STABILITY AND CHANGE IN ELECTORAL PATTERNS:
THE CASE OF THE 1972 BRITISH COLUMBIA
PROVINCIAL ELECTION IN VANCOUVER

by

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ABSTRACT

Chairman: Professor Julian V. Minghi

This dissertation demonstrates how variables previously neglected in voting studies - the political culture of the political system, migration, models of political space, area integration, and the geography of campaigning - can increase our understanding of the stability and change of electoral patterns. The variables are examined in three local areas in Vancouver, Canada, for the 1972 British Columbia Provincial Election. Data were obtained from personal interviews of inhabitants of the three local areas, and by personal interviews of representatives of the competing political parties. The argument is presented that B.C. political culture is essentially class-based and this provides a background understanding to the development of particular political norms in the three areas studied. The 1972 election is seen in the context of B.C. political history as an election of reaction against the Social Credit Party. Areas of consistent voting habits (political norms) are identified in Vancouver and a model of political space describing these consistencies is presented. Migration data are used to show that individuals tend to move to areas whose political norm is the same as their own political preference. A variety of latent and manifest measures of functional integration are used to show differences in the level of integration.
in the three areas under study. Status and voting behaviour are found to be associated. Associations between latent integration measures are found at the aggregate and individual levels. Individuals with a high degree of attachment to their area of residence are shown to vote in relation to the 'area norm'. Differences in the spatial organisation of political party campaigns and differences in the degree of spatial competition of canvassing are shown to be associated with differences in electoral outcome. Polls for which parties competed strongly tended to vote disproportionately in relation to the area norm, although this varied with the degree of integration of the area concerned.
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CHAPTER 1

THE STUDY OF ELECTORAL PATTERNS

This chapter has four main aims. First, to introduce the thesis and place it in its context. Second, to briefly review the geographic literature dealing with electoral patterns. Third, to discuss the thesis in greater detail and outline the relevance of the specific questions being asked. Fourth, to describe how data was collected in order to answer the questions posed.

THE THESIS AND ITS CONTEXT

An electoral pattern, or the spatial outcome of an election, is the result of mapping election results at the lowest scale (often the polling district) for which published statistics are available. The electoral pattern is a product of highly complex factors, for it represents the aggregation of a multitude of individual decisions made for a number of reasons. The approach to the problem of an adequate explanation of the pattern is thus, of necessity, multidisciplinary. The main aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate how variables neglected in a contemporary view of electoral geography can enhance our understanding of the stability and change in electoral patterns.

Some political sociologists and political scientists have reduced this complexity by attempting to explain voting behaviour solely in terms of individual socio-economic characteristics, such as age, sex and social class (Lipset, 1960), without reference to the social and political environment within which the individuals are located. Such studies have tended to treat the voter as if he were cut off
from his surroundings, "suspended, as it were, above the political and social conditions of his community" (Ennis, 1962, 181). Such facts about the voter become abstractions if they are separated from their underlying spatial structure and dynamism. In particular, this approach ignores the role of individuals interacting in geographic space, their attachments to their local area, and the consequent impact on the electoral pattern. It also ignores the impact of the spatial migration of voters, and the spatial aspects of the campaigns of the competing parties.

However, this is not to diminish the part played by socio-economic characteristics in the explanation of electoral patterns. It will be demonstrated here that the development of the British Columbia political culture has been essentially class-based (Chapter II) and that objectively defined status (based on occupation) and subjectively defined class (the respondents perception of his class affiliation) are important socio-economic indices associated with voting behaviour, and provide a partial explanation (Chapter V).

In order to increase our understanding of the electoral pattern however, we need to examine the spatial patterning of individuals with like class and status affiliations. It will be argued here that spatial concentrations of individuals with similar class affiliations will tend to reinforce the association between class and voting behaviour - that is, a 'clustering effect' (see Foldare, 1968). Concentrations will lead to the development in an area of a 'political norm' (the norms are described in Chapter III) which will tend to provide a reference point for, and structure the voting behaviour of, individuals living in that area. (Chapter V).
Although the trend toward status homogeneity in an area will lead to an accelerated trend toward the homogeneity of voting behaviour, the most important consideration is the individual sense of territoriality. For the purposes of this study, territoriality is defined as the sense of attachment to geographical area (Cohen and Rosenthal, 1971, 31). Thus, the way in which individuals feel a 'sense of belonging' and interact with other individuals living within that area can be used as a measure of territoriality (Chapter IV). This is the process by which the political norms of an area develop and change. On the other hand, lack of attachment to the area of residence on the part of an individual, reduces the likelihood of him voting with the area norm, and also establishes him as a potential mover out of the area (McAllister, 1970). The migration of that individual to another area may have a long-term impact on the stability and change of the electoral pattern (Chapter III).

Another major process of reinforcing the political norms in an area is through the election campaign. It will be shown that internal variations in the electoral pattern of an area are generally associated with the spatial allocation of party resources. (Chapter VI).

GEOGRAPHIC STUDIES OF ELECTIONS

Geographers have examined electoral patterns in a number of ways (McPhail, 1971; Prescott, 1972), but, in general, there has been little in-depth analysis of their stability and change. Furthermore, in general, political variables have been ignored in geographic explanations of voting behaviour. These major shortcomings of previous geographic research on electoral patterns led to the present inquiry.
The regional approach to the study of electoral patterns, for example, is concerned essentially with the classification and description of political-geographical regions based on election returns at the national scale (Kollmorgon, 1936; Cresler, 1952; Smith and Hart, 1955), provincial scale (Dean, 1949; Burghardt, 1963; Burghardt, 1964), and at the urban scale (Lewis, 1965; Kasperson, 1965).

The 'environmental-political' approach to the study of electoral patterns attempted in part to examine the effect of 'natural influences' (Krobheil, 1916) or 'geographic factors' (Prescott, 1972) on voting behaviour. There is a general philosophic problem with this approach in that it tries to explain individual voting behaviour with reference to the natural environment.

The 'areal structural' approach, on the other hand (McPhail, 1971, 7), has attempted to match census and electoral boundaries in order to provide a sociological explanation of electoral patterns at one point in time (Simmons, 1967). Apart from the 'matching' problem, is the problem of the 'ecological fallacy' (Robinson, 1955) which infers individual behaviour from aggregated data. Thus, an individual survey approach is used in the present study.

The 'spatial approach' is in part a reaction against the 'areal structural' approach in that it considers the latter to be essentially 'aspatial' (Reynolds and Archer, 1969). This approach has therefore emphasised spatial interaction and 'acquaintance fields' as important additional explanatory variables in the study of electoral patterns (Cox, 1969). The problem with this approach, however, is that it concentrates on one election out of political context, and disregards
the potential importance of political variables in any explanation.

THE THESIS VARIABLES

The approach used in the present study has arisen out of the limitations of previous approaches. The election used as a case study is seen in the context of the history of British Columbia Politics. This is essential in an explanatory sense because the election is seen as part of an on-going political process and part of a political culture (Chapter II). Further, as a starting point to the study of the dynamics of electoral patterns, the migration of voters within Vancouver is examined into and out of 'zones of latent partisanship' (Chapter III). Individual attachment to area of residence is one further variable which has not previously been considered in geographic explanations of voting behaviour (Chapters IV and V). Finally, the spatial aspects of the campaign - the geography of campaigning - is considered as an additional important political variable in the explanation of any electoral pattern (Chapter VI).

The Political Culture.

The term 'political culture' has been defined as consisting of "commonly shared goals and commonly accepted rules of individual and group interaction in terms of which authoritative decision and choice will be made by all the 'actors' within a political system" (Kim, 1964, 331). The political culture of a political system will be reflected in the political party system. General shifts in the political culture of a political system - for example, the introduction of a new political party - may have important implications for the study of the stability and change of electoral patterns. A consider-
ation of the evolution of the party system in British Columbia from before the time of Confederation, leads us to an appreciation of the political culture of the Province as a background to the explanation of electoral patterns. It lends insight into the political norms and values of the sample areas chosen for study, as well as giving some insight into the general 'political mood' at the time of the 1972 election.

Migration.

The second major explanatory component presented in this dissertation is migration between areas of latent political partisanship within the city of Vancouver. The first requirement in this regard is to identify the electoral pattern over a number of elections. This is done by identifying areas of consistent support for each of the competing parties for the last four Provincial elections in Vancouver - 1963, 1966, 1969 and 1972 - and presenting a descriptive model of political space. The 1963 election is used as a cut-off because this was the first time that the New Democratic Party had contested an election in British Columbia. Areas of consistent support can be regarded as zones of "latent partisanship" (Eulau et al, 1966, 210). Migration from one zone to another can serve to change or reinforce the electoral pattern dependent on the stability of individual political preference.

There are three main possibilities which require consideration in this regard. First, individuals may change their voting behaviour as a result of moving into a different voting zone - the 'conversion theory' (Campbell et al, 1960, 455). Cox has proposed a conceptual model of processes linking change in residential location to political be-
haviour (Cox, 1970). His hypothesis is that, if migration occurs, the individual's 'contact space' will change and he will be exposed to a new set of stimuli and cues. This may result in a change in voting behaviour. Thus, conversion of in-migrants to the political norm of the area will tend to reinforce that norm and promote stability in the electoral pattern of that area.

The second possibility is that individuals whose political preference is similar to that of the area of 'latent partisanship' in which they live may move to an area of different 'latent partisanship'. This would induce change in the electoral pattern.

Third, individuals whose political preference is different from that of the area of 'latent partisanship' in which they live may move to an area of 'latent partisanship' with the same general political preference as their own. This would reinforce stability in the electoral pattern. One study of migrants from city to suburbia, for example, has noted that any changes in voting behaviour occurred before migration and were reasons for moving, rather than movement to suburbia being a cause of the change in voting behaviour (Berger, 1968).

Local Area Integration.

Local area integration can be defined in latent and manifest terms. In a latent sense it is the degree to which inhabitants perceive general boundaries to their area of residence, and feel a sense of belonging with that area - that is, it is synonymous with territoriality (Cohen and Rosenthal, 1971, 31). In a manifest sense, it is the degree to which social interaction is carried on internally, as well as the use of local facilities such as shops and schools. Local area integration as defined here is therefore concerned with the emergence of
territorial differentiation, individual perception of territorial boundaries and attachment to territory.

Although it is often argued that the 'community concept' has been modified from an ecological to an interactional rationale (for example, Drabick, 1965), the local area is still regarded as a meaningful and important social unit especially in terms of patterning individual behaviour (Hills, 1968; Nohara, 1968). The argument that the local area is no longer a significant social unit and arises primarily out of the American context is a controversial one, although there is no firm evidence concerning its applicability in Canada. (Keller, 1968; Kornhauser 1959; Janowitz 1967; Shils 1962).

It is postulated here that the greater the degree of local area integration demonstrated by the inhabitants of a local area, the greater the tendency for them to vote homogeneously. This applies equally to other forms of behaviour - for example, crime.

Local area integration is considered to be an important variable in addition to the nature of individual socio-economic characteristics in an explanation of electoral patterns, for the greater the exposure of an individual to other members of his group, the greater the likelihood that they will serve as positive reference groups for his behaviour (Foladare, 1968). In a highly integrated area, therefore, the political norm would operate as a 'constraint' on individual voting behaviour (Durkheim, 1938; Blau, 1960).

Conversely, in an area having a low degree of integration, the political norm would not operate as a 'constraint'. One would therefore expect, in such an area, a heterogeneous electoral pattern. Secondly, even in a highly integrated area, an individual who did not
feel a strong sense of belonging to that area would tend to vote differently from the 'political party norm'.

The first step in the analysis of local area integration as an explanatory factor in voting behaviour is to delimit the local areas. Social area analysis and factorial ecology are techniques which have been used in this regard. However, the basis of social area analysis has been heavily criticised (Hawley and Duncan, 1957; Anderson and Ageland, 1961; Reissman, 1970). Further, with factorial ecology, problems are posed with the units of analysis, the nature of the data, the 'reality' of the factors, and their stability through time.

A more satisfactory technique, to be used in the present study, has been to get residents to delimit the boundaries of their area of residence with the aid of a map if necessary (Drabick and Buck, 1959). The method is more satisfactory in that consensus on local area boundaries is one index of local area integration (Form, 1954).

The second step in the analysis is to identify, by a variety of other indices, the degree of area integration in different local areas. As one author has noted, we do not know enough about integration to postulate any one set of data as the index of integration as such (Landecker, 1951, 332). Several indices need therefore to be used. One component of area integration is consensus on area image, and of particular importance in this regard are references to class and ethnic symbols in the description of the area (Ross, 1962, 80). Further, mobility and potential mobility have been shown to be important components of area integration (Smith et al, 1954). For example, older people tend to have stronger feelings of attachment to their area in part because of their relative lack of mobility compared with younger people (McAllister, 1970,
7-8). Often, therefore, length of residence is used as a surrogate for area integration (McAllister, 1970, 57). Other indices would include whether or not inhabitants feel at home in the area, whether or not they think the area is physically and socially getting better, and whether inhabitants feel closer to those living within their area or to those living outside of it.

All of these components are what can be described as latent components of area integration. Manifest components would include social interaction with people living within the area, the use of local facilities, and the reading of the area newspaper. Both latent and manifest components taken together can provide a general index of area integration.

Once the areas have been identified as having relevance to their inhabitants, and the general degree of integration has been established in each area, it remains to be shown how attachment to area is associated with voting behaviour. In order to achieve this a series of hypotheses concerning associations between individual socio-economic characteristics and individual voting behaviour deemed by previous research to be important indicators of Canadian voting behaviour need to be tested. It will be shown that such associations will generally be found not to hold, and an 'area effect' will be demonstrated whereby individuals vote according to the 'political party norm' of their area, rather than in relation to any socio-economic category. This is similar to Berelson's notion of the 'breakage effect', in which people tend to vote for the party supported by the 'climate of opinion' of the communities in which they live (Berelson et al, 1954, 98). Further, this 'area effect' will
vary according to the degree of area integration. Thus in those areas with a lower degree of integration the 'area effect' will be less. Similarly, in areas of high integration the 'area effect' will be greater. Finally, the general association between area integration and voting behaviour will be demonstrated.

The Geography of Campaigning.

One final important neglected component in the study of the stability and change of electoral patterns is the geography of campaigning - that is, the spatial aspects of the election campaigns of the competing parties. This will be reflected in the amount of time and money expended at different locations, and the kinds of localised issues raised. Three major arguments will be examined here. First, that local party activity will be associated with voting behaviour. Second, that the competing parties and candidates will employ a spatial strategy in their campaigns. Third, that the effectiveness of this strategy, measured in terms of election outcome, will be associated, to some extent, with the intensity of activity of the competing groups in various areas of the city.

One important objective of the campaign is the selection and crystallisation of issues and problems (Froman, 1966,3). It is hypothesised that, from the political party viewpoint, the major objective in the campaign is to win every poll. It will be argued here that, working within the framework of previous election results, the competing parties have different spatial priorities, and thus allocate their resources in a differential manner across space. It will be demonstrated that one of the most important factors in devising this strategy is the results of previous elections. This is important
because it means that the geography of campaigning is operating in such a way as to encourage stability in the electoral pattern.

However, the degree to which the geography of campaigning will change the electoral pattern is dependent in the final analysis on its effectiveness. The effectiveness of spatial strategy can be examined in two main ways. First, examining the association between strategy and election results. Second, in terms of questionnaire responses from individuals about the influence of the campaign upon their voting behaviour.

A geography of campaigning can be defined at a number of levels. First, the general Provincial campaign - the general theme and climate of opinion which each of the parties is trying to promote. Second, the level of the constituency - those priority constituencies for each of the competing parties. Third, the intra-constituency level - there is generally some internal difference in terms of past voting patterns and in terms of social structure, and thus each party will have its own intra-constituency priorities, particularly in terms of which areas to canvass and to drop literature. In the present example, due to the fact that questionnaire responses will be obtained from three local areas within the city, the geography of campaigning and its effectiveness will be examined only at the intra-local area scale.

The effectiveness of the local party campaign in terms of the election outcome has been shown to be associated with the 'degree of effort' on the part of the competing parties (for example, see Cutright and Rossi, 1958; Wolfinger, 1963; Crotty, 1968; Crotty, 1971, 446-7). Thus, important data requirements are the number of party workers involved in the campaign, the number of times each area is canvassed, as well as
the actual location of the campaign office within each constituency, often located to 'draw' workers from favourable surrounding areas, as well as to advertise the party cause. One writer has noted, however, that, even if the party campaign does not produce any 'conversions' or change the electoral pattern in any way, the least it achieves is a 'stirring up' of the electorate (Taylor, 1972, 331). This may be important in terms of generating party workers, or getting individuals to contribute to the party effort in some way, as well as in perhaps longer-term conversions - that is, there are latent as well as manifest functions of the geography of campaigning in this sense.

The final component of importance in a geography of campaigning is the nature of the candidates themselves. Especially important in this regard is whether or not the candidate is an incumbent or has run for political office before at any level. Incumbents and non-incumbents will have different spatial strategies, generally based on the aim of 'getting known', and the importance of face-to-face contact with members of the electorate.

THE DATA

For the purposes of showing that the above factors are important considerations in the stability and change of electoral patterns, three local areas in Vancouver were chosen, and 100 people were chosen to be interviewed in each area by professional interviewers using the local area questionnaire (Appendix I). Second, the competing candidates and campaign managers in the three constituencies containing the three local areas were interviewed to gain information on the geography of campaigning (Appendix II). Historical data used in the argument concerning the development of the political party system in
British Columbia was taken primarily from secondary sources. The rationale for the choice of the areas and the sample is given below.

Mayhew has identified 22 local areas in Vancouver, each of which, he argues, has some degree of functional coherence (Mayhew, 1967, 4). For the purposes of the survey analysis, the areas (Map 1) were grouped into three based on socio-economic differences. The three groups were as follows: Group 1 contained Strathcona, CBD, Grandview-Woodland, Hastings East, Cedar Cottage, Riley Park-Kensington, Mount Pleasant, Renfrew-Collingwood, Victoria Drive-Fraserview and Sunset; Group 2 contained Fairview, Little Mountain, Killarney, Marpole, Kitsilano and the West End; Group 3 contained Oakridge, Dunbar-Southlands, Point Grey, Arbutus Ridge, Kerrisdale and Shaughnessy. These three groups of areas correspond with spatially segregated clusters in Peucker and Rase's factorial ecology of the city (Peucker and Rase, 1971). Financial constraints dictated that only one area from each group could be chosen for the analysis. Furthermore, ideally the areas chosen would fall within different 'zones of latent partisanship' within the city. With this constraint in mind, one area from each group was chosen randomly, giving the three areas of Hastings East, Marpole and Dunbar-Southlands (see Map 1).

With regard to sample size, it has been noted that no regular proportion of the 'population' under study is necessarily ideal (Madge, 1965, 239-240), and the ideal sample size will also vary with the relative homogeneity of the 'population' (Bäckstrom and Hursh, 1963, 25-6). By sampling from areas of different general socio-economic characteristics, as well as areas of different 'latent partisanship',
we are therefore at an advantage in this regard. The final sample size in each area was chosen on the assumption that there would be a 50 per cent probability that residents would vote for the party representing the area norm. With a standard error of 3 per cent, the total sample size would thus be 310 (see Parton, 1950, 307), and with the financial constraint this was set at 300 equally divided into the three areas.

The next stage was to determine how the sample was to be taken. The voters lists were used to ascertain the number of households in each poll in each of the three areas using Mayhew's areal definition of the areas as a sampling frame. Total numbers of housing units were cumulated to give a total number of housing units of registered voters in each of the three areas (Backstrom and Hursh, 1963, 39-40). Backstrom and Hursh advise sampling of clusters of housing units, and for the purposes of the analysis, and for convenience polls were used as the cluster. Once the total number of housing units is known, then, in order to define a 'skip interval', this number is divided by the number of sample clusters required. The number of sample clusters for each area was set at 33, with three housing units in each cluster being sampled, plus an arbitrary additional unit to give the required sample of 100 in each area. The skip interval thus produces a selection of polls for cluster sampling based on probability in relation to the number of housing units in each poll. Once the polls or sample clusters are selected by use of the skip interval, the selected polls are randomly sampled, the random number being equivalent to a housing unit rather than an individual. This is repeated until three housing units are chosen. For each housing unit in turn, a different respondent-selection key is used to ensure the correct proportion of males and
females (see Backstrom and Hursh, 1963, 52-58). The process is then continued until 100 respondents are chosen from each area. Due to inaccurate voting enumeration, it was then necessary to double-check the names and addresses of respondents from the telephone directory and the city directory. Random substitutions within the chosen sampling clusters were then allowed in cases of removal or non-existence.

To obtain the desired information in relation to the aims of the study, two questionnaires were developed (Appendices I and II). The local area questionnaire (Appendix I) was to be administered personally to each respondent by professional interviewers hired and trained by York University Institute for Behavioural Research. This questionnaire was an amalgam of questions taken from other studies, mainly in Sociology, in relation to perception of local area, social interaction, membership of organisations, political participation, party identification, local party activity and personal data. Before the questionnaire reached its final form, it underwent a series of pre-tests. First, a mailed pilot study was undertaken in April 1972, and a great deal of useful feedback from respondents plus information on obvious 'problem questions' was obtained. Second, York University tested the questionnaire and advised on particular improvements. Third, the questionnaire was administered to a highly critical political geography class. Finally, before the actual fieldwork commenced, the questionnaire was pre-tested in the field by the professional interviewers, after a fairly thorough and critical briefing session with all of the interviewers present.

The questionnaire was then personally administered to the sample
of 300 respondents from late September to mid-October 1972, about 4 to 6 weeks after the B.C. Provincial election. We were advised on this matter by York University in terms of any problem of recall, that, previous experience had shown that, in the months immediately following an election recall in similar studies was usually quite sharp, and, that other social factors hardly vary at all under normal circumstances.

To increase interest, and to warn respondents of a forthcoming visit of an interviewer, a letter was sent to each respondent about three to four days before the visit. Three attempts were made to contact each respondent, and, if there was no success, then a substitute, which had been randomly selected in the same way as the main sample, was inserted. Unfortunately, after the interviewing in Area 1 (Hastings East) had been completed, funds for the final completion of Area 2 (Marpole) and Area 3 (Dunbar-Southlands) ran out. The final sample is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideal Sample</th>
<th>Actual Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area 1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the final sample consisted of 252 respondents or 84 per cent
of what was ideally required, 70 per cent of the names chosen and
97 per cent of those actually interviewed.

Unfortunately, at the time of writing the 1971 census was not
available in full to compare the representativeness of the sample
with socio-economic characteristics in each area. However, it
was possible to compare the election results within each area with
the voting behaviour of the respondents. Table II gives the com-
parison between the sample and the actual results in terms of voting
behaviour. It will be noted, first of all, that the percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE II  Comparison of the Sample with the Actual Voting Results (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of respondents who either refused the question on voting behaviour,
gave no answer, or did not vote, is fairly high - 27 per cent of the
total sample, and especially high in Area 1. Second, it will be
noted that, in every case but one - the Liberal vote in Area 2 -
the sample is under-represented in terms of per cent voting for
every party in each area. The sample is more under-represented,
However, in terms of Social Credit voters, especially in Area 1. In general, therefore, it is probably safe to say that refusals and no replies to the voting behaviour question exhibit no important systematic bias save in the case of Social Credit voters.

In terms of the geography of campaigning, 24 candidates and party workers were interviewed after the election. At least two respondents from each party were interviewed in each area. All four major political parties were contesting both Marpole and Dunbar-Southlands, and only the Liberal Party did not contest Hastings East. The party activity questionnaire (Appendix II) was developed from previous work on local party activity as well as in relation to the requirements of a geography of campaigning, and preliminary research among party workers prior to the election.

The analysis will proceed with a discussion of the development of the political party system of British Columbia to the time of the 1972 election in Chapter II. Second, migration to and from the 'zones of latent partisanship' in Vancouver will be considered in Chapter III. Third will be a discussion of local area integration with differences among the three local areas, before demonstrating in Chapter V the lack of association between individual socio-economic variables and voting behaviour in contrast to the association between area and voting behaviour, and area integration and voting behaviour. Finally, Chapter VI analyses the geography of campaigning within the three local areas.
CHAPTER II

THE BRITISH COLUMBIA POLITICAL CULTURE

This chapter has three main aims. First, it is an analysis of the factors leading to the development of the British Columbia party system. It will be shown that the development of the party system has been essentially class-based. The analysis will therefore give some insight into the factors associated with the development of the 'zones of latent partisanship' in Vancouver to be discussed in Chapter III. A second aim is to demonstrate the distinctiveness of the B.C. political culture in Canada. This is important with reference to the general argument of this dissertation for it implies that generalisations about associations between voting behaviour and socio-economic characteristics relevant elsewhere in Canada may not necessarily be applicable in B.C. Of course, this will also depend on the general 'political mood' or political environment surrounding each election. Thus, as the third aim, a consideration of the dynamics of the party system in B.C. will lend some insight into the 'political mood' at the time of the 1972 Provincial election.

The development of the political culture will be presented as a general process of action and reaction in a 'neo-Hartzian' framework. It is important for our understanding of the 1972 Provincial electoral pattern to see the 1972 Provincial election as part of this general historical-political process. In order to demonstrate that the 1972 election was an 'election of reaction' as part of a dynamic
process relevant to individual voting behaviour, respondents in the survey analysis were asked for the reasons why they voted as they did. The results of this will be presented at the end of the chapter.

The major argument here is derived from, but not identical to, the Hartzian fragment approach (Hartz, 1964), and the critique by Horowitz (Horowitz, 1966). The argument that B.C. is a distinctive political culture is reflected in its political history. Although the Province has often been identified, with good reason, with 'Western protest', and is sometimes discussed in these terms (for example, Desbarats, 1971), the argument here is that B.C. might be better described as 'the West beyond the West' (Sage, 1945, 183), where the 'psychology of the West' is important, (Wallace, 1936-7, 141), but has been moulded and modified by local and different circumstances. For example, protest politics in B.C. have never had their base in agrarian discontent (Sanford, 1961, 39; Ormsby, 1953).

The distinctiveness of B.C. politics has been noted by a number of writers since Sage. For example, Robin has pointed out that the B.C. situation is plainly unique both in terms of the West and in terms of the country as a whole (Robin, 1967, 201). Further, Ormsby argues for the distinctive political identity of the Province (Ormsby, 1953, 53). B.C. has been termed a 'deviant case' (Sanford, 1961, v). In a study of the Canadian Federal political party system, it was noted that, in B.C., deviant political tendencies at the Federal level which are manifest in a multi-party structure and ascribe weak support to the major political parties in general, are replicated
at the Provincial level (McDaniel, 1970, 26). This study shows that, from 1949 to 1968, the Federal election results classify B.C. as the only multi-party system in Canada. This is in contrast to the former 'quasi-party system' which has been said to exist in Alberta (Macpherson, 1953). A further mark of distinctiveness is the fact that, according to one author, B.C. has the strongest pattern of class voting in Canada (Gagne, 1970, 35). All of these characteristics point to the existence in B.C. of a distinctive political culture.

THE HARTZIAN THESIS AND BRITISH COLUMBIA

Hartz examines New World societies as fragments of the larger whole of Europe (Hartz, 1964), similar to Ratzel's Europeanisation of the earth (Ratzel, 1923, 106). According to Hartz, the process of fragmentation consists of the part detaching from the whole. The political values of the fragment are not representative of the "historical ideological spectrum" of the mother country (Horowitz, 1966, 143) and hence the fragment develops on its own outside its original context, and hence develops "without inhibition" (Hartz, 1964, 9).

Horowitz is critical of McRae's application of the Hartzian thesis to Canada in a pan-North American way (McRae, 1964), for it focuses on uniformities rather than differences, and therefore obscures the importance of socialism in Canada to the relative strength of toryism (Horowitz, 1966). English Canada, so his argument goes, has a 'tory touch' coming out of the American revolution, and therefore a 'socialist touch' (Horowitz, 1966, 148). Although Wilson has argued that the Horowitz interpretation fits Ontario (Wilson, 1972), one can apply it on a 'pan-Canadian' scale, and look again, not for
uniformity, but for differences. Although Horowitz notes that McRae ignored the fact that, in one Canadian Province - B.C. - CCF/NDP did succeed in becoming a major party, his interpretation does not account for this (Horowitz, 1966, 149).

The basis of the Hartzian thesis is migration, and migration into a relatively unconstrained environment. The direction and intensity of migration to B.C. from the early days is of obvious importance in the development of the social and hence political structure. The process is essentially one of action and reaction. The "liberal society of English Canada with a 'tory touch'" produces a reaction which becomes manifest in socialism. The more diverse the fragment or fragments, obviously the greater the amount of action and reaction. The relative diversity of economy and society in B.C. has, in the development of its politics, in part resulted in a series of conflicts and schisms.

The initial British fragment "who referred every question to his superiors", contrasted with the independence and self-reliance of the Americans lured by gold and other mineral wealth (Howay, Sage and Angus, 1942, 174). Further, 'Canadian' migrants to B.C. at first were sharply distinguished from 'British Columbians' (Howay, Sage and Angus, 1942, 191). With the completion of the CPR, B.C. became a collecting area for the 'secondary fragment'. On the one hand it contained British Columbians; but then the social structure was complicated by large influxes of people with 'Canadian' ideas from the East, many of whom were Tory. Other influxes included those who had escaped from the East to the frontier, which emphasised the American spirit of independence, self-reliance and pragmatism, plus
radical American miners from the South, and others escaping the American liberal tradition. All of these groups congealed in an area of diverse economy. By 1961, one-fifth of the population of B.C. consisted of Second World War immigrants and another fifth were born in the Prairies (Sanford, 1961, 62).

The two-step process of the 'secondary fragment' to the new frontier embodied therefore two main values in the early formation of the B.C. political culture. It embodied the "corporate-organic" tory element plus the "nationalist-egalitarian" ideas of American liberalism. Coupled with the two forms of action and reaction noted below - that is, reaction to the East and internal reaction, these values produced socialism in B.C., based on indigenous radical labour, which caused a reaction within labour (hence early labour-socialist splits.) Social Credit, on the other hand, developed in response to the corporatism of the Liberal Party and the toryism of the Conservative Party. Its success in B.C. was also attributable to its ability to provide a pragmatic alternative to the CCF/NDP. Social Credit in B.C. was born in the tradition of American liberalism. It was essentially anti-organic and populist.

As was noted above, the action-reaction process in B.C., although complex, took two major forms. First was the reaction to Eastern interests, which were symbolised in B.C. by the presence of the two 'old' parties - the Conservatives and the Liberals. Second was internal reaction, but for different reasons, for and against socialist ideology. In the final analysis, the former theme resulted in the coming to power of the Social Credit Party, and in the latter case was manifest, among other things, in terms of the
division between labourism and socialism in B.C. whereas the Social Credit Party was spawned at a time of depression, CCF was the culmination of 30 years of socialist activity. The Social Credit Party in B.C. eventually emerged in a time of plenty as a reaction to the original Canadian fragment and its inability to govern pragmatically in the 'West beyond the West', as well as a reaction against socialism. The CCF/NDP is a reaction to the basic principles of that original fragment, and its modus operandi in B.C.

Both protest parties were beset by internal reaction. Apart from personality conflicts, the parties had difficulty in two main areas. First was the difficulty of consolidating diverse interpretations of philosophy, and, second was the difficulty between party and movement. The first case was an argument over interpretation, while the second was an argument about the means for action based on that interpretation. This latter argument has been fully discussed for the national CCF (Young, 1969A). On the other hand, the 'movement' was to have an educational function. Those supporting the movement were naturally afraid of the contamination of their principles the arena of pragmatic politics would bring. This problem, and its consequences, have been very well argued in relation to Harold Wilson's role in the British Labour Party (Foot, 1968).

Although in the Horowitz scheme, the relative importance of socialism is attributed to the relative importance of toryism, in reality it is a two-way process - that is, action and reaction produces feedback continuously. For example, the relative importance of socialism in B.C. has also contributed to the 'tory reaction'. 
This is evidenced by the coalition governments of the 1940's and the eventual temporary changes in the electoral system in the early 1950's, both designed by the old parties to keep the socialists from power, although, ironically, in so doing, the old parties destroyed their own basis of power. This theme of self-destruction as a result of an attempt to maintain power on the part of B.C. political parties is an important and recurring one.

Horowitz notes the problem with the Hartzian thesis, that it makes it difficult to account in any precise way for the 'point of congealment' of a political culture (Horowitz, 1966, 153). In B.C., however, one can argue that this was a multi-stage process. Congealment involved the consolidation of the diverse interpretations of philosophy noted above, and favoured the party to the movement. In the first case, the Regina Manifesto of 1933 brought together labour and socialist groups on a national scale. In the second case, the Social Credit Party came to power in 1952, and this can be argued as a 'point of congealment', only 81 years after confederation.

The prime carrier of the 'tory touch' in Canada has been the Conservative Party (Horowitz, 1966, 156). B.C., being the most 'American' Province, however, spawned a party which came to represent its political culture which reacted against the organic tory view. It is significant in this regard that its original leader was a Conservative defector. The development toward congealment in 1952 is paralleled by a decline in the general importance of the Conservative Party in B.C. This reciprocal decline was predicted only seven years after the labour-socialist consolidation (Brown, 1940).
Brown predicted, at that time, that one of the existing parties in B.C. was doomed to extinction, and was certain that the party would not be the CCF. He argued that, in view of the Liberal Party consolidation as the Party of reaction, it would be the Conservative Party that would disappear (Brown, 1940, 169). It is important to note that, for the first time in its history, by 1969, the Conservative Party held no seats in B.C. either at the Federal or the Provincial levels. However, in the 1972 elections, the Conservative Party federally gained more seats in B.C. than at any other time since Diefenbaker, and provincially gained more seats than any time since Social Credit came to power in B.C.

The Liberal Party as the Party of reaction with its "antagonistic symbiosis" with CCF/NDP (Horowitz, 1966, 168), and the relative demise in recent years of the Conservative Party in B.C., makes the former, with its national standing, an important alternative to Social Credit at the Federal level. The importance of electoral migration in Vancouver-Burrard from the Liberal Party at the Federal level to Social Credit at the Provincial level, and back again, has been noted (Laponce, 1969, 171).

It has been mentioned above that the process of congealment of the B.C. political culture was a multi-stage one. Certain periods of action and reaction can be identified throughout the history of B.C. politics. The first stage is the period to 1903 which provides the radical setting for the culture — important especially is the theme of labourism and the fact that this is the 'pre-party era'. Second is the period 1903-1933 which includes the attachment of party labels at the Provincial level, the transplant of the 'old' parties to B.C. onto this radical base, and some internal reactions. Third,
is the period 1933-1952 with the consolidation of socialism, the beginning of Social Credit, and the effect of the former on the 'old' parties. Fourth, is the period from the point of congealment in 1952 to 1972, Social Credit being a reaction to both the second and third stages above. Finally, is the period from 1972 on which completes the overall process in terms of our present argument. The general reaction to Social Credit mainly because of its dictatorial attitude, its remoteness from the people, and its lack of openness. Again the theme is repeated, as it was when Social Credit came to power, of the authoritarian style of government self-destructing. The attempt to hold power above all destroyed the basis of that power. Thus, as in the 1972 Provincial election, voters reacted to the party in office.

Each reaction can be seen as a major change - a new political component emerged or came to power as a reaction to those which preceded it. The introduction of new political components into the B.C. political process of course resulted in greater division, and this can be demonstrated by the use of a fractionalisation measure (Fe). In a highly fractionalised electoral system there are many percentage shares of the total vote of equal magnitude, so that no one party obtains a very large share of the total vote (Rae, 1967, 53). Fractionalisation values and party shares of the total vote for B.C. Provincial election results from 1928-1972 are given in Table III. Rae regards an index of 0.5 as representing intermediate fractionalisation, and it will be noted that, since 1928, values in B.C. have always been at the least 0.5, and, usually, much higher. More important to note, in relation to the above argument, is that
the highest fractionalisation values have occurred at the points of intrusion of the new major protest parties - that is, values of 0.727 occur both in 1933 and 1952. Further, although values have fluctuated since that date, the 1969 value was the lowest since 1952. The value in 1972, however, reversed this apparent trend, and, apart from the value in 1963, represents the most fractionalised election since 1952. The 1969 figure, of course, relates in part to the demise of the Conservative Party up till 1969, and the increasing share of the vote during that period going to the NDP and Social Credit, plus the fact that the other 'old' party, the Liberals, had its lowest share of the vote. As will be seen from Table III, the Liberal share of the vote, since the coalition, has steadily declined, and this continued in 1972. The Conservatives in 1972, on the other hand, gained some of the Social Credit share of the total vote.

Thus, to summarise the general argument of this chapter. First, there was an initial tory base, but with immigration plus the mode and intensity of industrialisation there was a large reaction to it. Thus there emerged the first phase in the development of the B.C. political culture - the radical base with a 'tory touch'. This 'tory touch', representing power and vested interests, introduced the party system basically as a reaction the growing politicisation of this base. The introduction of the party system into B.C. Provincial politics is best understood with reference to the general class conflict framework employed here, rather than within a functional framework, as a move toward stability and equilibrium, as has been noted elsewhere (for example, Sanford, 1961). To a certain extent,
TABLE III  Fractionalisation in British Columbia Provincial Politics 1928-1972

Party shares (decimals)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Fe Value</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>Lib.</th>
<th>CCF, NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>.556</td>
<td>.533</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>.727</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.417</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>.697</td>
<td>.286</td>
<td>.373</td>
<td>.286</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>.685</td>
<td>.309</td>
<td>.329</td>
<td>.334</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>.548</td>
<td>.558</td>
<td>.376</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.614</td>
<td>.351</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>.727</td>
<td>.097</td>
<td>.235</td>
<td>.343</td>
<td>.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>.651</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.234</td>
<td>.295</td>
<td>.455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>.661</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.218</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>.458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>.694</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>.327</td>
<td>.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>.714</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.200</td>
<td>.278</td>
<td>.408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>.630</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.190</td>
<td>.339</td>
<td>.468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>.703</td>
<td>.126</td>
<td>.162</td>
<td>.392</td>
<td>.318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from the Statement of Votes, Registrar of Voters.
this resulted in the development of partyism - that is, the commitment of labour leaders and followers to the Grit and Tory Parties (Robin, 1968, 3). What stability that followed was only temporary, for the introduction of party lines frustrated the politicisation of the radical base in B.C., already divided, for it divided people on old party lines, the Liberal Party becoming the Party of reaction. However, at the time of the depression, more industrialisation and more immigration, and the consolidation of socialism, the CCF emerged as a major reaction to the transplant of the old parties onto the radical base with the 'tory touch'. A further reaction produced a party which fitted the B.C. political culture - the reaction was not only against socialism but also against the old parties. The Social Credit Party represented a reaction against the corporatism of the Liberal Party and the toryism of the Conservative Party. The final reaction which brought the NDP to power in the August 30th Provincial election was a major reaction, reflected in the fractionalisation value, against a party that had lost touch with the electorate.

The remainder of this chapter will be an analysis of each of the major periods noted above in the development of the B.C. political culture and the general action-reaction process which culminated in the 1972 election.

THE PRE-PARTY ERA TO 1903 - AN OVERVIEW

One author, in a study of B.C. party history to 1903, has noted that the facts seem to bear out Lower's thesis that there has been a certain aristocratic tinge to political life in Canada, and that leadership has generally been accepted from above (Dobie, 1932, 235). In
Provincial elections at that time, no one sought election unless assured of some support from influential members of the community (Dobie, 1932, 238). It was against the conservative constraints of the established institutions of Grit and Tory partyism and trade unionism that the socialist, independent labour and syndicalist radicals fought (Robin, 1968, 18). The labour movement was also the product of the Industrial Revolution, and was motivated, if not necessitated, by the concentration of labour in urban areas, and the changing economic position of the worker (Saywell, 1951, 129).

The importance of migration in this development has already been stressed. Saywell regards the development of the radical base in B.C. as being a clear reflection of increased militant activity in Britain and the United States following the Napoleonic Wars (Saywell, 1951 129). First, the influx of Canadian-born migrants with the completion of the CPR, and, with the railway-building period the number of Chinese also increased considerably (Loosmore, 1954, 13). Further, with the influx of Americans came their organisation - the Western Federation of Miners (WFM), an industrial rather than a craft union - and their political ideas (Loosmore, 1954, 15). Whereas the British artisan transplant into Canadian society was essentially politically conservative, and tended to reinforce the existing social and political structure in B.C. (Robin, 1968, 13), the effect of the influx of the Americans, particularly in the metal-mining industry, was a radical one (Loosmore, 1954, 17). The frontier attitudes and labour conditions prevalent in the Western metalliferous areas in part explain the form of unionism and political temperament of the
miners who came to Canada (Robin, 1968, 46). Nevertheless, the British workman, although basically conservative, was capable of becoming radical under pressure (Loosmore, 1954, 17). Oriental immigration and anti-Oriental agitation helped to unify and solidify labour ranks (Saywell, 1951, 135). Such unification, and its tendency to promote the development of class-consciousness, was an important feature in the emerging industrial society of B.C. (Sanford, 1961, 72).

In reciprocal relation with the development of unification and solidarity came the development of different forms of unionism. However, early efforts in this direction - for example, the American Railway Union of 1894 - were often frustrated and even nullified by the combined opposition of employees and the conservative American Federation of Labour (AFL) (Loosmore, 1954, 6).

In the late Nineteenth century, the centre of political activism in Canada shifted to the West, and especially to B.C., where people had become dissatisfied with the failure of the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC), to 'get results' in Ottawa (Loosmore, 1954, 11). Loosmore ascribes this 'shift' in the main to the impact of 'special conditions' peculiar to B.C. upon the new settlers, which, he argued, derive largely from the geographical position of the Province (Loosmore, 1954, 12). Further, the B.C. economy was based on extractive industries - coal, base metals, fishing and lumbering, where the capital investment and structure of employment assured industrial rather than craft unionism (Robin, 1968, 44).

The radical nature of labour, its unionisation and thence politicisation was a threat to the 'aristocratic tendency'. The wealth of the CPR, the power and influence of Dunsmuir interests, the open hostility of Federal and Provincial governments, and the antagonism of many
powerful non-socialist unions and federations, created an important reaction and opposition (Saywell, 1951, 139-140). The political importance of the labour movement in this period is evidenced by the sending of Ralph Smith from Nanaimo to the Legislative Assembly in 1898 on an Independent Labour ticket. Measures were thus taken to placate labour, and two measures were brought in by the Federal government. First, to prohibit Orientals from placer mining, and second, to limit underground work in mines to eight hours per day. Both measures were regarded as failures in their intent (Saywell, 1951, 143).

In part, the introduction of Federal Party labels into B.C. Provincial politics in 1903 can be seen as a reaction to the inability to placate labour politicisation. Certainly, one author sees labour agitation as a factor in the ending of the 'pre-party era' (Dobie, 1932, 247). However, another writer has argued that the instability of political and economic life in B.C. triggered the movement from factionalism toward partyism (Sanford, 1961, 71). The development of the Provincial party system in this argument was thus a response to this in order to produce a more stable political alignment (Sanford, 1961, 74). In the present interpretation, however, the B.C. Provincial political culture can better be seen in terms of a class conflict model. Phenomena are thus constantly in conflict and change comes as a resolution of this conflict. The system thus does not, of necessity, approach stability, but becomes a series of actions and reactions, for the dysfunctional elements are inherent within the system (for example, compare Merritt, 1963). Thus with industrialisation, immigration, labour unionisation and instability culminating in the short-lived Provincial Progressive Party in 1902, the introduction of party labels in 1903 can essentially be seen as a reaction
to everything the latter represented. In order to clarify this a little more fully, it is necessary to look more closely at the B.C. political culture to 1903.

THE B.C. POLITICAL CULTURE TO 1903

Unionisation came relatively early to B.C., the first one being the Shipwrights in Victoria in 1852 (Clark, 1945,2). With the goldrush in 1858, thousands of Americans came into B.C. bringing the influence of their social, economic and political environment. Saywell argues that the presence of Americans can be used to explain the outburst of radicalism toward the end of the Nineteenth century (Saywell, 1951, 131).

The strike at Nanaimo coal mines in 1861 revealed the strength of organisation at that early date, and after a further two years the first craft union appeared (Saywell, 1951, 132). In the period 1864-1871 there was constant agitation among the coalminers of Vancouver Island, and, in the early 1870's the first steps towards the political consolidation of labour were taken. The bid for a shorter working day in Britain and the United States spilled over into Canada (Robin, 1968, 17).

Although prior to July 20th, 1871, B.C. was ruled by the Hudson's Bay Company and an assortment of crown colonies, the political mood was not one of pro- or anti-government, but ill-feeling between Island and Mainland. This ill-feeling anti-dated the union of the two colonies in 1866 (Dobie, 1932, 245). Even so, as early as 1871 De Cosmos had made an appeal to the 'Liberals of the Province' (Sage, 1945, 177), even though party labels had not been introduced into Provincial politics. From 1871 to 1903, B.C. politics was on a basis
of loose groupings of cliques and factions (Sanford, 1961, 69). However, this did not mean that there were no important issues.

In 1872, for example, there appeared a division in Provincial politics on the question of relations with Ottawa, and this was fairly continuous until 1883 (Dobie, 1932, 245). One faction was bent on an antagonistic attitude toward the Federal Government while the other was inclined to be conciliatory. The two Provincial governments between 1873-1876 and 1876-1883 followed a policy of determined demands on the Federal Government to carry out the Terms of Union (Dobie, 1932, 245). One factor in this division was the old division between Island and Mainland, but after the Federal Government had begun railway construction and had granted financial aid to the Island for a graving dock and an Island railway, there was little basis for the division (Dobie, 1932, 246). Thus, in the 1874 election, the various candidates had no intention to be partisan so long as the obligations to B.C. were fulfilled (Dobie, 1932, 248). Thus the politics of the period tended to be pragmatic.

However, by the mid-1870's there was already an established traditional pattern of artisan political loyalties in Canada (Robin, 1968, 8). A strike among Nanaimo coalminers in 1877 was settled only by force of arms (Saywell, 1951, 135). In the period 1873-1878, the Liberal government in Ottawa aroused great hostility in B.C. by its failure to carry out the Terms of Union, and the Liberals took a long time to dispel that memory (Dobie, 1932, 249). B.C. MP's gave their political allegiance to whatever party promised to build the
trans-continental railway, and thus from 1878-1891 they supported the Conservatives (Sage, 1945, 178).

By 1879 the B.C. gold rushes were over, and many ex-miners settled on the land or turned to wage labour (Loosmore, 1954, 19). At the same time, organisations like the Workman's Protection Association (WPA) were concerned about the 'Chinese question'. There was intense competition for jobs because of the low wage levels of the Chinese (Loosmore, 1954, 20). By this time labour had begun to manifest political action at the Provincial electoral level, and, in 1882, the first workingman's candidates were selected, often on an anti-Chinese ticket (Loosmore, 1954, 22). The growing strength of labour after 1882 was important in the development of political issues in B.C. (Dobie, 1932, 247).

The Order of the Knights of Labour tended to give more unity and direction to the labour movement (Saywell, 1951, 134). This originated as a secret organisation of craftsmen in Philadelphia, immediately after the Civil War (Saywell, 1951, 134), and had spread from Hamilton where it had begun in Canada in 1881 (Robin, 1968, 20), and was established in Victoria in 1884. The Knights were neither craft nor industrial in their structure, and had idealistic intentions. They rejected the notion of a class struggle, opposed strikes, and aimed at the improvement of workers and working conditions (Loosmore, 1954, 26).

The Provincial election of 1886 was the first one contested by labour candidates (Loosmore, 1954, ii). There was much resentment
by labour and others over the control of current party affairs by a clique, and on June 9th, 1886, a meeting of 'workingmen and electors' was held in Victoria to select candidates for the opposition in the election (Dobie, 1932, 241). Although the Knights of Labour took no part in the election, the Workingman's Party ran candidates in Victoria and Nanaimo (Loosmore, 1954, 27). However, all labour candidates lost their deposits (Robin, 1968, 27). As Loosmore notes, "B.C. was not yet ready to elect labour candidates to the legislature" (Loosmore, 1954, 33).

Labour influence was also exerted through the Trades and Labour Council with its persistent demand for the restriction of Oriental immigration, and its agitation for specific remedies for the 'hard times' of the nineties (Dobie, 1932, 247). The craft unions, on the other hand, allied themselves with the American Federation of Labour (AFL) which rejected at the outset any radical approach, preferring a policy of collective bargaining to either direct or political action (Saywell, 1951, 134). The Knights, on the other hand, although they ran candidates in the 1886 Vancouver Civic Election (Robin, 1968, 27), declined rapidly afterward (Loosmore, 1954, 40). In fact the labour movement in general showed generally little organisation with the long recession between 1887 and 1896 (Saywell, 1951, 134).

From 1889 however, which marked the formation of the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council (VTLC), and the Vancouver Island Miners and Mine Labourers Protective Association (MMLPA), all Federal elections
were marked by some organised intervention of B.C. labour (Loosmore, 1954, 1). Union organisation in the B.C. interior at this time was almost non-existent until about the middle and late 1890's when the metal-mining industry mushroomed in South-East B.C., and the area was populated by Americans who brought skill in organisation and radical political tendencies (Robin, 1968, 45). Late in 1890, a broad organisation of all unions in B.C. was formed and was known as the B.C. Federated Labour Congress, established initially to fight for an eight-hour day (Saywell, 1951, 135). However, as the Knights came from the East and declined, so, for many years, as Saywell notes, workmen on the Pacific Coast were not too enthusiastic about the Congress because both personnel and philosophy were furnished by Eastern Canada (Saywell, 1951, 134). The 'Canadian' ideas of labour organisation were not to be directly transferable to a new and different social and political environment in B.C. The development of the party system in B.C. was therefore going to differ from that in the rest of Canada also.

The idea of class conflict in B.C., however, was becoming more clearly expressed in British Columbia (Loosmore, 1954, 51), and in the Federal elections of 1891 and 1896 party lines came to be more clearly drawn (Dobie, 1932, 249). The reaction of the government to the growing importance of the politicisation of labour at this time was reflected in the Labour Disputes Bill of 1893, which called for more information on labour activity and initiated a Board
of Arbitration (Saywell, 1951, 136). There was naturally much suspicion and criticism of this measure on the part of labour (Saywell, 1951, 137).

In 1894, there appeared the first "real 'labour' party" in B.C. in the form of the Nationalist Party. Before this point, labour political action was carried out by the unions themselves, for example, MMLPA or VTLC, or by "workingmen's parties" (Loosmore, 1954, 64). Even so, such parties did not provide sufficient appeal for focusing concerted labour action on a united front. There was much internal division, latent and manifest, about the interpretation of philosophy or the degree to which labour should become politicised. Fear of division on labour-union and anti-labour union lines made some politicians willing to accept a Liberal or Liberal-Conservative alignment in B.C. politics (Dobie, 1932, 247). The first Socialist organisation to take root in Canada was the Socialist Labour Party (SLP), an American organisation which appeared in Ontario in 1894. This organisation was essentially Marxist and anti-union (Robin, 1968, 34). Socialism first appeared in B.C. in 1895 when the Kootenay miners affiliated with the Western Federation of Miners (WFM), another American Marxist association (Saywell, 1951, 138).

Thus, as has been noted above, although B.C. provincial politics had remained essentially non-partisan, after 1896 there began a demand for the introduction of party lines (Dobie, 1932, 244). In the decade following 1896 a variety of factors transformed the labour scene into one of greater political involvement. American influence
became dominant, socialism appeared, and direct action and political activity increased in tempo (Saywell, 1951, 137). The Federal election of 1896 marked the introduction of party lines into B.C. Federal politics (Sanford, 1961, 69), and Maxwell, who was nominated by labour, and, although technically independent yet voted with the Liberals, was elected in Burrard (Loosmore, 1954, 83). Thus, even at this early stage, the Liberal Party in B.C. had become the 'party of reaction'. After the Maxwell victory, the Nationalist Party declined, and, in the 1898 Provincial election, nominated no candidates (Loosmore, 1954, 84).

With the arrival of Arthur Spencer in B.C. the Socialist Labour Party was established (Grantham, 1942, 10), and from 1898 to 1900, there developed a new form of political action (Loosmore, 1954, 88). The passage in 1898 of a law guaranteeing ballot secrecy so that any employee need no longer fear discrimination because of his vote was important (Loosmore, 1954, 89). The election of the labour-backed Smith in Nanaimo with the precarious government majority enabled him to gain some reform (Robin, 1968, 49). A positive reaction to the Socialist Party was a more moderate Labour Party initiated in 1899 (Saywell, 1951, 142). That year has been described as marking "the first great struggle between employer and employed in B.C. in nearly a decade" (Robin, 1968, 53).

Ormsby has noted that the economic life of B.C. during the first few years of the Twentieth Century was in jeopardy because of the continued social tension and unrest, exemplified in the Fraser
fishermen's strike (Ormsby, 1958, 331). By 1900, a split in the SLP was healed and the United Socialist Labour Party (USLP) was formed (Saywell, 1951, 143). This party plus the more moderate Independent Labour Party were successful only in Nanaimo with the re-election of Ralph Smith in the 1900 Provincial election (Saywell, 1951, 144). The WFM, on the other hand, had endorsed certain Conservative candidates for various concessions (Loosmore, 1954, iii). For the Federal election however, there was a Liberal-Labour alliance, with the initiative coming from the Liberals in the hope of gaining votes as well as attempting to contain radicalism in B.C. within its ranks by attaching that movement to the Liberal Party (Loosmore, 1954, 129). However, industrial conflict at this time was to 'drive a wedge' between the Lib-Lab alliance (Robin, 1968, 55). The period 1900-1906 was to see a decline in reformist 'labourism' and a rise in socialism (Loosmore, 1954, iii). With the growth of socialism in many parts of B.C., a series of splits in the existing labour reform movement were created (Loosmore, 1954, 152).

The struggle between socialists and reformers culminated in the 1902 Kamloops Convention. At this convention an effort was made to gather the scattered groups into one political organisation (Saywell, 1951, 146). The Provincial Progressive Party was formed as a kind of compromise moderate reform party of the diverse interests, but was short-lived because of internal dissension (Saywell, 1951, 147).

At the same time there was a consolidation of the socialist movement - that is, of the SLP, the Canadian Socialist League, and the
USLP, into the Socialist Party of B.C. (SPBC) (Robin, 1968, 40). As Robin notes, unlike their Ontario counterparts, B.C. socialists achieved early electoral success (Robin, 1968, 42). In 1903, the Royal Commission on Industrial Disputes in B.C., which was anti-socialist and anti-union in its stance, advocated the legal prohibition of socialism (Saywell, 1951, 140). A reaction of this kind and at this time against the radical unions helped to bring about their decline.

When McBride introduced Federal Party lines into the 1903 B.C. Provincial election, although an important factor from one viewpoint may have been stability, it is possible to see this ultimately as a reaction against the radical base which had steadily grown and thus had left an important legacy. Further, the attempts at conciliation with labour, the reforms gained through political pressure, the alliances with both old parties at different times, and the election of candidates, either those nominated directly or endorsed, provide evidence for the important political impact of the base. The development of the radical base and the transplant of the old parties as a reaction to the base thus marks the end of the first stage of the overall action-reaction political process in B.C. politics which culminated in the 1972 B.C. Provincial election.

OLD PARTY TRANSPLANT 1903-1933

Having now considered the radical base of B.C. politics, the second major stage in the development of the B.C. political culture - the transplant of the old parties into B.C. Provincial politics - will
be discussed and analysed. On the one hand the introduction of party lines did provide some stability electorally, and, on the other, it not only legitimised socialism but helped frustrate its larger development in terms of electoral success, the Liberal Party being the 'party of reaction'. Although the political leaders apparently were trying to satisfy as many groups as possible (Dobie, 1936, 154), the point of view of the old parties, with increasing industrialisation, urbanisation and immigration excluded a significant minority of economic and social groups (Young, 1969B, 109). Before the formation of a national socialist party which was committed to parliamentary success, discontent was not focussed in the B.C. labour and socialist parties. Most unions followed the policy of the AFL, to which some were affiliated, and gave their support to whichever candidate, Liberal or Conservative, who seemed to promote their interest (Dobie, 1936, 156). Thus the period 1903 to 1933 in B.C. politics was essentially a two-party system, although there were other, but less important, factions (Sanford, 1961, 85).

One writer has noted that an important feature of this period was the "struggle between one party to retain and the other to capture the benefits of office" (Dobie, 1936, 161). Evidence of the essential two-party system which operated in this period is given in Table III where the fractionalisation value to 1933 remained close to the level of intermediate fractionalisation. The factions noted above were various - labour, socialist, soldier, farmer and businessman. The problems of leadership, economy and patronage combined to force division, especially
within the Conservative Party. It is worth noting at this point that the United Farmers of B.C. (UFBC) grew out of the Conservative Party, rather than, as on the Prairies, out of the Liberal Party (Ormsby, 1953, 73).

The Conservative Party, although successful in the first four elections of its transplant, was to win only one more Provincial election in B.C., in 1928, and, by 1933, internal division and the coming of the CCF rendered the Party useful only as a partner in coalition to keep the socialists out. By the beginning of the First World War the reaction to the 'tory touch' in B.C. Provincial politics had jelled and the Liberal Party took over to 1937. At the Federal level, the Conservatives, apart from 1904, held the most seats in B.C. to 1930. The introduction of the CCF into B.C. Federal politics, and the increasing disaffection with the Conservative Party, tended to give the Liberals the most seats up to 1953.

In order to clarify the argument a little more fully, and identify the political processes involved, we need to examine the B.C. political culture a little more closely from 1903 to 1933.

THE B.C. POLITICAL CULTURE 1903-1933

During the time that concessions were being gained from Laurier as B.C. MP's were all Liberals in 1904 (Black, 1960, 15), the Socialist Party of Canada was being organised (Grantham, 1942, 20). Further, at the Provincial level, even though the Conservatives were in power, many reforms were secured by the SLP in the early years
The theme of 'better terms' with Ottawa for B.C. has been a significant one in B.C. politics ever since McBride visited Ottawa in 1903 (Black, 1960, 15).

In the 1907 Provincial election, three socialist candidates were elected, but McBride's rejection of Laurier's terms helped him increase his support, thereby weakening non-tory legislative strength (Black, 1960, 15). It appeared at this time that the appeal of sectional interests were more important in Provincial politics than the internal reaction to the 'tory touch'. Further, with the decision to build a CN line employing no Asiatics, labour was placated to a certain extent, and the Conservatives won a large victory in the 1909 contest (Ormsby, 1958, 357). However, the socialist vote outside of Vancouver totalled more than that of the Liberals, but after 1912 electoral support began to fall as the Liberals gained strength (Robin, 1968, 101). The socialist vote was only 4844 in 1912 compared with 5681 in 1909 (Grantham, 1942, 52). Robin attributes this decline to several factors including doctoral rigidity, internal disruption, and neglect of electoral organisation (Robin, 1968, 102). A further factor was, that, by 1912 McBride had become the 'symbol of B.C. success', and in the 1912 Provincial election, lost only 2 of 42 seats, both to the socialists (Ormsby, 1958, 363). The socialist problem was compounded by the fact that there was competition for the labour vote by both the Socialist Party of Canada (SPC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) (Robin, 1968, 104). At the meetings of the B.C. Federation of Labour at this time, resolutions for the creation of a new political party
were defeated (Robin, 1968, 105).

With the onset of the First World War came unemployment, the collapse of the real estate and building booms and the decline in the fortunes of the Conservative Party in B.C. Provincial politics (Ormsby, 1958, 383). The TLC started to drift away from the 'safe anchor' of the Liberal and Conservative parties (Robin, 1968, 118). The period 1914 to 1918 was therefore to see the growth of two forces in Canadian politics. The first was the organisation of the farmers, and then second the growing importance of labour, although the latter was the first to receive public attention (Young, 1969B, 14).

When McBride left the Conservative leadership in 1915 to go to England as the B.C. agent-general, Bowser became premier (Black, 1960, 18). There was a feeling about the poor leadership qualities which the latter possessed (Ormsby, 1958, 54), and Brewster, the Liberal leader, at the same time indicated that the Liberal Party would be responsive to the needs of the people. Thus in the B.C. 1916 Provincial election, the Conservatives were rejected and the Liberals were given a large victory (Ormsby, 1958, 387). This was the first major political reaction within the old party transplant in B.C. politics.

However, economic problems faced the new Liberal premier, and a continued lack of confidence in the Provincial government was accompanied by the farmers' concern about the future, with contracting markets and increasing production costs (Ormsby, 1953, 554-5). The
farmers themselves organised into a movement with J.L. Pridham as its chief proponent. As a result of his leadership the United Farmers of B.C. (UFBC) came into existence in 1917 (Ormsby, 1953, 56). Pridham accepted the Wood principle of 'group government' and rejected partyism (Ormsby, 1953, 56). Although the UFBC programme showed similarities to that of the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA), the farmers in B.C. did not have as intense a hostility to Eastern interests as Prairie agrarians (Ormsby, 1953, 57). Further, the UFBC movement sprang out of the Conservative Party, rather than, as on the Prairies, out of the Liberal Party (Ormsby, 1953, 73).

The other main force during this time, that of labour, was stimulated by the Russian Revolution and was given temporary direction by the setting up of the Canadian Labour Party in 1917. The reaction to these events on the part of the old party transplant was a thorough investigation of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) activities on the grounds that it was "attempting to spread sedition and ferment industrial unrest in B.C." (Robin, 1968, 164). The Federal government ordered thirteen organisations, including IWW, which appeared in 1906, to disband (Grantham, 1942, 108). In 1919, however, there was a call for One Big Union (OBU) at the Western Labour Conference (Robin, 1968, 177). The Vancouver council was the first one to adopt the conference proposal (Robin, 1968, 178), but there was little sympathy for OBU in Eastern Canada (Robin, 1968, 192). The state of unrest at this time following the war, was compounded by the problem of placing returning soldiers in employment (Ormsby, 1958, 405), and the Winnipeg general
strike was followed by sympathy strikes in Vancouver (Grantham, 1942, 122).

The farmer protest, apart from UFBC itself, became manifest in the rise of the Provincial Party in 1920 which represented a fusion of some elements of UFBC, dissatisfied veterans and politically minded Vancouver businessmen (Black, 1960, 21). To counter this, in the 1920 Provincial election the Liberals had to put up Labour, Soldier and Farmer candidates (Ormsby, 1958, 413). Henry Wise Wood had spoken against political action for the UFBC alone at their 1920 convention (Ormsby, 1953, 61). While the Provincial Party is seen as an agrarian protest movement, which was in full swing in Ontario and Western Canada (Black, 1960, 21), and was stimulated by the election of a UFO government in Ontario, the force of labour, on the other hand, became disunited. Internal dissension caused by inter-union rivalry finally destroyed the OBU and the B.C. wing defected in 1920 (Robin, 1968, 193). The SPC decided to contest only Vancouver and Prince Rupert in the Provincial election, and the apparent disruption of the labour movement by the advent of OBU led in 1920 to the disbanding of the B.C. Federation of Labour (Robin, 1968, 198).

Although the Liberals won the 1920 Provincial election, it was with a reduced number of seats. By 1921, the end of the alliance between the Liberals and organised labour was approaching (Hromnysky, 1965, 228), and by the autumn of that year there was growing dissension within the Liberal Party (Ormsby, 1958, 414).

At the Federal level, the farmer protest was organised around
the national Progressive Reconstruction Party, which, in the 1921 election gained 65 seats, and although this made it the second largest parliamentary group, the party did not choose to form the official opposition "because of their principles" (Young, 1969B, 32-3). Although this party gained 2 seats in B.C., and, in the 1924 Provincial election the Provincial Party gained 3 seats, third parties representing agricultural interests in B.C. to this time had not been as successful compared with the Prairies because of agricultural diversity and because the farmers were organised sufficiently well to gain their demands without direct political action (Dobie, 1936, 159). Dobie classifies the Farmers Party of 1920, the Provincial Party of 1922-1924, and the Peoples Party of 1932, all as 'Progressives', and notes that their main call was for the right kind of leadership (Dobie, 1936, 159). King, on the other hand, saw the Progressives as "impatient Liberals" (Young, 1969B, 30).

Thus, up to this time, although the reaction to the old party transplant was not felt with all-embracing protest parties, this phase in the development of the process saw the emergence of certain Progressive parties. However, increasingly so there was dissension within both old parties. In the Conservative Party, for example, in the period 1916-1922, 'Young Conservatives' considered that they had not got their share of patronage (Dobie, 1936, 158). Further, the reaffirmation of Bowser as Conservative leader brought much dissidence within the Conservative Party, and especially from the young Conservatives
The Provincial Party, which, as was noted above, had farmer support, emerged, and in the 1924 election their slogan was, with Oliver as Liberal premier, and Bowser the Conservative leader, "Turn Oliver out and don't let Bowser in" (Dobie, 1936, 159). The Provincial Party was to fight, among other things, for a reduction in freight rates (Ormsby, 1953, 69).

The Provincial Party contested its last election amid charges of Liberal corruption, and Ormsby has noted that the 1924 Provincial election was a revolt against "machine politics and the spoils system" (Ormsby, 1958, 423). Oliver tried to exploit the 'better terms' question (Hromnysky, 1965, 229), but both he and Bowser lost their seats and the Provincial Party elected three members. Bowser, angry, then decided to retire (Black, 1960, 22), and the Provincial Party faded quickly, some former Conservatives returning to the Conservative Party (Black, 1960, 23).

Meanwhile, the Russian Revolution had stimulated and retarded the growth of the labour movement. It stimulated enthusiasm among militant labour leaders, yet encouraged, apart from a general public reaction against socialism (Grantham, 1942, 139), the Communist Party of Canada to become affiliated with the CLP in 1924. This latter move had the effect, not of unifying the labour movement, but of dividing it by bringing into sharper focus the cleavage between radicals and moderates, and by 1926 the struggle between these two groups within the CLP reached a peak (Robin, 1968, 258).

Thus, the introduction of the party system into B.C. Provincial
politics, although perhaps providing some relative stability, certainly did not solve the problem of internal dissension and division within all of the parties during this period, which, in another sense, the introduction of the party system brought about. The old parties, however, were a 'safe anchor' amid a lack of union within the socialist movement, which, because of this was unable to provide the reaction to the old party transplant in this period.

The 'warring factions' within the Conservative Party finally led to the deposition of Bowser in 1926 and Tolmie was elected the new leader. However, from 1928 to 1933, the internal division and reaction within the Conservative Party continued. For example, there was a constant threat of defection of resentful 'Bowserites' (Dobie, 1936, 158). In the Liberal Party, Oliver died and McLean took over as leader, and the 1928 Provincial election was regarded primarily as a personality contest - McLean versus the local born and known Tolmie (Ormsby, 1958, 433). Further, the Liberal government was having problems especially with the PGE and the economic situation, and the Conservatives got in (Black, 1960, 24).

However, Tolmie's incumbency in Victoria marked the beginning of a long period of depression for the Conservative Party in B.C. Only once since would they send a greater number of MP's to Ottawa - in 1958 - and, at the Provincial level, they would never again win more than one-quarter of the total seats in the legislature. Black
has noted the apparent ineptitude of the Tolmie government (Black, 1960, 28), which may have related in part to the inexperience of the cabinet (Ormsby, 1958, 441). Dobie has pointed to the failure of Tolmie in 1928 to use his large majority for constructive policy-making in an attempt to apply relief measures. However, his failure to control party dissidents allowed the public to see that control of party rather than the public interest seemed to be the prime consideration of the government (Dobie, 1936, 160).

The internal conflict and reaction within the old party transplant continued, and, in 1931, the 'Bowserites' knew that, by demanding a convention, this would split the party and bring defeat in the next Provincial election (Dobie, 1936, 160). The Kidd Report of 1932 regarded government social services as a privilege, rather than as a right, as many people thought (Dobie, 1936, 161), just as the unions existed by permission, and not by right (Young, 1969B, 108). These two attitudes, deeply entrenched in the 'tory touch', would, in the end, contribute to its downfall in the 1972 election.

In the early 1930's, the 'tory touch', at a time of depression, was hardly likely to be successful, for philosophic rigidity of any kind has gained seats but never control in B.C. politics. The 'Bowserites' had already launched a 'citizenship movement' which was 'non-partisan'. In a prophetic statement on the future of his own party, Bowser claimed that "the day of party in Provincial politics was over" (Dobie, 1936, 162). General public discontent with B.C. political affairs, and the emergence of the CCF, which claimed that both old parties were bankrupt,
plus the disarray of the Conservative Party, gave the Liberals a victory in the 1933 Provincial election. Tolmie had proposed a 'union government' with the Liberals and appealed for support, but both Liberals and Conservatives opposed the idea (Black, 1960, 29). With the Conservatives split, many ran as independents. One Unionist was elected, and the Liberal Party formed the new government, with the CCF as the official opposition. The Liberal Party "was to meet the socialist challenge" and offered "practical idealism" as against "visionary socialism" (Dobie, 1936, 164). The call again was for pragmatism.

The Liberal victory in the 1933 Provincial election, and the CCF as the official opposition (a position which, until 1972, and, apart from 1937, it has held ever since in B.C. Provincial politics), marked the end of the phase where the two old parties were transplanted directly into B.C. Provincial politics. Dobie indicated at that time that the Liberals, unlike the Conservatives in B.C., had the basis to develop a party fitted to make a successful transition to "really socialised democracy" (Dobie, 1936, 166). One of the most important factors which brought the old party transplant phase to an end in B.C. politics was the ability of the left to effectively unite into one party. This is especially important in B.C. as it occurred at a time when the transplant appeared to be disintegrating anyway. This fact is important also, for it means that, in a diverse Province such as B.C. in terms of economy and society, the two-party system was unworkable. The protest parties can thus be regarded as reactions
against the attempt to 'constrain' this diversity.

PROTEST PARTY REACTION 1933-1952

During the transplanting of the old parties onto the radical base, there arose a series of protest/progressive/reform movements which have been discussed in general terms above. Most of these movements were fairly short-lived, and many were plagued by internal dissension and division, sometimes over the question of 'movement' versus 'party'. The Progressive movement was a product of the same feelings of "quasi-colonial" exploitation, and of frustrated ambitions, that led to the establishment of the CCF and Social Credit Parties (Young, 1969A, 15), and the period 1933 to 1952 was to see the emergence of these two main 'protest parties' in B.C. Provincial politics. The depression acted as a catalyst (Young, 1969B, 55).

When the CCF was established it appeared to have learnt the lesson from the Progressive experience, and was a "vigorous champion" of the parliamentary system (Young, 1969B, 39). While it took the depression to pave the way for a Social Credit government in Alberta, it took the depression in B.C. to bring about discussion of Social Credit ideas (Horsfield, 1953, 36). Social Credit doctrines were not imported, furthermore, from Alberta (Horsfield, 1953, 35).

Vancouver was the first to feel the business depression, and with it came social unrest (Ormsby, 1958, 442). The depression jolted the middle class, and it was they who began the revolt in Canada during the 1930's (Granatham, 1942, 166). While Social Credit
proposed to repair and modify the free enterprise system to make it work as it should on the frontier, the CCF proposed to substitute a better system (Young, 1969A, 36). In the eyes of many it was the capitalist system which had failed, and, in B.C., this was symbolised both in the collapse of the Conservative Party and in the birth of the CCF whose aim it was to replace that system. The introduction of the CCF into B.C. Provincial politics was therefore appropriate, for it was a reaction to what the old party transplant stood for, whereas Social Credit at this time was not. Furthermore, the legacy of the radical base in B.C., before the old party transplant, was an important ingredient. Two further reactions in the general process, however, were still to come.

In order to examine the protest reactions a little more fully, we need to discuss the B.C. political culture from 1933 to 1952 in more detail.

THE B.C. POLITICAL CULTURE 1933–1952

The final movement toward a united socialist party began in earnest in October 1929 when various independent labour parties in Western Canada convened in Regina and formed a Western Conference of Labour Parties (Robin, 1968, 269). In 1931, two intellectuals, Frank Scott and Frank Underhill agreed that Canada needed a new political party and, as a beginning, they established a society, the League for Social Reconstruction (LSR) in Toronto (Young, 1969A, 52–3). By early summer 1932 branches of the LSR were in Vancouver and Victoria (Grantham, 1942, 188). The growing discontent among farm
and labour groups in the West culminated in the Calgary conference of 1932, and by 1933 the Regina Manifesto of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) had been formulated. The programme was designed to appeal to farmers, trade unions, small businessmen, the unemployed, as well as doctrinaire socialists (Ormsby, 1958, 452). The LSR, however, had more influence than any of the affiliated groups in the CCF (Young, 1969A, 75).

The SPC (BC) was the only organised representative at Calgary (Grantham, 1942, 203). On the basis of press and radio reports after the Calgary conference, CCF clubs sprang up all over B.C. (Sanford, 1961, 100). However, in the 1933 election, it was opposed by business, industry, the old parties, the press, and even some religious influences (Grantham, 1942, 234). The CCF/NDP would come to power in B.C. only when both old parties opposed the party in power, and not CCF/NDP. Because of the Conservative demise at this time, many traditional Conservatives voted Liberal, and even so, the new party gained 32 per cent of the vote and 7 seats (Sanford, 1961, 104). Since that time, CCF/NDP has never had less than 28 per cent of the popular vote (Table III), in B.C. Provincial elections, better than both old parties. Pattullo thus became the new Liberal premier and promised a 'new deal' (Ormsby, 1958, 453). The 1933 Provincial election in B.C. has been termed a 'watershed' in Provincial affairs (Sherman, 1966, 24).

At about the same time, a reporter, Henry Torey, gained some information about Social Credit theories from an English newspaper, and he and William Tutte began a study group in 1932 (Horsfield, 1953,
They were joined by William Rose and the group became known as the Douglas Social Credit group, B.C. section, although they did not function outside of Vancouver or organise politically for several years (Horsfield, 1953, 37-8).

When in 1935 the Social Credit Party came to power in Alberta, the Social Credit League of B.C. was obtaining a charter for a political party. This then became the B.C. Social Credit League (Horsfield, 1953, 46). The United Farmers of Canada announced their intention in 1936 to coordinate efforts to elect a Social Credit government in B.C. (Ormsby, 1953, 73). Due to the failure of Aberhart, on a matter of interpretation of Douglas theories, to woo the B.C. Social Credit League, he set up the B.C. Credit Union which acknowledged him as the national leader of the movement (Horsfield, 1953, 48-9).

After Tolmie's resignation in 1936, Patterson became the leader of the Conservative Party (Black, 1960, 32). In the 1937 Provincial election, although the Liberals won again, they had a reduced number of seats, and the Conservatives became the official opposition for the last time. Economic conditions had improved by this time, especially in mining (Ormsby, 1958, 467). With the improved performance of the Conservative Party, the Kamloops convention in 1938 was regarded by one writer as "the beginnings of the renaissance of the Conservative Party" (Atkinson, 1941, 375). Further, although the Social Credit League was giving him public support, Pattullo began to lose favour in 1939 especially after another 'battle with Ottawa' over finance (Ormsby, 1958, 471). By this time the CCF was stronger
than in 1933 (Young, 1969B, 65), and during the period 1940 to 1945 it reached its peak (Young, 1969B, 67). One writer even went as far as to predict that the CCF would become the B.C. Provincial government in the 1941 Provincial election (Brown, 1940, 169). At the Federal level, on the other hand, CCF managed to elect only one member from B.C. in the 1940 election.

The period 1941 to 1952 again saw a number of moves designed to frustrate the growing importance of the CCF and keep it from power. For example, in the 1941 B.C. Provincial election, the number of Liberal seats was cut from 31 to 21, while CCF gained 14 seats, and became again the official opposition. Maitland, the Conservative leader thus called for a union government which would include the CCF, but Winch, the CCF leader, declined (Ormsby, 1958, 477). The Liberal and Conservative parties, however, maintained a tacit relationship at this time, fearing further growth of a joint adversary.

The transition from movement to party by the CCF was paralleled by a concern with urban socialism and a closer alignment with the trade unions than the farmers, especially outside the Prairies (Young, 1969A, 87). It is significant, therefore, that, in 1943, the industrial unions endorsed CCF as their political arm (Young, 1969B, 74).

A year later, Manning, the premier of Alberta, began to organise the Social Credit Association of Canada (Horsfield, 1953, 62), and in December 1944 the Social Credit Association was launched. The point was emphasised at that time that Social Credit and Socialism
were opposite philosophies (Horsfield, 1953, 64). The Social Credit League ran candidates in the 1949 Provincial election but none were elected, and the League gained only 1.6 per cent of the vote (Horsfield, 1953, 79).

The B.C. coalition government embodied the reaction to the perceived growth in CCF support, and gradually, from 1941, the number of CCF seats dropped from 14 to 7 in 1949. However, the coalition government itself, like the socialist parties before 1933, was undergoing continued strain and internal disagreement (Black, 1960, 40). In the 1949 Federal election the Conservative Party hit its lowest ebb since 1904 and gained only three seats in B.C. With the discontent with Anscomb as leader of the party at the 1950 convention, and the growing split between Federal and Provincial organisations (Black, 1960, 44), Anscomb indicated that the Liberal-Conservative agreement would end at the next election (Horsfield, 1953, 79). The final blow was a report strongly critical of the Hospital Insurance Scheme which was brought before the legislature and which divided the Liberals and Conservatives (Horsfield, 1953, 80).

In December 1951, a leading Conservative, unhappy for some time over the performance of the coalition left the party, and, with a small group of followers, allied himself with the Social Credit League (Black, 1960, 49). This party suddenly took on a 'crusading quality' in B.C. (Horsfield, 1953, 83), and its programme included a range of 'progressive' policies including the abolition of compulsory hospital insurance (Horsfield, 1953, 84). It was a perfect moment for
an alternate party to CCF to appeal to the electorate — to the north, the rural voters wanting roads, and the businessman in the cities who feared the progress of CCF (Ormsby, 1958, 487). The promise was for a middle-of-the-road free-enterprise government (Ormsby, 1958, 489). The introduction of the alternative voting system was the other main way the coalition of old parties hoped to frustrate the CCF. However, this system in the 1952 Provincial election helped Social Credit, for it meant that second choices were often in their favour (if not the first) in a registration of dissatisfaction with the old parties (Angus, 1952). Further, by giving Social Credit first choice, the electorate were still voting for a conservative form of government (Horsfield, 1953, 87).

Thus, with the 1952 election, government by old party transplant came to an end. The progress of the CCF was impeded by a conservative protest party. Social Credit was a reaction to the old parties as well as to socialism, but still kept the 'tory touch', while CCF was a reaction to what these parties represented. The 'Liberal remnant' still remained after the 1952 and 1953 Provincial elections, while the Conservatives disappeared until 1972.

THE SOCIAL CREDIT REACTION 1952-1972

The period from 1952 to 1972 was essentially a time of consolidation of a political culture that was B.C.-based. The year 1952 can thus be regarded as a point at which the political culture of B.C. 'congealed'. The Conservatives had no-one in the legislature
from 1956, and the system became essentially three-party with Social Credit in power, CCF/NDP as the official opposition, with a small number of seats going to the Liberal Party. The culture was finally set in the 1953 election when the voting procedure was 'normalised' and Social Credit gained a healthy victory.

There was little concern in the 1952 election with Social Credit philosophy or the party's inexperience (Ormsby, 1958, 489). Furthermore, the 1953 campaign saw a shift of business support from the old parties to Social Credit (Sanford, 1961, 209). This more than anything symbolised the congealment of the B.C. political culture, and legitimised the reaction to the old party transplant. This transplant continued to disintegrate, or, at least, the Conservative part of it. By 1954, the Conservative Federal and Provincial associations were split, and, at that time, Bennett claimed that many disaffected Conservatives were joining the Social Credit 'movement' (Black, 1960, 54). The Conservative split culminated in the publication of the "Blue Book" which gave "some of the reasons for the motion of No Confidence in the national leader" (Black, 1960, 55).

The 1956 Provincial election saw the consolidation of Social Credit support, while the Conservative Provincial association could only find 22 candidates to contest 52 seats, and all were defeated (Black, 1960, 58). Bennett was now claiming that the CCF and Social Credit Parties "were the only intact political alternatives in B.C." (Ormsby, 1958, 489). However, the Conservative Party in B.C. took a major temporary upswing in popularity when Diefenbaker became National
leader, and in the 1958 Federal election gained 18 seats, their best ever showing in B.C. The apparent sudden growth in unity was attributed to the new leader (Black, 1960, 62).

The pragmatic politics of Social Credit were demonstrated in the 1960 Provincial election when the slogan was 'vote for the Government that gets things done' (Smiley, 1962, 122). The Social Credit strategy for the sharp rise in unemployment at that time was to 'blame Ottawa' (Sanford, 1961, 231). Further, the home-ownership grant was raised to 'stop Socialism' (Sherman, 1966, 206). From 1960 on, the idea of Social Credit as a negative reaction to socialism was an important part of Social Credit strategy. However, the idea of the 'socialist hordes' at subsequent elections was, in the end, an overplayed one, especially to an increasingly educated electorate.

Meanwhile, the CCF Regina Manifesto, by 1950, had come to be regarded as outdated (Young, 1969B, 75). First, the Winnipeg Declaration in 1956, and then, in 1958, the CCF and CLC cooperated to form a 'new party' which was created in July 1961 (Young, 1969B, 77). The presence of representatives from farming organisations was more of a historical than political significance (Young, 1969A, 75). The New Democratic Party represented a move towards the model of the British Labour Party (Young, 1964). With the affiliation with the trade unions, use could be made of union dues for party activities (Sanford, 1961, 257). However, Bennett introduced Bill 42 shortly after, which forbade this possibility, and all unions had to declare and sign that they would abide by it (Sherman, 1966, 188).
The Social Credit Party became increasingly equivalent to what the old parties stood for in B.C. As was mentioned earlier, one of the features of the phase of the old party transplant was the struggle between the two parties to retain or capture the 'benefits' of office. The parallel under Social Credit caused Davie Fulton, as Conservative leader in 1963, to crusade for integrity in government (McGeer, 1972, 49). Bill 42 was reminiscent also of the situation under the old party transplant where the unions, like the social services, existed by permission, rather than by right. As we have seen and argued, the presence of dictatorial attitudes and an authoritarian system of control on an expanding frontier in the twentieth century are doomed to failure. It is interesting to note, in relation to this argument, that by February 1965, Bennett had become the longest-serving Provincial premier in B.C. history beating McBride (Sherman, 1966, 306). Further, just as, in 1952, the hospital issue was an important factor which precipitated the reaction against the old party government, so, in 1966, the B.C. Hospital Association Report branded B.C.'s five largest hospitals as obsolete, but nothing was seemingly done by the Social Credit government (McGeer, 1972, 115). This is important, because hospitals, and other social services were to become issues in the 1972 Provincial election.

Social Credit, then, was characterised by pragmatic politics (McGeer, 1972, 187), an authoritarian outlook (Sherman, 1966, 84), and an anti-parliamentary attitude (Smiley, 1962, 121). Robin has argued, however, that the desire for strong leadership in B.C. is due more
likely to "the effects of the acquisitive frontier" than to authoritarian attitudes (Robin, 1972A, 41). McGeer argues that the Social Credit movement in many ways is symbolised by Gaglardi - his driving habits, his jet trips, his tendency to ignore the law and so on (McGeer, 1972, 186-193). His final verdict is that the Bennett government undermined institutions it should have defended (McGeer, 1972, 232).

Social Credit had shown itself to be a more effective anti-socialist machine than either of the two other non-socialist parties (Angus, 1952, 524). The 'red scare' campaign in the 1969 Provincial election, however, was the last time Social Credit could use this tactic with any credulity. The existence of socialism as a main alternative, increased the independence of Bennett from the economic elite (Robin, 1967, 210). This contrived to make him extremely powerful, and his aim became to keep power at virtually any price (McGeer, 1972, 216). For Bennett in B.C. a political label mattered little. What mattered was, could he do the job (Young, 1969B, 104). The Social Credit Party had become the B.C. equivalent of the old party transplant. However, the party fitted the Provincial political culture - it was a conservative party with a 'radical touch' (Smiley, 1962, 121).

Since the 1969 Provincial election, there had been growing dissatisfaction within Social Credit ranks, particularly in relation to the leadership issue, and in relation to the provision of social
services. The first problem was to do with Bennett himself and his dictatorial attitude to, among others, members of his own party. Second, was Bennett's age, and the question of his successor. Third, was the improvement of services, especially the hospital service.

In the 1969 Provincial election, despite the shortcoming in the hospital programme, Dr. Scott Wallace defeated the incumbent Liberal in Oak Bay (McGeer, 1972, 114). However, Dr. Wallace was one of two defectors to the Conservative Party who, in the 1972 election, would be running with a revived Conservative Party. Change was in the air in the 1972 election, and the fact that the Social Credit Party was the only one going into the election without a new leader, symbolised their inability, or refusal, to change.

**THE NDP REACTION, 1972**

The Conservative Party, revived by their acquisition of two MLA's as well as a new leader, also revived Davie Fulton's 'platform of integrity' from 1963, the year of the highest fractionalisation index since Social Credit came to power (Table III). The Liberal Party, too, had a new leader, who, fresh from a 'fight' over tanker and oil routes down the B.C. coast at the Federal level, was now joining the other 'urban fighters' to 'fight' Social Credit.

During the campaign, both old parties exposed weaknesses in the Social Credit programme and past performance. The NDP, on the other hand, refused to be baited and refused to rouse the opposition which would undoubtedly react against them. Their strategy was a 'quiet campaign', and this had the effect of virtually nullifying
Bennett attempts to appeal once more to 'red scare' tactics effectively.

The symbolism of Social Credit as the spectre of the old party transplant was evident in the issues of the age of the government, or the age of Bennett, which were raised during the 1972 campaign (see Chapter VI). Bennett's removal from the interests of the people was symbolised by his lone, secretive campaigning in various areas of the Province. The internal problems of organisation and leadership were exemplified by the refusal of the local organisation in Chilliwack to endorse Harvey Schroeder (who won the seat), and culminated in the public attack on Bennett by Gaglardi, who, as McGeer points out, symbolised much of what Social Credit stood for. With this in mind, and the view that perhaps the Social Credit Party appealed more to authoritarian characters, then following Fromm, such characters can also be recognised by "the hatred that cries against an authority when its power is weakened and when it begins to totter" (Fromm, 1941, 169). Arguing this way, we can recognise that some Social Credit voters in the 1972 election would react against Social Credit and switch their vote, perhaps to the revived Conservative Party. Thus, like the coalition in 1949 which was beset with internal problems and was defeated, so was the Social Credit Party in 1972.

The reaction against Social Credit also came after the party had alienated a number of groups, such as the doctors, the teachers and labour. Funds from teachers groups, for example, were used to
further the campaign of those candidates who stood the best chance of defeating Social Credit candidates. In the case of labour, the Teamster's Union, normally non-partisan, committed itself to financial and other assistance to candidates who voted in the legislature in March 1971 against the government decision to order striking Teamsters back to work under the Mediation Commission Act.

As has been noted, the NDP was the most successful in crystallizing the mood of the electorate at this time. Their campaign theme - 'Tell them. Enough is Enough' - "Invited the voters to reject a party that no longer seemed capable of running its own affairs much less the province's" (Smith, 1972, 8). The NDP campaign slogan is borrowed from Cecil King, when, in May 1968, he published his 'enough is enough' article in the Daily Mirror demanding Harold Wilson's resignation. It is an ironic situation when a formerly anti-Labour slogan is used to elect the B.C. equivalent.

The reaction against the Social Credit Party in the 1972 B.C. Provincial election can thus be regarded as an integral part of a general dynamic process - a series of actions and reactions throughout the history of B.C. politics producing a distinctive political culture.

CONCLUSION

The argument has been made in this chapter that the B.C. party system is essentially class-based. Further, that B.C. politics represent a distinctive political culture in Canada, and is therefore better described, not as the West, but as 'the West beyond the West'. The
development of this culture has been presented as a dynamic process of action and reaction in a 'neo-Hartzian' framework. The main stages in this process - the development of a radical base, the transplant of the old parties as a reaction to this base, the protest parties as a reaction to this transplant and to each other, the final congealment of the political culture in 1952, and the NDP reaction to the Social Credit segment of that culture - have all been described and analysed.

As the result of the 1972 election, in this argument, is an integral part of this process, then voting behaviour in that election is clarified with reference to the history of the Provincial political context. The 1972 reaction is therefore not to be seen in isolation. To demonstrate that this was a conscious reaction, respondents to the questionnaire were asked why they voted the way they did (see Appendix I). Table IV gives the results of this. It will be noted that

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<th>TABLE IV  Reasons Given for Voting Decisions</th>
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<td>Area 1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Candidates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Always Voted This Way</td>
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<td>No Choice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfied As Is</td>
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<td>Anti-NDP</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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consistently in each area, at least 20 per cent of respondents gave as their reason for voting the way they did as something which could be categorized as 'reaction', such as, for example, "wanted a Social Credit defeat" or "get Social Credit out". In all three areas the 'reaction reason for voting was the most important one. It is interesting to note that, from Table VI there were more respondents in Area 2 (Marpole) than in any other area who were satisfied with the situation as it was at the time of the election - that is, did not want Social Credit to be defeated. Similarly, in Area 1 (Hastings East) no respondent voted for reasons stated to be anti-NDP, whilst Area 3 (Dunbar-Southlands) had the largest percentage of respondents who stated that they voted for anti-NDP reasons. This is consistent with expectations in relation to a model of political space which will be put forward and elaborated upon in the next chapter - that is, that voters living within a particular voting zone in the city of Vancouver, and with particular attachments to and associations within that zone, tend to vote with the 'majority feeling' (usually in relation to the voting history) of that zone.
CHAPTER III

MIGRATION AND THE MODEL OF POLITICAL SPACE IN VANCOUVER

This chapter has two main aims. First, to define 'zones of latent partisanship' in the city and present a model of political space describing the general political norms of particular city areas. Second, to analyse personal migration histories taken from the voter survey (see Appendix I) in an attempt to ascertain whether the model is a stable representation of the general electoral pattern in the city, or whether, in fact, it is undergoing change. Tentative evidence suggests that the zones, in general, are performing an agglomerative function - that is, they are acting as collecting areas for individuals with similar political preferences. On the basis of this conclusion it is reasonable to argue that the electoral pattern in Vancouver is becoming increasingly segregated and thus tending toward stability.

A MODEL OF POLITICAL SPACE IN VANCOUVER

In terms of the first aim of this chapter, voting behaviour at the Provincial level was mapped by poll in terms of the winning party in each poll for the last four elections - 1963, 1966, 1969 and 1972. The result is therefore a generalisation of the dominant pattern. The 1963 election was used as a starting point because this was the first election contested in Vancouver by the New Democratic Party. There was some slight problem in matching all of the boundaries
for polls over that time span, but, in general, using the 1972 poll map as a base, there were few real problems in this regard. The results of this are given in Map 2. A party had to win a poll at least 3 of 4 times to qualify to claim it as its territory. Further, any poll which had been won at least twice by a different party was classified as 'mixed'. In view of the minimal success of the Conservative Party in Vancouver since 1963, the map has only three other classifications - Liberal, NDP and Social Credit.

The spatial regularities in voting behaviour in the last four elections emerge rather clearly from the map. The area west of Granville Street, excluding Kitsilano has remained fairly solidly Liberal from 1963 with only four minor Social Credit 'intrusions' and one 'mixed' area. Apart from a relatively small section east of Granville between 52nd and 59th, this is the only area of consistent Liberal strength in the city. Between Granville and Fraser, south of 16th, there is a marked zone of consistent Social Credit support. This zone tapers off to the east of Fraser into an area of mixed Social Credit and NDP support. Other areas of consistent Social Credit support are the West End, especially north of Burrard, and Chinatown, which emerges as a Social Credit block virtually surrounded by NDP support. The area to the east of Chinatown, the area to the east of the mixed Social Credit-NDP support, and much of Kitsilano are all characterised by fairly consistent support for the NDP. The polls which are classified on the map as 'mixed' all tend to be
MAP 2
THE VOTING PATTERN
IN THE
CITY OF VANCOUVER BC 1963-1972

LIBERAL
N.D.P
SOCIAL CREDIT
MIXED
located at the margins of an area of support for a particular party. Thus the area from 13th to 16th from Granville to Collingwood is an area of 'mixed' polls acting as a kind of 'buffer' between the Liberal area to the south and the NDP area to the north. Similarly, the area running north-south along the east side of Granville from 22nd to 52nd acts as a buffer between the Liberal area to the west and the Social Credit area to the east. It is interesting to note, that the separation of Social Credit and NDP areas to the east of Fraser is marked by a 'zone of transition' rather than an area of 'mixed' polls. One final area of such polls surround the CBD, which itself has remained fairly consistently NDP.

Two interesting areas for possible future research emerge from the map, and also from a consideration of the argument presented in Chapter II. The first is concerned with relatively small areas which are surrounded by zones of consistent support for a different party. There are the examples in the area west of Granville, for example, of Social Credit support surrounded by a zone of Liberal support. Similarly, there are two or three NDP polls in the Social Credit zone, and, in Kitsilano, a Social Credit area surrounded by NDP support. The basic question thus would be, what kinds of things characterise these anomalies? How are they differentiated from the surrounding areas? Are there any distinctive spatial associations common to cases which are similar? The second area relates to the argument in Chapter II, but transferred to the voting map of Vancouver. What changes were there in the voting map after each major reaction in
the history of B.C. politics? A comparative historical analysis of this kind may yield some interesting results.

Figure 1  Model of Political Space in Vancouver

However, perhaps a more basic question in terms of the present discussion is, how can this map be generalised, and does any distinctive spatial pattern emerge which may suggest certain things to us about urban structure? If we abstract very slightly from the map we can draw a map similar to that shown in Figure 1. This may be called a
model of political space for Vancouver. Such models, have been ignored by urban and electoral geographers alike. There is no good reason why a model of political space of this kind should not be just as valid a description of urban spatial structure as models in the past which have used either socio-economic data or functional zones as their base. The difference in approach inferred here is one between the use of formal or functional regions in models of urban structure. However, Figure 1 presents both a formal and a functional model. It is a formal model in the sense that the zones are defined in the traditional formal geographic manner, and, it is functional from the viewpoint of the competing political parties, as will be demonstrated in Chapter VI. Furthermore, and more importantly with regard to this dissertation, the political zones will act as political norms for individuals living within relatively integrated areas. Within such areas the 'area norm' (or a shared set of standards or rules) will operate to structure the voting behaviour of inhabitants in particular directions.

The model of political space described in Figure 1 is highly suggestive of a zonal/sectoral arrangement between 1963 and 1972 in Vancouver. Again, as in Map 2, the divisions between the zones are not absolute but are marked by 'zones of transition'. The model consists of an inner ring - the CBD - which is characterised by NDP support, surrounded by a broken ring of Social Credit support. This is again surrounded by a further ring of NDP support which merges with and NDP sector in the east. The outer or fourth ring consists of a
series of sectors - the Liberal sector in the west, the Social Credit sector in the centre, and the NDP sector in the east. The Social Credit sector and NDP sector of the outer ring are separated by a mixed zone of Social Credit and NDP support which tends to parallel Kingsway which provides its northern boundary.

Although traditional models of urban structure apparently fail to describe adequately the nature of the city of Vancouver (Hardwick, 1971, 112), the model of political space outlined above accords well with a description of the central system in an alternative model (Hardwick, 1971, 112-114). The inner zone in Figure 4 accords with the inner ring of CBD in this model. Second, the "zone of transition" accords with the bisected Social Credit ring in our model. Third, the "inner city housing area" (Hardwick, 1971, 114) fits with our third ring of NDP support. Fourth, the "old suburban single family areas" which are "socially segregated neighbourhoods" accords with our series of four sectors in our outer zone. No mention is made in the description of the central system, however, of a sectoral arrangement of the outer zone. It may be that the outer zone socio-economically does not exhibit any sectoral pattern, yet Peucker and Rase, using the 1961 census as a base, which admittedly is outside the temporal span under discussion here, point to the possibility of a sectorial trend (Peucker and Rase, 1971, 85).

It is important to note here that the zonal-sectoral model of political space presented here fits well with recent calls for an integrated model of urban structure. Johnston, for example calls for
such a model, and states that socio-economic status groups tend to concentrate within certain sectors, and within each sector there is a zonal arrangement (Johnston, 1971, 119). A zonal-sectoral pattern has been noted by Robson in Sunderland (Robson, 1969). Further, Timms has noted that the zonal and sector models each are presented and discussed as if they were "total schemes capable of capturing all, or nearly all, of the significant variation in the urban residential structure" (Timms, 1971, 229). He too argues for the integration of the two models (Timms, 1971, 229). Thus, distinct phases in the development of the B.C. political culture can be compared in a spatial sense in Vancouver by examining the models of political space during these phases. Often, as was argued in Chapter II, such changes relate to the introduction of a new political element into the political system. In a social sense, therefore, change can be examined in relation to the introduction onto the urban scene of new social elements, such as minority groups. Thus, most of the work which has been done in this regard examines the invasion of areas by distinct racial groups (Johnston, 1971, 179).

Of course, models of political space like that outlined above, similar to models of urban social structure, can be used for comparative purposes, both temporally - at different times at the same location - and cross-culturally. There may be some problem in terms of the different political systems - for example, a different political party structure - but cross-cultural comparison of such models of political space (especially between cities which invite comparison - such as
Vancouver and Perth), would produce some interesting results. Such results would be useful both to urban as well as political geography.

MIGRATION AND POLITICAL ZONES

In terms of the second aim of this chapter, an analysis of whether individual intra-urban migration is contributing to the change or stability of the electoral pattern entails a consideration of two main possibilities concerning the interrelationship between change of residence and voting behaviour.

First, individuals may change their voting behaviour as a result of moving into a different political zone. This would promote stability in the electoral pattern. Second, individuals may take their political preference with them when they move. This may affect the electoral pattern in two main ways. First, if individuals whose political preference is similar to that of the area of 'latent partisanship' in which they live move to an area of different 'latent partisanship', this would induce change in the electoral pattern. Conversely, individuals whose political preference is different to that of the area of 'latent partisanship' in which they live may move to an area in which the political norm is similar to their own political preference. This would reinforce stability in the electoral pattern. These possibilities raise a series of questions which will be examined here.

First, were there any changes in individual voting behaviour from 1966 to 1969 to 1972? Second, if there were any changes, are
they associated with changes in residential zones? In this regard, there may have been some intra-urban migration, yet to a similar political zone. If this were the case, with regard to our argument, then voting behaviour would not change. Further, there may be a definable pattern to intra-urban migration which could have two facets. First, that individuals migrate to similar political zones within the city. Second, that their 'status aspirations' encourage migration from, say, the "inner city housing area" of NDP support, to the "socially segregated neighbourhoods", and, in particular, to a zone of perceived higher social status, such as the Liberal zone, for example. The second major question above may be reversed in order to ask a third, namely, if there have been no changes in individual voting behaviour from 1966 to 1972, have there been any changes in residential zones, either to similar zone types or to different zone types?

This question raises a series of alternative questions. The basic question here is, how far does voting behaviour in the 1972 election relate to political zones of residence in which individuals have previously lived? In other words, do individuals tend to take their urban political sub-culture with them when they move to a different political zone? In an operational sense, therefore, is voting behaviour in the 1972 B.C. Provincial election associated with previous zones of residence which differ from those in which individuals currently live? Four other questions emerge from this main one. First, is voting behaviour associated with
previous political zones if they are similar to those in which individuals currently live? Second, is voting behaviour associated with previous political zones if they are different from those in which individuals currently live? Third, is voting behaviour associated with the last zone of residence, or with a zone from which an individual moved relatively recently? Fourth, is voting behaviour associated with the sum total of previous political zones in which an individual has lived?

CHANGES IN VOTING BEHAVIOUR

With regard to the first series of questions above, data on voting behaviour in the three elections from 1966 to 1972 were collected (see Appendix I). In each of the elections area and voting behaviour are found to be consistently associated*, as the model of political space implies. However, with regard to changes in individual voting behaviour, Table V demonstrates that, comparing behaviour in 1972 with 1969 and 1966, there have been considerable shifts. The Tau C associations† indicate in all cases negative associations, although weak, between voting behaviour in 1966 compared with 1972, and voting behaviour in 1969 compared with 1972. This is further evidence of the 1972 election being an 'election of reaction', as was argued in Chapter II.

* at the 0.005 level

† Kendall's Tau C is a nonparametric index of association varying from -1 to +1 depending on the degree of association.
TABLE V  Area Versus Voting Behaviour, 1966-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1972 Vote</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area 1</td>
<td>Area 2</td>
<td>Area 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 vote</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 vote</td>
<td>-0.167</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1969 Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966 vote</td>
<td>0.525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, in Area 1, of those respondents voting Social Credit in 1969, 60 per cent voted NDP in 1972, and only 13 per cent voted Social Credit in 1972. This raises the possibility, that, at a time of reaction, switchers go from the government party to the party representing what may be called the 'area norm' - the NDP in our model. The consistency of the 'area norm' is demonstrated by the fact that, in Area 1, of those voting NDP in 1969, 79 per cent voted NDP in 1972, and 4 per cent voted Social Credit. The consistency of the Social Credit vote, on the other hand was much higher in Area 2, the 'area norm' for which, according to our model, is the Social Credit party. For example, of those voting Social Credit in 1969, 50 per cent voted Social Credit in 1972. Consistency of vote in terms of the other parties, however, was again greater in Area 2. For example, all NDP voters in 1969 voted NDP in 1972, and 69 per cent of those voting Liberal in 1969 voted Liberal in 1972, although 13 per cent switched to Social Credit, and 13 per cent to NDP. Further,
40 per cent of those voting Progressive Conservative in 1972 had voted Social Credit in 1969. In Area 3, the consistency of Liberal support from 1969 to 1972 attests to the importance of that party as the 'area norm' - 68 per cent of those voting Liberal in 1969 voted Liberal in 1972, although there was some switching (11 per cent) to NDP. The NDP vote, however, was even more consistent, with 71 per cent of those voting NDP in 1969 voting NDP in 1972, although there was some reverse switching (22 per cent) to the Liberal Party. Of those voting Social Credit in 1969 in Area 3, 47 per cent voted Social Credit in 1972, whereas 24 per cent switched to the Progressive Conservatives and 18 per cent to the Liberals. It is evident then that, in Area 3, as in Area 1, there was some switching from 1969 to 1972 to the 'area norm' - in this case, the Liberal Party.

The changes in individual voting behaviour from 1966 to 1972 and from 1969 to 1972 contrast markedly with the consistency which is evident between 1966 and 1969. Table V shows that in all three areas the Tau C value was highly positive, with Area 3 having the strongest association, and Area 2 the weakest. It may be, therefore, with the lack of any evidence to the contrary, that voting behaviour is relatively stable from one election to the next, save for such 'elections of reaction' as in 1972.

VOTING SHIFTS AND RESIDENCE CHANGE

Having now demonstrated that there were marked changes in the voting behaviour of individuals from 1966 to 1972 and from 1969 to 1972, we may address our second question - whether such changes are associated
with changes in residence from one political zone to another. Table VI gives the residential history of respondents in each area for the three locations before the present one. As will be noted, in terms of stability of residence, Area 1 is the most stable, followed by Area 3 and then Area 2. The most important zone for the last house of residence for respondents in Area 1 was an NDP zone, followed by the mixed Social Credit/NDP zone. In contrast, the most important zone for the last house of residence for respondents in Area 2 was a Social Credit zone, followed by the Liberal and the Social Credit/NDP zones. One might expect from this that respondents in Area 3 came last from the Liberal zone, but this is not the case. The most important zones in Area 3 were equally Social Credit and NDP with Liberal coming next. With these points in mind, it would appear that to demonstrate a clear association between change in individual voting behaviour and change in individual residence would be extremely difficult, especially in Areas 1 and 2.

Two lines of inquiry were attempted. First, an attempt was made to see if there was any association between 1972 voting behaviour and whether respondents had lived elsewhere. Second, an attempt was made to see if residence outside the present area would be associated with 1972 voting behaviour, holding 1969 voting behaviour constant. With regard to the first line of inquiry, in all three areas there were very weak associations between 1972 voting behaviour and whether respondents had lived elsewhere. In Area 1 (Tau C = -0.073), for example, of those voting NDP in 1972, 49 per cent had lived in another
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SC Zone</th>
<th>NDP Zone</th>
<th>Lib Zone</th>
<th>SC/NDP Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Last</td>
<td>3rd Last</td>
<td>2nd Last</td>
<td>3rd Last</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Last House</td>
<td>Last House</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadn't Lived in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another Zone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived Outside</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanc. Last</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>7 8 3 0</td>
<td>19 3 1</td>
<td>2 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1 32 4 1</td>
<td>10 1 3</td>
<td>15 6 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0 19 4 4</td>
<td>19 1 1</td>
<td>15 9 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
part of the city. Similarly, 33 per cent of Social Credit voters had lived elsewhere. However, of those having lived in another area of the city, 54 per cent voted NDP in 1972.

Although changes in individual voting behaviour have been observed in all areas, changes in the nature of the political zone type in which respondents have previously lived have been relatively small. One might perhaps expect therefore, that only in Area 3 will we observe the possibility of 'conversion' — that is, a change in voting behaviour as a result of migration between different political zones. However, the above evidence suggests the operation of part of our second possibility noted above — that is, when individuals move they tend to take their political preference with them — in this case they tend to move to a zone whose political norm is the same as their own political preference. However, the process may differ in Area 3 where in-migration may have been the result, in part, of 'status aspirations' and/or social mobility.

One interesting point which does emerge from the data is that voters voting in relation to the area norm in all three areas have been relatively the most mobile in the sense that they have lived in other areas of Vancouver. We have already noted this above in relation to the NDP voter in Area 1. In Area 2 (\( \tau C = -0.073 \)), Social Credit voters were the most mobile. For example, of those voting Social Credit in 1972, 87 per cent had lived in another part of the city, compared with 67 per cent of those voting NDP. Further, in area 3 (\( \tau C = -0.061 \)), 75 per cent of those voting Liberal in 1972 had lived
in another area of the city, compared with 70 per cent of those voting Social Credit. It is therefore possible to argue here that those who are the most mobile in each area, after having lived in other parts of Vancouver have 'retreated' into their local area and assumed more strongly localised associations than inhabitants who have not lived elsewhere. This argument accords with recent ideas concerning the "security aspect" of local areas (Johnston, 1971, 110), and the possible operation of some kind of 'retreat' process in those areas for reasons of social and economic security.

The impact of insecurity, due in part to mobility, may, after a length of time, encourage individuals to develop relatively strong attachments to particular areas\(^1\), and adhere to those area norms - in this particular instance the voting behaviour norm. This is an area of future research. However, if it be true, then each of the local areas would be expected to be perceived as distinct, and function, in general, as localised territorial units. This will be discussed further in Chapter IV.

In order to attempt to relate changes in voting behaviour more directly to changes in residence, 1972 voting behaviour was correlated with length of residence in the present area, holding 1969 voting behaviour constant. This was repeated holding 1966 voting behaviour constant. The results of this analysis, however, did not add any substantiation to our first possibility noted above - that relocation in a different political zone is associated with a change in voting

\(^1\) Especially in areas possessing remnants of frontier values - see Chapter II.
behaviour. For example, associations for the whole sample, as well as individual areas, holding 1966 voting behaviour constant, were generally very weak or weak. Holding 1969 voting behaviour constant, only one party and one zone demonstrated an association - the NDP and the NDP zone.

This suggests two things. First, that changes in voting behaviour are not necessarily associated with changes of residence. Second, that norms in the NDP zone are probably stronger than in the other zones. Even here, however, associations were generally not very strong. For example, for the whole sample, there was a fair negative association (τ = −0.233) between 1972 voting behaviour and length of residence, holding NDP voting in 1969 constant. Of those voting NDP in 1969, 54 per cent who voted NDP in 1972 had lived in their area of residence for more than 10 years. Similarly, in Area 1, (τ = -0.211), of those voting NDP in 1969, 64 per cent who voted NDP in 1972 had lived there for more than 10 years.

Thus, the association between length of residence in an area and consistency of voting behaviour is much more important than the association between change in residence and change in voting behaviour. For example, there was no evidence of Social Credit voters coming from another zone and being 'converted' to NDP in Area 1, from 1969 to 1972. This is substantiated by the fact that, in Area 1, 47 per cent of those voting Social Credit in 1969, voted NDP in 1972 and had lived in that area for more than 10 years. However, there are two plausible explanations here. First, that the change in vote from 1969 to 1972 on
the part of some Social Credit voters in Area 1 was related to the
general process of reaction. Second, that the conversion process,
if it exists at all, takes place over a time span of more than 10
years. Of course, to be able to substantiate the latter possibility
individuals would have to be studied over a long time span in order
to note changes in residence as well as voting behaviour at each
election. This was not possible within the limited scope of the
present inquiry.

PATTERN CHANGE AND RESIDENCE CHANGE

The second general possibility noted above is whether individuals
take their political preference with them when they move. The first
possibility in this regard is whether individuals whose political
preference is similar to that of the area of 'latent partisanship' in
which they live, move to an area of different 'latent partisanship'
thereby inducing change in the electoral pattern. The question thus
becomes, is 1972 voting behaviour associated to any degree with previous
residence in other political zones? In relation to this, we first
wanted to know whether previous voting behaviour was associated with
a previous zone of residence. Thus, 1969 voting behaviour was correlated
with the last zone of residence of individuals for each area. In all
cases, associations were slight.

However, there were some changes associated with the nature of
the political zone of each area. For example, in Area 1 (Tau C =
0.081), 25 per cent of those living last in a Social Credit zone voted
NDP in 1969. In Area 2 (Tau C = 0.155), 25 per cent of those living
in an NDP zone last voted Social Credit in 1969, and 25 per cent of those living last in the Liberal zone voted Social Credit in 1969. Similarly, in Area 3, \((\tau C = 0.019)\) 47 per cent of those living last in a Social Credit zone voted Liberal in 1969, and 27 per cent of those living last in an NDP zone voted Liberal in 1969. Thus, there was some relation to the present area norm for voting, despite the last zone of residence.

This finding is substantiated by correlating 1972 voting behaviour with the last zone of residence holding constant the length of residence in the present zone. In Area 1, for example, there were fair negative associations between the last zone of residence and 1972 voting behaviour for those living in the area less than one year \((\tau C = -0.500)\), for 1-2 years \((\tau C = -0.444)\) and for 2-5 years \((\tau C = -0.400)\). Similarly the association was very weak for those living in the area for more than 10 years \((\tau C = -0.058)\). Very weak, usually negative, associations were also noted in Area 2. In Area 3, a very similar pattern to Area 1 was observed. That is, that again there was a fair negative association between the last zone of residence and 1972 voting behaviour for those living in the area less than one year \((\tau C = -0.417)\), for 1-2 years \((\tau C = -0.167)\), and for 2-5 years \((\tau C = -0.648)\). Again, for those living in the area for more than 10 years, the associations were very weak \((\tau C = -0.065)\).

When taking 1969 voting behaviour into account, the results were very similar. For example, for those living in Area 1 for more than 10 years and voting NDP in 1969, there was a slight negative
association between 1972 vote and last zone of residence (Tau C = -0.181). The association was stronger, however, between 1972 vote and last zone of residence for those living in Area 1 for more than 10 years, and voting Social Credit in 1969 (Tau C = -0.496). Further, in Area 2, there was a negative association between 1972 vote and last zone of residence for those living in the area 2-5 years and voting Liberal in 1969 (Tau C = -0.240). Similarly for those voting Social Credit in 1969 and living in Area 2, 5-10 years, there was a strong negative association between 1972 vote and the last zone of residence (Tau C = -0.800). In Area 3, associations in general were weak. For example, those living for more than 10 years in the area and voting Liberal in 1969, there was a very weak association between 1972 vote and last zone of residence (-0.022), and for Social Credit voters in 1969 living for more than 10 years in the area, there was a weak association between 1972 vote and last zone of residence (Tau C = 0.160). Thus, in general, the evidence suggests that there is very little and even a negative association between 1972 voting behaviour and previous zone of residence.

One final attempt to examine the possibility of change in the electoral pattern through migration was undertaken by examining the question of whether the sum total of previous political zones in which respondents had lived was associated with 1972 voting behaviour. However, in all three areas the associations were very weak. In Area 1, for example, there was a very weak negative association (Tau C = -0.035);
in Area 2, a very weak positive association ($\text{ Tau } \ C = 0.043$), and in Area 3 a weak positive association ($\text{ Tau } \ C = 0.108$).

**PATTERN STABILITY AND RESIDENCE CHANGE**

It has now been demonstrated, first, that there is no evidence that changes in voting behaviour are a result of change in residence (although certain of the results were suggestive). Second, it has been shown that individuals whose political preference is similar to that of the area of 'latent partisanship' in which they live tend not to move to an area of different 'latent partisanship'. The question then becomes, if change of vote is not associated with change of residence, and voting behaviour is not associated with the norms of previous zones of residence, how are the two variables, vote and change of residence, associated? All available evidence seems to point to the conclusion that change of residence is associated with political preference *per se*, rather than any change in political preference. Hence, previous voting behaviour is not associated with previous zones of residence; hence 1972 voting behaviour is not associated with residence in previous zones, either in part or in total; hence changes in voting behaviour between 1966 and 1972 and 1969 and 1972 are not associated with changes in residence. If our alternate possibility is correct, then an important question is generated, namely, are individuals moving to political zones which are similar to their own voting behaviour in 1972?

This question can be answered by associating 1972 voting behaviour with the present area of residence holding previous zone of
residence constant. Tables VII, VIII and IX show the results of this. It will be noted that, from Table VII, 51 per cent of those who used to live in a Social Credit zone and moved to Area 3 - within the Liberal zone - voted Liberal in 1972, although still some 34 per cent voted Social Credit. Similarly, 25 per cent of those living previously in a Social Credit zone and moving to Area 1 - within an NDP zone - voted NDP in 1972, although an equal percentage still voted Social Credit. Area 2 in this regard provides something of an anomaly, in that, although 20 per cent of those previously living in a Social Credit zone supported Social Credit in 1972, 24 per cent voted Liberal.

In Table VIII, 38 per cent of those formerly living in an NDP zone and moving into Area 2, voted Social Credit in 1972. Similarly, in Area 3, 36 per cent of those formerly living in an NDP zone voted Liberal in 1972. In contrast to the Social Credit vote in Table VII, 67 per cent of those formerly resident in an NDP zone and presently living in Area 1 voted NDP in 1972.

Finally, in Table IX, 50 per cent of those formerly living in a Liberal zone voted NDP in Area 1, while 63 per cent of those in Area 2 formerly living in a Liberal zone voted Liberal. In Area 3, 36 per cent of those formerly resident in a Liberal zone voted Liberal in 1972. In all three figures for all three areas there was substantial movement into a different political zone, the 'norm' of which was the same as individual voting behaviour in 1972. The two exceptions were both in Area 2 - for the last house to be in a Social Credit zone
### TABLE VII

**Voting Behaviour and Previous Residence in a Social Credit Zone (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Did not Vote</th>
<th>Social Credit</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>PC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area 1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE VIII

**Voting Behaviour and Previous Residence in an NDP Zone (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Did not Vote</th>
<th>Social Credit</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>PC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area 1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE IX

**Voting Behaviour and Previous Residence in a Liberal Zone (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Did not Vote</th>
<th>Social Credit</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>PC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area 1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* From now on, significant results given in the Tables and referred to in the text are underlined for simplicity.
(Table VII), and for the last house to be in a Liberal zone (Table IX).

An affirmative answer to our alternate question poses the possibility of the political zones in Vancouver performing an agglomerative function. That is, that they are acting as collecting areas for individuals with similar political preferences, and that, as a result, the spatial pattern of voting behaviour in the city is becoming increasingly segregated. We can argue further that one associated factor in intra-urban migration is that local attachments to an area tend to be relatively weak. Thus, as has been shown in terms of voting behaviour, individuals whose norms differ from those surrounding them will tend to move, if possible, to areas that have similar norms. It is to these variables, attachment to area, in terms of local area integration, and its association with voting behaviour respectively, that the following two chapters now turn.
CHAPTER IV

LOCAL AREA INTEGRATION IN VANCOUVER

The main aim of the present chapter is to demonstrate that each of the local areas being used in the analysis are perceived as being distinctive territorial units and to show that each has a different degree of internal integration based on a variety of sociological measures. This will provide a starting point for the analysis in Chapter V. The measures used were respondents' perceptions of local area boundaries, area names, area image, socio-economic class of area, length of residence, whether the area is regarded as their real home, the 'state' of the area, choice of residence, perception of closeness to inhabitants of the area. These can all be described as latent measures (see Mann, 1954). Manifest measures such as frequency of social interaction with area inhabitants as well as the use of local facilities, such as shops and schools, and the reading of the area newspaper, were also used. Aggregating the measures used, it will be shown that Marpole (Area 2) is significantly less integrated than either Dunbar (Area 3) or Hastings East (Area 1). The implications of this for the stability and change of electoral patterns will be explored in Chapter V.
LOCAL AREA BOUNDARIES

Respondents were asked what they considered the boundaries of their area of residence to be. The interviewers probed for north, south, east and west boundaries, and, if no precise boundaries were given, probed further for information on the general spatial extent of the area, and, if necessary, showed the respondent a map of Vancouver (see Appendix I). The results showed marked differences with the boundaries drawn by Mayhew¹ (see Table X).

TABLE X  Degree of Agreement Between Mayhew's and Perceived Boundaries (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N. Boundary</th>
<th>S. Boundary</th>
<th>E. Boundary</th>
<th>W. Boundary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same as Mayhew</td>
<td>Same as Mayhew</td>
<td>Same as Mayhew</td>
<td>Same as Mayhew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table X shows, agreement with Mayhew's boundaries by respondents living within his areas is not especially close, particularly in Area 2, Areas 1 and 3 have the same average level of agreement if the rows are totalled and divided by four. It may be, therefore, that Area 2 is not as well defined as the other two areas. Further, looking at each column in turn, we note that the highest degree of agreement in all cases with Mayhew are those boundaries which

¹ At the 0.005 level.
are physical - Fraser River in Area 2 and Burrard Inlet in Area 1, or political - University Endowment Lands in Area 3 and Burnaby in Area 1. Excluding these boundaries from our consideration would give Area 3 the best degree of agreement and Area 2 the least.

As far as actual boundaries are concerned, Table XI gives the perceived boundaries for Area 1.

TABLE XI Perceived Boundaries in Hastings East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N. Boundary</th>
<th>S. Boundary</th>
<th>E. Boundary</th>
<th>W. Boundary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burrard Inlet - 44</td>
<td>Broadway - 25</td>
<td>Boundary - 51</td>
<td>Main - 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pender - 1</td>
<td>First - 12</td>
<td>Cassiar - 9</td>
<td>Nanaimo - 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hastings - 18</td>
<td>Kingsway - 14</td>
<td>Renfrew - 5</td>
<td>Clark - 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford - 1</td>
<td>Grandview - 4</td>
<td>Rupert - 1</td>
<td>Commercial - 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles - 1</td>
<td>41st - 2</td>
<td>66 responses</td>
<td>Renfrew - 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First - 2</td>
<td>Marine - 1</td>
<td>Victoria - 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth - 1</td>
<td>12th - 1</td>
<td>Cassiar - 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venables - 1</td>
<td>Hastings - 1</td>
<td>Fraser - 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69 responses</td>
<td>16th - 1</td>
<td>Cotton - 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22nd - 3</td>
<td>Kamloops - 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dundas - 1</td>
<td>Rupert - 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65 responses</td>
<td>Vernon - 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be noted that most respondents gave Burrard Inlet as the northern boundary of the area, and this accords with Mayhew, although
many regarded Hastings Street as an alternative (see Map 1). In the south, the largest proportion of respondents regarded Broadway as the boundary, which again accords with Mayhew, but more respondents defined other boundaries, especially Kingsway and First Avenue, the former, of course, being the southern boundary of the Vancouver East Provincial Electoral District. The relative importance of First Avenue as well as Kingsway, however, suggest some internal differentiation within Area 1. The eastern boundary was defined by the majority as Boundary Road, whereas the boundary in the west provided minimal agreement with that of Mayhew, whose western boundary, Nanaimo, was second to Main Street in importance. Further, Commercial and Clark were also important, and, in this regard, we can view the perceived boundary, especially where there is no clear physical divide, not as a line, but as a zone. Main Street, although having the highest degree of consensus is clearly seen locally as the divide between east and west sections of the city. Main Street, therefore, may have been perceived, like Burrard Inlet, as a physical divide, and therefore as a 'natural' boundary.

The actual zone in the west seems to fall between Nanaimo and Clark with streets within that zone accounting for over half of citations and over 40 per cent are within the Nanaimo-Commercial zone. Thus, if we take Nanaimo as the eastern margin of the zone, and Commercial as the western margin, the boundary line could be drawn anywhere within this. The importance of Commercial is interesting, and may relate to functional associations Italian respondents have with Italian shops, friends and
relatives living in the Grandview-Woodland area adjacent to Hastings East (see Map 1 and Gale, 1972). Thus, in general, in Area 1, if we take the perceived boundary with the largest number of citations we come very close to the boundaries proposed by Mayhew, with the exception of the western boundary.

Table XII gives the perceived boundaries for Area 2. In contrast to Area 1 boundaries of Area 2 do not coincide with those of Mayhew very closely. For example, the largest proportion of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE XII</th>
<th>Perceived Boundaries in Marpole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N. Boundary</td>
<td>S. Boundary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park Drive - 6</td>
<td>Fraser River - 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57th Ave. - 7</td>
<td>Marine Drive - 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59th - 11</td>
<td>60th Ave. - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49th - 11</td>
<td>70th - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th - 1</td>
<td>71st - 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st - 18</td>
<td>72nd - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64th - 4</td>
<td>73rd - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th - 5</td>
<td>77th - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61st - 1</td>
<td>80th - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd - 1</td>
<td>77 responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadway - 1</td>
<td>Boundary - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69th - 1</td>
<td>Hudson - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63rd - 1</td>
<td>Ash - 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th - 7</td>
<td>75 responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th - 1</td>
<td>76 responses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
regarded Forty-First Avenue as the northern boundary compared with 57th Avenue in Mayhew's study. However, again, we could argue that the northern boundary is a zone, for between 49th Avenue and 59th Avenue are contained over 40 per cent of citations. Thus a line between these two avenues would give the northern boundary. However, the relative importance of 41st Avenue as a boundary suggests the existence of sub-areas within the local area, or the local area being part of a slightly larger unit. The southern boundary, on the other hand, was closely related to that of Mayhew, with only 8 respondents out of 77 giving a boundary other than the Fraser River or Marine Drive. Respondents obviously did not regard the industrial area to the south of Marine Drive and to the river in general as part of their local area, even though they might have functional associations with it in terms of workplace. The largest proportion of respondents regarded Cambie Street, rather than Ontario as the eastern boundary. It is interesting to note here the existence of Cambie Street as the old divide between the Municipalities of Point Grey and South Vancouver before amalgamation in 1929. Only two respondents agreed with Mayhew and gave Ontario as the eastern boundary. In the west, most people regarded Granville as the boundary compared with Mayhew's Angus Drive, although West Boulevard was also important. Thus, as in Area 1, if we take boundaries with the largest number of citations, Area 2 would be bounded in the north by a zone, in the south by Marine Drive, in the east by Cambie and in the west by Granville, giving an area of somewhat different dimensions than that proposed by Mayhew.
Table XIII gives the perceived boundaries for Area 3. The boundaries as perceived in Area 3, like those in Area 2, do not generally agree very closely with those proposed by Mayhew. However, taking the boundary with the highest number of citations for the northern boundary gives 16th Avenue, which is the same as Mayhew, and is part of the old northern boundary of the Municipality of Point Grey. The southern boundary is slightly more confused with 41st Avenue, Marine Drive and the Fraser River being important alternatives. The importance especially of the former, suggests an internal differentiation in Area 3, probably between Dunbar in the north and Southlands in the south, and this is reflected in perceived boundaries, and perhaps will be also reflected in area names to be considered next. For the eastern boundary, Blenheim is the most important, but citations for Macdonald, Granville, Dunbar and McKenzie are also numerous. The major eastern boundary zone, however, seems to lie between Blenheim and Macdonald, where more than 60 per cent of citations can be located. For the western boundary, the majority of respondents regarded the Endowment Lands as the boundary, although 14 per cent believed Dunbar to be the boundary. With Dunbar being also perceived as an eastern boundary by 11 per cent of respondents, it is likely that it is the boundary for some internal sub-division within the area.

As was noted above, consensus on local area boundaries is one measure of local area integration. We can obtain a crude measure of this kind by summing proportions given by respondents to the highest
### TABLE XIII  Perceived Boundaries in Dunbar-Southlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N. Boundary</th>
<th>S. Boundary</th>
<th>E. Boundary</th>
<th>W. Boundary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26th Ave.</td>
<td>- 1 S.W. Marine</td>
<td>- 10 Macdonald</td>
<td>- 10 Endowment Lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd</td>
<td>- 8 Fraser River</td>
<td>- 17 Dunbar</td>
<td>- 8 Dunbar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quesnel</td>
<td>- 1 41st</td>
<td>- 29 Marguerite</td>
<td>- 1 Alma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>- 7 33rd</td>
<td>- 7 McKenzie</td>
<td>- 7 Macdonald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadway</td>
<td>- 3 49th</td>
<td>- 5 Trafalgar</td>
<td>- 1 Sasamat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th</td>
<td>- 1 35th</td>
<td>- 2 Oak</td>
<td>- 3 Wallace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st</td>
<td>- 1 25th</td>
<td>- 1 Carnarvon</td>
<td>- 1 Blenheim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.W. Marine</td>
<td>- 1 37th</td>
<td>- 1 Balaclava</td>
<td>- 2 McKenzie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>- 7 72 responses</td>
<td>Arbutus</td>
<td>- 6 Tolmie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>- 2</td>
<td>Granville</td>
<td>- 8 Collingwood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th</td>
<td>- 1</td>
<td>Alma</td>
<td>- 1 Crown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th</td>
<td>- 1</td>
<td>Blenheim</td>
<td>- 16 Blanca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>- 30</td>
<td>Cambie</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Bay</td>
<td>- 6</td>
<td>Quesnel</td>
<td>- 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 responses</td>
<td></td>
<td>Burrard</td>
<td>- 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The highest theoretical measure would thus be 100.

Table XIV shows that, in terms of local area boundary consensus, Area 1 is the most integrated, followed by Area 2 and then Area 3. Intuitively, the fact that Area 3 is the least integrated on this measure is surprising, and, yet, an explanation might be offered in terms of it being, not one area, but two – that is, Dunbar and Southlands, with 41st Avenue, perhaps, being the boundary between the
### Table XIV  Local Area Boundary Consensus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Average Consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area 1</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 2</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area 3</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two. This point can be demonstrated with reference to area names.

**Area Names**

Consensus on area names, like area boundaries, is a further latent measure of local area integration. Area names also provide a measure of the distinctiveness and spatial differentiation of a local area. Of the total sample of 252, only 13 respondents did not think that their local area had a name, and only 18 could not or did not name their area. There was no significant difference between local area and name (Table XV). The most distinctive area in terms of consensus on local area name was Area 2, where 69 per cent of its respondents believed the area to be named Marpole. For Area 1, 50 per cent of respondents named the area East End or East Vancouver compared with 21 per cent who thought the area was called East Hastings. Area 3, Dunbar-Southlands, had the lowest degree of consensus. This again is not surprising when one considers, as was intimated in relation to area boundaries, that the area comprises two sub-units, Dunbar and Southlands, and, naturally, this is

---

1 At the 0.005 level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Area 1</th>
<th>Area 2</th>
<th>Area 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Name</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renfrew</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East End</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Hastings</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandview</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marpole</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Vancouver</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shannon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Cambie</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marpole/Oakridge</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerrisdale</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakridge</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southlands</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunbar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point Grey</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerrisdale/Dunbar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mackenzie Heights</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunbar/Point Grey</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunbar Heights</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
reflected in the names given. Thus, 45 per cent of respondents in Area 3 named the area Dunbar, while 17 per cent named the area Southlands.

Although there is a strong relation between area and name, there is some evidence to support the existence of a 'border area'. For example, 8 per cent of those in Dunbar believed that their area was called Point Grey which is adjacent to it (see Map 1). Further, 1 per cent of those in Mayhew's Marpole region named their local area Kerrisdale as did 8 per cent of Dunbar respondents. This finding is consistent with expectation and the fact that Kerrisdale spatially separates Dunbar and Marpole. Similarly, in Area 2, some respondents believed the area to be named Oakridge (3 per cent) or Marpole/Oakridge (9 per cent), Oakridge being adjacent to Marpole (see Map 1). The existence of a 'border area' is further substantiated in Area 1, where 3 per cent of respondents named the area Grandview and 4 per cent named Renfrew, both of these areas again being adjacent to Area 1 (see Map 1).

There is some evidence too that respondents in Dunbar and Marpole still cling to the names of the old municipal components of Vancouver. For example, 9 per cent of Marpole respondents named the area South Vancouver. Similarly, it has already been noted that 8 per cent of Dunbar respondents named the area Point Grey. Finally, there is some evidence of internal differentiation, similar to the results on the perception of boundaries, into more localised areas
(apart from East End) within the local areas. For example, 6 per cent of Dunbar respondents named the area Mackenzie Heights, and, similarly, 1 per cent of respondents in Marpole named the area Shannon, compared with 1 per cent who named it South Cambie (Table XV).

Thus, while there is greater consensus on area name in Marpole than either Dunbar or East End, there is, nevertheless, some internal differentiation. This degree of consensus, like that in terms of the perception of local area boundaries, can be taken as evidence of the greater degree of local area integration in Marpole compared with the other two areas.

In order to demonstrate that respondents view the city as being composed of named areas, they were asked if they could name other parts of the city. The majority of respondents named at least one of the other local area names in the city (see Map 1), and all of the areas were cited at some point or other (Table XVI). If the number of citations can be used as a surrogate for area distinctiveness, then when this is compared with Mayhew's survey of citations in the telephone directory, there are some differences. For example, Mayhew's study shows Kerrisdale to be the most distinctive area of the city compared with Kitsilano in the present study (Mayhew, 1967).

It would be reasonable to assume that, in areas where inhabitants have lived in other parts of the city, that there would be a greater tendency to view the city as being composed of named areas, and, thereby, have a greater capacity to cite the names of such areas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Citations</th>
<th>Mayhew's Telephone Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kitsilano</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West End</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerrisdale</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point Grey</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaughnessy</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marpole</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunbar</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakridge</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraserview</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hastings East</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairview</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandview</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killarney</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Mountain</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Pleasant</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renfrew</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbutus</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cedar Cottage</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riley Park</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunset</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strathcona</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One might also expect some 'locational effect' in terms of area naming. That is, there would be a tendency for respondents to name more readily those areas immediately adjacent to their own, except, perhaps, in the case of the most distinctive areas such as Kitsilano, West End and Kerrisdale, which would tend to be known by most respondents.

With regard to the first point, there is no significant difference between area and having lived in another part of the city. The largest proportion of our sample who have lived in another area occurs in Marpole (77 per cent), compared with 71 per cent in Dunbar and 48 per cent in East End. One might expect, therefore, for Marpole respondents to have a relatively greater knowledge of other area names in the city, unless, of course, Marpole respondents have tended to concentrate in particular areas of the city in previous residences. However, in 11 of 22 cases, a greater proportion of Dunbar respondents named the areas, compared with Marpole having 7 and East End 4. With regard to any 'locational effect', taking adjacent areas to all three areas a greater proportion of respondents from Dunbar named its four adjacent areas of Point Grey, Kitsilano, Arbutus and Kerrisdale than any other (see Map 1). Similarly, a greater proportion of East End respondents named its three adjacent areas of Grandview, Cedar Cottage and Renfrew-Collingwood than any other area. In Marpole, however, although a greater proportion of respondents named 2 of its 3 adjacent areas - Oakridge and Sunset, the

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1 At the 0.005 level.
other area, Kerrisdale, was named by a larger proportion of Dunbar respondents. One could argue from this that Dunbar is closer to Kerrisdale than is Marpole, and this is certainly true in political terms, as our model of political space in Chapter III indicates. The 'locational effect' in terms of naming of adjacent areas, is evidence in all three areas of the existence of more localised functional relations on behalf of the inhabitants.

AREA IMAGE

One further important component of local area integration, as was noted earlier, is consensus on area image. Further, if the local areas can be shown to be distinctive spatial entities, then the degree of consensus will also be reflected in distinct area images for each of the areas. Images as defined in this study do not necessarily relate purely to physical objects such as edges and nodes, but have an important social component. They refer to an open-ended question which asks the respondent what kind of a place his area of residence is, and what, if anything, makes it different from other parts of the city. If there was any hesitation or reluctance to answer the question, the interviewers were asked to probe and to ask the respondent simply to describe the area (see Appendix I).

In reply to a similar question in another study, Ross noted the general reference to class and ethnic symbols (Ross, 1962, 80), and this is no less true of the three areas in the present study. A content analysis was performed on replies to the question and the
themes were tabulated by frequency of citation (Table XVII). In East End, for example, the most important component of area image is ethnicity, cited by 35 per cent of the sample from that area, compared with 12 per cent for Marpole and 3 per cent for Dunbar. Thus, obviously, ethnicity is an important distinctive element in the area image for Area 1. In Marpole on the other hand, the most important component is that the area has a large proportion of apartments, cited by 44 per cent of the sample, compared with no citations in East End and 1 per cent in Dunbar. In Dunbar, the most important element was the quietness of the area, although this was not distinctive, and whereas it was cited by 38 per cent of its respondents, 27 per cent in East End and 23 per cent in Marpole also cited this element. In Marpole, income and class was the second most component (cited by 35 per cent), while in both East End (27 per cent) and Dunbar (27 per cent) it came third. It is clear, then, from Table XVII, that ethnicity and class are among the most significant components of area image in the three areas.

In order to examine further the element of class in area image, respondents were asked later in the questionnaire to classify their area on a class scale (see Appendix I). The results showed that there was no significant difference between local area and perceived class \(^1\) (Table XII).

It will be noted that in all three areas, the largest propor-

\(^1\) At the 0.005 level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>East End</th>
<th>Marpole</th>
<th>Dunbar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traffic noise/pollution</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or no through traffic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quiet area</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to good transport</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good place to live/friendly</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor service provision</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prox. to downtown</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income/class</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterioration</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/property values/rents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of area</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apartment area</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better climate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trees/semi-rural/countryfied</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatively stable immobile pop.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Views</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golf courses</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNE</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraser River</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawmills</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University/Endowment Lands</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE XVIII  Area and Perceived Class (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Class Given</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Lower-Middle</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Upper-Middle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East End</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marpole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunbar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above findings, with regard to the importance of class in area image in all three areas, tend to question earlier ones which note that respondents in Dunbar, for example, are less inclined towards class concepts (Gibson, 1972, 161). This is true if Dunbar is compared with Marpole, but is not true when Dunbar is compared with East End (Table XVII).

From Table XVII, taking a minimum citation of 10 per cent of the sample in each area for each theme, we can characterise East End...
by ethnicity, friendliness, quietness, income and class and access to good transportation. Similarly, Marpole can be characterised by apartments, income and class, access to good transportation, traffic noise and pollution, quietness, friendliness, industry, a concern with rents and property values, sawmills, the age of the area and ethnicity. Finally, Dunbar can be characterised by quietness, rural nature, income and class, friendliness, the University and Endowment Lands, a relatively stable immobile population, the age of the area, views, proximity to downtown and access to good transportation. We note from this the relatively complex images of Marpole and Dunbar compared with East End, which tends to substantiate earlier findings regarding the nature of internal differentiation in the former two areas compared with the latter.

If we take those elements which were not cited by at least 15 per cent of the sample in the other areas we can determine the essentially distinctive components of each area image. Thus, in East End, the essential distinctiveness can be summarised by the element of ethnicity. Further, in Marpole, essential distinctiveness can be summarised by apartments, access to good transportation, traffic noise and pollution, industry, a concern with property values and rents, and sawmills. Finally, Dunbar can be summarised by elements of a rural nature, the University and Endowment Lands, a relatively stable immobile population, views, and proximity to downtown.

East End respondents, for example, noted the proliferation of
various nationalities especially Italians and Chinese, which often produced severe language problems. Further, many felt discrimination by 'city hall', especially in terms of the provision of certain services. This feeling of discrimination in terms of public policy on the part of people in this area of Vancouver has been noted before (Gibson, 1972, 145), and is a good argument for area representation on city council. The following two comments summarise the range of types of reply to this question:

1) "No, not very different from other areas. All working people. Under-kept. They never cut the grass on city property." (12)

2) "Terrible. A tremendous mixture of nationalities, wide variety of income and educational backgrounds. People born in the area were "accepted", whereas newcomers found it very difficult to break into the close knit society. Their children find it especially hard, having to 'prove' themselves to other neighbourhood kids, and the 'bullies' seemed to be other previously established newcomers." (4)

In Marpole, respondents noted the growth of apartments in the area in recent years and its effect on property values and rents. Further, the proliferation of industry, particularly sawmills, were distinctive components, along with traffic noise and pollution and access to good transportation. The following two comments summarise the range of types of image held by respondents of this area:

1) "It is an in-between area, caught between good residential and industrial areas. We are between well-to-do and working peoples
homes. This makes it difficult for children of have-not families to keep up with expensive school programmes. The remaining houses in the area should be rezoned for multiple occupancy. This would permit elderly persons to remain in their homes. Other homes are rented to transient young people. In this resulting transition, fewer children hence a nearby school was nearly closed down." (156)

2) "It has the river running beside it, the airport near it. It's not quite as crowded as some parts of town. It has a lot of industry such as sawmills and plywood mills nearby. Most of the roads in the area lead to highway 99." (141)

Dunbar respondents noted that the area had a relatively stable immobile population and was close to the University and the Endowment Lands. The area has good views over the surrounding part of the city, has a 'countryfied' atmosphere, and yet is close to downtown. This tends to confirm earlier work on the harmony of Dunbar residents with nature (Gibson, 1972, 161). Representative of images of this area were:

1) "It is healthy and high and slopes toward the south. No sawdust burners as you would find in Marpole." (246)

2) "Nice family area. This street is noisy but generally a quiet area. Lots of trees and houses are well kept up." (210)

LENGTH OF RESIDENCE

As has been noted earlier, length of residence is often used
as a surrogate for local area integration. It can thus be regarded as a latent functional measure of local area integration. Although there was a significant difference between area and length of residence\(^1\), a much higher proportion of East End respondents (70 per cent) had lived in their area for more than 10 years compared with Dunbar (50 per cent) and Marpole (40 per cent). The relative immobility of residents of East End has been noted before (Peucker and Rase, 1971, 93). Thus, if length of residence is an adequate measure of local area integration, one might expect it to be associated with other criteria. One would also expect that East End respondents would differ from respondents of other areas on other integration measures.

Length of residence in the local area was also found to be associated with age, status and home tenure\(^2\). For example, the relative mobility of younger people compared with older people is confirmed by our data - that is, there is no significant difference between age and length of residence\(^3\). Second, the data confirm that, in general, the higher the status of the respondent, the greater his relative mobility\(^4\). Third, a very high proportion of individuals (80 per cent) who have lived in their area for more than 10 years own their own home. Similarly, a significant proportion of those renting (57 per cent) have lived in their area for one year or less.

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\(^1\) At the 0.005 level.
\(^2\) At the 0.005 level.
\(^3\) At the 0.005 level.
\(^4\) At the 0.005 level.
REAL HOME

Respondents were asked whether or not they regarded their local area as their real home (see Appendix I). Although there was a significant difference between area and this variable\(^1\), a greater percentage of Marpole respondents (28 per cent) than either East End (20 per cent) or Dunbar (12 per cent) respondents, did not regard the area as their real home. One could possibly attribute these data to a number of factors. First, Marpole would be perceived by many as a 'transient' area, and therefore having an environment of potential mobility reflected in the distinctive 'apartment' component in its area image. Second, from the data on length of residence, the expectation, it was that East End would perhaps be more differentiated from the other areas if that variable was a meaningful surrogate. However, the distinctive component of its area image, ethnicity, has already been stressed, and, thus respondents, although having lived in the area for some time, may still have strong attachments to the 'homeland'.

In general, however, the longer respondents had lived in the local area, the more they regarded it as their real home\(^2\). The probability is that there is a two-way interaction between real home and length of residence. Thus we could argue that the more respondents come to regard the local area as their real home, the lower the potential mobility. Further, it has been noted elsewhere that complaints about

\(^1\) At the 0.005 level.
\(^2\) At the 0.005 level.
dwelling unit space and the physical environment around the home have strong predictive power on future residential mobility (Rossi, 1955; Michelson, 1970, 102). These relationships thus fit with the image of Marpole as 'apartment' and 'industrial', and with Dunbar as being 'countryfied'. The resultant greater potential mobility in Marpole compared with Dunbar in reference to dwelling units and general physical environment, is thus reflected in the greater proportion of respondents in that area who do not regard it as their real home.

'STATE' OF AREA

In the discussion in Chapter III above, it was noted that one factor in intra-urban migration may be that local area attachments on the part of individuals were not particularly strong. In relation to this possibility, respondents were asked two questions relating to the 'state' of their area. First, whether they thought that the area was becoming friendlier, less friendly or if it had just stayed the same. Second, whether the areas were beginning to look worse physically, look better or whether they had stayed the same (see Appendix I). There were significant differences between responses to each question. However, there was a significant difference also between area and responses to both questions

1. In the East End for example, the largest proportion of respondents thought that their area was getting less friendly and was looking worse physically. Further, Dunbar had the

1 At the 0.005 level.
largest proportion of respondents who answered to both questions that their area was staying the same. This is reflected in the feelings of stability noted in area image (Table XVII), and perhaps the concern of inhabitants of that area with maintaining the status quo.

It is interesting to note that there was no significant difference between responses to the friendliness question and length of residence.\(^1\) For example, of those having lived in the area for more than 10 years, 40 per cent believed the area had become a friendlier place to live.

**CHOICE OF RESIDENCE**

For this indicator of attachment to local area, respondents were asked whether, if they had their choice, they would continue to live in their local area or not. Although there was a significant difference between area and this variable\(^2\), there were some differences by area. For example, 31 per cent of Marpole respondents stated that, if they had their choice, they would not continue to live in that area, compared with 28 per cent in East End and 13 per cent in Dunbar. This finding confirms, in part, data on 'state' of area above in terms of the degree of favourable disposition toward an area. Further, there was no significant difference between this variable and length of

---

\(1\) At the 0.005 level.

\(2\) At the 0.005 level.
residence in the local area\textsuperscript{1}, and those who regarded their local area as their real home, in general, would continue to live there\textsuperscript{2}.

Closeness

The final latent functional measure of local area integration is the degree of closeness respondents feel towards those people who live within the areas compared with those who live outside. Although there was a significant difference between area and closeness\textsuperscript{3}, some interesting conclusions emerge (Table XIX). First,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE XIX</th>
<th>Area and Closeness (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East End</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marpole</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunbar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in all three areas a greater proportion of respondents felt closer to people outside, although this was more true of Marpole respondents from the other two areas. Second, a greater proportion of Dunbar respondents felt equally close to both groups of people, and, third, a larger proportion of respondents from East End felt closer to neither those within or those without. This evidence tends to confirm the impression of Marpole as a 'transient' more mobile and less integrated area than the other two.

\textsuperscript{1} At the 0.005 level.
\textsuperscript{2} At the 0.005 level.
\textsuperscript{3} At the 0.005 level.
With regard to other variables, there was a significant
difference between closeness and choice and closeness and length
of residence, although there was no significant difference between
closeness and the variables of real home and 'state' of area. ¹

LOCAL AREA INTERACTION

Although in a previous study of local areas in Vancouver,
some consensus on social beliefs was noted within selected areas,
the assumption that these areas were in fact integrated social
entities has not been adequately tested (Gibson, 1972, 10). As has
been demonstrated, the above latent components of local area integration
provide one means for such analysis. The other basis for analysis is
a consideration of manifest functional relations (Mann, 1954), such
as social interaction with people living within as well as outside
of the local areas, plus the use of local facilities, such as shops
and schools, and the reading of the area newspaper.

As far as social interaction is concerned, respondents were
asked to state the number and frequency of contact with friends and
local area inhabitants as well as their location (see Appendix I).
Although there was a significant difference by area for both number
and frequency of contacts within the local area, some interesting
points emerged. For example, in East End, 52 per cent of respondents
generally made only two contacts or less within their local area
compared with 47 per cent in Marpole and 40 per cent in Dunbar, but the

¹ At the 0.005 level.
frequency of contact in the East End was much greater than within the other two areas. The greater number of contacts was made in Dunbar - 60 per cent of respondents with three or more - yet the frequency of contact compared with the other areas was less. In terms of the number and frequency of contacts outside of the local area, there was a significant difference by area\(^1\). However, 42 per cent of East End respondents had two or less contacts outside of their area compared with 33 per cent in Marpole and 29 per cent in Dunbar. Conversely, Dunbar had the greatest proportion of respondents with three or more contacts outside of the local area (68 per cent), compared with Marpole (64 per cent) and East End (51 per cent). Thus, it is evident that Dunbar respondents have a greater degree of social interaction both within and outside of their local area, measured in terms of number of contacts, with East End respondents having the least, although the frequency of contact, especially within that area is greater.

There was a significant difference between number of contacts outside of the local area and all latent integration measures. The only variable where there was no significant difference for number of contacts within the local area was real home\(^2\). These associations tend to suggest that communication alone is insufficient to achieve local area integration, and, perhaps that personal relationships are not essential for individual attachment to an area.

\(^1\) At the 0.005 level.
\(^2\) At the 0.005 level.
In terms of the use of local facilities, information was gained on the use of local stores, schools, and reading of the local newspaper. The use of local facilities, such as stores, can be used as a further manifest measure of local area integration. Respondents in this regard were asked where they shopped mostly for food within their area, and the address of the store where most of their food is usually bought (see Appendix I). In all three areas, the majority of respondents bought most of their food at stores located within their local area. However, there were some differences by area. In East End, for example, 67 per cent of respondents bought most of their food within compared with 81 per cent in Marple and 83 per cent in Dunbar.

The presence of children in an area tends to bring people together (Michelson, 1970, 180), and thus the location of schools, and attendance by children in the local area would provide an integrating function. In all cases, the majority of children in the area also attended school in the area, although this was much less for Marpole (73 per cent), as for East End (91 per cent) and Dunbar (95 per cent).

Finally, as was noted above, local area newspapers serve to aid consensus (Janowitz, 1967), and the data showed no significant difference between area and local newspaper read\(^1\) (Table XX). It will be noted from Table XX, that Dunbar has the most distinctive readership.

\(^1\) At the 0.005 level.
TABLE XX  Local Area Newspapers (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>East End</th>
<th>Marpole</th>
<th>Dunbar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highland Echo</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Ender</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hastings News</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L'Eco Italiano / Courier</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western News</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Paper</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakridge News</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond News</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacifische Rundschau</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No paper read</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of the area newspaper, with the lowest percentage who do not read it (26 per cent) and the highest percentage who read one particular newspaper - the Courier. The Courier is also the most important paper in Marpole, although the Oakridge News is of some importance, and the Richmond News attest to the outside contacts which Marpole has. The East End, on the other hand, has a fairly distinctive selection with the Highland Echo being the most important.

It is important to note here, that for all of the variables descriptive of the use of local facilities - shopping, schools, and reading of the local newspaper - there is a significant difference
between them and both latent measures of integration and social interaction variables.\footnote{At the 0.005 level.} However, the associations which we have on local area integration suggest a model of local area integration below (Figure 2). The model represents a complex series of two-way interactions between the variables length of residence, closeness, choice, 'state' of area, real home and intra-area interaction. The form of the model is further substantiated by the lack of association between for example, length of residence and intra-area interaction, and closeness and real home\footnote{At the 0.005 level.}.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Components of local area integration extracted for the analysis have now been tested in three local areas in Vancouver. Such local areas were first identified by their inhabitants in terms of their boundaries and second in terms of area name. In each case, the areas were found to be socially and spatially distinct, with inhabitants having distinctive images of them. The areas have been shown to be functionally significant both in latent and manifest terms, although the relation

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\begin{tikzpicture}
    \node (real_home) at (0,0) {real home};
    \node (length) at (3,-1) {length of residence};
    \node (closeness) at (3,-2) {closeness};
    \node (choice) at (3,-3) {choice};
    \node (state) at (3,1) {'state' of area};
    \node (intra) at (0,-4) {intra-area interaction};

    \draw[->] (real_home) -- (length);
    \draw[->] (length) -- (closeness);
    \draw[->] (closeness) -- (choice);
    \draw[->] (choice) -- (state);
    \draw[->] (state) -- (length);
end{tikzpicture}
\caption{Model of Local Area Integration}
\end{figure}
between these elements at present is uncertain. The evidence from
the analysis thus support the original contention that local areas
in Vancouver have functional significance. Further, the general
thesis that the inhabitants view the city as a composite of area
names and perceive their own area as being distinct in terms of
name and image is upheld. The area, furthermore, were perceived as
having 'status ascriptive' functions.

Rather than summarise in detail all of the findings of this
chapter, some of the main points have been collected in Table XXI.
This table represents relative consensus on a variety of measures for
the three areas, and the composite indices of local area integration
have been computed. First, a measure based on all items, where
possible, gives Dunbar the highest relative degree of local area
integration with a score of 52 compared with 51 both for East End and
Marpole. Second, taking into account only those scores for the related
components in the model of local area integration (Figure 2), gives
findings related somewhat more to intuitive expectation. In this case,
the selective index still gives Dunbar the highest degree of local area
integration, closely followed by East End, but places Marpole significantly
lower on the scale.

Two final points emerge from Table XXI. First, the index for
all measures gives all three areas a value of more than 50 per cent —
that is, a majority of respondents in the three areas have a greater
identification with their local areas than with some other territorial
### TABLE XXI  Area and Relative Consensus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East End</th>
<th>Marpole</th>
<th>Dunbar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Individual status (highest)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Individual class perception (highest)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Local area boundaries</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Area name (highest)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Area image (highest)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Perceived class of area (highest)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Length residence 10 yrs+</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Real home (100-not)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. State of area (friendlier)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Choice (100-not)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Closeness (within)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Shopping (within)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Local newspaper (highest)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Index of integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East End</th>
<th>Marpole</th>
<th>Dunbar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(all measures)</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Index of integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East End</th>
<th>Marpole</th>
<th>Dunbar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(measures 7, 8, 9, 10 &amp; 11)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

unit. This means, firstly that areas are locally relevant. Second, the notions of a lack of a sense of community of a 'community without propinquity', or of a 'mass society' do not apply to the majority of
the respondents from each area. This holds too for the selective index in East End and Dunbar, but not for Marpole. That index gives Marpole a score of 45, which means that the arguments for a lack of a sense of community and so on do apply to the majority of respondents in that area.

The second point is that the indices of integration do not provide sufficient evidence for regarding a particular type of 'status area' as having a greater or lesser degree of integration. This conclusion conflicts with those from other areas (for example, Smith et al., 1954; Bell and Boat, 1957; Wellman et al., 1971).

The relative importance of these findings, especially in terms of their association with voting behaviour in the 1972 B.C. Provincial Election in Vancouver will now be examined in Chapter V.
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, it is proposed to demonstrate that the only socio-economic characteristic significantly associated with voting behaviour, and hence important in an analysis of the stability and change of electoral patterns, is objectively defined status (based on occupation). This reinforces the argument presented in Chapter II, that the B.C. political culture is essentially class-based. It is also to reinforce the argument that, in order to understand the stability and change of electoral patterns, a consideration of a range of socio-economic characteristics alone is insufficient. It will be demonstrated that, rather than explaining voting behaviour by association with a series of socio-economic variables (apart from status), voting behaviour can be more readily explained by reference to an area norm. It will be argued that voting in relation to an area norm can be explained with reference to individual attachment to area or territoriality, as well as by manifest integration.

Thus, second, it will be demonstrated that the degree to which there is an association between voting behaviour and area norm, will be directly related to the degree of area integration both at the individual and aggregate levels. It will be shown, therefore, that voting behaviour in Marpole in the 1972 election adhered much less to the area norm than voting behaviour in East End or Dunbar, as a
result of its lower degree of integration.

As norms can be defined as generally accepted group standards of conduct and behaviour, so a 'political norm' in an area would be the generally expected electoral pattern in that area in any one election. It therefore relates to the political history of a particular area (see Chapter III). Like all norms, adherence to a political norm in an area on the part of an individual voter depends on the degree of attachment to the group - in the present case, a 'socio-spatial' group or local area. Associations between individual tendencies to vote in relation to an area norm and individual attachments to area (in a latent and manifest sense) are not simple, as will be demonstrated below. The clearest results, for example, are obtained from the components of the model of local area integration (Figure 2). Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that the strength of adherence to voting behaviour norms is greater in areas of generally lower status group composition even though the level of integration in those areas (in the present case, one area - that is, East End) is no greater.

We are therefore dealing with a complex set of interrelationships between status, integration and voting behaviour translated spatially into the status composition of an area, area integration, and the electoral pattern. We will begin with a discussion of socio-economic characteristics in order to point up the relative importance of status.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

Associations between socio-economic characteristics and voting behaviour are well-known and provide a framework for political
sociology (for example, see Lipset, 1963), and have recently been discussed in detail with reference to voting behaviour in Canada (see Meisel, 1972).

The status-class argument is an important and inconclusive one in Canadian voting behaviour studies (for example, see Alford, 1963; Engelmann and Schwartz, 1967; Wilson, 1968; Meisel, 1972). Blishen has put forward an objective measure of status using occupation (Blishen, 1967). This scale can be broken down into six sub-categories which define occupations generally as follows - owners and professionals, managerial, service industries, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled. With regard to our argument, an association is posited between the proportion employed in managerial and professional occupations and Liberal vote. Further, an association is posited between semi-skilled and unskilled workers and NDP vote. Both associations are supported by our data, and, in general, there is no significant difference between status and voting behaviour\(^1\) (Table XXI).

Meisel has found that data for occupations are reinforced by responses elicited about self-perception of class (Meisel, 1972, 5). However, our data showed a significant difference between subjective class and voting behaviour\(^1\). However, there are slight associations between upper-middle class identifiers and Liberal voting behaviour and lower-middle class identifiers and NDP voting

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\(^1\) At the 0.005 level.
behaviour (Table XXII).

TABLE XXI  Status and Voting Behaviour (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Owners &amp; Profess.</th>
<th>Manag.</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Skilled</th>
<th>Semi Skilled</th>
<th>Unskilled</th>
<th>Retired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did not Vote</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Credit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE XXII  Class Self-Perception and Voting Behaviour (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Did not Vote</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-middle</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper-Middle</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Income is regarded as being an important variable in the social structure in terms which are often expressed politically as maintaining the status quo, or in an interest in social mobility (Porter, 1965, 76). Porter, for example, takes income as an objective measure of class in Canada (Porter, 1965, 100). An association might therefore be expected between lower income (less than $7,000) and NDP vote. It has been pointed out that NDP gains little or no
support from the economic elite (Porter, 1965, 297), and that NDP supporters themselves regard the party as representing the poor (Laponce, 1969, 72). Thus, one would not expect those with higher incomes ($15,000+), to vote NDP. Both of these expectations are sustained by our data, although, in general, there was no significant difference between income and voting behaviour¹ (Table XXIII).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Range</th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
<th>Social Credit</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>PC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than $5,000</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5,001-$7,500</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$7,501-$10,000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,001-$15,000</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000+</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Canada, religion is one of the major bases of political conflict (Porter, 1965, 512; Meisel, 1972, 3). Thus an association would be expected between proportion of Catholics and Liberal vote, (see Anderson, 1966). Similarly, an association would be expected between the proportion of Protestants and NDP vote (see Meisel, 1967, 52). Further, there is some evidence to suggest that a greater proportion of a-religious tend to support the NDP than any other party (for example, Laponce, 1969, 68). This latter association is

¹ At the 0.005 level.
the only one substantiated by our data, (Table XXIV), and, in general, there was a significant difference between religion and voting behaviour\(^1\).

**TABLE XXIV Religion and Voting Behaviour (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Church</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The length of residence in Canada has been seen to be important in terms of previous political affiliations and their relation, if any, to those held in Canada (Porter, 1965, 82). Some 63 per cent of our sample were born in Canada, and thus, one might expect that immigration and immigrant groups would be an important element in voting behaviour. On the contrary, there was a significant difference between country of birth and voting behaviour\(^1\). (Table XXV).

For example, Meisel found that the association between Canadian-born voters and Liberal voting behaviour was less than that between Post-Second World War immigrants (Meisel, 1972, 9). Second, that the Conservative Party appealed more to earlier settlers rather than more

\(^1\) At the 0.005 level.
recent arrivals. Third, that proportionately, the NDP would gain less pre-1946 immigrants (Meisel, 1972, 9). All three associations are not upheld by our data. On the other hand, a fourth, more intuitively relevant association, that a larger proportion of the 'lower rungs' of Porter's mosaic would vote NDP, is sustained (Table XXV).

TABLE XXV Country of Birth and Voting Behaviour (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>LIB</th>
<th>PC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain and U.S.A.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France, Germany, Holland</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia, E. Europe, Italy, Japan, other 'c. European'</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The level of education is regarded as an important surrogate for level of information, and is thus important in a consideration of flows of information. Further, it is generally believed that a higher level of education is associated with higher turnout (Lipset, 1963, 228). However, a general association between education level and voting behaviour is here rejected. In terms of individual parties, on the other hand, two associations are sustained. First, there is an association between higher (University) education categories and

---

1 At the 0.005 level.
Liberal support (Table XXVI). Second, there is an association between lower levels of education (elementary and secondary) and NDP support, (Table XXVI). As we have seen, therefore, apart from two specific cases, the general association between education and voting behaviour is rejected. This conclusion is similar to that of Meisel, who does not regard education level as a particularly useful indicator of voting behaviour (Meisel, 1972, 7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting Behaviour and Level of Education (%)</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
<th>Grades 1-8</th>
<th>Grades 9-13</th>
<th>Voc./ tech.</th>
<th>Univ./ college</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Credit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The general relationship between sex and voting behaviour again is well-known. There is a preference for women to maintain the status quo, and thus to support the conservative parties (Lipset, 1963, 231). In Canada, it appears that there is a tendency for women to support the Conservative Party (Meisel, 1972, 12). However, our data from the 1972 B.C. Provincial election in Vancouver dispute this finding (Table XXVII). Jewett has pointed out that proportionately less women vote NDP (Jewett, 1962), but our data show this to be untrue. Further, Anderson has shown an association between the
Table XXVII  Voting Behaviour and Sex (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did Not Vote</th>
<th>Social Credit</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>PC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

proportion of men and NDP vote (Anderson, 1966). Our data show that a greater proportion of women rather than men voted NDP in the 1972 election. The general association between sex and voting behaviour, like education, is thus rejected.

If in B.C. Provincial politics we define a 'classical' left-right alignment of the four parties as NDP-Liberal-Social Credit-Conservative (Laponce, 1969, 161), then one might assume the importance of age in voting behaviour based on another well-known relationship. The tendency for the younger voter to identify with the left, and the older voter with the right, has been discussed (Lipset, 1963, 231).

In B.C., age has been regarded as a major discriminatory factor between supporters of different parties (Laponce, 1969, 135). An association between young voters (20-35) and NDP support would thus be expected. Apart from gaining support in the literature (Anderson, 1966), it has been pointed out that older voters tend not to vote for the NDP (Young, 1964, 197). However, our data show that a similar proportion of support for the NDP is gained from respondents 45 and younger, and over 45 (Table XXVIII).

---

1 At the 0.005 level.
TABLE XXVIII  Age and Voting Behaviour (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Credit</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data do provide some support for the notion that middle and old age voters tend to vote Social Credit, and the largest proportion of Social Credit vote is in the retired category. However, apart from this association, the general association between age and voting behaviour is rejected.

Finally, membership of organisations has been seen as a differentiating component between voters of different parties, especially the association between the trade unions and the NDP. Thus, an association between trade union membership and voting for the NDP is expected. Further, an association is expected between membership of a professional society and voting for the Liberal Party. Both associations are sustained by our data (Table XXIX), and, in general, there is no significant difference between membership of formal organisations and voting behaviour.

Thus apart from an association between status and voting behaviour,

---

1 At the 0.005 level.
and between membership of formal organisations and voting behaviour, all other general associations between socio-economic characteristics and voting behaviour were rejected. This confirms the point made in Chapter II, that associations between such characteristics and voting behaviour found in other parts of Canada, may not necessarily hold in the B.C. political culture. Further, it supports our general argument that, in order to adequately explain and understand the stability and change of electoral patterns, factors other than a range of socio-economic characteristics need to be examined. Individuals need to be studied in relation to the social and political environment in which they live.

**THE 'AREA EFFECT'**

From the above evidence, the expectation would be that the examination of the spatial patterning of individuals with like status

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1 At the 0.005 level.
affiliations would lead part way to the explanation of the stability and change of the electoral pattern. Spatial concentrations of individuals with similar status will tend to reinforce this association with voting behaviour. Such concentrations will, in part, lead to the development in an area of a 'political norm' especially when the 'status areas' are shown to have local relevance to their inhabitants. Thus we would expect that voters would vote in relation to the area norm rather than in relation to any socio-economic characteristic other than status. We would expect, therefore, that, from the nature of our data (Table XXX) that the political norm in East End and Dunbar would be more clearly defined than in Marpole because of its relative status homogeneity.

TABLE XXX  Individual Status by Blishen (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East End</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marpole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunbar</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, we cannot assume that status homogeneity in an area is necessarily associated with individual attachment to that area. The above argument would be strengthened greatly, therefore, if an association could be demonstrated between individual status and individual attachment in each of our case areas. In order to achieve this a series of comparisons was undertaken between individual responses to
the main integration questions - name of area, length of residence, real home, 'state' of area, choice, and closeness - and individual status in each area.

If all of the status groups living in an area felt similarly in terms of the integration measures, then the null hypothesis using chi-square would be rejected - that is, the conclusion would be that there is a high degree of consensus among all status groups living in an area. Conversely, if all groups felt differently with regard to their area attachment then the null hypothesis would be accepted - that is, the conclusion would be that there exists a lower degree of group consensus in an area. The results of the analysis are given in Table XXXI. From the table it will be observed that, as Dunbar was defined in Chapter IV as the area having the highest degree of integration, so, in terms of individual status - integration relationships, it has the highest degree of consensus. Similarly, as East End had the second highest integration level, so too in terms of status-integration relationships. Finally, Marpole, having the lowest degree of integration in Chapter IV also has the lowest degree of group consensus from the results in Table XXXI.

From a geographic point of view, if, as has been shown status is associated with voting behaviour, and that the spatial concentration of status groups is also associated with individual attachment to area or territoriality, then it is consistent to argue that territoriality

1 At the 0.005 level.
### TABLE XXXI  Status and Integration by Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Name</th>
<th>Length of Residence</th>
<th>Real</th>
<th>Home</th>
<th>Friendlier</th>
<th>Looking Better</th>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East End</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marpole</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunbar</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R = null hypothesis rejected at the 0.005 level.

A = null hypothesis accepted at the 0.005 level.
itself is associated with voting behaviour and hence is important in an understanding of the stability and change of electoral patterns. Greater attachment to an area on the part of an individual voter will lead to greater attachment to the political norms of that area and vice-versa.

TERRITORIALITY AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR

In Chapter IV we examined territoriality in terms of local area integration. An association between local area integration and voting behaviour can be demonstrated at two levels - the aggregate and the individual. At the aggregate level (the level of the local area) two associations will be demonstrated. First, the more integrated the local area, the more politically homogeneous it will be in 1972. Second, the more integrated the local area, the more it will reflect the area norm, in the 1972 results. Both associations are confirmed by our data.

It has already been shown that the majority of inhabitants of East End and Dunbar possess a significant degree of local area integration compared with Marpole. With regard to our first association we would therefore expect that Marpole would be less politically homogeneous than either East End or Dunbar. From Maps 3, 4 and 5 depicting the 1972 results in each area, we can see this to be the case. In East End, all polls were won by the NDP, all with at least 50 per cent of the vote, with three parties competing (Map 3). In Dunbar, all polls but one were won by the Liberals, with no poll having more than 55 per cent of the vote Liberal, with four parties.
competing (Map 5). The 1972 pattern in Marpole, on the other hand, is more complex (Map 4). In this area, the NDP generally won polls on the east side, with the north and west consisting of a mixture of Social Credit, Liberal and NDP-won polls. The first association between voting behaviour and local area integration, is thus upheld.

With regard to our second association that the more integrated the local area, the more it will reflect the area norm in voting, can be demonstrated by comparing Maps 3, 4 and 5 with Map 2. It will be seen that the two most integrated areas - East End and Dunbar - both reflect the area norm in voting behaviour in the 1972 results - that is, NDP and Liberal respectively. Marpole, on the other hand, does so only partially, and, in fact, the majority of polls are won by NDP (Map 4). Our second aggregate level association is thus sustained.

At the individual level, in general there is no simple association between individual voting in relation to the area norm and individual attachment to area. The general argument presented here is that individual voting behaviour in the 1972 B.C. Provincial election is associated with the degree of individual attachment to area. Thus, in each area, a series of associations between individual voting behaviour and components of local area integration will be examined. The integration components examined will be naming of area, length of residence within the area, whether or not the area is regarded as the inhabitant's real home, the 'state' of the area, choice of residence, and individual attachment to people living within and outside of the area. Any lack of association is regarded as being partly with reference
map 3

VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN EAST END 1972
(all polls won by NDP)

0 — 700 yards

70% NDP  63–70%  57–63%  51–57%
VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN DUNBAR 1972
(all poll but one won by the liberals)
to differences in area integration — that is, expectations for Marpole are less because this is the least integrated area.

Thus, for the first integration indicator, an association between area name and voting behaviour is expected. However, in the East End, such an association was rejected\(^1\), due, in part, to the joint importance of East Hastings and East End as area names. However, it is important to note that a majority of respondents who voted in relation to the area norm (that is, NDP), named the area East End. Similarly, in Marpole, the general association between area name and voting behaviour was rejected\(^1\). However, again, the majority of those voting for the area norm — Social Credit — named the area Marpole. Further, in Dunbar, the general association between voting behaviour and area name was also rejected\(^1\). This could be explained in part by the dichotomous nature of that area — divisible into Dunbar in the north and Southlands in the south. Again, however, a significant proportion of those voting for the area norm — Liberal — named the area Dunbar (Table XXXII).

It may be, from the following Table, that consensus in area name is not a particularly satisfactory measure of attachment to area and hence not especially useful in an analysis of voting behaviour. It is interesting to note, that, with regard to the different levels of area integration, the strongest association between area name and

\(^1\) At the 0.005 level.
TABLE XXXII  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Naming and Voting Behaviour (%)</th>
<th>A)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East End</td>
<td>No name given</td>
<td>Grandview</td>
<td>East Hastings</td>
<td>E. End</td>
<td>Renfrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP Voting</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B) Marpole  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marpole/ Oakridge</th>
<th>South Van. Marpole Oakridge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No name given</td>
<td>Shannon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC Voting</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C) Dunbar  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No name given</td>
<td>Dunbar/ Mack. Pt. Grey Hts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib Voting</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

voting behaviour occurred in Marpole, and the weakest association occurred in Dunbar. It may be, that, in a dynamic situation, those still clinging to the area norm in terms of voting behaviour will tend to have the greatest degree of attachment to the area. This is further tentative evidence toward the operation of a 'retreat process' induced by mobility and change, and noted above in Chapter III.

It has been shown that length of residence, especially for those who have lived in their area for more than 10 years, is an important surrogate measure for local area integration. With regard to the general argument presented here, it is therefore expected that there will be a tendency in each area for those living there for more than 10 years to vote in relation to the area norm. Thus,
in the East End, an association is expected between the NDP vote and more than 10 years of residence. Similarly, for Dunbar, an association is expected between the Liberal vote and more than 10 years of residence. However, in Marpole, as with all of the integration-voting behaviour interrelationships, the expectation is that the association would be very much weaker, as Marpole is the least integrated of all three areas. Although in each area a general association was not found between length of residence and voting behaviour\(^1\), in all three areas an association was found between those voting in relation to the area norm and more than 10 years residence (Table XXXIII).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE XXXIII</th>
<th>Voting Behaviour and Length of Residence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A) East End</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>less than 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP voting</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) Marpole</td>
<td>SC voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C) Dunbar</td>
<td>Lib voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) At the 0.005 level.
It is interesting to note that the associations were not quite in the direction as expected when taking degrees of area integration into account. Dunbar, for example, had the weakest association. An examination of the voting behaviour of those having lived in each area for more than 10 years, however, revealed a consistent pattern in both East End and Dunbar — that is, a marked tendency to vote in relation to the area norm — although this was not the case in Marpole where similar proportions (26 per cent) voted NDP as well as Social Credit. This is a clear indication that the length of residence — voting behaviour relationship is not as well-defined in Marpole as in either Dunbar or the East End.

Furthermore, from Table XXXIII, it is clear, that, apart from in the East End, there is no clear linear relationship between the longer a respondent has lived in an area and his tendency to vote with regard to the area norm.

It has been demonstrated above that a larger proportion of Marpole inhabitants did not regard their local area as their real home, compared with East End or Dunbar respondents. It would be expected, therefore that the relation between those who regard their area as their real home and the propensity to vote in relation to the area norm would be less well-defined in Marpole. However, in all three areas the expectation would be that the majority of those voting for the area norm would regard the area as their real home. The data confirmed this latter expectation, and it was found that over 80 per
cent of inhabitants in each area voting for the area norm regarded the area as their real home. However, in an area like Marpole, which is the least integrated area, and thus the political norm is less well-defined, the reverse relationship did not hold - that is, more inhabitants who regarded the area as their real home voted NDP rather than Social Credit. The relationship held for the other two areas, however (Table XXXIV). The general association between real home and voting behaviour was rejected in all three areas.1

TABLE XXXIV
Real Home and Voting Behaviour (%)

A) East End

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did not vote</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inhabs. reg. area as real home</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B) Marpole

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did not vote</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inhabs. reg. area as real home</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C) Dunbar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did not vote</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inhabs. reg. area as real home</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 At the 0.005 level.
Similarly, general associations between voting behaviour and respondents' opinions as to whether their area was improving both socially (that is, becoming friendlier) and physically (that is, its physical appearance) were rejected. However, it was expected that positive opinions about the area - such as the area is becoming friendlier, or the area is looking better - were expected to be associated with voting in relation to the area norm. Thus, for East End, an association was expected between NDP voting and those who thought their area was becoming friendlier. Similarly, for Marpole an association was expected between Social Credit voting and those who thought their area was becoming friendlier, and for Dunbar an association was expected between Liberal voting and those who thought their area was becoming friendlier. Again, however, the expectations were confirmed for both East End and Dunbar, but not for Marpole (Table XXXV).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Becoming Friendlier and Voting Behaviour (%)</th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East End</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marpole</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunbar</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the other component of 'state' of area, the general expectation was that there would be an association between those who

\[1\] At the 0.005 level.
thought that their area was looking better, and voting in relation to the area norm. The association was upheld in East End and Marpole, but was partially upheld in Dunbar (Table XXVI).

TABLE XXXVI  Area Looking Better and Voting Behaviour (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East End</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marpole</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunbar</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results in Table XXXV may perhaps be explained partially with reference to area integration - that is, that Marpole is the least integrated area, and thus norms of behaviour would be less well-defined compared with East End, where, surprisingly, from the results perhaps, the norm appears to be much more well-defined than in Dunbar.

The results in Table XXXVI, on the other hand, are not so readily explicable. However, as both variables on the 'state' of the area do not appear in the model of local area integration (Figure 2) their utility in the understanding of the stability and change of electoral patterns is probably limited.

Choice of residence, on the other hand, was included in the model (Figure 2). However, in all three areas a general association between choice of residence and voting behaviour was rejected¹.

¹ At the 0.005 level.
However, with regard to area norm voting two sets of relationships are expected. First, that those who vote in relation to the area norm would choose to stay in their area of residence. Second, that there would be an association between those choosing to stay and area norm voting dependent on the level of area integration. In other words, those choosing to stay would tend to vote in relation to the area norm more readily in more integrated areas. The first expectation is confirmed by our data where, of area norm voters, the largest proportion chose to stay. The second expectation is also confirmed with, in Marpole, the largest proportion choosing to stay actually voting NDP rather than Social Credit (Table XXXVII). As has been demonstrated, Marpole is the least integrated of the three areas, and this finding supports the proposition that the electoral pattern in that area (if 1972 trends continue) is in the process of change from Social Credit to NDP.

TABLE XXXVII  Choosing to Stay and Voting Behaviour (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East End</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marpole</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunbar</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, the degree to which inhabitants in the three areas feel closer to people living within their area of residence was also included in the model of local area integration (Figure 2). The
general expectation with regard to this variable is that there would be an association between those feeling closer to people living within the local area and area norm voting dependent on the level of area integration. Second, that there would be a tendency for those who vote in relation to the area norm to feel closer to those living within their area of residence. Table XXXVIII gives the results with regard to the first expectation.

TABLE XXXVIII  Closer to Those Within and Voting Behaviour (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>SC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East End</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marpole</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunbar</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be noted that the least integrated area has a substantially lower proportion of those who feel closer to people within the local area voting for the area norm, Social Credit. However, surprisingly, Dunbar, the most integrated area, has a much lower proportion voting for the area norm than East End. It may be, therefore, that the status type and composition of an area modifies associations between attachment to area and voting behaviour. This conclusion emerges from an examination of all associations between attachment to area and voting behaviour, given in Tables XXXII - XXXVIII, where, in general, the strength of the associations in Dunbar was less than in East End. Thus the strength of adherence
to voting behaviour norms may be greater in areas of generally lower status composition even though the level of integration in those areas may be the same or less.

However, with regard to the second expectation, area norm voters in both East End and Marpole tended to feel closer to those living outside of the area, although the proportion was much less in East End (35 per cent) than in Marpole. In Dunbar, on the other hand, equal proportions of area norm voters felt closer to those within and outside of their area.

Several latent integration measures have now been examined in relation to voting behaviour, and a series of associations has been demonstrated. Any exceptions have generally occurred in the least integrated of the three areas, Marpole, although it has been noted that status type and composition of area may modify the strength of integration-voting behaviour associations.

**MANIFEST INTEGRATION AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR**

In view of the complexity of individual social interaction both within the local area and outside of it, only the number of such interactions will be considered here, rather than their intensity. With regard to internal social interaction, the general expectation is that the larger the number of such interactions, the greater the propensity to vote in relation to the area norm. Conversely, the expectation is that the largest proportion of those inhabitants who state that they interact with no household within their local area
will tend not to vote in relation to the area norm. For internal interaction in general, it seems that there is a cut-off point at about five households, above which interaction significantly declines. Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, associations between internal social interaction and voting behaviour will be considered only up to this point.

With regard to the first point, it is expected that in East End, the larger the number of internal social contacts, the greater the propensity to vote NDP. For Marpole, the larger the number of contacts, the greater the propensity to vote Social Credit, and, for Dunbar, it is expected that the larger the number of internal social contacts the greater the propensity to vote Liberal. However, the general association is only partially upheld in Marpole, where those with the largest number of contacts tended to vote Social Credit, whilst in both East End and Dunbar, the associations were not upheld (Tables XXXIX, XL and XLI). The other general expectation was upheld in Marpole and Dunbar - that is, those with no internal social contacts tended not to vote in relation to the area norm. In Marpole, for example, the largest proportion of those with no internal contacts voted Liberal (Table XL), and, in Dunbar, the largest proportion voted NDP (Table XLI). In East End, on the other hand, the largest proportion of those with no social contacts voted in relation to the area norm - that is, NDP (Table XXIX). Thus, it would seem that, although the degree of internal social interaction is not of great
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE XXXIX</th>
<th>Internal Social Interaction and Voting Behaviour in East End (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE XL</th>
<th>Internal Social Interaction and Voting Behaviour in Marpole (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE XLI</th>
<th>Internal Social Interaction and Voting Behaviour in Dunbar (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
importance in terms of voting behaviour, especially in East End, whereas the lack of such interaction is an important indicator, especially in Marpole and Dunbar.

In terms of social interaction outside of the local area, the general expectation is that the greater the degree of such interaction, the greater the propensity not to vote in relation to the area norm. Conversely, it is expected that the lower the degree of external social interaction, the greater the propensity to vote in relation to the area norm. For external interaction in general, there seems to be a cut-off point at about 6-10 households, above which interaction significantly declines. Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, associations between external social interaction and voting behaviour will be considered only up to this point.

With regard to the first point, concerning the association between external social interaction and voting behaviour, it is expected that the greater the number of social contacts, the greater the propensity not to vote NDP in East End. Similarly, in Marpole, it is expected that the greater the number of external social contacts, the greater the propensity not to vote Social Credit, and, for Dunbar, it is expected that the greater the number of external social contacts, the greater the propensity not to vote Liberal. All three expectations are rejected. In all cases, the data show that the greater the number of external contacts, especially up to 3-5, outside of the local area, the greater the propensity to vote in relation to the area norm (Tables XLII, XLIII and XLIV). Our second expectation that the
### TABLE XLII
**External Social Interaction and Voting Behaviour in East End (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Response</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>One</th>
<th>Two</th>
<th>3-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE XLIII
**External Social Interaction and Voting Behaviour in Marpole (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Response</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>One</th>
<th>Two</th>
<th>3-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE XLIV
**External Social Interaction and Voting Behaviour in Dunbar (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Response</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>One</th>
<th>Two</th>
<th>3-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
lower the degree of external interaction, the greater the propensity to vote in relation to the area norm is also rejected in all three areas, although, in East End, a significant proportion of the NDP vote (22 per cent) said that they had no social contacts outside of their local area.

It seems, therefore, that internal and external social interaction is, in general, weakly associated with voting behaviour. The number of contacts internally and externally are generally poor indicators, although the lack of social interaction, particularly within the local area, is weakly associated with voting behaviour.

Shopping for food within the local area has been discussed above as another manifest component of integration. The general expectation in relation to voting behaviour is that the greater the tendency to shop within the local area, the greater the propensity to vote in relation to the area norm. Thus, for East End, it is expected that a greater proportion of those who shopped within their local area vote NDP, rather than any other party. Similarly, for Marpole, it is expected that a greater proportion of those who shop within their local area vote Social Credit rather than any other party. Finally, for Dunbar, it is expected that a greater proportion of those who shop within the area vote Liberal rather than any other party. Rather surprisingly, only in Marpole was the association demonstrated (Tables XLV, XLVI and XLVII).

Our final expectation concerning the association of local area integration with voting behaviour concerns the reading of local news-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE XLV</th>
<th>Local Area Shopping and Voting Behaviour in East End (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE XLVI</th>
<th>Local Area Shopping and Voting Behaviour in Marpole (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE XLVII</th>
<th>Local Area Shopping and Voting Behaviour in Dunbar (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
papers. For the purposes of the analysis, only the most important newspaper cited in each area (Table XX) will be considered. The general expectation is that the largest proportion of those who read this newspaper will vote in relation to the area norm. Thus, for East End, it is expected that the largest proportion of those reading Highland Echo will vote NDP. Similarly, for Marpole, the largest proportion of those reading Courier will vote Social Credit. And, for Dunbar, the largest proportion of those reading Courier will vote Liberal. The associations were demonstrated for both East End and Dunbar, but again, not for Marpole (Table XLVIII).

### TABLE XLVIII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Area Newspaper and Voting Behaviour (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A) East End</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Echo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B) Marpole</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C) Dunbar</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courier</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONCLUSION**

The main aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate an association between voting behaviour and local area integration, and, in particular to demonstrate that voting in relation to an area norm
is dependent in part on the degree of attachment to area. Adherence to the political norm of an area was shown to be associated with measures of territoriality both at the aggregate and individual levels. However, the same pattern did not emerge when manifest measures of integration were related to voting behaviour. The overall pattern is consistent, however, for manifest integration measures were not found to be associated with territoriality (Figure 2). It would seem, therefore, that internalised feelings of attachment to area are far more important in voting behaviour than individual outward manifestations such as socio-economic characteristics and social interaction.

Individual status, however, was an important variable in voting behaviour, and status composition in an area was associated with latent integration measures. Thus the complex series of interrelationships between status composition of an area, area integration and electoral pattern have been examined.

One other important mechanism for changing or reinforcing the political norms of an area is through the election campaign. From a geographic viewpoint, therefore, a consideration of the spatial aspects of the campaign is important in any analysis of the stability and change of electoral patterns.
CHAPTER VI

THE GEOGRAPHY OF CAMPAIGNING

In the discussion of the stability and change of electoral patterns, the final neglected variable to be considered here is the political party input, or from a geographic viewpoint, the geography of campaigning. It is presented here as one tentative aspect of overall party campaign policy and can be important in two main ways. First, in reinforcing area norms, especially, as this chapter will demonstrate, in areas of high spatial competition in canvassing. Second, the geography of campaigning is relevant to the study of the change of electoral patterns by providing some basis for longer-term 'conversions', as is the case in the Conservative campaign in the three local areas being examined. The impact of this will vary in part according to the degree of local area integration.

One of the functions of campaigning is to mobilise sympathetic support, and thus the geography of campaigning implies differential spatial distribution and mobilisation of such support. It is thus an important variable in that it provides a very localised political environment within which voting behaviour takes place. The general argument here is that the electoral pattern is associated with the geography of campaigning. In other words, the degree of local party activity in different areas will be statistically associated with the election outcome at both aggregate and individual levels. The aggregate level comprises the degree of areal correspondence of local party activity and the results of the election by poll, and the individual level consists
of individual response to such activity and individual outcome in terms of voting behaviour. In order to obtain information from both the competing parties and individuals in this regard, two questionnaires were used. For the political parties, a questionnaire was administered to candidates and campaign managers in the three constituencies within which the three local areas considered in this dissertation are located (Appendix II). Second, questions relating to individual response to party activity and its outcome, were included on the local area questionnaire (Appendix I). In terms of the former, a total of 24 personal interviews were undertaken, shortly after the election, with a minimum of two interviews per party in each of the three areas to ensure reliability.

Before proceeding with the analysis, it is important to note that certain constraints apply in any discussion of the geography of campaigning. Decisions made by campaign organisers must be made within the limits of the constituency and poll boundaries which are 'given' before the campaign is actually organised. In this regard, therefore, the campaign, at the outset is organised spatially, and precisely how it is organised will depend, in part, on the spatial configuration of such boundaries. Furthermore, constituency boundaries tend to bisect local areas, and, consequently, constituencies are generally not functional entities. As one writer has noted, electors need an election to learn or be reminded that they live in a particular named electorate (Laponce, 1969, 3).

The analysis of the geography of campaigning presented in this chapter has five main components. First, it will be demonstrated that the competing parties will organise their campaigns on a spatial basis.
Second, that they will employ a spatial strategy in their campaigns. By spatial strategy is meant the plan by which parties allocate their resources spatially within a constituency. Variations in spatial organisation and spatial strategy will depend on the nature of the competing candidates, and, in particular whether the candidates are incumbents, have run for political office before, or have had no previous public political exposure. Third, the spatial variations of issues raised by the parties among the three local areas considered will be described. Fourth, it will be suggested that the response of those living within each polling district is associated with the degree of intensity of local party activity. Fifth, the voting behaviour of those living within each polling district will be shown to be associated with the degree of intensity of party campaigning in each district. The effectiveness of the spatial strategies of the competing parties will be shown to be associated with the internal organisation of each party.

SPATIAL ORGANISATION

All political parties in all Canadian Provinces use the constituency as a basic spatial organising unit for the campaign. This is a 'given'. Invariably, the constituency-based organisations break down the constituency into a number of organising units or districts. The criteria for defining such districts, which include availability of staff as well as the results of the preceding election, may vary according to the constituency organisation, and according to the nature of the candidates. However, if districts are used as organising units, they are simply agglomerations of polling districts.

Below the level of the district is the poll, which is normally the lowest level of spatial organisation. In certain cases, no
districts are defined, and thus the constituency is organised for the campaign by polls. The purpose of using districts and polls as spatial units is purely organisational. The district comprises a number of polls, and is defined in terms of organisational convenience. However, sometimes an attempt is made to define the district in terms of a local area or a neighbourhood. Thus, for the Liberal campaign in Vancouver-Point Gray, Dunbar was used as an organisational district. However, other criteria are used for district definition. For instance, the district may be defined on a physical basis. Thus, a major concentration of apartments in Marpole was district 8 of a 20-district Liberal campaign in Vancouver South (Map 6). Similarly, the area surrounding the PNE in East End was district 2 in a 17-district Conservative campaign in Vancouver-East (Map 7). In general, apart from the NDP campaign in Marpole, only the Liberal and Conservative parties were organising their campaigns on a district basis. Social Credit and NDP campaigns were generally organised on an ad hoc basis at the level of the poll. In those cases where districts were used, each district has a chairman, who, with the aid of poll captains for each poll within the district, will organise the district campaign. For those cases where districts were not used, each poll will usually have a poll captain, if manpower allows this, who will organise canvassing and leaflet distribution within that poll based on directives normally from a constituency campaign committee. This committee will normally comprise of all district chairmen, if there are any, plus a number of individuals who are in charge of particular specialised functions, such as money, signs, transportation and public relations.
SPATIAL ORGANISATION OF THE LIBERAL CAMPAIGN IN MARPOLE
SPATIAL ORGANISATION OF THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN IN EAST END
SPATIAL STRATEGY

As was noted above, spatial strategy is the plan by which the competing parties allocate their resources spatially within a constituency. Decisions taken for such allocation of resources are the responsibility of the campaign committee. However, spatial strategy can be examined at another level - that is, the priority assigned to a particular constituency by Provincial Headquarters.

One criteria would be used to measure such priorities is the relative expenditure by constituency. However, the expenditure of all parties does not necessarily reflect spatial priorities. In the case of the NDP, for example, expenditure is directly related to the amount of money able to be raised in each constituency. Thus, the configuration of constituency boundaries provides a spatial constraint with regard to fund-raising ability. Thus the NDP spent more in Vancouver-Point Grey than Vancouver-East because they were able to raise more (Table XLIX). The large sums of money for both Social Credit and Liberals, on the other hand, were used in an attempt to re-elect their incumbent candidates in Vancouver-South and Vancouver-Point Grey respectively. Both of these parties had well defined spatial priorities despite their ability to raise money locally. The Conservatives, on the other hand, decided to concentrate more of their resources in Point Grey, where two well-known candidates who had previously run successfully at the civic level, were running Provincial for the first time.

Thus, the nature of the candidate is the second important component of party spatial strategy. In both Vancouver-East and Vancouver-South, Conservative candidates had little or no previous public exposure
in politics. However, the budget is obviously of great importance in terms of the quality and quantity of campaign literature the local campaign can produce and use. It is also of importance in paying for other local advertising media, such as lawn signs, and the ability to mail literature or use professional firms to 'drop' literature in certain areas of the constituency. The NDP, however, does this by volunteer labour. The budget is important too in terms of operating an effective campaign headquarters or offices located within each constituency.

TABLE XLIX  Party Expenditure 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vancouver-East</th>
<th>Vancouver-South</th>
<th>Vancouver-Point Grey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>$16,867</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
<td>$22,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>$ 5,304</td>
<td>$ 8,016</td>
<td>$ 6,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>$ 5,071</td>
<td>$16,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>$ 3,284</td>
<td>$ 1,525</td>
<td>$ 4,378</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Registrar of Voters, Vancouver, B.C.

The third important factor in terms of spatial campaign strategy is the number of workers each campaign office has at its disposal. This is the most important factor influencing spatial strategy, second only to previous election results. An ideal canvassing strategy can be severely hampered by a lack of manpower. Table L gives the number of canvassers used in each of the three constituencies by the competing parties. One important factor in the interpretation of this data is the decision to be made by each party
whether canvassing by volunteer workers or canvassers is to be an
important part of the campaign. Social Credit in Vancouver-East
and Vancouver-South thought it was not, whereas the NDP in Vancouver-
East and the Liberals in Vancouver-Point Grey and South thought that
personally canvassing was a major part of their campaigns. The main
aim of the Conservative Party, on the other hand, was to get their
relatively unknown candidates known, and thus in general the can-
didates themselves personally canvassed large areas in their ridings
to get themselves as much exposure as possible. Of course, one
important factor in gaining party workers relates to the degree of
'latent partisanship' within each constituency. Thus, with
reference to our urban model (Figure 2) it is easier for the Liberals.
to obtain canvassers in Point Grey, and for the NDP to obtain can-
vassers in East, than it is for the other parties. It is further
desirable that sympathetic workers can have easy access to the
constituency campaign office or offices. In general, although cost
and availability of space are important factors, the campaign office
provides an important advertising function and attempts to be seen
as an artery of the party. It is thus best located in or near to a
shipping area where people can drop in, and on or near to a bus route.
One other factor in the location of the campaign office is the notion
of locating it in an area of relatively sympathetic support based
on previous voting figures. Location in an area of relative strength
is a good mobilising factor. This is important for it provides the
office with a 'base' from which to operate, and a territory from which
workers can be readily 'drawn'. Thus, in certain cases, this was an
important consideration in the location of the campaign office.
With the consideration of the budget, the nature of the candidates, and the number of campaign workers, in mind, certain decisions have to be made as to the spatial strategy to be followed in the campaign. The consideration of the most effective use of scarce resources is again an important one. Dependent on the above factors, each party in each area will decide which polls within the constituency are to be personally canvassed, first by volunteer workers, and second, in certain cases, by the candidates themselves. In the latter case, often this spatial strategy in the final analysis was a matter of convenience and generally ad hoc, rather than relating to some pre-conceived plan. However, with regard to canvassers, usually the spatial strategy was fairly explicit, and adhered to wherever possible. Second, decisions have to be made concerning the types of issues to be raised in the local campaign using campaign literature and other advertising media, such as local newspapers and public meetings. Each of these will be considered in turn.

With regard to the spatial strategy of canvassing each party in each area defined by certain specific criteria which polls were to be canvassed in relation to the general aims of their campaigns. The basis on which canvassing decisions were made was the 1969 Provincial election returns for each area. In East End, the Social Credit canvass was concerned above all with mobilising favourable support in 1969, and thus the canvass was concentrated in those polls which the party won in that election and also those polls which were only marginally lost. The NDP strategy in East End was more
specific. Polls with 40 per cent or less voting NDP were avoided because they were generally considered relatively weak. The reasoning was that the greater the canvassing presence in a poll, the greater the likelihood that there would be a higher turnout, and, thus, in relatively weak polls, this must be avoided if possible. The NDP canvass in East End was, therefore, restricted to those polls which gave the party at least 55 per cent of the vote in 1969. The aims of the Conservatives, on the other hand, were slightly different. First, they had no 1969 Provincial returns to use as a basis. Second, their candidates were relatively unknown, although both lived in the constituency. The aim at the outset was thus to have a blanket coverage of the area, but, due mainly to organisational inexperience, and, in particular, lack of manpower, the constituency was thinly covered, especially in the north. Further, the Conservative Party had an additional aim to rebuild and to provide a community base for future party organisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE L</th>
<th>Number of Canvassers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vancouver-East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Personal interview
SPATIAL COMPETITION

The different spatial strategies of the parties meant primarily, in relation to Social Credit and NDP, that they were competing in areas of previously known strength. However, there was competition for many polls, and, in some cases, polls were canvassed by all three parties (Map 8). Map 8 shows that, in East End, although there are a number of polls where spatial competition was weak (usually these were canvassed by Social Credit), there are a number of areas of medium (two-party) and strong (three-party) competition.

In Marpole, again NDP canvassing was carried on in areas of strength based on 1969 results. A minimum of 40 per cent of the 1969 vote was necessary for canvassing, and this meant that most NDP canvassing in Vancouver-South was carried on in the East of the riding, and only four polls were canvassed by the NDP in Marpole. For Social Credit, on the other hand, Marpole was a priority area, particularly the central portion running north to south. Canvassing in this case was not based on any specific figure from the 1969 returns as it was in East End, but rather that Marpole traditionally had voted Social Credit (see Map 2). The aim of both the Liberals and Conservatives was to canvass all polls in Marpole, both with a view to getting as much exposure as possible for their little-known candidates. However, the all-inclusive Conservative strategy, as in East End, tended to break down because of lack of manpower and the relatively poor location of its campaign office. The Conservative canvass was thus limited to the west side of Marpole. For the Liberals,
SPATIAL COMPETITION OF CANVASSING IN EAST END 1972

- strong—3 parties
- medium—2 parties
- weak—1 party

0 — 700 yards
on the other hand, manpower was not such a problem. The party could draw workers especially from the west and north of Marpole, and was thus able to canvass the whole area. The spatial competition of canvassing in most of Marpole was medium with an area of weak canvassing (Liberal) on the east side, and some pockets of strong competition in the centre and north (Map 9). No poll was canvassed by all four political parties.

Spatial competition in Dunbar in terms of canvassing was generally stronger than in either East End of Marpole, for there was no area of weak spatial competition, most of the area consisting of strong spatial competition, and including several polls with very strong spatial competition, being canvassed by all four parties (Map 10). Contrary to NDP strategy in Vancouver-East, Social Credit strategy in Dunbar was to canvass low polls based on the 1969 returns. The aim here was to acquaint areas of previously low Social Credit support with the qualities of the two candidates who were fairly well-known at the civic level. The NDP, on the other hand, continued its strategy of not arousing the opposition, and thus canvassed only in those polls which in 1969 showed a minimum support of 15 per cent, which was above the average in Dunbar for that party. The Conservative strategy, as in East End and Marpole was to attempt to gain as much exposure as possible, and thus the candidates themselves did a great deal of personal canvassing. The Liberals, on the other hand, being the incumbents, had a very well-developed party organisation, had plenty of workers and plenty of money. Fear of arousing opposition in Dunbar was thus not a consideration for them, as there was no Liberal equivalent to the
SPATIAL COMPETITION OF CANVASSING IN MARPOLE IN 1972

- strong-3 parties
- medium-2 parties
- weak-1 party

0 500 yards
MAP 10
SPATIAL COMPETITION OF CANVASSING IN DUNBAR 1972

- very strong - 4 parties
- strong - 3 parties
- medium - 2 parties

0  560 yards
'red scare'. The Liberal Party therefore canvassed fairly thoroughly every poll in the area.

ISSUES

Apart from the factors of spatial organisation and spatial strategy, there are important spatial differences among issues raised in the three local areas under consideration here, which are relevant in a geography of campaigning. Such differences in issues raised by the competing parties in different areas of the city may relate in part to differences in urban physical fabric and/or social structure. In general, information on issues was transmitted by campaign literature which was either left by the canvasser, but more generally was undertaken as a leaflet 'drop'.

Most parties in all three local areas dropped at least one piece of literature to all homes, save for Social Credit in East End, where the single drop was only partially completed, although in certain cases there can be two and sometimes three 'drops', such as, in the case of the latter, NDP in East End and the Conservatives in Dunbar. An analysis of the content of the campaign material used in the drops shows there to be differences between the three areas in terms of issues raised, as well as some party differences within each area. Table LI gives the issues raised by local canvassing and literature distribution in East End. The only two issues common to all three competing parties evident in the campaign literature in East End are old age pensions and the need to develop secondary industry. Further, several localised issues were raised such as harbour development, low rental housing, local representation, need for a local day care centre and swimming pool, and the need to improve local streets.
Further, the distribution of such local issues was not confined to any one party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues Raised in East End</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>SC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low rental housing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local representation</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary industry</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day care centre</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old age pensions</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swimming pool</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved streets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrogance of government</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credibility of government</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public information service</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education grants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto insurance</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-cost bus service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour-management relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Local party campaign literature.

In Dunbar, the development of the Jericho lands was the only issue common to all four parties evident in the campaign literature. This issue was one of several localised issues along with the Endowment
lands and Indian rights (Table LIII).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues Raised in Marpole</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>Lib</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old age pensions</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenants' rights</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto insurance</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transit</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollution</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free collective bargaining</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and welfare</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary industry</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shannon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource development</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Local party campaign literature.
### Issues Raised in Dunbar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>Lib</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endowment Lands</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates record</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>x</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto insurance</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old age pensions</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate speculation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for an alternative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third crossing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood pubs</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid transit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Local party campaign literature.
Although there are many issues which are common to all three local areas, there is a certain degree of spatial variation, not surprisingly, which is related to the social and physical nature of each area. The significant point, however, is that it is important to view the individual voter not only in relation to the spatial competition of canvassing within each area, but also to the spatial variation of issues raised by the competing parties among areas.

THE RESPONSE

It will be suggested in this section that individual response to the spatial strategy of the competing parties will be associated with the degree of intensity of local party activity in each area. The response can be examined in terms of whether respondents had been visited by party canvassers, had received party literature, and the kinds of issues considered important in the campaign. In other words, to examine the degree to which information distributed based on party spatial strategy was being received. The degree of intensity of local party activity can be examined in terms of the number of times chosen areas were canvassed and 'dropped', as well as the number of workers involved in various aspects of the campaign. The association of individual response with voting behaviour will be considered in the third section of this chapter.

In terms of individual response to party canvassing by area, the data showed there to be no significant difference\(^1\) (Table LIV).

\(^1\)At the 0.005 level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>East End</th>
<th>Marpole</th>
<th>Dunbar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal/NDP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal/PC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib/NDP/PC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib/NDP/PC/SC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Party canvassing was thus more readily received on behalf of those parties traditionally representing certain areas in the city, as in our model of political space (Figure 2). Thus the largest response in terms of visits received for the Liberals was in Dunbar compared with East End for NDP and Marpole for Social Credit. One would generally expect this finding if the spatial strategy generally holds that the competing parties tend to canvass more in those areas where they have done best in previous elections. This holds true also in terms of the proportion of respondents who reported meeting candidates in each area, and again there was no significant difference by area \(^1\), and the largest proportion of those who reported meeting

\(^1\)At the 0.005 level.
Liberal candidates, for example, was in Dunbar, compared with DNP candidates in East End and Social Credit candidates in Marpole (Table LV). The rest response to both Conservative canvassing and to meeting candidates, on the other hand, was in Dunbar (Tables LIV and LV).

TABLE LV  Meeting Candidates by Area (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East End</th>
<th>Marpole</th>
<th>Dunbar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No meeting</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of campaign material received by respondents, again there was no significant difference by area. However, in all three areas the majority of respondents stated that they had received campaign literature from all of the competing parties, although this varied slightly by area (Table LVI). Further, in Dunbar, the most important response in terms of campaign material received was on behalf of the Liberals, compared with the NDP in both East End and Marpole.

With the spatial differences in individual response to party activity, one would expect that there would also be some difference

---

1 At the 0.005 level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE LVI</th>
<th>Campaign Material Received (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE LVII</th>
<th>Issue Response by Area (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of government</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.C. labour laws</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum wage</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto insurance</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare services</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old age pensions</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary industry</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rents/low-income housing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in terms of perceived issues. An association between individual issue response and the party raising that issue in an area which has personally contacted individuals in the campaign would therefore be expected. Table LVII shows the issues which respondents considered to be the most important. For both Marpole and Dunbar, the age of the government was considered by respondents to be the most important issue, compared with old age pensions in East End. However, old age pensions was the second most important issue in Marpole, compared with unemployment in both East End and Dunbar (Table LVII). In East End, of all of the issues listed in Table LVII, eight were raised by the NDP, four by the Conservatives, and three by Social Credit (Table LI). In Marpole, of all the issues listed in Table LVII, ten were raised by the NDP, seven by Social Credit, four by the Conservatives and three by the Liberals (Table LII). Similarly, in Dunbar, six of the issues were raised by the NDP, four by the Liberals, four by the Conservatives and one by Social Credit (Table LIII).

Thus, with regard to our above expectation concerning an association between response and party activity, we would expect that the NDP campaigned with greater intensity in all three areas than any of the other competing parties. This association is seen to hold in both East End and Marpole in terms of various measures of intensity of activity, but not in Dunbar where the Liberals were the most active (Tables LVIII, LIX and LX).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Intensity of Party Activity</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>SC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LVIII</td>
<td>in East End</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number in campaign (total)</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. who helped throughout</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of office workers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of canvassers</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of canvasses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Partially 1</td>
<td>Partially 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of 'drops'</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Partially 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIX</td>
<td>Intensity of Party Activity in Marpole</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number in campaign (total)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. who helped throughout</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of office workers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of canvassers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of canvasses</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of 'drops'</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LX</td>
<td>Intensity of Party Activity in Dunbar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number in campaign (total)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. who helped throughout</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of office workers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of canvassers</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of canvasses</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of 'drops'</td>
<td>Partially 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PARTY ACTIVITY AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR.

Having now demonstrated that the competing parties employ a spatial strategy in their campaigns which is partially reflected in terms of individual response in relation to the intensity of party activity, our third major argument considered in this chapter is that such activity is associated with voting behaviour. Unfortunately, the number of individuals in our sample who reported being visited by a canvasser is too small for analysis, and thus the argument is examined at the level of the poll. Results can therefore be regarded only as suggestive.

Between areas, the expectation is, therefore, that the party with the greatest degree of activity will obtain above average votes in those polls in which it canvassed. Thus, it is expected that in both East End and Marpole, polls canvassed by NDP will give that party an above average vote. Further, within areas, it is expected that the party representing the area norm will do best in areas of high competition in terms of canvassing especially in the most integrated local areas. Both associations are sustained by our data. The NDP did obtain a better than average vote in those canvassed polls in East End and Marpole (Tables LXI and LXII respectively), whereas, although the Liberals had the greatest intensity of activity in Dunbar, as they canvassed every poll, it was not possible to examine the assertion. In terms of our second expectation, NDP did best in the areas of high competition in East End, and the Liberals did best in the areas of high
competition in Dunbar. Social Credit, on the other hand, did not do best in areas of high competition in Marpole.

TABLE LXI  Spatial Competition and Voting Behaviour in East End (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>PC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average % per poll</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % per canvassed poll</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % in areas high comp.</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % in areas med. comp.</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % in areas non-comp.</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE LXII  Spatial Competition and Voting Behaviour in Marpole (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>LIB</th>
<th>PC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average % per poll</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % per canvassed poll</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % in areas high comp.</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % in areas med. comp.</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % in areas non-comp.</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...In terms of individual parties and the association between party activity and voting behaviour, Social Credit did better than average in those polls that they canvassed only in East End. The NDP, on the other hand, did better than average in those polls canvassed in all three areas. The Conservatives, furthermore, did better than average
in those polls canvassed in both Marpole and Dunbar, and did no worse in East End. Social Credit had their best results in areas of medium or no spatial competition, whereas the Conservatives did best in polls it canvassed in Marpole and Dunbar, but in East End did best in areas of medium or no competition (Tables LXI, LXII and LXIII).

TABLE LXIII  Spatial Competition and Voting Behaviour in Dunbar (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>LIB</th>
<th>PC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average % per poll</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % per canvassed poll</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % in areas high comp.</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % in areas med. comp.</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MODEL OF PARTY ACTIVITY AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR

From what has been discussed in relation to party activity and voting behaviour a descriptive model can be formulated. The model has five components - election outcome, number of volunteers, spatial organisation, spatial strategy and spatial response. The components are related in the sense that depending on whether a party does well or poorly in the election is associated with the number of volunteers it will mobilise and thus can call upon for help in the subsequent campaign. The number of volunteers available is directly associated with the degree to which the party can effectively organise its campaign spatially and can carry out its spatial strategy. This in
turn is associated with the degree of spatial response on the part of individual voters in terms of whether they have been visited by canvassers, have received campaign material, and have perceived certain issues. This varies within as well as between areas. This response is then associated with voting behaviour. Implicit in the model is the importance of feedback, and the model can be entered at any point. Its form is given in Figure 3.

Figure 3 Model of Party Activity and Voting Behaviour

CONCLUSION

This chapter has dealt with a highly complex series of interrelationships between spatial aspects of the election campaign and the electoral pattern. Its aim has been first to introduce the subject of the geography of campaigning, and, second, to demonstrate that it is associated with voting behaviour, and is therefore important in a consideration of the stability and change of electoral patterns.

However, despite the importance of a consideration of the geography of campaigning in the study of electoral patterns, it must be
emphasised that the conclusions drawn are very tentative. Future research would require a greater number of interviews from workers of every party to obtain more accurate data. Second, candidates and campaign workers should be interviewed both before and after the election in order to ensure that interviews taken only after the election, as in the present study, are not just purely 'rationalisations' of what occurred. Third, more accurate data is required on precisely which individuals were visited by which party, and at what stage in the campaign. Adherence to these three considerations would make a geography of campaigning a more interesting and worthwhile area for future investigation.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The importance of a consideration of the neglected factors in
the study of the stability and change of electoral patterns has been
demonstrated. The dissertation has taken a spatial viewpoint, and,
has, of necessity, considered a simplification of some of the social
and political processes operating in space in order to increase our
understanding of the stability and change of electoral patterns. The
aim of the dissertation has not been to provide a final solution to
this understanding, but has endeavoured more to provide "prudent and
stimulating insights rather than (for) any disciplinary formula, (for
his) artistic finesse in geographic description, (his) power to suggest
rather than convince, to evoke ideas rather than impose doctrine, and
to open new horizons rather than define frontiers" (Buttimer, 1971,58).
If this dissertation has achieved any of this then its purpose will
have been fulfilled.

CONCLUSIONS

However, the study has endeavoured to expand the horizons of
electoral geography and, in particular, to present the argument that
it is important, for the understanding of the stability and change of
electoral patterns, to view the individual with reference to his
surroundings - that is, the political culture of the political system
in which he lives, the changes in the political party system and
resultant impacts on the electoral pattern, as well as the political
mood at the time of the election. Further, models of political space need to be considered in future voting studies in order to begin to identify the political norms of the area in which an individual lives. Important too is the impact on the electoral pattern of migration as well as the impact of territoriality and urban structure and their changes. Finally, from the political party viewpoint, the degree to which spatial aspects of the campaign are associated with the electoral pattern. All of these considerations are dynamic and constitute some of the complexity of the urban politic as well as providing means by which the stability and change of electoral patterns can be analysed.

The major finding of Chapter II, that the NDP victory was part of the ongoing process of action and reaction in B.C. politics, and should be clearly seen in that regard, has obvious implications for the study of the stability and change of electoral patterns. An area which had been consistently supporting Social Credit - that is, Marpole - changed its dominant party bias to NDP in 1972. However, one of the problems in dealing with the dynamics of political culture is that of ascertaining the 'political mood' of the electorate at the time of the election. The political mood is essentially a group phenomenon or feeling which is often fairly well-defined - for example, a feeling that Social Credit must go - or is rather vague. Further, it may or may not be reflected in the communications media, in interpersonal relations, or in opinion polls prior to the election. However, it is of potential importance as a concept in the analysis of the stability and change of electoral patterns in terms of its impact. For example, it is possible to argue that the political mood was in part
responsible for the removal of two well-known and established Social Credit candidates in the constituency of Little Mountain in the 1972 B.C. Provincial Election. It may be especially important, therefore, when the area under question has had little change in status composition, little migration, and no change in integration level. However, the spatial aspects of the campaign may help to reinforce or change trends in the political mood of an electorate. It is possible to argue that a congruence between political mood and campaign of a particular party is more beneficial to that party than a "cross-pressured" situation where diverse influences are in conflict and not in the same direction.

The major findings of Chapter III are that zones of latent partisanship do exist in Vancouver and that individuals are tending to move to that zone which is closest to their own political preference. However, this latter finding is very tentative, and is by no means conclusive. One of the problems in this analysis is the stability of individual political preference and its precise relationship to changes in residential location. Factors of social expectation and status mobility may be intervening variables which have not been given due consideration in this dissertation. A great deal of further work, undertaken over a number of years, is necessary before these relationships are finally established.

The major conclusions of Chapter IV, that, in some local areas the degree of integration is relatively low, and, yet in others still remains at a significant level, raises questions about the applicability of an American model in Canadian society. In two local areas studied - East End and Dunbar - a majority of inhabitants, on a variety of measures, felt a sense of belonging to their area of residence. It may be that Canada is at an earlier stage of social 'development' and,
hence, in the future will be faced with problems of anomie and disintegration in all local areas in the city.

At the aggregate level in Chapter V it was shown that, once local areas are defined with a degree of integration, that they begin to function as 'socio-spatial' groups and adherence to area norms is associated with the degree of area integration. Cohesiveness thus tends to lead to uniformity of behaviour. At the individual level, on the other hand, the relationship between integration and voting behaviour was much less clear. As a possible explanation in this regard, it could be that the relationship is only relevant at the group level and that individual associations are much more diffuse and, hence, do not exhibit any readily identifiable pattern.

With regard to the spatial aspects of the campaign both within and among the three local areas under study, we are dealing with a highly complex set of interrelationships. It can be argued, however, that campaigning activities result in a 'stirring up' of the electorate, with the main aim of 'getting out the vote'. However, several problems arose in this analysis. First, is the problem of gaining basic data from the political parties concerned. Important here is whether representatives of the various parties are willing to part with their particular approach to the campaign. Further, depending on the timing of the interview - whether before or after the election - the strategy may be 'rationalised' to what the party representative thinks the researcher would like to hear. This may be especially true after the election, although obtaining relatively confidential campaign material before election day poses an equally important problem.

Second, is the problem of obtaining accurate information from
individuals about whether or not they were contacted by a canvasser. In a hectic campaign there is often a genuine problem of recall here. One way of overcoming this in the future may be to try (if the political parties were willing) to check party records from individual canvassers to see which voters were actually contacted and which were not.

Two other problems arise out of this. First, if the accuracy of individual data on the impact of party activity is questionable, then the only associations obtainable are between the election result and the areas of party activity at an aggregate level - that is, the poll. This was achieved in Chapter VI. The limitations of these associations in view of the data problems are accepted here. It is possible to argue, however, that, in a static situation, a party doing well in certain polls in the 1969 election may automatically do well in 1972, other things being equal. Thus the impact of the spatial aspects of the campaign on the electoral pattern could be argued to be minimal. However, it is important to note in this regard that one of the findings of Chapter VI was that, taking one of the functions of the canvass to 'get out the vote', then in areas of high spatial competition for the vote, polls tended to reflect above average results for the political norm. This was found to be especially true in the two areas of higher integration, East End and Dunbar.

One general problem, however, which created difficulties in all of the analysis, is the use of areal divisions. For example, on the one hand, Chapter IV was testing the relevance of the boundaries identified by Mayhew and, yet, for the sake of data collection, Mayhew's areas were the most appropriate and least problematic ones to use. Thus,
at the outset, using Mayhew's areas as a sampling frame necessitated a tacit assumption that, in fact, his areas did have functional relevance and that their boundaries did have significance to the inhabitants.

The other general problem of areal divisions which arose in Chapter VI was the use of electoral ridings and polling districts. Again, like Mayhew's areas, these divisions were 'externally determined' and not designed specifically for this study. As was noted in Chapter VI they provide spatial constraints on the conduct of the campaign also. However, in terms of a consideration of area integration, the boundaries of these divisions pay little regard for local area boundaries. Hence local areas are often either bisected or are incorporated into a larger unit with which it has little functional relationship.

IMPLICATIONS

With regard to future research a consideration of the political culture and changes in the political party system is important because it lends considerable insight into the development of the electoral pattern and thus improves our understanding of it. However, future research in this area would need to concentrate specifically on the impact on the electoral pattern of the introduction of a new political party, and, if there was change in the pattern, to attempt to ascertain why changes occurred in some areas rather than others. Of particular interest in this regard would be the detailed study of the impact of the introduction of the Social Credit Party on the Vancouver electoral pattern in the 1952 and 1953 B.C. Provincial Elections, as well as the introduction of the National Alliance Party and its impact on the electoral pattern of the Perth Metropolitan Area in the 1974 State Election.
The findings of Chapter III have a number of implications for future research. First, is in the area of the model of political space and its comparability with social models of the same city, as well as the cross-comparability of models of political space in different cities. With regard to the latter situation, problems immediately arise in terms of the initial comparability of political parties in different countries. However, cross-comparability of urban models of political space in say Canada would provide a starting point in recognising common electoral patterns and highlighting common political processes. Of basic importance, of course, is a much more detailed analysis of the patterns themselves, and, in particular, the incidence of a particular small area of consistent political support which is surrounded by areas of completely different support. These can be seen in Map 2, and, of particular importance, for example may be such questions as how Chinese attitudes of relative isolation in South-East Asia have reflected in their relatively isolated pattern of electoral behaviour in Chinatown. Why is it that, over a period of 4 elections one or two polls consistently are different or 'anomalous' from the areas which surround them?

The second area of future inquiry arising out of Chapter III is a more detailed analysis of the interrelation between intra-urban migration, individual voter changes and the electoral pattern. A more detailed analysis of individual migration histories obtained in the personal interview (see Appendix 1) may give us some insight into the intra-urban migration pattern but, in order to relate this to changes in individual voting behaviour, individuals need to be studied over a long time span. Important for future research in this regard however,
is the relation between social mobility, status aspiration and changes in voting behaviour which reflects in the electoral pattern. Is a change in status associated with first migration and second a change in voting behaviour? What is the detailed interrelationship between status change, residence change and voting behaviour change? In this dissertation we have examined residence change and voting behaviour change relationships, but not their association with change in status and social mobility.

The third area of future research arising out of Chapter II and recurring again in Chapter V is the need to expand and analyse the existence of a possible 'retreat' process in the urban area. It was noted in Chapter III, for example, that those who voted in relation to the area norm had previously been relatively mobile. The speculation which requires inquiry arising out of this is that continual mobility over a period of time has resulted in insecurity and thus has encouraged individuals to develop relatively strong attachments to particular areas and adhere to those area norms - in this particular instance, the voting behaviour norm. How this actually occurs and at what point an individual develops attachments after a period of relative mobility again is an area of future research. However, it was suggested in Chapter III that a factor in intra-urban mobility may be that certain necessary functional associations are not being fulfilled. For example, the individual does not feel at home in the area, or has no friends in the immediate vicinity. The tentative finding therefore was that those who are not integrated into a local area tend to move to an area whose voting norm is the same as their own political preference. Important to note here in this regard is that in areas undergoing change, as in Marpole, there is still some
strong residual attachment to area by individuals voting for the area norm (see Chapter V).

The general findings can be combined to present an integrated descriptive model of urban spatial structure in Vancouver, derived from Chapters III and IV (Figure 4). The model is zonal and sectoral (based on Figure 1) as well as being formal (in the political sense) and functional (in the social sense). It consists of a zonal/sectoral pattern (political-formal) superimposed on a composite of local areas (social-functional). The model consists of four concentric rings, derived from Figure 1, based on voting patterns in Vancouver in the last four Provincial elections. The outermost ring, or the "old suburban single family areas", consists of four sectors based on these voting patterns. The inner ring, or CBD, is a formal zone in the political sense (Figure 1) as well as being a functional zone (Map 1). The second ring, or "zone of transition", is a formal zone in the political sense (Figure 1), but consists of two functional local areas of Strathcona and the West End. The third zone, or "inner city housing area", is a formal political zone, but consists of four functional local areas - Kitsilano, Fairview, Mount Pleasant and Grandview-Woodland. The outermost zone consists of all of the remaining functional local areas (see Map 1), arranged within four formal (political) sectors. The model is a more realistic description of spatial structure in Vancouver than the classical models, accords with the need to develop a functional model (Hardwick, 1971), as well as the need to provide an integrated sectoral and zonal model (Johnston,
AN INTEGRATED DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF THE URBAN SPATIAL STRUCTURE IN VANCOUVER
1971). However, the model is derived from one particular case, and thus needs testing in other Canadian cities.

Implied in the model is the need to see how inhabitants living in other areas of the city perceive the boundaries of their local area, and the degree to which those areas are functionally integrated. Important too is the study of the evolution of area integration and how it changes. Further, how the model of political space in Vancouver (Figure 1) changed, if at all, with the introduction of a new political element into the system (for example, the formation of the NDP).

Of particular importance from Chapter IV is the need to study how attachment to area or territoriality actually evolves in an urban area. Is it a particular temporal process? Does it relate specifically to a set of common symbols? What makes a socio-spatial group? Is attachment to area simply a function of the status composition of the area? As was suggested in Chapter V there is an interrelation between status composition and integration at the aggregate and individual level, but is status type also important? With regard to the first point is the development towards internal status similarity reinforced by the process of mobility and change resulting in increasing internal cohesion coupled with a 'retreat' process and hence an evolution of a definable territory? With regard to the second point, do areas composed chiefly of lower status groups tend to be more integrated, for example? The evidence presented in Chapter IV would suggest the reverse - that is, Dunbar, consisting of higher status groups was found
to be more integrated than East End which consists chiefly of lower status groups, although the differences in integration levels were relatively small. The problem as far as future research in this area is concerned is to begin to identify how and why this is the case. Is it an unconscious 'osmotic' kind of process as Campbell suggested several years ago (Campbell, 1958) in which norms are unconsciously learned? The evidence from Chapter V suggests that this may be the most useful line of future inquiry for associations between manifest area integration and voting behaviour were minimal. The detailed study of the evolution and change of political regions in the city over a number of years is one area of future research which may clarify this relationship.

However, apart from local areas being relevant to voting behaviour they may also be relevant to a number of other types of behaviour. The status/type/composition - area integration - behaviour set of interrelationships may be important in contributing to an understanding of a variety of behaviour in space, such as crime and delinquency, for example. Degrees of area integration may be important considerations in studies of mental illness.

The geography of campaigning, apart from clarifying the relationships between spatial organisation, spatial strategy, issues, response and voting behaviour, offers scope for future work at a variety of different levels and in different countries. However, the spatial aspects of campaigning may not be so readily identifiable at other levels of the political system - for example, the civic level - or in different countries - for example, in Australia, it is compulsory
to vote at all levels above the civic level, and hence at these levels, the relevance of a geography of campaigning may be minimal.

However, the most important implication to arise out of this study of the stability and change of electoral patterns is that we are dealing with complex sets of interrelationships in which dependent and independent variables become extremely difficult to identify. This points to the limitations of a strictly scientific approach to the study of electoral patterns in a real world situation, and, thus, the dynamics of the political culture, migration, the model of political space, status, integration, and the spatial aspects of the campaign, which are all interrelated phenomena, must be taken together in an holistic approach to adequately understand the stability and change of electoral patterns.
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APPENDIX I

Local Area Questionnaire  
Department of Geography  
University of British Columbia  

PERCEPTION OF LOCAL AREA:  

Q1  
a) Do you think that there is a name for this area of Vancouver?  
   1 yes  
   2 no  
   3 maybe  

(IF 'NO' GO TO Q2)  

b) (IF 'YES' or 'MAYBE' TO a), ASK):  

Could you tell me what you think is the name of this area of the city?  

(IF RESPONDENT CITES A CONSTITUENCY NAME, PROVINCIAL OR FEDERAL, PROBE FOR OTHER AREA NAMES)  

1 Renfrew  
2 East End/East Vancouver  
3 East Hastings/Hastings East  
4 Vancouver Heights  
5 Grandview  
6 Marpole  
7 South Vancouver  
8 Shannon  
9 South Cambie  
A Marpole/Oakridge  
B Kerrisdale/South Kerrisdale  
C Oakridge  
D Southlands  
E Dunbar  
F (West) Point Grey  
G Kerrisdale/Dunbar  
H McKenzie Heights  
J Dunbar/Point Grey  
K Dunbar Heights  
L Blenheim Flats  
M Other(s) (specify)
c) (IF 'YES' OR 'MAYBE' TO a), ASK):

Would you tell me which streets provide the boundaries of this area?
How about the .................

...............Northern Boundary
...............Southern Boundary
...............Eastern Boundary
...............Western Boundary

(SHOW MAP IF NECESSARY)

Q2 Would you tell me a little about this area of Vancouver? What kind of a place is it?
Is there anything, for instance, that makes it different in any way from other areas of Vancouver?

(IF RELUCTANT TO ANSWER MUCH, PROBE AND ASK, 'WELL HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THIS AREA?')
Q3: Would you tell me as many names of other local areas in Vancouver as you can think of?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(IN CERTAIN 'DOUBLE-BARRELLED') NAMES, CIRCLE EVEN IF RESPONDENT NAMES ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE NAME)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Arbutus Ridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 CBD/Downtown</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Cedar Cottage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Dunbar-Southlands</td>
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<td>5 Fairview</td>
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<td>6 Grandview-Woodland</td>
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<td>7 Hastings East</td>
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<td>8 Kerrisdale</td>
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<td>9 Killarney</td>
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<td>A Kitsilano</td>
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<td>B Little Mountain</td>
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<td>C Marpole</td>
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<td>D Mount Pleasant</td>
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<td>H Riley Park-Kensington</td>
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<td>J Shaughnessy</td>
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<td>K Strathcona</td>
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<tr>
<td>L Sunset</td>
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<tr>
<td>M Victoria-Fraserview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N West End</td>
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<tr>
<td>P Other(s) (specify)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Q4 Could you tell me how long you've lived in this area of Vancouver?

1 less than 1 year
2 1 year to less than 2 years
3 2 years to less than 5 years
4 5 years to less than 10 years
5 10 years plus

Q5 a) Do you think of this area as your real home?

1 yes
2 no

b) (IF 'NO', ASK):

What area or place do you think of as your real home?

Q6 a) In the time that you've lived here, have you found this area becoming a friendlier place to live, a less friendly place, or, has it just stayed the same?

1 friendlier
2 less friendly
3 stayed the same
4 don't know

b) In the time that you've lived here, have you found this area beginning to look worse physically, look better, or, has it just stayed the same?

1 look better
2 look worse
3 stayed the same
4 don't know

Q7 If you had your choice, would you continue to live in this area of Vancouver?

1 yes
2 no
3 maybe
4 don't know

Q8 a) Have you lived in another area of Vancouver?

1 yes
2 no
(IF 'NO' GO TO g))

b) (IF 'YES', ASK):

Could you tell me the name of the area in Vancouver in which you last lived?

(IN CERTAIN 'DOUBLE-BARRELLED' NAMES, CIRCLE EVEN IF RESPONDENT NAMES ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE NAME)

1 Arbutus Ridge
2 CBD/Downtown
3 Cedar Cottage
4 Dunbar-Southlands
5 Fairview
6 Grandview-Woodland
7 Hastings East
8 Kerrisdale
9 Killarney
A Kitsilano
B Little Mountain
C Marpole
D Mount Pleasant
E Oakridge
F (West) Point Grey
G Renfrew-Collingwood
H Riley Park-Kensington
J Shaughnessy
K Strathcona
L Sunset
M Victoria-Fraserview
N West End
P Other (specify)

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c) (IF 'YES' TO a), ASK):

Would you please give me the address of the residence that you lived in last? For the sake of privacy I'd be grateful if you would give me the street and block number, and not the full address.
d) (IF 'YES' TO a), ASK):

What type of building did you live in last? Was it a

1. duplex or triplex
2. single family house
3. town house, row house or garden apartment
4. apartment bldg. without elevator
5. apartment bldg. with elevator
6. suite in house
7. other (specify) ____________


e) (IF 'YES' TO a), ASK):

(HAND RESPONDENT CARD 1)

Could you please tell me how you would categorise that area from the list on this card by reading out the corresponding letter?

A lower-middle class
B lower class
C middle class
D upper class
E upper-middle class

f) (IF 'YES' TO a), ASK):

How long did you live in that area of Vancouver?

1. less than 1 year
2. 1 year to less than 2 years
3. 2 years to less than 5 years
4. 5 years to less than 10 years
5. 10 years plus
g) Could you tell me where you lived before that? Again, for the sake of privacy, I'd be grateful if you would just give me the street and block number, and not the full address. (REPEAT QUESTION TO COVER 10 YEARS BACK)

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<tr>
<th>block</th>
<th>street</th>
<th>year moved in</th>
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Q9 (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 1)

Could you please tell me how you would categorise the area in which you now live by reading out the corresponding letter from this card?

A lower-middle class
B lower class
C middle class
D upper class
E upper-middle class

SOCIAL INTERACTION:

Q10 a) How many households would you say you visit socially in ...

1 none
2 one
3 two
4 3-5
5 6-10
6 11-25
7 25+
8 don't know

(IF 'NONE', GO TO Q11)
b) **(IF 'ONE' OR MORE, ASK):**

Could you please give me the addresses of these households? For the sake of privacy, I'd be grateful if you would only give me the street and block number, and **not** the full address.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>address</th>
<th>sev times a week</th>
<th>once a week</th>
<th>sev times a month</th>
<th>once a month</th>
<th>less than 1 a month</th>
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c) How often, on the average, would you say you visited each of these households? Is it several times a week, once a week, several times a month, once a month, or less than once a month? **(MARK WITH 'X' ON THE ABOVE TABLE)**
Q11 a) How many households in Vancouver outside of your area of residence would you say you visit socially?  
1 none  
2 one  
3 two  
4 3-5  
5 6-10  
6 11-25  
7 25+  
8 don't know

(IF 'NONE', GO TO Q12)

b) (IF 'ONE' OR MORE, ASK):

Could you please give me the addresses of these households? For the sake of privacy, I'd be grateful if you would only give me the street and block number, and not the full address.

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<tr>
<th>address</th>
<th>sev times a week</th>
<th>once a week</th>
<th>sev times a month</th>
<th>once a month</th>
<th>less than 1 a month</th>
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c) How often, on the average, would you say you visited each of these households? Is it several times a week, once a week, several times a month, once a month, or less than once a month? (MARK WITH 'X' ON THE ABOVE TABLE)

Q12 Who would you say you feel closer to, people who you see and visit who live within your area of residence, or those who live outside?

Q13 a) What Vancouver city newspaper(s) do you read?
   1 Sun
   2 Province
   3 Sun + Province
   4 None

b) Do you read any Vancouver local area newspapers?
   1 yes
   2 no

c) (IF 'YES', ASK):
   Could you tell me which one(s) you read?
   1 Echo/Highland Echo
   2 East Ender
   3 Hastings News
   4 L'Eco Italian
   5 Courier/Kerrisdale Courier
   6 Western News
   7 The Paper
   8 Point Grey Gazette
   9 Marpole News
   A Brentwood News
   B Oakridge News
   C Richmond News
   D Other(s) (specify)
Q14 a) Do you or your family shop for most of your food in this area?  
   1 yes  
   2 no  
   3 some  

b) Could you please give me the addresses of the store(s) where you or your family buy most of your food?  
   (BLOCK AND STREET ENOUGH. IF NOT SURE, PROBE FOR STORE NAME AND GENERAL LOCATION)  

MEMBERSHIP OF ORGANISATIONS:  

Q15 a) Are you a member of any professional societies, trade associations or unions in Vancouver?  
   1 yes  
   2 no  

b) (IF 'YES', ASK):  
   Could you name them for me please?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation name</th>
<th>Type</th>
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Q16 a) Are you a member of any (other) organisations and groups, such as sports, recreation and hobby clubs, fraternal, civic and charitable organisations, social, cultural clubs and societies, children activity organisations, ratepayers, tenants, etc., or any others, for example, church organisations, and so on?  
   1 yes  
   2 no
b) (IF 'YES', ASK):

Could you name them for me please?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation name</th>
<th>Type</th>
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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:

In addition to information on your participation in clubs and groups, I'd like to ask you about your participation in B.C. politics at the Provincial level.

Q17 a) Did you vote in the August 30 1972 B.C. Provincial Election?

1 yes
2 no

b) (IF 'NO', ASK):

Could you tell me why you didn't vote please?

(IF 'NO' IN a), GO TO Q18)

c) (IF 'YES' IN a), ASK):

Could you please tell me which candidates you voted for?

(IF RESPONDENT IS RELUCTANT, PROBE FOR WHICH PARTY VOTED FOR)
d) (IF 'YES' IN a), ASK):
   Could you tell me why you voted this way?

   

e) (IF 'YES' IN a), ASK):
   What would you say was more important in your choice the party or the candidates?

   1 party
   2 candidates
   3 other (specify) ___

Q18 What would you say were the major issues in the 1972 B.C. Provincial election campaign?

PARTY IDENTIFICATION:
Q19 a) Did you personally do anything to help any party during the 1972 B.C. Provincial Election campaign?

   1 yes
   2 no

(IF 'NO', GO TO Q20)
b) **(IF 'YES', ASK):**
Could you tell me which political party it was you helped?

   1 Communist
   2 Liberal
   3 New Democratic Party
   4 Progressive Conservative
   5 Social Credit

c) **(IF 'YES' IN a), ASK):**
What did you actually do?

   1 gave money
   2 addressed mail
   3 assisted in campaign office
   4 canvassed
   5 distributed literature
   6 put up lawn sign, door or window sign
   7 helped distribute signs
   8 held a coffee party
   9 scrutineer
   A Other (specify) _________

Q20 a) **Do you remember if you voted in the 1969 B.C. Provincial Election?**

   1 voted
   2 did not vote
   3 can't remember

b) **(IF 'VOTED', ASK):**
Could you tell me which party you voted for?

   1 Communist
   2 Liberal
   3 New Democratic Party
   4 Progressive Conservative
   5 Social Credit
   6 Other (specify) _________
Q21 a) How about the 1966 B.C. Provincial Election - did you vote then?
   1 voted
   2 did not vote
   3 can't remember

b) (IF 'VOTED', ASK):
   Could you tell me which party you voted for?
   1 Communist
   2 Liberal
   3 New Democratic Party
   4 Progressive Conservative
   5 Social Credit
   6 Other (specify) ________

Q22 a) Are you a member of any political party?
   1 yes
   2 no

b) (IF 'YES', ASK):
   Could you tell me which political party you are a member of?
   1 Communist
   2 Liberal
   3 New Democratic Party
   4 Progressive Conservative
   5 Social Credit
   6 Other (specify) ________

LOCAL PARTY ACTIVITY:

Q23 a) During the 1972 B.C. Provincial Election campaign, did any canvassers (or people) from any of the political parties call at your home?
   1 yes
   2 no
b) (IF 'YES', ASK):
Which Party(ies) visited your home?
1 Communist
2 Liberal
3 New Democratic Party
4 Progressive
5 Social Credit

Q24 a) Were any pamphlets or other campaign material from any of the political parties delivered to your home during the 1972 B.C. Provincial Election campaign?

b) (IF 'YES', ASK):
Could you tell me which party(ies) left material?
1 Communist
2 Liberal
3 New Democratic Party
4 Progressive Conservative
5 Social Credit

Q25 a) From which source or sources did you get most of your news about the 1972 B.C. Provincial Election? Was it
1 radio
2 TV
3 talking to people
4 newspapers
5 campaign literature
6 other (specify) ______

_________________________
b) *(IF BY 'TALKING TO PEOPLE', ASK):*

What sort of people did you talk to most?
1 friends
2 neighbours
3 relatives
4 fellow workers
5 other (specify) __________

Q26 a) Did any of the political parties contact your home by telephone during the 1972 B.C. *Provincial* Election campaign?

b) *(IF 'YES', ASK):*

Could you tell me which political party telephoned your home?
1 Communist
2 Liberal
3 New Democratic Party
4 Progressive Conservative
5 Social Credit

Q27 a) Was your home contacted by any of the political parties on the day of the *Provincial* Election?

b) *(IF 'YES', ASK):*

Could you tell me which political party contacted your home?
1 Communist
2 Liberal
3 New Democratic Party
4 Progressive Conservative
5 Social Credit
Q28 a) Did you go to any local candidates political meetings during the 1972 B.C. Provincial Election campaign?

b) (IF 'YES', ASK):
Could you tell me which political parties held the meetings which you went to?
1 Communist
2 Liberal
3 New Democratic Party
4 Progressive Conservative
5 Social Credit
6 All Candidates meeting
c) (IF 'ALL CANDIDATES MEETING', ASK):
Which party or candidates were you impressed with most at the all candidates meetings?

Q29 a) Did you meet any of the candidates during the course of the 1972 B.C. Provincial Election campaign?

b) (IF 'YES', ASK):
Which candidates did you meet?

PERSONAL DATA:
Now, finally, I would like to ask you a few questions about yourself.

Q30 Sex: (INTERVIEWER OBSERVATION) 1 Male
2 Female
Q31 (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 2)
Could you please tell me which number on this card corresponds to the year when you were born?
1 before 1905
2 1905-1915
3 1916-1925
4 1926-1935
5 1936-1945
6 1946-1953

Q32 a) Could you please tell me if you are married?
1 yes
2 no

b) (IF 'YES', ASK):
Do you have any children at school in this area?
1 yes
2 no

c) (IF 'YES', ASK):
Could you tell me which school(s) they go to?

Q33 Could you tell me if you are the head of your household?
1 yes
2 no
3 other (specify)

Q34 Could you please tell me the occupation of the head of your household? (IF RESPONDENT IS THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, THEN ASK FOR 'YOUR OCCUPATION'. PROBE FOR SPECIFIC JOB AND TYPE OF COMPANY)
Q35 (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 3)

Could you please tell me which number on this card corresponds to the annual income of the head of your household? (IF RESPONDENT IS THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, THEN ASK FOR 'YOUR ANNUAL INCOME')

- 1 less than $5,000
- 2 $5,001-$7,500
- 3 $7501-$10,000
- 4 $10,001-$15,000
- 5 over $15,000

Q36 (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 4)

Could you please tell me which letter on this card corresponds to the social class that you see yourself as belonging to?

- A lower class
- C lower-middle class
- E middle class
- D upper-middle class
- B upper class

Q37 Could you tell me if you own, lease or rent this residence?

- 1 own
- 2 lease
- 3 rent
- 4 other (specify) ______

Q38 a) Could you tell me which country you were born in?

b) (IF NOT IN CANADA, ASK):

How long have you lived in Canada?

- 1 less than 5 years
- 2 5 to 10 years
- 3 10 years, 1 day, to 20 years
- 4 over 20 years

Q39 Could you please tell me your religious preference?
Q40 What was the last type of school you attended?

1 grades 1-8
2 grades 9-13 (high school)
3 vocational/technical
4 university/college

Q41 (INTERVIEWERS OBSERVATION)

Type of home?

1 single family house
2 duplex or triplex
3 town house, row house or garden apartment
4 apartment bldg. without elevator
5 apartment bldg. with elevator
6 suite in house
7 other (specify) ________________

THANK YOU VERY MUCH INDEED!
APPENDIX II

LOCAL PARTY ACTIVITY:

Area No.: ___________

Party: ___________ Communist
___________ Conservative
___________ Liberal
___________ NDP
___________ Social Credit

Role: ___________ Candidate
___________ Campaign Manager
___________ Office Manager
___________ Area controller
___________ Poll Captain
___________ Party worker

NOTE: START EITHER AT A. OR B. AND THEN TO C.

A. Questions 1-3 for candidates only

1. How long have you been in politics? ___________

2. How did you get your start in politics? ___________

3. What other offices have you held or run for? ___________
B. Questions 4-9 for others only

4. What was the first campaign in which you worked for (name party)?

5. (IF NOT 1972 PROVINCIAL CAMPAIGN, ASK):
   Have you always worked for this party?
   ___ Yes
   ___ No

6. (IF NO ASK):
   Between what years were you not working for this party?

7. Did you work for another party?
   ___ Yes
   ___ No

8. (IF YES ASK):
   Which party was this?
   ___ Communist
   ___ Liberal
   ___ Conservative
   ___ NDP
   ___ Social Credit
   ___ Other (specify)

9. What led you to become active in the (name party)?

C. All questions now to all respondents:

ORGANISATION:

10. How was the campaign in your constituency organised? That is, did one person run the whole campaign, or were specific jobs given to specific people?
11. If the work was divided, who did what jobs?

12. Are constituency organisations different in different constituencies in Vancouver?  
   ___ Yes  
   ___ No

13. (IF YES ASK):
   How are they different?

14. If you had a committee, was it active?
   What did it do?

15. What help, if any, did the regular party organisation give?

16. How many people were actively engaged in the campaign?

17. How many helped throughout the whole of the campaign?

18. Were these all volunteers?  
   ___ Yes  
   ___ No

18A. When did your campaign begin?

19. How many meetings did you have during the campaign with the constituency workers?
20. What help did other groups give? (e.g. trade associations, labour unions, etc.)?

21. What were the reasons behind the choice of the location of the campaign office?

22. Was the campaign organised spatially in any way? That is, were people assigned to specific areas or specific polls?
   ___ Yes
   ___ No

23. (IF YES ASK):
   Why was it decided to split up the organisation in this way?

ADVERTISING:

24. What advertising media did you use to put your issues and your (candidates) personality before the public?

   ___ Public all candidates meetings
   ___ Public party meetings
   ___ Radio
   ___ TV
   ___ Newspaper advertising
   ___ Newspaper stories
   ___ Billboards
   ___ Lawn signs
   ___ Window signs
   ___ Bumper stickers
   ___ Sound trucks
   ___ Direct mailing
   ___ Door-to-door canvassing and leaflet distribution
   ___ Lapel buttons
   ___ Other (specify)
   ___ Coffee parties
   ___ Movies
   ___ Bring in special speakers
25. Did the meetings attract large or small audiences? That is, were they effective means of reaching the public? 

26. Did the audience, in general, seem: ___ 'friendly' ___ 'unfriendly' ___ 'non-partisan' 

27. Where were the meetings located? 

28. Who sponsored the public meetings? 

29. Would it be possible to obtain copies of your (candidates) speeches to all of the meetings? 

30. Would it be possible to obtain times and content of TV and radio advertisements? 

31. In which newspapers did you advertise? 

32. Did you think the newspapers were fair and accurate to you? ___ Yes ___ No (IF NO): Why? 

33. If newspaper stories were used, how did you get them into the papers? 

34. Who was responsible for erecting any billboards, and where were they located? 

35. Who distributed the signs and who used them?
36. Was there any particular plan for the location of signs and billboards?

37. **If direct mailing was used, who** addressed the cards and envelopes?

38. How many office workers did you have?

39. **If door-to-door canvassing was used,** who did it, and how many canvassers did you have?

40. Which areas or polls were canvassed? All, or were they selected?

41. **If selected ask:** Why were these particular polls (areas) selected?

42. How many times was each area canvassed?

43. Did the candidates themselves visit any particular polls or areas?

44. **(IF YES ASK):**

   Which polls (areas) were they, and why were they chosen?

45. How many 'drops' of literature were undertaken?

46. Was there any significance in the timing and content of such material?

47. Were poll cards distributed? Mailed or delivered by hand?
48. Did you speak to or visit clubs, vets. organisations, chambers of commerce, etc.?

49. (IF YES):
Which did you visit?

50. Of all of the advertising media used, which one, in your opinion, was the most effective?

51. Why?

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITY:

52. Did your constituency organisation do anything to get voters registered?

(IF YES): What did it specifically do?

53. Did it keep some kind of voters record by poll?

54. Has the constituency got fairly complete records of its own supporters and independents?

55. Did (name party) know whether voters in the constituency were registered or not?

56. Were the records used to check voters at the polls on election day?
57. **(IF YES):**
   How were voters checked?

58. Were people in the constituency contacted by phone at all?

59. **(IF YES):**
   Who were they? (e.g., undecided voters, possible helpers, etc.)

60. How many people were given lifts to the polling stations?

61. How did you feel the level of support for your party was going before the election? What kind of reaction, for example, did you get to canvassing?

**MONEY:**

62. How much, roughly speaking, did the local constituency campaign cost?

63. How was the money divided among the various advertising media?

64. How did you finance the campaign?

65. Who were the chief contributors?

   **(IF RETICENT, ASK):**
   a) Did the party help you out?

       By what amount?
b) Did friends help you out? ____________________________
   By what amount? ____________________________
c) Did any organisations help you out? ____________________________
   By what amount? ____________________________

66. Did you have as much money as you needed? 
   _____ Yes
   _____ No

67. (IF NO ASK):
    In what ways could you have used more? ____________________________

STRATEGY AND ISSUES:

68. In your opinion was there a fairly clear plan for your party in this constituency about the type of activity to be followed? ____________________________

69. How did this plan evolve? ____________________________

70. Did you have any help in the plan from 'experts' outside of the party? 
   _____ Yes
   _____ No
   (IF YES): Who? ____________________________

71. Could you tell me more about the plan? ____________________________
    For example, did your campaign concentrate on any particular area in the constituency? ____________________________

72. (IF YES, ASK):
    Which areas, and why were they chosen? ____________________________
73. How important in this were the 1969 returns in your constituency?

74. What relation was there between the constituency and the party central office on policy and campaign strategy?

75. Was the approach divided in any way between the candidates?

76. What issues did you stress, and why?

77. If you had it to do over again, would you change your emphasis on particular issues? Would you emphasize different issues? Would you campaign more in different areas?

78. At what time in the campaign did you introduce your chief issue and chief argument?

79. Why did you choose that time?

80. At what time in the campaign did you make your greatest effort?

81. Do you think that any other timing in the presentation of issues would have made your campaign more successful?

82. Did you find that your advertising and information was getting across to all of the constituents, some, or only a few?
83. How could you tell this, and why do you think that this was occurring?

SUPPORT:

84. Were you formally endorsed by any group(s)?

85. (IF YES ASK):
Which group(s) were (was) these (this)?

86. Were you informally supported by any group(s), e.g., any local community groups?

(IF YES ASK): Which were these?

87. Did any of the supporting groups spend money for you, e.g., buy newspaper space, buy radio time, etc.?

(IF YES ASK): Which were they?

88. Did you have an opportunity to speak to supporting or endorsing groups?

PERCEPTION OF PARTY'S ROLE:

89. Would you say that there are important differences between your party and the others?

(IF YES ASK): What are the major differences you see?
OPPOSITION:

90. What do you think was the most effective party of the opposition parties' campaigns?

91. What do you think were their strongest issues?

92. What mistakes do you think your opponents made?

93. Do you think that your opposition spent more or less money than you in this constituency?

OUTCOME:

94. What influences do you give most credit for your (not) getting elected? Was it a matter of campaign techniques, community tradition, personalities, or what?

95. As far as the constituencies in Vancouver are concerned, was it decided at the outset of the campaign to concentrate more effort on some constituencies than others? (i.e., how
was your plan different from that in other constituencies?)

(IF YES ASK):

a) Why and how was this done?

b) How successful do you think this was?

CONCLUDING QUESTION:

96. Who else was deeply involved in your campaign? Would it be worthwhile for me to talk to them?