FORMAL CO-OPERATION AMONG PUBLIC AGENCIES: 
A STUDY OF VANCOUVER'S POLICE AND 
COMMUNITY SERVICES PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

This study in public administration examines an attempt to establish and sustain formal co-operation among police, social service, parole and probation agencies in prevention of crime and related social problems. The setting for this attempt was the Police and Community Services Project in Vancouver, British Columbia. The Project, as it was called, ran from September 1974 to March 31, 1977. It was developed in the south-east quadrant of Vancouver with the participation of the above named agencies, the B.C. Police Commission, and the B.C. Justice Development Commission.

Examination of the Project and events which led to its inception is undertaken to test the hypothesis that sustained, formal co-operation among public agencies requires the likelihood of benefits to each participant. The hypothesis is drawn, in part, from Antonio Jorge's *Competition, Co-operation, Efficiency, and Social Organization*, and Anthony Downs' *Inside Bureaucracy*. Both writers maintain that co-operation is often motivated by the likelihood of rewards such as power, prestige, and additional resources. However, herein the motive is shown to be of greater importance in formal as compared to informal co-operation due, in part, to the longer term commitment and greater degree of involvement required of participants.

Formal co-operation is defined as a formally constituted or
recognized interaction in which agencies and their officials agree to combine their activities in an organized manner for the promotion of common ends or objectives in such a way that the greater success of one party to the interaction, the greater the success of the other party or parties. Also, the interaction is usually governed by formal rules and is subject to scrutiny by a higher authority. This definition denotes the need for goal consensus which, in turn, may signify that participants perceive a likelihood of benefits.

Informal co-operation among police, probation and social service agencies prior to the Project (1963 - 1974) is examined to show development of the belief among all agencies that formal co-operation would improve the effectiveness of agency and police services. On the basis of this shared belief, the Vancouver Police Department developed support for the Project and encouraged participation of social agencies. This was facilitated by the fact that the police and most social agencies were, in 1974, decentralizing services to increase effectiveness in treating crime and social problems and were seeking clearer role definitions. Reorganization of social service agencies was also a response to the social policies of a New Democratic Party provincial government.

The Project was fraught with difficulties from its inception. Representatives of agencies who were expected to manage the Project were unable to agree on viable objectives for the Project. As the Project lacked a clear sense of direction, the police proposed experimentation with a team policing system.
(that is, reorganization of the police in the Project area into six neighbourhood teams with constables assigned on a permanent basis) to facilitate co-ordination of police and social agency services. All Project participants agreed to the experiment as it provided the Project with a concrete goal. However, concentration on team policing fed perceptions of social agencies that the Project was a "police project" rather than an inter-agency endeavour. But this concentration came about, in part, because of lack of strong social agency commitment to the Project. This was due largely to the preoccupation of agencies with changes in their own organizations resulting from a change to a Social Credit Party provincial government (December 1975) with conservative social policies. Also, the dominant role of the police in the Project appeared to lessen the likelihood of benefits to social agencies and, therefore, lessened their commitment. These factors are considered as major influences determining the Project's failure to sustain formal co-operation.

In contrast, field teams of police and agency workers in the team policing experiment developed a consensus on how to work together, whenever possible, while respecting each other's functional autonomy. Thus, they reverted to informal co-operation in co-ordination of services. This thesis suggests, then, that informal co-operation may be more effective than formal co-operation, even though likelihood of benefit is present, in improving co-ordination (albeit on a more limited scale) among diverse public agencies.
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The idea for this thesis developed from my observations during a period in 1976 when I provided public information services as a consultant to the Police and Community Services Project in Vancouver South. During that time, I was particularly concerned to find a lack of consensus among staff members and other persons participating in the Project as to the overall objectives of the Project. This lack of consensus appeared to result in a kind of bureaucratic anomie within the Project and a serious breakdown in internal and external communications. As the person expected to establish some form of information system to promote the Project, I was drawn to examine and consider some of the factors which seemed to impede the development of a clear message as to what the Project was about. In the end, however, the only clear message that I was able to develop was about team policing and not about inter-agency co-operation in crime prevention.

It was from my concern with the confusion over objectives within the Project, as compared to the confident approach of the police in developing a team policing system, that I decided to analyze the reasons for the breakdown of formal inter-agency co-operation. While the notion that likelihood of benefits to participants seems an obvious requirement for co-operative interaction, it seemed to me that, in this instance, it was a
critical factor in sustaining co-operation. Indeed, as this thesis suggests, the lessening of likelihood of benefits contributed strongly to lack of social agency commitment to the Project and, therefore, the Project's failure.

Other factors also affected the Project, but it has been possible herein to consider them only briefly. In fact, the focussing of this thesis on the motive of likelihood of benefits has made it necessary to omit discussion of the role of municipal government and the personal and professional ambitions of persons directly and indirectly involved in the Project. These factors deserve further exploration in their own right at another time. Indeed, once enough pieces of the puzzle are examined, it may be possible to develop firmer theoretical notions about formal inter-agency co-operation. At present, there seems to be no theoretical framework to guide analysis of such a form of co-operation and this, to some extent, is the reason for my concentration on a single factor (likelihood of benefits) which may later contribute to the construction of theory.

Finally, it must be noted that some of the information contained in this thesis was gained from persons who wish to remain anonymous. I have respected their wishes and I appreciate that they were willing to impart information which helped me to understand some of the tensions which existed in the Project. My only regret is that some interesting information on personality conflicts had to be deleted because it was not relevant to the approach taken in this thesis.
This study could not have been completed without the co-operation and assistance of members of the Vancouver Police Department, the Police and Community Services Project, and the Vancouver Resources Board. In particular, I am grateful to Tom Herdman and Jack Crich for their encouragement and help in obtaining resource materials. I also wish to thank the police constables and social workers who let me 'tag along', often in the middle of the night, while they did their jobs. The insights gained were invaluable.

My advisor, Professor Stephen Milne, was of great help in making sense of a large amount of information. I am grateful for his insights, guidance, and patience. The criticisms and suggestions offered by Professors Alan C. Cairns and John Wood were also much appreciated. Thanks must also go to Dr. Keith G. Banting for guiding this study in the early stages of its development. Special words of thanks go to my friends, especially L.D.W. and R.C.G., for helping me to keep my objectives in sight.

My wife, Louise, and my three sons; Kevin, Stuart, and Angus; have been enormously patient. I owe them a great debt of thanks for their support.

Finally, any errors, omissions, or misinterpretations of fact in this thesis are my responsibility alone. However, I hope the study may make a small contribution toward understanding problems encountered in inter-agency relations.
CHAPTER ONE

MOTIVES FOR CO-OPERATION AMONG AGENCIES

I. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

This thesis will examine an attempt to establish formal co-operation among police, social service, parole and probation agencies in a program to prevent crime and related social problems. The program was called the Police and Community Services Project. It was conducted in the Vancouver South district of Vancouver, British Columbia from September 1974 to March 31, 1977.

The interdependence and functional relatedness of the police to other public agencies has received greater attention throughout North America over the past ten years. The police, probation and parole services, and various social service agencies deal with similar problems and, often, the same persons. Recognition of interdependence and functional overlaps has fostered attempts to establish formal co-operation among these agencies. The belief has been that formal inter-agency co-operation will reduce unnecessary overlap of services and assist all agencies in providing more effective and efficient service. With regard to the above agencies, attempts to co-operate have been motivated, in part, by the belief that crime and social problems leading to crime can be prevented through a concerted
and sustained effort.

Co-operation among public agencies is not easily developed, nor is it easily sustained. Agencies are, to varying degrees, in conflict with each other in pursuit of or in defence of resources or power. Therefore, they may be reluctant to make commitments to formal, co-operative arrangements which may limit pursuit of those interests. However, if it appears likely that formal co-operation will produce benefits for agencies, they may agree to suspend or lessen conflict and enter into a co-operative interaction. They may also agree to co-operate for practical reasons if there are no costs involved. For example, two or more agencies serving the same clients may find it practical to co-operate in exchange of policy, service, or client information to avoid duplication of services. An agency may also agree to co-operate with others if it is perceived that co-operation may be a way of reaching a goal to which the agency is ideologically committed. For example, an agency providing social services to juveniles might co-operate with the police because it was committed to the notion that juvenile delinquency is a social problem and not a crime problem requiring action within the criminal justice system. The agency, therefore, would consider co-operation as an opportunity to divert juvenile offenders into the social service system.

Finally, agencies may co-operate because they believe that they share a responsibility for solving or preventing certain problems, such as crime or delinquency. This denotes, in a sense, a degree of goal consensus which may be reinforced by
the fact that the agencies concerned serve the same government.

The purpose of this thesis, then, is to test the hypothesis that sustained, formal co-operation among public agencies requires the likelihood of benefits to each participant. Another way of stating this is that agencies must believe that formal co-operation will pay. Benefits to agencies may be, for example, increased operational efficiency, new responsibilities leading to acquisition of additional resources, an opportunity to gain community or political support, or an opportunity to satisfy an ideological commitment.

Finally, the field of study in which this thesis lies is public administration. This field draws its content from many sources such as political theory, economics, sociology, social psychology, and experiences in management of industry, business, and government services. In the main, however, "[p]ublic administration encompasses a body of knowledge pertaining to the operational processes of the executive functions of government." 5

Helen C. Hilling, in proposing a framework for a curriculum in public administration, suggested that the curriculum could be conceptualized as follows:

(1) theories of the state, (2) dimensions of administrative personality, (3) technology for administration, (4) innovations in institutions and systems for administration, (5) theories of administrative action, (6) problems and methods of research and analysis.
will be apparent that some of the other areas listed above will be touched upon. 7

II. SETTING

During the past ten years, many major, urban police departments in Canada and the United States have introduced organizational, technical, and operational changes intended to improve effectiveness in dealing with increases in crime and a wide range of social service responsibilities. 8 These changes have occurred, primarily, in response to a major change in policing philosophy, that is, the police have shifted emphasis from detection of crime, apprehension of criminals, and reaction to requests for police service to "crime prevention". 9 The new emphasis has been apparent in Vancouver, British Columbia since the late 1960s. At that time the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) began a program of reorganization which led to decentralization of its patrol functions and the creation of patrol units primarily devoted to crime prevention. 10 The Department also began to increase informal co-operation activities with social service 11 and justice system agencies (i.e., probation and parole services). Short term projects were developed with these agencies in attempts to treat specific social problem situations (e.g., juvenile gang activity, neighbourhood conflicts of a racist nature, and vandalizing of public and private property). It was strongly felt that these problems could lead to the
commission of major crimes if they were not resolved.

By 1974, the Vancouver Police Department, parole, probation, and social service agencies decided to pursue a formal and long-term program of crime prevention and treatment of social problems such as family disputes, juvenile delinquency, mental health crises, and drug and alcohol abuse. The program was to emphasize co-ordination of services and was to develop through a demonstration project called the Police and Community Services Project (hereafter referred to as the Project). It was financially supported by the Justice Development Fund of the British Columbia Attorney General's Department.

The Project was to last two years, 1975 to 1977, and, at its conclusion, was expected to provide an evaluation of its activities. It was also hoped that the Project would develop and test a model for police and agency co-operation which could be applied elsewhere. The Project was conducted in the south-east quadrant of Vancouver, an area known as Vancouver South or Police District 3 (See Map No. 1). "The population of the area in 1971 was 157,735, representing approximately 36% of the city's population." The area was also characterized by a high number of calls for police service and a high crime rate. The structure of the Project, with a list of participants is provided in Diagram No. 1. The Project is discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
III. INFORMAL AND FORMAL CO-OPERATION

Co-operation and how it may be sustained is the concern of this thesis. It is, therefore, important to understand the ways in which the term co-operation is used herein. First, it must be noted that our main concern will be with formal co-operation. However, formal co-operation may result from positive experiences in informal co-operative interactions. This was the case with the Police and Community Services Project.

Informal co-operation among agencies refers to those inter-agency interactions which tend to be of an ad hoc nature, that is, they occur on an 'as required' basis. Such interactions are not governed by formal rules or procedures, and are not usually subject to scrutiny by some higher authority. Such interactions may require some degree of goal consensus and goodwill. Informal co-operation also requires that some benefits be gained by the parties to co-operation. The benefits may be in the form of satisfying the self-interests of officials. However, the satisfaction of such interests may, in turn, satisfy the overall objectives of the agency in which the official is employed. The individual may gain some "personal rewards (such as friendly relations with others, personal significance, and a degree of stability of interpersonal relationships) that are absolutely essential to the efficient operation of an organization."
In many instances, informal co-operation may make it easier for an official to do his or her job. Formal rules under which officials are expected to operate may be limiting or inappropriate when encountering novel or complex situations or tasks. Indeed, at times, it may appear that there is no formal rule to guide an official in a situation demanding action.\(^\text{17}\) Downs refers to use of informal procedures as a means of meeting an agency's overall objectives (e.g., crime prevention), "by filling 'gaps' in the formal rules, or adapting those rules to fit peculiar situations."

No set of rules can specify in advance every situation an organization encounters. Hence members of every bureau are called upon to implement the formal purposes of the organization in ways above and beyond those set forth in formal rules. When such implementations are frequently required, officials tend to routinize them so as to eliminate the cost of thinking out what to do each time the same situation recurs. Moreover, such unwritten "rules of the road" make each official's behavior more predictable for other officials who must interact with him. Thus, the need to economize on time by extending the formal rules to fit one's particular situation is an important cause of informal structure.\(^\text{18}\)

Downs also states, among his many propositions, that, "organizations operating in rapidly changing and highly uncertain environments tend to rely heavily on informal structures and procedures."\(^\text{19}\) Certainly this describes the general environment in which the police and social service agencies operate.\(^\text{20}\)

It is also worth noting that informal co-operation implies an awareness of the functional relatedness and interdependence
of agencies. That is, in order to co-operate, agencies must be, to some extent, aware of the services provided by other agencies if those agencies are to be called upon to co-operate in completing a task or providing a solution to a problem.21

Formal co-operation can be distinguished from informal co-operation in that it is formally constituted or recognized, is usually governed by formal rules, and is subject to scrutiny by a higher authority. For example, the Police and Community Services Project was formally constituted as an inter-agency co-operative endeavour by virtue of a contract for funding with the Justice Development Fund of the Attorney General's Department. Moreover, the Project was governed by a Management Co-ordinating Committee (see Diagram No. 1) composed of officially assigned agency representatives. With regard to rules, the Project eventually developed guidelines for co-operation among agencies under defined circumstances.22 Finally, the Project was expected to provide regular progress reports (distributed to the funding agency, Project participants, and interested members of the public) and a final evaluation of its activities (a public document). Not only was this a contractual requirement, but an expectation of participating agencies. Thus, the Project was subject to scrutiny by a higher authority — the Justice Development Fund and the Attorney General's Department.

Formal co-operation may also be defined as a formally recognized interaction in which agencies and their officials
combine their activities in an organized manner for the promotion of common ends or objectives, in such a way that the greater the success of one party to the interaction, the greater the success of the other party or parties. This definition draws attention to the importance of goal consensus and the belief that co-operation must pay. It also emphasizes that the benefits must be shared among the parties. The implication is that a party's share should be commensurate with its contribution to the interaction.

In comparing formal and informal co-operation, it can be seen that the former requires a long-term orientation to meeting objectives and gaining benefits. Informal co-operation does not require a long-term commitment. Also, the benefit expectations may be less. In formal arrangements there is time to weigh benefits carefully and, therefore, expectations may be or may become greater. Informal co-operation seems to focus on personal and more immediate, practical organizational benefits of the officials concerned, whereas formal co-operation may be concerned with broad objectives or policies of organizations. There is, then, greater likelihood of conflict in formal co-operation.

A final point is that informal co-operation accommodates goal diversity and respects the functional autonomy of participant agencies. In comparison, formal co-operation is dependent upon goal consensus. Also, the scope of the objectives developed in a formal setting may threaten functional autonomy. This is, then, indicative of a need in formal interaction to strike a balance between goal consensus and goal diversity if
inter-agency conflict is to be restricted and benefits realized by all participants.

The benefits to agencies participating in the Project were to be in the form of more effective and efficient use of police, social service, and justice system (parole and probation) agency resources in preventing crime and social problems. (Hereafter, the term 'social conflict' may be substituted for 'social problems'.) Another benefit was to be better definition and understanding of roles and responsibilities, leading to improved relations (goodwill) among police and agency members. (Note that the term 'agency' will sometimes be used to refer to justice system agencies other than the police, and social service agencies both in the text of this thesis and in some of the materials cited.) However, there were other agency-specific goals, such as gaining more funds and employees.\(^{24}\)

The motive of self- or agency-interest is considered by Downs as a major factor in co-operative interaction directed toward change or innovation. In seeking change or innovation (and the Project was a device for seeking change in inter-agency relations, as well as innovation in the form of service co-ordination), officials look for rewards such as "gains in power, income, and prestige associated with increases in the resources controlled by a given official or a given bureau."\(^{25}\)

The possibility of expanding services and, consequently, resources was, indeed, a part of the plan for all agencies participating in the Project:
Talk of co-ordination, integration, and co-operation was central to the Project and this appeared to entail two agendas. The first was simply the establishment of some mechanism to increase the interface between the police and service agencies. Beyond this was the assumption that through co-ordinated planning and perhaps service delivery, existing agencies would provide additional and more effective, preventative service.

Of course additional services usually require more resources and, if the added services are measured to be effective, the power and the prestige of agencies would be enhanced. The police, however, appear to have been less interested in new resources. They had already expanded staff -- 40 new constables in 1971 and 120 were to be added in 1976 -- and had funds to renovate buildings and establish a highly sophisticated communication centre with a computer-based information system. They were, primarily, interested in making better use of what they had to prevent crime and to develop a better 'police image' in the community. Gary Parkinson summarized the major reasons for VPD interest in Figuring It Out: An Evaluation of the Police and Community Services Project:

... The interest of the Vancouver Police Department in a community policing project emerged from three broad patterns which had been developing within this city for a few years. First, as a result of two or three rather serious incidents involving police and citizens, the police department was committed to establishing different relationships between the police and the community. This began some time ago with the creation of a few walking beats and school liaison programs. Second, the department wished to become more effectively involved with other components of the set of social services. As a result of an analysis of juvenile arrests in the late 1960s, the department became very much aware of the relationship between their 'clients' and the service potential of other agencies. It was a short step from this to seeing how the early involvement of community agencies could result in crime
prevention. The notion of diversion [i.e., diverting offenders to social service agencies instead of invoking the full criminal justice process] was also given significance in this context. The department became involved in programs of this type through a series of [pre-1975] community policing projects. . . . A common problem of the project approach to community policing was the isolation of the policemen involved from their colleagues, and frequently a confusion about the policeman's role. The third desire, then, was to provide a framework for the creation of community policing programs which would build in support for the police constables and produce clarity rather than confusion about police roles.

(Parkinson's emphasis.)

Finally, consideration is due the importance of goal consensus in formal co-operation. With reference to our definition of formal co-operation requiring mutually agreed upon objectives, we will examine its importance in the next section.

IV. GOAL CONSENSUS

The term 'goal consensus' is used here to denote agreement among members of a given group on a goal or set of goals. The Police and Community Services Project developed on the assumption that there was consensus on the goal of establishing inter-agency co-operation leading to co-ordination of police and agency services. This assumption developed from a prior assumption that police, parole, probation, and social service agencies share a responsibility for prevention of crime and social conflict. While these assumptions were not necessarily correct, the fact remains that the police and agencies made commitments to the Project on the basis of these assumptions.
We may, therefore, assume that there was consensus on the goal of establishing inter-agency co-operation leading to co-ordination of services. The Project, then, became the formal setting for inter-agency co-operation and service co-ordination.

The Project was not successful, however, in sustaining formal inter-agency co-operation and, as the Project ended, the police and agencies returned to informal co-operation. Why, then, if there was goal consensus, was it not possible to sustain co-operation? Antonio Jorge, in *Competition, Co-operation, Efficiency, and Social Organization*, provides a clue when he links goal consensus with the notion that it must be apparent that co-operation provides benefits.

In the long run, though, if conscious co-operation is to endure without love or radical sacrifice as a motivating power, it must be apparent that "it pays". If there is conviction on the part of the individual [or an agency] that there is basic conflict or disharmony [lack of goal consensus] between him [or the agency] and the group, active or conscious co-operation of the type envisioned for continued development becomes impossible.

In a sense, then, the perception of goal consensus (i.e., harmony of interests) holds out the promise of benefit (i.e., it is apparent that it pays) in that it denotes a sharing of interest in certain goals and agreement to effect a purpose described by those goals. Moreover, goal consensus reduces conflict, thus promoting co-ordination facilitating the satisfaction of goals. Downs has expressed this as follows: "Within any organization greater goal consensus reduces the
number and intensity of conflicts among members, thus improving the organization's overall coordination."

Yet, even with goal consensus, co-operation and co-ordination may not continue if some participants do not get the direct credit they feel they deserve for their contribution. William Clifford, in Planning Crime Prevention, points to another difficulty, the structure of agencies, but he also returns to the proposition that promise of benefit is a strong motive for development of co-operation and co-ordination of activities:

Too often, the very structures of a government or ministry or a group of ministries or departments is such that on a day-to-day basis coordination is difficult to ensure, despite a great deal of goodwill, persistent exhortation, and any number of regular meetings designed to coordinate. Human nature being what it is, and the power structures of our social organizations being what they are, coordination appears to come more easily where it is either enjoined by authority (so that there is a loss of status or the likelihood of penalization from a resistance to co-ordination) or where it is evinced by the promise of more funds and more departmental development in return for more consideration being given for dovetailing the ministry's [or agency's] work with that of other ministries or agencies.

In the Vancouver situation examined herein, formal co-operation was not enjoined by a higher authority, but there was pressure from the B.C. Attorney General's Department to develop formal co-operation. This is discussed further in Section IV.

It is also important to recognize that co-operation and co-ordination can be hampered as well as enjoined by higher
authorities. For example, political leaders may change government policy and thereby alter the goals or structure of an agency or agencies. These changes may take agency attention away from co-operative endeavours because the agency will be preoccupied with reorganization. Indeed, during such periods of change, inter-agency relations may be of very low priority. On the other hand, it is conceivable that agencies might use inter-agency co-operation as a means of redefining their roles in light of government policy changes. In the case of the Project, a change in government, resulting in a change in social policy affecting social service agencies, lessened the commitment of those agencies to the Project.

V. SUMMARY

This chapter has been devoted to discussion of motives which influence attempts to establish and sustain formal inter-agency co-operation. Primary interest has been in the contention that sustained, formal co-operation requires the likelihood of benefit (i.e., that it pays) to each participant.

Formal co-operation has been defined as a formally constituted or recognized interaction in which agencies and their officials combine their activities in an organized manner for the promotion of common ends or objectives, in such a way that all benefit by each other's actions. The definition denotes some degree of goal consensus, that is, promotion of common ends or objectives; co-ordination, that is, combining of activities in an organized manner; and likelihood of benefit.
Formal co-operation is also distinguished by the fact that it is governed by formal rules and is subject to scrutiny by a higher authority. The Police and Community Service Project, to be examined in detail in Chapter Three, was seen to fit this definition.

Goal consensus has been singled out as a key requisite for sustained, formal co-operation. In so doing, goal consensus was noted to depend on the participants' expectations of benefit. It was also seen as a means of improving co-ordination necessary to the attainment of goals and the fulfillment of the likelihood of benefit. It was also noted that the balance between goal consensus and goal diversity is important to the survival of formal co-operation.

Throughout this chapter, the hypothesis that sustained, formal co-operation requires the likelihood of benefit to participants has been returned to time and again. It appears that it may be the most important determinant of sustained, formal co-operation. We will return to this hypothesis once the Project has been described. First, however, it is important to examine a period of informal co-operation preceding the development of the Project. This is the subject of the following chapter.
FOOTNOTES CHAPTER ONE

1 For example, the person a policeman arrests today may, as the result of a court decision or exercise of discretion by a prosecutor, end up on a social worker's or probation officer's case list. On the other hand, a social worker may be unable to resolve a violent family dispute and so (s)he calls in the police to invoke the criminal justice process (i.e., to arrest and charge someone), or to act as a control agent. Similarly, probation officers use the police to control or apprehend probation violators.

It also must be noted that there is considerable evidence to suggest that lower socio-economic classes tend to be involved in both the social welfare system and criminal justice system. See R. Quinney, Critique of Legal Order (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974).  


For a somewhat more philosophical discussion of formal and informal co-operation see:  
Antonio Jorge, Competition, Co-operation, Efficiency, and Social Organization (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1978), pp. 19 - 33. Jorge uses the terms 'conscious' and 'unconscious' co-operation to describe, respectively, forms similar to formal and informal co-operation.

3 See Downs, p. 216. Downs expresses this in his Law of Interorganizational Conflict: "Every large organization is in partial conflict with every other social agent it deals with."

4 This hypothesis is drawn, in part, from Jorge, p. 20. He states that, "... if conscious cooperation is to endure without love or radical sacrifice as a motivating power, it must be apparent that 'it pays'."

This proposition is also supported by Downs when discussing processes of change and the motive of self-interest. "We have seen that self-interest is a powerful cause of inertia, but it can also motivate change if officials receive greater rewards for altering the status quo than preserving it." Downs, p. 198.

6 Ibid., p. 324.


8 Studies of calls to the police for assistance in non-criminal matters, that is, so-called 'service calls' which may involve family fights, complaints about noisy neighbours, health emergencies, traffic accidents, and so on, show that these calls constitute between fifty and eighty per cent of all calls to the police. This is usually seen as a result of the fact that the police department is the only recognized twenty four hour per day, public service agency.


Also see "Monograph 1: Citizen Requests For Service And Vancouver Police Department Response," The Social Service Role of the Police: Domestic Crisis Intervention (Vancouver: United Way of Greater Vancouver, January 1976).

9 The term "crime prevention" is often used to describe actions taken by the police (sometimes in co-operation with other agencies or the public) to reduce the incidence of particular crimes such as burglary, rape, shoplifting, etc., or to reduce crime in a particular area such as a manufacturing district or a complex of apartment buildings. In this thesis the term is used to describe attempts to bring about a reduction in all forms of crime. Herein, I have adopted the definition of crime prevention developed by the Ontario Task Force On Policing (1974). It is the definition which was used by the Vancouver Police and Community Services Project discussed in Chapter Three:

There is a need for more emphasis on crime prevention - a role which tends to be neglected because of the demands for responsive service and the incident orientation of most officers. Crime prevention includes a range of activities. Some are aimed at alleviating social conditions which are closely associated with crime. Others have to do with improvements in the detection and apprehension of criminals - with steps for reintegrating offenders into communities. Still others, such as 'hardening of the site', emphasize methods to make criminal
activity more difficult. Crime prevention implies a longer-term orientation for the police.


In 1971, Vancouver was divided into four police districts. The Patrol Division which previously had been only responsible for responding to calls for service now became responsible for prevention activities such as community relations programs, relations with social service agencies, police-school liaison, surveillance, property and person checks, and foot patrols.

Until 1973, the City of Vancouver was responsible for the administration of social welfare services and public health. Also, private agencies such as the Children's Aid Society and Catholic Family Services held mandates to deal with juvenile and family problems. In 1973 these services were taken over by the Human Resources Department of the Provincial Government and administered under the Community Resources Board Act through locally elected boards and appointed officials. Further detail is provided in Chapter Two.

A list of these agencies is given in Diagram No. 1. However, it should be noted that the Vancouver South Community Resources Board provided services to families, juveniles, and pensioners. These services were of a diverse nature. Further information on statutory and non-statutory services of CRBs appears in Chapter Two.

The term "demonstration project" is important to note because it was used in many Project documents to express the intention that the Project would provide a model that could be applied when the Project ended. It was expected by some (notably the police, the B.C. Police Commission, and the Project Director) that there would simply be a transition from the Project to an institutionalized set of inter-agency relations, perhaps in the form of an inter-agency council.

Parkinson, p. 48.

Ibid., p. 50.

Downs, p. 65. Rewards in terms of interpersonal relationships for a detached social worker or policemen who work alone for long periods of time may be important in maintaining morale.
A good example of this is a domestic dispute where a policeman often cannot, under the law, do anything unless one of the parties to the dispute lodges a complaint. He may strongly suggest that the persons involved seek counselling with a social worker, but he cannot compel them to do so. However, the fact that the suggestion comes from a policeman gives it weight.

Downs, p. 63.

Informal structures and procedures in this case refer to activities not governed by formal rules, but which are persistent. Because the behaviour is persistent it tends to become accepted as a structural aspect of an organization. For example, for many years the Vancouver police have realized that there are many social problems, such as family fights, mental health breakdowns, and alcoholism, for which they have neither the training, time, or responsibility under the law to deal with. Because they are called upon first to deal with these problems, they have tried to devise informal means to divert such cases to agencies best equipped and trained to deal with them. To facilitate this they have asked agencies to provide a "police liaison social worker". Now, while there have been police liaison social workers working within police headquarters for a number of years, it has been the result of an informal arrangement, but one which has persisted, is recognized, but not formally sanctioned. Also, policemen in certain areas of the city may get to know probation officers or social workers operating in the same area and establish personal relationships which allow for some exchange of information on potential offenders and criminal activities in the area. Then, when a problem arises, they can quickly refer the problem to the person representing the agency best equipped, best trained, and legally responsible for services to handle the situation.

The police and social workers are permitted to exercise considerable discretion because of the diverse circumstances in which they typically must operate.

For example, a policeman, when intervening in a family dispute which does not require formal police action (i.e., arrest), may call upon a social service agency specializing in family problems for assistance. This indicates both an awareness of alternatives and a recognition that police rules do not cover the situation. For the social service agency, such informal co-operation with the police assists in identifying a problem situation which otherwise might not receive attention.

For instance, the police and agencies developed a booklet describing problem situations and the agency most
capable of dealing with them. While there were many problems involved in developing such guidelines, there was nevertheless a clear attempt to establish some formal rules.


24 For example, one participating agency, Juvenile Probation, was concerned with expanding its role. It had, in fact, a shrinking clientele. The following excerpt from a confidential interview with a member of the Project emphasizes the point:

Juvenile Probation wanted to foster a better image. The police were resolving most problems with juveniles themselves or putting them through the courts. JP was running out of clients. They were no help to the kids anyway. So, with a better image, they thought the police would kick more kids into the system....

[Juvenile Probation's Project representative] wanted Project support for Juvenile Probation's demands for more staff.

25 Downs, p. 198.

26 Parkinson, p. 40.

27 Ibid., pp. 32 - 33.

28 See Parkinson, p. 46. Project documents referred to all agencies (including the police) having a mandate to prevent crime and social conflict. In fact, they do not. It must be assumed that what was meant was that agencies share a moral responsibility -- and so does the general public. However, agencies other than the police have no formal or legal responsibility for preventing crime and, in fact, they may be quite willing to leave crime problems to the police, in much the same way that the police are willing to leave social welfare problems to social workers.


30 Jorge, p. 20.

31 Downs, p. 223.

32 Clifford, p. 92.

33 Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO
PRELUDE TO FORMAL CO-OPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to describe conditions and experiences which led to an attempt to establish formal co-operation among the police, social service and justice system agencies in Vancouver. A period of informal co-operation, 1963 to 1974, drew attention to the interdependence of these agencies in preventing crime and related social problems.

While it is not possible to account for each and every factor which led to the realization of the need to co-operate, there are some which stand out. Clearly the police were confronted with increased crime but had neither the resources nor all the expertise necessary to prevent its increase. On the other hand, social service agencies, while having the expertise to treat social problems, were not co-ordinating services so as to provide effective response. Also, they required some means of identifying areas (and persons) in which they could provide help. Meanwhile, people in need of their services required help in identifying and gaining access to them.
What will be described here is a period of 'finding out'. The police found out that they could not deal successfully with crime increases, riots, and juvenile delinquency without attacking these problems at their source. Social service agencies found out that the police were dealing with problems which the agencies and the police thought were better handled by social workers. Social service agencies, then, saw a need to develop closer liaison with the police if they, the agencies, were to have these problems directed to them. Thus it evolved that the police helped to identify many social problems and then referred them to social agencies. In so doing, informal mechanisms developed for referral of problems to appropriate agencies, and this led to co-operation in development of solutions.

This chapter provides, in effect, a brief history of social conditions and crime problems which required informal co-operation for their treatment. This will be followed by some examples of co-operative ventures. It will be evident that while policemen and social workers have different world views (in fact, on a liberal to conservative spectrum they would be considered to be at opposite ends) they agreed to co-operate so as to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their individual services. Finally, I will relate some of the professional and political initiatives and pressures which called for formal co-operation among all agencies in crime and social problem prevention and treatment.
II. CRIME PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL PRESSURES IN THE SIXTIES

Over the past ten years, the Canadian criminal justice system has been subjected to growing demands for more effective means to deal with increases in crime and related social problems. Many social factors have contributed to these increases: liberalization of social norms and values, affluence and consumerism, deterioration of primary social networks (e.g., the family and neighbourhood friends), absence of community spirit, and mass media emphasis on violence and social conflict. Crime increases coupled with concerns over the increasing complexity of social life have led people to demand some means of reducing insecurity. Thus, pressure has mounted for the police, society's most evident problem solving agency, to respond to those demands. Herman Goldstein comments in *Policing A Free Society*:

Each of the major problems for which the police have traditionally been held responsible has increased significantly in this past decade. The incidence of violent crime has risen sharply and continues to climb. The corresponding increase in the fear of crime has resulted in mounting pressure on the police to provide security — often at the cost of dealing more directly with the crime problem.

Goldstein, writing from an American perspective, also notes the effects of large-scale disorders, such as riots, in the sixties.
The most immediate challenge, for the police, was to bring the riots under control. . . Additionally, because the riots were a form of protest against a whole range of problems and injustices that plague our society, the police were pressured into examining aspects of their own operations that may have contributed to the widespread discontent of minority groups in urban areas.

The police in Vancouver faced similar, but not as severe problems in the 1960s and the early 1970s. Increases in crimes against property and, notably, burglary and vandalism of private homes also fed public fears. The 1970 Annual Report of the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) notes, "[c]onsistent with the pattern of the past several years, to a very large extent young people are continuing to be responsible for the majority of crimes in this category [crimes against property]."³

Concomitant with the increase in crimes against property, fraudulent use of credit cards and misrepresentations in obtaining welfare benefits increased. I mention these specifically because they are crimes which, at base, probably result from social conditions. Public disorders also are usually the results of social problems. The Annual Report of the VPD in 1970 gives some idea of the intensity of the social malaise of the period:

Protest parades, activities of dissident groups, and street disturbances placed heavy demands on available manpower. Four of the more notable incidents were the Siege of the Public Safety Building in May; the Liberation of Stanley Park in June; the English Bay disturbance during the Sea Festival in July; and the Jericho Hostel eviction [of so-called Hippies] in October. Despite the offensive
attitude and conduct of many of the persons involved, and their obvious attempt to create a confrontation with the police, members of the Force conducted themselves in a highly commendable professional manner and in so doing earned the respect of the community.

However, one effect of these confrontations was that the police felt pressed to find ways of reaching and educating or converting anti-police groups, even though it was clear that these groups were reacting to social conditions over which the police had no control.

The impression should not be gained that riots and demonstrations are required to produce change. It was also evident to the police and to social service agencies in less tumultuous times that changes were required. A good example of this had to do with juvenile crime and delinquency. These problems were of particular concern to VPD and, in 1963, a Youth Preventive Squad (YPS) was formed. In addition to a high incidence of crimes such as theft, breaking and entering, and shoplifting, this period was marked by juvenile gang activity which often led to vandalism of public and private property. It was evident to the police that they did not have the necessary resources to direct juveniles to less destructive pursuits, and to counsel them, without the help of other agencies. So the police began working out informal co-operative projects with schools, community recreation centres,
social agencies (e.g., Children's Aid Society), and juvenile probation services. The 1966 report of the Squad describes police participation in community centre dances and sports activities, in-school activities, and even beach parties. Members of the YPS also gave talks (lectures) to school classes, parent-teacher groups, and service groups (Lions, Kiwanis, etc.) to increase community awareness of juvenile problems and to explain the role of the police in the community.

In 1966, informal inter-agency co-operation seemed to be taking a step forward:

There has been noted improvement on all fronts in regard to our liaison with the outside professional agencies. We are not experiencing previous difficulties we had in communicating with these people. They are now phoning us with regularity and advising us with completeness on their plans of attack with any specific problems we have sent to them. The change of attitude of the school authorities has been most encouraging and beneficial to both sides.

For their part, social service agencies reacted to the police initiatives by deploying workers to problem areas but, like the police, on an 'as required' basis.

Originally the Y.P.S. was formed to cope with youth problems in the Fraserview area and part of the role at that time was very near to that of a detached [social] worker. It was because of this project and the involvement of the Y.P.S. that the social work agencies in the area came to realize the serious need for detached workers and subsequently placed detached workers in these problem areas.

In reviewing internal police documents on juvenile crime
and delinquency prevention up to 1975, it is apparent that juvenile problems did not decrease and, therefore, the need for informal mechanisms for co-operation among the police, social service agencies, schools, and juvenile probation service remained and became accepted practice. But another important understanding developed during this period. It was that crime and delinquency had to be dealt with comprehensively on a local basis. The co-operative projects which had developed in this early period were, to some extent, neighbourhood-specific. That is, resources were deployed to 'trouble spots' and when the problem or problems appeared to be resolved, the resources were withdrawn. This meant that the police and the agency workers gained only a limited understanding of the area's problems. It was realized, then, that a fuller understanding was required if long-term solutions were to be developed.

The police also came to realize that, in addition to understanding the obvious nature of the crime and delinquency problems, they had to examine resources available within the community for solving such problems, and the prevalent attitudes and social values of the community. An example of an application of this approach was the formation of an East Indian Squad to deal with conflicts and vigilanteism in Vancouver's large East Indian community. The men of the East Indian Squad were able to explain to that community how social conflict and crime problems are handled in Canada. In this manner, the cultural gap was, in part, closed.
III. DECENTRALIZATION OF POLICE SERVICES

With the realization that community-by-community responses were needed, the police and social service agencies began to decentralize their operations. For example, studies were undertaken by VPD's Planning and Research Unit (formed in 1969) to examine all functions of the police force, "with a view to improving efficiency." These studies looked at deployment patterns, use of manpower, manpower requirements, and the administrative structure of the department. On the basis of these studies, the department was reorganized in 1971 and manpower was increased by 40 constables. Central functions such as communications and record-keeping were improved to facilitate the development of a decentralized patrol system which was to have responsibility for crime prevention, as well as for servicing complaints.

On January 17, 1971, Community Policing was introduced. The Patrol Division was reorganized with emphasis placed on a community approach to patrol responsibilities. The city was divided into four districts with an Officer [Inspector] placed in charge of each District with responsibility on a 24-hour basis for the deployment and efficient use of manpower assigned to him. The reorganization also involved the separation of two basic patrol responsibilities — servicing of complaints and crime prevention.

The crime prevention units, in addition to duties in surveillance and property and person checks, were also used as foot patrols in areas with a lot of street activity.
What was innovative in this reorganization was that the police were then able to learn about specific problems in their Districts in depth and, thus, develop solutions that took into account the nature of the District. They were also able to establish firmer, long-term relationships with local agencies and community organizations. Thus, the police became part of the "local scene" and their image as nondescript blue figures in passing patrol cars began to fade.

Another change occurred in 1972. It can be seen to result from earlier experiences of the police in informal co-operation. The Youth Preventive Squad became the School Liaison Officer program and police officers were placed in many of Vancouver's high schools (secondary schools) on a full-time basis. These School Liaison Officers (SLOs) were also responsible for liaison with satellite elementary schools of the high schools. SLOs do not "police" the schools, but are available to the school and the community as a resource.

An individual officer deals with a school population which can vary from 4,200 to 5,500 students. The SLO is provided with office space in the school to which he or she is assigned and is available on a regular basis for consultation with parents, students, and, yes, teachers.

The program which is still in existence as part of VPD's team policing system has been so successful that doctors, school counsellors, and social workers have referred parents and students to SLOs for assistance. Thus, these officers act as resources or catalysts for informal resolution of school and family problems.
IV. PRESSURE FOR POLICE REFORM

While the police were taking steps to decentralize services and to work informally with social agencies, additional professional and political pressures for reform were mounting. In June 1972, a group of representatives from police forces throughout British Columbia, and some members of the B.C. Attorney General's Department, submitted a report to the provincial government which indicated some of the changes required in B.C.'s policing systems. The report recommended, "that a Provincial Police Commission be established in the province to promote the prevention of crime and the efficiency of police services in the province."¹⁰

The report was prompted by the rapid increase in crime in B.C., especially in drug-related offences and crimes committed by juveniles.¹¹ It was also stressed that B.C. did not have enough police constables to provide adequate police service. The number of cases handled per constable was significantly higher than in any other province of Canada. No action was taken on the report in 1972.

In November 1973, the Attorney General of the newly elected New Democratic Party (NDP) government initiated discussions on police problems with police officials throughout the province. The Attorney General also invited representatives of professional and community organizations to join in the discussions:
There was substantial agreement within the group as to the main issues that must be dealt with in order to improve the level of police service in the province. These issues were: police role, standards, recruitment, training, community relations, and abuse of authority.

On the issue of police role, it was recognized that it had expanded into the social service area without guidelines or suitable training of officers. While it was clear that policemen should not become social workers, and that social workers should not become policemen, the police had become the recognized 24-hour per day agency called upon to intervene in a wide variety of social crisis situations. It was agreed that if the police were to continue to intervene in these situations, they should develop formal and sustained liaison with the social service system, receive training in the handling of domestic disputes, and develop firm guidelines for the exercise of discretion in such situations.

The decisions police officers make with respect to discretion not to invoke the criminal process, levels of enforcement priorities with respect to certain kinds of offences, diversion to social service networks and informal mediation at the community level have important consequences at each subsequent stage of the process. Being part of a larger system, police policy must be integrated with the criminal justice system as a whole and this requires more effective liaison through the sharing of information and joint planning.

The group initially called together by the Attorney General was expanded and asked to draft a statute which would contain their recommendations. This was accomplished and the
draft was circulated to interested parties, including police constables and officers of various rank. Some changes were suggested by those parties and incorporated in the proposed legislation which the Attorney General accepted in principle. In March 1974, the new Police Act passed third reading in the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia.

What is significant about the Police Act of 1974 is that it formally opened the door to innovative approaches to policing and inter-agency co-operation. To facilitate innovation, it established the B.C. Police Commission and provided it with a mandate to set up and promote programs to bring about police, social service system, and community co-operation. It was this Commission and the Justice Development Commission (established under the Administration of Justice Act passed in April 1974) that were instrumental in developing and providing support for the Police and Community Services Project which was expected to demonstrate inter-agency co-operation in crime prevention.

V. DECENTRALIZATION OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Social service agencies had also been moving toward decentralization of services in the late sixties. Like the police, these agencies had been dealing with problem areas of the city in an ad hoc manner. For example, in 1970, the Vancouver Social Planning Department assigned several workers to city parks that were being vandalized by juveniles. They
did so in response to a police request for assistance. But, realizing that such "band-aid" approaches were not producing long-term results, the Social Planning Department, with other agencies, began to plan for decentralization of services on a permanent basis. To this end a Social Service Co-ordinator was appointed in 1969. A 1969 police document notes:

The plans of the Social Service Co-ordinator are to decentralize agencies and work as a team with a member from each agency, in a specific area with a co-ordinator as chairman. There are three such groups already established and . . . this team approach will give the police much needed backing. 14

As the Social Planning Department moved to decentralize and co-ordinate social services it maintained a very close relationship with the police, especially in the area of juvenile problems. At one point the closeness was exhibited in an attempt to devise a formal means for sharing information on juvenile offenders. The rationale behind the move was that information sharing would provide the means to evaluate the effectiveness of problem treatment and crime prevention methods. But the plan required that all agencies in possession of information on juvenile offenders, their friends, and their families would have to submit the information to a central information bank. This information was to include the offender's school record. Two recommendations toward this end were submitted to Vancouver City Council by the Social Planning Department in October 1972. They were contained in a Juvenile Crime Survey,
and called for:

1. Integration of all information on known offenders and their associates.
2. Adoption of an integrated, combined approach by all agencies working in the field of Delinquency Prevention and Rehabilitation of Offenders.

These recommendations were accepted in principle by the City Council and sent to the provincial government for further study. The provincial government appeared to heed the public reaction to the recommendations, which was that the proposals represented an attempt by the police to gain the right to keep dossiers on children. The proposals were shelved.

Another reason for the recommendations going into limbo was that the NDP government, elected in 1972, had plans to wrest control of the administration of social services from municipal governments. In 1973, the government instituted the Community Resources Boards (CRB) system -- a decentralized and integrated social service system.

These Boards were to be administered by persons elected from the communities they served, as well as by appointed members of local government and local institutions. The elected Boards were also to participate in policy planning for welfare services and to set local service priorities. Ultimately, however, the Boards were responsible to the provincial Department of Human Resources.

The Resources Board in the Vancouver South area, in which
the Police and Community Services Project would later operate, developed twelve teams of social workers and financial aid workers. These teams operated with considerable autonomy in delivery of a wide range of statutory and non-statutory services formally provided by a variety of public and private agencies. Statutory services come under "the Protection of Children's Act, Family Relations Act, Juvenile Delinquents' Act, and the Social Assistance Act. Non-statutory services include family crisis counselling, services to youth, the handicapped and the elderly; drug and alcohol counselling; and other programs decided upon by the teams."^17

In addition to the decentralization of social service, Adult Probation Services completed decentralization in early 1975 with the setting up of four community offices, plus one court team. Juvenile Probation did not decentralize until late 1976, as a result of the Project discussed in the next chapter. During this period, the Greater Vancouver Mental Health Service also decentralized and provided three Community Care Teams^18 in the Vancouver South area.

The process of integrating and co-ordinating social services did not require the goodwill or willingness to accommodate often associated with co-operative interaction. This was, in effect, co-operation by edict and was facilitated by the fact that most of the agencies and people affected by the setting up of the CRBs were involved in doing similar tasks. While
it is also apparent that people doing similar tasks may be in competition, it appears that social workers tend to share a common ideology which may moderate competition and promote co-operation, at least on broad social goals. This was not the case in the attempt to develop co-operation between the police and social service agencies in the Project.

VI. SUMMARY

Facing increases in crime, juvenile delinquency, and large-scale disorders in the 1960s, the police began to search for ways of solving these problems through co-operation with other community agencies. They also began to emphasize crime prevention. One strategy was to deploy policemen to work as liaison officers with schools, social service agencies, and community organizations in identifying and heading off problems in specific neighbourhoods.

Informal relations between the police and social service agencies began to produce results, but often of a short-term nature. Therefore, the agencies and the police began to decentralize their operations on a permanent basis so that they could develop a better understanding of communities with problems and become better known to the communities they served.

As decentralization and inter-agency co-operation processes seemed to be effective, there was a strong move by the police and social service agencies toward formalizing inter-agency co-operation and service co-ordination. Furthermore, the NDP government's program of decentralizing and integrating
social services, exemplified by the Community Resources Boards Act (Bill 84), 1974, was developing an organizational framework which would facilitate service co-ordination and inter-agency co-operation at the neighbourhood level. With the integration of social services through establishment of Community Resources Boards, the police, parole, and probation services moved toward co-ordination of their services with the social services. This led to the development of the Police and Community Services Project in Vancouver South. The Project is the subject of the next chapter.
FOOTNOTES CHAPTER TWO

1 Goldstein, p. 3.

2 Ibid.


4 Ibid., p. 2.

5 "Youth Preventive Squad, Annual Report, 1966" (Vancouver Police Department, Mimeo), p. 2.

6 "Youth Preventive Squad, Annual Report, 1967" (Vancouver Police Department, Mimeo), p. 2.


11 There was an increase common to all parts of Canada, (approximately 20 per cent in 1974) but B.C. experienced a greater increase in drug-related offences and juvenile crime. A study of crime patterns in B.C.'s Lower Mainland (Vancouver, West Vancouver, North Vancouver, New Westminster, and Surrey) issued in 1976 seems to indicate that the area is representative of urban and semi-urban areas across the province. However, as the study offered no statistical comparison with areas outside the Lower Mainland this can only be an assumption. See: Neville Avison, Patterns of Crime in the Lower Mainland (Victoria: B.C. Police Commission, 1976), Mimeo.

It should be noted that most analysts agree that crime statistics are usually so incomplete and misleading as to be less than useful. For a discussion of this see: James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 96.

Ibid., p. 2.


"Youth Preventive Squad, Annual Report, 1972" (VPD), p. 3.


Parkinson, p. 51.

Community Care Teams are composed of psychiatrists, social workers, psychologists, occupational therapists, psychiatric nurses, and so on.

For an early study of the effects of co-operative and competitive behaviour among groups of individuals doing the same task see: Peter M. Blau, "Co-operation and Competition In A Bureaucracy," The American Journal of Sociology, Volume LIX (May 1954), pp. 530 - 535.

Parkinson attempted to assess this in his analysis of the Project from the standpoint of social workers' perceptions of themselves and perceptions of social workers held by police officers. He also looked at police officers' perceptions of themselves and those held by social workers. The analysis tended to confirm stereotypes of both social workers and policemen. Social workers saw themselves as helping, warm, expressive, competent, and professional persons. The police saw social workers as soft-headed, unrealistic, optimistic, opinionated, and incompetent. Neither group saw the other as open-minded or well-rounded. For an interesting but statistically limited exploration of this polarization see Parkinson, pp. 204 - 220.
CHAPTER THREE

THE POLICE AND COMMUNITY SERVICES PROJECT:
AN ATTEMPT TO FORMALIZE INTER-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

I. INTRODUCTION

The Police and Community Services Project was initiated in late 1974 in Police District No. 3, the south-east quadrant of Vancouver. It was expected to establish formal co-operation among police, parole, probation, and social service agencies leading to co-ordination of services in prevention of crime and social problems related to crime. This chapter provides a description of how the Project was developed, how it was structured, and some of the difficulties it encountered in attempting to define and reach its objectives.

The Project's objectives are of particular interest. During the Project emphasis shifted from the major objective of establishing inter-agency co-operation and service co-ordination directed toward crime prevention to promoting agency co-operation with the police in development of a new policing system. While the initial objective encompassed redefinition of the police role, the significance of the shift is that the former objective implied a sharing of likely benefits by all participants, whereas the latter may be seen to imply that benefits were more likely to be gained by one agency, the police.
This chapter also discusses impediments to development of formal inter-agency co-operation which relate to changes in the internal organization of particular agencies, and to management and communication difficulties within the Project itself. Some consideration is also given to the influence of a change in provincial government upon the degree of commitment of community service agencies and the police to the Project. Finally, there will be a brief discussion of the evaluation of the Project and the team policing program which came to dominate its activities.

II. FORMATION OF THE PROJECT

The Police and Community Services Project developed out of a widespread interest in redefining the role of the police in the community and involving other community agencies in prevention of crime. Throughout North America since 1968, police departments have been experimenting with various forms of community or neighbourhood policing. However, few of these experiments or programs have placed emphasis on development of formal co-operative relationships with social service and justice system (parole, probation) agencies. In general, however, community policing programs have set out, "to establish new and more helpful relationships with the community, and to act as catalysts to involve other professionals and citizens in sharing responsibility for things which have been seen as problems for the police alone." It was from these
notions that the Police and Community Services Project developed in Vancouver.

The basic idea for the Project was developed in 1974 by Superintendent Tom Herdman of the Vancouver Police Department and Mr. John Ekstedt, Acting Deputy Minister of Correction, of the Attorney General's Department of British Columbia while they were participating in a study of diversion programs for the provincial government. A general proposal for a project was then developed by Sergeant J. Swann of the Vancouver Police Department and Mr. J. Jessup of the Social Planning Department of the City of Vancouver. While it would appear that the development of the idea for a project was a joint undertaking, it is clear that the impetus was provided by the Vancouver Police Department.

A proposal, "The Optimum Organization of Police and Other Social Services in a Community Setting," was submitted to the Justice Development Commission of B.C. and, in May 1974, it was accepted in principle. "The Project was accepted and financed on the basis of very general goals, and it was recognized that the specific details and the final shape of the Project would only emerge under the direction of the participating groups." With this mandate to proceed, Superintendent Herdman set out to involve social service, parole and probation agencies in the Project.

It is worth noting here the perspective the proposal took:
The report begins by referring back to the earlier community policing efforts [referred to in Chapter Two] and suggests that, "... in attempts to draw all agencies together for a combined assault on the prevailing social problems, it proved most difficult to institute a concerted approach". It then goes on to talk about the creation of Community Resources Boards — the integration of basic social services and the decentralization of these to neighbourhood areas — and suggests that, "the fact that the social agencies have now been restructured into a form that makes them responsive to change, suggests that an in-depth review of a viable relationship between police and Community Resources Boards would produce good results". The report concludes with a recommendation to set up an experimental area where agencies would work together to identify problems, evaluate resources, and develop methodologies to apply resources to problems.

By November 1974, a Project Director was selected by representatives of agencies that had agreed to participate in the Project. The Project received temporary funding from the Attorney General's Department, "until August 1975 when a formal contract was signed between the Justice Development Fund of the Attorney General's Department and the Project Director and Assistant Director." The Project Director had been employed by the Social Planning Department of the City of North Vancouver and actively involved in liaison with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police detachment contracted to police that community. The Assistant Director, a police sergeant, was seconded to the Project by the Vancouver Police Department in September 1974, two months before the Director was appointed.

Staff funded by the Project budget included a Director, two research officers, and two secretarial positions. A public relations officer and a co-ordinator of diversion were employed for a
short time. All other "staff" were seconded on a part-time basis from participating agencies and these secondments involved at least eight other persons. Most of these participants acted in a liaison capacity. Seconded staff included a member of the South Vancouver Community Resources area, a member of the City Social Planning Department, a member of the Adult Probation staff, a person from the Juvenile Probation staff, and a second member of the Vancouver Police Department. (Other police members were added as required).

The Project was to be administered by a Management Co-ordinating Committee (M.C.C.) composed of senior members of participating agencies. The Superintendent of the Patrol Division, VPD, was elected Committee Chairman. This was the Superintendent who helped to initiate the Project. Voting members of the M.C.C. included the Senior Social Planner of the Social Planning Department, City of Vancouver; the Justice Council Co-ordinator for the Vancouver Region; the Regional Director, Community Services Division of the Provincial Corrections (probation) Branch; the Regional Director of the Vancouver Family and Juvenile Region of the Provincial Corrections Branch; and the Manager of the Vancouver South Community Resources Area. (In August 1976, the Director of Patient Services, Greater Vancouver Mental Health Service was added to the Committee.) There were two non-voting members: A Commissioner of the British Columbia Police Commission, and the Inspector in charge of District No. 3, Vancouver Police Department.

The relationship of the Management Co-ordinating Committee to the Project Director and Assistant Director, and the Project
staff is illustrated in Diagram No. 1. Note that the diagram shows that the funding contract was with the Director and Assistant Director and, therefore, the budget was not a direct responsibility of the M.C.C. This is discussed further in Section III. It should also be noted that the Project Director and Assistant Director had, in fact, no authority over seconded staff. The line of authority of seconded staff to their agencies remained intact. With the exception of the full-time police department secondments and a 4/5 time Community Resources Board secondment, "other agencies had really only given a commitment to have their staff serve in a liaison capacity." However, the intention expressed in the Project proposal was that seconded staff of agencies would be active members of the Project and constitute a research team with the Project's full-time staff. The idea was not strongly pursued due to lack of agency commitment, indicating an early lack of agreement over authority and autonomy within the Project structure. It was hoped, however, that agency commitment would later be strengthened once the program of the Project was defined. Instead, the seconded staff and other representatives of participating agencies served on various committees, sometimes referred to as 'task forces'.

The task forces or committees were expected to "develop terms of reference, strategies and make recommendations for new procedures, approaches and programs in inter-agency handling of Family Disputes, Juveniles, Adult Diversion and Emergency Support Services Needs of Police." In general, these committees proved to be ineffective. Part of the explanation for
this lies in the fact that committee members, other than full-time Project staff, had no autonomy from parent agencies. As a result, they were reluctant to be critical of their own services (indicating loyalty to their parent organizations) and those of other agencies. Also, they were often unwilling to consider definitions other than their own of problems they were attempting to solve. Therefore, inter-agency co-operation at the committee level was lacking and little was accomplished to satisfy the research objectives of the Project. In the next section we will examine the overall objectives of the Project and the attempts to develop inter-agency co-operation at the Management Co-ordinating Committee level.

III. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Police and Community Services Project shifted as conditions within and surrounding the Project changed. It is not unusual, however, for organizations to redefine objectives if they are seen to be unattainable or inappropriate. Parkinson comments:

'Objectives' are often elusive statements. They seldom appear to be simply guides for organizational activity, but are often a way for an organization to clarify where it is, and what it is doing. Since organizations typically respond to external and internal pressures and make 'progress' by capitalizing on accidents or opportunity, 'objectives' take on many interpretations, or get restated. This was the case with the Police and Community Services Project.

The initial objectives were broad, loose statements of directions the Project should take. There was some emphasis on the co-ordination of police and social services.
(1) to identify the social characteristics and conditions prevalent in the community;

(2) to identify existing police and social resources available to assist in reduction of problems;

(3) to develop a service delivery model designed to improve co-ordination and co-operation in preventing crime and delinquency;

(4) to develop a research methodology to assess and evaluate potential changes in organization, delivery or line operations;

(5) to develop performance criteria and standards for police and social services;

(6) to examine innovative social, justice, and policing concepts and where feasible assist in testing and measurement of effectiveness;

(7) to examine existing and alternative police resource strategies, team or community policing concepts which will assist in the development of one or more models of policing through an examination of the functions of the police and the resources required to provide alternative models.

The above objectives were developed when there was expectation of strong commitment from agencies that had agreed to participate in the Project. They also reflect a belief that the Project would have a strong research orientation (e.g., analysis of service systems, use of manpower, community attitudes, crime and social problem trends, alternates to the criminal justice system, and so on) and would operate in a smaller area than Police District No. 3, thus making research easier. As noted in Section II, the lack of strong agency commitment to a research program meant that these objectives, above, could not be pursued in full.

The Management Co-ordinating Committee, working from the above broad objectives, then set out to develop goals that
would satisfy, in a more specific manner, the participating agencies. The hope was that if the agencies submitted statements of goals they were interested in reaching, then a consensus might develop and greater involvement in the Project would be encouraged. Approximately fifty goal statements were submitted. They reflected, "a number of different expectations and perceptions of the Project." Some called for the integration of police and social services, while others saw the Project examining deployment of personnel or assessing police training methods. There was also an expression of a desire to develop, "community participation and local area control in establishing priorities and alternate patterns of delivering services both for social services and for policing." Out of this collection of desired goals, the M.C.C. appeared to reach a consensus on five objectives:

To bring together citizens, police and community services in:

(i) developing a comprehensive range of community alternatives to meet individual, family or community problems and facilitating a co-ordinated response to these problems;

(ii) developing methods to resolve disputes between offenders and victims on an informal basis whenever conciliation or mediation is possible;

(iii) promoting the development of diversionary programs through the co-operation and co-ordination of all the agencies and the community to divert persons from the criminal justice process into community-based programs;

(iv) substantially reducing the delinquency, domestic conflict and the incidence of crime in the community;
(v) developing patterns of community participation and local area responsibility for assisting in establishing priorities and alternate patterns in delivering both community and police services.

It is interesting to note that even though the Project was police-initiated, the objectives emphasized the roles of social (community) agencies and the community-at-large in the Project. However, the objectives were still broad and somewhat vague. "It became clear to some people that this broad proposal [the objectives] could not be initiated without substantial resource availability, the availability of active staff persons, and a lengthy period of education, involvement and discussion."

As the Project was to last only two years (April 1, 1975 to March 31, 1977 under the terms of the contract with the Justice Development Fund), and no substantial progress was being made by February 1975, in either defining firm objectives or programs, the Vancouver Police Department decided to develop a proposal for a 'team policing program' within the Project. The proposal put forward a plan for reorganization of the police in District No. 3 into six neighbourhood area teams with 24 hour responsibility for all policing services. This was in contrast to the system in use which deployed policemen throughout the entire district on eight hour shifts.

The selected areas closely corresponded to those in which teams of Community Resources Board social workers operated. It was believed that by reorganizing the police component in this fashion the meeting of the Project's objectives might be facilitated. The team policing proposal is discussed in greater
detail in Section VI.

By April 1975, with the acceptance of the team policing proposal, the Project turned toward being a "police project" and the earlier, five broad objectives became two more specific objectives:

(1) to supply a better form of delivering police services to a community. The criteria are lowered criminal occurrences, improved police-community relations, increased community satisfaction, increased [police] member job satisfaction, and elimination of "elitist" type assignments.

(2) to ensure a structured liaison between police and other social agencies. This would involve a recognition on the part of [police] members of the need for such services when they encounter situations where the need is demonstrated. The criteria would be greater community resolution of problems by utilization of referral services, information exchanges and active co-operation efforts between police and other social agencies to alleviate community problems.

Thus, the earlier objectives were pared down to two: team policing and a modified form of inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination. However, the sole objective of developing a team policing system eventually came to constitute the Project. As for the individual police teams in the district, they were left with responsibility for operationalizing these objectives. The teams had to establish liaison with other agencies and develop referral systems and programs. Parkinson remarks that, "while this began to occur in practice, the teams themselves were never assisted in setting objectives, they were not informed of the change in expectations [i.e., they were to
operationalize objectives], and they were not given assistance by the Project in either of these areas. What Team Policing meant remained ambiguous and the expectations of agency involvement were unclear.\textsuperscript{21} Lack of Project assistance was, in part, due to the fact that the team policing proposal implementation was under the control of the Assistant Director, a police sergeant, and there was a lack of communication between the police component and the Project's civilian staff.

The reasons for the shift in the Project's objectives to "team policing" appear to lie in the structure of the Project, the difficulties in gaining firm commitments from social service and justice system agencies, and the lack of a clear notion of what the Project was to do. Hence, there was a willingness to settle for something concrete. In this section the confusion over objectives has been described, but the confusion is only symptomatic of deeper problems within the Project, and pressures external to the Project. We turn now to a discussion of the internal difficulties.

IV. PROBLEMS WITHIN THE PROJECT

A major difficulty of the Project appears to have been in identifying a role for the Management Co-ordinating Committee. This also had the effect of leaving the relationship of the \textit{M.C.C.} to the Project staff unclear. Parkinson's analysis of the minutes of the \textit{M.C.C.} meetings indicates that the Committee was uncertain as to whether or not it was responsible for administering the Project, developing policy, or acting as a
pressure group above the Project. One senior Project staff member commented on the situation as follows:

The Management Co-ordinating Committee never got it together. They thought they were something like a board of directors. They didn't trust one another right from the beginning. You see, the staff was initially envisaged as a research team and the M.C.C. expected to direct the staff to do certain things, but that didn't happen.

However, the M.C.C. did start out with a definition of its role and a list of specific functions:

The Management Co-ordinating Committee determines the Project parameters, objectives and study implementation procedures and priorities in consultation with the particular agencies and departments represented on the Management Co-ordinating Committee, the British Columbia Police Commission and the Project Director and Project Staff. It is not intended that the Management Co-ordinating Committee will assume responsibility for line operations in the Project district of either the Police Department, Community Corrections or the Department of Human Resources.

The functions of the M.C.C. included the hiring of and responsibility for the Project Director, the approval of job descriptions for Project staff, approval of major undertakings (proposals, reports, programs), and approval of recommendations to agencies and departments co-operating in the Project. The potential for control over the Project's activities was, therefore, considerable. However, the M.C.C.'s position was weakened by a number of incidents:

Because of a personality clash which led the Director to offer his resignation after the first three weeks, the Director became very cautious of the Committee,
frequently suspicious of their intentions, and subsequently he used them primarily as the receivers of information.

Another incident had to do with the formal budget arrangements of the Project. It will be recalled that the contract for funds was between the Justice Development Fund and the Project Director and Assistant Director. The fact that the Director and Assistant Director were signators (a demand of the JDF) meant, in effect, that they were responsible for administering the budget and, consequently, the M.C.C. was denied control over the budget. "Some members [of the M.C.C.] felt their role became redundant at this point and that the Director used the contract to isolate them from a management function."

Yet another incident was the development of the 'team policing proposal' by the Project's Assistant Director. When it was completed, the proposal was first sent to the Executive of the Police Department and the Vancouver Police Board for approval before it was presented to the M.C.C. Due to this procedure, the non-police members of the M.C.C. came to look upon the proposal as a 'police document' rather than as a 'Project document'. The M.C.C. did not object to the content of the proposal because it offered a concrete program which the Project could undertake, and one which set out objectives complementary to the Project's broad objectives. So, despite concern over the manner in which it was developed, the plan for a Team Policing Program was accepted. By so doing, the M.C.C. provided the opportunity for the police to determine the
direction of the Project from that time on.

The apparent inability of the M.C.C. to take control of the Project was also exemplified by the manner in which the Director and the staff manipulated meetings of the Committee.

Many important issues were raised by some members of the committee but typically there was never any resolution. Either the issue was not acted upon by the staff or the Committee was not able to resolve it, and it was not re-introduced. Staff approached Committee meetings as something to 'get through', and frequently tried to manage the discussion so that little happened. The Director had a controlling position on this Committee since he prepared the agenda and took the minutes.

The weakness of the M.C.C. may have been due to a number of reasons. First, the agency representatives were not free from the priorities and problems of their own organizations. This appears to have prompted the feeling of some members that sitting on the M.C.C. simply amounted to a "display of commitment."

This had the effect of reducing exchange of important information on agencies' policies and practices which would have proven invaluable in planning for inter-agency service co-ordination. This stands in contrast to the interest exhibited by agencies prior to the Project when there was a definite search for areas of interdependence and forms of service co-ordination.

A second impediment to full commitment was misunderstanding over the nature and objectives of the Project. If it is considered that each agency brings its own world view into a new co-operative activity, then the likelihood is that there will be various interpretations of objectives. A clear example of this was the development of fifty suggestions for Project goals
(described in Section III) by participating agencies.

Commitment may also have been weakened because of the obviously strong role of the police. They had initiated the Project and seconded a sergeant to the position of Assistant Director, whereas the Director was a civilian, social planner (formerly with the City of North Vancouver) hired by the M.C.C. for the term of the Project. Also, the police eventually set the direction of the Project by way of the team policing proposal. It will be recalled that the original proposal for the Project was developed by the police in co-operation with the Social Planning Department of Vancouver. Also, the soliciting of agency participation was conducted by the police. It is understandable then that at the outset the agencies looked upon the Project as a "police project". This may account for the fact that a police officer was elected Chairman of the M.C.C. and that agency members declined nomination. The fact that a police Superintendent was Chairman was raised as an issue by some agency members:

The Superintendent was a logical choice, but while everyone respected his abilities, there was a shared feeling that the Project may have taken a different shape if one of the agency representatives had taken the position. It was felt especially that this would have promoted the active participation of all other agencies. Interestingly, the Chairman himself agreed with this view but a change of Chairman was not accomplished.

However, a change in Chairman, management structure, or staff (e.g., the Assistant Director) might not have increased commitment and co-operation if it is considered that the social
agencies were preoccupied with changes occurring within their own organizations (for details see Section V) and they appeared to be unwilling to take advantage of opportunities to play a strong role in the Project by seconding full-time staff and by chairing the M.C.C.

The strong commitment of the police also fed the belief that the Assistant Director was in control of the Project and not the freelance, civilian director. There may have been some basis for this belief in that the Assistant Director was seconded to the Project two months before the Director was hired. Moreover, the Assistant Director, who was not a responsibility of the M.C.C. as was the Director, was a co-signer of the contract with the Justice Development Fund. Therefore, he seemed to be, at least, on an equal footing with the Director. It was also believed that the Assistant Director was closely allied with the Superintendent, Chairman of the M.C.C. My observations over a period of two years, 1976 to 1978, lead me to conclude that it was a subordinate-superior professional relationship. As such, however, it may have been advantageous to the Assistant Director if it is considered that the Director was a civilian without allegiances to any agency.

A final indication of the strength of the Assistant Director's role was that he prepared the team policing proposal which determined a new direction for the Project. He also played a major part in putting the team system into operation, whereas the Director had limited involvement with the police component until late in the Project. This may also have been due to the fact that the Director was a civilian.
In summary, if it considered that the M.C.C. was chaired by a police officer, the Assistant Director was a police sergeant and appeared to exercise a great deal of control over the activities of the Project, and the Project came to act on a team policing proposal prepared and approved by the police before being submitted to the Project, then it is difficult to quarrel with the perception that the Project was a "police project". This perception alone might have lessened the commitment of agencies to the Project, but there were external, political factors which were also influential.

V. THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL CHANGE

When the Project was initiated social service and justice system agencies were undergoing organizational changes. For example, the Human Resources Department, during the first phase of the Project, was completing decentralization of services and grappling with the problem of setting up representative Community Resources Boards. In 1975, many area Resources Boards lacked managers, and so there was no one to designate staff to assist in the Project. Mental Health teams were also being established and the B.C. Corrections Branch (provincial probation and parole) had split its Community Services Division into two sections -- Adult Probation and Juvenile Probation -- and these sections were decentralizing within the Project area.

The decentralization of provincial agencies was the result of a policy of the New Democratic Party (NDP) government to establish delivery of social services at the neighbourhood level.
and, in the case of the Community Resources Boards, to promote community participation in the setting of social policy. The fact that the CRBs were attempting to cope with a new organizational setting and were enmeshed in a 'political' role, that is, attempting to satisfy the government's community participation policy and the expectations it had created in the community, makes it understandable that a major concern of the CRBs was with putting their own house in order.

When the Social Credit Party was elected in December 1975, the agencies, especially the Resources Boards, faced a new set of circumstances. The elected Community Resources Boards were disbanded in February 1976, and the managers of most Resources Boards were changed. Moreover, there was concern over budget cuts which were expected to result in staff reductions. In all, there was a high degree of uncertainty within all agencies, and within the Project itself. It was not certain that the Project would obtain the funds necessary to cover expenses for the April 1, 1976 to March 31, 1977 period. In the end the Project's budget was revised and it curtailed its planned public information program. This was consistent with what was happening to the public and internal information programs of most agencies involved in the Project.32

It is also interesting to note that the police were anxious about the effects of the change in government. My interviews with police members toward the end of the Project indicated that they perceived a change in attitude among Project participants after the government changed in 1975. Prior to this, the feeling of the police was that the NDP government was supportive of
police initiatives to promote better police-community relations and to improve service. The feeling also existed that the NDP Ministers were approachable and would listen to police representatives. Moreover, the legislative steps taken by the NDP (the B.C. Police Act, 1974; the Administration of Justice Act, 1974; and the establishment of the B.C. Police Commission and the B.C. Police College) were considered by my respondents to be long overdue, positive actions. One senior police officer expressed his concerns as follows:

Policeman: The NDP was starting into an entirely new situation, with lots of flurry and commotion, and because of this - indicating a lack of organizational skill - they were doomed to failure. I don't disagree with their basic philosophy, but their methods. In this sense the Socreds [Social Credit] are more responsible - conscious of budget and cost effectiveness. The problem is that it is difficult to [gain] access [to] them!

Interviewer: How does this affect the police?

Policeman: It will affect the resources at our disposal. For example, although we have less crime on a statistical basis, does this mean that we should sacrifice resources just because we seem to be more effective, or are our resources going to keep on improving? If we reduce available resources, where is the preventive action? [Team policing is a preventive action program.] . . . There has been a pulling back due to difficulties in gaining access [to the government] - to knowing what is really going on. I sense within our own department that we are drawing back. It's more satisfying when there is hope of achievement.

The feeling that achievement of goals was less likely because of the uncertainty created by the change of government and likely policy changes of the new government may have influenced the commitment of both the agencies and the police. It can be suggested that the police commitment to the Project per se
lessened as VPD began to concentrate more on the development of team policing and less on the development of inter-agency cooperation. It is important, then, to turn to an examination of the team policing proposal and program in the next section.

VI. TEAM POLICING

Frustration over the Project's slow rate of progress in defining its objectives and program fostered the development of a team policing proposal. The proposal was prepared by the Assistant Director of the Project in his role as a policeman and under the direction of the Superintendent of VPD's Patrol Division (the Chairman of the M.C.C.). The proposal, first presented in April 1975 and later revised, was entitled: Proposed Team Policing Concept: Vancouver Police Department. It provided a rationale for development of a team policing experiment within the Project:

The Police and Community Services Project is charged with creating a system of delivering police and other social services to the community in the most efficient manner possible. The present policing system is not a satisfactory vehicle to deliver the desired service. It lacks direction and flexibility to establish an effective liaison with other social agencies.

Parkinson suggests another reason for proposing a team policing experiment:

In addition, it is relevant that the [police] Department had just been granted a very large increase in manpower and was committed to using that strength to do something different. The Chief Constable said, "At the time an increase was granted by Council they made it perfectly clear to me that this increase was not granted on the basis of 'more of the same'."
The proposal described what was meant by 'team policing', its objectives, and how it was to be implemented. Team policing was defined as, "the assignment of a team of police members under a team leader to a specific geographic area for which the team bears 24 hour responsibility for all crime and related problems. It is inherent in the team concept that as many police functions as possible be decentralized to the team area." The use of the word 'team' was not meant to imply that an entire group of policemen would work together at the same time and in the same area. However, the term 'team policing' was originally used to describe such an approach.

The term Team Policing originated in Aberdeen, Scotland to describe a new program begun in response to the low morale of single officers patrolling quiet streets. With the creation of teams of five to ten men, the monotony and isolation of the patrolman was relieved.

Another type of program, also developed in Great Britain, involved assigning a group of patrolmen to a specific area. It was called the Unit Beat System and it made it possible for policemen, "to share information about the area and, thus, so it is argued, make better use of their limited resources." The policemen in this system did not work as a 'team' in the sense of all being on patrol at the same time. It was this Unit Beat System that provided the model for team policing systems developed in North America. The name was provided by Aberdeen.
The first well known team policing system was developed in Syracuse, New York, in 1968. However, in other cities the terms 'community policing' or 'neighbourhood team policing' were sometimes used. Whatever the name, North American team policing systems exhibited some common characteristics which were considered in the design of a system for Vancouver:

1. Geographic stability of patrol, i.e. relatively permanent assignment of personnel to a neighbourhood.
2. Maximum interaction among Team members.
3. Maximum communication among Team members and the community.
4. Unity of supervision. [All team members supervised by one person, the team leader.]
5. Lower-level flexibility in policy-making, i.e. the Team is able to carry out its own operational decisions.
6. Unified delivery of services, i.e. the Team has control over the delivery of all police services in the neighbourhood.
7. Combined investigative and patrol functions.
8. Formal Team conferences.
10. Community participation in police work.
11. Systematic referral to social agencies.

The VPD team policing proposal pointed out that no one system had combined all of these features and that very few had embodied (11), systematic referral to social agencies, or (6), unified delivery of services. "If we are successful in
the goals of our [team policing] Project, the final product will be unique throughout North America."^41 Whether or not it would be unique, these two characteristics, unified delivery of services and systematic referral to social agencies, were in line with the objectives of the Police and Community Services Project and could justify the Project's acceptance of the proposal.

The Team Policing Program began on January 1, 1976, as a component of the Project in Vancouver South. The District's manpower complement of 157 members was divided into six teams ranging in size from 19 to 30 police members. The teams were assigned to neighbourhood areas (see Map No. 2) which closely corresponded to areas served by teams of Community Resources Board social workers. Each team of constables was supervised by a sergeant, the team leader, who was assisted by a corporal, the assistant team leader. Later, a second corporal was added to ensure 24 hour supervision over three, eight hour shifts. The team leader was responsible to the District's operations officer, a staff sergeant, and the Inspector in charge of District No. 3.

In addition to the police members, two Adult Probation officers, two Family and Juvenile Probation officers, two Community Mental Health workers, and two Community Resources Board social workers were assigned to each team as liaison representatives. It should be noted in passing that Project documents described all of the above agency and police personnel as members of one team. In fact, this was not the case.
During the Project, the police team members and the agency liaison members met for team meetings every six weeks. At these meetings they were expected to discuss current policing and social problems in their area and develop approaches to solving them. However, a number of difficulties were encountered which limited full communication between agency and police personnel.

When the system was first instituted social workers began to express concern over being considered part of a 'police team'. They felt that the police were confused about the roles of social service workers participating in the experiment. The confusion was, in part, due to lack of guidance from the Project which, as noted in Section III, had left it up to the individual teams to work out police-agency relationships. Parkinson recorded the following comments of agency workers:

R: . . . one of the things that got us off on the wrong foot right away was the police's assumption that the Team included all social agencies.

... We're a V.R.B. [Vancouver Resources Board] Team and they're the police Team, and we'll co-operate with them but we're not the same Team. I think that's where the role confusion comes in.

A second person said:

R: I feel part of a community services team, along with the V.R.B. and police, but not part of the police team. I think that if my clientele saw it as a police service team I don't know how that would affect them.

Initially, however, the Project seemed to promote the notion that police and social agency personnel were part of
the same team. In fact, at first, team training meetings included the social agency people. But the meetings became more and more concerned with police problems and, thus, came to be police dominated. This may have been due to the fact that the police usually set the agenda and had clearly defined crime problems to discuss. There were attempts to develop liaison committees to prepare agendas so that meetings dealt with concerns of both the police and the agencies, but the committees were short-lived. Finally, the Team Meetings became Police Team Meetings with agency personnel invited to attend as resource persons when required.

Toward the end of the Project, however, a consensus emerged among police and agency personnel as to how they could work together at the line level.

This consensus centres on the following: (1) the primary function of the police is traditional police work; (2) in doing that work, each police team should employ management by objective and participatory management styles; (3) the police teams must understand the role of the agencies and have open lines of communication with them; (4) wherever possible the police should refer problems to the agencies and involve them in seeking solutions to ongoing problems; (5) wherever appropriate, the agencies should keep the police informed of community problems and include them in resolutions of those problems whenever possible.

This consensus provided a far more definite, if less ambitious, set of objectives and operating principles than those developed by the Project. It provided a clarification of the roles of agencies and the police, and respected the functional autonomy of all participants. When the Project ended on March 31, 1977, this reversion to informal co-operation remained in
effect. It continued to be facilitated by the police department's implementation of a team policing system throughout Vancouver in 1977-78. One senior policeman summed up the police point of view in an interview with this writer at the end of the Project:

The relationships with the agencies -- they're developing now at the line level [team level] and we're working our problems out. I don't think we're ever going to be sharing the same bed, but at the same time we're getting the resources of the community together and we're going to be able to, maybe not work in the total team concept that we originally envisaged because it just doesn't seem to work that well. But I think that we're going to be able to know what to expect of each other -- the limitations.  

Within the Project, however, the consequences of the development of the team policing system with little Project guidance and involvement left the Director in an awkward position. "Being a civilian he was entirely outside of the authority structure of the police component and his mandate was unclear. His contribution had to take the form of offering advice, bringing people together, and keeping management informed." This meant that the police component and, thus, team policing were isolated from the Project. Evidence of this is that, except for a brief period in June 1976, Project staff did not meet with the team policing component of the Project.

"With the exception of the Director, Project staff were frequently not aware of what was happening with the police experiment, and did not have an effective channel to communicate their activities to the police leaders." Therefore, the success the teams had in developing a consensus and a working
arrangement was, virtually, theirs alone. Moreover, success in developing and implementing a team policing system was due, primarily, to police efforts.

VII. THE LEGACY OF THE PROJECT

The Police and Community Services Project ended on March 31, 1977. We are left, therefore, to consider what the Project produced. First, it should be evident that the Project was not successful in establishing formal inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination of services. However, it did bring together police constables and social agency workers at the line (team) level. This contact and the discussions which ensued led to development of a consensus on how agencies and the police can work together in an informal manner and respect each other's roles. To the best of my knowledge, the police and social agencies continue to interact in the manner prescribed by the consensus. While the informal interaction is similar to that which occurred prior to the Project, it is now based on greater awareness of police and agency roles. This increase in awareness among police and agency workers may, then, be considered as a legacy of the Project.

A second consideration is that the Project provided an opportunity for significant organizational change (team policing) in the Vancouver Police Department. However, although it might be suggested that a team policing system was a legacy of the Project, the evidence presented in this chapter indicates that team policing was a police-controlled development with little
concrete assistance from the Project. Indeed, some members of the Management Co-ordinating Committee concluded that the Project was not essential for development and implementation of team policing.47

When the Police and Community Services Project was developed, it was expected to provide another legacy in the form of an elaborate evaluation of the programs it undertook. However, the studies outlined at the beginning of the Project were, for the most part, not undertaken. Instead, two minor research papers on crime trends and community attitudes toward the police were hastily put together in the last few months of the Project. Both studies suffered from lack of an adequate research design and limited data. This was not the fault of the author of the studies as the data were collected before he was hired. It appears that the major reason for production of the studies was pressure from the B.C. Police Commission. The Commission threatened to withdraw its support for the Project if the studies were not undertaken.48 Apparently the Commission was concerned that nothing at all would come of the Project.

A lengthy evaluation of the Project was produced by the Project's senior research officer, Dr. Parkinson. This document which was highly critical of the Project's attempts to develop inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination has been referred to extensively in this chapter. It is the only available record of the Project's activities aside from my own notes and recollections of the Project when I provided public information services to it for a short period in 1976.
Parkinson's title for his evaluation is *Figuring It Out*, and this reflects his opinion that most of the Project's energies were expended in trying to figure out how to implement change in existing relationships among agencies and the police. Although 'figuring it out' was a necessary first step, the Project did not get far beyond that first step. Thus, when the Project ended in March 1977, no significant, concrete results could be directly credited to it. However, the significance of attempting to figure it out should not be overlooked. At least senior police and agency officials became aware of the need to clarify inter-agency needs and to promote open discussion of those needs. And if the Project had continued for a longer period of time, it is possible that some form of formal inter-agency co-operation could have developed. In this regard it is instructive to note that the line teams of policemen and social agency workers did figure out how they could best co-operate, at least informally. The result suggests that close and persistent contact such as that at the working (line) level produces the intensity of communication required to figure it out.

Although not a direct result of the Project, it must be noted that the Vancouver Police Department produced an evaluation of the Team Policing Component of the Project in 1976. It was prepared by Inspector E. Lister, the officer in charge of District No. 3. Lister produced a detailed technical evaluation which contained a comprehensive set of recommendations on how to implement team policing in the three other Vancouver police
districts, with no additional manpower and at relatively low cost. VPD acted on the recommendations and the department was officially committed to a team policing system in 1977. The system was implemented throughout the City of Vancouver in 1978. Clearly, however, the information contained in this chapter shows that the Vancouver team policing system was a result of police initiatives and not a result of the Project. Indeed, it can be suggested that confusion and uncertainty within the Project left the Vancouver Police Department with no alternative but to set its own directions and respond to its own concerns. Even if the Project had continued and had been successful in developing formal inter-agency co-operation, it seems likely that the team policing system would have taken the same form. It can be suggested that the traditional authority structure of the police department and the traditional role of the policeman which often requires secrecy, would limit the degree to which social workers and policemen could be constant co-workers, that is, part of the same team. However, it is likely that communication on social problems related to crime would have been increased and perhaps formalized.
FOOTNOTES CHAPTER THREE

1 The first well known program was developed in Syracuse, New York, in 1968. Other noteworthy programs were later developed in Los Angeles, Dayton (Ohio), New York City and Rochester (New York).


2 Parkinson, p. 31.

3 Diversion is a term used to describe programs or actions of the police or other justice system agencies which divert offenders out of the criminal justice system. It also describes the use of sanctions other than imprisonment. In sum, it implies restraint in the use of the criminal law. For a full definition and discussion of diversion see:


4 The Social Planning Department was an agency in search of a role because the provincial government had taken over its line services with the establishment of the CRBs. It wanted a role as 'expert adviser' and the Police Department, as a city agency, was an obvious client. The development of the proposal, then, may be looked upon as a client-adviser relationship. However, the Social Planning Department did bring a strong social service orientation to the proposal.

5 Parkinson, pp. 33 - 34.

6 Ibid., pp. 126 - 127.

7 Ibid., p. 54. Parkinson notes on p. 72 that the signing arrangement was required by the Justice Development Fund as a matter of administrative convenience. The budget was $58,819 for August 1, 1975 to March 31, 1976 and $119,919 for the period April 1, 1976 to March 31, 1977. Furniture and office space were provided by the Public Works Department of the provincial government.

8 Ibid., pp. 54 - 55.
The Police and Community Services Project, "Progress Report No. 1" (Vancouver, December 1975), p. i.

Parkinson, p. 64.


See Parkinson, p. 78.

Ibid., p. 56.

Ibid., pp. 56 and 58.

Ibid., p. 61.

Ibid., p. 60.


Parkinson, pp. 61 - 62.

Ibid., p. 62.

With agency co-operation, the teams did develop a pocket size guide indicating which agency was best equipped and trained to deal with specific problem situations.

Parkinson, pp. 63 - 64.

Confidential interview, civilian staff member of Project, March 1977.

Parkinson, p. 70.

Ibid., p. 71.

Ibid., p. 72.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 73.

Ibid., p. 88.

Ibid., p. 69.

Ibid., p. 65.

By the fall of 1976, even the inter-agency activity at the operations level of the Project was focussed on the needs of the police. For details see: Parkinson, p. 86.
This information was obtained during consultations with information officers in justice system and social service agencies. They were concerned about losing their jobs. In some cases their fears were well founded. For example, the entire information-publications section of the Justice Development Commission was eliminated in 1976.

Confidential interview, police officer, April 1977.


Parkinson, pp. 127 - 128. In 1975, Vancouver City Council authorized the hiring of 120 new members for 1976. Sixty-five of these were assigned to District No. 3. The total complement for the city was then 955 members.

Crich et al., p. 3.

Parkinson, p. 122.

Ibid., p. 123.

Ibid.

Ibid. Also see Crich et al., p. 13.

Crich et al., p. 13.

Parkinson, p. 132.

Ibid., p. 136.

Confidential interview, police sergeant, March 1977.

Parkinson, p. 66.

Ibid., pp. 66 - 67.

Ibid., p. 114.

The Minutes of the M.C.C. for March 19, 1976, show that the B.C. Police Commission took the position that evaluation was the whole reason for the Project and it would not support the Project for a further year if it did not hire a researcher to complete reports on crime trends and attitudes of citizens toward the police. Moreover, the Commission wanted a document that would provide a team policing model it could recommend to other police forces in the Province.

CHAPTER FOUR
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that sustained, formal co-operation among public agencies requires the likelihood of benefits to each participant. To do so we have examined the Police and Community Services Project which was to develop and formalize inter-agency co-operation and service co-ordination in prevention of crime and related social problems. The first task in this chapter is to determine if likelihood of benefit existed for the Project's participants -- the police, parole, probation, and social service agencies. The benefits considered here are increased operational efficiency, new responsibilities and resources, the gain of community and/or political support, and opportunity to satisfy an ideological commitment. The second task will be to determine if likelihood of benefit was influential in the Project's attempt to establish formal co-operation. However, because the Project failed to sustain formal co-operation, it will be necessary to determine if the absence or lessening of likelihood of benefit to the participants contributed to the failure.

To determine if likelihood of benefit to participants existed we may ask if the Project was, in fact, necessary to
the various parties involved in it and, if so, for achieving what objectives? This question was not dealt with by the Project or its initiators. However, I believe that it is a fundamental question which must be addressed here.

II. WAS A PROJECT NECESSARY?

The police had definite ideas about what they wanted out of the Project. Other agencies were far less certain. The police believed that they could not provide an adequate crime prevention program, as well as continuing with the task of controlling crime and delinquency, without the assistance of social agencies and the support of the community-at-large. What they desired from the Project was fourfold.

First, they wanted reliable and consistent means to divert juvenile offenders, family disputes and minor crime problems (misdemeanours) to social agencies. The police felt that they were not trained to deal adequately with such problems and that invoking the criminal justice process provided no long-term solutions in such cases. Moreover, because the police felt ill at ease in social conflict situations, the likelihood existed that they would be criticized for mishandling such situations. This leads us to the second desire of the police — to improve the image of the police in the community.

Anti-police demonstrations in the 1960s prompted concerns over the image of the police in the community as a repressive force. It was felt that if the police department was identified as an agency which co-operates with other social agencies
and community organizations, its image would be enhanced. The Project was seen as a means of doing so. The Chief Constable of the Vancouver Police Department verified this on May 13, 1975, when he stated the Department's belief that co-operative projects were effective in achieving:

- improved police attitudes toward the community and community attitudes towards the police;
- the opening and maintaining of flexible and responsive channels of communication between all segments of the public and all policemen.

The third desire was for accountability of agencies for their actions or lack of action. This relates to the first desire, above, for reliable diversion systems. It was prompted by the belief of the police that social agencies cannot provide the services they say they do. The following comment from a senior policeman is typical:

It's not just a lack of trust. It's a lack of belief that they [social service and justice system agencies] are capable of doing the job they claim they can do. ... If they're so inclined, they can lose a case and shrug their shoulders and walk away. We can't afford to do that.

Therefore, it appeared to the police that making the agencies accountable for their activities in a formal, co-operative endeavour, like the Project, might make social services more responsive to police needs.

The fourth need of the police was to determine what to do with 120 new members. Faced with City Council's demand for innovative use of the new members, the police saw a project as
an excellent opportunity to devise a program to accommodate the demand. However, the Department was not certain, initially, as to what kind of program should be developed.

In contrast, there was no definite expression of need on the part of social service agencies to formalize co-operation with the police. Co-operation in the Project was seen more as a way of increasing contact with the police and learning more about the role of the police. However, one Resources Board Co-ordinator, "claimed that he had been asked to participate [in the Project] by the police and that determined his orientation."\(^4\)

In some cases, social workers involved in the Project at the team level (and this was also apparent at the M.C.C. level) saw the Project as a way to humanize and liberalize the police force.

For example, some thought that the police would begin to treat people in a different way, and that they would begin to break down the military-like authority structure. Some social workers thought that they could contribute to the reform of the police force.\(^5\)

Justice system agencies, however, felt the need to work more closely with the police to improve efficiency because, "their clients are 'created' by the police, and the police can provide important information on the 'adjustment' of their clients."\(^6\)

It may be drawn from the above discussion that the police and social agencies (excluding the correction agencies, i.e., probation and parole) were interested in reforming each other.
But this does not appear to have been a well defined or pressing need. However, it does indicate that everyone (and here the correction agencies can be included) shared in the belief that the existing systems of police service and social service delivery were inadequate and there was a need to do something about them. "The initial assumption appeared to be that if all the agency people were brought together [with the police], something would happen." There was, then, a likelihood of benefit, but exactly what kind of benefit was unknown, at least to the social service agencies. But the possible benefits to the police, noted above, were quite clear.

III. OBJECTIVES AND PERCEPTIONS

When the social agencies and the police agreed to co-operate in the Project, the Management Co-ordinating Committee attempted to focus attention on areas where co-operation might be beneficial or productive. However, because of the varying perceptions of members, the objective-setting exercise proved to be frustrating and unproductive. The sets of objectives developed before April 1975, were far too broad to act upon given the length of the Project and the resources available. At this point the police again took the initiative and focused attention on the development of team policing, a system that would complement changes which had been made in the service delivery systems of the social service and justice system agencies.

Again the likelihood of benefit was raised and agencies
committed personnel to work with the police at the line level (i.e., at the neighbourhood team level). However, it appears that the degree to which the police were perceived as being in control of the team policing experiment began to weaken the commitment of line level, agency personnel. Quite simply, these agency workers did not want to be identified as members of a 'police' team, that is, "negative benefits" were apparent to them.

Meanwhile, the Project was doing little to provide assistance to the teams of police and agency workers, and this reinforced perceptions of the team experiment being police-directed. Also, there was little of consequence occurring at the M.C.C. level that would indicate that the Project was continuing to function as an inter-agency project. In fact, as the Project started its final year, it was concerned with development of research materials to satisfy a demand of the B.C. Police Commission for information to pass on to other police departments.

Left on their own, the police and agency teams reached a consensus on how to work together 'whenever possible'. But in reverting to informal co-operation, the police and agency members made a commitment to improve knowledge of each other's roles and to respect each other's functional autonomy.

It was contended in Chapter One that the balance between goal diversity and goal consensus determines actual goal consensus. It appears that this balance was reached at the team or line level. Consensus was reached on broad areas such
as improving awareness of roles. Functional diversity and autonomy were to be respected and maintained.

IV. DISTRACTIONS

The influence of political change was discussed briefly in Chapter Three. On the basis of that discussion it is apparent that the social service and justice system agencies were distracted by changes within their own organizations made in order to accommodate new government policies. However, the police were, in practical terms, unaffected.

It can only be surmised that if the objectives of the Project had been clear and had also indicated the likelihood of benefit to them, the agencies might have committed themselves to the Project as a means of reducing the uncertainty they were experiencing. In other words, they could have used the Project, as the police did, to define roles and objectives which would accommodate new government policies. As the conservative Social Credit government was less sympathetic to the social agencies than to the police, it is suggested that the social agencies could have used the Project to develop (or to appear to develop) a more conservative approach to the operation of the social service system by stressing the economic benefits (i.e., efficiency) to be derived from inter-agency co-operation and service co-ordination.

The police do not appear to have been influenced by political change, although they worried about what the uncertainty created would mean in terms of increasing social
discontent. The comment of a police member of the Project typifies the police attitude toward political pressure, as well as pressure from senior agencies:

I don't think that the B.C. Police Commission or the provincial government is going to have any particular influence on the development of community and team policing, certainly not in the sense of the Vancouver Police Force at least.

The other 'distraction' which requires brief mention was the role of the Project Director and Project staff in impeding the Management Co-ordinating Committee. Through tailoring of meetings and controlling information, the M.C.C. may have been denied (but I think only in small measure) the tools and time to develop a meaningful consensus on objectives. It can be suggested that, confronted with the M.C.C.'s confusion over objectives, the staff unconsciously devised a strategy to do nothing more than 'get through' the Project. Also, as civilians outside the police authority structure and unaligned with the social agencies, they may have had difficulty in developing effective communication with both the police and the agencies. Whatever the reasons, the ineffectiveness of the civilian staff made it necessary for the Assistant Director, a policeman, to work out new objectives for the Project and to take control by way of directing the implementation of the team policing proposal.

V. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

The likelihood of benefit can take many forms. It has been
shown that the police and social service agencies perceived formal inter-agency co-operation, respectively, as essential and potentially interesting. These differences in perception were based on organizational priorities and professional perspectives. Yet these perceptions denote a belief in the likelihood of benefit, no matter how vague.

However, on the basis of these beliefs, the agencies and the police were unable to work out formal, co-operative arrangements. Therefore, the police, with the clearest notion of what they wished to achieve, took over the Project. The social agencies did not have a clear notion of what they wished to achieve. As agencies with diverse responsibilities and less defined authority and accountability structures than the police, they may have lacked strong goal consensus with regard to their own sphere of activity. The police, on the other hand, have a definite authority and accountability structure and a clearly defined responsibility for law enforcement and crime prevention. Therefore, when the police took over the Project, it became apparent to the social service agencies in particular that they stood little chance of gaining and a great chance of being used by the police in satisfaction of 'team policing' objectives. Thus, with the disappearance of likelihood of benefit, the attempt to formalize inter-agency co-operation collapsed.

It is not clear, however, that formal inter-agency co-operation would have developed if likelihood of benefit had remained or had been increased. In this instance we have no way of
assessing this because the Project failed. In fact, it is not clear that formality in inter-agency co-operation was required in this case because no one addressed the question of what the role of formal structure should be. In the Project they simply waited for some revelation.

On the other hand, informality in inter-agency relations does work, as demonstrated by the neighbourhood police and community service teams. But because these teams had little choice but to attempt to work out some co-operative working relationship, i.e., they were instructed to try to co-operate by a higher authority (the police and participating agencies designated personnel for each team), we are led to ask if the Project would have succeeded if formal co-operation had been enjoined by the provincial government? The question can only be offered here. Another Project with clear objectives imposed by senior levels of government might offer an answer. However, in the meantime, informal relations which were showing results before the Project started and are showing results now offer an effective approach to inter-agency co-operation.
FOOTNOTES CHAPTER FOUR

1The police believe that they are subject to scrutiny by the press, the government, and the public moreso than other agencies. A police sergeant commented that:

Day by day we're open to exposure in the press. Our failings are written up. For instance, what does a social worker have to produce in a year? Do they have, at the end of a year, an annual report saying what kind of decreases they've made in social work recipients . . . or how many families they've saved or how many they haven't? They don't have these kinds of problems.

Confidential interview, March 1977.

3Confidential interview, police sergeant, March 1977.
4Parkinson, p. 85.
5Ibid., pp. 198 - 199.
6Ibid., p. 218.
7Ibid., p. 195.
8See Downs, p. 224.
9Confidential interview, police sergeant, March 1977.
10This assessment is based on my conversations with the Assistant Director in 1976. He expressed deep concern over lack of action in the Project. At the time he also expressed the notion that policemen typically try to fill perceived vacuums, that is, they will take action on a problem if it appears that no one else is trying to come up with a solution.
MAP No. 1. VANCOUVER, B.C.
POLICE DISTRICTS AND
NEIGHBOURHOOD AREAS, 1975.

DISTRICT No. 1.

Burrard Inlet

DISTRICT No. 2.

DISTRICT No. 3.

DISTRICT No. 4.

STRAIT OF GEORGIA
Each Team had one sergeant and one corporal. Police constables (PCs) for each team were as follows:

TEAM 31: 17 PCs
TEAM 32: 19 PCs
TEAM 33: 19 PCs
TEAM 34: 28 PCs
TEAM 35: 28 PCs
TEAM 36: 22 PCs
DIAGRAM No. 1: Police and Community Services Project Structure.

1. Vancouver Police Department
2. Social Planning Department, City of Vancouver
3. Community Services Division, Provincial Corrections Branch
4. Juvenile & Family Branch, Provincial Corrections Branch
5. Justice Development Commission, Justice Councils
6. B.C. Police Commission
7. Greater Vancouver Mental Health Service (added in 1976)
8. Management areas of Vancouver Resources Board (second member added in September, 1976)
9. National Parole Service

* Liaison. Minimal contact with Project.
** A full-time secondment. // Means non-voting member.


British Columbia. Police Act. Chapter 64, 1974. [Consolidated for convenience only, August 1, 1975.]


Crich, J. et al. "Proposed Team Policing Concept: Vancouver Police Department." Vancouver Police Department, 4th Revision, July 31, 1975. (Mimeo.)


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