an inscription, served as his staff orderly. He must also have had the companionship of his wife, Livilla, for at least part of his mission. In 21, after his return to Rome, he spoke against a motion before the Senate to ban the accompaniment of provincial governors by their wives. He referred to his service in Illyricum and added that he would travel abroad again only reluctantly without Livilla by his side, clearly implying that she had accompanied him to Illyricum. Germanicus, of course, visited him briefly in late 17 or early 18 on his way to the East. None of his other contacts are known.

Although he describes Drusus' operations with extreme brevity Tacitus nevertheless does not fail to acknowledge his high ambition and earnestness — and the importance of his task. Drusus' aim was twofold: to eliminate the Germans as a threat to the Empire's northern frontiers by setting them against each other and to neutralize potentially the most dangerous German power of all, Maroboduus and his kingdom. His two goals were integrally related. Maroboduus was to be removed by means of inter-German discordiae. Surprisingly the discordia to be employed to complete the
king's downfall was not the one that had begun it. It appears that Arminius, although he had worsted Maroboduus in battle and drained away his subjects and allies to the point where the latter felt desperate enough to appeal to Rome, had failed to topple him and now declined or was unable to take part, directly at any rate, in his overthrow. Perhaps Tiberius and Drusus, never losing sight of their principal objective, the destruction of Maroboduus, had also decided to prevent Arminius from becoming too strong and undermined his fragile alliance through intrigue, or preoccupied him with other German enemies. More likely, one suspects, the dissipation of Maroboduus' power had correspondingly weakened the tribesmen's willingness to obey Arminius, just as Tiberius would have predicted.

According to Tacitus, the overthrow of Maroboduus was accomplished through someone else: Catualda. He was a *nobilis iuvenis*, presumably a chieftain's son, belonging to the Goths, a German tribe which had been made subject to, or brought into some sort of subordinate association with, Maroboduus and the Marcomanni. Apparently Catualda, like many other German tribesmen, had not relished Maroboduus' unGermanic overlordship, and had got into some sort of altercation that resulted in his becoming a *profugus* on Maroboduus' orders. Learning of Maroboduus' deteriorating military and political situation, he decided to strike back at his enemy. Having managed to assemble a sizeable force, he invaded Boiohaemum where, if he had not already done so,
he suborned the local chieftains who were probably not averse anyway to the idea of breaking up Maroboduus' regime. Catualda then struck at the heart of the king's power by seizing the royal court and adjoining fortress. Their strategic importance was reflected in and, no doubt in Catualda's view, enhanced by their contents and inhabitants: the royal treasure and the Roman merchants active in the kingdom, presumably with most of their wealth intact. For his part Maroboduus, with the props of his power kicked away, had no choice but to quit his kingdom post-haste.  

So far the story of Maroboduus' overthrow is fairly clear. It becomes much more obscure, however, when analysed in the context of Roman policy. Velleius states explicitly that it was Tiberius who, by the power of his consilia, employing Drusus as his minister et adiutor, was able to force the German king out of his realm, but does not explain how, exactly, this happened. That Catualda had some sort of connection with the Romans seems to follow from the coincidence of his rebellion with Drusus' presence across the Danube and deliberate policy of setting the Germans against each other in order to complete Maroboduus' downfall. Moreover Tiberius could hardly have boasted about suaque in destruendo eo consilia after Maroboduus' ouster unless his consilia had some sort of link, direct or indirect, with Catualda's activities. In addition, the grant of asylum in the Empire made to Catualda when he was in turn overthrown may indicate that he had an established relationship with the
Romans. Beyond these tantalizing intimations, however, the actual nature and extent of the relations between Catualda and the Roman government, and in particular the nature and extent of the contacts between Catualda and Drusus, of Drusus' direction of strategy and tactics, and of the physical, moral, and financial support that he may have given Catualda cannot be discerned.

Paradoxically, although the Romans had turned down his request for help against Arminius and had actively intrigued against him, it was to the Empire that Maroboduus turned upon his expulsion. From Velleius' claim that Tiberius, through Drusus' agency, compelled Maroboduus, "like a snake hidden in the ground," to come out of his kingdom *salubribus consiliorum suorum medicamentis*, it can be inferred that the pair had set themselves the specific goal of drawing him out of his capital in Boiohaemum and across the Danube. Perhaps Drusus had offered the Empire as a potential asylum even before his expulsion. How exactly he could have persuaded Maroboduus to choose that option, however, remains a mystery. Perhaps his memory of the good treatment he had received as a youth in Rome made the Empire an attractive prospect for refuge, even though the Empire had helped to bring about his need to seek it.

His immigration would have appealed to Drusus and Tiberius. They would then have their formidable foe under their power where they could watch him while he, separated from his people, would be powerless. He would also offer, as
it were, a potentially useful weapon in the Emperor's diplomatic arsenal. Should matters in Germany begin to evolve unfavourably for the Romans once again, Maroboduus could be sent back over the Danube to galvanize once more the partisans he had left behind. Even the threat of his return would force his former subjects, the Suebians, to pay attention to Roman interests.24

Maroboduus crossed the Danube into Noricum. It may be inferred from one of the official reasons for Drusus' ovatio, ob receptum Maroboduum, that Drusus personally received him. He did not arrest him but treated him with dignity and magnanimity appropriate for so important - and politically valuable - a personage. He allowed him to write a personal letter to Tiberius and to await his reply and terms for residing in the Empire. It was eventually arranged that he should live in Ravenna which afforded the double advantage of keeping him well away from the German frontier, where he could cause problems, and well within the Emperor's control.25

There can be no doubt that in executing the plot against Maroboduus, however it was woven, Drusus had pulled off a major coup, one that was all the more praiseworthy in that it had been accomplished by consilia, without the force of arms - and the enormous expenditure in blood and money that would have gone with it. The objective that Tiberius had first concentrated on in AD 6 had finally been achieved. His crowing over the accomplishment before the Senate is thus
entirely understandable - and justifiable. That he did not mention his son's role in the operation would not really have detracted from it. The plan was undoubtedly Tiberius' in essence but everyone would have recognized that Drusus, as his father's chief agent, was indispensable to its successful execution and worthy of praise in his own right. If there was any ignorance or doubt on that score, it was removed by the Senate's award to Drusus of an ovation equal in magnitude to that of Germanicus for his accomplishments in the East.\textsuperscript{26}

Ovations were granted in both cases rather than full triumphs probably because their successes, while substantial, had not been purely military. Nevertheless, their importance was confirmed by the construction of two arches, one bearing an effigy of Germanicus, the other an effigy of Drusus, on either side of the temple of Mars Ultor in the Forum Augusti. The location was meant to suggest an association with imperial Rome's outstanding military achievements including, for instance, Augustus' "triumph" over the Parthians, from which the \textit{signa recepta} were stored in the temple of Mars Ultor.\textsuperscript{27} Tiberius rejoiced in the knowledge that his two sons had proved the worth of the principle he had propounded to Germanicus in 16: more was to be accomplished \textit{consilio quam vi}. Tiberius, says Tacitus, was happier to have established peace through \textit{sapientia} than to have finished a war through hard fighting.\textsuperscript{28} His approval was reflected in the distinguished commemorations of Drusus' and Germanicus' successes.
The contemporary award of ovations and monuments to Drusus and Germanicus served as well to demonstrate officially that Tiberius was adhering to Augustus' plan, initiated at least as early as the adoptions of AD 4, of maintaining both young men as potential successors to the principate. There could be no doubt about Germanicus' precedence - he was, after all, consul in 18 and had the more prestigious command in the East - but, otherwise, the two were always officially to be presented as closely linked together. Apart from the significant example of the two arches by the temple of Mars Ultor no evidence survives in Rome itself to confirm the continued close, official pairing of Tiberius' sons at this time, but a number of inscriptions bearing joint dedications for their statues indicate that this view of the succession was held in Italy and the provinces. These monuments, all dated between AD 14 and 19, have been found in Forum Clodii in Etruria, Mediolanum Santonum in Aquitania, Olympia in Achaea, and Apollonia in Macedonia. Even the formats of the dedications were carefully designed to show the official association and, sometimes, even the ranking of Drusus and Germanicus. For example, the inscriptions for the statues from Aquitania, which appear in a group of three, record the honours and offices of the three top men of the Empire and symbolize in their layout the imperial hierarchy. In the centre are described the name and honours of Tiberius, the Emperor, and on either side those of his two sons and successors: on his
right (the reader's left), Germanicus, on his left (the reader's right) Drusus. Each of the three memorials occupies about the same area and the flanking inscriptions for Drusus and Germanicus create an impression of perfect symmetry. Such configurations conform to earlier provincial practice, including Drusus' and Germanicus' association with the cult of the Dioscuri.

It seems likely that Drusus' successful resolution of the Maroboduus problem actually provided only one reason for his ovatio. Tacitus makes two references to the honour: the first in connection with the announcement of Germanicus' settlement of Armenia in 18, and the second in connection with Drusus' return to Rome in 20. The first reference is also connected with Tiberius' elated speech in which only the discomfiture of Maroboduus is mentioned. The second reference mentions not just the primary grounds for the ovatio, ob receptum Maroboduum, but also an additional reason, et [ob] res priore aestate gestas. From these formulations it may be inferred that Drusus would have been initially awarded the ovatio in 18 solely for bringing about the overthrow and de facto capture of Maroboduus. Since, however, his mission in Illyricum continued, the ovatio would have been deferred until such time as he should return to Rome. In the meantime, in 19 and early 20, he would have completed the settlement of the Danube frontier, involving the dethronement and exile of Catualda and the establishment of Vannius' kingdom. These latter successes would have
been considered impressive enough to constitute additional grounds for Drusus' deferred ovatio. Though Drusus had won, in effect, two major "victories", the Emperor and Senate would have awarded him only one ovatio because both achievements were integrally related and directed to the same end.

The final settlement along the Danube did offer worthy additional grounds for Drusus' ovatio. For simply removing Maroboduus from his kingdom and bringing him into the Empire and, thus, under Roman control, did not complete the task that the Emperor had given Drusus. The replacement of Maroboduus by Catualda probably had the advantage, from the Roman point of view, of weakening the Marcomannic state. Presumably one of the ways in which Catualda would have seduced Maroboduus' subject chieftains (whom Tacitus calls corrupti primores) would have been to appeal to their dislike of Maroboduus' political power, transgressing as it did German political traditions. One would expect, then, that Catualda's replacement-regime would have effected some loosening of political ties and reduction of power in the king's hands. The Marcomannic kingdom remained, however, intact - and a potential threat to the Empire. Only if it were eliminated could Drusus genuinely be designated paci firmator of the Danube frontier. The elimination of the kingdom necessarily involved the removal in turn of Catualda. Having helped to oust one king, Drusus now had to work for the expulsion of another.
The nature and extent of his involvement in the removal of Catualda are no clearer than in the overthrow of Maroboduus. As in Maroboduus' case he appears to have employed the agency of other Germans. Catualda's nemesis proved to be Vibilius, the chieftain of the Hermunduri, like the Marcomanni a Suebic tribe but living in an area to the west of Boiohaemum and north of Raetia. Coincidentally, the Romans had better relations with the Hermunduri than with any other German tribe and allowed them unimpeded passage over the Danube into Raetia and unrestricted interaction and commerce with the local provincials. It probably would not have been difficult, then, for Drusus to encourage the Hermunduri to move against Catualda. Whatever he did, the operation proved highly successful. Catualda was indeed overthrown and the power of the Marcomannic kingdom was shattered for good.

Drusus proceeded to tie up all loose ends. Catualda, whether he had personally become a threat to Rome or not, was effectively neutralized like Maroboduus before him: he, too, accepted asylum in the Empire. So that he and Maroboduus would not have occasion to open old wounds, Tiberius ensured that they were well separated. Catualda was assigned a place in Forum Julii in Narbonese Gaul, on the other side of the Alps from Maroboduus' residence in Ravenna. The numerous German retainers of the two deposed kings presented another problem. They wanted to follow their leaders into the Empire but the Romans had good cause to fear that they, with their
large numbers, might cause havoc among the provincial populations. Drusus, doubtless acting at least in part on Tiberius' instructions, resolved the dilemma economically and advantageously by resettling the two groups together on the north bank of the Danube between the tributaries, Marus and Cusus, under a new king named Vannius. The regnum Vannianum completed Drusus' pacification of the German frontier.

The historical record is deficient in significant details about the constitution of the new kingdom. Once again it reveals little about Drusus' involvement. It does not disclose who the original inhabitants were or how they were displaced. Moreover it does not show how the partisans of Maroboduus and Catualda, presumably mortal enemies, were reconciled. Drusus may have relied on their Suebic race and previous association with the kingdom in Boiohaemum to provide sufficient common ground to unite them. He may have selected Vannius to the same end. As a chief of the Quadi, a semi-Suebic tribe, he would have shared a certain tribal identity with the partisans of both sides while, as neither a Goth, Marcoman, nor Hermundur, he would not himself have been tainted with partisanship. With these advantages he could well have served as a focus of unity, or at least of a truce, for his divided subjects. Little else can be inferred about the establishment of the regnum Vannianum.

However Drusus set it up, the new kingdom had some obvious advantages for the Romans. First, it provided them
with at least one friendly state on their northern frontiers. It was much smaller than the old kingdom in Boiohaemum and much more accessible — and thus much weaker and less of a potential threat to the Empire. It was not, in fact, likely to prove a nuisance to the Romans under any foreseeable circumstances. However reconciled the former adversaries had become under their new king, their artificial union would have retained a fissile potential that the Romans would be able to exploit should the need arise. That their former kings could be represented, from one point of view, as hostages in Roman hands would also have served to restrain the tribesmen from hostile activity. Moreover, since Vannius was a client king, belonging to the class described by Tacitus in the *Germania* as holding their power *ex auctoritate Romana*, supported mainly by Roman money, he would have been malleable to the Roman will and easily brought to heel.

Second, the *regnum Vannianum* had great strategic importance. By establishing a friendly kingdom with a semi-dependent king in German territory on the central Danube frontier, the Romans had fashioned for themselves a valuable buffer state in a turbulent key area. The *regnum Vannianum* had been cleverly conceived and constituted. 38

The actual date by which Drusus' assignment in Illyricum came to an end cannot be discerned. It is known that he returned to Italy briefly near the beginning of 20, but only in order to attend Germanicus' funeral, not to abandon his mission abroad. For he went back to Illyricum as
soon as the *iustitium* for Germanicus' death had ended, probably in late March.\(^{39}\) He reappeared in Rome, however, in time for Piso's trial which must have occurred some time before May 28th, since Drusus celebrated his *ovatio* on that day only after Piso's trial and death and the winding up of related matters, all of which would have taken about three weeks.\(^{40}\) Accordingly, Drusus would have been back in Rome by the first or the beginning of the second week of May at the latest.

His final duties in Illyricum must have been important. Only an occasion of state as grave as Germanicus' funeral could interrupt them. His subsequent return to Illyricum over so great a distance for so short a period of time—probably, including travelling time, not much more than a month (from late March, early April to early May)—indicates that he still had business deemed absolutely essential for completion. What that business was can only be conjectured. It is not likely to have been the establishment of the *regnum Vannianum*.\(^ {41}\) A better *prima facie* case can be made for dating this disposition to 19. A major achievement in its own right, of obviously crucial importance for future developments along the Danube frontier, and the final seal as it were on Drusus' grand scheme to neutralize all German threats to the Empire, establishment of the *regnum Vannianum* surely deserved to provide one of the grounds for Drusus' *ovatio*. If so it would have been included in the *res priore aestate gestas* and, thus, have been completed in 19.
Moreover, so important and enormous an undertaking must have required more than a month to complete. Perhaps Tiberius and Drusus merely wanted to ensure that their settlement along the Danube was going to last. Tiberius may have sent Drusus back to the area to supervise early developments in the new arrangement, initially intending him to remain long enough to guarantee success, but then, confronted by Piso's trial and believing its outcome to be of crucial gravity for the imperial family and, in particular, for the Emperor and his heir, he may have ordered Drusus to cut short his activities and get back to Rome as soon as possible. After the relatively peaceful resolution of Piso's trial and related matters the situation on the Danube may have appeared stable enough to make Drusus' return there unnecessary. The matter, however, remains obscure.

The end of Drusus' responsibilities for Illyricum and the Danube frontier seems to have been marked appropriately by his ovatio, the official seal of approval, as it were, for his services to Rome. It was the only triumph he ever celebrated. It was well deserved. Tiberius may have been responsible for general objectives and strategies, but it was Drusus who carried them out - and as successfully as he had quelled the Pannonian mutiny. His methods may have been more diplomatic than military, involving, no doubt, intrigue and bribery, but they worked. Maroboduus' kingdom had amassed and organized power so potentially dangerous to Roman interests that it had alarmed both Augustus and Tiberius.
Within the space of two to two and a half years Drusus had achieved the destruction of that power. Arminius himself, lacking a firm power base now that the withdrawal of the Romans had removed all incentive for his fractious countrymen to unite, was cut down by the treachery of his own kinsmen when he tried to re-assert his supremacy. In addition, a buffer state under Vannius, a client king, had been set up on the central Danube frontier and would be able to provide a bridgehead into the heart of Magna Germania should Rome ever wish to intervene more deeply in German affairs. Vannius' rule was to last in fact till AD 50 when, having lost his popularity because of his tyrannical behaviour, he was unable to withstand an insurrection led by his nephews, Vangio and Sido, supported by Catualda's old nemesis, Vibilius, king of the Hermunduri. Nevertheless, even then the regnum Vannianum was not lost to Roman interests: Vangio and Sido divided the kingdom between them but otherwise remained friendly to Rome. Vannius, like Maroboduus and Catualda before him, was able to take the escape route into the Empire no doubt promised him by Tiberius and Drusus when they first set him up. In fact, after Drusus' settlement of the Danube frontier another fifty years were to pass before Rome experienced any serious trouble from German tribes. Events, thus, conclusively demonstrated the superiority of Tiberius' and Drusus' approach to that of Germanicus for controlling the Germans to the benefit of the Empire. Drusus had been able to achieve at a much lower cost what Germanicus had not.
not have been a glorious Achilles, but he had proved himself an able Odysseus and, if the value of action is to be measured by results as much as by means, he had more than earned his ovatio.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 7


5. Moreover, the point of coincidence might not have belonged to the two pieces of news at all, but to decrees of the Senate. In the sentence, simul nuntiato regem Artaxian Armeniis a Germanico datum decrevere patres, ut Germanicus atque Drusus ovantes urbem introirent, there is no grammatical necessity for simul to qualify nuntiato rather than decrevere: the point of the latter usage would be to emphasize the close, complementary relationship and importance of Drusus and Germanicus in the state, and, in the art of the Annals, the fusion and completion of their stories.


7. Other passages in the Annals offer evidence that Tacitus could shift from a chronological to a thematic development of his narrative without adequately indicating the change. One possibility has already been noted in his sequencing of events at the end of Augustus' reign and at the beginning of Tiberius' (see Chapter 4, pp. 115-17). After describing the events of AD 19 Tacitus ends Book 2 of the Annals with a description of Arminius' downfall and death in 21. He then begins Book 3 with the events of the year 20. Tac. Hist. II.54 switches back to the events of 69 after relating matters belonging to 70 (Wellesley, 28-29). For a detailed study of Tacitus' departures from strict chronological sequencing in favour of thematic development see F. Graf, Untersuchungen über die Komposition der Annalen des Tacitus (Thun: 1929).
8. Accustoming Drusus to the army: Tac. Ann. 2.44.1.
Drusus' return Illyricos ad exercitus: 3.7.1.
Qualification for the tribunician power: 3.56.4.

9. See Chapter 6, p. 163 and footnote 31 above.

10. Legions: Tac. Ann. 1.23.6; Ritterling, "Legio (VII Claudia)," RE (1925) 12.2, 1617, "Legio (XI Claudia)," 1691; Rogers, 121. Auxiliaries: Rogers, 121.


12. Drusus, Carnuntum, and Legio XV Apollinaris: see
Kubitschek, "Carnuntum," RE (1899) 3.2, 1601; Mócsy, 43;
and Ritterling, "Legio (XV Apollinaris)," RE (1925) 12.2, 1749.

13. Dalmatian legionary bases: Rogers, 119; see H.M.D.
Parker, The Roman Legions (Oxford: 1928), 123, and R.
Syme, CAH 10, 804, note 1. Tac. Ann. 3.7.1 indicates a
close connection between Drusus' mission and the "armies
of Illyricum." Germanicus' visit to Drusus: Tac. Ann.
2.53.1.

14. Drusus as quattuorvir in Salona: CIL VI, 14712 = ILS
7160; see Wilkes, op. cit., 82; see Chapter 6, p. 163 and
footnote 32. Salona as communications centre: Mócsy,
44-45.

15. It was this very activity in which the Pannonian legions
had been engaged in 14 when they mutinied (Tac. Ann.
1.20).

16. See G. Alfoldy, "Eine Römische Strassenbauinschrift aus
Salona," Acta Arch. 16 (1964): 247-55. For dating see
CIL III 3201 = 10159 = ILS 5829a and CIL III 3198b =
10156b = ILS 5829. See also Mócsy, 44-45, who claims
that a road was built as well from Salona to Sirmium in
19-20, but gives no evidence. See also CIL III 3200 =
ILS 2478. Road and bridge building between Aquileia and
Carnuntum had been going on from at least AD 14: see
Tac. Ann. 1.20.1.

17. CIL IX 4121; Rogers, 123.

18. Tac. Ann. 3.34.13; see Rogers, 119.

iniciens Germanos ad discordias utque fracto iam
Maroboduuo usque in exitium insisteretur.


23. Maroboduus turns to the Romans: Tac. Ann. 2.63.1. salubribus...medicamentis: Vell. Pat. 2.129.3.


27. The arches: Tac. Ann. 2.64.1; CIL VI 911. The arches may also have borne, less prominently, portraits of other members of the imperial family (Goodyear II, 400). The temple of Mars Ultor had been initially constructed by Augustus to commemorate the avenging of Julius Caesar and then appropriated as a location for the Senate to consider wars and triumphs, for the escort of new governors being sent out to their provinces with imperium, and for the reception of returning victors and the tokens of their triumphs. (Suet. Aug. 29; see Furneaux, 360; Platner-Ashby, 220-23). The Fasti Ostienses indicate that Drusus' arch was dedicated on February 26th, AD 30: CIL XIV, 4533-34; Rogers, Studies, 123. Augustus' triumph and the signa recepta: Timpe, 274.


29. The inscriptions: (1) Forum Clodii: CIL XI 3308. (2) Mediolanum Santonum: CIL XIII 1036. (3) Olympia: Olympia V 372; this inscription was associated with portraits of Drusus and Germanicus in a quadriga (see M. Stuart, "How Were Imperial Portraits Distributed Throughout the Roman Empire?" AJA 43 [1939]: 604). (4) Apollonia: MAMA iv, 143; their joint portrait here was set up with individual portraits of other members of the imperial family: Divus Augustus, Livia, Tiberius, and Drusus senior.


31. The official pairing of Drusus and Germanicus may explain the apparently synchronous reporting in Rome of Drusus' and Germanicus' achievements referred to by Tacitus at Annals 2.64.1: Simul nuntiato regem Artaxian Armeniis a Germanico datum decrevere patres, ut Germanicus atque Drusus ovantes urbem introirent. By nuntiato Tacitus
might mean "officially announced," i.e. to the Roman public, the news itself having been received by the Senate much earlier but deliberately held back from official publication in order to allow the awards of ovations to Drusus and Germanicus to coincide in conformity with the official policy of pairing the brothers as much as possible. See footnote 5 above.

32. First reference: Tac. Ann. 2.64.1; second reference: 3.11.1; Tiberius' speech: 2.63.3.

33. See pp. 187-88 above.

34. Tac. Ann. 2.62.2.

35. Ibid., 2.63.5; on the Hermunduri see Tac. Germ. 41; Ann. 12.29-30; 13.57; Strabo 7.13; Vell. Pat. 2.106.2; Pliny NH 4.100; Dio 55.10a.2; Haug, "Hermunduri," RE (1912) 8, 906-8; Schmidt, Germania 23 (1930): 622-9; Koestermann I, 375; Goodyear II, 399.

36. Tiberius' and Drusus' dispositions involving Catualda and the regnum Vannianum: Tac. Ann. 2.63.5-6.

37. On the Quadi see Tac. Germ. 42-43.1; Strabo Geog. 7.1.3; Goessler, "Quadi," RE (1963) 24, 623-47; and Goodyear II, 399.


39. Drusus' attendance at Germanicus' funeral: Tac. Ann. 3.2.3. His return to Illyricum: 3.7.1. In the Annals a speech by Tiberius heralds the end of the iustitium for Germanicus' death and funeral. Tiberius concludes his speech, in essence an exhortation to the Roman people to moderate their excessive grief, with the following behests: proin repeterent sollemnia, et quia ludorum Megalesium spectaculum suberat, etiam voluptates resumerent (Ann. 3.6.3). Immediately following, Tacitus writes, Tum exuto iustitio reditum ad munia, et Drusus Illyricos ad exercitus profectus est, ... (Ann. 3.7.1.). Now since the Megalesian Games were celebrated from April 4th to 10th (H.H. Scullard, Festivals and Ceremonies of the Roman Republic [Ithaca, New York: 1981], 97-100; 101; see Ov. Fast. 4.179-82), Tiberius' speech and, thus, the end of the iustitium, can be dated to the latter half of March, AD 20, - assuming that Tiberius - or Tacitus - was not using the verb "subesse" loosely. Drusus, then, must have set off for Illyricum in late March at the earliest.
40. Piso's trial: Tac. Ann. 3.11.1. Date of the ovatio:

fasti Ost., Ital. Inscr. 13,1,186-216 = CIL XIV 244.

Sequence of events: in his narrative, Tacitus places Drusus' celebration of his ovatio (Ann. 3.19.3) after the state's inquiry into Germanicus' death: is finis fuit ulciscenda Germanici morte (Ann. 3.19.2). The natural inference here is that the ovatio followed chronologically the winding up of "Germanicus' case". The argument can be made that the reader should never assume a chronological sequence in the Annals unless Tacitus makes it explicit (e.g. with the use of temporal adverbs like deinde or deinceps). Even so, however, the natural sense of chapter 19 requires that, if the ovatio did not occur after the conclusion of Germanicus' case, it must have happened very near its end. Rogers, 124, footnote, suggests a plausible time-table for the case and the ovatio: "The following chronological data are clear: on one day the senatorial court convened and was charged by Tiberius (Tac. Ann. 3.12.1). The prosecution had two days to present its case and, after an interval of six days, the defense three (3.13.1). There was a comperendinatio (3.15.4, redintegratamque accusationem). The prosecution occupied another day (3.15.4-5). The next day Piso was found dead by suicide (3.15.6). A day (perhaps the same one seems to have been devoted to Tiberius' questioning of Marcus Piso, the reading of Piso's last protestations of innocence and the exoneration of his son Marcus [3.16.3-17.1]). The defense of Plancina took another two days (3.17.6). At least a day must have been consumed in the debate on motions for sentence (3.17.8-18.5). An interval of a few days (3.19.1) followed before Tiberius rewarded the prosecutors with priesthoods. The case had thus taken almost three weeks. Drusus then left the capital to recover his auspices and presently (mox) re-entered in ovation - 28 May (3.19.4)."

41. cf. Timpe, 280, footnote 55, who argues that the month was taken up with the establishment of the regnum Vannianum.

42. Tac. Ann. 3.19.3. The actual celebration involved a rather circuitous ritual in which Drusus had first to leave the city repetendis auspiciis in order to re-enter it ovans. The practice had its origin in republican constitutional law. A commander who crossed the pomerium into Rome had to give up his imperium with its attendant right of taking auspices (called the ius auspiciorum) for so long as he remained within the city. But only a commander who possessed imperium and auspicia could celebrate a triumph or ovation. Accordingly, in order to enter Rome ovans he would first have to leave the city to recover his imperium and auspicia. See Mommsen, RS (3rd ed.) I, 99-100; Wissowa, "Auspicium," RE (1896) 2.2,
2580-87, esp. 2582,83,87; Furneaux, \textit{ad loc.}, 414, and Koestermann I, \textit{ad loc.}, 453.

43. See Rogers, 22-123.


45. Charlesworth, \textit{CAH} 10, 619; see Rogers, 122, Schrömgbges, 165, Timpe, 280.

46. Timpe, 274.
CHAPTER 8: DRUSUS AND THE DEATH OF GERMANICUS

After Germanicus' visit to Drusus in Dalmatia late in 17 the two men did not, as far as is known, ever meet again. Germanicus died in Syria on October 10th, 19. Drusus acted with appropriate recognition of the gravity of the loss to the principate and with grief consistent with the excellent relations that he and Germanicus had enjoyed. He interrupted his mission in Illyricum in order to participate in the last stages of the procession carrying Germanicus' ashes to Rome. With Claudius and those children of Germanicus who had been left in Rome, he met the procession at Tarracina, formerly Anxur, on the Appian Way, some sixty miles south-east of Rome, and presumably (although Tacitus does not expressly say so) accompanied the cortege for the rest of the way to the city. None of the main sources indicates how Drusus further participated in Germanicus' funeral, but an inscription does survive of the senatus consultum on memorial honours in which provision is made for the inscription in bronze of a libellus read by Drusus in the Senate, consisting probably of a eulogy of Germanicus. It seems that Drusus had been given a duty similar to those accorded him after Augustus' death, when he had read out in the Senate various testamentary documents and eulogized the Emperor from the old rostra. From the same inscription it appears that Drusus, along with Tiberius, Livia, and Agrippina, had also played a prominent role in choosing appropriate honours for Germanicus from suggestions
made by the Senate. Drusus further showed his piety and deep respect for his brother by deferring his return to Illyricum till the justitium of mourning had ended. He revealed his grief as well on a more personal, emotional level. In addressing the Senate at the beginning of Piso's trial, Tiberius referred to the Drusi lacrimas shed for Germanicus. 5

According to Tacitus, however, Drusus' piety did not impress the Roman public. Germanicus (and this feeling was shared by his wife and friends) had believed that his last illness was due to poison and black magic sent against him from a distance by the Syrian legate, Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, and his wife, Plancina. He may, of course, have died from natural causes, but, according to the pro-Germanicus tradition accepted by Tacitus, the opinion of his family and supporters gained wide support among the Roman public. Consequently the Emperor, generally considered Piso's principal, garnered suspicion from all quarters. Inevitably Drusus also became tainted simply because he was his father's natural son. Tiberius, in addressing the Senate, referred openly to accusations made against himself and, apparently, Drusus as well. 6 The Emperor and his son could not mollify adverse public opinion. Although honours were showered upon Germanicus, recalling those accorded the dead Marcellus, Gaius, and even Augustus, according to Tacitus neither Tiberius nor Drusus was felt to have done enough. In particular, Tiberius' absence from the funeral and Drusus' attendance upon the cortege were unfavourably compared with
the solicitude shown by Augustus for the corpse of
Germanicus' father, Nero Drusus, in 9 BC. Augustus had gone
all the way to Ticinum, just below the Alps, to accompany the
cortege on its way from Germany to Rome. Drusus had gone
only as far as Tarracina, just south of Rome, to meet the
procession bearing Germanicus' ashes.7

If the Roman public really did feel resentment over
Germanicus' funeral, it was unjustified. He had already
received many last rites in Syria where his body had been
cremated. His ashes after all, not his body, were being
transported. Furthermore, Drusus had in fact marched all the
way from Illyricum, not just Rome, to meet the procession.
Moreover, Tiberius had a personal aversion to all forms of
immoderate behaviour in which all perspective and sense of
proportion were likely to be lost, as he himself tried to
make clear to the Roman commons.8 The public's disapproval
might be explained by distortion of its judgment resulting
from immoderate grief and suspicion. One cannot help but
suspect, however, that the pro-Germanicus, anti-Claudian bias
of the source tradition is manifesting itself here. The
cavilling, coupled with the vicious allegations that Tiberius
and Livia secretly experienced joy at Germanicus' death, have
all the appearance of pure partisan spite. Of course, if
Tiberius and Drusus had vied with others to show the most
grief, the anti-Claudian sources would probably have accused
them of trying to hide their true feelings.9

The suspicion that the Emperor had been somehow
implicated in a plot against Germanicus made his relationship with Piso, however innocent it might have been in fact, dangerous for both himself and Drusus. Piso and Plancina would be accused of and tried for murdering Germanicus. If either of them should be found culpable, or if, desperate to deflect prosecution and punishment away from themselves, they should accuse Tiberius of involvement in the alleged crime, he would probably be considered guilty by association regardless of his real innocence or guilt. Tiberius' authority would then be undermined, and Agrippina and her supporters might be tempted to try to recover the principate for the Julian house. As a Claudian and the only successor to his father, Drusus would find himself in as much jeopardy as Tiberius. To forestall this contingency, Tiberius had to ensure that the suspicions lighting on himself and Drusus were not exacerbated. Consequently he had to establish and publicly display an arm's length distance between himself and his son on the one hand and Piso on the other. He must have communicated this necessity to Drusus. Perhaps growing alarmed at the princeps' silence, Piso, on his way back to Italy to stand trial, sent his son Marcus to try to ingratiate his father with the Emperor while Piso himself, seeking perhaps an even more effective intermediary, approached Drusus in Dalmatia. According to Tacitus Piso hoped to find Drusus less antagonistic over the death of his brother than well-disposed because of the elimination of a rival. Drusus, however, adopting an inscrutability uncannily
similar to his father's, showed neither inclination. He refused to receive Piso in a private audience but insisted on making a public statement only, consisting of platitudes carefully contrived and qualified to give an impression of impartiality, and capable of being construed as either a veiled threat or a reserved expression of encouragement. Drusus told Piso that if the rumours about Germanicus' death were true his own hurt would be the greatest of all, but he hoped that they were false and empty and that his brother's demise would not prove fatal to anyone else. The message for Piso was that he was being left to face his accusers by himself: the Emperor and his son were deliberately holding themselves aloof and would show themselves either against him or for him according to the results of his trial. Tacitus says that Drusus' statement was believed to have been prescribed for him by Tiberius since he, a young man otherwise *incallidus et facilis*, was employing an old man's wiles. To some degree one can take issue with this assessment: Drusus' handling of the Pannonian mutiny and the Germans along the Danube frontier showed an intelligence which could not be described as either *facilis* or *incallidus*. Nevertheless, that Drusus should have cultivated the same aloofness as his father in this particular matter could hardly have been coincidental. They must have discussed the problem after Drusus had returned to Italy for Germanicus' funeral.

They certainly regarded Piso's case as a matter of
grave concern. Near the beginning of the trial Drusus cut short the final stage of his mission to Illyricum to return once more to Rome, from which he had so recently departed. He even deferred the celebration of his ovatio either because it would have been generally construed as an impious display of disrespect for the dead Germanicus or, even worse, positive, flagrant encouragement of Germanicus' suspected murderer, or because the term of his command in Illyricum had not run out.\textsuperscript{11} Piso's trial took immediate priority over everything else in Drusus' life.

It is probable that he attended the trial's proceedings. Because of his close official as well as family connection with Germanicus, for the sake of form and piety, if nothing else, his presence would have been considered highly desirable - and advisable. After Piso's death Valerius Messalinus proposed that Drusus be thanked, in addition to Tiberius, Livia, Antonia, and Agrippina, for avenging Germanicus. Such a proposal may have amounted to nothing more than a formula of courtesy to the imperial family. None of them except Tiberius may actually have done anything of substance to obtain justice for Germanicus. Nevertheless, the proposal does reflect at least the interest that Drusus was expected to have in the matter, even if only formally and officially, as a member of the imperial family. It is not surprising, then, that in his opening address to the Senate Tiberius referred to Drusus as though he were present like himself.\textsuperscript{12}
The case came to an abrupt end with Piso's despairing suicide and the dropping of charges against Plancina. No grounds now remained in law to implicate Tiberius in a conspiracy to murder Germanicus. With this danger passed, he and Drusus could now turn their attention back to their regular duties and pursuits. In particular, Drusus had no more impediments to the celebration of his ovatio, which finally took place on May 28th.\textsuperscript{13}

In the midst of the great sorrow afflicting Rome over Germanicus' death a happy event occurred for Drusus and Livilla: the birth of twin boys. They were named Germanicus Caesar and Tiberius Julius Caesar Nero, the latter usually referred to in antiquity by his praenomen, Tiberius, and sometimes by his nickname, Gemellus, "the twin". Their birth removed a grave deficiency in Drusus' family: the absence of male heirs. Apart from the twins Drusus and Livilla had only one, known, surviving child, their daughter, Julia, whose date of birth must be reckoned between AD 4 and 7. They may also have had a son of unknown name, but he would have died in 15, apparently not long after birth. The appearance of male twins at this late stage was also pleasing to Tiberius who now found himself a grandfather by blood and not just adoption. He boasted about this unexpected stroke of luck to the Senate.\textsuperscript{14}

Tacitus records the twins' birth towards the end of the section of the \textit{Annals} dealing with the developments of the year 19. He says, moreover, that it happened while the
sorrow for Germanicus' death was still fresh (*recenti adhuc maestitia*). Neither he nor the other sources are more specific. On the one hand, according to this evidence, the birth would have occurred after Germanicus' death on October 10th and, indeed, no earlier than the arrival of the unhappy news which set off the general *maestitia* in Rome. Under favourable conditions in the autumn news could travel the distance from Antioch to Rome within two to three weeks, so in this instance it could have reached the city not much later than early November. On the other hand, according to the *fasti Ostienses*, the official *iustitium* for Germanicus' death did not begin till December 10th. The expression, *recenti adhuc maestitia*, is vague enough to refer to either the period following the *iustitium* or the antecedent unofficial mourning. A date for the birth of the twins, thus, on the basis of Tacitus' information, could be set anywhere from late October to late December in 19 (see Excursus I).

The double stroke of fate which removed Germanicus and bestowed twin sons on Drusus naturally brought the succession into issue. Tiberius now had the opportunity to transfer the imperial dynasty from the line most closely connected to Augustus by blood - that of Germanicus and Agrippina - to his own blood line through Drusus and his sons. At the time of Germanicus' death three of his sons were still living: Nero, born probably ca. AD 6, Drusus, born probably ca. 7 or 8 (but not later than July 1 in 8),
and Gaius, born August 31 in 12. \(^{17}\) Nero, the eldest, thus would probably not have reached the age of fourteen when his father died. He certainly had not received the *toga virilis*. So, for the immediate future at least, the three sons of Germanicus were disqualified from direct succession to the principate by their youth, if nothing else. Tiberius' immediate successor could only be his own son, Drusus. Over the long term, moreover, the opportunity lay open for Drusus, upon succeeding his father, to become the head of his own dynasty instead of merely playing the role imposed upon Tiberius by Augustus: in essence, that of regent for Germanicus' family. \(^{18}\)

This possibility amounted to more than a subject for idle speculation. Some took it very seriously, as evidenced by Tacitus' report that the twins' birth was a source of sorrow to the people, who believed that Drusus' gain was a loss for Germanicus' family. The claim that the people as a whole felt such partisan ill will may be based more on Julian propaganda than on actual fact. Certainly, however, the supporters of Germanicus' family and the Julian house would have recognized the danger to their dynasty. The same Julian fear may underlie Tacitus' further claim that men now became zealous on Agrippina's behalf, calling her the glory of her country, the only blood descendant of Augustus, and the paragon of traditional virtue, and praying that her offspring would prosper and survive their enemies. \(^{19}\)

Tension had existed in the imperial household between
Tiberius and Livia on the one hand, and Germanicus and Agrippina on the other, probably even from the reign of Augustus. It had, however, been kept under control as a result of Germanicus' steady discretion and excellent relations with Drusus. Germanicus' death removed the checks on the growth of this alienation. Agrippina, already suspicious about the death of her husband, now began to feel real alarm over the weakness of her children's position in the succession, as well as over her family's general defencelessness.  

Agrippina's personal relations with Drusus and Livilla up to this point remain unknown, but her lack of congeniality and full store of ambition for her own sons probably made mutual, controlled, and ineradicable tension and mistrust inevitable. Earlier the partisan supporters of Drusus and Germanicus had not held back from contrasting the attributes of Livilla and Agrippina as well as those of their husbands. The rivalry between the two families became stronger and increasingly open after Germanicus' death.  

As it turned out - initially at any rate - Tiberius appears to have decided to stay the course set him by Augustus - or, at least, not to shut Germanicus' children out of the imperial hierarchy. He entrusted the two older boys to Drusus and requested him to care for and raise them as though they were his own sons. By this gesture he deliberately sought to reassure Agrippina and her supporters that he intended to maintain the precedence of her sons ahead
of Drusus' own. In 20, when Nero, the older boy, was probably only 14 (or 15 at most), Tiberius permitted him to don the *toga virilis* and then, as though to herald his preparation for a career at the highest level, commended him to the Senate. In addition, to launch him on the accelerated progress accorded young men of the imperial family through the *cursus honorum*, the Emperor asked that he be exempted from service in the vigintivirate and be allowed to seek the quaestorship with the privilege of the *quinquennium*, that is, the remission of five years from the legal minimum age. To back up and, no doubt, to add lustre to his petition, Tiberius cited as precedents the same privileges granted his brother and himself at Augustus' request. More honours were added. Nero was given some form of priesthood and, in honour of his first entry into the forum, a *congiarium* or largess was distributed among the plebs. In addition, he was married to Drusus' daughter Julia.

In fact there is no evidence that Tiberius tried to displace Germanicus' line in the succession in favour of his own until, as will be seen, AD 22 or 23. Up to that time he seems always to have accorded priority to blood kinship to Augustus even when Augustus' most important descendants, Agrippina and her sons, Nero and Drusus, appeared to be working against him. Moreover, after the fall of his own family's fortunes in 23 with the death of his son, Tiberius seems to have reverted to preferential treatment for Germanicus' line. Germanicus' sons, Nero and Drusus, were,
of course, to perish under him, as would their mother. Caligula, however, would survive and Tiberius had no doubt that he would prevail over his own surviving grandson, Gemellus. Drusus (the Emperor's son), too, whatever his private ambitions and feelings, seems to have shown nothing but magnanimity towards his nephews after their father's death and never gave any indication of dissatisfaction with their precedence ahead of his own sons.

In deciding to keep the dynasty centred on Germanicus' line Tiberius was probably motivated by more than just a sense of personal loyalty to Augustus' memory. First, he had to adjust his disposition of the succession according to a critical political consideration: the enormous prestige and influence within the state wielded by Agrippina and her children by virtue both of their direct descent from Augustus, a descent that Tiberius and Drusus did not share, and of their connection with the (at least according to the sources) ever popular Germanicus. If he were to demote Germanicus' family beneath his own so soon after Germanicus' death, Tiberius would probably be inviting a political storm to break over his head which might be intense enough to sweep away his own regime - and dynasty. Second, he could not ignore some implications, even if they were only theoretical, of Roman family law. Roman law made no distinction between blood kinship and adoption as bases for an agnatic relationship. So, since Tiberius had adopted Germanicus in AD 4, in the eyes of the law Germanicus' sons were just as
much Tiberius' grandsons as were Drusus' twins. In law it was only natural, then, that Nero, Drusus the son of Germanicus, and Caligula, because they were older than Drusus' twins, should have seniority in the imperial hierarchy. Third, Tiberius had an innate tendency to work within and preserve the status quo, including the Roman constitution as it had been moulded and had evolved under Augustus, rather than to redirect and change it according to his own will. He was not, strictly speaking, a reactionary: when circumstances had altered to the point where a different than usual response was required or appeared highly attractive, he could rise to the occasion - witness the change in his thinking about Roman policy in Germany. The steady waxing of the good fortune of Drusus and his sons after Germanicus' death and the consolidation of their position within the imperial family and the state appear, by 22 or 23 at the latest, finally to have convinced Tiberius that it was not only desirable but safe to shift them into primacy in the succession. In the immediate aftermath of Germanicus' death, however, this favourable arrangement of circumstances had not yet crystallized. So, if nothing else, the continued promotion of Germanicus' family offered, for the time being, the line of least resistance, aggravation, and danger, and since such a line appealed to his own natural inclinations, Tiberius took it. He continued to exclude Drusus and his sons from the centre of the Julio-Claudian dynasty.
He did not, however, shut them out of the hierarchy established by Augustus. On the contrary they, together with Germanicus' sons, allowed him to keep it going and they benefited from it. As noted earlier, Augustus had established a policy of keeping pairs at the various levels of his hierarchy, with one member in each pair serving as assistant and reserve to the other. Germanicus' death left no one to complement Tiberius' position in the state in the way that he had complemented Augustus'. So Drusus had to be brought along more quickly than had been planned. Thus his career accelerated rapidly from AD 20 on. In addition, he now occupied the second rank alone. To start to remedy that deficiency Tiberius initiated sudden, extensive promotion for Nero. After him additional candidates were available to meet the requirements of the pair system: Nero's brothers, Drusus and Caligula. And beyond them was yet another pair: Drusus' sons, Tiberius Gemellus and Germanicus. The prospect that the twins would prove so useful to Augustus' Vieraugensystem may have provided another reason for Tiberius' elation at their birth. Although for the time being he would not supplant Germanicus' sons with Drusus' in the imperial dynasty, Drusus' now unrivalled prominence within the imperial hierarchy would permit him to do so whenever he wanted.
Some scholars have seen a major discrepancy between Tacitus' assignment of the birth of the twins to the year 19 and the natural inferences to be drawn from the evidence concerning the age of the survivor, Tiberius Gemellus, around the time of Tiberius' death. 29 If the twins were born in late 19, then, at the time of Tiberius' death in March, 37, Gemellus would have been seventeen. Yet Tacitus, writing for the year 37, says that Gemellus was still nondum pubertatem ingressus. Moreover, Suetonius makes it clear that he had still not received the toga virilis at the time of Caligula's accession, while Dio says that Caligula nullified Tiberius' will because he could not have been of sound mind when he made it, since he had entrusted the principate to Gemellus, "a mere boy who could not even enter the senate-house."

Philo describes Gemellus as having just reached the transition between childhood and youth when he died, and reports that Caligula referred to him after his accession as nothing more than an infant in need of guardians, teachers, and pedagogues. These are hardly terms of reference for a seventeen year old. Furthermore, as a general rule, with very few exceptions among the recorded instances at any rate, boys in the late Republic and early Empire donned the toga virilis no later than the age of sixteen and no earlier than fourteen. Gemellus acquired his apparently not long after
Caligula's accession in 37, which would mean that, according to the standard age limits, he would have been born no earlier than AD 20 and no later than 23. In view of the infantile terms used to describe him in 37, one would expect his date of birth to have fallen closer to 23 than 20. Whichever the case, however, by this argument the year 19 would seem to be out of the question. The argument requires that Tacitus' reference to the twins' birth be either incorrect or a discrete section not chronologically linked to the Annals' surrounding account of developments in the year 19.

There are arguments on the other side, however. At their base rests the sound principle that chronological anomalies in Tacitus' Annals should only be accepted where they are explicit or where the presumption of their existence is absolutely necessary to reconcile conflicting evidence. The hypothesis that the twins were born after 19 does not meet the first criterion. Tacitus does not draw an explicit distinction between his reference to the birth and the rest of his narrative for that year. Nor, upon close examination, does there appear a conflict of evidence so great that it can be explained only by a chronological anomaly. Initiation into manhood after the age of 16 was not impossible. Caligula got his toga virilis from Tiberius only after he had turned 19. A fortiori Gemellus could have donned his when he was 17 or even 18. To the objection that one exception to a rule cannot justify or explain another exception can be
opposed the fact that these two exceptions were connected: Tiberius, initially at least, till his death in 37, was responsible for bestowing the toga virilis on both boys. The fact that he delayed in one case makes it less surprising that he delayed in the other. The descriptions of extreme youth applied to Gemellus in 37 can also be reconciled with birth in 19. He may have been immature, either physically or mentally, or both, for his age. Certainly the degrees of both physical and mental development in a boy were important considerations in the determination of his eligibility to advance formally to manhood. If Gemellus did not satisfy these criteria at the normal ages, then there would be no substantive objection to his having received the toga virilis at the age of 17 or 18. Moreover since the most explicit descriptions of Gemellus' extreme youth in 37 originate in fact with Caligula, their objectivity may be questioned. It was in Caligula's interest to do everything possible to cast doubt on his cousin's fitness for the principate and, thus, to counteract those who would prefer to see Tiberius' direct descendant rather than his adopted grandson on the throne. Because the Julian point of view triumphed in the source tradition, the disparaging representation of Gemellus prevailed. So, without more convincing proof to the contrary, it is probably better to accept, with reservations, a dating for the birth of Drusus' twins between late October and December of the year 19.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 8


2. Tac. Ann. 3.2.3. On Tarracina see Jackson, trans. and ed., Tacitus Annals (Loeb), ad loc., 524.


4. See Dio 56.32-34; Suet. Aug. 100.3, Tib. 23.


6. On Germanicus' sickness and death see Tac. Ann. 2.69-72, Dio 57.18.6-9, Suet. Cal. 1.2-2; public belief that Tiberius was implicated with Piso in Germanicus' death: see e.g. Suet. Cal. 2; public expression of this opinion: see Tac. Ann. 3.17.2. Occasions when public resentment against Drusus was manifested: birth of twins to Livilla not long after Germanicus' death (Tac. Ann. 2.84); criticism of Drusus for insufficient attendance upon Germanicus' remains (Tac. Ann. 3.5.2). Reference to accusations made against Drusus in addition to Tiberius: Tac. Ann. 3.12.7. In this passage Tiberius concludes his address to the senators by urging them not to pay attention to his own or Drusus' grief or any accusations fashioned "against us." Since in the rest of his address he employs only personal pronouns in the singular to describe himself, his single use of the first person plural probably includes Drusus.

7. Germanicus' funeral honours: Tac. Ann. 2.83. Comparison between Augustus and Drusus in honouring their dead kinsmen: 3.5.


9. See Chapter 1, Excursus I. Tiberius' and Livia's secret joy: Tac. Ann. 3.2.3-3.1; Dio 57.18.6.


12. Messalinus' proposal: Tac. Ann. 3.18.3; Rogers, 125. Tiberius' reference to Drusus: Tac. Ann. 3.12.7; Rogers, 125.


16. The expectation that the dynasty would pass to Germanicus and his descendants was implicit in Augustus' will; see Dio 57.18.11.

17. Nero's birth: see PIR (2nd ed.) I 223; Drusus' birth: see PIR (2nd ed.) I 220; Gaius' birth: Fasti Vallenses, Ital. Inscr. 13.1.317; Suet. Cal. 8.1; Dio 56.6.2, 7.2; see PIR (2nd ed.) I 217.


19. People's sorrow at twins' birth: Tac. Ann. 2.84.2. Zeal for Agrippina: 3.4.2.

20. First appearance of tension in the imperial family: Tac. Ann. 1.33. Good relations between Germanicus and Drusus: 2.43.5-6. Agrippina's alarm: 2.75.1.


25. H. Siber, Zur Entwicklung der römischen

27. There was no fixed, rigid matching in this system; realignments could take place as circumstances warranted. Thus, by 23 Drusus had been more or less raised to the first rank with Tiberius, and Drusus the son of Germanicus accordingly received rapid elevation into the second rank with his brother Nero: the former was granted all the honours that had been bestowed on Nero in 20 (Tac. Ann. 4.4.1) and a coin was issued showing each brother on either side (Boyle, "Coins of Tingis in Mauretania," Numismatic Notes and Monographs 109 [1947]: 21, nos. 8-9.). Upon the death of Drusus the son of Tiberius in 23 the Emperor commended Nero and Drusus the son of Germanicus to the Senate (Tac. Ann. 4.8.3-5; Suet. Tib. 54.1). The death, however, and the increasing alienation between Tiberius and Germanicus' family upset the finely balanced "pairs" system. Even so, by the time of his death, Tiberius had one last pair in place: Caligula and Gemellus.


29. O. Hirschfeld was the first to make this point in "Zur annalistischen Anlage des taciteischen Geschichtswerkes," Hermes 25 (1890): 363-373. Tacitus' reference to the birth: Ann. 2.84.

30. References to Gemellus' youth c. AD 37: Tac. Ann. 6.46.1; Suet. Cal. 14.1, 15.2; Dio 59.1.2; Philo Leg. 4.23 and 26 (Loeb). Age range for the toga virilis: see Marquardt, 126-129. Gemellus' toga virilis: Suet. Cal. 15.2; Philo Leg. 4.23; Dio 59.8.1.

31. Both Hirschfeld, op. cit., 371-373, and Goodyear II, 438 interpret Tacitus' reference to the twins' birth as a chronologically and stylistically discrete section within the Annals. Hirschfeld would place the birth in 20, Goodyear in late 21 or 22.

32. See the commentaries of Furneaux and Koestermann I on Ann. 2.84.


34. Marquardt, 126.

35. Caligula later confirmed that he saw Gemellus as a dangerous rival by having him liquidated: Philo Leg. 4.23.
CHAPTER 9: DRUSUS' CAREER AFTER HIS RETURN FROM ILLYRICUM

Drusus' celebration of his ovatio on May 28th, AD 20 brought his military career to a close. For the next three years he remained in or near Rome (except for an excursion to Campania in 22) engaged in work appropriate to a civilian magistrate.¹ He rose rapidly through the remaining honours of the imperial hierarchy until nothing but the principate itself remained for him. If Tiberius had misgivings about the influence of city life on Drusus' morals, they were overridden by the necessity of having his son nearby to prepare him for the succession.²

Tiberius lost no time in promoting his son. Round about this time Drusus became augur and flamen Augustalis, probably in direct succession to Germanicus, since the Senate had ruled at his death that no one but a member of the Julian gens could replace him in these offices. He was also probably appointed quindecimvir sacris faciundis. He was already, of course, a pontifex and sodalis Augustalis. His new prominence in the state as the Emperor's primary successor soon became published throughout the Empire. He became associated, for instance, with the cult of the goddess Rome in Pamphylia. More practically, still in AD 20, Drusus became consul designate.³ He was soon active in the important work of the Senate.

In particular he participated in the trial of Aemilia Lepida who had been charged by her ex-husband, Publius
Sulpicius Quirinius, with falsely claiming to have had a child by him, as well as with adultery, poisoning, and consulting astrologers about Caesar's family, a treasonable offence. After the witnesses had been heard and evidence submitted, Drusus became the subject of a special exception to one of the senatorial rules of procedure. Normally the consuls designate were asked to give their opinion first. In this instance Tiberius exempted Drusus from the requirement. Tacitus says that the exemption was interpreted by some observers as a deliberate measure to allow the other members of the Senate to speak their minds freely on the subject, for once Drusus had spoken everyone else might feel bound to follow suit for fear of offending him or the Emperor. Others, according to Tacitus, put a grimmer interpretation on the muzzling of the prince: *quidam ad saevitiam trahebant* neque enim cessurum nisi damnandi officio. This rather elliptical, obscure statement admits of two constructions. On the one hand, Tacitus may mean that certain observers inferred from Drusus' silence that Tiberius or Drusus or both had bad motives (*quidam ad saevitiam trahebant*): certain and desirous that Lepida would be condemned, Tiberius and Drusus yet would not have wanted the odium for the judgment to be placed on them. On the other hand, Tacitus may mean, in effect, that "some attributed the imposition of silence upon Drusus to (Tiberius' concern about) Drusus' natural viciousness (*saevitiam*): for Drusus could not be prevailed upon to do anything but condemn." If the latter
construction were correct, the sentence in question would mark another manifestation of the tradition of Drusus' saevitia and, without substantiation for the charge, anti-Claudian bias. It must also be recognized, however, that whatever Tacitus actually meant to say, his sentence describes not facts but opinion, and opinion with a vague attribution at that. Whether the restriction placed on Drusus was motivated by well-meaning or ignoble considerations, the Lepida trial shows the enormous importance and influence, for good or for ill, that he now had in the state and the close intimacy in which he worked with his father. Tiberius and Germanicus had never enjoyed so close an association.

As it turned out, Lepida was convicted, although on precisely which of the charges made against her the sources do not say. Drusus, when it came his turn to speak, supported the harshest sentence, that proposed by C. Rubellius Blandus: exile. His support, however, does not necessarily confirm Tacitus' imputation of saevitia. Such a sentence was not inappropriate for conviction on the charges in question. According to the Lex Cornelia de Falsis the crime of falsum, such as Lepida's false claim about Quirinius' paternity, could carry the penalties of exile: banishment and confiscation. Under the Lex Julia de Adulteriis of 18 BC adultery was punished by relegatio, that is, confinement to an island with partial confiscation of property. Moreover Drusus, due to his close cooperation with
his father, may well have become aware of the damning testimony of Quirinius' slaves on the non-maiestas charges which Tiberius suppressed till after Lepida had been sentenced. Even so, however, the court did not fully adopt Blandus' and Drusus' recommendation. In the end, in consideration of Mamercus Aemilius Scaurus, who had married Lepida and had had a daughter by her, the Senate decided to exile her but not to confiscate her property.⁹

Drusus' career prospects in AD 20 were not left untroubled. For it was probably around this time, if it had not happened before, that Lucius Aelius Sejanus became fully confirmed as Tiberius' right-hand man. The extant evidence hints at a network of connections binding Tiberius and Drusus to Sejanus. He shared the praetorian prefecture with his father, Aelius Strabo. His uncle, Q. Junius Blaesus, had served as legate under both Augustus and Tiberius in Pannonia and was later honoured through Tiberius' influence with a proconsulship in Africa, triumphal insignia, and the title imperator. It was thus not entirely coincidental that Sejanus accompanied Drusus in 14 when he went to deal with the mutiny against Blaesus. M. Gavius, also known as Apicius, a wealthy and eccentric gourmet and hedonist, provided another link. Gossip circulated that, in his youth, Sejanus had sought to get ahead financially by selling himself to Gavius at a high price for purposes of stuprum. This Gavius also, apparently, was reputed to have an influence upon Drusus, though only to the point of fostering
precious affectations. He was, for instance, able to prejudice the young man against cabbage sprouts, to the disgust of Tiberius. Sejanus took full advantage of the opportunities afforded by his contacts with the imperial family. Basking in Tiberius' favour he enjoyed a rapid rise in power and influence. According to Dio, by AD 20 he had been able to concentrate effective control of the Praetorian Guard in his own hands. After his father had been sent to Egypt, sole command of the Praetorians remained with Sejanus. He acquired even greater power by uniting their cohorts in one camp between the Colline and Viminal gates of Rome. Tiberius for his part honoured Sejanus by giving him the ornamenta praetoria in 20, an honour which, Dio asserts, had never before been accorded to an equestrian. Tiberius also arranged for the future betrothal of Sejanus' still infant daughter to Claudius' son. Given the ever increasing ties between the Emperor and his Praetorian Prefect it is not surprising that the former should call the latter, according to Dio, "abler and assistant in all things." The close association is reflected in similar expressions used by Tacitus and Velleius: respectively, socius laborum and singularis principalium onerum adiutor in omnia.

The ascendancy that this non-senatorial functionary came to exercise over the Emperor is remarkable in light of his own son's proven competence in assisting him. Dio says that Tiberius attached Sejanus to himself because of their
similarity of character or temper. He may mean simply that Sejanus made himself extremely congenial to Tiberius. Tiberius seems not to have been the only person whom he was able to charm. He was alleged to have had the same effect at different times and to varying degrees upon Cn. Calpurnius Piso, Drusus' wife, Livilla, Agrippina, and her son Drusus, in addition to a host of lesser lights whom he thought he could use to advance his designs. Perhaps Tiberius justified to himself his aggrandizement of Sejanus by the precedent of Augustus' reliance on Agrippa while he groomed first Marcellus and later Gaius and Lucius Caesar for high office. Whatever his rationale, however, it could not have been satisfactory to Drusus. He could not have helped but feel that the office of adviser and assistant to the princeps belonged more appropriately to his son and successor. Moreover, it must have rankled that Tiberius should allow another into his confidence after his own son's faithful service to and close association with him in the Pannonian mutiny and the mission to Illyricum. It may well have been around this time, then, the year 20, that Drusus' resentment boiled over, resulting in the brawl - or one of the brawls - that he was alleged to have had with Sejanus, which would in turn have spurred Sejanus, seeing Drusus now as an open and dangerous enemy as well as an obstacle to his ambition, to plot against him. Tacitus indicates that by 23 at the latest Drusus could no longer hide either his resentment or his suspicion that the Praetorian commander was seeking supreme
power. Drusus, however, either failed to communicate his misgivings to his father, or his father ignored them.

Little can be reconstructed about Drusus' private affairs in 20 after his return to Rome. A few days after he had celebrated his ovatio, his mother, Vipsania, died. The historical tradition preserves nothing about either Drusus' relations with Vipsania or his response to her death. Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of her death was its character. She was in all likelihood still only in her fifties when she passed away, but Tacitus claims that she alone of all Agrippa's children died from natural causes. The others either fell by the sword or were believed to have perished by poison or starvation.

Drusus' career continued to flourish in AD 21. At the beginning of the year he entered his second consulship, this time with his father as colleague. Neither appears to have held the magistracy for long. According to Suetonius, Tiberius resigned after only three months and, since two suffects were in office by May 30th, it is probable that Drusus withdrew either at the same time as his father or not much later. By sharing the consulship with his son, Tiberius formally marked Drusus out as his successor, just as he had marked out Germanicus' primacy in the succession with a shared consulship in 18.

In entering his second consulship with the Emperor as colleague, Drusus had reached the highest point attained by Germanicus in the cursus honorum. The new honour, however,
had another, less auspicious association that did not escape the more superstitious minds in Rome. It was noted that Tiberius' previous colleagues in the consulship, Quintilius Varus, Calpurnius Piso, and Germanicus, had all come to premature, violent ends. Dio suggests that Tiberius was accursed.\textsuperscript{17} The unpleasant coincidence may be viewed, however, simply as an illustration of the principle that attainment of high office in the late Republic and early Empire inevitably brought exposure to greater personal danger.

As noted above, Tiberius served as consul for only three months before withdrawing to Campania. He seems to have given the need to improve his health as his official excuse, which may well have been valid. It is not inconceivable that the robust constitution ascribed to him by Suetonius was starting to weaken in his sixty-first year. Tacitus says as well, however, that he was preparing, in effect, to withdraw from Rome permanently, and in fact, he only returned to the city once, when forced to by the news of his mother's grave illness in 22. Whatever Tiberius' precise motivation, his withdrawal had the effect of shifting responsibility and the focus of attention on to Drusus as the highest ranking member of the imperial family in Rome, and thereby of emphasizing his position as the Emperor's successor.\textsuperscript{18}

As Tiberius' main representative, both in and out of the consulship, Drusus would have been heavily involved in
the business of the Senate. In many cases Drusus is not actually mentioned in the sources, but he must have been present in or at least aware of most of the proceedings. He apparently shone in handling one of the first problems to come before him: a quarrel between Domitius Corbulo, an ex-praetor, and the youthful aristocrat, Lucius Sulla, who had shown disrespect to Corbulo by refusing to yield his seat to the older man at gladiatorial games. The conflict of principles and the composition of the groups who chose sides in the quarrel were, apparently, of much more significance than the quarrel itself. On Corbulo's side were ranged his seniority and custom. He had also the support of the older senators. Sulla could depend on numerous and powerful family connections - as might be expected among the Cornelii - such as the senators Mamercus Scaurus and L. Arruntius. There was hostile oratory in the curia until Drusus made a speech apta temperandis animis, whereupon Mamercus, who was both uncle and stepfather to Sulla, delivered an apology satisfactory to Corbulo. Once again inferences have to be drawn from meagre details, but it appears that the two sides in the dispute were sufficiently moved by Drusus' speech or, at least, by the opinion that they should not resist the obviously conciliatory wishes of the Emperor's son and representative, to patch up their quarrel. Whatever their motivation, the incident reveals that Drusus had continued to develop the skill in appraising and resolving problems that he had first shown in handling the Pannonian mutiny and seems later to
have applied on a larger scale to settle German affairs in the Roman interest. His earlier successes had been mainly military and diplomatic. He was now showing political aptitude. He was maturing into a well-rounded statesman.

He demonstrated tactful, constructive influence in another case. The old, battle-hardened soldier, A. Caecina Severus, proposed in the Senate that no magistrate to whom a province had been allotted should be accompanied by his wife. He was opposed in the main by M. Valerius Messalinus, to whose speech Drusus added words of support, arguing in particular that, in view of the frequency of trips that principes (such as himself) had to make to remote parts of the Empire (such as Illyricum), denying them the presence and support of their wives would constitute an unreasonable privation. He cited as an authoritative example Livia's frequent accompaniment of Augustus and expressed openly his reluctance to embark upon an official mission without Livilla, uxore carissima et tot communium liberorum parente. Having been ably refuted by Messalinus and Drusus, who had anyway the majority's opinion on their side, Caecina's proposal never even came to a vote.21

At the next meeting of the Senate a matter came forward in which Drusus, although the sources do not mention him, must have had a keen interest: the selection of a new governor for Africa from the two candidates proposed by Tiberius, Manius Lepidus and Quintus Junius Blaesus. Blaesus, of course, had been the legate of Pannonia to whose
support Drusus, accompanied by Blaesus' nephew, Sejanus, had marched in the mutinies following Augustus' death. Drusus' attitude to Blaesus is unknown. He was probably, however, hostile to Blaesus' nephew. Lepidus, fearing to run afoul of Sejanus' high favour with the Emperor, asked to be excused from his candidacy, and the Senate, fearing the same, raised no objection. Only the formality of appointing Blaesus remained. Tacitus indicates that Drusus was creating at this time a generally favourable impression among the Romans. In typical fashion, however, perhaps reflecting an anti-Claudian bias in his sources, he deigns to compliment him only in a grudging, back-handed way. He says that Drusus' sociable, congenial qualities were appreciated because they made him a useful intermediary and a buffer, as it were, between the citizen body and the Emperor, whom Tacitus represents to have been grim, uncommunicative, and inscrutable. Tacitus adds that even the faults that he alleges Drusus to have had, such as extravagance and fondness for convivia, were regarded tolerantly by the Romans simply because as "open," social vices they contrasted sharply with Tiberius' secrecy and obscurity. If the defamatory shading is removed from the picture, Drusus emerges as well-liked and respected in the conduct of both his public and private lives and generally viewed as a helpful and prudent adviser and deputy to his father.
He showed his fairness and competence in helping to check a major abuse of the Roman law of *maiestas*. Parties guilty of any legal infraction were increasingly resorting to grasping images of the Emperor in order to acquire, as it were, portable asylum, and thus to evade legal penalties. It does not seem that Tiberius had ever been approached about the problem. After he had departed Rome an appeal was made to his son to punish this outrageous behaviour. The problem was broached in the Senate by Gaius Cestius who was unable to have the sentence for a conviction of fraud carried out against Annia Rufilla because she kept a firm grip on a portrait of the Emperor. She had made her abuse of the law even more outrageous by insulting and threatening Cestius in public. Once Cestius had broken the silence on the matter a whole litany of similar experiences was reported to Drusus and he, urged now to set the example for punishment, had Annia summoned to appear before the Senate, probably on an *iniuria* charge, and, when she had been found guilty, had her incarcerated in the public prison. The judgment appears to have set a precedent still recognized - in theory at least - over a century later. Drusus had made an important contribution to the development of *maiestas* law.\(^{24}\)

The punishment of another type of abuse in this area of the law was also laid to Drusus' credit. Apparently Tiberius himself ordered and the Senate obligingly decreed the punishment of two knights, Considius Aequus and Caelius Cursor, for bringing false charges of treason against the
praetor, Magius Caecilianus. Tacitus reports that the satisfactory results of these proceedings were ascribed to Drusus' beneficial influence on Tiberius. One suspects that the ascribing might have been done by an anti-Tiberian source anxious to deny the Emperor credit even for his statesmanlike directives. Nevertheless, since Tiberius was absent from Rome, Drusus probably did bring the maiestas abuse to his attention and may even have persuaded him to check it. The result was that the Aequus and Cursor case was included with the Rufilla decision in laudem Drusi.  

Another major development in 21 that must have caused concern to Drusus was the rebellion led by Julius Florus and Julius Sacrovir among the Treviri and Aedui in Gallia Belgica and Gallia Lugdunensis respectively. By Tacitus' account, the rebellion appears to have been well contained and easily defeated by local forces. Nevertheless rumours in Rome inflated these localized uprisings into a general insurrection throughout the whole of Gaul and the Germanies, casting in doubt even the loyalty of the Spanish provinces, and threatening, in effect, the whole of the western Empire. In the general panic many thought it incumbent upon Tiberius to act personally or, at least, to send out Drusus to take command of the situation. Tiberius remained, however, resolutely unperturbed and secluded in Campania and Drusus stayed in the City. After the rebellion had been crushed Tiberius sent a letter to the Senate giving a factual account of the insurrection and attempting to explain why neither he
nor Drusus had left Italy to deal personally with it. He emphasized how unseemly it would be for *principes* to abandon Rome, the seat of government for the whole vast Empire, to deal with disturbances in one or two provincial communities. He was not prevaricating. He had adhered to the same policy during the much more serious troubles in Pannonia and along the Rhine after Augustus' death in 14, and when he had kept Drusus in the capital after Germanicus' death. He seems to have believed that it was necessary in troubled times for the Emperor to remain firmly established in or close to the Empire's head and heart, Rome, in order on the one hand to preserve the public image, in effect the myth, of the Empire's fundamental order and stability, and on the other hand for the Emperor himself to keep a firm grip on power and on the loyalty of the whole Empire. Tiberius would have based this policy on the premise that the identity and unity of the Empire, focussed both strategically and psychologically on Rome, had become indissolubly linked as well to the person of the *princeps*. It would follow that if the holder of supreme power should leave the city to march against a crisis elsewhere, he might create the impression that the very order and unity of the Empire itself were imperilled, a dangerous idea which could undermine belief in and respect for not only the Empire but the *princeps* himself. Significantly, Drusus had by now risen so high in the state, indeed, had become so closely associated with the position of the *princeps*, that, in Tiberius' eyes at least, he too was
now identified to a large degree with the Empire's power, order, and unity. Accordingly Tiberius felt free to venture out of Rome into Campania in 21 so long as Drusus remained behind in the city. For the same reason the Emperor not only refused to leave Italy himself during Florus' and Sacrovir's rebellion but also declined to let Drusus quit Rome.

Whatever Drusus' establishment in Rome did for his prestige, it did not, apparently, guarantee his health. In the latter half of 21 he became quite ill - gravely enough, in fact, for the foolhardy Clutorius Priscus secretly to compose a poem lamenting his expected death. The cause of his sickness is not known. The occurrence of the illness, however, probably less than two years before his death, has stimulated speculation. Perhaps plague was afflicting Rome, leading not only to Drusus' sickness in 21 but also to his death in 23. A sequence of necrological notices beginning in the year 20, based in the main on the Senate's vote of public funerals, offers some supporting evidence. Moreover, Tiberius departed for Campania early in 21, he claimed, to improve his health, and stayed there for some twenty months, and Marcus Lepidus pleaded ill health to have his candidacy for the governorship of Africa withdrawn. Perhaps, then, the convalescent Drusus followed his father into Campania late in 21 or early in 22 to escape a plague in Rome. Another possibility might be that Drusus' illness resulted from, or was at least aggravated by, his "extracurricular activities," namely, intemperate feasting and drinking - which, according
to Suetonius, Tiberius would initially believe to have contributed to his death in 23. Whatever the cause of Drusus' illness the superstitious in Rome undoubtedly interpreted it as proof of the baleful influence exerted by Tiberius' evil star on his colleagues in the consulship.\textsuperscript{29}

The last major incident in 21 in which Drusus had an interest stemmed from his illness: the trial of Clutorius Priscus, a knight, who, as noted above, had made the grave faux pas of anticipating Drusus' death and writing a poem about it. The whole incident should surely have unravelled as a farce; instead it turned into a tragedy. The evidence suggests that Priscus was something of a vain fool whose earlier success with a poem composed on the death of Germanicus had gone to his head. On learning of Drusus' illness he thought that he would improve on his earlier achievement. Casting aside all discretion, he not only produced his new dirge before the death of its subject, but expected an even greater reward and, unwilling to hide his lamp under a bushel, boastfully recited his production in the house of Publius Petronius in the presence of Petronius' mother-in-law, Vitellia, and many other noble women. This tasteless, but probably frivolous and innocent exercise met with an overwhelming, savage response. An unnamed delator had Priscus haled before the Senate to stand trial. He was convicted on the evidence of witnesses of his recital. During the deliberations on his sentence, only one senator, Manius Aemilius Lepidus, spoke on his behalf, and he
evidently believed that the Senate would consider only a severe penalty. In a desperate bid to stave off a death sentence by mollifying the other evidently indignant senators, Lepidus couched his defence of Priscus in harsh criticism. In conclusion he gave judgment that he should be exiled, "just as if he were guilty of treason" (ac si lege maiestatis teneretur). His tactics did not work. The entire Senate, with only two known exceptions, Lepidus and Rubellius Blandus, voted in favour of the death penalty.

It may be wondered what offence Priscus could have committed so terrible as to deserve the weightiest prosecution and punishment that the state could mete out. Some aspect of his private reading of the poem was potentially so damning that Vitellia, the chief witness for the defence, denied that she had heard anything. Yet the poem could not have differed much from the model whose success had inspired Priscus to compose again: a formal lamentation for the death of the Emperor's successor. The first work would probably have been distinguished from the second only in that the former's subject would have been dead when it was published. The second work would not, then, in all likelihood, have contained any subject-matter intrinsically seditious, libellous, or otherwise obnoxious. It could only have been the context of Priscus' lamentation for Drusus that determined the adverse response to it.

The sources do not state the legal basis or form of the charge, but the evidence suggests two possibilities.
First, even to mention the death of an imperial personage might have been deemed to presuppose a plot to bring it about. Senators who took this view would have had their suspicions deepened by the circumstances of the poem's first appearance. Since Drusus' death would automatically vault Germanicus' children into the rank of primary succession, and since a prominent member of the Vitellii, who were friends of Germanicus, was selected as one of the privileged few to hear Priscus' poem, many staunchly Tiberius senators may have concluded that Priscus' recitation was a manifestation of the continuing hope of Germanicus' family and supporters to usurp the throne. The Tiberians would thus have taken particular relish in forcing Vitellia to testify before the Senate against Priscus and, they might have hoped, to compromise or cast guilt upon herself and other putative members of "Germanicus' party." By this scenario, maiestas through sedition would have been the most appropriate charge, on the grounds that, in plotting against the Emperor's son and heir, Priscus was attacking the Emperor himself. Lepidus would, then, have conducted the defence to argue that no sinister plot or threat to Drusus could be deemed in Priscus' words, so that he was innocent of the charge and, even if he was not, the lighter maiestas penalty, exile, would be more appropriate than the capital one.

The Senate might also have construed the poem as a prediction of Drusus' death, in which case they would have presumed indulgence by Priscus in black magic and astrology
inimical to Drusus' interests. In this case, a charge of *maiestas* would have been possible but not likely. Occult practices were not expressly characterized as grounds for a charge of *maiestas* until the mid-fourth century. Priscus would have been more appropriately charged in accordance with certain rules, reputed to have originated in the Twelve Tables, about magical spells and incantations. Conviction would have entailed the death penalty. Lepidus would then have argued that Priscus' words implied no occult intention or practice and, to open up the possibility of a lighter penalty, would have tried to persuade the Senate to extend the *lex maestatis* to a case to which it would not normally apply. Lepidus' phrase, *perinde censeo ac si lege maestatis teneretur*, is typical of the language used when the scope of a public criminal *lex* was being extended by special interpretation.

Whatever the charge, Priscus did not deserve the death penalty for a mere poem which, while certainly inappropriate, was probably otherwise completely innocuous. It does not seem likely that Drusus could have driven the Senate to so extreme a reaction, even though he was the object of Priscus' impertinence and bad taste. Since Drusus' illness and, thus, the trial itself took place late in the year, the suffect consuls would have presided over it. There is not even any evidence that Drusus was present at the trial or, for that matter, that he had recovered sufficiently from his illness to be able to attend it. Tiberius, certainly,
was neither present nor knew anything about it. The Senate alone, thus, must bear responsibility for the conduct of Priscus' case.

Ironically, the very absence of Tiberius and Drusus may have contributed to the ferocity of the prosecution. Without the supervision of the princeps or his son the senators would have had no external guide or restraint to mark out appropriate treatment of the case. Left only with the imperative of pleasing the Emperor and his successor, they would have given themselves over fully to the sychophancy that, according to the sources, had characterized their behaviour towards Tiberius right from the beginning of his principate. The senators would doubtless have thought that a sentence of death upon the accused would reflect the highest concern and respect for Drusus and Tiberius - and to merit their favour. It was only to be expected, then, that Haterius Agrippa, who not only was Drusus' kinsman but also owed him at least one favour - the praetorship, should propose the extreme penalty, and that even Priscus' sole defender should so roundly abuse him. Had Tiberius and Drusus been present the trial would probably have followed a much different course. Tiberius had checked senatorial excess in the past and Drusus' reconciliation of Corbulo and Sulla, his polite but effective opposition to Caecina's proposal to ban governors' wives from accompanying their husbands abroad, and his firm but fair interventions in the cases of maiestas abuse involving Annia Rufilla, Considius Aequus, and Caelius
Cursor, all suggest that he would have been no less committed than his father to moderation in Priscus' case. So it was the very height of ill fortune for Priscus that he should have indulged in his fatuous exercise precisely at the time when the Senate was least restrained. He did the wrong thing at exactly the wrong time. Ironically, the Senate's overzealous conduct gives further proof, in a negative way, how important in the state and how closely linked to the Emperor Drusus had become. He was now approaching the climax of his career.

2. Concern for Drusus' moral health was supposedly one of Tiberius' reasons for sending Drusus to Illyricum in the first place (Tac. Ann. 2.44.1).

3. Reservation of Germanicus' priesthoods for Julians: Tac. Ann. 2.83.1. Drusus as augur: CIL VI 910 = ILS 168; CIL XII 147 = ILS 169 (both dated to c. AD 23); CIL IX 35 (after AD 14); CIL XIII 1036 (after Germanicus' death); see Lewis, 44; Rogers, 103. Drusus as flamen Augustalis: CIL XII 147 = ILS 169 (c. AD 23); see Lewis, 38; Rogers, 103. On the flamen Augustalis in general see Fishwick, I.1, 161-62; Lewis, 77-80; and K. Latte, Römische Religionsgeschichte (2nd ed.), Handb. d. Altertumswiss. 5.4 (Munich: 1974), 139. Drusus as quindecimvir sacris faciundis: CIL V 4954; see Rogers, 103, and PIR (2nd ed.) I 219, p. 176. Drusus as pontifex and sodalis Augustalis: see pp. 69, 86 above. On the sodales Augustales in general see Fishwick, I.1, 162. Drusus and the goddess Rome in Pamphylia: SEG Vol. XVII (1960): 582 (see J. et L. Robert, REG 61 (1948): 200, n. 229); in this inscription reference is made to a priest "of the goddess Roma Archegetis and of Drusus Caesar, son of Tiberius Caesar." Drusus as consul designate: Tac. Ann. 3.22.4.

4. Tac. Ann. 3.22.1; see Suet. Tib. 49.1. On the gravity of consulting astrologers about the imperial household see Furneaux ad loc., 417.

5. Tac. Ann. 3.22.4, 23.2. For legal procedure in such instances see Koestermann I ad loc., 458, Furneaux ad loc., 417-18, and Jackson, Annals (Loeb), 548, footnote 1, and 558, footnote 1.

6. Tac. Ann. 3.22.4; see Shotter, 315.

7. This interpretation is accepted by most critics, e.g. Furneaux, ad loc., 418; Jackson, Annals (Loeb), 558, f.n. 2; Levick, 273, n. 54; Seager, 156.

8. This interpretation is accepted by Rogers (1935), 55 (see Rogers, 150); and by Shotter, 315. See pp. 131-35 above on the tradition of Drusus' unpleasant character traits.


12. Tiberius' patronage of Sejanus: Dio 57.19.7. Sejanus and Piso: Tac. Ann. 3.16; Livilla: 4.3; Agrippina: 4.54.1; Drusus: 4.60. On the wide range of Sejanus' influence see, e.g., Tac. Ann. 4.2 and 6.8. On his influence over women in particular see, e.g., Dio 58.3.8.


14. Death of Vipsania: Tac. Ann. 3.19.3. Her date of birth is unknown. In the light of Cornelius Nepos' information in Atticus 19.4 and 22.3, Seager, 14, would argue that it must have fallen somewhere in the mid-thirties BC. Her natural death contrasted with the violent ends met by her brothers and sisters: Tac. Ann. 3.19.3.

16. See Rogers, 126; Seager, 120. Tiberius was continuing to follow the policy that he had pursued during Germanicus' life: to treat the adoptive brothers impartially and to follow Augustus' system of advancing them at the same rate (see Tac. Ann. 3.56.3). Augustus had at first placed Germanicus four years ahead of Drusus in the cursus honorum. Germanicus had been quaestor in AD 7, Drusus in 11. He reduced that difference to three years in appointing them to their first consulships: Germanicus in 12, Drusus in 15. Tiberius maintained the three year difference for their second consulships: Germanicus got his in 18, Drusus his in 21, in each case with Tiberius as colleague. Augustus' and Tiberius' careful ranking of the brothers makes it hard to believe that Drusus' consulship for 21 was not already in prospect in 18 or even 17 when Germanicus was actually designated consul (see Levick, 148).

17. Dio 57.20.1-2; see Rogers, 126-27.

18. Tiberius' health: Tac. Ann. 3.31.2; Suet. Tib. 68.4; Rogers, 127. His retirement from the consulship and Rome, leaving responsibility with Drusus: Tac. Ann. 3.31.2. Tiberius' return to Rome: Tac. Ann. 3.64.1; Seager, 120.

19. Rogers, 127; for a list of the important judicial cases before the Senate and thus, probably, Drusus as well, see Rogers, 129-30.


22. Tac. Ann. 3.35.

23. Tac. Ann. 3.37.2. On Drusus' character see Chapter 5, pp. 129-34.

24. Major abuse of maiestas law: Tac. Ann. 3.36.1. Annia Rufilla's case: Tac. Ann. 3.36.2-4; on the charge see Rogers, 128. The case was unusual. Normally a case involving injuria would have been tried in a lower civil court. Where the person aggrieved was a senator, however, the charge was classified as injuria atrox and, in such cases, "procedure might sometimes be extra ordinem, and in some degree assimilated to a criminal case" (Rogers [1932], 76, citing Paulus, Sententiae V 4.10; see Mommsen, Strafrecht, 789, 795). Both the procedure and the result of Rufilla's case as handled by Drusus were evidently extra ordinem - and deservedly so given the circumstances not just of Rufilla's conduct but
of the widespread practice of this sort of abuse.
Importance of the judgment: Rogers, 128; see Rogers (1935), 58-60.


26. For a general account of Florus' and Sacrovir's rebellion (or, more accurately, rebellions) see Tac. Ann. 3.40-46 and Furneaux, Koestermann I, and Jackson, Annals (Loeb) ad loc. Tiberius' letter to the Senate: Tac. Ann. 3.47.2.

27. Tac. Ann. 3.49.1; Dio 57.20.3.


30. For detailed accounts of the case of Clutorius Priscus see Tac. Ann. 3.49-51 and Dio 57.20.3-4. On Priscus' ineptitude (or, at least, lack of discretion) see especially Tac. Ann. 3.49.1, vaniloquentiam; 3.50.2, vanascelestis; and 3.50.3. Lepidus' defence: Tac. Ann. 3.50. Rogers (1932), 78, f.n., notes that Lepidus appears always in the role of defence counsel or on the side of moderation (see Tac. Ann. 3.11, 3.22, 4.20; see also 6.27).

31. Vitellia and "Germanicus' party:" see Levick, 160-61. Maiestas charge: Tac. Ann. 3.24.2 indicates that Augustus had extended the maiestas charge to include tampering with the Emperor's children, in his case, Julia.


33. Ibid., 63-64.

34. Suffect consuls presiding: see p. 225 and f.n. 15 above, and Levick, 273, n. 54. Tiberius' absence: Dio 57.20.4 says that Tiberius was vexed when he learned what had happened, not so much because the senators had punished Priscus as because they had done so without his knowledge, judgment, or assent), and he censured them. He had a law passed to the effect that no person condemned by the Senate in the future should be executed
for up to ten days to ensure that the Emperor would have time to learn of and review the decision (ibid.; see Tac. Ann. 3.51.1-2 and Suet. Tib. 75.2).

35. The latest example of shameless grovelling had occurred upon Tiberius' informing the Senate of the conclusion of Florus' and Sacrovir's rebellion. Cornelius Dolabella - and he was not alone in his flattery, only the worst - had proposed that Tiberius should enter Rome from Campania ovans. The Emperor dismissed the proposal with disdain (Tac. Ann. 3.47.4.). Tac. Ann. 3.65.3 reports that the Emperor, exasperated by the senators' fawning, acquired the habit of venting his contempt with the formula, expressed in Greek, "O men fit for slavery," every time he left the curia.

CHAPTER 10: THE CLIMAX OF DRUSUS' CAREER

The completion of Drusus' second consulship in AD 21 marked a watershed in his career. Up to this point Augustus and Tiberius had taken great care to regulate Drusus' promotion behind that of the primary successor, Germanicus, according to a fairly constant interval: some three years. Tiberius maintained this interval even after Germanicus' death in 19. Germanicus had held his second consulship in 18. Drusus became consul for the second time in 21.¹ After he had completed his second consulship nothing remained to hold back his advancement. Indeed, having replaced Germanicus as Tiberius' primary successor, he could look forward to the acceleration of his career. The change did come - and rapidly - for in the very next year, 22, the Emperor requested the Senate to grant Drusus the tribunicia potestas. The accelerated promotion was predictable. The Senate expected the Emperor's request.²

The tribunician power *per se* did not endow its holder with much power. It did, to be sure, have some significant practical effects. It enabled its holder to summon the Senate and People, to veto the act of any magistrate, to enjoy the *sacrosanctitas* traditionally given to the person of a tribune, and to have criminal jurisdiction within Rome. It had also, however, major limitations. In particular, it gave no positive power in the Empire at large and bestowed no jurisdiction in civil law.³ In law the *tribunicia potestas*
really gave its holder nothing more than the office of a tribune without the need to be elected every year.

The chief value of this honour lay in its symbolic, de facto benefits. Because Augustus had fashioned this potestas as the most distinctive basis for his pre-eminence within the state, his bestowal of it on others carried automatically a great deal of prestige. Most importantly it signalled that the Emperor had appointed the recipient as his successor. Drusus' elevation to that rank had been first intimated in 21 when he had shared the consulship with his father. Tiberius confirmed the rank by requesting the Senate to grant the tribunician power to his son in 22. In addition, the identification of the honour with Augustus and the principate linked the recipient inseparably to the Emperor, thereby raising him higher than everyone else in the Empire except the Emperor himself. Of course, the subsidiary holder of the tribunicia potestas could not match the princeps in power, but Augustus himself indicated that he regarded him virtually as a junior colleague. In the Res Gestae, referring to Agrippa and Tiberius, he uses the word οὐδέποτεν to describe another holder of the potestas. In a group of inscriptions found on the Capitolium of Brescia and dated probably to the reign of Vespasian appear the names of those whom Vespasian considered his only legitimate predecessors, namely Augustus, Tiberius, and Claudius, et qui in collegium recepti, Agrippa and Drusus. The inclusion of Drusus rather than Germanicus in this select group indicates
that the former alone had risen to the point where he could be called the Emperor's colleague. Since the only major honour awarded Drusus that had not been given to Germanicus was the tribunician power, it must have been this that gave him pre-eminence — a conclusion confirmed by the reference in the Brescia inscriptions to the tribunicia potestas alone of all Drusus' honours. The very formula, et qui in collegium recepti, is consistent with other ancient authorities' descriptions of the elevated rank enjoyed by other junior holders of the tribunician power.7

As a reflection of Drusus' new prestige and importance, his portrait and titles were represented on the Roman imperial coinage for the first time. In 22 to 23 the mint of Rome struck a novel and magnificent series of aes coins, mainly sestertii and dupondii, showing a complete break with former usage.8 They were well-designed, tending to have an attractive, often detailed, pictorial character with apt and sufficiently informative inscriptions focussing on the imperial family, in particular, Augustus, Tiberius, Livia, and Drusus. They had two main themes. One consisted of references to particular, topical aspects of the lives of the imperial family, such as Tiberius' aid to the cities of Asia for recovery from earthquake damage, Livia's recuperation from illness, and the birth of Drusus' twins. The second theme took up the more abstract association of members of the imperial family with virtues, such as Iustitia, Salus Augusta, Clementia, Moderatio, and Pietas.9
Within this series the coins depicting Drusus and his honours figured prominently. They were minted in AD 23. Three denominations survive, sestertii, a dupondius, and asses, with type variations among the denominations. The types tend to emphasize both Drusus' established position in the succession of the Augustan principate and his importance within the state. The typical obverse legend, "Drusus Caesar, son of Tiberius Augustus, grandson of the divine Augustus," displays the former emphasis. Drusus' high status is reflected in the title, pontifex, on two of the three denominations, in his association with Livia and Pietas on the dupondius, and in the significant honour of obverse portraiture accorded him on the asses. Since both his right of succession and his elevation in status derived from the tribunician power, his possession of the honour for the second year is appropriately emphasized on all three denominations.  

Tiberius would not by himself give Drusus the tribunician power. While Augustus had more or less invented it for his own use he had nevertheless taken great care to ensure its constitutional legitimacy by conceding to the Senate and People the rights of conferment and ratification. Accordingly Tiberius, who tried to adhere as much as possible to Augustus' constitutional practice, first formally petitioned the Senate for the honour. He made his request in a letter which he sent from Campania, where he had been travelling and residing since laying down his consulship
early in 21. When he wrote he may well have had the company of Drusus who was touring Campania at the same time.\textsuperscript{12}

Because the tribunician power held such enormous prestige and importance for the succession Tiberius felt obliged to justify his recommendation. Accordingly he listed his son's accomplishments and honours, emphasizing, of course, those details established in Augustus' reign as requisite for, and followed in, the careers of his successors, Agrippa, Gaius and Lucius, and Tiberius himself.\textsuperscript{13} Tiberius noted that Drusus had a wife and three children, thereby qualifying for the privileged status conferred by the \textit{ius trium liberorum}, had reached the age at which Tiberius himself had been requested by Augustus to take up the same honour, had suppressed a mutiny and settled warfare, had celebrated a triumph, had held two consulships, and was being admitted to a task with which he was already familiar.\textsuperscript{14} In short, he was an ideal candidate for the succession and, thus, the tribunician power.

The letter to the Senate was met, predictably, with a virtual orgy of sycophancy as various senators vied with each other to win the highest esteem from the Emperor and his son. They poured forth decrees for the usual paraphernalia of adulation: images of the princes, altars, temples, arches, \textit{aliaque solita}. Even these honours did not seem exorbitant and shameless enough to several senators, such as Marcus Silanus, who sought to degrade the highest republican magistracy, the consulate, and thus, by extension, the Roman
aristocracy - including himself, by proposing that the Emperor's tribunician power rather than the consuls should be used henceforth to date public and private monuments. Another extremist was Quintus Haterius who proposed that the senatus consulta granting the tribunician power to Drusus be inscribed in gold letters in the curia. Apart from the ridiculous excess of the idea, it was also potentially blasphemous, since gold implied an association with the divine. Accordingly even the other senators could not take Haterius seriously. Yet such a proposal represented no more than the logical conclusion of the line taken by the Senate in general.

The senators did not get the warm response that they expected for their over-heated obsequiousness. The Emperor was plainly repelled by it, since it went so completely contrary to the moderation and reserve that he deemed essential for public conduct and which he tried to practise himself. He ordered the ceremonies decreed for the conferment to be toned down. He picked out for special criticism Haterius' extraordinary proposal. Drusus for his part sent the Senate a deferentially phrased letter of acceptance from Campania, but failed to return to Rome to be honoured in person.16

His ostensible lack of interest sparked a sudden and extreme shift of opinion in the Senate. The loss of all sense of proportion that the members had so recently demonstrated in their adulation they now manifested in an
explosion of high dudgeon and censure. They doubtless interpreted Drusus' aloofness as signalling that, as far as the Emperor and his son were concerned, the request for and granting of tribunician power amounted to mere formalities - like, by extension, the dignity and power of the Senate. It was only to be expected, then, that they should have judged Drusus as displaying extreme arrogance, insolence, and frivolity - preferring, apparently, a tour of Campania to a meeting with the Senate.

In point of fact, although he may have breached protocol, Drusus had not acted unconstitutionally. His letter of acceptance amounted to an acknowledgment of the Senate's right to confer the tribunician power. Since he had not infringed the Senate's jurisdiction, there was no necessity for him to return to Rome. He may, moreover, have wanted to conform to the Emperor's revulsion at the Senate's unseemly adulation. The adverse reaction to his absence may reveal more about the Senate's insecurity and hypocrisy and the inherent disjunction and deficiency of communication between princeps and Senate than about Drusus' true motives in declining to return to Rome.

The beginning of Drusus' tribunician power in 22 cannot be precisely dated. It seems most likely to have fallen in the first five months of the year. Since Tacitus indicates that the power was bestowed while both Tiberius and Drusus were absent from Rome, the conferment must have occurred before Tiberius' return in 22 to attend his sick
mother. Tiberius probably entered Rome in late April or early May of that year because, according to Tacitus, neque enim multo ante Livia had dedicated an effigy to the divine Augustus not far from the theatre of Marcellus, an event which took place according to the Fasti Praenestini on April 23rd. Drusus' tribunician power would thus probably have begun earlier than the renewal of Tiberius' own on June 26th or July 1st.18

The sources do not indicate the duration of the grant of the potestas. It is known that by the time he died in 23 Drusus had entered his second year, although no evidence survives of a formal renewal. Since, however, Augustus had given the power to Tiberius for periods of five and ten years, it may be reasonably inferred that the initial grant to Drusus had been made for at least five years.19

The sources do not reveal how Drusus employed the tribunician power in the rest of 22. Presumably he was involved in senatorial debates and legislation, though no evidence survives to link his name to any such activity. It is not even known when he returned to Rome from Campania. Since, however, he had apparently followed his father out of Rome, it is a reasonable assumption that he also followed him back during Livia's illness, if he had not returned before. Certainly as a pontifex, augur, and flamen Augustalis he would have been expected to attend the ludi magni decreed by the Senate in supplication for Livia and conducted by the priestly colleges of pontifices, augurs, quindecimvirs,
septemvirs, and Augustales. Not much else of what Drusus did in 22 can even be conjectured.

Other developments, however, must have affected him to greater or lesser degrees. His half-brother, Asinius Saloninus, died in 22. Their mother, Vipsania, had passed away in 20. Saloninus' father, Gaius Asinius Gallus, consul in 8 BC, had married Vipsania after her divorce from Tiberius in 12 BC. He was still alive in 22. From Gallus' and Vipsania's union Drusus had at least four other half-brothers who survived Saloninus. What sort of relations he had with any of them remains unknown, but the jealousy and hostility that Tiberius reputedly felt towards Gallus would not have encouraged close contact.

Drusus' attention would also have been held by the ongoing rise of Sejanus. Tiberius continued to shower him with extraordinary honours. He officially praised him for preventing the spread of the fire that destroyed Pompey's Theatre, and the Senate, with its usual fawning attention to the Emperor's preferences, proceeded to vote Sejanus a statue for display in the rebuilt Theatre. Not long afterwards, according to Tacitus, Tiberius, in awarding Junius Blaesus well-deserved triumphal insignia for his defeat of Tacfarinas in Africa, actually went so far as to assert that he made the award in honour of Sejanus, who was Blaesus' nephew. As Dessau remarks, such exaltation surely exceeded the value of what Sejanus had actually done and of who he actually was. It would certainly have aggravated the conflict of interests.
between him and Drusus.

It is possible that by AD 23, the last year of Drusus' life, Tiberius had decided to transfer the imperial dynasty from Germanicus' family to his own, that is, to Drusus and his sons. Tiberius had laid the groundwork for such a change when he had first requested the tribunician power for Drusus in 22. To be sure, his request did not of itself prove that he was beginning to swerve from Augustus' dynastic scheme. When Augustus had bestowed the tribunician power on Tiberius in AD 4, he had intended that its effect should be limited. He had wished to guarantee Tiberius as his successor on the understanding that the principate should pass after him to Germanicus. Tiberius had remained faithful to Augustus' wishes till the end of Drusus' second consulship in 21. Then, as the passage of time after Germanicus' death in 19 had begun to weaken his hold over the public mind, and as Drusus' twins had survived beyond early infancy, conditions had become ripe for Tiberius to contemplate, at least, a change of dynasty. The award of the tribunician power to Drusus in 22 made that change possible. This honour raised him above Germanicus in the imperial hierarchy for the first time in his career. The next logical step would give Drusus' sons precedence ahead of Germanicus' in the succession. Numismatic evidence suggests that Tiberius had such a development in mind by AD 23 at the latest.

Prominent among the three denominations of Drusan coins issued in 23, noted earlier, were the sestertii. The
extant examples carry Drusus' full range of titles and the letters S.C (Senatus Consulto) on the obverse. On the reverse they show a winged caduceus upright between two cornucopiae crossed near the points. From the mouth of each projects the draped bust of a little boy, facing inwards. On the lip of each cornucopia, just below the busts, hangs a bunch of grapes. The symbolism of this particular type is pregnant with significance for the imperial dynasty.

Before the main "message" of the coin type can be appreciated its various symbols must be understood. Eckhard Meise has undertaken a detailed comparative study of the combination of symbols on the Drusan "twins" coins which has enabled him to reach a convincing interpretation of their meaning. Much of what follows on this subject is based on his work. To begin with, there can be little doubt as to the identity of the two little boys represented by the busts in the cornucopiae. The pair of infants most closely associated with Drusus, whose name appears on the obverse of the coin, were his twin sons, Tiberius Gemellus and Germanicus, who were probably in their fourth year (that is, between their third and fourth birthday) in 23. The twins motif was also traditionally associated with fertility and good fortune. The cornucopia obviously represented fertility and abundance, but it also became a symbol for good fortune or success or, as the Romans would say, felicitas, and appeared frequently bearing this significance on Hellenistic coins. The caduceus also became a symbol for good fortune. As though to
represent a double portion of or double insurance for *felicitas*, the symbols began to be combined from at least the time of Mark Antony in the form of two crossed cornucopiae with a caduceus between them.27

The concentration and combination of symbols on the "twins" sestertii would have signified, then, a superabundance of *felicitas*. The occasion of all this *felicitas* could not have been the birth *per se* of the twins, for the sestertii were minted several years after that event. Nor could it have been Drusus' assumption of the tribunician power, for the coins' legends showed that he had entered his second year of that honour. In fact, as noted earlier, the legends borne on the "twins" coins emphasized not just Drusus' high honours but also his place in the unbroken line of the imperial succession. The twins represented the next link in the chain. It may be suggested, then, that the design on the "twins" sestertii was intended officially to signify that the Roman Empire had received the great *felicitas* of having the Augustan dynasty preserved through Drusus and his sons.28 These coins would have announced, in effect, that the imperial succession had shifted from Augustus' nearest kin, Germanicus, Agrippina, and their children, to Tiberius' descendants, Drusus and his two sons. This interpretation is supported by the absence of references to Germanicus and his children in the official Roman coin issues of AD 22 and 23. Drusus would now have completely superseded Germanicus (see Excursus I and II).
EXCURSUS I:
Change in the Succession:

Figurative Evidence Apart from Coins

...
somewhat idealized and uniform nature. Three groups have been proposed as the most likely subjects for the *phalerae* portraits: first, Tiberius' younger brother, Nero Drusus, and his children; second, Germanicus and his older children; and third, Drusus and his children. An ironclad case can be made for none of these identifications but the third group seems to match the *phalerae* portraits in more respects than the others. The bust of the adult, authoritative, military figure could plausibly represent Drusus, the son and successor of Tiberius after Germanicus' death in 19. The designs showing two children's heads could depict Tiberius Gemellus and his twin, Germanicus, flanking their father, Drusus. This correspondence is strengthened by the equal size of the children's heads, suggesting equal age, and by their appearance of infancy. The design with three infants' heads could include as a subject Drusus' third surviving child, his daughter, Julia. This identification might be supported by the apparent representation of a little girl's head over the central figure's right shoulder in at least one example of the third type of design.

If these medallions did represent Drusus and his children, it would follow that the series would have been intended to assert among the legions on the Rhine and Danube both the importance of Drusus in the Empire and the certainty and security of the imperial succession through him and his children. These particular military forces would have been selected for this message because they represented one of the
main concentrations of power in the whole Empire and thus constituted an essential base of support for any Emperor. Drusus' achievements in the area, specifically his quelling of the Pannonian mutiny and his pacification of the German frontier during his mission to Illyricum, made it particularly appropriate that he should be honoured among these legions. Further evidence of the official promotion among the frontier armies of Drusus, his position in the succession, and his dynasty may be provided by a helmet ornament, discovered at Amerongen in the Netherlands, depicting figures identified as Drusus and his two sons. The phalerae, then, could lend support to the theory that Tiberius had decided by AD 23 at the latest to transfer the succession from Germanicus' descendants to Drusus'.

The correspondence between the phalerae and Drusus' family does, however, have weaknesses. Julia, born no later than AD 8, was considerably older - and bigger - than her brothers, a disparity that clashes with the relative similarity in size between the third child's head and those of the other infants on the phalerae. Moreover, the third head on the phalerae may be male, which would effectively rule out Drusus' family. Drusus may have had a third son, but, even so, he would have died in AD 15, well before Drusus became the Emperor's primary successor. To circumvent these obstacles the argument has been made that the design with three infants' heads could allude to one of Drusus' qualifications for the tribunician power attested by Tiberius.
to the Senate: his three surviving children by Livilla and, thus, his satisfaction of the *ius trium liberorum*. That one of his children was much older than the others and a girl would not have mattered. It was the fact that there were *three* of them that would have counted.\(^{38}\) This argument, however, sounds contrived and, at any rate, can be used with equal force for the other groups proposed as subjects for the *phalerae* designs. So, while the case does seem best for Drusus and his family, conclusive identification of the glass medallions cannot be made.\(^{39}\)
EXCURSUS II:
Change in the Succession: Drusus' Sons and the Dioscuri

There is evidence that Drusus' twins may have been associated with the Dioscuri, which might in turn imply the transfer of the imperial dynasty from Germanicus' family to Drusus'. It appears that Tiberius had long had an interest in the twin gods. According to Dio and Suetonius he rebuilt and rededicated their temple in either AD 6 or 12, or both, and inscribed his own name as well as that of his dead brother, the elder Drusus, upon it. The obvious motif of matching pairs suggests that Tiberius not only honoured the cult of these gods, but even saw some sort of intimate connection between it and his family, or at least himself and his brother. The birth of twin grandsons in 19, a happy event rare, as Tacitus notes, even in modicis penatibus, may have seemed to Tiberius, in the light of his devotion to the twin deities, a propitious sign from heaven, which would help to explain his boundless joy and uncharacteristic boasting on the occasion. It would make sense, then, if this particular devotion continued to be fostered. No explicit evidence survives from Rome of an official association between Drusus' twins and the Dioscuri but a lead tessera from Rome is extant showing on its reverse two heads identified as those of Drusus' sons looking towards each other as in the "twins" sestertii, with a star emitting four rays over each, a significant arrangement because stars had
long served as important representative symbols of Castor and Pollux. It may be significant that a similar sort of arrangement appears on one of the controversial glass medallions discussed above. In this particular piece, fragmentary and showing a princely figure in the centre with two infants' heads at his shoulders, a star with six rays is fixed over each child's head. The idea of a link between Drusus' sons and the twin deities was also promulgated in the form of a cult in the eastern Empire. An inscription in Ephesus survives naming one Proclus as priest of Βέλους Διοσκόρου and another inscription seems to refer to the existence of the same cult at Salamis in Cyprus.41

The idea is important because of the close association between the Dioscuri and the principatus iuventutis which, under Augustus, had become synonymous with primacy in the imperial succession.42 Gaius and Lucius Caesar, first in line to the principate, had been designated principes iuventutis and had become, thus, leaders of the knights and intimately associated with the knights' patron deities, Castor and Pollux. Drusus and Germanicus had probably received the same title and association with the twin gods once they had been adopted into the imperial succession. It can be argued in reverse, then, that the official association of Drusus' sons with the Dioscuri would have entailed the reservation for them of the principatus iuventutis. The case may be strengthened by the special minting of the "twins" sesterti, because a special issue of
coins in honour of Gaius and Lucius Caesar was produced when they became *principes iuventutis*. Unlike the Gaius and Lucius coins the "twins" sestertii do not explicitly designate Drusus' sons by the title, but that omission may be explained by the fact that they were still too young in 23 to receive it. Otherwise, the similarities between the two cases add weight to the rest of the evidence that the *principatus iuventutis*, and the primacy in succession associated with it, had been reserved for the twins. Similarly, the fact that Germanicus' older sons, Nero and Drusus Caesar, had received no such extraordinary honours would suggest their subordination to Drusus' sons by 23.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 10

1. See Levick, 148, and Chapter 9, p. 243, f.n. 16.


4. The prestige of the tribunicia potestas: Tac. Ann. 3.56.2 refers to it as the summi fastigii vocabulum and says that by it Augustus cetera imperia praemineret. Its significance for the succession: Tacitus (ibid.) says that Augustus gave it to Tiberius ne successor in incerto foret.

5. Rogers, 130.


7. N. Degrassi, "Le iscrizioni di Brescia con una serie di nomi di imperatori," Rendiconti della Pontificia Accademia di Archeologia 42 (1969-1970): 140-156; 169-170. Degrassi, ibid., 140, gives the Drusus inscription the following reconstruction: [Dru]sus Caesar, [Ti.] Caesaris Au[g(usti)] f(i(lius)), t]ribia(unicia) potest(ate). Consistency with other ancient authorities: ibid., 165-66. Dr. D. Fishwick notes that an important study of the inscriptions on the Capitolium of Brescia is in preparation by G. Di Vita-Evrard. Further testimony to the promotion accorded by the tribunician power appears in the Chronica of Eusebius as translated by St. Jerome. The entry for the year AD 22 reads: Tiberius Drusum consortem regni facit (Eusebius-Jerome, Chronica, 147). Consors regni, again, indicates that Romans regarded recipients of the tribunician power as colleagues of the Emperor.


9. Coin themes: see Sutherland, 110-111. For the association of members of the imperial family with virtues see Fishwick, II.1, "Augustan Blessings and Virtues," forthcoming.

11. Mommsen, RS (3rd ed.) II, 1161. Mommsen, ibid., and fn.1 (and, following him, Rogers, 131) argues that the Emperor had the right to co-opt a colleague in the tribunician power without recourse to either the popular assemblies or, possibly, even the Senate, but the texts that he cites, Suet. Aug. 27 and Dio 54.12, do not unequivocally support his position.

12. Tiberius' withdrawal to Campania: Tac. Ann. 3.31.2; Drusus' presence in Campania: Tac. Ann. 3.59.3.


20. Rogers, 103. Drusus had been pontifex since AD 8, as noted above (see p. 68), and flamen Augustalis and augur probably after Germanicus' death in AD 19. The dates of his admission into his other priesthoods are unknown. On his priesthoods, see PIR (2nd ed.) I no. 219, p. 176, and Rogers, 102-103. On the ludi magni: see Tac. Ann. 3.64.
21. Death of Saloninus: Tac. Ann. 3.75.1. Drusus' other half-brothers: see "Gaius Asinius Gallus," PIR (2nd ed.) AB 1229, esp. pp. 248-49. One of them might actually have been his full brother, that is, Tiberius' son, if any credence can be given to Dio's claim that when Augustus forced Tiberius to divorce Vipsania she not only had borne one child but also was pregnant again (Dio 54.31.2).


23. Tac. Ann. 3.56.

24. See, e.g., BMC I, p. 133, no. 95.


26. Twins motif: Paul Zanker, The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus, trans. Alan Shapiro (Ann Arbor: 1988), 172-174. The powerful symbolism of twins is employed, for example, in a panel on the Ara Pacis Augustae in which the goddess Pax appears holding an infant in each arm. The twins in this instance are thought to be associated with such positive qualities as peace, good fortune, fertility, growth, and hope.

27. On the meaning and history of the cornucopia, caduceus, and felicitas: Meise (1966), 12. On the Commagene dupondii, ibid., and see BMC I, pp. 144-45, nos. 174-176; pl. 26.11. Under Tiberius, whose military success had given him the reputation of felicitas, the combined symbols were used on dupondii minted in Commagene in AD 20-21 - only two years or so before the issue of Drusus' "twins" coins. From Galba's time on, when the goddess Felicitas appeared on imperial coinage she usually had the caduceus and cornucopia as her special attributes.

28. Meise (1966), 16-17. A series of coins with similar significance was minted in Cyrenaica. Their obverse legend emphasizes Drusus' close relationship to the Emperor. The legend, which has minor variations in spelling through the series, generally reads as follows: ΑΠΟΣΟΞ ΚΑΙΣΑΡ ΑΥΓΟΣΤΟΥ ΥΙΟΣ. On the reverse, as though to seal the continuity of the new succession, the abbreviations ΤΙΒ ΡΕΡ appear above the profiles of the small Tiberius Gemellus and Germanicus facing each other and surmounting the word, ΚΑΙΣΑΡΕΣ (BM Catalogue, Cyrenaica, vol. 28, p. 121, nos. 49-52; pl. 44.7-10). Coin issues with remarkably similar combinations of symbols were later used to convey
basically the same idea for other dynasties in the Roman world. Under Antoninus Pius a series of coins was minted showing crossed cornucopiae surmounted by little boys' busts, with the variation of ears of corn instead of grapes issuing from the mouths of the cornucopiae. The extra felicitas symbol, the winged caduceus, was absent from the type. The little boys depicted in this instance were the twins born in AD 149 by Faustina to Marcus Aurelius, the adopted son of Pius. Significantly, the expression TEMPORVM FELICITAS appeared on the reverses of these coins. Meise (1966), 13 believes that Pius had the issue minted to show that the continuity of the imperial family had been secured through the birth of twins to his adopted son (On these Pius coins see BMC IV, p. 97, nos. 678-679; p. 298, nos. 1827-1829; p. 299, no. 1834; p. 342; pl. 14.13, 44.13, 45.5). A similar coin type from Commagene dated to AD 72 shows an obverse impression of two crossed cornucopiae, each surmounted by a child's head with an anchor between them, and above the anchor a star. The youths represented here are the sons of Antiochus IV of Commagene, Epiphanes and Callinicus. The connection between these symbols of good fortune and the dynasty of Antiochus IV is confirmed by the legend on the obverse: ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΒΙΟΝ (Meise [1966], 13-14; see BM Catalogue, Galatia, etc., vol. 20, p. 110, no. 8; p. 111, no. 10; pl. XV.6).

29. Meise, 62; see Zeitschrift für Numismatik 33 (1922): 179, no. 8, pl. VI.4; 182, pl. VI.7.


31. including, by Alföldi's classification, Types III, IV, V, and VI; see Meise (1966), 18-19.

32. Harden, 22.

34. Zwierlein-Diehl, 110.

35. See Zanker, op. cit., 160.


37. See Dio 57.14.6 and Chapter 5, p. 136 above.

38. Tac. Ann. 3.56.4; Meise (1966), 19.

39. For criticism on minor stylistic points of the identification of Drusus and his children on the phalerae, see Zwierlein-Diehl, 110. For possible evidence in Roman cameos of the transfer of the imperial dynasty to Drusus' family see M.-L. Vollenwieder, "Der Onyx in Schaffhausen," Helvetia Archaeologica 2 (1971): 78-89.


42. Rogers, 97.


44. Meise (1966), 18; Meise, 64-65. On certain dupondii Nero and Drusus Caesar do appear together on horseback in a pose suggestive of leaders of the knights and, thus, principes iuventutis, though with no titles except their names (see BMC I, cxlvi and 154, nos. 44, 70, and 71; pl. 29[1] and 30[2]). These coins were minted, however, under Caligula and may indicate nothing more than insecurity on his part. He may have felt that he had to
propagandize in order to buttress the legitimacy of the claim of Germanicus' older sons - and thus of his own - to the imperial succession, - a need that could only have arisen had Tiberius actually given precedence to Drusus' offspring over Germanicus'.
CHAPTER 11: THE DEATH OF DRUSUS

The year AD 23 marked the climax of Drusus' career. He was distinguished by an impressive list of honours appropriate to his high status and responsibility within the state. Out of respect for him and, probably, to obtain his patronage, a number of small communities had elected him to various civic offices. He is known to have been made dictator of Aricia and duovir and praefectus quinquennalis at, respectively, Praeneste and Aquinum in Latium. Coins from Spain indicate that he was made duovir in Acci and quattuorvir in Carteia. As noted earlier he had become quattuorvir quinquennalis at Salona during his mission to Illyricum. He had been inducted into all the great priestly colleges of Rome, the pontifices, the augures, and the quindecimviri sacris faciundis, and had joined as well the exclusive ranks of the Sodales Augustales and Fratres Arvales. He had shown a high level of competence in the political and military tasks assigned to him and had won an ovatio. He had had two consulships and had been exalted with the tribunicia potestas. Finally, it is possible that Tiberius had transferred the imperial dynasty to him. If such was the case, then no higher honour remained for Drusus except the principate itself. He had, moreover, the early prospect of holding that office in all but name if Tiberius would, as seemed likely, follow through on his wish to retire to Campania from his duties in Rome. Yet, precisely at the
point when the supreme power seemed within his grasp, disaster struck. On September 14th in 23 Drusus died.³

At the time he was thought to have succumbed to a natural illness. No artificial, sinister agency was suspected. His deterioration was lingering and gradual—exactly the opposite of the expected development of a criminal assault—such as poisoning. Nor was ill health unknown to him. Only two years before he had become so sick that the unlucky Clutorius Priscus had written a poem anticipating his death.⁴ It is not surprising, then, that neither Tiberius nor even Drusus himself had, at the time, the slightest suspicion of foul play. Throughout his son's decline, and even after his death, Tiberius continued to follow his usual routine without any sign of anxiety. He believed that his son's death was due to illness compounded by intemperance. In fact, no one at the time publicly expressed any suspicions and the symptoms of Drusus' decline can be considered all the more unsuspicious for having been accepted as such in so poison-conscious an age.⁵ The unanimous impression at the time was that he had died a natural, albeit premature, tragic death.

According to the extant tradition, however, that was not the final verdict. Eight years after Drusus' death Sejanus' widow, Apicata, allegedly gave a different explanation. After learning that her children had been condemned to death in the general judicial bloodbath following Sejanus' downfall, and after seeing her eldest
son's mangled corpse exposed on the Gemonian Stairs, Apicata, before her own suicide, is said to have written a final letter to Tiberius. In it she is supposed to have made the devastating allegation that Livilla had been involved with Sejanus in compassing Drusus' death. The putative letter became the warrant for Tiberius to launch a ruthless and wide-ranging inquisition. In the course of the investigation Apicata's information was confirmed in detail through torture of the eunuch Lygdus, one of Drusus' favourite servants, and of Livilla's physician Eudemus, both of whom allegedly acted as her accomplices. At the same time, a second rumour that Tiberius had been involved in killing his son also began circulating. Both Tacitus and Dio report the story, but it can have been nothing more than malicious gossip, for both authors expressly repudiate Tiberius' guilt. The central claim of both reports, however, that Drusus had been murdered by poison, was never impugned.

The investigation launched by Tiberius produced a detailed reconstruction of the alleged plot against his son. According to this scenario Sejanus, seeing Drusus as the first and principal obstacle to his rise to power, and feeling additionally embittered after their mutual animosity had erupted, on at least one occasion, into a scuffle, resolved to do away with him. In order to get at Drusus he had to get close to him, which, because of their bad relations, meant getting close to the people nearest him instead. To that end he seduced Drusus' wife, Livilla, and,
winning her over through promises of love, marriage, and a share in the Empire, made her his partner in crime. To remove any doubts that Livilla might entertain about his sincerity, and thus about the plot itself, Sejanus divorced Apicata, mother of his three children. Livilla's friend and physician, Eudemus, was brought into the plot. He had expertise in the administration of drugs, and the physician's normal practice of frequent, private visits to his patient, in this case, Livilla (and possibly Drusus as well), made him an ideal go-between. Livilla's eunuch, Lygdus, was also suborned, probably because he was one of Drusus' favourite slaves and had easy access to him. With his "team" in place, Sejanus decided to use a slow-acting poison whose symptoms would give the appearance of a natural disease. Lygdus administered it. The whole operation, again, according to the tradition inherited by Seneca, Tacitus, Dio, Suetonius, and Eusebius, met with complete and undiscovered success.

The plot theory is, however, problematic. There can be little reasonable doubt that an allegation of conspiracy was either made to or concocted by Tiberius. Various ancient authors, including Tacitus, Dio, and Suetonius, refer either directly or implicitly to the tradition that Drusus was murdered. No writer expressly contradicts it. The validity of the evidence on which the tradition was based, however, is another matter altogether. None of the evidence survives first-hand and the truth of what the sources transmit is not self-evident.
The alleged method of murder raises a serious difficulty of proof. As noted, no one suspected poisoning when Drusus died, and, even if they had, the rudimentary forensic science of the day would probably not have permitted a conclusive judgment, as the earlier controversy over the cause of Germanicus' death demonstrated. Obviously no objective evidence of poison could have survived when Apicata is supposed to have made her accusation, some eight years after the fact. It follows, then, that the entire case against Livilla, Sejanus, and the other alleged conspirators depended on the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony.

Their credibility, however, is not patent. Apicata and her "evidence" are the most enigmatic elements of the whole story. Fundamental aspects of her putative letter foster misgivings. If she did write it, her circumstances suggest that she could have been motivated more by revenge than the simple desire to unburden her conscience. First, the timing of her disclosure must raise suspicions. She would have written her letter some eight years subsequent to the alleged murder and only after she had received the horrific news that her children had been condemned to death and she had undergone the traumatic experience of seeing her son's dead body exposed to public view. Evidently, neither concern for the imperial family, nor a guilty conscience, nor even the simple desire to prevent a crime could have been her primary motivation. Second, she would have had just cause
for wanting revenge. Sejanus, Tiberius, and possibly Livilla, had, in their own ways, damaged or destroyed much of what Apicata must have considered most precious. Both Tacitus and Dio record that Sejanus divorced her to please Livilla. If he did, then, whether the separation occurred before or after Drusus' death in 23, Apicata would have felt resentful towards her. Tiberius, for his part, bore responsibility for the judicial murder of Apicata's children in the general pogrom that he unleashed against Sejanus' connections in 31. Third, if Apicata did seek revenge against these tormentors, it would be difficult to imagine a more effective instrument than her last letter. It would bring about the disgrace and execution of her rival, Livilla, and overwhelm Tiberius with renewed grief in the belief that his only son had been cuckolded and murdered by his own wife, the Emperor's niece, and by his most trusted henchman. He would also be racked with doubt about the legitimacy of Drusus' twins and with shame and rage that he had been duped for so long by Sejanus, the man whom he had called his socius laborum. In addition, Sejanus' name and memory would be further vilified after his execution for plotting against Tiberius. It is entirely conceivable, then, that a woman so wronged and desperate as Apicata could have concocted the story of a murder conspiracy as a final, crushing blow against her enemies.

Another aspect of Apicata's testimony troubles as well: how she came upon her information. The argument can
be made that, unless she approved of or was actually involved in the plot against Drusus, she must surely have been the last person on earth to whom her initially adulterous and subsequently estranged husband would have revealed his most important - and secret - plans, particularly since she could have used that knowledge to avenge her shattered marriage and wounded pride. Difficulty in perceiving the provenance of the story must raise doubts as to its genuineness. In fact, the very existence of so problematic a letter, or, at least, of convincing evidence within such a letter, can be questioned. Even if Apicata had supplied detailed information about the supposed plot, her denunciation would have lacked direct, concrete proof. Tiberius, moreover, would have had to have been aware that the circumstances of the letter's composition rendered its contents highly suspect. Certainly it is hard to see how the letter, by itself, could have convinced him to embark upon the fierce prosecution which, according to Dio, would have as one of its consequences the death of Livilla, his own niece and daughter-in-law. His vehement reaction would make more sense if he considered the letter's validity to be demonstrated by his own, deep-rooted suspicions rather than vice versa, or if the letter supplied him with a convenient excuse for pre-determined action instead of with a primary motive. It is even conceivable that he might have concocted either the letter or its allegations further to justify his prosecution of Sejanus and his connections.
The secondary witnesses, Lygdus and Eudemus, do not inspire much confidence either. They yielded evidence under torture. In the absence of further details about the process of interrogation such evidence may be legitimately queried. Since, then, as far as is known, the whole case for conspiracy rested on the alleged testimony of Apicata, Lygdus, and Eudemus alone, the claim that Drusus was murdered cannot be accepted with assurance (see Excursus I).

Whatever its true cause, Drusus' death cut him off in the full flower of his career. He continued the unhappy tradition of those who shared the ill-starred second consulship with Tiberius. It was, for his family, a personal tragedy of the greatest magnitude. It would have major consequences for Tiberius' principate and the Julio-Claudian dynasty.
EXCURSUS I:
Assessment of the Murder Story

It is not difficult to conceive how the story that Drusus was murdered could have come to dominate the historical tradition. In keeping with Tacitus' observation that writers tended to distort the histories of the Julio-Claudian emperors through fear while they were alive and through hatred after they were dead, one might expect that Tiberius' contemporary annalists recorded uncritically his version of Drusus' death. Upon Caligula's accession, pro-Julian writers would have noted that the murder conspiracy story worked to the benefit of their Emperor and his family, for it cast in a very bad light their mortal enemy, Sejanus, and one of their dynastic rivals, Livilla, the mother of Gemellus, and it worked to embarrass and diminish the previous Emperor and his son. The story cast Drusus as a cuckold succumbing to a sordid fate, insinuated that Gemellus might be a product of adultery, and represented Tiberius to have been duped for a long time by his right-hand man. The Claudian house was shown, in effect, to have imploded, an ideal development as far as the pro-Julians would have been concerned. The latter would, then, have retained and embedded the murder conspiracy story in the historical tradition.

It is much more difficult to estimate the likelihood of the alleged conspiracy to murder Drusus. There is no
objective means by which to ascertain the extent of any distortion wrought by the original source tradition. This tradition, as taken up by later authors whose works have survived, does have some prima facie implausible elements. In particular, Livilla's motives are difficult to understand. Tacitus says that, after seducing her, Sejanus was able to gain her complicity by holding out the prospect of marriage (to himself), a share of power (consortium regni) and, last but not least, the death of her husband. Yet Livilla's position as wife of Drusus already guaranteed her, in practical terms, more than Sejanus could hope to offer. By 21, in all likelihood, and certainly by 22 and 23, the last possible date for the beginning of the putative conspiracy, Drusus had been confirmed as the next Augustus and, thus, Livilla as the next Livia. Drusus' position - and survival - assured excellent prospects for her sons, including, possibly, primacy in the succession. In 23, for all his influence with Tiberius, Sejanus was still merely Prefect of the Praetorian Guard, and, for all his ambitions, could not, as a knight, guarantee that he would rise any higher even if Drusus were to die. It would have been irrational for Livilla to exchange Drusus for Sejanus on a straight comparison of what each could offer her. One may wonder, too, about the fairness of the tradition's treatment of Sejanus. However ambitious he might have been and whatever antipathy might have existed between him and Drusus, he was entirely dependent on Drusus' father for advancement. There
is no proof that he ever forgot that fact or that, while looking out for his own interests, he ever swerved from loyal service to his Emperor. Once, he even risked his own life to protect Tiberius from falling rocks. The surviving historical record does not convincingly demonstrate that he plotted against Tiberius in 31. Nothing is preserved about the evidence against him except mention by Josephus of an accusatory letter from Antonia to Tiberius. It can be legitimately queried, then, whether he would have engaged in such egregious, anomalous - not to mention dangerous - treachery as to commit adultery with the Emperor's own niece and daughter-in-law and to plot against the life of his son with a view to dethroning eventually Tiberius himself.

It is possible to reconstruct how Livilla and Sejanus might have become saddled with a murder charge even if they were, in fact, innocent. Upon Drusus' death from natural causes in 23, Livilla would have suddenly found herself without any dynastic prospects either for herself or her children. Agrippina's sons were considerably older than her own so that, of necessity, Tiberius would have had to restore primacy in succession to them. The only person with any chance of gaining an advance on them would have been Sejanus, now the Emperor's closest associate and most powerful minister. If Livilla could ally herself with him, he might be able to pull her and her sons ahead of Agrippina and hers. Livilla, for her part, could offer Sejanus an extra connection with the imperial family and thus ease his way to
becoming the Emperor's primary successor. With each able to help the other it would make perfect sense for the pair to collaborate. Since the best means of cementing their alliance would be marriage, their plans would inevitably involve consortium regni and spem coniugii for Livilla and, for Sejanus, divorce from Apicata. Consistently with this scenario, according to which Sejanus and Livilla would have begun to work together only after Drusus' death, Sejanus would have first openly proposed marriage only in AD 25. Apicata would conceivably have felt resentful towards both Sejanus and Livilla whether Sejanus put her and their three children away before or after Drusus' death. Her resentment could have spurred her, broken in 31 with sorrow and despair, to defame both ex-husband and rival by fabricating their participation in a plot to murder Drusus. Whatever the origin of the allegation, coming as it did so soon after Sejanus' arrest and execution for sedition, it would have reached Tiberius when he was all too ready to believe the worst about his former henchman and friend and, thus, about everyone connected to him. He would have been very much inclined to deduce manifest confirmation of the allegation by extrapolating backwards in time the close relations of Sejanus and Livilla after Drusus' death to a vicious liaison before it. Lygdus and Eudemus would then have been forced, by torture, to confess to the details of the "deduction." Thus, the whole story of the conspiracy could have been fabricated by a distrustful Emperor from circumstantial
evidence distorted by a spurned wife.21 Arguments, however, run the other way as well. The surviving tradition does have the virtue of internal consistency. Tacitus says that Sejanus was able to persuade Livilla to help him only after he had seduced her. If she had become so enamoured of Sejanus as to give her desire to marry him priority over all other considerations, then of course she would have seen Drusus as an intolerable obstacle. Once she had agreed to get rid of him she would have had no other option but to look to Sejanus to guarantee her consortium regni. If she did initially, irrationally commit herself to Sejanus under the power of infatuation, the rest of her alleged conduct would fall into place. Other references to Livilla within the historical tradition are consistent with this dark picture. In a passage disparaging physicians, the elder Pliny alleges that Livilla had an adulterous relationship with Eudemus, who was implicated in the plot against Drusus. In AD 34 Mamercus Aemilius Scaurus was arraigned in part on a charge of adultery with her. These reports should be considered with caution. Writing after Tiberius' reign, Pliny could well have inherited an anti-Claudian source tradition. So, elsewhere, he alleges that both Drusus and his father were alcoholics. After Livilla's name had been dragged in the mud in 31 adultery would have been a credible - and convenient - charge, whether true or not, in the prosecution of any of her male acquaintances, such as Scaurus. Nevertheless, within the
tradition itself, however slanted and otherwise defective it might be, Livilla's alleged connection with Sejanus does not appear anomalous.\textsuperscript{22}

The theory, moreover, that Sejanus took the initiative in the plot is entirely consistent with the rest of the main historical tradition. He is represented as having resolutely and unscrupulously pursued, for a number of years, the grand goal of supreme power in the Empire. In the light of this ambition the decision to eliminate Drusus in 23 would have made good sense. First of all, in a \textit{plena Caesarum domus} Drusus would have represented the chief obstacle across his path. To achieve his ultimate goal, thus, Sejanus would have had no choice but to start by getting rid of him.\textsuperscript{23} Secondly, Sejanus could very reasonably have reckoned that the disappearance of Drusus from the scene in 23 would place Tiberius in a situation analogous to that in which Augustus had found himself after the deaths of Marcellus in 23 BC, Agrippa in 12 BC, and Gaius in AD 4: alone, with the heirs to the throne too young to help shoulder the burdens of empire, or with no heirs at all. In all three cases Augustus had resolved the problem by appointing someone close to him as colleague and regent-successor. Agrippa first and then Tiberius had filled these roles - Tiberius, of course, actually becoming Emperor. From these precedents Sejanus could realistically foresee that the death of Drusus would place primacy in the succession legitimately within his grasp. From that superior
position he would be able to deal with Drusus' twins, Agrippina and her numerous offspring, and even Tiberius himself at his leisure.

Certainly the removal of Drusus could not have been delayed much beyond 23. Germanicus' oldest son, Nero, who had received the *toga virilis* in 20 and, among other honours, the *quinquennium* for the quaestorship, was probably about seventeen years old in 23. In two or three years at most he would be able to enter the *cursus honorum* and thus provide Tiberius with a back-up for Drusus. In 23 Tiberius bestowed the same honours upon Germanicus' second son, Drusus. The promotions would have brought home to Sejanus, if he had not worried about it before, that additional obstacles would inevitably rise between himself and Tiberius - and thus the supreme power - if he did not soon leapfrog ahead by removing and replacing the Emperor's primary successor.²⁴

Drusus would have seemed to Sejanus not just the principal obstacle to his eventual goal but also an active adversary whose growing power and position in the state made him increasingly dangerous. Drusus, according to Tacitus, *impatiens aemuli*, saw clearly and did not hesitate to complain openly about Sejanus' undue influence in the state, his *de facto* rivalry with the Emperor's own son for the position of second-in-command, and his supreme ambition: the throne itself. Sejanus would have been aware of the possibility that Drusus' frequent denunciations might before long overcome Tiberius' partiality to his *socius laborum*.
Sejanus would have feared that contingency because he would not be able to withstand Drusus' hostility for long without the Emperor's protection.25

The bad blood between the two would have been exacerbated by their fight. Whether one accepts Dio's version that Sejanus first struck Drusus or Tacitus' version that Drusus got in the first blow, the fact is that even the hint of involvement in a violent altercation with the Emperor's successor might turn the Emperor and his supporters against Sejanus. Even if it did not arouse others' enmity, the brawl would only have intensified Drusus' animosity, making the threat posed by him much graver and thus giving Sejanus extra incentive to remove it as soon as possible. In addition, of course, Sejanus would have been smarting himself from the altercation, with the result that Drusus would have been the object not only of his fear but of his hatred as well - a deadly combination for Drusus and a sharper spur to Sejanus.26

Sejanus would also have been worried that, in view of Tiberius' loathing for government and his rapid elevation of Drusus in the years 21 to 23, he might intend to delegate his imperial power and responsibilities to his son in the near future and resume the longed for retirement that he had commenced in 21. That development would leave Sejanus alone in Rome confronted by an extremely powerful and hostile imperial regent. He might well have taken Tiberius' formal commendation of Drusus before the Senate early in 23,
particularly for his "paternal benevolence" towards Germanicus' children, as a sign that the dreaded state of affairs would come about sooner than later, and so realized that he must act to prevent it in that very year.\textsuperscript{27}

There is nothing within the surviving tradition, then, to contradict its claim that Sejanus and Livilla conspired with others to murder Drusus. It must not be overlooked, however, that that tradition's representation of the pair might consist of nothing less than a hatchet job, perpetrated first by pro-Tiberian writers after Sejanus' fall in 31, and preserved and refined by anti-Claudian authors after Caligula's accession. In the final analysis Drusus' death remains a mystery. Except for its date, his end is as shrouded as his birth.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 11

1. Drusus' minor civic offices: see PIR (2nd ed.) I 219, p. 176. Aricia: Eph. Epigr. 7, 1236; Praeneste: CIL XIV 2984; Aquinum: CIL X 5393, 5494; Acci: Mon. Hisp. 3.121, n. 6; Carteia: Mon. Hisp. 3.25, n. 6; Salona: CIL III 14712 = ILS 7160, see Chapter 6, p. 163.

2. Tiberius first showed this inclination in 21 (Tac. Ann. 3.31.2). He returned to Rome in 22 only because of his mother's serious illness (3.64.1).


4. On the natural appearance of Drusus' illness see Dio 57.22.3. Clutorius Priscus: Tac. Ann. 3.49.1. See also Dessau, 32-33, and pp. 235-40 above.


6. The deaths of Apicata's children: Dio 58.11.5-6 says that Apicata composed her accusatory letter to Tiberius after all her children, including her daughter, had been executed and she had seen their bodies exposed on the Gemonian Stairs. The Fasti Ostienses, however, (Ital. Inscr. 13.1, pp. 186-89 = CIL XIV, suppl., no. 4533, col. II, 15-17), supported by the surviving fragment of Tacitus' narrative on the subject (Ann. 5.9), indicate that only Apicata's older son, Strabo, perished before she committed suicide, and that her younger children, Capito and Junilla, were not slain till later. According to the Fasti Ostienses Sejanus was executed on October 10th and Strabo on October 24th, Apicata killed herself on October 26th, and Capito and Junilla were executed in December, all in AD 31. The discrepancy might be explained by Dio's tendencies to ignore inscripotional evidence and to dramatize his narrative. His slight departure from strict accuracy in these details, however, cannot undermine the tradition, implicitly supported by Tacitus (who otherwise agrees with the Fasti Ostienses), of Apicata's letter. (See Tac. Ann. 4.8.1 and 4.11.2; and J.P.V.D. Balsdon, "The "Murder" of Drusus, Son of Tiberius," CR 65 [1951]: 75. Cf. Eisenhut, 126-27).


9. Sejanus' decision to eliminate Drusus: Tac. Ann. 4.3.1-2; Dio 57.22.1-2. His corruption of Livilla: Tac. Ann. 4.3.3-4; Dio 57.22.2. His divorce from Apicata: Tac. Ann. 4.3.5; see Dio 58.11.6. Eudemus: Tac. Ann. 4.3.4; Lygdus: 4.8.1, 4.10.2. Nipperdey, in his commentary on Ann. 4.8, suggests that Lygdus may actually have served as Drusus' food-taster; so, too, the eunuch Halotus tested the Emperor Claudius' food - and poisoned him; see Stein, "Lygdus," RE (1927) 13.2, p. 2226. Poison and its administration: Tac. Ann. 4.8.1; Dio 57.22.2.

The record leaves no indication of the identity or even the symptoms of the "poison" that allegedly killed Drusus. Tacitus says only that Sejanus chose one that was slow-acting. For a list of the various animal, plant, and mineral poisons available to the ancients, see Ch. Lecrivain, "Veneficium, Venenum," DS 5 (1919): 713-15, and W. Morel, "Gifte," RE Suppl. 5 (1931): 223-28. Aconite in its various forms was perhaps the poison "par excellence" in the Greek and Roman worlds. It is said, however, to have worked very swiftly, and so must be excluded as a possible cause of Drusus' death. See Wagler, "Ἄκοβιτας," RE 1 (1893): 1178-83. Chronic arsenic poisoning seems also to have been well known. It could take up to two or even three months to kill; see F. D'erce, "La mort de Germanicus et les poisons de Caligula," Janus 56 (1969): 138, 139.

10. See note 8 above. Jos. AJ 18.206 says that Tiberius was left with no legitimate children because Drusus, his only son, happened to have died (ἦτε ἡγεμόνει τέκνων). From this statement some have concluded that Josephus believed that Drusus had died a natural death (see Spengel, 60; Eisenhut, 128; Meise, 50-51, 54-55). In fact, Josephus' words, viewed by themselves, could apply just as well if Drusus had been murdered. Moreover, in this particular context Josephus is concerned to note Tiberius' lack of surviving legitimate sons, not the manner or cause of Drusus' death. It can be argued that Josephus would certainly have reported Drusus' murder if he had known about it. Even so, however, Josephus was often mistaken or ignorant about affairs in Rome, so that his failure to assert that Drusus was poisoned cannot be taken as proof that he died of natural causes.


12. Tac. Ann. 4.3.5; Dio 58.11.6.


15. Dio 58.11.7.


17. Tac. Ann. 4.3.3.

18. See Dessau, 32; Eisenhut, 127; E. Meissner, Seian, Tiberius und die Nachfolge im Prinzipat (Erlangen: 1968), 28; Seager, 182; and Spengel, 57-58.


21. See, e.g., Eisenhut, 127-28; Meissner, *op. cit.*., 28; Maranon, 124.


26. Dio's version of the fight: 57.22.1-2; Tacitus' version: Ann. 4.3.1-2. On the effects of the fight see Marsh, 162-63, and Rogers, 150.

27. Tac. Ann. 4.4; Seager, 182-83.
Drusus' death elicited much open expression of grief. In the *curia*, before the funeral, the consuls sat on public benches as a sign of mourning and, when Tiberius addressed them, the whole Senate burst into tears. After he had commended to them Germanicus' sons, Nero and Drusus, the senators broke down and wept again. They added prayers for good fortune. Later, at the funeral, the Roman people wept.¹

Tacitus adds a discordant note to the description of general sorrow. He says that the mourning of the Senate and people was more simulated than sincere and that, secretly, they rejoiced at the revival of the prospects of Germanicus' family.² On what evidence he could, a century or so after the fact, so subtly probe the public's true feelings, he does not reveal. One suspects that he may be passing on uncritically the propaganda of pro-Julian, anti-Claudian sources. They would have regarded Drusus' death as an unexpected stroke of good luck since it restored primacy in the succession, and, thus, the principate, to direct descendants of Augustus. They would probably have been only too willing to believe that the population at large shared their partisan elation. Tacitus' assertion of general hypocrisy can, then, be considered with a high degree of scepticism.

Moreover, even if it were true it could be explained on grounds other than public dislike of Drusus. First of all
it should be noted that, by Tacitus' own account, the hypocritical display of mourning and secret feelings of joy were occasioned not by Drusus' death but by Tiberius' official eulogy. So the people may not have been reacting so much against Drusus as against Tiberius' speech. Since his speech was probably similar in substance and tone to the one he had delivered earlier to the Senate after commending to them Germanicus' two oldest sons, it would not be surprising if the response was also the same. On the earlier occasion, says Tacitus, the senators at first felt and expressed genuine sorrow at Drusus' death, and pity for Tiberius. Once, however, he had launched into sentimental bombast on the restoration of the republic and variations on that hackneyed theme, which no one believed he was serious about, the response changed completely. Since everyone supposed that the Emperor was indulging in maudlin hypocrisy on this subject, they lost all faith in the sincerity of his grief, and they themselves cynically joined in the sham. Memorials were decreed for the Emperor's son, not out of genuine sorrow, but ut ferme amat posterior adulatio. Just as Tiberius' presumed hypocrisy had contaminated this earlier occasion of mourning, so it would have contaminated Drusus' funeral. Revulsion for Tiberius would have turned the whole event into a sham. Secondly, Tacitus does not in any case ascribe to the Romans hatred for Drusus (except to the extent that he was linked in men's minds with his father) so much as happiness at the revived prospects for Germanicus' house,
which offered a convenient counterpoint to the hated Tiberius. If there were any truth to Tacitus' claim of insincerity it would mean simply that Drusus' true worth had been obscured by bitter partisan antipathy.

During and after Drusus' last illness Tiberius hid his grief beneath his characteristic reserve. A model of stoic impassivity, he continued to attend the Senate regularly even while his son was in extremis. When the consuls tried to show sorrow, he mildly corrected them by reminding them of their honour and place. He informed the other senators, without, apparently, showing any emotion, that he sought his consolation e complexu rei publicae. Even during the funeral itself, while everyone else was weeping, he showed the same steely resolve, and when he stood next to his son's body he adhered rigorously to the taboo imposed on the pontifex maximus of never gazing on a corpse. As Seneca remarks, he gave Sejanus, who was standing at his side, an object lesson quam patienter posset suos perdere. After the funeral, true to his word to the Senate, he set aside no time for mourning but plunged back into affairs of state.4

Suetonius construes Tiberius' reserve and steady devotion to business during this period as proof that he did not love his son.5 The biographer is probably merely relaying a libel of the anti-Claudian source tradition. Sufficient evidence survives to indicate that Tiberius did love Drusus and was, for all his outward appearance, deeply aggrieved by his death. If he did not withdraw from business


during his illness and death, he at least revealed the inner desire to unburden himself of his family and state responsibilities: he entrusted Germanicus' sons to the care of the Senate and talked about restoring the republic and giving up the reins of government. The Senate did not believe Tiberius, but his words and behaviour could just as well reflect a genuine mood as a serious plan to abdicate. The very fact that he had not mentioned such ideas since the death of Augustus would in itself suggest that he was profoundly shaken by his son's death. Josephus says plainly that Tiberius forbade the friends of his dead son to come into his presence because the mere sight of them would recall him to memory and stir up his grief. Dio says that Tiberius was devoted to Drusus as his only legitimate son and links this attachment to the terrible vengeance that the Emperor wrought upon those whom he suspected of favouring his son's death. Suetonius himself, the main authority for the tradition that Tiberius loathed Drusus, reports his extraordinary diligence in prosecuting those suspected of implication in the alleged murder conspiracy - a diligence that would be hard to explain if the Emperor had been indifferent. Tacitus, so strongly biased against Tiberius, nevertheless scrupulously refrains from accusing him of a lack of paternal affection, a defect he would most assuredly have highlighted had he evidence of it. So Tiberius' continuing preoccupation with state business was more likely a deliberate effort to distract himself rather than a sign of
indifference. Indeed his behaviour throughout the period of his son's decline could probably be summed up most accurately as an exercise of will-power, as Tacitus himself suggests. It would all have been a desperate attempt to control his distress. The effort was not uncharacteristic. Tiberius, so restrained and inscrutable in all other areas of his life, came by it naturally. He showed the same reserve at the death of other family members: his beloved brother, Nero Drusus, and his mother, Livia. He was, after all, only fulfilling the stoical dictates of Roman custom. From a conservative Roman perspective his behaviour could be viewed as truly admirable.\(^9\)

Whatever individuals' private feelings on the death of Drusus, the magnitude of the various public and official responses showed how important a place he had occupied in the state and how great was the loss caused by his passing away. This was no private, family affair. The consuls showed their sorrow and the Senate wept. Tiberius alone, in a supreme example of self-control, resolutely carried out his duties at the funeral while the people wept around him. Whether their mourning was sincere or not, its appearance and extent showed that a great man had died. The funeral itself was commensurate with the importance of the Emperor's appointed successor. Tiberius was present, not just as Drusus' father, but as head of state and chief priest, the pontifex maximus. He presided over a long procession of ancestral images through which Drusus was linked not just to the great
ancestors of the patrician Claudians going right back to the
founder of the line, Appius Claudius, but to the Julians as
well, going back to Romulus, the founder of Rome, and Aeneas,
the founder of the Roman race and the Julian family.\textsuperscript{10}
Thereby were re-affirmed Drusus' full membership in the
Julian dynasty and his association with the very idea of
Rome, as befitted the man who had been appointed to become
the next princeps of the Roman Empire. The delivery of
eulogies also had illustrious associations. A procedure was
followed that recalled, probably intentionally, the great
Augustus' own funeral. Just as Tiberius and his son, Drusus,
had separately eulogized Augustus, so now Tiberius and his
eldest grandson, Nero, did the same for Drusus. On the
analogy of the speeches at Augustus' funeral, Tiberius would
have given the official state eulogy while Nero would have
delivered an oration on personal and private themes.\textsuperscript{11} The
procedure once again linked Drusus directly to the Augustan
principate.

His other posthumous honours also reflected his
importance. Records of some of them survive in inscriptions
and on coins. The Senate voted that the silver shield
\textit{(clupeus)} given him by the knights should henceforward lead
their annual \textit{transvectio}, and that curule chairs bearing his
name should be placed with those of the \textit{Sodales Augustales} in
all theatres. An inscription survives indicating that the
Roman people gathered sufficient funds to set up at least one
statue in memory of Drusus. An arch partly in his honour was
erected at Spoletium. At the imperial temple at Lepcis Magna colossal cult statues of Roma and Divus Augustus were accompanied by a group of similar statues portraying various members of the Tiberian imperial family. These included likenesses of Germanicus and Drusus on a quadriga, which may have been placed in the pronaos of the temple. The brothers shared a cult in Lycia and appear to have had one as well in Lydia. Evidence for the latter devotion is preserved on Lydian coins which show the pair seated on the obverse in association with the inscription, "Drusus and Germanicus, the new (or young, neoi) fraternal gods." An allusion to the Dioscuri, with whom the imperial brothers may have been associated during their lives, seems unmistakable. It was only fitting that the close pairing of Drusus and Germanicus while they were alive should have been continued after their deaths.

The correspondence may aid in supplementing the few, fragmentary, direct references to Drusus' posthumous honours. Tacitus says that the same memorials were voted for Drusus as had been decreed for Germanicus, and abundant, detailed evidence of the latter's awards survives in the Annals and inscriptions. In many cases Germanicus received special memorial honours for his own personal accomplishments and experiences which could not be exactly translated for any one else. If, however, Tacitus' statement can be taken at face value, then, at the very least, Drusus should have been awarded arches in the Circus Flaminius and the places in the
Empire, such as Illyricum, where he had done active service, statues in the temples and public places of Rome where those of his father had been set up, and a clipeus - a disk engraved with his portrait - among those of the orators in the Palatine library. In addition, Drusus' name would have been inserted in the Salic hymn, five centuries in his name would have been added to the knights, the curule chairs placed in his memory among the seats of the sodales Augustales would have borne oak crowns, the temples in Rome would have been closed on the day that his bones were interred and on the anniversary of his death, an annual sacrifice would have been made to his manes before his tomb, his statue in ivory would have led the procession at the circensian games, a decree would have been passed that only a member of the Julian family might succeed him as flamen and augur, and the equestrian order would have named a section of its seats in the theatre after him and ridden behind his statue in the annual transvectio in July. Tacitus adds that Drusus actually received more honours than Germanicus ut ferme amat posterior adulatio. Perhaps flattery was a factor, but the increase makes sense on other grounds as well. By the time he died, Drusus had risen higher than Germanicus in a formal sense. The latter had never matched the former's two years of tribunicia potestas. Accordingly, more honours were appropriate for Drusus.

Some ten years after his death, Drusus was honoured again. An official imperial issue of denarii was minted in
AD 32-33 and in 33-34, probably in Caesarea, Cappadocia, bearing Tiberius head, with legend, on the obverse and a profile portrait and the following legend on the reverse: "Drusus Caesar, son of Tiberius Augustus, twice consul, with two years of tribunician power."

Drusus' death left a large gap in the structure of the principate. Within the imperial family Tiberius no longer had a skilled and experienced colleague capable of sharing the burdens of state and ready immediately to succeed to the throne should the Emperor retire or die. The oldest of Germanicus' sons, Nero, could not have been much more than seventeen, still far too young and inexperienced to step into his uncle's shoes. There was Sejanus, Tiberius' socius laborum, but he, a mere equestrian without close family ties to the Julio-Claudians, could serve at most only as a valuable retainer or employee. In AD 23 at any rate, whatever Sejanus' ambitions, the Emperor gave no sign that he considered him a candidate for the imperial family and succession. So Tiberius found himself in the same dynastic and administrative calamity as Augustus had upon the death of Gaius in AD 4. All his labour and planning for the succession now lay shattered and he was faced once more with the grim prospect of shouldering alone the full burden of the principate for the foreseeable future.

Drusus' death radically altered the prospects for his sons as well. Their infancy (they could have been no more than three years old in AD 23) and their grandfather's
advanced age (he would celebrate his sixty-fifth birthday that year) meant that, in purely practical terms for the survival of the Julio-Claudian dynasty, if they had gained precedence over Germanicus' sons in the succession they would have to give it up. Tiberius' statement to the Senate deploring his own and Livia's advanced ages on the one hand and his grandsons' immaturity on the other shows that he was well aware of this necessity. Indeed, his words bring to mind the formula used by Augustus in his will to explain why he made Tiberius his heir and successor: *quoniam atrox fortuna Gaium et Lucium filios mihi eripuit* .... In addition, the twins' access to the principate had depended entirely on their father's. Only so long as Drusus seemed guaranteed to follow Tiberius to the throne could Tiberius safely have reserved the long-term succession for his natural grandsons. These realities bear out Tacitus' affirmation that the succession now belonged beyond doubt to Germanicus' children. Drusus' death had removed not only Tiberius' chosen and prepared successor but also the possibility for his own dynasty.

The death forced Tiberius as well to defer his strong aspiration to retire from Rome and the burdens of government. He told the Senate that he would seek consolation in work, but practical necessities and his own sense of duty probably gave him equally strong motivations to return swiftly to state business after Drusus' death. With Drusus gone there was no one who could stand in for him in his crucial position
as head of state.

According to Tacitus, Drusus' death also marked the beginning of the deterioration of Tiberius' reign. So far his rule had been characterized, in general, by moderation, prudent and efficient administration, and justice. Drusus, thought by many to have had a moderating influence on his father, may have contributed significantly to this success. He had probably curbed Sejanus' dangerously strong influence upon Tiberius and the state and forced him to behave with circumspection and propriety. It is also likely that he had helped to temper the ambitions of Agrippina and her sons and supporters. So long as they had to face two Claudians in the principate, they would have felt less confident about asserting their own claim to the throne than if only one stood in their way. They would also have felt obliged to respect Drusus for his friendship or, at least, good relations, with Germanicus. When Drusus died, however, nothing remained to restrain either Sejanus or Germanicus' family from seeking to realise their ambitions. Consequently, Tiberius' reign became plagued with intrigue, allegations of conspiracy, arrests, executions, and bloody proscriptions. By the year 33 Sejanus, Agrippina, and her sons, Nero and Drusus, had all been liquidated for plotting against the Emperor. There can be no certainty that Drusus, Tiberius' son, would have been able to prevent these developments over the long term. Sejanus' ambitions and influence over Tiberius were strong, and it is difficult to
believe that Agrippina and her sons would not eventually have grown impatient with Drusus' precedence in the succession. There can be no doubt, however, that Drusus' premature death would have tempted both parties to assert themselves much sooner and with less restraint than they would otherwise have dared.

Drusus' death marked as well the first step in the decline of the imperial Claudians. Later in 23, one of Drusus' twins, Germanicus, died of causes unknown, a source of more grief for Tiberius. In 29 Livia passed away. In 31 Livilla, condemned for conspiring to murder Drusus, was reputedly starved to death by her own mother. Tiberius himself died in 37. He left behind the last of his male line, Drusus' son, Tiberius Gemellus, who, exposed to the full warmth of Caligula's tender mercies, was murdered, probably near the end of 37. Drusus' daughter, Julia, survived longest, all the while playing her part in her family's chequered history. Unfortunately she, too, may have been defamed by anti-Claudian sources. Married to Germanicus' son, Nero, in 20, she is said to have communicated her husband's most intimate thoughts and feelings to her mother, Livilla, who is supposed to have passed them on to Sejanus to use against the young man. After Nero was condemned Julia may, possibly, have been married to Sejanus. In 33 she became the wife of C. Rubellius Blandus, although the alliance was stigmatized because Blandus was a mere knight. In the end even she
succumbed to her family's evil destiny. She did not long outlive her grandfather and brother. In about 43 she was arrested on obscure charges trumped up through Messalina's ill will, given no chance for defence, and executed. Thus, some twenty years after the death of Drusus, was completed the fall of the ill-starred house of Tiberius.\(^{22}\)

Drusus' death amounted to a substantial loss for the Julio-Claudian principate.\(^{23}\) Up till then he had had a military and diplomatic record which, while limited in scope, had been excellent in quality, and there is no indication that his handling of judicial, political, and administrative matters had been anything but competent. If he had survived he would have continued to acquire experience and responsibility through which he might well have developed into an able statesman whom his father could safely rely upon and confidently entrust with the running of the state while he carried out his longstanding wish to retire. Drusus might also have been able to complete the establishment of his own and his father's dynasty, providing excellent tutelage and education to his sons and thereby ensuring the future stability of the succession and the Roman government. He would have continued to maintain good relations and communications between the principate and the Roman citizenry through his unrestrained congeniality.\(^{24}\) Last, but not least, one of the greatest benefits that he might have been able to bestow upon the Roman Empire would have been the exclusion of Caligula from the throne. With his steady
competence and amiability, Drusus might even have ushered in a new period of peace and prosperity, of genuine felicitas, to rival the happiest days of Augustus' reign.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 12

1. The Senate's reaction: Tac. Ann. 4.8.2 - 4.9.1.  
Response of the people: Sen. Ad Marc. de Consol. 15.3.

2. Tac. Ann. 4.12.1. Tacitus adds that Drusus' death was sine maerore publico (4.12.2); see Rogers, 134.

posterior adulatio: 4.9.


7. See Kuntz, 60.

8. Tiberius' exclusion of Drusus' friends: Jos. AJ 18.146.  
The anecdote rings true: it recalls the similar prohibition against allowing Vipsania into his sight after their divorce. She, too, was beloved. Reminders of her and of their separation were too painful for him to bear. See Suet. Tib. 7.3. Tiberius' devotion and vengeance: Dio 57.3-4a. Diligence in prosecution: Suet. Tib. 62.1. Tacitus' silence: Marsh, 165.

9. Exercise of will-power: see Tac. Ann. 4.8.2: ceterum Tiberius per omnes valitudinis eius dies, nullo metu an ut firmitudinem animi ostentaret, etiam defuncto necdum sepulto, curiam ingressus est. Tiberius' natural self-control: see Dio 57.13.3. His reserve at the death of his brother: see Sen. Ad Polyb. de Consol. 15.5; Seager, 27: "That he [Tiberius] and Drusus were friends is not disputed; it is therefore reasonable to suppose that his attitude on this occasion was dictated by sincere beliefs about the manifestation of public and private grief. It may then serve as a useful guide in interpreting his later behaviour in the matter of mourning." Reserve at the death of his mother: see Tac. Ann. 5.2, Dio 58.2.1-3; Suet. Tib. 51. Conformity to Roman custom: Tarver, 304. Admirable behaviour: Maranon, 125.

10. Mourning in the Senate: Tac. Ann. 4.8.2; at the funeral: Sen. Ad Marc. de Consol. 15.3. Tiberius as pontifex maximus: Sen. Ad Marc. de Consol. 15.3. Procession of


GERMANIKΩΣ ΝΕΟΙ ΘΕΟΙ ΦΙΛΑΡΕΑΦΟΙ.


That the honours of Drusus and Germanicus need not have been identical but only similar in kind is indicated by the absence of a memorial for Drusus, son of Tiberius, near the cenotaph of Drusus, stepson of Augustus, and the arch of Germanicus on the Rhine (see tabula Siarensis, col. c). This arrangement made sense. Drusus had operated in Illyricum and on the Danube, not on the Rhine, while Germanicus had been active in the same areas as his father. For Germanicus' posthumous honours in general see Fishwick, I.1, 161, note 69 with references. See also A. Fraschetti, "La Tabula Hebana, la Tabula Siarensis e il iustitium per la morte di Germanico," MEFRA 100 (1988): 867-89.


15. Coins: BMC I, cxl-cxli, p. 144, nos. 171-73; RIC (2nd ed.) I, Tiberius, no. 7; the reverse legend reads DRVSVS CAES. TI. AVG. F. COS. II TR. P. IT[erum]. It is
possible that the discovery of the alleged plot against Drusus' life provided the motivation behind this particular commemoration. The Roman government might have issued the coins in an official attempt to redress Drusus' murder by affirming his memory at the same time that it consigned Sejanus to oblivion (Sutherland [1951], 104). Alternatively, Tiberius might have commissioned the issue to promote the Claudian side of the imperial family, particularly Drusus' son, Gemellus.

Drusus may also have been honoured in 27. An inscription (CIL VI, 251) in honour of the "Genius of Tiberius" makes no explicit reference to Drusus, but bears the date May 28th, the anniversary of Drusus' ovatio for his work in Illyricum. The ovatio may be alluded to as well in AE (1936): 95. I am grateful to Dr. D. Fishwick for pointing out these references to me.


17. Tac. Ann. 4.13.1; Suet. Tib. 52.1.


19. Drusus as a check upon Sejanus; the consequences of his death: ibid. 4.7.1, 4.12.2. Tac. Ann. 4.12.1-2 refers to the resurgent hopes and ambitions of Germanicus' family and their supporters upon Drusus' death, but attributes their downfall to the enmity of Sejanus. Tacitus, however, may simply be passing on the propaganda of his pro-Julian sources, in which case he would probably be giving, at best, only half the story.

20. Death of the twin: Tac. Ann. 4.15.1; see Vell. 2.130.3.
Death of Livia: Tac. Ann. 5.1.1; Dio 58.2.1.

21. Livilla's death: Dio 58.11.7. Tiberius' death: Tac. Ann. 6.50; Suet. Tib. 73.1; Dio 58.28.5. Death of Gemellus: Suet. Cal. 23.3; Philo In Flacc. 10, 22; Leg. 23-30; Dio 59.1.3; see PIR (2nd ed.) I, no. 226, p. 190.

22. Julia's marriage to Nero: Tac. Ann. 3.29.3. Her communications to her mother: 4.60.2. Her possible marriage to Sejanus: Dio 58.3.9; see 58.7.5; Tac. Ann. 6.8.3; see 5.6.2. Her marriage to Blandus: Tac. Ann. 6.27.1; Dio 58.21.1. Her arrest and execution: Suet. Claud. 29.1; Sen. Apocol. 10.4; Dio 60.18.4; Tac. Ann.
13.32.3; 13.43.2. With Julia's death the line of direct descent from Tiberius and Drusus lost its prominence but did not die out. She appears to have borne at least three children to her last husband: Rubellius Plautus (Tac. Ann. 14.22.1), Rubellius Blandus (Juv. 8.39), and Rubellia Bassa (ILS 952); see PIR (2nd ed.) I 636, p. 301.

23. On the general efficiency and fairness of Tiberius' regime while Drusus was alive and its deterioration after his death see, in general, Tac. Ann. 4.6 - 4.7.1.

24. Drusus' sociableness and beneficial influence on his father: ibid., 3.37.2.
ABBREVIATIONS

Standard abbreviations are used for Classical journals and collections.

**AFA (Henzen)**

**AFA (Pasoli)**

**Alföldi**

**Alföldi (1957)**

**Berger**

**BMC**

**Castritius**

**Dessau**

**Dobias**

**Dobó**

**EJ**

**Eisenhut**

**Fishwick**
Fishwick, D. *The Imperial Cult in the*

Furneaux

Goodyear

Harden

Koestermann


Kornemann

Kuntz

Levick


Lewis

Marañón

Marquardt

Marsh

Meise

Meise (1966) Meise, E. "Der Sesterz des Drusus mit den

Millar

Mocsy

Platner-Ashby

RIC (2nd ed.)

Rogers

Rogers (1932)
Rogers, R.S. "Two Criminal Cases Tried Before Drusus Caesar." CP 27 (1932): 75-79.

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Schrombges

Seager

Shotter

Spengel

Sumner

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e
Syme  

Syme (1979)  

Tarver  

Timpe  

Wellesley  

Wilkes  

Zwierlein-Diehl  
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