

PRIVATE INNER CITY REDEVELOPMENT  
IN VANCOUVER:  
A CASE STUDY OF KITSILANO

by

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ABSTRACT

In Vancouver and an increasing number of other North American cities, private redevelopment is responsible for a substantial share of structural change in residential stock located in the Central City. For the most part this change has involved the replacement of older detached houses by apartments. During the 1960's, the great majority of the apartment units thus produced were marketed as rental accommodation; more recently completed market projects in Vancouver have featured condominium tenure almost exclusively. Besides generating structural change, the process of private redevelopment also has considerable social impact, the nature of which sometimes generates political conflict. Much of the impetus for private redevelopment has come from the increase in downtown employment opportunities for middle and upper income white collar workers, coupled with a reduction in the relative preference of many of those workers for the lifestyle offered by a suburban single family house compared with that afforded by a centrally located condominium apartment.

This thesis examines the process of private redevelopment as it evolved in Vancouver's inner city during the 1970's. To provide a context for the discussion, factors responsible for the creation of strong metropolitan demand pressures for multiple unit accommodation are established, as are the events which led to a decline in the return available from the construction of rental apartments and a coincident increase in the number of more profitable condominium projects. The

spread of these projects throughout the apartment zoned areas of several inner city neighbourhoods is shown to be responsible for the demolition of a substantial number of the moderate cost rental units contained in those neighbourhoods, at a time when such units were in short supply. Consequently, people displaced by condominium redevelopment faced serious relocation problems. One of Vancouver's more heavily redeveloped inner city neighbourhoods - Kitsilano - is chosen as the location for a case study which considers the problems of displacement caused by redevelopment, and the local political response to those problems by residents and City Council.

Major data sources include published and unpublished government and archival material, the Canadian Census, a survey of residents displaced by redevelopment, newspaper clippings, and the author's own observations from working with a Kitsilano neighbourhood group.

The study shows that a reordering of the distribution of income and lifestyle groups in Vancouver is well underway. Private redevelopment has provided the opportunity for a significant number of higher income individuals to take up residence in areas which were formerly almost totally occupied by lower middle class, often family, households. The residents displaced most recently have faced considerable difficulties in their search for accommodation, as the supply of affordable units in their neighbourhoods has been sharply reduced by demolition followed by redevelopment. In Kitsilano, the political attempts by



residents to maintain a supply of moderate cost rental housing suitable for families were spirited but met with limited success. The events in Kitsilano suggest that landscape evolution in Vancouver continues to be determined by City Council, the property industry, and the preferences of consumer groups with significant market power; meaningful citizen participation in urban decision making has not yet been achieved.

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## Preface

During the late 1960's and early 1970's, there was substantial discontent with the way in which Canadian cities were evolving (Lorimer, 1970; Hardwick, 1974). Uncontrolled high rise development and freeway construction were subject to increasing criticism, particularly in Toronto and Vancouver where there was condemnation of the harmonious relationship between the property industry and municipal politicians which produced those trends (Lemon, 1974; Pendakur, 1972). Eventually dissatisfaction became sufficiently widespread that reform councils committed to increased public participation in decision making and a more humane form of development were elected in both cities.

In Vancouver, the reform council was particularly interested in establishing the central part of the city as a residential as well as a commercial environment. Consequently attempts were made to improve amenities in the downtown and environs; emphasis was placed on the improvement of the pedestrian environment, the provision of adequate public transit and the creation of diverse residential opportunities. This approach proved popular and added to inner city housing demand which was already on the increase as a result of expanded downtown employment in the professional, financial, management, and service sectors. As a result, inner city residential neighbourhoods experienced considerable redevelopment pressure culminating in the wave of condominium construction which occurred during the early 1970's.

Most geographical research concerning inner city private redevelopment

ment in Canada has concentrated on structural change utilizing longitudinal mapping and statistical analysis as the primary means of investigation. Bourne (1967) examined the pattern of redevelopment in Toronto, suggested reasons for that pattern, and developed a model to predict future landscape evolution. Murphy (1973) adopted a similar approach in a study of the expansion of rental apartments in Victoria. Neither author examined closely the social effects of private redevelopment. In addition, the interplay among developers, politicians and citizens, which is often instrumental in determining landscape change, received only cursory attention. Gaylor (1971) commented from a slightly different viewpoint, emphasizing the planning and social problems associated with ad hoc private rental apartment redevelopment. He also suggested reasons why the West End in Vancouver was able to attract enough redevelopment activity to generate a sizeable population increase while the central areas of most American cities were suffering from population migration and urban blight.

This thesis will incorporate elements of the approaches utilized by both Bourne and Gaylor. The pattern of private redevelopment in Vancouver's inner city will be examined as both a structural process and an agent of social change. In addition, particular attention will be paid to the political aspects of private redevelopment. Chapter 1 considers metropolitan economic and demographic factors which led to the establishment of the condominium as the most profitable form of multiple unit tenure and thereby to a sharp reduction in rental apartment construction. In Chapter 2 the focus shifts to Vancouver's inner city. The pattern of condominium redevelopment is examined and reasons for that pattern are suggested. Social and demographic trends associated with condominium

redevelopment are also discussed. Chapter 3 deals with the impact of condominium redevelopment on one inner city neighbourhood - Kitsilano. The discussion covers the alterations in both social character and the landscape resulting from that redevelopment. Kitsilano was chosen because during the early 1970's it experienced more private redevelopment than any other inner city neighbourhood and its residents were particularly vocal in their opposition to that redevelopment. Chapter 4 examines the principal effects of redevelopment - the demolition of rental housing and the dislocation of low and moderate income tenants. Chapter 5 discusses the political response to these processes in the actions and activities of City Council and a Kitsilano neighbourhood group. Chapter 6 considers the effectiveness of government programs designed to deal with low income housing problems created by market activities such as condominium redevelopment. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a general summary of the findings.

## Chapter 1

### The Vancouver Housing Market in the 1970's:

#### The Regional Context of Condominium Redevelopment

### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

During the last decade, the dominance of single family dwellings in the housing stock of the Greater Vancouver Regional District has lessened substantially. Between the years 1961 and 1971, the proportional share of single family dwellings to total units declined from 78.3 per cent to 61.8 per cent. Over the same period apartments increased from 21.7 per cent to 34.4 per cent of the regional housing stock. In the period 1966-1971 alone, the number of apartments increased by 136.8 per cent while the quantity of single family dwellings grew by only 18.2 per cent (Table 1.1).

TABLE 1.1

GROWTH IN RESIDENTIAL TYPES

for the G.V.R.D., 1961, 1966, and 1971

	<u>1961</u>		<u>1966</u>		<u>1971</u>		<u>% Change</u>
	<u>No.</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>1961-1971</u>
1. Single Detached	171,620	78.3	182,575	67.4	202,790	61.8	18.2
2. Single Attached N.A.	--	--	8,800	3.2	12,470	3.8	41.1
3. Apartments	47,630	21.7	79,802	29.4	112,810	34.4	136.8
<u>Total</u>	<u>219,250</u>		<u>271,177</u>		<u>328,070</u>		

Source: The Census of Canada - 1961, 1966 and 1971.

- Notes: 1. Single detached means a single unit completely separated from all other dwellings.  
 2. Single attached refers to dwelling units separated by a common wall extending from ground to roof.  
 3. Apartments includes apartment units as well as up and down duplexes.

Since 1971, however, multiple dwelling starts have steadily declined (see Table 1.2) concomitant with a shift in the traditional tenure characteristics of those starts. Virtually all apartments completed during the period 1960-70 were marketed as rental accommodation but since that time an increasing proportion of multiple dwelling units have featured condominium tenure (see Table 1.3).

As a result of these two trends and Federal tax changes which will be discussed later, the volume of new rental apartments entering the market has dwindled markedly. In fact, between the years 1971 and 1974, the city of Vancouver which contains 56.8 per cent of the region's rental apartment stock, experienced a net reduction of 3.8 per cent in terms of those units (Davis, 1976:239). That reduction and the decline in apartment starts already mentioned occurred in the face of a regional vacancy rate which did not rise above one per cent from the middle of 1972 until the last quarter of 1976. Thus in the early 1970's the rental apartment market was plagued by a shortage of supply, a sluggish response to that shortage and a high level of demand. The results of this reduced rate of rental construction and alteration in the tenure composition of new multiple dwelling units is shown in Table 1.4; note the increases in owned single attached \* and apartment units as well as the relatively small increment in rental apartments as compared to the period 1966-71 (Table 1.1).

This situation primarily affected those with the least economic ability to compete in a tight market. Condominiums, as the main source of new multiple dwelling units, ranged from \$30,000 to more than \$125,000 in price depending on location and amenities. The construction of these

---

\* These are mainly now townhouse condominiums.

TABLE 1.2TOTAL AND APARTMENT STARTS VANCOUVER C.M.A.

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>APARTMENT</u>	<u>%</u>
1961	5588	2264	40.52
1962	7387	3581	48.48
1963	8941	5067	56.67
1964	12791	8496	66.42
1965	11684	7586	64.93
1966	9138	4673	51.14
1967	13896	7360	52.96
1968	15690	9721	61.96
1969	17690	11945	67.52
1970	13437	7766	57.80
1971	15553	8822	56.72
1972	16210	6896	42.54
1973	17334	7281	42.00
1974	14552	6349	43.63
1975	8230	2893	35.15

Source: Canadian Housing Statistics.

TABLE 1.3GROWTH OF CONDOMINIUM STARTS (GVRD)

<u>YEAR</u>	(1) <u>MULTIPLE DWELLING STARTS</u>	(2) <u>CONDOMINIUM UNITS</u>	<u>% (2) of (1)</u>
1969	12525	690	5.5
1970	8617	780	9.1
1971	9879	2030	20.5
1972	8531	2146	25.2
1973	8235	3944	47.9
1974	7258	4345	59.9

Source: Greater Vancouver Real Estate Board, 1976.



TABLE 1.4  
Trends in Dwelling Type and Tenure Composition  
(GVRD 1971-76)

<u>Dwelling Type</u>	<u>Tenure</u>					
	<u>Owned</u>			<u>Rented</u>		
	<u>1971</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>% change</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>% change</u>
Single Detached	178,225	189,800	+ 6.5	24,860	22,470	- 9.6
Single Attached	3,110	7,490	+104.8	9,370	9,895	+ 5.6
Apartment	8,615	16,535	+ 91.9	104,210	116,985	+12.2

Source: Census of Canada, 1971-76.

high priced units has for the most part taken place in fully built up areas and therefore necessitated the demolition of existing structures. Many of these structures, particularly in the city of Vancouver, were older detached houses converted into moderate cost rental units. Thus, high cost condominiums replaced low cost rental accommodation.

Normally, theory suggests (W. Grigsby, 1963:84-94) the loss of these units would be compensated for by the "filtering down" of more expensive units, that is high income individuals would occupy condominiums thereby freeing their former housing for middle income people who would in turn pass their accommodation on to low income individuals. However, as a recent report to the B.C. Rent Review Commission points out:

"The distance of the group (in terms of disposable income) for whom new housing is produced (the rich) from those who suffer the greatest housing shortage (the poor) is such as to dissipate the effect of the increase of quality housing among middle income groups before reaching the poor"

(Inter-departmental Study Team on Housing and Rents, 1975:135).

Hence, filtering fails to replace the low cost units lost through the process of demolition and redevelopment.

Later chapters will examine the impact of this process and the loss of low cost units on Kitsilano - an inner city Vancouver neighbourhood. Preceding that discussion, it is useful to provide a contextual review of the factors responsible for the character of the regional multiple dwelling market in the early 1970's. Such a review requires a consideration of both supply and demand forces. On the supply side, the focus of concern is the events which have led to a reduction in the profit available from the construction of rental apartments as compared to condominium projects, with a resultant decline in the former and increase in the latter. On the demand side, salient topics include demographic trends which have resulted in the expansion of age groups and household types normally occupying multiple dwelling accommodation; the outstripping of gains in disposable income by the costs of home ownership; and changing social attitudes which have contributed to increased apartment occupancy rates among young and old adults.

## 1.2 DEMAND FACTORS

Table 1.5 outlines the proportionate growth of apartment occupancy during the last decade by the age group of the household head and shows that while all cohorts demonstrated increases, the gains for the population under 25 years, 25-34 years and over 64 years were the most substantial. Further, the gains in absolute size demonstrated by these groupings also outdistanced all other cohorts. Clearly, such a pattern suggests that a significant portion of total regional demand for multiple dwelling accommodation occurred among young and old adults. In the following discussion, demographic and other forces which helped to produce that demand in the last decade will be examined. In addition,

TABLE 1.5

APARTMENT OCCUPANCY RATE BY AGE GROUP OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD  
FOR THE VANCOUVER C.M.A.

<u>AGE OF HEAD</u>	<u>1966</u>			<u>1971</u>		
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>OCCUPYING APARTMENTS</u>	<u>RATE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>OCCUPYING APARTMENTS</u>	<u>RATE</u>
15-24	50847	10435	20.5	73340	17380	23.7
25-34	111534	16307	14.6	144125	27980	19.4
35-44	120458	11524	9.6	123995	13585	10.9
45-54	108859	11347	10.4	120925	14075	11.6
55-64	74952	11028	14.7	93935	15315	16.3
65+	93739	19161	20.4	101985	24975	24.5


Source: Census of Canada, 1966, 1971.

trends in the composition of newly formed households played a significant role.

During the period 1966-71, the 20-29 years cohort expanded by more than 40 per cent in the GVRD. This expansion resulted partly from the maturation of infants born during the post war "baby boom" period but the main cause was the impact of net migration. The latter accounted for 76.5 per cent of total population growth in the GVRD between the years 1966-71; the figures for the young adult cohorts varied from 72 to 74 per cent (GVRD, 1973:5). Considering the extent of the increases experienced by these cohorts, net migration emerges as a very significant growth factor which certainly must have influenced the expansion in apartment occupancy rates demonstrated by young adult groups.

While this proposition is not directly verifiable, it is supported by circumstantial evidence. Figure 1.1 shows that the city of Vancouver attracted more than one-third of all migrants arriving in the GVRD.

**Figure 1.1**  
**Migrants by Point of Origin to City of Vancouver and G.V.R.D.**  
**(1966-1971)**



source: Løøy, 1975

Further, net migration figures for the city demonstrate that the bulk of those migrants were 20-24 years of age, although a sizeable portion also fell into the 15-19 years group (see Table 1.6). One would expect any children of those age groups to be under 5 years of age. However, Table 1.6 shows a net out-migration of 63 children in that cohort. Hence, it seems likely that most of Vancouver's immigrants (and therefore a considerable portion of all regional immigrants) were either single or members of childless couples (Johnston, 1975: 10). As households of this type and age structure tend to occupy multiple dwelling units, one effect of net migration appears to be the generation of a sizeable amount of demand for that form of accommodation, particularly because young migrant households are unlikely to move into ownership until they are well established.

It is likely that the dominance of net migration in population growth will, with the aid of the post war "baby boom", maintain the young adult cohorts (20-24 years and 25-29 years) as the region's largest population segments for the remainder of this decade. In fact, according to a GVRD planning department population forecast, those cohorts will comprise a slightly higher proportion (17.4 per cent) of regional inhabitants by 1981 than they did in 1971 (16.8 per cent) (GVRD, 1973: 6). If this prediction proves correct and if young adults maintain similar patterns of housing preference to those they displayed in the last decade, then a large amount of potential demand for multiple dwelling accommodation will likely exist until at least 1980.

The extent of this demand depends largely on the way in which the young adult cohorts organize themselves into households. During the

TABLE 1.6  
ESTIMATED NET MIGRATION 1966-1971  
CITY OF VANCOUVER

<u>Age in</u> <u>1971</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>Pop.</u>	<u>1966 Pop.</u> <u>(1 age group behind)</u>	<u>Deaths</u>	<u>Estimated Net</u> <u>Migration</u>
0-4	24,430	31,260	530	-6,300
5-9	28,155	30,200	80	-1,965
10-14	30,620	31,325	60	- 580
15-19	33,390	29,430	70	4,030
20-24	44,415	31,485	145	13,075
25-29	34,480	33,495	190	1,130
30-34	24,775	26,760	200	- 1,785
35-39	23,460	24,200	245	- 495
40-44	24,595	25,490	380	- 515
45-49	26,665	26,840	625	450
50-54	25,530	26,475	925	20
55-59	26,020	27,210	1,280	90
60-64	22,190	23,200	1,645	635
65-69	17,955	19,020	2,050	985
70-74	14,225	16,355	2,575	445
75-79	11,205	14,815	3,170	- 440
80-84	8,215	12,045	3,680	- 150
85-89	4,370	7,790	3,360	- 60
90-94	1,280	3,290	2,040	30
95-99	245	815	740	170
100 +	35	130	155	60

---

Source: City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1973: 6.

last decade, trends in this regard favoured the creation of multiple dwelling demand. In the period 1966-71, the young adult cohorts experienced a decline in average household size (Tables 1.7 and 1.8) prompted by a diminishing birth rate (Table 1.9); a resultant increase in childless couples (Table 1.10); rapid growth in non-family households, the majority of which contained only one person (Table 1.11); and an increase in single parent families (Table 1.12). The effect of these trends was to increase the number of households competing for space and those which could be adequately housed, at least in terms of space requirements, in apartments.

TABLE 1.7

AVERAGE SIZE OF HOUSEHOLDS BY AGE GROUPS (GVRD)

<u>AGE OF HEAD</u>	<u>1966</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Under 25	2.5	1.8	2.4	1.8
25-34	3.7	2.3	3.3	2.2
All heads	3.2		3.0	

Source: Census of Canada, 1966 and 1971.

TABLE 1.8

HOUSEHOLDS BY NUMBER OF PERSONS (GVRD)

<u>AGE OF HEAD</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF PERSONS</u>		
		<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
Under 25	1966	3223 (21.3)*	6601 (43.6)	3405 (22.5)
	1971	5955 (23.8)	11320 (45.3)	4890 (19.6)
25-34	1966	5120 (10.5)	9853 (20.2)	8711 (17.9)
	1971	9015 (12.9)	18105 (25.9)	13860 (19.8)

\* Figures in brackets are percentages of total households for the indicated year, and age group.

Source: Census of Canada, 1966, 1971.

TABLE 1.9FERTILITY RATIOS\* (GVRD)

<u>1956</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>
104.2	89.4	65.9	56.7

\* Number of live births per 1,000 women aged 15-49.

Source: Liroy, 1975.

TABLE 1.10

HUSBAND AND WIFE FAMILIES WITHOUT  
CHILDREN AT HOME BY AGE OF HEAD (GVRD)

<u>AGE OF HEAD</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	(1) <u>TOTAL</u>	(2) <u>NO CHILDREN</u>	(3) <u>% (2) of (1)</u>
Under 25	1966	9,339	4,871	52.2
	1971	12,300	6,835	55.6
25-34	1966	41,129	8,933	21.7
	1971	51,515	13,495	26.2

Source: Census of Canada, 1966, 1971.

TABLE 1.11

\*NON-FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS BY AGE OF HEAD  
AND PROPORTION COMPRISED OF ONE PERSON (GVRD)

<u>AGE OF HEAD</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	(1) <u>TOTAL</u>	(2) <u>ONE PERSON</u>	<u>Change in (1)</u> <u>1966-71</u>	<u>Change in (2)</u> <u>1966-71</u>
Under 25	1966	5989	3620		
	1971	11120	5955	+ 85.7%	+ 64.5%
25-34	1966	7081	5120		
	1971	13425	9015	+ 89.6%	+ 76.1%

\* These consist of unrelated people living together.

Source: Census of Canada, 1966, 1971.



TABLE 1.12SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES BY AGE OF HEAD (GVRD)

<u>AGE OF HEAD</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>% CHANGE</u>
Under 25	1966	592	
	1971	1360	129.7
25-34	1966	1796	
	1971	4740	148.9

Source: Census of Canada, 1966, 1971.

The social forces which helped to produce the above changes in household structure are complex and their consideration lies beyond the scope of this thesis. It would seem however that fundamental changes in a number of areas would be required to change, for example, the declining birth rate. As Liroy (1975:26) states:

The decline of fertility in the younger age groups (20-29 and 30-34) may reflect both the international concern for reaching zero population growth and the change in women's attitudes towards childbearing and liberalization, but it mainly reflects the economic problems encountered in the rearing of children.

With regard to the growth of non-family households, a recent study predicted further growth of this social form among young adult groups during the remainder of the 1970's. Table 1.13 provides the details of that projection.

TABLE 1.13NON-FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS BY AGE GROUP (VANCOUVER C.M.A.)

<u>AGE OF HEAD</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>%TOTAL*</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>%TOTAL*</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>%TOTAL*</u>
15-24	11,500	(45.2)	20,200	(54.1)	32,600	(62.6)
25-34	13,600	(18.8)	26,500	(24.5)	48,400	(30.9)

\* Total of all households in indicated age group.

Source: Kirkland, 1973.

This projection, if accurate, lends further support to the idea that strong multiple dwelling demand will continue until 1981 or later, because the typically small size of non-family households allows them to be adequately accommodated in such dwellings.

While young adults display considerable potential for growth in terms of the establishment of non-family households, senior citizens headed more such households in 1971 than any other age category and, according to CMHC projections shown in Table 1.14, will continue to do so over the remainder of this decade. It is interesting to note that while older adults will continue to comprise the largest single grouping of non-family households, in absolute terms, during that time, their relative contribution to total households of that type will gradually decline (Table 1.14). That decline results from the already discussed growth of young adult non-family households.

TABLE 1.14

TRENDS IN SENIOR CITIZEN NON-FAMILY HOUSEHOLD FORMATION

(VANCOUVER C.M.A.)

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>% OF HOUSEHOLDS IN AGE GROUP</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL NON-FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS</u>
1966	23,200	44.7	38.6
1971	30,600	48.6	34.4
1976	40,100	52.6	31.2
1981	53,400	55.9	28.8

Source: Kirkland, 1973.

The high incidence of non-family households in the over 65 years age group partly accounts for that group's expanding apartment occupancy rate referred to earlier. In 1971, almost 84 per cent of such

households contained only one person; of these, 69 per cent were women. For many senior citizens residing alone, particularly women, the physical and financial burdens of maintaining anything other than an apartment are simply too great.

In addition, common experience suggests that older couples move from single family dwellings to apartments for reasons of cost and convenience. Doubtless this movement has accelerated in the past several decades as the number of senior citizens taking up residence with their children has declined. Perhaps this decline is reflected in the increase of the headship rate\* from 55.49 to 59.48 in the over 65 years group during the period 1961-71 (Interdepartmental Study Team on Housing and Rent, 1975: 78).

Table 1.15 illustrates the changing residential trends of senior citizens. Clearly shown are the increases in apartment occupancy rates displayed by both male and female older adults and the corresponding decline in single family dwelling occupancy rates. In both cases, the female groups experienced the more pronounced changes.

To this point, the more salient demographic reasons for recent growth in demand for the GVRD's multiple dwelling sector have been explored. It has been shown that trends in the growth and composition of young adults (15-34 years) and senior citizen headed households contributed significantly to that growth. Generally, as indicated by

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\* Headship rate is the proportion of a particular age group or population that heads a household.

TABLE 1.15DWELLING TYPE OCCUPANCY TRENDSAMONG SENIOR CITIZEN HOUSEHOLD HEADS (GVRD)APARTMENTS

	<u>1961</u>		<u>1971</u>		
<u>Age Group and Sex</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>1961-71</u>
65-69 Years					
Male	1888	20.0	3685	26.6	+ 6.6
Female	1451	35.3	3260	51.3	+ 16.0
70 years and over					
Male	4294	20.3	7505	32.0	+ 11.7
Female	4243	37.6	10530	56.0	+ 18.4

SINGLE FAMILY DWELLINGS

	<u>1961</u>		<u>1971</u>		
<u>Age Group and Sex</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>1961-71</u>
65-69 Years					
Male	7145	75.9	9660	69.6	- 9.3
Female	2505	60.9	2875	45.2	- 15.7
70 years and over					
Male	16107	76.3	15020	64.1	- 12.2
Female	6654	58.9	7635	40.6	- 18.3

Source: Census of Canada, 1961, 1971.

gains in the non-family household sector, both groups demonstrated a movement towards a greater degree of residential independence. This trend, when augmented by declining birth rates among young adult couples, produced a decline in average household size making the apartment a feasible form of shelter for greater numbers of young and old adult households.

While considerable change remains a possibility, projections presented indicated that the demographic forces which helped to produce the increased apartment occupancy rates during the last decade will likely continue in a similar, albeit less pronounced fashion until at least 1980. Hence it is expected that strong demand for multiple dwelling accommodation will persist during that time.\*

### 1.3 INCOME AND SHELTER COSTS

The demographically induced demand pressure discussed above was augmented by the inability of incomes to keep pace with the costs of owner-occupied housing in the GVRD. In this section, it will be argued that for a significant and increasing portion of the regional population, the single family dwelling has become unaffordable and further that the other major type of owned accommodation - the condominium - also demands expenditures beyond the means of many households. For these households, rental accommodation, primarily of the multiple dwelling variety, represents the only viable form of shelter.

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
\* Of course, a change in national immigration policy might considerably alter the quantity of that demand. Almost one-third of all migrants entering the GVRD between 1966 and 1971 came from foreign countries (Liroy, 1975: 26).

A recent study (Social Policy and Research Dept., 1973) calculated the gains in disposable income received by an average industrial worker during the period 1963-73 and compared those gains to trends in the principal, interest and taxation payments required for the purchase of a standard 1200 square foot bungalow in suburban Burnaby over the same period. The results of that comparison (Table 1.16) show that the latter, triggered mainly by escalating land costs (Figure 1.2), outstripped the former by 158 per cent. As a result, according to the study, "... over the last 10 years (1963-73) the average industrial worker has been forced out of the Burnaby homeownership market" (Social Policy and Research Dept., 1973: 25). Moreover, a further analysis was conducted to determine what parts of the region a worker commanding an average income could afford to inhabit. The analysis concluded that in 1973 only Haney, Langley and Maple Ridge - outlying satellite areas over 15 miles from Vancouver among the municipalities of the Vancouver Metropolitan area - fell within the purchasing power of such a household.

However, as the study points out, all calculations assumed only one wage earner in the household whereas female participation rates, particularly among married women, climbed steadily during the 1960's and continued to increase into the 1970's. It is difficult to correct for this factor because mortgage lenders normally include only 20-50 per cent of a spouse's income in the determination of permissible debt load;<sup>2</sup> but it has helped to defray the rising cost of housing.

In any case, the average selling price of a single family dwelling increased to approximately \$57,000 by 1974 in the GVRD. Assuming a 10

**Figure 1.2**  
**Components of Housing Cost Increases in Burnaby**  
**1963–1973**



Source: Social Policy and Research Dept., 1973

TABLE 1.16  
COMPARISON OF MONTHLY P.I.T. PAYMENTS  
AND MONTHLY DISPOSABLE INCOME

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>TOTAL P.I.T. (Mo.)</u>	<u>INDEX</u> <u>Total P.I.T.</u>	<u>MONTHLY</u> <u>DISPOSABLE</u> <u>INCOME</u>	<u>INDEX</u> <u>DISPOSABLE</u> <u>INCOME</u>	<u>P.I.T. as %</u> <u>of DISPOSABLE</u> <u>INCOME</u>
1963	127	100	348	100	36.5
1964	133	105	359	103	37.3
1965	142	112	373	107	38.1
1966	160	126	394	113	40.6
1967	187	148	413	119	45.3
1968	224	177	431	124	52.2
1969	260	205	458	132	56.8
1970	283	224	493	142	57.4
1971	294	232	539	155	54.6
1972	305	241	611	176	49.9
1973	434	343	644	185	67.4

Source: United Way, 1973.

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per cent down payment, the 11.5 per cent interest rate then current, and a 25 year term, principal and interest charges on such a dwelling would amount to \$512 per month. Taxes would likely add a further \$60-\$70 to that total. Hence, to fall within the 25 per cent debt service/income ratio preferred by most mortgage lenders, a household would require an income of about \$22,800 per year. Recent information (Inter-Departmental Study Team on Housing and Rents, 1975) suggests that less than 20 per cent of GVRD households commanded such an income in 1974. Moreover, one would suspect that many such households already occupied single family dwellings because only 10 per cent of renter households



reported an annual income of over \$21,000 in 1974.

TABLE 1.17  
INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF RENTERS AND HOME PURCHASERS  
(VANCOUVER METROPOLITAN AREA, 1974)

<u>Income/Year</u>	<u>Renters (%)</u>	<u>Home Purchasers (%)</u>
- 9,000	46	5
9,000 - 11,999	16	22
12,000 - 14,999	10	25
15,000 +	28	48

Source: Interdepartmental Study Team on Housing and Rents, 1975, and Canadian Housing Statistics, 1974.

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Table 1.17 provides a comparison between the distributions of income of renters and borrowers purchasing existing housing. The most dramatic evidence of the difference between the two lies in the fact that 46 per cent of the former group reported an income of less than \$9,000 per year in contrast with only 5 per cent of the latter group. It is worth noting however that a characterization of all renters as poor would be incorrect because 38 per cent of that group made more than \$12,000 a year. The important point is that the bulk of renters reported incomes considerably below those of households with the ability to purchase owned accommodation.

Further, over half of renter households in the GVRD spent more than 25 per cent of their income on shelter costs as compared to less than a quarter of owner-occupied households. Given this high house-

hold income to shelter ratio and the relatively low cost of rental accommodation (\$185 on average for a one bedroom apartment) compared to the monthly payments (\$550-\$650) attached to home ownership, it is unlikely that renters would be financially capable of demonstrating any significant degree of movement towards homeownership under present market conditions.

The situation is similar with respect to condominium purchase - the logical means of accumulating equity for those unable to afford single family dwellings. Table 1.18 compares the income characteristics of condominium buyers with renters and reveals comparable differences to those noted with respect to home owners. These differences are most apparent in the average income figures for renters and owners because of the difficulty in comparing dissimilar income groupings used in the renter and condominium purchaser data.

In comparison to owned accommodation, the costs of rental units appear rather modest. As was noted earlier, the (1975) average rent for a one-bedroom apartment located in the GVRD was about \$185; the figure for a two-bedroom apartment varied between \$250 and \$300 (Greater Vancouver Real Estate Board, 1975: B-9). Rental costs increased by almost 80 per cent between 1963 and 1973 whereas disposable income grew by 85 per cent and home ownership costs by 242 per cent (Social Policy and Research Dept., 1973: 23).

One would expect that normally such a situation would result in the transferral of demand from owned to rented accommodation (Smith, 1974: 30-32). But considering the massive recent increases in house

TABLE 1.18  
INCOME CHARACTERISTIC OF RENTERS  
AND CONDOMINIUM PURCHASERS (GVRD, 1974)

<u>Condominium Purchasers</u>		
<u>Income/Year</u>	<u>Row %</u>	<u>Apartments (%)</u>
below 10,000	4	13
10,000 - 13,999	22	28
14,000 - 17,499	30	17
17,500 - 19,999	16	6
20,000 - 24,999	17	16
25,000 +	11	20

Average Income \$18,067

<u>Renters</u>	
below 9,000	46
9,000 - 12,000	16
12,000 - 15,000	10
15,000 - 18,000	10
18,000 - 21,000	8
21,000 +	10

Average Income \$11,058


Sources: Interdepartmental Study Team on Housing and Rents, 1975;  
 Canadian Housing Statistics, 1974.

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prices some individuals may have decided that their ability to buy a single family dwelling would only lessen as prices increased even further. In that regard, Dale-Johnson suggests the following scenario:

... if the consumer is convinced that prices of houses for sale will continue to escalate he will make every attempt to make his purchase now rather than wait.... Ownership becomes a growing asset as the consumer recognizes the protection

**Figure 1.3**  
**Trends in Newly Completed and Unoccupied Dwellings**  
**(Vancouver Metropolitan Area)**



Source; Canadian Housing Statistics 1974, 1975, and 1976

against inflation which it affords. In fact, higher prices will not deter buyers but will provide them with more and more impetus to establish a toe-hold in the marketplace.

(Dale-Johnson, 1975: 127.)

Of course, potential buyers must have the ability to purchase dwellings offered in the market place. Comparing the income distribution of renters to the payments required for homeownership revealed that a substantial proportion of renters lacked that ability. Hence, one must conclude that based on income constraints at least, rental demand will remain strong in the GVRD while the realizable segment of owned housing demand will decline. Some evidence of this decline is found in figure 1.3 which outlines trends in newly completed but unsold houses and apartments over the period 1972-76. It is clear that condominiums particularly faced considerable consumer resistance.

#### 1.4 SUPPLY FACTORS

The above discussion suggests a lack of correspondence between the nature of regional multiple dwelling demand and supply in the early 1970's. Demographic forces and the distribution of income combined to produce a strong demand for moderately priced rental apartments as witnessed by the GVRD's persistently minute vacancy rate. Yet, very little of that type of accommodation has been built in recent years; almost all multiple dwelling structures recently completed have been marketed as condominiums. But, as of the end of 1976, 1700 such units remained unoccupied presumably because people seeking multiple dwelling units either could not afford condominium prices or did not desire owned accommodation.

Thus, the situation seems paradoxical in the short run: what is demanded is not being built; what is being built is not demanded. However, condominium construction and the lack of rental starts has resulted from the property industry acting, as it always does, to maximize profits. Using that criterion solely, recent multiple dwelling construction trends make eminent sense because as John Sherman of Block Bros. Industries put it: "The expected returns from a building to be sold as a condominium are twice as high as those on a rental apartment building..." (Canadian Building, 1974: 20). The promise of such profits\* produced condominium starts at such a rate that by the end of 1976, as noted above, available units far outnumbered customers.

Several major factors contributed to the unfavourable profit picture of rental apartments. Federal tax reform instituted at the beginning of 1972 removed the capital cost allowance which had been applicable to rental structures. Essentially, this allowance permitted individuals or corporations to subtract losses incurred in rental operations from other income for purposes of tax calculations. Many wealthy professionals took advantage of this provision to reduce their overall tax burden. Because of the nature of the allowance, there was an incentive to charge marginal rents and therefore, in many cases, accommodation was provided at a cost which would have been uneconomic for someone whose livelihood was dependent solely on rental income.

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\* Such profits were realized. For example, Daon, one of the main condominium builders in the GVRD, reported an increase in profits of 86 per cent in 1974 (\$3.1 million) as compared to 1973 (\$1.7 million) (The Province, Jan. 13, 1975).

Moreover, the property industry gained an incentive to build rental apartments because professionals were willing to pay market prices for those apartments to obtain tax write-off benefits.

The cancellation of these benefits forced rental housing to attract capital only in response to the return on investment it generated. Hence in 1972-73, the region experienced considerable upward pressure on rents to chance profitability thereby inducing a capital inflow. The provincial government fearing that sharp rental increases would place an onerous burden on low and moderate income people introduced rent controls on existing structures in 1974. Newly constructed buildings were exempted from controls for a period of five years.

That exemption did not, as was its purpose, encourage new rental construction. Citing rising costs, developers claimed that the economic rents charged for new units would make those units uncompetitive with controlled apartments and, therefore, unprofitable for the investor. Table 1.19 illustrates the high rents as compared to present levels which it was claimed must be charged to gain a return sufficient to encourage capital investment.

In contrast, condominiums were profitable and possessed other advantages. These included a quick return on investment and a lack of maintenance, management and tenant militancy problems. Thus, condominiums captured the multiple dwelling market. Recently, given the oversupply of condominiums, developers have changed their market strategy. Instead of attempting to sell all units, some have been rented. Strata title on these rented units has been retained however so that

TABLE 1.19RATE OF RETURN ON APARTMENT UNIT COSTING \$25,000

	Fiscal 1975 Average Rental Income	% Increases Required to achieve Rate of Return indicated					
		+20	+30	+40	+50	+60	+70
Gross Rental Income	185	222	240	259	277	296	314
Operating Expenses	76	84	84	84	84	84	84
Net Operating Income	109	138	156	175	193	212	230
Mortgage Payments	179	179	179	179	179	179	179
Net Cash Flow - Monthly	-70	-41	-23	- 4	14	33	51
Net Cash Flow - Annually	-840	-492	-276	-48	168	396	612
Return on Investment	negative	neg.	neg.	neg.	3%	8%	12%

## Notes:

1. Rental income is based on the average gross rental income earned by Block Bros. in fiscal 1975 and assuming various percentage increases.
2. Expenses are also based on the average expenses for fiscal 1975 and assuming a 10% cost increase for the coming year.
3. Mortgage payments assume that a \$20,000 mortgage payable in monthly instalments of \$179 over a 25-year period with interest of 10% is obtainable.
4. The return on investment assumes that the apartment suite can be constructed for an average cost of \$25,000 and that 80% of the investment can be financed by a mortgage, therefore requiring the developer to invest \$5,000 equity capital.

Source: Block Bros. Annual Report, 1975.

they may be sold upon the expiry of the five year rent control exemption period or if a change occurs in the amount of demand for condominiums. Rents for such units average between \$200-\$350 for a one-bedroom apartment and from \$300-\$500 for a two-bedroom one (Hayes, 1975: 9).

1.5 SUMMARY

An overview of the GVRD multiple dwelling market has shown that while considerable potential demand for multiple unit rental accommoda-



tion has existed during this decade and will likely continue, such accommodation remains in short supply and there has been little movement to rectify that shortage before 1976. Furthermore it was established that the lack of an increase in supply resulted from the negligible profit involved in building and marketing rental accommodation as compared with that available from condominium development. The societal groups most affected by that situation were those - the low to moderate income elderly, young single adults, childless couples and single parent families - who inhabit multiple dwelling rental accommodation and face a dwindling supply of residential options as in-migration and household formation increase competition for what is a fixed or even diminishing inventory. That competition receives added impetus from the dominant trend in the multiple dwelling market towards condominiums, which in urbanized areas generally require the demolition of low to moderate cost rental housing.

## CHAPTER 2

### INNER CITY REDEVELOPMENT

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

Of all GVRD municipalities, the replacement of moderate cost rental units by expensive condominium apartments was most widespread in the City of Vancouver. The bulk of this activity took place in inner city neighbourhoods\*-- the West End, Kitsilano, Fairview, Mt. Pleasant and Grandview-Woodlands (see Map 2.1). This chapter will outline the major reasons for the distribution and examine, in general terms, the impact on the housing stock and social character of the inner city which has resulted from condominium construction. The main purpose here is to provide background information for a later detailed discussion of these topics in the context of the inner city neighbourhood of Kitsilano.


#### 2.2 INNER CITY RESURGENCE

The location of high cost housing in the city represents a departure from the trend in many North American cities where such housing is mainly confined to the suburbs as represented in the theoretical land use pattern suggested by Alonso:

... the poor will tend to central locations on expensive land and the rich to cheaper land on the periphery. The reason for this is not that the poor have greater purchasing power, but rather that they have steeper bid rent curves. This stems from the fact, that at any given location, the poor can buy

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\* Vancouver land registry office information reveals that 82.9 per cent of all condominium units constructed in Vancouver during the period 1970-76 were located in these neighbourhoods.



less land than the rich, and since only a small quantity of land is involved, changes in its price are not as important for the poor as the costs and inconvenience of commuting. The rich, on the other hand buy greater quantities of land, and are consequently affected by changes in its price to a great degree. In other words, because of variations in density among different levels of income, accessibility behaves as an inferior good.

(Alonso, 1960: 58)

In effect therefore, inner city condominium development was the result of a decision on the part of higher income people to choose accessibility to city centre over space. A similar occurrence has been noted in other parts of North America. Lorimer (1971) commented on the movement of young professionals into an inner city working class area in Toronto. Lipton (1977) observed that in a few major American cities (especially New York, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and San Francisco) the number of high income inner city residents increased substantially during the 1960's. He reported that: "... cities (with) administrative CBD's, without heavy industry, and with significant commuting distance to the suburbs from the core were likely to contain middle-class and upper-class neighbourhoods near the centre" (Lipton, 1977: 146). Lipton identified other contributing factors:

There have been significant changes in life style that decrease the relative desirability of single-family, suburban homes compared to central city multiple-family dwellings. Decreasing family size has reduced the portion of adults' lives in which they must consider amenities that are child related when choosing housing.... The greater number of singles, caused by deferring or postponing marriage and by divorce, creates a greater supply of people who do not have the time for house management or possibly the desire for suburban isolation. As more women enter the work force in administrative jobs, and both husbands and wives commute to downtown, the suburban location will become less desirable.

(Lipton, 1977: 146-47)

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\* It should be noted that Lipton's thesis only applies to certain groups, primarily middle to upper income downtown white collar workers. Overall, the dominant trend towards suburban growth in North America continues; witness the recent population increases in communities like Surrey and Delta.

Lipton's findings, although based on American data, appear relevant to the city of Vancouver. The lifestyle and household composition changes he mentions are common to virtually all of urbanized North America. Further, much of the impetus for inner city condominium development in Vancouver grew out of the massive growth in office space and employment which occurred during the late 1960's and early 1970's in the downtown and central Broadway areas (see Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1).

This growth - a manifestation of Vancouver's emergence as a major financial and management centre in Western Canada (see Hardwick, 1974 and Gutstein, 1975) - involved considerable numbers of young professionals, middle management, technicians and clerical staff many of whom, either singly or jointly with a working spouse, were able to afford a luxury condominium unit. Moreover, such accommodation was desirable to that group because:

- 1). it offered easy accessibility to work and a wide range of recreational and shopping opportunities.
- 2). it provided a more luxurious environment (tennis courts, saunas, swimming pools and larger floor space) than the traditional rental apartment.
- 3). it represented a means of acquiring equity - an important consideration to young couples eventually intending to purchase a single family dwelling.
- 4). it offered a more controlled living environment than apartments, for fellow owners would be more committed to building maintenance and order.

Further, during the same period, the image of the inner city as a residential area was enhanced by the attempts of the TEAM majority on city council to revitalize the central part of the city and establish it as a place to live as well as work - - these ventures included the Granville Mall, Gastown Redevelopment, False Creek housing, and revised

Table 2.1


TOTAL NEW OFFICE SPACE CONSTRUCTION, CITY OF VANCOUVER, 1967-1973

AREA		1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	TOTALS
DOWNTOWN	Sq. Ft.	499,000	103,400	1,277,000	170,000	614,785	173,840	1,326,550	418,000	4,164,575
	%	97.0%	69.8%	91.5%	70.4%	85.9%	44.0%	80.2%	70.7%	780.5
Broadway	Sq. Ft.	12,843	35,180	101,812	71,619	58,775	182,244	170,071	157,755	790,299
	%	2.5%	23.7%	7.3%	29.6%	8.2%	46.2%	10.3%	26.7%	15.0%
REST OF CITY	Sq. Ft.	2,650	9,610	15,585	0	42,080	38,615	158,229	15,745	282,514
	%	0.5%	6.5%	1.1%	-	5.9%	9.8%	9.6%	2/6%	5.4%
TOTALS	Sq. Ft.	514,493	148,190	1,394,397	241,619	715,640	394,699	1,654,850	591,500	5,237,388
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SQ.FT. NET RENTABLE SPACE BY YEAR OF COMPLETION

Source: D. Hayes, 1973.

Figure 2.1  
Growth of Downtown Office Space and Employment  
1966-1975



Source: Hays, 1975a

downtown guidelines encouraging pedestrian and residential developments.

Developers were quick to realize that the housing demand expressed by relatively affluent centrally located worker combined with the high cost of single family dwellings and a shortage of rental accommodation (see Chapter I) virtually guaranteed ready acceptance of luxury condominiums.\* As a result inner city Vancouver experienced extensive private condominium development beginning in 1970-71.

This development greatly influenced the urban land market. As one author put it:

"The impact of the shift towards condominium ownership is most obvious in the price of urban land, which is largely determined by the value that people place on its "services". In the case of rental apartments, the price that people are willing to pay in rents to acquire an apartment in a particular location determines the price that a landlord/developer can afford to pay for land. Given that an apartment in a condominium project in exactly the same location will attract a "higher rent" (or what is the same be valued more highly by an owner-occupier) a developer who is building a condominium can afford to bid a higher price for the land than he could if he were building a rental apartment. Thus, the net impact of the condominium phenomenon has been to increase the price of urban land and in the process, to increase the rents that must prevail before apartment construction can profitably be undertaken".

(Hayek et al, 1975:48).

As a result of the increase in land values, owners of older inner city housing were able to realize substantial and immediate profits by selling to developers. Many owners took advantage of that opportunity. In fact some owners were so anxious to sell their land for redevelopment they became militant if threatened with the removal of that opportunity. In Grandview-Woodlands, a proposal to downzone the apartment area intended to reduce the pace of redevelopment during the preparation of a local area plan met with stiff opposition from some property owners who pro-

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\* A further segment of demand came from older home owners who wished to escape the burdens of single family dwelling upkeep and were able to do so by purchasing a condominium with the equity they had acquired by home ownership.



tested by marching in the streets (Vancouver Sun, March 11, 1977: 10).

### 2.3 THE EFFECTS OF INNER CITY DEVELOPMENT IN VANCOUVER

The private redevelopment involved in these projects altered both the income mix and housing stock of the inner city. These alterations stemmed from the loss, without replacement, of many moderate cost rental units through demolition and "upward filtering".

Map 2.2 and Table 2.2 detail the extent of demolition activity in Vancouver during the period August, 1975 to January, 1977. Over 90 per cent of rental units demolished during that period were located in inner city communities. While complete information is not available, the pattern was probably similar for the period January, 1971 to July, 1975. However, it is likely that the West End experienced a much lower proportion of total demolitions during that period because few condominium



TABLE 2.2

#### NUMBER OF DEMOLISHED UNITS BY LOCAL AREA

<u>Local Area</u>	<u>No. Units</u>	<u>Local Area</u>	<u>No. Units</u>
Downtown	62	South Cambie	1
West End	277	Shaughnessy	2
D.T.E.S.	4	Arbutus	4
Strathcona	5	Dunbar	2
Kitsilano	146	West Point Grey	1
Fairview	92	Kerrisdale	
Mount Pleasant	59	Oakridge	2
Grandview	170	Sunset	7
Hastings-Sunrise	10	Victoria-Fraser	4
Renfrew-C.	8	Killarney	4
Cedar Cottage	12	Marpole	7
Riley Park	6	(Source: McAfee, 1977.)	

Demolitions of Rental Stock  
Aug. 1975 to Jan. 1977

N  
↑



units were constructed there between 1972 and 1974. Most demolition activity probably occurred in the communities of Kitsilano, Fairview, Mt. Pleasant and Grandview-Woodlands which received 70 per cent of all condominium units constructed in Vancouver, during the period 1972-74. In total it is estimated that the city lost at least 2842 rental units by demolition during the years 1973 to 1976 (McAfee, 1977: 1). Assuming that the proportion of these units located in the inner city remained constant, the loss in that area was approximately 2600 units.

Most of those units were located in converted houses. Hence it is worth noting the information regarding the demolition of that housing type which is contained in Table 2.3. The most striking aspect of this data is the number of units not replaced by any construction. This category comprised three-quarters of total units demolished during a period (January 1973 - August 1975) when the rental vacancy rate was less than one per cent.

TABLE 2.3

DEMOLITION AND REPLACEMENT OF MULTIPLE CONVERSIONS (VANCOUVER)

<u>Multiple Conversions</u>	<u>January 1, 1973- August 1, 1975</u>		<u>August 16, 1975- February 1, 1977</u>	
	<u>Buildings</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Buildings</u>	<u>Units</u>
Demolished	281	1659	77	547
Replaced by S.F. houses	4	4	0	0
Replaced by Duplexes	0	0	1	2
Replaced by Apartments	23	887	9	267
Replaced by Businesses	38	154	2	5
Not replaced to date	170	1240	50	630

Source: McAfee, 1977.

Presumably, demolition preceded construction to such an extent because developers wished to avoid any eviction problems when they were finally ready to begin construction. The poor condition of structures may have been another contributing factor, though it could not have been too important because about 90 per cent of demolished buildings were in "reasonable structural repair" (McAfee, 1977: 2).

The supply of moderately priced rental housing was further reduced by "upward filtering", involving the upgrading of some units and a change in tenure of others. Increased fire insurance premiums on converted houses have led some owners to alter non-self-contained accommodation to higher priced self-contained units. Others have made similar changes simply to increase revenues. In addition, there was a movement towards the conversion of rental apartments to condominium tenure. This trend became so widespread that Vancouver City Council, fearing a serious reduction of rental stock, declared a moratorium on such conversions in 1973. Enterprising property owners managed to circumvent this moratorium however and in 1978 one could still see many former rental units for sale, particularly in the West End and South Granville areas. The City Planning Department estimated that "upward filtering" in all its forms may be responsible for the loss of 1,000 units annually from the lower cost rental stock (McAfee, 1977: 1).

Hence the stock of moderately priced inner city rental housing was substantially reduced between 1972 and 1976. This reduction created serious problems for low income inner city residents; the supply of housing they could afford was being eroded and, because of that dwindling supply, prices for the remaining reasonably priced rental units

were increasing.

Thus, inner city private redevelopment in Vancouver increased the amount of housing in the upper end of the price range while decreasing supply in the lower end of that range. This may have been the net result of redevelopment during the 1960's, but the impact during the 1970's was much more dramatic. In the latter instance, condominiums requiring a mortgage payment in the vicinity of \$300-\$500 per month replaced units renting for \$90-\$150 per month. With regard to the earlier period, the average rent for an inner city unit in 1971 after the 1960's apartment boom was \$114 compared to \$130 for the city as a whole (Census of Canada, 1971).

Assuming that 25 per cent of gross income is a desirable rent outlay, a household with a net income of approximately \$5500 per year could have comfortably afforded an inner city apartment in 1971. At that time over 50 per cent of all inner city households reported incomes in excess of that amount (see Table 2.4). Hence, apartment development did not seriously distort the relationship between housing costs and incomes; the inner city remained an area of moderate income and moderate rents.

In comparison, condominium development expanded the upper end of the inner city income range. Data from the 1971 census show that inner city households were generally less affluent than averages for the city as a whole (see Table 2.5). In fact, Table 2.5 indicates that only one of 26 inner city census tracts achieved an average income equal to or greater than the city average. Condominium purchase required an income considerably higher than the city average. In 1975 when the average

TABLE 2.4COMPARISON BETWEEN INNER CITY INCOMES AND VANCOUVER INCOMES1971 POPULATION

Household Income (\$)	(1) Inner City	(2) Vancouver	(3) % (1) of (2)	(4) % of Total (1)	(5) % of Total (2)
- 1,000	3,390	5,370	63.13	4.84	3.50
1,000- 2,999	12,310	21,585	57.03	17.57	14.07
3,000- 4,999	11,465	20,090	57.07	16.36	13.10
5,000- 6,999	10,630	20,490	51.88	15.17	13.36
7,000- 9,999	13,215	30,600	43.19	18.86	19.94
10,000- 15,999	13,690	32,195	42.52	19.54	20.99
16,000- 19,999	3,425	12,865	26.62	4.89	8.38
20,000+	<u>1,950</u>	<u>10,215</u>	19.09	2.78	6.65
Total	70,075	153,415			

TABLE 2.5

DISTRIBUTION OF AVERAGE INCOMES  
FOR INNER CITY CENSUS TRACTS, 1971

<u>Average Income (\$)</u>	<u>No. of Census Tracts</u>	
4500-4999	2	
5000-5499	0	
5500-5999	3	
6000-6499	4	
6500-6999	5	
7000-7499	3	Vancouver City
7500-7999	4	Average Income
8000-8499	2	= \$9,317
8500-8999	2	
9000-9499	1	

Source: Census of Canada, 1971.

household income for the city had climbed to about \$12,000 per year, it was estimated that an income of at least \$15,000 a year was required to buy a condominium in Vancouver (The Province, June 5, 1975: 5). Figures from the CMHC annual report for 1974 suggest that this estimate may, in fact, be low (Table 2.6).

TABLE 2.6

INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF CONDOMINIUM PURCHASERS


<u>Family Income (\$)</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
0 - 9,999	3.6
10,000-13,999	21.7
14,000-17,499	30.6
17,500-19,999	16.1
20,000-24,999	17.1
25,000 +	10.9
Average Family Income = \$18,067	

Source: Canadian Housing Statistics,  
1974.

These figures refer to the metropolitan area but as inner city condominiums commanded a premium price it seems logical to assume that most purchasers of those condominiums would have come from the upper end of the above income distribution.

The proliferation of multiple dwelling units in the inner city which began in the 1960's was accompanied by particular trends in household size and structure. These included reductions in household size and the number of families with children as well as increases in non-family households and childless couples. (See Figure 2.2).

**Figure 2.2**  
**Inner City Household Trends**



\*figures represent percentage of total household

source: Census of Canada, 1966-1971



As was mentioned in Chapter 1, these trends were caused by a range of factors including demographic forces and changing social attitudes. Hence, it is incorrect to suggest that private redevelopment was primarily responsible for shifts in inner city household composition. However, redevelopment did create the housing stock which permitted those shifts.

By 1977, as one would expect, the sectors of the public least served by the production of expensive multiple dwelling units faced the most severe housing problems. An analysis of housing costs and incomes conducted by the City Planning Department revealed that 42,570 households renting accommodation spent more than the desirable maximum (25 per cent of gross income) on housing (see Figure 2.3). Over 90 per cent of this group earned \$12,000 a year or less but those earning less than \$8,000 annually were particularly hard hit. A shortfall of 6,000 affordable units was reported for the latter income range. In addition, tenant families earning between \$8,000 and \$12,000 a year experienced a shortfall of 4,000 affordable family sized units (McAfee, 1977a).


## 2.4 THE DISTRIBUTION OF CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT

Just as most demolition activity involving rental accommodation occurred in the inner city during the period 1970-76 so did most condominium construction.\* As can be seen from Map 2.3 and Table 2.7 the

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\* Clearly, this distribution was influenced by the fact that most of Vancouver's apartment zoned land is located in the inner city (see Map 2.4). Yet, zoning alone did not determine the pattern. As was noted earlier, a number of demand factors favoured the central part of the city; witness the lack of condominium clusters in apartment areas (Marpole and Kerrisdale) located outside the inner city.

Figure 2.3



Source: McAfee, 1977a

distribution of condominium construction and therefore the impact of that construction was not uniform. Moreover, different areas underwent different rates of construction during time. Most units built between 1970 and 1973 were located either in Kitsilano or the South Granville portion of Fairview. After that time, there was a more even distribution between these neighbourhoods and Mt. Pleasant, the West End and Grandview-Woodlands.

The initial dominance of Kitsilano and South Granville was caused by a combination of factors. Those areas offered a high level of amenity and a sizeable stock of relatively new (i.e. less than 10 years old) rental apartments. They were therefore able to attract investment capital.\* In addition, the West End - for long the site of most of Vancouver's apartment construction - was already heavily redeveloped by 1970. Most prime West End view lots were occupied by high rise rental apartments constructed during the 1960's.

As the popularity of condominium living increased and demand strengthened, developers were able to shift their activities to less environmentally attractive East side neighbourhoods; note the substantial number of units completed in Mt. Pleasant and Grandview-Woodlands beginning in 1973 (see Table 2.7).

The size of condominium projects varied according to available capital, the amount of land assembled, and zoning. Projects registered

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\* See Bourne (1967) for a discussion of the relationship between a neighbourhood's environmental qualities, existing housing stock and ability to attract developer capital.



CITY OF VANCOUVER  
APARTMENT AREAS

Map showing the City of Vancouver and its surrounding areas, including apartment areas. The map includes labels for various neighborhoods and streets.

Neighborhoods labeled: WEST END, STRATHCONA, MOUNT PLEASANT, BROADWAY-MAIN, LITTLE MOUNTAIN, OAKRIDGE, LANGARA, MARPOLE, KERRISDALE, SOUTH GRANVILLE, OAK, CAMBIE, ALMA, LITSILAND, EAST HASTINGS, GRANDVIEW.

Streets labeled: 10TH AVENUE, 12TH AVE, 14TH AVE, 16TH AVE, 18TH AVE, 20TH AVE, 22ND AVE, 24TH AVE, 26TH AVE, 28TH AVE, 30TH AVE, 32ND AVE, 34TH AVE, 36TH AVE, 38TH AVE, 40TH AVE, 42ND AVE, 44TH AVE, 46TH AVE, 48TH AVE, 50TH AVE, 52ND AVE, 54TH AVE, 56TH AVE, 58TH AVE, 60TH AVE, 62ND AVE, 64TH AVE, 66TH AVE, 68TH AVE, 70TH AVE, 72ND AVE, 74TH AVE, 76TH AVE, 78TH AVE, 80TH AVE, 82ND AVE, 84TH AVE, 86TH AVE, 88TH AVE, 90TH AVE, 92ND AVE, 94TH AVE, 96TH AVE, 98TH AVE, 100TH AVE.

Other labels: WEST END, STRATHCONA, MOUNT PLEASANT, BROADWAY-MAIN, LITTLE MOUNTAIN, OAKRIDGE, LANGARA, MARPOLE, KERRISDALE, SOUTH GRANVILLE, OAK, CAMBIE, ALMA, LITSILAND, EAST HASTINGS, GRANDVIEW.

TABLE 2.7

DISTRIBUTION OF CONDOMINIUM CONSTRUCTION 1970-76Inner City

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>WEST END</u>		<u>KITSILANO</u>		<u>FAIRVIEW</u>		<u>GRANDVIEW-WOODLANDS</u>		<u>MT. PLEASANT</u>		<u>STRATHCONA</u>		<u>INNER CITY</u>	
	Plans	Units	Plans	Units	Plans	Units	Plans	Units	Plans	Units	Plans	Units	Total	
1970	1	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	14
1971	0	0	2	44	2	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	71
1972	0	0	7	226	7	265	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	514
1973	0	0	4	142	6	301	0	0	2	110	0	0	12	553
1974	5	264	7	243	7	116	8	209	12	408	0	0	40	1240
1975	8	257	14	416	7	144	7	197	7	241	0	0	43	1255
1976	8	422	14	208	9	149	5	159	11	344	1	8	48	1290
	<u>22</u>	<u>957</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>1279</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>1002</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>565</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>1126</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>163</u>	<u>4937</u>

Outside Inner City

	<u>KILLARNEY</u>		<u>ARBUTUS</u>		<u>MARPOLE</u>		<u>OTHER</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
1970	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	24	1	24
1971	1	135	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	135
1972	2	210	0	0	0	0	3	35	5	245
1973	1	104	1	76	0	0	3	26	5	206
1974	0	0	1	118	1	16	2	17	4	151
1975	2	62	0	0	2	36	0	0	4	98
1976	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>147</u>
Total	6	511	4	211	6	83	11	201	28	1006

Source: Vancouver Land Registry Office Files

in the West End (zoned for high rise) tended to be larger (43 units on average) than those built in the portions of the inner city zoned for three story apartments. Projects located in the latter area averaged 28 units in size. Condominiums registered in the Fairview area after 1973 were particularly small, averaging less than 17 units in both 1974 and 1976. This may have been caused by land assembly problems, zoning, or consumer preference for compact projects.

Inner city private redevelopment produced a moderate increase in multiple unit density (see Table 2.8). It is interesting that despite this increase, inner city population and average household size actually declined between 1971 and 1976 (Table 2.9). It is suspected that the population decline was partially "... the result of residential units being demolished and replaced by commercial/industrial developments" (P. Johnston, 1977: 22). This was probably most true in the CBD, particularly the downtown east side where a number of sleeping and house-keeping units were demolished to make way for such developments. In the apartment areas, the decreases are less easy to explain.

Perhaps some of the decline in population in these areas can be attributed to the discrepancy between the vacancy rate in all units anticipated by the city planning department (approximately 0.5 per cent) and that reported by the census (5.3 per cent). Even if the 0.5 per cent rate had occurred however, the inner city would have experienced a decline in population of 4400 people during the period 1971-76.\* It would

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\*. This calculation assumes an average of 2.04 persons per household (the inner city average obtained from 1976 census figures) for all units less 0.5 per cent.

TABLE 2.8

INNER CITY MULTIPLE DWELLING UNIT TRENDS, 1971-75(By Neighbourhood)

<u>Neighbourhood</u>	<u>No of Units</u> <sup>*</sup>		<u>Change in %</u>
	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	
West End	22310+	26791	+20.09
Kitsilano	10770	11203	+ 4.02
Fairview	7955	9238	+16.13
Mt. Pleasant	6530	7139	+ 9.33
Grandview-Woodlands	5405	5571	+ 3.07
Strathcona	3960	4051	+ 2.30
CBD	2440	2222	- 8.93
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	59370	66215	+11.53

\* Includes apartments, conversions, and semi-detached housing occupied at time of data collection. The figures are net, reflecting both demolition activity and new construction.

+ There are problems with both the 1971 and 1975 figures for the West End. In 1971, the census failed to include some lodging houses as occupied dwelling units. Hence, that figure is a false low. In 1975, the planning department designated some apartment/hotels (e.g. Denman Place) as apartments only. Therefore, that figure is a false high.

Source: City of Vancouver Planning  
Department, 1975.



TABLE 2.9

## INNER CITY POPULATION, DWELLING UNITS AND HOUSEHOLD SIZE TRENDS, 1971-76

(By Neighbourhood)

<u>Neighbourhood*</u>	<u>Population</u>			<u>Occupied Units</u>			<u>Average Household + Size</u>		
	<u>1971</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>Change in %</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1976<sup>-</sup></u>	<u>Change in %</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>Change in %</u>
West End	38130	36900	- 3.2	23090	25131	+ 8.84	1.65	1.47	-10.90
Kitsilano	37475	35273	- 5.9	16670	18406	+ 10.41	2.25	1.92	-14.66
Fairview	19435	16920	-12.95	9700	9545	- 1.60	2.00	1.77	-11.50
Mt Pleasant	20665	21140	+ 2.30	7600	8963	+ 17.93	2.72	2.36	-13.24
Grandview-Woodlands	32705	28555	-12.69	9440	10200	8.05	3.47	2.80	-19.31
Strathcona+	11530	9794	-15.06	2895	2409	- 16.79	3.98	4.07	+ 2.26
C.B.D.+	6130	5020	-18.11	1080	534	- 50.55	5.68	9.40	+65.49
	<u>166070</u>	<u>153602</u>	<u>- 7.51</u>	<u>70475</u>	<u>75188</u>	<u>+ 6.69</u>	<u>2.36</u>	<u>2.04</u>	<u>-13.56</u>

\* Census tract divisions rather than local area boundaries are used to represent these neighbourhoods.

Tracts more than 50 per cent within a local area were included in that area in the preparation of this table.

+ Definitional problems involving transient hotels and permanent dwelling units make these results unreliable.

- 1976 dwelling unit figures are preliminary.

Source: Census of Canada, 1971, 1976.

appear therefore that a substantial proportion of the reduction in inner city population resulted from declines in average household size. In fact if the average household size had remained constant between 1971 and 1976, inner city population would have increased by about 24,000 people given the census vacancy rate. If the planning department rate was used, the increase would have been slightly less than 33,000 people.

Without detailed household structure data, it is impossible to determine the reasons for the decline in inner city household size. However, that decline would suggest the continuation of increases noted earlier in non-family households and childless couples which occurred between 1966 and 1971. It is possible that the deliberate exclusion of children from most inner city condominium developments contributed to these increases.

## 2.5 SUMMARY

In summation, during the period 1971-76 private redevelopment added approximately 4900\* high cost condominium apartments to the inner city housing inventory. To create space for those condominiums, 2600 low to moderate cost rental units were demolished. The reduction in rental stock during that period was increased by the conversion of rental apartments to condominium tenure and the upgrading of some other rental units. Decreases in supply put extreme pressure on low income people who were displaced by demolition and forced to search for alternate

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\* This figure represents roughly 10 per cent of the 1971 inner city rental apartment stock.

affordable accommodation in a tightening market. This search was made even more difficult by rental apartment vacancy rates of less than one per cent from 1973 to 1976.

It was suggested that financial and management related employment growth in the central part of the city as well as changing social attitudes and lifestyles created demand for the condominium units produced by redevelopment. The distribution of these units among inner city neighbourhoods was uneven through time; in the early 1970's Kitsilano and South Granville attracted most projects but by 1973, Mt. Pleasant and, to a lesser extent, Grandview-Woodlands were experiencing a significant portion of total inner city condominium construction.

Available information indicated that declines in household size and the number of families with children which began in the 1960's continued into the 1970's. In contrast, growth was noted in the quantity of non-family households and childless couples. Condominium development has altered the traditional income structure of the inner city. The high cost of this residential form attracted many more high income individuals than had formerly lived in the area while forcing some people of lower income to find accommodation elsewhere.

### Chapter 3

#### NEIGHBOURHOOD CHANGE IN KITSILANO: AN OVERVIEW

##### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

The impact of inner city condominium redevelopment has been particularly heavy in Kitsilano. During the period 1970-76 more condominium units were built in this district than in any other in Vancouver. This chapter will examine changes in land use and social character associated with that construction. It will be suggested that generally these changes are a continuation of trends which began with the rental apartment boom in the 1960's. However, important differences exist between the nature of change in the 1960's and that present in the 1970's; these differences will be highlighted.

##### 3.2 DEMOGRAPHIC AND HOUSING TRENDS 1961-76

During the period 1961-76, Kitsilano experienced the same kind of change in population composition and housing stock which occurred to a greater or lesser degree in other parts of the inner city. The number of family households, middle-aged adults (35-54 years), and children declined, while non-family households and the young adult cohorts (20-35 years) expanded. These demographic trends were accompanied by a sharp increase in the type of accommodation (multiple dwelling units) preferred by young non-family households and a decrease in the more traditional form of family housing, single detached units. Private redevelopment involving rental apartments in the 1960's and condominiums in the 1970's

was the main process responsible for these shifts in housing stock. While the nature of demographic and housing stock change in Kitsilano was pervasive, the intensity of that change was strongly influenced by zoning by-laws. Clearly Kitsilano's apartment and conversion zoned sectors contained more possibilities for redevelopment to multiple dwelling densities than the single family district.

The relationship between demographic and land use change is well illustrated by comparing household and age structure trends in areas of Kitsilano which, by virtue of their zoning, underwent dissimilar amounts of land use change through time. Map 3.1 details the areas\* chosen for this purpose:

- 1) The apartment district in which most of Kitsilano's redevelopment occurred during the 1960's and early 1970's.
- 2) The conversion area which underwent little new construction during that time, but rather extensive subdivision and refurbishing of existing structures.


N.B. The area around Connaught Park remains unexamined here because the census tract which includes it contains a large portion of apartment zoned land outside Kitsilano, which makes the analysis difficult.

- 3) The single family area, whose housing stock remained relatively stable during the same period.

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\* To facilitate the comparison of data through time, areas were chosen on the basis of census not zoning boundaries. Hence, all contain a variety of land use but the predominant residential type in each area is indicated by its designation.

# Kitsilano Residential Sub-Areas



department of planning  
and civic development



**Figure 3.1**  
**Household Trends (Kitsilano Apartment Area)**




TABLE 3.1  
AGE STRUCTURE TRENDS (APARTMENT AREA)


1951 - 71

	<u>1951</u>		<u>1961</u>		<u>1971</u>		<u>1976</u>	
<u>Age</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
0-4	1081	7.5	1160	7.8	650	4.0	365	2.4
5-9	745	5.2	744	5.0	515	3.2	315	2.1
10-14	580	4.0	658	4.4	390	2.4	330	2.2
15-19	672	4.7	738	5.0	835	5.1	580	3.8
20-24	1240	8.7	1421	9.6	3485	21.4	2635	17.4
25-34	2756	19.2	2709	18.3	4080	25.0	5075	33.6
35-44	2138	14.9	2454	16.5	1445	8.9	1295	8.6
45-54	1646	11.5	1877	12.6	1470	9.0	1360	9.0
55-64	1544	10.8	1354	9.1	1500	9.2	1370	9.1
65-69	778	5.4	607	4.1	565	3.5	540	3.6
70 +	1136	7.9	1575	10.6	1330	8.2	1245	8.2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>14316</u>		<u>14847</u>		<u>16295</u>		<u>15110</u>	

Source: Census of Canada 1971 - 76.



**Figure 3.2**  
**Household Trends (Kitsilano Conversion Area)**



source: Census of Canada, 1951-1976


TABLE 3.2  
AGE STRUCTURE TRENDS (CONVERSION AREA)

Males and Females

	<u>1951</u>		<u>1961</u>		<u>1971</u>		<u>1976</u>	
<u>Age</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
0-4	768	8.6	753	8.1	485	5.4	345	4.2
5-9	522	5.8	604	6.5	490	5.4	325	4.0
10-14	373	4.2	610	6.6	490	5.4	405	4.9
15-19	405	4.5	553	5.9	550	6.1	510	6.2
20-24	668	7.5	714	7.7	1355	15.0	1145	14.0
25-34	1695	18.9	1410	15.1	1695	18.7	2170	26.4
35-44	1315	14.7	1287	13.8	880	9.7	785	9.6
45-54	976	10.9	1168	12.5	925	10.2	785	9.6
55-64	1016	11.3	840	9.0	950	10.5	790	9.6
65-69	485	5.4	397	4.3	335	3.7	345	4.2
70 +	730	8.2	973	10.5	875	9.7	600	7.3
TOTAL	<u>8953</u>		<u>9309</u>		<u>9040</u>		<u>8205</u>	

Source: Census of Canada 1971 - 76.

**Figure 3.3**  
**Household Trends (Kitsilano Single Family Area)**



source : Census of Canada, 1951-1976

TABLE 3.3AGE STRUCTURE TRENDS (SINGLE FAMILY AREA)Males and Females


	<u>1951</u>		<u>1961</u>		<u>1971</u>		<u>1976</u>	
<u>Age</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
0-4	481	8.7	393	7.3	270	5.2	230	4.7
5-9	357	6.4	369	6.8	335	6.5	220	4.5
10-14	279	5.0	406	7.5	380	7.4	295	6.1
15-19	278	5.0	381	7.1	445	8.6	375	7.7
20-24	377	6.8	312	5.8	500	9.7	510	10.5
25-34	909	16.3	607	11.3	670	13.0	975	20.0
35-44	901	16.2	757	14.1	565	10.9	495	10.2
45-54	686	12.3	796	14.8	665	12.9	495	10.2
55-64	657	11.8	583	10.8	620	12.0	580	11.9
65-69	276	5.0	248	4.6	230	4.5	235	4.8
70 +	357	6.4	531	9.9	480	9.3	456	9.4
TOTAL	<u>5558</u>		<u>5383</u>		<u>5160</u>		<u>4863</u>	

Source: Census of Canada 1971 - 76.

A comparison of Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 reveals a general correspondence in terms of shifts in household structure between the three areas, during the period 1961-76. All experienced growth in non-family households and declines in families with children. These trends were most pronounced in the apartment and conversion areas. Slight differences between the three areas occurred in the childless couple sector. That group expanded marginally in the apartment district, while declining in the single family and conversion areas.

Changes in age structure reflected dominant trends in household structure (Tables 3.1-3.3). Young adults display a much higher rate of non-family household formation than other age groups. Consequently, the apartment district which experienced the greatest increase in non-family households of the three zoning areas also underwent the most growth in young adult cohorts. Similarly, the single family area which demonstrated the smallest decline in families with children of the three areas also experienced the smallest decline in numbers of children (0-14 years) and in the cohorts (35 - 54 years) which one would expect to contain the parents of those children. The pattern is further indicated by Figure 3.4 which shows the decline in household size associated with increases in non-family households and childless couples was much more pronounced in the apartment and conversion areas than in the single family district. An indication of the decline in children throughout the neighbourhood is provided by Table 3.4 which details enrollment data for Kitsilano's two main elementary schools. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 describe changes in dwelling unit and tenure composition during the period 1961-76. Strong growth occurred in the multiple dwelling unit sector in the conversion and apartment areas. Concomitantly, rental units

**Figure 3.4**  
**Household Size Trends (Kitsilano)**  
**(1961-1976)**



source: Census of Canada, 1961-1976

TABLE 3.4  
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT TRENDS (KITSILANO), 1966-77

	<u>Henry Hudson School</u>	<u>Bayview School</u>
1966	443	630
1967	415	642
1968	398	621
1969	420	585
1970	422	497
1971	375	470
1972	358	425
1973	300	386
1974	338	368
1975	304	334
1976	317	341
1977	319	364
Change		
1966.- 77	-28%	-42%

Source: Vancouver School Board, 1978.

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increased while the number of owner-occupied dwellings declined. By 1971, only the single family area retained a substantial proportion of owner-occupants. In the period 1971-76, the trend towards multiple dwelling units continued, but new construction in the apartment area mainly involved condominium rather than rental units. Consequently, the proportion of owner-occupancy in that area rose from 12 per cent in 1971 to 17 per cent in 1976.

TABLE 3.5TRENDS IN DWELLING UNIT COMPOSITION (KITSILANO), 1961 - 76

<u>Apartment Area</u>		
	<u>Single and Detached</u>	<u>Apartments and Duplexes</u>
1961	1,440	3,772
1971	1,160	7,070
1976	775	8,270

<u>Conversion Area</u>		
	<u>Single and Detached</u>	<u>Apartments and Duplexes</u>
1961	1,565	1,108
1971	1,535	1,965
1976	1,235	2,390

<u>Single Family Area</u>		
	<u>Single and Detached</u>	<u>Apartments and Duplexes</u>
1961	1,379	284
1971	1,415	340
1976	1,315	435

TABLE 3.6TENURE PATTERN (KITSILANO), 1961-76

<u>Apartment Area</u>		
	<u>Owned</u>	<u>Rented</u>
1961	1,477 (26) *	4,147 (74)
1971	960 (12)	7,265 (88)
1976	1,575 (17)	7,495 (83)

<u>Conversion Area</u>		
	<u>Owned</u>	<u>Rented</u>
1961	1,643 (55)	1,321 (45)
1971	1,335 (38)	2,160 (62)
1976	1,285 (35)	2,345 (65)


  

<u>Single Family Area</u>		
	<u>Owned</u>	<u>Rented</u>
1961	1,337 (78)	381 (22)
1971	1,250 (71)	505 (29)
1976	1,225 (70)	530 (30)

Source: Census of Canada, 1961, 1971, 1976.

\* Figures in brackets indicate per cent of total units for given year.





The overall pattern of redevelopment and conversion activity for the period 1971-76 is displayed on Map 3.2. The concentration of condominium activity below Fourth Avenue is related to the amenity value of the area, which is close to both beach front and park land, and offers fast downtown access. In addition, some locations below Fourth Avenue provide a striking view of the ocean and North Shore mountains. The distribution of rental to condominium conversions highlights the importance of location. Two of these structures face directly on the ocean; two have a view of the water and mountains from their hillside sites; another abuts Kitsilano Park.

The conversion pattern is rather scattered; but one noticeable concentration, located in the south-east portion is present. Previously, this section of Kitsilano had undergone limited conversion activity so the upswing during the period 1971-76 may have been an attempt by absentee owners to increase their cash flow in a time of strong demand for rental accommodation.

Thus the link between housing and household change is clear; households seek out the type of accommodation which best suits their needs. The apartment district, in which most of Kitsilano's new multiple dwelling units were built, demonstrated substantial growth in the types of households (childless couples and non-family households) best served by that form of housing, and a sharp decline in the type of household (families with children) which usually requires non-apartment units. The other two zoning areas showed a similar correspondence between the construction of new dwelling types and a growth in the households compatible with those dwelling types.

### 3.3 THE ADVENT OF CONDOMINIUM REDEVELOPMENT

By the end of the 1960's the trend towards apartment redevelopment was well established in Kitsilano. Hence, to switch successfully to more lucrative condominium redevelopment, developers had only to modify the tenure of their projects and attract a more affluent sub-market to occupy those projects. The former was simply a case of extra paperwork, for it involved only cosmetic design revisions. The latter required a skillful marketing campaign aimed at the obvious client group - young downtown executives, professionals, and other white-collar workers. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate how that campaign was conducted. The locational advantages and amenities of Kitsilano were emphasized; note the map indicating the proximity of the project to the downtown and the references in both advertisements to Kitsilano Beach ("close to the sea"; "...a seabreeze away from the beach"). Overall, a particular life style was promised for a particular type of person, "... city people going places... or already there", interested in an urbane, comfortable life style featuring "...the ultimate in luxury, privacy and security...near to the night life of Vancouver's heart... with private tennis and swimming as a matter of course." But such luxury and convenience did not come cheaply; note the prices for suites in the "Carriage House" and the "Westwind" shown in Figure 3.7. Naturally, the spread of luxury condominiums selling at such inflated prices altered Kitsilano's income mix.

### 3.4 SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRENDS ASSOCIATED WITH CONDOMINIUM REDEVELOPMENT

A study of Kitsilano's apartment area, commissioned by the City of Vancouver Social Planning Department in 1975, indicated that the average

Figure 3.5

## Classic.

Good lines, good breeding. Symbol of a time when the best was appreciated, enjoyed and savoured. When leisure and luxury went hand in hand. A way of life re-captured for you...at Carriage House, Vancouver's most prestigious new condominium residence.

Carriage House is for city people going places ... or already there. A classic ivory tower of your very own, close to the sea.


With private tennis and swimming as a matter of course. And near to the night life of Vancouver's heart.



## Carriage House

2425 West 3rd Avenue, Kitsilano — 736-8761 12 noon to 8 p.m. daily

A way of life that never went out of style



An Imperial Venture

2255 West Eighth Avenue

**The Westwind****GRAND OPENING**

West Coast evergreens surround Kitsilano's graceful, contemporary Westwind condominium, a seabreeze away from the beach.

The ultimate in luxury, privacy and security. Silent, high-ceilinged rooms, superbly decorated with your own custom touches.

— All of the Wonderful Things you Love about Vancouver.

**Tel: 731-6221**

Open 4-8:30 p.m.  
Weekends 1-6 p.m.

Another project developed by A. Molnar.

Figure 3.6

**STRATA TITLED!****FAIRVIEW SLOPES!****VIEW TOWNHOUSE!**

945 W. 7TH - OPEN MON. 1:30-3:30. Rare find! 3 storey, super modern, 1 bdrm. townhouse. Award winning design featuring 1200 sq. ft. & a mind blowing view of the city, mountains, ocean etc. Priced to sell! High \$80's! Penny Graham

**KITS 2 BDRM.****FIREPLACE!**

No. 210-2255 W. 8TH - OPEN SUN. 3:15-5. Beautifully decorated, spacious corner suite in well-maintained bldg. En-suite & 2nd bath, w/w carpeting, 4 appls. Everything like new - Vendor transferred. Only \$59,900! Call Mrs. Stephanie Carros or Di Musters

**CARRIAGE HOUSE!****NORTH WEST CORNER!**

No. 801 - 2445 W. 3RD. - OPEN SAT. 1-3. The only 2 bdrm. for sale on this corner (to our knowledge). Sweeping view from every room! Concrete bldg. Very soundproof! 2 full baths. Tennis, pool, etc. \$98,500. Bonnie Hydes

**GRANVILLE GARDENS!****2 BDRMS!**

No. 701 - 1616 W. 13TH - OPEN SUN. 3:15-5. Must sell! 100 sq. ft. of luxury in this beautifully appointed suite. Panorama view from every window. Deluxe appls. & washer/dryer. Vendors want to move Sept. 15 - Make your offer! Mrs. Stephanie Carros

**2 BDRM. & 2 BATH****NO307 - 2770 BURRARD ST.**

Now a rare opportunity to own 2 bdrm., living rm. with open F/place, 2 sets plmbg. with over 900 sq. ft. of living area in well managed bldg. All appls. included. John Land

**KERRISDALE****2 BDRM! 2 BATH!**

No. 201 - 5350 BALSAM ST. - OPEN SUN. 1-3. Terrific location, lovely & spacious suite. 2 full baths, 23' living rm., Call Mrs. Stephanie Carros

**LANDMARK HORIZON****2365 W. 3RD**

Deluxe 1 bdrm. condo in popular Kits. Over 770 sq. ft. of luxurious living. Frost-free fridge, self-cleaning oven. U/G parking, sunshine kitchen plus many extras. Asking \$48,700. John Land

Figure 3.7

household income for condominiums was 26% higher than that for rental apartments, 33% higher than that for single detached dwellings, and 42% higher than that for conversions in the same area.

The average income figure (\$11,000) reported for condominium households was not particularly high, but 17% of the sample was retired. Moreover, as the study points out, "... in 74% of those units composed of a person living alone or with immediate family members (which includes 99% of total units), none of the members of the family are employed full time.... as a direct result, 33% of 98 self-owned apartment units had a total household income less than \$12,000 per year." However, "...36% (of total units) fell into the \$12,000 to \$20,000 per year household income range, while the remaining 15% who replied\* were over the \$20,000 per year level" (City of Vancouver Social Planning Department, 1975:4-5). A more recent study of condominium dwellers (Eadie, 1978) in Vancouver and Victoria reported that 46% of condominium households in low and high-rise apartments earned more than \$16,000 a year.

The same study stated that 51% of working condominium residents in low and high-rise apartments were employed in managerial or professional capacities. The Social Planning Department report mentions that 32% of Kitsilano condominium residents were similarly employed, whereas only 14-16% of Kitsilano apartment area residents were classified as professional or management personnel in 1971 (Census of Canada, 1971).

In contrast, Table 3.7 shows that, even with considerable apartment

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\* 16% of the 98-unit sample did not know their income, or refused to reply to the question when asked.

construction\* during the 1960's, Kitsilano remained a moderate income area in 1971. In fact, percentage differences between average male incomes for the city and the residential areas of Kitsilano were greater in 1971 than in 1961. In these same areas average female incomes in Kitsilano equalled or exceeded the city average in both years, although those incomes were much lower in absolute terms than male incomes.

Thus the construction of a substantial amount of new apartment units and the conversion of existing structures during the 1960's did

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TABLE 3.7

KITSILANO INCOME PROFILE

<u>Area</u>	<u>Average Incomes of Individuals</u>			
	<u>1961</u>		<u>1971</u>	
	<u>M</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>F</u>
City of Vancouver	3979	2265	6904	3527
Single Family Area	4130 (+4)**	2444 (+8)	6450 (-7)	3550 (+1)
Conversion Area	3793 (-5)	2440 (+8)	5897 (-15)	3518 (0)
Apartment District#	3379 (-15)	2260 (0)	5580 (-19)	3824 (+8)
	3723 (-6)	2529 (+12)	4747 (-31)	3541 (0)
			6353 (-8)	4374 (+19)

Source: Census of Canada, 1961-71.

\*\* Figures in brackets indicate difference in percent between city average and area average.

# The figures for the apartment area reflect census tract boundaries in that area. The lines denote comparable figures in 1961 and 1971.

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\* Apartment units increased by 87% in the apartment district during the period 1961-71, and by 77% in the conversion area.

not drastically alter Kitsilano's income mix, although that construction was associated with considerable change in household and age structure. Essentially Kitsilano's income mix remained stable because rents remained modest.\* In addition, population growth during the 1960's was centred in the young adult groups who on average earn less than the older cohorts; and these latter groups experienced a decline during the same period.

The influx of more affluent people into Kitsilano is indicated by the transformation in the nature of the retail sector in the neighbourhood. During the 1960's, many retail outlets in Kitsilano focused on counter-culture activities (for example, small boutiques, craft supplies and sales, "Head Shops", vegetarian restaurants and the like), or were small service outlets of the "Mom and Pop" variety. In the 1970's, however, there has been a swing to more sophisticated retailing, particularly in the Fourth Avenue business section which lies in the centre of the condominium redevelopment area. Several stores featuring fairly costly furniture and accessories have opened, a trend towards more expensive specialty restaurants has begun, and a store exclusively offering classical music recordings has been a success. Gradually older, general household stores are being replaced by specialty consumer outlets. The new stores are for the most part taking up activities closely suited to the life style requirements of the new, more affluent Kitsilano residents (see Plates 3.1-2).

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\* Average rents in the three census tracts comprising the apartment area were \$119, \$133 and \$117 in 1971. The average for the city was \$130.





Plate 3.1 New retail development in the Kitsilano apartment area.




Plate 3.2 Examples of the new trend in Kitsilano retail development: leisure services and an antique shop.

Hence, it is clear that condominium redevelopment has resulted in substantial changes in Kitsilano's social character. The luxurious nature of condominium accommodation has attracted people of high social status to Kitsilano. Census income and occupational data suggest that in 1971 few such people resided in the apartment area. It seems safe to conclude that this was no longer the case in 1975, when over 40% of the multiple dwelling units in the apartment area were condominiums (Kitsilano Planning Office, 1975: 1).

Besides expanding the proportion of higher income residents, condominium redevelopment eroded the lower income accommodation by the removal of older housing. As we will see in the next chapter, residents displaced by this process were hard pressed to find alternative accommodation in the tight housing market which prevailed in Kitsilano during the early 1970's. Consequently, many such people were forced to leave the neighbourhood. Further, while condominium redevelopment was restricted to the apartment district, it doubtless affected land values in other parts of Kitsilano. Redevelopment activity tends to increase speculation in areas bordering that redevelopment. Such speculation increases the cost of housing, and probably added to the difficulties faced by people of moderate income searching for affordable accommodation.

In addition, a considerable amount of refurbishing of older houses has taken place in Kitsilano's conversion areas about 1974 (see Plate 3.3). This refurbishing, encouraged by the Federal Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program (RRAP), which provides low interest loans and grants for home improvement, has added to the attractiveness

of the conversion areas and, therefore, to the cost of housing (Phillips, 1976). It is apparent that, in many cases, the people renovating and occupying these older houses come from the same social group as the majority of condominium residents (Bishop, 1978).

Further, developers, perhaps in anticipation of a zoning change, have illegally built several fourplexes in a section of Kitsilano designated for duplex development. This process involved the demolition of an older house and its replacement by what is called a duplex but is in reality rented as four units (The Herald and Times, June 1, 1978: 1). The result of this process is to increase pressure for similar development and density in other parts of the duplex area, and thereby to drive up housing prices (see Plate 3.4).

Another trend which has produced pressure for increased redevelopment activity is the recent initiation of at least ten luxury townhouse projects in a section of Kitsilano bounded by Third Avenue, MacDonald Street, Cornwall Avenue, and Larch Street (see Plates 3.5-6). This activity has taken place despite City Planning Department guidelines which specify that the area should retain its traditional character as a conversion and single family district. Three of the projects are located within a two-block strip on the east side of MacDonald Street - a main traffic artery. Such visible alteration of the existing stock suggests that the surrounding area is experiencing rapid change and therefore increased speculative activity is encouraged. Continued townhouse redevelopment will further reduce Kitsilano's moderate cost rental supply which has already been seriously depleted by redevelopment associated demolition in the apartment area.



Plate 3.3 Renovation activity in the conversion area.



Plate 3.4 A new 'duplex' in the south-eastern part of Kitsilano. Note each half of the duplex has 2 mail boxes indicating the structure contains 4 households.



Plate 3.5 A townhouse development in the Kitsilano conversion area. The asking price is \$139,000 for a 2 bedroom unit with den.



Plate 3.6 Another townhouse project located in the same area. The asking price for these units is \$113,000.



### 3.5 SUMMARY

In summary, we have seen that condominium redevelopment affected both the land use and social character of Kitsilano. In terms of land use, effects included a reduction in moderate cost and older housing, which were replaced by luxury condominium accommodation. As the supply of older housing in the apartment area was reduced, the prices of remaining moderate cost units in other parts of the neighbourhood were increased following the usual course in supply and demand situations. Moreover, condominium redevelopment helped to establish Kitsilano as an extremely fashionable residential area, and consequently encouraged investment directed at the renovation of older housing in the conversion areas of the neighbourhood. Again, the effect of this renovation was to boost land prices and reduce the supply of moderate cost housing.

With respect to social change, several effects were noted. The trend towards smaller households and away from families with children, which began with rental apartment redevelopment in the 1960's, was accelerated by condominium redevelopment. The marketing of condominium projects was designed to attract the young affluent, professional or executive working in the downtown - a group not widespread in Kitsilano during the 1960's. The influx of this group, besides influencing the price and nature of housing in the area, has begun to alter the character of the retail sector. Most stores now opening in Kitsilano offer some type of expensive life style accoutrement. The transition from a moderate family area to an affluent, childless enclave is well under way.

Chapter 4  
The Impact of Displacement  
on Low Income Apartment Area Residents

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The removal of older housing in the Kitsilano apartment area, which accompanied private redevelopment, substantially reduced the supply of moderate cost accommodation and also created serious difficulties for the households displaced by demolition. This chapter will examine changes in the housing stock and the problems raised by demolition for lower income residents.

4.2 CHANGES IN THE HOUSING STOCK

Table 4.1 details the reduction in older housing stock which occurred in the Kitsilano apartment area during the period 1968-76. Table 4.2 shows demolitions directly attributable to condominium construction between 1971 and 1976, and the number of new units so produced. Clearly, condominium redevelopment substantially increased unit density. However, it is important to note that the consequences included the loss of a sizeable portion of the apartment area's single family, duplex and conversion stock, which had already been seriously depleted by rental apartment redevelopment in the late 1960's. Moreover, at least another 270 rental apartment units were converted to condominium tenure during the period 1971-76. Hence, some 1,360 expensive condominium units were added to the apartment area's housing

TABLE 4.1  
REDUCTION IN OLDER HOUSING STOCK  
KITSILANO APARTMENT AREA, 1968 - 76

	<u>1968</u>		<u>1974</u>		<u>1976</u>		<u>% Change</u> <u>1968-76</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Units</u>
<u>Single Family and Duplex</u>	427	457	270	293	217	234	-49	-49
<u>Conversions</u>	345	1,550*	212	996	190	850	-45	-45

\* Conversion figures are approximate

Sources: City of Vancouver, 1968: 12; Kitsilano Planning Office, 1974:1;  
City of Vancouver Land Use maps, 1976.

TABLE 4.2  
CONDOMINIUM UNITS CONSTRUCTED AND THE HOUSING DESTROYED TO  
CREATE SPACE FOR THOSE UNITS (1971 - 76)

<u>Condominium Construction</u>				<u>Housing Demolished</u>			
		<u>Single Family and Duplex</u>		<u>Conversions</u>		<u>Apartments</u>	
<u>No.</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Units</u>
40	1,094	70	77	61	278	4	28

Sources: Vancouver Land Registry Office; City of Vancouver Development Permits and Land Use maps, 1976.

stock at the cost of at least 650 units of predominantly moderate cost housing; the actual loss was almost certainly greater, for, as Table 4.1 shows, 700 units in converted dwellings alone were removed from 1968 to 1976. At the same time, the apartment area moved closer to complete



architectural monotony, as breaks in the rows of three-storey walk-ups, provided by the often interesting facades of older houses, became increasingly scarce.

#### 4.3 DISPLACEMENT SURVEY

Condominium redevelopment created major relocation problems for those displaced by demolition. To gain some idea of the impact of displacement on individuals, a survey was conducted of tenants displaced by three selected condominium projects in 1974-75. These tenants were interviewed between six and twelve months after displacement. Topics investigated in the survey included: the pattern of relocation; impressions of present and past locations; differences between current and former housing in terms of rent, level of satisfaction and size; and changes in activity patterns caused by displacement. A copy of the questionnaire appears in Appendix I.

##### 4.3.1 THE SAMPLE

A comprehensive search succeeded in locating 36 households, or about 40% of the total displaced by the three projects. It is believed that the remainder were undiscoverable for a number of reasons, including doubling up, movement away from the Lower Mainland,\* and taking up residential arrangements which did not which did not require use of private telephones or separate utility accounts. Thus it might be argued that the households who were impossible to trace had been forced

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\* It was determined that the members of at least a further 8 households had left the Lower Mainland, but attempts to contact them failed.

to make a more radical adjustment to displacement than those who were traceable.\*

In terms of age, occupation, and income, the sample appears broadly representative of the Kitsilano apartment area population. Most of the tenants interviewed were young, white-collar workers of low to moderate income (see Table 4.3, and see Chapter 3 for the apartment area demographic profile). Their median income range was only \$3,500 to \$4,500 a year. Very few were part of traditional family households; 47% were single, 19% were married without children, 14% were single parents, 11% were married with children, and 8% were living common-law. It is interesting to note that, although conversion residents are thought to be a heavily transient population, over 40% of the sample had lived in their former residences for two years or longer.

#### 4.3.2 RELOCATION PATTERN

A majority of the displaced tenants relocated in or near Kitsilano, and a smaller group moved to the cheaper rental area of East Vancouver (Map 4.1). The remaining sites are in South Vancouver and in neighbouring suburbs. One household not shown on the map relocated in Powell River. In total, 30% of the households relocated in Kitsilano. A further 14% found accommodation in contiguous neighbourhoods. Of the remainder, 25% relocated in East Vancouver, 11% in South Vancouver, 8%

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\* It is likely, for example, that a number of the elderly tenants may have moved into Senior Citizens' Homes, or perhaps into an in-law's suite with relatives. Their changed form of housing tenure would remove them from records as a separately identified household.

Sample CharacteristicsAge Structure

AGE:	<u>20 - 24</u>	<u>25 - 34</u>	<u>35 - 44</u>	<u>55 - 65</u>	<u>65 +</u>
	4 (11.1)*	17(47.2)	8 (22.2)	3 (8.3)	4 (11.1)

Occupations (self-assigned)

White collar	18 (50)
Blue collar	5 (13.9)
Retired	4 (11.1)
Unemployed	7 (19.4)
Student	2 ( 5.5)

Household Income Distribution

<u>Income Range</u>	<u>Number</u>
\$ 2,500	5 (13.9)
2,501 - 3,500	8 (22.2)
3,501 - 4,500	6 (16.6)
4,501 - 5,500	2 ( 5.5)
5,501 - 6,500	1 ( 2.8)
6,501 - 9,000	5 (13.9)
9,001 - 10,000	2 ( 5.5)
10,501 - 12,000	4 (11.1)
12,000 +	3 ( 8.3)

Sex

Male  
20 (55.6)

Female  
16 (44.4)

Household Size

No. of	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>Average</u>
<u>Persons</u>	15 (41.6)	13 (33.3)	7 (19.4)	---	1 (2.7)	1.86

Marital Status


<u>Single</u>	<u>Common-Law</u>	<u>Married without Children</u>	<u>Married with Children</u>	<u>Single Parent</u>
17(47.2)	3(8.3)	7 (19.4)	4 (11.1)	5 (13.8)

Length of Residence

<u>Less than 6 months</u>	<u>6 months - 1 year</u>	<u>1 - 2 years</u>	<u>2 - 3 years</u>	<u>3 - 5 years</u>	<u>5 + years</u>
5(13.9)	7(19.4)	9 (25)	8(22.2)	2(5.6)	5(13.9)

\* Figures in brackets are per cent of total respondents.

Map 4.1



in the downtown, and, with the exception of the one household which moved to Powell River, the rest took up residence in neighbouring suburbs.

Reasons for choosing locations, and satisfaction with those locations, varied considerably throughout the sample. However, some general points emerged. Of the 11 people who remained in Kitsilano, 10 stated a preference for one or several aspects of the neighbourhood as a major factor in their relocation decision. Aspects mentioned included locational advantages (access to transportation and the downtown), amenities (the beach or shops), and more intangible features. Among the latter were a sense of neighbourhood attachment - a feeling that Kitsilano was compatible with one's life style. As one respondent put it:

"Kitsilano is my neighbourhood. Most of my friends live here. I like the people, the beach and all the little shops. I don't want to live anywhere else."

A preference for Kitsilano was also common among people who relocated in other parts of the Lower Mainland. Of the respondents who took up residence outside Kitsilano, two-thirds indicated that they preferred their former location and would have stayed there if given a choice. The most common reason given for relocating outside Kitsilano was a lack of affordable accommodation there. All but one of the people moving to East Vancouver indicated that they had taken up residence there for reasons of cost rather than because of any advantages offered by the area.

Of the four people expressing a preference for their present location, three had purchased housing since their eviction. Thus their

response is not surprising, given the preference of most Canadian tenants for the status of home ownership (Dzus and Romsa, 1977).

#### 4.3.3 ATTITUDES TOWARDS PREVIOUS AND PRESENT HOUSING

Despite the fact that the poor quality of older housing is often cited as a reason for redevelopment, the relocatees expressed a high level of satisfaction with their previous dwellings. Somewhat less enthusiasm was expressed for their present accommodation (see Table 4.4). In total, 83% of the sample indicated that they would not have willingly moved from their former residence, and that they preferred it to their current accommodation. Their reasons included physical condition and features of the units, the cost of those units, and more friendly relations with their neighbours.

TABLE 4.4

LEVEL OF SATISFACTION WITH HOUSING  
OCCUPIED BEFORE AND AFTER RELOCATION

		<u>BEFORE</u>			
<u>Very Satisfied</u>	<u>Satisfied</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Dissatisfied</u>	<u>Very Dissatisfied</u>	
27 (76%)	9 (24%)	-	-	-	
		<u>AFTER</u>			
<u>Very Satisfied</u>	<u>Satisfied</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Dissatisfied</u>	<u>Very Dissatisfied</u>	
L# (36%)	16 (44%)	4 (11%)	-	3 (8%)	

References to physical features were both general and specific.

The following statements are typical:

"My place was well kept up inside, even though it looked a bit rundown from the outside. It had nice big rooms and lots of light."

"I really liked the little alcoves and irregular spaces. It wasn't predictable like this box [a one-bedroom apartment in Kitsilano] that I'm living in now."

"It was cosy, comfy, well-lived-in. Old but nice. I had real leaded glass in my windows, and a fireplace."

"I was on the top floor and I had a balcony with a fine view. Here [a basement suite in Kitsilano] I look out my window and all I see is a lane and the back of an ugly apartment."

Respondents from one site (located on Eighth Avenue) reported particularly friendly relations with their former neighbours, and expressed a good deal of dissatisfaction with their current accommodation. As one respondent put it:

"I hate this place [a small house in Dunbar which the respondent shares with five others]. On Eighth we had a garden which stretched across three backyards. Everybody worked on it. There's no garden here, and I pay \$50.00 a month more rent. I don't even know who lives next door, and I've been here almost six months."

Another former Eighth Avenue resident, a single parent with a young girl, missed the babysitting assistance supplied to her by her former neighbours.

"The people upstairs or next door were always willing to help me out [by babysitting]. I'd pay them back by inviting them to dinner, or baking them something. I've sort of lost track of those people since I moved, though, and anyway it's different if you're not living in the same house or next door."

Yet another respondent spoke of the neighbourly feelings present at the Eighth Avenue site:

"We used to have house dinners.... The doors were never locked, and we were always visiting next door. The people over here [in Mount Pleasant] aren't nearly as friendly."

Respondents from the other two sites did not seem to have shared the same strong interaction with their neighbours. Only 18% of that group mentioned that their past location was more friendly than their

present one. Of the remainder, two thought it was less friendly, and the remainder did not express an opinion.

A complaint shared by respondents from all sites was increased rents, often for equivalent or inferior accommodation. Table 4.5, which correlates rent increases with income groups, shows that households earning less than \$5,500 a year experienced 70% of all rent increases greater than \$20 per month. Table 4.6 details the substantial increases in rent/income ratios which resulted from displacement. Prior to relocation, 51% of respondents spent less than the desirable 25% of gross household income. After relocation, only 27% fell into that category. In addition, relocation resulted in 40% of the sample paying more than 50% of their household income for rent; only 12% paid that much prior to relocation. Most striking of all, the modal category of the rent/income ratio was less than 15% prior to displacement, but 50 - 70% after relocation.

Single parents were particularly hard hit by rent increases. The difficulty of finding accommodation in a tight housing market, faced by all respondents, was compounded by social disapproval in the case of single parents, for rental units which permitted children were much more scarce (and consequently more costly) than other accommodation. This finding supports the argument of Barber (1975) and Lee (1977) concerning the particular plight of single-parent households in the housing market.

Two of the five single parents indicated that they had to take time off work (four weeks in one case and two in the other) to look for



TABLE 4.5CROSS TABULATION OF RENT INCREASES AND INCOME GROUPS :

<u>Income Range</u>	<u>MINUS</u>			<u>PLUS</u>			
	<u>-36-70</u>	<u>-10-35</u>	<u>10-20</u>	<u>21-40</u>	<u>41-60</u>	<u>61-80</u>	<u>81+</u>
Less than \$2,500	-	-	3	1	1	-	-
\$2,501 - 3,500	-	-	3	4	1	-	-
3,501 - 4,500	-	-	-	2	3	-	1
4,501 - 5,500	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
5,501 - 6,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6,501 - 9,000	1	-	1	1	-	1	1
9,001 - 10,500	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
10,501 - 12,000	-	1	-	-	1	-	1
12,000 +	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTALS</b>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>

TABLE 4.6DISTRIBUTION OF RENT/INCOME RATIOSBEFORE AND AFTER DISPLACEMENT

<u>Rent/Income Ratio*</u>	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>
Less than 15.0%	10 (30)**	6 (18)
15.0 - 24.9	7 (21)	3 (9)
25.0 - 34.9	4 (12)	4 (12)
35.0 - 49.9	8 (24)	4 (12)
50.0 - 69.9	4 (12)	15 (45)
70.0 or more	-	1 (3)

\* Rent/income ratios were calculated using the median of respondents in one group.

\*\* Figures in brackets are per cent of total respondents.

housing and to ensure that their children were settled in a new school. Another single parent, unable to find affordable housing, moved in with her parents - an arrangement she found unsatisfactory. However, one single parent actually managed to reduce her rent from \$305 to \$240 per month in the process of relocation. She was offered a house, close to the one she had been renting, by the same landlord who had evicted her prior to the demolition of her former residence. After vainly searching for an alternative, she accepted the offer because it was the middle of November and she had two children to look after. However, she did not expect to remain very long in her new home. The landlord previously promised her at least a year in her original house - she lasted three months. He made similar assurances again, but she has heard that someone is buying the three adjacent conversions on the block, and four lots would make a very attractive parcel for condominium redevelopment. It is unlikely that her landlord would resist attempts to complete that parcel. In the Kitsilano apartment area, it is particularly difficult to find secure rental housing when you are a single parent with two children, earning less than \$9,000 a year.

The other single parents in the sample did not have as helpful a landlord, and therefore faced steep rent increases, as shown in Table 4.7.

TABLE 4.7  
COMPARISON OF SINGLE PARENT RENT  
INCREASES TO HOUSEHOLD INCOME RANGES

	<u>Rent Before</u> <u>Relocation</u>	<u>Rent After</u> <u>Relocation</u>	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Household Income Range</u>
1)	\$130	\$235	\$105 (81%)	\$6,501 - 9,000
2)	\$ 80	\$240	\$180 (200%)	\$4,501 - 5,500
3)	\$185	\$245	\$ 60 (32%)	\$5,501 - 6,500

The reduction in the supply of moderate cost rental accommodation suitable for single parent families which accompanied condominium redevelopment appears to have had predictable results. Table 4.8 shows the sharp decline in single parent families which occurred during the period 1971-76 in Kitsilano's apartment district - the area in which most demolition of rental units took place. Smaller losses were recorded in the more stable conversion and single family areas. While the reasons for this pattern cannot be determined without specific household data, the correspondence between rate of decline of single parent families and amount of redevelopment activity is striking.

TABLE 4.8

TRENDS IN THE OCCURRENCE OF SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES  
IN THE RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS OF KITSILANO

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>% Change</u>
Single Family Area	200	180	-10
Conversion Area	305	305	0
Apartment Area	515	400	-22

Source: Census of Canada, 1971-76.

4.3.4 CHANGES IN SIZE OF ACCOMMODATION

As was mentioned earlier, most tenants interviewed preferred their pre-relocation to their post-relocation accommodation. One important reason for this was that, in most cases, respondents moved into a unit smaller or equivalent to the one previously occupied and yet paid more for the new unit. Almost 68% of the sample moved into smaller or equivalent units but averaged a 35% increase; a further 12% paid an

average of 20% less for smaller or equivalent accommodation, while the final 20% paid an average of 35% more for larger units. Over all, then, there was a net reduction in the size of units and the desirability of the neighbourhood, and yet a net increase in housing costs.

#### 4.3.5 CHANGES IN ACTIVITIES

Respondents were asked to relate any changes in their normal activity pattern which had resulted from relocation. People who had moved away from the immediate vicinity of their former residence reported changes in shopping patterns and bank use, and a few mentioned some alteration of recreational activities. Examples of the latter included a decline in attendance at Kits House functions and Kitsilano Community Centre activities. One respondent mentioned that he no longer paddled his kayak at Kitsilano Beach!

On a more serious note, two women who relocated in different parts of East Vancouver complained that they did not feel they could safely walk in those neighbourhoods. For them, this was a serious restriction. Neither had cars, and both had used walking as a major mode of transportation and recreation while resident in Kitsilano. Further, a woman renting a house at the Eighth Avenue site supported herself by taking in Senior Citizen boarders and children on a day care basis. After relocation, she was unable to find an affordable house which would have allowed her to continue these activities. Consequently, she was forced to take up residence in a downtown government hostel, as were her two Senior Citizen boarders. Relocation in this case resulted in a woman's loss of her means of livelihood, a considerable reduction in the quality

of her housing, and consequently an almost total disruption of her life style. Her two Senior Citizen boarders were similarly affected.

The journey to work was another area where some change was experienced. Four of the nine households which relocated in East Vancouver reported that it took them longer to get to work than when they lived in Kitsilano. One of the respondents who moved to Richmond also complained about increased travelling time.

Only 25% of respondents reported a change in their contact with friends as a result of relocation. Of those reporting such a change, two were living in Richmond, one in Marpole, and the remainder in East Vancouver. It is clear that the distance moved from Kitsilano caused these disruptions in friendship patterns.

Overall, it can be concluded that relocation affected respondents in three main ways:

- (1) They were displaced from housing with which, in most cases, they were well satisfied, and forced to search for alternate accommodation at a time when such accommodation was in short supply and rents were increasing.
- (2) They paid substantially more rent for housing they liked less than their former units.
- (3) Because of difficulties in finding alternate accommodation, 48% of respondents were forced to relocate outside Kitsilano. None of these respondents left Kitsilano of their own volition, although a further 8% did choose to move to other areas.

Other effects included some change in day-to-day activities, but, with the exceptions noted earlier, that change did not appear to be a serious

imposition.

#### 4.4 PREVIOUS RELOCATION STUDIES

Earlier relocation studies have, in the main, concentrated on public renewal projects\* involving working-class, usually ethnic, populations. Clearly, the Kitsilano sample could not be described in those terms. Moreover, displacement in Kitsilano was induced by private, not public, redevelopment, and therefore no government housing or financial assistance was available.\*\* However, both the Kitsilano sample and other displaced groups faced similar relocation problems (locating available housing, coping with increased rents, and the like), because they all lacked the resources to command anything but marginal housing. Further restriction was added in the United States because some displaced groups, particularly blacks, were denied access to the full range of housing they could afford. The Kitsilano sample also suffered from a lack of choice, as a result of the extremely tight rental market which prevailed in Vancouver at the time they were displaced. Thus, the Kitsilano survey and other relocation studies were conducted in rather different types of neighbourhoods, and involved dissimilar social groups. It is, therefore, interesting to compare

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\* See Reynolds (1963) for a survey of the American experience, and Robertson (1973) for a Canadian example.

\*\* In 1977, amendments to the provincial landlord and tenant legislation included the provision that people evicted to permit redevelopment should receive up to \$300, payable by their landlord, towards moving expenses. This provision was not in effect in 1975 although about 30 per cent of the respondents did receive landlord assistance with moving expenses..

some of the findings of the Kitsilano survey with those of other relocation studies, to determine whether contrasting social groups living in dissimilar neighbourhoods have similar relocation experiences and attitudes towards displacement.

#### 4.4.1 THE SPATIAL PATTERN OF RELOCATION

Reynolds (1963), in a survey of the American relocation experience, and Robertson (1973) in a Victoria case study, found that the majority of displaced households tended to relocate nearby. Both attributed this clustering tendency to neighbourhood attraction. In addition, Hartman (1963) points out that working class people are frequently only familiar with a relatively small area surrounding their immediate area. Consequently, they tend to look for accommodation within that area. In the American case, racial segregation also contributed to the pattern.

As discussed earlier, neighbourhood attraction was the prime cause of clustering in the Kitsilano sample. It was also noted that a lack of affordable housing in Kitsilano caused some respondents to move to other areas, particularly East Vancouver, even though their preference was to remain in Kitsilano.

#### 4.4.2 THE RESPONSE TO DISPLACEMENT

Overall, the most common reaction of Kitsilano respondents to displacement was anger directed at the rental increases and decline in quality of housing which accompanied relocation. However, the Eighth Avenue group seemed more annoyed at losing a desirable social environment than they were concerned with the increased costs of alternate accommodation.

The reaction of this group contains elements of the grief response demonstrated by people displaced from Boston's West End by urban renewal. Fried (1963) in describing their response, referred to "... the feelings of painful loss, the continued longing, the general depressive tone, frequent symptoms of psychological or social or somatic distress, the occasional expressions of both direct and displaced anger ... and tendencies to idealize the lost place" which were experienced to varying degrees by the majority of the West End sample (Fried, 1963: 152).

The Eighth Avenue group display some of the same symptoms - feelings of anger, loss, and a tendency to idealize the lost place - as did West End residents in Boston. However, the intensity of the grief response was much greater for the latter group than for the Kitsilano residents. This partially results from differences in the depth of loss suffered by the two groups. With reference to the West End group, Michelson (1976: 68) describes the importance of the local area:

The people were living in high enough densities so that many related families could live near each other ... From their windows, people could easily view passers-by, and they were close enough to hail them if desired ... Stores which the local residents patronized were scattered throughout the neighbourhood, so that even the pursuit of routine daily errands would bring people within range of the doors and windows of a wide number of potential contacts. The people never idealized their housing itself. What they did value, however, was the combination of type of building and siting of buildings relative to each other, the streets, and the commercial land uses. This combination brought people into frequent, spontaneous, and intense contact with their relatives. It strongly supported their style of life.

The particular physical attributes of the West End supported the localized social interaction, the kinship ties, and group identity which were so important to that area's residents. Hence, the destruction of the West End seriously disrupted the lives of hundreds of households. In



contrast, the Eighth Avenue group lost desirable social interaction among less than ten unrelated households.

In addition, Fried would probably argue that class differences contributed to the contrast in response to relocation of the two groups:

there is a marked relationship between class studies and depth of grief; the higher the status, by any of several indices, the smaller the proportions of severe grief. It is primarily in the working class, and largely because of the importance of external stability, that dislocation from a familiar residential area has so great an effect on fragmenting the sense of spatial identity. Generally speaking, an integrated sense of spatial identity in the middle class is not as contingent on the external stability of place or as dependent on the localization of social patterns, interpersonal relationships, and daily routines.

(Fried, 1963: 158)

While the Kitsilano sample could not be described as middle class in the usual sense, because of their low income, there is no evidence that they placed as much importance on the local area as did West End residents. In Kitsilano it was less than a total way of life that was lost.

#### 4.4.3 RENT INCREASES

Although differences between the Kitsilano sample and other displaced groups, in terms of response to relocation and social orientation, are evident, there is a similarity with respect to rental increase experience. Hartmann reported a 73% increase in median rent among West End relocatees (Hartmann, 1964: 275). Robertson (1973: 79), in a study of a Victoria renewal project, found that rents increased by 40% on average. As noted earlier, the Kitsilano sample also experienced substantial rent increases averaging 29% overall, although

their impact was relatively much more severe for the poorest households. It was in response to the evident injustice of such redevelopment trends that political opposition arose.

#### 4.5 SUMMARY

An examination of housing stock change in the Kitsilano apartment area indicated that during the early 1970's approximately 1360 luxury condominium units were constructed at the cost of more than 650 units of moderate cost single family and conversion units. Problems encountered by people displaced by that process included a tight rental market generally and a lack of affordable rental accommodation in Kitsilano specifically. Consequently relocatees were forced to pay more for accommodation they liked less than their former units and, in many cases, to move to areas less desirable than Kitsilano. Single parent families were particularly hard hit by relocation difficulties because units in which children were acceptable were even more scarce than other types of rental housing. A review of previous relocation studies showed that people displaced by urban renewal in the 1960's experienced more social disruption than the Kitsilano sample but that the level of relocation-related economic difficulties encountered by the two groups was similar. In Kitsilano, it was primarily the evident injustice of these problems that prompted resident opposition to private condominium redevelopment.

## CHAPTER 5

### POLITICS AND PLANNING IN KITSILANO

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

The displacement of moderate income renters in Kitsilano did not go unchallenged; resident opposition to the social and landscape effects of condominium redevelopment was strong and consistent. This chapter will examine the activities of the citizens' group most involved in that opposition. In addition, attempts by City Council to deal with the problems of inner city redevelopment, in particular the Local Area Planning Program, will be analyzed. It is suggested that resident attempts to gain a measure of neighbourhood control over development trends is part of a more general movement, the aim of which is to establish citizen participation as a major part of the government decision-making process at all levels.

#### 5.2 CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN TORONTO AND VANCOUVER

In the 1960's substantial change occurred in political style and fundamental attitudes throughout Canada. At the beginning of the decade, the election of Pierre Trudeau as Prime Minister, with his play-boy image and long association with radical causes, would have been unthinkable. Yet, in 1968, Trudeau appealed to the sentiments of the day with his concept of participatory democracy and easily won national endorsement.

A reordering was also taking place at the municipal level. Traditionally, civic politicians worked to enhance property values by encouraging growth - almost any type of growth it seemed. Not surprisingly, some of the strongest supporters and closest confidants of such politicians were members of the development industry and downtown businessmen (Lorimer, 1970; Lorimer, 1972). This view of city government as just another corporation began to be challenged in the 1960's by those who felt that, in many cases, benefits obtained from the construction of highrises or a freeway system did not justify the attendant neighbourhood destruction and social disruption. People holding this view moved to replace growth with conservation as a guiding principle in urban planning and to open up municipal decision-making to more citizen input. In Canada, this change was particularly evident in Toronto and Vancouver.

In Toronto, the issues which prompted most public outcry were rampant high rise development and freeway construction (Lemon, 1974). Both violated the principle of neighbourhood preservation which by the late 1960's was widely supported. Construction of the Spadina Expressway proved to be the type of issue around which broad based citizen organization was possible. The many groups who opposed Spadina sought the power to further their cause by entering the 1969 municipal election. Little success was achieved however, although three reform aldermen were elected. Organizing proceeded under the guidance of the Stop Spadina - Save Our City - Coordinating Committee (SSSOCCC). But within a few years the threat of Spadina in concert with continued high rise development brought together a wide cross-section of groups, including both small property owners and tenants who were concerned with neighbourhood

preservation specifically and urban issues generally. The resultant group - the Confederation of Resident and Ratepayer Associations (CORRA) - "... dealt with city-wide policy questions of process and large developments not dealt with by local groups...", but did not tie candidates it supported to a particular platform - "each candidate ran his own campaign" (Lemon, 1974: 49-50). CORRA had considerable success in the 1972 campaign:

The loose coalition strategy worked far more effectively than most anticipated. Of 14 aldermanic candidates definitely supported, only three were not elected. Five or six more moderate aldermen who supported the CO'72 endorsees on many questions were also elected, so that a clear majority of council members are concerned about neighbourhood preservation and are not sympathetic to uncontrolled development, unlike the old council (Lemon, 1974: 50).

In addition, David Crombie, a reform alderman (although more moderate than his colleagues) was unexpectedly elected as Mayor.

Vancouver, in the late 1960's, was governed by the Non-Partisan Association (NPA) and had been since 1935. The NPA utilized a corporate form of government which, in theory, divided power so that dual commissioners administered the civic bureaucracy while council instigated policy. In practice, "the senior administrators, by necessity in part, adopted a dual role of administrator and policy initiator and advisor. City Council in turn acted as if they were the owners, the directors of a company, or the trustees of the public wealth.... Given the preoccupation of the population at large with the material upgrading of the city and a common wisdom that growth was 'good', the system worked remarkably well" (Hardwick and Hardwick, 1974: 91). Unfortunately there was very little flexibility or responsiveness in the system; the bureaucracy, the repository of power in Vancouver, set goals

which "... served the ends of the bureaucratic system first and other community needs second" (Hardwick, 1974: 31). Council acted more as managers than representatives of the people. They were "... reactive to initiatives of the bureaucracy and private sector, making decisions in an ad hoc fashion within some assumed, but not articulated, policy frameworks" (Hardwick, 1974: 92).

Consequently, there was little scope for citizen participation in decision making. Indeed, until the 1960's, most citizens were satisfied with the NPA stewardship and did not wish to participate. By the late 1960's however, the same concerns - neighbourhood preservation, rapid transit and the like - which were expressed in other parts of North America also had strong support in Vancouver. Thus when in 1967, Council, acting on the advice of its bureaucracy, proposed the construction of an interchange, to be located on Carrall Street in Chinatown, which would eventually link up to East-West and North-South freeways as well as to a waterfront freeway and third crossing of Burrard Inlet, public opinion was outraged. The low income Chinese community, concerned with the serious impact of the proposed development on their neighbourhood, were joined in their opposition by a number of middle class, liberal, groups who were determined to prevent the establishment of a precedent for future freeway development. After several stormy public meetings council abandoned their proposal (Pendakur, 1972).

The freeway debate convinced many that only by a change in the composition of council could they guarantee a change in transportation and development policy. Consequently, three parties committed to re-direction in city government were formed in the late 1960's: the Com-

mittee of Progressive Electors (COPE), a municipal branch of the New Democratic Party (NDP), and The Electors' Action Movement (TEAM). The least radical of the three (TEAM) - whose membership was dominated by professionals, academics and others with strong links to the Liberal establishment - was also the most successful. Promising increased citizen participation in decision making, rapid transit, and planned, controlled, development emphasizing public amenities, TEAM swept into power in 1972 by electing 9 of 11 council members.

### 5.3 CITIZEN OPPOSITION AT THE NEIGHBORHOOD LEVEL: KITSILANO IN THE EARLY 1970'S

While many were committed to city-wide action, others continued to work at the neighbourhood level. In Kitsilano, a major controversy arose over attempts to build high rise apartments near Kitsilano Beach. The effect of such construction would have been to block the views of residents located behind the high rises and many feared increased densities and the creation of a new West End. After a series of submissions to Council and discussions with several developers, it was agreed that high rises would be restricted to the top of the hill overlooking Kitsilano Beach and the pressure group disbanded.

Another issue provided the impetus for more continuous organizing. West Broadway, a main shopping artery in Kitsilano was proposed for beautification by a private developer in late 1972. Part of the plan involved the demolition of existing housing to provide space for parking and new shops. When the owners of those houses discovered they might face expropriation, reaction was swift. The West Broadway Citizens

Committee (WBCC) was formed and after more than eight months' effort succeeded in halting the project.

Encouraged by their success, WBCC members decided to broaden their area of operation in an attempt to achieve their overall goals of neighbourhood preservation and resident control over development. They decided next to contest a proposed multi-storey apartment located in an area which, although zoned for a maximum height of 120 feet, did not yet contain any high rises. The issue was complicated by the fact that the high rise, to provide low cost senior citizen housing, was sponsored by a non-profit service club (The Shalom Branch No. 178 of the Royal Canadian Legion) and funded by all three levels of government.\* WBCC objections included the contentions that high rises were not suitable for senior citizen housing (see Audain, 1972), that the construction of such a building in the proposed location would set a precedent for additional projects, and that the project was inappropriate in an area of three storey apartments. The civic Design Panel agreed with the latter point and recommended refusal of the project although it was supported by the Technical Planning Board because it met zoning requirements. The Board referred the matter to City Council who granted their approval in September, 1973.

As the project moved through the levels of bureaucracy, resistance in Kitsilano grew, led by WBCC and the Kitsilano Citizens' Committee (KCC). The latter group, headed by Shelagh Day,\*\* who lived across the

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\* The city provided land rather than capital.

\*\* Day has been associated with human rights issues in B.C. and is now (1978) an equal opportunity officer at City Hall.



street from the project site, was formed specifically to contest the 7th and Maple project and was supported by the Kitsilano Area Resources Association (KARA).<sup>\*</sup> WBCC felt that two groups contesting an issue from essentially the same position would result in an inefficient campaign and suggested a common front under their leadership. Day and her followers declined the offer. KARA was slightly resentful of WBCC at this point, feeling that its role as 'representative' of the community was threatened. In the past, the strategy of KARA had been to provide citizens who reacted to a particular issue with the skills to further their resistance and then, when the issue was resolved, to withdraw until the next controversy arose. Consequently, while KARA provided WBCC with support services, it would have preferred that the group had disbanded after the Beautification issue was settled and left the leadership role in the 7th and Maple issue to KCC.

WBCC had a different perspective on citizen participation, believing that the KARA model of community involvement would not produce any significant change in the urban decision making process. Neighbourhood control over development would never be achieved by a reactive stance. A more radical alteration of traditional power relations would require the full efforts of a strong, committed body possibly allied with those of other, similar, neighbourhood groups. Hence WBCC saw involvement in issues as both a necessary task of any community group and as a means

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<sup>\*</sup> KARA was first formed in 1966 to provide community services; its activities included a weekly newspaper, planning services, an information centre and the provision of organizers for community groups.

of building neighbourhood support to contest more fundamental matters.

Disagreement over roles in concert with differences in opinion concerning tactics eventually caused WBCC, KCC and KARA to end cooperative efforts, although their positions regarding the 7th and Maple high rise were virtually identical. As the controversy continued, WBCC emerged as a much more effective unit than either KCC or KARA. KCC ceased operation in November, 1973, while WBCC gained the support of some 20 Kitsilano groups for its position on the high rise. Eventually the project was scaled down to four stories containing the same number of suites as the original proposal. In addition, WBCC was able to convince City Council to hold a public hearing which resulted in the downzoning of all Kitsilano to a three storey maximum limit. At this point (January, 1974) relations between KARA and WBCC were so bad that KARA spokesmen argued against downzoning at the hearing despite their earlier support. Ley (1974: 83) indicates that "this decision was primarily a political gesture directed against WBCC." KARA, never blessed with a large membership, gradually reduced its operations and ceased to exist by December, 1974.

While enjoying major success in its campaign against high rises, WBCC also suffered a defeat in its first major confrontation with a private developer. By the middle of 1973, the group had taken a position against condominium redevelopment, particularly objecting to the loss of moderate income housing and the social change that process entailed. When it became known (in the summer of 1973) that a project was proposed for a site at Third and Balsam Street that was both a condominium and a high rise, WBCC's opposition was vehement. The high rise

was to be located only one half block away from the western edge of the apartment zoned area, so that in addition to displacing moderate income tenants, the project threatened to facilitate future westward expansion of the high rise zoned area.

Land assembly for the development, which was to occupy seven lots, began early in 1973 and was completed by late March. Thirty-day eviction notices were issued at the end of November to fall due on December 31, 1973. During the period leading up to the issuance of eviction notices, WBCC attempted to organize the block residents. Petitions were circulated in the area and several public meetings were held. At the same time, there was a search for grounds which might permit the rejection of the development by city council. Both these endeavours were hindered by lack of resources but one fact which at first seemed to contain considerable promise was discovered.

Research regarding the land assembly revealed that there had been a change in the original development permit. One of the lots included in that application became unavailable as the owner, realizing he had been given false information as to the value of his property by the real estate agent who was assembling land for the developer,\* refused to sell after he had initially agreed to do so. Court action by the developer failed to gain enforcement of the original agreement to sell.

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\* In 1973 the developer, Imperial Ventures, was also involved in several other luxury condominium "adult only" projects in various parts of the Metro Vancouver area. At least one other of these projects was the subject of citizen opposition.

Hence, the developer was forced to buy another piece of property at the eastern end of the block thereby completing his assembly. This deal was concluded after the issuance of the development permit in September 1973, so that the necessary changes in legal description were pencilled in at a later date. WBCC took the position that this action invalidated the original development permit and a new one would have to be issued. They hoped this would give city council the opportunity to reject the development in light of an imminent downzoning hearing regarding the area, resident opposition to highrises, and TEAM's stated policy of citizen participation in decision making. Such was not to be the case, however. The Board of Administration reported to city council that such changes were routine even though they appear to contravene the Zoning and Development By-law which states:

It shall be unlawful for any person to erase, alter, or modify any development permit including the application thereof or any plans or drawings accompanying the same.

After this initial setback the energies of WBCC were switched to the interim downzoning of Kitsilano. This, as noted earlier, was achieved at a public meeting held on January 31, 1974 and that result provided a further reason for continuing to oppose the high rise which was now a non-conforming land use, although, of course, the downzoning could not be retroactive.

Further attempts to have the project blocked by city council proved fruitless. The provincial government was approached and while a spokesman from the housing department expressed sympathy, there was little the provincial government could do and no concrete action was forthcoming.

After receiving no aid from the provincial government, WBCC decided to halt the project by the use of a picket line. It was hoped that this strategy would stop construction and, as well, secure publicity regarding the reasons for opposition to the development. By this means further community support might be engendered and pressure brought to bear on city council. In the first instance, the picket line proved to be a successful tactic. Excavation was halted for the better part of three days and considerable publicity resulted. WBCC managed to arrange a meeting with the developer in which the possibility of constructing a three story building containing some low cost accommodation was discussed. The developer agreed to consider the idea but instead secured an injunction prohibiting further picketing. The action effectively ended WBCC's strong and consistent opposition to the project. A few further submissions were made to city council but they did nothing to halt the development which was completed in 1975 (see Plate 5.1).

Thus by the early months of 1974, WBCC had enjoyed mixed success in dealing with a TEAM-dominated City Council. In the case of the Third and Balsam high rise, the results had been particularly frustrating, and while WBCC had won the West Broadway Beautification, senior citizens high rise and downzoning issues, negotiations had not always been amicable. TEAM council members, many of whom were used to refined intellectual debate, thought of WBCC leaders as a group of disaffected, bellicose radicals with political ambitions who would not listen to reason. WBCC, on the other hand, considered TEAM to be a collection of elitist liberals who could not be trusted to keep their promises of increasing citizen participation. This adversary relationship probably



Plate 5.1      "The Carriage House", the last high rise completed in the Kitsilano apartment area. In 1974-75 suite prices ranged from \$60,000 to \$98,000 depending on floor space and location within the building.

reduced the possibility of council acting to change development trends in Kitsilano and certainly caused some WBCC members to have misgivings over their involvement in TEAM's attempt to promote resident involvement in neighbourhood decision making - the Local Area Planning Program.

#### 5.4 LOCAL AREA PLANNING IN KITSILANO

As part of its 1972 election platform, TEAM promised to foster citizen participation in decision making. Some of the founding members of TEAM (for example Art Phillips, Walter Hardwick and Peter Oberlander) owed their presence in politics in part to the freeway debate of the late 1960's which clearly demonstrated the importance and potential of such participation. Art Phillips in a pre-1972 election interview stated his intention to provide neighbourhoods with community planners "[to] enable citizens to say what happens in their neighbourhoods" (Hrushowy, Nov. 21, 1972: 5). But this was not to be the effect of Local Area Planning in Kitsilano.

Another key element in the TEAM platform was a range of policies designed to create a "liveable city". These included a continuation of office space growth in the downtown but with reduced densities and an emphasis on pedestrian activities, housing, public transit, character areas such as Gastown, and open space (The Province, Dec. 6, 1972: 28; The Vancouver Sun, Feb. 14, 1973: 20). No longer was the downtown to evolve simply as the property industry and big business dictated, TEAM reformers were determined to create a downtown where a pedestrian would be presented with a variety of street level activities; where people could work, live, and choose from a wide range of cultural and enter-

tainment options; where a car would be discouraged if not banned and where an appreciation of Vancouver's beautiful natural setting would not be denied to people by "walls of concrete and glass" (The Vancouver Sun, Feb. 14, 1973: 20).

This attractive package doubtless encouraged the massive growth in office space which occurred in the downtown during the early 1970's. Certainly the recruitment of the white collar workers required to fill office towers is easier in cities offering high levels of amenity (Ley, 1978). The growth of jobs and improvement of the downtown environment prompted a demand for high quality housing to meet the needs of the burgeoning white collar population. The inner city was the logical area for much of this housing with Kitsilano proving to be a particularly desirable neighbourhood. Thus TEAM efforts to change the downtown from the "industrial city" to the "liveable city" created much of the impetus for condominium redevelopment in Kitsilano. At the same time the Local Area Planning program was to determine what form of development (if any) neighbourhood residents preferred. By the middle of 1974 when Local Area Planning (LAP) got underway, the planning options were rapidly disappearing for at least the apartment zoned area.

After discussions between interested residents, the planner assigned to Kitsilano, and City Council's Standing Committee on Community Development, it was decided to form a planning committee composed of representatives of "major community and interest groups in the area" rather than hold neighbourhood elections. Planning was to be undertaken jointly by the committee and LAP staff on a "cooperative" basis. In the words of alderman Volrich, who was assigned as liaison between



City Council and Kitsilano residents:

The planners and citizens will work together to identify the issues and matters of concern to the community, to suggest solutions and courses of action, and to plan goals and policies for the future of the area, in other words, both will be initiators.

(Volrich, 1974: 2)

The obvious weakness of the LAP program from WBCC's point of view was that it involved no decentralization of decision making. A letter sent to the Kitsilano planner contained the following reservations:

We have no illusions that the program in its present form will result immediately in major decisions affecting Kitsilano being made by the community rather than city council.... Our participation... is based on the assumption that, over time, more and more of the control over local development within the community will be vested in the members of the groups and individuals who reside within this community.

(WBCC, 1974)

WBCC was not alone in its concern over the lack of actual community decision making invested in LAP. At a public meeting called to discuss the program, briefs presented by the Burrard NDP Association and the Kitsilano Planning Committee, a subgroup of KARA, discussed the same theme. They both pointed to the fact that no decentralization of decision making was built into the proposed LAP structure. City Council retained all the power. The Kitsilano Local Area Planning Committee (KLAPC) would act only as an advisory body. They would not be able to control local local development.

As the planning process began, it was decided to divide Kitsilano into land use areas and consider each separately. The logical first choice for consideration was the apartment area which was under considerable redevelopment pressure. In fact, it quickly became evident that planning would not be feasible unless the pace of redevelopment

was slowed. Consequently, the KIAPC decided to recommend to council that the area north of Fourth Avenue bounded by Larch and Burrard in which most redevelopment was occurring, should be downzoned to RT-2 (townhouses and conversions) until the planning process could be completed. The committee's submission to council contained the following points:

1. The present trend in condominium development is not providing moderately priced rental accommodation. At this time it is felt by the members that this area of Kitsilano should be primarily rental units.
2. There is the danger that a drastic change in the type of people in the area could occur through this form of development. It is not known who we should be planning for at this time. Until this is determined we should maintain the social character of Kitsilano.

(City of Vancouver, July 9, 1974)

Council briefly considered the committee's suggestion, and then voted it down by an 8-3 margin on July 9, 1974, even though it was supported by the Kitsilano planner, Don Janczewski, and the head of the City Planning Department, Ray Spaxman, who stated "the best way to preserve the options for the future of the community is to rezone the area on an interim basis" (City of Vancouver, July 9, 1974: 822).

Of TEAM members on council, only the most left leaning - Darlene Marzari, a social worker and Michael Harcourt, a lawyer - voted for the motion. They were joined in their vote by Harry Rankin, a founding member of COPE, a labour lawyer and avowed socialist. The remaining TEAM council members contradicted their earlier image of strongly sup-

porting citizen participation by voting against the initial submission of a planning committee they had themselves established. At the first meeting of that committee Alderman Volrich, one of those who voted against the motion, made the following statement:

... City Council and the various boards that effect planning within the area will be giving the highest regard to recommendations of this committee.

(Kitsilano Planning Office,  
1974a: 2)

This apparent discrepancy between word and deed added to WBCC's suspicions concerning the LAP process. Dissatisfaction grew as displacement and demolition increased during the summer and early fall of 1974. Finally, on October 2, 1974, a monthly WBCC meeting passed a motion demanding that the KIAPC approach city council with the following proposal:

"That no demolition permit be issued which provides for the destruction of rental accommodation unless:

1. The developer can provide other rental accommodation for those being displaced.
2. That this accommodation be of the same quality, quantity and price range.
3. That this accommodation be within the boundaries of Kitsilano if the resident so desires"

(City of Vancouver, Oct. 22, 1974).

After considerable debate, the KIAPC voted 7 to 1 in favour of this radical proposal and agreed to submit it to council. No motion on the submission was made because the powers required to implement it were not included in the City Charter.\* As an alternative, the Director of

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\* Alterations of the City Charter are a provincial responsibility but in this case no application for change was made.

Planning suggested that one means of resolving the present housing dilemma in the Kitsilano area was the "interim downzoning of the area until such time as the area development plan is finalized" (City of Vancouver, Oct. 22, 1974: 18).

2 Alderman Rankin, following up on this suggestion, reintroduced the proposal to downzone the apartment area to RT-2 first made in July. Again this proposal was voted down, this time by a 5 to 3 margin. However, a second motion made by Alderman Marzari, that each application for demolition of residential property in Kitsilano received in the next four months be reviewed by city council, was passed. That motion, however, was little more than a gesture without changes in the City Charter which would have allowed council to refuse demolition permits.

The absence of Council support for KLAPC submissions convinced WBCC that its energies would be better spent in other endeavours. It therefore withdrew from the Committee and began to organize a tenants' union whose goals were to ensure secure housing and adequate maintenance of rental accommodation for members. In addition WBCC continued to provide housing advice and to contest particularly disruptive eviction cases. Later sections of the Chapter will consider the performance of WBCC after leaving KLAPC.

The remainder of KLAPC returned to the problems of devising a plan for the apartment area. Before considering sub-areas, however, the Committee established overall planning goals for the neighbourhood as follows:

1. Kitsilano should grow to reach a reasonable and optimum population which will maintain the positive aspects of the area.

2. A diversity of people in Kitsilano should be maintained.
3. Diversity should be encouraged within the neighbourhoods of Kitsilano.
4. Allow a greater diversity of building types.
5. Old homes that are capable of providing sound housing should be retained wherever possible.
6. Commercial development should be in scale with the communities.
7. Explore alternatives to the present method of controlling development and design.
8. Efforts should be made to make Kitsilano more attractive.
9. Reduce noise levels.
10. Outdoor common space in the form of small parks and playgrounds should be within walking distance of everyone.
11. Public use of the Kitsilano waterfront should be ensured.
12. Residents should have the opportunity to remain in the area as it changes.
13. Continue to provide opportunities for resident involvement in the planning of the area.
14. Co-ordinate social service planning and the physical planning process.
15. Promote public transit in the area.
16. Through traffic should be discouraged from using residential streets - roads and transit facilities should be designed to have the least detrimental effect on the community.
17. Solve the problems caused by heavy parking in residential areas.

18. A dual approach will be adopted in dealing with community facilities by centralizing some and decentralizing others.

(Source: Kitsilano Planning Office, 1974b.)

These statements are so broad in scope that a discussion of them serves little purpose. Instead, the goals that apply specifically to housing and development will be considered in the context of a plan proposed for the apartment area.

A draft of the plan was completed in late 1974 and a public meeting was called to discuss it on December 16. The topics treated in the plan included transportation, housing, population increase and social change, commercial and industrial areas, parks, street improvements and social services. However, the discussion at the public meeting barely got past the first topic, transportation. One of the two suggestions\* to decrease the problem of through traffic using residential rather than arterial streets in the apartment area was the Burrard-Arbutus connector - a six lane road running from the Burrard Street bridge to the corner of Broadway and Arbutus Streets. This proposal was first made in the 1929 overall Vancouver plan prepared by Harold Bartholomew and had surfaced several times since. The most recent incarnation had been in 1969 when the idea had again been strongly resisted by Kitsilano residents. Thus to find the connector included in a plan which was supposedly based on Kitsilano citizen opinion was disquieting, particularly to those who were already suspicious of the IAP process. People at the meeting maintained that the main beneficiaries of the connector would be affluent Kerrisdale residents returning from

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\* The other was maintaining the status quo which was rejected because of the seriousness of the problem.

their downtown work places. One WBCC member suggested that an Angus Drive connector running from 16th Avenue and Burrard to Arbutus through the exclusive Shaughnessy district would be a more appropriate proposal! The Planner and a representative of the Engineering Department argued that the Connector would solve the problem of through traffic using residential rather than arterial streets in the apartment area. Those who disagreed pointed out that the Connector would run within a block of two senior citizen developments at Seventh Avenue and Maple Street. Moreover, the construction of the Connector would involve the demolition of rental housing when such housing was in short supply.

In the discussion, the representative of the Engineering Department and the Planner revealed that the Connector was the policy of City Council. This was not widely known and prompted the accusation that City Council was using the LAP process to introduce the Connector through the "back door". This point was reinforced by the fact that the KLAPC had previously voted against the Connector. Finally, the representative of the Engineering Department admitted that about 20 per cent of the problem could be eliminated by increasing flow via the proper regulation of stop lights and by the addition of a few stop signs on residential streets.

One of the few voices arguing for the Connector was that of George Moul, the president of Kitsilano Ratepayers Association, the same organization which had first resisted the proposal in the 1930's. Moul felt that the Connector would solve local traffic problems, would meet the future needs of the city and contribute to the orderly development of Kitsilano. His views were less than generously supported. The

Planner promised to sample opinion in the apartment area on the issue more broadly by means of a questionnaire which would include a range of options beyond those in the plan.

Because of the controversy surrounding the Connector, the remaining proposals were not fully discussed and so a follow-up meeting was called for January 14, 1975. At this meeting housing proved the most contentious issue. Policies in the plan relating to that issue were as follows:

1. The downzoning of parts of the area to encourage their retention because of architectural merit and the provision of moderate cost rental units. About 50 buildings totaling 265 units were covered by this proposal.
2. The encouragement of and aid to property owners who wished to remain in the apartment area. The aid would include entitlement to funding from the Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program (not previously available to residents of the apartment area), and downzoning of properties to RT-2 (at the owner's request) to reduce taxes and to permit long term preservation. RT-2 zoning permits conversions and townhouses as a conditional use.
3. The retention of 3 storey apartment zoning near the beach area (so that the views of dwellings behind that area would not be blocked), and on streets that already contained a preponderance of three storey walk-ups, coupled with the introduction of more flexible regulations in other parts of the area so that two stories would be an outright use but if certain features were included a maximum of four stories would be allowed. These features included units for families, senior citizens, and/or lower income people; usable open space; landscaping; and the retention of existing buildings compatible with the street's character.

The reaction of many at the meeting was that the proposals would not result in the retention of moderate income rental housing in the area because no control over demolition was included and the provision of moderate income units in new structures was at the behest of the



developer. Moreover, there was no control procedure to ensure that the units provided by 'density bonusing' would be made available to those for whom they were intended. Overall, little agreement emerged from the two meetings both of which were attended by a sizeable number of WBCC members and others who supported the group.

The reaction to the draft plan and other submissions to the KLAPC and LAP staff were considered before the final draft was prepared for presentation at a public meeting. Because of the many subjects treated in the plan and the focus of this thesis, only the most contentious policies (those dealing with housing and the Burrard-Arbutus Connector) will be considered.

Substantial revision of the draft plan had occurred but this had been mainly in detail and not in overall direction. However, the plan did recommend against the Burrard-Arbutus Connector because:

... the construction of the Connector is not considered appropriate when land use and the need for improved traffic flow is balanced in the long term. The traffic situation has existed up to this time without this development. It is also felt that the development of a road such as this at the present time with the de-emphasis on automobiles and highways may be a mistake. However, the negative environmental effect that this proposal will have upon residential areas is believed to be severe and most important.

(City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1975: 15.)

Thus resident opposition was heeded on this point.

With respect to proposed housing policies little change was apparent. The plan recommended raising the allowable Floor Space ratio (F.S.R.) from 0.6 to 1.0 for older homes, allowing town houses to be built on "locked-in" lots, a density bonusing system to allow greater FSR's as described earlier, "infill" housing, and the downzoning of owner occupied

houses to RT-2 upon request of the owner. In addition, relocation assistance was to be provided to tenants displaced by redevelopment, and site acquisition was to be initiated for senior citizens, and low to moderate income family housing. A public meeting was called to discuss the plan on April 29, 1975.

The meeting was attended by two aldermen, Michael Harcourt (a leftist TEAM member and Kitsilano resident) and Harry Rankin, the lone COPE representative on council. The chairman was Tom Hinkle, a member of KLAPC. Discussion began with the least controversial issues, bike paths and the like, but Jacques Khouri, WBCC Chairman, managed to force a change in the agenda by arguing that most people were in attendance to discuss housing and the Burrard-Arbutus Connector and should not be forced to sit through the presentation of less pressing issues. In the discussion that followed it was repeatedly maintained by residents that the plan would not protect existing low or moderate income housing or the inhabitants of that housing; too much depended on the goodwill of developers. The Burrard-Arbutus Connector was also strongly criticized and it was suggested that the properties the City had already purchased in assembling land for the Connector should be used for moderate income family housing.\*

WBCC members were in the forefront of the opposition although others took part as well. The tone and substance of their objectives is illustrated by figure 5.1 which shows a leaflet distributed throughout the

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\* The expression of opposition to the Connector continued despite a recommendation in the draft plan against it because Council members had yet to vote on the matter and they had the final say.

**PUBLIC MEETING**  
**TUESDAY, APRIL 29, KITS**  
**HIGH SCHOOL, 7:30 P.M.**

**3000 KITS RESIDENTS**  
**FACE EVICTION.**

WILL YOU BE ONE OF THEM? (see map - over)

**IS \$19,000+ YOUR INCOME?**

IF NOT, YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BUY THE  
CHEAPEST HOUSING PROPOSED FOR KITSILANO.

These startling results are part of the  
 latest KITSILANO MASTER PLAN PROPOSED BY  
 CITY PLANNERS & DEVELOPER/SPECULATORS.

It is likely you have not seen copies of  
 this Plan - Here's Why:

- (1) A 6-LANE FREEWAY (The Arbutus/Burrard Connector) will cut through the heart of Kitsilano eroding several neighbourhoods. (a) Many Houses have & will be demolished to meet the requirements of the connector. 300 units of good low cost housing could be built on the extra land required for the expanded freeway alone (b) This freeway is on the doorstep of 2 Seniors Housing Projects. (c) Cypress Street will be widened right by Henry Hudson School - children for roads! (d) A nice freeway for people from Shaughnessy & S.W. Marine Drive to get downtown.
- (2) INCREASED DENSITY 25% - 400% in some areas. This Means: (a) More cars on the street - increased pollution, noise, accidents, parking problems (you think York, Yew, Vine, 1st & 2nd are bad now!?) (b) overloading of present facilities e.g. parks, buses (c) increased loneliness, isolation alienation (d) related thefts, assaults, etc.
- (3) UPZONING - Organized residents, last year forced downzoning (no highrises) last year. Since then, developer pressure to upzone will see 3 stories go to 4.
- (4) HUGE DECREASE IN LOW-MIDDLE INCOME HOUSING (less than \$19,000 income) despite the fact that the plan talks about the need for more housing, 1200 Units of housing (for 3000 people) will come down. The more demolished, the greater the pressure to demolish still more.
- (5) MORE HOUSING FOR THE RICH - the City Planner calls this DIVERSITY. Kitsilano already has a wide variety of housing styles & life styles. Prices for 1 bedroom condominiums in Kitsilano average \$60,000. Some are over \$100,000. About 95% of residents presently living here cannot afford these prices.
- (6) "GOOD FAITH" OF DEVELOPERS & SPECULATORS is what the whole plan rests on - do you know one developer or speculator who acts in good faith?
- (7) The Planner says that "the housing will be aesthetically appealing" (nice) but 95% of us won't be here to enjoy it!



Pack Your Bags ..... if  
 you won't stay & fight!

**DON'T LET THIS PLAN SLIP THROUGH - COME OUT & FIGHT**

**WE AIM TO STAY**

**WEST BROADWAY CITIZENS COMMITTEE** - 2150 W. 4th.

apartment area prior to the meeting. The main opposition to the WBCC position came from George Moul and a few of his supporters who felt the Connector and the provisions of the plan generally would facilitate the orderly development of Kitsilano. Hinkle probably felt obliged to defend the plan because of his membership on the KIAPC and in doing so, suggested that the re-introduction of high rise zoning for the apartment area would occur if the plan was not supported. This ill-advised statement drew a chorus of boos from the crowd.

In another ill-advised action, WBCC supporters attacked Dan Jan-  
czewski, the Kitsilano Planner, on a personal basis for his failure, in their view, to produce a plan which would protect moderate income housing and tenants. Both Rankin and Harcourt pointed out that attacking staff was not the way to secure change. Rankin took the position that until a fundamental alteration in the political structure occurred, the only sensible strategy was to press city council with proposals that had some chance of acceptance. The results of the meeting were inconclusive, although more criticism than support of the plan was expressed. The Burrard-Arbutus Connector drew the strongest negative reaction with disapproval of housing policies second. After the public meeting, the plan and its policies were considered by City Council and adopted on May 6, 1975 with few revisions. The vote was unanimous.

#### 5.5 EVALUATION OF THE PLAN

The specific policies in the Kitsilano plan concerned with housing and the social consequences of redevelopment were:

- #1: In order to encourage the retention of some older housing, the floor space ratio allowed on homes in this area be increased to 1.0.

- #2: Townhouses be permitted in the multiple-family zone.
- #3: Owners of single-family homes, duplexes, conversion homes (as well as apartments) be eligible for housing maintenance assistance through the Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program (RRAP).
- #4: The City Planning Department's Heritage Group and Heritage Advisory Committee be requested to examine buildings or groups of buildings to determine if any merit designation for heritage reasons.
- #5: Owners of individual or groups of existing buildings be permitted to rezone their property from the present zoning to an RT-2 type zoning, at the owner's initiative, such rezoning to RT-2 to be reversible only with the consent of City Council.
- #6: 'Infill' housing be permitted in the apartment neighbourhood.
- #7: The RM-3A apartment zoning be modified to encourage a more imaginative form of development.
- #8: Relocation assistance should be provided for displaced tenants as an aspect of the redevelopment process.
- #9: Site acquisition be initiated for senior citizen and low/moderate income family housing.
- #10: Senior citizen and low/moderate income units be provided within new multi-family units through a 'bonus' system.
- #11: A limited number of properties at the present time be zoned to RT-2.

(City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1975: 1.)

It is informative to compare the intent of these policies with their effects. The increase in FSR, the provision of RRAP funds, infill heritage, and spot downzoning proposals were all intended to retain older buildings while the other proposals with the exception of policy #8 whose purpose is self-evident, were designed to encourage the construction of new low-to-moderate income, senior citizen, and family housing. Few obtained the desired result to any significant degree.

A report on the apartment area zoning in Kitsilano (City of Vancouver, 1977) contains the following table which breaks down development permit applications by purpose for the one and one-half year periods before and after adoption of rezoning proposals in the Local Area Plan. It is noteworthy that the 'add to and/or convert' category increased from 3 before rezoning to 11 after rezoning.

TABLE 5.1

NUMBER OF DEVELOPMENT PERMIT APPLICATIONS (AS OF JULY 15, 1977)

<u>Type of Development</u>	<u>1-½ year period before rezoning (RM-3A)</u>	<u>1-½ year period after rezoning (RM-3A1, RM-3B)</u>
Add to and/or convert	3 (12%)	11 (30%)
Alter existing Apartment	3 (12%)	9 (24%)
New Apartment	20 (76%)	11 (30%)
Townhouse + Infill	0 (not permitted)	6 (16%)
<b>TOTALS</b>	<u>26</u>	<u>37</u>

Source: City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1977: 6.

The author of the report indicates that the majority of these projects were of the 'add to' variety. However, this represents only about 2 per cent of the older buildings present in the apartment area as of 1975. Thus while the FSR increase proposal appears to have stimulated activity, its overall impact has been small. The townhouse policy produced 5 projects, all of which were expensive, albeit family housing; only one infill project was built and this provided moderate income family housing.\* The introduction of RRAP funding appears to have had a much greater

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\* This was sponsored by the Kitsilano Housing Society, an affiliate of WBCC and will be discussed later.

impact. At least 68 applications for RRAP assistance were received in the one and one-half year period following implementation of the plan. The terms of the program specify that only owner-occupiers with incomes below \$11,000 a year are eligible for forgivable grants; other owners may receive loans however, at 10 per cent interest. Landlords on the other hand may claim up to \$10,000 per unit consisting of a maximum grant of \$3,750 (which the landlord must match on an equal basis) and the balance, a loan at eight per cent.\* As there are few owner occupiers in Kitsilano with incomes below \$11,000 a year, landlords are the chief beneficiaries (Murdoch, 1976). This is somewhat unfortunate because while the renovation activity stimulated by RRAP encourages the retention of the remaining older housing in the area, increases in housing costs also result because the policing of rent increases following RAPP funded landlord owned projects is ineffective (Murdoch, 1976: 6). Moreover, initial rents after RRAP improvements may also be beyond the reach of moderate income people. One project in Kitsilano after receiving \$20,000 of RAPP funding offered two-bedroom suites at approximately \$350 per month (The Courier, August 26, 1976: 27). This rent while not outrageously high would only be affordable by a household earning more than \$16,500 a year. Thus the policies intended to retain existing housing have had mixed but generally limited success; the most successful of these (RRAP) appears to have had the side effect of adding to the cost of some rental units.

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\* The landlord may use the loan portion to match the forgivable grant.

The proposals for changes in apartment zoning were intended to encourage diversity and innovative design as well as the provision on moderate income, family or senior citizen housing. Expanded usable open space, roof gardens and increased balcony size are features of apartments submitted for approval under the new zoning regulations. As a result, "... new proposed apartments have varying degrees of ... innovative design and therefore contribute to the diversity of buildings." Moreover, the new apartments contain 32 per cent two-bedroom units "... suitable for families with children", although the zoning regulations call for only 20 per cent (City of Vancouver Planning Dept., 1977: 7). But there is no guarantee that these units will be occupied by families. Most two-bedroom suites in Kitsilano condominium projects completed under the previous zoning regulations were occupied by childless couples; also, most inner city condominiums do not permit occupancy by families with young children. In addition, the main proposal aimed at initiating the construction of new moderate income units has been totally unsuccessful: no project has attempted to take full advantage of density bonusing. Developers have claimed that in many cases they cannot provide the amount of usable open space required to obtain an FSR of 1.45 and build to an FSR of 1.95 which is allowed if non-market units are included in the project.\* It is also more than likely that a developer "[does] not want 'cheap' units in his 'luxury' apartment building" or "... may be afraid that an unnecessarily long time period may be involved in arranging for the bonused units" (City of Vancouver Planning Dept., 1977: 7).

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\* This difficulty is increased by the front footage restriction of 200 feet which is included in the new regulations.



In any case only 2 of 11 apartment projects accepted under the new zoning have so far been built. Both are expensive with suites in the \$60-70,000 range in one and in the \$80,000 bracket in the other. As mentioned neither contain non-market units.

Another policy intended to provide "sufficient low-cost housing... to replace that which is lost through redevelopment" (City of Vancouver Planning Dept., 1977: 3), has also enjoyed limited success. Site acquisition for senior citizen and low/moderate income family housing has involved the purchase of two parcels at the cost of \$375,000 in funds provided by the federal Neighbourhood Improvement Programme. As of June, 1978 these parcels had not been developed although construction of one project involving 9 units of family housing had begun. This limited achievement is attributed to difficulties in meeting "Federal social housing and funding regulations and the complexities of providing this type of housing moderate cost in an area with land costs geared to higher priced condominium units" (City of Vancouver Planning Dept., 1977: 3). In addition, the attempt to retain dwellings "not appropriately zoned as multiple-family" because "they are generally sound substantial houses" (Plan Policy #7) was entirely unsuccessful (City of Vancouver Planning Dept., 1975: 4). The plan recommended that 27 buildings comprising 146 units should be rezoned to RT-2 but the owners of those buildings opposed that proposal and it was eventually withdrawn. By the time the plan was in effect, one of the three blocks involved in the policy was already assembled and now contains two condominium developments.

The final policy to be considered here attempts to deal with the

effects of displacement (Policy #8). The implementation of this policy involved requiring developers to submit a letter with their development permit application stating whether the existing buildings on the site contain low income people, long term resident families or senior citizens and if so what assistance is being provided for such tenants. The statements in these letters are not checked, hence it is not surprising that all applicants "have either stated that the buildings are vacant, none of the tenants fall into the categories mentioned or 'reasonable assistance' would be provided" (City of Vancouver Planning Dept., 1977:3). It is claimed that the volume of complaints regarding displacement has lessened since the advent of this policy. It should also be noted that less redevelopment activity has occurred in Kitsilano during the same period than previously because of the 'soft' condominium market.

Overall, the plan policies have contributed to the diversity of expensive housing in the area. It would appear however that the proposals designed to encourage the retention of older buildings have achieved rather limited success and those aimed at the construction of moderate income units, almost none. This is a key point because the plan was intended to permit the evolution of the area to multiple-family densities while maintaining a diversity of income groups by the provision of "lower-income units... on a long-term basis rather than relying on the 'whims' of the market." However, "... unless long term policies are adopted to provide a mix of income groups, the demolition of the existing, potentially low-income housing should be prevented until the housing situation eases" (City of Vancouver Planning Dept., 1975: 9). McAfee (1977a) has shown that the situation for low to moderate income renters

remains serious. Yet there has been little movement towards providing low income accommodation "on a long term basis" or preventing the demolition of existing low income housing. For example, the Director of Planning, in an attempt to reduce the impact of redevelopment on low income renters, suggested the following amendments to the plan:

1. That no demolition permit that involves the loss of existing low-cost units be issued until a similar amount is provided within the area, either by private or government actions.
2. That no development permit for multiple-unit buildings be issued until a similar amount of units that may be lost are provided by either private or government actions.

(City of Vancouver Planning Dept., 1975a: 4.)

Council chose not to accept these amendments, thereby permitting the continued redevelopment of the apartment area without any effective means of rehousing moderate income tenants displaced by redevelopment.

#### 5.6 WBCC REACTION TO THE PLAN

As a response to the city plan and as a policy statement designed to engender neighbourhood support, WBCC proposed their own plan for the apartment area. Features of the plan included the goal of retaining "... every building that provides sound, secure housing at a reasonable rent or price" and a board, consisting of six elected Kitsilano residents and one alderman, empowered to rule on development and demolition permits for the neighbourhood. The board was to evaluate proposals using a series of guidelines including the following:

1. Developers must show that demolishing a building or reducing the number of suites in a building is the only economically feasible way of meeting the housing priorities (as defined by the board).

2. Developers must show that they are providing priority housing at a rent or price those needing that housing can afford before developments would be permitted.

(WBCC, 1975: 3-4.)

Priority was to be given to developments which would help to re-establish the social mix which was present in Kitsilano during the period 1966-71: more housing for families with children, and less for affluent childless couples. The essence of this plan was community control and neighbourhood preservation. Of course, its implementation would have required considerably more decentralization of decision making power than City Council was willing to support. Consequently, the WBCC plan received little consideration and none of its proposals were introduced.

Realizing that little was to be gained by dealing with City Hall, WBCC began to organize tenants in an attempt to gain enough power to force change. A new affiliate, Renters United for Secure Housing (RUSH), was formed to undertake this task. A concentration on tenant issues represented a departure for WBCC which, as mentioned above, was formed to contest an issue which mainly affected property owners. However, the leadership of WBCC, some of them founding members, realized that if redevelopment was allowed to proceed unchallenged in the apartment area, then other parts of the neighbourhood would come under strong pressure for up-zoning and subsequent redevelopment. As a second means of dealing with apartment area problems, the Kitsilano Housing Society (KHS) was set up by WBCC to purchase older housing and retain it primarily for moderate income families.

RUSH, despite some early successes (more than 150 units organized in the first few months of operation) never managed to attract enough

tenants for effective action. Difficulties encountered in organizing included tenant complacency, caused in part by the protections offered by the British Columbia Government's landlord and tenant legislation, very limited resources including a lack of full time paid staff, and the time pressures of advising tenants and contesting development issues - activities which continued in addition to organizing. Overall, tenants were reluctant to become involved with a tenant's union until their housing was directly threatened. Consequently, RUSH was constantly responding to crises rather than building a power base. After several attempts at mass organizing utilizing leaflet distribution (see Figure 5.2) and door-to-door campaigning, it was decided to return to contesting local issues and providing tenant advice. This approach was intended as a means of generating support preparatory to larger scale organizing. However RUSH was not able to maintain their store front office through membership contributions and was forced to close it in June, 1976 - at which time both RUSH and WBCC ceased to be an active force in Kitsilano.

At this point the efforts of long time WBCC members were transferred to the Kitsilano Housing Society (KHS) which appeared at first to face greater obstacles than the tenants' union. The aim of the Society was to buy key properties to prevent assembly for condominium development, at the same time providing a continuing stock of low-to-moderate income housing in the apartment area. The strategy was to attract enough money for down-payments through private subscriptions and then finance the remaining costs. Once a building was purchased, KHS and the tenants would together establish a rent structure which would provide sufficient cash flow to cover debt servicing, taxes and maintenance. No rental increases would occur with the exception of those required to cover in-

renters  
united  
forsecure  
housing  
2150 w 4th  
van b.c.

# EVICCTIONS CAN BE STOPPED!

## BUT you must act before it happens

3000 TENANTS IN YOUR NEIGHBOURHOOD WILL BE EVICTED SHORTLY BECAUSE . . .

1. CITY HALL HAS APPROVED A REDEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR YOUR AREA (RM3A) WHICH:
  - (a) promotes luxury, high-priced condominiums (you need an income of \$19,000)
  - (b) calls for demolition of existing rental accomodation and forcing out of tenants.
2. YOU ARE PROBABLY ONE OF THESE TENANTS (you live in the RM3A area); HUNDREDS HAVE ALREADY BEEN EVICTED.
3. YOU MAY THINK YOUR LANDLORD IS A "GOOD GUY" BECAUSE YOUR RENTS ARE LOW! FREQUENTLY THIS MEANS THAT THE LANDLORD INTENDS TO SELL - LARGE PROFITS WILL BE MADE WHEN HE SELLS TO DEVELOPERS - SO HE CAN AFFORD TO KEEP THE RENTS LOW, PARTICULARLY, IF IT MEANS PUTTING LITTLE WORK INTO THE PREMISES.
4. SOME TENANTS HAVE FOUND OTHER ACCOMODATION, ONLY TO BE EVICTED AGAIN.
5. IF YOU ARE LUCKY TO FIND A SUITE (the vacancy rate in Kits is less than 1%), ON THE AVERAGE YOUR RENT WILL BE 50% HIGHER THAN YOUR RENT NOW.
6. TENANTS HAVE A RIGHT TO DECENT HOUSING ACCOMODATION AND TO SECURITY OF HOUSING.

\* TO STOP THESE EVICCTIONS MANY TENANTS ARE, AT LAST, ORGANIZING TOGETHER BEFORE EVICTION HAPPENS.

\* YOU CAN DO VERY LITTLE TO STOP EVICTION BY YOURSELF, BUT MANY TENANTS, TOGETHER, CAN STOP THEM.


\* THE IDEA IS - YOU HELP OTHER TENANTS IN THE ORGANIZATION WHEN THEY NEED IT, AND THEY WILL HELP YOU WHEN YOU NEED IT. (We don't have millions of \$\$\$, like developers and City Hall, but we do have thousands of tenants; when these tenants organize together they can wield an incredible amount of power.)

\* ORGANIZED TENANTS CAN DEMAND AND GET: (1) NO EVICTIONS (2) CLEAN AND DECENT HOUSING (3) NO ILLEGAL RENT HIKES - above 10.6% (4) NO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN (5) NO DEPOSITS - which tie up tenants' money.

DON'T WAIT UNTIL IT'S TOO LATE, SIGN UP NOW - call \_\_\_\_\_ or drop in to  
2150 West 4th Avenue, Monday to Friday 1:00 - 9:00 p.m., and Saturday from  
12:00 to 5:00 p.m.

p.s. If you can't support your fellow tenants then please, at least, return to us the enclosed computer card when you receive your eviction notice.

HELPING TENANTS TO MANAGE BETTER.



creased operating costs.

Jacques Khouri, Chairman of KHS, managed to raise \$16,500 which allowed the purchase of three buildings totalling 10 units at First Avenue and Maple Street. KHS outbid Andre Molnar, a well known Vancouver developer of expensive condominiums, paying \$130,000 for the site which was obtained from conventional mortgage lenders.

In March of 1976 KHS attempted to expand their holdings by applying to City Council for \$100,000 in seed money which would have permitted the purchase of \$2,000,000 worth of rental property. Council refused this request. Undaunted, KHS approached CMHC for funding and eventually received an \$8,000 start-up grant to begin upgrading of the site at First Avenue and Maple Street. After discussion with an architect and the tenants, it was decided to 'infill' the lot. This involved the construction of five townhouse units suitable for single parent families. After negotiating with CMHC, funding for the 'infill' project was obtained and construction was completed in 1977. Costs of the units, including land, averaged \$32,000 which is considerably below the price of other newly constructed accommodation in Kitsilano (see Plate 5.2).

When CMHC took over project financing, KHS was able to recapture its original investment and begin to look for another site. The result of this search was an older apartment building containing nine units located at Broadway and Vine. Again the downpayment (\$35,000) came from public subscription (the Buy Back Kitsilano Fund) and this time the \$25,000 second mortgage was provided by the Metropolitan Council of the United Church at a very low interest rate (The Vancouver Sun, May 20,



Plate 5.2 The first KHS project. In the foreground are the two refurbished existing buildings. The 'infill' townhouses can be seen to the right of the picture.



Plate 5.3 The second KHS project. The picture shows the solar heated town house units.



1977: 9). Further, KHS managed to secure a National Research Council demonstration grant to offset the cost of incorporating solar heating in the 'infill' section of the project (see Plate 5.3). In the meantime CMHC agreed to provide other construction costs of the eight townhouses to be included in that section. After construction is completed, the project will provide 17 units of moderate cost housing most of which will be suitable for families and will operate as a cooperative (Western News, April 12, 1978: 1).

Thus KHS using the money of members and supporters has succeeded in providing 32 units of moderate cost housing while retaining existing buildings and preventing evictions. This is of course exactly the approach to redevelopment WBCC had consistently advocated and represents greater production than the City has yet been able to achieve under their site acquisition policy which was included in the apartment plan.\* Hence WBCC, now as KHS, has remained steadfast in their philosophy and have demonstrated that their position is workable. Of course, the total number of units provided is small and does not come close to solving the problem of inner city moderate income housing, but, considering the obstacles (limited initial support from government at all levels, protracted negotiations and the like), it is an impressive achievement.

Throughout, WBCC and its affiliate groups maintained a consistent set of principles and fought to impress them upon the landscape. The

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\* One of the two sites purchased with NIP funds is tentatively scheduled for 32 townhouses but this project remains far from a firm proposal. The other site has 9 units under construction. It is anticipated that the units will serve as moderate income housing although income requirements have not been firmly established.

tactics used in this regard often resulted in confrontation and embittered adversaries. This belligerent posture reduced the possibility of gaining concessions from either the City or Provincial Government but at the same time appeared to add to the group's commitment and drive. In any event, there is nothing to suggest that the types of concessions (decentralization of decision making and funding for moderate income housing) desired by WBCC would have been forthcoming if the group had maintained more amicable relations with government.

### 5.7 THE DEMISE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

The inability of WBCC to convince City Council to take action in the redevelopment issue stemmed from a lack of sufficient municipal funds to permit an adequate moderate income housing program, a reluctance on the part of TEAM leadership to "interfere" with the housing market and a growing dissatisfaction among its leadership with the complexities of citizen participation. This dissatisfaction became apparent during the initial attempt at local area planning (IAP) in the City's West End. Both citizens and planners involved in the program stated that Council did not take their suggestions seriously. Paul Murphy, spokesman for the West End Community Council, contended that "... City Council is more interested in creating the illusion of participation than in responding to the reality ... I think Council is playing games with us. The planning team is visible here but that's about all." (The Vancouver Sun, May 21, 1974: 18). Lynn Uibel, co-ordinator of the West End Planning Team, complained that "... not all our recommendations are being listened to. It's sometimes very frustrating," and commented further:

"I think that Council sometimes wants to use local area planning teams as buffers so that it doesn't have to listen directly to community groups."  
 (The Vancouver Sun, May 21, 1974: 18.)

Uibel finally resigned, at least partially because "... Council backed out of citizen participation." He maintained along with other members of the planning team, that "... Council has been frightened away from LAP because citizens have not endorsed everything put forward by City Hall." ( The Vancouver Sun, August 13, 1974: 6).

Uibel was not the only planner to resign as a result of disagreements with City Council over the LAP program. Dan Janczewski, the local area planner in Kitsilano from May to September of 1974 and later the Local Area Planning coordinator for the City, resigned in January of 1976 after a series of disputes with Council over a rezoning of the Downtown East Side. Janczewski and the planning department proposed the area be rezoned from industrial to residential usage to protect its 2,400 housing units and to allow NIP funding to be used to upgrade neighbourhood facilities. Mayor Phillips wanted the area to remain under industrial zoning so that developers anxious to expand Gastown or build office buildings adjacent to the police station and law courts could be accommodated. The dispute culminated with the Mayor accusing Janczewski and the planner for the area, Dorothy Jan, of producing "incompetent crap" and telling them to "get off your ass" at a public meeting called to discuss options for the Downtown East Side (Glover, 1975: 26). Janczewski claims that the dispute over the Downtown East Side is indicative of a fundamental difference in viewpoints concerning development goals: "Vancouver is still in the 'City Beautiful' mentality ... whereas most planners are now trying to develop the 'City Humane'" (Glover, 1975: 26).

Throughout, Mayor Phillips and other TEAM aldermen continued to chip away at the foundations of citizen participation and LAP. At a TEAM meeting in 1974, Phillips succeeded in having a motion which supported "citizen participation in neighbourhood planning and decision making" changed to "citizen participation in neighbourhood planning at the appropriate time" (Sewell, 1974). He also clashed with the Director of Planning publicly over the direction of LAP and stated that a six months program should be sufficient for one community. In Phillips's view no ongoing neighbourhood planning process was necessary. Antagonism from Council was also evident in their tendency to question the legitimacy of the representatives of LAP committees. Alderman Bowers, in discussing a downzoning proposal made by the KLAPC, said, "We should know if we're hearing from 20 kooks or if what we're being told is representative" (The Province, Aug. 2, 1974: 25). Of course Council had previously appointed the KLAPC. It appears that the LAP experience in Vancouver is by no means unique. Anderson (1977) studied neighbourhood planning in four cities (Vancouver, Toronto, Hamilton and Winnipeg), interviewing 43 planners, and found that:

most of the (local area planning) programs have limited (if any) success. And most planners involved quickly become disillusioned with their role in the planning process. Instead of acting as resource people for community-based, decision making groups, they discover that City Council expects them to act as buffers, protecting politicians from their constituents. Their primary function is not to change the status quo, but to maintain it. (Anderson, 1977: 35.)

According to some TEAM aldermen the controversy over citizen participation resulted from a widespread misunderstanding of TEAM policy on the matter. Walter Hardwick, a TEAM alderman from 1968 to 1974,

differentiates among three government models: corporate, the NPA system explained earlier; participatory, where "the elected official is seen as directly accountable to the wishes of constituents, continuously interacting with them, and presenting their views in council debate"; and consultative, where "policy making (rests) with a representative council, prepared to draw advice from both the professionals and the public, and then transform it into plans and policies." (Hardwick and Hardwick, 1974: 93.) Alderman Volrich made it clear that in his view TEAM favoured the consultative model: "... our policy has never been one of giving decision-making power to citizens' groups. It never has been and I don't think it should be" (The Vancouver Sun, Aug. 13, 1974: 6). Yet TEAM spokesmen did not make that clear during the 1972 campaign. The then TEAM mayoralty candidate, Art Phillips, decried the fact that "too many think citizen involvement is a nuisance to be tolerated only if necessary" (The Province, Nov. 24, 1972: 5) and promised to "guide the development of the City according to the wishes of the people" (The Vancouver Sun, Aug. 13, 1974: 6). While these statements do not promise decentralization of decision making, they contain the implication that citizen opinion would strongly influence the actions of a TEAM Council. Certainly Phillips maintained that "... it has always been my position that unless there is an overriding civic interest, then we should do what the neighbourhood wants" (The Courier, July 3, 1975: 1).

But TEAM was also determined to take a strong leadership role because, in Phillips's words:

... big decisions (in land development) in recent years have been made by senior civil servants .... Basically, Council has abdicated the policy making role to senior staff. There has been insufficient thinking in terms of

broad policy. Instead, development of real estate has been a series of ad hoc decisions. There has been no real overall plan that you could plug anything into. Council must become the decision making body....

(The Province, Dec. 6, 1972: 28.)

Thus TEAM attempted to balance its commitment to citizen participation against its determination to guide city development with a view to achieving particular policy goals, especially the creation of the "live-able" city as described earlier. This balancing was not a difficult problem as long as there was a high level of agreement between Council and public opinion. However, when it became clear during the LAP process that such accord did not always exist, TEAM began to change its position on citizen participation -- as indicated by Mayor Phillips's 1974 restatement of TEAM policy on that issue, the failure of the majority of TEAM Council members to support proposals made by the KLAPC which they had appointed, and clashes with planning staff over the duration and importance of LAP.

In the case of Kitsilano, Council's reluctance to support tenant representations was increased by financial pressures. Redevelopment added to property values which in turn resulted in increased tax revenues. As Phillips in 1972 stated:

... municipal councils are so dependent on property taxes it makes it easy for them to opt for developments that will produce added revenue. This is one of the arguments developers use. And it strikes home.

(The Province, Dec. 6, 1972: 28.)

In addition, council was pressed by speculators, homeowners and landlords to protect their investment by retaining existing zoning. Finally the redevelopment of Kitsilano was consistent with TEAM's view of desirable development because it provided high quality centrally located

housing - a necessity for the continued evolution of the downtown as a financial and management centre.

## 5.8 SUMMARY

We have seen that different attitudes towards inner city redevelopment held by the TEAM majority on Council and WBCC members led to conflict. WBCC was almost exclusively concerned with development trends in Kitsilano and worked to retain that neighbourhood's stock of affordable rental units. TEAM, on the other hand, was committed to the revitalization of central Vancouver and was supportive of a series of measures intended to achieve that goal including the provision of diverse residential opportunities for downtown workers by means such as condominium redevelopment. Consequently while some council members expressed concern over the social effects of private inner city redevelopment, the TEAM majority was not anxious to curtail a process which was producing what they considered to be a desirable product.

The nature of the conflict between TEAM and WBCC was illustrated by the discussion of a series of issues relating to Local Area Planning, demolition control and downzoning. It was shown that overall the local area plan prepared for the apartment district increased redevelopment possibilities and failed to provide affordable units to replace those lost through demolition. Moreover, city council was unwilling to adopt downzoning or demolition control measures which might have reduced the rate at which moderate cost rental stock was disappearing.

Because of the problems with WBCC and other neighbourhood groups, the majority of TEAM council members grew disenchanted with the LAP pro-

gram and attempts were made to de-emphasize its importance. Some TEAM aldermen claimed that the controversy surrounding the LAP program resulted from a misunderstanding of TEAM policy on the matter. According to those spokesmen the intention never was to decentralize decision making but rather to take into account neighbourhood opinion in reaching council decisions which affected those neighbourhoods.

Realizing that City Council was unwilling or unable to halt the loss of affordable rental units in Kitsilano, WBCC tried unsuccessfully to organize a tenants' union whose function would have been to ensure security of tenure. A second undertaking of WBCC was the creation of KHS, which managed to produce 37 rental units mostly suitable for families.



## Chapter 6

### INNER-CITY CHANGE AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

#### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

As we have seen, the LAP Program was not very successful in dealing with the social problems created by redevelopment in Kitsilano. This chapter will examine a more ambitious attempt to deal with these problems -- the creation of a Municipal Housing Corporation. The success of Vancouver in that regard will be contrasted with the achievements of a similar corporation in Toronto. In addition, there will be a general review of the way in which the low income housing programs and policies of the senior levels of government affect municipal efforts in housing production.

#### 6.2 MUNICIPAL NON-PROFIT HOUSING EXPERIENCE - VANCOUVER AND TORONTO

At first, the creation of a Non-Profit Housing Corporation appeared to be an ideal strategy for attacking the problem of low-income housing. City Government with its intimate knowledge of Vancouver's housing problems would set the priorities and the senior levels of government would provide most of the funding. Unfortunately, the activities of the Corporation were so beset with difficulties that it failed to initiate any substantial new construction, and its director, Maurice Jeroff, resigned after only one year. The following gives an indication of the problems which contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Vancouver Housing Corporation:

Jeroff experienced the frustration of attempting to construct housing which met CMHC, Provincial and City Planning guidelines for family housing.... combined with the lack of front-end financial support from the city, an absence of agreed-upon city housing goals and strong citizen opposition to locating projects in existing communities. (McAfee, 1977b: 21.)

The lack of front-end funding in conjunction with a lack of full-time staff prevented the housing corporation from initiating its own site acquisition program; instead it was forced to call on developers to offer sites which would then be purchased using NHA Section 15.1 funding. This approach proved less than satisfactory:

The Vancouver experience suggests that the proposal call method may well bring forth marginal sites upon which developers are unsure of the future marketability of units. Architects employed by developers, normally accustomed to building higher density adult-oriented accommodation, are not necessarily those most experienced in identifying and designing for the physiological and psychological needs of lower income, often single parent families with young children. (McAfee, 1977b: 24.)

Further difficulties were created by a lack of direction from Council:

Absence of a clear council mandate to provide accommodation for persons on modest incomes, the lack of agreement whether land in lower cost suburban single family areas should be developed for multiple family housing and the absence of agreed upon guidelines as to what constitutes acceptable higher density housing resulted in varying levels of understanding about a city housing corporation and equally varying levels of commitment by council members to corporation activities.

(McAfee, 1977b: 22.)

In fact most aldermen assigned responsibility for housing to the Federal and Provincial governments, and while willing to accept any units the Corporation was able to secure under programs funded by those governments, they were reluctant to allocate any municipal money to housing. Given the limited resources of municipalities, this is not a surprising

attitude, but one wonders if it is a correct one given the relative success of the Toronto Housing Corporation.

The reform council elected in Toronto in 1972 set out to develop a housing policy for the city which would serve the needs of the disadvantaged and eliminate the problems experienced by earlier large scale urban renewal and slum clearance programs. To accomplish this goal, council established a task force which towards the end of 1973 submitted a report entitled Living Room: an Approach to Home Banking and Land Banking for the City of Toronto. The policy developed by the report was intended "to guide both public and private developers in building housing that would serve people the market had overlooked" and provide for "the protection and improvement of the city's neighbourhoods and their existing housing" (Stutz: 1977:14). Towards these ends a City Non-Profit Housing Corporation was created and the existing City Housing Department was expanded so that it could deal with the planning, development, and administration responsibilities of the corporation.

As with any new undertaking, particularly one of this magnitude, start-up problems were encountered. In 1974 and 1975, the Housing Program was able to begin construction on only 341 units of new assisted housing while obtaining funding commitments for a further 700 units. The goal for the same period was 1400 units. However, the acquisition and rehabilitation undertaken by the existing housing section of the program was able to purchase 1034 units in 1974 and 1975 compared with a projected quota of 825 units. Almost 60 per cent of the acquired units were suitable for families, rents were kept well below market levels, and tenants were encouraged to take an active role in the man-

agement of their buildings. Overall, most problems in all sectors of the program were related to bureaucratic delays. Particularly troublesome areas were funding negotiations with CMHC and the approval of rezoning applications by the Ontario Municipal Boards (City of Toronto Housing Department, 1976).

Despite the many positive aspects of Toronto's housing program, particularly compared with Vancouver's limited efforts in housing policy and production, the former has been criticized. Caulfield (1974) maintained that the program scale was too small to deal with Toronto's housing problems, that the spread of town houses in older working class neighbourhoods remained unchecked and that Mayor Crombie used the limited production of the housing program to justify granting developers the right to continue with expensive projects, even though those projects were resisted by neighbourhood residents and involved the demolition of low cost housing.

Irrespective of the truth of Caulfield's criticisms however, the fact remains that in Toronto the council has taken a much more active role in housing matters than in Vancouver. This unequal level of performance has resulted from several factors. First, Vancouver's council never provided the sort of firm policy direction contained in the Living Room statement. Yet council was certainly aware of the major housing problems facing a minority of Vancouver residents. In 1974, Michael Harcourt, then a TEAM alderman and chairman of the Housing and Environment Committee stated that city housing policy should be directed at "... giving priority to encouraging the development of housing for working families and senior citizens, filling the need for special-

ity housing such as single men's hostels, neighbourhood rehabilitation schemes, and tougher bylaw enforcement ... to control blockbusting" (The Vancouver Sun, Feb. 28, 1974). While in general form these goals are not dissimilar from those included in Living Room, they were never translated into specific production quotas or programs. The absence of a concrete policy framework proved troublesome. In fact McAfee (1977b: 25) argues that: "Experience with the Vancouver City Housing Corporation suggests that it is unrealistic to initiate a housing construction program in the absence of agreed upon city housing goals." The lack of policy direction despite the obvious need for such direction probably resulted from the majority of Council viewing social housing either as a low priority concern or the responsibility of other levels of government. Certainly, during the period in question, much of Council's attention was focused on downtown rezoning and False Creek redevelopment. The latter project was likely perceived as sufficient City involvement in the production of subsidized housing. It should be remembered however that of the approximately 300 assisted units built in False Creek, only one-third were occupied by the groups most in need - single and two parent low income families. (Parker, 1979 ).

A second contribution to Vancouver's weak housing record has been the attitude of the great majority of the City's residents who, already well housed themselves, were reluctant to support the financing of subsidized housing or the rezoning of small parcels of land in single family areas to permit the construction of compact family housing. In 1976, council approached the electorate with a five year capital borrowing program. Because the program had been defeated twice earlier, it was

divided into sections with the idea that at least partial acceptance might be achieved. However, with the exception of public works and firehalls, all sections, including a \$5,000,000 housing proposal, were defeated. A polling map (Skinnarland, 1977: 12) shows that, generally, inner city neighbourhoods supported the housing program while single family areas voted against it. This pattern probably reflected substantial inner city housing problems and also property owner concern over taxes and their lack of interest in housing for disadvantaged groups. Residents of single family areas also strongly opposed attempts to locate subsidized multiple dwelling projects in their neighbourhoods. They feared that such projects would reduce property values, encourage speculators, and set a precedent for further rezonings. The majority of council was sympathetic to these objections and refused to rezone four city owned properties located in single family areas even though the rezoning was sought by Maurice Jeroff, the City Housing Corporation Director, to allow the construction of compact family housing.\* Council also turned down several other rezoning applications involving private co-operative projects.<sup>5</sup> Mayor Phillips gave two major reasons for his vote against a rezoning in the Dunbar area:

"First, it has always been my position that unless there is an overriding civic interest, then we should do what the neighbourhood wants. Secondly, I believe that single family neighbourhoods are worth preserving. Mine was not a vote against co-op housing, it was a vote against spot zoning" (The Courier, July 3, 1975: 1).

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\* City Council bowed to neighbourhood resistance in 4 of 6 cases involving the rezoning of city owned land for subsidized family housing to be built by City Housing Corporation. The Greater Vancouver Regional District Housing Corporation built family units on the two sites that were rezoned.

NPA aldermen voting against rezonings argued similarly but made other points as shown in the following statement by Alderman Bird:

"The city would have been subsidizing PENTA [the co-operative group involved in the Dunbar project] to the tune of \$5,000 a unit.\* We simply couldn't afford it.... Housing is the responsibility of the Provincial Government" (The Courier, June 26, 1975: 2).

The position of the majority of Council with respect to spot rezoning in single family areas added to the problems faced by the Housing Corporation. The City did not own sites suitable for family projects in multiple dwelling zoned areas. Moreover, because of the cost of such sites, their acquisition was impossible under CMHC funding regulations.

Thirdly, the election of the Social Credit Party to provincial government in 1975 resulted in a change of attitude towards municipally produced housing. The previous NDP administration had actively encouraged the creation of a Vancouver Housing Corporation and promised support for its activities; however such support was not high on the Social Credit list of priorities.\*\* This change in government perspective presented the Corporation with further difficulties as it attempted to gain sufficient backing to make units available to households earning less than \$12,000 annually.

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\* This subsidy was in the form of a reduction in the cost of the city owned land which was to be used for the project.

\*\* Overall, the Social Credit government has reduced spending directed at the construction of assisted housing and increased expenditures on income subsidies. The Shelter Aid for Elderly Renters (SAFER) program is an example of this change in emphasis. See Mercer, 1978, for a full discussion.

Fourthly, the operations of the Housing Corporation were troubled by some questionable management decisions and a certain amount of inter-departmental squabbling. With respect to the former, the most obvious example was the decision not to hire full time staff. As a result, the Corporation was forced to use staff from other departments on a part-time basis, which slowed down the development of proposals. Moreover, the part-time staff came from departments which did not always share the priorities of the Corporation. For example, the Planning Department was assigned much of the Corporation's site selection and analysis work. Yet, the Director of that Department, Ray Spaxman, objected to a proposal by Maurice Jeroff involving the construction of several apartments to serve as family accommodation. Spaxman argued that the design for these apartments lacked features necessary for successful family housing such as direct ground access for each unit (The Vancouver Sun, June 26, 1976: 11). Before that question could be resolved Jeroff had resigned. However, the nature of the problem demonstrates why it was important for the Corporation to have clear policy guidelines and enough full time staff for implementation.

Thus the attempts of Vancouver's Housing Corporation to augment the dwindling supply of affordable family rental housing in the inner city met with limited success as a result of less than enthusiastic support by council, a lack of adequate funding and policy direction, the withdrawal of some provincial programs and public opposition to subsidized housing. Of even greater importance, considering the level of costs involved, were the priorities of CMHC. The following comments included in a report prepared by the City of Toronto Housing Department illustrate



the nature of municipal disaffection with the activities of CMHC:

The most serious failure of federal housing policy last year was that the Federal Government, contrary to most municipalities and the provinces and the great majority of Canadians, did not perceive assisted housing to be a high priority in the allocation of resources.... Direct lending by CMHC accounted for \$821 million and \$257 million was set aside for such programs as senior citizen, public housing and rural housing. These latter programs serve low income Canadians, those worst hit by inflation. The CMHC direct lending programs, on the other hand, serve moderate and middle income households. In 1975, federal housing policy acted as a mechanism for transfer payments to middle income households ... moderate and middle income [CMHC] programs took the larger share of resources, some 68 per cent, in 1974 and 1975.... [Overall], 34 per cent of federal budgetary resources in housing [including tax measures] go to low income groups while middle income groups get 66 per cent. (City of Toronto Housing Dept., 1976: 37-8.)

### 6.3 FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY

Dennis and Fish (1972) have argued that the second class status of low income housing programs has resulted from a reluctance on the part of national officials to put those programs in a policy context. Instead the federal government has used housing "as an economic lever, to control employment and growth" and generally allowed the private market to decide the nature and distribution of housing production in Canada (Dennis and Fish, 1972: 128). As a result, those with substantial economic means are better served while many poor and moderate income households face continual housing difficulties. If this situation is to be corrected, "the basic value judgements about what constitutes the equitable distribution of society's housing resources must be made before the market functions are called into play" (Dennis and Fish, 1972: 348).

Failing such a fundamental change in approach, existing programs intended to deal with the housing problems of low to moderate income

households must be more carefully designed. For example, a major attempt to increase private production of rental units (the Assisted Rental Program - ARP) has had marginal success in providing the type of housing most needed in Vancouver - affordable rental units suitable for families. McAfee (1978) comments as follows:

While ARP may be a profitable exercise from the perspective of the investor, the benefits to the community are less obvious. In the initial phases of the program, ARP subsidies were similar for all sizes of units. Given the higher rate of return for building bachelor and one-bedroom units, ARP subsidies lead to an imbalance in the type of new stock provided. During 1977, only 9% of 1,141 ARP units produced in the City were two-bedroom, potential family units. The remaining 23% bachelor and 68% one-bedroom units duplicated the type of stock currently available in the City.

As well as failing to provide the type of accommodation most needed, ARP is not supplying moderate cost units: "At 30% of income, most ARP units are only affordable to households earning in excess of \$12,000 annually." In the City of Vancouver, only about one-third of renters fall into that category (McAfee, 1978: 9). Of course, there are many worthwhile aspects of CMHC programs. The decision to fund co-op projects on a continuing basis has proved particularly beneficial. In addition, NIP and RRAP have provided substantial funds to assist in the stabilization of inner city communities. False Creek redevelopment would have been impossible without extensive financial participation by the senior levels of government. The new federal low income program is capable of providing family accommodation for households earning as little as \$10,000 per year. However, this may not happen, because:

For every household paying less than the average rent [the amount necessary to cover principal, interest, taxes and operating costs] another household must make up the difference. It will be necessary to attract high income households (\$15,000+) into the program in order to offset the lower rents paid by less affluent households. Since the

program is unlikely to attract these higher income households due to viable alternative housing the net result will be that the new "low income" program will only penetrate to a moderate income level and cannot serve the needs of very low income households.

(City of Vancouver Housing Planning Team, 1979: 23).

Overall, despite considerable capital expenditures, housing for lower income households is not being provided.

In 1977, new "affordable" units assisted by governments potentially helped one household in 300 of the non-elderly households listed as having a housing problem. Most "assisted" units are affordable only to households having incomes in excess of \$12,000. Only 28% of "assisted" units built in the City in 1977 were affordable to the majority of renters.

(City of Vancouver Housing Planning Team, 1979, 18.)

In Vancouver, some 40,000 tenant households currently face affordability problems (Table 6.1).

TABLE 6.1

INCOME RELATED HOUSING SHORTFALLS BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE (1978)

Families With Young Children

<u>Income</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>
- \$8,000	1,000 units
\$8,000-12,000	8,000 units
\$12,000-18,000	7,000 units
over \$18,000	ample supply

Households Without Young Children

<u>Income</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>
- \$8,000	23,000 units
\$8,000-12,000	adequate supply
\$12,000-18,000	adequate supply
over \$18,000	ample supply

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Source: City of Vancouver Planning Department Housing Team, 1979a: 5.

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These shortfalls were no doubt exacerbated by redevelopment related demolition because the type of housing involved would probably have met the cost and residential requirements of the households now experiencing affordability problems. That is not to say that without redevelopment activity no shortfalls would now exist but rather to suggest that these shortfalls would not be as extensive as they now are.

#### 6.4 OVERVIEW

Thus the low income housing problem in Vancouver remains serious; its solution requires several complementary types of corrective action including income assistance for households demonstrating ineffective demand and building or acquisition programs designed to fulfil the requirements of the underhoused. The City of Vancouver Planning Department Housing Study Team (1979) has identified the groups facing the most serious problems (the handicapped, low income single and two parent families, low income singles and seniors) and proposed programs to meet the needs of those groups. The implementation of the programs would require an expenditure of approximately \$23 million annually and would therefore require the financial participation of all three levels of government. In that regard the Housing Study Team report notes that City of Vancouver households receive approximately \$110 million in housing subsidies of various types. Most of this money goes to households not facing a housing cost problem. Hence, a restructuring of government spending on housing could significantly improve the situation of those most in need without seriously affecting other segments of society.

Chapter 7  
CONCLUDING REMARKS

7.1 THE PROCESS OF PRIVATE REDEVELOPMENT

The causes of private redevelopment in Vancouver are generally similar to those noted in other cities. As Bourne comments:

The underlying rationale for redevelopment as a process of change is basically economic. New construction occurs to meet demands that cannot be met within the existing building stock, and when it represents a profitable course of action. Two processes have been shown to operate, both based on the concept of obsolescence. First obsolescence may derive directly from deterioration and depreciation,... and second from economic succession. The latter factor is essentially a competitive growth effect, when existing use is outbid by another for occupancy of a given site.

(Bourne, 1967: 173.)

Clearly economic succession is the significant force in the case of Vancouver. Many structures demolished to make way for condominiums were sound but could not generate enough income to compete with the profits available from the marketing of condominiums.

The demand which prompted condominium redevelopment stemmed from a number of sources. Public and private investment intended to establish the central part of the city as a desirable place to live was partially responsible. In addition, the expansion of white collar jobs in the downtown played a role, and associated with it were changing social attitudes which favoured the sort of lifestyle and accessibility to downtown amenities provided by inner city condominiums.

## 7.2 IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

The acceptance of inner city living by the affluent suggests that the distribution of income groups posited by Alonso and others requires revision at least in a post-industrial city. Broadly speaking, the traditional view has been that the rich will sacrifice accessibility for space and choose to live in suburban locations. The poor on the other hand who can afford little space regardless of where they locate, opt for accessibility and therefore reside close to city centres. As a result, according to Alonso a paradox occurs: "the poor live near the centre on expensive land, and the rich on the periphery, on cheap land" (Alonso, 1960: 149). In Vancouver, present trends are inverting this thesis. A substantial number of higher income people are choosing to occupy expensive condominiums, that is, relatively small amounts of space, located in formerly moderate income inner city neighbourhoods. In the case of Kitsilano and several other inner city districts, considerable dislocation of former residents has accompanied this process. The relocation data reported in Chapter 4 suggests that many of the people thus displaced are moving into smaller and less satisfactory accommodation often located on the east side of Vancouver - an area of comparatively low land values and less amenity than Kitsilano. Thus a re-ordering of the distribution of inner city income groups has accompanied recent redevelopment. The affluent now occupy a substantial portion of high cost inner city apartment areas while the former occupants of those areas have been forced to seek accommodation in sections of the city not yet considered desirable enough for redevelopment.

It is possible that the residential options available to moderate income households in Vancouver will be further reduced. We have seen that condominium redevelopment spread from areas of high amenity such as Kitsilano to less environmentally attractive areas such as Mount Pleasant. At present (1978) the condominium market is 'soft', and a considerable oversupply exists, but demand may increase again in the future, causing renewed pressure on the small supply of moderate cost housing remaining in the inner city apartment zoned areas. As that supply dwindles, interest will doubtless shift to the adjacent conversion areas which abut the apartment districts. In Kitsilano, for example, recent redevelopment and renovation activity in the conversion zone has included the construction of townhouses (some of it in transgression of existing zoning by-laws), and the extensive refurbishing of older houses. The former involves demolition of existing, usually rental units and both trends produce very expensive housing. It would seem that although the demand for lower priced condominiums (\$35,000-\$50,000 range) is presently limited, higher priced units in say the \$80,000-\$120,000 range can still be successfully marketed (Brown, July 21, 1977: 22). Hence townhouses and renovated dwellings will likely sell relatively well even during the current 'soft' market. They have the same locational advantages as inner city condominiums but offer lower densities and, in many cases, even more luxurious finishing. This trend is well developed in Toronto (Caufield, 1974: 33).

The emerging landscape in Central Vancouver is one shaped by the desires of the affluent sections of post-industrial society. These desires include the creation of a sensually pleasing, luxurious, resident-

ial environment; the provision of a variety of retail and entertainment opportunities; and the removal of the remnants of the industrial city which lack the sensory appeal demanded by post-industrial aesthetic taste.

### 7.3 CITIZEN OPPOSITION TO CONDOMINIUM REDEVELOPMENT IN VANCOUVER

As we have noted, citizen attempts to change the course of redevelopment in Kitsilano met with mixed success. Some major victories were won and neighbourhood residents were made aware of the effects of condominium redevelopment. In addition, the Kitsilano Housing Society proved that affordable inner city family housing could be retained. However, the main goals of the West Broadway Citizens Committee - to gain neighbourhood control of development and to maintain Kitsilano's traditional character - were not achieved, partially because WBCC was unable to organize on a large enough scale to influence, significantly, political decisions after its initial downzoning success. Factors which prevented successful broad-based organizing included tenant apathy\* and insufficient financial resources.

In addition, the problems associated with condominium redevelopment did not attract the attention of the powerful liberal middle class reformers who had earlier contested the construction of freeways in downtown Vancouver and worked for increased public participation in municipal decision-making. Indeed, with some exceptions, the elected representatives

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\*Despite its reputation for activism, apathy appears to be a continuing problem in Kitsilano, at least in terms of housing matters. See Tana-be (1963) for a discussion of the apartment area in the early 1960's.



of those reformers (TEAM) were generally supportive of condominium redevelopment because it provided a supply of high quality housing near the downtown which facilitated the growth of the 'executive' city and reduced the number of workers commuting to the downtown from suburban locations, both of which were major TEAM goals. Hence, the opponents of condominium redevelopment had to contend with not only the desire for profits on the part of the property industry but also the urban vision of the dominant municipal political party. The results of that unequal contest were predictable; condominium redevelopment proceeded apace, with the exception of a few projects which were successfully opposed.

The limited ability of people to influence development trends in their own neighbourhood suggests that in Vancouver the movement towards increased public participation in decision-making which had so much momentum in the late 1960's and early 1970's has actually produced very little alteration in either urban power relations or the nature of structural change. The control of land use decision making remains firmly in the group of politicians and members of the property industry committed to a course of development which, while perhaps defensible from a strictly economic point of view, continues to reduce the residential options available to moderate income people, particularly families, who wish to live in central Vancouver.

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APPENDIX



Displacement Questionnaire

1. How long did you live in the 2400 block West 3rd? \_\_\_\_\_
2. In general, how satisfied were you with that dwelling? Very satisfied  
       \_\_\_\_\_ Satisfied \_\_\_\_\_ Neutral \_\_\_\_\_ Dissatisfied \_\_\_\_\_ Very Dissatisfied \_\_\_\_\_
3. What in particular do you think makes you feel that way?  
       \_\_\_\_\_  
       \_\_\_\_\_  
       \_\_\_\_\_
4. Could you briefly describe your former apartment?  
       # rooms \_\_\_\_\_ self-contained: yes \_\_\_\_\_ no \_\_\_\_\_  
       approximate floor space \_\_\_\_\_ sq. ft.  
       any further comments \_\_\_\_\_  
       \_\_\_\_\_  
       \_\_\_\_\_
5. Would you mind telling me how much rent you paid for your old apartment? \$ \_\_\_\_\_
6. How much notice did you receive prior to moving from your old apartment? \_\_\_\_\_ wks.
7. How long did you look for a new place? \_\_\_\_\_ weeks
8. Did you have any particular problems finding a new place? If so, what were they?  
       \_\_\_\_\_  
       \_\_\_\_\_  
       \_\_\_\_\_
9. Approximately how much were your moving costs? \_\_\_\_\_
10. How satisfied are you with your new place? Very satisfied \_\_\_\_\_  
       Satisfied \_\_\_\_\_ Neutral \_\_\_\_\_ Dissatisfied \_\_\_\_\_ Very Dissatisfied \_\_\_\_\_
11. What do you particularly like or dislike about it?  
       Like \_\_\_\_\_ Dislike \_\_\_\_\_  
       \_\_\_\_\_  
       \_\_\_\_\_  
       \_\_\_\_\_
12. Did you have any particular reason for choosing this location?  
       \_\_\_\_\_  
       \_\_\_\_\_  
       \_\_\_\_\_

(2)

13. Can you think of anything which you feel is better about your new place or its location than your place on 3rd? Worse?

Better \_\_\_\_\_ Worse \_\_\_\_\_

14. Could you tell me how much your rent is at present? \$ \_\_\_\_\_

15. How many rooms do you have here? \_\_\_\_\_ Is it self-contained? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Approximate floor space \_\_\_\_\_ sq. ft.

16. Would you please think about your present day to day activities and tell me how they may have changed from when you were on 3rd?

Shops- same \_\_\_\_\_ different \_\_\_\_\_

Friends- same \_\_\_\_\_ different \_\_\_\_\_

Recreational Activities- same \_\_\_\_\_ Different \_\_\_\_\_

Any other changes? \_\_\_\_\_

17. Overall would you say that you prefer the neighbourhood around here to that around 3rd? Could you please give me some reasons for your preference? \_\_\_\_\_

18. Which of the following describes you?

Blue collar worker \_\_\_\_\_ Unemployed \_\_\_\_\_ Retired \_\_\_\_\_ White collar worker \_\_\_\_\_

19. Into which category would your household income fall?

\_\_\_\_\_ \$2500 or less \_\_\_\_\_ \$2501-3500 \_\_\_\_\_ \$3501-4500 \_\_\_\_\_ \$4501-5500 \_\_\_\_\_ \$5501-6500

\_\_\_\_\_ \$6501-9000 \_\_\_\_\_ \$9001-10,500 \_\_\_\_\_ \$10,501-12,000 \_\_\_\_\_ more than \$12,000

20. By observation

Present housing type \_\_\_\_\_

Age \_\_\_\_\_

Sex \_\_\_\_\_

21. Do you live here by yourself?