

DYNASTY FORMATION IN THE COMMUNAL  
SOCIETY OF THE HUTTERITES.

by

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## ABSTRACT

The primary aim of this study is to analyze the relationship between collective ownership of the means of production and inequality of political opportunity within the Hutterite population. Two competing theoretical models are presented and compared with respect to their power to predict social and political mobility patterns within Hutterite colonies. The first model (the Marxian thesis) claims that inequality of political opportunity is a function of inequalities in the control over and access to the means of production. This theory asserts that a society in which the means of production is held in common (a communist society) will also be a society in which the political position held by an individual will be determined independently of family origin.

The second model (the Machiavellian thesis) claims that economic factors are not solely responsible for inequalities in political opportunity. Rather in a society which is structured such that individuals enjoy differing degrees of decision-making power, the offspring of the most powerful will have greater political opportunities than the offspring of the less powerful. Since Hutterian society holds the means of production in common and is characterized

by a well defined political hierarchy, it serves as an excellent case study for the testing of these two competing theories.

Both theories failed to receive empirical support in a number of critical areas. Some Hutterite colonies displayed complete equality of political opportunity, whereas others were characterized by the formation of political dynasties which had monopolized all effective political power for generations. This occurred despite the fact all Hutterite colonies are virtually identical with respect to ownership patterns and the structure of their political hierarchies.

It was discovered that the political position of the father only becomes a significant factor in the determination of the political position of the son if there is a shortage of positions in the occupational and political structure. Colonies in which economic, demographic, and organizational factors have produced an excess of positions tend to be equalitarian, whereas colonies in which a scarcity of positions have been produced tend to be dynastic.

This finding suggests that a communistic society such as the Hutterites can only achieve equality of opportunity if it is able to satisfy the career aspirations of its members. If it fails to do this, a more particularistic



grouping such as the family will emerge as a political force to protect the life chances of its own members.

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## Chapter I

### Introduction and Theory

Equality of opportunity has long been considered a desirable, yet elusive social goal of Western civilization. Sorokin has expressed this sentiment quite succinctly:

In the ideal mobile society individuals must be distributed according to their capacity and ability, regardless of the position of their fathers. Such a social distribution where everybody is placed at his proper place, seems to be the best. At least since ancient India and China, through Plato and Aristotle, up to the present democracies, this type of social distribution of individuals has been recognized as the most desirable.<sup>1</sup>

Although the notion of equality of opportunity may occupy an honoured position in Western culture as a social ideal, it is evident that Western societies have fallen short of attaining this ideal. This study will examine two major schools of thought which attempt to explain why Western societies have been unable to approximate the perfect mobility model. The first view, which will be referred to in this study as the Marxian thesis, focuses on the degree of economic inequality and treats it as a determinant of the degree of inequality of opportunity in a society. The second view, which will be referred to here as the Machiavellian thesis, takes the position that the degree of inequality of opportunity is not solely determined by

economic factors, but can be caused by the degree of inequality in the distribution of power in a society.

This controversy has long remained a 'sterile flower' in social theory. This problem has been considered interesting but unresearchable because both economic inequalities and inequalities in the distribution of power tend to occur together in most societies. Eva Rosenfeld has suggested that questions of this sort can be potentially resolved by means of the empirical analysis of communitarian societies which have intentionally abolished all economic inequalities. For purposes of sociological research, the analysis of such societies allow us to reduce the

[c]onceptual confusion in the use of the terms "class" (economic rank), "status" (prestige and honor rank) and "power" or "influence". The Israeli collectives fall into the category of "classless" societies (together with the societies of Hutterites, Amana, the 19th century Oneida and others). The social stratification which emerged is, therefore, free from the "confusing" economic factor.<sup>2</sup>

Of the communitarian societies mentioned by Rosenfeld, I have selected the Hutterites of North America as a subject of study, not only because this society is 'classless'; but also because sufficient written records exist to make such a study feasible. I also hope to contribute to the ethnographic record of the Hutterites in the area of social mobility. No

previous research has been conducted in the area of social mobility among the Hutterites, nor does the present ethnographic record even deal with the topic. Whatever contribution I make to our knowledge of Hutterite society will be narrowly confined to the area of social mobility. No attempt will be made to adequately describe Hutterian society in areas not specifically related to the research question; however, some attempt will be made to acquaint the reader with the general nature of the society.

The Hutterites represent a case of compelling theoretical interest to the social scientist interested in the study of inequality of opportunity. No other self-governing<sup>3</sup> human population of similar size and longevity has both of the following social characteristics:<sup>4</sup>

- a) political power concentrated in the hands of a small readily identifiable group of decision-makers, and
- b) all wealth held in common by the entire membership who collectively own the means of production.

Hopefully, by testing hypotheses derived from the Marxian and Machiavellian positions on the Hutterites, some light will be shed on the relative utility of these two views. It should go without saying that a test of a set of hypotheses derived from a more general theoretical framework

will not verify or falsify the entire theoretical framework. Both the Marxian and Machiavellian theories are highly rich and detailed, and deal with many topics unrelated to social mobility. I have attempted to isolate and operationalize only those aspects of these two theories which bear on the issue of social mobility. At times it has been necessary to refine and extend these theories in order to apply them to the Hutterite situation. I have endeavored to do this in a manner which is consistent with the general orientation of these schools of thought. My intention in this chapter will not be to precis these two theories with all of their deficiencies intact, but to construct two internally consistent and testable theories which have as their basis the Marxian and Machiavellian views.

#### The Machiavellian Position

The Machiavellian tradition is represented in classical sociological literature by such scholars as Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto. It is the works of these men which will provide the basis for a Machiavellian theory of dynasty formation. However, the works of modern writers whose position is consistent with this tradition will be utilized in order to fill obvious gaps in the theory.

The Machiavellians as a distinct school of thought are bound together by a common theoretical assumption which they either implicitly or explicitly accept. This assumption is perhaps best expressed by Mosca in The Ruling Class,

Among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in all political organisms, one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies ... two classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, is directed and controlled by the first, ....<sup>5</sup>

The assumption that the distribution of political power in society operates as a primary determinant which must be used to explain other social processes,<sup>6</sup> is a common theme which runs through all of the writings of the Machiavellians. In characterizing the position taken by the Machiavellians, Burnham states this assumption quite succinctly,

For an understanding of the social process, the most significant social division to be recognized is that between the ruling class and the ruled, between the elite and the non-elite.<sup>7</sup>

The Machiavellians regard the distribution of political power in society to be sufficient to explain the formation of dynasties. Although this hypothesis has not yet been explicated, it is important to note that the logical relation between the determinant and the result is considered a

sufficient one; that is, if X (distribution of power), then always Z (dynasty formation) regardless of anything else. However, the Machiavellians do not regard the distribution of political power to be the only sufficient determinant in this regard; they admit to at least one other - the distribution of ownership of the means of production. These two determinants are considered substitutable; that is, if X (distribution of power), then always Z; but if Y (distribution of the ownership of the means of production), then also always Z. By asserting that both the distribution of power and the distribution of the ownership of the means of production can act as determinants, the Machiavellians clearly differentiate themselves from those economic determinists who argue that only the latter variable can be considered a determinant. According to Mosca,

The first assumption [of the economic determinists] is that the whole political, juridical and religious organization of a society is uniformly subordinated to the prevailing type of economic production, and to the character of the relations that that type creates between labour and the owners of the instruments of production. .... The economic factor would be the sole and exclusive cause of all the material, intellectual, and moral changes that occur in human societies, and all other factors should be regarded not as factors but as mere effects and consequences of the economic factor.<sup>8</sup>

Mosca further maintains that

The prevailing system of economic production, with the special relations that it sets up between

labour and those who direct production and own its instruments, is but one of the factors that most largely influence changes in the political organization of a society ..... The error of economic determinism lies in holding that the economic factor is the only factor worthy of consideration as cause, and that all other factors have to be regarded as effects.<sup>9</sup>

Although the Machiavellians regard their formulation to be an alternative to the economic determinist model, most societies do not provide the necessary empirical conditions which would allow us to decide the relative utility of the two models. Whenever there is a high correlation between the distribution of power and the distribution of wealth in a society, both models make essentially the same predictions about that society. If the ruling elite consisted of the same individuals which made up the owning class, the two independent variables (wealth and power) would so confound each other that it would be impossible to decide whether wealth, or power, or both was sufficient to produce the outcome. At best we could say that both theories were supported or both theories were falsified, but we would not be able to distinguish between them.<sup>10</sup> Although I know of no comparative study which reports the frequency with which societies with congruent political and economic elites occur, a large number of the American community studies indicate that isomorphic or substantially overlapping political and



economic elites are rather frequently encountered.<sup>11</sup>

Similarly, a participatory democracy in which wealth was divided equally among all members would, if such a society existed, offer little scope for the testing of the Machiavellian and economic determinist (Marxian) models.

'Pluralist' societies in which the wealthy are not rulers and the rulers are not wealthy would appear to offer a better opportunity to test these hypotheses. However, another condition which limits the testability of these hypotheses is frequently found in pluralist societies, although it is by no means restricted to them. Societies (and communities) in which wealth can be exchanged for power and power can be traded in for wealth present major difficulties for the test of these two hypotheses.

Since I feel that the problem is somewhat complex, I have attempted to develop my argument in a clear step by step fashion in order to avoid confusion.

1) Every human society has a finite supply of scarce resources (both natural and human resources) which can be used to satisfy a multiplicity of human needs.

2) These scarce resources can be distributed to individual members of a society in three forms: goods, services, and money. Money will be defined as "any class of objects possessing generalized exchange value for goods and services."<sup>12</sup>

3) The wealth of an individual in a given society will be defined as that portion of the total goods and services which have a known exchange value, plus the money available in that society which has been distributed to and is now possessed by that individual.<sup>13</sup>

4) The range of goods and services which have an exchange value varies greatly from society to society; some societies have monetized nearly all goods and services, others have monetized very few.<sup>14</sup>

5) A power relationship can be considered a service which may be subject to monetization in a society. If power is defined as an asymmetrical relationship between two or more social units (individuals or groups) in which one party controls the behavior of another by virtue of his ability to deal out rewards and punishments to that other party,<sup>15</sup> and if the rewards and punishments used to control the other party are monetary, then that power relationship has been monetized.

6) In a society in which power relationships are monetized, wealth and power can not be considered mutually exclusive since many economic exchanges are also power relationships. By definition, an exchange of money for services implies a power relationship.

7) Even in a pluralist society in which the wealthy and the powerful appear to represent disjoint sets, the powerful may have spent considerable economic resources in acquiring a position of power as a long term investment which can be transformed into economic wealth in the future. Thus in a highly monetized society, the economic and political elites possess a chameleon quality which makes them difficult to isolate and analyze. Consequently, this characteristic makes both the Machiavellian and the Marxian models difficult to apply.<sup>16</sup>

My strategy will be similar to a chemist who wishes to analyze the effects of two chemical elements, but is forced to seek out the elements as they naturally occur. The chemist, if he had a choice, would not select a specimen in which the two elements had formed into a compound. The chemist would realize that the compound would produce effects resulting from the interaction between the two elements. Consequently, it would be difficult if not impossible to separate the particular effects of each element.<sup>17</sup> The fact that compounds occur with greater frequency in the natural world than pure uncompounded elements would be an irrelevant consideration to the chemist. Similarly, Hutterian society may be a deviant case, but it does meet the criteria necessary to test our two models. These are:

1. A society in which political power is concentrated in the hands of a small minority of members. It has a small well defined power elite.
2. This power elite cannot be distinguished from the non-elite on the basis of wealth. This means that the influence of one independent variable (wealth) is controlled while the other (power) is allowed to vary.
3. Power relationships have not been monetized since neither money nor any other medium of exchange is allowed to exist internally.<sup>18</sup>

#### A Formulation of the Machiavellian Thesis

Our major interest in the Machiavellians is their assertion that the differential distribution of political power is a sufficient condition to produce dynastic characteristics in a society.

Definition of the terms:

**Power:** An asymmetrical relationship between two or more social units (individuals or groups) in which one party controls the behavior of another by virtue of his ability to deal out rewards and punishments to that other party.

This ability to distribute rewards and punishments to others may be based on a variety of sources such as physical strength, wealth, knowledge, etc. If the resource base of power is

political position, then the power which is exerted by the holder of such a position will be referred to as 'political power'. This is a form of institutionalized power exercised by the holders of decision-making positions or offices in an organization or society. These offices themselves and their terms of reference must be legitimated by others in the organization or society. Whether or not the individuals over which power is exerted do the legitimating is an open empirical question, and would depend upon the distribution of power in a particular society. Legislation of the powers of a particular political position requires only that those who regard the position and its powers as rightful be able to enforce legitimation. It does not require that those in a subordinate or relatively powerless position accept the legitimacy of the position.<sup>19</sup> In the words of Arthur Stinchcombe:

A power is legitimate to the degree that, by virtue of the doctrines and norms by which it is justified, the power-holder can call upon sufficient other centers of power, as reserves in case of need, to make his power effective.<sup>20</sup>

A great deal of conceptual confusion has emerged over whether to regard power as a relationship or a characteristic.<sup>21</sup> I shall regard it as a 'ranking characteristic'. That is, it is an acquired characteristic of an individual that accrues

from his relative position to others. For example, it would be meaningless to refer to an isolate as having power. A person has more or less power depending upon the power held by others with whom he has relationships. According to Dahl,<sup>22</sup> under the condition that the bases of power does not shift (for example, we only consider power based on political position), a group of actors can be ranked from the most powerful to the least powerful. This ranking system is based upon the principle that the individual who controls the behavior of the greatest number of other actors is the most powerful, and the individual who controls the second greatest number is the second most powerful, and so on. Whereas Dahl operationally awards the highest rank to the individual who in a behavioral sense exercises control over the largest number, I find it more in keeping with my definition of power to give the highest rank to that individual who has a resource base which would enable him to control the greatest number of other actors. Just as it is less accurate to gauge the wealth of an individual by how much he spends than by how much he has to spend, it is less useful to know which individual in a particular situation exercised the most power than to know which individual holds a political office (the resource base of political power) which enables him, by virtue of the institutionalized rights

of that position, to control the largest number of other individuals. In this study, the weight (severity of the sanctions which can be employed), the domain (number of persons controlled), and the scope (number of areas of jurisdiction) of the rights guaranteed to political positions will serve to indicate the relative power held by incumbents to those positions.<sup>23</sup>

A political elite will be defined as that minority of political office holders who can by virtue of the terms of their offices utilize the strongest sanctions to control the largest number in the greatest variety of areas.

This definition is similar to the 'institutional approach' of C. Wright Mills, who views the political elite as occupying pivotal institutional positions or roles in a society.<sup>24</sup> This definition is also consistent with the general definition offered by another Machiavellian theorist Vilfredo Pareto:

Let us suppose that in every branch of human activity an index or grade can be assigned to each individual as an indication of his capacity, in much the same way that marks are awarded for the various subjects in a school examination. Thus, we will award 10 to the highest calibre of professional man (doctor, lawyer or the like), and 1 to his colleague who fails to get a patient or a client, awarding 0 to the absolute dolt..... Let us therefore make a class for those people who have the highest indices in their branch of activity, and give to this class the name of 'elite'.<sup>25</sup>

There is a serious boundary identification problem implicit in the above definition which becomes readily apparent when we attempt to operationalize the concept. For example, let us say that we have been able to rank order the members of a society according to the weight, domain, and scope of their political offices.<sup>26</sup> We find at the top of the scale a ruler who can exercise absolute control over all of the other members of the society in every sphere of action. Somewhere near the middle of our continuum we find a retainer who can employ only a specific set of sanctions to control the behavior of a small group of individuals as they perform a highly specialized function. For example, his position will only allow him to use monetary sanctions to control the behavior of a small group of household servants while they are at work. At the bottom we might find a slave who occupies no political position and is subject to the control of others in every sphere of action. Clearly the political elite will be found at the top of this continuum, but the cutting point separating it from the non-elite would be a rather arbitrary demarcation unless further defining characteristics are utilized. Most Machiavellians seem to agree that a political elite should constitute a readily identifiable group whose boundaries produce a



'natural' breakage in the continuum.<sup>27</sup> Meisel lists three characteristics of an elite which I will utilize as identifying criteria.

To put it into a facile formula, all elites shall be credited with what we should like to call the three C's: group consciousness, coherence, and conspiracy.<sup>28</sup>

By self-consciousness we refer to a collective perception of unity, perhaps best indicated by the presence of a collective label or group name. By coherence, we mean the capacity to act in a unitary manner in the pursuance of interdependent goals. This will be indicated by the presence of a group product such as the enactment of laws and regulations. By conspiracy, we refer not to secret plotting, but to relatively exclusive interaction carried on in the context of political activity. In other words, the elite must regularly meet or assemble as a body in a manner which excludes the non-elite.<sup>29</sup>

#### Dynastic Characteristics:

A dynasty will be defined as a sequence of rulers from the same family. Machiavellians contend that political elites tend to become dynastic in the sense that the children of elite members are more likely to be recruited into the elite than the children of the non-elite. In other

words, kinship particularism becomes the overriding selection criterion of elite recruitment. According to Mosca,

[A]ll ruling classes tend to become hereditary in fact if not in law. All political forces seem to possess a quality that in physics used to be called the force of inertia. They have a tendency, that is, to remain at the point and in the state in which they find themselves... Qualification for important office ... is much more readily acquired when one has had a certain familiarity with them from childhood.<sup>30</sup>

The Machiavellians are not altogether clear as to what social or psychological factors mediate this aristocratic or dynastic tendency. I have attempted to identify three separate alternatives in the Machiavellian literature.

The inertia hypothesis:

The notion that individuals conform to some principle of least effort or energy conservation has been used to explain the formation of dynasties. This idea, crudely expressed above by Mosca, has re-emerged in the writings of several influential community power researchers, notably Polsby and Dahl.<sup>31</sup> The hypothesis runs as follows. If both A and B are possible contenders for an elite position x, and if it requires a greater expenditure of human energy to equip and position A in x, then given the usual ceteris paribus assumptions, B will be more likely to occupy position x than A. The offspring of elites have a built in advantage over the offspring of non-elites because the early childhood

socialization of elite offspring has provided them with the requisite skills, information, and connections required to fill an elite position. The non-elite offspring is disadvantaged because it would require a greater expenditure of energy both on the part of the individual in question and others to adequately re-socialize or groom him for an elite position.<sup>32</sup>

The genetic hypothesis:

Although presently rather unpopular, the view that elites tend to become dynastic because elite offspring have an hereditary advantage over non-elite offspring was once considered to be a central explanation by many scholars.<sup>33</sup> It was claimed that many characteristics such as high intelligence and a high energy level were both requirements of elite positions and heritable traits. Thus elite offspring, because of their favourable endowments, would have an advantage over non-elite offspring. This interpretation still has adherents among modern social scientists, as is attested by the following quotation by the anthropologist Henry Selby:

Sadly for social utopias, genes will out, personality and capability are in part genetically determined, and in virtually any social system the son of an elite father has a better chance of becoming a member of the elite than the son of a non-elite father, provided the selection criteria do not change.<sup>34</sup>

The Thrasymachian hypothesis:<sup>35</sup>

According to this view, power is considered to be in scarce supply and highly valued even when it cannot be used to secure economic resources. Thus there is a tendency by those enjoying power to erect barriers which would exclude outsiders. The elite tends to become dynastic because the elite members find it in their interest to be highly restrictive in the recruitment of non-elite members into the elite. Since I will attempt to demonstrate in a subsequent chapter that the structural design of Hutterian society is such that both the inertia and the genetic hypotheses are inapplicable, I will take greater care in the formulation of this hypothesis.

According to the Thrasymachian hypothesis, men are motivated to seek power for reasons of self-interest. The rewards which they seek need not be monetary, they may be what Harsanyi calls 'status payoffs'. In general, status payoffs are various forms of deferential treatment accorded a power superior by a power inferior. Harsanyi defines deferential behavior as:

primarily a general cooperative attitude, a willingness to perform minor personal favors and services for another person. It also involves yielding him a priority of access to various minor privileges, or at least refraining from active competition with him for such privileges.<sup>36</sup>

Deferential treatment may be granted to power superiors as an incentive to perform what is perceived to be an important and valuable role in society or power inferiors may be induced to provide these minor privileges by virtue of the various social pressures which a power holder has at his disposal.<sup>37</sup> However, typically these status payoffs play a much less important role than economic payoffs. But in societies such as the Hutterites, where economic resources are held in common, non-economic resources such as social status may become important both as an incentive and as a major social mechanism for allocating resources. In short, social status usurps the functions money and private property normally play in most industrial societies. According to Harsanyi:

A social group may distribute its resources to individual members for their exclusive use as their private property, or may retain these resources for the common use of its members. In the latter case the actual use of these resources will be typically governed by the member's relative social status within the group, in the sense that, other things being equal the higher status members will tend to have a prior claim to their use.<sup>38</sup>

Since the acquisition of a position of power is positively rewarding to the incumbent, it follows that men holding these positions will strive to maintain their positions. If we further assume that the available power is always in short

supply or scarce, then the power holder will attempt to prevent others from acquiring it. The assumption that power is a relative term. That is, a person has more or less power depending upon the power held by others with whom he is in relationship. Thus in a power relationship an increase in power for A would mean a decrease in power for B. An instance where two people had equal power would be the same as having no power (over each other).<sup>39</sup>

Although it is clear that elites would be motivated to safeguard their own positions, it does not follow that they would be similarly motivated to safeguard these positions for their children's future occupancy. In order to make such a statement it is necessary to make the simple assumption that individuals will prefer their own offspring to the offspring of others.<sup>40</sup> Since it is a ubiquitous fact of human existence that all men die and that replacements must be found to fill their positions; it is predicted that elite members will attempt to ensure that their sons succeed them by keeping the avenues open to their sons and closed to the sons of other men. Not only would their offspring be given greater opportunities, but if power is perceived to be rewarding, then the sons of elite members would be motivated to take advantage of these opportunities.

If the elite is able to exercise control over entrance into the elite, we would predict that that society would be characterized by a) a high probability of elite offspring inheriting elite status, b) a high probability of non-elite offspring inheriting non-elite status, c) a low probability of non-elite offspring entering the elite from below (upward mobility), and d) a low probability of elite offspring entering the non-elite from above (downward mobility).

In a society such as the Hutterites, where a rigid division of labour by sex exists, the sons of the elite may be able to succeed to the positions of their fathers, but the daughters are barred from taking this route to elite status. Since it is unlikely that the elite would take steps to ensure that their male offspring acquire elite status without at the same time attempting to make a similar provision for their female offspring, we would predict that elite daughters would have a high probability of inheriting positions similar to their mothers'. Inasmuch as the status position of the wife is dependent upon the position held by the husband, this would involve marriage to an elite male.<sup>41</sup> We would, therefore predict that mate selection would be characterized by elite connubium - a system of marriage exchanges within the elite.<sup>42</sup> We would predict that there would be a) a high probability that elite daughters will

marry elite sons (elite connubium), b) a high probability that non-elite daughters will marry non-elite sons (non-elite connubium), c) a low probability that elite daughters will marry non-elite sons (hypogamy), and d) a low probability that non-elite daughters will marry elite sons (hypergamy).

Although we have hypothesized that the elite as a whole will maintain its exclusiveness in the area of succession and marriage, our theory leads us to expect that two segments of the elite will be more exclusive than others.

#### 1. The Upper Stratum of the Elite

If the elite itself is differentiated with respect to political power, we would expect the most powerful stratum to be more exclusive than the less powerful stratum or strata. This upper stratum would be in a position to utilize its relatively extensive power more effectively to ensure that its male offspring succeed to elite positions and that its female offspring contract elite marriages. We predict that within the elite a) the sons of the upper stratum members would have a higher probability of inheriting an elite position than the sons of other elite members, and b) the daughters of the upper stratum members would have a higher probability of contracting an elite marriage than the daughters of other elite members.



## 2. The Elite Kin Group

Within the elite, various individuals will have uncles, grandparents and other kin who are members of the elite. These extended kinfolk can be conceived of as having a cumulative effect with respect to securing an elite position for a nephew, grandson, etc. Similarly, by pooling their collective power, the elite kin may arrange an appropriate marriage for a favourite niece or grand-daughter. Tepperman, who was interested in the same phenomena, used the analogy of a rope to express the notion of kinship support.

Family support among extended kin may be visualized as a rope, each strand of which is slender and weak but, when intertwined with others, is stronger than the sum of these individual strengths. The analogy is a good one for, historically, family dynasties have been often supported by such intertwining through cousin marriages and co-operative business enterprises. Like a rope that is fraying, once some strands of an extended kindred are cut by death or untwined by exogamy, the remaining individual strands are placed under greater strain and the status of the entire family is endangered.<sup>43</sup>

We predict that a) among sons of the elite, the greater the number of generationally close kin<sup>44</sup> who are themselves members of the elite, the greater the probability of inheriting elite status, and b) among daughters of the elite, the greater the number of generationally close kin who are themselves members of the elite, the greater the probability of contracting an elite marriage.

### The Circulation of Elites

Mosca and Pareto's circulation of the elite hypothesis is perhaps their best known theoretical formulation. However, we must treat it with some care, since unless the conditions under which it is claimed to occur are clearly specified, it may contradict the thesis that elites tend to crystalize into exclusive dynasties. Another difficulty is that Mosca and Pareto appear to use the term in reference to two distinct types of social mobility. These are: a) group mobility or the replacement of one elite by another, and b) individual mobility or the vertical movement of individuals between the elite and the non-elite.

#### Group Mobility

Mosca in particular, treats the replacement of one elite by another as being the outcome of a struggle between elites. Presumably, a 'shadow' elite that operates on a different power base from the old elite, challenges and succeeds in overthrowing the old ruling elite.

[If] there is a shift in the balance of political forces - when, that is, a need is felt that capacities different from the old should assert themselves in the management of the state, when the old capacities, therefore, lose some of their importance or changes in their distribution occur - then the manner in which the ruling class is constituted changes also. If a new source of wealth develops in a society, if the practical importance of knowledge grows, if an old religion declines or

a new one is born, if a new current of ideas spreads, then, simultaneously far-reaching dislocations occur in the ruling class.<sup>45</sup>

Whether this shift occurs because of technological innovation, a change in the means of production, or the introduction of new information; the presence of an alternate base of power is clearly necessary for such a complete transformation to occur. Another necessary condition is the presence of sufficient dissatisfaction among the non-elite to prompt such a total replacement of the old elite.

According to Mosca, the first condition (the presence of an alternative base of power with which to launch a coup d'etat) is likely to be absent in a communal society such as the Hutterites. Mosca devotes a large part of his book to this very topic.<sup>46</sup> He claims that collectivist societies where the means of production are collectively owned, tend to have only one seat of power - political position. By abolishing individual ownership of private property and other forms of wealth, the collective society becomes unidimensional with respect to the source of power. This lack of a competing source of power makes group mobility impossible and ensures the unimpeded development of dynastic characteristics by the elite.<sup>47</sup>

Collectivism and communism ..... tend to destroy multiplicity of political forces. They would confine all power to individuals elected by the

people, or representing them. They would abolish private wealth, which ... has supplied many individuals with the means for acquiring independence and prestige apart from the assent and consent of the rulers of the state.<sup>48</sup>

To destroy multiplicity of political forces, ... would be to destroy all independence and all possibility of reciprocal balancing and control. Under collectivism, everyone will have to kowtow to the men in government. They alone can dispense favor, bread, the joy and sorrow of life. One single crushing, all-embracing, all-engrossing tyranny will weigh upon all.<sup>49</sup>

Once stripped of its emotional loadings, this hypothesis resembles the multi-influence hypothesis championed by many pluralists.<sup>50</sup> They take the position that a multiplicity of power bases which are not monopolized by the ruling elite, serve as a check against various forms of 'political abuse', such as nepotism. A power base which lies outside of the control of the ruling elite serves to restrain the actions of the elite and forces the elite to work for some of the interests of the non-elite (at least those who have a competing power base). The Hutterites with their monolithic power base lie at the opposite end of the continuum from the pluralist society. Not only is there no individual wealth or private property, but the lack of educational, ethnic, and religious differences leaves those in political positions free from any countervailing power.

We, therefore, hypothesize that the first type of elite circulation will not occur among the Hutterites, no matter

how dynastic the elite becomes. We will however hypothesize that a great deal of dissatisfaction will be expressed by the members of the non-elite whose upward mobility has been blocked. Since dissatisfaction with a dynastic elite cannot be expressed by attempting to overthrow the elite, when there is no viable power base upon which to launch such a coup, we predict that alienation will be expressed by voluntary withdrawal from the system. We hypothesize that the drop out rate will be greater among the offspring of the non-elite than among the offspring of the elite. We also predict that the more dynastic the elite, the greater the drop out rate among the offspring of the non-elite.

#### Individual Mobility:

Even in a completely dynastic society where elite offspring always inherit elite status, it is possible for upward mobility to occur.<sup>51</sup> There are two possibilities:

- a) A structural expansion of elite positions occurs such that the number of elite positions increase at a greater rate than the number of non-elite positions and if the elite has an insufficient number of sons to fill these positions, then non-elite offspring may be recruited to fill these vacancies.
- Or b) if the elite members fail to reproduce themselves, then non-elite offspring may be recruited into the elite.

Although the Machiavellians appear to have had little to say on the subject of structural expansion of the elite, either with respect to the causes or consequences of such an occurrence, we will predict that if the ratio of elite positions to non-elite positions increase (for whatever reason), then the amount of upward mobility will increase.

The occurrence of a lower fertility rate among the elite appears to have interested the Machiavellians more.<sup>52</sup>

Sorokin states the position quite succinctly,

In the course of time [sterility and a lower differential birth rate] cause either an extinction of the aristocratic families, or a decrease of their proportion in the total increased population of a society. In both cases such a situation creates a kind of 'social vacuum' within the upper strata. As the performance of the functions carried on by the upper strata continues to be necessary, and as the corresponding people cannot be recruited any longer from a diminishing upper population, it is natural that this 'vacuum' must be filled by climbers from the lower strata.<sup>53</sup>

Like Sorokin we will predict that if the fertility rate of the elite declines relative to the fertility rate of the non-elite, then the amount of upward mobility will increase.

Pareto<sup>54</sup> alludes to, but does not develop what would appear to be a rather far-fetched explanation for a decline in the reproductive ability of a dynastic elite. By excluding the non-elite from entry into the elite and by

maintaining elite endogamy, the elite itself consists of a very small breeding population. In a society such as the Hutterites which can be considered a model of an inbred genetic isolate,<sup>55</sup> a further restriction in the size of the gene pool would increase the probability of sterility and genetic defects occurring.<sup>56</sup> Therefore, we predict that the fertility rate of the elite will be less than the fertility rate of the non-elite.

#### The Marxian Position:

No fully developed alternative model to the Machiavellian paradigm exists in the economic determinist tradition, which examines the foregoing issues with the same degree of focus. However, the Marxian tradition does provide the basis for such a counter-paradigm. The rudimentary state of this model forces us to utilize it merely as a spring board which will direct us to a more thorough explication of a model.

The central point of contention between the two theoretical positions resides in the differing weight which they assign to economic power relative to political power, in determining the general character of the social structure. Whereas the Machiavellians clearly treat political power as a primary determinant, the economic determinists make similar claims for economic power. Frederick Engels, perhaps more unequivocally than Marx, has stated what we will take to be

the central axiom of the economic determinists.

The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders is dependent upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged.<sup>57</sup>

For the Marxist, the labour process is a pivotal activity, upon which all human activity depends and from which all exchangeable items of value spring.<sup>58</sup> The labour process consists of three factors: 1) the natural resource that is the object of labour such as water, soil, ore, timber, wild game, etc. 2) the labour activity itself or that activity performed "in order to appropriate nature's production in a form adopted to man's own wants", and 3) the instruments of labour or the 'tools' that man interposes between himself and the natural resources.<sup>59</sup> The products of the labour process are commodities that have been refined in such a way as to satisfy human needs. If an individual or a set of individuals has control over the means of production (certain natural resources and the instruments to refine them), he will also be able to exercise control over those who are without property and who are forced to exchange their labour power in return for a wage. Consequently, control over things leads to control over persons because of the advantageous



bargaining position held by those with control over the means of production. This control over the means of production would clearly have to be protected in order for the owner to retain his favourable position.

Marx focused on one particular institutional safeguard that protected those who controlled the means of production from those who did not; namely, the state. Marxists maintain that the owners of the means of production construct a governmental apparatus that has as its main function the preservation and legitimation of private property.

[An] important consequence of the distribution of property in production is that it determines the distribution of political power in society. Modern relations of production include the economic power of the owners of private property, the capitalists. And the political power of the bourgeois class exists from these modern relations of production. Indeed, it can be said that the state is but an association that administers the common business of the bourgeois class.<sup>60</sup>

Later Engels was to be more specific in describing what functions the state performed.

[I]t is, as a rule, the most powerful, economically dominant class which, through the medium of the state, that becomes the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class. Thus, the state of antiquity was above all the state of slave owners for the purpose of holding down the slaves, as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage labour by capital. ... In most

of the historical states, the state is an organisation of the possessing class for its protection against the non-possessing class.<sup>61</sup>

Marxists distinguish between several different types of property arrangements, ranging from communal property on the one hand to private ownership of the means of production on the other.<sup>62</sup> In general, these different types of property arrangements determine the character of the stratification system found in that society. The Marxian analysis has reached its most elaborate form in the treatment of what they call the 'bourgeois' society - a society in which a minority has acquired private ownership over the means of production and thus control the source of wealth in that society. In such a society, two social divisions are created that occupy different positions relative to the means of production - those who own it and those who do not. These social divisions are social classes which are defined as social aggregates that hold differential relations to the means of production. One class (the bourgeoisie) own the means, the other class (the proletariat) provides the labour.

By bourgeoisie is meant the class of capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage labour. By proletariat, the class of wage-labourers who having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live.<sup>63</sup>

The members of the proletariat are economically powerless because the bourgeoisie is in a position to control the distribution of economic rewards in society. The proletariat have little choice but to become the instruments of production for the bourgeoisie - they are the 'tools' the owners interpose between themselves and the natural resources. The interests of the wage earners are in conflict with the interests of the owners. The wage earners seek to maximize their wages, and the owners seek to maximize their profits. An increase in wages means a decrease in profits for the owners; therefore, it is in the owners' interest to attempt to minimize wages. This is the basis of antagonism between the two classes.

This economic cleavage is reflected in the political arena, social mobility patterns, inheritance rules, marriage patterns, etc. It is upon this basis that we see the development of a wealthy aristocracy. R. Sereno remarks that at this point the Marxist theory becomes almost identical to the Machiavellian theory.<sup>64</sup> The only difference lies in the Marxian insistence that power rests with those who control the means of production, not with those who occupy political positions. However, we are not interested in a society where the means of production is privately owned, but rather in one in which we find collective or communal ownership of the means

of production. For such a society, the Marxists make quite different predictions.

### The Classless Society

A society in which the means of production is held in common is by definition a classless society. Since all members share the same relations to the means of production, no social differentiation based on wealth is possible. This is not to suggest that such a society is unstratified.<sup>65</sup> On the contrary such characteristics as skill and intelligence may serve as relevant status criteria from the actor's point of view. Although these characteristics may constitute the basis of a ranking system, they are not characteristics which can be socially transmitted from parent to offspring, but rather disappear with the death of the person who holds them. Consequently, unlike wealth (and political power) they are not inheritable in the social sense; thus, they do not provide the bases for dynasty formation.<sup>66</sup>

From an economic determinist point of view, the most important consequence of communal ownership is that the economic interests of self and other are both shared and interdependent. They are shared in the sense that changes in the production affects all members equally. No one can gain at the expense of some other member; all members stand to enjoy economic prosperity or suffer economic hardship to

the same degree. Their interests are interdependent in the sense that an individual must work towards the benefit of all other members in order to receive economic rewards for himself. In their depiction of a classless society, Marx and Engels express a similar notion:

[In a classless society], we have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.<sup>67</sup>

Both Marx and Engels held an ambivalent attitude towards small communal societies. On the one hand, they felt that these small scale societies exhibited many of the political, economic, and social characteristics which they envisaged in the future communist society, as the following two quotations testify.

Of late, the Social-Democratic philistine has once more been filled with wholesome terror at the words: Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Well and good, gentlemen, do you want to know what this dictatorship looks like? Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.<sup>68</sup>

The analysis given in Capital does not offer any reasons either for or against the vitality of the rural commune, but the special study that I have made of it, for which I have researched the material in its original sources, has convinced me that the commune is the starting point for the social regeneration of Russia, but that, in order for it to function as such, it would be necessary first of all to eliminate the deleterious influences that assail it on all sides ....<sup>69</sup>

They took pains to point out that the internal structure of the communal society could be regarded as a micro-model of

the future communist society. They approved of the communes attempts to break down the rural-urban distinction, abolish the family, abolish private property, abolish the wage system, establish systems of communal production and consumption, institute universal suffrage, and create a state which was merely the coordinator of a federation of communes.<sup>70</sup>

However, on the other hand, they felt that communes were a weak political and economic force which had little effect on the transformation of the larger society. Their objections to communes were three-fold.

1) Communitarian groups tended to pitch their appeal to members of society without regard to class. This was felt to have a dampening effect upon class conflict and thus retard revolutionary activity. Marx made much of the fact that the Paris Commune attracted the bourgeoisie as well as the proletariat. Although he agreed that for a brief time they were able to create a classless society within the commune, he felt that the external effect was negligible; except, as a model to the proletariat of what could be done.

2) Marx felt that most communitarian groups suffered under the illusion that the larger society could be transformed by example and rational persuasion.

3) Marx felt that communitarian groups played a reactionary role in relation to the larger society. He felt that they

channeled off revolutionary protest into harmless areas and left the larger society untouched.<sup>71</sup>

In summary, Marx and Engels while applauding the internal structure of communal societies, deplored their inhibiting effect upon revolutionary change in the larger society. In this study we are interested only in what Marxists have to say concerning the internal structure of communal societies, the external effects are irrelevant.

The utopian socialists have been more vigorous than the Marxists in asserting that communal ownership of the means of production is a necessary condition for the establishment of an equalitarian mutual-aid society.<sup>72</sup> Although some of the utopian socialists have taken the indefensible position that members will become equals on all dimensions, the more tenable position is that the society will approach an equalitarian model of social mobility to the extent that life chances are independent of social origin. Although a classless society would not be an equal society in the sense that it would be free of all rank hierarchies, it would be equal in the sense that members would have an equal opportunity of attaining any hierarchical position. In other words, the social position of the father would be irrelevant in determining the social position of

the offspring.<sup>73</sup> Marx admitted that public officials or administrators would have to exist in order to coordinate production and distribution in the classless society.

However, unlike the Machiavellians, he did not think that these political positions would form the basis for the caste-like features associated with dynasty formation.<sup>74</sup>

The following argument will be used to support this contention. Since economic interests are shared and interdependent, changes in economic productivity affect all members with equal force. It is in the interests of ego, just as it is in the interests of all other members to insure that productivity is maximized. To the extent that productivity depends upon the allocation of those with skill and talent to positions where they can be optimally utilized, it is in the interests of all to strive for a barrier-free opportunity structure. The administrators who have substantial control over the distribution of talent would, therefore, find it in their interest (an interest they share with all other members) to strive for a highly permeable political hierarchy.<sup>75</sup> Thus, the economic determinists would predict, contrary to the Machiavellians that a classless society like the Hutterites would be characterized by a 'perfect' mobility structure. That is, the probability of a son reaching a given status category is independent of the father's status category.



It also follows from the assumptions of the economic determinist model that the classless society will be panmictic or characterized by random mate selection with respect to position of father. If potential mates cannot be differentiated with respect to wealth, such economic considerations as attempting to maximize one's wealth by contracting a strategic marriage becomes irrelevant. Such characteristics as physical and personality traits may take on greater weight in marital preference if potential mates cannot be distinguished from one another on economic grounds. In positing panmixia we must make the fairly safe assumption that those with the most desirable physical and personality traits are randomly distributed along the socio-political hierarchy.

It follows from the above as a corollary that if social mobility and mate selection proceed independently of father's position, then they will also be independent of the position held by other members such as grandfathers.

The classless society is also the unalienated society.<sup>76</sup> Alienation, in the Marxian tradition, refers to discontent arising from a condition of powerlessness. A person is alienated to the extent that he is separated from the means of production and powerless to exercise any control over his life chances.<sup>77</sup> Given that the members of a classless

society are undifferentiated with respect to wealth, and given that those in a position of leadership find it in their own interests to serve the interests of all, we predict that any expression of discontent will not be confined to any identifiable stratum. Certain members of the elite and non-elite may express dissatisfaction emanating from a number of sources, but this type of discontent will not be concentrated among the non-elite. Therefore, we predict that among the Hutterites, that expressions of discontent which take the form of defections will not be over-represented by the non-elite.

In the preceding section, I have attempted to present two mutually contradictory sociological models that bear upon the same substantive issue. Both models are uni-dimensional and perhaps for this reason neither may capture the complexity involved. Nevertheless, my justification for doing so involves no a priori assumptions about the nature of 'reality'. Instead it is based upon the so-called 'law of parsimony', which states that:

Neither more, nor more onerous, causes are to be assumed, than are necessary to account for the phenomena.<sup>78</sup>

Thus, uni-dimensional models are to be preferred to multi-dimensional models until such time as the former have been shown to be inadequate.

In order to facilitate comprehensions of the theoretical framework of this thesis and in order to clarify the implicit parallelism of the Machiavellian and economic determinist models, I have restated the major hypotheses in a more systematic form below.

### Major Hypotheses

#### A. The Social Mobility Hypothesis

##### The Machiavellian Version

The male offspring of the elite will have a higher probability of inheriting elite status than the male offspring of the non-elite.

##### The Economic Determinist Version

The male offspring of the elite will have an equal probability of inheriting elite status as the male offspring of the non-elite.

#### B. The Inter-marriage Hypothesis

##### The Machiavellian Version

The female offspring of the elite will have a higher probability of marrying elite sons than the female offspring of the non-elite.

##### The Economic Determinist Version

The female offspring of the elite will have an equal probability of marrying elite sons as the female offspring of the non-elite.

C. The Upper Stratum Mobility HypothesisThe Machiavellian Version

The male offspring of the upper stratum of the elite will have a higher probability of inheriting elite status than the sons of other elite members.

The Economic Determinist Version

The male offspring of the upper stratum of the elite will have an equal probability of inheriting elite status as the sons of other elite members.

D. The Upper Stratum Inter-marriage HypothesisThe Machiavellian Version

The female offspring of the upper stratum of the elite will have a higher probability of marrying elite sons than the daughters of other elite members.

The Economic Determinist Version

The female offspring of the upper stratum of the elite will have an equal probability of marrying elite sons as the daughters of other elite members.

E. The Family Support Hypothesis - Social MobilityThe Machiavellian Version

Sons of the elite who have a large number of generationally close kin who are themselves members of the elite will have a higher probability of inheriting elite status than the sons of the elite who have few elite relatives.

The Economic Determinist Version

Sons of the elite who have a large number of generationally close kin who are themselves members of the elite will have an equal

probability of inheriting elite status as the sons of the elite who have few elite relatives.

F. The Family Support Hypothesis - Inter-marriage

The Machiavellian Version

Daughters of the elite who have a large number of generationally close kin who are themselves members of the elite will have a higher probability of marrying elite sons than daughters of the elite who have few elite relatives.

The Economic Determinist Version

Daughters of the elite who have a large number of generationally close kin who are themselves members of the elite will have an equal probability of marrying elite sons as the daughters of the elite who have few elite relatives.

G. The Defection Hypothesis

The Machiavellian Version

The defection rate will be higher among the offspring of the non-elite than among the offspring of the elite.

The Economic Determinist Version

The defection rate will be equal among the offspring of the non-elite and the offspring of the elite.

H. Family Size Hypothesis

The Machiavellian Version

The average size of elite families will be lower than the average size of non-elite families.

The Economic Determinist Version

The average size of elite families will be equal to the average size of non-elite families.

### Footnotes

1. Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Mobility (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959) p. 530.
2. Eva Rosenfeld, "Social Stratification in a "Classless" Society", American Sociological Review, Vol. 16, December, 1951, p. 767.
3. The political independence of the Hutterites is a somewhat contentious issue. Although the Hutterites satisfy the criteria of political autonomy posited by Guy Swanson, Birth of the Gods (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 43 and later by Robert Marsh, Comparative Sociology (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), pp. 12-14, they constitute a hybrid which falls somewhere between an organization and a politically autonomous state. The following criteria put forward by Swanson and Marsh are satisfied: 1) the members of the group or their representatives must meet regularly; 2) the existence of the group must be considered legitimate by its members; 3) its members must make decisions that have a significant effect upon its members, such as the production and distribution of resources, the formation of alliances with other groups, punishment of crime, socialize its own members, organize its own work force, etc. 4) its members must expect it to persist into the indefinite future; and 5) it must not be a sub-system or agency of another organization. Only the last criterion poses a problem to the student of Hutterian society since it is more a matter of interpretation than empirical fact. The problem is that the Hutterites throughout their history, have located within the borders of a larger host society. However, the Hutterites have never regarded themselves as a functional part of the host society. Their belief system expressly forbids them from considering the host society as their 'ultimately sovereign organization', to use Swanson's expression. Rather they regard the host society as the external political, economic, and social environment with which they must contend.

If one were to argue that the Hutterites were actually a functional part of the host society whether they viewed themselves as such or not, one immediately faces the difficulty of specifying what those functions are. The Hutterites do not recruit members from outside, do not proselytize, and do not disseminate their belief system;

therefore, they do not serve any religious function for the host society. A Hutterite cannot remain a Hutterite and at the same time vote in an election, join a political party, hold political office, or even participate in 'outside' voluntary associations. He cannot join the armed forces, enter the public education system, or of his own accord involve himself in the judicial system. He cannot seek employment in any economic organization or seek to employ others. Any Hutterite who participates in these specialized arms of the state is typically ostracized from the Hutterian community. It is true that the Hutterites export and import various commodities, but no ultimately sovereign organization is completely self-subsistent; although I suspect that the Hutterites are more self-subsistent than many societies which are unquestionably regarded as ultimately sovereign organizations.

Since, for the purposes of this study, it is merely necessary that the host society not 1) control the number of political and occupational positions, 2) control the allocation of men to positions, and 3) control the rights and duties of these positions, we can be assured that the Hutterites have at least this degree of political autonomy.

4. Only the Israeli Kibbutzim could be considered comparable to the Hutterites in this regard. However, whereas the kibbutz is in its seventh decade of existence, the Hutterites are in their forty-fifth. In my view, seven decades are not a sufficient period of time for dynasties to crystalize (if in fact they form at all). Thus the kibbutzim movement does not offer the same opportunities of the study of elites as the Hutterites, although such a study would no doubt be instructive. Although a number of authors have examined the degree of elitism within the kibbutz movement, they have not specifically focused on the degree to which the decision-making elite is dynastic. See, Eva Rosenfeld, Op. Cit.; H.A. Aurbach, "Social Stratification in Israel's Collectives", Rural Sociology, Vol. 18, 1953; A. Etzioni, "The Structural Differentiation of Elites in the Kibbutz", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 64, 1959; and Ivan Vallier, "Structural Differentiation, Production Imperatives and Communal Norms: The Kibbutz in Crisis", Social Forces, Vol. 40, 1962.
5. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939) p. 50.



6. Although the assumption that the distribution of political power should always be taken as an independent variable clearly characterizes the Machiavellians, it is not clear what limit is placed on their choice of dependent variables. However, an examination of their literature reveals that the distribution of political power is primarily used to explain the distribution of privilege, the distribution of ideologies, and the differential opportunities for social mobility in a society.
7. James Burnham, The Machiavellians (New York: John Day Co., 1943) p. 224. For a similar characterization, see Geraint Parry, Political Elites (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969) p. 28, and T.B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (London: Penguin Books, 1966) p. 9.
8. Gaetano Mosca, Op. Cit. p. 439.
9. Ibid., p. 443.
10. For a carefully reasoned discussion of the methodological problems encountered in attempting to choose between two alternative models when the independent variables in the two models are highly correlated and the dependent variable is identical, see, Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964) pp. 87-93.
11. Unfortunately the issue of whether political and economic hierarchies are typically congruent or disjoint in American communities has given rise to two rival theoretical perspectives - the stratification theorists vs. the pluralists. The problem seems more of an empirical one than a problem of perspectives; that is, researchers should be more concerned with discovering the conditions under which elites form unitary structures and the conditions under which they form separate and competing structures. For a sample of this convoluted and seemingly endless controversy see, Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963) and G. William Domhoff The Higher Circles (New York: Vintage Books, 1971) esp. Chapter 9.
12. Manning Nash, Primitive and Peasant Economic Systems (San Francisco: Chandler Publ. Co., 1966) p. 26.

13. I mean by goods and services with exchange value those goods and services which can be expressed in terms of units of the medium of exchange (usually money) and can be exchanged for these monetary units. Many objects and human activities which could be broadly defined as goods and services may have no exchange value. Such things as air, water, military decorations, religious rites, friendship, sex appeal, and talkativeness may be monetized in some societies, but in most societies they would not.
14. See, Manning Nash Op. cit., pp. 26-7.
15. This definition is similar to that given by John C. Harsanyi, "A Bargaining Model for Social Status in Informal Groups and Formal Organizations", Behavioral Science, Vol. 11, 1966, p. 362. For similar definitions see, Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1964) p. 152 and R.H. Tawney, Equality (London: Allen and Unwin, 1931) p. 229.
16. This has led some researchers to attempt a synthesis of the Machiavellian and Marxian view of elites. See, for example, C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956) p. 277.
17. For interaction effects, see, Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Op. cit., pp. 91-93.
18. A society in which there is considerable economic inequality, but no political hierarchy is but a logical possibility only. A society without government appears to be merely the imagined ideal of a few anarchist writers. See, for example, Leonard Krimmerman and Lewis Perry (eds.), Patterns of Anarchy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966). The closest approximation to this ideal type is perhaps the hunting and gathering societies discussed by Gerhard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966) pp. 94-116, and Morton H. Fried, The Evolution of Political Society: An Essay in Political Anthropology (New York: Random House, 1967) pp. 27-107. However, typically these societies display little economic differentiation.

19. Weber's classical concept 'authority' is defined as legitimated power in which subordinates accept the right of superiors to control them. See Max Weber, op. cit., pp. 152-3. Weber, however, does not clearly differentiate between the following two uses of the term.
  - a) A situation in which the rules accept the superordinate position of the rulers as being legitimate, but the distribution of power is such that the subordinated do not hold sufficient power themselves to challenge this legitimacy.
  - b) A situation in which the distribution of power is such that subordinates command sufficient power to prevent the exercise of any power which they do not regard as legitimate.
20. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1968) p. 162.
21. Such a debate can be found in Marvin E. Olsen (ed.), Power in Societies (New York: Macmillan Co., 1970) esp. Chap. 1.
22. See, Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power", Behavioral Science, Vol. 2, July, 1957, p. 208.
23. See, Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950) p. 73.
24. C. Wright Mills, Op. cit., pp. 3-9.
25. Vilfredo Pareto, Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings, ed. by S.E. Finer (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) p. 248.
26. The problem of the degree of congruency between the weight, domain, and scope will not be dealt with here.
27. In practice, even Pareto used the term 'elite' to refer to a natural group of people rather than the 'top' of a continuum. On this point, see, T.B. Bottomore, Op. cit., pp. 7-8.
28. James H. Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the "Elite" (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958) p. 4.

29. These criteria closely approximate the defining characteristics of a human group. See, W.J.H. Sprott, Human Groups (London: Penguin Books, 1958) Chp. 1.
30. Gaetano Mosca, Op. cit., p. 61.
31. See, Nelson W. Polsby, Op. cit., pp. 97-135.
32. This view is implied in many empirical studies of elites, see, John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) pp. 283-285, and E. Digby Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958) pp. 63-66.
33. See, Vilfredo Pareto, Op. cit., p. 132; Sir Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences (Cleveland: World Publ., 1962); and Pitirim Sorokin, Op. cit., pp. 258-333.
34. Henry Selby, "Elite Selection and Social Integration: An Anthropologist's View" in Governing Elites: Studies in Training and Selection, ed. by Rupert Wilkinson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) pp. 3-22.
35. Named after the Greek philosopher Thrasymachus, whom Plato presents as a foil for his arguments in 'The Republic'. See, The Republic of Plato, trans. by F.M. Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945) pp. 15-39.
36. John C. Harsanyi, Op. cit., p. 359.
37. Perhaps the greatest theoretical contribution of Harsanyi's article is his use of a bargaining model to resolve the 'social status as an incentive' vs the 'social status as a function of power' controversy. The former position is represented by Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification", American Sociological Review, Vol. 10, 1945, pp. 242-49. The latter by Melvin M. Tumin, "Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis", American Sociological Review, Vol. 18, 1953, pp. 387-93. Since the controversy is at best tangentially related to my theoretical problem, I do not wish to enter into this debate. Suffice it to say, that I regard the relationship between the elite and the non-elite as being both

one of reciprocal exchange (deferential treatment accorded the elite by the non-elite in exchange for continued performance of important leadership services) and exploitation (deferential treatment accorded the elite by the non-elite in return for the non-performance of negative services).

38. John C. Harsanyi, Op. cit., p. 368.
39. For a similar point of view, see, Richard A. Schermerhorn, Society and Power (New York: Random House, 1961) p. 71.
40. Mosca makes the same assumption, see, Gaetano Mosca, Op. cit., p. 418. Unfortunately, social scientists appear to regard this issue as being too obvious to merit an empirical investigation.
41. Mosca makes the point that elite offspring tend to marry one another. Gaetano Mosca, Op. cit., p. 423. Mosca attributes this to the attraction of highly intelligent people to those who are similarly endowed. The status of women in Hutterite colonies is discussed in chapter II.
42. See, Robin Fox, Kinship and Marriage (London: Penguin Books, 1967) p. 176.
43. Lorne Tepperman, "The Natural Disruption of Dynasties", The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 9., #2, May, 1972, p. 115.
44. The term 'generationally close kin' will be operationalized in chapter III.
45. Gaetano Mosca, Op. cit., p. 65.
46. At one point Mosca claims that the entire book is a refutation of the collectivist utopia. See, p. 447. However, Chapter 11 'Collectivism' is the most relevant section.
47. See, Gaetano Mosca, Op. cit., p. 418.
48. Ibid., p. 292.
49. Ibid., p. 285.

50. This view is well represented by Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
51. See the interesting simulation study by Lorne J. Tepperman and Barry Tepperman, "Dynasty Formation in Eight Imaginary Societies", The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 8, August, 1971, pp. 121-41, for some of the consequences of various types of elite recruitment.
52. This position is summarized by Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class (New York: Random House, 1963) pp. 228-31.
53. Pitirim A. Sorokin, Op. cit., p. 346.
54. Vilfredo Pareto, Op. cit., pp. 132-3.
55. The author does not propose to contribute to the field of population genetics since it is clearly outside of his area of competence. Nevertheless, if the Hutterite elite became so inbred that it was unable to reproduce itself, the consequences for social mobility could scarcely be ignored. Although this hypothesis will be shown to be completely false in Chapter III, it is by no means obvious that this should be the case. Recent genetic research on the Hutterite population suggests that the Hutterites are highly inbred. Typically continuous interbreeding of first cousins would have to occur before deleterious recessive genes find phenotypic expression. However, when the genetic equivalence of first cousin marriages occur over successive generations, the same result can be expected to occur. Although the Schmiedeleut group (the Hutterian sub-sect which I studied) had only six first cousin marriages in recent history, they had many marriages which would have the same effect from a genetic standpoint. For example, second cousins would share more genes in common than would be expected if there were also a variety of more distant blood ties contributing to their genetic relatedness. Geneticists have devised a formula known as Wright's Coefficient of Inbreeding:  $R = (\frac{1}{2})^n$ . Where R expresses the relationship between two people in terms of the average number of genes they can be expected to have in common due to descent from common relatives and n refers to the number of descent linkages connecting

the two individuals. If we assume that common relatives are not themselves related, we get the following R's for the following types of relationship.

<u>Type of Relationship</u>	<u>R</u>
Parent-offspring	.50
Grandparent-grandchild	.25
First cousin	.125
Second cousin	.03125
Third cousin	.00781

In the case of the Hutterites, we cannot assume that common relatives are themselves unrelated. Arthur G. Steinberg, et. al., "Genetic Studies on an Inbred Human Isolate", Proceedings of the Third International Congress of Human Genetics (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1967) pp. 267-89 point out in their genetic study of the Hutterite population, that if marriages were contracted on a completely random basis, the resulting mean R for the marital pairs would be .0311. That is, if we randomly select a male and female from the Hutterite population they will on the average be genetically equivalent to second cousins. Steinberg concludes that most of the inbreeding can be accounted for by random mating. Given this high degree of genetic relatedness and if a small endogamous elite does exist, then it is not unlikely that genetic defects will occur in this quarter. There can be no doubt that a number of hereditary diseases have emerged in the Hutterite population. See, Victor A. McKusick and David Rimoin, "General Tom Thumb and Other Midgets", Scientific American, July 1967, pp. 102-10. The authors of this article point out that asexual ateliosis (asexual midgetism) is the result of close inbreeding among the Hutterites. Also, a number of other hereditary disorders such as an hereditary pancreatic disease and short sightedness have recently appeared.

56. An early genetic study by Edward East and Donald Jones, Inbreeding and Outbreeding: Their Genetic and Sociological Significance (London: J.B. Lippincott, 1919) revealed that continued inbreeding over several generations results in a decline in fertility and constitutional vigor, in addition to the probable occurrence of genetic defects. This finding is still widely accepted by geneticists. See, Paul A. Moody, Genetics of Man (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967) esp. pp. 111-25.

57. Frederick Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966) p. 50.
58. Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, ed. by T.B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel, (London: Watts & Co., 1956) p. 102.
59. Ibid., p. 103.
60. Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959) p. 13. This quote is from Dahrendorf's rendering of the unfinished 52nd chapter of Volumn III of Marx's Capital.
61. Frederick Engels, "On the Origin of the State" in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. by Robert C. Tucker, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1972) pp. 653-4.
62. See, Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations (New York: International Publishers, 1965). The question of what conditions give rise to various types of property arrangements lies outside of our research interests. We are interested only in the consequences, the causes are an exogenous consideration. For a systematic attempt to explain the presence of various types of property arrangements, see, Morton H. Fried, The Evolution of Political Society (New York: Random House, 1967) pp. 191-224.
63. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London: Penguin Books, 1967) p. 79.
64. See, Renzo Sereno, The Rulers: The Theory of the Ruling Class (New York: Harper & Row, 1968) p. 18.
65. On this point, see, Ralf Dahrendorf, Op. cit., p. 219.
66. Whereas ownership of the means of production and occupancy of political positions constitute institutionalized sources of power which can be handed down from father to son, sources of power which are dependent upon personal ability perish with the individual's death. I am willing to concede that what is recognized as inheritable depends to a large extent on cultural definition. Nevertheless, such a cultural definition would have to be institutionalized in order to be made operational. The Hutterites are devoid of such insti-



tutional mechanisms, except with respect to political position.

67. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Op. cit., p. 105.
68. Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France" in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. by Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1972) p. 537.
69. Quoted by David McLellan, The Thought of Karl Marx (London and Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1971) p. 101. This has been taken from Karl Marx's 'Letter to Vera Sassoulitch', 1881.
70. See Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France" in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. by Robert C. Tucker, (New York: Norton & Co., 1972), pp. 555-7.
71. Their critique of 'utopian' socialism can be found in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London: Penguin Books, 1967) pp. 114-8, and Frederick Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966) pp. 29-42.
72. The term 'mutual-aid' was used by Kropotkin to refer to co-operativeness resulting from 'the close dependency of every one's happiness upon the happiness of all.' Prince Petr Kropotkin, Mutual Aid (London: Penguin Books, 1939) p. 16. The arguments of the utopian socialists are summarized by Martin Buber, Paths in Utopia (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949). Many modern Neo-Marxists appear to have adopted the utopian socialist position and recast it in a more traditionally Marxian framework. See, for example, Gar Alperovitz, "Socialism as a Pluralistic Commonwealth", in The Capitalist System, ed. by Richard Edwards, Michael Reich, and Thomas Weisskopf (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972) pp. 524-539.
73. In his criticism of the party platform of the German Social Democratic movement (Gotha Program), Marx objected to their view that social and political inequality would have to be consciously eliminated after the abolition of private property. Marx responded that "it ought to have been said that with the abolition of class distinctions all social and political inequality arising from them would disappear of itself." Karl Marx, "Critique of the

Gotha Program", in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. by Robert C. Tucker, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1972) p. 392.

74. Marx felt that in the non-communist society, bureaucratic officials tended to put their own interests and the interests of their class ahead of the common interest. "What has been the characteristic attribute of the former state? Society has created its own organs to look after its common interests, originally through simple division of labour. But these organs, at whose head was the state power, had in the course of time, in pursuance of their own special interests, transformed themselves from the servants of society into the masters of society. This can be seen, for example, not only in the hereditary monarchy, but equally so in the democratic republic." Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France", The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. by Robert C. Tucker, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972) p. 535. Here Marx is in complete agreement with the Machiavellians; however, he felt that in the communist society administrative positions would lose their 'political character'. By this he meant that they would become 'strictly responsible agents' of the society as a whole. He cited two social mechanism implicit in the structure of a communist society which would bring this about. "In the first place, it filled all posts - administrative, judicial, and educational - by election on the basis of universal suffrage of all concerned, subject to the right of recall at any time by the same electors. And, in the second place, all officials, high or low, were paid only the wages received by other workers. In this way an affective barrier to place-hunting and careerism was set up." Karl Marx, Ibid., p. 536.
75. Melvin M. Tumin goes even further than this. He maintains that, "the more rigidly stratified a society is, the less chance does that society have of discovering any new facts about the talents of its members." See, Melvin M. Tumin, "Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis", American Sociological Review, Vol. 18, August, 1953, p. 388.
76. See, David McLellan, "Marx's View of the Unalienated Society", The Review of Politics, Vol. 31, October, 1969, pp. 459-65.

77. Marx's view of alienation is discussed by Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation", American Sociological Review, Vol. 24, December, 1959, pp. 784-5. An individual is deemed alienated if he is unable to exert any effective control over either the products of his labour or the means of production. This would be the case if both the means of production and the products of his labour were the property of another. See, Karl Marx, "Alienated Labour", in Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society, ed. by Eric and Mary Josephson, (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962) pp. 93-105. In a classless society where all things are communally owned, the products of labour directly serve the shared interests of the collectivity. Thus, the communard is not divorced from the products of his labour and hence is not alienated.
78. This is the modern rendering of Occam's razor (concepts are not to be multiplied beyond necessity). See Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science (London: J.M. Dent, 1892) pp. 340-1.

## Chapter II

### History, Ideology and Social Structure of the Hutterites

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the empirical context within which our hypotheses are embedded. No attempt will be made to provide a detailed ethnography; only those elements of the social structure which pertain to our major theoretical problem will receive elaboration.<sup>1</sup>

#### A Brief Historical Sketch

The Hutterites are named after Jacob Hutter who first instituted communal living among a group of persecuted Anabaptist refugees in Moravia in 1528. At the time, the Anabaptists were made up of peasants and petty artisans who had formed approximately forty separate groups which lacked both an overarching organization and internal cohesion.<sup>2</sup> Many of the Anabaptists had previously participated in the disastrous Peasants' War of 1524-25. The Peasants' War appears to have been a classic example of a revolt which occurs after a period of gradual socio-economic improvement which is followed by a sudden reversal. Rising expectations of continued prosperity are suddenly frustrated by a sharp decline in actual improvement.<sup>3</sup> Norman Cohn says of the Peasants' War,

The causes of the German Peasants' War have been and will no doubt continue to be a subject of controversy, but there are a few general comments

that can be made with some confidence. .... The well-being of the German peasantry was greater than it had ever been; and particularly the peasants who everywhere took the initiative in the insurrection, so far from being driven on by sheer misery and desperation, belonged to a rising and self-confident class. They were people whose position was improving both socially and economically and who for that very reason were impatient of the obstacles which stood in the way of further advance.<sup>4</sup>

The German noblemen easily crushed this brief revolt in which as many as 100,000 peasants perished. With a political solution to their problems clearly frustrated, many of the survivors sought an alternate religious solution.

These peasants came to view not only the prevailing socio-economic order as exploitive and unjust, but the established Protestant and Catholic churches as well. They were perceived as the supportive ideological arm of the landowners. The Hutterites were but one of the many small religious sects which emerged in opposition to the established church hierarchy. What has come to be known as the Radical Reformation consisted of several groups united by a few ethico-religious principles. Namely,

1. The re-establishment of the apostolic church<sup>5</sup>
2. Pacifism
3. Mutual aid and the sharing of possessions
4. An egalitarian social structure
5. Self-denial

The Hutterites took a more extreme position with regard to these principles than most Anabaptists. They insisted that the 'true' apostolic church should be restored immediately and not considered merely a desirable future goal. For the Hutterites, the restitution of the Kingdom of God on earth was a matter of practical as well as spiritual concern. Their goal was not to transform a society from within, but rather to withdraw from society and establish a spiritual community made up of an exclusive elite of believers who voluntarily act as God's stewards on earth.<sup>6</sup> They embraced pacifism not only by rejecting all forms of militarism, but by refusing to involve themselves in any form of political activity in the host society. The Hutterites distinguished themselves from the other Anabaptists who established 'communities of love' where charity and compassion were the forces governing the re-distribution of possessions.<sup>7</sup> The model taken by the Hutterites derived from their reading of Acts 2:41-47,<sup>8</sup>

Then they that gladly received his word were baptized ... and they continued steadfastly in the Apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and the breaking of the bread, and in prayers ... And all that believed were together and had all things in common; and they sold their possessions and goods and parted them to all men, as every man had need.

The Hutterites evolved a thorough going communistic community in which all property was held in common. The establishment of a 'community of goods' (Gütergemeinschaft) coupled with an ethic of self-denial and 'mortification of the flesh' had the effect of rendering all members equal on economic criteria.

Jacob Hutter emerged in 1528 as a charismatic figure who was able to organize 300 to 500 Anabaptists into three federated colonies.<sup>9</sup> Hutter who became the first chief elder or 'Vorsteher' of the sect was joined by Peter Rideman who later succeeded him. Rideman produced the first systematic theology for the group. First in 1529 with his "How to Build the House of God"<sup>10</sup> and later in 1540 with his Confession of Faith<sup>11</sup> he provided an unified doctrine which for the Hutterites is considered to rank next to the Bible as a theological text. During this period, the Hutterites suffered intermittent persecution from the Catholic church and noblemen in Moravia. At times, the Hutterites managed to contract a mutually agreeable economic relationship with the Moravian noblemen, only to have this arrangement shattered by a sudden purge directed by the Catholic church. During these purges, the Hutterites would disband their communities and form into small groups of 8 to 10 members who would seek refuge in nearby forests and caves.<sup>12</sup> The

Hutterites were to periodically resort to an alternate social structure which they called 'Kuttenweis' (as the wandering monks) which existed temporarily as an underground secret society. Rideman was succeeded by Peter Walpot who was a highly talented man of words<sup>13</sup> as well as a man of action. Under Walpot's direction the Hutterite communities expanded to as many as 30,000 members by 1578.<sup>14</sup>

In 1622, the Hutterites were forced to flee from Moravia when the Catholic Church persuaded the noblemen to purge their estates of Anabaptists. The Hutterites temporarily disbanded their communes and took up the 'Kuttenweis' model until 1646 when they were again able to restore their former 'gütergemeinschaft' (community of goods) model in Hungary. Although Hungary was at the time embroiled in the Thirty Years War, the Hutterites managed to escape official notice due to the chaos which accompanied the war.

During this period (1622-48), which was relatively tranquil from the Hutterite's point of view, Andreas Ehrenpreis became 'Vorsteher' (chief elder) of the Hutterian colonies. Ehrenpreis authored a small succinctly written epistle Ein Sendbrief<sup>15</sup> which has become the Hutterites most popular ideological work.<sup>16</sup>

With the termination of the war in 1648, the Hutterites lost their previous status of relative invisibility and again



became the focus of persecution. This persecution took the form of excessive taxation which became so onerous that they were forced to abandon the community of goods by 1685 and become an underground movement. Throughout this period (which ended in 1763), the Hutterites masqueraded as nominal Catholics and were able to maintain a secret society behind this facade.<sup>17</sup>

In 1763 the ruling Catholic government decided to resettle dissident Protestant minorities in Transylvania. The Hutterites took the government at its word and migrated to this resettlement area. However, this resettlement plan turned out to be little more than a crude attempt to isolate and exterminate religious dissenters. When they realized the dangerous situation they were in, they escaped over the Transylvanian Alps to Wallachia. However, almost concurrently with their arrival in Wallachia, Russia and Turkey entered into a war to contest the region. Finding themselves in the centre of rivalry, they sought out an avenue of escape. In 1770, the Hutterites received information that Catherine the Great of Russia was offering a large part of the Ukraine for foreign settlement. According to Peters,

The Russians expected the foreign settlers to fill two roles. They were to colonize the steppes, and to serve as models for the native population in farming techniques.<sup>18</sup>

As incentives the Russians offered free virgin land, tax concessions, religious freedom, exemption from military service, and little governmental interference in their community life. The Hutterites accepted the offer and established communities along the Molochnaya (Milky) River. This area took on the appearance of a reservation for religious dissenters. Aside from the native Tartars, the region had as its sole occupants Hutterites, Mennonites, Doukhobors, and Molokans.<sup>19</sup> Although the relations between these groups were not without discord, they were largely ignored by the state until 1864. In that year, under pressure from Russian colonists who found the land which the religious sects occupied, to be highly desirable, the government decided to either assimilate the religious dissenters or relocate them. Since these groups had long since fulfilled their original purpose of opening up the steppes, the Tsarist government announced that their communities and schools would fall under state supervision and that they would be eligible for conscription into the military. The Hutterites immediately decided to relocate themselves. They decided that the United States offered the most promising location.

In a manner which bore a remarkable similarity to the Russian colonization plan, the Americans offered the

Hutterites free land, freedom of religion, freedom of education, and exemption from military duty. The first Hutterites arrived in 1874 under the leadership of Michael Waldner. This group which numbered slightly more than 100 people became known as the 'Schmiedeleut' or 'blacksmith people' after Waldner's former occupation. After establishing a base near Lincoln Nebraska, the 'Schmiedeleut' sent out scouts to search for a desirable location. They finally decided on South Dakota. According to the Klein-Geschichtsbuch - a Hutterian chronicle which covers this period in their history,

The land and climate of the prairies reminded us of the Russian Steppes and, thus, influenced our choice. But of even greater importance was the decision by our elders to seek out secluded areas for settlement. We did not take any Government land for which we were entitled by the Homestead Act. 160 acres was given to every immigrant without cost. Such individualism did not agree with the principles of community since every single family would have to live on their 160 acres in order to get title to the land.<sup>20</sup>

The 'Schmiedeleut' preferred to purchase privately owned land in order to avoid the restrictions of the Homestead Act. They purchased 2500 acres of land which became the site of Bon Homme Colony. The Schmiedeleut were followed in the same year by a second group which later became known as the Dariusleut (after their senior elder Darius Walter). They established the Wolf Creek Colony a short distance from Bon Homme Colony.

A third group, the Lehrerleut (the teacher's people), arrived three years later in 1877 and founded Elmspring Colony in the same region. This group was named after their senior elder Jacob Wipf who had been a school teacher. This group was more heterogeneous than the two previous groups since it was made up of recent converts and Hutterites who had ceased to live communally and had become individual farmers. Although Wipf succeeded in restoring communalism to the group, a large proportion chose to remain individual farmers. For several years these non-communal Hutterites maintained close ties with the colonies. The communal Hutterites referred to this group as the 'Prairieleut' (prairie people) and for approximately forty years kinship ties and economic exchanges welded the Prairieleut to the communal Hutterites. However, when the Prairieleut were given the choice of either giving up their individual farms or leaving the sect, most chose to join the Krimmer Mennonite Church.<sup>21</sup>

The Schmiedeleut were later to expand throughout eastern South Dakota and into Manitoba, North Dakota and Minnesota. The Dariusleut and Lehrerleut were to abandon South Dakota by 1918 and establish their colonies in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Montana, and Washington. This geographical separation became institutionalized such that three permanent

sub-sects of the Hutterites emerged. The three sub-sects are now politically autonomous and strictly endogamous groupings which have evolved a wide variety of cultural differences in dress, meals, religious ceremonies and colony regulations.<sup>22</sup>

Since we will be dealing exclusively with the Schmiedeleut in this study, only the modern history of this sub-sect will be developed. In 1878, the Schmiedeleut mother colony Bon Homme produced its first daughter colony - Tripp Colony. Tripp was a complete failure; it developed a total reliance on Bon Homme for economic aid. Tripp became such a financial burden that the Schmiedeleut were forced to appeal to two other communal sects - the Amana colonies and the Rappite colony of New Harmony, for economic assistance.<sup>23</sup> The Rappites, who had considerably more experience with the political environment gave the Hutterites legal counsel and helped them draft their first constitution.<sup>24</sup> Tripp was sold in 1884 and the entire membership of the colony moved to Pennsylvania where they established Tidioute Colony on land owned by the Rappites. The Hutterites entered into a quarrel with the Rappites over the title of the land and amidst much acrimony returned to South Dakota in 1886 and founded Milltown Colony.<sup>25</sup>

By 1918, Bon Homme and Milltown had produced four daughter colonies: Maxwell, Rosedale, Huron, and James Valley. A fifth colony, Buffalo, which was a daughter colony of Milltown, was founded in 1907 but was forced to relocate in 1913. After relocation Buffalo colony became known as James Valley colony.

In 1918, the Hutterites migrated en masse to Canada. With the entry of the United States into World War I, the Hutterite colonies in South Dakota became a local focus for anti-German persecution. Not only were the colonies harassed by neighbouring farmers and townspeople, but the American government reneged on an earlier agreement with the Hutterites by declaring that the Hutterian Brethren did not constitute a religious organization. This meant that young Hutterite men were subject to military conscription. As pacifists, they responded by refusing to take up arms and a large number of Hutterite men were thrown into military prison. The death of two Hutterite men in Fort Leavenworth convinced the Hutterites that a more congenial political environment would have to be found.<sup>26</sup> Since Canada offered a much more favourable policy towards conscientious objectors, the Hutterites decided to relocate there. Milltown, Maxwell, Rosedale, Huron, and James Valley were transplanted in Manitoba. Only Bon Homme colony remained behind to look after the land, buildings, and equipment which the Hutterites

had been unable to sell. Bon Homme itself divided and produced a new colony in Manitoba which was also called Bon Homme. All of the men of draftable age departed for (new) Bon Homme, leaving (old) Bon Homme an old colony in terms of age composition.

After World War I, the Hutterites entered into a period of uninterrupted growth and expansion which has continued onto the present day. By 1970, a total of 83 Schmiedeleut colonies had been founded. There were 50 in Manitoba, 30 in South Dakota, 2 in North Dakota, and 1 in Minnesota. The return to South Dakota was prompted by the passage of the Communal Corporation Act of 1935 which allowed the Hutterites to incorporate as a religious organization.<sup>27</sup> All of the 'mother' colonies, with the exception of James Valley, had produced 'daughter' colonies in both the United States and Canada. (See Map 2.1)

Map 2.1 Location of Schmiedeleut Colonies.






FIGURE 2.1


SCHMIEDELEUT COLONY TREE: 1874-1970

FIGURE 2.1

<u>No.</u>	<u>Colony</u>	<u>Estab.</u>	<u>Relocation</u>	<u>Location</u>
1.	Bon Homme	1874	Never	Tabor S.D.
2.	Tripp	1878	1884	Tripp S.D.
3.	Tidioute	1884	1886	Tidioute Pa.
4.	Milltown	1886	1918	Milltown S.D.
5.	Maxwell	1900	1918	Scotland S.D.
6.	Rosedale	1901	1918	Alexandria S.D.
7.	Huron	1906	1918	Huron S.D.
8.	Buffalo	1907	1913	Gann Valley S.D.
9.	James Valley	1913	1918	Huron S.D.
10.	(New) Bon Homme	1918	Never	Elie Man.
11.	Waldheim	1935	Never	Elie Man.
12.	Rose Valley	1957	Never	Graysville Man.
13.	Spring Creek	1967	Never	Roseisle Man.
14.	Glendale	1949	Never	Frankfort S.D.
15.	Thunderbird	1964	Never	Wecota S.D.
16.	Grand	1958	Never	Elie Man.
17.	Grass River	1968	Never	Glenella Man.
18.	Newdale	1969	Never	Souris Man.
19.	Rockport	1934	Never	Alexandria S.D.
20.	Rosedale	1945	Never	Mitchell S.D.
21.	White Rock	1968	Never	Rosholt S.D.
22.	Riverside	1949	Never	Huron S.D.
23.	Maple River	1970	Never	Fullerton N.D.
24.	Spink	1945	Never	Frankfort S.D.
25.	Plainview	1959	Never	Ipswich S.D.
26.	Platte	1949	Never	Academy S.D.
27.	Spring Valley	1963	Never	Wessington Springs S.D.
28.	Cedar Grove	1970	Never	Platte S.D.
29.	Huron	1918	Never	Elie Man.
30.	Manitou	1925	1929	Manitou Man.
31.	Roseisle	1929	1937	Roseisle Man.
32.	Jamesville	1937	Never	Utica S.D.
33.	(New) Huron	1944	Never	Huron S.D.
34.	Hillside	1960	Never	Doland S.D.
35.	Clark	1955	Never	Raymond S.D.
36.	Greenwood	1970	Never	Delmont S.D.
37.	Poplar Point	1938	Never	Poplar Point Man.
38.	Springfield	1950	Never	Anola Man.
39.	Ridgeland	1966	Never	Dugald Man.
40.	Clearwater	1960	Never	Balmoral Man.
41.	Pearl Creek	1949	Never	Iroquois S.D.
42.	Long Lake	1966	Never	Wetonka S.D.
43.	Mountain View	1964	Never	Riding Mountain Man.
44.	Maxwell	1918	Never	Headingly Man.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Colony</u>	<u>Estab.</u>	<u>Relocation</u>	<u>Location</u>
45.	Barickman	1920	Never	Headingly Man.
46.	Teulon	1934	1936	Teulon Man.
47.	Tschetter	1942	Never	Olivet S.D.
48.	Gracevale	1948	Never	Winfred S.D.
49.	Cloverleaf	1963	Never	Gracevale S.D.
50.	Wolf Creek	1964	Never	Menno S.D.
51.	Greenwald	1955	Never	Dencross Man.
52.	Boyne Valley	1968	Never	Holland Man.
53.	Alsack	1932	1936	Alsack Sask.
54.	Elmsprings	1936	Never	Ethan S.D.
55.	(New) Maxwell	1949	Never	Scotland S.D.
56.	Spring Creek	1964	Never	Forbes N.D.
57.	Big Stone	1958	Never	Graceville Minn.
58.	Poinsett	1968	Never	Estelline S.D.
59.	Lakeside	1946	Never	Headingly Man.
60.	Homewood	1961	Never	Starbuck Man.
61.	Bright Stone	1959	Never	Lac du Bonnet Man.
62.	Rosedale	1918	Never	Elie Man.
63.	Iberville	1919	Never	Headingly Man.
64.	Riverside	1934	Never	Arden Man.
65.	Bloomfield	1957	Never	Westbourne Man.
66.	Rock Lake	1947	Never	Grosse Isle Man.
67.	Interlake	1961	Never	Teulon Man.
68.	White Shell	1961	Never	River Hills Man.
69.	Elm River	1934	Never	Newton Siding Man.
70.	Oak Bluff	1952	Never	Morris Man.
71.	Riverbend	1965	Never	Carberry Man.
72.	Rainbow	1964	Never	Isle de Chene Man.
73.	(New) Rosedale	1944	Never	Portage la Prairie Man.
74.	Forest River	1950	1955-63	Inkster N.D.
75.	Fairholm	1959	Never	Portage la Prairie Man.
76.	Hillside	1958	Never	Justice Man.
77.	Long Lake	1969	Never	Rockwood Man.
78.	Milltown	1918	Never	Elie Man.
79.	Blumengart	1922	Never	Plum Coulee Man.
80.	Sturgeon Creek	1938	Never	Headingly Man.
81.	Crystal Spring	1955	Never	Ste. Agathe Man.
82.	Suncrest	1969	Never	Tourond Man.
83.	Valley Lake	1967	Never	Austin Man.
84.	(New) Blumengart	1952	Never	Wecota S.D.
85.	Pembina	1961	Never	Darlingford Man.
86.	Sunnyside	1942	Never	Newton Siding Man.
87.	Spring Hill	1964	Never	Neepawa Man.
88.	Millerdale	1949	Never	Miller S.D.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Colony</u>	<u>Estab.</u>	<u>Relocation</u>	<u>Location</u>
89.	Glenway	1965	Never	Dominion City Man.
90.	James Valley	1918	Never	Starbuck Man.
91.	Riverdale	1946	Never	Gladstone Man.
92.	Deerboine	1959	Never	Alexander Man.
93.	Spring Valley	1956	Never	Glen Souris Man.
94.	Wellwood	1968	Never	Dunrea Man.
95.	Miami	1965	Never	Morden Man.

Figure 2.1 depicts the Schmiedeleut colony tree. The squares in the diagram represent colonies which were extant in 1970; the circles represent defunct colonies. It can be seen from the diagram that the original mother colony 'Bon Homme' has produced 8 daughter colonies, 23 grand-daughter colonies, 29 great grand-daughter colonies, 16 great great grand-daughter colonies, and 6 great great great grand-daughter colonies in its 96 years of existence. The Schmiedeleut colony tree doubles its size approximately every 15 years.

Table 2.1

Number of Colonies Over Time

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Colonies</u>
1875	1
1890	2
1905	4
1920	9
1935	17
1950	36
1965	68
1970	83

It can be seen from Table 2.2 that the average doubling time for the Schmiedeleut colonies is 14.42 years.<sup>28</sup> There is evidence that the doubling time is getting progressively shorter. Prior to the migration of 1918, the doubling time was 19.16 years. Since the migration, it has decreased to 13.61 years. The average time necessary to produce the most

recent colonies (those colonies which have not as yet produced a daughter colony) is even shorter (13.47 years).

Table 2.2

Colony Doubling Time in Years

<u>Clan</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Pre</u> <u>Migration</u>	<u>Post</u> <u>Migration</u>	<u>Latest</u> <u>Migration</u>
Bon Homme	13.63	14.50	13.53	14.30
Huron	13.84	25.00	14.09	14.28
Maxwell	14.50	21.00	13.57	13.22
Rosedale	14.25	20.50	13.35	12.88
Milltown	16.25	24.00	14.30	13.43
James Valley	14.83	22.50	11.00	11.33
Entire Leut	14.42	19.16	13.61	13.47

The period of migration appears to have had a disruptive influence on colony expansion. The only colony which did not migrate (Bon Homme) has doubling times for its clan which do not vary significantly throughout its history. The growth of James Valley clan, on the other hand, was severely retarded by the migration of 1918.<sup>29</sup> Because James Valley colony was forced to relocate during the early stage of its development, it took 39 years to accumulate enough resources with which to produce a daughter colony. However, since this time, James Valley clan has exhibited the most rapid colony division.

The regular geometrical progression which characterizes colony division can be shown to result from population growth. Censuses of the Schmiedeleut colonies have been taken at 12 irregular intervals, since 1874 by a variety of scholars.

Their enumerations are listed in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3

Schmiedeleut Censuses

<u>Author</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Average Colony Size</u>
Zieglschmid <sup>30</sup>	1874	200	200.0
Zieglschmid	1880	215	107.5
Zieglschmid	1900	350	116.7
Zieglschmid	1915	600	100.0
Peters (est.) <sup>31</sup>	1931	1164	105.8
Zieglschmid <sup>32</sup>	1947	2767	110.7
Eaton and Mayer	1950	3482	96.7
Mange <sup>33</sup>	1960	5450	104.8
Peters <sup>34</sup>	1964	6256	96.2
Hostetler <sup>35</sup>	1965	6528	96.0
Friedmann <sup>36</sup>	1969	7137	96.4
Clark <sup>37</sup>	1970	7369	95.7

The annual rate of growth of the Schmiedeleut population is 3.8%. The overall average doubling time of the population is 18.5 years. From Table 2.3, it can be seen that the average colony size has been declining over time. This is the case because the colony doubling time is 4.1 years more rapid than the population doubling time. See Table 2.5. It is a conscious policy of the Hutterites to establish an excess of colonies in order to minimize the effect of laws which may restrict their expansion in the future.<sup>38</sup> In the past twenty years, the gap between colony doubling time and population doubling time has widened.

Table 2.4Schmiedeleut Population 1970

<u>Colony</u>	<u># of Families</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Colony</u>	<u># of Families</u>	<u>Population</u>
Bon Homme	15	98	(New) Maxwell	13	81
(New) Bon Homme	19	137	Spring Creek N.D.	8	59
Waldheim	24	148	Big Stone	15	130
Rose Valley	9	58	Poinsett	10	72
Spring Creek	9	67	Lakeside	12	92
Glendale	18	103	Homewood	19	89
Thunderbird	13	83	Bright Stone	12	90
Grand	10	72	(Old) Rosedale	19	155
Grass River	9	60	Iberville	16	78
Newdale	Farm		Riverside	20	116
Rockport	28	171	Bloomfield	18	118
(New) Rosedale	28	169	Rocklake	15	112
White Rock	15	90	Interlake	4	46
(New) Riverside	14	117	White Shell	13	86
Maple River	Farm		Elm River	12	93
Spink	16	98	Oak Bluff	11	61
Plainview	16	115	Riverbend	11	63
Platte	11	93	Rainbow	13	89
Spring Valley	16	97	Rosedale	14	103
Cedar Grove	Farm		Forest River	10	78
Huron	15	89	Fairholm	15	110
Jamesville	22	157	Hillside Man.	14	130
(New) Huron	14	107	Long Lake Man.	Farm	
Hillside S.D.	14	85	Milltown	11	99
Clark	16	103	Blumengart	13	71
Greenwood	Farm		Sturgeon Creek	12	75
Poplar Point	12	98	Crystal Spring	20	158
Springfield	10	84	Suncrest	Farm	
Ridgeland	11	90	Valley Lake	12	79
Clearwater	19	119	(New) Blumengart	17	110
Pearl Creek	14	103	Pembina	15	78
Long Lake S.D.	13	100	Sunnyside	14	75
Mountain View	14	101	Spring Hill	12	86
Maxwell	17	129	Millerdale	15	91
Barickman	9	86	Glenway	12	54
Tschetter	17	105	James Valley	15	73
Gracevale	9	83	Riverdale	12	107
Cloverleaf	6	50	Deerboine	13	80
Wolf Creek	10	93	Spring Valley	8	53
Greenwald	11	78	Wellwood	9	85
Boyne Valley	9	88	Miami	12	82
Elmsprings	21	138	TOTAL	1059	7369



Table 2.5Population Doubling Time in Years<sup>39</sup>

<u>Clan</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>P.D.T.-</u> <u>C.D.T.*</u>	<u>Since 1950</u>	<u>P.D.T.-</u> <u>C.D.T.</u>
Bon Homme	16.8	3.2	16.6	2.3
Huron	18.4	4.6	21.2	6.9
Maxwell	17.6	3.1	17.8	4.6
Rosedale	17.6	3.3	20.0	7.1
Milltown	19.8	3.5	17.9	4.5
James Valley	24.9	10.1	18.4	7.1
Entire Leut	18.5	4.1	18.6	5.1

\*Population doubling time minus colony doubling time.

An  $r^2$  of .9904 between the population doubling time and the colony doubling time indicates that nearly all of the variation in colony growth is accounted for by the expansion of the population.

Eaton and Mayer,<sup>40</sup> in a demographic study of the Hutterite population carried out in 1950, claim that the Hutterites may hold the world's record for population increase. At that time the crude annual birth rate was 45.9 births per 1000 population, and the crude annual death rate was 4.4 deaths per 1000 population. This resulted in a crude annual rate of natural increase of 41.5 per 1000 population. (Crude birth rate - crude death rate = crude rate of natural increase.) If my data is correct and if the Schmiedeleut sub-sect is representative of the entire Hutterite population, the Hutterites still retain this title, although a decline in

their birth rate has reduced their lead. Between 1960 and 1970 the crude birth rate was 42.5 and the crude death rate was 4.5. Therefore, the crude annual rate of natural increase was 38.0, which is somewhat less than the 1950 figure.

Table 2.6

Population Characteristics of Hutterites and  
Other Selected Populations for 1970<sup>41</sup>

<u>Population</u>	<u>Crude Birth Rate</u>	<u>Crude Death Rate</u>	<u>Crude Rate of Natural Increase</u>	<u>Doubling Time</u>
Hutterites	42.5	4.5	38.0	18.6
Niger	52	23	29	24
Hong Kong	21	5	16	28
Costa Rica	45	8	37	19
Kuwait	43	7	36	9
Canada	17.6	7.3	10.3	41
U.S.A.	18.2	9.3	8.9	63

The rate of in-migration and out-migration is too small to seriously alter these figures. Since 1890, only 133 men and 9 women have defected from the Schmiedeleut sub-sect. Many of these cases may not be permanent defections, but rather temporary defections which happened to occur when I carried out my study. Most young men leave the colonies temporarily, but most return again after a few months absence.<sup>42</sup>

The amount of in-migration has been almost negligible. Since 1874, only six families have converted to the Schmiedeleut group. Today, twenty-six people can be found

with the following non-ethnic Hutterite surnames: Susz, Baer, Randle, Dorn, and Alexander. A sixth surname, Fast, has now disappeared when that family failed to produce an offspring. All of these converts were from a Mennonite background.

In 1953, Eaton and Mayer claimed that

[The Hutterites] show how a human population might grow if people believe in procreation without interference with biological reproductive potential, but live under technological conditions that give such a growing population good economic and medical support. The high fertility and low mortality of the sect combine to produce a rate of increase that may be unique in human experience.<sup>43</sup>

There is no evidence that this claim is any less relevant in 1970.

There have been only two incidents in recent history which have interrupted in a minor way, the continuous expansion of Hutterite population and colony system. Both incidents have occurred when a colony came under the influence of a rival religious sect and resulted in the mass excommunication of the dissidents.

In 1955 Forest River colony ceased to be Hutterian and joined the Society of Brothers movement. The Society of Brothers or Bruderhof movement was founded in 1920 in Sannerz, Germany, by a theologian named Dr. Eberhard Arnold. The Society of Brothers had its origin in an anarchistic Christian wing of the German Youth Movement. According to Zablocki, the

unstructured nature of their first attempt at community resembled that which can be found in contemporary hippie communes.<sup>44</sup> Their community became highly organized, when Arnold, after spending a year observing the Hutterite communities, decided that they should model themselves after the Hutterites. During his visit in 1930-31, Arnold became convinced that the Hutterites were the only religious group which practiced the radical Christianity of the New Testament. He converted to the Hutterian religion and was ordained as a 'Diener des Wortes' (preacher) at the Dariusleut colony of Stand-Off in Alberta. The Society Brethren began to imitate Hutterian customs, dress, regulations, and community organization in detail. They even began to refer to themselves as 'Hutterians'. In 1936, alarmed at the rise of Hitler and the Nazi regime, the Society Brethren decided to emigrate to England. However, the anti-German attitude prevalent in England at the time hampered the development of their community. They decided to move to Paraguay where they would be unaffected by the adverse political environment surrounding World War II. In 1952, the Society Brethren, disappointed with the poor missionary opportunities afforded by Paraguay, began to look to North America as a more promising region for future expansion. They asked the Hutterites to admit some of their members into the colonies. The Hutterite colonies, they

felt, would serve as bases for missionary work in the surrounding areas. All of the Hutterite colonies refused except for Forest River colony, because they disapproved of the 'Arnoldleut' group's evangelistic orientation. It is not clear why Forest River dissented, however, it should be noted that Forest River and its mother colony, New Rosedale, had a very large concentration of non-ethnic Hutterites among their members. Perhaps this prior experience with converts influenced their decision. In 1955, Peter Hofer, the Schmiedeleut bishop, called a leut council meeting where it was decided that Forest River be placed under the 'Meidung'.<sup>45</sup> About half of the members of Forest River returned to the mother colony, New Rosedale, in order to escape this ban. The community with a population of 116 members became known as the Forest River Bruderhof and entered the communal federation of the Society of Brothers. At that time the Society Brethren had a total population of 1171 members and 9 hofs.<sup>46</sup> The 'Arnoldleut' became quickly disenchanted with the bleak missionary possibilities afforded by North Dakota. In 1957, the 'Arnoldleut' plus several ethnic Hutterite families decided to move to Pennsylvania. The 50 ethnic Hutterites who remained behind requested that the ban be lifted. In 1963, the 'Meidung' was lifted and the colony was re-united with the other Schmiedeleut colonies.

Although officially part of the Hutterite federation, Forest River was considered a 'black sheep' colony. This suspicion appeared to be confirmed by a minor incident which occurred a few years later. In 1965, Tarrel R. Miller, an undergraduate in sociology, chose Forest River colony as a subject for a term paper which he was writing. Miller decided to remain at Forest River and for a time was their most zealous member. Although Miller remained a sincere proponent of communal life, he came to feel that the Hutterites were not living up to one of Christ's commandments. He came to believe that the Hutterites had made a virtue of ignoring St. Matthew, Chapter 28, verse 19, which read,

Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.<sup>47</sup>

Miller proceeded to correct this failing by actively pamphleteering and proselytizing for new members. Miller succeeded in attracting a small coterie of followers. Fearing that Forest River might again fall under the ban, if Miller was not restrained from further missionary activities, the colony elders decided to ask him to leave. In 1968, he left with his followers plus five Hutterite girls. They established a commune near Winnipeg which from all reports appears to be flourishing.

The Hutterites hold no great resentment against either the 'Arnoldleut' or 'Millerleut'. They view them as kindred groups whose activities they in large measure applaud, as long as they are conducted outside of the boundaries of the colonies. The only lasting effect that these hybrid groups had upon the Hutterites, aside from the loss of a few members, was to moderate the stance taken on a few colonies towards proselytizing. Six colonies among the Schmiedeleut; namely, Big Stone, Deerboine, Forest River, New Rosedale, Tschetter and White Rock have now begun to publicly advertise for new members and actively seek to explain the Hutterite faith to outsiders.<sup>48</sup>

The rather mild religious conflict that took place on Forest River colony stands in sharp contrast to the bitter struggle that transpired within Interlake colony in the mid-sixties. In 1963, two brothers, Michael and Samuel Hofer, were discovered to be listening to a radio broadcast called The World Tomorrow and subscribing to a magazine called The Plain Truth. Both the radio program and the magazine are distributed by a religious sect called the Worldwide Church of God. This sect was founded by Herbert W. Armstrong in 1934 as the Radio Church of God. Unlike the Hutterites, the Worldwide Church of God (W.C.G.) is almost exclusively oriented to the Old Testament and the Book of Revelations. The W.C.G.

claims to have discovered God's Plan for the World with which all world events can be interpreted and predicted. They believe that the British and the Americans are descendents of one of the ten lost tribes of Israel. The British and Americans in alliance with most of Western Europe are destined to fight the battle of Armageddon with a Chinese-Russian alliance. From the ruins of this battle will arise a theocratic world government with the Messiah at the helm. The faithful are expected to await the Apocalypse by observing Jewish practices set forth in the Old Testament. They are expected to worship on Saturday rather than on Sunday, observe kosher laws, and celebrate the Passover, Feast of Tabernacles, Day of Atonement, and the New Year in the Month of Abib (April) rather than such holidays as Christmas and Easter.

The Interlake colony preacher was disturbed not simply because some of the members were reading the doctrinal literature of a rival religious sect, but because they appeared to accept such a widely divergent doctrine. The Hutterites view themselves as New Testament Christians in the sense that they accept the Pauline view that the New Covenant has replaced the Old Covenant; the W.C.G., on the other hand, ignores the Apostle Paul. The two brothers were warned that they would be expelled from the colony for heresy, if they



did not make atonement for their faithlessness. The two brothers not only refused to repent, but managed to persuade several other families to convert to the W.C.G. Four families consisting of 34 people were given the sentence of 'Ausschluss' (excommunication), but they refused to leave the colony. This group began to hold their own religious services on Saturdays, eat specially prepared meals, dress in civilian clothing, and make pilgrimages to the headquarters of the W.C.G. at Ambassador College in Pasadena, California. The W.C.G. persuaded their Hutterian converts to take court action against the governing body of Interlake colony, for possession of the colony itself. With the financial backing of the W.C.G., the converts filed a petition against the Hutterites. The Hutterites were forced to defend their case in court. The court decided that the plaintiffs did not have a case since the Hutterian constitution clearly restricts those who have left the church from making financial claims on the colony.<sup>49</sup> With a court order to bolster the 'Ausschluss' all four families left the colony as apostates.<sup>50</sup>

### Central Beliefs

The Hutterites are committed to a well articulated and unified set of doctrines which inform nearly all aspects of their everyday behaviour. Although I am not well informed in the field of comparative religious belief systems, I cannot help but be impressed with the clarity, precision, and

operationality of the basic postulates of their ideology. The orderliness with which their doctrines are expressed is reminiscent of the axiomatic format of a geometry text.<sup>51</sup>

I will discuss the basic postulates of their ideology under the following headings: 1) God's Absolute Code, 2) The Kingdom of God on Earth, 3) Carnal Man and Self-surrender, and 4) The World.

#### 1) God's Absolute Code

The Hutterites believe in an all-powerful supernatural deity, God, who created the universe and built into it order and harmony. God created man and moulded him in His own likeness; He endowed man with reason and the capacity to follow His dictates. God desires man to obey His authority and follow His 'word'. However, man has the capacity, given to him by God, to sin or disobey the 'word'. The Hutterites conceive of God's 'word' as a set of instructions or a code wherein God's overall plan for mankind is given. They feel that this code was communicated by God to certain inspired individuals on earth.<sup>52</sup> This code can be found in the Bible and in their own doctrinal literature. Man must, if he is going to be in good standing with God, unflinchingly obey God's word. In order to be a good Christian, one must completely resign himself to the 'will of God'. All of man's faculties ought to be directed towards implementing God's

code; all criticism and skepticism directed towards God's word is sinful. The Hutterites feel that they alone are working to fulfill God's demands; the rest of mankind have rejected God and turned to Satan for guidance.<sup>53</sup> The Hutterites have an absolute certainty in the rightness of their way of life, which they believe has been supernaturally sanctioned by God.

## 2) The Kingdom of God on Earth

Only in a 'Gütergemeinschaft' (community of goods) can a Christian follow God's decrees and receive supernatural support. This community must be communistic both in its productive and consumptive aspects. The entire design of such an organization is conceived of as somehow existing on a supernatural plane, but will materialize on earth when a receptive group of believers assemble to receive this corporate blessing. God only makes his presence known through the community.

Whenever there are two or three gathered together in common belief, whether at work or at worship, the Lord is present. He who desires the presence of the Lord ought to seek this through his Christian brethren.<sup>54</sup>

The Hutterites believe that God has directed them to live communally; that the primitive Essene communities cited in Acts 2:41-45 and Acts 4:32-37 was the apostolic Church,

established by God through the apostles on the day of the Pentecost.

This apostolic Church has God as its Designer, Author, and Builder and serves as a perfect model of the Church of Christ on earth for all time, It was "a glorious Church of Christ, not having spot nor wrinkle."

This apostolic Church was communal in its character and organization; it taught through the Holy Ghost that all things should be held in common and shared by all as each had need. It was the first Christian collective living.

And this is the Church that the Hutterian Brethren restored in 1528, in which we still live and, with the help of God, in which we are resolved to remain "... in the apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and in breaking of bread, and in prayers" (Acts 2:42) until the end without wavering, and so help us God!<sup>55</sup>

The Hutterites do not believe in individualistic communion with God, rather the only channel of communication with the deity is through the community as a whole. God is not expected to answer personal prayers, for his presence is silent and invisible (Gegenwart). One simply follows God's dictates as they are recorded in the doctrinal literature; obedience to this code is the only true form of worship. Working together as 'God's stewards' maintaining and advancing the community (the Kingdom of God on Earth) is a religious duty.

The notion that the devout will be rewarded in Heaven and the wicked punished in Hell is accepted by the Hutterites,

but does not seem to be an important part of their ideology. They feel that as long as one mechanically obeys doctrinal authority, one will automatically go to Heaven at death. Death does not seem to be greatly feared, since the transition between life and death is not considered to be very great. Heaven is vaguely conceived of as another Hutterite colony, albeit more perfect than most. Hell is the exclusive abode of the 'outsider' (Draussiger) who has chosen to reject the Word of God. It is pictured as being similar to the 'outside' world, where wars, violence, sexual perversions and like horrors are rampant.

God does not reward individuals, instead communities that serve Him are thought to be rewarded. The Hutterites believe that rewards (blessings) lay buried before them in the future; only by rigidly following the cognitive map supplied by the doctrines can these rewards be uncovered. God has strategically placed blessings along 'the way', as a result only meticulous conformity to the doctrine will bring them to these rewards.

### 3) Carnal Man and Self-surrender

Man is by nature a carnal, selfish creature, whose primary instincts are egotism, acquisitiveness and personal ascendancy. Men are not born without innate characteristics, but are endowed at birth with Original Sin. These natural

inclinations of the 'Old Adam' are considered incompatible with the spiritual requirements of the Kingdom of God on earth and the altruistic characteristics necessary for co-operative living. Consequently, man must surrender his natural inclinations and obey communal authority; man must replace his 'self-will' with the common will of the community. The Hutterites use the term 'Gelassenheit' to refer to a state of abandonment of all self interest and worldly desires. Hutterites frequently use the term 'Gelassenheit' interchangeably with the term 'Gütergemeinschaft'. Only the truly 'gelassen' have yielded completely to God's authority and surrendered their attachment to all worldly possessions. The Community of Goods in the organizational expression of 'Gelassenheit'. Transition into a state of 'Gelassenheit' is considered by the Hutterites to be difficult. They conceive of it as a test of faith which separates the 'worthy' from the 'unworthy'. The majority of mankind have been 'damned', feel the Hutterites, not only because they have failed to surrender their selfish natural propensities, but because they have rejected the validity of doing so. It is unnatural for 'natural' man to desire to sacrifice his self-interested existence. 'Gelassenheit', according to the Hutterites, is the product of many years of intensive training. The purpose of education is to break the individual of his obstinate

self-will and transform him into one who will subordinate himself, and become loyal and obedient to the community. Adult baptism is the specific rite de passage which symbolizes the transition point when a person sacrifices his old self and is reborn as part of the corporate whole.

Seed had to die for the unity of the loaf. Only in this way was it able to take root and grow in the field and withstand all the storms. Only in this way could it bear fruit. In the same way each individual must give himself up, must die to himself, if he wants to follow Christ on his way. Then the grain must be crushed and milled if it is to be turned into bread. Our self-will undergoes the same for community.... Grains that remain whole are only fit for pigs or the muck heap.<sup>56</sup>

#### 4) The World

The Hutterites dichotomize the universe into two opposing and forever incompatible sectors. This dualistic outlook enables them to categorize all objects (both animate and inanimate), ideas, and supernatural entities as belonging to either one side or the other. On the one side, there is 'The World' which is populated by sensual, self-willed individuals (Welt-Leut) who have rejected God and have chosen to be ruled by Satan, the Prince of the World. Satan demands of the Welt-Leut the same degree of obedience to his will that God demands of His children; Satan's children express their loyalty by cleaving to private possessions, taking up the sword, and indulging in carnal pleasures. On the other side,

there is God's Kingdom on Earth which is made up of believers who have sacrificed their lives in order to live in obedience to His will. In the Kingdom theology of the Hutterites, the concepts of 'secular' and 'sacred' have a different meaning than that which is usually assigned to them by more orthodox Christian religions. Everything within the colony is sacred, since they have been surrendered to God and are His possessions. Even the trucks and farm machinery which are owned by the colony are sacred objects. Most of that which is located off the colony in the outside world is regarded as 'profane' rather than secular, since they are thought to be in active opposition to the sacred. The Hutterites have no real conception of the secular; however, when pressed they will admit that there may be some things which are neither sacred or profane since they are not employed by either of the two rival kingdoms, but still up for grabs. One exception to the identity of the community and the sacred, is that part of the 'outside' which, despite opposition, has penetrated into the colony, such as the elementary educational system.

The world is constantly attempting to seduce members of the Kingdom of God into its evil ways. As a result complete separation from the world is necessary.

[T]he followers of Christ are not of this world, although they are in it, have it around themselves, and cannot escape it entirely; but they have to



keep aloof of it and be on the alert against its corrupting influences; for the prince of this world (Satan) is very subtle, crafty, diplomatic with enticing flattery, impudent, and persistent. He is exceedingly resourceful, untiring, and relentless; and he never gives up the race, striving to gain his evil goal.<sup>57</sup>

The world under the rulership of Satan uses various ploys to entice believers away from the Kingdom of God; its favourites are governmental authority, 'false christianity', and such temples of fleshly lust as pool-rooms, circuses, cinemas, and brothels. Periodically God will test the faith of the community by driving the people of the world against the community. Hence, the Hutterites feel that the members of the Kingdom of God will necessarily meet with suffering and persecution. The Hutterites will not retaliate, but will accept their suffering with passive non-resistance. In fact, it will be welcomed as an opportunity to attest their faith through suffering and supreme sacrifice. The 'martyr-mindedness'<sup>58</sup> which characterizes the Hutterites, is best exemplified by a portion of the Hutterian Chronicle called "Martyrs Gallery" which describes in vivid detail the execution of 2173 martyrs. Hostility and persecution directed from the outside serves to strengthen their faith and provide confirmation that they are following the right course.

### Hutterian Social Structure

The Hutterites consider themselves to be 'peculiar people'; an appellation taken from Titus 2:14. Their desire 'to be in the world, but not of the world' is, perhaps the most important theme running through their culture. They are, on the one hand, a classic example of an introversionist sect<sup>59</sup> which seeks to preserve the exclusive relevancy of a contra-cultural creed by means of elaborate boundary maintaining mechanisms. Yet, on the other hand, the Hutterites realize that separation from the world can only be realized at a price. It is the price of maintaining a viable economy, which produces marketable goods and services for sale to outsiders. The Hutterites know that spiritual survival depends upon economic survival; thus, they have been willing to enter the 'worldly' market place as a producer of agricultural produce.

Agriculture is considered the only legitimate productive basis of a community. Stewardship in the 'Lord's vineyard' is a form of worship; whereas, most non-agrarian pursuits are regarded as iniquitous.

We allow none of our number to do the work of a trader or merchant, since this is a sinful business; as the wise man saith, "It is almost impossible for a merchant and trader to keep himself from sin. And as a nail sticketh fast between door and hinge; so doth sin stick close between buying and selling."<sup>60</sup>

Historically the Hutterites have always excelled at farming;<sup>61</sup> and their settlement in North America has been no exception. By 1970, the Schmiedeleut colonies held a combined acreage of approximately 316,700 acres. In Manitoba, the average number of acres held by a colony was 3763.18 acres; in the United States, the colonies tend to be slightly larger - approximately 3925.90 acres on the average.<sup>62</sup> This tends to be smaller than the colonies found in Alberta and Saskatchewan. The six colonies studied by Bennett, for example, averaged 10,273 acres each.<sup>63</sup> This size difference does not reflect a wealth difference between the Schmiedeleut and the other leute, but rather a difference in soils and land usage. Whereas Hutterites in the western prairies tend to specialize in grain and beef cattle production, the Schmiedeleut group tends to specialize in grain, hogs, and dairying. The moist climate and more fertile soil of Manitoba and the Dakotas permit a greater crop yield per acre than the semi-arid grasslands further west. Those Schmiedeleut colonies located in semi-arid regions tend to be similar to the large grain-cattle enterprises in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Montana. Bennett observes that Saskatchewan Hutterian colonies tend to have two characteristics which distinguish them from surrounding farms — greater population density and greater agricultural diversification.<sup>64</sup> This observation applies equally

well to the Hutterites of Manitoba and the Dakotas. For example, the average number of acres operated per person in the colonies is about 43. The corresponding figure for the Manitoba farm population is 90.<sup>65</sup>

Agricultural diversification is a characteristic to which Hutterites attach considerable importance. Colonies typically strive towards self-sufficiency by producing most of the goods and services which will be used internally. This reduces the colony's dependency upon the outside world and keeps down the amount of day to day contact with outsiders. A colony will usually place more emphasis on one enterprise than any other, but it will rarely allow that enterprise to dominate all other sectors of the economy. A survey conducted in 1968 by the Rural Sociology Department of South Dakota State University on the agricultural operations of 27 South Dakota Hutterite colonies showed the following degree of diversification.<sup>66</sup>

Table 2.7Agricultural Diversification in 27 South DakotaHutterite Colonies

<u>Type of Enterprise</u>	<u>Number of Colonies with Specific Enterprise</u>
Bulk Milk Production	27
Corn	27
Beef Cattle	26
Sorghum	26
Hogs	25
Egg Production	25
Oats	24
Hay	24
Barley	23
Wheat	20
Geese	14
Sheep	12
Turkeys	10

In addition, most colonies have a number of small scale enterprises which produce items for internal consumption; such as, a fruit orchard, apiary, vegetable garden, shoe shop, machine shop, carpentry shop, tailor shop, and soap making and broom making enterprises.

The balance sheet shown in Table 2.8 illustrates the extent of agricultural diversification on a randomly selected colony.

Table 2.8Balance Sheet for Barickman Colony, 1969

## INCOME

Hogs	\$154,212.71	Feed: Hogs and Cattle	\$62,545.96
Turkeys	65,732.79	Feed: Turkeys	47,686.85
Eggs	56,564.78	Building Supplies	33,414.19
Wheat	37,775.10	Oil and Gasoline	22,650.26
Geese	19,298.96	Groceries	16,825.50
Milk	16,166.98	Equipment: Hogs	17,976.74
Family Allowance	6,222.00	Equipment: Turkeys	15,953.00
Loan Repayment*	3,598.64	Equipment: Chickens	11,656.20
Custom Work	1,600.48	Repairs: Hogs	13,794.56
Laying Chicks	1,585.00	Repairs: Chickens	8,730.55
School Grant	1,265.00	Repairs: Turkeys	2,200.43
Honey	761.23	Insurance	14,080.00
Potatoes	412.45	Fertilizer	10,634.16
Vegetables	113.11	Land Tax	10,483.86
Bread	52.25	Dry Goods	2,954.14
Income in kind**	<u>7,774.93</u>	Farm Machinery	9,382.15
TOTAL	\$373,136.41	Household Hardware	6,252.79
		Electricity	8,159.25
		Feed: Chickens	7,699.68
		Feed: Geese	<u>2,595.92</u>
		TOTAL	\$325,676.19
		Profit	\$ 47,460.22

\* Loan repayment from daughter colony

\*\* Retail market value of produce consumed

Barickman colony, which was selected merely for illustrative purposes, represents a rather typical picture of the financial status of a colony during a certain period of its growth. As Bennett points out, Hutterite colonies go through a controlled growth cycle.<sup>67</sup> This cycle, which extends over a 15 year period on the average, begins with colony fission and ends with the second fission. During the period a colony

must accumulate approximately \$250,000.00 with which to purchase land, machinery, buildings, and livestock for a daughter colony. The first few years following fission is one of economic recovery, in which the colony recovers from the loss in capital, manpower, and machinery which was incurred during fission. During this period, colonies typically operate at a deficit or realize very small profits. After the recovery phase, the typical colony enters into a period of gradually improving profits until the next fission occurs. I tested this thesis by comparing the net income of 20 randomly selected colonies. Nearly half of the variation in colony incomes can be accounted for by the number of years which have passed since colony division ( $r^2 = .46$ ). The variation in the net incomes not explained by the growth cycle can no doubt be explained by differential marketing conditions, differential weather conditions, age of colony,<sup>68</sup> and the tendency for colonies to reach an income plateau a few years prior to fission.

The average Hutterite colony attempts to synchronize this controlled growth cycle with their population increase. Most colonies plan to have accumulated sufficient economic resources to finance colony fission before they have doubled their population. The average colony begins at fission with a population of approximately 70 people and reaches an upper

limit of approximately 140 people. Although the Schmiedeleut colonies range in population from 46 to 171 people, there is a fairly regular population progression from fission to fission, as Table 2.9 illustrates. Those colonies whose population differs significantly from the mean have usually experienced unusual problems.<sup>69</sup>

Table 2.9

Colony Population Size at Different Points  
in the Growth Cycle

<u>Number of Years Since Fission</u>	<u>Population</u>
1-2 years	78.6
3-4 years	80.9
5-6 years	85.7
7-8 years	81.5
9-10 years	103.5
11-12 years	123.0
13-14 years	133.4
15 years and over	126.0

'The fission before 140' rule is not as arbitrary as it may appear on the surface. James S. Frideres has argued that compliance to this rule is the secret to Hutterite survival.<sup>70</sup> According to Frideres, if Hutterite colonies were to attain a size significantly larger than 140 people, Hutterite colonies would experience enormous disruption. Frideres claims that the 'fission before 140' rule is determined by the nature of the Hutterian occupational structure.



The Hutterite occupational system consists of three levels of authority: the Elders, the departmental heads, and the general labour force. The highest level which is collectively labeled by the Hutterites as the 'Aufsehern', elders, or executives constitutes the decision-making elite of the colony. This body decides policy, handles all business which concerns the entire colony, oversees and coordinates the internal operations of the colony, and is in charge of all external relations. The core members of this elite are the preacher, the assistant preacher, the colony manager, and the farm boss. This core executive body does not necessarily exhaust all of the executive posts. Typically the number of executive posts varies directly with the size of the colony. Although there are rarely less than four executive posts even on the smallest colony, additional positions are added as the colony increases in size. There appears to be two standard means of accomplishing this. Firstly, a new executive role called the German Teacher is created. On small colonies the positions of assistant preacher and German Teacher are frequently combined into one and as the colony increases in size the two roles are differentiated. In some cases, the German Teacher may occupy a non-executive position (usually combining his role with that of headship of some minor

department such as the apiary or garden. In other cases the position of German Teacher is elevated to the executive level.

A second method of increasing the number of executive positions is the elevation of older men near retirement age into the executive. These men are referred to as councillors. The role of councillor is devoid of the functionally specific tasks which characterize the other executive positions.

Although councillors can be relied upon as a fund of accumulated experiential wisdom during council meetings, they spend most of their time in a state of semi-retirement. The councillors are usually ex-departmental heads, who by moving into an executive position allow younger more energetic men to replace them. Councillorship is probably the Hutterite version of being 'kicked upstairs'. In all the elders rarely exceed six in number.

All of the executive with the exception of the preacher is elected to their positions by an assembly consisting of all baptized male members of the colony. The selection of the preacher is partially by election, partially by appointment, and partially by random selection. The selection of preacher typically takes place after a colony has fissioned. When a colony fissions the members of the mother colony align themselves under either the preacher or the assistant preacher. A great deal of attention is given to seeing that

the two groups are similar with respect to such demographic characteristics as size, sex composition, age composition, and occupational composition. On the day of the split, the preacher and the assistant preacher draw a strip of paper from a hat which informs them whether their party leaves or stays. After the split has been completed the assistant preacher becomes spiritual head of his colony. At this point the position of assistant preacher becomes vacant on both the mother and daughter colonies. The colonies fill these vacancies by first nominating a slate of candidates from their own membership. Next the Leut 'bishop' with a number of his assistant elders arrives to officiate at the election.<sup>71</sup> At this point the Leut 'bishop' and his assistants weed out candidates whom they regard as unsuitable for the position. They may also add additional names to the list of candidates if they so wish. Once the list of candidates has been deemed suitable by the Leut 'bishop' an election is held. All baptized male members of the colony in question, the Leut 'bishop', and all of the visiting preachers are allowed to vote. Those candidates who receive less than five votes are taken out of the running. If there is more than one candidate still remaining, the final choice is made by drawing lots. The Hutterites do not conceive of this final procedure as being a matter of random selection,

but rather as a choice made by God. Rideman makes this very explicit in his book,

[M]inisters must not press themselves forward and come to the fore, but wait until God drawth them out and chooseth them.

If the Church needeth one or, indeed, more ministers, she must not elect them as pleaseth herself, but wait upon the lord to see whom he chooseth and showeth them. .... If there be many of them we wait to see which the Lord showeth us by lot; if, however, there be only one or just as many as are needed, then we need no lot, ...<sup>72</sup>

The preacher, first minister, or 'Diener des Wortes' is unquestionably the principal leader of the colony. All major problems are first brought to the preacher unless they are of a routine or technical nature. He chairs all meetings, leads the church service, approves all marriages, performs all important ceremonies, disciplines the morally delinquent, represents the colony on the Leut Council, greets and entertains all 'important' visitors to the colony, and serves as the spokesman of the colony in its relations with the outside world. The preacher also has the responsibility of keeping the colony in harmony with tradition and doctrine. The assistant preacher essentially acts as his apprentice and aide. Both the first preacher and the assistant preacher are expected to perform certain manual tasks in addition to their religious and governmental duties. The manual aspects are usually much

more apparent in the case of the assistant preacher who often must also fill the role of the colony's German Teacher. In many cases the manual work performed by the first preacher amounts to little more than tokenism. For example, a first preacher may fulfil his manual labour "quota" by grading eggs for one hour every morning. On Hutterite colonies one can observe 'working' preachers who take their manual work very seriously and treat their ministerial duties as something which can be handled in the evenings and on Sunday. But one can also find 'scholarly' preachers whose manual work consists of book binding and copying the Chronicles in longhand.

The next most important position is the colony manager, colony steward or 'Diener der Notdurft'. The colony manager is responsible for the temporal welfare of the colony. He keeps most of the colony books and records and sees to it that all sectors of the economy are running smoothly. It is his duty to insure that there is an equitable distribution of work, food, clothing, and shelter in the colony. He and the preacher conduct most business transactions with 'outsiders'. The manual labour component of the colony manager's role is somewhat greater than that of the preacher.

The third most important executive position is the farm boss or 'Weinzierl'. He is responsible for organizing the man power of the colony. He supervises all collective work

tasks such as the harvest and building construction. He also allocates the young men and the teen-age boys to which ever department they may be needed. His relationship to the colony manager is similar to the relationship between the assistant preacher and the first preacher. The farm boss is also a departmental head—the crops manager. In this capacity he is responsible for the planting, cultivation, harvesting, and storing of all crops grown on the colony.

The position of German Teacher may or may not be an executive position. On small colonies the duties of the German Teacher may be performed by the assistant preacher or the gardener. When it is a distinct position, it involves the education and disciplining of the children. The German Teacher directs the German School which meets for an hour before and after the regular English school, on Saturday mornings, and during the summer vacation. The curriculum of the German School consists of the German language, Hutterite church history, Hutterite hymns, and Hutterite theology. In large measure the German School attempts to counteract the 'worldly' influences of the English school. In a couple of rare cases the German Teacher also teaches the English school. This is rare because the Hutterites discourage education beyond the elementary school level. As a result the English school is nearly always taught by an 'outsider'

who possesses the prerequisite teaching diploma. During the summer months, the German Teacher supervises the children as they tend the children's garden, help with the harvest, and perform odd jobs around the colony; such as picking rocks out of the fields, watering the garden, and disposing of garbage.

The managers of the various departments comprise the next level of authority. The number of departmental heads varies directly with the size of the colony. A full slate of departmental heads would include a cattle man (beef), dairy man, sheep man, pig man, chicken man, geese man, duck man, egg man, mechanic, carpenter, shoeman, gardener, blacksmith (welder), and crops manager. It is exceedingly rare for all of these positions to be represented on any particular colony. The number of departmental headships will vary from about six on a small colony to about twelve on a large one. It is a rarity to find the position of crops manager divorced from the position of farm boss; however, this can occur if the colony becomes very large. As previously mentioned the positions of German Teacher and gardener are frequently combined, unless the size of the enterprise warrants separation. In addition the separation of the following roles are usually determined by the size of the colony—chicken man/egg man, mechanic/blacksmith, and cattle man/dairy man. The position of shoemaker appears to be slowly disappearing from

Hutterite colonies as the Hutterites turn to commercially produced footwear.<sup>73</sup>

The departmental heads do not constitute an organized group. However, several of the departmental heads sit on the General Assembly or 'Vorstehen Der Gemeinde'. Departmental heads are given a fair degree of leeway concerning the operations of their own departments. However, they must keep careful records and report periodically to the colony manager concerning departmental affairs. Department heads are elected to their positions and generally retain them as long as the operations of their departments remain efficient, profitable, and conform to colony policy and Hutterite tradition.

At the bottom of this authority hierarchy lies the general labour force. This category consists of all males who have graduated from the elementary school, but who have not as yet attained the rank of department head. The absence of a permanent occupation is the distinguishing mark of this category of members. In the kibbutzim, such people are given the generic label 'corks' (pkak).<sup>74</sup> 'Corks' float around in the labour pool and can be taken and bunged into holes when the need arises. Although the Hutterites do not use this term or anything like it, the same principle seems to operate. If one of the department heads requests a man to assist him, the farm



boss will immediately select someone from the general labour force and place him at the disposal of that department head. These men are not systematically rotated among the jobs available, but are allocated according to the day to day needs of the colony. The members of the executive often serve as 'corks' while fulfilling their manual labour requirements.

After baptism, the young men in the general labour force tend to apprentice themselves to one of the department heads. This does not mean that these men have ceased to be 'corks'; on the contrary, they can always be moved to another department if circumstances demand it; however, if they have familiarized themselves with the requisite skills of a particular department, the farm boss will usually assign them to that department in order to further efficient operations. Many of these young men manage to carve out sub-departments for themselves; such as superintendent of a fleet of combines, director of grain storage, or supervisor of crop irrigation. Although these activities always fall within the domain of one of the recognized departments and cannot be carried out without the department head's approval, they do provide the apprentice with training and experience in the operations of a department. Apprenticeship usually leads to headship in the future provided the apprentice reveals some degree of

competence. But headship may have to await the death or retirement of the present head unless colony fission opens up a large number of new positions. We shall return to this issue later.

Two categories of members have thus far been excluded from this description of the occupational structure—the women and children. The children may at times be considered part of the general labour force. During the summer months, elementary school children are asked to perform a variety of minor tasks such as hoeing, driving tractors, picking up rocks, running errands, and cleaning up debris. They are frequently used during the harvest season, but are not used in any serious way during the school months.

Women occupy a position in the authority hierarchy which is somewhat difficult to classify. In general they are regarded as an inferior social type.<sup>75</sup> Women have no political voice either in terms of the right to vote in the Assembly or an organized group to represent them. Rideman gives a theological explanation for this 'natural' inferiority of women.

[S]ince woman was taken from man, and not man from woman, man hath lordship but woman weakness, humility, and submission, therefore, she should be under the yoke of man and obedient to him, even as the woman was commanded by God when he said to her, "The man shall be thy lord."<sup>76</sup>

Hutterites have a well developed conception of women's work and men's work. Women are prohibited from competing with men for occupational positions. Women's work is not only considered less important than men's work, but is also less differentiated. The only exception to this is the head cook, who has authority over the other women in the kitchen and dining hall. Although she is elected to this position by the assembly, she is not allowed to sit on the assembly. There are no other positions among the women comparable to that of head cook. There are, however, a number of informal positions assigned to women by male department heads. The gardener often places a woman in charge of the other women who work in the garden. The German Teacher usually assigns women to operate the Kindergarten; he may also ask another to help him with the German School. The rest of the women participate in a rotation system, whereby they are moved from the kitchen to the garden and then to house cleaning and then to the laundry and finally back to the kitchen.

Not only are the sexes separated occupationally, but social interaction between the sexes occurs only infrequently in the work setting. The garden is the only major exception to this; although the garden is the domain of the gardener his work force is predominantly female.

The number and variety of occupational positions in a Hutterite colony always remains within well defined limits. As has been mentioned above, the number of executive positions varies between four and six, and the number of department headships varies between six and twelve. Thus, by the time a colony is preparing to fission eighteen occupational positions will have been filled.<sup>77</sup>

It can now be demonstrated that this will occur when the population of a colony reaches 140. The nature of the Hutterian age-sex pyramid (see Figure 2.3 and Table 2.10) determines the terminal population size of a colony. The Schmiedeleut sub-sect has a population size of 7369 people, of these 3730 (50.61%) are males and 3639 (49.40%) are females. Because of their high birth rate, Hutterites have a very high dependency ratio<sup>78</sup> —one productive member for every 1.06 dependents. Nearly one-half of the Hutterite population (3629 people or 49.25%) consists of children fifteen years of age or less. The remaining dependents are retired oldsters which make up 2.06% of the population. If we exclude all women and dependents, we are left with a male work force of 1805 men or 24.50% of the Hutterite population. Within the male work force, 736 males (9.99% of the population) are between the ages of 16 and 25. This is the period of time between elementary school graduation and baptism.<sup>79</sup>

These members usually make up the general labour force by virtue of their age. This leaves 1069 men or 14.51% of the population who are eligible to hold occupations.

Figure 2.2

Schmiedeleut Age-Sex Pyramid




Table 2.10Schmiedeleut Age-Sex Distribution

<u>Age in Years</u>	<u>Male</u>		<u>Female</u>	
	<u>Number of Males</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Number of Females</u>	<u>%</u>
0-5	704	9.55	706	9.58
6-10	663	9.00	629	8.54
11-15	479	6.50	448	6.08
16-20	406	5.51	372	5.05
21-25	330	4.48	343	4.65
26-30	260	3.53	251	3.41
31-35	187	2.54	211	2.89
36-40	193	2.62	172	2.33
41-45	135	1.83	135	1.83
46-50	93	1.26	117	1.59
51-55	89	1.21	75	1.02
56-60	65	.88	63	.85
61-65	47	.64	44	.60
66-70	40	.54	37	.50
71-75	18	.24	18	.24
76-80	14	.19	12	.16
81-85	6	.08	4	.05
86-90	<u>1</u>	<u>.01</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>.03</u>
TOTAL	3730	50.61	3639	49.40

Since colony fission nearly always results in the creation of two demographically similar colonies, the age-sex distribution of any colony selected at random closely resembles the larger leut age-sex distribution. Consequently, a new colony with an initial population of 70 members will typically have 35 males and 35 females. Seventeen males will be 15 years of age or less and one man will be of retirement age. This will leave 17 men in the work force. Seven of these men will be between the ages of 16 and 25 and the

remaining ten men will be potential occupation holders. It is no coincidence that ten occupations (4 executive and 6 departmental positions) is the minimum limit in the number of occupations.

If we look at a colony which has reached the termination size of 140 people, we will find that there are 69 women, 35 males 15 years of age and under, 2 retired men, 14 young men in the general labour force and 20 men who can potentially hold occupations. Since 18 positions are the maximum number which a colony can have, a colony of this size has just passed the point where the number of men match the number of positions.

If the population of a colony exceeds 140, many young males will be prevented from advancing within the Hutterite opportunity structure and authority hierarchy. When upward mobility is blocked in this way, the occupational aspirations of the young men are frustrated. The failure to attain an occupational position is made stressful not only because status ambitions have been thwarted, but more importantly because the Hutterites conceive of their occupational roles as a religious 'calling'. Like many Protestant sects, the Hutterites conceive of an occupation as an avenue to salvation. Karl Peter has best described the Hutterite variant of the Protestant ethic.

Hutterites gave a peculiar twist to (the Protestant ethic) by insisting that both the calling and the

attainment of certainty of grace could only be achieved in the context of the 'Gemeinschaft', that is in the spiritual and material community where the spirit of God, the material resources of men, and the attainment of eternal grace were shared equally and simultaneously by all members...

The individual, his work, and his eternal future are unalterably welded to the state of the total community and to the extent that he can be saved only if the total community is saved, he in turn must do his share to make such communal saving possible. In his "calling" he carries the burden of saving his neighbours and his kin.<sup>80</sup>

Most young Hutterite men expect that they will be voted into department headships or even executive positions. Such an expectation is reasonable because of the Hutterite norm of fissioning when all positions have been filled, thereby creating twenty positions—ten in the mother colony and ten in the daughter colony. Not only does colony fission immediately satisfy all twenty men who are in a position to hold occupations, but it also opens up future opportunities for personal advancement for those younger men in the general labour force.

However, if a colony fails to fission when its population has reached 140, the opportunity structure becomes closed and many young men become dissatisfied. As was first demonstrated in The American Soldier,<sup>81</sup> a high rate of upward mobility leads to a high expectation of promotion with the result that if promotion is not forthcoming a greater degree of dissatis-



faction will occur than when mobility rates are low. Hutterite men who find themselves trapped in the general labour force suffer a loss of self-esteem and a sense of personal worth, because normally only individuals who are deemed incompetent remain in the general labour force beyond the approximate age of 25. Young Hutterite males aspire to become departmental heads less out of a desire for personal gain and more out of a fear of being rejected by the group. If they are not given a responsible position, they feel that they are being viewed as incompetent or untrustworthy.

To most Hutterites, productive work which serves the interests of the community is regarded as a religious duty--the more useful the labour, the more spiritually worthy the individual performing it. This sentiment is rarely expressed by the Hutterites, but operates more as an implicit assumption. Hutterites are apt to attribute a lack of desire to aspire to a departmental position as being due to 'laziness' or a lack of concern for the welfare of the colony. Occasionally Hutterites will loosely compare such individuals to drones in a bee hive. In general, a lack of aspirations on the part of young men in the general labour force is regarded as 'unnatural'. A story was once repeated to me about a young man who publicly stated that he did not want to become a departmental head, but was quite happy to remain in the

general labour force. The outcome of this was that the individual was never given a responsible job. The implication was that anyone who had such a loose grasp on reality could never be trusted with a responsible position. The story concluded with the assertion that such people "should be made to eat at the children's table", since they were behaving in a manner appropriate only for children. So strong is the stigma attached to remaining in the general labour force when one has become an adult, that a great loss of self-esteem occurs when a slow rate of colony expansion prevents upward mobility.

Mackie,<sup>82</sup> in her study of Alberta colonies, was able to demonstrate that the defection rate was highest in the older 'over sized' colonies. Most of these defectors were young adult males. This finding supports our contention that dissatisfaction would increase in direct proportion to the size of the colony.

Colony fission can be delayed if a colony has insufficient financial resources with which to afford fission or a colony is prevented from fissioning by legal restrictions placed on it by the host society.

Frideres has argued that the provincial governments of Canada are systematically destroying Hutterite culture by means of land restriction legislation. He claims that the

effect of these laws is to curtail colony expansion and force colonies to become 'over sized'. When this occurs, the defection rate will rise until it matches the birth rate. He asserts that "as the defection rate increases, ghettos of 'ex-Hutterites' will emerge."<sup>83</sup> He concludes by predicting that,

What is happening now (and will continue to happen in the future) is that while the major components of the entire Hutterite cultural complex are being destroyed, some elements of their religious beliefs will remain.<sup>84</sup>

The evidence for this rather bold prophecy is at best spotty. He cites as evidence the Communal Land Act of 1947 and its predecessor, the Land Sales Prohibition Act of 1942—both of which were products of the Social Credit government of Alberta.<sup>85</sup> It is true that these acts did retard Hutterite expansion in the province of Alberta between 1942 and 1960. However, these acts have not been applied since 1960, and the acts themselves are now under review. Although Frideres seems to feel otherwise, no such law operates in the province of Manitoba. However, Manitoba Hutterites have voluntarily agreed to certain informal restrictions. They have agreed to confine all future colonies to 5120 acres (the average acreage is only 3763 acres), to space all future colonies to two per municipality. This last restriction may indeed pose a serious problem in the future, if it is adhered to. The

Hutterites have accepted this *modus operandi* in order to forestall the enactment of real land restriction legislation. To date the Schmiedeleut group has not had their colony expansion restricted; in fact it could be argued that the threat of such legislation has in itself provoked recent expansion (See Table 2.2). Within the Schmiedeleut sub-sect 'over sized' colonies have usually occurred because of inadequate finances.

It is the responsibility of each generation of Hutterites to provide the succeeding generation with sufficient resources and motivation with which to continue the Hutterian life style. Sufficient capital must be raised to allow a colony to 'branch out' or 'swarm' before the opportunity structure becomes closed and the ambitions of their young men thwarted. A great deal of shame is attached to a colony which fails to fission within a reasonable time. Hutterites depict the members of those colonies which are slow to fission as not only being insufficiently concerned with the welfare of their children, but also as being religious backsliders. It is felt that if the twin religious ideals of hard work and asceticism are upheld, a colony 'ought' to be in a position to fission at the 'appropriate' time. When this does not occur the members of the disgraced colony are depicted as a lazy, self-indulgent lot. A mild form of competition exists between colonies which

tends to keep them from becoming inactive and inefficient. Colonies which are able to 'spin off' daughter colonies quickly and efficiently gain considerable prestige and are viewed as models meriting emulation. It is not simply the speed with which a daughter colony is produced which brings a colony prestige, but the ability to outfit a daughter colony with equipment and holdings at least equal to that possessed by the mother colony in the shortest period of time. It is considered a deplorable act to produce a 'pre-mature' daughter colony which is so meagerly endowed that its growth is retarded. There have been about ten cases where a colony has produced a daughter colony in less than 10 years, these 'pre-mature' colonies have taken much longer to fission than the average (18.70 years verses 14.42 years).

In this competition, certain boundary rules are taken for granted. It is taken for granted that every colony will find it necessary to fission every 15 years. It is assumed that by that time the population pressure will be such that a colony, if it is not already in the process of fissioning, will have at least purchased a farm to show its intention of doing so in the near future. In a few rare cases, this expectation has not been met, because the population of the colonies in question have not grown sufficiently to warrant

fission at the anticipated time. This has not been due to birth control or any purposeful limitation of family size, but can be traced to a fissioning in which the age distribution of the mother colony did not match the age distribution of the daughter colony. Hutterite preachers have told me that they have to be extremely vigilant at the time of colony fission to ensure that colonies do not attempt to solve their generation conflicts by placing the older members on one colony and their younger members on the other colony. The creation of 'old' and 'young' colonies can be very disruptive because it leads to maldistribution of resources. The population growth potential is much greater for 'young' colonies than for 'old' colonies. The population growth of 'young' colonies can outdistance their ability to finance colony fission, whereas 'old' colonies can afford to branch out long before their population increase warrants it.

Another expectation which is almost universally adhered to by colonies, is that the opportunity structure will have become closed at this time and the members of a colony will desire to fission in order to open it up again. Although this is largely hypothetical, a colony may not be motivated to fission if it were to increase the number of occupational positions beyond the limit of 18. By creating new departmental and executive positions, a colony could conceivably

grow to the size of a small town before its members were motivated to fission. Hutterite informants expressed the opinion that colonies would become too difficult to administer if the number of positions were increased. There may be some truth to this view. Students of formal organizations have demonstrated that the maximum number of subordinates which a superordinate can monitor at one time is approximately six.<sup>86</sup> If this is an accurate estimate of a supervisor's span of control, then Hutterite colonies which have all 18 positions filled are operating at their administrative maximums. When all positions are filled, the preacher who is primus inter pares in the executive sphere, must supervise the other five executives in addition to his other duties. Only two executives are directly responsible for supervision; namely, the colony manager and the farm boss. With twelve men in departmental positions the maximum span of control is reached. New positions cannot be added without either reorganizing the authority hierarchy or suffering a loss in administrative efficiency. Their present authority structure has been laid down in their doctrinal literature; therefore, it is understandable that the Hutterites are reluctant to depart in any significant way from a structure which has proved workable in the past and has received religious endorsement. However, this is not to say that Hutterites would rigidly adhere to

this traditional structure at all costs. There is some evidence that if the difficulty of acquiring land for a new colony were great enough, Hutterites will respond by changing their organizational structure. The only case of this occurring is a Dariusleut colony in Alberta which has established a glove factory. It should be noted that this light industry was established on an experimental basis in response to restrictive land legislation in the province of Alberta. If this experiment is successful, we can expect many Hutterite colonies to industrialize. As far as I know, none of the Schmiedeleut colonies have seriously considered industrialization.<sup>87</sup>

Barkin and Bennett in their comparative analysis of the kibbutzim and Hutterian economic structures,<sup>88</sup> maintain that industrialization would increase the opportunity costs of members of Hutterite colonies, thus increasing the defection rate. In their view, industrialization would increase the perceived costs of remaining on the colony (in terms of opportunities forgone) and decrease the costs of seeking alternative external opportunities. Industrialization would necessitate an increase in the educational level of the colony labour force, if the Hutterites wished to become competitive with external industrial organizations. Their present level of educational attainment is adequate for their



own agricultural economy, but insufficient to allow Hutterite men to obtain comparable positions in the surrounding society. Their present grade eight education is sufficiently lower than the average level of formal education attained in the host society, that Hutterites are barred from taking up comparable external positions. In addition, the introduction of industries on Hutterite colonies would permit Hutterite men to make lateral moves into external industrial organizations. At present such lateral moves are not possible because comparable positions cannot be found on local farms and ranches and Hutterite defectors are not permitted to take with them any capital with which to purchase such enterprises. Their present external opportunities are limited to field hand and perhaps garage mechanic. According to Barkin and Bennett, such positions would represent a decrease in standard of living and occupational status.<sup>89</sup> In summary, industrialization would not only open the internal opportunity structure, but open external opportunities as well. As a consequence, Hutterite society would lose one of its major barriers preventing assimilation into the host society.

A third and final way in which a colony may avoid fissioning at the expected time, is by tolerating a high defection rate. If the rate of defection were to match the rate with which young males typically enter the occupational

structure, then a colony would enter a state of equilibrium. There is a feedback relationship between defections and the opportunity structure. As discussed earlier, when the demand for positions is greater than the supply, defections will occur. However, these very defections result in a reduction in the number of males demanding positions, thus a decline in the rate of defections occurs. Hutterites do not view this phenomena as a harmonious balancing process, but rather as evidence of internal stagnation and decadence. Hutterites frequently refer to these colonies as "dying colonies". It would probably be more accurate to refer to these colonies as "static colonies", since they do not die but simply cease to grow after attaining a certain level of development. There are five colonies in the Schmiedeleut federation which clearly fall within this category, in addition to a number of borderline cases. None of these colonies have ever fissioned, yet they have been in existence for an average of 21 years. Their population is both low (mean of 92) and stable (there population has increased on the average of 6 people in the last ten years). At this rate of growth these colonies are not likely to fission during this century, if ever.

By examining one of these "dying colonies" in detail, I hope to illustrate firstly, how defections can produce a

static population, and secondly, how a closing of the opportunity structure gives rise to these defections. In the next two chapters, I will attempt to show that the social dynamics illustrated by this case applies in varying degrees to the entire leut.

The colony of Millerdale near Miller, South Dakota was founded in 1949 by its parent colony Milltown. The initial population of Millerdale was 63 which is below the average initial population, but not abnormally so. Table 2.11 gives the age-sex distribution of Millerdale for the years 1949, 1955, 1960, 1965, and 1970. The diagonal lines have been added in order to assist the reader in tracing the population of each age cohort.

Table 2.12 shows that only six defections occurred since 1949. This may appear, at first glance, to be too small a number to significantly effect population growth; however, it can be demonstrated that these defections are the primary reason why Millerdale had a population of only 91 in 1970, rather than a population of well over 140.

In addition to the six men who defected, three men married out of the colony. Hutterites are typically patri-local; however, two men succeeded in taking up residence in a neighbouring colony (Platte Colony) which was not even in the same clan. These atypical residence patterns can be

Table 2.11Age-Sex Distribution of Millerdale Colonyfor the Years 1949, 1955, 1960, 1965, and 1970.

<u>Age in Years</u>	<u>Male</u>					<u>Female</u>				
	<u>1949</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>
0-5	5	6	7	7	7	4	5	6	8	7
6-10	4	5	6	7	7	3	4	5	6	8
11-15	4	4	5	6	7	4	3	4	5	6
16-20	6	4	4	5	6	3	4	3	4	5
21-25	2	6	2	4	4	5	3	4	3	1
26-30	3	2	3	2	3	4	3	4	3	2
31-35	1	3	1	2	2	2	5	2	4	3
36-40	1	1	3	1	2	0	2	5	2	4
41-45	0	1	1	3	1	0	0	2	5	2
46-50	1	0	1	1	3	2	0	0	2	5
51-55	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	2
56-60	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	0	0
61-65	2	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	2	0
over 65	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
TOTAL	32	37	36	41	45	31	34	39	45	46

Table 2.12Population Gains and Lossesof Millerdale Colony

<u>Category</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>
<u>Gains</u>		
Initial Population	32	31
Births	27	26
Marrying In	<u>0</u>	<u>6</u>
	59	63
<u>Losses</u>		
Deaths	5	5
Defections	6	0
Marrying Out	<u>3</u>	<u>12</u>
	14	17

taken as evidence that Millerdale was deemed an undesirable colony to live on. Coupled with the departure of these 9 men was an exodus of 12 women. All of these women married and went to their husband's colony of residence. They were replaced by 6 women who married into the colony for a net loss of 6. Five women of marriageable age remained at Millerdale as spinsters. This latter phenomena is unusual since nearly all Hutterites marry. Thus, Millerdale lost not only 9 men through defection and marrying out, but also 9 wives who would have replaced the colony women who married out. In addition, the colony also lost the children which these families would have produced. It is possible to estimate what the colony size would have been had these 9 men stayed by using Eaton and Mayer's estimates of the Hutterite nuptial fertility rate.<sup>90</sup> If we assume the potential spouses of these 9 men would have been the same age as their husbands and that the time of marriage would have conformed to the Hutterite norm, then an estimated 44 children would have been produced by these marriages by 1970. Therefore, if these 9 men had not left the colony Millerdale would have had a potential population of 153 people by 1970 (91 + 18 adults + 44 Children = 153 people). This would have been a normal population for a colony which was 21 years old, and in all probability it would already have fissioned.

In dying colonies the defection rate is not only sufficient to keep the population stationary, it also prevents the occupational structure from expanding to its maximum potential. Millerdale has never had more than eleven men in occupational positions, which is a lower number than normal for a colony of its size. At first sight it might appear that the defections at Millerdale occurred for reasons unrelated to the opportunity structure, since the defections themselves have curtailed its expansion. However, it can be shown that access to opportunities is differentially distributed among the male members of the colony. I will argue that kinship alliances create this inequality of opportunity.

The Hutterite folk explanation is that defections occur with the greatest frequency in 'weak' families. By this, they appear to mean that some families are less committed to colony life and are consequently more likely to leave. Many Hutterites believe that this is a genetic trait which can be found in the 'blood' of certain family lines. Hostetler and Huntington report that,<sup>91</sup>

This view of defection among themselves is valid, for of 38 defectors interviewed it was found that half originated in five families and all were located in declining colonies.

This assertion is supported in the case of Millerdale colony, since colony abandonment occurred more frequently in certain

family lines than in others. In Figure 2.4 which represents the genealogy of Millerdale, six distinct family lines can be discerned. Although, as in most colonies, the families are interconnected by a network of affinal and consanguineal ties. The closest relationship is between families 1 and 2 where the family heads were brothers. The next closest tie is between the heads of families 5 and 6 who were not only first cousins once removed, but the head of family 6's second marriage was the head of family 5's sister and his first marriage was with 5's wife's sister. All other consanguineal ties are more distant or untraceable. Thus, families 1 and 2, and families 5 and 6 make up two distinct kinship groupings, with families 3 and 4 making up a third weakly related group.

Table 2.13 shows the degree of inequality which exists between these kinship groupings with respect to occupational characteristics.

Families 1 and 2 form the political elite of Millerdale colony. The two brothers who headed these families held the positions of preacher and colony manager. With the death of the brother who held the position of farm manager, the position was taken up by his eldest son. Two of the preacher's sons became assistant preacher and farm boss. All of the executive positions at Millerdale are monopolized by this kinship line. This kin group descends from a line of preachers




Figure 2.3 Millerdale Genealogy



Key to Figure 2.3

Units above Dotted Line - Deceased ancestors who never  
resided in Millerdale Colony.

Slashed Units - Deceased while at Millerdale  
Colony.

O - Married out of colony

D - Defected from colony

S - Spinsters

P - Preacher

B - Colony Manager

A - Assistant Preacher

F - Farm Boss

E - Egg Man

K - Carpenter

C - Cattle Man

H - Chicken Man

L - Pig Man

M - Mechanic

G - Gardener

N - No occupation

Note: Genealogy includes only members of Millerdale colony  
who are 20 years of age or over.

Table 2.13Occupational Characteristics of Three KinshipGroupings within Millerdale Colony

	# of living males over 20	# of executive positions	# of occupa- tions	# with no occupa- tions	defections
Kinship Grouping 1 and 2	12	4	7	4	1
Kinship Grouping 3 and 4	8	0	3	2	3
Kinship Grouping 5 and 6	<u>7</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	27	4	11	7	9

and colony managers. Their father was the colony manager of the mother colony (Milltown) and both wives were daughters of preachers. If we examine the patrilineal line of descent of both the heads and their wives, we find that all of their male ancestors held executive posts.<sup>92</sup> Table 2.14 reveals that the offsprings of these two families have carried on the tradition of nepotism.

Table 2.14Marital Alliances of Families 1 and 2

	<u>Male Offspring (11)</u>	<u>Female Offspring (10)</u>
# Marrying Offspring of Elite	4	7
# Marrying Offspring of Non-Elite	4	2
Spouse holds Elite Position	-	5
Spouse holds Non-Elite Position	-	4
# Single or Defected	3	1

Families 5 and 6 present a completely different picture. None of the present members of these families hold executive positions and only one ancestor in the patrilineal lines of descent of the family heads and their wives held an executive position. The paternal grandfather of the head of family 5 and 6's second wife held the position of farm boss. The offspring of these two families have not improved on this record. Of the twelve offspring, only one married into the elite. A daughter of family 5 married the farm boss of Millerdale.

Families 3 and 4 hold a somewhat intermediate position with respect to elite connections. Although no present member of these families holds an elite position, three of the eight

male ancestors in the patrilineages of the heads and their wives held executive posts. Of their seven married offspring, three have married the offspring of preachers. Two of these marriages have taken place within Millerdale colony itself.

Millerdale colony can be seen to be divided into three kinship groups which differ with respect to the amount of political power and influence which they can wield. From Table 2.15, it can be seen that the decision to abandon the colony varies inversely with the amount of political influence held by one's kinship group.

Table 2.15

Political Status of Kinship Group  
and Decisions of Males to Abandon  
or Remain at Millerdale Colony

<u>Political Status</u>	<u>Abandonment</u>	
	No	Yes
Strong (families 1 & 2)	11	1
Intermediate (families 3 & 4)	5	3
Weak (families 5 & 6)	2	5
	18	9
		27

Decisions to abandon colony by political status are significant beyond .02 level by chi-square test with 2 d.f.

In colonies such as Millerdale, strong dynasties are often able to guarantee their own members preferred access to the available positions at the expense of other colony members. Hutterites officially disapprove of this form of favouratism and the very existence of dynasties. In his book, Paul Gross the preacher at the Dariusleut colony of Espinola states that,<sup>93</sup>

We have learned from experience that voting only kinsmen into office whether qualified or not, has led to grievous harm.

The family occupies a somewhat ambiguous position in Hutterite society. There is no reference to the family in Hutterite doctrinal literature; marriage and child rearing receive elaborate attention, but the family never receives recognition as a sub-group within a colony.<sup>94</sup>

Ideally the biologically based family was to be replaced by a spiritual 'family'. In this large spiritual 'family', members would become spiritual brothers, sisters, children, and parents to one another. Biologically based family and kin ties can be disruptive to the spiritual community if loyalty to a spouse, parent, or offspring is greater than one's commitment to the colony. Deets, in the first empirical study of the Hutterites, stated that,

Those in authority in the Hutterite communities recognize the home as a place not as easily controlled as the rest of the community. Some

utopian communities have met the problem by adopting the practice of celibacy. Oneida community tried to meet it by abolishing the conventional family. The Hutterites meet it in part by stripping the family of many of its functions.<sup>95</sup>

Yet, I think it is fair to say that the Hutterites have evolved a highly elaborate kinship system and have accepted the inevitable inequality which it entails as part of the natural order of things. In subsequent chapters, we will find that familial loyalties tend to become stronger than community loyalties when the colony is unable to satisfy the aspirations of the junior male members of all families.

### Footnotes

1. There is no dearth of historical and ethnographic studies on the Hutterites. Hostetler has recorded nearly 150 scholarly sources; most of which are descriptive. See John A. Hostetler, "A Bibliography of English Language Materials on the Hutterian Brethren", Mennonite Quarterly Review, Vol. 44, 1970, pp. 106-113. John A. Hostetler and Gertrude E. Huntington's, The Hutterites in North America (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967) is not only a competent ethnography but a useful introduction for those lacking a background in Hutteriana.
2. The label 'Anabaptist' (from the Greek 'anabaptismos' re-baptism) was at the time little more than a contemptuous slur invented by the establishment to conveniently categorize a heterogeneous mass of political radicals and religious dissenters. This labelling process created the illusion that a disorganized mass was in fact a highly unified group. The contemporary term 'Hippie' is a modern day example of the same phenomenon. The term was later adopted as a collective term after the mass crystallized into an organization. It now refers to the Amish, the Hutterites, the Mennonites, the Swiss Brethren, the Society of Brothers and few other small religious sects. See, Franklin H. Littell, The Origins of Sectarian Protestantism, (New York: MacMillan Co., 1964), pp. xv-xvi.
3. James C. Davies. "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review, Vol. 27, 1962, pp. 7 cites the Peasants' War of 1825-6 as an example of a revolution that occurred when actual socio-economic development lagged behind rising expectations.
4. Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, (London: Paladin, 1970), pp. 245.
5. The restoration of the apostolic church refers to a doctrine which advocates a return to the principles of the Church of Jerusalem under Jesus according to the Acts of the Apostles.
6. This is a view which characterizes all Anabaptists; see for example, Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1936), pp. 211-12.

7. The fundamental area of divergence between the Hutterites and Mennonites is over the issue of 'community of goods' vs. 'community of love'. See Donald Sommer, "Peter Rideman and Menno Simons on Economics", Mennonite Quarterly Review, Vol. 28, 1954, pp. 205-23.
8. According to some scholars the Dead Sea Scrolls reveal that the primitive Christian communities referred to in Acts were actually newly converted Qumran communities of the Essenes--an introversionist Jewish communal sect. If this evidence is accurate, the communal social structure pre-dated Christianity. See Jean Danielou and Henri Marrou, The First Six Hundred Years (London, Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1964), pp. 3-16.
9. See Karl A. Peter, "Factors of Social Change and Social Dynamics in the Communal Settlements of the Hutterites, 1527-1967" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1967), p. 82.
10. See, Mennonite Encyclopedia, Book 4, p. 326.
11. Peter Rideman, Confession of Faith: Account of our Religion, Doctrine, and Faith (Bungay, Suffolk: Plough Publ. House, 1950).
12. See George H. Williams, The Radical Reformation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962), pp. 672.
13. Peter Walpot is the major author of "The Great Article Book", 1577, which is considered by the Hutterites to be an important doctrinal text. Although "The Great Article Book" has been published in German in A. J. F. Zieglschmid (ed.), Die älteste Chronik der Hutterischen Brüder (Philadelphia: Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, 1943) only part of this work exists in English: Peter Walpot, True Surrender and Christian Community of Goods (Bromdon: Plough Publ. House, 1957).
14. See George H. Williams, op. cit., p. 680.
15. Andreas Ehrenpreis Ein Sendbrief (reprinted in Scottdale, Pa., 1920). An English language paraphrase of this epistle has been written by Robert Friedmann, "An Epistle Concerning Communal Life: A Hutterite Manifesto of 1650 and Its Modern Paraphrase", Mennonite Quarterly Review, Vol. 34, October, 1960, pp. 249-74.



16. As an indication of the popularity of this epistle, Victor Peters notes that,

In August 1957 (he) conducted a survey at several Hutterian communities in Manitoba. Among the questions directed separately and individually to a number of family heads, one required the listing of the authors on their bookshelves at home. Half of them began their list with Ehrenpreis.

See Victor Peters, All Things Common: The Hutterian Way of Life (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1965), p. 215.

17. Victor Peters, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
18. Ibid., p. 31.
19. The history of all four religious sects becomes intertwined at this point. On the Hutterites, see Victor Peters, op. cit., pp. 31-37. On the Mennonites, see C. Henry Smith, The Story of the Mennonites (Newton, Kansas: Mennonite Publication Office, 1957), pp. 396-403. On the Doukhobors, see George Woodcock and Ivan Avakumovic, The Doukhobors (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 35-61. On the Molokans, see P. V. Young, The Pilgrims of Russian-Town (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932).
20. A translation of A. J. F. Zieglschmid (ed.) Das Klein-Geschichtsbuch der Hutterischen Brüder (Philadelphia: Carl Schurz Memorial Fund, 1947), p. 458.
21. The Krimmer Mennonite Church received special attention in Emil J. Waltner Banished for Faith (Freeman, S.D.: Pine Hill Press, 1968).
22. A Hutterite author Paul S. Gross, a preacher at Espanola Colony in Washington, regards this tripartite split as a regrettable error which is likely to be irreversable. See, Paul S. Gross, The Hutterite Way (Saskatoon: Freeman Publ. Co., 1965), pp. 109-15.
23. The Amana Society or Community of True Inspiration was a communistic society founded by German Pietists in 1843 in Eastern Iowa. Although Amana has ceased to be

communistic, it still exists as a joint-stock company which specializes in the manufacture of refrigeration products. It has retained many of the features of a mutual aid society and a (near-ethnic) religious enclave. See Bertha Shambaugh, Amana That Was and Amana That Is (Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1932). The Rappite communities of Economy and Harmony were founded during the first decade of the 1900's by 600 German Quietists under the leadership of George Rapp. Both of these communities which were located in Pennsylvania had been dissolved by 1905. See Mark Holloway, Heavens on Earth (New York: Dover Publ., 1951), pp. 88-100.

24. The present constitution of the Hutterian Brethren Church has been reproduced in Victor Peters, op. cit., pp. 193-201.
25. Several contending explanations for the break between the Hutterites and Rappites have been offered. These range from a supposed doctrinal dispute with the Rappites over sexual relations (the Rappites were celibates) to difficulties which the Hutterites encountered in maintaining their isolation in this more densely populated and industrial region. See Karl J. Arndt, "The Harmonists and the Hutterites", American-German Review, Vol. 10, August 1944, pp. 26-27.
26. See John A. Hostetler and Gertrude E. Huntington, Op. cit., pp. 9-10 and 92-94.
27. See Marvin P. Riley, South Dakota's Hutterite Colonies: 1874-1969 (Brookings, S.D.: South Dakota State University Press, 1970).
28. Doubling time refers to the time in years for a colony to reproduce itself. John Bennett, in his study of 6 Hutterian colonies in South Western Saskatchewan, noted that the average doubling time was 17 years. See, John Bennett, Hutterian Brethren: The Agricultural Economy and Social Organization of a Communal People (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 181. At first glance, this would seem to suggest that the Schmiedeleut have a much more rapid doubling time. However, because of the nature of his sample, Bennett only looked at the average age of a colony when it produced

- its first daughter colony. Among the Schmiedeleut, the average age of a colony at the time of its first fission is 16.10 years, which is more in line with Bennett's findings. Subsequent fissions among the Schmiedeleut occur every 12.32 years.
29. James Valley clan had only 6 colonies in 1970, whereas the other five clans averaged 15.40 colonies.
  30. A. J. F. Zieglschmid, 1947, op. cit., pp. 685-6.
  31. Victor Peters, op. cit., p. 70.
  32. Joseph Eaton and Bert Kaplan, "The Hutterites Mental Health Study", The Mennonite Quarterly Review, Vol. 25, 1951, p. 62.
  33. Arthur P. Mange, "The Population Structure of a Human Isolate" (Unpublished Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1963).
  34. Victor Peters, op. cit., pp. 209-10.
  35. John A. Hostetler, Education and Marginality in the Communal Society of the Hutterites (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University, 1965).
  36. Robert Friedmann, "A Hutterite Census for 1969", The Mennonite Quarterly Review, Vol. 44, Jan. 1970, pp. 100-105.
  37. See Table 2.4.
  38. The Schmiedeleut group anticipate that discriminatory legislation similar to the 'Communal Property Act' which was passed by the Alberta legislature in 1947 will be enacted in the future.
  39. The following formulae were used to estimate doubling times.

$$\text{Doubling time (in years)} = \frac{\log 2}{\log (1+r)}$$

Where:

$$\log (1+r) = \frac{\log p_2}{\log p_1}$$

n

$p_1$  is the number of people in the population at  $t_1$   
 $p_2$  is the number of people in the population at  $t_2$   
 $r$  is the annual rate of growth  
 $n$  is the exact number of years between  $p_1$  and  $p_2$ .

See George W. Barclay, Techniques of Population Analysis, (New York: John Wiley, 1958), pp. 28-31.

40. Joseph W. Eaton and Albert J. Mayer, "The Social Biology of Very High Fertility Among the Hutterites: The Demography of a Unique Population", Human Biology, Vol. 25, 1953, pp. 206-64.
41. The comparative population statistics were taken from Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Population Resources, Environment (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1972, pp. 450-4.
42. The date 1890 was chosen rather than 1874 because of the rather large and undetermined movement of people between the Schmiedeleut and Prairieleut groups. One family, in particular, (the Tschetter family) fluctuated between colony and their individual farms until they finally settled in Bon Homme colony in 1888 on a permanent basis.
43. Joseph W. Eaton and Albert J. Mayer, op. cit., p. 244.
44. Benjamin Zablocki, The Joyful Community, (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1971), p. 73.
45. The sentence of 'Meidung' or 'shunning' when applied to an entire colony effectively means that the colony is temporarily cut off from all contact with other colonies, until such time as they repent and make atonement for their sins. A more serious penalty "Ausschluss" or excommunication when applied to an entire colony means that the colony is no longer Hutterian or anathematized.
46. Benjamin Zablocki, op. cit., p. 95.
47. The Holy Bible: King James Version
48. A bi-monthly periodical, Communities, published at the Skinnerian Walden II commune of Twin Oaks in Virginia presently serves as the official organ of the communal movement in North America. Communes which wish to advertise for new members are listed in their 'Commune

Directory'. These six Schmiedeleut colonies publicly state that visitors are welcome and that there is a trial period for all new members.

49. The relevant article in the Hutterian constitution reads:

None of the property, either real or personal, of a congregation or community shall ever be taken, held, owned, removed or withdrawn from the congregation or community in accordance with its by-laws, rules and regulations and the provisions of these Articles, and if any member of a congregation or community shall be expelled therefrom, or cease to be a member thereof, he or she shall not have, take, withdraw from, grant, sell, transfer, or convey, or be entitled to any of the property of the congregation or community or any interest therein.

Constitution of the Hutterian Brethren Church and Rules as to Community of Property (1950), Article 39. See also, Manitoba Queen's Bench, J. Dickson, Hofer et. al. v. Hofer et. al. Dominion Law Reports, Vol. 59. (Toronto: Canada Law Book Co., 1967).

50. The 34 apostates have not been counted among the defectors. The total number of people who have left the Schmiedeleut sub-sect since 1890 is 176.
51. Hostetler and Huntington suggest that the orderliness and rigidity of the Hutterian doctrinal system may have been determined by the pre-Lutheran Germanic-language structure with which it was first expressed. See John A. Hostetler and Gertrude E. Huntington, op. cit., pp. 12-14.
52. Three Hutterian theologians in particular hold this status. They are Peter Rideman, Peter Walpot, and Andreas Ehrenpreis.
53. The status of the devil in the Hutterian belief system is ambiguous. At times, Satan is thought of as an opposing force operating outside of God's control. He is the 'Prince of the World' who has established his Kingdom in opposition to the Kingdom of God; and perpetually struggles against God for the souls of men.

At other times, the devil is viewed as a dupe, who, although believing himself to be a free agent, is in reality an agent of God sent into the World to test the faith of men. At a practical level, this ambiguity seems to cause no confusion.

54. "A Brief Account of Early and Present Day Christian Communal Living", date and place of publication unknown. This is a pamphlet published by the Hutterite Brethren.
55. Joseph J. Kleinsasser, The Hutterian Brethren of Montana (Milford Colony, August, Montana, 1963), pp. 4-5.
56. Andreas Ehrenpreis, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
57. Joseph J. Kleinsasser, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
58. See Robert Friedman, Hutterite Studies (Scottsdale: Herald Press, 1961), p. 99.
59. See Bryan R. Wilson, "An Analysis of Sect Development", American Sociological Review, Vol. 24, 1959, pp. 3-15.
60. Peter Rideman, op. cit., pp. 126-7.
61. Klassen argues that one factor which could account for the survival of the Hutterites is their expertise as farmers. He argues that it is not so much prosperity, per se, which has led to their perpetuation, but rather the toleration which governments were willing to grant a group which, despite their dissident views, were willing and able to bolster the economy of the host society. See Peter J. Klassen, The Economics of Anabaptism (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964), pp. 106-13.
62. The exact number of acres owned by Manitoba Hutterites was obtained from the land assessment rolls in the Provincial Municipal Assessment Branch of the Department of Municipal Affairs located in Winnipeg. A similar procedure was attempted for the American Hutterites, but was only partially successful. The land assessment lists for the various counties were not located in a central location, but could be found only at local county court houses. The state of the land assessment lists varied enormously from county to county, as did the cooperation of local officials. As a consequence, I was unable to get adequate information on acreage and land assessment

for 10 American colonies. I typically compared information given to me by Hutterites with the assessment records. However, since I was unable to visit every colony, I was forced on several occasions to be satisfied with estimates given to me by Hutterites from other colonies. The South Dakota State University Rural Sociology Department was also useful in providing some estimates.

63. John Bennett, op. cit., pp. 178.
64. Ibid., pp. 239-41.
65. Manitoba Department of Agriculture, Manitoba Agriculture: 1971 Yearbook (Winnipeg, Man.: Queen's Printer, 1971), pp. 32-33.
66. Marvin P. Riley, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
67. See John W. Bennett, op. cit., p. 186.
68. Older colonies produce daughter colonies in a shorter time period than younger colonies, because they become increasingly able to shorten the recovery period.
69. For example, internal strife has kept population of two colonies very low. See above for the discussion of Interlake and Forest River colonies.
70. See, James S. Frideres, "The Death of Hutterite Culture", Phylon, Vol. 33, No. 3, Fall, 1972, pp. 260-5.
71. The Leut 'bishop' or 'Älteste' is "primus inter pares" among the colony preachers. He is elected to the position by the members of the Leut Council. The Leut Council consists of two representatives from each colony in the Leut (usually the preacher and the assistant preacher). The Leut 'bishop', the assistant bishop, and the secretary from each represent the Leut at the Hutterian Brethren Council. This nine member council (three members representing each Leut) elects a Senior Elder, an Assistant Senior Elder, and a secretary-treasurer from its own membership. This body has the responsibility of representing the interests of the entire Hutterite Church. The Leut 'bishops' represent the interests of their particular Leut. When the Leut 'bishop' oversees a colony election he is accompanied by the Council

member which he feels should be invited. This invitation is usually restricted to those Leut Council members who are familiar with the participants in the colony election. This usually includes those preachers who are in the same clan as the colony in question, but it may also include preachers from adjacent colonies.

72. Peter Rideman, op. cit., p. 80.
73. The occupation of shoemaker was dealt a serere blow with the introduction of tractors on the Hutterite colonies. The shoemaker had previously been responsible for the manufacture and repair of harness. The shoemaker has now been reduced to repairing shoes and binding books. Today shoemakers are typically older than other departmental heads. The entire occupation will likely disappear with their death. The blacksmith has not been similarly affected by the change from horses to tractors. The blacksmith was able to adapt by becoming the community welder.
74. See, for example, the description of this category of worker in Eva Rosenfeld, "Social Stratification in a 'Classless' Society", American Sociological Review, Vol. 16, December, 1951, p. 770. Today many of these unskilled, moveable workers have tended to be non-kibbutzniks. The Hutterites, on the other hand, have strictly prohibited the employment of outside labourers.
75. For a more detailed discussion of the status of woen in Hutterite colonies, see, John A. Hostetler and Gertrude E. Huntington, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
76. Peter Rideman, op. cit., p. 98.
77. There may be variations between leute in the number of occupational positions found within a colony. Frideres reports that 20 positions can be found on Alberta colonies. See, James S. Frideres, op. cit., p. 262.
78. The dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents (15 years of age and under and over 65) to the economically active.
79. For men baptism takes place between the age of 21 and 26. The average age of marriage for men is about 24.



80. Karl Peter, "The Dynamics of Open Social Systems" in Social Process and Institution: The Canadian Case, ed. by James E. Gallagher and Ronald D. Lambert (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 170.
81. Samuel A. Stouffer, et. al., The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, Vol. I, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949) chps. 6-7.
82. See Marlene Mackie, "The Defector From the Hutterite Colony" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Calgary, 1965).
83. Ibid., p. 265.
84. Ibid., p. 265.
85. These acts are described in Morris Davis and Joseph Krauter, The Other Canadians: Profiles of Six Minorities (Toronto: Methuen, 1971), pp. 93-95.
86. Stanley H. Udy, Jr., Organization of Work (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1959), pp. 37-38.
87. It has become traditional for Hutterites to oppose industrialization and insist that the only legitimate occupation is one based on agriculture. However, many Hutterites were at one time craftsmen who were engaged in the production of pottery, glassware, and cutlery. It is not clear why these crafts were discontinued. Klassen offers the explanation that the Hutterites made a virtue out of necessity by renouncing non-agrarian occupations. When persecution drove the Hutterites from the urban centres into the rural regions, they elevated the virtues of those agrarian tasks which they were forced to take up. See, Peter James Klassen, op. cit., p. 83.
88. See, David Barkin and John W. Bennett, "Kibbutz and Colony: Collective Economies and the Outside World", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 14, No. 4, Sept. 1972, pp. 456-82.
89. Ibid., p. 473.

90. The nuptial fertility rate is the number of births per year per 1000 married women of specific ages. Eaton and Mayer's estimates of the Hutterite nuptial fertility rate is as follows:

<u>Age of Women</u>	<u>Nuptial Fertility Rate</u>
15-19	92.31
20-24	336.42
25-29	498.22
30-34	442.76
35-39	370.24
40-44	215.06
45-49	43.24

Joseph W. Eaton and Albert J. Mayers, op. cit., p. 221.

91. John A Hostetler and Gertrude E. Huntington, op. cit., p. 105.
92. Relevant occupational and genealogical information could only be obtained for a maximum of three ascending generations in the patrilineage of the family heads and their wives. Data were not available for Hutterites who died prior to the North American immigration.
93. Paul S. Gross, op. cit., p. 62.
94. Karl Peter goes further than this when he states that the family has no official existence in the Hutterian social structure. See, Karl Peter, op. cit., 1967, p. 101.
95. Lee Emerson Deets, The Hutterites: A Study in Social Cohesion (Gettysburg: Times and News Publishing Co., 1939), p. 35.

### Chapter III

#### Inter-generational Mobility Among the Hutterites

In this chapter, the type of analysis which was applied to the 'dying colony' will be extended to the entire leut. The 'dying colony' represents an extreme type within the federation of colonies. As a general type they are characterized by their poverty, a slow rate of population growth, delayed colony fissioning, a high defection rate, and considerable inequality of opportunity between elite and non-elite families. It should go without saying that wealthy colonies with a rapid population growth, a fast rate of colony fissioning, and a low defection rate can be found at the opposite pole of the continuum. What is not clear at this point is whether the life chances of an individual in this latter type of colony are closely linked to the status of his family or relatively independent of his family's status. Although it is clear that dynasties occur on certain colonies, it is not yet clear how extensive they are or under what conditions they appear. In this chapter and in the following chapter, the extent to which dynasties have formed within the entire leut and the variations in kinship related inequalities of opportunity between colonies will be dealt with.

The data pertaining to dynasty formation among the Schmiedeleut sub-sect was taken from collected genealogies.

The primary source for this genealogical data was the colony record book which is kept by the colony's preacher. One of the preacher's duties is to record all births, deaths, marriages, and baptisms that occur while he holds office. Many preachers also record all conversions, excommunications, and defections which occur within their colony. The following is a typical entry in the preacher's record book:<sup>1</sup>

George D. Gross

Preacher

b. April 7, 1913 Maxwell Colony  
married Elizabeth Wipf of Rosedale  
Colony on Feb. 17, 1935

Children:

Elizabeth

b. April 10, 1936  
baptized Sept. 23, 1960  
married to Eli Waldner of Rosedale  
Colony on Feb. 10, 1961

Justina

b. March 8, 1938  
baptized Jan. 7, 1962  
married John Gross on March 4, 1962

etc.

The language richness, and legibility of this record varied from preacher to preacher. Some preachers included extensive information concerning parents and grandparents of current members while others included only the vital statistics of

the present membership. It is perhaps of peripheral interest to note that some preachers regarded the keeping of genealogies as a spiritual duty while others felt that it was a more utilitarian task. The former often kept the genealogies in the Bible, whereas the latter occasionally used spare cattle pedigrees.

In 1956, the geneticist, Dr. Arthur Steinberg of Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio, collected genealogies for selected families known to have genetic defects. He kindly gave me permission to use his data. It should be noted that the Steinberg collection had by 1970 been incorporated by the Hutterites into their own records, making it impossible to decide whether much of the information had been recorded by the Hutterites or simply copied from Steinberg's collection.

A third source of genealogical material was a set of family histories put together by Jacob Kleinsasser, the preacher at Crystal Spring Colony. As a service to the colony and as a hobby, Kleinsasser had taken special interest in the 19th century family histories of the Hutterites.<sup>2</sup> Using these three genealogical sources, I was able to put together a comprehensive genealogy of the Schmiedeleut subsect which extended over as many as six generations.<sup>3</sup>

The above mentioned genealogical collections were somewhat inadequate in one crucial area: namely, the occupational positions of the individuals were not always recorded. Therefore, it was necessary to obtain this information directly from colony records or by means of personal interviews with colony members. Unfortunately, I was not able to visit every Schmiedeleut colony in the time which I had available. Of the 77 colonies (and 6 farms) which existed in 1970, I was only able to collect detailed occupational data from 51. Since the occupational and political positions held by a member was a pivotal variable in this analysis, this chapter will focus only on those 51 colonies from which I was able to collect adequate data.

Since the sample consists of 2/3 of the total population, it is sufficiently large for questions of non-representativeness not to arise. In addition, the sample is only biased in the sense that the majority of colonies which were not included were located in two geographical locations - north-eastern South Dakota and south-western Manitoba. It is unlikely that this geographical bias could seriously distort the results.

In 1970, there were 5319 people on the 51 colonies surveyed. Of these, 639 were male occupation holders thirty years of age or over. I was able to collect useful occupa-

tional data on 1037 males, of these 398 had died between the dates of 1874 and 1970. The 1037 adult male occupation holders which will be examined in this chapter are distributed over six generations, with the earliest birth date being 1798 and the latest being 1940. The reason males who were born after 1940 were not included was because they were either children or adolescents who did not hold occupations, or young male adults whose occupational careers had not as yet stabilized.

Eleven occupational positions were considered to be the basic number of occupations within the Hutterite colonies. As noted in Chapter 2, as many as eighteen occupations can be found on large colonies; however, I decided to limit the number to eleven for the following reasons. 1) Some occupations occurred so infrequently that their inclusion was not warranted. These occupations were nearly always held by individuals who held a more important position as well. When this occurred the individual in question was listed under his dominant occupation. 2) Many occupations are subspecialties of a core occupation. For example, the generic occupation 'poultry man' was often subdivided into 'turkey man', 'geese man', 'chicken man', 'duck man', and 'egg man'. Similarly, the occupation 'cattle man' could be subdivided into dairying and stock raising. I found it necessary to

disregard these sub-specialties because the colony records often did not distinguish between them. In addition, one man often held two or more of these sub-specialty occupations with no one sub-specialty being clearly dominant. 3) A somewhat arbitrary decision was made to list 'hog man' and 'sheep man' together. The occupation 'sheep man' did not occur with sufficient frequency to justify a separate classification, yet when it did occur it was often a dominant occupation. 4) The occupation 'assistant preacher' was listed with 'preacher' because the former occupation is usually temporary. Most 'assistant preachers' live to become 'full preachers' unless they are seriously delinquent. The following is the list of core occupations which was ultimately arrived at:

1. Preacher
2. Colony Manager
3. Farm Boss
4. German Teacher
5. Cattle Man
6. Hog Man and Sheep Man
7. Poultry Man
8. Mechanic
9. Carpenter
10. Shoemaker and Bookbinder
11. Gardener



Precise occupational classification was difficult in those cases where an individual held multiple occupations with no one role being clearly dominant. This problem could usually be resolved by examining the individuals entire occupational career. Individuals often take on multiple roles in small colonies which have just divided. As the colony develops, the individual will usually shed all but one occupation. The most serious problem was presented by young men in the present generation whose occupational careers had just begun. If these men performed multiple roles in a newly created colony, it was impossible to determine which occupation would be their final one. In these cases, I was forced to rely upon self-report. Occasionally men would switch occupations. When this occurred I simply classified the individual under his final occupation. Since most of the occupational switching took place between the ages of twenty and thirty, and only rarely during middle age, I was able to avoid much of the problem by considering only those individuals who were thirty years of age or over.

The 1037 males in our sub-population are distributed over the eleven occupational categories in the following manner.

Table 3.1Frequency Distribution of Hutterite Malesin Occupations

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Frequencies</u>	<u>Percentages</u>
1. Preacher	157	15.14
2. Colony Manager	74	7.13
3. Farm Boss	54	5.21
4. German Teacher	49	4.72
5. Cattle Man	110	10.61
6. Hog Man and Sheep Man	121	11.68
7. Poultry Man	148	14.27
8. Mechanic	112	10.80
9. Carpenter	81	7.81
10. Shoemaker and Bookbinder	52	5.01
11. Gardener	62	5.98
12. No Occupation	<u>17</u>	<u>1.64</u>
TOTAL	1037	100.00

The largest occupational categories in Table 3.1, with the exception of the mechanic, are occupations which consist of two or more sub-specialties. The number of mechanics was greater than expected, but this can no doubt be accounted for by the highly mechanized nature of the Hutterite colony. The small number of colony managers is a result of not combining

this occupation with that of farm boss. Although most farm bosses become colony managers, the position of farm boss was preserved as a separate category because succession is by no means a certainty as is the case with the assistant manager.

Most of the men who do not hold occupations are between the ages of thirty and forty (See Table 3.2). There are no cases of men in this sub-population who died or retired without holding an occupation, although an occupation was only acquired during middle age in several cases.

Table 3.2 also reveals that in each age cohort except for those born between 1931 and 1940, an average of 36.75% of the men held elite positions. This is not surprising since one-third of all occupational positions are elite positions and these positions are nearly always filled, whereas many non-elite positions are not represented on many colonies. It was somewhat surprising, however, to find that only 7.97% of the 1931. to 1940 age cohort held the positions of preacher, assistant preacher, colony manager, and farm boss. This would seem to suggest that at present, those who hold elite positions tend to be older than those who hold non-elite positions. Traditionally, young men have held the positions of assistant preacher and farm boss, while their older brethren have been the preachers and colony managers. This procedure has facilitated elite succession by permitting

Table 3.2

Occupational Distribution by Age Cohort

Age Cohorts (year of birth)

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>pre-1870</u>	<u>1871-80</u>	<u>1881-90</u>	<u>1891-00</u>	<u>1901-10</u>	<u>1911-20</u>	<u>1921-30</u>	<u>1931-40</u>
Preacher	17(23.61)	11(22.91)	17(28.81)	23(31.08)	24(20.69)	27(17.20)	29(12.34)	9( 3.26)
C. Manager	9(12.50)	4( 8.33)	3( 5.08)	8(10.82)	11( 9.48)	14( 8.92)	16( 6.81)	9( 3.26)
Farm Boss	2( 2.78)	1( 2.08)	2( 3.39)	5( 6.76)	9( 7.76)	13( 8.28)	18( 7.66)	4( 1.45)
G. Teacher	10(13.89)	2( 4.17)	2( 3.39)	2( 2.70)	4( 3.45)	9( 5.73)	11( 4.68)	9( 3.27)
Cattle Man	4( 5.56)	4( 8.33)	8(13.56)	5( 6.76)	15(12.93)	11( 7.01)	24(10.21)	39(14.13)
Hog Man	5( 6.95)	4( 8.33)	10(16.95)	7( 9.46)	13(11.21)	12( 7.64)	23( 9.79)	47(17.03)
Poultry Man	6( 8.33)	6(12.51)	4(6.79)	10(13.51)	11( 9.48)	20(19.74)	33(14.04)	58(21.01)
Mechanic	6( 8.33)	5(10.42)	3( 5.08)	7( 9.46)	11( 9.48)	16(10.19)	24(10.21)	40(14.49)
Carpenter	4( 5.55)	4( 8.33)	3( 5.08)	3( 4.05)	6( 5.17)	9( 5.73)	23( 9.79)	29(10.51)
Shoemaker	7( 9.72)	5(10.42)	4( 6.79)	2( 2.70)	5( 4.32)	7( 4.46)	16( 6.81)	6( 2.17)
Gardener	2( 2.78)	2( 4.17)	3( 5.08)	2( 2.70)	7( 6.03)	19(12.10)	16( 6.81)	11( 3.99)
No Occupation	<u>0( 0.00)</u>	<u>0( 0.00)</u>	<u>0( 0.00)</u>	<u>0( 0.00)</u>	<u>0( 0.00)</u>	<u>0( 0.00)</u>	<u>2( 0.85)</u>	<u>15( 5.43)</u>
TOTAL	72(100%)	48(100%)	59(100%)	74(100%)	116(100%)	157(100%)	235(100%)	276(100%)

young men to apprentice for the positions of preacher and colony manager. However, this is clearly not occurring at the present time. It may be necessary in the near future for Hutterite colonies to fill elite positions by shifting men directly from non-elite positions. Unfortunately, since precise data on intragenerational occupational mobility was not available, further elaboration on this point is not possible.<sup>4</sup>

#### Intergenerational Occupational Mobility

The central topic of this chapter is intergenerational occupational mobility or the status change which sons undergo relative to their fathers' occupational position. Societies can be seen to range along a continuum of two polar opposite type of mobility patterns. a) On one extreme is the society where all males regardless of their fathers' occupation have an equal probability of occupying any of the occupational positions within the society. In such a society, an individual's life chances are independent of his family's status. These 'open' societies with a high degree of equality of opportunity are said to have 'perfect mobility' patterns.<sup>5</sup> b) At the other pole we find those societies in which all males inherit the positions occupied by their fathers. In such a society the life chances of an individual are closely

linked to the status of his family. These 'closed' societies are said to be characterized by 'mobility inertia'.<sup>6</sup>

All societies fall somewhere in between these two extremes. The extremes correspond to ideal-types which actual societies approach to varying degrees. In Table 3.3, the intergenerational occupational mobility transition matrix for the Schmiedeleut sub-population of male occupation holders is presented in terms of absolute frequencies. In this matrix, the two elite apprenticeship positions of assistant preacher and farm boss were combined with the positions preacher and colony manager respectively. Although this was done to simplify the analysis, the transition matrices in which the positions of assistant preacher and farm manager are preserved can be found in Appendix C. In addition, 63 men were excluded from the analysis. 17 of these men were excluded because they did not as yet hold occupations. The remaining 46 men do not appear in the matrix because their fathers' had no known occupation. This matrix deals only with the occupational mobility of sons whose fathers' occupation is known. These 46 men were either converts whose fathers were not Hutterites or the offspring of men whose fathers had died prior to the 1874 immigration to North America.

Table 3.3 contains absolute frequencies and for this reason it is not particularly useful for making internal comparisons. However, Table 3.4 which expresses the same information in terms of percentages allows such comparisons to be made. If Hutterian society were characterized by mobility inertia (a strong tendency for sons to enter the same occupational categories as their fathers) then we would expect the highest percentages in the matrix to be found on the major diagonal. However, this is clearly not the case. In only 3 of the 10 occupational categories do we find higher percentages on the diagonal than elsewhere. In one spectacular case: namely, the German teacher, we find that not a single German teacher inherited his position from his father.

This is much more clearly illustrated in Table 3.5 which presents the data in terms of indices of association.<sup>7</sup> The index of association measures the degree to which intergenerational mobility exceeds or falls short of what might be expected by chance. The index of association is simply the ratio of observed frequencies to the frequencies expected on the basis of statistical independence. The bottom row in Table 3.4 represents the percentage distribution of the 974 male Hutterites in the 10 occupational categories. This percentage distribution serves as a standard against which all percentages in the body of the table are compared. For

example,

$$\frac{\% \text{ of the sons of carpenters who became shoemakers}}{\text{Total \% of sons who became shoemakers}} = \frac{2.4\%}{4.3\%} = .55$$

Table 3.3

Mobility From Father's Occupation For 974 Male

Occupation Holders: Absolute Frequencies.

<u>Father's Occupation</u>	<u>Son's Occupation</u>										Row Total
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	
1.	70	57	21	34	31	37	19	14	12	20	315
2.	34	27	11	24	19	21	15	14	7	3	175
3.	15	8	0	1	8	9	3	5	3	8	60
4.	7	4	2	18	10	9	14	9	1	2	76
5.	12	7	2	13	17	8	8	7	13	8	95
6.	6	11	3	9	9	23	7	7	1	6	82
7.	5	0	0	2	8	14	16	7	2	2	56
8.	2	4	0	1	8	7	10	4	1	5	42
9.	3	2	5	5	5	11	9	2	1	0	43
10.	1	3	3	2	3	4	5	5	1	3	30
Col. Total	155	123	47	109	118	143	106	74	42	57	974

(1.= preacher and assistant preacher, 2. = colony manager and farm boss, 3. = German teacher, 4. = cattle man, 5. = hog man and sheep man, 6. = poultry man, 7. = mechanic, 8. = carpenter, 9. = shoemaker and bookbinder, 10. = gardener)




Table 3.4Mobility From Father's Occupation For 974 MaleOccupation Holders: Percentaged By Row.Son's Occupation

<u>Fa's</u> <u>Occ.</u>	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	Total
1.	22.2	18.1	6.7	10.8	9.8	11.8	6.0	4.4	3.8	6.4	100.0
2.	19.4	15.4	6.3	13.7	10.9	12.0	8.6	8.0	4.0	1.7	100.0
3.	25.0	13.3	0.0	1.7	13.3	15.0	5.0	8.3	5.0	13.3	100.0
4.	9.2	5.3	2.6	23.9	13.2	11.8	18.4	11.8	1.3	2.6	100.0
5.	12.6	7.4	2.1	13.7	17.9	8.4	8.4	7.4	13.7	8.4	100.0
6.	7.3	13.4	3.7	11.0	11.0	28.1	8.5	8.5	1.2	7.3	100.0
7.	8.9	0.0	0.0	3.6	14.3	25.0	28.6	12.5	3.6	3.6	100.0
8.	4.8	9.5	0.0	2.4	19.1	16.7	23.8	9.5	2.4	11.9	100.0
9.	7.0	4.7	11.6	11.6	11.6	25.6	20.9	4.7	2.3	0.0	100.0
10.	3.3	10.0	10.0	6.7	10.0	13.3	16.7	16.7	3.3	10.0	100.0
Total											
%	15.9	12.6	4.8	11.2	12.1	14.7	10.9	7.6	4.3	5.9	100.0

Table 3.5Mobility From Father's Occupation For 974 MaleOccupation Holders: Ratios of Observed FrequenciesTo Frequencies Expected Under TheAssumption of Independence.Son's Occupation

<u>Fa's</u> <u>Occ.</u>	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1.	<u>1.40</u>	<u>1.43</u>	<u>1.38</u>	.96	.81	.80	.55	.59	.88	<u>1.09</u>
2.	<u>1.22</u>	<u>1.22</u>	<u>1.30</u>	<u>1.23</u>	.90	.82	.79	<u>1.05</u>	.93	.29
3.	<u>1.57</u>	<u>1.06</u>	.00	.15	1.10	<u>1.02</u>	.46	<u>1.10</u>	<u>1.16</u>	<u>2.38</u>
4.	.58	.42	.55	<u>2.12</u>	<u>1.09</u>	.81	<u>1.69</u>	<u>1.56</u>	.31	.45
5.	.79	.58	.44	<u>1.22</u>	<u>1.48</u>	.57	.77	.97	<u>3.17</u>	<u>1.44</u>
6.	.46	<u>1.06</u>	.76	.98	.91	<u>1.91</u>	.78	<u>1.12</u>	.28	<u>1.25</u>
7.	.56	.00	.00	.32	<u>1.18</u>	<u>1.70</u>	<u>2.63</u>	<u>1.65</u>	.83	.61
8.	.30	.75	.00	.21	<u>1.57</u>	<u>1.14</u>	<u>2.19</u>	<u>1.26</u>	.55	<u>2.03</u>
9.	.44	.37	<u>2.41</u>	<u>1.04</u>	.96	<u>1.74</u>	<u>1.92</u>	.61	.54	.00
10.	.21	.79	<u>2.07</u>	.60	.83	.91	<u>1.53</u>	<u>2.19</u>	.77	<u>1.71</u>

Diagram 3.1Selected Sub-Matrices of the Transition Matrix

		Son's Occupation									
Father's Occupation		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	1			B							
	2										
	3	A									
	4										
	5										
	6										
	7										
	8										
	9										
	10										

1. Major Diagonal (from top left to bottom right)
2. Elite Sub-matrix (shaded sub-matrix)
3. Upwardly Mobile Sub-matrix (A)
4. Downwardly Mobile Sub-matrix (B)
5. Stationary Non-elite Sub-matrix (C)
6. Diagonal of Non-elite (major diagonal excluding shaded cells)

An index of association value of 1.00 indicates that the observed mobility equals that expected on the basis of chance. If all of the cell entries in Table 3.5 were 1.00, then Hutterian society would be an example of a society with perfect mobility; however, this is clearly not the case either. In order to help the reader to intuitively grasp the significance of Table 3.5, all cell entries which exceed the expected frequencies are underlined.

Since a visual examination of the transition matrix does not tell us whether Hutterian society more closely fits the inertia or perfect mobility models, it will be necessary to use statistical procedures. In a society typified by complete mobility inertia in which sons always entered their father's occupation, the mean of the indices of association on the major diagonal would be 10.00.<sup>8</sup> If on the other hand, sons were no more likely to enter their father's occupation than any of the other available occupations, then the mean of the indices of association on the major diagonal would be 1.00. The observed mean of the indices of association on the major diagonal is 1.425. By using the Student's t test as a test of significance, the observed mean was found not to depart significantly from the expected mean of 1.00.<sup>9</sup> (See, Table 3.6)

In general, occupations in Hutterian society are not passed down from father to son. Although comparisons between Hutterian society and larger industrial societies can be misleading, it is interesting to note that there is a greater tendency for sons to inherit their father's occupation in American society than in the supposedly tradition oriented Hutterian society. The mean of the indices of association of the major diagonal of the intergenerational occupational mobility table reported by Blau and Duncan is 3.12.<sup>10</sup> This

Table 3.6Means, Standard Deviations, and Tests of Significance forSelected Subsets of Indices of Association inTable 3.5

<u>Subset*</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>	<u>Student's t</u>
1. Major Diagonal	1.425	.716	1.781
2. Elite Sub-matrix	1.318	.098	5.647**
3. Upwardly Mobile			
Sub-matrix	.622	.370	-3.959**
4. Downwardly Mobile			
Sub-matrix	.898	.272	-1.450
5. Stationary Non-elite			
Sub-matrix	1.118	.701	1.341
6. Diagonal of			
Non-elite	1.454	.797	1.508

\* See Diagram 3.1

\*\* The means of sub-matrices 2 and 3 were found to depart significantly from the expected mean of 1.00. The Student's t test was significant beyond the .01 level on a one-tailed test of significance. In all other cases the results were not significant at the .05 level of significance.

finding, of course, does not suggest that Hutterian society has greater equality of opportunity than American society. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Hutterian occupational structure is here interpreted as being divided into two distinct status

categories - the elite and non-elite occupations. The most salient status division is between these two categories not between the specific occupations. Since eight out of the ten occupations exist on the same status level, the apparent 'perfect' mobility of individuals in the occupational structure is primarily a free movement of individuals between situs positions rather than between status positions. Although the above analysis has shown that situs positions are not inherited, it has not yet been demonstrated that this is the case for status positions.

If we focus on the movement of people between elite status and non-elite status a different picture emerges. In Table 3.6, only two groups: namely, the sons of the elite who attained elite status and the sons of the non-elite who attained elite status, were found to have mobility rates which significantly departed from the rates expected in a 'perfect' mobility system. Whereas 38.37% of the sons of the elite retained elite status, only 18.60% of non-elite sons entered the elite. (See Table 3.7)

In other words, elite sons have a slightly higher than a 2 to 1 advantage over non-elite sons in obtaining elite positions.<sup>11</sup> This finding clearly supports the Machiavellian 'social mobility' hypothesis cited in Chapter 1, which states that the male offspring of the elite will have a higher

Table 3.7Mobility From Father's Status Position:Percentaged by Row

		Son's Status Position		
Father's		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Status	Elite	188 (38.37%)	302 (61.63%)	490 (100.00%)
Position	Non-Elite	90 (18.60%)	394 (81.40%)	484 (100.00%)
Total %		278 (28.54%)	696 (71.46%)	947 (100.00%)

probability of obtaining elite status than the male offspring of the non-elite. Of all non-elite position, only sons of the German teacher have an equal chance of entering the elite (38.33% of the sons of the German teacher entered the elite). Since the German teacher occupies a position which is intermediate between the elite and the non-elite, this finding is not altogether unexpected.

Clearly common ownership of the means of production and economic equality does not guarantee equality of opportunity. However, in fairness to the Marxian position, if it could be shown that the degree of inequality of opportunity were less in Hutterian society than in societies where private ownership of the means of production and inequalities in the distribution of wealth are the norm, then the Marxian hypothesis may not be

totally erroneous. However, even this much weaker position is not supported by the data. In Table 3.8, data presented by S. M. Miller on the differences between societies in the degree of inequality of opportunity, was compared to Hutterite data.<sup>12</sup> The results indicate that the degree of inequality of opportunity in Hutterian society does not differ significantly from that found in so-called 'capitalist' societies.

In one respect Hutterite mobility is highly fluid. 61.63% of the sons of the elite are downwardly mobile. This rate is much greater than in any of the societies recorded by S. M. Miller.<sup>13</sup> The Hutterite elite appears to be one which is difficult to enter but relatively easy to leave.

This extremely high rate of downward mobility is the result of an unusual demographic characteristic of the Hutterite population. 50.31% of all male offspring in our sub-population are the sons of the elite. The average number of male offspring per family appears to vary by occupation, as can be seen in Table 3.9.

Although I can offer only weak speculations for these differences between occupational groups, the consequences are obvious.<sup>15</sup> Instead of failing to reproduce itself, as the Machiavellians predict,<sup>16</sup> the elite has succeeded in producing a surplus of male offspring. The approximate percentage of occupation holders per colony who are elite

Table 3.8

Inter-societal Comparisons of the Degree  
of Inequality of Opportunity

Society	A	B	Index of Inequality (Ratio of A to B)
	Non-manual	Manual	
	into Non-manual	into Non-manual	
Denmark	63.2%	42.1%	2.62
Finland	76.0%	11.0%	6.91
France I	79.5%	30.1%	2.64
France II	73.1%	29.6%	2.47
Great Britain	57.9%	24.8%	2.34
Hungary	72.5%	14.5%	5.00
<u>Hutterites</u>	38.4%	15.8%	2.43
Italy	63.5%	8.5%	7.47
Japan	70.3%	23.7%	2.97
Netherlands	56.8%	19.6%	2.90
Norway	71.4%	23.2%	3.08
Sweden	72.3%	25.5%	2.84
USA I	80.3%	28.8%	2.79
USA II	77.4%	28.7%	2.70
West Germany	71.0%	20.0%	3.55



Table 3.9Mean Number of Male Offspring Per FamilyFor Occupational Groups

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Mean Number of Male Offspring Per Family</u> <sup>14</sup>
Preacher and	
Assistant Preacher	6.08
Colony Manager	
and Farm Boss	4.72
German Teacher	4.35
Cattle Man	2.66
Hog Man and Sheep Man	3.09
Poultry Man	2.27
Mechanic	2.37
Carpenter	1.93
Shoemaker and Bookbinder	4.15
Gardener	4.11

members range from a maximum of 40% on small colonies (4 out of 10 positions) to a minimum of 20% on large colonies (4 out of 18 positions). According to Table 3.1, 27.48% of all occupation holders are members of the elite. If we assume that this figure represents the approximate size of the elite, and if we also assume that no dramatic structural expansion or contraction in the size of the elite can take place given the

nature of Hutterite colony organization, then the elite will be unable to accommodate all of its male offspring. At least 22.83% (50.31%-27.48%) of the labour force must be downwardly mobile because of the excess of elite sons relative to elite positions. As long as the elite fails to control its birth rate, it will be unable to ensure elite status for its sons.

Within the elite itself, the preacher occupies a position considerably above the colony manager and farm boss. Yet the sons of the preacher are only slightly more likely to retain elite status than the sons of colony managers and farm bosses. Table 3.10 reveals that approximately 4 out of every 10 sons of preachers remain in the elite, while 3.5 sons of colony managers and farm bosses do so.

Table 3.10

Mobility of Elite Sons From Father's Occupational Position:

		<u>Percentaged by Row</u>		
		Son's Status Position		
		Elite	Non-elite	Total
Father's	Preacher	127 (40.31%)	188 (59.69%)	315 (100.00%)
Occupational	Colony			
Position	Manager	61	114	175
	& Farm	(34.86%)	(65.14%)	(100.00%)
	Boss			
Total		188 (38.36%)	302 (61.64%)	490 (100.00%)

Since the differences in mobility patterns between the two elite categories are extremely slight, the Marxian version of the Upper Stratum Mobility hypothesis cited in Chapter 1 receives support.

### Marital Mobility

Although Hutterite women probably work as hard as Hutterite men, they are prohibited from competing with men for occupational positions. With the possible exception of the head cook, women do not hold recognized occupational positions in Hutterian society. A women's status seems to be largely determined by the status position held by her husband, although some women may gain prestige for their large families. Just as in the case of intergenerational occupational mobility for males, two ideal type marital mobility models can be posited.

a) At one extreme is a society in which all women regardless of their fathers' status position have an equal probability of marrying husbands who hold any of the available occupations in the society. b) At the other extreme, we find societies in which daughters tend to marry husbands who occupy the same status positions as their fathers. In Tables 3.11 and 3.12 the marital mobility transition matrices of 980 Hutterite women are presented in terms of percentages and indices of association respectively. The means of the indices of association for selected sub-matrices within the larger matrix were

calculated as in Table 3.6.<sup>17</sup> None of these means were found to depart significantly from the expected mean of 1.00. In other words, with respect to occupational position, the Hutterite marital system seems to be characterized by random mating or panmixia.

However, when we collapse this matrix into a 2X2 table and thereby focus only on the movement of women between the elite and the non-elite, elite daughters are shown to have a slight advantage over non-elite daughters in contracting marriages with elite husbands. (See, table 3.13). The daughters of the elite have a 1.46 to 1 advantage over non-elite daughters in finding elite husbands. If we compare this to the advantage enjoyed by elite sons (table 3.7), we find that elite sons are far more likely to retain elite status than the daughters of the elite. This suggests that the elite exercises far greater control over the filling of occupational positions than over the arranging of marriages. Historically all marriages were arranged by the council of elders in consultation with the parents; however, this practice rapidly deteriorated after the North American immigration. At the present time Hutterites have unofficially come to accept the North American concept of 'romantic love'. Although the council of elders, the parents, and the colony as a whole still play a considerable part in influencing the

Table 3.11

Mobility From Father's Occupation to Husband's Occupation

For 980 Hutterite Women: Percentaged By Row.

<u>Fa's Occ.</u>	<u>Husband's Occupation</u>										Total
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	
1.	18.4	17.2	5.8	12.0	11.0	12.3	8.6	6.1	3.1	5.5	100.0
2.	21.7	8.7	5.0	12.4	13.0	10.6	11.2	7.5	6.2	3.7	100.0
3.	19.6	17.4	2.2	8.7	10.9	19.6	6.5	8.7	0.0	6.5	100.0
4.	7.7	9.0	5.1	16.7	12.8	15.4	18.0	7.7	2.6	5.1	100.0
5.	6.5	8.4	0.0	6.5	15.0	21.5	17.8	12.2	5.6	6.5	100.0
6.	12.8	14.9	4.3	8.5	13.8	14.9	9.6	4.3	5.3	11.7	100.0
7.	11.5	7.7	7.7	11.5	9.6	19.2	11.5	7.7	9.6	3.9	100.0
8.	16.7	11.1	0.0	8.3	11.1	25.0	11.1	16.7	0.0	0.0	100.0
9.	34.2	7.3	7.3	4.9	7.3	7.3	9.8	7.3	7.3	7.3	100.0
10.	2.6	10.3	5.1	12.8	18.0	15.4	15.4	5.1	7.7	7.7	100.0
Total %	15.9	12.6	4.6	10.9	12.2	14.6	11.3	7.6	4.5	5.8	100.0

choice of a marital partner, the final decision is now made by the couple after a period of courtship. Within the elite itself, the daughters of preachers only have a very slight advantage over the daughters of other elite members in remaining within the elite after marriage. (See, table 3.14.) The picture which emerges from this analysis of marital mobility is of a society where inequalities of opportunity exist among the women, but are in the main very slight. Neither the Machiavellian nor the Marxian hypothesis cited in Chapter I are confirmed in any dramatic way.

Table 3.12

Mobility From Father's Occupation to Husband's Occupation For  
980 Hutterite Women: Ratios of Observed Frequencies to Frequen-  
cies Expected Under the Assumption of Independence.

		<u>Husband's Occupation</u>								
<u>Fa's</u>										
<u>Occ.</u>	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1.	<u>1.16</u>	<u>1.37</u>	<u>1.27</u>	<u>1.10</u>	.90	.84	.76	.81	.68	.95
2.	<u>1.37</u>	.69	<u>1.08</u>	<u>1.14</u>	<u>1.07</u>	.72	.99	.99	<u>1.38</u>	.64
3.	<u>1.23</u>	<u>1.39</u>	.47	.80	.89	<u>1.34</u>	.58	<u>1.15</u>	0.00	<u>1.12</u>
4.	.48	.72	<u>1.12</u>	<u>1.53</u>	<u>1.05</u>	<u>1.05</u>	<u>1.59</u>	<u>1.02</u>	.57	.88
5.	.41	.67	0.00	.60	<u>1.22</u>	<u>1.47</u>	<u>1.57</u>	<u>1.61</u>	<u>1.25</u>	<u>1.13</u>
6.	.80	<u>1.19</u>	.93	.78	<u>1.13</u>	<u>1.02</u>	.85	.56	<u>1.19</u>	<u>2.01</u>
7.	.73	.61	<u>1.68</u>	<u>1.06</u>	.79	<u>1.32</u>	<u>1.02</u>	<u>1.02</u>	<u>2.14</u>	.66
8.	<u>1.05</u>	.89	0.00	.76	.91	<u>1.71</u>	.98	<u>2.21</u>	0.00	0.00
9.	<u>2.15</u>	.58	<u>1.59</u>	.45	.60	.50	.86	.97	<u>1.63</u>	<u>1.26</u>
10.	.16	.82	<u>1.12</u>	<u>1.17</u>	<u>1.47</u>	<u>1.05</u>	<u>1.36</u>	.68	<u>1.71</u>	<u>1.32</u>

Table 3.13Marital Mobility From Father's Status Position:Percentaged by Row

		Husband's Status Position		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status Position	<u>Elite</u>	165 (33.88%)	322 (66.12%)	487 (100.00%)
	<u>Non-elite</u>	114 (23.12%)	379 (76.88%)	493 (100.00%)
Total		279 (28.47%)	701 (71.88%)	980 (100.00%)

Table 3.14Marital Mobility of Elite Daughters From Father'sOccupational Position: Percentaged by Row

		Husband's Status Position		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Occupational Position	Preacher	116 (35.58%)	210 (64.42%)	326 (100.00%)
	Colony Manager & Farm Boss	49 (30.43%)	112 (69.57%)	161 (100.00%)
Total		165 (33.88%)	322 (66.12%)	487 (100.00%)

Even this slight degree of inequality disappears when we consider the tendency for elite daughters to marry elite sons. In Table 3.15, we find that the status position of the husband's father plays no role whatsoever in determining marital alliances. Although the daughters of the elite have a slight advantage over other women in securing husbands who are themselves members of the elite, the husband's father's status is irrelevant in this regard. In other words the husband's achieved status rather than his ascribed status is an important marital consideration to the elite daughter.

Table 3.15

Marital Mobility From Father's Status Position

to Father-in-laws Status Position:

Percentaged by Row

		<u>Husband's Father's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-Elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status Position	<u>Elite</u>	228 (49.28%)	233 (50.72%)	461 (100.00%)
	<u>Non-Elite</u>	229 (50.73%)	228 (49.27%)	457 (100.00%)
		<hr/>		
Total %		457 (49.77%)	461 (50.23%)	918 (100.00%)



Family Support

In a truly dynastic society the inheritance of elite positions flows not only from parents to offspring, but from more distant kinfolk as well. We would expect that a kinship group which contained a large number of elite members could more easily place a relative in the elite than a kinship group which had very few elite members. Of the kinfolk which were examined, only three were found to have a significant effect, either singularly or collectively, in determining the ultimate status position of ego.<sup>18</sup> These were ego's father, ego's father's father, and ego's father's father's father. In table 3.16, two types of elite fathers are compared: fathers who are the only elite representative in the male line and fathers whose father, paternal grandfather, or both are members of the elite. This table shows that ego is more likely to inherit elite status if his father descended from a line of elite members than if ego's father was the sole elite member in the line. The first type of elite father is designated in the table as an 'unconnected' father, and the second type is referred to as a 'connected' father.

Table 3.17 reveals that Hutterite men are more likely to become elite members if both their fathers and their paternal grandfathers are elite members themselves, than if

Table 3.16

Mobility From Connected and Unconnected Father's Status Position:

Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Son's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-Elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status Position	Connected	150 (40.98%)	216 (59.02%)	366 (100.00%)
	Unconnected	36 (30.00%)	84 (70.00%)	120 (100.00%)
<u>Elite</u>		92 (18.85%)	396 (81.15%)	488 (100.00%)
<u>Non-elite</u>				
Total		278 (28.54%)	696 (71.46%)	974 (100.00%)

their paternal grandfather but not their father held this status position. Taken together Tables 3.16 and 3.17 support the thesis that patrilineal relatives in combination are more likely to enhance an individuals chances of joining the elite than isolated elite relatives. This point is brought out even more strongly in Table 3.18 where individuals with an unbroken paternal line of elite members going back three generations are shown to have a distinct advantage over individuals whose patrilineage lacks one or more elite kin.

Table 3.17

Mobility From Paternal Grandfather's (FaFa) Status Position

With FaFa With Elite Fa Distinguished From FaFa

With Non-elite Fa: Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Grandson's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
FaFa's Status Position	Elite Son	104 (47.70%)	114 (52.30%)	218 (100.00%)
	Non-elite Son	26 (11.76%)	195 (88.24%)	221 (100.00%)
Non-elite		102 (24.06%)	322 (75.94%)	424 (100.00%)
<u>Total</u>		232 (26.88%)	631 (73.12%)	863 (100.00%)

Table 3.18Mobility From FaFaFa's Status Position With FaFaFa WithElite Fa And Elite FaFa Distinguished From FaFaFaWith Fa or FaFa or Both in Non-elite:Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Great Grandson's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
FaFaFa's	Elite Son and	35	36	71
	Elite Grandson	(49.39%)	(50.61%)	(100.00%)
Status	<u>Elite</u>			
Position	Non-elite Son,	29	181	210
	Grandson, or Both	(13.81%)	(86.19%)	(100.00%)
	<u>Non-elite</u>	53	234	287
		(18.46%)	(81.54%)	(100.00%)
<u>Total</u>		117	451	568
		(20.60%)	(79.40%)	(100.00%)

A well placed family may not only seek to bolster the mobility chances of male family members, but also their female offspring as well. Although, it has been previously shown in Table 3.13 that elite parentage confers only a slight advantage on a daughter with respect to the likelihood of marrying elite males, this advantage is somewhat increased if both the wife's father and paternal grandfather are members of the elite. The evidence for this assertion can be found in Table 3.19.

Table 3.19Marital Mobility From Connected and UnconnectedFather's Status Position:Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Husband's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status Position	Connected*	98 (40.00%)	147 (60.00%)	245 (100.00%)
	Unconnected	67 (27.68%)	175 (72.32%)	242 (100.00%)
<u>Non-elite</u>		114 (23.12%)	379 (76.88%)	493 (100.00%)
<u>Total</u>		279 (28.47%)	701 (71.53%)	980 (100.00%)

\* Connected Fathers refer to those elite fathers whose father is a member of the elite. Unconnected fathers refer to those fathers whose father is not a member of the elite.

The influence of a number of other relatives was examined: namely, the wife's MoFa, FaMoFa, and FaFaFa. The status positions held by these relatives either had no effect upon the marital advantage of the female or in one case produced a slight disadvantage.

### Defections

In Chapter II, it was reported that 133 men have defected from the Schmiedeleut colonies since 1890. These men are considered to be defectors because they have either died as a member of the host society or have been absent sufficiently long that their return is not anticipated. Males in their late teens and early twenties frequently go on what might be defined as unauthorized vacations. These men are not considered defectors because both their departure and subsequent return are considered normal behavior for that age group. I have only considered an individual to be a defector if his name has been stricken from the membership records of the colony.<sup>19</sup>

The author was able to ascertain the father's occupational status for 130 of the 133 defectors. The results are presented in Table 3.20.

Table 3.20

#### Father's Occupational Status For 130 Hutterite Defectors

<u>Father's Occupation</u>	<u>Number of Defectors</u>	<u>Defection Rate</u> <sup>20</sup>
Preacher	25	7.35
Colony Manager/Farm Boss	23	11.61
German Teacher	4	6.25
Cattle Man	16	17.38
Hog Man/Sheep Man	16	14.41
Poultry Man	14	14.58
Mechanic	10	15.15
Carpenter	8	16.00
Shoemaker	6	12.24
Gardener	8	21.05

The results in Table 3.20 reveal that in terms of absolute frequencies, the sons of preachers and colony managers/farm bosses are the two largest categories of defectors. However, this is somewhat misleading since there is a wide degree of variation in the total number of sons in each occupational category (Table 3.3). When the number of defecting was expressed as a percentage of the total number of sons in each occupational category, the sons of the non-elite were found to be more prone to defect than the sons of the elite. This held for all occupational categories except for the sons of the German teacher, which as we have already pointed out occupies an intermediate position between the elite and the non-elite.

Hostetler reports that out of a sample of 38 defectors, 11 were the sons of preachers and colony managers.<sup>21</sup> The percentage of defectors who were sons of the elite is somewhat less in Hostetler's sample than in mine (28.94% vs 36.92%). However, Hostetler did not confine his study to the Schmiedeleut population and in addition, he makes no claims about the representativeness of his sample. This finding lends support to the Machiavellian contention that the defection rate among the sons of the non-elite will be greater than among the elite sons.

Summary

The preceding analyses of occupational mobility, marital mobility, family support and defection rates have been more supportive of the Machiavellian thesis than the Marxian counter thesis cited in Chapter I. This is clearly illustrated by the following inventory of results.

Table 3.21Inventory of Results

<u>Hypotheses</u>	<u>Theory Supported</u>		
	<u>Machiavellian</u>	<u>Marxian</u>	<u>Neither</u>
1. Social Mobility	X		
2. Inter - marriage	X*		
3. Upper Stratum Mobility		X	
4. Upper Stratum Inter-marriage		X	
5. Family Support Social Mobility	X		
6. Family Support (Inter-marriage)	***	***	
7. Defection	X		
8. Differential Fertility			X

\* Although the results are somewhat ambiguous in the case of marital mobility, a chi-square test performed on table 3.13 was found to be statistically significant at the .001 level; consequently, the null hypothesis (Marxian Hypothesis) was rejected.

\*\* Neither the Machiavellian or the Marxian hypotheses could be rejected in the case of family support of marital mobility because some family members had the opposite effect of other relatives.



The major results so far can be summarized as follows:

1. Elite sons are more likely to become elite members than non-elite sons.
2. Elite sons who have a number of elite ancestors are more likely to become elite members than elite sons who lack this family support.
3. Elite daughters are slightly more likely to marry elite husbands than non-elite daughters.
4. No significant differences in the degree of inequality of opportunity exists between the offspring of the religious leaders (preacher) and the offspring of the administrative leaders (colony manager/farm boss).
5. The defection rate is greater among the offspring of the non-elite than among the offspring of the elite.
6. The fertility rate of the elite is greater than the fertility rate of the non-elite.

In Chapter IV, I will attempt to provide an explanation for these somewhat mixed results.

Footnotes

1. The names in this example have been altered in accordance with Hutterite wishes.
2. Future research in demography, kinship analysis, and population genetics on the Hutterite population will no doubt be streamlined by Kleinsasser's efforts. While I was carrying out my research Kleinsasser was attempting to integrate his own collection with the Steinberg collection. He had also persuaded the preachers on other Schmiedeleut colonies to send him annual reports of the births, deaths, and marriages of their respective colonies. Crystal Spring colony can now be considered the informal census bureau and genealogical bank of the Schmiedeleut sub-sect. Kleinsasser has also been instrumental in persuading the Lehrerleut sub-sect to gather their own genealogies and make them available to researchers. During 1970, a research unit under the direction of anthropologist, Hermann Bleibtreu at the University of Arizona, attempted to collect these genealogies. I am not aware of any publications which have resulted from this field work. Only the Dariusleut sub-sect has failed to keep useful genealogical records. However, Paul Gross, the preacher at the Dariusleut colony of Espanola in the state of Washington, was persuaded by Robert Friedmann, a respected scholar of Hutteriana, to act as informal census taker of Hutterite colonies. It appears that the Hutterites have resigned themselves to the fact that researchers find them an irresistible subject of study, and consequently are attempting to reduce much of the disruption which researchers inevitably cause, by carrying out their own data collection.
3. There were three major problems encountered in the integration of these three sources. a) The Steinberg collection used a complex numerical code to replace all proper names. This was found to be necessary because there are only twelve surnames presently in use among ethnic Hutterites within the Schmiedeleut group. In addition, only a small number of Christian names occur with any degree of regularity. Although I was later to adopt this code for computer purposes (See Appendix A), it was initially difficult to combine it with the other genealogical sources.  
 b) The records of one colony were not easily connected to the records of another colony. Although these records adequately provided information concerning consanguineal and affinal ties among colony members, they were often

inadequate as a record of these ties between members of different colonies. It was often very difficult to trace the movement of women who married out of the colony.

c) The Preachers' records were often misleading. Some of the more common difficulties were the following: failure to record defections, failure to record occupations, and a tendency to refer to individuals by their nicknames. These name changes occurred whenever there appeared to be an excess of individuals with the identical name. This practice only served to compound the problem rather than eliminate it.

4. The fact that many of the men in the 1931-40 age cohort have not completed their occupational careers creates a slight distortion in subsequent analyses of intergenerational mobility. The extent of downward mobility is no doubt overestimated and the extent of upward mobility underestimated. The reader should be aware of this type of distortion. This finding, however, does not weaken the main thrust of our analysis, which is to compare the relative advantages of elite sons over non-elite sons in attaining elite posts. The index of inequality (ratio of elite sons entering elite to non-elite sons entering the elite) for the 1931-40 age cohort is 2.36. This is only slightly higher than the index of inequality for all age cohorts (2.06). See, Table 3.7. The following intergenerational mobility table of the 1931-40 age cohort shows virtually the same degree of inequality of opportunity as in Table 3.7.

Mobility From Father's Status Position Within the  
1931-40 Age Cohort: Percentaged by Row.\*

		<u>Son's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Father's</u>		15	109	124
<u>Status</u>	<u>Elite</u>	(12.09%)	(87.91%)	(100.00%)
		7	130	137
<u>Position</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	( 5.11%)	(94.89%)	(100.00%)
		22	239	261
	<u>Total</u>	( 8.43%)	(91.57%)	(100.00%)

\* The 15 members of the 1931-40 age cohort who did not hold a position were excluded from this analysis.

5. See, David Glass, ed., Social Mobility in Britain (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954) p. 222.
6. Ibid., p. 219.
7. For a more detailed discussion on indices of association, see, Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, The American Occupational Structure (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967) pp. 35-6.
8. This would be the case if and only if all cell entries were concentrated on the major diagonal. The sum of all indices of association in a 10X10 matrix must always equal 100.00, no matter how individuals are distributed in the occupational structure. Therefore, if the 10 cells on the diagonal were filled and all others were empty, the mean of the indices of association for these 10 cells must equal 10.00.
9. Student's t tests are used in order to ascertain whether a significant difference exists between a sample mean and a population mean. Since the population mean for the indices of association in the matrix must by necessity be 1.00, I was able to determine by using the Student's t test whether the means of the indices of association of selected sub-matrices within the larger matrix significantly deviated from 1.00. See, Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960) pp. 144-9, for a discussion of the Student's t test.
10. Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, Op. cit., p. 32.
11. The relative advantage of elite sons over non-elite sons in attaining elite positions is  $\frac{38.37\%}{18.60\%}$  or  $\frac{2.06}{1.00}$ .
12. S. M. Miller, "Comparative Social Mobility" in Structured Social Inequality, ed. by Celia S. Heller (London: MacMillan Co., 1969), p. 330. I have not included data cited by Miller which was taken from mobility studies of particular cities. Miller's international data was not immediately comparable to my own because the various occupational structures were divided into manual and non-manual which was not identical to the elite and non-elite division which I have drawn in the case of the Hutterites. Although all elite occupations were non-manual, one non-elite occupation was also non-manual - the German teacher.

By including the German teacher within the same category as the preacher and the colony manager, my data was made more comparable to Miller's.

13. Ibid., p. 329.
14. The reader should interpret this table with a note of caution. The families referred to in this table may not be completed families, and therefore do not reflect the true size of Hutterite families. What this table does reflect is the relative contribution of each occupational group to male labour force.
15. The explanation which I favour runs as follows. Hutterites in general place a high value on having large families; however, the preacher seems to be in a better position to actualize this ideal. The only form of birth control commonly practiced by the Hutterite is late marriage. However, preachers tend to have more access to fertile wives than other occupational groups. The wives of preachers are on the average 7.39 years younger than their husbands; whereas for all other occupational groups the wives are only 1.68 years younger than their husbands. This does not occur because preachers' wives marry at a younger age than other wives, but because preachers tend, upon the death of their first wife, to marry young women. Remarriages in all other occupational groups tends to be between partners of similar age.
16. Not only is the differential fertility hypothesis of the Machiavellians clearly false, but the Marxian hypothesis cited in Chapter 1 must also be rejected.
17. Means, Standard Deviations, and Test of Significance for Selected Subsets of Indices of Association in Table 3.12.

	<u>Subset</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>S.D.</u>	<u>Student's t</u>
1.	Major Diagonal	1.227	.465	1.463
2.	Elite Sub-matrix	.977	.443	- .489
3.	Upwardly Mobile Sub-matrix	.866	.451	-1.149
4.	Downwardly Mobile Sub-matrix	.957	.204	- .809

5. Stationary Non-elite			
Sub-matrix	1.038	.495	.612
6. Diagonal of			
Non-elite	1.302	.478	1.673

None of the means of the sub-matrices were found to depart significantly from the expected mean of 1.00. In all cases the results were not significant at the .05 level using a one-tailed test of significance.

18. The following male consanguineal kin were found to have no independent effect upon ego's ultimate status position: ego's MoFa, Ego's FaMoFa, and ego's FaFaFaFa. Collateral relatives such as cousins, uncles, and great-uncles were not examined, only lineal relatives received attention in this analysis.
19. It should be noted that a few of those on unauthorized vacations have turned out to be permanent defectors and a few of those considered permanent defectors have surprised the colony by returning after a lengthy absence. The decision to strike an individual's name from the membership list and consider him to be a permanent defector is typically based on the person's attitude upon leaving the colony, the contents of letters sent by the individual to his relatives, and gossip concerning the individuals occupational and marital status in the host society. Individuals who marry a non-Hutterite or enter the host society's educational system are very quickly defined as permanent defectors.
20. The defection rate will be defined as the number of defectors per 100 sons in each occupational category.
21. See, John A. Hostetler and Gertrude Enders Huntington, The Hutterites in North America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967) pp. 105-6.

## Chapter IV

### Inter-colony Comparisons

Students of Hutterian society have paid scant attention to the existence of dynasties and hereditary leadership in the various histories and ethnographies of the Hutterites. Although the results of Chapter III make it abundantly clear that the status position ascribed to a person by his family plays a significant role in determining that person's life chances, this theme has been virtually ignored by previous researchers. Furthermore, the very existence of inequalities of opportunity and material condition is directly contrary to the stated belief system of the Hutterites.<sup>1</sup> Hutterite communities are intentional communities which are structured in such a way as to prevent inequalities of opportunity and material condition from developing. There is an eminently sensible sociological reason why this should be the case. By abolishing the institution of private property, the possibility of differential allocation of material and economic rewards ought to be absent. Elite or decision-making positions should not be any more attractive than non-elite positions since no greater incentive is offered to the occupants of elite positions.

Do the results in Chapter III show that previous researchers have inaccurately described Hutterite society and

that the Hutterites themselves have failed in their desire to eradicate inequalities of opportunity? The data which will be presented in this chapter will reveal that the 'normal' condition of Hutterite society is indeed equality of opportunity. It is only on those colonies which are regarded by the Hutterites to be malfunctioning do we find grave inequalities of both opportunity and material condition. These are usually the 'dying colonies' referred to in Chapter II. Previous sociological and anthropological studies have usually been based on observations of a small number of colonies. The researchers have usually selected what they regard as typical or normal colonies as their major source of information. There have been no studies which have focused on the 'dying colony' as a subject of study.

The 'dying colony' is not simply a colony in which the population ceases to expand; it is a colony which suffers from a complex of social pathologies.<sup>2</sup>

In Chapter II, one 'dying colony' (Millerdale) was examined and revealed the following characteristics: zero population growth, a high defection rate, a failure to produce a daughter colony, the demand for occupational positions greater than the supply, and a high degree of inequality of opportunity between the elite and the non-elite. To this list might be added three other characteristics which I observed in the course of my



field work: collective poverty, intra-colony conflict, and inequalities in the redistribution of material goods to colony members.

All Hutterite colonies have as their major organizational goal the accumulation of sufficient capital to purchase a fully operational daughter colony within 15 years. A number of factors prevent the 'dying colony' from carrying out this mission. 'Dying colonies' are frequently those colonies which have had the misfortune or lack of foresight to locate in undesirable areas. A number of environmental conditions frequently limit the ability of a colony to make a profit. Infertile soil, poor drainage, early frosts, drought, and excessive precipitation are some of the environmental conditions which prevent a colony from achieving its goal. Wealthy colonies which have located in favourable regions are typically able to afford a daughter colony before the population of the colony doubles.

Dying colonies and colonies which have problems approaching those of the dying colony are frequently disadvantaged by the mother colony. Dying colonies are often pre-mature colonies which were produced before population pressure made fission necessary. Although I have no hard data on this, my impression is that colonies which fission very rapidly often do so in order to solve family feuds within the colony. After colony

division, one faction will receive the daughter colony, while the other faction remains on the mother colony. These hasty colony divisions can often put the daughter colony at a permanent disadvantage. Often the mother colony can only afford to purchase very cheap marginal land, thus seriously preventing future economic success on the part of the daughter colony.

The economic growth of these colonies may be retarded to such an extent that they are forever unable to accumulate sufficient capital to afford a daughter colony. The 'normal' colony is able to maintain a relatively open opportunity structure not only because the creation of a daughter colony produces new openings, but also because the population is never allowed to reach the point where there are more men than positions. In poor colonies on the other hand, the inability to fission results in a closed opportunity structure where the number of men exceed the number of positions. On colonies where there is a scarcity of positions, favouritism and nepotism often become the rule. Families which hold influential elite positions hand positions down to their sons and the sons of the non-elite families receive those positions which are left over.

Internal conflict arises as a result of this favouritism. Suppressed families which are frustrated by the lack of

opportunities and their exclusion from positions of authority frequently search for such alternatives as defection and feuding. In some colonies an impermeable class-like system begins to emerge, with a particular family operating a virtual dictatorship. The faction in power can control the powerless faction by threatening to expel them from the church and by virtue of their control over the redistribution of material goods.

Although the Hutterite family is not an economic unit and cannot own private possessions, it can by capturing the leadership of a colony guarantee its own members preferred access to and usage of material goods. For example, only the members of the elite on a colony have cheque signing power which can be used to ameliorate the material conditions of their own family members at the expense of the non-elite families.<sup>3</sup> However, the ruling elite can only successfully exploit the non-elite if they have sufficient voting strength in the extended council to guarantee their continued tenure in office. Typically the exploiting families will only use their power to attain a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed by their brethren on wealthy colonies. I have not observed a case where the degree of inequality of material condition was severe. Nevertheless, the degree of relative deprivation appears to be sufficient to cause the non-elite to search for

alternatives to their present condition. Although defection is perhaps the major alternative, some men choose to marry and move to their wife's colony. Usually Hutterites operate in accordance with a patrilocal residence rule. Most men are reluctant to move to their wife's colony because they would have to give up the support of their immediate relatives who occupy positions of power in the authority hierarchy. However, if their immediate kin are completely lacking in power they have nothing to lose by switching colonies.

Although true dying colonies may be rare, a significant number of colonies range in between the dying colony and the normal colony. These colonies do not suffer from the same magnitude of problems as the dying colony, but they are frequently slow to fission because they have considerable difficulties in raising sufficient capital to purchase a daughter colony. In Tables 4.1 and 4.2, I have divided the colonies of the Schmiedeleut federation into two categories - those which fission more rapidly than the average and those which fission more slowly than the average. According to Table 2.2, the average fissioning time is 14.42 years. This figure will be taken as our cutting point. 29 colonies were found to fission more rapidly than the average and 13 colonies were found to fission more slowly than the average. The remaining 9 colonies had formed only recently and had not as yet

divided, thus they were not included in this analysis.

The results of these tables show that there is a substantial difference in the degree of inequality of opportunity between the two types of colonies. The index of inequality<sup>4</sup> of the rapidly dividing colonies was only 1.61, whereas it was 3.27 for those colonies which divide slowly. This means that the probability of elite sons in slowly dividing colonies entering the elite is twice as great as the probability of elite sons in rapidly dividing colonies attaining elite positions.

Eight colonies exhibited an unusual form of inequality, in which the sons of the non-elite had a slight advantage over elite sons in attaining elite status. The average fission time for these eight colonies was 13.19 years. The fission times for all eight colonies ranged between 11 and 15 years.

Table 4.1

Mobility From Father's Status Position in 29 Rapidly Dividing

Colonies: Percentaged By Row:

		<u>Son's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status	<u>Elite</u>	102 (35.91%)	182 (64.09%)	284 (100.00%)
	<u>Non-elite</u>	64 (22.29%)	223 (77.71%)	287 (100.00%)
	<u>Total</u>	166 (29.07%)	405 (70.93%)	571 (100.00%)

Table 4.2

Mobility From Father's Status Position In 13 Slowly Dividing Colonies: Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Son's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status Position	<u>Elite</u>	56 (42.42%)	76 (57.58%)	132 (100.00%)
	<u>Non-elite</u>	18 (12.95%)	121 (87.05%)	139 (100.00%)
	<u>Total</u>	74 (27.30%)	197 (72.70%)	271 (100.00%)

Only four colonies could be classed as true dying colonies, in as much as they had been in existence for over 20 years without ever dividing. In Table 4.3, the inequalities of opportunity in dying colonies are shown to be enormous. Only one non-elite son ever managed to become an elite member. The index of inequality for dying colonies is 11.49, which means that the sons of the elite have a 11½ to 1 advantage over the sons of the non-elite.

A somewhat unexpected finding was that those colonies which divided extremely rapidly (a fission time of 10 years or less) exhibited a greater degree of inequality than those colonies which had a fission time between 10 and 14.42 years. The evidence for this assertion can be found in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.

Table 4.3Mobility From Father's Status Position in Dying Colonies:Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Son's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status Position	<u>Elite</u>	17 (45.94%)	20 (54.06%)	37 (100.00%)
	<u>Non-elite</u>	1 (4.00%)	24 (96.00%)	25 (100.00%)
	<u>Total</u>	18 (29.03%)	44 (70.97%)	62 (100.00%)

Table 4.4Mobility From Father's Status Position In Colonies With Extremely Rapid Fission Times (Less Than 10 Years); Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Son's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status Position	<u>Elite</u>	17 (41.46%)	24 (58.54%)	41 (100.00%)
	<u>Non-elite</u>	4 (16.00%)	21 (84.00%)	25 (100.00%)
	<u>Total</u>	21 (31.82%)	45 (68.13%)	66 (100.00%)

Table 4.5Mobility From Father's Status Position In ColoniesWith 'Normal' Fission Times (Between 10 and 14.42 Years):Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Son's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status Position	<u>Elite</u>	85 (34.98%)	158 (65.02%)	243 (100.00%)
	<u>Non-elite</u>	60 (22.90%)	202 (77.10%)	262 (100.00%)
	<u>Total</u>	145 (28.71%)	360 (71.29%)	505 (100.00%)

The index of inequality in extremely rapidly dividing colonies is 2.59 compared to 1.52 in 'normal' colonies. These are the colonies which in all probability produce pre-mature daughter colonies. These colonies divide very rapidly not because they can afford to sooner than other colonies but because they wish to rid themselves of factional conflicts, even if this entails a great financial cost to both mother and daughter colonies. Presumably, some of the so-called 'normal' colonies may also shorten their fissioning time in order to avoid conflict between family alliances.

The author endeavored to ascertain the wealth level of the various colonies in the Schmiedeleut federation. Of the many indicators of colony wealth, per capita assessed value of



colony holdings was selected as the main measure of corporate wealth. This measure was used instead of per capita corporate income, because of the difficulties encountered in getting this information from all colonies.<sup>5</sup> In addition, as described in Chapter II, this measure is determined by the colony's stage in the growth cycle and thus is not particularly useful for purposes on inter-colony comparisons of level of wealth. However, except on recently formed colonies, the land, buildings, and equipment held by a colony do not vary with the growth cycle. A mature colony will replace old buildings and equipment and may even purchase an additional section of land, but most of the capital which a colony accumulates will be used to outfit a daughter colony. Since the size and value of land holdings will in large measure determine economic prospects in an agrarian society, it was not surprising to find that there was a high correlation between the wealth level of a colony and the rate of fissioning. (See, Table 4.6.) Poor colonies tend to delay fissioning until well after the average time period, whereas wealthy and middle range colonies are able to divide more rapidly.

It is important to note that the four 'pre-mature' colonies referred to in Table 4.4 appear in the bottom left cell of Table 4.6. Since the existence of these colonies makes the relationship between level of wealth and fissioning time slightly

Table 4.6Wealth Level of Colony by Fissioning Time<sup>6</sup>

<u>Wealth Level</u> <u>of Colony</u>	<u>Fissioning Time</u>		
	<u>Rapid</u>	<u>Slow</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Wealthy</u>	12	1	13
<u>Middle</u>	11	3	14
<u>Poor</u>	6	7	13
<u>Total</u>	29	11	40

Wealth level by fissioning time is significant beyond the .05 level by chi-square test with 2 d.f.

curvilinear, their exclusion from the analysis produces a relationship significant beyond the .001 level by a chi-square test.

Although both the 'dying colony' and the 'pre-mature colony' represent mutations of normal Hutterian community development, they are not likely to constitute a major threat to the Hutterite way of life. The 'dying colony' does not reproduce itself; therefore its influence is contained. Both the mother and daughter colonies of pre-mature divisions are likely to be poor and small in population. As we have shown in Chapter II, these initial disadvantages are likely to delay subsequent colony divisions. However, since the initial population was much

smaller than normal, this delay in fissioning does not create an over-sized colony and all of the subsequent problems which that entails. A 'pre-mature colony' simply takes a much longer period of time before the population reaches 140.

In light of the above findings, it was not surprising to find that poor colonies displayed greater inequalities of opportunity than did either wealthy or 'middle' colonies. The evidence for this can be found in Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9.

Table 4.7

Mobility From Father's Status Position in Wealthy Colonies:

Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Son's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status Position	<u>Elite</u>	47 (33.57%)	93 (66.43%)	140 (100.00%)
	<u>Non-elite</u>	30 (18.52%)	132 (81.48%)	162 (100.00%)
	<u>Total</u>	77 (25.50%)	225 (74.50%)	302 (100.00%)

Table 4.8Mobility From Father's Status Position in 'Middle' Colonies:Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Son's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status Position	<u>Elite</u>	66 (37.93%)	108 (62.07%)	174 (100.00%)
	<u>Non-elite</u>	35 (21.21%)	130 (78.79%)	165 (100.00%)
	<u>Total</u>	101 (29.79%)	238 (70.21%)	339 (100.00%)

Table 4.9Mobility From Father's Status Position in Poor Colonies:Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Son's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status Position	<u>Elite</u>	66 (44.30%)	83 (55.70%)	149 (100.00%)
	<u>Non-elite</u>	23 (17.69%)	107 (82.31%)	130 (100.00%)
	<u>Total</u>	89 (31.90%)	190 (68.10%)	279 (100.00%)

The indices of inequality for the wealthy, 'middle' and poor colonies were 1.81, 1.78, and 2.50 respectively. No significant differences existed between wealthy and 'middle' colonies. Both were significantly more equalitarian than poor colonies.

The differences in inequality of opportunity between wealthy and 'middle' colonies on the one hand, and poor colonies on the other, also exist for the women but to a lesser extent. See, Tables 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12. The indices of inequality are as follows: 'wealthy colonies (1.41), 'middle' colonies (1.26), and poor colonies (1.66) The reason why 'middle' colonies have a greater degree of equality than wealthy colonies cannot be explained by the foregoing analysis.

Table 4.10

Marital Mobility From Father's Status Position

in Wealthy Colonies: Percentaged By Row

		<u>Husband's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status Position	<u>Elite</u>	47 (29.75%)	111 (70.25%)	158 (100.00%)
	<u>Non-elite</u>	30 (20.98%)	113 (79.02%)	143 (100.00%)
	<u>Total</u>	77 (25.58%)	224 (74.42%)	301 (100.00%)

Table 4.11Marital Mobility From Father's Status Positionin 'Middle' Colonies: Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Husband's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status Position	<u>Elite</u>	50 (33.33%)	100 (66.67%)	150 (100.00%)
	<u>Non-elite</u>	50 (26.46%)	139 (73.54%)	189 (100.00%)
	<u>Total</u>	100 (29.50%)	239 (70.50%)	339 (100.00%)

Table 4.12Marital Mobility From Father's Status Positionin Poor Colonies: Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Husband's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Status Position	<u>Elite</u>	58 (38.93%)	91 (61.07%)	149 (100.00%)
	<u>Non-elite</u>	31 (23.48%)	101 (76.52%)	132 (100.00%)
	<u>Total</u>	89 (31.67%)	192 (68.33%)	281 (100.00%)

The differences between wealthy, 'middle', and poor colonies with respect to the degree of inequality of opportunity were found in other areas as well. In poor colonies, the presence of elite family relatives significantly increased the probability of elite sons entering the elite; whereas this was true to a far lesser extent in wealthy and 'middle' colonies. Similarly, elite family support played a greater role in poor colonies than in wealthy and 'middle' colonies in determining the marital opportunities of elite daughters. However, the efficacy of family support in the determination of elite standing was more pronounced in the case of males than females.

Similarly, there was little difference in the rate of defection between the elite and the non-elite in wealthy and 'middle' colonies, but in poor colonies defections occurred most heavily among the non-elite.

One finding will be reported here because it appears at first glance to be somewhat puzzling, and thus merits further discussion. Poor colonies have been characterized above as having a higher degree of inequality of opportunity between the elite and the non-elite than wealthy and 'middle' colonies; however, it appears that they can also be characterized as having less inequality of opportunity within the elite. See Tables 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15. In wealthy and 'middle' colonies the sons of preachers are more likely to inherit elite status

than the sons of colony managers and farm bosses. However, the reverse occurs in poor colonies. The indices of inequality between the two categories within the elite in wealthy, 'middle', and poor colonies are 1.42, 1.33, and 0.73 respectively.

Table 4.13

Mobility of Elite Sons From Father's Occupational  
Position In Wealthy Colonies: Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Son's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Occupational Position	Preacher	35 (37.23%)	59 (62.77%)	94 (100.00%)
	Colony Manager & Farm Boss	12 (26.09%)	34 (73.91%)	46 (100.00%)
	<u>Total</u>	47 (33.57%)	93 (66.43%)	140 (100.00%)

Table 4.14

Mobility of Elite Sons From Father's Occupational  
Position In 'Middle' Colonies: Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Son's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Occupational Position	Preacher	41 (42.70%)	55 (57.30%)	96 (100.00%)
	Colony Manager & Farm Boss	25 (32.05%)	53 (67.95%)	78 (100.00%)
	<u>Total</u>	66 (37.99%)	108 (62.01%)	174 (100.00%)



Table 4.15

Mobility of Elite Sons From Father's Occupational  
Position In Poor Colonies: Percentaged By Row.

		<u>Son's Status Position</u>		
		<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father's Occupational Position	Preacher	47 (40.87%)	68 (59.13%)	115 (100.00%)
	Colony Manager & Farm Boss	19 (55.88%)	15 (44.12%)	34 (100.00%)
	<u>Total</u>	66 (44.29%)	83 (55.71%)	149 (100.00%)

This reversal is not due to a decline in the influence of the preacher in poor colonies since the percentage of preachers' sons who enter the elite varies only slightly with the wealth level of the colony - 37.23% in wealthy colonies, 42.70% in 'middle' colonies, and 40.87% in poor colonies. The reversal is due to an increase in the percentage of sons of colony managers/farm bosses entering the elite in poor colonies. To understand this phenomena it is important to remember that poor colonies are often characterized by social conflict between two kinship factions, one which holds the elite positions and prevents the other faction from doing so. The reason there is greater equality of opportunity within the elite in poor colonies is because those who occupy elite positions are often

members of the same kinship unit. Table 4.16 appears to bear this out.<sup>7</sup>

Table 4.16

Identity and Dissimilarity of Surnames of Elite Members on  
Wealthy, 'Middle' and Poor Colonies.

		<u>Surnames of Elite Members</u>		
		Identical	Dissimilar	Total
<u>Wealth Level</u> <u>Of Colony</u>	Wealthy	5 (38.46%)	8 (61.54%)	13 (100.00%)
	'Middle'	4 (28.57%)	10 (71.43%)	14 (100.00%)
	Poor	9 (69.23%)	4 (30.77%)	13 (100.00%)
		18 (45.00%)	22 (55.00%)	40 (100.00%)

We cannot conclude our discussion of dynasty formation without addressing ourselves to an issue which many would regard as central question. Does the Schmiedeleut federation have a large patronymic group which would roughly correspond to a royal family or an aristocracy? There are twelve major patronymic groups found within the Schmiedeleut colonies, plus a sprinkling of convert families. The twelve patronymic groups are: Decker, Glanzer, Gross, Hofer, Kleinsasser, Mendel, Stahl, Tschetter, Waldner, Wipf, Wollman, and Wurtz. A number of other patronymic groups were present during the history of the Schmiedeleut

federation but have either died out or produced no male offspring. These families' names were: Janzen, Knels, and Walter. These families have been replaced by the families of recent converts: namely, Alexander, Baer, Dorn, Randle, and Susz.

Table 4.17 reveals that some of these patronymic groups have a much greater proportion of elite members than others. This ranges from a low of 6% (Tschetter) to a high of 50% (Decker). It should also be noted that the patronymic groups vary greatly in size. Two of the groups with a very high proportion of elite members constitute over half of the population (Hofer and Waldner). It should also be noted that no member of a convert family has ever held an elite position.

Because of their greater size and opportunities for family support, 63.67% of all elite positions are held by members of the Hofer and Waldner families. However, this large percentage does not necessarily imply that these families are notably dynastic since they would occupy 52.51% of all elite positions purely on the basis of chance. However, some patronymic groups do tend to be more dynastic than others in the sense that they are more likely to hand elite positions down to their male offspring. In Table 4.18 each patronymic group has been rated in terms of the observed tendency to hand elite positions down from father to son. A patronymic group with an index of inequality

Table 4.17

Frequency Distribution of Patronymic Groups in Elite and  
Non-elite Positions.

<u>Patronymic Group</u>	<u>Status Position</u>		
	<u>Elite</u>	<u>Non-elite</u>	<u>Total</u>
Decker	6 (50.00%)	6 (50.00%)	12 (100.00%)
Glanzer	5 (41.67%)	7 (58.33%)	12 (100.00%)
Gross	14 (17.95%)	64 (82.05%)	78 (100.00%)
Hofer	71 (32.42%)	148 (67.58%)	219 (100.00%)
Kleinsasser	15 (26.32%)	42 (73.68%)	57 (100.00%)
Mendel	12 (20.34%)	47 (79.66%)	59 (100.00%)
Stahl	6 (12.24%)	43 (87.26%)	49 (100.00%)
Tschetter	1 ( 5.88%)	16 (94.12%)	17 (100.00%)
Waldner	106 (36.17%)	187 (63.83%)	293 (100.00%)
Wipf	19 (27.14%)	51 (72.86%)	70 (100.00%)
Wollman	15 (21.74%)	54 (78.28%)	69 (100.00%)
Wurtz	8 (26.67%)	22 (73.33%)	30 (100.00%)
Converts	0 (00.00%)	10 (100.00%)	10 (100.00%)
<u>Total</u>	278 (28.51%)	697 (71.49%)	975 (100.00%)

of 2.00 is a family in which an elite son has twice the probability of obtaining an elite position than a non-elite son.

Table 4.18

Dynastic Tendencies in Patronymic Groups

By Percentage in Poor Colonies

<u>Patronymic Group</u>	<u>Index of Inequality</u>	<u>% in Poor Colonies</u>
Decker	0.40	00.00%
Glanzer	0.75	00.00%
Gross	3.07	36.50%
Hofer	1.45	27.12%
Kleinsasser	2.03	25.00%
Mendel	1.39	31.15%
Stahl	0.78	16.66%
Tschetter	0.00	16.66%
Waldner	2.84	29.43%
Wipf	1.36	30.00%
Wollman	1.67	38.71%
Wurtz	1.50	44.82%

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$$r^2 = .6815$$

It was found that the larger the proportion of a patronymic group living on poor colonies, the greater the probability that the group will be dynastic ( $r^2=.6815$ ). This suggests that patronymic groups are dynastic only when they happen to be located on a poor colony. Therefore, we must conclude that there is no large patronymic group which dominates the entire leut, rather there are localized dynastic families which dominate primarily in poor colonies.<sup>8</sup>

Therefore we must conclude that kinship ties constitute a latent political force which can become manifest under certain conditions. Where there is an insufficient supply of occupational positions as is prevalent in poor colonies, kinship ties begin to play a large role in the allocation of men to positions.

### Conclusions

We have noted in Chapter III that the overall degree of inequality of opportunity found in the Schmiedeleut population was very slight. Nevertheless, this moderate degree of inequality was not evenly distributed among all of the colonies in the leut; to the contrary, some colonies were found to be highly dynastic while others were very equalitarian. In general, when colonies of differing levels of wealth were compared, the degree of dynasty formation was found to vary inversely with wealth level.

The Marxian notion that elite and non-elite positions become equally attractive when the means of production is held in common and when economic rewards cannot be differentially allocated to the occupants of positions, no doubt accounts for the surprising degree of equality found in the 'average' Hutterite colony. However, this view utterly fails to explain the presence of dynasties which can be found on a minority of colonies. The Marxian theory fails in this regard because it ignores the effects of structurally-induced mobility. That is, mobility which derives from the alteration of the opportunity structure wrought by demographic and organizational changes. The Marxian thesis rests on the implicit assumption that if all of the occupational and organizational positions in a social system are equally rewarding then the basis for dynasty formation is removed. In general, this assumption is borne out on colonies with open opportunity structures (the number of positions exceeds the number of men seeking positions). On such colonies, elite positions are not inherently more attractive than non-elite positions. In fact, it could be argued that elite positions may be slightly more unattractive since the incumbent is offered no greater reward for taking the position, but is given greater responsibility. Eaton reported one young Hutterite male as expressing exactly this sentiment.<sup>9</sup>

[They] the elite just got to work harder and worry. I hope they never elect me.

Preference between elite and non-elite positions ceases to be a matter of indifference when the opportunity structure becomes closed (the number of men seeking positions exceeds the number of positions). This demographic change does not generally increase the economic rewards attached to an elite position. Only on colonies which are generally conceded to be corrupt by the Hutterites themselves do elite positions become economically rewarding to the incumbent. The incentive to occupy elite positions when positions are scarce lies elsewhere. Men strive for elite positions on colonies with closed opportunity structures, not because they find the position inherently rewarding, but because they are urged to seek the position by their kinfolk. In such a colony where the mere possession of an occupation is a reward which not all members enjoy, the placing of a relative in an elite position is instrumental in gaining positions for kin members at the expense of non-kin. The kinship unit only becomes active as a political force when there is intra-colony competition for scarce positions.

The emergence of dynasties and the activation of the family as a political force occurs when adverse economic conditions allows population expansion to outdistance organizational



expansion. This outcome is contrary to Marxian predictions, but more importantly it is contrary to Hutterian ideology. Whether the Hutterites will be able to bring reality into conformity with their belief system depends less on their ideological convictions than on their ability to afford the financial costs which equality entails.

### Footnotes

1. One of the major themes running through all Hutterian doctrinal work is that of equality of opportunity and material condition. See, Peter Walpot, True Surrender and Christian Community of Goods (Bromdon: Plough Publishing House, 1957) pp. 320-366, and Peter Rideman, Confessions of Faith (Bungay, Suffolk: Plough Publishing House, 1950) pp. 88-91. It should be noted that the Hutterite's insistence upon equality does not extend to age, sex, and spiritual authority.
2. I do not intend to suggest that the 'dying colony' is pathological in any absolute sense. I simply mean that the 'dying colony' is regarded by the Hutterites as a 'sick' colony.
3. Although such incidents are rare, they are certainly not unknown. According to the Klein-Geschichtsbuch, two brothers, Michael and Fritz Waldner, who held the positions of preacher and colony manager of James Valley colony in Manitoba (a slow growth colony) engaged in these kinds of activities. Their crimes became so blatant that they were finally excommunicated by the leut council.  

"Both came from James Valley colony in South Dakota and both had large families. They were both forced to leave the community after it was discovered that they were forging bills and accounts. They had been selling community property keeping much of the money for themselves and their families and presenting the community with false bills of sale."

A translation of A. J. F. Zieglschmid, ed., Das Klein-Geschichtsbuch der Hutterischen Brüder (Philadelphia: Carl Schurz Memorial Fund, 1947) p. 489.
4. The index of inequality is defined as  

$$\frac{\% \text{ of the elite sons who enter the elite}}{\% \text{ of the non-elite sons who enter the elite}}$$
5. Not all colonies were willing to furnish me with detailed financial records; consequently, I was forced to utilize the assessed value of colony holdings as my main indicator of wealth level. The value of land and buildings was taken from the land assessment rolls and the value of equipment was determined by means of survey. Colony managers were

exceedingly willing to recount the age and make of each separate piece of farm machinery. I was able to get estimates of the retail value of these items from farm implement dealers. Unfortunately, I was unable to include the value of livestock in this measure, because the assessment of value would require the services of an expert.

In several counties in South Dakota, I was furnished with the personal income tax forms which had been filled out by the colony manager. This information was given to me by local municipal government officials even though the release of this information is illegal. Although this sort of information would have given me a more precise measure of corporate wealth, I decided not to use the information because I in no way wanted to encourage possible discriminatory practices directed towards the Hutterites. Although the measure of corporate wealth used in this study might be crude, it is the best that could be obtained under the circumstances.

6. The cutting point between colonies which are slow to fission and those who do so rapidly is 14.42 years. Colonies in which the assessed value of colony holdings ranged between \$00.00 and \$900.00 per person were considered poor colonies. 'Middle' colonies ranged between \$900.01 and \$1500.00 per person, and wealthy colonies ranged above \$1500.01. The mean per capita assessed value of colony holdings for the 40 colonies surveyed was \$1393.72. The means for wealthy, middle, and poor colonies was \$2208.14, \$1221.27, and \$689.25 respectively.
7. A note of caution is necessary when interpreting Table 4.16. An identity of surnames between the preacher and colony manager and farm boss does not necessarily mean that they are closely related; however, this will usually be the case.
8. The surnames of the Schmiedeleut 'Bishops' provide further evidence that there is no ruling patronymic group which dominates the entire federation. These surnames are: Waldner (2), Gross, Kleinsasser, and Hofer.
9. Joseph W. Eaton, Exploring Tomorrow's Agriculture (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1943) p. 226.

## Chapter V

### Conclusions and Implications For Further Research

The researcher who tests a set of hypotheses which have been derived from a theoretical model and finds that the results have falsified this model places himself in an uncomfortable position. Although, according to scientific canons the falsification of a theory is equal in importance to the verification of a theory, the academic community seldom finds the former as satisfying as the latter. The reader feels cheated because an alternative theory which would adequately explain the phenomena in question has not been provided. In order to right this imbalance, I propose to suggest the rough outlines of an alternative theoretical model which does adequately account for my research findings and which could provide the basis for future research in this area. I am not claiming that I have been able to fully test this theory. Such a test would require the collection of information different from the data which was needed to test the hypotheses set out in chapter 1. I do, however, claim that my findings are consistent with the theory which follows.

Two competing theoretical models were presented and compared with respect to their relative power to predict social and political mobility patterns within Hutterite colonies. The first model (the Marxian thesis) claims that inequality of

political opportunity is a function of inequalities in the control over and access to the means of production. This theory asserts that a society in which the means of production is held in common (a communistic society) will also be a society in which the political position held by an individual will be determined independently of family origin. The second model (the Machiavellian thesis) claims that economic factors are not solely responsible for inequalities in political opportunity. Rather in a society which is structured such that individuals enjoy differing degrees of decision-making power, the offspring of the most powerful will have greater political opportunities than the offspring of the less powerful. Since Hutterian society holds the means of production in common and is characterized by a well defined political hierarchy, it seemed to serve as an excellent case study for the testing of these two competing theories.

Both of these theories, however, failed to receive empirical support in a number of critical areas. Some Hutterite colonies displayed complete equality of political opportunity, whereas others were characterized by the formation of political dynasties which had monopolized all effective political power for generations. This occurred despite the fact that all Hutterite colonies are virtually identical with respect to ownership patterns and the structure of their political hierarchies.<sup>1</sup>

This discovery led the researcher to look for salient characteristics which would distinguish equalitarian colonies from dynastic colonies. Upon analysis, three factors emerged which further differentiated these two types of colonies. These factors were the wealth level of the colony, the rate of organizational expansion of the colony, and the defection rate of the colony. In general, equalitarian colonies were found to be wealthier, more rapidly expanding, and less prone to defections than dynastic colonies. The discovery of these relationships did not in itself constitute a theory which went beyond the peculiarities of the Hutterian social structure, but it did suggest such a theory.

The theory which is suggested by the findings of this research project is a variant of an approach taken by labour economists. In their analyses of labour markets, they begin with the basic premise that the productive potential of an economy is a function of its resources - labour, capital, natural resources, and the state of technology. Any dramatic change in these resources, whether it be brought on by environmental, economic, political, social or demographic factors, will have an impact upon the state of the labour market. Of particular interest to labour economists are shifts in these resources which lead to what is called 'structural unemployment'. Structural unemployment occurs when a

shift in resources creates a situation in which the supply of labour exceeds the demand.<sup>2</sup> This could occur; for example, if the natural resource base upon which an industry relied was suddenly depleted, if there was a sudden increase in the amount of labour as a consequence of immigration, or if technological innovations were introduced which automated tasks previously performed by labour.

Similarly, a similar set of structural conditions can cause widespread 'underemployment', whereby for reasons beyond their personal control, individuals are forced to perform tasks which under utilize their actual or potential skills. Hutterite colonies do not have unemployed members, but under certain labour market conditions they can have a number of underemployed members. These are the members who constitute what in previous chapters has been referred to as 'the general labour force'. The members of the general labour force occupy a status intermediate between that of school children on the one hand and bone fide adult male position holders (both departmental and decision-making positions) on the other. Although all male Hutterites pass through this transition state, the duration of the stay can become prolonged on colonies in which the resource base is not sufficient to enable organizational expansion to keep pace with an ever increasing supply of manpower.

Not only do Hutterite males prefer departmental positions to remaining in the general labour force, but they also hold an expectation that this change of status will occur as a matter of course. To a Hutterite male, productive work which serves the interests of the community is a religious duty. The more important his position is to the community, the more spiritually worthy the individual. Males who lack a desire to aspire to departmental positions are frequently accused of being 'lazy' or lacking in concern for the welfare of the community. So strong is the stigma attached to remaining in the general labour force when one has become an adult, that a great loss of self-esteem occurs when a slow rate of colony expansion prevents upward mobility.

Bernard Levenson<sup>3</sup> in his discussion of the responses to blocked upward mobility in a hierarchical organization, notes that aspirants who find the channels of mobility obstructed frequently come to terms with the situation by withdrawing from the organization. The greater frequency of defection in slowly expanding Hutterite colonies than in rapidly expanding ones, supports Levenson's contention. Withdrawal, however, does not exhaust all of the possible responses to blocked mobility. An alternative response, which in Hutterite colonies has more far ranging social consequences, is the mobilization of a supportive group in order to influence the process of selection.



Labour economists have drawn our attention to a pattern which tends to develop in labour markets in which the supply of labour is greater than the demand. The burden of unemployment and underemployment typically falls on certain categories of individuals more heavily than others, despite comparable qualifications in terms of skill and education. They have observed that under the condition of labour surplus, the relevance of such ascriptive categories as sex, social class, racial, and ethnic group status increases.<sup>4</sup> This pattern has not gone unnoticed by sociologists. Scott Greer, in a study of Negro-white labour relations,<sup>5</sup> concluded that the most important factor which determined the extent to which Negroes and other minorities were employed and upwardly mobile was the condition of the labour market. Only during periods when there was a high demand for labour did minority groups make substantial gains in the work place.

Hubert Blalock, Jr. has expanded this theme in his theory of minority-group relations. He expresses it in the form of a theoretical proposition, which states:

The bargaining position of minority labour will be enhanced in times of labour shortage (and correspondingly diminished during a labour surplus) because . . . minority competition will be less threatening to dominant-group labour, thereby lessening the influence of 'nonutilitarian' preference; and the less selective employers will be in hiring and upgrading, and less will be the

probability of their using 'particularistic' criteria (e.g., based on race) in selecting from a large pool of equally qualified workers.<sup>6</sup>

Although the Hutterites are ethnically and racially homogeneous, classless, and exclude women from the defined set of occupational roles; they do have one important group in which membership is based upon ascription: namely, the family. Since individuals can only have one biological 'mother' and 'father', the family presents the colony with a potential source of inequality. The relevance of familial identity and the degree of loyalty to the family as opposed to the degree of loyalty directed towards the colony depends upon situational factors.<sup>7</sup> Of particular significance to this study is the tendency for familial alliances to mobilize in support of aspiring kin in slowly expanding colonies and the lack of such mobilization in rapidly expanding colonies. Under the condition of labour scarcity which occurs in rapidly expanding colonies, the concern of a family for the welfare of aspiring kin does not conflict with the concern felt by other families since all members can obtain the positions to which they aspire. Under the condition of labour surplus, however, not all candidates for positions can be successful; thus, not all families will find the aspirations of kin members satisfied. This situation is conducive to inter-familial rivalry and the formation of coalitions between particular families<sup>8</sup> in an

attempt to effect the selection of an aspiring kin member.

It is my impression that aspirants rely upon two main resources with which to effect a mobilization of familial ties. Firstly, he can attempt to evoke the sympathy of close kin for his plight and encourage the emergence of nascent kin group loyalties. Secondly, and I suspect more importantly, the aspirant can threaten to defect from the colony.<sup>9</sup> As mentioned in Chapter II, families with a high defection rate are given the pejorative label 'weak families'. Since a defection is viewed as revealing a grave failing on the part of the family, the threat of defection on the part of a family member is in effect a threat of ruining the reputation of a family. In order to protect their collective reputations, family members will frequently unite in support of aspiring kin. Since all positions in the Hutterite occupational system are elective (with the exception of preacher which is a partially elective position), a family usually finds it necessary to coalesce with one or more other families in order to gain sufficient voting strength in the assembly. Although these coalitions are difficult to observe and are the result of complex bargaining strategies, they appear to form along extended kinship lines. Thus, in slowly expanding colonies voting blocks typically include male relatives; whereas in rapidly expanding colonies voting blocks, if they

exist, tend to be generational. In slowly expanding colonies, the largest faction has a clear cut advantage over competing factions in gaining the promotion of a 'favourite son'.

Although the decision to create a vacancy and to select someone from the general labour force to fill the vacancy is the result of a democratic vote of all members of the assembly, it should not be supposed that the power to influence the outcome of the vote is shared equally by all assemblymen. The power of the council of elders or decision-making elite does not rest entirely with their voting strength. By virtue of their positions in the Hutterite authority structure they are able to levy sanctions on the members of recalcitrant minority blocks. A unified elite can, for example, redistribute fewer goods and services to the families of minority block members, threaten to impose religious sanctions on them, and can redirect capital and manpower away from departments held by these members. In a more positive way, the ruling faction can tacitly promise a minority faction control over a future daughter colony in return for support in the present. These sanctions have the effect of either suppressing familial loyalty among the members of minority factions, or retarding the development of coalitions between minority factions, or placing family loyalty in conflict with other loyalties, such as commitment to a department and to the religious belief

system. I would hypothesize that these sanctions see their greatest usage in slowly expanding colonies in which the majority block is not of sufficient size to outvote a coalition of minority blocks. In colonies in which the majority block is larger than the combined opposition, none of these sanctions need be used since the majority faction can simply outvote the others in the assembly.

In any case, it is imperative that the majority factions in slowly expanding colonies secure and retain possession of elite positions, if they wish to guarantee junior family members a future position in the occupational structure. In rapidly expanding colonies, on the other hand, the future careers of junior kin is not dependent upon the power exerted by elite kin since the open opportunity structure which characterizes these colonies is capable of absorbing all candidates regardless of family status. In addition, since elite positions are not generally more rewarding to the incumbent than ordinary departmental positions,<sup>10</sup> very little incentive is provided with which to motivate colony members to aspire to elite positions. Succession to elite positions in these colonies may take the form of a 'negative queue' or it may devolve to highly committed members who are prepared to perform a higher form of service for the colony without any expectation of receiving additional rewards.

Although many of the connections in the causal chain described above require more systematic analysis, this study has demonstrated that the mode of leadership succession in Hutterite colonies is determined by labour market conditions. In colonies with a labour surplus, succession tends to be based upon the principle of ascriptive familial status; and in colonies with a labour shortage, succession to elite positions occurs independently of family status. Since the Machiavellian theory posited in chapter I predicted the former outcome would occur on all colonies and the Marxian theory predicted that the latter outcome would be general, it appears that both theories only apply under specific labour market conditions. The Machiavellian theory applies only under a condition in which there is competition for scarce positions and the Marxian theory only operates under the condition that there is a surplus of positions. This strongly suggests that the Machiavellian and Marxian theories may not be as antithetical as first supposed, since they can both be subsumed under a more general theory. Whether this theory is unique to Hutterian society or has wider applicability; is a question which can only be answered when the results of comparative studies of elite succession in other communistic societies are available.

### Footnotes

1. Based on his prior experience with the Hutterites, the researcher anticipated that the Marxian view would receive support while the Machiavellian view would not. This expectation was formed from observations made on one colony and from the ethnographic literature in the field. Comparative analysis of many colonies revealed that the patterns observed on one colony could not be generalized to the entire population of colonies. The outcome of this research not only points to the utility of comparative research, but casts doubt upon the generality of previous ethnographic studies on the Hutterites, since many are based on an extremely small number of colonies.
2. See, Sar A. Levitan, Garth L. Mangum and Ray Marshall, Human Resources and Labour Markets (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) pp. 34-36.
3. Bernard Levenson, "Bureaucratic Succession" in Complex Organizations, ed. by A. Etzioni (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962) pp. 362-75.
4. See, for example, Gary Becker, The Economics of Discrimination, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957).
5. Scott Greer, Last Man In (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).
6. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations (New York: Capricorn Books, 1970) p. 212.
7. For an excellent case study in which ethnic identity is mobilized in response to perceived gain, see, Leonard Plotnicov, "Situational Ethnicity in Jos, Nigeria", in Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, ed. by Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1971) pp. 606-25.
8. These observations are not based on systematically collected data, but are rather impressions gained during the course of field work.
9. It might be hypothesized that the 'temporary' defection is in fact a bargaining strategy. It should be noted in this regard that temporary defectors do not cease to be candidates for positions by virtue of their defection, to the contrary a temporary defection may help to secure a position

by helping to crystalize family alliances. It is my impression that temporary defectors do not lose status when they defect, but typically return just prior to their promotion.

10. Yuchtman reports a similar finding in the Kibbutz movement. See, Ephraim Yuchtman, "Reward Distribution and Work-Role Attractiveness in the Kibbutz - Reflections on Equity Theory", American Sociological Review, XXXVII (Oct., 1972), pp. 581-95. Yuchtman's study reveals that in the Kibbutz both workers and managers perceive the rewards offered to the incumbents of decision-making positions to be greater than those offered to workers. Yet at the same time managers tend to be less attracted to their jobs than workers. Yuchtman reasons that this occurs because managers feel that the additional rewards do not compensate for the additional effort which a manager must expend:



Appendix AThe Organization of the Genealogical Record

Kinship diagrams were found to be a much too cumbersome method of representing the complex kinship structure of the Schmiedeleut population. The system which was used took the form of an indexed file in which kinship relationships were represented by numerical code. Each card, in addition to carrying information pertaining to one nuclear family such as names, occupations, birth dates, and death dates of the husband, wife, and children; also carried a numerical code which enables the researcher to quickly locate the cards containing information pertaining to ancestors, descendants, and collaterals. This numbering system enables the researcher to

- a) Identify individuals and thereby distinguish them from other individuals. This was clearly necessary because Hutterite names did not serve that purpose.
- b) Locate individuals geographically with respect to their colony of origin and colony of residence.
- c) Locate individuals within a kinship network.

The procedure:

- (i) All colonies were assigned a number.  
e.g. Blumengard Colony received the number 057.
- (ii) All nuclear families within a colony received a unique number. e.g. George

Wurtz and his wife Anna Wurtz and their children on Blumengard Colony received the number 057.07. This numbering system was not entirely arbitrary. The digits .01 were reserved for the preacher's family and subsequent numbers (.02, .03, etc.) refer to the families of the preacher's sons who live on the same colony.

After this the colony manager's family and his sons' families receive numbers in that order.

- (iii) In order to identify individuals as opposed to nuclear families, I made use of the above numbering system in the following manner. Each individual received two identification numbers: a family of orientation number and a family of procreation number. Thus the following two numbers serve to identify George Wurtz: Family of Procreation Number - 057.07; Family of Orientation Number - 065.01. The family of procreation refers to the family which ego

forms by marriage. It includes his wife and children. The family of orientation refers to the family in which ego is born and reared. It includes his parents and siblings.

The utility of this system is that it enables the researcher to efficiently sort out individuals according to the following characteristics.

- 1) Colony of Residence. All individuals with the same first 3 digits in their family of procreation number are residents of the same colony. It also includes all former residents who died as members of the colony. For example, all individuals with the digits 057 as the first three digits of their family of procreation number are members or died as members of Blumengard colony.
- 2) Colony of Origin. All individuals with the same first three digits of their family of orientation number have parents who are members or died as members of the same colony. For example, all individuals with the digits 065 as the first three numbers of their family of orientation number have parents who are or died as members of Milltown Colony.
- 3) Affinal Ties. All individuals with the same family of procreation number are married to one another. For example,

both George Wurtz and his wife Anna are the only two individuals with the family of procreation number 057.07.

- 4) Siblings. All individuals with the same family of orientation number are siblings. For example, only the offspring of George and Anna Wurtz have the family of orientation number 057.07.
- 5) Parent-Offspring Relationship. All individuals whose family of procreation number is the same as the family of orientation number of another set of individuals are parents of the later. For example, 057.07 is the family of procreation number of George and Anna Wurtz and the family of orientation number of their children.
- 6) Marital Status. All individuals who lack a family of procreation number are unmarried.
- 7) Founding Families. All individuals who lack a family of orientation number are first generation immigrants or converts. These are individuals whose parents never lived on a North American Hutterite Colony.

In Figure A. 1, the general format of a genealogy of one nuclear family is given. Figure A. 2 is an example of an actual genealogy of one nuclear family.

Figure A.1

Format of Genealogy

Ego's Name		Ego's Occupation	Ego Wife's Maiden Name	Ego's Family of Procreation Number		
Ego's Birth Date	Ego's Date of Death	Ego's Family of Orienta- tion Number	Ego's Wife's Birth Date	Ego's Wife's Date of Death	Ego's Wife's Family of Orientation Number	
Ego's Children's Names	Ego's Children's Occupations	Ego's Children's Birth Date	Ego's Children's Date of Death	Names of Ego's Sons and Daughters- in-law	Family of Orientation Number of Sons and Daughters- in-law	Children's Family of Procreation Number

Figure A. 2

Sample Genealogy

John Mendel		Gardener	Mary Waldner		57.08	
1902	-	401.28	1905	-	400.99	
Michael	Carpenter	1931	-	Sarah Hofer	401.29	57.09
David	Cobbler	1933	-	Sarah Stahl	156.10	57.11
Mary		1935	-	Jacob Waldner	152.06	152.07
Jacob	Mechanic	1936	-	Anna Stahl	156.10	57.10
Rebecca		1938	-	Ben Waldner	73.11	73.20
Paul	Chicken Man	1940	-	Susan Waldner	156.06	57.24
Susan		1941	-	unmarried		
Sarah		1945	-	Andreas Waldner	73.11	73.26

Appendix BCODER'S MANUAL

## CARD I

Col. 1,2,3,4,5.

Ego's Identification Number. (i.e. 05604 or 17307). I.D. Number is found on the top right hand corner of genealogical cards.

In the case of those who do not possess a genealogical card, their I.D. number can be found in the column entitled 'Children's I.D. numbers'.

Col. 6,7,8.

Ego's Birth Date. If 1918 put 918, and if 1853 put 853. Ego's birth date can be found under ego's name on ego's genealogical card or in column entitled 'children's birth date' on father's genealogical card.

Col. 9,10,11.

Birth date of ego's wife. Same procedure as with ego's birth date. Found under wife's name on ego's genealogical card, or in the column entitled 'children's birth date' on the wife's father's genealogical card.

(This involves locating the wife's father's genealogical card; this can be done by locating the wife's father's I.D. number in the

column entitled 'children's spouses father's I.D. number'.

- Col. 12,13,14. Colony of Residence. Typically this merely involves recording the first three digits of ego's I.D. number. (i.e. 061 or 171). This cannot be done for the ancestral genealogical cards (those beginning with the digits 200, 400, and 401).
- Col. 15,16,17. Colony of Origin. (Please leave these columns blank for the present).
- Col. 18,19,20. Colony of Origin of Wife. (Please leave these columns blank for the present).
- Col. 21,22. Number of brothers. Count the number of married male offspring on ego's father's genealogical card. If there are six record 06.
- Col. 23,24. Ego's birth order among married brothers. If he was born first record 01.
- Col. 25,26. Number of living children in ego's nuclear family. Count the number of ego's children; they can be found on ego's genealogical card. See column entitled 'children's names').
- Col. 27,28. Number of married daughters.
- Col. 29,30. Number of married sons.



- Col. 31,32. Number of unmarried offspring. (Ask me for specifics here).
- Col. 33,34. Number of offspring who left colony. This is indicated on ego's genealogical card by the word 'left'.
- Col. 35,36. Ego's Occupation. This is denoted on the genealogical card by means of alphabetical symbols. This can be located at the top left-hand corner of ego's genealogical card or in the column entitled 'children's occupations' on ego's father's genealogical card.
- Occupations are to be coded in the following way.
- P (Preacher) - 01
  - AP (Assistant Preacher) - 02
  - B (Farm Manager) - 03
  - F (Foreman) - 04
  - GT (German Teacher) - 05
  - C (Cattle Boss) - 06
  - S (Sheep Boss and/or Pig Boss) - 07
  - H (Poultry Boss) - 08
  - M (Mechanic or Blacksmith) - 09
  - W (Carpenter) - 10

K (Cobbler and/or Bookbinder) - 11

G (Gardener) - 12

No Known Occupation - 00

- Col. 37,38 Ego's father's occupation. Found on Ego's father's genealogical card.
- Col. 39,40. Ego's wife's father's occupation.
- Col. 41,42. Ego's father's father's occupation.
- Col. 43,44. Ego's mother's father's occupation.
- Col. 45,46. Ego's wife's father's father's occupation.
- Col. 47,48. Ego's wife's mother's father's occupation.
- Col. 49,50. Ego's father's father's father's occupation.
- Col. 51,52. Ego's father's mother's father's occupation.
- Col. 53,54. Ego's father's father's father's father's occupation.
- Col. 55. Number of Preacher's and Assistant Preacher's among ego's sons, Information on ego's genealogical card or on ego's son's genealogical card. (P) & (AP)
- Col. 56. Number of farm managers.(B) among ego's sons.
- Col. 57. Number of foreman (F) among ego's sons.
- Col. 58. Number of German Teachers (GT) among ego's sons.
- Col. 59. Number of Cattle Bosses (C) among ego's sons.

- Col. 60. Number of Sheep Bosses and Pig Bosses (S) among ego's sons.
- Col. 61. Number of Poultry Bosses (H) among ego's sons.
- Col. 62. Number of Mechanics (M) among ego's sons.
- Col. 63. Number of Carpenters (W) among ego's sons.
- Col. 64. Number of Cobblers (K) among ego's sons.
- Col. 65. Number of Gardeners (G) among ego's sons.
- Col. 66. Number of Preachers and Assistant Preachers (P&AP) among ego's sons-in-law.
- Col. 67. Number of Farm Managers (B) among ego's sons-in-law.
- Col. 68. Number of Foreman (F) among ego's sons-in-law.
- Col. 69. Number of German Teachers (GT) among ego's sons-in-law.
- Col. 70. Number of Cattle Bosses (C) among ego's sons-in-law.
- Col. 71. Number of Sheep Bosses (S) among ego's sons-in-law.
- Col. 72. Number of Poultry Bosses (H) among ego's sons-in-law.
- Col. 73. Number of Mechanics (M) among ego's sons-in-law.

- Col. 74. Number of Carpenters (W) among ego's sons-in-law.
- Col. 75. Number of Cobblers (K) among ego's sons-in-law.
- Col. 76. Number of Gardeners (G) among ego's sons-in-law.
- Col. 77,78,79,80. Computer Card Number. Begin at 0001 and proceed up to 9999.

CODER'S MANUAL - CARD #2.

Col. 1,2,3,4,5. Ego's Identification Number.

Col. 6,7. Ego's Surname.

<u>Surname</u>	<u>Code Number</u>
Decker	01
Glanzer	02
Gross	03
Hofer	04
Janzen	05
Kleinsasser	06
Knels	07
Mendel	08
Stahl	09
Tschetter	10
Waldner	11

	<u>Surname</u>	<u>Code Number</u>
	Wipf	12
	Wollman	13
	Walter	14
	Wurtz	15
	other	16
Col. 8,9.	Ego's wife's surname.	
Col. 10.	Number of Decker's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 11.	Number of Glanzer's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 12.	Number of Gross's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 13.	Number of Hofer's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 14.	Number of Janzen's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 15.	Number of Kleinsasser's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 16.	Number of Knels's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 17.	Number of Mendel's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 18.	Number of Stahl's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 19.	Number of Tschetter's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 20.	Number of Waldner's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 21.	Number of Wipf's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 22.	Number of Wollman's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 23.	Number of Walter's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 24.	Number of Wurtz's among daughters-in-law.	
Col. 25.	Number of other's among daughters-in-law.	

Col. 26.	Number of Deckers among sons-in-law.
Col. 27.	Number of Glanzers among sons-in-law.
Col. 28.	Number of Grosses among sons-in-law.
Col. 29.	Number of Hofers among sons-in-law.
Col. 30.	Number of Janzens among sons-in-law.
Col. 31.	Number of Kleinsassers among sons-in-law.
Col. 32.	Number of Knelses among sons-in-law.
Col. 33.	Number of Mendels among sons-in-law.
Col. 34.	Number of Stahls among sons-in-law.
Col. 35.	Number of Tschetters among sons-in-law.
Col. 36.	Number of Waldners among sons-in-law.
Col. 37.	Number of Wipfs among sons-in-law.
Col. 38.	Number of Wollmans among sons-in-law.
Col. 39.	Number of Walters among sons-in-law.
Col. 40.	Number of Wurtzs among sons-in-law.
Col. 41.	Number of others among sons-in-law.
Col. 42.	Number of sons who remain within colony after marriage.
Col. 43.	Number of sons who remain clan after marriage.
Col. 44.	Number of sons who live outside of clan.
Col. 45.	Number of daughters who remain within colony after marriage.

Col. 46. Number of daughters who remain within clan after marriage.

Col. 47. Number of daughters who live outside of clan.

Col. 48. Amount of acreage in ego's colony of residence.

Acreage	Code Number
0-1500	1
1501-2000	2
2001-2500	3
2501-3000	4
3001-3500	5
3501-4000	6
4001-4500	7
4501-5000	8
5001 or over	9
Not known	0

Col. 49. Assessed land value of ego's colony of residence.

<u>Value</u>	<u>Code Number</u>
\$ .00-\$ 50,000.00	1
\$ 50,000.01-\$ 70,000.00	2
\$ 70,000.01-\$ 90,000.00	3
\$ 90,000.01-\$110,000.00	4

\$110,000.01-\$130,000.00	5
\$130,000.01-\$150,000.00	6
\$150,000.01-\$170,000.00	7
\$170,000.01-\$190,000.00	8
over \$190,000.01	9
Not known	0

Col. 50. Mean assessed value per acre of ego's colony of residence.

<u>Mean value</u>	<u>Code Number</u>
\$00.00 - \$10.00	1
\$10.01 - \$15.00	2
\$15.01 - \$20.00	3
\$20.01 - \$25.00	4
\$25.01 - \$30.00	5
\$30.01 - \$35.00	6
\$35.01 - \$40.00	7
\$40.01 - \$45.00	8
Over \$45.01	9
Not known	0

Col. 51. Population of ego's colony of residence.

<u>Population</u>	<u>Code Number</u>
0 - 60	1
60 - 70	2
71 - 80	3
81 - 90	4



<u>Population</u>	<u>Code Number</u>
91 - 100	5
101 - 110	6
111 - 120	7
121 - 130	8
131 or over	9
Not known	0

Col. 52.

Clan of residence.

<u>Clan</u>	<u>Code Number</u>
A	1
B	2
C	3
D	4
E	5
F	6

Col. 53.

Sub-clan of residence.

Col. 54.

Population density of ego's colony of  
residence.

<u>Persons per square mile</u>	<u>Code Number</u>
0 - 10	1
11 - 15	2
16 - 20	3
21 - 25	4
26 - 30	5

<u>Persons per square mile</u>	<u>Code Number</u>
31 - 35	6
36 - 40	7
41 - 45	8
over 45	9
Not known	0

Col. 55.

Per Capita land value of ego's colony of residence.

<u>Per Capita Land Value</u>	<u>Code Number</u>
\$ 00.00 - \$ 500.00	1
\$ 500.01 - \$ 700.00	2
\$ 700.01 - \$ 900.00	3
\$ 900.01 - \$1100.00	4
\$1100.01 - \$1300.00	5
\$1300.01 - \$1500.00	6
\$1500.01 - \$1700.00	7
\$1700.01 - \$1900.00	8
over \$1900.00	9
Not known	0

Appendix CTable C. 1Mobility From Father's Occupation For 974 MaleOccupation Holders: Absolute Frequencies.

<u>Fa's</u> <u>Occ.</u>	<u>Son's Occupation</u>												<u>Row</u> <u>Total</u>
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	
1.	47	23	30	25	21	32	28	33	18	11	12	20	300
2.	0	0	0	2	0	2	3	4	1	3	0	0	15
3.	22	6	13	11	8	14	13	14	11	11	4	3	130
4.	5	1	3	0	3	10	6	7	4	3	3	0	45
5.	14	1	8	0	0	1	8	9	3	5	3	8	60
6.	6	1	3	1	2	18	10	9	14	9	1	2	76
7.	6	6	4	3	2	13	17	8	8	7	13	8	95
8.	4	2	5	6	3	9	9	23	7	7	1	6	82
9.	3	2	0	0	0	2	8	14	16	7	2	2	56
10.	1	1	3	1	0	1	8	7	10	4	1	5	42
11.	2	1	0	2	5	5	5	11	9	2	1	0	43
12.	1	0	2	1	3	2	3	4	5	5	1	3	30

Col.

Total	111	44	71	52	47	109	118	143	106	74	42	57	974
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(1 = preacher, 2 = assistant preacher, 3 = colony manager, 4 = farm boss, 5 = German teacher, 6 = cattel man, 7 = hog man and sheep man, 8 = poultry man, 9 = mechanic, 10 = carpenter, 11 = shoemaker and bookbinder, 12 = gardener)

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