

THE RURAL PEOPLE'S COMMUNES IN SHANDONG PROVINCE, 1958-1965 :
A MODEL OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

by

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the movement to establish and consolidate rural people's communes in China during the period 1958-1965. It concentrates on the development and consolidation of people's communes in the northern province of Shandong.

The thesis argues that there are two trends in contemporary theories of Third World Development. One sees the development of Third World countries as a process of economic moves through adoption of advanced western technology and by the transformation of social institutions according to the features of ideal type of the western model. The other suggests that the development of Third World countries is not merely a process of economic growth, but is conditioned both by their respective historical backgrounds and the world-system. It is argued that China subscribes to the latter version of development theory. It is suggested that, historically, Chinese society followed a particular path of development. The western impact on China gradually brought about the disintegration of the traditional society. Chinese development strategy after 1949, especially after the establishment of the people's communes, is distinctive and differs not only from the dominant mode of development in China's past, but also from the modes in advanced societies of western Europe and North America, and the Third World in general.

The people's commune is considered as possessing an identifiable structure and subject to a process of growth and change. Its development is seen as a response to basic economic realities and also, to an important degree, to human decision-making.

It is argued that the commune system is at the center of China's strategy for rural development.

Within the context of Shandong, the development of the people's commune is seen through an analysis of agricultural production, local industry, building of water conservancy, as well as changes in family institutions. The analysis of this study shows that the characteristics of the development of the people's communes during 1958-1965 manifest in two major aspects. First, development planning aims at resolving certain peasant problems which are a heritage of the traditional mode of economic development in China, and to fulfill modernization and some specific ideological goals. Secondly, the development of the people's communes helps to retain the traditional structure of rural community. The latter is essentially found in the features of self-control and self-sufficiency in political and economic life in the people's communes, and also in the development of human relations.

The major sources of this study consist of documentary research, i.e., Chinese local and national newspapers of the period under study, and magazines of the same period. Interviews of émigrés were also used as supplementary sources.

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In speaking of the Chinese people's communes, one of the first western researchers to have been interested in this subject has said: "Over a fifth of mankind live in people's communes. To turn a blind eye to such a social organism is to deny a primary fact of twentieth-century life." (Crook, 1965 : xi).

However, the difficulty of access to field investigation in China did not facilitate the outsider sociologists and anthropologists in their task of collecting systematic data at first hand during the first years of the people's communes. Only in the last few years when China has become relatively more open than before and when documentary data about the people's communes has been accumulated abroad, have outsiders been able to undertake research on the commune movement.

Among the researches of the Chinese commune, attention has been one-sidedly concentrated on one province, Guangdong, at the expense of all others, due to the unequal availability of data by geographical areas. In order to have a better understanding of the commune movement and system in China, it is strongly desirable to extend the studies to as large an area as possible. With its natural and historical idiosyncrasies, each province can add some particularities in some aspects to the common pool of knowledge about the communes. The difficulty of data collection is indeed an obstacle to studying the less accessible areas, but it is nevertheless not insurmountable. This study is an attempt to scrutinize one area which has not so far been touched in this connection, in the hope that it will be a contribution to the common knowledge of the commune movement.

It is no exaggeration to say that all results of research come from the direct and indirect contribution and efforts of many people. Without the support of a multitude of institutions and the wise advice and kind help of a host of people, this dissertation could not have been completed.

First I should like to express my gratitude to those institutions that have supported me in various domains: The Department of Anthropology and Sociology of the University of British Columbia has provided me with an adequate training in sociology; the Department of Asian Studies of the same University has resolved my financial problems by kindly offering me some courses to teach during my sociological study; the Canada Council granted me a fellowship which made my fieldwork possible; and the Universities Service Center and the Union Research Institute of Hong Kong have both helped me greatly in my data collection.

Secondly, I am deeply indebted to many professors of the University of British Columbia and a large number of friends. I owe a great deal to Dr. Graham E. Johnson, the chairman of my dissertation committee, who has not only directed my study, but has also listened patiently to my complaints during my moments of frustration. I should also mention his kindness in making available to me his private library. I must express my thanks to Dr. Yun S. Chang, Dr. Tissa Fernando, Dr. Edgar Wickberg and Dr. Marwin Samuel who have all given me invaluable critical comments and suggestions, helping me greatly to shape the direction of this dissertation. To two professors I owe a special intellectual debt. Professor Michael Ames brought me closer to the contemporary thought of social science, including both conservative and radical. Professor Cyril Belshaw has incessantly encouraged me to think independently and has helped me a great deal in shaping my own thinking in the theory of development. I cannot forget

Dr. William Willmott who was the one who encouraged students of social science to use their imaginations and to rid themselves of academic narrowness in thinking and outlook. My friends, Dr. Jan Walls of the University of British Columbia, Dr. Lee Yun-kuang and Professor Meng Chuang-ming of the Hong Kong Chinese University, Professor Chuang Shen of the Hong Kong University, and Mr. Wang Ching-hsi, Director and Publisher of the "Perspective Review" and Literary Publishing House in Hong Kong deserve my thanks for offering me additional information, and their concern for and encouragement of my research work. My thanks are also due to Mr. John Dolfin, Director, Mr. Lau Yee-fui, librarian, and other staff members of the Universities Service Center in Hong Kong for their having facilitated my research during my fieldwork. I should like to thank my friend Roger Langford for his patience in sitting down with me to read my manuscript and to polish my English, and Mrs. Ellen Moore for her kind help in typing the manuscript.

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Needless to say, I alone am responsible for all errors and imperfections of this study.

CHINESE UNITS USED IN THIS STUDY

II Governmental Administration:

Sheng	Province
Xian	County
Shi	Municipality
Xiang	Township
Zhen	Town
Cun or Zhuang	Village

II Communal Units:

Ren-min gong-she	People's commune
Sheng-chan da-dui	Production brigade
Sheng-chen xiao-dui	Production team

III Measurement:

~~Mu~~ = 1.5 mu = 1 acre

15 mu = 1 hectare

Jin 1.1 pounds

0.5 kilograms

IV Currency:

Yuan U.S.\$ 0.382 (February 1965 official exchange rate)

Note on transliteration:

The transliteration of Chinese words, whether they are names or special terms used in this study, is in the pin-yin system, except for a few well-known names such as Mao Tse-tung and Peking. The reasons for using pin-yin instead of other systems are manifold. First, with pin-yin the pronunciation of the Chinese words will be more accurate than with other systems. Second, pin-yin is the official system of latinizing the Chinese language in China and has been adopted by almost all the Chinese language teachers in the world (except in Taiwan) in teaching Chinese. The students who have some interests in China will certainly know this system better than others in the future. Third, in Europe most of the newly published books have used pin-yin to transliterate Chinese words. In North America, there are also a few students of China who have begun to adopt pin-yin in their published works. Therefore, it is worthwhile promoting the utilization of pin-yin to gradually replace the other less accurate systems. However, in order to help the readers who are not familiar with this system, the corresponding transliteration in Wade-Giles will be added in the glossary.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE COMMUNE MOVEMENT

April, 1958	Establishment of the Weixing People's Commune
August 3-13, 1958	Mao Tse-tung's inspection tour in Hobei, Shandong and Honan Mao said: "We had better set up the People's Communes!"
August 17-30, 1958	Beidaiho enlarged meeting of the Politburo announcing formation of the people's communes
End of August, 1958	High tide of the commune movement
September 1, 1958	Publication of the Draft of the Experimental Regulations of the Weixing People's Commune, Chaya Mountain, Honan in <u>Hong-qi</u> (No. 7, 1958);
September 10, 1958	Publication of the Beidaiho Resolution in RMRB
November 2-10, 1958	Meeting in Zhengzhou, Honan
November 21-27, 1958	Meeting in Wuchang, Hubei
November 28-December 10, 1958	Sixth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP
December 10, 1958	Resolution adopted by the Eight Central Committee of the CCP at its Sixth Plenum in Wuchang, Hubei
December 19, 1958	Publication of the "Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Commune" (Wuchang Resolution) in RMRB, which called for the rectification of the communes
February, 1959	Enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CCP in Zhengzhou, Honan, to revise the rectification of the communes
April, 1959	Seventh Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in Shanghai The resolution of the enlarged meeting of the Politburo in Zhengzhou in February was approved, but no detailed report of it was published

- August 2-16, 1959 Eighth Plenum in Lushan
- Decision on three-level system of ownership in communes with the production brigade as the foundation; Marshall Peng De-huai and associates dismissed from Ministry of National Defence for their criticism of the commune movement
- November, 1960 The "Twelve Articles of Emergency Directives for Work in the Countryside" is issued by the Central Committee of the CCP (not publicly published)
- Confirmation of the three level ownership with the production brigade as the foundation; private plots are allowed to be returned to members of the commune; rural markets are allowed to be re-opened
- January, 1961 Ninth Plenum
- Announcement of full retreat on the economic front
- March, 1961 "Draft of the Regulation for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes" (Sixty Articles) is issued (not published); the production team gains more importance in ownership and management
- September, 1962 Tenth Plenum
- The "Revised Draft of the Regulation for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes" is issued (not published); consolidation of the commune system; three level ownership and management with the production team as the basic unit of accounting.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

From the point of view of development, the contemporary world can be divided into at least three large categories of models: the western model, the Soviet model and the model (or models) of the Third World (Horowitz, 1972). China, in this classification, occupies an ambiguous and undetermined position. From the ideological and political point of view, she should be a member of the bloc of the Soviet model in spite of her divergence of views with the Soviet leaders; but from the point of view of her socio-economic conditions, she shares many traits in common with the countries of the Third World.¹

The western model and the Soviet model can be well defined by specific features in their development. The Third World as a whole is difficult to define owing to a large range of diversity in race, culture, history and social and economic institutions of the countries included in it. Indeed, the Third World cannot be considered as one model but, rather, a set of models of development. Since the establishment of the people's communes in 1958, China has become increasingly different, as much from the Soviet model as from those of the Third World. This study is an attempt to discuss the Chinese case as a particular model of development through an examination of the development of agricultural communes in Shandong province from 1958 to 1965.

¹ This is the reason why Horowitz has so much hesitation in placing China in the Third World category and finally gave China the status of marginal membership (Horowitz, 1972 : 17).

I THE METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY

The methodology used during this study is conditioned by my theoretical framework on the one hand, and by the available data on the other.

A. Method of Data Selection

In the beginning, the writer hoped to do fieldwork in China but, as this was not possible, he had to be content with fieldwork in Hong Kong. That meant gathering information by documentary research, and by interviewing émigrés. Due to the actual circumstances in Hong Kong, the main body of data for this study comes from documentary research. Both the documentary research and interviews with émigrés have posed certain technical problems. The problems relevant to the interviews will be found in Appendix I. Here, I confine myself to the technical problems of the documentary research.

First, the problem of diversity of primary sources: Michel Oksenberg has classified the primary sources for research on contemporary China into five categories:

- (1) the press, and monitored radio broadcasts of the Peoples' Republic of China;
- (2) interviews with, and publications of former residents of China;
- (3) accounts by visitors to China;;
- (4) Chinese fiction (particularly novels and short stories); and
- (5) secret Chinese documents obtained and released by agencies outside China (Oksenberg, 1969 : 577-606).

Oksenberg has rightly advised the students of China to use different sources in order not to be biased by any one of these sources. Although sometimes the material conditions

do not provide enough means or the time for a researcher to exhaust all sources, Oksenberg's advice cannot be overlooked. In my case, the main bulk of information came from the first and the fifth categories. However, the other three categories have played a 'checking' role in my study. My interviews with emigrés have been a very useful source to testify and to supplement, to some extent, my documentary data. I have also used the accounts of visitors to China in the same way. I have not directly used any source from Chinese fiction, but this does not mean that I have not employed some of them indirectly. Because one of my specialities is Chinese fiction, my knowledge in this domain forms a background for testing all other relevant sources. Another advantage for me is that I have sufficient competence in Chinese language to look directly into the original documents so that I could avoid the stylization of the translators of the United States Consulate in Hong Kong, who certainly had their own policy in the selection of translations.

Secondly, discontinuity of information constitutes a difficult problem for all researchers of China. Since 1960 not only have local newspapers not been exported,² but the national newspapers and reviews have, for a long while, been less informative. I have relied mostly on local newspapers for the period 1958–1959, on national newspapers for the period 1960–1961, and on secret documents released outside China, Hong Kong news, and interviews for the period thereafter. The discontinuity of information has constituted an important handicap in constructing a continuing picture of development of some units to be studied, which I have only partially overcome.

Thirdly, how to evaluate data is another crucial technical problem. As John S. Aird reported, the statistical work during the GLF period became "creative" and

² For the four local newspapers of Shandong Province, the DZRB ceased to appear in the Union Research Institute Collection in October, 1958, the YTRB in August, 1958, the QDRB was only seen in one issue in October, 1959, and the JNRB in one issue in January, 1958.

played a major role in promoting the production enthusiasm of the masses (Aird, 1972). Some statistical figures of this period might be more fictive than real. The principal method of evaluating the validity of data is to compare it with, and to test it by other sources. Sometimes intuition is also useful. But competence in evaluating data can, after all, only be achieved through experience, and when you have become familiar enough with the subject to be studied. I have put aside much data during my study due to my doubts about their validity. But this does not guarantee that I have not misused some questionable ones owing to fallibility.

My documentary research was conducted mainly in the Union Research Institute in Hong Kong. Some documents were gathered from Hong Kong University Library, Hong Kong Chinese University Library (section of the United College), Hoover Institution Library, and the University of British Columbia Asian Studies Library. With regard to the studies of the people's commune in China, only the documents concerning Guangdong Province up to 1967 were recorded and classified (Baum, 1968). The documents concerning other provinces were widely dispersed; the enormous collection of the Union Research Institute, therefore, constitutes an untapped gold mine for future researchers who are interested in the commune problems of provinces other than Guangdong.

For my research, the data gathered are too much and, at the same time, not sufficient - too much because of some data which I judged relevant at the beginning, such as those concerning social control and political education, which I later found could not fit into my schema of study, and could be separate studies in themselves. It is insufficient because some crucial problems could not be adequately explained without the due amount of information. It should also be pointed out that the main weakness of these data is that they cannot equally cover all the counties of the province to be studied, nor can they be considered representative as an average. Most of the documents that I

found are related to a few communes or production brigades which were regarded as exemplary in production or organization. This means that documents about the under-productive communes and brigades are lacking. However, because those model units have pioneered the way in the recent development of China, the abovementioned drawbacks cannot affect much of their representative quality concerning the main trend of development in China.

B. Method of Analysis

Although development is a process of growth and change, it occurs within a certain structure. At the analytical level, this structure has first to be considered as somewhat static in order that it can be described. Talcott Parsons said:

Any ordinary system, therefore, is capable of description as on the one hand a structure, a set of units or components with, for the purposes in hand, stable properties, which of course may be relational, and on the other hand of events, of processes, in the course of which "something happens" to change some properties and some relations among them (Parsons, 1964 : 84).

In order to combine the description of structure and that of development, the method used in this study is a combination of those used by the structural-functionalists and historians. First, the commune is viewed as a system which is described as an amalgamation of related functional parts. Secondly, the process of development is presented mostly by case-studies. In each case-study, some particular aspects of growth and change will be emphasized and interpreted in the light of the proposed theory. But the commune movement, as a whole, will be situated in an historical perspective to throw the significance of the commune movement as a particular model of development into relief.

II THE OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF THIS STUDY

This section will deal first with what the writer attempts to achieve with this study, and then with the limits of the study, both temporal and spatial. Following this will be a brief introduction to how the study is organized.

A. The Objectives of the Study

The purpose of this study will be to attempt an interpretation of the Chinese commune movement from the point of view of development. This interpretation will be done by a description of events of the movement and by analysis of the people's commune as a system. The interpretation will be guided by the theory which I have proposed in this chapter. The final purpose is to single out the Chinese commune movement as a meaningful model of development among other models in the world in the light of its particular features manifested during the process of development, and its particular goals to be pursued.

B. The Limitations of This Study

When sociologists are scrutinizing a part of a social system, their final interests are nevertheless in the whole. To scrutinize the parts is to look into how these parts are related to the whole. For the purpose of research, any system has to be abstracted as a model of ideal type. In doing so, only the features which are considered crucial in the whole structure through the researcher's perception will be singled out. Thus, the parts under scrutinization only reflect the researcher's perception. The degree of the nearness between the abstracted ideal type and the reality depends upon this perception

which is conditioned by the researcher's competence and the adequateness of the theory he has chosen for his research. This is the first limitation for every researcher, as it is for me.

Following this, the researcher has to choose the unit of study. A unit must first possess the same characteristics as the whole, and, secondly, have an adequate size. That is to say, it must not be too big for the researcher to handle, or small enough to lose its representative quality.

For the study of the Chinese society, thirty-odd years ago, Radcliffe-Brown considered the village as the most suitable unit of study (Radcliffe-Brown, 1936). Thirty years later, Maurice Freedman expressed his feelings of dissatisfaction with Radcliffe-Brown's suggestion and encouraged anthropologists who worked on China to aim at the total society (Freedman, 1963a). G. William Skinner argues similarly by suggesting that the concentration in research on village has obscured the significance of the Chinese case (Skinner, 1964).

Indeed, in any complex society, a village is too small to be taken as a unit of research if the researcher is to aim at an understanding of the society as a whole. However, to take a whole country as the unit of study, especially one of such a size as China, is technically impossible. Therefore, a choice of unit of study becomes necessary before undertaking any research. In the case of the commune movement, a single commune is no doubt too small as a unit of study, because no comparison between communes and no relations between the commune and a larger structure are possible to establish. A whole province is presumably too large for a researcher to handle. The adequate size is, in my view, the county. A county which has some twenty communes provides for the researcher a large range of possibilities for study such as comparison, ranking, relating, etc.

Unfortunately, sometimes the choice is not merely a subjective matter depending on the researcher's good will. It depends, for the time being, more upon the availability of data than upon any other factors. In my case, finding that no single county could provide enough data for a study of this kind, I was obliged to take a unit of study as large as a province. But why did I choose Shandong rather than others? In the beginning, the choice was based simply on personal interest as a native of that province, and on the consideration that I should better know its general conditions than those in other provinces. However, I found, later in my research, other justifications for my choice of Shandong as the unit of study. First, Shandong is a province which shares many common traits with the other provinces in North China such as Hobei, Honan, Shanxi, Shanxi and the northern part of Jiangsu. Secondly, Shandong is very representative in the solution of Chinese peasant problems. These two points will be discussed further in Chapter Four and Chapter Twelve.

Following the geographical limitation, there necessarily comes a temporal limitation. I have previously mentioned that any process of development can only be observed over a relatively long period of time. For an anthropologist, if his study is related to a relatively stable society, a year may be adequate time for observing the whole range of activities and events. But such is not the case in the commune movement. The latter experienced vital turns during the first years of its inception. The commune of 1960 was different from that of 1958-1959, and that of 1962 from that of 1960-1961. Only after 1962 did the commune system seem to become relatively stable. That is the reason why seven years is covered in my study. The years between 1962 and 1965 permit me enough time to observe the movement in a stable phase of evolution after the system had been readjusted. The reason for stopping my observation at 1965 is that after that year the

Cultural Revolution started. The period of Cultural Revolution, a revolution which is political rather than economic by nature, should be considered as a separate stage from the period I have chosen to deal with.

C. The Organization of This Study

In the foregoing discussion, it was suggested that the commune movement is best treated as both a system and a dynamic evolution, and that the whole picture is meaningful only when it is located in the long course of history. There are, therefore, three component parts which are of importance in this study: system, evolution and history. While the first two parts constitute the main body of the study, the third one provides the background.

With a concern for logic and chronology, the last part has to be presented first. The background will thus be introduced in the first three chapters following the introduction. Chapter Two will provide an historical approach to the development of the Chinese society as a whole. This will be seen in a series of sequential stages. The idiosyncratic features of the Chinese society and those of each stage will be emphasized. Chapter Three will introduce the commune movement in China on a national scale. In order to make its evolutionary line as clear as possible, the movement will be approached by stages. The geographical and historical backgrounds particular to Shandong and relevant to the commune movement will be discussed in Chapter Four.

The second part, also consisting of three chapters, will deal with the commune as a system. A system is always composed of related parts. These parts will be described separately. However, due attention will be paid to the relationships between these parts on the one hand, and between the parts and the whole system on the other. In the mean-

time, though analyses of system are inevitably static, the change and evolution of the system will be described as well and, for the most part, this will be illustrated by concrete examples. Chapter Five will be devoted to the size, organization, leadership and social education of the commune. Chapter Six will center on the problems of ownership and management, while Chapter Seven deals with accounting system and distribution.

The best way to grasp the dynamic picture of development is to see it through concrete cases. However, it is impossible to see everything at one time. A choice among various sectors submitting to development is necessary. The more the chosen sectors are relevant to the march of the whole system, the more accurate the dynamic picture of the development as a whole will be. Two sectors are judged to have crucial importance in the commune movement. They are local industry and the building of water conservancy. The development in the two sectors will be the content of Chapters Eight and Nine. Chapter Ten, which is composed of three case-studies, will present the picture of economic growth and changes as continuing in some developing communal units. Chapter Eleven will be a case study of changes in the family structure. The characteristics of the commune movement which appeared in these units will be specially pointed out in order to show the particularity of the Chinese model of development.

Finally, the last chapter will present the result of this study. This will be done first in the context of the Chinese history and then on the international scale.

Chapter Two

AN APPROACH TO CHINESE SOCIETY FROM THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

There were two turning points in recent Chinese history. One was 1840, the year of the Opium War, the other was 1949, the year of the establishment of the People's Republic of China. It is suggested in this chapter that the development of Chinese society be divided into three stages: the traditional stage (before the western impact, up to 1840), the transitional stage (between 1840 and 1949, the period dating from China's exposure to western influence until the Communist Party came into power), and the socialist stage (1949 onward). The different stages imply a change from one type of society into another as a result of shifted orientation in development.

I THE TRADITIONAL STAGE (BEFORE 1840)

Karl Wittfogel's hydraulic theory about the Chinese society (and other Asiatic societies) has been widely known (1957). In my view, although he is right to advance the hydraulic order as a necessary cause of the Chinese political system, it seems that he is not right when making it a sufficient cause. First, the hydraulic work gave birth to a set of conditions on which the kinship group founded its elementary form of operation and organization. The legendary hero Yu was the first clan leader who went beyond his kinship group for the purpose of water control. Throughout Chinese history, only a few large-scale hydraulic works, mostly for transportation, were initiated and controlled by the state (Eberhard, 1952 : 34); all other irrigation water controls of a small scale were in the hands of the peasants at the village level.¹ Hsiao Kung-ch'uan has pointed out

¹ Franz Schurmann also diverged with Karl A. Wittfogel in this connection. He does not think that local irrigation in China depended on the State (Schurmann, 1970 : 405).

that in the traditional Chinese society, "kinship group and rural community were virtually identical, village leadership was none other than clan leadership" (Hsiao, 1960 : 327). That is to say, the small-scale hydraulic works were virtually operated not by the state, but by clan organizations. If the hydraulic work had exerted any influence to shape the form of political system, it must have been indirectly, by passing through kinship and family institutions. Secondly, if we compared ancient China to ancient Greece, we would find that the patriarchal clan organizations of the two areas shared many common characteristics (cf. Fustel de Coulanges, 1864), although Wittfogel tells us that ancient Greece was not under the influence of hydraulic order. Other kinds of agricultural work could give similar influence to social organizations provided they demanded similar conditions of cooperation between men. Sociologically, ancient Chinese patriarchy and ancient Greek patriarchy may be classified as the same type, but each certainly possessed other particularities of which the hydraulic order may constitute one relevant factor. Hydraulic order, therefore, can hardly be viewed by itself as a sufficient condition, or a determining condition of the Chinese political system. To understand the nature and structure of Chinese traditional social and political systems, we must look into the Chinese kinship and family institutions.

Historically, the Chinese term for family, "jia", was not the same as it is understood in its modern sense, but a clan organization. The jia of a thousand chariots and that of a hundred chariots referred to by Mencius indicate the jia's dimension which would not pertain to a simple family. Although this was a phenomenon of aristocracy, it is not improbable that the clan organizations among peasants already existed in an early time. The Chinese feudalism of Zhou (roughly 1100-500 B.C.) was based on

clannish principles. As Max Weber pointed out, "the high vassals of the time (chu hou, the princes) were exclusively selected from the descendents of the ancient rulers" (1951 : 35). Weber was the first western sociologist who paid close attention to the "charismatic sibe" in ancient China. In fact, even after the dissolution of the ancient feudalism (221 B.C.), the basic social order was not touched and the charismatic sibe in Weber's terms not only persisted as usual, but widespread so pervasively as to be soon a phenomenon of a general social organization in China. The clan organization became so important that individuals who lost their kindred ties would go to parasitize upon other clans instead of living independently. In Chinese history we find that the individual often acted in the society on behalf of his kinsmen. He shared glory as well as misfortune and, to a certain extent, properties, with the members of his kinship group. He was controlled by and exerted influence upon them. In contrast to the common belief that lineage is an expanded kinship group, it would be more appropriate to say that the family, in the Chinese sense, is a sub-unit of lineage.²

Before the western impact, jia meant to Chinese a sub-unit of a lineage in the form of an expanded or joint family in which an agnatic group of more than two generations, and sometimes more than one collateral degree, lived under the same roof. There were cases where the members of the group lived separately but shared joint rights to property and recognized each other as belonging to the same jia. A household might be a jia, but in many cases it was not. An extended household which could include non-family members was what Morton H. Fried saw in Ch'u Hsien (1969 : 29-30), or a reduced

² I use clan and lineage interchangeably in this thesis. For the distinction between these two terms in the Chinese case, see Freedman, Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore (1957 : 18).

household was often a fluctuating form of more than or a part of a jia in order to adapt itself to the social and economic demands. On the other hand, most of the Chinese have experienced the extended family at least once in their life cycle, especially during the first few years, and the last years of life.

In ancient times, it seems likely that there was no clear distinction between lineage and family. A kinship organization, whether it be a large form like lineage or a restricted form like family, was primarily an elementary political organization. From Confucius, Mencius and other classics, we can see that the Chinese feudalism and the principalities of the late Zhou (roughly 6th-3rd century, B.C.) were organized according to kinship principles. The dissolution of feudalism which coincided with the unification of China by Qin Shi-huang-di (221 B.C.) was a real revolution in Chinese history; nonetheless, it did not destroy the foundation of the Chinese society: the kinship organization. As soon as the Liu family took over the political power, the new state again set its foundation on kinship principles. Until the last dynasty, which was replaced by a republic in 1911, the Chinese state could roughly be viewed as an enlarged form of lineage. At a lower level, the peasant lineages always were, as Hsiao Kung-ch'uan said, identical with communal organizations. The Chinese monarchical structure and ethics were none other than kinship structure and ethics, differentiating only in scale. Even the bureaucracy, historically speaking, originated from a division of domestic functions.

As for the economic structure of the traditional society, C. K. Yang has pointed out:

The most outstanding of the characteristics [of (the economic structure)] was the predominance of the family as a unit of production; a unit of

organization of labor, capital and land for the acquisition of goods and services to meet the needs of the members of the household... . In agriculture, partnerships and other forms of organization were numerically negligible in comparison with the vast majority of China's traditional family forms. In commerce and industry the family as unit of organization was equally dominant. When a boy reached working age, he worked in the family business. Should the family business be too small to employ him, he would be apprenticed if possible to a firm owned by relatives... The dominance of the family as an organizational unit of production led to the development of another prominent characteristic of the Chinese family, namely, the provision of collective security for its immediate members and the extension of economic aid to more distant kinsmen... A high degree of economic self-sufficiency was another vital characteristic of the traditional family. Only those necessities that could not be fashioned at home or grown from the soil were purchased from outside (Yang, 1959 : 137-138).

From the above description, two crucial points attract our attention: one is the dominance of the family as an organizational unit of production, and another is the self-sufficiency of the family. Generally speaking, a village which was often identical with one lineage or a branch of a lineage, was a larger self-sufficient unit than family in terms of both production and consumption. The main consumption was supplied by domestic products and to a certain extent local products within the village; only secondary necessities were purchased from towns or other villages. The latter gave birth to a limited scope of commercial transaction.

In cities and towns, the situation was different. There, two different categories of social groups dominated the scene, namely, the bureaucracy and the guild (Burgess, 1928). Lacking large markets in the wide country-side, the urban merchants never had the opportunity of accumulating significant capital as those in Europe at the time of industrialization. However, a great deal of data, both from historical documents and from local gazetteers, indicate that the class of merchants was richer, and lived much better off than the class of peasants, even than the class of lower ranking bureaucrats.

But a career in commerce had never been as attractive as a career in officialdom. The reason, I think, is partly because the Chinese ideologically looked down upon the merchant class, and partly because the career of the merchant forced him to travel a lot and to often live apart from his kinsmen, and therefore, he could not enjoy security in times of crisis and have his kinsmen share his pleasure in times of prosperity. As a rule, as soon as a merchant had succeeded in accumulating a sizeable sum, he invested it in the land in order to settle down somewhere (usually in his native place) to become a landlord. If he had several sons, his land would be divided accordingly, and second or third generations would have a good chance to become ordinary peasants.


The equal division of the father's property by sons constituted a crucial factor in both population control and social mobility in the traditional stage. It is true that the prescription of this rule resulted from the deliberate elimination of primogeniture at the beginning of the Han Dynasty. It is not, however, proper to consider this measure as being only in favor of the central government. In fact, it greatly benefited the integration of local lineage organizations because the practice of primogeniture had often forced the younger sons to leave their native places, a phenomenon quite well-known in Japan. Without lineage, the effect would be different. For instance, in France, many scholars have regarded the practice of primogeniture to be a preventive measure for family integration and have considered that its abolition after the revolution of 1789 constituted one of the causes of the disappearance of large families (Delzons, 1913 : 249; Ariès, 1960 : 417). The Chinese case has empirically refuted the theory that primogeniture could play a determining role in family integration. Whether it could affect the membership of the family unit or not must depend upon other variables.

Although the practice of equal division of property among sons did not impede the formation of extended family in China, it seems that it resulted in a positive check on population growth. Once land was divided and re-divided into small parcels, it would quickly reach the limit in meeting its minimum surface which could hardly support a small household. The limitation of division of land resulted in the limitation of proliferation of households, and hence the limitation of the growth of population. Population growth must be related to the quantity of available arable land in Chinese history. Ho Ping-ti suggested that the introduction of new kinds of rice and other cereals from outside was the primary cause of population growth during the last centuries in China and the expansion of arable land was rather a consequence (Ho, 1959). I think the expansion of arable land during the last centuries³ might be, in the first place, a consequence of population growth, but could in all probability turn later into a cause of further population growth.

Without birth control, the Chinese population was checked by various factors, one of which might have been the land division. For more than two thousand years the Chinese population maintained an equilibrium, both within the society, and between the society and its ecological environment. Under such an equilibrium of population, the Chinese society was not in a state of stagnation as many people supposed. The vertical social mobility in Ming and Qing China was even greater than in "most large pre-modern western societies" according to Ho Ping-ti's research on social mobility during the two last Chinese dynasties (Ho, 1958-1959: 347). However, Ho's concern was only involved in social mobility through imperial examinations which obviously cannot represent

³ According to Robert F. Dernberger, between 1600 and 1893 there was 148 percent increase in cultivated land in China (1975 : 25). Perkins states that "by the middle of the 20th century the amount of cultivated land in China was four times the level of the late 14th century" (1969 : 185). The cultivated land continued to increase even after 1949 in a so thickly populated area as Guangdong (Johnson, 1973 : 15).

the whole picture of social mobility. Needless to say, more research is needed to gain a further understanding in this respect. Two aspects are, in my view, of crucial importance. First, Ho's data about the candidates for examinations and the holders of titles are arranged according to surnames, so the result of his research tells us much of the duel between lineages of different surnames, but nothing about the social mobility within one given lineage. In the Chinese villages which were mostly clustered by lineage differentiation, there existed a social stratification side by side with the kinship hierarchy. I have the impression that the social mobility within a lineage must have been more difficult than the inter-lineage social mobility. That is why the kinship organizations appeared more stable than any other social groups. Secondly, however limited the scope of commerce might be, it seemed to be of importance to social mobility. There is no doubt that the talented of the first class were attracted by bureaucracy, but commerce was a sure way to get rich and thus constituted an outlet for the ambitious people. As Ho Ping-ti has pointed out, "there is definite evidence showing that many officials and frustrated candidates openly engaged in trade and that not a few members of merchants' families managed to pass the national examination and become officials" (ibid : 333). Nonetheless, the merchant class was not a stable social stratum in the Chinese society, because they aimed at either officialdom or investment in land, as I have shown. The merchant class had merely a transitional place in social mobility. The latter, both upward and downward can be seen in the following diagram:



Ideologically, the merchant class was lower than the peasant class, but practically, it was higher because it was much better off than the latter.

The merchant class occupied only a marginal place in the Chinese social structure and thus never constituted an initial changing factor in the societal development in the traditional stage. The pattern of the merchant class was more influenced by, than exerted influence on the peasant class (including rich peasant), which was in turn dominated by the landlords or gentry class. It may be supposed that urban areas did not emit initial changes in the traditional stage as has happened in the European countries.⁴ In this light, perhaps we can suggest that the place of the merchant class in the social strata may constitute one more indicator of the development of Chinese society which was never able to orient itself along the same direction as the western societies until the western impact.

Max Weber has spent much time studying the relationships between the Chinese religions and the Chinese society (1951). He concluded that it was the Confucian and

⁴ Franz Schurmann has also noticed the difference between Chinese cities and European cities. He says: "The continuing link between countryside and city undoubtedly influenced the nature of the traditional Chinese city, which did not develop the urban character so typical of European and Japanese cities. A bourgeoisie, that is, a social class explicitly identified with the city, never arose in China - at least not until modern times" (Schurmann, 1970 : 366).

Taoist ethics which prevented the Chinese society from a capitalistic development; otherwise the Chinese society had the potentiality, probably more than Japan, of assimilating capitalism. On the other hand, the Chinese modern historians have used the term "incipient capitalism" to describe the economic situation of the pre-modern-impact period. It is evident that all of them have based their studies on the premise that capitalism is supposed to be a necessary stage of all societies. This thesis, from Spencer and Marx, had never been challenged until recent times. It has formed a restrictive paradigm in social sciences in which societies differentiated in kinds can be granted a place in development and can be understood only when they are put in connection with capitalistic societies. In the Chinese case, I cannot see any convincing evidence which would lead the Chinese society to a capitalistic stage before influence came from outside. I cannot see such a necessity either.

In short, the Chinese patrilineal kinship structure was so powerful and all-permeating that it has moulded a particular model of society, and a particular type of development which had its own direction, just as many other particular societies might be developing in other directions. The particularity of development of the traditional Chinese society can be seen in the following outlines:

A. Political Structure

Chinese feudalism before the unification of China by Qin Shi-huang-di (221 B.C.) originated from clan organizations.⁵ When the Ji clan of Zhou took control over

⁵ Cf. Si-ma Qian, Shi-Ji (the part concerning the pre-Han history).

other clans, it imposed its members as heads on only a few regions where the clans had been destroyed because of their hostility toward Zhou, but kept all the other clans intact. The prince of each principality was at the same time chief of his clan. All the principalities inside the Chinese territorial boundary recognized at the time as such founded a large alliance by marriage along the exogamic principle. An alliance was strongly clan-centric, affinal ties by marriage were viewed rather as a diplomatic relationship. It was impossible at the time for an individual without a clan to survive. He would perish or would let himself be adopted by another clan. It seems that everybody belonged to a clan; participating in clan activities meant participation in political life. Clan structure was identical to political structure.

Qin Shi-huang-di was the first ambitious leader in Chinese history who intended to break up clan organizations and to establish instead a network of bureaucratic officials exercising direct control over commoners. He failed. Fifteen years later when the Han Dynasty was founded, new rulers re-linked the Qin's bureaucratic system with clan organizations. Until the birth of the Republic in 1911, clan or lineage organizations always constituted the basic element of social and political fabric during the time of the Chinese monarchy. Even the two exotic political orders during the Mongol dominance and that of the Manchus did not touch this foundation.

B. Mode of Production

The patrilineal kinship structure determined the collective ownership of property of a patrilineal kinship group. The practice of agricultural production led the group to a fixed locality. Consequently a patrilineal kinship group was identical with a certain

locality. The division of labor between sex and age created a feeling of interdependence between members of the group. The collective ownership precluded any strong feeling of personal possessions. An individual was thus not only interdependent with his kin, but also with the land he cultivated, in other words, nature. He did not exploit nature, nor did he enslave it to his service but, rather, nourished it in the hope of getting a return which constituted the source of subsistence and happiness of the whole group. The relationship between man and nature determined the special mode of production which was labelled by Marx as "Asiatic mode of production". The Asiatic mode of production had been understood as a mode of production in stagnation, at least with little progress in technology used in production. This is not false, but the problem can also be examined from another angle. According to the outlook moulded by the patrilineal kinship structure, material fortune was not viewed as being of paramount importance in achieving happiness on the one hand; nature, embodied in land for the peasant, was regarded as an integral part of the kinship group and thus must not be squeezed indefinitely, on the other. There was an equilibrium between man and nature established as a result of mutual exchange for a long time. This equilibrium did not point to any significant change or "progress" in the sense of evolutionist terminology. It should be remembered that this kind of relationship between peasant and nature was almost universal. The technological improvement in agriculture in European societies was the result of industrialization rather than the progress of agriculture per se.

If we cannot say that the patrilineal kinship structure in itself determined the Chinese society as an agricultural or peasant society, at least we are certain that such a social structure cannot develop toward the industrialized society, in the sense of capitalism. Generally speaking, industry, trade and technology were not unknown in

China (Needham, 1956 —). According to recent archaeological findings, industry and technology in some sphere in ancient and medieval China could be seen as very "advanced" in comparison with European countries. Why did these industries and technology not experience proportional development as modern industrial societies? Many scholars, including the clear-sighted Max Weber, have spent life-times attempting to answer this question. Yet the problem is not clear. They have always concentrated on seeking such and such factor which might hinder the capitalistic development, but have forgotten the holistic structure of the Chinese society which would point to a quite different direction from that of a capitalistic and industrial society. I believe that industry, trade and technology in ancient and medieval China were different from those of modern times, not in quantity but in quality. In essence, they were regarded as tools to add to the amount of happiness, but not as a means of accumulation of capital for the purpose of reproduction. The development of industry and trade was neither a necessary nor a desirable condition for maintaining or improving the harmony of family and kinship relationships. For these reasons, industry and trade could never develop independently vis-à-vis agricultural development. When the production and consumption of agriculture had already entered into a stage of equilibrium, industry and trade worked perforce to maintain this equilibrium.

C. Values and Goals

Ideologically, Confucian virtue was based upon self-perfection. The cultured man must not be just a means for specified useful purpose. He is an end in himself. The Chinese "ego" is not an individualistic conception, but related to a network of kinship

relationships. Self-perfection means above all the process of personal achievement in bringing the family interpersonal relationships to perfection. Xiao (filial piety) and you (brotherhood) are both the beginning and the end of self achievement according to Confucian ethics.

Practically, the individual was brought up and educated by his parents or other members of near kin within the family framework. His personal fulfillment was not only involved with the interest of his living relatives, but also with that of his deceased ancestors. His troubles would be shared by other members of the family; and his satisfaction would be mainly dependent upon the positive attitude and behaviour of the same members. Without the help of his parents and kinsmen, an individual could not realize his ambition in the society at large, and without the sharing of his kinship group the realization of his ambitions would be meaningless. In Chinese history, almost without exception, successful ministers and officials ended their lives in returning to their native homes after a long political career. Luo-ye gui-gen (the floating leaves will all return to the root of the tree) symbolizes well the Chinese life outlook. Tian-lun zhi luo (the family happiness) indicates the ultimate goal of an individual's life pursuit.

A very different system of values and goals from that of the capitalistic society had been fostered within the patrilineal kinship structure in China and attained maturity at a very early age (more or less at the time of Confucius). That is to say, the social, economic and political systems have for a long time already adapted to each other to form a whole cultural unit which is dissimilar to other societies and could not, and still cannot, develop toward the same direction as the other societies point to. All attempts to place the Chinese society in a stage of any unilineal development or to judge the

Chinese society in relation to the capitalistic societies would be misleading and would probably offer a false departure in theory and conception in the social science.

II THE TRANSITIONAL STAGE (1840-1949)

Students of Chinese society have all remarked some actual changes or symptoms of changes in the Chinese socioeconomic structure during the transitional stage as a consequence of western impact on China. Few would deny that since the Opium War (1840) the influence exercised by the western countries on China was tremendous; from foreign trade, steamship transportation and financial institutions to missionary works, educational undertakings and journalistic enterprises. The total amount of foreign trade in the thirty years before the Sino-Japanese War (1894) more than doubled, but in the following thirty years it increased almost six times (Hou, 1965 : 51). After 1895, some 33 ports were opened to foreign trade. Foreigners could travel freely along a sea coast of 5,000 nautical miles and through inland rivers as long as 10,000 nautical miles (Shigeo, 1941 : 90-92). In the same period a length of 7,671 miles of railway was built, mostly with foreign capital (Chang Chia-ao : 424). With regard to banking, by 1925 foreigners had established 63 banks in China, with 179 branches, of which there were 17 with capital exceeding 10,000,000 yuan (pre-war value), while China itself set up two banks of some importance (Chien I-shih, 1939 : 249-251). Postal and telegraphic offices had also made much headway: the former had increased from 100 in 1901 to more than 12,000 in 1930, and the latter from about 500 in 1922 to 1,400

in 1930 (Chang Liang-jen, 1937, Vol. II : 5-7).⁶ Both commerce and industry had begun to increase in volume since the foreign economic intrusion, although commerce occupied the leading position. It may be noted that the total foreign investments in China increased from (U.S.) \$787,900,000 in 1902 to \$34,483,200,000 in 1936 (Hou, 1965 : 13).

Besides the economic invasion, the western missionaries worked intensively in social and educational spheres. In 1937, the Catholic missionaries maintained 2,985 primary schools (with 123,389 pupils), 58 high schools for boys (with 11,335 students), 45 high schools for girls (with 7,167), three universities (1,321 students and 908 preparatory students), 415 orphanages and 236 hospitals and homes for the poor. The educational activities of the Protestants were even more widespread than those of the Catholics. In 1935, about 150,000 children were educated in their primary schools, 47,940 in their high schools, and 7,098 in their 16 universities and colleges. In 1937, 271 hospitals were maintained by the Protestants (Lang, 1946 : 18).

All these innovations brought about by the invasion of the western powers drastically affected the Chinese society to a degree that was deep and far-reaching. Above all, the development of the Chinese traditional society was drawn away from its own orbit.

During the transitional stage, the Chinese society gradually changed its goals from the social norms dictated by Confucian ethics which precluded the social action

⁶ Sources which come from, respectively, Shigeo, Imura, History of Euro-American Economic Aggression in China, Tokyo : Dobunkai, 1941; Chang Chia-ao, Railway Construction in China; Chien I-shih, Economic History of Modern China, Tokyo, Keio Book Store, 1939; and Chang Liang-jen, Postal Administration in China, Shanghai, The Commercial Press, 1937, are all cited by Wu Kan (1952).

from pursuit of profit to a series of westernized new goals. It has been noted that, as in the course of industrialization in most western countries, the general tendency of changes in China during this stage was also manifested by urbanization of social life, dissolution of extended family, equalization between sex and age, degradation of father's authority, etc., probably to a lesser extent. Changes, of course, occurred unequally along the line of differences between urban area and rural area, gentry and peasantry, literates and illiterates, westernized and conservators, and so forth. It is also recognized that some change in the social structure was not only a consequence of changing economic patterns, but also resulted from the introduction of western customs and ideology, especially the western individualism.

III THE SOCIALIST STAGE (1949 ONWARD)

At the beginning of the Chinese socialist revolution, the revolutionary leaders seemed to be convinced that the priority of economic development must be given to industrialization, following the Soviet Union model. Taking the Soviet model means, in a certain sense, to trace indirectly the economic development of the western capitalist countries with the sole exception of stressing on state planning.⁷ A planned industrialization implies a planned restructure of social institutions. The success of industrialization depends much upon the flexibility of social institutions. The first two quinquennial plans in China resulted, however, in some grave consequences: acceleration of urbanization,⁸ disintegration of familial organization, reinforcement in "elite" education

⁷ The Soviet Union resembles the capitalist industrial countries in a variety of ways despite their differences in political systems (Inkeles and Bauer, 1959).

⁸ It is reported that between 1949 and 1960 China's urban population increased by some 70 million, described as one of history's largest population shifts in so short a time (Buchanan, 1970 : 30).

which implied the continuation of the split between intellectuals and masses, and consolidation of bureaucracy including entrepreneurship. Some of these phenomena contradict the Chinese traditional norms which still persisted, at least partially, in spite of the western impact, and others contradict the communist ideals.

The so-called "struggle between two roads" during the Cultural Revolution reflected, in my view, the divergence of viewpoint in regard to the societal development. On the one hand, Liu Shao-qij and his followers attempted to pursue an industrialization along the lines of the Soviet model in order to catch up with the western productive standards as soon as possible, even though it was detrimental to other social factors. On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung endeavored to combine the communist ideals with the Chinese traditional social structure. As we know, it was Mao who came out of this struggle as vanquisher. This struggle has an historical and sociological bearing of crucial importance because it was the first time since the western impact on China that the Chinese society placed emphasis on goals of social performance and economic development other than those in the western countries. Among others, the collectivization which implied an anti-individualistic attitude, is not only related to communist ideals, but has much to do with the traditional chinese kinship structure.

In the western countries, rapid industrialization and urbanization caused the disintegration of the rural communities. Collective life has become impossible in the context of the industrial setting. However, in China, the introduction of individualism has encountered resistance because the Chinese people have a strong propensity to collective life due to their familial organization. During the process of modernization, it seems that they had to make the choice between industrialization and collective life.

In comparison with Japan, China is geographically much larger and socially much less urbanized. It would be much more difficult for the Chinese people to emerge from their collective life and adapt themselves to the standards of individualistic "universalism". Under such circumstances, the Chinese peoples' propensity for collective life might constitute a real handicap in the way of industrialization. It would be a long time before the Chinese people could be urbanized, become universalistic, and finally be equipped with all the conditions favorable to industrialization. But the Maoist vision in this matter was quite different. According to them, the collective life is not at all incompatible with industrialization; on the contrary, it may be a favorable factor by the facility of organizing manpower. If it had some incompatibility with urbanization, why could one not do something different from the experience of western industrialization through an unorthodox process, namely, industrialization without urbanization?⁹ Many analyses by orthodox Marxists, as well as modern western social scientists, have shown that the process of urbanization, concomitant of the western industrialization, has brought about a dichotomy of metropolitan centers and their vast peripheries, which inevitably led to the rise of imperialism (Cohen, 1973). As a result, the formula of people's commune was launched.

The original blueprint of the people's communes was conceived as an all-comprising unit. Functionally, the communes run banks, factories and commercial enterprises, handle credit and distribution, undertake cultural and educational work, and control their militia and political organizations, besides the agricultural tasks. It seems

⁹ Rhoads Murphey points out in his analysis that the anti-urbanism attitude of the CCP "is directed primarily against the former treaty ports, but it involves by association all cities" (Murphey, 1970 : 69).

clear that the commune continues in fact to keep the basic characteristics of the traditional rural community: self-control in political and military affairs, self-sufficiency in economy and collective life (especially collective ownership of land and affectionate relationship between members of the collectivity). What is added to the traditional structure is its modern organization and additional new goals, of which the development of small-scale industry and the transformation of the natural environment are the most important ones.

Chapter Three

THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE MOVEMENT IN CHINA

The Chinese People's Communes were set up in 1958. While few have expressed reservations about the importance of the newly created socioeconomic unit, arguments have diverged as to the process of its birth. Some speak of it as a logical outcome of economic and political development in China,¹ whereas others insist on the forced setting-up in immature circumstances.² It is certain that both views have presented some truth, but neither of them seems able to avoid being biased by their respectively political inclinations. In this chapter I will try to establish an account as close as possible to the historical reality, and to find, and also to explain, the implications of the different arguments in such a controversy.

I THE PRELUDE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE MOVEMENT

When speaking of the development in China, it is not possible to ignore the leading role played by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the leadership of its chairman, Mao Tse-tung, in decision-making in any sector and at any crucial moment since 1949. The movement to establish people's communes was, like other turning points in the history of the People's Republic of China such as the Great Leap Forward (GLF)

¹ This point of view is specially represented by the Chinese official attitude and research done in China using only the Chinese official sources. For instance, Tao Chu (1964), Chu Li and Tien Chieh-yun (1974), and Wu Chou (1975).

² This point of view is specially represented by those who have a hostile attitude toward the CCP and the Chinese government such as researchers in Taiwan and some researchers of Chinese economy in the United States, for instance, Xiang Da-kun (1966), Cheng Chu-yuan (1959), and Hughes (1960).

and the Cultural Revolution, deeply imprinted by the CCP's past experiences. Franz Schurmann has rightly pointed out that "the revolutionary history of Chinese communism is closely linked to the peasantry; its organizational history is closely linked to the village cooperatives" (1970 : 413). During both the Jiang-xi Soviet period (1927-1934) and the Yan-an period (1935-1946), the CCP always tended to carry out its program of land reform and to establish cooperatives. And they got some successful results (Shi Jing-tang, 1957). It is worthwhile noting that the village cooperation based on kinship organizations was a commonplace in the countryside in China. Therefore, the communist program for social revolution, though guided by the communist ideology, also had its roots in Chinese tradition. What was radical is that the program of land reform aimed at eradicating the landlord class and replacing it by revolutionary organizations. From the point of view of rural development, the main achievement of the CCP during the two periods mentioned above was the experience gained from land redistribution and from organization of small-scale cooperatives, which was to become the basic guide of land reform on a nationwide scale after 1949.

The large-scale land reform started in 1950 and ended in 1952. Its importance in the history of cooperativization lies in its wiping out of a whole class of landlord and gentry. Schurmann called it one of the greatest social revolutions of modern times (1970 : 437). However, the land reform did not solve the problems of production either in organization or in technological revolution. The poor peasants who had received land from land redistribution were faced with the difficulties of effectively exploiting it, due to the lack of investment, draught animals and farm tools. In a short time after the land reform, some again got into debt while others began to sell land. New rich peasants got the upper hand in the rural economy. Middle peasants were trying to turn

themselves into rich peasants. Under such a situation, the CCP saw the obligation to speed up the cooperative movement by starting with the mutual-aid teams.

The latter was a traditional form of cooperation in the countryside. The teams consisted of a small number of households which shared their draught animals, farm tools and labor force in the busy season. But they did not pool their properties together. It was easier to use a traditional pattern than to initiate a new form before coming into cooperativization. The mutual-aid teams were thus planned as a preparatory step to setting up cooperatives.

Some cooperatives were set up immediately after the land reform; but in most places the movement was slow because of the shortage of local cadres. In January, 1954, the Central Committee of the CCP issued a directive on "developing agricultural producers' cooperatives". It was reported that 114,165 cooperatives had been formed by the end of that year (Schurmann, 1970 : 442). However, the cooperative movement speeded up in 1955 due to the personal intervention of Mao Tse-tung (Carin, 1960 : 192). It was in the main completed by the end of 1956. According to the Chinese official statistics, by the first half of 1955, the number of agricultural producers' cooperatives (nong-ye-she) increased to 670,000, embracing a number of households of about seventeen million (The State Statistical Bureau of China, 1960 : 28). But in only one year, by the end of May, 1956, the total number of cooperatives made a great leap forward, numbering 1,003,657, and the number of households rose to 110,134,226. Among those cooperatives (there were 302,756) advanced agricultural producers' cooperatives (gao-ji nong-ye-she) with the number of households being 74,720,054 (RMRB, 19 June, 1956). By the end of the year, more than 96 percent (or about 12 million) of all the peasant

households in China had joined agricultural producers' cooperatives, of which an overwhelming majority (87.8 percent of the total peasant households) had become parts of advanced cooperatives. Only 8.5 percent remained in the elementary agricultural producers' cooperatives (chu-ji nong-ye she) (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2).

In the elementary type, the ownership of land and of other important means of production, such as draught animals and large farm implements, were transferred from the members to the cooperatives. These means of production as well as land were considered as the peasants' shares to be used collectively by the cooperative for joint production. The peasants, however, retained the ownership of their houses, domestic animals, small farm implements and tools needed for sideline production. In addition, the peasants were allowed to have a small plot of land, called "private plot" (zi-liu-di), not exceeding 5% of the average landholding in the cooperative, for growing vegetables and raising pigs and poultry for their own use. While the cooperative products had to be sold to the state at fixed prices, the peasants' earnings were calculated on the basis of their "labor days" (lao-dong-ri) as well as the amount of their shares.

The crucial difference between the advanced type and elementary type of cooperatives is in the treatment of land compensation. In the advanced type, a peasant was not entitled to compensation for the amount of land that he had contributed to the cooperative. His income was determined solely by his "labor days". Besides, he had no shares for his draught animals and large farm implements for which he received a sale price from the cooperative.³ Another characteristic of the advanced type is its larger

³ There were some cooperatives of the advanced type set up from the very beginning of the cooperativization, for example, the Bai-pen-yao Advanced Agricultural Producers' Cooperative (The General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP, 1956, Vol. 1 : 294-300).

Table 3.1

AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION (I)

(thousand households)

	No. of peasant households in mutual-aid and cooperative organizations	No. of peasant households in agricultural producers' cooperatives			No. of peasant households in mutual-aid teams
		Total	Advanced	Elementary	
1950	11,313	0.219	0.032	0.187	11,313
1951	21,002	1.618	0.030	1.588	21,000
1952	45,423	59	2	57	45,364
1953	45,912	275	2	273	45,637
1954	70,775	2,297	12	2,285	68,478
1955	77,310	16,921	40	16,881	60,389
1956	117,829	117,829	107,442	10,407	--

Source: China : Ten Great Years. p. 34

Table 3.2

AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION (II)

(percentage)

	Percentage of peasant households in mutual-aid and cooperative organizations to total no. of peasant households	Agricultural Producers' cooperatives			Mutual-aid teams
		Total	Advanced	Elementary	
1950	10.713	---	---	---	10.7
1951	19.2	---	---	---	19.2
1952	40.0	0.1	---	0.1	39.9
1953	39.5	0.2	---	0.2	39.3
1954	60.3	2.0	---	2.0	58.3
1955	64.9	14.2	---	14.2	50.7
1956	96.3	96.33	87.8	8.5	--

Source: China : Ten Great Years. p. 35

larger size than the elementary one. It included a number of households of between 150 and 300. It could thus have more possibilities in planning land utilization and labor management.

It is easy to understand that not all the peasants who joined the cooperatives did so wholeheartedly. Some, especially the rich peasants (fu-nong) and the upper-middle peasants (shang-zhong-nong) were extremely unwilling to work in a collective framework for they had become used to relying on their own calculations in production and to hiring labor for heavy field work. But the majority which was composed of lower-middle peasants (xia-zhong-nong) and poor peasants (pin-nong) were filled with enthusiasm, because they had little to lose in collectivization. Therefore, while many rich and upper-middle peasants withdrew from the cooperatives in many parts of China during the course of collectivization, the poor peasants insisted on continuing along the collective road. A striking example was the Wang Guo-fan Cooperative in Zunhua County of Hobei Province. After the withdrawal of almost all members of the cooperative, three poor peasant households succeeded in proving the advantages of cooperation and finally regained all their lost members (cf. The General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP, 1956 : 5; Mao Tse-tung Si-Xiang Wan-Sui, 1969 : 200).

What was the most important advantage of the collectivization in the eyes of the peasants? No doubt it was the increase in production. Since 1949, following the course of collectivization, the output of grain crops and cotton had increased year by year. The yield of 1957 increased 71 percent over that of 1949 for grain crops and 270 percent for cotton.⁴ For 1958, the year of the GLF, the national grain figures were

⁴ The Chinese official statistical figures on agricultural production between 1955 and 1957 have been considered more reliable than other years by economists in western countries. See Liu and Yeh (1965 : 42), and Cheng (1963 : 184-185).

first estimated to increase 100 percent above 1957 (Liao, 1958), and then adjusted to 35 percent (see Table 3.3).

The improvement of the living standards in the countryside has also been witnessed by many foreign visitors.⁵ And the increase in agricultural production was confirmed by Mao Tse-tung himself through direct reports addressed to him.⁶ It was the striking success of cooperativization that paved the way for communization.

The process of establishment of the people's commune began with the merger of small-scale cooperatives into larger ones. During the "Chengdu Conference" in March, 1958, Mao's suggestion was to work out a plan for merging small cooperatives (Xiang, 1966 : 13), because the small cooperatives, with fewer members, less land, and little capital, were not able to operate on a large scale or employ machinery and would bind the development of productive force (The General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP, 1956 : 611). It was not long after Mao's call that Minhou County of Fujian Province made plans to unify all the cooperatives of the county into one, in April of the same year (Yue, 1958). Following the example of Minhou County more than one thousand cooperatives were merged into seven hundred larger ones in Lu County of Sichuan Province (RMRB, 23 April, 1958). At the same time two provinces, Honan and Liaoning, became experimental spots in this task for the whole country because they were in advance of all others. Honan had successfully merged its 38,473 small cooperatives into 1,378 and Liaoning its 9,600 into 1,412 (RMRB, 2 September, 1958).

⁵ For example, René Dumont, Isabel and David Crook, Keith Buchanan, Jan Myrdal, etc.

⁶ Mao said during his "Second Talk at the Second Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP": "There are many cooperatives in every province that have increased their output. When there is any increase, it would be either twice or several times the output of the previous years. Can you still not believe this?" Mao Tse-Tung Si-Xiang Wan-sui, 1969 : 200).

Table 3.3

OUTPUT OF GRAIN CROPS AND COTTON

	Grain crops	Of which:				Cotton
		Rice (unhusked)	Wheat	Coarse grains	Potatoes	
(Pre-libera- tion peak year=100						
1949	77.9	84.8	59.3	69.2	155.5	52.4
1952	111.3	119.3	77.8	99.6	257.9	153.6
1957	133.4	151.2	101.5	101.8	346.2	193.2
1958	180.2	198.3	124.2	119.8	715.0	247.3
(1949=100)						
1952	142.8	140.7	131.2	143.9	165.9	293.4
1957	171.1	178.4	171.2	147.1	222.7	369.0
1958	231.3	233.7	209.8	173.0	460.9	472.4
(1952=100)						
1957	119.8	126.8	130.4	102.2	134.3	125.8
1958	161.9	166.1	159.9	120.3	207.3	161.1
(1957=100)						
1958	135.1	131.0	122.4	117.7	207.3	128.0
Average Annual Rate of Increase(%)						
1950-1952	12.6	12.1	9.5	12.9	18.4	43.2
1953-1957	3.7	4.9	5.5	0.4	6.1	4.7
1950-1958	9.8	9.9	8.6	6.3	18.5	18.8

Source: China: Ten Great Years, p. 120

One of the merged cooperatives in Suiping County of Honan, composed of 27 small cooperatives, took the name of Weixing (sputnik) People's Commune in April, 1958.⁷ According to the available data, it must be the first of its kind.⁸

This new collective unit was distinct from the advanced cooperatives not only in having a larger size and in its more advanced character of ownership, but in integrating local government administration and commune management into one. Such an experience had been unknown not merely in Chinese history but also in other socialist countries. In addition to the Crooks' description in which a commune is believed to take upon itself spontaneously all the functions of both cooperative and township, it has been shown that the original idea stemmed from Mao. During his inspection trip to Hobei, Honan and Shandong, Mao is reported to have said: "It is better to set up People's Communes because the communes can combine

⁷ See "Chaya Shan Weixing Ren-min Gong-she Shi-xing Jian-zhang Cao-an" (The Draft of Experimental Regulations of Weixing People's Commune in Chaya Mountain), Hongqi, No. 7, 1958.

⁸ During a press conference for the journalists from Hong Kong and Macao, Tao Chu mentioned that the Zhangshi People's Commune in Qujiang County, Guangdong Province, was also set up in April, 1958 (cf. "On the Problems of the People's Commune - Tao Chu's Response in detail to the Journalists from Hong Kong and Macao" in Ren-min Gong-she Wen-ti Zi-liao, 1959 : 77). But there is no other evidence to prove that Zhangshi People's Commune was set up earlier than Weixing People's Commune.

industry, agriculture, commerce, education and the militia together, thus facilitating leadership." (Wu Zhi-pu, 1958 : 5).

Following the example of a few early established people's communes in Honan to which Mao publicly gave his approval, the 5,376 cooperatives in Suiping and Pingyu counties of the same province had been merged into 208 communes by early August (RMRB, 18 August, 1958). By the end of August, 1,378 communes had already been built from the 38,473 cooperatives in Honan Province (*ibid.*, 2 September, 1958). In view of such an upsurge of communization in Honan and, at the demand of Mao Tse-tung, the Politburo held an enlarged meeting in Beidaiho, lasting from August 17 to August 30. The conference concluded that the People's Communes were the "logical output of the march of events" and adopted a "Resolution on the Establishment of the People's Communes in the Rural Areas" (XHBYK, No. 8, 1958 : 1-2). This resolution provided a guideline for the ongoing commune movement, since by then the People's Communes were mushrooming throughout the country. From April, the month of emergence of the first commune, to the end of September, a mere six months, 90.4% of the total number of peasant households in China had been integrated into the commune system (the number and size of communes in different provinces and municipalities are shown in Table 3.4). By the end of 1958 communization could be considered completed in China.

From all available data it is safe to say that the creation of people's communes is an organizational change moving from the already well-established cooperatives rather than any kind of new establishment created by state investment, or promoted by technological innovations. This organizational achievement, however important it may be,

Table 3.4

People's Communes Established to September, 1958

	Number of Communes Established	Number of Participat- ing house- holds 21,936,350	Percentage of Total Peasant Households	Average Number of Households in each Commune
Peking	56	663,124	100.0	11,841
Shanghai	23	256,000	100.0	11,130
Hobei	951	8,402,639	100.0	8,836
Shanxi	975	3,483,564	100.0	3,573
Inner Mongolia	812	1,561,023	98.6	1,922
Liaoning	428	3,264,579	100.0	7,627
Jilin	481	1,914,547	100.0	3,980
Heilong-jiang	718	1,946,478	100.0	2,710
Shanxi	1,673	3,232,904	100.0	1,932
Gansu	794	2,006,389	100.0	2,527
Qinghai	144	245,624	100.0	2,456
Ninxia	53	201,815	67.3	3,808
Xinjiang	389	625,151	59.3	1,607
Shandong	1,580	11,347,989	100.0	7,182
Jiangsu	1,490	9,127,234	99.4	6,125
Anhui	1,054	7,219,244	100.0	6,849
Zhejiang	761	5,697,412	100.0	7,487
Fujian	622	2,672,839	95.1	4,297
Honan	1,285	10,272,517	100.0	7,994
Hubei	729	6,040,000	96.1	8,286
Hunan	1,284	8,172,440	100.0	6,365
Jiangxi	1,240	3,720,000	92.0	3,000
Guangdong	803	7,905,553	100.0	9,845
Guangxi	784	4,041,944	100.0	5,155
Sichuan	4,827	13,676,988	99.1	2,833
Guizhou	2,194	3,101,205	94.5	1,413
Yunnan	275	1,137,148	31.0	4,135
Total	26,425	121,936,350	98.2	4,614

Source: Tong-ji Gong-zuo (Statistical Work), Semi-Monthly, No. 20,
1958 : 23.

has incited much hostility from outside as well as discontent within the CCP itself, especially among the high-ranking leaders. Since the pre-Cultural Revolution period, students of modern China have become more and more aware of the disagreements among Chinese decision-makers. After the Cultural Revolution burst forth, a stream of documents has revealed to us that the Chinese decision-makers did not constitute a monolithic body acting from consensus. On the contrary, serious disagreements over a set of important issues had existed among the top leaders. It has been said that the approach to collectivization by organization and ideopolitical education was advocated by Mao Tse-tung. His rivals, such as Liu Shao-chi and his followers, were inclined to relate collectivization to agricultural mechanization. Since they were aware of the Soviet experience, they agreed that collectivization would be feasible only after industry has been able to equip the agricultural sector with sufficient machinery. Otherwise China would certainly fall into the same pitfall of losing the incentives of farmers as had the Russian people.⁹ The struggle between the two factions within the CCP had gone on for at least a decade before reaching its climax at the Cultural Revolution. As the "invincible" leader in modern Chinese history, Mao's policies eventually prevailed over those of his rivals. Chao Kang has correctly pointed out a crucial fact - that "all important decisions that resulted in drastic accelerations in agricultural collectivization were reached in special meetings under Mao's personal auspices" (Chao, 1970 : 23). Therefore, it can be said that Mao played a decisive role in the establishment of the people's communes.

⁹ Chao Kang has given a clear description of the struggle between Mao and Liu over agricultural development (1970 : 11-35).

II THE EVOLUTION OF THE SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE

Stages of change in the People's Commune system have been the subject of some previous studies.¹⁰ I shall deal with these stages in this section by changing slightly some details according to my own data. The evolution of the People's Commune can be roughly divided into four stages:

A. The First Stage - Period of Confusion - April 1958 to December 1958

After the first commune had emerged in Honan, rural communes were organized with incredible speed throughout the whole country. Within half a year, 26,425 communes were set up, representing 98.2 percent of the total number of peasant households, with an average of 4,614 households in each commune (see Table 3.4). Although the communization can be seen as completed by the end of September, 1958, considerable disparities existed in size, organization, ownership and distribution systems among the newly established units throughout the country.

The "Draft of An Experimental Regulation of the Weixing People's Commune" was published on 1st September, 1958 in Red Flag. It seemed to be published for the purpose of serving as a model for other newly established communes in the country.

The major points were:

- (1) Weixing People's Commune is a basic social unit combining agriculture, trade, culture, education and political affairs.

¹⁰ For example, Cheng Chu-yuan, Communist China's Economy 1949-1962 : Structural Changes and Crisis, Chapter 4, pp. 37-59; Chao Kang, Agricultural Production in Communist China 1949-1965, Chapter 1, pp. 26-35; and Xiang Da-kun, Problems of the Communist People's Communes, pp. 12-24. G. E. Johnson has also given a detailed description in his master's thesis "Mobilization, Growth and Diversity : The Chinese Case 1958-1963" (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Cornell University, 1966).

- (2) The commune system is considered as the proper form bridging socialism and communism, a stage to prepare the transition from the society of "to each according to his work" to that of "to each according to his needs".
- (3) Every citizen over sixteen years old, except those who have been landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and those who have been deprived of political rights for other reasons, can be a full member. Those in the excepted categories can only be informal members; that is, they will not have the rights of electing, being elected, and voting.
- (4) All the public property formerly belonging to the cooperatives that have become part of the commune must be transferred to the commune and will be owned by the commune. The share funds formerly contributed by the members of the cooperatives are still valid, but will not be refundable if a member leaves the commune, or dies.
- (5) Members' private plots, grounds of houses, livestock, trees, etc., will be transferred to the ownership of the commune; however, members are allowed to retain a small number of livestock. The Commune will compensate members for their losses of livestock and trees.
- (6) The commune will take special care to develop industry, irrigation, transportation, electrification and to set up commercial and bank services.
- (7) The commune is composed of all cooperatives in the whole township (xiang) with the former head of the township as its director.
- (8) The commune is divided into production brigades which are in turn divided into production teams.¹¹ While the commune is only responsible for profits and losses,

¹¹ At the beginning of communization, there were a few variations for the brigade and team levels, but most of the communes were based on a three-level system. For convenience, I translate all terms of the second level into "production brigade" and those of the third level into "production team"

the production brigade is the basic unit of production management and accounting, and the production team is the basic unit of labor organization.

- (9) Distribution system is a combination of wages based on the principle of "to each according to his work" and supply of free grain according to rations fixed by the state for each person. Those who work well can receive a prize in the maximum amount of one-quarter of their wages. Those who are lazy will be forced to work. Every male member is entitled to two days' leave per month, and female members three days' leave per month, without reduced wages. Absenteeism will be the subject of wage reduction. Women on leave for one month due to pregnancy will receive half a month's wages.
- (10) Each production brigade should organize its own mess hall and nursery. Those who do not want to eat in the mess hall or to use the services of the nursery are allowed to make other arrangements.
- (11) The commune will improve the housing conditions of the members by rebuilding houses in accordance with the consideration of facilitating production and leadership.
- (12) Inside the commune, management at every level must be carried out democratically. Management personnel must participate in labor. As a means of democratic expression, masses will be encouraged to use the Big Character posters to make criticisms (Hong-qi, No. 7, 1958 : 16-20).

Inspired by the experimental regulation of the Weixing People's Commune, Mao suggested drafting the "Resolution About the Problems Concerning the People's Commune" at the enlarged meeting of the Politburo in Beidaiho¹² which was to be

¹² Mao said during his "Talk at the Lushan Conference on 23 July 1959": "It was I who suggested to write down the Resolution at the Beidaiho Conference" (cf. Mao Tse-tung Si-xiang Wan-sui, 1969 : 304).

published on 10th September, 1958 in the Peoples' Daily. This resolution was a directive from the highest authority and was also one of the causes of confusion. With extreme enthusiasm and optimism the authorities uttered their ideas in the resolution in an idealistic and encouraging manner rather than in a realistic and practical one; many terms and ideas were expressed ambiguously. The resolution considered the appropriate size of a commune to be one xiang (township) in the slogan yi xiang yi she (one township for each commune) with about 2,000 households; and yet it is also suggested that local cadres should not oppose larger communes with more than 10,000 or 20,000 households, and advocated crossing township and county boundaries. It warned that the collective ownership should not be changed too quickly into ownership by the whole people, but, at the same time, thought that this transition period would be only a matter of three or four years in some places, and five or six years in others. It said that it was not necessary to deal immediately with the question of private plots, scattered fruit trees, share funds, and so on; on the other hand it suggested that the private plots might be pooled together to be managed collectively during the merger of cooperatives into communes. But, above all, two other measures promoted in the resolution were to become a source of disturbance to peasant life: one was militarization of the organization of labor force, the other was the everyday life being collectivized for which the most important symbol was the mess hall.

Because the suggestions contained in the Resolution were not precise enough to be followed, the leading cadres of each commune thought they had to do their best in the communization process. If deviation could not be avoided, they preferred to deviate to left rather than right, as a result of their experience in political education. This seemed unbelievable to outsiders so far as the efficiency of militarized actions of

the Chinese peasants is concerned. For example, at the beginning of the establishment of Weiguo People's Commune in the rural area of Yantai Municipality, Shandong Province, during half a night, under the orders of the production captain, the young peasant "soldiers" broke up all brick beds (Kang) of twelve households in the village in order to turn them into manure. Due to that very efficient action, the twelve households would face the problem of heating in the winter (YTRB, 26 August, 1958). In Xinyang Administrative District, Honan Province, in August, 1958, almost all the peasant households destroyed their private cooking stoves and handed over their conserved grain to show their determination to eat in the public mess hall (Li Fa-jiu, 1958). These were not isolated cases. Many other communes were, in the beginning, organized along military lines. For example, the Chengmen People's Commune in Minhou County, Fujian Province, was set up as a regiment which was divided into battalions at the brigade level. The whole commune was thus divided into 15 battalions, 121 companies, 329 platoons, and 1,254 squads (Hong-qi, No. 10, 1958 : 26). Most of the local cadres who led the commune movement were so afraid of being criticized as backward elements that they tended to take an overzealous attitude, without considering closely the objective situation. Protected by resounding slogans such as yi da er gong (literally, first big, second public; but here the word gong connotes the meaning of fairness and equality) and chi-fan bu-yao qian (eating without payment), they thought they could go as far as the Resolution had suggested. Consequently, some were looking for the big size in unifying all cooperatives in a county into one commune¹³ while others were striving to be highly public in eliminating

¹³ Statistics showed that in 13 provinces, 94 counties had either established only one commune, or formed a federation of communes in each (RMRB, 1 October, 1958).

private plots, destroying private cooking stoves, even going so far as to separate couples into different dormitories, and confiscating private houses and livestock.¹⁴

A general confusion rose throughout the country leading to reaction on the part of the peasants in the form of work slowdown, attacks on cadres, damage to public property, slaughter of livestock, waste of grain, and so forth (Cheng, 1963 : 126-129). Not only the peasants felt bitter; dissenting voices were heard even among the local cadres and high-ranking officials.

In the face of such confusion, Mao Tse-tung convened two meetings, one in Zhengzhou, Honan, between November 2-10, 1958, and another in Wuchang, Hubei, between November 21-27, 1958 (Wen-hui Bao, 1959 : 1) to hear reports from secretaries of provincial, autonomous regional and municipal Party Committees and to analyze the situation. These two meetings were the prelude to the 6th Plenary Session of the 8th CCP Central Committee which was to be held from November 28 to December 10, 1958. The Central Committee adopted a new resolution to amend and consolidate the Peoples' Commune. Following publication of this "Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes", although the configuration of the commune became much clearer than before, the movement entered into a period of crisis.

¹⁴ Mao later deplored the situation by saying: "We have blown the 'wind of communism' as to seize the property belonging originally to brigades or teams. Pigs and cabbages were carried away without uttering a single word. This is incorrect." ("Talk at the Wuhan Conference", Mao Tse-tung Si-xiang Wan-sui, 1969 : 297).

B. The Second Stage - Period of Crisis - January 1959 to July 1959

The objective of the "Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes" was to confirm the correctness of the Beidaiho Resolution, to eliminate some ambiguities and to make it easier to follow in order to consolidate the People's Commune system. The essential points as amended were:

- (1) The necessary tempo from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people is not three to four years or five to six years, but fifteen to twenty years.
- (2) Federation of communes within one county is encouraged.
- (3) The principles of "to each according to his work" is emphasized. Distribution is still based on half supply half wage, but wages can be ranked on a six or eight-degree scale, the highest being four times the lowest. The means of subsistence and savings deposit are guaranteed to be owned privately forever.
- (4) Increase of income for at least 90% of the members must be guaranteed.
- (5) Balanced development between agriculture and industry is encouraged.
- (6) Owing to the negative effect of the excessive shock actions, a limited time-schedule for one working day is fixed: 10 hours (8 for working and 2 for learning) for normal times and 12 hours during the busy farming season.
- (7) The leadership of militia is separated from that of administration and production.
- (8) "Politics in Command" should be enforced.

Among these rectifications, a very strange item was inserted in the Resolution: presumably based on the swollen figures of the agricultural output in 1958, the authority suddenly discovered that the agricultural problems had not lain in shortage of arable land and overpopulation, but on the contrary, in a shortage of labor force and surplus of arable land. Thus, a gradual reduction of one-third of the present cultivated land during the coming years was advocated. Of course, this suggestion was quickly to fall into silence and would never be talked of again.

Mao's point of view was still strongly reflected in this Resolution. However, it was at the same conference that Mao decided not to be nominated for presidency of the state for another term. The real motive behind his decision is still unclear. Certain documents released during the Cultural Revolution suggest that he was forced to yield his position by a contending group led by Liu Shao-qi, apparently because of the economic failure of the Great Leap Forward and the confusion caused throughout the countryside by the escalation of the communization. Now, looking back at the events, it seems probable that Mao preferred to sacrifice his presidency in order to get through the resolution about the People's Commune. At the end of the Resolution all party and administrative cadres at the provincial, municipal and autonomous regional level were called to participate intensively in the checking-up or rectification campaign of communes in organizing ten-thousand-person groups (wan-ren tuan) to investigate the situation.

In February, 1959, an enlarged meeting of the Politburo was held in Zhengzhou to revise the so-called rectification campaign. Some concrete measures were said to be formulated by this conference and approved by the CCP Central Committee's 7th

Plenum in April in Shanghai. But no detailed report was published.

The full impact of the confused situation caused by the setting-up of the People's Communes on agricultural production began to be tested by the summer of 1959. Although no statistical figures were published, it can be suggested by other evidence that agricultural production decreased drastically in comparison with the previous years (Buck, 1965, and Clark, 1965 : 148-49). Criticism among the high-ranking officials against the commune system began to mount. The famous case of Marshall Peng De-huai's petition at the Lushan Conference, held in August of that year, (which cost Peng his position as Minister of Defence), was representative of a large number of the high-ranking Party members. Although Mao succeeded during the Lushan Conference in subduing once again the opposition in the Party, his personal prestige was considerably lowered. A succession of readjustment measures was to be taken for the purpose of easing the economic crisis which continued to deepen as time went on. The period of 1959-1961 has been reported to be a time at the edge of a veritable famine, the cause of which is usually attributed to natural calamities, but it is alleged that Lui Shao-qí has said in a subsequent report that "the economic crisis was 30 percent attributable to natural calamities and 70 percent to man-made disaster" (Chao, 1970 : 31).

An official report issued in August, 1960, suggests that deliberate devastation of land by peasants during the spring sowing season had become serious (RMRB, 14 August, 1960). The shortage of grain for the coming years was so grave that the government was forced to buy wheat in great quantity from Australia and Canada.¹⁵

¹⁵ It is estimated that China imported 5-6 million tons of wheat from Australia, Canada and France in 1961 (Jan Deleyne, 1971 : 172).

In the face of such a disaster in rural economy, Mao's voice could no longer be as resounding as it had once been. It is very likely that a contending group took shape at the time around Liu Shao-qi and Deng Xiao-ping, and began to act in concert. The decision of the Lushan Conference and the "Twelve Articles of Emergency Directives for Work in the Countryside" issued by the Central Committee of the CCP in November, 1960¹⁶ marked another stage which may be called the "stage of regression".

C. The Third Stage - Period of Regression - August 1959 to August 1962

Following the Lushan decision, the "Twelve Articles of Emergency Directives for Work in the Countryside" were issued to carry out some important modifications:

- (1) The basic ownership of the production brigade and partial ownership of the production team was strengthened.
- (2) Labor force should be controlled at the production team level.
- (3) The portion paid in wages and the portion supplied should be 70% and 30% respectively.
- (4) The private plots were returned to members of the communes.
- (5) Family sidelines were allowed.
- (6) Rural trade markets were restored in a controlled manner.
- (7) The proper balance between work time and rest was assured.
- (8) Masses should be mobilized to participate in the "rectification campaign" of the commune (Chiang, 1965 : 70-71; 1967 Yearbook on Chinese Communism : 1029-1030).

¹⁶ The "Twelve Articles of Emergency Directives" and the later "Sixty Articles Concerning the People's Communes" have never been published in the Chinese press. I found them in the URI's collection, and the Hoover Institution collection among the materials gathered by the Taiwan Security Office. They have been viewed as veracious.

Based on the principles of the above "Emergency Directives", a document called "Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes (known also as "Sixty Articles Concerning the People's Communes") was issued in March, 1961, in order to concretize in detail the spirit of the "Twelve Articles". The "Sixty Articles" went further in putting a limitation on local industry and larger plans of irrigation systems in order to concentrate the labor force directly on agricultural production. The ex-landlords and rich peasants who had behaved well were for the first time allowed to be full members.

Along with this, the slogan of "san-zi yi-bao" (three privates and one guarantee) which was to become notorious during the Cultural Revolution was carried out as an efficient measure to stimulate the peasant's zeal in production. The "three privates" means private plots, free markets and responsibility for losses and gains in rural handicrafts production. All three things had existed during the cooperativization period. The one guarantee which caused the communal land to be distributed to individual households on condition that each household guaranteed a fixed quota in production, was a new policy. It is apparent that this policy made the system of labor distribution retreat even beyond the cooperativization period. That is why this period can be considered as a period of regression. However, it seems very likely that the "one guarantee" policy did not become really prevalent before being criticized as the main crime of the capitalist roaders.¹⁷

¹⁷ Deng Zi-hui, one of the high-ranking officials in the Government, was purged by Mao because he proposed the adoption of a nationwide system to set "guaranteed production quotas" for individual farm households instead of production teams (see Liu's "Confession", China Monthly, Sept. 1969, p. 35, quoted by Chao, 1970 : 322-323).

It is difficult to affirm now whether the cause of the improvement in agricultural production in 1962 was due to amelioration of weather, or to the drastic modifications in the commune system; probably both. In any event, the sign of the end of crisis gave Mao and his supporters an opportunity not to yield further in the Commune movement to Liu's group which considered that the economic policies had not been retreated far enough. Now Mao decided to launch his counter attack during the Tenth Session of the Eighth Central Committee, held in September, 1962, by focussing the economic problems on ideological ground. Class struggle was once again raised to gauge the standard of correct policy-making. The Maoists thereafter called this meeting an historical turning point in the duel of power struggle against the capitalist roaders (Chao, 1970 : 31). It was also this meeting which opened a nationwide campaign of politico-ideological indoctrination known as the Socialist Education Movement.¹⁸

D. The Fourth Stage - Period of Consolidation - September 1962 to 1965

The meeting of the Party's Central Committee in September, 1962 has been considered decisive by the Maoists because an alleged proposal on further modifications of the communal organization by Liu was not accepted at the meeting. In Maoist terms, the situation was that "the black wind of capitalism was victoriously stopped" (Chao, 1970 : 31). It seems that Mao regained since then some influence in decision-making which had been manipulated by Liu's group during the crisis period of 1959-1961. Although Mao and his policy have never been publicly criticized in the Chinese Press,

¹⁸ For a full account of this movement see Richard Baum (1975).

Mao recognized in many instances his mistakes in communization and specially pointed out two important deviations during the movement, namely, "ping-jun zhu-yi" (equalitarianism) and "gong-chan feng" (wind of communism).¹⁹ The former refers to the blunder of cadres in not understanding the necessity of socialist principle in distribution, "to each according to his work". The latter refers to the contradictions between commune and brigade, commune and team and brigade and team, on the one hand, and between collectivity and individual household on the other. Mao later recognized that the passage from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people would require much more time than he had originally thought. That is why he made no attempt to reverse the main modifications made by Liu's group, except the "one guarantee" policy.²⁰

Following the purge of Deng Zi-hui, who had been the flagbearer of Liu's "one guarantee" policy, the commune organization retained the "three levels" system without handing the communal land to individual households except at some experimental spots. The revised version of the "Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes" at the Party's Central Committee meeting in September, 1962, made clear that the ownership was of a collective nature, not by the whole people. Most property such as hilly land, fruit trees, small-scale industries, formerly owned by the commune, was handed over to the brigade and team for possession and management. The production team was designated instead of the brigade as the basic unit of accounting.²¹

¹⁹ See Mao's "Talk at Zhengzhou Meeting in March 1959: and "Talk at Lushan Conference in July 1959" (Mao Tse-tung Si-xiang Wan-sui, 1969 : 279-305).

²⁰ See Mao's "Talk at the Conference of the Party's Central Committee Work Group at Beidaiho on 9 August 1962." (Mao Tse-tung Si-xiang Wan-sui, 1969 : 425).

²¹ In the revised version, a two-level system (commune and team without brigade) was mentioned as a variation (See "Nongcun Renmin Gongshe Gongzuo Tiaoli-Xiuzheng an" ("A Revised Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Commune" or "Revised Version of the Sixty Articles Concerning the People's Communes"), Sept. 1962, reprinted by the Taiwan Security Office in May, 1965.

Along with the modifications in organization, the size of the commune was also reduced drastically.²² Up to November, 1963, the total number of communes had increased to 74,000 from around 26,000 in 1959 (Peking Review, 1 November, 1963 : 9), corresponding roughly to the number of townships in China.

From 1962 to 1965 no miraculous increase in agricultural output has been reported, but it is very likely that agricultural production was being steadily increased during that period. There is little doubt that the commune system was gradually consolidated and entered into a stage of stability.

III SUMMARY

Eighteen years have elapsed since the emergence of the people's commune. More and more people are recognizing the importance of this socioeconomic organism, and more and more information and research results are being published. However, we still feel the danger of being misled in one direction or another.

Let us put aside for the time being a few studies made in China on the People's Communes, because they could be thought of as being published for the purpose of disseminating some kind of propaganda. In the western countries there still exist two opposing points of view. For instance, Cheng Chu-yuan concluded in his study on the People's Commune: "The failure of communization, first experienced in the Soviet Union and now in Communist China, provides a valuable lesson to all other less developed countries - collectivization definitely leads to the deterioration of agricultural production (1963:5-6).

²² For the reasons and process of reducing commune size, see G. William Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China", Part III : "Rural Marketing in Communist China" (The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, May, 1965 : 363-399).

Perspicacious as he is, Chao Kang takes the view that the communes existed almost in name only by 1961 (1970 : 29). On the other hand, Keith Buchanan states that the "changes (modifications) do not mean the commune system is collapsing; they are rather a sign that the system is very much alive and developing" (1966 : 38). His point of view is shared by Jan Myrdal (1965 : 1970) and Peter Worsley (1975). It is certain that both views must be tested before either one can be accepted as a theory which can cope with the reality. However, we may ask a priori if these opposing points of view were not the consequence of their guiding theories.²³

As a matter of fact, a few social scientists have been aware of the danger of being misled by the theories, well established in the West, in approaching the problems of the Third World (Frank, 1967; Gurley, 1971). But most of them have expressed their dissenting points of view in the form of criticism, few have attempted to break up the paradigmatic restraint with suggestive studies. As has been expressed in the introduction, this study is an attempt to go beyond the conventional theories on the Third World. The development of the People's Commune is viewed, in this thesis, as a different model from the western capitalist and the Soviet socialist ones. It is likely not appropriate to establish this model by using the same criteria as would be used to build a model along the capitalist line. From this point of view, neither GNP index nor capital formation index is very meaningful in judging whether the commune system is a failure or a success. It is rather suggestive that the development of the People's Commune should be treated in its own historical and cultural backgrounds and sociological environment. Its success

²³ This academic dispute is not a novelty, but has its roots in the pre-World War II research which will be discussed further in the next chapter.

or failure is based on the structural flexibility of the Chinese society to the theory with which the decision-maker was attempting to change the social reality in order to attain some predesigned goal on the one hand, and the flexibility of the theory in its adaptability to the Chinese situation on the other.

The process of change is a dialectical one. However utopian a predesigned goal may be, if it is malleable and ready to modify itself in accordance with interaction between itself and the pre-existing social structure, it will be no longer utopian. On the contrary, a feasible predesign may become utopian if it is too rigid to adapt itself to the social reality. Therefore, it is almost inconceivable for me to consider the rectification of the commune as a pure regression without taking its adaptive aspect into account. It is undeniable that there were things which could be deemed as regressive in comparison with the original design of a very radical nature, but there were also other things which provided advanced indices for further development. In contrast to the conclusions of Cheng and Chao, I cannot find any solid ground of failure, nor can I say that the commune system is only a name. After the stage which I have called "regression", it was the stage of consolidation. Why is the People's Commune to be considered not as a failure, but as a valuable model? Why is it not merely a different name for the co-operative system? How was it being consolidated in a continuing developmental process? And how can it be perceived as such? the following chapters will respond to these questions.

Chapter Four

GENERAL BACKGROUND FOR THE RURAL ECONOMY IN SHANDONG BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNES


This chapter will be presented in three sections: the first section will provide a geographical and historical background of Shandong Province; the second section will deal with the historical facts relevant to the rural economy and the theoretical interpretations of the latter; and the third section will give a description of the situation of cooperativization on the eve of the commune movement in Shandong.

I GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Shandong Province, stretching from latitude 38°N to 34°N and from longitude 115°E to 123°E , has an area of a little more than 150,000 square kilometres, roughly corresponding to 1.5 percent of the total area of China.¹ The topography of Shandong is uneven. Mountainous and hilly regions comprise three-fifths of the total area. The province can be divided into four parts (see Map 1).

1. The Western Alluvial Plain is a part of the vast North-China Plain. Ninety percent of its surface is under fifty metres above sea level. The Yellow River and the Great Canal pass through, and cross each other in the middle of the region. Between the mountains in the central part of the province and the Yellow River alluvial plain, short rivers form lakes. Weishan Lake, the largest one, covers an area of approximately six hundred and sixty square kilometres. To the north of the region a delta formed by the

¹ China is about 9,6000,000 square kilometres.



1. The Western Alluvial Plain. 2. The Jiaolai Plain
3. The Central Mountainous Region. 4. The Eastern Liaodong Hilly Region.

Source: Atlas by Provinces of the PRC, 1974:143.

Yellow River between the estuaries of Tuhai River and Xiaoqing River stretches to the Gulf of Bohai.

2. The Jiaolai Plain is situated between the central mountainous region and the Jiaodong hilly region. It is also an alluvial plain formed by the rivers of Wei, Bailang, Jiaolai and Dagū.
3. The Central Mountainous Region consists of a chain of mountains such as Tai, Mong, Lu and Yi. The highest peak on Tai Mountain rises to more than one thousand five hundred metres, but the borders of the region are no more than three hundred metres above sea-level.
4. The Eastern Jiaodong Hilly Region is the main part of the Shandong Peninsula. This portion is made up of granite and gneiss with some crystalline limestone. It is not more than four hundred metres high on the average. The cultivated areas are concentrated in the two plains regions (cf. Atlas by Provinces of the PRC, 1974 : 37-40).

Ramon Myers describes Shandong Province as one area with poor soil conditions because "rainfall was insufficient to leach out most of the lime so that the soil was alkaline" (Myers, 1970 : 9). The annual rainfall is so irregular that agriculture used to depend largely upon the weather. Drought often occurred in the past,² but flooding was no less frequent because the concentration of rainfall in a short period during the summer

² During the nineteenth century Shandong had 30 droughts. See Amano Motonosuke, "Shindai no nōgyō to sono kōzō" (Agriculture during the Qing period and its structure) in *Ajia kenkyū* (Asiatic Studies), 3.1 : 240 (quoted by Myers, 1970 : 274).

usually caused the Yellow River to overflow.³ Drought, flood, alkali and sand have been viewed as the four major natural calamities contributing to the low agricultural output. Compared with the fertile Yangzi Delta, that of Pearl River, or the Sichuan Basin, the geographical conditions of Shandong province are greatly inferior, but they are no more severe than in many other inland provinces such as Honan, Shanxi and Shǎnxi. If the arable land and the total area ratio are taken into account, Shandong will occupy a better position. Shandong has been ranked first of all the provinces in China with respect to its net cultivated surface area (see Appendix III, Table 1). In spite of the relatively low yield per unit (Appendix III, Table 2), it has been ranked second only to Sichuan Province on the list of net output of food grains (Appendix III, Table 3). However, one factor which has placed Shandong among the poorest provinces is its man-land ratio. Its population numbered more than 48,870,000 in the census of 1955 (Tregear, 1965 : 228), 54,000,000 in 1958 (DZRB, 1 October, 1958), and 55,520,000 in 1974,⁴ a population three times as large as that of Shanxi Province which is equal to Shandong in area, and has twice the population of Canada which is almost as big as China.⁵ In the past, the vast virgin land in the North-east was the ideal colonial area for the surplus population of Shandong.

In short, poor soil conditions, insufficient annual rainfall, regular flooding of the Yellow River, and overpopulation, have constituted the main problems of

³ During the last 2,000 years, the last 2,000 years, the lower course of the Yellow River has overflowed in Honan and Shandong Provinces more than 1,500 times (see Huanghe Zai Qian-jin (The Yellow River Goes Ahead), published by the Ministry of Irrigation and Electricity, Peking, 1972).

⁴ Atlas by Provinces of the People's Republic of China, *op. cit.*, p. 39. In Shenzhou Jubian (Drastic Change in China), published in January, 1976 in Hong Kong by the Economic Report News Press, A population of more than 68,000,000 is given for Shandong Province (p. 88).


⁵ Shandong is ranked second after Jiangsu Province in population density, but Jiangsu is much more fertile than Shandong.

Shandong Province. These problems are no different than those of China as a whole, but they have manifested themselves in a more acute manner in Shandong than in any other province. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that Shandong is, geographically, one of the most representative areas of China with regard to basic problems in agricultural development.

Historically, Shandong is one of the places where the early Chinese culture flourished. Thanks to the archaeological discoveries during recent decades, we know that an early culture, called by archaeologists the Longshan Culture or Black Pottery Culture⁶ developed between approximately 2,000 and 1,200 B.C. in the present Longshan Township of Licheng County (Shi Zhang-ru, 1954 : 26). This neolithic culture spread to the north, west and south and was to meet the Yangshao Culture in the present Honan Province to form the earliest Chinese culture known to us before the Shang Dynasty (Pei, 1954 : 56). It was also in this province that Confucius was born and propagated his philosophy. Shandong Province formed part of the territory of China at a very early time and was part of the Chinese cultural unit long before the provinces to the south of the Yangzi River.

Administratively, at the end of the Qing Dynasty, Shandong was divided into ten fu and three zhi-li zhou (directly under the jurisdiction of the provincial government). Those ten fu were divided into 7 zhou and 97 xian (counties) (Shandong Tongzhi, 1915). After the Revolution of 1911, all zhou were converted into counties. So the province was divided first into 108 counties (Feng-sheng, Di-zhi, 1935), and then into 107 counties (see Map 2). After 1949, although some county seats were moved

⁶ It has been so called because the excavation was found at Longshan, Licheng County, Shandong Province, and consisted mainly of black potteries.



Counties of Shandong Province:

1.Wudi 2.Zhanhua 3.Yangxin 4.Luoling 5.Ningjin 6.Shanghe 7.Huimin 8.Bin 9.Lijin
 10.Boxing 11.Guangrao 12.Shouguang 13.Yidu 14.Linzhi 15.Changshan 16.Zouping
 17.Gaoqing 18.Huantai 19.Putai 20.Qingcheng 21.Qidong 22.Jiyang 23.Linyi 24.Ling
 25.De 26.En 27.Wuchang 28.Xiajin 29.Linqing 30.Qiu 31.Guantao 32.Guan 33.Xin
 34.Zhaocheng 35.Fan 36.Guancheng 37.Pu 38.Hezhe 39.Dingtao 40.Cao 41.Dan 42.Jinxiang
 43.Chengwu 44.Juye 45.Yuncheng 46.Jiaxiang 47.Wenshang 48.Dongping 49.Shouzhang
 50.Dong'a 51.Pinyin 52.Yangu 53.Tangyi 54.Liaocheng 55.Shiping 56.Boping 57.Qingpin
 58.Gaotang 59.Pingyuan 60.Yucheng 61.Qiho 62.Licheng 63.Changqing 64.Feicheng
 65.Tai'an 66.Ningyang 67.Sishui 68.Qufu 69.Yanzhou 70.Jining 71.Yutai 72.Zou
 73.Teng 74.Yi 75.Dancheng 76.Fei 77.Mengyin 78.Xintai 79.Laiwu 80.Zhangqiu 81.Zhichuan
 82.Boshan 83.Linju 84.Yishui 85.Linyi 86.Rizhao 87.Ju 88.Anqiu 89.Changluo 90.Wei
 91.Changyi 92.Gaomi 93.Zhucheng 94.Jiao 95.Pingdu 96.Ye 97.Zhaoyuan 98.Laiyang
 99.Jimo 100.Haiyang 101.Qixia 102.Huang 103.Penglai 104.Fushan 105.Muping 106.Wendeng
 107.Rongcheng

Sources: Myers 1970:10-11 and Atlas by Provinces of the PRC, 1974:37-38.

because of the development of transportation and some small counties were merged into large ones, the province continued in the main to keep the traditional subdivision. However, according to the available sources, we know that changes have been occurring since 1949. A 1958 source shows that the province was divided into 8 large Administrative Districts (Zhuan-qu) which were in turn divided into 6 municipalities and 104 counties in addition to four municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of the provincial government (DZRB, 7 July, 1958). The Administrative Atlas of China published by the U.S. Directorate of Intelligence in 1969 gives 9 Administrative Districts and 107 counties under their jurisdiction of Shandong Province. The most recent Chinese Atlas shows that the province is divided into 9 Administrative Districts and 4 municipalities under the jurisdiction of the provincial government. The 9 Administrative Districts are subdivided into 106 counties and 5 municipalities (Atlas by Provinces of the PRC : 39). No available source tells us when the trivial changes in the administrative division occurred between 1958 and 1974. As the more recent atlases do not contain the demarcation lines between counties, Map 2 remains the only reference as to county demarcation for the beginning of commune movement.

III RECENT HISTORY IN SHANDONG AND THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A. Recent History in Shandong

The following is a résumé of significant historical facts about Shandong Province since the Opium War of 1840 (cf. History Department of Shandong University, 1960), which reflect the extent to which peasant life was disturbed by both internal and external forces and the gradual collapse of the rural economy.

1. Invasion of Imperialist Powers

As a result of the Second Opium War in 1858, Yantai, an east-coast port in Shandong, was opened to foreign trade. Following the arrival of commercial goods, Catholic and Protestant missionaries from France, Italy, Germany, and the United States began to penetrate deeply into the countryside with three bastions in three big cities: Jinan (western parochiality of Shandong), Yanzhou (southern parochiality) and Yantai (eastern parochiality). It was not long before the religious activities of the American missionaries spread to a large number of counties such as Pingdu, Linqing, Qufu, Linyi, Weixian, Laiyang, Changqing, Yucheng and Enxian.

The secession of Taiwan as a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 whetted the Japanese appetite and consequently they occupied by force Weihaiwei, an other east-coast port in Shandong. At the same time, under the pretext of the disappearance of a German missionary, Germany occupied Jiaozhou Gulf where Qingdao was to be developed into a German bastion. In 1898 Great Britain seized Weihaiwei by routing the Japanese, and imposed another trade treaty port on China.

The German-Chinese Railway Company, the German-Chinese Mineral Exploitation Company and the German-Chinese Bank were set up simultaneously in 1899. The Jiao-Ji Railway was built by Germany in order to exploit a large area between Qingdao and Jinan.

In the meantime, intervention by the foreign missionaries in Chinese domestic affairs provoked peasant resistance and riots⁷ among which those in Pingyuan County

⁷ Deleted.

(1895), in Cao County and Dan County (1896), in Juye County and Yanggu County (1897), and in Yucheng County, Licheng County, Feicheng County, Guan County and Linqing County (1899) were the most well known.

During the First World War, the Japanese entered the conflict on the Allied side in order to move into the German concessions in Shandong. The famous Twenty-one Demands presented to China by Japan in 1915 provoked the May Fourth Movement which would have far-reaching influence in modern China. But China was too weak at that moment to defend herself. The Japanese army finally entered Shandong in 1927 to impede the northward march of Chiang Kai-shek's North-Expedition Army. The merciless massacre of the inhabitants of Jinan, the capital of Shandong, by the Japanese army, on May 3, 1928, makes this date a memorable one in modern Chinese history.

From 1937 to 1945, all the big cities and a large area along the railways in Shandong were occupied and governed by the Japanese forces. Because the communist guerrillas were active in the countryside, under the pretext of eliminating communists, looting and the massacre of Chinese peasants by the Japanese became routine in a large part of the province.

2. Peasant Rebellions

The failures in wars with foreign powers forced the Manchu government to continuously increase agricultural taxes. Between 1840 and 1854, open and organized peasant resistance to payment of taxes occurred in fifteen counties.

In 1854 the Tai-ping Army entered Shandong and at the same time peasant riots flared up in the western part of the province. Between 1855 and 1868 the Nian

Army actively engaged the Manchu Armies in a large region of Shandong. Both Taiping and Nian rebellions were on a nation-wide scale. Many other rebellious instances, although originating locally and having limited influence, affected even more the peasant life of this province. The best known of these local uprisings were: (1) the Fu-jun in the counties of Mengyin, Yishui, Teng, Fei, Yi, Taian, and Laiwu (1856-1862); (2) the Zou-jiao-jun in the counties of Zou and Qufu (1860-1862); (3) the Chang-qiang Hui (the Long Lance Society) in the counties of Fan, Mengcheng and Dongchang (1861-1867); (4) the Bai-lian Jiao (the White Lotus Society) in the West of Shandong (1861-1863); and (5) the Yi-he Quan (the Boxers 1863-1901) which was originally a branch of the White Lotus Society, expanding later into Hobei Province and Peking and finally becoming widely known because of the War of the Boxers.

In a relatively short span of time, the fact that so many peasant revolts occurred, strongly indicated the state of instability in the countryside.

3. Acceleration of Class Polarization

Due to disintegration of the social and economic structures and to the modern means of accumulating wealth, class polarization proceeded at an unprecedented pace. Because of disintegration of social and economic structures, the restraining forces, both structural and moral, were considerably weakened; because of modern means of accumulating wealth, people could be enriched in a short span of time to a degree that formerly took several generations. Two facts can be seen to indicate the tendency to class polarization:

- (1) Multi-enterprises of landlords: Besides leasing land, landlords also undertook commercial and handicraft enterprises, and began to set up money stores

(qian-zhuang) or silver stores (yin-hao). The last named was a modern means of accumulating wealth, much more efficacious than the means of traditional users. The Xu family in Xiajin County and the Shu family in Zhichuan County were very representative of this category of landlord.

- (2) Militia groups (Tuan-lian)⁸: Inasmuch as the Manchu legal forces were incapable of protecting people against either foreign invaders or armed peasant rebels, many wealthy and influential landlords embarked on the organization of a defensive militia. They built citadels and armed their tenants. They even collected taxes from the inhabitants of their spheres of influence. They offered an alternative to the peasants: aligning with the rebels, or looking for protection from these influential landlords. As the militia groups were proven efficient in fighting against the peasant rebels, they were encouraged by the government. This phenomenon was not, of course, limited to Shandong Province. It was a nationwide movement during this period. A few of these militia groups developed into warlords at the beginning of the Republic.

According to Chinese official statistics, before the Land Reform the landlord class in Shandong represented 3%-4% of the total population, but occupied 30%-50% of the total arable land. This situation was exacerbated in some places, for instance, at the time of Land Reform, officially reported surveys indicated that in the southern part of Zhucheng County, the landlord representing 10% of the local population possessed 80% of the land (DZRB, 6 August, 1957). This situation created tension not only between landlords and peasants, but also among the peasants themselves

⁸ Though the tuan-lian varied greatly in different places, under different circumstances, it was invariably a gentry creation for local militarization and control in response to a time of administrative weakness (cf. Kuhn, 1970 : 93-104).

because of the scarcity of land, a situation which made so many people pessimistic about the Chinese rural economy.

4. Civil Wars:

In Myers' book, the Japanese invasion of Shandong between 1937-1945 seems not to have dealt a serious blow to the rural economy. But his perceptions are highly suspect because he relied strongly on Japanese data to study the Chinese economy. He nevertheless gives a detailed account, always according to the Japanese surveys, of the impacts of warlordism and the civil war between the Communists and Nationalists on the rural economy (Myers, 1970 : 277-287). Shandong was not only the battlefield of the Japanese invasion armies, but also of the civil wars before and after them. As Myers says: "no other phenomena between 1911 and 1937 (sic!) caused such upheaval and misery in the countryside as that of dissident military units wandering about pillaging and warring with one another" (ibid. : 277).

Between 1937 and 1945, the rural situation became worse because of the pitiless attacks by the Japanese armies for the purpose of seizing provisions and eliminating the communists. But the defeat of the Japanese forces did not bring about calmness in Shandong. Between 1945 and 1948, the communist forces made assaults on the county seats one after another before they finally conquered the provincial capital, Jinan. It is known that the defeat of the Nationalist government did not result only from the military collapse, but also - probably mainly - from economic bankruptcy. On the eve of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, just as Myers points out, "the collapse of both urban and rural economy in north China was complete" (ibid. : 187).

B. Theoretical Interpretations of Economic Development

Many scholars, both Chinese and Western, have used much of their time and energy to investigate the causes and to look for some feasible solutions to the problems of backwardness or regression in Chinese agricultural development. In his research on peasant economy in Hobei and Shandong (the only serious study about local economy of Shandong Province so far as I know), Ramon H. Myers puts forth two theories for explaining the backwardness of Chinese agriculture: the distribution theory and the eclectic theory, as previously mentioned in Chapter One (Section I). Although those theories were not derived exclusively from research on Shandong and Hobei provinces, Myers thinks they can be applied towards explaining the agrarian problems in these two provinces. He states that his study is closer to that of J. L. Buck than to that of any other student of the Chinese rural economy. Therefore, he espouses Buck's explanations which rested on "incontrovertible evidence that the fundamental problems of agriculture had nothing to do with rural socioeconomic relationships" and "that China's rural problem was rooted firmly in improving farming technology and in the government undertaking various forms of assistance to permit farmers to manage their land more efficiently" (Myers, 1970 : 292).

Before advancing my comments about the divergence between the "distribution theory" and "eclectic theory" named by Myers, I would like to say a few words about the nature of Myers' data upon which he has based his research.

In the first place, there is little doubt that the North China rural surveys made by the Japanese during the war period (1939-1943), which constituted the bulk of the sources of Myers' data, have certain value for understanding the peasant economy

in the corresponding areas. In some ways, they might even be regarded as very valuable if there existed no other sources of the same nature, covering the same period. However, as Myers was aware, the validity of data is questionable because they were "collected via interpreters by citizens of a conquering power, by foreigners whose compatriots had committed aggression of the most naked kind" (Myers, 1970 : 37). After citing such a strange condition of data collecting, I can hardly believe that Myers could be so naive as to think that the Chinese peasants' "characteristic tolerance (and long experience) of alien powers suggested that they probably told the truth" and that "they could understand that these particular investigators were not the usual servants of the invading army" (*ibid.*). So far as I have observed, the Chinese peasants are no more tolerant of alien powers than any other people.⁹ Nor can I believe that the peasants during a time of war were capable of distinguishing "these particular investigators" from the "servants of the invading army".¹⁰

In the second place, the four villages from whence the bulk of the data was derived, were all close to big cities such as Peking and Jinan, or to county seats. They were not very representative of inland villages, either by number or by their geographical situation.

⁹ The Mongols and Manchus, in spite of their rapid Sinicization, were not really tolerated even after 80 years and more than 200 years domination respectively.

¹⁰ Even I, a Chinese, when collecting information for my thesis in Hong Kong, felt I had incited some undue suspicion in my compatriots, yet it was not a time of war. Moreover, I was in Hong Kong, a large westernized city, faced with informants who were more or less educated and surely capable of distinguishing a student from a secret agent; after all, I did not need an interpreter and was capable of communicating with my informants in the most subtle Chinese way (see Appendix I).

Thirdly, many examples in the data which could lead to a different conclusion were not discussed by Myers. For instance, in the data of Ling Shui Kou Village in Shandong Province, the land distribution is reported as very unequal. As we know, before 1949 the village leadership was strictly linked with wealth. The number of families belonging to the village council until 1925 represented 2% of the total number of village householders, but owned 10% of the land. Between 1928 and 1939, the number of village leaders increased to 4% while the land they owned decreased to 8%. There are two possible explanations for such an abrupt change occurring within a time span of only a few years. The first is that the members of the village council did not report the accurate figures of their land holdings between 1928-1939 for fear of being over-taxed by the Japanese. The second explanation may be that given the accuracy of the figures, this trend rather indicates a general impoverishment of the villagers, including the wealthy peasants, and not more equality of land distribution, because there was little chance that the land lost by the village leaders fell into the hands of the poor non-leader families. Who could purchase this land? Absentee landlords? Presumably. If this explanation is reasonable, it would touch the socioeconomic relationship in the rural areas. It was no longer possible to confine the problem merely to a purely economic framework.

With respect to the two theories about peasant development in China advanced by Myers, many points were shared by the two theories. Both sides recognized the impoverishment of the peasants and both thought that a large proportion of their income was unjustly taken away by taxes, high rents, usury and the like. The crucial difference between them in their conclusions is that the distribution theorists viewed the causes and solutions in production relationships and stressed them, whereas the eclectic theorists

viewed the causes and solutions in and stressed on productive forces. Bearing this in mind, we immediately find that this difference in thinking and in the accordingly derived arguments is not only confined to the research before World War II, but is still carried on by the students of China today. The difference between Buchanan, Worsley and Jan Myrdal on the one hand, and Cheng Chu-yuan and Chao Kang on the other, on the people's commune which I have discussed in the previous chapter, is none other than the old theme of production relationships versus productive forces. One interesting remark is that those who espouse the "eclectic theory" are mostly economists trained in the purely western academic tradition in economy, no matter whether their origins be Chinese or western. On the other side stand mostly non-economists whether they be sociologists, anthropologists or social historians. At this point, James Hansen's remark about the paradigmatic limitations in modern empiricist science would become very suggestive.¹¹ The old paradigmatic framework set up by Adam Smith in economic development is still in vogue.¹² Laissez-faire, self-interest and competitive markets are viewed as basic principles for rapid economic development. Derivatively, any interference from government is viewed as evil and undue action which could only obstruct a normal and healthy development. That is why those economists, when studying the Chinese economy, have done everything to avoid looking at any evidence which might contradict those principles. In spite of historic facts, many of them still think that communism was imposed on the Chinese peasants by a host of elitists and that the creation of the People's Commune was also arbitrarily conceived

11 In criticising the Empiricist Science, Hansen says: "This type of science is prevalent in most lab-work: the scientist 'collects' 'facts' in accordance with some pre-established paradigm" (1967).

12 John G. Gurley has made a precise analysis in this matter. See "Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development " (1969).

by Mao or by a few people against the peasants' will, and that if the Chinese peasantry was to be given a chance to develop itself along the line of laissez-faire, self-interest and competitive markets, it would have developed much better. But laissez-faire, self-interest and competitive markets have operated in a set of historical conditions and sociological institutions that the countries outside the western sphere do not possess. If the social and economic prerequisites for development in developing countries consist merely of introducing the necessary social institutions as well as technology from the developed countries, there would already have been some "united states" emerging in Latin America or Asia. The historical evidence of economic development shows that the countries of Latin America have not successfully received such similar conditions and institutions by diffusion from the developed countries after having developed along the line of "liberal economy" for more than two centuries, at least. India is another example of a country which has not successfully developed in this way. Even Japan, which has always been regarded as an exception in terms of a successful model of liberal economy, has not possessed similar institutions, although some historical conditions similar to the western countries in their development were created during World War II and are continuing in effect. Ironically enough to the expectations of some economists, they were not created by the liberal economy, but by Japanese military invasion.

The divergence between the two theories becomes all the more important when it is not merely circumscribed within the academic realm, but brought into the sphere of policy-making. It has been reported that the question of whether production relationships or productive forces should take precedence constituted the most burning issue of

the struggle between two factions within the CCP during the collectivization movement.¹³ The fact that the final decisions were always inclined to change the production relationships in order to resolve the contradiction between them and the productive forces, could sufficiently indicate that the final analyses of the decision-makers were in accord, to some degree, with the 'distribution' theorists. Contrary to Myers' accusation that the distribution theorists lacked thorough examination of "the great body of rural data" and critical analysis, they often brought about insight into the problems with more historical perspective and less limitation by the western economic paradigm. This discussion may help the reader to understand that Mao's decision to establish the People's Commune in order to bring about some radical changes in the production relationships in the rural areas was not so arbitrary as many have supposed it to be. Even Mao was not influenced by the research of the so-called "distribution" school, at least his analyses coincided with many of those theorists. Therefore, there is no reason to think that Mao was alone in having such a point of view, and was in default of theoretical support.

Before turning to the discussion of the Commune system it is necessary to present a brief description of the developmental situation in Shandong just before the creation of the People's Commune.

¹³ The faction led by Liu Shaoqi has often been depicted by the students of Chinese economy as representative of the "productive-force-first" theory and thus were more perceptive to the reality. In fact, there is no evidence to prove that Liu and his followers did not take the production relationships into account and that they were as liberal as Indira Gandhi or Kakuei Tanaka.

III ON THE EVE OF COMMUNIZATION IN SHANDONG

In China as a whole, the cooperative movement is said by a number of authorities to have started in 1955. But in some places, agricultural producers' co-operatives were set up as early as 1952, the very year of the completion of the Land Reform and the inception of the mutual-aid groups. Shandong was one of those places. According to the available sources, one of the earliest cooperatives was the Red Star (Hongxing) Agricultural Producers' Cooperative in the Village of Hou-zhaizi, Junan County, which was organized in the winter of 1952. It started with only 25 households, but this number was increased to 140 in 1954, representing 86.2% of the total households of the village (DZRB, 23 November, 1954). By 1954, there were already more than 24,000 agricultural producers' cooperatives while 68.1% of the total households had joined the mutual-aid groups in Shandong (DZRB, 10 November, 1954). By the end of 1955, 7,190,000 peasant households (or 76% of the total households in the province) had joined the cooperatives.¹⁴ In March of 1956 the number of cooperativized households rose to 10,070,000, or 91.8% of the total number of the peasant households. Among them, 7,200,000 households or 65.6% of the total number became members of the advanced type.¹⁵ Up to the beginning of 1957, 96% of the peasant households in Shandong had been cooperativized and 85% were in the advanced cooperatives.¹⁶ The cooperative movement can, in the main, be considered to

¹⁴ "Report on the National Economic Development and the Situation of Implementation of State Planning of Shandong Province in 1955" by the Statistical Bureau of Shandong Province (DZRB, 18 April, 1956).

¹⁵ Ibid. According to the provincial Statistic Bureau's report for 1956, there were 137 State farms in the province besides the cooperatives (DZRB, 9 August, 1957).

¹⁶ Report presented by Tan Qi-long, the first secretary of the Provincial CCP Committee of Shandong Province to the Third Plenum of the Second Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (RMRB, 12 March, 1957).

have been completed in 1957 in Shandong.

The most important achievements in agricultural development since the cooperative movement started were the increase of arable land by exploiting the virgin and deserted lands, and amelioration of soil conditions by building and improving irrigation systems, and afforestation. Mechanization also got under way.

In 1955, the newly exploited land amounted to 168,000 mu, giving a total increase of 1,219,000 mu over 1952 (DZRB, 18 April, 1956). In the sector of irrigation, in 1955, 245 small-scale dams, 737 irrigation canals and more than 5,000 reservoirs were built. There was also a well-building endeavor that brought the number of wells up to 2,110,000 (*ibid.*). Due to these basic irrigation works, 18,000,000 mu of land were brought under irrigation in 1956.¹⁷ In 1955 the afforestation areas increased 100% over 1954 (DZRB, 18 April, 1956). In 1956, 1,991,200 mu were added to make the total afforested area 5,148,800 mu (DZRB, 8 February, 1957).

Mechanization in agriculture was first introduced into Shandong in 1952 by the establishment of the first tractor station which possessed 6 tractors. In 1955, 13 more stations (with 364 tractors) were set up, serving 2,469 cooperatives in 22 counties. By September of 1956, the number of tractor stations and of tractors had increased to 36 and 700 respectively (DZRB, 5 September, 1956).

The 'per unit' yield steadily rose for most food grains and economic crops (see Table 4.1). In 1956 food grains increased 10% over 1955, amounting to 30 billion jin.¹⁸ A survey of 372 cooperatives (10,300 households) in 24 counties revealed that per capita output of food grains was 559 jin in 1955 and 607 jin in 1956. The actual

¹⁷ It is noted that before 1956 the total irrigated land was only 8,000,000 mu. See Tan Qi-long's report (1957).

¹⁸ Tan Qi-long's report, *op. cit.* Chao Kang's estimate is 25 billion 900 million jin for 1956 and 25 billion 930 million jin for 1957 (Chao, 1970).

grain distribution per capita after tax and sale to the State was 423 jin in 1956 (Tan, 1957).

Up to 1957, living standards of peasants had been steadily improving. This can be seen in the survey of the Village of Wang's Well (Wang-jing Cun) in the Red Temple Township (Zhu-miao Xiang), Xiqilin County (Table 4.2). However, the improvement of living standards was better seen in the category of lower-middle class peasants. Few, if any, improvements had been made for those above the upper-middle peasant class. Generally speaking, the sharp difference in living standards between rich peasants and poor peasants as a common pattern before the revolution, had given way to equalization. According to this survey, we see that in comparison with the level of living standards in 1936, the best year during a long period of turmoil before 1949, the upper-middle class peasants consumed more grain, more oil, a little more cotton cloth in 1956, but less meat. In contrast, the poor peasants consumed more of everything in 1956 than in 1936. The living standards of the poor peasants in 1956 almost reached the level of upper-middle class peasants in 1936.¹⁹

1956 was a year in which heavy industry still took precedence. It was reported that the gross output value of industry in Shandong increased 339.6% over 1949. The ratio of gross output value in the industrial sector to the total value of industry and agriculture rose from 29.1% in 1949 to 45.8% in 1956, an increase of 22.8% per year (DZRB, 3 August, 1957).

The first half of 1958 was a period of upsurge for the development of rural industry (xiang-she gong-ye literally means "industry of township and cooperatives").

¹⁹ According to the average income in the survey, the peasants of the village of Wang's Well were better off than the average in Shandong which was reported as 69 yuan in 1936, 78 yuan in 1952 and 83 yuan in 1956 (DZRB, 6 August, 1957).

Table 4.1

Per mu yield for the principal food grains and economic crops : 1954-55

(unit : jin)

	<u>1955</u>	<u>1954</u>
wheat	101.7	111.3
corn	184.1	177.5
millet	204.7	189.8
sorghum	169.0	119.6
soybeans	107.1	95.7
sweet potatoes	344.9	445.9
cotton	36.7	32.9
foreign hemp	187.71	132.5
tobacco	185.4	199.1
peanut	260.1	217.8
rape seed	50.1	30.1

Source: "Report on the National Economic Development and the Situation of implementation of the State Planning in Shandong Province in 1955" by the Statistical Bureau of Shandong Province (DZRB, 18 April 1956).

Table 4.2

Comparison of living standards from 1936 to 1956 in the Village of Wang's Well, Xiajin County (per individual)

net income (unit:yan)	1936	1943	1945	1950	1951	1954	1955	1956
upper-middle peasant	87.7	21.1	47.9	114.17	39.95	114.6	125	137.5
lower-middle	45.36	17.3	30	89.75	43.97	89.2	128.5	145.9
poor	29.5	17.98	33.6	73.72	21.8	91.8	139	165.9
average	54.19	18.79	37.16	92.55	35.24	98.53	130.83	149.77
grain consumption (jin)								
upper-middle	347.3	266.9	324.8	373.9	359.5	381.68	395	419.5
lower-middle	261.6	243.5	301.7	369.5	371.7	398.8	399.2	413.2
poor	242	218.7	322.9	356.6	352.8	406.6	411	451.9
average	283.6	243	316.5	369.66	361.3	395.69	401.73	428.2
meat consumption (jin)	7.66							
upper-middle	7.66	0.6	2.88	11.24	3.9	6.66	7.12	6.88
lower-middle	2.77	0.17	1.88	4.63	2.95	4.31	3.81	5.52
poor	1.31	0.29	1.35	3.13	1.8	3.33	4.27	5.63
average	3.91	0.35	2.037	6.33	2.88	4.77	5.07	6.1
oil consumption (jin)								
upper-middle	3.53	1.4	2.69	9.5	4.65	4.34	5	5.49
lower-middle	2.5	0.76	1.23	4.63	2.73	4.4	4.19	3.93
poor	2	0.35	1.58	4.61	2.33	3.88	4	4.15
average	2.676	0.84	1.83	6.25	3.24	4.21	4.4	4.52
cotton cloth consumption (chi)								
upper-middle	23	1.6	11.56	15.69	3.8	14.87	21.53	23.16
lower-middle	8.9	1.7	5.29	14.5	3.64	16.3	17.5	30.1
poor	7.17	0.47	6.47	2.62		14.76	18.37	22.36
average	9.69	1.26	7.75	10.94	2.48	15.31	19.1	25.21

In the village, there were 197 households and 725 persons in 1936. The total cultivated land was about 2,700 mu. 5.1% of the population were landlords and rich peasants who owned 24.7% of the land. There were 110 households (423 persons) of the middle peasant class. On the average each of them owned 4.3 mu. 55 households (194 persons) belonged to the poor peasant class. Each of them owned 1.07 mu on the average. 27 households had no land at all. In 1943, the number of households increased to 208. 32 middle-peasant households became poor peasant households. The percentage of middle peasants decreased from 56% to 43% while that of poor peasants increased from 28% to 35%. Those who had no land increased from 13% to 17%. In 1956, the year of the survey, there were 259 households totalling 970 persons. The classification of peasants was done during the Land Reform.

Source: Survey done by Liu Hong-kui et al (DZRB, 6 July, 1957).

In May, 1958, an average of 1,400 factories of various kinds were built up daily in the province (GRRB, 4 June, 1958). (For the extent of the development of the rural factories see Appendix III, Table 4). As René Dumont has pointed out: "une telle énumération laisse rêveur sur l'importance « d'usines » aussi variées et aussi vite bâties, par si peu de travailleurs!" (1965 : 68). It is true that the extravagant number of factories can only make people suspect the importance or quality of those factories. However, it is crucial to note that what was important was not the fact that all those factories merited their names, but the fact that the peasants were mobilized on a large scale to face their own problems. This movement had a twofold significance: it indicated on the one hand that the urban industry was insufficient to support rural development; on the other hand, the policy-makers did not rely only upon the urban industry for supporting the development of agriculture.

The period 1956-1967 has usually been considered as one of stability. But this stability was still precarious. As we have seen in the general rural development in Shandong, although improvement had been marked in different sectors, the living standards were still not as high as people might have expected, especially when the peasants had worked really hard for some years and had been too often promised a better living in a socialist society. Dissatisfaction grew and was sharply felt by the former landlord and rich peasant categories, because not only their living standards quickly lowered instead of being raised when collectivization advanced, but they could not see any promising future for them either economically or politically in socialization. It was these categories of people in the countryside who had more affinity with the intelligentsia in the cities. The Hundred Flowers policy which was launched in 1956, and

which was an over-optimistic estimation of the situation by the CCP leadership, provided an opportunity for those unsatisfied categories of people to give vent to their anger and disappointment. In the same year, the socialist camp as a whole was dismayed by the Hungarian revolt. In China, many intellectuals, as well as the bourgeois remaining in the cities, went so far as to doubt the feasibility of socialism and the legitimacy of the CCP as the absolute power holder. This dissident atmosphere spread widely under the Hundred Flowers policy, both in the cities and in the countryside. In many a place in Shandong, peasants led by the better-off ones, manifested their desire to withdraw from the cooperatives. For instance, in the spring of 1957, more than 4,700 households in Junan County threatened to withdraw from cooperatives (DZRB, 21 March, 1957). In the Village of Shage, Laixi County, 45 households in 7 cooperatives demanded permission to work on their own (DZRB, 15 May, 1957). In Cao County, one-third of the households (about 300) requested withdrawal from the New China (Xinhua) Cooperative (ibid.)

According to the Chinese analysts, an increasingly spontaneous tendency to capitalism was emerging. The CCP could not but take some emergency measures in order to reverse the tide. The Hundred Flowers movement was finally ended by a vehement Anti-rightist campaign. It was evident to some CCP leaders, especially to Mao and his supporters, that the collectivization could not remain at the stage of the cooperative movement for too long. As Mao pointed out: "Small cooperatives have fewer members, less land, and not much money. They cannot operate on a large scale or use machinery. The development of their forces of production is still hampered. They should not stay in this position too long, but should go on to combine with other cooperatives" (The General

Office of the Central Committee of the CCP, 1957 : 460). The shortcomings of the co-operatives, such as their small size and an important part of private ownership, not only bound the productive forces but also fostered the danger of the restoration of capitalism.

We have seen during the last century how destructive the disintegration of the traditional social structure was to the peasant economy and life. This disintegration of social structures resulted from western impact, but was thereafter enhanced by continued imperialist invasions, peasant rebellions, class polarization and civil wars. It was due to the socialist revolution and the political and economic policies designed by and implemented under the leadership of the CCP that China became independent and free from imperialist invasion, and that the causes of peasant rebellions, class polarization, civil war and other evil forces were eliminated. It is obvious that the restoration of capitalism would sooner signify a revival of all those evils than a happy development of liberal economy.

Moreover, as a French sociologist has pointed out, the agricultural history of China is largely that of peasant revolts (Dumont, 1965 : 26). Mao had profoundly understood that China's destiny was identical with the destiny of the peasants. It was recognized that China could not duplicate the Russian model of development by emphasizing heavy industry at the expense of agrarian development. To find a permanent solution to socioeconomic problems in China, it is necessary, above all, to eliminate the causes of peasant revolt. From Mao's point of view, the key lay in the policy of mass-line. That is to say, unless the peasants held the political and economic power themselves, they would not be able to fully release their potential for initiative and creativity. If the peasants were not allowed to express themselves positively, they

would do it negatively, by revolts for example. In order to make the peasants their own masters, it was necessary to set up a structural framework in which the peasant power could be realized and maintained.

In the final analysis, under pressures both from outside and within, the co-operative movement arrived at such a precarious stage during 1956-1957 that it could not gain a real stability without either advancing further or regressing. In order to depart once and for all from the capitalistic road of development, and to release the labor force for further large-scale works in agrarian development, such as the building of irrigation systems, land leveling, and the construction of local industries, it was considered necessary to design a more advanced framework for the economic unit of production. This was embodied in the setting up of the People's Communes.

Chapter Five

STRUCTURE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE (I) : ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

I SIZE

When the people's communes were first established in 1958, the Beidaiho Resolution gave a vague directive about their size. On the one hand it proposed that the communes be organized in accordance with the size of the township, but on the other hand it called for the local cadres not to oppose the organization of large communes. As in other provinces, there was a great disparity in the size of the communes in Shandong at the beginning of communization. The difference in size by population ranged from 4,000 households (e.g., the Haosheng People's Commune in Zouping County) (RMRB, 6 December, 1958), to 19,000 households (e.g., the Dongjiao People's Commune in Licheng County) (RMRB, 14 January, 1959). The average was 6,000-10,000 households (Tan, 1958). By cultivated area, some communes had only about 60,000 mu of land (e.g., the Lao-Zhaozhuang People's Commune in Linqing County) (XHDX, 18 December, 1961), while others could have three times more (e.g., the Xiawei People's Commune in Yishui County had 186,930 mu) (RMRB, 2 September, 1959). If township is taken as measurement, many communes might correspond roughly to the boundaries of their own townships while many others could cover several townships. For example, the Xingfu People's Commune in the suburb of Yantai Municipality included 2.5 townships in addition to the municipality.

"Township" has been utilized as a useful unit in the studies of Rural China and was taken as a standard in delimiting the boundaries of the commune. But, as an

administrative unit, it is an uncertain term because of its frequent variation in size in recent history.¹ Skinner reported that in China as a whole, townships were reduced in size and increased in number during 1951-52 to make about 220,000. This number was reduced to 100,000 by the beginning of 1957, and again to 80,000 by early June of 1958 (Skinner, 1964-65, Part III : 367-368). This means that up to the moment of the establishment of the communes the townships had been changed in size at least three times since 1949.

In Shandong Province, the term xiang (township) corresponded to a variety of sizes as an administrative unit or rural division under the county level. First, at the end of the Qing Dynasty, xiang was only one kind of a range of administrative units under the county level and not necessarily found in every county.² Besides xiang, there were zhen, ying, xin, pu and yi. The different terms indicate different kinds of rural clusters. Both ying and xin were garrison points either in former times or during the Qing Dynasty. pu and yi were stations of communication and transport. Zhen means a commercial centre. Xiang indicates a cluster of villages which was neither a strategic military point nor a commercial centre.

Secondly, xiang, or the township, did not correspond at all to the marketing area. For instance, at the beginning of the Republic, Linyi County was divided into

¹ The complicated variation of administrative divisions below the county level during the late Qing Dynasty has been documented by Hsiao Kung-ch'uan in Rural China (1960, Ch. 2), but far from extensively. Many variations of the nomenclature of administrative divisions in the countryside were not mentioned by Hsiao.

² For example, the Linqing zhou (larger than county) had, at the end of the Qing Dynasty, only 5 xiang which were only one kind of the administrative units besides others. At the beginning of the Republic, the Linqing County (smaller than the former Linqing zhou) had no xiang at all. Instead, the county was divided into 41 li above the village level. In 1930, the 41 li were grouped into 10 qu under the directive of the provincial government (Gazetteer of Linqing County, first published in 1934, reprinted in Taiwan by the Chengwen Press in 1967).

9 xiang which were subdivided into 125 she above the village level. There were 56 marketing places in the rural area in the county (Linyi Xian-zhi, 1967). One xiang had roughly 6 markets under its jurisdiction. It was much larger than Skinner's standard marketing area.³

If we take one county as an example, the evolution of xiang size can be explained in a concrete manner. In Qiho County, according to the county gazetteer (Qiho Xian-zhi, 1967), the whole county was divided into 10 xiang in 1906. Each xiang was subdivided into 7 or 8 qu (districts). Besides the qu which covered the county seat and its surrounding 12 villages, there were in total 75 qu. Each qu embraced a number of villages from 4 to 19. The xiang and qu were reversed in size in 1931. That is to say, the original smaller qu became the intermediate unit between county and xiang, and thus became much larger than before. Accordingly, xiang was reduced in size and increased in number (the numbers of qu, xiang, zhen and villages in Qiho County are shown in Table 5.1).

³ Skinner gives an estimate of 63,000 rural standard marketing systems for 1,790 counties in agricultural China before 1948. One county had approximately 35.2 standard marketing systems. If we subtract the estimated 5,300 standard markets which had died during the process of modernization, there were still almost 33 standard markets per county (Skinner, Part II : 227-228).

Table 5.1
Administrative Division of Qiho County in 1931

Qu	Xiang	Zhen	Villages
First	12	5	120
Second	13	2	124
Third	11	1	96
Fourth	13	7	112
Fifth	16	2	109
Sixth	5	8	125
Seventh	13	7	109
Eighth	10	5	67
Total: 8	93	37	862

Source: Qiho Xian-zhi (Gazetteer of Qiho County) : 108-122.

It should be noted that the term zhen (Skinner called it "urban township") was not only a market place (or commercial centre) at the time, but also an administrative division which headed the surrounding villages. Its size was more less the same as a xiang.

Among the 130 xiang and zhen of Qiho County, there were 37 zhen. In each zhen there was at least one commercial centre which could be ranged in importance from a big village in which a market took place periodically to a permanent market place. Besides the county seat where, in addition to its quality of a permanent market-ing place, 16 periodic markets took place, there were still 61 periodic markets in the rural areas. At least 37 of them took place at the zhen. So, the remaining number of periodic markets was much smaller than the number of xiang. It is obvious that the

peasants of two or three xiang could not but go to the same market. This fact sufficiently indicates the small size of a xiang at that time. The last population survey reported in the gazetteer which was done in 1928, gave 57,681 households and 292,613 individuals in the county (the previous figures were 250,258 individuals in 1884, and 59,322 households and 277,661 individuals in 1926). One xiang had, on the average, only 443.7 households and approximately 2,250 individuals.

According to the data from Honan Province, Skinner found that in 1935 the township (xiang) was larger than the natural village, while the 1948 township was larger than the standard marketing area and that in neither year did the township correspond to any natural social or economic system (Skinner, 1964-65, Part III : 222). According to the available data of three counties in Shandong, the xiang before 1949, as in the case cited by Skinner in Honan, did not correspond to any natural social or economic system either. It is clear that xiang was not as meaningful in North China as in Sichuan Province or Guandong with regard to the rural socioeconomic system. However, after 1949, the fact that the Chinese government attempted to enlarge the size of xiang seems to indicate its efforts to make this administrative unit closer to the natural social and economic community.

No sources are available regarding changes in size or number of xiang in the whole of Shandong Province since 1949. However, Skinner's approximate figures indicate that in China as a whole the number of xiang was reduced in 1957 from 100% to about 36%. That is to say, the xiang of 1957 was almost three times as large as the former xiang. According to the limited sources on this issue, we know that Shandong Province started to enlarge its xiang unit in 1956. In Laiyang County, in July, 1956, the 13 qu as intermediate administrative units between xiang and county were

abolished while the 154 xiang were merged into 35 larger xiang (and zhen) (DZRB, 10 February, 1957). The new xiang was roughly four times as large as the former one, and corresponded to the size of Skinner's standard marketing area. However, the new xiang units were still unequal both in size and in number of population. For instance, Holuo Township covered an area of 225 sq. li (about 50 sq. kilometres) with 34 natural villages and had a population of 11,500 belonging to 11 advanced cooperatives (ibid.). Guanzhuang Township in the same county, including 29 natural villages, had an area of 400 sq. li (about 100 sq. kilometres) and a population of 14,500 belonging to 22 cooperatives of which 15 were of advanced type (ibid.).

By virtue of the nature of the source which tells that the reorganization of xiang in Laiyang County was a response to the need of rural works of the nation, it can be understood that the change did not result from local initiatives. If the xiang in other counties were merged in the same way, we could make an estimate of approximately 3,735 xiang for the whole province on the eve of the communization. When the people's communes were set up in 1958, on the average, one commune roughly included 2.4 xiang. It is close to the three to one ratio of townships to people's communes for the whole country.

If, in 1958, the xiang size became close to the natural socioeconomic system in the rural areas in Shandong, the commune size was obviously too large to cope with the pre-existing social structure. The reason why the commune was so large in 1958 has been convincingly explained by Skinner:

Cadremen who took part in the decisions affecting the formation of particular communes were under pressure to make communes as large as prevailing conditions allowed...it was implied to the cadreman on the front line that commune size would be taken as a measure of his success in having brought the local area for which he was responsible along the road toward communism. He was, moreover, to make his communes big or risk suspicion as a right deviationist (Skinner, 1964-65, Part III : 391-92).

Apart from other problems it has been reported that the most urgent difficulty after the merger of small townships into larger ones was the lack of cadres. In Laiyang County, the 691 cadres at the township level, plus 272 cadres at the qu level before the merger, were reduced to 399 at the township level after the merger of townships and the abolition of qu. In this condition, one cadre must attend to several duties which were beyond his ability and the limitation of time (DZRB, 10 February, 1957). The problem of the shortage of cadres would become keener when two or three townships were merged into one commune, because, given the number of cadres remaining unchanged, the functions of a people's commune were much more diverse and sophisticated than those of a township.

Scholarly analyses have contributed at least one of the causes which made the newly established communes function badly during 1958-1961 due to their large size.⁴ In the "Draft of Regulations for the Operation of Rural Peoples' Communes" issued in March, 1961, the size of commune was indicated as follows:

The scale of the people's commune at the various levels should in every case be such as to benefit production, operation and management, and organizational life, and ought not to be excessively large... In general, the people's commune should be equivalent in scale to the original xiang or large xiang...

The readjustment of commune size no doubt started at that time. In 1963, China's Minister of Agriculture officially gave 74,000 as the number of People's Communes in China (Peking Review, No. 44, 1 November, 1963). No figures of the number of people's communes in each province have ever been published. However, Hong Kong

⁴ Skinner has pointed out that "the many and grave difficulties encountered by the communes during 1958-61 stemmed in significant part from the grotesquely large mold into which they had in most cases been forced, and in particular from the failure to align the new unit with the natural socioeconomic systems shaped by rural trade" (Part III : 394).

newspapers provide some clues to this change in Shandong. The Da Gong Bao (Ta Kung Pao) of Hong Kong published an article by Lü Hong-bin, Director of the Aiguo (Patriotic) People's Commune, Ju County, Shandong Province, in 1959. Lü said that his commune had 94 natural villages with more than 10,000 households or a population of more than 47,000, and managed more than 10,000 mu of land (DGB, 4 October, 1959). But in 1962 the China News (Zhongguo Xinwen) in Hong Kong reported that the same commune had 25 natural villages with 2,520 households (ZGXW, 10 February, 1962). The size of Aiguo People's Commune was thus reduced before 1962 to one-fourth of its size of 1959. A recent book published by the Economic Report News (Jing-ji Dao-bao) in Hong Kong revealed that there are more than 300 communes in Yantai Administrative District of Shandong (Shen-zhou Ju-bian, 1976 : 87). It is known that the nine Administrative Districts are roughly equal in size. Accordingly, Shandong should have approximately 2,700 communes (300×9) at the present time, an increase of 42% over the total number of 1958.

In comparison with the number of xiang in 1958, the size of the commune is still a little larger at a ratio of 1 : 1.38. Skinner's theory which places the progress of the modernized transport system as the basic pre-requisite of the enlargement of marketing area may account for the difference between the present commune size and the size of township in 1958. From this point of view, it is reasonable to consider that the actual commune size corresponds roughly to the natural social system. Using traditional solidarities for new organizational ends has no doubt great benefits. However, it also has disadvantages, as William Parish points out, "natural communities are potentially more resistant to outside intervention than artificially imposed communities might be" (Parish, 1975a). The paradox is that the structural innovation of the People's

Commune seems to be confined to a traditional framework. Skinner's conclusion may better illustrate this paradoxical process of the interplay between continuity and change:

While traditional marketing communities have given shape to the Communists' chosen instrument for rural transformation, that transformation inevitably and quite literally reshapes them in turn (Skinner, 1964-65, Part II : 399).

II ORGANIZATION

The process of establishment of the people's communes was primarily an operation of organization. The organizational issues have a special meaning in the Chinese historical context. In the traditional stage, organization of production was done within the family framework while the socialization process was carried out through the channels of kinship relationships. Any kind of organization aiming at production in economic life and socialization in social life beyond the family and kinship network did not exist and was unfamiliar to the Chinese people. The inability to organize non-kin groups is still clearly reflected in the Overseas Chinese communities in North America, although they are found in societies predominated by the spirit of entrepreneurship and all kinds of social and economic organizations. It is important to point out that the Chinese communists attempted a kind of organization without social and historical background. This is the special meaning that the organizational operation of collectivization conveys.

This kind of social innovation could be achieved only under some specific historical conditions. First, the pre-existing social structure must be already broken down or debilitated enough to be easily pulled down. Secondly, a well organized

force equipped with some definite goals takes charge of the action. Due to the western impact, these two conditions were met exactly before the revolution in China. Traditional Chinese social structure was gradually disintegrating along with the incessant military and economic invasions by imperialist powers. This provided the pre-conditions for a social revolution. A social revolution means more of a sudden change than a gradual one, more a qualitative change than a quantitative one. At the very beginning, the revolutionary program of the CCP already aimed at a radical restructure of the Chinese society. The means of restructuring society was none other than "organization". Franz Schurmann said:

When a revolution destroys a social system... the new revolutionary regime can only pull society together again through organization... The one great organizational product of the Chinese Revolution has been the Chinese Communist Party... One may say that almost the entire literature of Chinese communism since Yenan has revolved around two questions: organization and action (Schurmann, 1970 : lii).

The organizational operation of setting up the communes was rather a reorganization than an innovation, because it was based on a succession of organizational operations from the Land Reform to cooperativization. However, it still met no less resistance than in the previous steps of collectivization. This is just because this new social organization had no root in the traditional society, and its base built up during the collectivization movement was not solid enough to sustain a smooth progression. Therefore, this organization had to rely heavily on leadership and ideological indoctrination. The rest of this chapter will be dedicated to the organizational framework of the people's commune, the leadership which made organization possible and ideological education which sustained the dynamism of action.

A. Administrative Organization

The commune was organized according to the principle of "mass line". According to the "Revised Draft of Regulations for the Operation of Rural People's Communes" of 1962, the highest authority of a commune was vested in the Congress of the Representatives of the Commune Members which was transformed from the former People's Congress of the Representatives of the Township.⁵ The representatives were elected by the members of the commune in each production team and must proportionally represent all categories of people (e.g., women, youth, aged, educators, medical men, technicians, local industrial entrepreneurs, commercial agents, national minorities, etc.). The main function of the Congress of the Representatives of the Commune Members was to discuss and to make the decisions concerning the basic political, economic and social problems of the commune, and to choose the members of the Administrative Committee which constituted the highest functioning organ of the commune.

The Administrative Committee of the commune is the organ of united leadership of the commune. All work in connection with the execution of policy, formation of plans, financial control, and management of means of production and the fixing of plans for distribution, will all be concentrated in the Administrative Committee (Chen Zheng-ren, 1959).

The organization of the Administrative Committee might vary from one commune to another. But, in general, it followed the original idea about the nature of the Commune system, i.e., a commune is an all-embracing unit which combines the sectors of agriculture, industry, commerce, education and military service into one, and makes an over-all development of agriculture, forestry, husbandry, sideline production and

⁵ See also Wu Ren, "Ren-min Gong-she he Gong-jia" (The People's Commune and the State), GRRB, 20 October, 1958. For an historical account of People's Congress at different administrative levels, see James R. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China (1967), Chapter 5.

fishery. The Administrative Committee had one director and a number of vice-directors according to the size of the commune. The committee delegated special functions to a range of departments and each of them assumed a specific function.

The Weixing People's Commune in Honan had been taken as a model in the matter of organization. It maintained twelve functional departments for agriculture, irrigation, forestry, husbandry, industry and transport, finance and food, commerce, culture and education, internal affairs and labor, militia and defense, planning, and scientific research. The communes in other provinces followed this model in modifying some specific sectors according to their own particular conditions. For instance, the Xingfu People's Commune in Yantai substituted the irrigation, commerce, internal affairs and labor, planning and scientific research departments with fishery, supply service, vegetable culture, sanitation, and politics and jurisdiction departments (YTRB, 27 August, 1958).

Besides the Administrative Committee, a Supervisory Committee was composed of members also elected directly by the Congress of the Commune. Its function was to supervise and check whether the Administrative Committee properly implemented the decisions of the Congress. This organ was a vestige of the supervisory system independent from the administrative bureaucracy found in Imperial China. In practice, it was superfluous and almost impotent because of the vigorous leadership and supervision on the part of the Party.

The officers of the Administrative Committee and the Supervisory Committee as well as the representatives of the Congress of the Commune were elected to hold their office for two years.

As an economic unit, the commune was subdivided into production brigades. Each brigade maintained its own congress analogous on a lower level to the Congress of the Commune, which elected the brigade commander, vice-commanders, members of the brigade Administrative Committee and members of the brigade Supervisory Committee. The two brigade committees were constituted in miniature according to the structure of the communal committees.

The production brigade was again subdivided into production teams which represented the lowest level of communal organization. Each team had in turn its congress of members which elected the team commander and vice-commanders.

B. Party Control

In China, as in other socialist countries, the Communist Party has played a key role in leadership and supervision.⁶ The Party has been organized parallel to every echelon of the administrative organizations, in the commune as in the county, in the county as in the province, and in the province as in the state. The Party and the administrative organizations are not identical although they are closely linked together. Franz Schurmann's explanation on the distinction between state and Party may help us better understand the position and function of the Party in a socialist country.

The state is a conscious contrivance. It is the most important element of the superstructure of society, the instrument of the ruling class; in the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is the instrument of the proletariat. As an instrument it has "structure"... The state is bureaucracy, army, law; the body of organized formal instruments from which command flows.

The Party, on the other hand, is the organized expression of the will of society... For the Chinese it represents "the interest of the people". The Party actualizes the control of society over the state. But the Party, theoretically, does not command, for

⁶ For Party control in the commune see also Townsend (1967 : 113).

formal command must flow from some instrument of the state. The Communist Party may produce policy, but technically it cannot issue orders. These must come from an organ of the state. As long as this fine distinction is maintained, the Party cannot be regarded as an instrument of the structure of state power (1970 : 109-110).

As there had already existed a Party Committee at the township level, it was convenient to transform it into a communal Party Committee when a commune was set up in accordance with the size of a township. While the communal Party Committee was composed of Party members who held administrative offices at the same time, the Party organization was, however, clearly separated from the administrative system.


The Party Committee of the commune was headed by a secretary and several vice-secretaries. Under the Committee's authority, there were a few departmental divisions. In most cases, they were Party committee's general office, organization department, propaganda department and supervision commission. At the brigade level, there was either a Party general branch or a Party branch according to the size of the brigade. At the team level, there might be either a Party branch or a Party group according to the size of Party membership. A brigade Party branch was headed by a secretary (and vice-secretary) and a team Party group by a head of the group.

Besides the Party organization, there were also a Communist Youth League (CYL) and a Women's Federation in each commune and their branches at the lower level of the communal organizations. Although their members were not necessarily Party members, these two organizations could be considered as ramified members of the Party body.

The following charts will show the parallelism of Party organization and administrative organization in the communes.

Although there were variations in the organizational division from commune to commune, the general framework of every commune was always in accordance with the two


Chart 5.1 : Organizational Division of Xingfu People's Commune



—— formal belonging - - - - - Party control

Source: YTRE, 27 August, 1958.

Chart 5.2 : Organizational Division of Taiqian People's Commune (Shouzhang County)



Source: Jihua Jingji (Planned Economy Monthly), No. 11, 9 November, 1958.

principles governing the functions of the commune: they were all-embracing unit and over-all development. These two principles constituted the innovative part of the re-organization from cooperatives into communes, because the former had been a unit of mere agricultural production.

The setting up of the organizational framework could only pave the way for some possibilities in a new direction of development, but could not by any means ensure a successful functioning. This last should rely heavily on the efficiency of leadership.

III LEADERSHIP

A. Definition and Categorization of Leaders

For the purpose of this thesis, leaders are defined as the formal office-holders with authority, power and influence in both ideological and administrative spheres within the commune.

The result of analysis of my data conforms with Oksenberg's categorization of the local leaders in rural China (cf. Oksenberg, 1969). His eight types of local leaders (i.e., old cadres, land reform cadres, collectivization cadres, demobilized members of the People's Liberation Army, middle school graduates, cadres sent to local areas from higher levels, influential individuals whose leadership credentials were established under the pre-communist political system, and retired cadres) are largely, except the fourth and seventh ones, reflected in my data. However, my approach to leaders' functional categorization will be different from Oksenberg's, due to a different consideration. Oksenberg's study includes leaders above the commune, up to the county level. At

the county level, the functional division in terms of specialization seems to be more important than within the commune, because the main activities in the commune were still agricultural while those at the county level were focused on specified non-agricultural sectors. This may be the reason which makes Oksenberg categorize the leaders in the way of functional specialization. So, he divided the leaders into five categories: politics, administration, finance and trade, coercion (e.g., militia, defense, etc.), and education and technology. This mode of categorization is likely more meaningful in the analysis of changing structure in leadership and in that of a changing society than in the analysis of a static organization, because this categorization is not intended to point out the big line of power distribution in the communal organization. In this chapter I am focusing on the issue of the power holder.

This issue, which bears primary importance in ensuring a smooth functioning of the commune system, may cause some confusion due to the dual nature of the organizational structure in the commune as has been shown in the former section. It is legitimate to ask the questions: Who was the real chief of a commune, or a brigade, or a team, as there existed two parallel two systems of leadership? Between the secretary of the communal Party committee and the director of the commune, who had the last word? And how did they allot their functions? In view of these crucial questions, the leaders should be first of all divided into two broad categories: Party leaders and administrative leaders.

In her study of the rural people's communes in China, Thérèse Pang distinguishes the two kinds of leaders as follows:

Le chef élu (directeur de la commune, chef de la brigade ou de l'équipe) est un paysan. Il doit posséder de solides qualités personnelles, car il sera un guide pour tous les membres de la commune.. Ses qualités sont d'ordre politique et moral...

Le secretaire de l'organe du Parti au contraire est un fonctionnaire. Il n'est pas toujours de la région; il a été désigné à son poste par l'organe du Parti de l'échelon supérieur.

La bonne marche de la commune dépend de la bonne entente entre le chef-paysan et le représentant du Parti. Le cadre de la commune transmet les directives de l'autorité supérieure, tandis que le chef élu connaît les conditions locales. La rencontre des points de vue est nécessaire (1967 : 85).

Pang's distinction between Party leaders and administrative leaders can represent the perception of many foreign visitors who travelled in China from one commune to another and had conversations about this issue with the leaders or members of the commune. This distinction is not inaccurate, but is too over-simplified to reflect the reality. My data shows a more complex nature and a larger variation of the allotment of power between Party leaders and administrative leaders.

Usually, the leadership of the Party secretary was paramount.⁷ This has been a general rule in all socialist countries at all administrative echelons. This is also a tradition of the collectivization movement in rural China. The first article in the collection, Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside, compiled by Mao-Tse-tung himself, was entitled "The Party Secretary takes the lead and all the Party members help run the Co-ops" (1957). The role of the Party secretary in leadership has been recognized nationwide in all echelons from the provincial Party Committee downward. In 19 cases of leadership, from my data, 14 were reported to have the Party secretary take command (Table 5.2). The 5 cases where the role of the director of commune or commander of brigade over-shadowed that of the Party secretary were under special conditions. In the case of the Xiyou People's Commune, Ye County, the director, Xiu Jian-chun, was a

⁷ For a thorough analysis of Party leadership, see John W. Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (1963).

national model agricultural laborer. She climbed the ladder from head of mutual aid team, through director of elementary cooperative and of advanced cooperative, to the director of her commune. Her name was widely recognized while the Party secretary was a relatively unknown person. In the case of the Gaocun People's Commune, Wendeng County, and in that of the Fugui Brigade of the same commune, the director of the commune, Zhang Fu-gui who was, at the same time, commander of the Fugui Brigade, was also a model agricultural laborer. Like Xiu Jian-chun, he had been put forward by the press as a hero in the front of agriculture, so he enjoyed undoubted leadership in his commune. In the case of the Second Production Team, Caopo Brigade, the Zhuyou People's Commune, Ye County, the commander of the team, Zhang Dian-dong, was himself the head of the Party group. In the case of the Tenth Production Team, Chaijia Brigade, the Loujia People's Commune, Licheng County, there was no Party group at all in the team, the commander of the team, Zhu Chun-jing, was a member of the Communist Youth League.

Table 5.2

Leadership Standing Out in Relief (reported by the press)

County	Commune	Brigade	Team	Party Leaders	Administrative Leaders
Changqing	Wande			X	
Ye	Xiyou				X
Ye	Zhuyou			X	
Ye	Zhuyou	Caopo	Second		X
Yishui	Xiawei			X	
Licheng	Loujia	Chaijia		X	
Licheng	Loujia	Chaijia	Tenth		X
Jining	Anju	Zhuzhuang		X	
Qihou	Chengguan	Sanli		X	
Teng	Longyang	Shicun		X	
Fei	Mazhuang	Xianjutian		X	
Fei	Shijing	Dan		X	
Pingyi	Difang	Qiandonggu		X	
Zou	Chengqian	Xiamoshi		X	
Wendeng	Gaocun	Fugui			X
Wendeng	Gaocun	Fugui			X
Linyi	Zhuli	Xiaogezhuang		X	
Shiping	Xiuzhuang			X	
Qufu	Changguan			X	

Sources: various Chinese newspapers between 1958 and 1965.

The fact that most of the administrative leaders were Party members and they were obligatorily placed themselves under the Party secretary's influence according to the discipline of the Party also made the position of Party secretary more important than any administrative leader at the same echelon. Students of modern China have been familiar enough with the index of importance of political personages according to the order of their names in the press. This can also be seen at the commune and brigade levels. The formula for a commune is "under the leadership of the Party secretary, xxx, vice-secretary, and the director xxx..."; for a brigade, "under the leadership of the Party branch

secretary xxx and the commander of the brigade xxx...".

B. Functions of Party Leaders and Administrative Leaders

Thérèse Pang says that the Party secretary transmitted the directives of superior authority whereas the director of the commune or the commanders of the brigade and the team implemented them (Pang, 1967 : 85). This is only one aspect of the division of labor between the Party leaders and the administrative leaders. My data shows that the division of their functions was not always so clear and could vary from one locality and one time to another. Generally speaking, the functions of administrative leaders were more definite than those of the Party leaders, because the former's job was oriented toward productive activities in a concrete manner. The job of a Party secretary was more subtle. First of all, he was responsible for the transformation and shaping of people's thought and for stimulating people's enthusiasm in socialist construction. This is not to say however that he should be in charge of educational and cultural programs only. As he was responsible for the effective functioning of the whole unit under his responsibility, he could not avoid intervening in the productive activities as well as the daily life of the members. Sometimes problems occurred in a more acute and urgent manner than remoulding people's thought so that the Party secretary had to tackle the immediate problems first. They had usually been called by their superiors to "grasp the crucial points" (zhua zhong-dian) in a given situation. For instance, at the beginning of the commune movement in Shandong, in many areas at the urging of over-zealous leaders, peasants destroyed their brick beds and wooden beds in order to turn them into manure and rails for transportation. When winter came, keeping warm became an immediate problem. The Party secretaries at all echelons were called by the provincial committee of the CCP

to take urgent measures to solve the problem during the winter (RMRB, 6 December, 1968). Another example shows that the principal concern of the Party secretary of a commune in a mountainous region was to "conquer the mountains" and to plan the irrigation system.

The Party secretary of the Xiawei People's Commune, Yishui County, Wang Heng, is a widely known model in leading the control of mountains. He has climbed mountains every day to investigate, plan, labor and teach techniques. Even in the coldest winter time he left for some remote areas under the storm of snow in the morning and returned late in the night, day after day. In a short span of a few months, he has passed by every corner of these mountains. Last year he finally worked out a model of utilization of water power which laid the basis of a comprehensive system of irrigation (RMRB, 2 September, 1959).

In many cases the Party branch secretary of a brigade did just the same work as a brigade commander. Yang Zhong-lu, a retired communist veteran, was elected Party secretary of his brigade branch in the Difang People's Commune, Pingyi County. He was praised because of his leading role in improving soil conditions (RMRB, 30 March, 1963). Another Party branch secretary, Li Ru-lan, of Da'an Brigade, Shijing People's Commune, Fei County, became a national model agricultural laborer (*ibid.*).

Sometimes, Party secretaries and directors of communes divided their tasks according to both specialization and locality. This is the way of division of labor among leaders in the Aiguo People's Commune of Ju County. This commune had one Party secretary, one vice-secretary, one director, two vice-directors and one administrative secretary. The leading board at the commune level was composed of these six leaders. They adopted a method of "solving big problems together and small problems separately." In this way, each of the six cadres took charge of 3-5 villages in order to supervise closely and to help to solve problems at the brigade and team levels (RMRB, 20 October, 1963).

The importance of the role of Party secretaries in the commune or in the brigade just lies in the indefiniteness of their functions. The daily administrative and productive

functions were shared by the administrative cadres in each specific sector. The Party secretary was responsible for none and, at the same time, for all of those functions. Not being specifically in charge of a specific function would give him a free hand to tackle what was most crucial at a given time.

It can be said that every institutionalized organization is a bureaucracy. In order to keep the spirit of revolution going on in an institutionalized organization, it is necessary to have some elements which are outside the functional routine, but still powerful enough to influence this routine. This is the case of the role played by the Party secretary. Because he is not in the functional routine, he is better able to judge the needs of the masses and can evaluate the functioning of routine from the point of view of masses. In this way, he represents not only the authority of his superiors, but also the masses for whom he is responsible. In his capacity as representative of the masses, he will be equipped with more authority and power vis-à-vis the administrative cadres.

Of course, this is an ideal model of the role of the Party secretary in the commune or brigade. In reality, there existed a large variation in Party secretaries according to different circumstances and different personalities. However, in spite of exceptions in which some Party secretaries could play a role no more than that played by an administrative cadre while a director of commune, or a commander of brigade or team, could also accumulate the quality of a Party secretary, the general line of keeping the Party leaders outside the functional routine was of primary importance in regard to their quality of representative of "the interest of the people".

C. Social Origin and Emergence of Leaders

In order to keep the revolution going on, the social origin of leaders had always been a constant concern of the CCP. This issue was specially acute in the countryside, because the land reform was a landlord-elimination movement and the cooperativization an anti-rich-peasant-economy movement. Both the former landlord class and the rich peasant class must be carefully excluded from leadership. Needless to say, practically it was a big loss for the rural development in purely economic terms, because the offspring of the former landlords and rich peasants were more healthy and better educated than those stemming from poor families. However, from the revolutionary point of view, this loss was not only inevitable, but indispensable for ensuring the success of revolution and the transformation from a feudal society to a socialist and communist society. One RMRB editorial clearly made the point:

The leading power of production team must lie within the tight grasp of laboring peasants who belong to the classes of poor peasants or lower-middle peasants and who are equipped with socialist awareness, abilities in work, and experiences in agricultural production. The reason for picking up cadres among comrades from the classes of the poor peasants or lower-middle peasants is that their social status and economic position makes socialism, relatively speaking, more acceptable to them and frees them, also relatively speaking, from the bondage to the institution of the private ownership of the means of production dear to small landholders (RMRB, 11 January, 1963).

Generally speaking, people who came from landlord, rich peasant or upper-middle peasant classes could only hope to fill the leader positions of a secondary importance such as accountant, school teacher, agricultural technician, etc... The posts of the Party secretaries, directors of commune and commanders of brigade and team were jealously kept for the people who had poor or lower-middle peasant origin. The Sanli Brigade of the Chengguan People's Commune, Qiho County, can offer a typical example

in this matter. The Party branch committee of the brigade was composed of five members, four of them having poor peasant origin and one lower-middle peasant origin. Among the 26 cadres above the team level 20 were poor peasants and 6 lower-middle peasants (RMRB, 11 January, 1963). Another example can be seen in the composition of leader board of the Xia Dingjia Brigade of Da Lujia People's Commune, Huang County. Amongst the 135 cadres above team level, 78 were from poor peasant families, 18 from lower-middle peasant families (together 71.1%), and only 39 from middle peasant families (28.9%) (JJXJ, December, 1964 : 55).

Family origin (jia-ting cheng-fen) was an important prerequisite for becoming a leader in a commune. Other prerequisites included loyalty to the Party (and to Chairman Mao) and to the socialist enterprise, being an activist and enthusiastic in the socialist construction, and having some talent in leading the masses or in productive techniques. These prerequisites had to wait for a proper moment to be manifested. As Oksenberg has stated, after the military actions of the revolution, the land reform and the cooperativization movement were two crucial moments for new activists to show their talents. They were also two crucial moments for the CCP to recruit new leaders.

In the areas liberated before 1949, the key posts were usually occupied by the old cadres (lao ganbu) who had been recruited during the Sino-Japanese war or the civil war. For instance, in the vast region of the Mountains Yi and Meng which embrace six counties: Yishui, Yiyuan, Yinan, Mengyin, Pingyi and Fei, and had been the revolutionary base since the Sino-Japanese war, the old cadres were still in charge of leading functions at the level of commune and that of brigade.⁸ According to a survey, only

⁸ Three Party branch secretaries, Yang Zhong-lu, Donggu Brigade, Difang People's Commune, Pingyi County, Ma Xue-sheng, Taitou Brigade, Daigu People's Commune, Mengyin County, and Li Rui-lan, Da'an Brigade, Shijing People's Commune, Fei County, got their Party memberships respectively in 1938, 1938 and 1943 (RMRB, 30 March, 1963).

in Yishui County were there more than 7,000 old cadres occupying the posts of Party branch secretaries at the brigade level and commanders of brigades and teams, corresponding to 87% of the total posts at the same levels (RMRB, 30 March, 1963).

In the areas liberated around 1949, the key posts were held mostly by cadres who merged in land reform and cooperative movements. This is the case of the Sanli Brigade of the Ghengguan People's Commune, Qiho County, which I have just cited above. All the 26 cadres above the team level had emerged during the land reform and cooperative movements (RMRB, 11 January, 1963).

In the new developed areas such as the Xiyou People's Commune in Ye County, the young elementary and middle school graduates played important roles in the leadership. The director of the Xiyou People's Commune, Xiu Jian-chun, was only 25 years old when she was chosen as the director of the commune in 1960. In 1951, 16 years old and an elementary school graduate, she was called back home and was elected head of a mutual-aid group which was composed of only five households. Afterwards, she took the initiative in setting up successively an elementary cooperative and then an advanced cooperative of more than one thousand households. Due to her remarkable competence in agricultural production and in leadership, she had always been elected director in the former two steps of collectivization. Before coming to the leadership of a commune of more than 10,000 households, she was sent to the Agricultural University in Peking to receive a nine-month training in the special training class for commune management. According to her experience, she can also be classified in the category of cadres who emerged during the cooperative movement. However, because of her relative youth, she had always been considered by her countryfellows as a young intellectual. Her younger brother, after having finished two years of middle school, returned to the village

to become the head of a scientific research group in agriculture. In the Houliu Brigade of this commune 9 out of 16 cadres at the brigade level and 32 out of 55 team cadres (commanders of teams, accountants and material keepers) were intellectual youth (ZGQNB, 22 July and 2 October, 1961).

In 1960 there was a nationwide movement of "down to the countryside to settle down" (xia-xiang luo-hu) for urban youth. In Shandong Province, it was reported that more than 1,100,000 young workers responded to the call of the CCP and went to the first front of agricultural production from multiple professions such as industry, finance and trade, education and culture, sanitation, etc. (ZGQNB, 13 October, 1960). There were, however, two kinds of these downward-transferred (xia-fang) youth: one for learning from the peasants for a definite time and another for settling down permanently. In the latter case, if the youth had come from countryside, they were usually sent down to their native villages. Although many young people were disappointed in rural conditions and tried to seize the first occasion to return to the cities, a portion of them settled down permanently. For instance, among 107 downward-transferred youth in the Chengguan People's Commune, Feicheng County, 53 had been praised because of their zeal in working and 25 had been elected commanders of teams, branch secretaries of the Communist Youth League and accountants (ZGQNB, 21 December, 1960).

This downward mobility was not confined merely to young people, it touched also the experienced cadres. Because the competent low ranking cadres used to move upward, the basic units such as brigade and team constantly faced the problem of lacking competent leaders. The natural process should be, of course, to form younger cadres to replace the positions left by the promoted cadres. But in the 1960's, the reorganization in the countryside was so drastic and the production tasks were so urgent that there was

no time to follow the regular process of the formation of younger cadres. The only way remaining was as an emergency measure of sending down a part of middle rank cadres to the lower units. That is what was done in Qiho County. At the beginning of 1962, it was reported that 20% of the brigades in the county had difficulties in both production and living, to such a point as to impede the normal speed of spring cultivation. It was said that after analysis, apart from the natural calamities of the previous years, the principal cause was the weak leadership which profoundly affected the implementation of the Party's policies and could not sufficiently stimulate the enthusiasm of the masses. When the first secretary of the CCP of the county went investigating in the villages, the masses unanimously requested that their experienced old cadres who had been promoted to the offices of county and commune be sent back to their villages. Their request was granted. 44 cadres from the offices of the county and 66 cadres from different communes were sent to their native villages. This decision was later praised as an appropriate measure to support the basic productive units and to enhance and replenish the spirit of the cadres who had sat too long in the bureaucracy (RMRB, 28 April, 1962).

D. Procedure of Becoming Leaders

Some people could emerge during certain crucial moments such as land reform and cooperative movement. This meant that they demonstrated their talent and became potential leaders. To hold office, it was necessary to pass through a formal procedure. I have already mentioned that the administrative leaders were elected by the representatives of the commune members. How about the Party leaders? Thérèse Pang said that they were appointed by their superior organ of the Party. It was probably true for the Party secretaries at the commune level, because the communal committee of the CCP

was transformed from the township committee for which the secretaries had been presumably appointed by the county committee of the Party. But it is questionable so long as there is no information on the procedure of appointment of Party cadres available.⁹

As for the branch secretaries at the brigade and team levels, some evidence indicates that they were elected by the members of the Party in their units. A report about the models of old cadres made clear that the Party branch secretary was not appointed by the superior organ of the Party. "Yang Zhong-lu, a Party member since 1938, the report said, retired and went back to his native place, the Donggu Production Brigade, Difang People's Commune, Pingyi County, in 1958. As soon as he arrived at home, he started immediately going to the mountain and insisting on ploughing the field. The next year he was elected the Party branch secretary of the brigade" (RMRB, 30 March, 1963).

A second example is an intellectual youth who was said to be elected Party branch secretary of a brigade when the Party branch committee expired in 1963, and the re-election was carried out (RMRB, 27 November, 1963).

Another case tells that if the masses lost their trust in cadres (Party and/or administrative), they could complain to the superior organ. After investigation, if the cadres in question were found at fault, they must be dismissed from their positions and a new election would be carried out. In 1962, a few members of the Zhuzhuang Brigade of the Anju People's Commune, Jining Municipality, accused their Party branch secretary, Shi Yue-lan, commander of Brigade Guo Qing-yu, and the accountant, Zhang Qing-chen, of corruption. After the investigation by the Party committee and

⁹ This sort of information has been kept secret in China.

Administrative Committee of the Municipality, although no proof of corruption was found, the cadres were dismissed from their positions because they were divorced from the masses in their style of work. The Party committee and the administrative committee of the commune gave permission to the brigade to call a meeting of Party branch members and the Congress of Representatives of the Brigade to elect respectively a new Party branch secretary and new brigade commander and accountant (RMRB, 22 June, 1962).

Although the procedure of becoming officers was by formal election, the influence of the superior organ was strong. This is not only because congresses and meetings at a lower level were often supervised by representatives of a superior organ (by cadres specially sent down for the meetings or by the "squatters"), but also because of the direct leading role and influence of the Party members upon the masses.

E. Disciplines of Cadres

According to the "Revised Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of Rural People's Communes", cadres in every echelon in the commune must be placed under the discipline of the "Three Big Rules" and "Eight Remarks" of the Party and administrative cadres. The three big rules were (1) seriously implement the policies of the Central Committee of the Party and laws of the state, and actively participate in socialist construction; (2) carry out the system of democratic centralism; (3) report the situation as it is. The eight remarks were: (1) be concerned with the living condition of the masses; (2) participate in collective labor; (3) treat others equally; (4) take counsel with the masses and do things fairly; (5) be together with the masses and never make oneself special; (6) without investigation, no right of speaking; (7) do things according to the reality; (8) enhance the class consciousness of the proletariat and the political standard.

Besides this formal discipline, the cadres in the commune were especially warned to have a democratic style of leadership and not be oppressive and commandist. They were severely prohibited from indiscriminately giving people political "hats", beating or insulting the people and punishing members by retaining the grain ration, rebating work-points and refusing to give work (Chapter 7 of the "Revised Draft").

F. Methods in Leading

In order to keep a good and close relationship with those led, some techniques and methods in leading had been adopted and developed by the communal leaders. A part of the methods were based on the long revolutionary experience since the Yan'an period; another part was first worked out by some local cadres during the collectivization process and then taken as models by the CCP to spread on a nationwide scale.

1. Si-tong (four togethernesses): "Si-tong" means to eat together, to live together, to labor together and to take counsel together.¹⁰ These four togethernesses were considered as a model style of leadership in both factories and communes. In the commune, the last two togethernesses (to labor together and to take counsel together) were especially emphasized.

The director of the Gaocun People's Commune, Wendeng County, Zhang Fugui, was elected as a national model because he labored harder than a regular commune member. He was always the one who chose the heaviest and dirtiest work to do. Seeing he was growing in age, the members of the commune advised him not to do so much. He responded: "If a cadre does not participate in labor, how can he discover problems? If he

¹⁰ For origin and explanation of the term see T. A. Hsia, "A Terminological Study of the Hsia-fang Movement" (Summer, 1963 : 34-35).

cannot discover problems, how can he lead in production?" (RMRB, 12 May, 1963).

The director of the Aiguo People's Commune, Ju County, Lü Hong-bin, also a model, did more than 100 days of manual labor in the First Team of Aiguo Brigade during the first eight months of 1963. Some members had thought a cadre like Lü did not need to participate in manual work. Lü was not at all influenced by this opinion. As a matter of fact, it was through manual work that Lü found the key to solving the problem of how to increase grain output (RMRB, 20 October, 1963).

Being divorced from laboring was considered serious. According to the "Revised Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of Rural People's Communes", cadres at the team level were not allowed to rid themselves of manual work. They should labor in the same way and for the same duration of time as a common member. Cadres at the brigade level were allowed to rid themselves of a maximum of half of their manual work. Their labor days could not be less than a minimum time of 120 days per year. Cadres at the commune level should also participate in manual work in a team of their choice. The minimum labor days were 60 annually (Chapter 7 of the "Revised Draft").

Taking counsel together can be seen in a concrete example of the Xiao Gezhuang Brigade, Zhuli People's Commune, Linyi County. In the spring of 1959, the cadres of the brigade spent 153 yuan to buy a bicycle without consulting in advance the opinion of the members. Later on, during the Congress of the brigade, the masses criticized the cadres so severely that the latter were obliged to recognize their fault and apologize. After this lesson, a democratic financial system was established in the brigade (XHDX, 26 January, 1963).

2. Si dao-tian (four coming-to-the-fields): Just at the beginning of the commune movement, the biggest Shandong newspaper, the Da-zhong Ri-bao (the Masses Daily) called through an editorial to spread the method of leadership by coming to the field for four purposes: to labor, to tend official business, to sleep and to make criticism by big character posters (DZRB, 10 August, 1958). This method did not spread largely due to the real difficulty in realizing the purposes such as to sleep and to tend official business in the field.
3. Dun-dian (to squat on a spot, cf. Hsia, 1963 : 49): "Dun-dian" had a long story behind it. During the revolution there was an approach which was termed as shen-ru ji-ceng (to penetrate deeply into the basic layers) for the communist cadres to discover the basic problems of the society. Mao's famous articles such as "The Analysis of the Classes of the Chinese Society: (1926) and "The Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (1927) can be seen as the result of his penetrating into the basic layers of the society. In the commune this means that cadres at the commune and brigade levels must go down to the production teams to discover problems. For instance, the Party secretary of the Xuzhuang People's Commune, Shiping County, Yan You-yi, went down working in the Third Team of the Zhuzhuang Brigade and found that the ratio of active laborers was high but the finished works did not increase. From here, he set out to investigate and found the contradiction. The solution of the contradiction resulted in a new arrangement of the labor distribution which rendered the conditions favorable to increasing the yield of grain per unit (RMRB, 12 May, 1964).

In the framework of the commune, the tradition of "penetrating deeply into the basic layers" had developed into a system known as "Two-Five System" for the

rural cadres. China Quarterly (1960) described it as follows:

The regime is popularizing a new method of implementing the "mass line" of getting rural officials out of their offices to do manual labor. Under the "Two-Five System", cadres spend two days a week on meetings, inspections and political studies, and the other five actually in the fields. During the five days, the cadres spend the early morning inspecting work, the bulk of the day in manual labor, and the evenings helping production team leaders plan the following day's schedule (No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 1960 : 136).

"Squatting on a spot" can be seen as a variation of the "Two-Five System" without definite proportion of time. Presumably because of a question of convenience, "squatting on a spot" had become more prevalent later on than the original "Two-Five System". "Squatting on a spot" was a kind of fieldwork for cadres for an indefinite duration of time. It was a systematic obligation for all high ranking cadres in the commune between 1960-1965. For example, in the Chengguan People's Commune, Qufu County, amongst the 23 communal cadres who did not directly engage in manual labor, all but one who remained to keep the office went to "squat on a spot" in different production teams for ten days (Liu Cong-xian, 1963). Another example shows that a Party branch secretary of the Da'an Brigade, Shijing People's Commune, Fei County, squatted in a backward team for two years to help increase the output (RMRB, 30 March, 1963).

4. Chi ku zai xian, xiang luo zai hou (to eat the bitterness first and to enjoy oneself the last): This kind of behavior can be seen as a continuity of the Confucian spirit. The phrase is a semantic variation of the famous phraseology of Fan Zhong-yan, a Confucian minister of the Song Dynasty: "to worry before anyone in the world, and to enjoy oneself after everybody in the world". The Party branch secretary Zhu Qun-shan and the Commander Zhu Li-ji of the Sanli Brigade, Chengguan People's Commune, Qiho County, were praised for having the spirit of eating bitterness the

first and enjoying themselves the last. In 1961, the brigade suffered from the natural calamities. During the hard time, they always took the lead in the hardest work. But when the state sent relief food and money, they refused to accept any, although their houses had collapsed during the flooding (RMRB, 11 January, 1963).

5. Qun-zhong jian-du (under the supervision of the masses): In 1960, the Shicun Brigade of the Longyang People's Commune, Teng County, passed a motion to build a new brigade office of six units. When an old peasant heard of it, he hurried to see the Party branch secretary Xue Zheng-xiang to put his veto. He said: "Money should be spent on the due place. A new office certainly cannot grow grains. If this money be used to build two mechanical wells, how much dry fields will be carried into irrigation? and how much yield will be increased?" Secretary Xue thought the old peasant's suggestion was correct and cancelled the plan of office building. It was reported that this was a regular occurrence in this brigade. The brigade Party branch encouraged the masses to supervise and criticize the cadres. Besides the regular Congress, the Party branch called a meeting of representatives of members and a conversation of old peasants every two months in order to listen to mass opinions. After this, the Party branch paid much attention to family interviews, private chats and women's gossip. "It was under this method," said the reporter, "that the cadres could avoid committing many mistakes and defaults" (RMRB, 19 March, 1963).

6. Ren-ren dou-shi Zhuge Liang¹¹ ("Everybody is a Zhuge Liang"): A good cadre was not the one who only knew how to solve problems for the masses, but the one who

¹¹ Zhuge Liang was a minister of the period of Three Kingdoms, widely known for his wit and intelligence.

knew how to urge the masses to solve problems by themselves by stimulating initiative and creativity of the masses. In Xiyou People's Commune, Ye County, this method was utilized in amelioration and creation of farm implements. In a time span of more than one year, more than fifty kinds of farm implements and tools such as mechanical mill, seed planters, densely spacing drill, foot-stepped water wheels, had been made by creation or imitation (RMRB, 21 May, 1959).

G. Shortage of Rural Leaders

Before 1958, it was already reported in Shandong that the xiang level cadres were not sufficient. According to the official regulations, one township (xiang) could have ten cadres: 3 Party secretaries, one member of Party Committee in charge of organization and propaganda, one secretary of CYL, one administrative clerk, 3 chiefs and vice-chiefs of the township, one member of the Township Committee in charge of finance and grain. The ten cadres could have one cook who was not a cadre but was also on the state payroll. Ten cadres were considered too few as a number to handle the administrative affairs in a township. It was reported that in Holuo Township, Laiyang County, the ten xiang cadres must handle the daily administrative affairs of 34 villages with 2,300 households and a population of 11,500. The limited number of cadres meant that one cadre must serve several functions at a time. For instance, the secretary of CYL was at the same time in charge of security and defense. The cook was in charge of the mailman's task. As he could not deliver mails and cook at the same time, the delivery of mails fell on the back of one vice-chief of the township. The daily businesses were many. Cadres of the cooperatives came very often to the township to demand help in their difficulties in production. Family problems such as disputes between

mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, division of property between brothers, divorce, breaking of engagements, and other problems such as the relief fund for invalid veterans, employment of the demobilized PLA soldiers etc., all these needed to be solved by the township cadres. But these constituted only one aspect of their tasks. They had also to face the increased demands of their superiors. In Laiyang County, there were 89 cadres of the County Committee and 47 ramified organs. Everyone could give orders to the township cadres. The county security office demanded that township cadres participate in their training program. The county Party school demanded that the township send cadres to receive ideological training. The county finance office wanted township cadres to assist in their accounting training classes. The transport office asked the township cadres to lead the construction of highways. The New China Book Store requested the township cadres to sell books for them. The forestry office demanded that the township cadres investigate how many tree-sprouts the township could supply, and so on and so forth. According to the statistics of Holuo Township, they received on the average 60 letters of such requests every month. At the end of 1956 they even received 18 letters in one day. The only way they could handle all this, said the reporter, was to pigeonhole those letters and never touch them again (DZRB, 10 February, 1957).

The above example shows the gravity of the shortage of cadres under the county level even before the establishment of people's communes. In the commune, all the above-mentioned businesses existed still. But, the cadres of a commune must, in addition, devote themselves to leading production. The problem of insufficiency of rural cadres could also be an important factor which determined the size of the commune. If the commune size was the same as, or a little larger than the township size, it was no difficulty to transfer the township cadres to commune cadres. If the commune size had been smaller than a

township, it would have aggravated the problem of rural cadre insufficiency.

About this point, one may ask why the leaders of the cooperatives could not be transferred to the positions of commune cadres? There were two reasons which made it difficult. First, the cooperative leaders had to fill the ranks of brigade and team cadres. Secondly, it was difficult to choose one Party secretary among many cooperative secretaries to be Party secretary of the commune, to lead the other secretaries who had been at the same rank as he had been. This could be seen as a promotion without merit. It was the same for the position of director of the commune. That is why, except for a few national models like Xiu Jian-chun in Xiyou People's Commune and Zhang Fu-gui in Graocun People's Commune, who had personal prestige in the surrounding areas and could be easily raised to the position of director of commune from that of cooperative, the general rule was that the Party secretaries and chief and vice-chief of the township were transferred to the corresponding positions in the commune.

H. Morale Maintenance of the Rural Leaders

After having seen a variety of aspects concerning the leadership in the commune, we may realize how important a role the rural cadres in China have played! But at the same time we must also realize how difficult a role it was! Generally speaking, for the low-ranking rural cadres as a whole, rewards (especially material rewards) were meagre, promotion was scant, but the tasks were heavy and moral requirements were overriding. One may raise questions such as how could the Party make the recruits willing to accept a task of this kind? And how to maintain the cadres' zeal in a totally devoting enterprise with so little personal gain? In fact, the maintaining of rural cadres' morale was not without problems since the land reform. In his study about rural leadership in China,

Thomas P. Bernstein has drawn attention to two major elements which made rural cadres frustrated and led them to withdraw from political involvement after the land reform in the beginning of the 1950's (Bernstein, 1970). "One threat arose as the interests of the peasants in the maintenance of the small-producer economy affected the attitudes and behaviour of village leaders... The other threat arose as the rural administrative system became increasingly burdened by numerous tasks and assignments. As pressure to produce results increased, rural leaders, oriented towards getting each task done quickly, tended more and more to mobilize peasants by issuing commands and using coercion" (*ibid.* : 239).

The first issue raised by Bernstein was considerably diminished, if not yet completely eliminated, since the establishment of the people's communes, because the prospect of becoming a rich peasant was close to zero in the communal framework. The second did however still exist, and still manifested itself in the form of commandism and bureaucratism. It constituted one of the causes which held the commune movement back during the years 1958-1961. In order to correct this phenomenon, the CCP adopted a variety of approaches and techniques, such as the purge, the cultivation of a sense of threat, e.g., the U.S. threat at the beginning of the 1950's, the Soviet threat and the capitalist restoration since 1960, and educational work.

Among the approaches cited above it was the educational work or ideological indoctrination which constituted the permanent method of the CCP for forming, reforming and revitalizing cadres, and maintaining their morale. It was also the educational work which kept the revolutionary dynamism of development in the countryside.

IV SOCIALIST EDUCATION

Following the leadership, it is necessary to give a brief description about the socialist education, because the latter has been the principal method of forming and revitalizing cadres.

A. Definition

Before going into detail of socialist education, a few words concerning its conception are judged necessary. First, in a large sense, all the approaches utilized by the CCP for cadre formation cited above can be seen as forms of socialist education. Furthermore, it is well known that any kind of Chinese mass media has always been ideologically oriented. To some extent, the whole process of socialization can be seen as an educational process. That is why the scope of "socialist education" which we will discuss here should be clearly defined. In this section, "socialist education" will be treated in its narrower sense, implying only what concretely happened in rural communities in Shandong Province between 1958-1965 under the terminology "jiso-yu" (education). Secondly, there was a political campaign named "socialist education" launched first in the rural areas in 1957, concomitant with the xia-fang (downward transfer) movement and renewed in 1962.¹² Afterwards, all educational actions, with or without this official title, were implicitly related to this campaign. Thirdly, there was no clear distinction in the content between education of the masses and that of

¹² Following the anti-rightist movement in the cities in 1957, the "socialist education" movement brought about a revival of attacks on the former landlord and capitalist elements. For a thorough account of the "socialist education" movement from 1962 see Richard Baum, Prelude to Revolution - Mao, the Party and Peasant Question, 1962-1966 (1975).

the cadres, because the content and program of education as well as the approaches and techniques utilized for the two categories of people were the same. When education was carried out by cadres for educating the masses, the cadres themselves were educated too; and vice versa. Finally, it has to be pointed out that the positive aspect of the socialist education rests on creating and consolidating the identification of the cadres as well as the masses with the causes and goals of the socialist transformation.

B. Policy

If ideology and organization were the essential components of the CCP as Franz Schurmann viewed it, education would play the role of glue to cement the two component parts together. It was through education that ideology could play its role of guidance and keep the dynamism of organization. It was also through education that organization defined its goals and values. That is why education has been viewed by the Chinese communists as the principal method of propagating ideology and consolidating organization. The philosophy of the function of education is based on the belief of malleability of human nature, a belief rooted in the ancient Confucian thought. Because the peasants were believed to be educable, the transformation from individual small-farm economy into collective communal economy was logically possible. From this point of view, education was really considered by the decision-makers as a motor of all socioeconomic changes.

In the "Revised Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes", education was one of the important policies of the Party within the commune. After the role of leadership and that of organizer, another essential role which the Party organ had to play was educator. It is formulated that "the Party organ in the people's

commune must do ideological works." "It is needed to utilize all possible forms to propagate, separately to members of the Party, members of the CYL and the masses, Marxism-Leninism, the thought of Mao Tse-tung, the General Line of the Socialist Construction, GLF and the People's Commune, and to carry out the education of socialism, patriotism, collectivism, the alliance between workers and peasants, current occurrences and policies in order to consolidate the people's commune ideologically and politically"" (Chapter 9 of the "Revised Draft:")

Education for the members of the Party and the CYL and the cadres was especially emphasized. "Among the members of the Party and of the CYL education about the proletarian class and that about the Regulations of the Party and CYL must be constantly carried out. It is necessary to educate the members of the Party and CYL and the cadres to be constantly concerned for the difficult problems in life and production of the masses and to reflect the opinions of the masses. It is necessary to educate the members of the Party and CYL and the cadres to correctly implement the 'class line' of the Party in the countryside, to rely on the old peasants and the poor and lower-middle peasants, and to solidly unite the other middle peasants. It is necessary to enforce the unity of the laboring people of all nationalities" (*ibid.*).

C. Principle

Although "politics in command" was not confined only to the sphere of socialist education, it was the supreme principle in all ideological and educational actions. The slogan of "politics in command" was originally raised to oppose economism. The purely economic viewpoint had long been regarded by the leading force of the CCP as a

danger for development. Therefore "politics in command" must be carried out in all sectors as a principle to ensure the correct orientation of socioeconomic development in China. Socialist education aimed at changing peasants' world outlook and value system. It was considered that only under the principle of "politics in command" could the aim of socialist education be fulfilled.

"Politics in command" in the sphere of socialist education contains two meanings: theoretically it meant the socialist and communist ideology must be put in command; practically, it implied that the Party leaders in any sector of the society must take command. This can be illustrated by the example of Dongjiao People's Commune of Licheng County which was put forward as a model in the experience of socialist education. It was reported that "the socialist education was of great success in the Dongjiao People's Commune, mainly because the insistence of the members of the Party Committee of the commune upon "politics in command" was explicit and firm, and they strung together all the tasks such as high tide in production, state purchase, distribution and rectification of Party, commune and CYL with one red string of socialism and communism" (QDRB, 18 October, 1959).

D. Methods

The methods utilized in socialist education were of great variety. The following are examples of the most familiar, but represent only a few of the full number.

1. Da-ming da-fang (great contending and blooming)¹³: The term started to be used during the "Hundred Flowers" Movement in 1956-57 in order to encourage people

¹³ A brief account is found in T.A. Hsia, "The Commune in Retreat : As Evidenced in Terminology and Semantics" (1964 : 25).

to speak frankly and freely their opinions. Although the "Hundred Flowers" Movement ended in an "Anti-rightist" Movement, this term continued to be used in the communes, especially during the rectification of the commune in 1959. As a method of socialist education, it was presented in the form of "ming-fang hui" (contending and blooming meeting). According to the experience of the People's Commune, the characteristics of the ming-fang hui were that in the meeting the speakers were mainly low-ranking cadres and the masses. The leading cadres spoke little in this kind of meeting (QDRB, 18 October, 1959). The ming-fang hui had a twofold aim: it at the same time encouraged the masses to criticize the cadres in order to educate them and to discover the erroneous points of view such as rightist and revisionist etc. on the part of the masses in order to correct them.

2. Yi-ku si-tian (remembering the bitterness of the past and thinking about the sweetness of the present): This method was to raise the masses' awareness of the changes occurring in the socialist transformation process by comparing the present with the past. The Donjiao People's Commune's experience tells us that yi-ku si-tian was a flexible approach according to different circumstances. For instance, in 1959 in this commune, the theme was "remembering the changes and achievement during the last ten years since the establishment of the People's Republic, then during the last three years of cooperativization, and finally during the last year of communization" (QDRB, 18 October, 1959). The emphasis was placed on the comparison between the changes of the last ten years and the tremendous achievement in one year since the establishment of the people's commune. "The comparison was processed through concrete facts from remote events to present occurrences, from big things to small

ones from production to living, from collectivity to individuality, from revolution to construction, from economy to culture, from the tremendous changes in the nation and in the commune to the increase of living standards in material items such as gum-shoes and thermos bottles" (ibid.)

3. Model approach: The method utilized in the Xiwangzhung Brigade, Gufengtai People's Commune, Yishui County in socialist education was electing models of "five-good" members. This activity started in 1961 as a response to the appeal of the Party Committee of Yishui County. During the years of 1961-1964, meetings of criticism were held regularly every 10 days. For the collective benefit, it happened that father criticized son and son criticized father. Under the criticism and encouragement of models, people became more and more concerned with the interest of collectivity. After work, instead of taking rest at home, some members went gathering manure to throw into the brigade fields. During the summer harvest season, when rain started, members were hurried to cover the collective grain first and then to cover grain belonging to themselves. When members found lost money or other things, they would immediately be handed to the brigade office so that they could be returned to the losers. At the end of 1963, 85% of the brigade members became "five-good" members and 76% of the households became "five-good" families (XHDX, 26 May, 1964).

In the Liangquan Brigade of the Xujia zhuang People's Commune, Yiyuan County, the model approach was also utilized in electing "excellent" members. The method was seconded by mutual and self criticism which the local people called "zhao jingzi" (looking at oneself in the mirror). When criticisms were made (in most cases) by members of one's own family, they called this situation "self-education

of the masses" (XHDX, 2 November, 1964).

4. Record of the Village History: From 1962 to 1966 the term "si-shi yun-dong" (Four-history Movement) appeared quite often in Chinese newspapers.¹⁴ The compilation and publication committees of four histories were established in many provinces, cities and counties. It is said that the four histories comprise "family or clan history", "village history", "commune history" and "factory and mine history".¹⁵ The principal theme of those histories was "class struggle". This method can be seen as utilizing traditional bottles to contain revolutionary wine.

In the Julingzhuang Brigade of the Qiujidi People's Commune, Tai-an County, under the socialist education movement, the poor and lower-middle peasants destroyed the stone steles of "official honors" and "filial piety and faithful wives" of the landlord class for establishing the stele of the village history on the theme of class struggle. One face of the stele was a record of one thousand five hundred words on the "tearing and blooding" history of how the poor peasants in the old society suffered from exploitation and how they struggled against the feudalist domination and were finally emancipated and came on the road of socialist collectivity. On the other face was engraved "Never Forget It!" (GMRB, 10 December, 1964).

5. Learning from Lei Feng: In March, 1963, Mao Tse-tung appealed to the Chinese people, especially to the youth to "learn from Lei Feng". Lei Feng was a soldier who died at young age. During his short legendary life, he was said to devote himself without any reservation to serving the people. The movement of learning

¹⁴ For a detailed account of the Four-History Movement see Shi Cheng-zhi (Shih Ch'eng-chih), "Shi lun Si-shi yu Wen-ge" (On the Four-History and Cultural Revolution) Ming Pao Monthly, Nos. 72-80 (Dec. 1971-August, 1972).

¹⁵ In some parts of China, there appeared compilation and publication committees of five histories. The fifth one was said in some place to be "army history", in others, "street history" (Shi Cheng-ghi, 1971-72).

from Lei Feng was for a time (1963-65) of special importance amongst the members of CYL in the countryside.

In the Lijiazhuang Brigade, Chengguan People's Commune, Linju County, there was a high tide of learning from Lei Feng amongst the youth in 1963 (Gong- qing-tuan, 1965). In one month the youth of the village did more than three hundred good things in serving the people. But the zeal of the youth gradually decreased with time. The secretary of the CYL realized that to learn from Lei Feng was to learn how he learned from Chairman Mao's works. Lei Feng used to say: "I study Chairman Mao's books, I listen to what Chairman Mao said, and I do things according to Chairman Mao's directives."¹¹ The spirit of Lei Feng was rooted in Chairman Mao's works (ibid.)

6. Learning from Chairman Mao's Works: If Marx's, Engels' and Lenin's works were important for the intellectuals and high ranking cadres in the cities, Chairman Mao's works were important for everybody in China, but especially for the peasants who had difficulty in understanding translated works. However, as a movement of "learning from Chairman Mao's works" started only in 1963 when the renewed socialist education movement reached its high tide in the countryside. To learn Chairman Mao's works peasants were organized by the Party or the CYL in studying groups. For instance, in the Lijiazhuang Brigade which I have cited above, among the 156 young people, except one who was a dumb person, 155 participated in the studying group of learning from Chairman Mao's works (ibid.)

Among Mao's works, the most studied were the so-called "lao san-pian" (old three articles): "Serving the People", "In Memory of Norman Bethune" and

"The Foolish Old Man who Removed the Mountains".¹⁶ This is because these three articles are simple in form and heavily moral-laden in content. They aptly fitted the taste and intellectual level of the peasantry. In the three articles, there were three models to be learned from. In "Serving the People", there was a soldier, Zhang Si-de, a type of Lei Feng, who knew nothing else than serving and helping the others. In "In Memory of Norman Bethune", the spirit of Bethune was praised in the phraseology: "working not for the benefit even a little bit of oneself, but for the benefit of others." In "The Foolish Old Man who Removed the Mountains", the spirit of iron will was praised. As moral lessons, they were very encouraging and useful in the socialist construction under hard conditions.

The movement of learning from Chairman Mao's works was intensified in 1965, as a prelude to the Cultural Revolution. In Shandong, conference of exchanging experience in learning from Chairman Mao's works was organized at the provincial level and models were elected. The model of the models was Chen Lan-hua, a countrywoman of 36 years old from the West Shuyuan Brigade, Shuyuan People's Commune, Junan County. Coming from poor peasant family, she was almost illiterate. She was director of the Women's Federation Branch, and member of the Party branch committee. Although the mother of five children and laborer in the field (because her husband worked elsewhere), she managed to have studied all important works of Mao, including the philosophical article "On Practice", with the help of her daughter who studied in the high school (SHDX, 29 May, 1965).

¹⁶ "Serve the People", Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, Vol. III, pp. 227-228; "In Memory of Norman Bethune," Vol. II, pp. 337-338; "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains", Vol. III, pp. 321-324.

The focus of learning from Chairman Mao's works was "learning for using" (huo-xue huo-yong) and "learning with problems" (daizhe wenti zue). For example, Chen Lan-hua once urged some women who were not active in participating in harvest to go to the field. But nobody listened to her. She was very frustrated. Only when she read the sentence "cadres must be concerned with the life of the masses and pay attention to working method" in Mao's work, did she realize her mistake of not being concerned with the life of the masses and of not paying attention to her working method. She then changed her working style by starting to visit individually those women who were not active in laboring so she could understand their problems. She found that there really existed many reasons such as having too many children at home, being dissatisfied with the low work-point for women, etc. She began by organizing a nursery for the children and arranging to get "equal pay for equal work" for women. Finally, more than one hundred women laborers in the brigade all participated actively in collective laboring. Within 10 days, the women labor force had gathered three thousand carts of manure and leveled three hundred mu of land (ibid.).

V SUMMARY

Since the size of the commune was reduced between 1959 and 1963, the communal unit has become, as Skinner suggested, closer to the traditional marketing community. The average households of the commune in Shandong Province can be estimated as around 4,000 (or about 16,000 people). This figure is larger than the average for China as a whole (between 7,000 and 8,000 people),¹⁷ but smaller than that in the

¹⁷ The relatively large size of commune in Shandong was mainly due to its high population density (360 per sq. kms. in 1958, only ranged after Jiangsu Province in China).

double-cropping rice region, for example, in Guangdong the average population of a commune is over 30,000 (Buchanan, 1970 : 130). In comparison with the size of co-operative which had on the average 200 households (or some 800 people), the commune was twenty times larger. This sudden change in the size of economic unit in so short a time as within one year (1958-1959) can largely account for the difficulties faced by the organizers of the communes during 1959-1961. It is not surprising to see regression and failure in some sectors of the commune system. What is surprising was that this system did not collapse under so much pressure as we have shown in the former chapters, but was gradually consolidated. Without sufficient prerequisites in infrastructure, the establishment of the commune system relied mainly on organization.

The core of the communal organization was the CCP which is, as Franz Schurmann said, an organization itself. The success of the CCP in revolution owed much to its efficiency in organization, especially in the transformation of peasants into revolutionary fighters. The authorities of the CCP were enough aware of this quality to continue to utilize it in social and economic development. The organizational structure of the commune was based on the Party organization. The parallelism of the Party and administrative lines within the commune framework is a crucial organizational feature. Administrative organization was only a kind of bureaucracy, a functional tool under the strict control of the Party. This control was systematically established by the leadership structure: First, the position of the secretary of the commune was endowed with power by both the CCP and the people (because of the practice of mass line). Secondly, the fact that most of the administrative leaders were chosen among the members of the Party made them subordinate to the authority of the Party secretary.

However, there were two difficulties in leadership which faced the organizers of the commune system at the beginning of its establishment. One concerned the shortage

of the rural leaders at every echelon, especially at the commune level. The idea of yi-xiang yi-she (one township for one commune) contains only a partial solution of leadership. The second difficulty concerned the qualification of rural cadres. There were two aspects concerning a cadre's qualification: red and expert. The former was related to the cadre's political stand and ideological outlook while the latter related to his technical know-how in administration and production. Since the establishment of the communes, the know-how in production of the leading cadres had become increasingly important. The problem is that many commune cadres who had been administrative leaders of the townships were not familiar enough with production skills. The transfer of a great deal of technical tasks in production downward to the brigade and team levels may be seen as a temporary solution of the inexperience in production of these commune leaders. But no important measures, except for the "squatting on a spot", were adopted to resolve this problem.

While the "expert" aspect was overlooked, the "red" aspect was at any rate considered of paramount importance in order to carry on the socialist transformation and to form a new type of peasantry. As Mao repeated again and again: "man first" and "man determines matters". Man was viewed as the real motor of social change and economic development. That is why the socialist education was so emphasized in the process of the operation of communal organization. My data reflect to some extent the success of the socialist education in cadres' morale maintaining and thought reformation, although this success could not be attributed only to the effect of socialist education, but also other factors such as a minimum material incentive.

In sum, the establishment of the people's communes was above all an organizational operation. The organization of the communes was based on and relied upon the

capacity and efficiency of the rural leadership. The dynamism in forming qualified cadres and in promoting the initiatives and creativity of the masses was derived for a great part from the socialist education which was manifested in the form of ideological indoctrination.

Chapter Six

STRUCTURE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE (II) : OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

I OWNERSHIP

In accordance with the general evolution of the commune movement, the ownership system within the communal unit has experienced a variety of stages, ranging from confusion in conception to clarity, from fanatic attitudes to realistic ones and from chaotic practices to accurate planning. This process of changes can be seen through the four stages of the evolution of the commune movement I have suggested in Chapter Three.

A. Public Ownership (gong-you)

Public ownership is the antonym of private ownership (si-you). At the beginning of the commune movement, cadres who took the lead saw the movement rather as a process of transformation from private ownership to public ownership. In the "Draft of the Experimental Regulations of the Weixing People's Commune" it was formulated that

On the basis of the fundamental realization of public ownership of means of production, members of the cooperatives, when they become commune members, should hand over all their means of production such as private plots, foundations of houses, draught and domestic animals and trees to the commune. But the member could keep a small quantity of livestock. The privately owned draught animals and trees, when being transferred to the public ownership of the commune, should be considered as a part of investment of their owners. As for the households that are not members of the cooperative but have applied

for membership of the commune, they should hand over all but a small quantity of livestock, their means of production such as land, draught animals, trees and large farm implements to the commune. Those handed-over items will be converted into shares in the funds of membership according to the original regulations of the cooperatives. The part which exceeds the due shares in the funds of each member will be taken as his part of investment (Article 5).

It is clear that according to this document, members of the commune would no longer own any means of production except for a small quantity of livestock. Besides land, the definition of means of production was as large as to include the foundations of houses, draught and domestic animals, trees and large farm implements. However, the term "public ownership" was not clearly defined. It was said that "the means of production had to be transferred to the ownership of the commune as a whole", but it was not specified whether the brigades or teams would or would not own a part of them. Nor did it make the distinction between the "collective ownership" by the commune and the "ownership by the whole people". This distinction had not been mentioned until the publication of the Beidaiho Resolution in September, 1958.

In the Beidaiho Resolution, the vague term "public ownership" was replaced by two terms: "collective ownership" (ji-ti suo-you) and "ownership by the whole people" (quan-min suo-you). Although there was no redefinition of these two terms in the communal framework, it could be taken for granted that the "collective ownership" meant ownership by all the members of a given commune whereas "ownership by the whole people" meant ownership by the whole people of the country. Under Article 5 of the Resolution which was entitled "Problems about the name, system of ownership and system of distribution of the commune", it was specified that

after the establishment of the people's communes, it is not advised to hurry the pace in transforming the "collective ownership" into the "ownership by the whole people." It had better adopt the

"collective ownership" for the time being in order not to create unnecessary troubles during the process of transition. As a matter of fact, within the "collective ownership" system of the commune, it already contains some elements of the system of "ownership by the whole people." Elements of the system of "ownership by the whole people" will be increased in the incessant development until this system will gradually replace the "collective ownership". This process of transformation from the "collective ownership" to the "ownership by the whole people" could be completed in three or four years in some places and in five or six, or even more, in some others.

Here, the "collective ownership" was viewed as a transitional stage to the "ownership by the whole people" which was to be a further stage towards the realization of communism. But the content of the "collective ownership" was still not delineated. It only suggested that

there is no need for hasty treatment of the problems of private plots, small holdings of fruit trees and the shares in the funds of the cooperatives. Nor is it necessary to set written regulations. However, it is advised that the private plots may come under the collective management at the time of cooperatives' merging into commune. The small holdings of fruit trees are to be owned temporarily by the members. As for the problem of the shares in the funds, it suggests that it may be postponed one or two years until these funds will naturally turn to "public ownership" following the development of production, the increase in income and the elevation of people's political awareness (Article 4 of the Beidaiho Resolution).

As the Beidaiho Resolution was inspired by the "Experimental Regulations of the Weixing People's Commune, the content of "collective ownership" can be understood as including all means of production, identical to the term of "public ownership" in the above cited regulations. Although the attitude towards the transformation from private ownership into "collective ownership" was a little more reserved for some property such as fruit trees and the shares in the funds in the Resolution than in the Regulations of

the Weixing People's Commune, this moderation could be easily interpreted by the local cadres as merely a reference to some backward regions rather than as a general warning. That is why, instead of postponing the problem of ownership, most communes adopted a radical attitude in collectivizing private property. As there was no clear definition of the "collective ownership" within the communal framework, collectivization of ownership not only included personal property, but also implied a transfer of property collectively owned by the original cooperatives and production brigades or teams to the collective ownership of the commune. One writer said at the time:

The people's commune movement has swept up the remaining private ownership of means of production (e.g., private plots, private trees and draught and domestic animals) left by the advanced agricultural producers' cooperatives (Yue, 1958).

The conception of the collective ownership was not clear during this stage.

B. Collective Ownership and Ownership by the Whole People

In the Wuchang Resolution¹ more attention was paid to the problem of ownership in the commune. First, the development of the commune system was viewed as a necessary step along the gradual transformation from the system of collective ownership in agriculture to the system of ownership by the whole people (Wen-hui Bao, 1959 : 11). Secondly, the Resolution emphasized the distinction between the collective ownership and the ownership by the whole people. It pointed out that the transformation from _____

¹ "Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes" of the 6th Plenum of the 8th CCP Central Committee, held in Wuchang from 28 November to 10 December, 1958. Some writers, such as T. A. Hsia, called it "Wuhan Resolution". Wuchang is one of three cities which make the large Wuhan. In the Resolution it is said that the meeting was held in Wuchang. So, Wuchang is more accurate than Wuhan as the place of meeting.

cooperatives into people's communes had enlarged and enhanced the system of collective ownership by bringing some elements of the ownership by the whole people into the collective ownership (ibid. : 15). Furthermore, the Resolution made a distinction between socialism and communism in terms of ownership by saying that "the transformation from the collective ownership of socialism into the ownership by the whole people of socialism was not equal to the transformation from socialism into communism" (ibid. : 17).

It is evident that both the collective ownership and the ownership by the whole people were considered as having a socialist nature. It was believed that even under the system of ownership by the whole people, the society could still be socialist unless it has realized the principle of "from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs."

Accordingly, the Resolution warned that

no matter whether it concerns a transformation from socialist collective ownership into socialist ownership by the whole people or that from socialism into communism, the transformation must be based on the corresponding degree of development of productive forces. It should not be declared the immediate implementation of the ownership by the whole people and the immediate procession into communism in the People's communes without sufficient material grounds (ibid. : 19)

The Resolution also assured that the means of production and products of the rural people's communes were basically owned, for the time being, by the communal collectivities, and must be distinct from the means of production and products of the state enterprises which were owned by the whole people (ibid. : 16).

What is crucial during this stage of ownership is the clarification of the content of the ownership by the whole people within the communal framework. Formerly, the conception of the ownership by the whole people often constituted a subject of confusion

and misinterpretation. It could be understood as meaning that the communes should have been oriented toward a kind of state farm, i.e., its means of production and products could have been distributed rationally and uniformly by the state according to the needs of the national economy as a whole. The Wuchang Resolution stopped this kind of interpretations by the local cadres. It clearly attributed the elements of ownership by the whole people in the commune system to four areas: (1) The integration of the commune and the basic unit of administration (township) into one brought the basic economic unit closer to the state. (2) Rural banks and supply services which had originally been owned by the whole people (state) were transferred to the communal organization. (3) The commune participated in setting up industries and other enterprises which were of the nature of ownership by the whole people. (4) In many counties, the federations of communes had the right to regulate a suitable part of labor, material, and financial forces of the communes under their jurisdiction in order to construct enterprises which could be either within the county boundaries or without (ibid. : 15-16)

Amongst the four areas, the second one was the most important and was also the focus of the components of ownership by the whole people in a collective ownership system. It was important also because the integration of banks and supply services in the rural areas into the commune system implied a drastic change in the rural finance and trading systems. Formerly, these two systems were independent from the cooperative units and belonged to the state. In order to make the commune a de facto all-embracing basic unit, the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council decided to transfer the finance and trading systems in the rural areas to the people's commune.² This transfer

² cf. Zhong-gong Zhong-yang (The Central Committee of the CCP) and Guo-wu-yuan (the State Council), "Guan-yu shi-ying ren-min gong-she-hua de xing-shi gai-jin nong-cun cai-zheng mao-yi guan-li ti-zhi de jue-ding" (Resolution About Improvement of the Systems of Finance and Trade in the Countryside Following the Situation of Communization), 20 December, 1958, Wen-hui Bao, 1959 : 40-49.

was implemented under the policy of liang-fang, san-tong, yi-bao (two transfers, three unifications and one guarantee).

"Two transfers" means to transfer both the personnel and the property of the rural state owned offices of grain, trade, finance and bank to the communes. Control and management of those organs nominally belonged henceforth to the communes. Their personnel became communal officers. But their ownership was still of the ownership by the whole people. "Three unifications" means to unify at the same time policies, plan-nings and control of floating capital. That is to say, the communes had to be subject to the unified policies of the state, such as the policy of the market price, the policy of unified purchase and unified sale. The communes had also to be subject to the unified plannings of the state by selling the communal products to the state and the goods distributed by the state to commune members according to the state unified plannings. The last unification means that the communes had to handle the floating capital by guaranteeing that all floating capital coming from the state must be used only for industrial and agricultural production as well as for the circulation of merchandise, but not for basic construction or other expenditures. "One guarantee" means to guarantee the financial tasks towards the state. In other words, the communes had the duty to collect the agricultural tax, industrial tax, commercial tax and other local taxes for the state under one unified account (ibid. : 42-43).

Being nominally integrated components of the communal organization, the credit (bank) and finance service and the trade and supply service continued, however, to be controlled by their corresponding superior state organs. They served at the same time the commune and the state. Because of such a dual affiliation, these services

could be considered as component parts of the commune while keeping their nature of ownership by the whole people. From this point of view, the operation of downward transfer had as its purpose to increase the elements of the ownership by the whole people of the people's communes.³

Although the Resolution warned the cadres who led the commune movement not to be overly hasty in bringing about the transformation from the collective ownership into the ownership by the whole people, it was, however, suggested to adopt actively all possible measures to increase the part of ownership by the whole people in the communes in order to shift the nature of ownership when the condition was mature enough for such a change. The Resolution said:

If this transformation is not completed by the due time and the collective ownership is maintained for too long, it will result in the consequence that the commune members' outlook will be always limited within the small circle of collective profit and the continuing development of productive forces and continuing enhancement of people's political awareness will be hampered (*ibid.* : 16).

The way proposed in the Resolution for increasing the part of ownership by the whole people was to establish the federation of communes within the county boundaries. It seemed to be believed at the time that the larger the communal organization was, the more progressive it would be.

During this stage, in spite of the clarification between collective ownership and ownership by the whole people, and in spite of the warning on the nature of the communal ownership, the local cadres who led the commune movement spared no effort to make the commune as large as seemed feasible in order to enable ownership by the whole people

³ This point has been clearly explained by Li Xian-nian, in "Zen-yang Ren-shi nong-cun cai-mao guan-li ti-zhe de gai-jin" (How to recognize the improvement of the controlling system of finance and trade in rural areas), *Wen-hui Bao*, 1959 : 148.

to be as extensive as possible. That is because the collective ownership was described as a temporary situation while the ownership by the whole people was believed to be the ultimate goal.

C. Three Level Ownership With the Production Brigade as the Foundation

The period of regression of the commune movement was marked by the Lushan Conference in August 1959 and was confirmed by the "Twelve Articles of Emergency Directives for Work in the Countryside" issued by the Central Committee of the CCP in November, 1960.

After the Eighth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in Lushan, the RMRB announced:

A rectification has been carried out in the rural people's communes throughout the country in accordance with the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party adopted last December, the resolution of the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee held in Chengzhou in February this year and the series of directives issued by the Central Committee subsequently. During the rectification, the principles of management and accounting at different levels, of "to each according to his work" and more income for those who do more work have been implemented. It has been decided that at the present stage a three-level type of ownership of the means of production should be instituted in the people's communes. Ownership at the production brigade level constitutes the basic one. Ownership at the commune level constitutes another part (in addition to ownership of the public economic undertakings run by the commune, the commune can draw each year a reasonable amount for its capital accumulation fund from the income of the production brigades). A small part of the ownership should also be vested in the production team (RMRB, 27 August, 1959).

In the "Twelve Articles" the system of communal ownership was clearly defined

(1) Three level ownership with the production brigade as the foundation is the basic system for the people's commune at the present stage. (2) Resolutely oppose and thoroughly set right "one uniformity" and "two transfers" (One uniformity means "equalitarianism" and two transfers means "random transfer of manpower and materials"). (3) Strengthen the basic ownership system of the production brigade. (4) Persist in the minor partial ownership system of the production team. (5) Allow commune members to operate some private plots and smallscale family sidelines (Chiang I-shan, 1965 : 70).

The collective ownership which had been so unclearly defined that it had often been misinterpreted as an ownership at the commune level was finally defined as a three-level ownership with the production brigade as the foundation. The production brigade was originally transformed from the advanced cooperative. However, the difference between the ownership system of this period and that of the period of cooperativization was evident. During the latter, ownership was shared by the cooperative, its production brigade (or team) and individual household whereas during this period the ownership was shared also, at least in part, by the commune in addition to the above three levels.

Since the "Twelve Articles" was issued, the collective ownership could no longer be interpreted as a system of ownership by all commune members. But the detail of the items owned by the different levels within the commune was not clarified until the issue of another important document, namely, the "Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Commune" in March 1961 (see Chapter Three, p. 71, foot note 16).

In this document, although no detailed mention concerning the property owned by the commune level was made, under the Article 12, the commune nevertheless was allowed to undertake some enterprises which could directly serve the agricultural production according to the needs and capacity of each commune. These enterprises could be set up either by the investment of the commune alone or by joint investments of the commune

and brigade(s) or other commune(s). In the first case, it is understood that the enterprises in question were the property of the commune. In the second case, it was regulated that a contract was necessary in order to guarantee the rights and gains of the contractors. The right of property can be interpreted in such a case as a joint ownership.

For the production brigade, the Draft prescribed that

apart from the means of production owned by the production team and members, all means of production such as land, draught animals and farm implements are part of brigade's ownership. The products and revenue handed to the brigade by the production teams under the planning of contracted production and those from the enterprises directly managed by the brigade are all property of the brigade (Article 17).

As for the production team level, the Draft formulated that for the purpose of enhancing the enthusiasm of the members and the cadres of the production team, ownership at the team level must be ensured. The following income and property were considered as belonging to the production team:

- prizes for over-fulfillment of production target;
- income from other production after fulfillment of the production target;
- capital by saving;
- means of production and other equipment purchased with the capital owned by the team;
- any basic construction realized with the capital owned by the team;
- fruit trees, trees and other durable plants planted after the fulfillment of the production target;
- off-spring of the draught animals which have been contributed to the team for permanent use.

All of these: capital, materials, equipment, trees and animals were at the disposition of the team. Neither commune nor brigade could redistribute them for other usage.

If it was necessary to make any redistribution, it should be done with the agreement of the team and the redistributed objects must be compensated by way of exchange with other objects of equal value (Article 26).

No regulation was formulated about the private plots of the commune members. However, members' sideline production was considered as a subordinate part to the economy of the system of collective ownership. Using leisure time and holidays to develop sideline production was not only allowed, but encouraged. Accordingly, the family accumulation of manure, if used by the production team or brigade, should be paid according to its quality (Article 38).

During this period, the production brigade was not only taken as the foundation of ownership, but also as the basic unit of accounting and management. It was so, because the new requirements of the commune movement could not be met either by human factor (manpower) or by the material conditions (output). As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, shortage of experienced leaders for leading the commune operation constituted a handicap for the movement. Materially, the large size of the commune needed a larger surplus of agricultural production to develop local industry and to undertake basic construction such as irrigation and land leveling. Unfortunately, agricultural output in 1959-61 was not only not increased, but drastically decreased for many reasons, one of which was certainly that the power given to the commune level was too much. Now, the emergence of the production brigade as the centre of the commune organization signifies a shift of attitudes of the decision-makers from unrealistic to more realistic. The most evident advantage of placing importance on the brigade was making the infrastructure built up during the cooperative period useful. As one writer pointed out:

Up to now, agricultural machinaries are few. Most of the land is cultivated by humal labor and draught animals. The majority of the means of production such as land, draught animals, farm implements originally belonged to the advanced cooperatives that have been transformed into production brigades. This fact has determined the production brigade's position as foundation of the ownership (He Cheng-zhang, 1960).

However, the problem was that at this period the production brigade was still quite often larger than the advanced cooperative, and much larger than the elementary cooperative. In order to make a fuller use of this advantage the production team must be given its importance too.

D. Three Level Ownership With the Production Team as the Foundation

The last stage of changes in ownership can be said to have begun in September, 1962 with the issuance of the "Revised Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes" (see Chapter Three, p. 74, footnote 21).

In this document, the system of ownership of the people's commune was defined as collective ownership which was considered as one of the two forms of ownership of the socialist economy (another form was ownership by the whole people) (Article 1). This was an attempt to clarify the confusion caused by the mix-up with the ownership by the whole people during the previous year.

Although no declaration was made about that, the foundation of the three-level ownership was shifted to the production team due to the fact that the latter became the basic accounting unit; most of the means of production in the commune were transferred downward to the team level.

The "Revised Draft" formulated that all land within the boundaries of the production team was owned by the team. Production team's lands (including members' private

plots, private mountains, foundations of houses) were not allowed to be rented or sold. Without permission of the people's committee above the county level, no organization or individual was allowed to occupy or use the land belonging to the production team. (This formulation was obviously set up against any abusive power on the part of the commune or brigade toward the team in the matter of land). The draught animals and farm implements collectively owned by the production team were not allowed to be transferred elsewhere by the commune or brigade. The farm implements, small agricultural machinery and draught animals which originally belonged to the commune or to the brigade, but were judged to be more appropriately owned and utilized by the production team, should be transferred to the team ownership. Only those which were not appropriately owned and utilized by the production team could remain the property of the commune and the brigade. Some of these things were also permitted to be owned collectively by several teams. The collectively owned mountains, woods, water surface and pasture-land, if it was more profitable for them to be owned by the production team, should be transferred to the team ownership (Article 21).

A new point which is worth noting is that the "Revised Draft attributed a right of decision concerning the ownership and management to the members' congresses although the level of congresses was not determined. It is understood that all members' congresses (commune, brigade and team) had a right to discuss and to make decisions in the matters of ownership and management. Once a decision was made, it would be permanently effective (Article 21).

The individual ownership was clearly defined for the first time by the "Revised Draft". This kind of ownership was limited within the realm of means of subsistence such as houses, furniture, clothes, quilts, bicycles, sewing machines and bank savings. This individual ownership was considered as a right and could not be violated by anybody else (Article 44). Moreover, the members had a right to rent or to sell their

privately owned houses (without the foundations) (Article 45).

The private plots were considered as a means of production, therefore they could not be owned privately by the members. However, the members had a right of permanent use of them under the regulation of sideline production. These private plots were limited within 5-7% of the total arable land owned by the production team. Under the same regulation, members were encouraged to raise livestock and even draught animals. If needed, members could have extra plots for raising forage. With the permission of the commune or brigade, and under the unified planning, members were allowed to exploit a piece of barren land as large as their private lots. The total area of private plots, forage land and exploited barren land could be 5-10% of the total cultivated land of the team and should not exceed 15% (Article 40).

E. An Example of Ownership

In spite of the regulations in the "Revised Draft", there still existed a great variety in terms of ownership between 1962-1965. This is because ownership could not acquire any importance without linking with management and accounting systems. For instance, if the basic accounting unit was not the production team but the brigade and the right of utilization of land was clearly defined as belonging to the team, the question of whether the land belonged to team or brigade would become meaningless. In this case, the de facto ownership of land was determined by the management and accounting system rather than the reverse. But the ownership of means of production other than land seemed to be more important than that of land. This question is not difficult to explain. Land was cultivated in any case by the production teams because the team was

the basic unit of labor distribution for agricultural production, whereas other means of production could be managed either by the production team or by the brigade or commune. That is why the ownership of the means of production other than land must be clearly defined and usually draws more attention in practice than land ownership. Besides land, other means of production, including some local industries, were considered as sideline production. During 1962-1965 the general tendency of sideline production was also to be downward transferred.

According to a survey of Qixia County, the ownership and management of the means of sideline production had the following variations:

1. Ownership of production brigades:

- Owned by the brigade but managed collectively by several production teams: enterprises which required large investment and advanced techniques such as large orchards, woods, silkworm raising, house and road construction, food and oil processing, kilns etc.
- Owned by the brigade but managed by one production team: enterprises the resources of which were too dispersed to be managed by the brigade.
- Owned and managed by several brigades: such as a large brick factory which needed more labor than one brigade could afford.
- Owned and managed by one brigade.

2. Ownership of production teams:

- Owned and managed by team: enterprises that did not need large investment and much labor such as vermicelli workshop, beancurd workshop, small orchard, hog raising, etc.

- Owned by team but managed by brigade: enterprises which were not easy to be handled by production team such as animal breeding.

3. Ownership of households: small sideline production (the resources of which were very dispersed) that required only secondary labor force and fitted family management such as domestic animal raising, wild animal hunting and wild plant gathering, etc. (RMRB, 10 October, 1965).

F. Summary

After the principal means of production, namely, land, was shifted to the ownership of the production team, the commune and brigade would own only mountain-hills, woods, basic construction such as water conservancy, dams and some industrial and/or handicraft enterprises. But it was advised that woods and handicraft enterprises were to be transferred to the production team, or at least to be managed by the team, if necessary ("Revised Draft", Articles 12 and 13). In such a case, the commune and brigade owned little. That is why some scholars think that the commune remained since then no more than an empty shell (Hsia, 1964; Chao, 1970). This judgment has been based mainly on the grounds of ownership. According to the tradition of capitalist countries, ownership is the foundation of the social structure. When there is change occurring in ownership, the structure of the society will be affected accordingly. But this is not as true for the socialist countries as for the capitalist countries. In China, as in many other socialist societies, both collective ownership and private ownership have been viewed as temporary systems which would sooner or later give way to the ownership by the whole people. In the commune system, ownership is only one component element in the structure among others. The status of ownership differs from that in

the capitalist societies in two ways: first, the distinction between the right of utilization and the right of ownership is more prevalent and more significant in the Chinese communes than in the western countries. Secondly, the regulation concerning ownership is much less stable and more changeable than in the western countries. Yesterday, land was owned by the commune or brigade; today, it is owned by the team; and tomorrow it can be owned again by the brigade or commune. This will depend on the socioeconomic development. Therefore, the ownership alone cannot determine the whole structure of the commune system. In order to judge whether the commune system is or is not an empty shell, we have to depict a full picture by linking the ownership with the management and the system of distribution on the one hand, and by taking into consideration its organizational schema, leadership and ideological indoctrination on the other.

II MANAGEMENT

Management was a very complicated problem during the first years of the commune movement, because it not only historically experienced successive changes, but geographically had a large variety in the methods utilized. The following discussion on management will be divided into two parts: units of management and methods utilized in management. The former will show its historical evolution and the latter its local variations.

A. Units of Management

At the very beginning of the commune movement, the commune system was conceived as based on the principle of "unified leadership and management at different level."⁴ Like the evolution of ownership, the focus of management also experienced a downward transference.

1. Three level management with emphasis on the commune

F

From April, 1958 up to August, 1959 (corresponding to the first two stages in the general evolution of the people's commune), the commune was the focus of the three level management. The departmental division (see Chapter Five, Section II) at the commune level can provide a general schema of the scope of communal management. Generally speaking, the decision-making (production planning and responsibility for gains and losses) for agriculture and direct management for most non-agricultural businesses such as local industry, water conservancy, education, militia, sanitation, etc., were all concentrated in the hands of the authorities at the commune level.⁵ But the most significant event was the integration of supply and trading service and credit and finance service into the commune system.

As a matter of fact, before the establishment of the People's Communes, in some places there had already emerged a new type of cooperative which was called san-he-yi (three-in-one) or si-he-yi (four-in-one) cooperative. The san-he-yi cooperative means the merging of agricultural cooperative, supply and trading cooperative

⁴ Cf. "Draft of the Experimental Regulations of the Weixing People's Commune", Article 13.

⁵ Some scattered non-agricultural businesses could be managed by the production brigade.

and credit cooperatives into one cooperative while the si-he-yi cooperative means that in addition to the above three, the handicraft cooperative was also integrated into the new type of cooperative.⁶ After April, 1958, the integration of formerly state-owned supply and trading service and credit and finance service was merely a logical consequence of the original blueprint of the commune system which was conceived as an all-embracing unit. However, these two services needed professional staff which the commune could not provide. The solution was to transfer downwards the state personnel together with the services to the communes. In practice, although these two services were formally integrated into the communal organization as two departments among others, they still kept their independence in management. The functioning of the two services was conceived in the following way.

The credit department of the commune was at the same time a local branch of the State People's Bank, so it had to implement the state regulations of the currency control. Savings of the communal units at all echelons should be deposited in the credit department according to the regulations of currency control. The surplus of currency in the credit department should be deposited in the bank of the county in order to ensure the unified transfer and circulation on a nationwide scale. The amount of credits given to agriculture, industry and commerce were to be decided by the commune. The interest on deposits by members was unified in accordance with the state regulation.

The supply and trading department was to function under the contract system. Apart from the tasks of unified purchase and unified sale with the state, all other

⁶ Cf. "You li-shi yi-yi de gang ling-xing wen-jian" (A basic Document of Historical significance), Editorial of Hong-qi, No. 1, January, 1959 : 1.

commercial relationships either with the state or with other communes were to be set up by contracts. The function of this department was conceived to replace entirely that of the "free markets" (both traditional and modern) (see Note 2).

As for the management of the principal task of the commune, namely, agricultural production, it was divided at three levels. Before the discussion of management at each level, it is necessary to clarify the terminology used for the units of subdivision.

At the beginning of the commune movement, the titles of the sub-units in the commune were not unified. T. A. Hsia gave five variations of appellations of the units under commune level:

- a. The commune > gong-zuo zhi-dao zhan (work direction station) > sheng-chan dui (production brigade)
(communes in Tangshan Special District, Hobei)
- b. The commune > sheng-chan da-dui (large production brigade) > sheng-chan dui (production brigade)
(Weixing People's Commune, Honan)
- c. The commune > da-dui (large brigade) > xiao-dui (small brigade)
(communes in Tangshan Special District and Qiliying People's Commune, Xinxiang County, Honan)
- d. The commune > da-dui (large brigade) > zhong-dui (medium brigade)
(Chaoyang People's Commune, Shangcheng County, Honan)
- e. The commune > zuo-ye qu (farm-work district) > sheng-chan dui (production brigade).⁷

⁷ Hsia's list cannot be said to represent
Hsia, 1964: 36. By virtue of uniformity, I have changed Hsia's original Wade-Giles transliteration into pin-yin system.

Hsia's data cannot be said to represent the whole picture of the county. The real scope of variations must be larger than his. In Shandong Province, according to the available data which cannot represent the whole picture of Shandong either, three variations are found in the years 1958-1959 (after 1959 the names were unified):

- a. The commune > guan-li qu (administrative district) or
geng-zuo qu (plowing and farm-work district) >
sheng-chan dui (production team)
 (Chengguan People's Commune, Shouzhang County, DZRB, 19 September, 1958)
 (Laoguanzhai People's Commune, Linqing Municipality, RMRB, 19 August, 1959)
- b. The commune > sheng-chan dui (production brigade) > sheng-chan xiao-dui
 (small production brigade or production team)
 (Dongjiao People's Commune, Licheng County, QDRB, 18 October, 1959)
- c. The commune > sheng-chan da-dui (large production brigade or production brigade) > sheng-chan dui (production team)
 (most of the communes)

In December, 1958, the Wuchang Resolution reaffirmed the principle of "unified leadership and management at different levels" which had been advanced by the Weixing People's Commune. According to the Resolution, the second level unit was called guan-li qu or sheng-chan da-dui; and third level unit, sheng-chan dui (Wen-hui Bao, 1969 : 33). After 1959, the appellations of the communal sub-units were gradually unified by following the example of the Weixing People's Commune which was at the very beginning divided into sheng-chan da-dui (for the second level) and sheng-chan dui (for the third level)

The complication with regard to the names of the second and the third levels of the communal units was caused not only by the diversity of the Chinese terminology used during 1958-1959, but also by their English translation and the change in size of these units.

Sheng-chan dui was originally a subdivision of the advanced cooperative. It was translated in the Chinese official documents as "production brigade". However, in the official English version of the Wuchang Resolution, sheng-chan da-dui was translated as "production brigade" and sheng-chan dui as "production team" (Hsia, 1964 : 38). The English terms were standardized since the time of the English version of the Wuchang Resolution and students of China in other countries quickly became familiar with them, although the standardization of the Chinese terms came out much later.⁸

The change in size of these units was another cause of confusion. In December, 1958 when the Wuchang Resolution was made, the sheng-chan dui (third level unit) was almost as large as an advanced cooperative of 1957, and the sheng-chan da-dui or guan-li qu (second level unit) referred to an organization much larger than the advanced cooperative. However, after the reduction in size of the communes during 1959-62, only the sheng-chan da-dui (production brigade) has a size comparable to the advanced cooperative of 1957.⁹

According to the Wuchang Resolution, after the commune, the power of management was allotted as follows:

⁸ According to Hsia (1964), the Chinese terms started to be standardized since the RMRB's editorial on the 2nd April, 1961.

⁹ A detailed statement can be found in Bai Zhen, "People's Communes in Dissolution", China Weekly, Hong Kong, Vol. 37, No. 10, 5 March, 1962 (quoted by Hsia, 1964 : 82). In this thesis I have followed and continue to follow the standardized terminology in English translation, "production brigade" indicating the second level unit; and "production team" the third level unit, regardless of their Chinese titles.

The administrative district (or production brigade) is generally the unit which manages the industry, agriculture, trade, education and military affairs in a given area and forms an economic accounting unit, with its gains and losses pooled in the commune as a whole. The production team is the basic unit of labor organization. Under the unified leadership of the commune administrative committee, necessary power should be given to the administrative district (or production brigade) and the production team over such matters as the organization of production work and basic construction, finances and welfare, in order to bring their initiative into full play (Chapter 6).

During this period, the unified leadership of the commune administrative committee was emphasized. The requirement was that necessary powers should be given to the production brigade and production team is tantamount to an admission that the production brigade and production team had not enough necessary powers in management over either the organization of production work or other matters.

The crucial role in management played by the leadership at the commune level during this period can be seen in the report of the premier secretary of the CCP of Liaocheng Special District on the Laoguanzhai People's Commune. The following is a selection of relevant paragraphs of the report:

As soon as you arrived in the fields of the Laotuanzhai People's Commune, immediately you felt the high tension of the commune members who were struggling for a bumper autumn harvest. The leading cadres, from the Party secretary of the commune to the cadres of the production teams, all worked together with the members...

In order to overcome the natural calamities of drought and flooding, water conservancy, wells and ditches were planned to be built under the unified planning of the commune...

Under the unified leadership of the commune, a "field army corps" of ten thousand people was organized to conquer nature...

Under the unified leadership of the commune, all the production teams promoted a movement of making fertilizer and accumulating manure...

For the sake of strengthening the management of the field work and ensuring a bumper harvest of wheat, 105 teams (4,426 people) for special management on wheat were organized in the whole commune.

After the communalization, it has become more convenient for the Party committee of the commune to lead the production. The Party Committee of the Municipality (of Linqin) has also been able to lead the production in an immediate and concrete manner. The first secretary of the Party Committee of the Municipality, the comrade Zhang Jing-hu, planted an "experimental plot" in the commune and gave directives on the management of the field work. The director of the rural work bureau of the Municipal Committee, the comrade Xi Guang-shi, permanently stays in the commune to help in a concrete manner the direction and directly participates in labor work and in leading the production. The Party secretary of the commune, the comrade Zhang Zeng-yu, and the director of the commune, the comrade Yan Zhen-ding, are leading the commanders of the production teams and the Party branch secretaries of the whole commune as well as the masses in the management of the wheat field work day and night (RMRB, 19 August, 1959)

In this report, it can be seen that not only did the phrase "under the unified leadership of the commune" appear many times, but the planning of crop planting and the organization of labor force were directly managed by the commune cadres. Not merely the commune cadres, but even their superiors, the cadres of the municipality, came down to give their directives. It is really doubtful that the directives of those cadres who had been more familiar with administrative and ideological affairs than with agronomy, were effective for production or heartily accepted by the peasants. Such a situation certainly brought about negative results as was proved by the decrease in output during the years of 1959-1961. In the later resolutions on commune affairs, "xia zhi-hui" (blindly issuing directives) was prohibited and the management moved downwards.

2. Three level management with emphasis on the production brigade and production team

The moment in 1958 was likely to be immature for realizing such a grandiose enterprise mainly because there were not enough well-trained rural cadres who were capable of

leading such a gigantic and comprehensive organization as I have mentioned in the previous chapter. The shortage of rural cadres, especially the shortage of competent cadres in rural areas, seemed to be the main cause of the deterioration of the rural economy during 1959-1961. Under pressure from their superiors, the rural cadres at each echelon had to do things they did not understand well, were not familiar with and, worst of all, had never experienced in their lives. But they had enough enthusiasm and zeal. Their ignorance and fanatic attitude inevitably resulted in the blind issuance of directives, resulting in enormous disturbances of the normal routine of agricultural production.

The Lushan Resolution in August, 1959 was a turning point in commune movement due to its decision to rely once again upon the leadership of the cooperative movement by downward transferring the powers. Together with the downward transferred ownership, the powers of management were also gradually transferred from the commune level to its two lower level units: production brigade and production team.

It has to be pointed out that in practice the realization of such a transfer must be much later than the time of the issue of the resolution and must also be a very slow process on an unequal scale in the whole country. By virtue of this reasoning, it can be estimated that the transfer was proceeding between August, 1959 and some date later than September, 1962, the month when the "Revised Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes" was issued. Hereafter the allocation of the rights of management will be recounted at three levels: commune, production brigade and production team, basically according to the "Draft of the Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Communes" issued in March 1961, and supplemented by the "Revised Draft" (September, 1962).

a. Commune:

(1) Administration: The Administrative Committee of the Commune (ACC), corresponding to the People's Council of the former township, was under the jurisdiction of the People's Committee of the county (County Government). In the management of civil administration, production and construction, finance and trading, culture, education and sanitation, security, militia and civil suit etc., it exercised the official power of the former Township Council.

(2) Agricultural production: The ACC had the right to give suggestions to the production brigades on the planning of agricultural production according to the general planning of the state and the concrete conditions of each brigade. It could also reasonably readjust the production brigades' plannings with the agreement of these brigades. Any imposition was not allowed. Demanding statistical figures from the brigades and "blindly issuing directives" were prohibited.

The ACC could extend the methods of increasing output which had been proved successful, and could improve the farm implements. But this could only be carried out by establishing models or by giving suggestions. Any imposition upon the production brigades or production teams was not allowed.

The ACC could organize collaboration in production between the production brigades on the grounds of mutual agreement. It was not allowed to transfer and use manpower, means of production and other materials belonging to the production brigades or team without paying.

The ACC had to supply seeds, farm implements, fertilizer and pesticide, and to maintain the large agricultural machines in order to help the production brigades to realize their production planning. In supplying the above items, their quality must be

guaranteed. The production brigades had the right to refuse any farm implement, any fertilizer or pesticide which was not of good quality.

(3) Basic construction and irrigation: According to the needs of production and the possibility of manpower, material conditions and finance, the ACC could be engaged, with the permission of the superior organ and the agreement of the production brigades concerned, in construction of irrigation systems or other basic constructions which were beneficial to the agricultural production in the realm of the commune or for the common interest of several production brigades. However, it was not allowed to do this at the expense of the regular production work or at the expense of the increase of members' income for the year, and not allowed to be engaged in this kind of work excessively.

In being engaged in basic construction, the ACC must set up contracts regulating the rights and duties of each unit concerned and the sharing of labor and investment in accordance with the amount of the possible profit for each unit. The labor of those units which would not gain profit from the basic construction should be reasonably paid for.

(4) Industry: According to the needs and the possibility, the ACC could, by steps, set up industrial enterprises with either the investment of the commune alone, or a joint investment of the commune and production brigades or of several communes.

These enterprises must serve, in the main, the agricultural production, be united with the state planning and utilize the local raw materials in order not to compete with the unified purchase of materials by the state and the resources needed by the state enterprises.

The setting up of industrial enterprises must not hinder the agricultural production, the commune-managed enterprises should first use as much as possible the

non-agricultural manpower in the cities and towns. In case of necessarily using the labor force of the production brigade, it must not exceed 2% of its total amount.

(In the Revised Draft of 1962, the ACC was required not to set up more industrial enterprises in the following years. Those which were already set up but could not meet the conditions of normal production or were not welcomed by the masses should be closed. The enterprises which could keep their normal operation should be subject to the discussion and decision of the commune members' congresses for their management. According to different circumstances, some might be transferred to handicraft cooperatives, some to the production teams, and some others might be converted into family sideline production or individual handicraft. With the agreement of the members' congresses and the permission of the People's Committee of the county, some enterprises could continue to be managed by the commune or else be transferred to the production brigades.)

(5) Handicrafts: The ACC had to promote the development of the production of rural handicrafts.

It was the duty of the ACC to supervise the production brigades and production teams to remunerate skilled handicraft workers on different grounds from the agricultural laborers.

B b. Production brigade (PB):

(1) Scope of management: The PB was an independent unit of management inside the united economic organization of the commune. It controlled uniformly the production of all production teams and recognized in the meantime that each production team had the right to a certain autonomy in the management of production.

(2) Agricultural production: The production planning of the PB should be based on the production teams' planning. (The Revised Draft said that the PB only helped the production teams to establish their own production planing.)

On the other hand, the planning of the PB should take into account the overall economic development (agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and fishery) in accordance with the productive customs and the potential of local conditions.

The PB had to implement seriously the system of san-bao yi-jiang (three contracts and one reward) (this system will be explained in detail in the next section) vis-à-vis the production teams.

The PB had to promote advanced experience and methods of increasing output with the full consent of the production teams and members. Any imposition was not allowed.

(3) Industrial enterprises: In order to develop the multiple businesses to meet the needs of the productive development of the production teams and to increase profits for the society and the members' income, the PB could undertake a fixed number of brigade enterprises.

The PB enterprises must be subject to the principle: "more during the leisure seasons and less or none during the busy farming seasons."

The PB enterprises must not use the labor force more than 3% of the total amount of the production teams' labor force.

(4) Other management: In the Revised Draft a few items were added to the original draft: The PB had to manage the forest owned by it, to supervise the production teams to fulfill the tasks of the state purchase of grain and sideline products, to help the production

teams arrange members' life, to manage civil administration, militia, security, culture and education, sanitation etc., inside the brigade's realm, to process political and ideological works, and to implement the policies, laws and ordinances of the central government.

c. Production team (PT):

(1) Production: The PT had ascertain autonomy in the management of the production. Under the promise of fulfillment of the target in the "three contracts and one reward" system, it had the rights to any crop in accordance with the soil condition, of arranging the agricultural tasks, of making decisions to increase output, of controlling the selected seeds, of adjusting the quota of labor force, of exploiting barren land within the realm of the team provided that water and soil maintenance as well as forestry should not be affected, and of undertaking sideline production in the leisure time.

Before making any decision regarding the above-cited businesses, cadres of the Administrative Committee of the PT had to take full counsel with the members, and must especially listen to the opinion of the experienced peasants.

In the development of the agricultural production, the PT, except for those which were specialized in economic crops, had to take the foodstuff as the principle, to develop actively the production of cotton, oil and other economic crops, It was also required to comprehensively utilize the labor force, and to fully utilize the natural resources in the development of animal husbandry, forestry, fishery and other sideline production.

The PT had to protect and to proliferate draught animals and other domestic animals. The mothers and young animals should be given special care.

(2) Labor organization: In order to organize the production work, the PT had to implement the xiao-duan bao-gong (short-term plan for field-work arrangements) and to establish a serious system of responsibility for field-management. (These will be more fully explained in the next section.)

The PT had to organize all the people who were capable of doing manual work to attend labor work. The high schools and agricultural middle schools managed by the commune should be changed into part-time schools in order that the students might participate in labor work.

The PT must implement a stringent system of ping-gong ji-fen (assessment of work and reckoning of work-points). (This will be explained in the next chapter.)

(3) Welfare: The PT had to supply or to help the members who are old, weak, orphaned, widowed and disabled, the families with many people but few laborers, and those who suffered from accidents and had difficulty in making a living.

If the condition permitted, the PT had to manage the mess hall (this will be discussed in the next chapter).

(4) Non-agricultural enterprises: In the Draft of 1961, the non-agricultural enterprises were attributed to the management of the production brigade. But the Revised Draft of 1962 wanted most of those non-agricultural enterprises to be transferred to the production teams.

The PT was required to develop the production of sideline products which had already existed in the rural areas (mill, vermicelli workshop, oil workshop, beancurd workshop, etc.), handicrafts (farm implements, kiln, paper, knitting, etc.), animal raising (draught animal, poultry, apiculture, etc.), transport, gathering, hunting and

the like according to the local needs and conditions.

The other enterprises managed by the PB, if they were more suitable to be managed by the PT and did not hinder the agricultural production, ought to be transferred to the PT's ownership and management.

3. Summary

According to the description above, it can be said that between 1959 and 1962, the rights and powers of management were gradually transferred downward from the highest level to the lowest level in the commune. The former structure of the cooperatives which were presented in the form of production brigades was again coming into effect. This apparent regression can also be interpreted as a full utilization of the pre-existing organizational structure. In the final analysis, there were three reasons which made downward transfer necessary. First, from the point of view of leadership, the cadres at the ACC were mainly former administrative cadres of the townships. They had more experience in administration, ideological education, than in management of both agricultural and non-agricultural productions. If they were given the power of directing the production, it was inevitable that they had to grope their way as best they could. The downward transfer of management means that the Chinese authorities quickly perceived this deficiency and created a remedy by returning the power of management to the former leaders of cooperatives and the people such as experienced peasants and skillful handicraft workers who were capable of directing production. An editorial of RMRB explained it in a very concrete manner:

An important guarantee for agricultural production to satisfy the requirements of timeliness is to develop fully the independent, masterful and responsible spirit of the production brigade, and especially of the production team. The cadres of the brigade know better than the cadres of the commune about the

meteorological, geographical, and other actual conditions of the locality, but the cadres of the team know even better than the cadres of the brigade. Therefore, the timetable for sowing, transplanting of the seedlings, harvesting and other farming activities should be decided upon by the team. The leading organizations in the county and the commune had better not make unified and rigid arrangements from the above; they should certainly not make demands for uniformity (RMRB, 24 March, 1961).

Secondly, from the point of view of the labor force, it would produce a keen competition for laborers between the ACC and its lower units, if most of the non-agricultural enterprises were managed by the commune. This situation which was actually produced during 1958-1959, had a severe effect on the agricultural production.

Thirdly, from the financial point of view, the resource of the investments of the commune was the reserve funds which were contributed by the lower units. The enlargement of communal investments was meant to weight the contribution of the lower units, which was detrimental to the increase of peasants' income. If the decision of investment was in the hands of PB or PT, the peasants could more easily control the balance between the amount of investment and the increase of household and individual income.

Owing to these reasons, the downward transfer of management became a necessity in the current of the development of rural economy.

B. Methods of Management

The following methods of management were used in the communes of Shandong Province. But some of them had different terms and different arrangements in practice according to local conditions. For instance, the "six fixed" system employed by the Wangyuan Brigade was a variation of the "four fixed" system adopted on a nationwide

scale. The xiao-duan bao-gong also had different local variations.

1. San-hua (three -izations) and si-hua (four -izations)

In its early phase, the commune so strongly emphasized the efficiency of management in production that a military system was introduced known as san-hua: zu-zhi jun-shi-hua (organization militarized), sheng-chan zhan-dou-hua or xing-dong zhan-dou-hua (production martialized or action martialized) and sheng-huo ji-ti-hua (life collectivised) (Cf. Hsia, 1961). At the end of August and in the month of September, 1958, many newly established communes in Shandong, as elsewhere in the country, organized their members in ye-zhan bing-tuan (field army corps). For instance, the Shulan Township (belonged to Yantai Municipality) transformed its seven agricultural cooperatives and two fishery cooperatives into nine regiments in the attempt to set up a commune. The nine regiments were subdivided into 21 battalions which were, in turn, subdivided into 51 companies (YTRB, 14 August, 1958).

With the establishment of the commune, a more rapid development of agricultural production was expected. When the modern machinery was insufficient, efficiency in organization of labor force was seen as an easy solution to meet the requirements brought about by the new situation. Militarized organization was an idea close to hand of the rural cadres to elevate the efficiency in controlling the labor force, because of their rich military experience. The passage of the following report about the Weixing People's Commune is a clear explanation of why and how the san-hua was introduced.

"Militarized action" was started by the two "specialized task teams for paddy rice" under the First Brigade. It was only in this year that these two teams began to shift to the cultivation of paddy rice. Because they were not yet familiar with the work involved and because also the work was a huge one, fixed labor force was required together with strict organization and discipline

and tension in life. But it so happened that a part of the labor was then regularly either absent from work or late for work. What should be done then? The answer was found in militarization. The organizational structure of battalions, companies, platoons, and squads was established, and certain regulations and discipline requirements were instituted. The obvious effects of this reform were: fast action, tension in life, strict enforcement of discipline, and great increase in the efficiency of production. The whole commune became infected with the success: "militarized action" developed into a movement participated in by all the people. All the members of the commune capable of participation in production must practice "militarized action" and observe strict discipline (RMRB, 7 October, 1958).

Besides being more efficient in organization of labor force, the san-hua also implied an overall mobilization of villagers, especially the usually underemployed manpower such as women and children. A report of Shitun People's Commune, Fei County, said:

In order to resolve the shortage of labor, a method of lao-li pai-dui (utilization of labor force according to the order of emergency) was adopted. According to actual circumstances it was decided that 25% of the labor force be used for enforcing the management of the crops of late autumn and 75% for cultivation and transporting manure and fertilizer. After the implementation of organization militarized, production martialized and life collectivized, not only was the laboring efficiency greatly raised, but 440 women were able to attend as field labor. Besides, the 620 children in nine elementary schools of the commune will be mobilized to transport manure and other field works during their leisure time (DZRB, 19 September, 1958).

The excessive militarized actions resulted in two negative consequences: militarized actions which did not take much into account the normal balance between work time and rest time made the peasants exhausted. On the other hand, if the target of the actions had not been correctly chosen, as in the example of brickbed breaking that I have cited in Chapter three, then the more efficient the actions, the more the consequences would be pernicious. The Wuchang Resolution attempted to remedy the negative consequences of san-hua by introducing another "-ization", namely,

guan-li min-zhu-hua (management democratized). The san-hua thus became si-hua (four -izations).

Although the "management democratized" brought about a certain relaxation in military discipline imposed upon the commune members, the si-hua method was soon to be found inadequate in the management of labor. In Shandong, the militarized action became a target of criticism:

"Action by large army corps" has its advantages when certain production tasks are to be completed under certain conditions. But to substitute "action by large army corps" for ordinary production activities undertaken by the sheng-chan dui, or to abolish "contract for work at different levels" and the system of responsibilities will bring only confusion to the management of labor and will be harmful to production (RMRB, 27 December, 1958).

Therefore, another method, sheng-chan ze-ren zhi, was put forward.

2. Sheng-chan ze-ren zhi (system of responsibility for production)

At the end of 1958, under the rectification campaign, the Party Committee and the People's Committee of Shandong Province suggested some general rules about the management of production in the communes according to the experience concluded in different communes in the province (ibid.). Instead of "organization militarized, production martialized and life collectivized", the focus was shifted to "management of production democratized, production and life responsibilized and order of labor normalized" (ibid.).

This new san-hua in Shandong was clearly an antithesis of the old san-hua. Under the system of responsibility for production, the new policy called for management at three levels. During the following years, the system of responsibility for production was carried out in Shandong in varied forms. The following will be examples of its

variations.

3. San-bao yi-jiang (three contracts and one reward)

This was a system of management for production which determined the relationship between the production brigade (basic accounting unit before 1962) and the production team (unit of responsibility for target of production).¹⁰ San-bao means bao-chan (contract for production), bao-gong (contract for labor) and bao-cai-wu (contract for financing).¹¹ Yi-jiang means reward for overfulfillment of the target of production. The contracts were established in detail involving almost all the farming works, the assignment of manpower and budget of a production team during a year. The following is an example drawn from Dabu People's Commune, Shouzhong County:

(1) Bao-chan (contract of production): Targets for various crops. amount of yield to be pre-determined by the amount of production in the previous year and actual conditions for production in the current year.

(2) Bao-gong (contract for labor): The computation of work-points required in raising the crops, in maintenance of draught animals, collection of manure, service in mess halls and nurseries, etc. The team under contract was also to calculate and pay for labor employed in such minor construction works as the building of pigsties, and cattle stalls. Labor employed in basic construction was directly paid for by the brigade.

(3) Bao-cai-wu (contract for financing): All the expenditure of the team was predetermined in the contract, as either "basic expenses", such as the purchase of seeds, chemicals, fertilizers, etc., or "incidental expenses" such as were incurred in the repair of tools, fodder and veterinary care for the animals and business expenditure of the team staff. The total sum was paid by the brigade as its "investment" in production. The team is responsible for any deficit, but it could keep the unspent part of the sum (RMRB, 20 February, 1960).

¹⁰ During the cooperative movement, a san-bao zhi-du (three-contracted system) was already implemented between the production team and the advanced cooperative. Reward for overfulfillment of the target was also mentioned (RMRB, 16 September, 1957).

¹¹ In other instances, bao-cai-wu (contract for financing) was also known as bao-cheng-ben (contract for cost).

4. Si gu-ding (four fixed) and liu ding (six fixed)

Following the system of "three contracts and one reward", an old system "four fixed" which was used since 1955 in the cooperatives was revived. "Four fixed" means that the labor force, farming land, draught animals and farm implements were fixed by the production brigade for use by the production team (GRRB, 20 December, 1960). Each team had its fixed amount in the four items that the brigade could not use or transfer to other teams without the full agreement of the team concerned.

Parallel with the "four fixed", a system of liu-ding dao-dui (six fixed to the production brigade or production team) was developed since the end of 1958 in some localities. This system involved both the relationship of production between the commune and the brigade (RMRB, 27 December, 1958), and that between the brigade and the team (RMRB, 10 February, 1960). The "four fixed" system and the "six fixed" system can be seen as a prerequisite for the implementation of the san-bao system. The Wangyuan Production Brigade of the Dabu People's Commune provides us with an example of "six fixed" between the brigade and its teams.

According to the changes of conditions in farming land, labor force, draught animals and farm implements between production teams during the last year, the production brigade has appropriately arranged all concrete problems of the production teams before the implementation of san-bao through the "six fixed" system.

(1) The scale of the production teams has been fixed: The scales of the present 13 teams were convenient to leadership and implementation of the contracts of labor and production. They did not need to be changed. As for the labor force, apart from those which work for the industrial enterprises managed by the commune and the brigade, the rest of 628 laborers were all at the disposition of the production teams.

(2) Farming land has been fixed: A special organization has been formed for the purpose of appropriately adjusting the farming land. The principles are: first, no change is involved in the bulk of land owned by the production teams. Second, the land of each production team is to be arranged, if possible, into a square to facilitate cultivation. Third, the distance from the land to the residential area of the team, quality of soil and kind of crops have been taken into consideration in adjusting land. Fourth, the interlocked land between teams has been eliminated. Areas of cultivation have accordingly been demarcated and then fixed to each production team.

(3) Draught animals and farm implements have been fixed: According to the 1960 planning of development of draught animals of the brigade and the principle of assigning each draught animal to the same size of cultivated area, no change has occurred to the draught animals that had already been fixed to the teams. The problem of shortage of draught animals in some teams were appropriately solved according to their different conditions. No adjustment has occurred to the farm implements that had already been distributed. Small farm implements have been supplied by the members.

(4) Planting of crops has been fixed: The areas of wheat, cotton and oilcrops were fixed to each production team according to the tasks assigned by the commune and the state in association with the actual conditions of each team. Yin-di zhi-yi (to do what is suitable to the conditions of the land) was taken into account. The poorer teams have been allowed to plant more economic crops in order to increase their incomes.

(5) Planning of cultivation has been fixed: Different plannings have been worked out according to the different targets of gao-e feng-chan tian (high bumper fields), feng-chan tian (bumper fields) and normal fields in the 1960 planning of production. The planning has been checked and adopted by the congress of the representatives of members.

(6) Distribution has been fixed (ibid.).

The example cited gives evidence that the "four fixed" system and "six fixed" system were necessary measures for ensuring the success of the "three contracts and one reward" system.

The methods which have been recounted above were involved in the relationship of production between the brigade and the team. The following one was that which was utilized within the team for labor and production arrangements.

5. Xiao-duan bao-gong (short-term plan for field-work arrangements)

This method which concerned the organization of labor inside the production team had also been used in the cooperatives.¹² In practice, it could be applied in a variety of forms. For instance, during the spring planting and summer harvest, the communes of Licheng County adopted ten items to solve the shortage of labor force. Among these, one concerned the production teams' internal labor organization. A method of zu bao pian (contract for the work of a fixed area by a working group) and hu bao kuai (contract for the work of a fixed piece of land by a household) was suggested for adoption (GRRB, 23 May, 1959). In this system the responsibility usually fell on a working group, or on a household.

Xiao-duan bao-gong was the principal method used for labor organization in the agricultural production inside a production team. In some instances, the alternative to this was lin-shi pai-gong (temporarily distributed tasks) which was used in the second production team, Caopo Brigade, Zhuyou People's Commune, Ye County (ZGQNB, 27 December 1962). Both xiao-duan bao-gong and lin-shi pai-gong in this team were based on a system of ding-e guan-li (management according to a fixed quota) and an-jian an-zhi ji-gong (work-points according to the quantity and quality of the accomplished work). With this method, the responsibility fell on each individual.

The abovementioned methods were used for the agricultural production. As for the non-agricultural productions such as industry, forestry, husbandry, fishery and side-line production, the most common method in management was to form zhuan-ye dui.

¹² It was first adopted in 1954. See Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside (1957): 48).

6. Zhuan-yè dui (specialized task brigades or teams)

The experience of Dayu Brigade, Xinzhai People's Commune, Linju County may show the necessity of forming "specialized task teams."

At the beginning, few of the planted young trees could grow up, and the collectively raised hogs and sheep multiplied very slowly. A poor peasant by the name of Lu Shi-da who had some experience in forestation went to the Party branch secretary, Zhao Yong-tai, and said: "Yong-tai, we have planted trees. But no trees have grown up. Labor was wasted for nothing. Nor have hogs and sheep multiplied as quickly as we had expected. Why? We have to find the reason." Zhao Yong-tai had Lu Shi-da's opinion discussed at the meeting of the Administrative Committee. After having studied the problem, a decision of forming specialized task teams of forestry and animal husbandry was made (Peking DGB, 28 July, 1954).

This shows that a limited specialization started to germinate in the communes.

How far it could go remains to be seen.

The method of forming specialized task teams was especially prevalent for sideline production. In Qixia County, during the years of 1964-1965, the sideline production became the focus of attention. It was reported that all the production brigades and teams in this county had formed "specialized task teams" for sideline production (Peking DGB, 4 August, 1965).

Besides the "specialized task teams" for non-agricultural production, this kind of team was also used in agricultural production when a special task was involved. For instance, the Laoguanzhai People's Commune, Linqing Municipality, had formed 105 specialized teams for management of wheat (RMRB, 19 August, 1969).

C. Summary

Between 1959 and 1962 the powers of management inside the commune saw a significant downward transfer. This downward transfer implies two important meanings. First, both the infrastructure and the leadership of the period of the cooperative movement were thus liberated from the arbitrary pressures exerted by the inexperienced commune cadres at the first phase of the commune movement and regained their effectiveness in the rural economic development. Secondly, the downward transfer of power of management put the emphasis on people, not things. In the Wuchang Resolution, a note in this sense was injected:

It must care for the people and correct the tendency to see only things and not human beings (RMRB, 19 December, 1958).

When the san-hua or si-hua was prevalent during the early phase of the commune movement, people were organized as effectively as possible for the purpose of fulfilling planned targets. People's needs and willingness were taken little into consideration. In such a condition man became almost only a means of achieving some pre-planned goals. The change in this dehumanized tendency began with the downward transfer of power. More power of management in the hands of the production team and in the hands of individuals through the method of xiao-duan bao-gong meant more responsibility for each member and more participation on the part of each member. Therefore, the downward transfer of management was able to correct the deviation and thus to lend a hand to the stability and consolidation of the commune system.

Chapter Seven

STRUCTURE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE (III) : ACCOUNTING AND DISTRIBUTION

This chapter will be devoted to a discussion of accounting and distribution.

Although the accounting system is closely linked with the ownership and management, the former's operation is connected still more directly with the distribution. The shifting of the accounting unit could, for example, immediately affect the peasants' actual income in a current year. That is why the accounting system will be treated together with the distribution in the same chapter. However, analytically, they are still seen as separate entities.

I. ACCOUNTING

A. Basic Unit of Accounting:

Just like ownership and management, the basic unit of accounting also experienced a downward transfer through different stages. Roughly, three stages can be recognized:

1. The production brigade was taken as the basic unit of accounting, but the responsibility for gains and losses rested with the commune.

This system, which was proposed by the Weixing People's Commune and was confirmed by the Wuchang Resolution, lasted from approximately April, 1958 to May, 1961. In this system, although each brigade did its own accounting, it had to put the surplus into the common pool of the commune if its output for the year had been above the average. In compensation, if the brigade had a bad year, it could also share the profit of other

brigades whose results of production were better. This system functioned in favor of the low output brigades. It could do little effectively in raising the level of productivity of those low output brigades, but had a negative influence on higher output ones. This constituted what later on was criticized, in the "Twelve Articles", for yi ping er tiao (one uniformity, i.e., equalitarianism and two transfers, i.e., transfer of manpower and material) (Article 2).

2. The production brigade was not only taken as the basic unit of accounting, but took the responsibility for gains and losses from the commune.
the responsibility

The shortcomings of the accounting system during the first phase were especially perceptible during the three difficult years of 1959-1961. In an article about the problems of revenue and distribution published in May, 1960, the writer recognized that "inside the commune, the economic levels of the production brigades were different" and that "there were poor brigades and rich brigades" (Zhu Jing-zhi, 1960 : 38). Although he did not yet directly attack the accounting system, he pointed out that "distribution could influence production; fair distribution would promote the development of production force and consolidate and enhance the relationship of production, whereas unfair distribution would certainly hamper and jeopardize the production" (ibid.). A few months later, the yi ping er tiao (one conformity and two transfers) was officially opposed in the "Twelve Articles" in November of the same year. However, the brigade was not officially recognized as an entirely independent unit in accounting before March, 1961 when the "Draft of Regulations for the Operation of the Rural People's Commune" was issued. We can consider the period between March, 1961 and September, 1962 (when the "Revised Draft" was issued) as a second phase where each production brigade did its account and distribution by itself according to the results of harvests for the year and

no longer shared its fortunes whether good or bad with other brigades.

3. The production team was taken as the basic unit of accounting and had the responsibility for gains and losses.

The Revised Draft of September, 1962 made another step forward by transferring the operation of accounting and the responsibility for gains and losses to the production team. The rationale was the same as for the former phase: it was recognized that different economic levels existed not only among the brigades, but also among the teams within one brigade. It was also recognized that equalitarianism among the teams could jeopardize the ji-ji-xing (initiative) of the teams that worked hard and had better output, but could hardly stimulate those that did not work hard and had low output. With this change of accounting, each team was responsible for its own lot. The manners of leadership, efficiency of labor organization, carefulness in planning and methods of management etc., would be tested by the final income received by each member inside the team. Certainly, this system gave the members a keen concern with the functioning of productive affairs inside the team and made them willing to look closely at what was going on.

However, in some communes the brigade still remained as the basic unit of accounting. The members of each brigade could decide which system would better fit their case. It happened that in some communes, one brigade remained as the unit of accounting while for the rest of the commune, it was the team that assumed this task. This was often the case of the brigades where the level of production was high (e.g., those in the suburbs of big cities) and therefore no important differences existed between production teams (cf. Bethelheim et al., 1965 : 74).

B. How Was Accounting Done?

1. How was the accounting system practically set up in the People's Commune?

I have pointed out in the previous chapters that the shortage of leading cadres during the commune movement was serious. Among the leading cadres, competent accountants were especially lacking. The shortage of accountants had already been a problem during the cooperative movement. When the people's commune was established, accounting became far more complicated because of the larger size, on the one hand, and multiple management on the other. The former accountants of the cooperatives found it difficult to face this new situation. Two measures of urgency were adopted. First, short-term training classes were organized at the county level. Second, "experimental points" (shi-dian) were chosen at different levels inside a commune. The second measure was especially important in getting practical experience to match the particular situation of each commune and of each brigade inside a commune. The Lao Zhaozhuang People's Commune provides us with a concrete example.

In February, 1959, the Party secretary of the commune organized the accountants of all the units concerned, to experiment point by point with the different accounting situations in the different units: brigades and enterprises managed by the commune or the brigades. According to the characteristics of each unit, a preliminary blueprint of 8-10 items was worked out by each unit. A system of accounting was finally established through comparing and studying those preliminary blueprints. It was this final system which took all particularities in all different units into consideration, that was adopted as a general system in the commune with, nevertheless, the possibility of variations according to the particular situation of each unit (Lao Zhaozhuang Ren-min Gong-she, Cai-Mao Bu, 1959).

2. The accounting scheme

The total amount of production or its corresponding value during a fixed period (e.g., one year) of a commune is its gross revenues. After the deduction of expenditures of production from the gross revenues, the rest is the value created by the labor of the members during the year. This created value will be divided into two parts in the course of the distribution process: one goes to the society and another one to the members. In general (except for the first years of 1958-1959), the expenditures of production plus the part going to the society take 40% of the gross revenues and the remaining 60% will form the members' income (Zhu Jing-zhi, 1960 : 37).

The part distributed to the society is again divided into two parts: one goes to the ownership by the whole people under the form of the state tax and another part to the collectivity inside the commune under the form of the public funds. There are two kinds of public funds in the commune: the reserve funds (gong-ji jin) and the welfare funds (gong-yi jin). During the years of 1958-1960, a major part of the public funds was kept by the commune. After 1961, following the downward transfer of the ownership, management and the basic accounting unit, the public funds were mainly kept by the brigade or team. If the basic accounting unit was the brigade, the public funds would be kept by the brigade. They could correspond to 5% of the distributed revenues controlled by the brigade (cf. Chapter 4, Article 24 of the "Draft Regulations"). If the basic accounting unit was the team, the public funds would be kept by the team. In this case, the commune and the brigade were required not to take any portion of the public funds from the team during the following years from 1962 onward (Chapter 2, Article 16 of the "Revised Draft"). The main components of the accounting scheme

are described as follows:

a. The state tax:

The state tax is paid in grain produced by the brigade or team. After the establishment of the people's commune, an estimation of an average revenue for a "normal year" was made for a duration of five years.¹ The state tax was calculated at a rate of 15.5% of the estimated revenue. As this fictive revenue was inferior to the real, the rate of tax had never reached 15.5% of the real revenue. After the years of difficulty of 1959-1961, agricultural production tended to increase while the state tax remained on the same basis. So, it resulted in a decrease of the tax rate. According to a group of French social scientists, the average tax paid by the communes in the provinces of Hobei, Honan, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui and the municipalities of Peking and Shanghai which they visited during 1960-1964, varied between 6% and 10% of the grain output (Bettelheim et al., 1965 : 88). That is to say, the rate was still lower if the tax was to be calculated on the basis of the gross revenue.

b. The reserve funds (gong-ji jin):

Between 1958 and 1961, on the basis of three-level ownership, the reserve funds were also disposed at three levels. During this period, the reserve funds at the commune level were especially important, because the commune could take a portion of the reserve funds from the brigades. For instance, in 1959 in Honan Province, the reserve funds taken by the commune from the brigades were as high as 50% of the reserve funds of the latter (Zhu Jing-zhi, 1960 : 40). However, the sources of the reserve funds at the commune level were not limited to the latter's taking from the reserve funds

¹ So far as I know, according to the available data, it did not change in 1963, at the end of the five-year period.

of the brigades. The commune could also draw a part of its reserve funds from the gain of the enterprises under its own control, and from the state, in case of difficulty. The reserve funds at the commune level were used mainly for the larger scale construction of irrigation systems, the improvement of farm implements and the development of industry and multiple enterprises.

The sources of the reserve funds at the brigade level came from its production: mainly agricultural production. Apart from the portion taken by the commune, the rest was used for middle and small scale basic construction, the improvement of farm implements and techniques and the purchase of medium and small farm implements and of draught animals.

The sources of the reserve fund at the team level came from its agricultural production or the reward of the san-bao yi-jiang system, and the revenue from the sideline production. The reserve funds at this level were used for contributing to the reserve funds of the brigade and for developing its own sideline production.

After 1961, and especially after 1962, in order to correct the bias of taking too much under the name of reserve funds and leaving too little to the peasants, a policy of shao-kou dou-fen (to reserve little and to distribute more) was implemented (Chapter 4, Article 23 of the "Draft of the Regulations"). The reserve funds at the team level were required to be discussed by the members' congress for its usage and to be limited to between 3%-5% of the gross revenues of the team. And these funds would not be allowed to be taken either by the brigade or by the commune ("Revised Draft"). The teams specializing in economic crops or in forestry, or in the suburbs of the big cities, which usually had a higher level of revenues, might reserve more. Those which suffered from natural calamities could reserve little or none (Chapter 4, Article 35 of the

"Revised Draft").

c. The welfare funds (gong-yi jin):

Like the reserve funds, the welfare funds were also disposed of at three levels up to 1961. Afterwards they were kept mainly at the team level. The difference from the reserve funds is their usage. At the commune level, the welfare funds were used for helping the production of the poor brigades, carrying out social insurance, engaging in basic construction of welfare organizations and supporting the current expenditures of the welfare enterprises. At the brigade and team levels, they were used only for welfare enterprises. At the team level, they were used especially for supporting the wu-bao hu (households of five guarantees):

Since 1962, the amount of the welfare funds of the team was required not to exceed 2-3% of its gross revenues (Chapter 4, Article 36 of the "Revised Draft").

d. Peasants' income:

This constitutes the most important and the most complicated part of the accounting system which I will discuss separately in the next section under the title of entry: "distribution".

e. The sale of grains to the state:

Each year, each team (or brigade) had to reserve a part of its agricultural production for selling to the state. This sale was obligatory. The quota of sale might be the object of discussion at every level of the commune, but could not be less than the minimum required by the services of the state planning. The sale represented, on the average, 20% of the agricultural production (Bettelheim et al, 1965 : 87). The money from this sale constituted the bulk of the peasants' cash income. As a rule, in a year of good harvest, the state would not require any increase in the quantity of the

sale; in the year of bad harvest, the state could reduce the fixed quota after investigating the causes and the actual situation (ibid.).

The above-cited entries constitute the bulk of the accounting scheme. The actual calculation will be shown in the following example.

C. An Example of Accounting

The following example is extracted from a report of the investigation on the situation of production, distribution and marketing of the Taiqian People's Commune, Shouzhong County by a work group of the Statistics Bureau of Shandong Province (Shandong Ji-wei Gong-zuo-zu, 1958). This example which makes the part distributed to the peasants as low as 25% of the gross revenues represents a model biased, however, by the "equalitarianism" and the "wind of communism" at the beginning of the commune movement.

The Taiqian People's Commune was called at the time a branch commune (fen gong-she) as a sub-unit of the Federation of the Communes in Shouzhong County. It had 14,133 households and a population of 62,890. The harvest of 1958 was exceptionally good. The calculation of distribution of 1958 is as follows:

Table 7.1
Distribution in Taiqian People's Commune in 1958

	Actual values	Percentage
A. Gross revenues (unit : 10,000 yuan) (unit : 10,000 yuan)	3473.5	100
1. expenditures of production	1010.0	29.09
2. administration	17.4	0.50
3. welfare funds	173.4	5.00
4. funds of culture and education	347.4	10.00
5. distribution to peasants	868.4	25.00
6. reserve funds	1056.9	30.41
B. Average income of members (unit : yuan)	138.1	

- Notes: 1. No state tax appears in the report for 1958, but it was 0.96% of the gross revenues in a pre-established scheme for 1959.
2. In general, there were no special funds for culture and education. This accounting scheme was only representative at the beginning of the commune movement, but not typical after 1962.

The explanation in the report for the low percentage of the peasants' share was that (1) with this percentage, the peasants' actual income had already reached 138.1 yuan (double the 1956 figure); (2) too rapid an increase of the standard of living would hamper the improvement of production; and (3) peasants' income should not much exceed the average income of the workers which was only 133.28 yuan in Shouzhong County in 1958. This kind of consideration was a general tendency in 1958-1959. The questions raised by such a scheme of distribution were serious. (1) This scheme being established on the grounds of an exceptionally good year, if the peasants' income had not been proportionally large enough, it would not be able to balance the bad years in the future (while the workers' income would not be affected by the weather).

(2) The reserve funds taken by the commune was as high as 30.41% of the gross revenue. These funds had no guarantee of being used effectively in the hands of the cadres at the commune level. (3) The average income distributed by the commune covered the actual disparity of the output between the rich brigades and the poor ones. For instance, if the distribution had been calculated on the grounds of the actual output of each brigade, the average income of Taiqian Brigade would have been 265.8 yuan while that of Bailing Brigade was only 52.81 yuan.

The decision makers learned a lesson from the difficulty in agricultural production of 1959-1961 and quickly came to correct the bias of the "wind of communism" and "equalitarianism" by transferring downward the basic accounting unit to the teams and by fixing the peasants' share at not less than 60% of the gross revenues and the public funds at not more than 5% from 1961 onward.

II DISTRIBUTION

A. Policies

The policies of distribution can be roughly divided into two phases.

I. First phase

At the establishment of the commune system, the decision-makers had the extraordinary ambition to achieve a dream that the poor peasants had dreamed of for millennia: to eliminate the constant worry of the "belly problem" (du-zi wen-ti). It was therefore demanded that distribution be based on a system of "combination of wage and supply" (gong-zi gong-ji jie-he-zhi) (cf. "Wuchang Resolution", Chapter 4) which was boasted of as a genuine invention, concomitant with the commune system. Under this, the

members of the commune would receive a free supply of a basic ration of grain and a wage based on their actual labor. The Wuchang Resolution described the situation as follows:

As the result of the bumper crops many communes have instituted a system of distribution that combines the wage system with the free supply system; the mass of peasants, both men and women, have begun to receive their wages and those families which in the past constantly worried about their daily meals and about their firewood, rice, oil, salt, soya sauce, vinegar, and vegetables are now able to "eat without paying". In other words, they have the most important and the most reliable kind of social insurance. For the peasants, all this is epoch-making news. The living standards of the peasants have been improved and they know from practical experience and the prospects of the development of the communes that they will live much better in the future (ibid., Chapter 1, Wen-hui Bao, 1959 : 10-11).

The proportion of the wage in relation to the free supply of grain was flexible and could be fixed by each commune according to its own situation of production. However, the proportion should not be made at the expense of those households that had fewer mouths to feed but had a strong labor force (ibid., Chapter 4).

The wage part was expected to be increased year by year. It was allowed that this could be divided into 6 or 8 degrees according to the skill, experience and energy of each individual laborer. The highest wage could be four times the lowest, or even more (ibid.).

The free supply part of grain was achieved by the spreading of mess halls. The first commune, the Weixing People's Commune in Honan, was probably the first to put this system into practice. Although the mess halls were not a novelty in 1958, the mess halls with free food did not exist before the establishment of the commune system. The system of free supply of grain functioned in the Weixing People's Commune as follows:

The commune has the centralized control of food which it distributes among the production teams according to the size of population, the ration quota specified by the state, and the conditions of the increase in food production in the commune. The production team distributes to its members "food certificates", each equivalent to a certain amount of food for each member. The members eat in the commune mess hall, where food is supplied free of charge upon the presentation of the certificate. However, the members have still to pay for such items as cooking oil, salt etc. (RMRB, 18 August, 1958).

In Shandong Province, the generalization of mess halls was quickly completed in only a few months after the Weixing People's Commune. In September, 1958, in the Special Districts of Linyi and Liaocheng, 90.1% of the peasant households joined the mess halls. The largest mess halls could serve 300-400 people and the smallest served no less than 100-200 (DZRM, 28 September, 1958). A commune like the Dongjiao People's Commune which had 15 teams and 19,000 households created 256 mess halls (RMRB, 14 January, 1959), one team having on the average 17 mess halls. Another one, the Wangliu People's Commune, with a population of 25,000, had 120 mess halls (ZGQNB, 12 September, 1959).

The system of free supply of grain under the slogan of "eating without paying" (chi-fan bu-yao qian) turned into a gold mine, greatly helping not only the setting-up of the mess halls, but also that of the people's communes. As T.A. Hsia stated,

There was an old woman in Pao-shan near Shanghai, who had insisted on "doing-it-alone" [dan-gan] all through the years of the mutual-aid team, the elementary cooperative, and the advanced cooperative. But she applied for membership to the commune when she heard about "eating without paying" (1964 : 11).

No sooner had the mess halls been established than a variety of problems arose. Just as in the case of managing a commune, there were not enough competent personnel who had had experience in managing mess halls of several hundred people. The then director of Rural Works Department, Deng Zi-hui, had criticized the mess halls in the

people's communes for (1) one mess hall served so large an area that the peasants had to cross mountains and rivers for one meal; (2) there were so many people eating in the same mess hall that they must line up and wait for an extremely long time before getting served; (3) the quality of food was too bad and the waste was serious (Fei-qing Nian-bao, 1967: 1029).

Besides these reasons, there were still three major causes that made the peasants feel unhappy with the mess halls: (1) Since everybody had to eat in the mess hall, the ration of grain of each member would be delivered directly to the mess hall. A peasant without grain at home is not a peasant. It was difficult for them to become accustomed to such a situation. (2) The existence of the mess halls for everybody attacked the *raison d'être* of the private plots on which vegetables had usually been cultivated for family consumption. The loss of those private plots profoundly perturbed the peasants. (3) Preparing some special dishes from time to time was traditionally one of the limited pleasures and liberties enjoyed by a peasant household, especially the households with children (a peasant household without children was rare). Now, with the obligation of eating every day in a mess hall this enjoyment was ended. That is why it was not long before the enthusiasm of the peasants for "eating without paying" was submerged in a generalized complaint about and dissatisfaction with, the mess halls. In the middle of 1959, the policy with respect to the mess hall shifted to voluntary from a compulsory matter for the peasants.²

In the meantime, the free supply of grain saw the difficulty of maintaining itself in many a place, especially during the three-years-of failure in agricultural

² ibid. It was reported that at the end of 1958, the number of mess halls reached 2,650,000 in China (Hong Kong DGB, 1 January, 1959).

production. This system discouraged the peasants who were energetic and worked hard. Because the part of wage was at the time not very significant, the peasants who worked hard would think that they did not earn much more than those who worked less and would ask why they should do so for so little difference in income. The pressures coming from below made the policy change. The principle of "to each according to his work" began to be more and more underlined.

2. Second phase

The free supply of grain was viewed for a time as a cherished sprout of communism. In spite of the difficulty in practice, the idea was hard to abandon for the people who considered themselves as true communists. That is why there is no clear date of a division between the first phase where the policy of semi-wage and semi-supply was emphasized, and the second phase where the policy of "to each according to his work" was prevalent.

The change of policy was a gradual process. Following the indetermination of the proportion of wage and free supply, a policy of "taking wage as principal" (gong-zi wei-zhu) was first implemented. In the "Twelve Articles" of November, 1960, it was noted that

persist in the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work, the more work performed the bigger the reward"; the portion supplied and portion paid in wages should be 30% and 70% respectively (Article 7).

In the years 1961-1962, the "equalitarianism" was called a mistake. In many places grain was also distributed according to the work accomplished by each member. Rather, the free supply part became symbolic. This practice was officially allowed by the "Draft of the Regulations" of 1961 (Chapter 5, Article 33). From 1962 onwards, the system of free supply almost disappeared everywhere. The "Revised Draft" of 1962

proposed three solutions in regard to the distribution of grain: (1) Grain can be distributed, half according to the basic ration, and half according to work. (2) Grain can be distributed according to work. Those who have difficulty will be helped by welfare funds. (3) Any other solution adopted by the members' congress (Chapter 4, Article 34).

In fact, since 1962, it was the second solution proposed by the Revised Draft which had become prevalent. As both wages and grain were distributed according to the work accomplished, the system of measuring the accomplished work, namely, the work-point system, thus acquired its paramount importance.

B. Work-Point System

The ping-gong ji-fen (assessment of work and reckoning of work points) or simply the "work-point" system is not a creation of the communes, but a heritage of the cooperatives.³ During the years of the cooperative movement, two systems had been elaborated: "basic point" system and "norms of work" system. During the commune movement a third system was worked out in the famous Dazhai Brigade. Generally speaking, there was no unification of the work-point system. Every commune, brigade or team could democratically establish its own system. However, since the general structure of the commune system was more or less the same, the methods adopted in the different places were either a variation of one of the three, or a combination of the current system.

³ See "Yi-ge he-zuo-she ding-e guan-li de jing-yan" (The experience of management of norms in a cooperative), Zhong-guo nong-cun de she-hui zhu-yi gao-chao, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 148-156.

1. "Basic point" System (di-fen zhi)

This system is to take the quality of each peasant as basis of work-points according to his skill and/or energy. The laborers of a team can be classified into more than two categories. For instance, in a four-category system, there can be strong-skillful, weak-skillful, strong-unskillful and weak-unskillful. If the highest category is fixed to have 10 work-points a day, the lower categories will have 9, 8 and 7 respectively. With this system, there is in general a difference between men and women. If the highest points for men are 10, the highest points for women can only be 8, because it is taken for granted that women are less strong and/or skillful than men. Immature laborers are classified lower too.

Theoretically, under this system each peasant has his basic points. No matter what kind of work and how he has done, provided he finishes his day, he will receive the points corresponding to his category. If this is applied in practice, it is called si-fen-si-ji (~~fixed rates inflexibly~~ registered). The shortcomings of this system can be seen in an article written during the cooperative movement:

For one thing, the management committee, assigning people jobs only as they arose instead of planning in advance, was kept running around in circles. For another thing, the members were becoming apathetic. Some of them began to feel, "What if we get to the fields late and come home early? We earn the same number of points anyhow." As one man expressed it: "Whether I push it hard or take it slow, my work-points never change. With all the dawdling going on around here, we'll never raise our output." ⁴

A variation of si-fen-si-ji is si-fen huo-ji (fixed rates with flexible assessment).

In this system, the basic points of each peasant are always taken as the starting point.

⁴ "A Whole Village Goes Co-operative in a Little Over a Month" (The General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP, 1957 : 34).

But the actual points a peasant can obtain will depend on how much he has actually done during the day and how well he has done. The assessment is done through a democratic discussion among all the members of the team at the end of a day's work. This system is apparently fairer than the si-fen si-ji; however, another problem arises to make it difficult in application.

It was very difficult to apply the "flexible assessment" part of the new system. In the evening when the day's work was over, everyone would get together to discuss how many points each member should receive. The arguments lasted half the night. Members said these weren't "flexible assessment" meetings - they were "inflexible battles to the death!" Some said, "My family's food depends on what's decided at those meetings. Why shouldn't I argue?" For a fraction of a point, men shouted themselves blue in the face (ibid. : 35).

In order to avoid such tiresome discussion every day, it was recommended that the team make assessment only once a month, or even the team make assessment only once a month, or even twice a year, on the basic points of each peasant. On the other hand, this is subject to change in accordance with the change of the physical conditions of each. In some communes, the basic points attributed to each peasant are not the same in the summer time as in the winter time because the work is much lighter in the winter than in the busy summer season (Bettelheim et al., 1965 : 77).

2. "Norms of Work" System (ding-e zhi)

If the "basic points" system is based on the quality of each person, the "norms of work" system is based on the standard of each job. This system was officially recommended by the Revised Draft of 1962 (Chapter 4, Article 32). In this system, there are two major modalities. One is to classify all the farming tasks according to the skill and energy that each task needs to be accomplished. Norms will be established on the

grounds of this classification. The number of work-points obtained by each peasant will not depend on his quality, but on the norms of the task he has accomplished and the time he has spent on it. Another modality is an-jian ji-gong (registration of work-points by piece-work). With this system, once the norms of a task are accomplished, the time will not be counted in. The peasant will obtain certain points according only to the norms of the task no matter how long a time he has spent on it. With this system there is no discrimination against women. However, women were usually assigned to do lighter work, the work-points of which were lower.

The major difficulty of the "norms of work" system lies in the establishment of norms. The farming tasks are generally so variable and dispersed that the established norms can only with difficulty cover all. For instance, in the Dongquo Brigade, Lingcheng People's Commune, Qufu County, it was said that norms were set for about 90% of all the farming tasks, including the making and repairing of tools. All together there were 1,700 norms established (RMRB, 18 September, 1962). We may ask whether it is really necessary to establish so large a list of norms for assessing a limited variation of work-points which can not vary beyond the decimal numbers.

The established norms vary greatly from one team to another. Even in the same team norms for one task can vary according to the weather. Marchisio reported in a team that she visited that for earning 10 work-points one must transport 800 jin of manure to the fields when the weather was good, whereas the norm could fall to 500 jin when it was raining (Bettelheim et al., 1965 : 79). Moreover, all norms are subject to readjustment.

It was said that the peasants preferred this kind of detailed norm because they thought the more the norms were minute, the fairer the system would be. This system

can be seen as a kind of application of "to each according to his work".

3. Dazhai System

The Dazhai Brigade had experience in the assessment of work-points first through democratic discussion and then through using norms. But the first was found too tiresome and the second often sacrificed the quality of work to quantity. After having studied the problem, the cadres came to the conclusion that the key lay in socialist education. On the basis of such a consideration, a new system named zi-bao gong-yi (assessed by oneself and criticized by everybody) was worked out.

In this system, norms of a maximum of work-points for each task are pre-established. At the end of the work, each peasant compares the work that he has accomplished with the norm, and attributes to himself a certain number of work-points. This number of work-points will be rectified by the public through discussion.

The practice of this system is of great interest. According to Marchisio:

Au début, certains paysans ne voulant pas être taxés d'égoïsme, s'attribuèrent un nombre de points inférieur à ce qu'ils auraient dû avoir. Lors de la discussion, on rectifia. D'autres éléments, peu consciencieux, s'attribuèrent plus qu'ils n'avaient réellement mérité. Lors de la discussion, on rectifia également, mais non sans criailleries. A ce moment-là, la cellule du parti étudia le fonctionnement du nouveau système, et le fit en pensant à ce qui était l'objectif numéro un: l'éducation des membres. Les premiers, qui avaient sous-évalué leur travail, n'avaient pas été réalistes, il fallait leur apprendre à le devenir, et pour cela ne pas continuer à relever le nombre de points qu'ils étaient attribués. De cette façon, il n'y eut plus par la suite de paysans à se sous-estimer. Pour les autres, on décida aussi de cesser de réduire leur points et pour les éduquer, on adopta la méthode de "l'attelage". Autrement dit: on fit travailler un paysan qui s'était attribué 10 points, alors, qu'il n'en méritait que 8, avec un paysan qui avait réellement mérité ses 10 points. Il ne fallut pas deux jours pour que le premier, ne réussissant pas à soutenir la comparaison avec le paysan qualifié, diminue de lui-même ses points. De cette façon, la manière dont les paysans "s'attribuent leurs points est maintenant "relativement juste" (ibid: 84-85).

The investigation made by the group of French social scientists in 1963 in Dazhai Brigade shows that the number of work-points actually received by the members during the course of the year well reflected the differences of qualifications: the especially qualified peasants earned, on the average, 12 points a day, the peasants qualified strong, 10.05, those qualified medium, 9.5 points, those weak, 7 points and the half laborer, 4-5 points. The peasants who had special skills or did special tasks earned in general more than a normal peasant. For example, the cutters of stone earned 20% more than a normal peasant in his category; and the breeders, carpenters and shepherds got respectively 15%, 11% and 10% more (ibid. : 85).

With the movement of "agriculture learning from Dazhai" (nong-ye xue Dazhai), this system would no doubt have its influence in the future.

4. An Example of Work-Point System

In the Linqian Brigade, Chengguan People's Commune, Qufu County, the work-points system is a combination of "basic points" system and "norms of work" system. The peasants are first classified into three categories: (1) those who have skill; (2) those who are physically strong; and (3) those who are physically weak and have no skill. A difference of 2 work-points is marked between each category. Then, norms of different tasks are established. For instance, weeding one mu of the fields of sorghum and millet can get 6 points under the condition of its being deeply, thoroughly and clearly done. But these 6 points are only to be taken as standard. At the end of each day, the results of work accomplished must be examined by the commander of the team and the agricultural technician. If the quality of the results does not reach the standard, work-points will be deducted. On the other hand, if the quality is exceptionally

good, a few work-points could be added to the basic 6 points as a reward.

As for the "work group under contract" (bao-gong dao-zu), a global number of work-points is given to the group. This global number of work-points will then be shared by each member of the group according to his category in the "basic points" system, and how well he has actually done. For instance, during the harvesting of wheat, with one mu harvested (including reaping, binding and transporting), the group of 20 peasants can get 8 points. If in one day they harvest 30 mu of wheat, they will get collectively 240 work points. According to the difference in categories and the actual attitude during the work, each peasant will receive 10-14 work points. This distribution of work-points is an internal problem of the work group. It is usually done through democratic discussion (Liu Cong-xian, 1963).

C. A Few Remarks Concerning the Distribution

1. The Complication of the Work-Points System

From the above description, it can be seen that none of the three current systems of the "work-points" registration is perfect. Very often a combination of the three is found in most of the production teams. The proportion of the ingredients varies not only from place to place, but also from time to time. It is not easy to keep a just balance between fairness and efficiency. The emphasis on fairness functions often at the expense of efficiency and vice versa. Moreover, another problem came to be added to the "work-points" system. It is that of the personnel who control the registration of the work-points.

In practice, the distribution of work-points is done under the form of "work-point tickets" (gong-fen piao) or "work-point note-books" (gong-fen shou-ce). These work-point tickets or the registration on the members' note-books are in general controlled

by the commander of the team or by a work-points recorder (*ji-fen yuan*). The work-points recorder is in many cases the accountant who is often a xia-fang qing-nian (sent down intellectual youth) or an elementary school graduate (often a middle-peasant's son).

This is a role easily to be corrupted. That is why the work-points recorder or accountant appears very often as a questionable personage in the modern Chinese fiction.⁵

When the power of distribution of work-point tickets or registration of work-points is in the hands of the commander or the recorder, it is easy to raise the peasants' suspicion that the commander or the recorder has done a favor for himself and the members of his family. Actually, the suspicion of the peasants is not unfounded. In December, 1964, the RMRB published a series of confessions by the commanders of the teams and the work-points recorders in different provinces. They acknowledged that they had unfairly given more points to themselves and the members of their families.⁶

In some places, the masses come to take the control of distribution of work-points by themselves. For instance, in the Shicun Brigade, Longyang People's Commune, Teng County, the members suggested a solution to remedy this problem. The work-point tickets were to be made in two different colors: those for the members in one color and those for the cadres who were in charge of distribution of tickets in another color. And one impartial person was to be selected among the members, who would be in charge of the distribution of work-point tickets to the cadres concerned (RMRB, 19 March, 1963).

⁵ For example, in the famous novel, Yan-yang Tian (Shiny Skies) of Hao Ran, the accountant of the team is a son of a rich peasant. Although he pretends to demarcate a firm political line with his father, he has never really gotten rid of his rich-peasant thought and finally is used by the capitalist roaders. See Hao Ran, Yan-yang Tian, Peking, Ren-min Wen-xue Chu-ban-she, 1972.

⁶ These confessions were arranged under the title of "Why do we call the unfairly taking of work-points exploitation?", RMRB, 11 December, 1964.

2. Ji-ben lao-dong ri (The basic labor days) System

This system which was advocated by the Revised Draft of 1962 can be seen both as a disciplinary measure and a guarantee of the peasants' livelihood. The basic labor days in one year of each peasant are fixed through democratic discussion with the consideration of the physical condition of each peasant and the needs of each family. Generally speaking, men have to have more labor days than women, adults more than adolescents, and those who need more have more than those who need less. This system aims at preventing laziness on the one hand, and guaranteeing that everybody has a basic earning on the other.

3. The Compensatory Work Points for the Cadres

One of the policies of the CCP concerning the people's commune is to eliminate the bureaucratic tendency among the cadres at different echelons. The cadres at the commune level have been required to participate in manual work in a team not less than 60 days a year ("Revised Draft", Chapter 7, Article 50). However, they did not need to earn work-points, because they were paid by the state as the cadres of the county. On the contrary, the cadres at the brigade and team levels had to earn their own work-points in the same way as a normal member of the commune. The cadres at the brigade level had to participate in manual work in a team not less than 120 days a year. As for the cadres at the team level, they should be no different than the other members (*ibid.*) However, it was recognized that a part of their time would be occupied by non-productive activities (administration, meetings, etc.). In such a case, a compensatory system was set up to ensure that those cadres' incomes were not less than other members. For the cadres at the brigade level, their time spent for the public business

could be compensated for either by the state payroll or by compensatory work-points in the team. For the cadres at the team level, their time spent on public business could only be compensated for by the compensatory work-points. The total compensatory work-points for the cadres of a team could not exceed 1% of the total work-points of the team. The total compensatory work-points for the cadres at the team level plus those at the brigade level could not exceed 2% of the total work-points of a team (*ibid.*).

In practice, there were cases where the cadres favored themselves through the compensatory work-points. Sometimes they even changed the compensatory work-points into actual work-points in order to make the total compensatory work-points fall within the range of 2% of the total work-points of the team. The following is extracted from a letter written by a poor peasant of the Lilin Production Brigade, Qiujiadian People's Commune, Anqiu County, and will tell of such a case:

We have just finished the pre-distribution of the fall and are now in the final distribution of the year. During the distribution process, we have felt that the compensatory work-points for the cadres had not been appropriately done. According to the Regulations, the compensatory work-points for the cadres both at brigade level and at team level should not exceed 2% of the total work-points. If we closely examine the work-point note-books of the cadres, we shall find that unfairness is obvious. Sometimes the work-points of the cadres were registered for the works they should not earn any work-points for and sometimes, their work-points were registered for much more than they actually deserved. In such a case, the work-points of some of the cadres are much higher than those of the members. From the pre-distribution of wheat season to that of the fall, a full labor force has gotten about 1,100 points. But some of the cadres got much more than this. When they could not compensate themselves legally, they did it secretly by turning the compensatory work-points into actual work-points. If both the legal and secret work-points are put together, the percentage will be more than 4% of the total work-points of the team.⁷

7 See "Why do we call the unfairly taking work-points exploitation?" (RMRB, 11 December, 1964).

The letter finished with a remark about socialist education. The peasant said that since the campaign of the socialist education started, cadres participated more in manual work, but still not enough to match the level the masses expected of them. He thought that it was a question of thinking and should be solved by education.

4. A Model of Democracy in the Commune System

The process of distribution in the commune is a real democracy for the peasants. The policy of the CCP gave full freedom to the peasants on whatever concerned the distribution. First, the peasants of each production team have the right to adopt whatever work-point system they want. Second, the merits and demerits of each laborer are not evaluated by the cadres (the counterpart of the entrepreneurs in the western countries), but by the masses themselves through discussion. Third, the cadres' remunerations are also subject to discussion by the masses and are under the close supervision of the masses.

Although there are still inequities in some particular cases, generally speaking, it can be said that the distribution system in the peoples' commune is fair.

5. The Welfare System

The welfare system in the countryside is mainly reflected in the wu-bao zhi (the system of five guarantees).

When the free supply of grain could not maintain its viability in 1959-1960, an old system of "five guarantees" which had been a kind of social insurance practised during the cooperative movement was revived to replace the system of free supply of grain in order to solve the problems of subsistence of the households that were really not able to make a living by themselves. The five guarantees mean guarantee of eating, clothing, heating, education and burying. Two basic problems were involved in this

system. What kind of persons or households could be entitled to this right? And how to keep it up?

In answer to the first question, the "Model Regulations of the Advanced Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives" stipulated that the aged, the weak, orphans, widows, and the disabled who lacked, or had completely lost their laboring capacity, could be entitled to the "five guarantees".⁸ Although the formal regulation is not unclear, it is not always easy, in practice, to determine who is entitled, and who is not. In some places, the standards might be too strict so as to exclude someone who really needed such guarantees, while in other places, the standards might be so loose as to include someone who did not really need them.⁹ An editorial of the RMRB said that two additional reasons made this question all the more complicated. First, by virtue of being afraid to give rise to the "parasitic thought", the cadres did not dare to push the masses to discuss the matter and make a decision by themselves. Second, some members took this pretext to separate from their aged parents and left the latter to the entire charge of the collectivity. For instance, in the Aiguo Cooperative, Ju County, in 1956, the 1,771 households just before the wheat harvest when the system of "five guarantees" was announced as being put into practice, turned suddenly into 1,808 households after the harvest. The 37 newly propagated households were mostly the aged parents abandoned by their sons (see footnote 9). That is why during the commune movement, the aged who had sons were not entitled to the five guarantees. The sons would be obliged to support their parents by turning over a portion of their work-points to them. If they did not do so voluntarily, these

⁸ See "Model the Advanced Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives", Chapter 9, Article 53, RMRB, 1 July, 1956.

⁹ Examples can be found in an editorial of RMRB under the title of "Zhèng-quē shì-xíng wú-bào zhī-dù" (Correctly implementing the system of Five Guarantees), 9 February, 1957.

work-points would nevertheless go automatically to their parents. If the aged had only daughters, a choice could be made by the daughter(s). When the daughter was willing to support her parents, she would inherit their property (house and furniture) when they died. If the daughter did not want to support her parents, the aged could be entitled to five guarantees. In such a case, all property of the aged would be turned over to the collective at their death.¹⁰

In answer to the second question, theoretically there seems to be no problem, because there is a welfare fund in each team. In practice, it was not so easy to support all households of five guarantees with funds which were often very meagre. Only in the rich teams was there no difficulty in supporting such households. In most of the below-average teams, it constituted a real problem when the rest of the households could hardly make their own livelihood, especially during the bad years. We can find a concrete example in the Zhuxinzhuang Brigade, Ertun People's Commune, Dezhou Municipality.

Zhuxinzhuang Brigade is one of the units which have suffered from the most serious flooding under the jurisdiction of Dezhou Municipality. . . The livelihood for the majority of the brigade has been more or less solved. However, there are still a few households in difficulty. These are those that lack labor force, or have too many children, or have sick members at home. The Party branch of the brigade called for an enlarged meeting of the members of the Committee to investigate the situation. Finally, the solution which was adopted is that every member of the Party and the Youth League as well as the cadres above the level of the commander of the team, has to take the charge of

¹⁰ Information comes from informant A (see Appendix I). The difference between son and daughter as regards the duty of supporting parents resulted partly from the traditional custom, partly from the fact that daughters are often married outside the village where the parents live. According to a local newspaper, close relatives or friends could also support the aged and inherit their property at their death ("Responses to a Few Questions Concerning the Households of Five Guarantees", HBRB, 17 June, 1957).

one or two of those households in difficulty. They will be responsible for solving the problems of eating, heating, clothing and housing...Sun Zhi-ying, a Party member, has taken charge of the household of Liu Feng-ming who has too many children but few laborers. Sun Zhi-ying has made Liu Feng-ming's problems his own by concretely arranging the livelihood for Liu. First of all, he helped Liu Feng-ming work out a list of needs such as vegetables, wood, etc., and then they have tried together to find the way to satisfy these needs. Every day, when he went to work, he called Liu Feng-ming to go with him. In the meantime, he sent his children to accompany Liu's two young children to get wild vegetables and to gather wood. Within 10 days the household of Liu Feng-ming gathered four hundred jin of wood and accumulated more than one hundred jin of dry wild vegetables.

The 84-year-old grannie Chen had no place to live. The Party branch secretary Zhang De-heng settled her in his own house. A candidate for Party membership by the name of Liu Guan-qi has not only helped a woman member who has three children arrange her livelihood, but also gave her dry vegetables (RMRB, 14 December, 1961).

In most cases, the five guarantees system not only helps the needy to solve material problems, but also gives them human warmth by offering them services. Maybe the latter is still more important than the former, especially for the aged. For instance, in Liuying Brigade, Pengji People's Commune, Dongping County, the Youth League branch organized the young volunteers who were willing to help the needy into 17 groups with 5 persons in each. In the Third Team, the old Li Yan-chun who was one of the households of five guarantees had many difficulties in daily life because of his advanced age. One youth group led by Ma Zhao-xia took charge of all services needed by the old Li, such as milling grains, transporting water, washing and repairing clothes (ZGQNBZ, December, 1964). In the Sanfengzhuang Brigade, Moshan People's Commune, Cangshan County, an eighty-seven-year old grannie said at her death: "I have no children. All the years I have always worried about being alone. I am afraid that when I am sick no one will come to serve me; and when I die, no one will bury me. Now, I

know my worry is superfluous. I have been treated even better than those who have children. It is thanks to the people's commune. I can never forget it even after my death"(XHDX, 11 January, 1961).

In 1958, just before the commune movement, there were 3,130,000 households (5,190,000) people that were enrolled in the "five guarantees" system (ZGQNB, 4 June, 1958). Social welfare was not limited to the households of the five guarantees, but also extended to four other kinds of households: those of martyrs, soldiers, workers and cadres. This was because they did not have enough labor force at home.

D. Examples of Remuneration (two Case-Studies)

After the description of the distribution system of the people's commune, which is complicated but crucial in the communal structure, it is necessary to give a few concrete examples as illustrations. The following two examples will show the actual remuneration of the peasants in Shandong Province on the one hand, and the difference in remuneration between teams and between households on the other.

1. Comparison of Remuneration Between East Hao (Dong Hao) Production Team and West Hao (Xi Hao) Production Team of the Yingzi People's Commune, Linju County

The Hao Village of the Yingzi People's Commune is divided into two production teams: The East Hao and the West Hao. The two teams were approximately equal in number of households, population, arable land and basis of production. The gross revenues of the East Hao Team were higher than those of the West Hao Team for 1961. They were respectively 22,056 yuan and 17,965 yuan. But at the end of the year the final account of distribution shows that the peasants' remuneration of the East Hao Team was unexpectedly lower than that of the West Hao Team. Apart from the quantity of grain distributed to

each household which was basically equal between the two teams, a household of the West Hao Team received on the average 90.3 yuan in cash, whereas a household of East Hao Team received on the average only 22.5 yuan.

There were two brothers, Hao Yuan-xiao and Hao Yuan-jing, one belonging to the West Hao and the other to the East Hao. The two brothers had more or less the same labor force and had invested more or less the same quantity of manure during the year. But their final remuneration in cash was very different. Hao Yuan-xiao (in the West Hao Team) got 195 yuan with his 280 labor days plus the invested manure, whereas his brother, Hao Yuan-jing (in the East Hao Team) got only 36 yuan with his 228 labor days plus the invested manure.

Why was there this difference in remuneration? After investigation by the commune cadres, it was found that the commander and accountant of the West Hao Team knew how to produce economically. By contrast, the cadres of the East Hao Team did not keep their purse carefully enough. This can be seen in the following measures adopted by the leading cadres of the two teams in the year 1961. (1) When manure was in short supply, the West Hao Team organized the members to accumulate natural manure by raising hogs, sheep and by gathering and other traditionally known methods. The East Hao Team simply spent more than 1,200 yuan to buy chemical fertilizer. (2) When draught animals were in short supply, the West Hao Team actively developed animal breeding which resulted in getting two more calves. The East Hao Team simply bought two animals, spending more than 2,700 yuan. (3) When there was a shortage of feed, the West Hao Team solved it by using the traditionally known methods to gather enough grass. The East Hao Team simply spent more than 240 yuan to buy hay. (4) The West Hao Team repaired and made the farm implements themselves. The East Hao Team used to buy

new farm implements. Finally, the West Hao Team spent only 1,200 yuan in production during 1961, whereas the East Hao Team spent 5,118 yuan.

After the investigation, the cadres of the East Hao Team were said to have learned a lesson and to have expressed their determination to catch up to the level of the West Hao Team in remuneration for the following year (ZGQNB, 4 June, 1958).

2. Peasants' Remuneration of the Second Production Team of the Caopo Brigade

Caopo Brigade of the Zhuyou People's Commune, Ye County, is a village by the same name, situated a few kilometres to the east of the Bohai Gulf. The Caopo Brigade is divided into five production teams. Here the Second Team is chosen as our example (Lin Cong, 1961).

The Second Team of the Caopo Brigade had, at the end of 1962, 58 households with 114 whole and half laborers (including 46 youths) and 431 mu of arable land. This team had suffered from decrease of production for two successive years, 1960-1961. Especially in 1961, the winter wheat suffered from a serious drought. It resulted in a decrease of 5% from that of 1960 which was already a bad year. The autumn corn also suffered from drought and a plague of insects. The other crops were not good either. All these factors made the total output of 1961 decrease 35% from that of 1959, 25% from that of 1960. The team was obliged to request 14,000 jin of grain supplied by the state.

However, in 1962, the economy recovered. The total output of food grains increased 69% over than of 1961 with an increase of 65% per unit. In 1962, not only did this team no longer need any supplies from the state, but after having fulfilled the task of the state purchase, it could afford to sell an additional 3,800 jin of grain to the

state. The basic grain distribution to each member amounted to 460 jin for 1962. A strong laborer could get 600 jin. Moreover, with the reserve funds, the team was able to buy two 56-style water wheels, three carts and other small farm implements. The skinny draught animals also recovered. The domestic animals increased by 28 hogs, 27 sheep and 46 chickens.

One of the reasons contributing to such a tremendous change was said to be the resolute implementation of the policy of "to each according to his work" and "the more work performed the bigger the reward" (duo-lao duo-de). In 1962 in this team, there was an important improvement both in management and in the distribution system. The following systems were implemented during the year: (1) ding-e guan-li (management of norms); (2) an-jian ji-gong (registration of work-points by piece-work); (3) ji-ben lao-dong-ri (basic labor days); (4) tong-yi lao-li (unified control of labor force) according to the needs of production.

The pre-distribution of the summer harvest provided evidence for "the more work performed the bigger the reward". The household of the poor peasant Zhang Lian-dou had three people. All three actively participated in laboring. From January to May, they had done 1,030 work-points which brought them 330 jin of wheat (110 per person) in the summer. In addition, they got a reward of 67 jin of wheat for their activist spirit. By contrast, another household, also of three people, had a different result. From January to May, this household had done only 700 work-points. More than 600 were earned by the husband. The wife who was not active at all in laboring earned hardly 100 points. Therefore, they obtained only 270 jin of wheat (90 jin per person).

The following table will show the remuneration of the different categories of the labor force for the year of 1962 in the Second Team of the Caopo Brigade, Zhuyou People's Commune.

Table 7.2

Comparison of Peasants' Remuneration by Categories of Labor Force for 1962 in the
 Second Team, Caopo Brigade, Zhuyou People's Commune, Ye County

	Household of strong labor force: Wang Jia-yuan	Household of medium labor force: Zhang Ru-jie	Household of weak labor force: Shi Yu-guang
Number of members of the household	4	3	7
Number of laborers	3 (1+1+1)	1.5 (1+0.5)	1.25 (0.75+0.5)
Total work-points earned	3,900	1,800	1,900
Food grains distributed (jin)	2,338	1,518	2,796 ²
Quantity of grains per person (jin)	584	506	399
Reserved Wheat (jin)	300	140	200
Income from sideline production (yuan)	100 (from sale of eggs, grass & straw hats)	60 (from sale of eggs & straw hats)	
Domestic animals raised	2 pigs (1 cow for team)	2 pigs (1 donkey for team)	
Improvement of living conditions	Built 2 units of house with tile roof for married son	purchased a sewing machine	
Farm implements purchased	pick 1 basket 1	hoe 1 hay fork 1 basket 1	

1. The categorization of labor force was somewhat arbitrary in each team (see "Basic point" system of this chapter).
2. The food grains were distributed in this team not only according to the work-points, but also in taking account of the basic ration of the members of a household.

From the two examples cited, we can see that the disparity in remuneration existed between both the teams and households within one team. What is remarkable in the commune system is that the standards of living were no longer a personal problem but a collective concern. When a team had a bad harvest, or a household had a lower income than the others, it would draw the attention of the collectivity. Investigations were carried out to find the causes. If the causes were man-made, the responsible cadres of the team, or the chief of the household would be criticized and educated. If the causes were not man-made, appropriate help, both material and non-material, would be given. In this system no one was to be left behind the others.

III CONCLUSION OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE

According to the description of the previous chapters, it can be said that the structure of the people's commune was determined during the years of 1959-1961, and stabilized from 1962 onwards. During the period of formation and stabilization, many radical designs were dropped while many elements of the structure of the advanced agricultural producers' cooperatives were revived and saw their consolidation within the communal framework. This is no doubt the main reason why so many scholars think that the commune system has regressed to the stage of the cooperative movement. However, I hold in this thesis a different point of view. My data have clearly indicated that the commune structure during the period of my study, i.e., between 1958 and 1965, should not be viewed as a pure or simple regression; rather it should be considered as a starting point of a new stage of the Chinese socioeconomic development in the countryside. The rationale which is drawn from the study of the previous chapters and which can lend support to my arguments will be stated as follows.

A. Utilization of the Pre-Existing Structure

Making full utilization of the pre-existing structure does not equal a regression. In contrast, the tendency of rejection or negation of the basic structure of the advanced cooperative at the beginning of the commune movement could be interpreted as fanatic and unrealistic (or utopian) attitudes. Any socio-economic development in any country had always grown from some pre-existing ground. It is rather a natural process that the commune movement has had recourse to the already established structure of the advanced cooperative.

On the other hand, the emphasis of the pre-existing structure means the recognition of the unequal development in different places. This also evidences a much more realistic attitude than that which was imbued with the spirit of "equalitarianism" and that of a premature communism at the beginning of the commune movement. The consolidation or the success of the commune system after 1962 was not based on how to equally distribute the "fruits of labor" to everybody, but on how to lend support to the backward communes, brigades, teams and households in catching up with the advanced ones.

B. Structural Differences Between the Commune and the Advanced Cooperative

It can still be said to be a regression if the structure of the commune was exactly that of the advanced cooperative. But this is not the case. The structure of the commune differs from that of the advanced cooperative, at least in the following ways:

1. Size

Both geographically and according to the population, the commune is much larger than the advanced cooperative. The advantages of the larger size can be seen in

its easier organization of labor force for larger scale construction such as irrigation systems and routes of transportation, and faster accumulation of capital for the development of local industry.

2. Ownership (only means of production concerned)

The ownership of the commune is at three levels; the ownership of the advanced cooperative was at two levels. Although the ownership at the commune level was still of no great significance during 1958-1965, it will no doubt be expanded in the long-run development.

3. Occupation

The people's commune undertakes multiple economic enterprises including agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and fishery; the advanced cooperative was engaged exclusively in agriculture. The design of multiple occupations is to cause a faster development by stimulating and supporting each other among the different sectors on the one hand, and to achieve an over-all (or more balanced) development on the other.

4. Organization

The commune is a coordinated organization of socioeconomic, political, military, educational and cultural affairs; the advanced cooperative was merely an economic organization. The communal organization is oriented more to a life of community than to a unit of production; the advanced cooperative was oriented more to a unit of production than to a life of community.

5. Social Welfare

Because of the larger size and greater public funds, the social welfare system is on a larger scale in the commune than in the advanced cooperative. Although during the period of my study the welfare system of the commune was still mainly concentrated upon the system of the five guarantees (i.e., it was hardly larger than during the period of the cooperative movement), it has, however, since then, expanded little by little into the sphere of education and that of sanitation and medical care.

C. A Significant Feature of the Commune System

The most significant feature of the commune system is its orientation toward a kind of life of community. The significance of the life of the community does not lie merely in how much a member can produce, but in how well he can relate to other people. Therefore, competence and skill of a member are indeed important for economic development; but what is valued the most is one's manner and attitudes in relation with others; in other words, one's concern for the other people and for the collectivity as a whole. Under such a concept, material incentives will, in many cases, give way to moral ones. It has been considered that the growth of a human being is still more important than the economic growth. According to the approach of the Chinese communists, the growth of a human being is possible only in the process of interpersonal relations in a collective situation. From this point of view, the commune structure actually marks a departure into a new phase of socioeconomic development, the achievement of which is, of course, still to be seen.

Chapter Eight

LOCAL INDUSTRIALIZATION

This chapter will be divided into four sections: first, the industrial background of Shandong Province will be briefly introduced; then, three sections will be devoted to the development of local industrialization between 1958 and 1965. As we know, no detailed official statistics on any branch of the economy in China have been released since 1960. It is difficult, then, to build an accurate schema with detailed figures after 1960. However, an outline of the general development can still be worked out. According to the available data, two phases can be discerned during this period. The first phase, between 1958 and 1960, was a period where local industry was strongly emphasized, whereas the second phase, between 1960 and 1965 was one where the focus was shifted to agriculture and the development of local industry was limited for fear of jeopardizing the agricultural development.

I INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUNDS IN SHANDONG

A. Industrial History

This brief history of the industries of Shandong Province has been built up with the data released by the Industrial Section of the Statistical Bureau of Shandong Province in 1957 (DZRB, 9 February and 8 August, 1957). The history of industry of this province can be traced back to 1898 when Japan and Germany began to set up textile factories and coal and iron mines. Up to 1936, among twelve textile factories, eight were controlled by the Japanese. The coal mines in Fangzi and Zhichuan and the iron mine in

Jinling were owned first by the Germans and then taken over by the Japanese. Only after the Chinese paid a considerable sum in 1922 did these mines become Sino-Japanese co-owned and co-managed. During this time, the output was very low. For instance, the coal mine in Zhichuan produced no more than 1,540,000 tons between 1916-1923, and 15,000,000 tons during the 22 years between 1923 and 1945. The gross output value of industry in Shandong in 1936 reached only 785,000,000 yuan. The increase in industrial output became significant only after 1949. By 1952, the gross output value of industry increases 121.2% over 1949 and, by 1957, 318.7% over 1949, with an average annual increase of 22.8%. The ramified sectors of industry since 1949 will be presented as follows:

1. Machine-building

Before 1949, the only machine-building factory in Shandong was the Si-fang Machine Factory set up by the Germans in the early 1900's in Qingdao. This factory had never produced a single large machine during its fifty years under the successive controls of Germans, Japanese and the Nationalist Government. Its first electric machine tool was produced in 1949. Since 1952 it began to produce locomotives. A few other machine-building factories were set up in Jinan and Qingdao. By 1956, the gross value in this sector had a fourteen-fold increase over 1949.

2. Coal

Up to 1957, the level of mechanization in the coal industry reached 55.72%. 24.52% of the coal mines had adopted new methods of production. Eighteen modern coal mines were under construction. In 1956, coal production had an increase of 100% over 1955, two-fold that of 1949.

480,000 tons over 1955, two-fold that of 1949.¹

3. Electricity

There were only 16 electric power factories in 1936 in Shandong. After 1949, five new electric power factories were built and 46 units were equipped with generators. By 1956, electric power had achieved an increase of 38,000 kWh over 1955, and five-fold that of 1949.²

4. Light Industries

The year of 1956 marked an expansion in light industries. The gross value of the output of textiles had an increase of 350 tons over 1955 and doubled that of 1949. The gross value of the output of the food industry had a six-fold increase over 1949,³ and that of the paper industry eight-fold. The gross value of the output of consumer goods in general increased 18.5% over 1955 and 223.2% over 1949.

5. Private Industrial Enterprises and Handicraft

The socialist reform of private industrial enterprises and handicraft was completed by 1956 in Shandong. The 2,300 private enterprises were all converted into co-owned and co-managed enterprises between the state and the owners. 368,000 handicraftsmen (98.7% of the total) joined either a handicraft cooperative, or a group. The gross output value of the co-owned enterprises had an increase of 32.22% over 1955, and that of handicrafts reached 690,000,000 yuan in 1956. According to an investigation in Liaocheng Special District, the per capita value of handicrafts was 1,817 yuan,

¹ The coal production in China as a whole was 105,900,000 tons in 1956, and 130,000,000 tons in 1957 (see Grossman, 1960 : 137).

² Electric power production in China as a whole was 16,600,000,000 kWh in 1956 and 19,300,000,000 kWh in 1957 (*ibid.*).

³ They produced 15,900 tons of wheat flour and 1,880 tons of vegetable oil more than in 1955.

double that of 1955.

1956 was a year where the industrial development in Shandong had its greatest growth since 1949. The gross output value of industry as a whole had an increase of 318.7% over 1949, with an average annual increase of 22.8%. The gross value of production goods (means of production) grew faster than that of consumer goods, and had a ten-fold increase over 1949, rising to 46.8% of the gross output value of the industry as a whole from only 20.9% in 1948. By 1956, the industrial production represented 45.8% of the gross output value of industry and agriculture combined. It should be noted that it represented only 29.1% in 1949.

From 1956 to 1959, each year represented a leap forward in industry. The gross output value of industry in Shandong for 1957 was 3,640,000,000 yuan. This sum was doubled in 1958, amounting to 7,600,000,000 yuan. The estimate for 1959 was 12,500,000,000 yuan, (Qian Chang-zhao, 1959).

B. Development of the Local Industry Before the Establishment of the People's Communes

1958 was a crucial year in Chinese socioeconomic development. Aside from the creation of the people's communes, it was also the year of the famous Great Leap Forward (GLF) movement, launched just after the Anti-rightist Movement of 1957. Ideologically, the GLF was an anti-elitist and anti-intellectual movement, just as Schurmann has said:

The professional intellectuals were denounced for their technological fetishism, for their arrogant conviction that modern scientific and technical learning was only accessible to the educated. The "mass line" rapidly took on concrete content as simple peasants and workers were enrolled in "worker-

peasant universities" and told that they too could participate in administration, accounting, designing, and scientific experimentation. Reducing the gap between mental and physical labor, an old Marxist dream, was taken seriously during the Great Leap Forward (1970: 91).

During the GLF, it was a logical consequence that in the industrial sector of the economy the local industry - which would need a larger mass participation and which could stimulate the masses' initiative and creativity - was strongly encouraged. All the 'hang-ups' on the part of the middle-ranking leaders with regard to relying on the masses, and hesitation in leading them to join the industrial corps in favor of the agricultural development were criticized as conservative and rightist attitudes. The bureaucrats in the Bureau of Industry of Shandong Province had to make a maximum effort in pushing local industry forward. The director of the Bureau of Industry of Shandong said:

The upsurge in agricultural production has appeared and continues to develop in the whole country. This new situation brought about new tasks for us, the ones who are in charge of the local industry. Agriculture urgently needs the support of materials of production. But, at the beginning, in facing this new situation, we did not have any clear idea. For instance, myself, I had insufficient knowledge of the policy of uniting industry and the rural economy, and of how to utilize the local resources to solve the problems of supply food, clothes and other consumer goods, how to increase the peasants' income, and of how to activize the rural economy. Because of our insufficient knowledge, we have not implemented the policy energetically... On the other hand, we have had some serious conservative thoughts with regard to developing the production of the materials of agricultural production. This can be seen in our attitudes when dealing with this problem in the past. We have always looked too much at the disadvantages and neglected the advantages. We have always thought that it was difficult to manage the local industry well because of its professional multiplicity and geographical dispersion, but we have not taken enough consideration of the fact that the basis of the local industry in Shandong which is better than most other provinces could be a favorable condition...(Liu Qing, 1958).

The local industry in Shandong, under the name of xiang-she gong-ye (township-and-cooperative industry) thus developed at full speed. In April, 1958, at the enlarged meeting of the provincial CCP Committee, it was decided to develop immediately the township-and-cooperative industry in great volume (GRRB, 4 June, 1958). Every county was required to use 70% of their forces in township-and-cooperative industry and 30% in county industry. The original plan of building up and enlarging 46,000 factories and mines in the province for 1958 was revised upward to 190,000 (ibid.). This was no sooner said than done; according to the statistics for 101 counties and municipalities (outside the urban area) for the month of May, 43,000 units of the township-and-cooperative industry were built up at the rate of 1,400 units per day. Gao-tang county alone established 1,143 units in nine days (see Appendix III, Table 4).

It was said that the newly established units effectively resolved the shortage of the farm implements and fertilizers badly needed during the summer season. The official statics show that in Changwei, Laiyang, Hoze and Liaocheng special districts, 2,470,000 rudimentary water-carrying instruments, 370,000 farm implements and 39,850,000 jin of various kinds of fertilizers were produced in a short span of time (GRRB, 4 June, 1958).

By the end of June, 1958, the newly created units amounted to more than 180,000, almost achieving the number of 190,000 established for the year in the revised plan (DZRB, 7 July, 1958). However, the development in the different special districts was unequal. For instance, the Changwei Special District had built up 46,000 units, whereas the Linyi Special District had only finished 10,000. The contrast between counties was also considerable: 5,400 units in Wei County versus 220 in Guan County (ibid.).

In July, 1958, just before the spread of the commune system in Shandong, the established units of the township-and-cooperative industry had reached a total of 250,000.⁴

II. AN UPSURGE IN THE BUILDING OF LOCAL INDUSTRY (1958-1959)

During the first two years of the People's Commune, the local industry was heavily emphasized. The term xiang-she gong-ye (township-and-cooperative industry) was out-of-date following the establishment of the People's Communes. At the end of 1958, another term, xian-she gong-ye (county-and-commune industry) was substituted. The development of the xian-she gong-ye began to be called a movement (yun-dong) almost as soon as the term appeared (Peking DGB, 30 November, 1958). This section will deal with this movement by an analysis of the state and provincial policies and the methods used in the building of local industry, which will be followed by five case-studies.

A. Policies

When Liu Shao-qi proclaimed the general line of socialist construction at the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress in May, 1959, he quoted Mao Tse-tung's "Ten Great Relationships" and said:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung laid down a series of important policies for the realization of the general line of more, faster, better and more economical socialist construction. Of these, numbers one and five suggested the principle of simultaneous development of industry and agriculture under conditions of preferential development of heavy industry, as well as the principle of unifying the

⁴ At the Conference of the Local Industry in June, 1958, it was decided to build up 500,000 units with an average of 5,000 per county (see Lai Ke-ke, 1958).

concentrated authority of the center and the divided authority of the regions (RMSC, 1959 : 21).

Two points are crucial in Liu's proclamation in regard to the development of local industry. One is the "simultaneous development of industry and agriculture" (one aspect of walking on two legs), and another, "unifying the concentrated authority of the center and the divided authority of the regions", (another aspect of walking on two legs). Local industry was thus viewed as an important sector in industry, because it would not only lend support to agriculture in the most direct and economical manner, but would also have the function of decentralizing the existing industrial centres. The Second Five-year Plan which was shadowed by the GLF called for the output value of local industry to catch up with the level of the needs of the agricultural sector (Liu Qing, 1958). The GLF carried this requirement still further. The general policy of the state at that time can be summarized into the following statement: every county and every township must develop its own industry by relying on the masses (DZRB, 7 July, 1958).

Based on the general policy of the state, the Provincial Committee came to work out its own policies on how to develop the local industry. First, it was required that each echelon attend to its own affairs, no xian (county) relying on the province, and no xiang (township) relying on the county (ibid.) Second, the cadres at every echelon were required to grasp agriculture with one hand and industry with the other (yi-shou zhua nong-ye yi-shou zhua gong-ye) (Lai Ke-ke, 1958). Third, local (or traditional) methods should 'mount the horse' before mechanization (tu-fa xian shang-ma ran-hou ji-jie-hua) (Ya Qi, 1958). Fourth, methodologically, the si-wei (four fors), san-jiu (three on-the-spots), er-zhu (two chiefly) and yi-zi (one self) were given as a guiding principle. (The four fors mean "for the agricultural production, for the people's

livelihood, for the big industry and for exportation"; the three on-the-spots mean "taking raw materials on the spot, producing on the spot and selling on the spot"; the two chiefly mean "chiefly on small scale and chiefly in handicraft"; and the one self means "to solve the problem of capital by oneself" (Lai Ke-ke, 1958).

The above policies were required to be carried out in Shandong just at the same time as the spread of the commune movement (i.e., between July and September, 1958). The two movements were seen as mutually supporting and reciprocally beneficial. During the conference on the spot (xian-chang hui-yi) of local industry in November, 1958, in Gaotang County, which was a model county in developing county-and-commune industry, the provincial first secretary of the Party, Bai Ru-bing, gave the following concrete directives for the immediate tasks in the winter of 1958 and spring of 1959:

1. The locality with mineral resources has to spare no effort in exploiting them. It has to build up small coal mines and other mineral units or small iron factories and other metallurgical units.
2. It has to rapidly develop the mechanical industry in order to produce mechanical instruments and equipment. It has, above all, to produce simple machine tools in great quantity for the purpose of increasing the capacity of production of the mechanical industry so that the agricultural production can be better served and the technical revolution in industry and agriculture can be promoted.
3. It has to develop the chemical industry and to produce in great quantity rudimentary fertilizers and pesticides in order to satisfy the needs of agricultural production and the needs of the people's livelihood.
4. It has to develop the electrical industry, notably that based on marsh gas. Small electric power-stations with marsh gas, water force, combustive force, wind force and

any other mechanical forces have to be built up in order to gradually solve the problems of electrical supply in agricultural production and in livelihood.

5. It has to develop the construction industry, and the industry of materials of construction. Every county and every people's commune has to form its own team of construction and installation workers, and to set up kilns of brick, tile and lime, and factories of cement and nonflammable materials.

6. It has to spare no efforts in developing light industry and the food industry. It has to plan urgently for setting up factories for agricultural and sideline products processing. If conditions permit, it has also to build up factories for water products, fruit processing, and particular handicrafts.

7. It has also to develop the service industries, such as clothing and quilt-making factories, shoe and hat making factories, children's toy-making factories, etc.

(Peking DGB, 30 November, 1958).

The guiding line for developing the abovementioned industries was xiao (small), tu (local or rudimentary) and qun (prolific) (ibid.).

B. High Tide of xian-she Industry - Five Case-Studies

1. Gaotang County⁵

The upsurge of the development of local industry started in Gaotang, a county in the Liaocheng Special District to the west of Shandong Province, in May, 1958. It was not long before this county became a model, due to the quantity and quality of

5 This case-study is based on a report by Liu Hua-zhong, the secretary of the CCP Committee of Gaotang County, entitled "Fa-zhan xiang-she gong-ye de ji-dian ti-hui" (Some points of Reflection on Developing Township and-Cooperative Industry), DZRB, 7 July, 1958. Other sources will be noted.

local industry built in its area.

a. Decision-making through thought struggle:

After the call of the central government for the developing of local industry, among the leading cadres of the counties and townships two contradictory thoughts emerged: one was conservative, the other revolutionary. The conservative faction had expressed much doubt about the capacity of the peasants to develop industry, and raised five impossibilities (wu-ge bu-xing) to oppose the implementation of state policies. They said that it was impossible to develop industry without machinery, engineers or technicians, capital provided by the state or the province, work-shops and offices. In order to fight against this kind of conservative thought, the Party organized the cadres and workers to study the general line in socialist construction and the policies and directives of the Provincial Committee of the CCP. The masses were also educated through conferences on the spot, broadcasts and public debate. But the most spectacular and convincing example was the one provided by the Yinji Township (later the Yinji People's Commune).

In Yinji Township, the measures adopted to increase agricultural production had not been fully realized due to the shortage of labor and fertilizer, and the backwardness of the farm implements. To resolve these contradictions between the production plan and production capacity, the cadres and masses of Yinji concentrated their forces on developing industry. They spent a total of 17,500 yuan to set up 38 workshops, among them a sewing service of 15 workers costing them only 14 yuan. In the Hongming Cooperative, an iron-forge group of three youths had successfully readjusted 10 water-wheels, made 30 instruments for transplanting, and repaired more than 200 farm implements with a few simple tools such as pincers and hammers.

It was reported that the conservative thought in Gaotang County was finally changed by education through learning the directives and public debate and by the demonstration of the successful model of Yinji.

b. What kind of industry should be created first?

After the decision to develop local industry had been made through thought struggle, the second question faced by the people of Gaotang County was what kind of industry should be created first. The state policy was clear - that the local industry must directly serve agricultural production. From this point of departure, they found first three major contradictions in agricultural production that needed to be resolved. These were a shortage of labor, lack of fertilizer, and backwardness of farm implements. Taking this consideration as a guideline, three kinds of local industry were created in the county: (1) factories which could directly serve agriculture, such as iron-forge, carpentry, manure processing, and animal feed processing; (2) those which could liberate the labor force, such as the "three processings" (food grain processing, oil processing, and clothes processing); and (3) agricultural and sideline products processing such as cotton processing, papermaking, osier plaiting, winemaking, cement, brick and tile, electrical power and hemp processing.

c. How to set up local industry?

The following problem was how to accumulate enough capital and manpower to build up those factories and workshops. The guiding principle in solving this problem was self-reliance. The Party called on the cadres and the masses of the county to offer whatever they had: money, materials, manpower and techniques. At the same time debates were organized to increase people's awareness so that individual interest was identical with the interest of the state.

- (1) Capital: 3,150,000 yuan was quickly raised;
- (2) Materials: timber, brick and tile, lime, of a total value of 260,000 yuan were accumulated;
- (3) Techniques: The masses were required to report talented people. In a short time 50 technicians in different fields, and 218 skilled workers were found. The 20 townships of the county were divided into four cooperative areas. Technical conferences in each area were to be regularly held in order to exchange experiences. In addition, the county sent out 179 workers to learn techniques in other counties. Fifty-six workers went to other townships to learn techniques under an exchange program within the county. Up to the end of 1958, the number of workers increased from barely 1,000 to more than 18,000 (RMRB, 9 January, 1959).

d. Management:

- (1) Production planning: Each factory had to make a production plan for one year according to the needs of agricultural production and those of the people. This plan would include the kinds of products, the quantity of production, and the annual output value. Within the framework of the annual plan, the seasonal sequences of agriculture had to be taken into account.
- (2) Apart from a few technicians, the factories did not hire permanent workers. Workers were hired temporarily under contract from the cooperatives (later communes). Workers were peasants and peasants were workers. When there was work in the factories, peasants came there to work; when no work was available, peasants went back to the fields.
- (3) The wages of workers were paid in three ways: First, they were paid by unit of time, such as in the wheat flour, cotton processing and fertilizer factories. Second,

they were paid by piece-work, such as in the iron-forge and carpentry workshops.

Third, the workers took a share of the profit. In all three cases, the wages of workers were a little higher than the average peasants' income.

(4) Competition between workers in the same factory, and between factories, was promoted in order to increase the quantity and quality of the products.

e. Volume of local industry and output value:

Between May and July, 1958, 2,441 small-scale factories and workshops were built up in Gaotang County. Of those units, 5 were run by the county, 44 by the townships, and 2,392 by the cooperatives. This constituted a gain of eleven-fold over the total volume of local industry built since 1949. The gross output value from January to June, 1958 amounted to 12,180,000 yuan (57.4% was produced in May and June), five times the gross output value of 1957. (It should be noted that the estimate of the gross output value in agriculture of Gaotang County for 1958 was 65,400,000 yuan). According to the statistics at the end of June, 38,200 water-carrying instruments and 78,900 farm implements were produced or repaired during the previous six months. In May and June, the various factories and workshops daily made 410 water-carrying instruments, produced in total 270,756,000 jin of fertilizers of varied kinds, 15,000,000 pieces of brick and tile, 62,200 jin of cement and 35,700 articles of clothing and, in addition, processed 2,550,000 jin of grains and 2,200,000 jin of forage for the members.

The Yinji Township was converted into a people's commune on 19 October, 1958. From that date to the end of November of the same year, in only 40 days, 66 units of 25 kinds of local industry were either enlarged or newly created. The members of the commune supported the industrial construction both by their labor and by offering materials. 762 cubic metres of timber, 760,000 pieces of brick, 85,700 pieces of tile,

55,670 jin of lime and 822 big earthenware vessels were gathered by and from the members. In addition, 218 units of houses were turned into workshops by their inhabitants (Qian Chang-zhao, 1959).

2. Jiao County⁶

a. How to resolve the problems in thought?

In the beginning, the cadres of the townships and cooperatives were said to have made industry a mystery, and to have neglected the existence of the large number of small-scale handicrafts found everywhere. Some of them thought that to develop local industry was against the best interests of agriculture. In order to resolve this kind of problem thinking, the CCP Committee of the county chose the Yinghai Township as an experimental point. A conference on the spot was held in Yinghai to spread its experience of setting up 85 small factories in 12 days. The cadres were finally convinced of the advantages in developing local industry through debate and demonstration of the Yinghai model (this model will be presented as a separate case-study).

b. Raising of capital:

It was laid down that the capital of local industry must be raised within the locality of a given industry. The masses of Jiao County were called upon to invest either money or materials. In June, 1958, 5,000,000 yuan was gathered for county industry and 273,000 yuan for township-and-cooperative industry. With regard to raw materials, three methods of collection were adopted: (1) Offices, schools and factories were required to clean up their warehouses. 7.5 tons of waste materials were procured

⁶ This case-study is based on the report by Zhong-gong Jiao-xian wei-yuan-hui (the CCP Committee of the Jiao County), "Fa-zhan xiang-she gong-ye de yi-xie zuo-fa" (A Few Ways of Developing the Township-and-cooperative industry), Peking, DGB, 26 July, 1958. Other sources will be noted.

in this way. (2) The people of the county were called upon to promote a movement of selling scrap metal. One hundred and seventy tons of scrap-iron was collected. (3) another 100 tons of materials was obtained by exchange for substitute products.

c. Technical resource:

There were three ways to resolve the problem of technical personnel: (1) The people with some skills were called upon to register themselves. According to incomplete statistics of 17 townships, 1,334 technicians were registered. (2) Old factories were required to train new technicians. For instance, the iron-forge factory of the county was planning to train 140 technicians in this field. (3) 300 people were sent out to learn techniques.

d. Wages:

The workers' wage was counted by the same work-point system as that of the peasants, except that the former was a little higher than the latter. That is to say, the workers did not earn a money wage, because most of the local industry at the time was run by the cooperatives and were covered by the same accounting system.

e. Volume of local industry in Jiāo County:

Up to the middle of June, 1958, the 26 townships (and towns) had developed 4,329 factories and workshops, and most of them had gone into production (DZRB, 7 July, 1958). It was reported that those factories and workshops had provided great support for agricultural production. For instance, in Licha Township, because of shortage of labor force and transporting instruments, the original plan of fertilizing each mu of land with 15,000 jin of manure could not be fulfilled. Under such circumstances, the 240 newly established factories and workshops promoted a movement for making small flat carts. In only one week more than 2,000 carts were produced. With these

not only was the problem of transporting vehicles resolved, but 3,400 laborers and 3,300 draught animals were freed for other purposes (ibid.).

The plan of a leap forward in local industry of Jiao County for 1958 required an increase in gross output value of 498.8% over 1957, and that 54.8% of the gross output value of agriculture be reached.

3. The Yinghai Model⁷

The Yinghai Township of Jiao County was a model of models in the leap forward of local industry (because the county was already one of the models in Shandong province). This township was composed of 31 natural villages (26 agricultural cooperatives and one fishery cooperative) with a population of 16,746 representing 3,524 households. It had 35,000 mu of arable land with a favorable man-land ratio of 1:2. To the east is the Yellow Sea and to the west a highway leads to the Jiao County seat, an important station on the Jiao-ji railway. Furthermore, it was easy to gain access from Yinghai to Qingdao - the industrialized port and the second largest city in Shandong - by boat across the Jiaozhou Gulf, a short distance of 25 kilometres. As a result 40% of the peasants of the coastal villages worked in Qingdao in 1958. This resulted in a crucial shortage of labor force in the township. During the years of cooperativization, a few workshops were built up along with the development of sideline production. There had been only two iron-forge furnaces, four carpenter workshops, two sewing services and one stone-cutter workshop as of 1957. The services were so inadequate that people of the township had to go to the county seat for repairs or to replenish the stock of farm implements, and for the purchase of other handicraft products.

⁷ This case-study is based on Ya Qi, 1958 : 29-31.

When the GLF movement started, new requirements in agricultural production became evident: more than 10,000 mu of land needed to be deeply ploughed, 320 reservoirs were planned, and in order to achieve the production target of 900 jin of yield per mu, each mu of land had to be fertilized with 15,000 jin of manure. How to resolve the contradictions between the requirements of agricultural production and the shortage of labor force, the inefficiency of farm implements and means of transport, had become more and more of an urgent problem. Under the guidance of the general line, the CCP Committee of the township organized meetings for debate. The conclusion reached was that the resolution of the contradictions did not lie in developing agriculture alone, nor in relying on the support of the big industries in the cities, but in developing small-scale local industry.

The plan for local industry development had been revised four times. Finally, during the 12 days from 21 April to 3rd May, 1958, 85 factories and workshops were set up. Capital, personnel, equipment, materials all in all were solved by "self-reliance" (zi-li geng-sheng). The details are given as follows:

- a. Capital and material resources: A movement to support local industry by investing money and materials was launched. The cadres of the township and 54 elementary school teachers together invested 6,000 yuan (500 yuan from the chief of the township). The fishery cooperative alone invested 10,000 yuan. The scrap iron invested by the masses was worth 3,000 yuan. An old woman even offered her precious conserved candle-sticks and copper coins more than one hundred years old.
- b. Personnel: Technicians and skilled workers were required to register. In a short span of time, 240 workers in a variety of areas such as iron-forges, carpentry, electricity, machine tool and rubber had been registered.

- c. Wages: The salary scale in the township industry was lower than in the state factories, but higher than in cooperative industry, and than the income of the peasants. The wage of a worker varied between 28 and 36 yuan; that of an apprentice between 10 and 20 yuan. The salaries of the Party secretary, director of the factory, and accountant were the same: 31 yuan. Personnel were under contract and still kept their cooperative or commune membership. Their wages, after the necessary costs of living, had to be invested in the cooperatives. The wages of the workers in the cooperative industry were in general paid with work-points, a little higher than or equal to a peasant's income. The value of work-points was dependent on the yearly agricultural production.
- d. Factory plants: The problem of factory plants was resolved principally by transforming existing offices or houses. For instance, the iron-forge and carpentry factory were installed in the newly-built theatre of the Haizhuang Cooperative in which no theatrical performance had ever been presented. Sometimes the workers themselves built their plants. One carpentry plant was built in 10 days by its 13 workers assisted by members of the cooperative.
- e. Equipment: No important equipment was available. The tools were provided by the workers themselves.
- f. Variety of factories and workshops: The 243 factories and workshops of the Yinghai Township could be classified in three categories: (1) those which directly served agricultural production such as iron-forge, carpentry, fertilizer and cement; (2) those which served the members' livelihood such as brick kiln, the manufacture of shoes and clothing; and (3) those which produced merchandise for export, such as sea salt, paper and handicraft goods.

g. Scale: The type of factories and workshops still resembled the handicraft type on a small scale. The largest, such as salt production, had 20-30 workers, whereas the smallest had only 3-5 workers. For instance, the iron-forge and carpentry factory had a work force of 32 people: 1 Party secretary, 1 director, 1 accountant and 29 workers divided into two groups: iron-forge and carpentry. The three leading cadres also participated in manual work. The equipment and tools consisted of one steam engine, one drilling machine, one six-foot machine tool, one steel mill, three furnaces, three pairs of pliers, and small tools provided by the workers. The property was valued at 5,971 yuan. The investment totalled 7,000 yuan with which the steam engine and steel mill were purchased, and with which six workshops were built. The factory could produce and repair small farm implements. It could also mount and repair bicycles, carts and steam engines. In two months, the factory produced 1,520 farm implements and transport instruments of 13 kinds with a total value of 2,016 yuan.

h. Summary: The experience of Yinghai Township provided the development of local industry with the following advantages: (1) The small scale local industry could supply more efficient farm implements in time for seasonal tasks to be fulfilled. (2) It could produce the kind and quantity in accordance with the need. The price was only one-third of the market price. (3) It could gradually improve farm implements and create favorable conditions for the mechanization of agriculture. (4) When the members purchased or repaired farm implements, they did not require money; they could pay with work-points. (5) The service factories such as manufacturers of clothing and shoes could liberate a large part of the female labor force.

Yinghai's plan for development of local industry for 1958 was to build 669 factories and workshops in order to meet the increasing requirements of agricultural

production. It was hoped that the gross output value of local industry would reach 93.29% of that of agriculture in 1958.

4. Liaocheng Special District

Having presented case-studies at the county and township levels, I will now turn to a case at a higher level, namely, the special district.

Shandong was divided into eight special districts in 1958, each of which was composed of 1--14 counties (and municipalities). Liaocheng was at the west boundary of Shandong and was composed of ten counties and two municipalities. One of its counties was Gaotang, the model in the development of local industry at the time. Liaocheng Special District was thus called a "flag" in the development of local industry in Shandong Province (RMRB, 9 January, 1959).

a. Leadership in the movement:

"Politics in command" was emphasized during the movement of greatly developing the county-and-commune industry. In Liaocheng Special District, at every echelon, it was always the first secretary of the CCP who took command, grasping agriculture by one hand and industry by the other (GRRB, 23 December, 1958).

b. Large scale propaganda:

Every county of Liaocheng Special District had made efforts in spreading propaganda for developing local industry. The principal slogan was "learning from Gaotang" (xue Gao-tang). The common approaches were: broadcast, telephone meetings, mass meetings of one thousand and ten thousand people (qian-ren hui, wan-ren hui), meeting of red-and-expert activists (hong-zhuan ji-ji fen-zi da-hui), army of educational propaganda of communism (gong-chan zhu-yi jiao-yu xuan-chuan da-jun) and blackboard posters, big character posters. It was said that there were more than 300,000 people

listening to the broadcast organized by Fan County (Peking DGB, 13 December, 1958).

c. Conference on the spot (xian-chang hui-yi):

An on the spot conference in Gaotang County was held at the end of November, 1958 for the purpose of setting up the model of Gaotang and learning from its experience (GRRB, 23 December, 1958).

d. Mass support:

Because of large-scale propaganda, an upsurge of mass support in developing local industry took place just after the on the spot conference in Gaotang. Incomplete statistics of the 12 counties and municipalities show that the masses transformed 36,100 units of their houses for the use of local industry, offered 280,000 cubic metres of timber, 36,000,000 pieces of brick and 57,000 earthenware vessels. Capital invested by the masses of Liaocheng, linquing and Guan counties amounted to 8,800,000 yuan (Peking DGB, 13 December, 1958).

e. Volume of local industry at the end of 1958:

During the two weeks from 25 November to 10 December, 1958, 14,846 factories were created or enlarged (13,000 newly created) of a great variety such as mechanical industry, food-grain processing, clothing manufacture, shoes and hat manufacture, food, oil pressing, paper, textiles, glass and construction materials (GRRB, 23 December, 1958). The number of workers increased from 272,700 at the end of October to 397,000 at the beginning of December, 1958 (Peking DGB, 13 December, 1958).

f. Capacity of local industry at the end of 1958:

During 20 days at the end of 1958, the county-and-commune industry of Liaocheng Special District produced 459,200 iron tools, 766,100 wooden tools, 9,740,000

pieces of brick, 2,893,000 jin of wheat flour, 575,000 suits of clothes (GRRB, 23 December, 1958), and 6,300,000,000 jin of rudimentary fertilizers (RMRB, 9 January, 1959).

5. Xiyou People's Commune in Ye County

Neither Xiyou Township nor Ye County was a model during the movement for developing local industry in 1958. However, the Xiyou People's Commune directed by the famous national activist Xu Jian-chun was a model in agriculture in 1959. As early as 1956, when Xu Jian-chun was the director of a collective farm, it was said that her farm was specially aided by the CCP Committee of Ye County to build a candy factory which brought a net gain of 50 yuan daily in order to keep both her and her farm as advanced figures (ZGQNB, 19 November, 1956). That is why when the Xiyou People's Commune which she headed became a model in agriculture, the industry run by the commune was also an object of interest.

Xiyou People's Commune was composed of 35 natural villages (21 agricultural cooperatives and one fishery cooperative before the formation of the commune) with 10,000 households and a population of 39,170 (RMRB, 2 May, 1959). Before the formation of the commune, local industry in Xiyou Township was not well developed. There were only a candy factory and a few iron-forge and carpentry workshops. The only products were small farm implements. The take-off of local industry rather took place after August, 1958 when the commune was formed. With the larger funds handled by the commune, 2 motors, 6 lathes and 5 textile machines were purchased. With the larger labor force at the disposition of the commune, 500 youths who had participated in the iron-furnace movement were drawn from the production brigades to serve the commune industry.

Within half a year, 80 factories and workshops were either built or enlarged. The most important were those manufacturing mechanical goods, fertilizer, clothing and textiles (ZGQNB, 9 October, 1959). The mechanical factory hired 150 permanent workers (ZGQNB, 19 August, 1959). During one year, 600 large farm implements such as corn huskers, drills, mechanical mills, wind-power water-wheels, 7,800 small farm implements, 2,296 tons of rudimentary fertilizers and other consumer goods were produced (ZGQNB, 9 October, 1959). Considerable capital was accumulated as well by the commune industry. The gross output value of industry amounted to 680,000 yuan in 1958, an increase of 41.8% over 1957 (RMRB, 2 May, 1959). From January to August, 1959, the four largest manufacturers of mechanical goods and textiles had a net gain of 10,000 yuan (ZGQNB, 9 October, 1959).

III THE EBBING OF LOCAL INDUSTRY (1960-1962)

A. New Contradictions versus old contradictions

As has been mentioned, the movement of greatly developing local industry was launched for the purpose of removing the three contradictions in agricultural production, namely, the shortage of labor force, the lack of fertilizer and the backwardness of farm implements. According to Mao's dialectical approach to analysis of both natural and social phenomena, contradictions are viewed as the fundamental causes of the former's development (Mao, 1967 : 311-347). Theoretically speaking, when old contradictions are resolved new contradictions come into being, and in this way a thing (no matter whether it is a matter or a social phenomenon) develops towards a higher stage. This constituted the basis of Mao's dialectical thinking as well as the theoretical foundation

of the CCP's policy-making, especially during the period of GLF. Under the influence of Mao's dialectical thinking, the movement of developing local industry was analytically considered as one - maybe the only - correct measure for removing the contradictions in agricultural production and raising it to a higher developmental stage. Today, when we look back at the events which really took place at the time, we still cannot say that the basic analysis was wrong. But the fact that the consequences were not exactly what had been expected shows that something was wrong either with the policy-making, or with the implementation of the policy. Hereafter I will try to provide a brief analysis in explanation of the change of policy vis-à-vis the development of local industry from 1960 onward.

1. Competition for the Labor Force Between Local Industry and Agriculture

If local industry was to be seen as a means of resolving the shortage of labor force in agricultural production, a minute calculation in the matter of increase in labor force was necessary. Two factors have to be taken into account for such a calculation: one is quantitative increase of manpower, the other is time. For instance, in a given commune, first the industry will help to resolve the shortage of labor force in agriculture only if the products of the industry create an economy of manpower greater than that which is absorbed by industry. Secondly, industry will help only upon the condition that its products can immediately, or in a short time, be transformed into manpower. Otherwise, not only will local industry not lend any support to the resolution of shortage of manpower in agriculture, but the former will become a keen competitor of the latter in the utilization of labor force. That is why there must be some limits to the development of local industry.

The mass movement is one means which has been used most frequently by the Chinese communists to fulfill their goals since the Yan'an period. Long experience shows that when mass is added to movement, it can be characterized by a fanaticism which makes people, the leaders and the led, spare no efforts to push the movement forward. The fear of not being able to fulfill the tasks usually pushed people into going far beyond the limits. It has never been possible to keep just balance in a mass movement. This was also the case with the movement of developing local industry (or county-and-commune industry) in 1958-1959.

As we have seen, the number of workers in local industry suddenly increased by 120,000 in only one month (from 272,700 at the end of October to 397,000 at the beginning of December 1958) in Liaocheng Special District (Peking DGB, 13 December, 1958). Three causes made the number of workers increase at such a pace. First, the number of factories and workshops was rapidly increased. Second, the pay of workers was better than that of peasants. Third, the peasants were encouraged by the local cadres to become workers during the upsurge of the movement.⁸ When so many peasants (often the best ones) left the fields to enter industry, it is not difficult to imagine that the agricultural labor force, which was said to be in short supply, was greatly affected by the movement. In other words, the unbalanced development of local industry absorbed a much larger manpower than that which could be economized in agriculture by the contribution of this local industry.

⁸ The slogan at the time was "when there is work in the factory we work in the factory, when there is no work in the factory we work in the fields." It is obvious that industry took precedence over agriculture.

2. Waste of Capital Investment

The capital available for investing in local industry was gathered entirely from the masses and local cadres. The capital consisted of both money and materials. During the movement, to invest either money or materials was almost compulsory under political pressures. In general, the cadres invested money, whereas the masses usually invested materials instead. For instance, in the Yinghai Township, the 30 cadres and 54 elementary school teachers invested 6,000 yuan (Ya Qi, 1958), being more than 70 yuan each. It should be noted that 70 yuan was almost half the yearly income of a peasant in 1958, and the whole year's income from the sideline production of a household. It corresponded to the savings of a peasant for several years. The available cash of both the cadres and the masses was soon exhausted, and no further investment would be made. Moreover, because only a part of the newly created factories and workshops could keep functioning and have some gains, most capital invested disappeared with the breakdown of the factories. This caused discontent among a large range of people.

As for capital in the form of materials, it was recognized by the press that the waste was considerable. For example, in the Yinghai Township again, amongst the scrap metal valued at 120 yuan invested by the masses were found two antique candle-sticks, three jin of copper coins and 38 copper washing basins in perfect condition (*ibid.*).

3. Quantitative Pursuit of Local Industry

Under the pressures of the GLF in general and the movement of developing local industry in particular, the local cadres could not help but sacrifice quality to quantity in setting up as many factories and workshops as possible in order to catch

up with the number of the models and to match the requirement of plans at every echelon. Gaotang County built 1,300 factories and workshops in 9 days (DZRB, 7 July, 1958). To catch up with Gaotang, Teng County, for instance, built 20,977 factories and workshops in three months (DZRB, 16 August, 1958). In an article published in September, 1958, the director of the Bureau of Industry of the CCP Committee in Shandong expressed his hope of seeing the realization of a plan of 500,000 units of local industry in the province with 5,000 in each county (Lai Ke-ke, 1958). The result was that 828,990 were built before 1959 (RMRB, 9 January, 1959). It is not surprising that René Dumont commented on this by saying: "Such numbers make us doubt the importance of factories of so many kinds and so quickly built by so few workers!" (Dumont, 1965 : 68). Just as Ya Qi reported in his article on the Yinghai experience, three or four peasants brought a few pincers or hammers into a shed and Presto! a factory is built! (Ya Qi, 1958). Most of these kinds of factories and workshops which could not produce anything of value resulted in a squandering of energy and time at the expense of agricultural production.

4. Multiple Movements Dispersing Human Force

The upsurge of local industry was not the only movement which competed with agriculture. During the GLF, the famous campaign of small blast furnaces (in the cities they were called, in English, "backyard blast furnaces") was also pushed to its extremity under the slogan of "overtaking Britain in fifteen years". It was reported that in September, 1958, the very month of the spread of the commune movement, the campaign of small blast furnaces reached its peak with an iron-and-steel army of 1,400,000 people in Shandong Province fighting night and day to refine steel (DZRB, 9 September, 1958). In Laiwu county alone, 138,000 blast furnaces were built, an

average of one furnace per household (DZRB, 29 September, 1958). It was hardly possible for the masses or the cadres to direct their energies to or concentrate their attention on so many things at a time. Consequently, the three competitive movements jeopardized each other.

5. Confusion of Leadership in the Industrial Enterprises

During the GLF, the administrative and managerial structure in industry was dismantled because of over-emphasis on "mass line" and on "politics in command". On the one hand workers were called to participate in direction and on the other the Party secretary, a red but usually not an expert, started to directly handle management. The Liang-can yi gai (two participations: participation of cadres in labor and participation of workers in direction, and one correction: correcting the old regulations in industrial enterprises) became the fashionable slogan at the time. A Chinese writer said in an article on the GLF:

In the industrial production of today, there exist, no doubt, some shortcomings such as the confusion in both administrative and productive managements. In some industrial and mineral enterprises, it has become a situation of no system, no order, no discipline and no government. The system of responsibility of the director under the leadership of the Party secretary has not been effectively implemented in many enterprises... The waste of material is serious, the maintaining of equipment is neglected, the productivity decreases, the quality of products is low, the cost of production is high and the transport cannot meet the need of industrial development...(Deng Chen-xi, 1959).

The big industry in the cities had been expected to lend some support to local industry, at least in the technical sphere. Since most of the industrial enterprises found themselves in a confused situation, they could consequently give little help to development of local industry.

In sum, the above analysis has shown that the movement of developing local industry, which was originally launched with the intention of removing the contradictions in agricultural production was obviously not able to fulfill its task but, on the contrary, created new contradictions in addition to the old ones. It is not that the dialectical analysis upon which the decision-making was based was wrong, but the limits were not carefully set up and the balance of development between the various sectors which came into interplay was not preserved. With the old contradictions plus the new ones, it was difficult to expect the agricultural production to develop towards a higher stage in the coming years.

B. De-emphasis on Local Industry

At the beginning of 1959, the new contradictions brought about by the unbalanced development of local industry were very perceptible. In the press, the term of gu-gong diu-nong (taking care of industry while neglecting agriculture) began to appear (RMRB, 9 January, 1959). For overcoming the bias of neglecting agriculture, the labor force was required to be arranged more in balance by forming special task teams (zhuan-ye dui) to take care of the local industry. It was also recognized that the system of half peasant and half worker was not so beneficial to agriculture (ibid.).

However, "walking on two legs" was still emphasized. The contribution of the county-and-commune industry was recognized. It was reported that the production of pig iron by small furnaces of less than 28 cubic metres accounted for two-thirds of the total provincial production and the small mines run by the county or commune produced one-fifth of the coal output (RMRB, 21 November, 1959). This can show the positive aspect of the development of local industry in the industrial sphere in spite

of the detrimental effects it brought to agriculture.

In Shandong, as in other provinces, from 1960 onward, local industry was gradually de-emphasized. The mass movement was cut off at the beginning of 1959. No new factories or workshops were created after that year. At the end of 1959, the total number of local industry units was reported to be more than one hundred thousand (ibid.). That is to say, almost 700,000 units disappeared during 1959.

C. Limitations Imposed on Local Industry

During the three difficult years of 1959-1961, no statistical information was released. It can be said, however, that the local industry could not make any further development during this period because of the failure in agriculture. When people, including the decision-makers, began to realize that the overriding mass movement in the building of local industry might have played a role, along with other factors, in damaging agriculture, they became more cautious about this sector.

In the Draft of the Regulations of 1961, the terms "local industry" or "country-and-commune industry" did not appear. But it should be understood that the term qi-ye (enterprise) indicates industrial enterprises. There is careful mention in the Draft: "According to the needs and the possibilities, the Administrative Committee of the people's commune can gradually set up enterprises with the investment by the commune alone, or by the commune and the brigades together or by several communes (Chapter 3, Article 12). However, the setting up of enterprises by the commune was under the conditions, first, that these enterprises must, in the main, serve the agricultural production; second, they must match the capacity of the given commune; third, they must not hamper the agricultural production (ibid.).

The Revised Draft of 1962 showed a still more cautious attitude in this matter. It clearly imposed limitations on setting up commune enterprises. "The administrative committee of the commune is not required to set up enterprises in the following years. If the enterprises which are currently run by the commune are not welcome by the masses, they should be shut down. The rest can be treated in any one of the following ways: in accordance with the decision of the members' congress they can be turned over to the handicraft cooperatives, transferred to the production teams, transformed into individual handicraft or household sideline production, or continue to be managed by the commune or the brigades. In the last case, it must have the agreement of the members' congress and the permission of the People's Committee of the county ("Revised Draft", Chapter 2, Article 13). In the meantime, conditions were set in the light of past experience:

- (1) The commune enterprises must directly serve agricultural production and the peasants' livelihood.
- (2) They must not hamper the agricultural production or increase the members' burden.
- (3) They must be managed democratically and controlled by a strict accounting system with period announcement of accounts.
- (4) Reports must be made periodically to the members' congress about the employment of personnel, the productive activities, and material and financial situations. Corruption is not tolerated.
- (5) The commune cadres or anybody else are not allowed to use these enterprises to achieve personal goals (ibid.).

Besides, the handicraft which had been included in local industry in 1958-1959 was considered separate in 1961-1962. It was not only separated from local industry, but from agriculture as well. In 1962, the old handicraft cooperatives or groups which had been integrated with the people's communes in 1958 again became independent units with management under the double leadership of the people's commune and the Federation of the Handicraft Cooperatives of the county (ibid., Chapter 2, Article 14).

IV THE CHANGING DIRECTION OF LOCAL INDUSTRY (1963-1965)

If the GLF represents a period where the heavy industry took precedence and local industry occupied the position of agent for accelerating the development of agricultural production, the years following the failure in agriculture of 1959-1961 would be a period where agriculture regained the focus of attention and water conservancy, instead of local industry, acquired primary importance. (I will be dealing with the latter in the next chapter.) However, this does not mean that local industry was completely pigeonholed after 1962. Rather, it changed its direction and was treated under different labels.

A. The Spread of Technical Groups

The technical aspect of local industry found another outlet in the scientific research directly serving agricultural production. With the "downward transfer of intellectual youth" (see Chapter Five, Section III, Leadership), the sector of local industry proved to be too restricted to absorb them. Therefore, the agricultural sector had to arrange adequate jobs for these intellectual youth. A part of them would soon become low-ranking cadres such as Party branch secretaries, commanders of production teams, accountants and work-point recorders, while another part found their positions in a newly enlarged sub-section in agriculture, namely, the ji-shu zu (technical group). The enlargement of the technical groups was partly due to the needs of agriculture at the moment when the sector of local industry could not provide effective technique support as has been explained above, and partly due to the advantage of making use of the knowledge of these intellectual youths.

In 1963, it was reported that many communes in Shandong had made full use of intellectual youth to create technical groups, youth technical groups, youth technical teams (qīng-nián jī-shù duì) and leisure time technical schools (ye-yu jī-shu xue-xiao) (RMRB, 18 July, 1963). All the 39 production brigades of the Sang'azhen People's Commune, Guan County, had established their own technical research groups (jī-shu yan-jīu zu). Among the 700 members of the technical research groups, 78% were intellectual youth. Their principal tasks were to do research on the methods of crop cultivation, farm insecticide making and the prevention of insect plagues (ibid.). Yanggu County had increased its 30 technical research groups to 204, and its 22 leisure time technical schools to 60 by 1963 (ibid.). In the peanut planting area, the Jingjiazhai Production Brigade, Mencun People's Commune, Pingdu County had 30 downward transferred intellectual youths as its basic agricultural technicians. After a few years of study and experimentation, they found three new strains of peanut which better fitted the local conditions (ibid.) Li Chun-ting, a high school graduate, after returning to his native village, the Bei Luoyang Brigade, Zhaili People's Commune, Qixia County, began to study possible methods of improving the soil condition, and finally found a way of changing the soil of a large alkaline field. Li himself took charge as commander of a shock team which was composed of 30 young people. They successfully changed the soil condition of a field of 300 mu, and increased the output from 30-40 jin per unit to 400. Li was later elected commander of the brigade and named as Party branch secretary at the same time (ibid.). In Xiyou People's Commune, Ye County, a few experts in agriculture such as Xu Jian-min in seed strain cultivation, and Zhang Bao-ji in insect plague control, had been trained in the technical groups (ibid., 27 November, 1963). In the whole province, 28 young members of the technical groups gained the title

of researcher from the Shandong Branch of the Academy of Agriculture because of the successful results of their research (ibid., 18 July, 1963).

The formation of technical groups was apparently a cheaper means than local industry, because it did not need any important investment at the outset. However, it could transform the knowledge and potentiality of these downward transferred intellectual youths into immediate tangible assets in the service to agriculture. The technical groups have since then taken an important portion of the tasks which, a few years ago, were expected to be fulfilled by local industry.

B. Mechanization

The local industry could not help but yield a large part of its place in mechanization to the big industries. At the beginning, local industry was seen as playing an important role in agricultural mechanization. But it achieved few significant results in this field during 1958-1959, due to the multiple reasons which I have previously dealt with. In 1960, the big industries in the cities were called upon to support agriculture by directly furnishing improved farm implements and equipment for irrigation. For instance, the ninety largest factories of mechanical, chemical and light industries in Jinan were said to directly support 99 communes in the counties under the jurisdiction of Jinan Municipality by means of yi-chang bao yi-she (one factory taking charge of one commune), yi-chang bao duo-she (one factory taking charge of several communes) and duo-chang bao yi-she (several factories taking charge of one commune) (GRRB, 13 July, 1960).

The crucial problem of agricultural mechanization remained however the substitution of tractors for labor. This problem could not be solved by relying only on local

industry which was comprised mainly of handicraft plants. Nor could it be solved by the big industries in one single province. It needed the support of the state, in other words, the support of the big industrial centers in China.

The first tractor station was set up in Shandong in 1952 with only six tractors. The number of tractor stations was increased to 36, and the number of tractors to 700 by 1956) (DZRB, 5 September, 1956). In 1963 the number of tractors was said to be ten times as many as in 1956) (RMRB, 18 July, 1963). The production capacity of a tractor equals more or less that of 40 energetic peasants plus 31 draught animals.⁹ The 7,000 tractors could thus replace approximately 280,000 peasants plus 217,000 draught animals. Although this number was still not too important in so large a province as Shandong which had a peasant population of at least 40,000,000 in 1963, this improvement began to reduce the shortage of manpower in agricultural production.

The pace of the spread of tractor stations depended not merely on the pace of industrial development in China as a whole, but also on the volume of the surplus value of agricultural production in every province. In Shandong there were two ways of setting up new tractor stations: One was by the county or municipality and the other

⁹ One of the best tractor drivers was reported to have cultivated 9,400 mu of land in one month; see Jiang Wen-pin, "Meng-hu che-zhang Wu Chun-sheng" (The Tiger Tractor Driver Wu Chun-sheng), Hong Kong, XHDX, 28 October, 1961. Another source provided the information in this matter as follows: With the old-style plow, one person plus two draught animals can plow 3 mu a day. With the two-wheeled double-share plow, one person plus two or three animals can plow 8-10 mu a day. A tractor of the style "Red-east 54" driven by 2 persons can plow 100 mu every 10 hours. (See "The Capacity of Agro-machineries", RMRB, 10 March, 1963.)

by the communes. In the first case, the county (or municipality) purchased tractors from the state and rented them to the communes or brigades under contract. In the second, the commune purchased tractors and either rented them to brigades or teams under contract or loaned them, depending on the economic situation of each commune. Because the purchase of new tractors required large capital and the training of tractor drivers and technicians was easier for a county or a municipality than for a commune, the tractor stations run by the county or municipality seemed to be more efficient than those run by a commune. For instance, the tractor station of Juye County could make use of 52 out of 58 tractors,¹⁰ but this ratio in the Pingyuan People's Commune, Licheng County, was only 4:13 (RMRB, 5 February, 1961).

Mechanization of agriculture, which was embodied by the spreading utilization of tractors, was more sensitive to resolving the problem of shortage of manpower than local industry. That is why investment in the renting or buying of tractors might be seen as more beneficial than developing local industry, at least for short-term planning.

C. Sideline Production

As we have seen in both the Draft of Regulations of 1961 and the Revised Draft of 1962, sideline production was treated as a separate entity from that of local industry. This change obviously aimed at correcting the confusion between sideline production and local industry created by the mass movement in 1958-1959. At this earlier period, in order to increase the quantitative amount of local industry, all sideline production was considered as a part of local industry. At the same time, leading cadres of the

¹⁰ RMRB, 25 March, 1961. This ration for the tractor station of Hoze Municipality was 20:31.

movement in their efforts to dispel the myth of industry told the masses that industry was as simple as sideline production (mostly handicraft). The negative effects of the fusion between local industry and sideline production were manifested in two ways: First, conceptually, the local industry was lowered to the level of handicraft. (Actually, the development of handicraft could take a very different direction from that of industry.) Secondly, the integration of handicraft into local industry barred the way for individual and household sideline production. It was obviously thought later on that such a situation was beneficial neither to agriculture nor to local industry; therefore, since 1962, sideline production, both collective and individual, was again recognized as an important sector of the peasant economy apart from rural industrial enterprises.

The slogan, "yi-shou zhua nong-ye, yi-shou zhua gong-ye" (grasping agriculture with one hand and industry with another) was now changed to "yi-shou zhua nong-ye, yi-shou zhua fuxie" (grasping agriculture with one hand and sideline production with another) (XMRB, 10 October, 1965). Actually, many items in the sphere of local industry such as food processing, kilns, etc., began to be considered as sideline production. Orchards, domestic animal raising, silkwork raising were also important items of sideline production. In Qixia County, the variety of sideline production had developed to more than one hundred kinds (these can be grouped in three big categories: planting, animal raising and food processing)((ibid.)). From the point of view of management, the sideline production could be divided into two categories: the collectively managed and the individually (or household) managed.

1. Collective Sideline Production

The demarcation between the collectively managed sideline production and individually managed was based on the scale, the investment, the required technique

and the kinds of resources of sideline production. Those which were large in scale, required much larger investment and a higher level of technique, and had more concentrated resources, were to be managed by the collective (examples can be found in Chapter Six, Section I, E. An Example of Ownership). The experience of 1958-59 shows that over-emphasis in sideline production could cause a repeat of the same error as that of local industry. That is why both human and money investments in sideline production were limited. For instance, in Qixia County, sideline production absorbed 25,000 workers which corresponded to 20% of the total labor force of the county in agriculture. This was the maximum labor force that sideline production could use. As for the investment, it was required that 80% of the gains from sideline production be invested in agriculture and only 20% be used for increasing sideline production (*ibid.*). But sideline production was still lopsidedly developed in different areas. The gross value of output of sideline production represented from 10% to 38% of that of agricultural production. In some brigades, 80% of the members' income was dependent on sideline production, whereas in others it was only 6% (*ibid.*). Qixia County was a model in sideline production. Sideline production in this county became an important support to agriculture. During two years (1963-64), investment from sideline production in agriculture amounted to 8,000,000 yuan. With this capital, 1,306 farm machines such as motor engines, pumps and hullers, 20,000 tons of chemical fertilizers, 980,000 jin of pesticides, and 600,000 small farm tools were purchased. Moreover, due to sideline production, the county was able to contribute to the export program by selling 26,000,000 jin of fruits, 1,580,000 jin of cocoons, 88,000 pigs, 250,000 jin of medical grass, and 3,700 jin of perfumery to the state (*ibid.*). It was also

important as to the income of the members. In 1964, 15 yuan out of 21 yuan – the average cash income of peasants in the county – came from sideline production (*ibid.*).

2. Household and Individual Sideline Production

Sideline production held by the household and individual was difficult to gauge because a large part of it was self-consumed. This was especially true of the production from private plots. What could be more easily figured out was domestic animal raising. Before 1961, owing to the fear of a revival of a rich-peasant economy, restrictions were placed on individual domestic animal raising. Instead, collective animal raising was encouraged. But the results were not successful. After 1962, policy was shifted to encouraging domestic animal raising. In 1964, almost every household had one or two pigs and some fowl. In the Dayu Brigade, Xinzhai People's Commune, Linju County, each household had, on the average, 4.5 pigs and/or sheep besides fowl (RMRB, 28 July, 1964).

However, development of sideline production as a whole was not that much in favor of household management. The general tendency can be seen from the following table:

Table 8.1

Comparison of collectively managed sideline production and household sideline production in Qixia County for 1962 and 1964.

	<u>Brigade</u>	<u>Team</u>	<u>Household</u>
1962	22%	18%	60%
1964	55%	12%	33%

Source: "Investigation on the Sideline Production of Qixia County, Shandong Province", RMRB, 10 October, 1965.

When sideline production was separated from local industry, the latter contained no more than factories for the manufacture of farm implements, chemical fertilizer, pesticide, insecticide, and a few other consumer goods such as clothing, shoes, etc. As for sideline production, it falls between the sectors of agriculture and local industry. If these two sectors expanded to meet each other, there would be no possibility of an independent sector of sideline production. The necessity for and possibility of an independent sector of sideline production depended mainly on the utility of traditional handicraft. That was because agriculture was still not mechanized. There still existed a large gap between agriculture and industry. In such a situation, agriculture needed the support of handicraft in two ways: to furnish simple farm tools and to accumulate capital for mechanization. The more support handicraft could give to agriculture, the sooner mechanization of agriculture could be achieved. On the other hand, one of the goals of mechanization of agriculture was to lend more support to industrial development. Therefore, a steady development of handicraft could indirectly support industrialization. According to this analysis, it is easily understood that sideline production (mainly in the form of handicrafts) had its role to play in a certain stage of economic development. The policy of 1958-1959, which placed direct emphasis on the development of local industry and neglected the importance of the mediate role of sideline production between agriculture and industry in the peasant economy, was certainly a mistake. Fortunately, it was quickly corrected by reemphasizing sideline production instead of local industry in the following years.

This change in direction, however, does not mean that local industry was to be pigeonholed for ever. It was, rather, redefined in the light of the experience of 1958-59. The consequences of such a redefinition can be seen as follows: (1) Local

industry must keep on a certain level in order to deserve the name "industry". (2) It should leave space for the development of traditional handicraft so that the latter could be fully used as a supporting force for both the development of agriculture and of local industry.

V SUMMARY

In a country such as China where agriculture still plays a crucial role in the national economy, the pace of industrial development depends largely on the capital accumulation by the agricultural sector. On the other hand, the increase in agricultural output depends, in turn, on the support of industry in furnishing more advanced farm implements, more chemical fertilizers and insecticides, and more equipment for irrigation. In the final analysis, the two sectors in the economy - agriculture and industry - are closely interdependent. The Chinese policies of "walking on two legs", "simultaneous development of industry and agriculture" and "taking industry as the leading sector and agriculture as foundation" all reflect that the interdependent relationship between agriculture and industry was keenly perceived. Following this line of thinking, the launching of the greatly developing local industry movement could certainly be interpreted as an effort in the attempt to forge a closer link between industry and agriculture.

When the people's commune was created, it seemed likely that the conditions for development of local industry became more favorable than ever. However, the experience of 1958-1959 did not live up to expectations. The causes and consequences of the failure of the leap in local industry which have been analyzed in this chapter suggest the same direction of evolution as that of the commune structure. The structural development

of the commune system could not make a leap forward passing over the pre-existing structure of the cooperatives. By the same token, local industry could hardly jump further ahead without giving full consideration to the existing traditional handicraft.

The traditional handicraft was a by-product of agricultural activities. The long co-existence of the two sectors had made them more interdependent than competitive. In contrast, the overriding development of the local industry caused it to become from its inception a competitor of agriculture both in labor force and in investment. If the local industry utilized only the peasants' leisure time and the residue of agricultural production, it would be no more than handicraft or sideline production. Why should it be given the name "industry"? If it had to hire permanent workers, and try to be better equipped, it could not but compete in some way with agriculture.

On the other hand, local industry should compete with big industries in selling their products. In some cases, the products of local industry might be inferior, but not less expensive than those of big industries. That is why local industry could hardly achieve the objective of lending closer support to agriculture than the big industries in the cities could do.

The later development of technical groups and the reemphasis on sideline production can be viewed as a response to the dilemma faced by the development of local industry. When the mechanization of agriculture was still in its infancy, the technical groups and sideline production which needed little investment could do much by way of directly supporting agricultural production.

Generally speaking, the increase of agricultural output relies on three factors: mechanization, fertilizer and irrigation. While the first two depend too

much on industry – both big and local – and could not achieve any spectacular outcome in a short time span, the third one was seen as a sector which could gain some quicker results by substituting labor for capital investment. This issue will be the central theme of the next chapter.

Chapter Nine

WATER CONSERVANCY

This chapter will deal with the construction of water conservancy (which is vital to the agricultural development in China and closely related to the commune system) in three parts. First, the general development of water conservancy in Shandong Province from 1956 to 1965 will be introduced. This will be followed by two case-studies. The first is centered on the problem of "labor accumulation" in the construction of water conservancy, a method which has been used by the Chinese to turn labor into capital in their economic development. The second will be a study of various aspects of water conservancy in a production brigade situated in unfavorable natural conditions. Special attention will be given to how the people of the brigade broke up the ordinary economic mechanism by applying the principle of "self-reliance", as well as to the role of ideology and that of leadership in the economic development.

I CONSTRUCTION OF WATER CONSERVANCY IN SHANDONG

A. Natural Conditions

Shandong is a hilly province, with a 60% mountainous and hilly area and only 40% of its land on the plains (see Chapter Four, Section I : Geographical and Historical Background). The agricultural production of the province has been affected by two major factors of the natural conditions: the north China climate and the Yellow River.

In north China, rainfall is insufficient and irregular. In Shandong the average rainfall varies between 500 and 900 centimetres from the northwest to the southeast.

seaboard, but most of it falls in the summer season, and represents 60–70% of the yearly rainfall. Moreover, the difference in rainfall between different years is considerable. The rainfall in a rainy year may be several times as much as in a dry year. Because of its proximity to the sea the climate is a little warmer and more humid than the other provinces on the North China Plain. The average temperature is between 12° and 14°C from the northeast seaboard to the southwest, -4° to -1°C in the coldest month (January) and 24° – 27° in the hottest month (August for the coastal area and July for the rest). The frost-free season varies between six and seven months from the north to the south (cf. Atlas by Provinces of the PRC, 1974 : 39).

Because of insufficient rainfall, most of the famines in Shandong as in the other provinces of north China throughout Chinese history have been caused by drought.

Cressey has pointed out that:

China's greatest famines have occurred when two or more adjacent provinces simultaneously failed to receive rain, or when the same area has experienced drought for successive years. Thus Chekiang had six successive years without enough rain, 1170 to 1175, and again four years from 1180 to 1183. Hopei and Honan suffered from 990 to 992, from 1296 to 1298, and again 1324 to 1328. The provinces most frequently affected are Hopei, Honan, Shansi, Shensi and Shantung; here occurred 100 out of the 216 greatest droughts (1955 : 97–98).

The Yellow River and the Grand Canal are the two main water courses in Shandong Province, the former 571 kilometres long, and the latter 630 kilometres within the provincial boundaries. While the Grand Canal is helpful to farm irrigation and transportation, the Yellow River has always been considered more harmful than beneficial. Because it brings a great quantity of earth when it passes through the loess plateaux, the riverbed at the lower reaches becomes increasingly shallow year by year. This is the

reason why the river flow has changed its course from time to time and inundated land along both banks during the rainy seasons. According to the historical record, during the last 2,000 years the lower course of the Yellow River overflowed in Honan and Shandong provinces more than 1,500 times (cf. Huanghe Zai Qian-jin, 1972). Furthermore the Yellow River in Honan Province used to melt earlier in the spring than its lower course in Shandong. The consequent spring ice flow has also been one of the causes of inundation in Shandong (Atlas by Provinces of the PRC, : 39). Apart from the Yellow River, many other rivers which originate from the mountains in Shandong, and which have short courses and rapid flows, also cause floods.

Historically, ~~then, drought and flood~~ (mainly from the Yellow River) constituted the major natural calamities for agriculture in Shandong. After 1949, owing to the efforts devoted to harnessing the Yellow River, floods were considerably reduced, but drought was still a serious yearly threat. (The figures for the most important droughts in Shandong between 1952 and 1965 can be seen in Table 9.1). In order to eliminate the drought threat the construction of water conservancy became an urgent task.

Apart from the natural calamities such as drought and flood, the soil conditions in Shandong are not favorable to agriculture, due to two major causes: First, Shandong is one of the earliest areas to be farmed. The same soil has been cultivated by Chinese peasants for at least 5,000 years, presumably. In spite of the constant care of the peasants to maintain its fertility, the soil is not as rich as in the newer areas, so that it requires much more fertilizer. Secondly, owing to the destruction of the forests and the random reclamation of mountain slopes, the earth has been stripped of the protection provided by vegetation and for a long time serious losses of water and soil have occurred. (In the time of Mencius - about 300 B.C. - the destruction of woods in the mountainous

Table 9.1

Important Droughts in Shandong Province Between 1952 and 1965

	Spring drought	Scope & intensity	Summer drought	Scope and intensity	Autumn drought	Scope and intensity	Winter drought	Scope and Intensity
1952	X				X	some areas		
1953								
1954								
1955	X	some areas	X					
1956	X	prior to May 31						
1957			X	since July .	X		X	
1958	X		X	serious .				
1959	X		X	since July 74 counties and munici- palities. severity seldom heard of in past decades.	X	since late September	X	
1960	X		X					
1961	X	severe in most counties	X					
1962								
1963								
1964								
1965	X	Qufu County*						

Source: Save where otherwise indicated, from Robert Carin, Irrigation Scheme in Communist China.¹

* Hong Kong, XHDX, 4 August, 1965.

¹ Robert Carin, Irrigation Scheme in Communist China, monograph in mimeo., Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1963. This book contains much detailed information although the writer's opinion seems to be partial and I do not agree with the conclusion of this work in which the construction of water conservancy is considered as a complete failure.

areas in Shandong was already considerable.) Obviously, afforestation was needed. However, unless combined with an effective system of water conservancy, both application of fertilizer and afforestation could not be appropriately effected. This is another reason why construction of water conservancy became an urgent task in the fifties and sixties.

B. Construction by the Masses

1. Construction of Water Conservancy Before the Establishment of the People's Communes

Since 1951 in China as a whole there had been an anti-drought campaign launched somewhere almost every year. Even if there was no drought during the year, the winter and spring were usually dedicated to some kind of water conservancy projects.

It was reported that in Shandong 100,000 irrigation wells were sunk in 1951, 200,000 in the spring of 1952 (Carin, 1963 : 24), and 160,000 in 1955 (ibid. : 45). No information is available for other years. However, one source gives the total number of wells in Shandong as 2,110,000 by 1955 (Shandong Sheng Tong-ji Ju, 1956). It seems that a certain number of wells were sunk every year. In addition to wells, in the year 1955, 245 small-scale dams, 737 irrigation canals and more than 5,000 reservoirs were built(ibid.).

If a drought occurred, a substantial amount of labor was committed to the construction of wells and other kinds of water conservancy. In 1958, during the summer drought, a total of 15,000,000 man-days was utilized daily in Shandong in the campaign of anti-drought cultivation and the protection of young plants (Carin, 1963 : 82). In a report of Li Xian-nian, the Minister of Finance, it was said that from October, 1957

to January, 1958, approximately 100 million peasants in the whole country were daily engaged in water conservancy projects. Supposing these 100 million people each worked 100 days, the number of work-days spent in water conservancy construction in China would amount to 10,000 million (*ibid.* : 76). However, due to the lack of careful planning and advanced techniques, not all the wells sunk were useful to irrigation. It was reported that:

When water conservancy work was carried out this spring (1956), the phenomenon of blindness was known to have occurred in some places in Shandong due to their failure to proceed from reality. This resulted in the wasting of the labour and capital of the agricultural producers cooperatives and the drilling of many useless wells (quoted by Carin : 48).

In spite of some waste, the labor poured into the water conservancy construction was not insignificant. By 1956, in Shandong, 18,000,000 mu of land were brought under irrigation (Tan Qi-long, 1957), to which 5,100,000 mu were added in 1957.²

2. Construction of Water Conservancy Since the Establishment of the Commune up to 1965

In 1958 two conferences on the 1959 tasks and plans for water conservancy were called by the Ministry of Agriculture in May and June. One was at Xiangyang (covering 13 provinces and regions in the south), the other at Zhengzhou (covering northern provinces and regions). The plans envisaged expansion of irrigated regions by 490,000,000 mu, elimination of water-logging on 72,810,000 mu and construction of earth and stone works to the extent of 96,100,000,000 cubic metres during 1959 (Carin, 1963 : 84). In order to enlarge the irrigation system, the small works done

² *People's cooperation*
RMRB, 4 January, 1958. In 1957 the irrigated land in China as a whole was about 34.6 million hectares (see Carin, 1963 : 85).

were found insufficient and medium and large works were considered necessary.

In carrying out the policy of "relying mainly on cooperatives for building small works to store up water", attention should be paid to developing medium works and certain large works which are necessary and possible (quoted by Carin : 84).

It should be noted that in addition to many other reasons, the merging of cooperatives into people's communes was seen as a necessarily organizational restructure to cope with the large-scale construction of water conservancy.

The peasants in the newly established communes all over the country are demonstrating even greater enthusiasm in production. They are...building irrigation projects... The people's communes, which have far greater manpower and financial resources and a higher level of collectivization than agricultural producer cooperatives, have displayed their advantages from the outset of their operations (quoted by Carin : 85).

With the greater manpower and financial resources handled by the communes, larger scale water conservancy was made possible for the masses to undertake themselves without state investment.

At present, a new change has emerged, under which people's communes have been set up practically throughout the countryside. Compared with individual agricultural economy, agricultural cooperativization is far more superior; yet people's communes are still superior to agricultural cooperatives. Formerly agricultural cooperatives could undertake comparatively small water conservancy projects covering several hundred or several thousand of mu of land, nowadays people's communes can handle water conservancy construction covering tens and hundreds of thousands of mu; formerly agricultural cooperatives could resist comparatively small floods and droughts, now people's communes have the strength to resist much larger floods and droughts; formerly water conservancy projects undertaken by agricultural cooperatives were centered on resisting drought and fighting water-logging, now it is possible for people's communes to draw up overall plans for irrigation, water-logging prevention... (RMRB Editorial, 14 October, 1958).

The winter of 1958 was an extremely busy season for the peasants. The establishment of the people's communes, the movement of developing local industry, the blast furnace campaign and the campaign of water conservancy all came together. They were all of an urgent nature. All required full participation of the peasants who had, as human beings, only limited time and energy. In consequence, all the movements and campaigns were jeopardized by keen competition between them. The disorder of the commune movement, the feverish advance of the blast furnaces campaign, and the movement of developing local industry, have already been discussed in previous chapters. Now it has to be noted that the campaign of water conservancy which was launched in the winter of 1958 with the intention of pushing it on a larger scale by relying on the greater disposition of the people's commune was far from fulfilling its objective. It was reported that in Shandong, the area of wheat fields under irrigation totalled only little more than 30 percent of the wheat acreage, whereas in the corresponding period of 1957 53.4% of the wheat fields were reported to have been irrigated (Carin, 1963 : 89), probably because of the competition from all these movements.

1959 was a bad year in Shandong because the drought was so serious that at its worst point, 73,070,000 mu of crops were damaged (ibid. : 95). Shandong was only one of 17 provinces hit by that unprecedented drought. When most of the other affected provinces began to have rainfall in August, the drought in Shandong was lessened in intensity or ended in very few places only (ibid.).

The painful experience of the drought of 1959 warned the masses as well as the state to pay more attention to the construction of water conservancy. The RMRB declared that the struggle against the natural calamities in 1959 greatly inspired the masses to develop greater ambition to reform nature and that a large-scale mass water

conservancy construction should be carried out this winter [1959] and next spring [1960] (RMRB, 7 September, 1959). The labor force required in building water conservancy projects was expected to reach approximately 10 percent of the rural labor force in 1960. But, as water conservancy projects have a strong seasonal character, the labor force had to be concentrated within 80–120 days during the winter and spring. The number of laborers used during this period was expected to reach 20 to 40 percent of the total number of rural laborers depending on the magnitude of the works (Carin, 1963 : 91).

In Shandong, where no large or medium-sized projects were built before 1958, over 21,000 kilometres of ditches for irrigation purposes were dug (ibid. : 101), 139 large and medium reservoirs were under construction, and more than 94,000 small reservoirs, ponds and canals were completed, and 14,100 wells were built or repaired by the commune in 1959 (ibid. : 106).

In 1960, Shandong was, as had happened before, one of the areas worst hit by the drought. The DGB of Hong Kong reported:

The provinces hit in wide areas by the drought were Hobei, Honan, Shandong and Shanxi. It is estimated that over 60 percent of the cultivated land in the four provinces fell victim to natural calamities with the longest spell of drought lasting for six or seven months. In some areas, the dry spells lasted for more than one year. At the most serious stages of drought in spring and autumn this year, there was no water in eight of the 12 principal rivers in Shandong Province (Hong Kong DGB, 30 December, 1960).

This serious drought resulted in a mobilization of about 13,580,000 persons in Shandong in the struggle against drought for the protection of the wheat crop (XHDX, 19 April, 1960). Thanks to the completed works of water conservancy, the peasants of the province succeeded in bringing water to 40,000,000 mu of wheat in the tilling

stage (*ibid.*, 9 March, 1960).

Since the construction of water conservancy absorbed so many laborers as to sometimes hinder the tasks in the fields, a halt seems to have been put to the campaign of water conservancy construction in the winter of 1960. This was witnessed by the RMRB:

q This winter (1960), since rural areas will spend much less manpower on such construction tasks as building water conservancy works and levelling farmland as compared with the previous two years, more manpower can be devoted to agricultural and subsidiary production (RMRB, 14 November, 1960).

But in the winter of 1960, there was still very little snow and rain in all parts of Shandong, as well as in other provinces in North China.

With the exception of some counties and communes in three special districts and municipalities of Qingdao, Yantai and Changwei, in the other six special districts and municipalities drought to varying extent has emerged. In some counties and communes in Liaocheng Special District and Jinan Municipality where the drought situation is most serious, the water content of the soil is less than 10 percent (RMRB, 3 March, 1961).

In 1961 the four provinces of Shandong, Honan, Hobei and Shanxi in North China were menaced by serious drought for the third year in succession. In such a situation, the Chinese government was forced to stress renewal of water conservancy construction (*cf.* Carin, 1963 : 120-122). The climate became favorable only in the winter of 1961 in North China (see Table 9.1). However, the construction of water conservancy has since then been considered as one of the most crucial tasks in agricultural production, especially for a province so vulnerable to climatic changes as Shandong.

The halt to the release of statistics in China during 1960-1961, and since then, makes research for the period between 1961 and 1965 difficult. However, some occasional information gives indications that the construction of water conservancy constituted

during this period a regular task in the winter and spring when agricultural work was not heavy. The kind of water conservancy which was emphasized varied in accordance with the physical conditions of each area. For instance, in the river basins dams were constructed, whereas in the plains wells were sunk as the main water sources. In the mountainous areas, reservoirs and pumping stations were the most crucial.

The Yi River was one of the most destructive rivers in the history of Shandong with frequent changes of its main course. Up to 1962 fourteen dams had been built along the course of this river in three counties, Yishui, Yanan and Linyi (ZGXW, 2 March, 1962).

To the west of the Yi River basin is Meng Mountain which was one of the poorest mountainous areas in Shandong. In the total area of 2,140,000 mu of Mengyin County, the arable land amounted only to 590,000 mu of which 540,000 mu was piecemeal and in hilly land. During the winter of 1964 and the spring of 1965, 100,000 laborers in the county were mobilized in water conservancy projects and field levelling. More than 100 reservoirs, ponds and pumping stations were constructed and more than 50,000 mu of hilly land was improved (*ibid.*, 11 June, 1965).

In 1963-1964, the production brigades which had low output in agricultural production in the nine special districts of the province found that one of the causes of low output was the soil salinization and alkalization in the water-logged areas. The emphasis was thus placed on the improvement of soil conditions. In Qiho County alone, even the production brigades which were in difficulty dug 1,600 ditches to shift 80,000 mu of water-logged land into good land. In the meantime, the sinking and repairing of 1,000 new and old wells brought the area under irrigation from 20,000 mu to 30,000 mu. The Yuzhuang Brigade, Jiangguantun People's Commune, Gaotang County had improved 150 mu of alkaline land and 300 mu of water-logged land. In the whole province, the

brigades in difficulties had improved a total of more than 4,000,000 mu of water-logged, alkaline and sandy land in 1962-1963. It resulted in raising the output in 80% of these brigades in difficulties to the average level (XHDX, 5 January, 1964).

C. Efforts of the State

The policy of construction of water conservancy was to mobilize the masses in order to make full use of labor instead of capital investment. This policy was declared through one editorial of the RMRB:

We should firmly implement the "three primary" policy, that is, the water conservancy projects should be primarily designed to store water, should be primarily of a small scale, and should be built primarily by the people themselves...

We can only expect to solve manpower, material, financial and technical problems by fully mobilizing and relying on the masses (1 November, 1959).

However, this does not mean that the state made no effort in the construction of water conservancy, or that it did not invest in it at all. On the contrary, while the masses were busy with the small-scale works, the state concentrated its efforts on large works, especially in some strategic points that would benefit a large area such as an irrigation system, and thus needed more materials and labor, larger financial resources, and more complex techniques. Up to 1962, there were eight irrigation systems constructed in North China,³ of which three were partially or entirely in Shandong.

³ The eight irrigation systems are North Jiangsu, Bi-Shi-hang (Carin mistook as Shi-bi-hang), Baisha, People's Victory, Sanyizhai People's Victory, East Wind, Dayuzhang and Weishan (see Carin, 1963 : 129-158).

1. Sanyizhai People's Victory Irrigation System⁴

The construction of this project started in March, 1958. It was anticipated that this irrigation system would be the biggest in China. 220,000 workers were employed in the construction. The project consisted of a main trunk canal connected with the Yellow River in Lankao County of Honan Province, small irrigation canals, and a sluice gate 72 metres long to regulate the flow from the Yellow River (Carin, 1963 : 145-146). The construction was completed in August of the same year. It was said that this system could bring the waters from the Yellow River to 9,000,000 mu of parched land in the adjoining Honan and Shandong provinces (DZRB, 16 August, 1958). It could also supply water for the Wanfu River leading to eastern Shandong (*ibid.*).

2. Dayuzhang Irrigation System

Construction of this system began in October 1956 and was completed in 1958 (Carin, 1963 : 147). The objective and capacity of this project can be seen in the following report:

The irrigated area covered by the water system spreads over the plains of Guangrao and Boxing counties near the seacoast in Shandong Province where the land has turned saline and alkaline, due to saline underground water. Part of the area now to be irrigated, covering 93,000 hectares has been wasteland for a long time because of its heavy saline and alkaline content. More than half a million people in these two counties have had to drink salty water all the year round.

The new irrigation system will not only bring the water of the Yellow River to end drought, but will also gradually wash away the saline and alkaline content of the land and increase its output. The 93,000 hectares of wasteland will be made arable and reclaimed. Newly built drainage canals will relieve the area of the menace of water-logging in the rainy season... Irrigation canals and drainage ditches, totalling

⁴ Carin gives the name as "Sanyizhai People's Leap Forward", but the DZRB, the chief local newspaper in Shandong called it "Sanyizhai People's Victory". I follow the latter.

22,000 kilometres in length, have been built in addition to numerous sluice gates, bridges and culverts. A total of 107 million cubic metres of earthwork was involved (quoted by Carin, 1963 : 147).

3. Weishan Irrigation System

This irrigation system started in May, 1958, and was completed in December of 1959 (ibid. : 148-149). The system consisted of a trunk canal running from the main course of the Yellow River at Dong'a County to link up with the Grand Canal. A big reservoir was to be built in Dong'a County. The whole irrigation system was expected to bring the irrigated area up to 1.5 million hectares and to control the flow along the lower reaches of the Yellow River so that the menace of spring ice flow and summer torrents might be eliminated (ibid.).

During the serious drought spell in 1958 it was reported that the Weishan Irrigation System had played a crucial role even before its completion:

Four ;trunk canals of the Weishan Irrigation Project have been completed, which cut across seven counties and the cities of Liaocheng, Shiping, Gaotang, Xiajin, Pingyuan, Linqing and Qiho. Wherever the trunk canals go, the people's communes in various counties have excavated more than 7,800 large and small canals, and constructed more than 10,000 control gates and irrigation gates, scattered in various fields like blood vessels. The result is that 3,600,000 mu of farm land is now automatically irrigated, and another 1,290,000 mu is partially automatically irrigated with water brought by watercarts. In places automatically irrigated, once the gate is open, the water of the Yellow River then flows to the foot of the farm (quoted by Carin, 1963 : 149).

III. CONSTRUCTION OF WATER CONSERVANCY IN THREE PRODUCTION BRIGADES OF THE GUFENGTAI PEOPLE'S COMMUNE, YISHUI COUNTY : A CASE STUDY ON LABOR ACCUMULATION⁵

In the previous chapters I have mentioned that one method used successfully by the Chinese for economic development is to turn labor into capital. Hereafter I will illustrate this method by a concrete example in water conservancy and show the relationship between labor and capital, on the one hand, and the significance of labor accumulation in the Chinese experience of rural economic development on the other. But before making the presentation it is necessary to give a definition of the term "labor accumulation" in the framework of the development of Chinese rural economy. Labor accumulation can in general mean capital in the form of reserve funds and/or in the form of collective property accumulated by labor. However, a particular usage in some context means an extra capital accumulated entirely by labor beyond the regular labor utilization in agriculture. In other words, the labor accumulation in some particular context, such as in this study, means to turn the underemployed labor into capital by means of non-agricultural activities.

A. Construction of Water Conservancy and Field Works in Three Production Brigades (Zhangjiarongren, Shagou and Xiwangzhuang)

The natural conditions for the three brigades were not good. Eighty percent of the land of the Zhangjiarongren Brigade consisted of water-logged fields, whereas 70-80 percent of the land of both Shagou Brigade and Xiwangzhuang Brigade was hilly fields where losses of water and soil were serious. Up to the year of the establishment of the

⁵ This study is based on the report by Shandong sheng Jing-ji Yan-jiu-suo Nong-ye-jing-ji-zu (the Group of Agricultural Economy of the Economic Research Institute of Shandong Province), Jing-ji Yan-jiu Yue-kan (The Economic Research Monthly), No. 107, 20 September, 1965: 1-13.

people's communes, the grain output in the three brigades had been low and unstable, varying from 150 to 250 jin per mu.

Changes of natural conditions in the three brigades started after the agricultural collectivization, but were intensified after 1958 when the commune system was introduced. These changes were brought about mainly by the construction of water conservancy, field works and afforestation. The results of these basic constructions between 1958 and 1964 in the three brigades can be seen in Tables 9.2 and 9.3 over.

The construction of water conservancy could not be effective without being combined with field works and afforestation. The basic construction made by the three brigades had laid the foundation of their irrigation systems. By 1964, the acreage under irrigation of Zhangjiarongren, Shagou and Xiwangzhuang reached, respectively, 1,200 mu (61.6% of the total cultivated land), 1,800 (41.4%) and 1,100 (34.7%).

B. Utilization of Underemployed Labor Force

In the countryside, the labor force suffered from both shortage and underemployment, in shortage during the busy seasons and underemployment during the leisure seasons, i.e., the winter and part of spring of each year. The water conservancy and other basic construction used to be done during the winter and spring by utilizing the underemployed labor force. However, this underemployed labor was not unlimited. In order not to hamper the agricultural production and sideline production, the labor force available to basic construction could not be beyond the residual of the total available labor force in a productive unit after the needsof the main productive activities had been met. Therefore, the potentiality of the labor force in a productive unit and the level of labor utilization in production would be the two determinants of the extent of this underemployed labor

Table 9.2

Construction of Water Conservancy

	reservoirs	pond embank- ments	ponds	ditches (metres)	river harn- essing (metres)	river embank- ments (metres)	utilization of river for irrigation
Zhangjia- rongren	2	1		6,000	1,500	1,500	1
Shagou	9	28	7	6,250	2,200		
Xiawang- zhuang	3		2	7,000		3,500	

Table 9.3

Construction of Field Works and Afforestation (unit: mu)

	"three-in-one" terraced fields *	deeply turned and levelled fields	soil improved fields	regularized fields	total field works	afforesta- tion
Zhangjia- rongren	250	800	870	1,416	3,336	260
Shagou	1,500	1,565	800		3,865	2,200
Xiawang- zhuang	681	1,200	50		1,391	3,150

* "Three-in-one" means the combination of three field works: embankment, deeply turned and levelled, and drainage ditches.

force which can be used for basic construction works. The extent of the underemployed labor force available to the basic construction should vary from one place to another according to the different natural conditions and the level of development of production in each place. The success in basic construction depended to a large extent upon the maximized utilization of the underemployed labor force within the extent limited by both the potentiality of available labor force and the level of production in a given productive unit. What was done in the three brigades in this connection provides a relative successful model based on a rational distribution of labor force. The actual situation of the labor force for 1964 in the three brigades is shown in Table 9.4.

Table 9.4

Population, labor force and cultivated acreage in the three brigades
in 1964

	Population	Labor force	cultivated acreage (mu)		
			total acreage	per capita	per laborer
Zhangjia-rongren	860	356	1,715	2	4.8
Shagou	2,428	750	4,344	1.8	5.8
Xiwang-zhuang	1,280	563	3,165	2.5	5.6

From 1961 to 1964 the amount of labor used in production in the three brigades increased year by year. In the meantime, the amount of labor used in basic construction increased at the same rate except for Shagou Brigade for the years 1962 and 1963 (see Table 9.5 over).

Table 9.5

Labor Utilization in Production and Basic Construction from 1961 to 1964
in the Three Brigades
Unit: Labor-day

		1961	1962		1963		1964		
		amount	amount	% of the last year	amount	% of the last year	amount	% of the last year	% of 1961
Zhangjia- rongren	Production	38,890	41,915	108	43,029	103	48,385	112	125
	Basic construction	9,610	11,230	117	11,660	104	18,835	162	195
Shagou	Production	91,470	103,000	113	126,135	123	131,313	104	144
	Basic construction	35,000	30,130	86	22,215	73	53,030	239	152
Xiwang- zhuang	Production	52,497	55,354	105	86,260	156	101,565	118	194
	Basic construction	14,140	15,349	109	15,380	100	27,100	178	192

Table 9.5 shows that the level of production in the three brigades continued to rise during the years 1961-1964 and, at the same time, the scale of basic construction was increasingly enlarged. During the four years, the total amount of labor utilization in the three brigades increased respectively from 48,500, 126,470 and 66,637 to 67,220, 184,343 and 128,665 labor days. The increased percentages are respectively 39%, 45.7% and 93%. Where did this increased labor come from? There were two sources: natural increase of the labor force and utilization of underemployed labor. During the four years the labor force in the three brigades naturally increased respectively 3.2%, 12% and 10%. Therefore, the major part of the increased labor force was not provided by natural increase, but by the utilization of underemployed labor.

Because production required an increasing amount of labor force year by year, competition was inevitable between production (mainly agricultural production) and basic construction for the available underemployed labor. Although agricultural production must take precedence over other sectors in labor utilization, the basic construction could not be neglected - it being the fundamental effective means of raising the agricultural output. Therefore, a balanced distribution of labor force between the sector of production and that of basic construction was necessary. When many other units had suffered from the disproportional distribution of labor force among various sectors, the proportion of distribution of labor force between the sector of production and that of basic construction in the three brigades furnished a successful model for the agricultural development in the communes. The following table will show this proportion of labor distribution:

Table 9.6
Labor Distribution in the Three Brigades for
1961-1964

		1961	1962	1963	1964
Zhangjia-rongren	Total amount of labor-days	48,480	53,145	54,689	67,220
	% for production	79.2	78.9	78.7	72
	% for basic const.	20.8	21.1	21.3	28
Shagou	Total amount of labor-days	126,470	133,130	148,350	184,343
	% for production	72.3	77.4	85	71.2
	% for basic const.	27.7	22.6	15	28.8
Xiwang-zhuang	Total amount of labor-days	66,637	70,703	101,640	128,665
	% for production	78.8	78.3	85	78.9
	% for basic const.	21.2	21.7	15	21.1

It can be seen that the labor force used in the basic construction in the three brigades varied between 20%-30% of the total amount of labor utilization. Sometimes it was less than 20%, but it never exceeded 30%. This proportion of labor force could be used in the basic construction only upon the condition that the underemployed labor force was fully extracted out during the leisure seasons. The maximized utilization of underemployed labor relies on the effective organization of the labor force.

In the three brigades labor used for the basic construction was organized in two forms: mass shock teams and special task teams. Responsibility for the completion of the main body of basic construction rested with the mass shock teams during the winter time (usually concentrated in 100-120 days between the end of September and the middle of February). The special task teams were responsible only for the maintenance

of the works and technique services. Because the special task teams needed a permanent labor force withdrawn from the agricultural production, it could not be large. The proportion of special task teams to the total labor force in the three brigades was respectively 4.2%, 7.8% and 3.6%. This labor force of the special task teams had to be poured into agricultural production during the height of the busy seasons. Therefore, it can be said that more than 15% of the 20-30% of the total labor force was the result of concentrated use of underemployed labor during leisure seasons.

In order to maximize utilization of underemployed labor force organization and the ideological motivation by socialist education of which I have given many examples in the previous chapters and have considered as an important means in mass mobilization were not enough. Some rational incentive measures were also called for. That is why the relationship between the utilization of the underemployed labor force and income distribution should be rationally regulated.

C. Labor Accumulation and Members' Income Distribution

1. Financial Responsibility for Basic Construction

The basic construction (water conservancy, field works and afforestation) was usually centered on the brigade level. For instance, among the 99,905 labor days that the Zhangjiarongren Brigade had employed in basic construction from 1955 to 1965, 16.3% was used for work at the state level, 3.5% at the commune level and 80.2% at the brigade level. One part of the work at the brigade level was done directly under brigade direction, and another part done by production teams under the brigade's unified planning and supervision.

As we have already seen, the labor force for basic construction was organized in two forms: the mass shock teams and special task teams. In the former case, the proportion of labor force which each production team should provide as its share was set according to two norms: (1) the size of the labor force of the production team, and (2) the extent of the benefit the production team would derive from the work to be constructed. In the latter case, only the size of labor force of the production team was taken into account. If one production team could not provide the due proportion of the labor force, it should either pay off with labor in other sectors or with money calculated according to the work-points or labor-days to the team that shared the extra portion of the labor force.

Once the work was accomplished, it would become the collective property of the brigade. However, the financial burden did not rest on the brigade. The problem of laborers' wages was solved in two ways: (1) For the mass shock teams, wages would be counted in work-points and charged to the production team's account. This was practiced in all three brigades. (2) For the special task teams, the wages were either charged in work-points to the production team's account (Zhangjiarongren and Shagou), or paid in cash by the brigade (Xiwangzhuang).⁶ As the special task teams accounted for only a very small portion in the total labor force used in basic construction, it can be said that the main financial responsibility rested on the production teams.

⁶ Because the income from forestry and sideline production of this brigade was larger than the other two.

2. Labor Employment for Basic Construction and Income Distribution

There would be three methods to repay the laborers employed in the basic construction: One was to count one part of their labor-days contributed to the basic construction as voluntary labor, and to count the rest in work-points within the normal rank of income distribution. The second was to count all of their labor-days in regular work-points. The third was to repay the laborers with the brigade's reserve funds.

In 1962 the Shagou Brigade adopted the first method. The voluntary labor accounted for 3% of the basic labor-days of every laborer in one year. The advantages of this method lay in keeping a higher value of work-point by eliminating 3% of the work-points, and being favorable to the households who had not enough labor force. The disadvantages were to lower the laborers' motivation and to complicate the account system. The Shagou Brigade abandoned this method and adopted the second method in 1963 as the other two brigades had always done.

The advantages and disadvantages of the second method were complementary to the first one. However, although the value of the work-point was lowered due to the addition of those supplementary labor-days used in basic construction, the actual final income of the households that had laborers participating in these works could not be lowered because of their additional work-points. Only those households that did not have enough laborers to participate in the basic construction would be affected by the lowered value of work-points. Table 9.7 will show the difference of income between households with different categories of labor force.

Table 9.7

Income of Households by Strength of Laborers for 1963 in the Second Production Team, Xiwangzhuang Brigade

	Number of Households	Total Income (yuan)	Average income by Household (yuan)
Strong laborers	6	2,291.3	381.9
Relatively strong laborers	6	1,691	281.8
Normal laborers	5	1,407	281.4
Weak laborers	6	1,606	267.7
Without laborers	6	352	58.7

Note: Classification of households by strength of laborers was done according to the system of "basic labor-days" (for this system see Chapter Seven, Section II). The total labor-days of a household are divided by the number of members of the household: (1) households of strong laborers (90-118 labor-days); (2) households of relatively strong laborers (70-89); (3) households of normal laborers (55-69); households of weak laborers (under 55); (5) households without laborers (five-guarantee households).

In order to guarantee that those unfavored households (unfavored due only to the fact that they were weak in labor force) would not be affected, the Xiwangzhuang Brigade paid special attention to arranging light work in other sectors for those households. The result of the income for 1964 (see Table 9.8) shows that this kind of disadvantage brought about by the practice of the second method could be easily corrected, if attention was paid to it.

Table 9.8

Income of Households by Strength of Laborers for 1964 in the Second Production Team, Xiwangzhuang Brigade

	Number of households	Total income (yuan)	Average income by household (yuan)	% of 1964 over 1963
Strong laborers	6	2,518	419.7	10
Relatively strong Laborers	6	1,900	316.7	13
Normal laborers	5	1,615	323	14.7
Weak laborers	6	1,871	311.8	17
Without laborers	6	421	70.2	19.6

The third method, although used elsewhere, had never been adopted by any of the three brigades. There were two reasons which made this method difficult for adoption: First, the reserve funds of the brigade were still not large enough to pay the wages of basic construction. Secondly, to pay with the reserve funds would diminish the amount of collective accumulation at the brigade level. The second method guaranteed a rational payment for the laborers who worked during their leisure time, but at the same time, made the financial burden rest on the production teams. In consequence, the reserve funds and collective property at the brigade level would be accumulated more and more by the unpaid laborer (from the brigade's point of view). This is not only a way to turn labor into capital, but also to turn low level collective property into higher level collective property.

D. Significance of Labor Accumulation in the Development of the Rural Economy

The accomplishment of the works of basic construction relying mainly upon labor accumulation does not mean that no capital was invested at all. A minimum amount of capital was always necessary. For example, construction tools, vehicles, cement, TNT and the like had to be purchased. This capital was usually raised by sideline production. The significance of labor accumulation is to minimize the capital investment and to maximize the labor investment. Let us take Xiwangzhuang Brigade as an example: during 1963-1964, the brigade employed a total of 72,975 labor-days in basic construction. If one labor-day was counted at 0.80 yuan (the labor price at that time), it would be worth a total of 58,380 yuan. During the same period, a capital of only 10,184 yuan was invested. The capital-labor ration is 15%: 85%. This means that 85% of the basic construction is represented by labor accumulation alone.

We may ask: why should this underemployed labor force be mainly used in basic construction, especially water conservancy projects? The answer is that the basic construction was considered as the crucial taking-off point for the Chinese rural economy. For centuries, the latter, just like the cyclic evolution of dynasties, had been caught in a vicious circle dominated by nature. The efforts of the peasants for several years had always been suddenly destroyed by the cyclic natural calamities. After a few years, the peasants had to start again from almost nothing. This was the greatest tragedy of the Chinese peasants, which did not seem solvable by the small farmer economy. The hope of winning this struggle against nature depended upon collective forces. The experience of the three brigades presented in this case-study represents merely a preliminary step in the battle. Yet the result can be said to be encouraging. Owing to the

improved irrigation system which was the direct result of basic construction, agricultural output has steadily increased as can be seen in the following table.

Table 9.9

Comparison of Output in the Three Brigades Between 1957 and 1964
(unit: jin)

	1957		1964		% over 1957	
	per mu	total	per mu	total	per mu	total
Zhangjiarongren	243	387,620	608	993,683	197.6	156
Shagou	162	914,202	496	1,210,286	206	87
Xiwangzhuang	160	474,575	443	823,304	176.8	73.4

The indirect result of the basic construction was manifested by forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and fishery. In 1964, the Zhangjiarongren Brigade had an income of 26,000 yuan from these sectors, which accounted for 20% of the gross revenue of that year and largely doubled that of 1957. The other two brigades also had increases in these sectors.

There was also a remarkable improvement in living standards. The food grain per capital had an increase of 97%, 45.8% and 31% in 1964 over 1957 respectively for Zhangjiarongren, Shagou and Xiwangzhuang. The respective increases in personal income were 133.6%, 73% and 135%. But the most perceivable improvement was reflected by the accumulation of reserve funds which increased between three and five times during the eight years as shown in Table 9.10.

Table 9.10

Comparison of Reserve Funds between 1957 and 1964 in the Three Brigades
(unit: yuan)

	1957			1964			
	Of the year	% in gross revenue	Accumulation	Of the year	% in gross revenue	Accumulation	% over 1957
Zhangia-rongren	1,862	3	3,958.5	6,749	5	75,597	262
Shagou	1,321	3	5,506	8,843	5.2	77,367	571
Xiwang-zhuang-zhuang	1,800	1.8	14,928	10,217	5	152,108	468

More reserve funds means a bigger capacity for further basic construction, but above all had a paramount significance in the collective economy. If the basic construction could reach the level capable of resisting most of the disastrous natural calamities, the battle would be won. It had obviously not yet reached such a level by 1964 in the three brigades, but it can certainly be said that they were advancing along a promising path.

E. Summary

The experience of the three brigades provides us with a concrete example of how to turn the underemployed labor force into capital, how to maximize the utilization of this underemployed labor and of how to make this accumulation a collective property at the brigade level as much as possible in order to gradually raise the level of collective ownership.

III CONSTRUCTION OF WATER CONSERVANCY IN THE XIA DINGJIA PRODUCTION BRIGADE, DA LÜJIA PEOPLE'S COMMUNE, HUANG COUNTY : A CASE STUDY ON WATER CONSERVANCY 17

A. Physical Setting

The Da Lüjia People's Commune is situated in the middle of Huang County, some thirty kilometres to the south of the Bohai Gulf in the north-eastern part of Shandong. The Xia Dingjia Production Brigade was one of its brigades and was composed of eight natural villages (21 production teams) and had a population of 2,653 representing 560 households. It possessed 2,368 mu of cultivated land (0.93 mu per person) located in the Shashi Mountain area. A short river called Yongwen passes through it. In the cultivated land, mountainous and hilly fields amounted to 74%.

Before the liberation, the area was known as a calamitous place due to its physical setting. The layer of soil was so thin that high output crops could not be planted. In nine out of ten years the harvests were affected by drought. The per mu yield was so low as to vary only between 100 and 200 jin. Consequently, living was extremely hard in this area. At that time, out of 450 households in the eight villages, 84 households had gone to the north-east and 48 households went to beg elsewhere. Among the rest, thirty percent lived by hiring themselves to outside landlords and sixty percent made their living either by selling their daily labor to the ten percent of well-to-do, or by cutting trees and grass in the mountain and selling them in the market. The land reform changed the relationship of production. But the transformation of the earth in this area actually began in 1954 with the start of the construction of water conservancy (XHDX, 17 November, 1963).

17 This case-study is based mainly on the report by Shandong sheng Jing-ji Yan-jiu-suo Nong-ye-jing-ji-zu (the Agricultural Economy Group of the Economic Research Institute of Shandong Province), Jing-ji Yan-jiu yue-kan (Economic Research Monthly), N. 98, 20 December, 1964 : 48-56. Other sources will be noted.

B. Construction of Water Conservancy

The formation of elementary cooperatives on the basis of mutual-aid groups in 1954 initiated the construction of water conservancy by sinking wells. The emergence of advanced cooperatives in the following year (1955) pushed the sinking of wells to a higher level. Up to 1957, the number of wells sunk amounted to 72.

However, the drought in the spring of 1957 dried up almost all of them. Because the level of underground water was low, to sink a new well required too many laborers and too much time. Moreover, the wells were found not to fit very well into the terraced fields which constituted the bulk of Xia Dingjia's cultivated land. Therefore, the people of Xia Dingjia were forced to search for other more efficient ways of conserving water. After having learned from experiences in other places and owing also to the help of the Bureau of Water Conservancy of the county, the Xia Dingjia people shifted the emphasis from sinking wells to conserving water by constructing reservoirs (Qi Zhe-wen, 1966). The first reservoir was completed in only one month and displayed its capacity in the same year. The irrigated land could therefore be increased from 400 mu in 1954 to 642 mu in 1957. The maize fields which were irrigated by the reservoir yielded 230 jin more per mu (the other maize fields yielded only 150 jin per mu). This result encouraged the people of Xia Dingjia to undertake 12 small projects of water conservancy in the winter of 1957 and spring of 1958. They began with the easily accessible places and gradually moved to the high mountains. Following establishment of the people's commune in the autumn of 1958, they constructed the first high mountain reservoir in order to automatically irrigate the higher placed terraced fields. Owing to these invested efforts, in spite of the serious drought in 1957-1958, the annual per mu yield was increased to 500 jin.

Between 1958 and 1963, three reservoirs, six pond-embankments, one river-dam, two pumping stations, 64 wells and 5 kilometres of ditches had been built. Another 762 mu of land were thus brought under irrigation and 240 mu of irrigated land was improved. In 1963, another two reservoirs and three pond embankments were constructed. The number of wells amounted to 150. The irrigation system could irrigate in this year 53.4% of the total cultivated land (XHDX, 17 November, 1963). By 1964, the irrigated area was increased to 1,380 mu or 58% of the total cultivated acreage. Among the 1,380 mu, 892 mu were automatically irrigated, 165 mu mechanized in irrigation and 323 mu by wells. In the same year another three high mountain reservoirs under construction were expected to bring 500 mu of high placed terraced fields under irrigation. This would increase the irrigated area to 80% of the total cultivated acreage.

However, the construction of water conservancy was not an isolated work. Its effectiveness was conditioned by many other sectors. For instance, the Minister of Water Conservancy and Electric Power, Fu Zuo-yi, has pointed out that "the irrigated areas could completely demonstrate the benefit of irrigation only after the land was levelled and field works were built" (RMRB 11 October, 1959). This was what the Xia Dingjia Brigade had taken into account. In the meantime while water conservancy was being constructed, the people of the brigade set out to undertake basic field works.

C. Basic Construction of Field Works

During the nine years 1955-1964, 1,534 mu of farmland had been levelled and improved, and 30,000 metres of stone embankment of terraced fields had been built. The methods of the field works carried out can be included in the following three kinds

according to the adaptation to a variety of topography and soil.

1. Deeply turning over and levelling earth: this method was used in the hilly land of different levels and different depths of soil.
2. Changing soil: this method was used in the river-side land the layer of soil of which was too thin to plant high output crops. The method consisted of changing the stone and sand underground with earth to thicken the layer of soil.
3. Terracing the hilly land: This method was applied in two ways: the first, called "changing big into small" (da gai xiao), was to transform a large hilly land into small terraced fields in order to reduce the degree of slope and to prevent soil erosion. The second one, called "changing small into big" (xia gai da), was to level the lower terraced fields in order to transform them into larger fields.

The changed fields on which in the past only sweet potatoes could grow were now suitable for planting of maize and wheat owing to the increase of at least six inches to one foot in depth of soil and the improvement of soil conditions. But above all, they were more suitable to irrigation. The change in per mu yield of the harnessed fields is shown in the following table.

Table 9.11

Comparison of per unit yield by crops, soil condition and field work in Xia Dingjia Brigade

Crop	Soil	Yield per mu (jin)		Percentage of increase
		Before field works	After field works	
wheat	sandy-loamy	200-250	300-350	40-50
wheat	clay	200	260-270	30-35
maize	loamy	450-500	700-750	50
sweet potato	gravelly	600-700	800-900	33
peanut	sandy	200-250	300-350	40-50

Besides the basic field works, the Xia Dingjia Brigade also paid attention to reforestation in order to prevent further losses of water and soil.

D. Reforestation

The brigade possessed 7,540 mu of mountain land. Owing to uncontrolled lumbering before the revolution, the mountain was almost bare of trees. At the beginning reforestation was not effective due to a lack of unified planning and suitable investment. In 1956, a plan of reforestation was set up and the mountain was closed to peasants. In the following years it was only periodically opened to those who came to cut grass.

By 1964 the mountain was no longer barren. Apart from 860 mu of a mixture of red pine, oak and locust trees, only red pine was planted. There were 6,600 mu (92.8%) which had more than 400 trees per mu. Now the forest could perform the function of retaining the mountainous torrents during the rainy season.

E. Other Measures for Increasing Output

The comprehensive arrangement of nature created the conditions for the application of Chairman Mao's "Eight-Point Charter" for agriculture (i.e., soil improvement, water control, rational application of fertilizer, improved seed strains, rational close planting, plant protection, field management and improvement of farm implements). The measures adopted by the Xia Dingjia Brigade in accordance with the "Eight-Point Charter" were as follows:

1. Increasing Fertilizer application

Although the chemical fertilizer supplied by the state increased yearly, the farm manures still constituted the principal fertilizers. There were two types of farm manure:

non-organic and organic. The first consisted of old-wall-earth and hay-ash, and the second consisted of grass and human and animal excrement. The accumulation of organic manure by raising pigs was especially important, because it is a 'one-stone-kills-two-birds' method. By 1964 the Brigade had reached the ratio of 1.2 pigs per household. The system of "basic fertilizing" (i.e., applying fertilizer before planting) was applied. Manure used for one mu had been increased from 3,000 jin before the cooperative movement to 8,000 jin in 1964. After the "basic fertilizing" three applications of supplementary fertilizer for wheat and two applications for maize.

2. Increasing the Index of Double-Cropping and the Acreage of High Output Crops

Before the cooperative movement, 70% of the farmland of the brigade had only one crop a year, and 30% had either three crops every other year or two crops a year. The index of double-cropping was only 125-130%. By 1963, this index was increased to 167%. In other words, 60% of the farmland could yield two crops per year.

In the area of the brigade, maize was a high output crop. With sufficient water and fertilizer, the per mu yield of maize could reach 600-800 jin, sometimes 1,000 jin at the most. This is why the acreage of maize had a tendency to rise every year. In 1964 it increased almost 40% compared with the previous years.

3. Applying Inter-Planting and Rational Close Planting

There were inter-plantings of maize and soybean, of summer millet and summer maize, of sweet potato and maize and soybean, of wheat and peanuts, of cabbage and wheat and the like. The advantages of inter-planting were that nutriments of the soil could be fully absorbed by the different kinds of crops and light and air could reach everywhere because of the different heights of the crops. All these factors could

contribute to raising the per mu yield.

As for close planting, the per mu plants for maize were increased from 2,000-2,500 to 3,000-3,500 and those for sweet potato from 2,500-3,000 to 3,500-3,800. The per mu bunches for millet (each bunch comprises 3-5 plants) were increased from 13,000 to 18,000. The per mu seeds for wheat were increased from 7-9 jin to 13-15. The degree of density was determined by three factors: air circulation, depth of soil and the quantity of water and fertilizer. The different seed strains required different density. For instance, the "Double No. 1" maize could be planted closer together than the "Gold Queen" maize.

4. Seed Selection and Introduction of Better Strains

On the one hand the Xia Dingjia Brigade introduced better strains from outside, on the other hand it selected and cultivated the better strains by setting up seed fields. By 1964, 90% of the maize fields and 80% of the wheat fields had been planted with the better strains introduced from outside, or cultivated by the peasants of the brigade.

5. Careful Field Management

Before sowing, no matter whether in spring or summer, the earth of the fields was always turned deeply over once again and the fields were levelled. The summer crops were hoed 3-4 times. Preventive measures were taken for plant protection.

6. Establishing "three fields" for Improving Agro-Techniques

The "three fields" (san-tian) means "experimental fields" (shi-yan-tian), "model fields" (yang-ban-tian) and "seed fields" (zhong-zi-tian). The first was used for experimentation. For instance, when the "qian-jiao", a new strain of wheat seed,

was first introduced into the brigade, it was only planted in the "experimental fields" in order to determine its quality, and to gain experience. The second field aimed at showing to the peasants a model and a standard in production. The third was used especially for the purpose of raising better strains. Up to 1964, more than ten new and better strains of eight crops had been cultivated in the "seed fields" of the brigade. The Xia Dingjia Brigade, by that time, was almost self-reliant in the matter of better seed strains, and no longer needed to rely solely on outside supply.

F. Result of the Water Conservancy and Field Works -
Increased Output in Agriculture and Sideline Production

The results of construction of water conservancy and the basic construction of field works were reflected directly in the yearly increase of agriculture output as well as by the sideline production. The per mu yield of the Xia Dingjia Brigade before the cooperative movement was only about 200 jin. But since establishment of the people's commune, the grain output per mu had steadily remained over 830 jin in spite of serious drought in the years 1957-1958 and 1960-1961. The grain output during the six years of the commune movement can be seen in the following table.

Table 9.12

Per Unit Output of Food Grains in Xia Dingjia Brigade from 1959 to 1964
in Comparison with That of 1957

		Per mu yield (jin)	Percentage over 1957
1957		574	100
1959 to 1964	1959	856	149.1
	1960	831	144.8
	1961	830	144.6
	1962	841	146.5
	1963	855	148.9
	1964	920	160.8
Average		855.5	149.1

Sideline production had also experienced a steady increase. Owing to the better irrigation system, fruit production rose from 460,000 jin in 1956 to 760,000 jin in 1963. The increase from fruit production alone in 1963 accounted for as much as 25% of the gross revenues of the brigade in that year. The brigade had 157 draught animals in 1959, but 173 in 1963, an increase of 16 animals in four years. Pigs had increased from 210 in 1954 to 620 in 1964, and sheep from 40 to 350.

Prior to the cooperative movement, Xia Dingjia was one of the poorest areas where the people could make both ends meet only by relying on the grain supplied by the state. Since 1955 it had not only succeeded in becoming self-reliant in the matter of grain, but had been able to support the state. During the eight years from 1955 to 1963, the brigade sold to the state 2,280,000 jin of food grains, 440,000 jin of oil materials, and 2,310,000 jin of fruits.

During the years 1956-1963 the accumulated reserve fund of the brigade amounted to 150,000 yuan. In 1964 property owned by the brigade was worth 250,000 yuan. The brigade and production teams had together 30,000 yuan deposited in the bank. The income of members in 1963 rose 56% in comparison with 1956. 40% of the households of the brigade had deposits in the bank, amounting to about 20,000 yuan.

G. Investment in Water Conservancy and Field Works

From 1956 to 1963 the Xia Dingjia Brigade invested altogether 43,715 yuan in the construction of water conservancy and field works. Apart from 10 tons of cement valued at 2,200 yuan, given by the state in 1957, the rest of the investment was solved by the brigade itself. There were two sources of this investment: the main part came

from proceeds of sideline production, and a small part from members' savings. As we have seen, the income from orchards alone accounted for 25% of the 1963 gross revenues of the brigade. If the income from forest, animal husbandry and other sideline production were counted together the percentage would be 35%. This kind of income was to be divided into two parts. One part was to be distributed in cash to members and the other part went to reserve funds which were to be used mainly for construction of water conservancy and field works, and mechanization of agriculture.

But the capital investment accounted for only a small part of the total investment. The major investment in basic construction could be said, (as in the case of the three brigades I have just presented), to be labor investment. During the eight years from 1956 to 1963 labor investment in the Xia Dingjia Brigade totalled 250,000 labor-days. Each laborer in the brigade invested an average of 40 labor-days yearly.

The distribution of labor force in the different sectors of a brigade was of crucial importance to agricultural production. In many cases, as we have seen in previous chapters, especially during the period of GLF, it was unbalanced. The success of the Xia Dingjia Brigade provides another instance, in addition to that of the three brigades in the previous section, for justifying the importance of a balanced labor distribution. The arrangement of labor force in this brigade was as follows: 60% for agricultural production, 20% for forestry, animal husbandry and sideline production, and 20% for basic construction of water conservancy and field works. This last one was extensively used during the winter and spring leisure time in order to make use of the underemployed labor force. During 120-150 days between December and March, 50 to 60% of the total labor force of the brigade was poured into basic construction.

H. Driving Force Behind the Scene

The history of Xia Dingjia Brigade in its struggle against nature was not a smooth process, but a bitter experience through resolving a variety of contradictions.

In the first place, there was the contradiction between socialist collectivism and small farmer economy. Although Xia Dingjia was a poor area and there were more poor and lower-middle peasants who were willing to carry out the socialist revolution, the nostalgic thoughts of small farmers were still strong owing to the fact that social awareness always lags behind social existence. Many people thought that to construct water conservancy and field works was too hard a way to achieve gains, and preferred to make money by the easy way they had practiced through generations; that is to say, to cut trees in the mountain and sell them in the market. They said: "zhong-di huo-ku he-bu-lai, bu-ru shang-shan qu kan-chai" (The construction of field works is too hard to be profitable, we had better go cut the trees in the mountain); and "er-sun zi-you er-sun fu, bu-gei er-sun zuo ma-niu" (our children and grandchildren have their own fortunes, we don't need to do horse-and-cattle work for them).

Secondly, there were the old ideas, habits and superstitions that frequently interfered in the struggles against nature. For instance, the old belief in geomancy (feng-shui) of many peasants gave rise to fear when the work spot chosen was believed to be a "geomantic point" (Qi Zhe-wen, 1966).

The key to resolving these contradictions was said to lay in the socialist education. And socialist education could be carried on effectively due to the efforts of the Party branch secretary Wang Yong-xing. The peasants of Xia Dingjia called him the "iron pillar of socialism" and the "good guide of the brigade" (RMRB, 31 December, 1969).

Wang Yong-xing was demobilized from the PLA and returned to his native place in 1950. He had been seriously wounded and decorated in the army. Once home, he actively participated in the collectivization movement. It was not long before he was named the Party branch secretary of the Xia Dingjia Township. When the mutual-aid groups were merged into elementary cooperative, he sold his own donkey and added 40 yuan to buy a horse for the cooperative, while he had nothing left to offer to his bride and slept in a borrowed bed just after his marriage. He spent most of his pension for the collective. In 1955, he led the seven elementary cooperatives in Xia Dingjia Township into merging into one advanced cooperative: the Sunlight Cooperative. Wang Yong-xing became its Party branch secretary. When the Da Lùjia People's Commune was formed in 1958, the Sunlight Advanced Cooperative became the Xia Dingjia Brigade. Wang Yong-xing continued to lead the brigade as Party branch secretary (*ibid.*).

It was Wang Yong-xing who led the people of Xia Dingjia to reform nature (especially in the anti-drought campaigns). It was also Wang Yong-xing who took the responsibility for carrying on the socialist education in remoulding people's thought. The success of Xia Dingjia certainly owed much to the change of relationship of production through the long process of both cooperativization and commune movement, but the leadership played a crucial role in it. In many cases in China, the success of a brigade or a commune depended to a great extent on the quality of its leaders. The role played by Chen Yong-gui in the famous Dazhai Brigade is a salient example. An ideal leader in the people's commune is one who has been ideologically well prepared, who leads the people by participating directly in manual work and who does not care a pin about personal gains and losses. It was only in this way that a leader could gain his prestige, could unify the people around him, and could fully exert his influence.

One of the reasons why there were still brigades remaining as the basic accounting units when in most cases this unit was transferred to the production teams was good leadership. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that behind the scene of the struggles in the Xia Dingjia Brigade, there was a driving force: a leader equipped with the socialist revolutionary ideology.

IV SUMMARY

In his study of the irrigation scheme in China, Robert Carin thinks that the water conservancy projects in China as a whole were a failure. His argument goes as follows:

The reasons for the failure of the irrigation schemes are partly the neglect of physical limits, but are largely the upset of hydrographical and hydrological features combined with a preference for risky moves rather than constructive approaches. Meanwhile, the confusion of planning and designing and the lack of technical personnel and capital are also retarding factors (Carin, 1963 : 215).

And he predicts:

The expectations of high yields in China augur poorly for their attainment and crop failures will continue under the impact of irrigation schemes (ibid.).

There are two reasons which make Carin's conclusion open to criticism. First his study extends only to 1962 with the emphasis on 1958-61. The causes of failure of agricultural production during 1959-1961 were manifold. Both the organizational dislocation and serious natural calamities might affect the effectiveness of water conservancy projects. Under such a condition it was easy to take some external defects as the internal defaults in the projects. As a matter of fact, the contribution of the water

conservancy built during the years of the GLF to the agricultural production since 1962 has shown that the internal defaults of most of the projects have been only minimal.

Secondly, the result and process of construction of water conservancy, just as in other economic sectors in China, cannot be judged according to a purely economic mechanism. It is true that the lack of technical personnel and capital are retarding factors in economic development according to the conventional economic theories. But these economic theories cannot always be applied in China, because what the Chinese were endeavouring to do in their economic development was precisely to attempt to break through the limitations of the economic mechanism in the capitalist countries. They have two modi operandi in the breaking-up of economic development. The first one which is within the economic sphere is to turn labor into capital, and the second, which is outside the economic sphere, is to turn the spiritual force into a material one. The former (see the case-study of the three brigades in the Gufengtai People's Commune) which is practiced not only in China, but has also been practiced with varying degrees of success in other third world countries where capital is scarce, is easily understood. The latter is a subject which has often stirred up skepticism. However, the case of Xia Ding-jia Brigade can provide in this connection, an instance. Xia Dingjia was one of the poorest areas in Shandong. Materially, it started with almost nothing. It succeeded in barely a decade in creating a relative prosperity and welfare for its people without aid from the outside. As I have shown in the previous section, the leadership and socialist education had played a crucial role in the development of the Xia Dingjia Brigade. In other words, it can be said that ideology had been transformed into material force through organization and education. The lack of technical personnel and capital had largely been offset by the ideological indoctrination. Let us use the

commune members' language: "when we take the correct line, no difficulty cannot be overcome". This is not to say that ideological indoctrination is a panacea. It certainly has its limitations and it also needs certain preconditions before it can be effectively carried out. The Chinese had bitterly experienced these limitations during the years 1958-1961. They have also endeavored to create such preconditions, the process of which is just an aspect of what I am trying to describe in this thesis.

The particular model of development in China has begun to attract the attention of western economists (Richman, 1969; Deleyne, 1971), and has even been recognized as a possible and valuable model of development (cf. Wheelwright and McFarlane, 1970). Western economists have also begun making an attempt to study the Chinese way of development with some new approaches other than the conventional theories (cf. Gurley, 1971; Gray, 1973). That is why a study such as Carin's, which sticks closely to the pure economic mechanism, has difficulty in grasping the Chinese reality.

The construction of water conservancy in China was not a failure, but a success. The efforts of both the masses and the state have in fact brought about some astonishing consequences. This can be seen by two major factors: the changes of the landscape and the drastic increase in agricultural output in the late sixties and the early seventies.

For the former, many visitors from outside have witnessed the changes of landscape in China. I cite only two cases hereafter to support my argument. René Dumont has pointed out in his book that

aucun paysage rural n'a jamais changé, dans tout l'histoire de l'agriculture mondiale, autant que la chine orientale de 1955 à 1964 (1965 : 12).

Another witness is Ping-ti Ho. During a lecture at the University of British Columbia in 1975, he vividly threw light upon the contrast between the green landscape he had seen during his recent visit to China and the image of barren land he was used to seeing before 1949.

As for the latter, the change can be said to be unprecedented. In the Chinese history, North China had always depended on South China for grain supply.⁸ This longtime dependence came to an end in 1973 (New China's First Quarter-Century : 41). Shandong Province achieved its self-sufficiency in food-grain in 1970 by increasing the irrigated areas to 54,310,000 mu out of 113,000,000 mu and by increasing the output of food grain to 120% over that of 1949 and 44% over that of 1965 (Jing-ji Dao-bao, 1976 : 90-91). All these achievements in agricultural growth relied, for the most part, on the basis of water conservancy constructed between 1957 and 1962.

The astonishing results of water conservancy were also related to the commune system. The commune structure made the organization of the labor force more effective than cooperatives in the connection of construction of water conservancy. In the meantime, the labor accumulation embodied by the irrigation system has enormously enriched the collective property and reserve funds which would no doubt have a far-reaching influence in strengthening the commune system and in enabling the system to advance to a higher level.

⁸ That the capital was often in the North was another reason to transport the grain from South to North.

Chapter Ten

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNES (THREE CASE-STUDIES)

This chapter consists of three case-studies on the development of the people's communes. Various aspects of economic and social development within the communal framework will be discussed. But emphasis will be given to the economic sectors and the significance of the commune system as a socioeconomic unit in the rural development of Shandong.

1. THE CASE OF XIYOU PEOPLE'S COMMUNE, YE COUNTY

The Xiyou People's Commune was established in August 1958 by merging 21 advanced agricultural cooperatives and 1 fishery cooperative. It included 35 natural villages with a population of 39,170 representing 10,100 households. The director of the commune was one of the national woman models and activists in Shandong Province, Xu Jian-chun (Xu Jian-chun, 1959a).

A. Economic Development

1. Basic Construction, Commune Industry and Mechanization

During the period of GLF in 1958 the Xiyou Commune had poured almost half of its labor force (6,500 of its 14,018 laborers) into commune industry and the construction of water conservancy and field works (*ibid.*). On the eve of the establishment of the commune, it had only 2,349 wells (none mechanical), 6 pumps and 922 water-wheels. But one year later, 481 wells, 72 mechanical wells, 47 pumps and 74 water wheels were

added to the original number. In addition, one ditch for drawing the river water was dug to bring 300 mu under automatic irrigation. Four out of the seventeen production brigades had mechanized their irrigation equipments (Xu Jian-chun, 1959b). The small blast furnaces of the commune produced 140 tons of iron and 96 tons of steel in 1958 (*ibid.*). The commune industrial enterprises increased rapidly during the first year of communization to more than 80 units representing a variety of projects such as mechanical, chemical, material for construction, textile and candy (Sun Li-chao and Xu Zhi-cheng, 1959). This brought the commune to a point of producing small farm implements and even larger machines such as water-wheels, maize hullers, generators and mechanical mills, and increased the capacity of fertilizer production to 2,000 jin per year (*ibid.*). The gross output value of commune industry for 1958 amounted to 680,000 yuan, an increase of 41.8% over 1957 (Xu Jian-chun, 1959a).

Though the problem of competition for labor force between local industry and basic construction on the one hand and agriculture on the other also arose in the Xiyou Commune, it seems that agricultural production was not as seriously affected by it as other communes. This was partly because local industry had a better foundation in this commune, and could lend more support to agriculture, and partly because the commune, as an advanced model in agriculture, could get some help from the county as well as the state in resolving its difficulties.

In order to resolve the shortage of labor force in agriculture, the Xiyou Commune made a great effort to mechanize by improving farm implements. It constituted one of the successful models in effectively using commune industry for mechanizing agriculture, just as the policy makers of the local industry movement had expected, during the years of 1958-1959, a time when the majority of communes failed in this area.

The most salient results in mechanization were the creation and copying by commune members of agro-machines such as mechanical mills, sowers, planters for close-planting, and mechanical water-wheels. This improvement of farm implements greatly increased labor productivity. For instance, the four grinders made by the commune factory, with a capacity of grinding 5,000-7,000 jin of grain each per day, could daily replace 400-500 laborers. The 250 wind-power water-wheels could save 500 laborers a day. One mechanical mill with a daily capacity of producing 10,000 jin of wheat flour could spare 140 women laborers plus 140 draught animals a day. One potato-cutting machine could spare another hundred laborers daily (*ibid.*).

Apart from the self-made machines, the mechanization of agriculture was also represented by the increase in purchased larger farm machines. Before the creation of the commune, the people of the township had only 200 new model plows, 3 sowers and 4 diskers as large machines. One year after the establishment of the commune, they bought another 82 new model plows, 7 diskers and 10 sowers. They then had 15 hullers, 1 header, 6 tractors and 1 truck. One-third of the total 64,000 mu of communal land was thus brought under mechanized cultivation (Xu Jian-chun, 1959b). By 1962, the number of tractors was increased to 14 and the number of pumps to 95. Other machines such as sowers and hullers amounted to more than one hundred (RMRB, 4 July, 1962).

2. The Technical Revolution

Xiyou was one of the communes where the technical groups for agronomic research had an earlier and better development. In order to carry out the technical revolution in agronomy, every brigade of the commune created its own technical group

composed mainly of downward transferred youth. In general, the technical group had a size of about 10 persons. The emphasis of their research was on cultivation of better strains of seeds and the control of insect plagues (Sun Li-chao and Xu Zhi-cheng, 1959). For example, in the Houlü Brigade, the technical group had introduced in a few years more than two hundred wheat strains and thirty maize strains from outside for the purpose of experimentation. Nine better strains of wheat and maize were chosen to be planted in the brigade. This contributed greatly to the increase of grain output (ZGQNB, 2 October, 1961). In the Wangjia Brigade, Zhang Huan-ying, a graduate of elementary school, found two better wheat strains by hybridizing different wheat strains to their sixth generation (RMRB, 4 July, 1962). In the Xiyou Brigade, one youth of the technical group by the name of Zhang Bao-ji had studied 29 kinds of crop insects. His research had far-reaching influence in the prevention and control of insect plagues (Xu Jian-chun, 1959a).

The technical groups also brought about important improvements in the methods of cultivation, especially in close-planting, intercrop planting and double-cropping planting. In Xiyou commune there used to be three crops every two years. Due to the selection of better strains, and improvement in methods of cultivation, most of the land could have two crops per year. The index of double-cropping was thus greatly increased (RMRB, 4 July, 1962).

Besides his research, each member of the technical groups took charge of technical counselling of one or two production teams. They often worked together with team agronomic technicians in the team's fields (*ibid.*, 27 November, 1963).

Some brigades, such as Zhufeng, Houlü and Wangjia, set up mechanic's training classes, technical night schools and stations of domestic animal breeding

(Sun Li-chao and Xu Zhi-cheng, 1959). In 1953 no technician existed in this area. Houli Village bought a pump for irrigation, but had difficulty finding someone capable of operating it (*ibid.*). By 1963 the Xiyou Commune had trained 43 tractor drivers (12 of them were sent to the tractor station of the county), 125 diesel operators, 123 agro-technicians, 3 truck drivers and 6 animal breeders (RMRB, 27 November, 1963).

3. Development of Agricultural Production and Improvement of Members' Income

The Xiyou Commune had 64,000 mu of cultivated land (Xu Jian-chun, 1959a). In 1950 the average per mu yield was only about 300 jin. It rose to 440 jin in 1957 (Qu Hong-zao, 1959). In spite of the serious drought, the per mu yield was raised to 621 jin in 1958 (Xu Jian-chun, 1959a), and 846 jin in 1959 (RMRB, 28 December, 1959).

With the increase in grain output, the living standards of the members rose accordingly. In 1957 the distributed quota of grain per person was 391 jin. This quota was increased to 401 and 430 respectively by 1958 and 1959. In the quota of grain distributed there was 71 jin of wheat in 1958 and 90 in 1959. The total income of a member was 55 yuan in 1958 and 80 yuan in 1959 (income from household sideline production was not included) (Sun Li-chao and Xu Zhi-cheng, 1959).

The living standards of members could also be reflected by the purchasing power and bank deposits. The value of the purchasing power between January and June, 1958 was 693,681 yuan, but that of the same period in 1959 was increased to 908,069 yuan. The total bank deposits of members between January and August of 1959 tripled those of the same period in 1958. The percentage of households having bank deposits rose from 50% of the total number of households in 1958 to 80% in 1959 (*ibid.*).

B. Social Development

1. Welfare and Health Services

In 1958, the Xiyou Commune also implemented the system of semi-wage and semi-supply for a while, as had been done elsewhere. Mess halls were set up to provide the members with ready food in order to liberate the women labor force. As in other places, this system did not succeed in Xiyou for the reasons I have given in Chapter Seven (see Chapter Seven, Section II). However, some other kinds of welfare and health services created at the same time did survive.

By 1959 the number of kindergartens was increased from 15 to 54, and the number of asylums for old people increased from 2 to 6. In addition, 72 nurseries were created. In the sector of health, due to the larger public funds provided by the commune, a hospital and ten health stations were built (*ibid.*).

2. Education

With the establishment of the commune, education was integrated into the commune system. The schools newly established by the commune in 1959 were: three half-work-half-study agronomic schools, two leisure-time middle schools, one red-and-expert school and one elementary school (Xu Jian-chun, 1959b). In the same year more than 400 peasants had graduated from the wiping-out-illiteracy classes (Xu Jian-chun, 1959a). The graduates from both elementary and middle schools and the students who could continue their education, greatly increased in number. The following table will show the change in this connection in the Houliü Brigade.

Table 10.1

Comparison of Elementary and Middle School Graduates Between 1949
and 1960 in Houliu Brigade

	Elementary School Graduates			Middle School Graduates		
	Total number	continue studying	took a job	total number	continue studying	took a job
1949	45	5	40	8	6	2
1960	138	58	80	121	100	21

Source: Wei Wen-hua, 1961.

3. Change in Leadership

The large number of downward transferred intellectual youth (xia-fang zhi-qing) and those who returned home (hui-xiang) inevitably brought about changes in the countryside. The most discernible ones were found in technical improvement in agriculture and in leadership. These two sectors were inter-influenced.

The graduates from both elementary and middle schools who returned home or stayed at home to participate in agriculture production were sharply increased in Xiyou Commune during the years of 1957-1963. In 1952, there were only about 200 graduates from elementary school working in agriculture in the area. By 1957 this number was increased to 1,005. In 1963 the total number of intellectual youth amounted to 3,527 (among them 39 had graduated from high-school), accounting for 95% of the young people of the commune and more than 50% of the full laborers (RMRB, 27 November, 1963).

I have mentioned that the agro-technicians and mechanical operators in the countryside were mostly intellectual youth (Chapter Eight, Section IV). Many other positions

which required a certain degree of literacy, such as school teachers, editors of black-board news papers and organizers of recreational activities were also filled by the intellectual youth. Because of their two major qualities - literacy and youth, which the old peasants obviously lacked, they became a very active force in the life of the commune. In 1963, among the 3,527 youths of the commune, 280 were given the title of "five-good youth" (wu-hao qing-nian), 222 got the title of "five-good member" (wu-hao she-yuan), 561 were absorbed into the Youth League and 57 became Party members. In such a situation, leadership could not help but absorb them into its ranks. By the same year, the positions of 5 brigade Party branch secretaries, 8 brigade commanders and vice-commanders, 24 brigade accountants and 270 team commanders, vice-commanders, accountants and material keepers had been filled by intellectual youth (ibid.).

The process of becoming a leader was usually through a long process of talent demonstration in some sectors and by gradually gaining the trust of the members. The case of Xu Jian-min could be a typical example. He was the younger brother of Xu Jian-chun, the director of the Xiyou Commune. When he graduated from elementary school in 1954 the only thing he intended to do was continue studying. For some unknown reason, he could not enter the middle school in his native place. He went to Jinan, the capital of Shandong, to study at night school for two years. Then under the pressure of the returning home movement, he willy-nilly went home to be enrolled in the technical group for strain cultivation. A few years later, owing to the brilliant results he obtained in the cultivation of maize strains, he was given the title of peasant researcher by the Shandong Agronomic Academy and became the chief of the technical group (ZGQNB, 2 October, 1961). Finally he was elected Party branch secretary in 1963 and became the most powerful leading cadre of the Houliü Brigade (RMRB, 27 November, 1963). At

the time of his elevation to this position, he was only 25 years old, relatively young, though he had already spent seven years working in the technical group. The commander and the accountant of the Houliū Brigade were also young fellows. The former was 24 and the latter 20 when they were elected to their positions in 1961 (ZGQNB, 2 October, 1961).

Because the development of the commune was oriented to a more sophisticated form of management and to a larger variety of methods in production, the people who had more technical knowledge and higher literacy were needed for leadership. It can be said that the further development of the commune would create more opportunities for intellectual youth and, in the meantime, the elevation of intellectual youth in the power echelons would help a quicker development.

C. Significance of the Commune System in the Socioeconomic Development of the Xiyou Commune

From the Xiyou case, we can see that the formation of the commune enabled the rural socioeconomic development to reduce some unfavorable conditions and to create some favorable ones.

1. Regularization of land

During the cooperative period, many of the fields which belonged to different cooperatives were interlocked with each other. They amounted to more than 5,000 mu, representing almost 9% of the total cultivated land of the commune. Members of one cooperative often had to pass through the land of another cooperative to reach their own fields. Needless to say, the small pieces of land did not fit mechanization. It was once suggested that the related cooperatives might make some exchange in order to

regularize their fields. However, the exchange could not easily be carried out, because the members of every cooperative always thought that their land was better than the others and any exchange represented a loss. The land could only be regularized after the emerging of cooperatives into communes. The regularization of land resulted in a saving of 15,000 labor days per year (Sun Li-chao and Xu Zhi-cheng, 1959).

2. Unified Arrangement of Labor Force as Being in Favor of Multiple Productions

Owing to the unified arrangement of labor force, the commune could locate an important number of laborers in blast furnaces and commune industry without too much effect on the agricultural production. For example, in the winter of 1958, 51,000 mu of wheat was sown on time due to unified arrangement of labor. On the other hand, the commune industry had better development under the commune structure. Fishery production was increased in gross value from 480,000 yuan during the cooperative period to 1,100,000 yuan in 1959 (Xu Jian-chun, 1959b).

3. How the Larger Labor Force Facilitated the Construction of Water conservancy and other Basic Field Works

In one year, from August 1958 to August 1959, the Xiyou Commune sank 481 wells and 72 mechanical wells and dug one ditch to bring 300 mu under automatic irrigation by river water (*ibid.*).

4. The Commune as Paving the Way to Mechanization

Most of the large agricultural machines of the commune were purchased after the establishment of the commune (see Section I, sub-section A of this chapter).

5. The Way in Which the Commune Created Favorable Conditions for Collective Welfare Enterprises

The establishment of nurseries, kindergartens and asylums for old people freed women from housework to a large extent. The creation of hospital and health stations could improve members' health which is, as Gunnar Myrdal has said, an investment in man, a crucial condition of economic growth (Myrdal, 1972 : 353-376). The increased number of schools in which 6,600 regular and part-time students were enrolled in 1959 (ZGQNB, 29 August, 1959) helped form more literate and skillful peasants. All of this exerted far-reaching influence on rural socioeconomic development.

II THE CASE OF DONGGUO PRODUCTION BRIGADE, LINGCHENG PEOPLE'S COMMUNE, QUFU COUNTY

This case study will show how and why a poor village became a model of production. Before the land reform the Dongguo Brigade was a poor village of tenant farmers. The agricultural production was so low that the villagers had to rely on the grain supplied by the state until 1955, the year of the cooperativization. The brigade had a little more than 200 households and 1,700 mu of land in 1962 (ZGXW, 6 December, 1962).

A. Focus in Promoting Agricultural Production

1. Improving Field Conditions

Three things were considered as essential in improving field conditions: water, fertilizer and soil. The area had always been threatened by drought. In order to diminish

¹ The name of "Lingcheng" was changed to Dongguo in 1966 because of the production success of the Dongguo Brigade (GRRB, 30 September, 1966).

this menace, the brigade directed its efforts to sinking wells, especially mechanical ones. In 1949 there were only five wells in the whole village supplying water for the villagers' use. Not a single mu of land was under regular irrigation. Up to 1962, 95 wells (including 12 mechanical wells) had been sunk. They were equipped with 62 water-wheels and pumps (ibid.). During the winter of 1962 and the spring of 1963, three more mechanical wells were added. At the same time 300 mu of land was levelled to facilitate irrigation (XHDX, 17 April, 1963).

In the sphere of fertilizing, the brigade relied on organic manures accumulated mainly by raising pigs. In 1949 there were only 24 pigs in the village. By 1962, one household had on the average 8.5 pigs, a high figure in Shandong Province. Also, the brigade bought soybean cakes and chemical fertilizers. In 1962, for example, 10,000 jin of the former was applied to the land (ibid.).

To improve soil conditions, the brigade adopted the method of changing the earth. In the winter of 1962 the soil of more than one hundred mu of sandy land was changed into good earth. This work was said to be still continuing (ibid.).

2. Improving Crop Strains

Better strains were selected, cultivated and widely applied through their experimental fields. The brigade had a long experience in managing these kinds of fields, for they began to set them up in 1956. During the seven years between 1956 and 1963, twenty kinds of crops were being studied. Seventeen among more than forty cultivated better strains were widely applied on the land of the brigade. The better strains were selected according to two criteria: higher yield and quicker maturity. This aimed at increasing both the per unit yield and the index of double-cropping. The brigade used to be an

area of food grains. But from 1963 on, they tried to plant some economic crops such as cotton, peanuts and tobacco (*ibid.*).

B. Results of the Agricultural Output

The Dongguo Brigade is situated in the North China Plains. Its soil conditions were not as bad as those in the hilly areas, such as the Xia Dingjia Brigade. The poverty suffered before collectivization was mainly due to the relationship of production which badly limited the peasants within the area of small farmer economy, and also due to the general collapse of the rural economy in the late 1940's. Following the co-operative movement, because labor productivity increased year by year, agricultural output was raised accordingly. The improvement in per unit yield was still more striking than that of the brigades which worked hard but had bad natural conditions. The per mu yield in Dongguo was rapidly increased from 150 jin in 1949 to 610 jin in 1961 (ZGXW, 6 December, 1962). This continued to rise to 1,000 jin in 1965 (GRRB, 30 September, 1966).

In Qufu County, the Dongguo Brigade was a unit far advanced in production. In comparison with the figures of Dongguo, the average mu yield of the whole county was much lower: 270 jin in 1956, and 356 jin in 1964 (XHDX, 4 August, 1965). The average per mu yield of the Dongguo People's Commune was in between with 700 jin in 1965 (GRRB, 30 September, 1966). That is why the Dongguo Brigade became a "red flag" of the county. All brigades were advised to learn from and to catch up with the Dongguo Brigade.

C. Dongguo Brigade as a model

The model approach was of great importance in the rural development for not only did the model represent a concrete target of output for other units, but also its experience could be an objective to learn from. A model might be a team, a brigade, or a commune, but it was mostly a brigade during the period of my study. The frequency of choosing brigades as models obviously shows that brigade was regarded as a crucial unit in the commune movement.

Dongguo was ostensibly used as a model not only for its merit in the economic sphere, but notably in the political sphere. If the increase of its agricultural output had been used only to raise the income of its members and to improve their living standards without paying any attention to the other backward units or showing any "collective spirit", it would have become a target of criticism of economism instead of a model of "socialist economy". The latter means economic development with socialist spirit. In other words, economic development could not only take an economic target as its objective; on the contrary, the objective must be political in essence.

In the case of the Dongguo Brigade, its collective spirit was manifested in two ways. First, before taking care of the increase of income of its members, the brigade sold grains more than two times above the fixed quotas to the state (150,000 jin of wheat in 1963). And the quality of the grain sold was better than the brigade kept for its members (XHDX, 20 June, 1963). Secondly, the Dongguo Brigade, as a unit in the commune, constantly lent support to the other brigades which had difficulties in production (GRRB, 30 September, 1966).

The mutual aid (mostly the advanced helped the backward ones) based on the socialist spirit can be seen as complementary to the principle of "self-reliance."

III THE CASE OF TAOJIAKUANG BRIGADE, THE MUNICIPALITY PEOPLE'S COMMUNE OF THE WEIHAI MUNICIPALITY²

The Taojiakuang Brigade, situated in the rural area of the Weihai Municipality, is surrounded on three sides by mountains and one side by sea. It was composed of three natural villages and had a population of 453 representing 98 households in 1965. It had only 470 mu of arable land. The development of Taojiakuang was bound by two conditions: the scarcity of land and the proximity to a city. The case of Taojiakuang provides us with an example of "directed development", due to the fact that it did not and could not indulge itself in developing naturally along the path guided by the two conditions mentioned above.

A. Multiple Managements with Grain Production as Foundation

The Taojiakuang Brigade had only 470 mu of hilly land with unequal soil quality, but had 500 mu of barren mountains good only for afforestation. Its topography

² This case study is based on a report by Liu Lu-min et al, RMRB, 23 August, 1965. As we know, the Chinese "municipality" (shi) does not only indicate an urban area, but is also a term designating an administrative division at different levels. The largest municipalities such as Peking and Shanghai are at the same administrative level as the province though they are geographically much smaller. The second level of municipality is at the same level as the special district with an area as large as three or four counties. In Shandong there are four municipalities at this level. The third is at the level of county. There are five in Shandong. Weihai is one of the five, situated on the north-east coast of the Shandong Peninsula. Apart from being a military strategic point, it is not as important as Qingdao or Yantai as a port, nor is it remarkable in regard to industry or commerce. This could be the reason why no railway had been built to connect it with inland areas such as Qingdao and Yantai.

and proximity to a city provided the brigade with the possibility of fruit and timber production. But no favorable condition existed to promise better agricultural production. In fact, the brigade did orient itself toward the non-agricultural production at the beginning. The 500 mu of barren mountains had been afforested: two-fifths with pine and three-fifths with mulberry trees. The area of the mulberry trees was used to raise silkworms. The 470 mu of hilly land had been divided into two sections: 200 mu of land with better soil conditions was reserved for grain cultivation and about 270 mu of gravelly land had been transformed into orchards of apple and grape. By 1964, the per mu output of apples was 2,300 jin which was worth 368 yuan. In the meantime, the per mu yield of grain in the land of better soil conditions was 653 jin, hardly worth 70 yuan.³ On the purely economic calculation, it would be much more advantageous to transform all the land into orchards. This was, however, not possible because to pursue purely economic gain was not the policy of the state. The guidance for rural development was "multiple managements and overall development with grain as the foundation" (yi liang wei gang, quan-mian jing-ying, quan-mian fa-zhan). Under this principle, the brigade had to make a balanced development between agricultural production and non-agricultural production.

In 1964, the gross value of revenues of the brigade amounted to 150,000 yuan in which the fruit production alone accounted for 97,000 yuan. The rest came from agricultural and other sideline production. Between 1957 and 1964 the brigade was able to sell to the state 2,570,000 jin of fruits, 17,000 jin of cocoons, and 76,000 jin of peanuts. But the grain production was not even self-sufficient. In order to resolve this

³ One kilo of wheat flour cost only 0.32-0.36 yuan in 1966 in Peking. See Jan Delayne, 1971 : 46.

problem, besides building irrigation systems and improving methods of cultivation, the brigade adopted a method of interplanting crops between fruit trees. In 1964, 39,600 jin of food grains and 12,000 jin of peanuts were produced from interplanted orchards.

Though fruit production formed the bulk of the Taojiakuang Brigade's revenue, agricultural production was not neglected nor completely replaced by fruit production. Instead, it would become the focus in the coming years in order to achieve the target of self-sufficiency.

With regard to the members' income, before the cooperativization the individual yearly income was about 110 yuan. After 1961, it rose to 170-200 yuan. The collective reserve funds were increased accordingly. Up to 1965, these funds had accumulated to 150,000 yuan. In 1964 the individual income was about 216 yuan (199 yuan from collective production plus 17 yuan from household sideline production). There is no doubt that the individual income could have increased much more quickly if the brigade had developed more fruit production instead of grain production. The fact that this brigade did not do and could not do so will show its fundamental difference from the development in the capitalist countries where the pursuit of pure economic interest based on a calculation of maximum gain and minimum loss is the rational behavior.

B. The "Directed Development" and the People's Commune

One of my informants in Hong Kong told me that the cadres of a certain Guangdong commune provoked the general resentment of the members by cutting away the orange trees in order to transform the orchard into grain fields. He interpreted the act of the cadres as irrational and irresponsible because of dogmatism and ignorance of the basic principles of economy. In fact, the cadres of this Guangdong commune acted out

of the same concern as that of the Taojiakuang Brigade. The only difference is that in one the fruit trees were cut away and in the other the planting of fruit trees was limited. Therefore, the psychological effect on the members in the two places could be quite different. It is difficult to judge whether the act of cadres in the Guangdong commune was really as irrational and irresponsible as my informant claimed without sufficient knowledge of the economy of the commune. One thing is certain: in order to increase the grain output they sacrificed the orange grove which could be worth double or triple the value of the grain output that the same land would produce.

The development of the Taojiakuang Brigade shows that "multiple managements, overall development with grain production as foundation" has been an important principle for commune development. Even the brigades or communes which were situated in the suburbs of cities and had the conditions needed to specialize in one or a few non-agricultural productions could not be ignorant of this principle. The first commune in Shandong, the Beiyuan Commune, is another example. It is situated in the suburbs of Jinan and has always been one of Jinan's suppliers of vegetables. It would have made a larger profit by producing more vegetables than grain. But the output figures for 1967 of this commune show that the vegetable production was increased 80% over 1957, whereas grain production (rice and wheat) was increased 100% (RMRB, 9 August, 1968).

Specialization has been one salient feature in capitalist development in the western countries. Specialization and coordination constitute the two fundamental functional elements of a complex structure of the western modern economy. This specialization is especially evident in the contrast between cities and the countryside on the national scale and between metropolitan centres and peripheral regions on the international

scale. This kind of structural interdependence has been interpreted by the Marxists as a relationship between dominants and dominated, in other words, a situation of imperialist domination. The commune system was conceived to break this kind of development of inequality at its inception by gradually eliminating the difference between the cities and the countryside, the difference between the peasants and the workers, and the difference between those who use their brains and those who use their brawn (cf. Wuchang Resolution). However, this does not mean that the efficiency of professional specialization should be condemned by itself; it becomes condemnable only when it works at the expense of human freedom and independence. As a matter of fact, there existed professional specializations, not only in the industrial centers, but inside the communes as well. But this specialization must be balanced by ideological training. An equilibrium between expertness and redness has been viewed as a remedy for the possible inequality created by professional specialization. At any rate, the development of specialization was limited structurally by the commune system. The commune goes along the "directed development" line which has its fixed goals and ideals. From this point of view, a commune is both an independent and dependent unit. It is independent in terms of economy and dependent in the social and political domains. This economic independence is, to a certain degree, pursued at every level, as much for the brigade as for the commune, and as much for the team as for the brigade. Even at the individual level, an ideal commune member is characterized by "all-round development." He is at the same time peasant, worker, soldier and artist. Following this, the commune has to be seen as a self-sufficient unit which contains many sub-units of equal self-sufficiency.

Chapter Eleven

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE : CHANGES AND CONTINUITY IN FAMILY STRUCTURE

(A case of Mazhuang Brigade, Wangguadian People's Commune, Feicheng County)¹

Mazhuang Brigade is a natural village of the same name. It was subdivided into 13 production teams and had a population of about 5,000-6,000 representing about 1,300 households around 1965. This case-study is centered on the changes and continuity of family structure since the establishment of the people's commune. I will not present here the features of the traditional Chinese family, because they have been described by many modern anthropologists and sociologists who have studied the Chinese family, such as those mentioned in the introduction to this study. The Chinese family under the impact of the Marriage Law during the earlier period of the PRC has also been scrutinized by C. K. Yang (1959b). In this section emphasis will be placed on the relevant influence exerted by the commune system on the family structure.

I FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD

Students of the Chinese family have usually emphasized the economic aspect of the family and have neglected its social aspect. For instance, Olga Lang's definition of the Chinese family is "a unit consisting of members related to each other by blood, marriage, or adoption and having a common budget and common property. Both the persons staying together and those temporarily absent are included." (1946 : 13). If we view

¹ This study is based on the information gathered by interviews. (see Appendix I).

the family only from the economic point of view, it will be easy to confuse the family with household. But the Chinese family was not, and still is not merely an economic unit, so the family is not identical with a household. On the other hand, there is another confusion between family and kinship. To distinguish "family" from "kinship", Maurice Freedman said: "Family is another matter. Essentially, its realm is that of domestic life, a realm of co-residence and the constant involvement in affairs of the hearth, children, and marriage. Kinship is something different. Outside his family a Chinese was bound by rights and duties to people related to him through ties of descent and marriage." (1962-62). It is apparent that Freedman identified family with household too.² To what extent a family can extend in the realm of kinship and what is the adequate line of demarcation between family and kinship in the Chinese case are still subjects to be studied.

Many discussions about the family size³ based on the statistics of households (mainly J. L. Buck's surveys on the size of peasant households, 1937 : 278), seem to be empty talking because these students of the Chinese family have not been serious in making the distinction between family and household. The Chinese statistical figures from census and surveys have generally used only the term "hu" (household) but rarely used the term "jia" (family), and this is the main source of confusion. From the point of view of social control, "household" has always been more important than "family". But from the point of view of kinship relationships, "family" is more meaningful than "household". However, it seems that the household has increasingly assumed more importance in

² Freedman said in Lineage Organization in Southeastern China (1958 : 19): "The peasant household was nearly always a family unit."

³ For example, Francis Hsu, The Myth of Chinese Family Size (1943) and Morton H. Fried, The Family in China : The People's Republic (1959).

modern life when the kinship ties began to be weakened in the commune system.

In Mazhuang, it was the household which was taken as a subunit within a production team. Although the household was no longer a unit of agricultural production, it was still a unit of sideline production and in any rate a unit of consumption and income distribution (income was distributed on the basis of both individual and household).

The average size of households in Mazhuang was about four persons, similar to the earlier surveys (J. L. Buck's and Lang's). The difference is that in earlier times, however small it might be there was always a number of large households of more than ten persons,⁴ whereas in Mazhuang the informants (informant A and B) could not remember any single household which had more than ten persons. The reasons for the disappearance of large households were varied: (1) The well-to-do families (landlords and rich peasants) which used to be a large size, were no longer well-to-do. (2) The family policies discouraged the extension of household size. (3) The household was no longer the unit of agricultural production, so manpower was not so badly needed in a household as before. (4) The elevation of women's status made the joint-family between brothers extremely difficult. (5) The welfare system of the commune provided more security for old people than ever before. (6) Many married sons preferred to turn over a number of workpoints to their parents rather than live under the same roof with them. (7) To include non-family members (a distant relative or a servant) became impossible in the commune system.

The households consisted of three types: nuclear family (about 50%), stem family (about 40%) and fraternal joint family (about 10%). In the last case, it often happened

⁴ For instance in the Ting Hsien Studies, among the sample of 5,255 families (households) 8.7% had more than 10 members and 0.7% more than 20 members. See Sidney Gamble, Ting Hsien: A North China Rural Community, 1954.

that one of the brothers worked outside, so his wife and children lived with his brother's family. There was almost no joint family in which two brothers were both at home. The stem family was mainly composed of the nuclear family of a married son and one of his parents. In most cases, the married son was either the only son, or the only son who remained in the village. If there were more than two married sons, the parents, or one of the parents, usually lived apart. A similar situation was related by informant C for Yangjiagao Brigade, Weizi People's Commune, Changyi County, which is 230 kilometres from Mazhuang.

Sometimes the household is not so easily defined. The sister-in-law of the last informant is such a case. She was a widow since she was 28 years old, and had two married sons. She lived in two units of a house of five units. The other three units were occupied by her younger son and his family. Her elder son and his family lived apart. However, officially she was registered in the same household as her elder son's, so her part of the private plot was together in the same lot with her elder son's. In practice the old woman cooked apart by herself and received 600 workpoints, 30 yuan and 50 jin of wheat from each of her two sons yearly. She lived much better in this way than eating together with either of the two sons. The difficulty in defining her household situation is that she lived in the same house as her younger son and was registered in her elder son's household, but lived alone in practice.

For the old generation the notion of family and that of household were distinct. But for the younger generation, according to my informants, this distinction began to become somewhat blurred. This is because the land which had been both the common property and the symbol of union of a family was no longer there. But for the duty of supporting aged parents, once a married son made his own household, he had no special

duty nor had little claim on his brothers, uncles and other relatives. On the other hand, the conception of family which had always been a product of the male's point of view might be subject to change when the female had more to say in the family's affairs. The woman's perception of family which was very different from that of the man had to be considered to some extent when they could earn work-points too. For instance, the husband could continue to consider his separated brother as a member of the family while his wife might not. Therefore, a household in the commune system tended to become closer than ever before to a family from the subjective point of view, especially from that of a woman. This phenomenon can, however, be seen only as a tendency, but was still far from being a dominating feature.

The type of nuclear family with a variety of stem family was the main trend in Mazhuang. Nobody dreamed any more of having a large family, because it was no longer the mark of prestige and status. On the contrary, it could be the symbol of feudalism or the mark of the notorious landlord class.

II KINSHIP NETWORK

It is premature to say, in my view, that the lineage organizations were stronger or more widespread in South China than in the North as Freedman asserted (1964) before the latter had been thoroughly studied. My informants said that lineage was very important in the social and economic life in their villages before the revolution. My personal observation tends to suggest the same thing. The majority of the Shandong villages still bear today the names of lineages which were either the only group or the principal group living in these villages.

The majority of the inhabitants in Mazhuang naturally had Ma as surname. There were nevertheless a few households having the names of Zhang and Wang. The ancestor temple of the Ma lineage was now transformed into a warehouse. Needless to say, the ritual activities of lineage had ceased and the formal organization had been dissolved long ago.

However, it is interesting to note that the agnatic kinship ties were still manifested on ritual occasions such as marriages and funerals. The informant A's grandfather was classified as landlord. But at this death all the people named Ma, including important brigade and team cadres, came to pay their respects to the dead man and to give a hand to the family as though they had forgotten the latter's notorious position. On such occasions, the highest ranking cadre took the traditional position of lineage head which had earlier been determined by wealth, generation and age.⁵

As lineage was considered as the product of feudal society, nobody would overtly show his kinship inclination in public affairs. The power hierarchy was determined more by Party affiliation than by kinship or otherwise. Party membership, social position (e.g., poor or lower-middle peasant position) and personal competence were the main criteria of holding power. However, the members of the brigade still had a secret preference to see their own kinsmen selected as cadres. In Mazhuang Brigade, both the Party branch secretary and the commander were named Ma. It was difficult for the cadres to favor their own kinsmen in public affairs under the strict supervision of the Party. On the contrary, in order to show their impartiality and loyalty to the Party, the cadres sometimes needed to favor the people with other surnames.

⁵ In Guangdong the old lineage still seems to have life in the production brigade and teams. See William L. Parish, "The Commune as a Social System: Kwangtung Province, 1970-74", 1975.

Relationships with the relatives of mother's or wife's side experienced little change in Mazhang, due to the fact that the village had few households of other surnames and no endogamy had ever been known. In contrast, in informant C's village, there were some intra-village marriages. A new kind of solidarity unknown before between the two related households within the same village came into being. Because it was not a very frequent practice, it is still too early to observe any significant consequences.

Because of the shift in the channel of loyalty, the change in the ideal type of family and fewer occasions of ritual gatherings, the solidarity between kinsmen of the same lineage was considerably weakened. However, as the brigade was a stable socio-economic unit and the children continued to carry on the father's surname, the awareness of a distinct agnate group was still there. Whether there will be a complete disappearance of lineage or a renewal is still to be seen.

III MARRIAGE

A. Age of Marriage

According to the marriage law (Meijer, 1971),⁶ the legal age of marriage is 20 for men and 18 for women (Article 4). But after 1958 when the birth control problem had

⁶ The effectiveness of the marriage law seems to be partial. It had an impressive impact on divorce and familial disputes around 1953, but since then it has gradually retreated and left much ground for the revival of traditional mores. Generally speaking, it has been more effective in application to minimum marriage age and divorce than to free choice of partners and rights of heritage for women.

become increasingly serious, the age of marriage was gradually raised. It seems that the late marriage was only advised by different social and political organs, but was never regulated by law. Therefore, in different places there were different ages to be proposed. Informant A gave 27-28 for men and 23-24 for women in Mazhuang Brigade around 1965, whereas informant C gave 28 for men and 26 for women in Yangjiagao around 1975. The severity of the application of the age standard in marriage was not equal in different periods. Generally speaking, it was more severe during the political movements than at other times. If there were some adequate reasons, exception could be made. Moreover, only one of the engaged parties needed to reach the recommended age for a marriage to be contracted. This allowed women to be married at a younger age. For example, in Mazhuang, a girl of 19 years old got married because her fiancé reached 27. However, in most cases the recommended age of marriage was respected.

The effectiveness of the application of late marriage was not only the result of efficient implementation of the Party's policies, but was also influenced by economic changes. Now unmarried girls were no longer merely second hands for housework, but could earn workpoints. Hence, the parents liked to keep them longer at home. The girls were also willing to earn some money for their parents and themselves before getting married. On the other hand, a marriage cost the bridegroom a lot (I will explain the reason a little later). It was often difficult for a man to contract a marriage at a young age unless his parents were rich.

B. Betrothal

The betrothal in the commune of 1965 was completely different from some twenty years ago, before the revolution. Informant B, the mother of Informant A, gave me a detailed description of betrothal and marriage in her time. According to her information,

and what I know myself, the betrothal before the revolution was contracted at a very young age, usually between one and sixteen years old for both boy and girl. The engagement was determined not only by the fitness in terms of wealth of the two families, but also by that of the astrological elements of the two parties. As the betrothal was contracted at so early an age, it was entirely an affair of parents. However, it was not arranged directly by the parents, but was always done through a go-between who could be either a professional matchmaker or a relative, or a friend. The time between the betrothal and marriage could last many years. During the engagement period, the fiancé and fiancée had to avoid meeting each other. That is why, in many cases, the wedding day was a point of surprise for both bride and groom. The bride-price, which would be called in Chinese cai-li (gift of marriage) was found among the poor people, but was not a common practice above the middle-class, because only the poor families dared to lose face by accepting money for "marrying out" their daughters. But gifts for the bride or for ritual usage could be accepted without a loss of face.

Now (1965) in Mazhaung Brigade, no one was betrothed at a very young age. The average age of betrothal was around 20 for women and 23 for men. It was always arranged by parents of the two parties through a go-between - a relative or friend. There were no more professional matchmakers; but there were semi-professional ones who took the advantages of receiving gifts in the form of meat or cakes. The informants have never heard of any engagement in this village stemming from romantic love. This is because not only had romantic love no root in tradition, but it was frowned upon by the authorities. A Hong Kong newspaper stated:

A recent refugee from mainland China summed up the official attitude there toward romance and marriage. Young love in Communist China is under fire because it diverts attention from assigned jobs, and under an all-embracing "austerity" drive initiated by Peking, personal happiness is categorized as a "bourgeois-aspiration" (HKS, 27 November, 1963).

Another reason why romantic love was rare is that most of the young people who met each other in the village were related by agnatic ties. The few youths of other surnames also looked for their potential mates beyond the village boundaries due to the old custom of exogamy. That is why romantic love could not occur in the countryside as easily as in the cities. This is not unique to Shandong. Jack Chen reported the same situation in the 1970's in the countryside in Honan Province. He said: "The idea of romantic love followed by personal courtship and marriage never crossed their minds except as something that happened in operas" (1973 : 72).

With regard to the principal of exogamy, informant A remembered only one case of village endogamy between two families of different surnames in her mother's village. She considered it as unusual. However, informant C said that there were more cases of intra-village marriage in her village because it is multi-surnamed. According to informant C, most of the young girls nowadays preferred to remain in their native village by getting married to a countryfellow of the same village. Another informant from Guangdong Province told me that there were cases of marriage between people of the same surname in Guangdong, but all the informants from Shandong have considered this impossible.

Although the betrothal was arranged by the choice of parents, the two parties had the right of veto. But they seldom used this right, simply because they were still not accustomed to thinking that to be engaged was a personal affair. The most obvious change is that the two engaged parties no longer avoid seeing each other before or

after the betrothal. As a rule, before the engagement the would-be fiancée came to pay a visit to the would-be fiancé's family in order to ensure that there were enough rooms in the house and that the position of the family was not in the dangerous categories (landlord, rich peasant, counter-revolutionary, etc.) lest she should be fooled by the go-between. On this occasion the would-be fiancé was not necessarily present. If there were not enough rooms, and if there was another married brother at home, to build a new house, and to ensure the division of the household after marriage were common conditions imposed by the would-be fiancée. This kind of visit could last several days, because the would-be fiancée had to make sure that the house she visited had not been borrowed from a relative or a neighbor.⁷ On this occasion the mother of the would-be fiancé had to give a present of "first view" (jian-mian li) which was usually 30-40 yuan, to the would-be fiancée regardless of the possibility of engagement. If the girl was satisfied with this first visit, the betrothal could be planned. A bride-price and/or presents of betrothal from the fiancé's family to the fiancée were indispensable. Informant C gave the sum of 200 yuan as an average bride-price. If presents, they were in general represented by "three wheels" (san-zhuan) which meant bicycle, watch and sewing machine, as well as dresses. The value of the presents depended upon the "quality" of the fiancée and the economic situation of the fiancé's family. Generally speaking, without 1,000 yuan (including expenses of the wedding and house building) a man could not marry a woman. As romantic love was almost unknown in the countryside, the material conditions became all the more important. Though the practice of bride-price was officially discouraged (ZGQNB Editorial, 19 November, 1964), it seemed that it could not entirely disappear when the social and economic conditions had not yet favored such a disappearance.

⁷ It should be noted that dupery in marriage has frequently occurred in China and has not been considered as too immoral. One of the duties of a matchmaker is to conceal the drawbacks of both parties and to reveal only the advantages.

The main reason why women had the advantage over men in the marriage bargain was that there were many more men than women in the countryside.⁸ This was partially due to the traditional preference on the part of parents for boys over girls, and partially due to the fact that the young girls in the countryside looked to the cities for their possible mates. For instance, the secretary of the CCP Committee of Ding County (Ting Hsien), Hobei Province, has revealed that:

The conditions for marriage mate selection of many young girls in the countryside in our county consist only of the size of the income of the partner and the possibility of being brought into cities or towns. For instance, when a military officer of a certain village went home to see his parents, more than twenty young girls in the village as well as from the nearby villages came to talk to him. The first question they asked was how much he earned a month; and the second question was if he could bring his future wife to live in the city. In many villages young girls write to relatives or friends who work in the cities entrusting them with the task of introducing partners. Some went to cities by themselves in search of a mate. In doing so not only did they desert their agricultural tasks, but wasted much money. There have even been cases that girls abandoned their boyfriends in the village by getting others from the city. This is the case of a girl of the Chang-wang village. She was engaged to a young man of the same village. When they were preparing their wedding, the girl met a worker from the city. After having talked a short time with this worker in the maize field, she decided to marry him. This made her fiancé lose his senses (Liu Chao-yen, 1957).

The girls of the villages near cities had some chance to marry men in cities. The girls of the remote villages tended to marry the men in the villages nearer cities. Consequently, in the remote villages, women were lacking.⁹ A man from a politically low-ranking family, if he was poor at the same time, had little chance of finding a bride. In informant C's village, there were 40 poor or politically low-ranking men over 30 years old who

⁸ There were more men than women in the countryside of Honan Province too. (see Jack Chen, 1973 : 73).

⁹ This pattern of marriage mobility toward cities was also confirmed by one of my informants from Guangdong Province.

who remained bachelors. My informant thought there would be little chance for those men to get married.

Informant A's cousin (the son of her father's brother, whom she still referred to as "brother" instead of "cousin" to make the distinction from a cousin on the mother's side) is another instance. Although his family had enough rooms, he failed five or six times in the "first visit" of the would-be fiancée, because his grandfather had been the landlord. Finally, the family duped a girl coming from a distant village by telling her that the family was in a middle-peasant's position. After the betrothal, the fiancée began to hear some rumours about the fiancé's family and became suspicious that she had been fooled. While she was attempting to demand a dissolution of the engagement, informant A came home to interfere in the affair by offering presents brought from the cities, and arranged a quick marriage. According to informant A, this young wife was not happy at being fooled before the marriage and still tried to get a divorce, after having had two children, but she said that it was difficult to get divorced because of the children.

C. Weddings

The time between betrothal and wedding could last one to three years. During this time the fiancée often paid visits to the fiancé's family. Each time, the mother of the fiancé had to give the fiancée some money as a present. By contrast, the fiancé came seldom, if at all, to the fiancée's house. This is because of the patrilocal practice. No man, except for special reasons, was willing to go to live in his wife's village.

The wedding ceremony is very simple now in comparison with the sophisticated and complex rituals before the revolution. There existed a large range of variations according to different circumstances. The only indispensable formality was to go to register in the commune in front of an officer and to get the marriage certificate. The bride and groom wore new clothes on this special occasion. The bride's dowry was no longer common practice. According to informant D, in Qiho County, a dowry of "five-items" (wu-jian) was the maximum which had been the minimum for a married daughter in a middle peasant family before the revolution.

After the registration, the common practice was to invite a few relatives and close friends to a banquet. Whether to have or not to have the banquet, and the degree of its opulence, were dependent on the economic situation of the groom's family on the one hand, and the general economic situation of the year on the other. For instance, between 1959 and 1961 there could hardly have been a banquet on any occasion. But in 1975, according to informant C, the banquet of marriage was very opulent with at least twenty dishes, because vegetables and meats were not expensive. Sometimes the family of the groom could exhaust its savings of many years and could even run into debt because of a wedding banquet. That is why a new style of wedding, with tea, candy and cigarettes, was strongly recommended by the press.¹⁰ However, this new style of wedding remained only within a small circle of activists for the purpose of demonstration.

The old custom of "nao-fang" (making jokes in the bridal chamber) was still observed, but was said to be practiced to a lesser extent than before the revolution. However, some accidents could happen. It was reported that once in a village of Jimo County,

¹⁰ For example, "Hun-shi xin-ban" (A Wedding in a New Style), GRRB, 4 July, 1964.

the youths who came to make fun in the bridal chamber found the door closed because the couple had already gone to bed. They angrily broke down the door and made the bride "taking airplane" by throwing her in the air and finished by breaking one of her arms (ZGQNB, 28 March, 1958).

There was some change in regard to the bride's residence after marriage. Before the revolution, the common practice in Shandong was that the bride passed at least eight months a year in her own family during the first three to five years of marriage. She took her husband's family as permanent residence only when she had had several children and had become familiar with both her husband and his family.¹¹ Now, in Mazhuang, the wife stayed a longer time in each year with her husband if they had set up a separate household after marriage. However, the old practice was still not uncommon. According to informant C, in her village most of the young married women went to their husbands' families only during the busy season and on some important occasions such as the New Year and mid-August during the first year of marriage. Under such conditions, the mutual affection between husband and wife was neither necessary nor expected. The overt affection between young couples usually received a critical eye, whereas coldheartedness was considered normal behavior. For example, here is a report about a model worker:

¹¹ This custom seems not to be common in all China. C. K. Yang has said: "except for ceremonial occasions, frequent visits by the wife to her own parents' home were discouraged" (Yang, 1959b : 111). I do not know to what extent this custom has been prevailing in China. Another source gives indication that in Hui'an County, Fujian Province, the similar custom was practiced under the name of "zuo-jia" (staying at home). A Chinese writer quoted from the History of Marriage in Hui'an County of Fujian Province: "According to the local custom, a married woman had to go back to her own family on the third day after the wedding. Since then she would go to her husband's home only during the busy season and on the occasion of the new year and other important festivals until she gave birth to a child. In some cases married women could remain in their own families for twenty years. That is why no real affection existed between husband and wife" Yang Wen, "Xin Zhong-guo de hun-yin Zhi-du" (The Marriage System in New China), ZGXW (Guangzhou), 10 March, 1966.

Chen Zhong-wan, a young worker of the magnesium mine in Ye County of Shandong Province, has always insisted on full attendance at work since he came to the mine in October, 1958. The National Holiday of last year was the third time he and his fiancée decided to get married. The first time they chose for the ceremony was on the new year day 1959. Because Chen was too busy in the mine, he finally persuaded his fiancée to postpone their marriage to the 1st May holiday in 1960. Unfortunately on that day Chen was still too busy to take a holiday. The date of their marriage thus was changed to another time on the National Holiday in 1961. Three days before the holiday Chen made an extra effort to accomplish the target of September so that he could go home to get married. The day of the wedding was precisely the last day of his holiday. As soon as the wedding finished, he insisted immediately on going back to work. The members of his family all said that it was not important to miss one working day for a marriage. He responded: "It is indeed not important to miss one working day for one person, but it will certainly be catastrophic if everybody misses one working day!" He explained to his brother, sister-in-law and his bride the reason why the production task had to take precedence over private affairs and promised that he would come home to visit them when possible in the future during holidays. Understanding that they could not hold him, the brother proposed to carry him back on his bicycle early the next morning in order that he could pass the wedding night at home. At three o'clock the groom awoke his brother and asked him to accompany him to go back to work. When he arrived at the mine it was not yet day (GRRB, 4 February, 1962).

Though this report relates an extreme case and was published with the intention of spreading some propaganda, it indicates the normal pattern of relationship between young married couples which the public could expect and praise.

IV WOMEN'S POSITION¹²

The women's position will be seen at two levels: within the family and in the society at large.

¹² For the situation of women's position in China after the period of my study a brief account was done by Norma Diamond based on first hand information. N. Diamond, "Collectivization, Kinship and the Status of Women in Rural China", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Special Issue : Asian Women, Vol. 7, No. 1, January-March, 1975.

A. Women's Status in the Family

In the traditional Chinese family stratification of status was based on the difference in sex and in age: women were subordinate to men and younger to older. Since the revolution, both the Party and the government had concentrated much effort, including the promulgation of marriage laws, to reverse the trend. Some salient results have been gained.¹³ With the establishment of the people's communes, some additional conditions in favor of the ascendancy of women's status in the family has been created.

In Mazhuang Brigade, no maltreatment of daughter-in-law by mother-in-law, the symbol of women's tragedy in old China, was possible because of the actual separation of households after the son's marriage or the possible separation in case of dispute. Sometimes the separation of households could be limited by material considerations such as lack of lodging space. That is why this problem was so important in the eyes of a girl when a marriage was being negotiated. Not having enough room in a family meant great difficulty in finding a wife for the son.

The position of wife vis-à-vis her husband was raised too, although to a lesser extent. The possibility of divorce greatly reduced the husband's arrogance. However, the wife was still somewhat subordinate to her husband because he was chief of the household by tradition and the principal income earner. In Mazhuang, after the over-hasty mess-hall movement in 1958-1959, no mess halls actually survived. There were no nurseries either. Only during the busy season were some old women mobilized to take care of the small children. As a rule the housework fell on the shoulders of the wife while the husband was working in the field. After the wife had several children it was impossible for her to work regularly in the field. Only the mature daughter could go to

¹³ See C. K. Yang, 1959, Chapter VI : The Ascendancy of the Status of Women, pp. 105-116.

the field and work as much as a son. As a result, the unmarried daughters were much better treated than before, although parents' preferences were still for a son. As for the inheritance of property, custom was still stronger than law. At any rate, it was not very meaningful without land. In general, daughters did not inherit the parents' house or furniture if there was a son.

B. Women's Status in the Society

C. K. Yang gave three elements symbolizing the low status of women in the traditional society: loss of their name, seclusion and lack of education (Yang, 1959b : 105-116). All three had changed to varying degrees since the revolution. After the promulgation of the marriage law, officially, the wife had the right to use her own surname (Chapter three, Article II). This became common in the cities when women worked in offices or factories, but still was not common in the countryside. For example, in Mazhuang, most families were related to each other by agnate ties, so they usually addressed each other in kinship terms without necessarily mentioning the surname. As for people of other surnames, they addressed each other in fictive kinship terms in which only the husband's surname was involved. As a result, married women's own surnames were not currently used in the countryside.

By contrast, women's seclusion was completely broken down. As a matter of fact, before the revolution women's seclusion was only applied to the people above the middle peasant families. The poor peasants had no economic means by which to keep their women in seclusion. First, the poor peasants had no large houses in which to hide their women from view. Secondly, they needed their women in the field. Now, in the commune, apart from the enforced propaganda of women's liberation, the material

foundation for women's seclusion no longer existed. There were no large size families and no big houses which had constituted one of the conditions necessary to seclude the women. But above all everybody must participate in outdoor work during the busy season. This made any seclusion impossible.

In Mazhuang, girls had an almost equal opportunity for elementary school education. However, if a family could not afford to send all its children to school, it preferred to send the boys first and kept the girls for housework. At the level of middle school, because it was in another village, the parents also preferred to send boys first. As a result of tradition, women still lagged behind men in education, though women's access to education had been greatly improved in comparison with the pre-revolution situation.

In spite of remaining unfavorable conditions for women, the fundamental change in women's social status since the commune movement lay in their economic independence. In the traditional society, the property (mostly in the form of land) was in the hands of men from generation to generation, whereas women had, in the normal case, no right of inheritance. Moreover, the forced seclusion and ignorance of women deprived them of occupational opportunities. Therefore, women's dependency on men was total. But in the commune, land belonged to the collectivity and women were encouraged to work on the same footing as men, so women actually were and, above all, psychologically felt independent from men.

In Mazhuang women were usually assigned to lighter work than men, but a few unmarried adult women who had enough physical strength could earn as many work-points as men under the principle of "equal pay for equal work". It should be noted that in a

different place the situation could be different. For instance, in informant C's village, because the villagers had lace embroidery as sideline production, the unmarried girls used to do embroidery at home while the married women went to the field. Generally speaking, in the commune system women had the same access to work as men if they were physically able, and wanted to work. This opening up of work opportunity made it no longer necessary for women to live under the threat of hunger which had forced them to submit to an inferior status in the old times.

As for leadership, women still were not equal to men, In Mazhuang, only one out of five cadres was a woman. The vice-commander of the brigade was a woman. In informant C's village, the proportion of female leaders was still smaller. This is because, firstly, the traditional conception of women's incompetence was still strong and, secondly, the patrilocal practice did not work in favor of women's prestige. In Xu Jian-chun, the woman director of the Xiyou Commune was one of a few exceptions.

V THE COMMUNAL LIFE IN MAZHUANG

Mazhuang Brigade was neither a model (never mentioned in the press) nor a very poor unit, and can be seen as average. It is situated four kilometres from the county seat and 90 kilometres from Jinan, the capital of Shandong, to which it was linked by a highway. In addition, a special railway communicated with the coal mine which is about 2.5 kilometres to the south of Mazhuang and Jinan. There were two coal mines: a big one and a small one. The big mine belonged to the state with workers recruited from everywhere. The coal was extracted to support the industrial centres and could not be consumed on the spot. The small mine was exploited for local consumption under the supervision of the county. Workers in the small mine were recruited temporarily

from the neighboring communes. Workers' wages were paid to the brigades and the latter transformed them into work-points.

Owing to the exploitation of coal mines, an electric power station was set up about 1966. But Mazhuang was not equipped with electric light until the late 1960's. However, in 1965, the Wangguadian People's Commune to which the Mazhuang brigade belonged had a tractor station. Every brigade had its own pumping stations.

The people of Mazhuang were far from rich, but had enough to eat and to wear. Almost all households that had young people had bicycles and transistors. A large number of households had sewing machines. The people purchased their secondary necessities in the periodical market (every 5 days according to the lunar calendar) in Yixian Village which was 1.5 kilometres distant. A big market was in the county seat where more varieties of goods were found and the prices were also a little cheaper. The peasants usually went to the market to sell small quantities of grain, vegetables, fowl and eggs and to buy small tools, clothes and other articles of daily use. The brigade could kill pigs to sell meat. More women than men went to the market because the men were busier in the fields.

The work time for the peasants was usually from 5 to 8 AM, from 11 AM to 2 PM and from 3 to 6 PM. During the busy season, the peasants started for the fields at 4 AM, at 11 AM they took a break to eat and have a nap, and started again at 3 PM. Then they continued to work until very late in the night. But work under such pressure lasted only one week to ten days. Usually, the peasants took two meals, but during the busy season they could take three or four.

Following the creation of the people's commune, the peasants had a sense of security. They knew that provided they worked they would be compensated. If they

were really short of anything, the collective could help them. They were also aware that the collectivity was much stronger than small farmers in resisting natural calamities. They could no longer quit their native places during the hard years to beg elsewhere. The old people especially were relieved from the threat of being deserted by an unfilial son.

As in the old times, peasants in Mazhuang still placed importance on the continuation of family lines. Generally speaking, they worked hard in the hope of improving their living standards. However, they were used to a frugal life. The rise in living standards was far more manifested in the form of savings than in consumption. The peasants had to build savings in order to construct new houses and to prepare in advance for the necessary expenses of son's betrothals and weddings. As a matter of fact, building a new house was not for oneself but for the sons and their future households. It has to be recalled that having a new house was a favorable condition for getting a daughter-in-law. The cost of a house of three units varied from 700 yuan (in sunburn brick) to 1,000 yuan (in kiln made brick). It represented the savings of many years for an average household living a frugal life. While they could anticipate the continuation of the family line, the peasants were not unhappy with the hardships of their life.

VI TRENDS OF FAMILY LIFE IN THE COMMUNE

Marion J. Levy thought, after his analysis of the family revolution in modern China, that the particularism based on the kinship system was a major obstacle to the spread of modern industry in China, and the western pattern of family organization would triumph in China more probably than any others (see Chapter One, Section I, pp. 14-15).

Levy's analysis, like the analyses of many other sociologists and economists on the societies of the Third World, was based on the assumption that China would and must take the same way of development as the western societies had passed through. Since the establishment and the stabilization of the people's communes, it can be said that China has definitely taken a different path of development from the western model. Therefore, in the commune framework, the approach of particularism versus universalism advanced by Talcott Parsons as a conceptual tool, is not so meaningful as in the developing countries that have taken the western model of development. Let us try to explain the reason.

It is true, as Marion Levy has pointed out, that "the family organization is in all societies an ineradicable stronghold of particularism and functional diffuseness" (Levy, Jr., 1949 : 317). The larger the proportion of the total social structure covered by the family structure, the stronger and more permeating is the particularism in the society. The western developmental experience indicates that evolution of human behavior from particularism towards universalism went along together with the weakening of family structure. The weakening of family structure which has been interpreted as a condition favorable to industrialization has been manifested in the first place by the replacement of the family by other social organizations in its functions of satisfying human needs, and in the second place, by the reduction of family size as well as the size of the kinship network. According to my study on the family organization in France and Switzerland, the most detrimental force in breaking down the large family and family community was much less the industrialization itself than its concomitant:

the urbanization.¹⁴ Because of the rapid spread of urbanization in the last centuries, in France, for example, the large families in the countryside could not survive the accelerated and continuing reduction of their members. By contrast, in China, the Chinese model of development is an industrialization without urbanization (see Chapter Two, Section III, p. 47). The creation of the People's communes not only stopped the mobility of rural population toward cities, but enabled the countryside to absorb a part of the urban population. We have some evidence to suggest that within the commune framework the traditional family structure is essentially preserved though changed in some important respects. Even the kinship network seems to be able to perpetuate itself without the formal lineage organization. Particularism will not necessarily be replaced by universalism, but it can certainly be balanced by the comradeship between members of the Party on the one hand, and by the notion of the "state" indoctrinated through political campaigns on the other. In this case, the Chinese particularism would not be so detrimental to the industrialization as it might have been in other circumstances.

To study the Chinese family in the commune framework, Michael Ames' dimensional approach in studying Indian families could be a useful conceptual tool (Ames, 1973). Although the economic development in India and in China is different, there are many common traits in the family structure in the two societies (Gore, 1968). If the Indian family has not changed along the line from joint family to nuclear family under the impact of modernization, there is little chance to expect the Chinese family to do so. The small

¹⁴ See for example, Louis Delzons, La famille française et son évolution, 1913; Henri Mendras, La fin des paysans : innovations et changement dans l'agriculture française, 1967; E. H. Lacombe, Les changements de la société française, 1971; Walter Sorell, The Swiss : A Cultural Panorama of Switzerland, 1972; and Armin Gretler and Pierre-Emeric Mandl, Values, Trends and Alternatives in Swiss Society, 1973.

size of household in the Chinese commune alone cannot indicate any meaningful change in the family structure, just as the similar situation did not change the Indian families. K. Ishwaran said: "It has been shown that at any given point of time, the composition of most Indian households is not joint. This fact in itself does not prove that great changes have occurred, since even in the past, most households were not joint. Despite the prevalence of a large number of residentially nuclear families, empirical evidence suggests that Indian values and attitudes are still generally in favor of the joint family: (Ishwaran, 1971). Kapadia's statement is as meaningful to the Indian family as to the Chinese family. He said: "Even in those cases where the property is divided and the income of the members of families is not pooled...the constituent families maintain their connections through mutual cooperation and rights and obligations other than those of property." (Kapadia, 1959). Reuben and Hansen Hill have classified households into five types of jointness (1963) which have been adopted by I. P. Desai in the study of the Indian family (1964). Similar to Hill's classification, the dimensional approach suggested by Ames is defined with reference to dwelling, residence, property, kinship network and ideal, an approach which goes beyond the types of households into the sphere of the family. So a five-dimensional approach (the commensal dimension, residential or household dimension, property or coparcenary dimension, network dimension and ideal dimension) has been worked out for his study on the Indian family of Jamshedpur (Ames, 1973). With this approach as a conceptual tool, we will see that the trend of the changes of the Chinese family in the commune was not similar to the trends in the industrialized societies. The following are the major trends drawn from the limited data obtained by interviews.

A. Size of Family

The size of family cannot be defined only by the size of the household, because the household tended to be either as small as nuclear or as large as famille souche. Indeed, the young married wives mostly preferred to live independently of their parents-in-law. But when they grew older and became mothers-in-law themselves, they would prefer to live with one married son. Insofar as the welfare funds of the brigade or team could not support all old persons, the responsibility of supporting old parents would rest on the sons (or daughters if no son). Insofar as the social services such as nurseries and mess halls were not widely available, an old grandmother was always a helpful hand in looking after children and doing other housework in order that the daughter-in-law might earn work-points. Therefore, it can be said that the present conditions in the commune favor the household of the stem family (*famille souche*) type.

The present lodging condition can also be seen as a kind of limitation to large size households. Before the revolution, the size of the house matched the amount of the wealth and the number of the members of the family. After all land and foundations of houses had been collectivized, the family that wanted to build a new house had to apply for permission to do so from the brigade or the commune. The place of new building was in general under the unified planning of the brigade or commune. A new house built for a married son might not necessarily be next to the father's dwelling. The new architecture tended to set up small units of residence.

However, a separate married son's household could not be seen as a separate family, because all the married sons had the responsibility of supporting their parents both by turning work-points over to them, and by giving services in case of necessity. For instance, informant A who worked in a city was obliged to ask for a year-long leave

to serve her mother-in-law who was sick in the countryside. If the parents lived with one married son, the other married sons were considered as members of the same family. When both parents were dead the relationship between brothers became somewhat different, but both sides were still bound by mutual obligations. As the commune structure had stabilized the population mobility in the countryside, these mutual obligations among close kin would certainly be reinforced by the togetherness of work and living.

Should the intra-village marriage prevail under the influence of easy contact between young people of the same village, the traditional agnatic kinship network would suffer from the emergence of kinship by affinity. According to my informants, the relatives on the wife's, mother's, daughter's and sister's side had already acquired an unusual importance in the urban areas. The weakening of paternal lineage would certainly open up the possibility of closer interdependence between affinal kin who had been excluded from the circle of family in the traditional society. It is not improbable that the conception of family would be affected by such a change.

Limited by data, no conclusion can be drawn in this connection. It can only be suggested that a family can, at the present time, include several households. The size of family should be studied because the notion and conception of family is in full evolution. Two variables can be singled out as important agents of change: women's perception of the family which has been mentioned in the former section and village endogamy as mentioned above.

B. Pattern of Marriage

Under the commune structure, it is doubtful that the principle of exogamy could be maintained indefinitely as an absolute rule. Informant C has given evidence that in

her village (multi-surnamed) girls began to have preference for intra-village marriage. The cases of village endogamy have been even more frequent in Guangdong Province than in North China according to my informants from this province. Any quantitative change from exogamy to endogamy will have far-reaching influence on both the family institution and marriage patterns.

Insofar as the marriage pattern is concerned, the essence has changed little; what was visibly different from the traditional pattern is rather a question of form. The essence of marriage can be seen in three components: choice of partners, contract of marriage and place of residence of married couple.

In the first place, the choice of partners was no longer forced because the two parties had the right of veto which was guaranteed by law. However, they were not really free in comparison with the pattern of mate choice in the western countries. With few exceptions, the general pattern of the choice of partner and the decision-making in contracting marriage in the countryside was still handled by parents through a go-between.

Secondly, the contract of marriage was accompanied, or can even be said to be symbolized, by a bride-price (or bride presents). This indicates the continuity of patriarchal dominance in marriage, especially in connection with the patrilocal practice and the position of women in the family.

Thirdly, the residence of married couples was still patrilocal. If the newly married couple did not live under the same roof of the husband's father's house, they would live in the husband's village in a house built by the husband's family.

All the three components of the marriage pattern could be affected by the change from exogamy to endogamy. This is because (1) village endogamy could have more chance

to be based on real "free choice" (or romantic love); (2) endogamous marriage enabled the bride to stay close to her family so that she could continue to help her family in case of need; the bride-price which was mainly a compensation for the loss of a member on the part of the bride's family would no longer be very meaningful in such a case; (3) endogamy would make the patrilocal practice lose some of its characteristics by the equal physical closeness to the families of both partners.

However, although the commune structure seemed to favor the endogamous marriage, the old trend could not be easily changed when the economic development was unequal in different places. While people were bound by the communal organization, one of few possible ways of moving to a better place was through marriage. Women could not miss the opportunity of taking advantage of the old exogamy practice.

C. Family hierarchy and interpersonal relationships

The traditional hierarchy in the family based on the differentiation of sex and age was in general retained with some modifications. As a rule, the nominal head of a household was always the oldest male. A widow-mother who lived with her married son recognized the latter as the nominal head of the family. The stratification of status and allocation of authority in the family was thus always structured along the double criteria of sex and age. The modifications of this hierarchy came from two sources: the Party (or political power) and the financial contribution to the family. A member of the family who held an important Party or administrative position in the commune, though he or she was not the nominal head of the family, had more weight in the decision-making in family affairs than without such a position. It is also true of a member who made a large financial contribution to the family. This member, in either of the above

cases, was likely to be a male between 25 and 65 years old. Only in a few cases could this member occasionally be an adult daughter or a daughter-in-law. Therefore, the family power was still held in the hands of an adult male under 65 years old.

Owing to the present pattern of marriage which was not founded on "romantic love", the relationship between parents and children always took precedence over that between husband and wife. In spite of the dissolution of the formal lineage organization, the family was still viewed more as an institution to carry on the patrilineal line than a simple union of a man and a woman for a common life. However, if you ask your informants the question: "What is a family?" the answer might be: "A family is the union of a man and a woman with their children working together for the cause of revolution." But if you continue your interview in depth, you will soon find that this answer is but an easy sentence learned from the political courses and does not correspond either to the reality or to the informant's real feelings. I have said previously that the old habit in which a married woman lived with her own family for most of the time during the first years of marriage still prevailed in some places, so the affectional tie between husband and wife was rather loose at the beginning of the marriage. The worker who cold-heartedly left his bride behind the day after their wedding to rush to his work is a meaningful example. This tie could only be gradually strengthened as time went on after the wife's bearing of children into the family.

The loose relationship between husband and wife was both the cause and consequence of the strong link between parents and children, especially between father and son. Because the young people were not used to expressing their affection toward their spouses, they expressed more toward their parents and other persons including

siblings and friends of the same sex.¹⁵ On the other hand, the parents-children tie was too strong (a consequence of the loose tie between parents themselves) to allow the young to indulge themselves in the "romantic love" of the western style before and after the marriage. As the sons (sometimes daughters too) were still the most reliable support in old age, the affection and hope that the parents poured into children (especially sons) were so intense that the children would have felt like traitors if they had not been able to return that affection at the same level of intensity due to their attention being absorbed too much by their spouses. That is why the father-son relationship was not only a dominant figure in the family, but also one in the society at large.

There is no sign of significant change in this sphere in the near future so long as the marriage pattern has not shifted and the welfare system for the old people is not improved to the point of releasing the son from the duty of supporting old parents.

The data from Mazhuang (informants A and B) combined with those from Yangjiagao (informant C) and Qiho (informant D) show that the traditional family structure was, in the main, maintained in the commune framework with some changes which might have far-reaching influence on an eventual new orientation. But so far no significant changes within the family structure have yet become definitive. It is of some interest to note that the result of my analysis is very similar to that of William L. Parish, Jr.'s which was based on the data from Guangdong Province (Parish, 1975b). The most meaningful change in

¹⁵ A Chinese who died for the cause of friendship should not be mistaken as a case of homosexuality. This is because the friendship is a very emotional experience in China, almost of the same intensity as love in the western culture. As for the relationship between husband and wife and that between siblings, I have two friends who have divorced just because their sisters did not like their wives. This is understandable for a Chinese, but is rather strange for a westerner.

this sphere was the external family relationship, in other words, the extension of the family, or the lineage and its corresponding social organizations such as fictive kinship organizations in the form of "zong-qin hui" (kinship association) or in the form of secret societies.

Two forces were functionally detrimental to the large network of kinship: the rise of the Party as a new centre of loyalty and the commune system as both the unit and organizer of production. The political functions and economic functions of lineage and the like were taken over respectively by the Party and the commune organizations. An individual could no longer rely merely on his family and his kin for satisfying his multiple needs. From this point of view, the change was tremendous. In consequence, the family was no longer so much the core of the Chinese social organization as was the case in the traditional society. However, its influence on human behavior in the society at large was still strongly felt.

Chapter Twelve

CONCLUSION

From the point of view of development, the Chinese experience since 1840 up to the commune movement of 1958 on can be seen as a restructuring of the fabric of the traditional Chinese society. This restructure has two determinants: the pre-existing structure and the agents of change introduced from outside in the form of both ideas and material forces (commercial goods and military invasion). As I have suggested at the beginning of this thesis, the process of this restructuring has been viewed as having passed from the traditional stage, through the transitional stage, to the socialist stage (see Chapter Two). This division into different stages does not necessarily mean, however, that the fabric of the society was fundamentally changed from one stage to another. Rather, it indicates that some changes occurred in the different stages and these can provide indicators pointing to a new direction. In the light of this argument, the development of the Chinese society can be seen as having shifted its orientation from one stage to another without the social structure being completely changed. During the "transitional stage", under the direct impact of the western powers, Chinese society began to move towards capitalistic development, in that developments in western societies, especially the American society, were taken as its model. But this orientation was diverted by the socialist revolution, and a new orientation, which can be called "the Chinese road to socialism", as Wheelwright and McFarlane have termed it, replaced western influence. As far as development is concerned, the century-long stage of transition was largely eclipsed by the quarter-century long stage of socialism in which the Chinese social fabric was shaped into a new form. Some sociologists, such as C. K. Yang (1959),

think that the achievement under socialism was a continuation of the transitional stage in terms of modernization. In my view, the third stage should be viewed as a departure from the transitional stage rather than a continuation of it. Though the transitional stage had paved the way for the arrival of socialism, the socialist stage has retained more traits of the traditional stage than of the transitional one.

I A THEORETICAL SUGGESTION FOR AN APPROACH TO TRADITIONAL CHINESE SOCIETY

During the traditional stage, the Chinese society was composed of three elements: state, gentry and peasantry. The three elements were hierarchically linked together. This structural configuration has been directly or indirectly suggested by a variety of studies on traditional Chinese society by scholars such as Fei Hsiao-t'ung (1968), Hsiao Kung-ch'uan (1960), Ho Ping-ti (1962), Chang Chung-li (1955), and others. This vertical hierarchy was structurally intertwined with a horizontal network, namely, the lineage system. While the vertical force was working to polarize class differentiation, the horizontal force restrained it by establishing boundaries. An equilibrium was thus made up dialectically by two opposing and complementary forces. If we present it by a static schema, it can be conceived as a dual extension of which two forces (the class polarization extends vertically while the lineage system extends horizontally) being neutralized by each other. Each of the two needed support from the other; therefore, neither could acquire a dominant position. I suggest we call this structural situation a "coextensive structure". The structure of three elements characterizes functions of the traditional Chinese society and the "coextensive structure" indicates its social processes.

Within the former, the three categories, state, gentry and peasantry, were functionally related to each other. The state depended on the gentry for communication with and control over the peasantry as well as for recruiting its members to fill the state bureaucracy. The gentry depended on the state to grant it authority and to legitimate its social status. The peasantry depended on the gentry for economic means (land and/or loans) and moral resources, and on the state for legal justice. Finally, both the state and gentry depended on the peasantry for material supplies. To maintain these relationships was the social goal. A breakdown would benefit none of the three. The balance between the gentry and the peasantry was however precarious when social status, economic means and moral resources were almost entirely concentrated in the hands of the former. There was always, therefore, a force working to pull the two classes apart. They could have been so polarized in a relatively short time, say, one hundred years or so, if there had been no lineage system to restrain this force. Among others, two variables in the lineage system can be seen as essential restraining forces on class polarization. First, the system of equal sharing of their fathers' property by sons after the abolition of the primogeniture system in very early times eliminated the possibility of concentrating wealth accumulated by generations. Second, owing common property by all members of the lineage was a general rule of all lineages, a rule which also impeded the concentration of wealth in one household. Before the western impact, class polarization in China had never reached the point of threatening to undermine the whole social system in spite of the rise and fall of dynasties.

It can be suggested that traditional Chinese society had reached the point of material and moral self-sufficiency. All it needed to do was to maintain the structural framework within which the society developed according to its own orientation. This

orientation definitely did not point to an industrialized society of the modern western type. The abundance of scholarly works of the Confucian school since the Han Dynasty shows that the Chinese before the western impact were not unaware of or unconcerned with their destiny. A Confucian "manifesto", written two thousand years before Marx's manifesto, greatly stimulated the imagination of the traditional Chinese elite. This is the "Datong Pian" (The Great Union) in Li Ji (The Book of Rituals):

When the Grand course was pursued, a public and common spirit ruled all under the sky; they chose men of talents, virtue, and ability; their words were sincere, and what they cultivated was harmony. Thus men did not love their parents only, nor treat as children only their own sons. A competent provision was secured for the aged till their death, employment for the able-bodied, and the means of growing up to the young. They showed kindness and compassion to widows, orphans, childless men, and those who were disabled by disease, so that they were all sufficiently maintained. Males had their proper work, and females had their homes. (They accumulated) articles (of value), disliking that they should be thrown upon the ground, but not wishing to keep them for their own gratification. (They laboured) with their strength, disliking that it should not be exerted, but not exerting it (only) with a view to their own advantage. In this way (selfish) schemings were repressed and found no development. Robbers, filchers, and rebellious traitors did not show themselves, and hence the outer doors remained open, and were not shut. This was (the period of) what we call the Grand Union.¹

It contained more detail in terms of an ideal society than Marx's work and had served as a guide for both moral and economic development in China for two thousand years. What is interesting is that the Confucian manifesto described a type of society similar to Marx's ideal except that this earlier one would be based on the cooperation derived from the extension of familism instead of cooperation between class brothers. It is unclear to us to what extent the development of the traditional Chinese society had been influenced

¹ Li Chi (Book of Rites), translated by James Legge, 1967 (reed.): 364-366.

by such an ideal. Studies of the evolution of the Chinese lineage organizations, which are still, unfortunately, lacking, may shed a new light on this question. Nonetheless, what I have learned strongly suggests that the originally defensive structure of lineage organization had a tendency to move toward a relatively open structure and that conflict between lineages gradually moved to cooperation. It is in the light of this hypothesis that I have suggested that the "coextensive structure" of the traditional Chinese society indicates its social processes. Despite the drastic deviation from its customary orbit, the modern Chinese society is likely to be still bound to some extent by the traditional structural remains in its development.

II FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE

From the above schema, we can see that the peasants' problems and agricultural development in China could have occurred in a different order if there had been no intervening forces from outside strong enough to break down the existing social structure. But the expansion of the western powers forced China to open her doors since 1840. During one century, Chinese society experienced a process of disintegration which was symptomized by the ruin of the peasantry and the collapse of the rural economy.

China is predominantly an agricultural country. The development of Chinese economy meant, for the major part, the need to solve the problems of the peasantry. I have already advanced the argument as to why the problems of the Chinese peasantry could not be solved only by modernizing the productive forces without changing production relationships (Chapter Four, Section III). The change of production relationships had been completed by a series of engineered policies and programs such as land reform, cooperativization and the people's communes. The commune movement was the last

step in collectivization. Its functional characteristics in regard to solving the peasant problems can be sketched in four aspects.

A. Natural Calamities

One of the peasants' problems in Chinese history was the cyclical nature calamities. Because of the climatic variations, droughts and floods frequently caused famine and important losses of harvests. Irrigation systems had been considered as a crucial factor in agriculture since early times, but had never succeeded in eliminating the major natural calamities. The small farm economy had not only no effective means to undertake large projects of irrigation, but could even hardly benefit from the existing irrigation systems owing to the piecemeal structure of the cultivated land. It is easy to understand that only the collective economy could provide large enough capital and manpower for the construction of large projects and make unified plans. It is also understandable that only the large extent of land would benefit better from the irrigation systems.

B. Peasant Rebellions

Another major peasant problem in Chinese history was the peasant rebellions which were sometimes caused by natural calamities and sometimes by man-made reasons. The people's commune offered a solution to this problem by putting the political and economic power into the hands of poor peasants, by making the peasant his own master and, above all, by finding valuable outlets for releasing their potential of initiative and creativity. This is why Paul T.K. Lin called it a "people-oriented" development (1975).

C. Modernization

There is no doubt that the only way for the contemporary thinking and imagination to attain modernization is through industrialization. What remains is to choose how to achieve the industrialization. In contrast to the capitalist pattern in which capital and technology are concentrated in a few metropolitan areas, the Chinese pattern is described as "walking on two legs". That is to say, the concentrated use of capital and technology in industry is not neglected, but a decentralized development of industry has been advocated and carried out with great effort. The development of local industry is aimed at gradually eliminating the "three big differences" (the difference between peasants and workers, the difference between cities and countryside, and the difference between those who use brains and those who use brawn). For developing local industry, the commune system is not only superior to the small farm economy but also superior to the cooperatives. I have said in Chapter Eight that the changing direction of local industry in the 1960's does not mean that the local industry was abandoned for good. It was a deliberate measure to make full use of the existing traditional handicrafts. When the latter reaches maturity, it will be the time of better development of local industry. The increase of reserve funds of the brigades in the case-studies in this thesis can provide some indicators in the matter of capital accumulation which is one of the crucial prerequisites of industrial development. The commune system has no doubt formed the best framework so far as we can see for unified planning and concentrated use of capital and manpower on the scale of local industry.

D. Goals and Ideal of Development

Students of Chinese society have argued that the family was a key aspect of social organization in the traditional stage. Though some aspects of familism might obstruct modernization, "family" as a primary social group has been seen as central in China's "modernization". According to the western experience of modernization, nothing was more destructive to the traditional familial organization than the rapid urbanization and disintegration of rural communities. The family network and the rural communities in China have not only been preserved by the establishment of the people's communes,² but at the same time reinforced by a general strategy in economic development in the whole country (cf. Gurley, 1971). In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the rural communities were likely to be able to create new jobs for local youth, and to absorb some of the youth from urbanized areas.³ A communal life in which the family could still play an important role and which is less and less possible in the western industrialized societies has been stabilized by the commune system.

² Some scholars think that the establishment of the people's commune brought a fatal blow to the traditional familial organization. Richard Hughes' description may be an extreme example, but certainly not the only one of this view. He said: "Houses had either been commandeered or burned down and replaced by barrack-line dormitories. Husbands and wives had been segregated in different dormitories and were allowed to meet privately only once every two weeks - and only then if their work for the commune had been satisfactory. Couples lined up in deep humiliation for their brief reunion, after which they were required to separate once more. Families had been broken up and parents saw their children only once or twice a week. There were even reports that the children had been quietly removed from their native communes and that the parents did not know where they had been sent." (Hughes, *The Chinese Commune*, 1960). The study of Maurice Freedman ("The Family under Chinese Communism", 1964), that of William L. Parish Jr. ("Socialism and the Chinese Peasant Family", 1975b), and mine have all led to the same conclusion, although with different judgment, that the Chinese family structure had persisted in the commune system.

³ Graham E. Johnson's impression during his numerous visits to Guangdong confirms this statement. He says: "there is urban to rural migration, but not the reverse." (Johnson, "Rural Economic Development and Social Change in South China," mimeo., (1973).

Goals and ideals of human life fostered by the traditional family system and cherished by the Chinese people for a long time, which were neglected or blamed for being an obstacle to modernization during the transitional stage, will probable reassume their place among other newly acquired goals in the framework of the people's commune. Cyril S. Belshaw has pointed out that goals constitute the determining factors of a social system (1969 : 39). From this point of view, both the traditional and new ideals can be seen as a crucial factor in determining the development of the Chinese social system as a whole.

After the functional characteristics in solving the peasants' problems, we have also to examine that which formed the structural characteristics of the commune system.

III STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE

One of the special features of the old structure retained in the commune system is self-control and self-sufficiency. In the traditional stage, village life was characterized politically by self-control and economically by self-sufficiency.⁴ Generally speaking, the village was the unit of agnatic kinship network and served to satisfy the villagers' primary necessities, while the marketing area was the unit of the affinal kinship network and served to supply secondary necessities. Except for the landlord class and some of the rich peasants, the activities of the average peasants hardly went beyond the marketing boundaries. Only serious natural calamities and extreme poverty could force the peasants to migrate far away.

⁴ In the theory of economic growth, self-sufficiency. Both Hsiao Kung-ch'uan and Franz Schurmann have expressed such a point of view (Hsiao, 1960; Schurmann, 1970).

In the theory of economic growth, self-sufficiency has been viewed as one of the principal features of stagnation (Myint, 1964). The degree of economic growth has thus been seen as depending upon the degree of change from an economy of self-sufficiency to one of interdependence. From this point of view, Chinese development with the commune system departs from western development both in practice and in theory, because the commune system brought about a reinforcement to the self-sufficiency in the rural economy.

The emphasis placed on a diversified and overall development in each commune and even in each brigade clearly indicates the goal established for attaining an economic sufficiency in each productive unit. According to Marxist analysis, this is the way not only for getting rid of the western disease of turning interdependence into domination and exploitation, but at the same time for avoiding falling into individual "alienation" which has resulted from the advanced mode of division of labor in modern western industry.

According to the Marxist ideal:

In communist society where nobody has one exclusive field of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind to, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic (Marx and Engels, 1939 : 22).

Goal is an important factor especially in a planned economy of development. The Chinese preferred to push development forward by means of "self-reliance" rather than by means of "diffusion" from a few technologically advanced metropolis to the wide countryside. Though any spectacular result of economic growth is still to be seen, the communal structure represents no doubt a model of development without necessarily breaking

down an economy of "self-sufficiency".

However, the present "self-sufficiency" differs from the traditional one by the structure in which the economic "self-sufficiency" operates. In the traditional stage, social processes, as I have pointed out, submitted to the operation of the "co-extensive structure". The unit of "self-sufficiency" could not expand itself either in wealth or in population beyond the constraint of the forces of the "co-extensive structure". Now, one of the three elements which functionally composed the traditional social structure, namely, the gentry class, disappeared. Class polarization is in general no longer possible in the commune system,⁵ hence the structure is no longer co-extensive. Each productive unit is a unit of economic self-sufficiency. This unit can expand itself in terms of increase in population and output. One unit can theoretically continue to expand itself until it meets the expansion of other units. The structural situation has become more "expansive" through the unit of self-sufficiency than "co-extensive" between class polarization and population growth. Therefore, the nation-wide economic planning and birth-control programs will be all the more important in the future.

IV DYNAMISM OF THE CHINESE MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT

From the functional and structural characteristics of the commune system concluded above, it can be seen that with the communes, the development of Chinese society has clearly formed a particular developmental model in response to solving China's own problems. After having attempted to follow first the western model and then the Soviet model, the Chinese finally worked out their own model. The process of reaching such a

⁵ There has existed disparity of incomes among peasants (see Chapter Seven, Section II, subsection D : Examples of Remuneration; also Whyte, 1975), but this disparity is limited and is fundamentally different from class polarization in the traditional society.

stage was a fumbling experimentation; success was succeeded by failure and failure by success; advance was followed by regression and regression by another advance. It is still at an experimental stage. Changes could intervene at any time to modify the existing structure in some aspects; but the commune system as a whole is likely to exhibit stability. What makes the commune system so singular in comparison with the western model, the Soviet model and other Third World models is of great importance. The dynamic methods used by the Chinese to develop in a "more, quicker, better and more economical" manner have several aspects.

A. Turning Labor into Capital

When capital is scarce, industrialization suffers. This is the common problem in all countries of the Third World. Many countries have adopted an easy way of either receiving foreign aid in exchange for political or military alliances, or being open to foreign private investment at the price of being forcibly integrated into the international market system controlled by a few powerful nations. China is, so far, almost the only country which has relied on her own force to industrialize, except for limited Soviet aid for a short period in the 1950's. Chapter Nine of this study has illustrated the solutions which the Chinese found in relation to the scarcity of capital : turning labor into capital.

Labor can be seen to have a "capital value". The real question lies in "how" to turn labor into capital. Accumulation of capital is the saving value of labor after consumption. In the rural areas where the productive force is still too low to make any meaningful saving for capital accumulation, the only possible solution is to extract the underemployed labor value and to turn it into the form of basic construction such as water conservancy and field construction. The basic construction comprises a capital value in two

ways: First, the construction itself represents a capital value in economic development. Second, almost all the basic construction could produce added value in either agricultural production or in forestry, fishery and sideline production in a short span of time. A great part of this added value could be used in reinvestment as capital. The capital in the form of reserve funds at the commune level or the brigade level has been mainly used in agricultural mechanization and local industry development which will in turn increase the agricultural productivity. Thus, a larger labor force can be saved for basic construction.

However, this cycle between labor accumulation and capital accumulation still cannot explain the whole dynamic schema. Without the following two elements this mechanism could not function normally.

B. Directed Development

To ensure an adequate operation of the above mechanism by means of target fulfillment in the short run, and to ensure the correct direction toward ultimate goals in the long run, development must be directed or planned. Planning work has become a routine at every level. However, the planning of the brigade should not conflict with that of the commune; and the planning of the commune should not conflict with that of the county, and so on and so forth up to the level of the centre. The ultimate guidance is not in the form of policy, but in the form of ideology. Policies could be wrong while ideology was always correct. That is why the ideological training and indoctrination have been considered so important both to the local leaders and to the masses as to penetrate through to the lowest organization. In Chapter Ten, Section III, an example of "directed development" has been given. The "directed development" functioned against

economism or the spontaneous forces of capitalism in the historical march of events.

For instance, when a few units of production which were favored either by their geographical situation or by their advanced technology pursued purely economic interest by turning their productions into specialization of one economic crop or sideline production, this unit had to be brought back on the correct road of "overall development with grain production as the foundation". Otherwise, not only would the whole development schema of the commune system be affected, it would be no different from capitalistic development. From the point of view of economy and that of ideology, the deliberate diversion from the capitalist development model has been viewed as a necessary measure adopted to avoid following the road on which the capitalist countries had moved.

The principle of "directed development" serves to direct the economic mechanism to function along a planned path. Only in this way can the economic mechanism be effective in relation to achieving the ultimate goal.

C. Emphasis on Man Rather than on Mere Material in Development

It must be pointed out that the belief in the possibility of bettering human nature is both a Chinese conception and a Marxist one, though we are not interested here in the philosophical discussion about its justification. With this belief, man is viewed as both a subject for development and an agent of development.

In the first place, man is believed to be able to improve qualitatively through education. The term "development" which means in the western countries socioeconomic growth contains in the Chinese case another element, namely, the betterment of human nature. Political courses and study groups of Mao Tse-tung Thought have been organized on the same footing as other productive activities in the communes. One of the focal

points of the political indoctrination has been the spirit of collectivism. Collectivism has been seen in China as more than a means of achieving economic goals. It has been believed that human virtue can be produced only through the relationship of at least more than two persons. The collective life is, from the Chinese point of view, an ideal milieu in which human nature can be improved.

The several months' long discussion of a young peasant's behavior, organized by the Peking Chinese Youth Newspaper (ZGQNB) in 1956 (see Appendix II) exemplified the problem of education in a collective milieu. If Zhang Xi-yuan was not working in the collective, nobody could find what is wrong with him, nor could he find any wrong himself. Now he was working in a collective environment, he could not pretend not to pay attention to what the others thought of him. Even if he could do so, the others would not stay passive for long. Just as the old director of the cooperative said: "We certainly have some ways to help Zhang Xi-yuan progress. We cannot stand there just to look at him regress day by day." "Help" is one of the key words in the Chinese development. It can have an awful connotation for western people because excessive help can sometimes intrude into the realm of "privacy" or "freedom" which is so serious a matter as to be safeguarded by law. In the western societies, the meaning of "help" could be either positive or negative, depending on the circumstances, whereas in China it can only be positive. This is because in a collective life, "privacy" and individual "freedom" mean little, if anything at all. The mutual help, above all the help of an advanced person or unit, for a backward one, no matter whether it be material or spiritual, is a virtue and constitutes the complementary principle of "self-reliance". From this point of view, an individual is under constant "help" of everybody in his needs and progress. It is also true of a small productive unit in a large one. Of course, under

such circumstances, free choice beyond the model established by socialist ideology is impossible. However, in the final analysis it is doubtful that the scope of free choice beyond the social norms in other countries could be larger. The real question lies in the realm of the value system and self-satisfaction. If the pursued goal is highly valued by the common people and they can get satisfaction from the process of pursuing this goal, it will be all right. In conclusion, man's growth is not only a positive factor for economic growth but a goal in itself.

In the second place, man is viewed as an important agent of development. The Chinese experience of development since the socialist revolution has never entirely relied on the purely economic mechanism. That is why leadership has been emphasized in the commune. Many successful models in production resulted from good leadership such as the examples of the Xiyou People's Commune (Chapter Five, Section III and Chapter Ten, Section I) and the Xia Ding-jia Brigade (Chapter Nine, Section III). In order to eschew becoming a bureaucratic routine, the double line of leadership has been established. Not being specially in charge of a special function, the Party secretary represents the initiative and driving force of the organism (Chapter Five, Section III, and Chapter Nine, Section III). On the other hand, the method of selecting models among the peasants is also an important approach to encourage peasant initiative and creativity (Chapter Five, Section IV). Therefore, according to the Chinese model of development, man is definitely not a product of socioeconomic evolution, but a being who can creatively intervene in and push forward evolution. Man is thus the last resource of the dynamism of development.

In the above sections I have sketched a rough configuration and some crucial characteristics of what the Chinese model of development consists of. Now, let us turn to the regional implications of Shandong Province as regards the development in China

as a whole.

V REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SHANDONG PROVINCE

Insofar as the regional studies of the Chinese society since 1949 are concerned, Guangdong Province is probably the most intensively studied area, due to its proximity to Hong Kong which has been the best point of outlet of information from China during the last three decades. Since research on the commune system of other regions is lacking, the only possible comparison that I can establish remains for the time being between Shandong and Guangdong.

Both historically and geographically, Shandong and Guangdong represent two extremities in the diversity of China. Historically, Shandong was an important center of Chinese civilization and produced the most important Chinese philosophers and politicians, including Confucius and Mencius, in the early period of Chinese history. Guangdong is an area of relatively recent settlement, presumably not earlier than the Southern and Northern Dynasties (420-589 A.D.). However, it has produced many important personalities such as Sun Yat-sen, Kang Yau-wei and Liang Qi-chao in recent history.

From the point of view of geographical conditions, Shandong has almost all the unfavorable factors for agriculture within agricultural China, such as frequent droughts and floods, infertility of the soil, scarcity of rainfall, and a short frost-free season, whereas Guangdong stands at the other extreme in this regard. Guangdong was classified by J. L. Buck as in the double cropping rice zone (1937 : 27). A great part of Guangdong has become in recent years a tripple-cropping area (Zhong-hua Ren-min Gong-ho-guo Fen-sheng Di-tu, 1974 : 83). By contrast, Shandong used to have only three crops every two years. Only lately could a limited area have double-cropping. Moreover,

Guangdong has seventy thousand square kilometres more than Shandong (Guangdong and Shandong have respectively 22 thousand square kilometres, and 15 thousand square kilometres as total area), but has 13 million less population (according to a 1974 source Guangdong had a population of more than 42 million while Shandong had more than 55 million).

Another particularity of Guangdong with which no other provinces could compare, except only for Fujian Province to a lesser extent, is an important figure of remittances coming yearly from abroad since the last century when a sizeable population of this province migrated to America and South Asia. This made the province much better developed in many sectors such as transportation, education and residential buildings before 1949 than any other province in China. Needless to say, Guangdong was also the earliest province to come into contact with western countries and received more influence from the West.

From the above comparison, we can see that Guangdong is rather a unique case in China⁶ while Shandong shares many more common problems which resulted from the Chinese historical and geographical conditions with a large number of inland provinces. Many factors considered as a necessity, and justification in this study in relation to shifting a rich peasant economy or a small farmer economy into a collective type, cannot necessarily be applied to the Guangdong situation. That is why the émigrés from Shandong usually have a very different view of the commune system from those from Guangdong. While a great many refugees from Guangdong had risked their lives to cross the gulf to come to Hong Kong, and swore they would never go back again, the

⁶ Elizabeth and Graham Johnson have observed the distinctive cultural features (language, food, dress, music, etc.) of Guangdong and thought that the people of Guangdong were self-conscious about these particularities as a distinct sub-culture in China (Elizabeth and Graham Johnson, 1976 : 7).

few émigrés from Shandong province whom I interviewed expressed their willingness to maintain good relations with the Chinese authorities in the hope of an eventual return to their native place.

As Shandong does not possess most of the advantages enjoyed by Guangdong, it might have experienced less resistance to the collectivization than Guangdong and could enjoy more the fruits produced by the collective mode of production. In the light of this comparison, the commune movement in Shandong may be more meaningful than that in Guangdong in regard to the solution of the Chinese peasant problems and the development of rural economy.

Now let us turn to the final questions of this theses: What does a Chinese model mean among many other developmental models in the world? And what is the possibility for the Chinese model to be applied outside China?

VI THE CHINESE MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT AND ITS APPLICABILITY

A. What Makes the Chinese Model Differ from the Soviet Model?

The essential difference between the Chinese model and the Soviet model lies partially in the emphasis on economic sectors and partially in the technique of mass mobilization.

The Soviet Union has placed emphasis on heavy industries and developed them with maximum speed regardless of human or economic cost. It has resulted in a remarkable dichotomy of advanced workers and backward peasantry. The Chinese development is characterized by "walking on two legs", that is to say, the agricultural sector is seen as being as important as industry. The success of the Soviet model in economic development

has relied greatly upon the efficiency of a centralized decision-making apparatus. The manner of mass mobilization carried out by the decision-making apparatus has been described as mandatory (Chopra, 1975). In China, though the centralized decision-making apparatus is also efficient, the technique of mass mobilization has been mainly participative. In management, the tendency toward decentralization has become increasingly apparent. The grass-roots growth is emphasized in development.

B. What Makes the Chinese Model Differ from the Japanese Model?

Agricultural cooperatives started in Japan before the Second World War, but did not become a powerful institution until the war-time military government used them for its own aims. The post-war Japanese cooperatives functioned on the one hand as managers of market transactions, and on the other as credit unions to help the tenants become independent from their landlords. In the 1950's, the average size of a Japanese agricultural cooperative was about 400 households, but was enlarged to more than 700 in the late 1960's in order to be able to compete with other business firms in marketing. In comparison with the Chinese commune, the size of the Japanese cooperative is much smaller than a commune but larger than the average brigade. Among the 28,800 Japanese cooperatives in 1961, 58.8% were specialized in some particular crops. After the merging of small into larger cooperatives, the specialized cooperatives were increased to 64% of the total in 1968 (12,700 out of 19,700) (Shimpo, 1970).

There are four characteristics of the Japanese agricultural cooperatives:

- (1) the cooperatives are based on private land ownership;
- (2) they tend to be specialized in one or a few special crops;
- (3) they function as agents of mechanizing agriculture by offering credit to the farmers; and
- (4) they function as marketing agents to

direct agricultural production according to marketing demands.

It is clear from the above characteristics that the Japanese cooperatives were so strictly conditioned by industrialization and so involved in a monetary economy that they were moving toward an "industry" themselves. Therefore, it can be said that Japanese agricultural cooperativization was the by-product of Japan's industrialization and conveys all the essential characteristics of the western model of modernization.

By contrast, the Chinese communization was not at all the by-product of industrialization. On the contrary, it has imposed conditions on industrialization. By channeling the direction of industrialization the Chinese development aims at creating a stable communal life in the countryside, whereas the Japanese model tends to integrate the peasantry into the industrialized network in accordance with the requirements of the latter.

C. What Makes the Chinese Model Differ from the Other Countries of the Third World?

Most of the countries in the Third World have either chosen the western model of free economy by relying upon imported technology, foreign aid and investment, and sophisticated industry, or have used a combination of the western model with the central planning of the Soviet style. There have been some successes during the last three decades such as the cases of Taiwan, South Korea and the Phillipines. It is not difficult to distinguish the Chinese model from these areas.

However, some experiences of cooperatives in the Third World countries may arouse some interest when compared with the Chinese commune. For instance, in Mexico there has emerged a type of peasant cooperative in the form of recreational enterprises. I cite a case from my personal knowledge. Atotonilco, in the State of Morelos, was

originally a farm village. A few competent peasants took the initiative to make their land more productive. They organized themselves into a cooperative by pooling together their land. With the help or collaboration of bankers in the city, they built a modern hotel with a huge tropical garden on their land. The hotel was run by the cooperative and created a large number of jobs for the villagers. So, many peasants were transformed into servants and gardeners of the hotel. By attracting people who look for warm sunny weather, not only from the Mexican cities but also from places as far away as the United States, the hotel has made a considerable profit. Since then, the village has undergone a remarkable change. The villagers have been rapidly modernized and are certainly much better off in a material sense than before.

The question is not how fast the modernization was introduced into the area, nor to what extent the income of the villagers has been increased, but that some nefarious consequences could be brought about by this change in the long-run development. In the first place, this transformation from small farmers into cooperative has reinforced the existing economic structure of dependence. In the second place, the independent and creative peasants have been reduced to an enslaved position by the relationship contained in this structure.

The Chinese commune system aims at breaking any economic dependence of area upon area, and domination and exploitation of man by man. If the informant who blamed the commune cadres for ignoring the basic economic facts because they cut down the more lucrative orange groves to plant less lucrative food grain (see Chapter Ten, Section III) had known of the Mexican case, he might have had second thoughts on the question before passing his judgment.

D. What Makes the Chinese Model Differ from the Western Model?

Irving L. Horowitz considers the countries in Western Europe and North America as belonging to one model of development in his schema of "three worlds of development".

He says:

Historically they had their initial "take-off" in the banking houses of sixteenth-century Italy, in the middle-sized industry of seventeenth-century France, and in the industrial mechanization of eighteenth-century England and nineteenth-century United States and Germany. Economically, they share an emphasis on industrialization and technology used for private enrichment and public welfare in uneven dosages (1972 : 5).

The western model, based on Adam Smith's theory, has been the one which modernized the western world in the form of highly industrialized society. Affluence, in terms of material goods, the prolonging of human life by improvement of sanitation and medicine, modern systems of transportation and communication, the general enhancement of education and so on and so forth, which have been realized by industrialization are unprecedented in human history. As a result, one used to think that the whole industrial development must have been based on a high level of rationality. However, further reflection brings us to question the validity of such a premise. It seems that the rationality of the industrialized societies was only highly demonstrated in short-run development by raising as high as possible the efficiency of technology and management in production. Insofar as the long-run development is concerned, rationality is likely to become very low, if it exists at all. This can be seen by three major phenomena. First, the economic structure in industrialized societies no longer responds to the basic needs of people to maintain life and to improve happiness, but functions as a mechanism to maintain what is going on. A certain level of materialism is no doubt indispensable for laying the basis on which happiness may be built up. Beyond this level, increase of material gains

does not necessarily mean a corresponding increase in happiness. But the functional mechanism in industry has created a false image of identification between material gain and happiness, which has become the source of unhappiness of a large segment of the population. Second, the arms industry in the industrialized society is no longer a reflection of the insecurity of human psychology as merely being defensive, but has become an autonomous growing organ by itself. It grows by the feedback stimulation of multiple arms industries everywhere in the world that have been fed by its own stimulation. The situation is so grave that any social scientist would repeat the same alarming question as that posed by Wilbert E. Moore: "Can an intelligent species that has achieved the reliable capacity for its own destruction avoid using it?" (1963 : 117). Third, a grow-for-growth process has led the development of the western societies to the edge of some foreseeable catastrophe. Many social and natural scientists, such as Forrester (1971), and Meadows et al (1972), are alarmed about the grave consequences caused by the exhaustion of natural resources, ecological disturbance by pollution, as well as the population explosion.⁷ In spite of the repeated alarms, it is doubtful that the industrial development could slow down, because no mechanism is rational in itself. Herbert Marcuse has said in his philosophical treatise, One Dimensional Man:

And yet this society [western society] is irrational as a whole. Its productivity is destructive of the free development of human deeds and faculties, its peace maintained by the constant threat of war, its growth dependent on the repression of the real possibilities for pacifying the struggle for existence - individual, national, and international. This repression, so different from that which characterized the preceding, less developed stages of our society, operates today not from a position of natural and technical immaturity but rather from a position of strength (1964 : ix-x).

⁷ In a recent report, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology warned that the world might begin running out of oil as early as the 1980's and the conversion away from petroleum fuels must be pursued with wartime urgency (The Vancouver Sun, 17 May, 1977).

In comparison with the western model, the Chinese model's rationality is manifested in its long-run schema of development by establishing goals and by not relying that much on economic automatic growth. Another factor which makes the Chinese model differ from the western model is that the development of "man" has been fed into the economic planning. The communal life or the collectivity has not only been viewed as a pure means to enhance efficiency in production, but has been considered as having a value in itself. This value is based on the belief in the malleability of human nature, an old Confucian conception. And human nature is believed to develop and improve itself better in a collective environment than in an individualistic situation. Industrialization is desirable only under the condition that it will not disturb the collective life and will help to shorten the distance in the "three big differences" instead of enlarging them. Under such circumstances, there is no doubt that in both social and economic growth the development of the Chinese model is much slower than that of the western model. If the western model has the symptoms of "overdevelopment",⁸ the Chinese model should be characterized by underdevelopment. When I use the term "underdevelopment", I do not mean that the level of GNP in China is much lower than that of the developed countries, but that China has not yet reached the mature stage according to her own design.

E. Applicability of the Chinese Model

I do not believe that a model of development in one place should be entirely borrowed and applied to another place. Development is a process which will involve

⁸ Irving L. Horowitz gives the definition of overdevelopment as referring to "a social condition in which processes and structures are realized out of proportion to, and in excess of, available resources, manpower, etc." (Horowitz, 1972 : 432).

the whole culture, history and social structure of a given society. However, partial borrowing has been a common practice in the development of human societies. Some patterns and methods, if applicable in China, might be applicable in some other countries where social or physical environments are similar to China, for example, some countries of the Third World. To some degree, I agree with K. Buchanan's opinion when he said:

The basic patterns of economic planning the Chinese are evolving have a relevance not only to China but to much of the Third World; they are certainly more applicable to this latter group of countries than either the capitalism or the socialism of the developed world. This does not mean they can be transplanted wholesale; as we have seen, the "Chinese way" has evolved out of specially Chinese conditions and one of the strengths of Chinese planning lies precisely in this fact. Moreover, Chinese development has been favoured by the existence of factors not always present in other emergent countries - the calibre of the leaders, the degree of disintegration in Kuomintang China, the dedication and drive of the masses, the high densities of rural population and the immensely long peasant tradition - all these, to cite but a few examples, gave China an incontestable advantage. Adoption of the "Chinese way" in toto is unlikely - but many of the development techniques such as labour investment, "walking on two legs", decentralization of decision-making, above all, the psychological drive designed to show the peasant that he can initiate development himself, that he need not limp along supported by the twin crutches of outside expertise and outside aid, all these have a direct applicability to the majority of the Third World countries (1970 : 113).

As a model of development, the Chinese experiment is still ongoing. Besides the model value China could offer to the Third World, the most crucial importance of the Chinese experiment lies, in my opinion, in her contribution to diversifying the cultures and modes of society in the world. When there are more and more people who have come to realize that a culture, however splendid it may be, will not be able to satisfy either the world as a whole or the society from which culture originates, diversification of

cultures remains the only alternative. I leave the reader with a quotation from Claude

Lévi-Strauss as the final conclusion:

We have taken the notion of world civilization as a sort of limiting concept or as an epitome of a highly complex process. If our arguments are valid, there is not, and can never be, a world civilization in the absolute sense in which that term is often used, since civilization implies, and indeed consists in, the coexistence of cultures exhibiting the maximum possible diversities. A world civilization could, in fact, represent no more than a world-wide coalition of cultures, each of which would preserve its own originality (my emphasis) (1971 : 261).

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERVIEWS IN HONG KONG

The method of interview used in social science is not familiar in China. The reasons are many. First, social science was not a branch of the traditional scholarship. Anthropology and sociology began to be included in the curricula of Chinese universities in the early 1930's with the first generation of social scientists trained in Great Britain and the United States, such as Wu Wen-zao and Fei Hsiao-t'ung. However, their influence was only in academic circles. Second, since 1949, anthropology and sociology are no longer in vogue in the programs of socialist education. Third, during the period of the nationalist government and that of the Japanese occupation, the term "diao-cha" (investigation) was always associated with politics. To be involved in "investigation" sometimes meant to endanger one's life. This tradition has changed very little. During all political campaigns in China the terms such as "investigation" and "interview" (tan-hua) have often been linked with cases of counter-revolutionaries, political conspiracy, capitalist roaders, revisionists etc. That is why "interview" raises a very negative feeling among the average Chinese in normal circumstances.

However, "interview" of émigrés in Hong Kong remains one possible method for research available to the students of social science since China is closed for field-work. Most of the students who came from North America and Europe gathered in the Universities Service Center in Kowloon. The center provides facilities for the researcher on China in many domains. One of those is to find informants. The center has a special room for interviews and has some liaison with a few unofficial organizations that receive émigrés from China. But the researchers who stay for some time in Hong Kong do not rely on the center for finding informants. Usually, a researcher first hires a

research assistant (who is often an émigré himself) with the help of the center, or through introduction by other research assistants in the center. Further informants can be easily found through the research assistants. In such a case, the only reason for an informant to consent to being interviewed is money. Most of the researchers are quite aware of this situation, and have worked out various ways to testify the validity of information gathered through interviews.

In my case, I could not find an informant either with the help of the center or through research assistants, because the émigrés whom the center could help to find were those who came from Guangdong Province, and none of the research assistants from that province had any acquaintance with the émigrés from Shandong.

By virtue of the distance between Shandong and Hong Kong, it could be assumed that if there were some émigrés from that province, they must have come to Hong Kong legally. If they had come to Hong Kong legally, they were not in a position which would make them eager to be interviewed. This is partially because they might have family in Hong Kong, so they did not need money so badly as to accept money for being interviewed, and partially because they might want to remain on good terms with the Chinese authorities and were not willing therefore to run the risk of being interviewed by a stranger. The situation was, to say the least, rather dismaying for me.

There were two problems I had to face: First, how to locate those émigrés and, second, how to persuade them to be interviewed. In the beginning, I thought of the voluntary association of Shandong. There was such a group which included people of both Shandong and Hobei. But friends warned me that this association was known as a politically committed organization, and that if I told them the truth about looking for informants, they would suspect my real objective. Therefore, I decided not to go through

this association, but to first use personal relations. A friend of mine who was teaching at Hong Kong Chinese University was kind enough to introduce me to one of his colleagues who was of Shandong origin. This gentleman bravely promised me to find at least one lady whom he knew had come from Shandong recently. He said that as soon as he got in touch with her he would let me know. A few days later he called to say that the lady wanted to know the real purpose of my wish to talk with her. He added: "I know your purpose, but what do you want me to explain to her?" I told him to tell her the truth - that I was preparing a Ph.D. thesis and would like to know something about the Chinese family. I did not mention the people's commune, which could sound political. After a couple of days, this friend said that the lady did not want to meet me and apologized for his failure.

I had to think again about contacting the Hobei and Shandong Association. After a few days of pondering over the matter, I finally decided to meet the people of the association. I was warmly received by its secretary. Because of the first experience, I did not tell him that I was preparing a Ph.D. thesis. I said that I was from Canada and wanted to visit China and that it would be helpful if I could meet somebody who came from my native province. He told me that he did not know any émigré from Shandong but he knew somebody who had recently visited Shandong. He was kind enough to write for me a short letter of introduction to two people. After having met the two persons, I felt disappointed because they had only toured in the big cities and knew no more than I had already learned from documentary research.

The only way remaining to me was to look for people on my own. I began to frequent the few Shandong restaurants in Hong Kong. One day, one man approached me when I was talking with the restaurateur. He had overheard me say that I came from

Vancouver. This was an Englishman, who had been born and raised in China so that he spoke and behaved exactly as a Chinese. He asked me about Vancouver, and invited me to sit down with him and his friend, a man of Shandong origin. I seized the opportunity to ask the Shandong fellow if he knew anybody who came from Shandong because I badly wanted to learn something of my native place. He said the daughter of one of his friends had recently come from Shandong, and that the family had the same surname as mine. "You will certainly be welcomed by them as a relative," he added. In this way I met informants A and B. Through this family, I also met E, a friend of theirs. I was very careful at the outset. I spent two afternoons establishing a relationship before attempting to ask them anything I wanted to know.

I interviewed Informant C also by chance. As everyone in the Universities Service Centre knew that I badly needed informants from Shandong, one research assistant told me one day that he had talked with the owner of a bakery not far from the Centre about my problem, because he chanced to know that this person was of Shandong origin. The wife of the baker had recently visited her native place in Shandong. He said the family would like to meet me because they were applying for immigration into Canada and hoped to know something about the country before leaving. The day I met informant C, her husband was also present. However, he asked me to carry on as if he was not there. "A woman is not responsible for what she has said," he said. This was his reason for granting the interview.

As a matter of fact, informants A and B reminded me again and again not to mention their names if my thesis was to be published. On my part, I promised at the beginning not to ask questions about politics. I did not show much concern about economy either, although it is of importance for my thesis. I was fully aware that the Chinese

émigrés were not only suspicious of pure research, but became very wary of anybody who had any interest in China, after having experienced so many political campaigns in China.

Because of the facility in the Center, I also interviewed a few research assistants who came from Guangdong Province.

The information gathered through interviews has only been used very sparingly in this dissertation. The following is a brief description of the backgrounds of my informants.

Informants

- A. Female, 34 years old, married with three children, mathematics teacher in middle school in China. Her grandfather was classified as a landlord. She worked in a city, but went home to the countryside every year to see her family. She came to Hong Kong in 1974. I had three in-depth interviews with her.
- B. Informant A's mother. 60 years old, illiterate. She had lived a long time in the countryside. She came to Hong Kong in 1968. I had two in-depth interviews with her.
- C. Female, 52, elementary school education, housewife. Her family was classified as poor peasant during the land reform. She came to Hong Kong in 1952. She went back to visit her family in 1974 and 1975. I met with her three times for two-to-three hour interviews.

D. Female, 61, housewife. She is a relative of mine. She had lived a few years in the countryside before leaving China in 1966. I questioned her by correspondence.

E. Female, 58, illiterate. She was a friend of informant B. She came to Hong Kong in 1962. I had only a short talk with her.

(The above informants are all from Shandong).

F. Male, 26. He was downward transferred to Sanjiang People's Commune, Zengcheng County, Guangdong Province between 1969 and 1971. He came to Hong Kong in 1975.

G. Male, 25. He was downward transferred to Yuanzhou People's Commune, Boluo County, Guangdong in 1969. He came to Hong Kong in 1973.

H. Male, 29. He was downward transferred in Hubei Province during 1968-70. He came to Hong Kong in 1971.

I. Male, 27, Hakka origin. He succeeded in arriving in Hong Kong in 1974, after having failed six times to escape.

(Informants F, G, H and I are from Guangdong.)

APPENDIX II

"Wo-men zhi-dao de Zhang Xi-yuan" (Zhang Xi-yuan Whom We Know) by Li Huai and Zhen-ye, was an article published on the 7th February, 1956, in the Peking China Youth News (ZGQNB), which brought about a series of articles discussing the behavior of the youth in the collective life in the countryside. I think this article is relevant to the development of "new human behavior" in the Chinese collective framework. Hereafter is the translation.

In the autumn of last year we made the acquaintance of a youth named Zhang Xi-yuan when we went to participate in setting up a cooperative in the Zhang Village. Zhang Xi-yuan was a young man of nineteen years old. His was a lower-middle peasant family. At that time the masses of the Zhang Village all demanded to join the cooperative except for Zhang Xi-yuan's father. It was Zhang Xi-yuan who patiently mobilized his father to finally join the cooperative. Many people said at the time: "After all, youth is more progressive than the old!" We thought that in view of Zhang Xi-yuan's activeness, he would certainly make quick progress in the cooperative and would be an excellent member.

Was the result like we had expected?

Recently we went again to the Zhang Village. When we were talking with the old director, Zhang Wan-cang, about the situation in the cooperative, we asked him about Zhang Xi-yuan.

The old director shook his head and said: "It is no use talking of him! There is no one single team which would like to accept him. He has never seriously looked at what he was doing, but kept his eyes greatly open when work-points were assigned!

A few days ago, while we were building a pigpen, he was assigned to transport earth. To transport two hand-barrows of earth from the local god temple outside the

village could earn one work-point. While everybody else transported a full barrow of earth, he brought only a little more than half a barrow each time. When I went to inspect "at the spot", he was there talking with old Fu-yuan. As I stood on the other side of the wall, he did not see me. He said to old Fu-yuan who was busy filling his barrow with earth: 'My uncle Fu-yuan, it is enough! Why do you put so much!' Then old Fu-yuan stopped filling. He continued to say: 'I won't come to transport earth tomorrow. I will go to construct walls. You know, that work cannot be counted by units. Provided they give work-points I will do anything! I have enough energy. We farmers lived on our labor in the past when we were working along; now, after having joined the cooperative, we still live on our labor. If we don't know how to earn more work-points for the time being, we can only eat fresh air in the future!' When he was about to leave, he said again to the old Fu-yuan: 'You have filled for me thirteen barrows and I have transported thirteen barrows. Is that right, Uncle Fu-yuan?' Fu-yuan responded with hesitation: 'It's not that many. I think you've done eleven barrows.' He hastily contradicted him: 'It's thirteen! You are wrong! I did seven barrows this morning, and I have already done six this afternoon!' The old Fu-yuan could not but say: 'Maybe I am wrong.' On hearing this, I really got mad. Look, for what purpose does Zhang Xi-yuan work in a cooperative?

When we fertilized the wheat fields, the others all carefully put the fertilizer into the pits which had been dug out for this purpose, except for Zhang Xi-yuan. He did not want to bend! He took a handful of soybean cake and threw it into the pits while standing. Much of the fertilizer was carried away by the wind. This was soybean cake! We hold it more precious than gold! But him, he just threw it away! That is why he quickly finished his assigned units. While others did more than one mu a day,

he did more than two. One day, when I saw him doing this, I said to him: 'Xi-yuan, it is not easy for the cooperative to buy this soybean cake. What a pity if you haven't put it into the field!' He giggled and said: 'It is not that much important when some has been carried away by the wind. It will fall into the cooperative's fields anyway!' I said: 'What nonsense you talk! Haven't you seen the soybean cake was carried by the wind into the ditch along the road? You don't feel sorry, do you? Are you assigned to fertilize the field or the ditch?' He blushed. To console him I said: 'You rest a while. I do some for you.'" I did a few lines for the purpose of showing him the correct manner. He is not stupid. He said: 'Uncle Man-cang, I know how to do it now.'" He took a handful of soybean cake and carefully put it into the pit by bending himself. I thought that was OK. But when I turned my head back from a distance, I saw him just doing as he had done before I corrected him. The night during the meeting of work-point distribution, when others proposed to give him ten points, he insisted on giving himself thirteen!

Last month the cooperative bought a dozen pairs of pottery jars to water the wheat. This Zhang Xi-yuan came immediately on hearing that to carry water two times could earn one work-point. In one day he broke four pairs of jars, because he did not worry about knocking the jars against trees or stones. One pair of jars cost 1.4 yuan. This all comes from members' sweat! Look, what he said to the others: 'It does not matter if I break some jars. They belong to everybody. How little they cost you and me!'

Not only did he not care for the jars, he did not care for our collective treasure, the draught animals. Last winter he was assigned an ox to cultivate the field. He disliked the slowness of the ox, because he could not earn as many work-points as he wanted with it. Therefore, he cheated another team by changing the ox for a mule. Unfortunately,

the mule was not much quicker than the ox. He whipped the animal with all his force as though he had had a deep-seated hatred for the animal. I knew the mule of six years old was a good animal. Before the day was half over the animal collapsed on the ground. If the mule could speak, it would come to complain to you.

At the end of last year, we had a serious drought. Sinking wells became an urgent task. We planned to sink two. He was among the six young people sent to carry out this task. After a half day, he complained of the work being too hard. So, he did not show up that very afternoon. When the others went to look for him, they found him packing tobacco at home. Packing tobacco was a work for women and could earn cash. So he liked doing it too. The commander of the team came to call him to sink wells. He not only did not want to go, but got mad at the commander and shouted at him: 'Even in a cooperative I should have my freedom. I did not sell myself to the cooperative. I don't want to do that hard job. No matter whoever comes to mobilize me, I just do not go!'

The cooperative could not but change the original plan in order to draw a laborer from another task. Because of him, the other five persons wasted a half day.

Yesterday evening, I talked to the branch secretary of the Youth League and asked him to do something to Zhang Xi-yuan. But he just said: 'Zhang Xi-yuan is not a member of the Youth League. He is a backward element. It is difficult for us to make him progress.' I don't think this is the right way to deal with it. We have so many good members in the cooperative and we have certainly some ways to help Zhang Xi-yuan progress. We cannot stand there just watching him regress day by day. What do you say?"

APPENDIX III

STATISTICAL TABLES

Table 1: Cultivated Area in China by Province, 1949 and 1957 (10,000 mu)

Province	1949	1957
Anhui	7,700	8,800
Fujian	2,100	2,233
Guangdong	5,192	5,740
Guangxi	3,306	3,796
Guizhou	2,697	3,050
Heilongjiang	8,546	10,930
Hobei	(10,960)	13,503
Honan	13,100	13,460
Hubei	(6,450)	6,430
Hunan	(5,021)	5,741
Inner Mongolia	6,360	8,315
Jilin	6,860	7,078
Jiangsu	5,100	9,300
Jiangxi	3,542	4,220
Kansu	((5,400)	5,939
Liaoning	6,730	7,126
Qinghai	766	750
Shandong	13,797	14,000
Shanxi	(6,400)	6,812
Shānxi	5,348	6,700
Sichuan	11,340	11,530
Xinjiang	1,810	3,022
Yunnan	3,380	4,262
Zhejiang	(3,380)	3,378

Source: Chao Kang, 1970 : 280. All figures without parentheses are from Provincial Agricultural Statistics for Communist China, 1969, and those in parentheses are estimates of Chao Kang.

Table 2: Yields of Food Grains per Unit by Province, 1949 and 1957

Province	1949	1957 (jin per mu)
Anhui	101	192.2
Fujian	204	283
Guangdong	191	243
Guangxi	172	192.7
Guizhou	(230.2)	285
Heilongjiang	160.5	178.9
Hobei	86	196
Honan	102.6	150
Hubei	(170.5)	273
Hunan	(272)	277
Inner Mongolia	81	89
Jilin	178	168.2
Jiangsu	(144.4)	198.8
Jiangxi	(172.4)	249
Kansu	101	178.3
Liaoning	122	220
Qinghai	131	220.5
Shandong	116	179
Shanxi	92.2	120.6
Shānxi	(113)	157
Sichuan	211	277
Xinjiang	142.1	203
Yunnan	(217.8)	252
Zhejiang	204	381

Source: Chao Kang, 1970 : 300. Figures without parentheses are from Provincial Agricultural Statistics for Communist China, and those in parentheses are derived by Chao Kang.

Table 3: Output of Food Grains, by Province, 1949 and 1957 (100 million jin)

Province	1949	1957
Anhui	91	230
Fujian	55.6	87.54
Guangdong	160	244
Guangxi	74.4	107.5
Guizhou	58	105
Heilongjiang	101	123
Hobei	91	195
Honan	130	245
Hubei	104	219.3
Hunan	127.59	224
Inner Mongolia	39.9	56.2
Jilin	89	85.5
Jiangsu	133	236
Jiangxi	77.5	136.6
Kansu	46	103
Liaoning	71.4	118.7
Qinghai	5.9	12.8
Shandong	158	259
Shanxi	51.9	71.3
Shǎnxi	72	90
Sichuan	298.94	459.6
Xinjiang	19.9	40.7
Yunnan	77	125
Zhejiang	84	156
Total	2,219.09	3,370.74

Source: Provincial Agricultural Statistics for Communist China, quoted by Chao Kang, 1970 : 302.

Table 4: Development of the Township-and-cooperative Industry in Shandong Province up to the end of June, 1958.

Areas	Number of units in the revised plan	Number completed by the end of June 1958
The whole province	537,649	180,355
Changweishan Special District	90,573	46,022
Weifang Municipality		225
Yidu County	6,000	2,282
Jiao County	3,613	4,329
Gaomi County	8,779	3,177
Pingdu County	10,000	4,594
Zhucheng County	8,000	3,385
Anqiu County	7,000	3,144
Linjiao County	3,210	1,574
Linzhi County	2,907	1,149
Jiaonan County	10,000	4,942
Changluo County	44,000	1,661
Changyi County	5,000	2,836
Wulian County	5,020	2,855
Shouguang County	8,000	3,570
Wei County	6,544	5,460
Boshan County	2,500	839
Laiyang Special District	59,918	39,240
Rongchang County	4,960	2,643
Muping County	4,668	3,107
Ye County	4,542	2,355
Penglai County	2,500	3,712
Zhaoyuan County	2,663	1,775
Huang County	5,933	1,184
Jimo County	11,035	6,241
Laixi County	4,204	3,816
Qixia County	3,323	2,244
Weihai Municipality	572	735
Laiyang County	4,705	3,058
Haiyang County	3,364	2,474
Fushan County	3,024	1,232
Wendeng County	1,992	2,436
Rushan County	2,417	2,139
Changdao County	16	89
Liaocheng Special District	64,555	22,291
De County	1,114	891
Wucheng County	5,657	1,207
Xiajin County	566	646
Pingyuan County	3,257	1,625

Areas	Number of units in the revised plan	Number completed by the end of June 1958
Yucheng County	4,575	1,671
Qiho County	4,000	2,570
Gaotang County	1,117	2,983
Linqing County	7,848	832
Guantao County	1,153	338
Guan County	9,359	220
Shen County	2,473	2,240
Fan County	3,121	1,529
Shouzhong County	8,496	1,200
Yanggu County	7,392	947
Dong'a County	1,340	675
Liaocheng County	2,132	1,446
Shiping County	856	1,168
Dezhou Municipality	26	26
Linqing Municipality	73	77
Hoze Special District	120,622	21,692
Juye County	18,356	3,095
Dingtao County	77,188	1,437
Liangshan County	11,000	2,803
Cao County	14,422	3,756
Yancheng County	10,539	766
Dan County	20,000	3,286
Chengwu County	10,918	1,494
Yuncheng County	12,000	2,533
Hoze County	16,199	2,522
Tai'an Special District	37,000	14,064
Tai'an County	3,680	1,635
Laiwu County	5,720	2,151
Zhangqiu County	4,600	2,562
Xintai County	5,520	1,507
Feicheng County	4,600	676
Pingyin County	2,500	1,885
Dongping County	3,000	291
Changqing County	3,500	425
Ningyang County	3,680	2,817
Taishan Municipality	200	115
Jining Special District	52,517	13,479
Teng County	12,000	2,984
Zou County	5,000	2,446
Wenshang County	4,000	1,825
Jiaxiang County	4,500	1,508
Ziyang County	3,000	1,236

Area	Number of units in the revised plan	Number completed by the end of June 1958
Jining County	4,500	939
Yi County	4,500	691
Jinxiang County	6,000	630
Qufu County	3,500	532
Sishui County	3,000	512
Weishan County	2,300	144
Jining Municipality	217	32
Huimin Special District	86,804	12,804
Guangrao County	10,076	687
Huantai County	6,073	1,885
Zouping County	3,500	907
Qidong County	10,000	1,347
Yueling County	5,519	998
Boxing County	3,890	574
Zhanhua County	8,072	395
Jiyang County	4,000	439
Bin County	5,036	400
Huimin County	6,122	1,238
Linyi County	5,500	1,301
Wudi County	3,966	804
Yangxin County	5,000	390
Lijin County	4,680	544
Shangho County	5,370	991
Linyi Special District	25,660	10,763
Linyi County	3,326	2,178
Lancheng County	2,745	528
Cangshan County	1,884	379
Fei County	900	394
Yishui County	2,579	1,012
Yiyuan County	1,519	828
Yinan County	1,650	493
Mengyin County	1,513	924
Pingyi County	2,291	479
Ju County	3,916	919
Junan County	2,759	984
Rizhao County	578	1,645

Notes: (1) The above statistics cover 109 counties (or municipalities) of eight special districts with the exception of Licheng County which did not appear in the original source. (2) The statistical figures for the municipalities indicate only the rural areas.

Source: DZRB, 8 July, 1958.

GLOSSARY*

Names of Persons

- Bai Ru-bing (Pai Ju-ping) 白如冰
 Chen Lan-hua (Ch'en Lan-hua) 陈兰花
 Chen Yong-gui (Ch'en Yung-kui) 陈永贵
 Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石
 Deng Xiao-ping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing) 邓小平
 Deng Zihui (Teng Tseu-hui) 邓子恢
 Fan Zhong-yan (Fan Chung-yen) 范仲淹
 Fu Zuo-yi (Fu Tsuo-yi) 傅作义
 Guo Qing-yu (Kuo Ch'ing-yu) 郭庆余
 Han 汉
 Hao Ran (Hao Jan) 浩然
 Hao Yuan-jing (Hao Yuan-ching) 郝元敬
 Hao Yuan-xiao (Hao Yuan-hsiao) 郝元孝
 Ji (Chi) 姬
 Kang You-wei (K'ang You-wei) 康有为
 Lei Feng 雷锋
 Li Chun-ting (Li Ch'un-t'ing) 李春亭
 Li Rui-lan (Li Jui-lan) 李瑞岚
 Li Yan-chun (Li Yen-ch'un) 李言春
 Liang Qi-chao (Liang Ch'i-ch'ao) 梁启超
 Liu Feng-ming 刘凤鸣
 Liu Guan-qi (Liu Kuan-ch'i) 刘官岐
 Liu Shao-qi (Liu Shao-ch'i) 刘少奇
 Lu Shi-da (Lu Shih-ta) 卢士达
 Lü Hong-bin (Lü Hung-pin) 吕鸿宾
 Ma Xue-sheng (Ma Hsueh-sheng) 马学生
 Ma Zhao-xia (Ma Chao-hsia) 马兆洽
 Mao Tse-tung 毛泽东
 Peng De-huai (P'eng Te-huai) 彭德怀
 Qin (Ch'in) 秦
 Qin Shi-huang-di (Ch'in Shih-huang-ti) 秦始皇帝
 Shi Yu-guang (Shih Yu-kuang) 石玉光

*Transliteration in Wade-Giles will be found in parentheses, if it is different from pin-yin.

Shi Yue-lan (Shih Yue-lan) 史月兰

Shu 树

Sun Yat-sen 孙逸仙

Sun Zhi-ying (Sun Chih-ying) 孙志英

Tan Qi-long (T'an Ch'i-lung) 谭启龙

Wang Jia-yun (Wang Chia-yun) 王嘉云

Wang Guo-fan (Wang Kuo-fan) 王国藩

Wang Heng 王恒

Wang Yong-xing (Wang Yung-hsing) 王永幸

Xi Guang-shi (Hsi Kuang-shih) 席广师

Xu (Hsu) 徐

Xu Jian-chun (Hsu Chien-ch'un) 徐建春

Xu Jian-min (Hsu Chien-min) 徐建民

Xue Zheng-xiang (Hsueh Chen-hsiang) 薛振祥

Yan You-yi (Yen You-yi) 严有益

Yan Zhen-ding (Yen Chen-ting) 阎振顶

Yang Zhong-lu (Yang Chung-lu) 杨中路

Zhang Bao-ji (Chang Pao-chi) 张宝吉

Zhang De-heng (Chang Te-heng) 张德恒

Zhang Dian-tong (Chang Tien-tung) 张殿栋

Zhang Fu-gui (Chang Fu-kui) 张富贵

Zhang Huan-ying (Chang Huan-ying) 张焕英

Zhang Jing-hu (Chang Ching-hu) 张镜湖

Zhang Lian-dou (Chang Lien-tou) 张联斗

Zhang Qing-chen (Chang Ch'ing-ch'en) 张清臣

Zhang Ru-jie (Chang Ju-chieh) 张汝杰

Zhang Si-de (Chang Szu-te) 张思德

Zhang Xi-yuan (Chang Hsi-yuan) 张希元

Zhang Zeng-yu (Chang Tseng-yu) 张增玉

Zhao Yong-tai (Chao Yung-t'ai) 赵永太

Zhou (Chou) 周

Zhu Chun-jing (Chu Ch'un-ching) 朱春景

Zhu Li-ji (Chu Li-chi) 朱立基

Zhu Qun-shan (Chu Ch'un-shan) 朱群山

Names of Mountains and Rivers

Bailang (Pailang) 白浪
 Baisha (Paisha) 白沙
 Beidaiho (Peitaiho) 北戴河
 Bi-shi-hang (Pi-shih-hang) 滬史杭
 Bohai (Pohai) 渤海
 Dagu (Taku) 大沽
 Lu 魯
 Lushan 廬山
 Mong (Mung) 蒙
 Sanyizhai (Sanyichai) 三义寨
 Shashi (Shashih) 沙石
 Tai (T'ai) 泰
 Tuhai (T'uhai) 徒骇
 Wanfu 万福
 Wei 潍
 Weishan 微山
 Xiaoqing (Hsiao-ch'ing) 小清
 Yangzi (Yangtzu) 揚子
 Yi 沂
 Yongwen (Yungwen) 泳文

Administration Units (provinces, counties and townships)

Anhui 安徽
 Cangshan (Ts'angshan) 蒼山
 Cao (Ts'ao) 曹
 Changqing (Ch'angch'ing) 長清
 Changyi (Ch'angyi) 昌邑
 Chengdu (Ch'engtu) 成都
 Dan (Tan) 單
 Dezhou (Techow) 德州
 Ding (Ting) 定
 Dong'a (Tung'a) 東阿
 Dongchang (Tungch'ang) 東昌

Dongping (Tungp'ing) 东平
 En 恩
 Fan 范
 Fangzi (Fangtzu) 坊子
 Fei 费
 Feicheng (Feich'eng) 肥城
 Fujian (Fukien) 福建
 Guan (Kuan) 冠
 Guanzhuang (Kuanchuang) 官庄
 Guangzhou (Kwangchou, Canton) 府州
 Hobei (Hopen) 河北
 Holuo 河洛
 Honan 河南
 Hou Zhaizi (Hou Chaitzu) 后寨子
 Huang 黄
 Hubei (Hupei) 湖北
 Hui'an 惠安
 Jimo (Chimo) 即墨
 Jinan (Tsinan) 济南
 Jining (Chining) 济宁
 Jiangsu (Kiangsu) 江苏
 Jiangxi (Kiangsi) 江西
 Jiao (Chiao) 胶
 Jiaotong (Chiaotung) 胶东
 Jiaolai (Chiaolai) 胶莱
 Jiaozhou (Chiaochow) 胶州
 Jinling (Chinling) 金岭
 Jū (Chū) 莒
 Junan (Chūnan) 莒南
 Juye (Chūyeh) 巨野
 Laiwu 莱芜
 Laixi (Laisi) 莱西
 Laiyang 莱阳
 Lankao (Lank'ao) 兰考
 Licha (Lich'a) 里岔

Licheng (Lich'eng) 历城
 Liaocheng (Liaoch'eng) 聊城
 Linju (Linchtu) 临朐
 Linqing (Linch'ing) 临清
 Linyi 临沂
 Longshan (Lungshan) 龙 山
 Lu 廬
 Mengcheng (Mungch'eng) 蒙 城
 Mengyin (Mungyin) 蒙 阴
 Minhou 闽 侯
 Peking 北 京
 Pingdu (P'ingtu) 平 度
 Pingyi (P'ingyi) 平 邑
 Pingyuan (P'ingyuan) 平 原
 Pingyu (P'ingyu) 平 舆
 Qiho (Ch'ihō) 齐 河
 Qixia (Ch'ihsia) 棲 霞
 Qingdao (Ch'ingtao) 青 島
 Qufu (Ch'ufu) 曲 阜
 Qujiang (Ch'ukiang) 曲 江
 Shage (Shako) 沙 格
 Shandong (Shantung) 山 东
 Shanxi (Shansi) 山 西
 Shǎnxi (Shensi) 陕 西
 Shangcheng (Suangch'eng) 商 城
 Shanghai 上 海
 Shiping (Shihp'ing) 荏 平
 Shouzhang (Shouchang) 寿 张
 Shulan 榑 岚
 Sichuan (Szuch'uan) 四 川
 Suiping (Suip'ing) 遂 平
 Tai'an (T'ai'an) 泰 安
 Tangshan (T'angshan) 唐 山
 Teng (T'eng) 滕

Wangjingcun (Wangchingtsun) 王井村

Wei 潍

Weihaiwei 威海衛

Wendeng (Wenteng) 文登

Wuchang (Wuch'ang) 武昌

Xiajin (Hsiachin) 夏津

Xinxiang (Hsinhsiang) 新乡

Xinyang (Hsinyang) 信阳

Yan'an (Yenan) 延安

Yantai (Yent'ai) 烟台

Yanzhou (Yenchow) 兗州

Yangshao 仰韶

Yanggu (Yangku) 阳谷

Ye (Yeh) 掖

Yi 峯

Yinan 沂南

Yishui 沂水

Yiyuan 沂源

Yinghai 营海

Yucheng (Yuch'eng) 禹城

Zhejiang (Chekiang) 浙江

Zhengzhou (Chengchow) 鄭州

Zhichuan (Chihch'uan) 淄川

Zhuchang (Chuch'eng) 诸城

Zhumiaoxiang (Chumiaohsiang) 朱廟乡

Zou (Tsou) 邹

Zouping (Tsoup'ing) 邹平

Zunhua (Tsunhua) 遵化

Communal Units (Communes and Brigades)

Aiguo (Aikuo) 爱国

Anju (Anchu) 安居

Bailing (Pailing) 白岭

Baipenyao (Paip'enyao) 白盆窑

- Bei Luoyang (Pei Luoyang) 北 洛 阳
 Beiyuan (Peiyuan) 北 园
 Caopo (Ts'aop'o) 草 坡
 Chaijia (Ch'aichia) 柴 家
 Chengmen (Ch'engmen) 城 门
 Chengguan (Ch'engkuan) 城 关
 Chengjian (Ch'engch'ien) 城 前
 Da'an (Ta'an) 大 安
 Dabu (Tapu) 大 布
 Da Lüjia (Ta Lüchia) 大 吕 家
 Dayu (Tayu) 大 峪
 Dazhai (Tachai) 大 寨
 Daigu (Taiku) 岱 岗
 Difang (Tifang) 地 方
 Dongguo (Tungkuo) 东 郭
 Dong Hao (Tung Hao) 东 郝
 Dongjiao (Tungchiao) 东 郊
 Ertun (erht'un) 二 屯
 Fugui (Fukui) 富 贵
 Gaocun (Kaots'un) 高 村
 Gufengtai (Kufengt'ai) 古 峰 台
 Haizhuang (Haichuang) 海 庄
 Haosheng 好 生
 Hongming (Hungming) 宏 明
 Hongxing (Hunghsing) 红 星
 Houlu 后 吕
 Jiangguantun (Kiangkuant'un) 蒋 官 屯
 Jingjiazhai (Chingchiachai) 荆 家 寨
 Julingzhuang (Chülingchuang) 居 岭 庄
 Laoguanzhai (Laokuanchai) 老 官 寨
 Lao Zhaozhuang (Lao Chaochuang) 老 赵 庄
 Lijiazhuang (Lichiachuang) 李 家 庄
 Lilin 栗 林
 Liangquan (Liangch'uan) 凉 泉

Linqian (Linch'ien) 临前
 Lingcheng (Lingch'eng) 陵城
 Liuying 柳营
 Longyang (Lungyang) 龙阳
 Loujia (Louchia) 婁家
 Mazhuang (Machuang) 马庄
 Mencun (Ments'un) 门村
 Moshan 磨山
 Pengji (P'engchi) 彭集
 Pingyuan (P'ingyuan) 平原
 Qiandonggu (Ch'ientungku) 前东固
 Qiliying (Ch'iliying) 七里营
 Qiujiadian (Ch'iuchiatién) 丘家店
 Sanli 三里
 Sanfengzhuang (Sanfengchuang) 三峰庄
 Sang'azhen (Sang'achen) 桑阿镇
 Shagou (Shakou) 沙沟
 Shicun (Shihts'un) 史村
 Shijing (Shihching) 石井
 Shitun (Shiht'un) 拾屯
 Shuyuan 书院
 Taiqian (T'aich'ien) 台前
 Taitou (T'ait'ou) 台头
 Taojiakuang (T'aochiak'uang) 陶家乔
 Wande (Wante) 万德
 Wangguadian (Wangkuatien) 王瓜店
 Wangjia (Wangchia) 王贾
 Wangliu (Wangliu) 望留
 Wangyuan 王元
 Weiguo (Weikuo) 卫国
 Weixing (Weihsing) 卫星
 Weizi (Weitzu) 围子
 Xi Hao (Si Hao) 西郝
 Xiwangzhuang (Siwangchuang) 西旺庄

Xiyou (Siyou) 西由
 Xia Dingjia (Hsia Tingchia) 下丁家
 Xianiutian (Hsianiut'ien) 下牛田
 Xiamoshi (Hsiamoshih) 下磨石
 Xiawi (Hsiawei) 下位
 Xiao Gezhuang (Hsiao Kechuang) 小葛庄
 Xinzhai (Hsinchai) 车寨
 Xingfu (Hsingfu) 幸福
 Xuzhuang (Hsüchuang) 徐庄
 Yangjiagao (Yangchiakao) 杨家高
 Yinji (Yinchi) 尹集
 Yingzi (Yingtzu) 营子
 Yuzhuang (Yuchuang) 于庄
 Zhaili (Chaili) 寨里
 Zhangjiarongren (Changchiajungjen) 张家荣仁
 Zhangshi (Changshih) 樟市
 Zhaoyang (Chaoyang) 朝阳
 Zhufeng (Chufeng) 诸冯
 Zhuli (Chuli) 朱里
 Zhuxinzhuan (Chuhsinchuang) 祝辛庄
 Zhuyou (Chuyou) 朱由
 Zhuzhuang (Chuchuang) 朱庄

General Terms and Phraseology

an-jian an-zhi ji-gong (an-chien an-chin chi-kung) 按件按质记工
 Bai-lian-jiao (Pailien-chiao) 白莲教
 bao-cai-wu (pao-ts'ai-wu) 包财务
 bao cheng-ben (pao ch'eng-pen) 包成本
 bao-gong (pao-kung) 包工
 bao sheng-chan (pao sheng-ch'an) 包生产
 cai-li (ts'ai-li) 彩礼
 Chang-qiang hui (Ch'ang-ch'iang hui) 长枪会
 chi-fan bu-yao qian (ch'ih-fan pu-yao ch'ien) 吃饭不要钱
 chi ku zai xian, xiang luo zai hou 吃苦在先, 享乐在后
 (ch'i ku tsai hsien, hsiang luo tsai hou)

chu-ji nong-ye-she (ch'u-chi nung-yeh-she) 初级农业社
 da-dui (Ta-tui) 大队
 da gai xiao (ta kai hsiao) 大改小
 da-ming da-fang (ta-ming ta-fang) 大鸣大放
 Datong Pian (Tat'ung P'ien) 大同篇
 Daizhe wen-ti xue (taiche wen-t'i hsueh) 带着问题学
 dan-gan (tan-kan) 单干
 di-fen zhi (ti-fen chih) 底分制
 ding-e guan-li (ting-e huan-li) 定额管理
 ding-e zhi (ting-e chih) 定额制
 duzi wen-ti (tu-tzu wen-t'i) 肚子问题
 duo-chang ban yi-she (tuo-ch'ang pao yi-she) 多厂包一社
 duo-lao duo-de (tuo-lao tuo-te) 多劳多得
 dun-dian (tun-tien) 蹲点
 er-sun zi-you er-sun fu, bu-gei er-sun zuo ma-niu. 儿孙自有儿孙福, 不
 (erh-sun tzu-you erh-sun fu p'u-kei erh-sun tzu zuo ma-niu) 给儿孙作马牛
 feng-chan tian (feng-ch'an t'ien) 丰产田
 feng-shui 风水
 fu 府
 Fu-jun (Fu-chün) 幅军
 fu-nong (fu-nung) 富农
 gao-e feng-chan tian (kao-e feng-ch'an t'ien) 高额丰产田
 gao-ji nong-ye-she (kao-chi nung-yeh-she) 高级农业社
 geng-zuo qu (keng-tsou ch'u) 耕作区
 gong-chan zhu-yi jiao-yu xuan-chuan da-jun 共产主义教育宣传大军
 (kung-ch'an chu-i chiao-yu hsüan-ch'uan ta-chün)
 gong-chan feng (kung-ch'an feng) 共产风
 gong-fen piao (kung-fen p'iao) 工分票
 gong-fen shou-ce (kung-fen shou-ts'e) 工分手册
 gong-ji jin (kung-chi chin) 公积金
 gong-yi jin (kung-i chin) 公益金
 gong-you (kung-you) 公有
 gong-zi gong-ji jie-he zhi
 (kung-tzu kung-chi chie-ho chih) 工资供给结合制

gong-zi wei-zhu (kung-tzu wei-chu) 工资为主
 gong-zuo zhi-dao zhan (kung-tsuo chih-tao chan) 工作指导站
 gu-gong diu-nong (ku-kung tiu-nung) 顾工丢农
 guan-li min-zhu-hua (kuan-li min-chu-hua) 管理民主化
 guanli qu (kuan-li ch'u) 管理区
 nong-zhuan ji-ji fen-zi da-hui

(hung-chuan chi-chi fen-tzu ta-hui) 红专积极分子大会

hu bao kuai (hu pao k'uai) 户包块

hui-xiang (hui-hsiang) 回乡

Huo-xue huo-yong (huo-hsueh huo-yung) 活学活用

ji-ben lao-dong ri (chi-pen lao-tung jih) 基本劳动日

ji-fen yuan (chi-fen yuan) 记分员

ji-ji-xing (chi-chi-hsing) 积极性

ji-shu zu (chi-shu tsu) 技术组

ji-shu yan-jiu zu (chi-shu yen-chiu tsu) 技术研究组

ji-ti suo-you (chi-t'i suo-you) 集体所有

jia (chia) 家

jia-ting cheng-fen (chia-t'ing ch'eng-fen) 家庭成分

jia-mian-li (ch'ien-mien li) 见面礼

Jiao-ji (Chiao-Chi) 胶济(路)

jiao-yu (chiao-yu) 教育

kang (k'ang) 炕

lao-dong-ri (lao-tung-jih) 劳动日

lao gan-bu (lao kan-pu) 老干部

lao-li pai-dui (lao-li p'ai-tui) 劳力排队

lao san-pian (lao san-p'ien) 老三篇

li 里

liang-can yi-gai (liang-ts'an i-kai) 两参一改

liang fang, san-tong, yi-bao (liang-fang, san-t'ung, i-pao) 两放、三统、一包

lin-shi pai-gong (lin-shih p'ai-kung) 临时派工

liu ding (liu ting) 六定

liu-ding dao-dui (liu-ting tao-tui) 六定到队

liu-xiang (liu-hsiang) 留乡

luo-ye gui-gen (luo-yeh kui-ken) 落叶归根

ming-fang hui 鸣放会

nao-fang 鬧房
 Nian (Nien) 捻
 nong-ye-she (nung-yeh-she) 农业社
 nong-ye xue Dazhai (nung-yeh hsüeh Tachai) 农业学大寨
 pin-nong (p'in-nung) 贫农
 ping-jun zhu-yi (p'in-chün chu-i) 平均主义
 ping-gong ji-fen (p'ing-kung chi-fen) 评工记分
 pu (p'u) 铺
 qi-ye (ch'i-yeh) 企业
 qian-jiao (ch'ien-chiao) 钱交
 qian-ren hui (ch'ien-jen hui) 千人会
 qian-zhuang (ch'ien-chuang) 钱庄
 qing-nian ji-shu-dui (ch'ing-nien chi-shu-tui) 青年技术队
 qu (ch'u) 区
 quan-min suo-you (ch'üan-min suo-you) 全民所有
 qun-zhong jian-du (ch'un-chung chien-tu) 群众监督
 ren-ren dou-shi Zhu-ge Liang (jen-jen tou-shih Chu-ke Liang)
 人人都是诸葛亮
 san-jiang yi-bao (san-chiang i-pao) 三包一奖
 san-bao zhi-du (san-pao chih-tu) 三包制度
 san-he-yi (san-ho-i) 三合一
 san-hua (三化)
 san-tian (san-t'ien) 三田
 san-zhuan (san-chuan) 三转
 san-zi yi-bao (san-tzu i-pao) 三自一包
 shang-zhong-nong (shang-chung-nung) 上中农
 shao-kou duo-fen (shao-k'ou tuo-fen) 少扣多分
 she 社
 shen-ru ji-ceng (shen-ju chi-ts'eng) 深入基层
 sheng-chan dui (sheng-ch'an tui) 生产队
 shang-chan ze-ren zhi (sheng-ch'an tse-jen chih) 生产责任制
 sheng-chan zhan-dou-hua (sheng-ch'an chantou-hua) 生产战团化
 sheng-huo ji-ti-hua (sheng-huo chi-t'i-hua) 生活集体化
 shi-dian (shih-tien) 试点
 shi-yan-tian (shih-yen-tien) 试验田

si dao tian (szu tao tien) 四到田
 si-fen huo-ji (szu-fen huo-chi) 死分活记
 si-fen si-ji (szu-fen szu-chi) 死分死记
 si gu-ding (szu ku-ting) 四固定
 si-hua (szu-hua) 四化
 si-he-yi (szu-ho-i) 四合一
 si-shi yun-dong (szu-shih yun-tung) 四史运动
 si-tong (szu-t'ung) 四通
 si-wei, san-jiu, er-zhu, yi-tzu
 (szu-wei, san-chiu, erh-chu, i-tzu) 四为、三就、二主、一自
 si-you (szu-you) 私有
 Tai-ping (T'ai-p'ing) 太平
 tian-lun zhi luo (t'ien-lun chih luo) 天伦之乐
 tong-yi lao-li (t'ung-i lao-li) 统一劳力
 tu-fa xian shang-ma, ran-hou ji-jie-hua 土法先上马
 (t'u-fa hsien shang-ma jan-hou chi-chie-hua) 然后机械化
 tuan-lian (t'uan-lien) 团练
 wan-ren hui (wan-jen hui) 万人会
 wan-ren tuan (wan-jen t'uan) 万人团
 wu-bao hu (wu-pao hu) 五保户
 wu-ge bu-xing (wu-ke pu-hsing) 五个不行
 wu-hao qing-nian (wu-hao ch'ing-nien) 五好青年
 wu-hao she-yuan (wu-hao she-yuan) 五好社员
 wu-jian (wu-chien) 五件
 xia-fang (hsia-fang) 下放
 xia-fang qing-nian (hsia-fang ch'ing-nien) 下放青年
 xia-xiang luo-hu (hsia-hsiang luo-hu) 下乡落户
 xia zhi-hui (hsia chih-hui) 瞎指挥
 xia-zhong-nong (hsia-chung-nung) 下中农
 xian-chang hui-yi (hsien-ch'ang hui-i) 现场会议
 xian (hsien) 县
 xian-she gong-ye (hsien-she kung-yeh) 县社工业
 xiang (hsiang) 乡
 xiang-she gong-ye (hsiang-she kung-yeh) 乡社工业

xiao (hsiao) 孝

xiao-duan bao-gong (hsiao-tuan pao-kung) 小段包工

xiao-dui (hsiao-tui) 小队

xiao gai da (hsiao kai ta) 小改大

xiao, tu, qun (hsiao, t'u, ch'un) 小土群

xin (hsin) 汛

Xinhua (Hsinhua) 新华

xing-dong zhan-dou-hua (hsing-tung chan-tou-hua) 行动戰鬥化

xue Gaotang (hsüeh Kaot'ang) 学高唐

Yan-yang Tian (Yen-yang T'ien) 艳阳天

yang-ban-tian (yang-pan-t'ien) 样板田

ye-yu ji-shu xue-xiao (yeh-yu chi-shu hsüeh-hsiao) 业余技术学校

ye-zhan bing-tuan (yeh-chan ping-t'uan) 野战兵团

yi (2) 驛

yi-chang bao duo-she (yi-ch'ang pao tuo-she) 一厂包多社

yi-chang bao yi-she (yi-ch'ang pao yi-she) 一厂包一社

yi da er gong (yi ta erh kung) 一大二公

Yi-he-quan (yi-ho-ch'uan) 义和拳

yi-ku si-tien (i-k'u szu-t'ien) 忆苦思甜

Yi-liang wir-gang, quan-mian jing-ying, quan-mian fa-zhan

(yi-liang wei-kang, ch'uan-miem ching-ying, ch'uan-mien fa-chan)

以粮为纲, 全面经营, 全面发展

yi-ping er-tiao (i-p'ing erh-t'iao) 一平二调

yi-shou zhua nong-ye, yi shou zhua fu-ye

(i-shou chua nung-yeh, i-shou chua fu-yeh) 一手抓农业, 一手抓副业

yi-shou zhua nong-ye, yi-shou zhua gong-ye

i-shou chua nung-yeh, i-shou chua kung-yeh) 一手抓农业, 一手抓工业

yi xiang yi she (i hsiang i she) 一乡一社

yin-di zhi-yi (yin-ti chih-i) 因地制宜

yin-hao (银号

ying 营

you 友

yun-dong (yun-tung) 运动

zhao jing-zi (chao ching-tzu) 照镜子

zhen (chen) 镇

zheng-di huo-ku he-bu-lai, bu-ru shang-shan qu kan-chai

(cheng-ti huo-k'u ho-pu-lai, pu-ju shang-shan ch'u k'an-ch'ai)

整地活苦合不来, 不如上山去砍柴

zhi-li zhou (chih-li chow) 直隸州

zhong-dui (chung-tui) 中队

zhong-zi tian (chung-tzu t'ien) 种子田

zhou (chow) 州

zhua zhong-dian (zha chung-tien) 抓重点

zhuan-qu (chuan-ch'u) 专区

zhuan-ye dui (chuan-yeh tui) 专业队

zi-bao gong-yi (tzu-pao kung-i) 自报公议

zi-li geng-sheng (tzu-li keng-sheng) 自立更生

zi-liu-di (tzu-liu-ti) 自留地

zong-jin hui (tsong-ch'in hui) 宗親会

Zou-jiao-jun (Tsou-chiao-chun) 邹教军

zu bao pian (tsu pao pien) 组包片

zu-zhi jun-shi-hua (tsu-chin chun-shih-hua) 组织军事化

zuo-jia (tsuo-chia) 坐家

zuo-ye qu (tsuo-yeh ch'u) 作业区