

FROM SENTENCE TO DISCOURSE:  
INTEGRATED EXPLANATIONS FOR CERTAIN  
LINGUISTIC PHENOMENA IN JAPANESE

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### Abstract

This thesis examines those aspects of language in which syntax and extra-syntactic factors interface.

There are three major approaches to discourse study (interpretation of a sentence in discourse):

- i) Discourse Study without Syntax: Any linguistic phenomena can be explained through discourse; syntax is dissolved into discourse study.
- ii) Discourse Study Interacting with Syntax: Syntactic rules and discourse functions interact or intermingle with each other.
- iii) Modular Approach to Discourse Study: Syntax is autonomous, but can feed information into other extra-syntactic components to obtain the final interpretation of a sentence in context.

Approach (iii) is adopted here, where a "Government and Binding" (Chomsky (1981)) type of generative grammar is assumed as the syntactic framework.

Four linguistic phenomena in Japanese are chosen for case studies of the mode of interaction between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.

Chapter 2 examines the Japanese reflexive *zibun*. The co-reference problem is solved through syntactic rules for the anaphoric use and discourse rules for the referential use.

Chapter 3 examines demonstratives. Since they are originally used as deixis, the problem is mainly discussed in semantic and discourse arenas. The comparison between pronoun and demonstrative is also discussed. Both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 deal with the problem of coreference, which is one disambiguation mechanism in the comprehension of discourse.

Chapter 4 examines quantifier interpretation. This problem involves another type of disambiguation mechanism. The scope interpretation being represented in LF, why a certain reading is obtained in the actual discourse environment is explained from the viewpoint of the human attention system (conscious and unconscious).

Chapter 5 examines the particle *wa*, which is most commonly considered a topic marker or an old information marker. *Wa* marks a certain semantic structure in syntactic representation and such a *wa*-sentence has an important function in discourse organization. The nature of the contrastiveness associated with a *wa* sentence is explained in this light.

In this modular type of approach, the phenomena which were formerly explained by fairly complex sets of rules have become more transparent, and some seemingly conflicting analyses done in the past



are now considered as analyses of different aspects of a single phenomenon.

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## Chapter 1

### Introduction


There are many linguistic phenomena where syntax and discourse interact (Kuroda 1973, Inoue 1982). As for the mode of this interaction, Kuno's series of works (1978, 1979, and elsewhere) for example, called Functional Grammar, integrate syntactic and discourse rules into rule sets based on functional perspectives. In his framework, the phenomena by which syntactically well-formed sentences turn out to be ill-formed sentences in discourse are given interesting explanations: e.g., if the violation of the discourse rules is the result of the inevitable application of syntactic rules, the penalty is low (the sentence is not felt to be too bad) (1978, Chapter 3). In the spectrum of interaction, considering Kuno's system to occupy the middle ground, one end will be occupied by Chomsky's generative grammar, which claims an autonomous system of grammar; and the other by discourse-oriented grammar (Givón 1979).

This thesis assumes a "Government and Binding" type of generative grammar, and several linguistic phenomena are analyzed. Many important works of functional grammar are also taken into consideration in the course of research, as they deal with the area in

which syntactic and discourse phenomena overlap. The reason for adopting the generative grammar approach is that the theory of the autonomy of grammar and the modular account of human language provides an explanation for a complex phenomenon by means of a combination of much simpler rule sets and principles, instead of employing rules which are directly applied to the phenomena and which attempt to explain everything at once; and furthermore makes it possible to explain independent phenomena by the use of the same principles (integrated explanation of linguistic phenomena).

In this framework, formal grammar<sup>1</sup> and other human cognitive functions are viewed as autonomous, each being a modular component of language. What actual variety of modules language consists of is still under investigation. Newmeyer (1983) presents one potentially accurate but preliminary sketch, shown below:


(1)



[Newmeyer: p. 3]



As for the formal grammars, Extended Standard Theory and Government Binding Theory assume the following model:



[Saito (1985): p. 11]

LF and PF are syntactic representations for semantics and phonology, respectively. LF is followed by LF' as assumed in Chomsky (1977). Semantics by itself, which may possibly form an independent module, may be distinguished from pragmatics,<sup>2</sup> which can be broken down into several modules (which probably includes those conversational principles proposed by Grice (1975) as one of the modules, as Newmeyer's model suggests). The interaction between syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic phenomena will be viewed in a similar direction as in Dretske (1972):

- (3) ...the semantical differences between C (U) and C (U') are to be represented as having their source in the apparently non-semantical differences between U and U' – is by

calling the difference while acknowledging that certain pragmatic differences, just as certain syntactic differences, figure importantly in the semantic analysis of some expressions in which they are embedded. (C(U) is a larger linguistic expression in which an expression U is embedded.<sup>3</sup> [M. O.] [p. 427]

In this light, passive, for example, would be viewed as having a syntactic representation as a sentence, but the distribution of passive constructions is conditioned by discourse (Williams 1977, Oosten 1984). The situations are the same when a certain pragmatic phenomenon is closely connected to a semantic phenomenon, a semantic phenomenon to a syntactic phenomenon, a syntactic phenomenon to a pragmatic phenomenon (cf. Kuno's functional grammar), and so forth. For example, Rochemont (1985) is a work carried out within the framework of the autonomy of grammar with modular components, which accounts for English focus as in (4):

- (4) Focus, it is concluded, is a syntactically represented notion with systematic though varying phonological and semantic representations. [pp. 177-178]

In this thesis, I have selected four linguistic phenomena in Japanese, some of which have been studied largely in syntax, some of which have been studied for the most part in pragmatics (context-dependent aspect), and some of which have been studied from both angles, but not often as the result of the interaction between syntax and pragmatics; and I investigate how the modular account of these

phenomena provides us with a much simpler but integrated explanation for them.

The first two chapters deal with the problem of coreference. In Chapter 2, the reflexive pronoun *zibun* is examined. This topic has been examined mainly in syntax. However, I will argue that syntactic rules and pragmatic (discourse) accounts of the coreference problem of *zibun* will provide a fuller explanation of the phenomenon as a whole.

In Chapter 3, demonstrative pronouns are examined. The coreference problem of demonstrative pronouns is considered to be mainly one of a pragmatic nature, since their original function is deixis. The central concerns of the investigation are the semantic nature of the demonstrative, and the demonstrative in discourse anaphora. The former will occupy a good deal of space, since it is related to the manner of "demonstration"; in the latter, demonstratives are compared with pronouns in terms of the usage in discourse anaphora.

In Chapter 4, I will examine interpretation of quantifier nouns in a sentence. Quantifier interpretation has been considered in syntactic terms, but I will show that the choice between the readings is determined by extra-syntactic factors.

In Chapter 5, the property and function of the particle *wa*, which is best known as a "topic" marker, is discussed. The examination will be carried out from the standpoints of semantics, syntax, and pragmatics.

In the course of this thesis, some of the apparently conflicting analyses done in the past may become, not alternative solutions to the same problem, but merely studies of the different aspects (modular components) of phenomena. Independent linguistic phenomena, on the other hand, may be found to be dominated by the same principle of cognitive functioning. Even certain phenomena which are seemingly particular to Japanese can be recognized as manifestations of functions of human cognition, ones which may happen to be strongly dominating factors in Japanese, but scarcely specific to it alone.

## Notes (Chapter 1)

- <sup>1</sup> Formal grammar itself is modular (cf. Chomsky (1981), Nakajima (1985-86), and LGB-type generative grammar.
- <sup>2</sup> Gazdar (1979) puts it this way: Pragmatics = Meaning-Truth Conditional [p. 2]. Wilson (1975), on the other hand, proposes non-truth conditional semantics. In this thesis, I assume that semantics is at least truth-conditional (with the possible addition of non-truth conditional and conventional meaning (?); cf. Wilson), and that pragmatics is the context-dependent aspect of meaning, although the line between the two has not been clearly defined so far.
- <sup>3</sup> U and U' are, for example, sentences having contrastive features (stress), which Dretske regards as pragmatic features, adapting the definition of pragmatics in C. Morris and R. Carnap (*International Encyclopedia of United Science*, Chicago, 1955). Although his view of semantics and pragmatics differs from the one I have adopted in this thesis, the point made by Dretske offers an idea of how to look at the mode of interface between syntax, semantics, and discourse.

## Chapter 2

### The "Reflexive" Pronoun in Japanese

#### §2.0 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how *zibun*, which is generally considered to be the Japanese reflexive, establishes a coreferential relation to another noun. My concern is not the generation of *zibun* but its disambiguating mechanism in terms of the interpretation. Although *zibun* is often regarded as a counterpart of English reflexives such as *myself*, *yourself*, or *himself*, *zibun* also exhibits a fair number of similarities to pronouns in English. This characteristic of *zibun* will be taken into serious consideration in this chapter.

#### §2.1 Three Types of Pronoun Usage

According to Evans (1980), there are three categories<sup>1</sup> in the usage of pronouns. Let us call them the referential use, the anaphoric use, and the bound variable use, in consideration of the relationship between a pronoun, its referent, and the expression where the referent is pinned down as a linguistic form, if any.

### Referential Use

- (1) Look at *him!* (e.g., pointing at a man walking over there)
- (2) I heard that the company which *John* was working for went bankrupt. I wonder how *he* is making his living now.

### Anaphoric Use

- (3) *John* said that *he* will go to Mexico next month. (John = he)
- (4) *John* loves *his* mother. (John = his)

### Bound Variable Use

- (5) *Everyone* loves *his* mother.

In (1) and (2), the object as a referent must actually be pointed out or described as salient in some manner. In determining its reference, pragmatic factors are involved. In (3) and (4), a coreferential relation is established between the NP *John* and the pronoun *he* since *John* and *he* refer to the same person. In (5), although *everyone* by itself cannot make a reference to any person, each member of a set of *everyone* can be its referent just like the bound variables in logic. In examples (3) and (4), the reading that *he* is not *John* belongs to the referential use.<sup>2</sup>

Lasnik (1979) proposes a non-referential rule;<sup>3</sup> the rule syntactically determines when two NPs are "not coreferential" and leaves the rest of the cases without discriminating referential cases (1) and (2) and anaphoric cases (3) and (4). As a consequence, the Lasnik-type approach results in the coreference (but not non-coreference) relation is eventually determined in the pragmatic domain.

However, Evans considers the existence of case (5) as very crucial, and places emphasis on the connection (though not immediate)<sup>4</sup> between (3)-(4) and (5), drawing a distinction between "intended coreference" and "referentially dependent relation (grammatical coreference)." Rochemont (1983) makes the further assumption that "a pronoun is referentially dependent on some NP only if the two phrases are coindexed."

Now, in the case of the Japanese reflexive *zibun*, although its anaphoric aspect tends to get primary attention, I must point out that despite the name "reflexive," which in English denotes behavior which is syntactically different from the pronoun (cf. Chomsky (1981)), *zibun* in fact exhibits all three usages of pronouns, as shown in (6) - (9):

#### Referential Use

- (6) Ara, ara, darenimo yarazu ni zibun bakari ga  
anybody (to) not giving self only NOM

tabete iru wa.

eat -ing

'Oh my, without giving it to anybody, only self is eating.'



- (7) Zibun wa hitori de saki ni kaetta rasii yo.  
 self TOP alone earlier went home seem  
 'It seems that self alone left earlier.'

[Since *zibun* is usually identified with English *self*, the tentative translations are given using that word, although the best and most idiomatic rendering of these examples would be with the pronoun *he*.]

#### Anaphoric Use

- (8) Taroo wa [zibun no oya] o taisei ni suru.  
 Taroo TOP self's parent(s) ACC be attentive to  
 'Taroo is attentive to self's parent(s).'

#### Bound Variable Use<sup>5</sup>

- (9) Daremo ga [zibun no oya] o taisei ni suru.  
 Everyone NOM  
 'Everyone is attentive to self's parents.'

Taking the Evans-type approach (also cf. Reinhart (1983)), I will divide (6) - (9) into two categories: (8) and (9) will be called anaphoric, and (6) and (7) referential in this chapter.

In the following sections, I will first examine the referential use of *zibun*, which is pragmatically "bound"<sup>6</sup> in discourse, then the anaphoric use, which is syntactically bound. I will also show how coreference under syntactic restriction and coreference conditioned by discourse interact on a single instance of *zibun* in a sentence. A

sentence is taken to be both a minimum unit of discourse and a syntactic product.

## §2.2 The Referential Use of *Zibun*

First, observe the following examples (10) - (12). Imaginable contexts for these sentences would be internal monologues including interjectional expressions.

- (10) *Zibun ga ikeba yokatta.*  
 self NOM go (provisional) be preferable-PAST  
 '(I wish) self (= I) should have gone.'

- (11) *Konna toki koso zibun ga sikkari sinakereba.*  
 in this very situation self NOM should become courageous  
 'In this very situation self (= I) should become courageous.'

- (12) *Kore wa zibun mo ukauka site irarenai zo.*  
 self (NOM) too be off one's guard can-not-be-ing  
 'Well, self (= I) too can not be off 'self's' guard.'

In an internal monologue, the speaker is the only one in the "world" created by his consciousness (internal world); in other words, he occupies an absolute position and does not have to identify his position in relation to other people. *Zibun* is uniquely chosen in an internal monologue, instead of the first person pronouns such as *ore*, *boku*, *watasi*, and the like, the choice of which is socio-culturally determined;

i.e., consideration of the outside world is involved. However, *zibun* is not merely the substitute for the first person pronoun *I*; it is rather "self" in opposition to "other." (13) - (15) show clear instances of the self/other opposition:

- (13) Hito wa hito,                      zibun wa zibun              da  
       others (contrastive)      self (contrastive)      COP  
       'Others are others, self is self.'

- (14) Anotoki      wa      [NP [NP zibun ga nigeru]      no ]      ga  
       that time    TOP    [    self    SUB escape]                      NOM  
                          seiippai                      de,    tanin no koto    made  
       doing everything in one's power    COP other's matter as well  
       kangaete    irarenakatta.  
       think      not be-ing-PAST  
       'At that moment, all self could do was to escape and could  
       not think about others as well.'

- (15) Hito wa ninotugi de, mazu zibun ga    kawaii.  
       others    second            first    self            dear  
       'Others are second; first, self is dear.'

"Self," which is opposed to "other" is not necessarily fixed on the speaker. *Zibun* may also be the hearer, as in (16) - (18), or a third party, as in (19) - (21):

- (16) Mazu zibun ga saki ni tabete miro yo.  
 first self NOM before me eat try (imperative)  
 '(You) try/eat first!'
- (17) Zibun no koto na-n-da kara zibun de denwa sinasai.  
 'self's' matter it is since self (in person) telephone  
 (imperative)  
 'Since it is self's own matter, phone them yourself.'
- (18) [Basu ni nori-okureta] no wa zibun no sei  
 bus to miss COMP TOP self 's (own) fault  
 desyoo  
 isn't it  
 'The reason you missed the bus is self's own fault, isn't it?'
- (19) Zibun bakari tabete iru wa.  
 only eat -ing  
 'Only self is eating.'
- (20) Zibun ga yareba ii noni naa.  
 self NOM do (provisional) it is good though I-wish  
 '(I wish) self would do it.'

- (21) [NP[<sub>S</sub> Zibun ga kaita] tegami] ni zibun ga henzi o kaite  
 self NOM wrote letter to reply ACC  
 iru wa.  
 '(Look at him.) self is writing a reply to the letter which  
 self wrote.'

The three *zibun* s in (22) form a "minimal trio" each of which refers to a different person:

- (22) a. Zibun ga siyoo. (1st person)  
 will do  
 'Self will do it.'
- b. Zibun ga sinasai. (2nd person)  
 do (imperative)  
 '(Self) do it!'
- c. Zibun ga site iru yo. (3rd person)  
 do -ing  
 'Self is doing it, isn't he?'

(22a) is a volitional expression which requires a 1st person subject; (22b) is an imperative which requires a 2nd person subject; and in (22c) *-te iru yo* implies that the speaker is an observer. With the help of these linguistic devices and/or a shared environment between the speaker and the hearer, the referring objects will be clarified. Interestingly enough, this kind of deictic use seems to be controlled by a similar principle which dominates *ko-so-a* demonstratives with

respect to the "speech arena" formation. (Cf. Chapter 3 for Japanese Demonstratives.)

To summarize, *zibun* in the referential use has the following properties:

- 1) *Zibun*, unlike the typical personal pronoun, is free from considerations of gender and honorific.
- 2) *Zibun* contrasts with "other" in the self-other opposition;
- 3) the "self" which is opposed to "other" can be shifted according to context; that is, *zibun* can be 1st person, 2nd person, or 3rd person.

Now, *zibun* in a discourse bound case is assumed to show the restricted mode of the same use (the deictic use). In written discourse, *zibun* can be either a narrator who is the writer himself or a narrator who is one of the characters whose internal feelings are described in the current discourse. In this sense, each sentence can be understood through its embedding in a higher abstract sentence such as (23):<sup>7</sup>

(23)	<NP wa> [.....]	to omotta	(thought)
		kanzita	(felt)
		handansita	(judged)
		mita	(observed)
			etc.

[NP = performer (writer/a character from whose point of view the story is told)]

However, these outer frames of sentences in (23) seldom, at least in a consistent manner, exist as linguistic forms in actual discourse; they do not have real forms, except for the occasional realizations such as (24) – (27), when the discourse environment permits them.

- (24) Watasi wa omowazu [zibun ga ikeba yokatta] to  
       I TOP involuntarily COMP  
       sakenda.  
       cried out  
       'I involuntarily cried out that self (I) should have gone in  
       person.
- (25) Hanako wa [zibun ga sikkari-si-na-kere-ba] to ketui sita.  
       TOP COMP decided  
       'Hanako decided that self (she) should brace (herself) up.'
- (26) Taroo wa [zibun mo ukauka site irarenai zo] to omotta.  
       TOP COMP decided  
       'Taroo thought that self (he) should not be off self's guard.'
- (27) Sono otoko wa [zibun no ban ga kita] koto  
       the man TOP [self 's turn NOM came] COMP(the fact)  
       o sitta.  
       ACC realized  
       'The man realized that self's (his) turn came.'

However, once sentences have the forms of (24) – (27) instead of (24') – (27') below, they *possibly* fall into the domain of anaphoric use<sup>8</sup> just like the (28) – (28') pair does.

(24') Zibun ga ikeba yokatta!

'I should have gone in person.'

(25') Zibun ga sikkari-si-nakere-ba...

'I should brace myself up.'

(26') Zibun mo ukauka-site-irarenai zo.

'I should not be off my guard.'

(27') Zibun no ban ga kita.'

'It's my turn.'

(24) – (27) vs (24') – (27') are analogous to (28) vs (28'):

(28) He is running! (referential)

(28') John said that he was running (when he saw Jane).  
(anaphoric)

In this section, *zibun* in the referential use has been observed in typical settings. The next section will concern anaphoric use.

### §2.3 The Anaphoric Use of *Zibun*


*Zibun* differs from English reflexives in the following two respects: i) long distance coreference (i.e., *zibun* does not observe clause-mate condition); ii) its antecedent is the subject of the sentence.



In this section, the coreference rule for anaphoric use of *zibun* will be examined.

As for the coreference in syntax, the notion "c-command" (29) is gaining significance in recent literature:

- (29) C-Command: Node A c (constituent)-commands node B if the branching node most immediately dominating A also dominates B. [Reinhart: 1976]



NP<sub>1</sub> c-commands NP<sub>2</sub>


NP<sub>2</sub> cannot c-command NP<sub>1</sub>

Now, assuming that Japanese is a configurational language,<sup>9</sup> *zibun* also seems to observe the general coreference rule for pronouns (cf. Saito (1985)) which is given in (30):

- (30) *Zibun* cannot c-command its antecedent.

Rule (30) defines the case where *zibun* is disjoint in reference as shown in (31).

(31)



- (i) NP<sub>3</sub> is not eligible as the antecedent of NP<sub>1</sub> and NP<sub>2</sub>.
- (ii) NP<sub>2</sub> is not eligible as the antecedent of NP<sub>1</sub>.

Thus in (32) NP<sub>2</sub> is *zibun*; then, NP<sub>3</sub> cannot be its antecedent:


- (32) [s<sub>1</sub> Taroo<sub>i</sub> wa zibun<sub>i</sub> ni [s<sub>2</sub> Ziroo<sub>j</sub> koso Hanako<sub>k</sub>  
           NP<sub>1</sub> TOP NP<sub>2</sub> to NP<sub>3</sub> (emphatic) NP<sub>4</sub>  
       ga suki nan n da] to tubuyaita].  
       NOM like it-is-that COMP muttered

'Taroo muttered to self that it is Ziroo, not me, who likes Hanako.'

In (33b) and (34b), *zibun* is not coreferential with *Taroo* since it does not observe Rule (30) (*zibun* does c-command *Taroo*):


- (33)a. Taroo<sub>i</sub> ga [<sub>NP</sub> zibun<sub>i</sub> no kodomo] o sikatta.  
 self 's child ACC scolded

'Taroo scolded self's child.'



- b. \*Zibun<sub>i</sub> ga [<sub>NP</sub> Taroo<sub>i</sub> no kodomo] o sikatta.

'Self scolded Taroo's child.'



- (34)a. Taroo<sub>i</sub> ga [<sub>NP</sub> zibun<sub>i</sub> no ie o katta hito ]  
           [ self 's house ACC bought person]

o sagasita.

ACC looked for

'Taroo looked for the person who bought self's house.'

- b. \*Zibun<sub>i</sub> ga [<sub>NP</sub> Taroo<sub>i</sub> no ie o katta hito] o sagasita.

'Self looked for the person who bought Taroo's house.'

Next, as is well-known, the antecedent of *zibun* is subject (subject-antecedent condition), *zibun* also observes Rule (35):

- (35) The antecedent must c-command *zibun*.

In (36), Taroo does not c-command *zibun*; although *zibun* cannot c-command *Taroo*; thus, Taroo cannot be its antecedent (unless *Taroo* is mentioned somewhere in discourse and referred to by *zibun* in referential use):

- (36) \*[<sub>NP</sub>[<sub>S</sub> Zibun<sub>i</sub> ga katte iru] inu] ga [<sub>NP</sub>Taroo<sub>i</sub> no  
           self SUB was keeping dog NOM Taroo 's

neko] ni kamituita.

cat to bit

'The dog which self was keeping bit Taroo's cat.'

Also observe (37a) – (37c):

- (37)a. \*[<sub>NP</sub>Taroo no sigotoba] wa [<sub>NP</sub>zibun no kazoku]  
           Taroo's workshop      TOP      self's family (NOM)  
           sae      hairenai.  
           even cannot enter

'As for Taroo's workshop, even self's family cannot enter.'

- b.\* [<sub>NP</sub>Taroo<sub>i</sub> no kazoku] wa [<sub>NP</sub>zibun<sub>i</sub> no sigotoba] ni hairenai.

'As for Taroo's family, they cannot enter self's workshop.'

- c.\* [<sub>NP</sub>Zibun<sub>i</sub> no sigotoba] wa [<sub>NP</sub>Taroo<sub>i</sub> no kazoku] sae hairenai.

'As for self's workshop, even Taroo's family cannot enter it.'

In all three examples, *Taroo* does not c-command *zibun* because of NP nodes and all get “\*”. Note that if one takes *Taroo no kazoku* instead of *Taroo* in (37b) as the antecedent of *zibun*, then it is grammatical with no violation of rules.

Now in a configuration like (31), if NP<sub>3</sub> is *zibun*, the potential antecedents are NP<sub>1</sub> and NP<sub>2</sub> (Rule 30); and both NP<sub>1</sub> and NP<sub>2</sub> c-command *zibun* in NP<sub>3</sub> position (Rule (35)). However, the subject-antecedent condition for Japanese reflexives allows only NP<sub>1</sub> to be a possible antecedent. Consequently, *zibun* in subject position as in (38a) is considered as a referential case while (38b) is anaphoric:

(38)a. *Zibun ga ikoo.*

NOM shall-go

'Self (I) shall go.'

b. *Taroo wa [zibun ga ikoo] to itta.*

TOP

said

'Taroo said that self (he) shall go.'

Thus, Rule (30), (35) and the S-A (subject-antecedent) condition explain basic cases of *zibun* coreference in anaphoric use. Cases which do not fall in the domain of these rules and conditions are considered as referential. In the next section, the nature of these rules is examined in more detail within the framework of universal grammar, to see how the Japanese *zibun* behaves therein.

## §2.4 Anaphor, Pronominal, and Variables

### §2.4.1 The Binding Theory

The binding theory (Chomsky 1981) classifies nominal expressions into three categories: anaphor, pronominal, and R-expression, and states the conditions for each category as in (39):

(39) Binding Condition [p. 188]

(A) An anaphor is bound in its governing category.

(B) A pronominal is free in its governing category.

(C) An R-expresssion (e.g., name and variable) is free.

The governing category is defined as in (40):

(40) Governing Category [p. 188]

$\alpha$  is the governing category for  $\beta$  if and only if  $\alpha$  is minimal category containing  $\beta$  and a governor of  $\beta$ , where  $\alpha = \text{NP or S}$ .

The notion "binding" is defined as in (41):

(41)  $\alpha$  is X (= A or A')-bound by  $\beta$  if and only if  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are coindexed,  $\beta$  c-commands  $\alpha$ , and  $\beta$  is in an X-position.  
[p. 184]

Under the definition of the governing domain in (40) and the binding conditions in (39), *zibun* is considered neither as a anaphor (cf. the long-distance coreference) nor as a pronominal (cf., the subject-antecedent property). This conflict will be pursued in the next section.

#### §2.4.2 Governing Domain

*Zibun* is distributionally different from English reflexive: *zibun* can occur in the subject position and possessive case, whereas English reflexives cannot.<sup>10</sup> In both of these cases, *zibun* cannot be an anaphor, since they are free in governing categories if a possessive bearing NP as well as S is taken as the governing category (one possible assumption about such NPs).

Because of a number of difficulties involved in its formulation, Huang (1982) proposes a modification of the governing category (40), which is given below in (42):

(42)a. Governing Category [Huang, p. 337]

$\alpha$  is a governing category for  $\beta$  if and only if  $\alpha$  is the minimal category containing  $\beta$ , and a SUBJECT which, if  $\beta$  is an anaphor, is accessible to  $\beta$ .

b. SUBJECT is AGR (agreement) or a subject of NP and S.

c. "Accessibility" is defined as following (Chomsky 1981, p.211 ff.):

(i)  $\alpha$  is accessible to  $\beta$  if and only if in the c-command domain of  $\alpha$  and assignment to  $\beta$  of the index to  $\alpha$  would not violate (ii).

(ii)  $*[\gamma, \delta \dots]$ , where  $\gamma$  and  $\delta$  bear the same index ( $i$  within  $i$  condition).

If a SUBJECT is accessible to  $\beta$  (= an anaphor or a pronominal), then an anaphor and a pronominal share the same governing category; if a SUBJECT is not accessible to  $\beta$ , then an anaphor and a pronominal have different governing categories since the accessibility is irrelevant to a pronoun. Thus, with  $\beta$  in the subject (= SUBJECT) position as in (43), and governed inside  $\alpha$ ,<sup>11</sup> if  $\beta$  is an anaphor then  $\alpha$  is not its governing category since an anaphor cannot be its own subject ( $i$  within  $i$  condition), whereas if  $\beta$  is a pronominal then  $\alpha$  is its governing category.



(43)  $[\alpha \beta_i \dots]_i$

Given a sentence like (44), if *zibun* is an anaphor, S is the governing category instead of NP and it is bound in the S; if *zibun* is a pronominal, NP is its governing category and it is free in the NP.

(44)  $[_S \text{ Taroo}_i \text{ ga Hanako o } [_{NP} \text{ zibun}_i \text{ no ie}] \text{ de sekkyo-sita.}]$   
                     NOM          ACC    self    's house at    lectured

'Taroo lectured Hanako at self's house.'

In either case, *Taroo* = *zibun* reading is obtained. The identity of *zibun* is obscure, but the coreference is still accounted for.

However, this type of analysis is not free from problems both for the anaphor hypothesis and the pronominal hypothesis. Suppose *zibun* is an anaphor, the analysis cannot explain the *zibun<sub>j</sub>* reading in (45) since NP<sub>j</sub> is outside of its GC (governing category):

(45)a.  $[_{S_3} \text{ Taroo}_j \text{ ga } [_{S_2} \text{ Hanako}_i \text{ ga } [_{S_1} \text{ zibun}_{i/j} \text{ ga tadasii}] \text{ to}$   
                                     NOM                    NOM                    NOM right

omotte-iru] to omotta].

is-thinking    thought

'Taroo thought that Hanako was thinking that self was right.'

- b. [<sub>S<sub>2</sub></sub> Yamada<sub>i</sub> ga [<sub>S<sub>1</sub></sub> Matida<sub>j</sub> ga [<sub>NP</sub> zibun<sub>i/j</sub> no kuruma]

NOM                      NOM                      's      car

de      ziko-o-okasita] to itta].

with had-an-accident      said

'Mr. Yamada said that Mr. Matida had an accident by self's  
car.'

In (45a), since *zibun* in subject position is not an accessible subject, S<sub>2</sub> instead of S<sub>1</sub> is GC and *Taroo* is outside of GC.<sup>12</sup> In (45b) S<sub>1</sub> is GC and *Yamada* is outside of GC.<sup>13</sup> If *zibun* is a pronominal, on the other hand, the problem of GC is not a problem any more since a pronominal is free in GC but may (or may not) be coindexed with NP outside of GC. Then, the fact that *zibun* is always coindexed with the subject becomes a very peculiar characteristic for a pronominal controlled by condition B in (39). (Sportiche's (1986) explanation for this is that the long distance coreference property of *zibun* is that of a bound pronoun (i.e., *zibun* is either an anaphor or a bound pronoun). I will pursue this point further in § 2.4.3.3).

Now, the possible resolution for the problems of the governing category will be found in Manzini and Wexler (1987) and Wexler and Manzini (1987). In Manzini and Wexler and Wexler and Manzini, five values of parameter for GC (and two values of parameter for the proper antecedent) are set up in universal grammar.

(46) GC parameter [M & W: 1987a, p. 53]

$\gamma$  is a governing category for  $\alpha$  iff

$\gamma$  is the minimal category which contains  $\alpha$  and

- a. has a subject, or
- b. has an INFL, or
- c. has a TNS, or
- d. has an indicative TNS, or
- e. has a root TNS.

(47) Binding [ibid, p. 64]

- a. An anaphor is bound in its governing category by a proper antecedent.
- b. A pronominal is free in its governing category from proper antecedents.

(48) Antecedent parameter [ibid, p. 64]

A proper antecedent for  $\alpha$  is

- a. a subject  $\beta$ ; or
- b. an element  $\beta$  whatsoever.

In Japanese, the value (e) will be selected in (46) for GC and (45) are nicely accounted for as anaphor cases.

In the next section, this anaphor solution is further investigated in connection with topic-antecedent cases.

### §2.4.3 Topic-bound vs. Subject-bound

#### §2.4.3.1 Topic-Antecedent

The topic sensitive property of *zibun* has been pointed out by Kuno (1973), Matsuda (1975), and Kitagawa (1981), among others. First of all, it is important to distinguish two types of topics, i.e., Topic 1 and Topic 2. For Topic 1 the topic NP is associate with the gap in S.

- (49) Taroo<sub>i</sub> wa [S e<sub>i</sub> Hanako o syookai sita]  
                     TOP                      ACC    introduced

'As for Taroo, (he) introduced Hanako.'

- (50) Hanako<sub>i</sub> wa [S Taroo ga e<sub>i</sub> syookai sita]  
                     TOP                      NOM (ACC)    introduced

'As for Hanako, Taroo introduced (her).'

In (49), the topic corresponds to the subject; in (50), the topic corresponds to the object. (The "e" is either a pro or a trace in Saito (1985); the "e" is a trace in Kuroda ((1988) and elsewhere).) Note that with Topic 1, topicalization does not affect the coreference relation of the subject-antecedent condition, as can be seen in (51):

- (51)a. Taroo<sub>i</sub> ga Hanako o zibun<sub>i</sub> no nooto de butta.  
                     NOM                      ACC    self 's notebook INS    hit

'Taroo hit Hanako with self's notebook.'

- b. Taroo<sub>i</sub> wa [s e<sub>i</sub> Hanako o zibun<sub>i</sub> no nooto de butta.]  
                   TOP (NOM)           ACC

'As for Taroo, (he) hit Hanako with self's notebook.'

- c. Hanako<sub>j</sub> wa [s Taroo<sub>i</sub> ga e<sub>j</sub> zibun<sub>i</sub>/\*<sub>j</sub> no nooto  
                   TOP                   NOM (ACC)

de butta.]

'As for Hanako, Taroo hit (her) with self's notebook.'

In (51), *zibun* is coreferential with subject NP, which is in turn coindexed with topic NP; as a result, *Taroo* and *zibun* obtain a coreference relation. This does not hold for (51c) since topic NP is coindexed with the object, which cannot be coreferential with *zibun*. Also observe (52):

- (52) Taroo<sub>i</sub> wa [zibun\*<sub>i</sub> ga e<sub>i</sub> itiban yoku sitte-iru].  
                   TOP           NOM       very well   know

'As for Taroo, self knows him very well.'

*Zibun* in (52) is only interpreted as referential. This subject-bound property is observed in a relative clause case like (53a). In an example like (53b), the ambiguity of *zibun* is nicely accounted for:

- (53)a. [<sub>NP</sub>[<sub>S</sub>Taroo<sub>i</sub> ga e<sub>j</sub> zibun<sub>i</sub>/\*<sub>j</sub> no ie de issyo ni benkyoosita]  
home at together studied

Hanako<sub>j</sub>]

'Hanako whom Taroo studied with at self's home'

- b. Taroo<sub>i</sub> wa [<sub>S</sub> e<sub>i</sub> [<sub>NP</sub> [<sub>S</sub> e<sub>j</sub> zibun<sub>i</sub>/j no kuruma o aratte-iru]  
TOP car ACC is-washing  
otoko<sub>j</sub>] o nagamete-iru].  
man ACC is-watching

'Taroo is watching a man who is washing self's car.'

In (53b), *e<sub>j</sub>* is coindexed with the head noun of the relative clause and *e<sub>i</sub>* is coindexed with topic, and unlike *e<sub>j</sub>* in (53a), each *e* in the subject positions is coreferential with *zibun*.

Therefore, in the case of Topic 1, the subject-antecedent condition and not topic-antecedent, still holds.

The situation is different in the case of Topic 2, where there is no corresponding argument position of the verb, as in (54) and (55):

- (54)a. Taroo<sub>i</sub> wa [zibun<sub>i</sub> ga tyokusetu soko ni itta.]  
TOP NOM in person there went

'As for Taroo, self went there personally.'

- b. Taroo<sub>i</sub> wa [zibun<sub>i</sub> no ootoo ga itta.]  
TOP 's younger brother NOM went

'As for Taroo, self's younger brother went.'

- c. Taroo<sub>i</sub> wa [[zibun<sub>i</sub> ga katte-ita] inu] ga byooki ni natta.  
 TOP self NOM kept dog NOM sick became  
 'As for Taroo, the dog which self was keeping became  
 sick.'

- (55)a. Taroo<sub>i</sub> wa [itiban sita no musume]<sub>j</sub> ga zibun<sub>i/\*j</sub> to  
 TOP 2 youngest daughter NOM self with  
 dookyosite iru. (\*<sub>j</sub>...semantically anomalous)  
 live -ing

(*zibun* = *Taroo*)

'As for Taroo, his youngest daughter lives with self.'

- b. Taroo<sub>i</sub> wa hahaoya<sub>j</sub> ga [zibun<sub>i/j</sub> no zaisan] o  
 TOP 2 mother NOM self's property ACC  
 kanrisite-iru.  
 manage -ing

(*zibun* = *Taroo/hahaoya*)

'As for Taroo, his mother manages self's property.'

There are cases in which the establishment of coreference is apparently difficult.<sup>14</sup> The examples in (56) are such cases:

- (56)a. ?Taroo wa Hanako ga zibun to kekkon sita.  
 TOP 2 NOM with married

'As for Taroo, Hanako married self.'

b. ?Taroo wa Hanako ga zibun o syookai sita.

ACC introduced

'As for Taroo, Hanako introduced self.'

These, as a matter of fact, are good illustrations of the nature of Topic 2. With Topic 2, whether the connection between the topic and the rest of the sentence is appropriate or not is determined pragmatically. In isolation, these sentences have low acceptability because of the lack of pragmatic information<sup>15</sup>. The coreferential relationship between *zibun* and *Taroo* in these cases is not impossible, simply open.

Therefore, the statement that the *zibun* coreference is sensitive to topic means that it is sensitive to Topic 2. The question then, is what is the nature of topic-antecedent as opposed to subject-antecedent. In the following, I will examine Topic 2 and its coreferential relationship to *zibun*.

According to Kuno (1973, p62ff) Topic 2 is created through a process of "Subjectivization" from either NP-*no* (possessive) or NP-*ni* (locative) as shown in (57) and (58).

(57)a. John no otoosan ga sinda. (=Kuno's (23))

's father NOM died

'John's father died.'

b. John ga otoosan ga sinda. (Subjectivization)

NOM NOM

c. John wa otoosan ga sinda. (Thematization)

TOP



- (58) Bunmeikoku            no dansei ga heikin-zyumyoo ga  
 civilized countries 's male 's average life span NOM  
 mizikai. (=Kuno's (27))  
 is-short

'It is the average life span of men of civilized countries  
 that is short.'

Kuno claims that sentences such as (59) (=Kuno's (18) (1973, p251)), and  
 (56) above, which do not have a corresponding NP-*no* or NP-*ni* sentence,  
 are base generated.

- (59)a. [<sub>S</sub>Sakana wa    [<sub>S</sub>tai            ga    ii.]  
          fish    TOP red snapper NOM good

'As for fish, red snapper is good.'

- b. [<sub>S</sub>Hana            wa    [<sub>S</sub>sakura            ga    ii.]  
      blossoms TOP cherry-blossom NOM good

'As for flowers, cherry blossoms are the best.'

On the other hand, Kuroda (1986 and elsewhere) labels Topic 2 as  
 the "major subject"<sup>16</sup> and argues that unlike Topic 1 sentences (for  
 which Kuroda has maintained the movement analysis since 1965), these  
 sentences are base-generated and get the nominative case marker *ga* in  
 position, then are moved under S' position just like Topic 1.  
 Consequently, Kuroda considers examples like (60) (given in Mikami  
 (1960)) as a separate category of *wa* sentences.

- (60)a. [<sub>NP</sub>Sinbun o yomitai] hito wa/\*ga koko ni  
 newspaper ACC read-want person TOP here in  
 arimasu.  
 exist

'As for those who want to read newspapers, they are here.'

- b. Basyo wa/\*ga okunai-setu ga attooteko datta.  
 place TOP indoor-theory NOM predominant was

'As for the place (of the murder), the "indoor" theory was predominant.'

Now back to the topic of *zibun* coreference. If the cases where *zibun* is coreferential with Topic 2 are considered as pragmatically determined, then the ungrammaticality of the Topic 1 case in (51c) (repeated here as (61)) will be left without explanation, since the functional difference between Topic 1 and Topic 2, if any, is far from clear in terms of *zibun* coreference.

- (61). Hanako<sub>j</sub> wa [<sub>S</sub> Taroo<sub>i</sub> ga e<sub>j</sub> zibun<sub>i</sub>/\*<sub>j</sub> no nooto de butta.]  
 TOP NOM (ACC)

'As for Hanako, Taroo hit (her) with self's notebook.'

On the other hand, if this coreference is considered a syntactic phenomenon, it is puzzling why both subject and topic are chosen as the antecedents. I shall pursue the latter case further under the investigation of the nature of topics in syntax.

### §2.4.3.2 Topic vs. Subject

First, let us look at the previously proposed topic structures. (62) gives a summary of Kuno and Kuroda's analyses introduced in the previous section.

(62)a. Kuno's Analysis (1973)...base-generation

Ex. [<sub>S</sub>Sakana wa [<sub>S</sub>tai ga ii.]] (cf (59))

b. Kuroda's Analysis (1986)...movement

Ex. [<sub>S</sub>Sakana<sub>i</sub> wa [<sub>S</sub>t<sub>i</sub> [<sub>S</sub>tai ga ii.]]

On the other hand, Saito (1985) suggests two derivations for topic sentences as in (63).

(63)a. Taroo<sub>i</sub> wa [<sub>S</sub>Hanako ga e<sub>i</sub> suki da.]

'As for Taroo, Hanako likes him.'

b. [<sub>S</sub>Taroo<sub>i</sub> wa [<sub>S</sub>Hanako ga t<sub>i</sub> suki da.]]

In (63a), the relationship between NP-*wa* and S is "licensed" by the "aboutness relation" (Saito 1985, p.287) Hoji (1985) further assumes that the base-generated NP-*wa* is Kuno's "thematic" topic and NP-*wa* created by movement is Kuno's "contrastive" topic as shown in (64) (=Hoji's (73)).

(64)a. "Thematic"

Ex. [<sub>S</sub>NP<sub>i</sub>-*wa* [<sub>S</sub>[<sub>S</sub>NP-*ga* [<sub>VP</sub> e<sub>i</sub> V]]]]

b. "Contrastive"

Ex. [<sub>S</sub>NP<sub>i</sub>-*wa* [<sub>S</sub>NP-*ga* [<sub>VP</sub> t<sub>i</sub> V]]]

Hoji identifies the "thematic" topic as the E(xpression) of Banfield (1973).

Now, evidence in favor of the structure (64a) rather than (62a)/(62b) for Topic 2 comes from examples such as (65).

- (65)a. Taroo wa kodomo-tati wa mina dokuritu sita.  
           TOP2 children TOP1 all be-independent

'As for Taroo, as for his children, (they) all get up on their own.'

- b. Taroo wa ototoo<sub>i</sub> wa e<sub>i</sub> kodomo o  
           TOP2 younger brother TOP1 child ACC  
       daigaku ni yaranakatta.  
       university to did-not-send

'As for Taroo, as for his younger brother, (he) did not send his child to a university.'


- c. Taroo wa kodomo<sub>i</sub> wa Hanako ga e<sub>i</sub> sodatete-iru  
           TOP2 child TOP1 is-raising

(e.g. Hanako is his ex-wife)

'As for Taroo, as for his child, Hanako is raising (him).'


Since Topic 2 precedes Topic 1 (S/S') in these examples, the following structure (66) can be suggested.

(66)



Now, using the recent version of X'-theory described by Chomsky (1986) which facilitates the comparison of structures despite their apparent diversity, (66) may be represented as (67).

(67)

(68) It is [<sub>CP</sub>John [<sub>CP</sub>who left.]]

Assuming (67) is the correct structure for Topic 1 and Topic 2, the position occupied by Topic 2 is that of a small-clause subject<sup>17</sup> as possibly assumed in English cleft constructions such as (68); while Topic 1 under CP(=S') instead of IP(=S), as suggested by Kuroda (1988), is in the specifier's position and is not a subject in the same sense of Topic 2. This explains why NP-*wa*, which is under S', by Kuroda's movement analysis, and binds the object, cannot be the antecedent in (61). Furthermore, this gives a consistent view for the syntactic structure of *zibun* coreference with the subject-antecedent condition.

Although I have to leave the details of this analysis for future research, I assume this as one possible syntactic explanation.

In the next section, another possibility for the variable interpretation of *zibun* is examined for syntactic topic coreference.

#### §2.4.3.3 *Zibun* as a Variable

The claim that *zibun* (and null pronouns, but not overt pronouns) can be a variable has been made several times in the literature (Hoji (1982), Saito and Hoji (1983) among others). Saito and Hoji (1983) claim that the difference between (69a) and (69b), which have the configuration shown in (70), is due to the fact that *zibun* exhibits a weak crossover effect while *kare* does not.

(69)a. [<sub>S</sub> Jiro<sub>i</sub>-o [<sub>S</sub> [<sub>NP</sub> Hanako-ga kare<sub>i</sub>-o kiratteiru koto]-ga  
ACC NOM him ACC dislike fact NOM

[<sub>VP</sub> t<sub>i</sub> yuuutuni siteiru]]].

depressed make (= S & H (15b))

'(Lit.) Jiro<sub>i</sub>, the fact that Hanako dislikes him<sub>i</sub> has depressed.'

b\* [<sub>S</sub> Jiro<sub>i</sub>-o [<sub>S</sub> [<sub>NP</sub> Hanako-ga zibun<sub>i</sub>-o kiratteiru koto]-ga  
[<sub>VP</sub> t<sub>i</sub> yuuutuni siteiru]]]. (= (15c))

(70)a. QO<sub>i</sub> [.....kare<sub>i</sub>.....t<sub>i</sub>.....]

b\* QO<sub>i</sub> [.....zibun<sub>i</sub>.....t<sub>i</sub>.....] (weak crossover)

(QO: *quasi-operator* = scrambled NP)

If *zibun* is a variable and *kare* is not (which is assumed to be true), (70b) is accounted for as a result of violating the Bijection Principle (Koopman and Spontiche (1982)), which prevents an operator from binding more than one variable. This assumption leads to the stipulation given in (71):

- (71) When *zibun* is locally A'-bound, it must be construed as a variable. (Saito & Hoji, p. 255)

However, Saito & Hoji eventually claims that instead of the Bijection principle, which requires many stipulations to make it work in (70), (70b), which exhibits a weak crossover effect, is better explained by the general principle given in (72):

- (72) A variable cannot be antecedent of a pronoun or an anaphor that it does not c-command. [p. 256]

A stipulation such as (71), in fact, has problems. Observe (51b), repeated here as (73):

- (73) Taroo<sub>i</sub> wa [s e<sub>i</sub> Hanako o zibun<sub>i</sub> no nooto de butta.]  
           TOP (NOM) DO

'As for Taroo, he hit Hanako with self's notebook.'

Suppose (73) is derived by movement as Kuroda and Saito suggest. Then since *zibun* is locally A'-bound by *Taroo* which, in turn, binds the trace, the sentence violates the Bijection Principle. However, in reality the sentence is grammatical.

If *zibun* is an anaphor, it has to be A-bound; if *zibun* is a variable, it has to be A'-bound. Since Topic 2 is in the A'-position, if (71) is a correct generalization, *zibun* has to be a variable. But this is

not the case. This conclusion indirectly supports the possibility of the alternative "subject" analysis for Topic 2 presented in the previous section.

In the next section, I will examine how discourse affects coreference.

#### §2.4.4 Zero-Topic and Referential Use

Huang (1982 and 1984) claims that the empty topic binds the object EC (empty category) in Chinese.

(74) [<sub>topic</sub>*e<sub>i</sub>*], [Zhangsan shuo [Lisi bu renshi *e<sub>i</sub>*]

say not know

'[Him<sub>i</sub>], Zhangsan said that Lisi didn't know *e<sub>i</sub>*.'

[Huang (1984), p. 542]

He also claims that this type of zero-topic binding is only allowed in a "topic-prominent" language like Chinese. In fact, the topic NP deletion observed for Chinese in Tsao (1977) is strikingly similar to Japanese NP-*wa* deletion (cf. Mikami (1960), Kuno (1978) and Terakura (1984)). Huang's zero-topic is motivated by the "topic-chain" phenomenon in discourse as shown in (75):

(75) [[Topic<sub>i</sub>],.....][[*e<sub>i</sub>*],.....][[*e<sub>i</sub>*],.....][[*e<sub>i</sub>*],.....],.....

Huang assumes that this coindexing in (75) can be done in LF' module followed after LF<sup>18</sup> (cf. (2) in Chapter 1). That is, in Huang's interpretive framework, the coindexing in syntax provides the coreferential



relationships in a sentence and the coindexing in the type above provides information for a sentence to be interpreted in discourse.

Now in Japanese, (13) in §2.6 also provides an example of zero analysis for Topic 1. In examples like (76), let us also assume that they have a zero topic which is Topic 2 as in (77); then *zibun* is, in fact, not referential but anaphoric and coindexed (in syntax) with Topic 2.

- (76)a. *zibun ga zikani soko ni itta*  
       NOM in person there to went

'Self went there in person.'

- b. *Taroo ga zibun no kodomo o syuzyutu-sita*  
       NOM self 's child ACC operated

'Taro operated self's child.'


- (77)a. [ $e_i$ ] [*zibun<sub>i</sub> ga zikani soko ni itta.*]  
       TOP 2

- b. [ $e_j$ ] [*Taroo<sub>i</sub> ga zibun<sub>i/j</sub> no kodomo o syuzyuti-sita.*]  
       TOP 2

The problem is that unlike Topic 1, since Topic 2 is an extra-NP, it is not clear whether a sentence has a zero Topic 2 or not. The discourse concept of a 'global topic' could offer one possible solution for this. Assuming that "global topic" (discourse topic) is what a discourse is about, while "local topic" (Topic 1 and Topic 2) is what a sentence is about, it is observed that the "global topic" and Topic 2 have similar functions; it has often been pointed out that Topic 2 has a discourse function similar to such expressions as *Taroo to ieba*, "speaking of



discourse interpretation as shown in (80) and *zibun* then is *Hanako*. Notice here that the subject-antecedent condition is not violated, since *Hanako* (= *zibun*) is the Topic 2 but not the direct object (which is also *Hanako*).



However, (79b) is not exactly a Topic 2 sentence. Example (81), which is in fact (79b) with the NP overt, is, in fact, ungrammatical.

(81)\* [<sub>S</sub>"Hanako wa [<sub>S</sub>Taroo ga Hanako o zibun no tomodati mae de homehazimeta.]]

Now let us replace (79b) with (82a).

(82)a. Taroo ga kanozyo/e o zibun no tomodati  
she

no mae de homehazimeta no sa.

b. [<sub>e<sub>i</sub></sub> [Taroo<sub>j</sub> ga kanozyo<sub>i/e<sub>i</sub></sub> o zibun<sub>i/j</sub> no tomodati  
TOP 1

no mae de homehazimeta no sa.]]

If (82a) has the structure of (82b) with/without the resumptive pronoun *kanozoyo*, then *zibun* is coreferential with the zero topic which is, in turn, coindexed with the discourse topic *Hanako*. However, as Kuno (1978, p104) reports, it is rather rare, though not impossible, that a non-subject NP in the preceding discourse occurs as a zero topic. Also, (82b) is a counter example to cases such as (61) which does not allow coindexing between Topic 1 and *zibun*<sup>20</sup>. Therefore, although Topic 2 has a function similar to that of the discourse topic, (79b) does not necessarily have Topic 2 as the zero form. The same thing can be said of pairs (24-27) vs. (24'-27') in relation with the performative analysis in terms of the abstract "localization" of discourse function.

Let us return our attention to the data (4) in §2.6 (the relevant portion repeated here as (83)).

- (83) John<sub>i</sub> wa [N<sub>p</sub>[sono ie ni zibun\*<sub>i</sub> o kakumatte-  
TOP 1 that house in self ACC sheltered  
Iureta] Bill] o uragitta-nodaroo.  
ACC betrayed-would-have

'Perhaps it was the case that John betrayed Bill, who sheltered self in that house.'

*Zibun* in (83) is not *John* but *Mary*, which has occurred earlier in the previous discourse. *Mary* is the protagonistic character and from her point of view the story is narrated.

Thus, the referential use of *zibun*, which is identified with the narrator and/or the protagonistic character can override syntactic

coreference as in cases such as that shown in (83) (*John* ≠ *zibun*), where the syntactic antecedent does not coincide with the narrator/protagonist. There are also discourses which do not have particular narrators (cf. Kuroda's reportative and non-reportative distinction in Kuroda (1973b)). In connection with this topic, I will examine two key notions which, although they are not syntactic concepts, are relevant to *zibun* coreference.

## §2.5 *Zibun* and Kuno and Kuroda's Extra-Syntactic Notions

Kuno (1973) claims that the notion of "awareness" plays the key role in determining the choice between *zibun* and *kare* 'he', as he states in (84):

- (84) *Zibun* in a constituent clause (A) is coreferential with a noun phrase (B) of the matrix sentence only if A represents an action or state that the referent of B is *aware of* at the time it takes place or has come to be aware of at some later time. In other words, *zibun* appears in subordinate clauses only when the clauses represent the internal feeling of the referent of *zibun* and the first person pronoun appears in its place in the direct representation of the internal feeling. [p. 322]

In Kuno's analysis, apparent free variations of "reflexive" *zibun* / "pronominal" *kare* in cases like (85) - (87) are not free variations as far as an extra-syntactic level is concerned. In other words, the distribution of those two is dominated by an extra-syntactic factor, which is "awareness."

- (85) Taroo wa [Ziroo ga zibun/kare o nantonaku  
 TOP NOM 'self'/him ACC somehow  
 sakete-iru to] omotta.  
 be-avoiding COMP thought

'Taroo thought that Ziroo was somehow avoiding him.'

- (86) Taroo wa [kyoodai-tati ga zibun/kare o  
 TOP siblings NOM self/him ACC  
 tayori-ni-site-iru koto] ga wazurawasikatta  
 depend-on COMP NOM was-annoying

'Taroo felt that it was annoying that his siblings depended on him.'

- (87) Taroo wa [<sub>NP</sub>[teki no supai ga sirokuji-chu zibun/kare  
 TOP enemy 's spy NOM all the time 'self'/him  
 o mihatte-ita] toki] mo fudan to kawari-nakatta.  
 ACC was-watching when too usual was-the-same

'Taroo was his usual self even when the enemy's spies were watching him.'

As a native speaker myself, I certainly detect that the choice of the use of these two controls, say, the nuance of the utterance. The problem with a notion like "awareness" is the difficulty in defining what exactly it means or even in proving that it exists, although intuitively the concept does not seem to be far off what native speakers sense in examples like (85) - (87).







(91)a. Watasi/\*Taroo wa atui.  
hot

'I am hot.'

b. \*Watasi/Taroo wa atu-gatte-iru.  
hot-feel-(being in a certain state)

'Taroo is hot.'

Such epistemological characteristics are a strongly dominating factor in Japanese, which can be extended to broader aspects of the language than normally thought, possibly including the in-group/out-group distinction in the honorific system and the principles governing the use of the *ko-so-a-do* demonstratives (cf. Chapter 3).

What is noteworthy in both Kuno's and Kuroda's hypotheses is that the subject NP which is independently defined in grammar is also the site of manifestation of such conceptions as "awareness" and "view-point," which have extra-syntactic natures..

Now, to review the position, there are two uses of *zibun*: referential use and anaphoric use; the former is pragmatically bound and the latter is syntactically bound. Every *zibun* is potentially ambiguous. Then the structural information makes a certain prediction, namely possible and impossible coreference relationships. The contextual information provides who is identified with zero topic, who is construable as the performer of abstract performative frame, who is the narrator, and the like. Although the final decision on the choice of the antecedent involves complex pragmatic factors, there is now a series of

candidates for the most likely antecedent, either structural or contextual, for *zibun*. In the following section, I will analyze some discourse data drawn from texts to test the foregoing predictions.

## §2.6 Examination of Discourse Data

[Data]

(1) ...私はここで何人か文学者と称する人たちと知りあったが、故郷の町で思いえがいていたような作家や詩人には一人も会わなかった。私が会った限りでは、誰もが自分のことしか話さなかった。自分の作品を語り、自分の生活を語り、それが語りつきると、自分の将来について語った。私はかつてこんな自己陶醉者の群れに出会ったことがなかった。マッチが転がっていると、彼らは自分のマッチの話をした。シェイクスピアの話をする、自分がそれをいつ読みはじめたかについて話すのだった。(円形劇場から・129)

(2) ...雨が街灯の光のなかをせわしく降りしきっていた。待合室では田舎出らしい長い外套の男や、箆を膝にかかえた女たちがじっと自分の前を見つめたまま暗い表情をしていた。そこだけは電灯まで薄暗いのではないかと思えるほどだった。通路や店の前で喋ったり、笑ったり、腕を組んで歩いたりしている都会の男女とは、顔つき、動作、言葉が違っていた。私は思わずそうした田舎者たちの流行遅れの帽子や、日焼けした頬や、落着きない眼ざしから、眼をそらした。(円形劇場から・123)

(3) ...私が、大都会の不気味な唸声を遠くに聞きながら、不安を感じなくなったのは、大都会の内蔵がどんなものであるか、その消化作用がどんなものであるか、ある感覚を通して知ることができたからである。しかしそれは別の言葉で言えば、私がこの大都会を通過して向う側に出て、それを、自分の視野の中に包みこんだということだった。(円形劇場から・141)

(4) *Mary<sub>m</sub>-wa henzi-o mat-te tyuuibukaku zibun<sub>m</sub>-ni sosoi-de i-ru Bill<sub>k</sub>-no me-kara kao-o sorasi-ta. Bill<sub>k</sub>-no giwaku-ga zibun<sub>m</sub>-ni muke-rare-te i-ru koto, zibun<sub>m</sub>-ga otooto-no John<sub>i</sub>-ni yar-ase-ru dake no riyuu-ga ar-u koto, koton i otooto-ga keisatu-ni ima tukamatte-i-ru koto – korera-no kan-gae-ga subayai hirameki-de Mary<sub>m</sub>-no atama-no naka-o tuukasi-ta. Osoraku (dareka-ni tanom-are-te) John<sub>i</sub>-wa sono ie-ni zibun<sub>m</sub>-/kare<sub>i</sub>-o kakumat-te kure-ta Bill<sub>k</sub>-o uragit-ta no dar-oo. Isi no yowai John<sub>i</sub>-no koto dakara. Sikasi zibun<sub>m</sub>-wa mukankei da.*

*'Mary<sub>m</sub> turned away from the stare of Bill<sub>k</sub>, who was watching SELF<sub>m</sub> attentively and waiting for an answer. That Bill<sub>k</sub>'s suspicion was turned on SELF<sub>m</sub> [i.e., that Bill<sub>k</sub> suspected SELF<sub>m</sub>], that SELF<sub>m</sub> had a good reason to have [her<sub>m</sub>] younger brother John<sub>i</sub> do that, especially that [her<sub>m</sub>] brother<sub>i</sub> was in the custody of the police – these ideas rushed through [her<sub>m</sub>] mind. Perhaps it was the case that (being asked to) John<sub>i</sub> betrayed Bill<sub>k</sub>, who sheltered SELF<sub>m</sub>/him<sub>i</sub> in that house. Because John<sub>i</sub> was infirm of purpose. But SELF<sub>m</sub> was not a party to that.'*  
(Oshima's original.)

(5) 廊下から父が来た。自分は胡坐を、かいて居た足を横坐到に直しながら、其為ともお辞儀ともつかぬ程度に少し頭を下げた。最初父は一寸自分が分からない風だった。二人は丸二年会はなかった。(尤も一度其間に東京駅の横で彼方から俾で来る父と擦違った車があったが、路幅の広い所だったし、一緒に歩いて妻も気がつかずに居た位で、さう不自然でなく自分は知らん顔をした) 其上自分は不精から一寸近く顔ひげを延ばしてゐたから顔も少し変つてゐた。が、間もなく父は自分と認めると、云ひやうのない不愉快な顔をした。(和解・141)

(6) それから一ト月近く経った。祖母からの便りで、父が赤児を見たがって居るから最近に連れて来て呉れと云つて来た。自分は何だか赤児を東京にやりたくなかった。其上に自分には又邪推があった。父が赤児を呼びたがるのは八十一歳になった祖母を我孫子へ寄越したくないからだ云ふ気がした。父は祖母が自分の家へ来てゐる車を前から、非常に嫌がった。それは年寄った祖母が若し自分の家へ来てゐる間に重い病氣にでもなった場合、自身出入りを止めてゐる身で其家へ入っては行けないと云ふ考が絶えず父を脅迫してゐるらしかったからである。(和解・245)

(7) 自分は続いた寝不足で頭痛のする上に、前に書くのを忘れたが股に出来た根太の膿みきる前で其所がづき々々痛く、気分が悪かった。常と云ふ女中が床を延べると直く自分は寝間着に着更へて寝床へ入った。

妻は暫く子守唄を唄ひながら暗い縁側を往復してゐた。そして赤児が眠ると蚊帳へ入って来て、小さい網の寝台へそれを寝かした。

妻は自分の頭を少時揉んでから蚊帳を出て行った。

十五分位すると又赤児は眼を覚まして泣き出した。妻は茶の間から起って来て蚊帳へ額をつけて中を覗いた。自分は小声で云った。(和解・246)

(8) 今は東京の医者 of 来るのが僅かな望みだった。

「九時半に電報がついて、支度に三十分と見て、それから一時間半したら来ませう」と医者が云った。

「一時間なら来るさ」とYが云った。

「夜道だからな」と自分は危ぶんだ。

「早くて十一時半ですか」と医者が云った。

「昨夜の荒れで水がどうかな」と又自分が云った。

医者は胸の芥子をそつと剥がして見た。明瞭した輪郭で其所だけ赤くなって居た。(和解・250)

(9) 間もなく三造と隣の婆さんとが沼向うから氷を充分に買って帰って来た。自分は三造に、赤児の夜着とおむつと、それから八畳釣りの蚊帳と、自分の着物とを取らしにやった。

自分①は自分②の頭痛が何時かの間にか直つてゐるのに気がついた。そして夕方迄づき々々と痛んでゐた根太も今はどうもなくなつて居たのに気がついた。然し時々欠伸だけが出た。(和解・250)

(10) 「どうですか」と自分は側から云った。

「余程窄みましたね」と答へた。

「若しかすると助かるぞ」と自分は云った。自分①は自分②の眼の輝くを感じた。(和解・251)

(11) 「わたしの活動領域、それは時間だ」とゲーテは語った。これはまさに不条理な言葉だ。不条理な人間とは実際になのか。永遠を否定はしないが、永遠のためになにもしないひとのことだ。永遠への郷愁がかれには無縁のものだからではない。永遠よりもかれは自分の勇気と論証力のほうを愛するのだ。勇気は上訴の道を閉ざされたところで生をこれっきりのものとして生き、自分のもっているもので自足する方法をかれに教え、論証力はかれに自分の限界を悟らせる。（不条理な論証・シーシュポスの神話・96）

(12) 太郎といえば、一番下の弟が、自分の親友をさそっていっしょに家出してしまったらしいよ。（創作）

(13) しかし、また同時に、不条理な人間は、自分はこれまで自由を当然のものとして仮定し、そうした仮定に縛られ、そうした仮定の幻の上で生きていたのだということを理解する。ある意味では、これがかれの行動を束縛していたのだ。自分の人生になにかひとつの目的を想い描いているかぎり、かれは目的を達するのに必要なことをしようと従順で、自分の自由の奴隷になりつつあったのだ。だから、自分がそれになろうとしている一家の父親（あるいは技師、あるいは大衆の指導者、あるいは郵便局の臨時雇い）としてしか振舞えぬだろう。自分は、あれになるよりもこれになるほうを選ぶことができるのだと、自分では思っている。なるほど無意識にそう思っているのかもしれぬ。だが、同時にまた、自分の周囲の人びとがいだいているさまざまな信念、自分と同じ境遇にある人びとがいだいているいろいろな先入見でもって、自分は自由なのだというこの仮定をささえているのだ。（不条理な人間・83-4）

#### [TEXTS]

Shiga, Naoya: "Wakai," in *Gendai Nihon Bungaku Taikei* 34, Tikuma Shoboo, Tokyo.

Shimizu, Tooru: *Shiisyuposu no Shinwa*, by A. Camus, Sintyoo Bunko, Tokyo.

Tsuji, Kunio: "Enkei-Gekizyoo kara," in *Kita no Misaki*, Sintyoo Bunko, Tokyo.

## [The Skeletons of the Relevant Sentence Structures in the Data]

1.     [Watasi ga   atta   kagiri de   wa   daremo   ga  
                   NOM met   as far as   TOP   everyone NOM  
           zibun no koto       sika hanasanakatta.  
           self's matter (ACC) but   did not speak.  
           'As far as I know, everyone spoke of nothing but self's  
           own matter.'
2.     [[rel-cl] otoko ya [rel-cl] onna-tati] ga   [zibun no mae]  
                   man and                    women   NOM   self' s front  
           o   mitumete ita.  
           ACC were gazing at  
           'The man who...and the woman who...were gazing in front of  
           selves.'
3.     Watasi ga...sore   o   [zibun no       siya]       ni  
           I   NOM it   ACC   self' s' field of vision LOC  
           tutumi-konda.  
           put into (put things in perspective)  
           '...and I put things into perspective.'
4.     .....[cf. Data].....
5.     Titi<sub>i</sub>       wa e<sub>i</sub> zibun ga                   wakaranakatta.  
           father   TOP   'self' NOM (object) could not recognize  
           'My father could not recognize self.'

6.      Titi<sub>i</sub>   wa   e<sub>i</sub>   [sobo        ga   [zibun no uti]    e   kuru]  
              TOP [grandmother   NOM   self   s' home   GO come]  
              koto    o    iyagatta.  
              COMP ACC    hated.

'My father was unwilling for my grandmother to come to self's home.'

7.      Tuma<sub>i</sub>    wa   e<sub>i</sub> [zibun no atama]    o        monda.  
              wife    TOP       self   's head    ACC   massaged  
              'My wife massaged self's head.'

8.      [.....] to        zibun    ga   itta.  
              COMP        self   SUB   said

'Self said that...'

9.      Zibun<sub>1i</sub>   wa    e<sub>i</sub>   [NP[zibun<sub>2</sub> no zutuu]    ga   naotte iru] no]  
              self<sub>1</sub>   TOP            ['self<sub>2</sub>'s' headache NOM has gone]  
              ni    kizuita  
              to    noticed

'Self noticed that self's headache was gone.'

10.     Zibun<sub>1i</sub>        wa   e<sub>i</sub> [NP[zibun<sub>2</sub> no me]    ga   kagayaku] no]  
              self<sub>1</sub>        TOP            [self<sub>2</sub> 's eyes    NOM light up]  
              o    kanjita.  
              ACC    felt

'Self felt that self's eyes lighted up.'

11. Eien yori mo kare<sub>i</sub> wa e<sub>i</sub> [zibun no yuuki to ronsyoo  
eternity-than he TOP [self's courage and proof  
no hoo] o ais<sub>u</sub>.  
(rather)] ACC love  
'He loves self's courage and proof more than eternity.'
12. Taroo to ieba, ootoo ga [zibun no sinyuu]  
speaking of Taroo younger brother NOM self 's friend  
to iede site simatta rashii yo.  
with has run away from home seems you-know  
'Speaking of Taroo, his younger brother seems to have run  
away with self's friend.'
13. [e<sub>i</sub>[e<sub>i</sub>[NP[NP[S[NP[Zibun<sub>i</sub> no syuui] no hito-bito] ga idaite iru]  
[[self's surrounding people] NOM have]  
[NP[samazama na sinnen]], [.....]] demotte [NP...[NPkat<sub>e<sub>i</sub>]] o  
[various kinds of beliefs,] with supposition ACC  
sasaete iru]].  
support -ing  
'∅ supports this supposition [that...] with various kinds of  
beliefs which those around self usually have and...'</sub>

In (1), *zibun* is *daremo*. *Daremo* is the c-commanding subject. Thus, it satisfies Rule (35) and the subject-antecedent condition. Furthermore, since *daremo* is a quantified NP, this is a typical syntactically bound (bound variable) case. Notice that *watasi* is in the



adverbial clause, thus it cannot c-command *zibun*. The referential use of *zibun* is also possible. However, the context excludes this possibility.

In (2), there is the same case as in (1). Here a plural NP acts in the same way as a quantified NP in Japanese (cf. Hoji (1982)).

In (3), the c-commanding subject is *watasi*. Thus, *watasi* is coreferential with *zibun*. Also *zibun* can be referential, referring to the narrator. However, since the subject is the same as the narrator, the two coincide and the reference remains the same.

In (4), second sentence from the bottom, *John* is the subject-topic; thus it is a possible antecedent. *Mary* is a performer in an invisible performative sentence, such as *Mary wa...to omotta* "Mary thought...". Oshima (1979) claims that if one replaces *zibun* by *kare*, then *kare* is *John*; otherwise *zibun* only has a *zibun-Mary* reading. However, the fact is that *zibun* is ambiguous between *John* and *Mary* or the subject and the performer. The reason why only the *zibun-Mary* reading is possible is related to a type of discourse strategy: that is, *zibun* is used consistently to refer to *Mary* in the previous discourse.

Examples (5), (6), and (7) are all taken from Naoya Siga's "Wakai" (Reconciliation). The story is narrated by the hero who appears as *zibun*, and *zibun* is consistently used to refer to the narrator.

In (5), the local topic *titi* binds the subject. (Notice that the object *zibun* is marked by *ga*.) Thus, *titi* is a possible antecedent as far as the structure is concerned. However, the context (especially the

style of narration) clarifies that *zibun* is referential and refers to the narrator.

In (6), the subject *sobo* and the subject *titi* are possible antecedents, but again the context specifies that *zibun* refers to the narrator.

In (7), *tuma* is the subject. But the head mentioned is not the wife's head but rather her husband's head. He is the narrator.

Examples (8), (9) and (10) are also taken from Shiga's *Wakai*; however, the uses of *zibun* illustrated therein are a little different from those in the previous examples.

In (8), the matrix subject *zibun* is referential by position and refers to the narrator. Note that this sentence sounds like an objective observation: the narrator describes his own action. This is because *zibun* is coreferential with a performer in an invisible performative sentence such as *X wa...to mita*, 'X observed...'; thus, the narrator is the observed object (= *zibun*) and the observer (= X) simultaneously.

(9) and (10) provide another interesting case. In (9), *zibun*<sub>1</sub> is referential by position. *Zibun*<sub>2</sub> is either referential or anaphoric. If anaphoric, *zibun*<sub>2</sub> is coreferential with the subject *zibun*<sub>1</sub>. If referential, each *zibun* can have a different reference as a logical possibility. However, *zibun*<sub>1</sub> and *zibun*<sub>2</sub> are coreferential contextually. (10) exhibits the same case.

In (11), *zibun* can be either referential or anaphoric by position; however, it is anaphoric by context and bound to the c-commanding subject *kare*, which in turn is referential, referring to *Geete* (Goethe).

The final cases are related to Topic 2. *Zibun* in (12) is ambiguous between the Topic 2, *Taroo*, and the subject *otooto*.

In (13), *zibun* is coreferential with the subject which is null but bound by Topic 1. Topic 1, in turn, is also null but identified with *huzyoori na ningen* (absurd man) through the topic chain.

## §2.7 Conclusion

Syntax cannot give the complete answer to the coreference possibilities of Japanese reflexives. However, it is too extreme a move to leave the whole issue to a theory of pragmatics, since *zibun* still observes certain syntactic restrictions. The distinction between referential and anaphoric uses, which captures the nature of *zibun*, is more than just assuming *zibun* as the English reflexive equivalent.<sup>21</sup> That is, every *zibun* is potentially ambiguous between referential and anaphoric. Anaphoric cases are the ones whose coreference relations to other NPs are determined by sentence grammar which says, details aside, that *zibun* has to be bound to the subjects (including Topic 2).<sup>22</sup> If a sentence has a zero topic (which may get a coindex through the subject in case Topic 1), its referent is determined in discourse. And such a process is assumed to be in the formal representation of discourse structure, i.e., in the LF' module.

Thus, the basic schema is: the sentence grammar feeds the information such as potential candidates for the coreference (i.e., general "subjects" including Topic 2) to the non-syntactic modules where the final disambiguation in the coreference interpretation takes place. The LF' module of grammar identifies what is the entity of the topic. If it is null in syntax, Topic 1 is easily identifiable through topic chain in surface structure of discourse; while the Topic 2 case is more abstract and its nature is not fully clear yet, but it is related to the "ground" on which the story is told (cf. Chapter 5, multi-*wa* sentences) or topic in a global sense. Now, subject which is syntactically identifiable candidate for the *zibun* coreference is also identified, in turn, as the site of "awareness" or "viewpoint."<sup>23</sup> If these are key notions to determine the coreference in discourse, it explains why the subject-bound topic, as opposed to the object-bound topic, is coreferential with *zibun*. The cases where *zibun* is coreferential with the narrator (referential case) seem to fall in the same pragmatic domain controlled by a notion such as "viewpoint"/"awareness."

## Notes (Chapter 2)

- 1 There is a fourth category, "E-type pronouns." However, these three are sufficient for the purpose in this chapter.
- 2 Actually (3) and (4) are still ambiguous between the coreference given by sentence grammar and the coreference given by discourse rule (referential use) since the pronouns are preceded by their antecedents. However, in (i), such a possibility is excluded. The coreference reading is solely determined by sentence grammar. This was pointed out to me by M. Rochemont (personal communication).
  - (i) His mother loves John. (he = John)
- 3 If NP<sub>1</sub> precedes and kommands NP<sub>2</sub>, and NP<sub>2</sub> is not a pronoun, then NP<sub>1</sub> and NP<sub>2</sub> are noncoreferential. *Definition*: A kommands B if the minimal cyclic node dominating A also dominates B. [Lasnik, 1976, p. 15]
- 4 The following pair does not exhibit a parallelism, unlike (4) and (5):
  - (i) His mother loves everyone. (he ≠ everyone)
  - (ii) His mother loves John. (he = John)
- 5 In Japanese, *zibun* 'self', but not *kare* 'he', has this type of use.
- 6 The term "bind" is used here in an intuitively understandable sense, not a syntactically defined one for anaphoric use.
- 7 Kuno's direct discourse analysis (e.g. 1973) is developed on this aspect of *zibun*.
- 8 'Anaphora' or 'anaphoric' expressions are different from 'anaphor': the latter is defined in the binding theory; the former means the expressions which have coreferential NPs in the same sentence.
- 9 The configurationality does not necessarily dictate the tree structure as in (29) (cf. Hoji [1982] for a binary branching

hierarchical structure). However, the choice of the configurational representations does not affect our analysis.

- <sup>10</sup> *Zibun* in object position and clause-bound cases like (i) in general are slightly awkward:

(i)a. Hanako<sub>i</sub> ga zibun<sub>i</sub> o hometa.

'Hanako praised 'self.''

b. Taroo<sub>i</sub> ga zibun<sub>i</sub> o syookai-sita.

'Taroo introduced 'self.''

(For an unknown reason, if *zibun-de* (by him/her self) is added, these sentences sound more natural.)

There are peculiar cases with *zibun-o*. Once sentences in (ii) are embedded, unlike (i) where *zibun* can have long-distance coreference, they strictly observe the clause-mate condition, as in (iii):

(ii)a. Taroo wa zibun o korosita.

'Taroo suppressed 'self.''

b. Taroo wa zibun o migaita.

'Taroo cultivated 'self.''

(iii)a. Hanako<sub>j</sub> wa [Taroo<sub>i</sub> ga zibun<sub>i</sub>/\*<sub>j</sub> o korosita] to omotta.

'Hanako thought that Taroo suppressed 'self.''

b. Hanako<sub>j</sub> wa [Taroo<sub>i</sub> ga zibun<sub>i</sub>/\*<sub>j</sub> o migaita] to omotta.

'Hanako thought that Taroo cultivated 'self.''

The nature of *zibun* with these subjective state verbs might be that of an ordinary noun which has a meaning like "ego" or "mind." An expression such as *kare wa zibun to iu mono o motte iru*, 'He is his own man' contains such a *zibun*. This assumption is compatible with the following claim of Kuno's:

Zero pronominalization in the possessive case: the more predictable the reference of the possessor is, the more possible it is that the possessive phrase becomes a zero pronoun. (translated by M. O. [Kuno 1983])

Then, what is coreferential with *Taroo* is not *zibun* but the zero pronoun in the possessive position of *zibun*. Even so, however, it is still necessary to explain why the zero pronoun refers to *Taroo* and not *Hanako*. The explanation will be given in exactly the same manner as it is given here, for the zero pronoun for this kind of *zibun* is used as the inalienable possession.

- <sup>11</sup> This condition is needed because of small clauses and *believe* type contexts.
- <sup>12</sup> In the following sentence, it is a little difficult to make a comparison between *i* and *j* and *zibun<sub>k</sub>* but this is due simply to memory capacity:

(i)      [<sub>S</sub><sub>3</sub> Taroo<sub>k</sub> ga [<sub>S</sub><sub>2</sub> Hanako<sub>j</sub> ga [<sub>S</sub><sub>1</sub> Ziroo<sub>i</sub> ga [<sub>NP</sub> zibun<sub>i/j/?k</sub>

NOM                      NOM                      NOM

no ie] de yopparatte-iru] to itta] to itta].  
's house in      drunk                      said      said

'Taroo said that Hanako said that Ziroo was drunk in 'self's' house.'

- <sup>13</sup> Possessive is a problematic case for GC. GC for (i) often receives irregular treatment and assumes S instead of NP. (cf. Anderson (1979)):

(i)      [<sub>S</sub> John washed [<sub>NP</sub> his car.]]

- <sup>14</sup> M. Soga's comments on Topic 2 called my attention to these kinds of examples, reflecting the nature of Topic 2. I also owe example (59) to Soga.

- <sup>15</sup> Terms which imply socio-cultural bonds supply good contextual information for *zibun* as coreferential with a topic. The use of





environment. However, the discourse context like (78) is, at least, not the one for (61c) to improve.

- 21 After I completed this chapter, I learned that the English reflexive is not so straightforward, and is also controlled by a certain discourse factor. (cf. Zribi-Hertz (1989))
- 22 Psych-verb cases (McCawley (1976)) are not directly discussed in this chapter. For the treatment of this type of sentence in a GB framework, cf. Belletti and Rizzi (1988).
- 23 H. Terakura has pointed out to me that the term "subject of consciousness" used in Ann Banfield (1982) (*Unspeakable Sentences*, London) may possibly be added to this list.

## Chapter 3

### Japanese Demonstratives: *Ko-So-A*

#### §3.0 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, I examined the Japanese reflexive pronoun *zibun*, which is used referentially/anaphorically. In this chapter, I will be examining Japanese demonstratives, with special attention to those used anaphorically as antecedents in discourse, and compare them with pro-nominal elements in discourse. I will first examine the main issues concerning the nature of demonstratives and provide a general perspective regarding exactly how Japanese demonstratives work. I believe that any factual observation which is made about their use in discourse should be re-examined in the light of their deictic function. Then, I will examine the distributional difference between the *ko*-series and the *so*-series in discourse. One might say that such choices are more or less pragmatic matters: see, for instance, the following example, where we can employ either *ko* or *so*:

- (1) Tantyooosa ni tomonau aki wa yoku hiroo  
monotony follow boredom often weariness  
to taihi sareru. Kore/sore wa tugi-no-yoo na  
be-compared this/that following  
riyuu ni yoru.<sup>1</sup> (Kobayashi: Tantyoo na Shigoto)  
reason

'Boredom caused by the monotony (of tasks) is often compared with weariness. This is for the following reason.'

This type of problem is often regarded as a matter of, say, the language user's subjective ( = *ko* )/objective ( = *so* ) attitudes toward the referent. However, my concern here is not stylistics, but rather the behavior of the demonstrative itself, which may eventually be correlated with various kinds of phenomena, some purely linguistic and some not. A close examination of the nature of the referents of each demonstrative is one of the main aims of this investigation. In the course of the chapter, the characteristics of the use of the various demonstratives will be compared with that of pronouns.

### S3.1 The Use of the Demonstratives

#### S3.1.0 Introduction

While English has a twofold demonstrative system, i.e. *this-that/here-there*, Japanese has a threefold system, the *ko*-series, the *so*-series, and the *a*-series demonstratives, which are distributed over the various syntactic categories as shown in (2):

(2)

	<i>ko</i>	<i>so</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>do</i> (interrogative)
noun 1 (object)	<i>kore</i>	<i>sore</i>	<i>are</i>	<i>dore</i>
noun 2 (object/ person)	<i>koitu</i>	<i>soitu</i>	<i>aitu</i>	<i>doitu</i>
noun 3 (place)	<i>koko</i>	<i>koko</i>	<i>asoko</i>	<i>doko</i>
noun 4 (direction)	<i>kotti</i> <i>kotira</i>	<i>sotti</i> <i>sotira</i>	<i>atti</i> <i>atira</i>	<i>dotti</i> <i>dotira</i>
nominal- adjective	<i>konna</i>	<i>sonna</i>	<i>anna</i>	<i>donna</i>
determiner	<i>kono</i>	<i>sono</i>	<i>ano</i>	<i>dono</i>
adverb	<i>koo</i>	<i>soo</i>	<i>aa</i>	<i>doo</i>

For purposes of translation, Japanese demonstratives and English ones are taken to correspond in the following manner:

(3)

Japanese	<i>ko</i>	<i>so</i>	<i>a</i>
English	this/here	that/there	

The *a*-series are sometimes translated as "that one over there," since objects pointed out by the *a*-series can be found further away than those pointed out by the *so*-series. The traditional views about the threefold system in Japanese demonstratives are based on this observation, namely, that the objects for *ko-so-a* may be arrayed according to the distance from the speaker, as shown in (4):

- (4)a. *Kono* kyuuri to, *soko* no tomato to, eeto, *asoko*  
 this cucumber and that tomato and er... that  
 ni aru no nasu kasira. Dattara are mo tyoodai.  
 exist eggplant isn't if so that too give-me


(At a greengrocer's) 'I will take these cucumbers and those tomatoes and, er, is that one (over there) an eggplant? If it is, give me some of that, too.'

- b. cf. SPEAKER : cucumber → tomato → eggplant

[ <i>ko</i> ]	[ <i>so</i> ]	[ <i>a</i> ]
Proximal	Medial	Distal


The modified version of (4b), which is presented in (5), incorporates the existence of the hearer in this schema and is often considered to be a better-supported alternative:

(5)



The schema given in (5) indicates that something near to the speaker is referred to by *ko* ; something near to the hearer rather than the speaker is referred to by *so* ; and something distant from both the speaker and the hearer is referred to by *a*.

Sakuma (1936/enlarged ed. 1951) is often quoted as the representative of the *nawabari* 'territory' theory developed from the view presented in (5). Sakuma claims that something in the speaker's territory is referred to by *ko* ; something in the hearer's territory is referred to by *so* ; and something in neither the speaker's nor the hearer's territory is referred to by *a*, as shown in (6):




There have been many modifications of this theory after its formulation by Sakuma, but the idea of territory formation has been accepted as the foundation of studies of the Japanese demonstratives. Now, in the next three sections I will investigate three core notions in such theories of the demonstratives: (i) ternary vs. binary; (ii) distance; and (iii) the existence of the hearer.

### §3.1.1 Ternary vs. Binary


Sakuma's demonstrative theory assumes a tripartite structure in territorial formation. On the other hand, Mikami (1955) claims that territorial formation takes place in two sets of binary relations: *ko* vs. *so* and *ko* vs. *a*, as shown below in (7):

(7) a.



Case 1

b.



Case 2

According to Mikami, there are two cases of psychological territory formation with respect to *ko-so-a* use. In Case 1, *ko* and *so* share the oval field. The oval shape indicates that the field shared by the two has two centers: the speaker and the hearer. In Case 2, the territory of *ko* completely overlaps or absorbs the territory of *so*, and *ko* in turn is opposed to *a*. The speaker is the center of *ko* in this case; however, *a* does not have a corresponding center. As the result of the combination of the binary sets indicated in Case 1 and Case 2, the apparent *ko-so-a* opposition is formed. In cases like that exemplified by (4), the shift from Case 1 to Case 2 takes place rapidly (Okamura 1972).

This assumption may explain the lack of *so-a* pairs in the idiomatic expressions given in (8) below:



(8)a. *ko-so* pairs

sore ya kore ya de	'because of this and that'
that and this (and) with	
soko koko ni	'over there and over here'
there here at	
soo koo suru utini	'while doing this
in that way in this way do while	and doing that'
sonna konna de	'because of cases
in that (reason) in this (reason) with	like that and cases
	like this'

b. *ko-a* pairs

are (ya) kore (ya)	'one thing and/or another'
that (and) this (and)	
aa da koo da	'this and that'
that way this way	
kare (= are) <sup>2</sup> kore	'this and that/about'
that this	
koko kasiko (= asoko)	'over here and over there'
here there	

c. \**so-a* pairs<sup>3</sup>

The paradigm does not, of course, provide direct support to the binary theory, but at the least it tells us that for some reason *so-a* cannot


form pairs in opposition. More interesting items of data on idiomatic expressions are given in (9) below:

(9)	dare	sore		'so and so'
	who	that	(person)	
	doko	soko		'such and such a
	where	there		place'
	nanda	ka( = a)nda	itte	'on some pretext or
	(it is) what	(it is) this	saying	other'

The interrogative forms, *dare* 'who', *doko* 'where', and *nani* 'what' are combined with *so* or *a* but never with *ko*. This fact indicates a special property in *ko*, and I will be returning to this topic in section 3.1.3.

The next item of data to consider related to the binary theory is the possible range of choices among the demonstratives. Without any change in physical position, the speaker can point out the same referent, sometimes with *ko*, sometimes with *so*; *ko-so* and *ko-a* are interchangeable, respectively, under certain conditions. However, all three members of the *ko-so-a* series are not interchangeable at the same time:

(10)a.



R = a referent which is approximately the same distance from A and B, with the two facing one another.

b. A: *Kore/sore/\*are wa nan-desu ka.*

this that what Q


'What is this/that?'

B: *Kore/sore/\*are ga rei no yatu sa.*

in question one

'This/that is the one I mean.'

(11)a.



b. Hyottositara      *ano*    tubo, syuusyuuka ga nodo  
by some chance that    vase    collector

kara te ga deru hodo hosigatte-iru to-ka-iu....  
enthusiastically                  want                  I hear

[(monologue) *Kore* o sagasu tame ni dorehodo  
this    look for                  how much

kuroo-sita-koto-ka.]

have-a-hard-time

'Hey, is that the vase which I hear that many collectors are  
drooling over? [Finally I found it. What a hard time I had  
to track it down!']

*Ko-so* in (10) and *ko-a* in (11) are interchangeable, respectively; but it is not possible to use *a* in (10) and *so* in (11). The possible pairs in (10) and (11) correspond to the pairs given in the binary opposition. Again, this does not provide direct support for the binary theory, but the implications are worth investigating. In this chapter, I will be assuming a modified binary system, of which the details will be discussed in §3.1.3.

### §3.1.2. Territory Formation: Physical Distance vs. Psychological Distance

Assuming that the primary function of demonstratives is deictic (Lyons: 1977), let us focus on the spatial use of demonstratives, where it is clear how S-H-R are arranged in physical space.

The problem here is how we determine whether the referent is closer to S, closer to H, or close to neither S nor H. The following examples demonstrate that the physical distance involved is not the main factor in determining the "distance" (although it is not totally irrelevant).

(12)a. A:     *Soko wa moo sukosi mizikame ni tanomu yo.*  
                   there    a little more   shorter    please

(at a barber shop)

'Will you make it a little shorter there?'

Who can tell which person is physically closer to the speaker's hair, the speaker whose hair it is, or the barber who is actually touching the speaker's hair? Also observe (13) and (14):

(13) A:     *Kore ga      koko no           itamae no ziman-ryoori*  
                   this   here (this restaurant)   chef      special (dish)  
                   da yo.

'This is the chef's special.'

B:     Yaa *kore* wa   umasoo da.  
           well this     looks-good


'Well, this/it looks good.'

(14)   Kono *usa-tyan* wa nanto-iu *onamae*?  
           this   bunny            what     name

'What is this bunny's name?'

In (13), the dish is on the table, in between the two speakers, or it is even possible in this instance for it to be physically closer to B; but A still uses *ko*. In (14), the utterance is made to a small child who is playing with a stuffed animal: the addressee is touching the referent, the speaker is not, but nevertheless the speaker still uses *ko*. The fact is that the physical distance is very much affected by the psychological one. In (13), A's utterance implies that he is the host or at least patronizes the restaurant; and in this sense, the dish on the table is "closer" to A than to B. In (14), a friendly speaker is eager to show her closeness to the doll and thus to the girl: this is why she used *ko* instead of the alternative, *so*. The psychological parameters of distance perception may be illustrated by (15):

(15)a.



Each speaker (A, B, C, D)  
is almost the same  
distance from the  
referent, a scorpion.

b. A: Saa, *kore*/*\*sore* ga mekisiko de saisyuusita  
this Mexico at collected

sin-syu no sasori da yo.  
new species scorpion

'Here it is. These are the scorpions of a new species  
which I collected in Mexico.'

B: Dore dore! *Kore*/*\*sore* wa sugoi ya. Mata korekusyon  
let me see this collection

ga fueta ne.  
added

'Let me see! This is great. You've added to your  
collection again.'

C: *Konna*/*Sonna* mono o tukamaeru tame ni  
this kind of/that kind of thing catch

harubaru makisiko made ittekita-no-kai.

all the way Mexico to went

Aikawarazu kawarimono-da-ne.

as usual eccentric

'You went all the way to Mexico to catch this/that thing? You are as eccentric as ever!

D: Kimoti-warui! *\*Konna/Sonna* mono hayaku  
disgusting that thing quickly

dokoka e yatte yo. ([in a whisper to C]  
somewhere send

*Anna/\*konna/\*sonna* mono no doko ga ii-no-kasira,  
that thing where-good

mattaku.)

actually


'Disgusting! Take that thing away. (I don't understand what he sees in it, really!)

In (15b), as an enthusiastic collector, A is "close" to his collection; thus, he uses *ko*. B is on A's side, and shows his strong interest by also using *ko*. C is amazed by A's hobby: he may use *so* to express his disgust, or remain with *ko* to show his amazement, which counts as a form of interest. D is a person totally out of sympathy with A's hobby.



She wants to create a psychological distance between herself and what she sees as A's bizarre collection, and so *ko* is avoided when speaking to the group as a whole. However, since D either considers C her ally or wants to win C over to her side, she uses *a* in the remark addressed privately to C (cf. (7b)). Thus, Sakuma's theory of territory formation, illustrated in (16) below, makes better sense when constructed on the basis of the participants' perception of psychological distance:

(16)



R. Lakoff (1974) categorizes English demonstrative uses into three classes: Spatio-temporal deixis (pointing words); discourse deixis (anaphora); and emotional deixis. I do not agree with this classification, at least as far as Japanese is concerned, since even spatio-temporal deixis is not free from psychological assessments of

"distance," as I have demonstrated above. But what interests me most is the emotional deixis which is used for "vividness" or creating 'closeness.' Lakoff's examples are duplicated here as (17) for *this* and (18) for *that* :

(17)a. I see there's going to be peace in the Mideast. This Henry Kissinger really is something! (= Lakoff's (8))

b. He kissed her with this/an/\*the unbelievable passion.  
(= (11))

(18)a. How is that throat? (= (35))

b. That Henry Kissinger sure knows his way around Hollywood!  
(= (45))


Lakoff's comment on the *that*-case is, "these are perhaps the most curious semantically, since the distance marker *that* seems to establish emotional closeness between speaker and addressee" (p. 351). However, this is no surprise at all if *that* is considered to be an undifferentiated equivalent of both *so* and *a* ; (18) would be a case of *a* in Japanese. The emotional closeness in (17) is between the speaker and the referent, while *that* in (18) is the speaker and the hearer, or the two who share the conversation. Lakoff's analysis of English *this/that* can easily be fitted into the schema for the Japanese *ko* and *a* in (16). The point on which I disagree with Lakoff is that, unlike her, I assume that spatio-temporal deixis is also affected by psychological factors. Lakoff's categorization of the demonstratives may be descriptively right, but I believe that three usages are generated from the fundamental schema of

the function of demonstratives, where the (psychological) distance factor is one of the parameters. The reason why I consider the term 'territory' should be preferred over 'distance' is that 'territory' implies a sense that the subject matter or the other parties 'belong' to the speaker; while 'distance' does not.

Now, notice that in the case of *a* in (16), the speaker and the hearer form the territory whereas the referent does not belong to it; or in the case of *so*, the referent belongs to the hearer's territory but not to the speaker's. In the schema in (16), speaker, hearer, and referent participate in the formation of territory. However, is it the case that the hearer's existence is as significant a factor as that of the other two in territory formation? This is the problem that I will be addressing in the next section.

### §3.1.3 Speaker's Territory and Egocentricity

In the preceding section, I mentioned that the sense of distance is affected by the speaker's perceptions; however, it is also true that the physical distance constrains the perception to a certain extent. For example, in pitch darkness, the speaker can only use *ko* for a referent which he can touch or feel. A person cannot use *so* to refer to the food in his own mouth, and other people cannot refer to that same food with *ko*. Here, the assumption of a hierarchy of 'truth' in McCawley (1978) may lead to an explanation:

(19) A Hierarchy of 'Truth'

[McCawley (1978): p. 178]

A thing which the speaker can perceive with certainty within his territory is one whose existence the speaker can confirm with his senses. Such an object will be the most certainly 'true' for him, in McCawley's terms, and will thus be referred to by *ko*. Observe (20):

## (20)

sense	experiencer	non-experiencer
taste	<i>Kono/*sono/(ano) azi nandaroo.</i> (What is this/*that taste?)	<i>*Kono/sono azi tyotto hendaroo.</i> (Isn't *this/that/(the) taste a little strange?)
smell	<i>Kono/*sono/(ano) nioi nandaroo.</i> (What is this/*that smell?)	<i>*Kono/sono nioi doo omoo.</i> (What do you think *this/that/[the] smell is?)
touch	<i>Kono/*sono/(ano) tezawari karasuruto, asa rashi.</i> (Judging from this/(the)/*that texture, it seems to be linen.)	<i>*Kono/sono tezawari asa mitaidaroo.</i> (*This/that texture is like linen, isn't it?)

feeling	<i>Konna/*sonna/(anna)</i> sugasuga-shii kibun wa hisasiburi da. (I have not had this/*that re-freshing feeling for a long time.)	<i>*Konnani/sonnani</i> kibun ga ii kai? (You feel *this/that good?)
sound	<i>Kono/*sono/ano</i> oto nandaroo. (What is this/*that/that (over there) sound?)	<i>*Kono/sono</i> oto ikaga. (What do you think *this/that sound is?; eg. the addressee is using headphones.)
sight	<i>Kono/*sono/ano</i> e mita koto ga arunaa. (I have seen this/*that painting before.)	Kabe no <i>*kotti/sotti</i> gawa wa donnahuu dai. (What is *this/that (the other) side of the wall like?)

In the cases of 'taste,' 'smell,' and 'touch' it is of course possible for the speaker and the hearer to experience the same food, smell, or texture at the same time; but such instances are excluded.

In cases concerning 'feeling,' 'taste,' 'smell,' and 'touch,' *a* can be used only when the speaker is referring to past experiences; while *a* is perfectly all right for referring to present experiences observed through 'sight' and 'sound.' However, in the latter case, *ko* and *a* are differentiated according to the physical distance from the source of sound or sight. When someone asks the experiencer about the experience, *so* is used. In other words, things (the experience in this case) which do not belong to the speaker are indicated by *so*. This fact casts the significance of the role of the hearer in the use of *so* into doubt.

In her categorization of emotional deixis, Lakoff claims that *that* creates a "closeness" or "togetherness" between speaker and hearer. According to Sakuma's schema, in the case of *a*, the hearer and the speaker belong to the same territory. In reality, however, it is not necessarily the case that the hearer is involved in the use of the *a*-series: typical examples are soliloquies like those in (20), but this may be involved in other situations as well. Examine (21) – (23):

- (21) Kimi niwa soozoo mo tukumai daroo ga *anna* sugasugasii  
 you cannot-imagine probably but that refreshing

kibun wa umarete hazimete no keiken sa.  
 feeling for-the-first-time-in one's life experience

'You probably cannot imagine (this), but that was the first time in my life I experienced that refreshing feeling.'

- (22) *Ano* soba wa umakatta naa. Kimi mo zehi itido  
 that noodle was-good you by all means once

tamesite goran yo.

try

'Those noodles were darn good. You should try them sometime!'

- (23) *Ano tezamari kara suruto asa mitaidatta keredo,*  
 that texture judging-from linen seems-like but  
  
*kinu mitai ni zyuryookan ga nakute ne. Zitubutu o*  
 silk like weight do-not-have real thing  
  
*siranai kimi ni setumei suru no wa tyotto*  
 don't know you explain a little  
  
*muzukasii kedo...*  
 difficult


'Judging from that texture, it seemed like linen, but it is as light as silk. Since you have not seen the real thing, it is very difficult to explain.'

It would seem to be the case that the existence of the addressee is a somewhat secondary factor in the above cases: these are not monologues, and the addressees exist for the speakers. Thus, as an alternative, I propose the following hypothesis: the principle governing the distinctive use of the three demonstratives is established on an "egocentric" basis. The territory is always formed with the speaker's ego as its center, and the way in which the object is referred to depends on whether it is within the speaker's ego domain or not. This egocentric hypothesis may seem a bit too speculative to be of use in explaining a linguistic phenomenon. However, there are some other phenomena for which the egocentricity hypothesis gives a better interpretation than other existing analyses, or at least new openings for investigation: the

focus of interest (Zubin 1979, also cf. Chapter 4), for instance, and story-retelling (Bartlett 1932 reported by Zubin). Moreover, McCawley's hierarchy of 'truth' is based on the degree of distance from the speaker's ego.

Now, returning to the problem with the demonstratives, the following diagram will illustrate what seems to be going on:

(24)



The boundaries of the speaker's territory, which is formed on the basis of the speaker's ego, are elastic: something in the microworld may be referred to by  $ko$ , or the whole universe may be  $ko$ . The boundaries of  $a$  correspond exactly with  $ko$ . Thus,  $a$  is also elastic, changing to conform with the speaker's territory. As the result of this territory formation (the flexible domain of  $ko$ ), something in the speech arena which does not belong to the speaker's territory will be indicated by  $so$ , regardless of whether the hearer is inside or outside of this schema. In other words, whether the speaker's ego recognizes the other



existence in this schema or not is a secondary factor. For example, in an actual conversation, it can be the case that the speaker stands in opposition to the other, and he may utter a sentence like (25):

- (25) *Kore wa boku no omotya de, sore wa kimi no.*  
           this        I        toy        that       you

'This is my toy and that is yours.'

Here, the speaker tries to make a clear distinction between something which is in his territory and something which is not, and by the nature of the conversation, the hearer exists in a domain which is opposed to the speaker's. Or observe (26) below:

- (26)a. A: *Kono tubo doo omou.*  
           this    pot    how    think

'What do you think of this pot?'

- b. B: (Dore dore) Aa, *kore wa neuti mono da nee.*  
                                   this        valuable thing

'(Let me see) Well, this is a valuable one, you know.'

In (26a), the speaker is A and the hearer is B, and A used *ko* ; in (26b), the speaker is B and the hearer is A, and B used *ko*. Here, the territories of the two speakers overlap almost completely. Hearer's existence is not included in this schema, even though two people have taken turns in playing the roles of speaker and hearer in this conversation. The

speaker's position is placed in opposition to the rest of the "world," let us say, and this "world" is often represented by the hearer in conversational situations: *ko* (speaker) is opposed to *so* (non-speaker, possibly hearer).

On the other hand, in a *ko-a* opposition, the speaker's ego does not contrast itself with the rest of the world. Rather, *a* is within the domain of the speaker's ego, or within an extension or projection of the speaker's ego domain. Within the speaker's "world," *ko*, which indicates the "here" and "now" is opposed to *a*, which in turn indicates the "there" and "then." Seen in this light, it is easy to explain why in the *a*-series the togetherness of the speaker and the hearer is emphasized more than with the *ko*-series. Below, I will explain this point further.

First of all, if one is making a serious effort to play the hearer's role (it will be necessary to make such an effort as long as one is interested in the conversation or wishes to be a hearer), one has to participate in the speaker's story in an attentive manner. If the speaker uses *ko*, the hearer will *make an effort* to identify the *ko*-object. However, the hearer cannot refer to some object existing in someone's inner world using *ko* even if he succeeds in forming a clear image of the *ko*-object (cf. (20)). Thus, *ko* is ruled out in (27):

(27) A: Tyuugaku no dookyuu ni Yamada toiu  
junior high school classmate

otoko ga ite ne. *Koitu* no henzin-buri wa  
man was this man eccentric manner

do-hazurete ita ne.  
extraordinary

'I have a junior high school classmate called Yamada.  
His eccentricity was extraordinary.'

B: Sore de \*kono/sono hito ima doosite-iru no.  
So this that person now is doing Q

'So, what is that/(the) friend doing now?'

Notice that in the use of *ko* in (26), speaker and hearer are very close, and the two share the referent as the *ko* object. Yet the use of *ko* does not bring a similar type of "togetherness" as is implied by the use of *a*. This is because in (26), the two territories overlap yet are still separate: there exist two egos as the center of each territory in the same 'space.'

On the other hand, in cases with *a* there is no territorial overlap as there is with the *ko* case given above. According to the Cooperative Principle of Conversation in Grice (1975), a conversation is formed on the basis of the mutual cooperation of the speaker and the hearer: the speaker may offer something which is more commonly shared between

the two. Also, if the hearer can relate to the speaker through identifying the *a*-referent, which exists in the speaker's mind as his "there" and "then," it means that the hearer can share, in a sense, the speaker's inner world. The more successfully the identification has been carried out, the closer the relationship established between the two:

(28) A: *Ano koro wa hontooni yokatta yo. Naa, Yoshida-kun*  
 that time really nice you know

*ya Kinoshita-kun nimo ano toozi no seikatu o*  
 and too that time life

*taikensasete-yaritai yo.*  
 let-(them)-experience-for-them

'Those were the good old days. You know, I want to let Yoshida and Kinoshita experience what life was like at that time (for their sakes).'

B: *Ee, hontooni ano koro wa yoi zidai desita ne.*  
 yes really that time good time

'Yes, it was a really good time, wasn't it.'

C:     *Sono* koro no koto o     zahi     hanasite-kudasai.  
           that time    thing by all means tell-(it)-for-me  
           'Please tell me (for my sake) how things were at  
               that time.'

(29) A:     Kimi to dookyuu no Tanaka-kun ne.  
               you     classmate  
               'You know your classmate Tanaka?'

B:     Aa, *ano* Tanaka ne.  
           'Oh, that Tanaka?'

The curious thing here is why the referent is *far* from the speaker/hearer territory – for the speaker, further than the *so*-object in the actual situation – while at the same time, the speaker (and often the hearer) identifies the referent with "closeness." A possible explanation is as follows: the speaker has the referent in his inner world, regardless of the hearer's acquaintanceship with it, since things do exist in the speaker's ego world, and the *ko-a* opposition occurs with *ko* as his ego center and *a* as the extension of his ego domain: the former is difficult for the hearer to share; but the latter is more or less accessible and the speaker tends to choose the referent which is mutually familiar, since such a topic, shared between the two participants in the conversation, makes it interesting and thus practical. Certainly, though, the speaker can still use *ko-a* even if the

hearer cannot identify the referent, leaving the latter a contented listener.

As for the *so* series, according to the standard assumptions of territory theories, the *so*-object is in the hearer's territory. Observe (30):

- (30) A: Mukasi, onazi tyoonai ni taihenna wanpaku kozoo ga  
 old days same town very naughty kid  
 ite ne. Tasika tabakoya no hitori-musuko  
 was if-I-remember-right cigar store only-son  
 datta to omou kedo, tonikaku *koitu* no  
 was (I) think though anyway this one  
 warugaki-buri-ttara nakatta yo.  
 rotten little brat was-no-comparison
- 'In the old days (when I was small), there was a naughty kid in the same town I lived in – if I remember right, he was the only son of the [man who owned the] cigar store, I think – anyway, *he (this one)* was the most unbelievable rotten little brat.'

B: Aa, *sono* ko nara sitte-iru wa. *Ano* ko no itazura  
 oh that child (I) know that child mischief  
 niwa zuibun nakasareta mono.  
 very suffer greatly you know

'Oh, I know *that kid*. His mischief gave me a lot of trouble.'

C: Hee.... Demo *sono* ko ga ima no hanasi to  
 Yeah... but that child the-story-you-told  
 dooiu kankei ga aru no.  
 what relationship is


'Yeah. But what does *that kid* have to do with the story you told me?'

Kitagawa (1978) characterizes the use of *so* in discourses like (30) as "to put the identity locus of the referent in the addressee's sphere, or, at least, away from the speaker's" (p. 236), and *sono hito* 'that person' means "the person whom you have mentioned" (p. 236), which satisfies one of Grice's conversational principles, "Be Relevant". However, in written paragraphs is the person whom the writer has mentioned in the hearer's territory? It is often the case in written discourse that the existence of the hearer (= reader) cannot be specified. I see the *so*-phenomenon in this: the referent is simply outside of the speaker domain; however, in many cases, the hearer exists in such an "outside"

domain, and faces the speaker as an interlocutor. This can explain the use of *so* regardless of whether mutual participation between speaker and hearer is involved or not.

If the demonstrative system is analyzed from the speaker-centered viewpoint used above, this may form a bridge between a type of focusing system and the discourse use of the demonstratives: the referent which is highlighted because of being in the speaker's ego domain may fall outside of that domain in the next instant, as the spotlight of attention moves along with the flow of the discourse. I will return to this topic later in this chapter.

Now, in section 3.1.1, I examined the binary theory as opposed to the ternary theory. Assuming the superiority of the binary framework on the basis of "egocentricity," I propose the following schema (31) for the *ko-so-a* demonstrative system in Japanese:



There exist two kinds of oppositions in the system: i) speaker's "here and now" vs. "there and then" – [KO] vs. [A]; ii) speaker's cognitive world



vs. outside world – [K0] vs. [S0]. The domain of *ko* is elastic and so is that of *a*. The way *ko* and *a* are used in (32) indicates the nature of the *ko-a* opposition:

- (32) Hee, *ano* e ga kimi ga daifuntō-site  
 oh that painting you make-strenuous-efforts  
 seritosita to-iiu...[(monologue) Makasa  
 made-a-successful-bid by no means  
 konna tokoro de kono e to saikai-suru towa  
 a-place-like-this this painting see-again  
 omatte-inakatta naa.]  
 did-not-think
- 'Oh, is *that* the painting you went all out to make a  
 successful bid for? [I never imagined that I would see *this*  
 painting again in a place like this.]

The referent in the speaker's "there" is referred to by *a*. The Japanese sentence implies the existence of a hearer; thus, the purpose of the utterance is an objective identification of the referent. The physical distance is the dominant factor. Then, in the monologue, the speaker's strong concern for the referent is the controlling factor; the physical distance is almost irrelevant and the speaker recognizes the referent in his "here" domain. In written texts, apart from dialogues, *a* is seldom

used except in cases like (33), in which the writer believes he can share the same cognitive sphere:

- (33) *Kono* yoona syakaizyoosei no ugoki wa wareware  
 like-this the-state-of-society movement us  
 ni *ano* 19xx-nen tooji no zyookyoo o  
 that (year) then the-state-of-affairs  
 omoidasaseru.  
 make-(us)-recall.

'The way the state of society is developing reminds us of  
 the way it was in (*that*) 19xx.'

This usage is predicted by the nature of *a*: in written discourse it is not easy (though as the above shows, it is not impossible) to identify oneself or feel oneself related with the writer's "there and then." As for the *ko-so* opposition, more elaboration is needed as regards the implications of being outside of the speaker's domain. The operation of the *so* series in discourse is, as a matter of fact, far from simple. In the rest of this chapter, I will examine the use of *so* in discourse, and in the course of this the nature of *ko* and *a* will also be discussed.

### §3.2 The Use of *Ko/So* in Discourse

#### §3.2.1 Introduction

There are two major problems which will be examined in the following sections. The first one concerns anaphoricity. The use of demonstratives is often classified into two categories: deixis (pointing out the reference) and anaphora (finding the referent in discourse). However, Kuno (1973 a, b) claims that *ko* is a "semi-anaphora" or "semi-demonstrative (= deixis [M. O.])" because of the "vividness" imparted by its use; while Mikami (1970) claims that *a* is always deixis. Compare (34) and (35):

- (34) *Soo ieba Tanaka mo moo mago ga iru tosi*  
 speaking-of-that too already grandchild have age  
*da naa. Ano otoko ga oziityan nante yobareru zu wa*  
 that man grandpa is-called picture  
*tyotto soozoo dekinai kedo....*  
 a little imagine cannot

'Speaking of that, Tanaka too is at the age where he could have grandchildren. I cannot picture *that man* (he) being called grandpa.'

- (35) A: Mukasi onazi tyoonai ni tabakoya no hitori-musuko  
 old days same town at tobacco store only-son  
 de taihenna wanpaku ga ite nee.  
 very naughty kid was

'In the old days, there was a very naughty kid who  
 was the only son of the cigar-store (owner).'

- B: Sono/ano ko nara watasi mo sitte-iru wa.  
 that kid if I too know

'If you are talking about *that* kid, I know him.'

If *a* as in (34) and (35) are deictic, then what about *so* in (35)? Kuno admits this type of use is "probably nonanaphoric but demonstrative" (1973a, p. 289). In fact, *so* in (35) is different from the *so* s in (36), but what exactly differentiates the usage in (36) from that in (35) is still far from clear:

- (36) Sore wa kahun-bunseki to iwareru hoohoo de kahun no  
 that pollen-analysis is-called method pollen  
 naka no keisitu no bubun ga itai tosite nokori, sono syurui,  
 in silica portion remain as leave that type  
 ryoo kara kako no syokusei no hukugen o  
 quantity from past plant-distribution reconstruct

si, sore o toosite kikoo no henshen o siru toiuu  
that through climate change know

mono de aru. (Sikata: Yoozo no kigen)

'That is a method which is called pollen analysis. The silica component of the pollen is left as remainder, and from *that* type and quantity we restore the plant distribution in the past, and through that we come to know the changes in the climate.'

Thus, the question which must be addressed here is: what is the exact nature of the anaphoric (= discourse) use of the demonstratives, *ko*, (*a*), and *so* ?

A second question which must be asked concerns the determining factor governing the choice between *ko* and *so*. Observe (37) and (38):

(37) *Naisin de motiron desi no soo ga zibun o*  
in one's inmost heart of course disciple monk

*toki-husete kono hoo o kokoromi-saseru no o matte ita*  
convince this method make-(him)-try wait

no de aru. *Desi no soo nimo Naigu no kono sakuryaku ga*  
disciple monk too this strategy

*wakaranai hazu wa nai. Sikasi sore ni taisuru hankan*  
must-know but that against ill-feeling

· yori wa sooiu sakuryaku o toru kokoro-moti no hoo ga  
 than such strategy take psychology

yori tuyoku kono desi no soo no doozyoo o ugokasita  
 more strong this disciple priest sympathy appealed to  
 no-de-arū.

it will be the case that (Akutagawa: Hana)

*'In the depths of his heart, of course, he was waiting for  
 his disciple monks to convince him and make him try this  
 method. His disciples must have sensed this (his) strategy.  
 But, more than the ill-feeling towards that (such a)  
 strategy, it would be the case that Naigu's psychology,  
 which made him think in that way, appealed to the  
 sympathies of this disciple.'*

- (38) Naigu wa hazime, kore o zibun no kao-gawari ga sita  
                   at first this his face-metamorphosize  
 sei da to kaisyaku-sita. Sikasi doomo kono  
 because of interpret but somehow this  
 kaisyaku dake de wa zyuubun ni setumei ga  
 interpretation only adequately explain  
 tsukanai yoo-de-arū. Motiron, Naka-doozi ya Ge-boosi ga  
                   of course and

warau genin wa soko ni aru ni tigainai (ga)....

laugh cause there was must (Akutagawa: Hana)

'At first Naigu interpreted this to mean that it was because his face had undergone a metamorphosis. It seemed that this interpretation as well could not explain things adequately. Of course, the reason why Nakadoozi and Geboosi laughed was there, (but)....'

In (37), besides the original *kono* (sakuryaku)/*sooiu* (sakuryaku) combination, three other combinations would be theoretically possible:

- (39) a. {*kono/sooiu*} (original)
- b. {*kono/\*kooiu*}
- c. {*sono/sooiu*}
- d. {*sono/\*kooiu*}

However, (39b) and (39d), which contain *kooiu* as the second component, are not acceptable. Why is this so?

In (38), the combinations are as follows:

- (40) a. {*kono/soko*} (original)
- b. {*kono/??koko*}
- c. {*sono/soko*}
- d. {*sono/??koko*}

Again, some pairs, like (40b) and (40d) are less preferred, if not entirely unacceptable, when compared with their *so* counterparts. What determines the choice between *ko* and *so* here?

The two questions posed above are related, and involve many subsequent topics like pronoun vs. demonstrative, referential vs. non-referential, antecedents in discourse, and so on. In what follows, these topics will also be examined in the course of the investigation of the two major questions.

### §3.2.2 The *Ko/So* - Antecedent Relation

In this section, I will discuss how *ko* and *so* are used in discourse. First, let us look at the results of the analysis of actual texts in Ono (1975 and 1977) to see what differences there may be. Five scientific articles<sup>4</sup> were chosen for this study of the demonstratives. The total number of occurrences of the demonstratives in question was 571: 253 cases of *ko* and 318 cases of *so*. The results which are relevant to this section's objectives are as follows:

- [1] i) The average distance between the antecedents and demonstratives (D = 1 means the antecedent is in the adjacent sentence).

	D
<i>ko</i> -series	1.063
<i>so</i> -series	0.377

( $t = 13.407$  Pr  $\ll 0.001$ )



The antecedent of *ko* is found further distant than that of *so* in the previous discourse, that is, *ko* has a longer-distance power of referral. Within the data, cases in which the antecedent is more than two sentences away are only to be found with *ko* antecedents.

ii) The location of *ko/so* antecedents

*Ko* and its antecedent tend to be found in two separate sentences: it is rare to find its antecedent within the same clause as the *ko*, while the antecedent of *so* is usually found in the same sentence.

	sentence		
	same	different	
kore <sup>5</sup>	21	53	74
so <sup>re</sup>	69	24	93
	90	77	167

In extreme cases, the antecedent of *so* is found in the adjacent noun phrase in coordinate structures, e.g., "Aru Kapone to sono itimi," "Al Capone and his gang." It is impossible to substitute *ko* for *so* here.

[2] i) The type of the antecedent

*Ko* has a sentential level antecedent as well as a word level one, while *so* prefers to have a word level antecedent.

	sentential (clause, sentence)	word	
kore (wa/ga) <sup>6</sup>	20	32	52
sore (wa/ga)	4	35	39
	24	67	91

ii) The size of the antecedent

*Ko* can refer to a fairly large portion of discourse, as shown below:

number of sentences	2	3	4	5	6	12	20	26	
kono/NP	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	4
kono yoonu/ koo iu	6	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	12
koo/kono yooni	1	1	1	1	2	1	0	1	8
	7	4	4	3	3	1	1	1	24

On the other hand, it turns out that the antecedents of *so* are no more than single sentences.

Besides [1] and [2] above, the following are additional interesting characteristics of the data:

- [3] Postcedent: *Ko* can have a postcedent as well as an antecedent.<sup>7</sup>

Ex.: ...tugi ni *kore* mo yooi ni dekiru pasu no hoohoo dearu.

next this too easy can pass method

Sore wa dai-hati-zu no yooni, hidari te o ue ni muke,

it Figure 8 as left-hand upward put

kahei o oyayubi to nakayubi to de sasaeru. Soko e...

coin thumb and middle finger with hold there

hoka no yubi wa kahei no ue o oou no dearu....

other finger coin on cover

(Mazikku Shooziten)

'Next, *this* is also an easy method for a pass. It is, as Figure 8 shows, that you put your left palm upward and hold the coin with your thumb and middle finger. There,... cover the coin with the other fingers.'

- [4] Reflexive Reference: *Ko* can refer to itself, i.e., the reflexive usage.

Ex.1 *Kono* bun no *kono* gozyun wa bunpoo ni

this sentence this word order grammar

kanatte-imasu.

agree

'This word order in this sentence is grammatical.'



of *ko* is strongly exhibited in the data. That is, the reflexive use in [4] is one thing, and the postcedent in [3] is another. In the latter, this type of use implies that what the speaker wants to say is already in his mind preceding its appearance in discourse: in other words, it supports the assumption that he actually refers to something which exists in his mind in cases involving *ko*. In the former, Example 1 is a clear-cut case of the reflexive use of the deixis to the "meta-sentence" of the actual sentence. The use in Example 1 lends great support to that in Example 2, where *ko* refers not to the *expression* but to the actual existence in the fictional world created by the discourse. Let us now consider the negation, [5]. A negative expression has, as a matter of course, its affirmative counter-part. According to Ishigami (1983), the difference between affirmative sentences and negative sentences is based on the difference in how to choose (the direct) material for one's utterance. Ishigami illustrates this point using examples like that reproduced in (41), and the figure duplicated here with my own interpretations as (42):

(41)a. Shingoo wa akai

signal        red


'The signal is red.'

b. Shingoo wa aoku-nai.


signal        NEG

'The signal is not green.'


(42) [affirmative]




(it is)



[negative]



(it is not)



Ishigami argues that in (41a), the direct material is [shingoo ga akai (koto)] "(the fact that) the signal is red," which matches the "reality" which the speaker sees in front of his eyes. On the other hand, in (41b), the direct material is [signal is green], which the speaker gets not from the observation of "reality" but his (subjective) choice, and this material contradicts what he actually sees; then the utterance [signal is not green] is obtained. This argument itself is established on the basis of a metaphysical conception. The interesting point given my present concerns is: the negative sentence expresses the negation of the existence of what the speaker conceptualizes. In Chapter 5, a sentence which contains a certain use of the particle *ga*, which is called *neutral description* (Kuno, 1973) or *thetic* sentence (Kuroda, 1965 and elsewhere) will be introduced, and Ishigami's theory of negation can explain why this type of sentence is very difficult, if not impossible, to negate (a fact pointed out by Kuroda and others). That is, a negative utterance is not a direct observation of the outside world.

Another important point is that Ishigami's schema about negation claims that first you have to conceptualize something to exist as the direct material for its negation. In light of this, the following conditional case (43) could be given a similar explanation:

- (43) Moshi kyoo no gogo teiden ni nattara, *sonna/\*konna*  
 if today's afternoon power-failure this  
 koto wa nai to omou ga, sugu kenkyuuzyo ni  
 thing not think but immediately laboratory  
 hatudenki o karini ikinasai.  
 power-generator borrow go

'If you have a power failure this afternoon - I don't think  
 that will be the case - go immediately to the laboratory to  
 borrow a generator.'

*Koo* refers to the subjunctive idea [*kyoo no gogo teiden ni naru*], not [*Mosi kyoo no gogo teiden ni nattara*], which includes the [if.....] frame. Keeping this point in mind, I will examine the *ko*- antecedent relation in the following.

First of all, what is the implication of the tendency that *ko* has to refer to larger chunks of discourse, at the least sentential statements (cf. [2])? Compare (44b) and (44c) with (44a):



- (44)a. Tantyooosa ni tomonau aki wa yoku hiroo  
 monotony follow boredom often weariness  
 to taihi sareru. (= (1) in this chapter)  
 be-compared

'Boredom caused by the monotony (of tasks) is often compared with weariness.'

- b. Kore wa tugi-no-yoo na riyuu ni yoru.  
 this following reason

'This is for the following reason.'

- c. Sore wa tugi-no-yoo na riyuu ni yoru.  
 this following reason

'This is for the following reason.'

In (44c), *sore* can be replaced by [*tantyooosa ni tomonau aki ga yoku hiroo to hikakusareru no/?koto*], while in (44b) *kore* is replaced by [*tantyooosa ni tomonau aki wa yoku hiroo to hikakusareru to-iu-no/koto*]. *No* is the nominalizer in Japanese; thus, although *so* refers to the previous sentence, precisely speaking *so* refers to a nominal concept. On the other hand, *ko* refers to a sentential concept, i.e., *to* is a quotative marker and *toiukoto* is different from the simple *koto*.<sup>10</sup> (Notice that the particle *wa* is used in the latter, but its place is taken by *ga* in the former, since *wa* cannot occur in NP according to the general rules for

its use.) The levels of conceptualization seem to be different in *ko* and *so*.

Next compare *ko* in (45):

- (45) Zyagaimo to ninzin o sainome ni kitte, tyotto  
       potato        carrot   small cube       cut   a little  
  
       yawarakai-gurai ni yudete, kore o guriinpiisu to  
       soft                boil    this   green peas  
  
       mazete-kudasai.  
       mix

'First cut potato and carrot into small cubes and boil them until a little tender, and mix this with green peas.'

Although the referent cannot be pinned down in a linguistic form, i.e., in a noun form (cf. *this* is accusative in the following sentence), it is obvious that the referent is something which is prepared in the way described in the preceding sentence: the diced and boiled potato and carrot. This is a good example of how deixis works in discourse. The *ko*-referent is in the speaker's territory or in the 'reflection' of his inner world. It must have some reality at least in his mind, though it does not necessarily have to exist for other people. On the other hand, in (written) discourse, the writer tries to relate his thought to the readers (including the writer himself). In (45), the previous discourse has established such an existence as the referent: the referent's existence is inferrable for the reader from the previous discourse. The reader has

received sufficient information from the previous discourse to figure out what is in the speaker's mind at the moment in question. It is often the case that the *ko*-reference is hard to pin down as a linguistic form, a word, a phrase, or a sentence in a discourse (Ono, 1975 and 1977); and as Kuno (1973) points out, the referent has a "vividness" in context. Although it is not impossible for it to refer to some concrete object mentioned in discourse, the *ko*-referent normally takes a sentence or sentences. All these facts indicate that *ko* refers to some imaginary existence evoked in the context.<sup>11</sup> Thus it takes a good deal of discourse (at least a sentential expression) to establish a plausible referent in context. Negative and conditional clauses are either to negate or to suppose a certain existence; the imaginary existence of something is the foundation upon which these expressions are based, and *ko* can refer to such kinds of existences as well. Thus, I support the contention that *ko* is always deixis, regardless of whether it is used in an actual pointing manner or used as the discourse anaphora.

Now then, what is the difference between *ko* and *so*? In (45), *kore* can be replaced by *sore* but it lacks the "vividness" which is attached to the *ko*-use. Roughly speaking, the anaphoric use of *so* can be described as "what I/you have mentioned in the previous discourse" (Kitagawa (1978) assumes that Grice's "be relevant" is operating here); while *ko* is described as a discourse deixis. It is, in fact, *possible* to use *so* to refer to a statement including a negative or an *if*-frame, as in (46) and (47), as well as excluding them (cf. Ex. in [5] and (43)):

- (46) Kare wa hannin dewa nai. *Sonna/\*Konna* uwasu wa  
 he murderer is not that/this rumor  
 sinzite inai. Tada mondai wa...  
 (I) believe not only problem

'He is not the murderer. I don't believe that (such a) rumor.  
 But the problem is...'

- (47) Mosi kesa nesugosazu ni, ano hikooki ni  
 if this morning without-oversleeping that airplane  
 notte-itara... *soo/koo* kangaeta dake de hiyaase ga  
 took in this way think only cold sweat  
 nizimideru.  
 break out

'If I hadn't overslept this morning and had taken that  
 airplane...the very thought makes me break out in a cold  
 sweat.'

The difference in *ko/so* in (47), for example, is that while *soo kangaeta dake de* can be easily replaced with [*mosi...tara*] to *kangaeta dake de*, what *koo* refers to is a hypothetical situation, "I had not overslept this morning and had taken that airplane" but not the expression [*mosi...tara*].

Now, we can readily understand why there are many conjunctive words of *so* origin in Japanese. Observe (36), (37), and (38), which are duplicated here as (48), (49), and (50) respectively:

- (48) Sore wa kahun-bunseki to iwareru hoohoo de kahun no  
 that pollen-analysis is-called method pollen  
 naka no keisitu no bubun ga itai tosite nokori, sono syurui,  
 in silica portion remain as leave that type  
 ryoo kara kako no syokusei no hukugen o  
 quantity from past plant-distribution reconstruct  
 si, sore o toosite kikoo no hensen o siru toiuu  
 that through climate change know  
 mono de aru. (Sikata: Yoozo no kigen).

'That is a method which is called pollen analysis. The silica component of the pollen is left as remainder, and from *that* type and quantity we restore the plant distribution in the past, and through that we come to know the changes in the climate.'

- (49) Naisin de motiron desi no soo ga zibun o  
 in one's inmost heart of course disciple monk  
 toki-husete kono hoo o kokoromi-saseru no o matte ita  
 convince this method make-(him)-try wait

no de aru. Desi no soo nimo Naigu no *kono sakuryaku* ga  
disciple monk too this strategy

wakaranai hazu wa nai. Sikasi sore ni taisuru hankan  
must-know but that against ill-feeling

yori wa *sooiu sakuryaku* o toru kokoro-moti no hoo ga  
than such strategy take psychology

yori tuyoku kono desi no soo no doozyoo o ugokasita  
more strong this disciple priest sympathy appealed to

no-de-ar.

it will be the case that (Akutagawa: Hana)

*'In the depths of his heart, of course, he was waiting for his disciple monks to convince him and make him try this method. His disciples must have sensed this (his) strategy. But, more than the ill-feeling towards that (such a) strategy, it would be the case that Naigu's psychology, which made him think in that way, appealed to the sympathies of this disciple.'*

- (50) Naigu wa hazime, kore o *zibun no kao-gawari ga sita*  
at first this his face-metamorphosize  
*sei* da to kaisyaku-sita. Sikasi doomo *kono*  
because of interpret but somehow this



(i) *So* is related to a certain mechanism which operates to pass information from the previous discourse to the current discourse. A certain objective tone is imposed on this use, since the referent is not in the speaker's current area of concern (= territory).

(ii) *Ko* is related to a certain mechanism which indicates where "we" (= speaker and hearer, hearer, or writer and reader) have shared an experience through an imaginary scene built on the basis of information given by the discourse, manufactured by the use of "here and now" deixis *ko*. More sample discourses showing this type of "spotlighting" *ko* use will be found in the Appendix.

With this taken care of, the next section will be concerned with some residual problems connected with *so*, which has a more complicated nature than *ko*.

### §3.2.3 Problems in the Use of *So*

In this section, the distinction between demonstratives and pronouns will be discussed in terms of the use of *so*. In §3.1.0, the correspondence between *that* in English, a language which has a twofold demonstrative system, and *so* and *a* in Japanese with its threefold demonstrative system, was touched upon. The Japanese *so*, in turn, can apparently be translated into not only *that* but also *it*. Compare (51) and its Japanese counterpart, (52):



(51)a. What is *that* on Ms. Kimura's desk?

b. *That/It* is a stuffed bird from South America, I heard.

(52)a. Kimura-san no tukue no ue ni aru *sore* wa nanda?

b. *Sore/ø* wa nanbei no tori no hakusei da soo desu.

Japanese is poor in third person pronouns, in contrast with a very rich demonstrative system, makes the situation a little complicated. *Kare/kanozyo/karera* "he/she/they" are newcomers to the language, which occasionally replace zero pronouns, and English *it* is generally translated using *sore* or a zero pronoun. (52) is a case of either *that/it* = *sore* or *that* = *sore/it* =  $\emptyset$  in the translation. Then is *sore* used as a pronoun or a demonstrative? Or is it the case that the function of *sore* does not exactly fit into the *that* vs. *it* distinction in English?<sup>12</sup> In what follows, the nature of *so* will be examined in comparison with pronouns.

One of the characteristics of pronouns is their bound variable use (Evans (1980), Partee (1982), among others). So, unlike *ko* and zero pronouns, seems to have this use:

(53) Kono mati dewa, subete no tatemono ga *sono/ø/\*kono*

this town in every building

rekisi o monogatatte-iru.

history tell

'In this town, every building tells its own history.'

However, also observe the slightly different cases in (54):

- (54)a. Kono naka kara dore-demo suki na burooti o erande,  
 this among whatever like brooch choose

*sore/ø/\*kore o konya no paatee ni site iki-nasai.*

that tonight party put go

'Choose whatever brooch you like of those, and go to tonight's party wearing it.'

- b. Kyoo kore kara depaato ni itte nanika  
 today now department store go something

*sagasite-mimasu. Mosi yoi mono ga mitukattara,*

try to look for if good one find

*sore/ø/\*kore o Haruko-san e no purezento ni simasu.*

that present make

'Now I am going to the department store to look for something (for that purpose). If I can find something good, I will make it a present for Haruko.'

- c. Kondo wa Kyooto no yukigesiki o toritai ne. *Sore/ø/\*Kore*  
 next time snow-scene take a picture that  
 o Afurika ni iru Kyooto-umare no tomodati ni okuttara  
 Africa is born friend send-if  
 yorokobu-daroo naa.  
 be-glad-will

'Next time, I want to take pictures of snow scenes in  
 Kyoto. If I send them to my friend from Kyoto who lives in  
 Africa right now, he will be delighted.'

In these examples, *sore* does not refer to specific objects. These examples remind me of the E-type pronoun in (55), which are (6) – (8) in Evans (1980):

- (55)a. Few M.P.s came to the party but they had a good time.  
 b. Few congressmen admire Kennedy, and they are very junior.  
 c. John owns some sheep and Henry vaccinates them in Spring.

In these examples, the pronoun is not bound by the quantifier. According to Evans, in (55c), for example, the sentence entails that "Harry vaccinates *all* the sheep John owns" (p. 339), unlike the quantifier binding case (56):

- (56) Some sheep are such that John owns them and Harry  
 vaccinates them in Spring.

Evans treats these cases in (55) as referential, although the pronouns do not refer to specific entities.

Now, let us assume that the demonstratives are always referential regardless of whether they are in the deictic use or the anaphoric use. *Ko* does not have much trouble in adapting to this assumption, since its referential nature has been made clear in the discussions in the previous sections. In the case of discourse anaphora, the speaker's territory is formed in the speaker's inner realm, which has its reflection in the discourse. Then, *so* is defined as something outside of the speaker's territory: the referent is not the speaker's "now and here" but "then and there." If so, there already exists a good background for *so* as well to be considered as referential all the time. Maclaran (1982) suggests adapting the idea of discourse referent in Karttunen (1976) for the non-specific referent cases. First look at (57), which is Karttunen's (34):

(57)a. Harvey courts *a girl* at every convention.

b. Most boys in this town are in love with *a go-go dancer*.

The sentences (57a) and (57b) are both ambiguous between the specific reading and the non-specific reading. However (58), which is Karttunen's (35), has only the specific reading:

- (58)a. Harvey courts *a girl* at every convention. *She* is very pretty.
- b. Most boys in this town are in love with *a go-go dancer*.  
Mary doesn't like *her* at all.

Here, indefinite NPs "establish" discourse referents for the pronoun to refer to. Thus, although there is no specific fish which exists in (59), *it* can refer to it, since the imaginary discourse referent does exist in the speaker's mind, and thus supposedly in the hearer's mind as well:

- (59) Bill wants to catch a fish and eat *it* for supper.

The discourse referent exists, however, in a modal bound fashion; the referent is a temporary one.

McCawley (1979) argues for Karttunen's proposal. He suggests taking the universe of discourse as time-dependent and time branch-dependent in order to avoid the universal quantifier reading for (60) (= McCawley's (18d)):

- (60) If blisters develop on the patient's body, you should bandage *them*.

(For every blister X, if X develops on the patient's body, you should bandage X.)

Thus, "blisters develop on the patient's body" in (60) is causing a "temporary addition of a corresponding discourse referent to the context domain" (p. 384).

If Karttunen's discourse referent is a step in the right direction, the original deictic nature of demonstratives can fully utilize its referential function in discourse, where successive sentences may be bound by certain modals, mood, tenses, aspects, and so on, to create a certain imaginary world. This can be supported by the claim made by Stechow (1982) and others that the demonstrative entails the existence of the referent. If so, the level where this type of referential mention is described<sup>13</sup> is not in LF but in LF'.

Now, although Maclaran (1982) concludes that there are no genuine bound variable cases in English demonstratives, Japanese *sono* seems to differ in this respect. Unlike *ko* in *kono*, *so* in *sono* in general is in fact ambiguous between the following two cases in (61):

- (61)a. Rei no        tukue ni hikidasi ga tuite-iru ne. *Sono* hikidasi  
           in question   desk drawer        there-is        that drawer  
           no naka o mite-goran.  
           inside        look

'You know that/the desk which has a drawer. Look inside of the/that drawer.'



c. Sono/ø kodomo-tati ga sonkei-site-iru titioya  
                   children           respect           father

'The father whom his children respect.'

In these cases, the *so-that* correspondence is ruled out. *So*, whose referents are non-human otherwise, apparently works like the personal pronouns here, or at least is used like "pro-forms." Notice in (62c), *sono* is cataphoric, which is normally not allowed for *ko*.

Both the demonstratives and the pronouns can "stand for" expressions as a part of their functions; thus, the repetition of the same expressions may be avoided in this way. A typical example for this use of the demonstratives is given in (63), examples of which are not rare in certain styles of writing:

(63) Hitori damatte tabi nideru, Taroo wa *sonna* otoko da.  
           alone quietly leave for a trip                   such a man

'Quietly leaving for a trip alone, Taroo is such a man.'

If it is the case that the use of *sono* in (53) is the same as the usage exhibited in (62) – supposing some uses employ only the "stand for" function of demonstratives – *sono* is not referential there but rather to be identified with the bound variable use. So far, there is no conclusive evidence bearing on this dispute concerning the non-referential use in demonstratives (also cf. Stechow (1982)). What is clear so far is that



the way pronouns and demonstratives<sup>14</sup> refer is different, although both stand for the previous expression, as in (64):

- (64) He will stay. I am sure of *it*. What a mistake. I am sure of  
*that*. (N. Parton, *Vancouver Sun*)

The difference in the ways a pronoun and a demonstrative refer is that the former "stands for" the NP in the simplest way; i.e., instead of using the same NP, the pronoun which has the same referent as the NP is used; the latter "stands for" the NP which is defined or identifiable in a discourse. In other words, in the case of demonstratives, what *it* stands for in (65) is not just *onion*, but *onion which was stir-fried until its sweet flavor came out* or *onion which is in a certain state after the preceding cooking procedure*. On the other hand, in the case of a pronoun, what *it* stands for is *onion* regardless of whatever state it is in now.

- (65) Tamonegi o zyuubun-ni amami ga deru made  
 onion ACC well sweet flavor NOM draw until  
 itamete-kudasai. Sorekara, sore o suupu no nabe ni  
 stir-fry then ACC soup 's pan to  
 utusite-kudasai.  
 transfer

'Stir-fry the onion until its sweet flavor comes out. Then,  
 transfer that/it into a soup pan.

*Sore* in (65) can have both the demonstrative reading and the pronoun reading. Considering the fact that there are bound variable cases in (53)

and non-referential cases in (62), and the observation that *it* is usually translated with *sore*, it seems to be the case that the function of *sore* covers that of a demonstrative and a pronoun.<sup>15</sup>

### §3.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, a good deal of space has been devoted to discussing the characteristics of Japanese demonstratives. The reason is that although various useful observations and assumptions have been put forward by many researchers, these mainly concern spatial deixis; there are quite a few noteworthy proposals about discourse use, but they are usually limited to dialogue. The framework of the characterization has mainly been constructed on the basis of spatio (-temporal) deixis. Meanwhile, the observations presented by linguists and often by rhetoricians about so-called anaphora demonstratives have succeeded in capturing certain aspects of demonstratives, but in the delimitation of the contextual environment. My main concern, apart from the nature of the demonstrative, is the use of demonstratives as one apparatus of discourse. It seems to me a reasonable procedure to take a first step towards the goal by getting a consistent view of the essential nature of demonstratives; otherwise, certain factual, characteristic uses might be mistakenly considered as essential, when in reality such uses were of an *a posteriori* nature, manifested as a result of the influence of certain factors originating in the way demonstratives are employed. If the characteristics of each use (spatial, temporal, and so on) can be referred back to some more basic nature (which is actually the case), a consistent view of the demonstratives in all spatio-temporal and

discourse uses will have been obtained. It cannot be denied that the framework presented in §3.1 concerning such a basic nature contains some speculative assumptions. However, I believe that this is a viable attempt to deduce a significant relationship between 'facts' in the actual use of demonstratives; and that on the basis of such a framework, the "anaphora" use of the demonstrative can be reexamined. The difference between pronoun and demonstrative has also been discussed. In conclusion, anaphoric demonstratives are all referential by nature (except some uses of *some* which should be handled in sentence grammar) and they can be bound in discourse (LF') but not in a sentence (LF).

## Notes (Chapter 3)

- <sup>1</sup> *Sore* is used in the original text.
- <sup>2</sup> *Ka* is the old form of *a*.
- <sup>3</sup> \* is used as a marker for "bad" or impossible formulations regardless of whether these are syntactic or not.
- <sup>4</sup> [Data corpus]
  - (A) Hideo Suzuki (1974), "Hyôgaki no Kankyô Fukugen," *Kagaku* vol. 44-7.
  - (B) Daiichirô Sugimoto (1974), "Taiyô Nyutorino," *Kagaku* vol. 44-7.
  - (C) Kazutaka Kobayashi (1974), "Tanchi na Shigoto no Dôtai," *Kagaku* vol. 44-7.
  - (D) Marikazu Shikata (1974), "Yôjô no kigen to kakuritsukatei," *Seibutsu-kagaku* vol. 26-2.
  - (E) Shôzô Osawa (1965), "Ribosômu no Sei-gôsei," *Seibutsu-butsuri* vol. 5-4.
- <sup>5</sup> *Kore* and *kono* (NP) behave differently: *kono* can refer farther than *kore* because of the (partially) identical NP of the antecedent which immediately follows *kono*. Considering this extra factor, the comparison is made on the basis of the *-re* (noun) forms.
- <sup>6</sup> *Kore/sore* (noun form) which is used as the topic or the subject is chosen for the comparison.
- <sup>7</sup> Sentence (i) seems to be a case where, at the first glance, the postcedent is the whole following story. However, this style is rather new in Japanese and it is said to have come into use under the influence of the dummy subject construction in English:
  - (i) *Sore wa ame no sito-sito huru hen ni hito no*  
     that/it rain quietly fall in a strange way one's

ki            o meiraseru yoona            ban        desita.  
spirits            depress            evening

'It was an evening when the quietly falling rain depressed  
one's spirits in a strange way'

- <sup>8</sup> This claim may sound a little too strong, since *ko* is used in similar sentences apparently referring to non-negative portions of statements. However, the point is that *konna* cannot be used in the context of Ex. in [5], or, putting it in a different way, if *konna* is used, it refers to the whole event of his being accused as a murderer but not the previous statement by itself. The following example permits a *ko* which refers to the statement including the negative:

(i) Kare wa hannin nanka-zyaa-nai. Kore/sore wa hakkiri-site-iru.

'He is not the murderer. This is for sure.'

In the above (i); for example, once *kore* is changed to *kono zizitu* "this fact," *sono zizitu* is ruled out. The level of reference in the conceptualization of ideas seems to differ in *ko* and *so*.

- <sup>9</sup> In German, the distance component of *jener* and *dieser* can be pinned down in discourse context according to the temporal order, like Japanese *zensya* 'the former' and *koosya* 'the latter'.
- <sup>10</sup> As for the function of *to/no/koto* cf. McCawley (1978), Josephs (1976), Watanabe (1989), among others.
- <sup>11</sup> I use the term 'discourse' in opposition to 'sentence,' and use 'context' as referring to the contextual aspect of discourse.
- <sup>12</sup> *It* cannot be used deictically (observation from M. Rochemont).
- <sup>13</sup> M. Rochemont suggested to me that Discourse Representation Theory developed in Heim (1982) might be useful to describe this type of phenomenon for demonstratives.
- <sup>14</sup> The demonstrative expressions like "this man" are compared with the definite expression "the man here" in Stechow (1982). According to Stechow, the former is *directly referential* while the latter is not,

and this difference is evident in the interpretation of the following example, (i) (= Stechow's (4) and (5)):

(i)a. Next year, I will consult this fortune-teller.

b. Next year, I will consult the fortune-teller here.

In (a), "this fortune-teller" means Mr. So-and-so whom the speaker can point out, whereas in (b), "the fortune-teller here" can mean the one who will be found here next year, whoever he is, in addition to the interpretation as (a).

- <sup>15</sup> The alternative view is that there are two kinds of *sore*: one is a demonstrative, the other is a pronoun.

## Chapter 4

### Quantifier Reading

#### §4.0 Introduction

The third disambiguation mechanism in discourse, in addition to *zibun* coreference and demonstratives, is the quantifier reading in Japanese. This problem has been examined in syntax in connection with the formalism of the quantification in formal logic, but little extra-syntactic work has been carried out. The purpose of this chapter is to determine factors which control the pragmatic aspects of quantifier reading, that is, why a certain reading is prominent and why one reading is chosen over another.

#### §4.1 Quantifier Interpretation

##### §4.1.1 Quantifier Reading in Japanese

A quantifier sentence like (1) is generally viewed as potentially ambiguous between (1b) and (1c):

(1)a. Everyone admires someone.

b.  $(\forall x)(\exists y) \text{ ADMIRE}(x, y)$

c.  $(\exists y)(\forall x) \text{ ADMIRE}(x, y)$

May (1977) proposes two distinct LF representations for (1), which are created by two different operations on Quantifier Raising. However, May (1985) proposes a Scope Principle which controls the interaction between two operators. In either way, the ambiguity is captured in syntax and its disambiguation process is left for an extra-syntactic component.

On the other hand, examples like (2), which is a Japanese equivalent of (1), is considered as unambiguous<sup>1</sup> by Kuroda (1970) while its scrambled version is ambiguous. This view is adopted by current GB literature like Hoji (1985 and 1986).

(2)a. Daremo ga dareka o sonkeisiteiru (= (1b))

everyone NOM someone ACC admires

'Everyone admires someone.'

b. Dareka o daremo ga sonkeisiteru. (= (1b)/(1c))

'Someone, everyone admires.'

Furthermore, Hoji (1986) gives the following paradigm (3).



- (3)a. \*QP-ga WH-o V
- b. WH-o<sub>i</sub> QP-ga  $t_i$  V (unambiguous: WH takes wide scope)
- c. QP-ga QP-o V (unambiguous: QP-ga takes wide scope)
- d. QP-o<sub>i</sub> QP-ga  $t_i$  V (ambiguous)

Assuming May's (1985) Scope Principle, Hoji adds some generalizations (4) particular to Japanese to account for (3).

- (4)a. Scope interpretation is more restricted in Japanese than in English in the sense that it reflects *more* closely the hierarchical relation at S-structure.
- b. In Japanese the wh-phrase always takes wide scope over a non-wh quantifier (but English does not have this restriction). [p. 9]

Now, suppose syntax takes care of the scope interpretation in Japanese as in the way Hoji claims or something similar to that, and feeds the information to semantics, the questions that will arise are: i) why the scope reading is more or less close to the hierarchical relation at S-structure; ii) why certain QPs tend to have wide scope; iii) how the ambiguity represented in (3d) is disambiguated. As for iii), it is not the problem of syntax; for i) and ii), syntax offers syntactic sides of its explanations but they are not the whole story. In what follows, the problems of quantifier interpretations will be examined in order to answer the above questions.

#### §4.1.2 Linear Order Hypothesis and Subjecthood

The phenomenon observed in (2) is interpreted in two ways: i) the word order affects the quantifier reading; ii) subject NPs get wide scope reading. The first view is taken by Kuno (1973a, and the revised version in 1973b); the second one is taken by Keenan (1976) as one of his subject properties.

First let us examine Kuno's claim concerning the linear order hypothesis (5) for Japanese.

- (5) Rule 1: In the basic word order structure, if two quantifiers appear in the order of  $Q_1 - Q_2$ , the obtained reading is the "same" vs. the "different."
- Rule 2: If the order of  $Q_1 - Q_2$  is changed into  $Q_2 - Q_1$  as the result of leftward movement, the obtained reading is the "same" vs. the "same."
- Rule 3: If the order of  $Q_1 - Q_2$  is changed into  $Q_2 - Q_1$  as the result of rightward movement, the obtained reading is the "different" vs. the "same" – the interpretation of each  $Q$  is unchanged.

[summary translation from Kuno 1973b;  
see also Kuno 1973a, footnote 33, p. 384,]

Kuno's terms "same" vs. "different" roughly overlaps the terms "wide" vs. "narrow" but they are not exactly the same. They are in a sense hybrids of *wide/narrow* and *group/distributive*. This is especially true in Rule 2. Since Kuno's functional grammar does not differentiate syntactic






structure, i.e., *every year* is a VP-adverb. Therefore, the "same" reading is obtained for *many tourists* by Rule 1 in (5).


Thus, Kuno contends that not only is the surface word order a relevant factor in determining the quantifier reading, but also the direction of movement. He also contends that the crossing is another factor. Let us examine this conclusion next.

Japanese passives like (2) is treated as "a basic word order sentence as far as the quantifier reading is concerned" (Kuno 1973b, p. 273), which gives an *ad hoc* appearance in a Standard Theory framework such as that which Kuno adopted, especially when his leftward movement rule for the quantifier interpretation handles English passive cases in the way illustrated in (9) (= Kuno's (14) in 1973b):

(9)a. Every girl likes many boys.



b. Many boys every girl likes.



- c. Many boys are liked by every girl.

Q <sub>2</sub>	Q <sub>1</sub>
[same]	[different]

Here, the leftward movement creates the [same] vs. [different] reading, which contradicts Rule 2. This poses a minor problem to Kuno's contention. However, in current GB-type generative grammar, this is no problem at all since passive sentences are generated as in (10) below, and Rule 1 in (5) accounts for the [same] vs. [different] reading in both Japanese and English.

- (10)  $\Delta$  are liked *many boys* by every girl.

Furthermore, in (8), sentence (8b) is not necessarily considered as a case of the rightward movement. *Many tourists* in fact is ambiguous, not only in (8b) but also in (8a). Observe example (11):

- (11)a. *Mainen* oozei no kankookyaku ga nihon ni kimasu.  
 every year many tourist (nom) Japan to come  
 [same] vs. [same] (*mainen* = VP-adverb)

- b. Oozei no kankookyaku ga *mainen* nihon ni kimasu.  
 many tourist (nom) every year Japan to come  
 [same] [different] (*mainen* = VP-adverb)

'Many tourists come to Japan every year.'

In the case of VP-adverbs, the [same] vs. [same] reading<sup>2</sup> in (11a) (= (8a)) can be obtained by preposing *mainen*. Thus, while (8a) ([same] vs.



The readings in (13) represent Kuno's contention with the understanding that the basic word order of Japanese existential sentence is L + S + V instead of S + L + V, thus assuming that (12b) is the preposed case of (12a).

If this is so, the conclusion to be drawn from this data is that the wide scope reading is not the property of the subject but the result of the position, i.e., the 'sentence initial position,' since in (12a) not subject but locative gets the "same" (i. e., "wide" in this case) reading; that is, the leftmost quantifier, which in most cases, is incidentally the subject, always gets the "same" reading in sentences with the basic word order. In fact, this seems to be a generalization of the phenomenon. However, there is a question to be asked here, which is: why, then, the sentence initial position gets the "same" reading. Before exploring the answer for this question, the problem associated with wide/narrow scope interpretation will be discussed in the next section.

#### §4.1.3 Wide/Narrow vs. Same/Different

First let us examine Kuno's terms "same" and "different" more closely in order to determine the relationship between his terms and the more general terms "wide/narrow."



- (13) Tasuu no otoko ga syoosuu no onna o homeru.  
 many (pos) man (nom) a few (pos) woman (acc) praise  
 'Many men praise a few women.'

- (14) Syoosuu no onna ga tasuu no otoko ni homerareru.  
 a few (pos) women (nom) many (pos) man by be-praised  
 'A few women are praised by many men.'

The reading obtained for (13) is: each member of the "same" 'many' praises each member of the "different" sets of 'a few', as shown in (15a) and (15b).

(15)a. a set of 'many' = {Bill, John,...Tom}

a set of 'a few' = {'a few<sub>1</sub>', 'a few<sub>2</sub>',...'a few<sub>n</sub>'}

a set of 'a few<sub>1</sub>' = {Sarah, Jane,...Sue}

a set of 'a few<sub>2</sub>' = {Julie, Mary,...Lucy}

...

a set of 'a few<sub>n</sub>' = {Nancy, Ann,...Karen}

Bill praises 'a few<sub>1</sub>'


John praises 'a few<sub>2</sub>'

...

Tom praises 'a few<sub>n</sub>'

[the same 'many'] vs. [different 'a few']

b.



On the other hand, in the reading in (14), each member of the same 'a few' (e.g., Karen, Julie,...Margaret) is praised by each member of the different sets of 'many,' as demonstrated<sup>3</sup> in (16a) and (16b).

(16)a. a set of 'few' = {Karen, Julie,...Margaret}

a set of 'many' = {'many<sub>1</sub>', 'many<sub>2</sub>'...'many<sub>n</sub>'}

a set of 'many<sub>1</sub>' = {Tom, Bill...Sam}

a set of 'many<sub>2</sub>' = {John, Joe,...Adam}

a set of 'many<sub>3</sub>' = {Jim, Ken,...Jeff}

...

a set of 'many<sub>n</sub>' = {Brian, Steve...Ben}

Karen was praised by 'many<sub>1</sub>'


Julie was praised by 'many<sub>2</sub>'

...

Margaret was praised by 'many<sub>n</sub>'

[the same 'few'] vs. [different 'many']

b.



Thus, what is clear is that Kuno's terms "same" and "different" are in fact referring to a set, and not an individual member.

Now, the wide/narrow scope interpretation for the English equivalents of (13) and (14) is often described in a way somewhat like (17) and (18), respectively:

(17) Many men praise a few women.

$(\forall x) (\exists y) \text{ PRAISE } (x, y)$

(= For many men, there are a few women they praise.)

(18) A few women are praised by many men.

$(\exists y) (\forall x) \text{ BE-PRAISED } (x, y)$

(= There are a few women such that they are praised by many men.)

Furthermore, Kuno's "same vs. different" corresponds in a certain manner with loup's (1973) "collective vs. individual." For example, the plural quantifier *all*, according to loup, gets the "individual" reading when it gets wide scope; i. e., "there can be as many garages as there are women" [p. 119]. On the other hand, when the singular quantifier gets wide scope, *all* gets the "collective" reading, i.e., "women work together to build the garage."

(19) All women built a garage.

Using loup's terms, then (15b) can be explained in the following way: each member of the "same" set of *many men* (= individual) praises "different" [A FEW WOMEN] (= set, not each member), i. e., there can be as many [A FEW WOMEN] as whatever numbers represented as *many*. A set is treated just like a singular quantifier.

Now the problem is Kuno's "same" vs. "same" reading,<sup>4</sup> which is typically presented in subject-object scrambling cases like (20) (also cf. (6b) and (7b)):

(20) Syoosuu no onna o tasuu no otoko ga homeru.


a few woman many man praise

'(lit.) A few women, many men praise.'

[same] vs. [same]

If the "same" *a few women*, i. e., [A FEW WOMEN] (= set) is treated like a singular quantifier, then [MANY MEN] (= set) has to be "collective" as a set and obtains the "same" *many men* reading in (21):

(21)



However, this type of "set" reading is not likely to be considered as a part of syntactic scope interpretation but it is rather taken as an extra-syntactic phenomenon. According to Contreras (1986), plural and

collective NPs have either "group" or "distributive" readings.<sup>5</sup> If so, it is the case that (21) gets the "distributive" reading, as well as the "group" reading shown in the illustration, on the first quantifier. Likewise, the "group" reading, instead of the "distributive" reading shown in the illustrations, is also possible in (15b) and (16b). Given these assumptions, the wide/narrow interpretation in syntax, which is considered as ambiguous in this case, is still intact.

So far, I have dealt with the question of how one interpretation of two quantifiers affects the meaning of a sentence which differs from the other interpretations involving (syntactic) scope interpretation and other non-syntactic factors. In the next section, I will deal with the question asked earlier in this section, i.e., why does the sentence initial position get the "same" reading? I will examine Zubin's 'focus' system assuming some sort of "centering" device is relevant to the interpretation of quantifiers.

#### §4.2 "Attention" systems in discourse

In Zubin's (1979) system, "focus" is controlled by the specific limitations and biases of human perception. The speaker's "focus of interest," as Zubin calls it, has at least two cognitive roots, Selective Attention and Egocentric Bias:

## (22) SELECTIVE ATTENTION

Every person has the following tendencies:

1. To focus interest on entities that are cognitively salient to him.
2. To focus interest on relatively few entities in the narrated scene, in comparison to the total range of entities available
3. To focus interest on one entity or on one set of homogeneous entities at a time.
4. To persevere in attention on one entity.
5. To reach a satiation limit where attention is shifted.

[Zubin 1979: p.471]

## (23) EGOCENTRIC BIAS

We process information about other human beings more readily than that about nonhumans, and we process information about ourselves most readily.

[Zubin 1979: p.471]

## (24) EGOCENTRIC SCALE

speaker (ego) > hearer > other person >  
inanimate, concrete > abstract

[Zubin 1979: p.478]

Zubin attempts to draw a relationship between the *cognitive bias* of the semantic substance focus and the *grammatical encoding*. He concludes that nominative (grammatical subject) is used to indicate the





subject usually coincides with the sentential realization of a discourse topic.

It is to be noted here that is referred to as "focus" in various theories, which is considered some kind of highlighting phenomenon, can be classified into two categories: that of the preconscious attention system, like Zubin's, and that of the conscious attention system. As will be shown in §4.5 Addendum, the conscious attention systems can be further divided into Grosz-type 'focus' which centers our attention on what the discourse is all about, Kuno's "new" information-type 'focus' which draws our attention to what is new in the discourse, and Rochemont's focus, relevant to what is not "under discussion."

According to Zubin, however, 'focus' is the grammatical encoding of "PRECONSCIOUSLY disposed speaker's interest," which is a part of the cognitive property of the human attention mechanism. Although deictic use, word order, and stress are other devices in this mechanism by which a speaker's CONSCIOUS EFFORT at communication is conducted, but they are not related to Zubin's focus system.

Now, I will investigate the connection between subjecthood and Zubin's "focus of the interest."<sup>7</sup>

First, the following two assumptions will be taken as premises:

- (27) Assumption I: Human attention is restricted to a specific entity.

- (28) Assumption II: The nominative NP is the center of attention in the preconscious levels.

Assumption I is derived from cognitive properties of "selective attention" in Zubin. Assumption II is Zubin's 'focus of the interest'. A hypothesis can be drawn from these assumptions, which is:

- (29) The subject NP receives the "same" reading by its inherent nature.

The "sameness" is used in the sense of the one specific entry in opposition to diverse entries. The following examples with indefinite quantifiers illustrate this specific vs. non-specific<sup>8</sup> opposition:

- (30)a. *Dareka ga minna o aisiteiru.*  
 someone (nom) everyone (acc) love  
 'Someone (specific) loves everyone.'  
 [same]

- b. *Minna ga dareka o aisiteiru.*  
 everyone (nom) someone (acc) love  
 'Everyone loves someone (unspecific).'  
 [different]

In this section, adopting Zubin's assumptions about the human attention system, an item or group of items represented as the subject is assumed to get specific attention and as a result it receives the "same" reading. In the following section, this assumption will be

investigated further in connection with cases where non-subjects get the "same" reading.

#### §4.3 Focus of Interest, Quantifier, and Word Order

In the preceding section, it is assumed that the subject gets the same reading. However, observe (31). The example sentence in (31) is ambiguous between the specific *dareka* reading and the non-specific one:

- (31)a. (Itumo) dareka ga (watasitati o) mihatteiru.  
(always) someone (nom) (we (acc)) be-watching

'Someone is always watching us.'

- b. Specific reading: the same 'dareka'  
a set of 'dareka' = {x}, x = John, Bill,...Sue.
- c. Non-specific reading: different 'dareka'  
a set of 'dareka' = {'dareka<sub>1</sub>', 'dareka<sub>2</sub>',... 'dareka<sub>n</sub>'}  
a set of 'dareka<sub>1</sub>' = {x<sub>1</sub>}, x<sub>1</sub> = John, Lucy,...Bill.  
a set of 'dareka<sub>2</sub>' = {x<sub>2</sub>}, x<sub>2</sub> = Mary, Jean,...Bob.  
...  
...  
a set of 'dareka<sub>n</sub>' = {x<sub>n</sub>}, x<sub>n</sub> = Lisa, Ron,...Tom.



pragmatic reasons. That is, in reality it is more likely to have "different" many tourists than the "same" many tourists. Note that besides the property of subject in our discussion, the quantifier reading is also affected by one's knowledge and beliefs about the world. The rule (29) is pragmatically sensitive by nature.

Now, in addition to (29), cases like (32) a generalization such as (33):

- (33) Temporal/Locative phrases have the widest scope (and the "same" reading) because of their function as frame setters for a sentence.<sup>9</sup>

Observe example (34):

- (34)a. *Mainiti gonin no hito ga kuru.*  
 everyday five (pos) person (nom) come  
 ([same]) [different]

'Everyday, five people come.'

- b. *Mainiti gonin no hito ga hatizyuttuu no*  
 everyday five (pos) person (nom) eighty (pos)  
 ([same]) [[same]/[different]] [different]]

*denwa o kakeru.*  
 telephone (acc) make-call

'Every day, five people make eighty calls.'

In (34b), the subject has the wider scope than the non-subject items within the domain of the temporal frame of *every day*, which in turn has the widest scope. As a result, *five people* is ambiguous between the "same" and "different" reading in (34b), while it tends to get the "different" reading in (34a); (33) overrides (34).

Let us now consider word order as it is related to the interpretation of quantifiers. (35) is a case of the reversed word order of (13), which is derived by Scrambling:<sup>10</sup>

- (35) Syoosuu no onna o tasuu no otoko ga homeru.  
       a few (pos) woman (acc) many (pos) man (nom) praise

'A few women, many men praise.'

The reading obtained is: the same 'a few' vs. the same 'many', not the same 'a few' vs. different 'many' as in (14). This is predicted by Kuno's Rule 2.

The reading in (35) has two significant implications. First, the subject NP receives the "same" reading not because it is the leftmost element (i.e., in sentence initial position) but because it is subject. Hence, the inherent attention-calling nature of subjects is supported here. Second, the sentence-initial preposed item (hereafter, SIP) obtains the "same" reading. This can be explained if the validity of the surface linear order principle is assumed. Thus, based on the above observation, one may advance the following (36):

- (36) The SIP gains the "same" reading because of its position.  
(to be revised)

However, this does not explain why the sentence initial position gets the "same" reading. Masunaga's (1982) notion of "bridge" seems to provide an explanation for that. According to her, the SIP constitutes a bridge between the previous discourse and the rest of the sentence; that is, the SIP has an anaphoric function and its antecedent is given in a linguistic or non-linguistic form. I assume that it is because of this anaphoric nature that the SIP has to be specific. Thus, (36) will be revised to (37):

- (37) The SIP gains the "same" reading because of its discourse anaphoric function.

The "same" reading, originating in the anaphoric function as with the SIP, seems to hold the key to the "same" reading on topic NP's, too. Consider (38). (38a) is an instance of nominative topicalization; (38b) is one of accusative topicalization:

- (38)a. Sannin no gakusei wa hutatu no  
three (pos) student (top/nom) two (pos)

purozyekuto o hikiuketa.  
project (acc) took-charge-of

'Three students took charge of two projects.'  
[the same 'three'] vs. [different/same(?) 'two']



b. Hutatu no purozyekuto wa sannin no gakusei  
 two (pos) project (top/acc) three (pos) student  
 ga hikiuketa.  
 (nom) took-charge-of

'(As for) two projects, three students took charge of them.'  
 [the same 'two'] vs. [the same 'three']

NP-*wa* is either contrastive or thematic. But, all the topicalized quantifier NPs are considered to be instances of contrastive topics.<sup>11</sup> (For the details of this argument see Chapter 5) Topic, in general, is anaphoric by nature, although the contrastive topic has its antecedent in the previous discourse, while this is not necessarily the case for the thematic topic (i.e., the antecedent could be in the universal discourse).<sup>12</sup> Thus, the contrastive topic is anaphoric in an even narrower sense than the thematic topic. If it is anaphoric, the referent should be determined uniquely; thus, the "different" referents are impossible in this case.

Note, however, that the contrastiveness which is often regarded in the same light as exhaustiveness, does not affect the reading. In the following example, contrastive reading is indicated by stress, which is often the case:<sup>13</sup>

(39)a. Sannin no onna no ko ga gónin no otoko no ko ni kisusita.

three (pos) girl (nom) five (pos) boy to kissed

'Three girls kissed five boys.'

b. Hutari no otoko ga yáttu no pai o tairageta.

two (pos) man (nom) eight (pos) pie (acc) ate-up

'Two men ate up eight pies.'

[the same 'two'] vs. [different 'eight']

Here, in spite of the contrast, the "different" reading is still obtained for the second quantifier; that is, the stress gives the emphasis on the amount, but does not change the quantifier reading itself. Hence, the emphatic tone associated with the contrastive topic is not likely to be an influential factor in the quantifier reading in question, while the anaphoric nature is. Thus, we arrive at (40):

(40) Topic gains the "same" reading because of its anaphoric function.

The following (41) sums up the dominant readings and the generalizations which account for them:

(41)a.  $Q_1$  (subject) –  $Q_2$

[same] [different] (by (29))

b.  $Q_1$  (non-subject) –  $Q_2$  (subject)

[same] [same] (by (37) and (29))

c.  $Q_1$  (Top-subject) –  $Q_2$

[same] [different] (by (40) (and (29)))

c'  $Q$  (Top) –  $Q_2$  (subject)

[same] [same] (by (40) and (29))

d.  $Q_1$  (Loc/Temp) –  $Q_2$  (subject)

[same] [same/different] (by (33) and (29)?)

The surface linear order principle is descriptively correct, but it does not provide any explanation for the phenomenon. The set of hypotheses (29), (33), (37), and (40) discussed in this section are my attempt to resolve this problem. If (29) holds, the prominence of the subject<sup>14</sup> in a sentential expression is supported from an extra-syntactic point of view. Zubin's assumption that something prominent to us, i.e. the center of attention, cannot be a diverse entity is empirically supported in our perception of the outside world. As for (33), (37), and (40), they are related to the discourse function of those sentence initial elements. Locative/temporal adverbs provide a situational setting for the sentence; that is, they are used to cast the sentential discourse into a locative/temporal frame. In this sense, topic also has this "framing" function. Utterances always occur within the framework of the topic. I assume that SIP in Scrambling and the contrastive topic both have virtually the same function in terms of their anaphoricity. The difference between the two is: the latter has the particle *wa*, and the former does not. As is discussed in Chapter 5, the anaphoric aspect of NP-*wa* is rather secondary compared to its semantic

function, i.e., that of the categorical judgement marker. As the Grosz-type 'focus' claims, anaphoric use is closely related to our conscious attention system, as opposed to the unconscious attention system (i. e., Zubin's 'focus'), which is, in turn, tied to subjecthood. Unlike the syntactic rules, the proposed generalizations for extra-syntactic phenomena are sensitive to certain pragmatic factors related to our real world knowledge.

#### §4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has given an explanation of the disambiguation mechanism of quantifier reading in Japanese. The scope interpretation which is assumed to have LF representation in syntax provides a wide/narrow reading for the  $Q_1 - Q_2$  sequence. However, actual readings obtained for such sentences are more or less influenced by some extra-syntactic factors. Contreras' "group" vs. "distributive" reading is a relevant case for such influential factors. Kuno's "same" vs. "different," which offers a type of reading supported by our intuition, is also considered as another case of such meanings which are not purely syntactic, having a certain relationship to the wide/ narrow reading. "Same/different" overlaps wide/narrow for a sentence with the basic word order. On the other hand, in cases of scrambling, although syntax allows an ambiguous scope interpretation here, what is actually obtained in the discourse environment is more likely to be the "same" –

"same" reading, which involves functions of the subject item and preposed non-subject item in discourse.

#### §4.5 Addendum

##### §4.5.1 Grosz's 'Focus': Defined solely on a semantic<sup>15</sup> basis in a processing model

Grosz (1977, 1978, and elsewhere) considers focus to be an active process of attention-calling (she often uses the terms "focusing" or "highlighting"), and takes it to be formally representable on partitioned semantic networks.

Her concept of 'focus' is formed on the basis of a task-oriented dialogue,<sup>16</sup> to be incorporated into a computer processing model. The particular nature of the task-oriented dialogue is that the discourse formation process is parallel to the actual task. Hence, this type of discourse provides an opportunity to check the description-forming process with the actual chronology of the task without worrying about the degree of idiosyncrasy in the discourse style.

Grosz's model (1977) of the focusing mechanism in task-oriented dialogues is as follows. A task as represented in discourse consists of hierarchially nested subtasks. When it is completed, the description of each subtask fades from focus; however, the parent task remains in focus. Therefore, when the description of a sibling subtask is completed, discourse anaphoric expressions are related to the concepts

in the parent task in focus, not to the already completed sibling task(s). Thus, this is a two-fold focus system (Grosz, 1978); that is, the main task is "explicitly" focused while subtasks or objects involved are "implicitly" focused. The following examples are given in Grosz (1977)<sup>17</sup>:

(42) Discourse I (= Figure II-7, p. 23)

(E = expert; A = apprentice; [*italics*] = an object in focus, or a focused task)

- |                        |    |   |
|------------------------|----|---|
| [M-Task]               | E: | Good morning. I would like for you to reassemble the <i>compressor</i> <sub>i</sub> .                       |
|                        |    | .....   |
| [S-Task <sub>1</sub> ] | E: | I suggest you begin by attaching the pump to the platform ...(other Sub-Task <sub>1</sub> - 1~n)            |
| [S-Task <sub>2</sub> ] | E: | Good. All that remains then is to attach the belt housing cover to the belt housing frame.                  |
|                        | A: | All right. I assume the hole in the housing cover opens to the pump pulley rather than to the motor pulley. |
|                        |    | .....   |
|                        | A: | All right. The belt housing cover is on and tightened down. (60 utterances after the beginning.)            |
| [M-Task]               | E: | Fine. Now, let's see if <i>it</i> <sub>j</sub> works.   |

(43) Discourse II (= Figure II-14, p. 37)

[S-Task<sub>1</sub>] A: How do I remove the flywheel?

E: First loosen the *two allen head setscrews<sub>k</sub>* holding it to the shaft, then pull it off.

A: The *two screws<sub>l</sub>* are loose but I'm having trouble getting the wheel off.

[S-Task<sub>2</sub>] E: Use the wheel puller. Do you know how to use it?

A: No.

E: Loosen the *screw<sub>m</sub>* in the center and place the jaw around the hub of the wheel, then tighten the *screw<sub>n</sub>*.

Discourse I in (42) shows the nested hierarchical structure of tasks, i.e., (M-T (S-T<sub>1</sub> (S-T<sub>1~1</sub>,...S-T<sub>1~n</sub>), S-T<sub>2</sub>)), while Discourse II in (43) consists of two sibling tasks, S-T<sub>1</sub> and S-T<sub>2</sub>. The use of the discourse anaphoric expressions, including repetitions, indicates the task description units since they are likely to have their antecedents, which are in focus, within the same task descriptions:  $j = i$  in M-Task in (42);  $l = k$  in S-Task<sub>1</sub> and  $n = m$  in S-Task<sub>2</sub> in (43).

Bullwinkle (1977) suggests using Grosz's type of 'focus' for anaphora disambiguation:

- (44)a. Ira wants to have a *party<sub>i</sub>* at his *house<sub>j</sub>*. *It* is going to be at 8 o'clock p.m. Invite {everyone at the lab; Mitch, Dave, Candy, Bruce, and Beth} to attend. (*it = i*)
- b. Ira wants to have a *party<sub>i</sub>* at his *house<sub>j</sub>*. *It* is at 25 Wildwood Street. Invite {everyone at the lab; Mitch, Dave, Candy, Bruce, and Beth} to attend. (*it = i*)

*It* refers to a *party*, not *his house*, unless *his house* rather than a *party* is in focus in this conversation. The same thing happens in a Japanese zero anaphora case:

- (45) Tanaka ga zibun no ie<sub>k</sub> de paatee<sub>i</sub> o  
(nom) self's house at party (acc)

yaru-rasii yo.  
seems to throw, you know (mod)

Ø Mitaka datte-iu keredo, iku kai. (Ø = I)  
(it is) I've heard although go (Q)

'I heard that (Mr.) Tanaka is going to throw a party at his own house. It's in Mitaka, I've heard. Are you going?'

It seems to be natural to interpret that the locational information, *Mitaka*, is given for a *party*, not for *his own house*, in (45).

Now, in much literature, the term 'focus' is often used as just another name for what is traditionally called 'topic'. Grosz's 'focus' can be counted as one such example: 'topic' in her sense is the same entity which is referred to as 'global topic' in Chapter 2 (cf. also 'discourse



topic' in Chapter 5). As observed in Chapter 2, this type of topic frequently coincides with sentential topic in actual discourse. On the other hand, the topic-focus articulation descended from the Prague School - which has had, and continues to have, a great influence on this area of study - presupposes the complementary distribution of topic and focus. Also "new information" in Praguian FSP (functional sentence perspective), "comment" in topic-comment (Hockett, 1958), and "Rheme" in theme-rheme (Halliday, 1967) have often been regarded as "focused" items, depending on the definition accorded the term 'focus.' In the following two sections, I will introduce Kuno's 'focus' and Rochemont's 'focus', which are controlled by principles largely contrary to that of Grosz's.

#### §4.5.2 Kuno's 'Focus': Information value represented in word order

A series of important works by Susumu Kuno can be considered North American descendants of Praguian FSP. Kuno (1978) defines focus as new information, with word order arranged (in principle) in the sequence of old information to new information before a verb. That is, with the exception of emphatically stressed cases, the position immediately preceding the verb is the most likely place for focus (cf. Kuno §1, especially §1.5. (46) = Kuno's (8) and (10)).<sup>18</sup>



- (48) A<sub>1</sub> You must have spent a fortune during your trip on hotels. Couldn't you stay with your friends or your friends' friends?
- B<sub>1</sub> In some cities, I did, but I had to stay in hotels in many cities.
- A<sub>2</sub> You first went to Paris, right? Did you stay in a hotel there?
- B<sub>2</sub> No, I didn't stay in a hotel  $\emptyset$  - I stayed with an old friend of mine who is studying music there.
- A<sub>3</sub> Did you stay in a hotel in London? I hear hotels are getting terribly expensive there.
- B<sub>3</sub> a. Yes, I stayed in a hotel  $\emptyset$  because I didn't have any friends there.
- b. Yes, unfortunately, in a hotel.
- c. \*Yes, in London.

In the above,  $\emptyset$  in B<sub>2</sub> (= *in Paris* ) is older and less important; however, in B<sub>3</sub>-a,  $\emptyset$  (= *in London* ) is newer but less important, while *in a hotel* is older but more important. Thus, Kuno's deletion rule is revised from "deleting less new information rather than newer" to "deleting less important information rather than more important."

Kuno's version of 'focus' predicts that items such as wh-words, which one would intuitively consider to be "highlighted," will be focused. The wh-question construction is the very thing which is

utilized to gain the information that the speaker desires; in other words, the *wh*-word is the most important piece of *unfilled* information. As a consequence, the piece of information in the answer which fills the gap created by the *wh*-word is focused.

However, Kuno's version does not predict cases involving the discourse anaphoric use of demonstratives. These deictic signal words are also another device for "highlighting." If one accepts this sort of highlighting as a type of 'focus', then first of all, Kuno's new information strategy certainly does not work in these cases, since demonstratives have antecedents and are therefore not new in any sense. Second, even if one employs the notion of 'importance', the antecedent is not the *important* item in discourse in the same sense as the informational gap-filling word in an answer is. Therefore, the function of discourse anaphoric expressions cannot be accommodated in Kuno's focus system.

At first glance, it might appear that Kuno's notion of 'focus' and its predictions of focused items are opposed to Grosz's. According to Kuno's informational value based 'focus', a topic or thematic item is less likely than other items to be focused. However, this is not always the case (cf. Kuno 1972, 1975):

- (49)a. Tikyuu wa marui.  
           earth (top) round  
           'The earth is round.'

- b. Kinoo, Ikeda-san ga tazunete-kimasita.  
yesterday Mr. Ikeda (nom) come to visit

Ikeda-san wa mamonaku Amerika e iku to itte-imashita.  
(top) soon America to go said that

'Yesterday, Mr. Ikeda came to visit me. He said that he  
would go to America soon.'

- (50)a. Dare ga kore o kowasita no.  
who (nom) this (acc) broke (Q)

'Who broke this?'

- b. Boku wa/\*ga kowasite-nai yo.  
I (top/nom) have not broken I'll tell you (mod)

'I didn't break it.' ("I" contrasts with "someone" who did it.)

- c. (= Kuno's (2-2) in 1972)

John to Mary to Bill ga tazunete kimasita.  
and and (nom) visiting come

John wa/ga kudamono o kuremasita.  
(top/nom) fruit (acc) gave-me

Mary wa/ga okasi o kuremasita.  
(top/nom) cookies (acc) gave-me

Bill wa/ga hon o motte kite kuremasita.  
 (top/nom) book (acc) bringing coming gave-me

In contrast with the topics in (49), the topics in (50c), *John* and *Mary* (but not *Bill*) all constitute new information, since they are not predictable in the context (cf. Kuno 1972: 276). One might say that these topics (and also *Bill*) are all old information, since they are already mentioned in the previous discourse. However, it is misleading to assign an old-new distinction to one of noun quality (as in the above); the "old-new distinction" is the distinction made on the information structure of discourse; thus, a sentence element is identified as *new* or *old* only in terms of how it is related to its embedded context.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, according to the definition of *importance*, these topics are focused since they are non-deletable. In (50b), there is not much dispute over identifying *boku* (-wa) as new information and *boku* is also non-deletable, important information; thus the topic *boku* becomes focused.

According to Halliday (1967, 1968, and elsewhere), his *theme-rheme* structure is different from *old-new* information, although the two can be overlapped: the former is the structure of a sentence (i.e., *theme* is the sentence initial element and *rheme* is the rest); whereas the latter is the information structure for discourse. According to the former view, the topic in topic-comment articulations is more like a combination of the above two classes *old* and *theme*.

While Grosz's type of "focus" works to pivot the expanding discourse, Kuno's type of "focus" is relevant to the expansion itself. Here there seems to exist two opposed dynamisms in discourse: one works to bring about convergence with the topic (= Grosz's focus), the other works towards the expansion of discourse or the addition of new information to that already given.

#### §4.5.3      Rochemont's 'Focus': a syntactically represented and contextually construable entity

There are studies of 'focus' in generative grammar (Chomsky (1970), Jackendoff (1972) among others). A more recent work, Rochemont (1986) is an extensive study of 'focus' in English, which deals with phonological, syntactic, and discourse aspects of 'focus' from the viewpoint of generative grammar. Rochemont's 'focus', which is diagnosed by the well-formedness of question/answer pairs like (51) below, is treated as a syntactic notion, systematically associated with prominent stress and certain pragmatic environments.

- (51) a.      Who did Tom call?  
       b.      Tom called *Mary*.  
                                 focus

It is not the purpose of this chapter to give an overview of Rochemont's complex theory of focus. What is relevant here is his notion *c-construable* in (52), using the pragmatic notion "under discussion,"

which in turn provides a possible alternative to rather loosely defined concepts like old information. This *c-construable* is used to identify Rochemont's focus in discourse context.

- (52) a. If *a* is not *c-construable*, then *a* is focused. [p. 172]
- b. *a* is *c-construable* if (i) *a* is under discussion, or  
(ii) *a* is an indexical expression

"Under discussion" means either that it is specifically mentioned in the previous discourse, or mentioned using the expression with the same sense or the same reference. "Indexical expressions" are the personal pronouns *I, you, we*; locative and temporal adverbs such as *here, there, today, last time*; and verbs of appearance such as *arrive*. *C-construable* is further divided into two categories: "conventional" and "conversational," in the sense of Grice (1975). The rule for Contrastive focus in (53) makes an interesting claim:

- (53) If *a* / *S* is directly *c-construable* [= the case of (i) in (52b), M.O.], where *a* / *S* is the result of extracting *a* from *S*, and *S* is not *c-construable*, then *a* is a focus. [p. 175]

This is to say that old information can be focused. At least, it is safe to say that a topic can be focused, considering the varied definitions of "old."

Rochemont's rule also predicts that in Kuno's (50c), *John, Mary*, and *Bill* are contrastively focused (*a* / *S* = conversationally *c-construable*). Considering the fact that Kuno (1973) classified topics into two categories, thematic topic and contrastive topic, Kuno's theory



also indicates similar consequences, which naturally follow from seeing topic (Grosz's focus or Japanese *wa*- marked NP) and focus as two independent notions,<sup>20</sup> neither two ends of a single spectrum nor in complementary distribution. They have two different functions, which I assume belong to different dynamisms of discourse formation.

## Notes (Chapter 4)

- 1 There are some disagreements over the readings in (2a); however, even for those who disagree with the unambiguous reading, the preferred reading is still (1b), and (1c) is marginal. On the other hand, for those who disagree with the ambiguity treatment in (1a), the unambiguous reading is also (1b). Whichever is the case (unambiguously obtained reading or preferred one), (1b) has the prominence in reading.
- 2 There is no difference between the same 'every' and the different 'every.'
- 3 The entries of *a few women* can overlap. That is, in actuality, one may for example obtain the following cases, which are consistent with the assertion:

(i) 'a few' : 'a few<sub>1</sub>' ≠ 'a few<sub>2</sub>'; 'a few<sub>1</sub>' = 'a few<sub>2</sub>'; 'a few<sub>1</sub>' ⊄ 'a few<sub>2</sub>'; 'a few<sub>1</sub>' ⊆ 'a few<sub>2</sub>'; 'a few<sub>1</sub>' ⊂ 'a few<sub>2</sub>'.

Thus, the "different" can include a case like 'a few<sub>1</sub>' = 'a few<sub>2</sub>' in (i) which is, in effect, equivalent to the "same" reading. However, we find these special cases only after checking into the situation in the real world. This is a consequence of the potential discrepancy between what is asserted in language and what actually takes place in reality.

- 4 Kuno (1971) claims that the subject-object scrambling case is ambiguous in terms of wide/narrow scope interpretation. However Kuno (1973 a & b) claims the unambiguous "same" - "same" reading for it.
- 5 Contreras specifies certain conditions for "distributive" reading. On the other hand, according to William (1986), any NP which has a "group" reading potentially has a "distributive" reading when it is in subject position.
- 6 It is well-known that Japanese, as a member of the so-called topic prominent languages, has the topic marker *wa*. An English sentence like (i) can be translated into Japanese either as (ii) or (iii), depending on the context:

- (i) Bill saw Mary at the park.
- (ii) Biru *wa* Merii o kooen de mita.  
(top) (acc) park at saw
- (iii) Biru *ga* Merii o kooen de mita.  
(nom)

On the other hand, English has topicalization as in (iv); however, the structurally-marked topic sentence which is approximate to the Japanese *wa* sentence in discourse function is a left-dislocated sentence like (v) (cf. Reinhart, 1982):

- (iv) Mary, Bill likes. (Topicalization)
- (v) Mary, Bill likes her. (Left Dislocation)

It is not clear, however, whether the German topic sentence, for example (vi) given by Zubin, is functionally similar to English (iv), (v), or neither of them:

- (vi) Den Film habe ich schon dreimal  
the movie (top/acc) have I (nom) already three times  
gesehen.  
seen.

Further investigation of the discourse function of this type of sentence is required.

- 7 Zubin uses nominative and (grammatical) subject in an interchangeable sense. Shibatani (1978) argues that in the multi-nominative construction, which is one of the characteristics of Japanese, only one of the several nominatives in a sentence is the subject. Problems to be examined here involve subjecthood, the status of the subject in syntactic theories, and the analysis of the multi-nominative construction. However, these will be left for future research, as they do not affect the main lines of the argument.
- 8 Although the 'same' is almost synonymous with 'specific,' the scope relation and specificity are closely related but not exactly the same;

if the speaker has a specific person in mind it takes wide scope but not vice versa (cf. Maclaran, 1982).

- 9 Within Temporal/Locative, T seems wider than L:

(i) Mainiti dokoka de nanninka ga umarete-iru.  
every day somewhere some numbers (of people) is-born  
([same]) [different]

'Every day, somewhere, some number of babies are born.'

(ii) Dokoka de mainiti nanninka ga umarete-iru.  
[same] ([different])

- 10 A movement analysis is assumed for scrambling (cf. Saito, 1985). However, whether the structure is derived by movement or not is not an essential problem in this analysis. Even if it is not derived by movement, the function of the SIP is intact.

- 11 This classification of topics is originally given by Kuno (cf. for example, 1973a). The following illustrates that a quantifier NP can occur in NP-wa position only when it has the contrastive reading:

(i) Oozei no hito wa kita.  
many (pos) people (c-top/\*t-top) came.

- 12 Thematic topic: Kuzira wa honyurui da.  
whale (top) mammal (cop)

'A whale is a mammal.'

Contrastive topic: Kaze wa huite-iru.  
wind is-blowing

'The wind is blowing (but it is not cold).'

- 13 Other means to indicate contrastiveness are: the contrastive topic in question and the exhaustive-listing *ga* (cf. Kuno 1973a), which is untestable because it is the nominative marker.
- 14 It is not surprising then that the subject is responsive to *zibun*, the egocentric pronoun in Japanese, as the antecedent.

- 15 "Semantic" could be replaced here with "pragmatic"; i.e., it is used here in a wide, or non-truth conditional, sense.
- 16 Linde (1979) takes a similar approach.
- 17 Supplementary explanations and clarifications have been added to these examples.
- 18 Kuno uses \* to indicate sentences which are infelicitous in their contexts. Throughout this thesis, \* is used to indicate ungrammatical sentences as well as infelicitous sentences, in contexts where this does not cause any confusion.
- 19 Also cf. the argument of Reinhart (1985), which is briefly introduced in Chapter 5.
- 20 "Topic" has certainly created another "thicket" of terminology, even less transparent than the one associated with "focus." However, I assume Japanese NP-*wa* is a topic which happens to occur with a morphological marker.

## Chapter 5

### The Function of the Particles *wa* and *ga*

#### §5.0 Introduction

Many analyses and observations have been made concerning the particle *wa* in terms of sentence structure, semantics, and discourse function, the last being the most popular topic. The main concern in this chapter is not to challenge a particular analysis or observation, but rather to provide an integrated explanation of the nature of *wa* (and *ga* in that connection) which underlies the recognized characteristics of the use of *wa*. In this way, some disagreements between the previous analyses may be resolved into mere terminological clashes or differences in points of view. After this is recognized, the reinterpretation of such disagreements will shed new light on already existing analyses.

#### §5.1 The Particle *wa*

The Japanese particle *wa* is most commonly considered to be a topic marker or an old information marker. While these are intuitively

appealing explanations, the vagueness of the concepts 'topic' and 'old information' causes difficulty in defining the terms. In fact, it is quite possible to assume that the use of *wa* is not primarily controlled by discourse factors such as these.

#### §5.1.1 A Characteristic of the Use of *Wa*

"I am a cat" is the famous opening sentence of Soseki Natsume's (1867–1916) 1905 novel *Wagahai wa Neko dearu* (*I am a cat*), which looks at human life from the viewpoint of a house cat. Outside of fiction, though, this type of utterance is totally absurd.

Japanese has a peculiar sentence type which is often called the "eel-sentence," named after a popular example given in (1):

- (1) Boku      wa      [unagi da].  
       [I]<sub>NP</sub>   Particle [eel    ?]<sub>VP</sub>

A possible context for (1) is at a restaurant. Suppose a waiter is taking orders. Each customer says something like, "Boku wa sushi da (I am going to have sushi)"; "Boku wa soba da (I am going to have noodles)"; or "Boku wa unagi da (= (1))." Or when fishing, one might say (1) in answer to a question such as, "What did you catch?" Last but not least, (1) can literally mean "I am an eel" in a fictional context. Additional examples of this type are given in (2) below:

(2) a. Titi wa kuruma da.

my father car

'My father is a car/My father goes to work by car/My father's favorite pastime is repairing a car/etc.'

b. Ototo wa kyooryuu da.

my brother dinosaur

'My brother is a dinosaur./My brother loves dinosaurs./My brother got a toy dinosaur./etc.'

Suppose that someone asked you how your father goes to work. You could answer with (3a) or (3b), but a nonredundant answer like (2a) is not merely acceptable but somewhat preferred:

(3) a. Titi wa kuruma de sigoto ni ikimasu.

my father car by work to go

'My father goes to work by car.'

b. Titi wa kuruma de ikimasu.

'My father goes by car.'


In turn, (3b) is a well-formed answer to a question like, "What kind of stuffed animal did your brother get for Christmas?"

This type of sentence has the form of [X wa Y da], and is equated with the English copula sentence [X is Y]. While English copula sentences



are translated into either [X *wa* Y *da*] or [X *ga* Y *da*], it is often the case that "NP *wa*" is translated into English using "as for NP" as an approximation.

(4) Translation equivalent:



The following translations (1') and (2') may describe the nature of such *wa* sentences:

(1') Boku *wa* unagi *da*.

'As for me, I am an eel/it is (an) eel.'

(2')a. Titi *wa* kuruma *da*.

'As for my father, he is a car/it is a car.'

b. Ototoo *wa* kyooryuu *da*.

'As for my brother, he is a dinosaur/it is a dinosaur.'

The ambiguity between the above two readings has yielded a number of studies of these so-called "eel sentences."

Now, the questions that should be asked here are: i) whether or not "*da*" in an "eel-sentence" is the Japanese equivalent of the English verb "to be" or the copula; and if so, ii) whether or not the Japanese-

specific particle *wa* embodies the special function in the "eel-sentence" phenomenon (English copula sentences are used rarely, if at all, in the same way as (1) and (2) in Japanese). In what follows, I will argue for the copula hypothesis for *da*, rather than the others, in investigating the function of *wa*.

Let us first look at Okutsu (1978), which challenges the copula hypothesis. He proposes instead the propredication hypothesis, which maintains that *da* is the proform of (a part of) the predicate, such as *-tabetai* (to want to eat), *-kudasai* (please give), *-tyumonsuru* (to order), etc., as shown in (5):

(5) Propredication Hypothesis: Okutsu (1978)

Boku	wa	unagi	ga	tabetai	'I want to eat eel.'
I		eel	Nom (obj)	want to eat	
			o	tyumonsuru	'I order an eel.'
			Acc.		
			o	kure	'Give me eel.'
			Acc.	give (Imp)	
			∅	<i>da</i>	

Okutsu proposes the propredication transformation<sup>1</sup> followed by (optional) particle deletion. Okutsu's propredication hypothesis, however, is not well restricted, which is a crucial defect in theory construction. According to Okutsu, "*da*" can replace almost anything -

verbs, adjectives, and nominal adjectives - in its derived forms with various suffixes, tenses, negative morphemes, etc., associating with various grammatical cases (!). This can be seen in (6):

(6) a. Q:       Kinoo       kimitati   doko   ni       ita   no.  
                  yesterday you (two) where LOC be-Past Q

'Where were you yesterday?'

A<sub>1</sub>:   Ototoo wa gakkoo   ni       ITE  
          brother       school LOC be-(gerund)

Boku wa uti       ni       ITA  
          I       home   LOC   be-Past

A<sub>2</sub>:   Ototoo wa gakkoo   DE,   boku wa uti DA.  
                                   ("da" in gerund)

'My brother was at school and I was at home.'

b.   Q:   Kimi wa itu   ko-rare-nai   no.  
           you       when come-can-Neg Q

'When cannot you come?'

A<sub>1</sub>:   (Boku wa) suiyoobi ni   KO-RARE-NAI  
   on come-can-Neg

A<sub>2</sub>:   (Boku wa) suiyoobi DA   (ne).  
   you know

c. Q: kimi wa nani o hanas-ase-rare-ta no.  
 you what Acc speak-Causative-Passive-Past. Q

A<sub>1</sub>: boku wa zibun no kazoku ni tuite no hanasi o  
 self's family about 's story  
 KAK-ASE-RARE-TA.

A<sub>2</sub>: Boku wa zibun no kazoku ni tuite no hanasi DA (yo).  
 Emp.

In (6), "*da*" replaces the past form of the verb *iru* in (a), a negative form of the verb *kuru* in (b), and a causative-passive past form of the verb *hanasu* in (c). Furthermore, in Okutsu's analysis, with the exception of the equational case of (7c) which he admits is the copula case, even (7a) and (7b), which are usually not considered as "eel-sentences,"<sup>2</sup> are also derivable from (8a) and (8b) respectively:

(7) a. Boku wa Yamada da.

I (name)

'As for me, I am Yamada.'

b. Boku wa gakusei da.

I student

'As for me, I am a student.'

- c. Tokyo wa Nihon no syuto da.  
Japan 's capital city

'As for Tokyo, it is the capital city of Japan.'

- (8) a. Boku wa Yamada [to iu].  
as call (oneself)

- b. Boku wa gakusei [ni zokusuru].  
to belong

'I belong to the students.'

To treat (7c) as an exception is poorly motivated. I cannot see why (8') below is not acceptable for (7c) as an underlying form, if (8a) and (8b) are acceptable for (7a) and (7b) respectively:

- (8') Tokyo wa Nihon no syuto to onazi-da.  
as same

'As for Tokyo, it is the same as the capital city of Japan.'

It is true that Okutsu's main idea is not undermined by excluding (7c) from his proform analysis. But the point is that there is nothing to prevent including (7c) in "eel sentences" since *da* can replace anything in his theory.

The revised version of Okutsu's (1981) theory states the condition for the applicability of transformation: target elements should be "presupposed." What this "presupposition" means is not clearly

stated by Okutsu, but it seems to be similar to so-called "old" or "known" information. (This still does not make the status of (7) any clearer, because of the nature of these widely used but loosely defined notions.) However, I must say that this revision does not put any essential restriction on his rule sets, but rather creates a less restricted theory of grammar: sentence grammar has to utilize contextual information to make itself fully functional. To progress toward the aim of a well-restricted theory, the idea that "*da*" is the proform of various pre-dicative expressions will have to be abandoned.

For the purpose of deriving the "eel sentences," Kitahara's pseudo-cleft hypothesis (1981) is a potential alternative to that of Okutsu. The "eel-sentence" is derived through its pseudo-cleft counterpart as shown in (9):

(9) Pseudo-cleft Hypothesis: Kitahara (1981)

- a. [Boku ga        tabe-tai        no]<sub>NP</sub> wa unagi da.  
       I     Nom     want to eat                                eel

'What I want to eat is eel.'

- b. [Boku no no]<sub>NP</sub> wa unagi da.

- c. [Boku no]<sub>NP</sub> wa unagi da.

- d. Boku wa unagi da.

'As for me, it is eel.'

Kitahara calls the first "no" in (9b) the prenominal particle, like "no" in (10); and the second "no" the nominalizer particle as in (11).

- (10) Taroo no hon  
book

'Taroo's book.'

- (11) [Tenisu .o suru no]<sub>NP</sub> wa tanosii  
tennis Acc play fun

'Playing tennis is fun.'

According to Kitahara, "da" is a part of the pseudo-cleft construction, but different from the copulative "da" in (7).

Kitahara's analysis does not require contextual information be taken into consideration; however, it shares the same fundamental basis; i.e., all information which is necessary for interpretation is already provided in the sentence as the underlying form. Thus Kitahara's analysis also places a large burden on sentence grammar, just as Okutsu's does.


In conclusion, there does not seem to be any reason to assume two kinds of "da," and to treat the "eel-sentence" as a syntactically special case. What is apparent here is that as far as syntax is concerned, the eel sentence is not different from those given in (7), and all of these [ X wa Y da ] sentences are classified as copulative






(13)

a.



b.



The *wa*-attached NPs, *Taroo* in (13a) and *Taroo* in (13b), are bound to the nominative in the former and the accusative in the latter. However,

there are also cases where a *wa*-attached NP is not bound to any arguments within S, as in (14):

(14)a. Sakana wa [<sub>S</sub> tai                      ga    umai].

fish            red snapper    Nom    good

'As for fish, red snapper is tasty.'

b. Horidei wa [<sub>S</sub> hawai ga ii].

holiday        Hawaii    good

'As for holidays, Hawaii is good.'

c. Taroo wa [<sub>S</sub> Hanako ga            sono kai    ni       deta].

Nom. the meeting    to    attended

'As for Taroo, Hanako attended the meeting.'

In (14c), *Taroo* has something to do with Hanako's going to the meeting. For example, Hanako might be Taroo's assistant, and she went to a business-related meeting on his behalf. The examples in (14) remind us of the phenomenon seen in the copula case. Without context or real world knowledge, the relationship between the NP and the rest of the sentence looks rather arbitrary. Just as it does in some copulative sentences, the co-occurrence of two nouns apparently creates a nonsensical sentence.

What then is the role of *wa* in these sentences? It can be seen that *wa* marks the major break in a sentence. Looking at the matter

from another standpoint, *wa* apparently functions to join two otherwise unrelated elements into one sentence in (14). That raises a fundamental question: what makes a sentence a sentence? In the following, I will look at Kuroda's (1965 & 1972) analyses of the sentence with *wa* and the sentence without *wa*, which holds the key to this question.

#### §5.1.2 *Wa* and Human Judgment

Adapting the framework of Brentano-Marty's theory of judgment for Japanese, Kuroda (1965) claims that the distinction between the two types of human judgment explained below, *thetic* in (15) and *categorical* in (16), gains substantial support from Japanese, because of the particle *wa*:

- (15) *Thetic* (single) judgment: represents simply the recognition or rejection of material of judgment.  
[p. 154, Kuroda, 1972]
- (16) *Categorical* (double) judgment: consists of two separate acts, one, the act of recognition of that which is to be made the subject, and the other, the act of affirming or denying what is expected by the predicate about the subject.  
[p. 154, Kuroda, 1972]

In the categorical judgement (16), the particle *wa* marks the "subject" in Japanese.

Note that Kuroda uses the terms 'subject' and 'predicate' not in the syntactic sense, but in the sense of traditional grammar or logic linked to Port-Royal logic.<sup>4</sup> Throughout this chapter, the term 'subject'

will be used in Kuroda's sense. Although in traditional grammar and logic, the subject-predicate structure of a sentence corresponds to the similar structure of judgment, in Brentano-Marty's theory, a sentence has the subject-predicate structure, but judgment may or may not have it. Kuroda argues that in Japanese, however, the subject-predicate structure in categorical judgment happens to be marked by the particle *wa* as in (17). A sentence without the *wa*-marked phrase is 'subject-less' in judgment, and that is thetic. A thetic sentence like (18) is simply used to recognize an event.

- (17) a. Inu wa hasitte-iru. (= Kuroda's 7.2)  
dog (Nom) is-chasing

'The dog is running.'

- b. Inu wa neko o oikakete-iru. (= Kuroda's 8.2)  
dog (Nom) cat Acc is chasing

'The dog is chasing the cat.'

- (18) a. Inu ga hasitte-iru. (= Kuroda's 7.1)

'The/A dog is running.'

- b. Inu ga neko o oikakete-iru. (= Kuroda's 7.2)

'The/A dog is chasing a cat.'

In the thetic judgment sentence in (18), *inu* 'dog' and *neko* 'cat' are simply participants in the event. On the other hand, in the categorical

judgement sentence (17), *inu* 'dog' unlike *neko* 'cat' is not just a participant but has a prominent status in the description of the event. The judgement underlying the example of the thetic case in (18b), for instance, is analyzed as (19) by Kuroda:

- (19) a. X is chasing of Y (kernel judgement)  
       b. X is a dog (identification of participants)  
       c. Y is a cat

Categorical judgements are based on thetic judgements like (19) and, in addition, X is chosen among the participants and given prominent status, "subject," marked by *wa*. Such, in outline, is Kuroda's conceptual proposal on the nature of the *wa*- sentence.

In this framework, once the event and the entity are recognized through judgment, the reflection of this judgment act is realized in sentence form as a *wa*- sentence. Regardless of whether an NP-*wa* has a direct connection to the rest of the sentence as a participant of the event described there, the *wa*- sentence is a syntactic realization of the subject-predicate structure in judgment. Judgment underlies a well-formed sentential expression; then, syntax detects the structural well-formedness of the sentence. In other words, while syntax has to provide a certain device to describe this phenomenon, the "eel-sentences," even though their NPs lack thematic roles, are perfectly well-formed. As is indicated by *wa*, the sentences represent a categorical judgement.<sup>5</sup>

In the following sections, I will investigate further consequences of assigning *wa* such a logico-semantic function,<sup>6</sup> i.e., marking a categorical judgement, in connection with the common functional approach to *wa*.

### §5.1.3 Judgement Marker vs. Topic Marker

*Wa* has often been called the topic marker, but what the popular term "topic" refers to is a rather opaque concept. There have been many attempts to define "topic." While such definitions or criteria for "topic" are often vague, Japanese *wa*-marked NPs seem to coincide with the "theme" in the "theme-rheme" articulation of the Prague school tradition.<sup>7</sup> Reinhart (1982) claims that the "theme," which is also her sentence topic, is determined relative to a discourse, in the way shown in (20) (= Reinhart (6)):

- (20) a. (Who did Max see yesterday?)  
           Max saw Rosa yesterday. (topic = Max)
- b. (Has anybody seen Rosa yesterday?)  
           Max saw Rosa yesterday. (topic = Rosa)

Reinhart claims that topichood should be defined as "a RELATION between an argument and a proposition relative to a context" (p. 7; emphasis mine) instead of as a PROPERTY of the referents relative to a context, like "old information."<sup>8</sup> For the "relation" in question, Reinhart argues that



assertions for the proposition of a given sentence (= what a statement is about in a semantic or logician's sense). In Japanese, this distinction is not only assumed on an abstract level, but also the contextually chosen pragmatic assertion in PPA is morphologically marked by *wa*.

The criteria employed by Reinhart to identify the topic are Strawson's (1964) "subjecthood" criteria. Strawson uses the term "subject" and "topic" interchangeably and what Strawson means by "subject" is the "subject" in traditional philosophical logic, as is the case with Kuroda. Now, according to Strawson's criteria, what a statement is about (= topic) is: i) presumed knowledge, i.e., "assumed to be already in the audience's possession" (the principle of the presumption of knowledge) in accordance with the purpose of communication (the principle of relevance); ii) (tends to be) the center of the truth value assessment, i.e., a statement is verified according to whether it is a true/false statement about the topic.

Now, while Strawson uses the term "topic" and "subject" interchangeably, Kuroda rejects the term "topic" and chooses "subject" because of the discourse-oriented nature of the former. Kuroda comments on this point as follows:

- (23) ...In fact, one might assume that the form of human judgement is uniformly something like the predicate form of modern logic, and any term, or set of terms, in such a form may be assigned the role of topic depending on discourse contexts. If such a claim is made, the concept of topic is kept valid as a valid concept, but the subject-predicate structure is not recognized as a (or the) form of judgement at all. [1972, p. 159]



However, "topic" in Reinhart's definition does not necessarily conflict with the "subject-predicate" structure in Kuroda's proposal. Strawson's (pragmatic) criteria are not the criteria for the *RELATION* but the criteria for the properties of the chosen argument (= topic) in context. Reinhart's definition of topichood can therefore be divided into two parts: the relation between an argument and a proposition in a sentence, and the selection procedure of the topic in a discourse. I assume that the relationship underlying a topic sentence is context-free; that is, the subject-predicate relation and the "aboutness" relation reflects the internal structure of a sentence or the reinterpretation of that internal structure in discourse context. It is necessary to postulate something like the subject-predicate relation in semantics, or else one cannot explain why a sentence which contains an NP without any thematic role (cf. (1), (2), and (14)) can be realized as a sentence.

#### §5.1.4            *wa* in Contrastive Reading


##### §5.1.4.1        "Contrastiveness" and the Categorical Judgement

Kuroda (1965) assumes that the categorical judgement is a transformationally derived structure (= syntactic structure) which is marked by *wa*, while *wa* itself has the inherent semantic feature, contrastiveness; that is, creating the contrastive effect and marking the categorical judgement are two different functions of the same *wa*, the former being primary and the latter secondary. On the other hand, Kuno


(1972) claims that there are two kinds of *wa*, the thematic *wa* and the contrastive *wa*. A natural consequence of his functional analysis is that Kuno postulates two types of *wa*.

Hoji (1985) claims, however, that the functional distinction between "thematic" *wa* and "contrastive" *wa* have different syntactic representations. He proposes a base-generated structure (24a) for "thematic", and a movement structure (24b) for "contrastive":

(24)a.



b.



If *wa* marks an NP dominated by *S'*,<sup>9</sup> then *Taroo* in (25) is non-contrastive; if *wa* marks an *S* dominating NP, then it is contrastive:

(25) *Taroo wa Tookyoo e itta.*

Tokyo to went

'Taroo went to Tokyo.'

Hoji's analysis is motivated by the possibility of variable/anaphora binding in "reconstruction" cases, which involves syntactic movement. If his analysis holds, here is a case where two different discourse-related functions, topic and contrastive in Kuno (1972), are represented by different syntactic structures. In general, there is no reason that a discourse function should be distinguished by its syntactic form, though an agreement might take place accidentally. In fact, Hoji's syntactic distinction does not fully coincide with the distinction between "thematic" and "contrastive" in a functional sense, for the structure in (24b) is also shared by "scrambling" (Hoji 1985), which does not involve the particle *wa*, and has a different discourse function (cf. Masunaga 1982). Furthermore, his contrastive *wa* examples are ones where *wa* has a heavy stress. While it is observed in English that stress placement changes coreference relation (cf. Chomsky 1971 and 1976), which is handled in syntax, stress is not the primary means for conveying contrastiveness on topic in Japanese. Thus it is not clear whether Hoji is discussing a syntactic effect of stress placement,<sup>10</sup> where virtually any element including *wa* can receive a stress, or an effect of (contrastive) *wa*.



- (27)a. Dare ga/? $\emptyset$ /\*wa Hanako to kenkasita no.  
with quarreled Q

'Who had a quarrel with Hanako?'

- b. Dare ga/? $\emptyset$ /\*wa Hanako ni denwa sita no ka na.  
to phoned-I-wonder

'I wonder who phoned Hanako?'

- c. Dare ga/?? $\emptyset$ /\*wa yatta no.  
did Q

'Who did (this)?'

Contrary to Kuno's claim, however, *ga*-deletion is quite possible. In the  
thetic sentences in (28), particle deletion still takes place:

- (28)a. (Ara,) ame  $\emptyset$  futte-(i)ru.  
ga

(oh!) rain Nom is-falling

'(Oh!) It's raining.'

- b. (A), dareka  $\emptyset$  kita.  
oh someone Nom came

'(Oh!) Someone came (to the door).'



(30)a. Sono hon wa yomi-masita.

that book read (polite)

'I read that book.'

b. Sono hon  $\emptyset$  yomi-masita.

This fact suggests that there is a strong correlation between *wa* and the contrastiveness which is not merely a contextual product.

Terakura (1984) provides an interesting case in terms of the *wa* =  $\emptyset$  phenomenon. She claims that there exist cases where the absence of *wa* is obligatory. Such examples are given in (31):

(31)a. Yuube aru paatii e itta n da kedo ne. Soko de atta kimura to yuu hito \*wa/ $\emptyset$  anata no kookoo no sempai da soo ne.

(= Terakura (7b))

'I went to a party last night. The person I called Kimura that I met there, I understand (he) is a graduate from your high school.'

b. Tyotto henna koto o ukagaimasu ga, Nihon e kaetta tomodati ga oite itta ueki \*wa/ $\emptyset$  watakusi no tokoro de

wa basyo ga nai no de o-taku ni ikaga to omoimasite.

Kanari ookii gomu no ki desu ga motte mairimasyoo ka.

(= Terakura (7c))

'I'm afraid I'm going to ask an odd question. A plant a friend of mine left when he returned to Japan, I have no room for (it) at my place, so I'm wondering if you would like to have (it). (It) is a fairly big rubber plant. Would you like me to show (it) to you?'

Terakura identifies the discourse function of these sentence initial NPs as being "not currently in addressee's consciousness" in Chafe (1976)'s sense, just like LD (left-dislocation) 2 in Prince (1983 and 1984).

However, Terakura's examples like (31) can in fact have *wa*, contrary to what she has claimed, but then the discourse function of the NP (*-wa*) have been changed<sup>12</sup> (the contrastive feature of *wa* is more or less apparent compared with  $\emptyset$  version) and they are no longer felicitous in those contexts. Thus, "obligatory (absence)" means "obligatory" at least on the level of discourse. However, (31) may also be syntactically different from so-called topic sentences.<sup>13</sup> It seems to me that (29) belongs to the same group of sentences as (32) below:

- (32) Hitori damatte sake o nomu, Taroo wa sonna otoko da.  
 alone quietly ACC drink such a man

'Drink(ing) sake alone and quietly, Taroo is such a person.'

The example (32) does not fit into the definition of categorical judgement, and there is no *wa* version for (32) since the sentence initial element seems like a preposed relative clause with *sonna* as the pro-form; i. e. [*hitori damatte sake o nome( = sonna)*] *otoko* "a man who



drinks sake alone and quietly." If (31) is a (32)-type sentence, (31) cannot be dealt with as a categorical judgement.

Now, the non-deletability of *wa* in contrastive environments shown in (29) and the contrastive *wa* version of (31) lend support to the assumption that *wa* has an inherent semantic feature. However, if the particle *wa* is the one which contributes to the contrastiveness, why is it the case that (33), which is a typical non-contrastive (= "thematic"), general statement has the contrastive reading given in (34)?

(33) Kuzira wa honyuurui da.

whale        mammal

'A whale is a mammal.'

(34) Kuzira wa honyuurui da ga same wa gyorui da.

whale        mammal        but shark        fish

'A whale is a mammal but a shark is a fish.'

The next section will be devoted to investigating this problem.

#### §5.1.4.3 "Contrastiveness" and *Wa* (II): Contrastive Construction

Contrastive reading is typically associated with *wa*- sentences like (35):

- (35) Ani                wa        futuu no kaisyain da        ga  
           older brother        ordinary company employee   but  
  
           ototoo                wa    yuumei na komedian da.  
           younger brother        famous comedian

'Older brother is an ordinary company employee but younger brother is a famous comedian.'

The use of *wa* here is called contrastive (Kuno, 1972). One might say, however, that the contrastive reading results from the contrastive context: each sentence in isolation does not necessarily have a contrastive implication, as shown in (36):

- (36) a.        Ani wa futuu no kaisyain da.  
  
                  'Older brother is an ordinary company employee.'  
  
       b.        Ototoo wa yuumei na komedian da.  
  
                  'Younger brother is a famous comedian.'

Nevertheless, there are reasons to assume that *wa* has something to do with contrastiveness. First, consider (37):

- (37)a. Ame wa hutte-imasu. (= Kuno (18a))  
           rain        falling-be  
  
           'Rain is falling.'

b. Oozei no hito wa paatee ni kimasita. (= Kuno (19a))

many people party to come

'Many people came to the party.'

In Kuno's thematic-contrastive distinction, although generic sentences like *Kuzira wa honyurui da* ("Whales are mammals") are typical examples which have the thematic *wa*, many sentences are ambiguous between thematic and contrastive (e.g. *Biru wa gakusei da*, "Bill is a student"), and some only have the contrastive *wa*. Examples of the latter (unambiguously contrastive) case are in (37). The sentences in (37) cannot be thematic since they would violate the restriction that a thematic NP must be generic or anaphoric, but they are perfectly all right as contrastives, as shown in (37'):

(37')a. Ame wa hutte-imasu. Demo kaze wa huite-imasen  
rain is-falling but wind is-not-blowing

kara daizyoobu desyoo.

as alright will be

'It is raining. But as the wind is not blowing, it will be alright.'

- b. Oozei no hito wa paatee ni kimasita ga paatee wa  
 many people party to come but party  
 tittomo moriagarimasendesita.  
 at all was-not-a-success

'Many people came to the party but the party (itself)  
 was not a success at all.'

It is likely the case that even if sentences like (37) were given without context, one would embed them in an imaginary context to fully interpret them. It is the sentences which demand such felicitous contrastive environments; they are ungrammatical otherwise. Sentences which are grammatical only in discourse are not allowed, on principle. Thus, the examples in (37) provide cases where the sentences in isolation already imply the contrastive reading; that is, *wa* seems to have a contrastive feature intrinsic to it. However, the problem still remains as regards whether the sentences in (36) are different from the sentences in (35); are they two different *wa*, the contrastive *wa* for (35) and the thematic *wa* for (36), as Kuno claims?<sup>14</sup> To answer this question, the role of the contextual environment will be investigated next.

First, consider (38) and (39):

(38)a. Ame ga hutte-kita.

rain come-to-fall

'Rain has started to fall.'

b. Tuki ga dete-iru.

moon is-there

'There is the moon.'

(39)a\* Ame ga hutte-kita ga tuki ga (mada) dete-iru.

b. Ame ga hutte-kita ga tuki wa dete-iru.

'It has started to rain but the moon is (still) there.'

c. Ame wa hutte-kita ga tuki ga dete-iru.

d. Ame wa hutte-kita ga tuki wa dete-iru.

*Ame* in (38a) and *tuki* in (38b) are non-generic and also non-anaphoric when one is describing the outside scene, which is a characteristic ofthetic sentences. Thus, it is necessary to use *ga* instead of *wa* in (38). However, once embedded in a *[clause] ga [clause]* construction, *wa* is necessary<sup>15</sup> in both clauses, as in (39d), or at least in one of the two clauses, as in (39b) and (39c). If it were really the case that because of the *[clause] ga [clause]* construction, two events/ideas get contrasted, then (39a) should be grammatical without changing *ga* into *wa*, but it actually is not.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, if the *[clause] ga [clause]* construction *requires* a *wa*- sentence(s) to play a key role in creating

the contrastive effect, one can explain why *wa* is needed in (39c). But the semantic function of the *[clause] ga [clause]* form itself does not seem to have anything to do with the contrastiveness; it is very common to find non-contrastive sentences in this construction, as in (40) where *ga* can be translated as "and" rather than contrastive "but":

(40)a. Boku no tomodati de Yamada to-iu no ga iru-n-desu  
 I ('s) friend and called one Nom be

ga kore ga taihenna kwarimono desite...  
 and this person Nom quite a character be (Ger.)

'I have a friend called Yamada and this person is quite a character and...'

b. Kono biiru wa nihon no desu ga nakanaka ikemasu  
 this beer made-in-Japan be and pretty good

yo.  
 you know

'This beer is from Japan and it's pretty good, you know.'

What the *[clause] ga [clause]* construction does here is to provide a felicitous environment (= context) for the *wa*-sentence, just as in the case of "discourse conditioned" (Williams, 1977) sentences, for example a passive sentence which seems to require a specific environment in discourse, or a cleft sentence as a less controversial case.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, it is the *wa* sentence which is directly connected with the

contrastiveness. The reason why the sentences in (36) in isolation are apparently neutral in terms of contrastiveness will be explained by the nature of contrastiveness in §5.1.4.6. In the following two sections, I will examine the nature of subject NP in *wa*-sentences in relation to the contrastiveness feature.

#### §5.1.4.4 "Contrastiveness" and *Wa* (III): Indefinite Nouns

Kuroda (1965, 1972) claims that his subject "cannot be indefinite specific" for the reason given below in (41):

- (41) Now assume that one has made a categorical judgement in which the subject is referred to by an indefinite noun in referential use. The speaker's mind must then have been directed not towards its individuality, but towards it as a completely unmarked representative of those individual entities that share the attribute represented by the noun used as the subject, say, *dog*. Then, if the speaker assigns a certain attribute expressed by the predicate to the subject, he would in fact be assigning this property to an arbitrary individual entity that might be named by the particular attribute used to refer to it, *dog*. In other words, he would, in effect, have made a generic statement concerning the class of objects, *dogs*, contradicting our initial assumption that he intended to make a statement about a specific object he is referring to. Thus, no subject in the logical sense can be indefinite specific. [Kuroda 1972, p. 167]

Thus, he claims that (42a) can be translated with either *wa* or *ga*, but (42b) must be translated with *ga*.

(42)a. The dog is running.

'Inu wa/ga hasitte-iru.'

b. A dog is running.

'Inu wa\*/ga hasitte-iru.'

The argument in (41) is explicated further in Kuroda (1965) as follows: a categorical judgement (also called "predication") consists of a logical premise and a conclusion,<sup>18</sup> as in (43a). Supposing (42b) were a *wa*-sentence, it would have to have the same form as (43b).

(43)a. If X is A, then X is B. (is true)

b. If it is a dog, then it is running.

However, the if-clause in (43b) cannot be a logical premise of the predication. Thus, (42b) cannot be a *wa*-sentence.

The reason why (44a) is ungrammatical while (44b) is grammatical is also explained by Kuroda in the same fashion:

(44)a\* A man is intelligent.

b. A man is mortal.

*Man* in (44b) has to be interpreted as generic, instead of a specific "a man"; while in (44a) *a man* cannot obtain such a generic (indefinite non-specific) interpretation; thus, the sentence is ungrammatical.



(45), on the other hand, is an apparent counter-example to this: if *basu* in (45) refers to one in sight of the speaker, that is an indefinite specific, "a bus."

(45) Basu wa hasitte-iru

bus is-running

'[A bus is running.]'

(This translation is usually equivalent to the *ga* version of the sentence.)

The sentence also sounds perfectly all right in contexts such as (46):

(46) Are, basu wa hasitte-iru. Densya wa tomatte-iru

why! electric train be-stopped

noni naa.

though (interjection)

'Why, [a bus is running], though the electric trains are stopped!'

Nevertheless, (46) is not a genuine indefinite specific case, for the speaker is really giving a general statement on buses through discussion of a single instance. The speaker can consider the statement true in an area which is his concern at that moment.

A generalization about the indefinite subject is: if there is an indefinite noun in the subject position of the categorical judgement, it

must be non-specific. Thus, in (44a) "a man" has to receive the generic reading. Now, the cases which require serious attention here are those where an indefinite non-specific sentence semantically fails to obtain the generic reading. The sentence is still grammatical if read with a certain contrastive implication. Consider (47) and (48):

- (47) Nanninka wa buzi nogareta  
       some people safely escaped

'Some people escaped safely.'

- (48)a. Dareka wa byooki desu. (= Kuno (18c))  
       someone sick is

'Someone is sick.'

- b. Dareka wa (itumo) kesseki desu.  
       someone (always) absent is

'Someone is always absent.'

(47) and (48) are categorical judgement sentences (*wa*- sentences) with indefinite nouns as their subjects, "nanninka" and "dareka." They are grammatical only when read with a contrastive implication. For instance, in (47) "some who managed to escape" is contrasted with "the others who did not." The situation is exactly the same<sup>19</sup> in (48): the sentence may only have this reading with a contrast between "some" and "the others." More examples of this type will be found in cases involving numerals:

(49)a. Sono paatee ni gozyuunin wa kita.

that party to fifty people came

'Fifty people came to that party.'

b. Yonin wa totyude dete-itta.

four people in the middle went out

'Four people left in the middle.'

Japanese does not have (in)definite particles. *Gozyuunin* in (49a) and *yonin* in (49b) can be definite, as "the fifty people" and "the four" respectively, and then they are no different from other categoricals. On the other hand, if *gozyuunin* and *yonin* are indefinite, then they must have a contrastive reading: the "four people" in contrast to, say, "the people who stayed there" in (49b). This contrastive phenomenon is also observed in Kuno (1973).

The questions to be asked now are: why is the contrastive reading compulsory in these cases?; and again, what is the relationship between the generic reading ("thematic" in Kuno (1973)) and the contrastive reading ("contrastive") in indefinite nouns? These questions will be answered in the next section.

§5.1.4.5 "Contrastiveness" and *Wa* (IV): Subject NPs and  
Definiteness Effect.

There are some linguistic phenomena where the distinction between definite and indefinite plays a key role. This has often been called the "definiteness effect" or the "definiteness restriction." A typical example of the DE is observed in the existential *there*-sentence in English, as in (50):

(50)a. There is *a table* in this room.

b\* There is *the table* in this room.

Only the indefinite NP *a table* is allowed in this construction. Unlike English, Japanese does not have (in)definite articles. However, beyond the existence (or non-existence) of morphological marking devices, the notion of (in)definiteness comes into play in many languages, if not all, in the form of various "definiteness effects" (Gil, 1987). Milsark (1977), however, claims that the definiteness restriction on the *there*-sentence has been too narrowly defined. The NPs which are excluded from this environment are not only "the NP" but also a group of NPs which he called "strong" NPs. The "weak" versus "strong" distinction shown in (51) is intended to describe the actual restrictions on *there*-sentences.

## (51) WEAK

*a**sm* [of "sm" vs. "some" in Postal (1969): M.O.]

number determiners

Ø plural and mass

determiner in nonuniversal reading

## STRONG

"definites"

*the*

demonstratives

pronouns

possessive DET's

universals

*all**every**each**any* when not polarity item of *some*

Ø DET in universal reading

[Milsark (1977), p. 8]

Milsark identifies the distinction of the "weak" versus the "strong" as that of "cardinality" versus "quantification." Here, a definite article like the English *the* is viewed merely as a linguistic manifestation of the quantificational effect (cf. Chomsky (1975) for *the* as a universal

quantifier). After all, it is already clear from a language like Japanese that the existence of the article is a rather different issue from the existence of the concept "definiteness."<sup>20</sup>

Now, according to Milsark, words like *some*, *many*, *few*, and their analogous expressions are treated as ambiguous<sup>21</sup> between the non-quantified reading (weak) and the quantified reading (strong). For example, in his theory, the strong sense of "some" salesmen is nearly synonymous with "some" of the salesmen; but more precisely what the strong reading means is "some" of the limited set of the group. That is, "some" people could be "some of the students" or "some of the people on the earth." What Milsark is not aware of, however, is that number determiners (numerals including *a* as a singular determiner) are also ambiguous between the quantified and non-quantified readings, or "strong" and "weak." The strong reading of *a* in *a man* is the generic reading, that is, the universally quantified *man*, whereas the weak reading is the numerical interpretation of "a."

Returning to *wa*, a definiteness effect on the bare NPs construed as (in)definite, apparently more complicated than was the case with *there*, now appears more clearly when viewed in terms of the nature of the NP (*-wa*).<sup>22</sup> The key examples here are the indefinite noun subjects, as in (47) - (49), duplicated below as (52) - (54):

(52) Nanninka wa buzi nogareta

some people safely escaped

'Some people escaped safely.'

(53)a. Dareka wa byooki desu. (= Kuno (18c)\*)

someone sick is

'Someone is sick.'

b. Dareka wa (itumo) kesseki desu.

someone (always) absent is

'Someone is always absent.'

(54)a. Sono paatee ni gozyuunin wa kita.

that party to fifty people came

'Fifty people came to that party.'

b. Yonin wa totyude dete-itta.

four people in the middle went out

'Four people left in the middle.'

*Nanninka, dareka, gozyuunin, and yonin, in these examples, are respectively member(s) of certain limited sets: for instance, (52), some people of the sinking ship; (53), someone among my classmates; (54), fifty people on the invitation list, or four people at the meeting. The domain of the quantification is pragmatically defined: only context*

determines what the "limited sets" in question are. Kuno's often-quoted claims in (55) are correct at some level of the description:

- (55) a. *Wa* is either *thematic* or *contrastive*
- b. Themes must be anaphoric or generic. Non-anaphoric nongeneric themes result in ungrammaticality.
- c. On the other hand, nonanaphoric nongeneric noun phrases can be contrasted. [Kuno 1973, p. 59-60]

However, an integrated explanation of the nature of the NPs is to be found in a rather different manner. First of all, I do not accept the binary approach to the function of *wa*, the division into *thematic* and *contrastive*, but rather consider these two the result of the interaction between the nature of the subject NP (semantics) and the context (pragmatics). Categorical judgement requires a quantificational nature for the subject NPs. "Fifty people" can be the uniquely identifiable entity in the context, "the fifty people" (i.e., "definite" in the usual sense), or members of the uniquely identifiable set, "fifty people of the group." In the latter, these limited sets are uniquely identifiable because the domain of quantification is pragmatically determined by context. Ladusaw (1982) also claims that X of the partitive construction " $x_n$  of the X" (e.g., "three of the men") is "a group level individual, denoting the set of all properties that the unique contextually relevant group of men have" (p. 238). This "group level individual" (as opposed to "individual entity") is an equivalent notion to Kuroda's subject quality of the categorical judgement (cf. (41)). Then, what the contrastive reading in indefinite nouns means should be



considered in the light of the nature of the subject NP. To do so, let us look at indefinite noun cases in contrastive environments. A typical environment is given in (56):

- (56)a. Nanmin-tati wa hidoku tukarete-ita. Ooku ga/wa sono mati  
 refugees very was-exhausted many the town  
 ni sibiraku todomaru-koto-ni-sita. Daga nanninka wa  
 ACC for a while decided-to-stay but some  
 sarani saki ni susunda.  
 further ahead went

'The refugees were very exhausted. Many of them decided to stay in the town. But some of them went further.'

- b. Takasi wa usagi o katte-iru. Nihiki wa massiro no  
 (NAME) rabbit ACC be-raising two pure-white  
 yatu, sanbiki wa makkuro, sosite nokori wa zenbu  
 one three pure-black and the rest all  
 buti da.  
 speckled

'Takasi is raising rabbits. Two of them are pure-white ones, three of them are pure-black, and the rest are speckled.'



contrastiveness seems to be a little "faded" in (57b). Compare (58) with (59):

(58)a. Nanninka wa buzi nogareta.

some (people) safely escaped

'Some (of them) safely escaped.'

b. Hansuu wa itumo atumari ni okureru

half always meeting be-late

'Half (of them) are always late for the meeting.'

(59)a. Sono fune no nanninka wa buzi nogareta.

that ship 's some people safely escaped

'Some people in that ship escaped safely.'

b. Watasi no guruupu no hansuu wa itumo atumari ni okureru

my group 's half always meeting be-late

'Half of the people in my group are always late for a meeting.'

Again, (58) has a stronger contrastive implication than (59) with "of the X." My assumption here is that the lack of an expression to limit the set in (58) indicates that the set is easily identifiable in the context. In other words, these sentences in (58) are strongly related to the previous discourse with its contextually unique set. On the other hand, the existence of an expression limiting the set, *in that ship* or *in my group*

means that the set is less identifiable and needs explicit mentioning. In other words, without these expressions, the connection between the two sentences is weak.

The relation between "strong relatedness" and "contrastiveness" will be examined further in the next section, and an overall picture of the contrastive effect will be provided there.

#### §5.1.4.6 The Nature of "Contrastiveness"

Through the observations and arguments in the previous sections, I have come to the conclusion that the contrastive reading of *wa* sentences, which has often been used as a primitive notion, is the product of both the intrinsic and the extrinsic nature of a *wa* sentence. There are two significant factors involved in inducing a contrastive quality in the sentence: one is related to the semantic property of subject NP of a categorical sentence, and the other is related to the contextual environment for the sentence in question. I will discuss the former first.

The following three sentences represent: a generic sentence, which is non-contrastive ( = (60a)); a non-generic sentence, which is ambiguous ( = (60b)); and a sentence with an indefinite noun as its subject, which is always contrastive ( = (60c)).

(60)a. Kuzira wa honyuurui da.

'A whale is a mammal.'

b. Taroo wa gakusei da.

'Taro is a student.'

c. Gonin wa kita.

'Five (of them) came.'

Instead of postulating two kinds of *wa*, thematic and contrastive, their differences will be explained in a uniform manner as follows:

Suppose that "X is contrastive" means that X contrasts with Y. Then X and Y will have something like the figure-ground distinction: the ground is needed for the figure to stand out. In (60c), *gonin* automatically receives the partitive reading because of the nature of subject NP of categorical judgement. The "of X" portion is the "ground" upon which the "figure" *gonin* stands out. A careful observation reveals, however, what actually contrasts is not just *gonin* and "of X" but *five people's coming* vs. *the other people (= X - 5)'s not coming*. Likewise, in (60b) where it has the contrastive reading, *Taro's being a student* contrasts with *the other's not being students* or perhaps the other's not yet having a clear status in the set consisting of both kinds of people. In a generic statement like (60a), *whale's being a mammal* is set against the other (= whole set of living creatures minus whales)'s being in non-specified classes. Notice that generally speaking, when we

compare two, we always compare the two on the same ground. As in the case of figure-ground opposition, the vaguer and broader the ground is, the less salient the figure becomes. This is why (60a) is generally considered as non-contrastive. In §5.1.4.5, I used the term "strong relatedness" in connection with the overt/covert case of "of X." If X is obvious from context, it means that the contrasting party is clearly definable in discourse. In a generic sentence like (60a), where "of X" is conventionally definable by our knowledge of the world, the contrastive effect almost fades out. However, once (60a) is embedded in a context like that found in (61) (= (34)), the situation becomes a little different:

(61) Kuzira wa honyuurui da ga same wa gyorui da.

whale        mammal        but shark        fish

'A whale is a mammal but a shark is a fish.'

Now the context clarifies what contrasts with what; i.e., *whale's being a mammal* to *shark's being a fish*. The subject status of *whale* and *shark* makes the two nouns prominent; however, the characteristic of *wa* contrast is not item contrast (cf. the exhaustive *ga* in the following section), but rather statement contrast. I will discuss the statement contrast in further detail next.

First observe (62):

- (62)a. Taroo wa hon o katta ga  
           book Acc bought but  
       Ziroo wa (hon o) kawanakatta.  
                           did-not-buy

'Taro bought a book but Ziro did not buy one.'

- b. Taroo wa hon o katta ga  
       Ziroo wa kuruma o katta.  
                           car bought

'Taro bought a book but Ziro bought a car.'

- c. (Sono okane de) Taroo wa ie o katta ga  
       that money with house bought

Ziroo wa biznesu o hazimeta.  
                           business started

'(With that money), Taro bought a house but Ziro started a business.'

In (62), one might say that *Taroo* and *Ziroo* are in contrast; however, when  $[X_1\text{-}wa\text{-}Y_1]$  is contrasted with  $[X_2\text{-}wa\text{-}Y_2]$ , not only  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  but also  $Y_1$  and  $Y_2$  contrast, as is evident from the resultant ungrammatical sentences<sup>23</sup> in (62'a):

(62')a\* Taroo wa hon o katta ga

Ziroo wa hon o katta.

'Taro bought a book but Ziro bought one.'

b. Taroo wa hon o katta ga

Ziroo wa kuruma o katta.

'Taro bought a book but Ziro bought a car.'

However, in two contrastive statements, *wa* marked items serve as focal points, in the sense of Dretske (1972). Next, let us examine the case of multiple-subject constructions in terms of the statement contrast. Observe (63):

(63)a. [Supootu wa [(fuyu ni) sukii wa simasu]] ga...

sports winter in ski do but

'As for sports, I ski in winter, but...'

b. [Watasi wa [asa wa [koohi wa nomimasen.]]]

I morning coffee do-not-drink


'I don't drink coffee in the morning.'

In the multi-subject construction, it is observed that the leftmost NP-*wa* is thematic and the rest are contrastive (Kuno, 1973). This can be explained by assuming a nesting structure for those sentences. For example, the subject NP is *sports* in (63a) and among the possible




descriptions concerning *sports*, *ski* is chosen as the second subject. This relation in (63a) and (63b) is illustrated in (64a) and (64b) below:

(64)a.



b.



In (64b), on the ground of the description about *I*, the description about *morning* is salient, which in turn serves as the ground for the description about *coffee*. Rather than the dichotomy between thematic and contrastive, the contrastive effect is gradual in this schema – the more restricted the ground is, the more distinctive the figure is – and this graduation, I believe, matches our intuition about the sentence.

Next observe (65):

(65)a. Watasi wa asa wa koohii o nomimasen ga  
           I morning coffee Acc do-not-drink but  
                   hiru (ni) wa (koohii o) nomimasu.  
                   daytime drink

b. Watasi wa asa wa koohii wa nomimasen ga  
                   otya wa nomimasu.

'I don't drink coffee in the morning but drink tea.'

c\* Watasi wa asa wa koohii wa nomimasen ga  
                   hiru wa otya wa nomimasu.

'I don't drink coffee in the morning but I drink tea in the  
 daytime.'

d\* Watasi wa asa wa koohii wa nomimasen ga  
                   hiru wa koohii wa nomimasu.

'I don't drink coffee in the morning but drink it in the  
 daytime.'


The parallel construction provides a felicitous environment for the contrastive effect of *wa* sentences; in (65a) the description of *morning* and that of *daytime* contrast on the ground of the description concerning *I* ; in (65b), the description of *coffee* and that of *tea* contrast on the ground of the description concerning *morning*, for which the description concerning *I* serves as the ground. There is a

restriction against two nesting descriptions contrasting with another two nesting descriptions at the same time (cf. (65c)); in other words, once the descriptions contrast with each other, they cannot serve as the ground for another description (cf. (65d); notice that (65a) is grammatical). (65d) is probably a special case of (65c), or the other way around. Thus, (66), Kuno's counter-example for (65c) and (65d), which is reported in Enomoto (1983), is a case where two parallel descriptions concerning *I* contain more than one contrastive *wa* for each:

- (66) Boku wa syuumatu ni wa hon wa yomu ga zassi wa yomazu  
       I       weekend       book    read   magazine do-not-read  
       syuuzitu ni wa sinbun wa yomu ga hon wa yomanai  
       weekday     newspaper read    book do-not-read
- 'On weekends, I read books but do not read magazines;  
 however, on weekdays I read newspapers but do not read  
 books.'

However, this is not a genuine counter-example. There are two types of parallel here: one is *my weekend's book-reading* vs. *my weekend's non-magazine-reading* (also *my weekday's newspaper-reading* vs. *my weekday's non-book-reading*); the other is *my weekend's activity* vs. *my weekday's activity*. That is, (66) has the following nesting structure of (66'a), which is also illustrated using a tree structure in (66'b):

(66')a [1 Boku wa [2 [3 syuumatu ni wa [4 [5 hon wa yomu]5 ga  
 5[zassi wa yomazu]5 ]4 [3 syuuzitu ni wa [4 [5 sinbun wa  
 yomu]5 ga [hon wa yomanai]5 ]4 ]3 ]2 ]1



As shown in (66'b) the items in contrast have to be under sister nodes in the parallelism. Thus, while (66'a) is a perfectly well-formed contrastive sentence, (67b) below is not, since *kuruma-wa* and *konpyuuta-wa* do not have a sister relationship as illustrated in (67c):


(67)a. Taroo wa kuruma o katta ga  
           car      bought

Ziroo wa konpyuutaa o katta.  
           computer  bought

'Taroo bought a car but Ziroo bought a computer.'

b\* Taroo wa kuruma wa katta ga

Ziroo wa konpuuta wa katta.



Note that the contrastive parallelism does not necessarily occur along with syntactically parallel structures like (65). Look at (68):

- (68) [Taroo wa katta] hon o Zi-roo wa kawanakatta.  
           bought book Acc                    did-not-buy

'Ziro did not buy the book Taro bought.'

Here, the relative clause<sup>24</sup> and the main clause contrast; yet, *Taroo-wa* and *Zi-roo-wa* are in a sister relationship in the contrastive parallelism scheme.

Summing up, the intrinsic ground-figure contrast of the *wa*-sentence on the one hand, and the effect of the extrinsic contextual parallelism<sup>25</sup> on the other, interact to produce what we feel as contrastive in actual discourse.

## §5.2 *Ga* and *Wa*

### §5.2.1 *Ga* vs. *Wa*

The copula sentences which we saw at the beginning of this chapter do in fact have *ga* counterparts, as shown in (69):

(69)a. Boku *wa* susi da.

'[lit.] As for me, it is sushi.'

b. Boku *ga* susi da.

'[lit.] I am sushi.'

Mini-discourses for (69a) and (69b) are given in (70a) and (70b) respectively:

(70)a. Q: Kimi wa nani (o taberu)?

you what Acc eat

'What are you going to eat?'

A: Boku wa susi da.

b. Q: Dare ga susi (o tyuumonsita no)?

who Nom ordered Q

'Who ordered sushi?'

A: Boku ga susi da.

*Nani* "what" in (70a) and *dare* "who" in (70b) are information-seeking words, and *susi* and *boku* "I" supply the information for them. Kuroda

calls this "focus in the sense of Chomsky (1970)." Kuno (1970) calls the use of *ga* here exhaustive listing.<sup>26</sup>

The interesting fact is that A in (70b) has its alternative (71):

(71) Susi wa boku da.

'[lit.] As for sushi, it is me.'

Now then, let us assume tentatively that the choice of *wa* and *ga* marks the difference of the order of information as shown in (72):

(72)a. Kimi wa nani?

Boku wa susi da. (= (69a))

Old      New

b. Dare ga susi?

Boku ga susi da. (= (69b))

New      Old

Susi wa boku da. (= (71))

Old      New

Supposing that the old-new is marked by *wa*, and the new-old is marked by *ga*, then in (72b) the reversal in the information order seemingly determines the choice between the two particles. However, the problem is that although *wa* marks old-new order exclusively, *ga* may mark new-new order, which is thethetic case, in addition to new-old order. Thus, *ga* does not exclusively mark a reversed information order of the case of *wa*. Another problem is that the dichotomy of old-new or new-

old divided by *wa* or *ga* in a sentence is not the structure found in many cases. For instance, look at (73):

(73)a. Kimi wa nani o taberu?

'What will you have?'

Boku wa susi o tabeyoo.

I        sushi    will-eat  
old       new       old

'I will have sushi'

b. Kimi wa kono okane o doo suru no.

you        this money Acc how do Q

'What are you going to do with this money?'

Boku wa kono okane o tyokinsimasu.

I        this money Acc        save  
old        old                new

'I will deposit this money (at the bank).'

In (73a) *wa* occurs after old and the rest is new-old; in (73b) *wa* occurs after old and the rest is old-new. If the reversal shown in (72) is assumed to take place in predication instead of the informational structure, then both (69a) and (69b) are considered as categorical sentences. The difference between (69a) and (69b) is that in (69a) the predication is done in normal order, but in (69b) it is done in reversed order. Ogiwara (1986), in fact, develops this analysis of the reversed order of predication within Montague Grammar. This line of approach



not only contributes to the establishment of an integrated theory of *wa* and *ga*, but also provides a good perspective to understand one of the mechanisms operating in discourse. I will discuss this topic further in the next section.

### §5.2.2 *Wa, Ga, and Discourse*

Unlike English, Japanese does not have cleft sentence constructions equivalent in syntax. However, as far as discourse function is concerned, non-thetic *ga* sentences serve a similar function as cleft sentences.<sup>27</sup> Let us take a further look at this point.

Lacking cleft sentences, Japanese has pseudo-cleft sentences as in (74), which is in the construction of (75):

- (74)a. Kono tegami o kaita no wa Taroo da.  
           this letter Acc wrote

'The person who wrote this letter is Taroo.'

- b. Taroo ga tyuumonsita no wa unagi da.  
           nom       order               eel

'What Taroo ordered is eel.'

- c. Taroo ga tegami o dasita no wa Pari (kara) da.  
                     letter      sent                  Paris

'Where Taroo sent a letter is from Paris.'

- (75) [NP [S ..... ] no ] wa NP da.

(The pre-copula NP may be followed by a case-marking particle.)

Now, the status of *no* in the pseudo-cleft is controversial. Kitagawa and Ross (1982) argues that this *no* is a pre-nominal modifier, the same one used in (76), under the assumption that *no* connects not only NP and NP but also S and NP (cf. Soga and Fujimura, 1978).

- (76) Watasi no hon  
           I            book

[I]<sub>NP</sub> no [book]<sub>NP</sub>

Thus the relative clause in pseudo-cleft is assumed to be headed by a null pronoun PRO instead of a real NP. On the other hand, Haig (1983) proposes that *no* is a nominal head of the relative clause, assuming two cases for it: referential and non-referential. An interesting consequence of Haig's proposal is: if (74b), for example, is a case of referential *no*, then *no* works more like the pronoun "one" in English and there is no difference from the ordinary copula sentence; on the other hand, if it is a case of non-referential *no*, then the sentence is

equivalent to the specificational pseudo-cleft<sup>28</sup> in Higgins (1972). In other words, in the referential case, the sentence is equivalent to (77):

(77) Yamada wa watasi da.

'I am Yamada.'

(77) is often used *almost* interchangeably with (77'):

(77') Watasi ga Yamada da.

'I am Yamada.'

*Ga* in (77') has the focus/exhaustive listing reading.<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, the specificational pseudo-cleft only allows *wa*, and interestingly enough, if the order is reversed (which, unlike predicational, is possible in English (cf. William, 1983)), *ga* (ex-listing) is needed, as shown in (78) and (79):

(78)a. Kono tegamo o kaita no wa Taroo da.

'The person who wrote this letter is Taroo.'

b. Taroo ga kono tegami o kaita (no da).

'It is Taroo who wrote this letter.'

(79)a. Taroo ga tyuumonsita no wa unagi da.

'What Taroo ordered is eel.'

b. Unagi ga Taroo ga tyuumonsita no da.<sup>30</sup>

(78b), for example, has the thetic reading, but the focus reading is the one which pairs with (78a) in a functional sense.

Now, although it is probably the case that the reversal of the order takes place either in semantics (Montague framework) or in syntax (Williams), which are almost identical in a functional sense, the alternation of *wa/ga* is determined by different discourse factors. (77) is used, for instance, in the following environment:

(80) Yamada-san wa donata desu ka.

who

'Who is Mr. Yamada?'

Minasan Yamada to-iu otoko o osagasi no yoo desu ne.

everybody called man look for seem

Yamada wa (zitu wa) watasi desu.

as a matter of fact

'It seems that people are looking for a man called Mr.

Yamada. (As a matter of fact), Mr. Yamada is me.'

In (80), topic continuity – once a topic is established, it is maintained for a while (cf. Givón (1983)) – is involved; *Yamada* is repeated in the third sentence. On the other hand, (81) is a typical environment for (77'):

(81)a. Dare ga Yamada-san desu ka.

who Mr.

'Who is Mr. Yamada?'

Watasi ga Yamada desu.

'I am Yamada.'

b. Anata no oture ga Yamada-san desu ka.

your company

'Is your company Mr. Yamada?'

Iie, zituwa watasi ga Yamada (nan) desu.

No as a matter of fact (emphatic)

'No, as a matter of fact, I am Yamada.'

The exhaustive *ga* is used in a well-formed question-answer pair in (81a) or a parallel construction in (81b), just like focus in English (cf. Rochemont (1985)).

Now, as has already been observed in the previous section, *wa* is associated with contrastiveness; and the exhaustive-listing *ga* is also associated with a type of contrastiveness: *watasi* contrasts with *anata no oture* in (81b). In this sense, the contrastiveness in *ga* is not different from that found in *wa* in §5.1.4.6. That is, the NP is selected and contrasts with the rest of the members of a certain set, and the

contextual (including structural) parallelism induces the contrastive effect in discourse.

(82) Watasi wa Tookyoo e ikimasu ga.

I Tokyo to go

Yasuda-san wa Nyuuyooku e ikimasu.

New York to go

'I go to Tokyo but Mr. Yasuda goes to New York.'

(83) Watasi (ga Tookyoo e iku no) de wa nakute

I Tokyo to go is-not-the-case

Suzuki-san ga Tookyoo e ikimasu.

Tokyo to go

'It is not the case that I go to Tokyo, but it is the case that Mr. Suzuki goes to Tokyo.'

The difference is, however, in the case of *wa*, it is the statement contrast – the predicate should be different as well as the subject in (82) – but the subject becomes the focal point for the contrast; on the other hand, *ga* is not the statement contrast and the predicate may be identifiable as the same kind in interpretation. It seems to be the case that the exhaustiveness in *ga* is a secondary induced factor, partially because of the nature of the question-answer environment – you have to give information no more or no less than what is needed (Grice's conversational maxim of Quantity) – and probably more fundamentally,

it would seem to be related to the non-"class" reading of the NP (*-ga*), unlike the NP (*-wa*) (cf. the nature of the subject in (41) in §5.1.4.4), although the details are not susceptible of proof at this stage.

Now, Japanese is often called a topic-prominent language because of the *wa*-marked NP, while in a language like English focus marking (constructionally/phonologically: cf. Rochemont (1985)) is far more prominent than topic. In Japanese, (sentence) topic is always marked by *wa*; furthermore, when a discourse is carried out on the same topic, or the topic is obvious from context, NP (*-wa*) is expressed by  $\emptyset$ . The latter characteristic, the deletability (or, null topic) of NP-*wa*, may lead us to make a claim such as (84):

- (84) Any sentence can potentially have the NP-*wa* element at the sentence initial position in discourse, with the exception of thetic sentences.

Zero topic analysis for *zibun* in Chapter 2 is based on the above assumption.

Apparent thetic sentences may be categorical, if it is bound by a temporal/locative element (with *wa*), which is, in turn,  $\emptyset$ , as shown in (85):

- (85)a. *Hi ga tette-imasu.*

sun is-shining

'The sun is shining.'

- b. Soto wa/kyoo wa/Ø hi ga tette-imasu.  
outside/today

'Outside/today the sun is shining.'

Thetic sentences usually cannot be negated (Kuroda 1969 and elsewhere), as in (86a); but categorical can, as in (86b):

(86)a\* Hi ga tette-imasen.

Neg

- b Soto/Ø wa hi ga tette-imasen.

Neg

As is discussed under *eel*-sentences, the possibly non-thematic nature of NP-*wa* enables us to add a discourse topic, say "Mary," to a sentence during the course of interpretation, with the sense of "speaking of Mary."

When we have on the one hand a language which overtly marks what we are talking about (topic prominent) all the time, and on the other a language which marks what is in focus (focus prominent), it may not be unreasonable to expect that these two languages will use different strategies in discourse formation. I will leave this problem, however, for more intensive studies of discourse structure.



### §5.3 Conclusion

The function of *wa* has been one of the most studied topics in Japanese traditional grammar. It has been a big issue because it concerns not just problems of syntax or discourse but also problems involving various linguistic components at the same time. In this sense, the problem of *wa* is one of the most interesting cases for the application of the modular approach proposed in recent generative theories.

I began my investigation of this topic with intensive studies of Kuroda's conceptual proposal of adopting the categorial and thematic distinction into Japanese sentences. According to Kuroda, categorial judgement happens to be morphologically/syntactically marked in Japanese because of the particle *wa*. As well, the *wa*- sentence as discussed in this chapter has a long history of discourse study, often relating to the commonly accepted views of *wa* as a topic marker or old information marker.

The first several sections are devoted to justifying the view of *wa* as the judgement marker, rather than the topic/old information marker. Then, Kuno's classification of topic, contrastive vs. thematic, is examined to clarify the notion of contrastive as it applies to *wa*-sentences. What we feel as contrastive in terms of *wa* actually has two sources: the inherent nature of NP(-*wa*) and contextual parallelism. The former is related to the semantic property of subject NP of categorial judgement. In the latter, the nature of *wa* contrast is

closely linked to its characteristic statement-contrast instead of item-contrast. The contrastive reading reported in the literature, which is sometimes expressed in terms of graduation, is the result of the interaction between the property of *wa* and the contextual environment. By means of this analysis, the difference between contrastive *wa* and thematic *wa* is dissolved, and they are no longer distinctive categories.

Many of the topics discussed in each section above are not new, but rather classical; but the purpose of my research here has been to propose an integrated framework for the nature of *wa*. Some of the seemingly conflicting analyses proposed in the past have, I believe, been reconciled by being reworked with different components in the over-all view of *wa* which is proposed here.

## Notes (Chapter 5)

- <sup>1</sup> Base generation is a possible alternative.
- <sup>2</sup> (7a) and (7b) can have the "eel" reading; e.g., 'I am going to meet Yamada' for (7a) and 'I play the role of a student' for (7b). However, these are irrelevant for the present purpose.
- <sup>3</sup> We use the terms 'copula' and 'verb, to-be' interchangeably.
- <sup>4</sup> "Subject in the logical sense" does not mean "logical subject" in generative grammar.
- <sup>5</sup> The truth conditional difference between the subject-predicate structure and the subjectless structure is argued in Kuroda (1969 & 1970).
- <sup>6</sup> "Judgement" is used as a term in logic, not in psychology. (cf. Kuroda, 1972, note 2.)
- <sup>7</sup> This term was originally used by members of the Prague School although Halliday of the London School contributed largely to the development of the concept. 'Theme' is the leftmost element of a sentence, which serves as "the starting point of the utterance," whereas 'rheme' is "what the speaker states about" the theme (cf. Brown and Yule (1983)).
- <sup>8</sup> The referents are constantly changing their roles in context: the same referent can be old or new, depending on context. Also look at (i) (= Reinhart (37)):

(i) A: Who did Felix praise?

B: Felix praised HIMSELF.

According to Reinhart, *himself* is new (focus expression), but it is also old, since it is the same person as *Felix* (topic expression.) Thus *himself* is old and new at the same time, which is a

contradiction. However, the old-new distinction might not necessarily be made in terms of referents. That is, what is new is the information that [Felix praised X and X is someone] (the someone happening to be Felix himself in this case; also cf. §4.2.2 in Chapter 4).

- <sup>9</sup> Hoji notes that the S" is the same as the node E(xpression) of Banfield (1973). The proposal of the node E is also adopted in van Riemsdijk and Zwart (1974) for left-dislocation as opposed to topicalization (reported in Reinhart, 1983).
- <sup>10</sup> Hoji also points out that certain phrases like a PP-*wa* can be contrastive without stress.
- <sup>11</sup> Rochemont (1986) classifies 'focus' into two categories: contrastive focus and presentational focus. While *ga* in athetic sentence is related to the latter, non-deletable *ga* marks the contrastive focus only.
- <sup>12</sup> In Terakura's analysis, these are not considered as deletion but simply non-*wa* sentences. Thus, once the sentences get *wa*, they are different sentences from Terakura's.
- <sup>13</sup> Cf. note 10 in Terakura (1984).
- <sup>14</sup> In fact, (36) is ambiguous between the thematic and the contrastive, but it is not a relevant issue.
- <sup>15</sup> M. Soga has pointed out that (39a) is not so bad, especially when the order is reversed, like "tuki ga dete iru ga ame ga hutte kita." However, (i)c is very bad:

(i)a. Taroo ga tatte-iru.  
           Nom be-standing

'Taroo is standing'

- b. Ziroo ga suwatte-iru.  
     Nom be-sitting

'Ziroo is sitting.'

- c.\* Taroo ga tatte-iru ga, Ziroo ga suwatte-iru.

'Taroo is standing but Ziroo is sitting.'

The reason why (39a) is felt slightly better than (i)c probably has something to do with the fact that (39a) involves a cause and effect relation, i.e., rain falling is a counter-expectation of moon shining.

- <sup>16</sup> The contrastive effect is produced pragmatically (by our knowledge of the world), as well. Look at the sentences in (i) and (ii):

- (i) Gonbe ga tane (o) makya (= make ba), karasu ga/wa  
       Nom seed Acc sow Conditional crow  
       hojikuru.  
       dig up

'When Gonbe sows seeds, crows dig them up.'

- (ii) Taroo ga/wa Tookyoo e itte, Ziroo ga/wa Oosaka itta.  
                                   to go (Ger.)                                   to go

'Taroo went to Tokyo and Ziroo went to Osaka.'

*Ba* in (i) is a conditional marker, and the *-te* form (= a gerund form) in (ii) is used to enumerate events. In these cases which can but do not necessarily have *wa*, two ideas contrast pragmatically.

- <sup>17</sup> For the distribution of passive sentences in discourse, cf. Givon (1979) and Oosten (1984). There are also some arguments against such discourse constitutions in terms of passive.
- <sup>18</sup> Haiman (1978) argues for the close relationship between conditionals and topics.

- <sup>19</sup> *Dareka* can be a specifiable someone, but this is not a relevant issue here.
- <sup>20</sup> Gil (1987) argues that the reason why some languages have the (in)definite article while some do not is controlled by two independent parameters in the universal grammar: configurationality and the count-mass distinction.
- <sup>21</sup> M. Rochemont pointed out to me that *sm* and *some* are different lexical items rather than being ambiguous. However, it does undermine Milsark's contention over "weak" vs. "strong."
- <sup>22</sup> Kuroda (1969) also points out, without going into details, that indefinite NPs can be used like "variables."
- <sup>23</sup> Contrary to *wa*, the particle *mo* is used in similar environments to (62'),  $[X_1 - Y_1]$  and  $[X_2 - Y_1]$ :
- (i) Taroo ga hon o katte, Ziroo mo hon o katta.  
'Taro bought a book and Ziro bought one, too.'
- <sup>24</sup> It has been observed that *wa* cannot appear in subordinate clauses. But an exception to this is the contrastive *wa* as shown in (i): *friend* is in contrast with someone else who did not buy a car:
- (i) [<sub>S</sub>tomodati wa katta] kuruma]<sub>NP</sub>  
friend bought car  
'The car which my friend bought'
- According to Kuroda (1972), subordinate structures do not represent judgement, but are "judgement materials without judgement forms."
- <sup>25</sup> The interaction between the negative and *wa* creates an interesting effect:

- (i) Sanzyuunin wa konakatta.  
thirty people did-not-come

'Thirty people did not come.'

The sentence can mean thirty people did not come although twenty-nine (twenty-eight, twenty-seven, etc....) people did come. This reading involves the underlying expectation in the utterance. That is, the sentence implies that "thirty" is what the speaker had in his mind, but the actual number of people who came was less than that. An affirmative sentence like (ii) can also be interpreted in a similar manner:

- (ii) Hyakunin wa kita.

'A hundred people came.'

The sentence means that as many as a hundred people came. I consider that the type of contrastive implication involved in (i) is of a different nature than what I discuss in this section, although it originates in the function of *wa*. The particle *mo* also exhibits a similar (but differently manifested) type of problem: cf. Soga (1976).

- <sup>26</sup> Two types of *ga*,thetic *ga* and non-thetic (exhaustive) *ga* can be viewed as focus markers for non-contrastive (presentational) focus and contrastive focus (Rochemont's (1986) terms) respectively.
- <sup>27</sup> Kuno (1973) makes some interesting observations about the similarity between exhaustive-listing *ga* in Japanese and stress and cleft constructions in English (cf. "*Wa* and *Ga* (Part I)" in Kuno (1973)).
- <sup>28</sup> Also cf. Williams (1983), where two types of pseudo-cleft are differentiated in his predication theory.
- <sup>29</sup> If the predicate is stative, *ga* is the exhaustive-listing except with numeral/quantifier NP like (i) (Kuno, 1973):

- (i) Takusan no hito ga bezitarian da.  
       many people vegetarian

'Many people are vegetarians.'

<sup>30</sup> The following sentences are preferred to (79b) probably because of the "-ga -ga" sequence which is not multi-nominative:

- (i)a. Unagi (´´) Taroo ga tyuumonsita.  
       b. Taroo ga unagi ´´ tyuumonsita.



## Chapter 6

### Concluding Remarks

A sentence uttered in an actual speech situation is not free from context. Thus, the question is how formal grammar and extra-grammatical factors interact for sentences to receive full comprehension in actual discourse. With the purpose of giving answers to this question, four linguistic phenomena were examined in this thesis.

The first two chapters concern the coreference problems of pronouns: reflexive pronouns in Chapter 2 and demonstrative pronouns in Chapter 3. The former has been studied mostly in syntax, often with analogies to the English reflexive pronoun; the latter has been studied from the viewpoint of pragmatics. In Chapter 4, quantifier reading was examined. All three topics are related to disambiguation mechanisms in discourse. The topic of Chapter 5 is of a slightly different nature, not a disambiguation system, but the so-called "topic" marker *wa*, one of the most interesting cases which has overt manifestations at each level of representation: semantics, syntax, and pragmatics.

while the LF' module of grammar will identify the entity of the null element in the topic position. The final determination procedure among the eligible antecedents is complex and still not very clear; yet it is highly possible that the pragmatic factors like "awareness"/"viewpoint" control the final determination of the referent, where the structurally defined concept "subject" enters as one strong candidate for the site of the manifestation of such pragmatic conceptions. In Chapter 3, unlike *zibun*, demonstratives are shown to be always referential with the exception of the problematic cases created by those of the *so-* series, some of which exhibit a strong anaphoric nature or at least a possible disappearance of the distinction between pronouns (= proforms which stand for referents) and demonstratives (= demonstration). The latter case may be handled in the formal representation of discourse structure (LF' module). In Chapter 4, quantifier reading was examined. The LF representation provides the wide/narrow reading for a quantifier sentence. The final interpretation is determined by the interaction between the subjecthood, the sentence initial position which serves an important discourse function, and the "egocentricity." The egocentricity has turned out to have a wide influence on linguistic phenomena in Japanese (which is often called an epistemological language), for example, in *zibun* in Chapter 2 and in the demonstrative *ko-so-a* distinction in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, adopting Kuroda'sthetic vs. categorical distinction, it is argued that a semantic structure corresponds to a syntactic structure through *wa* as the marker of the categorical judgement; and that syntactic structure, in turn,

corresponds to discourse structure, i.e., the function of the sentence topic marked by *wa* seems to have a significant influence on discourse organization. NP-*wa* has an anaphoric nature to a certain extent; however, its manner of reference is totally different from pronoun type anaphora, functioning rather as a "nexus" in the flow of discourse (cf. Grice's conversational maxim, "Be relevant."). The absence of NP-*wa*, as a consequence, indicates that the topic NP established in the previous sentence is still in effect, and this local discourse is about the same topic.

The mode of interaction assumed from these analyses is that with a form as a medium, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics interface on it; a certain linguistic phenomenon has a function on each linguistic level (though it might have a null function on some level(s) of representation). The autonomous system prevents two-directional interactions between two different levels of representation. In the case of *zibun*, for example, the ambiguity represented in syntax is eventually disambiguated outside of the syntactic module. The case with the quantifier is apparently a little different from the case of *zibun*, but not to a substantial degree; here the LF representation of the scope reading provides the ambiguity for certain cases like scrambling, and such readings are reinterpreted outside of syntax in a systematically related manner to the readings in LF.

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## Appendix

[Data]

[11] お料理の主なもの、そうね、コロッケ、カツ、シチュー、それにサラダ、そんなものだったわね。

一番おいしくて、忘れられないのが＜牛肉とキャベツの煮物＞。キャベツを四つ割ぐらいにザックリと切って、牛肉はスープ肉なくて、もう少し上等なところをひとかたまり、大きいまま入れて水からコトコト長いこと煮てゆくの。

二、三時間、水を足しながら煮てゆくと、キャベツは飴色にくずれるようになり、牛肉はバラバラに、センイだけみたいになるの。

それを最後に、塩とコショウであっさりした味をつけます。スープをたっぷりにとって、キャベツと牛肉をいただくのだけど、そのキャベツのおいしかったこと、こどもの私でもよくわかったわ。

コロッケはね、人参を砂のようにほんとにこまかく、シジンに刻んで牛の挽肉といっしょにして、バターたっぷりでいためてから、なにかつなぎを入れて丸めるの。べつにじゃがいものマッシュを作って、それをよくねると、お餅みたいにねばりが出てくる、それを薄くのぼして、さっきの牛肉とにんじんをおまんじゅうのようにつつんで俵形にするの。

それをメリケン粉と玉子をつけ、パン粉をつけて揚げました。これ、うちの母がととても上手だったわよ。

それからサラダね。ひらめを小さく切って塩をしておき、水とお酢と半々に合せた中でサッとゆでる。おじゃがと人参をさいの目に切って、ちょっとやわらかいぐらいにゆでて、それとカン詰のグリーンピース。

玉ねぎはそんなにミジンにしないで、ミジンの荒切りぐらいにして、水にもさらしたりしないで、そのままで、玉子はかたくゆでて小さく切って、それを全部まぜるわけ、そして、その上から酢油ソースをたっぷりかけるの。

このサラダは父がととても好きで、よく、長屋の子みたいに父のお皿からわけてもらったわ。

それから、シチューにするような肉を買ってきて、おなべにバターをとって、表面の色がかわるぐらいまでいため、それを出して、そのあとのなべで玉ねぎをいためて、それも出しておいて、あとへ粉とバターを入れていため、ブラウンソースを作って、そこへさっきの肉と玉ねぎをもどすの。

そして、水を入れて、いい赤ぶどう酒＜メドック＞ぐらいのを入れて、煮こんだの、このシチューもとてもおいしかったわ。

「森鷗外の西洋料理」、『くらしの手帖』

[2] そこで現実的な提案をしたい。どんな雑煮をつくれれば最も経済的、かつ省力的、しかも栄養満点で飽きず食べつづけられるか。三平汁をつくることである。三平汁といえばむろん北海道の郷土料理で、昔はにしんを使っていたけれども、いまは鮭が使われている。われわれも鮭でつくりたい。魚の知識のない主婦にもまず当り外れなく買えて、最も廉価な魚が鮭だからである。

ただ、鮭は一匹丸ごと買わなくてはならない。その場合魚屋に指定していただきたいのは、沖（とはつまり海である）でとって、船上で処理した鮭であることを意味する。「沖」に対して「陸」と呼ばれる鮭は、陸揚げした後で処理した鮭である。例外はあるけれども「陸」よりも「沖」のほうが高価である。ただ、その差はキロ五百円程度で、二キロの鮭なら千円あまりでしかない。それで味の違いは雲泥の差なのだから、安い鮭を買うのは金棄てることである。

正月の料理に華やかな色どりを望まれる方は、更に「沖」の「紅」と指定して買っていただきたい。アラスカ産やカナダ産の紅鮭に対して、「本紅」と呼ばれる日本近海の紅鮭である。

買って来た鮭は、まず三枚におろして、背の部分は刺身用に、腹の部分は焼いて食べる、つまり塩鮭用に分ける。刺身部分は皮をはぎ、一回の食事の量に切り分けてサランラップに包んで冷凍する。それを出して、解凍寸前に刺身にしてレモンあるいはだいたいを絞りにかけて食べる。つまり、ルイベである。

骨と頭と皮は三平汁にする。塩が強いので頭はたてに二つに割り、皮も一緒にしばらく水につけて塩出しをする。土鍋に水から昆布を入れて強火で熱し沸騰する寸前に昆布をとり出す。それに骨、頭、皮を入れて、沸騰する度にあくをとる。あくをとり終わったら味をみて、塩辛いはずだから煮汁を容器にとり、水を足す。それを何度かくり返して適度な塩味になったところで大根や人参などの野菜を入れ、野菜が煮えたら酒糟を入れる。実は①この雑煮を推す理由の一つは酒糟仕立てである点で、魚の脂の酸化を防ぎ、何日も温めなおして食べて、あくや臭いを生まないからである。話はとぶようだが、吸いものや鍋の残りを翌日味噌汁にするような際にも、酒糟を入れると臭いのない美味なものになる。

それで三平汁の出来上りだが、餅を入れて餅が煮えかけてから、ねぎや春菊のような青菜を入れ、②これは煮すぎないうちに食べてほしい。容器にとった煮汁は冷蔵あるいは冷凍しておき、正月のあいだ何度でもそれを足し、酒糟も新しく加えて、野菜をたっぷり入れた美味しい雑煮を食べていただきたい。鮭の骨はやわらかく、子どもにも食べられるので、③この魚ばかりはどこ一つ無駄にしないところがない。

『オール読物』

[3] ご家庭でやっていただく、かんたんな木の芽田楽の作り方をご紹介します。まずみそですが、八丁みそ百グラムを日本酒カップ1杯(1合、180 cc)ぐらいでのぼします。箸だけではなかなかとけにくいので、泡立器を使ったらどうでしょうか。ゆっくり、ていねいにかきまぜてゆきます。

だいたいとけたら、そこへ玉子を一コ、黄味も白味もいっしょによくよくといて入れます。砂糖はお酒の甘みがありますから、あまり入れたくないですね、およその目安はみその量の七分目、70グラムぐらい入れます。

①これをあまり強くない火にかけて、かきまぜながら、ドロリとさせてゆきます。すくってみて、しゃもじの上に、いったん止ってくれる、そのぐらいがけっこうです。

田楽のおとうふは、口あたりは絹ごしもおいしいけれど、本来は木綿のものです。②この木綿とうふとなると、千差万別で、東京はことに弱いでしょう。京都の嵯峨のとうふをたべたら、東京のとうふとは、またえらくちがうのがはっきりしますが、とうふのお話はまた別の機会にしましょう。

マナ板を斜にして、フキンを敷き、その上にとうふをのせ、軽く重しをしたまま、三十分ほどおくと、水気が切れます。とうふはあまり水をしばってしまっても、おいしくないもので、まあ三十分ぐらいが限度でしょうね。切り方は好みですが、端から1センチより少し厚めに切ってゆくと、だいたい六つぐらいに切れます。それをさらに二つに切ります。

串は、ふつうに売っているおでんの竹串でけっこう間にあいます。とうふ一きれに串は二本、先を開けるようなかたちで打ちます。

それをまず火にかけ、いくらかまわりをかためてから、みその中にとっぷりつけます。それを片面二分ずつも焼いていただきます。そうしたら、もう一回みその中につけて、焼きます。

焼き上ったら、その上に木の芽をたたいて、ばらっと散らしていただければ出来上がりです。なんだか簡単なようですが、なかなかどうして③これは立派な料理で、しかも野趣を失っていないのです。

焼くとき、おとうふだけを焼いて、串を焼かない工夫がいますが、魚焼きアミの上に大根を細長く切って、ヨコに二本渡し、それに竹串をのせて焼くと、串が焼けません。

④こういうみそは、二人分とか三人分では、とうふをとっぷりつけるわけにはいきません。少し余分に作るわけですが、お酒と玉子と砂糖ですから、二、三日はそのままおいても充分もちます。

もっとも、いくらか蒸発して、固くなっているかもしれません。そういうときは、ちょっとお酒を入れてゆるめて下さい。

⑤このみそは他に、春若大根のふろふきにもよし、油焼きのナスにかけてもよし、そのときの台所の都合では、木の芽でなくても、しょうがをすってそえても、なかなかよくあうものです。

しかし、⑥この田楽はおかわりをいくらたべても、おなかにもたれません。つぎつぎおかわりをするのも、春の日春の宵のたのしみですね。

「春は春らしく」、『くらしの手帖』

[4] そこで、白い麻の半袖ブラウスを淡い黄色(A10)で染めてみました。1カンで約225グラムの布が染められると書いていますから、①このブラウスだと、およそ カンで間に合います。

まず、染める前にブラウスをよく洗って汚れを落としておくことは、むかしの煮染めとおなじことです。汚れやシミがあると、そこだけムラになるからです。洗ったら乾さずに、そのままおきます。

大きめのバケツにブラウスがたっぷり浸るだけの水を入れます。②ここへ、染粉は カンをカップ 1 杯のお湯で、よくよく溶かして入れます。さらに助剤として、塩大サジ2杯(約35グラム)とダイロンコーレト・フィックス(専用の定着剤) 袋をお湯でとかして加えます。

染粉がよくとけたところで、ぬれたブラウスを入れ、手早くかきまぜて、ムラのできないように浸します。③こうして、約30分ほど浸します。はじめの10分間は長い箸かゴム手袋をはめて、たえずかきまわして、布に平均に、色がしみこむようにします。④これが一番大切なところです。

あとの20分は、ときどきかきまわして、水面から布が浮き上らないように気をつける程度です。⑤こうして、30分したら取りだし、水でゆすきます。

はじめは、びっくりするくらい水に色がでますが、何回かゆすぐとだんだん水がきれいになってきますから、そうしたら、一度お湯でゆすぎます。また色がでます、出るだけ出してから洗剤を入れて、サッと洗い、水でゆすいで染め上りです。あとはかげ干しにします。

染め上がったブラウスは、見本よりも少しあざやかな、きれいな黄色いブラウスになりました。染める前の黄ばみかけたものに比べると、新しいブラウスが一枚増えたようでした。

「水で染められる染粉」、『くらしの手帖』

[5] 掌がはいる程度にふすまを開ける。つぎにその手を敷居から二四、五センチのところにかけて、体の中央あたりまで開け、つづいて反対の手をかけて、残った部分の半分を開ける。このとき手がかりになる分だけ残しておく。動作の間は使っていないほうの手は正しくひざの上に置く。

閉めるときは、ふすまに近いほうの手で、やはり敷居から二四、五センチのところを持ち、体の中央まで引き出し、反対の手で持ちかえて、残りを引いて閉める。このとき、引いている手が建付にあたるところまで引く。その手を引手につけ、静かに閉める。

要するに閉め方は開け方の逆の動作をすればよいのである。

茶道口に正しくすわり、立ち上がる時には、まず両手をひざに軽くあてたまま、両足を同時につまだてて、かかとの上に腰をそっとのせる。このとき腰から上の姿勢は、くずさないようにし、両足のかかともきちんとそろえる。

#### 『学生の手茶道』

#### [Observations]

Sample (1): After the description of the rough procedure for each dish, the dish is referred to by *ko*.

Sample (2): The main topic is (*sake no*) *zooni*.

*Ko*

1 -- *kono zooni*

2 -- *kore = sanpei-ziru (sake no zooni)*

3 -- *kono sakana → sake*

Sample (3):

*Ko*

- 1 ..."*miso*" is the main concern
- 2 ...the topic is shifted to *momen-doohu*
- 3 ...*dengaku* is the topic of the whole paragraph
- 4 ...*miso* is now being focused; *miso* is the essential factor of *dengaku*

Sample (4):

*Ko*

- 1 -- *kono burausu* (the focused object of the dyeing procedure).
- 2 -- *koko e*
- 3 -- *koo-site*            These referents are in certain stages
- 4 -- *kore ga*            of the procedure
- 5 -- *koo-site*

Sample (5): The procedure is strictly temporal-linear order in this case, and *ko* refers to a certain point of such a procedure to add the comment. In this kind of typical procedural discourse, the reader follows the procedure with some visualization of what he is doing.